Mercurial > hg > Aquinas
changeset 125:183bfdf5ca5c
catch up through FS_vi A108
| author | ht |
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| date | Sat, 10 Sep 2022 10:03:58 +0000 |
| parents | c4381ecdd053 |
| children | a23602c8183d |
| files | summa/bilingual/FS_iv.html summa/bilingual/FS_v.html summa/bilingual/FS_vi.html summa/bilingual/FS_vi.pdf |
| diffstat | 4 files changed, 41256 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) [+] |
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--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/summa/bilingual/FS_iv.html Sat Sep 10 10:03:58 2022 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,3037 @@ + + <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:x="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + <head> + <title>Bilingual Aquinas</title> + <style> + h2, h3, h4 {margin-bottom: 0px; clear: both} + .bilingual {clear: both; margin-top: .5em} + div.eng {width: 45%; float: left} + div.lat {width: 45%; float: right} + @page { size: A4 portrait; margin: 1cm; + orphans: 2; widows: 2; + } + @media print {div.div3 {page-break-before: always}} + </style> + </head> + <body style="font-family: Bitstream Vera Serif"><div id="FS.iv" class="div2"> + + + <h2 id="FS.iv-p0.1">TREATISE ON HABITS (QQ[49]-54)</h2><div class="toc"><a href="#FS_Q49">Q. 49. OF HABITS IN GENERAL, AS TO THEIR SUBSTANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q50">Q. 50. OF THE SUBJECT OF HABITS (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q51">Q. 51. OF THE CAUSE OF HABITS, AS TO THEIR FORMATION (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q52">Q. 52. OF THE INCREASE OF HABITS (THREE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q53">Q. 53. HOW HABITS ARE CORRUPTED OR DIMINISHED (THREE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q54">Q. 54. OF THE DISTINCTION OF HABITS (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/></div> + <div id="FS_Q49" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q49-p0.1">Q. 49. OF HABITS IN GENERAL, AS TO THEIR SUBSTANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q49-p2"> After treating of human acts and passions, we now pass on to the consideration of the principles of human acts, and firstly + of intrinsic principles, secondly of extrinsic principles. The intrinsic principle is power and habit; but as we have treated + of powers in the FP, Q[77], seqq., it remains for us to consider them in general: in the second place we shall consider virtues + and vices and other like habits, which are the principles of human acts. + </p><p id="FS_Q49-p3"> Concerning habits in general there are four points to consider: First, the substance of habits; second, their subject; third, + the cause of their generation, increase, and corruption; fourth, how they are distinguished from one another. + </p><p id="FS_Q49-p4"> Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q49-p5"><a href="#FS_Q49_A1"> (1) Whether habit is a quality?</a></p><p id="FS_Q49-p6"><a href="#FS_Q49_A2"> (2) Whether it is a distinct species of quality?</a></p><p id="FS_Q49-p7"><a href="#FS_Q49_A3"> (3) Whether habit implies an order to an act?</a></p><p id="FS_Q49-p8"><a href="#FS_Q49_A4"> (4) Of the necessity of habit.</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 pr."><a name="35593" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35593] +Iª-IIae q. 49 pr.</span></a> Post actus et passiones, +considerandum est de principiis humanorum actuum. Et primo, de +principiis intrinsecis; secundo, de principiis extrinsecis. +Principium autem intrinsecum est potentia et habitus; sed quia de +potentiis in prima parte dictum est, nunc restat de habitibus +considerandum. Et primo quidem, in generali; secundo vero, de +virtutibus et vitiis, et aliis huiusmodi habitibus, qui sunt +humanorum actuum principia. Circa ipsos autem habitus in generali, +quatuor consideranda sunt, primo quidem, de ipsa substantia +habituum, secundo, de subiecto eorum; tertio, de causa +generationis, augmenti et corruptionis ipsorum; quarto, de +distinctione ipsorum. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum +habitus sit qualitas. Secundo, utrum sit determinata species +qualitatis. Tertio, utrum habitus importet ordinem ad actum. +Quarto, de necessitate habitus.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q49_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q49_A1-p0.1">Q. 49. A. 1. Whether habit is a quality?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habit is not a quality. For Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 73): "this word 'habit' is derived from the + verb 'to have.'" But "to have" belongs not only to quality, but also to the other categories: for we speak of ourselves as + "having" quantity and money and other like things. Therefore habit is not a quality. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35594" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35594] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus non sit qualitas. Dicit enim +Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod <i>hoc nomen +habitus dictum est ab hoc verbo quod est habere</i>. Sed habere non +solum pertinet ad qualitatem, sed ad alia genera, dicimur enim +habere etiam quantitatem, et pecuniam, et alia huiusmodi. Ergo +habitus non est qualitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habit is reckoned as one of the predicaments; as may be clearly seen in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi). + But one predicament is not contained under another. Therefore habit is not a quality. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35595" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35595] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +habitus ponitur unum praedicamentum; ut patet in libro +praedicamentorum. Sed unum praedicamentum non continetur sub alio. +Ergo habitus non est qualitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "every habit is a disposition," as is stated in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi). Now disposition is "the + order of that which has parts," as stated in Metaph. v, text. 24. But this belongs to the predicament Position. Therefore + habit is not a quality. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35596" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35596] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> +<i>Praeterea, omnis habitus est dispositio</i>, ut dicitur in +praedicamentis. Sed dispositio est ordo habentis partes, ut dicitur +in V Metaphys. Hoc autem pertinet ad praedicamentum situs. Ergo +habitus non est qualitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says in the Book of Predicaments (Categor. vi) that "habit is a quality which is difficult to change." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35597" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35597] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in praedicamentis, quod habitus est +qualitas de difficili mobilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q49_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> This word "habitus" [habit] is derived from "habere" [to have]. Now habit is taken from this word in two ways; in one way, + inasmuch as man, or any other thing, is said to "have" something; in another way, inasmuch as a particular thing has a relation + [se habet] either in regard to itself, or in regard to something else. + </p><p id="FS_Q49_A1-p7"> Concerning the first, we must observe that "to have," as said in regard to anything that is "had," is common to the various + predicaments. And so the Philosopher puts "to have" among the "post-predicaments," so called because they result from the + various predicaments; as, for instance, opposition, priority, posterity, and such like. Now among things which are had, there + seems to be this distinction, that there are some in which there is no medium between the "haver" and that + which is had: as, for instance, there is no medium between the subject and quality or quantity. Then there are some in which + there is a medium, but only a relation: as, for instance, a man is said to have a companion or a friend. And, further, there + are some in which there is a medium, not indeed an action or passion, but something after the manner of action or passion: + thus, for instance, something adorns or covers, and something else is adorned or covered: wherefore the Philosopher says + (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "a habit is said to be, as it were, an action or a passion of the haver and that which is had"; + as is the case in those things which we have about ourselves. And therefore these constitute a special genus of things, which + are comprised under the predicament of "habit": of which the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "there is a habit + between clothing and the man who is clothed." + </p><p id="FS_Q49_A1-p8"> But if "to have" be taken according as a thing has a relation in regard to itself or to something else; in that case habit + is a quality; since this mode of having is in respect of some quality: and of this the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. + 25) that "habit is a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill, and this, either in regard to itself + or in regard to another: thus health is a habit." And in this sense we speak of habit now. Wherefore we must say + that habit is a quality. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 1 co."><a name="35598" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35598] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod hoc nomen habitus ab habendo est sumptum. A quo +quidem nomen habitus dupliciter derivatur, uno quidem modo, +secundum quod homo, vel quaecumque alia res, dicitur aliquid +habere; alio modo, secundum quod aliqua res aliquo modo se habet in +seipsa vel ad aliquid aliud. Circa primum autem, considerandum est +quod habere, secundum quod dicitur respectu cuiuscumque quod +habetur, commune est ad diversa genera. Unde philosophus inter post +praedicamenta habere ponit, quae scilicet diversa rerum genera +consequuntur; sicut sunt opposita, et prius et posterius, et alia +huiusmodi. Sed inter ea quae habentur, talis videtur esse +distinctio, quod quaedam sunt in quibus nihil est medium inter +habens et id quod habetur, sicut inter subiectum et qualitatem vel +quantitatem nihil est medium. Quaedam vero sunt in quibus est +aliquid medium inter utrumque, sed sola relatio, sicut dicitur +aliquis habere socium vel amicum. Quaedam vero sunt inter quae est +aliquid medium, non quidem actio vel passio, sed aliquid per modum +actionis vel passionis, prout scilicet unum est ornans vel tegens, +et aliud ornatum aut tectum, unde philosophus dicit, in V +Metaphys., quod <i>habitus dicitur tanquam actio quaedam habentis +et habiti</i>, sicut est in illis quae circa nos habemus. Et ideo +in his constituitur unum speciale genus rerum, quod dicitur +praedicamentum habitus, de quo dicit philosophus, in V Metaphys., +quod <i>inter habentem indumentum, et indumentum quod habetur, est +habitus medius</i>. Si autem sumatur habere prout res aliqua +dicitur quodam modo se habere in seipsa vel ad aliud; cum iste +modus se habendi sit secundum aliquam qualitatem, hoc modo habitus +quaedam qualitas est, de quo philosophus, in V Metaphys., dicit +quod habitus dicitur dispositio secundum quam bene vel male +disponitur dispositum, et aut secundum se aut ad aliud, ut sanitas +habitus quidam est. Et sic loquimur nunc de habitu. Unde dicendum +est quod habitus est qualitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument takes "to have" in the general sense: for thus it is common to many predicaments, as we have said. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35599" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35599] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de habere communiter +sumpto, sic enim est commune ad multa genera, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument takes habit in the sense in which we understand it to be a medium between the haver, and that which is had: + and in this sense it is a predicament, as we have said. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35600" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35600] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de habitu secundum quod +intelligitur aliquid medium inter habens et id quod habetur, sic +enim est quoddam praedicamentum, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Disposition does always, indeed, imply an order of that which has parts: but this happens in three ways, as the Philosopher + goes on at once to says (Metaph. v, text. 25): namely, "either as to place, or as to power, or as to species." "In saying + this," as Simplicius observes in his Commentary on the Predicaments, "he includes all dispositions: bodily dispositions, when + he says 'as to place,'" and this belongs to the predicament "Position," which is + the order of parts in a place: "when he says 'as to power,' he includes all those dispositions which are in course of formation + and not yet arrived at perfect usefulness," such as inchoate science and virtue: "and when he says, 'as to species,' he includes + perfect dispositions, which are called habits," such as perfected science and virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35601" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35601] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod dispositio quidem semper importat ordinem alicuius +habentis partes, sed hoc contingit tripliciter, ut statim ibidem +philosophus subdit, scilicet aut secundum locum, aut secundum +potentiam, aut secundum speciem. In quo, ut Simplicius dicit in +commento praedicamentorum, comprehendit omnes dispositiones. +Corporales quidem, in eo quod dicit secundum locum, et hoc pertinet +ad praedicamentum situs, qui est ordo partium in loco. Quod autem +dicit secundum potentiam, includit illas dispositiones quae sunt in +praeparatione et idoneitate nondum perfecte, sicut scientia et +virtus inchoata. Quod autem dicit secundum speciem, includit +perfectas dispositiones, quae dicuntur habitus, sicut scientia et +virtus complete.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q49_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q49_A2-p0.1">Q. 49. A. 2. Whether habit is a distinct species of quality?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habit is not a distinct species of quality. Because, as we have said + <a href="#FS_Q49_A1" id="FS_Q49_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, habit, in so far as it is a quality, is "a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill." But this + happens in regard to any quality: for a thing happens to be well or ill disposed in regard also to shape, and in like manner, + in regard to heat and cold, and in regard to all such things. Therefore habit is not a distinct + species of quality. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35602" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35602] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus non sit determinata species +qualitatis. Quia, ut dictum est, habitus, secundum quod est +qualitas, dicitur dispositio secundum quam bene aut male disponitur +dispositum. Sed hoc contingit secundum quamlibet qualitatem, nam et +secundum figuram contingit aliquid bene vel male esse dispositum, +et similiter secundum calorem et frigus, et secundum omnia +huiusmodi. Ergo habitus non est determinata species qualitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi), that heat and cold are dispositions or habits, + just as sickness and health. Therefore habit or disposition is not distinct from the other species of quality. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35603" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35603] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus, in praedicamentis, caliditatem et frigiditatem dicit +esse dispositiones vel habitus, sicut aegritudinem et sanitatem. +Sed calor et frigus sunt in tertia specie qualitatis. Ergo habitus +vel dispositio non distinguuntur ab aliis speciebus qualitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "difficult to change" is not a difference belonging to the predicament of quality, but rather to movement or passion. + Now, no genus should be contracted to a species by a difference of another genus; but "differences should be proper to a genus," + as the Philosopher says in Metaph. vii, text. 42. Therefore, since habit is "a quality difficult to change," it seems not + to be a distinct species of quality. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35604" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35604] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +difficile mobile non est differentia pertinens ad genus qualitatis, +sed magis pertinet ad motum vel passionem. Nullum autem genus +determinatur ad speciem per differentiam alterius generis; sed +oportet differentias per se advenire generi, ut philosophus dicit, +in VII Metaphys. Ergo, cum habitus dicatur esse qualitas difficile +mobilis, videtur quod non sit determinata species qualitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi) that "one species of quality is habit and disposition." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35605" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35605] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in praedicamentis, quod <i>una species +qualitatis est habitus et dispositio</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q49_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The Philosopher in the Book of Predicaments (Categor. vi) reckons disposition and habit as the first species of quality. + Now Simplicius, in his Commentary on the Predicaments, explains the difference of these species as follows. He says "that + some qualities are natural, and are in their subject in virtue of its nature, and are always there: but some are adventitious, + being caused from without, and these can be lost. Now the latter," i.e. those which are + adventitious, "are habits and dispositions, differing in the point of being easily or difficultly lost. As to natural qualities, + some regard a thing in the point of its being in a state of potentiality; and thus we have the second species of quality: + while others regard a thing which is in act; and this either deeply rooted therein or only on its surface. If deeply rooted, + we have the third species of quality: if on the surface, we have the fourth species of quality, as shape, and form which is + the shape of an animated being." But this distinction of the species of quality seems unsuitable. For there are many shapes, + and passion-like qualities, which are not natural but adventitious: and there are also many dispositions which are not adventitious + but natural, as health, beauty, and the like. Moreover, it does not suit the order of the species, since that which is the + more natural is always first. + </p><p id="FS_Q49_A2-p7"> Therefore we must explain otherwise the distinction of dispositions and habits from other qualities. For quality, properly + speaking, implies a certain mode of substance. Now mode, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3), "is that which a measure + determines": wherefore it implies a certain determination according to a certain measure. Therefore, just as that in accordance + with which the material potentiality [potentia materiae] is determined to its substantial being, is called + quality, which is a difference affecting the substance, so that, in accordance with the potentiality of the subject is determined + to its accidental being, is called an accidental quality, which is also a kind of difference, as is clear from the Philosopher + (Metaph. v, text. 19). + </p><p id="FS_Q49_A2-p8"> Now the mode of determination of the subject to accidental being may be taken in regard to the very nature of the subject, + or in regard to action, and passion resulting from its natural principles, which are matter and form; or again in regard to + quantity. If we take the mode or determination of the subject in regard to quantity, we shall then have the fourth species + of quality. And because quantity, considered in itself, is devoid of movement, and does not imply the notion of + good or evil, so it does not concern the fourth species of quality whether a thing be well or ill disposed, nor quickly or + slowly transitory. + </p><p id="FS_Q49_A2-p9"> But the mode of determination of the subject, in regard to action or passion, is considered in the second and third species + of quality. And therefore in both, we take into account whether a thing be done with ease or difficulty; whether it be transitory + or lasting. But in them, we do not consider anything pertaining to the notion of good or evil: because movements and passions + have not the aspect of an end, whereas good and evil are said in respect of an end. + </p><p id="FS_Q49_A2-p10"> On the other hand, the mode or determination of the subject, in regard to the nature of the thing, belongs to the first species + of quality, which is habit and disposition: for the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17), when speaking of habits of the + soul and of the body, that they are "dispositions of the perfect to the best; and by perfect I mean that which is disposed + in accordance with its nature." And since the form itself and the nature of a thing is the end and the cause + why a thing is made (Phys. ii, text. 25), therefore in the first species we consider both evil and good, and also changeableness, + whether easy or difficult; inasmuch as a certain nature is the end of generation and movement. And so the Philosopher (Metaph. + v, text. 25) defines habit, a "disposition whereby someone is disposed, well or ill"; and in Ethic. ii, 4, he says that by + "habits we are directed well or ill in reference to the passions." For when the mode is suitable to the thing's nature, + it has the aspect of good: and when it is unsuitable, it has the aspect of evil. And since nature is the first object of consideration + in anything, for this reason habit is reckoned as the first species of quality. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 2 co."><a name="35606" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35606] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod philosophus, in praedicamentis, ponit inter quatuor +species qualitatis primam, dispositionem et habitum. Quarum quidem +specierum differentias sic assignat Simplicius, in commento +praedicamentorum, dicens quod <i>qualitatum quaedam sunt naturales, +quae secundum naturam insunt, et semper, quaedam autem sunt +adventitiae, quae ab extrinseco efficiuntur, et possunt amitti. Et +haec quidem</i>, quae sunt adventitiae, <i>sunt habitus et +dispositiones, secundum facile et difficile amissibile differentes. +Naturalium autem qualitatum quaedam sunt secundum id quod aliquid +est in potentia, et sic est secunda species qualitatis. Quaedam +vero secundum quod aliquid est in actu, et hoc vel in profundum, +vel secundum superficiem. Si in profundum quidem, sic est tertia +species qualitatis, secundum vero superficiem, est quarta species +qualitatis, sicut figura et forma, quae est figura animati</i>. Sed +ista distinctio specierum qualitatis inconveniens videtur. Sunt +enim multae figurae et qualitates passibiles non naturales, sed +adventitiae, et multae dispositiones non adventitiae, sed +naturales, sicut sanitas et pulchritudo et huiusmodi. Et praeterea +hoc non convenit ordini specierum, semper enim quod naturalius est, +prius est. Et ideo aliter accipienda est distinctio dispositionum +et habituum ab aliis qualitatibus. Proprie enim qualitas importat +quendam modum substantiae. Modus autem est, ut dicit Augustinus, +super Gen. ad litteram, quem mensura praefigit, unde importat +quandam determinationem secundum aliquam mensuram. Et ideo sicut id +secundum quod determinatur potentia materiae secundum esse +substantiale dicitur qualitas quae est differentia substantiae; ita +id secundum quod determinatur potentia subiecti secundum esse +accidentale, dicitur qualitas accidentalis, quae est etiam quaedam +differentia, ut patet per philosophum in V Metaphys. Modus autem +sive determinatio subiecti secundum esse accidentale, potest accipi +vel in ordine ad ipsam naturam subiecti; vel secundum actionem et +passionem quae consequuntur principia naturae, quae sunt materia et +forma; vel secundum quantitatem. Si autem accipiatur modus vel +determinatio subiecti secundum quantitatem, sic est quarta species +qualitatis. Et quia quantitas, secundum sui rationem, est sine +motu, et sine ratione boni et mali; ideo ad quartam speciem +qualitatis non pertinet quod aliquid sit bene vel male, cito vel +tarde transiens. Modus autem sive determinatio subiecti secundum +actionem et passionem, attenditur in secunda et tertia specie +qualitatis. Et ideo in utraque consideratur quod aliquid facile vel +difficile fiat, vel quod sit cito transiens aut diuturnum. Non +autem consideratur in his aliquid pertinens ad rationem boni vel +mali, quia motus et passiones non habent rationem finis, bonum +autem et malum dicitur per respectum ad finem. Sed modus et +determinatio subiecti in ordine ad naturam rei, pertinet ad primam +speciem qualitatis, quae est habitus et dispositio, dicit enim +philosophus, in VII Physic., loquens de habitibus animae et +corporis, quod sunt <i>dispositiones quaedam perfecti ad optimum; +dico autem perfecti, quod est dispositum secundum naturam. Et quia +ipsa forma et natura rei est finis et cuius causa fit aliquid</i>, +ut dicitur in II Physic. ideo in prima specie consideratur et bonum +et malum; et etiam facile et difficile mobile, secundum quod aliqua +natura est finis generationis et motus. Unde in V Metaphys. +philosophus definit habitum, quod est dispositio secundum quam +aliquis disponitur bene vel male. Et in II Ethic. dicit quod +<i>habitus sunt secundum quos ad passiones nos habemus bene vel +male</i>. Quando enim est modus conveniens naturae rei, tunc habet +rationem boni, quando autem non convenit, tunc habet rationem mali. +Et quia natura est id quod primum consideratur in re, ideo habitus +ponitur prima species qualitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Disposition implies a certain order, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). Wherefore a man is not said to be disposed by some quality + except in relation to something else. And if we add "well or ill," which belongs to the essential notion of habit, we must + consider the quality's relation to the nature, which is the end. So in regard to shape, or heat, or cold, a man is not said + to be well or ill disposed, except by reason of a relation to the nature of a + thing, with regard to its suitability or unsuitability. Consequently even shapes and passion-like qualities, in so far as + they are considered to be suitable or unsuitable to the nature of a thing, belong to habits or dispositions: for shape and + color, according to their suitability to the nature of thing, concern beauty; while heat and cold, according to their suitability + to the nature of a thing, concern health. And in this way heat and cold are put, by the Philosopher, in the first species + of + quality. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35607" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35607] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod dispositio ordinem quendam importat, ut dictum +est. Unde non dicitur aliquis disponi per qualitatem, nisi in +ordine ad aliquid. Et si addatur bene vel male, quod pertinet ad +rationem habitus, oportet quod attendatur ordo ad naturam, quae est +finis. Unde secundum figuram, vel secundum calorem vel frigus, non +dicitur aliquis disponi bene vel male, nisi secundum ordinem ad +naturam rei, secundum quod est conveniens vel non conveniens. Unde +et ipsae figurae et passibiles qualitates, secundum quod +considerantur ut convenientes vel non convenientes naturae rei, +pertinent ad habitus vel dispositiones, nam figura, prout convenit +naturae rei, et color, pertinent ad pulchritudinem; calor autem et +frigus, secundum quod conveniunt naturae rei, pertinent ad +sanitatem. Et hoc modo caliditas et frigiditas ponuntur a +philosopho in prima specie qualitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A2-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Wherefore it is clear how to answer the second objection: though some give another solution, as Simplicius says in his Commentary + on the Predicaments. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35608" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35608] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Unde patet +solutio ad secundum. Licet a quibusdam aliter solvatur, ut +Simplicius dicit, in commento praedicamentorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q49_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This difference, "difficult to change," does not distinguish habit from the other species of quality, but from disposition. + Now disposition may be taken in two ways; in one way, as the genus of habit, for disposition is included in the definition + of habit (Metaph. v, text. 25): in another way, according as it is divided against habit. Again, disposition, properly so + called, can be divided against habit in two ways: first, as perfect and imperfect + within the same species; and thus we call it a disposition, retaining the name of the genus, when it is had imperfectly, so + as to be easily lost: whereas we call it a habit, when it is had perfectly, so as not to be lost easily. And thus a disposition + becomes a habit, just as a boy becomes a man. Secondly, they may be distinguished as diverse species of the one subaltern + genus: so that we call dispositions, those qualities of the first species, which by reason of their very nature are easily + lost, because they have changeable causes; e.g. sickness and health: whereas we call habits those qualities which, by reason + of their very nature, are not easily changed, in that they have unchangeable causes, e.g. sciences and virtues. And in this + sense, disposition does not become habit. The latter explanation seems more in keeping with the intention of Aristotle: for + in order to confirm this distinction he adduces the common mode of speaking, according to which, when a quality is, by reason + of its nature, easily changeable, and, through some accident, becomes difficultly changeable, then it is called a habit: while + the contrary happens in regard to qualities, by reason of their nature, difficultly changeable: for supposing a man to have + a science imperfectly, so as to be liable to lose it easily, we say that he is disposed to that science, rather than that + he has the science. From this it is clear that the word "habit" implies a certain lastingness: while the word "disposition" + does not. + </p><p id="FS_Q49_A2-p14"> Nor does it matter that thus to be easy and difficult to change are specific differences (of a quality), although they belong + to passion and movement, and not the genus of quality. For these differences, though apparently accidental to quality, nevertheless + designate differences which are proper and essential to quality. In the same way, in the genus of substance we often take + accidental instead of substantial differences, in so far as by the former, essential principles are + designated. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35609" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35609] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ista differentia, difficile mobile, non diversificat +habitum ab aliis speciebus qualitatis, sed a dispositione. +Dispositio autem dupliciter accipitur, uno modo, secundum quod est +genus habitus, nam in V Metaphys. dispositio ponitur in definitione +habitus; alio modo, secundum quod est aliquid contra habitum +divisum. Et potest intelligi dispositio proprie dicta condividi +contra habitum, dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut perfectum et +imperfectum in eadem specie, ut scilicet dispositio dicatur, +retinens nomen commune, quando imperfecte inest, ita quod de facile +amittitur; habitus autem, quando perfecte inest, ut non de facili +amittatur. Et sic dispositio fit habitus, sicut puer fit vir. Alio +modo possunt distingui sicut diversae species unius generis +subalterni, ut dicantur dispositiones illae qualitates primae +speciei, quibus convenit secundum propriam rationem ut de facili +amittantur, quia habent causas transmutabiles, ut aegritudo et +sanitas; habitus vero dicuntur illae qualitates quae secundum suam +rationem habent quod non de facili transmutentur, quia habent +causas immobiles, sicut scientiae et virtutes. Et secundum hoc +dispositio non fit habitus. Et hoc videtur magis consonum +intentioni Aristotelis. Unde ad huius distinctionis probationem +inducit communem loquendi consuetudinem, secundum quam qualitates +quae secundum rationem suam sunt facile mobiles, si ex aliquo +accidenti difficile mobiles reddantur, habitus dicuntur, et e +converso est de qualitatibus quae secundum suam rationem sunt +difficile mobiles; nam si aliquis imperfecte habeat scientiam, ut +de facili possit ipsam amittere, magis dicitur disponi ad scientiam +quam scientiam habere. Ex quo patet quod nomen habitus +diuturnitatem quandam importat; non autem nomen dispositionis. Nec +impeditur quin secundum hoc facile et difficile mobile sint +specificae differentiae, propter hoc quod ista pertinent ad +passionem et motum, et non ad genus qualitatis. Nam istae +differentiae, quamvis per accidens videantur se habere ad +qualitatem, designant tamen proprias et per se differentias +qualitatum. Sicut etiam in genere substantiae frequenter +accipiuntur differentiae accidentales loco substantialium, +inquantum per eas designantur principia essentialia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q49_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q49_A3-p0.1">Q. 49. A. 3. Whether habit implies order to an act?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habit does not imply order to an act. For everything acts according as it is in act. But the Philosopher + says (De Anima iii, text 8), that "when one is become knowing by habit, one is still in a state of potentiality, but otherwise + than before learning." Therefore habit does not imply the relation of a principle to an act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35610" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35610] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus non importet ordinem ad actum. +Unumquodque enim agit secundum quod est actu. Sed philosophus +dicit, in III de anima, quod <i>cum aliquis fit sciens secundum +habitum, est etiam tunc in potentia, aliter tamen quam ante +addiscere</i>. Ergo habitus non importat habitudinem principii ad +actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is put in the definition of a thing, belongs to it essentially. But to be a principle of action, is put + in the definition of power, as we read in Metaph. v, text. 17. Therefore to be the principle of an act belongs to power essentially. + Now that which is essential is first in every genus. If therefore, habit also is a principle of act, it follows that it is + posterior to power. And so habit and disposition will not be the first species of + quality. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35611" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35611] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +illud quod ponitur in definitione alicuius, per se convenit illi. +Sed esse principium actionis ponitur in definitione potentiae; ut +patet in V Metaphys. Ergo esse principium actus per se convenit +potentiae. Quod autem est per se, est primum in unoquoque genere. +Si ergo etiam habitus sit principium actus, sequitur quod sit +posterior quam potentia. Et sic non erit prima species qualitatis +habitus vel dispositio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, health is sometimes a habit, and so are leanness and beauty. But these do not indicate relation to an act. Therefore + it is not essential to habit to be a principle of act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35612" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35612] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sanitas quandoque est habitus, et similiter macies et pulchritudo. +Sed ista non dicuntur per ordinem ad actum. Non ergo est de ratione +habitus quod sit principium actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that "habit is that whereby something is done when necessary." And the Commentator says + (De Anima iii) that "habit is that whereby we act when we will." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35613" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35613] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de bono coniugali, quod +<i>habitus est quo aliquid agitur cum opus est</i>. Et Commentator +dicit, in III de anima, quod <i>habitus est quo quis agit cum +voluerit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q49_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> To have relation to an act may belong to habit, both in regard to the nature of habit, and in regard to the subject in which + the habit is. In regard to the nature of habit, it belongs to every habit to have relation to an act. For it is essential + to habit to imply some relation to a thing's nature, in so far as it is suitable or unsuitable thereto. But a thing's nature, + which is the end of generation, is further ordained to another end, which is either an + operation, or the product of an operation, to which one attains by means of operation. Wherefore habit implies relation not + only to the very nature of a thing, but also, consequently, to operation, inasmuch as this is the end of nature, or conducive + to the end. Whence also it is stated (Metaph. v, text. 25) in the definition of habit, that it is a disposition whereby that + which is disposed, is well or ill disposed either in regard to itself, that is to its nature, or in regard to something + else, that is to the end. + </p><p id="FS_Q49_A3-p7"> But there are some habits, which even on the part of the subject in which they are, imply primarily and principally relation + to an act. For, as we have said, habit primarily and of itself implies a relation to the thing's nature. If therefore the + nature of a thing, in which the habit is, consists in this very relation to an act, it follows that the habit principally + implies relation to an act. Now it is clear that the nature and the notion of power is that it should be a + principle of act. Wherefore every habit is subjected in a power, implies principally relation to an act. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 3 co."><a name="35614" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35614] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod habere ordinem ad actum potest competere habitui et +secundum rationem habitus; et secundum rationem subiecti in quo est +habitus. Secundum quidem rationem habitus, convenit omni habitui +aliquo modo habere ordinem ad actum. Est enim de ratione habitus ut +importet habitudinem quandam in ordine ad naturam rei, secundum +quod convenit vel non convenit. Sed natura rei, quae est finis +generationis, ulterius etiam ordinatur ad alium finem, qui vel est +operatio, vel aliquod operatum, ad quod quis pervenit per +operationem. Unde habitus non solum importat ordinem ad ipsam +naturam rei, sed etiam consequenter ad operationem, inquantum est +finis naturae, vel perducens ad finem. Unde et in V Metaphys. +dicitur in definitione habitus, quod est dispositio secundum quam +bene vel male disponitur dispositum aut secundum se, idest secundum +suam naturam, aut ad aliud, idest in ordine ad finem. Sed sunt +quidam habitus qui etiam ex parte subiecti in quo sunt, primo et +principaliter important ordinem ad actum. Quia ut dictum est, +habitus primo et per se importat habitudinem ad naturam rei. Si +igitur natura rei in qua est habitus, consistat in ipso ordine ad +actum, sequitur quod habitus principaliter importet ordinem ad +actum. Manifestum est autem quod natura et ratio potentiae est ut +sit principium actus. Unde omnis habitus qui est alicuius potentiae +ut subiecti, principaliter importat ordinem ad actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Habit is an act, in so far as it is a quality: and in this respect it can be a principle of operation. It is, however, in + a state of potentiality in respect to operation. Wherefore habit is called first act, and operation, second act; as it is + explained in De Anima ii, text. 5. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35615" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35615] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod habitus est actus quidam, inquantum est +qualitas, et secundum hoc potest esse principium operationis. Sed +est in potentia per respectum ad operationem. Unde habitus dicitur +actus primus, et operatio actus secundus; ut patet in II de +anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not the essence of habit to be related to power, but to be related to nature. And as nature precedes action, to which + power is related, therefore habit is put before power as a species of quality. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35616" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35616] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod non est de ratione habitus quod respiciat potentiam, +sed quod respiciat naturam. Et quia natura praecedit actionem, quam +respicit potentia; ideo prior species qualitatis ponitur habitus +quam potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Health is said to be a habit, or a habitual disposition, in relation to nature, as stated above. But in so far as nature + is a principle of act, it consequently implies a relation to act. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Hist. Animal. x, 1), + that man, or one of his members, is called healthy, "when he can perform the operation of a healthy man." And the same applies + to other habits. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35617" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35617] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod sanitas dicitur habitus, vel habitualis dispositio, +in ordine ad naturam, sicut dictum est. Inquantum tamen natura est +principium actus, ex consequenti importat ordinem ad actum. Unde +philosophus dicit, in X de historia Animal., quod homo dicitur +sanus, vel membrum aliquod, quando potest facere operationem sani. +Et est simile in aliis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q49_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q49_A4-p0.1">Q. 49. A. 4. Whether habits are necessary?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habits are not necessary. For by habits we are well or ill disposed in respect of something, as stated + above. But a thing is well or ill disposed by its form: for in respect of its form a thing is good, even as it is a being. + Therefore there is no necessity for habits. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35618" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35618] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit necessarium esse habitus. +Habitus enim sunt quibus aliquid disponitur bene vel male ad +aliquid, sicut dictum est. Sed per suam formam aliquid bene vel +male disponitur, nam secundum formam aliquid est bonum, sicut et +ens. Ergo nulla necessitas est habituum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habit implies relation to an act. But power implies sufficiently a principle of act: for even the natural powers, + without any habits, are principles of acts. Therefore there was no necessity for habits. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35619" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35619] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +habitus importat ordinem ad actum. Sed potentia importat principium +actus sufficienter, nam et potentiae naturales absque habitibus +sunt principia actuum. Ergo non fuit necessarium habitus esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as power is related to good and evil, so also is habit: and as power does not always act, so neither does habit. + Given, therefore, the powers, habits become superfluous. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35620" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35620] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut potentia se habet ad bonum et malum, ita et habitus, et sicut +potentia non semper agit, ita nec habitus. Existentibus igitur +potentiis, superfluum fuit habitum esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Habits are perfections (Phys. vii, text. 17). But perfection is of the greatest necessity to a thing: since it is in the + nature of an end. Therefore it is necessary that there should be habits. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35621" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35621] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod habitus sunt perfectiones quaedam, ut dicitur in VII +Physic. Sed perfectio est maxime necessaria rei, cum habeat +rationem finis. Ergo necessarium fuit habitus esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q49_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said above ( + <a href="#FS_Q49_A2" id="FS_Q49_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,3), habit implies a disposition in relation to a thing's nature, and to its operation or end, by reason of which disposition + a thing is well or ill disposed thereto. Now for a thing to need to be disposed to something else, three conditions are necessary. + The first condition is that which is disposed should be distinct from that to which it is disposed; and so, that it should + be related to it as + potentiality is to act. Whence, if there is a being whose nature is not composed of potentiality and act, and whose substance + is its own operation, which itself is for itself, there we can find no room for habit and disposition, as is clearly the case + in God. + </p><p id="FS_Q49_A4-p7"> The second condition is, that that which is in a state of potentiality in regard to something else, be capable of determination + in several ways and to various things. Whence if something be in a state of potentiality in regard to something else, but + in regard to that only, there we find no room for disposition and habit: for such a subject from its own nature has the due + relation to such an act. Wherefore if a heavenly body be composed of matter and form, since that matter is + not in a state of potentiality to another form, as we said in the + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q56_A2" id="FS_Q49_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[56], A[2]</a>, there is no need for disposition or habit in respect of the form, or even in respect of operation, since the nature of the + heavenly body is not in a state of potentiality to more than one fixed movement. + </p><p id="FS_Q49_A4-p8"> The third condition is that in disposing the subject to one of those things to which it is in potentiality, several things + should occur, capable of being adjusted in various ways: so as to dispose the subject well or ill to its form or to its operation. + Wherefore the simple qualities of the elements which suit the natures of the elements in one single fixed way, are not called + dispositions or habits, but "simple qualities": but we call dispositions or habits, such things as + health, beauty, and so forth, which imply the adjustment of several things which may vary in their relative adjustability. + For this reason the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 24,25) that "habit is a disposition": and disposition is "the order + of that which has parts either as to place, or as to potentiality, or as to species," as we have said above (A[1], ad 3). + Wherefore, since there are many things for whose natures and operations several things must concur which may vary in their + relative + adjustability, it follows that habit is necessary. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 4 co."><a name="35622" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35622] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus importat +dispositionem quandam in ordine ad naturam rei, et ad operationem +vel finem eius, secundum quam bene vel male aliquid ad hoc +disponitur. Ad hoc autem quod aliquid indigeat disponi ad alterum, +tria requiruntur. Primo quidem, ut id quod disponitur, sit alterum +ab eo ad quod disponitur; et sic se habeat ad ipsum ut potentia ad +actum. Unde si aliquid sit cuius natura non sit composita ex +potentia et actu, et cuius substantia sit sua operatio, et ipsum +sit propter seipsum; ibi habitus vel dispositio locum non habet, +sicut patet in Deo. Secundo requiritur quod id quod est in potentia +ad alterum, possit pluribus modis determinari, et ad diversa. Unde +si aliquid sit in potentia ad alterum, ita tamen quod non sit in +potentia nisi ad ipsum, ibi dispositio et habitus locum non habet, +quia tale subiectum ex sua natura habet debitam habitudinem ad +talem actum. Unde si corpus caeleste sit compositum ex materia et +forma, cum illa materia non sit in potentia ad aliam formam, ut in +primo dictum est, non habet ibi locum dispositio vel habitus ad +formam; aut etiam ad operationem, quia natura caelestis corporis +non est in potentia nisi ad unum motum determinatum. Tertio +requiritur quod plura concurrant ad disponendum subiectum ad unum +eorum ad quae est in potentia, quae diversis modis commensurari +possunt, ut sic disponatur bene vel male ad formam vel ad +operationem. Unde qualitates simplices elementorum, quae secundum +unum modum determinatum naturis elementorum conveniunt, non dicimus +dispositiones vel habitus, sed simplices qualitates, dicimus autem +dispositiones vel habitus sanitatem, pulchritudinem et alia +huiusmodi, quae important quandam commensurationem plurium quae +diversis modis commensurari possunt. Propter quod philosophus +dicit, in V Metaphys., quod <i>habitus est dispositio, et +dispositio est ordo habentis partes vel secundum locum, vel +secundum potentiam, vel secundum speciem</i>; ut supra dictum est. +Quia igitur multa sunt entium ad quorum naturas et operationes +necesse est plura concurrere quae diversis modis commensurari +possunt, ideo necesse est habitus esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By the form the nature of a thing is perfected: yet the subject needs to be disposed in regard to the form by some disposition. + But the form itself is further ordained to operation, which is either the end, or the means to the end. And if the form is + limited to one fixed operation, no further disposition, besides the form itself, is needed for the operation. But if the form + be such that it can operate in diverse ways, as the soul; it needs to be + disposed to its operations by means of habits. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35623" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35623] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod per formam perficitur natura rei, sed oportet +quod in ordine ad ipsam formam disponatur subiectum aliqua +dispositione. Ipsa tamen forma ordinatur ulterius ad operationem, +quae vel est finis, vel via in finem. Et si quidem habeat forma +determinate unam tantum operationem determinatam, nulla alia +dispositio requiritur ad operationem praeter ipsam formam. Si autem +sit talis forma quae possit diversimode operari, sicut est anima; +oportet quod disponatur ad suas operationes per aliquos +habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Power sometimes has a relation to many things: and then it needs to be determined by something else. But if a power has not + a relation to many things, it does not need a habit to determine it, as we have said. For this reason the natural forces do + not perform their operations by means of habits: because they are of themselves determined to one mode of operation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35624" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35624] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod potentia quandoque se habet ad multa, et ideo oportet +quod aliquo alio determinetur. Si vero sit aliqua potentia quae non +se habeat ad multa, non indiget habitu determinante, ut dictum est. +Et propter hoc vires naturales non agunt operationes suas +mediantibus aliquibus habitibus, quia secundum seipsas sunt +determinatae ad unum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same habit has not a relation to good and evil, as will be made clear further on ( + <a href="#FS_Q54_A3" id="FS_Q49_A4-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[54], A[3]</a>): whereas the same power has a relation to good and evil. And, therefore, habits are necessary that the powers be determined + to good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35625" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35625] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod non idem habitus se habet ad bonum et malum, sicut +infra patebit. Eadem autem potentia se habet ad bonum et malum. Et +ideo necessarii sunt habitus ut potentiae determinentur ad +bonum.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q50" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q50-p0.1">Q. 50. OF THE SUBJECT OF HABITS (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q50-p2"> We consider next the subject of habits: and under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q50-p3"><a href="#FS_Q50_A1"> (1) Whether there is a habit in the body?</a></p><p id="FS_Q50-p4"><a href="#FS_Q50_A2"> (2) Whether the soul is a subject of habit, in respect of its essence or in respect of its power?</a></p><p id="FS_Q50-p5"><a href="#FS_Q50_A3"> (3) Whether in the powers of the sensitive part there can be a habit?</a></p><p id="FS_Q50-p6"><a href="#FS_Q50_A4"> (4) Whether there is a habit in the intellect?</a></p><p id="FS_Q50-p7"><a href="#FS_Q50_A5"> (5) Whether there is a habit in the will?</a></p><p id="FS_Q50-p8"><a href="#FS_Q50_A6"> (6) Whether there is a habit in separate substances?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 pr."><a name="35626" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35626] +Iª-IIae q. 50 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +subiecto habituum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum in +corpore sit aliquis habitus. Secundo, utrum anima sit subiectum +habitus secundum suam essentiam, vel secundum suam potentiam. +Tertio, utrum in potentiis sensitivae partis possit esse aliquis +habitus. Quarto, utrum in ipso intellectu sit aliquis habitus. +Quinto, utrum in voluntate sit aliquis habitus. Sexto, utrum in +substantiis separatis.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q50_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q50_A1-p0.1">Q. 50. A. 1. Whether there is a habit in the body?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is not a habit in the body. For, as the Commentator says (De Anima iii), "a habit is that whereby + we act when we will." But bodily actions are not subject to the will, since they are natural. Therefore there can be no habit + in the body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35627" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35627] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod in corpore non sit aliquis habitus. Ut +enim Commentator dicit, in III de anima, <i>habitus est quo quis +agit cum voluerit</i>. Sed actiones corporales non subiacent +voluntati, cum sint naturales. Ergo in corpore non potest esse +aliquis habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all bodily dispositions are easy to change. But habit is a quality, difficult to change. Therefore no bodily disposition + can be a habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35628" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35628] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +omnes dispositiones corporales sunt facile mobiles. Sed habitus est +qualitas difficile mobilis. Ergo nulla dispositio corporalis potest +esse habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all bodily dispositions are subject to change. But change can only be in the third species of quality, which is + divided against habit. Therefore there is no habit in the body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35629" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35629] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +omnes dispositiones corporales subiacent alterationi. Sed alteratio +non est nisi in tertia specie qualitatis, quae dividitur contra +habitum. Ergo nullus habitus est in corpore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says in the Book of Predicaments (De Categor. vi) that health of the body and incurable disease are called + habits. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35630" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35630] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus, in praedicamentis, sanitatem corporis, vel +infirmitatem insanabilem, habitum nominari dicit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q50_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said above ( + <a href="#FS_Q49_A2" id="FS_Q50_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[49], AA[2]</a> seqq.), habit is a disposition of a subject which is in a state of potentiality either to form or to operation. Therefore + in so far as habit implies disposition to operation, no habit is principally in the body as its subject. For every operation + of the body proceeds either from a natural quality of the body or from the soul moving the body. Consequently, as to those + operations which proceed from + its nature, the body is not disposed by a habit: because the natural forces are determined to one mode of operation; and we + have already said ( + <a href="#FS_Q49_A4" id="FS_Q50_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[49], A[4]</a>) that it is when the subject is in potentiality to many things that a habitual disposition is required. As to the operations + which proceed from the soul through the body, they belong principally to the soul, and secondarily to the body. Now habits + are in proportion to their operations: whence "by like acts like habits + are formed" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). And therefore the dispositions to such operations are principally in the soul. But they can + be secondarily in the body: to wit, in so far as the body is disposed and enabled with promptitude to help in the operations + of the soul. + </p><p id="FS_Q50_A1-p7"> If, however, we speak of the disposition of the subject to form, thus a habitual disposition can be in the body, which is + related to the soul as a subject is to its form. And in this way health and beauty and such like are called habitual dispositions. + Yet they have not the nature of habit perfectly: because their causes, of their very nature, are easily changeable. + </p><p id="FS_Q50_A1-p8"> On the other hand, as Simplicius reports in his Commentary on the Predicaments, Alexander denied absolutely that habits or + dispositions of the first species are in the body: and held that the first species of quality belonged to the soul alone. + And he held that Aristotle mentions health and sickness in the Book on the Predicaments not as though they belonged to the + first species of quality, but by way of example: so that he would mean that just as health and sickness may be easy + or difficult to change, so also are all the qualities of the first species, which are called habits and dispositions. But + this is clearly contrary to the intention of Aristotle: both because he speaks in the same way of health and sickness as examples, + as of virtue and science; and because in Phys. vii, text. 17, he expressly mentions beauty and health among habits. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 1 co."><a name="35631" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35631] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus est quaedam +dispositio alicuius subiecti existentis in potentia vel ad formam, +vel ad operationem. Secundum ergo quod habitus importat +dispositionem ad operationem, nullus habitus est principaliter in +corpore sicut in subiecto. Omnis enim operatio corporis est aut a +naturali qualitate corporis; aut est ab anima movente corpus. +Quantum igitur ad illas operationes quae sunt a natura, non +disponitur corpus per aliquem habitum, quia virtutes naturales sunt +determinatae ad unum; dictum est autem quod habitualis dispositio +requiritur ubi subiectum est in potentia ad multa. Operationes vero +quae sunt ab anima per corpus, principaliter quidem sunt ipsius +animae, secundario vero ipsius corporis. Habitus autem +proportionantur operationibus, unde ex similibus actibus similes +habitus causantur, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Et ideo dispositiones ad +tales operationes principaliter sunt in anima. In corpore vero +possunt esse secundario, inquantum scilicet corpus disponitur et +habilitatur ad prompte deserviendum operationibus animae. Si vero +loquamur de dispositione subiecti ad formam, sic habitualis +dispositio potest esse in corpore, quod comparatur ad animam sicut +subiectum ad formam. Et hoc modo sanitas et pulchritudo, et +huiusmodi, habituales dispositiones dicuntur. Non tamen perfecte +habent rationem habituum, quia causae eorum ex sua natura de facili +transmutabiles sunt. Alexander vero posuit nullo modo habitum vel +dispositionem primae speciei esse in corpore, ut Simplicius refert +in commento Praedicament., sed dicebat primam speciem qualitatis +pertinere tantum ad animam. Et quod Aristoteles inducit in +praedicamentis de sanitate et aegritudine, non inducit quasi haec +pertineant ad primam speciem qualitatis, sed per modum exempli, ut +sit sensus quod sicut aegritudo et sanitas possunt esse facile vel +difficile mobiles, ita etiam qualitates primae speciei, quae +dicuntur habitus et dispositio. Sed patet hoc esse contra +intentionem Aristotelis. Tum quia eodem modo loquendi utitur +exemplificando de sanitate et aegritudine, et de virtute et de +scientia. Tum quia in VII Physic. expresse ponit inter habitus +pulchritudinem et sanitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection runs in the sense of habit as a disposition to operation, and of those actions of the body which are from + nature: but not in the sense of those actions which proceed from the soul, and the principle of which is the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35632" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35632] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de habitu secundum quod +est dispositio ad operationem, et de actibus corporis qui sunt a +natura, non autem de his qui sunt ab anima, quorum principium est +voluntas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Bodily dispositions are not simply difficult to change on account of the changeableness of their bodily causes. But they + may be difficult to change by comparison to such a subject, because, to wit, as long as such a subject endures, they cannot + be removed; or because they are difficult to change, by comparison to other dispositions. But qualities of the soul are simply + difficult to change, on account of the unchangeableness of the subject. And + therefore he does not say that health which is difficult to change is a habit simply: but that it is "as a habit," as we read + in the Greek [*{isos hexin} (Categor. viii)]. On the other hand, the qualities of the soul are called habits simply. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35633" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35633] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod dispositiones corporales non sunt simpliciter +difficile mobiles, propter mutabilitatem corporalium causarum. +Possunt tamen esse difficile mobiles per comparationem ad tale +subiectum, quia scilicet, tali subiecto durante, amoveri non +possunt, vel quia sunt difficile mobiles per comparationem ad alias +dispositiones. Sed qualitates animae sunt simpliciter difficile +mobiles, propter immobilitatem subiecti. Et ideo non dicit quod +sanitas difficile mobilis simpliciter sit habitus, sed quod est ut +habitus, sicut in Graeco habetur. Qualitates autem animae dicuntur +simpliciter habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q50_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Bodily dispositions which are in the first species of quality, as some maintained, differ from qualities of the third species, + in this, that the qualities of the third species consist in some "becoming" and movement, as it were, wherefore they are called + passions or passible qualities. But when they have attained to perfection (specific perfection, so to speak), they have then + passed into the first species of quality. But Simplicius in his Commentary + disapproves of this; for in this way heating would be in the third species, and heat in the first species of quality; whereas + Aristotle puts heat in the third. + </p><p id="FS_Q50_A1-p12"> Wherefore Porphyrius, as Simplicius reports (Commentary), says that passion or passion-like quality, disposition and habit, + differ in bodies by way of intensity and remissness. For when a thing receives heat in this only that it is being heated, + and not so as to be able to give heat, then we have passion, if it is transitory; or passion-like quality if it is permanent. + But when it has been brought to the point that it is able to heat something else, then it is a disposition; and + if it goes so far as to be firmly fixed and to become difficult to change, then it will be a habit: so that disposition would + be a certain intensity of passion or passion-like quality, and habit an intensity or disposition. But Simplicius disapproves + of this, for such intensity and remissness do not imply diversity on the part of the form itself, but on the part of the diverse + participation thereof by the subject; so that there would be no diversity among the species of quality. And therefore + we must say otherwise that, as was explained above ( + <a href="#FS_Q49_A2" id="FS_Q50_A1-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[2]</a>, ad 1), the adjustment of the passion-like qualities themselves, according to their suitability to nature, implies the notion + of disposition: and so, when a change takes place in these same passion-like qualities, which are heat and cold, moisture + and dryness, there results a change as to sickness and health. But change does not occur in regard to like habits and dispositions, + primarily and of + themselves. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35634" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35634] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod dispositiones corporales quae sunt in prima specie +qualitatis, ut quidam posuerunt, differunt a qualitatibus tertiae +speciei in hoc, quod qualitates tertiae speciei sunt ut in fieri et +ut in motu, unde dicuntur passiones vel passibiles qualitates. +Quando autem iam pervenerint ad perfectum, quasi ad speciem, tunc +iam sunt in prima specie qualitatis. Sed hoc improbat Simplicius, +in commento praedicamentorum, quia secundum hoc calefactio esset in +tertia specie qualitatis, calor autem in prima, Aristoteles autem +ponit calorem in tertia. Unde Porphyrius dicit, sicut idem +Simplicius refert, quod passio vel passibilis qualitas, et +dispositio et habitus, differunt in corporibus secundum intensionem +et remissionem. Quando enim aliquid recipit caliditatem secundum +calefieri tantum, non autem ut calefacere possit; tunc est passio, +si sit cito transiens, vel passibilis qualitas, si sit manens. +Quando autem iam ad hoc perducitur quod potest etiam alterum +calefacere, tunc est dispositio, si autem ulterius intantum +confirmetur quod sit difficile mobilis, tunc erit habitus, ut sic +dispositio sit quaedam intensio seu perfectio passionis vel +passibilis qualitatis, habitus autem dispositionis. Sed hoc +improbat Simplicius, quia talis intensio et remissio non important +diversitatem ex parte ipsius formae, sed ex diversa participatione +subiecti. Et ita non diversificarentur per hoc species qualitatis. +Et ideo aliter dicendum est quod, sicut supra dictum est, +commensuratio ipsarum qualitatum passibilium secundum convenientiam +ad naturam, habet rationem dispositionis, et ideo, facta +alteratione circa ipsas qualitates passibiles, quae sunt calidum et +frigidum, humidum et siccum, fit ex consequenti alteratio secundum +aegritudinem et sanitatem. Primo autem et per se non est alteratio +secundum huiusmodi habitus et dispositiones.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q50_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q50_A2-p0.1">Q. 50. A. 2. Whether the soul is the subject of habit in respect of its essence or in respect of its power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habit is in the soul in respect of its essence rather than in respect of its powers. For we speak of dispositions + and habits in relation to nature, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q49_A2" id="FS_Q50_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[2]</a>). But nature regards the essence of the soul rather than the powers; because it is in respect of its essence that the soul + is the nature of such a body and the form thereof. Therefore habits are in the soul in respect of its essence and not in + respect of its powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35635" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35635] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus sint in anima magis secundum +essentiam quam secundum potentiam. Dispositiones enim et habitus +dicuntur in ordine ad naturam, ut dictum est. Sed natura magis +attenditur secundum essentiam animae quam secundum potentias, quia +anima secundum suam essentiam est natura corporis talis, et forma +eius. Ergo habitus sunt in anima secundum eius essentiam et non +secundum potentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, accident is not the subject of accident. Now habit is an accident. But the powers of the soul are in the genus of + accident, as we have said in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q77_A1" id="FS_Q50_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[77], A[1]</a>, ad 5. Therefore habit is not in the soul in respect of its powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35636" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35636] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +accidentis non est accidens. Habitus autem est quoddam accidens. +Sed potentiae animae sunt de genere accidentium, ut in primo dictum +est. Ergo habitus non est in anima ratione suae potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the subject is prior to that which is in the subject. But since habit belongs to the first species of quality, it + is prior to power, which belongs to the second species. Therefore habit is not in a power of the soul as its subject. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35637" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35637] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +subiectum est prius eo quod est in subiecto. Sed habitus, cum +pertineat ad primam speciem qualitatis, est prior quam potentia, +quae pertinet ad secundam speciem. Ergo habitus non est in potentia +animae sicut in subiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) puts various habits in the various powers of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35638" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35638] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus, in I Ethic., ponit diversos habitus in +diversis partibus animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q50_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said above ( + <a href="#FS_Q49_A2" id="FS_Q50_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[49], AA[2]</a>,3), habit implies a certain disposition in relation to nature or to operation. If therefore we take habit as having a relation + to nature, it cannot be in the soul---that is, if we speak of human nature: for the soul itself is the form completing the + human nature; so that, regarded in this way, habit or disposition is rather to be found in the body by reason of its relation + to the soul, than in the + soul by reason of its relation to the body. But if we speak of a higher nature, of which man may become a partaker, according + to 2 Pet. 1, "that we may be partakers of the Divine Nature": thus nothing hinders some habit, namely, grace, from being in + the soul in respect of its essence, as we shall state later on ( + <a href="FS_vii.html#FS_Q110_A4" id="FS_Q50_A2-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[110], A[4]</a>). + </p><p id="FS_Q50_A2-p7"> On the other hand, if we take habit in its relation to operation, it is chiefly thus that habits are found in the soul: in + so far as the soul is not determined to one operation, but is indifferent to many, which is a condition for a habit, as we + have said above ( + <a href="#FS_Q49_A4" id="FS_Q50_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[4]</a>). And since the soul is the principle of operation through its powers, therefore, regarded in this sense, habits are in the + soul in respect of its powers. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 2 co."><a name="35639" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35639] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus importat +dispositionem quandam in ordine ad naturam, vel ad operationem. Si +ergo accipiatur habitus secundum quod habet ordinem ad naturam, sic +non potest esse in anima, si tamen de natura humana loquamur, quia +ipsa anima est forma completiva humanae naturae; unde secundum hoc, +magis potest esse aliquis habitus vel dispositio in corpore per +ordinem ad animam, quam in anima per ordinem ad corpus. Sed si +loquamur de aliqua superiori natura, cuius homo potest esse +particeps, secundum illud II Petr. I, <i>ut simus consortes naturae +divinae</i>, sic nihil prohibet in anima secundum suam essentiam +esse aliquem habitum, scilicet gratiam, ut infra dicetur. Si vero +accipiatur habitus in ordine ad operationem, sic maxime habitus +inveniuntur in anima, inquantum anima non determinatur ad unam +operationem, sed se habet ad multas, quod requiritur ad habitum, ut +supra dictum est. Et quia anima est principium operationum per suas +potentias, ideo secundum hoc, habitus sunt in anima secundum suas +potentias.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The essence of the soul belongs to human nature, not as a subject requiring to be disposed to something further, but as a + form and nature to which someone is disposed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35640" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35640] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod essentia animae pertinet ad naturam humanam, non +sicut subiectum disponendum ad aliquid aliud, sed sicut forma et +natura ad quam aliquis disponitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Accident is not of itself the subject of accident. But since among accidents themselves there is a certain order, the subject, + according as it is under one accident, is conceived as the subject of a further accident. In this way we say that one accident + is the subject of another; as superficies is the subject of color, in which sense power is the subject of habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35641" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35641] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod accidens per se non potest esse subiectum accidentis. +Sed quia etiam in ipsis accidentibus est ordo quidam, subiectum +secundum quod est sub uno accidente, intelligitur esse subiectum +alterius. Et sic dicitur unum accidens esse subiectum alterius, ut +superficies coloris. Et hoc modo potest potentia esse subiectum +habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Habit takes precedence of power, according as it implies a disposition to nature: whereas power always implies a relation + to operation, which is posterior, since nature is the principle of operation. But the habit whose subject is a power, does + not imply relation to nature, but to operation. Wherefore it is posterior to power. Or, we may say that habit takes precedence + of power, as the complete takes precedence of the incomplete, and as act takes + precedence of potentiality. For act is naturally prior to potentiality, though potentiality is prior in order of generation + and time, as stated in Metaph. vii, text. 17; ix, text. 13. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35642" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35642] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod habitus praemittitur potentiae, secundum quod +importat dispositionem ad naturam, potentia autem semper importat +ordinem ad operationem, quae est posterior, cum natura sit +operationis principium. Sed habitus cuius potentia est subiectum, +non importat ordinem ad naturam, sed ad operationem. Unde est +posterior potentia. Vel potest dici quod habitus praeponitur +potentiae sicut completum incompleto, et actus potentiae. Actus +enim naturaliter est prior; quamvis potentia sit prior ordine +generationis et temporis, ut dicitur in VII et IX Metaphys.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q50_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q50_A3-p0.1">Q. 50. A. 3. Whether there can be any habits in the powers of the sensitive parts?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be any habits in the powers of the sensitive part. For as the nutritive power is an irrational + part, so is the sensitive power. But there can be no habits in the powers of the nutritive part. Therefore we ought not to + put any habit in the powers of the sensitive part. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35643" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35643] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod in potentiis sensitivae partis non +possit esse aliquis habitus. Sicut enim potentia nutritiva pars est +irrationalis, ita et sensitiva. Sed in potentiis nutritivae partis +non ponitur aliquis habitus. Ergo nec in potentiis sensitivae +partis aliquis habitus debet poni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sensitive parts are common to us and the brutes. But there are not any habits in brutes: for in them there is + no will, which is put in the definition of habit, as we have said above ( + <a href="#FS_Q49_A3" id="FS_Q50_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[3]</a>). Therefore there are no habits in the sensitive powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35644" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35644] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sensitivae partes sunt communes nobis et brutis. Sed in brutis non +sunt aliqui habitus, quia non est in eis voluntas, quae in +definitione habitus ponitur, ut supra dictum est. Ergo in potentiis +sensitivis non sunt aliqui habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the habits of the soul are sciences and virtues: and just as science is related to the apprehensive power, so it + virtue related to the appetitive power. But in the sensitive powers there are no sciences: since science is of universals, + which the sensitive powers cannot apprehend. Therefore, neither can there be habits of virtue in the sensitive part. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35645" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35645] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +habitus animae sunt scientiae et virtutes, et sicut scientia +refertur ad vim apprehensivam, ita virtus ad vim appetitivam. Sed +in potentiis sensitivis non sunt aliquae scientiae, cum scientia +sit universalium, quae vires sensitivae apprehendere non possunt. +Ergo etiam nec habitus virtutum in partibus sensitivis esse +possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "some virtues," namely, temperance and fortitude, "belong to the irrational part." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35646" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35646] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod aliquae virtutes, +scilicet temperantia et fortitudo, sunt irrationabilium +partium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The sensitive powers can be considered in two ways: first, according as they act from natural instinct: secondly, according + as they act at the command of reason. According as they act from natural instinct, they are ordained to one thing, even as + nature is; but according as they act at the command of reason, they can be ordained to various things. And thus there can + be habits in them, by which they are well or ill disposed in regard to something. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 3 co."><a name="35647" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35647] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod vires sensitivae dupliciter possunt considerari, uno +modo, secundum quod operantur ex instinctu naturae; alio modo, +secundum quod operantur ex imperio rationis. Secundum igitur quod +operantur ex instinctu naturae, sic ordinantur ad unum, sicut et +natura. Et ideo sicut in potentiis naturalibus non sunt aliqui +habitus, ita etiam nec in potentiis sensitivis, secundum quod ex +instinctu naturae operantur. Secundum vero quod operantur ex +imperio rationis, sic ad diversa ordinari possunt. Et sic possunt +in eis esse aliqui habitus, quibus bene aut male ad aliquid +disponuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The powers of the nutritive part have not an inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason, and therefore there are no habits + in them. But the sensitive powers have an inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason; and therefore habits can be in them: + for in so far as they obey reason, in a certain sense they are said to be rational, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35648" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35648] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod vires nutritivae partis non sunt natae obedire +imperio rationis, et ideo non sunt in eis aliqui habitus. Sed vires +sensitivae natae sunt obedire imperio rationis, et ideo in eis esse +possunt aliqui habitus; nam secundum quod obediunt rationi, +quodammodo rationales dicuntur, ut in I Ethic. dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The sensitive powers of dumb animals do not act at the command of reason; but if they are left to themselves, such animals + act from natural instinct: and so in them there are no habits ordained to operations. There are in them, however, certain + dispositions in relation to nature, as health and beauty. But whereas by man's reason brutes are disposed by a sort of custom + to do things in this or that way, so in this sense, to a certain extent, we can + admit the existence of habits in dumb animals: wherefore Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 36): "We find the most untamed beasts, + deterred by fear of pain, from that wherein they took the keenest pleasure; and when this has become a custom in them, we + say that they are tame and gentle." But the habit is incomplete, as to the use of the will, for they have not that power of + using or of refraining, which seems to belong to the notion of habit: and therefore, properly speaking, there can be no + habits in them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35649" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35649] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod vires sensitivae in brutis animalibus non operantur +ex imperio rationis; sed si sibi relinquantur bruta animalia, +operantur ex instinctu naturae. Et sic in brutis animalibus non +sunt aliqui habitus ordinati ad operationes. Sunt tamen in eis +aliquae dispositiones in ordine ad naturam, ut sanitas et +pulchritudo. Sed quia bruta animalia a ratione hominis per quandam +consuetudinem disponuntur ad aliquid operandum sic vel aliter, hoc +modo in brutis animalibus habitus quodammodo poni possunt, unde +Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod <i>videmus +immanissimas bestias a maximis voluptatibus absterreri dolorum +metu, quod cum in earum consuetudinem verterit, domitae et +mansuetae vocantur</i>. Deficit tamen ratio habitus quantum ad usum +voluntatis, quia non habent dominium utendi vel non utendi, quod +videtur ad rationem habitus pertinere. Et ideo, proprie loquendo, +in eis habitus esse non possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q50_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sensitive appetite has an inborn aptitude to be moved by the rational appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 57: + but the rational powers of apprehension have an inborn aptitude to receive from the sensitive powers. And therefore it is + more suitable that habits should be in the powers of sensitive appetite than in the powers of sensitive apprehension, since + in the powers of sensitive appetite habits do not exist except according as they act at + the command of the reason. And yet even in the interior powers of sensitive apprehension, we may admit of certain habits whereby + man has a facility of memory, thought or imagination: wherefore also the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. ii) that "custom + conduces much to a good memory": the reason of which is that these powers also are moved to act at the command of the reason. + </p><p id="FS_Q50_A3-p10"> On the other hand the exterior apprehensive powers, as sight, hearing and the like, are not susceptible of habits, but are + ordained to their fixed acts, according to the disposition of their nature, just as the members of the body, for there are + no habits in them, but rather in the powers which command their movements. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35650" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35650] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod appetitus sensitivus natus est moveri ab appetitu +rationali, ut dicitur in III de anima, sed vires rationales +apprehensivae natae sunt accipere a viribus sensitivis. Et ideo +magis convenit quod habitus sint in viribus sensitivis appetitivis +quam in viribus sensitivis apprehensivis, cum in viribus sensitivis +appetitivis non sint habitus nisi secundum quod operantur ex +imperio rationis. Quamvis etiam in ipsis interioribus viribus +sensitivis apprehensivis possint poni aliqui habitus, secundum quos +homo fit bene memorativus vel cogitativus vel imaginativus, unde +etiam philosophus dicit, in cap. de memoria, quod <i>consuetudo +multum operatur ad bene memorandum</i>, quia etiam istae vires +moventur ad operandum ex imperio rationis. Vires autem +apprehensivae exteriores, ut visus et auditus et huiusmodi, non +sunt susceptivae aliquorum habituum, sed secundum dispositionem +suae naturae ordinantur ad suos actus determinatos; sicut et membra +corporis, in quibus non sunt habitus, sed magis in viribus +imperantibus motum ipsorum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q50_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q50_A4-p0.1">Q. 50. A. 4. Whether there is any habit in the intellect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are no habits in the intellect. For habits are in conformity with operations, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q50_A1" id="FS_Q50_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But the operations of man are common to soul and body, as stated in De Anima i, text. 64. Therefore also are habits. But + the intellect is not an act of the body (De Anima iii, text. 6). Therefore the intellect is not the subject of a habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35651" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35651] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod in intellectu non sint aliqui habitus. +Habitus enim operationibus conformantur, ut dictum est. Sed +operationes hominis sunt communes animae et corpori, ut dicitur in +I de anima. Ergo et habitus. Sed intellectus non est actus +corporis, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo intellectus non est +subiectum alicuius habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is in a thing, is there according to the mode of that in which it is. But that which is form without matter, + is act only: whereas what is composed of form and matter, has potentiality and act at the same time. Therefore nothing at + the same time potential and actual can be in that which is form only, but only in that which is composed of matter and form. + Now the intellect is form without matter. Therefore habit, which has potentiality at the + same time as act, being a sort of medium between the two, cannot be in the intellect; but only in the "conjunction," which + is composed of soul and body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35652" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35652] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +omne quod est in aliquo, est in eo per modum eius in quo est. Sed +id quod est forma sine materia, est actus tantum, quod autem est +compositum ex forma et materia, habet potentiam et actum simul. +Ergo in eo quod est forma tantum, non potest esse aliquid quod sit +simul in potentia et actu, sed solum in eo quod est compositum ex +materia et forma. Sed intellectus est forma sine materia. Ergo +habitus, qui habet potentiam simul cum actu, quasi medium inter +utrumque existens, non potest esse in intellectu; sed solum in +coniuncto, quod est compositum ex anima et corpore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, habit is a disposition whereby we are well or ill disposed in regard to something, as is said (Metaph. v, text. + 25). But that anyone should be well or ill disposed to an act of the intellect is due to some disposition of the body: wherefore + also it is stated (De Anima ii, text. 94) that "we observe men with soft flesh to be quick witted." Therefore the habits of + knowledge are not in the intellect, which is separate, but in some power which is the act + of some part of the body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35653" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35653] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +habitus est dispositio secundum quam aliquis bene vel male +disponitur ad aliquid, ut dicitur in V Metaph. Sed quod aliquis +bene vel male sit dispositus ad actum intellectus, provenit ex +aliqua corporis dispositione, unde etiam in II de anima dicitur +quod <i>molles carne bene aptos mente videmus</i>. Ergo habitus +cognoscitivi non sunt in intellectu, qui est separatus; sed in +aliqua potentia quae est actus alicuius partis corporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2,3,10) puts science, wisdom and understanding, which is the habit of first principles, in the + intellective part of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35654" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35654] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus, in VI Ethic., ponit scientiam et sapientiam +et intellectum, qui est habitus principiorum, in ipsa intellectiva +parte animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q50_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> concerning intellective habits there have been various opinions. Some, supposing that there was only one "possible" [* + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q79_A2" id="FS_Q50_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[79], A[2]</a>, ad 2] intellect for all men, were bound to hold that habits of knowledge are not in the intellect itself, but in the interior + sensitive powers. For it is manifest that men differ in habits; and so it was impossible to put the habits of knowledge directly + in that, which, being only one, would be common + to all men. Wherefore if there were but one single "possible" intellect of all men, the habits of science, in which men differ + from one another, could not be in the "possible" intellect as their subject, but would be in the interior sensitive powers, + which differ in various men. + </p><p id="FS_Q50_A4-p7"> Now, in the first place, this supposition is contrary to the mind of Aristotle. For it is manifest that the sensitive powers + are rational, not by their essence, but only by participation (Ethic. i, 13). Now the Philosopher puts the intellectual virtues, + which are wisdom, science and understanding, in that which is rational by its essence. Wherefore they are not in the sensitive + powers, but in the intellect itself. Moreover he says expressly (De Anima iii, text. 8,18) that when + the "possible" intellect "is thus identified with each thing," that is, when it is reduced to act in respect of singulars + by the intelligible species, "then it is said to be in act, as the knower is said to be in act; and this happens when the + intellect can act of itself," i.e. by considering: "and even then it is in potentiality in a sense; but not in the same way + as before learning and discovering." Therefore the "possible" intellect itself is the subject of the habit of science, by + which the + intellect, even though it be not actually considering, is able to consider. In the second place, this supposition is contrary + to the truth. For as to whom belongs the operation, belongs also the power to operate, belongs also the habit. But to understand + and to consider is the proper act of the intellect. Therefore also the habit whereby one considers is properly in the intellect + itself. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 4 co."><a name="35655" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35655] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod circa habitus cognoscitivos diversimode sunt aliqui +opinati. Quidam enim, ponentes intellectum possibilem esse unum in +omnibus hominibus, coacti sunt ponere quod habitus cognoscitivi non +sunt in ipso intellectu, sed in viribus interioribus sensitivis. +Manifestum est enim quod homines in habitibus diversificantur, unde +non possunt habitus cognoscitivi directe poni in eo quod, unum +numero existens, est omnibus hominibus commune. Unde si intellectus +possibilis sit unus numero omnium hominum, habitus scientiarum, +secundum quos homines diversificantur, non poterunt esse in +intellectu possibili sicut in subiecto, sed erunt in viribus +interioribus sensitivis, quae sunt diversae in diversis. Sed ista +positio, primo quidem, est contra intentionem Aristotelis. +Manifestum est enim quod vires sensitivae non sunt rationales per +essentiam, sed solum per participationem, ut dicitur in I Ethic. +Philosophus autem ponit intellectuales virtutes, quae sunt +sapientia, scientia et intellectus, in eo quod est rationale per +essentiam. Unde non sunt in viribus sensitivis, sed in ipso +intellectu. Expresse etiam dicit, in III de anima, quod intellectus +possibilis, cum sic fiat singula, idest cum reducatur in actum +singulorum per species intelligibiles, tunc fit secundum actum eo +modo quo sciens dicitur esse in actu, quod quidem accidit cum +aliquis possit operari per seipsum, scilicet considerando. Est +quidem igitur et tunc potentia quodammodo; non tamen similiter ut +ante addiscere aut invenire. Ipse ergo intellectus possibilis est +in quo est habitus scientiae quo potest considerare etiam cum non +considerat. Secundo etiam, haec positio est contra rei veritatem. +Sicut enim eius est potentia cuius est operatio, ita etiam eius est +habitus cuius est operatio. Intelligere autem et considerare est +proprius actus intellectus. Ergo et habitus quo consideratur, est +proprie in ipso intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q50_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some said, as Simplicius reports in his Commentary on the Predicaments, that, since every operation of man is to a certain + extent an operation of the "conjunctum," as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, text. 64); therefore no habit is in the soul + only, but in the "conjunctum." And from this it follows that no habit is in the intellect, for the intellect is separate, + as ran the argument, given above. But the argument is no cogent. For habit is not a + disposition of the object to the power, but rather a disposition of the power to the object: wherefore the habit needs to + be in that power which is principle of the act, and not in that which is compared to the power as its object. + </p><p id="FS_Q50_A4-p9"> Now the act of understanding is not said to be common to soul and body, except in respect of the phantasm, as is stated in + De Anima, text. 66. But it is clear that the phantasm is compared as object to the passive intellect (De Anima iii, text. + 3,39). Whence it follows that the intellective habit is chiefly on the part of the intellect itself; and not on the part of + the phantasm, which is common to soul and body. And therefore we must say that the "possible" intellect is the + subject of habit, which is in potentiality to many: and this belongs, above all, to the "possible" intellect. Wherefore the + "possible" intellect is the subject of intellectual habits. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35656" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35656] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod quidam dixerunt, ut Simplicius refert in +commento praedicamentorum, quod quia omnis operatio hominis est +quodammodo coniuncti, ut philosophus dicit in I de anima; ideo +nullus habitus est animae tantum, sed coniuncti. Et per hoc +sequitur quod nullus habitus sit in intellectu, cum intellectus sit +separatus, ut ratio proposita procedebat. Sed ista ratio non cogit. +Habitus enim non est dispositio obiecti ad potentiam, sed magis +dispositio potentiae ad obiectum, unde habitus oportet quod sit in +ipsa potentia quae est principium actus, non autem in eo quod +comparatur ad potentiam sicut obiectum. Ipsum autem intelligere non +dicitur commune esse animae et corpori, nisi ratione phantasmatis, +ut dicitur in I de anima. Patet autem quod phantasma comparatur ad +intellectum possibilem ut obiectum, ut dicitur in III de anima. +Unde relinquitur quod habitus intellectivus sit principaliter ex +parte ipsius intellectus, non autem ex parte phantasmatis, quod est +commune animae et corpori. Et ideo dicendum est quod intellectus +possibilis est subiectum habitus, illi enim competit esse subiectum +habitus, quod est in potentia ad multa; et hoc maxime competit +intellectui possibili. Unde intellectus possibilis est subiectum +habituum intellectualium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As potentiality to sensible being belongs to corporeal matter, so potentiality to intellectual being belongs to the "possible" + intellect. Wherefore nothing forbids habit to be in the "possible" intellect, for it is midway between pure potentiality and + perfect act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35657" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35657] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut potentia ad esse sensibile convenit materiae +corporali, ita potentia ad esse intelligibile convenit intellectui +possibili. Unde nihil prohibet in intellectu possibili esse +habitum, qui est medius inter puram potentiam et actum +perfectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Because the apprehensive powers inwardly prepare their proper objects for the "possible intellect," therefore it is by the + good disposition of these powers, to which the good disposition of the body cooperates, that man is rendered apt to understand. + And so in a secondary way the intellective habit can be in these powers. But principally it is in the "possible" intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35658" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35658] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, quia vires apprehensivae interius praeparant +intellectui possibili proprium obiectum; ideo ex bona dispositione +harum virium, ad quam cooperatur bona dispositio corporis, redditur +homo habilis ad intelligendum. Et sic habitus intellectivus +secundario potest esse in istis viribus. Principaliter autem est in +intellectu possibili.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q50_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q50_A5-p0.1">Q. 50. A. 5. Whether any habit is in the will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is not a habit in the will. For the habit which is in the intellect is the intelligible species, + by means of which the intellect actually understands. But the will does not act by means of species. Therefore the will is + not the subject of habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="35659" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35659] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod in voluntate non sit aliquis habitus. +Habitus enim qui in intellectu est, sunt species intelligibiles, +quibus intelligit actu. Sed voluntas non operatur per aliquas +species. Ergo voluntas non est subiectum alicuius habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no habit is allotted to the active intellect, as there is to the "possible" intellect, because the former is an + active power. But the will is above all an active power, because it moves all the powers to their acts, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q50_A5-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Therefore there is no habit in the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="35660" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35660] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +in intellectu agente non ponitur aliquis habitus, sicut in +intellectu possibili, quia est potentia activa. Sed voluntas est +maxime potentia activa, quia movet omnes potentias ad suos actus, +ut supra dictum est. Ergo in ipsa non est aliquis habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the natural powers there is no habit, because, by reason of their nature, they are determinate to one thing. + But the will, by reason of its nature, is ordained to tend to the good which reason directs. Therefore there is no habit in + the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="35661" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35661] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +in potentiis naturalibus non est aliquis habitus, quia ex sua +natura sunt ad aliquid determinatae. Sed voluntas ex sua natura +ordinatur ad hoc quod tendat in bonum ordinatum ratione. Ergo in +voluntate non est aliquis habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Justice is a habit. But justice is in the will; for it is "a habit whereby men will and do that which is just" (Ethic. v, + 1). Therefore the will is the subject of a habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 5 s. c."><a name="35662" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35662] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod iustitia est habitus quidam. Sed iustitia est in +voluntate, est enim iustitia <i>habitus secundum quem aliqui volunt +et operantur iusta</i>, ut dicitur in V Ethic. Ergo voluntas est +subiectum alicuius habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Every power which may be variously directed to act, needs a habit whereby it is well disposed to its act. Now since the will + is a rational power, it may be variously directed to act. And therefore in the will we must admit the presence of a habit + whereby it is well disposed to its act. Moreover, from the very nature of habit, it is clear that it is principally related + to the will; inasmuch as habit "is that which one uses when one wills," as stated above + + <a href="#FS_Q50_A1" id="FS_Q50_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 5 co."><a name="35663" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35663] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod omnis potentia quae diversimode potest ordinari ad +agendum, indiget habitu quo bene disponatur ad suum actum. Voluntas +autem, cum sit potentia rationalis, diversimode potest ad agendum +ordinari. Et ideo oportet in voluntate aliquem habitum ponere, quo +bene disponatur ad suum actum. Ex ipsa etiam ratione habitus +apparet quod habet quendam principalem ordinem ad voluntatem, prout +habitus est quo quis utitur cum voluerit, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even as in the intellect there is a species which is the likeness of the object; so in the will, and in every appetitive + power there must be something by which the power is inclined to its object; for the act of the appetitive power is nothing + but a certain inclination, as we have said above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q6_A4" id="FS_Q50_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[6], A[4]</a>; + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q22_A2" id="FS_Q50_A5-p7.2" shape="rect"> Q[22], A[2]</a>). And therefore in respect of those things to which it is inclined sufficiently by the + nature of the power itself, the power needs no quality to incline it. But since it is necessary, for the end of human life, + that the appetitive power be inclined to something fixed, to which it is not inclined by the nature of the power, which has + a relation to many and various things, therefore it is necessary that, in the will and in the other appetitive powers, there + be certain qualities to incline them, and these are called habits. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="35664" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35664] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut in intellectu est aliqua species quae est +similitudo obiecti, ita oportet in voluntate, et in qualibet vi +appetitiva, esse aliquid quo inclinetur in suum obiectum, cum nihil +aliud sit actus appetitivae virtutis quam inclinatio quaedam, ut +supra dictum est. Ad ea ergo ad quae sufficienter inclinatur per +naturam ipsius potentiae, non indiget aliqua qualitate inclinante. +Sed quia necessarium est ad finem humanae vitae, quod vis +appetitiva inclinetur in aliquid determinatum, ad quod non +inclinatur ex natura potentiae, quae se habet ad multa et diversa; +ideo necesse est quod in voluntate, et in aliis viribus +appetitivis, sint quaedam qualitates inclinantes, quae dicuntur +habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The active intellect is active only, and in no way passive. But the will, and every appetitive power, is both mover and moved + (De Anima iii, text. 54). And therefore the comparison between them does not hold; for to be susceptible of habit belongs + to that which is somehow in potentiality. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="35665" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35665] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod intellectus agens est agens tantum, et nullo modo +patiens. Sed voluntas, et quaelibet vis appetitiva, est movens +motum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Et ideo non est similis ratio de +utroque, nam esse susceptivum habitus convenit ei quod est +quodammodo in potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will from the very nature of the power inclined to the good of the reason. But because this good is varied in many ways, + the will needs to be inclined, by means of a habit, to some fixed good of the reason, in order that action may follow more + promptly. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="35666" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35666] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod voluntas ex ipsa natura potentiae inclinatur in bonum +rationis. Sed quia hoc bonum multipliciter diversificatur, +necessarium est ut ad aliquod determinatum bonum rationis voluntas +per aliquem habitum inclinetur, ad hoc quod sequatur promptior +operatio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q50_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q50_A6-p0.1">Q. 50. A. 6. Whether there are habits in the angels?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are no habits in the angels. For Maximus, commentator of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), says: "It + is not proper to suppose that there are intellectual (i.e. spiritual) powers in the divine intelligences (i.e. in the angels) + after the manner of accidents, as in us: as though one were in the other as in a subject: for accident of any kind is foreign + to them." But every habit is an accident. Therefore there are no habits in the angels. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="35667" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35667] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Angelis non sint habitus. Dicit +enim maximus, Commentator Dionysii, in VII cap. de Cael. Hier., non +convenit arbitrari virtutes intellectuales, idest spirituales, more +accidentium, quemadmodum et in nobis sunt, in divinis +intellectibus, scilicet Angelis, esse, ut aliud in alio sit sicut +in subiecto, accidens enim omne illinc repulsum est. Sed omnis +habitus est accidens. Ergo in Angelis non sunt habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "The holy dispositions of the heavenly essences participate, above all other + things, in God's goodness." But that which is of itself [per se] is prior to and more power than that which is by another + [per aliud]. Therefore the angelic essences are perfected of themselves unto conformity with God, and therefore not by means + of habits. And this seems to have been the reasoning of Maximus, who in the same passage adds: + "For if this were the case, surely their essence would not remain in itself, nor could it have been as far as possible deified + of itself." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="35668" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35668] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Cael. Hier., <i>sanctae +caelestium essentiarum dispositiones super omnia alia Dei bonitatem +participant</i>. Sed semper quod est per se, est prius et potius eo +quod est per aliud. Ergo Angelorum essentiae per seipsas +perficiuntur ad conformitatem Dei. Non ergo per aliquos habitus. Et +haec videtur esse ratio maximi, qui ibidem subdit, <i>si enim hoc +esset, non utique maneret in semetipsa harum essentia, nec +deificari per se, quantum foret possibile, valuisset</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, habit is a disposition (Metaph. v, text. 25). But disposition, as is said in the same book, is "the order of that + which has parts." Since, therefore, angels are simple substances, it seems that there are no dispositions and habits in them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="35669" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35669] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +habitus est dispositio quaedam, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. Sed +dispositio, ut ibidem dicitur, est ordo habentis partes. Cum ergo +Angeli sint simplices substantiae, videtur quod in eis non sint +dispositiones et habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that the angels are of the first hierarchy are called: "Fire-bearers and Thrones and Outpouring + of Wisdom, by which is indicated the godlike nature of their habits." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 6 s. c."><a name="35670" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35670] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Dionysius dicit, VII cap. Cael. Hier., quod <i>Angeli +primae hierarchiae nominantur calefacientes et throni et effusio +sapientiae, manifestatio deiformis ipsorum habituum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q50_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some have thought that there are no habits in the angels, and that whatever is said of them, is said essentially. Whence + Maximus, after the words which we have quoted, says: "Their dispositions, and the powers which are in them, are essential, + through the absence of matter in them." And Simplicius says the same in his Commentary on the Predicaments: "Wisdom which + is in the soul is its habit: but that which is in the intellect, is its substance. For + everything divine is sufficient of itself, and exists in itself." + </p><p id="FS_Q50_A6-p7"> Now this opinion contains some truth, and some error. For it is manifest from what we have said ( + <a href="#FS_Q49_A4" id="FS_Q50_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[4]</a>) that only a being in potentiality is the subject of habit. So the above-mentioned commentators considered that angels are + immaterial substances, and that there is no material potentiality in them, and on that account, excluded from them habit and + any kind of accident. Yet since though there is no material potentiality in angels, there is still + some potentiality in them (for to be pure act belongs to God alone), therefore, as far as potentiality is found to be in them, + so far may habits be found in them. But because the potentiality of matter and the potentiality of intellectual substance + are not of the same kind. Whence, Simplicius says in his Commentary on the Predicaments that: "The habits of the intellectual + substance are not like the habits here below, but rather are they like simple and immaterial images which it contains in + itself." + </p><p id="FS_Q50_A6-p8"> However, the angelic intellect and the human intellect differ with regard to this habit. For the human intellect, being the + lowest in the intellectual order, is in potentiality as regards all intelligible things, just as primal matter is in respect + of all sensible forms; and therefore for the understanding of all things, it needs some habit. But the angelic intellect is + not as a pure potentiality in the order of intelligible things, but as an act; not indeed as pure act (for + this belongs to God alone), but with an admixture of some potentiality: and the higher it is, the less potentiality it has. + And therefore, as we said in the + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q55_A1" id="FS_Q50_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[55], A[1]</a>, so far as it is in potentiality, so far is it in need of habitual perfection by means of intelligible species in regard + to its proper operation: but so far as it is in act, through its own essence it can understand some things, at least itself, + and other things according to the mode of its + substance, as stated in De Causis: and the more perfect it is, the more perfectly will it understand. + </p><p id="FS_Q50_A6-p9"> But since no angel attains to the perfection of God, but all are infinitely distant therefrom; for this reason, in order + to attain to God Himself, through intellect and will, the angels need some habits, being as it were in potentiality in regard + to that Pure Act. Wherefore Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that their habits are "godlike," that is to say, that by them + they are made like to God. + </p><p id="FS_Q50_A6-p10"> But those habits that are dispositions to the natural being are not in angels, since they are immaterial.</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 6 co."><a name="35671" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35671] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod quidam posuerunt in Angelis non esse habitus; sed +quaecumque dicuntur de eis, essentialiter dicuntur. Unde maximus, +post praedicta verba quae induximus, dicit, <i>habitudines earum, +atque virtutes quae in eis sunt, essentiales sunt, propter +immaterialitatem</i>. Et hoc etiam Simplicius dicit, in commento +praedicamentorum, <i>sapientia quae est in anima, habitus est, quae +autem in intellectu, substantia. Omnia enim quae sunt divina, et +per se sufficientia sunt, et in seipsis existentia</i>. Quae quidem +positio partim habet veritatem, et partim continet falsitatem. +Manifestum est enim ex praemissis quod subiectum habitus non est +nisi ens in potentia. Considerantes igitur praedicti commentatores +quod Angeli sunt substantiae immateriales, et quod non est in illis +potentia materiae; secundum hoc, ab eis habitum excluserunt, et +omne accidens. Sed quia, licet in Angelis non sit potentia +materiae, est tamen in eis aliqua potentia (esse enim actum purum +est proprium Dei); ideo inquantum invenitur in eis de potentia, +intantum in eis possunt habitus inveniri. Sed quia potentia +materiae et potentia intellectualis substantiae non est unius +rationis, ideo per consequens nec habitus unius rationis est +utrobique. Unde Simplicius dicit, in commento praedicamentorum, +quod <i>habitus intellectualis substantiae non sunt similes his qui +sunt hic habitibus; sed magis sunt similes simplicibus et +immaterialibus speciebus quas continet in seipsa</i>. Circa +huiusmodi tamen habitum aliter se habet intellectus angelicus, et +aliter intellectus humanus. Intellectus enim humanus, cum sit +infimus in ordine intellectuum, est in potentia respectu omnium +intelligibilium, sicut materia prima respectu omnium formarum +sensibilium, et ideo ad omnia intelligenda indiget aliquo habitu. +Sed intellectus angelicus non se habet sicut pura potentia in +genere intelligibilium, sed sicut actus quidam, non autem sicut +actus purus (hoc enim solius Dei est), sed cum permixtione alicuius +potentiae, et tanto minus habet de potentialitate, quanto est +superior. Et ideo, ut in primo dictum est, inquantum est in +potentia, indiget perfici habitualiter per aliquas species +intelligibiles ad operationem propriam, sed inquantum est actu, per +essentiam suam potest aliqua intelligere, ad minus seipsum, et alia +secundum modum suae substantiae, ut dicitur in Lib. de causis, et +tanto perfectius, quanto est perfectior. Sed quia nullus Angelus +pertingit ad perfectionem Dei, sed in infinitum distat; propter +hoc, ad attingendum ad ipsum Deum per intellectum et voluntatem, +indigent aliquibus habitibus, tanquam in potentia existentes +respectu illius puri actus. Unde Dionysius dicit habitus eorum esse +deiformes, quibus scilicet Deo conformantur. Habitus autem qui sunt +dispositiones ad esse naturale, non sunt in Angelis, cum sint +immateriales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This saying of Maximus must be understood of material habits and accidents. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="35672" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35672] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod verbum maximi intelligendum est de habitibus et +accidentibus materialibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A6-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As to that which belongs to angels by their essence, they do not need a habit. But as they are not so far beings of themselves, + as not to partake of Divine wisdom and goodness, therefore, so far as they need to partake of something from without, so far + do they need to have habits. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="35673" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35673] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod quantum ad hoc quod convenit Angelis per suam +essentiam, non indigent habitu. Sed quia non ita sunt per seipsos +entes, quin participent sapientiam et bonitatem divinam; ideo +inquantum indigent participare aliquid ab exteriori, intantum +necesse est in eis ponere habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A6-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In angels there are no essential parts: but there are potential parts, in so far as their intellect is perfected by several + species, and in so far as their will has a relation to several things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="35674" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35674] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in Angelis non sunt partes essentiae, sed sunt partes +secundum potentiam, inquantum intellectus eorum per plures species +perficitur, et voluntas eorum se habet ad plura.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q51" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q51-p0.1">Q. 51. OF THE CAUSE OF HABITS, AS TO THEIR FORMATION (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q51-p2"> We must next consider the cause of habits: and firstly, as to their formation; secondly, as to their increase; thirdly, as + to their diminution and corruption. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FS_Q51-p3"><a href="#FS_Q51_A1"> (1) Whether any habit is from nature?</a></p><p id="FS_Q51-p4"><a href="#FS_Q51_A2"> (2) Whether any habit is caused by acts?</a></p><p id="FS_Q51-p5"><a href="#FS_Q51_A3"> (3) Whether any habit can be caused by one act?</a></p><p id="FS_Q51-p6"><a href="#FS_Q51_A4"> (4) Whether any habits are infused in man by God?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 pr."><a name="35675" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35675] +Iª-IIae q. 51 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causa +habituum. Et primo, quantum ad generationem ipsorum; secundo, +quantum ad augmentum; tertio, quantum ad diminutionem et +corruptionem. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum aliquis +habitus sit a natura. Secundo, utrum aliquis habitus ex actibus +causetur. Tertio, utrum per unum actum possit generari habitus. +Quarto, utrum aliqui habitus sint in hominibus infusi a Deo.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q51_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q51_A1-p0.1">Q. 51. A. 1. Whether any habit is from nature?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no habit is from nature. For the use of those things which are from nature does not depend on the will. + But habit "is that which we use when we will," as the Commentator says on De Anima iii. Therefore habit is not from nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35676" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35676] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullus habitus sit a natura. Eorum +enim quae sunt a natura, usus non subiacet voluntati. Sed habitus +est quo quis utitur cum voluerit, ut dicit Commentator, in III de +anima. Ergo habitus non est a natura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nature does not employ two where one is sufficient. But the powers of the soul are from nature. If therefore the + habits of the powers were from nature, habit and power would be one. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35677" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35677] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +natura non facit per duo quod per unum potest facere. Sed potentiae +animae sunt a natura. Si igitur habitus potentiarum a natura +essent, habitus et potentia essent unum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nature does not fail in necessaries. But habits are necessary in order to act well, as we have stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q49_A4" id="FS_Q51_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[4]</a>). If therefore any habits were from nature, it seems that nature would not fail to cause all necessary habits: but this is + clearly false. Therefore habits are not from nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35678" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35678] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +natura non deficit in necessariis. Sed habitus sunt necessarii ad +bene operandum, ut supra dictum est. Si igitur habitus aliqui +essent a natura, videtur quod natura non deficeret quin omnes +habitus necessarios causaret. Patet autem hoc esse falsum. Ergo +habitus non sunt a natura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> In Ethic. vi, 6, among other habits, place is given to understanding of first principles, which habit is from nature: wherefore + also first principles are said to be known naturally. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35679" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35679] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod in VI Ethic., inter alios habitus ponitur intellectus +principiorum, qui est a natura, unde et principia prima dicuntur +naturaliter cognita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q51_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> One thing can be natural to another in two ways. First in respect of the specific nature, as the faculty of laughing is natural + to man, and it is natural to fire to have an upward tendency. Secondly, in respect of the individual nature, as it is natural + to Socrates or Plato to be prone to sickness or inclined to health, in accordance with their respective temperaments. Again, + in respect of both natures, something may be called natural in two ways: first, + because it entirely is from the nature; secondly, because it is partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic principle. + For instance, when a man is healed by himself, his health is entirely from nature; but when a man is healed by means of medicine, + health is partly from nature, partly from an extrinsic principle. + </p><p id="FS_Q51_A1-p7"> Thus, then, if we speak of habit as a disposition of the subject in relation to form or nature, it may be natural in either + of the foregoing ways. For there is a certain natural disposition demanded by the human species, so that no man can be without + it. And this disposition is natural in respect of the specific nature. But since such a disposition has a certain latitude, + it happens that different grades of this disposition are becoming to different men in respect of the + individual nature. And this disposition may be either entirely from nature, or partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic + principle, as we have said of those who are healed by means of art. + </p><p id="FS_Q51_A1-p8"> But the habit which is a disposition to operation, and whose subject is a power of the soul, as stated above (Q[50], A[2]), + may be natural whether in respect of the specific nature or in respect of the individual nature: in respect of the specific + nature, on the part of the soul itself, which, since it is the form of the body, is the specific principle; but in respect + of the individual nature, on the part of the body, which is the material principle. Yet in neither way does it + happen that there are natural habits in man, so that they be entirely from nature. In the angels, indeed, this does happen, + since they have intelligible species naturally impressed on them, which cannot be said of the human soul, as we have said + in the + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q55_A2" id="FS_Q51_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[55], A[2]</a>; + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q84_A3" id="FS_Q51_A1-p8.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[84], A[3]</a>. + </p><p id="FS_Q51_A1-p9"> There are, therefore, in man certain natural habits, owing their existence, partly to nature, and partly to some extrinsic + principle: in one way, indeed, in the apprehensive powers; in another way, in the appetitive powers. For in the apprehensive + powers there may be a natural habit by way of a beginning, both in respect of the specific nature, and in respect of the individual + nature. This happens with regard to the specific nature, on the part of the soul itself: thus the + understanding of first principles is called a natural habit. For it is owing to the very nature of the intellectual soul that + man, having once grasped what is a whole and what is a part, should at once perceive that every whole is larger than its part: + and in like manner with regard to other such principles. Yet what is a whole, and what is a part---this he cannot know except + through the intelligible species which he has received from phantasms: and for this reason, the Philosopher at the end + of the Posterior Analytics shows that knowledge of principles comes to us from the senses. + </p><p id="FS_Q51_A1-p10"> But in respect of the individual nature, a habit of knowledge is natural as to its beginning, in so far as one man, from + the disposition of his organs of sense, is more apt than another to understand well, since we need the sensitive powers for + the operation of the intellect. + </p><p id="FS_Q51_A1-p11"> In the appetitive powers, however, no habit is natural in its beginning, on the part of the soul itself, as to the substance + of the habit; but only as to certain principles thereof, as, for instance, the principles of common law are called the "nurseries + of virtue." The reason of this is because the inclination to its proper objects, which seems to be the beginning of a habit, + does not belong to the habit, but rather to the very nature of the powers. + </p><p id="FS_Q51_A1-p12"> But on the part of the body, in respect of the individual nature, there are some appetitive habits by way of natural beginnings. + For some are disposed from their own bodily temperament to chastity or meekness or such like. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 1 co."><a name="35680" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35680] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod aliquid potest esse naturale alicui dupliciter. Uno +modo, secundum naturam speciei, sicut naturale est homini esse +risibile, et igni ferri sursum. Alio modo, secundum naturam +individui, sicut naturale est Socrati vel Platoni esse aegrotativum +vel sanativum, secundum propriam complexionem. Rursus, secundum +utramque naturam potest dici aliquid naturale dupliciter, uno modo, +quia totum est a natura; alio modo, quia secundum aliquid est a +natura, et secundum aliquid est ab exteriori principio. Sicut cum +aliquis sanatur per seipsum, tota sanitas est a natura, cum autem +aliquis sanatur auxilio medicinae, sanitas partim est a natura, +partim ab exteriori principio. Sic igitur si loquamur de habitu +secundum quod est dispositio subiecti in ordine ad formam vel +naturam, quolibet praedictorum modorum contingit habitum esse +naturalem. Est enim aliqua dispositio naturalis quae debetur +humanae speciei, extra quam nullus homo invenitur. Et haec est +naturalis secundum naturam speciei. Sed quia talis dispositio +quandam latitudinem habet, contingit diversos gradus huiusmodi +dispositionis convenire diversis hominibus secundum naturam +individui. Et huiusmodi dispositio potest esse vel totaliter a +natura, vel partim a natura et partim ab exteriori principio, sicut +dictum est de his qui sanantur per artem. Sed habitus qui est +dispositio ad operationem, cuius subiectum est potentia animae, ut +dictum est, potest quidem esse naturalis et secundum naturam +speciei, et secundum naturam individui. Secundum quidem naturam +speciei, secundum quod se tenet ex parte ipsius animae, quae, cum +sit forma corporis, est principium specificum. Secundum autem +naturam individui, ex parte corporis, quod est materiale +principium. Sed tamen neutro modo contingit in hominibus esse +habitus naturales ita quod sint totaliter a natura. In Angelis +siquidem contingit, eo quod habent species intelligibiles +naturaliter inditas, quod non competit animae humanae, ut in primo +dictum est. Sunt ergo in hominibus aliqui habitus naturales, +tanquam partim a natura existentes et partim ab exteriori +principio; aliter quidem in apprehensivis potentiis, et aliter in +appetitivis. In apprehensivis enim potentiis potest esse habitus +naturalis secundum inchoationem, et secundum naturam speciei, et +secundum naturam individui. Secundum quidem naturam speciei, ex +parte ipsius animae, sicut intellectus principiorum dicitur esse +habitus naturalis. Ex ipsa enim natura animae intellectualis, +convenit homini quod statim, cognito quid est totum et quid est +pars, cognoscat quod omne totum est maius sua parte, et simile est +in ceteris. Sed quid sit totum, et quid sit pars, cognoscere non +potest nisi per species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus acceptas. +Et propter hoc philosophus, in fine posteriorum, ostendit quod +cognitio principiorum provenit nobis ex sensu. Secundum vero +naturam individui, est aliquis habitus cognoscitivus secundum +inchoationem naturalis, inquantum unus homo, ex dispositione +organorum, est magis aptus ad bene intelligendum quam alius, +inquantum ad operationem intellectus indigemus virtutibus +sensitivis. In appetitivis autem potentiis non est aliquis habitus +naturalis secundum inchoationem, ex parte ipsius animae, quantum ad +ipsam substantiam habitus, sed solum quantum ad principia quaedam +ipsius, sicut principia iuris communis dicuntur esse seminalia +virtutum. Et hoc ideo, quia inclinatio ad obiecta propria, quae +videtur esse inchoatio habitus, non pertinet ad habitum, sed magis +pertinet ad ipsam rationem potentiarum. Sed ex parte corporis, +secundum naturam individui, sunt aliqui habitus appetitivi secundum +inchoationes naturales. Sunt enim quidam dispositi ex propria +corporis complexione ad castitatem vel mansuetudinem, vel ad +aliquid huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection takes nature as divided against reason and will; whereas reason itself and will belong to the nature of man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35681" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35681] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de natura secundum quod +dividitur contra rationem et voluntatem, cum tamen ipsa ratio et +voluntas ad naturam hominis pertineant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Something may be added even naturally to the nature of a power, while it cannot belong to the power itself. For instance, + with regard to the angels, it cannot belong to the intellective power itself capable of knowing all things: for thus it would + have to be the act of all things, which belongs to God alone. Because that by which something is known, must needs be the + actual likeness of the thing known: whence it would follow, if the power of the angel + knew all things by itself, that it was the likeness and act of all things. Wherefore there must needs be added to the angels' + intellective power, some intelligible species, which are likenesses of things understood: for it is by participation of the + Divine wisdom and not by their own essence, that their intellect can be actually those things which they understand. And so + it is clear that not everything belonging to a natural habit can belong to the power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35682" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35682] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod aliquid etiam naturaliter potest superaddi potentiae, +quod tamen ad ipsam potentiam pertinere non potest. Sicut in +Angelis non potest pertinere ad ipsam potentiam intellectivam quod +sit per se cognoscitiva omnium, quia oporteret quod esset actus +omnium, quod solius Dei est. Id enim quo aliquid cognoscitur, +oportet esse actualem similitudinem eius quod cognoscitur, unde +sequeretur, si potentia Angeli per seipsam cognosceret omnia, quod +esset similitudo et actus omnium. Unde oportet quod superaddantur +potentiae intellectivae ipsius aliquae species intelligibiles, quae +sunt similitudines rerum intellectarum, quia per participationem +divinae sapientiae, et non per essentiam propriam, possunt +intellectus eorum esse actu ea quae intelligunt. Et sic patet quod +non omne id quod pertinet ad habitum naturalem, potest ad potentiam +pertinere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Nature is not equally inclined to cause all the various kinds of habits: since some can be caused by nature, and some not, + as we have said above. And so it does not follow that because some habits are natural, therefore all are natural. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35683" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35683] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod natura non aequaliter se habet ad causandas omnes +diversitates habituum, quia quidam possunt causari a natura, quidam +non, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo non sequitur, si aliqui habitus +sint naturales, quod omnes sint naturales.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q51_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q51_A2-p0.1">Q. 51. A. 2. Whether any habit is caused by acts?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no habit is caused by acts. For habit is a quality, as we have said above ( + <a href="#FS_Q49_A1" id="FS_Q51_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[1]</a>). Now every quality is caused in a subject, according to the latter's receptivity. Since then the agent, inasmuch as it acts, + does not receive but rather gives: it seems impossible for a habit to be caused in an agent by its own acts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35684" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35684] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullus habitus possit ex actu causari. +Habitus enim est qualitas quaedam, ut supra dictum est. Omnis autem +qualitas causatur in aliquo subiecto, inquantum est alicuius +receptivum. Cum igitur agens ex hoc quod agit, non recipiat +aliquid, sed magis ex se emittat; videtur quod non possit aliquis +habitus in agente ex propriis actibus generari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the thing wherein a quality is caused is moved to that quality, as may be clearly seen in that which is heated or + cooled: whereas that which produces the act that causes the quality, moves, as may be seen in that which heats or cools. If + therefore habits were caused in anything by its own act, it would follow that the same would be mover and moved, active and + passive: which is impossible, as stated in Physics iii, 8. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35685" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35685] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +illud in quo causatur aliqua qualitas, movetur ad qualitatem illam, +sicut patet in re calefacta vel infrigidata, quod autem producit +actum causantem qualitatem, movet, ut patet de calefaciente vel +infrigidante. Si igitur in aliquo causaretur habitus per actum sui +ipsius, sequeretur quod idem esset movens et motum, agens et +patiens. Quod est impossibile, ut dicitur in VII Physic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the effect cannot be more noble than its cause. But habit is more noble than the act which precedes the habit; as + is clear from the fact that the latter produces more noble acts. Therefore habit cannot be caused by an act which precedes + the habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35686" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35686] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +effectus non potest esse nobilior sua causa. Sed habitus est +nobilior quam actus praecedens habitum, quod patet ex hoc, quod +nobiliores actus reddit. Ergo habitus non potest causari ab actu +praecedente habitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1,2) teaches that habits of virtue and vice are caused by acts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35687" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35687] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus, in II Ethic., docet habitus virtutum et +vitiorum ex actibus causari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In the agent there is sometimes only the active principle of its act: for instance in fire there is only the active principle + of heating. And in such an agent a habit cannot be caused by its own act: for which reason natural things cannot become accustomed + or unaccustomed, as is stated in Ethic. ii, 1. But a certain agent is to be found, in which there is both the active and the + passive principle of its act, as we see in human acts. For the acts of the + appetitive power proceed from that same power according as it is moved by the apprehensive power presenting the object: and + further, the intellective power, according as it reasons about conclusions, has, as it were, an active principle in a self-evident + proposition. Wherefore by such acts habits can be caused in their agents; not indeed with regard to the first active principle, + but with regard to that principle of the act, which principle is a mover moved. For everything that is passive and + moved by another, is disposed by the action of the agent; wherefore if the acts be multiplied a certain quality is formed + in the power which is passive and moved, which quality is called a habit: just as the habits of moral virtue are caused in + the appetitive powers, according as they are moved by the reason, and as the habits of science are caused in the intellect, + according as it is moved by first propositions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 2 co."><a name="35688" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35688] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod in agente quandoque est solum activum principium sui +actus, sicut in igne est solum principium activum calefaciendi. Et +in tali agente non potest aliquis habitus causari ex proprio actu, +et inde est quod res naturales non possunt aliquid consuescere vel +dissuescere, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Invenitur autem aliquod agens +in quo est principium activum et passivum sui actus, sicut patet in +actibus humanis. Nam actus appetitivae virtutis procedunt a vi +appetitiva secundum quod movetur a vi apprehensiva repraesentante +obiectum, et ulterius vis intellectiva, secundum quod ratiocinatur +de conclusionibus, habet sicut principium activum propositionem per +se notam. Unde ex talibus actibus possunt in agentibus aliqui +habitus causari, non quidem quantum ad primum activum principium, +sed quantum ad principium actus quod movet motum. Nam omne quod +patitur et movetur ab alio, disponitur per actum agentis, unde ex +multiplicatis actibus generatur quaedam qualitas in potentia +passiva et mota, quae nominatur habitus. Sicut habitus virtutum +moralium causantur in appetitivis potentiis, secundum quod moventur +a ratione, et habitus scientiarum causantur in intellectu, secundum +quod movetur a primis propositionibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The agent, as agent, does not receive anything. But in so far as it moves through being moved by another, it receives something + from that which moves it: and thus is a habit caused. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35689" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35689] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod agens, inquantum est agens, non recipit aliquid. +Sed inquantum agit motum ab alio, sic recipit aliquid a movente, et +sic causatur habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same thing, and in the same respect, cannot be mover and moved; but nothing prevents a thing from being moved by itself + as to different respects, as is proved in Physics viii, text. 28,29. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35690" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35690] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod idem, secundum idem, non potest esse movens et motum. +Nihil autem prohibet idem a seipso moveri secundum diversa, ut in +VIII Physic. probatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The act which precedes the habit, in so far as it comes from an active principle, proceeds from a more excellent principle + than is the habit caused thereby: just as the reason is a more excellent principle than the habit of moral virtue produced + in the appetitive power by repeated acts, and as the understanding of first principles is a more excellent principle than + the science of conclusions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35691" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35691] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod actus praecedens habitum inquantum procedit a +principio activo, procedit a nobiliori principio quam sit habitus +generatus, sicut ipsa ratio est nobilius principium quam sit +habitus virtutis moralis in vi appetitiva per actuum consuetudines +generatus; et intellectus principiorum est nobilius principium quam +scientia conclusionum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q51_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q51_A3-p0.1">Q. 51. A. 3. Whether a habit can be caused by one act?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a habit can be caused by one act. For demonstration is an act of reason. But science, which is the habit + of one conclusion, is caused by one demonstration. Therefore habit can be caused by one act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35692" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35692] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod per unum actum possit habitus +generari. Demonstratio enim actus rationis est. Sed per unam +demonstrationem causatur scientia quae est habitus conclusionis +unius. Ergo habitus potest causari ex uno actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as acts happen to increase by multiplication so do they happen to increase by intensity. But a habit is caused by + multiplication of acts. Therefore also if an act be very intense, it can be the generating cause of a habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35693" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35693] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut contingit actus crescere per multiplicationem, ita contingit +actum crescere per intensionem. Sed multiplicatis actibus, +generatur habitus. Ergo etiam si multum intendatur unus actus, +poterit esse causa generativa habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, health and sickness are habits. But it happens that a man is healed or becomes ill, by one act. Therefore one act + can cause a habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35694" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35694] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sanitas et aegritudo sunt habitus quidam. Sed ex uno actu contingit +hominem vel sanari vel infirmari. Ergo unus actus potest habitum +causare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7): "As neither does one swallow nor one day make spring: so neither does one day nor a short + time make a man blessed and happy." But "happiness is an operation in respect of a habit of perfect virtue" (Ethic. i, 7,10,13). + Therefore a habit of virtue, and for the same reason, other habits, is not caused by one act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35695" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35695] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod <i>una hirundo ver +non facit, nec una dies, ita utique nec beatum nec felicem una +dies, nec paucum tempus. Sed beatitudo est operatio secundum +habitum perfectae virtutis</i>, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Ergo habitus +virtutis, et eadem ratione alius habitus, non causatur per unum +actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said already + <a href="#FS_Q51_A2" id="FS_Q51_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, habit is caused by act, because a passive power is moved by an active principle. But in order that some quality be caused + in that which is passive the active principle must entirely overcome the passive. Whence we see that because fire cannot at + once overcome the combustible, it does not enkindle at once; but it gradually expels contrary dispositions, so that by overcoming + it entirely, it may impress + its likeness on it. Now it is clear that the active principle which is reason, cannot entirely overcome the appetitive power + in one act: because the appetitive power is inclined variously, and to many things; while the reason judges in a single act, + what should be willed in regard to various aspects and circumstances. Wherefore the appetitive power is not thereby entirely + overcome, so as to be inclined like nature to the same thing, in the majority of cases; which inclination belongs to the + habit of virtue. Therefore a habit of virtue cannot be caused by one act, but only by many. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 3 co."><a name="35696" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35696] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, habitus per actum generatur +inquantum potentia passiva movetur ab aliquo principio activo. Ad +hoc autem quod aliqua qualitas causetur in passivo, oportet quod +activum totaliter vincat passivum. Unde videmus quod, quia ignis +non potest statim vincere suum combustibile, non statim inflammat +ipsum, sed paulatim abiicit contrarias dispositiones, ut sic +totaliter vincens ipsum, similitudinem suam ipsi imprimat. +Manifestum est autem quod principium activum quod est ratio, non +totaliter potest supervincere appetitivam potentiam in uno actu, eo +quod appetitiva potentia se habet diversimode et ad multa; +iudicatur autem per rationem, in uno actu, aliquid appetendum +secundum determinatas rationes et circumstantias. Unde ex hoc non +totaliter vincitur appetitiva potentia, ut feratur in idem ut in +pluribus, per modum naturae, quod pertinet ad habitum virtutis. Et +ideo habitus virtutis non potest causari per unum actum, sed per +multos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A3-p7"> But in the apprehensive powers, we must observe that there are two passive principles: one is the "possible" [*See + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q79_A2" id="FS_Q51_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[79], A[2]</a> ad 2] intellect itself; the other is the intellect which Aristotle (De Anima iii, text. 20) calls "passive," and is the "particular + reason," that is the cogitative power, with memory and imagination. With regard then to the former passive principle, it is + possible for a certain active principle to entirely overcome, by one + act, the power of its passive principle: thus one self-evident proposition convinces the intellect, so that it gives a firm + assent to the conclusion, but a probable proposition cannot do this. Wherefore a habit of opinion needs to be caused by many + acts of the reason, even on the part of the "possible" intellect: whereas a habit of science can be caused by a single act + of the reason, so far as the "possible" intellect is concerned. But with regard to the lower apprehensive powers, the same + acts + need to be repeated many times for anything to be firmly impressed on the memory. And so the Philosopher says (De Memor. et + Remin. 1) that "meditation strengthens memory." Bodily habits, however, can be caused by one act, if the active principle + is of great power: sometimes, for instance, a strong dose of medicine restores health at once. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin"> In apprehensivis autem potentiis considerandum est quod +duplex est passivum, unum quidem ipse intellectus possibilis; aliud +autem intellectus quem vocat Aristoteles passivum, qui est ratio +particularis, idest vis cogitativa cum memorativa et imaginativa. +Respectu igitur primi passivi, potest esse aliquod activum quod uno +actu totaliter vincit potentiam sui passivi, sicut una propositio +per se nota convincit intellectum ad assentiendum firmiter +conclusioni; quod quidem non facit propositio probabilis. Unde ex +multis actibus rationis oportet causari habitum opinativum, etiam +ex parte intellectus possibilis, habitum autem scientiae possibile +est causari ex uno rationis actu, quantum ad intellectum +possibilem. Sed quantum ad inferiores vires apprehensivas, +necessarium est eosdem actus pluries reiterari, ut aliquid firmiter +memoriae imprimatur. Unde philosophus, in libro de memoria et +reminiscentia, dicit quod <i>meditatio confirmat memoriam</i>. +Habitus autem corporales possibile est causari ex uno actu, si +activum fuerit magnae virtutis, sicut quandoque medicina fortis +statim inducit sanitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A3-p8"> Hence the solutions to the objections are clear.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 3 ad arg."><a name="35697" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35697] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 3 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc +patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q51_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q51_A4-p0.1">Q. 51. A. 4. Whether any habits are infused in man by God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no habit is infused in man by God. For God treats all equally. If therefore He infuses habits into some, + He would infuse them into all: which is clearly untrue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35698" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35698] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullus habitus hominibus infundatur a +Deo. Deus enim aequaliter se habet ad omnes. Si igitur quibusdam +infundit habitus aliquos, omnibus eos infunderet. Quod patet esse +falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God works in all things according to the mode which is suitable to their nature: for "it belongs to Divine providence + to preserve nature," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But habits are naturally caused in man by acts, as we have said above + + <a href="#FS_Q51_A2" id="FS_Q51_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore God does not cause habits to be in man except by acts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35699" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35699] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Deus operatur in omnibus secundum modum qui convenit naturae +ipsorum, quia divinae providentiae est naturam salvare, ut dicit +Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed habitus in homine naturaliter +causantur ex actibus, ut dictum est. Non ergo causat Deus in +hominibus aliquos habitus absque actibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if any habit be infused into man by God, man can by that habit perform many acts. But "from those acts a like habit + is caused" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Consequently there will be two habits of the same species in the same man, one acquired, the + other infused. Now this seems impossible: for the two forms of the same species cannot be in the same subject. Therefore a + habit is not infused into man by God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35700" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35700] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +si aliquis habitus a Deo infunditur, per illum habitum homo potest +multos actus producere. Sed ex illis actibus causatur similis +habitus, ut in II Ethic. dicitur. Sequitur ergo duos habitus +eiusdem speciei esse in eodem, unum acquisitum, et alterum infusum. +Quod videtur esse impossibile, non enim duae formae unius speciei +possunt esse in eodem subiecto. Non ergo habitus aliquis infunditur +homini a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q51_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.15.5" target="asv">Ecclus. 15:5</a>): "God filled him with the spirit of wisdom and understanding." Now wisdom and understanding are habits. Therefore some habits + are infused into man by God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35701" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35701] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Eccli. XV, <i>implevit eum dominus spiritu +sapientiae et intellectus</i>. Sed sapientia et intellectus quidam +habitus sunt. Ergo aliqui habitus homini a Deo infunduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q51_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some habits are infused by God into man, for two reasons. + </p><p id="FS_Q51_A4-p7"> The first reason is because there are some habits by which man is disposed to an end which exceeds the proportion of human + nature, namely, the ultimate and perfect happiness of man, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q5_A5" id="FS_Q51_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[5], A[5]</a>). And since habits need to be in proportion with that to which man is disposed by them, therefore is it necessary that those + habits, which dispose to this end, exceed the proportion of human nature. Wherefore such habits can never be in man except + by Divine infusion, as is the case with all gratuitous virtues. + </p><p id="FS_Q51_A4-p8"> The other reason is, because God can produce the effects of second causes, without these second causes, as we have said in + the + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q105_A6" id="FS_Q51_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[105], A[6]</a>. Just as, therefore, sometimes, in order to show His power, He causes health, without its natural cause, but which nature + could have caused, so also, at times, for the manifestation of His power, He infuses into man even those habits which can + be caused by a natural power. Thus He gave to the apostles the + science of the Scriptures and of all tongues, which men can acquire by study or by custom, but not so perfectly. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 4 co."><a name="35702" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35702] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod duplici ratione aliqui habitus homini a Deo +infunduntur. Prima ratio est, quia aliqui habitus sunt quibus homo +bene disponitur ad finem excedentem facultatem humanae naturae, qui +est ultima et perfecta hominis beatitudo, ut supra dictum est. Et +quia habitus oportet esse proportionatos ei ad quod homo disponitur +secundum ipsos, ideo necesse est quod etiam habitus ad huiusmodi +finem disponentes, excedant facultatem humanae naturae. Unde tales +habitus nunquam possunt homini inesse nisi ex infusione divina, +sicut est de omnibus gratuitis virtutibus. Alia ratio est, quia +Deus potest producere effectus causarum secundarum absque ipsis +causis secundis, ut in primo dictum est. Sicut igitur quandoque, ad +ostensionem suae virtutis, producit sanitatem absque naturali +causa, quae tamen per naturam posset causari; ita etiam quandoque, +ad ostendendam suam virtutem, infundit homini illos etiam habitus +qui naturali virtute possunt causari. Sicut apostolis dedit +scientiam Scripturarum et omnium linguarum, quam homines per +studium vel consuetudinem acquirere possunt, licet non ita +perfecte.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God, in respect of His Nature, is the same to all, but in respect of the order of His Wisdom, for some fixed motive, gives + certain things to some, which He does not give to others. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35703" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35703] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Deus, quantum ad suam naturam, aequaliter se +habet ad omnes, sed secundum ordinem suae sapientiae certa ratione +quaedam tribuit aliquibus, quae non tribuit aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That God works in all according to their mode, does not hinder God from doing what nature cannot do: but it follows from + this that He does nothing contrary to that which is suitable to nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35704" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35704] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod hoc quod Deus in omnibus operatur secundum modum +eorum, non excludit quin Deus quaedam operetur quae natura operari +non potest, sed ex hoc sequitur quod nihil operatur contra id quod +naturae convenit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Acts produced by an infused habit, do not cause a habit, but strengthen the already existing habit; just as the remedies + of medicine given to a man who is naturally health, do not cause a kind of health, but give new strength to the health he + had before. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35705" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35705] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod actus qui producuntur ex habitu infuso, non causant +aliquem habitum, sed confirmant habitum praeexistentem, sicut +medicinalia remedia adhibita homini sano per naturam, non causant +aliquam sanitatem, sed sanitatem prius habitam corroborant.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q52" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q52-p0.1">Q. 52. OF THE INCREASE OF HABITS (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q52-p2"> We have now to consider the increase of habits; under which head there are three points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q52-p3"><a href="#FS_Q52_A1"> (1) Whether habits increase?</a></p><p id="FS_Q52-p4"><a href="#FS_Q52_A2"> (2) Whether they increase by addition?</a></p><p id="FS_Q52-p5"><a href="#FS_Q52_A3"> (3) Whether each act increases the habit?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 pr."><a name="35706" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35706] +Iª-IIae q. 52 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +augmento habituum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo, utrum +habitus augeantur. Secundo, utrum augeantur per additionem. Tertio, +utrum quilibet actus augeat habitum.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q52_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q52_A1-p0.1">Q. 52. A. 1. Whether habits increase?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habits cannot increase. For increase concerns quantity (Phys. v, text. 18). But habits are not in the + genus quantity, but in that of quality. Therefore there can be no increase of habits. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35707" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35707] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus augeri non possint. Augmentum +enim est circa quantitatem, ut dicitur in V Physic. Sed habitus non +sunt in genere quantitatis, sed in genere qualitatis. Ergo circa +eos augmentum esse non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habit is a perfection (Phys. vii, text. 17,18). But since perfection conveys a notion of end and term, it seems + that it cannot be more or less. Therefore a habit cannot increase. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35708" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35708] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +habitus est perfectio quaedam, ut dicitur in VII Physic. Sed +perfectio, cum importet finem et terminum, non videtur posse +recipere magis et minus. Ergo habitus augeri non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, those things which can be more or less are subject to alteration: for that which from being less hot becomes more + hot, is said to be altered. But in habits there is no alteration, as is proved in Phys. vii, text. 15,17. Therefore habits + cannot increase. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35709" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35709] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +in his quae recipiunt magis et minus, contingit esse alterationem, +alterari enim dicitur quod de minus calido fit magis calidum. Sed +in habitibus non est alteratio, ut probatur in VII Physic. Ergo +habitus augeri non possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Faith is a habit, and yet it increases: wherefore the disciples said to our Lord ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q52_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.17.5" target="asv">Lk. 17:5</a>): "Lord, increase our faith." Therefore habits increase. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35710" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35710] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod fides est quidam habitus, et tamen augetur, unde discipuli +domino dicunt, domine, adauge nobis fidem, ut habetur Luc. XVII. +Ergo habitus augentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Increase, like other things pertaining to quantity, is transferred from bodily quantities to intelligible spiritual things, + on account of the natural connection of the intellect with corporeal things, which come under the imagination. Now in corporeal + quantities, a thing is said to be great, according as it reaches the perfection of quantity due to it; wherefore a certain + quantity is reputed great in man, which is not reputed great in an elephant. And so + also in forms, we say a thing is great because it is perfect. And since good has the nature of perfection, therefore "in things + which are great, but not in quantity, to be greater is the same as to be better," as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 8). + </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p7"> Now the perfection of a form may be considered in two ways: first, in respect of the form itself: secondly, in respect of + the participation of the form by its subject. In so far as we consider the perfections of a form in respect of the form itself, + thus the form is said to be "little" or "great": for instance great or little health or science. But in so far as we consider + the perfection of a form in respect of the participation thereof by the subject, it is said to be "more" or + "less": for instance more or less white or healthy. Now this distinction is not to be understood as implying that the form + has a being outside its matter or subject, but that it is one thing to consider the form according to its specific nature, + and another to consider it in respect of its participation by a subject. + </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p8"> In this way, then, there were four opinions among philosophers concerning intensity and remission of habits and forms, as + Simplicius relates in his Commentary on the Predicaments. For Plotinus and the other Platonists held that qualities and habits + themselves were susceptible of more or less, for the reason that they were material and so had a certain want of definiteness, + on account of the infinity of matter. Others, on the contrary, held that qualities and habits of themselves + were not susceptible of more or less; but that the things affected by them [qualia] are said to be more or less, in respect + of the participation of the subject: that, for instance, justice is not more or less, but the just thing. Aristotle alludes + to this opinion in the Predicaments (Categor. vi). The third opinion was that of the Stoics, and lies between the two preceding + opinions. For they held that some habits are of themselves susceptible of more and less, for instance, the arts; and that + some are not, as the virtues. The fourth opinion was held by some who said that qualities and immaterial forms are not susceptible + of more or less, but that material forms are. + </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p9"> In order that the truth in this matter be made clear, we must observe that, in respect of which a thing receives its species, + must be something fixed and stationary, and as it were indivisible: for whatever attains to that thing, is contained under + the species, and whatever recedes from it more or less, belongs to another species, more or less perfect. Wherefore, the Philosopher + says (Metaph. viii, text. 10) that species of things are like numbers, in which addition or + subtraction changes the species. If, therefore, a form, or anything at all, receives its specific nature in respect of itself, + or in respect of something belonging to it, it is necessary that, considered in itself, it be something of a definite nature, + which can be neither more nor less. Such are heat, whiteness or other like qualities which are not denominated from a relation + to something else: and much more so, substance, which is "per se" being. But those things which receive their species + from something to which they are related, can be diversified, in respect of themselves, according to more or less: and nonetheless + they remain in the same species, on account of the oneness of that to which they are related, and from which they receive + their species. For example, movement is in itself more intense or more remiss: and yet it remains in the same species, on + account of the oneness of the term by which it is specified. We may observe the same thing in health; for a body attains to + the nature of health, according as it has a disposition suitable to an animal's nature, to which various dispositions may + be suitable; which disposition is therefore variable as regards more or less, and withal the nature of health remains. Whence + the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 2,3): "Health itself may be more or less: for the measure is not the same in all, nor is it + always the same in one individual; but down to a certain point it may decrease and still remain health." + </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p10"> Now these various dispositions and measures of health are by way of excess and defect: wherefore if the name of health were + given to the most perfect measure, then we should not speak of health as greater or less. Thus therefore it is clear how a + quality or form may increase or decrease of itself, and how it cannot. + </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p11"> But if we consider a quality or form in respect of its participation by the subject, thus again we find that some qualities + and forms are susceptible of more or less, and some not. Now Simplicius assigns the cause of this diversity to the fact that + substance in itself cannot be susceptible of more or less, because it is "per se" being. And therefore every form which is + participated substantially by its subject, cannot vary in intensity and remission: wherefore in the genus of + substance nothing is said to be more or less. And because quantity is nigh to substance, and because shape follows on quantity, + therefore is it that neither in these can there be such a thing as more or less. Whence the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. + 15) that when a thing receives form and shape, it is not said to be altered, but to be made. But other qualities which are + further removed from quantity, and are connected with passions and actions, are susceptible of more or less, in respect + of their participation by the subject. + </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p12"> Now it is possible to explain yet further the reason of this diversity. For, as we have said, that from which a thing receives + its species must remain indivisibly fixed and constant in something indivisible. Wherefore in two ways it may happen that + a form cannot be participated more or less. First because the participator has its species in respect of that form. And for + this reason no substantial form is participated more or less. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, + text. 10) that, "as a number cannot be more or less, so neither can that which is in the species of substance," that is, in + respect of its participation of the specific form: "but in so far as substance may be with matter," i.e. in respect of material + dispositions, "more or less are found in substance." + </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p13"> Secondly this may happen from the fact that the form is essentially indivisible: wherefore if anything participate that form, + it must needs participate it in respect of its indivisibility. For this reason we do not speak of the species of number as + varying in respect of more or less; because each species thereof is constituted by an indivisible unity. The same is to be + said of the species of continuous quantity, which are denominated from numbers, as two-cubits-long, + three-cubits-long, and of relations of quantity, as double and treble, and of figures of quantity, as triangle and tetragon. + </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p14"> This same explanation is given by Aristotle in the Predicaments (Categor. vi), where in explaining why figures are not susceptible + of more or less, he says: "Things which are given the nature of a triangle or a circle, are accordingly triangles and circles": + to wit, because indivisibility is essential to the motion of such, wherefore whatever participates their nature must participate + it in its indivisibility. + </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p15"> It is clear, therefore, since we speak of habits and dispositions in respect of a relation to something (Phys. vii, text. + 17), that in two ways intensity and remission may be observed in habits and dispositions. First, in respect of the habit itself: + thus, for instance, we speak of greater or less health; greater or less science, which extends to more or fewer things. Secondly, + in respect of participation by the subject: in so far as equal science or health is participated more + in one than in another, according to a diverse aptitude arising either from nature, or from custom. For habit and disposition + do not give species to the subject: nor again do they essentially imply indivisibility. + </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p16"> We shall say further on ( + <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q66_A1" id="FS_Q52_A1-p16.1" shape="rect">Q[66], A[1]</a>) how it is with the virtues. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 1 co."><a name="35711" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35711] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod augmentum, sicut et alia ad quantitatem pertinentia, +a quantitatibus corporalibus ad res spirituales intelligibiles +transfertur; propter connaturalitatem intellectus nostri ad res +corporeas, quae sub imaginatione cadunt. Dicitur autem in +quantitatibus corporeis aliquid magnum, secundum quod ad debitam +perfectionem quantitatis perducitur, unde aliqua quantitas +reputatur magna in homine, quae non reputatur magna in elephante. +Unde et in formis dicimus aliquid magnum, ex hoc quod est +perfectum. Et quia bonum habet rationem perfecti, propter hoc <i>in +his quae non mole magna sunt, idem est esse maius quod melius</i>, +ut Augustinus dicit, in VI de Trin. Perfectio autem formae +dupliciter potest considerari, uno modo, secundum ipsam formam; +alio modo, secundum quod subiectum participat formam. Inquantum +igitur attenditur perfectio formae secundum ipsam formam, sic +dicitur ipsa esse parva vel magna; puta magna vel parva sanitas vel +scientia. Inquantum vero attenditur perfectio formae secundum +participationem subiecti, dicitur magis et minus; puta magis vel +minus album vel sanum. Non autem ista distinctio procedit secundum +hoc, quod forma habeat esse praeter materiam aut subiectum, sed +quia alia est consideratio eius secundum rationem speciei suae, et +alia secundum quod participatur in subiecto. Secundum hoc igitur, +circa intensionem et remissionem habituum et formarum, fuerunt +quatuor opiniones apud philosophos, ut Simplicius narrat in +commento praedicamentorum. Plotinus enim et alii Platonici ponebant +ipsas qualitates et habitus suscipere magis et minus, propter hoc +quod materiales erant, et ex hoc habebant indeterminationem +quandam, propter materiae infinitatem. Alii vero in contrarium +ponebant quod ipsae qualitates et habitus secundum se non +recipiebant magis et minus; sed qualia dicuntur magis et minus, +secundum diversam participationem; puta quod iustitia non dicatur +magis et minus, sed iustum. Et hanc opinionem tangit Aristoteles in +praedicamentis. Tertia fuit opinio Stoicorum, media inter has. +Posuerunt enim quod aliqui habitus secundum se recipiunt magis et +minus, sicuti artes; quidam autem non, sicut virtutes. Quarta +opinio fuit quorundam dicentium quod qualitates et formae +immateriales non recipiunt magis et minus, materiales autem +recipiunt. Ut igitur huius rei veritas manifestetur, considerandum +est quod illud secundum quod sortitur aliquid speciem, oportet esse +fixum et stans, et quasi indivisibile, quaecumque enim ad illud +attingunt, sub specie continentur; quaecumque autem recedunt ab +illo, vel in plus vel in minus, pertinent ad aliam speciem, vel +perfectiorem vel imperfectiorem. Unde philosophus dicit, in VIII +Metaphys., quod species rerum sunt sicut numeri, in quibus additio +vel diminutio variat speciem. Si igitur aliqua forma, vel +quaecumque res, secundum seipsam vel secundum aliquid sui, +sortiatur rationem speciei; necesse est quod, secundum se +considerata, habeat determinatam rationem, quae neque in plus +excedere, neque in minus deficere possit. Et huiusmodi sunt calor +et albedo, et aliae huiusmodi qualitates quae non dicuntur in +ordine ad aliud, et multo magis substantia, quae est per se ens. +Illa vero quae recipiunt speciem ex aliquo ad quod ordinantur, +possunt secundum seipsa diversificari in plus vel in minus, et +nihilominus sunt eadem specie, propter unitatem eius ad quod +ordinantur, ex quo recipiunt speciem. Sicut motus secundum se est +intensior et remissior, et tamen remanet eadem species, propter +unitatem termini, ex quo specificatur. Et idem potest considerari +in sanitate, nam corpus pertingit ad rationem sanitatis, secundum +quod habet dispositionem convenientem naturae animalis, cui possunt +dispositiones diversae convenientes esse; unde potest variari +dispositio in plus vel in minus, et tamen semper remanet ratio +sanitatis. Unde philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., quod <i>sanitas +ipsa recipit magis et minus, non enim eadem est commensuratio in +omnibus, neque in uno et eodem semper; sed remissa permanet sanitas +usque ad aliquid</i>. Huiusmodi autem diversae dispositiones vel +commensurationes sanitatis se habent secundum excedens et excessum, +unde si nomen sanitatis esset impositum soli perfectissimae +commensurationi, tunc ipsa sanitas non diceretur maior vel minor. +Sic igitur patet qualiter aliqua qualitas vel forma possit secundum +seipsam augeri vel minui, et qualiter non. Si vero consideremus +qualitatem vel formam secundum participationem subiecti, sic etiam +inveniuntur quaedam qualitates et formae recipere magis et minus, +et quaedam non. Huiusmodi autem diversitatis causam Simplicius +assignat ex hoc, quod substantia secundum seipsam non potest +recipere magis et minus, quia est ens per se. Et ideo omnis forma +quae substantialiter participatur in subiecto, caret intensione et +remissione, unde in genere substantiae nihil dicitur secundum magis +et minus. Et quia quantitas propinqua est substantiae, et figura +etiam consequitur quantitatem; inde est quod neque etiam in istis +dicitur aliquid secundum magis aut minus. Unde philosophus dicit, +in VII Physic., quod cum aliquid accipit formam et figuram, non +dicitur alterari, sed magis fieri. Aliae vero qualitates, quae sunt +magis distantes a substantia, et coniunguntur passionibus et +actionibus, recipiunt magis et minus secundum participationem +subiecti. Potest autem et magis explicari huiusmodi diversitatis +ratio. Ut enim dictum est, id a quo aliquid habet speciem, oportet +manere fixum et stans in indivisibili. Duobus igitur modis potest +contingere quod forma non participatur secundum magis et minus. Uno +modo, quia participans habet speciem secundum ipsam. Et inde est +quod nulla forma substantialis participatur secundum magis et +minus. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit, in VIII Metaphys., quod, +sicut numerus non habet magis neque minus, sic neque substantia +quae est secundum speciem, idest quantum ad participationem formae +specificae; sed si quidem quae cum materia, idest, secundum +materiales dispositiones invenitur magis et minus in substantia. +Alio modo potest contingere ex hoc quod ipsa indivisibilitas est de +ratione formae, unde oportet quod, si aliquid participet formam +illam, quod participet illam secundum rationem indivisibilitatis. +Et inde est quod species numeri non dicuntur secundum magis et +minus, quia unaquaeque species in eis constituitur per +indivisibilem unitatem. Et eadem ratio est de speciebus quantitatis +continuae quae secundum numeros accipiuntur ut bicubitum et +tricubitum; et de relationibus, ut duplum et triplum; et de +figuris, ut trigonum et tetragonum. Et hanc rationem ponit +Aristoteles in praedicamentis, ubi, assignans rationem quare +figurae non recipiunt magis et minus, dicit, <i>quae quidem enim +recipiunt trigoni rationem et circuli, similiter trigona vel +circuli sunt</i>, quia scilicet indivisibilitas est de ipsa eorum +ratione, unde quaecumque participant rationem eorum, oportet quod +indivisibiliter participent. Sic igitur patet quod, cum habitus et +dispositiones dicantur secundum ordinem ad aliquid, ut dicitur in +VII Physic., dupliciter potest intensio et remissio in habitibus et +dispositionibus considerari. Uno modo, secundum se, prout dicitur +maior vel minor sanitas; vel maior vel minor scientia, quae ad +plura vel pauciora se extendit. Alio modo, secundum participationem +subiecti, prout scilicet aequalis scientia vel sanitas magis +recipitur in uno quam in alio, secundum diversam aptitudinem vel ex +natura vel ex consuetudine. Non enim habitus et dispositio dat +speciem subiecto, neque iterum in sui ratione includit +indivisibilitatem. Quomodo autem circa virtutes se habeat, infra +dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A1-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the word "great" is taken from corporeal quantities and applied to the intelligible perfections of forms; so also is the + word "growth," the term of which is something great. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35712" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35712] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut nomen magnitudinis derivatur a +quantitatibus corporalibus ad intelligibiles perfectiones formarum; +ita etiam et nomen augmenti, cuius terminus est magnum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A1-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Habit is indeed a perfection, but not a perfection which is the term of its subject; for instance, a term giving the subject + its specific being. Nor again does the nature of a habit include the notion of term, as do the species of numbers. Wherefore + there is nothing to hinder it from being susceptible of more or less. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35713" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35713] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod habitus quidem perfectio est, non tamen talis +perfectio quae sit terminus sui subiecti, puta dans ei esse +specificum. Neque etiam in sui ratione terminum includit, sicut +species numerorum. Unde nihil prohibet quin recipiat magis et +minus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A1-p19"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Alteration is primarily indeed in the qualities of the third species; but secondarily it may be in the qualities of the first + species: for, supposing an alteration as to hot and cold, there follows in an animal an alteration as to health and sickness. + In like manner, if an alteration take place in the passions of the sensitive appetite, or the sensitive powers of apprehension, + an alteration follows as to science and virtue (Phys. viii, text. 20). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35714" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35714] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod alteratio primo quidem est in qualitatibus tertiae +speciei. In qualitatibus vero primae speciei potest esse alteratio +per posterius, facta enim alteratione secundum calidum et frigidum, +sequitur animal alterari secundum sanum et aegrum. Et similiter, +facta alteratione secundum passiones appetitus sensitivi, vel +secundum vires sensitivas apprehensivas, sequitur alteratio +secundum scientias et virtutes, ut dicitur in VII Physic.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q52_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q52_A2-p0.1">Q. 52. A. 2. Whether habits increases by addition?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the increase of habits is by way of addition. For the word "increase," as we have said, is transferred + to forms, from corporeal quantities. But in corporeal quantities there is no increase without addition: wherefore (De Gener. + i, text. 31) it is said that "increase is an addition to a magnitude already existing." Therefore in habits also there is + no increase without addition. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35715" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35715] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod augmentum habituum fiat per +additionem. Nomen enim augmenti, ut dictum est, a quantitatibus +corporalibus transfertur ad formas. Sed in quantitatibus +corporalibus non fit augmentum sine additione, unde in I de +Generat. dicitur quod <i>augmentum est praeexistenti magnitudini +additamentum</i>. Ergo et in habitibus non fit augmentum nisi per +additionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habit is not increased except by means of some agent. But every agent does something in the passive subject: for + instance, that which heats, causes heat in that which is heated. Therefore there is no increase without addition. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35716" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35716] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +habitus non augetur nisi aliquo agente. Sed omne agens aliquid +facit in subiecto patiente, sicut calefaciens facit calorem in ipso +calefacto. Ergo non potest esse augmentum nisi aliqua fiat +additio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as that which is not white, is in potentiality to be white: so that which is less white, is in potentiality to be + more white. But that which is not white, is not made white except by the addition of whiteness. Therefore that which is less + white, is not made more white, except by an added whiteness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35717" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35717] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut id quod non est album, est in potentia ad album; ita id quod +est minus album, est in potentia ad magis album. Sed id quod non +est album, non fit album nisi per adventum albedinis. Ergo id quod +est minus album, non fit magis album nisi per aliquam aliam +albedinem supervenientem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text. 84): "That which is hot is made hotter, without making, in the matter, something hot, + that was not hot, when the thing was less hot." Therefore, in like manner, neither is any addition made in other forms when + they increase. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35718" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35718] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in IV Physic., <i>ex calido fit magis +calidum, nullo facto in materia calido, quod non esset calidum +quando erat minus calidum</i>. Ergo, pari ratione, nec in aliis +formis quae augentur, est aliqua additio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q52_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The solution of this question depends on what we have said above + <a href="#FS_Q52_A1" id="FS_Q52_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. For we said that increase and decrease in forms which are capable of intensity and remissness, happen in one way not on + the part of the very form considered in itself, through the diverse participation thereof by the subject. Wherefore such increase + of habits and other forms, is not caused by an addition of form to form; but by the subject participating more or + less perfectly, one and the same form. And just as, by an agent which is in act, something is made actually hot, beginning, + as it were, to participate a form, not as though the form itself were made, as is proved in Metaph. vii, text. 32, so, by + an intense action of the agent, something is made more hot, as it were participating the form more perfectly, not as though + something were added to the form. + </p><p id="FS_Q52_A2-p7"> For if this increase in forms were understood to be by way of addition, this could only be either in the form itself or in + the subject. If it be understood of the form itself, it has already been stated + <a href="#FS_Q52_A1" id="FS_Q52_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that such an addition or subtraction would change the species; even as the species of color is changed when a thing from + being pale becomes white. If, on the other hand, this addition be understood as applying to the subject, this could only be + either because one part of the subject receives a form which it had not previously (thus we may say cold increases in a man + who, after being cold in one part of his body, is cold in several parts), or because some other subject is added sharing in + the same form (as when a hot thing is added to another, or one white thing to another). But in either of these two ways we + have not a more white or a more hot thing, but a greater white or hot thing. + </p><p id="FS_Q52_A2-p8"> Since, however, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q52_A1" id="FS_Q52_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, certain accidents are of themselves susceptible of more or less, in some of these we may find increase by addition. For + movement increases by an addition either to the time it lasts, or to the course it follows: and yet the species remains the + same on account of the oneness of the term. Yet movement increases the intensity as to participation in its subject: i.e. + in so far as the same movement can be executed more + or less speedily or readily. In like manner, science can increase in itself by addition; thus when anyone learns several conclusions + of geometry, the same specific habit of science increases in that man. Yet a man's science increases, as to the subject's + participation thereof, in intensity, in so far as one man is quicker and readier than another in considering the same conclusions. + </p><p id="FS_Q52_A2-p9"> As to bodily habits, it does not seem very probable that they receive increase by way of addition. For an animal is not said + to be simply healthy or beautiful, unless it be such in all its parts. And if it be brought to a more perfect measure, this + is the result of a change in the simple qualities, which are not susceptible of increase save in intensity on the part of + the subject partaking of them. + </p><p id="FS_Q52_A2-p10"> How this question affects virtues we shall state further on ( + <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q66_A1" id="FS_Q52_A2-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[66], A[1]</a> ). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 2 co."><a name="35719" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35719] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod huius quaestionis solutio dependet ex praemissa. +Dictum est enim supra quod augmentum et diminutio in formis quae +intenduntur et remittuntur, accidit uno modo non ex parte ipsius +formae secundum se consideratae, sed ex diversa participatione +subiecti. Et ideo huiusmodi augmentum habituum et aliarum formarum, +non fit per additionem formae ad formam; sed fit per hoc quod +subiectum magis vel minus perfecte participat unam et eandem +formam. Et sicut per agens quod est actu, fit aliquid actu calidum, +quasi de novo incipiens participare formam, non quod fiat ipsa +forma, ut probatur VII Metaphys.; ita per actionem intensam ipsius +agentis efficitur magis calidum, tanquam perfectius participans +formam, non tanquam formae aliquid addatur. Si enim per additionem +intelligeretur huiusmodi augmentum in formis, hoc non posset esse +nisi vel ex parte ipsius formae, vel ex parte subiecti. Si autem ex +parte ipsius formae, iam dictum est quod talis additio vel +subtractio speciem variaret; sicut variatur species coloris, quando +de pallido fit album. Si vero huiusmodi additio intelligatur ex +parte subiecti, hoc non posset esse nisi vel quia aliqua pars +subiecti recipit formam quam prius non habebat, ut si dicatur +frigus crescere in homine qui prius frigebat in una parte, quando +iam in pluribus partibus friget, vel quia aliquod aliud subiectum +additur participans eandem formam, sicut si calidum adiungatur +calido, vel album albo. Sed secundum utrumque istorum duorum +modorum, non dicitur aliquid magis album vel calidum, sed maius. +Sed quia quaedam accidentia augentur secundum seipsa, ut supra +dictum est, in quibusdam eorum fieri potest augmentum per +additionem. Augetur enim motus per hoc quod ei aliquid additur vel +secundum tempus in quo est, vel secundum viam per quam est, et +tamen manet eadem species, propter unitatem termini. Augetur etiam +nihilominus motus per intensionem, secundum participationem +subiecti, inquantum scilicet idem motus potest vel magis vel minus +expedite aut prompte fieri. Similiter etiam et scientia potest +augeri secundum seipsam per additionem, sicut cum aliquis plures +conclusiones geometriae addiscit, augetur in eo habitus eiusdem +scientiae secundum speciem. Augetur nihilominus scientia in aliquo, +secundum participationem subiecti, per intensionem, prout scilicet +expeditius et clarius unus homo se habet alio in eisdem +conclusionibus considerandis. In habitibus autem corporalibus non +multum videtur fieri augmentum per additionem. Quia non dicitur +animal sanum simpliciter, aut pulchrum, nisi secundum omnes partes +suas sit tale. Quod autem ad perfectiorem commensurationem +perducatur, hoc contingit secundum transmutationem simplicium +qualitatum; quae non augentur nisi secundum intensionem, ex parte +subiecti participantis. Quomodo autem se habeat circa virtutes, +infra dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even in bodily bulk increase is twofold. First, by addition of one subject to another; such is the increase of living things. + Secondly, by mere intensity, without any addition at all; such is the case with things subject to rarefaction, as is stated + in Phys. iv, text. 63. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35720" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35720] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod etiam in magnitudine corporali contingit +dupliciter esse augmentum. Uno modo, per additionem subiecti ad +subiectum; sicut est in augmento viventium. Alio modo, per solam +intensionem, absque omni additione; sicut est in his quae +rarefiunt, ut dicitur in IV Physic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The cause that increases a habit, always effects something in the subject, but not a new form. But it causes the subject + to partake more perfectly of a pre-existing form, or it makes the form to extend further. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35721" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35721] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod causa augens habitum, facit quidem semper aliquid in +subiecto, non autem novam formam. Sed facit quod subiectum +perfectius participet formam praeexistentem, aut quod amplius se +extendat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> What is not already white, is potentially white, as not yet possessing the form of whiteness: hence the agent causes a new + form in the subject. But that which is less hot or white, is not in potentiality to those forms, since it has them already + actually: but it is in potentiality to a perfect mode of participation; and this it receives through the agent's action. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35722" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35722] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod id quod nondum est album, est in potentia ad formam +ipsam, tanquam nondum habens formam, et ideo agens causat novam +formam in subiecto. Sed id quod est minus calidum aut album, non +est in potentia ad formam, cum iam actu formam habeat, sed est in +potentia ad perfectum participationis modum. Et hoc consequitur per +actionem agentis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q52_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q52_A3-p0.1">Q. 52. A. 3. Whether every act increases its habit?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every act increases its habit. For when the cause is increased the effect is increased. Now acts are causes + of habits, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q51_A2" id="FS_Q52_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[51], A[2]</a>). Therefore a habit increases when its acts are multiplied. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35723" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35723] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod quilibet actus augeat habitum. +Multiplicata enim causa, multiplicatur effectus. Sed actus sunt +causa habituum aliquorum, ut supra dictum est. Ergo habitus +augetur, multiplicatis actibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, of like things a like judgment should be formed. But all the acts proceeding from one and the same habit are alike + (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Therefore if some acts increase a habit, every act should increase it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35724" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35724] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +de similibus idem est iudicium. Sed omnes actus ab eodem habitu +procedentes sunt similes, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Ergo, si aliqui +actus augeant habitum, quilibet actus augebit ipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, like is increased by like. But any act is like the habit whence it proceeds. Therefore every act increases the habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35725" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35725] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +simile augetur suo simili. Sed quilibet actus est similis habitui a +quo procedit. Ergo quilibet actus auget habitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Opposite effects do not result from the same cause. But according to Ethic. ii, 2, some acts lessen the habit whence they + proceed, for instance if they be done carelessly. Therefore it is not every act that increases a habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35726" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35726] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +idem non est contrariorum causa. Sed, sicut dicitur in II Ethic., +aliqui actus ab habitu procedentes diminuunt ipsum; utpote cum +negligenter fiunt. Ergo non omnis actus habitum auget.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> "Like acts cause like habits" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Now things are like or unlike not only in respect of their qualities being + the same or various, but also in respect of the same or a different mode of participation. For it is not only black that is + unlike white, but also less white is unlike more white, since there is movement from less white to more white, even as from + one opposite to another, as stated in Phys. v, text. 52. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 3 co."><a name="35727" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35727] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod similes actus similes habitus causant, ut dicitur in +II Ethic. Similitudo autem et dissimilitudo non solum attenditur +secundum qualitatem eandem vel diversam; sed etiam secundum eundem +vel diversum participationis modum. Est enim dissimile non solum +nigrum albo, sed etiam minus album magis albo, nam etiam motus fit +a minus albo in magis album, tanquam ex opposito in oppositum, ut +dicitur in V Physic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A3-p7"> But since use of habits depends on the will, as was shown above ( + <a href="#FS_Q50_A5" id="FS_Q52_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[50], A[5]</a>); just as one who has a habit may fail to use it or may act contrary to it; so may he happen to use the habit by performing + an act that is not in proportion to the intensity of the habit. Accordingly, if the intensity of the act correspond in proportion + to the intensity of the habit, or even surpass it, every such act either increases the habit or disposes to an increase + thereof, if we may speak of the increase of habits as we do of the increase of an animal. For not every morsel of food actually + increases the animal's size as neither does every drop of water hollow out the stone: but the multiplication of food results + at last in an increase of the body. So, too, repeated acts cause a habit to grow. If, however, the act falls short of the + intensity of the habit, such an act does not dispose to an increase of that habit, but rather to a lessening thereof. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Quia vero usus habituum in voluntate hominis +consistit, ut ex supradictis patet; sicut contingit quod aliquis +habens habitum non utitur illo, vel etiam agit actum contrarium; +ita etiam potest contingere quod utitur habitu secundum actum non +respondentem proportionaliter intensioni habitus. Si igitur +intensio actus proportionaliter aequetur intensioni habitus, vel +etiam superexcedat; quilibet actus vel auget habitum, vel disponit +ad augmentum ipsius; ut loquamur de augmento habituum ad +similitudinem augmenti animalis. Non enim quodlibet alimentum +assumptum actu auget animal, sicut nec quaelibet gutta cavat +lapidem, sed, multiplicato alimento, tandem fit augmentum. Ita +etiam, multiplicatis actibus, crescit habitus. Si vero intensio +actus proportionaliter deficiat ab intensione habitus, talis actus +non disponit ad augmentum habitus, sed magis ad diminutionem +ipsius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A3-p8"> From this it is clear how to solve the objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 3 ad arg."><a name="35728" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35728] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc +patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q53" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q53-p0.1">Q. 53. HOW HABITS ARE CORRUPTED OR DIMINISHED (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q53-p2"> We must now consider how habits are lost or weakened; and under this head there are three points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q53-p3"><a href="#FS_Q53_A1"> (1) Whether a habit can be corrupted?</a></p><p id="FS_Q53-p4"><a href="#FS_Q53_A2"> (2) Whether it can be diminished?</a></p><p id="FS_Q53-p5"><a href="#FS_Q53_A3"> (3) How are habits corrupted or diminished?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 pr."><a name="35729" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35729] +Iª-IIae q. 53 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +corruptione et diminutione habituum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. +Primo, utrum habitus corrumpi possit. Secundo, utrum possit +diminui. Tertio, de modo corruptionis et diminutionis.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q53_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q53_A1-p0.1">Q. 53. A. 1. Whether a habit can be corrupted?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a habit cannot be corrupted. For habit is within its subject like a second nature; wherefore it is pleasant + to act from habit. Now so long as a thing is, its nature is not corrupted. Therefore neither can a habit be corrupted so long + as its subject remains. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35730" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35730] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus corrumpi non possit. Habitus +enim inest sicut natura quaedam, unde operationes secundum habitum +sunt delectabiles. Sed natura non corrumpitur, manente eo cuius est +natura. Ergo neque habitus corrumpi potest, manente subiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whenever a form is corrupted, this is due either to corruption of its subject, or to its contrary: thus sickness + ceases through corruption of the animal, or through the advent of health. Now science, which is a habit, cannot be lost through + corruption of its subject: since "the intellect," which is its subject, "is a substance that is incorruptible" (De Anima i, + text. 65). In like manner, neither can it be lost through the action of its contrary: + since intelligible species are not contrary to one another (Metaph. vii, text. 52). Therefore the habit of science can nowise + be lost. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35731" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35731] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +omnis corruptio formae vel est per corruptionem subiecti, vel est a +contrario, sicut aegritudo corrumpitur corrupto animali, vel etiam +superveniente sanitate. Sed scientia, quae est quidam habitus, non +potest corrumpi per corruptionem subiecti, quia intellectus, qui +est subiectum eius, est substantia quaedam, et non corrumpitur, ut +dicitur in I de anima. Similiter etiam non potest corrumpi a +contrario, nam species intelligibiles non sunt ad invicem +contrariae, ut dicitur in VII Metaphys. Ergo habitus scientiae +nullo modo corrumpi potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all corruption results from some movement. But the habit of science, which is in the soul, cannot be corrupted by + a direct movement of the soul itself, since the soul is not moved directly. It is, however, moved indirectly through the movement + of the body: and yet no bodily change seems capable of corrupting the intelligible species residing in the intellect: since + the intellect independently of the body is the proper abode of the species; for which + reason it is held that habits are not lost either through old age or through death. Therefore science cannot be corrupted. + For the same reason neither can habits of virtue be corrupted, since they also are in the rational soul, and, as the Philosopher + declares (Ethic. i, 10), "virtue is more lasting than learning." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35732" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35732] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +omnis corruptio est per aliquem motum. Sed habitus scientiae, qui +est in anima, non potest corrumpi per motum per se ipsius animae, +quia anima per se non movetur. Movetur autem per accidens per motum +corporis. Nulla autem transmutatio corporalis videtur posse +corrumpere species intelligibiles existentes in intellectu, cum +intellectus sit per se locus specierum, sine corpore, unde ponitur +quod nec per senium nec per mortem corrumpuntur habitus. Ergo +scientia corrumpi non potest. Et per consequens, nec habitus +virtutis, qui etiam est in anima rationali, et, sicut philosophus +dicit in I Ethic., <i>virtutes sunt permanentiores +disciplinis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) that "forgetfulness and deception are the corruption of science." Moreover, + by sinning a man loses a habit of virtue: and again, virtues are engendered and corrupted by contrary acts (Ethic. ii, 2). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35733" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35733] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in libro de longitudine et brevitate +vitae, quod scientiae corruptio est oblivio et deceptio. Peccando +etiam aliquis habitum virtutis amittit. Et ex contrariis actibus +virtutes generantur et corrumpuntur, ut dicitur II Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q53_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A form is said to be corrupted directly by its contrary; indirectly, through its subject being corrupted. When therefore + a habit has a corruptible subject, and a cause that has a contrary, it can be corrupted both ways. This is clearly the case + with bodily habits---for instance, health and sickness. But those habits that have an incorruptible subject, cannot be corrupted + indirectly. There are, however, some habits which, while residing chiefly in an + incorruptible subject, reside nevertheless secondarily in a corruptible subject; such is the habit of science which is chiefly + indeed in the "possible" intellect, but secondarily in the sensitive powers of apprehension, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q50_A3" id="FS_Q53_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[50], A[3]</a>, ad 3). Consequently the habit of science cannot be corrupted indirectly, on the part of the "possible" intellect, but only + on the part of the lower sensitive powers. + </p><p id="FS_Q53_A1-p7"> We must therefore inquire whether habits of this kind can be corrupted directly. If then there be a habit having a contrary, + either on the part of itself or on the part of its cause, it can be corrupted directly: but if it has no contrary, it cannot + be corrupted directly. Now it is evident that an intelligible species residing in the "possible" intellect, has no contrary; + nor can the active intellect, which is the cause of that species, have a contrary. Wherefore if in the + "possible" intellect there be a habit caused immediately by the active intellect, such a habit is incorruptible both directly + and indirectly. Such are the habits of the first principles, both speculative and practical, which cannot be corrupted by + any forgetfulness or deception whatever: even as the Philosopher says about prudence (Ethic. vi, 5) that "it cannot be lost + by being forgotten." There is, however, in the "possible" intellect a habit caused by the reason, to wit, the habit of + conclusions, which is called science, to the cause of which something may be contrary in two ways. First, on the part of those + very propositions which are the starting point of the reason: for the assertion "Good is not good" is contrary to the assertion + "Good is good" (Peri Herm. ii). Secondly, on the part of the process of reasoning; forasmuch as a sophistical syllogism is + contrary to a dialectic or demonstrative syllogism. Wherefore it is clear that a false reason can corrupt the habit of a + true opinion or even of science. Hence the Philosopher, as stated above, says that "deception is the corruption of science." + As to virtues, some of them are intellectual, residing in reason itself, as stated in Ethic. vi, 1: and to these applies what + we have said of science and opinion. Some, however, viz. the moral virtues, are in the appetitive part of the soul; and the + same may be said of the contrary vices. Now the habits of the appetitive part are caused therein because it is natural to + it + to be moved by the reason. Therefore a habit either of virtue or of vice, may be corrupted by a judgment of reason, whenever + its motion is contrary to such vice or virtue, whether through ignorance, passion or deliberate choice. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 1 co."><a name="35734" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35734] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod secundum se dicitur aliqua forma corrumpi per +contrarium suum, per accidens autem, per corruptionem sui subiecti. +Si igitur fuerit aliquis habitus cuius subiectum est corruptibile, +et cuius causa habet contrarium, utroque modo corrumpi poterit, +sicut patet de habitibus corporalibus, scilicet sanitate et +aegritudine. Illi vero habitus quorum subiectum est incorruptibile, +non possunt corrumpi per accidens. Sunt tamen habitus quidam qui, +etsi principaliter sint in subiecto incorruptibili, secundario +tamen sunt in subiecto corruptibili, sicut habitus scientiae, qui +principaliter est quidem in intellectu possibili, secundario autem +in viribus apprehensivis sensitivis, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo +ex parte intellectus possibilis, habitus scientiae non potest +corrumpi per accidens; sed solum ex parte inferiorum virium +sensitivarum. Est igitur considerandum si possunt huiusmodi habitus +per se corrumpi. Si igitur fuerit aliquis habitus qui habeat +aliquod contrarium, vel ex parte sua vel ex parte suae causae, +poterit per se corrumpi, si vero non habet contrarium, non poterit +per se corrumpi. Manifestum est autem quod species intelligibilis +in intellectu possibili existens, non habet aliquid contrarium. +Neque iterum intellectui agenti, qui est causa eius, potest aliquid +esse contrarium. Unde si aliquis habitus sit in intellectu +possibili immediate ab intellectu agente causatus, talis habitus +est incorruptibilis et per se et per accidens. Huiusmodi autem sunt +habitus primorum principiorum, tam speculabilium quam practicorum, +qui nulla oblivione vel deceptione corrumpi possunt, sicut +philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., de prudentia, quod non perditur +per oblivionem. Aliquis vero habitus est in intellectu possibili ex +ratione causatus, scilicet habitus conclusionum, qui dicitur +scientia, cuius causae dupliciter potest aliquid contrarium esse. +Uno modo, ex parte ipsarum propositionum ex quibus ratio procedit, +etenim enuntiationi quae est, bonum est bonum, contraria est ea +quae est, bonum non est bonum, secundum philosophum, in II +Periherm. Alio modo, quantum ad ipsum processum rationis; prout +syllogismus sophisticus opponitur syllogismo dialectico vel +demonstrativo. Sic igitur patet quod per falsam rationem potest +corrumpi habitus verae opinionis, aut etiam scientiae. Unde +philosophus dicit quod deceptio est corruptio scientiae, sicut +supra dictum est. Virtutum vero quaedam sunt intellectuales, quae +sunt in ipsa ratione, ut dicitur in VI Ethic., de quibus est eadem +ratio quae est de scientia vel opinione. Quaedam vero sunt in parte +animae appetitiva, quae sunt virtutes morales, et eadem ratio est +de vitiis oppositis. Habitus autem appetitivae partis causantur per +hoc quod ratio nata est appetitivam partem movere. Unde per +iudicium rationis in contrarium moventis quocumque modo, scilicet +sive ex ignorantia, sive ex passione, vel etiam ex electione, +corrumpitur habitus virtutis vel vitii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated in Ethic. vii, 10, a habit is like a second nature, and yet it falls short of it. And so it is that while the nature + of a thing cannot in any way be taken away from a thing, a habit is removed, though with difficulty. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35735" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35735] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in VII Ethic., habitus +similitudinem habet naturae, deficit tamen ab ipsa. Et ideo, cum +natura rei nullo modo removeatur ab ipsa, habitus difficile +removetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although there is no contrary to intelligible species, yet there can be a contrary to assertions and to the process of reason, + as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35736" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35736] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, etsi speciebus intelligibilibus non sit aliquid +contrarium, enuntiationibus tamen et processui rationis potest +aliquid esse contrarium, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Science is not taken away by movement of the body, if we consider the root itself of the habit, but only as it may prove + an obstacle to the act of science; in so far as the intellect, in its act, has need of the sensitive powers, which are impeded + by corporal transmutation. But the intellectual movement of the reason can corrupt the habit of science, even as regards the + very root of the habit. In like manner a habit of virtue can be corrupted. + Nevertheless when it is said that "virtue is more lasting than learning," this must be understood in respect, not of the subject + or cause, but of the act: because the use of virtue continues through the whole of life, whereas the use of learning does + not. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35737" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35737] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod scientia non removetur per motum corporalem quantum +ad ipsam radicem habitus, sed solum quantum ad impedimentum actus; +inquantum intellectus indiget in suo actu viribus sensitivis, +quibus impedimentum affertur per corporalem transmutationem. Sed +per intelligibilem motum rationis potest corrumpi habitus +scientiae, etiam quantum ad ipsam radicem habitus. Et similiter +etiam potest corrumpi habitus virtutis. Tamen quod dicitur, +virtutes esse permanentiores disciplinis, intelligendum est non ex +parte subiecti vel causae, sed ex parte actus, nam virtutum usus +est continuus per totam vitam, non autem usus disciplinarum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q53_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q53_A2-p0.1">Q. 53. A. 2. Whether a habit can diminish?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a habit cannot diminish. Because a habit is a simple quality and form. Now a simple thing is possessed + either wholly or not at all. Therefore although a habit can be lost it cannot diminish. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35738" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35738] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus diminui non possit. Habitus +enim est quaedam qualitas et forma simplex. Simplex autem aut totum +habetur, aut totum amittitur. Ergo habitus, etsi corrumpi possit, +diminui non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if a thing is befitting an accident, this is by reason either of the accident or of its subject. Now a habit does + not become more or less intense by reason of itself; else it would follow that a species might be predicated of its individuals + more or less. And if it can become less intense as to its participation by its subject, it would follow that something is + accidental to a habit, proper thereto and not common to the habit and its subject. Now + whenever a form has something proper to it besides its subject, that form can be separate, as stated in De Anima i, text. + 13. Hence it follows that a habit is a separable form; which is impossible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35739" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35739] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +omne quod convenit accidenti, convenit eidem secundum se, vel +ratione sui subiecti. Habitus autem secundum seipsum non intenditur +et remittitur, alioquin sequeretur quod aliqua species de suis +individuis praedicaretur secundum magis et minus. Si igitur +secundum participationem subiecti diminui possit, sequeretur quod +aliquid accidat habitui proprium, quod non sit commune ei et +subiecto. Cuicumque autem formae convenit aliquid proprium praeter +suum subiectum, illa forma est separabilis, ut dicitur in I de +anima. Sequitur ergo quod habitus sit forma separabilis, quod est +impossibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the very notion and nature of a habit as of any accident, is inherence in a subject: wherefore any accident is defined + with reference to its subject. Therefore if a habit does not become more or less intense in itself, neither can it in its + inherence in its subject: and consequently it will be nowise less intense. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35740" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35740] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +ratio et natura habitus, sicut et cuiuslibet accidentis, consistit +in concretione ad subiectum, unde et quodlibet accidens definitur +per suum subiectum. Si igitur habitus secundum seipsum non +intenditur neque remittitur, neque etiam secundum concretionem sui +ad subiectum diminui poterit. Et ita nullo modo diminuetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is natural for contraries to be applicable to the same thing. Now increase and decrease are contraries. Since therefore + a habit can increase, it seems that it can also diminish. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35741" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35741] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod contraria nata sunt fieri circa idem. Augmentum autem et +diminutio sunt contraria. Cum igitur habitus possit augeri, videtur +quod etiam possit diminui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Habits diminish, just as they increase, in two ways, as we have already explained ( + <a href="#FS_Q52_A1" id="FS_Q53_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[52], A[1]</a>). And since they increase through the same cause as that which engenders them, so too they diminish by the same cause as + that which corrupts them: since the diminishing of a habit is the road which leads to its corruption, even as, on the other + hand, the engendering of a habit is a foundation of its increase. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 2 co."><a name="35742" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35742] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod habitus dupliciter diminuuntur, sicut et augentur, ut +ex supradictis patet. Et sicut ex eadem causa augentur ex qua +generantur, ita ex eadem causa diminuuntur ex qua corrumpuntur, nam +diminutio habitus est quaedam via ad corruptionem, sicut e converso +generatio habitus est quoddam fundamentum augmenti ipsius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A habit, considered in itself, is a simple form. It is not thus that it is subject to decrease; but according to the different + ways in which its subject participates in it. This is due to the fact that the subject's potentiality is indeterminate, through + its being able to participate a form in various ways, or to extend to a greater or a smaller number of things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35743" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35743] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod habitus secundum se consideratus, est forma +simplex, et secundum hoc non accidit ei diminutio, sed secundum +diversum modum participandi, qui provenit ex indeterminatione +potentiae ipsius participantis, quae scilicet diversimode potest +unam formam participare, vel quae potest ad plura vel ad pauciora +extendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument would hold, if the essence itself of a habit were nowise subject to decrease. This we do not say; but that + a certain decrease in the essence of a habit has its origin, not in the habit, but in its subject. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35744" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35744] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si ipsa essentia habitus nullo +modo diminueretur. Hoc autem non ponimus, sed quod quaedam +diminutio essentiae habitus non habet principium ab habitu, sed a +participante.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> No matter how we take an accident, its very notion implies dependence on a subject, but in different ways. For if we take + an accident in the abstract, it implies relation to a subject, which relation begins in the accident and terminates in the + subject: for "whiteness is that whereby a thing is white." Accordingly in defining an accident in the abstract, we do not + put the subject as though it were the first part of the definition, viz. the genus; but + we give it the second place, which is that of the difference; thus we say that "simitas" is "a curvature of the nose." But + if we take accidents in the concrete, the relation begins in the subject and terminates in the concrete, the relation begins + in the subject and terminates at the accident: for "a white thing" is "something that has whiteness." Accordingly in defining + this kind of accident, we place the subject as the genus, which is the first part of a definition; for we say that a "simum" + is a "snub-nose." Accordingly whatever is befitting an accident on the part of the subject, but is not of the very essence + of the accident, is ascribed to that accident, not in the abstract, but in the concrete. Such are increase and decrease in + certain accidents: wherefore to be more or less white is not ascribed to whiteness but to a white thing. The same applies + to habits and other qualities; save that certain habits and other qualities; save that certain habits increase or diminish + by a + kind of addition, as we have already clearly explained ( + <a href="#FS_Q52_A2" id="FS_Q53_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[52], A[2]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35745" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35745] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, quocumque modo significetur accidens, habet +dependentiam ad subiectum secundum suam rationem, aliter tamen et +aliter. Nam accidens significatum in abstracto, importat +habitudinem ad subiectum quae incipit ab accidente, et terminatur +ad subiectum, nam albedo dicitur qua aliquid est album. Et ideo in +definitione accidentis abstracti non ponitur subiectum quasi prima +pars definitionis, quae est genus; sed quasi secunda, quae est +differentia; dicimus enim quod simitas est curvitas nasi. Sed in +concretis incipit habitudo a subiecto, et terminatur ad accidens, +dicitur enim album quod habet albedinem. Propter quod in +definitione huiusmodi accidentis ponitur subiectum tanquam genus, +quod est prima pars definitionis, dicimus enim quod simum est nasus +curvus. Sic igitur id quod convenit accidentibus ex parte subiecti, +non autem ex ipsa ratione accidentis, non attribuitur accidenti in +abstracto, sed in concreto. Et huiusmodi est intensio et remissio +in quibusdam accidentibus, unde albedo non dicitur magis et minus, +sed album. Et eadem ratio est in habitibus et aliis qualitatibus, +nisi quod quidam habitus augentur vel diminuuntur per quandam +additionem, ut ex supradictis patet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q53_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q53_A3-p0.1">Q. 53. A. 3. Whether a habit is corrupted or diminished through mere cessation from act?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a habit is not corrupted or diminished through mere cessation from act. For habits are more lasting than + passion-like qualities, as we have explained above ( + <a href="#FS_Q49_A2" id="FS_Q53_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[2]</a>, ad 3; + <a href="#FS_Q50_A1" id="FS_Q53_A3-p2.2" shape="rect"> Q[50], A[1]</a>). But passion-like qualities are neither corrupted nor diminished by cessation from act: for whiteness is not lessened through + not affecting the sight, nor heat through ceasing to make something hot. + Therefore neither are habits diminished or corrupted through cessation from act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35746" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35746] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus non corrumpatur aut diminuatur +per solam cessationem ab opere. Habitus enim permanentiores sunt +quam passibiles qualitates, ut ex supradictis apparet. Sed +passibiles qualitates non corrumpuntur neque diminuuntur per +cessationem ab actu, non enim albedo diminuitur si visum non +immutet, neque calor si non calefaciat. Ergo neque habitus +diminuuntur vel corrumpuntur per cessationem ab actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, corruption and diminution are changes. Now nothing is changed without a moving cause. Since therefore cessation + from act does not imply a moving cause, it does not appear how a habit can be diminished or corrupted through cessation from + act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35747" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35747] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +corruptio et diminutio sunt quaedam mutationes. Sed nihil mutatur +absque aliqua causa movente. Cum igitur cessatio ab actu non +importet aliquam causam moventem, non videtur quod per cessationem +ab actu possit esse diminutio vel corruptio habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the habits of science and virtue are in the intellectual soul which is above time. Now those things that are above + time are neither destroyed nor diminished by length of time. Neither, therefore, are such habits destroyed or diminished through + length of time, if one fails for long to exercise them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35748" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35748] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +habitus scientiae et virtutis sunt in anima intellectiva, quae est +supra tempus. Ea vero quae sunt supra tempus, non corrumpuntur +neque diminuuntur per temporis diuturnitatem. Ergo neque huiusmodi +habitus corrumpuntur vel diminuuntur per temporis diuturnitatem, si +diu aliquis absque exercitio permaneat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) that not only "deception," but also "forgetfulness, is the corruption of + science." Moreover he says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "want of intercourse has dissolved many a friendship." In like manner other + habits of virtue are diminished or destroyed through cessation from act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35749" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35749] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus, in libro de Longit. et Brevit. vitae, dicit +quod corruptio scientiae non solum est deceptio, sed etiam oblivio. +Et in VIII Ethic. dicitur quod multas amicitias inappellatio +dissolvit. Et eadem ratione, alii habitus virtutum per cessationem +ab actu diminuuntur vel tolluntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in Phys. vii, text. 27, a thing is a cause of movement in two ways. First, directly; and such a thing causes movement + by reason of its proper form; thus fire causes heat. Secondly, indirectly; for instance, that which removes an obstacle. It + is in this latter way that the destruction or diminution of a habit results through cessation from act, in so far, to wit, + as we cease from exercising an act which overcame the causes that destroyed or weakened + that habit. For it has been stated + <a href="#FS_Q53_A1" id="FS_Q53_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that habits are destroyed or diminished directly through some contrary agency. Consequently all habits that are gradually + undermined by contrary agencies which need to be counteracted by acts proceeding from those habits, are diminished or even + destroyed altogether by long cessation from act, as is clearly seen in the case both of science and of virtue. For it is evident + that a habit of moral virtue makes a man ready to choose + the mean in deeds and passions. And when a man fails to make use of his virtuous habit in order to moderate his own passions + or deeds, the necessary result is that many passions and deeds fail to observe the mode of virtue, by reason of the inclination + of the sensitive appetite and of other external agencies. Wherefore virtue is destroyed or lessened through cessation from + act. The same applies to the intellectual habits, which render man ready to judge aright of those things that are pictured + by his imagination. Hence when man ceases to make use of his intellectual habits, strange fancies, sometimes in opposition + to them, arise in his imagination; so that unless those fancies be, as it were, cut off or kept back by frequent use of his + intellectual habits, man becomes less fit to judge aright, and sometimes is even wholly disposed to the contrary, and thus + the intellectual habit is diminished or even wholly destroyed by cessation from act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 3 co."><a name="35750" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35750] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in VIII Physic., aliquid potest esse +movens dupliciter, uno modo, per se, quod scilicet movet secundum +rationem propriae formae, sicut ignis calefacit; alio modo, per +accidens, sicut id quod removet prohibens. Et hoc modo cessatio ab +actu causat corruptionem vel diminutionem habituum, inquantum +scilicet removetur actus qui prohibebat causas corrumpentes vel +diminuentes habitum. Dictum est enim quod habitus per se +corrumpuntur vel diminuuntur ex contrario agente. Unde quorumcumque +habituum contraria subcrescunt per temporis tractum, quae oportet +subtrahi per actum ab habitu procedentem; huiusmodi habitus +diminuuntur, vel etiam tolluntur totaliter, per diuturnam +cessationem ab actu; ut patet et in scientia et in virtute. +Manifestum est enim quod habitus virtutis moralis facit hominem +promptum ad eligendum medium in operationibus et passionibus. Cum +autem aliquis non utitur habitu virtutis ad moderandas passiones +vel operationes proprias, necesse est quod proveniant multae +passiones et operationes praeter modum virtutis, ex inclinatione +appetitus sensitivi, et aliorum quae exterius movent. Unde +corrumpitur virtus, vel diminuitur, per cessationem ab actu. +Similiter etiam est ex parte habituum intellectualium, secundum +quos est homo promptus ad recte iudicandum de imaginatis. Cum +igitur homo cessat ab usu intellectualis habitus, insurgunt +imaginationes extraneae, et quandoque ad contrarium ducentes; ita +quod, nisi per frequentem usum intellectualis habitus, quodammodo +succidantur vel comprimantur, redditur homo minus aptus ad recte +iudicandum, et quandoque totaliter disponitur ad contrarium. Et sic +per cessationem ab actu diminuitur, vel etiam corrumpitur +intellectualis habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even heat would be destroyed through ceasing to give heat, if, for this same reason, cold which is destructive of heat were + to increase. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35751" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35751] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ita etiam calor per cessationem a calefaciendo +corrumperetur, si per hoc incresceret frigidum, quod est calidi +corruptivum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Cessation from act is a moving cause, conducive of corruption or diminution, by removing the obstacles, thereto, as explained + above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35752" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35752] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod cessatio ab actu est movens ad corruptionem vel +diminutionem, sicut removens prohibens, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellectual part of the soul, considered in itself, is above time, but the sensitive part is subject to time, and therefore + in course of time it undergoes change as to the passions of the sensitive part, and also as to the powers of apprehension. + Hence the Philosopher says (Phys. iv. text. 117) that time makes us forget. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35753" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35753] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod pars intellectiva animae secundum se est supra +tempus, sed pars sensitiva subiacet tempori. Et ideo per temporis +cursum, transmutatur quantum ad passiones appetitivae partis et +etiam quantum ad vires apprehensivas. Unde philosophus dicit, in IV +Physic., quod tempus est causa oblivionis.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q54" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q54-p0.1">Q. 54. OF THE DISTINCTION OF HABITS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q54-p2"> We have now to consider the distinction of habits; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q54-p3"><a href="#FS_Q54_A1"> (1) Whether many habits can be in one power?</a></p><p id="FS_Q54-p4"><a href="#FS_Q54_A2"> (2) Whether habits are distinguished by their objects?</a></p><p id="FS_Q54-p5"><a href="#FS_Q54_A3"> (3) Whether habits are divided into good and bad?</a></p><p id="FS_Q54-p6"><a href="#FS_Q54_A4"> (4) Whether one habit may be made up of many habits?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 pr."><a name="35754" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35754] +Iª-IIae q. 54 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +distinctione habituum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, +utrum multi habitus possint esse in una potentia. Secundo, utrum +habitus distinguantur secundum obiecta. Tertio, utrum habitus +distinguantur secundum bonum et malum. Quarto, utrum unus habitus +ex multis habitibus constituatur.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q54_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q54_A1-p0.1">Q. 54. A. 1. Whether many habits can be in one power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be many habits in one power. For when several things are distinguished in respect of the + same thing, if one of them be multiplied, the others are too. Now habits and powers are distinguished in respect of the same + thing, viz. their acts and objects. Therefore they are multiplied in like manner. Therefore there cannot be many habits in + one power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35755" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35755] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non possint esse multi habitus in una +potentia. Eorum enim quae secundum idem distinguuntur multiplicato +uno, multiplicatur et aliud. Sed secundum idem potentiae et habitus +distinguuntur, scilicet secundum actus et obiecta. Similiter ergo +multiplicantur. Non ergo possunt esse multi habitus in una +potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a power is a simple force. Now in one simple subject there cannot be diversity of accidents; for the subject is + the cause of its accidents; and it does not appear how diverse effects can proceed from one simple cause. Therefore there + cannot be many habits in one power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35756" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35756] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +potentia est virtus quaedam simplex. Sed in uno subiecto simplici +non potest esse diversitas accidentium, quia subiectum est causa +accidentis; ab uno autem simplici non videtur procedere nisi unum. +Ergo in una potentia non possunt esse multi habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as the body is informed by its shape, so is a power informed by a habit. But one body cannot be informed at + the same time by various shapes. Therefore neither can a power be informed at the same time by many habits. Therefore several + habits cannot be at the same time in one power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35757" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35757] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut corpus formatur per figuram, ita potentia formatur per +habitum. Sed unum corpus non potest simul formari diversis figuris. +Ergo neque una potentia potest simul formari diversis habitibus. +Non ergo plures habitus possunt simul esse in una potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The intellect is one power; wherein, nevertheless, are the habits of various sciences. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35758" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35758] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod intellectus est una potentia, in qua tamen sunt diversarum +scientiarum habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q54_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q49_A4" id="FS_Q54_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[4]</a>), habits are dispositions of a thing that is in potentiality to something, either to nature, or to operation, which is the + end of nature. As to those habits which are dispositions to nature, it is clear that several can be in one same subject: since + in one subject we may take parts in various ways, according to the various dispositions of which parts there are various habits. + Thus, if we take the humors + as being parts of the human body, according to their disposition in respect of human nature, we have the habit or disposition + of health: while, if we take like parts, such as nerves, bones, and flesh, the disposition of these in respect of nature is + strength or weakness; whereas, if we take the limbs, i.e. the hands, feet, and so on, the disposition of these in proportion + to nature, is beauty: and thus there are several habits or dispositions in the same subject. + </p><p id="FS_Q54_A1-p7"> If, however, we speak of those habits that are dispositions to operation, and belong properly to the powers; thus, again, + there may be several habits in one power. The reason for this is that the subject of a habit is a passive power, as stated + above ( + <a href="#FS_Q51_A2" id="FS_Q54_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[51], A[2]</a>): for it is only an active power that cannot be the subject of a habit, as was clearly shown above ( + <a href="#FS_Q51_A2" id="FS_Q54_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[51], A[2]</a>). Now a passive power is compared to the determinate act + of any species, as matter to form: because, just as matter is determinate to one form by one agent, so, too, is a passive + power determined by the nature of one active object to an act specifically one. Wherefore, just as several objects can move + one passive power, so can one passive power be the subject of several acts or perfections specifically diverse. Now habits + are qualities or forms adhering to a power, and inclining that power to acts of a determinate species. Consequently several + habits, even as several specifically different acts, can belong to one power. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 1 co."><a name="35759" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35759] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus sunt dispositiones +quaedam alicuius in potentia existentis ad aliquid, sive ad +naturam, sive ad operationem vel finem naturae. Et de illis quidem +habitibus qui sunt dispositiones ad naturam, manifestum est quod +possunt plures esse in uno subiecto, eo quod unius subiecti possunt +diversimode partes accipi, secundum quarum dispositionem habitus +dicuntur. Sicut, si accipiantur humani corporis partes humores, +prout disponuntur secundum naturam humanam, est habitus vel +dispositio sanitatis, si vero accipiantur partes similes ut nervi +et ossa et carnes, earum dispositio in ordine ad naturam, est +fortitudo aut macies, si vero accipiantur membra, ut manus et pes +et huiusmodi, earum dispositio naturae conveniens, est pulchritudo. +Et sic sunt plures habitus vel dispositiones in eodem. Si vero +loquamur de habitibus qui sunt dispositiones ad opera, qui proprie +pertinent ad potentias; sic etiam contingit unius potentiae esse +habitus plures. Cuius ratio est, quia subiectum habitus est +potentia passiva, ut supra dictum est, potentia enim activa tantum +non est alicuius habitus subiectum, ut ex supradictis patet. +Potentia autem passiva comparatur ad actum determinatum unius +speciei, sicut materia ad formam, eo quod, sicut materia +determinatur ad unam formam per unum agens, ita etiam potentia +passiva a ratione unius obiecti activi determinatur ad unum actum +secundum speciem. Unde sicut plura obiecta possunt movere unam +potentiam passivam, ita una potentia passiva potest esse subiectum +diversorum actuum vel perfectionum secundum speciem. Habitus autem +sunt quaedam qualitates aut formae inhaerentes potentiae, quibus +inclinatur potentia ad determinatos actus secundum speciem. Unde ad +unam potentiam possunt plures habitus pertinere, sicut et plures +actus specie differentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even as in natural things, diversity of species is according to the form, and diversity of genus, according to matter, as + stated in Metaph. v, text. 33 (since things that differ in matter belong to different genera): so, too, generic diversity + of objects entails a difference of powers (wherefore the Philosopher says in Ethic. vi, 1, that "those objects that differ + generically belong to different departments of the soul"); while specific difference of + objects entails a specific difference of acts, and consequently of habits also. Now things that differ in genus differ in + species, but not vice versa. Wherefore the acts and habits of different powers differ in species: but it does not follow that + different habits are in different powers, for several can be in one power. And even as several genera may be included in one + genus, and several species be contained in one species; so does it happen that there are several species of habits and + powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35760" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35760] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut in rebus naturalibus diversitas specierum +est secundum formam, diversitas autem generum est secundum +materiam, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. (ea enim sunt diversa genere, +quorum est materia diversa), ita etiam diversitas obiectorum +secundum genus, facit distinctionem potentiarum (unde philosophus +dicit, in VI Ethic., quod <i>ad ea quae sunt genere altera, sunt +etiam animae particulae aliae</i>); diversitas vero obiectorum +secundum speciem, facit diversitatem actuum secundum speciem, et +per consequens habituum. Quaecumque autem sunt diversa genere, sunt +etiam specie diversa, sed non convertitur. Et ideo diversarum +potentiarum sunt diversi actus specie, et diversi habitus, non +autem oportet quod diversi habitus sint diversarum potentiarum, sed +possunt esse plures unius. Et sicut sunt genera generum, et species +specierum; ita etiam contingit esse diversas species habituum et +potentiarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although a power is simple as to its essence, it is multiple virtually, inasmuch as it extends to many specifically different + acts. Consequently there is nothing to prevent many superficially different habits from being in one power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35761" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35761] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod potentia, etsi sit quidem simplex secundum essentiam, +est tamen multiplex virtute, secundum quod ad multos actus specie +differentes se extendit. Et ideo nihil prohibet in una potentia +esse multos habitus specie differentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A body is informed by its shape as by its own terminal boundaries: whereas a habit is not the terminal boundary of a power, + but the disposition of a power to an act as to its ultimate term. Consequently one same power cannot have several acts at + the same time, except in so far as perchance one act is comprised in another; just as neither can a body have several shapes, + save in so far as one shape enters into another, as a three-sided in a four-sided + figure. For the intellect cannot understand several things at the same time "actually"; and yet it can know several things + at the same time "habitually." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35762" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35762] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod corpus formatur per figuram sicut per propriam +terminationem, habitus autem non est terminatio potentiae, sed est +dispositio ad actum sicut ad ultimum terminum. Et ideo non possunt +esse unius potentiae simul plures actus, nisi forte secundum quod +unus comprehenditur sub alio, sicut nec unius corporis plures +figurae, nisi secundum quod una est in alia, sicut trigonum in +tetragono. Non enim potest intellectus simul multa actu +intelligere. Potest tamen simul habitu multa scire.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q54_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q54_A2-p0.1">Q. 54. A. 2. Whether habits are distinguished by their objects?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habits are not distinguished by their objects. For contraries differ in species. Now the same habit of + science regards contraries: thus medicine regards the healthy and the unhealthy. Therefore habits are not distinguished by + objects specifically distinct. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35763" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35763] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus non distinguantur secundum +obiecta. Contraria enim sunt specie differentia. Sed idem habitus +scientiae est contrariorum, sicut medicina sani et aegri. Non ergo +secundum obiecta specie differentia, habitus distinguuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, different sciences are different habits. But the same scientific truth belongs to different sciences: thus both + the physicist and the astronomer prove the earth to be round, as stated in Phys. ii, text. 17. Therefore habits are not distinguished + by their objects. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35764" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35764] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +diversae scientiae sunt diversi habitus. Sed idem scibile pertinet +ad diversas scientias, sicut terram esse rotundam demonstrat et +naturalis et astrologus, ut dicitur in II Physic. Ergo habitus non +distinguuntur secundum obiecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, wherever the act is the same, the object is the same. But the same act can belong to different habits of virtue, + if it be directed to different ends; thus to give money to anyone, if it be done for God's sake, is an act of charity; while, + if it be done in order to pay a debt, it is an act of justice. Therefore the same object can also belong to different habits. + Therefore diversity of habits does not follow diversity of objects. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35765" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35765] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +eiusdem actus est idem obiectum. Sed idem actus potest pertinere ad +diversos habitus virtutum, si ad diversos fines referatur, sicut +dare pecuniam alicui, si sit propter Deum, pertinet ad caritatem; +si vero sit propter debitum solvendum, pertinet ad iustitiam. Ergo +etiam idem obiectum potest ad diversos habitus pertinere. Non ergo +est diversitas habituum secundum diversitatem obiectorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Acts differ in species according to the diversity of their objects, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A5" id="FS_Q54_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[5]</a>). But habits are dispositions to acts. Therefore habits also are distinguished according to the diversity of objects. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35766" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35766] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +actus differunt specie secundum diversitatem obiectorum, ut supra +dictum est. Sed habitus sunt dispositiones quaedam ad actus. Ergo +etiam habitus distinguuntur secundum diversa obiecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q54_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A habit is both a form and a habit. Hence the specific distinction of habits may be taken in the ordinary way in which forms + differ specifically; or according to that mode of distinction which is proper to habits. Accordingly forms are distinguished + from one another in reference to the diversity of their active principles, since every agent produces its like in species. + Habits, however, imply order to something: and all things that imply order to something, + are distinguished according to the distinction of the things to which they are ordained. Now a habit is a disposition implying + a twofold order: viz. to nature and to an operation consequent to nature. + </p><p id="FS_Q54_A2-p7"> Accordingly habits are specifically distinct in respect of three things. First, in respect of the active principles of such + dispositions; secondly, in respect of nature; thirdly, in respect of specifically different objects, as will appear from what + follows. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 2 co."><a name="35767" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35767] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod habitus et est forma quaedam, et est habitus. Potest +ergo distinctio habituum secundum speciem attendi aut secundum +communem modum quo formae specie distinguuntur; aut secundum +proprium modum distinctionis habituum. Distinguuntur siquidem +formae ad invicem secundum diversa principia activa, eo quod omne +agens facit simile secundum speciem. Habitus autem importat ordinem +ad aliquid. Omnia autem quae dicuntur secundum ordinem ad aliquid, +distinguuntur secundum distinctionem eorum ad quae dicuntur. Est +autem habitus dispositio quaedam ad duo ordinata, scilicet ad +naturam, et ad operationem consequentem naturam. Sic igitur +secundum tria, habitus specie distinguuntur. Uno quidem modo, +secundum principia activa talium dispositionum; alio vero modo, +secundum naturam; tertio vero modo, secundum obiecta specie +differentia; ut per sequentia explicabitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In distinguishing powers, or also habits, we must consider the object not in its material but in its formal aspect, which + may differ in species or even in genus. And though the distinction between specific contraries is a real distinction yet they + are both known under one aspect, since one is known through the other. And consequently in so far as they concur in the one + aspect of cognoscibility, they belong to one cognitive habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35768" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35768] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod in distinctione potentiarum, vel etiam habituum, +non est considerandum ipsum obiectum materialiter; sed ratio +obiecti differens specie, vel etiam genere. Quamvis autem contraria +specie differant diversitate rerum, tamen eadem ratio est +cognoscendi utrumque, quia unum per aliud cognoscitur. Et ideo +inquantum conveniunt in una ratione cognoscibilis, pertinent ad +unum habitum cognoscitivum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The physicist proves the earth to be round by one means, the astronomer by another: for the latter proves this by means of + mathematics, e.g. by the shapes of eclipses, or something of the sort; while the former proves it by means of physics, e.g. + by the movement of heavy bodies towards the center, and so forth. Now the whole force of a demonstration, which is "a syllogism + producing science," as stated in Poster. i, text. 5, depends on the mean. And + consequently various means are as so many active principles, in respect of which the habits of science are distinguished. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35769" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35769] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod terram esse rotundam per aliud medium demonstrat +naturalis, et per aliud astrologus, astrologus enim hoc demonstrat +per media mathematica, sicut per figuras eclipsium, vel per aliud +huiusmodi; naturalis vero hoc demonstrat per medium naturale, sicut +per motum gravium ad medium, vel per aliud huiusmodi. Tota autem +virtus demonstrationis, quae est syllogismus faciens scire, ut +dicitur in I Poster., dependet ex medio. Et ideo diversa media sunt +sicut diversa principia activa, secundum quae habitus scientiarum +diversificantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, text. 89; Ethic. vii, 8), the end is, in practical matters, what the principle is in speculative + matters. Consequently diversity of ends demands a diversity of virtues, even as diversity of active principles does. Moreover + the ends are objects of the internal acts, with which, above all, the virtues are concerned, as is evident from what has been + said ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A6" id="FS_Q54_A2-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[6]</a>; + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q19_A2" id="FS_Q54_A2-p10.2" shape="rect"> Q[19], + A[2] + </a>, ad 1; + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q34_A4" id="FS_Q54_A2-p10.3" shape="rect"> Q[34], A[4]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35770" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35770] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in II Physic. et in VII +Ethic., ita se habet finis in operabilibus, sicut principium in +demonstrativis. Et ideo diversitas finium diversificat virtutes +sicut et diversitas activorum principiorum. Sunt etiam ipsi fines +obiecta actuum interiorum, qui maxime pertinent ad virtutes, ut ex +supradictis patet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q54_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q54_A3-p0.1">Q. 54. A. 3. Whether habits are divided into good and bad?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habits are not divided into good and bad. For good and bad are contraries. Now the same habit regards + contraries, as was stated above (A[2], OBJ[1]). Therefore habits are not divided into good and bad. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35771" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35771] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus non distinguantur secundum +bonum et malum. Bonum enim et malum sunt contraria. Sed idem +habitus est contrariorum, ut supra habitum est. Ergo habitus non +distinguuntur secundum bonum et malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, good is convertible with being; so that, since it is common to all, it cannot be accounted a specific difference, + as the Philosopher declares (Topic. iv). Again, evil, since it is a privation and a non-being, cannot differentiate any being. + Therefore habits cannot be specifically divided into good and evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35772" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35772] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +bonum convertitur cum ente, et sic, cum sit commune omnibus, non +potest sumi ut differentia alicuius speciei; ut patet per +philosophum in IV Topic. Similiter etiam malum, cum sit privatio et +non ens, non potest esse alicuius entis differentia. Non ergo +secundum bonum et malum possunt habitus specie distingui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there can be different evil habits about one same object; for instance, intemperance and insensibility about matters + of concupiscence: and in like manner there can be several good habits; for instance, human virtue and heroic or godlike virtue, + as the Philosopher clearly states (Ethic. vii, 1). Therefore, habits are not divided into good and bad. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35773" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35773] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +circa idem obiectum contingit esse diversos habitus malos, sicut +circa concupiscentias intemperantiam et insensibilitatem, et +similiter etiam plures habitus bonos, scilicet virtutem humanam et +virtutem heroicam sive divinam, ut patet per philosophum in VII +Ethic. Non ergo distinguuntur habitus secundum bonum et malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A good habit is contrary to a bad habit, as virtue to vice. Now contraries are divided specifically into good and bad habits. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35774" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35774] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod habitus bonus contrariatur habitui malo, sicut virtus +vitio. Sed contraria sunt diversa secundum speciem. Ergo habitus +differunt specie secundum differentiam boni et mali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q54_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q54_A2" id="FS_Q54_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, habits are specifically distinct not only in respect of their objects and active principles, but also in their relation + to nature. Now, this happens in two ways. First, by reason of their suitableness or unsuitableness to nature. In this way + a good habit is specifically distinct from a bad habit: since a good habit is one which disposes to an act suitable to the + agent's nature, while an evil habit is one which + disposes to an act unsuitable to nature. Thus, acts of virtue are suitable to human nature, since they are according to reason, + whereas acts of vice are discordant from human nature, since they are against reason. Hence it is clear that habits are distinguished + specifically by the difference of good and bad. + </p><p id="FS_Q54_A3-p7"> Secondly, habits are distinguished in relation to nature, from the fact that one habit disposes to an act that is suitable + to a lower nature, while another habit disposes to an act befitting a higher nature. And thus human virtue, which disposes + to an act befitting human nature, is distinct from godlike or heroic virtue, which disposes to an act befitting some higher + nature. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 3 co."><a name="35775" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35775] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, habitus specie distinguuntur non +solum secundum obiecta et principia activa, sed etiam in ordine ad +naturam. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum +convenientiam ad naturam, vel etiam secundum disconvenientiam ab +ipsa. Et hoc modo distinguuntur specie habitus bonus et malus, nam +habitus bonus dicitur qui disponit ad actum convenientem naturae +agentis; habitus autem malus dicitur qui disponit ad actum non +convenientem naturae. Sicut actus virtutum naturae humanae +conveniunt, eo quod sunt secundum rationem, actus vero vitiorum, +cum sint contra rationem, a natura humana discordant. Et sic +manifestum est quod secundum differentiam boni et mali, habitus +specie distinguuntur. Alio modo secundum naturam habitus +distinguuntur, ex eo quod habitus unus disponit ad actum +convenientem naturae inferiori; alius autem habitus disponit ad +actum convenientem naturae superiori. Et sic virtus humana, quae +disponit ad actum convenientem naturae humanae, distinguitur a +divina virtute vel heroica, quae disponit ad actum convenientem +cuidam superiori naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The same habit may be about contraries in so far as contraries agree in one common aspect. Never, however, does it happen + that contrary habits are in one species: since contrariety of habits follows contrariety of aspect. Accordingly habits are + divided into good and bad, namely, inasmuch as one habit is good, and another bad; but not by reason of one habit being something + good, and another about something bad. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35776" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35776] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod contrariorum potest esse unus habitus, secundum +quod contraria conveniunt in una ratione. Nunquam tamen contingit +quod habitus contrarii sint unius speciei, contrarietas enim +habituum est secundum contrarias rationes. Et ita secundum bonum et +malum habitus distinguuntur, scilicet inquantum unus habitus est +bonus et alius malus, non autem ex hoc quod unus est boni et alius +mali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not the good which is common to every being, that is a difference constituting the species of a habit; but some determinate + good by reason of suitability to some determinate, viz. the human, nature. In like manner the evil that constitutes a difference + of habits is not a pure privation, but something determinate repugnant to a determinate nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35777" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35777] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod bonum commune omni enti non est differentia +constituens speciem alicuius habitus, sed quoddam bonum +determinatum, quod est secundum convenientiam ad determinatam +naturam, scilicet humanam. Similiter etiam malum quod est +differentia constitutiva habitus, non est privatio pura, sed est +aliquid determinatum repugnans determinatae naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Several good habits about one same specific thing are distinct in reference to their suitability to various natures, as stated + above. But several bad habits in respect of one action are distinct in reference to their diverse repugnance to that which + is in keeping with nature: thus, various vices about one same matter are contrary to one virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35778" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35778] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod plures habitus boni circa idem specie, distinguuntur +secundum convenientiam ad diversas naturas, ut dictum est. Plures +vero habitus mali distinguuntur circa idem agendum secundum +diversas repugnantias ad id quod est secundum naturam, sicut uni +virtuti contrariantur diversa vitia circa eandem materiam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q54_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q54_A4-p0.1">Q. 54. A. 4. Whether one habit is made up of many habits?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one habit is made up of many habits. For whatever is engendered, not at once, but little by little, seems + to be made up of several parts. But a habit is engendered, not at once, but little by little out of several acts, as stated + above ( + <a href="#FS_Q51_A3" id="FS_Q54_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[51], A[3]</a>). Therefore one habit is made up of several. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35779" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35779] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod unus habitus ex pluribus habitibus +constituatur. Illud enim cuius generatio non simul perficitur, sed +successive, videtur constitui ex pluribus partibus. Sed generatio +habitus non est simul, sed successive ex pluribus actibus, ut supra +habitum est. Ergo unus habitus constituitur ex pluribus +habitibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a whole is made up of its parts. Now many parts are assigned to one habit: thus Tully assigns many parts of fortitude, + temperance, and other virtues. Therefore one habit is made up of many. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35780" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35780] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ex partibus constituitur totum. Sed uni habitui assignantur multae +partes, sicut Tullius ponit multas partes fortitudinis, +temperantiae et aliarum virtutum. Ergo unus habitus constituitur ex +pluribus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one conclusion suffices both for an act and for a habit of scientific knowledge. But many conclusions belong to + but one science, to geometry, for instance, or to arithmetic. Therefore one habit is made up of many. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35781" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35781] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +de una sola conclusione potest scientia haberi et actu et habitu. +Sed multae conclusiones pertinent ad unam scientiam totam, sicut ad +geometriam vel arithmeticam. Ergo unus habitus constituitur ex +multis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A habit, since it is a quality, is a simple form. But nothing simple is made up of many. Therefore one habit is not made + up of many. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35782" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35782] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +habitus, cum sit qualitas quaedam, est forma simplex. Sed nullum +simplex constituitur ex pluribus. Ergo unus habitus non +constituitur ex pluribus habitibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q54_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A habit directed to operation, such as we are chiefly concerned with at present, is a perfection of a power. Now every perfection + should be in proportion with that which it perfects. Hence, just as a power, while it is one, extends to many things, in so + far as they have something in common, i.e. some general objective aspect, so also a habit extends to many things, in so far + as they are related to one, for instance, to some specific objective aspect, or to + one nature, or to one principle, as was clearly stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q54_A2" id="FS_Q54_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,3). + </p><p id="FS_Q54_A4-p7"> If then we consider a habit as to the extent of its object, we shall find a certain multiplicity therein. But since this + multiplicity is directed to one thing, on which the habit is chiefly intent, hence it is that a habit is a simple quality, + not composed to several habits, even though it extend to many things. For a habit does not extend to many things save in relation + to one, whence it derives its unity. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 4 co."><a name="35783" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35783] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod habitus ad operationem ordinatus, de quo nunc +principaliter intendimus, est perfectio quaedam potentiae. Omnis +autem perfectio proportionatur suo perfectibili. Unde sicut +potentia, cum sit una, ad multa se extendit secundum quod +conveniunt in aliquo uno, idest in generali quadam ratione obiecti; +ita etiam habitus ad multa se extendit secundum quod habent ordinem +ad aliquod unum, puta ad unam specialem rationem obiecti, vel unam +naturam, vel unum principium, ut ex supradictis patet. Si igitur +consideremus habitum secundum ea ad quae se extendit, sic +inveniemus in eo quandam multiplicitatem. Sed quia illa +multiplicitas est ordinata ad aliquid unum, ad quod principaliter +respicit habitus, inde est quod habitus est qualitas simplex, non +constituta ex pluribus habitibus, etiam si ad multa se extendat. +Non enim unus habitus se extendit ad multa, nisi in ordine ad unum, +ex quo habet unitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That a habit is engendered little by little, is due, not to one part being engendered after another, but to the fact that + the subject does not acquire all at once a firm and difficultly changeable disposition; and also to the fact that it begins + by being imperfectly in the subject, and is gradually perfected. The same applies to other qualities. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35784" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35784] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod successio in generatione habitus non contingit +ex hoc quod pars eius generetur post partem, sed ex eo quod +subiectum non statim consequitur dispositionem firmam et difficile +mobilem; et ex eo quod primo imperfecte incipit esse in subiecto, +et paulatim perficitur. Sicut etiam est de aliis qualitatibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The parts which are assigned to each cardinal virtue, are not integral parts that combine to form a whole; but subjective + or potential parts, as we shall explain further on (Q[57], A[6], ad 4; + <a href="SS_ii.html#SS_Q48" id="FS_Q54_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[48])</a>. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35785" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35785] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod partes quae singulis virtutibus cardinalibus +assignantur, non sunt partes integrales, ex quibus constituatur +totum sed partes subiectivae sive potentiales, ut infra +patebit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In any science, he who acquires, by demonstration, scientific knowledge of one conclusion, has the habit indeed, yet imperfectly. + And when he obtains, by demonstration, the scientific knowledge of another conclusion, no additional habit is engendered in + him: but the habit which was in him previously is perfected, forasmuch as it has increased in extent; because the conclusions + and demonstrations of one science are coordinate, and one flows from + another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35786" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35786] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ille qui in aliqua scientia acquirit per +demonstrationem scientiam conclusionis unius, habet quidem habitum, +sed imperfecte. Cum vero acquirit per aliquam demonstrationem +scientiam conclusionis alterius, non aggeneratur in eo alius +habitus; sed habitus qui prius inerat fit perfectior, utpote ad +plura se extendens; eo quod conclusiones et demonstrationes unius +scientiae ordinatae sunt, et una derivatur ex alia.</p></div></div></div></div> + + + ` + </div> + </body> + </html>
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/summa/bilingual/FS_v.html Sat Sep 10 10:03:58 2022 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,21923 @@ + + <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:x="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + <head> + <title>Bilingual Aquinas</title> + <style> + h2, h3, h4 {margin-bottom: 0px; clear: both} + .bilingual {clear: both; margin-top: .5em} + div.eng {width: 45%; float: left} + div.lat {width: 45%; float: right} + @page { size: A4 portrait; margin: 1cm; + orphans: 2; widows: 2; + } + @media print {div.div3 {page-break-before: always}} + </style> + </head> + <body style="font-family: Bitstream Vera Serif"><div id="FS.v" class="div2"> + + + <h2 id="FS.v-p0.1">TREATISE ON HABITS IN PARTICULAR (QQ[55]-89) GOOD HABITS, i.e. VIRTUES (QQ[55]-70)</h2><div class="toc"><a href="#FS_Q55">Q. 55. OF THE VIRTUES, AS TO THEIR ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q56">Q. 56. OF THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q57">Q. 57. OF THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q58">Q. 58. OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q59">Q. 59. OF MORAL VIRTUE IN RELATION TO THE PASSIONS (FIVE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q60">Q. 60. HOW THE MORAL VIRTUES DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FIVE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q61">Q. 61. OF THE CARDINAL VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q62">Q. 62. OF THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q63">Q. 63. OF THE CAUSE OF VIRTUES (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q64">Q. 64. OF THE MEAN OF VIRTUE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q65">Q. 65. OF THE CONNECTION OF VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q66">Q. 66. OF EQUALITY AMONG THE VIRTUES (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q67">Q. 67. OF THE DURATION OF VIRTUES AFTER THIS LIFE (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q68">Q. 68. OF THE GIFTS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q69">Q. 69. OF THE BEATITUDES (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q70">Q. 70. OF THE FRUITS OF THE HOLY GHOST (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q71">Q. 71. EVIL HABITS, i.e. VICES AND SINS (QQ[71]-89)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q72">Q. 72. OF THE DISTINCTION OF SINS (NINE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q73">Q. 73. OF THE COMPARISON OF ONE SIN WITH ANOTHER (TEN ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q74">Q. 74. OF THE SUBJECT OF SIN (TEN ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q75">Q. 75. OF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES) </a><br/><a href="#FS_Q76">Q. 76. OF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN PARTICULAR (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q77">Q. 77. OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF THE SENSITIVE APPETITE (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q78">Q. 78. OF THAT CAUSE OF SIN WHICH IS MALICE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q79">Q. 79. OF THE EXTERNAL CAUSES OF SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q80">Q. 80. OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, AS REGARDS THE DEVIL (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q81">Q. 81. OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF MAN (FIVE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q82">Q. 82. OF ORIGINAL SIN, AS TO ITS ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q83">Q. 83. OF THE SUBJECT OF ORIGINAL SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q84">Q. 84. OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, IN RESPECT OF ONE SIN BEING THE CAUSE OF ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q85">Q. 85. OF THE EFFECTS OF SIN, AND, FIRST, OF THE CORRUPTION OF THE GOOD OF NATURE (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q86">Q. 86. OF THE STAIN OF SIN (TWO ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q87">Q. 87. OF THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q88">Q. 88. OF VENIAL AND MORTAL SIN (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q89">Q. 89. OF VENIAL SIN IN ITSELF (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/></div> + <div id="FS_Q55" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q55-p0.1">Q. 55. OF THE VIRTUES, AS TO THEIR ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q55-p2"> We come now to the consideration of habits specifically. And since habits, as we have said ( + <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q54_A3" id="FS_Q55-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[54], A[3]</a>), are divided into good and bad, we must speak in the first place of good habits, which are virtues, and of other matters + connected with them, namely the Gifts, Beatitudes and Fruits; in the second place, of bad habits, namely of vices and sins. + Now five things must be considered about virtues: (1) the essence of virtue; (2) its subject; (3) the division + of virtue; (4) the cause of virtue; (5) certain properties of virtue. + </p><p id="FS_Q55-p3"> Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q55-p4"><a href="#FS_Q55_A1"> (1) Whether human virtue is a habit?</a></p><p id="FS_Q55-p5"><a href="#FS_Q55_A2"> (2) Whether it is an operative habit?</a></p><p id="FS_Q55-p6"><a href="#FS_Q55_A3"> (3) Whether it is a good habit?</a></p><p id="FS_Q55-p7"><a href="#FS_Q55_A4"> (4) Of the definition of virtue.</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 pr."><a name="35787" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35787] +Iª-IIae q. 55 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de +habitibus in speciali. Et quia habitus, ut dictum est, +distinguuntur per bonum et malum, primo dicendum est de habitibus +bonis, qui sunt virtutes et alia eis adiuncta, scilicet dona, +beatitudines et fructus; secundo, de habitibus malis, scilicet de +vitiis et peccatis. Circa virtutes autem quinque consideranda sunt, +primo, de essentia virtutis; secundo, de subiecto eius; tertio, de +divisione virtutum; quarto, de causa virtutis; quinto, de quibusdam +proprietatibus virtutis. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, +utrum virtus humana sit habitus. Secundo, utrum sit habitus +operativus. Tertio, utrum sit habitus bonus. Quarto, de definitione +virtutis.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q55_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q55_A1-p0.1">Q. 55. A. 1. Whether human virtue is a habit?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that human virtue is not a habit: For virtue is "the limit of power" (De Coelo i, text. 116). But the limit + of anything is reducible to the genus of that of which it is the limit; as a point is reducible to the genus of line. Therefore + virtue is reducible to the genus of power, and not to the genus of habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35788" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35788] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus humana non sit habitus. Virtus +enim est <i>ultimum potentiae</i>, ut dicitur in I de caelo. Sed +ultimum uniuscuiusque reducitur ad genus illud cuius est ultimum, +sicut punctum ad genus lineae. Ergo virtus reducitur ad genus +potentiae, et non ad genus habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii) [*Retract. ix; cf. De Lib. Arb. ii, 19] that "virtue is good use of free-will." + But use of free-will is an act. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35789" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35789] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in II de libero Arbit., quod <i>virtus est bonus +usus liberi arbitrii</i>. Sed usus liberi arbitrii est actus. Ergo +virtus non est habitus, sed actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we do not merit by our habits, but by our actions: otherwise a man would merit continually, even while asleep. But + we do merit by our virtues. Therefore virtues are not habits, but acts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35790" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35790] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +habitibus non meremur, sed actibus, alioquin homo mereretur +continue, etiam dormiendo. Sed virtutibus meremur. Ergo virtutes +non sunt habitus, sed actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that "virtue is the order of love," and (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 30) that "the ordering + which is called virtue consists in enjoying what we ought to enjoy, and using what we ought to use." Now order, or ordering, + denominates either an action or a relation. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an action or a relation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="35791" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35791] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in libro de moribus Eccles., quod <i>virtus est +ordo amoris</i>. Et in libro octoginta trium quaest., dicit quod +<i>ordinatio quae virtus vocatur, est fruendis frui, et utendis +uti</i>. Ordo autem, seu ordinatio, nominat vel actum, vel +relationem. Ergo virtus non est habitus, sed actus vel relatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, just as there are human virtues, so are there natural virtues. But natural virtues are not habits, but powers. Neither + therefore are human virtues habits. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="35792" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35792] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut inveniuntur virtutes humanae, ita et virtutes naturales. Sed +virtutes naturales non sunt habitus, sed potentiae quaedam. Ergo +etiam neque virtutes humanae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Categor. vi) that science and virtue are habits. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35793" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35793] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus, in libro Praedicament., scientiam et virtutem +ponit esse habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q55_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Virtue denotes a certain perfection of a power. Now a thing's perfection is considered chiefly in regard to its end. But + the end of power is act. Wherefore power is said to be perfect, according as it is determinate to its act. + </p><p id="FS_Q55_A1-p9"> Now there are some powers which of themselves are determinate to their acts; for instance, the active natural powers. And + therefore these natural powers are in themselves called virtues. But the rational powers, which are proper to man, are not + determinate to one particular action, but are inclined indifferently to many: and they are determinate to acts by means of + habits, as is clear from what we have said above ( + <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q49_A4" id="FS_Q55_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[4]</a> ). Therefore human virtues + are habits. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 co."><a name="35794" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35794] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod virtus nominat quandam potentiae perfectionem. +Uniuscuiusque autem perfectio praecipue consideratur in ordine ad +suum finem. Finis autem potentiae actus est. Unde potentia dicitur +esse perfecta, secundum quod determinatur ad suum actum. Sunt autem +quaedam potentiae quae secundum seipsas sunt determinatae ad suos +actus; sicut potentiae naturales activae. Et ideo huiusmodi +potentiae naturales secundum seipsas dicuntur virtutes. Potentiae +autem rationales, quae sunt propriae hominis, non sunt determinatae +ad unum, sed se habent indeterminate ad multa, determinantur autem +ad actus per habitus, sicut ex supradictis patet. Et ideo virtutes +humanae habitus sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sometimes we give the name of a virtue to that to which the virtue is directed, namely, either to its object, or to its act: + for instance, we give the name Faith, to that which we believe, or to the act of believing, as also to the habit by which + we believe. When therefore we say that "virtue is the limit of power," virtue is taken for the object of virtue. For the furthest + point to which a power can reach, is said to be its virtue; for instance, if a + man can carry a hundredweight and not more, his virtue [*In English we should say 'strength,' which is the original signification + of the Latin 'virtus': thus we speak of an engine being so many horse-power, to indicate its 'strength'] is put at a hundredweight, + and not at sixty. But the objection takes virtue as being essentially the limit of power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35795" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35795] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod quandoque virtus dicitur id ad quod est virtus, +scilicet vel obiectum virtutis, vel actus eius, sicut fides dicitur +quandoque id quod creditur, quandoque vero ipsum credere, quandoque +autem ipse habitus quo creditur. Unde quando dicitur quod virtus +est ultimum potentiae, sumitur virtus pro obiecto virtutis. Id enim +in quod ultimo potentia potest, est id ad quod dicitur virtus rei, +sicut si aliquis potest ferre centum libras et non plus, virtus +eius consideratur secundum centum libras, non autem secundum +sexaginta. Obiectio autem procedebat ac si essentialiter virtus +esset ultimum potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Good use of free-will is said to be a virtue, in the same sense as above (ad 1); that is to say, because it is that to which + virtue is directed as to its proper act. For the act of virtue is nothing else than the good use of free-will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35796" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35796] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod bonus usus liberi arbitrii dicitur esse virtus, +secundum eandem rationem, quia scilicet est id ad quod ordinatur +virtus sicut ad proprium actum. Nihil est enim aliud actus virtutis +quam bonus usus liberi arbitrii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> We are said to merit by something in two ways. First, as by merit itself, just as we are said to run by running; and thus + we merit by acts. Secondly, we are said to merit by something as by the principle whereby we merit, as we are said to run + by the motive power; and thus are we said to merit by virtues and habits. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35797" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35797] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod aliquo dicimur mereri dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut +ipso merito, eo modo quo dicimur currere cursu, et hoc modo meremur +actibus. Alio modo dicimur mereri aliquo sicut principio merendi, +sicut dicimur currere potentia motiva, et sic dicimur mereri +virtutibus et habitibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> When we say that virtue is the order or ordering of love, we refer to the end to which virtue is ordered: because in us love + is set in order by virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="35798" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35798] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod virtus dicitur ordo vel ordinatio amoris, sicut id ad +quod est virtus, per virtutem enim ordinatur amor in nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Natural powers are of themselves determinate to one act: not so the rational powers. And so there is no comparison, as we + have said. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="35799" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35799] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod potentiae naturales sunt de se determinatae ad unum, +non autem potentiae rationales. Et ideo non est simile, ut dictum +est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q55_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q55_A2-p0.1">Q. 55. A. 2. Whether human virtue is an operative habit?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not essential to human virtue to be an operative habit. For Tully says (Tuscul. iv) that as health + and beauty belong to the body, so virtue belongs to the soul. But health and beauty are not operative habits. Therefore neither + is virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35800" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35800] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit de ratione virtutis humanae +quod sit habitus operativus. Dicit enim Tullius, in IV de Tuscul. +quaest., quod sicut est sanitas et pulchritudo corporis, ita est +virtus animae. Sed sanitas et pulchritudo non sunt habitus +operativi. Ergo neque etiam virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in natural things we find virtue not only in reference to act, but also in reference to being: as is clear from + the Philosopher (De Coelo i), since some have a virtue to be always, while some have a virtue to be not always, but at some + definite time. Now as natural virtue is in natural things, so is human virtue in rational beings. Therefore also human virtue + is referred not only to act, but also to being. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35801" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35801] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +in rebus naturalibus invenitur virtus non solum ad agere, sed etiam +ad esse, ut patet per philosophum, in I de caelo, quod quaedam +habent virtutem ut sint semper, quaedam vero non ad hoc quod sint +semper, sed aliquo tempore determinato. Sed sicut se habet virtus +naturalis in rebus naturalibus, ita se habet virtus humana in +rationalibus. Ergo etiam virtus humana non solum est ad agere, sed +etiam ad esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that virtue "is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best." + Now the best thing to which man needs to be disposed by virtue is God Himself, as Augustine proves (De Moribus + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.3" target="asv">Eccl. 3</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Eccl.6" target="asv">6</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A2-p4.3" href="./asv.html#Eccl.14" target="asv">14</a>) to Whom the soul is disposed by being made like to Him. Therefore it seems that virtue is a quality of the soul in reference + to God, likening it, as it were, to Him; and not in reference to operation. It is not, + therefore, an operative habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35802" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35802] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in VII Physic., quod virtus est dispositio +perfecti ad optimum. Optimum autem ad quod hominem oportet disponi +per virtutem, est ipse Deus, ut probat Augustinus in libro II de +moribus Eccles.; ad quem disponitur anima per assimilationem ad +ipsum. Ergo videtur quod virtus dicatur qualitas quaedam animae in +ordine ad Deum, tanquam assimilativa ad ipsum, non autem in ordine +ad operationem. Non igitur est habitus operativus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) says that "virtue of a thing is that which makes its work good." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35803" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35803] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod <i>virtus +uniuscuiusque rei est quae opus eius bonum reddit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q55_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Virtue, from the very nature of the word, implies some perfection of power, as we have said above + <a href="#FS_Q55_A1" id="FS_Q55_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Wherefore, since power [*The one Latin word 'potentia' is rendered 'potentiality' in the first case, and 'power' in the + second] is of two kinds, namely, power in reference to being, and power in reference to act; the perfection of each of these + is called virtue. But power in reference to being is on the part of matter, which is + potential being, whereas power in reference to act, is on the part of the form, which is the principle of action, since everything + acts in so far as it is in act. + </p><p id="FS_Q55_A2-p7"> Now man is so constituted that the body holds the place of matter, the soul that of form. The body, indeed, man has in common + with other animals; and the same is to be said of the forces which are common to the soul and body: and only those forces + which are proper to the soul, namely, the rational forces, belong to man alone. And therefore, human virtue, of which we are + speaking now, cannot belong to the body, but belongs only to that which is proper to the soul. Wherefore human + virtue does not imply reference to being, but rather to act. Consequently it is essential to human virtue to be an operative + habit. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 2 co."><a name="35804" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35804] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod virtus, ex ipsa ratione nominis, importat quandam +perfectionem potentiae, ut supra dictum est. Unde, cum duplex sit +potentia, scilicet potentia ad esse et potentia ad agere, utriusque +potentiae perfectio virtus vocatur. Sed potentia ad esse se tenet +ex parte materiae, quae est ens in potentia, potentia autem ad +agere se tenet ex parte formae, quae est principium agendi, eo quod +unumquodque agit inquantum est actu. In constitutione autem +hominis, corpus se habet sicut materia, anima vero sicut forma. Et +quantum quidem ad corpus, homo communicat cum aliis animalibus; et +similiter quantum ad vires quae sunt animae et corpori communes; +solae autem illae vires quae sunt propriae animae, scilicet +rationales, sunt hominis tantum. Et ideo virtus humana, de qua +loquimur, non potest pertinere ad corpus; sed pertinet tantum ad id +quod est proprium animae. Unde virtus humana non importat ordinem +ad esse, sed magis ad agere. Et ideo de ratione virtutis humanae +est quod sit habitus operativus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Mode of action follows on the disposition of the agent: for such as a thing is, such is its act. And therefore, since virtue + is the principle of some kind of operation, there must needs pre-exist in the operator in respect of virtue some corresponding + disposition. Now virtue causes an ordered operation. Therefore virtue itself is an ordered disposition of the soul, in so + far as, to wit, the powers of the soul are in some way ordered to one another, + and to that which is outside. Hence virtue, inasmuch as it is a suitable disposition of the soul, is like health and beauty, + which are suitable dispositions of the body. But this does not hinder virtue from being a principle of operation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35805" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35805] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod modus actionis sequitur dispositionem agentis, +unumquodque enim quale est, talia operatur. Et ideo, cum virtus sit +principium aliqualis operationis, oportet quod in operante +praeexistat secundum virtutem aliqua conformis dispositio. Facit +autem virtus operationem ordinatam. Et ideo ipsa virtus est quaedam +dispositio ordinata in anima, secundum scilicet quod potentiae +animae ordinantur aliqualiter ad invicem, et ad id quod est extra. +Et ideo virtus, inquantum est conveniens dispositio animae, +assimilatur sanitati et pulchritudini, quae sunt debitae +dispositiones corporis. Sed per hoc non excluditur quin virtus +etiam sit operationis principium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Virtue which is referred to being is not proper to man; but only that virtue which is referred to works of reason, which + are proper to man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35806" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35806] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod virtus quae est ad esse, non est propria hominis, sed +solum virtus quae est ad opera rationis, quae sunt propria +hominis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As God's substance is His act, the highest likeness of man to God is in respect of some operation. Wherefore, as we have + said above ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q3_A2" id="FS_Q55_A2-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[2]</a>), happiness or bliss by which man is made most perfectly conformed to God, and which is the end of human life, consists in + an operation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35807" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35807] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, cum Dei substantia sit eius actio, summa assimilatio +hominis ad Deum est secundum aliquam operationem. Unde, sicut supra +dictum est, felicitas sive beatitudo, per quam homo maxime Deo +conformatur, quae est finis humanae vitae, in operatione +consistit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q55_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q55_A3-p0.1">Q. 55. A. 3. Whether human virtue is a good habit?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not essential to virtue that it should be a good habit. For sin is always taken in a bad sense. + But there is a virtue even of sin; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.56" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:56</a>: "The virtue [Douay: 'strength'] of sin is the Law." Therefore virtue is not always a good habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35808" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35808] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit de ratione virtutis quod sit +habitus bonus. Peccatum enim in malo semper sumitur. Sed etiam +peccati est aliqua virtus; secundum illud I ad Cor. XV, <i>virtus +peccati lex</i>. Ergo virtus non semper est habitus bonus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Virtue corresponds to power. But power is not only referred to good, but also to evil: according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.5" target="asv">Is. 5</a>: "Woe to you that are mighty to drink wine, and stout men at drunkenness." Therefore virtue also is referred to good and + evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35809" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35809] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +virtus potentiae respondet. Sed potentia non solum se habet ad +bonum, sed etiam ad malum; secundum illud Isaiae V, <i>vae, qui +potentes estis ad bibendum vinum, et viri fortes ad miscendam +ebrietatem</i>. Ergo etiam virtus se habet et ad bonum et ad +malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.9" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:9</a>): "Virtue [Douay: 'power'] is made perfect in infirmity." But infirmity is an evil. Therefore virtue is referred not only + to good, but also to evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35810" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35810] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +secundum apostolum, II ad Cor. XII, virtus in infirmitate +perficitur. Sed infirmitas est quoddam malum. Ergo virtus non solum +se habet ad bonum, sed etiam ad malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi): "No one can doubt that virtue makes the soul exceeding good": and the Philosopher says + (Ethic. ii, 6): "Virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35811" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35811] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de moribus Eccles., <i>nemo +autem dubitaverit quod virtus animam facit optimam</i>. Et +philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod <i>virtus est quae bonum +facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said above + <a href="#FS_Q55_A1" id="FS_Q55_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, virtue implies a perfection of power: wherefore the virtue of a thing is fixed by the limit of its power (De Coelo i). Now + the limit of any power must needs be good: for all evil implies defect; wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Hom. ii) that every + evil is a weakness. And for this reason the virtue of a thing must be regarded in reference to good. Therefore human virtue + which is an operative habit, is a + good habit, productive of good works. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 3 co."><a name="35812" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35812] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtus importat perfectionem +potentiae, unde virtus cuiuslibet rei determinatur ad ultimum in +quod res potest, ut dicitur in I de caelo. Ultimum autem in quod +unaquaeque potentia potest, oportet quod sit bonum, nam omne malum +defectum quendam importat; unde Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Div. +Nom., quod omne malum est infirmum. Et propter hoc oportet quod +virtus cuiuslibet rei dicatur in ordine ad bonum. Unde virtus +humana, quae est habitus operativus, est bonus habitus, et boni +operativus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as bad things are said metaphorically to be perfect, so are they said to be good: for we speak of a perfect thief or + robber; and of a good thief or robber, as the Philosopher explains (Metaph. v, text. 21). In this way therefore virtue is + applied to evil things: so that the "virtue" of sin is said to be law, in so far as occasionally sin is aggravated through + the law, so as to attain to the limit of its possibility. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35813" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35813] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod sicut perfectum, ita et bonum dicitur +metaphorice in malis, dicitur enim et perfectus fur sive latro, et +bonus fur sive latro; ut patet per philosophum, in V Metaphys. +Secundum hoc ergo, etiam virtus metaphorice in malis dicitur. Et +sic virtus peccati dicitur lex, inquantum scilicet per legem +occasionaliter est peccatum augmentatum, et quasi ad maximum suum +posse pervenit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The evil of drunkenness and excessive drink, consists in a falling away from the order of reason. Now it happens that, together + with this falling away from reason, some lower power is perfect in reference to that which belongs to its own kind, even in + direct opposition to reason, or with some falling away therefrom. But the perfection of that power, since it is compatible + with a falling away from reason, cannot be called a human virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35814" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35814] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod malum ebrietatis et nimiae potationis, consistit in +defectu ordinis rationis. Contingit autem, cum defectu rationis, +esse aliquam potentiam inferiorem perfectam ad id quod est sui +generis, etiam cum repugnantia vel cum defectu rationis. Perfectio +autem talis potentiae, cum sit cum defectu rationis, non posset +dici virtus humana.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Reason is shown to be so much the more perfect, according as it is able to overcome or endure more easily the weakness of + the body and of the lower powers. And therefore human virtue, which is attributed to reason, is said to be "made perfect in + infirmity," not of the reason indeed, but of the body and of the lower powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35815" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35815] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod tanto ratio perfectior esse ostenditur, quanto +infirmitates corporis et inferiorum partium magis potest vincere +seu tolerare. Et ideo virtus humana, quae rationi attribuitur, in +infirmitate perfici dicitur, non quidem rationis, sed in +infirmitate corporis et inferiorum partium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q55_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q55_A4-p0.1">Q. 55. A. 4. Whether virtue is suitably defined?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the definition, usually given, of virtue, is not suitable, to wit: "Virtue is a good quality of the mind, + by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God works in us, without us." For virtue is man's goodness, + since virtue it is that makes its subject good. But goodness does not seem to be good, as neither is whiteness white. It is + therefore unsuitable to describe virtue as a "good quality." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35816" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35816] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit conveniens definitio virtutis +quae solet assignari, scilicet, virtus est bona qualitas mentis, +qua recte vivitur, qua nullus male utitur, quam Deus in nobis sine +nobis operatur. Virtus enim est bonitas hominis, ipsa enim est quae +bonum facit habentem. Sed bonitas non videtur esse bona, sicut nec +albedo est alba. Igitur inconvenienter dicitur quod virtus est bona +qualitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no difference is more common than its genus; since it is that which divides the genus. But good is more common than + quality, since it is convertible with being. Therefore "good" should not be put in the definition of virtue, as a difference + of quality. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35817" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35817] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +nulla differentia est communior suo genere, cum sit generis +divisiva. Sed bonum est communius quam qualitas, convertitur enim +cum ente. Ergo bonum non debet poni in definitione virtutis, ut +differentia qualitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 3): "When we come across anything that is not common to us and the beasts of the + field, it is something appertaining to the mind." But there are virtues even of the irrational parts; as the Philosopher says + (Ethic. iii, 10). Every virtue, therefore, is not a good quality "of the mind." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35818" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35818] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut Augustinus dicit, in XII de Trin., <i>ubi primo occurrit +aliquid quod non sit nobis pecoribusque commune, illud ad mentem +pertinet</i>. Sed quaedam virtutes sunt etiam irrationabilium +partium; ut philosophus dicit, in III Ethic. Non ergo omnis virtus +est bona qualitas mentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, righteousness seems to belong to justice; whence the righteous are called just. But justice is a species of virtue. + It is therefore unsuitable to put "righteous" in the definition of virtue, when we say that virtue is that "by which we live + righteously." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="35819" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35819] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +rectitudo videtur ad iustitiam pertinere, unde idem dicuntur recti, +et iusti. Sed iustitia est species virtutis. Inconvenienter ergo +ponitur rectum in definitione virtutis, cum dicitur, qua recte +vivitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, whoever is proud of a thing, makes bad use of it. But many are proud of virtue, for Augustine says in his Rule, + that "pride lies in wait for good works in order to slay them." It is untrue, therefore, "that no one can make bad use of + virtue." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="35820" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35820] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +quicumque superbit de aliquo, male utitur eo. Sed multi superbiunt +de virtute, dicit enim Augustinus, in regula, <i>quod superbia +etiam bonis operibus insidiatur, ut pereant</i>. Falsum est ergo +quod nemo virtute male utatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, man is justified by virtue. But Augustine commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.15.11" target="asv"> Jn. 15:11</a>: "He shall do greater things than these," says [*Tract. xxvii in Joan.: Serm. xv de Verb. + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A4-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rev.11" target="asv">Ap. 11</a>]: "He who created thee without thee, will not justify thee without thee." It is therefore unsuitable to say that "God works + virtue in us, without us." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 arg. 6"><a name="35821" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35821] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, +homo per virtutem iustificatur. Sed Augustinus dicit, super illud +Ioan., <i>maiora horum faciet, qui creavit te sine te, non +iustificabit te sine te</i>. Inconvenienter ergo dicitur quod +virtutem Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> We have the authority of Augustine from whose words this definition is gathered, and principally in De Libero Arbitrio ii, + 19. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35822" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35822] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est auctoritas Augustini, ex cuius verbis praedicta definitio +colligitur, et praecipue in II de libero arbitrio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q55_A4-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> This definition comprises perfectly the whole essential notion of virtue. For the perfect essential notion of anything is + gathered from all its causes. Now the above definition comprises all the causes of virtue. For the formal cause of virtue, + as of everything, is gathered from its genus and difference, when it is defined as "a good quality": for "quality" is the + genus of virtue, and the difference, "good." But the definition would be more suitable if for + "quality" we substitute "habit," which is the proximate genus. + </p><p id="FS_Q55_A4-p10"> Now virtue has no matter "out of which" it is formed, as neither has any other accident; but it has matter "about which" + it is concerned, and matter "in which" it exits, namely, the subject. The matter about which virtue is concerned is its object, + and this could not be included in the above definition, because the object fixes the virtue to a certain species, and here + we are giving the definition of virtue in general. And so for material cause we have the subject, which is + mentioned when we say that virtue is a good quality "of the mind." + </p><p id="FS_Q55_A4-p11"> The end of virtue, since it is an operative habit, is operation. But it must be observed that some operative habits are always + referred to evil, as vicious habits: others are sometimes referred to good, sometimes to evil; for instance, opinion is referred + both to the true and to the untrue: whereas virtue is a habit which is always referred to good: and so the distinction of + virtue from those habits which are always referred to evil, is expressed in the words "by which we live + righteously": and its distinction from those habits which are sometimes directed unto good, sometimes unto evil, in the words, + "of which no one makes bad use." + </p><p id="FS_Q55_A4-p12"> Lastly, God is the efficient cause of infused virtue, to which this definition applies; and this is expressed in the words + "which God works in us without us." If we omit this phrase, the remainder of the definition will apply to all virtues in general, + whether acquired or infused. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 co."><a name="35823" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35823] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod ista definitio perfecte complectitur totam rationem +virtutis. Perfecta enim ratio uniuscuiusque rei colligitur ex +omnibus causis eius. Comprehendit autem praedicta definitio omnes +causas virtutis. Causa namque formalis virtutis, sicut et +cuiuslibet rei, accipitur ex eius genere et differentia, cum +dicitur qualitas bona, genus enim virtutis qualitas est, +differentia autem bonum. Esset tamen convenientior definitio, si +loco qualitatis habitus poneretur, qui est genus propinquum. Virtus +autem non habet materiam ex qua, sicut nec alia accidentia, sed +habet materiam circa quam; et materiam in qua, scilicet subiectum. +Materia autem circa quam est obiectum virtutis; quod non potuit in +praedicta definitione poni, eo quod per obiectum determinatur +virtus ad speciem; hic autem assignatur definitio virtutis in +communi. Unde ponitur subiectum loco causae materialis, cum dicitur +quod est bona qualitas mentis. Finis autem virtutis, cum sit +habitus operativus, est ipsa operatio. Sed notandum quod habituum +operativorum aliqui sunt semper ad malum, sicut habitus vitiosi; +aliqui vero quandoque ad bonum, et quandoque ad malum, sicut opinio +se habet ad verum et ad falsum; virtus autem est habitus semper se +habens ad bonum. Et ideo, ut discernatur virtus ab his quae semper +se habent ad malum, dicitur, qua recte vivitur, ut autem +discernatur ab his quae se habent quandoque ad bonum, quandoque ad +malum, dicitur, qua nullus male utitur. Causa autem efficiens +virtutis infusae, de qua definitio datur, Deus est. Propter quod +dicitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. Quae quidem +particula si auferatur, reliquum definitionis erit commune omnibus +virtutibus, et acquisitis et infusis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That which is first seized by the intellect is being: wherefore everything that we apprehend we consider as being, and consequently + as gone, and as good, which are convertible with being. Wherefore we say that essence is being and is one and is good; and + that oneness is being and one and good: and in like manner goodness. But this is not the case with specific forms, as whiteness + and health; for everything that we apprehend, is not apprehended with + the notion of white and healthy. We must, however, observe that, as accidents and non-subsistent forms are called beings, + not as if they themselves had being, but because things are by them; so also are they called good or one, not by some distinct + goodness or oneness, but because by them something is good or one. So also is virtue called good, because by it something + is good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35824" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35824] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod id quod primo cadit in intellectu, est ens, unde +unicuique apprehenso a nobis attribuimus quod sit ens; et per +consequens quod sit unum et bonum, quae convertuntur cum ente. Unde +dicimus quod essentia est ens et una et bona; et quod unitas est +ens et una et bona; et similiter de bonitate. Non autem hoc habet +locum in specialibus formis, sicut est albedo et sanitas, non enim +omne quod apprehendimus, sub ratione albi et sani apprehendimus. +Sed tamen considerandum quod sicut accidentia et formae non +subsistentes dicuntur entia, non quia ipsa habeant esse, sed quia +eis aliquid est; ita etiam dicuntur bona vel una, non quidem aliqua +alia bonitate vel unitate, sed quia eis est aliquid bonum vel unum. +Sic igitur et virtus dicitur bona, quia ea aliquid est bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Good, which is put in the definition of virtue, is not good in general which is convertible with being, and which extends + further than quality, but the good as fixed by reason, with regard to which Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) "that the good of + the soul is to be in accord with reason." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35825" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35825] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod bonum quod ponitur in definitione virtutis, non est +bonum commune, quod convertitur cum ente, et est in plus quam +qualitas, sed est bonum rationis, secundum quod Dionysius dicit, in +IV cap. de Div. Nom., <i>quod bonum animae est secundum rationem +esse</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Virtue cannot be in the irrational part of the soul, except in so far as this participates in the reason (Ethic. i, 13). + And therefore reason, or the mind, is the proper subject of virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35826" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35826] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod virtus non potest esse in irrationali parte animae, +nisi inquantum participat rationem, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Et ideo +ratio, sive mens, est proprium subiectum virtutis humanae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Justice has a righteousness of its own by which it puts those outward things right which come into human use, and are the + proper matter of justice, as we shall show further on (Q[60], A[2]; + <a href="SS_ii.html#SS_Q58_A8" id="FS_Q55_A4-p16.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[58], A[8]</a>). But the righteousness which denotes order to a due end and to the Divine law, which is the rule of the human will, as stated + above (Q[19], A[4]), is common to all virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="35827" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35827] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod iustitiae est propria rectitudo quae constituitur +circa res exteriores quae in usum hominis veniunt, quae sunt +propria materia iustitiae, ut infra patebit. Sed rectitudo quae +importat ordinem ad finem debitum et ad legem divinam, quae est +regula voluntatis humanae, ut supra dictum est, communis est omni +virtuti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> One can make bad use of a virtue objectively, for instance by having evil thoughts about a virtue, e.g. by hating it, or + by being proud of it: but one cannot make bad use of virtue as principle of action, so that an act of virtue be evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="35828" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35828] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod virtute potest aliquis male uti tanquam obiecto, puta +cum male sentit de virtute, cum odit eam, vel superbit de ea, non +autem tanquam principio usus, ita scilicet quod malus sit actus +virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Infused virtue is caused in us by God without any action on our part, but not without our consent. This is the sense of the + words, "which God works in us without us." As to those things which are done by us, God causes them in us, yet not without + action on our part, for He works in every will and in every nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 ad 6"><a name="35829" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35829] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum +dicendum quod virtus infusa causatur in nobis a Deo sine nobis +agentibus, non tamen sine nobis consentientibus. Et sic est +intelligendum quod dicitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. +Quae vero per nos aguntur, Deus in nobis causat non sine nobis +agentibus, ipse enim operatur in omni voluntate et natura.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q56" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q56-p0.1">Q. 56. OF THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q56-p2"> We now have to consider the subject of virtue, about which there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q56-p3"><a href="#FS_Q56_A1"> (1) Whether the subject of virtue is a power of the soul?</a></p><p id="FS_Q56-p4"><a href="#FS_Q56_A2"> (2) Whether one virtue can be in several powers?</a></p><p id="FS_Q56-p5"><a href="#FS_Q56_A3"> (3) Whether the intellect can be the subject of virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q56-p6"><a href="#FS_Q56_A4"> (4) Whether the irascible and concupiscible faculties can be the subject of virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q56-p7"><a href="#FS_Q56_A5"> (5) Whether the sensitive powers of apprehension can be the subject of virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q56-p8"><a href="#FS_Q56_A6"> (6) Whether the will can be the subject of virtue?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 pr."><a name="35830" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35830] +Iª-IIae q. 56 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +subiecto virtutis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum virtus +sit in potentia animae sicut in subiecto. Secundo, utrum una virtus +possit esse in pluribus potentiis. Tertio, utrum intellectus possit +esse subiectum virtutis. Quarto, utrum irascibilis et +concupiscibilis. Quinto, utrum vires apprehensivae sensitivae. +Sexto, utrum voluntas.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q56_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q56_A1-p0.1">Q. 56. A. 1. Whether the subject of virtue is a power of the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the subject of virtue is not a power of the soul. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that "virtue + is that by which we live righteously." But we live by the essence of the soul, and not by a power of the soul. Therefore virtue + is not a power, but in the essence of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35831" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35831] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus non sit in potentia animae +sicut in subiecto. Dicit enim Augustinus, in II de Lib. Arbit., +quod virtus est qua recte vivitur. Vivere autem non est per +potentiam animae, sed per eius essentiam. Ergo virtus non est in +potentia animae, sed in eius essentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise." + But as work is set up by power, so he that has a virtue is set up by the essence of the soul. Therefore virtue does not belong + to the power, any more than to the essence of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35832" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35832] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., <i>virtus est quae bonum facit +habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit</i>. Sed sicut opus +constituitur per potentiam, ita habens virtutem constituitur per +essentiam animae. Ergo virtus non magis pertinet ad potentiam +animae, quam ad eius essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, power is in the second species of quality. But virtue is a quality, as we have said above ( + <a href="#FS_Q55_A4" id="FS_Q56_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[4]</a>): and quality is not the subject of quality. Therefore a power of the soul is not the subject of virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35833" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35833] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +potentia est in secunda specie qualitatis. Virtus autem est quaedam +qualitas, ut supra dictum est. Qualitatis autem non est qualitas. +Ergo virtus non est in potentia animae sicut in subiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> "Virtue is the limit of power" (De Coelo ii). But the limit is in that of which it is the limit. Therefore virtue is in a + power of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35834" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35834] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +virtus est ultimum potentiae, ut dicitur in I de caelo. Sed ultimum +est in eo cuius est ultimum. Ergo virtus est in potentia +animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It can be proved in three ways that virtue belongs to a power of the soul. First, from the notion of the very essence of + virtue, which implies perfection of a power; for perfection is in that which it perfects. Secondly, from the fact that virtue + is an operative habit, as we have said above ( + <a href="#FS_Q55_A2" id="FS_Q56_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[2]</a>): for all operation proceeds from the soul through a power. Thirdly, from the fact that virtue disposes to that which is + best: for + the best is the end, which is either a thing's operation, or something acquired by an operation proceeding from the thing's + power. Therefore a power of the soul is the subject of virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 1 co."><a name="35835" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35835] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod virtutem pertinere ad potentiam animae, ex tribus +potest esse manifestum. Primo quidem, ex ipsa ratione virtutis, +quae importat perfectionem potentiae, perfectio autem est in eo +cuius est perfectio. Secundo, ex hoc quod est habitus operativus, +ut supra dictum est, omnis autem operatio est ab anima per aliquam +potentiam. Tertio, ex hoc quod disponit ad optimum, optimum autem +est finis, qui vel est operatio rei, vel aliquid consecutum per +operationem a potentia egredientem. Unde virtus humana est in +potentia animae sicut in subiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "To live" may be taken in two ways. Sometimes it is taken for the very existence of the living thing: in this way it belongs + to the essence of the soul, which is the principle of existence in the living thing. But sometimes "to live" is taken for + the operation of the living thing: in this sense, by virtue we live righteously, inasmuch as by virtue we perform righteous + actions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35836" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35836] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod vivere dupliciter sumitur. Quandoque enim +dicitur vivere ipsum esse viventis, et sic pertinet ad essentiam +animae, quae est viventi essendi principium. Alio modo vivere +dicitur operatio viventis, et sic virtute recte vivitur, inquantum +per eam aliquis recte operatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Good is either the end, or something referred to the end. And therefore, since the good of the worker consists in the work, + this fact also, that virtue makes the worker good, is referred to the work, and consequently, to the power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35837" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35837] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod bonum vel est finis, vel in ordine ad finem dicitur. +Et ideo, cum bonum operantis consistat in operatione, hoc etiam +ipsum quod virtus facit operantem bonum, refertur ad operationem, +et per consequens ad potentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One accident is said to be the subject of another, not as though one accident could uphold another; but because one accident + inheres to substance by means of another, as color to the body by means of the surface; so that surface is said to be the + subject of color. In this way a power of the soul is said to be the subject of virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35838" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35838] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod unum accidens dicitur esse in alio sicut in subiecto, +non quia accidens per seipsum possit sustentare aliud accidens, sed +quia unum accidens inhaeret substantiae mediante alio accidente, ut +color corpori mediante superficie; unde superficies dicitur esse +subiectum coloris. Et eo modo potentia animae dicitur esse +subiectum virtutis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q56_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q56_A2-p0.1">Q. 56. A. 2. Whether one virtue can be in several powers?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one virtue can be in several powers. For habits are known by their acts. But one act proceeds in various + way from several powers: thus walking proceeds from the reason as directing, from the will as moving, and from the motive + power as executing. Therefore also one habit can be in several powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35839" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35839] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod una virtus possit esse in duabus +potentiis. Habitus enim cognoscuntur per actus. Sed unus actus +progreditur diversimode a diversis potentiis, sicut ambulatio +procedit a ratione ut a dirigente, a voluntate sicut a movente, et +a potentia motiva sicut ab exequente. Ergo etiam unus habitus +virtutis potest esse in pluribus potentiis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that three things are required for virtue, namely: "to know, to will, and to + work steadfastly." But "to know" belongs to the intellect, and "to will" belongs to the will. Therefore virtue can be in several + powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35840" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35840] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod ad virtutem tria requiruntur, +scilicet scire, velle et immobiliter operari. Sed scire pertinet ad +intellectum, velle ad voluntatem. Ergo virtus potest esse in +pluribus potentiis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, prudence is in the reason since it is "the right reason of things to be done" (Ethic. vi, 5). And it is also in + the will: for it cannot exist together with a perverse will (Ethic. vi, 12). Therefore one virtue can be in two powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35841" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35841] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +prudentia est in ratione, cum sit recta ratio agibilium, ut dicitur +in VI Ethic. Est etiam in voluntate, quia non potest esse cum +voluntate perversa, ut in eodem libro dicitur. Ergo una virtus +potest esse in duabus potentiis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The subject of virtue is a power of the soul. But the same accident cannot be in several subjects. Therefore one virtue cannot + be in several powers of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35842" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35842] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +virtus est in potentia animae sicut in subiecto. Sed idem accidens +non potest esse in pluribus subiectis. Ergo una virtus non potest +esse in pluribus potentiis animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It happens in two ways that one thing is subjected in two. First, so that it is in both on an equal footing. In this way + it is impossible for one virtue to be in two powers: since diversity of powers follows the generic conditions of the objects, + while diversity of habits follows the specific conditions thereof: and so wherever there is diversity of powers, there is + diversity of habits; but not vice versa. In another way one thing can be subjected in two or + more, not on an equal footing, but in a certain order. And thus one virtue can belong to several powers, so that it is in + one chiefly, while it extends to others by a kind of diffusion, or by way of a disposition, in so far as one power is moved + by another, and one power receives from another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 2 co."><a name="35843" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35843] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod aliquid esse in duobus, contingit dupliciter. Uno +modo, sic quod ex aequo sit in utroque. Et sic impossibile est unam +virtutem esse in duabus potentiis, quia diversitas potentiarum +attenditur secundum generales conditiones obiectorum, diversitas +autem habituum secundum speciales; unde ubicumque est diversitas +potentiarum, est diversitas habituum, sed non convertitur. Alio +modo potest esse aliquid in duobus vel pluribus, non ex aequo, sed +ordine quodam. Et sic una virtus pertinere potest ad plures +potentias; ita quod in una sit principaliter, et se extendat ad +alias per modum diffusionis, vel per modum dispositionis; secundum +quod una potentia movetur ab alia, et secundum quod una potentia +accipit ab alia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> One act cannot belong to several powers equally, and in the same degree; but only from different points of view, and in various + degrees. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35844" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35844] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod idem actus non potest aequaliter, et eodem +ordine, pertinere ad diversas potentias, sed secundum diversas +rationes, et diverso ordine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "To know" is a condition required for moral virtue, inasmuch as moral virtue works according to right reason. But moral virtue + is essentially in the appetite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35845" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35845] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod scire praeexigitur ad virtutem moralem, inquantum +virtus moralis operatur secundum rationem rectam. Sed essentialiter +in appetendo virtus moralis consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Prudence is really subjected in reason: but it presupposes as its principle the rectitude of the will, as we shall see further + on + <a href="#FS_Q56_A3" id="FS_Q56_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[3];</a> Q[57], A[4]). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35846" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35846] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod prudentia realiter est in ratione sicut in subiecto, +sed praesupponit rectitudinem voluntatis sicut principium, ut infra +dicetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q56_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q56_A3-p0.1">Q. 56. A. 3. Whether the intellect can be the subject of virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellect is not the subject of virtue. For Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that all virtue is + love. But the subject of love is not the intellect, but the appetitive power alone. Therefore no virtue is in the intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35847" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35847] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus non sit subiectum +virtutis. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de moribus Eccles., quod +omnis virtus est amor. Subiectum autem amoris non est intellectus, +sed solum vis appetitiva. Ergo nulla virtus est in intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue is referred to good, as is clear from what has been said above ( + <a href="#FS_Q55_A3" id="FS_Q56_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[3]</a>). Now good is not the object of the intellect, but of the appetitive power. Therefore the subject of virtue is not the intellect, + but the appetitive power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35848" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35848] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +virtus ordinatur ad bonum, sicut ex supradictis patet. Bonum autem +non est obiectum intellectus, sed appetitivae virtutis. Ergo +subiectum virtutis non est intellectus, sed appetitiva virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, virtue is that "which makes its possessor good," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6). But the habit which perfects + the intellect does not make its possessor good: since a man is not said to be a good man on account of his science or his + art. Therefore the intellect is not the subject of virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35849" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35849] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> +<i>Praeterea, virtus est quae bonum facit habentem</i>, ut +philosophus dicit. Sed habitus perficiens intellectum non facit +bonum habentem, non enim propter scientiam vel artem dicitur homo +bonus. Ergo intellectus non est subiectum virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The mind is chiefly called the intellect. But the subject of virtue is the mind, as is clear from the definition, above given, + of virtue ( + <a href="#FS_Q55_A4" id="FS_Q56_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[4]</a>). Therefore the intellect is the subject of virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35850" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35850] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod mens maxime dicitur intellectus. Subiectum autem virtutis +est mens; ut patet ex definitione virtutis supra inducta. Ergo +intellectus est subiectum virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q56_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said above ( + <a href="#FS_Q55_A3" id="FS_Q56_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[3]</a>), a virtue is a habit by which we work well. Now a habit may be directed to a good act in two ways. First, in so far as by + the habit a man acquires an aptness to a good act; for instance, by the habit of grammar man has the aptness to speak correctly. + But grammar does not make a man always speak correctly: for a grammarian may be guilty of a barbarism or make a solecism: + and the case is the same + with other sciences and arts. Secondly, a habit may confer not only aptness to act, but also the right use of that aptness: + for instance, justice not only gives man the prompt will to do just actions, but also makes him act justly. + </p><p id="FS_Q56_A3-p7"> And since good, and, in like manner, being, is said of a thing simply, in respect, not of what it is potentially, but of + what it is actually: therefore from having habits of the latter sort, man is said simply to do good, and to be good; for instance, + because he is just, or temperate; and in like manner as regards other such virtues. And since virtue is that "which makes + its possessor good, and his work good likewise," these latter habits are called virtuous simply: because they + make the work to be actually good, and the subject good simply. But the first kind of habits are not called virtues simply: + because they do not make the work good except in regard to a certain aptness, nor do they make their possessor good simply. + For through being gifted in science or art, a man is said to be good, not simply, but relatively; for instance, a good grammarian + or a good smith. And for this reason science and art are often divided against virtue; while at other times they are + called virtues (Ethic. vi, 2). + </p><p id="FS_Q56_A3-p8"> Hence the subject of a habit which is called a virtue in a relative sense, can be the intellect, and not only the practical + intellect, but also the speculative, without any reference to the will: for thus the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3) holds that + science, wisdom and understanding, and also art, are intellectual virtues. But the subject of a habit which is called a virtue + simply, can only be the will, or some power in so far as it is moved by the will. And the reason of this is, + that the will moves to their acts all those other powers that are in some way rational, as we have said above (Q[9], A[1]; + Q[17], AA[1],5; + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q82_A4" id="FS_Q56_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[82], A[4]</a>): and therefore if man do well actually, this is because he has a good will. Therefore the virtue which makes a man to do + well actually, and not merely to have the aptness to do well, must be either in the will itself; or in some power as moved + by the will. + </p><p id="FS_Q56_A3-p9"> Now it happens that the intellect is moved by the will, just as are the other powers: for a man considers something actually, + because he wills to do so. And therefore the intellect, in so far as it is subordinate to the will, can be the subject of + virtue absolutely so called. And in this way the speculative intellect, or the reason, is the subject of Faith: for the intellect + is moved by the command of the will to assent to what is of faith: for "no man believeth, unless he will" + [*Augustine: Tract. xxvi in Joan.]. But the practical intellect is the subject of prudence. For since prudence is the right + reason of things to be done, it is a condition thereof that man be rightly disposed in regard to the principles of this reason + of things to be done, that is in regard to their ends, to which man is rightly disposed by the rectitude of the will, just + as to the principles of speculative truth he is rightly disposed by the natural light of the active intellect. And therefore + as the subject of science, which is the right reason of speculative truths, is the speculative intellect in its relation to + the active intellect, so the subject of prudence is the practical intellect in its relation to the right will. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 3 co."><a name="35851" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35851] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtus est habitus quo quis +bene operatur. Dupliciter autem habitus aliquis ordinatur ad bonum +actum. Uno modo, inquantum per huiusmodi habitum acquiritur homini +facultas ad bonum actum, sicut per habitum grammaticae habet homo +facultatem recte loquendi. Non tamen grammatica facit ut homo +semper recte loquatur, potest enim grammaticus barbarizare aut +soloecismum facere. Et eadem ratio est in aliis scientiis et +artibus. Alio modo, aliquis habitus non solum facit facultatem +agendi, sed etiam facit quod aliquis recte facultate utatur, sicut +iustitia non solum facit quod homo sit promptae voluntatis ad iusta +operandum, sed etiam facit ut iuste operetur. Et quia bonum, sicut +et ens, non dicitur simpliciter aliquid secundum id quod est in +potentia, sed secundum id quod est in actu; ideo ab huiusmodi +habitibus simpliciter dicitur homo bonum operari, et esse bonus, +puta quia est iustus vel temperatus; et eadem ratio est de +similibus. Et quia virtus est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus +eius bonum reddit, huiusmodi habitus simpliciter dicuntur virtutes, +quia reddunt bonum opus in actu, et simpliciter faciunt bonum +habentem. Primi vero habitus non simpliciter dicuntur virtutes, +quia non reddunt bonum opus nisi in quadam facultate, nec +simpliciter faciunt bonum habentem. Non enim dicitur simpliciter +aliquis homo bonus, ex hoc quod est sciens vel artifex, sed dicitur +bonus solum secundum quid, puta bonus grammaticus, aut bonus faber. +Et propter hoc, plerumque scientia et ars contra virtutem +dividitur, quandoque autem virtutes dicuntur, ut patet in VI Ethic. +Subiectum igitur habitus qui secundum quid dicitur virtus, potest +esse intellectus, non solum practicus, sed etiam intellectus +speculativus, absque omni ordine ad voluntatem, sic enim +philosophus, in VI Ethic., scientiam, sapientiam et intellectum, et +etiam artem, ponit esse intellectuales virtutes. Subiectum vero +habitus qui simpliciter dicitur virtus, non potest esse nisi +voluntas; vel aliqua potentia secundum quod est mota a voluntate. +Cuius ratio est, quia voluntas movet omnes alias potentias quae +aliqualiter sunt rationales, ad suos actus, ut supra habitum est, +et ideo quod homo actu bene agat, contingit ex hoc quod homo habet +bonam voluntatem. Unde virtus quae facit bene agere in actu, non +solum in facultate, oportet quod vel sit in ipsa voluntate; vel in +aliqua potentia secundum quod est a voluntate mota. Contingit autem +intellectum a voluntate moveri, sicut et alias potentias, +considerat enim aliquis aliquid actu, eo quod vult. Et ideo +intellectus, secundum quod habet ordinem ad voluntatem, potest esse +subiectum virtutis simpliciter dictae. Et hoc modo intellectus +speculativus, vel ratio, est subiectum fidei, movetur enim +intellectus ad assentiendum his quae sunt fidei, ex imperio +voluntatis; nullus enim credit nisi volens. Intellectus vero +practicus est subiectum prudentiae. Cum enim prudentia sit recta +ratio agibilium, requiritur ad prudentiam quod homo se bene habeat +ad principia huius rationis agendorum, quae sunt fines; ad quos +bene se habet homo per rectitudinem voluntatis, sicut ad principia +speculabilium per naturale lumen intellectus agentis. Et ideo sicut +subiectum scientiae, quae est ratio recta speculabilium, est +intellectus speculativus in ordine ad intellectum agentem; ita +subiectum prudentiae est intellectus practicus in ordine ad +voluntatem rectam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saying of Augustine is to be understood of virtue simply so called: not that every virtue is love simply: but that it + depends in some way on love, in so far as it depends on the will, whose first movement consists in love, as we have said above + (Q[25], AA[1],2,3; Q[27], A[4]; + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q20_A1" id="FS_Q56_A3-p10.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[20], A[1]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35852" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35852] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod verbum Augustini intelligendum est de virtute +simpliciter dicta non quod omnis talis virtus sit simpliciter amor; +sed quia dependet aliqualiter ab amore, inquantum dependet a +voluntate, cuius prima affectio est amor, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The good of each thing is its end: and therefore, as truth is the end of the intellect, so to know truth is the good act + of the intellect. Whence the habit, which perfects the intellect in regard to the knowledge of truth, whether speculative + or practical, is a virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35853" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35853] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod bonum uniuscuiusque est finis eius, et ideo, cum +verum sit finis intellectus, cognoscere verum est bonus actus +intellectus. Unde habitus perficiens intellectum ad verum +cognoscendum, vel in speculativis vel in practicis, dicitur +virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection considers virtue simply so called. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35854" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35854] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de virtute simpliciter dicta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q56_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q56_A4-p0.1">Q. 56. A. 4. Whether the irascible and concupiscible powers are the subject of virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the irascible and concupiscible powers cannot be the subject of virtue. For these powers are common to + us and dumb animals. But we are now speaking of virtue as proper to man, since for this reason it is called human virtue. + It is therefore impossible for human virtue to be in the irascible and concupiscible powers which are parts of the sensitive + appetite, as we have said in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q81_A2" id="FS_Q56_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[81], A[2]</a>. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35855" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35855] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis non +possint esse subiectum virtutis. Huiusmodi enim vires sunt communes +nobis et brutis. Sed nunc loquimur de virtute secundum quod est +propria homini, sic enim dicitur virtus humana. Non igitur humanae +virtutis potest esse subiectum irascibilis et concupiscibilis, quae +sunt partes appetitus sensitivi, ut in primo dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sensitive appetite is a power which makes use of a corporeal organ. But the good of virtue cannot be in man's + body: for the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q56_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7" target="asv">Rom. 7</a>): "I know that good does not dwell in my flesh." Therefore the sensitive appetite cannot be the subject of virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35856" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35856] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +appetitus sensitivus est vis utens organo corporali. Sed bonum +virtutis non potest esse in corpore hominis, dicit enim apostolus, +Rom. VII, <i>scio quod non habitat in carne mea bonum</i>. Ergo +appetitus sensitivus non potest esse subiectum virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine proves (De Moribus Eccl. v) that virtue is not in the body but in the soul, for the reason that the body + is ruled by the soul: wherefore it is entirely due to his soul that a man make good use of his body: "For instance, if my + coachman, through obedience to my orders, guides well the horses which he is driving; this is all due to me." But just as + the soul rules the body, so also does the reason rule the sensitive appetite. Therefore that the + irascible and concupiscible powers are rightly ruled, is entirely due to the rational powers. Now "virtue is that by which + we live rightly," as we have said above ( + <a href="#FS_Q55_A4" id="FS_Q56_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[4]</a>). Therefore virtue is not in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but only in the rational powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35857" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35857] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus probat, in libro de moribus Eccles., quod virtus non est +in corpore, sed in anima, eo quod per animam corpus regitur, unde +quod aliquis corpore bene utatur, totum refertur ad animam; +<i>sicut si mihi auriga obtemperans, equos quibus praeest, recte +regit, hoc totum mihi debetur</i>. Sed sicut anima regit corpus, +ita etiam ratio regit appetitum sensitivum. Ergo totum rationali +parti debetur, quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis recte regantur. +Sed virtus est qua recte vivitur, ut supra dictum est. Virtus +igitur non est in irascibili et concupiscibili, sed solum in parte +rationali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, "the principal act of moral virtue is choice" (Ethic. viii, 13). Now choice is not an act of the irascible and concupiscible + powers, but of the rational power, as we have said above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q13_A2" id="FS_Q56_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[13], A[2]</a>). Therefore moral virtue is not in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but in the reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="35858" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35858] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +principalis actus virtutis moralis est electio, ut dicitur in VIII +Ethic. Sed electio non est actus irascibilis et concupiscibilis, +sed rationis, ut supra dictum est. Ergo virtus moralis non est in +irascibili et concupiscibili, sed in ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Fortitude is assigned to the irascible power, and temperance to the concupiscible power. Whence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, + 10) says that "these virtues belong to the irrational part of the soul." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35859" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35859] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod fortitudo ponitur esse in irascibili, temperantia autem in +concupiscibili. Unde philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod <i>hae +virtutes sunt irrationabilium partium</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q56_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The irascible and concupiscible powers can be considered in two ways. First, in themselves, in so far as they are parts of + the sensitive appetite: and in this way they are not competent to be the subject of virtue. Secondly, they can be considered + as participating in the reason, from the fact that they have a natural aptitude to obey reason. And thus the irascible or + concupiscible power can be the subject of human virtue: for, in so far as it participates in + the reason, it is the principle of a human act. And to these powers we must needs assign virtues. + </p><p id="FS_Q56_A4-p8"> For it is clear that there are some virtues in the irascible and concupiscible powers. Because an act, which proceeds from + one power according as it is moved by another power, cannot be perfect, unless both powers be well disposed to the act: for + instance, the act of a craftsman cannot be successful unless both the craftsman and his instrument be well disposed to act. + Therefore in the matter of the operations of the irascible and concupiscible powers, according as they are moved + by reason, there must needs be some habit perfecting in respect of acting well, not only the reason, but also the irascible + and concupiscible powers. And since the good disposition of the power which moves through being moved, depends on its conformity + with the power that moves it: therefore the virtue which is in the irascible and concupiscible powers is nothing else but + a certain habitual conformity of these powers to reason. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 co."><a name="35860" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35860] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis dupliciter considerari +possunt. Uno modo secundum se, inquantum sunt partes appetitus +sensitivi. Et hoc modo, non competit eis quod sint subiectum +virtutis. Alio modo possunt considerari inquantum participant +rationem, per hoc quod natae sunt rationi obedire. Et sic +irascibilis vel concupiscibilis potest esse subiectum virtutis +humanae, sic enim est principium humani actus, inquantum participat +rationem. Et in his potentiis necesse est ponere virtutes. Quod +enim in irascibili et concupiscibili sint aliquae virtutes, patet. +Actus enim qui progreditur ab una potentia secundum quod est ab +alia mota, non potest esse perfectus, nisi utraque potentia sit +bene disposita ad actum, sicut actus artificis non potest esse +congruus, nisi et artifex sit bene dispositus ad agendum, et etiam +ipsum instrumentum. In his igitur circa quae operatur irascibilis +et concupiscibilis secundum quod sunt a ratione motae, necesse est +ut aliquis habitus perficiens ad bene agendum sit non solum in +ratione, sed etiam in irascibili et concupiscibili. Et quia bona +dispositio potentiae moventis motae, attenditur secundum +conformitatem ad potentiam moventem; ideo virtus quae est in +irascibili et concupiscibili, nihil aliud est quam quaedam +habitualis conformitas istarum potentiarum ad rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The irascible and concupiscible powers considered in themselves, as parts of the sensitive appetite, are common to us and + dumb animals. But in so far as they are rational by participation, and are obedient to the reason, they are proper to man. + And in this way they can be the subject of human virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35861" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35861] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis secundum se +consideratae, prout sunt partes appetitus sensitivi, communes sunt +nobis et brutis. Sed secundum quod sunt rationales per +participationem, ut obedientes rationi, sic sunt propriae hominis. +Et hoc modo possunt esse subiectum virtutis humanae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as human flesh has not of itself the good of virtue, but is made the instrument of a virtuous act, inasmuch as being + moved by reason, we "yield our members to serve justice"; so also, the irascible and concupiscible powers, of themselves indeed, + have not the good of virtue, but rather the infection of the "fomes": whereas, inasmuch as they are in conformity with reason, + the good of reason is begotten in them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35862" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35862] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut caro hominis ex se quidem non habet bonum +virtutis, fit tamen instrumentum virtuosi actus, inquantum, movente +ratione, membra nostra exhibemus ad serviendum iustitiae, ita etiam +irascibilis et concupiscibilis ex se quidem non habent bonum +virtutis sed magis infectionem fomitis; inquantum vero conformantur +rationi, sic in eis adgeneratur bonum virtutis moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The body is ruled by the soul, and the irascible and concupiscible powers by the reason, but in different ways. For the body + obeys the soul blindly without any contradiction, in those things in which it has a natural aptitude to be moved by the soul: + whence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that the "soul rules the body with a despotic command" as the master rules his slave: + wherefore the entire movement of the body is referred to the soul. For this + reason virtue is not in the body, but in the soul. But the irascible and concupiscible powers do not obey the reason blindly; + on the contrary, they have their own proper movements, by which, at times, they go against reason, whence the Philosopher + says (Polit. i, 3) that the "reason rules the irascible and concupiscible powers by a political command" such as that by which + free men are ruled, who have in some respects a will of their own. And for this reason also must there be some virtues in + the irascible and concupiscible powers, by which these powers are well disposed to act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35863" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35863] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod alia ratione regitur corpus ab anima, et irascibilis +et concupiscibilis a ratione. Corpus enim ad nutum obedit animae +absque contradictione, in his in quibus natum est ab anima moveri, +unde philosophus dicit, in I Polit., quod anima regit corpus +despotico principatu, idest sicut dominus servum. Et ideo totus +motus corporis refertur ad animam. Et propter hoc in corpore non +est virtus, sed solum in anima. Sed irascibilis et concupiscibilis +non ad nutum obediunt rationi, sed habent proprios motus suos, +quibus interdum rationi repugnant, unde in eodem libro philosophus +dicit quod ratio regit irascibilem et concupiscibilem principatu +politico, quo scilicet reguntur liberi, qui habent in aliquibus +propriam voluntatem. Et propter hoc etiam oportet in irascibili et +concupiscibili esse aliquas virtutes, quibus bene disponantur ad +actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In choice there are two things, namely, the intention of the end, and this belongs to the moral virtue; and the preferential + choice of that which is unto the end, and this belongs to prudence (Ethic. vi, 2,5). But that the irascible and concupiscible + powers have a right intention of the end in regard to the passions of the soul, is due to the good disposition of these powers. + And therefore those moral virtues which are concerned with the passions are + in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but prudence is in the reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="35864" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35864] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod in electione duo sunt, scilicet intentio finis, quae +pertinet ad virtutem moralem; et praeacceptio eius quod est ad +finem, quod pertinet ad prudentiam; ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Quod +autem habeat rectam intentionem finis circa passiones animae, hoc +contingit ex bona dispositione irascibilis et concupiscibilis. Et +ideo virtutes morales circa passiones, sunt in irascibili et +concupiscibili, sed prudentia est in ratione.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q56_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q56_A5-p0.1">Q. 56. A. 5. Whether the sensitive powers of apprehension are the subject of virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is possible for virtue to be in the interior sensitive powers of apprehension. For the sensitive appetite + can be the subject of virtue, in so far as it obeys reason. But the interior sensitive powers of apprehension obey reason: + for the powers of imagination, of cogitation, and of memory [*Cf. + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q78_A4" id="FS_Q56_A5-p2.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[78], A[4]</a>] act at the command of reason. Therefore in these powers there can be virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="35865" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35865] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod in viribus sensitivis apprehensivis +interius, possit esse aliqua virtus. Appetitus enim sensitivus +potest esse subiectum virtutis, inquantum obedit rationi. Sed vires +sensitivae apprehensivae interius, rationi obediunt, ad imperium +enim rationis operatur et imaginativa et cogitativa et memorativa. +Ergo in his viribus potest esse virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the rational appetite, which is the will, can be hindered or helped in its act, by the sensitive appetite, so + also can the intellect or reason be hindered or helped by the powers mentioned above. As, therefore, there can be virtue in + the interior powers of appetite, so also can there be virtue in the interior powers of apprehension. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="35866" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35866] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut appetitus rationalis, qui est voluntas, in suo actu potest +impediri, vel etiam adiuvari, per appetitum sensitivum; ita etiam +intellectus vel ratio potest impediri, vel etiam iuvari, per vires +praedictas. Sicut ergo in viribus sensitivis appetitivis potest +esse virtus, ita etiam in apprehensivis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, prudence is a virtue, of which Cicero (De Invent. Rhetor. ii) says that memory is a part. Therefore also in the + power of memory there can be a virtue: and in like manner, in the other interior sensitive powers of apprehension. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="35867" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35867] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +prudentia est quaedam virtus, cuius partem ponit Tullius memoriam, +in sua rhetorica. Ergo etiam in vi memorativa potest esse aliqua +virtus. Et eadem ratione, in aliis interioribus apprehensivis +viribus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> All virtues are either intellectual or moral (Ethic. ii, 1). Now all the moral virtues are in the appetite; while the intellectual + virtues are in the intellect or reason, as is clear from Ethic. vi, 1. Therefore there is no virtue in the interior sensitive + powers of apprehension. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 5 s. c."><a name="35868" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35868] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod omnes virtutes vel sunt intellectuales, vel morales, ut +dicitur in II Ethic. Morales autem virtutes omnes sunt in parte +appetitiva, intellectuales autem in intellectu vel ratione, sicut +patet in VI Ethic. Nulla ergo virtus est in viribus sensitivis +apprehensivis interius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In the interior sensitive powers of apprehension there are some habits. And this is made clear principally from what the + Philosopher says (De Memoria ii), that "in remembering one thing after another, we become used to it; and use is a second + nature." Now a habit of use is nothing else than a habit acquired by use, which is like unto nature. Wherefore Tully says + of virtue in his Rhetoric that "it is a habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Yet, + in man, that which he acquires by use, in his memory and other sensitive powers of apprehension, is not a habit properly so + called, but something annexed to the habits of the intellective faculty, as we have said above ( + <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q50_A4" id="FS_Q56_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[50], A[4]</a>, ad 3). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 5 co."><a name="35869" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35869] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod in viribus sensitivis apprehensivis interius, +ponuntur aliqui habitus. Quod patet ex hoc praecipue quod +philosophus dicit, in libro de memoria, <i>quod in memorando unum +post aliud, operatur consuetudo, quae est quasi quaedam natura</i>, +nihil autem est aliud habitus consuetudinalis quam habitudo +acquisita per consuetudinem, quae est in modum naturae. Unde de +virtute dicit Tullius, in sua rhetorica, quod est <i>habitus in +modum naturae, rationi consentaneus</i>. In homine tamen id quod ex +consuetudine acquiritur in memoria, et in aliis viribus sensitivis +apprehensivis, non est habitus per se; sed aliquid annexum +habitibus intellectivae partis, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A5-p7"> Nevertheless even if there be habits in such powers, they cannot be virtues. For virtue is a perfect habit, by which it never + happens that anything but good is done: and so virtue must needs be in that power which consummates the good act. But the + knowledge of truth is not consummated in the sensitive powers of apprehension: for such powers prepare the way to the intellective + knowledge. And therefore in these powers there are none of the virtues, by which we know truth: these + are rather in the intellect or reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin"> Sed tamen si +qui sunt habitus in talibus viribus, virtutes dici non possunt. +Virtus enim est habitus perfectus, quo non contingit nisi bonum +operari, unde oportet quod virtus sit in illa potentia quae est +consummativa boni operis. Cognitio autem veri non consummatur in +viribus sensitivis apprehensivis; sed huiusmodi vires sunt quasi +praeparatoriae ad cognitionem intellectivam. Et ideo in huiusmodi +viribus non sunt virtutes, quibus cognoscitur verum; sed magis in +intellectu vel ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sensitive appetite is related to the will, which is the rational appetite, through being moved by it. And therefore the + act of the appetitive power is consummated in the sensitive appetite: and for this reason the sensitive appetite is the subject + of virtue. Whereas the sensitive powers of apprehension are related to the intellect rather through moving it; for the reason + that the phantasms are related to the intellective soul, as colors to sight + (De Anima iii, text. 18). And therefore the act of knowledge is terminated in the intellect; and for this reason the cognoscitive + virtues are in the intellect itself, or the reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="35870" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35870] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod appetitus sensitivus se habet ad voluntatem, +quae est appetitus rationis, sicut motus ab eo. Et ideo opus +appetitivae virtutis consummatur in appetitu sensitivo. Et propter +hoc, appetitus sensitivus est subiectum virtutis. Virtutes autem +sensitivae apprehensivae magis se habent ut moventes respectu +intellectus, eo quod phantasmata se habent ad animam intellectivam, +sicut colores ad visum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Et ideo opus +cognitionis in intellectu terminatur. Et propter hoc, virtutes +cognoscitivae sunt in ipso intellectu vel ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A5-p9"> And thus is made clear the Reply to the Second Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="35871" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35871] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc +patet solutio ad secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Memory is not a part of prudence, as species is of a genus, as though memory were a virtue properly so called: but one of + the conditions required for prudence is a good memory; so that, in a fashion, it is after the manner of an integral part. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="35872" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35872] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod memoria non ponitur pars prudentiae, sicut species +est pars generis, quasi ipsa memoria sit quaedam virtus per se, sed +quia unum eorum quae requiruntur ad prudentiam, est bonitas +memoriae; ut sic quodammodo se habeat per modum partis +integralis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q56_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q56_A6-p0.1">Q. 56. A. 6. Whether the will can be the subject of virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is not the subject of virtue. Because no habit is required for that which belongs to a power + by reason of its very nature. But since the will is in the reason, it is of the very essence of the will, according to the + Philosopher (De Anima iii, text. 42), to tend to that which is good, according to reason. And to this good every virtue is + ordered, since everything naturally desires its own proper good; for virtue, as Tully says in his + Rhetoric, is a "habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Therefore the will is not the subject of virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="35873" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35873] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non sit subiectum alicuius +virtutis. Ad id enim quod convenit potentiae ex ipsa ratione +potentiae, non requiritur aliquis habitus. Sed de ipsa ratione +voluntatis, cum sit in ratione, secundum philosophum in III de +anima, est quod tendat in id quod est bonum secundum rationem, ad +quod ordinatur omnis virtus, quia unumquodque naturaliter appetit +proprium bonum, <i>virtus enim est habitus per modum naturae, +consentaneus rationi</i>, ut Tullius dicit in sua rhetorica. Ergo +voluntas non est subiectum virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every virtue is either intellectual or moral (Ethic. i, 13; ii, 1). But intellectual virtue is subjected in the + intellect and reason, and not in the will: while moral virtue is subjected in the irascible and concupiscible powers which + are rational by participation. Therefore no virtue is subjected in the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="35874" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35874] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +omnis virtus aut est intellectualis, aut moralis, ut dicitur in I +et II Ethic. Sed virtus intellectualis est, sicut in subiecto, in +intellectu et ratione, non autem in voluntate, virtus autem moralis +est, sicut in subiecto, in irascibili et concupiscibili, quae sunt +rationales per participationem. Ergo nulla virtus est in voluntate +sicut in subiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all human acts, to which virtues are ordained, are voluntary. If therefore there be a virtue in the will in respect + of some human acts, in like manner there will be a virtue in the will in respect of all human acts. Either, therefore, there + will be no virtue in any other power, or there will be two virtues ordained to the same act, which seems unreasonable. Therefore + the will cannot be the subject of virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="35875" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35875] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +omnes actus humani, ad quos virtutes ordinantur, sunt voluntarii. +Si igitur respectu aliquorum humanorum actuum sit aliqua virtus in +voluntate, pari ratione respectu omnium actuum humanorum erit +virtus in voluntate. Aut ergo in nulla alia potentia erit aliqua +virtus, aut ad eundem actum ordinabuntur duae virtutes, quod +videtur inconveniens. Voluntas ergo non potest esse subiectum +virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Greater perfection is required in the mover than in the moved. But the will moves the irascible and concupiscible powers. + Much more therefore should there be virtue in the will than in the irascible and concupiscible powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 6 s. c."><a name="35876" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35876] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod maior perfectio requiritur in movente quam in moto. Sed +voluntas movet irascibilem et concupiscibilem. Multo ergo magis +debet esse virtus in voluntate, quam in irascibili et +concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q56_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since the habit perfects the power in reference to act, then does the power need a habit perfecting it unto doing well, which + habit is a virtue, when the power's own proper nature does not suffice for the purpose. + </p><p id="FS_Q56_A6-p7"> Now the proper nature of a power is seen in its relation to its object. Since, therefore, as we have said above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q19_A3" id="FS_Q56_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[3]</a>), the object of the will is the good of reason proportionate to the will, in respect of this the will does not need a virtue + perfecting it. But if man's will is confronted with a good that exceeds its capacity, whether as regards the whole human species, + such as Divine good, which transcends the limits of human nature, or as + regards the individual, such as the good of one's neighbor, then does the will need virtue. And therefore such virtues as + those which direct man's affections to God or to his neighbor are subjected in the will, as charity, justice, and such like. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 6 co."><a name="35877" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35877] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, cum per habitum perficiatur potentia ad agendum, ibi +indiget potentia habitu perficiente ad bene agendum, qui quidem +habitus est virtus, ubi ad hoc non sufficit propria ratio +potentiae. Omnis autem potentiae propria ratio attenditur in ordine +ad obiectum. Unde cum, sicut dictum est, obiectum voluntati sit +bonum rationis voluntati proportionatum, quantum ad hoc non indiget +voluntas virtute perficiente. Sed si quod bonum immineat homini +volendum, quod excedat proportionem volentis; sive quantum ad totam +speciem humanam, sicut bonum divinum, quod transcendit limites +humanae naturae, sive quantum ad individuum, sicut bonum proximi; +ibi voluntas indiget virtute. Et ideo huiusmodi virtutes quae +ordinant affectum hominis in Deum vel in proximum, sunt in +voluntate sicut in subiecto; ut caritas, iustitia et huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection is true of those virtues which are ordained to the willer's own good; such as temperance and fortitude, which + are concerned with the human passions, and the like, as is clear from what we have said ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q35_A6" id="FS_Q56_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[35], A[6]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="35878" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35878] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ratio illa habet locum de virtute quae ordinat +ad bonum proprium ipsius volentis, sicut temperantia et fortitudo, +quae sunt circa passiones humanas et alia huiusmodi, ut ex dictis +patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not only the irascible and concupiscible powers are rational by participation but "the appetitive power altogether," i.e. + in its entirety (Ethic. i, 13). Now the will is included in the appetitive power. And therefore whatever virtue is in the + will must be a moral virtue, unless it be theological, as we shall see later on ( + <a href="#FS_Q62_A3" id="FS_Q56_A6-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[62], A[3]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="35879" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35879] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod rationale per participationem non solum est +irascibilis et concupiscibilis; sed omnino, idest universaliter, +appetitivum, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Sub appetitivo autem +comprehenditur voluntas. Et ideo, si qua virtus est in voluntate, +erit moralis, nisi sit theologica, ut infra patebit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some virtues are directed to the good of moderated passion, which is the proper good of this or that man: and in these cases + there is no need for virtue in the will, for the nature of the power suffices for the purpose, as we have said. This need + exists only in the case of virtues which are directed to some extrinsic good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="35880" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35880] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod quaedam virtutes ordinantur ad bonum passionis +moderatae, quod est proprium huius vel illius hominis, et in +talibus non est necessarium quod sit aliqua virtus in voluntate, +cum ad hoc sufficiat natura potentiae, ut dictum est. Sed hoc solum +necessarium est in illis virtutibus quae ordinantur ad aliquod +bonum extrinsecum.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q57" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q57-p0.1">Q. 57. OF THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q57-p2"> We now have to consider the various kinds of virtue: and (1) the intellectual virtues; (2) the moral virtues; (3) the theological + virtues. Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FS_Q57-p3"><a href="#FS_Q57_A1"> (1) Whether habits of the speculative intellect are virtues?</a></p><p id="FS_Q57-p4"><a href="#FS_Q57_A2"> (2) Whether they are three, namely, wisdom, science and understanding?</a></p><p id="FS_Q57-p5"><a href="#FS_Q57_A3"> (3) Whether the intellectual habit, which is art, is a virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q57-p6"><a href="#FS_Q57_A4"> (4) Whether prudence is a virtue distinct from art?</a></p><p id="FS_Q57-p7"><a href="#FS_Q57_A5"> (5) Whether prudence is a virtue necessary to man?</a></p><p id="FS_Q57-p8"><a href="#FS_Q57_A6"> (6) Whether "eubulia," "synesis" and "gnome" are virtues annexed to prudence?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 pr."><a name="35881" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35881] +Iª-IIae q. 57 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +distinctione virtutum. Et primo, quantum ad virtutes +intellectuales; secundo, quantum ad morales; tertio, quantum ad +theologicas. Circa primum quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum habitus +intellectuales speculativi sint virtutes. Secundo, utrum sint tres, +scilicet sapientia, scientia et intellectus. Tertio, utrum habitus +intellectualis qui est ars, sit virtus. Quarto, utrum prudentia sit +virtus distincta ab arte. Quinto, utrum prudentia sit virtus +necessaria homini. Sexto, utrum eubulia, synesis et gnome sint +virtutes adiunctae prudentiae.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q57_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q57_A1-p0.1">Q. 57. A. 1. Whether the habits of the speculative intellect are virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the habits of the speculative intellect are not virtues. For virtue is an operative habit, as we have + said above ( + <a href="#FS_Q55_A2" id="FS_Q57_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[2]</a>). But speculative habits are not operative: for speculative matter is distinct from practical, i.e. operative matter. Therefore + the habits of the speculative intellect are not virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35882" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35882] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus intellectuales speculativi non +sint virtutes. Virtus enim est habitus operativus, ut supra dictum +est. Sed habitus speculativi non sunt operativi, distinguitur enim +speculativum a practico, idest operativo. Ergo habitus +intellectuales speculativi non sunt virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue is about those things by which man is made happy or blessed: for "happiness is the reward of virtue" (Ethic. + i, 9). Now intellectual habits do not consider human acts or other human goods, by which man acquires happiness, but rather + things pertaining to nature or to God. Therefore such like habits cannot be called virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35883" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35883] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +virtus est eorum per quae fit homo felix sive beatus, eo quod +felicitas est virtutis praemium, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Sed habitus +intellectuales non considerant actus humanos, aut alia bona humana, +per quae homo beatitudinem adipiscitur, sed magis res naturales et +divinas. Ergo huiusmodi habitus virtutes dici non possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, science is a speculative habit. But science and virtue are distinct from one another as genera which are not subalternate, + as the Philosopher proves in Topic. iv. Therefore speculative habits are not virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35884" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35884] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +scientia est habitus speculativus. Sed scientia et virtus +distinguuntur sicut diversa genera non subalternatim posita; ut +patet per philosophum, in IV Topic. Ergo habitus speculativi non +sunt virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The speculative habits alone consider necessary things which cannot be otherwise than they are. Now the Philosopher (Ethic. + vi, 1) places certain intellectual virtues in that part of the soul which considers necessary things that cannot be otherwise + than they are. Therefore the habits of the speculative intellect are virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35885" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35885] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +soli habitus speculativi considerant necessaria quae impossibile +est aliter se habere. Sed philosophus ponit, in VI Ethic., quasdam +virtutes intellectuales in parte animae quae considerat necessaria +quae non possunt aliter se habere. Ergo habitus intellectuales +speculativi sunt virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q57_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since every virtue is ordained to some good, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q55_A3" id="FS_Q57_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[3]</a>), a habit, as we have already observed ( + <a href="#FS_Q56_A3" id="FS_Q57_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[56], A[3]</a>), may be called a virtue for two reasons: first, because it confers aptness in doing good; secondly, because besides aptness, + it confers the right use of it. The latter condition, as above stated ( + <a href="#FS_Q55_A3" id="FS_Q57_A1-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[55], A[3]</a>), belongs to those habits alone which affect the + appetitive part of the soul: since it is the soul's appetitive power that puts all the powers and habits to their respective + uses. + </p><p id="FS_Q57_A1-p7"> Since, then, the habits of the speculative intellect do not perfect the appetitive part, nor affect it in any way, but only + the intellective part; they may indeed be called virtues in so far as they confer aptness for a good work, viz. the consideration + of truth (since this is the good work of the intellect): yet they are not called virtues in the second way, as though they + conferred the right use of a power or habit. For if a man possess a habit of speculative science, it does + not follow that he is inclined to make use of it, but he is made able to consider the truth in those matters of which he has + scientific knowledge: that he make use of the knowledge which he has, is due to the motion of his will. Consequently a virtue + which perfects the will, as charity or justice, confers the right use of these speculative habits. And in this way too there + can be merit in the acts of these habits, if they be done out of charity: thus Gregory says (Moral. vi) that the + "contemplative life has greater merit than the active life." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 1 co."><a name="35886" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35886] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, cum omnis virtus dicatur in ordine ad bonum, sicut +supra dictum est, duplici ratione aliquis habitus dicitur virtus, +ut supra dictum est, uno modo, quia facit facultatem bene operandi; +alio modo, quia cum facultate, facit etiam usum bonum. Et hoc, +sicut supra dictum est, pertinet solum ad illos habitus qui +respiciunt partem appetitivam, eo quod vis appetitiva animae est +quae facit uti omnibus potentiis et habitibus. Cum igitur habitus +intellectuales speculativi non perficiant partem appetitivam, nec +aliquo modo ipsam respiciant, sed solam intellectivam; possunt +quidem dici virtutes inquantum faciunt facultatem bonae +operationis, quae est consideratio veri (hoc enim est bonum opus +intellectus), non tamen dicuntur virtutes secundo modo, quasi +facientes bene uti potentia seu habitu. Ex hoc enim quod aliquis +habet habitum scientiae speculativae, non inclinatur ad utendum, +sed fit potens speculari verum in his quorum habet scientiam, sed +quod utatur scientia habita, hoc est movente voluntate. Et ideo +virtus quae perficit voluntatem, ut caritas vel iustitia, facit +etiam bene uti huiusmodi speculativis habitibus. Et secundum hoc +etiam, in actibus horum habituum potest esse meritum, si ex +caritate fiant, sicut Gregorius dicit, in VI Moral., quod +<i>contemplativa est maioris meriti quam activa</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Work is of two kinds, exterior and interior. Accordingly the practical or active faculty which is contrasted with the speculative + faculty, is concerned with exterior work, to which the speculative habit is not ordained. Yet it is ordained to the interior + act of the intellect which is to consider the truth. And in this way it is an operative habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35887" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35887] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod duplex est opus, scilicet exterius, et interius. +Practicum ergo, vel operativum, quod dividitur contra speculativum, +sumitur ab opere exteriori, ad quod non habet ordinem habitus +speculativus. Sed tamen habet ordinem ad interius opus intellectus, +quod est speculari verum. Et secundum hoc est habitus +operativus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Virtue is about certain things in two ways. In the first place a virtue is about its object. And thus these speculative virtues + are not about those things whereby man is made happy; except perhaps, in so far as the word "whereby" indicates the efficient + cause or object of complete happiness, i.e. God, Who is the supreme object of contemplation. Secondly, a virtue is said to + be about its acts: and in this sense the intellectual virtues are about those + things whereby a man is made happy; both because the acts of these virtues can be meritorious, as stated above, and because + they are a kind of beginning of perfect bliss, which consists in the contemplation of truth, as we have already stated ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q3_A7" id="FS_Q57_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[7]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35888" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35888] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod virtus est aliquorum dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut +obiectorum. Et sic huiusmodi virtutes speculativae non sunt eorum +per quae homo fit beatus; nisi forte secundum quod ly per dicit +causam efficientem vel obiectum completae beatitudinis, quod est +Deus, quod est summum speculabile. Alio modo dicitur virtus esse +aliquorum sicut actuum. Et hoc modo virtutes intellectuales sunt +eorum per quae homo fit beatus. Tum quia actus harum virtutum +possunt esse meritorii, sicut dictum est. Tum etiam quia sunt +quaedam inchoatio perfectae beatitudinis, quae in contemplatione +veri consistit, sicut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Science is contrasted with virtue taken in the second sense, wherein it belongs to the appetitive faculty. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35889" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35889] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod scientia dividitur contra virtutem secundo modo +dictam, quae pertinet ad vim appetitivam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q57_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q57_A2-p0.1">Q. 57. A. 2. Whether there are only three habits of the speculative intellect, viz. wisdom, science and understanding?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem unfitting to distinguish three virtues of the speculative intellect, viz. wisdom, science and understanding. + Because a species is a kind of science, as stated in Ethic. vi, 7. Therefore wisdom should not be condivided with science + among the intellectual virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35890" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35890] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter distinguantur tres +virtutes intellectuales speculativae, scilicet sapientia, scientia +et intellectus. Species enim non debet condividi generi. Sed +sapientia est quaedam scientia, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Ergo +sapientia non debet condividi scientiae, in numero virtutum +intellectualium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in differentiating powers, habits and acts in respect of their objects, we consider chiefly the formal aspect of + these objects, as we have already explained ( + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q77_A3" id="FS_Q57_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[77], A[3]</a>). Therefore diversity of habits is taken, not from their material objects, but from the formal aspect of those objects. Now + the principle of a demonstration is the formal aspect under which the conclusion is known. Therefore the understanding of + principles + should not be set down as a habit or virtue distinct from the knowledge of conclusions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35891" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35891] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +in distinctione potentiarum, habituum et actuum, quae attenditur +secundum obiecta, attenditur principaliter distinctio quae est +secundum rationem formalem obiectorum, ut ex supradictis patet. Non +ergo diversi habitus debent distingui secundum materiale obiectum; +sed secundum rationem formalem illius obiecti. Sed principium +demonstrationis est ratio sciendi conclusiones. Non ergo +intellectus principiorum debet poni habitus alius, aut alia virtus, +a scientia conclusionum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an intellectual virtue is one which resides in the essentially rational faculty. Now even the speculative reason + employs the dialectic syllogism for the sake of argument, just as it employs the demonstrative syllogism. Therefore as science, + which is the result of a demonstrative syllogism, is set down as an intellectual virtue, so also should opinion be. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35892" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35892] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +virtus intellectualis dicitur quae est in ipso rationali per +essentiam. Sed ratio, etiam speculativa, sicut ratiocinatur +syllogizando demonstrative; ita etiam ratiocinatur syllogizando +dialectice. Ergo sicut scientia, quae causatur ex syllogismo +demonstrativo, ponitur virtus intellectualis speculativa; ita etiam +et opinio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 1) reckons these three alone as being intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science and understanding. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35893" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35893] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus, VI Ethic., ponit has solum tres virtutes +intellectuales speculativas, scilicet sapientiam, scientiam et +intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q57_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As already stated + <a href="#FS_Q57_A1" id="FS_Q57_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the virtues of the speculative intellect are those which perfect the speculative intellect for the consideration of truth: + for this is its good work. Now a truth is subject to a twofold consideration---as known in itself, and as known through another. + What is known in itself, is as a "principle," and is at once understood by the intellect: wherefore the habit that perfects + the intellect for the consideration + of such truth is called "understanding," which is the habit of principles. + </p><p id="FS_Q57_A2-p7"> On the other hand, a truth which is known through another, is understood by the intellect, not at once, but by means of the + reason's inquiry, and is as a "term." This may happen in two ways: first, so that it is the last in some particular genus; + secondly, so that it is the ultimate term of all human knowledge. And, since "things that are knowable last from our standpoint, + are knowable first and chiefly in their nature" (Phys. i, text. 2, 3); hence that which is last with + respect to all human knowledge, is that which is knowable first and chiefly in its nature. And about these is "wisdom," which + considers the highest causes, as stated in Metaph. i, 1,2. Wherefore it rightly judges all things and sets them in order, + because there can be no perfect and universal judgment that is not based on the first causes. But in regard to that which + is last in this or that genus of knowable matter, it is "science" which perfects the intellect. Wherefore according to the + different kinds of knowable matter, there are different habits of scientific knowledge; whereas there is but one wisdom. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 2 co."><a name="35894" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35894] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, virtus intellectualis +speculativa est per quam intellectus speculativus perficitur ad +considerandum verum, hoc enim est bonum opus eius. Verum autem est +dupliciter considerabile, uno modo, sicut per se notum; alio modo, +sicut per aliud notum. Quod autem est per se notum, se habet ut +principium; et percipitur statim ab intellectu. Et ideo habitus +perficiens intellectum ad huiusmodi veri considerationem, vocatur +intellectus, qui est habitus principiorum. Verum autem quod est per +aliud notum, non statim percipitur ab intellectu, sed per +inquisitionem rationis, et se habet in ratione termini. Quod quidem +potest esse dupliciter, uno modo, ut sit ultimum in aliquo genere; +alio modo, ut sit ultimum respectu totius cognitionis humanae. +<i>Et quia ea quae sunt posterius nota quoad nos, sunt priora et +magis nota secundum naturam</i>, ut dicitur in I Physic.; ideo id +quod est ultimum respectu totius cognitionis humanae, est id quod +est primum et maxime cognoscibile secundum naturam. Et circa +huiusmodi est sapientia, quae considerat altissimas causas, ut +dicitur in I Metaphys. Unde convenienter iudicat et ordinat de +omnibus, quia iudicium perfectum et universale haberi non potest +nisi per resolutionem ad primas causas. Ad id vero quod est ultimum +in hoc vel in illo genere cognoscibilium, perficit intellectum +scientia. Et ideo secundum diversa genera scibilium, sunt diversi +habitus scientiarum, cum tamen sapientia non sit nisi una.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Wisdom is a kind of science, in so far as it has that which is common to all the sciences; viz. to demonstrate conclusions + from principles. But since it has something proper to itself above the other sciences, inasmuch as it judges of them all, + not only as to their conclusions, but also as to their first principles, therefore it is a more perfect virtue than science. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35895" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35895] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod sapientia est quaedam scientia, inquantum habet +id quod est commune omnibus scientiis, ut scilicet ex principiis +conclusiones demonstret. Sed quia habet aliquid proprium supra +alias scientias, inquantum scilicet de omnibus iudicat; et non +solum quantum ad conclusiones, sed etiam quantum ad prima +principia, ideo habet rationem perfectioris virtutis quam +scientia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q57_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When the formal aspect of the object is referred to a power or habit by one same act, there is no distinction of habit or + power in respect of the formal aspect and of the material object: thus it belongs to the same power of sight to see both color, + and light, which is the formal aspect under which color is seen, and is seen at the same time as the color. On the other hand, + the principles of a demonstration can be considered apart, without the + conclusion being considered at all. Again they can be considered together with the conclusions, since the conclusions can + be deduced from them. Accordingly, to consider the principles in this second way, belongs to science, which considers the + conclusions also: while to consider the principles in themselves belongs to understanding. + </p><p id="FS_Q57_A2-p10"> Consequently, if we consider the point aright, these three virtues are distinct, not as being on a par with one another, + but in a certain order. The same is to be observed in potential wholes, wherein one part is more perfect than another; for + instance, the rational soul is more perfect than the sensitive soul; and the sensitive, than the vegetal. For it is thus that + science depends on understanding as on a virtue of higher degree: and both of these depend on wisdom, as + obtaining the highest place, and containing beneath itself both understanding and science, by judging both of the conclusions + of science, and of the principles on which they are based. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35896" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35896] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod quando ratio obiecti sub uno actu refertur ad +potentiam vel habitum, tunc non distinguuntur habitus vel potentiae +penes rationem obiecti et obiectum materiale, sicut ad eandem +potentiam visivam pertinet videre colorem, et lumen, quod est ratio +videndi colorem et simul cum ipso videtur. Principia vero +demonstrationis possunt seorsum considerari, absque hoc quod +considerentur conclusiones. Possunt etiam considerari simul cum +conclusionibus, prout principia in conclusiones deducuntur. +Considerare ergo hoc secundo modo principia, pertinet ad scientiam, +quae considerat etiam conclusiones, sed considerare principia +secundum seipsa, pertinet ad intellectum. Unde, si quis recte +consideret, istae tres virtutes non ex aequo distinguuntur ab +invicem, sed ordine quodam; sicut accidit in totis potentialibus, +quorum una pars est perfectior altera, sicut anima rationalis est +perfectior quam sensibilis, et sensibilis quam vegetabilis. Hoc +enim modo, scientia dependet ab intellectu sicut a principaliori. +Et utrumque dependet a sapientia sicut a principalissimo, quae sub +se continet et intellectum et scientiam, ut de conclusionibus +scientiarum diiudicans, et de principiis earundem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q55_A3" id="FS_Q57_A2-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[55], AA[3]</a>,4), a virtuous habit has a fixed relation to good, and is nowise referable to evil. Now the good of the intellect is truth, + and falsehood is its evil. Wherefore those habits alone are called intellectual virtues, whereby we tell the truth and never + tell a falsehood. But opinion and suspicion can be about both truth and falsehood: and so, as stated in Ethic. vi, 3, they + are not intellectual + virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35897" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35897] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus virtutis determinate +se habet ad bonum, nullo autem modo ad malum. Bonum autem +intellectus est verum, malum autem eius est falsum. Unde soli illi +habitus virtutes intellectuales dicuntur, quibus semper dicitur +verum, et nunquam falsum. Opinio vero et suspicio possunt esse veri +et falsi. Et ideo non sunt intellectuales virtutes, ut dicitur in +VI Ethic.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q57_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q57_A3-p0.1">Q. 57. A. 3. Whether the intellectual habit, art, is a virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that art is not an intellectual virtue. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19) that "no one makes bad + use of virtue." But one may make bad use of art: for a craftsman can work badly according to the knowledge of his art. Therefore + art is not a virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35898" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35898] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ars non sit virtus intellectualis. +Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de libero arbitrio, quod virtute +nullus male utitur. Sed arte aliquis male utitur, potest enim +aliquis artifex, secundum scientiam artis suae, male operari. Ergo +ars non est virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no virtue of a virtue. But "there is a virtue of art," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore + art is not a virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35899" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35899] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +virtutis non est virtus. Artis autem est aliqua virtus, ut dicitur +in VI Ethic. Ergo ars non est virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the liberal arts excel the mechanical arts. But just as the mechanical arts are practical, so the liberal arts are + speculative. Therefore, if art were an intellectual virtue, it would have to be reckoned among the speculative virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35900" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35900] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +artes liberales sunt excellentiores quam artes mechanicae. Sed +sicut artes mechanicae sunt practicae, ita artes liberales sunt +speculativae. Ergo si ars esset virtus intellectualis, deberet +virtutibus speculativis annumerari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3,4) says that art is a virtue; and yet he does not reckon it among the speculative virtues, + which, according to him, reside in the scientific part of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35901" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35901] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus, in VI Ethic., ponit artem esse virtutem; nec +tamen connumerat eam virtutibus speculativis, quarum subiectum +ponit scientificam partem animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Art is nothing else but "the right reason about certain works to be made." And yet the good of these things depends, not + on man's appetitive faculty being affected in this or that way, but on the goodness of the work done. For a craftsman, as + such, is commendable, not for the will with which he does a work, but for the quality of the work. Art, therefore, properly + speaking, is an operative habit. And yet it has something in common with the speculative + habits: since the quality of the object considered by the latter is a matter of concern to them also, but not how the human + appetite may be affected towards that object. For as long as the geometrician demonstrates the truth, it matters not how his + appetitive faculty may be affected, whether he be joyful or angry: even as neither does this matter in a craftsman, as we + have observed. And so art has the nature of a virtue in the same way as the speculative habits, in so far, to wit, as neither + art nor speculative habit makes a good work as regards the use of the habit, which is the property of a virtue that perfects + the appetite, but only as regards the aptness to work well. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 3 co."><a name="35902" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35902] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod ars nihil aliud est quam ratio recta aliquorum operum +faciendorum. Quorum tamen bonum non consistit in eo quod appetitus +humanus aliquo modo se habet, sed in eo quod ipsum opus quod fit, +in se bonum est. Non enim pertinet ad laudem artificis, inquantum +artifex est, qua voluntate opus faciat; sed quale sit opus quod +facit. Sic igitur ars, proprie loquendo, habitus operativus est. Et +tamen in aliquo convenit cum habitibus speculativis, quia etiam ad +ipsos habitus speculativos pertinet qualiter se habeat res quam +considerant, non autem qualiter se habeat appetitus humanus ad +illas. Dummodo enim verum geometra demonstret, non refert qualiter +se habeat secundum appetitivam partem, utrum sit laetus vel iratus, +sicut nec in artifice refert, ut dictum est. Et ideo eo modo ars +habet rationem virtutis, sicut et habitus speculativi, inquantum +scilicet nec ars, nec habitus speculativus, faciunt bonum opus +quantum ad usum, quod est proprium virtutis perficientis appetitum; +sed solum quantum ad facultatem bene agendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When anyone endowed with an art produces bad workmanship, this is not the work of that art, in fact it is contrary to the + art: even as when a man lies, while knowing the truth, his words are not in accord with his knowledge, but contrary thereto. + Wherefore, just as science has always a relation to good, as stated above (A[2], ad 3), so it is with art: and it is for this + reason that it is called a virtue. And yet it falls short of being a perfect + virtue, because it does not make its possessor to use it well; for which purpose something further is requisite: although + there cannot be a good use without the art. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35903" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35903] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, cum aliquis habens artem operatur malum +artificium, hoc non est opus artis, immo est contra artem, sicut +etiam cum aliquis sciens verum mentitur, hoc quod dicit non est +secundum scientiam, sed contra scientiam. Unde sicut scientia se +habet semper ad bonum, ut dictum est, ita et ars, et secundum hoc +dicitur virtus. In hoc tamen deficit a perfecta ratione virtutis, +quia non facit ipsum bonum usum, sed ad hoc aliquid aliud +requiritur, quamvis bonus usus sine arte esse non possit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In order that man may make good use of the art he has, he needs a good will, which is perfected by moral virtue; and for + this reason the Philosopher says that there is a virtue of art; namely, a moral virtue, in so far as the good use of art requires + a moral virtue. For it is evident that a craftsman is inclined by justice, which rectifies his will, to do his work faithfully. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35904" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35904] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, quia ad hoc ut homo bene utatur arte quam habet, +requiritur bona voluntas, quae perficitur per virtutem moralem; +ideo philosophus dicit quod artis est virtus, scilicet moralis, +inquantum ad bonum usum eius aliqua virtus moralis requiritur. +Manifestum est enim quod artifex per iustitiam, quae facit +voluntatem rectam, inclinatur ut opus fidele faciat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even in speculative matters there is something by way of work: e.g. the making of a syllogism or of a fitting speech, or + the work of counting or measuring. Hence whatever habits are ordained to such like works of the speculative reason, are, by + a kind of comparison, called arts indeed, but "liberal" arts, in order to distinguish them from those arts that are ordained + to works done by the body, which arts are, in a fashion, servile, inasmuch as the + body is in servile subjection to the soul, and man, as regards his soul, is free [liber]. On the other hand, those sciences + which are not ordained to any such like work, are called sciences simply, and not arts. Nor, if the liberal arts be more excellent, + does it follow that the notion of art is more applicable to them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35905" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35905] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod etiam in ipsis speculabilibus est aliquid per modum +cuiusdam operis, puta constructio syllogismi aut orationis congruae +aut opus numerandi vel mensurandi. Et ideo quicumque ad huiusmodi +opera rationis habitus speculativi ordinantur, dicuntur per quandam +similitudinem artes, sed liberales; ad differentiam illarum artium +quae ordinantur ad opera per corpus exercita, quae sunt quodammodo +serviles, inquantum corpus serviliter subditur animae, et homo +secundum animam est liber. Illae vero scientiae quae ad nullum +huiusmodi opus ordinantur, simpliciter scientiae dicuntur, non +autem artes. Nec oportet, si liberales artes sunt nobiliores, quod +magis eis conveniat ratio artis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q57_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q57_A4-p0.1">Q. 57. A. 4. Whether prudence is a distinct virtue from art?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prudence is not a distinct virtue from art. For art is the right reason about certain works. But diversity + of works does not make a habit cease to be an art; since there are various arts about works widely different. Since therefore + prudence is also right reason about works, it seems that it too should be reckoned a virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35906" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35906] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod prudentia non sit alia virtus ab arte. +Ars enim est ratio recta aliquorum operum. Sed diversa genera +operum non faciunt ut aliquid amittat rationem artis, sunt enim +diversae artes circa opera valde diversa. Cum igitur etiam +prudentia sit quaedam ratio recta operum, videtur quod etiam ipsa +debeat dici ars.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, prudence has more in common with art than the speculative habits have; for they are both "about contingent matters + that may be otherwise than they are" (Ethic. vi, 4,5). Now some speculative habits are called arts. Much more, therefore, + should prudence be called an art. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35907" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35907] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +prudentia magis convenit cum arte quam habitus speculativi, +utrumque enim eorum est circa contingens aliter se habere, ut +dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed quidam habitus speculativi dicuntur artes. +Ergo multo magis prudentia debet dici ars.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it belongs to prudence, "to be of good counsel" (Ethic. vi, 5). But counselling takes place in certain arts also, + as stated in Ethic. iii, 3, e.g. in the arts of warfare, of seamanship, and of medicine. Therefore prudence is not distinct + from art. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35908" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35908] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +ad prudentiam pertinet bene consiliari, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed +etiam in quibusdam artibus consiliari contingit, ut dicitur in III +Ethic., sicut in arte militari, et gubernativa, et medicinali. Ergo +prudentia ab arte non distinguitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher distinguishes prudence from art (Ethic. vi, 5). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35909" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35909] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus distinguit prudentiam ab arte, in VI +Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q57_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Where the nature of virtue differs, there is a different kind of virtue. Now it has been stated above + <a href="#FS_Q57_A1" id="FS_Q57_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1];</a> Q[56], A[3]) that some habits have the nature of virtue, through merely conferring aptness for a good work: while some habits + are virtues, not only through conferring aptness for a good work, but also through conferring the use. But art confers the + mere aptness for good work; since it does not regard the appetite; whereas + prudence confers not only aptness for a good work, but also the use: for it regards the appetite, since it presupposes the + rectitude thereof. + </p><p id="FS_Q57_A4-p7"> The reason for this difference is that art is the "right reason of things to be made"; whereas prudence is the "right reason + of things to be done." Now "making" and "doing" differ, as stated in Metaph. ix, text. 16, in that "making" is an action passing + into outward matter, e.g. "to build," "to saw," and so forth; whereas "doing" is an action abiding in the agent, e.g. "to + see," "to will," and the like. Accordingly prudence stands in the same relation to such like human actions, + consisting in the use of powers and habits, as art does to outward making: since each is the perfect reason about the things + with which it is concerned. But perfection and rectitude of reason in speculative matters, depend on the principles from which + reason argues; just as we have said above (A[2], ad 2) that science depends on and presupposes understanding, which is the + habit of principles. Now in human acts the end is what the principles are in speculative matters, as stated in Ethic. vii, + 8. Consequently, it is requisite for prudence, which is right reason about things to be done, that man be well disposed with + regard to the ends: and this depends on the rectitude of his appetite. Wherefore, for prudence there is need of a moral virtue, + which rectifies the appetite. On the other hand the good things made by art is not the good of man's appetite, but the good + of those things themselves: wherefore art does not presuppose rectitude of the appetite. The consequence is that more + praise is given to a craftsman who is at fault willingly, than to one who is unwillingly; whereas it is more contrary to prudence + to sin willingly than unwillingly, since rectitude of the will is essential to prudence, but not to art. Accordingly it is + evident that prudence is a virtue distinct from art. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 4 co."><a name="35910" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35910] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod ubi invenitur diversa ratio virtutis, ibi oportet +virtutes distingui. Dictum est autem supra quod aliquis habitus +habet rationem virtutis ex hoc solum quod facit facultatem boni +operis, aliquis autem ex hoc quod facit non solum facultatem boni +operis, sed etiam usum. Ars autem facit solum facultatem boni +operis, quia non respicit appetitum. Prudentia autem non solum +facit boni operis facultatem, sed etiam usum, respicit enim +appetitum, tanquam praesupponens rectitudinem appetitus. Cuius +differentiae ratio est, quia ars est recta ratio factibilium; +prudentia vero est recta ratio agibilium. Differt autem facere et +agere quia, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys., factio est actus transiens +in exteriorem materiam, sicut aedificare, secare, et huiusmodi; +agere autem est actus permanens in ipso agente, sicut videre, +velle, et huiusmodi. Sic igitur hoc modo se habet prudentia ad +huiusmodi actus humanos, qui sunt usus potentiarum et habituum, +sicut se habet ars ad exteriores factiones, quia utraque est +perfecta ratio respectu illorum ad quae comparatur. Perfectio autem +et rectitudo rationis in speculativis, dependet ex principiis, ex +quibus ratio syllogizat, sicut dictum est quod scientia dependet ab +intellectu, qui est habitus principiorum, et praesupponit ipsum. In +humanis autem actibus se habent fines sicut principia in +speculativis, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Et ideo ad prudentiam, quae +est recta ratio agibilium, requiritur quod homo sit bene dispositus +circa fines, quod quidem est per appetitum rectum. Et ideo ad +prudentiam requiritur moralis virtus, per quam fit appetitus +rectus. Bonum autem artificialium non est bonum appetitus humani, +sed bonum ipsorum operum artificialium, et ideo ars non +praesupponit appetitum rectum. Et inde est quod magis laudatur +artifex qui volens peccat, quam qui peccat nolens; magis autem +contra prudentiam est quod aliquis peccet volens, quam nolens, quia +rectitudo voluntatis est de ratione prudentiae, non autem de +ratione artis. Sic igitur patet quod prudentia est virtus distincta +ab arte.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The various kinds of things made by art are all external to man: hence they do not cause a different kind of virtue. But + prudence is right reason about human acts themselves: hence it is a distinct kind of virtue, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35911" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35911] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod diversa genera artificialium omnia sunt extra +hominem, et ideo non diversificatur ratio virtutis. Sed prudentia +est recta ratio ipsorum actuum humanorum, unde diversificatur ratio +virtutis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Prudence has more in common with art than a speculative habit has, if we consider their subject and matter: for they are + both in the thinking part of the soul, and about things that may be otherwise than they are. But if we consider them as virtues, + then art has more in common with the speculative habits, as is clear from what has been said. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35912" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35912] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod prudentia magis convenit cum arte quam habitus +speculativi, quantum ad subiectum et materiam, utrumque enim est in +opinativa parte animae, et circa contingens aliter se habere. Sed +ars magis convenit cum habitibus speculativis in ratione virtutis, +quam cum prudentia, ut ex dictis patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Prudence is of good counsel about matters regarding man's entire life, and the end of human life. But in some arts there + is counsel about matters concerning the ends proper to those arts. Hence some men, in so far as they are good counselors in + matters of warfare, or seamanship, are said to be prudent officers or pilots, but not simply prudent: only those are simply + prudent who give good counsel about all the concerns of life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35913" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35913] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod prudentia est bene consiliativa de his quae pertinent +ad totam vitam hominis, et ad ultimum finem vitae humanae. Sed in +artibus aliquibus est consilium de his quae pertinent ad fines +proprios illarum artium. Unde aliqui, inquantum sunt bene +consiliativi in rebus bellicis vel nauticis, dicuntur prudentes +duces vel gubernatores, non autem prudentes simpliciter, sed illi +solum qui bene consiliantur de his quae conferunt ad totam +vitam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q57_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q57_A5-p0.1">Q. 57. A. 5. Whether prudence is a virtue necessary to man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prudence is not a virtue necessary to lead a good life. For as art is to things that are made, of which + it is the right reason, so is prudence to things that are done, in respect of which we judge of a man's life: for prudence + is the right reason about these things, as stated in Ethic. vi, 5. Now art is not necessary in things that are made, save + in order that they be made, but not after they have been made. Neither, therefore is prudence + necessary to man in order to lead a good life, after he has become virtuous; but perhaps only in order that he may become + virtuous. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="35914" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35914] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod prudentia non sit virtus necessaria ad +bene vivendum. Sicut enim se habet ars ad factibilia, quorum est +ratio recta; ita se habet prudentia ad agibilia, secundum quae vita +hominis consideratur, est enim eorum recta ratio prudentia, ut +dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed ars non est necessaria in rebus +factibilibus nisi ad hoc quod fiant, non autem postquam sunt +factae. Ergo nec prudentia est necessaria homini ad bene vivendum, +postquam est virtuosus, sed forte solum quantum ad hoc quod +virtuosus fiat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "It is by prudence that we are of good counsel," as stated in Ethic. vi, 5. But man can act not only from his own, + but also from another's good counsel. Therefore man does not need prudence in order to lead a good life, but it is enough + that he follow the counsels of prudent men. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="35915" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35915] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +prudentia est per quam recte consiliamur, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. +Sed homo potest ex bono consilio agere non solum proprio, sed etiam +alieno. Ergo non est necessarium ad bene vivendum quod ipse homo +habeat prudentiam; sed sufficit quod prudentum consilia +sequatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an intellectual virtue is one by which one always tells the truth, and never a falsehood. But this does not seem + to be the case with prudence: for it is not human never to err in taking counsel about what is to be done; since human actions + are about things that may be otherwise than they are. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q57_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.9.14" target="asv">Wis. 9:14</a>): "The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain." Therefore it seems that prudence + should not be reckoned an intellectual virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="35916" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35916] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +virtus intellectualis est secundum quam contingit semper dicere +verum, et nunquam falsum. Sed hoc non videtur contingere secundum +prudentiam, non enim est humanum quod in consiliando de agendis +nunquam erretur; cum humana agibilia sint contingentia aliter se +habere. Unde dicitur Sap. IX, <i>cogitationes mortalium timidae, et +incertae providentiae nostrae</i>. Ergo videtur quod prudentia non +debeat poni intellectualis virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is reckoned with other virtues necessary for human life, when it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q57_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.7" target="asv">Wis. 8:7</a>) of Divine Wisdom: "She teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude, which are such things as men can have + nothing more profitable in life." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 5 s. c."><a name="35917" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35917] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Sap. VIII, connumeratur aliis virtutibus necessariis ad +vitam humanam, cum dicitur de divina sapientia, <i>sobrietatem et +prudentiam docet, iustitiam et virtutem, quibus utilius nihil est +in vita hominibus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Prudence is a virtue most necessary for human life. For a good life consists in good deeds. Now in order to do good deeds, + it matters not only what a man does, but also how he does it; to wit, that he do it from right choice and not merely from + impulse or passion. And, since choice is about things in reference to the end, rectitude of choice requires two things: namely, + the due end, and something suitably ordained to that due end. Now man is suitably + directed to his due end by a virtue which perfects the soul in the appetitive part, the object of which is the good and the + end. And to that which is suitably ordained to the due end man needs to be rightly disposed by a habit in his reason, because + counsel and choice, which are about things ordained to the end, are acts of the reason. Consequently an intellectual virtue + is needed in the reason, to perfect the reason, and make it suitably affected towards things ordained to the end; and this + virtue is prudence. Consequently prudence is a virtue necessary to lead a good life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 5 co."><a name="35918" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35918] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod prudentia est virtus maxime necessaria ad vitam +humanam. Bene enim vivere consistit in bene operari. Ad hoc autem +quod aliquis bene operetur, non solum requiritur quid faciat, sed +etiam quomodo faciat; ut scilicet secundum electionem rectam +operetur, non solum ex impetu aut passione. Cum autem electio sit +eorum quae sunt ad finem, rectitudo electionis duo requirit, +scilicet debitum finem; et id quod convenienter ordinatur ad +debitum finem. Ad debitum autem finem homo convenienter disponitur +per virtutem quae perficit partem animae appetitivam, cuius +obiectum est bonum et finis. Ad id autem quod convenienter in finem +debitum ordinatur, oportet quod homo directe disponatur per habitum +rationis, quia consiliari et eligere, quae sunt eorum quae sunt ad +finem, sunt actus rationis. Et ideo necesse est in ratione esse +aliquam virtutem intellectualem, per quam perficiatur ratio ad hoc +quod convenienter se habeat ad ea quae sunt ad finem. Et haec +virtus est prudentia. Unde prudentia est virtus necessaria ad bene +vivendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The good of an art is to be found, not in the craftsman, but in the product of the art, since art is right reason about things + to be made: for since the making of a thing passes into external matter, it is a perfection not of the maker, but of the thing + made, even as movement is the act of the thing moved: and art is concerned with the making of things. On the other hand, the + good of prudence is in the active principle, whose activity is its + perfection: for prudence is right reason about things to be done, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q57_A4" id="FS_Q57_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. Consequently art does not require of the craftsman that his act be a good act, but that his work be good. Rather would it + be necessary for the thing made to act well (e.g. that a knife should carve well, or that a saw should cut well), if it were + proper to such things to act, rather than to be acted on, because they have not dominion over their actions. Wherefore the + craftsman + needs art, not that he may live well, but that he may produce a good work of art, and have it in good keeping: whereas prudence + is necessary to man, that he may lead a good life, and not merely that he may be a good man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="35919" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35919] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod bonum artis consideratur non in ipso artifice, +sed magis in ipso artificiato, cum ars sit ratio recta factibilium, +factio enim, in exteriorem materiam transiens, non est perfectio +facientis, sed facti, sicut motus est actus mobilis; ars autem +circa factibilia est. Sed prudentiae bonum attenditur in ipso +agente, cuius perfectio est ipsum agere, est enim prudentia recta +ratio agibilium, ut dictum est. Et ideo ad artem non requiritur +quod artifex bene operetur, sed quod bonum opus faciat. +Requireretur autem magis quod ipsum artificiatum bene operaretur, +sicut quod cultellus bene incideret, vel serra bene secaret; si +proprie horum esset agere, et non magis agi, quia non habent +dominium sui actus. Et ideo ars non est necessaria ad bene vivendum +ipsi artificis; sed solum ad faciendum artificiatum bonum, et ad +conservandum ipsum. Prudentia autem est necessaria homini ad bene +vivendum, non solum ad hoc quod fiat bonus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When a man does a good deed, not of his own counsel, but moved by that of another, his deed is not yet quite perfect, as + regards his reason in directing him and his appetite in moving him. Wherefore, if he do a good deed, he does not do well simply; + and yet this is required in order that he may lead a good life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="35920" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35920] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, cum homo bonum operatur non secundum propriam +rationem, sed motus ex consilio alterius; nondum est omnino +perfecta operatio ipsius, quantum ad rationem dirigentem, et +quantum ad appetitum moventem. Unde si bonum operetur, non tamen +simpliciter bene; quod est bene vivere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated in Ethic. vi, 2, truth is not the same for the practical as for the speculative intellect. Because the truth of + the speculative intellect depends on conformity between the intellect and the thing. And since the intellect cannot be infallibly + in conformity with things in contingent matters, but only in necessary matters, therefore no speculative habit about contingent + things is an intellectual virtue, but only such as is about necessary + things. On the other hand, the truth of the practical intellect depends on conformity with right appetite. This conformity + has no place in necessary matters, which are not affected by the human will; but only in contingent matters which can be effected + by us, whether they be matters of interior action, or the products of external work. Hence it is only about contingent matters + that an intellectual virtue is assigned to the practical intellect, viz. art, as regards things to be made, and + prudence, as regards things to be done. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="35921" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35921] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod verum intellectus practici aliter accipitur quam +verum intellectus speculativi, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Nam verum +intellectus speculativi accipitur per conformitatem intellectus ad +rem. Et quia intellectus non potest infallibiliter conformari rebus +in contingentibus, sed solum in necessariis; ideo nullus habitus +speculativus contingentium est intellectualis virtus, sed solum est +circa necessaria. Verum autem intellectus practici accipitur per +conformitatem ad appetitum rectum. Quae quidem conformitas in +necessariis locum non habet, quae voluntate humana non fiunt, sed +solum in contingentibus quae possunt a nobis fieri, sive sint +agibilia interiora, sive factibilia exteriora. Et ideo circa sola +contingentia ponitur virtus intellectus practici, circa factibilia +quidem, ars; circa agibilia vero prudentia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q57_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q57_A6-p0.1">Q. 57. A. 6. Whether "eubulia, synesis, and gnome" are virtues annexed to prudence? [*{euboulia, synesis, gnome}]</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that "{euboulia, synesis}, and {gnome}" are unfittingly assigned as virtues annexed to prudence. For "{euboulia}" + is "a habit whereby we take good counsel" (Ethic. vi, 9). Now it "belongs to prudence to take good counsel," as stated (Ethic. + vi, 9). Therefore "{euboulia}" is not a virtue annexed to prudence, but rather is prudence itself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="35922" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35922] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter adiungantur prudentiae +eubulia, synesis et gnome. Eubulia enim est habitus quo bene +consiliamur, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed bene consiliari pertinet +ad prudentiam, ut in eodem libro dicitur. Ergo eubulia non est +virtus adiuncta prudentiae, sed magis est ipsa prudentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs to the higher to judge the lower. The highest virtue would therefore seem to be the one whose act is + judgment. Now "{synesis}" enables us to judge well. Therefore "{synesis}" is not a virtue annexed to prudence, but rather + is a principal virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="35923" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35923] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ad superiorem pertinet de inferioribus iudicare. Illa ergo virtus +videtur suprema, cuius est actus iudicium. Sed synesis est bene +iudicativa. Ergo synesis non est virtus adiuncta prudentiae, sed +magis ipsa est principalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as there are various matters to pass judgment on, so are there different points on which one has to take counsel. + But there is one virtue referring to all matters of counsel. Therefore, in order to judge well of what has to be done, there + is no need, besides "{synesis}" of the virtue of "{gnome}." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="35924" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35924] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut diversa sunt ea de quibus est iudicandum, ita etiam diversa +sunt ea de quibus est consiliandum. Sed circa omnia consiliabilia +ponitur una virtus, scilicet eubulia. Ergo ad bene iudicandum de +agendis, non oportet ponere, praeter synesim, aliam virtutem, +scilicet gnomen.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Cicero (De Invent. Rhet. iii) mentions three other parts of prudence; viz. "memory of the past, understanding of + the present, and foresight of the future." Moreover, Macrobius (Super Somn. Scip. 1) mentions yet others: viz. "caution, docility," + and the like. Therefore it seems that the above are not the only virtues annexed to prudence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 arg. 4"><a name="35925" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35925] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +Tullius ponit, in sua rhetorica, tres alias partes prudentiae, +scilicet memoriam praeteritorum, intelligentiam praesentium, et +providentiam futurorum. Macrobius etiam ponit, super somnium +Scipionis, quasdam alias partes prudentiae, scilicet cautionem, +docilitatem, et alia huiusmodi. Non videntur igitur solae huiusmodi +virtutes prudentiae adiungi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9,10,11), who assigns these three virtues as being annexed to prudence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 s. c."><a name="35926" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35926] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est auctoritas philosophi, in VI Ethic., qui has tres virtutes +ponit prudentiae adiunctas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Wherever several powers are subordinate to one another, that power is the highest which is ordained to the highest act. Now + there are three acts of reason in respect of anything done by man: the first of these is counsel; the second, judgment; the + third, command. The first two correspond to those acts of the speculative intellect, which are inquiry and judgment, for counsel + is a kind of inquiry: but the third is proper to the practical intellect, in so far + as this is ordained to operation; for reason does not have to command in things that man cannot do. Now it is evident that + in things done by man, the chief act is that of command, to which all the rest are subordinate. Consequently, that virtue + which perfects the command, viz. prudence, as obtaining the highest place, has other secondary virtues annexed to it, viz. + "{eustochia}," which perfects counsel; and "{synesis}" and "{gnome}," which are parts of prudence in relation to judgment, + and of + whose distinction we shall speak further on (ad 3). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 co."><a name="35927" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35927] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod in omnibus potentiis ordinatis illa est principalior, +quae ad principaliorem actum ordinatur. Circa agibilia autem humana +tres actus rationis inveniuntur, quorum primus est consiliari, +secundus iudicare, tertius est praecipere. Primi autem duo +respondent actibus intellectus speculativi qui sunt inquirere et +iudicare, nam consilium inquisitio quaedam est. Sed tertius actus +proprius est practici intellectus, inquantum est operativus, non +enim ratio habet praecipere ea quae per hominem fieri non possunt. +Manifestum est autem quod in his quae per hominem fiunt, +principalis actus est praecipere, ad quem alii ordinantur. Et ideo +virtuti quae est bene praeceptiva, scilicet prudentiae, tanquam +principaliori, adiunguntur tanquam secundariae, eubulia, quae est +bene consiliativa, et synesis et gnome, quae sunt partes +iudicativae; de quarum distinctione dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Prudence makes us be of good counsel, not as though its immediate act consisted in being of good counsel, but because it + perfects the latter act by means of a subordinate virtue, viz. "{euboulia}." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="35928" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35928] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod prudentia est bene consiliativa, non quasi bene +consiliari sit immediate actus eius, sed quia hunc actum perficit +mediante virtute sibi subiecta, quae est eubulia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Judgment about what is to be done is directed to something further: for it may happen in some matter of action that a man's + judgment is sound, while his execution is wrong. The matter does not attain to its final complement until the reason has commanded + aright in the point of what has to be done. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="35929" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35929] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod iudicium in agendis ad aliquid ulterius ordinatur, +contingit enim aliquem bene iudicare de aliquo agendo, et tamen non +recte exequi. Sed ultimum complementum est, quando ratio iam bene +praecipit de agendis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Judgment of anything should be based on that thing's proper principles. But inquiry does not reach to the proper principles: + because, if we were in possession of these, we should need no more to inquire, the truth would be already discovered. Hence + only one virtue is directed to being of good counsel, wheres there are two virtues for good judgment: because difference is + based not on common but on proper principles. Consequently, even in speculative + matters, there is one science of dialectics, which inquires about all matters; whereas demonstrative sciences, which pronounce + judgment, differ according to their different objects. "{Synesis}" and "{gnome}" differ in respect of the different rules + on which judgment is based: for "{synesis}" judges of actions according to the common law; while "{gnome}" bases its judgment + on the natural law, in those cases where the common law fails to apply, as we shall explain further on ( + <a href="SS_ii.html#SS_Q51_A4" id="FS_Q57_A6-p10.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[51], A[4]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="35930" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35930] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod iudicium de unaquaque re fit per propria principia +eius. Inquisitio autem nondum est per propria principia, quia his +habitis, non esset opus inquisitione, sed iam res esset inventa. Et +ideo una sola virtus ordinatur ad bene consiliandum, duae autem +virtutes ad bene iudicandum, quia distinctio non est in communibus +principiis, sed in propriis. Unde et in speculativis una est +dialectica inquisitiva de omnibus, scientiae autem demonstrativae, +quae sunt iudicativae, sunt diversae de diversis. Distinguuntur +autem synesis et gnome secundum diversas regulas quibus iudicatur, +nam synesis est iudicativa de agendis secundum communem legem; +gnome autem secundum ipsam rationem naturalem, in his in quibus +deficit lex communis; sicut plenius infra patebit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Memory, understanding and foresight, as also caution and docility and the like, are not virtues distinct from prudence: but + are, as it were, integral parts thereof, in so far as they are all requisite for perfect prudence. There are, moreover, subjective + parts or species of prudence, e.g. domestic and political economy, and the like. But the three first names are, in a fashion, + potential parts of prudence; because they are subordinate thereto, as + secondary virtues to a principal virtue: and we shall speak of them later (SS, Q[48], seqq.). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 ad 4"><a name="35931" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35931] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod memoria, intelligentia et providentia, similiter +etiam cautio et docilitas, et alia huiusmodi, non sunt virtutes +diversae a prudentia, sed quodammodo comparantur ad ipsam sicut +partes integrales, inquantum omnia ista requiruntur ad perfectionem +prudentiae. Sunt etiam et quaedam partes subiectivae, seu species +prudentiae, sicut oeconomica, regnativa, et huiusmodi. Sed +praedicta tria sunt quasi partes potentiales prudentiae, quia +ordinantur sicut secundarium ad principale. Et de his infra +dicetur.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q58" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q58-p0.1">Q. 58. OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q58-p2"> We must now consider moral virtues. We shall speak (1) of the difference between them and intellectual virtues; (2) of their + distinction, one from another, in respect of their proper matter; (3) of the difference between the chief or cardinal virtues + and the others. + </p><p id="FS_Q58-p3"> Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q58-p4"><a href="#FS_Q58_A1"> (1) Whether every virtue is a moral virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q58-p5"><a href="#FS_Q58_A2"> (2) Whether moral virtue differs from intellectual virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q58-p6"><a href="#FS_Q58_A3"> (3) Whether virtue is adequately divided into moral and intellectual virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q58-p7"><a href="#FS_Q58_A4"> (4) Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q58-p8"><a href="#FS_Q58_A5"> (5) Whether, on the other hand, there can be intellectual without moral virtue?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 pr."><a name="35932" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35932] +Iª-IIae q. 58 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +virtutibus moralibus. Et primo, de distinctione earum a virtutibus +intellectualibus; secundo, de distinctione earum ab invicem, +secundum propriam materiam; tertio, de distinctione principalium, +vel cardinalium, ab aliis. Circa primum quaeruntur quinque. Primo, +utrum omnis virtus sit virtus moralis. Secundo, utrum virtus +moralis distinguatur ab intellectuali. Tertio, utrum sufficienter +dividatur virtus per intellectualem et moralem. Quarto, utrum +moralis virtus possit esse sine intellectuali. Quinto, utrum e +converso, intellectualis virtus possit esse sine morali.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q58_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q58_A1-p0.1">Q. 58. A. 1. Whether every virtue is a moral virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every virtue is a moral virtue. Because moral virtue is so called from the Latin "mos," i.e. custom. Now, + we can accustom ourselves to the acts of all the virtues. Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35933" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35933] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis virtus sit moralis. Virtus enim +moralis dicitur a more, idest consuetudine. Sed omnium virtutum +actus consuescere possumus. Ergo omnis virtus est moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that moral virtue is "a habit of choosing the rational mean." But every virtue + is a habit of choosing: since the acts of any virtue can be done from choice. And, moreover, every virtue consists in following + the rational mean in some way, as we shall explain further on ( + <a href="#FS_Q64_A1" id="FS_Q58_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[64], AA[1]</a>,2,3). Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35934" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35934] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod <i>virtus moralis est habitus +electivus in medietate rationis consistens</i>. Sed omnis virtus +videtur esse habitus electivus, quia actus cuiuslibet virtutis +possumus ex electione facere. Omnis etiam virtus aliqualiter in +medio rationis consistit, ut infra patebit. Ergo omnis virtus est +moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Cicero says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "virtue is a habit like a second nature, in accord with reason." But since + every human virtue is directed to man's good, it must be in accord with reason: since man's good "consists in that which agrees + with his reason," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35935" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35935] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Tullius dicit, in sua rhetorica, quod <i>virtus est habitus in +modum naturae, rationi consentaneus</i>. Sed cum omnis virtus +humana ordinetur ad bonum hominis, oportet quod sit consentanea +rationi, cum bonum hominis sit secundum rationem esse, ut Dionysius +dicit. Ergo omnis virtus est moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13): "When we speak of a man's morals, we do not say that he is wise or intelligent, but that + he is gentle or sober." Accordingly, then, wisdom and understanding are not moral virtues: and yet they are virtues, as stated + above ( + <a href="#FS_Q57_A2" id="FS_Q58_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[57], A[2]</a>). Therefore not every virtue is a moral virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35936" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35936] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., <i>dicentes de moribus, +non dicimus quoniam sapiens vel intelligens; sed quoniam mitis vel +sobrius</i>. Sic igitur sapientia et intellectus non sunt morales. +Quae tamen sunt virtutes, sicut supra dictum est. Non ergo omnis +virtus est moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q58_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In order to answer this question clearly, we must consider the meaning of the Latin word "mos"; for thus we shall be able + to discover what a "moral" virtue is. Now "mos" has a twofold meaning. For sometimes it means custom, in which sense we read + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q58_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.15.1" target="asv">Acts 15:1</a>): "Except you be circumcised after the manner (morem) of Moses, you cannot be saved." Sometimes it means a natural or quasi-natural + inclination to do some particular action, in which + sense the word is applied to dumb animals. Thus we read ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q58_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iiMacc.1.2" target="asv">2 Macc. 1:2</a>) that "rushing violently upon the enemy, like lions [*Leonum more, i.e. as lions are in the habit of doing], they slew them": + and the word is used in the same sense in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q58_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.67.7" target="asv">Ps. 67:7</a>, where we read: "Who maketh men of one manner [moris] to dwell in a house." For both these significations there is but one + word in Latin; but in the Greek there is a distinct word for each, for the word "ethos" is written sometimes + with a long, and sometimes a short "e". + </p><p id="FS_Q58_A1-p7"> Now "moral" virtue is so called from "mos" in the sense of a natural or quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action. + And the other meaning of "mos," i.e. "custom," is akin to this: because custom becomes a second nature, and produces an inclination + similar to a natural one. But it is evident that inclination to an action belongs properly to the appetitive power, whose + function it is to move all the powers to their acts, as explained above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q58_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[9], + A[1] + </a>). Therefore not every virtue is a moral virtue, but only those that are in the appetitive faculty. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 1 co."><a name="35937" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35937] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod ad huius evidentiam, considerare oportet quid sit +mos, sic enim scire poterimus quid sit moralis virtus. Mos autem +duo significat. Quandoque enim significat consuetudinem, sicut +dicitur Act. XV, <i>nisi circumcidamini secundum morem Moysi, non +poteritis salvi fieri</i>. Quandoque vero significat inclinationem +quandam naturalem, vel quasi naturalem, ad aliquid agendum, unde +etiam et brutorum animalium dicuntur aliqui mores; unde dicitur II +Machab. XI, quod <i>leonum more irruentes in hostes, prostraverunt +eos</i>. Et sic accipitur mos in Psalmo LXVII, ubi dicitur, <i>qui +habitare facit unius moris in domo</i>. Et hae quidem duae +significationes in nullo distinguuntur, apud Latinos, quantum ad +vocem. In Graeco autem distinguuntur, nam ethos, quod apud nos +morem significat, quandoque habet primam longam, et scribitur per +eta, Graecam litteram; quandoque habet primam correptam, et +scribitur per epsilon. Dicitur autem virtus moralis a more, +secundum quod mos significat quandam inclinationem naturalem, vel +quasi naturalem, ad aliquid agendum. Et huic significationi moris +propinqua est alia significatio, qua significat consuetudinem, nam +consuetudo quodammodo vertitur in naturam, et facit inclinationem +similem naturali. Manifestum est autem quod inclinatio ad actum +proprie convenit appetitivae virtuti, cuius est movere omnes +potentias ad agendum, ut ex supradictis patet. Et ideo non omnis +virtus dicitur moralis, sed solum illa quae est in vi +appetitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument takes "mos" in the sense of "custom." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35938" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35938] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de more, secundum quod +significat consuetudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Every act of virtue can be done from choice: but no virtue makes us choose aright, save that which is in the appetitive part + of the soul: for it has been stated above that choice is an act of the appetitive faculty ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q13_A1" id="FS_Q58_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[13], A[1]</a>). Wherefore a habit of choosing, i.e. a habit which is the principle whereby we choose, is that habit alone which perfects + the appetitive faculty: although the acts of other habits also may be a matter + of choice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35939" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35939] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod omnis actus virtutis potest ex electione agi, sed +electionem rectam agit sola virtus quae est in appetitiva parte +animae, dictum est enim supra quod eligere est actus appetitivae +partis. Unde habitus electivus, qui scilicet est electionis +principium, est solum ille qui perficit vim appetitivam, quamvis +etiam aliorum habituum actus sub electione cadere possint.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> "Nature is the principle of movement" (Phys. ii, text. 3). Now to move the faculties to act is the proper function of the + appetitive power. Consequently to become as a second nature by consenting to the reason, is proper to those virtues which + are in the appetitive faculty. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35940" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35940] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod natura est principium motus, sicut dicitur in II +Physic. Movere autem ad agendum proprium est appetitivae partis. Et +ideo assimilari naturae in consentiendo rationi, est proprium +virtutum quae sunt in vi appetitiva.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q58_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q58_A2-p0.1">Q. 58. A. 2. Whether moral virtue differs from intellectual virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtue does not differ from intellectual virtue. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv, 21) "that virtue + is the art of right conduct." But art is an intellectual virtue. Therefore moral and intellectual virtue do not differ. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35941" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35941] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus moralis ab intellectuali non +distinguatur. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Civ. Dei, quod +<i>virtus est ars recte vivendi</i>. Sed ars est virtus +intellectualis. Ergo virtus moralis ab intellectuali non +differt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, some authors put science in the definition of virtues: thus some define perseverance as a "science or habit regarding + those things to which we should hold or not hold"; and holiness as "a science which makes man to be faithful and to do his + duty to God." Now science is an intellectual virtue. Therefore moral virtue should not be distinguished from intellectual + virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35942" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35942] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +plerique in definitione virtutum moralium ponunt scientiam, sicut +quidam definiunt quod perseverantia est scientia vel habitus eorum +quibus est immanendum vel non immanendum; et sanctitas est scientia +faciens fideles et servantes quae ad Deum iusta. Scientia autem est +virtus intellectualis. Ergo virtus moralis non debet distingui ab +intellectuali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 6) that "virtue is the rectitude and perfection of reason." But this belongs to the + intellectual virtues, as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Therefore moral virtue does not differ from intellectual. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35943" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35943] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in I Soliloq., quod <i>virtus est recta et +perfecta ratio</i>. Sed hoc pertinet ad virtutem intellectualem, ut +patet in VI Ethic. ergo virtus moralis non est distincta ab +intellectuali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a thing does not differ from that which is included in its definition. But intellectual virtue is included in the + definition of moral virtue: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "moral virtue is a habit of choosing the mean appointed + by reason as a prudent man would appoint it." Now this right reason that fixes the mean of moral virtue, belongs to an intellectual + virtue, as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Therefore moral virtue does not differ from + intellectual. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="35944" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35944] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +nihil distinguitur ab eo quod in eius definitione ponitur. Sed +virtus intellectualis ponitur in definitione virtutis moralis, +dicit enim philosophus, in II Ethic., quod <i>virtus moralis est +habitus electivus existens in medietate determinata ratione, prout +sapiens determinabit</i>. Huiusmodi autem recta ratio determinans +medium virtutis moralis, pertinet ad virtutem intellectualem, ut +dicitur in VI Ethic. Ergo virtus moralis non distinguitur ab +intellectuali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated in Ethic. i, 13 that "there are two kinds of virtue: some we call intellectual; some moral." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35945" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35945] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur in I Ethic., <i>determinatur virtus secundum +differentiam hanc, dicimus enim harum has quidem intellectuales, +has vero morales</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Reason is the first principle of all human acts; and whatever other principles of human acts may be found, they obey reason + somewhat, but in various ways. For some obey reason blindly and without any contradiction whatever: such are the limbs of + the body, provided they be in a healthy condition, for as soon as reason commands, the hand or the foot proceeds to action. + Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "the soul rules the body like a despot," i.e. + as a master rules his slave, who has no right to rebel. Accordingly some held that all the active principles in man are subordinate + to reason in this way. If this were true, for man to act well it would suffice that his reason be perfect. Consequently, since + virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good actions, it would follow that it is only in the reason, so that + there would be none but intellectual virtues. This was the opinion of Socrates, who said "every virtue is a kind of + prudence," as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Hence he maintained that as long as man is in possession of knowledge, he cannot sin; + and that every one who sins, does so through ignorance. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 co."><a name="35946" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35946] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod omnium humanorum operum principium primum ratio est, +et quaecumque alia principia humanorum operum inveniantur, +quodammodo rationi obediunt; diversimode tamen. Nam quaedam rationi +obediunt omnino ad nutum, absque omni contradictione, sicut +corporis membra, si fuerint in sua natura consistentia; statim enim +ad imperium rationis, manus aut pes movetur ad opus. Unde +philosophus dicit, in I Polit., quod anima regit corpus despotico +principatu, idest sicut dominus servum, qui ius contradicendi non +habet. Posuerunt igitur quidam quod omnia principia activa quae +sunt in homine, hoc modo se habent ad rationem. Quod quidem si +verum esset, sufficeret quod ratio esset perfecta, ad bene agendum. +Unde, cum virtus sit habitus quo perficimur ad bene agendum, +sequeretur quod in sola ratione esset, et sic nulla virtus esset +nisi intellectualis. Et haec fuit opinio Socratis, qui dixit omnes +virtutes esse prudentias, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Unde ponebat quod +homo, scientia in eo existente, peccare non poterat; sed quicumque +peccabat, peccabat propter ignorantiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p8"> Now this is based on a false supposition. Because the appetitive faculty obeys the reason, not blindly, but with a certain + power of opposition; wherefore the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "reason commands the appetitive faculty by a politic + power," whereby a man rules over subjects that are free, having a certain right of opposition. Hence Augustine says on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q58_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118" target="asv">Ps. 118</a> (Serm. 8) that "sometimes we understand [what is right] while desire is slow, or follows not at all," in so + far as the habits or passions of the appetitive faculty cause the use of reason to be impeded in some particular action. And + in this way, there is some truth in the saying of Socrates that so long as a man is in possession of knowledge he does not + sin: provided, however, that this knowledge is made to include the use of reason in this individual act of choice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Hoc autem procedit ex +suppositione falsi. Pars enim appetitiva obedit rationi non omnino +ad nutum, sed cum aliqua contradictione, unde philosophus dicit, in +I Polit., quod ratio imperat appetitivae principatu politico, quo +scilicet aliquis praeest liberis, qui habent ius in aliquo +contradicendi. Unde Augustinus dicit, super Psalm., quod +<i>interdum praecedit intellectus, et sequitur tardus aut nullus +affectus</i>, intantum quod quandoque passionibus vel habitibus +appetitivae partis hoc agitur, ut usus rationis in particulari +impediatur. Et secundum hoc, aliqualiter verum est quod Socrates +dixit, quod scientia praesente, non peccatur, si tamen hoc +extendatur usque ad usum rationis in particulari eligibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p9"> Accordingly for a man to do a good deed, it is requisite not only that his reason be well disposed by means of a habit of + intellectual virtue; but also that his appetite be well disposed by means of a habit of moral virtue. And so moral differs + from intellectual virtue, even as the appetite differs from the reason. Hence just as the appetite is the principle of human + acts, in so far as it partakes of reason, so are moral habits to be considered virtues in so far as they are in + conformity with reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Sic +igitur ad hoc quod homo bene agat, requiritur quod non solum ratio +sit bene disposita per habitum virtutis intellectualis; sed etiam +quod vis appetitiva sit bene disposita per habitum virtutis +moralis. Sicut igitur appetitus distinguitur a ratione, ita virtus +moralis distinguitur ab intellectuali. Unde sicut appetitus est +principium humani actus secundum quod participat aliqualiter +rationem, ita habitus moralis habet rationem virtutis humanae, +inquantum rationi conformatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine usually applies the term "art" to any form of right reason; in which sense art includes prudence which is the right + reason about things to be done, even as art is the right reason about things to be made. Accordingly, when he says that "virtue + is the art of right conduct," this applies to prudence essentially; but to other virtues, by participation, for as much as + they are directed by prudence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35947" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35947] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Augustinus communiter accipit artem, pro +qualibet recta ratione. Et sic sub arte includitur etiam prudentia, +quae ita est recta ratio agibilium, sicut ars est recta ratio +factibilium. Et secundum hoc, quod dicit quod virtus est ars recte +vivendi, essentialiter convenit prudentiae, participative autem +aliis virtutibus, prout secundum prudentiam diriguntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All such definitions, by whomsoever given, were based on the Socratic theory, and should be explained according to what we + have said about art (ad 1). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35948" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35948] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod tales definitiones, a quibuscumque inveniantur datae, +processerunt ex opinione Socratica, et sunt exponendae eo modo quo +de arte praedictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same applies to the Third Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35949" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35949] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Et similiter +dicendum est ad tertium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Right reason which is in accord with prudence is included in the definition of moral virtue, not as part of its essence, + but as something belonging by way of participation to all the moral virtues, in so far as they are all under the direction + of prudence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="35950" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35950] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod recta ratio, quae est secundum prudentiam, ponitur in +definitione virtutis moralis, non tanquam pars essentiae eius, sed +sicut quiddam participatum in omnibus virtutibus moralibus, +inquantum prudentia dirigit omnes virtutes morales.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q58_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q58_A3-p0.1">Q. 58. A. 3. Whether virtue is adequately divided into moral and intellectual?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that virtue is not adequately divided into moral and intellectual. For prudence seems to be a mean between + moral and intellectual virtue, since it is reckoned among the intellectual virtues (Ethic. vi, 3,5); and again is placed by + all among the four cardinal virtues, which are moral virtues, as we shall show further on ( + <a href="#FS_Q61_A1" id="FS_Q58_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[61], A[1]</a>). Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral, as though there + were no mean between them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35951" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35951] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus humana non sufficienter +dividatur per virtutem moralem et intellectualem. Prudentia enim +videtur esse aliquid medium inter virtutem moralem et +intellectualem, connumeratur enim virtutibus intellectualibus in VI +Ethic.; et etiam ab omnibus communiter connumeratur inter quatuor +virtutes cardinales, quae sunt morales, ut infra patebit. Non ergo +sufficienter dividitur virtus per intellectualem et moralem, sicut +per immediata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, contingency, perseverance, and patience are not reckoned to be intellectual virtues. Yet neither are they moral + virtues; since they do not reduce the passions to a mean, and are consistent with an abundance of passion. Therefore virtue + is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35952" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35952] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +continentia et perseverantia, et etiam patientia, non computantur +inter virtutes intellectuales. Nec etiam sunt virtutes morales, +quia non tenent medium in passionibus, sed abundant in eis +passiones. Non ergo sufficienter dividitur virtus per +intellectuales et morales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, faith, hope, and charity are virtues. Yet they are not intellectual virtues: for there are only five of these, viz. + science, wisdom, understanding, prudence, and art, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q57_A2" id="FS_Q58_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[57], AA[2]</a> ,3,5). Neither are they moral virtues; since they are not about the passions, which are the chief concern of moral virtue. + Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35953" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35953] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +fides, spes et caritas quaedam virtutes sunt. Non tamen sunt +virtutes intellectuales, hae enim solum sunt quinque, scilicet +scientia, sapientia, intellectus, prudentia et ars, ut dictum est. +Nec etiam sunt virtutes morales, quia non sunt circa passiones, +circa quas maxime est moralis virtus. Ergo virtus non sufficienter +dividitur per intellectuales et morales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "virtue is twofold, intellectual and moral." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35954" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35954] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., <i>duplicem esse +virtutem, hanc quidem intellectualem, illam autem moralem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Human virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good deeds. Now, in man there are but two principles of human + actions, viz. the intellect or reason and the appetite: for these are the two principles of movement in man as stated in De + Anima iii, text. 48. Consequently every human virtue must needs be a perfection of one of these principles. Accordingly if + it perfects man's speculative or practical intellect in order that his deed may be good, it + will be an intellectual virtue: whereas if it perfects his appetite, it will be a moral virtue. It follows therefore that + every human virtue is either intellectual or moral. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 3 co."><a name="35955" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35955] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod virtus humana est quidam habitus perficiens hominem +ad bene operandum. Principium autem humanorum actuum in homine non +est nisi duplex, scilicet intellectus sive ratio, et appetitus, +haec enim sunt duo moventia in homine, ut dicitur in III de anima. +Unde omnis virtus humana oportet quod sit perfectiva alicuius +istorum principiorum. Si quidem igitur sit perfectiva intellectus +speculativi vel practici ad bonum hominis actum, erit virtus +intellectualis, si autem sit perfectiva appetitivae partis, erit +virtus moralis. Unde relinquitur quod omnis virtus humana vel est +intellectualis vel moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Prudence is essentially an intellectual virtue. But considered on the part of its matter, it has something in common with + the moral virtues: for it is right reason about things to be done, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q57_A4" id="FS_Q58_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[57], A[4]</a>). It is in this sense that it is reckoned with the moral virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35956" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35956] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod prudentia, secundum essentiam suam, est +intellectualis virtus. Sed secundum materiam, convenit cum +virtutibus moralibus, est enim recta ratio agibilium, ut supra +dictum est. Et secundum hoc, virtutibus moralibus connumeratur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Contingency and perseverance are not perfections of the sensitive appetite. This is clear from the fact that passions abound + in the continent and persevering man, which would not be the case if his sensitive appetite were perfected by a habit making + it conformable to reason. Contingency and perseverance are, however, perfections of the rational faculty, and withstand the + passions lest reason be led astray. But they fall short of being virtues: since + intellectual virtue, which makes reason to hold itself well in respect of moral matters, presupposes a right appetite of the + end, so that it may hold itself aright in respect of principles, i.e. the ends, on which it builds its argument: and this + is wanting in the continent and persevering man. Nor again can an action proceeding from two principles be perfect, unless + each principle be perfected by the habit corresponding to that operation: thus, however perfect be the principal agent employing + an instrument, it will produce an imperfect effect, if the instrument be not well disposed also. Hence if the sensitive faculty, + which is moved by the rational faculty, is not perfect; however perfect the rational faculty may be, the resulting action + will be imperfect: and consequently the principle of that action will not be a virtue. And for this reason, contingency, desisting + from pleasures, and perseverance in the midst of pains, are not virtues, but something less than a virtue, as the + Philosopher maintains (Ethic. vii, 1,9). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35957" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35957] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod continentia et perseverantia non sunt perfectiones +appetitivae virtutis sensitivae. Quod ex hoc patet, quod in +continente et perseverante superabundant inordinatae passiones, +quod non esset, si appetitus sensitivus esset perfectus aliquo +habitu conformante ipsum rationi. Est autem continentia, seu +perseverantia, perfectio rationalis partis, quae se tenet contra +passiones ne deducatur. Deficit tamen a ratione virtutis, quia +virtus intellectiva quae facit rationem se bene habere circa +moralia, praesupponit appetitum rectum finis, ut recte se habeat +circa principia, idest fines, ex quibus ratiocinatur; quod +continenti et perseveranti deest. Neque etiam potest esse perfecta +operatio quae a duabus potentiis procedit, nisi utraque potentia +perficiatur per debitum habitum, sicut non sequitur perfecta actio +alicuius agentis per instrumentum, si instrumentum non sit bene +dispositum, quantumcumque principale agens sit perfectum. Unde si +appetitus sensitivus, quem movet rationalis pars, non sit +perfectus; quantumcumque rationalis pars sit perfecta, actio +consequens non erit perfecta. Unde nec principium actionis erit +virtus. Et propter hoc, continentia a delectationibus, et +perseverantia a tristitiis, non sunt virtutes, sed aliquid minus +virtute, ut philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Faith, hope, and charity are superhuman virtues: for they are virtues of man as sharing in the grace of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35958" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35958] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod fides, spes et caritas sunt supra virtutes humanas, +sunt enim virtutes hominis prout est factus particeps divinae +gratiae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q58_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q58_A4-p0.1">Q. 58. A. 4. Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral can be without intellectual virtue. Because moral virtue, as Cicero says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) is + "a habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Now though nature may be in accord with some sovereign reason that moves + it, there is no need for that reason to be united to nature in the same subject, as is evident of natural things devoid of + knowledge. Therefore in a man there may be a moral virtue like a second nature, inclining + him to consent to his reason, without his reason being perfected by an intellectual virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35959" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35959] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus moralis possit esse sine +intellectuali. <i>Virtus enim moralis</i>, ut dicit Tullius, <i>est +habitus in modum naturae, rationi consentaneus</i>. Sed natura etsi +consentiat alicui superiori rationi moventi, non tamen oportet quod +illa ratio naturae coniungatur in eodem, sicut patet in rebus +naturalibus cognitione carentibus. Ergo potest esse in homine +virtus moralis in modum naturae, inclinans ad consentiendum +rationi, quamvis illius hominis ratio non sit perfecta per virtutem +intellectualem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, by means of intellectual virtue man obtains perfect use of reason. But it happens at times that men are virtuous + and acceptable to God, without being vigorous in the use of reason. Therefore it seems that moral virtue can be without intellectual. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35960" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35960] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +per virtutem intellectualem homo consequitur rationis usum +perfectum. Sed quandoque contingit quod aliqui in quibus non multum +viget usus rationis, sunt virtuosi et Deo accepti. Ergo videtur +quod virtus moralis possit esse sine virtute intellectuali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further moral virtue makes us inclined to do good works. But some, without depending on the judgment of reason, have a natural + inclination to do good works. Therefore moral virtues can be without intellectual virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35961" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35961] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +virtus moralis facit inclinationem ad bene operandum. Sed quidam +habent naturalem inclinationem ad bene operandum, etiam absque +rationis iudicio. Ergo virtutes morales possunt esse sine +intellectuali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. xxii) that "the other virtues, unless we do prudently what we desire to do, cannot be real virtues." + But prudence is an intellectual virtue, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q57_A5" id="FS_Q58_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[57], A[5]</a>). Therefore moral virtues cannot be without intellectual virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35962" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35962] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Gregorius dicit, in XXII Moral., quod <i>ceterae virtutes, +nisi ea quae appetunt, prudenter agant, virtutes esse nequaquam +possunt</i>. Sed prudentia est virtus intellectualis, ut supra +dictum est. Ergo virtutes morales non possunt esse sine +intellectualibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Moral virtue can be without some of the intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science, and art; but not without understanding + and prudence. Moral virtue cannot be without prudence, because it is a habit of choosing, i.e. making us choose well. Now + in order that a choice be good, two things are required. First, that the intention be directed to a due end; and this is done + by moral virtue, which inclines the appetitive faculty to the good that is in accord with + reason, which is a due end. Secondly, that man take rightly those things which have reference to the end: and this he cannot + do unless his reason counsel, judge and command aright, which is the function of prudence and the virtues annexed to it, as + stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q57_A5" id="FS_Q58_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[57], AA[5]</a>,6). Wherefore there can be no moral virtue without prudence: and consequently neither can there be without understanding. + For it is by the virtue of understanding that we know self-evident + principles both in speculative and in practical matters. Consequently just as right reason in speculative matters, in so far + as it proceeds from naturally known principles, presupposes the understanding of those principles, so also does prudence, + which is the right reason about things to be done. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 4 co."><a name="35963" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35963] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod virtus moralis potest quidem esse sine quibusdam +intellectualibus virtutibus, sicut sine sapientia, scientia et +arte, non autem potest esse sine intellectu et prudentia. Sine +prudentia quidem esse non potest moralis virtus, quia moralis +virtus est habitus electivus, idest faciens bonam electionem. Ad +hoc autem quod electio sit bona, duo requiruntur. Primo, ut sit +debita intentio finis, et hoc fit per virtutem moralem, quae vim +appetitivam inclinat ad bonum conveniens rationi, quod est finis +debitus. Secundo, ut homo recte accipiat ea quae sunt ad finem, et +hoc non potest esse nisi per rationem recte consiliantem, +iudicantem et praecipientem; quod pertinet ad prudentiam et ad +virtutes sibi annexas, ut supra dictum est. Unde virtus moralis +sine prudentia esse non potest. Et per consequens nec sine +intellectu. Per intellectum enim cognoscuntur principia naturaliter +nota, tam in speculativis quam in operativis. Unde sicut recta +ratio in speculativis, inquantum procedit ex principiis naturaliter +cognitis, praesupponit intellectum principiorum; ita etiam +prudentia, quae est recta ratio agibilium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The inclination of nature in things devoid of reason is without choice: wherefore such an inclination does not of necessity + require reason. But the inclination of moral virtue is with choice: and consequently in order that it may be perfect it requires + that reason be perfected by intellectual virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35964" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35964] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod inclinatio naturae in rebus carentibus ratione, +est absque electione, et ideo talis inclinatio non requirit ex +necessitate rationem. Sed inclinatio virtutis moralis est cum +electione, et ideo ad suam perfectionem indiget quod sit ratio +perfecta per virtutem intellectualem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man may be virtuous without having full use of reason as to everything, provided he have it with regard to those things + which have to be done virtuously. In this way all virtuous men have full use of reason. Hence those who seem to be simple, + through lack of worldly cunning, may possibly be prudent, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q58_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.10.16" target="asv"> Mat. 10:16</a>: "Be ye therefore prudent [Douay: 'wise'] as serpents, and simple as doves." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35965" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35965] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod in virtuoso non oportet quod vigeat usus rationis +quantum ad omnia, sed solum quantum ad ea quae sunt agenda secundum +virtutem. Et sic usus rationis viget in omnibus virtuosis. Unde +etiam qui videntur simplices, eo quod carent mundana astutia, +possunt esse prudentes; secundum illud Matth. X, <i>estote +prudentes sicut serpentes, et simplices sicut columbae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The natural inclination to a good of virtue is a kind of beginning of virtue, but is not perfect virtue. For the stronger + this inclination is, the more perilous may it prove to be, unless it be accompanied by right reason, which rectifies the choice + of fitting means towards the due end. Thus if a running horse be blind, the faster it runs the more heavily will it fall, + and the more grievously will it be hurt. And consequently, although moral virtue be + not right reason, as Socrates held, yet not only is it "according to right reason," in so far as it inclines man to that which + is, according to right reason, as the Platonists maintained [*Cf. Plato, Meno xli.]; but also it needs to be "joined with + right reason," as Aristotle declares (Ethic. vi, 13). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35966" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35966] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod naturalis inclinatio ad bonum virtutis, est quaedam +inchoatio virtutis, non autem est virtus perfecta. Huiusmodi enim +inclinatio, quanto est fortior, tanto potest esse periculosior, +nisi recta ratio adiungatur, per quam fiat recta electio eorum quae +conveniunt ad debitum finem, sicut equus currens, si sit caecus, +tanto fortius impingit et laeditur, quanto fortius currit. Et ideo, +etsi virtus moralis non sit ratio recta, ut Socrates dicebat; non +tamen solum est secundum rationem rectam, inquantum inclinat ad id +quod est secundum rationem rectam, ut Platonici posuerunt; sed +etiam oportet quod sit cum ratione recta, ut Aristoteles dicit, in +VI Ethic.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q58_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q58_A5-p0.1">Q. 58. A. 5. Whether there can be intellectual without moral virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there can be intellectual without moral virtue. Because perfection of what precedes does not depend on + the perfection of what follows. Now reason precedes and moves the sensitive appetite. Therefore intellectual virtue, which + is a perfection of the reason, does not depend on moral virtue, which is a perfection of the appetitive faculty; and can be + without it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="35967" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35967] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus intellectualis possit esse sine +virtute morali. Perfectio enim prioris non dependet a perfectione +posterioris. Sed ratio est prior appetitu sensitivo, et movens +ipsum. Ergo virtus intellectualis quae est perfectio rationis, non +dependet a virtute morali, quae est perfectio appetitivae partis. +Potest ergo esse sine ea.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, morals are the matter of prudence, even as things makeable are the matter of art. Now art can be without its proper + matter, as a smith without iron. Therefore prudence can be without the moral virtue, although of all the intellectual virtues, + it seems most akin to the moral virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="35968" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35968] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +moralia sunt materia prudentiae, sicut factibilia sunt materia +artis. Sed ars potest esse sine propria materia, sicut faber sine +ferro. Ergo et prudentia potest esse sine virtutibus moralibus, +quae tamen inter omnes intellectuales virtutes, maxime moralibus +coniuncta videtur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, prudence is "a virtue whereby we are of good counsel" (Ethic. vi, 9). Now many are of good counsel without having + the moral virtues. Therefore prudence can be without a moral virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="35969" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35969] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +prudentia est virtus bene consiliativa, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed +multi bene consiliantur, quibus tamen virtutes morales desunt. Ergo +prudentia potest esse sine virtute morali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> To wish to do evil is directly opposed to moral virtue; and yet it is not opposed to anything that can be without moral virtue. + Now it is contrary to prudence "to sin willingly" (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore prudence cannot be without moral virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 5 s. c."><a name="35970" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35970] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +velle malum facere opponitur directe virtuti morali; non autem +opponitur alicui quod sine virtute morali esse potest. Opponitur +autem prudentiae quod volens peccet, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Non +ergo prudentia potest esse sine virtute morali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Other intellectual virtues can, but prudence cannot, be without moral virtue. The reason for this is that prudence is the + right reason about things to be done (and this, not merely in general, but also in particular); about which things actions + are. Now right reason demands principles from which reason proceeds to argue. And when reason argues about particular cases, + it needs not only universal but also particular principles. As to universal principles of + action, man is rightly disposed by the natural understanding of principles, whereby he understands that he should do no evil; + or again by some practical science. But this is not enough in order that man may reason aright about particular cases. For + it happens sometimes that the aforesaid universal principle, known by means of understanding or science, is destroyed in a + particular case by a passion: thus to one who is swayed by concupiscence, when he is overcome thereby, the object of his desire + seems good, although it is opposed to the universal judgment of his reason. Consequently, as by the habit of natural understanding + or of science, man is made to be rightly disposed in regard to the universal principles of action; so, in order that he be + rightly disposed with regard to the particular principles of action, viz. the ends, he needs to be perfected by certain habits, + whereby it becomes connatural, as it were, to man to judge aright to the end. This is done by moral virtue: for the + virtuous man judges aright of the end of virtue, because "such a man is, such does the end seem to him" (Ethic. iii, 5). Consequently + the right reason about things to be done, viz. prudence, requires man to have moral virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 5 co."><a name="35971" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35971] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod aliae virtutes intellectuales sine virtute morali +esse possunt, sed prudentia sine virtute morali esse non potest. +Cuius ratio est, quia prudentia est recta ratio agibilium; non +autem solum in universali, sed etiam in particulari, in quibus sunt +actiones. Recta autem ratio praeexigit principia ex quibus ratio +procedit. Oportet autem rationem circa particularia procedere non +solum ex principiis universalibus, sed etiam ex principiis +particularibus. Circa principia quidem universalia agibilium, homo +recte se habet per naturalem intellectum principiorum, per quem +homo cognoscit quod nullum malum est agendum; vel etiam per aliquam +scientiam practicam. Sed hoc non sufficit ad recte ratiocinandum +circa particularia. Contingit enim quandoque quod huiusmodi +universale principium cognitum per intellectum vel scientiam, +corrumpitur in particulari per aliquam passionem, sicut +concupiscenti, quando concupiscentia vincit, videtur hoc esse bonum +quod concupiscit, licet sit contra universale iudicium rationis. Et +ideo, sicut homo disponitur ad recte se habendum circa principia +universalia, per intellectum naturalem vel per habitum scientiae; +ita ad hoc quod recte se habeat circa principia particularia +agibilium, quae sunt fines, oportet quod perficiatur per aliquos +habitus secundum quos fiat quodammodo homini connaturale recte +iudicare de fine. Et hoc fit per virtutem moralem, virtuosus enim +recte iudicat de fine virtutis, <i>quia qualis unusquisque est, +talis finis videtur ei</i>, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Et ideo ad +rectam rationem agibilium, quae est prudentia, requiritur quod homo +habeat virtutem moralem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Reason, as apprehending the end, precedes the appetite for the end: but appetite for the end precedes the reason, as arguing + about the choice of the means, which is the concern of prudence. Even so, in speculative matters the understanding of principles + is the foundation on which the syllogism of the reason is based. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="35972" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35972] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ratio, secundum quod est apprehensiva finis, +praecedit appetitum finis, sed appetitus finis praecedit rationem +ratiocinantem ad eligendum ea quae sunt ad finem, quod pertinet ad +prudentiam. Sicut etiam in speculativis, intellectus principiorum +est principium rationis syllogizantis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It does not depend on the disposition of our appetite whether we judge well or ill of the principles of art, as it does, + when we judge of the end which is the principle in moral matters: in the former case our judgment depends on reason alone. + Hence art does not require a virtue perfecting the appetite, as prudence does. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="35973" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35973] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod principia artificialium non diiudicantur a nobis bene +vel male secundum dispositionem appetitus nostri, sicut fines, qui +sunt moralium principia, sed solum per considerationem rationis. Et +ideo ars non requirit virtutem perficientem appetitum, sicut +requirit prudentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Prudence not only helps us to be of good counsel, but also to judge and command well. This is not possible unless the impediment + of the passions, destroying the judgment and command of prudence, be removed; and this is done by moral virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="35974" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35974] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod prudentia non solum est bene consiliativa, sed etiam +bene iudicativa et bene praeceptiva. Quod esse non potest, nisi +removeatur impedimentum passionum corrumpentium iudicium et +praeceptum prudentiae; et hoc per virtutem moralem.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q59" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q59-p0.1">Q. 59. OF MORAL VIRTUE IN RELATION TO THE PASSIONS (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q59-p2"> We must now consider the difference of one moral virtue from another. And since those moral virtues which are about the passions, + differ accordingly to the difference of passions, we must consider (1) the relation of virtue to passion; (2) the different + kinds of moral virtue in relation to the passions. Under the first head there are five points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FS_Q59-p3"><a href="#FS_Q59_A1"> (1) Whether moral virtue is a passion?</a></p><p id="FS_Q59-p4"><a href="#FS_Q59_A2"> (2) Whether there can be moral virtue with passion?</a></p><p id="FS_Q59-p5"><a href="#FS_Q59_A3"> (3) Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q59-p6"><a href="#FS_Q59_A4"> (4) Whether every moral virtue is about a passion?</a></p><p id="FS_Q59-p7"><a href="#FS_Q59_A5"> (5) Whether there can be moral virtue without passion?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 pr."><a name="35975" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35975] +Iª-IIae q. 59 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +distinctione moralium virtutum ad invicem. Et quia virtutes morales +quae sunt circa passiones, distinguuntur secundum diversitatem +passionum, oportet primo considerare comparationem virtutis ad +passionem; secundo, distinctionem moralium virtutum secundum +passiones. Circa primum quaeruntur quinque. Primo, utrum virtus +moralis sit passio. Secundo, utrum virtus moralis possit esse cum +passione. Tertio, utrum possit esse cum tristitia. Quarto, utrum +omnis virtus moralis sit circa passionem. Quinto, utrum aliqua +virtus moralis possit esse sine passione.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q59_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q59_A1-p0.1">Q. 59. A. 1. Whether moral virtue is a passion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtue is a passion. Because the mean is of the same genus as the extremes. But moral virtue is + a mean between two passions. Therefore moral virtue is a passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35976" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35976] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus moralis sit passio. Medium enim +est eiusdem generis cum extremis. Sed virtus moralis est medium +inter passiones. Ergo virtus moralis est passio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue and vice, being contrary to one another, are in the same genus. But some passions are reckoned to be vices, + such as envy and anger. Therefore some passions are virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35977" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35977] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +virtus et vitium, cum sint contraria, sunt in eodem genere. Sed +quaedam passiones vitia esse dicuntur, ut invidia et ira. Ergo +etiam quaedam passiones sunt virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, pity is a passion, since it is sorrow for another's ills, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q35_A8" id="FS_Q59_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[35], A[8]</a>). Now "Cicero the renowned orator did not hesitate to call pity a virtue," as Augustine states in De Civ. Dei ix, 5. Therefore + a passion may be a moral virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35978" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35978] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +misericordia quaedam passio est, est enim tristitia de alienis +malis, ut supra dictum est. <i>Hanc autem Cicero, locutor egregius, +non dubitavit appellare virtutem</i>; ut Augustinus dicit, in IX de +Civ. Dei. Ergo passio potest esse virtus moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated in Ethic. ii, 5 that "passions are neither virtues nor vices." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35979" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35979] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur in II Ethic., quod <i>passiones neque virtutes +sunt neque malitiae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Moral virtue cannot be a passion. This is clear for three reasons. First, because a passion is a movement of the sensitive + appetite, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q22_A3" id="FS_Q59_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[3]</a>): whereas moral virtue is not a movement, but rather a principle of the movement of the appetite, being a kind of habit. + Secondly, because passions are not in themselves good or evil. For man's good or evil is something in reference to reason: + wherefore the passions, + considered in themselves, are referable both to good and evil, for as much as they may accord or disaccord with reason. Now + nothing of this sort can be a virtue: since virtue is referable to good alone, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q55_A3" id="FS_Q59_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[55], A[3]</a>). Thirdly, because, granted that some passions are, in some way, referable to good only, or to evil only; even then the movement + of passion, as passion, begins in the appetite, and ends in the reason, since the appetite tends to conformity + with reason. On the other hand, the movement of virtue is the reverse, for it begins in the reason and ends in the appetite, + inasmuch as the latter is moved by reason. Hence the definition of moral virtue (Ethic. ii, 6) states that it is "a habit + of choosing the mean appointed by reason as a prudent man would appoint it." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 1 co."><a name="35980" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35980] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod virtus moralis non potest esse passio. Et hoc patet +triplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia passio est motus quidam +appetitus sensitivi, ut supra dictum est. Virtus autem moralis non +est motus aliquis, sed magis principium appetitivi motus, habitus +quidam existens. Secundo quia passiones ex seipsis non habent +rationem boni vel mali. Bonum enim vel malum hominis est secundum +rationem, unde passiones, secundum se consideratae, se habent et ad +bonum et ad malum, secundum quod possunt convenire rationi vel non +convenire. Nihil autem tale potest esse virtus, cum virtus solum ad +bonum se habeat, ut supra dictum est. Tertio quia, dato quod aliqua +passio se habeat solum ad bonum, vel solum ad malum, secundum +aliquem modum; tamen motus passionis, inquantum passio est, +principium habet in ipso appetitu, et terminum in ratione, in cuius +conformitatem appetitus tendit. Motus autem virtutis est e +converso, principium habens in ratione et terminum in appetitu, +secundum quod a ratione movetur. Unde in definitione virtutis +moralis dicitur, in II Ethic., <i>quod est habitus electivus in +medietate consistens determinata ratione, prout sapiens +determinabit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue is a mean between passions, not by reason of its essence, but on account of its effect; because, to wit, it establishes + the mean between passions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35981" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35981] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod virtus, secundum suam essentiam, non est medium +inter passiones, sed secundum suum effectum, quia scilicet inter +passiones medium constituit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If by vice we understand a habit of doing evil deeds, it is evident that no passion is a vice. But if vice is taken to mean + sin which is a vicious act, nothing hinders a passion from being a vice, or, on the other hand, from concurring in an act + of virtue; in so far as a passion is either opposed to reason or in accordance with reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35982" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35982] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, si vitium dicatur habitus secundum quem quis male +operatur, manifestum est quod nulla passio est vitium. Si vero +dicatur vitium peccatum, quod est actus vitiosus, sic nihil +prohibet passionem esse vitium, et e contrario concurrere ad actum +virtutis; secundum quod passio vel contrariatur rationi, vel +sequitur actum rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Pity is said to be a virtue, i.e. an act of virtue, in so far as "that movement of the soul is obedient to reason"; viz. + "when pity is bestowed without violating right, as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent forgiven," as Augustine says + (De Civ. Dei ix, 5). But if by pity we understand a habit perfecting man so that he bestows pity reasonably, nothing hinders + pity, in this sense, from being a virtue. The same applies to similar passions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35983" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35983] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod misericordia dicitur esse virtus, idest virtutis +actus, secundum quod <i>motus ille animi rationi servit, quando +scilicet ita praebetur misericordia, ut iustitia conservetur, sive +cum indigenti tribuitur, sive cum ignoscitur poenitenti</i>, ut +Augustinus dicit ibidem. Si tamen misericordia dicatur aliquis +habitus quo homo perficitur ad rationabiliter miserendum, nihil +prohibet misericordiam sic dictam esse virtutem. Et eadem est ratio +de similibus passionibus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q59_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q59_A2-p0.1">Q. 59. A. 2. Whether there can be moral virtue with passion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtue cannot be with passion. For the Philosopher says (Topic. iv) that "a gentle man is one who + is not passionate; but a patient man is one who is passionate but does not give way." The same applies to all the moral virtues. + Therefore all moral virtues are without passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35984" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35984] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus moralis cum passione esse non +possit. Dicit enim philosophus, in IV Topic., quod <i>mitis est qui +non patitur, patiens autem qui patitur et non deducitur</i>. Et +eadem ratio est de omnibus virtutibus moralibus. Ergo omnis virtus +moralis est sine passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue is a right affection of the soul, as health is to the body, as stated Phys. vii, text. 17: wherefore "virtue + is a kind of health of the soul," as Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. iv). But the soul's passions are "the soul's diseases," as + he says in the same book. Now health is incompatible with disease. Therefore neither is passion compatible with virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35985" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35985] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +virtus est quaedam recta habitudo animae, sicut sanitas corporis, +ut dicitur in VII Physic., unde virtus quaedam sanitas animae esse +videtur, ut Tullius dicit, in IV de Tuscul. quaest. Passiones autem +animae dicuntur morbi quidam animae, ut in eodem libro Tullius +dicit. Sanitas autem non compatitur secum morbum. Ergo neque virtus +compatitur animae passionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, moral virtue requires perfect use of reason even in particular matters. But the passions are an obstacle to this: + for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "pleasures destroy the judgment of prudence": and Sallust says (Catilin.) that + "when they," i.e. the soul's passions, "interfere, it is not easy for the mind to grasp the truth." Therefore passion is incompatible + with moral virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35986" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35986] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +virtus moralis requirit perfectum usum rationis etiam in +particularibus. Sed hoc impeditur per passiones, dicit enim +philosophus, in VI Ethic., quod <i>delectationes corrumpunt +existimationem prudentiae</i>; et Sallustius dicit, in Catilinario, +quod non facile verum perspicit animus, ubi illa officiunt, +scilicet animi passiones. Virtus ergo moralis non potest esse cum +passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6): "If the will is perverse, these movements," viz. the passions, "are perverse also: but + if it is upright, they are not only blameless, but even praiseworthy." But nothing praiseworthy is incompatible with moral + virtue. Therefore moral virtue does not exclude the passions, but is consistent with them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35987" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35987] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, <i>si perversa est +voluntas, perversos habebit hos motus</i>, scilicet passionum, si +autem recta est, <i>non solum inculpabiles, verum etiam laudabiles +erunt</i>. Sed nullum laudabile excluditur per virtutem moralem. +Virtus ergo moralis non excludit passiones, sed potest esse cum +ipsis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q59_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The Stoics and Peripatetics disagreed on this point, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei ix, 4). For the Stoics held that the + soul's passions cannot be in a wise or virtuous man: whereas the Peripatetics, who were founded by Aristotle, as Augustine + says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), maintained that the passions are compatible with moral virtue, if they be reduced to the mean. + </p><p id="FS_Q59_A2-p7"> This difference, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), was one of words rather than of opinions. Because the Stoics, + through not discriminating between the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, and the sensitive appetite, which is divided + into irascible and concupiscible, did not, as the Peripatetics did, distinguish the passions from the other affections of + the human soul, in the point of their being movements of the sensitive appetite, whereas the other emotions of the + soul, which are not passions, are movements of the intellective appetite or will; but only in the point of the passions being, + as they maintained, any emotions in disaccord with reason. These emotions could not be in a wise or virtuous man if they arose + deliberately: while it would be possible for them to be in a wise man, if they arose suddenly: because, in the words of Aulus + Gellius [*Noct. Attic. xix, 1], quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), "it is not in our power to call up the visions + of the soul, known as its fancies; and when they arise from awesome things, they must needs disturb the mind of a wise man, + so that he is slightly startled by fear, or depressed with sorrow," in so far as "these passions forestall the use of reason + without his approving of such things or consenting thereto." + </p><p id="FS_Q59_A2-p8"> Accordingly, if the passions be taken for inordinate emotions, they cannot be in a virtuous man, so that he consent to them + deliberately; as the Stoics maintained. But if the passions be taken for any movements of the sensitive appetite, they can + be in a virtuous man, in so far as they are subordinate to reason. Hence Aristotle says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "some describe + virtue as being a kind of freedom from passion and disturbance; this is incorrect, because the assertion should + be qualified": they should have said virtue is freedom from those passions "that are not as they should be as to manner and + time." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 2 co."><a name="35988" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35988] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod circa hoc fuit discordia inter Stoicos et +Peripateticos, sicut Augustinus dicit, IX de Civ. Dei. Stoici enim +posuerunt quod passiones animae non possunt esse in sapiente, sive +virtuoso, Peripatetici vero, quorum sectam Aristoteles instituit, +ut Augustinus dicit in IX de Civ. Dei, posuerunt quod passiones +simul cum virtute morali esse possunt, sed ad medium reductae. Haec +autem diversitas, sicut Augustinus ibidem dicit, magis erat +secundum verba, quam secundum eorum sententias. Quia enim Stoici +non distinguebant inter appetitum intellectivum, qui est voluntas, +et inter appetitum sensitivum, qui per irascibilem et +concupiscibilem dividitur; non distinguebant in hoc passiones +animae ab aliis affectionibus humanis, quod passiones animae sint +motus appetitus sensitivi, aliae vero affectiones, quae non sunt +passiones animae, sunt motus appetitus intellectivi, qui dicitur +voluntas, sicut Peripatetici distinxerunt, sed solum quantum ad hoc +quod passiones esse dicebant quascumque affectiones rationi +repugnantes. Quae si ex deliberatione oriantur, in sapiente, seu in +virtuoso, esse non possunt. Si autem subito oriantur, hoc in +virtuoso potest accidere, <i>eo quod animi visa quae appellant +phantasias, non est in potestate nostra utrum aliquando incidant +animo; et cum veniunt ex terribilibus rebus, necesse est ut +sapientis animum moveant, ita ut paulisper vel pavescat metu, vel +tristitia contrahatur, tanquam his passionibus praevenientibus +rationis officium; nec tamen approbant ista, eisque +consentiunt</i>; ut Augustinus narrat in IX de Civ. Dei, ab Agellio +dictum. Sic igitur, si passiones dicantur inordinatae affectiones, +non possunt esse in virtuoso, ita quod post deliberationem eis +consentiatur; ut Stoici posuerunt. Si vero passiones dicantur +quicumque motus appetitus sensitivi, sic possunt esse in virtuoso, +secundum quod sunt a ratione ordinati. Unde Aristoteles dicit, in +II Ethic., quod <i>non bene quidam determinant virtutes +impassibilitates quasdam et quietes, quoniam simpliciter +dicunt</i>, sed deberent dicere quod sunt quietes a passionibus +quae sunt ut non oportet, et quando non oportet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher quotes this, as well as many other examples in his books on Logic, in order to illustrate, not his own mind, + but that of others. It was the opinion of the Stoics that the passions of the soul were incompatible with virtue: and the + Philosopher rejects this opinion (Ethic. ii, 3), when he says that virtue is not freedom from passion. It may be said, however, + that when he says "a gentle man is not passionate," we are to understand this of + inordinate passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35989" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35989] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod philosophus exemplum illud inducit, sicut et +multa alia in libris logicalibus, non secundum opinionem propriam, +sed secundum opinionem aliorum. Haec autem fuit opinio Stoicorum, +quod virtutes essent sine passionibus animae. Quam opinionem +philosophus excludit in II Ethic., dicens virtutes non esse +impassibilitates. Potest tamen dici quod, cum dicitur quod mitis +non patitur, intelligendum est secundum passionem inordinatam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This and all similar arguments which Tully brings forward in De Tusc. Quaest. iv take the passions in the execution of reason's + command. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35990" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35990] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa, et omnes similes quas Tullius ad hoc +inducit in IV libro de Tuscul. quaest., procedit de passionibus +secundum quod significant inordinatas affectiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When a passion forestalls the judgment of reason, so as to prevail on the mind to give its consent, it hinders counsel and + the judgment of reason. But when it follows that judgment, as through being commanded by reason, it helps towards the execution + of reason's command. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35991" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35991] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod passio praeveniens iudicium rationis, si in animo +praevaleat ut ei consentiatur, impedit consilium et iudicium +rationis. Si vero sequatur, quasi ex ratione imperata, adiuvat ad +exequendum imperium rationis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q59_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q59_A3-p0.1">Q. 59. A. 3. Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow is incompatible with virtue. Because the virtues are effects of wisdom, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q59_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.7" target="asv"> Wis. 8:7</a>: "She," i.e. Divine wisdom, "teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude." Now the "conversation" of wisdom + "hath no bitterness," as we read further on (verse 16). Therefore sorrow is incompatible with virtue also. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35992" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35992] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus cum tristitia esse non possit. +Virtutes enim sunt sapientiae effectus, secundum illud Sap. VIII, +sobrietatem et iustitiam docet, scilicet divina sapientia, +prudentiam et virtutem. Sed sapientiae convictus non habet +amaritudinem, ut postea subditur. Ergo nec virtutes cum tristitia +esse possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sorrow is a hindrance to work, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 13; x, 5). But a hindrance to good works is + incompatible with virtue. Therefore sorrow is incompatible with virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35993" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35993] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +tristitia est impedimentum operationis; ut patet per philosophum, +in VII et X Ethic. Sed impedimentum bonae operationis repugnat +virtuti. Ergo tristitia repugnat virtuti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Tully calls sorrow a disease of the mind (De Tusc. Quaest. iv). But disease of the mind is incompatible with virtue, + which is a good condition of the mind. Therefore sorrow is opposed to virtue and is incompatible with it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35994" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35994] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +tristitia est quaedam animi aegritudo; ut Tullius eam vocat, in III +de Tuscul. quaest. Sed aegritudo animae contrariatur virtuti, quae +est bona animae habitudo. Ergo tristitia contrariatur virtuti, nec +potest simul esse cum ea.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Christ was perfect in virtue. But there was sorrow in Him, for He said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q59_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.26.38" target="asv">Mat. 26:38</a>): "My soul is sorrowful even unto death." Therefore sorrow is compatible with virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35995" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35995] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Christus fuit perfectus virtute. Sed in eo fuit tristitia, +dicit enim, ut habetur Matth. XXVI, <i>tristis est anima mea usque +ad mortem</i>. Ergo tristitia potest esse cum virtute.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q59_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8), the Stoics held that in the mind of the wise man there are three {eupatheiai}, i.e. + "three good passions," in place of the three disturbances: viz. instead of covetousness, "desire"; instead of mirth, "joy"; + instead of fear, "caution." But they denied that anything corresponding to sorrow could be in the mind of a wise man, for + two reasons. + </p><p id="FS_Q59_A3-p7"> First, because sorrow is for an evil that is already present. Now they held that no evil can happen to a wise man: for they + thought that, just as man's only good is virtue, and bodily goods are no good to man; so man's only evil is vice, which cannot + be in a virtuous man. But this is unreasonable. For, since man is composed of soul and body, whatever conduces to preserve + the life of the body, is some good to man; yet not his supreme good, because he can abuse it. Consequently + the evil which is contrary to this good can be in a wise man, and can cause him moderate sorrow. Again, although a virtuous + man can be without grave sin, yet no man is to be found to live without committing slight sins, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q59_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.1.8" target="asv">1 Jn. 1:8</a>: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." A third reason is because a virtuous man, though not actually in + a state of sin, may have been so in the past. And he is to be commended if he sorrow for that sin, according to + + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q59_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.7.10" target="asv">2 Cor. 7:10</a>: "The sorrow that is according to God worketh penance steadfast unto salvation." Fourthly, because he may praiseworthily + sorrow for another's sin. Therefore sorrow is compatible with moral virtue in the same way as the other passions are when + moderated by reason. + </p><p id="FS_Q59_A3-p8"> Their second reason for holding this opinion was that sorrow is about evil present, whereas fear is for evil to come: even + as pleasure is about a present good, while desire is for a future good. Now the enjoyment of a good possessed, or the desire + to have good that one possesses not, may be consistent with virtue: but depression of the mind resulting from sorrow for a + present evil, is altogether contrary to reason: wherefore it is incompatible with virtue. But this is + unreasonable. For there is an evil which can be present to the virtuous man, as we have just stated; which evil is rejected + by reason. Wherefore the sensitive appetite follows reason's rejection by sorrowing for that evil; yet moderately, according + as reason dictates. Now it pertains to virtue that the sensitive appetite be conformed to reason, as stated above (A[1], ad + 2). Wherefore moderated sorrow for an object which ought to make us sorrowful, is a mark of virtue; as also the Philosopher + says (Ethic. ii, 6,7). Moreover, this proves useful for avoiding evil: since, just as good is more readily sought for the + sake of pleasure, so is evil more undauntedly shunned on account of sorrow. + </p><p id="FS_Q59_A3-p9"> Accordingly we must allow that sorrow for things pertaining to virtue is incompatible with virtue: since virtue rejoices + in its own. On the other hand, virtue sorrows moderately for all that thwarts virtue, no matter how. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 3 co."><a name="35996" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35996] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod sicut dicit Augustinus, XIV de Civ. Dei, <i>Stoici +voluerunt, pro tribus perturbationibus, in animo sapientis esse +tres eupathias, idest tres bonas passiones, pro cupiditate scilicet +voluntatem; pro laetitia, gaudium; pro metu, cautionem</i>. Pro +tristitia vero, negaverunt posse aliquid esse in animo sapientis, +duplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia tristitia est de malo quod iam +accidit. Nullum autem malum aestimant posse accidere sapienti, +crediderunt enim quod, sicut solum hominis bonum est virtus, bona +autem corporalia nulla bona hominis sunt; ita solum inhonestum est +hominis malum, quod in virtuoso esse non potest. Sed hoc +irrationabiliter dicitur. Cum enim homo sit ex anima et corpore +compositus, id quod confert ad vitam corporis conservandam, aliquod +bonum hominis est, non tamen maximum, quia eo potest homo male uti. +Unde et malum huic bono contrarium in sapiente esse potest, et +tristitiam moderatam inducere. Praeterea, etsi virtuosus sine gravi +peccato esse possit, nullus tamen invenitur qui absque levibus +peccatis vitam ducat, secundum illud I Ioan. I, <i>si dixerimus +quia peccatum non habemus, nos ipsos seducimus</i>. Tertio, quia +virtuosus, etsi peccatum non habeat, forte quandoque habuit. Et de +hoc laudabiliter dolet; secundum illud II ad Cor. VII, <i>quae +secundum Deum est tristitia, poenitentiam in salutem stabilem +operatur</i>. Quarto, quia potest etiam dolere laudabiliter de +peccato alterius. Unde eo modo quo virtus moralis compatitur alias +passiones ratione moderatas, compatitur etiam tristitiam. Secundo, +movebantur ex hoc, quod tristitia est de praesenti malo, timor +autem de malo futuro, sicut delectatio de bono praesenti, +desiderium vero de bono futuro. Potest autem hoc ad virtutem +pertinere, quod aliquis bono habito fruatur, vel non habitum habere +desideret, vel quod etiam malum futurum caveat. Sed quod malo +praesenti animus hominis substernatur, quod fit per tristitiam, +omnino videtur contrarium rationi, unde cum virtute esse non +potest. Sed hoc irrationabiliter dicitur. Est enim aliquod malum +quod potest esse virtuoso praesens, ut dictum est. Quod quidem +malum ratio detestatur. Unde appetitus sensitivus in hoc sequitur +detestationem rationis, quod de huiusmodi malo tristatur, moderate +tamen, secundum rationis iudicium. Hoc autem pertinet ad virtutem, +ut appetitus sensitivus rationi conformetur, ut dictum est. Unde ad +virtutem pertinet quod tristetur moderate in quibus tristandum est, +sicut etiam philosophus dicit in II Ethic. Et hoc etiam utile est +ad fugiendum mala. Sicut enim bona propter delectationem promptius +quaeruntur, ita mala propter tristitiam fortius fugiuntur. Sic +igitur dicendum est quod tristitia de his quae conveniunt virtuti, +non potest simul esse cum virtute, quia virtus in propriis +delectatur. Sed de his quae quocumque modo repugnant virtuti, +virtus moderate tristatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passage quoted proves that the wise man is not made sorrowful by wisdom. Yet he sorrows for anything that hinders wisdom. + Consequently there is no room for sorrow in the blessed, in whom there can be no hindrance to wisdom. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35997" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35997] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ex illa auctoritate habetur quod de sapientia +sapiens non tristetur. Tristatur tamen de his quae sunt impeditiva +sapientiae. Et ideo in beatis, in quibus nullum impedimentum +sapientiae esse potest, tristitia locum non habet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sorrow hinders the work that makes us sorrowful: but it helps us to do more readily whatever banishes sorrow. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35998" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35998] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod tristitia impedit operationem de qua tristamur, sed +adiuvat ad ea promptius exequenda per quae tristitia fugitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Immoderate sorrow is a disease of the mind: but moderate sorrow is the mark of a well-conditioned mind, according to the + present state of life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35999" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35999] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod tristitia immoderata est animae aegritudo, tristitia +autem moderata ad bonam habitudinem animae pertinet, secundum +statum praesentis vitae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q59_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q59_A4-p0.1">Q. 59. A. 4. Whether all the moral virtues are about the passions?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the moral virtues are about the passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "moral virtue + is about objects of pleasure and sorrow." But pleasure and sorrow are passions, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q59_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a>; + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q59_A4-p2.2" shape="rect"> Q[31], A[1]</a>; + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q35_A1" id="FS_Q59_A4-p2.3" shape="rect"> Q[35], AA[1]</a>, 2). Therefore all the moral virtues are about the passions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36000" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36000] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis virtus moralis sit circa +passiones. Dicit enim philosophus, in II Ethic., quod <i>circa +voluptates et tristitias est moralis virtus</i>. Sed delectatio et +tristitia sunt passiones, ut supra dictum est. Ergo omnis virtus +moralis est circa passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the subject of the moral virtues is a faculty which is rational by participation, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. + i, 13). But the passions are in this part of the soul, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q22_A3" id="FS_Q59_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[3]</a>). Therefore every moral virtue is about the passions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36001" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36001] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +rationale per participationem est subiectum moralium virtutum, ut +dicitur in I Ethic. Sed huiusmodi pars animae est in qua sunt +passiones, ut supra dictum est. Ergo omnis virtus moralis est circa +passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some passion is to be found in every moral virtue: and so either all are about the passions, or none are. But some + are about the passions, as fortitude and temperance, as stated in Ethic. iii, 6,10. Therefore all the moral virtues are about + the passions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36002" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36002] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +in omni virtute morali est invenire aliquam passionem. Aut ergo +omnes sunt circa passiones, aut nulla. Sed aliquae sunt circa +passiones, ut fortitudo et temperantia, ut dicitur in III Ethic. +Ergo omnes virtutes morales sunt circa passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Justice, which is a moral virtue, is not about the passions; as stated in Ethic. v, 1, seqq. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36003" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36003] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod iustitia, quae est virtus moralis, non est circa +passiones, ut dicitur in V Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Moral virtue perfects the appetitive part of the soul by directing it to good as defined by reason. Now good as defined by + reason is that which is moderated or directed by reason. Consequently there are moral virtues about all matters that are subject + to reason's direction and moderation. Now reason directs, not only the passions of the sensitive appetite, but also the operations + of the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, which is not the subject of a + passion, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q22_A3" id="FS_Q59_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[3]</a>). Therefore not all the moral virtues are about passions, but some are about passions, some about operations. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 4 co."><a name="36004" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36004] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod virtus moralis perficit appetitivam partem animae +ordinando ipsam in bonum rationis. Est autem rationis bonum id quod +est secundum rationem moderatum seu ordinatum. Unde circa omne id +quod contingit ratione ordinari et moderari, contingit esse +virtutem moralem. Ratio autem ordinat non solum passiones appetitus +sensitivi; sed etiam ordinat operationes appetitus intellectivi, +qui est voluntas, quae non est subiectum passionis, ut supra dictum +est. Et ideo non omnis virtus moralis est circa passiones; sed +quaedam circa passiones, quaedam circa operationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The moral virtues are not all about pleasures and sorrows, as being their proper matter; but as being something resulting + from their proper acts. For every virtuous man rejoices in acts of virtue, and sorrows for the contrary. Hence the Philosopher, + after the words quoted, adds, "if virtues are about actions and passions; now every action and passion is followed by pleasure + or sorrow, so that in this way virtue is about pleasures and sorrows," viz. as + about something that results from virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36005" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36005] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod non omnis virtus moralis est circa delectationes +et tristitias sicut circa propriam materiam, sed sicut circa +aliquid consequens proprium actum. Omnis enim virtuosus delectatur +in actu virtutis, et tristatur in contrario. Unde philosophus post +praemissa verba subdit quod, <i>si virtutes sunt circa actus et +passiones; omni autem passioni et omni actui sequitur delectatio et +tristitia; propter hoc virtus erit circa delectationes et +tristitias</i>, scilicet sicut circa aliquid consequens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not only the sensitive appetite which is the subject of the passions, is rational by participation, but also the will, where + there are no passions, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36006" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36006] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod rationale per participationem non solum est appetitus +sensitivus, qui est subiectum passionum; sed etiam voluntas, in qua +non sunt passiones, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some virtues have passions as their proper matter, but some virtues not. Hence the comparison does not hold for all cases. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36007" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36007] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in quibusdam virtutibus sunt passiones sicut propria +materia, in quibusdam autem non. Unde non est eadem ratio de +omnibus, ut infra ostendetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q59_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q59_A5-p0.1">Q. 59. A. 5. Whether there can be moral virtue without passion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtue can be without passion. For the more perfect moral virtue is, the more does it overcome the + passions. Therefore at its highest point of perfection it is altogether without passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36008" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36008] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus moralis possit esse absque +passione. Quanto enim virtus moralis est perfectior, tanto magis +superat passiones. Ergo in suo perfectissimo esse, est omnino +absque passionibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, then is a thing perfect, when it is removed from its contrary and from whatever inclines to its contrary. Now the + passions incline us to sin which is contrary to virtue: hence ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q59_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.5" target="asv">Rom. 7:5</a>) they are called "passions of sins." Therefore perfect virtue is altogether without passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36009" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36009] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +tunc unumquodque est perfectum, quando est remotum a suo contrario, +et ab his quae ad contrarium inclinant. Sed passiones inclinant ad +peccatum, quod virtuti contrariatur, unde Rom. VII, nominantur +passiones peccatorum. Ergo perfecta virtus est omnino absque +passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is by virtue that we are conformed to God, as Augustine declares (De Moribus Eccl. vi, xi, xiii). But God does + all things without passion at all. Therefore the most perfect virtue is without any passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36010" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36010] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +secundum virtutem Deo conformamur; ut patet per Augustinum, in +libro de moribus Eccles. Sed Deus omnia operatur sine passione. +Ergo virtus perfectissima est absque omni passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> "No man is just who rejoices not in his deeds," as stated in Ethic. i, 8. But joy is a passion. Therefore justice cannot + be without passion; and still less can the other virtues be. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36011" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36011] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod nullus iustus est qui non gaudet iusta operatione, ut +dicitur in I Ethic. Sed gaudium est passio. Ergo iustitia non +potest esse sine passione. Et multo minus aliae virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q59_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> If we take the passions as being inordinate emotions, as the Stoics did, it is evident that in this sense perfect virtue + is without the passions. But if by passions we understand any movement of the sensitive appetite, it is plain that moral virtues, + which are about the passions as about their proper matter, cannot be without passions. The reason for this is that otherwise + it would follow that moral virtue makes the sensitive appetite altogether idle: + whereas it is not the function of virtue to deprive the powers subordinate to reason of their proper activities, but to make + them execute the commands of reason, by exercising their proper acts. Wherefore just as virtue directs the bodily limbs to + their due external acts, so does it direct the sensitive appetite to its proper regulated movements. + </p><p id="FS_Q59_A5-p7"> Those moral virtues, however, which are not about the passions, but about operations, can be without passions. Such a virtue + is justice: because it applies the will to its proper act, which is not a passion. Nevertheless, joy results from the act + of justice; at least in the will, in which case it is not a passion. And if this joy be increased through the perfection of + justice, it will overflow into the sensitive appetite; in so far as the lower powers follow the movement of the + higher, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q17_A7" id="FS_Q59_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[17], A[7]</a>; + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q24_A3" id="FS_Q59_A5-p7.2" shape="rect"> Q[24], A[3]</a>). Wherefore by reason of this kind of overflow, the more perfect a virtue is, the more does it cause passion. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 5 co."><a name="36012" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36012] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, si passiones dicamus inordinatas affectiones, sicut +Stoici posuerunt; sic manifestum est quod virtus perfecta est sine +passionibus. Si vero passiones dicamus omnes motus appetitus +sensitivi, sic planum est quod virtutes morales quae sunt circa +passiones sicut circa propriam materiam, sine passionibus esse non +possunt. Cuius ratio est, quia secundum hoc, sequeretur quod virtus +moralis faceret appetitum sensitivum omnino otiosum. Non autem ad +virtutem pertinet quod ea quae sunt subiecta rationi, a propriis +actibus vacent, sed quod exequantur imperium rationis, proprios +actus agendo. Unde sicut virtus membra corporis ordinat ad actus +exteriores debitos, ita appetitum sensitivum ad motus proprios +ordinatos. Virtutes vero morales quae non sunt circa passiones, sed +circa operationes, possunt esse sine passionibus (et huiusmodi +virtus est iustitia), quia per eas applicatur voluntas ad proprium +actum, qui non est passio. Sed tamen ad actum iustitiae sequitur +gaudium, ad minus in voluntate, quod non est passio. Et si hoc +gaudium multiplicetur per iustitiae perfectionem, fiet gaudii +redundantia usque ad appetitum sensitivum; secundum quod vires +inferiores sequuntur motum superiorum, ut supra dictum est. Et sic +per redundantiam huiusmodi, quanto virtus fuerit perfectior, tanto +magis passionem causat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue overcomes inordinate passion; it produces ordinate passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36013" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36013] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod virtus passiones inordinatas superat, moderatas +autem producit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is inordinate, not ordinate, passion that leads to sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36014" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36014] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod passiones inordinatae inducunt ad peccandum, non +autem si sunt moderatae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The good of anything depends on the condition of its nature. Now there is no sensitive appetite in God and the angels, as + there is in man. Consequently good operation in God and the angels is altogether without passion, as it is without a body: + whereas the good operation of man is with passion, even as it is produced with the body's help. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36015" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36015] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod bonum in unoquoque consideratur secundum conditionem +suae naturae. In Deo autem et Angelis non est appetitus sensitivus, +sicut est in homine. Et ideo bona operatio Dei et Angeli est omnino +sine passione, sicut et sine corpore, bona autem operatio hominis +est cum passione, sicut et cum corporis ministerio.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q60" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q60-p0.1">Q. 60. HOW THE MORAL VIRTUES DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q60-p2"> We must now consider how the moral virtues differ from one another: under which head there are five points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q60-p3"><a href="#FS_Q60_A1"> (1) Whether there is only one moral virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q60-p4"><a href="#FS_Q60_A2"> (2) Whether those moral virtues which are about operations, are distinct from those which are about passions?</a></p><p id="FS_Q60-p5"><a href="#FS_Q60_A3"> (3) Whether there is but one moral virtue about operations?</a></p><p id="FS_Q60-p6"><a href="#FS_Q60_A4"> (4) Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions?</a></p><p id="FS_Q60-p7"><a href="#FS_Q60_A5"> (5) Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the passions?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 pr."><a name="36016" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36016] +Iª-IIae q. 60 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +distinctione virtutum moralium ad invicem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur +quinque. Primo, utrum sit tantum una virtus moralis. Secundo, utrum +distinguantur virtutes morales quae sunt circa operationes, ab his +quae sunt circa passiones. Tertio, utrum circa operationes sit una +tantum moralis virtus. Quarto, utrum circa diversas passiones sint +diversae morales virtutes. Quinto, utrum virtutes morales +distinguantur secundum diversa obiecta passionum.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q60_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q60_A1-p0.1">Q. 60. A. 1. Whether there is only one moral virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is only one moral virtue. Because just as the direction of moral actions belongs to reason which + is the subject of the intellectual virtues; so does their inclination belong to the appetite which is the subject of moral + virtues. But there is only one intellectual virtue to direct all moral acts, viz. prudence. Therefore there is also but one + moral virtue to give all moral acts their respective inclinations. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36017" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36017] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod sit una tantum moralis virtus. Sicut +enim in actibus moralibus directio pertinet ad rationem, quae est +subiectum intellectualium virtutum; ita inclinatio pertinet ad vim +appetitivam, quae est subiectum moralium virtutum. Sed una est +intellectualis virtus dirigens in omnibus moralibus actibus, +scilicet prudentia. Ergo etiam una tantum est moralis virtus +inclinans in omnibus moralibus actibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habits differ, not in respect of their material objects, but according to the formal aspect of their objects. Now + the formal aspect of the good to which moral virtue is directed, is one thing, viz. the mean defined by reason. Therefore, + seemingly, there is but one moral virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36018" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36018] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +habitus non distinguuntur secundum materialia obiecta, sed secundum +formales rationes obiectorum. Formalis autem ratio boni ad quod +ordinatur virtus moralis, est unum, scilicet modus rationis. Ergo +videtur quod sit una tantum moralis virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things pertaining to morals are specified by their end, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A3" id="FS_Q60_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[3]</a>). Now there is but one common end of all moral virtues, viz. happiness, while the proper and proximate ends are infinite + in number. But the moral virtues themselves are not infinite in number. Therefore it seems that there is but one. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36019" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36019] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +moralia recipiunt speciem a fine, ut supra dictum est. Sed finis +omnium virtutum moralium communis est unus, scilicet felicitas; +proprii autem et propinqui sunt infiniti. Non sunt autem infinitae +virtutes morales. Ergo videtur quod sit una tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> One habit cannot be in several powers, as stated above (Q[56], A[2]). But the subject of the moral virtues is the appetitive + part of the soul, which is divided into several powers, as stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q80_A2" id="FS_Q60_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[80], A[2]</a>; + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q81_A2" id="FS_Q60_A1-p5.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[81], A[2]</a>. Therefore there cannot be only one moral virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36020" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36020] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod unus habitus non potest esse in diversis potentiis, ut +supra dictum est. Sed subiectum virtutum moralium est pars +appetitiva animae, quae per diversas potentias distinguitur, ut in +primo dictum est. Ergo non potest esse una tantum virtus +moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q60_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q58_A1" id="FS_Q60_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[58], AA[1]</a>,2,3), the moral virtues are habits of the appetitive faculty. Now habits differ specifically according to the specific differences + of their objects, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q54_A2" id="FS_Q60_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[54], A[2]</a>). Again, the species of the object of appetite, as of any thing, depends on its specific form which it receives from the + agent. But we must observe that the matter of the passive subject bears a twofold + relation to the agent. For sometimes it receives the form of the agent, in the same kind specifically as the agent has that + form, as happens with all univocal agents, so that if the agent be one specifically, the matter must of necessity receive + a form specifically one: thus the univocal effect of fire is of necessity something in the species of fire. Sometimes, however, + the matter receives the form from the agent, but not in the same kind specifically as the agent, as is the case with + non-univocal causes of generation: thus an animal is generated by the sun. In this case the forms received into matter are + not of one species, but vary according to the adaptability of the matter to receive the influx of the agent: for instance, + we see that owing to the one action of the sun, animals of various species are produced by putrefaction according to the various + adaptability of matter. + </p><p id="FS_Q60_A1-p7"> Now it is evident that in moral matters the reason holds the place of commander and mover, while the appetitive power is + commanded and moved. But the appetite does not receive the direction of reason univocally so to say; because it is rational, + not essentially, but by participation (Ethic. i, 13). Consequently objects made appetible by the direction of reason belong + to various species, according to their various relations to reason: so that it follows that moral virtues are of + various species and are not one only. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 1 co."><a name="36021" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36021] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtutes morales sunt +habitus quidam appetitivae partis. Habitus autem specie differunt +secundum speciales differentias obiectorum, ut supra dictum est. +Species autem obiecti appetibilis, sicut et cuiuslibet rei, +attenditur secundum formam specificam, quae est ab agente. Est +autem considerandum quod materia patientis se habet ad agens +dupliciter. Quandoque enim recipit formam agentis secundum eandem +rationem, prout est in agente, sicut est in omnibus agentibus +univocis. Et sic necesse est quod, si agens est unum specie, quod +materia recipiat formam unius speciei, sicut ab igne non generatur +univoce nisi aliquid existens in specie ignis. Aliquando vero +materia recipit formam ab agente non secundum eandem rationem, +prout est in agente, sicut patet in generantibus non univocis, ut +animal generatur a sole. Et tunc formae receptae in materia ab +eodem agente, non sunt unius speciei sed diversificantur secundum +diversam proportionem materiae ad recipiendum influxum agentis, +sicut videmus quod ab una actione solis generantur per +putrefactionem animalia diversarum specierum secundum diversam +proportionem materiae. Manifestum est autem quod in moralibus ratio +est sicut imperans et movens; vis autem appetitiva est sicut +imperata et mota. Non autem appetitus recipit impressionem rationis +quasi univoce, quia non fit rationale per essentiam, sed per +participationem, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Unde appetibilia secundum +motionem rationis constituuntur in diversis speciebus, secundum +quod diversimode se habent ad rationem. Et ita sequitur quod +virtutes morales sint diversae secundum speciem, et non una +tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The object of the reason is truth. Now in all moral matters, which are contingent matters of action, there is but one kind + of truth. Consequently, there is but one virtue to direct all such matters, viz. prudence. On the other hand, the object of + the appetitive power is the appetible good, which varies in kind according to its various relations to reason, the directing + power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36022" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36022] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod obiectum rationis est verum. Est autem eadem +ratio veri in omnibus moralibus, quae sunt contingentia agibilia. +Unde est una sola virtus in eis dirigens, scilicet prudentia. +Obiectum autem appetitivae virtutis est bonum appetibile. Cuius est +diversa ratio, secundum diversam habitudinem ad rationem +dirigentem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This formal element is one generically, on account of the unity of the agent: but it varies in species, on account of the + various relations of the receiving matter, as explained above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36023" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36023] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod illud formale est unum genere, propter unitatem +agentis. Sed diversificatur specie, propter diversas habitudines +recipientium, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Moral matters do not receive their species from the last end, but from their proximate ends: and these, although they be + infinite in number, are not infinite in species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36024" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36024] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod moralia non habent speciem a fine ultimo sed a +finibus proximis, qui quidem, etsi infiniti sint numero, non tamen +infiniti sunt specie.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q60_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q60_A2-p0.1">Q. 60. A. 2. Whether moral virtues about operations are different from those that are about passions?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtues are not divided into those which are about operations and those which are about passions. + For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that moral virtue is "an operative habit whereby we do what is best in matters of + pleasure or sorrow." Now pleasure and sorrow are passions, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q60_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[31], A[1]</a>; + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q35_A1" id="FS_Q60_A2-p2.2" shape="rect"> Q[35], A[1]</a>). Therefore the same virtue which is about passions is also about + operations, since it is an operative habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36025" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36025] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales non distinguantur ab +invicem per hoc quod quaedam sunt circa operationes, quaedam circa +passiones. Dicit enim philosophus, in II Ethic., quod virtus +moralis est circa delectationes et tristitias optimorum operativa. +Sed voluptates et tristitiae sunt passiones quaedam, ut supra +dictum est. Ergo eadem virtus quae est circa passiones, est etiam +circa operationes, utpote operativa existens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the passions are principles of external action. If therefore some virtues regulate the passions, they must, as a + consequence, regulate operations also. Therefore the same moral virtues are about both passions and operations. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36026" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36026] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +passiones sunt principia exteriorum operationum. Si ergo aliquae +virtutes rectificant passiones, oportet quod etiam per consequens +rectificent operationes. Eaedem ergo virtutes morales sunt circa +passiones et operationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the sensitive appetite is moved well or ill towards every external operation. Now movements of the sensitive appetite + are passions. Therefore the same virtues that are about operations are also about passions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36027" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36027] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +ad omnem operationem exteriorem movetur appetitus sensitivus bene +vel male. Sed motus appetitus sensitivi sunt passiones. Ergo eaedem +virtutes quae sunt circa operationes, sunt circa passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher reckons justice to be about operations; and temperance, fortitude and gentleness, about passions (Ethic. + ii, 3,7; v, 1, seqq.). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36028" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36028] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus ponit iustitiam circa operationes; +temperantiam autem et fortitudinem et mansuetudinem, circa +passiones quasdam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q60_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Operation and passion stand in a twofold relation to virtue. First, as its effects; and in this way every moral virtue has + some good operations as its product; and a certain pleasure or sorrow which are passions, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q59_A4" id="FS_Q60_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[59], A[4]</a>, ad 1). + </p><p id="FS_Q60_A2-p7"> Secondly, operation may be compared to moral virtue as the matter about which virtue is concerned: and in this sense those + moral virtues which are about operations must needs differ from those which are about passions. The reason for this is that + good and evil, in certain operations, are taken from the very nature of those operations, no matter how man may be affected + towards them: viz. in so far as good and evil in them depend on their being commensurate with someone else. In + operations of this kind there needs to be some power to regulate the operations in themselves: such are buying and selling, + and all such operations in which there is an element of something due or undue to another. For this reason justice and its + parts are properly about operations as their proper matter. On the other hand, in some operations, good and evil depend only + on commensuration with the agent. Consequently good and evil in these operations depend on the way in which man is affected + to + them. And for this reason in such like operations virtue must needs be chiefly about internal emotions which are called the + passions of the soul, as is evidently the case with temperance, fortitude and the like. + </p><p id="FS_Q60_A2-p8"> It happens, however, in operations which are directed to another, that the good of virtue is overlooked by reason of some + inordinate passion of the soul. In such cases justice is destroyed in so far as the due measure of the external act is destroyed: + while some other virtue is destroyed in so far as the internal passions exceed their due measure. Thus when through anger, + one man strikes another, justice is destroyed in the undue blow; while gentleness is destroyed by the + immoderate anger. The same may be clearly applied to other virtues. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 2 co."><a name="36029" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36029] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod operatio et passio dupliciter potest comparari ad +virtutem. Uno modo, sicut effectus. Et hoc modo, omnis moralis +virtus habet aliquas operationes bonas, quarum est productiva; et +delectationem aliquam vel tristitiam, quae sunt passiones, ut supra +dictum est. Alio modo potest comparari operatio ad virtutem +moralem, sicut materia circa quam est. Et secundum hoc, oportet +alias esse virtutes morales circa operationes, et alias circa +passiones. Cuius ratio est, quia bonum et malum in quibusdam +operationibus attenditur secundum seipsas, qualitercumque homo +afficiatur ad eas, inquantum scilicet bonum in eis et malum +accipitur secundum rationem commensurationis ad alterum. Et in +talibus oportet quod sit aliqua virtus directiva operationum +secundum seipsas, sicut sunt emptio et venditio, et omnes huiusmodi +operationes in quibus attenditur ratio debiti vel indebiti ad +alterum. Et propter hoc, iustitia et partes eius proprie sunt circa +operationes sicut circa propriam materiam. In quibusdam vero +operationibus bonum et malum attenditur solum secundum +commensurationem ad operantem. Et ideo oportet in his bonum et +malum considerari, secundum quod homo bene vel male afficitur circa +huiusmodi. Et propter hoc, oportet quod virtutes in talibus sint +principaliter circa interiores affectiones, quae dicuntur animae +passiones, sicut patet de temperantia, fortitudine et aliis +huiusmodi. Contingit autem quod in operationibus quae sunt ad +alterum, praetermittatur bonum virtutis propter inordinatam animi +passionem. Et tunc, inquantum corrumpitur commensuratio exterioris +operationis, est corruptio iustitiae, inquantum autem corrumpitur +commensuratio interiorum passionum, est corruptio alicuius alterius +virtutis. Sicut cum propter iram aliquis alium percutit, in ipsa +percussione indebita corrumpitur iustitia, in immoderantia vero +irae corrumpitur mansuetudo. Et idem patet in aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A2-p9"><b>Reply to Objections:</b> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first considers operations as the effect of virtue, while the other + two consider operation and passion as concurring in the same effect. But in some cases virtue is chiefly about operations, + in others, about passions, for the reason given above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36030" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36030] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc +patet responsio ad obiecta. Nam prima ratio procedit de operatione, +secundum quod est effectus virtutis. Aliae vero duae rationes +procedunt ex hoc, quod ad idem concurrunt operatio et passio. Sed +in quibusdam virtus est principaliter circa operationem, in +quibusdam circa passionem, ratione praedicta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q60_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q60_A3-p0.1">Q. 60. A. 3. Whether there is only one moral virtue about operations?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is but one moral virtue about operations. Because the rectitude of all external operations seems + to belong to justice. Now justice is but one virtue. Therefore there is but one virtue about operations. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36031" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36031] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod sit una tantum virtus moralis circa +operationes. Rectitudo enim omnium operationum exteriorum videtur +ad iustitiam pertinere. Sed iustitia est una virtus. Ergo una sola +virtus est circa operationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those operations seem to differ most, which are directed on the one side to the good of the individual, and on the + other to the good of the many. But this diversity does not cause diversity among the moral virtues: for the Philosopher says + (Ethic. v, 1) that legal justice, which directs human acts to the common good, does not differ, save logically, from the virtue + which directs a man's actions to one man only. Therefore diversity of operations does + not cause a diversity of moral virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36032" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36032] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +operationes maxime differentes esse videntur quae ordinantur ad +bonum unius, et quae ordinantur ad bonum multitudinis. Sed ista +diversitas non diversificat virtutes morales, dicit enim +philosophus, in V Ethic., quod iustitia legalis, quae ordinat actus +hominum ad commune bonum, non est aliud a virtute quae ordinat +actus hominis ad unum tantum, nisi secundum rationem. Ergo +diversitas operationum non causat diversitatem virtutum +moralium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if there are various moral virtues about various operations, diversity of moral virtues would needs follow diversity + of operations. But this is clearly untrue: for it is the function of justice to establish rectitude in various kinds of commutations, + and again in distributions, as is set down in Ethic. v, 2. Therefore there are not different virtues about different operations. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36033" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36033] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +si sunt diversae virtutes morales circa diversas operationes, +oporteret quod secundum diversitatem operationum, esset diversitas +virtutum moralium. Sed hoc patet esse falsum, nam ad iustitiam +pertinet in diversis generibus commutationum rectitudinem statuere, +et etiam in distributionibus, ut patet in V Ethic. Non ergo +diversae virtutes sunt diversarum operationum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Religion is a moral virtue distinct from piety, both of which are about operations. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36034" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36034] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod religio est alia virtus a pietate, quarum tamen utraque +est circa operationes quasdam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> All the moral virtues that are about operations agree in one general notion of justice, which is in respect of something + due to another: but they differ in respect of various special notions. The reason for this is that in external operations, + the order of reason is established, as we have stated + <a href="#FS_Q60_A2" id="FS_Q60_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, not according as how man is affected towards such operations, but according to the becomingness of the thing itself; from + which + becomingness we derive the notion of something due which is the formal aspect of justice: for, seemingly, it pertains to justice + that a man give another his due. Wherefore all such virtues as are about operations, bear, in some way, the character of justice. + But the thing due is not of the same kind in all these virtues: for something is due to an equal in one way, to a superior, + in another way, to an inferior, in yet another; and the nature of a debt differs according as it arises from a + contract, a promise, or a favor already conferred. And corresponding to these various kinds of debt there are various virtues: + e.g. "Religion" whereby we pay our debt to God; "Piety," whereby we pay our debt to our parents or to our country; "Gratitude," + whereby we pay our debt to our benefactors, and so forth. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 3 co."><a name="36035" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36035] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod omnes virtutes morales quae sunt circa operationes, +conveniunt in quadam generali ratione iustitiae, quae attenditur +secundum debitum ad alterum, distinguuntur autem secundum diversas +speciales rationes. Cuius ratio est quia in operationibus +exterioribus ordo rationis instituitur sicut dictum est, non +secundum proportionem ad affectionem hominis, sed secundum ipsam +convenientiam rei in seipsa; secundum quam convenientiam accipitur +ratio debiti, ex quo constituitur ratio iustitiae, ad iustitiam +enim pertinere videtur ut quis debitum reddat. Unde omnes huiusmodi +virtutes quae sunt circa operationes, habent aliquo modo rationem +iustitiae. Sed debitum non est unius rationis in omnibus, aliter +enim debetur aliquid aequali, aliter superiori, aliter minori; et +aliter ex pacto, vel ex promisso, vel ex beneficio suscepto. Et +secundum has diversas rationes debiti, sumuntur diversae virtutes, +puta religio est per quam redditur debitum Deo; pietas est per quam +redditur debitum parentibus vel patriae; gratia est per quam +redditur debitum benefactoribus; et sic de aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Justice properly so called is one special virtue, whose object is the perfect due, which can be paid in the equivalent. But + the name of justice is extended also to all cases in which something due is rendered: in this sense it is not as a special + virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36036" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36036] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod iustitia proprie dicta est una specialis virtus, +quae attendit perfectam rationem debiti, quod secundum +aequivalentiam potest restitui. Dicitur tamen et ampliato nomine +iustitia, secundum quamcumque debiti redditionem. Et sic non est +una specialis virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That justice which seeks the common good is another virtue from that which is directed to the private good of an individual: + wherefore common right differs from private right; and Tully (De Inv. ii) reckons as a special virtue, piety which directs + man to the good of his country. But that justice which directs man to the common good is a general virtue through its act + of command: since it directs all the acts of the virtues to its own end, viz. the + common good. And the virtues, in so far as they are commanded by that justice, receive the name of justice: so that virtue + does not differ, save logically, from legal justice; just as there is only a logical difference between a virtue that is active + of itself, and a virtue that is active through the command of another virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36037" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36037] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod iustitia quae intendit bonum commune, est alia virtus +a iustitia quae ordinatur ad bonum privatum alicuius, unde et ius +commune distinguitur a iure privato; et Tullius ponit unam +specialem virtutem, pietatem, quae ordinat ad bonum patriae. Sed +iustitia ordinans hominem ad bonum commune, est generalis per +imperium, quia omnes actus virtutum ordinat ad finem suum, scilicet +ad bonum commune. Virtus autem secundum quod a tali iustitia +imperatur, etiam iustitiae nomen accipit. Et sic virtus a iustitia +legali non differt nisi ratione, sicut sola ratione differt virtus +operans secundum seipsam, et virtus operans ad imperium +alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is the same kind of due in all the operations belonging to special justice. Consequently, there is the same virtue + of justice, especially in regard to commutations. For it may be that distributive justice is of another species from commutative + justice; but about this we shall inquire later on ( + <a href="SS_ii.html#SS_Q61_A1" id="FS_Q60_A3-p9.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[61], A[1]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36038" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36038] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in omnibus operationibus ad iustitiam specialem +pertinentibus, est eadem ratio debiti. Et ideo est eadem virtus +iustitiae, praecipue quantum ad commutationes. Forte enim +distributiva est alterius speciei a commutativa, sed de hoc infra +quaeretur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q60_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q60_A4-p0.1">Q. 60. A. 4. Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are not different moral virtues about different passions. For there is but one habit about things + that concur in their source and end: as is evident especially in the case of sciences. But the passions all concur in one + source, viz. love; and they all terminate in the same end, viz. joy or sorrow, as we stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q25_A1" id="FS_Q60_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[25], AA[1]</a>,2,4; + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q27_A4" id="FS_Q60_A4-p2.2" shape="rect"> Q[27], A[4]</a>). Therefore there is but one moral + virtue about all the passions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36039" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36039] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod circa diversas passiones non sint +diversae virtutes morales. Eorum enim quae conveniunt in principio +et fine, unus est habitus, sicut patet maxime in scientiis. Sed +omnium passionum unum est principium, scilicet amor; et omnes ad +eundem finem terminantur, scilicet ad delectationem vel tristitiam; +ut supra habitum est. Ergo circa omnes passiones est una tantum +moralis virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if there were different moral virtues about different passions, it would follow that there are as many moral virtues + as passions. But this clearly is not the case: since there is one moral virtue about contrary passions; namely, fortitude, + about fear and daring; temperance, about pleasure and sorrow. Therefore there is no need for different moral virtues about + different passions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36040" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36040] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +si circa diversas passiones essent diversae virtutes morales, +sequeretur quod tot essent virtutes morales quot passiones. Sed hoc +patet esse falsum, quia circa oppositas passiones est una et eadem +virtus moralis, sicut fortitudo circa timores et audacias, +temperantia circa delectationes et tristitias. Non ergo oportet +quod circa diversas passiones sint diversae virtutes morales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, love, desire, and pleasure are passions of different species, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q60_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a>). Now there is but one virtue about all these three, viz. temperance. Therefore there are not different moral virtues about + different passions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36041" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36041] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +amor, concupiscentia et delectatio sunt passiones specie +differentes, ut supra habitum est. Sed circa omnes has est una +virtus, scilicet temperantia. Ergo virtutes morales non sunt +diversae circa diversas passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Fortitude is about fear and daring; temperance about desire; meekness about anger; as stated in Ethic. iii, 6,10; iv, 5. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36042" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36042] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod fortitudo est circa timores et audacias; temperantia circa +concupiscentias; mansuetudo circa iras; ut dicitur in III et IV +Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q60_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It cannot be said that there is only one moral virtue about all the passions: since some passions are not in the same power + as other passions; for some belong to the irascible, others to the concupiscible faculty, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q23_A1" id="FS_Q60_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[1]</a>). + </p><p id="FS_Q60_A4-p7"> On the other hand, neither does every diversity of passions necessarily suffice for a diversity of moral virtues. First, + because some passions are in contrary opposition to one another, such as joy and sorrow, fear and daring, and so on. About + such passions as are thus in opposition to one another there must needs be one same virtue. Because, since moral virtue consists + in a kind of mean, the mean in contrary passions stands in the same ratio to both, even as in the natural + order there is but one mean between contraries, e.g. between black and white. Secondly, because there are different passions + contradicting reason in the same manner, e.g. by impelling to that which is contrary to reason, or by withdrawing from that + which is in accord with reason. Wherefore the different passions of the concupiscible faculty do not require different moral + virtues, because their movements follow one another in a certain order, as being directed to the one same thing, viz. the + attainment of some good or the avoidance of some evil: thus from love proceeds desire, and from desire we arrive at pleasure; + and it is the same with the opposite passions, for hatred leads to avoidance or dislike, and this leads to sorrow. On the + other hand, the irascible passions are not all of one order, but are directed to different things: for daring and fear are + about some great danger; hope and despair are about some difficult good; while anger seeks to overcome something contrary + which + has wrought harm. Consequently there are different virtues about such like passions: e.g. temperance, about the concupiscible + passions; fortitude, about fear and daring; magnanimity, about hope and despair; meekness, about anger. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 4 co."><a name="36043" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36043] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod non potest dici quod circa omnes passiones sit una +sola virtus moralis, sunt enim quaedam passiones ad diversas +potentias pertinentes; aliae namque pertinent ad irascibilem, aliae +ad concupiscibilem, ut supra dictum est. Nec tamen oportet quod +omnis diversitas passionum sufficiat ad virtutes morales +diversificandas. Primo quidem, quia quaedam passiones sunt quae +sibi opponuntur secundum contrarietatem, sicut gaudium et +tristitia, timor et audacia, et alia huiusmodi. Et circa huiusmodi +passiones sic oppositas, oportet esse unam et eandem virtutem. Cum +enim virtus moralis in quadam medietate consistat, medium in +contrariis passionibus secundum eandem rationem instituitur, sicut +et in naturalibus idem est medium inter contraria, ut inter album +et nigrum. Secundo, quia diversae passiones inveniuntur secundum +eundem modum rationi repugnantes, puta secundum impulsum ad id quod +est contra rationem; vel secundum retractionem ab eo quod est +secundum rationem. Et ideo diversae passiones concupiscibilis non +pertinent ad diversas virtutes morales, quia earum motus secundum +quendam ordinem se invicem consequuntur, utpote ad idem ordinati, +scilicet ad consequendum bonum, vel ad fugiendum malum; sicut ex +amore procedit concupiscentia, et ex concupiscentia pervenitur ad +delectationem. Et eadem ratio est de oppositis, quia ex odio +sequitur fuga vel abominatio, quae perducit ad tristitiam. Sed +passiones irascibilis non sunt unius ordinis, sed ad diversa +ordinantur, nam audacia et timor ordinantur ad aliquod magnum +periculum; spes et desperatio ad aliquod bonum arduum; ira autem ad +superandum aliquod contrarium quod nocumentum intulit. Et ideo +circa has passiones diversae virtutes ordinantur, utpote +temperantia circa passiones concupiscibilis; fortitudo circa +timores et audacias; magnanimitas circa spem et desperationem; +mansuetudo circa iras.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All the passions concur in one common principle and end; but not in one proper principle or end: and so this does not suffice + for the unity of moral virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36044" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36044] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod omnes passiones conveniunt in uno principio et +fine communi, non autem in uno proprio principio seu fine. Unde hoc +non sufficit ad unitatem virtutis moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as in the natural order the same principle causes movement from one extreme and movement towards the other; and as in + the intellectual order contraries have one common ratio; so too between contrary passions there is but one moral virtue, which, + like a second nature, consents to reason's dictates. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36045" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36045] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut in naturalibus idem est principium quo +receditur ab uno principio, et acceditur ad aliud; et in +rationalibus est eadem ratio contrariorum, ita etiam virtus +moralis, quae in modum naturae rationi consentit, est eadem +contrariarum passionum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those three passions are directed to the same object in a certain order, as stated above: and so they belong to the same + virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36046" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36046] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod illae tres passiones ad idem obiectum ordinantur +secundum quendam ordinem, ut dictum est. Et ideo ad eandem virtutem +moralem pertinent.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q60_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q60_A5-p0.1">Q. 60. A. 5. Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the passions?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the moral virtues do not differ according to the objects of the passions. For just as there are objects + of passions, so are there objects of operations. Now those moral virtues that are about operations, do not differ according + to the objects of those operations: for the buying and selling either of a house or of a horse belong to the one same virtue + of justice. Therefore neither do those moral virtues that are about passions differ + according to the objects of those passions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36047" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36047] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales non distinguantur +secundum obiecta passionum. Sicut enim sunt obiecta passionum, ita +sunt obiecta operationum. Sed virtutes morales quae sunt circa +operationes, non distinguuntur secundum obiecta operationum, ad +eandem enim virtutem iustitiae pertinet emere vel vendere domum, et +equum. Ergo etiam nec virtutes morales quae sunt circa passiones, +diversificantur per obiecta passionum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the passions are acts or movements of the sensitive appetite. Now it needs a greater difference to differentiate + habits than acts. Hence diverse objects which do not diversify the species of passions, do not diversify the species of moral + virtue: so that there is but one moral virtue about all objects of pleasure, and the same applies to the other passions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36048" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36048] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +passiones sunt quidam actus vel motus appetitus sensitivi. Sed +maior diversitas requiritur ad diversitatem habituum, quam ad +diversitatem actuum. Diversa igitur obiecta quae non diversificant +speciem passionis, non diversificabunt speciem virtutis moralis. +Ita scilicet quod de omnibus delectabilibus erit una virtus +moralis, et similiter est de aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, more or less do not change a species. Now various objects of pleasure differ only by reason of being more or less + pleasurable. Therefore all objects of pleasure belong to one species of virtue: and for the same reason so do all fearful + objects, and the same applies to others. Therefore moral virtue is not diversified according to the objects of the passions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36049" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36049] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +magis et minus non diversificant speciem. Sed diversa delectabilia +non differunt nisi secundum magis et minus. Ergo omnia delectabilia +pertinent ad unam speciem virtutis. Et eadem ratione, omnia +terribilia, et similiter de aliis. Non ergo virtus moralis +distinguitur secundum obiecta passionum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, virtue hinders evil, even as it produces good. But there are various virtues about the desires for good things: + thus temperance is about desires for the pleasure of touch, and "eutrapelia" [*{eutrapelia}] about pleasures in games. Therefore + there should be different virtues about fears of evils. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="36050" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36050] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut virtus est operativa boni, ita est impeditiva mali. Sed circa +concupiscentias bonorum sunt diversae virtutes, sicut temperantia +circa concupiscentias delectationum tactus, et eutrapelia circa +delectationes ludi. Ergo etiam circa timores malorum debent esse +diversae virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A5-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Chastity is about sexual pleasures, abstinence about pleasures of the table, and "eutrapelia" about pleasures in games. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36051" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36051] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod castitas est circa delectabilia venereorum; abstinentia +vero est circa delectabilia ciborum; et eutrapelia circa +delectabilia ludorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q60_A5-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The perfection of a virtue depends on the reason; whereas the perfection of a passion depends on the sensitive appetite. + Consequently virtues must needs be differentiated according to their relation to reason, but the passions according to their + relation to the appetite. Hence the objects of the passions, according as they are variously related to the sensitive appetite, + cause the different species of passions: while, according as they are related to reason, + they cause the different species of virtues. Now the movement of reason is not the same as that of the sensitive appetite. + Wherefore nothing hinders a difference of objects from causing diversity of passions, without causing diversity of virtues, + as when one virtue is about several passions, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q60_A4" id="FS_Q60_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>; and again, a difference of objects from causing different virtues, without causing a difference of passions, since several + virtues are directed about one + passion, e.g. pleasure. + </p><p id="FS_Q60_A5-p8"> And because diverse passions belonging to diverse powers, always belong to diverse virtues, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q60_A4" id="FS_Q60_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>; therefore a difference of objects that corresponds to a difference of powers always causes a specific difference of virtues---for + instance the difference between that which is good absolutely speaking, and that which is good and difficult to obtain. Moreover + since the reason rules man's lower powers in a certain order, and even extends to + outward things; hence, one single object of the passions, according as it is apprehended by sense, imagination, or reason, + and again, according as it belongs to the soul, body, or external things, has various relations to reason, and consequently + is of a nature to cause a difference of virtues. Consequently man's good which is the object of love, desire and pleasure, + may be taken as referred either to a bodily sense, or to the inner apprehension of the mind: and this same good may be directed + to man's good in himself, either in his body or in his soul, or to man's good in relation to other men. And every such difference, + being differently related to reason, differentiates virtues. + </p><p id="FS_Q60_A5-p9"> Accordingly, if we take a good, and it be something discerned by the sense of touch, and something pertaining to the upkeep + of human life either in the individual or in the species, such as the pleasures of the table or of sexual intercourse, it + will belong to the virtue of "temperance." As regards the pleasures of the other senses, they are not intense, and so do not + present much difficulty to the reason: hence there is no virtue corresponding to them; for virtue, "like art, is + about difficult things" (Ethic. ii, 3). + </p><p id="FS_Q60_A5-p10"> On the other hand, good discerned not by the senses, but by an inner power, and belonging to man in himself, is like money + and honor; the former, by its very nature, being employable for the good of the body, while the latter is based on the apprehension + of the mind. These goods again may be considered either absolutely, in which way they concern the concupiscible faculty, or + as being difficult to obtain, in which way they belong to the irascible part: which distinction, + however, has no place in pleasurable objects of touch; since such are of base condition, and are becoming to man in so far + as he has something in common with irrational animals. Accordingly in reference to money considered as a good absolutely, + as an object of desire, pleasure, or love, there is "liberality": but if we consider this good as difficult to get, and as + being the object of our hope, there is "magnificence" [*{megaloprepeia}]. With regard to that good which we call honor, taken + absolutely, as the object of love, we have a virtue called "philotimia" [*{philotimia}], i.e. "love of honor": while if we + consider it as hard to attain, and as an object of hope, then we have "magnanimity." Wherefore liberality and "philotimia" + seem to be in the concupiscible part, while magnificence and magnanimity are in the irascible. + </p><p id="FS_Q60_A5-p11"> As regards man's good in relation to other men, it does not seem hard to obtain, but is considered absolutely, as the object + of the concupiscible passions. This good may be pleasurable to a man in his behavior towards another either in some serious + matter, in actions, to wit, that are directed by reason to a due end, or in playful actions, viz. that are done for mere pleasure, + and which do not stand in the same relation to reason as the former. Now one man behaves towards + another in serious matters, in two ways. First, as being pleasant in his regard, by becoming speech and deeds: and this belongs + to a virtue which Aristotle (Ethic. ii, 7) calls "friendship" [*{philia}], and may be rendered "affability." Secondly, one + man behaves towards another by being frank with him, in words and deeds: this belongs to another virtue which (Ethic. iv, + 7) he calls "truthfulness" [*{aletheia}]. For frankness is more akin to the reason than pleasure, and serious matters than + play. Hence there is another virtue about the pleasures of games, which the Philosopher "eutrapelia" [*{eutrapelia}] (Ethic. + iv, 8). + </p><p id="FS_Q60_A5-p12"> It is therefore evident that, according to Aristotle, there are ten moral virtues about the passions, viz. fortitude, temperance, + liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, "philotimia," gentleness, friendship, truthfulness, and "eutrapelia," all of which + differ in respect of their diverse matter, passions, or objects: so that if we add "justice," which is about operations, there + will be eleven in all. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 co."><a name="36052" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36052] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod perfectio virtutis ex ratione dependet, perfectio +autem passionis, ex ipso appetitu sensitivo. Unde oportet quod +virtutes diversificentur secundum ordinem ad rationem, passiones +autem, secundum ordinem ad appetitum. Obiecta igitur passionum, +secundum quod diversimode comparantur ad appetitum sensitivum, +causant diversas passionum species, secundum vero quod comparantur +ad rationem, causant diversas species virtutum. Non est autem idem +motus rationis, et appetitus sensitivi. Unde nihil prohibet aliquam +differentiam obiectorum causare diversitatem passionum, quae non +causat diversitatem virtutum, sicut quando una virtus est circa +multas passiones, ut dictum est, et aliquam etiam differentiam +obiectorum causare diversitatem virtutum, quae non causat +diversitatem passionum, cum circa unam passionem, puta +delectationem, diversae virtutes ordinentur. Et quia diversae +passiones ad diversas potentias pertinentes, semper pertinent ad +diversas virtutes, ut dictum est; ideo diversitas obiectorum quae +respicit diversitatem potentiarum, semper diversificat species +virtutum; puta quod aliquid sit bonum absolute, et aliquid bonum +cum aliqua arduitate. Et quia ordine quodam ratio inferiores +hominis partes regit, et etiam se ad exteriora extendit; ideo etiam +secundum quod unum obiectum passionis apprehenditur sensu vel +imaginatione, aut etiam ratione; et secundum etiam quod pertinet ad +animam, corpus, vel exteriores res; diversam habitudinem habet ad +rationem; et per consequens natum est diversificare virtutes. Bonum +igitur hominis, quod est obiectum amoris, concupiscentiae et +delectationis, potest accipi vel ad sensum corporis pertinens; vel +ad interiorem animae apprehensionem. Et hoc, sive ordinetur ad +bonum hominis in seipso, vel quantum ad corpus vel quantum ad +animam; sive ordinetur ad bonum hominis in ordine ad alios. Et +omnis talis diversitas, propter diversum ordinem ad rationem, +diversificat virtutem. Sic igitur si consideretur aliquod bonum, si +quidem sit per sensum tactus apprehensum, et ad consistentiam +humanae vitae pertinens in individuo vel in specie, sicut sunt +delectabilia ciborum et venereorum; erit pertinens ad virtutem +temperantiae. Delectationes autem aliorum sensuum, cum non sint +vehementes, non praestant aliquam difficultatem rationi, et ideo +circa eas non ponitur aliqua virtus, quae est circa difficile, +sicut et ars, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Bonum autem non sensu, sed +interiori virtute apprehensum, ad ipsum hominem pertinens secundum +seipsum, est sicut pecunia et honor; quorum pecunia ordinabilis est +de se ad bonum corporis; honor autem consistit in apprehensione +animae. Et haec quidem bona considerari possunt vel absolute, +secundum quod pertinent ad concupiscibilem; vel cum arduitate +quadam, secundum quod pertinent ad irascibilem. Quae quidem +distinctio non habet locum in bonis quae delectant tactum, quia +huiusmodi sunt quaedam infima, et competunt homini secundum quod +convenit cum brutis. Circa bonum igitur pecuniae absolute sumptum, +secundum quod est obiectum concupiscentiae vel delectationis aut +amoris, est liberalitas. Circa bonum autem huiusmodi cum arduitate +sumptum, secundum quod est obiectum spei, est magnificentia. Circa +bonum vero quod est honor, si quidem sit absolute sumptum, secundum +quod est obiectum amoris, sic est quaedam virtus quae vocatur +philotimia, idest amor honoris. Si vero cum arduitate consideretur, +secundum quod est obiectum spei, sic est magnanimitas. Unde +liberalitas et philotimia videntur esse in concupiscibili, +magnificentia vero et magnanimitas in irascibili. Bonum vero +hominis in ordine ad alium, non videtur arduitatem habere, sed +accipitur ut absolute sumptum, prout est obiectum passionum +concupiscibilis. Quod quidem bonum potest esse alicui delectabile +secundum quod praebet se alteri vel in his quae serio fiunt, idest +in actionibus per rationem ordinatis ad debitum finem; vel in his +quae fiunt ludo, idest in actionibus ordinatis ad delectationem +tantum, quae non eodem modo se habent ad rationem sicut prima. In +seriis autem se exhibet aliquis alteri dupliciter. Uno modo, ut +delectabilem decentibus verbis et factis, et hoc pertinet ad +quandam virtutem quam Aristoteles nominat amicitiam; et potest dici +affabilitas. Alio modo praebet se aliquis alteri ut manifestum, per +dicta et facta, et hoc pertinet ad aliam virtutem, quam nominat +veritatem. Manifestatio enim propinquius accedit ad rationem quam +delectatio; et seria quam iocosa. Unde et circa delectationes +ludorum est alia virtus, quam philosophus eutrapeliam nominat. Sic +igitur patet quod, secundum Aristotelem, sunt decem virtutes +morales circa passiones, scilicet fortitudo, temperantia, +liberalitas, magnificentia, magnanimitas, philotimia, mansuetudo, +amicitia, veritas et eutrapelia. Et distinguuntur secundum diversas +materias vel secundum diversas passiones; vel secundum diversa +obiecta. Si igitur addatur iustitia, quae est circa operationes, +erunt omnes undecim.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A5-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All objects of the same specific operation have the same relation to reason: not so all the objects of the same specific + passion; because operations do not thwart reason as the passions do. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36053" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36053] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod omnia obiecta eiusdem operationis secundum +speciem, eandem habitudinem habent ad rationem; non autem omnia +obiecta eiusdem passionis secundum speciem, quia operationes non +repugnant rationi, sicut passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A5-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Passions are not differentiated by the same rule as virtues are, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36054" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36054] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod alia ratione diversificantur passiones, et alia +virtutes, sicut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A5-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> More and less do not cause a difference of species, unless they bear different relations to reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36055" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36055] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod magis et minus non diversificant speciem, nisi +propter diversam habitudinem ad rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A5-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Good is a more potent mover than evil: because evil does not cause movement save in virtue of good, as Dionysius states (Div. + Nom. iv). Hence an evil does not prove an obstacle to reason, so as to require virtues unless that evil be great; there being, + seemingly, one such evil corresponding to each kind of passion. Hence there is but one virtue, meekness, for every form of + anger; and, again, but one virtue, fortitude, for all forms of daring. On the + other hand, good involves difficulty, which requires virtue, even if it be not a great good in that particular kind of passion. + Consequently there are various moral virtues about desires, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="36056" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36056] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod bonum fortius est ad movendum quam malum quia malum +non agit nisi virtute boni, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. +Nom. Unde malum non facit difficultatem rationi quae requirat +virtutem, nisi sit excellens, quod videtur esse unum in uno genere +passionis. Unde circa iras non ponitur nisi una virtus, scilicet +mansuetudo, et similiter circa audacias una sola, scilicet +fortitudo. Sed bonum ingerit difficultatem, quae requirit virtutem, +etiam si non sit excellens in genere talis passionis. Et ideo circa +concupiscentias ponuntur diversae virtutes morales, ut dictum +est.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q61" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q61-p0.1">Q. 61. OF THE CARDINAL VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q61-p2"> We must now consider the cardinal virtues: under which head there are five points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q61-p3"><a href="#FS_Q61_A1"> (1) Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal virtues?</a></p><p id="FS_Q61-p4"><a href="#FS_Q61_A2"> (2) Of their number;</a></p><p id="FS_Q61-p5"><a href="#FS_Q61_A3"> (3) Which are they?</a></p><p id="FS_Q61-p6"><a href="#FS_Q61_A4"> (4) Whether they differ from one another?</a></p><p id="FS_Q61-p7"><a href="#FS_Q61_A5"> (5) Whether they are fittingly divided into social, perfecting, perfect, and exemplar virtues?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 pr."><a name="36057" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36057] +Iª-IIae q. 61 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +virtutibus cardinalibus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. Primo, +utrum virtutes morales debeant dici cardinales, vel principales. +Secundo, de numero earum. Tertio, quae sint. Quarto, utrum +differant ab invicem. Quinto, utrum dividantur convenienter in +virtutes politicas, et purgatorias, et purgati animi, et +exemplares.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q61_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q61_A1-p0.1">Q. 61. A. 1. Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtues should not be called cardinal or principal virtues. For "the opposite members of a division + are by nature simultaneous" (Categor. x), so that one is not principal rather than another. Now all the virtues are opposite + members of the division of the genus "virtue." Therefore none of them should be called principal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36058" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36058] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales non debeant dici +cardinales, seu principales. Quae enim ex opposito dividuntur, sunt +simul natura, ut dicitur in praedicamentis, et sic unum non est +altero principalius. Sed omnes virtutes ex opposito dividunt genus +virtutis. Ergo nullae earum debent dici principales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the end is principal as compared to the means. But the theological virtues are about the end; while the moral virtues + are about the means. Therefore the theological virtues, rather than the moral virtues, should be called principal or cardinal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36059" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36059] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +finis principalior est his quae sunt ad finem. Sed virtutes +theologicae sunt circa finem, virtutes autem morales circa ea quae +sunt ad finem. Ergo virtutes morales non debent dici principales, +seu cardinales; sed magis theologicae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is essentially so is principal in comparison with that which is so by participation. But the intellectual + virtues belong to that which is essentially rational: whereas the moral virtues belong to that which is rational by participation, + as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q58_A3" id="FS_Q61_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[58] , A[3]</a>). Therefore the intellectual virtues are principal, rather than the moral virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36060" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36060] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +principalius est quod est per essentiam, quam quod est per +participationem. Sed virtutes intellectuales pertinent ad rationale +per essentiam, virtutes autem morales ad rationale per +participationem, ut supra dictum est. Ergo virtutes morales non +sunt principales, sed magis virtutes intellectuales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose in explaining the words, "Blessed are the poor in spirit" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q61_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.20" target="asv">Lk. 6:20</a>) says: "We know that there are four cardinal virtues, viz. temperance, justice, prudence, and fortitude." But these are moral + virtues. Therefore the moral virtues are cardinal virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36061" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36061] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Ambrosius dicit, super Lucam, exponens illud, <i>beati +pauperes spiritu, scimus virtutes esse quatuor cardinales, scilicet +temperantiam, iustitiam, prudentiam, fortitudinem</i>. Hae autem +sunt virtutes morales. Ergo virtutes morales sunt cardinales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> When we speak of virtue simply, we are understood to speak of human virtue. Now human virtue, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q56_A3" id="FS_Q61_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[56], A[3]</a>), is one that answers to the perfect idea of virtue, which requires rectitude of the appetite: for such like virtue not only + confers the faculty of doing well, but also causes the good deed done. On the other hand, the name virtue is applied to one + that answers imperfectly to the idea of virtue, and does not + require rectitude of the appetite: because it merely confers the faculty of doing well without causing the good deed to be + done. Now it is evident that the perfect is principal as compared to the imperfect: and so those virtues which imply rectitude + of the appetite are called principal virtues. Such are the moral virtues, and prudence alone, of the intellectual virtues, + for it is also something of a moral virtue, as was clearly shown above ( + <a href="#FS_Q57_A4" id="FS_Q61_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[57], A[4]</a>). Consequently, + those virtues which are called principal or cardinal are fittingly placed among the moral virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 1 co."><a name="36062" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36062] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, cum simpliciter de virtute loquimur, intelligimur +loqui de virtute humana. Virtus autem humana, ut supra dictum est, +secundum perfectam rationem virtutis dicitur, quae requirit +rectitudinem appetitus, huiusmodi enim virtus non solum facit +facultatem bene agendi, sed ipsum etiam usum boni operis causat. +Sed secundum imperfectam rationem virtutis dicitur virtus quae non +requirit rectitudinem appetitus, quia solum facit facultatem bene +agendi, non autem causat boni operis usum. Constat autem quod +perfectum est principalius imperfecto. Et ideo virtutes quae +continent rectitudinem appetitus, dicuntur principales. Huiusmodi +autem sunt virtutes morales; et inter intellectuales, sola +prudentia, quae etiam quodammodo moralis est, secundum materiam, ut +ex supradictis patet, unde convenienter inter virtutes morales +ponuntur illae quae dicuntur principales, seu cardinales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When a univocal genus is divided into its species, the members of the division are on a par in the point of the generic idea; + although considered in their nature as things, one species may surpass another in rank and perfection, as man in respect of + other animals. But when we divide an analogous term, which is applied to several things, but to one before it is applied to + another, nothing hinders one from ranking before another, even in the point of + the generic idea; as the notion of being is applied to substance principally in relation to accident. Such is the division + of virtue into various kinds of virtue: since the good defined by reason is not found in the same way in all things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36063" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36063] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, quando genus univocum dividitur in suas +species, tunc partes divisionis ex aequo se habent secundum +rationem generis; licet secundum naturam rei, una species sit +principalior et perfectior alia, sicut homo aliis animalibus. Sed +quando est divisio alicuius analogi, quod dicitur de pluribus +secundum prius et posterius; tunc nihil prohibet unum esse +principalius altero, etiam secundum communem rationem; sicut +substantia principalius dicitur ens quam accidens. Et talis est +divisio virtutum in diversa genera virtutum, eo quod bonum rationis +non secundum eundem ordinem invenitur in omnibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The theological virtues are above man, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q58_A3" id="FS_Q61_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[58], A[3]</a>, ad 3). Hence they should properly be called not human, but "super-human" or godlike virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36064" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36064] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod virtutes theologicae sunt supra hominem, ut supra +dictum est. Unde non proprie dicuntur virtutes humanae, sed +superhumanae, vel divinae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the intellectual virtues, except in prudence, rank before the moral virtues, in the point of their subject, they + do not rank before them as virtues; for a virtue, as such, regards good, which is the object of the appetite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36065" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36065] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum, quod aliae virtutes intellectuales a prudentia, etsi sint +principaliores quam morales quantum ad subiectum; non tamen sunt +principaliores quantum ad rationem virtutis, quae respicit bonum, +quod est obiectum appetitus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q61_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q61_A2-p0.1">Q. 61. A. 2. Whether there are four cardinal virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are not four cardinal virtues. For prudence is the directing principle of the other moral virtues, + as is clear from what has been said above ( + <a href="#FS_Q58_A4" id="FS_Q61_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[58], A[4]</a>). But that which directs other things ranks before them. Therefore prudence alone is a principal virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36066" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36066] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sint quatuor virtutes cardinales. +Prudentia enim est directiva aliarum virtutum moralium, ut ex +supradictis patet. Sed id quod est directivum aliorum, principalius +est. Ergo prudentia sola est virtus principalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the principal virtues are, in a way, moral virtues. Now we are directed to moral works both by the practical reason, + and by a right appetite, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2. Therefore there are only two cardinal virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36067" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36067] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +virtutes principales sunt aliquo modo morales. Sed ad operationes +morales ordinamur per rationem practicam, et appetitum rectum, ut +dicitur in VI Ethic. Ergo solae duae virtutes cardinales sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, even among the other virtues one ranks higher than another. But in order that a virtue be principal, it needs not + to rank above all the others, but above some. Therefore it seems that there are many more principal virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36068" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36068] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +inter alias etiam virtutes una est principalior altera. Sed ad hoc +quod virtus dicatur principalis, non requiritur quod sit +principalis respectu omnium, sed respectu quarundam. Ergo videtur +quod sint multo plures principales virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. ii): "The entire structure of good works is built on four virtues." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36069" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36069] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Gregorius dicit, in II Moral., <i>in quatuor virtutibus +tota boni operis structura consurgit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q61_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Things may be numbered either in respect of their formal principles, or according to the subjects in which they are: and + either way we find that there are four cardinal virtues. + </p><p id="FS_Q61_A2-p7"> For the formal principle of the virtue of which we speak now is good as defined by reason; which good is considered in two + ways. First, as existing in the very act of reason: and thus we have one principal virtue, called "Prudence." Secondly, according + as the reason puts its order into something else; either into operations, and then we have "Justice"; or into passions, and + then we need two virtues. For the need of putting the order of reason into the passions is due to their + thwarting reason: and this occurs in two ways. First, by the passions inciting to something against reason, and then the passions + need a curb, which we call "Temperance." Secondly, by the passions withdrawing us from following the dictate of reason, e.g. + through fear of danger or toil: and then man needs to be strengthened for that which reason dictates, lest he turn back; and + to this end there is "Fortitude." + </p><p id="FS_Q61_A2-p8"> In like manner, we find the same number if we consider the subjects of virtue. For there are four subjects of the virtue + we speak of now: viz. the power which is rational in its essence, and this is perfected by "Prudence"; and that which is rational + by participation, and is threefold, the will, subject of "Justice," the concupiscible faculty, subject of "Temperance," and + the irascible faculty, subject of "Fortitude." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 2 co."><a name="36070" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36070] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod numerus aliquorum accipi potest aut secundum +principia formalia aut secundum subiecta, et utroque modo +inveniuntur quatuor cardinales virtutes. Principium enim formale +virtutis de qua nunc loquimur, est rationis bonum. Quod quidem +dupliciter potest considerari. Uno modo, secundum quod in ipsa +consideratione rationis consistit. Et sic erit una virtus +principalis, quae dicitur prudentia. Alio modo, secundum quod circa +aliquid ponitur rationis ordo. Et hoc vel circa operationes, et sic +est iustitia, vel circa passiones, et sic necesse est esse duas +virtutes. Ordinem enim rationis necesse est ponere circa passiones, +considerata repugnantia ipsarum ad rationem. Quae quidem potest +esse dupliciter. Uno modo secundum quod passio impellit ad aliquid +contrarium rationi, et sic necesse est quod passio reprimatur, et +ab hoc denominatur temperantia. Alio modo, secundum quod passio +retrahit ab eo quod ratio dictat, sicut timor periculorum vel +laborum, et sic necesse est quod homo firmetur in eo quod est +rationis, ne recedat; et ab hoc denominatur fortitudo. Similiter +secundum subiecta, idem numerus invenitur. Quadruplex enim +invenitur subiectum huius virtutis de qua nunc loquimur, scilicet +rationale per essentiam, quod prudentia perficit; et rationale per +participationem, quod dividitur in tria; idest in voluntatem, quae +est subiectum iustitiae; et in concupiscibilem, quae est subiectum +temperantiae; et in irascibilem, quae est subiectum +fortitudinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Prudence is the principal of all the virtues simply. The others are principal, each in its own genus. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36071" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36071] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod prudentia est simpliciter principalior omnibus. +Sed aliae ponuntur principales unaquaeque in suo genere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That part of the soul which is rational by participation is threefold, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36072" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36072] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod rationale per participationem dividitur in tria, ut +dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All the other virtues among which one ranks before another, are reducible to the above four, both as to the subject and as + to the formal principle. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36073" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36073] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod omnes aliae virtutes, quarum una est principalior +alia, reducuntur ad praedictas quatuor, et quantum ad subiectum, et +quantum ad rationes formales.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q61_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q61_A3-p0.1">Q. 61. A. 3. Whether any other virtues should be called principal rather than these?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that other virtues should be called principal rather than these. For, seemingly, the greatest is the principal + in any genus. Now "magnanimity has a great influence on all the virtues" (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore magnanimity should more + than any be called a principal virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36074" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36074] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliae virtutes debeant dici magis +principales quam istae. Id enim quod est maximum in unoquoque +genere, videtur esse principalius. Sed magnanimitas operatur magnum +in omnibus virtutibus, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Ergo magnanimitas +maxime debet dici principalis virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which strengthens the other virtues should above all be called a principal virtue. But such is humility: for + Gregory says (Hom. iv in Ev.) that "he who gathers the other virtues without humility is as one who carries straw against + the wind." Therefore humility seems above all to be a principal virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36075" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36075] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +illud per quod aliae virtutes firmantur, videtur esse maxime +principalis virtus. Sed humilitas est huiusmodi, dicit enim +Gregorius quod <i>qui ceteras virtutes sine humilitate congregat, +quasi paleas in ventum portat</i>. Ergo humilitas videtur esse +maxime principalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is most perfect seems to be principal. But this applies to patience, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q61_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.4" target="asv"> James 1:4</a>: "Patience hath a perfect work." Therefore patience should be reckoned a principal virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36076" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36076] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +illud videtur esse principale, quod est perfectissimum. Sed hoc +pertinet ad patientiam; secundum illud Iacobi I, <i>patientia opus +perfectum habet</i>. Ergo patientia debet poni principalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Cicero reduces all other virtues to these four (De Invent. Rhet. ii). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36077" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36077] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Tullius, in sua rhetorica, ad has quatuor omnes alias +reducit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q61_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q61_A2" id="FS_Q61_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, these four are reckoned as cardinal virtues, in respect of the four formal principles of virtue as we understand it now. + These principles are found chiefly in certain acts and passions. Thus the good which exists in the act of reason, is found + chiefly in reason's command, but not in its counsel or its judgment, as stated above (Q[57], A[6]). Again, good as defined + by reason and put into our operations as + something right and due, is found chiefly in commutations and distributions in respect of another person, and on a basis of + equality. The good of curbing the passions is found chiefly in those passions which are most difficult to curb, viz. in the + pleasures of touch. The good of being firm in holding to the good defined by reason, against the impulse of passion, is found + chiefly in perils of death, which are most difficult to withstand. + </p><p id="FS_Q61_A3-p7"> Accordingly the above four virtues may be considered in two ways. First, in respect of their common formal principles. In + this way they are called principal, being general, as it were, in comparison with all the virtues: so that, for instance, + any virtue that causes good in reason's act of consideration, may be called prudence; every virtue that causes the good of + right and due in operation, be called justice; every virtue that curbs and represses the passions, be called + temperance; and every virtue that strengthens the mind against any passions whatever, be called fortitude. Many, both holy + doctors, as also philosophers, speak about these virtues in this sense: and in this way the other virtues are contained under + them. Wherefore all the objections fail. + </p><p id="FS_Q61_A3-p8"> Secondly, they may be considered in point of their being denominated, each one from that which is foremost in its respective + matter, and thus they are specific virtues, condivided with the others. Yet they are called principal in comparison with the + other virtues, on account of the importance of their matter: so that prudence is the virtue which commands; justice, the virtue + which is about due actions between equals; temperance, the virtue which suppresses desires for the + pleasures of touch; and fortitude, the virtue which strengthens against dangers of death.</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 3 co."><a name="36078" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36078] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod sicut supra dictum est, huiusmodi quatuor virtutes +cardinales accipiuntur secundum quatuor formales rationes virtutis +de qua loquimur. Quae quidem in aliquibus actibus vel passionibus +principaliter inveniuntur. Sicut bonum consistens in consideratione +rationis, principaliter invenitur in ipso rationis imperio; non +autem in consilio, neque in iudicio, ut supra dictum est. Similiter +autem bonum rationis prout ponitur in operationibus secundum +rationem recti et debiti, principaliter invenitur in +commutationibus vel distributionibus quae sunt ad alterum cum +aequalitate. Bonum autem refraenandi passiones principaliter +invenitur in passionibus quas maxime difficile est reprimere, +scilicet in delectationibus tactus. Bonum autem firmitatis ad +standum in bono rationis contra impetum passionum, praecipue +invenitur in periculis mortis, contra quae difficillimum est stare. +Sic igitur praedictas quatuor virtutes dupliciter considerare +possumus. Uno modo, secundum communes rationes formales. Et +secundum hoc, dicuntur principales, quasi generales ad omnes +virtutes, utputa quod omnis virtus quae facit bonum in +consideratione rationis, dicatur prudentia; et quod omnis virtus +quae facit bonum debiti et recti in operationibus, dicatur +iustitia; et omnis virtus quae cohibet passiones et deprimit, +dicatur temperantia; et omnis virtus quae facit firmitatem animi +contra quascumque passiones, dicatur fortitudo. Et sic multi +loquuntur de istis virtutibus, tam sacri doctores quam etiam +philosophi. Et sic aliae virtutes sub ipsis continentur unde +cessant omnes obiectiones. Alio vero modo possunt accipi, secundum +quod istae virtutes denominantur ab eo quod est praecipuum in +unaquaque materia. Et sic sunt speciales virtutes, contra alias +divisae. Dicuntur tamen principales respectu aliarum, propter +principalitatem materiae, puta quod prudentia dicatur quae +praeceptiva est; iustitia, quae est circa actiones debitas inter +aequales; temperantia, quae reprimit concupiscentias delectationum +tactus; fortitudo, quae firmat contra pericula mortis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A3-p9"><b>Reply to Objections:</b> Thus again do the objections fail: + because the other virtues may be principal in some other way, but these are called principal by reason of their matter, as + stated above.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36079" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36079] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Et sic etiam +cessant obiectiones, quia aliae virtutes possunt habere aliquas +alias principalitates, sed istae dicuntur principales ratione +materiae, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q61_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q61_A4-p0.1">Q. 61. A. 4. Whether the four cardinal virtues differ from one another? </h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the above four virtues are not diverse and distinct from one another. For Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 1): + "There is no true prudence, unless it be just, temperate and brave; no perfect temperance, that is not brave, just and prudent; + no sound fortitude, that is not prudent, temperate and just; no real justice, without prudence, fortitude and temperance." + But this would not be so, if the above virtues were distinct from one another: since the + different species of one genus do not qualify one another. Therefore the aforesaid virtues are not distinct from one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36080" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36080] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod quatuor praedictae virtutes non sint +diversae virtutes, et ab invicem distinctae. Dicit enim Gregorius, +in XXII Moral., <i>prudentia vera non est, quae iusta, temperans et +fortis non est; nec perfecta temperantia, quae fortis, iusta et +prudens non est; nec fortitudo integra, quae prudens, temperans et +iusta non est; nec vera iustitia, quae prudens, fortis et temperans +non est</i>. Hoc autem non contingeret, si praedictae quatuor +virtutes essent ab invicem distinctae, diversae enim species +eiusdem generis non denominant se invicem. Ergo praedictae virtutes +non sunt ab invicem distinctae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, among things distinct from one another the function of one is not attributed to another. But the function of temperance + is attributed to fortitude: for Ambrose says (De Offic. xxxvi): "Rightly do we call it fortitude, when a man conquers himself, + and is not weakened and bent by any enticement." And of temperance he says (De Offic. xliii, xlv) that it "safeguards the + manner and order in all things that we decide to do and say." Therefore it seems that + these virtues are not distinct from one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36081" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36081] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +eorum quae ab invicem sunt distincta, quod est unius, non +attribuitur alteri. Sed illud quod est temperantiae, attribuitur +fortitudini, dicit enim Ambrosius, in I libro de Offic., <i>iure ea +fortitudo vocatur, quando unusquisque seipsum vincit, nullis +illecebris emollitur atque inflectitur</i>. De temperantia etiam +dicit quod modum vel ordinem servat <i>omnium quae vel agenda vel +dicenda arbitramur</i>. Ergo videtur quod huiusmodi virtutes non +sunt ab invicem distinctae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that the necessary conditions of virtue are first of all "that a man should + have knowledge; secondly, that he should exercise choice for a particular end; thirdly, that he should possess the habit and + act with firmness and steadfastness." But the first of these seems to belong to prudence which is rectitude of reason in things + to be done; the second, i.e. choice, belongs to temperance, whereby a man, holding his + passions on the curb, acts, not from passion but from choice; the third, that a man should act for the sake of a due end, + implies a certain rectitude, which seemingly belongs to justice; while the last, viz. firmness and steadfastness, belongs + to fortitude. Therefore each of these virtues is general in comparison to other virtues. Therefore they are not distinct from + one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36082" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36082] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod ad virtutem haec requiruntur, +<i>primum quidem, si sciens; deinde, si eligens, et eligens propter +hoc; tertium autem, si firme et immobiliter habeat et operetur</i>. +Sed horum primum videtur ad prudentiam pertinere, quae est recta +ratio agibilium; secundum, scilicet eligere, ad temperantiam, ut +aliquis non ex passione, sed ex electione agat, passionibus +refraenatis; tertium, ut aliquis propter debitum finem operetur, +rectitudinem quandam continet, quae videtur ad iustitiam pertinere +aliud, scilicet firmitas et immobilitas, pertinet ad fortitudinem. +Ergo quaelibet harum virtutum est generalis ad omnes virtutes. Ergo +non distinguuntur ad invicem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi) that "there are four virtues, corresponding to the various emotions of love," and he + applies this to the four virtues mentioned above. Therefore the same four virtues are distinct from one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36083" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36083] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de moribus Eccles., quod +<i>quadripartita dicitur virtus, ex ipsius amoris vario +affectu</i>, et subiungit de praedictis quatuor virtutibus. +Praedictae ergo quatuor virtutes sunt ab invicem distinctae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q61_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q61_A3" id="FS_Q61_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, these four virtues are understood differently by various writers. For some take them as signifying certain general conditions + of the human mind, to be found in all the virtues: so that, to wit, prudence is merely a certain rectitude of discretion in + any actions or matters whatever; justice, a certain rectitude of the mind, whereby a man does what he ought in any matters; + temperance, a disposition of the mind, + moderating any passions or operations, so as to keep them within bounds; and fortitude, a disposition whereby the soul is + strengthened for that which is in accord with reason, against any assaults of the passions, or the toil involved by any operations. + To distinguish these four virtues in this way does not imply that justice, temperance and fortitude are distinct virtuous + habits: because it is fitting that every moral virtue, from the fact that it is a "habit," should be accompanied by a + certain firmness so as not to be moved by its contrary: and this, we have said, belongs to fortitude. Moreover, inasmuch as + it is a "virtue," it is directed to good which involves the notion of right and due; and this, we have said, belongs to justice. + Again, owing to the fact that it is a "moral virtue" partaking of reason, it observes the mode of reason in all things, and + does not exceed its bounds, which has been stated to belong to temperance. It is only in the point of having discretion, + which we ascribed to prudence, that there seems to be a distinction from the other three, inasmuch as discretion belongs essentially + to reason; whereas the other three imply a certain share of reason by way of a kind of application (of reason) to passions + or operations. According to the above explanation, then, prudence would be distinct from the other three virtues: but these + would not be distinct from one another; for it is evident that one and the same virtue is both habit, and virtue, and + moral virtue. + </p><p id="FS_Q61_A4-p7"> Others, however, with better reason, take these four virtues, according as they have their special determinate matter; each + of its own matter, in which special commendation is given to that general condition from which the virtue's name is taken + as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q61_A3" id="FS_Q61_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. In this way it is clear that the aforesaid virtues are distinct habits, differentiated in respect of their diverse objects. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 4 co."><a name="36084" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36084] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, praedictae quatuor virtutes +dupliciter a diversis accipiuntur. Quidam enim accipiunt eas, prout +significant quasdam generales conditiones humani animi, quae +inveniuntur in omnibus virtutibus, ita scilicet quod prudentia +nihil sit aliud quam quaedam rectitudo discretionis in quibuscumque +actibus vel materiis; iustitia vero sit quaedam rectitudo animi, +per quam homo operatur quod debet in quacumque materia; temperantia +vero sit quaedam dispositio animi quae modum quibuscumque +passionibus vel operationibus imponit, ne ultra debitum efferantur; +fortitudo vero sit quaedam dispositio animae per quam firmetur in +eo quod est secundum rationem, contra quoscumque impetus passionum +vel operationum labores. Haec autem quatuor sic distincta, non +important diversitatem habituum virtuosorum quantum ad iustitiam, +temperantiam et fortitudinem. Cuilibet enim virtuti morali, ex hoc +quod est habitus, convenit quaedam firmitas, ut a contrario non +moveatur, quod dictum est ad fortitudinem pertinere. Ex hoc vero +quod est virtus, habet quod ordinetur ad bonum, in quo importatur +ratio recti vel debiti, quod dicebatur ad iustitiam pertinere. In +hoc vero quod est virtus moralis rationem participans, habet quod +modum rationis in omnibus servet, et ultra se non extendat, quod +dicebatur pertinere ad temperantiam. Solum autem hoc quod est +discretionem habere, quod attribuebatur prudentiae, videtur +distingui ab aliis tribus, inquantum hoc est ipsius rationis per +essentiam; alia vero tria important quandam participationem +rationis, per modum applicationis cuiusdam ad passiones vel +operationes. Sic igitur, secundum praedicta, prudentia quidem esset +virtus distincta ab aliis tribus, sed aliae tres non essent +virtutes distinctae ab invicem; manifestum est enim quod una et +eadem virtus et est habitus, et est virtus, et est moralis. Alii +vero, et melius, accipiunt has quatuor virtutes secundum quod +determinantur ad materias speciales; unaquaeque quidem illarum ad +unam materiam, in qua principaliter laudatur illa generalis +conditio a qua nomen virtutis accipitur, ut supra dictum est. Et +secundum hoc, manifestum est quod praedictae virtutes sunt diversi +habitus, secundum diversitatem obiectorum distincti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gregory is speaking of these four virtues in the first sense given above. It may also be said that these four virtues qualify + one another by a kind of overflow. For the qualities of prudence overflow on to the other virtues in so far as they are directed + by prudence. And each of the others overflows on to the rest, for the reason that whoever can do what is harder, can do what + is less difficult. Wherefore whoever can curb his desires for the pleasures + of touch, so that they keep within bounds, which is a very hard thing to do, for this very reason is more able to check his + daring in dangers of death, so as not to go too far, which is much easier; and in this sense fortitude is said to be temperate. + Again, temperance is said to be brave, by reason of fortitude overflowing into temperance: in so far, to wit, as he whose + mind is strengthened by fortitude against dangers of death, which is a matter of very great difficulty, is more able to + remain firm against the onslaught of pleasures; for as Cicero says (De Offic. i), "it would be inconsistent for a man to be + unbroken by fear, and yet vanquished by cupidity; or that he should be conquered by lust, after showing himself to be unconquered + by toil." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36085" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36085] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Gregorius loquitur de praedictis quatuor +virtutibus secundum primam acceptionem. Vel potest dici quod istae +quatuor virtutes denominantur ab invicem per redundantiam quandam. +Id enim quod est prudentiae, redundat in alias virtutes, inquantum +a prudentia diriguntur. Unaquaeque vero aliarum redundat in alias +ea ratione, quod qui potest quod est difficilius, potest et id quod +minus est difficile. Unde qui potest refraenare concupiscentias +delectabilium secundum tactum, ne modum excedant, quod est +difficillimum; ex hoc ipso redditur habilior ut refraenet audaciam +in periculis mortis, ne ultra modum procedat, quod est longe +facilius; et secundum hoc, fortitudo dicitur temperata. Temperantia +etiam dicitur fortis, ex redundantia fortitudinis in temperantiam, +inquantum scilicet ille qui per fortitudinem habet animum firmum +contra pericula mortis, quod est difficillimum, est habilior ut +retineat animi firmitatem contra impetus delectationum; quia, ut +dicit Tullius in I de Offic., <i>non est consentaneum ut qui metu +non frangitur, cupiditate frangatur; nec qui invictum se a labore +praestiterit, vinci a voluptate</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A4-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From this the Reply to the Second Objection is clear. For temperance observes the mean in all things, and fortitude keeps + the mind unbent by the enticements of pleasures, either in so far as these virtues are taken to denote certain general conditions + of virtue, or in the sense that they overflow on to one another, as explained above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36086" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36086] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc +etiam patet responsio ad secundum. Sic enim temperantia in omnibus +modum servat, et fortitudo contra illecebras voluptatum animum +servat inflexum, vel inquantum istae virtutes denominant quasdam +generales conditiones virtutum; vel per redundantiam +praedictam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These four general conditions of virtue set down by the Philosopher, are not proper to the aforesaid virtues. They may, however, + be appropriated to them, in the way above stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36087" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36087] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod illae quatuor generales virtutum conditiones quas +ponit philosophus, non sunt propriae praedictis virtutibus. Sed +possunt eis appropriari, secundum modum iam dictum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q61_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q61_A5-p0.1">Q. 61. A. 5. Whether the cardinal virtues are fittingly divided into social virtues, perfecting, perfect, and exemplar virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that these four virtues are unfittingly divided into exemplar virtues, perfecting virtues, perfect virtues, + and social virtues. For as Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1), the "exemplar virtues are such as exist in the mind of God." + Now the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that "it is absurd to ascribe justice, fortitude, temperance, and prudence to God." + Therefore these virtues cannot be exemplar. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36088" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36088] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter huiusmodi quatuor +virtutes dividantur in virtutes exemplares, purgati animi, +purgatorias, et politicas. Ut enim Macrobius dicit, in I super +somnium Scipionis, <i>virtutes exemplares sunt quae in ipsa divina +mente consistunt</i>. Sed philosophus, in X Ethic., dicit quod +<i>ridiculum est Deo iustitiam, fortitudinem, temperantiam et +prudentiam attribuere</i>. Ergo virtutes huiusmodi non possunt esse +exemplares.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the "perfect" virtues are those which are without any passion: for Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1) that "in + a soul that is cleansed, temperance has not to check worldly desires, for it has forgotten all about them: fortitude knows + nothing about the passions; it does not have to conquer them." Now it was stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q59_A5" id="FS_Q61_A5-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[59], A[5]</a>) that the aforesaid virtues cannot be without passions. Therefore there is no such thing as + "perfect" virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36089" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36089] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +virtutes purgati animi dicuntur quae sunt absque passionibus, dicit +enim ibidem Macrobius quod <i>temperantiae purgati animi est +terrenas cupiditates non reprimere, sed penitus oblivisci; +fortitudinis autem passiones ignorare, non vincere</i>. Dictum est +autem supra quod huiusmodi virtutes sine passionibus esse non +possunt. Ergo huiusmodi virtutes purgati animi esse non +possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the "perfecting" virtues are those of the man "who flies from human + affairs and devotes himself exclusively to the things of God." But it seems wrong to do this, for Cicero says (De Offic. i): + "I reckon that it is not only unworthy of praise, but wicked for a man to say that he despises what most men admire, viz. + power and office." Therefore there are no "perfecting" virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36090" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36090] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +virtutes purgatorias dicit esse eorum <i>qui quadam humanorum fuga +solis se inserunt divinis</i>. Sed hoc videtur esse vitiosum, dicit +enim Tullius, in I de Offic., <i>quod qui despicere se dicunt ea +quae plerique mirantur imperia et magistratus, his non modo non +laudi, verum etiam vitio dandum puto</i>. Ergo non sunt aliquae +virtutes purgatoriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the "social" virtues are those "whereby good men work for the good + of their country and for the safety of the city." But it is only legal justice that is directed to the common weal, as the + Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore other virtues should not be called "social." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="36091" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36091] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +virtutes politicas esse dicit <i>quibus boni viri reipublicae +consulunt, urbesque tuentur</i>. Sed ad bonum commune sola iustitia +legalis ordinatur; ut philosophus dicit, in V Ethic. Ergo aliae +virtutes non debent dici politicae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A5-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1): "Plotinus, together with Plato foremost among teachers of philosophy, says: 'The four + kinds of virtue are fourfold: In the first place there are social* virtues; secondly, there are perfecting virtues [*Virtutes + purgatoriae: literally meaning, cleansing virtues]; thirdly, there are perfect [*Virtutes purgati animi: literally, virtues + of the clean soul] virtues; and fourthly, there are exemplar virtues.'" [*Cf. + Chrysostom's fifteenth homily on St. Matthew, where he says: "The gentle, the modest, the merciful, the just man does not + shut up his good deeds within himself . . . He that is clean of heart and peaceful, and suffers persecution for the sake of + the truth, lives for the common weal."] + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36092" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36092] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Macrobius ibidem dicit, <i>Plotinus, inter philosophiae +professores cum Platone princeps, quatuor sunt, inquit, quaternarum +genera virtutum. Ex his primae politicae vocantur; secundae, +purgatoriae; tertiae autem, iam purgati animi; quartae, +exemplares</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q61_A5-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi), "the soul needs to follow something in order to give birth to virtue: this something + is God: if we follow Him we shall live aright." Consequently the exemplar of human virtue must needs pre-exist in God, just + as in Him pre-exist the types of all things. Accordingly virtue may be considered as existing originally in God, and thus + we speak of "exemplar" virtues: so that in God the Divine Mind itself may be called + prudence; while temperance is the turning of God's gaze on Himself, even as in us it is that which conforms the appetite to + reason. God's fortitude is His unchangeableness; His justice is the observance of the Eternal Law in His works, as Plotinus + states (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1). + </p><p id="FS_Q61_A5-p8"> Again, since man by his nature is a social [*See above note on Chrysostom] animal, these virtues, in so far as they are in + him according to the condition of his nature, are called "social" virtues; since it is by reason of them that man behaves + himself well in the conduct of human affairs. It is in this sense that we have been speaking of these virtues until now. + </p><p id="FS_Q61_A5-p9"> But since it behooves a man to do his utmost to strive onward even to Divine things, as even the Philosopher declares in + Ethic. x, 7, and as Scripture often admonishes us---for instance: "Be ye . . . perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q61_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.48" target="asv">Mat. 5:48</a>), we must needs place some virtues between the social or human virtues, and the exemplar virtues which are Divine. Now these + virtues differ by reason of a difference of movement and term: so that some are + virtues of men who are on their way and tending towards the Divine similitude; and these are called "perfecting" virtues. + Thus prudence, by contemplating the things of God, counts as nothing all things of the world, and directs all the thoughts + of the soul to God alone: temperance, so far as nature allows, neglects the needs of the body; fortitude prevents the soul + from being afraid of neglecting the body and rising to heavenly things; and justice consists in the soul giving a whole-hearted + consent to follow the way thus proposed. Besides these there are the virtues of those who have already attained to the Divine + similitude: these are called the "perfect virtues." Thus prudence sees nought else but the things of God; temperance knows + no earthly desires; fortitude has no knowledge of passion; and justice, by imitating the Divine Mind, is united thereto by + an everlasting covenant. Such as the virtues attributed to the Blessed, or, in this life, to some who are at the summit of + perfection. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 co."><a name="36093" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36093] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro de moribus Eccles., +<i>oportet quod anima aliquid sequatur, ad hoc quod ei possit +virtus innasci, et hoc Deus est, quem si sequimur, bene +vivimus</i>. Oportet igitur quod exemplar humanae virtutis in Deo +praeexistat, sicut et in eo praeexistunt omnium rerum rationes. Sic +igitur virtus potest considerari vel prout est exemplariter in Deo, +et sic dicuntur virtutes exemplares. Ita scilicet quod ipsa divina +mens in Deo dicatur prudentia; temperantia vero, conversio divinae +intentionis ad seipsum, sicut in nobis temperantia dicitur per hoc +quod concupiscibilis conformatur rationi; fortitudo autem Dei est +eius immutabilitas; iustitia vero Dei est observatio legis aeternae +in suis operibus, sicut Plotinus dixit. Et quia homo secundum suam +naturam est animal politicum, virtutes huiusmodi, prout in homine +existunt secundum conditionem suae naturae, politicae vocantur, +prout scilicet homo secundum has virtutes recte se habet in rebus +humanis gerendis. Secundum quem modum hactenus de his virtutibus +locuti sumus. Sed quia ad hominem pertinet ut etiam ad divina se +trahat quantum potest, ut etiam philosophus dicit, in X Ethic.; et +hoc nobis in sacra Scriptura multipliciter commendatur, ut est +illud Matth. V, <i>estote perfecti, sicut et pater vester caelestis +perfectus est</i>, necesse est ponere quasdam virtutes medias inter +politicas, quae sunt virtutes humanae, et exemplares, quae sunt +virtutes divinae. Quae quidem virtutes distinguuntur secundum +diversitatem motus et termini. Ita scilicet quod quaedam sunt +virtutes transeuntium et in divinam similitudinem tendentium, et +hae vocantur virtutes purgatoriae. Ita scilicet quod prudentia +omnia mundana divinorum contemplatione despiciat, omnemque animae +cogitationem in divina sola dirigat; temperantia vero relinquat, +inquantum natura patitur, quae corporis usus requirit; fortitudinis +autem est ut anima non terreatur propter excessum a corpore, et +accessum ad superna; iustitia vero est ut tota anima consentiat ad +huius propositi viam. Quaedam vero sunt virtutes iam assequentium +divinam similitudinem, quae vocantur virtutes iam purgati animi. +Ita scilicet quod prudentia sola divina intueatur; temperantia +terrenas cupiditates nesciat; fortitudo passiones ignoret; iustitia +cum divina mente perpetuo foedere societur, eam scilicet imitando. +Quas quidem virtutes dicimus esse beatorum, vel aliquorum in hac +vita perfectissimorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is speaking of these virtues according as they relate to human affairs; for instance, justice, about buying + and selling; fortitude, about fear; temperance, about desires; for in this sense it is absurd to attribute them to God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36094" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36094] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de his virtutibus secundum +quod sunt circa res humanas, puta iustitia circa emptiones et +venditiones, fortitudo circa timores, temperantia circa +concupiscentias. Sic enim ridiculum est eas Deo attribuere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Human virtues, that is to say, virtues of men living together in this world, are about the passions. But the virtues of those + who have attained to perfect bliss are without passions. Hence Plotinus says (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1) that "the + social virtues check the passions," i.e. they bring them to the relative mean; "the second kind," viz. the perfecting virtues, + "uproot them"; "the third kind," viz. the perfect virtues, "forget them; while + it is impious to mention them in connection with virtues of the fourth kind," viz. the exemplar virtues. It may also be said + that here he is speaking of passions as denoting inordinate emotions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36095" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36095] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod virtutes humanae sunt circa passiones, scilicet +virtutes hominum in hoc mundo conversantium. Sed virtutes eorum qui +plenam beatitudinem assequuntur, sunt absque passionibus. Unde +Plotinus dicit quod passiones politicae virtutes molliunt, idest ad +medium reducunt; secundae, scilicet purgatoriae, auferunt; tertiae, +quae sunt purgati animi, obliviscuntur; in quartis, scilicet +exemplaribus, nefas est nominari. Quamvis dici possit quod loquitur +hic de passionibus secundum quod significant aliquos inordinatos +motus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To neglect human affairs when necessity forbids is wicked; otherwise it is virtuous. Hence Cicero says a little earlier: + "Perhaps one should make allowances for those who by reason of their exceptional talents have devoted themselves to learning; + as also to those who have retired from public life on account of failing health, or for some other yet weightier motive; when + such men yielded to others the power and renown of authority." This agrees with + what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): "The love of truth demands a hollowed leisure; charity necessitates good works. + If no one lays this burden on us we may devote ourselves to the study and contemplation of truth; but if the burden is laid + on us it is to be taken up under the pressure of charity." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36096" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36096] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod deserere res humanas ubi necessitas imponitur, +vitiosum est, alias est virtuosum. Unde parum supra Tullius +praemittit, <i>his forsitan concedendum est rempublicam non +capessentibus, qui excellenti ingenio doctrinae se dederunt; et his +qui aut valetudinis imbecillitate, aut aliqua graviori causa +impediti, a republica recesserunt; cum eius administrandae +potestatem aliis laudemque concederent</i>. Quod consonat ei quod +Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, <i>otium sanctum quaerit caritas +veritatis; negotium iustum suscipit necessitas caritatis. Quam +sarcinam si nullus imponit, percipiendae atque intuendae vacandum +est veritati, si autem imponitur, suscipienda est, propter +caritatis necessitatem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A5-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Legal justice alone regards the common weal directly: but by commanding the other virtues it draws them all into the service + of the common weal, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1). For we must take note that it concerns the human virtues, as + we understand them here, to do well not only towards the community, but also towards the parts of the community, viz. towards + the household, or even towards one individual. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="36097" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36097] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod sola iustitia legalis directe respicit bonum commune, +sed per imperium omnes alias virtutes ad bonum commune trahit, ut +in V Ethic. dicit philosophus. Est enim considerandum quod ad +politicas virtutes, secundum quod hic dicuntur, pertinet non solum +bene operari ad commune, sed etiam bene operari ad partes communis, +scilicet ad domum, vel aliquam singularem personam.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q62" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q62-p0.1">Q. 62. OF THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q62-p2"> We must now consider the Theological Virtues: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q62-p3"><a href="#FS_Q62_A1"> (1) Whether there are any theological virtues?</a></p><p id="FS_Q62-p4"><a href="#FS_Q62_A2"> (2) Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and moral virtues?</a></p><p id="FS_Q62-p5"><a href="#FS_Q62_A3"> (3) How many, and which are they?</a></p><p id="FS_Q62-p6"><a href="#FS_Q62_A4"> (4) Of their order.</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 pr."><a name="36098" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36098] +Iª-IIae q. 62 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +virtutibus theologicis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, +utrum sint aliquae virtutes theologicae. Secundo, utrum virtutes +theologicae distinguantur ab intellectualibus et moralibus. Tertio, +quot, et quae sint. Quarto, de ordine earum.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q62_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q62_A1-p0.1">Q. 62. A. 1. Whether there are any theological virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are not any theological virtues. For according to Phys. vii, text. 17, "virtue is the disposition + of a perfect thing to that which is best: and by perfect, I mean that which is disposed according to nature." But that which + is Divine is above man's nature. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of a man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36099" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36099] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sint aliquae virtutes theologicae. +Ut enim dicitur in VII Physic., <i>virtus est dispositio perfecti +ad optimum, dico autem perfectum, quod est dispositum secundum +naturam</i>. Sed id quod est divinum, est supra naturam hominis. +Ergo virtutes theologicae non sunt virtutes hominis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, theological virtues are quasi-Divine virtues. But the Divine virtues are exemplars, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q61_A5" id="FS_Q62_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[61], A[5]</a>), which are not in us but in God. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36100" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36100] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +virtutes theologicae dicuntur quasi virtutes divinae. Sed virtutes +divinae sunt exemplares, ut dictum est, quae quidem non sunt in +nobis, sed in Deo. Ergo virtutes theologicae non sunt virtutes +hominis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the theological virtues are so called because they direct us to God, Who is the first beginning and last end of + all things. But by the very nature of his reason and will, man is directed to his first beginning and last end. Therefore + there is no need for any habits of theological virtue, to direct the reason and will to God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36101" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36101] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +virtutes theologicae dicuntur quibus ordinamur in Deum, qui est +primum principium et ultimus finis rerum. Sed homo ex ipsa natura +rationis et voluntatis, habet ordinem ad primum principium et +ultimum finem. Non ergo requiruntur aliqui habitus virtutum +theologicarum, quibus ratio et voluntas ordinetur in Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. Now the Divine Law contains precepts about the acts of faith, hope, and + charity: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q62_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.2.8" target="asv">Ecclus. 2:8, </a> seqq.): "Ye that fear the Lord believe Him," and again, "hope in Him," and again, "love Him." Therefore faith, hope, and + charity are virtues directing us to God. Therefore they are theological virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36102" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36102] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod praecepta legis sunt de actibus virtutum. Sed de actibus +fidei, spei et caritatis dantur praecepta in lege divina, dicitur +enim Eccli. II, qui timetis Deum, credite illi; item, sperate in +illum; item, diligite illum. Ergo fides, spes et caritas sunt +virtutes in Deum ordinantes. Sunt ergo theologicae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Man is perfected by virtue, for those actions whereby he is directed to happiness, as was explained above ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q5_A7" id="FS_Q62_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[5], A[7]</a>). Now man's happiness is twofold, as was also stated above ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q5_A5" id="FS_Q62_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[5], A[5]</a>). One is proportionate to human nature, a happiness, to wit, which man can obtain by means of his natural principles. The + other is a happiness surpassing man's nature, and which man can obtain by the power of God alone, by a + kind of participation of the Godhead, about which it is written (2 Pet. 1:4) that by Christ we are made "partakers of the + Divine nature." And because such happiness surpasses the capacity of human nature, man's natural principles which enable him + to act well according to his capacity, do not suffice to direct man to this same happiness. Hence it is necessary for man + to receive from God some additional principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness, even as he is directed + to his + connatural end, by means of his natural principles, albeit not without Divine assistance. Such like principles are called + "theological virtues": first, because their object is God, inasmuch as they direct us aright to God: secondly, because they + are infused in us by God alone: thirdly, because these virtues are not made known to us, save by Divine revelation, contained + in Holy Writ. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 1 co."><a name="36103" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36103] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod per virtutem perficitur homo ad actus quibus in +beatitudinem ordinatur, ut ex supradictis patet. Est autem duplex +hominis beatitudo sive felicitas, ut supra dictum est. Una quidem +proportionata humanae naturae, ad quam scilicet homo pervenire +potest per principia suae naturae. Alia autem est beatitudo naturam +hominis excedens, ad quam homo sola divina virtute pervenire +potest, secundum quandam divinitatis participationem; secundum quod +dicitur II Petr. I, quod per Christum facti sumus consortes divinae +naturae. Et quia huiusmodi beatitudo proportionem humanae naturae +excedit, principia naturalia hominis, ex quibus procedit ad bene +agendum secundum suam proportionem, non sufficiunt ad ordinandum +hominem in beatitudinem praedictam. Unde oportet quod superaddantur +homini divinitus aliqua principia, per quae ita ordinetur ad +beatitudinem supernaturalem, sicut per principia naturalia +ordinatur ad finem connaturalem, non tamen absque adiutorio divino. +Et huiusmodi principia virtutes dicuntur theologicae, tum quia +habent Deum pro obiecto, inquantum per eas recte ordinamur in Deum; +tum quia a solo Deo nobis infunduntur; tum quia sola divina +revelatione, in sacra Scriptura, huiusmodi virtutes traduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A certain nature may be ascribed to a certain thing in two ways. First, essentially: and thus these theological virtues surpass + the nature of man. Secondly, by participation, as kindled wood partakes of the nature of fire: and thus, after a fashion, + man becomes a partaker of the Divine Nature, as stated above: so that these virtues are proportionate to man in respect of + the Nature of which he is made a partaker. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36104" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36104] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod aliqua natura potest attribui alicui rei +dupliciter. Uno modo, essentialiter, et sic huiusmodi virtutes +theologicae excedunt hominis naturam. Alio modo, participative, +sicut lignum ignitum participat naturam ignis, et sic quodammodo +fit homo particeps divinae naturae, ut dictum est. Et sic istae +virtutes conveniunt homini secundum naturam participatam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> These virtues are called Divine, not as though God were virtuous by reason of them, but because of them God makes us virtuous, + and directs us to Himself. Hence they are not exemplar but exemplate virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36105" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36105] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod istae virtutes non dicuntur divinae, sicut quibus +Deus sit virtuosus, sed sicut quibus nos efficimur virtuosi a Deo, +et in ordine ad Deum. Unde non sunt exemplares, sed exemplatae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason and will are naturally directed to God, inasmuch as He is the beginning and end of nature, but in proportion to + nature. But the reason and will, according to their nature, are not sufficiently directed to Him in so far as He is the object + of supernatural happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36106" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36106] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ad Deum naturaliter ratio et voluntas ordinatur prout +est naturae principium et finis, secundum tamen proportionem +naturae. Sed ad ipsum secundum quod est obiectum beatitudinis +supernaturalis, ratio et voluntas secundum suam naturam non +ordinantur sufficienter.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q62_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q62_A2-p0.1">Q. 62. A. 2. Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and moral virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues. For the theological + virtues, if they be in a human soul, must needs perfect it, either as to the intellective, or as to the appetitive part. Now + the virtues which perfect the intellective part are called intellectual; and the virtues which perfect the appetitive part, + are called moral. Therefore, the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral and + intellectual virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36107" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36107] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes theologicae non distinguantur +a moralibus et intellectualibus. Virtutes enim theologicae, si sunt +in anima humana, oportet quod perficiant ipsam vel secundum partem +intellectivam vel secundum partem appetitivam. Sed virtutes quae +perficiunt partem intellectivam, dicuntur intellectuales, virtutes +autem quae perficiunt partem appetitivam, sunt morales. Ergo +virtutes theologicae non distinguuntur a virtutibus moralibus et +intellectualibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the theological virtues are those which direct us to God. Now, among the intellectual virtues there is one which + directs us to God: this is wisdom, which is about Divine things, since it considers the highest cause. Therefore the theological + virtues are not distinct from the intellectual virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36108" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36108] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +virtutes theologicae dicuntur quae ordinant nos ad Deum. Sed inter +intellectuales virtutes est aliqua quae ordinat nos ad Deum, +scilicet sapientia, quae est de divinis, utpote causam altissimam +considerans. Ergo virtutes theologicae ab intellectualibus +virtutibus non distinguuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv) shows how the four cardinal virtues are the "order of love." Now love is charity, + which is a theological virtue. Therefore the moral virtues are not distinct from the theological. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36109" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36109] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus, in libro de moribus Eccles., manifestat in quatuor +virtutibus cardinalibus quod sunt ordo amoris. Sed amor est +caritas, quae ponitur virtus theologica. Ergo virtutes morales non +distinguuntur a theologicis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> That which is above man's nature is distinct from that which is according to his nature. But the theological virtues are + above man's nature; while the intellectual and moral virtues are in proportion to his nature, as clearly shown above ( + <a href="#FS_Q58_A3" id="FS_Q62_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[58], A[3]</a>). Therefore they are distinct from one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36110" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36110] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +id quod est supra naturam hominis, distinguitur ab eo quod est +secundum naturam hominis. Sed virtutes theologicae sunt super +naturam hominis, cui secundum naturam conveniunt virtutes +intellectuales et morales, ut ex supradictis patet. Ergo +distinguuntur ab invicem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q54_A2" id="FS_Q62_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[54], A[2]</a>, ad 1), habits are specifically distinct from one another in respect of the formal difference of their objects. Now the object + of the theological virtues is God Himself, Who is the last end of all, as surpassing the knowledge of our reason. On the other + hand, the object of the intellectual and moral virtues is something comprehensible to human reason. Wherefore the theological + virtues are specifically + distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 2 co."><a name="36111" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36111] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus specie distinguuntur +secundum formalem differentiam obiectorum. Obiectum autem +theologicarum virtutum est ipse Deus, qui est ultimus rerum finis, +prout nostrae rationis cognitionem excedit. Obiectum autem virtutum +intellectualium et moralium est aliquid quod humana ratione +comprehendi potest. Unde virtutes theologicae specie distinguuntur +a moralibus et intellectualibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intellectual and moral virtues perfect man's intellect and appetite according to the capacity of human nature; the theological + virtues, supernaturally. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36112" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36112] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod virtutes intellectuales et morales perficiunt +intellectum et appetitum hominis secundum proportionem naturae +humanae, sed theologicae supernaturaliter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The wisdom which the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3,7) reckons as an intellectual virtue, considers Divine things so far as they + are open to the research of human reason. Theological virtue, on the other hand, is about those same things so far as they + surpass human reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36113" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36113] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod sapientia quae a philosopho ponitur intellectualis +virtus, considerat divina secundum quod sunt investigabilia ratione +humana. Sed theologica virtus est circa ea secundum quod rationem +humanam excedunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Though charity is love, yet love is not always charity. When, then, it is stated that every virtue is the order of love, + this can be understood either of love in the general sense, or of the love of charity. If it be understood of love, commonly + so called, then each virtue is stated to be the order of love, in so far as each cardinal virtue requires ordinate emotions; + and love is the root and cause of every emotion, as stated above (Q[27], A[4]; + Q[28], A[6], ad 2; Q[41], A[2], ad 1). If, however, it be understood of the love of charity, it does not mean that every other + virtue is charity essentially: but that all other virtues depend on charity in some way, as we shall show further on (Q[65], + AA[2],5; + <a href="SS_i.html#SS_Q23_A7" id="FS_Q62_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[23], A[7]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36114" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36114] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, licet caritas sit amor, non tamen omnis amor est +caritas. Cum ergo dicitur quod omnis virtus est ordo amoris, potest +intelligi vel de amore communiter dicto; vel de amore caritatis. Si +de amore communiter dicto, sic dicitur quaelibet virtus esse ordo +amoris, inquantum ad quamlibet cardinalium virtutum requiritur +ordinata affectio, omnis autem affectionis radix et principium est +amor, ut supra dictum est. Si autem intelligatur de amore +caritatis, non datur per hoc intelligi quod quaelibet alia virtus +essentialiter sit caritas, sed quod omnes aliae virtutes +aliqualiter a caritate dependeant, ut infra patebit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q62_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q62_A3-p0.1">Q. 62. A. 3. Whether faith, hope, and charity are fittingly reckoned as theological virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that faith, hope, and charity are not fittingly reckoned as three theological virtues. For the theological + virtues are in relation to Divine happiness, what the natural inclination is in relation to the connatural end. Now among + the virtues directed to the connatural end there is but one natural virtue, viz. the understanding of principles. Therefore + there should be but one theological virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36115" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36115] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter ponantur tres virtutes +theologicae, fides, spes et caritas. Virtutes enim theologicae se +habent in ordine ad beatitudinem divinam, sicut inclinatio naturae +ad finem connaturalem. Sed inter virtutes ordinatas ad finem +connaturalem, ponitur una sola virtus naturalis, scilicet +intellectus principiorum. Ergo debet poni una sola virtus +theologica.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the theological virtues are more perfect than the intellectual and moral virtues. Now faith is not reckoned among + the intellectual virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is imperfect knowledge. Likewise hope is not reckoned + among the moral virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is a passion. Much less therefore should they be reckoned + as theological virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36116" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36116] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +theologicae virtutes sunt perfectiores virtutibus intellectualibus +et moralibus. Sed inter intellectuales virtutes fides non ponitur, +sed est aliquid minus virtute, cum sit cognitio imperfecta. +Similiter etiam inter virtutes morales non ponitur spes, sed est +aliquid minus virtute, cum sit passio. Ergo multo minus debent poni +virtutes theologicae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the theological virtues direct man's soul to God. Now man's soul cannot be directed to God, save through the intellective + part, wherein are the intellect and will. Therefore there should be only two theological virtues, one perfecting the intellect, + the other, the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36117" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36117] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +virtutes theologicae ordinant animam hominis ad Deum. Sed ad Deum +non potest anima hominis ordinari nisi per intellectivam partem, in +qua est intellectus et voluntas. Ergo non debent esse nisi duae +virtutes theologicae, una quae perficiat intellectum, alia quae +perficiat voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q62_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:13</a>): "Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36118" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36118] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XIII, <i>nunc autem manent +fides, spes, caritas, tria haec</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q62_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q62_A1" id="FS_Q62_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the theological virtues direct man to supernatural happiness in the same way as by the natural inclination man is directed + to his connatural end. Now the latter happens in respect of two things. First, in respect of the reason or intellect, in so + far as it contains the first universal principles which are known to us by the natural light of the intellect, and which are + reason's starting-point, both in + speculative and in practical matters. Secondly, through the rectitude of the will which tends naturally to good as defined + by reason. + </p><p id="FS_Q62_A3-p7"> But these two fall short of the order of supernatural happiness, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q62_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:9</a>: "The eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for + them that love Him." Consequently in respect of both the above things man needed to receive in addition something supernatural + to direct him to a supernatural end. First, as regards the intellect, man receives certain supernatural principles, which + are + held by means of a Divine light: these are the articles of faith, about which is faith. Secondly, the will is directed to + this end, both as to that end as something attainable---and this pertains to hope---and as to a certain spiritual union, whereby + the will is, so to speak, transformed into that end---and this belongs to charity. For the appetite of a thing is moved and + tends towards its connatural end naturally; and this movement is due to a certain conformity of the thing with its end. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 3 co."><a name="36119" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36119] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtutes theologicae hoc +modo ordinant hominem ad beatitudinem supernaturalem, sicut per +naturalem inclinationem ordinatur homo in finem sibi connaturalem. +Hoc autem contingit secundum duo. Primo quidem, secundum rationem +vel intellectum, inquantum continet prima principia universalia +cognita nobis per naturale lumen intellectus, ex quibus procedit +ratio tam in speculandis quam in agendis. Secundo, per rectitudinem +voluntatis naturaliter tendentis in bonum rationis. Sed haec duo +deficiunt ab ordine beatitudinis supernaturalis; secundum illud I +ad Cor. II, <i>oculus non vidit, et auris non audivit, et in cor +hominis non ascendit, quae praeparavit Deus diligentibus se</i>. +Unde oportuit quod quantum ad utrumque, aliquid homini +supernaturaliter adderetur, ad ordinandum ipsum in finem +supernaturalem. Et primo quidem, quantum ad intellectum, adduntur +homini quaedam principia supernaturalia, quae divino lumine +capiuntur, et haec sunt credibilia, de quibus est fides. Secundo +vero, voluntas ordinatur in illum finem et quantum ad motum +intentionis, in ipsum tendentem sicut in id quod est possibile +consequi, quod pertinet ad spem, et quantum ad unionem quandam +spiritualem, per quam quodammodo transformatur in illum finem, quod +fit per caritatem. Appetitus enim uniuscuiusque rei naturaliter +movetur et tendit in finem sibi connaturalem, et iste motus +provenit ex quadam conformitate rei ad suum finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intellect requires intelligible species whereby to understand: consequently there is need of a natural habit in addition + to the power. But the very nature of the will suffices for it to be directed naturally to the end, both as to the intention + of the end and as to its conformity with the end. But the nature of the power is insufficient in either of these respects, + for the will to be directed to things that are above its nature. Consequently there + was need for an additional supernatural habit in both respects. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36120" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36120] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod intellectus indiget speciebus intelligibilibus, +per quas intelligat, et ideo oportet quod in eo ponatur aliquis +habitus naturalis superadditus potentiae. Sed ipsa natura +voluntatis sufficit ad naturalem ordinem in finem, sive quantum ad +intentionem finis, sive quantum ad conformitatem ad ipsum. Sed in +ordine ad ea quae supra naturam sunt, ad nihil horum sufficit +natura potentiae. Et ideo oportet fieri superadditionem habitus +supernaturalis quantum ad utrumque.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Faith and hope imply a certain imperfection: since faith is of things unseen, and hope, of things not possessed. Hence faith + and hope, in things that are subject to human power, fall short of the notion of virtue. But faith and hope in things which + are above the capacity of human nature surpass all virtue that is in proportion to man, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q62_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.1.25" target="asv">1 Cor. 1:25</a>: "The weakness of God is stronger than men." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36121" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36121] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod fides et spes imperfectionem quandam important, quia +fides est de his quae non videntur, et spes de his quae non +habentur. Unde habere fidem et spem de his quae subduntur humanae +potestati, deficit a ratione virtutis. Sed habere fidem et spem de +his quae sunt supra facultatem naturae humanae, excedit omnem +virtutem homini proportionatam; secundum illud I ad Cor. I, <i>quod +infirmum est Dei, fortius est hominibus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Two things pertain to the appetite, viz. movement to the end, and conformity with the end by means of love. Hence there must + needs be two theological virtues in the human appetite, namely, hope and charity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36122" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36122] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ad appetitum duo pertinent, scilicet motus in finem; +et conformatio ad finem per amorem. Et sic oportet quod in appetitu +humano duae virtutes theologicae ponantur, scilicet spes et +caritas.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q62_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q62_A4-p0.1">Q. 62. A. 4. Whether faith precedes hope, and hope charity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the order of the theological virtues is not that faith precedes hope, and hope charity. For the root precedes + that which grows from it. Now charity is the root of all the virtues, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q62_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.17" target="asv"> Eph. 3:17</a>: "Being rooted and founded in charity." Therefore charity precedes the others. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36123" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36123] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit hic ordo theologicarum +virtutum, quod fides sit prior spe, et spes prior caritate. Radix +enim est prior eo quod est ex radice. Sed caritas est radix omnium +virtutum; secundum illud ad Ephes. III, <i>in caritate radicati et +fundati</i>. Ergo caritas est prior aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i): "A man cannot love what he does not believe to exist. But if he believes and + loves, by doing good works he ends in hoping." Therefore it seems that faith precedes charity, and charity hope. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36124" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36124] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in I de Doct. Christ., <i>non potest aliquis +diligere quod esse non crediderit. Porro si credit et diligit, bene +agendo efficit ut etiam speret</i>. Ergo videtur quod fides +praecedat caritatem, et caritas spem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, love is the principle of all our emotions, as stated above (A[2], ad 3). Now hope is a kind of emotion, since it + is a passion, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q25_A2" id="FS_Q62_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[25], A[2]</a>). Therefore charity, which is love, precedes hope. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36125" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36125] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +amor est principium omnis affectionis, ut supra dictum est. Sed +spes nominat quandam affectionem; est enim quaedam passio, ut supra +dictum est. Ergo caritas, quae est amor, est prior spe.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle enumerates them thus ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q62_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:13</a>): "Now there remain faith, hope, charity." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36126" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36126] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est ordo quo apostolus ista enumerat, dicens, <i>nunc autem manent +fides, spes, caritas</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q62_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Order is twofold: order of generation, and order of perfection. By order of generation, in respect of which matter precedes + form, and the imperfect precedes the perfect, in one same subject faith precedes hope, and hope charity, as to their acts: + because habits are all infused together. For the movement of the appetite cannot tend to anything, either by hoping or loving, + unless that thing be apprehended by the sense or by the intellect. Now it is by faith + that the intellect apprehends the object of hope and love. Hence in the order of generation, faith precedes hope and charity. + In like manner a man loves a thing because he apprehends it as his good. Now from the very fact that a man hopes to be able + to obtain some good through someone, he looks on the man in whom he hopes as a good of his own. Hence for the very reason + that a man hopes in someone, he proceeds to love him: so that in the order of generation, hope precedes charity as regards + their respective acts. + </p><p id="FS_Q62_A4-p7"> But in the order of perfection, charity precedes faith and hope: because both faith and hope are quickened by charity, and + receive from charity their full complement as virtues. For thus charity is the mother and the root of all the virtues, inasmuch + as it is the form of them all, as we shall state further on ( + <a href="SS_i.html#SS_Q23_A8" id="FS_Q62_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[23], A[8]</a>). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 4 co."><a name="36127" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36127] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod duplex est ordo, scilicet generationis, et +perfectionis. Ordine quidem generationis, quo materia est prior +forma, et imperfectum perfecto, in uno et eodem; fides praecedit +spem, et spes caritatem, secundum actus (nam habitus simul +infunduntur). Non enim potest in aliquid motus appetitivus tendere +vel sperando vel amando, nisi quod est apprehensum sensu aut +intellectu. Per fidem autem apprehendit intellectus ea quae sperat +et amat. Unde oportet quod, ordine generationis, fides praecedat +spem et caritatem. Similiter autem ex hoc homo aliquid amat, quod +apprehendit illud ut bonum suum. Per hoc autem quod homo ab aliquo +sperat se bonum consequi posse, reputat ipsum in quo spem habet, +quoddam bonum suum. Unde ex hoc ipso quod homo sperat de aliquo, +procedit ad amandum ipsum. Et sic, ordine generationis, secundum +actus, spes praecedit caritatem. Ordine vero perfectionis, caritas +praecedit fidem et spem, eo quod tam fides quam spes per caritatem +formatur, et perfectionem virtutis acquirit. Sic enim caritas est +mater omnium virtutum et radix, inquantum est omnium virtutum +forma, ut infra dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A4-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36128" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36128] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc +patet responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine is speaking of that hope whereby a man hopes to obtain bliss through the merits which he has already: this belongs + to hope quickened by and following charity. But it is possible for a man before having charity, to hope through merits not + already possessed, but which he hopes to possess. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36129" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36129] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de spe qua quis sperat ex meritis +iam habitis se ad beatitudinem perventurum, quod est spei formatae, +quae sequitur caritatem. Potest autem aliquis sperare antequam +habeat caritatem, non ex meritis quae iam habet, sed quae sperat se +habiturum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q40_A7" id="FS_Q62_A4-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[40], A[7]</a>), in treating of the passions, hope regards two things. One as its principal object, viz. the good hoped for. With regard + to this, love always precedes hope: for good is never hoped for unless it be desired and loved. Hope also regards the person + from whom a man hopes to be able to obtain some good. With regard to this, hope precedes love at first; though afterwards + hope is increased by love. + Because from the fact that a man thinks that he can obtain a good through someone, he begins to love him: and from the fact + that he loves him, he then hopes all the more in him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36130" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36130] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum de passionibus ageretur, +spes respicit duo. Unum quidem sicut principale obiectum, scilicet +bonum quod speratur. Et respectu huius, semper amor praecedit spem, +nunquam enim speratur aliquod bonum nisi desideratum et amatum. +Respicit etiam spes illum a quo se sperat posse consequi bonum. Et +respectu huius, primo quidem spes praecedit amorem; quamvis postea +ex ipso amore spes augeatur. Per hoc enim quod aliquis reputat per +aliquem se posse consequi aliquod bonum, incipit amare ipsum, et ex +hoc ipso quod ipsum amat, postea fortius de eo sperat.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q63" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q63-p0.1">Q. 63. OF THE CAUSE OF VIRTUES (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q63-p2"> We must now consider the cause of virtues; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q63-p3"><a href="#FS_Q63_A1"> (1) Whether virtue is in us by nature?</a></p><p id="FS_Q63-p4"><a href="#FS_Q63_A2"> (2) Whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation?</a></p><p id="FS_Q63-p5"><a href="#FS_Q63_A3"> (3) Whether any moral virtues are in us by infusion?</a></p><p id="FS_Q63-p6"><a href="#FS_Q63_A4"> (4) Whether virtue acquired by habituation, is of the same species as infused virtue?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 pr."><a name="36131" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36131] +Iª-IIae q. 63 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causa +virtutum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum virtus sit +in nobis a natura. Secundo, utrum aliqua virtus causetur in nobis +ex assuetudine operum. Tertio, utrum aliquae virtutes morales sint +in nobis per infusionem. Quarto, utrum virtus quam acquirimus ex +assuetudine operum, sit eiusdem speciei cum virtute infusa.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q63_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q63_A1-p0.1">Q. 63. A. 1. Whether virtue is in us by nature? </h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that virtue is in us by nature. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14): "Virtues are natural to us and + are equally in all of us." And Antony says in his sermon to the monks: "If the will contradicts nature it is perverse, if + it follow nature it is virtuous." Moreover, a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.23" target="asv"> Mat. 4:23, </a> "Jesus went about," etc., says: "He taught them natural virtues, i.e. chastity, justice, humility, which man possesses naturally." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36132" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36132] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus sit in nobis a natura. Dicit +enim Damascenus, in III libro, <i>naturales sunt virtutes, et +aequaliter insunt omnibus</i>. Et Antonius dicit, in sermone ad +monachos, <i>si naturam voluntas mutaverit, perversitas est; +conditio servetur, et virtus est</i>. Et Matth. IV, super illud, +<i>circuibat Iesus</i> etc., dicit Glossa, <i>docet naturales +iustitias, scilicet castitatem, iustitiam, humilitatem, quas +naturaliter habet homo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the virtuous good consists in accord with reason, as was clearly shown above ( + <a href="#FS_Q55_A4" id="FS_Q63_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[4]</a>, ad 2). But that which accords with reason is natural to man; since reason is part of man's nature. Therefore virtue is in + man by nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36133" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36133] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +bonum virtutis est secundum rationem esse, ut ex dictis patet. Sed +id quod est secundum rationem, est homini naturale, cum ratio sit +hominis natura. Ergo virtus inest homini a natura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is in us from birth is said to be natural to us. Now virtues are in some from birth: for it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.31.18" target="asv">Job 31:18</a>): "From my infancy mercy grew up with me; and it came out with me from my mother's womb." Therefore virtue is in man by nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36134" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36134] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +illud dicitur esse nobis naturale, quod nobis a nativitate inest. +Sed virtutes quibusdam a nativitate insunt, dicitur enim Iob XXXI, +<i>ab infantia crevit mecum miseratio, et de utero egressa est +mecum</i>. Ergo virtus inest homini a natura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is in man by nature is common to all men, and is not taken away by sin, since even in the demons natural gifts remain, + as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). But virtue is not in all men; and is cast out by sin. Therefore it is not in man by nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36135" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36135] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +id quod inest homini a natura, est omnibus hominibus commune, et +non tollitur per peccatum, quia etiam in Daemonibus bona naturalia +manent, ut Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed virtus non +inest omnibus hominibus; et abiicitur per peccatum. Ergo non inest +homini a natura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q63_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> With regard to corporeal forms, it has been maintained by some that they are wholly from within, by those, for instance, + who upheld the theory of "latent forms" [*Anaxagoras; Cf. + <a href="FP_iv.html#FP_Q45_A8" id="FS_Q63_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[45], A[8]</a>; Q[65], A[4]]. Others held that forms are entirely from without, those, for instance, who thought that corporeal forms originated + from some separate cause. Others, however, esteemed that they are partly from within, in so far as they + pre-exist potentially in matter; and partly from without, in so far as they are brought into act by the agent. + </p><p id="FS_Q63_A1-p7"> In like manner with regard to sciences and virtues, some held that they are wholly from within, so that all virtues and sciences + would pre-exist in the soul naturally, but that the hindrances to science and virtue, which are due to the soul being weighed + down by the body, are removed by study and practice, even as iron is made bright by being polished. This was the opinion of + the Platonists. Others said that they are wholly from without, being due to the inflow of the active + intellect, as Avicenna maintained. Others said that sciences and virtues are within us by nature, so far as we are adapted + to them, but not in their perfection: this is the teaching of the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1), and is nearer the truth. + </p><p id="FS_Q63_A1-p8"> To make this clear, it must be observed that there are two ways in which something is said to be natural to a man; one is + according to his specific nature, the other according to his individual nature. And, since each thing derives its species + from its form, and its individuation from matter, and, again, since man's form is his rational soul, while his matter is his + body, whatever belongs to him in respect of his rational soul, is natural to him in respect of his specific + nature; while whatever belongs to him in respect of the particular temperament of his body, is natural to him in respect of + his individual nature. For whatever is natural to man in respect of his body, considered as part of his species, is to be + referred, in a way, to the soul, in so far as this particular body is adapted to this particular soul. + </p><p id="FS_Q63_A1-p9"> In both these ways virtue is natural to man inchoatively. This is so in respect of the specific nature, in so far as in man's + reason are to be found instilled by nature certain naturally known principles of both knowledge and action, which are the + nurseries of intellectual and moral virtues, and in so far as there is in the will a natural appetite for good in accordance + with reason. Again, this is so in respect of the individual nature, in so far as by reason of a disposition in + the body, some are disposed either well or ill to certain virtues: because, to wit, certain sensitive powers are acts of certain + parts of the body, according to the disposition of which these powers are helped or hindered in the exercise of their acts, + and, in consequence, the rational powers also, which the aforesaid sensitive powers assist. In this way one man has a natural + aptitude for science, another for fortitude, another for temperance: and in these ways, both intellectual and moral + virtues are in us by way of a natural aptitude, inchoatively, but not perfectly, since nature is determined to one, while + the perfection of these virtues does not depend on one particular mode of action, but on various modes, in respect of the + various matters, which constitute the sphere of virtue's action, and according to various circumstances. + </p><p id="FS_Q63_A1-p10"> It is therefore evident that all virtues are in us by nature, according to aptitude and inchoation, but not according to + perfection, except the theological virtues, which are entirely from without. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 1 co."><a name="36136" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36136] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod circa formas corporales, aliqui dixerunt quod sunt +totaliter ab intrinseco, sicut ponentes latitationem formarum. +Aliqui vero, quod totaliter sint ab extrinseco, sicut ponentes +formas corporales esse ab aliqua causa separata. Aliqui vero, quod +partim sint ab intrinseco, inquantum scilicet praeexistunt in +materia in potentia; et partim ab extrinseco, inquantum scilicet +reducuntur ad actum per agens. Ita etiam circa scientias et +virtutes, aliqui quidem posuerunt eas totaliter esse ab intrinseco, +ita scilicet quod omnes virtutes et scientiae naturaliter +praeexistunt in anima; sed per disciplinam et exercitium +impedimenta scientiae et virtutis tolluntur, quae adveniunt animae +ex corporis gravitate; sicut cum ferrum clarificatur per +limationem. Et haec fuit opinio Platonicorum. Alii vero dixerunt +quod sunt totaliter ab extrinseco, idest ex influentia +intelligentiae agentis, ut ponit Avicenna. Alii vero dixerunt quod +secundum aptitudinem scientiae et virtutes sunt in nobis a natura, +non autem secundum perfectionem, ut philosophus dicit, in II Ethic. +Et hoc verius est. Ad cuius manifestationem, oportet considerare +quod aliquid dicitur alicui homini naturale dupliciter, uno modo, +ex natura speciei; alio modo, ex natura individui. Et quia +unumquodque habet speciem secundum suam formam, individuatur vero +secundum materiam; forma vero hominis est anima rationalis, materia +vero corpus, id quod convenit homini secundum animam rationalem, +est ei naturale secundum rationem speciei; id vero quod est ei +naturale secundum determinatam corporis complexionem, est ei +naturale secundum naturam individui. Quod enim est naturale homini +ex parte corporis secundum speciem, quodammodo refertur ad animam, +inquantum scilicet tale corpus est tali animae proportionatum. +Utroque autem modo virtus est homini naturalis secundum quandam +inchoationem. Secundum quidem naturam speciei, inquantum in ratione +homini insunt naturaliter quaedam principia naturaliter cognita tam +scibilium quam agendorum, quae sunt quaedam seminalia +intellectualium virtutum et moralium; et inquantum in voluntate +inest quidam naturalis appetitus boni quod est secundum rationem. +Secundum vero naturam individui, inquantum ex corporis dispositione +aliqui sunt dispositi vel melius vel peius ad quasdam virtutes, +prout scilicet vires quaedam sensitivae actus sunt quarundam +partium corporis, ex quarum dispositione adiuvantur vel impediuntur +huiusmodi vires in suis actibus, et per consequens vires +rationales, quibus huiusmodi sensitivae vires deserviunt. Et +secundum hoc, unus homo habet naturalem aptitudinem ad scientiam, +alius ad fortitudinem, alius ad temperantiam. Et his modis tam +virtutes intellectuales quam morales, secundum quandam aptitudinis +inchoationem, sunt in nobis a natura. Non autem consummatio earum. +Quia natura determinatur ad unum, consummatio autem huiusmodi +virtutum non est secundum unum modum actionis, sed diversimode, +secundum diversas materias in quibus virtutes operantur, et +secundum diversas circumstantias. Sic ergo patet quod virtutes in +nobis sunt a natura secundum aptitudinem et inchoationem, non autem +secundum perfectionem, praeter virtutes theologicas, quae sunt +totaliter ab extrinseco.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A1-p11"><b>Reply to Objections:</b> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two argue about the nurseries of virtue which are in us by + nature, inasmuch as we are rational beings. The third objection must be taken in the sense that, owing to the natural disposition + which the body has from birth, one has an aptitude for pity, another for living temperately, another for some other virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36137" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36137] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc +patet responsio ad obiecta. Nam primae duae rationes procedunt +secundum quod seminalia virtutum insunt nobis a natura, inquantum +rationales sumus. Tertia vero ratio procedit secundum quod ex +naturali dispositione corporis, quam habet ex nativitate, unus +habet aptitudinem ad miserendum, alius ad temperate vivendum, alius +ad aliam virtutem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q63_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q63_A2-p0.1">Q. 63. A. 2. Whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that virtues can not be caused in us by habituation. Because a gloss of Augustine [*Cf. Lib. Sentent. Prosperi + cvi.] commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.14.23" target="asv"> Rom. 14:23, </a> "All that is not of faith is sin," says: "The whole life of an unbeliever is a sin: and there is no good without the Sovereign + Good. Where knowledge of the truth is lacking, virtue is a mockery even in the best behaved people." Now faith cannot be acquired + by means of works, but is + caused in us by God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A2-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.8" target="asv"> Eph. 2:8</a>: "By grace you are saved through faith." Therefore no acquired virtue can be in us by habituation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36138" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36138] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes in nobis causari non possint +ex assuetudine operum. Quia super illud Rom. XIV, <i>omne quod non +est ex fide, peccatum est</i>, dicit Glossa Augustini, <i>omnis +infidelium vita peccatum est; et nihil est bonum sine summo bono. +Ubi deest cognitio veritatis, falsa est virtus etiam in optimis +moribus</i>. Sed fides non potest acquiri ex operibus, sed causatur +in nobis a Deo; secundum illud Ephes. II, <i>gratia estis salvati +per fidem</i>. Ergo nulla virtus potest in nobis acquiri ex +assuetudine operum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin and virtue are contraries, so that they are incompatible. Now man cannot avoid sin except by the grace of God, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.21" target="asv"> Wis. 8:21</a>: "I knew that I could not otherwise be continent, except God gave it." Therefore neither can any virtues be caused in us + by habituation, but only by the gift of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36139" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36139] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum, cum contrarietur virtuti, non compatitur secum virtutem. +Sed homo non potest vitare peccatum nisi per gratiam Dei; secundum +illud Sap. VIII, <i>didici quod non possum esse aliter continens, +nisi Deus det</i>. Ergo nec virtutes aliquae possunt in nobis +causari ex assuetudine operum; sed solum dono Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, actions which lead toward virtue, lack the perfection of virtue. But an effect cannot be more perfect than its cause. + Therefore a virtue cannot be caused by actions that precede it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36140" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36140] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +actus qui sunt in virtutem, deficiunt a perfectione virtutis. Sed +effectus non potest esse perfectior causa. Ergo virtus non potest +causari ex actibus praecedentibus virtutem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that good is more efficacious than evil. But vicious habits are caused by evil acts. Much more, + therefore, can virtuous habits be caused by good acts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36141" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36141] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod bonum est +virtuosius quam malum. Sed ex malis actibus causantur habitus +vitiorum. Ergo multo magis ex bonis actibus possunt causari habitus +virtutum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We have spoken above ( + <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q51_A2" id="FS_Q63_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[51], AA[2]</a>,3) in a general way about the production of habits from acts; and speaking now in a special way of this matter in relation + to virtue, we must take note that, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q55_A3" id="FS_Q63_A2-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[55], AA[3]</a>,4), man's virtue perfects him in relation to good. Now since the notion of good consists in "mode, species, and order," as + Augustine states (De Nat. Boni. iii) or in "number, weight, and + measure," as expressed in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A2-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.21" target="asv"> Wis. 11:21, </a> man's good must needs be appraised with respect to some rule. Now this rule is twofold, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q19_A3" id="FS_Q63_A2-p6.4" shape="rect">Q[19], AA[3]</a>,4), viz. human reason and Divine Law. And since Divine Law is the higher rule, it extends to more things, so that whatever + is ruled by human reason, is ruled by the Divine Law too; but the converse does not hold. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 2 co."><a name="36142" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36142] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod de generatione habituum ex actibus, supra in generali +dictum est. Nunc autem specialiter quantum ad virtutem, +considerandum est quod sicut supra dictum est, virtus hominis +perficit ipsum ad bonum. Cum autem ratio boni consistat in modo, +specie et ordine, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de natura boni; sive +in numero, pondere et mensura, ut dicitur Sap. XI, oportet quod +bonum hominis secundum aliquam regulam consideretur. Quae quidem +est duplex, ut supra dictum est, scilicet ratio humana, et lex +divina. Et quia lex divina est superior regula, ideo ad plura se +extendit, ita quod quidquid regulatur ratione humana, regulatur +etiam lege divina, sed non convertitur. Virtus igitur hominis +ordinata ad bonum quod modificatur secundum regulam rationis +humanae, potest ex actibus humanis causari, inquantum huiusmodi +actus procedunt a ratione, sub cuius potestate et regula tale bonum +consistit. Virtus vero ordinans hominem ad bonum secundum quod +modificatur per legem divinam, et non per rationem humanam, non +potest causari per actus humanos, quorum principium est ratio, sed +causatur solum in nobis per operationem divinam. Et ideo, huiusmodi +virtutem definiens, Augustinus posuit in definitione virtutis, quam +Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A2-p7"> It follows that human virtue directed to the good which is defined according to the rule of human reason can be caused by + human acts: inasmuch as such acts proceed from reason, by whose power and rule the aforesaid good is established. On the other + hand, virtue which directs man to good as defined by the Divine Law, and not by human reason, cannot be caused by human acts, + the principle of which is reason, but is produced in us by the Divine operation alone. Hence Augustine in + giving the definition of the latter virtue inserts the words, "which God works in us without us" (Super + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118" target="asv">Ps. 118</a>, Serm. xxvi). It is also of these virtues that the First Objection holds good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36143" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36143] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Et de +huiusmodi etiam virtutibus prima ratio procedit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Mortal sin is incompatible with divinely infused virtue, especially if this be considered in its perfect state. But actual + sin, even mortal, is compatible with humanly acquired virtue; because the use of a habit in us is subject to our will, as + stated above ( + <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q49_A3" id="FS_Q63_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[3]</a>): and one sinful act does not destroy a habit of acquired virtue, since it is not an act but a habit, that is directly contrary + to a habit. Wherefore, though + man cannot avoid mortal sin without grace, so as never to sin mortally, yet he is not hindered from acquiring a habit of virtue, + whereby he may abstain from evil in the majority of cases, and chiefly in matters most opposed to reason. There are also certain + mortal sins which man can nowise avoid without grace, those, namely, which are directly opposed to the theological virtues, + which are in us through the gift of grace. This, however, will be more fully explained later ( + <a href="FS_vii.html#FS_Q109_A4" id="FS_Q63_A2-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[109], A[4]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36144" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36144] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod virtus divinitus infusa, maxime si in sua perfectione +consideretur, non compatitur secum aliquod peccatum mortale. Sed +virtus humanitus acquisita potest secum compati aliquem actum +peccati, etiam mortalis, quia usus habitus in nobis est nostrae +voluntati subiectus, ut supra dictum est; non autem per unum actum +peccati corrumpitur habitus virtutis acquisitae; habitui enim non +contrariatur directe actus, sed habitus. Et ideo, licet sine gratia +homo non possit peccatum mortale vitare, ita quod nunquam peccet +mortaliter; non tamen impeditur quin possit habitum virtutis +acquirere, per quam a malis operibus abstineat ut in pluribus, et +praecipue ab his quae sunt valde rationi contraria. Sunt etiam +quaedam peccata mortalia quae homo sine gratia nullo modo potest +vitare, quae scilicet directe opponuntur virtutibus theologicis, +quae ex dono gratiae sunt in nobis. Hoc tamen infra manifestius +fiet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q63_A1" id="FS_Q63_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[1];</a> Q[51], A[1]), certain seeds or principles of acquired virtue pre-exist in us by nature. These principles are more excellent + than the virtues acquired through them: thus the understanding of speculative principles is more excellent than the science + of conclusions, and the natural rectitude of the reason is more excellent than the rectification of the appetite which results + through the appetite partaking + of reason, which rectification belongs to moral virtue. Accordingly human acts, in so far as they proceed from higher principles, + can cause acquired human virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36145" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36145] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, virtutum acquisitarum praeexistunt +in nobis quaedam semina sive principia, secundum naturam. Quae +quidem principia sunt nobiliora virtutibus eorum virtute +acquisitis, sicut intellectus principiorum speculabilium est +nobilior scientia conclusionum; et naturalis rectitudo rationis est +nobilior rectificatione appetitus quae fit per participationem +rationis, quae quidem rectificatio pertinet ad virtutem moralem. +Sic igitur actus humani, inquantum procedunt ex altioribus +principiis, possunt causare virtutes acquisitas humanas.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q63_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q63_A3-p0.1">Q. 63. A. 3. Whether any moral virtues are in us by infusion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no virtues besides the theological virtues are infused in us by God. Because God does not do by Himself, + save perhaps sometimes miraculously, those things that can be done by second causes; for, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv), + "it is God's rule to bring about extremes through the mean." Now intellectual and moral virtues can be caused in us by our + acts, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q63_A2" id="FS_Q63_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore it is not reasonable that + they should be caused in us by infusion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36146" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36146] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod praeter virtutes theologicas, non sint +aliae virtutes nobis infusae a Deo. Ea enim quae possunt fieri a +causis secundis, non fiunt immediate a Deo, nisi forte aliquando +miraculose, quia, ut Dionysius dicit, lex divinitatis est ultima +per media adducere. Sed virtutes intellectuales et morales possunt +in nobis causari per nostros actus, ut dictum est. Non ergo +convenienter causantur in nobis per infusionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, much less superfluity is found in God's works than in the works of nature. Now the theological virtues suffice to + direct us to supernatural good. Therefore there are no other supernatural virtues needing to be caused in us by God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36147" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36147] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +in operibus Dei multo minus est aliquid superfluum quam in operibus +naturae. Sed ad ordinandum nos in bonum supernaturale, sufficiunt +virtutes theologicae. Ergo non sunt aliae virtutes supernaturales, +quas oporteat in nobis causari a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nature does not employ two means where one suffices: much less does God. But God sowed the seeds of virtue in our + souls, according to a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1" target="asv">Heb. 1</a> [*Cf. Jerome on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.1.15" target="asv"> Gal. 1: 15,16</a>]. Therefore it is unfitting for Him to cause in us other virtues by means of infusion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36148" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36148] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +natura non facit per duo, quod potest facere per unum, et multo +minus Deus. Sed Deus inseruit animae nostrae semina virtutum, ut +dicit Glossa Heb. I. Ergo non oportet quod alias virtutes in nobis +per infusionem causet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.7" target="asv">Wis. 8:7</a>): "She teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36149" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36149] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Sap. VIII, <i>sobrietatem et iustitiam docet, +prudentiam et virtutem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Effects must needs be proportionate to their causes and principles. Now all virtues, intellectual and moral, that are acquired + by our actions, arise from certain natural principles pre-existing in us, as above stated + <a href="#FS_Q63_A1" id="FS_Q63_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1];</a> Q[51], A[1]): instead of which natural principles, God bestows on us the theological virtues, whereby we are directed to + a supernatural end, as stated (Q[62], A[1]). Wherefore we need to receive from God other + habits corresponding, in due proportion, to the theological virtues, which habits are to the theological virtues, what the + moral and intellectual virtues are to the natural principles of virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 3 co."><a name="36150" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36150] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod oportet effectus esse suis causis et principiis +proportionatos. Omnes autem virtutes tam intellectuales quam +morales, quae ex nostris actibus acquiruntur, procedunt ex +quibusdam naturalibus principiis in nobis praeexistentibus, ut +supra dictum est. Loco quorum naturalium principiorum, conferuntur +nobis a Deo virtutes theologicae, quibus ordinamur ad finem +supernaturalem, sicut supra dictum est. Unde oportet quod his etiam +virtutibus theologicis proportionaliter respondeant alii habitus +divinitus causati in nobis, qui sic se habeant ad virtutes +theologicas sicut se habent virtutes morales et intellectuales ad +principia naturalia virtutum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some moral and intellectual virtues can indeed be caused in us by our actions: but such are not proportionate to the theological + virtues. Therefore it was necessary for us to receive, from God immediately, others that are proportionate to these virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36151" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36151] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod aliquae quidem virtutes morales et +intellectuales possunt causari in nobis ex nostris actibus, tamen +illae non sunt proportionatae virtutibus theologicis. Et ideo +oportet alias, eis proportionatas, immediate a Deo causari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The theological virtues direct us sufficiently to our supernatural end, inchoatively: i.e. to God Himself immediately. But + the soul needs further to be perfected by infused virtues in regard to other things, yet in relation to God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36152" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36152] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod virtutes theologicae sufficienter nos ordinant in +finem supernaturalem, secundum quandam inchoationem, quantum +scilicet ad ipsum Deum immediate. Sed oportet quod per alias +virtutes infusas perficiatur anima circa alias res, in ordine tamen +ad Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The power of those naturally instilled principles does not extend beyond the capacity of nature. Consequently man needs in + addition to be perfected by other principles in relation to his supernatural end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36153" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36153] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod virtus illorum principiorum naturaliter inditorum, +non se extendit ultra proportionem naturae. Et ideo in ordine ad +finem supernaturalem, indiget homo perfici per alia principia +superaddita.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q63_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q63_A4-p0.1">Q. 63. A. 4. Whether virtue by habituation belongs to the same species as infused virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that infused virtue does not differ in species from acquired virtue. Because acquired and infused virtues, + according to what has been said + <a href="#FS_Q63_A3" id="FS_Q63_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, do not differ seemingly, save in relation to the last end. Now human habits and acts are specified, not by their last, but + by their proximate end. Therefore the infused moral or intellectual virtue does not differ from the acquired virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36154" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36154] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes infusae non sint alterius +speciei a virtutibus acquisitis. Virtus enim acquisita et virtus +infusa, secundum praedicta, non videntur differre nisi secundum +ordinem ad ultimum finem. Sed habitus et actus humani non recipiunt +speciem ab ultimo fine, sed a proximo. Non ergo virtutes morales +vel intellectuales infusae differunt specie ab acquisitis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habits are known by their acts. But the act of infused and acquired temperance is the same, viz. to moderate desires + of touch. Therefore they do not differ in species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36155" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36155] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +habitus per actus cognoscuntur. Sed idem est actus temperantiae +infusae, et acquisitae, scilicet moderari concupiscentias tactus. +Ergo non differunt specie.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, acquired and infused virtue differ as that which is wrought by God immediately, from that which is wrought by a + creature. But the man whom God made, is of the same species as a man begotten naturally; and the eye which He gave to the + man born blind, as one produced by the power of generation. Therefore it seems that acquired and infused virtue belong to + the same species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36156" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36156] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +virtus acquisita et infusa differunt secundum illud quod est +immediate a Deo factum, et a creatura. Sed idem est specie homo +quem Deus formavit, et quem generat natura; et oculus quem caeco +nato dedit, et quem virtus formativa causat. Ergo videtur quod est +eadem specie virtus acquisita, et infusa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Any change introduced into the difference expressed in a definition involves a difference of species. But the definition + of infused virtue contains the words, "which God works in us without us," as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q55_A4" id="FS_Q63_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[4]</a>). Therefore acquired virtue, to which these words cannot apply, is not of the same species as infused virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36157" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36157] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +quaelibet differentia in definitione posita, mutata diversificat +speciem. Sed in definitione virtutis infusae ponitur, quam Deus in +nobis sine nobis operatur, ut supra dictum est. Ergo virtus +acquisita, cui hoc non convenit, non est eiusdem speciei cum +infusa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q63_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There is a twofold specific difference among habits. The first, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q54_A2" id="FS_Q63_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[54], A[2]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q56_A2" id="FS_Q63_A4-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[56], A[2]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q60_A1" id="FS_Q63_A4-p6.3" shape="rect"> Q[60], A[1]</a>), is taken from the specific and formal aspects of their objects. Now the object of every virtue is a good considered as + in that virtue's proper matter: thus the object of temperance is a good in respect of the pleasures connected with the concupiscence + of touch. The + formal aspect of this object is from reason which fixes the mean in these concupiscences: while the material element is something + on the part of the concupiscences. Now it is evident that the mean that is appointed in such like concupiscences according + to the rule of human reason, is seen under a different aspect from the mean which is fixed according to Divine rule. For instance, + in the consumption of food, the mean fixed by human reason, is that food should not harm the health of the body, + nor hinder the use of reason: whereas, according to the Divine rule, it behooves man to "chastise his body, and bring it into + subjection" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A4-p6.4" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.27" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:27</a>), by abstinence in food, drink and the like. It is therefore evident that infused and acquired temperance differ in species; + and the same applies to the other virtues. + </p><p id="FS_Q63_A4-p7"> The other specific differences among habits is taken from the things to which they are directed: for a man's health and a + horse's are not of the same species, on account of the difference between the natures to which their respective healths are + directed. In the same sense, the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 3) that citizens have diverse virtues according as they are + well directed to diverse forms of government. In the same way, too, those infused moral virtues, whereby men + behave well in respect of their being "fellow-citizens with the saints, and of the household [Douay: 'domestics'] of God" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.19" target="asv">Eph. 2:19</a>), differ from the acquired virtues, whereby man behaves well in respect of human affairs. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 4 co."><a name="36158" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36158] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod dupliciter habitus distinguuntur specie. Uno modo, +sicut praedictum est, secundum speciales et formales rationes +obiectorum. Obiectum autem virtutis cuiuslibet est bonum +consideratum in materia propria, sicut temperantiae obiectum est +bonum delectabilium in concupiscentiis tactus. Cuius quidem obiecti +formalis ratio est a ratione, quae instituit modum in his +concupiscentiis, materiale autem est id quod est ex parte +concupiscentiarum. Manifestum est autem quod alterius rationis est +modus qui imponitur in huiusmodi concupiscentiis secundum regulam +rationis humanae, et secundum regulam divinam. Puta in sumptione +ciborum, ratione humana modus statuitur ut non noceat valetudini +corporis, nec impediat rationis actum, secundum autem regulam legis +divinae, requiritur quod homo castiget corpus suum, et in +servitutem redigat, per abstinentiam cibi et potus, et aliorum +huiusmodi. Unde manifestum est quod temperantia infusa et acquisita +differunt specie, et eadem ratio est de aliis virtutibus. Alio modo +habitus distinguuntur specie secundum ea ad quae ordinantur, non +enim est eadem specie sanitas hominis et equi, propter diversas +naturas ad quas ordinantur. Et eodem modo dicit philosophus, in III +Polit., quod diversae sunt virtutes civium, secundum quod bene se +habent ad diversas politias. Et per hunc etiam modum differunt +specie virtutes morales infusae, per quas homines bene se habent in +ordine ad hoc quod sint cives sanctorum et domestici Dei; et aliae +virtutes acquisitae, secundum quas homo se bene habet in ordine ad +res humanas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Infused and acquired virtue differ not only in relation to the ultimate end, but also in relation to their proper objects, + as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36159" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36159] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod virtus infusa et acquisita non solum differunt +secundum ordinem ad ultimum finem; sed etiam secundum ordinem ad +propria obiecta, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Both acquired and infused temperance moderate desires for pleasures of touch, but for different reasons, as stated: wherefore + their respective acts are not identical. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36160" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36160] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod alia ratione modificat concupiscentias delectabilium +tactus temperantia acquisita, et temperantia infusa, ut dictum est. +Unde non habent eundem actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God gave the man born blind an eye for the same act as the act for which other eyes are formed naturally: consequently it + was of the same species. It would be the same if God wished to give a man miraculously virtues, such as those that are acquired + by acts. But the case is not so in the question before us, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36161" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36161] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod oculum caeci nati Deus fecit ad eundem actum ad quem +formantur alii oculi secundum naturam, et ideo fuit eiusdem +speciei. Et eadem ratio esset, si Deus vellet miraculose causare in +homine virtutes quales acquiruntur ex actibus. Sed ita non est in +proposito, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q64" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q64-p0.1">Q. 64. OF THE MEAN OF VIRTUE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q64-p2"> We must now consider the properties of virtues: and (1) the mean of virtue, (2) the connection between virtues, (3) equality + of virtues, (4) the duration of virtues. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FS_Q64-p3"><a href="#FS_Q64_A1"> (1) Whether moral virtue observes the mean?</a></p><p id="FS_Q64-p4"><a href="#FS_Q64_A2"> (2) Whether the mean of moral virtue is the real mean or the rational mean?</a></p><p id="FS_Q64-p5"><a href="#FS_Q64_A3"> (3) Whether the intellectual virtues observe the mean?</a></p><p id="FS_Q64-p6"><a href="#FS_Q64_A4"> (4) Whether the theological virtues do?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 pr."><a name="36162" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36162] +Iª-IIae q. 64 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +proprietatibus virtutum. Et primo quidem, de medio virtutum; +secundo, de connexione virtutum; tertio, de aequalitate earum; +quarto, de ipsarum duratione. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. +Primo, utrum virtutes morales sint in medio. Secundo, utrum medium +virtutis moralis sit medium rei, vel rationis. Tertio, utrum +intellectuales virtutes consistant in medio. Quarto, utrum virtutes +theologicae.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q64_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q64_A1-p0.1">Q. 64. A. 1. Whether moral virtues observe the mean?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtue does not observe the mean. For the nature of a mean is incompatible with that which is extreme. + Now the nature of virtue is to be something extreme; for it is stated in De Coelo i that "virtue is the limit of power." Therefore + moral virtue does not observe the mean. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36163" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36163] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus moralis non consistat in medio. +Ultimum enim repugnat rationi medii. Sed de ratione virtutis est +ultimum, dicitur enim in I de caelo, quod virtus est ultimum +potentiae. Ergo virtus moralis non consistit in medio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the maximum is not a mean. Now some moral virtues tend to a maximum: for instance, magnanimity to very great honors, + and magnificence to very large expenditure, as stated in Ethic. iv, 2,3. Therefore not every moral virtue observes the mean. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36164" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36164] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +illud quod est maximum, non est medium. Sed quaedam virtutes +morales tendunt in aliquod maximum, sicut magnanimitas est circa +maximos honores, et magnificentia circa maximos sumptus, ut dicitur +in IV Ethic. Ergo non omnis virtus moralis est in medio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it is essential to a moral virtue to observe the mean, it follows that a moral virtue is not perfected, but the + contrary corrupted, through tending to something extreme. Now some moral virtues are perfected by tending to something extreme; + thus virginity, which abstains from all sexual pleasure, observes the extreme, and is the most perfect chastity: and to give + all to the poor is the most perfect mercy or liberality. Therefore it seems that it is + not essential to moral virtue that it should observe the mean. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36165" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36165] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +si de ratione virtutis moralis sit in medio esse, oportet quod +virtus moralis non perficiatur, sed magis corrumpatur, per hoc quod +tendit ad extremum. Sed quaedam virtutes morales perficiuntur per +hoc quod tendunt ad extremum, sicut virginitas, quae abstinet ab +omni delectabili venereo, et sic tenet extremum, et est +perfectissima castitas. Et dare omnia pauperibus est perfectissima +misericordia vel liberalitas. Ergo videtur quod non sit de ratione +virtutis moralis esse in medio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "moral virtue is a habit of choosing the mean." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36166" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36166] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod <i>virtus moralis +est habitus electivus in medietate existens</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As already explained ( + <a href="#FS_Q55_A3" id="FS_Q64_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[3]</a>), the nature of virtue is that it should direct man to good. Now moral virtue is properly a perfection of the appetitive + part of the soul in regard to some determinate matter: and the measure or rule of the appetitive movement in respect of appetible + objects is the reason. But the good of that which is measured or ruled consists in its conformity with its rule: thus the + good things made by art is + that they follow the rule of art. Consequently, in things of this sort, evil consists in discordance from their rule or measure. + Now this may happen either by their exceeding the measure or by their falling short of it; as is clearly the case in all things + ruled or measured. Hence it is evident that the good of moral virtue consists in conformity with the rule of reason. Now it + is clear that between excess and deficiency the mean is equality or conformity. Therefore it is evident that moral + virtue observes the mean. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 1 co."><a name="36167" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36167] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ex supradictis patet, virtus de sui ratione +ordinat hominem ad bonum. Moralis autem virtus proprie est +perfectiva appetitivae partis animae circa aliquam determinatam +materiam. Mensura autem et regula appetitivi motus circa +appetibilia, est ipsa ratio. Bonum autem cuiuslibet mensurati et +regulati consistit in hoc quod conformetur suae regulae, sicut +bonum in artificiatis est ut consequantur regulam artis. Malum +autem per consequens in huiusmodi est per hoc quod aliquid +discordat a sua regula vel mensura. Quod quidem contingit vel per +hoc quod superexcedit mensuram, vel per hoc quod deficit ab ea, +sicut manifeste apparet in omnibus regulatis et mensuratis. Et ideo +patet quod bonum virtutis moralis consistit in adaequatione ad +mensuram rationis. Manifestum est autem quod inter excessum et +defectum medium est aequalitas sive conformitas. Unde manifeste +apparet quod virtus moralis in medio consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Moral virtue derives goodness from the rule of reason, while its matter consists in passions or operations. If therefore + we compare moral virtue to reason, then, if we look at that which is has of reason, it holds the position of one extreme, + viz. conformity; while excess and defect take the position of the other extreme, viz. deformity. But if we consider moral + virtue in respect of its matter, then it holds the position of mean, in so far as it makes + the passion conform to the rule of reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "virtue, as to its essence, is a + mean state," in so far as the rule of virtue is imposed on its proper matter: "but it is an extreme in reference to the 'best' + and the 'excellent,'" viz. as to its conformity with reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36168" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36168] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod virtus moralis bonitatem habet ex regula +rationis, pro materia autem habet passiones vel operationes. Si +ergo comparetur virtus moralis ad rationem, sic, secundum id quod +rationis est, habet rationem extremi unius, quod est conformitas, +excessus vero et defectus habet rationem alterius extremi, quod est +difformitas. Si vero consideretur virtus moralis secundum suam +materiam, sic habet rationem medii, inquantum passionem reducit ad +regulam rationis. Unde philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod virtus +secundum substantiam medietas est, inquantum regula virtutis +ponitur circa propriam materiam, secundum optimum autem et bene, +est extremitas, scilicet secundum conformitatem rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In actions and passions the mean and the extremes depend on various circumstances: hence nothing hinders something from being + extreme in a particular virtue as to one circumstance, while the same thing is a mean in respect of other circumstances, through + being in conformity with reason. This is the case with magnanimity and magnificence. For if we look at the absolute quantity + of the respective objects of these virtues, we shall call it an extreme and + a maximum: but if we consider the quantity in relation to other circumstances, then it has the character of a mean: since + these virtues tend to this maximum in accordance with the rule of reason, i.e. "where" it is right, "when" it is right, and + for an "end" that is right. There will be excess, if one tends to this maximum "when" it is not right, or "where" it is not + right, or for an undue "end"; and there will be deficiency if one fails to tend thereto "where" one ought, and "when" one + aught. + This agrees with the saying of the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) that the "magnanimous man observes the extreme in quantity, + but the mean in the right mode of his action." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36169" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36169] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod medium et extrema considerantur in actionibus et +passionibus secundum diversas circumstantias, unde nihil prohibet +in aliqua virtute esse extremum secundum unam circumstantiam, quod +tamen est medium secundum alias circumstantias, per conformitatem +ad rationem. Et sic est in magnificentia et magnanimitate. Nam si +consideretur quantitas absoluta eius in quod tendit magnificus et +magnanimus, dicetur extremum et maximum, sed si consideretur hoc +ipsum per comparationem ad alias circumstantias, sic habet rationem +medii; quia in hoc tendunt huiusmodi virtutes secundum regulam +rationis, idest ubi oportet, et quando oportet, et propter quod +oportet. Excessus autem, si in hoc maximum tendatur quando non +oportet, vel ubi non oportet, vel propter quod non oportet; +defectus autem est, si non tendatur in hoc maximum ubi oportet, et +quando oportet. Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., +quod <i>magnanimus est quidem magnitudine extremus; eo autem quod +ut oportet, medius</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same is to be said of virginity and poverty as of magnanimity. For virginity abstains from all sexual matters, and poverty + from all wealth, for a right end, and in a right manner, i.e. according to God's word, and for the sake of eternal life. But + if this be done in an undue manner, i.e. out of unlawful superstition, or again for vainglory, it will be in excess. And if + it be not done when it ought to be done, or as it ought to be done, it is a + vice by deficiency: for instance, in those who break their vows of virginity or poverty. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36170" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36170] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod eadem ratio est de virginitate et paupertate, quae +est de magnanimitate. Abstinet enim virginitas ab omnibus venereis, +et paupertas ab omnibus divitiis, propter quod oportet, et secundum +quod oportet; idest secundum mandatum Dei, et propter vitam +aeternam. Si autem hoc fiat secundum quod non oportet, idest +secundum aliquam superstitionem illicitam, vel etiam propter inanem +gloriam; erit superfluum. Si autem non fiat quando oportet, vel +secundum quod oportet, est vitium per defectum, ut patet in +transgredientibus votum virginitatis vel paupertatis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q64_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q64_A2-p0.1">Q. 64. A. 2. Whether the mean of moral virtue is the real mean, or the rational mean?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the mean of moral virtue is not the rational mean, but the real mean. For the good of moral virtue consists + in its observing the mean. Now, good, as stated in Metaph. ii, text. 8, is in things themselves. Therefore the mean of moral + virtue is a real mean. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36171" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36171] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod medium virtutis moralis non sit medium +rationis, sed medium rei. Bonum enim virtutis moralis consistit in +hoc quod est in medio. Bonum autem, ut dicitur in VI Metaphys., est +in rebus ipsis. Ergo medium virtutis moralis est medium rei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the reason is a power of apprehension. But moral virtue does not observe a mean between apprehensions, but rather + a mean between operations or passions. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is not the rational, but the real mean. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36172" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36172] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ratio est vis apprehensiva. Sed virtus moralis non consistit in +medio apprehensionum; sed magis in medio operationum et passionum. +Ergo medium virtutis moralis non est medium rationis, sed medium +rei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a mean that is observed according to arithmetical or geometrical proportion is a real mean. Now such is the mean + of justice, as stated in Ethic. v, 3. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is not the rational, but the real mean. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36173" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36173] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +medium quod accipitur secundum proportionem arithmeticam vel +geometricam, est medium rei. Sed tale est medium iustitiae, ut +dicitur in V Ethic. Ergo medium virtutis moralis non est medium +rationis, sed rei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "moral virtue observes the mean fixed, in our regard, by reason." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36174" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36174] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod <i>virtus moralis in +medio consistit quoad nos, determinata ratione</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q64_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The rational mean can be understood in two ways. First, according as the mean is observed in the act itself of reason, as + though the very act of reason were made to observe the mean: in this sense, since moral virtue perfects not the act of reason, + but the act of the appetitive power, the mean of moral virtue is not the rational mean. Secondly, the mean of reason may be + considered as that which the reason puts into some particular matter. In this sense every + mean of moral virtue is a rational mean, since, as above stated + <a href="#FS_Q64_A1" id="FS_Q64_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, moral virtue is said to observe the mean, through conformity with right reason. + </p><p id="FS_Q64_A2-p7"> But it happens sometimes that the rational mean is also the real mean: in which case the mean of moral virtue is the real + mean, for instance, in justice. On the other hand, sometimes the rational mean is not the real mean, but is considered in + relation to us: and such is the mean in all the other moral virtues. The reason for this is that justice is about operations, + which deal with external things, wherein the right has to be established simply and absolutely, as stated above + ( + <a href="#FS_Q60_A2" id="FS_Q64_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[60], A[2]</a>): wherefore the rational mean in justice is the same as the real mean, in so far, to wit as justice gives to each one his + due, neither more nor less. But the other moral virtues deal with interior passions wherein the right cannot be established + in the same way, since men are variously situated in relation to their passions; hence the rectitude of reason has to be established + in the passions, with due regard to us, who are moved in respect of the + passions. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 2 co."><a name="36175" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36175] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod medium rationis dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno +modo, secundum quod medium in ipso actu rationis existit, quasi +ipse actus rationis ad medium reducatur. Et sic, quia virtus +moralis non perficit actum rationis, sed actum virtutis +appetitivae; medium virtutis moralis non est medium rationis. Alio +modo potest dici medium rationis id quod a ratione ponitur in +aliqua materia. Et sic omne medium virtutis moralis est medium +rationis, quia, sicut dictum est, virtus moralis dicitur consistere +in medio, per conformitatem ad rationem rectam. Sed quandoque +contingit quod medium rationis est etiam medium rei, et tunc +oportet quod virtutis moralis medium sit medium rei; sicut est in +iustitia. Quandoque autem medium rationis non est medium rei, sed +accipitur per comparationem ad nos, et sic est medium in omnibus +aliis virtutibus moralibus. Cuius ratio est quia iustitia est circa +operationes, quae consistunt in rebus exterioribus, in quibus +rectum institui debet simpliciter et secundum se, ut supra dictum +est, et ideo medium rationis in iustitia est idem cum medio rei, +inquantum scilicet iustitia dat unicuique quod debet, et non plus +nec minus. Aliae vero virtutes morales consistunt circa passiones +interiores, in quibus non potest rectum constitui eodem modo, +propter hoc quod homines diversimode se habent ad passiones, et +ideo oportet quod rectitudo rationis in passionibus instituatur per +respectum ad nos, qui afficimur secundum passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A2-p8"><b>Reply to Objections:</b> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two arguments take the rational mean as being in the very + act of reason, while the third argues from the mean of justice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36176" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36176] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc +patet responsio ad obiecta. Nam, primae duae rationes procedunt de +medio rationis quod scilicet invenitur in ipso actu rationis. +Tertia vero ratio procedit de medio iustitiae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q64_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q64_A3-p0.1">Q. 64. A. 3. Whether the intellectual virtues observe the mean?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual virtues do not observe the mean. Because moral virtue observes the mean by conforming + to the rule of reason. But the intellectual virtues are in reason itself, so that they seem to have no higher rule. Therefore + the intellectual virtues do not observe the mean. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36177" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36177] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes intellectuales non consistant +in medio. Virtutes enim morales consistunt in medio, inquantum +conformantur regulae rationis. Sed virtutes intellectuales sunt in +ipsa ratione; et sic non videntur habere superiorem regulam. Ergo +virtutes intellectuales non consistunt in medio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the mean of moral virtue is fixed by an intellectual virtue: for it is stated in Ethic. ii, 6, that "virtue observes + the mean appointed by reason, as a prudent man would appoint it." If therefore intellectual virtue also observe the mean, + this mean will have to be appointed for them by another virtue, so that there would be an indefinite series of virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36178" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36178] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +medium virtutis moralis determinatur a virtute intellectuali, +dicitur enim in II Ethic., quod <i>virtus consistit in medietate +determinata ratione, prout sapiens determinabit</i>. Si igitur +virtus intellectualis iterum consistat in medio, oportet quod +determinetur sibi medium per aliquam aliam virtutem. Et sic +procedetur in infinitum in virtutibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a mean is, properly speaking, between contraries, as the Philosopher explains (Metaph. x, text. 22,23). But there + seems to be no contrariety in the intellect; since contraries themselves, as they are in the intellect, are not in opposition + to one another, but are understood together, as white and black, healthy and sick. Therefore there is no mean in the intellectual + virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36179" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36179] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +medium proprie est inter contraria; ut patet per philosophum, in X +Metaphys. Sed in intellectu non videtur esse aliqua contrarietas, +cum etiam ipsa contraria, secundum quod sunt in intellectu, non +sint contraria, sed simul intelligantur, ut album et nigrum, sanum +et aegrum. Ergo in intellectualibus virtutibus non est medium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Art is an intellectual virtue; and yet there is a mean in art (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore also intellectual virtue observes + the mean. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36180" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36180] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod ars est virtus intellectualis, ut dicitur in VI Ethic.; et +tamen artis est aliquod medium, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Ergo etiam +virtus intellectualis consistit in medio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q64_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The good of anything consists in its observing the mean, by conforming with a rule or measure in respect of which it may + happen to be excessive or deficient, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q64_A1" id="FS_Q64_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Now intellectual virtue, like moral virtue, is directed to the good, as stated above (Q[56], A[3]). Hence the good of an + intellectual virtue consists in observing the mean, in so far as it is subject to a measure. Now the good of intellectual + virtue is + the true; in the case of contemplative virtue, it is the true taken absolutely (Ethic. vi, 2); in the case of practical virtue, + it is the true in conformity with a right appetite. + </p><p id="FS_Q64_A3-p7"> Now truth apprehended by our intellect, if we consider it absolutely, is measured by things; since things are the measure + of our intellect, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 5; because there is truth in what we think or say, according as the thing + is so or not. Accordingly the good of speculative intellectual virtue consists in a certain mean, by way of conformity with + things themselves, in so far as the intellect expresses them as being what they are, or as not being what they are + not: and it is in this that the nature of truth consists. There will be excess if something false is affirmed, as though something + were, which in reality it is not: and there will be deficiency if something is falsely denied, and declared not to be, whereas + in reality it is. + </p><p id="FS_Q64_A3-p8"> The truth of practical intellectual virtue, if we consider it in relation to things, is by way of that which is measured; + so that both in practical and in speculative intellectual virtues, the mean consists in conformity with things. But if we + consider it in relation to the appetite, it has the character of a rule and measure. Consequently the rectitude of reason + is the mean of moral virtue, and also the mean of prudence---of prudence as ruling and measuring, of moral virtue, as + ruled and measured by that mean. In like manner the difference between excess and deficiency is to be applied in both cases. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 3 co."><a name="36181" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36181] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod bonum alicuius rei consistit in medio, secundum quod +conformatur regulae vel mensurae quam contingit transcendere et ab +ea deficere, sicut dictum est. Virtus autem intellectualis +ordinatur ad bonum, sicut et moralis, ut supra dictum est. Unde +secundum quod bonum virtutis intellectualis se habet ad mensuram, +sic se habet ad rationem medii. Bonum autem virtutis intellectualis +est verum, speculativae quidem virtutis, verum absolute, ut in VI +Ethic. dicitur; practicae autem virtutis, verum secundum +conformitatem ad appetitum rectum. Verum autem intellectus nostri +absolute consideratum, est sicut mensuratum a re, res enim est +mensura intellectus nostri, ut dicitur in X Metaphys.; ex eo enim +quod res est vel non est, veritas est in opinione et in oratione. +Sic igitur bonum virtutis intellectualis speculativae consistit in +quodam medio, per conformitatem ad ipsam rem, secundum quod dicit +esse quod est, vel non esse quod non est; in quo ratio veri +consistit. Excessus autem est secundum affirmationem falsam, per +quam dicitur esse quod non est, defectus autem accipitur secundum +negationem falsam, per quam dicitur non esse quod est. Verum autem +virtutis intellectualis practicae, comparatum quidem ad rem, habet +rationem mensurati. Et sic eodem modo accipitur medium per +conformitatem ad rem, in virtutibus intellectualibus practicis, +sicut in speculativis. Sed respectu appetitus, habet rationem +regulae et mensurae. Unde idem medium, quod est virtutis moralis, +etiam est ipsius prudentiae, scilicet rectitudo rationis, sed +prudentiae quidem est istud medium ut regulantis et mensurantis; +virtutis autem moralis, ut mensuratae et regulatae. Similiter +excessus et defectus accipitur diversimode utrobique.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Intellectual virtues also have their measure, as stated, and they observe the mean according as they conform to that measure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36182" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36182] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod etiam virtus intellectualis habet suam mensuram, +ut dictum est, et per conformitatem ad ipsam, accipitur in ipsa +medium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There is no need for an indefinite series of virtues: because the measure and rule of intellectual virtue is not another + kind of virtue, but things themselves. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36183" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36183] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod non est necesse in infinitum procedere in virtutibus, +quia mensura et regula intellectualis virtutis non est aliquod +aliud genus virtutis, sed ipsa res.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The things themselves that are contrary have no contrariety in the mind, because one is the reason for knowing the other: + nevertheless there is in the intellect contrariety of affirmation and negation, which are contraries, as stated at the end + of Peri Hermenias. For though "to be" and "not to be" are not in contrary, but in contradictory opposition to one another, + so long as we consider their signification in things themselves, for on the one hand we + have "being" and on the other we have simply "non-being"; yet if we refer them to the act of the mind, there is something + positive in both cases. Hence "to be" and "not to be" are contradictory: but the opinion stating that "good is good" is contrary + to the opinion stating that "good is not good": and between two such contraries intellectual virtue observes the mean. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36184" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36184] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ipsae res contrariae non habent contrarietatem in +anima, quia unum est ratio cognoscendi alterum, et tamen in +intellectu est contrarietas affirmationis et negationis, quae sunt +contraria, ut dicitur in fine peri hermeneias. Quamvis enim esse et +non esse non sint contraria, sed contradictorie opposita, si +considerentur ipsa significata prout sunt in rebus, quia alterum +est ens, et alterum est pure non ens, tamen si referantur ad actum +animae, utrumque ponit aliquid. Unde esse et non esse sunt +contradictoria, sed opinio qua opinamur quod bonum est bonum, est +contraria opinioni qua opinamur quod bonum non est bonum. Et inter +huiusmodi contraria medium est virtus intellectualis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q64_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q64_A4-p0.1">Q. 64. A. 4. Whether the theological virtues observe the mean?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that theological virtue observes the mean. For the good of other virtues consists in their observing the mean. + Now the theological virtues surpass the others in goodness. Therefore much more does theological virtue observe the mean. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36185" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36185] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus theologica consistat in medio. +Bonum enim aliarum virtutum consistit in medio. Sed virtus +theologica excedit in bonitate alias virtutes. Ergo virtus +theologica multo magis est in medio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the mean of moral virtue depends on the appetite being ruled by reason; while the mean of intellectual virtue consists + in the intellect being measured by things. Now theological virtue perfects both intellect and appetite, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q62_A3" id="FS_Q64_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[62], A[3]</a>). Therefore theological virtue also observes the mean. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36186" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36186] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +medium virtutis accipitur, moralis quidem secundum quod appetitus +regulatur per rationem; intellectualis vero secundum quod +intellectus noster mensuratur a re. Sed virtus theologica et +perficit intellectum, et appetitum, ut supra dictum est. Ergo etiam +virtus theologica consistit in medio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, hope, which is a theological virtue, is a mean between despair and presumption. Likewise faith holds a middle course + between contrary heresies, as Boethius states (De Duab. Natur. vii): thus, by confessing one Person and two natures in Christ, + we observe the mean between the heresy of Nestorius, who maintained the existence of two persons and two natures, and the + heresy of Eutyches, who held to one person and one nature. Therefore theological virtue + observes the mean. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36187" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36187] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +spes quae est virtus theologica, medium est inter desperationem et +praesumptionem. Similiter etiam fides incedit media inter +contrarias haereses, ut Boetius dicit, in libro de duabus naturis, +quod enim confitemur in Christo unam personam et duas naturas, +medium est inter haeresim Nestorii, qui dicit duas personas et duas +naturas; et haeresim Eutychis, qui dicit unam personam et unam +naturam. Ergo virtus theologica consistit in medio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Wherever virtue observes the mean it is possible to sin by excess as well as by deficiency. But there is no sinning by excess + against God, Who is the object of theological virtue: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q64_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.43.33" target="asv">Ecclus. 43:33</a>): "Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as much as you can: for He is above all praise." Therefore theological virtue does not observe + the mean. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36188" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36188] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +in omnibus in quibus consistit virtus in medio, contingit peccare +per excessum, sicut et per defectum. Sed circa Deum, qui est +obiectum virtutis theologicae, non contingit peccare per excessum, +dicitur enim Eccli. XLIII, <i>benedicentes Deum, exaltate illum +quantum potestis, maior enim est omni laude</i>. Ergo virtus +theologica non consistit in medio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q64_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q64_A1" id="FS_Q64_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the mean of virtue depends on conformity with virtue's rule or measure, in so far as one may exceed or fall short of that + rule. Now the measure of theological virtue may be twofold. One is taken from the very nature of virtue, and thus the measure + and rule of theological virtue is God Himself: because our faith is ruled according to Divine truth; charity, according to + His goodness; hope, according to the + immensity of His omnipotence and loving kindness. This measure surpasses all human power: so that never can we love God as + much as He ought to be loved, nor believe and hope in Him as much as we should. Much less therefore can there be excess in + such things. Accordingly the good of such virtues does not consist in a mean, but increases the more we approach to the summit. + </p><p id="FS_Q64_A4-p7"> The other rule or measure of theological virtue is by comparison with us: for although we cannot be borne towards God as + much as we ought, yet we should approach to Him by believing, hoping and loving, according to the measure of our condition. + Consequently it is possible to find a mean and extremes in theological virtue, accidentally and in reference to us. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 4 co."><a name="36189" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36189] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, medium virtutis accipitur per +conformitatem ad suam regulam vel mensuram, secundum quod contingit +ipsam transcendere vel ab ea deficere. Virtutis autem theologicae +duplex potest accipi mensura. Una quidem secundum ipsam rationem +virtutis. Et sic mensura et regula virtutis theologicae est ipse +Deus, fides enim nostra regulatur secundum veritatem divinam, +caritas autem secundum bonitatem eius, spes autem secundum +magnitudinem omnipotentiae et pietatis eius. Et ista est mensura +excellens omnem humanam facultatem, unde nunquam potest homo tantum +diligere Deum quantum diligi debet, nec tantum credere aut sperare +in ipsum, quantum debet. Unde multo minus potest ibi esse excessus. +Et sic bonum talis virtutis non consistit in medio, sed tanto est +melius, quanto magis acceditur ad summum. Alia vero regula vel +mensura virtutis theologicae est ex parte nostra, quia etsi non +possumus ferri in Deum quantum debemus, debemus tamen ferri in +ipsum credendo, sperando et amando, secundum mensuram nostrae +conditionis. Unde per accidens potest in virtute theologica +considerari medium et extrema, ex parte nostra.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The good of intellectual and moral virtues consists in a mean of reason by conformity with a measure that may be exceeded: + whereas this is not so in the case of theological virtue, considered in itself, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36190" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36190] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod bonum virtutum intellectualium et moralium +consistit in medio per conformitatem ad regulam vel mensuram quam +transcendere contingit. Quod non est in virtutibus theologicis, per +se loquendo, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Moral and intellectual virtues perfect our intellect and appetite in relation to a created measure and rule; whereas the + theological virtues perfect them in relation to an uncreated rule and measure. Wherefore the comparison fails. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36191" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36191] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod virtutes morales et intellectuales perficiunt +intellectum et appetitum nostrum in ordine ad mensuram et regulam +creatam, virtutes autem theologicae in ordine ad mensuram et +regulam increatam. Unde non est similis ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hope observes the mean between presumption and despair, in relation to us, in so far, to wit, as a man is said to be presumptuous, + through hoping to receive from God a good in excess of his condition; or to despair through failing to hope for that which + according to his condition he might hope for. But there can be no excess of hope in comparison with God, Whose goodness is + infinite. In like manner faith holds a middle course between contrary + heresies, not by comparison with its object, which is God, in Whom we cannot believe too much; but in so far as human opinion + itself takes a middle position between contrary opinions, as was explained above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36192" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36192] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod spes est media inter praesumptionem et desperationem, +ex parte nostra, inquantum scilicet aliquis praesumere dicitur ex +eo quod sperat a Deo bonum quod excedit suam conditionem; vel non +sperat quod secundum suam conditionem sperare posset. Non autem +potest esse superabundantia spei ex parte Dei, cuius bonitas est +infinita. Similiter etiam fides est media inter contrarias +haereses, non per comparationem ad obiectum, quod est Deus, cui non +potest aliquis nimis credere, sed inquantum ipsa opinio humana est +media inter contrarias opiniones, ut ex supradictis patet.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q65" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q65-p0.1">Q. 65. OF THE CONNECTION OF VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q65-p2"> We must now consider the connection of virtues: under which head there are five points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q65-p3"><a href="#FS_Q65_A1"> (1) Whether the moral virtues are connected with one another?</a></p><p id="FS_Q65-p4"><a href="#FS_Q65_A2"> (2) Whether the moral virtues can be without charity?</a></p><p id="FS_Q65-p5"><a href="#FS_Q65_A3"> (3) Whether charity can be without them?</a></p><p id="FS_Q65-p6"><a href="#FS_Q65_A4"> (4) Whether faith and hope can be without charity?</a></p><p id="FS_Q65-p7"><a href="#FS_Q65_A5"> (5) Whether charity can be without them?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 pr."><a name="36193" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36193] +Iª-IIae q. 65 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +connexione virtutum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. Primo, utrum +virtutes morales sint ad invicem connexae. Secundo, utrum virtutes +morales possint esse sine caritate. Tertio, utrum caritas possit +esse sine eis. Quarto, utrum fides et spes possint esse sine +caritate. Quinto, utrum caritas possit esse sine eis.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q65_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q65_A1-p0.1">Q. 65. A. 1. Whether the moral virtues are connected with one another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the moral virtues are not connected with one another. Because moral virtues are sometimes caused by the + exercise of acts, as is proved in Ethic. ii, 1,2. But man can exercise himself in the acts of one virtue, without exercising + himself in the acts of some other virtue. Therefore it is possible to have one moral virtue without another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36194" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36194] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales non sint ex +necessitate connexae. Virtutes enim morales quandoque causantur ex +exercitio actuum, ut probatur in II Ethic. Sed homo potest +exercitari in actibus alicuius virtutis sine hoc quod exercitetur +in actibus alterius virtutis. Ergo una virtus moralis potest haberi +sine altera.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, magnificence and magnanimity are moral virtues. Now a man may have other moral virtues without having magnificence + or magnanimity: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2,3) that "a poor man cannot be magnificent," and yet he may have other + virtues; and (Ethic. iv) that "he who is worthy of small things, and so accounts his worth, is modest, but not magnanimous." + Therefore the moral virtues are not connected with one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36195" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36195] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +magnificentia et magnanimitas sunt quaedam virtutes morales. Sed +aliquis potest habere alias virtutes morales, sine hoc quod habeat +magnificentiam et magnanimitatem, dicit enim philosophus, in IV +Ethic., quod inops non potest esse magnificus, qui tamen potest +habere quasdam alias virtutes; et quod <i>ille qui parvis est +dignus, et his se dignificat, temperatus est, magnanimus autem non +est</i>. Ergo virtutes morales non sunt connexae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive part of the soul, so do the intellectual virtues perfect the intellective + part. But the intellectual virtues are not mutually connected: since we may have one science, without having another. Neither, + therefore, are the moral virtues connected with one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36196" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36196] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut virtutes morales perficiunt partem appetitivam animae, ita +virtutes intellectuales perficiunt partem intellectivam. Sed +virtutes intellectuales non sunt connexae, potest enim aliquis +habere unam scientiam, sine hoc quod habeat aliam. Ergo etiam neque +virtutes morales sunt connexae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if the moral virtues are mutually connected, this can only be because they are united together in prudence. But + this does not suffice to connect the moral virtues together. For, seemingly, one may be prudent about things to be done in + relation to one virtue, without being prudent in those that concern another virtue: even as one may have the art of making + certain things, without the art of making certain others. Now prudence is right reason about + things to be done. Therefore the moral virtues are not necessarily connected with one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="36197" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36197] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +si virtutes morales sint connexae, hoc non est nisi quia +connectuntur in prudentia. Sed hoc non sufficit ad connexionem +virtutum moralium. Videtur enim quod aliquis possit esse prudens +circa agibilia quae pertinent ad unam virtutem, sine hoc quod sit +prudens in his quae pertinent ad aliam, sicut etiam aliquis potest +habere artem circa quaedam factibilia, sine hoc quod habeat artem +circa alia. Prudentia autem est recta ratio agibilium. Ergo non est +necessarium virtutes morales esse connexas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.20" target="asv"> Lk. 6:20</a>: "The virtues are connected and linked together, so that whoever has one, is seen to have several": and Augustine says (De + Trin. vi, 4) that "the virtues that reside in the human mind are quite inseparable from one another": and Gregory says (Moral. + xxii, 1) that "one virtue without the other is either of no account whatever, or very imperfect": and Cicero says (Quaest. + Tusc. ii): "If you confess to not having + one particular virtue, it must needs be that you have none at all." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36198" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36198] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Ambrosius dicit, super Lucam, <i>connexae sibi sunt, +concatenataeque virtutes, ut qui unam habet, plures habere +videatur</i>. Augustinus etiam dicit, in VI de Trin., quod +<i>virtutes quae sunt in animo humano, nullo modo separantur ab +invicem</i>. Et Gregorius dicit, XXII Moral., quod <i>una virtus +sine aliis aut omnino nulla est, aut imperfecta</i>. Et Tullius +dicit, in II de Tuscul. quaest., <i>si unam virtutem confessus es +te non habere, nullam necesse est te habiturum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q65_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Moral virtue may be considered either as perfect or as imperfect. An imperfect moral virtue, temperance for instance, or + fortitude, is nothing but an inclination in us to do some kind of good deed, whether such inclination be in us by nature or + by habituation. If we take the moral virtues in this way, they are not connected: since we find men who, by natural temperament + or by being accustomed, are prompt in doing deeds of liberality, but are not prompt in + doing deeds of chastity. + </p><p id="FS_Q65_A1-p8"> But the perfect moral virtue is a habit that inclines us to do a good deed well; and if we take moral virtues in this way, + we must say that they are connected, as nearly as all are agreed in saying. For this two reasons are given, corresponding + to the different ways of assigning the distinction of the cardinal virtues. For, as we stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q61_A3" id="FS_Q65_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[61], AA[3]</a>,4), some distinguish them according to certain general properties of the virtues: for instance, by + saying that discretion belongs to prudence, rectitude to justice, moderation to temperance, and strength of mind to fortitude, + in whatever matter we consider these properties to be. In this way the reason for the connection is evident: for strength + of mind is not commended as virtuous, if it be without moderation or rectitude or discretion: and so forth. This, too, is + the reason assigned for the connection by Gregory, who says (Moral. xxii, 1) that "a virtue cannot be perfect" as a virtue, + "if + isolated from the others: for there can be no true prudence without temperance, justice and fortitude": and he continues to + speak in like manner of the other virtues (cf. + <a href="#FS_Q61_A4" id="FS_Q65_A1-p8.2" shape="rect"> Q[61], A[4]</a>, OBJ[1]). Augustine also gives the same reason (De Trin. vi, 4). + </p><p id="FS_Q65_A1-p9"> Others, however, differentiate these virtues in respect of their matters, and it is in this way that Aristotle assigns the + reason for their connection (Ethic. vi, 13). Because, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q58_A4" id="FS_Q65_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[58], A[4]</a>), no moral virtue can be without prudence; since it is proper to moral virtue to make a right choice, for it is an elective + habit. Now right choice requires not only the inclination to a due end, which inclination is the direct outcome of moral virtue, + but also correct choice of things conducive to the end, which choice is made by prudence, that counsels, judges, and commands + in those things that are directed to the end. In like manner one cannot have prudence unless one has the moral virtues: since + prudence is "right reason about things to be done," and the starting point of reason is the end of the thing to be done, to + which end man is rightly disposed by moral virtue. Hence, just as we cannot have speculative science unless we have the + understanding of the principles, so neither can we have prudence without the moral virtues: and from this it follows clearly + that the moral virtues are connected with one another. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 co."><a name="36199" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36199] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod virtus moralis potest accipi vel perfecta vel +imperfecta. Imperfecta quidem moralis virtus, ut temperantia vel +fortitudo, nihil aliud est quam aliqua inclinatio in nobis existens +ad opus aliquod de genere bonorum faciendum, sive talis inclinatio +sit in nobis a natura, sive ex assuetudine. Et hoc modo accipiendo +virtutes morales, non sunt connexae, videmus enim aliquem ex +naturali complexione, vel ex aliqua consuetudine, esse promptum ad +opera liberalitatis, qui tamen non est promptus ad opera +castitatis. Perfecta autem virtus moralis est habitus inclinans in +bonum opus bene agendum. Et sic accipiendo virtutes morales, +dicendum est eas connexas esse; ut fere ab omnibus ponitur. Cuius +ratio duplex assignatur, secundum quod diversimode aliqui virtutes +cardinales distinguunt. Ut enim dictum est, quidam distinguunt eas +secundum quasdam generales conditiones virtutum, utpote quod +discretio pertineat ad prudentiam, rectitudo ad iustitiam, +moderantia ad temperantiam, firmitas animi ad fortitudinem, in +quacumque materia ista considerentur. Et secundum hoc, manifeste +apparet ratio connexionis, non enim firmitas habet laudem virtutis, +si sit sine moderatione, vel rectitudine, aut discretione; et eadem +ratio est de aliis. Et hanc rationem connexionis assignat +Gregorius, XXII Moral., dicens quod <i>virtutes, si sint +disiunctae, non possunt esse perfectae</i>, secundum rationem +virtutis, <i>quia nec prudentia vera est quae iusta, temperans et +fortis non est</i>; et idem subdit de aliis virtutibus. Et similem +rationem assignat Augustinus, in VI de Trin. Alii vero distinguunt +praedictas virtutes secundum materias. Et secundum hoc assignatur +ratio connexionis ab Aristotele, in VI Ethic. Quia sicut supra +dictum est, nulla virtus moralis potest sine prudentia haberi, eo +quod proprium virtutis moralis est facere electionem rectam, cum +sit habitus electivus; ad rectam autem electionem non solum +sufficit inclinatio in debitum finem, quod est directe per habitum +virtutis moralis; sed etiam quod aliquis directe eligat ea quae +sunt ad finem, quod fit per prudentiam, quae est consiliativa et +iudicativa et praeceptiva eorum quae sunt ad finem. Similiter etiam +prudentia non potest haberi nisi habeantur virtutes morales, cum +prudentia sit recta ratio agibilium, quae, sicut ex principiis, +procedit ex finibus agibilium, ad quos aliquis recte se habet per +virtutes morales. Unde sicut scientia speculativa non potest haberi +sine intellectu principiorum, ita nec prudentia sine virtutibus +moralibus. Ex quo manifeste sequitur virtutes morales esse +connexas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q65_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some moral virtues perfect man as regards his general state, in other words, with regard to those things which have to be + done in every kind of human life. Hence man needs to exercise himself at the same time in the matters of all moral virtues. + And if he exercise himself, by good deeds, in all such matters, he will acquire the habits of all the moral virtues. But if + he exercise himself by good deeds in regard to one matter, but not in regard to + another, for instance, by behaving well in matters of anger, but not in matters of concupiscence; he will indeed acquire a + certain habit of restraining his anger; but this habit will lack the nature of virtue, through the absence of prudence, which + is wanting in matters of concupiscence. In the same way, natural inclinations fail to have the complete character of virtue, + if prudence be lacking. + </p><p id="FS_Q65_A1-p11"> But there are some moral virtues which perfect man with regard to some eminent state, such as magnificence and magnanimity; + and since it does not happen to all in common to be exercised in the matter of such virtues, it is possible for a man to have + the other moral virtues, without actually having the habits of these virtues---provided we speak of acquired virtue. Nevertheless, + when once a man has acquired those other virtues he possesses these in proximate potentiality. Because + when, by practice, a man has acquired liberality in small gifts and expenditure, if he were to come in for a large sum of + money, he would acquire the habit of magnificence with but little practice: even as a geometrician, by dint of little study, + acquires scientific knowledge about some conclusion which had never been presented to his mind before. Now we speak of having + a thing when we are on the point of having it, according to the saying of the Philosopher (Phys. ii, text. 56): "That which + is + scarcely lacking is not lacking at all." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36200" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36200] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod virtutum moralium quaedam perficiunt hominem +secundum communem statum, scilicet quantum ad ea quae communiter in +omni vita hominum occurrunt agenda. Unde oportet quod homo simul +exercitetur circa materias omnium virtutum moralium. Et si quidem +circa omnes exercitetur bene operando, acquiret habitus omnium +virtutum moralium. Si autem exercitetur bene operando circa unam +materiam, non autem circa aliam, puta bene se habendo circa iras, +non autem circa concupiscentias; acquiret quidem habitum aliquem ad +refrenandum iras, qui tamen non habebit rationem virtutis, propter +defectum prudentiae, quae circa concupiscentias corrumpitur. Sicut +etiam naturales inclinationes non habent perfectam rationem +virtutis, si prudentia desit. Quaedam vero virtutes morales sunt +quae perficiunt hominem secundum aliquem eminentem statum, sicut +magnificentia, et magnanimitas. Et quia exercitium circa materias +harum virtutum non occurrit unicuique communiter, potest aliquis +habere alias virtutes morales, sine hoc quod habitus harum virtutum +habeat actu, loquendo de virtutibus acquisitis. Sed tamen, +acquisitis aliis virtutibus, habet istas virtutes in potentia +propinqua. Cum enim aliquis per exercitium adeptus est +liberalitatem circa mediocres donationes et sumptus, si superveniat +ei abundantia pecuniarum, modico exercitio acquiret magnificentiae +habitum, sicut geometer modico studio acquirit scientiam alicuius +conclusionis quam nunquam consideravit. Illud autem habere dicimur, +quod in promptu est ut habeamus; secundum illud philosophi, in II +Physic., <i>quod parum deest, quasi nihil deesse videtur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A1-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36201" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36201] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc +patet responsio ad secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q65_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellectual virtues are about divers matters having no relation to one another, as is clearly the case with the various + sciences and arts. Hence we do not observe in them the connection that is to be found among the moral virtues, which are about + passions and operations, that are clearly related to one another. For all the passions have their rise in certain initial + passions, viz. love and hatred, and terminate in certain others, viz. pleasure + and sorrow. In like manner all the operations that are the matter of moral virtue are related to one another, and to the passions. + Hence the whole matter of moral virtues falls under the one rule of prudence. + </p><p id="FS_Q65_A1-p14"> Nevertheless, all intelligible things are related to first principles. And in this way, all the intellectual virtues depend + on the understanding of principles; even as prudence depends on the moral virtues, as stated. On the other hand, the universal + principles which are the object of the virtue of understanding of principles, do not depend on the conclusions, which are + the objects of the other intellectual virtues, as do the moral virtues depend on prudence, because the + appetite, in a fashion, moves the reason, and the reason the appetite, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q65_A1-p14.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q58_A5" id="FS_Q65_A1-p14.2" shape="rect"> Q[58], A[5]</a>, ad 1). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36202" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36202] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod virtutes intellectuales sunt circa diversas materias +ad invicem non ordinatas, sicut patet in diversis scientiis et +artibus. Et ideo non invenitur in eis connexio quae invenitur in +virtutibus moralibus existentibus circa passiones et operationes, +quae manifeste habent ordinem ad invicem. Nam omnes passiones, a +quibusdam primis procedentes, scilicet amore et odio, ad quasdam +alias terminantur, scilicet delectationem et tristitiam. Et +similiter omnes operationes quae sunt virtutis moralis materia, +habent ordinem ad invicem, et etiam ad passiones. Et ideo tota +materia moralium virtutum sub una ratione prudentiae cadit. Habent +tamen omnia intelligibilia ordinem ad prima principia. Et secundum +hoc, omnes virtutes intellectuales dependent ab intellectu +principiorum; sicut prudentia a virtutibus moralibus, ut dictum +est. Principia autem universalia, quorum est intellectus +principiorum, non dependent a conclusionibus, de quibus sunt +reliquae intellectuales virtutes; sicut morales dependent a +prudentia, eo quod appetitus movet quodammodo rationem, et ratio +appetitum, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Those things to which the moral virtues incline, are as the principles of prudence: whereas the products of art are not the + principles, but the matter of art. Now it is evident that, though reason may be right in one part of the matter, and not in + another, yet in no way can it be called right reason, if it be deficient in any principle whatever. Thus, if a man be wrong + about the principle, "A whole is greater than its part," he cannot acquire the + science of geometry, because he must necessarily wander from the truth in his conclusion. Moreover, things "done" are related + to one another, but not things "made," as stated above (ad 3). Consequently the lack of prudence in one department of things + to be done, would result in a deficiency affecting other things to be done: whereas this does not occur in things to be made. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="36203" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36203] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod ea ad quae inclinant virtutes morales, se habent ad +prudentiam sicut principia, non autem factibilia se habent ad artem +sicut principia, sed solum sicut materia. Manifestum est autem +quod, etsi ratio possit esse recta in una parte materiae, et non in +alia; nullo tamen modo potest dici ratio recta, si sit defectus +cuiuscumque principii. Sicut si quis erraret circa hoc principium, +omne totum est maius sua parte, non posset habere scientiam +geometricam, quia oporteret multum recedere a veritate in +sequentibus. Et praeterea, agibilia sunt ordinata ad invicem; non +autem factibilia, ut dictum est. Et ideo defectus prudentiae circa +unam partem agibilium, induceret defectum etiam circa alia +agibilia. Quod in factibilibus non contingit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q65_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q65_A2-p0.1">Q. 65. A. 2. Whether moral virtues can be without charity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtues can be without charity. For it is stated in the Liber Sentent. Prosperi vii, that "every + virtue save charity may be common to the good and bad." But "charity can be in none except the good," as stated in the same + book. Therefore the other virtues can be had without charity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36204" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36204] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales possint esse sine +caritate. Dicitur enim in libro sententiarum prosperi, quod +<i>omnis virtus praeter caritatem, potest esse communis bonis et +malis</i>. Sed caritas non potest esse nisi in bonis, ut dicitur +ibidem. Ergo aliae virtutes possunt haberi sine caritate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, moral virtues can be acquired by means of human acts, as stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2, whereas charity cannot be had + otherwise than by infusion, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv"> Rom. 5:5</a>: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us." Therefore it is possible to have + the other virtues without charity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36205" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36205] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +virtutes morales possunt acquiri ex actibus humanis, ut dicitur in +II Ethic. Sed caritas non habetur nisi ex infusione; secundum illud +Rom. V, <i>caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum +sanctum, qui datus est nobis</i>. Ergo aliae virtutes possunt +haberi sine caritate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the moral virtues are connected together, through depending on prudence. But charity does not depend on prudence; + indeed, it surpasses prudence, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.19" target="asv"> Eph. 3:19</a>: "The charity of Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge." Therefore the moral virtues are not connected with charity, and + can be without it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36206" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36206] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +virtutes morales connectuntur ad invicem, inquantum dependent a +prudentia. Sed caritas non dependet a prudentia; immo prudentiam +excedit, secundum illud Ephes. III, <i>supereminentem scientiae +caritatem Christi</i>. Ergo virtutes morales non connectuntur +caritati, sed sine ea esse possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.14" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:14</a>): "He that loveth not, abideth in death." Now the spiritual life is perfected by the virtues, since it is "by them" that + "we lead a good life," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 17,19). Therefore they cannot be without the love of charity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36207" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36207] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur I Ioan. III, <i>qui non diligit, manet in +morte</i>. Sed per virtutes perficitur vita spiritualis, ipsae enim +sunt quibus recte vivitur, ut Augustinus dicit, in II de Lib. +Arbit. Ergo non possunt esse sine dilectione caritatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q65_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[63], A[2]), it is possible by means of human works to acquire moral virtues, in so far as they produce + good works that are directed to an end not surpassing the natural power of man: and when they are acquired thus, they can + be without charity, even as they were in many of the Gentiles. But in so far as they produce good works in proportion to a + supernatural last end, thus they have the character of virtue, truly and perfectly; and cannot + be acquired by human acts, but are infused by God. Such like moral virtues cannot be without charity. For it has been stated + above + <a href="#FS_Q65_A1" id="FS_Q65_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1];</a> Q[58], AA[4],5) that the other moral virtues cannot be without prudence; and that prudence cannot be without the moral virtues, + because these latter make man well disposed to certain ends, which are the starting-point of the procedure of prudence. Now + for prudence to proceed aright, it is much more necessary that man be well disposed + towards his ultimate end, which is the effect of charity, than that he be well disposed in respect of other ends, which is + the effect of moral virtue: just as in speculative matters right reason has greatest need of the first indemonstrable principle, + that "contradictories cannot both be true at the same time." It is therefore evident that neither can infused prudence be + without charity; nor, consequently, the other moral virtues, since they cannot be without prudence. + </p><p id="FS_Q65_A2-p7"> It is therefore clear from what has been said that only the infused virtues are perfect, and deserve to be called virtues + simply: since they direct man well to the ultimate end. But the other virtues, those, namely, that are acquired, are virtues + in a restricted sense, but not simply: for they direct man well in respect of the last end in some particular genus of action, + but not in respect of the last end simply. Hence a gloss of Augustine [*Cf. Lib. Sentent. Prosperi cvi.] on + the words, "All that is not of faith is sin" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.14.23" target="asv">Rom. 14:23</a>), says: "He that fails to acknowledge the truth, has no true virtue, even if his conduct be good." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 2 co."><a name="36208" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36208] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtutes morales prout sunt +operativae boni in ordine ad finem qui non excedit facultatem +naturalem hominis, possunt per opera humana acquiri. Et sic +acquisitae sine caritate esse possunt, sicut fuerunt in multis +gentilibus. Secundum autem quod sunt operativae boni in ordine ad +ultimum finem supernaturalem, sic perfecte et vere habent rationem +virtutis; et non possunt humanis actibus acquiri, sed infunduntur a +Deo. Et huiusmodi virtutes morales sine caritate esse non possunt. +Dictum est enim supra quod aliae virtutes morales non possunt esse +sine prudentia; prudentia autem non potest esse sine virtutibus +moralibus, inquantum virtutes morales faciunt bene se habere ad +quosdam fines, ex quibus procedit ratio prudentiae. Ad rectam autem +rationem prudentiae multo magis requiritur quod homo bene se habeat +circa ultimum finem, quod fit per caritatem, quam circa alios +fines, quod fit per virtutes morales, sicut ratio recta in +speculativis maxime indiget primo principio indemonstrabili, quod +est contradictoria non simul esse vera. Unde manifestum fit quod +nec prudentia infusa potest esse sine caritate; nec aliae virtutes +morales consequenter, quae sine prudentia esse non possunt. Patet +igitur ex dictis quod solae virtutes infusae sunt perfectae, et +simpliciter dicendae virtutes, quia bene ordinant hominem ad finem +ultimum simpliciter. Aliae vero virtutes, scilicet acquisitae, sunt +secundum quid virtutes, non autem simpliciter, ordinant enim +hominem bene respectu finis ultimi in aliquo genere, non autem +respectu finis ultimi simpliciter. Unde Rom. XIV super illud, +<i>omne quod non est ex fide, peccatum est</i>, dicit Glossa +Augustini, <i>ubi deest agnitio veritatis, falsa est virtus etiam +in bonis moribus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue, in the words quoted, denotes imperfect virtue. Else if we take moral virtue in its perfect state, "it makes its possessor + good," and consequently cannot be in the wicked. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36209" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36209] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod virtutes ibi accipiuntur secundum imperfectam +rationem virtutis. Alioquin, si virtus moralis secundum perfectam +rationem virtutis accipiatur, bonum facit habentem; et per +consequens in malis esse non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument holds good of virtue in the sense of acquired virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36210" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36210] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de virtutibus moralibus +acquisitis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Though charity surpasses science and prudence, yet prudence depends on charity, as stated: and consequently so do all the + infused moral virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36211" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36211] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, etsi caritas excedat scientiam et prudentiam, tamen +prudentia dependet a caritate, ut dictum est. Et per consequens, +omnes virtutes morales infusae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q65_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q65_A3-p0.1">Q. 65. A. 3. Whether charity can be without moral virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem possible to have charity without the moral virtues. For when one thing suffices for a certain purpose, it is + superfluous to employ others. Now charity alone suffices for the fulfilment of all the works of virtue, as is clear from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:4, </a> seqq.: "Charity is patient, is kind," etc. Therefore it seems that if one has charity, other virtues are superfluous. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36212" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36212] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas sine aliis virtutibus +moralibus haberi possit. Ad id enim ad quod sufficit unum, +indebitum est quod plura ordinentur. Sed sola caritas sufficit ad +omnia opera virtutis implenda, ut patet per id quod dicitur I ad +Cor. XIII, <i>caritas patiens est, benigna est,</i> et cetera. Ergo +videtur quod, habita caritate, aliae virtutes superfluerent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he that has a habit of virtue easily performs the works of that virtue, and those works are pleasing to him for + their own sake: hence "pleasure taken in a work is a sign of habit" (Ethic. ii, 3). Now many have charity, being free from + mortal sin, and yet they find it difficult to do works of virtue; nor are these works pleasing to them for their own sake, + but only for the sake of charity. Therefore many have charity without the other virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36213" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36213] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +qui habet habitum virtutis, de facili operatur ea quae sunt +virtutis, et ei secundum se placent, unde et signum habitus est +delectatio quae fit in opere, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed multi +habent caritatem, absque peccato mortali existentes, qui tamen +difficultatem in operibus virtutum patiuntur, neque eis secundum se +placent, sed solum secundum quod referuntur ad caritatem. Ergo +multi habent caritatem, qui non habent alias virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, charity is to be found in every saint: and yet there are some saints who are without certain virtues. For Bede says + (on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.17.10" target="asv"> Lk. 17:10</a>) that the saints are more humbled on account of their not having certain virtues, than rejoiced at the virtues they have. + Therefore, if a man has charity, it does not follow of necessity that he has all the moral virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36214" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36214] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +caritas in omnibus sanctis invenitur. Sed quidam sunt sancti qui +tamen aliquibus virtutibus carent, dicit enim Beda quod sancti +magis humiliantur de virtutibus quas non habent, quam de virtutibus +quas habent, glorientur. Ergo non est necessarium quod qui habet +caritatem, omnes virtutes morales habeat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The whole Law is fulfilled through charity, for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.8" target="asv">Rom. 13:8</a>): "He that loveth his neighbor, hath fulfilled the Law." Now it is not possible to fulfil the whole Law, without having all + the moral virtues: since the law contains precepts about all acts of virtue, as stated in Ethic. v, 1,2. Therefore he that + has charity, has all the moral virtues. Moreover, Augustine says in a letter (Epis. clxvii) [*Cf. Serm. xxxix and xlvi + de Temp.] that charity contains all the cardinal virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36215" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36215] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod per caritatem tota lex impletur, dicitur enim Rom. XIII, +<i>qui diligit proximum, legem implevit</i>. Sed tota lex impleri +non potest nisi per omnes virtutes morales, quia lex praecipit de +omnibus actibus virtutum, ut dicitur in V Ethic. Ergo qui habet +caritatem, habet omnes virtutes morales. Augustinus etiam dicit, in +quadam epistola, quod caritas includit in se omnes virtutes +cardinales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q65_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> All the moral virtues are infused together with charity. The reason for this is that God operates no less perfectly in works + of grace than in works of nature. Now, in the works of nature, we find that whenever a thing contains a principle of certain + works, it has also whatever is necessary for their execution: thus animals are provided with organs whereby to perform the + actions that their souls empower them to do. Now it is evident that charity, inasmuch as + it directs man to his last end, is the principle of all the good works that are referable to his last end. Wherefore all the + moral virtues must needs be infused together with charity, since it is through them that man performs each different kind + of good work. + </p><p id="FS_Q65_A3-p7"> It is therefore clear that the infused moral virtues are connected, not only through prudence, but also on account of charity: + and, again, that whoever loses charity through mortal sin, forfeits all the infused moral virtues. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 3 co."><a name="36216" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36216] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod cum caritate simul infunduntur omnes virtutes +morales. Cuius ratio est quia Deus non minus perfecte operatur in +operibus gratiae, quam in operibus naturae. Sic autem videmus in +operibus naturae, quod non invenitur principium aliquorum operum in +aliqua re, quin inveniantur in ea quae sunt necessaria ad huiusmodi +opera perficienda, sicut in animalibus inveniuntur organa quibus +perfici possunt opera ad quae peragenda anima habet potestatem. +Manifestum est autem quod caritas, inquantum ordinat hominem ad +finem ultimum, est principium omnium bonorum operum quae in finem +ultimum ordinari possunt. Unde oportet quod cum caritate simul +infundantur omnes virtutes morales, quibus homo perficit singula +genera bonorum operum. Et sic patet quod virtutes morales infusae +non solum habent connexionem propter prudentiam; sed etiam propter +caritatem. Et quod qui amittit caritatem per peccatum mortale, +amittit omnes virtutes morales infusas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In order that the act of a lower power be perfect, not only must there be perfection in the higher, but also in the lower + power: for if the principal agent were well disposed, perfect action would not follow, if the instrument also were not well + disposed. Consequently, in order that man work well in things referred to the end, he needs not only a virtue disposing him + well to the end, but also those virtues which dispose him well to whatever is + referred to the end: for the virtue which regards the end is the chief and moving principle in respect of those things that + are referred to the end. Therefore it is necessary to have the moral virtues together with charity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36217" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36217] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ad hoc quod actus inferioris potentiae sit +perfectus, requiritur quod non solum adsit perfectio in superiori +potentia, sed etiam in inferiori, si enim principale agens debito +modo se haberet, non sequeretur actio perfecta, si instrumentum non +esset bene dispositum. Unde oportet ad hoc quod homo bene operetur +in his quae sunt ad finem, quod non solum habeat virtutem qua bene +se habeat circa finem, sed etiam virtutes quibus bene se habeat +circa ea quae sunt ad finem, nam virtus quae est circa finem, se +habet ut principalis et motiva respectu earum quae sunt ad finem. +Et ideo cum caritate necesse est etiam habere alias virtutes +morales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It happens sometimes that a man who has a habit, finds it difficult to act in accordance with the habit, and consequently + feels no pleasure and complacency in the act, on account of some impediment supervening from without: thus a man who has a + habit of science, finds it difficult to understand, through being sleepy or unwell. In like manner sometimes the habits of + moral virtue experience difficulty in their works, by reason of certain ordinary + dispositions remaining from previous acts. This difficulty does not occur in respect of acquired moral virtue: because the + repeated acts by which they are acquired, remove also the contrary dispositions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36218" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36218] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod quandoque contingit quod aliquis habens habitum, +patitur difficultatem in operando, et per consequens non sentit +delectationem et complacentiam in actu, propter aliquod +impedimentum extrinsecus superveniens, sicut ille qui habet habitum +scientiae, patitur difficultatem in intelligendo, propter +somnolentiam vel aliquam infirmitatem. Et similiter habitus +moralium virtutum infusarum patiuntur interdum difficultatem in +operando, propter aliquas dispositiones contrarias ex +praecedentibus actibus relictas. Quae quidem difficultas non ita +accidit in virtutibus moralibus acquisitis, quia per exercitium +actuum, quo acquiruntur, tolluntur etiam contrariae +dispositiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Certain saints are said not to have certain virtues, in so far as they experience difficulty in the acts of those virtues, + for the reason stated; although they have the habits of all the virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36219" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36219] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod aliqui sancti dicuntur aliquas virtutes non habere, +inquantum patiuntur difficultatem in actibus earum, ratione iam +dicta; quamvis habitus omnium virtutum habeant.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q65_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q65_A4-p0.1">Q. 65. A. 4. Whether faith and hope can be without charity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that faith and hope are never without charity. Because, since they are theological virtues, they seem to be + more excellent than even the infused moral virtues. But the infused moral virtues cannot be without charity. Neither therefore + can faith and hope be without charity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36220" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36220] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod fides et spes nunquam sint sine +caritate. Cum enim sint virtutes theologicae, digniores esse +videntur virtutibus moralibus, etiam infusis. Sed virtutes morales +infusae non possunt esse sine caritate. Ergo neque fides et +spes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "no man believes unwillingly" as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.). But charity is in the will as a perfection + thereof, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q62_A3" id="FS_Q65_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[62], A[3]</a>). Therefore faith cannot be without charity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36221" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36221] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +nullus credit nisi volens, sed caritas est in voluntate ut +Augustinus dicit, super Ioan. Sicut perfectio eius, ut supra dictum +est. Ergo fides non potest esse sine caritate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that "there can be no hope without love." But love is charity: for it is of this + love that he speaks. Therefore hope cannot be without charity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36222" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36222] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., quod <i>spes sine amore esse non +potest</i>. Amor autem est caritas, de hoc enim amore ibi loquitur. +Ergo spes non potest esse sine caritate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.1.2" target="asv"> Mat. 1:2 </a>says that "faith begets hope, and hope, charity." Now the begetter precedes the begotten, and can be without it. Therefore + faith can be without hope; and hope, without charity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36223" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36223] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Matth. I, dicitur in Glossa quod <i>fides generat spem, +spes vero caritatem</i>. Sed generans est prius generato, et potest +esse sine eo. Ergo fides potest esse sine spe; et spes sine +caritate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q65_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Faith and hope, like the moral virtues, can be considered in two ways; first in an inchoate state; secondly, as complete + virtues. For since virtue is directed to the doing of good works, perfect virtue is that which gives the faculty of doing + a perfectly good work, and this consists in not only doing what is good, but also in doing it well. Else, if what is done + is good, but not well done, it will not be perfectly good; wherefore neither will the habit that + is the principle of such an act, have the perfect character of virtue. For instance, if a man do what is just, what he does + is good: but it will not be the work of a perfect virtue unless he do it well, i.e. by choosing rightly, which is the result + of prudence; for which reason justice cannot be a perfect virtue without prudence. + </p><p id="FS_Q65_A4-p7"> Accordingly faith and hope can exist indeed in a fashion without charity: but they have not the perfect character of virtue + without charity. For, since the act of faith is to believe in God; and since to believe is to assent to someone of one's own + free will: to will not as one ought, will not be a perfect act of faith. To will as one ought is the outcome of charity which + perfects the will: since every right movement of the will proceeds from a right love, as Augustine says (De + Civ. Dei xiv, 9). Hence faith may be without charity, but not as a perfect virtue: just as temperance and fortitude can be + without prudence. The same applies to hope. Because the act of hope consists in looking to God for future bliss. This act + is perfect, if it is based on the merits which we have; and this cannot be without charity. But to expect future bliss through + merits which one has not yet, but which one proposes to acquire at some future time, will be an imperfect act; and this is + possible without charity. Consequently, faith and hope can be without charity; yet, without charity, they are not virtues + properly so-called; because the nature of virtue requires that by it, we should not only do what is good, but also that we + should do it well (Ethic. ii, 6). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 4 co."><a name="36224" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36224] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod fides et spes, sicut et virtutes morales, dupliciter +considerari possunt. Uno modo, secundum inchoationem quandam; alio +modo, secundum perfectum esse virtutis. Cum enim virtus ordinetur +ad bonum opus agendum, virtus quidem perfecta dicitur ex hoc quod +potest in opus perfecte bonum, quod quidem est dum non solum bonum +est quod fit, sed etiam bene fit. Alioquin, si bonum sit quod fit, +non autem bene fiat, non erit perfecte bonum, unde nec habitus qui +est talis operis principium, habebit perfecte rationem virtutis. +Sicut si aliquis operetur iusta, bonum quidem facit, sed non erit +opus perfectae virtutis, nisi hoc bene faciat, idest secundum +electionem rectam, quod est per prudentiam, et ideo iustitia sine +prudentia non potest esse virtus perfecta. Sic igitur fides et spes +sine caritate possunt quidem aliqualiter esse, perfectae autem +virtutis rationem sine caritate non habent. Cum enim fidei opus sit +credere Deo; credere autem sit alicui propria voluntate assentire, +si non debito modo velit, non erit fidei opus perfectum. Quod autem +debito modo velit, hoc est per caritatem, quae perficit voluntatem, +omnis enim rectus motus voluntatis ex recto amore procedit, ut +Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei. Sic igitur fides est quidem +sine caritate, sed non perfecta virtus, sicut temperantia vel +fortitudo sine prudentia. Et similiter dicendum est de spe. Nam +actus spei est expectare futuram beatitudinem a Deo. Qui quidem +actus perfectus est, si fiat ex meritis quae quis habet, quod non +potest esse sine caritate. Si autem hoc expectet ex meritis quae +nondum habet, sed proponit in futurum acquirere, erit actus +imperfectus, et hoc potest esse sine caritate. Et ideo fides et +spes possunt esse sine caritate, sed sine caritate, proprie +loquendo, virtutes non sunt; nam ad rationem virtutis pertinet ut +non solum secundum ipsam aliquod bonum operemur, sed etiam bene, ut +dicitur in II Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Moral virtue depends on prudence: and not even infused prudence has the character of prudence without charity; for this involves + the absence of due order to the first principle, viz. the ultimate end. On the other hand faith and hope, as such, do not + depend either on prudence or charity; so that they can be without charity, although they are not virtues without charity, + as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36225" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36225] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod virtutes morales dependent a prudentia, +prudentia autem infusa nec rationem prudentiae habere potest absque +caritate, utpote deficiente debita habitudine ad primum principium, +quod est ultimus finis. Fides autem et spes, secundum proprias +rationes, nec a prudentia nec a caritate dependent. Et ideo sine +caritate esse possunt; licet non sint virtutes sine caritate, ut +dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument is true of faith considered as a perfect virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36226" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36226] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de fide quae habet perfectam +rationem virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Augustine is speaking here of that hope whereby we look to gain future bliss through merits which we have already; and this + is not without charity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36227" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36227] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur ibi de spe, secundum quod aliquis +expectat futuram beatitudinem per merita quae iam habet, quod non +est sine caritate.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q65_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q65_A5-p0.1">Q. 65. A. 5. Whether charity can be without faith and hope?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that charity can be without faith and hope. For charity is the love of God. But it is possible for us to love + God naturally, without already having faith, or hope in future bliss. Therefore charity can be without faith and hope. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36228" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36228] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas possit esse sine fide et spe. +Caritas enim est amor Dei. Sed Deus potest a nobis amari +naturaliter, etiam non praesupposita fide, vel spe futurae +beatitudinis. Ergo caritas potest esse sine fide et spe.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, charity is the root of all the virtues, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.17" target="asv"> Eph. 3:17</a>: "Rooted and founded in charity." Now the root is sometimes without branches. Therefore charity can sometimes be without + faith and hope, and the other virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36229" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36229] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +caritas est radix omnium virtutum; secundum illud Ephes. III, <i>in +caritate radicati et fundati</i>. Sed radix aliquando est sine +ramis. Ergo caritas potest esse aliquando sine fide et spe et aliis +virtutibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there was perfect charity in Christ. And yet He had neither faith nor hope: because He was a perfect comprehensor, + as we shall explain further on ( + <a href="TP_ii.html#TP_Q7_A3" id="FS_Q65_A5-p4.1" shape="rect">TP, Q[7], AA[3]</a>,4). Therefore charity can be without faith and hope. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36230" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36230] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +in Christo fuit perfecta caritas. Ipse tamen non habuit fidem et +spem, quia fuit perfectus comprehensor, ut infra dicetur. Ergo +caritas potest esse sine fide et spe.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.6" target="asv">Heb. 11:6</a>): "Without faith it is impossible to please God"; and this evidently belongs most to charity, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A5-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.17" target="asv"> Prov. 8:17</a>: "I love them that love me." Again, it is by hope that we are brought to charity, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q62_A4" id="FS_Q65_A5-p5.3" shape="rect">Q[62], A[4]</a>). Therefore it is not possible to have charity without faith and hope. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36231" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36231] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, Heb. XI, <i>sine fide impossibile est +placere Deo</i>; quod maxime pertinet ad caritatem, ut patet; +secundum illud Proverb. VIII, <i>ego diligentes me diligo</i>. Spes +etiam est quae introducit ad caritatem, ut supra dictum est. Ergo +caritas non potest haberi sine fide et spe.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Charity signifies not only the love of God, but also a certain friendship with Him; which implies, besides love, a certain + mutual return of love, together with mutual communion, as stated in Ethic. viii, 2. That this belongs to charity is evident + from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:16</a>: "He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him," and from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.1.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 1:9, </a> where it is written: "God is faithful, by Whom you are called unto the + fellowship of His Son." Now this fellowship of man with God, which consists in a certain familiar colloquy with Him, is begun + here, in this life, by grace, but will be perfected in the future life, by glory; each of which things we hold by faith and + hope. Wherefore just as friendship with a person would be impossible, if one disbelieved in, or despaired of, the possibility + of their fellowship or familiar colloquy; so too, friendship with God, which is charity, is impossible without faith, so as + to believe in this fellowship and colloquy with God, and to hope to attain to this fellowship. Therefore charity is quite + impossible without faith and hope. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 5 co."><a name="36232" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36232] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod caritas non solum significat amorem Dei, sed etiam +amicitiam quandam ad ipsum; quae quidem super amorem addit mutuam +redamationem cum quadam mutua communicatione, ut dicitur in VIII +Ethic. Et quod hoc ad caritatem pertineat, patet per id quod +dicitur I Ioan. IV, <i>qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus +in eo</i>. Et I ad Cor. I dicitur, <i>fidelis Deus, per quem vocati +estis in societatem filii eius</i>. Haec autem societas hominis ad +Deum, quae est quaedam familiaris conversatio cum ipso, inchoatur +quidem hic in praesenti per gratiam, perficietur autem in futuro +per gloriam, quorum utrumque fide et spe tenetur. Unde sicut +aliquis non posset cum aliquo amicitiam habere, si discrederet vel +desperaret se posse habere aliquam societatem vel familiarem +conversationem cum ipso; ita aliquis non potest habere amicitiam ad +Deum, quae est caritas, nisi fidem habeat, per quam credat +huiusmodi societatem et conversationem hominis cum Deo, et speret +se ad hanc societatem pertinere. Et sic caritas sine fide et spe +nullo modo esse potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Charity is not any kind of love of God, but that love of God, by which He is loved as the object of bliss, to which object + we are directed by faith and hope. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36233" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36233] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod caritas non est qualiscumque amor Dei, sed amor +Dei quo diligitur ut beatitudinis obiectum, ad quod ordinamur per +fidem et spem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Charity is the root of faith and hope, in so far as it gives them the perfection of virtue. But faith and hope as such are + the precursors of charity, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q62_A4" id="FS_Q65_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[62], A[4]</a>), and so charity is impossible without them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36234" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36234] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod caritas est radix fidei et spei, inquantum dat eis +perfectionem virtutis. Sed fides et spes, secundum rationem +propriam, praesupponuntur ad caritatem, ut supra dictum est. Et sic +caritas sine eis esse non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In Christ there was neither faith nor hope, on account of their implying an imperfection. But instead of faith, He had manifest + vision, and instead of hope, full comprehension [*See above + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q4_A3" id="FS_Q65_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">, Q[4], A[3]</a>]: so that in Him was perfect charity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36235" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36235] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod Christo defuit fides et spes, propter id quod est +imperfectionis in eis. Sed loco fidei, habuit apertam visionem; et +loco spei, plenam comprehensionem. Et sic fuit perfecta caritas in +eo.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q66" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q66-p0.1">Q. 66. OF EQUALITY AMONG THE VIRTUES (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q66-p2"> We must now consider equality among the virtues: under which head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q66-p3"><a href="#FS_Q66_A1"> (1) Whether one virtue can be greater or less than another?</a></p><p id="FS_Q66-p4"><a href="#FS_Q66_A2"> (2) Whether all the virtues existing together in one subject are equal?</a></p><p id="FS_Q66-p5"><a href="#FS_Q66_A3"> (3) Of moral virtue in comparison with intellectual virtue;</a></p><p id="FS_Q66-p6"><a href="#FS_Q66_A4"> (4) Of the moral virtues as compared with one another;</a></p><p id="FS_Q66-p7"><a href="#FS_Q66_A5"> (5) Of the intellectual virtues in comparison with one another;</a></p><p id="FS_Q66-p8"><a href="#FS_Q66_A6"> (6) Of the theological virtues in comparison with one another.</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 pr."><a name="36236" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36236] +Iª-IIae q. 66 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +aequalitate virtutum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum +virtus possit esse maior vel minor. Secundo, utrum omnes virtutes +simul in eodem existentes, sint aequales. Tertio, de comparatione +virtutum moralium ad intellectuales. Quarto, de comparatione +virtutum moralium ad invicem. Quinto, de comparatione virtutum +intellectualium ad invicem. Sexto, de comparatione virtutum +theologicarum ad invicem.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q66_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q66_A1-p0.1">Q. 66. A. 1. Whether one virtue can be greater or less than another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one virtue cannot be greater or less than another. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.16" target="asv">Apoc. 21:16</a>) that the sides of the city of Jerusalem are equal; and a gloss says that the sides denote the virtues. Therefore all virtues + are equal; and consequently one cannot be greater than another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36237" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36237] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus non possit esse maior vel +minor. Dicitur enim in Apoc. XXI, quod latera civitatis Ierusalem +sunt aequalia. Per haec autem significantur virtutes, ut Glossa +dicit ibidem. Ergo omnes virtutes sunt aequales. Non ergo potest +esse virtus maior virtute.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing that, by its nature, consists in a maximum, cannot be more or less. Now the nature of virtue consists in + a maximum, for virtue is "the limit of power," as the Philosopher states (De Coelo i, text. 116); and Augustine says (De Lib. + Arb. ii, 19) that "virtues are very great boons, and no one can use them to evil purpose." Therefore it seems that one virtue + cannot be greater or less than another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36238" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36238] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +omne illud cuius ratio consistit in maximo, non potest esse maius +vel minus. Sed ratio virtutis consistit in maximo, est enim virtus +ultimum potentiae, ut philosophus dicit in I de caelo; et +Augustinus etiam dicit, in II de Lib. Arb., quod <i>virtutes sunt +maxima bona, quibus nullus potest male uti</i>. Ergo videtur quod +virtus non possit esse maior neque minor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the quantity of an effect is measured by the power of the agent. But perfect, viz. infused virtues, are from God + Whose power is uniform and infinite. Therefore it seems that one virtue cannot be greater than another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36239" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36239] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quantitas effectus pensatur secundum virtutem agentis. Sed virtutes +perfectae, quae sunt virtutes infusae, sunt a Deo, cuius virtus est +uniformis et infinita. Ergo videtur quod virtus non possit esse +maior virtute.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Wherever there can be increase and greater abundance, there can be inequality. Now virtues admit of greater abundance and + increase: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.20" target="asv">Mat. 5:20</a>): "Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven": + and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.15.5" target="asv">Prov. 15:5</a>): "In abundant justice there is the greatest strength [virtus]." Therefore it seems that a virtue can be greater or + less than another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36240" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36240] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +ubicumque potest esse augmentum et superabundantia, potest esse +inaequalitas. Sed in virtutibus invenitur superabundantia et +augmentum, dicitur enim Matth. V, <i>nisi abundaverit iustitia +vestra plus quam Scribarum et Pharisaeorum, non intrabitis in +regnum caelorum</i>; et Proverb. XV dicitur, <i>in abundanti +iustitia virtus maxima est</i>. Ergo videtur quod virtus possit +esse maior vel minor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q66_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> When it is asked whether one virtue can be greater than another, the question can be taken in two senses. First, as applying + to virtues of different species. In this sense it is clear that one virtue is greater than another; since a cause is always + more excellent than its effect; and among effects, those nearest to the cause are the most excellent. Now it is clear from + what has been said ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A5" id="FS_Q66_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[5]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q61_A2" id="FS_Q66_A1-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[61], + A[2] + </a>) that the cause and root of human good is the reason. Hence prudence which perfects the reason, surpasses in goodness the + other moral virtues which perfect the appetitive power, in so far as it partakes of reason. And among these, one is better + than another, according as it approaches nearer to the reason. Consequently justice, which is in the will, excels the remaining + moral virtues; and fortitude, which is in the irascible part, stands before temperance, which is in the + concupiscible, which has a smaller share of reason, as stated in Ethic. vii, 6. + </p><p id="FS_Q66_A1-p7"> The question can be taken in another way, as referring to virtues of the same species. In this way, according to what was + said above ( + <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q52_A1" id="FS_Q66_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[52], A[1]</a> ), when we were treating of the intensity of habits, virtue may be said to be greater or less in two ways: first, in itself; + secondly with regard to the subject that partakes of it. If we consider it in itself, we shall call it greater or little, + according to the things to which it extends. Now whosoever has a + virtue, e.g. temperance, has it in respect of whatever temperance extends to. But this does not apply to science and art: + for every grammarian does not know everything relating to grammar. And in this sense the Stoics said rightly, as Simplicius + states in his Commentary on the Predicaments, that virtue cannot be more or less, as science and art can; because the nature + of virtue consists in a maximum. + </p><p id="FS_Q66_A1-p8"> If, however, we consider virtue on the part of the subject, it may then be greater or less, either in relation to different + times, or in different men. Because one man is better disposed than another to attain to the mean of virtue which is defined + by right reason; and this, on account of either greater habituation, or a better natural disposition, or a more discerning + judgment of reason, or again a greater gift of grace, which is given to each one "according to the measure of + the giving of Christ," as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.9" target="asv"> Eph. 4:9.</a> And here the Stoics erred, for they held that no man should be deemed virtuous, unless he were, in the highest degree, disposed + to virtue. Because the nature of virtue does not require that man should reach the mean of right reason as though it were + an indivisible point, as the Stoics thought; but it is enough that he should approach the mean, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. + Moreover, one same indivisible mark is reached more nearly + and more readily by one than by another: as may be seen when several arches aim at a fixed target. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 1 co."><a name="36241" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36241] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod cum quaeritur utrum virtus una possit esse maior +alia, dupliciter intelligi potest quaestio. Uno modo, in virtutibus +specie differentibus. Et sic manifestum est quod una virtus est +alia maior. Semper enim est potior causa suo effectu, et in +effectibus, tanto aliquid est potius, quanto est causae +propinquius. Manifestum est autem ex dictis quod causa et radix +humani boni est ratio. Et ideo prudentia, quae perficit rationem, +praefertur in bonitate aliis virtutibus moralibus, perficientibus +vim appetitivam inquantum participat rationem. Et in his etiam +tanto est una altera melior, quanto magis ad rationem accedit. Unde +et iustitia, quae est in voluntate, praefertur aliis virtutibus +moralibus, et fortitudo, quae est in irascibili, praefertur +temperantiae, quae est in concupiscibili, quae minus participat +rationem, ut patet in VII Ethic. Alio modo potest intelligi +quaestio in virtute eiusdem speciei. Et sic, secundum ea quae dicta +sunt supra, cum de intensionibus habituum ageretur, virtus potest +dupliciter dici maior et minor, uno modo, secundum seipsam; alio +modo, ex parte participantis subiecti. Si igitur secundum seipsam +consideretur, magnitudo vel parvitas eius attenditur secundum ea ad +quae se extendit. Quicumque autem habet aliquam virtutem, puta +temperantiam, habet ipsam quantum ad omnia ad quae se temperantia +extendit. Quod de scientia et arte non contingit, non enim +quicumque est grammaticus, scit omnia quae ad grammaticam +pertinent. Et secundum hoc bene dixerunt Stoici, ut Simplicius +dicit in commento praedicamentorum, quod virtus non recipit magis +et minus, sicut scientia vel ars; eo quod ratio virtutis consistit +in maximo. Si vero consideretur virtus ex parte subiecti +participantis, sic contingit virtutem esse maiorem vel minorem, +sive secundum diversa tempora, in eodem; sive in diversis +hominibus. Quia ad attingendum medium virtutis, quod est secundum +rationem rectam, unus est melius dispositus quam alius, vel propter +maiorem assuetudinem, vel propter meliorem dispositionem naturae, +vel propter perspicacius iudicium rationis, aut etiam propter maius +gratiae donum, quod unicuique donatur secundum mensuram donationis +Christi, ut dicitur ad Ephes. IV. Et in hoc deficiebant Stoici, +aestimantes nullum esse virtuosum dicendum, nisi qui summe fuerit +dispositus ad virtutem. Non enim exigitur ad rationem virtutis, +quod attingat rectae rationis medium in indivisibili, sicut Stoici +putabant, sed sufficit prope medium esse, ut in II Ethic. dicitur. +Idem etiam indivisibile signum unus propinquius et promptius +attingit quam alius, sicut etiam patet in sagittatoribus +trahentibus ad certum signum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This equality is not one of absolute quantity, but of proportion: because all virtues grow in a man proportionately, as we + shall see further on + <a href="#FS_Q66_A2" id="FS_Q66_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36242" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36242] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod aequalitas illa non est secundum quantitatem +absolutam, sed est secundum proportionem intelligenda, quia omnes +virtutes proportionaliter crescunt in homine, ut infra dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This "limit" which belongs to virtue, can have the character of something "more" or "less" good, in the ways explained above: + since, as stated, it is not an indivisible limit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36243" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36243] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod illud ultimum quod pertinet ad virtutem, potest +habere rationem magis vel minus boni secundum praedictos modos, cum +non sit ultimum indivisibile, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God does not work by necessity of nature, but according to the order of His wisdom, whereby He bestows on men various measures + of virtue, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.7" target="asv"> Eph. 4:7</a>: "To every one of you [Vulg.: 'us'] is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36244" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36244] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod Deus non operatur secundum necessitatem naturae, sed +secundum ordinem suae sapientiae, secundum quam diversam mensuram +virtutis hominibus largitur, secundum illud ad Ephes. IV, +<i>unicuique vestrum data est gratia secundum mensuram donationis +Christi</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q66_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q66_A2-p0.1">Q. 66. A. 2. Whether all the virtues that are together in one man, are equal?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the virtues in one same man are not all equally intense. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:7</a>): "Everyone hath his proper gift from God; one after this manner, and another after that." Now one gift would not be more + proper than another to a man, if God infused all the virtues equally into each man. Therefore it seems that the virtues are + not all equal in one and the same man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36245" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36245] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnes virtutes in uno et eodem +sint aequaliter intensae. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. VII, +<i>unusquisque habet proprium donum a Deo, alius quidem sic, alius +autem sic</i>. Non esset autem unum donum magis proprium alicui +quam aliud, si omnes virtutes dono Dei infusas quilibet aequaliter +haberet. Ergo videtur quod non omnes virtutes sint aequales in uno +et eodem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if all the virtues were equally intense in one and the same man, it would follow that whoever surpasses another + in one virtue, would surpass him in all the others. But this is clearly not the case: since various saints are specially praised + for different virtues; e.g. Abraham for faith ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.4" target="asv">Rom. 4</a>), Moses for his meekness ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Num.7.3" target="asv">Num. 7:3</a>), Job for his patience ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A2-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Tob.2.12" target="asv">Tob. 2:12</a>). This is why of each Confessor the Church sings: + "There was not found his like in keeping the law of the most High," [*See Lesson in the Mass Statuit (Dominican Missal)], + since each one was remarkable for some virtue or other. Therefore the virtues are not all equal in one and the same man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36246" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36246] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +si omnes virtutes essent aeque intensae in uno et eodem, sequeretur +quod quicumque excederet aliquem in una virtute, excederet ipsum in +omnibus aliis virtutibus. Sed hoc patet esse falsum, quia diversi +sancti de diversis virtutibus praecipue laudantur; sicut Abraham de +fide, Moyses de mansuetudine, Iob de patientia. Unde et de quolibet +confessore cantatur in Ecclesia, <i>non est inventus similis illi, +qui conservaret legem excelsi</i>; eo quod quilibet habuit +praerogativam alicuius virtutis. Non ergo omnes virtutes sunt +aequales in uno et eodem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more intense a habit is, the greater one's pleasure and readiness in making use of it. Now experience shows + that a man is more pleased and ready to make use of one virtue than of another. Therefore the virtues are not all equal in + one and the same man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36247" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36247] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quanto habitus est intensior, tanto homo secundum ipsum +delectabilius et promptius operatur. Sed experimento patet quod +unus homo delectabilius et promptius operatur actum unius virtutis +quam actum alterius. Non ergo omnes virtutes sunt aequales in uno +et eodem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 4) that "those who are equal in fortitude are equal in prudence and temperance," and so on. + Now it would not be so, unless all the virtues in one man were equal. Therefore all virtues are equal in one man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36248" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36248] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in VI de Trin., quod <i>quicumque sunt +aequales in fortitudine, aequales sunt in prudentia et +temperantia</i>; et sic de aliis. Hoc autem non esset, nisi omnes +virtutes unius hominis essent aequales. Ergo omnes virtutes unius +hominis sunt aequales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q66_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As explained above + <a href="#FS_Q66_A1" id="FS_Q66_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the comparative greatness of virtues can be understood in two ways. First, as referring to their specific nature: and in + this way there is no doubt that in a man one virtue is greater than another, for example, charity, than faith and hope. Secondly, + it may be taken as referring to the degree of participation by the subject, according as a virtue becomes intense or remiss + in its subject. In this sense all + the virtues in one man are equal with an equality of proportion, in so far as their growth in man is equal: thus the fingers + are unequal in size, but equal in proportion, since they grow in proportion to one another. + </p><p id="FS_Q66_A2-p7"> Now the nature of this equality is to be explained in the same way as the connection of virtues; for equality among virtues + is their connection as to greatness. Now it has been stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q65_A1" id="FS_Q66_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[65], A[1]</a>) that a twofold connection of virtues may be assigned. The first is according to the opinion of those who understood these + four virtues to be four general properties of virtues, each of which is found together with the other in any matter. In this + way + virtues cannot be said to be equal in any matter unless they have all these properties equal. Augustine alludes to this kind + of equality (De Trin. vi, 4) when he says: "If you say these men are equal in fortitude, but that one is more prudent than + the other; it follows that the fortitude of the latter is less prudent. Consequently they are not really equal in fortitude, + since the former's fortitude is more prudent. You will find that this applies to the other virtues if you run over them all + in + the same way." + </p><p id="FS_Q66_A2-p8"> The other kind of connection among virtues followed the opinion of those who hold these virtues to have their own proper + respective matters ( + <a href="#FS_Q65_A1" id="FS_Q66_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[65] , AA[1]</a>,2). In this way the connection among moral virtues results from prudence, and, as to the infused virtues, from charity, and + not from the inclination, which is on the part of the subject, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q65_A1" id="FS_Q66_A2-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[65], A[1]</a>). Accordingly the nature of the equality among virtues can + also be considered on the part of prudence, in regard to that which is formal in all the moral virtues: for in one and the + same man, so long as his reason has the same degree of perfection, the mean will be proportionately defined according to right + reason in each matter of virtue. + </p><p id="FS_Q66_A2-p9"> But in regard to that which is material in the moral virtues, viz. the inclination to the virtuous act, one may be readier + to perform the act of one virtue, than the act of another virtue, and this either from nature, or from habituation, or again + by the grace of God. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 2 co."><a name="36249" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36249] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod quantitas virtutum, sicut ex dictis patet, potest +attendi dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum rationem speciei. Et sic non +est dubium quod una virtus unius hominis sit maior quam alia, sicut +caritas fide et spe. Alio modo potest attendi secundum +participationem subiecti, prout scilicet intenditur vel remittitur +in subiecto. Et secundum hoc, omnes virtutes unius hominis sunt +aequales quadam aequalitate proportionis, inquantum aequaliter +crescunt in homine, sicut digiti manus sunt inaequales secundum +quantitatem, sed sunt aequales secundum proportionem, cum +proportionaliter augeantur. Huiusmodi autem aequalitatis oportet +eodem modo rationem accipere, sicut et connexionis, aequalitas enim +est quaedam connexio virtutum secundum quantitatem. Dictum est +autem supra quod ratio connexionis virtutum dupliciter assignari +potest. Uno modo, secundum intellectum eorum qui intelligunt per +has quatuor virtutes, quatuor conditiones generales virtutum, +quarum una simul invenitur cum aliis in qualibet materia. Et sic +virtus in qualibet materia non potest aequalis dici, nisi habeat +omnes istas conditiones aequales. Et hanc rationem aequalitatis +virtutum assignat Augustinus, in VI de Trin., dicens, <i>si dixeris +aequales esse istos fortitudine, sed illum praestare prudentia; +sequitur quod huius fortitudo minus prudens sit. Ac per hoc, nec +fortitudine aequales sunt, quando est illius fortitudo prudentior. +Atque ita de ceteris virtutibus invenies, si omnes eadem +consideratione percurras</i>. Alio modo assignata est ratio +connexionis virtutum secundum eos qui intelligunt huiusmodi +virtutes habere materias determinatas. Et secundum hoc, ratio +connexionis virtutum moralium accipitur ex parte prudentiae, et ex +parte caritatis quantum ad virtutes infusas, non autem ex parte +inclinationis, quae est ex parte subiecti, ut supra dictum est. Sic +igitur et ratio aequalitatis virtutum potest accipi ex parte +prudentiae, quantum ad id quod est formale in omnibus virtutibus +moralibus, existente enim ratione aequaliter perfecta in uno et +eodem, oportet quod proportionaliter secundum rationem rectam +medium constituatur in qualibet materia virtutum. Quantum vero ad +id quod est materiale in virtutibus moralibus, scilicet +inclinationem ipsam ad actum virtutis; potest esse unus homo magis +promptus ad actum unius virtutis quam ad actum alterius, vel ex +natura, vel ex consuetudine, vel etiam ex gratiae dono.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This saying of the Apostle may be taken to refer to the gifts of gratuitous grace, which are not common to all, nor are all + of them equal in the one same subject. We might also say that it refers to the measure of sanctifying grace, by reason of + which one man has all the virtues in greater abundance than another man, on account of his greater abundance of prudence, + or also of charity, in which all the infused virtues are connected. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36250" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36250] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod verbum apostoli potest intelligi de donis +gratiae gratis datae, quae non sunt communia omnibus, nec omnia +aequalia in uno et eodem. Vel potest dici quod refertur ad mensuram +gratiae gratum facientis; secundum quam unus abundat in omnibus +virtutibus plus quam alius, propter maiorem abundantiam prudentiae, +vel etiam caritatis, in qua connectuntur omnes virtutes +infusae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One saint is praised chiefly for one virtue, another saint for another virtue, on account of his more admirable readiness + for the act of one virtue than for the act of another virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36251" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36251] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod unus sanctus laudatur praecipue de una virtute, et +alius de alia, propter excellentiorem promptitudinem ad actum unius +virtutis, quam ad actum alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A2-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36252" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36252] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Et per hoc +etiam patet responsio ad tertium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q66_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q66_A3-p0.1">Q. 66. A. 3. Whether the moral virtues are better than the intellectual virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the moral virtues are better than the intellectual. Because that which is more necessary, and more lasting, + is better. Now the moral virtues are "more lasting even than the sciences" (Ethic. i) which are intellectual virtues: and, + moreover, they are more necessary for human life. Therefore they are preferable to the intellectual virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36253" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36253] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales praeemineant +intellectualibus. Quod enim magis est necessarium, et permanentius, +est melius. Sed virtutes morales sunt permanentiores etiam +disciplinis, quae sunt virtutes intellectuales, et sunt etiam magis +necessariae ad vitam humanam. Ergo sunt praeferendae virtutibus +intellectualibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue is defined as "that which makes its possessor good." Now man is said to be good in respect of moral virtue, + and art in respect of intellectual virtue, except perhaps in respect of prudence alone. Therefore moral is better than intellectual + virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36254" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36254] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +de ratione virtutis est quod bonum faciat habentem. Sed secundum +virtutes morales dicitur homo bonus, non autem secundum virtutes +intellectuales, nisi forte secundum solam prudentiam. Ergo virtus +moralis est melior quam intellectualis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the end is more excellent than the means. But according to Ethic. vi, 12, "moral virtue gives right intention of + the end; whereas prudence gives right choice of the means." Therefore moral virtue is more excellent than prudence, which + is the intellectual virtue that regards moral matters. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36255" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36255] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +finis est nobilior his quae sunt ad finem. Sed sicut dicitur in VI +Ethic., <i>virtus moralis facit rectam intentionem finis; prudentia +autem facit rectam electionem eorum quae sunt ad finem</i>. Ergo +virtus moralis est nobilior prudentia, quae est virtus +intellectualis circa moralia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Moral virtue is in that part of the soul which is rational by participation; while intellectual virtue is in the essentially + rational part, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. Now rational by essence is more excellent than rational by participation. Therefore + intellectual virtue is better than moral virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36256" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36256] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +virtus moralis est in rationali per participationem; virtus autem +intellectualis in rationali per essentiam, sicut dicitur in I +Ethic. Sed rationale per essentiam est nobilius quam rationale per +participationem. Ergo virtus intellectualis est nobilior virtute +morali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q66_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A thing may be said to be greater or less in two ways: first, simply; secondly, relatively. For nothing hinders something + from being better simply, e.g. "learning than riches," and yet not better relatively, i.e. "for one who is in want" [*Aristotle, + Topic. iii.]. Now to consider a thing simply is to consider it in its proper specific nature. Accordingly, a virtue takes + its species from its object, as explained above ( + <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q54_A2" id="FS_Q66_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[54], A[2]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q60_A1" id="FS_Q66_A3-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[60], A[1]</a>). Hence, speaking simply, that virtue is more excellent, which has the more excellent object. Now it is evident that the + object of the reason is more excellent than the object of the appetite: since the reason apprehends things in the universal, + while the appetite tends to things themselves, whose being is restricted to the particular. Consequently, speaking simply, + the intellectual virtues, which perfect the reason, are more excellent than the moral virtues, + which perfect the appetite. + </p><p id="FS_Q66_A3-p7"> But if we consider virtue in its relation to act, then moral virtue, which perfects the appetite, whose function it is to + move the other powers to act, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q66_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>), is more excellent. And since virtue is so called from its being a principle of action, for it is the perfection of a power, + it follows again that the nature of virtue agrees more with moral than with intellectual virtue, though the intellectual virtues + are more excellent + habits, simply speaking. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 3 co."><a name="36257" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36257] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod aliquid potest dici maius vel minus, dupliciter, uno +modo, simpliciter; alio modo, secundum quid. Nihil enim prohibet +aliquid esse melius simpliciter, ut philosophari quam ditari, quod +tamen non est melius secundum quid, idest necessitatem patienti. +Simpliciter autem consideratur unumquodque, quando consideratur +secundum propriam rationem suae speciei. Habet autem virtus speciem +ex obiecto, ut ex dictis patet. Unde, simpliciter loquendo, illa +virtus nobilior est quae habet nobilius obiectum. Manifestum est +autem quod obiectum rationis est nobilius quam obiectum appetitus, +ratio enim apprehendit aliquid in universali; sed appetitus tendit +in res, quae habent esse particulare. Unde, simpliciter loquendo, +virtutes intellectuales, quae perficiunt rationem, sunt nobiliores +quam morales, quae perficiunt appetitum. Sed si consideretur virtus +in ordine ad actum, sic virtus moralis, quae perficit appetitum, +cuius est movere alias potentias ad actum, ut supra dictum est, +nobilior est. Et quia virtus dicitur ex eo quod est principium +alicuius actus, cum sit perfectio potentiae, sequitur etiam quod +ratio virtutis magis competat virtutibus moralibus quam virtutibus +intellectualibus, quamvis virtutes intellectuales sint nobiliores +habitus simpliciter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The moral virtues are more lasting than the intellectual virtues, because they are practised in matters pertaining to the + life of the community. Yet it is evident that the objects of the sciences, which are necessary and invariable, are more lasting + than the objects of moral virtue, which are certain particular matters of action. That the moral virtues are more necessary + for human life, proves that they are more excellent, not simply, but relatively. + Indeed, the speculative intellectual virtues, from the very fact that they are not referred to something else, as a useful + thing is referred to an end, are more excellent. The reason for this is that in them we have a kind of beginning of that happiness + which consists in the knowledge of truth, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q3_A6" id="FS_Q66_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[6]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36258" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36258] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod virtutes morales sunt magis permanentes quam +intellectuales, propter exercitium earum in his quae pertinent ad +vitam communem. Sed manifestum est quod obiecta disciplinarum, quae +sunt necessaria et semper eodem modo se habentia, sunt +permanentiora quam obiecta virtutum moralium, quae sunt quaedam +particularia agibilia. Quod autem virtutes morales sunt magis +necessariae ad vitam humanam, non ostendit eas esse nobiliores +simpliciter, sed quoad hoc. Quinimmo virtutes intellectuales +speculativae, ex hoc ipso quod non ordinantur ad aliud sicut utile +ordinatur ad finem, sunt digniores. Hoc enim contingit quia +secundum eas quodammodo inchoatur in nobis beatitudo, quae +consistit in cognitione veritatis, sicut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reason why man is said to be good simply, in respect of moral virtue, but not in respect of intellectual virtue, is because + the appetite moves the other powers to their acts, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q56_A3" id="FS_Q66_A3-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[56], A[3]</a>). Wherefore this argument, too, proves merely that moral virtue is better relatively. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36259" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36259] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod secundum virtutes morales dicitur homo bonus +simpliciter, et non secundum intellectuales, ea ratione, quia +appetitus movet alias potentias ad suum actum, ut supra dictum est. +Unde per hoc etiam non probatur nisi quod virtus moralis sit melior +secundum quid.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Prudence directs the moral virtues not only in the choice of the means, but also in appointing the end. Now the end of each + moral virtue is to attain the mean in the matter proper to that virtue; which mean is appointed according to the right ruling + of prudence, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6; vi, 13. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36260" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36260] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod prudentia non solum dirigit virtutes morales in +eligendo ea quae sunt ad finem, sed etiam in praestituendo finem. +Est autem finis uniuscuiusque virtutis moralis attingere medium in +propria materia, quod quidem medium determinatur secundum rectam +rationem prudentiae, ut dicitur in II et VI Ethic.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q66_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q66_A4-p0.1">Q. 66. A. 4. Whether justice is the chief of the moral virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that justice is not the chief of the moral virtues. For it is better to give of one's own than to pay what + is due. Now the former belongs to liberality, the latter to justice. Therefore liberality is apparently a greater virtue than + justice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36261" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36261] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod iustitia non sit praecipua inter +virtutes morales. Maius enim est dare alicui de proprio, quam +reddere alicui quod ei debetur. Sed primum pertinet ad +liberalitatem; secundum autem ad iustitiam. Ergo videtur quod +liberalitas sit maior virtus quam iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the chief quality of a thing is, seemingly, that in which it is most perfect. Now, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.4" target="asv"> Jam. 1:4, </a> "Patience hath a perfect work." Therefore it would seem that patience is greater than justice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36262" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36262] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +illud videtur esse maximum in unoquoque, quod est perfectissimum in +ipso. Sed sicut dicitur Iac. I, <i>patientia opus perfectum +habet</i>. Ergo videtur quod patientia sit maior quam iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "Magnanimity has a great influence on every virtue," as stated in Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore it magnifies even justice. + Therefore it is greater than justice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36263" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36263] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> +<i>Praeterea, magnanimitas operatur magnum, in omnibus +virtutibus</i>, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Ergo magnificat etiam ipsam +iustitiam. Est igitur maior quam iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "justice is the most excellent of the virtues." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36264" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36264] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., quod <i>iustitia est +praeclarissima virtutum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q66_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A virtue considered in its species may be greater or less, either simply or relatively. A virtue is said to be greater simply, + whereby a greater rational good shines forth, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q66_A1" id="FS_Q66_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. In this way justice is the most excellent of all the moral virtues, as being most akin to reason. This is made evident by + considering its subject and its object: its subject, because this is the will, and the will is the rational appetite, + as stated above (Q[8], A[1]; Q[26], A[1]): its object or matter, because it is about operations, whereby man is set in order + not only in himself, but also in regard to another. Hence "justice is the most excellent of virtues" (Ethic. v, 1). Among + the other moral virtues, which are about the passions, the more excellent the matter in which the appetitive movement is subjected + to reason, so much the more does the rational good shine forth in each. Now in things touching man, the chief of all is + life, on which all other things depend. Consequently fortitude which subjects the appetitive movement to reason in matters + of life and death, holds the first place among those moral virtues that are about the passions, but is subordinate to justice. + Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. 1) that "those virtues must needs be greatest which receive the most praise: since virtue + is a power of doing good. Hence the brave man and the just man are honored more than others; because the former," i.e. + fortitude, "is useful in war, and the latter," i.e. justice, "both in war and in peace." After fortitude comes temperance, + which subjects the appetite to reason in matters directly relating to life, in the one individual, or in the one species, + viz. in matters of food and of sex. And so these three virtues, together with prudence, are called principal virtues, in excellence + also. + </p><p id="FS_Q66_A4-p7"> A virtue is said to be greater relatively, by reason of its helping or adorning a principal virtue: even as substance is + more excellent simply than accident: and yet relatively some particular accident is more excellent than substance in so far + as it perfects substance in some accidental mode of being. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 4 co."><a name="36265" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36265] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod virtus aliqua secundum suam speciem potest dici maior +vel minor, vel simpliciter, vel secundum quid. Simpliciter quidem +virtus dicitur maior, secundum quod in ea maius bonum rationis +relucet, ut supra dictum est. Et secundum hoc, iustitia inter omnes +virtutes morales praecellit, tanquam propinquior rationi. Quod +patet et ex subiecto, et ex obiecto. Ex subiecto quidem, quia est +in voluntate sicut in subiecto, voluntas autem est appetitus +rationalis, ut ex dictis patet. Secundum autem obiectum sive +materiam, quia est circa operationes, quibus homo ordinatur non +solum in seipso, sed etiam ad alterum. Unde iustitia est +praeclarissima virtutum, ut dicitur in V Ethic. Inter alias autem +virtutes morales, quae sunt circa passiones, tanto in unaquaque +magis relucet rationis bonum, quanto circa maiora motus appetitivus +subditur rationi. Maximum autem in his quae ad hominem pertinent, +est vita, a qua omnia alia dependent. Et ideo fortitudo, quae +appetitivum motum subdit rationi in his quae ad mortem et vitam +pertinent, primum locum tenet inter virtutes morales quae sunt +circa passiones, tamen ordinatur infra iustitiam. Unde philosophus +dicit, in I Rhetoric., quod <i>necesse est maximas esse virtutes, +quae sunt aliis honoratissimae, siquidem est virtus potentia +benefactiva. Propter hoc, fortes et iustos maxime honorant, haec +quidem enim in bello, scilicet fortitudo; haec autem, scilicet +iustitia, et in bello et in pace utilis est</i>. Post fortitudinem +autem ordinatur temperantia, quae subiicit rationi appetitum circa +ea quae immediate ordinantur ad vitam, vel in eodem secundum +numerum, vel in eodem secundum speciem, scilicet in cibis et +venereis. Et sic istae tres virtutes, simul cum prudentia, dicuntur +esse principales etiam dignitate. Secundum quid autem dicitur +aliqua virtus esse maior, secundum quod adminiculum vel ornamentum +praebet principali virtuti. Sicut substantia est simpliciter +dignior accidente; aliquod tamen accidens est secundum quid dignius +substantia, inquantum perficit substantiam in aliquo esse +accidentali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The act of liberality needs to be founded on an act of justice, for "a man is not liberal in giving, unless he gives of his + own" (Polit. ii, 3). Hence there could be no liberality apart from justice, which discerns between "meum" and "tuum": whereas + justice can be without liberality. Hence justice is simply greater than liberality, as being more universal, and as being + its foundation: while liberality is greater relatively since it is an ornament and + an addition to justice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36266" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36266] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod actus liberalitatis oportet quod fundetur super +actum iustitiae, <i>non enim esset liberalis datio, si non de +proprio daret</i>, ut in II Polit. dicitur. Unde liberalitas sine +iustitia esse non posset, quae secernit suum a non suo. Iustitia +autem potest esse sine liberalitate. Unde iustitia simpliciter est +maior liberalitate, tanquam communior, et fundamentum ipsius, +liberalitas autem est secundum quid maior, cum sit quidam ornatus +iustitiae, et complementum eius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Patience is said to have "a perfect work," by enduring evils, wherein it excludes not only unjust revenge, which is also + excluded by justice; not only hatred, which is also suppressed by charity; nor only anger, which is calmed by gentleness; + but also inordinate sorrow, which is the root of all the above. Wherefore it is more perfect and excellent through plucking + up the root in this matter. It is not, however, more perfect than all the other virtues + simply. Because fortitude not only endures trouble without being disturbed, but also fights against it if necessary. Hence + whoever is brave is patient; but the converse does not hold, for patience is a part of fortitude. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36267" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36267] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod patientia dicitur habere opus perfectum in tolerantia +malorum, in quibus non solum excludit iniustam vindictam, quam +etiam excludit iustitia; neque solum odium quod facit caritas; +neque solum iram, quod facit mansuetudo; sed etiam excludit +tristitiam inordinatam, quae est radix omnium praedictorum. Et ideo +in hoc est perfectior et maior, quod in hac materia extirpat +radicem. Non autem est simpliciter perfectior omnibus aliis +virtutibus. Quia fortitudo non solum sustinet molestias absque +perturbatione, quod est patientiae, sed etiam ingerit se eis, cum +opus fuerit. Unde quicumque est fortis, est patiens, sed non +convertitur, est enim patientia quaedam fortitudinis pars.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There can be no magnanimity without the other virtues, as stated in Ethic. iv, 3. Hence it is compared to them as their ornament, + so that relatively it is greater than all the others, but not simply. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36268" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36268] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod magnanimitas non potest esse nisi aliis virtutibus +praeexistentibus, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Unde comparatur ad alias +sicut ornatus earum. Et sic secundum quid est maior omnibus aliis, +non tamen simpliciter.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q66_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q66_A5-p0.1">Q. 66. A. 5. Whether wisdom is the greatest of the intellectual virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that wisdom is not the greatest of the intellectual virtues. Because the commander is greater than the one + commanded. Now prudence seems to command wisdom, for it is stated in Ethic. i, 2 that political science, which belongs to + prudence (Ethic. vi, 8), "orders that sciences should be cultivated in states, and to which of these each individual should + devote himself, and to what extent." Since, then, wisdom is one of the sciences, it seems that + prudence is greater than wisdom. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36269" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36269] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod sapientia non sit maxima inter +virtutes intellectuales. Imperans enim maius est eo cui imperatur. +Sed prudentia videtur imperare sapientiae, dicitur enim I Ethic., +quod <i>quales disciplinarum debitum est esse in civitatibus, et +quales unumquemque addiscere, et usquequo, haec praeordinat</i>, +scilicet politica, quae ad prudentiam pertinet, ut dicitur in VI +Ethic. Cum igitur inter disciplinas etiam sapientia contineatur, +videtur quod prudentia sit maior quam sapientia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs to the nature of virtue to direct man to happiness: because virtue is "the disposition of a perfect thing + to that which is best," as stated in Phys. vii, text. 17. Now prudence is "right reason about things to be done," whereby + man is brought to happiness: whereas wisdom takes no notice of human acts, whereby man attains happiness. Therefore prudence + is a greater virtue than wisdom. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36270" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36270] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +de ratione virtutis est quod ordinet hominem ad felicitatem, est +enim virtus dispositio perfecti ad optimum, ut dicitur in VII +Physic. Sed prudentia est recta ratio agibilium, per quae homo ad +felicitatem perducitur, sapientia autem non considerat humanos +actus, quibus ad beatitudinem pervenitur. Ergo prudentia est maior +virtus quam sapientia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more perfect knowledge is, the greater it seems to be. Now we can have more perfect knowledge of human affairs, + which are the subject of science, than of Divine things, which are the object of wisdom, which is the distinction given by + Augustine (De Trin. xii, 14): because Divine things are incomprehensible, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.26.26" target="asv"> Job 26:26</a>: "Behold God is great, exceeding our knowledge." Therefore science is a greater virtue than + wisdom. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36271" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36271] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quanto cognitio est perfectior, tanto videtur esse maior. Sed +perfectiorem cognitionem habere possumus de rebus humanis, de +quibus est scientia, quam de rebus divinis, de quibus est +sapientia, ut distinguit Augustinus in XII de Trin., quia divina +incomprehensibilia sunt, secundum illud Iob XXXVI, <i>ecce Deus +magnus, vincens scientiam nostram</i>. Ergo scientia est maior +virtus quam sapientia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, knowledge of principles is more excellent than knowledge of conclusions. But wisdom draws conclusions from indemonstrable + principles which are the object of the virtue of understanding, even as other sciences do. Therefore understanding is a greater + virtue than wisdom. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="36272" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36272] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +cognitio principiorum est dignior quam cognitio conclusionum. Sed +sapientia concludit ex principiis indemonstrabilibus, quorum est +intellectus; sicut et aliae scientiae. Ergo intellectus est maior +virtus quam sapientia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that wisdom is "the head" among "the intellectual virtues." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36273" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36273] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod sapientia est sicut +caput inter virtutes intellectuales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q66_A3" id="FS_Q66_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, the greatness of a virtue, as to its species, is taken from its object. Now the object of wisdom surpasses the objects of + all the intellectual virtues: because wisdom considers the Supreme Cause, which is God, as stated at the beginning of the + Metaphysics. And since it is by the cause that we judge of an effect, and by the higher cause that we judge of the lower effects; + hence it is that wisdom exercises + judgment over all the other intellectual virtues, directs them all, and is the architect of them all. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 co."><a name="36274" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36274] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, magnitudo virtutis secundum suam +speciem, consideratur ex obiecto. Obiectum autem sapientiae +praecellit inter obiecta omnium virtutum intellectualium, +considerat enim causam altissimam, quae Deus est, ut dicitur in +principio Metaphys. Et quia per causam iudicatur de effectu, et per +causam superiorem de causis inferioribus; inde est quod sapientia +habet iudicium de omnibus aliis virtutibus intellectualibus; et +eius est ordinare omnes; et ipsa est quasi architectonica respectu +omnium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since prudence is about human affairs, and wisdom about the Supreme Cause, it is impossible for prudence to be a greater + virtue than wisdom, "unless," as stated in Ethic. vi, 7, "man were the greatest thing in the world." Wherefore we must say, + as stated in the same book (Ethic. vi), that prudence does not command wisdom, but vice versa: because "the spiritual man + judgeth all things; and he himself is judged by no man" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.15" target="asv">1 Cor. + 2:15 + </a>). For prudence has no business with supreme matters which are the object of wisdom: but its command covers things directed + to wisdom, viz. how men are to obtain wisdom. Wherefore prudence, or political science, is, in this way, the servant of wisdom; + for it leads to wisdom, preparing the way for her, as the doorkeeper for the king. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36275" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36275] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, cum prudentia sit circa res humanas, sapientia +vero circa causam altissimam; impossibile est quod prudentia sit +maior virtus quam sapientia, <i>nisi</i>, ut dicitur in VI Ethic., +<i>maximum eorum quae sunt in mundo, esset homo</i>. Unde dicendum +est, sicut in eodem libro dicitur, quod prudentia non imperat ipsi +sapientiae, sed potius e converso, quia <i>spiritualis iudicat +omnia, et ipse a nemine iudicatur</i>, ut dicitur I ad Cor. II. Non +enim prudentia habet se intromittere de altissimis, quae considerat +sapientia, sed imperat de his quae ordinantur ad sapientiam, +scilicet quomodo homines debeant ad sapientiam pervenire. Unde in +hoc est prudentia, seu politica, ministra sapientiae, introducit +enim ad eam, praeparans ei viam, sicut ostiarius ad regem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Prudence considers the means of acquiring happiness, but wisdom considers the very object of happiness, viz. the Supreme + Intelligible. And if indeed the consideration of wisdom were perfect in respect of its object, there would be perfect happiness + in the act of wisdom: but as, in this life, the act of wisdom is imperfect in respect of its principal object, which is God, + it follows that the act of wisdom is a beginning or participation of future + happiness, so that wisdom is nearer than prudence to happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36276" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36276] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod prudentia considerat ea quibus pervenitur ad +felicitatem, sed sapientia considerat ipsum obiectum felicitatis, +quod est altissimum intelligibile. Et si quidem esset perfecta +consideratio sapientiae respectu sui obiecti, esset perfecta +felicitas in actu sapientiae. Sed quia actus sapientiae in hac vita +est imperfectus respectu principalis obiecti, quod est Deus; ideo +actus sapientiae est quaedam inchoatio seu participatio futurae +felicitatis. Et sic propinquius se habet ad felicitatem quam +prudentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher says (De Anima i, text. 1), "one knowledge is preferable to another, either because it is about a higher + object, or because it is more certain." Hence if the objects be equally good and sublime, that virtue will be greater which + possesses more certain knowledge. But a virtue which is less certain about a higher and better object, is preferable to that + which is more certain about an object of inferior degree. Wherefore the + Philosopher says (De Coelo ii, text. 60) that "it is a great thing to be able to know something about celestial beings, though + it be based on weak and probable reasoning"; and again (De Part. Animal. i, 5) that "it is better to know a little about sublime + things, than much about mean things." Accordingly wisdom, to which knowledge about God pertains, is beyond the reach of man, + especially in this life, so as to be his possession: for this "belongs to God alone" (Metaph. i, 2): and yet this + little knowledge about God which we can have through wisdom is preferable to all other knowledge. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36277" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36277] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in I de anima, <i>una +notitia praefertur alteri aut ex eo quod est nobiliorum, aut +propter certitudinem</i>. Si igitur subiecta sint aequalia in +bonitate et nobilitate, illa quae est certior, erit maior virtus. +Sed illa quae est minus certa de altioribus et maioribus, +praefertur ei quae est magis certa de inferioribus rebus. Unde +philosophus dicit, in II de caelo, quod magnum est de rebus +caelestibus aliquid posse cognoscere etiam debili et topica +ratione. Et in I de partibus Animal., dicit quod <i>amabile est +magis parvum aliquid cognoscere de rebus nobilioribus quam multa +cognoscere de rebus ignobilioribus</i>. Sapientia igitur ad quam +pertinet Dei cognitio, homini, maxime in statu huius vitae, non +potest perfecte advenire, ut sit quasi eius possessio; sed hoc +solius Dei est, ut dicitur in I Metaphys. Sed tamen illa modica +cognitio quae per sapientiam de Deo haberi potest, omni alii +cognitioni praefertur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The truth and knowledge of indemonstrable principles depends on the meaning of the terms: for as soon as we know what is + a whole, and what is a part, we know at once that every whole is greater than its part. Now to know the meaning of being and + non-being, of whole and part, and of other things consequent to being, which are the terms whereof indemonstrable principles + are constituted, is the function of wisdom: since universal being is the proper + effect of the Supreme Cause, which is God. And so wisdom makes use of indemonstrable principles which are the object of understanding, + not only by drawing conclusions from them, as other sciences do, but also by passing its judgment on them, and by vindicating + them against those who deny them. Hence it follows that wisdom is a greater virtue than understanding. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="36278" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36278] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod veritas et cognitio principiorum indemonstrabilium +dependet ex ratione terminorum, cognito enim quid est totum et quid +pars, statim cognoscitur quod omne totum est maius sua parte. +Cognoscere autem rationem entis et non entis, et totius et partis, +et aliorum quae consequuntur ad ens, ex quibus sicut ex terminis +constituuntur principia indemonstrabilia, pertinet ad sapientiam, +quia ens commune est proprius effectus causae altissimae, scilicet +Dei. Et ideo sapientia non solum utitur principiis +indemonstrabilibus, quorum est intellectus, concludendo ex eis, +sicut aliae scientiae; sed etiam iudicando de eis, et disputando +contra negantes. Unde sequitur quod sapientia sit maior virtus quam +intellectus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q66_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q66_A6-p0.1">Q. 66. A. 6. Whether charity is the greatest of the theological virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that charity is not the greatest of the theological virtues. Because, since faith is in the intellect, while + hope and charity are in the appetitive power, it seems that faith is compared to hope and charity, as intellectual to moral + virtue. Now intellectual virtue is greater than moral virtue, as was made evident above ( + <a href="#FS_Q62_A3" id="FS_Q66_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[62], A[3]</a>). Therefore faith is greater than hope and charity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="36279" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36279] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas non sit maxima inter virtutes +theologicas. Cum enim fides sit in intellectu, spes autem et +caritas in vi appetitiva, ut supra dictum est; videtur quod fides +comparetur ad spem et caritatem, sicut virtus intellectualis ad +moralem. Sed virtus intellectualis est maior morali, ut ex dictis +patet. Ergo fides est maior spe et caritate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, when two things are added together, the result is greater than either one. Now hope results from something added + to charity; for it presupposes love, as Augustine says (Enchiridion viii), and it adds a certain movement of stretching forward + to the beloved. Therefore hope is greater than charity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="36280" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36280] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quod se habet ex additione ad aliud, videtur esse maius eo. Sed +spes, ut videtur, se habet ex additione ad caritatem, praesupponit +enim spes amorem, ut Augustinus dicit in Enchirid.; addit autem +quendam motum protensionis in rem amatam. Ergo spes est maior +caritate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a cause is more noble than its effect. Now faith and hope are the cause of charity: for a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.1.3" target="asv"> Mat. 1:3 </a>says that "faith begets hope, and hope charity." Therefore faith and hope are greater than charity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="36281" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36281] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +causa est potior effectu. Sed fides et spes sunt causa caritatis, +dicitur enim Matth. I, in Glossa, quod <i>fides generat spem, et +spes caritatem</i>. Ergo fides et spes sunt maiores caritate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:13</a>): "Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 6 s. c."><a name="36282" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36282] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XIII, <i>nunc autem manent +fides, spes, caritas, tria haec; maior autem horum est +caritas</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q66_A3" id="FS_Q66_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, the greatness of a virtue, as to its species, is taken from its object. Now, since the three theological virtues look at + God as their proper object, it cannot be said that any one of them is greater than another by reason of its having a greater + object, but only from the fact that it approaches nearer than another to that object; and in this way charity is greater than + the others. Because the others, in their + very nature, imply a certain distance from the object: since faith is of what is not seen, and hope is of what is not possessed. + But the love of charity is of that which is already possessed: since the beloved is, in a manner, in the lover, and, again, + the lover is drawn by desire to union with the beloved; hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A6-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:16</a>): "He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 6 co."><a name="36283" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36283] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, magnitudo virtutis secundum +suam speciem, consideratur ex obiecto. Cum autem tres virtutes +theologicae respiciant Deum sicut proprium obiectum, non potest una +earum dici maior altera ex hoc quod sit circa maius obiectum; sed +ex eo quod una se habet propinquius ad obiectum quam alia. Et hoc +modo caritas est maior aliis. Nam aliae important in sui ratione +quandam distantiam ab obiecto, est enim fides de non visis, spes +autem de non habitis. Sed amor caritatis est de eo quod iam +habetur, est enim amatum quodammodo in amante, et etiam amans per +affectum trahitur ad unionem amati; propter quod dicitur I Ioan. +IV, <i>qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Faith and hope are not related to charity in the same way as prudence to moral virtue; and for two reasons. First, because + the theological virtues have an object surpassing the human soul: whereas prudence and the moral virtues are about things + beneath man. Now in things that are above man, to love them is more excellent than to know them. Because knowledge is perfected + by the known being in the knower: whereas love is perfected by the lover being + drawn to the beloved. Now that which is above man is more excellent in itself than in man: since a thing is contained according + to the mode of the container. But it is the other way about in things beneath man. Secondly, because prudence moderates the + appetitive movements pertaining to the moral virtues, whereas faith does not moderate the appetitive movement tending to God, + which movement belongs to the theological virtues: it only shows the object. And this appetitive movement towards its + object surpasses human knowledge, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.19" target="asv"> Eph. 3:19</a>: "The charity of Christ which surpasseth all knowledge." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="36284" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36284] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod non hoc modo se habent fides et spes ad +caritatem, sicut prudentia ad virtutem moralem. Et hoc propter duo. +Primo quidem, quia virtutes theologicae habent obiectum quod est +supra animam humanam, sed prudentia et virtutes morales sunt circa +ea quae sunt infra hominem. In his autem quae sunt supra hominem, +nobilior est dilectio quam cognitio. Perficitur enim cognitio, +secundum quod cognita sunt in cognoscente, dilectio vero, secundum +quod diligens trahitur ad rem dilectam. Id autem quod est supra +hominem, nobilius est in seipso quam sit in homine, quia +unumquodque est in altero per modum eius in quo est. E converso +autem est in his quae sunt infra hominem. Secundo, quia prudentia +moderatur motus appetitivos ad morales virtutes pertinentes, sed +fides non moderatur motum appetitivum tendentem in Deum, qui +pertinet ad virtutes theologicas; sed solum ostendit obiectum. +Motus autem appetitivus in obiectum, excedit cognitionem humanam; +secundum illud ad Ephes. III, <i>supereminentem scientiae caritatem +Christi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Hope presupposes love of that which a man hopes to obtain; and such love is love of concupiscence, whereby he who desires + good, loves himself rather than something else. On the other hand, charity implies love of friendship, to which we are led + by hope, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q62_A4" id="FS_Q66_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[62], A[4]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="36285" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36285] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod spes praesupponit amorem eius quod quis adipisci se +sperat, qui est amor concupiscentiae, quo quidem amore magis se +amat qui concupiscit bonum, quam aliquid aliud. Caritas autem +importat amorem amicitiae, ad quam pervenitur spe, ut supra dictum +est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An efficient cause is more noble than its effect: but not a disposing cause. For otherwise the heat of fire would be more + noble than the soul, to which the heat disposes the matter. It is in this way that faith begets hope, and hope charity: in + the sense, to wit, that one is a disposition to the other. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="36286" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36286] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod causa perficiens est potior effectu, non autem causa +disponens. Sic enim calor ignis esset potior quam anima, ad quam +disponit materiam, quod patet esse falsum. Sic autem fides generat +spem, et spes caritatem, secundum scilicet quod una disponit ad +alteram.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q67" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q67-p0.1">Q. 67. OF THE DURATION OF VIRTUES AFTER THIS LIFE (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q67-p2"> We must now consider the duration of virtues after this life, under which head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q67-p3"><a href="#FS_Q67_A1"> (1) Whether the moral virtues remain after this life?</a></p><p id="FS_Q67-p4"><a href="#FS_Q67_A2"> (2) Whether the intellectual virtues remain?</a></p><p id="FS_Q67-p5"><a href="#FS_Q67_A3"> (3) Whether faith remains?</a></p><p id="FS_Q67-p6"><a href="#FS_Q67_A4"> (4) Whether hope remains?</a></p><p id="FS_Q67-p7"><a href="#FS_Q67_A5"> (5) Whether anything remains of faith or hope?</a></p><p id="FS_Q67-p8"><a href="#FS_Q67_A6"> (6) Whether charity remains?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 pr."><a name="36287" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36287] +Iª-IIae q. 67 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +duratione virtutum post hanc vitam. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. +Primo, utrum virtutes morales maneant post hanc vitam. Secundo, +utrum virtutes intellectuales. Tertio, utrum fides. Quarto, utrum +remaneat spes. Quinto, utrum aliquid fidei maneat, vel spei. Sexto, +utrum maneat caritas.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q67_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q67_A1-p0.1">Q. 67. A. 1. Whether the moral virtues remain after this life?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the moral virtues doe not remain after this life. For in the future state of glory men will be like angels, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.30" target="asv"> Mat. 22:30.</a> But it is absurd to put moral virtues in the angels [*"Whatever relates to moral action is petty, and unworthy of the gods" + (Ethic. x, 8)], as stated in Ethic. x, 8. Therefore neither in man will there be moral virtues after this life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36288" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36288] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales non maneant post hanc +vitam. Homines enim in statu futurae gloriae erunt similes Angelis, +ut dicitur Matth. XXII. Sed ridiculum est in Angelis ponere +virtutes morales, ut dicitur in X Ethic. Ergo neque in hominibus, +post hanc vitam, erunt virtutes morales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, moral virtues perfect man in the active life. But the active life does not remain after this life: for Gregory says + (Moral. iv, 18): "The works of the active life pass away from the body." Therefore moral virtues do not remain after this + life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36289" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36289] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +virtutes morales perficiunt hominem in vita activa. Sed vita activa +non manet post hanc vitam, dicit enim Gregorius, in VI Moral., +<i>activae vitae opera cum corpore transeunt</i>. Ergo virtutes +morales non manent post hanc vitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, temperance and fortitude, which are moral virtues, are in the irrational parts of the soul, as the Philosopher states + (Ethic. iii, 10). Now the irrational parts of the soul are corrupted, when the body is corrupted: since they are acts of bodily + organs. Therefore it seems that the moral virtues do not remain after this life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36290" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36290] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +temperantia et fortitudo, quae sunt virtutes morales, sunt +irrationalium partium, ut philosophus dicit, in III Ethic. Sed +irrationales partes animae corrumpuntur, corrupto corpore, eo quod +sunt actus organorum corporalium. Ergo videtur quod virtutes +morales non maneant post hanc vitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.15" target="asv">Wis. 1:15</a>) that "justice is perpetual and immortal." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36291" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36291] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Sap. I, quod <i>iustitia perpetua est et +immortalis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9), Cicero held that the cardinal virtues do not remain after this life; and that, as Augustine + says (De Trin. xiv, 9), "in the other life men are made happy by the mere knowledge of that nature, than which nothing is + better or more lovable, that Nature, to wit, which created all others." Afterwards he concludes that these four virtues remain + in the future life, but after a different manner. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 1 co."><a name="36292" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36292] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Trin., Tullius +posuit post hanc vitam quatuor virtutes cardinales non esse; sed in +alia vita homines esse beatos sola cognitione naturae, in qua nihil +est melius aut amabilius, ut Augustinus dicit ibidem, ea natura +quae creavit omnes naturas. Ipse autem postea determinat huiusmodi +quatuor virtutes in futura vita existere, tamen alio modo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p7"> In order to make this evident, we must note that in these virtues there is a formal element, and a quasi-material element. + The material element in these virtues is a certain inclination of the appetitive part to the passions and operations according + to a certain mode: and since this mode is fixed by reason, the formal element is precisely this order of reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Ad cuius +evidentiam, sciendum est quod in huiusmodi virtutibus aliquid est +formale; et aliquid quasi materiale. Materiale quidem est in his +virtutibus inclinatio quaedam partis appetitivae ad passiones vel +operationes secundum modum aliquem. Sed quia iste modus +determinatur a ratione, ideo formale in omnibus virtutibus est ipse +ordo rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p8"> Accordingly we must say that these moral virtues do not remain in the future life, as regards their material element. For + in the future life there will be no concupiscences and pleasures in matters of food and sex; nor fear and daring about dangers + of death; nor distributions and commutations of things employed in this present life. But, as regards the formal element, + they will remain most perfect, after this life, in the Blessed, in as much as each one's reason will have most + perfect rectitude in regard to things concerning him in respect of that state of life: and his appetitive power will be moved + entirely according to the order of reason, in things pertaining to that same state. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9) + that "prudence will be there without any danger of error; fortitude, without the anxiety of bearing with evil; temperance, + without the rebellion of the desires: so that prudence will neither prefer nor equal any good to God; fortitude will adhere + to + Him most steadfastly; and temperance will delight in Him Who knows no imperfection." As to justice, it is yet more evident + what will be its act in that life, viz. "to be subject to God": because even in this life subjection to a superior is part + of justice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Sic igitur dicendum est quod huiusmodi virtutes +morales in futura vita non manent, quantum ad id quod est materiale +in eis. Non enim habebunt in futura vita locum concupiscentiae et +delectationes ciborum et venereorum; neque etiam timores et +audaciae circa pericula mortis; neque etiam distributiones et +communicationes rerum quae veniunt in usum praesentis vitae. Sed +quantum ad id quod est formale, remanebunt in beatis perfectissimae +post hanc vitam, inquantum ratio uniuscuiusque rectissima erit +circa ea quae ad ipsum pertinent secundum statum illum; et vis +appetitiva omnino movebitur secundum ordinem rationis, in his quae +ad statum illum pertinent. Unde Augustinus ibidem dicit quod +<i>prudentia ibi erit sine ullo periculo erroris; fortitudo, sine +molestia tolerandorum malorum; temperantia, sine repugnatione +libidinum. Ut prudentiae sit nullum bonum Deo praeponere vel +aequare; fortitudinis, ei firmissime cohaerere; temperantiae, nullo +defectu noxio delectari</i>. De iustitia vero manifestius est quem +actum ibi habebit, scilicet esse subditum Deo, quia etiam in hac +vita ad iustitiam pertinet esse subditum superiori.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is speaking there of these moral virtues, as to their material element; thus he speaks of justice, as regards + "commutations and distributions"; of fortitude, as to "matters of terror and danger"; of temperance, in respect of "lewd desires." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36293" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36293] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod philosophus loquitur ibi de huiusmodi virtutibus +moralibus, quantum ad id quod materiale est in eis, sicut de +iustitia, quantum ad commutationes et depositiones; de fortitudine, +quantum ad terribilia et pericula; de temperantia, quantum ad +concupiscentias pravas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same applies to the Second Objection. For those things that concern the active life, belong to the material element of + the virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36294" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36294] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Et similiter +dicendum est ad secundum. Ea enim quae sunt activae vitae, +materialiter se habent ad virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is a twofold state after this life; one before the resurrection, during which the soul will be separate from the body; + the other, after the resurrection, when the souls will be reunited to their bodies. In this state of resurrection, the irrational + powers will be in the bodily organs, just as they now are. Hence it will be possible for fortitude to be in the irascible, + and temperance in the concupiscible part, in so far as each power will be + perfectly disposed to obey the reason. But in the state preceding the resurrection, the irrational parts will not be in the + soul actually, but only radically in its essence, as stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q77_A8" id="FS_Q67_A1-p11.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[77], A[8]</a>. Wherefore neither will these virtues be actually, but only in their root, i.e. in the reason and will, wherein are certain + nurseries of these virtues, as stated above (Q[63], A[1]). Justice, however, will remain because it is in the will. Hence + of justice it is + specially said that it is "perpetual and immortal"; both by reason of its subject, since the will is incorruptible; and because + its act will not change, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36295" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36295] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod status post hanc vitam est duplex, unus quidem ante +resurrectionem, quando animae erunt a corporibus separatae; alius +autem post resurrectionem, quando animae iterato corporibus suis +unientur. In illo ergo resurrectionis statu, erunt vires +irrationales in organis corporis, sicut et nunc sunt. Unde et +poterit in irascibili esse fortitudo, et in concupiscibili +temperantia, inquantum utraque vis perfecte erit disposita ad +obediendum rationi. Sed in statu ante resurrectionem, partes +irrationales non erunt actu in anima, sed solum radicaliter in +essentia ipsius, ut in primo dictum est. Unde nec huiusmodi +virtutes erunt in actu nisi in radice, scilicet in ratione et +voluntate, in quibus sunt seminalia quaedam harum virtutum, ut +dictum est. Sed iustitia, quae est in voluntate, etiam actu +remanebit. Unde specialiter de ea dictum est quod est perpetua et +immortalis, tum ratione subiecti, quia voluntas incorruptibilis +est; tum etiam propter similitudinem actus, ut prius dictum +est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q67_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q67_A2-p0.1">Q. 67. A. 2. Whether the intellectual virtues remain after this life?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual virtues do not remain after this life. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:8,9</a>) that "knowledge shall be destroyed," and he states the reason to be because "we know in part." Now just as the knowledge + of science is in part, i.e. imperfect; so also is the knowledge of the other intellectual virtues, as long as this life lasts. + Therefore all the intellectual virtues will cease after this life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36296" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36296] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes intellectuales non maneant +post hanc vitam. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. XIII, quod +scientia destruetur, et ratio est quia ex parte cognoscimus. Sed +sicut cognitio scientiae est ex parte, idest imperfecta; ita etiam +cognitio aliarum virtutum intellectualium, quandiu haec vita durat. +Ergo omnes virtutes intellectuales post hanc vitam cessabunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Categor. vi) that since science is a habit, it is a quality difficult to remove: for it is + not easily lost, except by reason of some great change or sickness. But no bodily change is so great as that of death. Therefore + science and the other intellectual virtues do not remain after death. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36297" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36297] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in praedicamentis, quod scientia, cum sit +habitus, est qualitas difficile mobilis, non enim de facili +amittitur, nisi ex aliqua forti transmutatione vel aegritudine. Sed +nulla est tanta transmutatio corporis humani sicut per mortem. Ergo +scientia et aliae virtutes intellectuales non manent post hanc +vitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellectual virtues perfect the intellect so that it may perform its proper act well. Now there seems to be + no act of the intellect after this life, since "the soul understands nothing without a phantasm" (De Anima iii, text. 30); + and, after this life, the phantasms do not remain, since their only subject is an organ of the body. Therefore the intellectual + virtues do not remain after this life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36298" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36298] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +virtutes intellectuales perficiunt intellectum ad bene operandum +proprium actum. Sed actus intellectus non videtur esse post hanc +vitam, eo quod nihil intelligit anima sine phantasmate, ut dicitur +in III de anima; phantasmata autem post hanc vitam non manent, cum +non sint nisi in organis corporeis. Ergo virtutes intellectuales +non manent post hanc vitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The knowledge of what is universal and necessary is more constant than that of particular and contingent things. Now the + knowledge of contingent particulars remains in man after this life; for instance, the knowledge of what one has done or suffered, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.25" target="asv"> Lk. 16:25</a>: "Son, remember that thou didst receive good things in thy life-time, and likewise Lazarus evil things." Much more, therefore, + does the knowledge of universal and + necessary things remain, which belong to science and the other intellectual virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36299" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36299] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod firmior est cognitio universalium et necessariorum, quam +particularium et contingentium. Sed in homine remanet post hanc +vitam cognitio particularium contingentium, puta eorum quae quis +fecit vel passus est; secundum illud Luc. XVI, <i>recordare quia +recepisti bona in vita tua, et Lazarus similiter mala</i>. Ergo +multo magis remanet cognitio universalium et necessariorum, quae +pertinent ad scientiam et ad alias virtutes intellectuales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q67_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q79_A6" id="FS_Q67_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[79], A[6]</a> some have held that the intelligible species do not remain in the passive intellect except when it actually understands; + and that so long as actual consideration ceases, the species are not preserved save in the sensitive powers which are acts + of bodily organs, viz. in the powers of imagination and memory. Now these powers cease when the body is corrupted: and consequently, + according to this opinion, + neither science nor any other intellectual virtue will remain after this life when once the body is corrupted. + </p><p id="FS_Q67_A2-p7"> But this opinion is contrary to the mind of Aristotle, who states (De Anima iii, text. 8) that "the possible intellect is + in act when it is identified with each thing as knowing it; and yet, even then, it is in potentiality to consider it actually." + It is also contrary to reason, because intelligible species are contained by the "possible" intellect immovably, according + to the mode of their container. Hence the "possible" intellect is called "the abode of the species" (De Anima + iii) because it preserves the intelligible species. + </p><p id="FS_Q67_A2-p8"> And yet the phantasms, by turning to which man understands in this life, by applying the intelligible species to them as + stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q84_A7" id="FS_Q67_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[84], A[7]</a>; + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q85_A1" id="FS_Q67_A2-p8.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[85], A[1]</a>, ad 5, cease as soon as the body is corrupted. Hence, so far as the phantasms are concerned, which are the quasi-material + element in the intellectual virtues, these latter cease when the body is destroyed: but as regards the intelligible species, + which are in the + "possible" intellect, the intellectual virtues remain. Now the species are the quasi-formal element of the intellectual virtues. + Therefore these remain after this life, as regards their formal element, just as we have stated concerning the moral virtues + + <a href="#FS_Q67_A1" id="FS_Q67_A2-p8.3" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 2 co."><a name="36300" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36300] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut in primo dictum est, quidam posuerunt quod +species intelligibiles non permanent in intellectu possibili nisi +quandiu actu intelligit, nec est aliqua conservatio specierum, +cessante consideratione actuali, nisi in viribus sensitivis, quae +sunt actus corporalium organorum, scilicet in imaginativa et +memorativa. Huiusmodi autem vires corrumpuntur, corrupto corpore. +Et ideo secundum hoc, scientia nullo modo post hanc vitam +remanebit, corpore corrupto; neque aliqua alia intellectualis +virtus. Sed haec opinio est contra sententiam Aristotelis, qui in +III de anima dicit quod <i>intellectus possibilis est in actu, cum +fit singula, sicut sciens; cum tamen sit in potentia ad +considerandum in actu</i>. Est etiam contra rationem, quia species +intelligibiles recipiuntur in intellectu possibili immobiliter, +secundum modum recipientis. Unde et intellectus possibilis dicitur +locus specierum, quasi species intelligibiles conservans. Sed +phantasmata, ad quae respiciendo homo intelligit in hac vita, +applicando ad ipsa species intelligibiles, ut in primo dictum est, +corrupto corpore corrumpuntur. Unde quantum ad ipsa phantasmata, +quae sunt quasi materialia in virtutibus intellectualibus, virtutes +intellectuales destruuntur, destructo corpore, sed quantum ad +species intelligibiles, quae sunt in intellectu possibili, virtutes +intellectuales manent. Species autem se habent in virtutibus +intellectualibus sicut formales. Unde intellectuales virtutes +manent post hanc vitam, quantum ad id quod est formale in eis, non +autem quantum ad id quod est materiale, sicut et de moralibus +dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saying of the Apostle is to be understood as referring to the material element in science, and to the mode of understanding; + because, to it, neither do the phantasms remain, when the body is destroyed; nor will science be applied by turning to the + phantasms. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36301" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36301] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod verbum apostoli est intelligendum quantum ad id +quod est materiale in scientia, et quantum ad modum intelligendi, +quia scilicet neque phantasmata remanebunt, destructo corpore; +neque erit usus scientiae per conversionem ad phantasmata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sickness destroys the habit of science as to its material element, viz. the phantasms, but not as to the intelligible species, + which are in the "possible" intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36302" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36302] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod per aegritudinem corrumpitur habitus scientiae +quantum ad id quod est materiale in eo, scilicet quantum ad +phantasmata, non autem quantum ad species intelligibiles, quae sunt +in intellectu possibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q89_A1" id="FS_Q67_A2-p11.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[89], A[1]</a> the separated soul has a mode of understanding, other than by turning to the phantasms. Consequently science remains, yet + not as to the same mode of operation; as we have stated concerning the moral virtues + <a href="#FS_Q67_A1" id="FS_Q67_A2-p11.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36303" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36303] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod anima separata post mortem habet alium modum +intelligendi quam per conversionem ad phantasmata, ut in primo +dictum est. Et sic scientia manet, non tamen secundum eundem modum +operandi, sicut et de virtutibus moralibus dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q67_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q67_A3-p0.1">Q. 67. A. 3. Whether faith remains after this life?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that faith remains after this life. Because faith is more excellent than science. Now science remains after + this life, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q67_A2" id="FS_Q67_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore faith remains also. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36304" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36304] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod fides maneat post hanc vitam. Nobilior +enim est fides quam scientia. Sed scientia manet post hanc vitam, +ut dictum est. Ergo et fides.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:11</a>): "Other foundation no man can lay, but that which is laid; which is Christ Jesus," i.e. faith in Jesus Christ. Now if the + foundation is removed, that which is built upon it remains no more. Therefore, if faith remains not after this life, no other + virtue remains. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36305" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36305] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +I ad Cor. III, dicitur, <i>fundamentum aliud nemo potest ponere, +praeter id quod positum est, quod est Christus Iesus</i>, idest +fides Christi Iesu. Sed sublato fundamento, non remanet id quod +superaedificatur. Ergo, si fides non remanet post hanc vitam, nulla +alia virtus remaneret.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the knowledge of faith and the knowledge of glory differ as perfect from imperfect. Now imperfect knowledge is compatible + with perfect knowledge: thus in an angel there can be "evening" and "morning" knowledge [*Cf. + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q58_A6" id="FS_Q67_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[58], A[6]</a>]; and a man can have science through a demonstrative syllogism, together with opinion through a probable syllogism, about + one same conclusion. Therefore after this life faith also is compatible with + the knowledge of glory. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36306" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36306] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +cognitio fidei et cognitio gloriae differunt secundum perfectum et +imperfectum. Sed cognitio imperfecta potest esse simul cum +cognitione perfecta, sicut in Angelo simul potest esse cognitio +vespertina cum cognitione matutina; et aliquis homo potest simul +habere de eadem conclusione scientiam per syllogismum +demonstrativum, et opinionem per syllogismum dialecticum. Ergo +etiam fides simul esse potest, post hanc vitam, cum cognitione +gloriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.5.6" target="asv">2 Cor. 5:6,7</a>): "While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord: for we walk by faith and not by sight." But those who are in glory + are not absent from the Lord, but present to Him. Therefore after this life faith does not remain in the life of glory. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36307" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36307] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. V, <i>quandiu sumus in +corpore, peregrinamur a domino, per fidem enim ambulamus, et non +per speciem</i>. Sed illi qui sunt in gloria, non peregrinantur a +domino, sed sunt ei praesentes. Ergo fides non manet post hanc +vitam in gloria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Opposition is of itself the proper cause of one thing being excluded from another, in so far, to wit, as wherever two things + are opposite to one another, we find opposition of affirmation and negation. Now in some things we find opposition in respect + of contrary forms; thus in colors we find white and black. In others we find opposition in respect of perfection and imperfection: + wherefore in alterations, more and less are considered to be contraries, as when + a thing from being less hot is made more hot (Phys. v, text. 19). And since perfect and imperfect are opposite to one another, + it is impossible for perfection and imperfection to affect the same thing at the same time. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 3 co."><a name="36308" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36308] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod oppositio est per se et propria causa quod unum +excludatur ab alio, inquantum scilicet in omnibus oppositis +includitur oppositio affirmationis et negationis. Invenitur autem +in quibusdam oppositio secundum contrarias formas, sicut in +coloribus album et nigrum. In quibusdam autem, secundum perfectum +et imperfectum, unde in alterationibus magis et minus accipiuntur +ut contraria, ut cum de minus calido fit magis calidum, ut dicitur +in V Physic. Et quia perfectum et imperfectum opponuntur, +impossibile est quod simul, secundum idem, sit perfectio et +imperfectio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p7"> Now we must take note that sometimes imperfection belongs to a thing's very nature, and belongs to its species: even as lack + of reason belongs to the very specific nature of a horse and an ox. And since a thing, so long as it remains the same identically, + cannot pass from one species to another, it follows that if such an imperfection be removed, the species of that thing is + changed: even as it would no longer be an ox or a horse, were it to be rational. Sometimes, however, the + imperfection does not belong to the specific nature, but is accidental to the individual by reason of something else; even + as sometimes lack of reason is accidental to a man, because he is asleep, or because he is drunk, or for some like reason; + and it is evident, that if such an imperfection be removed, the thing remains substantially. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Est autem considerandum quod imperfectio quidem +quandoque est de ratione rei, et pertinet ad speciem ipsius, sicut +defectus rationis pertinet ad rationem speciei equi vel bovis. Et +quia unum et idem numero manens non potest transferri de una specie +in aliam, inde est quod, tali imperfectione sublata, tollitur +species rei, sicut iam non esset bos vel equus, si esset +rationalis. Quandoque vero imperfectio non pertinet ad rationem +speciei, sed accidit individuo secundum aliquid aliud, sicut alicui +homini quandoque accidit defectus rationis, inquantum impeditur in +eo rationis usus, propter somnum vel ebrietatem vel aliquid +huiusmodi. Patet autem quod, tali imperfectione remota, nihilominus +substantia rei manet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p8"> Now it is clear that imperfect knowledge belongs to the very nature of faith: for it is included in its definition; faith + being defined as "the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.1" target="asv">Heb. 11:1</a>). Wherefore Augustine says (Tract. xl in Joan.): "Where is faith? Believing without seeing." But it is an imperfect knowledge + that is of things unapparent or unseen. Consequently imperfect knowledge belongs to the very nature of + faith: therefore it is clear that the knowledge of faith cannot be perfect and remain identically the same. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Manifestum est autem quod imperfectio +cognitionis est de ratione fidei. Ponitur enim in eius definitione, +<i>fides enim est substantia sperandarum rerum, argumentum non +apparentium</i>, ut dicitur ad Heb. XI. Et Augustinus dicit, +<i>quid est fides? Credere quod non vides</i>. Quod autem cognitio +sit sine apparitione vel visione, hoc ad imperfectionem cognitionis +pertinet. Et sic imperfectio cognitionis est de ratione fidei. Unde +manifestum est quod fides non potest esse perfecta cognitio, eadem +numero manens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p9"> But we must also consider whether it is compatible with perfect knowledge: for there is nothing to prevent some kind of imperfect + knowledge from being sometimes with perfect knowledge. Accordingly we must observe that knowledge can be imperfect in three + ways: first, on the part of the knowable object; secondly, on the part of the medium; thirdly, on the part of the subject. + The difference of perfect and imperfect knowledge on the part of the knowable object is seen in the + "morning" and "evening" knowledge of the angels: for the "morning" knowledge is about things according to the being which + they have in the Word, while the "evening" knowledge is about things according as they have being in their own natures, which + being is imperfect in comparison with the First Being. On the part of the medium, perfect and imperfect knowledge are exemplified + in the knowledge of a conclusion through a demonstrative medium, and through a probable medium. On the part of the + subject the difference of perfect and imperfect knowledge applies to opinion, faith, and science. For it is essential to opinion + that we assent to one of two opposite assertions with fear of the other, so that our adhesion is not firm: to science it is + essential to have firm adhesion with intellectual vision, for science possesses certitude which results from the understanding + of principles: while faith holds a middle place, for it surpasses opinion in so far as its adhesion is firm, but falls + short of science in so far as it lacks vision. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Sed ulterius considerandum est utrum simul possit +esse cum cognitione perfecta, nihil enim prohibet aliquam +cognitionem imperfectam simul esse aliquando cum cognitione +perfecta. Est igitur considerandum quod cognitio potest esse +imperfecta tripliciter, uno modo, ex parte obiecti cognoscibilis; +alio modo, ex parte medii; tertio modo, ex parte subiecti. Ex parte +quidem obiecti cognoscibilis, differunt secundum perfectum et +imperfectum cognitio matutina et vespertina in Angelis, nam +cognitio matutina est de rebus secundum quod habent esse in verbo; +cognitio autem vespertina est de eis secundum quod habent esse in +propria natura, quod est imperfectum respectu primi esse. Ex parte +vero medii, differunt secundum perfectum et imperfectum cognitio +quae est de aliqua conclusione per medium demonstrativum, et per +medium probabile. Ex parte vero subiecti differunt secundum +perfectum et imperfectum opinio, fides et scientia. Nam de ratione +opinionis est quod accipiatur unum cum formidine alterius oppositi, +unde non habet firmam inhaesionem. De ratione vero scientiae est +quod habeat firmam inhaesionem cum visione intellectiva, habet enim +certitudinem procedentem ex intellectu principiorum. Fides autem +medio modo se habet, excedit enim opinionem, in hoc quod habet +firmam inhaesionem; deficit vero a scientia, in hoc quod non habet +visionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p10"> Now it is evident that a thing cannot be perfect and imperfect in the same respect; yet the things which differ as perfect + and imperfect can be together in the same respect in one and the same other thing. Accordingly, knowledge which is perfect + on the part of the object is quite incompatible with imperfect knowledge about the same object; but they are compatible with + one another in respect of the same medium or the same subject: for nothing hinders a man from having at one and + the same time, through one and the same medium, perfect and imperfect knowledge about two things, one perfect, the other imperfect, + e.g. about health and sickness, good and evil. In like manner knowledge that is perfect on the part of the medium is incompatible + with imperfect knowledge through one and the same medium: but nothing hinders them being about the same subject or in the + same subject: for one man can know the same conclusions through a probable and through a demonstrative medium. + Again, knowledge that is perfect on the part of the subject is incompatible with imperfect knowledge in the same subject. + Now faith, of its very nature, contains an imperfection on the part of the subject, viz. that the believer sees not what he + believes: whereas bliss, of its very nature, implies perfection on the part of the subject, viz. that the Blessed see that + which makes them happy, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q3_A8" id="FS_Q67_A3-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[8]</a>). Hence it is manifest that faith and bliss are + incompatible in one and the same subject. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Manifestum est autem quod perfectum et imperfectum non +possunt simul esse secundum idem, sed ea quae differunt secundum +perfectum et imperfectum, secundum aliquid idem possunt simul esse +in aliquo alio eodem. Sic igitur cognitio perfecta et imperfecta ex +parte obiecti, nullo modo possunt esse de eodem obiecto. Possunt +tamen convenire in eodem medio, et in eodem subiecto, nihil enim +prohibet quod unus homo simul et semel per unum et idem medium +habeat cognitionem de duobus, quorum unum est perfectum et aliud +imperfectum, sicut de sanitate et aegritudine, et bono et malo. +Similiter etiam impossibile est quod cognitio perfecta et +imperfecta ex parte medii, conveniant in uno medio. Sed nihil +prohibet quin conveniant in uno obiecto, et in uno subiecto, potest +enim unus homo cognoscere eandem conclusionem per medium probabile, +et demonstrativum. Et est similiter impossibile quod cognitio +perfecta et imperfecta ex parte subiecti, sint simul in eodem +subiecto. Fides autem in sui ratione habet imperfectionem quae est +ex parte subiecti, ut scilicet credens non videat id quod credit, +beatitudo autem de sui ratione habet perfectionem ex parte +subiecti, ut scilicet beatus videat id quo beatificatur, ut supra +dictum est. Unde manifestum est quod impossibile est quod fides +maneat simul cum beatitudine in eodem subiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Faith is more excellent than science, on the part of the object, because its object is the First Truth. Yet science has a + more perfect mode of knowing its object, which is not incompatible with vision which is the perfection of happiness, as the + mode of faith is incompatible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36309" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36309] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod fides est nobilior quam scientia, ex parte +obiecti, quia eius obiectum est veritas prima. Sed scientia habet +perfectiorem modum cognoscendi, qui non repugnat perfectioni +beatitudinis, scilicet visioni, sicut repugnat ei modus fidei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Faith is the foundation in as much as it is knowledge: consequently when this knowledge is perfected, the foundation will + be perfected also. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36310" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36310] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod fides est fundamentum quantum ad id quod habet de +cognitione. Et ideo quando perficietur cognitio, erit perfectius +fundamentum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36311" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36311] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +patet solutio ex his quae dicta sunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q67_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q67_A4-p0.1">Q. 67. A. 4. Whether hope remains after death, in the state of glory?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hope remains after death, in the state of glory. Because hope perfects the human appetite in a more excellent + manner than the moral virtues. But the moral virtues remain after this life, as Augustine clearly states (De Trin. xiv, 9). + Much more then does hope remain. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36312" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36312] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod spes maneat post mortem in statu +gloriae. Spes enim nobiliori modo perficit appetitum humanum quam +virtutes morales. Sed virtutes morales manent post hanc vitam, ut +patet per Augustinum, in XIV de Trin. Ergo multo magis spes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fear is opposed to hope. But fear remains after this life: in the Blessed, filial fear, which abides for ever---in + the lost, the fear of punishment. Therefore, in a like manner, hope can remain. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36313" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36313] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +spei opponitur timor. Sed timor manet post hanc vitam, et in beatis +quidem timor filialis, qui manet in saeculum; et in damnatis timor +poenarum. Ergo spes, pari ratione, potest permanere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as hope is of future good, so is desire. Now in the Blessed there is desire for future good; both for the glory + of the body, which the souls of the Blessed desire, as Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35); and for the glory of the + soul, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.24.29" target="asv">Ecclus. 24:29</a>: "They that eat me, shall yet hunger, and they that drink me, shall yet thirst," and + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A4-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iPet.1.12" target="asv">1 Pet. 1:12</a>: "On Whom the angels desire to look." Therefore it seems that + there can be hope in the Blessed after this life is past. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36314" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36314] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut spes est futuri boni, ita et desiderium. Sed in beatis est +desiderium futuri boni, et quantum ad gloriam corporis, quam animae +beatorum desiderant, ut dicit Augustinus, XII super Gen. ad Litt.; +et etiam quantum ad gloriam animae, secundum illud Eccli. XXIV, +<i>qui edunt me, adhuc esurient, et qui bibunt me, adhuc +sitient</i>; et I Petr. I, dicitur, <i>in quem desiderant Angeli +prospicere</i>. Ergo videtur quod possit esse spes post hanc vitam +in beatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.24" target="asv">Rom. 8:24</a>): "What a man seeth, why doth he hope for?" But the Blessed see that which is the object of hope, viz. God. Therefore they + do not hope. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36315" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36315] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. VIII, <i>quod videt quis, quid +sperat?</i> Sed beati vident id quod est obiectum spei, scilicet +Deum. Ergo non sperant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q67_A3" id="FS_Q67_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, that which, in its very nature, implies imperfection of its subject, is incompatible with the opposite perfection in that + subject. Thus it is evident that movement of its very nature implies imperfection of its subject, since it is "the act of + that which is in potentiality as such" (Phys. iii): so that as soon as this potentiality is brought into act, the movement + ceases; for a thing does not continue to + become white, when once it is made white. Now hope denotes a movement towards that which is not possessed, as is clear from + what we have said above about the passion of hope (Q[40], AA[1],2). Therefore when we possess that which we hope for, viz. + the enjoyment of God, it will no longer be possible to have hope. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 4 co."><a name="36316" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36316] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, id quod de ratione sui importat +imperfectionem subiecti, non potest simul stare cum subiecto +opposita perfectione perfecto. Sicut patet quod motus in ratione +sui importat imperfectionem subiecti, est enim actus existentis in +potentia, inquantum huiusmodi, unde quando illa potentia reducitur +ad actum, iam cessat motus; non enim adhuc albatur, postquam iam +aliquid factum est album. Spes autem importat motum quendam in id +quod non habetur; ut patet ex his quae supra de passione spei +diximus. Et ideo quando habebitur id quod speratur, scilicet divina +fruitio, iam spes esse non poterit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Hope surpasses the moral virtues as to its object, which is God. But the acts of the moral virtues are not incompatible with + the perfection of happiness, as the act of hope is; except perhaps, as regards their matter, in respect of which they do not + remain. For moral virtue perfects the appetite, not only in respect of what is not yet possessed, but also as regards something + which is in our actual possession. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36317" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36317] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod spes est nobilior virtutibus moralibus quantum +ad obiectum, quod est Deus. Sed actus virtutum moralium non +repugnant perfectioni beatitudinis, sicut actus spei; nisi forte +ratione materiae, secundum quam non manent. Non enim virtus moralis +perficit appetitum solum in id quod nondum habetur; sed etiam circa +id quod praesentialiter habetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Fear is twofold, servile and filial, as we shall state further on ( + <a href="SS_i.html#SS_Q19_A2" id="FS_Q67_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[19], A[2]</a>). Servile fear regards punishment, and will be impossible in the life of glory, since there will no longer be possibility + of being punished. Filial fear has two acts: one is an act of reverence to God, and with regard to this act, it remains: the + other is an act of fear lest we be separated from God, and as regards this act, it does not remain. + Because separation from God is in the nature of an evil: and no evil will be feared there, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A4-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.1.33" target="asv"> Prov. 1:33</a>: "He . . . shall enjoy abundance without fear of evils." Now fear is opposed to hope by opposition of good and evil, as stated + above (Q[23], A[2]; Q[40], A[1] ), and therefore the fear which will remain in glory is not opposed to hope. In the lost there + can be fear of punishment, rather than hope of glory in the Blessed. Because in the lost there will be a + succession of punishments, so that the notion of something future remains there, which is the object of fear: but the glory + of the saints has no succession, by reason of its being a kind of participation of eternity, wherein there is neither past + nor future, but only the present. And yet, properly speaking, neither in the lost is there fear. For, as stated above (Q[42], + A[2]), fear is never without some hope of escape: and the lost have no such hope. Consequently neither will there be fear + in + them; except speaking in a general way, in so far as any expectation of future evil is called fear. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36318" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36318] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod timor est duplex, servilis et filialis, ut infra +dicetur. Servilis quidem est timor poenae, qui non poterit esse in +gloria, nulla possibilitate ad poenam remanente. Timor vero +filialis habet duos actus, scilicet revereri Deum, et quantum ad +hunc actum manet; et timere separationem ab ipso, et quantum ad +hunc actum non manet. Separari enim a Deo habet rationem mali, +nullum autem malum ibi timebitur, secundum illud Proverb. I, +<i>abundantia perfruetur, malorum timore sublato</i>. Timor autem +opponitur spei oppositione boni et mali, ut supra dictum est, et +ideo timor qui remanet in gloria, non opponitur spei. In damnatis +autem magis potest esse timor poenae, quam in beatis spes gloriae. +Quia in damnatis erit successio poenarum, et sic remanet ibi ratio +futuri, quod est obiectum timoris, sed gloria sanctorum est absque +successione, secundum quandam aeternitatis participationem, in qua +non est praeteritum et futurum, sed solum praesens. Et tamen nec +etiam in damnatis est proprie timor. Nam sicut supra dictum est, +timor nunquam est sine aliqua spe evasionis, quae omnino in +damnatis non erit. Unde nec timor; nisi communiter loquendo, +secundum quod quaelibet expectatio mali futuri dicitur timor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As to the glory of the soul, there can be no desire in the Blessed, in so far as desire looks for something future, for the + reason already given (ad 2). Yet hunger and thirst are said to be in them because they never weary, and for the same reason + desire is said to be in the angels. With regard to the glory of the body, there can be desire in the souls of the saints, + but not hope, properly speaking; neither as a theological virtue, for thus its object + is God, and not a created good; nor in its general signification. Because the object of hope is something difficult, as stated + above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q40_A1" id="FS_Q67_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[40], A[1]</a>): while a good whose unerring cause we already possess, is not compared to us as something difficult. Hence he that has money + is not, properly speaking, said to hope for what he can buy at once. In like manner those who have the glory of the soul are + not, properly speaking, said to hope for the glory of the body, but only to + desire it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36319" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36319] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod quantum ad gloriam animae, non potest esse in beatis +desiderium, secundum quod respicit futurum, ratione iam dicta. +Dicitur autem ibi esse esuries et sitis, per remotionem fastidii, +et eadem ratione dicitur esse desiderium in Angelis. Respectu autem +gloriae corporis, in animabus sanctorum potest quidem esse +desiderium, non tamen spes, proprie loquendo, neque secundum quod +spes est virtus theologica, sic enim eius obiectum est Deus, non +autem aliquod bonum creatum; neque secundum quod communiter +sumitur. Quia obiectum spei est arduum, ut supra dictum est, bonum +autem cuius iam inevitabilem causam habemus, non comparatur ad nos +in ratione ardui. Unde non proprie dicitur aliquis qui habet +argentum, sperare se habiturum aliquid quod statim in potestate +eius est ut emat. Et similiter illi qui habent gloriam animae, non +proprie dicuntur sperare gloriam corporis; sed solum +desiderare.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q67_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q67_A5-p0.1">Q. 67. A. 5. Whether anything of faith or hope remains in glory?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that something of faith and hope remains in glory. For when that which is proper to a thing is removed, there + remains what is common; thus it is stated in De Causis that "if you take away rational, there remains living, and when you + remove living, there remains being." Now in faith there is something that it has in common with beatitude, viz. knowledge: + and there is something proper to it, viz. darkness, for faith is knowledge in a dark manner. + Therefore, the darkness of faith removed, the knowledge of faith still remains. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36320" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36320] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquid fidei vel spei remaneat in +gloria. Remoto enim eo quod est proprium, remanet id quod est +commune, sicut dicitur in libro de causis, quod, <i>remoto +rationali, remanet vivum; et remoto vivo, remanet ens</i>. Sed in +fide est aliquid quod habet commune cum beatitudine, scilicet ipsa +cognitio, aliquid autem quod est sibi proprium, scilicet aenigma; +est enim fides cognitio aenigmatica. Ergo, remoto aenigmate fidei, +adhuc remanet ipsa cognitio fidei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, faith is a spiritual light of the soul, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.17" target="asv"> Eph. 1:17,18</a>: "The eyes of your heart enlightened . . . in the knowledge of God"; yet this light is imperfect in comparison with the light + of glory, of which it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A5-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.35.10" target="asv">Ps. 35:10</a>): "In Thy light we shall see light." Now an imperfect light remains when a perfect light supervenes: for a candle is not + extinguished when the sun's rays appear. Therefore it + seems that the light of faith itself remains with the light of glory. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36321" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36321] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +fides est quoddam spirituale lumen animae, secundum illud Ephes. I, +<i>illuminatos oculos cordis vestri in agnitionem Dei</i>; sed hoc +lumen est imperfectum respectu luminis gloriae, de quo dicitur in +Psalmo XXXV, <i>in lumine tuo videbimus lumen</i>. Lumen autem +imperfectum remanet, superveniente lumine perfecto, non enim +candela extinguitur, claritate solis superveniente. Ergo videtur +quod ipsum lumen fidei maneat cum lumine gloriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the substance of a habit does not cease through the withdrawal of its matter: for a man may retain the habit of + liberality, though he have lost his money: yet he cannot exercise the act. Now the object of faith is the First Truth as unseen. + Therefore when this ceases through being seen, the habit of faith can still remain. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36322" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36322] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +substantia habitus non tollitur per hoc quod subtrahitur materia, +potest enim homo habitum liberalitatis retinere, etiam amissa +pecunia; sed actum habere non potest. Obiectum autem fidei est +veritas prima non visa. Ergo, hoc remoto per hoc quod videtur +veritas prima, adhuc potest remanere ipse habitus fidei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Faith is a simple habit. Now a simple thing is either withdrawn entirely, or remains entirely. Since therefore faith does + not remain entirely, but is taken away as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q67_A3" id="FS_Q67_A5-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, it seems that it is withdrawn entirely. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36323" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36323] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod fides est quidam habitus simplex. Simplex autem vel totum +tollitur, vel totum manet. Cum igitur fides non totaliter maneat, +sed evacuetur, ut dictum est; videtur quod totaliter tollatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q67_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some have held that hope is taken away entirely: but that faith is taken away in part, viz. as to its obscurity, and remains + in part, viz. as to the substance of its knowledge. And if this be understood to mean that it remains the same, not identically + but generically, it is absolutely true; since faith is of the same genus, viz. knowledge, as the beatific vision. On the other + hand, hope is not of the same genus as heavenly bliss: because it is compared to + the enjoyment of bliss, as movement is to rest in the term of movement. + </p><p id="FS_Q67_A5-p7"> But if it be understood to mean that in heaven the knowledge of faith remains identically the same, this is absolutely impossible. + Because when you remove a specific difference, the substance of the genus does not remain identically the same: thus if you + remove the difference constituting whiteness, the substance of color does not remain identically the same, as though the identical + color were at one time whiteness, and, at another, blackness. The reason is that genus is not + related to difference as matter to form, so that the substance of the genus remains identically the same, when the difference + is removed, as the substance of matter remains identically the same, when the form is changed: for genus and difference are + not the parts of a species, else they would not be predicated of the species. But even as the species denotes the whole, i.e. + the compound of matter and form in material things, so does the difference, and likewise the genus; the genus denotes the + whole by signifying that which is material; the difference, by signifying that which is formal; the species, by signifying + both. Thus, in man, the sensitive nature is as matter to the intellectual nature, and animal is predicated of that which has + a sensitive nature, rational of that which has an intellectual nature, and man of that which has both. So that the one same + whole is denoted by these three, but not under the same aspect. + </p><p id="FS_Q67_A5-p8"> It is therefore evident that, since the signification of the difference is confined to the genus if the difference be removed, + the substance of the genus cannot remain the same: for the same animal nature does not remain, if another kind of soul constitute + the animal. Hence it is impossible for the identical knowledge, which was previously obscure, to become clear vision. It is + therefore evident that, in heaven, nothing remains of faith, either identically or specifically the + same, but only generically. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 5 co."><a name="36324" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36324] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod spes totaliter tollitur, fides +autem partim tollitur, scilicet quantum ad aenigma, et partim +manet, scilicet quantum ad substantiam cognitionis. Quod quidem si +sic intelligatur quod maneat non idem numero, sed idem genere, +verissime dictum est, fides enim cum visione patriae convenit in +genere, quod est cognitio. Spes autem non convenit cum beatitudine +in genere, comparatur enim spes ad beatitudinis fruitionem, sicut +motus ad quietem in termino. Si autem intelligatur quod eadem +numero cognitio quae est fidei, maneat in patria; hoc est omnino +impossibile. Non enim, remota differentia alicuius speciei, remanet +substantia generis eadem numero, sicut, remota differentia +constitutiva albedinis, non remanet eadem substantia coloris +numero, ut sic idem numero color sit quandoque albedo, quandoque +vero nigredo. Non enim comparatur genus ad differentiam sicut +materia ad formam, ut remaneat substantia generis eadem numero, +differentia remota; sicut remanet eadem numero substantia materiae, +remota forma. Genus enim et differentia non sunt partes speciei, +alioquin non praedicarentur de specie. Sed sicut species significat +totum, idest compositum ex materia et forma in rebus materialibus, +ita differentia significat totum, et similiter genus, sed genus +denominat totum ab eo quod est sicut materia; differentia vero ab +eo quod est sicut forma; species vero ab utroque. Sicut in homine +sensitiva natura materialiter se habet ad intellectivam, animal +autem dicitur quod habet naturam sensitivam; rationale quod habet +intellectivam; homo vero quod habet utrumque. Et sic idem totum +significatur per haec tria, sed non ab eodem. Unde patet quod, cum +differentia non sit nisi designativa generis, remota differentia, +non potest substantia generis eadem remanere, non enim remanet +eadem animalitas, si sit alia anima constituens animal. Unde non +potest esse quod eadem numero cognitio, quae prius fuit +aenigmatica, postea fiat visio aperta. Et sic patet quod nihil idem +numero vel specie quod est in fide, remanet in patria; sed solum +idem genere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If "rational" be withdrawn, the remaining "living" thing is the same, not identically, but generically, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36325" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36325] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, remoto rationali, non remanet vivum idem +numero, sed idem genere, ut ex dictis patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The imperfection of candlelight is not opposed to the perfection of sunlight, since they do not regard the same subject: + whereas the imperfection of faith and the perfection of glory are opposed to one another and regard the same subject. Consequently + they are incompatible with one another, just as light and darkness in the air. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36326" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36326] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod imperfectio luminis candelae non opponitur +perfectioni solaris luminis, quia non respiciunt idem subiectum. +Sed imperfectio fidei et perfectio gloriae opponuntur ad invicem, +et respiciunt idem subiectum. Unde non possunt esse simul, sicut +nec claritas aeris cum obscuritate eius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He that loses his money does not therefore lose the possibility of having money, and therefore it is reasonable for the habit + of liberality to remain. But in the state of glory not only is the object of faith, which is the unseen, removed actually, + but even its possibility, by reason of the unchangeableness of heavenly bliss: and so such a habit would remain to no purpose. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36327" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36327] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ille qui amittit pecuniam, non amittit possibilitatem +habendi pecuniam, et ideo convenienter remanet habitus +liberalitatis. Sed in statu gloriae non solum actu tollitur +obiectum fidei, quod est non visum; sed etiam secundum +possibilitatem, propter beatitudinis stabilitatem. Et ideo frustra +talis habitus remaneret.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q67_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q67_A6-p0.1">Q. 67. A. 6. Whether charity remains after this life, in glory?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that charity does not remain after this life, in glory. Because according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:10, </a> "when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part," i.e. that which is imperfect, "shall be done away." Now the + charity of the wayfarer is imperfect. Therefore it will be done away when the perfection of glory is attained. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="36328" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36328] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas non maneat post hanc vitam in +gloria. Quia, ut dicitur I ad Cor. XIII, <i>cum venerit quod +perfectum est, evacuabitur quod ex parte est</i>, idest quod est +imperfectum. Sed caritas viae est imperfecta. Ergo evacuabitur, +adveniente perfectione gloriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habits and acts are differentiated by their objects. But the object of love is good apprehended. Since therefore + the apprehension of the present life differs from the apprehension of the life to come, it seems that charity is not the same + in both cases. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="36329" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36329] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +habitus et actus distinguuntur secundum obiecta. Sed obiectum +amoris est bonum apprehensum. Cum ergo alia sit apprehensio +praesentis vitae, et alia apprehensio futurae vitae; videtur quod +non maneat eadem caritas utrobique.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things of the same kind can advance from imperfection to perfection by continuous increase. But the charity of the + wayfarer can never attain to equality with the charity of heaven, however much it be increased. Therefore it seems that the + charity of the wayfarer does not remain in heaven. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="36330" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36330] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +eorum quae sunt unius rationis, imperfectum potest venire ad +aequalitatem perfectionis, per continuum augmentum. Sed caritas +viae nunquam potest pervenire ad aequalitatem caritatis patriae, +quantumcumque augeatur. Ergo videtur quod caritas viae non remaneat +in patria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:8</a>): "Charity never falleth away." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 6 s. c."><a name="36331" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36331] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XIII, <i>caritas nunquam +excidit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q67_A3" id="FS_Q67_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, when the imperfection of a thing does not belong to its specific nature, there is nothing to hinder the identical thing + passing from imperfection to perfection, even as man is perfected by growth, and whiteness by intensity. Now charity is love, + the nature of which does not include imperfection, since it may relate to an object either possessed or not possessed, either + seen or not seen. Therefore charity is + not done away by the perfection of glory, but remains identically the same. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 6 co."><a name="36332" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36332] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, quando imperfectio alicuius +rei non est de ratione speciei ipsius, nihil prohibet idem numero +quod prius fuit imperfectum, postea perfectum esse, sicut homo per +augmentum perficitur, et albedo per intensionem. Caritas autem est +amor; de cuius ratione non est aliqua imperfectio, potest enim esse +et habiti et non habiti, et visi et non visi. Unde caritas non +evacuatur per gloriae perfectionem, sed eadem numero manet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The imperfection of charity is accidental to it; because imperfection is not included in the nature of love. Now although + that which is accidental to a thing be withdrawn, the substance remains. Hence the imperfection of charity being done away, + charity itself is not done away. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="36333" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36333] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod imperfectio caritatis per accidens se habet ad +ipsam, quia non est de ratione amoris imperfectio. Remoto autem eo +quod est per accidens, nihilominus remanet substantia rei. Unde, +evacuata imperfectione caritatis, non evacuatur ipsa caritas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The object of charity is not knowledge itself; if it were, the charity of the wayfarer would not be the same as the charity + of heaven: its object is the thing known, which remains the same, viz. God Himself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="36334" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36334] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod caritas non habet pro obiecto ipsam cognitionem, sic +enim non esset eadem in via et in patria. Sed habet pro obiecto +ipsam rem cognitam, quae est eadem, scilicet ipsum Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason why charity of the wayfarer cannot attain to the perfection of the charity of heaven, is a difference on the part + of the cause: for vision is a cause of love, as stated in Ethic. ix, 5: and the more perfectly we know God, the more perfectly + we love Him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="36335" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36335] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod caritas viae per augmentum non potest pervenire ad +aequalitatem caritatis patriae, propter differentiam quae est ex +parte causae, visio enim est quaedam causa amoris, ut dicitur in IX +Ethic. Deus autem quanto perfectius cognoscitur, tanto perfectius +amatur.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q68" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q68-p0.1">Q. 68. OF THE GIFTS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q68-p2"> We now come to consider the Gifts; under which head there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q68-p3"><a href="#FS_Q68_A1"> (1) Whether the Gifts differ from the virtues?</a></p><p id="FS_Q68-p4"><a href="#FS_Q68_A2"> (2) Of the necessity of the Gifts?</a></p><p id="FS_Q68-p5"><a href="#FS_Q68_A3"> (3) Whether the Gifts are habits?</a></p><p id="FS_Q68-p6"><a href="#FS_Q68_A4"> (4) Which, and how many are they?</a></p><p id="FS_Q68-p7"><a href="#FS_Q68_A5"> (5) Whether the Gifts are connected?</a></p><p id="FS_Q68-p8"><a href="#FS_Q68_A6"> (6) Whether they remain in heaven?</a></p><p id="FS_Q68-p9"><a href="#FS_Q68_A7"> (7) Of their comparison with one another;</a></p><p id="FS_Q68-p10"><a href="#FS_Q68_A8"> (8) Of their comparison with the virtues.</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 pr."><a name="36336" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36336] +Iª-IIae q. 68 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de +donis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum dona differant a +virtutibus. Secundo, de necessitate donorum. Tertio, utrum dona +sint habitus. Quarto, quae, et quot sint. Quinto, utrum dona sint +connexa. Sexto, utrum maneant in patria. Septimo, de comparatione +eorum ad invicem. Octavo, de comparatione eorum ad virtutes.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q68_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q68_A1-p0.1">Q. 68. A. 1. Whether the Gifts differ from the virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gifts do not differ from the virtues. For Gregory commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.1.2" target="asv"> Job 1:2, </a> "There were born to him seven sons," says (Moral. i, 12): "Seven sons were born to us, when through the conception of heavenly + thought, the seven virtues of the Holy Ghost take birth in us": and he quotes the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.2" target="asv"> Is. 11:2,3</a>: "And the Spirit . . . of understanding . . . shall rest upon him," etc. where the seven gifts of + the Holy Ghost are enumerated. Therefore the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36337" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36337] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod dona non distinguantur a virtutibus. +Dicit enim Gregorius, in I Moral., exponens illud Iob, <i>nati sunt +ei septem filii, septem nobis nascuntur filii, cum per conceptionem +bonae cogitationis, sancti spiritus septem in nobis virtutes +oriuntur</i>. Et inducit illud quod habetur Isaiae XI, requiescet +super eum spiritus intellectus etc., ubi enumerantur septem +spiritus sancti dona. Ergo septem dona spiritus sancti sunt +virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.45" target="asv"> Mat. 12:45, </a> "Then he goeth and taketh with him seven other spirits," etc., says (De Quaest. Evang. i, qu. 8): "The seven vices are opposed + to the seven virtues of the Holy Ghost," i.e. to the seven gifts. Now the seven vices are opposed to the seven virtues, commonly + so called. Therefore the gifts do not differ from the virtues commonly so called. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36338" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36338] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in libro de Quaestionib. Evang., exponens illud +quod habetur Matth. XII, <i>tunc vadit, et assumit septem alios +spiritus etc., septem vitia sunt contraria septem virtutibus +spiritus sancti</i>, idest septem donis. Sunt autem septem vitia +contraria virtutibus communiter dictis. Ergo dona non distinguuntur +a virtutibus communiter dictis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things whose definitions are the same, are themselves the same. But the definition of virtue applies to the gifts; + for each gift is "a good quality of the mind, whereby we lead a good life," etc. [*Cf. + <a href="#FS_Q55_A4" id="FS_Q68_A1-p4.1" shape="rect"> Q[55], A[4]</a>]. Likewise the definition of a gift can apply to the infused virtues: for a gift is "an unreturnable giving," according to + the Philosopher (Topic. iv, 4). Therefore the virtues and gifts do not differ from one + another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36339" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36339] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quorum est definitio eadem, ipsa quoque sunt eadem. Sed definitio +virtutis convenit donis, unumquodque enim donum est bona qualitas +mentis qua recte vivitur, et cetera. Similiter definitio doni +convenit virtutibus infusis, est enim donum datio irreddibilis, +secundum philosophum. Ergo virtutes et dona non distinguuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Several of the things mentioned among the gifts, are virtues: for, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q57_A2" id="FS_Q68_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[57], A[2]</a>), wisdom, understanding, and knowledge are intellectual virtues, counsel pertains to prudence, piety to a kind of justice, + and fortitude is a moral virtue. Therefore it seems that the gifts do not differ from the virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="36340" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36340] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +plura eorum quae enumerantur inter dona, sunt virtutes. Nam sicut +supra dictum est, sapientia et intellectus et scientia sunt +virtutes intellectuales; consilium autem ad prudentiam pertinet; +pietas autem species est iustitiae; fortitudo autem quaedam virtus +est moralis. Ergo videtur quod virtutes non distinguantur a +donis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. i, 12) distinguishes seven gifts, which he states to be denoted by the seven sons of Job, from the three + theological virtues, which, he says, are signified by Job's three daughters. He also distinguishes (Moral. ii, 26) the same + seven gifts from the four cardinal virtues, which he says were signified by the four corners of the house. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36341" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36341] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Gregorius, I Moral., distinguit septem dona, quae dicit +significari per septem filios Iob, a tribus virtutibus theologicis, +quas dicit significari per tres filias Iob. Et in II Moral., +distinguit eadem septem dona a quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus, +quae dicit significari per quatuor angulos domus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q68_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> If we speak of gift and virtue with regard to the notion conveyed by the words themselves, there is no opposition between + them. Because the word "virtue" conveys the notion that it perfects man in relation to well-doing, while the word "gift" refers + to the cause from which it proceeds. Now there is no reason why that which proceeds from one as a gift should not perfect + another in well-doing: especially as we have already stated ( + <a href="#FS_Q63_A3" id="FS_Q68_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[63], + A[3] + </a>) that some virtues are infused into us by God. Wherefore in this respect we cannot differentiate gifts from virtues. Consequently + some have held that the gifts are not to be distinguished from the virtues. But there remains no less a difficulty for them + to solve; for they must explain why some virtues are called gifts and some not; and why among the gifts there are some, fear, + for instance, that are not reckoned virtues. + </p><p id="FS_Q68_A1-p8"> Hence it is that others have said that the gifts should be held as being distinct from the virtues; yet they have not assigned + a suitable reason for this distinction, a reason, to wit, which would apply either to all the virtues, and to none of the + gifts, or vice versa. For, seeing that of the seven gifts, four belong to the reason, viz. wisdom, knowledge, understanding + and counsel, and three to the appetite, viz. fortitude, piety and fear; they held that the gifts perfect the + free-will according as it is a faculty of the reason, while the virtues perfect it as a faculty of the will: since they observed + only two virtues in the reason or intellect, viz. faith and prudence, the others being in the appetitive power or the affections. + If this distinction were true, all the virtues would have to be in the appetite, and all the gifts in the reason. + </p><p id="FS_Q68_A1-p9"> Others observing that Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift of the Holy Ghost, by coming into the soul endows it with + prudence, temperance, justice, and fortitude, and at the same time strengthens it against every kind of temptation by His + sevenfold gift," said that the virtues are given us that we may do good works, and the gifts, that we may resist temptation. + But neither is this distinction sufficient. Because the virtues also resist those temptations which lead to the + sins that are contrary to the virtues; for everything naturally resists its contrary: which is especially clear with regard + to charity, of which it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Song.8.7" target="asv">Cant 8:7</a>): "Many waters cannot quench charity." + </p><p id="FS_Q68_A1-p10"> Others again, seeing that these gifts are set down in Holy Writ as having been in Christ, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.2" target="asv"> Is. 11:2,3, </a> said that the virtues are given simply that we may do good works, but the gifts, in order to conform us to Christ, chiefly + with regard to His Passion, for it was then that these gifts shone with the greatest splendor. Yet neither does this appear + to be a satisfactory distinction. Because Our Lord Himself wished us to be conformed to Him, chiefly + in humility and meekness, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.29" target="asv"> Mat. 11:29</a>: "Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart," and in charity, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p10.3" href="./asv.html#John.15.12" target="asv"> Jn. 15:12</a>: "Love one another, as I have loved you." Moreover, these virtues were especially resplendent in Christ's Passion. + </p><p id="FS_Q68_A1-p11"> Accordingly, in order to differentiate the gifts from the virtues, we must be guided by the way in which Scripture expresses + itself, for we find there that the term employed is "spirit" rather than "gift." For thus it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.2" target="asv">Is. 11:2,3</a>): "The spirit . . . of wisdom and of understanding . . . shall rest upon him," etc.: from which words we are clearly given + to understand that these seven are there set down as being in us by Divine inspiration. Now + inspiration denotes motion from without. For it must be noted that in man there is a twofold principle of movement, one within + him, viz. the reason; the other extrinsic to him, viz. God, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q9_A4" id="FS_Q68_A1-p11.2" shape="rect">Q[9], AA[4]</a>,6): moreover the Philosopher says this in the chapter On Good Fortune (Ethic. Eudem. vii, 8). + </p><p id="FS_Q68_A1-p12"> Now it is evident that whatever is moved must be proportionate to its mover: and the perfection of the mobile as such, consists + in a disposition whereby it is disposed to be well moved by its mover. Hence the more exalted the mover, the more perfect + must be the disposition whereby the mobile is made proportionate to its mover: thus we see that a disciple needs a more perfect + disposition in order to receive a higher teaching from his master. Now it is manifest that human virtues + perfect man according as it is natural for him to be moved by his reason in his interior and exterior actions. Consequently + man needs yet higher perfections, whereby to be disposed to be moved by God. These perfections are called gifts, not only + because they are infused by God, but also because by them man is disposed to become amenable to the Divine inspiration, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.50.5" target="asv"> Is. 50:5</a>: "The Lord . . . hath opened my ear, and I do not resist; I have not gone back." Even the + Philosopher says in the chapter On Good Fortune (Ethic. Eudem., vii, 8) that for those who are moved by Divine instinct, there + is no need to take counsel according to human reason, but only to follow their inner promptings, since they are moved by a + principle higher than human reason. This then is what some say, viz. that the gifts perfect man for acts which are higher + than acts of virtue. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 co."><a name="36342" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36342] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, si loquamur de dono et virtute secundum nominis +rationem, sic nullam oppositionem habent ad invicem. Nam ratio +virtutis sumitur secundum quod perficit hominem ad bene agendum, ut +supra dictum est, ratio autem doni sumitur secundum comparationem +ad causam a qua est. Nihil autem prohibet illud quod est ab alio ut +donum, esse perfectivum alicuius ad bene operandum, praesertim cum +supra dixerimus quod virtutes quaedam nobis sunt infusae a Deo. +Unde secundum hoc, donum a virtute distingui non potest. Et ideo +quidam posuerunt quod dona non essent a virtutibus distinguenda. +Sed eis remanet non minor difficultas, ut scilicet rationem +assignent quare quaedam virtutes dicantur dona, et non omnes; et +quare aliqua computantur inter dona, quae non computantur inter +virtutes, ut patet de timore. Unde alii dixerunt dona a virtutibus +esse distinguenda; sed non assignaverunt convenientem distinctionis +causam, quae scilicet ita communis esset virtutibus, quod nullo +modo donis, aut e converso. Considerantes enim aliqui quod, inter +septem dona, quatuor pertinent ad rationem, scilicet sapientia +scientia, intellectus et consilium; et tria ad vim appetitivam, +scilicet fortitudo, pietas et timor; posuerunt quod dona +perficiebant liberum arbitrium secundum quod est facultas rationis, +virtutes vero secundum quod est facultas voluntatis, quia +invenerunt duas solas virtutes in ratione vel intellectu, scilicet +fidem et prudentiam, alias vero in vi appetitiva vel affectiva. +Oporteret autem, si haec distinctio esset conveniens, quod omnes +virtutes essent in vi appetitiva, et omnia dona in ratione. Quidam +vero, considerantes quod Gregorius dicit, in II Moral., quod +<i>donum spiritus sancti, quod in mente sibi subiecta format +temperantiam, prudentiam, iustitiam et fortitudinem; eandem mentem +munit contra singula tentamenta per septem dona</i>, dixerunt quod +virtutes ordinantur ad bene operandum, dona vero ad resistendum +tentationibus. Sed nec ista distinctio sufficit. Quia etiam +virtutes tentationibus resistunt, inducentibus ad peccata, quae +contrariantur virtutibus, unumquodque enim resistit naturaliter suo +contrario. Quod praecipue patet de caritate, de qua dicitur Cantic. +VIII, <i>aquae multae non potuerunt extinguere caritatem</i>. Alii +vero, considerantes quod ista dona traduntur in Scriptura secundum +quod fuerunt in Christo, ut patet Isaiae XI; dixerunt quod virtutes +ordinantur simpliciter ad bene operandum; sed dona ordinantur ad +hoc ut per ea conformemur Christo, praecipue quantum ad ea quae +passus est, quia in passione eius praecipue huiusmodi dona +resplenduerunt. Sed hoc etiam non videtur esse sufficiens. Quia +ipse dominus praecipue nos inducit ad sui conformitatem secundum +humilitatem et mansuetudinem, Matth. XI, <i>discite a me, quia +mitis sum et humilis corde</i>; et secundum caritatem, ut Ioan. XV, +<i>diligatis invicem, sicut dilexi vos</i>. Et hae etiam virtutes +praecipue in passione Christi refulserunt. Et ideo ad distinguendum +dona a virtutibus, debemus sequi modum loquendi Scripturae, in qua +nobis traduntur non quidem sub nomine donorum, sed magis sub nomine +spirituum, sic enim dicitur Isaiae XI, <i>requiescet super eum +spiritus sapientiae et intellectus,</i> et cetera. Ex quibus verbis +manifeste datur intelligi quod ista septem enumerantur ibi, +secundum quod sunt in nobis ab inspiratione divina. Inspiratio +autem significat quandam motionem ab exteriori. Est enim +considerandum quod in homine est duplex principium movens, unum +quidem interius, quod est ratio; aliud autem exterius, quod est +Deus, ut supra dictum est; et etiam philosophus hoc dicit, in cap. +de bona fortuna. Manifestum est autem quod omne quod movetur, +necesse est proportionatum esse motori, et haec est perfectio +mobilis inquantum est mobile, dispositio qua disponitur ad hoc quod +bene moveatur a suo motore. Quanto igitur movens est altior, tanto +necesse est quod mobile perfectiori dispositione ei proportionetur, +sicut videmus quod perfectius oportet esse discipulum dispositum, +ad hoc quod altiorem doctrinam capiat a docente. Manifestum est +autem quod virtutes humanae perficiunt hominem secundum quod homo +natus est moveri per rationem in his quae interius vel exterius +agit. Oportet igitur inesse homini altiores perfectiones, secundum +quas sit dispositus ad hoc quod divinitus moveatur. Et istae +perfectiones vocantur dona, non solum quia infunduntur a Deo; sed +quia secundum ea homo disponitur ut efficiatur prompte mobilis ab +inspiratione divina, sicut dicitur Isaiae l, <i>dominus aperuit +mihi aurem; ego autem non contradico, retrorsum non abii</i>. Et +philosophus etiam dicit, in cap. de bona fortuna, quod his qui +moventur per instinctum divinum, non expedit consiliari secundum +rationem humanam, sed quod sequantur interiorem instinctum, quia +moventur a meliori principio quam sit ratio humana. Et hoc est quod +quidam dicunt, quod dona perficiunt hominem ad altiores actus quam +sint actus virtutum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sometimes these gifts are called virtues, in the broad sense of the word. Nevertheless, they have something over and above + the virtues understood in this broad way, in so far as they are Divine virtues, perfecting man as moved by God. Hence the + Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 1) above virtue commonly so called, places a kind of "heroic" or "divine virtue [*{arete heroike + kai theia}]," in respect of which some men are called "divine." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36343" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36343] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod huiusmodi dona nominantur quandoque virtutes, +secundum communem rationem virtutis. Habent tamen aliquid +supereminens rationi communi virtutis, inquantum sunt quaedam +divinae virtutes, perficientes hominem inquantum est a Deo motus. +Unde et philosophus, in VII Ethic., supra virtutem communem ponit +quandam virtutem heroicam vel divinam, secundum quam dicuntur +aliqui divini viri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The vices are opposed to the virtues, in so far as they are opposed to the good as appointed by reason; but they are opposed + to the gifts, in as much as they are opposed to the Divine instinct. For the same thing is opposed both to God and to reason, + whose light flows from God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36344" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36344] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod vitia, inquantum sunt contra bonum rationis, +contrariantur virtutibus, inquantum autem sunt contra divinum +instinctum, contrariantur donis. Idem enim contrariatur Deo et +rationi, cuius lumen a Deo derivatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This definition applies to virtue taken in its general sense. Consequently, if we wish to restrict it to virtue as distinguished + from the gifts, we must explain the words, "whereby we lead a good life" as referring to the rectitude of life which is measured + by the rule of reason. Likewise the gifts, as distinct from infused virtue, may be defined as something given by God in relation + to His motion; something, to wit, that makes man to follow well the + promptings of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36345" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36345] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod definitio illa datur de virtute secundum communem +modum virtutis. Unde si volumus definitionem restringere ad +virtutes prout distinguuntur a donis, dicemus quod hoc quod +dicitur, qua recte vivitur, intelligendum est de rectitudine vitae +quae accipitur secundum regulam rationis. Similiter autem donum, +prout distinguitur a virtute infusa, potest dici id quod datur a +Deo in ordine ad motionem ipsius; quod scilicet facit hominem bene +sequentem suos instinctus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A1-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Wisdom is called an intellectual virtue, so far as it proceeds from the judgment of reason: but it is called a gift, according + as its work proceeds from the Divine prompting. The same applies to the other virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="36346" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36346] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod sapientia dicitur intellectualis virtus, secundum +quod procedit ex iudicio rationis, dicitur autem donum, secundum +quod operatur ex instinctu divino. Et similiter dicendum est de +aliis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q68_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q68_A2-p0.1">Q. 68. A. 2. Whether the gifts are necessary to man for salvation?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gifts are not necessary to man for salvation. Because the gifts are ordained to a perfection surpassing + the ordinary perfection of virtue. Now it is not necessary for man's salvation that he should attain to a perfection surpassing + the ordinary standard of virtue; because such perfection falls, not under the precept, but under a counsel. Therefore the + gifts are not necessary to man for salvation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36347" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36347] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod dona non sint necessaria homini ad +salutem. Dona enim ordinantur ad quandam perfectionem ultra +communem perfectionem virtutis. Non autem est homini necessarium ad +salutem ut huiusmodi perfectionem consequatur, quae est ultra +communem statum virtutis, quia huiusmodi perfectio non cadit sub +praecepto, sed sub consilio. Ergo dona non sunt necessaria homini +ad salutem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is enough, for man's salvation, that he behave well in matters concerning God and matters concerning man. Now + man's behavior to God is sufficiently directed by the theological virtues; and his behavior towards men, by the moral virtues. + Therefore gifts are not necessary to man for salvation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36348" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36348] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ad salutem hominis sufficit quod homo se bene habeat et circa +divina et circa humana. Sed per virtutes theologicas homo se habet +bene circa divina; per virtutes autem morales, circa humana. Ergo +dona non sunt homini necessaria ad salutem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the Holy Ghost gives wisdom against folly, understanding against dullness, counsel + against rashness, fortitude against fears, knowledge against ignorance, piety against hardness of our heart, and fear against + pride." But a sufficient remedy for all these things is to be found in the virtues. Therefore the gifts are not necessary + to man for salvation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36349" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36349] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Gregorius dicit, in II Moral., quod <i>spiritus sanctus dat +sapientiam contra stultitiam, intellectum contra hebetudinem, +consilium contra praecipitationem, fortitudinem contra timorem, +scientiam contra ignorantiam, pietatem contra duritiam, timorem +contra superbiam</i>. Sed sufficiens remedium potest adhiberi ad +omnia ista tollenda per virtutes. Ergo dona non sunt necessaria +homini ad salutem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Of all the gifts, wisdom seems to be the highest, and fear the lowest. Now each of these is necessary for salvation: since + of wisdom it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.28" target="asv">Wis. 7:28</a>): "God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom"; and of fear ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.1.28" target="asv">Ecclus. 1:28</a>): "He that is without fear cannot be justified." Therefore the other gifts that are placed between these are also necessary + for salvation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36350" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36350] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +inter dona summum videtur esse sapientia, infimum autem timor. +Utrumque autem horum necessarium est ad salutem, quia de sapientia +dicitur, Sap. VII, <i>neminem diligit Deus nisi eum qui cum +sapientia inhabitat</i>; et de timore dicitur, Eccli. I, <i>qui +sine timore est, non poterit iustificari</i>. Ergo etiam alia dona +media sunt necessaria ad salutem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q68_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q68_A1" id="FS_Q68_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the gifts are perfections of man, whereby he is disposed so as to be amenable to the promptings of God. Wherefore in those + matters where the prompting of reason is not sufficient, and there is need for the prompting of the Holy Ghost, there is, + in consequence, need for a gift. + </p><p id="FS_Q68_A2-p7"> Now man's reason is perfected by God in two ways: first, with its natural perfection, to wit, the natural light of reason; + secondly, with a supernatural perfection, to wit, the theological virtues, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q62_A1" id="FS_Q68_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[62], A[1]</a>). And, though this latter perfection is greater than the former, yet the former is possessed by man in a more perfect manner + than the latter: because man has the former in his full possession, whereas he possesses the latter + imperfectly, since we love and know God imperfectly. Now it is evident that anything that has a nature or a form or a virtue + perfectly, can of itself work according to them: not, however, excluding the operation of God, Who works inwardly in every + nature and in every will. On the other hand, that which has a nature, or form, or virtue imperfectly, cannot of itself work, + unless it be moved by another. Thus the sun which possesses light perfectly, can shine by itself; whereas the moon which has + the nature of light imperfectly, sheds only a borrowed light. Again, a physician, who knows the medical art perfectly, can + work by himself; but his pupil, who is not yet fully instructed, cannot work by himself, but needs to receive instructions + from him. + </p><p id="FS_Q68_A2-p8"> Accordingly, in matters subject to human reason, and directed to man's connatural end, man can work through the judgment + of his reason. If, however, even in these things man receive help in the shape of special promptings from God, this will be + out of God's superabundant goodness: hence, according to the philosophers, not every one that had the acquired moral virtues, + had also the heroic or divine virtues. But in matters directed to the supernatural end, to which man's reason + moves him, according as it is, in a manner, and imperfectly, informed by the theological virtues, the motion of reason does + not suffice, unless it receive in addition the prompting or motion of the Holy Ghost, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.14" target="asv">Rom. 8:14</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A2-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.17" target="asv">17</a>: "Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are sons of God . . . and if sons, heirs also": and + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A2-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.142.10" target="asv"> Ps. 142:10</a>: "Thy good Spirit shall lead me into the right land," because, to wit, none can receive the inheritance of that + land of the Blessed, except he be moved and led thither by the Holy Ghost. Therefore, in order to accomplish this end, it + is necessary for man to have the gift of the Holy Ghost. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 2 co."><a name="36351" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36351] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, dona sunt quaedam hominis +perfectiones, quibus homo disponitur ad hoc quod bene sequatur +instinctum divinum. Unde in his in quibus non sufficit instinctus +rationis, sed est necessarius spiritus sancti instinctus, per +consequens est necessarium donum. Ratio autem hominis est perfecta +dupliciter a Deo, primo quidem, naturali perfectione, scilicet +secundum lumen naturale rationis; alio modo, quadam supernaturali +perfectione, per virtutes theologicas, ut dictum est supra. Et +quamvis haec secunda perfectio sit maior quam prima, tamen prima +perfectiori modo habetur ab homine quam secunda, nam prima habetur +ab homine quasi plena possessio, secunda autem habetur quasi +imperfecta; imperfecte enim diligimus et cognoscimus Deum. +Manifestum est autem quod unumquodque quod perfecte habet naturam +vel formam aliquam aut virtutem, potest per se secundum illam +operari, non tamen exclusa operatione Dei, qui in omni natura et +voluntate interius operatur. Sed id quod imperfecte habet naturam +aliquam vel formam aut virtutem, non potest per se operari, nisi ab +altero moveatur. Sicut sol, quia est perfecte lucidus, per seipsum +potest illuminare, luna autem, in qua est imperfecte natura lucis, +non illuminat nisi illuminata. Medicus etiam, qui perfecte novit +artem medicinae, potest per se operari, sed discipulus eius, qui +nondum est plene instructus, non potest per se operari, nisi ab eo +instruatur. Sic igitur quantum ad ea quae subsunt humanae rationi, +in ordine scilicet ad finem connaturalem homini; homo potest +operari, per iudicium rationis. Si tamen etiam in hoc homo +adiuvetur a Deo per specialem instinctum, hoc erit superabundantis +bonitatis, unde secundum philosophos, non quicumque habebat +virtutes morales acquisitas, habebat virtutes heroicas vel divinas. +Sed in ordine ad finem ultimum supernaturalem, ad quem ratio movet +secundum quod est aliqualiter et imperfecte formata per virtutes +theologicas; non sufficit ipsa motio rationis, nisi desuper adsit +instinctus et motio spiritus sancti; secundum illud Rom. VIII, +<i>qui spiritu Dei aguntur, hi filii Dei sunt; et si filii, et +haeredes</i>, et in Psalmo CXLII, dicitur, <i>spiritus tuus bonus +deducet me in terram rectam</i>; quia scilicet in haereditatem +illius terrae beatorum nullus potest pervenire, nisi moveatur et +deducatur a spiritu sancto. Et ideo ad illum finem consequendum, +necessarium est homini habere donum spiritus sancti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The gifts surpass the ordinary perfection of the virtues, not as regards the kind of works (as the counsels surpass the commandments), + but as regards the manner of working, in respect of man being moved by a higher principle. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36352" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36352] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod dona excedunt communem perfectionem virtutum, +non quantum ad genus operum, eo modo quo consilia excedunt +praecepta, sed quantum ad modum operandi, secundum quod movetur +homo ab altiori principio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By the theological and moral virtues, man is not so perfected in respect of his last end, as not to stand in continual need + of being moved by the yet higher promptings of the Holy Ghost, for the reason already given. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36353" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36353] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod per virtutes theologicas et morales non ita +perficitur homo in ordine ad ultimum finem, quin semper indigeat +moveri quodam superiori instinctu spiritus sancti, ratione iam +dicta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Whether we consider human reason as perfected in its natural perfection, or as perfected by the theological virtues, it does + not know all things, nor all possible things. Consequently it is unable to avoid folly and other like things mentioned in + the objection. God, however, to Whose knowledge and power all things are subject, by His motion safeguards us from all folly, + ignorance, dullness of mind and hardness of heart, and the rest. Consequently the + gifts of the Holy Ghost, which make us amenable to His promptings, are said to be given as remedies to these defects. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36354" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36354] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod rationi humanae non sunt omnia cognita, neque omnia +possibilia, sive accipiatur ut perfecta perfectione naturali, sive +accipiatur ut perfecta theologicis virtutibus. Unde non potest +quantum ad omnia repellere stultitiam, et alia huiusmodi, de quibus +ibi fit mentio. Sed Deus cuius scientiae et potestati omnia +subsunt, sua motione ab omni stultitia et ignorantia et hebetudine +et duritia et ceteris huiusmodi, nos tutos reddit. Et ideo dona +spiritus sancti, quae faciunt nos bene sequentes instinctum ipsius, +dicuntur contra huiusmodi defectus dari.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q68_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q68_A3-p0.1">Q. 68. A. 3. Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits. Because a habit is a quality abiding in man, being defined + as "a quality difficult to remove," as stated in the Predicaments (Categor. vi). Now it is proper to Christ that the gifts + of the Holy Ghost rest in Him, as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.2" target="asv"> Is. 11:2,3</a>: "He upon Whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it is that baptizeth"; on which words Gregory + comments as + follows (Moral. ii, 27): "The Holy Ghost comes upon all the faithful; but, in a singular way, He dwells always in the Mediator." + Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36355" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36355] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod dona spiritus sancti non sint habitus. +Habitus enim est qualitas in homine manens, est enim qualitas +difficile mobilis, ut dicitur in praedicamentis. Sed proprium +Christi est quod dona spiritus sancti in eo requiescant; ut dicitur +Isaiae XI. Et Ioan. I, dicitur, <i>super quem videris spiritum +descendentem, et manentem super eum, hic est qui baptizat</i>, quod +exponens Gregorius, in II Moral., dicit, <i>in cunctis fidelibus +spiritus sanctus venit; sed in solo mediatore semper singulariter +permanet</i>. Ergo dona spiritus sancti non sunt habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man according as he is moved by the Spirit of God, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q68_A1" id="FS_Q68_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2). But in so far as man is moved by the Spirit of God, he is somewhat like an instrument in His regard. Now to be perfected + by a habit is befitting, not an instrument, but a principal agent. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36356" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36356] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +dona spiritus sancti perficiunt hominem secundum quod agitur a +spiritu Dei, sicut dictum est. Sed inquantum homo agitur a spiritu +Dei, se habet quodammodo ut instrumentum respectu eius. Non autem +convenit ut instrumentum perficiatur per habitum, sed principale +agens. Ergo dona spiritus sancti non sunt habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the gifts of the Holy Ghost are due to Divine inspiration, so is the gift of prophecy. Now prophecy is not a + habit: for "the spirit of prophecy does not always reside in the prophets," as Gregory states (Hom. i in Ezechiel). Neither, + therefore, are the gifts of the Holy Ghost. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36357" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36357] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut dona spiritus sancti sunt ex inspiratione divina, ita et +donum prophetiae. Sed prophetia non est habitus, non enim semper +spiritus prophetiae adest prophetis, ut Gregorius dicit, in I +homilia Ezechielis. Ergo neque etiam dona spiritus sancti sunt +habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord in speaking of the Holy Ghost said to His disciples ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.17" target="asv">Jn. 14:17</a>): "He shall abide with you, and shall be in you." Now the Holy Ghost is not in a man without His gifts. Therefore His gifts + abide in man. Therefore they are not merely acts or passions but abiding habits. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36358" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36358] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dominus dicit discipulis, de spiritu sancto loquens, Ioan. +XIV, <i>apud vos manebit, et in vobis erit</i>. Spiritus autem +sanctus non est in hominibus absque donis eius. Ergo dona eius +manent in hominibus. Ergo non solum sunt actus vel passiones, sed +etiam habitus permanentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q68_A1" id="FS_Q68_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the gifts are perfections of man, whereby he becomes amenable to the promptings of the Holy Ghost. Now it is evident from + what has been already said (Q[56], A[4]; Q[58], A[2]), that the moral virtues perfect the appetitive power according as it + partakes somewhat of the reason, in so far, to wit, as it has a natural aptitude to be moved by the command of reason. Accordingly + the gifts of the Holy Ghost, as + compared with the Holy Ghost Himself, are related to man, even as the moral virtues, in comparison with the reason, are related + to the appetitive power. Now the moral virtues are habits, whereby the powers of appetite are disposed to obey reason promptly. + Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits whereby man is perfected to obey readily the Holy Ghost. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 3 co."><a name="36359" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36359] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, dona sunt quaedam perfectiones +hominis, quibus disponitur ad hoc quod homo bene sequatur +instinctum spiritus sancti. Manifestum est autem ex supradictis +quod virtutes morales perficiunt vim appetitivam secundum quod +participat aliqualiter rationem, inquantum scilicet nata est moveri +per imperium rationis. Hoc igitur modo dona spiritus sancti se +habent ad hominem in comparatione ad spiritum sanctum, sicut +virtutes morales se habent ad vim appetitivam in comparatione ad +rationem. Virtutes autem morales habitus quidam sunt, quibus vires +appetitivae disponuntur ad prompte obediendum rationi. Unde et dona +spiritus sancti sunt quidam habitus, quibus homo perficitur ad +prompte obediendum spiritui sancto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gregory solves this objection (Moral. ii, 27) by saying that "by those gifts without which one cannot obtain life, the Holy + Ghost ever abides in all the elect, but not by His other gifts." Now the seven gifts are necessary for salvation, as stated + above + <a href="#FS_Q68_A2" id="FS_Q68_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore, with regard to them, the Holy Ghost ever abides in holy men. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36360" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36360] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Gregorius ibidem solvit, dicens quod <i>in illis +donis sine quibus ad vitam perveniri non potest, spiritus sanctus +in electis omnibus semper manet, sed in aliis non semper manet</i>. +Septem autem dona sunt necessaria ad salutem, ut dictum est. Unde +quantum ad ea, spiritus sanctus semper manet in sanctis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument holds, in the case of an instrument which has no faculty of action, but only of being acted upon. But man is + not an instrument of that kind; for he is so acted upon, by the Holy Ghost, that he also acts himself, in so far as he has + a free-will. Therefore he needs a habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36361" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36361] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de instrumento cuius non est +agere, sed solum agi. Tale autem instrumentum non est homo; sed sic +agitur a spiritu sancto, quod etiam agit, inquantum est liberi +arbitrii. Unde indiget habitu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Prophecy is one of those gifts which are for the manifestation of the Spirit, not for the necessity of salvation: hence the + comparison fails. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36362" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36362] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod prophetia est de donis quae sunt ad manifestationem +spiritus, non autem ad necessitatem salutis. Unde non est +simile.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q68_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q68_A4-p0.1">Q. 68. A. 4. Whether the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are suitably enumerated?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are unsuitably enumerated. For in that enumeration four are set down corresponding + to the intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, understanding, knowledge, and counsel, which corresponds to prudence; whereas nothing + is set down corresponding to art, which is the fifth intellectual virtue. Moreover, something is included corresponding to + justice, viz. piety, and something corresponding to fortitude, viz. the gift of + fortitude; while there is nothing to correspond to temperance. Therefore the gifts are enumerated insufficiently. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36363" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36363] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter septem dona spiritus +sancti enumerentur. In illa enim enumeratione ponuntur quatuor +pertinentia ad virtutes intellectuales, scilicet sapientia, +intellectus, scientia et consilium, quod pertinet ad prudentiam, +nihil autem ibi ponitur quod pertineat ad artem, quae est quinta +virtus intellectualis. Similiter etiam ponitur aliquid pertinens ad +iustitiam, scilicet pietas, et aliquid pertinens ad fortitudinem, +scilicet donum fortitudinis, nihil autem ponitur ibi pertinens ad +temperantiam. Ergo insufficienter enumerantur dona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, piety is a part of justice. But no part of fortitude is assigned to correspond thereto, but fortitude itself. Therefore + justice itself, and not piety, ought to have been set down. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36364" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36364] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +pietas est pars iustitiae. Sed circa fortitudinem non ponitur +aliqua pars eius, sed ipsa fortitudo. Ergo non debuit poni pietas, +sed ipsa iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the theological virtues, more than any, direct us to God. Since, then, the gifts perfect man according as he is + moved by God, it seems that some gifts, corresponding to the theological virtues, should have been included. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36365" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36365] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +virtutes theologicae maxime ordinant nos ad Deum. Cum ergo dona +perficiant hominem secundum quod movetur a Deo, videtur quod +debuissent poni aliqua dona pertinentia ad theologicas +virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, even as God is an object of fear, so is He of love, of hope, and of joy. Now love, hope, and joy are passions condivided + with fear. Therefore, as fear is set down as a gift, so ought the other three. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="36366" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36366] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut Deus timetur, ita etiam amatur, et in ipsum aliquis sperat, +et de eo delectatur. Amor autem, spes et delectatio sunt passiones +condivisae timori. Ergo, sicut timor ponitur donum, ita et alia +tria debent poni dona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, wisdom is added in order to direct understanding; counsel, to direct fortitude; knowledge, to direct piety. Therefore, + some gift should have been added for the purpose of directing fear. Therefore the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are unsuitably + enumerated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="36367" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36367] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +intellectui adiungitur sapientia quae regit ipsum; fortitudini +autem consilium, pietati vero scientia. Ergo et timori debuit addi +aliquod donum directivum. Inconvenienter ergo septem dona spiritus +sancti enumerantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Holy Writ ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.2" target="asv">Is. 11:2,3</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36368" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36368] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed in +contrarium est auctoritas Scripturae, Isaiae XI.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q68_A4-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q68_A3" id="FS_Q68_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, the gifts are habits perfecting man so that he is ready to follow the promptings of the Holy Ghost, even as the moral virtues + perfect the appetitive powers so that they obey the reason. Now just as it is natural for the appetitive powers to be moved + by the command of reason, so it is natural for all the forces in man to be moved by the instinct of God, as by a superior + power. Therefore whatever powers in man + can be the principles of human actions, can also be the subjects of gifts, even as they are virtues; and such powers are the + reason and appetite. + </p><p id="FS_Q68_A4-p9"> Now the reason is speculative and practical: and in both we find the apprehension of truth (which pertains to the discovery + of truth), and judgment concerning the truth. Accordingly, for the apprehension of truth, the speculative reason is perfected + by "understanding"; the practical reason, by "counsel." In order to judge aright, the speculative reason is perfected by "wisdom"; + the practical reason by "knowledge." The appetitive power, in matters touching a man's relations to + another, is perfected by "piety"; in matters touching himself, it is perfected by "fortitude" against the fear of dangers; + and against inordinate lust for pleasures, by "fear," according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.15.27" target="asv"> Prov. 15:27</a>: "By the fear of the Lord every one declineth from evil," and + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A4-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.120" target="asv"> Ps. 118:120</a>: "Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear: for I am afraid of Thy judgments." Hence it is clear that these gifts extend to all + those things to which the virtues, both intellectual and + moral, extend. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 co."><a name="36369" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36369] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, dona sunt quidam habitus +perficientes hominem ad hoc quod prompte sequatur instinctum +spiritus sancti, sicut virtutes morales perficiunt vires +appetitivas ad obediendum rationi. Sicut autem vires appetitivae +natae sunt moveri per imperium rationis, ita omnes vires humanae +natae sunt moveri per instinctum Dei, sicut a quadam superiori +potentia. Et ideo in omnibus viribus hominis quae possunt esse +principia humanorum actuum, sicut sunt virtutes, ita etiam sunt +dona, scilicet in ratione, et in vi appetitiva. Ratio autem est +speculativa et practica, et in utraque consideratur apprehensio +veritatis, quae pertinet ad inventionem; et iudicium de veritate. +Ad apprehensionem igitur veritatis, perficitur speculativa ratio +per intellectum; practica vero per consilium. Ad recte autem +iudicandum, speculativa quidem per sapientiam, practica vero per +scientiam perficitur. Appetitiva autem virtus, in his quidem quae +sunt ad alterum, perficitur per pietatem. In his autem quae sunt ad +seipsum, perficitur per fortitudinem contra terrorem periculorum, +contra concupiscentiam vero inordinatam delectabilium, per timorem, +secundum illud Proverb. XV, <i>per timorem domini declinat omnis a +malo</i>; et in Psalmo CXVIII, <i>confige timore tuo carnes meas, a +iudiciis enim tuis timui</i>. Et sic patet quod haec dona extendunt +se ad omnia ad quae se extendunt virtutes tam intellectuales quam +morales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man in matters concerning a good life: whereas art is not directed to such matters, but + to external things that can be made, since art is the right reason, not about things to be done, but about things to be made + (Ethic. vi, 4). However, we may say that, as regards the infusion of the gifts, the art is on the part of the Holy Ghost, + Who is the principal mover, and not on the part of men, who are His organs when He + moves them. The gift of fear corresponds, in a manner, to temperance: for just as it belongs to temperance, properly speaking, + to restrain man from evil pleasures for the sake of the good appointed by reason, so does it belong to the gift of fear, to + withdraw man from evil pleasures through fear of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36370" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36370] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod dona spiritus sancti perficiunt hominem in his +quae pertinent ad bene vivendum, ad quae non ordinatur ars, sed ad +exteriora factibilia; est enim ars ratio recta non agibilium, sed +factibilium, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Potest tamen dici quod, +quantum ad infusionem donorum, ars pertinet ad spiritum sanctum, +qui est principaliter movens; non autem ad homines, qui sunt +quaedam organa eius dum ab eo moventur. Temperantiae autem +respondet quodammodo donum timoris. Sicut enim ad virtutem +temperantiae pertinet, secundum eius propriam rationem, ut aliquis +recedat a delectationibus pravis propter bonum rationis; ita ad +donum timoris pertinet quod aliquis recedat a delectationibus +pravis propter Dei timorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Justice is so called from the rectitude of the reason, and so it is more suitably called a virtue than a gift. But the name + of piety denotes the reverence which we give to our father and to our country. And since God is the Father of all, the worship + of God is also called piety, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1). Therefore the gift whereby a man, through reverence for + God, works good to all, is fittingly called piety. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36371" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36371] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod nomen iustitiae imponitur a rectitudine rationis, et +ideo nomen virtutis est convenientius quam nomen doni. Sed nomen +pietatis importat reverentiam quam habemus ad patrem et ad patriam. +Et quia pater omnium Deus est, etiam cultus Dei pietas nominatur; +ut Augustinus dicit, X de Civ. Dei. Et ideo convenienter donum quo +aliquis propter reverentiam Dei bonum operatur ad omnes, pietas +nominatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The mind of man is not moved by the Holy Ghost, unless in some way it be united to Him: even as the instrument is not moved + by the craftsman, unless there by contact or some other kind of union between them. Now the primal union of man with God is + by faith, hope and charity: and, consequently, these virtues are presupposed to the gifts, as being their roots. Therefore + all the gifts correspond to these three virtues, as being derived therefrom. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36372" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36372] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod animus hominis non movetur a spiritu sancto, nisi ei +secundum aliquem modum uniatur, sicut instrumentum non movetur ab +artifice nisi per contactum, aut per aliquam aliam unionem. Prima +autem unio hominis est per fidem, spem et caritatem. Unde istae +virtutes praesupponuntur ad dona, sicut radices quaedam donorum. +Unde omnia dona pertinent ad has tres virtutes, sicut quaedam +derivationes praedictarum virtutum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Love, hope and joy have good for their object. Now God is the Sovereign Good: wherefore the names of these passions are transferred + to the theological virtues which unite man to God. On the other hand, the object of fear is evil, which can nowise apply to + God: hence fear does not denote union with God, but withdrawal from certain things through reverence for God. Hence it does + not give its name to a theological virtue, but to a gift, which withdraws + us from evil, for higher motives than moral virtue does. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="36373" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36373] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod amor et spes et delectatio habent bonum pro obiecto. +Summum autem bonum Deus est, unde nomina harum passionum +transferuntur ad virtutes theologicas, quibus anima coniungitur +Deo. Timoris autem obiectum est malum, quod Deo nullo modo +competit, unde non importat coniunctionem ad Deum, sed magis +recessum ab aliquibus rebus propter reverentiam Dei. Et ideo non +est nomen virtutis theologicae, sed doni, quod eminentius retrahit +a malis quam virtus moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Wisdom directs both the intellect and the affections of man. Hence two gifts are set down as corresponding to wisdom as their + directing principle; on the part of the intellect, the gift of understanding; on the part of the affections, the gift of fear. + Because the principal reason for fearing God is taken from a consideration of the Divine excellence, which wisdom considers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="36374" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36374] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod per sapientiam dirigitur et hominis intellectus, et +hominis affectus. Et ideo ponuntur duo correspondentia sapientiae +tanquam directivo, ex parte quidem intellectus, donum intellectus; +ex parte autem affectus, donum timoris. Ratio enim timendi Deum +praecipue sumitur ex consideratione excellentiae divinae, quam +considerat sapientia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q68_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q68_A5-p0.1">Q. 68. A. 5. Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gifts are not connected, for the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:8</a>): "To one . . . by the Spirit, is given the word of wisdom, and to another, the word of knowledge, according to the same + Spirit." Now wisdom and knowledge are reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are + given to divers men, and are not connected together in the same man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36375" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36375] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod dona non sint connexa. Dicit enim +apostolus, I ad Cor. XII, <i>alii datur per spiritum sermo +sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae secundum eundem spiritum</i>. Sed +sapientia et scientia inter dona spiritus sancti computantur. Ergo +dona spiritus sancti dantur diversis, et non connectuntur sibi +invicem in eodem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "many of the faithful have not knowledge, though they have faith." But some + of the gifts, at least the gift of fear, accompany faith. Therefore it seems that the gifts are not necessarily connected + together in one and the same man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36376" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36376] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Trin., quod <i>scientia non pollent +fideles plurimi, quamvis polleant ipsa fide</i>. Sed fidem +concomitatur aliquod de donis, ad minus donum timoris. Ergo videtur +quod dona non sint ex necessitate connexa in uno et eodem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. i) that wisdom "is of small account if it lack understanding, and understanding is wholly useless + if it be not based upon wisdom . . . Counsel is worthless, when the strength of fortitude is lacking thereto . . . and fortitude + is very weak if it be not supported by counsel . . . Knowledge is nought if it hath not the use of piety . . . and piety is + very useless if it lack the discernment of knowledge . . . and assuredly, unless it + has these virtues with it, fear itself rises up to the doing of no good action": from which it seems that it is possible to + have one gift without another. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not connected. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36377" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36377] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Gregorius, in I Moral., dicit quod <i>minor est sapientia, si +intellectu careat; et valde inutilis est intellectus, si ex +sapientia non subsistat. Vile est consilium, cui opus fortitudinis +deest; et valde fortitudo destruitur, nisi per consilium fulciatur. +Nulla est scientia, si utilitatem pietatis non habet; et valde +inutilis est pietas, si scientiae discretione caret. Timor quoque +ipse, si non has virtutes habuerit, ad nullum opus bonae actionis +surgit</i>. Ex quibus videtur quod unum donum possit sine alio +haberi. Non ergo dona spiritus sancti sunt connexa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory prefaces the passage above quoted, with the following remark: "It is worthy of note in this feast of Job's sons, + that by turns they fed one another." Now the sons of Job, of whom he is speaking, denote the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore + the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected together by strengthening one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36378" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36378] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod ibidem Gregorius praemittit, dicens, <i>illud in hoc +filiorum convivio perscrutandum videtur, quod semetipsos invicem +pascunt</i>. Per filios autem Iob, de quibus loquitur, designantur +dona spiritus sancti. Ergo dona spiritus sancti sunt connexa, per +hoc quod se invicem reficiunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The true answer to this question is easily gathered from what has been already set down. For it has been stated + <a href="#FS_Q68_A3" id="FS_Q68_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a> that as the powers of the appetite are disposed by the moral virtues as regards the governance of reason, so all the powers + of the soul are disposed by the gifts as regards the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now the Holy Ghost dwells in us by charity, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv"> Rom. 5:5</a>: "The charity of God is + poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us," even as our reason is perfected by prudence. Wherefore, + just as the moral virtues are united together in prudence, so the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected together in charity: + so that whoever has charity has all the gifts of the Holy Ghost, none of which can one possess without charity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 5 co."><a name="36379" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36379] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod huius quaestionis veritas de facili ex praemissis +potest haberi. Dictum est enim supra quod sicut vires appetitivae +disponuntur per virtutes morales in comparatione ad regimen +rationis, ita omnes vires animae disponuntur per dona in +comparatione ad spiritum sanctum moventem. Spiritus autem sanctus +habitat in nobis per caritatem, secundum illud Rom. V, <i>caritas +Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui datus +est nobis</i>, sicut et ratio nostra perficitur per prudentiam. +Unde sicut virtutes morales connectuntur sibi invicem in prudentia, +ita dona spiritus sancti connectuntur sibi invicem in caritate, ita +scilicet quod qui caritatem habet, omnia dona spiritus sancti +habet; quorum nullum sine caritate haberi potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Wisdom and knowledge can be considered in one way as gratuitous graces, in so far, to wit, as man so far abounds in the knowledge + of things Divine and human, that he is able both to instruct the believer and confound the unbeliever. It is in this sense + that the Apostle speaks, in this passage, about wisdom and knowledge: hence he mentions pointedly the "word" of wisdom and + the "word" of knowledge. They may be taken in another way for the gifts of the + Holy Ghost: and thus wisdom and knowledge are nothing else but perfections of the human mind, rendering it amenable to the + promptings of the Holy Ghost in the knowledge of things Divine and human. Consequently it is clear that these gifts are in + all who are possessed of charity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36380" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36380] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod sapientia et scientia uno modo possunt +considerari secundum quod sunt gratiae gratis datae, prout scilicet +aliquis abundat intantum in cognitione rerum divinarum et +humanarum, ut possit et fideles instruere et adversarios confutare. +Et sic loquitur ibi apostolus de sapientia et scientia, unde +signanter fit mentio de sermone sapientiae et scientiae. Alio modo +possunt accipi prout sunt dona spiritus sancti. Et sic sapientia et +scientia nihil aliud sunt quam quaedam perfectiones humanae mentis, +secundum quas disponitur ad sequendum instinctus spiritus sancti in +cognitione divinorum vel humanorum. Et sic patet quod huiusmodi +dona sunt in omnibus habentibus caritatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine is speaking there of knowledge, while expounding the passage of the Apostle quoted above (OBJ 1): hence he is referring + to knowledge, in the sense already explained, as a gratuitous grace. This is clear from the context which follows: "For it + is one thing to know only what a man must believe in order to gain the blissful life, which is no other than eternal life; + and another, to know how to impart this to godly souls, and to defend it + against the ungodly, which latter the Apostle seems to have styled by the proper name of knowledge." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36381" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36381] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur de scientia exponens +praedictam auctoritatem apostoli, unde loquitur de scientia +praedicto modo accepta, secundum quod est gratia gratis data. Quod +patet ex hoc quod subdit, <i>aliud enim est scire tantummodo quid +homo credere debeat propter adipiscendam vitam beatam, quae non +nisi aeterna est; aliud autem scire quemadmodum hoc ipsum et piis +opituletur, et contra impios defendatur; quam proprio appellare +vocabulo scientiam videtur apostolus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as the connection of the cardinal virtues is proved in one way from the fact that one is, in a manner, perfected by + another, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q65_A1" id="FS_Q68_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[65], A[1]</a>); so Gregory wishes to prove the connection of the gifts, in the same way, from the fact that one cannot be perfect without + the other. Hence he had already observed that "each particular virtue is to the last degree destitute, unless one virtue lend + its support to + another." We are therefore not to understand that one gift can be without another; but that if understanding were without + wisdom, it would not be a gift; even as temperance, without justice, would not be a virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36382" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36382] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut uno modo connexio virtutum cardinalium +probatur per hoc quod una earum perficitur quodammodo per aliam, ut +supra dictum est; ita Gregorius eodem modo vult probare connexionem +donorum, per hoc quod unum sine alio non potest esse perfectum. +Unde praemittit dicens, <i>valde singula quaelibet destituitur, si +non una alii virtus virtuti suffragetur</i>. Non ergo datur +intelligi quod unum donum possit esse sine alio, sed quod +intellectus, si esset sine sapientia, non esset donum; sicut +temperantia, si esset sine iustitia, non esset virtus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q68_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q68_A6-p0.1">Q. 68. A. 6. Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost remain in heaven?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost do not remain in heaven. For Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that by means of + His sevenfold gift the "Holy Ghost instructs the mind against all temptations." Now there will be no temptations in heaven, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.9" target="asv"> Is. 11:9</a>: "They shall not hurt, nor shall they kill in all My holy mountain." Therefore there will be no gifts of the Holy Ghost in + heaven. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="36383" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36383] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod dona spiritus sancti non maneant in +patria. Dicit enim Gregorius, in II Moral., quod <i>spiritus +sanctus contra singula tentamenta septem donis erudit mentem</i>. +Sed in patria non erunt aliqua tentamenta; secundum illud Isaiae +XI, <i>non nocebunt et non occident in universo monte sancto +meo</i>. Ergo dona spiritus sancti non erunt in patria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q68_A3" id="FS_Q68_A6-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. But habits are of no use, where their acts are impossible. Now the acts of some gifts are not possible in heaven; for Gregory + says (Moral. i, 15) that "understanding . . . penetrates the truths heard . . . counsel . . . stays us from acting rashly + . . . fortitude . . . has no fear of adversity . . . piety satisfies the inmost heart with deeds of mercy," all of + which are incompatible with the heavenly state. Therefore these gifts will not remain in the state of glory. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="36384" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36384] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +dona spiritus sancti sunt habitus quidam, ut supra dictum est. +Frustra autem essent habitus, ubi actus esse non possunt. Actus +autem quorundam donorum in patria esse non possunt, dicit enim +Gregorius, in I Moral., quod <i>intellectus facit audita penetrare, +et consilium prohibet esse praecipitem, et fortitudo facit non +metuere adversa, et pietas replet cordis viscera operibus +misericordiae</i>; haec autem non competunt statui patriae. Ergo +huiusmodi dona non erunt in statu gloriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some of the gifts perfect man in the contemplative life, e.g. wisdom and understanding: and some in the active life, + e.g. piety and fortitude. Now the active life ends with this as Gregory states (Moral. vi). Therefore not all the gifts of + the Holy Ghost will be in the state of glory. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="36385" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36385] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +donorum quaedam perficiunt hominem in vita contemplativa, ut +sapientia et intellectus; quaedam in vita activa, ut pietas et +fortitudo. Sed activa vita cum hac vita terminatur; ut Gregorius +dicit, in VI Moral. Ergo in statu gloriae non erunt omnia dona +spiritus sancti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Spiritu Sancto i, 20): "The city of God, the heavenly Jerusalem is not washed with the waters of an earthly + river: it is the Holy Ghost, of Whose outpouring we but taste, Who, proceeding from the Fount of life, seems to flow more + abundantly in those celestial spirits, a seething torrent of sevenfold heavenly virtue." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 6 s. c."><a name="36386" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36386] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Ambrosius dicit, in libro de spiritu sancto, <i>civitas +Dei illa, Ierusalem caelestis, non meatu alicuius fluvii terrestris +abluitur; sed ex vitae fonte procedens spiritus sanctus, cuius nos +brevi satiamur haustu, in illis caelestibus spiritibus redundantius +videtur affluere, pleno septem virtutum spiritualium fervens +meatu</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We may speak of the gifts in two ways: first, as to their essence; and thus they will be most perfectly in heaven, as may + be gathered from the passage of Ambrose, just quoted. The reason for this is that the gifts of the Holy Ghost render the human + mind amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost: which will be especially realized in heaven, where God will be "all in all" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.28" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:28</a>), and man entirely subject unto Him. Secondly, they may + be considered as regards the matter about which their operations are: and thus, in the present life they have an operation + about a matter, in respect of which they will have no operation in the state of glory. Considered in this way, they will not + remain in the state of glory; just as we have stated to be the case with regard to the cardinal virtues ( + <a href="#FS_Q67_A1" id="FS_Q68_A6-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[67], A[1]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 6 co."><a name="36387" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36387] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod de donis dupliciter possumus loqui. Uno modo, quantum +ad essentiam donorum, et sic perfectissime erunt in patria, sicut +patet per auctoritatem Ambrosii inductam. Cuius ratio est quia dona +spiritus sancti perficiunt mentem humanam ad sequendam motionem +spiritus sancti, quod praecipue erit in patria, quando Deus erit +omnia in omnibus, ut dicitur I ad Cor. XV, et quando homo erit +totaliter subditus Deo. Alio modo possunt considerari quantum ad +materiam circa quam operantur, et sic in praesenti habent +operationem circa aliquam materiam circa quam non habebunt +operationem in statu gloriae. Et secundum hoc, non manebunt in +patria, sicut supra de virtutibus cardinalibus dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gregory is speaking there of the gifts according as they are compatible with the present state: for it is thus that they + afford us protection against evil temptations. But in the state of glory, where all evil will have ceased, we shall be perfected + in good by the gifts of the Holy Ghost. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="36388" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36388] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Gregorius loquitur ibi de donis secundum quod +competunt statui praesenti, sic enim donis protegimur contra +tentamenta malorum. Sed in statu gloriae, cessantibus malis, per +dona spiritus sancti perficiemur in bono.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Gregory, in almost every gift, includes something that passes away with the present state, and something that remains in + the future state. For he says that "wisdom strengthens the mind with the hope and certainty of eternal things"; of which two, + hope passes, and certainty remains. Of understanding, he says "that it penetrates the truths heard, refreshing the heart and + enlightening its darkness," of which, hearing passes away, since "they shall teach + no more every man . . . his brother" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A6-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.31.3" target="asv">Jer. 31:3,4</a>); but the enlightening of the mind remains. Of counsel he says that it "prevents us from being impetuous," which is necessary + in the present life; and also that "it makes the mind full of reason," which is necessary even in the future state. Of fortitude + he says that it "fears not adversity," which is necessary in the present life; and further, that it "sets before us the viands + of confidence," which remains also in the + future life. With regard to knowledge he mentions only one thing, viz. that "she overcomes the void of ignorance," which refers + to the present state. When, however, he adds "in the womb of the mind," this may refer figuratively to the fulness of knowledge, + which belongs to the future state. Of piety he says that "it satisfies the inmost heart with deeds of mercy." These words + taken literally refer only to the present state: yet the inward regard for our neighbor, signified by "the inmost + heart," belongs also to the future state, when piety will achieve, not works of mercy, but fellowship of joy. Of fear he say + that "it oppresses the mind, lest it pride itself in present things," which refers to the present state, and that "it strengthens + it with the meat of hope for the future," which also belongs to the present state, as regards hope, but may also refer to + the future state, as regards being "strengthened" for things we hope are here, and obtain there. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="36389" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36389] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod Gregorius quasi in singulis donis ponit aliquid quod +transit cum statu praesenti, et aliquid quod permanet etiam in +futuro. Dicit enim quod sapientia mentem de aeternorum spe et +certitudine reficit, quorum duorum spes transit, sed certitudo +remanet. Et de intellectu dicit quod in eo quod audita penetrat, +reficiendo cor, tenebras eius illustrat, quorum auditus transit, +quia non docebit vir fratrem suum, ut dicitur Ierem. XXXI; sed +illustratio mentis manebit. De consilio autem dicit quod prohibet +esse praecipitem, quod est necessarium in praesenti, et iterum quod +ratione animum replet, quod est necessarium etiam in futuro. De +fortitudine vero dicit quod adversa non metuit, quod est +necessarium in praesenti, et iterum quod confidentiae cibos +apponit, quod permanet etiam in futuro. De scientia vero unum +tantum ponit, scilicet quod ignorantiae ieiunium superat, quod +pertinet ad statum praesentem. Sed quod addit, in ventre mentis, +potest figuraliter intelligi repletio cognitionis, quae pertinet +etiam ad statum futurum. De pietate vero dicit quod cordis viscera +misericordiae operibus replet. Quod quidem secundum verba, pertinet +tantum ad statum praesentem. Sed ipse intimus affectus proximorum, +per viscera designatus, pertinet etiam ad futurum statum; in quo +pietas non exhibebit misericordiae opera, sed congratulationis +affectum. De timore vero dicit quod premit mentem, ne de +praesentibus superbiat, quod pertinet ad statum praesentem; et quod +de futuris cibo spei confortat, quod etiam pertinet ad statum +praesentem, quantum ad spem; sed potest etiam ad statum futurum +pertinere, quantum ad confortationem de rebus hic speratis, et ibi +obtentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers the gifts as to their matter. For the matter of the gifts will not be the works of the active life; + but all the gifts will have their respective acts about things pertaining to the contemplative life, which is the life of + heavenly bliss. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="36390" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36390] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de donis quantum ad materiam. +Opera enim activae vitae non erunt materia donorum, sed omnia +habebunt actus suos circa ea quae pertinent ad vitam +contemplativam, quae est vita beata.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q68_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q68_A7-p0.1">Q. 68. A. 7. Whether the gifts are set down by Isaias in their order of dignity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gifts are not set down by Isaias in their order of dignity. For the principal gift is, seemingly, + that which, more than the others, God requires of man. Now God requires of man fear, more than the other gifts: for it is + written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.10.12" target="asv">Dt. 10:12</a>): "And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God?" and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Mal.1.6" target="asv">Malachi 1:6</a>): "If . . . I be a master, where is My + fear?" Therefore it seems that fear, which is mentioned last, is not the lowest but the greatest of the gifts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="36391" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36391] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod dignitas donorum non attenditur +secundum enumerationem qua enumerantur Isaiae XI. Illud enim +videtur esse potissimum in donis, quod maxime Deus ab homine +requirit. Sed maxime requirit Deus ab homine timorem, dicitur enim +Deut. X, <i>et nunc, Israel, quid dominus Deus tuus petit a te, +nisi ut timeas dominum Deum tuum?</i> Et Malach. I, dicitur, <i>si +ego dominus, ubi timor meus?</i> Ergo videtur quod timor, qui +enumeratur ultimo, non sit infimum donorum, sed maximum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, piety seems to be a kind of common good; since the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.4.8" target="asv">1 Tim. 4:8</a>): "Piety [Douay: 'Godliness'] is profitable to all things." Now a common good is preferable to particular goods. Therefore + piety, which is given the last place but one, seems to be the most excellent gift. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="36392" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36392] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +pietas videtur esse quoddam bonum universale, dicit enim apostolus, +I ad Tim. IV, quod <i>pietas ad omnia utilis est</i>. Sed bonum +universale praefertur particularibus bonis. Ergo pietas, quae +penultimo enumeratur, videtur esse potissimum donorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, knowledge perfects man's judgment, while counsel pertains to inquiry. But judgment is more excellent than inquiry. + Therefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than counsel; and yet it is set down as being below it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="36393" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36393] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +scientia perficit iudicium hominis; consilium autem ad +inquisitionem pertinet. Sed iudicium praeeminet inquisitioni. Ergo +scientia est potius donum quam consilium, cum tamen post +enumeretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, fortitude pertains to the appetitive power, while science belongs to reason. But reason is a more excellent power + than the appetite. Therefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than fortitude; and yet the latter is given the precedence. + Therefore the gifts are not set down in their order of dignity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 arg. 4"><a name="36394" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36394] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +fortitudo pertinet ad vim appetitivam; scientia autem ad rationem. +Sed ratio est eminentior quam vis appetitiva. Ergo et scientia est +eminentius donum quam fortitudo, quae tamen primo enumeratur. Non +ergo dignitas donorum attenditur secundum ordinem enumerationis +eorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says [*De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4]: "It seems to me that the sevenfold operation of the Holy Ghost, of which Isaias + speaks, agrees in degrees and expression with these [of which we read in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.3" target="asv"> Mat. 5:3</a>]: but there is a difference of order, for there [viz. in Isaias] the enumeration begins with the more excellent gifts, here, + with the lower gifts." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 s. c."><a name="36395" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36395] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, +<i>videtur mihi septiformis operatio spiritus sancti, de qua Isaias +loquitur, his gradibus sententiisque congruere</i> (de quibus fit +mentio Matth. V); sed interest ordinis. Nam ibi (scilicet in Isaia) +<i>enumeratio ab excellentioribus coepit, hic vero, ab +inferioribus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The excellence of the gifts can be measured in two ways: first, simply, viz. by comparison to their proper acts as proceeding + from their principles; secondly, relatively, viz. by comparison to their matter. If we consider the excellence of the gifts + simply, they follow the same rule as the virtues, as to their comparison one with another; because the gifts perfect man for + all the acts of the soul's powers, even as the virtues do, as stated above + + <a href="#FS_Q68_A4" id="FS_Q68_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. Hence, as the intellectual virtues have the precedence of the moral virtues, and among the intellectual virtues, the contemplative + are preferable to the active, viz. wisdom, understanding and science to prudence and art (yet so that wisdom stands before + understanding, and understanding before science, and prudence and synesis before eubulia): so also among the gifts, wisdom, + understanding, knowledge, and counsel are more excellent than piety, fortitude, and + fear; and among the latter, piety excels fortitude, and fortitude fear, even as justice surpasses fortitude, and fortitude + temperance. But in regard to their matter, fortitude and counsel precede knowledge and piety: because fortitude and counsel + are concerned with difficult matters, whereas piety and knowledge regard ordinary matters. Consequently the excellence of + the gifts corresponds with the order in which they are enumerated; but so far as wisdom and understanding are given the preference + to the others, their excellence is considered simply, while, so far, as counsel and fortitude are preferred to knowledge and + piety, it is considered with regard to their matter. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 co."><a name="36396" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36396] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod dignitas donorum dupliciter potest attendi, uno modo, +simpliciter, scilicet per comparationem ad proprios actus prout +procedunt a suis principiis; alio modo, secundum quid, scilicet per +comparationem ad materiam. Simpliciter autem loquendo de dignitate +donorum, eadem est ratio comparationis in ipsis et in virtutibus, +quia dona ad omnes actus potentiarum animae perficiunt hominem, ad +quos perficiunt virtutes, ut supra dictum est. Unde sicut virtutes +intellectuales praeferuntur virtutibus moralibus; et in ipsis +virtutibus intellectualibus contemplativae praeferuntur activis, ut +sapientia intellectui, et scientia prudentiae et arti; ita tamen +quod sapientia praefertur intellectui, et intellectus scientiae, +sicut prudentia et synesis eubuliae, ita etiam in donis sapientia +et intellectus, scientia et consilium, praeferuntur pietati et +fortitudini et timori; in quibus etiam pietas praefertur +fortitudini, et fortitudo timori, sicut iustitia fortitudini, et +fortitudo temperantiae. Sed quantum ad materiam, fortitudo et +consilium praeferuntur scientiae et pietati, quia scilicet +fortitudo et consilium in arduis locum habent; pietas autem, et +etiam scientia, in communibus. Sic igitur donorum dignitas ordini +enumerationis respondet, partim quidem simpliciter, secundum quod +sapientia et intellectus omnibus praeferuntur, partim autem +secundum ordinem materiae, secundum quod consilium et fortitudo +praeferuntur scientiae et pietati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Fear is chiefly required as being the foundation, so to speak, of the perfection of the other gifts, for "the fear of the + Lord is the beginning of wisdom" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.110.10" target="asv">Ps. 110:10</a>; + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.1.16" target="asv"> Ecclus. 1:16</a>), and not as though it were more excellent than the others. Because, in the order of generation, man departs from evil on + account of fear ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Prov.16.16" target="asv">Prov. 16:16</a>), before doing good works, and which result from the other + gifts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="36397" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36397] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod timor maxime requiritur quasi primordium quoddam +perfectionis donorum, quia initium sapientiae timor domini, non +propter hoc quod sit ceteris dignius. Prius enim est, secundum +ordinem generationis, ut aliquis recedat a malo, quod fit per +timorem, ut dicitur Proverb. XVI; quam quod operetur bonum, quod +fit per alia dona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the words quoted from the Apostle, piety is not compared with all God's gifts, but only with "bodily exercise," of which + he had said it "is profitable to little." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="36398" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36398] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod pietas non comparatur in verbis apostoli, omnibus +donis Dei, sed soli corporali exercitationi, de qua praemittit quod +ad modicum utilis est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although knowledge stands before counsel by reason of its judgment, yet counsel is more excellent by reason of its matter: + for counsel is only concerned with matters of difficulty (Ethic. iii, 3), whereas the judgment of knowledge embraces all matters. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="36399" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36399] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod scientia etsi praeferatur consilio ratione iudicii, +tamen consilium praefertur ratione materiae, nam consilium non +habet locum nisi in arduis, ut dicitur in III Ethic.; sed iudicium +scientiae in omnibus locum habet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The directive gifts which pertain to the reason are more excellent than the executive gifts, if we consider them in relation + to their acts as proceeding from their powers, because reason transcends the appetite as a rule transcends the thing ruled. + But on the part of the matter, counsel is united to fortitude as the directive power to the executive, and so is knowledge + united to piety: because counsel and fortitude are concerned with matters of + difficulty, while knowledge and piety are concerned with ordinary matters. Hence counsel together with fortitude, by reason + of their matter, are given the preference to knowledge and piety. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 ad 4"><a name="36400" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36400] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod dona directiva, quae pertinent ad rationem, donis +exequentibus digniora sunt, si considerentur per comparationem ad +actus prout egrediuntur a potentiis, ratio enim appetitivae +praeeminet, ut regulans regulato. Sed ratione materiae, adiungitur +consilium fortitudini, sicut directivum exequenti, et similiter +scientia pietati, quia scilicet consilium et fortitudo in arduis +locum habent, scientia autem et pietas etiam in communibus. Et ideo +consilium simul cum fortitudine, ratione materiae, numeratur ante +scientiam et pietatem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q68_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q68_A8-p0.1">Q. 68. A. 8. Whether the virtues are more excellent than the gifts?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the virtues are more excellent than the gifts. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18) while speaking of + charity: "No gift of God is more excellent than this. It is this alone which divides the children of the eternal kingdom from + the children of eternal damnation. Other gifts are bestowed by the Holy Ghost, but, without charity, they avail nothing." + But charity is a virtue. Therefore a virtue is more excellent than the gifts of the Holy + Ghost. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="36401" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36401] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes sint praeferendae donis. +Dicit enim Augustinus, in XV de Trin., de caritate loquens, +<i>nullum est isto Dei dono excellentius. Solum est quod dividit +inter filios regni aeterni, et filios perditionis aeternae, dantur +et alia per spiritum sanctum munera, sed sine caritate nihil +prosunt</i>. Sed caritas est virtus. Ergo virtus est potior donis +spiritus sancti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is first naturally, seems to be more excellent. Now the virtues precede the gifts of the Holy Ghost; + for Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift of the Holy Ghost in the mind it works on, forms first of all justice, prudence, + fortitude, temperance . . . and doth afterwards give it a temper in the seven virtues" [viz. the gifts], so "as against folly + to bestow wisdom; against dullness, understanding; against rashness, counsel; against + fear, fortitude; against ignorance, knowledge; against hardness of heart, piety; against piety, fear." Therefore the virtues + are more excellent than the gifts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="36402" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36402] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ea quae sunt priora naturaliter, videntur esse potiora. Sed +virtutes sunt priores donis spiritus sancti, dicit enim Gregorius, +in II Moral., quod <i>donum spiritus sancti in subiecta mente ante +alia iustitiam, prudentiam, fortitudinem et temperantiam format, et +sic eandem mentem septem mox virtutibus</i> (idest donis) +<i>temperat, ut contra stultitiam, sapientiam; contra hebetudinem, +intellectum; contra praecipitationem, consilium; contra timorem, +fortitudinem; contra ignorantiam, scientiam; contra duritiam, +pietatem; contra superbiam, det timorem</i>. Ergo virtutes sunt +potiores donis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that "the virtues cannot be used to evil purpose." But it is possible to make + evil use of the gifts, for Gregory says (Moral. i, 18): "We offer up the sacrifice of prayer . . . lest wisdom may uplift; + or understanding, while it runs nimbly, deviate from the right path; or counsel, while it multiplies itself, grow into confusion; + that fortitude, while it gives confidence, may not make us rash; lest knowledge, while + it knows and yet loves not, may swell the mind; lest piety, while it swerves from the right line, may become distorted; and + lest fear, while it is unduly alarmed, may plunge us into the pit of despair." Therefore the virtues are more excellent than + the gifts of the Holy Ghost. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="36403" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36403] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +virtutibus nullus male uti potest, ut Augustinus dicit. Donis autem +potest aliquis male uti, dicit enim Gregorius, in I Moral., quod +<i>hostiam nostrae precis immolamus ne sapientia elevet; ne +intellectus, dum subtiliter currit, oberret; ne consilium, dum se +multiplicat, confundat; ne fortitudo, dum fiduciam praebet, +praecipitet; ne scientia, dum novit et non diligit, inflet; ne +pietas, dum se extra rectitudinem inclinat, intorqueat; ne timor, +dum plus iusto trepidat, in desperationis foveam mergat</i>. Ergo +virtutes sunt digniores donis spiritus sancti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The gifts are bestowed to assist the virtues and to remedy certain defects, as is shown in the passage quoted (OBJ 2), so + that, seemingly, they accomplish what the virtues cannot. Therefore the gifts are more excellent than the virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 8 s. c."><a name="36404" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36404] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dona dantur in adiutorium virtutum contra defectus, ut +patet in auctoritate inducta; et sic videtur quod perficiant quod +virtutes perficere non possunt. Sunt ergo dona potiora +virtutibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q68_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As was shown above ( + <a href="#FS_Q58_A3" id="FS_Q68_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[58], A[3]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q62_A1" id="FS_Q68_A8-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[62], A[1]</a>), there are three kinds of virtues: for some are theological, some intellectual, and some moral. The theological virtues + are those whereby man's mind is united to God; the intellectual virtues are those whereby reason itself is perfected; and + the moral virtues are those which perfect the powers of appetite in obedience to the reason. On the other hand the gifts of + the Holy Ghost dispose all the powers of the soul to be amenable to the Divine motion. + </p><p id="FS_Q68_A8-p7"> Accordingly the gifts seem to be compared to the theological virtues, by which man is united to the Holy Ghost his Mover, + in the same way as the moral virtues are compared to the intellectual virtues, which perfect the reason, the moving principle + of the moral virtues. Wherefore as the intellectual virtues are more excellent than the moral virtues and control them, so + the theological virtues are more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost and regulate them. Hence Gregory + says (Moral. i, 12) that "the seven sons," i.e. the seven gifts, "never attain the perfection of the number ten, unless all + they do be done in faith, hope, and charity." + </p><p id="FS_Q68_A8-p8"> But if we compare the gifts to the other virtues, intellectual and moral, then the gifts have the precedence of the virtues. + Because the gifts perfect the soul's powers in relation to the Holy Ghost their Mover; whereas the virtues perfect, either + the reason itself, or the other powers in relation to reason: and it is evident that the more exalted the mover, the more + excellent the disposition whereby the thing moved requires to be disposed. Therefore the gifts are more perfect + than the virtues. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 8 co."><a name="36405" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36405] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ex supradictis patet, virtutes in tria genera +distinguuntur, sunt enim quaedam virtutes theologicae, quaedam +intellectuales, quaedam morales. Virtutes quidem theologicae sunt +quibus mens humana Deo coniungitur; virtutes autem intellectuales +sunt quibus ratio ipsa perficitur; virtutes autem morales sunt +quibus vires appetitivae perficiuntur ad obediendum rationi. Dona +autem spiritus sancti sunt quibus omnes vires animae disponuntur ad +hoc quod subdantur motioni divinae. Sic ergo eadem videtur esse +comparatio donorum ad virtutes theologicas, per quas homo unitur +spiritui sancto moventi; sicut virtutum moralium ad virtutes +intellectuales, per quas perficitur ratio, quae est virtutum +moralium motiva. Unde sicut virtutes intellectuales praeferuntur +virtutibus moralibus, et regulant eas; ita virtutes theologicae +praeferuntur donis spiritus sancti, et regulant ea. Unde Gregorius +dicit, in I Moral., quod <i>neque ad denarii perfectionem septem +filii</i> (idest septem dona) <i>perveniunt, nisi in fide, spe et +caritate fuerit omne quod agunt</i>. Sed si comparemus dona ad +alias virtutes intellectuales vel morales, dona praeferuntur +virtutibus. Quia dona perficiunt vires animae in comparatione ad +spiritum sanctum moventem, virtutes autem perficiunt vel ipsam +rationem, vel alias vires in ordine ad rationem. Manifestum est +autem quod ad altiorem motorem oportet maiori perfectione mobile +esse dispositum. Unde perfectiora sunt dona virtutibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Charity is a theological virtue; and such we grant to be more perfect than the gifts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="36406" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36406] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod caritas est virtus theologica; de qua concedimus +quod sit potior donis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There are two ways in which one thing precedes another. One is in order of perfection and dignity, as love of God precedes + love of our neighbor: and in this way the gifts precede the intellectual and moral virtues, but follow the theological virtues. + The other is the order of generation or disposition: thus love of one's neighbor precedes love of God, as regards the act: + and in this way moral and intellectual virtues precede the gifts, since man, + through being well subordinate to his own reason, is disposed to be rightly subordinate to God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="36407" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36407] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod aliquid est prius altero dupliciter. Uno modo, ordine +perfectionis et dignitatis, sicut dilectio Dei est prior dilectione +proximi. Et hoc modo dona sunt priora virtutibus intellectualibus +et moralibus, posteriora vero virtutibus theologicis. Alio modo, +ordine generationis seu dispositionis, sicut dilectio proximi +praecedit dilectionem Dei, quantum ad actum. Et sic virtutes +morales et intellectuales praecedunt dona, quia per hoc quod homo +bene se habet circa rationem propriam, disponitur ad hoc quod se +bene habeat in ordine ad Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A8-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Wisdom and understanding and the like are gifts of the Holy Ghost, according as they are quickened by charity, which "dealeth + not perversely" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A8-p11.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:4</a>). Consequently wisdom and understanding and the like cannot be used to evil purpose, in so far as they are gifts of the Holy + Ghost. But, lest they depart from the perfection of charity, they assist one another. This is what Gregory means to say. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="36408" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36408] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod sapientia et intellectus et alia huiusmodi sunt dona +spiritus sancti, secundum quod caritate informantur; quae non agit +perperam, ut dicitur I ad Cor. XIII. Et ideo sapientia et +intellectu et aliis huiusmodi nullus male utitur, secundum quod +sunt dona spiritus sancti. Sed ad hoc quod a caritatis perfectione +non recedant, unum ab altero adiuvatur. Et hoc est quod Gregorius +dicere intendit.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q69" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q69-p0.1">Q. 69. OF THE BEATITUDES (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q69-p2"> We must now consider the beatitudes: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q69-p3"><a href="#FS_Q69_A1"> (1) Whether the beatitudes differ from the gifts and virtues?</a></p><p id="FS_Q69-p4"><a href="#FS_Q69_A2"> (2) Of the rewards of the beatitudes: whether they refer to this life?</a></p><p id="FS_Q69-p5"><a href="#FS_Q69_A3"> (3) Of the number of the beatitudes;</a></p><p id="FS_Q69-p6"><a href="#FS_Q69_A4"> (4) Of the fittingness of the rewards ascribed to the beatitudes.</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 pr."><a name="36409" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36409] +Iª-IIae q. 69 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +beatitudinibus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum +beatitudines a donis et virtutibus distinguantur. Secundo, de +praemiis beatitudinum, utrum pertineant ad hanc vitam. Tertio, de +numero beatitudinum. Quarto, de convenientia praemiorum quae eis +attribuuntur.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q69_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q69_A1-p0.1">Q. 69. A. 1. Whether the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts. For Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) assigns + the beatitudes recited by Matthew (v 3, seqq.) to the gifts of the Holy Ghost; and Ambrose in his commentary on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.20" target="asv"> Luke 6:20, </a> seqq., ascribes the beatitudes mentioned there, to the four cardinal virtues. Therefore the beatitudes do not differ from + the virtues and gifts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36410" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36410] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudines a virtutibus et donis non +distinguantur. Augustinus enim, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, +attribuit beatitudines in Matthaeo enumeratas, donis spiritus +sancti, Ambrosius autem, super Lucam, attribuit beatitudines ibi +enumeratas quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus. Ergo beatitudines non +distinguuntur a virtutibus et donis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there are but two rules of the human will: the reason and the eternal law, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q19_A3" id="FS_Q69_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[3]</a>; + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q21_A1" id="FS_Q69_A1-p3.2" shape="rect"> Q[21], A[1]</a>). Now the virtues perfect man in relation to reason; while the gifts perfect him in relation to the eternal law of the Holy + Ghost, as is clear from what has been said ( + <a href="#FS_Q68_A1" id="FS_Q69_A1-p3.3" shape="rect">Q[68], AA[1]</a>,3, seqq.). Therefore there cannot be anything else pertaining to the rectitude of + the human will, besides the virtues and gifts. Therefore the beatitudes do not differ from them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36411" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36411] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +humanae voluntatis non est nisi duplex regula, scilicet ratio, et +lex aeterna, ut supra habitum est. Sed virtutes perficiunt hominem +in ordine ad rationem; dona autem in ordine ad legem aeternam +spiritus sancti, ut ex dictis patet. Ergo non potest esse aliquid +aliud pertinens ad rectitudinem voluntatis humanae, praeter +virtutes et dona. Non ergo beatitudines ab eis distinguuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, among the beatitudes are included meekness, justice, and mercy, which are said to be virtues. Therefore the beatitudes + do not differ from the virtues and gifts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36412" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36412] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +in enumeratione beatitudinum ponitur mititas, et iustitia, et +misericordia; quae dicuntur esse quaedam virtutes. Ergo +beatitudines non distinguuntur a virtutibus et donis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Certain things are included among the beatitudes, that are neither virtues nor gifts, e.g. poverty, mourning, and peace. + Therefore the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36413" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36413] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod quaedam enumerantur inter beatitudines, quae nec sunt +virtutes nec dona; sicut paupertas, et luctus, et pax. Differunt +ergo beatitudines et a virtutibus et a donis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q2_A7" id="FS_Q69_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[2], A[7]</a>; + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q3_A1" id="FS_Q69_A1-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[3], A[1]</a>), happiness is the last end of human life. Now one is said to possess the end already, when one hopes to possess it; wherefore + the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9) that "children are said to be happy because they are full of hope"; and the Apostle says + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.24" target="asv">Rom. 8:24</a>): "We are saved by hope." Again, we hope to obtain an end, because we are suitably moved + towards that end, and approach thereto; and this implies some action. And a man is moved towards, and approaches the happy + end by works of virtue, and above all by the works of the gifts, if we speak of eternal happiness, for which our reason is + not sufficient, since we need to be moved by the Holy Ghost, and to be perfected with His gifts that we may obey and follow + him. Consequently the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts, not as habit, but as act from habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 1 co."><a name="36414" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36414] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, beatitudo est ultimus finis +humanae vitae. Dicitur autem aliquis iam finem habere, propter spem +finis obtinendi, unde et philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod +<i>pueri dicuntur beati propter spem</i>; et apostolus dicit, Rom. +VIII, <i>spe salvi facti sumus</i>. Spes autem de fine consequendo +insurgit ex hoc quod aliquis convenienter movetur ad finem, et +appropinquat ad ipsum, quod quidem fit per aliquam actionem. Ad +finem autem beatitudinis movetur aliquis et appropinquat per +operationes virtutum; et praecipue per operationes donorum, si +loquamur de beatitudine aeterna, ad quam ratio non sufficit, sed in +eam inducit spiritus sanctus, ad cuius obedientiam et sequelam per +dona perficimur. Et ideo beatitudines distinguuntur quidem a +virtutibus et donis, non sicut habitus ab eis distincti, sed sicut +actus distinguuntur ab habitibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine and Ambrose assign the beatitudes to the gifts and virtues, as acts are ascribed to habits. But the gifts are more + excellent than the cardinal virtues, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q68_A8" id="FS_Q69_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[68], A[8]</a>). Wherefore Ambrose, in explaining the beatitudes propounded to the throng, assigns them to the cardinal virtues, whereas + Augustine, who is explaining the beatitudes delivered to the disciples on the mountain, and so to those who were more + perfect, ascribes them to the gifts of the Holy Ghost. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36415" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36415] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Augustinus et Ambrosius attribuunt beatitudines +donis et virtutibus, sicut actus attribuuntur habitibus. Dona autem +sunt eminentiora virtutibus cardinalibus, ut supra dictum est. Et +ideo Ambrosius, exponens beatitudines turbis propositas, attribuit +eas virtutibus cardinalibus; Augustinus autem, exponens +beatitudines discipulis propositas in monte, tanquam +perfectioribus, attribuit eas donis spiritus sancti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument proves that no other habits, besides the virtues and gifts, rectify human conduct. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36416" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36416] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa probat quod non sunt alii habitus +rectificantes humanam vitam, praeter virtutes et dona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Meekness is to be taken as denoting the act of meekness: and the same applies to justice and mercy. And though these might + seem to be virtues, they are nevertheless ascribed to gifts, because the gifts perfect man in all matters wherein the virtues + perfect him, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q68_A2" id="FS_Q69_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[68], A[2]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36417" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36417] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod mititas accipitur pro actu mansuetudinis, et +similiter dicendum est de iustitia et de misericordia. Et quamvis +haec videantur esse virtutes, attribuuntur tamen donis, quia etiam +dona perficiunt hominem circa omnia circa quae perficiunt virtutes, +ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q69_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q69_A2-p0.1">Q. 69. A. 2. Whether the rewards assigned to the beatitudes refer to this life?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the rewards assigned to the beatitudes do not refer to this life. Because some are said to be happy because + they hope for a reward, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q69_A1" id="FS_Q69_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Now the object of hope is future happiness. Therefore these rewards refer to the life to come. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36418" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36418] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod praemia quae attribuuntur +beatitudinibus, non pertineant ad hanc vitam. Dicuntur enim aliqui +beati propter spem praemiorum, ut dictum est. Sed obiectum spei +beatitudo est futura. Ergo praemia ista pertinent ad vitam +futuram.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, certain punishments are set down in opposition to the beatitudes, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.25" target="asv"> Lk. 6:25, </a> where we read: "Woe to you that are filled; for you shall hunger. Woe to you that now laugh, for you shall mourn and weep." + Now these punishments do not refer to this life, because frequently men are not punished in this life, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Job.21.13" target="asv"> Job 21:13</a>: "They spend their days in wealth." Therefore neither do the rewards of the beatitudes + refer to this life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36419" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36419] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Luc. VI, ponuntur quaedam poenae per oppositum ad beatitudines, cum +dicitur, <i>vae vobis qui saturati estis, quia esurietis. Vae vobis +qui ridetis nunc, quia lugebitis et flebitis</i>. Sed istae poenae +non intelliguntur in hac vita, quia frequenter homines in hac vita +non puniuntur, secundum illud Iob XXI, <i>ducunt in bonis dies +suos</i>. Ergo nec praemia beatitudinum pertinent ad hanc +vitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the kingdom of heaven which is set down as the reward of poverty is the happiness of heaven, as Augustine says (De + Civ. Dei xix) [*Cf. De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 1]. Again, abundant fullness is not to be had save in the life to come, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.16.15" target="asv"> Ps. 16:15</a>: "I shall be filled [Douay: 'satisfied'] when Thy glory shall appear." Again, it is only in the future life that we shall + see God, and that our Divine sonship will be made + manifest, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:2</a>: "We are now the sons of God; and it hath not yet appeared what we shall be. We know that, when He shall appear, we shall + be like to Him, because we shall see Him as He is." Therefore these rewards refer to the future life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36420" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36420] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +regnum caelorum, quod ponitur praemium paupertatis, est beatitudo +caelestis; ut Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei. Plena etiam +saturitas non nisi in futura vita habetur; secundum illud Psalmi +XVI, <i>satiabor cum apparuerit gloria tua</i>. Visio etiam Dei, et +manifestatio filiationis divinae, ad vitam futuram pertinent; +secundum illud I Ioan. III, <i>nunc filii Dei sumus, et nondum +apparuit quid erimus. Scimus quoniam cum apparuerit, similes ei +erimus, quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est</i>. Ergo praemia illa +pertinent ad vitam futuram.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): "These promises can be fulfilled in this life, as we believe them to have been + fulfilled in the apostles. For no words can express that complete change into the likeness even of an angel, which is promised + to us after this life." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36421" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36421] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, <i>ista +quidem in hac vita compleri possunt, sicut completa esse in +apostolis credimus. Nam illa omnimoda, et in angelicam formam +mutatio, quae post hanc vitam promittitur, nullis verbis exponi +potest</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q69_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Expounders of Holy Writ are not agreed in speaking of these rewards. For some, with Ambrose (Super Luc. v), hold that all + these rewards refer to the life to come; while Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) holds them to refer to the present + life; and Chrysostom in his homilies (In Matth. xv) says that some refer to the future, and some to the present life. + </p><p id="FS_Q69_A2-p7"> In order to make the matter clear we must take note that hope of future happiness may be in us for two reasons. First, by + reason of our having a preparation for, or a disposition to future happiness; and this is by way of merit; secondly, by a + kind of imperfect inchoation of future happiness in holy men, even in this life. For it is one thing to hope that the tree + will bear fruit, when the leaves begin to appear, and another, when we see the first signs of the fruit. + </p><p id="FS_Q69_A2-p8"> Accordingly, those things which are set down as merits in the beatitudes, are a kind of preparation for, or disposition to + happiness, either perfect or inchoate: while those that are assigned as rewards, may be either perfect happiness, so as to + refer to the future life, or some beginning of happiness, such as is found in those who have attained perfection, in which + case they refer to the present life. Because when a man begins to make progress in the acts of the virtues and + gifts, it is to be hoped that he will arrive at perfection, both as a wayfarer, and as a citizen of the heavenly kingdom. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 2 co."><a name="36422" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36422] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod circa ista praemia expositores sacrae Scripturae +diversimode sunt locuti. Quidam enim omnia ista praemia ad futuram +beatitudinem pertinere dicunt, sicut Ambrosius, super Lucam. +Augustinus vero dicit ea ad praesentem vitam pertinere. +Chrysostomus autem, in suis homiliis, quaedam eorum dicit pertinere +ad futuram vitam, quaedam autem ad praesentem. Ad cuius evidentiam, +considerandum est quod spes futurae beatitudinis potest esse in +nobis propter duo, primo quidem, propter aliquam praeparationem vel +dispositionem ad futuram beatitudinem, quod est per modum meriti; +alio modo, per quandam inchoationem imperfectam futurae +beatitudinis in viris sanctis, etiam in hac vita. Aliter enim +habetur spes fructificationis arboris cum virescit frondibus, et +aliter cum iam primordia fructuum incipiunt apparere. Sic igitur ea +quae in beatitudinibus tanguntur tanquam merita, sunt quaedam +praeparationes vel dispositiones ad beatitudinem, vel perfectam vel +inchoatam. Ea vero quae ponuntur tanquam praemia, possunt esse vel +ipsa beatitudo perfecta, et sic pertinent ad futuram vitam, vel +aliqua inchoatio beatitudinis, sicut est in viris perfectis, et sic +praemia pertinent ad praesentem vitam. Cum enim aliquis incipit +proficere in actibus virtutum et donorum, potest sperari de eo quod +perveniet et ad perfectionem viae, et ad perfectionem patriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Hope regards future happiness as the last end: yet it may also regard the assistance of grace as that which leads to that + end, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.27.7" target="asv"> Ps. 27:7</a>: "In Him hath my heart hoped, and I have been helped." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36423" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36423] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod spes est de futura beatitudine sicut de ultimo +fine, potest etiam esse et de auxilio gratiae, sicut de eo quod +ducit ad finem, secundum illud Psalmi XXVII, <i>in Deo speravit cor +meum, et adiutus sum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although sometimes the wicked do not undergo temporal punishment in this life, yet they suffer spiritual punishment. Hence + Augustine says (Confess. i): "Thou hast decreed, and it is so, Lord---that the disordered mind should be its own punishment." + The Philosopher, too, says of the wicked (Ethic. ix, 4) that "their soul is divided against itself . . . one part pulls this + way, another that"; and afterwards he concludes, saying: "If wickedness makes a + man so miserable, he should strain every nerve to avoid vice." In like manner, although, on the other hand, the good sometimes + do not receive material rewards in this life, yet they never lack spiritual rewards, even in this life, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.29" target="asv"> Mat. 19:29, </a> and + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Mark.10.30" target="asv"> Mk. 10:30</a>: "Ye shall receive a hundred times as much" even "in this time." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36424" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36424] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod mali, etsi interdum in hac vita temporales poenas non +patiantur, patiuntur tamen spirituales. Unde Augustinus dicit, in I +Confess., <i>iussisti, domine, et sic est, ut poena sibi sit +inordinatus animus</i>. Et philosophus dicit, in IX Ethic., de +malis, quod <i>contendit ipsorum anima, et hoc quidem huc trahit, +illud autem illuc</i>; et postea concludit, <i>si autem sic miserum +est malum esse, fugiendum est malitiam intense</i>. Et similiter e +converso boni, etsi in hac vita quandoque non habeant corporalia +praemia, nunquam tamen deficiunt a spiritualibus, etiam in hac +vita; secundum illud Matth. XIX, et Marc. X, <i>centuplum +accipietis etiam in hoc saeculo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All these rewards will be fully consummated in the life to come: but meanwhile they are, in a manner, begun, even in this + life. Because the "kingdom of heaven," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv; *Cf. De Serm. Dom. in Monte, i, 1), can denote + the beginning of perfect wisdom, in so far as "the spirit" begins to reign in men. The "possession" of the land denotes the + well-ordered affections of the soul that rests, by its desire, on the solid foundation + of the eternal inheritance, signified by "the land." They are "comforted" in this life, by receiving the Holy Ghost, Who is + called the "Paraclete," i.e. the Comforter. They "have their fill," even in this life, of that food of which Our Lord said + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.34" target="asv">Jn. 4:34</a>): "My meat is to do the will of Him that sent Me." Again, in this life, men "obtain" God's "Mercy." Again, the eye being + cleansed by the gift of understanding, we can, so to speak, "see God." Likewise, in this life, those + who are the "peacemakers" of their own movements, approach to likeness to God, and are called "the children of God." Nevertheless + these things will be more perfectly fulfilled in heaven. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36425" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36425] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod omnia illa praemia perfecte quidem consummabuntur in +vita futura, sed interim etiam in hac vita quodammodo inchoantur. +Nam regnum caelorum, ut Augustinus dicit, potest intelligi +perfectae sapientiae initium, secundum quod incipit in eis spiritus +regnare. Possessio etiam terrae significat affectum bonum animae +requiescentis per desiderium in stabilitate haereditatis perpetuae, +per terram significatae. Consolantur autem in hac vita, spiritum +sanctum, qui Paracletus, idest consolator, dicitur, participando. +Saturantur etiam in hac vita illo cibo de quo dominus dicit, +<i>meus cibus est ut faciam voluntatem patris mei</i>. In hac etiam +vita consequuntur homines misericordiam Dei. In hac etiam vita, +purgato oculo per donum intellectus, Deus quodammodo videri potest. +Similiter etiam in hac vita qui motus suos pacificant, ad +similitudinem Dei accedentes, filii Dei nominantur. Tamen haec +perfectius erunt in patria.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q69_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q69_A3-p0.1">Q. 69. A. 3. Whether the beatitudes are suitably enumerated?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the beatitudes are unsuitably enumerated. For the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts, as stated above + (A[1], ad 1). Now some of the gifts, viz. wisdom and understanding, belong to the contemplative life: yet no beatitude is + assigned to the act of contemplation, for all are assigned to matters connected with the active life. Therefore the beatitudes + are insufficiently enumerated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36426" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36426] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter enumerentur +beatitudines. Attribuuntur enim beatitudines donis, ut dictum est. +Donorum autem quaedam pertinent ad vitam contemplativam, scilicet +sapientia et intellectus, nulla autem beatitudo ponitur in actu +contemplationis, sed omnes in his quae pertinent ad vitam activam. +Ergo insufficienter beatitudines enumerantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, not only do the executive gifts belong to the active life, but also some of the directive gifts, e.g. knowledge + and counsel: yet none of the beatitudes seems to be directly connected with the acts of knowledge or counsel. Therefore the + beatitudes are insufficiently indicated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36427" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36427] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ad vitam activam non solum pertinent dona exequentia; sed etiam +quaedam dona dirigentia, ut scientia et consilium. Nihil autem +ponitur inter beatitudines quod directe ad actum scientiae vel +consilii pertinere videatur. Ergo insufficienter beatitudines +tanguntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, among the executive gifts connected with the active life, fear is said to be connected with poverty, while piety + seems to correspond to the beatitude of mercy: yet nothing is included directly connected with justice. Therefore the beatitudes + are insufficiently enumerated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36428" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36428] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +inter dona exequentia in vita activa, timor ponitur ad paupertatem +pertinere; pietas autem videtur pertinere ad beatitudinem +misericordiae. Nihil autem ponitur directe ad fortitudinem +pertinens. Ergo insufficienter enumerantur beatitudines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, many other beatitudes are mentioned in Holy Writ. Thus, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.5.17" target="asv">Job 5:17</a>): "Blessed is the man whom God correcteth"; and (Ps. i, 1): "Blessed is the man who hath not walked in the counsel of the + ungodly"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.3.13" target="asv">Prov. 3:13</a>): "Blessed is the man that findeth wisdom." Therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently enumerated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="36429" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36429] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +in sacra Scriptura tanguntur multae aliae beatitudines, sicut Iob +V, dicitur, <i>beatus homo qui corripitur a domino</i>; et in +Psalmo I, <i>beatus vir qui non abiit in consilio impiorum</i>; et +Proverb. III, <i>beatus vir qui invenit sapientiam</i>. Ergo +insufficienter beatitudines enumerantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> On the other hand, it seems that too many are mentioned. For there are seven gifts of the Holy Ghost: whereas eight beatitudes + are indicated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><div class="latin"><p title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 s. c. 1"><a name="36430" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36430] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 s. c. 1</span></a> Sed +contra, videtur quod superflue enumerentur. Sunt enim septem dona +spiritus sancti. Beatitudines autem tanguntur octo.</p><p title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 s. c. 2"><a name="36431" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36431] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 s. c. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Luc. VI, ponuntur quatuor tantum beatitudines. Superflue ergo +enumerantur septem, vel octo, in Matthaeo.</p></div></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, only four beatitudes are indicated in the sixth chapter of Luke. Therefore the seven or eight mentioned in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5" target="asv">Matthew 5</a> are too many. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 co."><a name="36432" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36432] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod beatitudines istae convenientissime enumerantur. Ad +cuius evidentiam, est considerandum quod triplicem beatitudinem +aliqui posuerunt, quidam enim posuerunt beatitudinem in vita +voluptuosa; quidam in vita activa; quidam vero in vita +contemplativa. Hae autem tres beatitudines diversimode se habent ad +beatitudinem futuram, cuius spe dicimur hic beati. Nam beatitudo +voluptuosa, quia falsa est et rationi contraria, impedimentum est +beatitudinis futurae. Beatitudo vero activae vitae dispositiva est +ad beatitudinem futuram. Beatitudo autem contemplativa, si sit +perfecta, est essentialiter ipsa futura beatitudo, si autem sit +imperfecta, est quaedam inchoatio eius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q69_A3-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> These beatitudes are most suitably enumerated. To make this evident it must be observed that beatitude has been held to consist + in one of three things: for some have ascribed it to a sensual life, some, to an active life, and some, to a contemplative + life [*See Q[3]]. Now these three kinds of happiness stand in different relations to future beatitude, by hoping for which + we are said to be happy. Because sensual happiness, being false and contrary to reason, + is an obstacle to future beatitude; while happiness of the active life is a disposition of future beatitude; and contemplative + happiness, if perfect, is the very essence of future beatitude, and, if imperfect, is a beginning thereof. + </p><p id="FS_Q69_A3-p9"> And so Our Lord, in the first place, indicated certain beatitudes as removing the obstacle of sensual happiness. For a life + of pleasure consists of two things. First, in the affluence of external goods, whether riches or honors; from which man is + withdrawn---by a virtue so that he uses them in moderation---and by a gift, in a more excellent way, so that he despises them + altogether. Hence the first beatitude is: "Blessed are the poor in spirit," which may refer either to the + contempt of riches, or to the contempt of honors, which results from humility. Secondly, the sensual life consists in following + the bent of one's passions, whether irascible or concupiscible. From following the irascible passions man is withdrawn---by + a virtue, so that they are kept within the bounds appointed by the ruling of reason---and by a gift, in a more excellent manner, + so that man, according to God's will, is altogether undisturbed by them: hence the second beatitude is: "Blessed are + the meek." From following the concupiscible passions, man is withdrawn---by a virtue, so that man uses these passions in moderation---and + by gift, so that, if necessary, he casts them aside altogether; nay more, so that, if need be, he makes a deliberate choice + of sorrow [*Cf. + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q35_A3" id="FS_Q69_A3-p9.1" shape="rect"> Q[35], A[3]</a>]; hence the third beatitude is: "Blessed are they that mourn." + </p><p id="FS_Q69_A3-p10"> Active life consists chiefly in man's relations with his neighbor, either by way of duty or by way of spontaneous gratuity. + To the former we are disposed---by a virtue, so that we do not refuse to do our duty to our neighbor, which pertains to justice---and + by a gift, so that we do the same much more heartily, by accomplishing works of justice with an ardent desire, even as a hungry + and thirsty man eats and drinks with eager appetite. Hence the fourth beatitude is: "Blessed are + they that hunger and thirst after justice." With regard to spontaneous favors we are perfected---by a virtue, so that we give + where reason dictates we should give, e.g. to our friends or others united to us; which pertains to the virtue of liberality--and + by a gift, so that, through reverence for God, we consider only the needs of those on whom we bestow our gratuitous bounty: + hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.14.12" target="asv">Lk. 14:12,13</a>): "When thou makest a dinner or supper, call not thy friends, + nor thy brethren," etc . . . "but . . . call the poor, the maimed," etc.; which, properly, is to have mercy: hence the fifth + beatitude is: "Blessed are the merciful." + </p><p id="FS_Q69_A3-p11"> Those things which concern the contemplative life, are either final beatitude itself, or some beginning thereof: wherefore + they are included in the beatitudes, not as merits, but as rewards. Yet the effects of the active life, which dispose man + for the contemplative life, are included in the beatitudes. Now the effect of the active life, as regards those virtues and + gifts whereby man is perfected in himself, is the cleansing of man's heart, so that it is not defiled by the + passions: hence the sixth beatitude is: "Blessed are the clean of heart." But as regards the virtues and gifts whereby man + is perfected in relation to his neighbor, the effect of the active life is peace, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.32.17" target="asv"> Is. 32:17</a>: "The work of justice shall be peace": hence the seventh beatitude is "Blessed are the peacemakers." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Et ideo dominus primo +quidem posuit quasdam beatitudines quasi removentes impedimentum +voluptuosae beatitudinis. Consistit enim voluptuosa vita in duobus. +Primo quidem, in affluentia exteriorum bonorum, sive sint divitiae, +sive sint honores. A quibus quidem retrahitur homo per virtutem sic +ut moderate eis utatur, per donum autem excellentiori modo, ut +scilicet homo totaliter ea contemnat. Unde prima beatitudo ponitur, +beati pauperes spiritu, quod potest referri vel ad contemptum +divitiarum; vel ad contemptum honorum, quod fit per humilitatem. +Secundo vero voluptuosa vita consistit in sequendo proprias +passiones, sive irascibilis sive concupiscibilis. A sequela autem +passionum irascibilis, retrahit virtus ne homo in eis superfluat, +secundum regulam rationis, donum autem excellentiori modo, ut +scilicet homo, secundum voluntatem divinam, totaliter ab eis +tranquillus reddatur. Unde secunda beatitudo ponitur, beati mites. +A sequela vero passionum concupiscibilis, retrahit virtus, moderate +huiusmodi passionibus utendo, donum vero, eas, si necesse fuerit, +totaliter abiiciendo; quinimmo, si necessarium fuerit, voluntarium +luctum assumendo. Unde tertia beatitudo ponitur, beati qui lugent. +Activa vero vita in his consistit praecipue quae proximis +exhibemus, vel sub ratione debiti, vel sub ratione spontanei +beneficii. Et ad primum quidem nos virtus disponit, ut ea quae +debemus proximis, non recusemus exhibere, quod pertinet ad +iustitiam. Donum autem ad hoc ipsum abundantiori quodam affectu nos +inducit, ut scilicet ferventi desiderio opera iustitiae impleamus, +sicut ferventi desiderio esuriens et sitiens cupit cibum vel potum. +Unde quarta beatitudo ponitur, beati qui esuriunt et sitiunt +iustitiam. Circa spontanea vero dona nos perficit virtus ut illis +donemus quibus ratio dictat esse donandum, puta amicis aut aliis +nobis coniunctis, quod pertinet ad virtutem liberalitatis. Sed +donum, propter Dei reverentiam, solam necessitatem considerat in +his quibus gratuita beneficia praestat, unde dicitur Luc. XIV, +<i>cum facis prandium aut coenam, noli vocare amicos neque fratres +tuos etc., sed voca pauperes et debiles</i> etc., quod proprie est +misereri. Et ideo quinta beatitudo ponitur, beati misericordes. Ea +vero quae ad contemplativam vitam pertinent, vel sunt ipsa +beatitudo finalis, vel aliqua inchoatio eius, et ideo non ponuntur +in beatitudinibus tanquam merita, sed tanquam praemia. Ponuntur +autem tanquam merita effectus activae vitae, quibus homo disponitur +ad contemplativam vitam. Effectus autem activae vitae, quantum ad +virtutes et dona quibus homo perficitur in seipso, est munditia +cordis, ut scilicet mens hominis passionibus non inquinetur. Unde +sexta beatitudo ponitur, beati mundo corde. Quantum vero ad +virtutes et dona quibus homo perficitur in comparatione ad +proximum, effectus activae vitae est pax; secundum illud Isaiae +XXXII, <i>opus iustitiae pax</i>. Et ideo septima beatitudo +ponitur, beati pacifici.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The acts of the gifts which belong to the active life are indicated in the merits: but the acts of the gifts pertaining to + the contemplative life are indicated in the rewards, for the reason given above. Because to "see God" corresponds to the gift + of understanding; and to be like God by being adoptive "children of God," corresponds to the gift of wisdom. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36433" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36433] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod actus donorum pertinentium ad vitam activam, +exprimuntur in ipsis meritis, sed actus donorum pertinentium ad +vitam contemplativam, exprimuntur in praemiis, ratione iam dicta. +Videre enim Deum respondet dono intellectus; et conformari Deo +quadam filiatione adoptiva, pertinet ad donum sapientiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In things pertaining to the active life, knowledge is not sought for its own sake, but for the sake of operation, as even + the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 2). And therefore, since beatitude implies something ultimate, the beatitudes do not include + the acts of those gifts which direct man in the active life, such acts, to wit, as are elicited by those gifts, as, e.g. to + counsel is the act of counsel, and to judge, the act of knowledge: but, on the + other hand, they include those operative acts of which the gifts have the direction, as, e.g. mourning in respect of knowledge, + and mercy in respect of counsel. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36434" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36434] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod in his quae pertinent ad activam vitam, cognitio non +quaeritur propter seipsam, sed propter operationem, ut etiam +philosophus dicit, in II Ethic. Et ideo, quia beatitudo aliquid +ultimum importat, non computantur inter beatitudines actus donorum +dirigentium in vita activa, quos scilicet eliciunt, sicut +consiliari est actus consilii, et iudicare est actus scientiae, sed +magis attribuuntur eis actus operativi in quibus dirigunt, sicut +scientiae lugere, et consilio misereri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q69_A3-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In applying the beatitudes to the gifts we may consider two things. One is likeness of matter. In this way all the first + five beatitudes may be assigned to knowledge and counsel as to their directing principles: whereas they must be distributed + among the executive gifts: so that, to wit, hunger and thirst for justice, and mercy too, correspond to piety, which perfects + man in his relations to others; meekness to fortitude, for Ambrose says on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.22" target="asv"> + Lk. 6:22 + </a>: "It is the business of fortitude to conquer anger, and to curb indignation," fortitude being about the irascible passions: + poverty and mourning to the gift of fear, whereby man withdraws from the lusts and pleasures of the world. + </p><p id="FS_Q69_A3-p15"> Secondly, we may consider the motives of the beatitudes: and, in this way, some of them will have to be assigned differently. + Because the principal motive for meekness is reverence for God, which belongs to piety. The chief motive for mourning is knowledge, + whereby man knows his failings and those of worldly things, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.1.18" target="asv"> Eccles. 1:18</a>: "He that addeth knowledge, addeth also sorrow [Vulg: labor]." The principal motive for hungering after the works of + justice is fortitude of the soul: and the chief motive for being merciful is God's counsel, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p15.2" href="./asv.html#Dan.4.24" target="asv">Dan. 4:24</a>: "Let my counsel be acceptable to the king [Vulg: to thee, O king]: and redeem thou thy sins with alms, and thy iniquities + with works of mercy to the poor." It is thus that Augustine assigns them (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36435" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36435] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in attributione beatitudinum ad dona, possunt duo +considerari. Quorum unum est conformitas materiae. Et secundum hoc, +omnes primae quinque beatitudines possunt attribui scientiae et +consilio, tanquam dirigentibus. Sed inter dona exequentia +distribuuntur, ita scilicet quod esuries et sitis iustitiae, et +etiam misericordia, pertineant ad pietatem, quae perficit hominem +in his quae sunt ad alterum; mititas autem ad fortitudinem, dicit +enim Ambrosius, super Lucam, quod <i>fortitudinis est iram vincere, +indignationem cohibere</i>, est enim fortitudo circa passiones +irascibilis; paupertas vero et luctus ad donum timoris, quo homo se +retrahit a cupiditatibus et delectationibus mundi. Alio modo +possumus in his beatitudinibus considerare motiva ipsarum, et sic, +quantum ad aliqua eorum, oportet aliter attribuere. Praecipue enim +ad mansuetudinem movet reverentia ad Deum; quae pertinet ad +pietatem. Ad lugendum autem movet praecipue scientia, per quam homo +cognoscit defectus suos et rerum mundanarum; secundum illud Eccle. +I, <i>qui addit scientiam, addit et dolorem</i>. Ad esuriendum +autem iustitiae opera, praecipue movet animi fortitudo. Ad +miserendum vero praecipue movet consilium Dei; secundum illud Dan. +IV, <i>consilium meum regi placeat, peccata tua eleemosynis redime, +et iniquitates tuas misericordiis pauperum</i>. Et hunc modum +attributionis sequitur Augustinus, in libro de Serm. Dom. in +monte.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> All the beatitudes mentioned in Holy Writ must be reduced to these, either as to the merits or as to the rewards: because + they must all belong either to the active or to the contemplative life. Accordingly, when we read, "Blessed is the man whom + the Lord correcteth," we must refer this to the beatitude of mourning: when we read, "Blessed is the man that hath not walked + in the counsel of the ungodly," we must refer it to cleanness of heart: and when we + read, "Blessed is the man that findeth wisdom," this must be referred to the reward of the seventh beatitude. The same applies + to all others that can be adduced. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="36436" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36436] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod necesse est beatitudines omnes quae in sacra +Scriptura ponuntur, ad has reduci vel quantum ad merita, vel +quantum ad praemia, quia necesse est quod omnes pertineant aliquo +modo vel ad vitam activam, vel ad vitam contemplativam. Unde quod +dicitur, beatus vir qui corripitur a domino, pertinet ad +beatitudinem luctus. Quod vero dicitur, beatus vir qui non abiit in +consilio impiorum, pertinet ad munditiam cordis. Quod vero dicitur, +beatus vir qui invenit sapientiam, pertinet ad praemium septimae +beatitudinis. Et idem patet de omnibus aliis quae possunt +induci.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The eighth beatitude is a confirmation and declaration of all those that precede. Because from the very fact that a man is + confirmed in poverty of spirit, meekness, and the rest, it follows that no persecution will induce him to renounce them. Hence + the eighth beatitude corresponds, in a way, to all the preceding seven. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 ad 5"><a name="36437" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36437] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod octava beatitudo est quaedam confirmatio et +manifestatio omnium praecedentium. Ex hoc enim quod aliquis est +confirmatus in paupertate spiritus et mititate et aliis +sequentibus, provenit quod ab his bonis propter nullam +persecutionem recedit. Unde octava beatitudo quodammodo ad septem +praecedentes pertinet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Luke relates Our Lord's sermon as addressed to the multitude ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p18.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.17" target="asv">Lk. 6:17</a>). Hence he sets down the beatitudes according to the capacity of the multitude, who know no other happiness than pleasure, + temporal and earthly: wherefore by these four beatitudes Our Lord excludes four things which seem to belong to such happiness. + The first of these is abundance of external goods, which he sets aside by saying: "Blessed are ye poor." The + second is that man be well off as to his body, in food and drink, and so forth; this he excludes by saying in the second place: + "Blessed are ye that hunger." The third is that it should be well with man as to joyfulness of heart, and this he puts aside + by saying: "Blessed are ye that weep now." The fourth is the outward favor of man; and this he excludes, saying, fourthly: + "Blessed shall you be, when men shall hate you." And as Ambrose says on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p18.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.20" target="asv"> Lk. 6:20, </a> "poverty corresponds + to temperance, which is unmoved by delights; hunger, to justice, since who hungers is compassionate and, through compassion + gives; mourning, to prudence, which deplores perishable things; endurance of men's hatred belongs to fortitude." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 ad 6"><a name="36438" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36438] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum +dicendum quod Lucas narrat sermonem domini factum esse ad turbas. +Unde beatitudines numerantur ab eo secundum capacitatem turbarum, +quae solam voluptuosam et temporalem et terrenam beatitudinem +noverunt. Unde dominus per quatuor beatitudines quatuor excludit +quae ad praedictam beatitudinem pertinere videntur. Quorum primum +est abundantia bonorum exteriorum, quod excludit per hoc quod +dicit, beati pauperes. Secundum est quod sit bene homini quantum ad +corpus, in cibis et potibus et aliis huiusmodi, et hoc excludit per +secundum quod ponit, beati qui esuritis. Tertium est quod sit +homini bene quantum ad cordis iucunditatem, et hoc excludit tertio, +dicens, beati qui nunc fletis. Quartum est exterior hominum favor, +et hoc excludit quarto, dicens, beati eritis cum vos oderint +homines. Et sicut Ambrosius dicit, <i>paupertas pertinet ad +temperantiam, quae illecebrosa non quaerit; esuries ad iustitiam, +quia qui esurit, compatitur, et, compatiendo, largitur; fletus ad +prudentiam, cuius est flere occidua; pati odium hominum, ad +fortitudinem</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q69_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q69_A4-p0.1">Q. 69. A. 4. Whether the rewards of the beatitudes are suitably enumerated?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the rewards of the beatitudes are unsuitably enumerated. Because the kingdom of heaven, which is eternal + life, contains all good things. Therefore, once given the kingdom of heaven, no other rewards should be mentioned. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36439" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36439] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod praemia beatitudinum inconvenienter +enumerentur. In regno enim caelorum, quod est vita aeterna, bona +omnia continentur. Posito ergo regno caelorum, non oportuit alia +praemia ponere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the kingdom of heaven is assigned as the reward, both of the first and of the eighth beatitude. Therefore, on the + same ground it should have been assigned to all. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36440" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36440] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +regnum caelorum ponitur pro praemio et in prima beatitudine et in +octava. Ergo, eadem ratione, debuit poni in omnibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the beatitudes are arranged in the ascending order, as Augustine remarks (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): whereas + the rewards seem to be placed in the descending order, since to "possess the land" is less than to possess "the kingdom of + heaven." Therefore these rewards are unsuitably enumerated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36441" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36441] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +in beatitudinibus proceditur ascendendo, sicut Augustinus dicit. In +praemiis autem videtur procedi descendendo, nam possessio terrae +est minus quam regnum caelorum. Ergo inconvenienter huiusmodi +praemia assignantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Our Lord Who propounded these rewards. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36442" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36442] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est auctoritas ipsius domini, praemia huiusmodi proponentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q69_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> These rewards are most suitably assigned, considering the nature of the beatitudes in relation to the three kinds of happiness + indicated above + <a href="#FS_Q69_A3" id="FS_Q69_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. For the first three beatitudes concerned the withdrawal of man from those things in which sensual happiness consists: which + happiness man desires by seeking the object of his natural desire, not where he should seek it, viz. in God, but in temporal + and perishable things. Wherefore the + rewards of the first three beatitudes correspond to these things which some men seek to find in earthly happiness. For men + seek in external things, viz. riches and honors, a certain excellence and abundance, both of which are implied in the kingdom + of heaven, whereby man attains to excellence and abundance of good things in God. Hence Our Lord promised the kingdom of heaven + to the poor in spirit. Again, cruel and pitiless men seek by wrangling and fighting to destroy their enemies so as to gain + security for themselves. Hence Our Lord promised the meek a secure and peaceful possession of the land of the living, whereby + the solid reality of eternal goods is denoted. Again, men seek consolation for the toils of the present life, in the lusts + and pleasures of the world. Hence Our Lord promises comfort to those that mourn. + </p><p id="FS_Q69_A4-p7"> Two other beatitudes belong to the works of active happiness, which are the works of virtues directing man in his relations + to his neighbor: from which operations some men withdraw through inordinate love of their own good. Hence Our Lord assigns + to these beatitudes rewards in correspondence with the motives for which men recede from them. For there are some who recede + from acts of justice, and instead of rendering what is due, lay hands on what is not theirs, that they may + abound in temporal goods. Wherefore Our Lord promised those who hunger after justice, that they shall have their fill. Some, + again, recede from works of mercy, lest they be busied with other people's misery. Hence Our Lord promised the merciful that + they should obtain mercy, and be delivered from all misery. + </p><p id="FS_Q69_A4-p8"> The last two beatitudes belong to contemplative happiness or beatitude: hence the rewards are assigned in correspondence + with the dispositions included in the merit. For cleanness of the eye disposes one to see clearly: hence the clean of heart + are promised that they shall see God. Again, to make peace either in oneself or among others, shows a man to be a follower + of God, Who is the God of unity and peace. Hence, as a reward, he is promised the glory of the Divine sonship, + consisting in perfect union with God through consummate wisdom. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 4 co."><a name="36443" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36443] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod praemia ista convenientissime assignantur, +considerata conditione beatitudinum secundum tres beatitudines +supra assignatas. Tres enim primae beatitudines accipiuntur per +retractionem ab his in quibus voluptuosa beatitudo consistit, quam +homo desiderat quaerens id quod naturaliter desideratur, non ubi +quaerere debet, scilicet in Deo, sed in rebus temporalibus et +caducis. Et ideo praemia trium primarum beatitudinum accipiuntur +secundum ea quae in beatitudine terrena aliqui quaerunt. Quaerunt +enim homines in rebus exterioribus, scilicet divitiis et honoribus, +excellentiam quandam et abundantiam, quorum utrumque importat +regnum caelorum, per quod homo consequitur excellentiam et +abundantiam bonorum in Deo. Et ideo regnum caelorum dominus +pauperibus spiritu repromisit. Quaerunt autem homines feroces et +immites per litigia et bella securitatem sibi acquirere, inimicos +suos destruendo. Unde dominus repromisit mitibus securam et quietam +possessionem terrae viventium, per quam significatur soliditas +aeternorum bonorum. Quaerunt autem homines in concupiscentiis et +delectationibus mundi, habere consolationem contra praesentis vitae +labores. Et ideo dominus consolationem lugentibus repromittit. +Aliae vero duae beatitudines pertinent ad opera activae +beatitudinis, quae sunt opera virtutum ordinantium hominem ad +proximum, a quibus operibus aliqui retrahuntur propter inordinatum +amorem proprii boni. Et ideo dominus attribuit illa praemia his +beatitudinibus, propter quae homines ab eis discedunt. Discedunt +enim aliqui ab operibus iustitiae, non reddentes debitum, sed +potius aliena rapientes ut bonis temporalibus repleantur. Et ideo +dominus esurientibus iustitiam, saturitatem repromisit. Discedunt +etiam aliqui ab operibus misericordiae, ne se immisceant miseriis +alienis. Et ideo dominus misericordibus repromittit misericordiam, +per quam ab omni miseria liberentur. Aliae vero duae ultimae +beatitudines pertinent ad contemplativam felicitatem seu +beatitudinem, et ideo secundum convenientiam dispositionum quae +ponuntur in merito, praemia redduntur. Nam munditia oculi disponit +ad clare videndum, unde mundis corde divina visio repromittitur. +Constituere vero pacem vel in seipso vel inter alios, manifestat +hominem esse Dei imitatorem, qui est Deus unitatis et pacis. Et +ideo pro praemio redditur ei gloria divinae filiationis, quae est +in perfecta coniunctione ad Deum per sapientiam consummatam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv in Matth.), all these rewards are one in reality, viz. eternal happiness, which the human intellect + cannot grasp. Hence it was necessary to describe it by means of various boons known to us, while observing due proportion + to the merits to which those rewards are assigned. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36444" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36444] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, omnia praemia ista +unum sunt in re, scilicet beatitudo aeterna; quam intellectus +humanus non capit. Et ideo oportuit quod per diversa bona nobis +nota, describeretur, observata convenientia ad merita quibus +praemia attribuuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as the eighth beatitude is a confirmation of all the beatitudes, so it deserves all the rewards of the beatitudes. Hence + it returns to the first, that we may understand all the other rewards to be attributed to it in consequence. Or else, according + to Ambrose (Super Luc. v), the kingdom of heaven is promised to the poor in spirit, as regards the glory of the soul; but + to those who suffer persecution in their bodies, it is promised as regards the + glory of the body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36445" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36445] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut octava beatitudo est firmitas quaedam omnium +beatitudinum, ita debentur sibi omnium beatitudinum praemia. Et +ideo redit ad caput, ut intelligantur sibi consequenter omnia +praemia attribui. Vel, secundum Ambrosium, pauperibus spiritu +repromittitur regnum caelorum, quantum ad gloriam animae, sed +passis persecutionem in corpore, quantum ad gloriam corporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The rewards are also arranged in ascending order. For it is more to possess the land of the heavenly kingdom than simply + to have it: since we have many things without possessing them firmly and peacefully. Again, it is more to be comforted in + the kingdom than to have and possess it, for there are many things the possession of which is accompanied by sorrow. Again, + it is more to have one's fill than simply to be comforted, because fulness implies + abundance of comfort. And mercy surpasses satiety, for thereby man receives more than he merited or was able to desire. And + yet more is it to see God, even as he is a greater man who not only dines at court, but also sees the king's countenance. + Lastly, the highest place in the royal palace belongs to the king's son. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36446" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36446] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod etiam praemia secundum additionem se habent ad +invicem. Nam plus est possidere terram regni caelorum, quam +simpliciter habere, multa enim habemus quae non firmiter et +pacifice possidemus. Plus est etiam consolari in regno, quam habere +et possidere, multa enim cum dolore possidemus. Plus est etiam +saturari quam simpliciter consolari, nam saturitas abundantiam +consolationis importat. Misericordia vero excedit saturitatem, ut +plus scilicet homo accipiat quam meruerit, vel desiderare potuerit. +Adhuc autem maius est Deum videre, sicut maior est qui in curia +regis non solum prandet, sed etiam faciem regis videt. Summam autem +dignitatem in domo regia filius regis habet.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q70" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q70-p0.1">Q. 70. OF THE FRUITS OF THE HOLY GHOST (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q70-p2"> We must now consider the Fruits of the Holy Ghost: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q70-p3"><a href="#FS_Q70_A1"> (1) Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost are acts?</a></p><p id="FS_Q70-p4"><a href="#FS_Q70_A2"> (2) Whether they differ from the beatitudes?</a></p><p id="FS_Q70-p5"><a href="#FS_Q70_A3"> (3) Of their number?</a></p><p id="FS_Q70-p6"><a href="#FS_Q70_A4"> (4) Of their opposition to the works of the flesh.</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 pr."><a name="36447" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36447] +Iª-IIae q. 70 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +fructibus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum fructus +spiritus sancti sint actus. Secundo, utrum differant a +beatitudinibus. Tertio, de eorum numero. Quarto, de oppositione +eorum ad opera carnis.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q70_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q70_A1-p0.1">Q. 70. A. 1. Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost which the Apostle enumerates ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p0.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.5" target="asv">Gal. 5</a>) are acts? + </h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the fruits of the Holy Ghost, enumerated by the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.22" target="asv">Gal. 5:22,23</a>), are not acts. For that which bears fruit, should not itself be called a fruit, else we should go on indefinitely. But our + actions bear fruit: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.3.15" target="asv">Wis. 3:15</a>): "The fruit of good labor is glorious," and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p2.3" href="./asv.html#John.4.36" target="asv">Jn. 4:36</a>): "He that reapeth receiveth wages, and gathereth fruit unto life everlasting." + Therefore our actions are not to be called fruits. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36448" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36448] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod fructus spiritus sancti quos apostolus +nominat ad Galat. V, non sint actus. Id enim cuius est alius +fructus, non debet dici fructus, sic enim in infinitum iretur. Sed +actuum nostrorum est aliquis fructus, dicitur enim Sap. III, +<i>bonorum laborum gloriosus est fructus</i>; et Ioan. IV, <i>qui +metit, mercedem accipit, et fructum congregat in vitam +aeternam</i>. Ergo ipsi actus nostri non dicuntur fructus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10), "we enjoy [*'Fruimur', from which verb we have the Latin 'fructus' and the English + 'fruit'] the things we know, when the will rests by rejoicing in them." But our will should not rest in our actions for their + own sake. Therefore our actions should not be called fruits. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36449" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36449] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut Augustinus dicit, in X de Trin., <i>fruimur cognitis in +quibus voluntas propter ipsa delectata conquiescit</i>. Sed +voluntas nostra non debet conquiescere in actibus nostris propter +se. Ergo actus nostri fructus dici non debent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, the Apostle numbers certain virtues, viz. charity, meekness, faith, and chastity. + Now virtues are not actions but habits, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q55_A1" id="FS_Q70_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[1]</a>). Therefore the fruits are not actions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36450" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36450] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +inter fructus spiritus sancti enumerantur ab apostolo aliquae +virtutes scilicet caritas, mansuetudo, fides et castitas. Virtutes +autem non sunt actus, sed habitus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo +fructus non sunt actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.33" target="asv">Mat. 12:33</a>): "By the fruit the tree is known"; that is to say, man is known by his works, as holy men explain the passage. Therefore + human actions are called fruits. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36451" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36451] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Matth. XII, <i>ex fructu arbor cognoscitur</i>; +idest, ex operibus suis homo, ut ibi exponitur a sanctis. Ergo ipsi +actus humani dicuntur fructus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The word "fruit" has been transferred from the material to the spiritual world. Now fruit, among material things, is the + product of a plant when it comes to perfection, and has a certain sweetness. This fruit has a twofold relation: to the tree + that produces it, and to the man who gathers the fruit from the tree. Accordingly, in spiritual matters, we may take the word + "fruit" in two ways: first, so that the fruit of man, who is likened to the tree, is that + which he produces; secondly, so that man's fruit is what he gathers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 1 co."><a name="36452" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36452] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod nomen fructus a corporalibus ad spiritualia est +translatum. Dicitur autem in corporalibus fructus, quod ex planta +producitur cum ad perfectionem pervenerit, et quandam in se +suavitatem habet. Qui quidem fructus ad duo comparari potest, +scilicet ad arborem producentem ipsum; et ad hominem qui fructum ex +arbore adipiscitur. Secundum hoc igitur, nomen fructus in rebus +spiritualibus dupliciter accipere possumus, uno modo, ut dicatur +fructus hominis, quasi arboris, id quod ab eo producitur; alio +modo, ut dicatur fructus hominis id quod homo adipiscitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p7"> Yet not all that man gathers is fruit, but only that which is last and gives pleasure. For a man has both a field and a tree, + and yet these are not called fruits; but that only which is last, to wit, that which man intends to derive from the field + and from the tree. In this sense man's fruit is his last end which is intended for his enjoyment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin"> Non +autem omne id quod adipiscitur homo, habet rationem fructus, sed id +quod est ultimum, delectationem habens. Habet enim homo et agrum et +arborem, quae fructus non dicuntur; sed solum id quod est ultimum, +quod scilicet ex agro et arbore homo intendit habere. Et secundum +hoc, fructus hominis dicitur ultimus hominis finis, quo debet frui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p8"> If, however, by man's fruit we understand a product of man, then human actions are called fruits: because operation is the + second act of the operator, and gives pleasure if it is suitable to him. If then man's operation proceeds from man in virtue + of his reason, it is said to be the fruit of his reason: but if it proceeds from him in respect of a higher power, which is + the power of the Holy Ghost, then man's operation is said to be the fruit of the Holy Ghost, as of a Divine + seed, for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.9" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:9</a>): "Whosoever is born of God, committeth no sin, for His seed abideth in him." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin"> +Si autem dicatur fructus hominis id quod ex homine producitur, sic +ipsi actus humani fructus dicuntur, operatio enim est actus +secundus operantis, et delectationem habet, si sit conveniens +operanti. Si igitur operatio hominis procedat ab homine secundum +facultatem suae rationis, sic dicitur esse fructus rationis. Si +vero procedat ab homine secundum altiorem virtutem, quae est virtus +spiritus sancti; sic dicitur esse operatio hominis fructus spiritus +sancti, quasi cuiusdam divini seminis, dicitur enim I Ioan. III, +<i>omnis qui natus est ex Deo, peccatum non facit, quoniam semen +ipsius in eo manet</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since fruit is something last and final, nothing hinders one fruit bearing another fruit, even as one end is subordinate + to another. And so our works, in so far as they are produced by the Holy Ghost working in us, are fruits: but, in so far as + they are referred to the end which is eternal life, they should rather be called flowers: hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.24.23" target="asv">Ecclus. 24:23</a>): "My flowers are the fruits of honor and riches." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36453" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36453] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, cum fructus habeat quodammodo rationem ultimi +et finis, nihil prohibet alicuius fructus esse alium fructum, sicut +finis ad finem ordinatur. Opera igitur nostra inquantum sunt +effectus quidam spiritus sancti in nobis operantis, habent rationem +fructus, sed inquantum ordinantur ad finem vitae aeternae, sic +magis habent rationem florum. Unde dicitur Eccli. XXIV, <i>flores +mei fructus honoris et honestatis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When the will is said to delight in a thing for its own sake, this may be understood in two ways. First, so that the expression + "for the sake of" be taken to designate the final cause; and in this way, man delights in nothing for its own sake, except + the last end. Secondly, so that it expresses the formal cause; and in this way, a man may delight in anything that is delightful + by reason of its form. Thus it is clear that a sick man delights in health, + for its own sake, as in an end; in a nice medicine, not as in an end, but as in something tasty; and in a nasty medicine, + nowise for its own sake, but only for the sake of something else. Accordingly we must say that man must delight in God for + His own sake, as being his last end, and in virtuous deeds, not as being his end, but for the sake of their inherent goodness + which is delightful to the virtuous. Hence Ambrose says (De Parad. xiii) that virtuous deeds are called fruits because "they + refresh those that have them, with a holy and genuine delight." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36454" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36454] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, cum dicitur voluntas in aliquo propter se delectari, +potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod ly propter +dicit causam finalem, et sic propter se non delectatur aliquis nisi +in ultimo fine. Alio modo, secundum quod designat causam formalem, +et sic propter se aliquis potest delectari in omni eo quod +delectabile est secundum suam formam. Sicut patet quod infirmus +delectatur in sanitate propter se, sicut in fine; in medicina autem +suavi, non sicut in fine, sed sicut in habente saporem +delectabilem; in medicina autem austera, nullo modo propter se, sed +solum propter aliud. Sic igitur dicendum est quod in Deo delectari +debet homo propter se, sicut propter ultimum finem, in actibus +autem virtuosis, non sicut propter finem, sed propter honestatem +quam continent, delectabilem virtuosis. Unde Ambrosius dicit quod +opera virtutum dicuntur fructus, <i>quia suos possessores sancta et +sincera delectatione reficiunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sometimes the names of the virtues are applied to their actions: thus Augustine writes (Tract. xl in Joan.): "Faith is to + believe what thou seest not"; and (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 10): "Charity is the movement of the soul in loving God and our + neighbor." It is thus that the names of the virtues are used in reckoning the fruits. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36455" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36455] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod nomina virtutum sumuntur quandoque pro actibus earum, +sicut Augustinus dicit quod <i>fides est credere quod non vides; et +caritas est motus animi ad diligendum Deum et proximum</i>. Et hoc +modo sumuntur nomina virtutum in enumeratione fructuum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q70_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q70_A2-p0.1">Q. 70. A. 2. Whether the fruits differ from the beatitudes?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the fruits do not differ from the beatitudes. For the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts, as stated + above ( + <a href="#FS_Q69_A1" id="FS_Q70_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[69], A[1]</a>, ad 1). But the gifts perfect man in so far as he is moved by the Holy Ghost. Therefore the beatitudes themselves are fruits + of the Holy Ghost. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36456" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36456] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod fructus a beatitudinibus non +differant. Beatitudines enim attribuuntur donis, ut supra dictum +est. Sed dona perficiunt hominem secundum quod movetur a spiritu +sancto. Ergo beatitudines ipsae sunt fructus spiritus sancti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the fruit of eternal life is to future beatitude which is that of actual possession, so are the fruits of the + present life to the beatitudes of the present life, which are based on hope. Now the fruit of eternal life is identified with + future beatitude. Therefore the fruits of the present life are the beatitudes. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36457" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36457] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut se habet fructus vitae aeternae ad beatitudinem futuram, quae +est rei; ita se habent fructus praesentis vitae ad beatitudines +praesentis vitae, quae sunt spei. Sed fructus vitae aeternae est +ipsa beatitudo futura. Ergo fructus vitae praesentis sunt ipsae +beatitudines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fruit is essentially something ultimate and delightful. Now this is the very nature of beatitude, as stated above + ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q3_A1" id="FS_Q70_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[1]</a>; + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q4_A1" id="FS_Q70_A2-p4.2" shape="rect"> Q[4], A[1]</a>). Therefore fruit and beatitude have the same nature, and consequently should not be distinguished from one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36458" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36458] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +de ratione fructus est quod sit quiddam ultimum et delectabile. Sed +hoc pertinet ad rationem beatitudinis, ut supra dictum est. Ergo +eadem ratio est fructus et beatitudinis. Ergo non debent ab invicem +distingui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Things divided into different species, differ from one another. But fruits and beatitudes are divided into different parts, + as is clear from the way in which they are enumerated. Therefore the fruits differ from the beatitudes. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36459" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36459] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +quorum species sunt diversae, ipsa quoque sunt diversa. Sed in +diversas partes dividuntur et fructus et beatitudines; ut patet per +numerationem utrorumque. Ergo fructus differunt a +beatitudinibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> More is required for a beatitude than for a fruit. Because it is sufficient for a fruit to be something ultimate and delightful; + whereas for a beatitude, it must be something perfect and excellent. Hence all the beatitudes may be called fruits, but not + vice versa. For the fruits are any virtuous deeds in which one delights: whereas the beatitudes are none but perfect works, + and which, by reason of their perfection, are assigned to the gifts rather than to + the virtues, as already stated ( + <a href="#FS_Q69_A1" id="FS_Q70_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[69], A[1]</a>, ad 1). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 2 co."><a name="36460" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36460] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod plus requiritur ad rationem beatitudinis, quam ad +rationem fructus. Nam ad rationem fructus sufficit quod sit aliquid +habens rationem ultimi et delectabilis, sed ad rationem +beatitudinis, ulterius requiritur quod sit aliquid perfectum et +excellens. Unde omnes beatitudines possunt dici fructus, sed non +convertitur. Sunt enim fructus quaecumque virtuosa opera, in quibus +homo delectatur. Sed beatitudines dicuntur solum perfecta opera, +quae etiam, ratione suae perfectionis, magis attribuuntur donis +quam virtutibus, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument proves the beatitudes to be fruits, but not that all the fruits are beatitudes. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36461" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36461] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ratio illa probat quod beatitudines sint +fructus, non autem quod omnes fructus beatitudines sint.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fruit of eternal life is ultimate and perfect simply: hence it nowise differs from future beatitude. On the other hand + the fruits of the present life are not simply ultimate and perfect; wherefore not all the fruits are beatitudes. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36462" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36462] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod fructus vitae aeternae est simpliciter ultimus et +perfectus, et ideo in nullo distinguitur a beatitudine futura. +Fructus autem praesentis vitae non sunt simpliciter ultimi et +perfecti, et ideo non omnes fructus sunt beatitudines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> More is required for a beatitude than for a fruit, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36463" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36463] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod aliquid amplius est de ratione beatitudinis quam de +ratione fructus, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q70_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q70_A3-p0.1">Q. 70. A. 3. Whether the fruits are suitably enumerated by the Apostle?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the fruits are unsuitably enumerated by the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.22" target="asv">Gal. 5:22,23</a>). Because, elsewhere, he says that there is only one fruit of the present life; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.6.22" target="asv"> Rom. 6:22</a>: "You have your fruit unto sanctification." Moreover it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Isa.27.9" target="asv">Is. 27:9</a>): "This is all the fruit . . . that the sin . . . be taken away." Therefore we should not reckon twelve fruits. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36464" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36464] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod apostolus inconvenienter enumeret, ad +Galat. V, duodecim fructus. Alibi enim dicit esse tantum unum +fructum praesentis vitae; secundum illud Rom. VI, habetis fructum +vestrum in sanctificatione et Isaiae XXVII dicitur, <i>hic est +omnis fructus, ut auferatur peccatum</i>. Non ergo ponendi sunt +duodecim fructus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fruit is the product of spiritual seed, as stated (A[1] ). But Our Lord mentions ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.13.23" target="asv">Mat. 13:23</a>) a threefold fruit as growing from a spiritual seed in a good ground, viz. "hundredfold, sixtyfold," and "thirtyfold." Therefore + one should not reckon twelve fruits. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36465" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36465] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +fructus est qui ex spirituali semine exoritur, ut dictum est. Sed +dominus, Matth. XIII, ponit triplicem terrae bonae fructum ex +spirituali semine provenientem, scilicet centesimum, et +sexagesimum, et trigesimum. Ergo non sunt ponendi duodecim +fructus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the very nature of fruit is to be something ultimate and delightful. But this does not apply to all the fruits mentioned + by the Apostle: for patience and long-suffering seem to imply a painful object, while faith is not something ultimate, but + rather something primary and fundamental. Therefore too many fruits are enumerated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36466" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36466] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +fructus habet in sui ratione quod sit ultimum et delectabile. Sed +ratio ista non invenitur in omnibus fructibus ab apostolo +enumeratis, patientia enim et longanimitas videntur in rebus +contristantibus esse; fides autem non habet rationem ultimi, sed +magis rationem primi fundamenti. Superflue igitur huiusmodi fructus +enumerantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> On the other hand, It seems that they are enumerated insufficiently and incompletely. For it has been stated + <a href="#FS_Q70_A2" id="FS_Q70_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a> that all the beatitudes may be called fruits; yet not all are mentioned here. Nor is there anything corresponding to the + acts of wisdom, and of many other virtues. Therefore it seems that the fruits are insufficiently enumerated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36467" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36467] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +videtur quod insufficienter et diminute enumerentur. Dictum est +enim quod omnes beatitudines fructus dici possunt, sed non omnes +hic enumerantur. Nihil etiam hic ponitur ad actum sapientiae +pertinens, et multarum aliarum virtutum. Ergo videtur quod +insufficienter enumerentur fructus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q70_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The number of the twelve fruits enumerated by the Apostle is suitable, and that there may be a reference to them in the twelve + fruits of which it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.22.2" target="asv">Apoc. 22:2</a>): "On both sides of the river was the tree bearing twelve fruits." Since, however, a fruit is something that proceeds from + a source as from a seed or root, the difference between these fruits must be gathered from the various ways in which the Holy + Ghost proceeds in us: + which process consists in this, that the mind of man is set in order, first of all, in regard to itself; secondly, in regard + to things that are near it; thirdly, in regard to things that are below it. + </p><p id="FS_Q70_A3-p7"> Accordingly man's mind is well disposed in regard to itself when it has a good disposition towards good things and towards + evil things. Now the first disposition of the human mind towards the good is effected by love, which is the first of our emotions + and the root of them all, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q27_A4" id="FS_Q70_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[27], A[4]</a>). Wherefore among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, we reckon "charity," wherein the Holy Ghost is given in a special manner, + as in His own likeness, + since He Himself is love. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv">Rom. 5:5</a>): "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us." The necessary result of the love + of charity is joy: because every lover rejoices at being united to the beloved. Now charity has always actual presence in + God Whom it loves, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p7.3" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:16</a>: "He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in Him": wherefore the sequel of charity is "joy." Now the perfection + of joy + is peace in two respects. First, as regards freedom from outward disturbance; for it is impossible to rejoice perfectly in + the beloved good, if one is disturbed in the enjoyment thereof; and again, if a man's heart is perfectly set at peace in one + object, he cannot be disquieted by any other, since he accounts all others as nothing; hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p7.4" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.165" target="asv">Ps. 118:165</a>): "Much peace have they that love Thy Law, and to them there is no stumbling-block," because, to wit, external + things do not disturb them in their enjoyment of God. Secondly, as regards the calm of the restless desire: for he does not + perfectly rejoice, who is not satisfied with the object of his joy. Now peace implies these two things, namely, that we be + not disturbed by external things, and that our desires rest altogether in one object. Wherefore after charity and joy, "peace" + is given the third place. In evil things the mind has a good disposition, in respect of two things. First, by not being + disturbed whenever evil threatens: which pertains to "patience"; secondly, by not being disturbed, whenever good things are + delayed; which belongs to "long suffering," since "to lack good is a kind of evil" (Ethic. v, 3). + </p><p id="FS_Q70_A3-p8"> Man's mind is well disposed as regards what is near him, viz. his neighbor, first, as to the will to do good; and to this + belongs "goodness." Secondly, as to the execution of well-doing; and to this belongs "benignity," for the benign are those + in whom the salutary flame [bonus ignis] of love has enkindled the desire to be kind to their neighbor. Thirdly, as to his + suffering with equanimity the evils his neighbor inflicts on him. To this belongs "meekness," which curbs anger. + Fourthly, in the point of our refraining from doing harm to our neighbor not only through anger, but also through fraud or + deceit. To this pertains "faith," if we take it as denoting fidelity. But if we take it for the faith whereby we believe in + God, then man is directed thereby to that which is above him, so that he subject his intellect and, consequently, all that + is his, to God. + </p><p id="FS_Q70_A3-p9"> Man is well disposed in respect of that which is below him, as regards external action, by "modesty," whereby we observe + the "mode" in all our words and deeds: as regards internal desires, by "contingency" and "chastity": whether these two differ + because chastity withdraws man from unlawful desires, contingency also from lawful desires: or because the continent man is + subject to concupiscence, but is not led away; whereas the chaste man is neither subject to, nor led away from + them. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 3 co."><a name="36468" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36468] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod numerus duodecim fructuum ab apostolo enumeratorum, +conveniens est, et possunt significari per duodecim fructus de +quibus dicitur Apoc. ult., <i>ex utraque parte fluminis lignum +vitae, afferens fructus duodecim</i>. Quia vero fructus dicitur +quod ex aliquo principio procedit sicut ex semine vel radice, +attendenda est distinctio horum fructuum secundum diversum +processum spiritus sancti in nobis. Qui quidem processus attenditur +secundum hoc, ut primo mens hominis in seipsa ordinetur; secundo +vero, ordinetur ad ea quae sunt iuxta; tertio vero, ad ea quae sunt +infra. Tunc autem bene mens hominis disponitur in seipsa, quando +mens hominis bene se habet et in bonis et in malis. Prima autem +dispositio mentis humanae ad bonum, est per amorem, qui est prima +affectio et omnium affectionum radix, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo +inter fructus spiritus primo ponitur caritas; in qua specialiter +spiritus sanctus datur, sicut in propria similitudine, cum et ipse +sit amor. Unde dicitur Rom. V, <i>caritas Dei diffusa est in +cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis</i>. Ad +amorem autem caritatis ex necessitate sequitur gaudium. Omnis enim +amans gaudet ex coniunctione amati. Caritas autem semper habet +praesentem Deum, quem amat; secundum illud I Ioan. IV, <i>qui manet +in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo</i>. Unde sequela +caritatis est gaudium. Perfectio autem gaudii est pax, quantum ad +duo. Primo quidem, quantum ad quietem ab exterioribus +conturbantibus, non enim potest perfecte gaudere de bono amato, qui +in eius fruitione ab aliis perturbatur; et iterum, qui perfecte cor +habet in uno pacatum, a nullo alio molestari potest, cum alia quasi +nihil reputet; unde dicitur in Psalmo CXVIII, <i>pax multa +diligentibus legem tuam, et non est illis scandalum</i>, quia +scilicet ab exterioribus non perturbantur, quin Deo fruantur. +Secundo, quantum ad sedationem desiderii fluctuantis, non enim +perfecte gaudet de aliquo, cui non sufficit id de quo gaudet. Haec +autem duo importat pax, scilicet ut neque ab exterioribus +perturbemur; et ut desideria nostra conquiescant in uno. Unde post +caritatem et gaudium, tertio ponitur pax. In malis autem bene se +habet mens quantum ad duo. Primo quidem, ut non perturbetur mens +per imminentiam malorum, quod pertinet ad patientiam. Secundo, ut +non perturbetur in dilatione bonorum, quod pertinet ad +longanimitatem, nam carere bono habet rationem mali, ut dicitur in +V Ethic. Ad id autem quod est iuxta hominem, scilicet proximum, +bene disponitur mens hominis, primo quidem, quantum ad voluntatem +bene faciendi. Et ad hoc pertinet bonitas. Secundo, quantum ad +beneficentiae executionem. Et ad hoc pertinet benignitas, dicuntur +enim benigni quos bonus ignis amoris fervere facit ad benefaciendum +proximis. Tertio, quantum ad hoc quod aequanimiter tolerentur mala +ab eis illata. Et ad hoc pertinet mansuetudo, quae cohibet iras. +Quarto, quantum ad hoc quod non solum per iram proximis non +noceamus, sed etiam neque per fraudem vel per dolum. Et ad hoc +pertinet fides, si pro fidelitate sumatur. Sed si sumatur pro fide +qua creditur in Deum, sic per hanc ordinatur homo ad id quod est +supra se, ut scilicet homo intellectum suum Deo subiiciat, et per +consequens omnia quae ipsius sunt. Sed ad id quod infra est, bene +disponitur homo, primo quidem, quantum ad exteriores actiones, per +modestiam, quae in omnibus dictis et factis modum observat. Quantum +ad interiores concupiscentias, per continentiam et castitatem, sive +haec duo distinguantur per hoc, quod castitas refrenat hominem ad +illicitis, continentia vero etiam a licitis; sive per hoc quod +continens patitur concupiscentias sed non deducitur, castus autem +neque patitur neque deducitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sanctification is effected by all the virtues, by which also sins are taken away. Consequently fruit is mentioned there in + the singular, on account of its being generically one, though divided into many species which are spoken of as so many fruits. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36469" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36469] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod sanctificatio fit per omnes virtutes per quas +etiam peccata tolluntur. Unde fructus ibi singulariter nominatur +propter unitatem generis, quod in multas species dividitur, +secundum quas dicuntur multi fructus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The hundredfold, sixtyfold, and thirtyfold fruits do not differ as various species of virtuous acts, but as various degrees + of perfection, even in the same virtue. Thus contingency of the married state is said to be signified by the thirtyfold fruit; + the contingency of widowhood, by the sixtyfold; and virginal contingency, by the hundredfold fruit. There are, moreover, other + ways in which holy men distinguish three evangelical fruits according to the + three degrees of virtue: and they speak of three degrees, because the perfection of anything is considered with respect to + its beginning, its middle, and its end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36470" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36470] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod fructus centesimus, sexagesimus et trigesimus non +diversificantur secundum diversas species virtuosorum actuum, sed +secundum diversos perfectionis gradus etiam unius virtutis. Sicut +continentia coniugalis dicitur significari per fructum trigesimum; +continentia vidualis per sexagesimum; virginalis autem per +centesimum. Et aliis etiam modis sancti distinguunt tres +evangelicos fructus secundum tres gradus virtutis. Et ponuntur tres +gradus, quia cuiuslibet rei perfectio attenditur secundum +principium, medium et finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The fact of not being disturbed by painful things is something to delight in. And as to faith, if we consider it as the foundation, + it has the aspect of being ultimate and delightful, in as much as it contains certainty: hence a gloss expounds thus: "Faith, + which is certainly about the unseen." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36471" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36471] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ipsum quod est in tristitiis non perturbari, rationem +delectabilis habet. Et fides etiam si accipiatur prout est +fundamentum, habet quandam rationem ultimi et delectabilis, +secundum quod continet certitudinem, unde Glossa exponit, <i>fides, +idest de invisibilibus certitudo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As Augustine says on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.22" target="asv"> Gal. 5:22,23, </a> "the Apostle had no intention of teaching us how many [either works of the flesh, or fruits of the Spirit] there are; but + to show how the former should be avoided, and the latter sought after." Hence either more or fewer fruits might have been + mentioned. Nevertheless, all the acts of the gifts and virtues can be reduced to these by a certain kind of fittingness, in + so far as all the virtues and + gifts must needs direct the mind in one of the above-mentioned ways. Wherefore the acts of wisdom and of any gifts directing + to good, are reduced to charity, joy and peace. The reason why he mentions these rather than others, is that these imply either + enjoyment of good things, or relief from evils, which things seem to belong to the notion of fruit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="36472" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36472] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, super epistolam ad Galat., +<i>apostolus non hoc ita suscepit, ut doceret quod sunt</i> (vel +opera carnis, vel fructus spiritus); sed <i>ut ostenderet in quo +genere illa vitanda, illa vero sectanda sint</i>. Unde potuissent +vel plures, vel etiam pauciores fructus enumerari. Et tamen omnes +donorum et virtutum actus possunt secundum quandam convenientiam ad +haec reduci, secundum quod omnes virtutes et dona necesse est quod +ordinent mentem aliquo praedictorum modorum. Unde et actus +sapientiae, et quorumcumque donorum ordinantium ad bonum, +reducuntur ad caritatem, gaudium et pacem. Ideo tamen potius haec +quam alia enumeravit, quia hic enumerata magis important vel +fruitionem bonorum, vel sedationem malorum; quod videtur ad +rationem fructus pertinere.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q70_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q70_A4-p0.1">Q. 70. A. 4. Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost are contrary to the works of the flesh?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the fruits of the Holy Ghost are not contrary to the works of the flesh, which the Apostle enumerates + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.19" target="asv">Gal. 5:19, </a> seqq.). Because contraries are in the same genus. But the works of the flesh are not called fruits. Therefore the fruits + of the Spirit are not contrary to them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36473" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36473] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod fructus non contrarientur operibus +carnis quae apostolus enumerat. Contraria enim sunt in eodem +genere. Sed opera carnis non dicuntur fructus. Ergo fructus +spiritus eis non contrariantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one thing has a contrary. Now the Apostle mentions more works of the flesh than fruits of the Spirit. Therefore + the fruits of the Spirit and the works of the flesh are not contrary to one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36474" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36474] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +unum uni est contrarium. Sed plura enumerat apostolus opera carnis +quam fructus spiritus. Ergo fructus spiritus et opera carnis non +contrariantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, among the fruits of the Spirit, the first place is given to charity, joy, and peace: to which, fornication, uncleanness, + and immodesty, which are the first of the works of the flesh are not opposed. Therefore the fruits of the Spirit are not contrary + to the works of the flesh. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36475" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36475] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +inter fructus spiritus primo ponuntur caritas, gaudium, pax, quibus +non correspondent ea quae primo enumerantur inter opera carnis, +quae sunt fornicatio, immunditia, impudicitia. Ergo fructus +spiritus non contrariantur operibus carnis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.17" target="asv">Gal. 5:17</a>) that "the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36476" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36476] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit ibidem, quod <i>caro concupiscit adversus +spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q70_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The works of the flesh and the fruits of the Spirit may be taken in two ways. First, in general: and in this way the fruits + of the Holy Ghost considered in general are contrary to the works of the flesh. Because the Holy Ghost moves the human mind + to that which is in accord with reason, or rather to that which surpasses reason: whereas the fleshly, viz. the sensitive, + appetite draws man to sensible goods which are beneath him. Wherefore, since upward and + downward are contrary movements in the physical order, so in human actions the works of the flesh are contrary to the fruits + of the Spirit. + </p><p id="FS_Q70_A4-p7"> Secondly, both fruits and fleshly works as enumerated may be considered singly, each according to its specific nature. And + in this they are not of necessity contrary each to each: because, as stated above (A[3], ad 4), the Apostle did not intend + to enumerate all the works, whether spiritual or carnal. However, by a kind of adaptation, Augustine, commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.22" target="asv"> Gal. 5:22,23, </a> contrasts the fruits with the carnal works, each to each. Thus "to fornication, which + is the love of satisfying lust outside lawful wedlock, we may contrast charity, whereby the soul is wedded to God: wherein + also is true chastity. By uncleanness we must understand whatever disturbances arise from fornication: and to these the joy + of tranquillity is opposed. Idolatry, by reason of which war was waged against the Gospel of God, is opposed to peace. Against + witchcrafts, enmities, contentions, emulations, wraths and quarrels, there is longsuffering, which helps us to bear the evils + inflicted on us by those among whom we dwell; while kindness helps us to cure those evils; and goodness, to forgive them. + In contrast to heresy there is faith; to envy, mildness; to drunkenness and revellings, contingency." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 4 co."><a name="36477" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36477] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod opera carnis et fructus spiritus possunt accipi +dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum communem rationem. Et hoc modo in +communi fructus spiritus sancti contrariantur operibus carnis. +Spiritus enim sanctus movet humanam mentem ad id quod est secundum +rationem, vel potius ad id quod est supra rationem, appetitus autem +carnis, qui est appetitus sensitivus, trahit ad bona sensibilia, +quae sunt infra hominem. Unde sicut motus sursum et motus deorsum +contrariantur in naturalibus, ita in operibus humanis contrariantur +opera carnis fructibus spiritus. Alio modo possunt considerari +secundum proprias rationes singulorum fructuum enumeratorum, et +operum carnis. Et sic non oportet quod singula singulis +contraponantur, quia, sicut dictum est, apostolus non intendit +enumerare omnia opera spiritualia, nec omnia opera carnalia. Sed +tamen, secundum quandam adaptationem, Augustinus, super epistolam +ad Galat., contraponit singulis operibus carnis singulos fructus. +<i>Sicut fornicationi, quae est amor explendae libidinis a legitimo +connubio solutus, opponitur caritas, per quam anima coniungitur Deo +in qua etiam est vera castitas. Immunditiae autem sunt omnes +perturbationes de illa fornicatione conceptae, quibus gaudium +tranquillitatis opponitur. Idolorum autem servitus, propter quam +bellum est gestum adversus Evangelium Dei, opponitur paci. Contra +veneficia autem, et inimicitias et contentiones et aemulationes, +animositates et dissensiones, opponuntur longanimitas, ad +sustinendum mala hominum inter quos vivimus; et ad curandum, +benignitas; et ad ignoscendum, bonitas. Haeresibus autem opponitur +fides, invidiae, mansuetudo; ebrietatibus et comessationibus, +continentia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That which proceeds from a tree against the tree's nature, is not called its fruit, but rather its corruption. And since + works of virtue are connatural to reason, while works of vice are contrary to nature, therefore it is that works of virtue + are called fruits, but not so works of vice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36478" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36478] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod id quod procedit ab arbore contra naturam +arboris, non dicitur esse fructus eius, sed magis corruptio +quaedam. Et quia virtutum opera sunt connaturalia rationi, opera +vero vitiorum sunt contra rationem; ideo opera virtutum fructus +dicuntur, non autem opera vitiorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "Good happens in one way, evil in all manner of ways," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): so that to one virtue many vices + are contrary. Consequently we must not be surprised if the works of the flesh are more numerous than the fruits of the spirit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36479" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36479] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod <i>bonum contingit uno modo, malum vero +omnifariam</i>, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., unde et +uni virtuti plura vitia opponuntur. Et propter hoc, non est mirum +si plura ponuntur opera carnis quam fructus spiritus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A4-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36480" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36480] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +patet solutio ex dictis.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q71" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q71-p0.1">Q. 71. EVIL HABITS, i.e. VICES AND SINS (QQ[71]-89)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q71-p2">OF VICE AND SIN CONSIDERED IN THEMSELVES (SIX ARTICLES)</p><p id="FS_Q71-p3"> We have in the next place to consider vice and sin: about which six points have to be considered: (1) Vice and sin considered + in themselves; (2) their distinction; (3) their comparison with one another; (4) the subject of sin; (5) the cause of sin; + (6) the effect of sin. + </p><p id="FS_Q71-p4"> Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q71-p5"><a href="#FS_Q71_A1"> (1) Whether vice is contrary to virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q71-p6"><a href="#FS_Q71_A2"> (2) Whether vice is contrary to nature?</a></p><p id="FS_Q71-p7"><a href="#FS_Q71_A3"> (3) Which is worse, a vice or a vicious act?</a></p><p id="FS_Q71-p8"><a href="#FS_Q71_A4"> (4) Whether a vicious act is compatible with virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q71-p9"><a href="#FS_Q71_A5"> (5) Whether every sin includes action?</a></p><p id="FS_Q71-p10"><a href="#FS_Q71_A6"> (6) Of the definition of sin proposed by Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii): "Sin is a word, deed, or desire against the eternal + law." + </a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 pr."><a name="36481" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36481] +Iª-IIae q. 71 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de +vitiis et peccatis. Circa quae sex consideranda occurrunt, primo +quidem, de ipsis vitiis et peccatis secundum se; secundo, de +distinctione eorum; tertio, de comparatione eorum ad invicem; +quarto, de subiecto peccati; quinto, de causa eius; sexto, de +effectu ipsius. Circa primum quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum vitium +contrarietur virtuti. Secundo, utrum vitium sit contra naturam. +Tertio, quid sit peius, utrum vitium vel actus vitiosus. Quarto, +utrum actus vitiosus possit esse simul cum virtute. Quinto, utrum +in omni peccato sit aliquis actus. Sexto, de definitione peccati +quam Augustinus ponit, XXII contra Faustum, <i>peccatum est dictum +vel factum vel concupitum contra legem aeternam</i>.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q71_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q71_A1-p0.1">Q. 71. A. 1. Whether vice is contrary to virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that vice is not contrary to virtue. For one thing has one contrary, as proved in Metaph. x, text. 17. Now + sin and malice are contrary to virtue. Therefore vice is not contrary to it: since vice applies also to undue disposition + of bodily members or of any things whatever. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36482" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36482] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod vitium non contrarietur virtuti. Uni +enim unum est contrarium, ut probatur in X Metaphys. Sed virtuti +contrariantur peccatum et malitia. Non ergo contrariatur ei vitium, +quia vitium dicitur etiam si sit indebita dispositio membrorum +corporalium, vel quarumcumque rerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue denotes a certain perfection of power. But vice does not denote anything relative to power. Therefore vice + is not contrary to virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36483" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36483] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +virtus nominat quandam perfectionem potentiae. Sed vitium nihil +nominat ad potentiam pertinens. Ergo vitium non contrariatur +virtuti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv) says that "virtue is the soul's health." Now sickness or disease, rather than vice, + is opposed to health. Therefore vice is not contrary to virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36484" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36484] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Tullius dicit, in IV de Tusculanis quaest., quod <i>virtus est +quaedam sanitas animae</i>. Sanitati autem opponitur aegritudo vel +morbus, magis quam vitium. Ergo virtuti non contrariatur +vitium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. ii) that "vice is a quality in respect of which the soul is evil." But "virtue is a quality + which makes its subject good," as was shown above ( + <a href="#FS_Q55_A3" id="FS_Q71_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[55], AA[3]</a>,4). Therefore vice is contrary to virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36485" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36485] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de perfectione iustitiae, quod +<i>vitium est qualitas secundum quam malus est animus</i>. Virtus +autem est qualitas quae facit bonum habentem, ut ex supradictis +patet. Ergo vitium contrariatur virtuti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q71_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Two things may be considered in virtue---the essence of virtue, and that to which virtue is ordained. In the essence of virtue + we may consider something directly, and we may consider something consequently. Virtue implies "directly" a disposition whereby + the subject is well disposed according to the mode of its nature: wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that + "virtue is a disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best; and by perfect I + mean that which is disposed according to its nature." That which virtue implies "consequently" is that it is a kind of goodness: + because the goodness of a thing consists in its being well disposed according to the mode of its nature. That to which virtue + is directed is a good act, as was shown above ( + <a href="#FS_Q56_A3" id="FS_Q71_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[56], A[3]</a>). + </p><p id="FS_Q71_A1-p7"> Accordingly three things are found to be contrary to virtue. One of these is "sin," which is opposed to virtue in respect + of that to which virtue is ordained: since, properly speaking, sin denotes an inordinate act; even as an act of virtue is + an ordinate and due act: in respect of that which virtue implies consequently, viz. that it is a kind of goodness, the contrary + of virtue is "malice": while in respect of that which belongs to the essence of virtue directly, its contrary + is "vice": because the vice of a thing seems to consist in its not being disposed in a way befitting its nature: hence Augustine + says (De Lib. Arb. iii): "Whatever is lacking for a thing's natural perfection may be called a vice." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 1 co."><a name="36486" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36486] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod circa virtutem duo possumus considerare, scilicet +ipsam essentiam virtutis; et id ad quod est virtus. In essentia +quidem virtutis aliquid considerari potest directe; et aliquid ex +consequenti. Directe quidem virtus importat dispositionem quandam +alicuius convenienter se habentis secundum modum suae naturae, unde +philosophus dicit, in VII Physic. quod <i>virtus est dispositio +perfecti ad optimum; dico autem perfecti, quod est dispositum +secundum naturam</i>. Ex consequenti autem sequitur quod virtus sit +bonitas quaedam, in hoc enim consistit uniuscuiusque rei bonitas, +quod convenienter se habeat secundum modum suae naturae. Id autem +ad quod virtus ordinatur, est actus bonus, ut ex supradictis patet. +Secundum hoc igitur tria inveniuntur opponi virtuti. Quorum unum +est peccatum, quod opponitur sibi ex parte eius ad quod virtus +ordinatur, nam peccatum proprie nominat actum inordinatum, sicut +actus virtutis est actus ordinatus et debitus. Secundum autem quod +ad rationem virtutis consequitur quod sit bonitas quaedam, +opponitur virtuti malitia. Sed secundum id quod directe est de +ratione virtutis, opponitur virtuti vitium, vitium enim +uniuscuiusque rei esse videtur quod non sit disposita secundum quod +convenit suae naturae. Unde Augustinus dicit, in III de Lib. Arb., +<i>quod perfectioni naturae deesse perspexeris, id voca +vitium</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These three things are contrary to virtue, but not in the same respect: for sin is opposed to virtue, according as the latter + is productive of a good work; malice, according as virtue is a kind of goodness; while vice is opposed to virtue properly + as such. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36487" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36487] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod illa tria non contrariantur virtuti secundum +idem, sed peccatum quidem contrariatur secundum quod virtus est +operativa boni; malitia autem secundum quod est bonitas quaedam; +vitium autem proprie secundum quod est virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Virtue implies not only perfection of power, the principle of action; but also the due disposition of its subject. The reason + for this is because a thing operates according as it is in act: so that a thing needs to be well disposed if it has to produce + a good work. It is in this respect that vice is contrary to virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36488" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36488] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod virtus non solum importat perfectionem potentiae quae +est principium agendi, sed etiam importat debitam dispositionem +eius cuius est virtus, et hoc ideo quia unumquodque operatur +secundum quod actu est. Requiritur ergo quod aliquid sit in se bene +dispositum, quod debet esse boni operativum. Et secundum hoc +virtuti vitium opponitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv), "disease and sickness are vicious qualities," for in speaking of the body "he calls + it" disease "when the whole body is infected," for instance, with fever or the like; he calls it sickness "when the disease + is attended with weakness"; and vice "when the parts of the body are not well compacted together." And although at times there + may be disease in the body without sickness, for instance, when a man has a hidden + complaint without being hindered outwardly from his wonted occupations; "yet, in the soul," as he says, "these two things + are indistinguishable, except in thought." For whenever a man is ill-disposed inwardly, through some inordinate affection, + he is rendered thereby unfit for fulfilling his duties: since "a tree is known by its fruit," i.e. man by his works, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q71_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.33" target="asv"> Mat. 12:33.</a> But "vice of the soul," as Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv), "is a habit or affection of + the soul discordant and inconsistent with itself through life": and this is to be found even without disease and sickness, + e.g. when a man sins from weakness or passion. Consequently vice is of wider extent than sickness or disease; even as virtue + extends to more things than health; for health itself is reckoned a kind of virtue (Phys. vii, text. 17). Consequently vice + is reckoned as contrary to virtue, more fittingly than sickness or disease. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36489" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36489] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut Tullius dicit, in IV de Tusculanis quaest., +morbi et aegrotationes partes sunt vitiositatis, in corporibus enim +morbum appellant totius corporis corruptionem, puta febrem vel +aliquid huiusmodi; aegrotationem vero, morbum cum imbecillitate; +vitium autem, cum partes corporis inter se dissident. Et quamvis in +corpore quandoque sit morbus sine aegrotatione, puta cum aliquis +est interius male dispositus, non tamen exterius praepeditur a +solitis operationibus; in animo tamen, ut ipse dicit, haec duo non +possunt nisi cogitatione secerni. Necesse est enim quod +quandocumque aliquis interius est male dispositus, habens +inordinatum affectum, quod ex hoc imbecillis reddatur ad debitas +operationes exercendas, quia unaquaeque arbor ex suo fructu +cognoscitur, idest homo ex opere, ut dicitur Matth. XII. <i>Sed +vitium animi</i>, ut Tullius ibidem dicit, <i>est habitus aut +affectio animi in tota vita inconstans, et a seipsa +dissentiens</i>. Quod quidem invenitur etiam absque morbo vel +aegrotatione, ut puta cum aliquis ex infirmitate vel ex passione +peccat. Unde in plus se habet vitium quam aegrotatio vel morbus, +sicut etiam virtus in plus se habet quam sanitas, nam sanitas etiam +quaedam virtus ponitur in VII Physic. Et ideo virtuti convenientius +opponitur vitium quam aegrotatio vel morbus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q71_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q71_A2-p0.1">Q. 71. A. 2. Whether vice is contrary to nature?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that vice is not contrary to nature. Because vice is contrary to virtue, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q71_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Now virtue is in us, not by nature but by infusion or habituation, as stated above (Q[63], AA[1] ,2,3). Therefore vice is + not contrary to nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36490" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36490] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod vitium non sit contra naturam. Vitium +enim contrariatur virtuti, ut dictum est. Sed virtutes non sunt in +nobis a natura, sed causantur in nobis per infusionem aut ab +assuetudine, ut dictum est. Ergo vitia non sunt contra naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is impossible to become habituated to that which is contrary to nature: thus "a stone never becomes habituated + to upward movement" (Ethic. ii, 1). But some men become habituated to vice. Therefore vice is not contrary to nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36491" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36491] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ea quae sunt contra naturam, non possunt assuefieri, sicut lapis +nunquam assuescit ferri sursum, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed aliqui +assuefiunt ad vitia. Ergo vitia non sunt contra naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, anything contrary to a nature, is not found in the greater number of individuals possessed of that nature. Now vice + is found in the greater number of men; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q71_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.13" target="asv">Mat. 7:13</a>): "Broad is the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who go in thereat." Therefore vice is not contrary to + nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36492" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36492] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +nihil quod est contra naturam, invenitur in habentibus illam +naturam ut in pluribus. Sed vitia inveniuntur in hominibus ut in +pluribus, quia, sicut dicitur Matth. VII, <i>lata est via quae +ducit ad perditionem, et multi vadunt per eam</i>. Ergo vitium non +est contra naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, sin is compared to vice, as act to habit, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q71_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Now sin is defined as "a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the Law of God," as Augustine shows (Contra Faust. xxii, 27). + But the Law of God is above nature. Therefore we should say that vice is contrary to the Law, rather than to nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="36493" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36493] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum comparatur ad vitium sicut actus ad habitum, ut ex +supradictis patet. Sed peccatum definitur esse dictum vel factum +vel concupitum contra legem Dei; ut patet per Augustinum, XXII +contra Faustum. Lex autem Dei est supra naturam. Magis ergo +dicendum est quod vitium sit contra legem, quam sit contra +naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 13): "Every vice, simply because it is a vice, is contrary to nature." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36494" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36494] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in III de Lib. Arb., <i>omne vitium, eo +ipso quod vitium est, contra naturam est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q71_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q71_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, vice is contrary to virtue. Now the virtue of a thing consists in its being well disposed in a manner befitting its nature, + as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q71_A2-p7.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Hence the vice of any thing consists in its being disposed in a manner not befitting its nature, and for this reason is + that thing "vituperated," which word is derived from "vice" according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii, 14). + </p><p id="FS_Q71_A2-p8"> But it must be observed that the nature of a thing is chiefly the form from which that thing derives its species. Now man + derives his species from his rational soul: and consequently whatever is contrary to the order of reason is, properly speaking, + contrary to the nature of man, as man; while whatever is in accord with reason, is in accord with the nature of man, as man. + Now "man's good is to be in accord with reason, and his evil is to be against reason," as Dionysius states + (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore human virtue, which makes a man good, and his work good, is in accord with man's nature, for as + much as it accords with his reason: while vice is contrary to man's nature, in so far as it is contrary to the order of reason. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 co."><a name="36495" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36495] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, vitium virtuti contrariatur. +Virtus autem uniuscuiusque rei consistit in hoc quod sit bene +disposita secundum convenientiam suae naturae, ut supra dictum est. +Unde oportet quod in qualibet re vitium dicatur ex hoc quod est +disposita contra id quod convenit naturae. Unde et de hoc +unaquaeque res vituperatur, <i>a vitio autem nomen vituperationis +tractum creditur</i>, ut Augustinus dicit, in III de Lib. Arb. Sed +considerandum est quod natura uniuscuiusque rei potissime est forma +secundum quam res speciem sortitur. Homo autem in specie +constituitur per animam rationalem. Et ideo id quod est contra +ordinem rationis, proprie est contra naturam hominis inquantum est +homo; quod autem est secundum rationem, est secundum naturam +hominis inquantum est homo. <i>Bonum autem hominis est secundum +rationem esse, et malum hominis est praeter rationem esse</i>, ut +Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Unde virtus humana, quae +hominem facit bonum, et opus ipsius bonum reddit, intantum est +secundum naturam hominis, inquantum convenit rationi, vitium autem +intantum est contra naturam hominis, inquantum est contra ordinem +rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the virtues are not caused by nature as regards their perfection of being, yet they incline us to that which accords + with reason, i.e. with the order of reason. For Cicero says (De Inv. Rhet. ii) that "virtue is a habit in accord with reason, + like a second nature": and it is in this sense that virtue is said to be in accord with nature, and on the other hand that + vice is contrary to nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36496" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36496] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod virtutes, etsi non causentur a natura secundum +suum esse perfectum, tamen inclinant ad id quod est secundum +naturam, idest secundum ordinem rationis, dicit enim Tullius, in +sua rhetorica, quod <i>virtus est habitus in modum naturae rationi +consentaneus</i>. Et hoc modo virtus dicitur esse secundum naturam, +et per contrarium intelligitur quod vitium sit contra naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Philosopher is speaking there of a thing being against nature, in so far as "being against nature" is contrary to "being + from nature": and not in so far as "being against nature" is contrary to "being in accord with nature," in which latter sense + virtues are said to be in accord with nature, in as much as they incline us to that which is suitable to nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36497" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36497] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod philosophus ibi loquitur de his quae sunt contra +naturam, secundum quod esse contra naturam opponitur ei quod est +esse a natura, non autem secundum quod esse contra naturam +opponitur ei quod est esse secundum naturam, eo modo quo virtutes +dicuntur esse secundum naturam, inquantum inclinant ad id quod +naturae convenit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is a twofold nature in man, rational nature, and the sensitive nature. And since it is through the operation of his + senses that man accomplishes acts of reason, hence there are more who follow the inclinations of the sensitive nature, than + who follow the order of reason: because more reach the beginning of a business than achieve its completion. Now the presence + of vices and sins in man is owing to the fact that he follows the inclination of his + sensitive nature against the order of his reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36498" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36498] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in homine est duplex natura, scilicet rationalis et +sensitiva. Et quia per operationem sensus homo pervenit ad actus +rationis, ideo plures sequuntur inclinationes naturae sensitivae +quam ordinem rationis, plures enim sunt qui assequuntur principium +rei, quam qui ad consummationem perveniunt. Ex hoc autem vitia et +peccata in hominibus proveniunt, quod sequuntur inclinationem +naturae sensitivae contra ordinem rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Whatever is irregular in a work of art, is unnatural to the art which produced that work. Now the eternal law is compared + to the order of human reason, as art to a work of art. Therefore it amounts to the same that vice and sin are against the + order of human reason, and that they are contrary to the eternal law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 6) that "every + nature, as such, is from God; and is a vicious nature, in so far as it fails from the + Divine art whereby it was made." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="36499" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36499] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod quidquid est contra rationem artificiati, est etiam +contra naturam artis, qua artificiatum producitur. Lex autem +aeterna comparatur ad ordinem rationis humanae sicut ars ad +artificiatum. Unde eiusdem rationis est quod vitium et peccatum sit +contra ordinem rationis humanae, et quod sit contra legem aeternam. +Unde Augustinus dicit, in III de Lib. Arb., quod <i>a Deo habent +omnes naturae quod naturae sunt, et intantum sunt vitiosae, +inquantum ab eius, qua factae sunt, arte discedunt</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q71_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q71_A3-p0.1">Q. 71. A. 3. Whether vice is worse than a vicious act?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that vice, i.e. a bad habit, is worse than a sin, i.e. a bad act. For, as the more lasting a good is, the better + it is, so the longer an evil lasts, the worse it is. Now a vicious habit is more lasting than vicious acts, that pass forthwith. + Therefore a vicious habit is worse than a vicious act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36500" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36500] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod vitium, idest habitus malus sit peius +quam peccatum, idest actus malus. Sicut enim bonum quod est +diuturnius, est melius; ita malum quod est diuturnius, est peius. +Sed habitus vitiosus est diuturnior quam actus vitiosi, qui statim +transeunt. Ergo habitus vitiosus est peior quam actus vitiosus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, several evils are more to be shunned than one. But a bad habit is virtually the cause of many bad acts. Therefore + a vicious habit is worse than a vicious act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36501" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36501] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +plura mala sunt magis fugienda quam unum malum. Sed habitus malus +virtualiter est causa multorum malorum actuum. Ergo habitus +vitiosus est peior quam actus vitiosus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a cause is more potent than its effect. But a habit produces its actions both as to their goodness and as to their + badness. Therefore a habit is more potent than its act, both in goodness and in badness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36502" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36502] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +causa est potior quam effectus. Sed habitus perficit actum tam in +bonitate quam in malitia. Ergo habitus est potior actu et in +bonitate et in malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A man is justly punished for a vicious act; but not for a vicious habit, so long as no act ensues. Therefore a vicious action + is worse than a vicious habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36503" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36503] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +pro actu vitioso aliquis iuste punitur, non autem pro habitu +vitioso, si non procedat ad actum. Ergo actus vitiosus est peior +quam habitus vitiosus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A habit stands midway between power and act. Now it is evident that both in good and in evil, act precedes power, as stated + in Metaph. ix, 19. For it is better to do well than to be able to do well, and in like manner, it is more blameworthy to do + evil, than to be able to do evil: whence it also follows that both in goodness and in badness, habit stands midway between + power and act, so that, to wit, even as a good or evil habit stands above the corresponding + power in goodness or in badness, so does it stand below the corresponding act. This is also made clear from the fact that + a habit is not called good or bad, save in so far as it induces to a good or bad act: wherefore a habit is called good or + bad by reason of the goodness or badness of its act: so that an act surpasses its habit in goodness or badness, since "the + cause of a thing being such, is yet more so." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 3 co."><a name="36504" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36504] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod habitus medio modo se habet inter potentiam et actum. +Manifestum est autem quod actus in bono et in malo praeeminet +potentiae, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys., melius est enim bene agere +quam posse bene agere; et similiter vituperabilius est male agere +quam posse male agere. Unde etiam sequitur quod habitus in bonitate +et in malitia medium gradum obtineat inter potentiam et actum, ut +scilicet, sicut habitus bonus vel malus praeeminet in bonitate vel +malitia potentiae, ita etiam subdatur actui. Quod etiam ex hoc +apparet, quod habitus non dicitur bonus vel malus nisi ex hoc quod +inclinat ad actum bonum vel malum. Unde propter bonitatem vel +malitiam actus, dicitur habitus bonus vel malus. Et sic potior est +actus in bonitate vel malitia quam habitus, quia propter quod +unumquodque tale, et illud magis est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nothing hinders one thing from standing above another simply, and below it in some respect. Now a thing is deemed above another + simply if it surpasses it in a point which is proper to both; while it is deemed above it in a certain respect, if it surpasses + it in something which is accidental to both. Now it has been shown from the very nature of act and habit, that act surpasses + habit both in goodness and in badness. Whereas the fact that habit is more + lasting than act, is accidental to them, and is due to the fact that they are both found in a nature such that it cannot always + be in action, and whose action consists in a transient movement. Consequently act simply excels in goodness and badness, but + habit excels in a certain respect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36505" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36505] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquid esse simpliciter altero +potius, quod tamen secundum quid ab eo deficit. Simpliciter enim +potius iudicatur quod praeeminet quantum ad id quod per se +consideratur in utroque, secundum quid autem quod praeeminet +secundum id quod per accidens se habet ad utrumque. Ostensum est +autem ex ipsa ratione actus et habitus, quod actus est potior in +bonitate et malitia quam habitus. Quod autem habitus sit diuturnior +quam actus, accidit ex eo quod utrumque invenitur in tali natura +quae non potest semper agere, et cuius actio est in motu +transeunte. Unde simpliciter actus est potior tam in bonitate quam +in malitia, sed habitus est potior secundum quid.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A habit is several acts, not simply, but in a certain respect, i.e. virtually. Wherefore this does not prove that habit precedes + act simply, both in goodness and in badness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36506" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36506] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod habitus non est simpliciter plures actus, sed +secundum quid, idest virtute. Unde ex hoc non potest concludi quod +habitus sit simpliciter potior in bonitate vel malitia quam +actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Habit causes act by way of efficient causality: but act causes habit, by way of final causality, in respect of which we consider + the nature of good and evil. Consequently act surpasses habit both in goodness and in badness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36507" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36507] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod habitus est causa actus in genere causae efficientis, +sed actus est causa habitus in genere causae finalis, secundum quam +consideratur ratio boni et mali. Et ideo in bonitate et malitia +actus praeeminet habitui.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q71_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q71_A4-p0.1">Q. 71. A. 4. Whether sin is compatible with virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a vicious act, i.e. sin, is incompatible with virtue. For contraries cannot be together in the same subject. + Now sin is, in some way, contrary to virtue, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q71_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore sin is incompatible with virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36508" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36508] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus vitiosus, sive peccatum, non +possit simul esse cum virtute. Contraria enim non possunt esse +simul in eodem. Sed peccatum quodammodo contrariatur virtuti, ut +dictum est. Ergo peccatum non potest simul esse cum virtute.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is worse than vice, i.e. evil act than evil habit. But vice cannot be in the same subject with virtue: neither, + therefore, can sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36509" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36509] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum est peius quam vitium, idest actus malus quam habitus +malus. Sed vitium non potest simul esse in eodem cum virtute. Ergo +neque peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sin occurs in natural things, even as in voluntary matters (Phys. ii, text. 82). Now sin never happens in natural + things, except through some corruption of the natural power; thus monsters are due to corruption of some elemental force in + the seed, as stated in Phys. ii. Therefore no sin occurs in voluntary matters, except through the corruption of some virtue + in the soul: so that sin and virtue cannot be together in the same subject. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36510" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36510] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut peccatum accidit in rebus voluntariis, ita et in rebus +naturalibus, ut dicitur in II Physic. Sed nunquam in rebus +naturalibus accidit peccatum nisi per aliquam corruptionem virtutis +naturalis, sicut monstra accidunt corrupto aliquo principio in +semine, ut dicitur in II Physic. Ergo etiam in rebus voluntariis +non accidit peccatum nisi corrupta aliqua virtute animae. Et sic +peccatum et virtus non possunt esse in eodem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 2,3) that "virtue is engendered and corrupted by contrary causes." Now one virtuous act + does not cause a virtue, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q51_A3" id="FS_Q71_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[51], A[3]</a>): and, consequently, one sinful act does not corrupt virtue. Therefore they can be together in the same subject. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36511" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36511] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod per contraria virtus +generatur et corrumpitur. Sed unus actus virtuosus non causat +virtutem, ut supra habitum est. Ergo neque unus actus peccati +tollit virtutem. Possunt ergo simul in eodem esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q71_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Sin is compared to virtue, as evil act to good habit. Now the position of a habit in the soul is not the same as that of + a form in a natural thing. For the form of a natural thing produces, of necessity, an operation befitting itself; wherefore + a natural form is incompatible with the act of a contrary form: thus heat is incompatible with the act of cooling, and lightness + with downward movement (except perhaps violence be used by some extrinsic mover): + whereas the habit that resides in the soul, does not, of necessity, produce its operation, but is used by man when he wills. + Consequently man, while possessing a habit, may either fail to use the habit, or produce a contrary act; and so a man having + a virtue may produce an act of sin. And this sinful act, so long as there is but one, cannot corrupt virtue, if we compare + the act to the virtue itself as a habit: since, just as habit is not engendered by one act, so neither is it destroyed by + one + act as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q63_A2" id="FS_Q71_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[63], A[2]</a>, ad 2). But if we compare the sinful act to the cause of the virtues, then it is possible for some virtues to be destroyed + by one sinful act. For every mortal sin is contrary to charity, which is the root of all the infused virtues, as virtues; + and consequently, charity being banished by one act of mortal sin, it follows that all the infused virtues are expelled "as + virtues." And I say on account of faith and hope, whose habits remain + unquickened after mortal sin, so that they are no longer virtues. On the other hand, since venial sin is neither contrary + to charity, nor banishes it, as a consequence, neither does it expel the other virtues. As to the acquired virtues, they are + not destroyed by one act of any kind of sin. + </p><p id="FS_Q71_A4-p7"> Accordingly, mortal sin is incompatible with the infused virtues, but is consistent with acquired virtue: while venial sin + is compatible with virtues, whether infused or acquired. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 4 co."><a name="36512" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36512] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod peccatum comparatur ad virtutem sicut actus malus ad +habitum bonum. Aliter autem se habet habitus in anima, et forma in +re naturali. Forma enim naturalis ex necessitate producit +operationem sibi convenientem, unde non potest esse simul cum forma +naturali actus formae contrariae; sicut non potest esse cum calore +actus infrigidationis, neque simul cum levitate motus descensionis, +nisi forte ex violentia exterioris moventis. Sed habitus in anima +non ex necessitate producit suam operationem, sed homo utitur eo +cum voluerit. Unde simul habitu in homine existente, potest non uti +habitu, aut agere contrarium actum. Et sic potest habens virtutem +procedere ad actum peccati. Actus autem peccati, si comparetur ad +ipsam virtutem prout est habitus quidam, non potest ipsam +corrumpere, si sit unus tantum, sicut enim non generatur habitus +per unum actum, ita nec per unum actum corrumpitur, ut supra dictum +est. Sed si comparetur actus peccati ad causam virtutum, sic +possibile est quod per unum actum peccati aliquae virtutes +corrumpantur. Quodlibet enim peccatum mortale contrariatur +caritati, quae est radix omnium virtutum infusarum, inquantum sunt +virtutes, et ideo per unum actum peccati mortalis, exclusa +caritate, excluduntur per consequens omnes virtutes infusae, +quantum ad hoc quod sunt virtutes. Et hoc dico propter fidem et +spem, quarum habitus remanent informes post peccatum mortale, et +sic non sunt virtutes. Sed peccatum veniale, quod non contrariatur +caritati nec excludit ipsam, per consequens etiam non excludit +alias virtutes. Virtutes vero acquisitae non tolluntur per unum +actum cuiuscumque peccati. Sic igitur peccatum mortale non potest +simul esse cum virtutibus infusis, potest tamen simul esse cum +virtutibus acquisitis. Peccatum vero veniale potest simul esse et +cum virtutibus infusis, et cum acquisitis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sin is contrary to virtue, not by reason of itself, but by reason of its act. Hence sin is incompatible with the act, but + not with the habit, of virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36513" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36513] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod peccatum non contrariatur virtuti secundum se, +sed secundum suum actum. Et ideo peccatum non potest simul esse cum +actu virtutis, potest tamen simul esse cum habitu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Vice is directly contrary to virtue, even as sin to virtuous act: and so vice excludes virtue, just as sin excludes acts + of virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36514" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36514] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod vitium directe contrariatur virtuti, sicut et +peccatum actui virtuoso. Et ideo vitium excludit virtutem, sicut +peccatum excludit actum virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The natural powers act of necessity, and hence so long as the power is unimpaired, no sin can be found in the act. On the + other hand, the virtues of the soul do not produce their acts of necessity; hence the comparison fails. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36515" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36515] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod virtutes naturales agunt ex necessitate, et ideo, +integra existente virtute, nunquam peccatum potest in actu +inveniri. Sed virtutes animae non producunt actus ex necessitate, +unde non est similis ratio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q71_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q71_A5-p0.1">Q. 71. A. 5. Whether every sin includes an action?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every sin includes an action. For as merit is compared with virtue, even so is sin compared with vice. + Now there can be no merit without an action. Neither, therefore, can there be sin without action. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36516" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36516] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod in quolibet peccato sit aliquis actus. +Sicut enim meritum comparatur ad virtutem, ita peccatum ad vitium +comparatur. Sed meritum non potest esse absque aliquo actu. Ergo +nec peccatum potest esse absque aliquo actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) [*Cf. De Vera Relig. xiv.]: So "true is it that every sin is voluntary, that, + unless it be voluntary, it is no sin at all." Now nothing can be voluntary, save through an act of the will. Therefore every + sin implies an act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36517" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36517] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in libro de Lib. Arb., quod <i>omne peccatum adeo +est voluntarium, quod si non sit voluntarium, non est peccatum</i>. +Sed non potest esse aliquid voluntarium nisi per actum voluntatis. +Ergo omne peccatum habet aliquem actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if sin could be without act, it would follow that a man sins as soon as he ceases doing what he ought. Now he who + never does something that he ought to do, ceases continually doing what he ought. Therefore it would follow that he sins continually; + and this is untrue. Therefore there is no sin without an act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36518" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36518] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +si peccatum esset absque aliquo actu, sequeretur quod ex hoc ipso +quod aliquis cessat ab actu debito, peccaret. Sed continue aliquis +cessat ab actu debito, ille scilicet qui nunquam actum debitum +operatur. Ergo sequeretur quod continue peccaret, quod est falsum. +Non ergo est aliquod peccatum absque actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q71_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.17" target="asv">James 4:17</a>): "To him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin." Now "not to do" does not imply an act. Therefore + sin can be without act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36519" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36519] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Iac. IV, <i>scienti bonum facere et non facienti, +peccatum est illi</i>. Sed non facere non importat aliquem actum. +Ergo peccatum potest esse absque actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q71_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The reason for urging this question has reference to the sin of omission, about which there have been various opinions. For + some say that in every sin of omission there is some act, either interior or exterior---interior, as when a man wills "not + to go to church," when he is bound to go---exterior, as when a man, at the very hour that he is bound to go to church (or + even before), occupies himself in such a way that he is hindered from going. This seems, in a + way, to amount to the same as the first, for whoever wills one thing that is incompatible with this other, wills, consequently, + to go without this other: unless, perchance, it does not occur to him, that what he wishes to do, will hinder him from that + which he is bound to do, in which case he might be deemed guilty of negligence. On the other hand, others say, that a sin + of omission does not necessarily suppose an act: for the mere fact of not doing what one is bound to do is a sin. + </p><p id="FS_Q71_A5-p7"> Now each of these opinions has some truth in it. For if in the sin of omission we look merely at that in which the essence + of the sin consists, the sin of omission will be sometimes with an interior act, as when a man wills "not to go to church": + while sometimes it will be without any act at all, whether interior or exterior, as when a man, at the time that he is bound + to go to church, does not think of going or not going to church. + </p><p id="FS_Q71_A5-p8"> If, however, in the sin of omission, we consider also the causes, or occasions of the omission, then the sin of omission + must of necessity include some act. For there is no sin of omission, unless we omit what we can do or not do: and that we + turn aside so as not to do what we can do or not do, must needs be due to some cause or occasion, either united with the omission + or preceding it. Now if this cause be not in man's power, the omission will not be sinful, as when anyone + omits going to church on account of sickness: but if the cause or occasion be subject to the will, the omission is sinful; + and such cause, in so far as it is voluntary, must needs always include some act, at least the interior act of the will: which + act sometimes bears directly on the omission, as when a man wills "not to go to church," because it is too much trouble; and + in this case this act, of its very nature, belongs to the omission, because the volition of any sin whatever, pertains, of + itself, to that sin, since voluntariness is essential to sin. Sometimes, however, the act of the will bears directly on something + else which hinders man from doing what he ought, whether this something else be united with the omission, as when a man wills + to play at the time he ought to go to church---or, precede the omission, as when a man wills to sit up late at night, the + result being that he does not go to church in the morning. In this case the act, interior or exterior, is accidental to + the omission, since the omission follows outside the intention, and that which is outside the intention is said to be accidental + (Phys. ii, text. 49,50). Wherefore it is evident that then the sin of omission has indeed an act united with, or preceding + the omission, but that this act is accidental to the sin of omission. + </p><p id="FS_Q71_A5-p9"> Now in judging about things, we must be guided by that which is proper to them, and not by that which is accidental: and + consequently it is truer to say that a sin can be without any act; else the circumstantial acts and occasions would be essential + to other actual sins. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 5 co."><a name="36520" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36520] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod quaestio ista principaliter movetur propter peccatum +omissionis, de quo aliqui diversimode opinantur. Quidam enim dicunt +quod in omni peccato omissionis est aliquis actus vel interior vel +exterior. Interior quidem, sicut cum aliquis vult non ire ad +Ecclesiam quando ire tenetur. Exterior autem, sicut cum aliquis +illa hora qua ad Ecclesiam ire tenetur, vel etiam ante, occupat se +talibus quibus ab eundo ad Ecclesiam impeditur. Et hoc quodammodo +videtur in primum redire, qui enim vult aliquid cum quo aliud simul +esse non potest, ex consequenti vult illo carere; nisi forte non +perpendat quod per hoc quod vult facere, impeditur ab eo quod +facere tenetur; in quo casu posset per negligentiam culpabilis +iudicari. Alii vero dicunt quod in peccato omissionis non +requiritur aliquis actus, ipsum enim non facere quod quis facere +tenetur, peccatum est. Utraque autem opinio secundum aliquid +veritatem habet. Si enim intelligatur in peccato omissionis illud +solum quod per se pertinet ad rationem peccati, sic quandoque +omissionis peccatum est cum actu interiori, ut cum aliquis vult non +ire ad Ecclesiam, quandoque vero absque omni actu vel interiori vel +exteriori, sicut cum aliquis hora qua tenetur ire ad Ecclesiam, +nihil cogitat de eundo vel non eundo ad Ecclesiam. Si vero in +peccato omissionis intelligantur etiam causae vel occasiones +omittendi, sic necesse est in peccato omissionis aliquem actum +esse. Non enim est peccatum omissionis nisi cum aliquis +praetermittit quod potest facere et non facere. Quod autem aliquis +declinet ad non faciendum illud quod potest facere et non facere, +non est nisi ex aliqua causa vel occasione coniuncta vel +praecedente. Et si quidem causa illa non sit in potestate hominis, +omissio non habet rationem peccati, sicut cum aliquis propter +infirmitatem praetermittit ad Ecclesiam ire. Si vero causa vel +occasio omittendi subiaceat voluntati, omissio habet rationem +peccati, et tunc semper oportet quod ista causa, inquantum est +voluntaria, habeat aliquem actum, ad minus interiorem voluntatis. +Qui quidem actus quandoque directe fertur in ipsam omissionem, puta +cum aliquis vult non ire ad Ecclesiam, vitans laborem. Et tunc +talis actus per se pertinet ad omissionem, voluntas enim +cuiuscumque peccati per se pertinet ad peccatum illud, eo quod +voluntarium est de ratione peccati. Quandoque autem actus +voluntatis directe fertur in aliud, per quod homo impeditur ab actu +debito, sive illud in quod fertur voluntas, sit coniunctum +omissioni, puta cum aliquis vult ludere quando ad Ecclesiam debet +ire; sive etiam sit praecedens, puta cum aliquis vult diu vigilare +de sero, ex quo sequitur quod non vadat hora matutinali ad +Ecclesiam. Et tunc actus iste interior vel exterior per accidens se +habet ad omissionem, quia omissio sequitur praeter intentionem; hoc +autem dicimus per accidens esse, quod est praeter intentionem, ut +patet in II Physic. Unde manifestum est quod tunc peccatum +omissionis habet quidem aliquem actum coniunctum vel praecedentem, +qui tamen per accidens se habet ad peccatum omissionis. Iudicium +autem de rebus dandum est secundum illud quod est per se, et non +secundum illud quod est per accidens. Unde verius dici potest quod +aliquod peccatum possit esse absque omni actu. Alioquin etiam ad +essentiam aliorum peccatorum actualium pertinerent actus et +occasiones circumstantes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> More things are required for good than for evil, since "good results from a whole and entire cause, whereas evil results + from each single defect," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv): so that sin may arise from a man doing what he ought not, or + by his not doing what he ought; while there can be no merit, unless a man do willingly what he ought to do: wherefore there + can be no merit without act, whereas there can be sin without act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36521" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36521] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod plura requiruntur ad bonum quam ad malum, eo +quod <i>bonum contingit ex tota integra causa, malum autem ex +singularibus defectibus</i>, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. +Nom. Et ideo peccatum potest contingere sive aliquis faciat quod +non debet, sive non faciendo quod debet, sed meritum non potest +esse nisi aliquis faciat voluntarie quod debet. Et ideo meritum non +potest esse sine actu, sed peccatum potest esse sine actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The term "voluntary" is applied not only to that on which the act of the will is brought to bear, but also to that which + we have the power to do or not to do, as stated in Ethic. iii, 5. Hence even not to will may be called voluntary, in so far + as man has it in his power to will, and not to will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36522" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36522] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod aliquid dicitur voluntarium non solum quia cadit +super ipsum actus voluntatis, sed quia in potestate nostra est ut +fiat vel non fiat, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Unde etiam ipsum non +velle potest dici voluntarium, inquantum in potestate hominis est +velle et non velle.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sin of omission is contrary to an affirmative precept which binds always, but not for always. Hence, by omitting to act, + a man sins only for the time at which the affirmative precept binds him to act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36523" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36523] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod peccatum omissionis contrariatur praecepto +affirmativo, quod obligat semper, sed non ad semper. Et ideo solum +pro tempore illo aliquis cessando ab actu peccat, pro quo +praeceptum affirmativum obligat.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q71_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q71_A6-p0.1">Q. 71. A. 6. Whether sin is fittingly defined as a word, deed, or desire contrary to the eternal law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin is unfittingly defined by saying: "Sin is a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the eternal law." Because + "Word," "deed," and "desire" imply an act; whereas not every sin implies an act, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q71_A5" id="FS_Q71_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. Therefore this definition does not include every sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="36524" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36524] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter definiatur peccatum, +cum dicitur, peccatum est <i>dictum vel factum vel concupitum +contra legem aeternam</i>. Dictum enim, vel factum, vel concupitum, +importat aliquem actum. Sed non omne peccatum importat aliquem +actum, ut dictum est. Ergo haec definitio non includit omne +peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Duab. Anim. xii): "Sin is the will to retain or obtain what justice forbids." Now will is comprised + under desire, in so far as desire denotes any act of the appetite. Therefore it was enough to say: "Sin is a desire contrary + to the eternal law," nor was there need to add "word" or "deed." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="36525" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36525] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in libro de duabus animabus, <i>peccatum est +voluntas retinendi vel consequendi quod iustitia vetat</i>. Sed +voluntas sub concupiscentia comprehenditur, secundum quod +concupiscentia largo modo sumitur, pro omni appetitu. Ergo +suffecisset dicere, peccatum est concupitum contra legem aeternam; +nec oportuit addere, dictum vel factum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sin apparently consists properly in aversion from the end: because good and evil are measured chiefly with regard + to the end as explained above ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A3" id="FS_Q71_A6-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[3]</a>; + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A4" id="FS_Q71_A6-p4.2" shape="rect"> Q[18], AA[4]</a>,6; + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q20_A2" id="FS_Q71_A6-p4.3" shape="rect"> Q[20], AA[2]</a>,3): wherefore Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i) defines sin in reference to the end, by saying that "sin is nothing else than to + neglect eternal things, and seek after temporal things": and again he + says (Qq. lxxxii, qu. 30) that "all human wickedness consists in using what we should enjoy, and in enjoying what we should + use." Now the definition is question contains no mention of aversion from our due end: therefore it is an insufficient definition + of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="36526" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36526] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum proprie consistere videtur in aversione a fine, nam bonum +et malum principaliter considerantur secundum finem, ut ex +supradictis patet. Unde et Augustinus, in I de Lib. Arb., per +comparationem ad finem definit peccatum, dicens quod <i>peccare +nihil est aliud quam, neglectis rebus aeternis, temporalia +sectari</i>, et in libro octoginta trium quaest., dicit quod +<i>omnis humana perversitas est uti fruendis et frui utendis</i>. +Sed in praemissa definitione nulla fit mentio de aversione a debito +fine. Ergo insufficienter definitur peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a thing is said to be forbidden, because it is contrary to the law. Now not all sins are evil through being forbidden, + but some are forbidden because they are evil. Therefore sin in general should not be defined as being against the law of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 arg. 4"><a name="36527" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36527] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +ex hoc dicitur aliquid esse prohibitum, quia legi contrariatur. Sed +non omnia peccata sunt mala quia prohibita, sed quaedam sunt +prohibita quia mala. Non ergo in communi definitione peccati debuit +poni quod sit contra legem Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, a sin denotes a bad human act, as was explained above + <a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q71_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Now man's evil is to be against reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore it would have been better to say that + sin is against reason than to say that it is contrary to the eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 arg. 5"><a name="36528" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36528] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum significat malum hominis actum, ut ex dictis patet. Sed +malum hominis est contra rationem esse, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. +de Div. Nom. Ergo potius debuit dici quod peccatum sit contra +rationem, quam quod peccatum sit contra legem aeternam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> the authority of Augustine suffices (Contra Faust. xxii, 27). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 s. c."><a name="36529" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36529] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> In +contrarium sufficit auctoritas Augustini.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As was shown above + <a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q71_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, sin is nothing else than a bad human act. Now that an act is a human act is due to its being voluntary, as stated above + (Q[1], A[1]), whether it be voluntary, as being elicited by the will, e.g. to will or to choose, or as being commanded by + the will, e.g. the exterior actions of speech or operation. Again, a human act is evil through lacking conformity with its + due measure: and conformity of measure in a + thing depends on a rule, from which if that thing depart, it is incommensurate. Now there are two rules of the human will: + one is proximate and homogeneous, viz. the human reason; the other is the first rule, viz. the eternal law, which is God's + reason, so to speak. Accordingly Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 27) includes two things in the definition of sin; one, pertaining + to the substance of a human act, and which is the matter, so to speak, of sin, when he says "word," "deed," or "desire"; + the other, pertaining to the nature of evil, and which is the form, as it were, of sin, when he says, "contrary to the eternal + law." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 co."><a name="36530" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36530] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ex dictis patet, peccatum nihil aliud est quam +actus humanus malus. Quod autem aliquis actus sit humanus, habet ex +hoc quod est voluntarius, sicut ex supradictis patet, sive sit +voluntarius quasi a voluntate elicitus, ut ipsum velle et eligere; +sive quasi a voluntate imperatus, ut exteriores actus vel +locutionis vel operationis. Habet autem actus humanus quod sit +malus, ex eo quod caret debita commensuratione. Omnis autem +commensuratio cuiuscumque rei attenditur per comparationem ad +aliquam regulam, a qua si divertat, incommensurata erit. Regula +autem voluntatis humanae est duplex, una propinqua et homogenea, +scilicet ipsa humana ratio; alia vero est prima regula, scilicet +lex aeterna, quae est quasi ratio Dei. Et ideo Augustinus in +definitione peccati posuit duo, unum quod pertinet ad substantiam +actus humani, quod est quasi materiale in peccato, cum dixit, +dictum vel factum vel concupitum; aliud autem quod pertinet ad +rationem mali, quod est quasi formale in peccato, cum dixit, contra +legem aeternam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Affirmation and negation are reduced to one same genus: e.g. in Divine things, begotten and unbegotten are reduced to the + genus "relation," as Augustine states (De Trin. v, 6,7): and so "word" and "deed" denote equally what is said and what is + not said, what is done and what is not done. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="36531" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36531] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod affirmatio et negatio reducuntur ad idem genus, +sicut in divinis genitum et ingenitum ad relationem, ut Augustinus +dicit, in V de Trin. Et ideo pro eodem est accipiendum dictum et +non dictum, factum et non factum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The first cause of sin is in the will, which commands all voluntary acts, in which alone is sin to be found: and hence it + is that Augustine sometimes defines sin in reference to the will alone. But since external acts also pertain to the substance + of sin, through being evil of themselves, as stated, it was necessary in defining sin to include something referring to external + action. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="36532" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36532] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod prima causa peccati est in voluntate, quae imperat +omnes actus voluntarios, in quibus solum invenitur peccatum, et +ideo Augustinus quandoque per solam voluntatem definit peccatum. +Sed quia etiam ipsi exteriores actus pertinent ad substantiam +peccati, cum sint secundum se mali, ut dictum est, necesse fuit +quod in definitione peccati poneretur etiam aliquid pertinens ad +exteriores actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The eternal law first and foremost directs man to his end, and in consequence, makes man to be well disposed in regard to + things which are directed to the end: hence when he says, "contrary to the eternal law," he includes aversion from the end + and all other forms of inordinateness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="36533" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36533] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod lex aeterna primo et principaliter ordinat hominem ad +finem, consequenter autem facit hominem bene se habere circa ea +quae sunt ad finem. Et ideo in hoc quod dicit contra legem +aeternam, tangit aversionem a fine, et omnes alias +inordinationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> When it is said that not every sin is evil through being forbidden, this must be understood of prohibition by positive law. + If, however, the prohibition be referred to the natural law, which is contained primarily in the eternal law, but secondarily + in the natural code of the human reason, then every sin is evil through being prohibited: since it is contrary to natural + law, precisely because it is inordinate. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 ad 4"><a name="36534" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36534] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, cum dicitur quod non omne peccatum ideo est malum +quia est prohibitum, intelligitur de prohibitione facta per ius +positivum. Si autem referatur ad ius naturale, quod continetur +primo quidem in lege aeterna, secundario vero in naturali +iudicatorio rationis humanae, tunc omne peccatum est malum quia +prohibitum, ex hoc enim ipso quod est inordinatum, iuri naturali +repugnat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The theologian considers sin chiefly as an offense against God; and the moral philosopher, as something contrary to reason. + Hence Augustine defines sin with reference to its being "contrary to the eternal law," more fittingly than with reference + to its being contrary to reason; the more so, as the eternal law directs us in many things that surpass human reason, e.g. + in matters of faith. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 ad 5"><a name="36535" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36535] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod a theologis consideratur peccatum praecipue secundum +quod est offensa contra Deum, a philosopho autem morali, secundum +quod contrariatur rationi. Et ideo Augustinus convenientius definit +peccatum ex hoc quod est contra legem aeternam, quam ex hoc quod +est contra rationem, praecipue cum per legem aeternam regulemur in +multis quae excedunt rationem humanam, sicut in his quae sunt +fidei.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q72" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q72-p0.1">Q. 72. OF THE DISTINCTION OF SINS (NINE ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q72-p2"> We must now consider the distinction of sins or vices: under which head there are nine points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q72-p3"><a href="#FS_Q72_A1"> (1) Whether sins are distinguished specifically by their objects?</a></p><p id="FS_Q72-p4"><a href="#FS_Q72_A2"> (2) Of the distinction between spiritual and carnal sins;</a></p><p id="FS_Q72-p5"><a href="#FS_Q72_A3"> (3) Whether sins differ in reference to their causes?</a></p><p id="FS_Q72-p6"><a href="#FS_Q72_A4"> (4) Whether they differ with respect to those who are sinned against?</a></p><p id="FS_Q72-p7"><a href="#FS_Q72_A5"> (5) Whether sins differ in relation to the debt of punishment?</a></p><p id="FS_Q72-p8"><a href="#FS_Q72_A6"> (6) Whether they differ in regard to omission and commission?</a></p><p id="FS_Q72-p9"><a href="#FS_Q72_A7"> (7) Whether they differ according to their various stages?</a></p><p id="FS_Q72-p10"><a href="#FS_Q72_A8"> (8) Whether they differ in respect of excess and deficiency?</a></p><p id="FS_Q72-p11"><a href="#FS_Q72_A9"> (9) Whether they differ according to their various circumstances?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 pr."><a name="36536" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36536] +Iª-IIae q. 72 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +distinctione peccatorum vel vitiorum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur +novem. Primo, utrum peccata distinguantur specie secundum obiecta. +Secundo, de distinctione peccatorum spiritualium et carnalium. +Tertio, utrum secundum causas. Quarto, utrum secundum eos in quos +peccatur. Quinto, utrum secundum diversitatem reatus. Sexto, utrum +secundum omissionem et commissionem. Septimo, utrum secundum +diversum processum peccati. Octavo, utrum secundum abundantiam et +defectum. Nono, utrum secundum diversas circumstantias.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q72_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q72_A1-p0.1">Q. 72. A. 1. Whether sins differ in species according to their objects?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sins do not differ in species, according to their objects. For acts are said to be good or evil, in relation, + chiefly, to their end, as shown above ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A3" id="FS_Q72_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[3]</a>; + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A4" id="FS_Q72_A1-p2.2" shape="rect"> Q[18], AA[4]</a>,6). Since then sin is nothing else than a bad human act, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q72_A1-p2.3" shape="rect">Q[71], A[1]</a>), it seems that sins should differ specifically according to their ends rather than according to their objects. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36537" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36537] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccata non differant specie secundum +obiecta. Actus enim humani praecipue dicuntur boni vel mali per +comparationem ad finem, ut supra ostensum est. Cum igitur peccatum +nihil aliud sit quam actus hominis malus, sicut dictum est, videtur +quod secundum fines peccata debeant distingui specie, magis quam +secundum obiecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, evil, being a privation, differs specifically according to the different species of opposites. Now sin is an evil + in the genus of human acts. Therefore sins differ specifically according to their opposites rather than according to their + objects. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36538" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36538] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +malum, cum sit privatio, distinguitur specie secundum diversas +species oppositorum. Sed peccatum est quoddam malum in genere +humanorum actuum. Ergo peccata magis distinguuntur specie secundum +opposita, quam secundum obiecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if sins differed specifically according to their objects, it would be impossible to find the same specific sin with + diverse objects: and yet such sins are to be found. For pride is about things spiritual and material as Gregory says (Moral. + xxxiv, 18); and avarice is about different kinds of things. Therefore sins do not differ in species according to their objects. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36539" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36539] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +si peccata specie differrent secundum obiecta, impossibile esset +idem peccatum specie circa diversa obiecta inveniri. Sed +inveniuntur aliqua huiusmodi peccata, nam superbia est et in rebus +spiritualibus et in corporalibus, ut Gregorius dicit, in libro +XXXIV Moral.; avaritia etiam est circa diversa genera rerum. Ergo +peccata non distinguuntur specie secundum obiecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> "Sin is a word, deed, or desire against God's law." Now words, deeds, and desires differ in species according to their various + objects: since acts differ by their objects, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A2" id="FS_Q72_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[2]</a> ). Therefore sins, also differ in species according to their objects. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36540" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36540] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod peccatum est dictum vel factum vel concupitum contra legem +Dei. Sed dicta vel facta vel concupita distinguuntur specie +secundum diversa obiecta, quia actus per obiecta distinguuntur, ut +supra dictum est. Ergo etiam peccata secundum obiecta specie +distinguuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q71_A6" id="FS_Q72_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[6]</a>), two things concur in the nature of sin, viz. the voluntary act, and its inordinateness, which consists in departing from + God's law. Of these two, one is referred essentially to the sinner, who intends such and such an act in such and such matter; + while the other, viz. the inordinateness of the act, is referred accidentally to the intention of the sinner, for "no one + acts intending evil," as Dionysius + declares (Div. Nom. iv). Now it is evident that a thing derives its species from that which is essential and not from that + which is accidental: because what is accidental is outside the specific nature. Consequently sins differ specifically on the + part of the voluntary acts rather than of the inordinateness inherent to sin. Now voluntary acts differ in species according + to their objects, as was proved above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A2" id="FS_Q72_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[18], A[2]</a>). Therefore it follows that sins are properly + distinguished in species by their objects. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 1 co."><a name="36541" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36541] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ad rationem peccati duo +concurrunt, scilicet actus voluntarius; et inordinatio eius, quae +est per recessum a lege Dei. Horum autem duorum unum per se +comparatur ad peccantem, qui intendit talem actum voluntarium +exercere in tali materia, aliud autem, scilicet inordinatio actus, +per accidens se habet ad intentionem peccantis; nullus enim +intendens ad malum operatur, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. +Nom. Manifestum est autem quod unumquodque, consequitur speciem +secundum illud quod est per se, non autem secundum id quod est per +accidens, quia ea quae sunt per accidens, sunt extra rationem +speciei. Et ideo peccata specie distinguuntur ex parte actuum +voluntariorum, magis quam ex parte inordinationis in peccato +existentis. Actus autem voluntarii distinguuntur specie secundum +obiecta, ut in superioribus ostensum est. Unde sequitur quod +peccata proprie distinguantur specie secundum obiecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The aspect of good is found chiefly in the end: and therefore the end stands in the relation of object to the act of the + will which is at the root of every sin. Consequently it amounts to the same whether sins differ by their objects or by their + ends. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36542" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36542] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod finis principaliter habet rationem boni, et ideo +comparatur ad actum voluntatis, qui est primordialis in omni +peccato, sicut obiectum. Unde in idem redit quod peccata differant +secundum obiecta, vel secundum fines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sin is not a pure privation but an act deprived of its due order: hence sins differ specifically according to their objects + of their acts rather than according to their opposites, although, even if they were distinguished in reference to their opposite + virtues, it would come to the same: since virtues differ specifically according to their objects, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q60_A5" id="FS_Q72_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[60], A[5]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36543" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36543] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod peccatum non est pura privatio, sed est actus debito +ordine privatus. Et ideo peccata magis distinguuntur specie +secundum obiecta actuum, quam secundum opposita. Quamvis etiam si +distinguantur secundum oppositas virtutes, in idem rediret, +virtutes enim distinguuntur specie secundum obiecta, ut supra +habitum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In various things, differing in species or genus, nothing hinders our finding one formal aspect of the object, from which + aspect sin receives its species. It is thus that pride seeks excellence in reference to various things; and avarice seeks + abundance of things adapted to human use. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36544" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36544] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod nihil prohibet in diversis rebus specie vel genere +differentibus, invenire unam formalem rationem obiecti, a qua +peccatum speciem recipit. Et hoc modo superbia circa diversas res +excellentiam quaerit, avaritia vero abundantiam eorum quae usui +humano accommodantur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q72_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q72_A2-p0.1">Q. 72. A. 2. Whether spiritual sins are fittingly distinguished from carnal sins?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that spiritual sins are unfittingly distinguished from carnal sins. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.19" target="asv">Gal. 5:19</a>): "The works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, luxury, idolatry, witchcrafts," etc. + from which it seems that all kinds of sins are works of the flesh. Now carnal sins are called works of the flesh. Therefore + carnal sins should not be distinguished from spiritual sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36545" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36545] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter distinguantur peccata +spiritualia a carnalibus. Dicit enim apostolus, ad Galat. V, +<i>manifesta sunt opera carnis, quae sunt fornicatio, immunditia, +impudicitia, luxuria, idolorum servitus, veneficia,</i> etc., ex +quo videtur quod omnia peccatorum genera sunt opera carnis. Sed +peccata carnalia dicuntur opera carnis. Ergo non sunt distinguenda +peccata carnalia a spiritualibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whosoever sins, walks according to the flesh, as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.13" target="asv"> Rom. 8:13</a>: "If you live according to the flesh, you shall die. But if by the spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall live." + Now to live or walk according to the flesh seems to pertain to the nature of carnal sin. Therefore carnal sins should not + be distinguished from spiritual sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36546" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36546] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quicumque peccat, secundum carnem ambulat, secundum illud Rom. +VIII, <i>si secundum carnem vixeritis, moriemini; si autem spiritu +facta carnis mortificaveritis, vivetis</i>. Sed vivere vel ambulare +secundum carnem, videtur pertinere ad rationem peccati carnalis. +Ergo omnia peccata sunt carnalia. Non ergo sunt distinguenda +peccata carnalia a spiritualibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the higher part of the soul, which is the mind or reason, is called the spirit, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.23" target="asv"> Eph. 4:23</a>: "Be renewed in the spirit of your mind," where spirit stands for reason, according to a gloss. Now every sin, which is committed + in accordance with the flesh, flows from the reason by its consent; since consent in a sinful act belongs to the higher reason, + as we shall state further on ( + <a href="#FS_Q74_A7" id="FS_Q72_A2-p4.2" shape="rect">Q[74], A[7]</a>). + Therefore the same sins are both carnal and spiritual, and consequently they should not be distinguished from one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36547" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36547] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +superior pars animae, quae est mens vel ratio, spiritus nominatur, +secundum illud Ephes. IV, <i>renovamini spiritu mentis vestrae</i>, +ubi spiritus pro ratione ponitur, ut ibi Glossa dicit. Sed omne +peccatum quod secundum carnem committitur, a ratione derivatur per +consensum, quia superioris rationis est consentire in actum +peccati, ut infra dicetur. Ergo eadem peccata sunt carnalia et +spiritualia. Non ergo sunt distinguenda ad invicem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if some sins are carnal specifically, this, seemingly, should apply chiefly to those sins whereby man sins against + his own body. But, according to the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.6.18" target="asv">1 Cor. 6:18</a>), "every sin that a man doth, is without the body: but he that committeth fornication, sinneth against his own body." Therefore + fornication would be the only carnal sin, whereas the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.3" target="asv">Eph. 5:3</a>) reckons covetousness with the carnal + sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="36548" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36548] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +si aliqua peccata specialiter sunt carnalia, hoc potissime +intelligendum videtur de illis peccatis quibus aliquis in corpus +suum peccat. Sed sicut apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. VI, <i>omne +peccatum quodcumque fecerit homo, extra corpus est, qui autem +fornicatur, in corpus suum peccat</i>. Ergo sola fornicatio esset +peccatum carnale, cum tamen apostolus, ad Ephes. V, etiam avaritiam +carnalibus peccatis annumeret.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) says that "of the seven capital sins five are spiritual, and two carnal." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36549" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36549] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., dicit quod <i>septem capitalium +vitiorum quinque sunt spiritualia, et duo carnalia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q72_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q72_A1" id="FS_Q72_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, sins take their species from their objects. Now every sin consists in the desire for some mutable good, for which man has + an inordinate desire, and the possession of which gives him inordinate pleasure. Now, as explained above (Q[31], A[3]), pleasure + is twofold. One belongs to the soul, and is consummated in the mere apprehension of a thing possessed in accordance with desire; + this can also be called spiritual + pleasure, e.g. when one takes pleasure in human praise or the like. The other pleasure is bodily or natural, and is realized + in bodily touch, and this can also be called carnal pleasure. + </p><p id="FS_Q72_A2-p8"> Accordingly, those sins which consist in spiritual pleasure, are called spiritual sins; while those which consist in carnal + pleasure, are called carnal sins, e.g. gluttony, which consists in the pleasures of the table; and lust, which consists in + sexual pleasures. Hence the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.7.1" target="asv">2 Cor. 7:1</a>): "Let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of the flesh and of the spirit." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 co."><a name="36550" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36550] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, peccata recipiunt speciem ex +obiectis. Omne autem peccatum consistit in appetitu alicuius +commutabilis boni quod inordinate appetitur, et per consequens in +eo iam habito inordinate aliquis delectatur. Ut autem ex +superioribus patet, duplex est delectatio. Una quidem animalis, +quae consummatur in sola apprehensione alicuius rei ad votum +habitae, et haec etiam potest dici delectatio spiritualis, sicut +cum aliquis delectatur in laude humana, vel in aliquo huiusmodi. +Alia vero delectatio est corporalis, sive naturalis, quae in ipso +tactu corporali perficitur, quae potest etiam dici delectatio +carnalis. Sic igitur illa peccata quae perficiuntur in delectatione +spirituali, vocantur peccata spiritualia, illa vero quae +perficiuntur in delectatione carnali, vocantur peccata carnalia; +sicut gula, quae perficitur in delectatione ciborum, et luxuria, +quae perficitur in delectatione venereorum. Unde et apostolus dicit +II ad Cor. VII. <i>Emundemus nos ab omni inquinamento, carnis et +spiritus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As a gloss says on the same passage, these vices are called works of the flesh, not as though they consisted in carnal pleasure; + but flesh here denotes man, who is said to live according to the flesh, when he lives according to himself, as Augustine says + (De Civ. Dei xiv, 2,3). The reason of this is because every failing in the human reason is due in some way to the carnal sense. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36551" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36551] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut Glossa ibidem dicit, illa vitia dicuntur +opera carnis, <i>non quia in voluptate carnis perficiantur, sed +caro sumitur ibi pro homine, qui dum secundum se vivit, secundum +carnem vivere dicitur</i>; ut etiam Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. +Dei. Et huius ratio est ex hoc, quod omnis rationis humanae +defectus ex sensu carnali aliquo modo initium habet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A2-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36552" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36552] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc +etiam patet responsio ad secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even in the carnal sins there is a spiritual act, viz. the act of reason: but the end of these sins, from which they are + named, is carnal pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36553" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36553] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in peccatis etiam carnalibus est aliquis actus +spiritualis, scilicet actus rationis, sed finis horum peccatorum, a +quo denominantur, est delectatio carnis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As the gloss says, "in the sin of fornication the soul is the body's slave in a special sense, because at the moment of sinning + it can think of nothing else": whereas the pleasure of gluttony, although carnal, does not so utterly absorb the reason. It + may also be said that in this sin, an injury is done to the body also, for it is defiled inordinately: wherefore by this sin + alone is man said specifically to sin against his body. While covetousness, + which is reckoned among the carnal sins, stands here for adultery, which is the unjust appropriation of another's wife. Again, + it may be said that the thing in which the covetous man takes pleasure is something bodily, and in this respect covetousness + is numbered with the carnal sins: but the pleasure itself does not belong to the body, but to the spirit, wherefore Gregory + says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that it is a spiritual sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="36554" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36554] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, sicut Glossa ibidem dicit, <i>specialiter in +fornicationis peccato servit anima corpori, intantum ut nihil aliud +in ipso momento cogitare homini liceat</i>. Delectatio autem gulae, +etsi sit carnalis, non ita absorbet rationem. Vel potest dici quod +in hoc peccato etiam quaedam iniuria fit corpori, dum inordinate +maculatur. Et ideo per hoc solum peccatum dicitur specialiter homo +in corpus peccare. Avaritia vero quae in carnalibus peccatis +connumeratur, pro adulterio ponitur, quod est iniusta usurpatio +uxoris alienae. Vel potest dici quod res in qua delectatur avarus, +corporale quoddam est, et quantum ad hoc, connumeratur peccatis +carnalibus. Sed ipsa delectatio non pertinet ad carnem, sed ad +spiritum, et ideo secundum Gregorium, est spirituale peccatum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q72_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q72_A3-p0.1">Q. 72. A. 3. Whether sins differ specifically in reference to their causes?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sins differ specifically in reference to their causes. For a thing takes its species from that whence + it derives its being. Now sins derive their being from their causes. Therefore they take their species from them also. Therefore + they differ specifically in reference to their causes. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36555" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36555] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccata distinguantur specie secundum +causas. Ab eodem enim habet res speciem, a quo habet esse. Sed +peccata habent esse ex suis causis. Ergo ab eis etiam speciem +sortiuntur. Differunt ergo specie secundum diversitatem +causarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, of all the causes the material cause seems to have least reference to the species. Now the object in a sin is like + its material cause. Since, therefore, sins differ specifically according to their objects, it seems that much more do they + differ in reference to their other causes. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36556" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36556] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +inter alias causas minus videtur pertinere ad speciem causa +materialis. Sed obiectum in peccato est sicut causa materialis. Cum +ergo secundum obiecta peccata specie distinguantur, videtur quod +peccata multo magis secundum alias causas distinguantur specie.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine, commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.79.17" target="asv"> Ps. 79:17, </a> "Things set on fire and dug down," says that "every sin is due either to fear inducing false humility, or to love enkindling + us to undue ardor." For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:16</a>) that "all that is in the world, is the concupiscence of the flesh, or [Vulg.: 'and'] the concupiscence of the eyes, or [Vulg.: + 'and'] the pride of life." Now a thing is said to be in the world on + account of sin, in as much as the world denotes lovers of the world, as Augustine observes (Tract. ii in Joan.). Gregory, + too (Moral. xxxi, 17), distinguishes all sins according to the seven capital vices. Now all these divisions refer to the causes + of sins. Therefore, seemingly, sins differ specifically according to the diversity of their causes. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36557" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36557] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus, super illud Psalmi, incensa igni et suffossa, dicit +quod <i>omne peccatum est ex timore male humiliante, vel ex amore +male inflammante</i>. Dicitur etiam I Ioan. II, quod <i>omne quod +est in mundo, aut est concupiscentia carnis, aut concupiscentia +oculorum, aut superbia vitae</i>, dicitur autem aliquid esse in +mundo, propter peccatum, secundum quod mundi nomine amatores mundi +significantur, ut Augustinus dicit, super Ioan. Gregorius etiam, +XXXI Moral., distinguit omnia peccata secundum septem vitia +capitalia. Omnes autem huiusmodi divisiones respiciunt causas +peccatorum. Ergo videtur quod peccata differant specie secundum +diversitatem causarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> If this were the case all sins would belong to one species, since they are due to one cause. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.15" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:15</a>) that "pride is the beginning of all sin," and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.10" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:10</a>) that "the desire of money is the root of all evils." Now it is evident that there are various species of sins. Therefore + sins do not differ specifically according to their different causes. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36558" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36558] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quia secundum hoc omnia peccata essent unius speciei, cum ex +una causa causentur, dicitur enim Eccli. X, quod <i>initium omnis +peccati est superbia</i>; et I ad Tim. ult., quod <i>radix omnium +malorum est cupiditas</i>. Manifestum est autem esse diversas +species peccatorum. Non ergo peccata distinguuntur specie secundum +diversitates causarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since there are four kinds of causes, they are attributed to various things in various ways. Because the "formal" and the + "material" cause regard properly the substance of a thing; and consequently substances differ in respect of their matter and + form, both in species and in genus. The "agent" and the "end" regard directly movement and operation: wherefore movements + and operations differ specifically in respect of these causes; in different ways, however, + because the natural active principles are always determined to the same acts; so that the different species of natural acts + are taken not only from the objects, which are the ends or terms of those acts, but also from their active principles: thus + heating and cooling are specifically distinct with reference to hot and cold. On the other hand, the active principles in + voluntary acts, such as the acts of sins, are not determined, of necessity, to one act, and consequently from one active or + motive principle, diverse species of sins can proceed: thus from fear engendering false humility man may proceed to theft, + or murder, or to neglect the flock committed to his care; and these same things may proceed from love enkindling to undue + ardor. Hence it is evident that sins do not differ specifically according to their various active or motive causes, but only + in respect of diversity in the final cause, which is the end and object of the will. For it has been shown above ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A3" id="FS_Q72_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[3]</a>; + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A4" id="FS_Q72_A3-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[18], AA[4]</a>,6) that human acts take their species from the end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 3 co."><a name="36559" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36559] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, cum quatuor sint causarum genera, diversimode +diversis attribuuntur. Causa enim formalis et materialis respiciunt +proprie substantiam rei, et ideo substantiae secundum formam et +materiam specie et genere distinguuntur. Agens autem et finis +respiciunt directe motum et operationem, et ideo motus et +operationes secundum huiusmodi causas specie distinguuntur; +diversimode tamen. Nam principia activa naturalia sunt determinata +semper ad eosdem actus, et ideo diversae species in actibus +naturalibus attenduntur non solum secundum obiecta, quae sunt fines +vel termini, sed etiam secundum principia activa; sicut calefacere +et infrigidare distinguuntur specie secundum calidum et frigidum. +Sed principia activa in actibus voluntariis, cuiusmodi sunt actus +peccatorum, non se habent ex necessitate ad unum, et ideo ex uno +principio activo vel motivo possunt diversae species peccatorum +procedere; sicut ex timore male humiliante potest procedere quod +homo furetur, et quod occidat, et quod deserat gregem sibi +commissum; et haec eadem possunt procedere ex amore. Unde +manifestum est quod peccata non differant specie secundum diversas +causas activas vel motivas; sed solum secundum diversitatem causae +finalis. Finis autem est obiectum voluntatis, ostensum est enim +supra quod actus humani habent speciem ex fine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The active principles in voluntary acts, not being determined to one act, do not suffice for the production of human acts, + unless the will be determined to one by the intention of the end, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. ix, text. 15,16), and + consequently sin derives both its being and its species from the end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36560" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36560] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod principia activa in actibus voluntariis, cum non +sint determinata ad unum, non sufficiunt ad producendum humanos +actus, nisi determinetur voluntas ad unum per intentionem finis; ut +patet per philosophum, in IX Metaphys. Et ideo a fine perficitur et +esse et species peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Objects, in relation to external acts, have the character of matter "about which"; but, in relation to the interior act of + the will, they have the character of end; and it is owing to this that they give the act its species. Nevertheless, even considered + as the matter "about which," they have the character of term, from which movement takes its species (Phys. v, text. 4; Ethic. + x, 4); yet even terms of movement specify movements, in so far as term has + the character of end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36561" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36561] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod obiecta, secundum quod comparantur ad actus +exteriores, habent rationem materiae circa quam, sed secundum quod +comparantur ad actum interiorem voluntatis, habent rationem finium; +et ex hoc habent quod dent speciem actui. Quamvis etiam secundum +quod sunt materia circa quam, habeant rationem terminorum; a quibus +motus specificantur, ut dicitur in V Physic. et in X Ethic. Sed +tamen etiam termini motus dant speciem motibus, inquantum habent +rationem finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These distinctions of sins are given, not as distinct species of sins, but to show their various causes. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36562" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36562] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod illae divisiones peccatorum non dantur ad +distinguendas species peccatorum; sed ad manifestandas diversas +causas eorum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q72_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q72_A4-p0.1">Q. 72. A. 4. Whether sin is fittingly divided into sin against God, against oneself, and against one's neighbor?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin is unfittingly divided into sin against God, against one's neighbor, and against oneself. For that + which is common to all sins should not be reckoned as a part in the division of sin. But it is common to all sins to be against + God: for it is stated in the definition of sin that it is "against God's law," as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q66_A6" id="FS_Q72_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[66], A[6]</a>). Therefore sin against God should not be reckoned a part of the division of + sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36563" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36563] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter peccatum distinguatur +per peccatum quod est in Deum, in proximum, et in seipsum. Illud +enim quod est commune omni peccato, non debet poni quasi pars in +divisione peccati. Sed commune est omni peccato quod sit contra +Deum, ponitur enim in definitione peccati quod sit contra legem +Dei, ut supra dictum est. Non ergo peccatum in Deum debet poni +quasi pars in divisione peccatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every division should consist of things in opposition to one another. But these three kinds of sin are not opposed + to one another: for whoever sins against his neighbor, sins against himself and against God. Therefore sin is not fittingly + divided into these three. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36564" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36564] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +omnis divisio debet fieri per opposita. Sed ista tria genera +peccatorum non sunt opposita, quicumque enim peccat in proximum, +peccat etiam in seipsum et in Deum. Non ergo peccatum convenienter +dividitur secundum haec tria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, specification is not taken from things external. But God and our neighbor are external to us. Therefore sins are + not distinguished specifically with regard to them: and consequently sin is unfittingly divided according to these three. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36565" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36565] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +ea quae sunt extrinsecus, non conferunt speciem. Sed Deus et +proximus sunt extra nos. Ergo per haec non distinguuntur peccata +secundum speciem. Inconvenienter igitur secundum haec tria peccatum +dividitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore (De Summo Bono), in giving the division of sins, says that "man is said to sin against himself, against God, and + against his neighbor." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36566" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36566] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Isidorus, in libro de summo bono, distinguens peccata, +dicit quod <i>homo dicitur peccare in se, in Deum, et in +proximum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q72_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[71], AA[1]</a>,6), sin is an inordinate act. Now there should be a threefold order in man: one in relation to the rule of reason, in so + far as all our actions and passions should be commensurate with the rule of reason: another order is in relation to the rule + of the Divine Law, whereby man should be directed in all things: and if man were by nature a solitary animal, this twofold + order would suffice. But since man is + naturally a civic and social animal, as is proved in Polit. i, 2, hence a third order is necessary, whereby man is directed + in relation to other men among whom he has to dwell. Of these orders the second contains the first and surpasses it. For whatever + things are comprised under the order of reason, are comprised under the order of God Himself. Yet some things are comprised + under the order of God, which surpass the human reason, such as matters of faith, and things due to God alone. Hence he + that sins in such matters, for instance, by heresy, sacrilege, or blasphemy, is said to sin against God. In like manner, the + first order includes the third and surpasses it, because in all things wherein we are directed in reference to our neighbor, + we need to be directed according to the order of reason. Yet in some things we are directed according to reason, in relation + to ourselves only, and not in reference to our neighbor; and when man sins in these matters, he is said to sin against + himself, as is seen in the glutton, the lustful, and the prodigal. But when man sins in matters concerning his neighbor, he + is said to sin against his neighbor, as appears in the thief and murderer. Now the things whereby man is directed to God, + his neighbor, and himself are diverse. Wherefore this distinction of sins is in respect of their objects, according to which + the species of sins are diversified: and consequently this distinction of sins is properly one of different species of sins: + because the virtues also, to which sins are opposed, differ specifically in respect of these three. For it is evident from + what has been said ( + <a href="#FS_Q62_A1" id="FS_Q72_A4-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[62], AA[1]</a>,2,3) that by the theological virtues man is directed to God; by temperance and fortitude, to himself; and by justice to his + neighbor. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 4 co."><a name="36567" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36567] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, peccatum est actus +inordinatus. Triplex autem ordo in homine debet esse. Unus quidem +secundum comparationem ad regulam rationis, prout scilicet omnes +actiones et passiones nostrae debent secundum regulam rationis +commensurari. Alius autem ordo est per comparationem ad regulam +divinae legis, per quam homo in omnibus dirigi debet. Et si quidem +homo naturaliter esset animal solitarium, hic duplex ordo +sufficeret, sed quia homo est naturaliter animal politicum et +sociale, ut probatur in I Polit., ideo necesse est quod sit tertius +ordo, quo homo ordinetur ad alios homines, quibus convivere debet. +Horum autem ordinum secundus continet primum, et excedit ipsum. +Quaecumque enim continentur sub ordine rationis, continentur sub +ordine ipsius Dei, sed quaedam continentur sub ordine ipsius Dei, +quae excedunt rationem humanam, sicut ea quae sunt fidei, et quae +debentur soli Deo. Unde qui in talibus peccat, dicitur in Deum +peccare, sicut haereticus et sacrilegus et blasphemus. Similiter +etiam secundus ordo includit tertium, et excedit ipsum. Quia in +omnibus in quibus ordinamur ad proximum, oportet nos dirigi +secundum regulam rationis, sed in quibusdam dirigimur secundum +rationem quantum ad nos tantum, non autem quantum ad proximum. Et +quando in his peccatur, dicitur homo peccare in seipsum, sicut +patet de guloso, luxurioso et prodigo. Quando vero peccat homo in +his quibus ad proximum ordinatur, dicitur peccare in proximum, +sicut patet de fure et homicida. Sunt autem diversa quibus homo +ordinatur ad Deum, et ad proximum, et ad seipsum. Unde haec +distinctio peccatorum est secundum obiecta, secundum quae +diversificantur species peccatorum. Unde haec distinctio peccatorum +proprie est secundum diversas peccatorum species. Nam et virtutes, +quibus peccata opponuntur, secundum hanc differentiam specie +distinguuntur, manifestum est enim ex dictis quod virtutibus +theologicis homo ordinatur ad Deum, temperantia vero et fortitudine +ad seipsum, iustitia autem ad proximum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To sin against God is common to all sins, in so far as the order to God includes every human order; but in so far as order + to God surpasses the other two orders, sin against God is a special kind of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36568" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36568] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod peccare in Deum, secundum quod ordo qui est ad +Deum, includit omnem humanum ordinem, commune est omni peccato. Sed +quantum ad id quod ordo Dei excedit alios duos ordines, sic +peccatum in Deum est speciale genus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When several things, of which one includes another, are distinct from one another, this distinction is understood to refer, + not to the part contained in another, but to that in which one goes beyond another. This may be seen in the division of numbers + and figures: for a triangle is distinguished from a four-sided figure not in respect of its being contained thereby, but in + respect of that in which it is surpassed thereby: and the same applies to the + numbers three and four. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36569" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36569] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod quando aliqua quorum unum includit alterum, ab +invicem distinguuntur, intelligitur fieri distinctio non secundum +illud quod unum continetur in altero, sed secundum illud quod unum +excedit alterum. Sicut patet in divisione numerorum et figurarum, +non enim triangulus dividitur contra quadratum secundum quod +continetur in eo, sed secundum quod exceditur ab eo; et similiter +est de ternario et quaternario.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although God and our neighbor are external to the sinner himself, they are not external to the act of sin, but are related + to it as to its object. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36570" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36570] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod Deus et proximus, quamvis sint exteriora respectu +ipsius peccantis, non tamen sunt extranea respectu actus peccati; +sed comparantur ad ipsum sicut propria obiecta ipsius.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q72_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q72_A5-p0.1">Q. 72. A. 5. Whether the division of sins according to their debt of punishment diversifies their species?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the division of sins according to their debt of punishment diversifies their species; for instance, when + sin is divided into "mortal" and "venial." For things which are infinitely apart, cannot belong to the same species, nor even + to the same genus. But venial and mortal sin are infinitely apart, since temporal punishment is due to venial sin, and eternal + punishment to mortal sin; and the measure of the punishment corresponds to the gravity + of the fault, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.2" target="asv"> Dt. 25:2</a>: "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure be also of the stripes be." Therefore venial and mortal sins are + not of the same genus, nor can they be said to belong to the same species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36571" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36571] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod divisio peccatorum quae est secundum +reatum, diversificet speciem, puta cum dividitur secundum veniale +et mortale. Ea enim quae in infinitum differunt, non possunt esse +unius speciei, nec etiam unius generis. Sed veniale et mortale +peccatum differunt in infinitum, veniali enim debetur poena +temporalis, mortali poena aeterna; mensura autem poenae respondet +quantitati culpae, secundum illud Deut. XXV, <i>pro mensura delicti +erit et plagarum modus</i>. Ergo veniale et mortale non sunt unius +generis, nedum quod sint unius speciei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, some sins are mortal in virtue of their species [*"Ex genere," genus in this case denoting the species], as murder + and adultery; and some are venial in virtue of their species, as in an idle word, and excessive laughter. Therefore venial + and mortal sins differ specifically. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36572" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36572] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quaedam peccata sunt mortalia ex genere, sicut homicidium et +adulterium, quaedam vero ex suo genere sunt peccata venialia, sicut +verbum otiosum et risus superfluus. Ergo peccatum veniale et +mortale specie differunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as a virtuous act stands in relation to its reward, so does sin stand in relation to punishment. But the reward + is the end of the virtuous act. Therefore punishment is the end of sin. Now sins differ specifically in relation to their + ends, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). Therefore they are also specifically distinct according to the debt of punishment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36573" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36573] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut se habet actus virtuosus ad praemium, ita se habet peccatum +ad poenam. Sed praemium est finis virtuosi actus. Ergo et poena est +finis peccati. Sed peccata distinguuntur specie secundum fines, ut +dictum est. Ergo etiam distinguuntur specie secundum reatum +poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Those things that constitute a species are prior to the species, e.g. specific differences. But punishment follows sin as + the effect thereof. Therefore sins do not differ specifically according to the debt of punishment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36574" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36574] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +ea quae constituunt speciem, sunt priora, sicut differentiae +specificae. Sed poena sequitur culpam, sicut effectus eius. Ergo +peccata non differunt specie secundum reatum poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q72_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In things that differ specifically we find a twofold difference: the first causes the diversity of species, and is not to + be found save in different species, e.g. "rational" and "irrational," "animate," and "inanimate": the other difference is + consequent to specific diversity; and though, in some cases, it may be consequent to specific diversity, yet, in others, it + may be found within the same species; thus "white" and "black" are consequent to the specific + diversity of crow and swan, and yet this difference is found within the one species of man. + </p><p id="FS_Q72_A5-p7"> We must therefore say that the difference between venial and mortal sin, or any other difference is respect of the debt of + punishment, cannot be a difference constituting specific diversity. For what is accidental never constitutes a species; and + what is outside the agent's intention is accidental (Phys. ii, text. 50). Now it is evident that punishment is outside the + intention of the sinner, wherefore it is accidentally referred to sin on the part of the sinner. Nevertheless it + is referred to sin by an extrinsic principle, viz. the justice of the judge, who imposes various punishments according to + the various manners of sin. Therefore the difference derived from the debt of punishment, may be consequent to the specific + diversity of sins, but cannot constitute it. + </p><p id="FS_Q72_A5-p8"> Now the difference between venial and mortal sin is consequent to the diversity of that inordinateness which constitutes + the notion of sin. For inordinateness is twofold, one that destroys the principle of order, and another which, without destroying + the principle of order, implies inordinateness in the things which follow the principle: thus, in an animal's body, the frame + may be so out of order that the vital principle is destroyed; this is the inordinateness of death; while, + on the other hand, saving the vital principle, there may be disorder in the bodily humors; and then there is sickness. Now + the principle of the entire moral order is the last end, which stands in the same relation to matters of action, as the indemonstrable + principle does to matters of speculation (Ethic. vii, 8). Therefore when the soul is so disordered by sin as to turn away + from its last end, viz. God, to Whom it is united by charity, there is mortal sin; but when it is disordered without + turning away from God, there is venial sin. For even as in the body, the disorder of death which results from the destruction + of the principle of life, is irreparable according to nature, while the disorder of sickness can be repaired by reason of + the vital principle being preserved, so it is in matters concerning the soul. Because, in speculative matters, it is impossible + to convince one who errs in the principles, whereas one who errs, but retains the principles, can be brought back to the + truth by means of the principles. Likewise in practical matters, he who, by sinning, turns away from his last end, if we consider + the nature of his sin, falls irreparably, and therefore is said to sin mortally and to deserve eternal punishment: whereas + when a man sins without turning away from God, by the very nature of his sin, his disorder can be repaired, because the principle + of the order is not destroyed; wherefore he is said to sin venially, because, to wit, he does not sin so as to + deserve to be punished eternally. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 5 co."><a name="36575" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36575] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod eorum quae specie differunt, duplex differentia +invenitur. Una quidem quae constituit diversitatem specierum, et +talis differentia nunquam invenitur nisi in speciebus diversis; +sicut rationale et irrationale, animatum et inanimatum. Alia autem +differentia est consequens diversitatem speciei, et talis +differentia, etsi in aliquibus consequatur diversitatem speciei, in +aliis tamen potest inveniri in eadem specie; sicut album et nigrum +consequuntur diversitatem speciei corvi et cygni, tamen invenitur +huiusmodi differentia in eadem hominis specie. Dicendum est ergo +quod differentia venialis et mortalis peccati, vel quaecumque alia +differentia sumitur penes reatum, non potest esse differentia +constituens diversitatem speciei. Nunquam enim id quod est per +accidens, constituit speciem. Id autem quod est praeter intentionem +agentis, est per accidens, ut patet in II Physic. Manifestum est +autem quod poena est praeter intentionem peccantis. Unde per +accidens se habet ad peccatum, ex parte ipsius peccantis. Ordinatur +tamen ad peccatum ab exteriori, scilicet ex iustitia iudicantis, +qui secundum diversas conditiones peccatorum diversas poenas +infligit. Unde differentia quae est ex reatu poenae, potest +consequi diversam speciem peccatorum; non autem constituit +diversitatem speciei. Differentia autem peccati venialis et +mortalis consequitur diversitatem inordinationis, quae complet +rationem peccati. Duplex enim est inordinatio, una per +subtractionem principii ordinis; alia qua, salvato principio +ordinis, fit inordinatio circa ea quae sunt post principium. Sicut +in corpore animalis quandoque quidem inordinatio complexionis +procedit usque ad destructionem principii vitalis, et haec est +mors, quandoque vero, salvo principio vitae, fit inordinatio +quaedam in humoribus, et tunc est aegritudo. Principium autem +totius ordinis in moralibus est finis ultimus, qui ita se habet in +operativis, sicut principium indemonstrabile in speculativis, ut +dicitur in VII Ethic. Unde quando anima deordinatur per peccatum +usque ad aversionem ab ultimo fine, scilicet Deo, cui unimur per +caritatem, tunc est peccatum mortale, quando vero fit deordinatio +citra aversionem a Deo, tunc est peccatum veniale. Sicut enim in +corporalibus deordinatio mortis, quae est per remotionem principii +vitae, est irreparabilis secundum naturam; inordinatio autem +aegritudinis reparari potest, propter id quod salvatur principium +vitae; similiter est in his quae pertinent ad animam. Nam in +speculativis qui errat circa principia, impersuasibilis est, qui +autem errat salvatis principiis, per ipsa principia revocari +potest. Et similiter in operativis qui peccando avertitur ab ultimo +fine, quantum est ex natura peccati, habet lapsum irreparabilem, et +ideo dicitur peccare mortaliter, aeternaliter puniendus. Qui vero +peccat citra aversionem a Deo, ex ipsa ratione peccati +reparabiliter deordinatur, quia salvatur principium, et ideo +dicitur peccare venialiter, quia scilicet non ita peccat ut +mereatur interminabilem poenam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Mortal and venial sins are infinitely apart as regards what they "turn away from," not as regards what they "turn to," viz. + the object which specifies them. Hence nothing hinders the same species from including mortal and venial sins; for instance, + in the species "adultery" the first movement is a venial sin; while an idle word, which is, generally speaking, venial, may + even be a mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36576" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36576] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod peccatum mortale et veniale differunt in +infinitum ex parte aversionis, non autem ex parte conversionis, per +quam respicit obiectum, unde peccatum speciem habet. Unde nihil +prohibet in eadem specie inveniri aliquod peccatum mortale et +veniale, sicut primus motus in genere adulterii est peccatum +veniale; et verbum otiosum, quod plerumque est veniale, potest +etiam esse mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the fact that one sin is mortal by reason of its species, and another venial by reason of its species, it follows that + this difference is consequent to the specific difference of sins, not that it is the cause thereof. And this difference may + be found even in things of the same species, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36577" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36577] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ex hoc quod invenitur aliquod peccatum mortale ex +genere, et aliquod peccatum veniale ex genere, sequitur quod talis +differentia consequatur diversitatem peccatorum secundum speciem, +non autem quod causet eam. Talis autem differentia potest inveniri +etiam in his quae sunt eiusdem speciei, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reward is intended by him that merits or acts virtually; whereas the punishment is not intended by the sinner, but, on + the contrary, is against his will. Hence the comparison fails. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36578" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36578] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod praemium est de intentione merentis vel virtuose +agentis, sed poena non est de intentione peccantis, sed magis est +contra voluntatem ipsius. Unde non est similis ratio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q72_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q72_A6-p0.1">Q. 72. A. 6. Whether sins of commission and omission differ specifically?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sins of commission and omission differ specifically. For "offense" and "sin" are condivided with one another + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.1" target="asv">Eph. 2:1</a>), where it is written: "When you were dead in your offenses and sins," which words a gloss explains, saying: "'Offenses,' + by omitting to do what was commanded, and 'sins,' by doing what was forbidden." Whence it is evident that "offenses" here + denotes sins of omission; while "sin" denotes sins of + commission. Therefore they differ specifically, since they are contrasted with one another as different species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="36579" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36579] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum commissionis et omissionis +specie differant. Delictum enim contra peccatum dividitur, Ephes. +II, ubi dicitur, <i>cum essetis mortui delictis et peccatis +vestris</i>. Et exponit ibi Glossa, <i>delictis, idest dimittendo +quae iubentur; et peccatis, scilicet agendo prohibita</i>, ex quo +patet quod per delictum intelligitur peccatum omissionis, per +peccatum, peccatum commissionis. Differunt igitur specie, cum ex +opposito dividantur, tanquam diversae species.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is essential to sin to be against God's law, for this is part of its definition, as is clear from what has been + said ( + <a href="#FS_Q71_A6" id="FS_Q72_A6-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[6]</a>). Now in God's law, the affirmative precepts, against which is the sin of omission, are different from the negative precepts, + against which is the sin of omission. Therefore sins of omission and commission differ specifically. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="36580" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36580] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +peccato per se convenit quod sit contra legem Dei, ponitur enim in +eius definitione, ut ex supradictis patet. Sed in lege Dei alia +sunt praecepta affirmativa, contra quae est peccatum omissionis; et +alia praecepta negativa, contra quae est peccatum commissionis. +Ergo peccatum omissionis et peccatum commissionis differunt +specie.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, omission and commission differ as affirmation and negation. Now affirmation and negation cannot be in the same species, + since negation has no species; for "there is neither species nor difference of non-being," as the Philosopher states (Phys. + iv, text. 67). Therefore omission and commission cannot belong to the same species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="36581" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36581] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +omissio et commissio differunt sicut affirmatio et negatio. Sed +affirmatio et negatio non possunt esse unius speciei, quia negatio +non habet speciem; non entis enim non sunt neque species neque +differentiae, ut philosophus dicit. Ergo omissio et commissio non +possunt esse unius speciei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Omission and commission are found in the same species of sin. For the covetous man both takes what belongs to others, which + is a sin of commission; and gives not of his own to whom he should give, which is a sin of omission. Therefore omission and + commission do not differ specifically. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 6 s. c."><a name="36582" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36582] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +in eadem specie peccati invenitur omissio et commissio, avarus enim +et aliena rapit, quod est peccatum commissionis; et sua non dat +quibus dare debet, quod est peccatum omissionis. Ergo omissio et +commissio non differunt specie.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There is a twofold difference in sins; a material difference and a formal difference: the material difference is to be observed + in the natural species of the sinful act; while the formal difference is gathered from their relation to one proper end, which + is also their proper object. Hence we find certain acts differing from one another in the material specific difference, which + are nevertheless formally in the same species of sin, because they are directed + to the one same end: thus strangling, stoning, and stabbing come under the one species of murder, although the actions themselves + differ specifically according to the natural species. Accordingly, if we refer to the material species in sins of omission + and commission, they differ specifically, using species in a broad sense, in so far as negation and privation may have a species. + But if we refer to the formal species of sins of omission and commission, they do not differ specifically, because + they are directed to the same end, and proceed from the same motive. For the covetous man, in order to hoard money, both robs, + and omits to give what he ought, and in like manner, the glutton, to satiate his appetite, both eats too much and omits the + prescribed fasts. The same applies to other sins: for in things, negation is always founded on affirmation, which, in a manner, + is its cause. Hence in the physical order it comes under the same head, that fire gives forth heat, and that it does not + give forth cold. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 6 co."><a name="36583" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36583] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod in peccatis invenitur duplex differentia, una +materialis, et alia formalis. Materialis quidem attenditur secundum +naturalem speciem actuum peccati, formalis autem secundum ordinem +ad unum finem proprium, quod est obiectum proprium. Unde +inveniuntur aliqui actus materialiter specie differentes, qui tamen +formaliter sunt in eadem specie peccati, quia ad idem ordinantur, +sicut ad eandem speciem homicidii pertinet iugulatio, lapidatio et +perforatio, quamvis actus sint specie differentes secundum speciem +naturae. Sic ergo si loquamur de specie peccati omissionis et +commissionis materialiter, differunt specie, large tamen loquendo +de specie, secundum quod negatio vel privatio speciem habere +potest. Si autem loquamur de specie peccati omissionis et +commissionis formaliter, sic non differunt specie, quia ad idem +ordinantur, et ex eodem motivo procedunt. Avarus enim ad +congregandum pecuniam et rapit, et non dat ea quae dare debet; et +similiter gulosus ad satisfaciendum gulae, et superflua comedit, et +ieiunia debita praetermittit; et idem est videre in ceteris. Semper +enim in rebus negatio fundatur super aliqua affirmatione, quae est +quodammodo causa eius, unde etiam in rebus naturalibus eiusdem +rationis est quod ignis calefaciat, et quod non infrigidet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This division in respect of commission and omission, is not according to different formal species, but only according to + material species, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="36584" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36584] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod illa divisio quae est per commissionem et +omissionem, non est secundum diversas species formales, sed +materiales tantum, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In God's law, the necessity for various affirmative and negative precepts, was that men might be gradually led to virtue, + first by abstaining from evil, being induced to this by the negative precepts, and afterwards by doing good, to which we are + induced by the affirmative precepts. Wherefore the affirmative and negative precepts do not belong to different virtues, but + to different degrees of virtue; and consequently they are not of necessity, opposed + to sins of different species. Moreover sin is not specified by that from which it turns away, because in this respect it is + a negation or privation, but by that to which it turns, in so far as sin is an act. Consequently sins do not differ specifically + according to the various precepts of the Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="36585" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36585] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod necesse fuit in lege Dei proponi diversa praecepta +affirmativa et negativa, ut gradatim homines introducerentur ad +virtutem, prius quidem abstinendo a malo, ad quod inducimur per +praecepta negativa; et postmodum faciendo bonum, ad quod inducimur +per praecepta affirmativa. Et sic praecepta affirmativa et negativa +non pertinent ad diversas virtutes, sed ad diversos gradus +virtutis. Et per consequens non oportet quod contrarientur diversis +peccatis secundum speciem. Peccatum etiam non habet speciem ex +parte aversionis, quia secundum hoc est negatio vel privatio, sed +ex parte conversionis, secundum quod est actus quidam. Unde +secundum diversa praecepta legis non diversificantur peccata +secundum speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection considers the material diversity of sins. It must be observed, however, that although, properly speaking, + negation is not in a species, yet it is allotted to a species by reduction to the affirmation on which it is based. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="36586" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36586] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de materiali diversitate +speciei. Sciendum est tamen quod negatio, etsi proprie non sit in +specie, constituitur tamen in specie per reductionem ad aliquam +affirmationem quam sequitur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q72_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q72_A7-p0.1">Q. 72. A. 7. Whether sins are fittingly divided into sins of thought, word, and deed?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sins are unfittingly divided into sins of thought, word, and deed. For Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) describes + three stages of sin, of which the first is "when the carnal sense offers a bait," which is the sin of thought; the second + stage is reached "when one is satisfied with the mere pleasure of thought"; and the third stage, "when consent is given to + the deed." Now these three belong to the sin of thought. Therefore it is unfitting to + reckon sin of thought as one kind of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="36587" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36587] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter dividatur peccatum in +peccatum cordis, oris, et operis. Augustinus enim, in XII de Trin., +ponit tres gradus peccati, quorum primus est, cum carnalis sensus +illecebram quandam ingerit, quod est peccatum cogitationis, +secundus gradus est, quando sola cogitationis delectatione aliquis +contentus est; tertius gradus est, quando faciendum decernitur per +consensum. Sed tria haec pertinent ad peccatum cordis. Ergo +inconvenienter peccatum cordis ponitur quasi unum genus +peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory (Moral. iv, 25) reckons four degrees of sin; the first of which is "a fault hidden in the heart"; the second, + "when it is done openly"; the third, "when it is formed into a habit"; and the fourth, "when man goes so far as to presume + on God's mercy or to give himself up to despair": where no distinction is made between sins of deed and sins of word, and + two other degrees of sin are added. Therefore the first division was unfitting. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="36588" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36588] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Gregorius, in IV Moral., ponit quatuor gradus peccati, quorum +primus est culpa latens in corde; secundus, cum exterius +publicatur; tertius est, cum consuetudine roboratur; quartus est, +cum usque ad praesumptionem divinae misericordiae, vel ad +desperationem, homo procedit. Ubi non distinguitur peccatum operis +a peccato oris; et adduntur duo alii peccatorum gradus. Ergo +inconveniens fuit prima divisio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there can be no sin of word or deed unless there precede sin of thought. Therefore these sins do not differ specifically. + Therefore they should not be condivided with one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="36589" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36589] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +non potest esse peccatum in ore vel in opere, nisi fiat prius in +corde. Ergo ista peccata specie non differunt. Non ergo debent +contra se invicem dividi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome in commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.43.23" target="asv"> Ezech. 43:23</a>: "The human race is subject to three kinds of sin, for when we sin, it is either by thought, or word, or deed." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 7 s. c."><a name="36590" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36590] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Hieronymus dicit, super Ezech., <i>tria sunt generalia +delicta quibus humanum subiacet genus, aut enim cogitatione, aut +sermone, aut opere peccamus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Things differ specifically in two ways: first, when each has the complete species; thus a horse and an ox differ specifically: + secondly, when the diversity of species is derived from diversity of degree in generation or movement: thus the building is + the complete generation of a house, while the laying of the foundations, and the setting up of the walls are incomplete species, + as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. x, 4); and the same can apply to the + generation of animals. Accordingly sins are divided into these three, viz. sins of thought, word, and deed, not as into various + complete species: for the consummation of sin is in the deed, wherefore sins of deed have the complete species; but the first + beginning of sin is its foundation, as it were, in the sin of thought; the second degree is the sin of word, in so far as + man is ready to break out into a declaration of his thought; while the third degree consists in the consummation of the + deed. Consequently these three differ in respect of the various degrees of sin. Nevertheless it is evident that these three + belong to the one complete species of sin, since they proceed from the same motive. For the angry man, through desire of vengeance, + is at first disturbed in thought, then he breaks out into words of abuse, and lastly he goes on to wrongful deeds; and the + same applies to lust and to any other sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 7 co."><a name="36591" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36591] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod aliqua inveniuntur differre specie dupliciter. Uno +modo, ex eo quod utrumque habet speciem completam, sicut equus et +bos differunt specie. Alio modo, secundum diversos gradus in aliqua +generatione vel motu accipiuntur diversae species, sicut +aedificatio est completa generatio domus, collocatio autem +fundamenti et erectio parietis sunt species incompletae, ut patet +per philosophum, in X Ethic.; et idem etiam potest dici in +generationibus animalium. Sic igitur peccatum dividitur per haec +tria, scilicet peccatum oris, cordis et operis, non sicut per +diversas species completas, nam consummatio peccati est in opere, +unde peccatum operis habet speciem completam. Sed prima inchoatio +eius est quasi fundatio in corde; secundus autem gradus eius est in +ore, secundum quod homo prorumpit facile ad manifestandum conceptum +cordis; tertius autem gradus iam est in consummatione operis. Et +sic haec tria differunt secundum diversos gradus peccati. Patet +tamen quod haec tria pertinent ad unam perfectam peccati speciem, +cum ab eodem motivo procedant, iracundus enim, ex hoc quod appetit +vindictam, primo quidem perturbatur in corde; secundo, in verba +contumeliosa prorumpit; tertio vero, procedit usque ad facta +iniuriosa. Et idem patet in luxuria, et in quolibet alio +peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All sins of thought have the common note of secrecy, in respect of which they form one degree, which is, however, divided + into three stages, viz. of cogitation, pleasure, and consent. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="36592" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36592] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod omne peccatum cordis convenit in ratione +occulti, et secundum hoc ponitur unus gradus. Qui tamen per tres +gradus distinguitur, scilicet cogitationis, delectationis et +consensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sins of words and deed are both done openly, and for this reason Gregory (Moral. iv, 25) reckons them under one head: whereas + Jerome (in commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.43.23" target="asv"> Ezech. 43:23</a>) distinguishes between them, because in sins of word there is nothing but manifestation which is intended principally; while + in sins of deed, it is the consummation of the inward thought which is principally intended, and the outward manifestation + is by way of sequel. + Habit and despair are stages following the complete species of sin, even as boyhood and youth follow the complete generation + of a man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="36593" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36593] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod peccatum oris et operis conveniunt in manifestatione, +et propter hoc a Gregorio sub uno computantur. Hieronymus autem +distinguit ea, quia in peccato oris est manifestatio tantum, et +principaliter intenta, in peccato vero operis est principaliter +expletio interioris conceptus cordis, sed manifestatio est ex +consequenti. Consuetudo vero et desperatio sunt gradus consequentes +post speciem perfectam peccati, sicut adolescentia et iuventus post +perfectam hominis generationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sin of thought and sin of word are not distinct from the sin of deed when they are united together with it, but when each + is found by itself: even as one part of a movement is not distinct from the whole movement, when the movement is continuous, + but only when there is a break in the movement. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="36594" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36594] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod peccatum cordis et oris non distinguuntur a peccato +operis, quando simul cum eo coniunguntur, sed prout quodlibet horum +per se invenitur. Sicut etiam pars motus non distinguitur a toto +motu, quando motus est continuus, sed solum quando motus sistit in +medio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q72_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q72_A8-p0.1">Q. 72. A. 8. Whether excess and deficiency diversify the species of sins?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins. For excess and deficiency differ in respect + of more and less. Now "more" and "less" do not diversify a species. Therefore excess and deficiency do not diversify the species + of sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="36595" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36595] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod superabundantia et defectus non +diversificent species peccatorum. Superabundantia enim et defectus +differunt secundum magis et minus. Sed magis et minus non +diversificant speciem. Ergo superabundantia et defectus non +diversificant speciem peccatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as sin, in matters of action, is due to straying from the rectitude of reason, so falsehood, in speculative + matters, is due to straying from the truth of the reality. Now the species of falsehood is not diversified by saying more + or less than the reality. Therefore neither is the species of sin diversified by straying more or less from the rectitude + of reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="36596" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36596] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut peccatum in agibilibus est ex hoc quod receditur a +rectitudine rationis, ita falsitas in speculativis est ex hoc quod +receditur a veritate rei. Sed non diversificatur species falsitatis +ex hoc quod aliquis dicit plus vel minus esse quam sit in re. Ergo +etiam non diversificatur species peccati ex hoc quod recedit a +rectitudine rationis in plus vel in minus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "one species cannot be made out of two," as Porphyry declares [*Isagog.; cf. Arist. Metaph. i]. Now excess and deficiency + are united in one sin; for some are at once illiberal and wasteful---illiberality being a sin of deficiency, and prodigality, + by excess. Therefore excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="36597" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36597] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> +<i>Praeterea, ex duabus speciebus non constituitur una species</i>, +ut Porphyrius dicit. Sed superabundantia et defectus uniuntur in +uno peccato, sunt enim simul quidam illiberales et prodigi, quorum +duorum illiberalitas est peccatum secundum defectum, prodigalitas +autem secundum superabundantiam. Ergo superabundantia et defectus +non diversificant speciem peccatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Contraries differ specifically, for "contrariety is a difference of form," as stated in Metaph. x, text. 13,14. Now vices + that differ according to excess and deficiency are contrary to one another, as illiberality to wastefulness. Therefore they + differ specifically. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 8 s. c."><a name="36598" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36598] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +contraria differunt secundum speciem, nam contrarietas est +differentia secundum formam, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed vitia +quae differunt secundum superabundantiam et defectum, sunt +contraria, sicut illiberalitas prodigalitati. Ergo differunt +secundum speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> While there are two things in sin, viz. the act itself and its inordinateness, in so far as sin is a departure from the order + of reason and the Divine law, the species of sin is gathered, not from its inordinateness, which is outside the sinner's intention, + as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q72_A1" id="FS_Q72_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, but one the contrary, from the act itself as terminating in the object to which the sinner's intention is directed. Consequently + wherever we find a + different motive inclining the intention to sin, there will be a different species of sin. Now it is evident that the motive + for sinning, in sins by excess, is not the same as the motive for sinning, in sins of deficiency; in fact, they are contrary + to one another, just as the motive in the sin of intemperance is love for bodily pleasures, while the motive in the sin of + insensibility is hatred of the same. Therefore these sins not only differ specifically, but are contrary to one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 8 co."><a name="36599" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36599] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, cum in peccato sint duo, scilicet ipse actus, et +inordinatio eius, prout receditur ab ordine rationis et legis +divinae; species peccati attenditur non ex parte inordinationis, +quae est praeter intentionem peccantis, ut supra dictum est; sed +magis ex parte ipsius actus, secundum quod terminatur ad obiectum, +in quod fertur intentio peccantis. Et ideo ubicumque occurrit +diversum motivum inclinans intentionem ad peccandum, ibi est +diversa species peccati. Manifestum est autem quod non est idem +motivum ad peccandum in peccatis quae sunt secundum +superabundantiam, et in peccatis quae sunt secundum defectum; +quinimmo sunt contraria motiva; sicut motivum in peccato +intemperantiae est amor delectationum corporalium, motivum autem in +peccato insensibilitatis est odium earum. Unde huiusmodi peccata +non solum differunt specie, sed etiam sunt sibi invicem +contraria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A8-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although "more" and "less" do not cause diversity of species, yet they are sometimes consequent to specific difference, in + so far as they are the result of diversity of form; thus we may say that fire is lighter than air. Hence the Philosopher says + (Ethic. viii, 1) that "those who held that there are no different species of friendship, by reason of its admitting of degree, + were led by insufficient proof." In this way to exceed reason or to fall short + thereof belongs to sins specifically different, in so far as they result from different motives. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="36600" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36600] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod magis et minus, etsi non sint causa diversitatis +speciei, consequuntur tamen quandoque species differentes, prout +proveniunt ex diversis formis, sicut si dicatur quod ignis est +levior aere. Unde philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic., quod qui +posuerunt non esse diversas species amicitiarum propter hoc quod +dicuntur secundum magis et minus, non sufficienti crediderunt +signo. Et hoc modo superexcedere rationem, vel deficere ab ea, +pertinet ad diversa peccata secundum speciem, inquantum +consequuntur diversa motiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not the sinner's intention to depart from reason; and so sins of excess and deficiency do not become of one kind through + departing from the one rectitude of reason. On the other hand, sometimes he who utters a falsehood, intends to hide the truth, + wherefore in this respect, it matters not whether he tells more or less. If, however, departure from the truth be not outside + the intention, it is evident that then one is moved by different causes to + tell more or less; and in this respect there are different kinds of falsehood, as is evident of the "boaster," who exceeds + in telling untruths for the sake of fame, and the "cheat," who tells less than the truth, in order to escape from paying his + debts. This also explains how some false opinions are contrary to one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="36601" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36601] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod intentio peccantis non est ut recedat a ratione, et +ideo non efficitur eiusdem rationis peccatum superabundantiae et +defectus propter recessum ab eadem rationis rectitudine. Sed +quandoque ille qui dicit falsum, intendit veritatem occultare, unde +quantum ad hoc, non refert utrum dicat vel plus vel minus. Si tamen +recedere a veritate sit praeter intentionem, tunc manifestum est +quod ex diversis causis aliquis movetur ad dicendum plus vel minus, +et secundum hoc diversa est ratio falsitatis. Sicut patet de +iactatore, qui superexcedit dicendo falsum, quaerens gloriam; et de +deceptore, qui diminuit, evadens debiti solutionem. Unde et quaedam +falsae opiniones sunt sibi invicem contrariae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One may be prodigal and illiberal with regard to different objects: for instance one may be illiberal [*Cf. + <a href="SS_ii.html#SS_Q119_A1" id="FS_Q72_A8-p9.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[119], A[1]</a>, ad 1] in taking what one ought not: and nothing hinders contraries from being in the same subject, in different respects. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="36602" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36602] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod prodigus et illiberalis potest esse aliquis secundum +diversa, ut scilicet sit aliquis illiberalis in accipiendo quae non +debet, et prodigus in dando quae non debet. Nihil autem prohibet +contraria inesse eidem secundum diversa.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q72_A9" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q72_A9-p0.1">Q. 72. A. 9. Whether sins differ specifically in respect of different circumstances?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A9-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that vices and sins differ in respect of different circumstances. For, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "evil + results from each single defect." Now individual defects are corruptions of individual circumstances. Therefore from the corruption + of each circumstance there results a corresponding species of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="36603" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36603] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod vitia et peccata diversificentur +specie secundum diversas circumstantias. Quia, ut dicit Dionysius, +IV cap. de Div. Nom., <i>malum contingit ex singularibus +defectibus</i>. Singulares autem defectus sunt corruptiones +singularum circumstantiarum. Ergo ex singulis circumstantiis +corruptis singulae species peccatorum consequuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A9-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sins are human acts. But human acts sometimes take their species from circumstances, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A10" id="FS_Q72_A9-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[10]</a>). Therefore sins differ specifically according as different circumstances are corrupted. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="36604" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36604] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +peccata sunt quidam actus humani. Sed actus humani interdum +accipiunt speciem a circumstantiis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo +peccata differunt specie secundum quod diversae circumstantiae +corrumpuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q72_A9-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, diverse species are assigned to gluttony, according to the words contained in the following verse: + </p><p id="FS_Q72_A9-p5"> 'Hastily, sumptuously, too much, greedily, daintily.' Now these pertain to various circumstances, for "hastily" means sooner + than is right; "too much," more than is right, and so on with the others. Therefore the species of sin is diversified according + to the various circumstances. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="36605" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36605] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +diversae species gulae assignantur secundum particulas quae in hoc +versiculo continentur, <i>praepropere, laute, nimis, ardenter, +studiose</i>. Haec autem pertinent ad diversas circumstantias, nam +praepropere est antequam oportet, nimis plus quam oportet, et idem +patet in aliis. Ergo species peccati diversificantur secundum +diversas circumstantias.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A9-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7; iv, 1) that "every vice sins by doing more than one ought, and when one ought not"; + and in like manner as to the other circumstances. Therefore the species of sins are not diversified in this respect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 9 s. c."><a name="36606" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36606] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in III et IV Ethic., quod singula vitia +peccant agendo et plus quam oportet, et quando non oportet, et +similiter secundum omnes alias circumstantias. Non ergo secundum +hoc diversificantur peccatorum species.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q72_A9-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q72_A8" id="FS_Q72_A9-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[8])</a>, wherever there is a special motive for sinning, there is a different species of sin, because the motive for sinning is the + end and object of sin. Now it happens sometimes that although different circumstances are corrupted, there is but one motive: + thus the illiberal man, for the same motive, takes when he ought not, where he ought not, and more than he ought, and so on + with the circumstances, since he does + this through an inordinate desire of hoarding money: and in such cases the corruption of different circumstances does not + diversify the species of sins, but belongs to one and the same species. + </p><p id="FS_Q72_A9-p8"> Sometimes, however, the corruption of different circumstances arises from different motives: for instance that a man eat + hastily, may be due to the fact that he cannot brook the delay in taking food, on account of a rapid exhaustion of the digestive + humors; and that he desire too much food, may be due to a naturally strong digestion; that he desire choice meats, is due + to his desire for pleasure in taking food. Hence in such matters, the corruption of different circumstances + entails different species of sins. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 9 co."><a name="36607" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36607] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ubi occurrit aliud motivum ad +peccandum, ibi est alia peccati species, quia motivum ad peccandum +est finis et obiectum. Contingit autem quandoque quod in +corruptionibus diversarum circumstantiarum est idem motivum, sicut +illiberalis ab eodem movetur quod accipiat quando non oportet, et +ubi non oportet, et plus quam oportet, et similiter de aliis +circumstantiis; hoc enim facit propter inordinatum appetitum +pecuniae congregandae. Et in talibus diversarum circumstantiarum +corruptiones non diversificant species peccatorum, sed pertinent ad +unam et eandem peccati speciem. Quandoque vero contingit quod +corruptiones diversarum circumstantiarum proveniunt a diversis +motivis. Puta quod aliquis praepropere comedat, potest provenire ex +hoc quod homo non potest ferre dilationem cibi, propter facilem +consumptionem humiditatis; quod vero appetat immoderatum cibum, +potest contingere propter virtutem naturae potentem ad convertendum +multum cibum; quod autem aliquis appetat cibos deliciosos, +contingit propter appetitum delectationis quae est in cibo. Unde in +talibus diversarum circumstantiarum corruptiones inducunt diversas +peccati species.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A9-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Evil, as such, is a privation, and so it has different species in respect of the thing which the subject is deprived, even + as other privations. But sin does not take its species from the privation or aversion, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q72_A1" id="FS_Q72_A9-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, but from turning to the object of the act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="36608" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36608] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod malum, inquantum huiusmodi, privatio est, et +ideo diversificatur specie secundum ea quae privantur, sicut et +ceterae privationes. Sed peccatum non sortitur speciem ex parte +privationis vel aversionis, ut supra dictum est; sed ex conversione +ad obiectum actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A9-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A circumstance never transfers an act from one species to another, save when there is another motive. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="36609" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36609] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod circumstantia nunquam transfert actum in aliam +speciem, nisi quando est aliud motivum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A9-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the various species of gluttony there are various motives, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="36610" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36610] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in diversis speciebus gulae diversa sunt motiva, +sicut dictum est.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q73" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q73-p0.1">Q. 73. OF THE COMPARISON OF ONE SIN WITH ANOTHER (TEN ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q73-p2"> We must now consider the comparison of one sin with another: under which head there are ten points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q73-p3"><a href="#FS_Q73_A1"> (1) Whether all sins and vices are connected with one another?</a></p><p id="FS_Q73-p4"><a href="#FS_Q73_A2"> (2) Whether all are equal?</a></p><p id="FS_Q73-p5"><a href="#FS_Q73_A3"> (3) Whether the gravity of sin depends on its object?</a></p><p id="FS_Q73-p6"><a href="#FS_Q73_A4"> (4) Whether it depends on the excellence of the virtue to which it is opposed?</a></p><p id="FS_Q73-p7"><a href="#FS_Q73_A5"> (5) Whether carnal sins are more grievous than spiritual sins?</a></p><p id="FS_Q73-p8"><a href="#FS_Q73_A6"> (6) Whether the gravity of sins depends on their causes?</a></p><p id="FS_Q73-p9"><a href="#FS_Q73_A7"> (7) Whether it depends on their circumstances?</a></p><p id="FS_Q73-p10"><a href="#FS_Q73_A8"> (8) Whether it depends on how much harm ensues?</a></p><p id="FS_Q73-p11"><a href="#FS_Q73_A9"> (9) Whether on the position of the person sinned against?</a></p><p id="FS_Q73-p12"><a href="#FS_Q73_A10"> (10) Whether sin is aggravated by reason of the excellence of the person sinning?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 pr."><a name="36611" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36611] +Iª-IIae q. 73 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +comparatione peccatorum ad invicem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur decem. +Primo, utrum omnia peccata et vitia sint connexa. Secundo, utrum +omnia sint paria. Tertio, utrum gravitas peccatorum attendatur +secundum obiecta. Quarto, utrum secundum dignitatem virtutum quibus +peccata opponuntur. Quinto, utrum peccata carnalia sint graviora +quam spiritualia. Sexto, utrum secundum causas peccatorum +attendatur gravitas peccatorum. Septimo, utrum secundum +circumstantias. Octavo, utrum secundum quantitatem nocumenti. Nono, +utrum secundum conditionem personae in quam peccatur. Decimo, utrum +propter magnitudinem personae peccantis aggravetur peccatum.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q73_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A1-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 1. Whether all sins are connected with one another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all sins are connected. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.10" target="asv">James 2:10</a>): "Whosoever shall keep the whole Law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all." Now to be guilty of transgressing + all the precepts of Law, is the same as to commit all sins, because, as Ambrose says (De Parad. viii), "sin is a transgression + of the Divine law, and disobedience of the heavenly commandments." Therefore whoever commits one sin is guilty of + all. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36612" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36612] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnia peccata sint connexa. Dicitur +enim Iac. II, <i>quicumque totam legem servaverit, offendat autem +in uno, factus est omnium reus</i>. Sed idem est esse reum omnium +mandatorum legis, quod habere omnia peccata, quia, sicut Ambrosius +dicit, <i>peccatum est transgressio legis divinae, et caelestium +inobedientia mandatorum</i>. Ergo quicumque peccat uno peccato, +subiicitur omnibus peccatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, each sin banishes its opposite virtue. Now whoever lacks one virtue lacks them all, as was shown above ( + <a href="#FS_Q65_A1" id="FS_Q73_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[65], A[1]</a>). Therefore whoever commits one sin, is deprived of all the virtues. Therefore whoever commits one sin, is guilty of all + sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36613" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36613] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quodlibet peccatum excludit virtutem sibi oppositam. Sed qui caret +una virtute, caret omnibus, ut patet ex supradictis. Ergo qui +peccat uno peccato, privatur omnibus virtutibus. Sed qui caret +virtute, habet vitium sibi oppositum. Ergo qui habet unum peccatum, +habet omnia peccata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all virtues are connected, because they have a principle in common, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q65_A1" id="FS_Q73_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[65], AA[1]</a>,2). Now as the virtues have a common principle, so have sins, because, as the love of God, which builds the city of God, + is the beginning and root of all the virtues, so self-love, which builds the city of Babylon, is the root of all sins, as + Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28). Therefore all vices and sins are also connected + so that whoever has one, has them all. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36614" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36614] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +virtutes omnes sunt connexae quae conveniunt in uno principio, ut +supra habitum est. Sed sicut virtutes conveniunt in uno principio, +ita et peccata, quia sicut amor Dei, qui facit civitatem Dei, est +principium et radix omnium virtutum, ita amor sui, qui facit +civitatem Babylonis, est radix omnium peccatorum; ut patet per +Augustinum, XIV de Civ. Dei. Ergo etiam omnia vitia et peccata sunt +connexa, ita ut qui unum habet, habeat omnia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Some vices are contrary to one another, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 8). But contraries cannot be together in the + same subject. Therefore it is impossible for all sins and vices to be connected with one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36615" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36615] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +quaedam vitia sunt sibi invicem contraria, ut patet per +philosophum, in II Ethic. Sed impossibile est contraria simul +inesse eidem. Ergo impossibile est omnia peccata et vitia esse sibi +invicem connexa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The intention of the man who acts according to virtue in pursuance of his reason, is different from the intention of the + sinner in straying from the path of reason. For the intention of every man acting according to virtue is to follow the rule + of reason, wherefore the intention of all the virtues is directed to the same end, so that all the virtues are connected together + in the right reason of things to be done, viz. prudence, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q65_A1" id="FS_Q73_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[65], A[1]</a>). But the intention of the sinner is not directed to the point of straying from the path of reason; rather is it directed + to tend to some appetible good whence it derives its species. Now these goods, to which the sinner's intention is directed + when departing from reason, are of various kinds, having no mutual connection; in fact they are sometimes contrary to one + another. Since, therefore, vices and sins take their species from that to which they turn, it is + evident that, in respect of that which completes a sin's species, sins are not connected with one another. For sin does not + consist in passing from the many to the one, as is the case with virtues, which are connected, but rather in forsaking the + one for the many. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 1 co."><a name="36616" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36616] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod aliter se habet intentio agentis secundum virtutem ad +sequendum rationem, et aliter intentio peccantis ad divertendum a +ratione. Cuiuslibet enim agentis secundum virtutem intentio est ut +rationis regulam sequatur, et ideo omnium virtutum intentio in idem +tendit. Et propter hoc omnes virtutes habent connexionem ad invicem +in ratione recta agibilium, quae est prudentia, sicut supra dictum +est. Sed intentio peccantis non est ad hoc quod recedat ab eo quod +est secundum rationem, sed potius ut tendat in aliquod bonum +appetibile, a quo speciem sortitur. Huiusmodi autem bona in quae +tendit intentio peccantis a ratione recedens, sunt diversa, nullam +connexionem habentia ad invicem, immo etiam interdum sunt +contraria. Cum igitur vitia et peccata speciem habeant secundum +illud ad quod convertuntur, manifestum est quod, secundum illud +quod perficit speciem peccatorum, nullam connexionem habent peccata +ad invicem. Non enim peccatum committitur in accedendo a +multitudine ad unitatem, sicut accidit in virtutibus quae sunt +connexae, sed potius in recedendo ab unitate ad multitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> James is speaking of sin, not as regards the thing to which it turns and which causes the distinction of sins, as stated + above ( + <a href="#FS_Q72_A1" id="FS_Q73_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[72] , A[1]</a>), but as regards that from which sin turns away, in as much as man, by sinning, departs from a commandment of the law. Now + all the commandments of the law are from one and the same, as he also says in the same passage, so that the same God is despised + in every sin; and in this sense he + says that whoever "offends in one point, is become guilty of all," for as much as, by committing one sin, he incurs the debt + of punishment through his contempt of God, which is the origin of all sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36617" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36617] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Iacobus loquitur de peccato non ex parte +conversionis, secundum quod peccata distinguuntur, sicut dictum +est, sed loquitur de eis ex parte aversionis, inquantum scilicet +homo peccando recedit a legis mandato. Omnia autem legis mandata +sunt ab uno et eodem, ut ipse ibidem dicit, et ideo idem Deus +contemnitur in omni peccato. Et ex hac parte dicit quod qui +offendit in uno, factus est omnium reus, quia scilicet uno peccato +peccando, incurrit poenae reatum ex hoc quod contemnit Deum, ex +cuius contemptu provenit omnium peccatorum reatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q71_A4" id="FS_Q73_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[4]</a>), the opposite virtue is not banished by every act of sin; because venial sin does not destroy virtue; while mortal sin destroys + infused virtue, by turning man away from God. Yet one act, even of mortal sin, does not destroy the habit of acquired virtue; + though if such acts be repeated so as to engender a contrary habit, the habit of acquired virtue is destroyed, the destruction + of which entails + the loss of prudence, since when man acts against any virtue whatever, he acts against prudence, without which no moral virtue + is possible, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q58_A4" id="FS_Q73_A1-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[58], A[4]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q65_A1" id="FS_Q73_A1-p8.3" shape="rect"> Q[65], A[1]</a>). Consequently all the moral virtues are destroyed as to the perfect and formal being of virtue, which they have in so far + as they partake of prudence, yet there remain the inclinations to virtuous acts, which inclinations, however, are not virtues. + Nevertheless it + does not follow that for this reason man contracts all vices of sins---first, because several vices are opposed to one virtue, + so that a virtue can be destroyed by one of them, without the others being present; secondly, because sin is directly opposed + to virtue, as regards the virtue's inclination to act, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q73_A1-p8.4" shape="rect">Q[71], A[1]</a>). Wherefore, as long as any virtuous inclinations remain, it cannot be said that man has the opposite vices or sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36618" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36618] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, non per quemlibet actum +peccati tollitur virtus opposita, nam peccatum veniale virtutem non +tollit; peccatum autem mortale tollit virtutem infusam, inquantum +avertit a Deo; sed unus actus peccati etiam mortalis, non tollit +habitum virtutis acquisitae. Sed si multiplicentur actus intantum +quod generetur contrarius habitus, excluditur habitus virtutis +acquisitae. Qua exclusa, excluditur prudentia, quia cum homo agit +contra quamcumque virtutem, agit contra prudentiam. Sine prudentia +autem nulla virtus moralis esse potest, ut supra habitum est. Et +ideo per consequens excluduntur omnes virtutes morales, quantum ad +perfectum et formale esse virtutis, quod habent secundum quod +participant prudentiam, remanent tamen inclinationes ad actus +virtutum, non habentes rationem virtutis. Sed non sequitur quod +propter hoc homo incurrat omnia vitia vel peccata. Primo quidem, +quia uni virtuti plura vitia opponuntur, ita quod virtus potest +privari per unum eorum, etsi alterum non adsit. Secundo, quia +peccatum directe opponitur virtuti quantum ad inclinationem +virtutis ad actum, ut supra dictum est, unde, remanentibus +aliquibus inclinationibus virtuosis, non potest dici quod homo +habeat vitia vel peccata opposita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The love of God is unitive, in as much as it draws man's affections from the many to the one; so that the virtues, which + flow from the love of God, are connected together. But self-love disunites man's affections among different things, in so + far as man loves himself, by desiring for himself temporal goods, which are various and of many kinds: hence vices and sins, + which arise from self-love, are not connected together. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36619" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36619] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod amor Dei est congregativus, inquantum affectum +hominis a multis ducit in unum, et ideo virtutes, quae ex amore Dei +causantur, connexionem habent. Sed amor sui disgregat affectum +hominis in diversa, prout scilicet homo se amat appetendo sibi bona +temporalia, quae sunt varia et diversa, et ideo vitia et peccata, +quae causantur ex amore sui, non sunt connexa.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q73_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A2-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 2. Whether all sins are equal?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all sins are equal. Because sin is to do what is unlawful. Now to do what is unlawful is reproved in one + and the same way in all things. Therefore sin is reproved in one and the same way. Therefore one sin is not graver than another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36620" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36620] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnia peccata sint paria. Hoc enim est +peccare, facere quod non licet. Sed facere quod non licet, uno et +eodem modo in omnibus reprehenditur. Ergo peccare uno et eodem modo +reprehenditur. Non ergo unum peccatum est alio gravius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every sin is a transgression of the rule of reason, which is to human acts what a linear rule is in corporeal things. + Therefore to sin is the same as to pass over a line. But passing over a line occurs equally and in the same way, even if one + go a long way from it or stay near it, since privations do not admit of more or less. Therefore all sins are equal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36621" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36621] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +omne peccatum consistit in hoc quod homo transgreditur regulam +rationis, quae ita se habet ad actus humanos, sicut regula linearis +in corporalibus rebus. Ergo peccare simile est ei quod est lineas +transilire. Sed lineas transilire est aequaliter et uno modo, etiam +si aliquis longius recedat vel propinquius stet, quia privationes +non recipiunt magis et minus. Ergo omnia peccata sunt aequalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sins are opposed to virtues. But all virtues are equal, as Cicero states (Paradox. iii). Therefore all sins are + equal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36622" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36622] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +peccata virtutibus opponuntur. Sed omnes virtutes aequales sunt, ut +Tullius dicit, in paradoxis. Ergo omnia peccata sunt paria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said to Pilate ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.19.11" target="asv">Jn. 19:11</a>): "He that hath delivered me to thee, hath the greater sin," and yet it is evident that Pilate was guilty of some sin. Therefore + one sin is greater than another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36623" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36623] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dominus dicit ad Pilatum, Ioan. XIX, <i>qui tradidit me +tibi, maius peccatum habet</i>. Et tamen constat quod Pilatus +aliquod peccatum habuit. Ergo unum peccatum est maius alio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The opinion of the Stoics, which Cicero adopts in the book on Paradoxes (Paradox. iii), was that all sins are equal: from + which opinion arose the error of certain heretics, who not only hold all sins to be equal, but also maintain that all the + pains of hell are equal. So far as can be gathered from the words of Cicero the Stoics arrived at their conclusion through + looking at sin on the side of the privation only, in so far, to wit, as it is a departure from + reason; wherefore considering simply that no privation admits of more or less, they held that all sins are equal. Yet, if + we consider the matter carefully, we shall see that there are two kinds of privation. For there is a simple and pure privation, + which consists, so to speak, in "being" corrupted; thus death is privation of life, and darkness is privation of light. Such + like privations do not admit of more or less, because nothing remains of the opposite habit; hence a man is not less dead + on + the first day after his death, or on the third or fourth days, than after a year, when his corpse is already dissolved; and, + in like manner, a house is no darker if the light be covered with several shades, than if it were covered by a single shade + shutting out all the light. There is, however, another privation which is not simple, but retains something of the opposite + habit; it consists in "becoming" corrupted rather than in "being" corrupted, like sickness which is a privation of the due + commensuration of the humors, yet so that something remains of that commensuration, else the animal would cease to live: and + the same applies to deformity and the like. Such privations admit of more or less on the part of what remains or the contrary + habit. For it matters much in sickness or deformity, whether one departs more or less from the due commensuration of humors + or members. The same applies to vices and sins: because in them the privation of the due commensuration of reason is such + as + not to destroy the order of reason altogether; else evil, if total, destroys itself, as stated in Ethic. iv, 5. For the substance + of the act, or the affection of the agent could not remain, unless something remained of the order of reason. Therefore it + matters much to the gravity of a sin whether one departs more or less from the rectitude of reason: and accordingly we must + say that sins are not all equal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 2 co."><a name="36624" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36624] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod opinio Stoicorum fuit, quam Tullius prosequitur in +paradoxis, quod omnia peccata sunt paria. Et ex hoc etiam derivatus +est quorundam haereticorum error, qui, ponentes omnia peccata esse +paria, dicunt etiam omnes poenas Inferni esse pares. Et quantum ex +verbis Tullii perspici potest, Stoici movebantur ex hoc quod +considerabant peccatum ex parte privationis tantum, prout scilicet +est recessus a ratione, unde simpliciter aestimantes quod nulla +privatio susciperet magis et minus, posuerunt omnia peccata esse +paria. Sed si quis diligenter consideret, inveniet duplex +privationum genus. Est enim quaedam simplex et pura privatio, quae +consistit quasi in corruptum esse, sicut mors est privatio vitae, +et tenebra est privatio luminis. Et tales privationes non recipiunt +magis et minus, quia nihil residuum est de habitu opposito. Unde +non minus est mortuus aliquis primo die mortis, et tertio vel +quarto, quam post annum, quando iam cadaver fuerit resolutum. Et +similiter non est magis tenebrosa domus, si lucerna sit operta +pluribus velaminibus, quam si sit operta uno solo velamine totum +lumen intercludente. Est autem alia privatio non simplex, sed +aliquid retinens de habitu opposito; quae quidem privatio magis +consistit in corrumpi, quam in corruptum esse, sicut aegritudo, +quae privat debitam commensurationem humorum, ita tamen quod +aliquid eius remanet, alioquin non remaneret animal vivum; et +simile est de turpitudine, et aliis huiusmodi. Huiusmodi autem +privationes recipiunt magis et minus ex parte eius quod remanet de +habitu contrario, multum enim refert ad aegritudinem vel +turpitudinem, utrum plus vel minus a debita commensuratione humorum +vel membrorum recedatur. Et similiter dicendum est de vitiis et +peccatis, sic enim in eis privatur debita commensuratio rationis, +ut non totaliter ordo rationis tollatur; alioquin malum, si sit +integrum, destruit seipsum, ut dicitur in IV Ethic.; non enim +posset remanere substantia actus, vel affectio agentis, nisi +aliquid remaneret de ordine rationis. Et ideo multum interest ad +gravitatem peccati, utrum plus vel minus recedatur a rectitudine +rationis. Et secundum hoc dicendum est quod non omnia peccata sunt +paria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To commit sin is lawful on account of some inordinateness therein: wherefore those which contain a greater inordinateness + are more unlawful, and consequently graver sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36625" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36625] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod peccata committere non licet, propter aliquam +deordinationem quam habent. Unde illa quae maiorem deordinationem +continent, sunt magis illicita; et per consequens graviora +peccata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument looks upon sin as though it were a pure privation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36626" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36626] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de peccato, ac si esset privatio +pura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Virtues are proportionately equal in one and the same subject: yet one virtue surpasses another in excellence according to + its species; and again, one man is more virtuous than another, in the same species of virtue, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q66_A1" id="FS_Q73_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[66], AA[1]</a>,2). Moreover, even if virtues were equal, it would not follow that vices are equal, since virtues are connected, and vices + or sins are not. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36627" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36627] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod virtutes sunt aequales proportionaliter in uno et +eodem, tamen una virtus praecedit aliam dignitate secundum suam +speciem; et unus etiam homo est alio virtuosior in eadem specie +virtutis, ut supra habitum est. Et tamen si virtutes essent pares, +non sequeretur vitia esse paria, quia virtutes habent connexionem, +non autem vitia seu peccata.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q73_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A3-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 3. Whether the gravity of sins varies according to their objects?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gravity of sins does not vary according to their objects. Because the gravity of a sin pertains to + its mode or quality: whereas the object is the matter of the sin. Therefore the gravity of sins does not vary according to + their various objects. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36628" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36628] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatorum gravitas non varietur +secundum obiecta. Gravitas enim peccati pertinet ad modum vel +qualitatem ipsius peccati. Sed obiectum est materia ipsius peccati. +Ergo secundum diversa obiecta, peccatorum gravitas non +variatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the gravity of a sin is the intensity of its malice. Now sin does not derive its malice from its proper object to + which it turns, and which is some appetible good, but rather from that which it turns away from. Therefore the gravity of + sins does not vary according to their various objects. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36629" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36629] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +gravitas peccati est intensio malitiae ipsius. Peccatum autem non +habet rationem malitiae ex parte conversionis ad proprium obiectum, +quod est quoddam bonum appetibile; sed magis ex parte aversionis. +Ergo gravitas peccatorum non variatur secundum diversa obiecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sins that have different objects are of different kinds. But things of different kinds cannot be compared with one + another, as is proved in Phys. vii, text. 30, seqq. Therefore one sin is not graver than another by reason of the difference + of objects. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36630" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36630] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +peccata quae habent diversa obiecta, sunt diversorum generum. Sed +ea quae sunt diversorum generum, non sunt comparabilia, ut probatur +in VII Physic. Ergo unum peccatum non est gravius altero secundum +diversitatem obiectorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Sins take their species from their objects, as was shown above ( + <a href="#FS_Q72_A1" id="FS_Q73_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[72], A[1]</a>). But some sins are graver than others in respect of their species, as murder is graver than theft. Therefore the gravity + of sins varies according to their objects. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36631" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36631] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +peccata recipiunt speciem ex obiectis, ut ex supradictis patet. Sed +aliquorum peccatorum unum est gravius altero secundum suam speciem, +sicut homicidium furto. Ergo gravitas peccatorum differt secundum +obiecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As is clear from what has been said ( + <a href="#FS_Q71_A5" id="FS_Q73_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[5]</a>), the gravity of sins varies in the same way as one sickness is graver than another: for just as the good of health consists + in a certain commensuration of the humors, in keeping with an animal's nature, so the good of virtue consists in a certain + commensuration of the human act in accord with the rule of reason. Now it is evident that the higher the principle the disorder + of which + causes the disorder in the humors, the graver is the sickness: thus a sickness which comes on the human body from the heart, + which is the principle of life, or from some neighboring part, is more dangerous. Wherefore a sin must needs be so much the + graver, as the disorder occurs in a principle which is higher in the order of reason. Now in matters of action the reason + directs all things in view of the end: wherefore the higher the end which attaches to sins in human acts, the graver the sin. + Now the object of an act is its end, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q72_A3" id="FS_Q73_A3-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[72], A[3]</a>, ad 2); and consequently the difference of gravity in sins depends on their objects. Thus it is clear that external things + are directed to man as their end, while man is further directed to God as his end. Wherefore a sin which is about the very + substance of man, e.g. murder, is graver than a sin which is about external things, e.g. theft; and graver still is a sin + committed directly against God, e.g. + unbelief, blasphemy, and the like: and in each of these grades of sin, one sin will be graver than another according as it + is about a higher or lower principle. And forasmuch as sins take their species from their objects, the difference of gravity + which is derived from the objects is first and foremost, as resulting from the species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 3 co."><a name="36632" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36632] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ex supradictis patet, gravitas peccatorum +differt eo modo quo una aegritudo est alia gravior, sicut enim +bonum sanitatis consistit in quadam commensuratione humorum per +convenientiam ad naturam animalis, ita bonum virtutis consistit in +quadam commensuratione humani actus secundum convenientiam ad +regulam rationis. Manifestum est autem quod tanto est gravior +aegritudo, quanto tollitur debita humorum commensuratio per +commensurationem prioris principii, sicut aegritudo quae provenit +in corpore humano ex corde, quod est principium vitae, vel ex +aliquo quod appropinquat cordi, periculosior est. Unde oportet +etiam quod peccatum sit tanto gravius, quanto deordinatio contingit +circa aliquod principium quod est prius in ordine rationis. Ratio +autem ordinat omnia in agibilibus ex fine. Et ideo quanto peccatum +contingit in actibus humanis ex altiori fine, tanto peccatum est +gravius. Obiecta autem actuum sunt fines eorum, ut ex supradictis +patet. Et ideo secundum diversitatem obiectorum attenditur +diversitas gravitatis in peccatis. Sicut patet quod res exteriores +ordinantur ad hominem sicut ad finem; homo autem ordinatur ulterius +in Deum sicut in finem. Unde peccatum quod est circa ipsam +substantiam hominis, sicut homicidium est gravius peccato quod est +circa res exteriores, sicut furtum; et adhuc est gravius peccatum +quod immediate contra Deum committitur, sicut infidelitas, +blasphemia et huiusmodi. Et in ordine quorumlibet horum peccatorum +unum peccatum est gravius altero, secundum quod est circa aliquid +principalius vel minus principale. Et quia peccata habent speciem +ex obiectis, differentia gravitatis quae attenditur penes obiecta, +est prima et principalis, quasi consequens speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the object is the matter about which an act is concerned, yet it has the character of an end, in so far as the intention + of the agent is fixed on it, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q72_A3" id="FS_Q73_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[72], A[3]</a>, ad 2). Now the form of a moral act depends on the end, as was shown above ( + <a href="#FS_Q72_A6" id="FS_Q73_A3-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[72], A[6]</a>; + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A6" id="FS_Q73_A3-p7.3" shape="rect"> Q[18], A[6]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36633" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36633] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod obiectum, etsi sit materia circa quam terminatur +actus, habet tamen rationem finis, secundum quod intentio agentis +fertur in ipsum, ut supra dictum est. Forma autem actus moralis +dependet ex fine, ut ex superioribus patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the very fact that man turns unduly to some mutable good, it follows that he turns away from the immutable Good, which + aversion completes the nature of evil. Hence the various degrees of malice in sins must needs follow the diversity of those + things to which man turns. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36634" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36634] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ex ipsa indebita conversione ad aliquod bonum +commutabile, sequitur aversio ab incommutabili bono, in qua +perficitur ratio mali. Et ideo oportet quod secundum diversitatem +eorum quae pertinent ad conversionem, sequatur diversa gravitas +malitiae in peccatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All the objects of human acts are related to one another, wherefore all human acts are somewhat of one kind, in so far as + they are directed to the last end. Therefore nothing prevents all sins from being compared with one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36635" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36635] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod omnia obiecta humanorum actuum habent ordinem ad +invicem, et ideo omnes actus humani quodammodo conveniunt in uno +genere, secundum quod ordinantur ad ultimum finem. Et ideo nihil +prohibet omnia peccata esse comparabilia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q73_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A4-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 4. Whether the gravity of sins depends on the excellence of the virtues to which they are opposed?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gravity of sins does not vary according to the excellence of the virtues to which they are opposed, + so that, to wit, the graver the sin is opposed to the greater virtue. For, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.15.5" target="asv"> Prov. 15:5, </a> "In abundant justice there is the greatest strength." Now, as Our Lord says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.20" target="asv">Mat. 5:20, </a> seqq.) abundant justice restrains anger, which is a less grievous sin than murder, which less abundant justice + restrains. Therefore the least grievous sin is opposed to the greatest virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36636" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36636] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod gravitas peccatorum non differat +secundum dignitatem virtutum quibus peccata opponuntur, ut scilicet +maiori virtuti gravius peccatum opponatur. Quia ut dicitur Prov. +XV, <i>in abundanti iustitia virtus maxima est</i>. Sed sicut dicit +dominus, Matth. V, abundans iustitia cohibet iram; quae est minus +peccatum quam homicidium, quod cohibet minor iustitia. Ergo maximae +virtuti opponitur minimum peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is stated in Ethic. ii, 3 that "virtue is about the difficult and the good": whence it seems to follow that the + greater virtue is about what is more difficult. But it is a less grievous sin to fail in what is more difficult, than in what + is less difficult. Therefore the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36637" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36637] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +in II Ethic. dicitur quod virtus est circa difficile et bonum, ex +quo videtur quod maior virtus sit circa magis difficile. Sed minus +est peccatum si homo deficiat in magis difficili, quam si deficiat +in minus difficili. Ergo maiori virtuti minus peccatum +opponitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, charity is a greater virtue than faith or hope ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:13</a>). Now hatred which is opposed to charity is a less grievous sin than unbelief or despair which are opposed to faith and hope. + Therefore the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36638" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36638] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +caritas est maior virtus quam fides et spes, ut dicitur I ad Cor. +XIII. Odium autem, quod opponitur caritati, est minus peccatum quam +infidelitas vel desperatio, quae opponuntur fidei et spei. Ergo +maiori virtuti opponitur minus peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. 8:10) that the "worst is opposed to the best." Now in morals the best is the greatest virtue; + and the worst is the most grievous sin. Therefore the most grievous sin is opposed to the greatest virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36639" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36639] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic., quod <i>pessimum optimo +contrarium est</i>. Optimum autem in moralibus est maxima virtus; +pessimum autem, gravissimum peccatum. Ergo maximae virtuti +opponitur gravissimum peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A sin is opposed to a virtue in two ways: first, principally and directly; that sin, to with, which is about the same object: + because contraries are about the same thing. In this way, the more grievous sin must needs be opposed to the greater virtue: + because, just as the degrees of gravity in a sin depend on the object, so also does the greatness of a virtue, since both + sin and virtue take their species from the object, as shown above ( + <a href="#FS_Q60_A5" id="FS_Q73_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[60], A[5]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q72_A1" id="FS_Q73_A4-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[72], A[1]</a>). Wherefore the greatest sin must needs be directly opposed to the greatest virtue, as being furthest removed from it in + the same genus. Secondly, the opposition of virtue to sin may be considered in respect of a certain extension of the virtue + in checking sin. For the greater a virtue is, the further it removes man from the contrary sin, so that it withdraws man not + only from that sin, but also from whatever leads to it. + And thus it is evident that the greater a virtue is, the more it withdraws man also from less grievous sins: even as the more + perfect health is, the more does it ward off even minor ailments. And in this way the less grievous sin is opposed to the + greater virtue, on the part of the latter's effect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 4 co."><a name="36640" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36640] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod virtuti opponitur aliquod peccatum, uno quidem modo +principaliter et directe, quod scilicet est circa idem obiectum, +nam contraria circa idem sunt. Et hoc modo oportet quod maiori +virtuti opponatur gravius peccatum. Sicut enim ex parte obiecti +attenditur maior gravitas peccati, ita etiam maior dignitas +virtutis, utrumque enim ex obiecto speciem sortitur, ut ex +supradictis patet. Unde oportet quod maximae virtuti directe +contrarietur maximum peccatum, quasi maxime ab eo distans in eodem +genere. Alio modo potest considerari oppositio virtutis ad +peccatum, secundum quandam extensionem virtutis cohibentis +peccatum, quanto enim fuerit virtus maior, tanto magis elongat +hominem a peccato sibi contrario, ita quod non solum ipsum +peccatum, sed etiam inducentia ad peccatum cohibet. Et sic +manifestum est quod quanto aliqua virtus fuerit maior, tanto etiam +minora peccata cohibet, sicut etiam sanitas, quanto fuerit maior, +tanto etiam minores distemperantias excludit. Et per hunc modum +maiori virtuti minus peccatum opponitur ex parte effectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers the opposition which consists in restraining from sin; for thus abundant justice checks even minor + sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36641" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36641] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de oppositione quae +attenditur secundum cohibitionem peccati, sic enim abundans +iustitia etiam minora peccata cohibet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The greater virtue that is about a more difficult good is opposed directly to the sin which is about a more difficult evil. + For in each case there is a certain superiority, in that the will is shown to be more intent on good or evil, through not + being overcome by the difficulty. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36642" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36642] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod maiori virtuti, quae est circa bonum magis difficile, +contrariatur directe peccatum quod est circa malum magis difficile. +Utrobique enim invenitur quaedam eminentia, ex hoc quod ostenditur +voluntas proclivior in bonum vel in malum, ex hoc quod difficultate +non vincitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Charity is not any kind of love, but the love of God: hence not any kind of hatred is opposed to it directly, but the hatred + of God, which is the most grievous of all sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36643" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36643] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod caritas non est quicumque amor, sed amor Dei. Unde +non opponitur ei quodcumque odium directe, sed odium Dei, quod est +gravissimum peccatorum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q73_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A5-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 5. Whether carnal sins are of less guilt than spiritual sins?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that carnal sins are not of less guilt than spiritual sins. Because adultery is a more grievous sin than theft: + for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.6.30" target="asv">Prov. 6:30</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A5-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.6.32" target="asv">32</a>): "The fault is not so great when a man has stolen . . . but he that is an adulterer, for the folly of his heart shall destroy + his own soul." Now theft belongs to covetousness, which is a spiritual sin; while adultery pertains to lust, which is a carnal + sin. Therefore carnal sins are + of greater guilt than spiritual sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36644" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36644] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccata carnalia non sint minoris +culpae quam peccata spiritualia. Adulterium enim gravius peccatum +est quam furtum, dicitur enim Prov. VI, <i>non grandis est culpae +cum quis furatus fuerit. Qui autem adulter est, propter cordis +inopiam perdet animam suam</i>. Sed furtum pertinet ad avaritiam, +quae est peccatum spirituale; adulterium autem ad luxuriam, quae +est peccatum carnale. Ergo peccata carnalia sunt maioris +culpae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says in his commentary on Leviticus [*The quotation is from De Civ. Dei ii, 4 and iv, 31.] that "the devil + rejoices chiefly in lust and idolatry." But he rejoices more in the greater sin. Therefore, since lust is a carnal sin, it + seems that the carnal sins are of most guilt. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36645" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36645] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, super Levit., quod Diabolus maxime gaudet de +peccato luxuriae et idololatriae. Sed de maiori culpa magis gaudet. +Ergo, cum luxuria sit peccatum carnale, videtur quod peccata +carnalia sint maximae culpae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher proves (Ethic. vii, 6) that "it is more shameful to be incontinent in lust than in anger." But anger + is a spiritual sin, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17); while lust pertains to carnal sins. Therefore carnal sin is more + grievous than spiritual sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36646" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36646] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus probat, in VII Ethic., quod <i>incontinens +concupiscentiae est turpior quam incontinens irae</i>. Sed ira est +peccatum spirituale, secundum Gregorium, XXXI Moral.; +concupiscentia autem pertinet ad peccata carnalia. Ergo peccatum +carnale est gravius quam peccatum spirituale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 11) that carnal sins are of less guilt, but of more shame than spiritual sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36647" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36647] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Gregorius dicit, quod peccata carnalia sunt minoris +culpae, et maioris infamiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Spiritual sins are of greater guilt than carnal sins: yet this does not mean that each spiritual sin is of greater guilt + than each carnal sin; but that, considering the sole difference between spiritual and carnal, spiritual sins are more grievous + than carnal sins, other things being equal. Three reasons may be assigned for this. The first is on the part of the subject: + because spiritual sins belong to the spirit, to which it is proper to turn to God, and to + turn away from Him; whereas carnal sins are consummated in the carnal pleasure of the appetite, to which it chiefly belongs + to turn to goods of the body; so that carnal sin, as such, denotes more a "turning to" something, and for that reason, implies + a closer cleaving; whereas spiritual sin denotes more a "turning from" something, whence the notion of guilt arises; and for + this reason it involves greater guilt. A second reason may be taken on the part of the person against whom sin is + committed: because carnal sin, as such, is against the sinner's own body, which he ought to love less, in the order of charity, + than God and his neighbor, against whom he commits spiritual sins, and consequently spiritual sins, as such, are of greater + guilt. A third reason may be taken from the motive, since the stronger the impulse to sin, the less grievous the sin, as we + shall state further on + <a href="#FS_Q73_A6" id="FS_Q73_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[6])</a>. Now carnal sins have a stronger impulse, viz. our innate + concupiscence of the flesh. Therefore spiritual sins, as such, are of greater guilt. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 5 co."><a name="36648" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36648] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod peccata spiritualia sunt maioris culpae quam peccata +carnalia. Quod non est sic intelligendum quasi quodlibet peccatum +spirituale sit maioris culpae quolibet peccato carnali, sed quia, +considerata hac sola differentia spiritualitatis et carnalitatis, +graviora sunt quam cetera peccata, ceteris paribus. Cuius ratio +triplex potest assignari. Prima quidem ex parte subiecti. Nam +peccata spiritualia pertinent ad spiritum, cuius est converti ad +Deum et ab eo averti, peccata vero carnalia consummantur in +delectatione carnalis appetitus, ad quem principaliter pertinet ad +bonum corporale converti. Et ideo peccatum carnale, inquantum +huiusmodi, plus habet de conversione, propter quod etiam est +maioris adhaesionis, sed peccatum spirituale habet plus de +aversione, ex qua procedit ratio culpae. Et ideo peccatum +spirituale, inquantum huiusmodi, est maioris culpae. Secunda ratio +potest sumi ex parte eius in quem peccatur. Nam peccatum carnale, +inquantum huiusmodi, est in corpus proprium; quod est minus +diligendum, secundum ordinem caritatis, quam Deus et proximus, in +quos peccatur per peccata spiritualia. Et ideo peccata spiritualia, +inquantum huiusmodi, sunt maioris culpae. Tertia ratio potest sumi +ex parte motivi. Quia quanto est gravius impulsivum ad peccandum, +tanto homo minus peccat, ut infra dicetur. Peccata autem carnalia +habent vehementius impulsivum, idest ipsam concupiscentiam carnis +nobis innatam. Et ideo peccata spiritualia, inquantum huiusmodi, +sunt maioris culpae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Adultery belongs not only to the sin of lust, but also to the sin of injustice, and in this respect may be brought under + the head of covetousness, as a gloss observes on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.5" target="asv"> Eph. 5:5.</a> "No fornicator, or unclean, or covetous person," etc.; so that adultery is so much more grievous than theft, as a man loves + his wife more than his chattels. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36649" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36649] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod adulterium non solum pertinet ad peccatum +luxuriae, sed etiam pertinet ad peccatum iniustitiae. Et quantum ad +hoc, potest ad avaritiam reduci; ut Glossa dicit, ad Ephes., super +illud, <i>omnis fornicator, aut immundus, aut avarus</i>. Et tunc +gravius est adulterium quam furtum, quanto homini carior est uxor +quam res possessa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The devil is said to rejoice chiefly in the sin of lust, because it is of the greatest adhesion, and man can with difficulty + be withdrawn from it. "For the desire of pleasure is insatiable," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 12). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36650" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36650] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod Diabolus dicitur maxime gaudere de peccato luxuriae, +quia est maximae adhaerentiae, et difficile ab eo homo potest +eripi, insatiabilis est enim delectabilis appetitus ut philosophus +dicit, in III Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher himself says (Ethic. vii, 6), the reason why it is more shameful to be incontinent in lust than in anger, + is that lust partakes less of reason; and in the same sense he says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "sins of intemperance are most worthy + of reproach, because they are about those pleasures which are common to us and irrational minds": hence, by these sins man + is, so to speak, brutalized; for which same reason Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, + 17) that they are more shameful. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36651" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36651] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod philosophus dicit, turpiorem esse incontinentem +concupiscentiae quam incontinentem irae, quia minus participat de +ratione. Et secundum hoc etiam dicit, in III Ethic., quod peccata +intemperantiae sunt maxime exprobrabilia, quia sunt circa illas +delectationes quae sunt communes nobis et brutis, unde quodammodo +per ista peccata homo brutalis redditur. Et inde est quod, sicut +Gregorius dicit, sunt maioris infamiae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q73_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A6-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 6. Whether the gravity of a sin depends on its cause?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gravity of a sin does not depend on its cause. Because the greater a sin's cause, the more forcibly + it moves to sin, and so the more difficult is it to resist. But sin is lessened by the fact that it is difficult to resist; + for it denotes weakness in the sinner, if he cannot easily resist sin; and a sin that is due to weakness is deemed less grievous. + Therefore sin does not derive its gravity from its cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="36652" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36652] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod gravitas peccatorum non attendatur +secundum causam peccati. Quanto enim peccati causa fuerit maior, +tanto vehementius movet ad peccandum, et ita difficilius potest ei +resisti. Sed peccatum diminuitur ex hoc quod ei difficilius +resistitur, hoc enim pertinet ad infirmitatem peccantis, ut non +facile resistat peccato; peccatum autem quod est ex infirmitate, +levius iudicatur. Non ergo peccatum habet gravitatem ex parte suae +causae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, concupiscence is a general cause of sin; wherefore a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.7" target="asv"> Rom. 7:7, </a> "For I had not known concupiscence," says: "The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evils." Now + the greater the concupiscence by which man is overcome, the less grievous his sin. Therefore the gravity of a sin is diminished + by the greatness of its cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="36653" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36653] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +concupiscentia est generalis quaedam causa peccati, unde dicit +Glossa, super illud Rom. VII, <i>nam concupiscentiam nesciebam +etc., bona est lex, quae, dum concupiscentiam prohibet, omne malum +prohibet</i>. Sed quanto homo fuerit victus maiori concupiscentia, +tanto est minus peccatum. Gravitas ergo peccati diminuitur ex +magnitudine causae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as rectitude of the reason is the cause of a virtuous act, so defect in the reason seems to be the cause of sin. + Now the greater the defect in the reason, the less grievous the sin: so much so that he who lacks the use of reason, is altogether + excused from sin, and he who sins through ignorance, sins less grievously. Therefore the gravity of a sin is not increased + by the greatness of its cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="36654" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36654] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut rectitudo rationis est causa virtuosi actus, ita defectus +rationis videtur esse causa peccati. Sed defectus rationis, quanto +fuerit maior, tanto est minus peccatum, intantum quod qui carent +usu rationis, omnino excusentur a peccato; et qui ex ignorantia +peccat, levius peccat. Ergo gravitas peccati non augetur ex +magnitudine causae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> If the cause be increased, the effect is increased. Therefore the greater the cause of sin, the more grievous the sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 6 s. c."><a name="36655" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36655] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +multiplicata causa, multiplicatur effectus. Ergo, si causa peccati +maior fuerit, peccatum erit gravius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q73_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In the genus of sin, as in every other genus, two causes may be observed. The first is the direct and proper cause of sin, + and is the will to sin: for it is compared to the sinful act, as a tree to its fruit, as a gloss observes on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.18" target="asv"> Mat. 7:18, </a> "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit": and the greater this cause is, the more grievous will the sin be, since the + greater the will to sin, the more grievously does man sin. + </p><p id="FS_Q73_A6-p7"> The other causes of sin are extrinsic and remote, as it were, being those whereby the will is inclined to sin. Among these + causes we must make a distinction; for some of them induce the will to sin in accord with the very nature of the will: such + is the end, which is the proper object of the will; and by a such like cause sin is made more grievous, because a man sins + more grievously if his will is induced to sin by the intention of a more evil end. Other causes incline the will + to sin, against the nature and order of the will, whose natural inclination is to be moved freely of itself in accord with + the judgment of reason. Wherefore those causes which weaken the judgment of reason (e.g. ignorance), or which weaken the free + movement of the will, (e.g. weakness, violence, fear, or the like), diminish the gravity of sin, even as they diminish its + voluntariness; and so much so, that if the act be altogether involuntary, it is no longer sinful. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 6 co."><a name="36656" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36656] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod in genere peccati, sicut et in quolibet alio genere, +potest accipi duplex causa. Una quae est propria et per se causa +peccati, quae est ipsa voluntas peccandi, comparatur enim ad actum +peccati sicut arbor ad fructum, ut dicitur in Glossa, super illud +Matth. VII, <i>non potest arbor bona fructus malos facere</i>. Et +huiusmodi causa quanto fuerit maior, tanto peccatum erit gravius, +quanto enim voluntas fuerit maior ad peccandum, tanto homo gravius +peccat. Aliae vero causae peccati accipiuntur quasi extrinsecae et +remotae, ex quibus scilicet voluntas inclinatur ad peccandum. Et in +his causis est distinguendum. Quaedam enim harum inducunt +voluntatem ad peccandum, secundum ipsam naturam voluntatis, sicut +finis, quod est proprium obiectum voluntatis. Et ex tali causa +augetur peccatum, gravius enim peccat cuius voluntas ex intentione +peioris finis inclinatur ad peccandum. Aliae vero causae sunt quae +inclinant voluntatem ad peccandum, praeter naturam et ordinem +ipsius voluntatis, quae nata est moveri libere ex seipsa secundum +iudicium rationis. Unde causae quae diminuunt iudicium rationis, +sicut ignorantia; vel quae diminuunt liberum motum voluntatis, +sicut infirmitas vel violentia aut metus, aut aliquid huiusmodi, +diminuunt peccatum, sicut et diminuunt voluntarium, intantum quod +si actus sit omnino involuntarius, non habet rationem peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers the extrinsic moving cause, which diminishes voluntariness. The increase of such a cause diminishes + the sin, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="36657" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36657] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de causa movente +extrinseca, quae diminuit voluntarium, cuius quidem causae +augmentum diminuit peccatum, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If concupiscence be understood to include the movement of the will, then, where there is greater concupiscence, there is + a greater sin. But if by concupiscence we understand a passion, which is a movement of the concupiscible power, then a greater + concupiscence, forestalling the judgment of reason and the movement of the will, diminishes the sin, because the man who sins, + being stimulated by a greater concupiscence, falls through a more grievous + temptation, wherefore he is less to be blamed. On the other hand, if concupiscence be taken in this sense follows the judgment + of reason, and the movement of the will, then the greater concupiscence, the graver the sin: because sometimes the movement + of concupiscence is redoubled by the will tending unrestrainedly to its object. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="36658" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36658] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod si sub concupiscentia includatur etiam ipse motus +voluntatis, sic ubi est maior concupiscentia, est maius peccatum. +Si vero concupiscentia dicatur passio quaedam, quae est motus vis +concupiscibilis, sic maior concupiscentia praecedens iudicium +rationis et motum voluntatis, diminuit peccatum, quia qui maiori +concupiscentia stimulatus peccat, cadit ex graviori tentatione; +unde minus ei imputatur. Si vero concupiscentia sic sumpta sequatur +iudicium rationis et motum voluntatis, sic ubi est maior +concupiscentia, est maius peccatum, insurgit enim interdum maior +concupiscentiae motus ex hoc quod voluntas ineffrenate tendit in +suum obiectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers the cause which renders the act involuntary, and such a cause diminishes the gravity of sin, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="36659" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36659] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de causa quae causat +involuntarium, et haec diminuit peccatum, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q73_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A7-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 7. Whether a circumstance aggravates a sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a circumstance does not aggravate a sin. Because sin takes its gravity from its species. Now a circumstance + does not specify a sin, for it is an accident thereof. Therefore the gravity of a sin is not taken from a circumstance. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="36660" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36660] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod circumstantia non aggravet peccatum. +Peccatum enim habet gravitatem ex sua specie. Circumstantia autem +non dat speciem peccato, cum sit quoddam accidens eius. Ergo +gravitas peccati non consideratur ex circumstantia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a circumstance is either evil or not: if it is evil, it causes, of itself, a species of evil; and if it is not evil, + it cannot make a thing worse. Therefore a circumstance nowise aggravates a sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="36661" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36661] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +aut circumstantia est mala, aut non. Si circumstantia mala est, +ipsa per se causat quandam speciem mali, si vero non sit mala, non +habet unde augeat malum. Ergo circumstantia nullo modo auget +peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the malice of a sin is derived from its turning away (from God). But circumstances affect sin on the part of the + object to which it turns. Therefore they do not add to the sin's malice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="36662" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36662] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +malitia peccati est ex parte aversionis. Sed circumstantiae +consequuntur peccatum ex parte conversionis. Ergo non augent +malitiam peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Ignorance of a circumstance diminishes sin: for he who sins through ignorance of a circumstance, deserves to be forgiven + (Ethic. iii, 1). Now this would not be the case unless a circumstance aggravated a sin. Therefore a circumstance makes a sin + more grievous. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 7 s. c."><a name="36663" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36663] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod ignorantia circumstantiae diminuit peccatum, qui enim +peccat ex ignorantia circumstantiae, meretur veniam, ut dicitur in +III Ethic. Hoc autem non esset, nisi circumstantia aggravaret +peccatum. Ergo circumstantia peccatum aggravat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher says in speaking of habits of virtue (Ethic. ii, 1,2), "it is natural for a thing to be increased by that + which causes it." Now it is evident that a sin is caused by a defect in some circumstance: because the fact that a man departs + from the order of reason is due to his not observing the due circumstances in his action. Wherefore it is evident that it + is natural for a sin to be aggravated by reason of its circumstances. This happens in + three ways. First, in so far as a circumstance draws a sin from one kind to another: thus fornication is the intercourse of + a man with one who is not his wife: but if to this be added the circumstance that the latter is the wife of another, the sin + is drawn to another kind of sin, viz. injustice, in so far as he usurps another's property; and in this respect adultery is + a more grievous sin than fornication. Secondly, a circumstance aggravates a sin, not by drawing it into another genus, but + only by multiplying the ratio of sin: thus if a wasteful man gives both when he ought not, and to whom he ought not to give, + he commits the same kind of sin in more ways than if he were to merely to give to whom he ought not, and for that very reason + his sin is more grievous; even as that sickness is the graver which affects more parts of the body. Hence Cicero says (Paradox. + iii) that "in taking his father's life a man commits many sins; for he outrages one who begot him, who fed him, who + educated him, to whom he owes his lands, his house, his position in the republic." Thirdly, a circumstance aggravates a sin + by adding to the deformity which the sin derives from another circumstance: thus, taking another's property constitutes the + sin of theft; but if to this be added the circumstance that much is taken of another's property, the sin will be more grievous; + although in itself, to take more or less has not the character of a good or of an evil act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 7 co."><a name="36664" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36664] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod unumquodque ex eodem natum est augeri, ex quo +causatur; sicut philosophus dicit de habitu virtutis, in II Ethic. +Manifestum est autem quod peccatum causatur ex defectu alicuius +circumstantiae, ex hoc enim receditur ab ordine rationis, quod +aliquis in operando non observat debitas circumstantias. Unde +manifestum est quod peccatum natum est aggravari per +circumstantiam. Sed hoc quidem contingit tripliciter. Uno quidem +modo, inquantum circumstantia transfert in aliud genus peccati. +Sicut peccatum fornicationis consistit in hoc quod homo accedit ad +non suam, si autem addatur haec circumstantia, ut illa ad quam +accedit sit alterius uxor, transfertur iam in aliud genus peccati, +scilicet in iniustitiam, inquantum homo usurpat rem alterius. Et +secundum hoc, adulterium est gravius peccatum quam fornicatio. +Aliquando vero circumstantia non aggravat peccatum quasi trahens in +aliud genus peccati, sed solum quia multiplicat rationem peccati. +Sicut si prodigus det quando non debet, et cui non debet, +multiplicius peccat eodem genere peccati, quam si solum det cui non +debet. Et ex hoc ipso peccatum fit gravius, sicut etiam aegritudo +est gravior quae plures partes corporis inficit. Unde et Tullius +dicit, in paradoxis, quod <i>in patris vita violanda, multa +peccantur, violatur enim is qui procreavit, qui aluit, qui +erudivit, qui in sede ac domo, atque in republica collocavit</i>. +Tertio modo circumstantia aggravat peccatum ex eo quod auget +deformitatem provenientem ex alia circumstantia. Sicut accipere +alienum constituit peccatum furti, si autem addatur haec +circumstantia, ut multum accipiat de alieno, est peccatum gravius; +quamvis accipere multum vel parum, de se non dicat rationem boni +vel mali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some circumstances do specify a moral act, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A10" id="FS_Q73_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[10]</a>). Nevertheless a circumstance which does not give the species, may aggravate a sin; because, even as the goodness of a thing + is weighed, not only in reference to its species, but also in reference to an accident, so the malice of an act is measured, + not only according to the species of that act, but also according to a circumstance. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="36665" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36665] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod aliqua circumstantia dat speciem actui morali, +ut supra habitum est. Et tamen circumstantia quae non dat speciem, +potest aggravare peccatum. Quia sicut bonitas rei non solum +pensatur ex sua specie, sed etiam ex aliquo accidente; ita malitia +actus non solum pensatur ex specie actus, sed etiam ex +circumstantia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A circumstance may aggravate a sin either way. For if it is evil, it does not follow that it constitutes the sin's species; + because it may multiply the ratio of evil within the same species, as stated above. And if it be not evil, it may aggravate + a sin in relation to the malice of another circumstance. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="36666" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36666] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod utroque modo circumstantia potest aggravare peccatum. +Si enim sit mala, non tamen propter hoc oportet quod semper +constituat speciem peccati, potest enim addere rationem malitiae in +eadem specie, ut dictum est. Si autem non sit mala, potest +aggravare peccatum in ordine ad malitiam alterius +circumstantiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Reason should direct the action not only as regards the object, but also as regards every circumstance. Therefore one may + turn aside from the rule of reason through corruption of any single circumstance; for instance, by doing something when one + ought not or where one ought not; and to depart thus from the rule of reason suffices to make the act evil. This turning aside + from the rule of reason results from man's turning away from God, to Whom man + ought to be united by right reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="36667" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36667] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio debet ordinare actum non solum quantum ad +obiectum, sed etiam quantum ad omnes circumstantias. Et ideo +aversio quaedam a regula rationis attenditur secundum corruptionem +cuiuslibet circumstantiae, puta si aliquis operetur quando non +debet, vel ubi non debet. Et huiusmodi aversio sufficit ad rationem +mali. Hanc autem aversionem a regula rationis, sequitur aversio a +Deo, cui debet homo per rectam rationem coniungi.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q73_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A8-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 8. Whether sin is aggravated by reason of its causing more harm?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a sin is not aggravated by reason of its causing more harm. Because the harm done is an issue consequent + to the sinful act. But the issue of an act does not add to its goodness or malice, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q20_A5" id="FS_Q73_A8-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[20], A[5]</a>). Therefore a sin is not aggravated on account of its causing more harm. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="36668" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36668] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod gravitas peccati non augeatur secundum +maius nocumentum. Nocumentum enim est quidam eventus consequens +actum peccati. Sed eventus sequens non addit ad bonitatem vel +malitiam actus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo peccatum non aggravatur +propter maius nocumentum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, harm is inflicted by sins against our neighbor. Because no one wishes to harm himself: and no one can harm God, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Job.35.6" target="asv">Job 35:6</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A8-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Job.35.8" target="asv">8</a>: "If thy iniquities be multiplied, what shalt thou do against Him? . . . Thy wickedness may hurt a man that is like thee." + If, therefore, sins were aggravated through causing more harm, it would follow that sins against our neighbor are more grievous + than sins against God or oneself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="36669" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36669] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +nocumentum maxime invenitur in peccatis quae sunt contra proximum, +quia sibi ipsi nemo vult nocere; Deo autem nemo potest nocere, +secundum illud Iob XXXV, <i>si multiplicatae fuerint iniquitates +tuae, quid facies contra illum? Homini, qui similis tibi est, +nocebit impietas tua</i>. Si ergo peccatum aggravaretur propter +maius nocumentum, sequeretur quod peccatum quo quis peccat in +proximum, esset gravius peccato quo quis peccat in Deum vel in +seipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, greater harm is inflicted on a man by depriving him of the life of grace, than by taking away his natural life; + because the life of grace is better than the life of nature, so far that man ought to despise his natural life lest he lose + the life of grace. Now, speaking absolutely, a man who leads a woman to commit fornication deprives her of the life of grace + by leading her into mortal sin. If therefore a sin were more grievous on account of its + causing a greater harm, it would follow that fornication, absolutely speaking, is a more grievous sin than murder, which is + evidently untrue. Therefore a sin is not more grievous on account of its causing a greater harm. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="36670" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36670] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +maius nocumentum infertur alicui cum privatur vita gratiae, quam +cum privatur vita naturae, quia vita gratiae est melior quam vita +naturae, intantum quod homo debet vitam naturae contemnere ne +amittat vitam gratiae. Sed ille qui inducit aliquam mulierem ad +fornicandum, quantum est de se, privat eam vita gratiae, inducens +eam ad peccatum mortale. Si ergo peccatum esset gravius propter +maius nocumentum, sequeretur quod simplex fornicator gravius +peccaret quam homicida, quod est manifeste falsum. Non ergo +peccatum est gravius propter maius nocumentum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 14): "Since vice is contrary to nature, a vice is the more grievous according as it diminishes + the integrity of nature." Now the diminution of the integrity of nature is a harm. Therefore a sin is graver according as + it does more harm. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 8 s. c."><a name="36671" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36671] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in III de Lib. Arb., <i>quia vitium +naturae adversatur, tantum additur malitiae vitiorum, quantum +integritati naturarum minuitur</i>. Sed diminutio integritatis +naturae est nocumentum. Ergo tanto gravius est peccatum, quanto +maius est nocumentum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q73_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Harm may bear a threefold relation to sin. Because sometimes the harm resulting from a sin is foreseen and intended, as when + a man does something with a mind to harm another, e.g. a murderer or a thief. In this case the quantity of harm aggravates + the sin directly, because then the harm is the direct object of the sin. Sometimes the harm is foreseen, but not intended; + for instance, when a man takes a short cut through a field, the result being that he + knowingly injures the growing crops, although his intention is not to do this harm, but to commit fornication. In this case + again the quantity of the harm done aggravates the sin; indirectly, however, in so far, to wit, as it is owing to his will + being strongly inclined to sin, that a man does not forbear from doing, to himself or to another, a harm which he would not + wish simply. Sometimes, however, the harm is neither foreseen nor intended: and then if this harm is connected with the sin + accidentally, it does not aggravate the sin directly; but, on account of his neglecting to consider the harm that might ensue, + a man is deemed punishable for the evil results of his action if it be unlawful. If, on the other hand, the harm follow directly + from the sinful act, although it be neither foreseen nor intended, it aggravates the sin directly, because whatever is directly + consequent to a sin, belongs, in a manner, to the very species of that sin: for instance, if a man is a notorious + fornicator, the result is that many are scandalized; and although such was not his intention, nor was it perhaps foreseen + by him, yet it aggravates his sin directly. + </p><p id="FS_Q73_A8-p7"> But this does not seem to apply to penal harm, which the sinner himself incurs. Such like harm, if accidentally connected + with the sinful act, and if neither foreseen nor intended, does not aggravate a sin, nor does it correspond with the gravity + of the sin: for instance, if a man in running to slay, slips and hurts his foot. If, on the other hand, this harm is directly + consequent to the sinful act, although perhaps it be neither foreseen nor intended, then greater harm does not + make greater sin, but, on the contrary, a graver sin calls for the infliction of a greater harm. Thus, an unbeliever who has + heard nothing about the pains of hell, would suffer greater pain in hell for a sin of murder than for a sin of theft: but + his sin is not aggravated on account of his neither intending nor foreseeing this, as it would be in the case of a believer, + who, seemingly, sins more grievously in the very fact that he despises a greater punishment, that he may satisfy his desire + to + sin; but the gravity of this harm is caused by the sole gravity of sin. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 8 co."><a name="36672" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36672] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod nocumentum tripliciter se habere potest ad peccatum. +Quandoque enim nocumentum quod provenit ex peccato, est praevisum +et intentum, sicut cum aliquis aliquid operatur animo nocendi +alteri, ut homicida vel fur. Et tunc directe quantitas nocumenti +adauget gravitatem peccati, quia tunc nocumentum est per se +obiectum peccati. Quandoque autem nocumentum est praevisum, sed non +intentum, sicut cum aliquis transiens per agrum ut compendiosius +vadat ad fornicandum, infert nocumentum his quae sunt seminata in +agro, scienter, licet non animo nocendi. Et sic etiam quantitas +nocumenti aggravat peccatum, sed indirecte, inquantum scilicet ex +voluntate multum inclinata ad peccandum, procedit quod aliquis non +praetermittat facere damnum sibi vel alii, quod simpliciter non +vellet. Quandoque autem nocumentum nec est praevisum nec intentum. +Et tunc si per accidens se habeat ad peccatum, non aggravat +peccatum directe, sed propter negligentiam considerandi nocumenta +quae consequi possent, imputantur homini ad poenam mala quae +eveniunt praeter eius intentionem, si dabat operam rei illicitae. +Si vero nocumentum per se sequatur ex actu peccati, licet non sit +intentum nec praevisum, directe peccatum aggravat, quia quaecumque +per se consequuntur ad peccatum, pertinent quodammodo ad ipsam +peccati speciem. Puta si aliquis publice fornicetur, sequitur +scandalum plurimorum, quod quamvis ipse non intendat, nec forte +praevideat, directe per hoc aggravatur peccatum. Aliter tamen +videtur se habere circa nocumentum poenale, quod incurrit ipse qui +peccat. Huiusmodi enim nocumentum, si per accidens se habeat ad +actum peccati, et non sit praevisum nec intentum, non aggravat +peccatum, neque sequitur maiorem gravitatem peccati, sicut si +aliquis currens ad occidendum, impingat et laedat sibi pedem. Si +vero tale nocumentum per se consequatur ad actum peccati, licet +forte nec sit praevisum nec intentum, tunc maius nocumentum non +facit gravius peccatum; sed e converso gravius peccatum inducit +gravius nocumentum. Sicut aliquis infidelis, qui nihil audivit de +poenis Inferni, graviorem poenam in Inferno patietur pro peccato +homicidii quam pro peccato furti, quia enim hoc nec intendit nec +praevidet, non aggravatur ex hoc peccatum (sicut contingit circa +fidelem, qui ex hoc ipso videtur peccare gravius, quod maiores +poenas contemnit ut impleat voluntatem peccati), sed gravitas +huiusmodi nocumenti solum causatur ex gravitate peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As we have already stated ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q20_A5" id="FS_Q73_A8-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[20], A[5]</a>), in treating of the goodness and malice of external actions, the result of an action if foreseen and intended adds to the + goodness and malice of an act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="36673" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36673] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut etiam supra dictum est, cum de bonitate +et malitia exteriorum actuum ageretur, eventus sequens, si sit +praevisus et intentus, addit ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the harm done aggravates a sin, it does not follow that this alone renders a sin more grievous: in fact, it is inordinateness + which of itself aggravates a sin. Wherefore the harm itself that ensues aggravates a sin, in so far only as it renders the + act more inordinate. Hence it does not follow, supposing harm to be inflicted chiefly by sins against our neighbor, that such + sins are the most grievous, since a much greater inordinateness is to + be found against which man commits against God, and in some which he commits against himself. Moreover we might say that although + no man can do God any harm in His substance, yet he can endeavor to do so in things concerning Him, e.g. by destroying faith, + by outraging holy things, which are most grievous sins. Again, a man sometimes knowingly and freely inflicts harm on himself, + as in the case of suicide, though this be referred finally to some apparent good, for example, delivery from some + anxiety. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="36674" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36674] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, quamvis nocumentum aggravet peccatum, non tamen +sequitur quod ex solo nocumento peccatum aggravetur, quinimmo +peccatum per se est gravius propter inordinationem, ut supra dictum +est. Unde et ipsum nocumentum aggravat peccatum, inquantum facit +actum esse magis inordinatum. Unde non sequitur quod, si nocumentum +maxime habeat locum in peccatis quae sunt contra proximum, quod +illa peccata sunt gravissima, quia multo maior inordinatio +invenitur in peccatis quae sunt contra Deum, et in quibusdam eorum +quae sunt contra seipsum. Et tamen potest dici quod, etsi Deo +nullus possit nocere quantum ad eius substantiam, potest tamen +nocumentum attentare in his quae Dei sunt, sicut extirpando fidem, +violando sacra, quae sunt peccata gravissima. Sibi etiam aliquis +quandoque scienter et volenter infert nocumentum, sicut patet in +his qui se interimunt, licet finaliter hoc referant ad aliquod +bonum apparens, puta ad hoc quod liberentur ab aliqua angustia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument does not prove, for two reasons: first, because the murderer intends directly to do harm to his neighbors; + whereas the fornicator who solicits the woman intends not to harm but pleasure; secondly, because murder is the direct and + sufficient cause of bodily death; whereas no man can of himself be the sufficient cause of another's spiritual death, because + no man dies spiritually except by sinning of his own will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="36675" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36675] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod illa ratio non sequitur, propter duo. Primo quidem, +quia homicida intendit directe nocumentum proximi, fornicator autem +qui provocat mulierem, non intendit nocumentum, sed delectationem. +Secundo, quia homicida est per se et sufficiens causa corporalis +mortis, spiritualis autem mortis nullus potest esse alteri causa +per se et sufficiens; quia nullus spiritualiter moritur nisi +propria voluntate peccando.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q73_A9" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A9-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 9. Whether a sin is aggravated by reason of the condition of the person against whom it is committed?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A9-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin is not aggravated by reason of the condition of the person against whom it is committed. For if this + were the case a sin would be aggravated chiefly by being committed against a just and holy man. But this does not aggravate + a sin: because a virtuous man who bears a wrong with equanimity is less harmed by the wrong done him, than others, who, through + being scandalized, are also hurt inwardly. Therefore the condition of the person against + whom a sin is committed does not aggravate the sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="36676" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36676] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod propter conditionem personae in quam +peccatur, peccatum non aggravetur. Si enim hoc esset, maxime +aggravaretur ex hoc quod aliquis peccat contra aliquem virum iustum +et sanctum. Sed ex hoc non aggravatur peccatum, minus enim laeditur +ex iniuria illata virtuosus, qui aequanimiter tolerat, quam alii, +qui etiam interius scandalizati laeduntur. Ergo conditio personae +in quam peccatur, non aggravat peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A9-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if the condition of the person aggravated the sin, this would be still more the case if the person be near of kin, + because, as Cicero says (Paradox. iii): "The man who kills his slave sins once: he that takes his father's life sins many + times." But the kinship of a person sinned against does not apparently aggravate a sin, because every man is most akin to + himself; and yet it is less grievous to harm oneself than another, e.g. to kill one's own, than + another's horse, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Therefore kinship of the person sinned against does not aggravate + the sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="36677" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36677] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +si conditio personae aggravaret peccatum, maxime aggravaretur ex +propinquitate, quia sicut Tullius dicit in paradoxis, <i>in servo +necando semel peccatur, in patris vita violanda multa +peccantur</i>. Sed propinquitas personae in quam peccatur, non +videtur aggravare peccatum, quia unusquisque sibi ipsi maxime est +propinquus; et tamen minus peccat qui aliquod damnum sibi infert, +quam si inferret alteri, puta si occideret equum suum, quam si +occideret equum alterius, ut patet per philosophum, in V Ethic. +Ergo propinquitas personae non aggravat peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A9-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the condition of the person who sins aggravates a sin chiefly on account of his position or knowledge, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.6.7" target="asv"> Wis. 6:7</a>: "The mighty shall be mightily tormented," and + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.47" target="asv"> Lk. 12:47</a>: "The servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did it not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes." Therefore, in + like manner, on the part of the person sinned against, the sin is made more grievous by reason of his position + and knowledge. But, apparently, it is not a more grievous sin to inflict an injury on a rich and powerful person than on a + poor man, since "there is no respect of persons with God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p4.3" href="./asv.html#Col.3.25" target="asv">Col. 3:25</a>), according to Whose judgment the gravity of a sin is measured. Therefore the condition of the person sinned against does + not aggravate the sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="36678" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36678] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +conditio personae peccantis praecipue aggravat peccatum ratione +dignitatis vel scientiae, secundum illud Sap. VI, <i>potentes +potenter tormenta patientur</i>; et Luc. XII, <i>servus sciens +voluntatem domini, et non faciens, plagis vapulabit multis</i>. +Ergo, pari ratione, ex parte personae in quam peccatur, magis +aggravaret peccatum dignitas aut scientia personae in quam +peccatur. Sed non videtur gravius peccare qui facit iniuriam +personae ditiori vel potentiori, quam alicui pauperi, quia non est +personarum acceptio apud Deum, secundum cuius iudicium gravitas +peccati pensatur. Ergo conditio personae in quam peccatur, non +aggravat peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A9-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Holy Writ censures especially those sins that are committed against the servants of God. Thus it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p5.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 19:14</a>): "They have destroyed Thy altars, they have slain Thy prophets with the sword." Moreover much blame is attached to the sin + committed by a man against those who are akin to him, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Mic.7.6" target="asv"> Micah 7:6</a>: "the son dishonoreth the father, and the daughter riseth up against her mother." Furthermore + sins committed against persons of rank are expressly condemned: thus it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p5.3" href="./asv.html#Job.34.18" target="asv">Job 34:18</a>): "Who saith to the king: 'Thou art an apostate'; who calleth rulers ungodly." Therefore the condition of the person sinned + against aggravates the sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 9 s. c."><a name="36679" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36679] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod in sacra Scriptura specialiter vituperatur peccatum quod +contra servos Dei committitur, sicut III Reg. XIX, <i>altaria tua +destruxerunt, et prophetas tuos occiderunt gladio</i>. Vituperatur +etiam specialiter peccatum commissum contra personas propinquas, +secundum illud Mich. VII, <i>filius contumeliam facit patri, filia +consurgit adversus matrem suam</i>. Vituperatur etiam specialiter +peccatum quod committitur contra personas in dignitate constitutas, +ut patet Iob XXXIV, <i>qui dicit regi, apostata; qui vocat duces +impios</i>. Ergo conditio personae in quam peccatur, aggravat +peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q73_A9-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The person sinned against is, in a manner, the object of the sin. Now it has been stated above + <a href="#FS_Q73_A3" id="FS_Q73_A9-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a> that the primary gravity of a sin is derived from its object; so that a sin is deemed to be so much the more grave, as its + object is a more principal end. But the principal ends of human acts are God, man himself, and his neighbor: for whatever + we do, it is on account of one of these that we do it; although one of them is subordinate + to the other. Therefore the greater or lesser gravity of a sin, in respect of the person sinned against, may be considered + on the part of these three. + </p><p id="FS_Q73_A9-p7"> First, on the part of God, to Whom man is the more closely united, as he is more virtuous or more sacred to God: so that + an injury inflicted on such a person redounds on to God according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Zech.2.8" target="asv"> Zech. 2:8</a>: "He that toucheth you, toucheth the apple of My eye." Wherefore a sin is the more grievous, according as it is committed + against a person more closely united to God by reason of personal sanctity, or official station. On the part of man himself, + it is evident + that he sins all the more grievously, according as the person against whom he sins, is more united to him, either through + natural affinity or kindness received or any other bond; because he seems to sin against himself rather than the other, and, + for this very reason, sins all the more grievously, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.14.5" target="asv">Ecclus. 14:5</a>: "He that is evil to himself, to whom will he be good?" On the part of his neighbor, a man sins the more grievously, according + as his sin affects more persons: so that a sin + committed against a public personage, e.g. a sovereign prince who stands in the place of the whole people, is more grievous + than a sin committed against a private person; hence it is expressly prohibited ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.28" target="asv">Ex. 22:28</a>): "The prince of thy people thou shalt not curse." In like manner it would seem that an injury done to a person of prominence, + is all the more grave, on account of the scandal and the disturbance it would cause among many people. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 9 co."><a name="36680" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36680] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod persona in quam peccatur, est quodammodo obiectum +peccati. Dictum est autem supra quod prima gravitas peccati +attenditur ex parte obiecti. Ex quo quidem tanto attenditur maior +gravitas in peccato, quanto obiectum eius est principalior finis. +Fines autem principales humanorum actuum sunt Deus, ipse homo, et +proximus, quidquid enim facimus, propter aliquod horum facimus; +quamvis etiam horum trium unum sub altero ordinetur. Potest igitur +ex parte horum trium considerari maior vel minor gravitas in +peccato secundum conditionem personae in quam peccatur. Primo +quidem, ex parte Dei, cui tanto magis aliquis homo coniungitur, +quanto est virtuosior vel Deo sacratior. Et ideo iniuria tali +personae illata, magis redundat in Deum, secundum illud Zach. II, +<i>qui vos tetigerit, tangit pupillam oculi mei</i>. Unde peccatum +fit gravius ex hoc quod peccatur in personam magis Deo coniunctam, +vel ratione virtutis vel ratione officii. Ex parte vero sui ipsius, +manifestum est quod tanto aliquis gravius peccat, quanto in magis +coniunctam personam, seu naturali necessitudine, seu beneficiis, +seu quacumque coniunctione, peccaverit, quia videtur in seipsum +magis peccare, et pro tanto gravius peccat, secundum illud Eccli. +XIV, <i>qui sibi nequam est, cui bonus erit?</i> Ex parte vero +proximi, tanto gravius peccatur, quanto peccatum plures tangit. Et +ideo peccatum quod fit in personam publicam, puta regem vel +principem, qui gerit personam totius multitudinis, est gravius quam +peccatum quod committitur contra unam personam privatam, unde +specialiter dicitur Exod. XXII, <i>principi populi tui non +maledices</i>. Et similiter iniuria quae fit alicui famosae +personae, videtur esse gravior, ex hoc quod in scandalum et in +turbationem plurimorum redundat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A9-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> He who inflicts an injury on a virtuous person, so far as he is concerned, disturbs him internally and externally; but that + the latter is not disturbed internally is due to his goodness, which does not extenuate the sin of the injurer. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="36681" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36681] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ille qui infert iniuriam virtuoso, quantum est +in se, turbat eum et interius et exterius. Sed quod iste interius +non turbetur, contingit ex eius bonitate, quae non diminuit +peccatum iniuriantis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A9-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The injury which a man inflicts on himself in those things which are subject to the dominion of his will, for instance his + possessions, is less sinful than if it were inflicted on another, because he does it of his own will; but in those things + that are not subject to the dominion of his will, such as natural and spiritual goods, it is a graver sin to inflict an injury + on oneself: for it is more grievous for a man to kill himself than another. Since, + however, things belonging to our neighbor are not subject to the dominion of our will, the argument fails to prove, in respect + of injuries done to such like things, that it is less grievous to sin in their regard, unless indeed our neighbor be willing, + or give his approval. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="36682" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36682] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod nocumentum quod quis sibi ipsi infert in his quae +subsunt dominio propriae voluntatis, sicut in rebus possessis, +habet minus de peccato quam si alteri inferatur, quia propria +voluntate hoc agit. Sed in his quae non subduntur dominio +voluntatis, sicut sunt naturalia et spiritualia bona, est gravius +peccatum nocumentum sibi ipsi inferre, gravius enim peccat qui +occidit seipsum, quam qui occidit alterum. Sed quia res +propinquorum nostrorum non subduntur voluntatis nostrae dominio, +non procedit ratio quantum ad nocumenta rebus illorum illata, quod +circa ea minus peccetur; nisi forte velint, vel ratum habeant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A9-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is no respect for persons if God punishes more severely those who sin against a person of higher rank; for this is + done because such an injury redounds to the harm of many. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="36683" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36683] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod non est acceptio personarum si Deus gravius punit +peccantem contra excellentiores personas, hoc enim fit propter hoc +quod hoc redundat in plurium nocumentum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q73_A10" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A10-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 10. Whether the excellence of the person sinning aggravates the sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A10-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the excellence of the person sinning does not aggravate the sin. For man becomes great chiefly by cleaving + to God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A10-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.25.13" target="asv"> Ecclus. 25:13</a>: "How great is he that findeth wisdom and knowledge! but there is none above him that feareth the Lord." Now the more a man + cleaves to God, the less is a sin imputed to him: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A10-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iiChr.30.18" target="asv">2 Paral. 30: 18,19</a>): "The Lord Who is good will show mercy to all + them, who with their whole heart seek the Lord the God of their fathers; and will not impute it to them that they are not + sanctified." Therefore a sin is not aggravated by the excellence of the person sinning. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="36684" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36684] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod magnitudo personae peccantis non +aggravet peccatum. Homo enim maxime redditur magnus ex hoc quod Deo +adhaeret, secundum illud Eccli. XXV, <i>quam magnus est qui invenit +sapientiam et scientiam. Sed non est super timentem Deum</i>. Sed +quanto aliquis magis Deo adhaeret, tanto minus imputatur ei aliquid +ad peccatum, dicitur enim II Paralip. XXX, <i>dominus bonus +propitiabitur cunctis qui in toto corde requirunt dominum Deum +patrum suorum, et non imputabitur eis quod minus sanctificati +sunt</i>. Ergo peccatum non aggravatur ex magnitudine personae +peccantis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A10-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "there is no respect of persons with God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A10-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.11" target="asv">Rom. 2:11</a>). Therefore He does not punish one man more than another, for one and the same sin. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by + the excellence of the person sinning. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="36685" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36685] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +non est personarum acceptio apud Deum, ut dicitur Rom. II. Ergo non +magis punit pro uno et eodem peccato, unum quam alium. Non ergo +aggravatur ex magnitudine personae peccantis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A10-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one should reap disadvantage from good. But he would, if his action were the more blameworthy on account of his + goodness. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by reason of the excellence of the person sinning. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 10 arg. 3"><a name="36686" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36686] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +nullus debet ex bono incommodum reportare. Reportaret autem, si id +quod agit, magis ei imputaretur ad culpam. Ergo propter +magnitudinem personae peccantis non aggravatur peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A10-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 18): "A sin is deemed so much the more grievous as the sinner is held to be a more excellent + person." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 10 s. c."><a name="36687" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36687] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Isidorus dicit, in II de summo bono, <i>tanto maius +cognoscitur peccatum esse, quanto maior qui peccat habetur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A10-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Sin is twofold. There is a sin which takes us unawares on account of the weakness of human nature: and such like sins are + less imputable to one who is more virtuous, because he is less negligent in checking those sins, which nevertheless human + weakness does not allow us to escape altogether. But there are other sins which proceed from deliberation: and these sins + are all the more imputed to man according as he is more excellent. Four reasons may be assigned + for this. First, because a more excellent person, e.g. one who excels in knowledge and virtue, can more easily resist sin; + hence Our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A10-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.47" target="asv">Lk. 12:47</a>) that the "servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did it not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes." Secondly, + on account of ingratitude, because every good in which a man excels, is a gift of God, to Whom man is ungrateful when he sins: + and in this respect any excellence, even in temporal goods, aggravates a + sin, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A10-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.6.7" target="asv"> Wis. 6:7</a>: "The mighty shall be mightily tormented." Thirdly, on account of the sinful act being specially inconsistent with the excellence + of the person sinning: for instance, if a prince were to violate justice, whereas he is set up as the guardian of justice, + or if a priest were to be a fornicator, whereas he has taken the vow of chastity. Fourthly, on account of the example or scandal; + because, as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 2): "Sin becomes much more + scandalous, when the sinner is honored for his position": and the sins of the great are much more notorious and men are wont + to bear them with more indignation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 10 co."><a name="36688" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36688] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod duplex est peccatum. Quoddam ex subreptione +proveniens, propter infirmitatem humanae naturae. Et tale peccatum +minus imputatur ei qui est maior in virtute, eo quod minus negligit +huiusmodi peccata reprimere, quae tamen omnino subterfugere +infirmitas humana non sinit. Alia vero peccata sunt ex +deliberatione procedentia. Et ista peccata tanto magis alicui +imputantur, quanto maior est. Et hoc potest esse propter quatuor. +Primo quidem, quia facilius possunt resistere peccato maiores, puta +qui excedunt in scientia et virtute. Unde dominus dicit, Luc. XII, +quod <i>servus sciens voluntatem domini sui, et non faciens, plagis +vapulabit multis</i>. Secundo, propter ingratitudinem, quia omne +bonum quo quis magnificatur, est Dei beneficium, cui homo fit +ingratus peccando. Et quantum ad hoc, quaelibet maioritas, etiam in +temporalibus bonis peccatum aggravat, secundum illud Sap. VI, +<i>potentes potenter tormenta patientur</i>. Tertio, propter +specialem repugnantiam actus peccati ad magnitudinem personae, +sicut si princeps iustitiam violet, qui ponitur iustitiae custos; +et si sacerdos fornicetur, qui castitatem vovit. Quarto, propter +exemplum, sive scandalum, quia, ut Gregorius dicit in pastorali, +<i>in exemplum culpa vehementer extenditur, quando pro reverentia +gradus peccator honoratur</i>. Ad plurium etiam notitiam perveniunt +peccata magnorum; et magis homines ea indigne ferunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A10-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passage quoted alludes to those things which are done negligently when we are taken unawares through human weakness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="36689" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36689] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod auctoritas illa loquitur de his quae per +subreptionem infirmitatis humanae negligenter aguntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A10-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God does not respect persons in punishing the great more severely, because their excellence conduces to the gravity of their + sin, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="36690" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36690] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod Deus non accipit personas, si maiores plus punit, +quia ipsorum maioritas facit ad gravitatem peccati, ut dictum +est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A10-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The man who excels in anything reaps disadvantage, not from the good which he has, but from his abuse thereof. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 10 ad 3"><a name="36691" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36691] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod homo magnus non reportat incommodum ex bono quod +habet, sed ex malo usu illius.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q74" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q74-p0.1">Q. 74. OF THE SUBJECT OF SIN (TEN ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q74-p2"> We must now consider the subject of vice or sin: under which head there are ten points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q74-p3"><a href="#FS_Q74_A1"> (1) Whether the will can be the subject of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q74-p4"><a href="#FS_Q74_A2"> (2) Whether the will alone is the subject of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q74-p5"><a href="#FS_Q74_A3"> (3) Whether the sensuality can be the subject of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q74-p6"><a href="#FS_Q74_A4"> (4) Whether it can be the subject of mortal sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q74-p7"><a href="#FS_Q74_A5"> (5) Whether the reason can be the subject of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q74-p8"><a href="#FS_Q74_A6"> (6) Whether morose delectation or non-morose delectation be subjected in the higher reason?</a></p><p id="FS_Q74-p9"><a href="#FS_Q74_A7"> (7) Whether the sin of consent in the act of sin is subjected in the higher reason?</a></p><p id="FS_Q74-p10"><a href="#FS_Q74_A8"> (8) Whether the lower reason can be the subject of mortal sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q74-p11"><a href="#FS_Q74_A9"> (9) Whether the higher reason can be the subject of venial sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q74-p12"><a href="#FS_Q74_A10"> (10) Whether there can be in the higher reason a venial sin directed to its proper object?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 pr."><a name="36692" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36692] +Iª-IIae q. 74 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +subiecto vitiorum, sive peccatorum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur decem. +Primo, utrum voluntas possit esse subiectum peccati. Secundo, utrum +voluntas sola sit peccati subiectum. Tertio, utrum sensualitas +possit esse subiectum peccati. Quarto, utrum possit esse subiectum +peccati mortalis. Quinto, utrum ratio possit esse subiectum +peccati. Sexto, utrum delectatio morosa, vel non morosa, sit in +ratione inferiori sicut in subiecto. Septimo, utrum peccatum +consensus in actum sit in superiori ratione sicut in subiecto. +Octavo, utrum ratio inferior possit esse subiectum peccati +mortalis. Nono, utrum ratio superior possit esse subiectum peccati +venialis. Decimo, utrum in ratione superiori possit esse peccatum +veniale circa proprium obiectum.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q74_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A1-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 1. Whether the will is a subject of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will cannot be a subject of sin. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is outside the will + and the intention." But sin has the character of evil. Therefore sin cannot be in the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36693" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36693] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non possit esse subiectum +peccati. Dicit enim Dionysius, in IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod +<i>malum est praeter voluntatem et intentionem</i>. Sed peccatum +habet rationem mali. Ergo peccatum non potest esse in +voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the will is directed either to the good or to what seems good. Now from the fact that will wishes the good, it does + not sin: and that it wishes what seems good but is not truly good, points to a defect in the apprehensive power rather than + in the will. Therefore sin is nowise in the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36694" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36694] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +voluntas est boni, vel apparentis boni. Ex hoc autem quod voluntas +vult bonum, non peccat, hoc autem quod vult apparens bonum quod non +est vere bonum, magis pertinere videtur ad defectum virtutis +apprehensivae quam ad defectum voluntatis. Ergo peccatum nullo modo +est in voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same thing cannot be both subject and efficient cause of sin: because "the efficient and the material cause + do not coincide" (Phys. 2, text. 70). Now the will is the efficient cause of sin: because the first cause of sinning is the + will, as Augustine states (De Duabus Anim. x, 10,11). Therefore it is not the subject of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36695" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36695] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +non potest esse idem subiectum peccati, et causa efficiens, quia +causa efficiens et materialis non incidunt in idem, ut dicitur in +II Physic. Sed voluntas est causa efficiens peccati, prima enim +causa peccandi est voluntas, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de +duabus animabus. Ergo non est subiectum peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that "it is by the will that we sin, and live righteously." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36696" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36696] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro Retract., quod <i>voluntas est +qua peccatur, et recte vivitur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Sin is an act, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q74_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[71], AA[1]</a>,6). Now some acts pass into external matter, e.g. "to cut" and "to burn": and such acts have for their matter and subject, + the thing into which the action passes: thus the Philosopher states (Phys. iii, text. 18) that "movement is the act of the + thing moved, caused by a mover." On the other hand, there are acts which do not pass into external matter, but remain in the + agent, e.g. "to + desire" and "to know": and such are all moral acts, whether virtuous or sinful. Consequently the proper subject of sin must + needs be the power which is the principle of the act. Now since it is proper to moral acts that they are voluntary, as stated + above ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A1" id="FS_Q74_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[1], A[1]</a> ; + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A6" id="FS_Q74_A1-p6.3" shape="rect"> Q[18], A[6]</a>), it follows that the will, which is the principle of voluntary acts, both of good acts, and of evil acts or sins, is the + principle of sins. Therefore it follows that + sin is in the will as its subject. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 1 co."><a name="36697" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36697] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod peccatum quidam actus est, sicut supra dictum est. +Actuum autem quidam transeunt in exteriorem materiam, ut urere et +secare, et huiusmodi actus habent pro materia et subiecto id in +quod transit actio; sicut philosophus dicit, in III Physic., quod +motus est actus mobilis a movente. Quidam vero actus sunt non +transeuntes in exteriorem materiam, sed manentes in agente, sicut +appetere et cognoscere, et tales actus sunt omnes actus morales, +sive sint actus virtutum, sive peccatorum. Unde oportet quod +proprium subiectum actus peccati sit potentia quae est principium +actus. Cum autem proprium sit actuum moralium quod sint voluntarii, +ut supra habitum est; sequitur quod voluntas, quae est principium +actuum voluntariorum, sive bonorum sive malorum, quae sunt peccata, +sit principium peccatorum. Et ideo sequitur quod peccatum sit in +voluntate sicut in subiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Evil is said to be outside the will, because the will does not tend to it under the aspect of evil. But since some evil is + an apparent good, the will sometimes desires an evil, and in this sense is in the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36698" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36698] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod malum dicitur esse praeter voluntatem, quia +voluntas non tendit in ipsum sub ratione mali. Sed quia aliquod +malum est apparens bonum, ideo voluntas aliquando appetit aliquod +malum. Et secundum hoc peccatum est in voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If the defect in the apprehensive power were nowise subject to the will, there would be no sin, either in the will, or in + the apprehensive power, as in the case of those whose ignorance is invincible. It remains therefore that when there is in + the apprehensive power a defect that is subject to the will, this defect also is deemed a sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36699" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36699] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod si defectus apprehensivae virtutis nullo modo +subiaceret voluntati, non esset peccatum nec in voluntate nec in +apprehensiva virtute, sicut patet in his qui habent ignorantiam +invincibilem. Et ideo relinquitur quod etiam defectus apprehensivae +virtutis subiacens voluntati, deputetur in peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument applies to those efficient causes whose actions pass into external matter, and which do not move themselves, + but move other things; the contrary of which is to be observed in the will; hence the argument does not prove. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36700" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36700] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit in causis efficientibus quarum +actiones transeunt in materiam exteriorem, et quae non movent se, +sed alia. Cuius contrarium est in voluntate. Unde ratio non +sequitur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q74_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A2-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 2. Whether the will alone is the subject of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will alone is the subject of sin. For Augustine says (De Duabus Anim. x, 10) that "no one sins except + by the will." Now the subject of sin is the power by which we sin. Therefore the will alone is the subject of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36701" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36701] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod sola voluntas sit subiectum peccati. +Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de duabus animabus, quod <i>non +nisi voluntate peccatur</i>. Sed peccatum est sicut in subiecto in +potentia qua peccatur. Ergo sola voluntas est subiectum +peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is an evil contrary to reason. Now good and evil pertaining to reason are the object of the will alone. Therefore + the will alone is the subject of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36702" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36702] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum est quoddam malum contra rationem. Sed bonum et malum ad +rationem pertinens, est obiectum solius voluntatis. Ergo sola +voluntas est subiectum peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every sin is a voluntary act, because, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) [*Cf. De Vera Relig. xiv.], "so + true is it that every sin is voluntary, that unless it be voluntary, it is no sin at all." Now the acts of the other powers + are not voluntary, except in so far as those powers are moved by the will; nor does this suffice for them to be the subject + of sin, because then even the external members of the body, which are moved by the will, + would be a subject of sin; which is clearly untrue. Therefore the will alone is the subject of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36703" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36703] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +omne peccatum est actus voluntarius, quia, ut dicit Augustinus, in +libro de Lib. Arb., <i>peccatum adeo est voluntarium, quod si non +sit voluntarium, non est peccatum</i>. Sed actus aliarum virium non +sunt voluntarii nisi inquantum illae vires moventur a voluntate. +Hoc autem non sufficit ad hoc quod sint subiectum peccati, quia +secundum hoc etiam membra exteriora, quae moventur a voluntate, +essent subiectum peccati; quod patet esse falsum. Ergo sola +voluntas est subiectum peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Sin is contrary to virtue: and contraries are about one same thing. But the other powers of the soul, besides the will, are + the subject of virtues, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q56" id="FS_Q74_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[56])</a>. Therefore the will is not the only subject of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36704" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36704] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +peccatum virtuti contrariatur. Contraria autem sunt circa idem. Sed +aliae etiam vires animae praeter voluntatem, sunt subiecta +virtutum, ut supra dictum est. Ergo non sola voluntas est subiectum +peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As was shown above + <a href="#FS_Q74_A1" id="FS_Q74_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, whatever is the a principle of a voluntary act is a subject of sin. Now voluntary acts are not only those which are elicited + by the will, but also those which are commanded by the will, as we stated above (Q[6], A[4]) in treating of voluntariness. + Therefore not only the will can be a subject of sin, but also all those powers which can be moved to their acts, or restrained + from their acts, by the will; and + these same powers are the subjects of good and evil moral habits, because act and habit belong to the same subject. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 2 co."><a name="36705" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36705] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ex praedictis patet, omne quod est principium +voluntarii actus, est subiectum peccati. Actus autem voluntarii +dicuntur non solum illi qui eliciuntur a voluntate, sed etiam illi +qui a voluntate imperantur; ut supra dictum est, cum de voluntario +ageretur. Unde non sola voluntas potest esse subiectum peccati, sed +omnes illae potentiae quae possunt moveri ad suos actus, vel ab eis +reprimi, per voluntatem. Et eaedem etiam potentiae sunt subiecta +habituum moralium bonorum vel malorum, quia eiusdem est actus et +habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We do not sin except by the will as first mover; but we sin by the other powers as moved by the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36706" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36706] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod non peccatur nisi voluntate sicut primo movente, +aliis autem potentiis peccatur sicut ab ea motis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Good and evil pertain to the will as its proper objects; but the other powers have certain determinate goods and evils, by + reason of which they can be the subject of virtue, vice, and sin, in so far as they partake of will and reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36707" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36707] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod bonum et malum pertinent ad voluntatem sicut per se +obiecta ipsius, sed aliae potentiae habent aliquod determinatum +bonum et malum, ratione cuius potest in eis esse et virtus et +vitium et peccatum, secundum quod participant voluntate et +ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The members of the body are not principles but merely organs of action: wherefore they are compared to the soul which moves + them, as a slave who is moved but moves no other. On the other hand, the internal appetitive powers are compared to reason + as free agents, because they both act and are acted upon, as is made clear in Polit. i, 3. Moreover, the acts of the external + members are actions that pass into external matter, as may be seen in the blow + that is inflicted in the sin of murder. Consequently there is no comparison. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36708" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36708] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod membra corporis non sunt principia actuum, sed solum +organa, unde et comparantur ad animam moventem sicut servus, qui +agitur et non agit. Potentiae autem appetitivae interiores +comparantur ad rationem quasi liberae, quia agunt quodammodo et +aguntur, ut patet per id quod dicitur I Polit. Et praeterea actus +exteriorum membrorum sunt actiones in exteriorem materiam +transeuntes, sicut patet de percussione in peccato homicidii. Et +propter hoc non est similis ratio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q74_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A3-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 3. Whether there can be sin in the sensuality?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be sin in the sensuality. For sin is proper to man who is praised or blamed for his actions. + Now sensuality is common to us and irrational animals. Therefore sin cannot be in the sensuality. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36709" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36709] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod in sensualitate non possit esse +peccatum. Peccatum enim est proprium homini, qui ex suis actibus +laudatur vel vituperatur. Sed sensualitas est communis nobis et +brutis. Ergo in sensualitate non potest esse peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "no man sins in what he cannot avoid," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18). But man cannot prevent the movement + of the sensuality from being inordinate, since "the sensuality ever remains corrupt, so long as we abide in this mortal life; + wherefore it is signified by the serpent," as Augustine declares (De Trin. xii, 12,13). Therefore the inordinate movement + of the sensuality is not a sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36710" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36710] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> +<i>Praeterea, nullus peccat in eo quod vitare non potest</i>; sicut +Augustinus dicit, in libro de Lib. Arb. Sed homo non potest vitare +quin actus sensualitatis sit inordinatus, est enim sensualitas +perpetuae corruptionis, quandiu in hac mortali vita vivimus; unde +et per serpentem significatur, ut Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin. +Ergo inordinatio motus sensualitatis non est peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which man himself does not do is not imputed to him as a sin. Now "that alone do we seem to do ourselves, which + we do with the deliberation of reason," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8). Therefore the movement of the sensuality, + which is without the deliberation of reason, is not imputed to a man as a sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36711" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36711] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +illud quod homo ipse non facit, non imputatur ei ad peccatum. Sed +hoc solum videmur nos ipsi facere, quod cum deliberatione rationis +facimus; ut philosophus dicit, in IX Ethic. Ergo motus +sensualitatis qui est sine deliberatione rationis, non imputatur +homini ad peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q74_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.19" target="asv">Rom. 7:19</a>): "The good which I will I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do": which words Augustine explains (Contra Julian. + iii, 26; De Verb. Apost. xii, 2,3), as referring to the evil of concupiscence, which is clearly a movement of the sensuality. + Therefore there can be sin in the sensuality. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36712" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36712] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Rom. VII, <i>non enim quod volo bonum, hoc ago; +sed quod odi malum, illud facio</i>, quod exponit Augustinus de +malo concupiscentiae, quam constat esse motum quendam +sensualitatis. Ergo in sensualitate est aliquod peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q74_A2" id="FS_Q74_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,3), sin may be found in any power whose act can be voluntary and inordinate, wherein consists the nature of sin. Now it is + evident that the act of the sensuality, or sensitive appetite, is naturally inclined to be moved by the will. Wherefore it + follows that sin can be in the sensuality. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 3 co."><a name="36713" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36713] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, peccatum potest inveniri in +qualibet potentia cuius actus potest esse voluntarius et +inordinatus, in quo consistit ratio peccati. Manifestum est autem +quod actus sensualitatis potest esse voluntarius, inquantum +sensualitas, idest appetitus sensitivus, nata est a voluntate +moveri. Unde relinquitur quod in sensualitate possit esse +peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although some of the powers of the sensitive part are common to us and irrational animals, nevertheless, in us, they have + a certain excellence through being united to the reason; thus we surpass other animals in the sensitive part for as much as + we have the powers of cogitation and reminiscence, as stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q78_A4" id="FS_Q74_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[78], A[4]</a>. In the same way our sensitive appetite surpasses that of other animals by reason of a certain + excellence consisting in its natural aptitude to obey the reason; and in this respect it can be the principle of a voluntary + action, and, consequently, the subject of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36714" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36714] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod aliquae vires sensitivae partis, etsi sint +communes nobis et brutis, tamen in nobis habent aliquam +excellentiam ex hoc quod rationi iunguntur, sicut nos, prae aliis +animalibus, habemus in parte sensitiva cogitativam et +reminiscentiam, ut in primo dictum est. Et per hunc modum etiam +appetitus sensitivus in nobis prae aliis animalibus habet quandam +excellentiam, scilicet quod natus est obedire rationi. Et quantum +ad hoc, potest esse principium actus voluntarii; et per consequens +subiectum peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The continual corruption of the sensuality is to be understood as referring to the "fomes," which is never completely destroyed + in this life, since, though the stain of original sin passes, its effect remains. However, this corruption of the "fomes" + does not hinder man from using his rational will to check individual inordinate movements, if he be presentient to them, for + instance by turning his thoughts to other things. Yet while he is turning his + thoughts to something else, an inordinate movement may arise about this also: thus when a man, in order to avoid the movements + of concupiscence, turns his thoughts away from carnal pleasures, to the considerations of science, sometimes an unpremeditated + movement of vainglory will arise. Consequently, a man cannot avoid all such movements, on account of the aforesaid corruption: + but it is enough, for the conditions of a voluntary sin, that he be able to avoid each single one. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36715" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36715] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod perpetua corruptio sensualitatis est intelligenda +quantum ad fomitem, qui nunquam totaliter tollitur in hac vita, +transit enim peccatum originale reatu, et remanet actu. Sed talis +corruptio fomitis non impedit quin homo rationabili voluntate +possit reprimere singulos motus inordinatos sensualitatis, si +praesentiat, puta divertendo cogitationem ad alia. Sed dum homo ad +aliud cogitationem divertit, potest etiam circa illud aliquis +inordinatus motus insurgere, sicut cum aliquis transfert +cogitationem suam a delectabilibus carnis, volens concupiscentiae +motus vitare, ad speculationem scientiae, insurgit quandoque +aliquis motus inanis gloriae impraemeditatus. Et ideo non potest +homo vitare omnes huiusmodi motus, propter corruptionem praedictam, +sed hoc solum sufficit ad rationem peccati voluntarii, quod possit +vitare singulos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man does not do perfectly himself what he does without the deliberation of reason, since the principal part of man does nothing + therein: wherefore such is not perfectly a human act; and consequently it cannot be a perfect act of virtue or of sin, but + is something imperfect of that kind. Therefore such movement of the sensuality as forestalls the reason, is a venial sin, + which is something imperfect in the genus of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36716" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36716] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod illud quod homo facit sine deliberatione rationis, +non perfecte ipse facit, quia nihil operatur ibi id quod est +principale in homine. Unde non est perfecte actus humanus. Et per +consequens non potest esse perfecte actus virtutis vel peccati, sed +aliquid imperfectum in genere horum. Unde talis motus sensualitatis +rationem praeveniens, est peccatum veniale, quod est quiddam +imperfectum in genere peccati.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q74_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A4-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 4. Whether mortal sin can be in the sensuality?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that mortal sin can be in the sensuality. Because an act is discerned by its object. Now it is possible to + commit a mortal sin about the objects of the sensuality, e.g. about carnal pleasures. Therefore the act of the sensuality + can be a mortal sin, so that mortal sin can be found in the sensuality. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36717" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36717] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod in sensualitate possit esse peccatum +mortale. Actus enim ex obiecto cognoscitur. Sed circa obiecta +sensualitatis contingit peccare mortaliter, sicut circa +delectabilia carnis. Ergo actus sensualitatis potest esse peccatum +mortale. Et ita in sensualitate peccatum mortale invenitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, mortal sin is opposed to virtue. But virtue can be in the sensuality; for temperance and fortitude are virtues of + the irrational parts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 10). Therefore, since it is natural to contraries to be about + the same subject, sensuality can be the subject of mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36718" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36718] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum mortale contrariatur virtuti. Sed virtus potest esse in +sensualitate, temperantia enim et fortitudo sunt virtutes +irrationabilium partium, ut philosophus dicit, in III Ethic. Ergo +in sensualitate potest esse peccatum mortale, cum contraria sint +nata fieri circa idem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin. Now disposition and habit are in the same subject. Since therefore venial + sin may be in the sensuality, as stated above (A[3], ad 3), mortal sin can be there also. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36719" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36719] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +veniale peccatum est dispositio ad mortale. Sed dispositio et +habitus sunt in eodem. Cum igitur veniale peccatum sit in +sensualitate, ut dictum est; etiam mortale peccatum esse poterit in +eadem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Retract. i, 23): "The inordinate movement of concupiscence, which is the sin of the sensuality, can even + be in those who are in a state of grace," in whom, however, mortal sin is not to be found. Therefore the inordinate movement + of the sensuality is not a mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36720" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36720] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro Retract., et habetur in Glossa +Rom. VII, inordinatus concupiscentiae motus (qui est peccatum +sensualitatis) potest etiam esse in his qui sunt in gratia, in +quibus tamen peccatum mortale non invenitur. Ergo inordinatus motus +sensualitatis non est peccatum mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Just as a disorder which destroys the principle of the body's life causes the body's death, so too a disorder which destroys + the principle of spiritual life, viz. the last end, causes spiritual death, which is mortal sin, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q72_A5" id="FS_Q74_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[72], A[5]</a>). Now it belongs to the reason alone, and not to the sensuality, to order anything to the end: and disorder in respect of + the end can only belong to the power whose function it is to + order others to the end. Wherefore mortal sin cannot be in the sensuality, but only in the reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 4 co."><a name="36721" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36721] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut inordinatio corrumpens principium vitae +corporalis, causat corporalem mortem; ita etiam inordinatio +corrumpens principium spiritualis vitae, quod est finis ultimus, +causat mortem spiritualem peccati mortalis, ut supra dictum est. +Ordinare autem aliquid in finem non est sensualitatis, sed solum +rationis. Inordinatio autem a fine non est nisi eius cuius est +ordinare in finem. Unde peccatum mortale non potest esse in +sensualitate, sed solum in ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The act of the sensuality can concur towards a mortal sin: yet the fact of its being a mortal sin is due, not to its being + an act of the sensuality, but to its being an act of reason, to whom the ordering to the end belongs. Consequently mortal + sin is imputed, not to the sensuality, but to reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36722" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36722] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod actus sensualitatis potest concurrere ad +peccatum mortale, sed tamen actus peccati mortalis non habet quod +sit peccatum mortale, ex eo quod est sensualitatis; sed ex eo quod +est rationis, cuius est ordinare in finem. Et ideo peccatum mortale +non attribuitur sensualitati, sed rationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An act of virtue is perfected not only in that it is an act of the sensuality, but still more in the fact of its being an + act of reason and will, whose function it is to choose: for the act of moral virtue is not without the exercise of choice: + wherefore the act of moral virtue, which perfects the appetitive power, is always accompanied by an act of prudence, which + perfects the rational power; and the same applies to mortal sin, as stated (ad 1). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36723" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36723] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod etiam actus virtutis non perficitur per id quod est +sensualitatis tantum, sed magis per id quod est rationis et +voluntatis, cuius est eligere, nam actus virtutis moralis non est +sine electione. Unde semper cum actu virtutis moralis, quae +perficit vim appetitivam, est etiam actus prudentiae, quae perficit +vim rationalem. Et idem est etiam de peccato mortali, sicut dictum +est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A disposition may be related in three ways to that to which it disposes: for sometimes it is the same thing and is in the + same subject; thus inchoate science is a disposition to perfect science: sometimes it is in the same subject, but is not the + same thing; thus heat is a disposition to the form of fire: sometimes it is neither the same thing, nor in the same subject, + as in those things which are subordinate to one another in such a way that we can + arrive at one through the other, e.g. goodness of the imagination is a disposition to science which is in the intellect. In + this way the venial sin that is in the sensuality, may be a disposition to mortal sin, which is in the reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36724" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36724] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod dispositio tripliciter se habet ad id ad quod +disponit. Quandoque enim est idem et in eodem, sicut scientia +inchoata dicitur esse dispositio ad scientiam perfectam. Quandoque +autem est in eodem, sed non idem, sicut calor est dispositio ad +formam ignis. Quandoque vero nec idem nec in eodem, sicut in his +quae habent ordinem ad invicem ut ex uno perveniatur in aliud, +sicut bonitas imaginationis est dispositio ad scientiam, quae est +in intellectu. Et hoc modo veniale peccatum, quod est in +sensualitate, potest esse dispositio ad peccatum mortale, quod est +in ratione.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q74_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A5-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 5. Whether sin can be in the reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin cannot be in the reason. For the sin of any power is a defect thereof. But the fault of the reason + is not a sin, on the contrary, it excuses sin: for a man is excused from sin on account of ignorance. Therefore sin cannot + be in the reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36725" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36725] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non possit esse in ratione. +Cuiuslibet enim potentiae peccatum est aliquis defectus ipsius. Sed +defectus rationis non est peccatum, sed magis excusat peccatum, +excusatur enim aliquis a peccato propter ignorantiam. Ergo in +ratione non potest esse peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the primary object of sin is the will, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q74_A1" id="FS_Q74_A5-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Now reason precedes the will, since it directs it. Therefore sin cannot be in the reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36726" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36726] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +primum subiectum peccati est voluntas, ut dictum est. Sed ratio +praecedit voluntatem, cum sit directiva ipsius. Ergo peccatum esse +non potest in ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there can be no sin except about things which are under our control. Now perfection and defect of reason are not + among those things which are under our control: since by nature some are mentally deficient, and some shrewd-minded. Therefore + no sin is in the reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36727" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36727] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +non potest esse peccatum nisi circa ea quae sunt in nobis. Sed +perfectio et defectus rationis non est eorum quae sunt in nobis, +quidam enim sunt naturaliter ratione deficientes, vel ratione +solertes. Ergo in ratione non est peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that sin is in the lower and in the higher reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36728" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36728] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro XII de Trin., quod peccatum est +in ratione inferiori et in ratione superiori.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The sin of any power is an act of that power, as we have clearly shown ( + <a href="#FS_Q74_A1" id="FS_Q74_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2,3). Now reason has a twofold act: one is its proper act in respect of its proper object, and this is the act of knowing + the truth; the other is the act of reason as directing the other powers. Now in both of these ways there may be sin in the + reason. First, in so far as it errs in the knowledge of truth, which error is imputed to the reason as a sin, when + it is in ignorance or error about what it is able and ought to know: secondly, when it either commands the inordinate movements + of the lower powers, or deliberately fails to check them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 5 co."><a name="36729" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36729] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod peccatum cuiuslibet potentiae consistit in actu +ipsius, sicut ex dictis patet. Habet autem ratio duplicem actum, +unum quidem secundum se, in comparatione ad proprium obiectum, quod +est cognoscere aliquod verum; alius autem actus rationis est +inquantum est directiva aliarum virium. Utroque igitur modo +contingit esse peccatum in ratione. Et primo quidem, inquantum +errat in cognitione veri, quod quidem tunc imputatur ei ad +peccatum, quando habet ignorantiam vel errorem circa id quod potest +et debet scire. Secundo, quando inordinatos actus inferiorum virium +vel imperat, vel etiam post deliberationem non coercet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers the defect in the proper act of the reason in respect of its proper object, and with regard to the + case when it is a defect of knowledge about something which one is unable to know: for then this defect of reason is not a + sin, and excuses from sin, as is evident with regard to the actions of madmen. If, however, the defect of reason be about + something which a man is able and ought to know, he is not altogether excused from sin, + and the defect is imputed to him as a sin. The defect which belongs only to the act of directing the other powers, is always + imputed to reason as a sin, because it can always obviate this defect by means of its proper act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36730" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36730] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de defectu rationis qui +pertinet ad actum proprium respectu proprii obiecti, et hoc quando +est defectus cognitionis eius quod quis non potest scire. Tunc enim +talis defectus rationis non est peccatum, sed excusat a peccato, +sicut patet in his quae per furiosos committuntur. Si vero sit +defectus rationis circa id quod homo potest et debet scire, non +omnino homo excusatur a peccato, sed ipse defectus imputatur ei ad +peccatum. Defectus autem qui est solum in dirigendo alias vires, +semper imputatur ei ad peccatum, quia huic defectui occurrere +potest per proprium actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q17_A1" id="FS_Q74_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[17], A[1]</a>), when we were treating of the acts of the will and reason, the will moves and precedes the reason, in one way, and the reason + moves and precedes the will in another: so that both the movement of the will can be called rational, and the act of the reason, + voluntary. Accordingly sin is found in the reason, either through being a voluntary defect of the reason, or through the reason + being the + principle of the will's act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36731" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36731] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum de actibus voluntatis et +rationis ageretur, voluntas quodammodo movet et praecedit rationem, +et ratio quodammodo voluntatem, unde et motus voluntatis dici +potest rationalis, et actus rationis potest dici voluntarius. Et +secundum hoc in ratione invenitur peccatum, vel prout est defectus +eius voluntarius, vel prout actus rationis est principium actus +voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A5-p9"> The Reply to the Third Objection is evident from what has been said (ad 1).</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36732" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36732] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +patet responsio ex dictis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q74_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A6-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 6. Whether the sin of morose delectation is in the reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sin of morose delectation is not in the reason. For delectation denotes a movement of the appetitive + power, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q74_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[31], A[1]</a>). But the appetitive power is distinct from the reason, which is an apprehensive power. Therefore morose delectation is not + in the reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="36733" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36733] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum morosae delectationis non sit +in ratione. Delectatio enim importat motum appetitivae virtutis, ut +supra dictum est. Sed vis appetitiva distinguitur a ratione, quae +est vis apprehensiva. Ergo delectatio morosa non est in +ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object shows to which power an act belongs, since it is through the act that the power is directed to its object. + Now a morose delectation is sometimes about sensible goods, and not about the goods of the reason. Therefore the sin of morose + delectation is not in the reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="36734" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36734] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ex obiectis cognosci potest ad quam potentiam actus pertineat, per +quem potentia ordinatur ad obiectum. Sed quandoque est delectatio +morosa circa bona sensibilia, et non circa bona rationis. Ergo +peccatum delectationis morosae non est in ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a thing is said to be morose [*From the Latin 'mora'---delay] through taking a length of time. But length of time + is no reason why an act should belong to a particular power. Therefore morose delectation does not belong to the reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="36735" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36735] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +morosum dicitur aliquid propter diuturnitatem temporis. Sed +diuturnitas temporis non est ratio quod aliquis actus pertineat ad +aliquam potentiam. Ergo delectatio morosa non pertinet ad +rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that "if the consent to a sensual delectation goes no further than the mere thought of + the pleasure, I deem this to be like as though the woman alone had partaken of the forbidden fruit." Now "the woman" denotes + the lower reason, as he himself explains (De Trin. xii, 12). Therefore the sin of morose delectation is in the reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 6 s. c."><a name="36736" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36736] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin., quod <i>consensus +illecebrae si sola cogitationis delectatione contentus est, sic +habendum existimo velut cibum vetitum mulier sola comederit</i>. +Per mulierem autem intelligitur ratio inferior, sicut ibidem ipse +exponit. Ergo peccatum morosae delectationis est in ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated + <a href="#FS_Q74_A5" id="FS_Q74_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>, sin may be in the reason, not only in respect of reason's proper act, but sometimes in respect of its directing human actions. + Now it is evident that reason directs not only external acts, but also internal passions. Consequently when the reason fails + in directing the internal passions, sin is said to be in the reason, as also when it fails in directing external actions. + Now it fails, in two ways, in directing + internal passions: first, when it commands unlawful passions; for instance, when a man deliberately provokes himself to a + movement of anger, or of lust: secondly, when it fails to check the unlawful movement of a passion; for instance, when a man, + having deliberately considered that a rising movement of passion is inordinate, continues, notwithstanding, to dwell [immoratur] + upon it, and fails to drive it away. And in this sense the sin of morose delectation is said to be in the reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 6 co."><a name="36737" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36737] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, peccatum contingit esse in +ratione quandoque quidem inquantum est directiva humanorum actuum. +Manifestum est autem quod ratio non solum est directiva exteriorum +actuum, sed etiam interiorum passionum. Et ideo quando deficit +ratio in directione interiorum passionum, dicitur esse peccatum in +ratione, sicut etiam quando deficit in directione exteriorum +actuum. Deficit autem in directione passionum interiorum +dupliciter. Uno modo, quando imperat illicitas passiones, sicut +quando homo ex deliberatione provocat sibi motum irae vel +concupiscentiae. Alio modo, quando non reprimit illicitum passionis +motum, sicut cum aliquis, postquam deliberavit quod motus passionis +insurgens est inordinatus, nihilominus circa ipsum immoratur, et +ipsum non expellit. Et secundum hoc dicitur peccatum delectationis +morosae esse in ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Delectation is indeed in the appetitive power as its proximate principle; but it is in the reason as its first mover, in + accordance with what has been stated above + <a href="#FS_Q74_A1" id="FS_Q74_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, viz. that actions which do not pass into external matter are subjected in their principles. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="36738" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36738] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod delectatio quidem est in vi appetitiva sicut in +proximo principio, sed in ratione est sicut in primo motivo, +secundum hoc quod supra dictum est, quod actiones quae non +transeunt in exteriorem materiam, sunt sicut in subiecto in suis +principiis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Reason has its proper elicited act about its proper object; but it exercises the direction of all the objects of those lower + powers that can be directed by the reason: and accordingly delectation about sensible objects comes also under the direction + of reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="36739" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36739] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio actum proprium illicitum habet circa proprium +obiectum, sed directionem habet circa omnia obiecta inferiorum +virium quae per rationem dirigi possunt. Et secundum hoc etiam +delectatio circa sensibilia obiecta pertinet ad rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Delectation is said to be morose not from a delay of time, but because the reason in deliberating dwells [immoratur] thereon, + and fails to drive it away, "deliberately holding and turning over what should have been cast aside as soon as it touched + the mind," as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="36740" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36740] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod delectatio dicitur morosa non ex mora temporis; sed +ex eo quod ratio deliberans circa eam immoratur, nec tamen eam +repellit, <i>tenens et volvens libenter quae statim ut attigerunt +animum, respui debuerunt</i>, ut Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q74_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A7-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 7. Whether the sin of consent to the act is in the higher reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher reason. For consent is an act of the appetitive power, + as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q15_A1" id="FS_Q74_A7-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[15], A[1]</a>): whereas the reason is an apprehensive power. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="36741" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36741] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum consensus in actum non sit in +ratione superiori. Consentire enim est actus appetitivae virtutis, +ut supra habitum est. Sed ratio est vis apprehensiva. Ergo peccatum +consensus in actum non est in ratione superiori.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "the higher reason is intent on contemplating and consulting the eternal law," as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, + 7). [*'Rationes aeternae,' cf. + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q15_A2" id="FS_Q74_A7-p3.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[15], AA[2]</a>,[3] where as in similar passages 'ratio' has been rendered by the English 'type,' because St. Thomas was speaking of the + Divine 'idea' as the archetype of the creature. Hence the type or idea is a rule of conduct, and is identified with the eternal + law, (cf. A[8], + OBJ[1]; A[9])]. But sometimes consent is given to an act, without consulting the eternal law: since man does not always think + about Divine things, whenever he consents to an act. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not always in the higher reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="36742" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36742] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ratio superior intendit rationibus aeternis inspiciendis et +consulendis, ut Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin. Sed quandoque +consentitur in actum non consultis rationibus aeternis, non enim +semper homo cogitat de rebus divinis, quando consentit in aliquem +actum. Ergo peccatum consensus in actum non semper est in ratione +superiori.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as man can regulate his external actions according to the eternal law, so can he regulate his internal pleasures + or other passions. But "consent to a pleasure without deciding to fulfil it by deed, belongs to the lower reason," as Augustine + states (De Trin. xii, 2). Therefore the consent to a sinful act should also be sometimes ascribed to the lower reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="36743" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36743] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut per rationes aeternas potest homo regulare actus exteriores, +ita etiam interiores delectationes, vel alias passiones. Sed +consensus in delectationem absque hoc quod opere statuatur +implendum, est rationis inferioris; ut dicit Augustinus, XII de +Trin. Ergo etiam consensus in actum peccati debet interdum attribui +rationi inferiori.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as the higher reason excels the lower, so does the reason excel the imagination. Now sometimes man proceeds + to act through the apprehension of the power of imagination, without any deliberation of his reason, as when, without premeditation, + he moves his hand, or foot. Therefore sometimes also the lower reason may consent to a sinful act, independently of the higher + reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 arg. 4"><a name="36744" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36744] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut ratio superior excedit inferiorem, ita ratio excedit vim +imaginativam. Sed quandoque procedit homo in actum per +apprehensionem virtutis imaginativae, absque omni deliberatione +rationis, sicut cum aliquis ex impraemeditato movet manum aut +pedem. Ergo etiam quandoque potest ratio inferior consentire in +actum peccati, absque ratione superiori.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12): "If the consent to the evil use of things that can be perceived by the bodily senses, + so far approves of any sin, as to point, if possible, to its consummation by deed, we are to understand that the woman has + offered the forbidden fruit to her husband." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 s. c."><a name="36745" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36745] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin., <i>si in consensione male +utendi rebus quae per sensum corporis sentiuntur, ita decernitur +quodcumque peccatum, ut, si potestas sit, etiam corpore compleatur, +intelligenda est mulier cibum illicitum viro dedisse</i>, per quem +superior ratio significatur. Ergo ad rationem superiorem pertinet +consentire in actum peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Consent implies a judgment about the thing to which consent is given. For just as the speculative reason judges and delivers + its sentence about intelligible matters, so the practical reason judges and pronounces sentence on matters of action. Now + we must observe that in every case brought up for judgment, the final sentence belongs to the supreme court, even as we see + that in speculative matters the final sentence touching any proposition is delivered by + referring it to the first principles; since, so long as there remains a yet higher principle, the question can yet be submitted + to it: wherefore the judgment is still in suspense, the final sentence not being as yet pronounced. But it is evident that + human acts can be regulated by the rule of human reason, which rule is derived from the created things that man knows naturally; + and further still, from the rule of the Divine law, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q19_A4" id="FS_Q74_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[4]</a>). + Consequently, since the rule of the Divine law is the higher rule, it follows that the ultimate sentence, whereby the judgment + is finally pronounced, belongs to the higher reason which is intent on the eternal types. Now when judgment has to be pronounced + on several points, the final judgment deals with that which comes last; and, in human acts, the action itself comes last, + and the delectation which is the inducement to the action is a preamble thereto. Therefore the consent to an action + belongs properly to the higher reason, while the preliminary judgment which is about the delectation belongs to the lower + reason, which delivers judgment in a lower court: although the higher reason can also judge of the delectation, since whatever + is subject to the judgment of the lower court, is subject also to the judgment of the higher court, but not conversely. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 co."><a name="36746" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36746] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod consensus importat iudicium quoddam de eo in quod +consentitur, sicut enim ratio speculativa iudicat et sententiat de +rebus intelligibilibus, ita ratio practica iudicat et sententiat de +agendis. Est autem considerandum quod in omni iudicio ultima +sententia pertinet ad supremum iudicatorium, sicut videmus in +speculativis quod ultima sententia de aliqua propositione datur per +resolutionem ad prima principia. Quandiu enim remanet aliquod +principium altius, adhuc per ipsum potest examinari id de quo +quaeritur, unde adhuc est suspensum iudicium, quasi nondum data +finali sententia. Manifestum est autem quod actus humani regulari +possunt ex regula rationis humanae, quae sumitur ex rebus creatis, +quas naturaliter homo cognoscit; et ulterius ex regula legis +divinae, ut supra dictum est. Unde cum regula legis divinae sit +superior, consequens est ut ultima sententia, per quam iudicium +finaliter terminatur, pertineat ad rationem superiorem, quae +intendit rationibus aeternis. Cum autem de pluribus occurrit +iudicandum, finale iudicium est de eo quod ultimo occurrit. In +actibus autem humanis ultimo occurrit ipse actus; praeambulum autem +est delectatio, quae inducit ad actum. Et ideo ad rationem +superiorem proprie pertinet consensus in actum; ad rationem vero +inferiorem, quae habet inferius iudicium, pertinet iudicium +praeambulum, quod est de delectatione. Quamvis etiam et de +delectatione superior ratio iudicare possit, quia quidquid iudicio +subditur inferioris, subditur etiam iudicio superioris, sed non +convertitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Consent is an act of the appetitive power, not absolutely, but in consequence of an act of reason deliberating and judging, + as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q15_A3" id="FS_Q74_A7-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[15], A[3]</a>). Because the fact that the consent is finally given to a thing is due to the fact that the will tends to that upon which + the reason has already passed its judgment. Hence consent may be ascribed both to the will and to the reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="36747" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36747] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod consentire est actus appetitivae virtutis non +absolute, sed consequenter ad actum rationis deliberantis et +iudicantis, ut supra dictum est, in hoc enim terminatur consensus, +quod voluntas tendit in id quod est ratione iudicatum. Unde +consensus potest attribui et voluntati et rationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The higher reason is said to consent, from the very fact that it fails to direct the human act according to the Divine law, + whether or not it advert to the eternal law. For if it thinks of God's law, it holds it in actual contempt: and if not, it + neglects it by a kind of omission. Therefore the consent to a sinful act always proceeds from the higher reason: because, + as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12), "the mind cannot effectively decide on the + commission of a sin, unless by its consent, whereby it wields its sovereign power of moving the members to action, or of restraining + them from action, it become the servant or slave of the evil deed." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="36748" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36748] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ex hoc ipso quod ratio superior non dirigit actus +humanos secundum legem divinam, impediens actum peccati, dicitur +ipsa consentire; sive cogitet de lege aeterna, sive non. Cum enim +cogitat de lege Dei, actu eam contemnit, cum vero non cogitat, eam +negligit per modum omissionis cuiusdam. Unde omnibus modis +consensus in actum peccati procedit ex superiori ratione, quia, ut +Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin., <i>non potest peccatum efficaciter +perpetrandum mente decerni, nisi illa mentis intentio penes quam +summa potestas est membra in opus movendi vel ab opere cohibendi, +malae actioni cedat aut serviat</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The higher reason, by considering the eternal law, can direct or restrain the internal delectation, even as it can direct + or restrain the external action: nevertheless, before the judgment of the higher reason is pronounced the lower reason, while + deliberating the matter in reference to temporal principles, sometimes approves of this delectation: and then the consent + to the delectation belongs to the lower reason. If, however, after considering the + eternal law, man persists in giving the same consent, such consent will then belong to the higher reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="36749" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36749] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio superior, per considerationem legis aeternae, +sicut potest dirigere vel cohibere actum exteriorem, ita etiam +delectationem interiorem. Sed tamen antequam ad iudicium superioris +rationis deveniatur, statim ut sensualitas proponit delectationem, +inferior ratio, per rationes temporales deliberans, quandoque +huiusmodi delectationem acceptat, et tunc consensus in +delectationem pertinet ad inferiorem rationem. Si vero etiam +consideratis rationibus aeternis, homo in eodem consensu +perseveret, iam talis consensus ad superiorem rationem +pertinebit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The apprehension of the power of imagination is sudden and indeliberate: wherefore it can cause an act before the higher + or lower reason has time to deliberate. But the judgment of the lower reason is deliberate, and so requires time, during which + the higher reason can also deliberate; consequently, if by its deliberation it does not check the sinful act, this will deservedly + by imputed to it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 ad 4"><a name="36750" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36750] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod apprehensio virtutis imaginativae est subita et sine +deliberatione, et ideo potest aliquem actum causare antequam +superior vel inferior ratio etiam habeat tempus deliberandi. Sed +iudicium rationis inferioris est cum deliberatione, quae indiget +tempore, in quo etiam ratio superior deliberare potest. Unde si non +cohibeat ab actu peccati per suam deliberationem, ei imputatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q74_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A8-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 8. Whether consent to delectation is a mortal sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that consent to delectation is not a mortal sin, for consent to delectation belongs to the lower reason, which + does not consider the eternal types, i.e. the eternal law, and consequently does not turn away from them. Now every mortal + sin consists in turning away from Augustine's definition of mortal sin, which was quoted above ( + <a href="#FS_Q71_A6" id="FS_Q74_A8-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[6]</a>). Therefore consent to delectation is not a mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="36751" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36751] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod consensus in delectationem non sit +peccatum mortale. Consentire enim in delectationem pertinet ad +rationem inferiorem, cuius non est intendere rationibus aeternis +vel legi divinae, et per consequens nec ab eis averti. Sed omne +peccatum mortale est per aversionem a lege divina; ut patet per +definitionem Augustini, de peccato mortali datam, quae supra posita +est. Ergo consensus in delectationem non est peccatum mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, consent to a thing is not evil, unless the thing to which consent is given be evil. Now "the cause of anything being + such is yet more so," or at any rate not less. Consequently the thing to which a man consents cannot be a lesser evil than + his consent. But delectation without deed is not a mortal sin, but only a venial sin. Therefore neither is the consent to + the delectation a mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="36752" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36752] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +consentire in aliquid non est malum nisi quia illud est malum in +quod consentitur. Sed propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis, vel +saltem non minus. Non ergo illud in quod consentitur, potest esse +minus malum quam consensus. Sed delectatio sine opere non est +peccatum mortale, sed veniale tantum. Ergo nec consensus in +delectationem est peccatum mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, delectations differ in goodness and malice, according to the difference of the deeds, as the Philosopher states + (Ethic. x, 3,5). Now the inward thought is one thing, and the outward deed, e.g. fornication, is another. Therefore the delectation + consequent to the act of inward thought, differs in goodness and malice from the pleasure of fornication, as much as the inward + thought differs from the outward deed; and consequently there is a like difference + of consent on either hand. But the inward thought is not a mortal sin, nor is the consent to that thought: and therefore neither + is the consent to the delectation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="36753" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36753] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +delectationes differunt in bonitate et malitia secundum +differentiam operationum, ut dicit philosophus, in X Ethic. Sed +alia operatio est interior cogitatio, et alia actus exterior, puta +fornicationis. Ergo et delectatio consequens actum interioris +cogitationis, tantum differt a delectatione fornicationis in +bonitate vel malitia, quantum differt cogitatio interior ab actu +exteriori. Et per consequens etiam eodem modo differt consentire in +utrumque. Sed cogitatio interior non est peccatum mortale; nec +etiam consensus in cogitationem. Ergo per consequens nec consensus +in delectationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the external act of fornication or adultery is a mortal sin, not by reason of the delectation, since this is found + also in the marriage act, but by reason of an inordinateness in the act itself. Now he that consents to the delectation does + not, for this reason, consent to the inordinateness of the act. Therefore he seems not to sin mortally. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 arg. 4"><a name="36754" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36754] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +exterior actus fornicationis vel adulterii non est peccatum mortale +ratione delectationis, quae etiam invenitur in actu matrimoniali; +sed ratione inordinationis ipsius actus. Sed ille qui consentit in +delectationem, non propter hoc consentit in deordinationem actus. +Ergo non videtur mortaliter peccare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the sin of murder is more grievous than simple fornication. Now it is not a mortal sin to consent to the delectation + resulting from the thought of murder. Much less therefore is it a mortal sin to consent to the delectation resulting from + the thought of fornication. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 arg. 5"><a name="36755" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36755] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum homicidii est gravius quam simplicis fornicationis. Sed +consentire in delectationem quae consequitur cogitationem de +homicidio, non est peccatum mortale. Ergo multo minus consentire in +delectationem quae consequitur cogitationem de fornicatione, est +peccatum mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, the Lord's prayer is recited every day for the remission of venial sins, as Augustine asserts (Enchiridion lxxviii). + Now Augustine teaches that consent to delectation may be driven away by means of the Lord's Prayer: for he says (De Trin. + xii, 12) that "this sin is much less grievous than if it be decided to fulfil it by deed: wherefore we ought to ask pardon + for such thoughts also, and we should strike our breasts and say: 'Forgive us our + trespasses.'" Therefore consent to delectation is a venial sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 arg. 6"><a name="36756" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36756] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, +oratio dominica quotidie dicitur pro remissione venialium, ut +Augustinus dicit. Sed consensum in delectationem Augustinus docet +esse abolendum per orationem dominicam, dicit enim, in XII de +Trin., quod <i>hoc est longe minus peccatum quam si opere statuatur +implendum, et ideo de talibus quoque cogitationibus venia petenda +est, pectusque percutiendum, atque dicendum, dimitte nobis debita +nostra</i>. Ergo consensus in delectationem est peccatum +veniale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine adds after a few words: "Man will be altogether lost unless, through the grace of the Mediator, he be forgiven + those things which are deemed mere sins of thought, since without the will to do them, he desires nevertheless to enjoy them." + But no man is lost except through mortal sin. Therefore consent to delectation is a mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 s. c."><a name="36757" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36757] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus post pauca subdit, <i>totus homo damnabitur, +nisi haec quae, sine voluntate operandi, sed tamen cum voluntate +animum talibus oblectandi, solius cogitationis sentiuntur esse +peccata, per mediatoris gratiam remittantur</i>. Sed nullus +damnatur nisi pro peccato mortali. Ergo consensus in delectationem +est peccatum mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q74_A8-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There have been various opinions on this point, for some have held that consent to delectation is not a mortal sin, but only + a venial sin, while others have held it to be a mortal sin, and this opinion is more common and more probable. For we must + take note that since every delectation results from some action, as stated in Ethic. x, 4, and again, that since every delectation + may be compared to two things, viz. to the operation from which it results, and to + the object in which a person takes delight. Now it happens that an action, just as a thing, is an object of delectation, because + the action itself can be considered as a good and an end, in which the person who delights in it, rests. Sometimes the action + itself, which results in delectation, is the object of delectation, in so far as the appetitive power, to which it belongs + to take delight in anything, is brought to bear on the action itself as a good: for instance, when a man thinks and + delights in his thought, in so far as his thought pleases him; while at other times the delight consequent to an action, e.g. + a thought, has for its object another action, as being the object of his thought; and then his thought proceeds from the inclination + of the appetite, not indeed to the thought, but to the action thought of. Accordingly a man who is thinking of fornication, + may delight in either of two things: first, in the thought itself, secondly, in the fornication thought of. Now the + delectation in the thought itself results from the inclination of the appetite to the thought; and the thought itself is not + in itself a mortal sin; sometimes indeed it is only a venial sin, as when a man thinks of such a thing for no purpose; and + sometimes it is no sin at all, as when a man has a purpose in thinking of it; for instance, he may wish to preach or dispute + about it. Consequently such affection or delectation in respect of the thought of fornication is not a mortal sin in virtue + of + its genus, but is sometimes a venial sin and sometimes no sin at all: wherefore neither is it a mortal sin to consent to such + a thought. In this sense the first opinion is true. + </p><p id="FS_Q74_A8-p10"> But that a man in thinking of fornication takes pleasure in the act thought of, is due to his desire being inclined to this + act. Wherefore the fact that a man consents to such a delectation, amounts to nothing less than a consent to the inclination + of his appetite to fornication: for no man takes pleasure except in that which is in conformity with his appetite. Now it + is a mortal sin, if a man deliberately chooses that his appetite be conformed to what is in itself a mortal sin. + Wherefore such a consent to delectation in a mortal sin, is itself a mortal sin, as the second opinion maintains. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 co."><a name="36758" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36758] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod circa hoc aliqui diversimode opinati sunt. Quidam +enim dixerunt quod consensus in delectationem non est peccatum +mortale, sed veniale tantum. Alii vero dixerunt quod est peccatum +mortale, et haec opinio est communior et verisimilior. Est enim +considerandum quod, cum omnis delectatio consequatur aliquam +operationem, ut dicitur in X Ethic.; et iterum cum omnis delectatio +habeat aliquod obiectum, delectatio quaelibet potest comparari ad +duo, scilicet ad operationem quam consequitur, et ad obiectum in +quo quis delectatur. Contingit autem quod aliqua operatio sit +obiectum delectationis, sicut et aliqua alia res, quia ipsa +operatio potest accipi ut bonum et finis, in quo quis delectatus +requiescit. Et quandoque quidem ipsamet operatio quam consequitur +delectatio, est obiectum delectationis, inquantum scilicet vis +appetitiva, cuius est delectari, reflectitur in ipsam operationem +sicut in quoddam bonum; puta cum aliquis cogitat, et delectatur de +hoc ipso quod cogitat, inquantum sua cogitatio placet. Quandoque +vero delectatio consequens unam operationem, puta cogitationem +aliquam, habet pro obiecto aliam operationem quasi rem cogitatam, +et tunc talis delectatio procedit ex inclinatione appetitus non +quidem in cogitationem, sed in operationem cogitatam. Sic igitur +aliquis de fornicatione cogitans, de duobus potest delectari, uno +modo, de ipsa cogitatione; alio modo, de fornicatione cogitata. +Delectatio autem de cogitatione ipsa sequitur inclinationem +affectus in cogitationem ipsam. Cogitatio autem ipsa secundum se +non est peccatum mortale, immo quandoque est veniale tantum, puta +cum aliquis inutiliter cogitat; quandoque autem sine peccato +omnino, puta cum aliquis utiliter de ea cogitat, sicut cum vult de +ea praedicare vel disputare. Et ideo per consequens affectio et +delectatio quae sic est de cogitatione fornicationis, non est de +genere peccati mortalis; sed quandoque est peccatum veniale, +quandoque nullum. Unde nec consensus in talem delectationem est +peccatum mortale. Et secundum hoc prima opinio habet veritatem. +Quod autem aliquis cogitans de fornicatione, delectetur de ipso +actu cogitato, hoc contingit ex hoc quod affectio eius inclinata +est in hunc actum. Unde quod aliquis consentiat in talem +delectationem, hoc nihil aliud est quam quod ipse consentiat in hoc +quod affectus suus sit inclinatus in fornicationem, nullus enim +delectatur nisi in eo quod est conforme appetitui eius. Quod autem +aliquis ex deliberatione eligat quod affectus suus conformetur his +quae secundum se sunt peccata mortalia, est peccatum mortale. Unde +talis consensus in delectationem peccati mortalis, est peccatum +mortale; ut secunda opinio ponit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Consent to delectation may be not only in the lower reason, but also in the higher reason, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q74_A7" id="FS_Q74_A8-p11.1" shape="rect">(A[7])</a>. Nevertheless the lower reason may turn away from the eternal types, for, though it is not intent on them, as regulating + according to them, which is proper to the higher reason, yet, it is intent on them, as being regulated according to them: + and by turning from them in this sense, it may sin mortally; since even + the acts of the lower powers and of the external members may be mortal sins, in so far as the direction of the higher reason + fails in directing them according to the eternal types. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="36759" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36759] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod consensus in delectationem potest esse non solum +rationis inferioris, sed etiam superioris, ut dictum est. Et tamen +ipsa etiam ratio inferior potest averti a rationibus aeternis. Quia +etsi non intendit eis ut secundum eas regulans, quod est proprium +superioris rationis; intendit tamen eis ut secundum eas regulata. +Et hoc modo, ab eis se avertens, potest peccare mortaliter. Nam et +actus inferiorum virium, et etiam exteriorum membrorum, possunt +esse peccata mortalia, secundum quod deficit ordinatio superioris +rationis regulantis eos secundum rationes aeternas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Consent to a sin that is venial in its genus, is itself a venial sin, and accordingly one may conclude that the consent to + take pleasure in a useless thought about fornication, is a venial sin. But delectation in the act itself of fornication is, + in its genus, a mortal sin: and that it be a venial sin before the consent is given, is accidental, viz. on account of the + incompleteness of the act: which incompleteness ceases when the deliberate consent + has been given, so that therefore it has its complete nature and is a mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="36760" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36760] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod consensus in peccatum quod est veniale ex genere, est +veniale peccatum. Et secundum hoc potest concludi quod consensus in +delectationem quae est de ipsa vana cogitatione fornicationis, est +peccatum veniale. Sed delectatio quae est in ipso actu +fornicationis, de genere suo est peccatum mortale. Sed quod ante +consensum sit veniale peccatum tantum, hoc est per accidens, +scilicet propter imperfectionem actus. Quae quidem imperfectio +tollitur per consensum deliberatum supervenientem. Unde ex hoc +adducitur in suam naturam, ut sit peccatum mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers the delectation which has the thought for its object. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="36761" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36761] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de delectatione quae habet +cogitationem pro obiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The delectation which has an external act for its object, cannot be without complacency in the external act as such, even + though there be no decision to fulfil it, on account of the prohibition of some higher authority: wherefore the act is inordinate, + and consequently the delectation will be inordinate also. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 ad 4"><a name="36762" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36762] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod delectatio quae habet actum exteriorem pro obiecto, +non potest esse absque complacentia exterioris actus secundum se; +etiam si non statuatur implendum, propter prohibitionem alicuius +superioris. Unde actus fit inordinatus, et per consequens +delectatio erit inordinata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The consent to delectation, resulting from complacency in an act of murder thought of, is a mortal sin also: but not the + consent to delectation resulting from complacency in the thought of murder. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 ad 5"><a name="36763" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36763] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod etiam consensus in delectationem quae procedit ex +complacentia ipsius actus homicidii cogitati, est peccatum mortale. +Non autem consensus in delectationem quae procedit ex complacentia +cogitationis de homicidio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The Lord's Prayer is to be said in order that we may be preserved not only from venial sin, but also from mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 ad 6"><a name="36764" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36764] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum +dicendum quod oratio dominica non solum contra peccata venialia +dicenda est, sed etiam contra mortalia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q74_A9" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A9-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 9. Whether there can be venial sin in the higher reason as directing the lower powers?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A9-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be venial sin in the higher reason as directing the lower powers, i.e. as consenting to a + sinful act. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 7) that the "higher reason is intent on considering and consulting the eternal + law." But mortal sin consists in turning away from the eternal law. Therefore it seems that there can be no other than mortal + sin in the higher reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="36765" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36765] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod in superiori ratione non possit esse +peccatum veniale, secundum quod est directiva inferiorum virium, +idest secundum quod consentit in actum peccati. Dicit enim +Augustinus, in XII de Trin., quod ratio superior inhaeret +rationibus aeternis. Sed peccare mortaliter est per aversionem a +rationibus aeternis. Ergo videtur quod in superiori ratione non +possit esse peccatum nisi mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A9-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the higher reason is the principle of the spiritual life, as the heart is of the body's life. But the diseases of + the heart are deadly. Therefore the sins of the higher reason are mortal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="36766" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36766] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +superior ratio se habet in vita spirituali tanquam principium; +sicut et cor in vita corporali. Sed infirmitates cordis sunt +mortales. Ergo peccata superioris rationis sunt mortalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A9-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a venial sin becomes a mortal sin if it be done out of contempt. But it would seem impossible to commit even a venial + sin, deliberately, without contempt. Since then the consent of the higher reason is always accompanied by deliberate consideration + of the eternal law, it seems that it cannot be without mortal sin, on account of the contempt of the Divine law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="36767" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36767] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum veniale fit mortale, si fiat ex contemptu. Sed hoc non +videtur esse sine contemptu, quod aliquis ex deliberatione peccet +etiam venialiter. Cum ergo consensus rationis superioris semper sit +cum deliberatione legis divinae, videtur quod non possit esse sine +peccato mortali, propter contemptum divinae legis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A9-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Consent to a sinful act belongs to the higher reason, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q74_A7" id="FS_Q74_A9-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[7])</a>. But consent to an act of venial sin is itself a venial sin. Therefore a venial sin can be in the higher reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 9 s. c."><a name="36768" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36768] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +consensus in actum peccati pertinet ad rationem superiorem, ut +supra dictum est. Sed consensus in actum peccati venialis est +peccatum veniale. Ergo in superiori ratione potest esse peccatum +veniale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A9-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 7), the higher reason "is intent on contemplating or consulting the eternal law"; it contemplates + it by considering its truth; it consults it by judging and directing other things according to it: and to this pertains the + fact that by deliberating through the eternal types, it consents to an act or dissents from it. Now it may happen that the + inordinateness of the act to which it consents, is not contrary to the eternal law, + in the same way as mortal sin is, because it does not imply aversion from the last end, but is beside that law, as an act + of venial sin is. Therefore when the higher reason consents to the act of a venial sin, it does not turn away from the eternal + law: wherefore it sins, not mortally, but venially. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 9 co."><a name="36769" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36769] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in XII de Trin., ratio +superior <i>inhaeret rationibus aeternis conspiciendis aut +consulendis</i>, conspiciendis quidem, secundum quod earum +veritatem speculatur; consulendis autem, secundum quod per rationes +aeternas de aliis iudicat et ordinat; ad quod pertinet quod, +deliberando per rationes aeternas, consentit in aliquem actum, vel +dissentit ab eo. Contingit autem quod inordinatio actus in quem +consentit, non contrariatur rationibus aeternis, quia non est cum +aversione a fine ultimo, sicut contrariatur actus peccati mortalis, +sed est praeter eas, sicut actus peccati venialis. Unde quando +ratio superior in actum peccati venialis consentit, non avertitur a +rationibus aeternis. Unde non peccat mortaliter, sed +venialiter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A9-p7"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="36770" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36770] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc +patet responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A9-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Disease of the heart is twofold: one which is in the very substance of the heart, and affects its natural consistency, and + such a disease is always mortal: the other is a disease of the heart consisting in some disorder either of the movement or + of the parts surrounding the heart, and such a disease is not always mortal. In like manner there is mortal sin in the higher + reason whenever the order itself of the higher reason to its proper object which is + the eternal law, is destroyed; but when the disorder leaves this untouched, the sin is not mortal but venial. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="36771" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36771] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod duplex est infirmitas cordis. Una quae est in ipsa +substantia cordis, et immutat naturalem complexionem ipsius, et +talis infirmitas semper est mortalis. Alia est autem infirmitas +cordis propter aliquam inordinationem vel motus eius, vel alicuius +eorum quae circumstant cor, et talis infirmitas non semper est +mortalis. Et similiter in ratione superiori semper est peccatum +mortale, quando tollitur ipsa ordinatio rationis superioris ad +proprium obiectum, quod est rationes aeternae. Sed quando est +inordinatio circa hoc, non est peccatum mortale, sed veniale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A9-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Deliberate consent to a sin does not always amount to contempt of the Divine law, but only when the sin is contrary to the + Divine law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="36772" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36772] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod deliberatus consensus in peccatum non semper pertinet +ad contemptum legis divinae, sed solum quando peccatum legi divinae +contrariatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q74_A10" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A10-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 10. Whether venial sin can be in the higher reason as such?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A10-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial sin cannot be in the higher reason as such, i.e. as considering the eternal law. For the act of + a power is not found to fail except that power be inordinately disposed with regard to its object. Now the object of the higher + reason is the eternal law, in respect of which there can be no disorder without mortal sin. Therefore there can be no venial + sin in the higher reason as such. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="36773" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36773] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod in superiori ratione non possit esse +peccatum veniale secundum seipsam, idest secundum quod inspicit +rationes aeternas. Actus enim potentiae non invenitur esse +deficiens, nisi per hoc quod inordinate se habet circa suum +obiectum. Sed obiectum superioris rationis sunt aeternae rationes, +a quibus deordinari non est sine peccato mortali. Ergo in superiori +ratione non potest esse peccatum veniale secundum seipsam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A10-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, since the reason is a deliberative power, there can be no act of reason without deliberation. Now every inordinate + movement in things concerning God, if it be deliberate, is a mortal sin. Therefore venial sin is never in the higher reason + as such. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="36774" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36774] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +cum ratio sit vis deliberativa, actus rationis semper est cum +deliberatione. Sed omnis inordinatus motus in his quae Dei sunt, si +sit cum deliberatione, est peccatum mortale. Ergo in ratione +superiori secundum seipsam, nunquam est peccatum veniale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A10-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it happens sometimes that a sin which takes us unawares, is a venial sin. Now a deliberate sin is a mortal sin, + through the reason, in deliberating, having recourse to some higher good, by acting against which, man sins more grievously; + just as when the reason in deliberating about an inordinate pleasurable act, considers that it is contrary to the law of God, + it sins more grievously in consenting, than if it only considered that it is contrary to + moral virtue. But the higher reason cannot have recourse to any higher tribunal than its own object. Therefore if a movement + that takes us unawares is not a mortal sin, neither will the subsequent deliberation make it a mortal sin; which is clearly + false. Therefore there can be no venial sin in the higher reason as such. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 10 arg. 3"><a name="36775" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36775] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +contingit quandoque quod peccatum ex subreptione est peccatum +veniale, peccatum autem ex deliberatione est peccatum mortale, per +hoc quod ratio deliberans recurrit ad aliquod maius bonum, contra +quod homo agens gravius peccat, sicut cum de actu delectabili +inordinato ratio deliberat quod est contra legem Dei, gravius +peccat consentiendo, quam si solum consideraret quod est contra +virtutem moralem. Sed ratio superior non potest recurrere ad +aliquod altius quam sit suum obiectum. Ergo si motus ex subreptione +non sit peccatum mortale, neque etiam deliberatio superveniens +faciet ipsum esse peccatum mortale, quod patet esse falsum. Non +ergo in ratione superiori secundum seipsam, potest esse peccatum +veniale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A10-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A sudden movement of unbelief is a venial sin. But it belongs to the higher reason as such. Therefore there can be a venial + sin in the higher reason as such. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 10 s. c."><a name="36776" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36776] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +motus subreptitius infidelitatis est peccatum veniale. Sed pertinet +ad superiorem rationem secundum seipsam. Ergo in ratione superiori +potest esse peccatum veniale secundum seipsam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q74_A10-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The higher reason regards its own object otherwise than the objects of the lower powers that are directed by the higher reason. + For it does not regard the objects of the lower powers, except in so far as it consults the eternal law about them, and so + it does not regard them save by way of deliberation. Now deliberate consent to what is a mortal sin in its genus, is itself + a mortal sin; and consequently the higher reason always sins mortally, if the acts of + the lower powers to which it consents are mortal sins. + </p><p id="FS_Q74_A10-p7"> With regard to its own object it has a twofold act, viz. simple "intuition," and "deliberation," in respect of which it again + consults the eternal law about its own object. But in respect of simple intuition, it can have an inordinate movement about + Divine things, as when a man suffers a sudden movement of unbelief. And although unbelief, in its genus, is a mortal sin, + yet a sudden movement of unbelief is a venial sin, because there is no mortal sin unless it be contrary to the + law of God. Now it is possible for one of the articles of faith to present itself to the reason suddenly under some other + aspect, before the eternal law, i.e. the law of God, is consulted, or can be consulted, on the matter; as, for instance, when + a man suddenly apprehends the resurrection of the dead as impossible naturally, and rejects it, as soon as he had thus apprehended + it, before he has had time to deliberate and consider that this is proposed to our belief in accordance with the Divine + law. If, however, the movement of unbelief remains after this deliberation, it is a mortal sin. Therefore, in sudden movements, + the higher reason may sin venially in respect of its proper object, even if it be a mortal sin in its genus; or it may sin + mortally in giving a deliberate consent; but in things pertaining to the lower powers, it always sins mortally, in things + which are mortal sins in their genus, but not in those which are venial sins in their genus. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 10 co."><a name="36777" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36777] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod ratio superior aliter fertur in suum obiectum, atque +aliter in obiecta inferiorum virium quae per ipsam diriguntur. In +obiecta enim inferiorum virium non fertur nisi inquantum de eis +consulit rationes aeternas. Unde non fertur in ea nisi per modum +deliberationis. Deliberatus autem consensus in his quae ex genere +suo sunt mortalia, est mortale peccatum. Et ideo ratio superior +semper mortaliter peccat, si actus inferiorum virium in quos +consentit, sint peccata mortalia. Sed circa proprium obiectum habet +duos actus, scilicet simplicem intuitum; et deliberationem, +secundum quod etiam de proprio obiecto consulit rationes aeternas. +Secundum autem simplicem intuitum, potest aliquem inordinatum motum +habere circa divina, puta cum quis patitur subitum infidelitatis +motum. Et quamvis infidelitas secundum suum genus sit peccatum +mortale, tamen subitus motus infidelitatis est peccatum veniale. +Quia peccatum mortale non est nisi sit contra legem Dei, potest +autem aliquid eorum quae pertinent ad fidem, subito rationi +occurrere sub quadam alia ratione, antequam super hoc consulatur, +vel consuli possit, ratio aeterna, idest lex Dei; puta cum quis +resurrectionem mortuorum subito apprehendit ut impossibilem +secundum naturam, et simul apprehendendo renititur, antequam tempus +habeat deliberandi quod hoc est nobis traditum ut credendum +secundum legem divinam. Si vero post hanc deliberationem motus +infidelitatis maneat, est peccatum mortale. Et ideo circa proprium +obiectum, etsi sit peccatum mortale ex genere, potest ratio +superior peccare venialiter in subitis motibus; vel etiam +mortaliter per deliberatum consensum. In his autem quae pertinent +ad inferiores vires, semper peccat mortaliter in his quae sunt +peccata mortalia ex suo genere, non autem in his quae secundum suum +genus sunt venialia peccata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A10-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A sin which is against the eternal law, though it be mortal in its genus, may nevertheless be venial, on account of the incompleteness + of a sudden action, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="36778" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36778] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod peccatum quod est contra rationes aeternas, etsi +sit peccatum mortale ex genere, potest tamen esse peccatum veniale +propter imperfectionem actus subiti, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A10-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In matters of action, the simple intuition of the principles from which deliberation proceeds, belongs to the reason, as + well as the act of deliberation: even as in speculative matters it belongs to the reason both to syllogize and to form propositions: + consequently the reason also can have a sudden movement. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="36779" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36779] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod in operativis ad rationem, ad quam pertinet +deliberatio, pertinet etiam simplex intuitus eorum ex quibus +deliberatio procedit, sicut etiam in speculativis ad rationem +pertinet et syllogizare, et propositiones formare. Et ideo etiam +ratio potest habere subitum motum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A10-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One and the same thing may be the subject of different considerations, of which one is higher than the other; thus the existence + of God may be considered, either as possible to be known by the human reason, or as delivered to us by Divine revelation, + which is a higher consideration. And therefore, although the object of the higher reason is, in its nature, something sublime, + yet it is reducible to some yet higher consideration: and in this way, that + which in the sudden movement was not a mortal sin, becomes a mortal sin in virtue of the deliberation which brought it into + the light of a higher consideration, as was explained above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 10 ad 3"><a name="36780" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36780] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod una et eadem res potest diversas considerationes +habere, quarum una est altera altior, sicut Deum esse potest +considerari vel inquantum est cognoscibile ratione humana, vel +inquantum creditur revelatione divina, quae est consideratio +altior. Et ideo quamvis obiectum rationis superioris sit quiddam +secundum naturam rei altissimum, tamen potest etiam reduci in +quandam altiorem considerationem. Et hac ratione, quod in motu +subito non erat peccatum mortale, per deliberationem reducentem in +altiorem considerationem fit peccatum mortale, sicut supra +expositum est.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q75" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q75-p0.1">Q. 75. OF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES) </h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q75-p2"> We must now consider the causes of sin: (1) in general; (2) in particular. Under the first head there are four points of + inquiry: + </p><p id="FS_Q75-p3"><a href="#FS_Q75_A1"> (1) Whether sin has a cause?</a></p><p id="FS_Q75-p4"><a href="#FS_Q75_A2"> (2) Whether it has an internal cause?</a></p><p id="FS_Q75-p5"><a href="#FS_Q75_A3"> (3) Whether it has an external cause?</a></p><p id="FS_Q75-p6"><a href="#FS_Q75_A4"> (4) Whether one sin is the cause of another?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 pr."><a name="36781" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36781] +Iª-IIae q. 75 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +causis peccatorum. Et primo, in generali; secundo, in speciali. +Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum peccatum habeat +causam. Secundo, utrum habeat causam interiorem. Tertio, utrum +habeat causam exteriorem. Quarto, utrum peccatum sit causa +peccati.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q75_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q75_A1-p0.1">Q. 75. A. 1. Whether sin has a cause?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin has no cause. For sin has the nature of evil, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q71_A6" id="FS_Q75_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[6]</a>). But evil has no cause, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore sin has no cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36782" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36782] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non habeat causam. Peccatum +enim habet rationem mali, ut dictum est. Sed malum non habet +causam, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo peccatum non +habet causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a cause is that from which something follows of necessity. Now that which is of necessity, seems to be no sin, for + every sin is voluntary. Therefore sin has no cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36783" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36783] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +causa est ad quam de necessitate sequitur aliud. Sed quod est ex +necessitate, non videtur esse peccatum, eo quod omne peccatum est +voluntarium. Ergo peccatum non habet causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if sin has a cause, this cause is either good or evil. It is not a good, because good produces nothing but good, + for "a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q75_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.18" target="asv">Mat. 7:18</a>). Likewise neither can evil be the cause of sin, because the evil of punishment is a sequel to sin, and the evil of guilt + is the same as sin. Therefore sin has no cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36784" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36784] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +si peccatum habet causam, aut habet pro causa bonum, aut malum. Non +autem bonum, quia bonum non facit nisi bonum; <i>non enim potest +arbor bona fructus malos facere</i>, ut dicitur Matth. VII +similiter autem nec malum potest esse causa peccati, quia malum +poenae sequitur ad peccatum; malum autem culpae est idem quod +peccatum. Peccatum igitur non habet causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is done has a cause, for, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q75_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.5.6" target="asv">Job 5:6</a>, "nothing upon earth is done without a cause." But sin is something done; since it a "word, deed, or desire contrary to the + law of God." Therefore sin has a cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36785" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36785] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +omne quod fit, habet causam, quia, ut dicitur Iob V, nihil in terra +sine causa fit. Sed peccatum fit, est enim dictum vel factum vel +concupitum contra legem Dei. Ergo peccatum habet causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A sin is an inordinate act. Accordingly, so far as it is an act, it can have a direct cause, even as any other act; but, + so far as it is inordinate, it has a cause, in the same way as a negation or privation can have a cause. Now two causes may + be assigned to a negation: in the first place, absence of the cause of affirmation; i.e. the negation of the cause itself, + is the cause of the negation in itself; since the result of the removing the cause is the + removal of the effect: thus the absence of the sun is the cause of darkness. In the second place, the cause of an affirmation, + of which a negation is a sequel, is the accidental cause of the resulting negation: thus fire by causing heat in virtue of + its principal tendency, consequently causes a privation of cold. The first of these suffices to cause a simple negation. But, + since the inordinateness of sin and of every evil is not a simple negation, but the privation of that which something ought + naturally to have, such an inordinateness must needs have an accidental efficient cause. For that which naturally is and ought + to be in a thing, is never lacking except on account of some impeding cause. And accordingly we are wont to say that evil, + which consists in a certain privation, has a deficient cause, or an accidental efficient cause. Now every accidental cause + is reducible to the direct cause. Since then sin, on the part of its inordinateness, has an accidental efficient cause, and + on + the part of the act, a direct efficient cause, it follows that the inordinateness of sin is a result of the cause of the act. + Accordingly then, the will lacking the direction of the rule of reason and of the Divine law, and intent on some mutable good, + causes the act of sin directly, and the inordinateness of the act, indirectly, and beside the intention: for the lack of order + in the act results from the lack of direction in the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 1 co."><a name="36786" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36786] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod peccatum est quidam actus inordinatus. Ex parte +igitur actus, potest habere per se causam, sicut et quilibet alius +actus. Ex parte autem inordinationis, habet causam eo modo quo +negatio vel privatio potest habere causam. Negationis autem +alicuius potest duplex causa assignari. Primo quidem, defectus +causae, idest ipsius causae negatio, est causa negationis secundum +seipsam, ad remotionem enim causae sequitur remotio effectus; sicut +obscuritatis causa est absentia solis. Alio modo, causa +affirmationis ad quam sequitur negatio, est per accidens causa +negationis consequentis, sicut ignis, causando calorem ex +principali intentione, consequenter causat privationem +frigiditatis. Quorum primum potest sufficere ad simplicem +negationem. Sed cum inordinatio peccati, et quodlibet malum, non +sit simplex negatio, sed privatio eius quod quid natum est et debet +habere; necesse est quod talis inordinatio habeat causam agentem +per accidens, quod enim natum est inesse et debet, nunquam abesset +nisi propter causam aliquam impedientem. Et secundum hoc consuevit +dici quod malum, quod in quadam privatione consistit, habet causam +deficientem, vel agentem per accidens. Omnis autem causa per +accidens reducitur ad causam per se. Cum igitur peccatum ex parte +inordinationis habeat causam agentem per accidens, ex parte autem +actus habeat causam agentem per se; sequitur quod inordinatio +peccati consequatur ex ipsa causa actus. Sic igitur voluntas carens +directione regulae rationis et legis divinae, intendens aliquod +bonum commutabile, causat actum quidem peccati per se, sed +inordinationem actus per accidens et praeter intentionem, provenit +enim defectus ordinis in actu, ex defectu directionis in +voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sin signifies not only the privation of good, which privation is its inordinateness, but also the act which is the subject + of that privation, which has the nature of evil: and how this evil has a cause, has been explained. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36787" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36787] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod peccatum non solum significat ipsam privationem +boni, quae est inordinatio; sed significat actum sub tali +privatione, quae habet rationem mali. Quod quidem qualiter habeat +causam, dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If this definition is to be verified in all cases, it must be understood as applying to a cause which is sufficient and not + impeded. For it happens that a thing is the sufficient cause of something else, and that the effect does not follow of necessity, + on account of some supervening impediment: else it would follow that all things happen of necessity, as is proved in Metaph. + vi, text. 5. Accordingly, though sin has a cause, it does not follow that + this is a necessary cause, since its effect can be impeded. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36788" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36788] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, si illa definitio causae universaliter debeat +verificari, oportet ut intelligatur de causa sufficienti et non +impedita. Contingit enim aliquid esse causam sufficientem alterius, +et tamen non ex necessitate sequitur effectus, propter aliquod +impedimentum superveniens, alioquin sequeretur quod omnia ex +necessitate contingerent, ut patet in VI Metaphys. Sic igitur, etsi +peccatum habeat causam, non tamen sequitur quod sit necessaria, +quia effectus potest impediri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above, the will in failing to apply the rule of reason or of the Divine law, is the cause of sin. Now the fact + of not applying the rule of reason or of the Divine law, has not in itself the nature of evil, whether of punishment or of + guilt, before it is applied to the act. Wherefore accordingly, evil is not the cause of the first sin, but some good lacking + some other good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36789" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36789] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, voluntas sine adhibitione regulae +rationis vel legis divinae, est causa peccati. Hoc autem quod est +non adhibere regulam rationis vel legis divinae, secundum se non +habet rationem mali, nec poenae nec culpae, antequam applicetur ad +actum. Unde secundum hoc, peccati primi non est causa aliquod +malum, sed bonum aliquod cum absentia alicuius alterius boni.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q75_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q75_A2-p0.1">Q. 75. A. 2. Whether sin has an internal cause?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin has no internal cause. For that which is within a thing is always in it. If therefore sin had an internal + cause, man would always be sinning, since given the cause, the effect follows. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36790" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36790] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non habeat causam interiorem. +Id enim quod est interius alicui rei, semper adest ei. Si igitur +peccatum habeat causam interiorem, semper homo peccaret, cum, +posita causa, ponatur effectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing is not its own cause. But the internal movements of a man are sins. Therefore they are not the cause of + sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36791" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36791] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +idem non est causa sui ipsius. Sed interiores motus hominis sunt +peccatum. Ergo non sunt causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is within man is either natural or voluntary. Now that which is natural cannot be the cause of sin, for + sin is contrary to nature, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 3; iv, 21); while that which is voluntary, if it be inordinate, + is already a sin. Therefore nothing intrinsic can be the cause of the first sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36792" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36792] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quidquid est intra hominem, aut est naturale, aut voluntarium. Sed +id quod est naturale, non potest esse peccati causa, quia peccatum +est contra naturam, ut dicit Damascenus. Quod autem est +voluntarium, si sit inordinatum, iam est peccatum. Non ergo aliquid +intrinsecum potest esse causa primi peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Duabus Anim. x, 10,11; Retract. i, 9) that "the will is the cause of sin." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36793" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36793] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, quod voluntas est causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q75_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q75_A1" id="FS_Q75_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the direct cause of sin must be considered on the part of the act. Now we may distinguish a twofold internal cause of human + acts, one remote, the other proximate. The proximate internal cause of the human act is the reason and will, in respect of + which man has a free-will; while the remote cause is the apprehension of the sensitive part, and also the sensitive appetite. + For just as it is due to the judgment of + reason, that the will is moved to something in accord with reason, so it is due to an apprehension of the senses that the + sensitive appetite is inclined to something; which inclination sometimes influences the will and reason, as we shall explain + further on (Q[77], A[1]). Accordingly a double interior cause of sin may be assigned; one proximate, on the part of the reason + and will; and the other remote, on the part of the imagination or sensitive appetite. + </p><p id="FS_Q75_A2-p7"> But since we have said above (A[1], ad 3) that the cause of sin is some apparent good as motive, yet lacking the due motive, + viz. the rule of reason or the Divine law, this motive which is an apparent good, appertains to the apprehension of the senses + and to the appetite; while the lack of the due rule appertains to the reason, whose nature it is to consider this rule; and + the completeness of the voluntary sinful act appertains to the will, so that the act of the will, given the + conditions we have just mentioned, is already a sin. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 2 co."><a name="36794" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36794] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, per se causam peccati oportet +accipere ex parte ipsius actus. Actus autem humani potest accipi +causa interior et mediata, et immediata. Immediata quidem causa +humani actus est ratio et voluntas, secundum quam homo est liber +arbitrio. Causa autem remota est apprehensio sensitivae partis, et +etiam appetitus sensitivus, sicut enim ex iudicio rationis voluntas +movetur ad aliquid secundum rationem, ita etiam ex apprehensione +sensus appetitus sensitivus in aliquid inclinatur. Quae quidem +inclinatio interdum trahit voluntatem et rationem, sicut infra +patebit. Sic igitur duplex causa peccati interior potest assignari, +una proxima, ex parte rationis et voluntatis; alia vero remota, ex +parte imaginationis vel appetitus sensitivi. Sed quia supra dictum +est quod causa peccati est aliquod bonum apparens motivum cum +defectu debiti motivi, scilicet regulae rationis vel legis divinae; +ipsum motivum quod est apparens bonum, pertinet ad apprehensionem +sensus et appetitum. Ipsa autem absentia debitae regulae pertinet +ad rationem, quae nata est huiusmodi regulam considerare. Sed ipsa +perfectio voluntarii actus peccati pertinet ad voluntatem, ita quod +ipse voluntatis actus, praemissis suppositis, iam est quoddam +peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That which is within a thing as its natural power, is always in it: but that which is within it, as the internal act of the + appetitive or apprehensive power, is not always in it. Now the power of the will is the potential cause of sin, but is made + actual by the preceding movements, both of the sensitive part, in the first place, and afterwards, of the reason. For it is + because a thing is proposed as appetible to the senses, and because the appetite is + inclined, that the reason sometimes fails to consider the due rule, so that the will produces the act of sin. Since therefore + the movements that precede it are not always actual, neither is man always actually sinning. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36795" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36795] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod id quod est intrinsecum sicut potentia +naturalis, semper inest, id autem quod est intrinsecum sicut actus +interior appetitivae vel apprehensivae virtutis, non semper inest. +Ipsa autem potentia voluntatis est causa peccati in potentia, sed +reducitur in actum per motus praecedentes et sensitivae partis +primo, et rationis consequenter. Ex hoc enim quod aliquid +proponitur ut appetibile secundum sensum et appetitus sensitivus +inclinatur in illud, ratio interdum cessat a consideratione regulae +debitae, et sic voluntas producit actum peccati. Quia igitur motus +praecedentes non semper sunt in actu, neque peccatum semper est in +actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not true that all the internal acts belong to the substance of sin, for this consists principally in the act of the + will; but some precede and some follow the sin itself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36796" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36796] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod non omnes motus interiores sunt de substantia +peccati, quod consistit principaliter in actu voluntatis, sed +quidam praecedunt, et quidam consequuntur ipsum peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which causes sin, as a power produces its act, is natural; and again, the movement of the sensitive part, from which + sin follows, is natural sometimes, as, for instance, when anyone sins through appetite for food. Yet sin results in being + unnatural from the very fact that the natural rule fails, which man, in accord with his nature, ought to observe. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36797" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36797] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod illud quod est causa peccati sicut potentia producens +actum, est naturale. Motus etiam sensitivae partis, ex quo sequitur +peccatum, interdum est naturalis, sicut cum propter appetitum cibi +aliquis peccat. Sed efficitur peccatum innaturale ex hoc ipso quod +deficit regula naturalis, quam homo secundum naturam suam debet +attendere.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q75_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q75_A3-p0.1">Q. 75. A. 3. Whether sin has an external cause?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin has no external cause. For sin is a voluntary act. Now voluntary acts belong to principles that are + within us, so that they have no external cause. Therefore sin has no external cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36798" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36798] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non habeat causam exteriorem. +Peccatum enim est actus voluntarius. Voluntaria autem sunt eorum +quae sunt in nobis; et ita non habent exteriorem causam. Ergo +peccatum non habet exteriorem causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as nature is an internal principle, so is the will. Now in natural things sin can be due to no other than an internal + cause; for instance, the birth of a monster is due to the corruption of some internal principle. Therefore in the moral order, + sin can arise from no other than an internal cause. Therefore it has no external cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36799" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36799] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut natura est principium interius, ita etiam voluntas. Sed +peccatum in rebus naturalibus nunquam accidit nisi ex aliqua +interiori causa, ut puta monstruosi partus proveniunt ex +corruptione alicuius principii interioris. Ergo neque in moralibus +potest contingere peccatum nisi ex interiori causa. Non ergo habet +peccatum causam exteriorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the cause is multiplied, the effect is multiplied. Now the more numerous and weighty the external inducements + to sin are, the less is a man's inordinate act imputed to him as a sin. Therefore nothing external is a cause of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36800" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36800] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +multiplicata causa, multiplicatur effectus. Sed quanto plura sunt +et maiora exterius inducentia ad peccandum, tanto minus id quod +quis inordinate agit, ei imputatur ad peccatum. Ergo nihil exterius +est causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q75_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Num.21.16" target="asv">Num. 21:16</a>): "Are not these they, that deceived the children of Israel by the counsel of Balaam, and made you transgress against the + Lord by the sin of Phogor?" Therefore something external can be a cause of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36801" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36801] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Num. XXXI, <i>nonne istae sunt quae deceperunt +filios Israel, et praevaricari vos fecerunt in domino super peccato +Phogor?</i> Ergo aliquid exterius potest esse causa faciens +peccare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q75_A2" id="FS_Q75_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, the internal cause of sin is both the will, as completing the sinful act, and the reason, as lacking the due rule, and the + appetite, as inclining to sin. Accordingly something external might be a cause of sin in three ways, either by moving the + will itself immediately, or by moving the reason, or by moving the sensitive appetite. Now, as stated above (Q[9], A[6]; Q[10], + A[4]), none can move the will inwardly + save God alone, who cannot be a cause of sin, as we shall prove further on (Q[79], A[1]). Hence it follows that nothing external + can be a cause of sin, except by moving the reason, as a man or devil by enticing to sin; or by moving the sensitive appetite, + as certain external sensibles move it. Yet neither does external enticement move the reason, of necessity, in matters of action, + nor do things proposed externally, of necessity move the sensitive appetite, except perhaps it be disposed thereto + in a certain way; and even the sensitive appetite does not, of necessity, move the reason and will. Therefore something external + can be a cause moving to sin, but not so as to be a sufficient cause thereof: and the will alone is the sufficient completive + cause of sin being accomplished. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 3 co."><a name="36802" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36802] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, causa interior peccati est +et voluntas, ut perficiens actum peccati; et ratio, quantum ad +carentiam debitae regulae; et appetitus sensitivus inclinans. Sic +ergo aliquid extrinsecum tripliciter posset esse causa peccati, vel +quia moveret immediate ipsam voluntatem; vel quia moveret rationem; +vel quia moveret appetitum sensitivum. Voluntatem autem, ut supra +dictum est, interius movere non potest nisi Deus; qui non potest +esse causa peccati, ut infra ostendetur. Unde relinquitur quod +nihil exterius potest esse causa peccati, nisi vel inquantum movet +rationem, sicut homo vel Daemon persuadens peccatum; vel sicut +movens appetitum sensitivum, sicut aliqua sensibilia exteriora +movent appetitum sensitivum. Sed neque persuasio exterior in rebus +agendis ex necessitate movet rationem; neque etiam res exterius +propositae ex necessitate movent appetitum sensitivum, nisi forte +aliquo modo dispositum; et tamen etiam appetitus sensitivus non ex +necessitate movet rationem et voluntatem. Unde aliquid exterius +potest esse aliqua causa movens ad peccandum, non tamen +sufficienter ad peccatum inducens, sed causa sufficienter complens +peccatum est sola voluntas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From the very fact that the external motive causes of sin do not lead to sin sufficiently and necessarily, it follows that + it remains in our power to sin or not to sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36803" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36803] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ex hoc ipso quod exteriora moventia ad peccandum +non sufficienter et ex necessitate inducunt, sequitur quod remaneat +in nobis peccare et non peccare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fact that sin has an internal cause does not prevent its having an external cause; for nothing external is a cause of + sin, except through the medium of the internal cause, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36804" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36804] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod per hoc quod ponitur interior causa peccati, non +excluditur exterior, non enim id quod est exterius est causa +peccati, nisi mediante causa interiori, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the external causes inclining to sin be multiplied, the sinful acts are multiplied, because they incline to the sinful + act in both greater numbers and greater frequency. Nevertheless the character of guilt is lessened, since this depends on + the act being voluntary and in our power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36805" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36805] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, multiplicatis exterioribus causis inclinantibus ad +peccandum, multiplicantur actus peccati, quia plures ex illis +causis, et pluries, inclinantur ad actus peccati. Sed tamen +minuitur ratio culpae, quae consistit in hoc quod aliquid sit +voluntarium et in nobis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q75_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q75_A4-p0.1">Q. 75. A. 4. Whether one sin is a cause of another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one sin cannot be the cause of another. For there are four kinds of cause, none of which will fit in with + one sin causing another. Because the end has the character of good; which is inconsistent with sin, which has the character + of evil. In like manner neither can a sin be an efficient cause, since "evil is not an efficient cause, but is weak and powerless," + as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). The material and formal cause seems to have + no place except in natural bodies, which are composed of matter and form. Therefore sin cannot have either a material or a + formal cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36806" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36806] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non sit causa peccati. Sunt +enim quatuor genera causarum, quorum nullum potest ad hoc congruere +quod peccatum sit causa peccati. Finis enim habet rationem boni, +quod non competit peccato, quod de sua ratione est malum. Et eadem +ratione nec peccatum potest esse causa efficiens, quia malum non +est causa agens, sed est infirmum et impotens, ut Dionysius dicit, +IV cap. de Div. Nom. Causa autem materialis et formalis videntur +habere solum locum in naturalibus corporibus quae sunt composita ex +materia et forma. Ergo peccatum non potest habere causam materialem +et formalem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "to produce its like belongs to a perfect thing," as stated in Meteor. iv, 2 [*Cf. De Anima ii.]. But sin is essentially + something imperfect. Therefore one sin cannot be a cause of another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36807" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36807] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +agere sibi simile est rei perfectae, ut dicitur in IV Meteor. Sed +peccatum de sui ratione est imperfectum. Ergo peccatum non potest +esse causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if one sin is the cause of a second sin, in the same way, yet another sin will be the cause of the first, and thus + we go on indefinitely, which is absurd. Therefore one sin is not the cause of another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36808" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36808] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +si huius peccati sit causa aliud peccatum, eadem ratione et illius +erit causa aliquod aliud peccatum, et sic procedetur in infinitum, +quod est inconveniens. Non ergo peccatum est causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says on Ezechiel (Hom. xi): "A sin is not quickly blotted out by repentance, is both a sin and a cause of sin." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36809" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36809] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., <i>peccatum quod per +poenitentiam citius non deletur, peccatum est et causa +peccati</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Forasmuch as a sin has a cause on the part of the act of sin, it is possible for one sin to be the cause of another, in the + same way as one human act is the cause of another. Hence it happens that one sin may be the cause of another in respect of + the four kinds of causes. First, after the manner of an efficient or moving cause, both directly and indirectly. Indirectly, + as that which removes an impediment is called an indirect cause of movement: for when man, + by one sinful act, loses grace, or charity, or shame, or anything else that withdraws him from sin, he thereby falls into + another sin, so that the first sin is the accidental cause of the second. Directly, as when, by one sinful act, man is disposed + to commit more readily another like act: because acts cause dispositions and habits inclining to like acts. Secondly, after + the manner of a material cause, one sin is the cause of another, by preparing its matter: thus covetousness prepares the + matter for strife, which is often about the wealth a man has amassed together. Thirdly, after the manner of a final cause, + one sin causes another, in so far as a man commits one sin for the sake of another which is his end; as when a man is guilty + of simony for the end of ambition, or fornication for the purpose of theft. And since the end gives the form to moral matters, + as stated above ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A3" id="FS_Q75_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[3]</a>; + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A4" id="FS_Q75_A4-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[18], AA[4]</a>,6), it follows that one sin is + also the formal cause of another: because in the act of fornication committed for the purpose of theft, the former is material + while the latter is formal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 4 co."><a name="36810" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36810] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, cum peccatum habeat causam ex parte actus, hoc modo +unum peccatum posset esse causa alterius, sicut unus actus humanus +potest esse causa alterius. Contingit igitur unum peccatum esse +causam alterius secundum quatuor genera causarum. Primo quidem, +secundum modum causae efficientis vel moventis, et per se et per +accidens. Per accidens quidem, sicut removens prohibens dicitur +movens per accidens, cum enim per unum actum peccati homo amittit +gratiam, vel caritatem, vel verecundiam, vel quodcumque aliud +retrahens a peccato, incidit ex hoc in aliud peccatum; et sic +primum peccatum est causa secundi per accidens. Per se autem, sicut +cum ex uno actu peccati homo disponitur ad hoc quod alium actum +consimilem facilius committit, ex actibus enim causantur +dispositiones et habitus inclinantes ad similes actus. Secundum +vero genus causae materialis, unum peccatum est causa alterius, +inquantum praeparat ei materiam, sicut avaritia praeparat materiam +litigio, quod plerumque est de divitiis congregatis. Secundum vero +genus causae finalis, unum peccatum est causa alterius, inquantum +propter finem unius peccati aliquis committit aliud peccatum, sicut +cum aliquis committit simoniam propter finem ambitionis, vel +fornicationem propter furtum. Et quia finis dat formam in +moralibus, ut supra habitum est, ex hoc etiam sequitur quod unum +peccatum sit formalis causa alterius, in actu enim fornicationis +quae propter furtum committitur, est quidem fornicatio sicut +materiale, furtum vero sicut formale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sin, in so far as it is inordinate, has the character of evil; but, in so far as it is an act, it has some good, at least + apparent, for its end: so that, as an act, but not as being inordinate, it can be the cause, both final and efficient, of + another sin. A sin has matter, not "of which" but "about which" it is: and it has its form from its end. Consequently one + sin can be the cause of another, in respect of the four kinds of cause, as stated + above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36811" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36811] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod peccatum, inquantum est inordinatum, habet +rationem mali, sed inquantum est actus quidam, habet aliquod bonum, +saltem apparens, pro fine. Et ita ex parte actus potest esse causa +et finalis et effectiva alterius peccati, licet non ex parte +inordinationis. Materiam autem habet peccatum non ex qua, sed circa +quam. Formam autem habet ex fine. Et ideo secundum quatuor genera +causarum peccatum potest dici causa peccati, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sin is something imperfect on account of its moral imperfection on the part of its inordinateness. Nevertheless, as an act + it can have natural perfection: and thus it can be the cause of another sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36812" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36812] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod peccatum est imperfectum imperfectione morali ex +parte inordinationis, sed ex parte actus potest habere perfectionem +naturae. Et secundum hoc potest esse causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not every cause of one sin is another sin; so there is no need to go on indefinitely: for one may come to one sin which is + not caused by another sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36813" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36813] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod non omnis causa peccati est peccatum. Unde non +oportet quod procedatur in infinitum; sed potest perveniri ad +aliquod primum peccatum, cuius causa non est aliud peccatum.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q76" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q76-p0.1">Q. 76. OF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN PARTICULAR (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q76-p2"> We must now consider the causes of sin, in particular, and (1) The internal causes of sin; (2) its external causes; and (3) + sins which are the causes of other sins. In view of what has been said above + <a href="#FS_Q76_A2" id="FS_Q76-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, the first consideration will be threefold: so that in the first place we shall treat of ignorance, which is the cause of + sin on the part of reason; secondly, of weakness or passion, which is the cause of sin on the part of the sensitive appetite; + thirdly, of malice, which is the cause of sin on the part of the will. + </p><p id="FS_Q76-p3"> Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q76-p4"><a href="#FS_Q76_A1"> (1) Whether ignorance is a cause of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q76-p5"><a href="#FS_Q76_A2"> (2) Whether ignorance is a sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q76-p6"><a href="#FS_Q76_A3"> (3) Whether it excuses from sin altogether?</a></p><p id="FS_Q76-p7"><a href="#FS_Q76_A4"> (4) Whether it diminishes sin?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 pr."><a name="36814" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36814] +Iª-IIae q. 76 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +causis peccati in speciali. Et primo, de causis interioribus +peccati; secundo, de exterioribus; tertio, de peccatis quae sunt +causa aliorum peccatorum. Prima autem consideratio, secundum +praemissa, erit tripartita, nam primo, agetur de ignorantia, quae +est causa peccati ex parte rationis; secundo, de infirmitate seu +passione, quae est causa peccati ex parte appetitus sensitivi; +tertio, de malitia, quae est causa peccati ex parte voluntatis. +Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum ignorantia sit causa +peccati. Secundo, utrum ignorantia sit peccatum. Tertio, utrum +totaliter a peccato excuset. Quarto, utrum diminuat peccatum.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q76_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q76_A1-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 1. Whether ignorance can be a cause of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that ignorance cannot be a cause of sin: because a non-being is not the cause of anything. Now ignorance is + a non-being, since it is a privation of knowledge. Therefore ignorance is not a cause of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36815" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36815] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ignorantia non possit esse causa +peccati. Quia quod non est, nullius est causa. Sed ignorantia est +non ens, cum sit privatio quaedam scientiae. Ergo ignorantia non +est causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, causes of sin should be reckoned in respect of sin being a "turning to" something, as was stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q75_A1" id="FS_Q76_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[1]</a>). Now ignorance seems to savor of "turning away" from something. Therefore it should not be reckoned a cause of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36816" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36816] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +causae peccati sunt accipiendae ex parte conversionis, ut ex +supradictis patet. Sed ignorantia videtur respicere aversionem. +Ergo non debet poni causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every sin is seated in the will. Now the will does not turn to that which is not known, because its object is the + good apprehended. Therefore ignorance cannot be a cause of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36817" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36817] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +omne peccatum in voluntate consistit, ut supra dictum est. Sed +voluntas non fertur nisi in aliquod cognitum, quia bonum +apprehensum est obiectum voluntatis. Ergo ignorantia non potest +esse causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. lxvii) "that some sin through ignorance." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36818" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36818] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de natura et gratia, quod +quidam per ignorantiam peccant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q76_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 27) a moving cause is twofold, direct and indirect. A direct cause is one that + moves by its own power, as the generator is the moving cause of heavy and light things. An indirect cause, is either one that + removes an impediment, or the removal itself of an impediment: and it is in this way that ignorance can be the cause of a + sinful act; because it is a privation of knowledge perfecting the reason that forbids the act + of sin, in so far as it directs human acts. + </p><p id="FS_Q76_A1-p7"> Now we must observe that the reason directs human acts in accordance with a twofold knowledge, universal and particular: + because in conferring about what is to be done, it employs a syllogism, the conclusion of which is an act of judgment, or + of choice, or an operation. Now actions are about singulars: wherefore the conclusion of a practical syllogism is a singular + proposition. But a singular proposition does not follow from a universal proposition, except through the medium of + a particular proposition: thus a man is restrained from an act of parricide, by the knowledge that it is wrong to kill one's + father, and that this man is his father. Hence ignorance about either of these two propositions, viz. of the universal principle + which is a rule of reason, or of the particular circumstance, could cause an act of parricide. Hence it is clear that not + every kind of ignorance is the cause of a sin, but that alone which removes the knowledge which would prevent the sinful + act. Consequently if a man's will be so disposed that he would not be restrained from the act of parricide, even though he + recognized his father, his ignorance about his father is not the cause of his committing the sin, but is concomitant with + the sin: wherefore such a man sins, not "through ignorance" but "in ignorance," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 1). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 1 co."><a name="36819" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36819] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, in VIII Physic., causa movens +est duplex, una per se, et alia per accidens. Per se quidem, quae +propria virtute movet, sicut generans est causa movens gravia et +levia. Per accidens autem, sicut removens prohibens, vel sicut ipsa +remotio prohibentis. Et hoc modo ignorantia potest esse causa actus +peccati, est enim privatio scientiae perficientis rationem, quae +prohibet actum peccati, inquantum dirigit actus humanos. +Considerandum est autem quod ratio secundum duplicem scientiam est +humanorum actuum directiva, scilicet secundum scientiam +universalem, et particularem. Conferens enim de agendis, utitur +quodam syllogismo, cuius conclusio est iudicium seu electio vel +operatio. Actiones autem in singularibus sunt. Unde conclusio +syllogismi operativi est singularis. Singularis autem propositio +non concluditur ex universali nisi mediante aliqua propositione +singulari, sicut homo prohibetur ab actu parricidii per hoc quod +scit patrem non esse occidendum, et per hoc quod scit hunc esse +patrem. Utriusque ergo ignorantia potest causare parricidii actum, +scilicet et universalis principii, quod est quaedam regula +rationis; et singularis circumstantiae. Unde patet quod non +quaelibet ignorantia peccantis est causa peccati, sed illa tantum +quae tollit scientiam prohibentem actum peccati. Unde si voluntas +alicuius esset sic disposita quod non prohiberetur ab actu +parricidii, etiam si patrem agnosceret; ignorantia patris non est +huic causa peccati, sed concomitanter se habet ad peccatum. Et ideo +talis non peccat propter ignorantiam, sed peccat ignorans, secundum +philosophum, in III Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Non-being cannot be the direct cause of anything: but it can be an accidental cause, as being the removal of an impediment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36820" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36820] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod non ens non potest esse alicuius causa per se, +potest tamen esse causa per accidens, sicut remotio +prohibentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As knowledge, which is removed by ignorance, regards sin as turning towards something, so too, ignorance of this respect + of a sin is the cause of that sin, as removing its impediment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36821" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36821] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod sicut scientia quam tollit ignorantia, respicit +peccatum ex parte conversionis; ita etiam ignorantia ex parte +conversionis est causa peccati ut removens prohibens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will cannot turn to that which is absolutely unknown: but if something be known in one respect, and unknown in another, + the will can will it. It is thus that ignorance is the cause of sin: for instance, when a man knows that what he is killing + is a man, but not that it is his own father; or when one knows that a certain act is pleasurable, but not that it is a sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36822" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36822] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in illud quod est quantum ad omnia ignotum, non +potest ferri voluntas, sed si aliquid est secundum aliquid notum et +secundum aliquid ignotum, potest voluntas illud velle. Et hoc modo +ignorantia est causa peccati, sicut cum aliquis scit hunc quem +occidit, esse hominem, sed nescit eum esse patrem; vel cum aliquis +scit aliquem actum esse delectabilem, nescit tamen eum esse +peccatum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q76_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q76_A2-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 2. Whether ignorance is a sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that ignorance is not a sin. For sin is "a word, deed or desire contrary to God's law," as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q71_A5" id="FS_Q76_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[5]</a>). Now ignorance does not denote an act, either internal or external. Therefore ignorance is not a sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36823" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36823] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ignorantia non sit peccatum. Peccatum +enim est dictum vel factum vel concupitum contra legem Dei, ut +supra habitum est. Sed ignorantia non importat aliquem actum, neque +interiorem neque exteriorem. Ergo ignorantia non est peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is more directly opposed to grace than to knowledge. Now privation of grace is not a sin, but a punishment resulting + from sin. Therefore ignorance which is privation of knowledge is not a sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36824" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36824] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum directius opponitur gratiae quam scientiae. Sed privatio +gratiae non est peccatum, sed magis poena quaedam consequens +peccatum. Ergo ignorantia, quae est privatio scientiae, non est +peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if ignorance is a sin, this can only be in so far as it is voluntary. But if ignorance is a sin, through being voluntary, + it seems that the sin will consist in the act itself of the will, rather than in the ignorance. Therefore the ignorance will + not be a sin, but rather a result of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36825" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36825] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +si ignorantia est peccatum, hoc non est nisi inquantum est +voluntaria. Sed si ignorantia sit peccatum inquantum est +voluntaria, videtur peccatum in ipso actu voluntatis consistere +magis quam in ignorantia. Ergo ignorantia non erit peccatum, sed +magis aliquid consequens ad peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, every sin is taken away by repentance, nor does any sin, except only original sin, pass as to guilt, yet remain + in act. Now ignorance is not removed by repentance, but remains in act, all its guilt being removed by repentance. Therefore + ignorance is not a sin, unless perchance it be original sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="36826" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36826] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +omne peccatum per poenitentiam tollitur; nec aliquod peccatum +transiens reatu remanet actu, nisi solum originale. Ignorantia +autem non tollitur per poenitentiam, sed adhuc remanet actu, omni +reatu per poenitentiam remoto. Ergo ignorantia non est peccatum, +nisi forte sit originale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if ignorance be a sin, then a man will be sinning, as long as he remains in ignorance. But ignorance is continual + in the one who is ignorant. Therefore a person in ignorance would be continually sinning, which is clearly false, else ignorance + would be a most grievous sin. Therefore ignorance is not a sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 arg. 5"><a name="36827" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36827] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +si ipsa ignorantia sit peccatum, quandiu ignorantia remaneret in +homine, tandiu actu peccaret. Sed continue manet ignorantia in +ignorante. Ergo ignorans continue peccaret. Quod patet esse falsum, +quia sic ignorantia esset gravissimum. Non ergo ignorantia est +peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Nothing but sin deserves punishment. But ignorance deserves punishment, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q76_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.38" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:38</a>: "If any man know not, he shall not be known." Therefore ignorance is a sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36828" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36828] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +nihil meretur poenam nisi peccatum. Sed ignorantia meretur poenam, +secundum illud I ad Cor. XIV, <i>si quis ignorat, ignorabitur</i>. +Ergo ignorantia est peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Ignorance differs from nescience, in that nescience denotes mere absence of knowledge; wherefore whoever lacks knowledge + about anything, can be said to be nescient about it: in which sense Dionysius puts nescience in the angels (Coel. Hier. vii). + On the other hand, ignorance denotes privation of knowledge, i.e. lack of knowledge of those things that one has a natural + aptitude to know. Some of these we are under an obligation to know, those, to wit, without + the knowledge of which we are unable to accomplish a due act rightly. Wherefore all are bound in common to know the articles + of faith, and the universal principles of right, and each individual is bound to know matters regarding his duty or state. + Meanwhile there are other things which a man may have a natural aptitude to know, yet he is not bound to know them, such as + the geometrical theorems, and contingent particulars, except in some individual case. Now it is evident that whoever neglects + to have or do what he ought to have or do, commits a sin of omission. Wherefore through negligence, ignorance of what one + is bound to know, is a sin; whereas it is not imputed as a sin to man, if he fails to know what he is unable to know. Consequently + ignorance of such like things is called "invincible," because it cannot be overcome by study. For this reason such like ignorance, + not being voluntary, since it is not in our power to be rid of it, is not a sin: wherefore it is evident that no + invincible ignorance is a sin. On the other hand, vincible ignorance is a sin, if it be about matters one is bound to know; + but not, if it be about things one is not bound to know. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 co."><a name="36829" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36829] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod ignorantia in hoc a nescientia differt, quod +nescientia dicit simplicem scientiae negationem, unde cuicumque +deest aliquarum rerum scientia, potest dici nescire illas; secundum +quem modum Dionysius in Angelis nescientiam ponit, VII cap. Cael. +Hier. Ignorantia vero importat scientiae privationem, dum scilicet +alicui deest scientia eorum quae aptus natus est scire. Horum autem +quaedam aliquis scire tenetur, illa scilicet sine quorum scientia +non potest debitum actum recte exercere. Unde omnes tenentur scire +communiter ea quae sunt fidei, et universalia iuris praecepta, +singuli autem ea quae ad eorum statum vel officium spectant. +Quaedam vero sunt quae etsi aliquis natus est scire, non tamen ea +scire tenetur, sicut theoremata geometriae, et contingentia +particularia, nisi in casu. Manifestum est autem quod quicumque +negligit habere vel facere id quod tenetur habere vel facere, +peccat peccato omissionis. Unde propter negligentiam, ignorantia +eorum quae aliquis scire tenetur, est peccatum. Non autem imputatur +homini ad negligentiam, si nesciat ea quae scire non potest. Unde +horum ignorantia invincibilis dicitur, quia scilicet studio +superari non potest. Et propter hoc talis ignorantia, cum non sit +voluntaria, eo quod non est in potestate nostra eam repellere, non +est peccatum. Ex quo patet quod nulla ignorantia invincibilis est +peccatum, ignorantia autem vincibilis est peccatum, si sit eorum +quae aliquis scire tenetur; non autem si sit eorum quae quis scire +non tenetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q71_A6" id="FS_Q76_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[6]</a>, ad 1), when we say that sin is a "word, deed or desire," we include the opposite negations, by reason of which omissions + have the character of sin; so that negligence, in as much as ignorance is a sin, is comprised in the above definition of sin; + in so far as one omits to say what one ought, or to do what one ought, or to desire what one ought, in order to acquire the + knowledge which we ought to + have. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36830" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36830] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in hoc quod dicitur +dictum vel factum vel concupitum, sunt intelligendae etiam +negationes oppositae, secundum quod omissio habet rationem peccati. +Et ita negligentia, secundum quam ignorantia est peccatum, +continetur sub praedicta definitione peccati, inquantum +praetermittitur aliquid quod debuit dici vel fieri vel concupisci, +ad scientiam debitam acquirendam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although privation of grace is not a sin in itself, yet by reason of negligence in preparing oneself for grace, it may have + the character of sin, even as ignorance; nevertheless even here there is a difference, since man can acquire knowledge by + his acts, whereas grace is not acquired by acts, but by God's favor. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36831" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36831] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod privatio gratiae, etsi secundum se non sit peccatum, +tamen ratione negligentiae praeparandi se ad gratiam, potest habere +rationem peccati, sicut et ignorantia. Et tamen quantum ad hoc est +dissimile, quia homo potest aliquam scientiam acquirere per suos +actus, gratia vero non acquiritur ex nostris actibus, sed ex Dei +munere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as in a sin of transgression, the sin consists not only in the act of the will, but also in the act willed, which is + commanded by the will; so in a sin of omission not only the act of the will is a sin, but also the omission, in so far as + it is in some way voluntary; and accordingly, the neglect to know, or even lack of consideration is a sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36832" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36832] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut in peccato transgressionis peccatum non +consistit in solo actu voluntatis, sed etiam in actu volito qui est +imperatus a voluntate; ita in peccato omissionis non solum actus +voluntatis est peccatum, sed etiam ipsa omissio, inquantum est +aliqualiter voluntaria. Et hoc modo ipsa negligentia sciendi, vel +inconsideratio, est peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although when the guilt has passed away through repentance, the ignorance remains, according as it is a privation of knowledge, + nevertheless the negligence does not remain, by reason of which the ignorance is said to be a sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="36833" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36833] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod licet, transeunte reatu per poenitentiam, remaneat +ignorantia secundum quod est privatio scientiae; non tamen remanet +negligentia, secundum quam ignorantia peccatum dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Just as in other sins of omission, man sins actually only at the time at which the affirmative precept is binding, so is + it with the sin of ignorance. For the ignorant man sins actually indeed, not continually, but only at the time for acquiring + the knowledge that he ought to have. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 ad 5"><a name="36834" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36834] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod, sicut in aliis peccatis omissionis solo illo tempore +homo actu peccat, pro quo praeceptum affirmativum obligat; ita est +etiam de peccato ignorantiae. Non enim continuo ignorans actu +peccat, sed solum quando est tempus acquirendi scientiam quam +habere tenetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q76_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q76_A3-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 3. Whether ignorance excuses from sin altogether?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that ignorance excuses from sin altogether. For as Augustine says (Retract. i, 9), every sin is voluntary. + Now ignorance causes involuntariness, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q6_A8" id="FS_Q76_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[6], A[8]</a>). Therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36835" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36835] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ignorantia, ex toto excuset a peccato. +Quia, ut Augustinus dicit, omne peccatum voluntarium est. Sed +ignorantia causat involuntarium ut supra habitum est. Ergo +ignorantia totaliter excusat peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is done beside the intention, is done accidentally. Now the intention cannot be about what is unknown. + Therefore what a man does through ignorance is accidental in human acts. But what is accidental does not give the species. + Therefore nothing that is done through ignorance in human acts, should be deemed sinful or virtuous. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36836" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36836] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +id quod aliquis facit praeter intentionem, per accidens agit. Sed +intentio non potest esse de eo quod est ignotum. Ergo id quod per +ignorantiam homo agit, per accidens se habet in actibus humanis. +Sed quod est per accidens, non dat speciem. Nihil ergo quod est per +ignorantiam factum, debet iudicari peccatum vel virtuosum in +humanis actibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man is the subject of virtue and sin, inasmuch as he is partaker of reason. Now ignorance excludes knowledge which + perfects the reason. Therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36837" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36837] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +homo est subiectum virtutis et peccati inquantum est particeps +rationis. Sed ignorantia excludit scientiam, per quam ratio +perficitur. Ergo ignorantia totaliter excusat a peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) that "some things done through ignorance are rightly reproved." Now those things alone + are rightly reproved which are sins. Therefore some things done through ignorance are sins. Therefore ignorance does not altogether + excuse from sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36838" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36838] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Lib. Arb., quod <i>quaedam +per ignorantiam facta, recte improbantur</i>. Sed solum illa recte +improbantur quae sunt peccata. Ergo quaedam per ignorantiam facta, +sunt peccata. Non ergo ignorantia omnino excusat a peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q76_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Ignorance, by its very nature, renders the act which it causes involuntary. Now it has already been stated ( + <a href="#FS_Q76_A1" id="FS_Q76_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2) that ignorance is said to cause the act which the contrary knowledge would have prevented; so that this act, if knowledge + were to hand, would be contrary to the will, which is the meaning of the word involuntary. If, however, the knowledge, which + is removed by ignorance, would not have prevented the act, on account of + the inclination of the will thereto, the lack of this knowledge does not make that man unwilling, but not willing, as stated + in Ethic. iii, 1: and such like ignorance which is not the cause of the sinful act, as already stated, since it does not make + the act to be involuntary, does not excuse from sin. The same applies to any ignorance that does not cause, but follows or + accompanies the sinful act. + </p><p id="FS_Q76_A3-p7"> On the other hand, ignorance which is the cause of the act, since it makes it to be involuntary, of its very nature excuses + from sin, because voluntariness is essential to sin. But it may fail to excuse altogether from sin, and this for two reasons. + First, on the part of the thing itself which is not known. For ignorance excuses from sin, in so far as something is not known + to be a sin. Now it may happen that a person ignores some circumstance of a sin, the knowledge of which + circumstance would prevent him from sinning, whether it belong to the substance of the sin, or not; and nevertheless his knowledge + is sufficient for him to be aware that the act is sinful; for instance, if a man strike someone, knowing that it is a man + (which suffices for it to be sinful) and yet be ignorant of the fact that it is his father, (which is a circumstance constituting + another species of sin); or, suppose that he is unaware that this man will defend himself and strike him back, and + that if he had known this, he would not have struck him (which does not affect the sinfulness of the act). Wherefore, though + this man sins through ignorance, yet he is not altogether excused, because, not withstanding, he has knowledge of the sin. + Secondly, this may happen on the part of the ignorance itself, because, to wit, this ignorance is voluntary, either directly, + as when a man wishes of set purpose to be ignorant of certain things that he may sin the more freely; or indirectly, as when + a man, through stress of work or other occupations, neglects to acquire the knowledge which would restrain him from sin. For + such like negligence renders the ignorance itself voluntary and sinful, provided it be about matters one is bound and able + to know. Consequently this ignorance does not altogether excuse from sin. If, however, the ignorance be such as to be entirely + involuntary, either through being invincible, or through being of matters one is not bound to know, then such like ignorance + excuses from sin altogether. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 3 co."><a name="36839" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36839] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod ignorantia de se habet quod faciat actum quem causat, +involuntarium esse. Iam autem dictum est quod ignorantia dicitur +causare actum quem scientia opposita prohibebat. Et ita talis +actus, si scientia adesset, esset contrarius voluntati, quod +importat nomen involuntarii. Si vero scientia quae per ignorantiam +privatur, non prohiberet actum, propter inclinationem voluntatis in +ipsum; ignorantia huius scientiae non facit hominem involuntarium, +sed non volentem, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Et talis ignorantia, +quae non est causa actus peccati, ut dictum est, quia non causat +involuntarium, non excusat a peccato. Et eadem ratio est de +quacumque ignorantia non causante, sed consequente vel concomitante +actum peccati. Sed ignorantia quae est causa actus, quia causat +involuntarium, de se habet quod excuset a peccato, eo quod +voluntarium est de ratione peccati. Sed quod aliquando non +totaliter excuset a peccato, potest contingere ex duobus. Uno modo, +ex parte ipsius rei ignoratae. Intantum enim ignorantia excusat a +peccato, inquantum ignoratur aliquid esse peccatum. Potest autem +contingere quod aliquis ignoret quidem aliquam circumstantiam +peccati, quam si sciret, retraheretur a peccando, sive illa +circumstantia faciat ad rationem peccati sive non; et tamen adhuc +remanet in eius scientia aliquid per quod cognoscit illud esse +actum peccati. Puta si aliquis percutiens aliquem, sciat quidem +ipsum esse hominem, quod sufficit ad rationem peccati; non tamen +scit eum esse patrem, quod est circumstantia constituens novam +speciem peccati; vel forte nescit quod ille se defendens +repercutiat eum, quod si sciret, non percuteret, quod non pertinet +ad rationem peccati. Unde licet talis propter ignorantiam peccet, +non tamen totaliter excusatur a peccato, quia adhuc remanet ei +cognitio peccati. Alio modo potest hoc contingere ex parte ipsius +ignorantiae, quia scilicet ipsa ignorantia est voluntaria, vel +directe, sicut cum aliquis studiose vult nescire aliqua, ut +liberius peccet; vel indirecte, sicut cum aliquis propter laborem, +vel propter alias occupationes, negligit addiscere id per quod a +peccato retraheretur. Talis enim negligentia facit ignorantiam +ipsam esse voluntariam et peccatum, dummodo sit eorum quae quis +scire tenetur et potest. Et ideo talis ignorantia non totaliter +excusat a peccato. Si vero sit talis ignorantia quae omnino sit +involuntaria, sive quia est invincibilis, sive quia est eius quod +quis scire non tenetur; talis ignorantia omnino excusat a +peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every ignorance causes involuntariness, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q6_A8" id="FS_Q76_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[6], A[8]</a>). Hence not every ignorance excuses from sin altogether. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36840" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36840] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod non omnis ignorantia causat involuntarium, sicut +supra dictum est. Unde non omnis ignorantia totaliter excusat a +peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> So far as voluntariness remains in the ignorant person, the intention of sin remains in him: so that, in this respect, his + sin is not accidental. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36841" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36841] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod inquantum remanet in ignorante de voluntario, +intantum remanet de intentione peccati. Et secundum hoc, non erit +per accidens peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the ignorance be such as to exclude the use of reason entirely, it excuses from sin altogether, as is the case with madmen + and imbeciles: but such is not always the ignorance that causes the sin; and so it does not always excuse from sin altogether. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36842" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36842] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, si esset talis ignorantia quae totaliter usum +rationis excluderet, omnino a peccato excusaret, sicut patet in +furiosis et amentibus. Non autem semper ignorantia causans peccatum +est talis. Et ideo non semper totaliter excusat a peccato.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q76_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q76_A4-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 4. Whether ignorance diminishes a sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that ignorance does not diminish a sin. For that which is common to all sins does not diminish sin. Now ignorance + is common to all sins, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that "every evil man is ignorant." Therefore ignorance does + not diminish sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36843" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36843] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ignorantia non diminuat peccatum. +Illud enim quod est commune in omni peccato, non diminuit peccatum. +Sed ignorantia est communis in omni peccato, dicit enim +philosophus, in III Ethic., quod omnis malus est ignorans. Ergo +ignorantia non diminuit peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one sin added to another makes a greater sin. But ignorance is itself a sin, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q76_A2" id="FS_Q76_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore it does not diminish a sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36844" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36844] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum additum peccato facit maius peccatum. Sed ipsa ignorantia +est peccatum, ut dictum est. Ergo non diminuit peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same thing does not both aggravate and diminish sin. Now ignorance aggravates sin; for Ambrose commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q76_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.4" target="asv"> Rom. 2:4, </a> "Knowest thou not that the benignity of God leadeth thee to penance?" says: "Thy sin is most grievous if thou knowest not." + Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36845" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36845] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +non est eiusdem aggravare et diminuere peccatum. Sed ignorantia +aggravat peccatum, quoniam super illud apostoli, <i>ignoras quoniam +benignitas Dei,</i> etc., dicit Ambrosius, <i>gravissime peccas, si +ignoras</i>. Ergo ignorantia non diminuit peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if any kind of ignorance diminishes a sin, this would seem to be chiefly the case as regards the ignorance which + removes the use of reason altogether. Now this kind of ignorance does not diminish sin, but increases it: for the Philosopher + says (Ethic. iii, 5) that the "punishment is doubled for a drunken man." Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="36846" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36846] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +si aliqua ignorantia diminuit peccatum, hoc maxime videtur de illa +quae totaliter tollit usum rationis. Sed huiusmodi ignorantia non +minuit peccatum, sed magis auget, dicit enim philosophus, in III +Ethic., quod <i>ebrius meretur duplices maledictiones</i>. Ergo +ignorantia non minuit peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is a reason for sin to be forgiven, diminishes sin. Now such is ignorance, as is clear from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q76_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.13" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:13</a>: "I obtained . . . mercy . . . because I did it ignorantly." Therefore ignorance diminishes or alleviates sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36847" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36847] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +quidquid est ratio remissionis peccati, alleviat peccatum. Sed +ignorantia est huiusmodi, ut patet I ad Tim. I, <i>misericordiam +consecutus sum, quia ignorans feci</i>. Ergo ignorantia diminuit, +vel alleviat peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q76_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since every sin is voluntary, ignorance can diminish sin, in so far as it diminishes its voluntariness; and if it does not + render it less voluntary, it nowise alleviates the sin. Now it is evident that the ignorance which excuses from sin altogether + (through making it altogether involuntary) does not diminish a sin, but does away with it altogether. On the other hand, ignorance + which is not the cause of the sin being committed, but is concomitant with it, + neither diminishes nor increases the sin. + </p><p id="FS_Q76_A4-p8"> Therefore sin cannot be alleviated by any ignorance, but only by such as is a cause of the sin being committed, and yet does + not excuse from the sin altogether. Now it happens sometimes that such like ignorance is directly and essentially voluntary, + as when a man is purposely ignorant that he may sin more freely, and ignorance of this kind seems rather to make the act more + voluntary and more sinful, since it is through the will's intention to sin that he is willing to bear the + hurt of ignorance, for the sake of freedom in sinning. Sometimes, however, the ignorance which is the cause of a sin being + committed, is not directly voluntary, but indirectly or accidentally, as when a man is unwilling to work hard at his studies, + the result being that he is ignorant, or as when a man willfully drinks too much wine, the result being that he becomes drunk + and indiscreet, and this ignorance diminishes voluntariness and consequently alleviates the sin. For when a thing is not + known to be a sin, the will cannot be said to consent to the sin directly, but only accidentally; wherefore, in that case + there is less contempt, and therefore less sin. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 co."><a name="36848" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36848] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, quia omne peccatum est voluntarium, intantum +ignorantia potest diminuere peccatum, inquantum diminuit +voluntarium, si autem voluntarium non diminuat, nullo modo diminuet +peccatum. Manifestum est autem quod ignorantia quae totaliter a +peccato excusat, quia totaliter voluntarium tollit, peccatum non +minuit, sed omnino aufert. Ignorantia vero quae non est causa +peccati, sed concomitanter se habet ad peccatum, nec minuit +peccatum nec auget. Illa igitur sola ignorantia potest peccatum +minuere, quae est causa peccati, et tamen totaliter a peccato non +excusat. Contingit autem quandoque quod talis ignorantia directe et +per se est voluntaria, sicut cum aliquis sua sponte nescit aliquid, +ut liberius peccet. Et talis ignorantia videtur augere voluntarium +et peccatum, ex intensione enim voluntatis ad peccandum provenit +quod aliquis vult subire ignorantiae damnum, propter libertatem +peccandi. Quandoque vero ignorantia quae est causa peccati, non est +directe voluntaria, sed indirecte vel per accidens, puta cum +aliquis non vult laborare in studio, ex quo sequitur eum esse +ignorantem; vel cum aliquis vult bibere vinum immoderate, ex quo +sequitur eum inebriari et discretione carere. Et talis ignorantia +diminuit voluntarium, et per consequens peccatum. Cum enim aliquid +non cognoscitur esse peccatum, non potest dici quod voluntas +directe et per se feratur in peccatum, sed per accidens, unde est +ibi minor contemptus, et per consequens minus peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The ignorance whereby "every evil man is ignorant," is not the cause of sin being committed, but something resulting from + that cause, viz. of the passion or habit inclining to sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36849" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36849] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ignorantia secundum quam omnis malus est +ignorans, non est causa peccati; sed aliquid consequens ad causam, +scilicet ad passionem vel habitum inclinantem in peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One sin is added to another makes more sins, but it does not always make a sin greater, since, perchance, the two sins do + not coincide, but are separate. It may happen, if the first diminishes the second, that the two together have not the same + gravity as one of them alone would have; thus murder is a more grievous sin if committed by a man when sober, than if committed + by a man when drunk, although in the latter case there are two sins: because + drunkenness diminishes the sinfulness of the resulting sin more than its own gravity implies. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36850" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36850] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod peccatum peccato additum facit plura peccata, non +tamen facit semper maius peccatum, quia forte non coincidunt in +idem peccatum, sed sunt plura. Et potest contingere, si primum +diminuat secundum, quod ambo simul non habeant tantam gravitatem +quantam unum solum haberet. Sicut homicidium gravius peccatum est a +sobrio homine factum, quam si fiat ab ebrio, quamvis haec sint duo +peccata, quia ebrietas plus diminuit de ratione sequentis peccati, +quam sit sua gravitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The words of Ambrose may be understood as referring to simply affected ignorance; or they may have reference to a species + of the sin of ingratitude, the highest degree of which is that man even ignores the benefits he has received; or again, they + may be an allusion to the ignorance of unbelief, which undermines the foundation of the spiritual edifice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36851" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36851] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod verbum Ambrosii potest intelligi de ignorantia +simpliciter affectata. Vel potest intelligi in genere peccati +ingratitudinis, in qua summus gradus est quod homo etiam beneficia +non recognoscat. Vel potest intelligi de ignorantia infidelitatis, +quae fundamentum spiritualis aedificii subvertit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The drunken man deserves a "double punishment" for the two sins which he commits, viz. drunkenness, and the sin which results + from his drunkenness: and yet drunkenness, on account of the ignorance connected therewith, diminishes the resulting sin, + and more, perhaps, than the gravity of the drunkenness implies, as stated above (ad 2). It might also be said that the words + quoted refer to an ordinance of the legislator named Pittacus, who ordered + drunkards to be more severely punished if they assaulted anyone; having an eye, not to the indulgence which the drunkard might + claim, but to expediency, since more harm is done by the drunk than by the sober, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="36852" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36852] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod ebrius meretur quidem duplices maledictiones, propter +duo peccata quae committit, scilicet ebrietatem et aliud peccatum +quod ex ebrietate sequitur. Tamen ebrietas, ratione ignorantiae +adiunctae, diminuit sequens peccatum, et forte plus quam sit +gravitas ipsius ebrietatis, ut dictum est. Vel potest dici quod +illud verbum inducitur secundum ordinationem cuiusdam Pittaci +legislatoris, qui statuit <i>ebrios, si percusserint, amplius +puniendos; non ad veniam respiciens, quam ebrii debent magis +habere; sed ad utilitatem, quia plures iniuriantur ebrii quam +sobrii</i>; ut patet per philosophum, in II politicorum.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q77" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q77-p0.1">Q. 77. OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF THE SENSITIVE APPETITE (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q77-p2"> We must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of the sensitive appetite, as to whether a passion of the soul may be + a cause of sin: and under this head there are eight points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FS_Q77-p3"><a href="#FS_Q77_A1"> (1) Whether a passion of the sensitive appetite can move or incline the will?</a></p><p id="FS_Q77-p4"><a href="#FS_Q77_A2"> (2) Whether it can overcome the reason against the latter's knowledge?</a></p><p id="FS_Q77-p5"><a href="#FS_Q77_A3"> (3) Whether a sin resulting from a passion is a sin of weakness?</a></p><p id="FS_Q77-p6"><a href="#FS_Q77_A4"> (4) Whether the passion of self-love is the cause of every sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q77-p7"><a href="#FS_Q77_A5"> (5) Of three causes mentioned in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:16</a>: "Concupiscence of the eyes, Concupiscence of the flesh," and "Pride of life." + </a></p><p id="FS_Q77-p8"><a href="#FS_Q77_A6"> (6) Whether the passion which causes a sin diminishes it?</a></p><p id="FS_Q77-p9"><a href="#FS_Q77_A7"> (7) Whether passion excuses from sin altogether?</a></p><p id="FS_Q77-p10"><a href="#FS_Q77_A8"> (8) Whether a sin committed through passion can be mortal?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 pr."><a name="36853" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36853] +Iª-IIae q. 77 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causa +peccati ex parte appetitus sensitivi, utrum passio animae sit causa +peccati. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum passio +appetitus sensitivi possit movere vel inclinare voluntatem. +Secundo, utrum possit superare rationem contra eius scientiam. +Tertio, utrum peccatum quod ex passione provenit, sit peccatum ex +infirmitate. Quarto, utrum haec passio quae est amor sui, sit causa +omnis peccati. Quinto, de illis tribus causis quae ponuntur I Ioan. +II, <i>concupiscentia oculorum, concupiscentia carnis, et superbia +vitae</i>. Sexto, utrum passio quae est causa peccati, diminuat +ipsum. Septimo, utrum totaliter excuset. Octavo, utrum peccatum +quod ex passione est, possit esse mortale.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q77_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q77_A1-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 1. Whether the will is moved by a passion of the senstive appetite?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is not moved by a passion of the sensitive appetite. For no passive power is moved except by + its object. Now the will is a power both passive and active, inasmuch as it is mover and moved, as the Philosopher says of + the appetitive power in general (De Anima iii, text. 54). Since therefore the object of the will is not a passion of the sensitive + appetite, but good defined by the reason, it seems that a passion of the sensitive + appetite does not move the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36854" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36854] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non moveatur a passione +appetitus sensitivi. Nulla enim potentia passiva movetur nisi a suo +obiecto. Voluntas autem est potentia passiva et activa simul, +inquantum est movens et mota, sicut in III de anima philosophus +dicit universaliter de vi appetitiva. Cum ergo obiectum voluntatis +non sit passio appetitus sensitivi, sed magis bonum rationis; +videtur quod passio appetitus sensitivi non moveat voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the higher mover is not moved by the lower; thus the soul is not moved by the body. Now the will, which is the rational + appetite, is compared to the sensitive appetite, as a higher mover to a lower: for the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. + 57) that "the rational appetite moves the sensitive appetite, even as, in the heavenly bodies, one sphere moves another." + Therefore the will cannot be moved by a passion of the sensitive appetite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36855" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36855] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +superior motor non movetur ab inferiori, sicut anima non movetur a +corpore. Sed voluntas, quae est appetitus rationis, comparatur ad +appetitum sensitivum sicut motor superior ad inferiorem, dicit enim +philosophus, in III de anima, quod <i>appetitus rationis movet +appetitum sensitivum, sicut in corporibus caelestibus sphaera movet +sphaeram</i>. Ergo voluntas non potest moveri a passione appetitus +sensitivi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing immaterial can be moved by that which is material. Now the will is an immaterial power, because it does + not use a corporeal organ, since it is in the reason, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 42: whereas the sensitive appetite + is a material force, since it is seated in an organ of the body. Therefore a passion of the sensitive appetite cannot move + the intellective appetite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36856" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36856] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +nullum immateriale potest moveri ab aliquo materiali. Sed voluntas +est quaedam potentia immaterialis, non enim utitur organo +corporali, cum sit in ratione, ut dicitur in III de anima. +Appetitus autem sensitivus est vis materialis, utpote fundata in +organo corporali. Ergo passio appetitus sensitivi non potest movere +appetitum intellectivum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.13.56" target="asv">Dan. 13:56</a>): "Lust hath perverted thy heart." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36857" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36857] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Dan. XIII, <i>concupiscentia subvertit cor +tuum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q77_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A passion of the sensitive appetite cannot draw or move the will directly; but it can do so indirectly, and this in two ways. + First, by a kind of distraction: because, since all the soul's powers are rooted in the one essence of the soul, it follows + of necessity that, when one power is intent in its act, another power becomes remiss, or is even altogether impeded, in its + act, both because all energy is weakened through being divided, so that, on the + contrary, through being centered on one thing, it is less able to be directed to several; and because, in the operations of + the soul, a certain attention is requisite, and if this be closely fixed on one thing, less attention is given to another. + In this way, by a kind of distraction, when the movement of the sensitive appetite is enforced in respect of any passion whatever, + the proper movement of the rational appetite or will must, of necessity, become remiss or altogether impeded. + </p><p id="FS_Q77_A1-p7"> Secondly, this may happen on the part of the will's object, which is good apprehended by reason. Because the judgment and + apprehension of reason is impeded on account of a vehement and inordinate apprehension of the imagination and judgment of + the estimative power, as appears in those who are out of their mind. Now it is evident that the apprehension of the imagination + and the judgment of the estimative power follow the passion of the sensitive appetite, even as the verdict of + the taste follows the disposition of the tongue: for which reason we observe that those who are in some kind of passion, do + not easily turn their imagination away from the object of their emotion, the result being that the judgment of the reason + often follows the passion of the sensitive appetite, and consequently the will's movement follows it also, since it has a + natural inclination always to follow the judgment of the reason. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 1 co."><a name="36858" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36858] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod passio appetitus sensitivi non potest directe trahere +aut movere voluntatem, sed indirecte potest. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno +quidem modo, secundum quandam abstractionem. Cum enim omnes +potentiae animae in una essentia animae radicentur, necesse est +quod quando una potentia intenditur in suo actu, altera in suo actu +remittatur, vel etiam totaliter impediatur. Tum quia omnis virtus +ad plura dispersa fit minor, unde e contrario, quando intenditur +circa unum, minus potest ad alia dispergi. Tum quia in operibus +animae requiritur quaedam intentio, quae dum vehementer applicatur +ad unum, non potest alteri vehementer attendere. Et secundum hunc +modum, per quandam distractionem, quando motus appetitus sensitivi +fortificatur secundum quamcumque passionem, necesse est quod +remittatur, vel totaliter impediatur motus proprius appetitus +rationalis, qui est voluntas. Alio modo, ex parte obiecti +voluntatis, quod est bonum ratione apprehensum. Impeditur enim +iudicium et apprehensio rationis propter vehementem et inordinatam +apprehensionem imaginationis, et iudicium virtutis aestimativae, ut +patet in amentibus. Manifestum est autem quod passionem appetitus +sensitivi sequitur imaginationis apprehensio, et iudicium +aestimativae, sicut etiam dispositionem linguae sequitur iudicium +gustus. Unde videmus quod homines in aliqua passione existentes, +non facile imaginationem avertunt ab his circa quae afficiuntur. +Unde per consequens iudicium rationis plerumque sequitur passionem +appetitus sensitivi; et per consequens motus voluntatis, qui natus +est sequi iudicium rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the passion of the sensitive appetite is not the direct object of the will, yet it occasions a certain change in + the judgment about the object of the will, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36859" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36859] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod per passionem appetitus sensitivi fit aliqua +immutatio circa iudicium de obiecto voluntatis, sicut dictum est; +quamvis ipsa passio appetitus sensitivi non sit directe voluntatis +obiectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The higher mover is not directly moved by the lower; but, in a manner, it can be moved by it indirectly, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36860" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36860] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod superius non movetur ab inferiori directe, sed +indirecte quodammodo moveri potest, sicut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A1-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Third Objection is solved in like manner.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36861" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36861] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Et similiter +dicendum est ad tertium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q77_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q77_A2-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 2. Whether the reason can be overcome by a passion, against its knowledge?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the reason cannot be overcome by a passion, against its knowledge. For the stronger is not overcome by + the weaker. Now knowledge, on account of its certitude, is the strongest thing in us. Therefore it cannot be overcome by a + passion, which is weak and soon passes away. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36862" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36862] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ratio non possit superari a passione +contra suam scientiam. Fortius enim non vincitur a debiliori. Sed +scientia, propter suam certitudinem, est fortissimum eorum quae in +nobis sunt. Ergo non potest superari a passione, quae est debilis +et cito transiens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the will is not directed save to the good or the apparent good. Now when a passion draws the will to that which + is really good, it does not influence the reason against its knowledge; and when it draws it to that which is good apparently, + but not really, it draws it to that which appears good to the reason. But what appears to the reason is in the knowledge of + the reason. Therefore a passion never influences the reason against its knowledge. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36863" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36863] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +voluntas non est nisi boni vel apparentis boni. Sed cum passio +trahit voluntatem in id quod est vere bonum, non inclinat rationem +contra scientiam. Cum autem trahit eam in id quod est apparens +bonum et non existens, trahit eam in id quod rationi videtur, hoc +autem est in scientia rationis, quod ei videtur. Ergo passio +nunquam inclinat rationem contra suam scientiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it be said that it draws the reason from its knowledge of something in general, to form a contrary judgment about + a particular matter---on the contrary, if a universal and a particular proposition be opposed, they are opposed by contradiction, + e.g. "Every man," and "Not every man." Now if two opinions contradict one another, they are contrary to one another, as stated + in Peri Herm. ii. If therefore anyone, while knowing something in general, were + to pronounce an opposite judgment in a particular case, he would have two contrary opinions at the same time, which is impossible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36864" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36864] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Si dicatur +quod trahit rationem scientem aliquid in universali, ut contrarium +iudicet in particulari, contra, universalis et particularis +propositio, si opponantur, opponuntur secundum contradictionem, +sicut omnis homo et non omnis homo. Sed duae opiniones quae sunt +contradictoriarum, sunt contrariae, ut dicitur in II peri Herm. Si +igitur aliquis sciens aliquid in universali, iudicaret oppositum in +singulari, sequeretur quod haberet simul contrarias opiniones, quod +est impossibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whoever knows the universal, knows also the particular which he knows to be contained in the universal: thus who + knows that every mule is sterile, knows that this particular animal is sterile, provided he knows it to be a mule, as is clear + from Poster. i, text. 2. Now he who knows something in general, e.g. that "no fornication is lawful," knows this general proposition + to contain, for example, the particular proposition, "This is an act of + fornication." Therefore it seems that his knowledge extends to the particular. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="36865" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36865] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +quicumque scit universale, scit etiam particulare quod novit sub +universali contineri; sicut quicumque scit omnem mulam esse +sterilem, scit hoc animal esse sterile, dummodo sciat quod sit +mula; ut patet per id quod dicitur in I Poster. Sed ille qui scit +aliquid in universali, puta nullam fornicationem esse faciendam, +scit hoc particulare sub universali contineri, puta hunc actum esse +fornicarium. Ergo videtur quod etiam in particulari sciat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q77_A2-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), "words express the thoughts of the mind." Now it often happens that + man, while in a state of passion, confesses that what he has chosen is an evil, even in that particular case. Therefore he + has knowledge, even in particular. + </p><p id="FS_Q77_A2-p7"> Therefore it seems that the passions cannot draw the reason against its universal knowledge; because it is impossible for + it to have universal knowledge together with an opposite particular judgment. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 arg. 5"><a name="36866" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36866] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +ea quae sunt in voce, sunt signa intellectus animae, secundum +philosophum. Sed homo in passione existens frequenter confitetur id +quod eligit esse malum etiam in particulari. Ergo etiam in +particulari habet scientiam. Sic igitur videtur quod passiones non +possint trahere rationem contra scientiam universalem, quia non +potest esse quod habeat scientiam universalem, et existimet +oppositum in particulari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.23" target="asv">Rom. 7:23</a>): "I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin." Now the law + that is in the members is concupiscence, of which he had been speaking previously. Since then concupiscence is a passion, + it seems that a passion draws the reason counter to its knowledge. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36867" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36867] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicit apostolus, Rom. VII, <i>video aliam legem in membris +meis repugnantem legi mentis meae, et captivantem me in lege +peccati</i>. Lex autem quae est in membris, est concupiscentia, de +qua supra locutus fuerat. Cum igitur concupiscentia sit passio +quaedam, videtur quod passio trahat rationem etiam contra hoc quod +scit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q77_A2-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 2), the opinion of Socrates was that knowledge can never be overcome by passion; wherefore + he held every virtue to be a kind of knowledge, and every sin a kind of ignorance. In this he was somewhat right, because, + since the object of the will is a good or an apparent good, it is never moved to an evil, unless that which is not good appear + good in some respect to the reason; so that the will would never tend to evil, + unless there were ignorance or error in the reason. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.14.22" target="asv">Prov. 14:22</a>): "They err that work evil." + </p><p id="FS_Q77_A2-p10"> Experience, however, shows that many act contrary to the knowledge that they have, and this is confirmed by Divine authority, + according to the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.47" target="asv"> Lk. 12:47</a>: "The servant who knew that the will of his lord . . . and did not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes," and of + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A2-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.17" target="asv"> James 4:17</a>: "To him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin." Consequently he was not altogether right, and + it is necessary, with the + Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 3) to make a distinction. Because, since man is directed to right action by a twofold knowledge, + viz. universal and particular, a defect in either of them suffices to hinder the rectitude of the will and of the deed, as + stated above (Q[76], A[1]). It may happen, then, that a man has some knowledge in general, e.g. that no fornication is lawful, + and yet he does not know in particular that this act, which is fornication, must not be done; and this suffices for the will + not to follow the universal knowledge of the reason. Again, it must be observed that nothing prevents a thing which is known + habitually from not being considered actually: so that it is possible for a man to have correct knowledge not only in general + but also in particular, and yet not to consider his knowledge actually: and in such a case it does not seem difficult for + a man to act counter to what he does not actually consider. Now, that a man sometimes fails to consider in particular what + he + knows habitually, may happen through mere lack of attention: for instance, a man who knows geometry, may not attend to the + consideration of geometrical conclusions, which he is ready to consider at any moment. Sometimes man fails to consider actually + what he knows habitually, on account of some hindrance supervening, e.g. some external occupation, or some bodily infirmity; + and, in this way, a man who is in a state of passion, fails to consider in particular what he knows in general, in so far + as the passions hinder him from considering it. Now it hinders him in three ways. First, by way of distraction, as explained + above + <a href="#FS_Q77_A1" id="FS_Q77_A2-p10.3" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Secondly, by way of opposition, because a passion often inclines to something contrary to what man knows in general. Thirdly, + by way of bodily transmutation, the result of which is that the reason is somehow fettered so as not to exercise its act freely; + even as sleep or drunkenness, on account of some change wrought on the body, + fetters the use of reason. That this takes place in the passions is evident from the fact that sometimes, when the passions + are very intense, man loses the use of reason altogether: for many have gone out of their minds through excess of love or + anger. It is in this way that passion draws the reason to judge in particular, against the knowledge which it has in general. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 co."><a name="36868" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36868] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod opinio Socratis fuit, ut philosophus dicit in VII +Ethic., quod scientia nunquam posset superari a passione. Unde +ponebat omnes virtutes esse scientias, et omnia peccata esse +ignorantias. In quo quidem aliqualiter recte sapiebat. Quia cum +voluntas sit boni vel apparentis boni, nunquam voluntas in malum +moveretur, nisi id quod non est bonum, aliqualiter rationi bonum +appareret, et propter hoc voluntas nunquam in malum tenderet, nisi +cum aliqua ignorantia vel errore rationis. Unde dicitur Prov. XIV, +<i>errant qui operantur malum</i>. Sed quia experimento patet quod +multi agunt contra ea quorum scientiam habent; et hoc etiam +auctoritate divina confirmatur, secundum illud Luc. XII, <i>servus +qui cognovit voluntatem domini sui et non fecit, plagis vapulabit +multis</i>; et Iac. IV dicitur, scienti bonum facere et non +facienti, peccatum est illi, non simpliciter verum dixit, sed +oportet distinguere, ut philosophus tradit in VII Ethic. Cum enim +ad recte agendum homo dirigatur duplici scientia, scilicet +universali et particulari; utriusque defectus sufficit ad hoc quod +impediatur rectitudo operis et voluntatis, ut supra dictum est. +Contingit igitur quod aliquis habeat scientiam in universali, puta +nullam fornicationem esse faciendam; sed tamen non cognoscat in +particulari hunc actum qui est fornicatio, non esse faciendum. Et +hoc sufficit ad hoc quod voluntas non sequatur universalem +scientiam rationis. Iterum considerandum est quod nihil prohibet +aliquid sciri in habitu, quod tamen actu non consideratur. Potest +igitur contingere quod aliquis etiam rectam scientiam habeat in +singulari, et non solum in universali, sed tamen in actu non +consideret. Et tunc non videtur difficile quod praeter id quod actu +non considerat, homo agat. Quod autem homo non consideret in +particulari id quod habitualiter scit, quandoque quidem contingit +ex solo defectu intentionis, puta cum homo sciens geometriam, non +intendit ad considerandum geometriae conclusiones, quas statim in +promptu habet considerare. Quandoque autem homo non considerat id +quod habet in habitu propter aliquod impedimentum superveniens, +puta propter aliquam occupationem exteriorem, vel propter aliquam +infirmitatem corporalem. Et hoc modo ille qui est in passione +constitutus, non considerat in particulari id quod scit in +universali, inquantum passio impedit talem considerationem. Impedit +autem tripliciter. Primo, per quandam distractionem, sicut supra +expositum est. Secundo, per contrarietatem, quia plerumque passio +inclinat ad contrarium huius quod scientia universalis habet. +Tertio, per quandam immutationem corporalem, ex qua ratio +quodammodo ligatur, ne libere in actum exeat, sicut etiam somnus +vel ebrietas, quadam corporali transmutatione facta, ligant usum +rationis. Et quod hoc contingat in passionibus, patet ex hoc quod +aliquando, cum passiones multum intenduntur, homo amittit totaliter +usum rationis, multi enim propter abundantiam amoris et irae, sunt +in insaniam conversi. Et per hunc modum passio trahit rationem ad +iudicandum in particulari contra scientiam quam habet in +universali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Universal knowledge, which is most certain, does not hold the foremost place in action, but rather particular knowledge, + since actions are about singulars: wherefore it is not astonishing that, in matters of action, passion acts counter to universal + knowledge, if the consideration of particular knowledge be lacking. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36869" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36869] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod scientia universalis, quae est certissima, non +habet principalitatem in operatione, sed magis scientia +particularis, eo quod operationes sunt circa singularia. Unde non +est mirum si in operabilibus passio agit contra scientiam +universalem, absente consideratione in particulari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fact that something appears good in particular to the reason, whereas it is not good, is due to a passion: and yet this + particular judgment is contrary to the universal knowledge of the reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36870" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36870] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod rationi videatur in particulari +aliquid bonum quod non est bonum, contingit ex aliqua passione. Et +tamen hoc particulare iudicium est contra universalem scientiam +rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is impossible for anyone to have an actual knowledge or true opinion about a universal affirmative proposition, and at + the same time a false opinion about a particular negative proposition, or vice versa: but it may well happen that a man has + true habitual knowledge about a universal affirmative proposition, and actually a false opinion about a particular negative: + because an act is directly opposed, not to a habit, but to an act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36871" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36871] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod non posset contingere quod aliquis haberet simul in +actu scientiam aut opinionem veram de universali affirmativo, et +opinionem falsam de particulari negativo, aut e converso. Sed bene +potest contingere quod aliquis habeat veram scientiam habitualiter +de universali affirmativo, et falsam opinionem in actu de +particulari negativo, actus enim directe non contrariatur habitui, +sed actui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> He that has knowledge in a universal, is hindered, on account of a passion, from reasoning about that universal, so as to + draw the conclusion: but he reasons about another universal proposition suggested by the inclination of the passion, and draws + his conclusion accordingly. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that the syllogism of an incontinent man has four propositions, + two particular and two universal, of which one is of the reason, e.g. + No fornication is lawful, and the other, of passion, e.g. Pleasure is to be pursued. Hence passion fetters the reason, and + hinders it from arguing and concluding under the first proposition; so that while the passions lasts, the reason argues and + concludes under the second. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="36872" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36872] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod ille qui habet scientiam in universali, propter +passionem impeditur ne possit sub illa universali sumere, et ad +conclusionem pervenire, sed assumit sub alia universali, quam +suggerit inclinatio passionis, et sub ea concludit. Unde +philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod syllogismus incontinentis +habet quatuor propositiones, duas universales, quarum una est +rationis, puta nullam fornicationem esse committendam; alia est +passionis, puta delectationem esse sectandam. Passio igitur ligat +rationem ne assumat et concludat sub prima, unde, ea durante, +assumit et concludit sub secunda.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Even as a drunken man sometimes gives utterance to words of deep signification, of which, however, he is incompetent to judge, + his drunkenness hindering him; so that a man who is in a state of passion, may indeed say in words that he ought not to do + so and so, yet his inner thought is that he must do it, as stated in Ethic. vii, 3. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 ad 5"><a name="36873" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36873] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod, sicut ebrius quandoque proferre potest verba +significantia profundas sententias, quas tamen mente diiudicare non +potest, ebrietate prohibente; ita in passione existens, etsi ore +proferat hoc non esse faciendum, tamen interius hoc animo sentit +quod sit faciendum, ut dicitur in VII Ethic.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q77_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q77_A3-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 3. Whether a sin committed through passion, should be called a sin of weakness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a sin committed through passion should not be called a sin of weakness. For a passion is a vehement movement + of the sensitive appetite, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q77_A1" id="FS_Q77_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Now vehemence of movements is evidence of strength rather than of weakness. Therefore a sin committed through passion, should + not be called a sin of weakness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36874" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36874] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum quod est ex passione, non +debeat dici ex infirmitate. Passio enim est quidam vehemens motus +appetitus sensitivi, ut dictum est. Vehementia autem motus magis +attestatur fortitudini quam infirmitati. Ergo peccatum quod est ex +passione, non debet dici ex infirmitate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, weakness in man regards that which is most fragile in him. Now this is the flesh; whence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.77.39" target="asv">Ps. 77:39</a>): "He remembered that they are flesh." Therefore sins of weakness should be those which result from bodily defects, rather + than those which are due to a passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36875" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36875] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +infirmitas hominis maxime attenditur secundum illud quod est in eo +fragilius. Hoc autem est caro, unde dicitur in Psalmo LXXVII, +<i>recordatus est quia caro sunt</i>. Ergo magis debet dici +peccatum ex infirmitate quod est ex aliquo corporis defectu, quam +quod est ex animae passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man does not seem to be weak in respect of things which are subject to his will. Now it is subject to man's will, + whether he do or do not the things to which his passions incline him, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.4.7" target="asv">Gn. 4:7</a>: "Thy appetite shall be under thee [*Vulg.: 'The lust thereof shall be under thee.'], and thou shalt have dominion over it." + Therefore sin committed through passion is not a sin of weakness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36876" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36876] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +ad ea non videtur homo esse infirmus, quae eius voluntati +subduntur. Sed facere vel non facere ea ad quae passio inclinat, +hominis voluntati subditur, secundum illud Gen. IV, <i>sub te erit +appetitus tuus, et tu dominaberis illius</i>. Ergo peccatum quod +est ex passione, non est ex infirmitate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv) calls the passions diseases of the soul. Now weakness is another name for disease. Therefore + a sin that arises from passion should be called a sin of weakness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36877" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36877] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Tullius, in IV libro de Tuscul. quaest., passiones animae +aegritudines vocat. Aegritudines autem alio nomine infirmitates +dicuntur. Ergo peccatum quod est ex passione, debet dici ex +infirmitate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The cause of sin is on the part of the soul, in which, chiefly, sin resides. Now weakness may be applied to the soul by way + of likeness to weakness of the body. Accordingly, man's body is said to be weak, when it is disabled or hindered in the execution + of its proper action, through some disorder of the body's parts, so that the humors and members of the human body cease to + be subject to its governing and motive power. Hence a member is said to be weak, when + it cannot do the work of a healthy member, the eye, for instance, when it cannot see clearly, as the Philosopher states (De + Hist. Animal. x, 1). Therefore weakness of the soul is when the soul is hindered from fulfilling its proper action on account + of a disorder in its parts. Now as the parts of the body are said to be out of order, when they fail to comply with the order + of nature, so too the parts of the soul are said to be inordinate, when they are not subject to the order of reason, for + the reason is the ruling power of the soul's parts. Accordingly, when the concupiscible or irascible power is affected by + any passion contrary to the order of reason, the result being that an impediment arises in the aforesaid manner to the due + action of man, it is said to be a sin of weakness. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) compares the incontinent man to an + epileptic, whose limbs move in a manner contrary to his intention. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 3 co."><a name="36878" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36878] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod causa peccati propria est ex parte animae in qua +principaliter est peccatum. Potest autem dici infirmitas in anima +ad similitudinem infirmitatis corporis. Dicitur autem corpus +hominis esse infirmum, quando debilitatur vel impeditur in +executione propriae operationis, propter aliquam inordinationem +partium corporis, ita scilicet quod humores et membra hominis non +subduntur virtuti regitivae et motivae corporis. Unde et membrum +dicitur esse infirmum, quando non potest perficere operationem +membri sani, sicut oculus quando non potest clare videre, ut dicit +philosophus, in X de historiis animalium. Unde et infirmitas animae +dicitur quando impeditur anima in propria operatione, propter +inordinationem partium ipsius. Sicut autem partes corporis dicuntur +esse inordinatae, quando non sequuntur ordinem naturae; ita et +partes animae dicuntur inordinatae, quando non subduntur ordini +rationis, ratio enim est vis regitiva partium animae. Sic ergo +quando extra ordinem rationis vis concupiscibilis aut irascibilis +aliqua passione afficitur, et per hoc impedimentum praestatur modo +praedicto debitae actioni hominis, dicitur peccatum esse ex +infirmitate. Unde et philosophus, in I Ethic., comparat +incontinentem paralytico, cuius partes moventur in contrarium eius +quod ipse disponit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as in the body the stronger the movement against the order of nature, the greater the weakness, so likewise, the stronger + the movement of passion against the order of reason, the greater the weakness of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36879" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36879] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut quanto fuerit motus fortior in corpore +praeter ordinem naturae, tanto est maior infirmitas; ita quanto +fuerit motus fortior passionis praeter ordinem rationis, tanto est +maior infirmitas animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, which is not hindered by weakness of the body: for he that is weak in body may + have a will ready for action, and yet be hindered by a passion, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q77_A1" id="FS_Q77_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Hence when we speak of sins of weakness, we refer to weakness of soul rather than of body. And yet even weakness of soul + is called weakness of the flesh, in so far as it is owing to a condition of the flesh that the + passions of the soul arise in us through the sensitive appetite being a power using a corporeal organ. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36880" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36880] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod peccatum principaliter consistit in actu voluntatis, +qui non impeditur per corporis infirmitatem, potest enim qui est +corpore infirmus, promptam habere voluntatem ad aliquid faciendum. +Impeditur autem per passionem, ut supra dictum est. Unde cum +dicitur peccatum esse ex infirmitate, magis est referendum ad +infirmitatem animae quam ad infirmitatem corporis. Dicitur tamen +etiam ipsa infirmitas animae infirmitas carnis, inquantum ex +conditione carnis passiones animae insurgunt in nobis, eo quod +appetitus sensitivus est virtus utens organo corporali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is in the will's power to give or refuse its consent to what passion inclines us to do, and it is in this sense that our + appetite is said to be under us; and yet this consent or dissent of the will is hindered in the way already explained + <a href="#FS_Q77_A1" id="FS_Q77_A3-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36881" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36881] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in potestate quidem voluntatis est assentire vel non +assentire his in quae passio inclinat, et pro tanto dicitur noster +appetitus sub nobis esse. Sed tamen ipse assensus vel dissensus +voluntatis impeditur per passionem, modo praedicto.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q77_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q77_A4-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 4. Whether self-love is the source of every sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that self-love is not the source of every sin. For that which is good and right in itself is not the proper + cause of sin. Now love of self is a good and right thing in itself: wherefore man is commanded to love his neighbor as himself + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.18" target="asv">Lev. 19:18</a>). Therefore self-love cannot be the proper cause of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36882" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36882] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor sui non sit principium omnis +peccati. Id enim quod est secundum se bonum et debitum, non est +propria causa peccati. Sed amor sui est secundum se bonum et +debitum, unde et praecipitur homini ut diligat proximum sicut +seipsum, Levit. XIX. Ergo amor sui non potest esse propria causa +peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.8" target="asv">Rom. 7:8</a>): "Sin taking occasion by the commandment wrought in me all manner of concupiscence"; on which words a gloss says that "the + law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evils," the reason for which is that concupiscence is the cause + of every sin. Now concupiscence is a distinct passion from love, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q3_A2" id="FS_Q77_A4-p3.2" shape="rect">Q[3], A[2]</a>; + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q77_A4-p3.3" shape="rect"> Q[23], A[4]</a>). + Therefore self-love is not the cause of every sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36883" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36883] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +apostolus dicit, Rom. VII, <i>occasione accepta, peccatum per +mandatum operatum est in me omnem concupiscentiam</i>, ubi Glossa +dicit quod <i>bona est lex, quae, dum concupiscentiam prohibet, +omne malum prohibet</i>, quod dicitur propter hoc, quia +concupiscentia est causa omnis peccati. Sed concupiscentia est alia +passio ab amore, ut supra habitum est. Ergo amor sui non est causa +omnis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine in commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.79.17" target="asv"> Ps. 79:17, </a> "Things set on fire and dug down," says that "every sin is due either to love arousing us to undue ardor or to fear inducing + false humility." Therefore self-love is not the only cause of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36884" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36884] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus, super illud Psalmi, incensa igni et suffossa, dicit +quod omne peccatum est <i>ex amore male inflammante, vel ex timore +male humiliante</i>. Non ergo solus amor sui est causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, as man sins at times through inordinate love of self, so does he sometimes through inordinate love of his neighbor. + Therefore self-love is not the cause of every sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="36885" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36885] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut homo quandoque peccat propter inordinatum sui amorem, ita +etiam interdum peccat propter inordinatum amorem proximi. Ergo amor +sui non est causa omnis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) that "self-love, amounting to contempt of God, builds up the city of Babylon." Now every + sin makes man a citizen of Babylon. Therefore self-love is the cause of every sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36886" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36886] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod <i>amor sui usque +ad contemptum Dei, facit civitatem Babylonis</i>. Sed per quodlibet +peccatum pertinet homo ad civitatem Babylonis. Ergo amor sui est +causa omnis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q75_A1" id="FS_Q77_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[1]</a>), the proper and direct cause of sin is to be considered on the part of the adherence to a mutable good; in which respect + every sinful act proceeds from inordinate desire for some temporal good. Now the fact that anyone desires a temporal good + inordinately, is due to the fact that he loves himself inordinately; for to wish anyone some good is to love him. Therefore + it is evident that inordinate love of + self is the cause of every sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 co."><a name="36887" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36887] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, propria et per se causa +peccati accipienda est ex parte conversionis ad commutabile bonum; +ex qua quidem parte omnis actus peccati procedit ex aliquo +inordinato appetitu alicuius temporalis boni. Quod autem aliquis +appetat inordinate aliquod temporale bonum, procedit ex hoc quod +inordinate amat seipsum, hoc enim est amare aliquem, velle ei +bonum. Unde manifestum est quod inordinatus amor sui est causa +omnis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Well ordered self-love, whereby man desires a fitting good for himself, is right and natural; but it is inordinate self-love, + leading to contempt of God, that Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) reckons to be the cause of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36888" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36888] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod amor sui ordinatus est debitus et naturalis, ita +scilicet quod velit sibi bonum quod congruit. Sed amor sui +inordinatus, qui perducit ad contemptum Dei, ponitur esse causa +peccati secundum Augustinum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Concupiscence, whereby a man desires good for himself, is reduced to self-love as to its cause, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36889" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36889] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod concupiscentia, qua aliquis appetit sibi bonum, +reducitur ad amorem sui sicut ad causam, ut iam dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man is said to love both the good he desires for himself, and himself to whom he desires it. Love, in so far as it is directed + to the object of desire (e.g. a man is said to love wine or money) admits, as its cause, fear which pertains to avoidance + of evil: for every sin arises either from inordinate desire for some good, or from inordinate avoidance of some evil. But + each of these is reduced to self-love, since it is through loving himself that man + either desires good things, or avoids evil things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36890" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36890] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod aliquis dicitur amare et illud bonum quod optat sibi, +et se, cui bonum optat. Amor igitur secundum quod dicitur eius esse +quod optatur, puta quod aliquis dicitur amare vinum vel pecuniam, +recipit pro causa timorem, qui pertinet ad fugam mali. Omne enim +peccatum provenit vel ex inordinato appetitu alicuius boni, vel ex +inordinata fuga alicuius mali. Sed utrumque horum reducitur ad +amorem sui. Propter hoc enim homo vel appetit bona vel fugit mala, +quia amat seipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A friend is like another self (Ethic. ix): wherefore the sin which is committed through love for a friend, seems to be committed + through self-love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="36891" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36891] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod amicus est quasi alter ipse. Et ideo quod peccatur +propter amorem amici, videtur propter amorem sui peccari.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q77_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q77_A5-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 5. Whether concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life are fittingly described as causes of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that "concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life" are unfittingly described as + causes of sin. Because, according to the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.10" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:10</a>), "covetousness [*Douay: 'The desire of money'] is the root of all evils." Now pride of life is not included in covetousness. + Therefore it should not be reckoned among the causes of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36892" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36892] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter ponantur causae +peccatorum esse concupiscentia carnis, concupiscentia oculorum, et +superbia vitae. Quia secundum apostolum, I ad Tim. ult., <i>radix +omnium malorum est cupiditas</i>. Sed superbia vitae sub cupiditate +non continetur. Ergo non oportet poni inter causas peccatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, concupiscence of the flesh is aroused chiefly by what is seen by the eyes, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.13.56" target="asv"> Dan. 13:56</a>: "Beauty hath deceived thee." Therefore concupiscence of the eyes should not be condivided with concupiscence of the flesh. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36893" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36893] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +concupiscentia carnis maxime ex visione oculorum excitatur, +secundum illud Dan. XIII, <i>species decepit te</i>. Ergo non debet +dividi concupiscentia oculorum contra concupiscentiam carnis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, concupiscence is desire for pleasure, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q30_A2" id="FS_Q77_A5-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[30], A[2]</a>). Now objects of pleasure are perceived not only by the sight, but also by the other senses. Therefore "concupiscence of + the hearing" and of the other senses should also have been mentioned. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36894" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36894] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +concupiscentia est delectabilis appetitus, ut supra habitum est. +Delectationes autem contingunt non solum secundum visum, sed etiam +secundum alios sensus. Ergo deberet etiam poni concupiscentia +auditus, et aliorum sensuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as man is induced to sin, through inordinate desire of good things, so is he also, through inordinate avoidance + of evil things, as stated above (A[4], ad 3). But nothing is mentioned here pertaining to avoidance of evil. Therefore the + causes of sin are insufficiently described. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="36895" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36895] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut homo inducitur ad peccandum ex inordinata concupiscentia +boni, ita etiam ex inordinata fuga mali, ut dictum est. Sed nihil +hic enumeratur pertinens ad fugam mali. Ergo insufficienter causae +peccatorum tanguntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A5-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:16</a>): "All that is in the world is concupiscence of the flesh, or [Vulg.: 'and'] pride of life." Now a thing is said to be "in + the world" by reason of sin: wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.5.19" target="asv">1 Jn. 5:19</a>): "The whole world is seated in wickedness." Therefore these three are causes of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36896" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36896] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur I Ioan. II, <i>omne quod est in mundo, aut est +concupiscentia carnis, aut concupiscentia oculorum, aut superbia +vitae</i>. In mundo autem dicitur aliquid esse propter peccatum, +unde et ibidem, dicit quod <i>totus mundus in maligno positus +est</i>. Ergo praedicta tria sunt causae peccatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q77_A5-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q77_A4" id="FS_Q77_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, inordinate self-love is the cause of every sin. Now self-love includes inordinate desire of good: for a man desires good + for the one he loves. Hence it is evident that inordinate desire of good is the cause of every sin. Now good is, in two ways, + the object of the sensitive appetite, wherein are the passions which are the cause of sin: first, absolutely, according as + it is the object of the concupiscible part; + secondly, under the aspect of difficulty, according as it is the object of the irascible part, as stated above (Q[23], A[1]). + Again, concupiscence is twofold, as stated above (Q[30], A[3]). One is natural, and is directed to those things which sustain + the nature of the body, whether as regards the preservation of the individual, such as food, drink, and the like, or as regards + the preservation of the species, such as sexual matters: and the inordinate appetite of such things is called + "concupiscence of the flesh." The other is spiritual concupiscence, and is directed to those things which do not afford sustentation + or pleasure in respect of the fleshly senses, but are delectable in respect of the apprehension or imagination, or some similar + mode of perception; such are money, apparel, and the like; and this spiritual concupiscence is called "concupiscence of the + eyes," whether this be taken as referring to the sight itself, of which the eyes are the organ, so as to denote + curiosity according to Augustine's exposition (Confess. x); or to the concupiscence of things which are proposed outwardly + to the eyes, so as to denote covetousness, according to the explanation of others. + </p><p id="FS_Q77_A5-p8"> The inordinate appetite of the arduous good pertains to the "pride of life"; for pride is the inordinate appetite of excellence, + as we shall state further on (Q[84], A[2]; + <a href="SS_iii.html#SS_Q162_A1" id="FS_Q77_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[162], A[1]</a>). + </p><p id="FS_Q77_A5-p9"> It is therefore evident that all passions that are a cause of sin can be reduced to these three: since all the passions of + the concupiscible part can be reduced to the first two, and all the irascible passions to the third, which is not divided + into two because all the irascible passions conform to spiritual concupiscence. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 co."><a name="36897" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36897] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, inordinatus amor sui est causa +omnis peccati. In amore autem sui includitur inordinatus appetitus +boni, unusquisque enim appetit bonum ei quem amat. Unde manifestum +est quod inordinatus appetitus boni est causa omnis peccati. Bonum +autem dupliciter est obiectum sensibilis appetitus, in quo sunt +animae passiones, quae sunt causa peccati, uno modo, absolute, +secundum quod est obiectum concupiscibilis; alio modo, sub ratione +ardui, prout est obiectum irascibilis, ut supra dictum est. Est +autem duplex concupiscentia, sicut supra habitum est. Una quidem +naturalis, quae est eorum quibus natura corporis sustentatur; sive +quantum ad conservationem individui, sicut cibus et potus et alia +huiusmodi; sive quantum ad conservationem speciei, sicut in +venereis. Et horum inordinatus appetitus dicitur concupiscentia +carnis. Alia est concupiscentia animalis, eorum scilicet quae per +sensum carnis sustentationem aut delectationem non afferunt, sed +sunt delectabilia secundum apprehensionem imaginationis, aut +alicuius huiusmodi acceptionis, sicut sunt pecunia, ornatus +vestium, et alia huiusmodi. Et haec quidem animalis concupiscentia +vocatur concupiscentia oculorum, sive intelligatur concupiscentia +oculorum, idest ipsius visionis, quae fit per oculos, ut referatur +ad curiositatem, secundum quod Augustinus exponit, X Confess.; sive +referatur ad concupiscentiam rerum quae exterius oculis +proponuntur, ut referatur ad cupiditatem, secundum quod ab aliis +exponitur. Appetitus autem inordinatus boni ardui pertinet ad +superbiam vitae, nam superbia est appetitus inordinatus +excellentiae, ut inferius dicetur. Et sic patet quod ad ista tria +reduci possunt omnes passiones, quae sunt causa peccati. Nam ad duo +prima reducuntur omnes passiones concupiscibilis, ad tertium autem +omnes passiones irascibilis; quod ideo non dividitur in duo, quia +omnes passiones irascibilis conformantur concupiscentiae +animali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Pride of life" is included in covetousness according as the latter denotes any kind of appetite for any kind of good. How + covetousness, as a special vice, which goes by the name of "avarice," is the root of all sins, shall be explained further + on ( + <a href="#FS_Q84_A1" id="FS_Q77_A5-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[1]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36898" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36898] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod secundum quod cupiditas importat universaliter +appetitum cuiuscumque boni, sic etiam superbia vitae continetur sub +cupiditate. Quomodo autem cupiditas, secundum quod est speciale +vitium, quod avaritia nominatur, sit radix omnium peccatorum, infra +dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "Concupiscence of the eyes" does not mean here the concupiscence for all things which can be seen by the eyes, but only for + such things as afford, not carnal pleasure in respect of touch, but in respect of the eyes, i.e. of any apprehensive power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36899" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36899] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod concupiscentia oculorum non dicitur hic +concupiscentia omnium rerum quae oculis videri possunt, sed solum +earum in quibus non quaeritur delectatio carnis, quae est secundum +tactum, sed solum delectatio oculi, idest cuiuscumque apprehensivae +virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sense of sight is the most excellent of all the senses, and covers a larger ground, as stated in Metaph. i: and so its + name is transferred to all the other senses, and even to the inner apprehensions, as Augustine states (De Verb. Dom., serm. + xxxiii). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36900" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36900] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod sensus visus est excellentior inter omnes sensus, et +ad plura se extendens, ut dicitur in I Metaphys. Et ideo nomen eius +transfertur ad omnes alios sensus, et etiam ad omnes interiores +apprehensiones, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de verbis domini.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A5-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Avoidance of evil is caused by the appetite for good, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q25_A2" id="FS_Q77_A5-p13.1" shape="rect">Q[25], A[2]</a>; + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q39_A2" id="FS_Q77_A5-p13.2" shape="rect"> Q[39], A[2]</a>); and so those passions alone are mentioned which incline to good, as being the causes of those which cause inordinately + the avoidance of evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="36901" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36901] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod fuga mali causatur ex appetitu boni, ut supra dictum +est. Et ideo ponuntur solum passiones inclinantes ad bonum, tanquam +causae earum quae faciunt inordinate fugam mali.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q77_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q77_A6-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 6. Whether sin is alleviated on account of a passion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin is not alleviated on account of passion. For increase of cause adds to the effect: thus if a hot thing + causes something to melt, a hotter will do so yet more. Now passion is a cause of sin, as stated + <a href="#FS_Q77_A5" id="FS_Q77_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. Therefore the more intense the passion, the greater the sin. Therefore passion does not diminish sin, but increases it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="36902" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36902] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non allevietur propter +passionem. Augmentum enim causae auget effectum, si enim calidum +dissolvit, magis calidum magis dissolvit. Sed passio est causa +peccati, ut habitum est. Ergo quanto est intensior passio, tanto +est maius peccatum. Passio igitur non minuit peccatum, sed +auget.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a good passion stands in the same relation to merit, as an evil passion does to sin. Now a good passion increases + merit: for a man seems to merit the more, according as he is moved by a greater pity to help a poor man. Therefore an evil + passion also increases rather than diminishes a sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="36903" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36903] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut se habet passio bona ad meritum, ita se habet mala passio ad +peccatum. Sed bona passio auget meritum, tanto enim aliquis magis +videtur mereri, quanto ex maiori misericordia pauperi subvenit. +Ergo etiam mala passio magis aggravat peccatum quam alleviat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a man seems to sin the more grievously, according as he sins with a more intense will. But the passion that impels + the will makes it tend with greater intensity to the sinful act. Therefore passion aggravates a sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="36904" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36904] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quanto intensiori voluntate aliquis facit peccatum, tanto gravius +videtur peccare. Sed passio impellens voluntatem, facit eam +vehementius ferri in actum peccati. Ergo passio aggravat +peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The passion of concupiscence is called a temptation of the flesh. But the greater the temptation that overcomes a man, the + less grievous his sin, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei iv, 12). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 6 s. c."><a name="36905" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36905] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +passio ipsa concupiscentiae vocatur tentatio carnis. Sed quanto +aliquis maiori tentatione prosternitur, tanto minus peccat, ut +patet per Augustinum. Ergo passio diminuit peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q77_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Sin consists essentially in an act of the free will, which is a faculty of the will and reason; while passion is a movement + of the sensitive appetite. Now the sensitive appetite can be related to the free-will, antecedently and consequently: antecedently, + according as a passion of the sensitive appetite draws or inclines the reason or will, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q77_A1" id="FS_Q77_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2; Q[10], A[3]); and consequently, in so far as the movements of the + higher powers redound on to the lower, since it is not possible for the will to be moved to anything intensely, without a + passion being aroused in the sensitive appetite. + </p><p id="FS_Q77_A6-p7"> Accordingly if we take passion as preceding the sinful act, it must needs diminish the sin: because the act is a sin in so + far as it is voluntary, and under our control. Now a thing is said to be under our control, through the reason and will: and + therefore the more the reason and will do anything of their own accord, and not through the impulse of a passion, the more + is it voluntary and under our control. In this respect passion diminishes sin, in so far as it diminishes its + voluntariness. + </p><p id="FS_Q77_A6-p8"> On the other hand, a consequent passion does not diminish a sin, but increases it; or rather it is a sign of its gravity, + in so far, to wit, as it shows the intensity of the will towards the sinful act; and so it is true that the greater the pleasure + or the concupiscence with which anyone sins, the greater the sin. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 6 co."><a name="36906" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36906] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod peccatum essentialiter consistit in actu liberi +arbitrii, quod est facultas voluntatis et rationis. Passio autem +est motus appetitus sensitivi. Appetitus autem sensitivus potest se +habere ad liberum arbitrium et antecedenter, et consequenter. +Antecedenter quidem, secundum quod passio appetitus sensitivi +trahit vel inclinat rationem et voluntatem, ut supra dictum est. +Consequenter autem, secundum quod motus superiorum virium, si sint +vehementes, redundant in inferiores, non enim potest voluntas +intense moveri in aliquid, quin excitetur aliqua passio in appetitu +sensitivo. Si igitur accipiatur passio secundum quod praecedit +actum peccati, sic necesse est quod diminuat peccatum. Actus enim +intantum est peccatum, inquantum est voluntarium et in nobis +existens. In nobis autem aliquid esse dicitur per rationem et +voluntatem. Unde quanto ratio et voluntas ex se aliquid agunt, non +ex impulsu passionis, magis est voluntarium et in nobis existens. +Et secundum hoc passio minuit peccatum, inquantum minuit +voluntarium. Passio autem consequens non diminuit peccatum, sed +magis auget, vel potius est signum magnitudinis eius, inquantum +scilicet demonstrat intensionem voluntatis ad actum peccati. Et sic +verum est quod quanto aliquis maiori libidine vel concupiscentia +peccat, tanto magis peccat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Passion is the cause of sin on the part of that to which the sinner turns. But the gravity of a sin is measured on the part + of that from which he turns, which results accidentally from his turning to something else---accidentally, i.e. beside his + intention. Now an effect is increased by the increase, not of its accidental cause, but of its direct cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="36907" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36907] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod passio est causa peccati ex parte conversionis. +Gravitas autem peccati magis attenditur ex parte aversionis; quae +quidem ex conversione sequitur per accidens, idest praeter +intentionem peccantis. Causae autem per accidens augmentatae non +augmentant effectus, sed solum causae per se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A good passion consequent to the judgment of reason increases merit; but if it precede, so that a man is moved to do well, + rather by his passion than by the judgment of his reason, such a passion diminishes the goodness and praiseworthiness of his + action. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="36908" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36908] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod bona passio consequens iudicium rationis, augmentat +meritum. Si autem praecedat, ut scilicet homo magis ex passione +quam ex iudicio rationis moveatur ad bene agendum, talis passio +diminuit bonitatem et laudem actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the movement of the will incited by the passion is more intense, yet it is not so much the will's own movement, + as if it were moved to sin by the reason alone. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="36909" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36909] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, etsi motus voluntatis sit intensior ex passione +incitatus, non tamen ita est voluntatis proprius, sicut si sola +ratione moveretur ad peccandum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q77_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q77_A7-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 7. Whether passion excuses from sin altogether?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that passion excuses from sin altogether. For whatever causes an act to be involuntary, excuses from sin altogether. + But concupiscence of the flesh, which is a passion, makes an act to be involuntary, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.17" target="asv"> Gal. 5:17</a>: "The flesh lusteth against the spirit . . . so that you do not the things that you would." Therefore passion excuses from + sin altogether. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="36910" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36910] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod passio totaliter excuset a peccato. +Quidquid enim causat involuntarium, excusat totaliter a peccato. +Sed concupiscentia carnis, quae est quaedam passio, causat +involuntarium, secundum illud Gal. V, <i>caro concupiscit adversus +spiritum, ut non quaecumque vultis, illa faciatis</i>. Ergo passio +totaliter excusat a peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, passion causes a certain ignorance of a particular matter, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q77_A2" id="FS_Q77_A7-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[2];</a> Q[76], A[3]). But ignorance of a particular matter excuses from sin altogether, as stated above (Q[6], A[8]). Therefore passion + excuses from sin altogether. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="36911" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36911] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +passio causat ignorantiam quandam in particulari, ut dictum est. +Sed ignorantia particularis totaliter excusat a peccato, sicut +supra habitum est. Ergo passio totaliter excusat a peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, disease of the soul is graver than disease of the body. But bodily disease excuses from sin altogether, as in the + case of mad people. Much more, therefore, does passion, which is a disease of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="36912" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36912] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +infirmitas animae gravior est quam infirmitas corporis. Sed +infirmitas corporis totaliter excusat a peccato, ut patet in +phreneticis. Ergo multo magis passio, quae est infirmitas +animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.5" target="asv">Rom. 7:5</a>) speaks of the passions as "passions of sins," for no other reason than that they cause sin: which would not be the case + if they excused from sin altogether. Therefore passion does not excuse from sin altogether. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 7 s. c."><a name="36913" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36913] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus, Rom. VII, vocat passiones peccatorum, non nisi +quia peccata causant. Quod non esset, si a peccato totaliter +excusarent. Ergo passiones non totaliter a peccato excusant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q77_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> An act which, in its genus, is evil, cannot be excused from sin altogether, unless it be rendered altogether involuntary. + Consequently, if the passion be such that it renders the subsequent act wholly involuntary, it entirely excuses from sin; + otherwise, it does not excuse entirely. In this matter two points apparently should be observed: first, that a thing may be + voluntary either "in itself," as when the will tends towards it directly; or "in its cause," + when the will tends towards that cause and not towards the effect; as is the case with one who wilfully gets drunk, for in + that case he is considered to do voluntarily whatever he does through being drunk. Secondly, we must observe that a thing + is said to be voluntary "directly" or "indirectly"; directly, if the will tends towards it; indirectly, if the will could + have prevented it, but did not. + </p><p id="FS_Q77_A7-p7"> Accordingly therefore we must make a distinction: because a passion is sometimes so strong as to take away the use of reason + altogether, as in the case of those who are mad through love or anger; and then if such a passion were voluntary from the + beginning, the act is reckoned a sin, because it is voluntary in its cause, as we have stated with regard to drunkenness. + If, however, the cause be not voluntary but natural, for instance, if anyone through sickness or some such cause + fall into such a passion as deprives him of the use of reason, his act is rendered wholly involuntary, and he is entirely + excused from sin. Sometimes, however, the passion is not such as to take away the use of reason altogether; and then reason + can drive the passion away, by turning to other thoughts, or it can prevent it from having its full effect; since the members + are not put to work, except by the consent of reason, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q17_A9" id="FS_Q77_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[17], A[9]</a>): wherefore such a + passion does not excuse from sin altogether. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 7 co."><a name="36914" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36914] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod secundum hoc solum actus aliquis qui de genere suo +est malus, totaliter a peccato excusatur, quod totaliter +involuntarius redditur. Unde si sit talis passio quae totaliter +involuntarium reddat actum sequentem, totaliter a peccato excusat, +alioquin, non totaliter. Circa quod duo consideranda videntur. +Primo quidem, quod aliquid potest esse voluntarium vel secundum se, +sicut quando voluntas directe in ipsum fertur, vel secundum suam +causam, quando voluntas fertur in causam et non in effectum, ut +patet in eo qui voluntarie inebriatur; ex hoc enim quasi +voluntarium ei imputatur quod per ebrietatem committit. Secundo +considerandum est quod aliquid dicitur voluntarium directe, vel +indirecte, directe quidem, id in quod voluntas fertur; indirecte +autem, illud quod voluntas potuit prohibere, sed non prohibet. +Secundum hoc igitur distinguendum est. Quia passio quandoque quidem +est tanta quod totaliter aufert usum rationis, sicut patet in his +qui propter amorem vel iram insaniunt. Et tunc si talis passio a +principio fuit voluntaria, imputatur actus ad peccatum, quia est +voluntarius in sua causa, sicut etiam de ebrietate dictum est. Si +vero causa non fuit voluntaria, sed naturalis, puta cum aliquis ex +aegritudine, vel aliqua huiusmodi causa, incidit in talem passionem +quae totaliter aufert usum rationis; actus omnino redditur +involuntarius, et per consequens totaliter a peccato excusatur. +Quandoque vero passio non est tanta quod totaliter intercipiat usum +rationis. Et tunc ratio potest passionem excludere, divertendo ad +alias cogitationes; vel impedire ne suum consequatur effectum, quia +membra non applicantur operi nisi per consensum rationis, ut supra +dictum est. Unde talis passio non totaliter excusat a peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words, "So that you do not the things that you would" are not to be referred to outward deeds, but to the inner movement + of concupiscence; for a man would wish never to desire evil, in which sense we are to understand the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.19" target="asv"> Rom. 7:19</a>: "The evil which I will not, that I do." Or again they may be referred to the will as preceding the passion, as is the case + with the incontinent, who act counter to their resolution on + account of their concupiscence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="36915" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36915] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod hoc quod dicitur, <i>ut non quaecumque vultis, +illa faciatis</i>, non est referendum ad ea quae fiunt per +exteriorem actum, sed ad interiorem concupiscentiae motum, vellet +enim homo nunquam concupiscere malum. Sicut etiam exponitur id quod +dicitur Rom. VII, quod <i>odi malum, illud facio</i>. Vel potest +referri ad voluntatem praecedentem passionem, ut patet in +continentibus qui contra suum propositum agunt propter suam +concupiscentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The particular ignorance which excuses altogether, is ignorance of a circumstance, which a man is unable to know even after + taking due precautions. But passion causes ignorance of law in a particular case, by preventing universal knowledge from being + applied to a particular act, which passion the reason is able to drive away, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="36916" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36916] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ignorantia particularis quae totaliter excusat, est +ignorantia circumstantiae quam quidem quis scire non potest, debita +diligentia adhibita. Sed passio causat ignorantiam iuris in +particulari, dum impedit applicationem communis scientiae ad +particularem actum. Quam quidem passionem ratio repellere potest, +ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Bodily disease is involuntary: there would be a comparison, however, if it were voluntary, as we have stated about drunkenness, + which is a kind of bodily disease. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="36917" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36917] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod infirmitas corporis est involuntaria. Esset autem +simile, si esset voluntaria, sicut de ebrietate dictum est, quae +est quaedam corporalis infirmitas.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q77_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q77_A8-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 8. Whether a sin committed through passion can be mortal?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin committed through passion cannot be mortal. Because venial sin is condivided with mortal sin. Now + sin committed from weakness is venial, since it has in itself a motive for pardon [venia]. Since therefore sin committed through + passion is a sin of weakness, it seems that it cannot be mortal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="36918" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36918] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum quod est ex passione, non +possit esse mortale. Veniale enim peccatum dividitur contra +mortale. Sed peccatum quod est ex infirmitate, est veniale, cum +habeat in se causam veniae. Cum igitur peccatum quod est ex +passione, sit ex infirmitate, videtur quod non possit esse +mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the cause is more powerful than its effect. But passion cannot be a mortal sin, for there is no mortal sin in the + sensuality, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q74_A4" id="FS_Q77_A8-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[74], A[4]</a>). Therefore a sin committed through passion cannot be mortal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="36919" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36919] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +causa non est potior effectu. Sed passio non potest esse peccatum +mortale, non enim in sensualitate est peccatum mortale, ut supra +habitum est. Ergo peccatum quod est ex passione, non potest esse +mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, passion is a hindrance to reason, as explained above ( + <a href="#FS_Q77_A1" id="FS_Q77_A8-p4.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2). Now it belongs to the reason to turn to God, or to turn away from Him, which is the essence of a mortal sin. Therefore + a sin committed through passion cannot be mortal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="36920" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36920] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +passio abducit a ratione, ut ex dictis patet. Sed rationis est +converti ad Deum vel averti ab eo, in quo consistit ratio peccati +mortalis. Peccatum ergo quod est ex passione, non potest esse +mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.5" target="asv">Rom. 7:5</a>) that "the passions of the sins . . . work [Vulg.: 'did work'] in our members to bring forth fruit unto death." Now it is + proper to mortal sin to bring forth fruit unto death. Therefore sin committed through passion may be mortal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 8 s. c."><a name="36921" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36921] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. VII, quod <i>passiones peccatorum +operantur in membris nostris ad fructificandum morti</i>. Hoc autem +est proprium mortalis peccati, quod fructificet morti. Ergo +peccatum quod est ex passione, potest esse mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Mortal sin, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q72_A5" id="FS_Q77_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[72], A[5]</a>), consists in turning away from our last end which is God, which aversion pertains to the deliberating reason, whose function + it is also to direct towards the end. Therefore that which is contrary to the last end can happen not to be a mortal sin, + only when the deliberating reason is unable to come to the rescue, which is the case in sudden movements. Now when anyone + proceeds from passion to a + sinful act, or to a deliberate consent, this does not happen suddenly: and so the deliberating reason can come to the rescue + here, since it can drive the passion away, or at least prevent it from having its effect, as stated above: wherefore if it + does not come to the rescue, there is a mortal sin; and it is thus, as we see, that many murders and adulteries are committed + through passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 8 co."><a name="36922" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36922] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod peccatum mortale, ut supra dictum est, consistit in +aversione ab ultimo fine, qui est Deus, quae quidem aversio +pertinet ad rationem deliberantem, cuius etiam est ordinare in +finem. Hoc igitur solo modo potest contingere quod inclinatio +animae in aliquid quod contrariatur ultimo fini, non sit peccatum +mortale quia ratio deliberans non potest occurrere, quod contingit +in subitis motibus. Cum autem ex passione aliquis procedit ad actum +peccati, vel ad consensum deliberatum, hoc non fit subito. Unde +ratio deliberans potest hic occurrere, potest enim excludere, vel +saltem impedire passionem, ut dictum est. Unde si non occurrat, est +peccatum mortale, sicut videmus quod multa homicidia et adulteria +per passionem committuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A8-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A sin may be venial in three ways. First, through its cause, i.e. through having cause to be forgiven, which cause lessens + the sin; thus a sin that is committed through weakness or ignorance is said to be venial. Secondly, through its issue; thus + every sin, through repentance, becomes venial, i.e. receives pardon [veniam]. Thirdly, by its genus, e.g. an idle word. This + is the only kind of venial sin that is opposed to mortal sin: whereas the objection + regards the first kind. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="36923" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36923] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod veniale dicitur tripliciter. Uno modo, ex causa, +quia scilicet habet aliquam causam veniae, quae diminuit peccatum, +et sic peccatum ex infirmitate et ignorantia dicitur veniale. Alio +modo, ex eventu, sicut omne peccatum per poenitentiam fit veniale, +idest veniam consecutum. Tertio modo dicitur veniale ex genere, +sicut verbum otiosum. Et hoc solum veniale opponitur mortali, +obiectio autem procedit de primo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Passion causes sin as regards the adherence to something. But that this be a mortal sin regards the aversion, which follows + accidentally from the adherence, as stated above (A[6], ad 1): hence the argument does not prove. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="36924" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36924] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod passio est causa peccati ex parte conversionis. Quod +autem sit mortale, est ex parte aversionis, quae per accidens +sequitur ad conversionem, ut dictum est. Unde ratio non +sequitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Passion does not always hinder the act of reason altogether: consequently the reason remains in possession of its free-will, + so as to turn away from God, or turn to Him. If, however, the use of reason be taken away altogether, the sin is no longer + either mortal or venial. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="36925" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36925] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio non semper in suo actu totaliter a passione +impeditur, unde remanet ei liberum arbitrium, ut possit averti vel +converti ad Deum. Si autem totaliter tolleretur usus rationis, iam +non esset peccatum nec mortale nec veniale.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q78" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q78-p0.1">Q. 78. OF THAT CAUSE OF SIN WHICH IS MALICE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q78-p2"> We must now consider the cause of sin on the part of the will, viz. malice: and under this head there are four points of + inquiry: + </p><p id="FS_Q78-p3"><a href="#FS_Q78_A1"> (1) Whether it is possible for anyone to sin through certain malice, i.e. purposely?</a></p><p id="FS_Q78-p4"><a href="#FS_Q78_A2"> (2) Whether everyone that sins through habit, sins through certain malice?</a></p><p id="FS_Q78-p5"><a href="#FS_Q78_A3"> (3) Whether every one that sins through certain malice, sins through habit?</a></p><p id="FS_Q78-p6"><a href="#FS_Q78_A4"> (4) Whether it is more grievous to sin through certain malice, than through passion?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 pr."><a name="36926" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36926] +Iª-IIae q. 78 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causa +peccati quae est ex parte voluntatis, quae dicitur malitia. Et +circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum aliquis possit ex certa +malitia, seu industria, peccare. Secundo, utrum quicumque peccat ex +habitu, peccet ex certa malitia. Tertio, utrum quicumque peccat ex +certa malitia, peccet ex habitu. Quarto, utrum ille qui peccat ex +certa malitia, gravius peccet quam ille qui peccat ex passione.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q78_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q78_A1-p0.1">Q. 78. A. 1. Whether anyone sins through certain malice?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no one sins purposely, or through certain malice. Because ignorance is opposed to purpose or certain malice. + Now "every evil man is ignorant," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1); and it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q78_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.14.22" target="asv">Prov. 14:22</a>): "They err that work evil." Therefore no one sins through certain malice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36927" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36927] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullus peccet ex industria, sive ex +certa malitia. Ignorantia enim opponitur industriae, seu certae +malitiae. Sed omnis malus est ignorans, secundum philosophum. Et +Prov. XIV, dicitur, <i>errant qui operantur malum</i>. Ergo nullus +peccat ex certa malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "no one works intending evil." Now to sin through malice seems to denote the + intention of doing evil [*Alluding to the derivation of "malitia" (malice) from "malum" (evil)] in sinning, because an act + is not denominated from that which is unintentional and accidental. Therefore no one sins through malice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36928" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36928] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>nullus intendens ad +malum operatur</i>. Sed hoc videtur esse peccare ex malitia, +intendere malum in peccando, quod enim est praeter intentionem, est +quasi per accidens, et non denominat actum. Ergo nullus ex malitia +peccat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, malice itself is a sin. If therefore malice is a cause of sin, it follows that sin goes on causing sin indefinitely, + which is absurd. Therefore no one sins through malice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36929" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36929] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +malitia ipsa peccatum est. Si igitur malitia sit causa peccati, +sequetur quod peccatum sit causa peccati in infinitum, quod est +inconveniens. Nullus igitur ex malitia peccat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q78_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.34.27" target="asv">Job 34:27</a>): "[Who] as it were on purpose have revolted from God [Vulg.: 'Him'], and would not understand all His ways." Now to revolt + from God is to sin. Therefore some sin purposely or through certain malice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36930" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36930] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Iob XXXIV, <i>quasi de industria recesserunt a +Deo, et vias eius intelligere noluerunt</i>. Sed recedere a Deo est +peccare. Ergo aliqui peccant ex industria, seu ex certa +malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Man like any other being has naturally an appetite for the good; and so if his appetite incline away to evil, this is due + to corruption or disorder in some one of the principles of man: for it is thus that sin occurs in the actions of natural things. + Now the principles of human acts are the intellect, and the appetite, both rational (i.e. the will) and sensitive. Therefore + even as sin occurs in human acts, sometimes through a defect of the intellect, as when + anyone sins through ignorance, and sometimes through a defect in the sensitive appetite, as when anyone sins through passion, + so too does it occur through a defect consisting in a disorder of the will. Now the will is out of order when it loves more + the lesser good. Again, the consequence of loving a thing less is that one chooses to suffer some hurt in its regard, in order + to obtain a good that one loves more: as when a man, even knowingly, suffers the loss of a limb, that he may save his life + which he loves more. Accordingly when an inordinate will loves some temporal good, e.g. riches or pleasure, more than the + order of reason or Divine law, or Divine charity, or some such thing, it follows that it is willing to suffer the loss of + some spiritual good, so that it may obtain possession of some temporal good. Now evil is merely the privation of some good; + and so a man wishes knowingly a spiritual evil, which is evil simply, whereby he is deprived of a spiritual good, in order + to + possess a temporal good: wherefore he is said to sin through certain malice or on purpose, because he chooses evil knowingly. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 1 co."><a name="36931" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36931] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod homo, sicut et quaelibet alia res, naturaliter habet +appetitum boni. Unde quod ad malum eius appetitus declinet, +contingit ex aliqua corruptione seu inordinatione in aliquo +principiorum hominis, sic enim in actionibus rerum naturalium +peccatum invenitur. Principia autem humanorum actuum sunt +intellectus et appetitus, tam rationalis, qui dicitur voluntas, +quam sensitivus. Peccatum igitur in humanis actibus contingit +quandoque, sicut ex defectu intellectus, puta cum aliquis per +ignorantiam peccat; et ex defectu appetitus sensitivi, sicut cum +aliquis ex passione peccat; ita etiam ex defectu voluntatis, qui +est inordinatio ipsius. Est autem voluntas inordinata, quando minus +bonum magis amat. Consequens autem est ut aliquis eligat pati +detrimentum in bono minus amato, ad hoc quod potiatur bono magis +amato, sicut cum homo vult pati abscissionem membri etiam scienter, +ut conservet vitam, quam magis amat. Et per hunc modum, quando +aliqua inordinata voluntas aliquod bonum temporale plus amat, puta +divitias vel voluptatem, quam ordinem rationis vel legis divinae, +vel caritatem Dei, vel aliquid huiusmodi; sequitur quod velit +dispendium pati in aliquo spiritualium bonorum, ut potiatur aliquo +temporali bono. Nihil autem est aliud malum quam privatio alicuius +boni. Et secundum hoc aliquis scienter vult aliquod malum +spirituale, quod est malum simpliciter, per quod bonum spirituale +privatur, ut bono temporali potiatur. Unde dicitur ex certa +malitia, vel ex industria peccare, quasi scienter malum +eligens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Ignorance sometimes excludes the simple knowledge that a particular action is evil, and then man is said to sin through ignorance: + sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a particular action is evil at this particular moment, as when he sins through passion: + and sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a particular evil is not to be suffered for the sake of possessing a particular + good, but not the simple knowledge that it is an evil: it is thus that + a man is ignorant, when he sins through certain malice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36932" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36932] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ignorantia quandoque quidem excludit scientiam +qua aliquis simpliciter scit hoc esse malum quod agitur, et tunc +dicitur ex ignorantia peccare. Quandoque autem excludit scientiam +qua homo scit hoc nunc esse malum, sicut cum ex passione peccatur. +Quandoque autem excludit scientiam qua aliquis scit hoc malum non +sustinendum esse propter consecutionem illius boni, scit tamen +simpliciter hoc esse malum, et sic dicitur ignorare qui ex certa +malitia peccat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Evil cannot be intended by anyone for its own sake; but it can be intended for the sake of avoiding another evil, or obtaining + another good, as stated above: and in this case anyone would choose to obtain a good intended for its own sake, without suffering + loss of the other good; even as a lustful man would wish to enjoy a pleasure without offending God; but with the two set before + him to choose from, he prefers sinning and thereby incurring God's + anger, to being deprived of the pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36933" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36933] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod malum non potest esse secundum se intentum ab aliquo, +potest tamen esse intentum ad vitandum aliud malum, vel ad +consequendum aliud bonum, ut dictum est. Et in tali casu aliquis +eligeret consequi bonum per se intentum, absque hoc quod pateretur +detrimentum alterius boni. Sicut aliquis lascivus vellet frui +delectatione absque offensa Dei, sed duobus propositis, magis vult +peccando incurrere offensam Dei, quam delectatione privetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The malice through which anyone sins, may be taken to denote habitual malice, in the sense in which the Philosopher (Ethic. + v, 1) calls an evil habit by the name of malice, just as a good habit is called virtue: and in this way anyone is said to + sin through malice when he sins through the inclination of a habit. It may also denote actual malice, whether by malice we + mean the choice itself of evil (and thus anyone is said to sin through malice, in so + far as he sins through making a choice of evil), or whether by malice we mean some previous fault that gives rise to a subsequent + fault, as when anyone impugns the grace of his brother through envy. Nor does this imply that a thing is its own cause: for + the interior act is the cause of the exterior act, and one sin is the cause of another; not indefinitely, however, since we + can trace it back to some previous sin, which is not caused by any previous sin, as was explained above ( + <a href="#FS_Q75_A4" id="FS_Q78_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[4]</a>, ad 3). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36934" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36934] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod malitia ex qua aliquis dicitur peccare, potest +intelligi malitia habitualis, secundum quod habitus malus a +philosopho nominatur malitia, sicut habitus bonus nominatur virtus. +Et secundum hoc aliquis dicitur ex malitia peccare, quia peccat ex +inclinatione habitus. Potest etiam intelligi malitia actualis. Sive +ipsa mali electio malitia nominetur, et sic dicitur aliquis ex +malitia peccare, inquantum ex mali electione peccat. Sive etiam +malitia dicatur aliqua praecedens culpa, ex qua oritur subsequens +culpa, sicut cum aliquis impugnat fraternam gratiam ex invidia. Et +tunc idem non est causa sui ipsius, sed actus interior est causa +actus exterioris. Et unum peccatum est causa alterius, non tamen in +infinitum, quia est devenire ad aliquod primum peccatum, quod non +causatur ex aliquo priori peccato, ut ex supradictis patet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q78_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q78_A2-p0.1">Q. 78. A. 2. Whether everyone that sins through habit, sins through certain malice?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not every one who sins through habit, sins through certain malice. Because sin committed through certain + malice, seems to be most grievous. Now it happens sometimes that a man commits a slight sin through habit, as when he utters + an idle word. Therefore sin committed from habit is not always committed through certain malice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36935" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36935] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnis qui peccat ex habitu, peccet +ex certa malitia. Peccatum enim quod est ex certa malitia, videtur +esse gravissimum. Sed quandoque homo aliquod leve peccatum +committit ex habitu, sicut cum dicit verbum otiosum. Non ergo omne +peccatum quod est ex habitu, est ex certa malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Acts proceeding from habits are like the acts by which those habits were formed" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). But the acts + which precede a vicious habit are not committed through certain malice. Therefore the sins that arise from habit are not committed + through certain malice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36936" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36936] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> +<i>Praeterea, actus ex habitu procedentes sunt similes actibus ex +quibus habitus generantur</i>, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed actus +praecedentes habitum vitiosum non sunt ex certa malitia. Ergo etiam +peccata quae sunt ex habitu, non sunt ex certa malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, when a man commits a sin through certain malice, he is glad after having done it, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q78_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.2.14" target="asv"> Prov. 2:14</a>: "Who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things": and this, because it is pleasant to obtain what + we desire, and to do those actions which are connatural to us by reason of habit. But those who sin through habit, are sorrowful + after committing a sin: because "bad men," i.e. those who have a vicious + habit, "are full of remorse" (Ethic. ix, 4). Therefore sins that arise from habit are not committed through certain malice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36937" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36937] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +in his quae aliquis ex certa malitia committit, gaudet postquam +commisit, secundum illud Prov. II, <i>qui laetantur cum male +fecerint et exultant in rebus pessimis</i>. Et hoc ideo, quia +unicuique est delectabile cum consequitur id quod intendit, et qui +operatur quod est ei quodammodo connaturale secundum habitum. Sed +illi qui peccant ex habitu, post peccatum commissum dolent, +poenitudine enim replentur pravi, idest habentes habitum vitiosum, +ut dicitur in IX Ethic. Ergo peccata quae sunt ex habitu, non sunt +ex certa malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A sin committed through certain malice is one that is done through choice of evil. Now we make choice of those things to + which we are inclined by habit, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2 with regard to virtuous habits. Therefore a sin that arises from + habit is committed through certain malice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36938" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36938] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +peccatum ex certa malitia dicitur esse quod est ex electione mali. +Sed unicuique est eligibile id ad quod inclinatur per proprium +habitum; ut dicitur in VI Ethic. de habitu virtuoso. Ergo peccatum +quod est ex habitu, est ex certa malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There is a difference between a sin committed by one who has the habit, and a sin committed by habit: for it is not necessary + to use a habit, since it is subject to the will of the person who has that habit. Hence habit is defined as being "something + we use when we will," as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q50_A1" id="FS_Q78_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[50], A[1]</a>). And thus, even as it may happen that one who has a vicious habit may break forth into a virtuous act, because a bad habit + does not + corrupt reason altogether, something of which remains unimpaired, the result being that a sinner does some works which are + generically good; so too it may happen sometimes that one who has a vicious habit, acts, not from that habit, but through + the uprising of a passion, or again through ignorance. But whenever he uses the vicious habit he must needs sin through certain + malice: because to anyone that has a habit, whatever is befitting to him in respect of that habit, has the aspect of something + lovable, since it thereby becomes, in a way, connatural to him, according as custom and habit are a second nature. Now the + very thing which befits a man in respect of a vicious habit, is something that excludes a spiritual good: the result being + that a man chooses a spiritual evil, that he may obtain possession of what befits him in respect of that habit: and this is + to sin through certain malice. Wherefore it is evident that whoever sins through habit, sins through certain malice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 2 co."><a name="36939" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36939] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod non est idem peccare habentem habitum, et peccare ex +habitu. Uti enim habitu non est necessarium, sed subiacet voluntati +habentis, unde et habitus definitur esse quo quis utitur cum +voluerit. Et ideo sicut potest contingere quod aliquis habens +habitum vitiosum, prorumpat in actum virtutis, eo quod ratio non +totaliter corrumpitur per malum habitum, sed aliquid eius integrum +manet, ex quo provenit quod peccator aliqua operatur de genere +bonorum; ita etiam potest contingere quod aliquis habens habitum, +interdum non ex habitu operetur, sed ex passione insurgente, vel +etiam ex ignorantia. Sed quandocumque utitur habitu vitioso, +necesse est quod ex certa malitia peccet. Quia unicuique habenti +habitum, est per se diligibile id quod est ei conveniens secundum +proprium habitum, quia fit ei quodammodo connaturale, secundum quod +consuetudo et habitus vertitur in naturam. Hoc autem quod est +alicui conveniens secundum habitum vitiosum, est id quod excludit +bonum spirituale. Ex quo sequitur quod homo eligat malum +spirituale, ut adipiscatur bonum quod est ei secundum habitum +conveniens. Et hoc est ex certa malitia peccare. Unde manifestum +est quod quicumque peccat ex habitu, peccet ex certa malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Venial sin does not exclude spiritual good, consisting in the grace of God or charity. Wherefore it is an evil, not simply, + but in a relative sense: and for that reason the habit thereof is not a simple but a relative evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36940" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36940] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod peccata venialia non excludunt bonum spirituale, +quod est gratia Dei vel caritas. Unde non dicuntur mala +simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Et propter hoc nec habitus ipsorum +possunt dici simpliciter mali, sed solum secundum quid.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Acts proceeding from habits are of like species as the acts from which those habits were formed: but they differ from them + as perfect from imperfect. Such is the difference between sin committed through certain malice and sin committed through passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36941" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36941] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod actus qui procedunt ex habitibus, sunt similes +secundum speciem actibus ex quibus habitus generantur, differunt +tamen ab eis sicut perfectum ab imperfecto. Et talis est +differentia peccati quod committitur ex certa malitia, ad peccatum +quod committitur ex aliqua passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He that sins through habit is always glad for what he does through habit, as long as he uses the habit. But since he is able + not to use the habit, and to think of something else, by means of his reason, which is not altogether corrupted, it may happen + that while not using the habit he is sorry for what he has done through the habit. And so it often happens that such a man + is sorry for his sin not because sin in itself is displeasing to him, but on + account of his reaping some disadvantage from the sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36942" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36942] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ille qui peccat ex habitu, semper gaudet de hoc quod +ex habitu operatur, quandiu habitu utitur. Sed quia potest habitu +non uti, sed per rationem, quae non est totaliter corrupta, aliquid +aliud meditari; potest contingere quod, non utens habitu, doleat de +hoc quod per habitum commisit. Plerumque tamen tales poenitent de +peccato, non quia eis peccatum secundum se displiceat; sed propter +aliquod incommodum quod ex peccato incurrunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q78_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q78_A3-p0.1">Q. 78. A. 3. Whether one who sins through certain malice, sins through habit?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that whoever sins through certain malice, sins through habit. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 9) that "an + unjust action is not done as an unjust man does it," i.e. through choice, "unless it be done through habit." Now to sin through + certain malice is to sin through making a choice of evil, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q78_A1" id="FS_Q78_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore no one sins through certain malice, unless he has the habit of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36943" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36943] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod quicumque peccat ex certa malitia, +peccet ex habitu. Dicit enim philosophus, in V Ethic., quod non est +cuiuslibet iniusta facere qualiter iniustus facit, scilicet ex +electione, sed solum habentis habitum. Sed peccare ex certa malitia +est peccare ex electione mali, ut dictum est. Ergo peccare ex certa +malitia non est nisi habentis habitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Origen says (Peri Archon iii) that "a man is not suddenly ruined and lost, but must needs fall away little by little." + But the greatest fall seems to be that of the man who sins through certain malice. Therefore a man comes to sin through certain + malice, not from the outset, but from inveterate custom, which may engender a habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36944" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36944] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Origenes dicit, in I peri archon, quod <i>non ad subitum quis +evacuatur aut deficit, sed paulatim per partes defluere necesse +est</i>. Sed maximus defluxus esse videtur ut aliquis ex certa +malitia peccet. Ergo non statim a principio, sed per multam +consuetudinem, ex qua habitus generari potest, aliquis ad hoc +devenit ut ex certa malitia peccet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whenever a man sins through certain malice, his will must needs be inclined of itself to the evil he chooses. But + by the nature of that power man is inclined, not to evil but to good. Therefore if he chooses evil, this must be due to something + supervening, which is passion or habit. Now when a man sins through passion, he sins not through certain malice, but through + weakness, as stated ( + <a href="#FS_Q77_A3" id="FS_Q78_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[77], A[3]</a>). Therefore whenever anyone + sins through certain malice, he sins through habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36945" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36945] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quandocumque aliquis ex certa malitia peccat, oportet quod ipsa +voluntas de se inclinetur ad malum quod eligit. Sed ex natura +potentiae non inclinatur homo ad malum, sed magis ad bonum. Ergo +oportet, si eligit malum, quod hoc sit ex aliquo supervenienti, +quod est passio vel habitus. Sed quando aliquis peccat ex passione, +non peccat ex certa malitia, sed ex infirmitate, ut dictum est. +Ergo quandocumque aliquis peccat ex certa malitia, oportet quod +peccet ex habitu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The good habit stands in the same relation to the choice of something good, as the bad habit to the choice of something evil. + But it happens sometimes that a man, without having the habit of a virtue, chooses that which is good according to that virtue. + Therefore sometimes also a man, without having the habit of a vice, may choose evil, which is to sin through certain malice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36946" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36946] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +sicut se habet habitus bonus ad electionem boni, ita habitus malus +ad electionem mali. Sed quandoque aliquis non habens habitum +virtutis, eligit id quod est bonum secundum virtutem. Ergo etiam +quandoque aliquis non habens habitum vitiosum, potest eligere +malum, quod est ex certa malitia peccare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The will is related differently to good and to evil. Because from the very nature of the power, it is inclined to the rational + good, as its proper object; wherefore every sin is said to be contrary to nature. Hence, if a will be inclined, by its choice, + to some evil, this must be occasioned by something else. Sometimes, in fact, this is occasioned through some defect in the + reason, as when anyone sins through ignorance; and sometimes this arises through the + impulse of the sensitive appetite, as when anyone sins through passion. Yet neither of these amounts to a sin through certain + malice; for then alone does anyone sin through certain malice, when his will is moved to evil of its own accord. This may + happen in two ways. First, through his having a corrupt disposition inclining him to evil, so that, in respect of that disposition, + some evil is, as it were, suitable and similar to him; and to this thing, by reason of its suitableness, the will + tends, as to something good, because everything tends, of its own accord, to that which is suitable to it. Moreover this corrupt + disposition is either a habit acquired by custom, or a sickly condition on the part of the body, as in the case of a man who + is naturally inclined to certain sins, by reason of some natural corruption in himself. Secondly, the will, of its own accord, + may tend to an evil, through the removal of some obstacle: for instance, if a man be prevented from sinning, not + through sin being in itself displeasing to him, but through hope of eternal life, or fear of hell, if hope give place to despair, + or fear to presumption, he will end in sinning through certain malice, being freed from the bridle, as it were. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 3 co."><a name="36947" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36947] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod voluntas aliter se habet ad bonum, et aliter ad +malum. Ex natura enim suae potentiae inclinatur ad bonum rationis, +sicut ad proprium obiectum, unde et omne peccatum dicitur esse +contra naturam. Quod ergo in aliquod malum voluntas eligendo +inclinetur, oportet quod aliunde contingat. Et quandoque quidem +contingit ex defectu rationis, sicut cum aliquis ex ignorantia +peccat, quandoque autem ex impulsu appetitus sensitivi, sicut cum +peccat ex passione. Sed neutrum horum est ex certa malitia peccare; +sed tunc solum ex certa malitia aliquis peccat, quando ipsa +voluntas ex seipsa movetur ad malum. Quod potest contingere +dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, per hoc quod homo habet aliquam +dispositionem corruptam inclinantem ad malum, ita quod secundum +illam dispositionem fit homini quasi conveniens et simile aliquod +malum, et in hoc, ratione convenientiae, tendit voluntas quasi in +bonum, quia unumquodque secundum se tendit in id quod sibi est +conveniens. Talis autem dispositio corrupta vel est aliquis habitus +acquisitus ex consuetudine, quae vertitur in naturam, vel est +aliqua aegritudinalis habitudo ex parte corporis, sicut aliquis +habens quasdam naturales inclinationes ad aliqua peccata, propter +corruptionem naturae in ipso. Alio modo contingit quod voluntas per +se tendit in aliquod malum, per remotionem alicuius prohibentis. +Puta si aliquis prohibeatur peccare non quia peccatum ei secundum +se displiceat, sed propter spem vitae aeternae vel propter timorem +Gehennae; remota spe per desperationem, vel timore per +praesumptionem, sequitur quod ex certa malitia, quasi absque freno, +peccet. Sic igitur patet quod peccatum quod est ex certa malitia, +semper praesupponit in homine aliquam inordinationem, quae tamen +non semper est habitus. Unde non est necessarium quod quicumque +peccat ex certa malitia, peccet ex habitu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A3-p7"> It is evident, therefore, that sin committed through certain malice, always presupposes some inordinateness in man, which, + however, is not always a habit: so that it does not follow of necessity, if a man sins through certain malice, that he sins + through habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36948" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36948] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod operari qualiter iniustus operatur, non solum +est operari iniusta ex certa malitia, sed etiam delectabiliter, et +sine gravi renisu rationis. Quod non est nisi eius qui habet +habitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To do an action as an unjust man does, may be not only to do unjust things through certain malice, but also to do them with + pleasure, and without any notable resistance on the part of reason, and this occurs only in one who has a habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36949" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36949] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod non statim ad hoc aliquis labitur quod ex certa +malitia peccet, sed praesupponitur aliquid, quod tamen non semper +est habitus, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is true that a man does not fall suddenly into sin from certain malice, and that something is presupposed; but this something + is not always a habit, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36950" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36950] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod illud propter quod voluntas inclinatur ad malum, non +semper habitus est vel passio, sed quaedam alia, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which inclines the will to evil, is not always a habit or a passion, but at times is something else. Moreover, there + is no comparison between choosing good and choosing evil: because evil is never without some good of nature, whereas good + can be perfect without the evil of fault. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="36951" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36951] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod non est similis ratio de electione boni, et de +electione mali. Quia malum nunquam est sine bono naturae, sed bonum +potest esse sine malo culpae perfecte.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q78_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q78_A4-p0.1">Q. 78. A. 4. Whether it is more grievous to sin through certain malice than through passion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not more grievous to sin through certain malice than through passion. Because ignorance excuses + from sin either altogether or in part. Now ignorance is greater in one who sins through certain malice, than in one who sins + through passion; since he that sins through certain malice suffers from the worst form of ignorance, which according to the + Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) is ignorance of principle, for he has a false estimation of the + end, which is the principle in matters of action. Therefore there is more excuse for one who sins through certain malice, + than for one who sins through passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36952" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36952] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ille qui peccat ex certa malitia, non +peccet gravius quam ille qui peccat ex passione. Ignorantia enim +excusat peccatum vel in toto vel in parte. Sed maior est ignorantia +in eo qui peccat ex certa malitia, quam in eo qui peccat ex +passione, nam ille qui peccat ex certa malitia, patitur ignorantiam +principii, quae est maxima, ut philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic.; +habet enim malam existimationem de fine, qui est principium in +operativis. Ergo magis excusatur a peccato qui peccat ex certa +malitia, quam ille qui peccat ex passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the more a man is impelled to sin, the less grievous his sin, as is clear with regard to a man who is thrown headlong + into sin by a more impetuous passion. Now he that sins through certain malice, is impelled by habit, the impulse of which + is stronger than that of passion. Therefore to sin through habit is less grievous than to sin through passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36953" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36953] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quanto aliquis habet maius impellens ad peccandum, tanto minus +peccat, sicut patet de eo qui maiori impetu passionis deiicitur in +peccatum. Sed ille qui peccat ex certa malitia, impellitur ab +habitu, cuius est fortior impulsio quam passionis. Ergo ille qui +peccat ex habitu, minus peccat quam ille qui peccat ex +passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to sin through certain malice is to sin through choosing evil. Now he that sins through passion, also chooses evil. + Therefore he does not sin less than the man who sins through certain malice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36954" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36954] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +peccare ex certa malitia est peccare ex electione mali. Sed ille +qui peccat ex passione, etiam eligit malum. Ergo non minus peccat +quam ille qui peccat ex certa malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A sin that is committed on purpose, for this very reason deserves heavier punishment, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q78_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.34.26" target="asv"> Job 34:26</a>: "He hath struck them as being wicked, in open sight, who, as it were, on purpose, have revolted from Him." Now punishment + is not increased except for a graver fault. Therefore a sin is aggravated through being done on purpose, i.e. through certain + malice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36955" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36955] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod peccatum quod ex industria committitur, ex hoc ipso +graviorem poenam meretur, secundum illud Iob XXXIV, <i>quasi impios +percussit eos in loco videntium, qui quasi de industria recesserunt +ab eo</i>. Sed poena non augetur nisi propter gravitatem culpae. +Ergo peccatum ex hoc aggravatur, quod est ex industria, seu certa +malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A sin committed through malice is more grievous than a sin committed through passion, for three reasons. First, because, + as sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, it follows that, other things being equal, a sin is all the more grievous, + according as the movement of the sin belongs more to the will. Now when a sin is committed through malice, the movement of + sin belongs more to the will, which is then moved to evil of its own accord, than when a sin is + committed through passion, when the will is impelled to sin by something extrinsic, as it were. Wherefore a sin is aggravated + by the very fact that it is committed through certain malice, and so much the more, as the malice is greater; whereas it is + diminished by being committed through passion, and so much the more, as the passion is stronger. Secondly, because the passion + which incites the will to sin, soon passes away, so that man repents of his sin, and soon returns to his good intentions; + whereas the habit, through which a man sins, is a permanent quality, so that he who sins through malice, abides longer in + his sin. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) compares the intemperate man, who sins through malice, to a sick + man who suffers from a chronic disease, while he compares the incontinent man, who sins through passion, to one who suffers + intermittently. Thirdly, because he who sins through certain malice is ill-disposed in respect of the end itself, which is + the + principle in matters of action; and so the defect is more dangerous than in the case of the man who sins through passion, + whose purpose tends to a good end, although this purpose is interrupted on account of the passion, for the time being. Now + the worst of all defects is defect of principle. Therefore it is evident that a sin committed through malice is more grievous + than one committed through passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 4 co."><a name="36956" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36956] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod peccatum quod est ex certa malitia, est gravius +peccato quod est ex passione, triplici ratione. Primo quidem quia, +cum peccatum principaliter in voluntate consistat, quanto motus +peccati est magis proprius voluntati, tanto peccatum est gravius, +ceteris paribus. Cum autem ex certa malitia peccatur, motus peccati +est magis proprius voluntati, quae ex seipsa in malum movetur, quam +quando ex passione peccatur, quasi ex quodam extrinseco impulsu ad +peccandum. Unde peccatum ex hoc ipso quod est ex malitia, +aggravatur, et tanto magis, quanto fuerit vehementior malitia. Ex +eo vero quod est ex passione, diminuitur, et tanto magis, quanto +passio fuerit magis vehemens. Secundo, quia passio quae inclinat +voluntatem ad peccandum, cito transit, et sic homo cito redit ad +bonum propositum, poenitens de peccato. Sed habitus, quo homo ex +malitia peccat, est qualitas permanens, et ideo qui ex malitia +peccat, diuturnius peccat. Unde philosophus, in VII Ethic., +comparat intemperatum, qui peccat ex malitia, infirmo qui continue +laborat; incontinentem autem, qui peccat ex passione, ei qui +laborat interpolate. Tertio, quia ille qui peccat ex certa malitia, +est male dispositus quantum ad ipsum finem, qui est principium in +operabilibus. Et sic eius defectus est periculosior quam eius qui +ex passione peccat, cuius propositum tendit in bonum finem, licet +hoc propositum interrumpatur ad horam propter passionem. Semper +autem defectus principii est pessimus. Unde manifestum est quod +gravius est peccatum quod est ex malitia, quam quod est ex +passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Ignorance of choice, to which the objection refers, neither excuses nor diminishes a sin, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q76_A4" id="FS_Q78_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[4]</a>). Therefore neither does a greater ignorance of the kind make a sin to be less grave. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36957" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36957] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ignorantia electionis, de qua obiectio procedit, +neque excusat neque diminuit peccatum, ut supra dictum est. Unde +neque maior ignorantia talis facit esse minus peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The impulse due to passion, is, as it were, due to a defect which is outside the will: whereas, by a habit, the will is inclined + from within. Hence the comparison fails. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36958" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36958] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod impulsio quae est ex passione, est quasi ex exteriori +respectu voluntatis, sed per habitum inclinatur voluntas quasi ab +interiori. Unde non est similis ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is one thing to sin while choosing, and another to sin through choosing. For he that sins through passion, sins while + choosing, but not through choosing, because his choosing is not for him the first principle of his sin; for he is induced + through the passion, to choose what he would not choose, were it not for the passion. On the other hand, he that sins through + certain malice, chooses evil of his own accord, in the way already explained ( + <a href="#FS_Q78_A2" id="FS_Q78_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,3), so that his choosing, of which he has full control, is the principle of his sin: and for this reason he is said to sin + "through" choosing. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36959" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36959] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod aliud est peccare eligentem, et aliud peccare ex +electione. Ille enim qui peccat ex passione, peccat quidem eligens, +non tamen ex electione, quia electio non est in eo primum peccati +principium, sed inducitur ex passione ad eligendum id quod extra +passionem existens non eligeret. Sed ille qui peccat ex certa +malitia, secundum se eligit malum, eo modo quo dictum est. Et ideo +electio in ipso est principium peccati; et propter hoc dicitur ex +electione peccare.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q79" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q79-p0.1">Q. 79. OF THE EXTERNAL CAUSES OF SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q79-p2"> We must now consider the external causes of sin, and (1) on the part of God; (2) on the part of the devil; (3) on the part + of man. + </p><p id="FS_Q79-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q79-p4"><a href="#FS_Q79_A1"> (1) Whether God is a cause of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q79-p5"><a href="#FS_Q79_A2"> (2) Whether the act of sin is from God?</a></p><p id="FS_Q79-p6"><a href="#FS_Q79_A3"> (3) Whether God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart?</a></p><p id="FS_Q79-p7"><a href="#FS_Q79_A4"> (4) Whether these things are directed to the salvation of those who are blinded or hardened?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 pr."><a name="36960" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36960] +Iª-IIae q. 79 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +causis exterioribus peccati. Et primo, ex parte Dei; secundo, ex +parte Diaboli; tertio, ex parte hominis. Circa primum quaeruntur +quatuor. Primo, utrum Deus sit causa peccati. Secundo, utrum actus +peccati sit a Deo. Tertio, utrum Deus sit causa excaecationis et +obdurationis. Quarto, utrum haec ordinentur ad salutem eorum qui +excaecantur vel obdurantur.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q79_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q79_A1-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 1. Whether God is a cause of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God is a cause of sin. For the Apostle says of certain ones ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.28" target="asv">Rom. 1:28</a>): "God delivered them up to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are not right [Douay: 'convenient']," and a gloss + comments on this by saying that "God works in men's hearts, by inclining their wills to whatever He wills, whether to good + or to evil." Now sin consists in doing what is not right, and in having a will inclined to evil. Therefore + God is to man a cause of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36961" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36961] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus sit causa peccati. Dicit enim +apostolus, Rom. I, de quibusdam, <i>tradidit eos Deus in reprobum +sensum, ut faciant ea quae non conveniunt</i>. Et Glossa ibidem +dicit quod <i>Deus operatur in cordibus hominum, inclinando +voluntates eorum in quodcumque voluerit, sive in bonum sive in +malum</i>. Sed facere quae non conveniunt, et inclinari secundum +voluntatem ad malum, est peccatum. Ergo Deus hominibus est causa +peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.11" target="asv">Wis. 14:11</a>): "The creatures of God are turned to an abomination; and a temptation to the souls of men." But a temptation usually denotes + a provocation to sin. Since therefore creatures were made by God alone, as was established in the + <a href="FP_iv.html#FP_Q44_A1" id="FS_Q79_A1-p3.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[44], A[1]</a>, it seems that God is a cause of sin, by provoking man to sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36962" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36962] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Sap. XIV, dicitur, <i>creaturae Dei in odium factae sunt, et in +tentationem animae hominum</i>. Sed tentatio solet dici provocatio +ad peccandum. Cum ergo creaturae non sint factae nisi a Deo, ut in +primo habitum est, videtur quod Deus sit causa peccati provocans +homines ad peccandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the cause of the cause is the cause of the effect. Now God is the cause of the free-will, which itself is the cause + of sin. Therefore God is the cause of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36963" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36963] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quidquid est causa causae, est causa effectus. Sed Deus est causa +liberi arbitrii, quod est causa peccati. Ergo Deus est causa +peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, every evil is opposed to good. But it is not contrary to God's goodness that He should cause the evil of punishment; + since of this evil it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.45.7" target="asv">Is. 45:7</a>) that God creates evil, and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Amos.3.6" target="asv">Amos 3:6</a>): "Shall there be evil in the city which God [Vulg.: 'the Lord'] hath not done?" Therefore it is not incompatible with God's + goodness that He should cause the evil of fault. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="36964" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36964] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +omne malum opponitur bono. Sed non repugnat divinae bonitati quod +ipse sit causa mali poenae, de isto enim malo dicitur Isaiae XLV, +quod <i>Deus est creans malum</i>; et Amos III, <i>si est malum in +civitate quod Deus non fecerit?</i> Ergo etiam divinae bonitati non +repugnat quod Deus sit causa culpae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.25" target="asv">Wis. 11:25</a>): "Thou . . . hatest none of the things which Thou hast made." Now God hates sin, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.9" target="asv">Wis. 14:9</a>: "To God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful." Therefore God is not a cause of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36965" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36965] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +Sap. XI, dicitur de Deo, <i>nihil odisti eorum quae fecisti</i>. +Odit autem Deus peccatum, secundum illud Sap. XIV, <i>odio est Deo +impius, et impietas eius</i>. Ergo Deus non est causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Man is, in two ways, a cause either of his own or of another's sin. First, directly, namely be inclining his or another's + will to sin; secondly, indirectly, namely be not preventing someone from sinning. Hence ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.3.18" target="asv">Ezech. 3:18</a>) it is said to the watchman: "If thou say not to the wicked: 'Thou shalt surely die' [*Vulg.: "If, when I say to the wicked, + 'Thou shalt surely die,' thou declare it not to him."] . . . I will require his blood at thy + hand." Now God cannot be directly the cause of sin, either in Himself or in another, since every sin is a departure from the + order which is to God as the end: whereas God inclines and turns all things to Himself as to their last end, as Dionysius + states (Div. Nom. i): so that it is impossible that He should be either to Himself or to another the cause of departing from + the order which is to Himself. Therefore He cannot be directly the cause of sin. In like manner neither can He cause sin + indirectly. For it happens that God does not give some the assistance, whereby they may avoid sin, which assistance were He + to give, they would not sin. But He does all this according to the order of His wisdom and justice, since He Himself is Wisdom + and Justice: so that if someone sin it is not imputable to Him as though He were the cause of that sin; even as a pilot is + not said to cause the wrecking of the ship, through not steering the ship, unless he cease to steer while able and bound to + steer. It is therefore evident that God is nowise a cause of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 co."><a name="36966" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36966] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod homo dupliciter est causa peccati vel sui vel +alterius. Uno modo, directe, inclinando scilicet voluntatem suam +vel alterius ad peccandum. Alio modo, indirecte, dum scilicet non +retrahit aliquos a peccato, unde Ezech. III speculatori dicitur, +<i>si non dixeris impio, morte morieris, sanguinem eius de manu tua +requiram</i>. Deus autem non potest esse directe causa peccati vel +sui vel alterius. Quia omne peccatum est per recessum ab ordine qui +est in ipsum sicut in finem. Deus autem omnia inclinat et convertit +in seipsum sicut in ultimum finem, sicut Dionysius dicit, I cap. de +Div. Nom. Unde impossibile est quod sit sibi vel aliis causa +discedendi ab ordine qui est in ipsum. Unde non potest directe esse +causa peccati. Similiter etiam neque indirecte. Contingit enim quod +Deus aliquibus non praebet auxilium ad vitandum peccata, quod si +praeberet, non peccarent. Sed hoc totum facit secundum ordinem suae +sapientiae et iustitiae, cum ipse sit sapientia et iustitia. Unde +non imputatur ei quod alius peccat, sicut causae peccati, sicut +gubernator non dicitur causa submersionis navis ex hoc quod non +gubernat navem, nisi quando subtrahit gubernationem potens et +debens gubernare. Et sic patet quod Deus nullo modo est causa +peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As to the words of the Apostle, the solution is clear from the text. For if God delivered some up to a reprobate sense, it + follows that they already had a reprobate sense, so as to do what was not right. Accordingly He is said to deliver them up + to a reprobate sense, in so far as He does not hinder them from following that reprobate sense, even as we are said to expose + a person to danger if we do not protect him. The saying of Augustine (De Grat. et + Lib. Arb. xxi, whence the gloss quoted is taken) to the effect that "God inclines men's wills to good and evil," is to be + understood as meaning that He inclines the will directly to good; and to evil, in so far as He does not hinder it, as stated + above. And yet even this is due as being deserved through a previous sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36967" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36967] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, quantum ad verba apostoli, ex ipso textu patet +solutio. Si enim Deus tradit aliquos in reprobum sensum, iam ergo +reprobum sensum habent ad faciendum ea quae non conveniunt. Dicitur +ergo tradere eos in reprobum sensum, inquantum non prohibet eos +quin suum sensum reprobum sequantur, sicut dicimur exponere illos +quos non tuemur. Quod autem Augustinus dicit, in libro de gratia et +libero arbitrio, unde sumpta est Glossa, quod <i>Deus inclinat +voluntates hominum in bonum et malum</i>; sic intelligendum est +quod in bonum quidem directe inclinat voluntatem, in malum autem +inquantum non prohibet, sicut dictum est. Et tamen hoc etiam +contingit ex merito praecedentis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When it is said the "creatures of God are turned 'to' an abomination, and a temptation to the souls of men," the preposition + "to" does not denote causality but sequel [*This is made clear by the Douay Version: the Latin "factae sunt in abominationem" + admits of the translation "were made to be an abomination," which might imply causality.]; for God did not make the creatures + that they might be an evil to man; this was the result of man's folly, + wherefore the text goes on to say, "and a snare to the feet of the unwise," who, to wit, in their folly, use creatures for + a purpose other than that for which they were made. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36968" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36968] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, cum dicitur, <i>creaturae Dei factae sunt in odium +et in tentationem animae hominum</i>, haec praepositio in non +ponitur causaliter, sed consecutive, non enim Deus fecit creaturas +ad malum hominum, sed hoc consecutum est propter insipientiam +hominum. Unde subditur, et in muscipulam pedibus insipientium, qui +scilicet per suam insipientiam utuntur creaturis ad aliud quam ad +quod factae sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The effect which proceeds from the middle cause, according as it is subordinate to the first cause, is reduced to that first + cause; but if it proceed from the middle cause, according as it goes outside the order of the first cause, it is not reduced + to that first cause: thus if a servant do anything contrary to his master's orders, it is not ascribed to the master as though + he were the cause thereof. In like manner sin, which the free-will commits + against the commandment of God, is not attributed to God as being its cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36969" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36969] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod effectus causae mediae procedens ab ea secundum quod +subditur ordini causae primae, reducitur etiam in causam primam. +Sed si procedat a causa media secundum quod exit ordinem causae +primae, non reducitur in causam primam, sicut si minister faciat +aliquid contra mandatum domini, hoc non reducitur in dominum sicut +in causam. Et similiter peccatum quod liberum arbitrium committit +contra praeceptum Dei, non reducitur in Deum sicut in causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Punishment is opposed to the good of the person punished, who is thereby deprived of some good or other: but fault is opposed + to the good of subordination to God; and so it is directly opposed to the Divine goodness; consequently there is no comparison + between fault and punishment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="36970" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36970] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod poena opponitur bono eius qui punitur, qui privatur +quocumque bono. Sed culpa opponitur bono ordinis qui est in Deum, +unde directe opponitur bonitati divinae. Et propter hoc non est +similis ratio de culpa et poena.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q79_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q79_A2-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 2. Whether the act of sin is from God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the act of sin is not from God. For Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. ii) that "the act of sin is not + a thing." Now whatever is from God is a thing. Therefore the act of sin is not from God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36971" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36971] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus peccati non sit a Deo. Dicit +enim Augustinus, in libro de perfectione iustitiae, quod <i>actus +peccati non est res aliqua</i>. Omne autem quod est a Deo, est res +aliqua. Ergo actus peccati non est a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man is not said to be the cause of sin, except because he is the cause of the sinful act: for "no one works, intending + evil," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Now God is not a cause of sin, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q79_A1" id="FS_Q79_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore God is not the cause of the act of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36972" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36972] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +homo non dicitur esse causa peccati nisi quia homo est causa actus +peccati, nullus enim intendens ad malum operatur, ut Dionysius +dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed Deus non est causa peccati, ut +dictum est. Ergo Deus non est causa actus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some actions are evil and sinful in their species, as was shown above (Q[18], AA[2],8). Now whatever is the cause + of a thing, causes whatever belongs to it in respect of its species. If therefore God caused the act of sin, He would be the + cause of sin, which is false, as was proved above + <a href="#FS_Q79_A1" id="FS_Q79_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore God is not the cause of the act of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36973" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36973] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +aliqui actus secundum suam speciem sunt mali et peccata, ut ex +supradictis patet. Sed quidquid est causa alicuius, est causa eius +quod convenit ei secundum suam speciem. Si ergo Deus esset causa +actus peccati, sequeretur quod esset causa peccati. Sed hoc non est +verum, ut ostensum est. Ergo Deus non est causa actus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The act of sin is a movement of the free-will. Now "the will of God is the cause of every movement," as Augustine declares + (De Trin. iii, 4,9). Therefore God's will is the cause of the act of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36974" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36974] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +actus peccati est quidam motus liberi arbitrii. Sed voluntas Dei +est causa omnium motionum, ut Augustinus dicit, III de Trin. Ergo +voluntas Dei est causa actus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The act of sin is both a being and an act; and in both respects it is from God. Because every being, whatever the mode of + its being, must be derived from the First Being, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. v). Again every action is caused by something + existing in act, since nothing produces an action save in so far as it is in act; and every being in act is reduced to the + First Act, viz. God, as to its cause, Who is act by His Essence. Therefore God is the + cause of every action, in so far as it is an action. But sin denotes a being and an action with a defect: and this defect + is from the created cause, viz. the free-will, as falling away from the order of the First Agent, viz. God. Consequently this + defect is not reduced to God as its cause, but to the free-will: even as the defect of limping is reduced to a crooked leg + as its cause, but not to the motive power, which nevertheless causes whatever there is of movement in the limping. Accordingly + God is the cause of the act of sin: and yet He is not the cause of sin, because He does not cause the act to have a defect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 2 co."><a name="36975" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36975] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod actus peccati et est ens, et est actus; et ex utroque +habet quod sit a Deo. Omne enim ens, quocumque modo sit, oportet +quod derivetur a primo ente; ut patet per Dionysium, V cap. de Div. +Nom. Omnis autem actio causatur ab aliquo existente in actu, quia +nihil agit nisi secundum quod est actu, omne autem ens actu +reducitur in primum actum, scilicet Deum, sicut in causam, qui est +per suam essentiam actus. Unde relinquitur quod Deus sit causa +omnis actionis, inquantum est actio. Sed peccatum nominat ens et +actionem cum quodam defectu. Defectus autem ille est ex causa +creata, scilicet libero arbitrio, inquantum deficit ab ordine primi +agentis, scilicet Dei. Unde defectus iste non reducitur in Deum +sicut in causam, sed in liberum arbitrium, sicut defectus +claudicationis reducitur in tibiam curvam sicut in causam, non +autem in virtutem motivam, a qua tamen causatur quidquid est +motionis in claudicatione. Et secundum hoc, Deus est causa actus +peccati, non tamen est causa peccati, quia non est causa huius, +quod actus sit cum defectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In this passage Augustine calls by the name of "thing," that which is a thing simply, viz. substance; for in this sense the + act of sin is not a thing. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36976" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36976] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Augustinus nominat ibi rem id quod est res +simpliciter, scilicet substantiam. Sic enim actus peccati non est +res.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not only the act, but also the defect, is reduced to man as its cause, which defect consists in man not being subject to + Whom he ought to be, although he does not intend this principally. Wherefore man is the cause of the sin: while God is the + cause of the act, in such a way, that nowise is He the cause of the defect accompanying the act, so that He is not the cause + of the sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36977" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36977] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod in hominem sicut in causam reducitur non solum actus, +sed etiam ipse defectus, quia scilicet non subditur ei cui debet +subdi, licet hoc ipse non intendat principaliter. Et ideo homo est +causa peccati. Sed Deus sic est causa actus, quod nullo modo est +causa defectus concomitantis actum. Et ideo non est causa +peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q72_A1" id="FS_Q79_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[72], A[1]</a>), acts and habits do not take their species from the privation itself, wherein consists the nature of evil, but from some + object, to which that privation is united: and so this defect which consists in not being from God, belongs to the species + of the act consequently, and not as a specific difference. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36978" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36978] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est supra, actus et habitus non +recipiunt speciem ex ipsa privatione, in qua consistit ratio mali; +sed ex aliquo obiecto cui coniungitur talis privatio. Et sic ipse +defectus, qui dicitur non esse a Deo, pertinet ad speciem actus +consequenter, et non quasi differentia specifica.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q79_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q79_A3-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 3. Whether God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. + 3) that God is not the cause of that which makes man worse. Now man is made worse by spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. + Therefore God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36979" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36979] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit causa excaecationis et +indurationis. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium +quaest., quod <i>Deus non est causa eius quod homo sit +deterior</i>. Sed per excaecationem et obdurationem fit homo +deterior. Ergo Deus non est causa excaecationis et +obdurationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Fulgentius says (De Dupl. Praedest. i, 19): "God does not punish what He causes." Now God punishes the hardened + heart, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.3.27" target="asv"> Ecclus. 3:27</a>: "A hard heart shall fear evil at the last." Therefore God is not the cause of hardness of heart. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36980" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36980] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Fulgentius dicit quod <i>Deus non est ultor illius rei cuius est +auctor</i>. Sed Deus est ultor cordis obdurati, secundum illud +Eccli. III, <i>cor durum male habebit in novissimo</i>. Ergo Deus +non est causa obdurationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same effect is not put down to contrary causes. But the cause of spiritual blindness is said to be the malice + of man, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.2.21" target="asv"> Wis. 2:21</a>: "For their own malice blinded them," and again, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.4.4" target="asv">2 Cor. 4:4</a>: "The god of this world hath blinded the minds of unbelievers": which causes seem to be opposed to God. Therefore God is + not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36981" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36981] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +idem effectus non attribuitur causis contrariis. Sed causa +excaecationis dicitur esse malitia hominis, secundum illud Sap. II, +<i>excaecavit enim eos malitia eorum</i>; et etiam Diabolus, +secundum illud II ad Cor. IV, <i>Deus huius saeculi excaecavit +mentes infidelium</i>; quae quidem causae videntur esse contrariae +Deo. Deus ergo non est causa excaecationis et obdurationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.10" target="asv">Is. 6:10</a>): "Blind the heart of this people, and make their ears heavy," and + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.18" target="asv"> Rom. 9:18</a>: "He hath mercy on whom He will, and whom He will He hardeneth." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36982" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36982] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Isaiae VI, <i>excaeca cor populi huius, et aures +eius aggrava</i>. Et Rom. IX dicitur, <i>cuius vult, miseretur; et +quem vult, indurat</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q79_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Spiritual blindness and hardness of heart imply two things. One is the movement of the human mind in cleaving to evil, and + turning away from the Divine light; and as regards this, God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart, + just as He is not the cause of sin. The other thing is the withdrawal of grace, the result of which is that the mind is not + enlightened by God to see aright, and man's heart is not softened to live aright; and as + regards this God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. + </p><p id="FS_Q79_A3-p7"> Now we must consider that God is the universal cause of the enlightening of souls, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.9" target="asv"> Jn. 1:9</a>: "That was the true light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world," even as the sun is the universal cause + of the enlightening of bodies, though not in the same way; for the sun enlightens by necessity of nature, whereas God works + freely, through the order of His wisdom. Now although the sun, so far as it is concerned, enlightens all + bodies, yet if it be encountered by an obstacle in a body, it leaves it in darkness, as happens to a house whose window-shutters + are closed, although the sun is in no way the cause of the house being darkened, since it does not act of its own accord in + failing to light up the interior of the house; and the cause of this is the person who closed the shutters. On the other hand, + God, of His own accord, withholds His grace from those in whom He finds an obstacle: so that the cause of grace being + withheld is not only the man who raises an obstacle to grace; but God, Who, of His own accord, withholds His grace. In this + way, God is the cause of spiritual blindness, deafness of ear, and hardness of heart. + </p><p id="FS_Q79_A3-p8"> These differ from one another in respect of the effects of grace, which both perfects the intellect by the gift of wisdom, + and softens the affections by the fire of charity. And since two of the senses excel in rendering service to the intellect, + viz. sight and hearing, of which the former assists "discovery," and the latter, "teaching," hence it is that spiritual "blindness" + corresponds to sight, "heaviness of the ears" to hearing, and "hardness of heart" to the affections. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 3 co."><a name="36983" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36983] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod excaecatio et obduratio duo important. Quorum unum +est motus animi humani inhaerentis malo, et aversi a divino lumine. +Et quantum ad hoc Deus non est causa excaecationis et obdurationis, +sicut non est causa peccati. Aliud autem est subtractio gratiae, ex +qua sequitur quod mens divinitus non illuminetur ad recte videndum, +et cor hominis non emolliatur ad recte vivendum. Et quantum ad hoc +Deus est causa excaecationis et obdurationis. Est autem +considerandum quod Deus est causa universalis illuminationis +animarum, secundum illud Ioan. I, <i>erat lux vera quae illuminat +omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum</i>, sicut sol est +universalis causa illuminationis corporum. Aliter tamen et aliter, +nam sol agit illuminando per necessitatem naturae; Deus autem agit +voluntarie, per ordinem suae sapientiae. Sol autem, licet quantum +est de se omnia corpora illuminet, si quod tamen impedimentum +inveniat in aliquo corpore, relinquit illud tenebrosum, sicut patet +de domo cuius fenestrae sunt clausae. Sed tamen illius +obscurationis nullo modo causa est sol, non enim suo iudicio agit +ut lumen interius non immittat, sed causa eius est solum ille qui +claudit fenestram. Deus autem proprio iudicio lumen gratiae non +immittit illis in quibus obstaculum invenit. Unde causa +subtractionis gratiae est non solum ille qui ponit obstaculum +gratiae, sed etiam Deus, qui suo iudicio gratiam non apponit. Et +per hunc modum Deus est causa excaecationis, et aggravationis +aurium, et obdurationis cordis. Quae quidem distinguuntur secundum +effectus gratiae, quae et perficit intellectum dono sapientiae, et +affectum emollit igne caritatis. Et quia ad cognitionem intellectus +maxime deserviunt duo sensus, scilicet visus et auditus, quorum +unus deservit inventioni, scilicet visus, alius disciplinae, +scilicet auditus, ideo quantum ad visum, ponitur excaecatio; +quantum ad auditum, aurium aggravatio; quantum ad affectum, +obduratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Blindness and hardheartedness, as regards the withholding of grace, are punishments, and therefore, in this respect, they + make man no worse. It is because he is already worsened by sin that he incurs them, even as other punishments. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36984" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36984] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, cum excaecatio et induratio, ex parte +subtractionis gratiae, sint quaedam poenae, ex hac parte eis homo +non fit deterior, sed deterior factus per culpam, haec incurrit, +sicut et ceteras poenas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument considers hardheartedness in so far as it is a sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36985" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36985] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de obduratione secundum quod +est culpa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Malice is the demeritorious cause of blindness, just as sin is the cause of punishment: and in this way too, the devil is + said to blind, in so far as he induces man to sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36986" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36986] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod malitia est causa excaecationis meritoria, sicut +culpa est causa poenae. Et hoc etiam modo Diabolus excaecare +dicitur, inquantum inducit ad culpam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q79_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q79_A4-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 4. Whether blindness and hardness of heart are directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that blindness and hardness of heart are always directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened. + For Augustine says (Enchiridion xi) that "as God is supremely good, He would nowise allow evil to be done, unless He could + draw some good from every evil." Much more, therefore, does He direct to some good, the evil of which He Himself is the cause. + Now God is the cause of blindness and hardness of heart, as stated above + + <a href="#FS_Q79_A3" id="FS_Q79_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. Therefore they are directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36987" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36987] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod excaecatio et obduratio semper +ordinentur ad salutem eius qui excaecatur et obduratur. Dicit enim +Augustinus, in Enchirid., quod <i>Deus, cum sit summe bonus, nullo +modo permitteret fieri aliquod malum, nisi posset ex quolibet malo +elicere bonum</i>. Multo igitur magis ordinat ad bonum illud malum +cuius ipse est causa. Sed excaecationis et obdurationis Deus est +causa, ut dictum est. Ergo haec ordinantur ad salutem eius qui +excaecatur vel induratur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.13" target="asv">Wis. 1:13</a>) that "God hath no pleasure in the destruction of the ungodly [*Vulg.: 'God made not death, neither hath He pleasure in the + destruction of the living.']." Now He would seem to take pleasure in their destruction, if He did not turn their blindness + to their profit: just as a physician would seem to take pleasure in torturing the invalid, if he did not intend to heal the + invalid when he prescribes a bitter + medicine for him. Therefore God turns blindness to the profit of those who are blinded. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36988" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36988] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Sap. I dicitur quod <i>Deus non delectatur in perditione +impiorum</i>. Videretur autem in eorum perditione delectari, si +eorum excaecationem in bonum eorum non converteret, sicut medicus +videretur delectari in afflictione infirmi, si medicinam amaram, +quam infirmo propinat, ad eius sanitatem non ordinaret. Ergo Deus +excaecationem convertit in bonum excaecatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "God is not a respecter of persons" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.10.34" target="asv">Acts 10:34</a>). Now He directs the blinding of some, to their salvation, as in the case of some of the Jews, who were blinded so as not + to believe in Christ, and, through not believing, to slay Him, and afterwards were seized with compunction, and converted, + as related by Augustine (De Quaest. Evang. iii). Therefore God turns all blindness to the spiritual welfare of those who are + blinded. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36989" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36989] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> +<i>Praeterea, Deus non est personarum acceptor</i>, ut dicitur Act. +X. Sed quorundam excaecationem ordinat ad eorum salutem, sicut +quorundam Iudaeorum, qui excaecati sunt ut Christo non crederent, +et non credentes occiderent, et postmodum compuncti converterentur, +sicut de quibusdam legitur Act. II; ut patet per Augustinum, in +libro de quaest. Evang. Ergo Deus omnium excaecationem convertit in +eorum salutem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> On the other hand, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.8" target="asv"> Rom. 3:8, </a> evil should not be done, that good may ensue. Now blindness is an evil. Therefore God does not blind some for the sake of + their welfare. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36990" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36990] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +non sunt facienda mala ut veniant bona, ut dicitur Rom. III. Sed +excaecatio est malum. Ergo Deus non excaecat aliquos propter eorum +bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Blindness is a kind of preamble to sin. Now sin has a twofold relation---to one thing directly, viz. to the sinner's damnation---to + another, by reason of God's mercy or providence, viz. that the sinner may be healed, in so far as God permits some to fall + into sin, that by acknowledging their sin, they may be humbled and converted, as Augustine states (De Nat. et Grat. xxii). + Therefore blindness, of its very nature, is directed to the damnation of those who + are blinded; for which reason it is accounted an effect of reprobation. But, through God's mercy, temporary blindness is directed + medicinally to the spiritual welfare of those who are blinded. This mercy, however, is not vouchsafed to all those who are + blinded, but only to the predestinated, to whom "all things work together unto good" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.28" target="asv">Rom. 8:28</a>). Therefore as regards some, blindness is directed to their healing; but as regards others, to their damnation; as Augustine + says + (De Quaest. Evang. iii). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 4 co."><a name="36991" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36991] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod excaecatio est quoddam praeambulum ad peccatum. +Peccatum autem ad duo ordinatur, ad unum quidem per se, scilicet ad +damnationem; ad aliud autem ex misericordi Dei providentia, +scilicet ad sanationem, inquantum Deus permittit aliquos cadere in +peccatum, ut peccatum suum agnoscentes, humilientur et +convertantur, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de natura et gratia. +Unde et excaecatio ex sui natura ordinatur ad damnationem eius qui +excaecatur, propter quod etiam ponitur reprobationis effectus, sed +ex divina misericordia excaecatio ad tempus ordinatur medicinaliter +ad salutem eorum qui excaecantur. Sed haec misericordia non omnibus +impenditur excaecatis, <i>sed praedestinatis solum, quibus omnia +cooperantur in bonum</i>, sicut dicitur Rom. VIII. Unde quantum ad +quosdam, excaecatio ordinatur ad sanationem, quantum autem ad +alios, ad damnationem, ut Augustinus dicit, in III de quaest. +Evang.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Every evil that God does, or permits to be done, is directed to some good; yet not always to the good of those in whom the + evil is, but sometimes to the good of others, or of the whole universe: thus He directs the sin of tyrants to the good of + the martyrs, and the punishment of the lost to the glory of His justice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36992" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36992] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod omnia mala quae Deus facit vel permittit fieri, +ordinantur in aliquod bonum, non tamen semper in bonum eius in quo +est malum, sed quandoque ad bonum alterius, vel etiam totius +universi. Sicut culpam tyrannorum ordinavit in bonum martyrum; et +poenam damnatorum ordinat in gloriam suae iustitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God does not take pleasure in the loss of man, as regards the loss itself, but by reason of His justice, or of the good that + ensues from the loss. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36993" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36993] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod Deus non delectatur in perditione hominum quantum ad +ipsam perditionem, sed ratione suae iustitiae, vel propter bonum +quod inde provenit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That God directs the blindness of some to their spiritual welfare, is due to His mercy; but that the blindness of others + is directed to their loss is due to His justice: and that He vouchsafes His mercy to some, and not to all, does not make God + a respecter of persons, as explained in the + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q23_A5" id="FS_Q79_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[23], A[5]</a>, ad 3. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36994" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36994] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod hoc quod Deus aliquorum excaecationem ordinat in +eorum salutem, misericordiae est, quod autem excaecatio aliorum +ordinetur ad eorum damnationem, iustitiae est. Quod autem +misericordiam quibusdam impendit et non omnibus, non facit +personarum acceptionem in Deo, sicut in primo dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Evil of fault must not be done, that good may ensue; but evil of punishment must be inflicted for the sake of good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="36995" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36995] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod mala culpae non sunt facienda ut veniant bona, sed +mala poenae sunt inferenda propter bonum.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q80" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q80-p0.1">Q. 80. OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, AS REGARDS THE DEVIL (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q80-p2"> We must now consider the cause of sin, as regards the devil; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q80-p3"><a href="#FS_Q80_A1"> (1) Whether the devil is directly the cause of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q80-p4"><a href="#FS_Q80_A2"> (2) Whether the devil induces us to sin, by persuading us inwardly?</a></p><p id="FS_Q80-p5"><a href="#FS_Q80_A3"> (3) Whether he can make us sin of necessity?</a></p><p id="FS_Q80-p6"><a href="#FS_Q80_A4"> (4) Whether all sins are due to the devil's suggestion?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 pr."><a name="36996" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36996] +Iª-IIae q. 80 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causa +peccati ex parte Diaboli. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, +utrum Diabolus sit directe causa peccati. Secundo, utrum Diabolus +inducat ad peccandum interius persuadendo. Tertio, utrum possit +necessitatem peccandi inducere. Quarto, utrum omnia peccata ex +Diaboli suggestione proveniant.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q80_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q80_A1-p0.1">Q. 80. A. 1. Whether the devil is directly the cause of man's sinning?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the devil is directly the cause of man's sinning. For sin consists directly in an act of the appetite. + Now Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 12) that "the devil inspires his friends with evil desires"; and Bede, commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q80_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.5.3" target="asv"> Acts 5:3, </a> says that the devil "draws the mind to evil desires"; and Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 41; iii, 5) that the devil "fills + men's hearts with secret lusts." Therefore the devil is directly the + cause of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36997" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36997] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod Diabolus sit homini directe causa +peccandi. Peccatum enim directe in affectu consistit. Sed +Augustinus dicit, IV de Trin., quod <i>Diabolus suae societati +malignos affectus inspirat</i>. Et Beda, super Act., dicit quod +<i>Diabolus animam in affectum malitiae trahit</i>. Et Isidorus +dicit, in libro de summo bono, quod <i>Diabolus corda hominum +occultis cupiditatibus replet</i>. Ergo Diabolus directe est causa +peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Jerome says (Contra Jovin. ii, 2) that "as God is the perfecter of good, so is the devil the perfecter of evil." + But God is directly the cause of our good. Therefore the devil is directly the cause of our sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36998" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36998] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Hieronymus dicit quod <i>sicut Deus est perfector boni, ita +Diabolus est perfector mali</i>. Sed Deus est directe causa bonorum +nostrorum. Ergo Diabolus est directe causa peccatorum +nostrorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says in a chapter of the Eudemein Ethics (vii, 18): "There must needs be some extrinsic principle + of human counsel." Now human counsel is not only about good things but also about evil things. Therefore, as God moves man + to take good counsel, and so is the cause of good, so the devil moves him to take evil counsel, and consequently is directly + the cause of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36999" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36999] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus probat, in quodam cap. Ethicae Eudemicae, quod oportet +esse quoddam principium extrinsecum humani consilii. Consilium +autem humanum non solum est de bonis, sed etiam de malis. Ergo +sicut Deus movet ad consilium bonum, et per hoc directe est causa +boni; ita Diabolus movet hominem ad consilium malum, et per hoc +sequitur quod Diabolus directe sit causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine proves (De Lib. Arb. i, 11) that "nothing else than his own will makes man's mind the slave of his desire." Now + man does not become a slave to his desires, except through sin. Therefore the cause of sin cannot be the devil, but man's + own will alone. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37000" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37000] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus probat, in I et III de Lib. Arb., <i>quod nulla +alia re fit mens hominis serva libidinis, nisi propria +voluntate</i>. Sed homo non fit servus libidinis nisi per peccatum. +Ergo causa peccati non potest esse Diabolus, sed sola propria +voluntas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q80_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Sin is an action: so that a thing can be directly the cause of sin, in the same way as anyone is directly the cause of an + action; and this can only happen by moving that action's proper principle to act. Now the proper principle of a sinful action + is the will, since every sin is voluntary. Consequently nothing can be directly the cause of sin, except that which can move + the will to act. + </p><p id="FS_Q80_A1-p7"> Now the will, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q9_A3" id="FS_Q80_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[9], AA[3]</a>,4,6), can be moved by two things: first by its object, inasmuch as the apprehended appetible is said to move the appetite: + secondly by that agent which moves the will inwardly to will, and this is no other than the will itself, or God, as was shown + above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q9_A3" id="FS_Q80_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[9], AA[3]</a>,4,6). Now God cannot be the cause of sin, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q79_A1" id="FS_Q80_A1-p7.3" shape="rect">Q[79], A[1]</a>). Therefore it follows that + in this respect, a man's will alone is directly the cause of his sin. + </p><p id="FS_Q80_A1-p8"> As regards the object, a thing may be understood as moving the will in three ways. First, the object itself which is proposed + to the will: thus we say that food arouses man's desire to eat. Secondly, he that proposes or offers this object. Thirdly, + he that persuades the will that the object proposed has an aspect of good, because he also, in a fashion, offers the will + its proper object, which is a real or apparent good of reason. Accordingly, in the first way the sensible + things, which approach from without, move a man's will to sin. In the second and third ways, either the devil or a man may + incite to sin, either by offering an object of appetite to the senses, or by persuading the reason. But in none of these three + ways can anything be the direct cause of sin, because the will is not, of necessity, moved by any object except the last end, + as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q10_A1" id="FS_Q80_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[10], AA[1]</a>,2). Consequently neither the thing offered from without, nor he that + proposes it, nor he that persuades, is the sufficient cause of sin. Therefore it follows that the devil is a cause of sin, + neither directly nor sufficiently, but only by persuasion, or by proposing the object of appetite. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 1 co."><a name="37001" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37001] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod peccatum actus quidam est. Unde hoc modo potest esse +aliquid directe causa peccati, per quem modum aliquis directe est +causa alicuius actus. Quod quidem non contingit nisi per hoc quod +proprium principium illius actus movet ad agendum. Proprium autem +principium actus peccati est voluntas, quia omne peccatum est +voluntarium. Unde nihil potest directe esse causa peccati, nisi +quod potest movere voluntatem ad agendum. Voluntas autem, sicut +supra dictum est, a duobus moveri potest, uno modo, ab obiecto, +sicut dicitur quod appetibile apprehensum movet appetitum; alio +modo, ab eo quod interius inclinat voluntatem ad volendum. Hoc +autem non est nisi vel ipsa voluntas, vel Deus, ut supra ostensum +est. Deus autem non potest esse causa peccati, ut dictum est. +Relinquitur ergo quod ex hac parte sola voluntas hominis sit +directe causa peccati eius. Ex parte autem obiecti, potest +intelligi quod aliquid moveat voluntatem tripliciter. Uno modo, +ipsum obiectum propositum, sicut dicimus quod cibus excitat +desiderium hominis ad comedendum. Alio modo, ille qui proponit vel +offert huiusmodi obiectum. Tertio modo, ille qui persuadet obiectum +propositum habere rationem boni, quia et hic aliqualiter proponit +proprium obiectum voluntati, quod est rationis bonum verum vel +apparens. Primo igitur modo, res sensibiles exterius apparentes +movent voluntatem hominis ad peccandum, secundo autem et tertio +modo, vel Diabolus, vel etiam homo, potest incitare ad peccandum, +vel offerendo aliquid appetibile sensui, vel persuadendo rationi. +Sed nullo istorum trium modorum potest aliquid esse directa causa +peccati, quia voluntas non ex necessitate movetur ab aliquo obiecto +nisi ab ultimo fine, ut supra dictum est; unde non est sufficiens +causa peccati neque res exterius oblata, neque ille qui eam +proponit, neque ille qui persuadet. Unde sequitur quod Diabolus non +sit causa peccati directe et sufficienter; sed solum per modum +persuadentis, vel proponentis appetibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All these, and other like authorities, if we meet with them, are to be understood as denoting that the devil induces man + to affection for a sin, either by suggesting to him, or by offering him objects of appetite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37002" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37002] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod omnes illae auctoritates, et si quae similes +inveniantur, sunt referendae ad hoc quod Diabolus suggerendo, vel +aliqua appetibilia proponendo, inducit in affectum peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This comparison is true in so far as the devil is somewhat the cause of our sins, even as God is in a certain way the cause + of our good actions, but does not extend to the mode of causation: for God causes good things in us by moving the will inwardly, + whereas the devil cannot move us in this way. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37003" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37003] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod similitudo illa est attendenda quantum ad hoc, quod +Diabolus quodammodo est causa peccatorum nostrorum, sicut Deus est +aliquo modo causa bonorum nostrorum. Non tamen attenditur quantum +ad modum causandi, nam Deus causat bona interius movendo +voluntatem, quod Diabolo convenire non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God is the universal principle of all inward movements of man; but that the human will be determined to an evil counsel, + is directly due to the human will, and to the devil as persuading or offering the object of appetite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37004" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37004] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod Deus est universale principium omnis interioris motus +humani, sed quod determinetur ad malum consilium voluntas humana, +hoc directe quidem est ex voluntate humana; et a Diabolo per modum +persuadentis, vel appetibilia proponentis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q80_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q80_A2-p0.1">Q. 80. A. 2. Whether the devil can induce man to sin, by internal instigations?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the devil cannot induce man to sin, by internal instigations. Because the internal movements of the soul + are vital functions. Now no vital functions can be exercised except by an intrinsic principle, not even those of the vegetal + soul, which are the lowest of vital functions. Therefore the devil cannot instigate man to evil through his internal movements. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37005" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37005] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod Diabolus non possit inducere ad +peccandum interius instigando. Interiores enim motus animae sunt +quaedam opera vitae. Sed nullum opus vitae potest esse nisi a +principio intrinseco; nec etiam opus animae vegetabilis, quod est +infimum inter opera vitae. Ergo Diabolus secundum interiores motus +non potest hominem instigare ad malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all the internal movements arise from the external senses according to the order of nature. Now it belongs to God + alone to do anything beside the order of nature, as was stated in the + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A4" id="FS_Q80_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[110], A[4]</a>. Therefore the devil cannot effect anything in man's internal movements, except in respect of things which are perceived + by the external senses. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37006" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37006] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +omnes interiores motus, secundum ordinem naturae, a sensibus +exterioribus oriuntur. Sed praeter ordinem naturae aliquid operari +est solius Dei, ut in primo dictum est. Ergo Diabolus non potest in +interioribus motibus hominis aliquid operari, nisi secundum ea quae +exterioribus sensibus apparent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the internal acts of the soul are to understand and to imagine. Now the devil can do nothing in connection with + either of these, because, as stated in the + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q111_A2" id="FS_Q80_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[111], AA[2]</a>,3, ad 2, the devil cannot impress species on the human intellect, nor does it seem possible for him to produce imaginary + species, since imaginary forms, being more spiritual, are more excellent than those which are in sensible matter, which, nevertheless, + the devil is unable to produce, as is clear from what we have said in the + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A2" id="FS_Q80_A2-p4.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[110], A[2]</a>; + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q111_A2" id="FS_Q80_A2-p4.3" shape="rect">FP, Q[111], AA[2]</a>,3, ad 2. Therefore the devil cannot through man's internal movements induce him to sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37007" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37007] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +interiores actus animae sunt intelligere et imaginari. Sed quantum +ad neutrum horum potest Diabolus aliquid operari. Quia, ut in primo +habitum est, Diabolus non imprimit in intellectum humanum. In +phantasiam etiam videtur quod imprimere non possit, quia formae +imaginatae, tanquam magis spirituales, sunt digniores quam formae +quae sunt in materia sensibili; quas tamen Diabolus imprimere non +potest, ut patet ex his quae in primo habita sunt. Ergo Diabolus +non potest secundum interiores motus inducere hominem ad +peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> In that case, the devil would never tempt man, unless he appeared visibly; which is evidently false. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37008" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37008] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quia secundum hoc nunquam tentaret hominem nisi visibiliter +apparendo. Quod patet esse falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q80_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The interior part of the soul is intellective and sensitive; and the intellective part contains the intellect and the will. + As regards the will, we have already stated + <a href="#FS_Q80_A1" id="FS_Q80_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1];</a> + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q111_A1" id="FS_Q80_A2-p6.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[111], A[1]</a>) what is the devil's relation thereto. Now the intellect, of its very nature, is moved by that which enlightens it in the + knowledge of truth, which the devil has no intention of doing in man's regard; rather does he + darken man's reason so that it may consent to sin, which darkness is due to the imagination and sensitive appetite. Consequently + the operation of the devil seems to be confined to the imagination and sensitive appetite, by moving either of which he can + induce man to sin. For his operation may result in presenting certain forms to the imagination; and he is able to incite the + sensitive appetite to some passion or other. + </p><p id="FS_Q80_A2-p7"> The reason of this is, that as stated in the + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A3" id="FS_Q80_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[110], A[3]</a>, the corporeal nature has a natural aptitude to be moved locally by the spiritual nature: so that the devil can produce all + those effects which can result from the local movement of bodies here below, except he be restrained by the Divine power. + Now the representation of forms to the imagination is due, sometimes, to local movement: for the Philosopher says (De Somno + et Vigil.) [*De Insomn. + iii, iv.] that "when an animal sleeps, the blood descends in abundance to the sensitive principle, and the movements descend + with it, viz. the impressions left by the action of sensible objects, which impressions are preserved by means of sensible + species, and continue to move the apprehensive principle, so that they appear just as though the sensitive principles were + being affected by them at the time." Hence such a local movement of the vital spirits or humors can be procured by the demons, + whether man sleep or wake: and so it happens that man's imagination is brought into play. + </p><p id="FS_Q80_A2-p8"> In like manner, the sensitive appetite is incited to certain passions according to certain fixed movements of the heart and + the vital spirits: wherefore the devil can cooperate in this also. And through certain passions being aroused in the sensitive + appetite, the result is that man more easily perceives the movement or sensible image which is brought in the manner explained, + before the apprehensive principle, since, as the Philosopher observes (De Somno et Virgil.: De Insomn. + iii, iv), "lovers are moved, by even a slight likeness, to an apprehension of the beloved." It also happens, through the rousing + of a passion, that what is put before the imagination, is judged, as being something to be pursued, because, to him who is + held by a passion, whatever the passion inclines him to, seems good. In this way the devil induces man inwardly to sin. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 2 co."><a name="37009" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37009] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod interior pars animae est intellectiva et sensitiva. +Intellectiva autem continet intellectum et voluntatem. Et de +voluntate quidem iam dictum est quomodo ad eam Diabolus se habet. +Intellectus autem per se quidem movetur ab aliquo illuminante ipsum +ad cognitionem veritatis, quod Diabolus circa hominem non intendit, +sed magis obtenebrare rationem ipsius ad consentiendum peccato. +Quae quidem obtenebratio provenit ex phantasia et appetitu +sensitivo. Unde tota interior operatio Diaboli esse videtur circa +phantasiam et appetitum sensitivum. Quorum utrumque commovendo, +potest inducere ad peccatum, potest enim operari ad hoc quod +imaginationi aliquae formae imaginariae praesententur; potest etiam +facere quod appetitus sensitivus concitetur ad aliquam passionem. +Dictum est enim in primo libro quod natura corporalis spirituali +naturaliter obedit ad motum localem. Unde et Diabolus omnia illa +causare potest quae ex motu locali corporum inferiorum provenire +possunt, nisi virtute divina reprimatur. Quod autem aliquae formae +repraesententur imaginationi, consequitur quandoque ad motum +localem. Dicit enim philosophus, in libro de somno et vigilia, quod +<i>cum animal dormierit, descendente plurimo sanguine ad principium +sensitivum, simul descendunt motus</i>, sive impressiones relictae +ex sensibilium motionibus, quae in sensibilibus speciebus +conservantur, et movent principium apprehensivum, ita quod apparent +ac si tunc principium sensitivum a rebus ipsis exterioribus +immutaretur. Unde talis motus localis spirituum vel humorum potest +procurari a Daemonibus, sive dormiant sive vigilent homines, et sic +sequitur quod homo aliqua imaginetur. Similiter etiam appetitus +sensitivus concitatur ad aliquas passiones secundum quendam +determinatum motum cordis et spirituum. Unde ad hoc etiam Diabolus +potest cooperari. Et ex hoc quod passiones aliquae concitantur in +appetitu sensitivo, sequitur quod et motum sive intentionem +sensibilem praedicto modo reductam ad principium apprehensivum, +magis homo percipiat, quia, ut philosophus in eodem libro dicit, +<i>amantes modica similitudine in apprehensionem rei amatae +moventur</i>. Contingit etiam ex hoc quod passio est concitata, ut +id quod proponitur imaginationi, iudicetur prosequendum, quia ei +qui a passione detinetur, videtur esse bonum id ad quod per +passionem inclinatur. Et per hunc modum Diabolus interius inducit +ad peccandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although vital functions are always from an intrinsic principle, yet an extrinsic agent can cooperate with them, even as + external heat cooperates with the functions of the vegetal soul, that food may be more easily digested. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37010" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37010] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod opera vitae semper etsi sint ab aliquo principio +intrinseco, tamen ad ea potest cooperari aliquod exterius agens, +sicut etiam ad opera animae vegetabilis operatur calor exterior, ut +facilius digeratur cibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This apparition of imaginary forms is not altogether outside the order of nature, nor is it due to a command alone, but according + to local movement, as explained above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37011" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37011] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod huiusmodi apparitio formarum imaginabilium non est +omnino praeter ordinem naturae. Nec est per solum imperium, sed per +motum localem, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A2-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Consequently the Reply to the Third Objection is clear, because these forms are received originally from the senses.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37012" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37012] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Unde patet +responsio ad tertium, quia formae illae sunt a sensibus acceptae +primordialiter.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q80_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q80_A3-p0.1">Q. 80. A. 3. Whether the devil can induce man to sin of necessity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the devil can induce man to sin of necessity. Because the greater can compel the lesser. Now it is said + of the devil ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q80_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.41.24" target="asv">Job 41:24</a>) that "there is no power on earth that can compare with him." Therefore he can compel man to sin, while he dwells on the + earth. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37013" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37013] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod Diabolus possit necessitatem inferre +ad peccandum. Potestas enim maior potest necessitatem inferre +minori. Sed de Diabolo dicitur Iob XLI, <i>non est potestas super +terram quae ei valeat comparari</i>. Ergo potest homini terreno +necessitatem inferre ad peccandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man's reason cannot be moved except in respect of things that are offered outwardly to the senses, or are represented + to the imagination: because "all our knowledge arises from the senses, and we cannot understand without a phantasm" (De Anima + iii, text. 30. 39). Now the devil can move man's imagination, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q80_A2" id="FS_Q80_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>; and also the external senses, for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 12) that "this evil," of which, + to wit, the devil is the cause, "extends gradually through all the approaches to the senses, it adapts itself to shapes, blends + with colors, mingles with sounds, seasons every flavor." Therefore it can incline man's reason to sin of necessity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37014" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37014] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ratio hominis non potest moveri nisi secundum ea quae exterius +sensibus proponuntur et imaginationi repraesentantur, quia omnis +nostra cognitio ortum habet a sensu, <i>et non est intelligere sine +phantasmate</i>, ut dicitur in libro de anima. Sed Diabolus potest +movere imaginationem hominis, ut dictum est, et etiam exteriores +sensus, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., +quod <i>serpit hoc malum</i>, scilicet quod est a Diabolo, <i>per +omnes aditus sensuales; dat se figuris, accommodat coloribus, +adhaeret sonis, infundit saporibus</i>. Ergo potest rationem +hominis ex necessitate inclinare ad peccandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 4) that "there is some sin when the flesh lusteth against the spirit." Now the + devil can cause concupiscence of the flesh, even as other passions, in the way explained above + <a href="#FS_Q80_A2" id="FS_Q80_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore he can induce man to sin of necessity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37015" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37015] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +secundum Augustinum, <i>nonnullum peccatum est, cum caro +concupiscit adversus spiritum</i>. Sed concupiscentiam carnis +Diabolus potest causare, sicut et ceteras passiones, eo modo quo +supra dictum est. Ergo ex necessitate potest inducere ad +peccandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q80_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q80_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.5.8" target="asv">1 Pet. 5:8</a>): "Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about seeking whom he may devour." Now it would be useless to admonish + thus, if it were true that man were under the necessity of succumbing to the devil. Therefore he cannot induce man to sin + of necessity. + </p><p id="FS_Q80_A3-p6"> Further, it is likewise written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q80_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.7" target="asv">Jam. 4:7</a>): "Be subject . . . to God, but resist the devil, and he will fly from you," which would be said neither rightly nor truly, + if the devil were able to compel us, in any way whatever, to sin; for then neither would it be possible to resist him, nor + would he fly from those who do. Therefore he does not compel to sin. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37016" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37016] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur I Petr. ult., <i>adversarius vester Diabolus +tanquam leo rugiens circuit, quaerens quem devoret, cui resistite +fortes in fide</i>. Frustra autem talis admonitio daretur, si homo +ei ex necessitate succumberet. Non ergo potest homini necessitatem +inducere ad peccandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The devil, by his own power, unless he be restrained by God, can compel anyone to do an act which, in its genus, is a sin; + but he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning. This is evident from the fact that man does not resist that which moves + him to sin, except by his reason; the use of which the devil is able to impede altogether, by moving the imagination and the + sensitive appetite; as is the case with one who is possessed. But then, the reason being + thus fettered, whatever man may do, it is not imputed to him as a sin. If, however, the reason is not altogether fettered, + then, in so far as it is free, it can resist sin, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q77_A7" id="FS_Q80_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[77], A[7]</a>). It is consequently evident that the devil can nowise compel man to sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 3 co."><a name="37017" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37017] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod Diabolus propria virtute, nisi refraenetur a Deo, +potest aliquem inducere ex necessitate ad faciendum aliquem actum +qui de suo genere peccatum est, non autem potest inducere +necessitatem peccandi. Quod patet ex hoc quod homo motivo ad +peccandum non resistit nisi per rationem, cuius usum totaliter +impedire potest movendo imaginationem et appetitum sensitivum, +sicut in arreptitiis patet. Sed tunc, ratione sic ligata, quidquid +homo agat, non imputatur ei ad peccatum. Sed si ratio non sit +totaliter ligata, ex ea parte qua est libera, potest resistere +peccato, sicut supra dictum est. Unde manifestum est quod Diabolus +nullo modo potest necessitatem inducere homini ad peccandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every power that is greater than man, can move man's will; God alone can do this, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q9_A6" id="FS_Q80_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[6]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37018" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37018] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod non quaelibet potestas maior homine, potest +movere voluntatem hominis, sed solus Deus, ut supra habitum +est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That which is apprehended by the senses or the imagination does not move the will, of necessity, so long as man has the use + of reason; nor does such an apprehension always fetter the reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37019" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37019] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod illud quod est apprehensum per sensum vel +imaginationem, non ex necessitate movet voluntatem, si homo habeat +usum rationis. Nec semper huiusmodi apprehensio ligat rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The lusting of the flesh against the spirit, when the reason actually resists it, is not a sin, but is matter for the exercise + of virtue. That reason does not resist, is not in the devil's power; wherefore he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37020" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37020] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod concupiscentia carnis contra spiritum, quando ratio +ei actualiter resistit, non est peccatum, sed materia exercendae +virtutis. Quod autem ratio ei non resistat, non est in potestate +Diaboli. Et ideo non potest inducere necessitatem peccati.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q80_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q80_A4-p0.1">Q. 80. A. 4. Whether all the sins of men are due to the devil's suggestion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the sins of men are due to the devil's suggestion. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the "crowd + of demons are the cause of all evils, both to themselves and to others." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37021" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37021] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnia peccata hominum sint ex +suggestione Diaboli. Dicit enim Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., +quod <i>multitudo Daemonum causa est omnium malorum et sibi et +aliis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever sins mortally, becomes the slave of the devil, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q80_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.8.34" target="asv"> Jn. 8:34</a>: "Whosoever committeth sin is the slave [Douay: 'servant'] of sin." Now "by whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is + the slave" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q80_A4-p3.2" href="./asv.html#iiPet.2.19" target="asv">2 Pet. 2:19</a>). Therefore whoever commits a sin, has been overcome by the devil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37022" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37022] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quicumque peccat mortaliter, efficitur servus Diaboli; secundum +illud Ioan. VIII, <i>qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati. Sed ei +aliquis in servitutem addicitur, a quo superatus est</i>, ut +dicitur II Petr. II. Ergo quicumque facit peccatum, superatus est a +Diabolo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. iv, 10) the sin of the devil is irreparable, because he sinned at no other's suggestion. Therefore, + if any men were to sin of their own free-will and without suggestion from any other, their sin would be irremediable: which + is clearly false. Therefore all the sins of men are due to the devil's suggestion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37023" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37023] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Gregorius dicit quod peccatum Diaboli est irreparabile, quia +cecidit nullo suggerente. Si igitur aliqui homines peccarent per +liberum arbitrium, nullo suggerente, eorum peccatum esset +irremediabile, quod patet esse falsum. Ergo omnia peccata humana a +Diabolo suggeruntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (De Eccl. Dogm. lxxxii): "Not all our evil thoughts are incited by the devil; sometimes they are due to a movement + of the free-will." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37024" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37024] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur in libro de ecclesiasticis dogmatibus, <i>non +omnes cogitationes nostrae malae a Diabolo excitantur, sed +aliquoties ex nostri arbitrii motu emergunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> the devil is the occasional and indirect cause of all our sins, in so far as he induced the first man to sin, by reason of + whose sin human nature is so infected, that we are all prone to sin: even as the burning of wood might be imputed to the man + who dried the wood so as to make it easily inflammable. He is not, however, the direct cause of all the sins of men, as though + each were the result of his suggestion. Origen proves this (Peri Archon iii, 2) from + the fact that even if the devil were no more, men would still have the desire for food, sexual pleasures and the like; which + desire might be inordinate, unless it were subordinate to reason, a matter that is subject to the free-will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 4 co."><a name="37025" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37025] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod occasionaliter quidem et indirecte Diabolus est causa +omnium peccatorum nostrorum, inquantum induxit primum hominem ad +peccandum, ex cuius peccato intantum vitiata est humana natura, ut +omnes simus ad peccandum proclives, sicut diceretur esse causa +combustionis lignorum qui ligna siccaret, ex quo sequeretur quod +facile incenderentur. Directe autem non est causa omnium peccatorum +humanorum, ita quod singula peccata persuadeat. Quod Origenes +probat ex hoc, quia etiam si Diabolus non esset, homines haberent +appetitum cibi et venereorum et similium, qui posset esse +inordinatus nisi ratione ordinaretur, quod subiacet libero +arbitrio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The crowd of demons are the cause of all our evils, as regards their original cause, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37026" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37026] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod multitudo Daemonum est causa omnium malorum +nostrorum secundum primam originem, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man becomes another's slave not only by being overcome by him, but also by subjecting himself to him spontaneously: it + is thus that one who sins of his own accord, becomes the slave of the devil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37027" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37027] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod non solum fit servus alicuius qui ab eo superatur, +sed etiam qui se ei voluntarie subiicit. Et hoc modo fit servus +Diaboli qui motu proprio peccat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The devil's sin was irremediable, not only because he sinned without another's suggestion; but also because he was not already + prone to sin, on account of any previous sin; which can be said of no sin of man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37028" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37028] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod peccatum Diaboli fuit irremediabile, quia nec aliquo +suggerente peccavit, nec habuit aliquam pronitatem ad peccandum ex +praecedenti suggestione causatam. Quod de nullo hominis peccato +dici potest.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q81" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q81-p0.1">Q. 81. OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF MAN (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q81-p2"> We must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of man. Now, while man, like the devil, is the cause of another's sin, + by outward suggestion, he has a certain special manner of causing sin, by way of origin. Wherefore we must speak about original + sin, the consideration of which will be three-fold: (1) Of its transmission; (2) of its essence; (3) of its subject. + </p><p id="FS_Q81-p3"> Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q81-p4"><a href="#FS_Q81_A1"> (1) Whether man's first sin is transmitted, by way of origin to his descendants?</a></p><p id="FS_Q81-p5"><a href="#FS_Q81_A2"> (2) Whether all the other sins of our first parent, or of any other parents, are transmitted to their descendants, by way + of origin? + </a></p><p id="FS_Q81-p6"><a href="#FS_Q81_A3"> (3) Whether original sin is contracted by all those who are begotten of Adam by way of seminal generation?</a></p><p id="FS_Q81-p7"><a href="#FS_Q81_A4"> (4) Whether it would be contracted by anyone formed miraculously from some part of the human body?</a></p><p id="FS_Q81-p8"><a href="#FS_Q81_A5"> (5) Whether original sin would have been contracted if the woman, and not the man, had sinned?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 pr."><a name="37029" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37029] +Iª-IIae q. 81 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causa +peccati ex parte hominis. Cum autem homo sit causa peccati alteri +homini exterius suggerendo, sicut et Diabolus, habet quendam +specialem modum causandi peccatum in alterum per originem. Unde de +peccato originali dicendum est. Circa quod tria consideranda +occurrunt, primo, de eius traductione; secundo, de eius essentia; +tertio, de eius subiecto. Circa primum quaeruntur quinque. Primo, +utrum primum peccatum hominis derivetur per originem in posteros. +Secundo, utrum omnia alia peccata primi parentis, vel etiam aliorum +parentum, per originem in posteros deriventur. Tertio, utrum +peccatum originale derivetur ad omnes qui ex Adam per viam seminis +generantur. Quarto, utrum derivaretur ad illos qui miraculose ex +aliqua parte humani corporis formarentur. Quinto, utrum si femina +peccasset, viro non peccante, traduceretur originale peccatum.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q81_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q81_A1-p0.1">Q. 81. A. 1. Whether the first sin of our first parent is contracted by his descendants, by way of origin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the first sin of our first parent is not contracted by others, by way of origin. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.18.20" target="asv">Ezech. 18:20</a>): "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father." But he would bear the iniquity if he contracted it from him. Therefore + no one contracts any sin from one of his parents by way of origin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37030" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37030] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod primum peccatum primi parentis non +traducatur ad alios per originem. Dicitur enim Ezech. XVIII, +<i>filius non portabit iniquitatem patris</i>. Portaret autem, si +ab eo iniquitatem traheret. Ergo nullus trahit ab aliquo parentum +per originem aliquod peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an accident is not transmitted by way of origin, unless its subject be also transmitted, since accidents do not + pass from one subject to another. Now the rational soul which is the subject of sin, is not transmitted by way of origin, + as was shown in the + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q118_A2" id="FS_Q81_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[118], A[2]</a>. Therefore neither can any sin be transmitted by way of origin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37031" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37031] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +accidens non traducitur per originem, nisi traducto subiecto, eo +quod accidens non transit de subiecto in subiectum. Sed anima +rationalis, quae est subiectum culpae, non traducitur per originem, +ut in primo ostensum est. Ergo neque aliqua culpa per originem +traduci potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is transmitted by way of human origin, is caused by the semen. But the semen cannot cause sin, because + it lacks the rational part of the soul, which alone can be a cause of sin. Therefore no sin can be contracted by way of origin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37032" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37032] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +omne illud quod traducitur per originem humanam, causatur ex +semine. Sed semen non potest causare peccatum, eo quod caret +rationali parte animae, quae sola potest esse causa peccati. Ergo +nullum peccatum potest trahi per originem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, that which is more perfect in nature, is more powerful in action. Now perfect flesh cannot infect the soul united + to it, else the soul could not be cleansed of original sin, so long as it is united to the body. Much less, therefore, can + the semen infect the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="37033" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37033] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +quod est perfectius in natura, virtuosius est ad agendum. Sed caro +perfecta non potest inficere animam sibi unitam, alioquin anima non +posset emundari a culpa originali dum est carni unita. Ergo multo +minus semen potest inficere animam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "No one finds fault with those who are ugly by nature, but only those who + are so through want of exercise and through carelessness." Now those are said to be "naturally ugly," who are so from their + origin. Therefore nothing which comes by way of origin is blameworthy or sinful. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="37034" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37034] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod <i>propter naturam turpes +nullus increpat, sed eos qui propter desidiam et negligentiam</i>. +Dicuntur autem natura turpes qui habent turpitudinem ex sua +origine. Ergo nihil quod est per originem, est increpabile, neque +peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>): "By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death." Nor can this be understood as denoting imitation or suggestion, + since it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.2.24" target="asv">Wis. 2:24</a>): "By the envy of the devil, death came into this world." It follows therefore that through origin from the first man sin + entered into the world. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37035" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37035] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. V, <i>per unum hominem peccatum in +hunc mundum intravit</i>. Quod non potest intelligi per modum +imitationis, propter hoc quod dicitur Sap. II, <i>invidia Diaboli +mors intravit in orbem terrarum</i>. Restat ergo quod per originem +a primo homine peccatum in mundo intravit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q81_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Catholic Faith we are bound to hold that the first sin of the first man is transmitted to his descendants, + by way of origin. For this reason children are taken to be baptized soon after their birth, to show that they have to be washed + from some uncleanness. The contrary is part of the Pelagian heresy, as is clear from Augustine in many of his books [*For + instance, Retract. i, 9; De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. ix; Contra Julian. iii, 1; De Dono + Persev. xi, xii.] + </p><p id="FS_Q81_A1-p9"> In endeavoring to explain how the sin of our first parent could be transmitted by way of origin to his descendants, various + writers have gone about it in various ways. For some, considering that the subject of sin is the rational soul, maintained + that the rational soul is transmitted with the semen, so that thus an infected soul would seem to produce other infected souls. + Others, rejecting this as erroneous, endeavored to show how the guilt of the parent's soul can be + transmitted to the children, even though the soul be not transmitted, from the fact that defects of the body are transmitted + from parent to child---thus a leper may beget a leper, or a gouty man may be the father of a gouty son, on account of some + seminal corruption, although this corruption is not leprosy or gout. Now since the body is proportionate to the soul, and + since the soul's defects redound into the body, and vice versa, in like manner, say they, a culpable defect of the soul is + passed + on to the child, through the transmission of the semen, albeit the semen itself is not the subject of the guilt. + </p><p id="FS_Q81_A1-p10"> But all these explanations are insufficient. Because, granted that some bodily defects are transmitted by way of origin from + parent to child, and granted that even some defects of the soul are transmitted in consequence, on account of a defect in + the bodily habit, as in the case of idiots begetting idiots; nevertheless the fact of having a defect by the way of origin + seems to exclude the notion of guilt, which is essentially something voluntary. Wherefore granted that the + rational soul were transmitted, from the very fact that the stain on the child's soul is not in its will, it would cease to + be a guilty stain binding its subject to punishment; for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5), "no one reproaches a man + born blind; one rather takes pity on him." + </p><p id="FS_Q81_A1-p11"> Therefore we must explain the matter otherwise by saying that all men born of Adam may be considered as one man, inasmuch + as they have one common nature, which they receive from their first parents; even as in civil matters, all who are members + of one community are reputed as one body, and the whole community as one man. Indeed Porphyry says (Praedic., De Specie) that + "by sharing the same species, many men are one man." Accordingly the multitude of men born of Adam, are as so + many members of one body. Now the action of one member of the body, of the hand for instance, is voluntary not by the will + of that hand, but by the will of the soul, the first mover of the members. Wherefore a murder which the hand commits would + not be imputed as a sin to the hand, considered by itself as apart from the body, but is imputed to it as something belonging + to man and moved by man's first moving principle. In this way, then, the disorder which is in this man born of Adam, is + voluntary, not by his will, but by the will of his first parent, who, by the movement of generation, moves all who originate + from him, even as the soul's will moves all the members to their actions. Hence the sin which is thus transmitted by the first + parent to his descendants is called "original," just as the sin which flows from the soul into the bodily members is called + "actual." And just as the actual sin that is committed by a member of the body, is not the sin of that member, except + inasmuch as that member is a part of the man, for which reason it is called a "human sin"; so original sin is not the sin + of this person, except inasmuch as this person receives his nature from his first parent, for which reason it is called the + "sin of nature," according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.3" target="asv"> Eph. 2:3</a>: "We . . . were by nature children of wrath." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 co."><a name="37036" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37036] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod secundum fidem Catholicam est tenendum quod primum +peccatum primi hominis originaliter transit in posteros. Propter +quod etiam pueri mox nati deferuntur ad Baptismum, tanquam ab +aliqua infectione culpae abluendi. Contrarium autem est haeresis +Pelagianae, ut patet per Augustinum in plurimis suis libris. Ad +investigandum autem qualiter peccatum primi parentis originaliter +possit transire in posteros, diversi diversis viis processerunt. +Quidam enim, considerantes quod peccati subiectum est anima +rationalis, posuerunt quod cum semine rationalis anima traducatur, +ut sic ex infecta anima animae infectae derivari videantur. Alii +vero, hoc repudiantes tanquam erroneum, conati sunt ostendere +quomodo culpa animae parentis traducitur in prolem, etiam si anima +non traducatur, per hoc quod corporis defectus traducuntur a +parente in prolem, sicut si leprosus generat leprosum, et +podagricus podagricum, propter aliquam corruptionem seminis, licet +talis corruptio non dicatur lepra vel podagra. Cum autem corpus sit +proportionatum animae, et defectus animae redundent in corpus, et e +converso; simili modo dicunt quod culpabilis defectus animae per +traductionem seminis in prolem derivatur, quamvis semen actualiter +non sit culpae subiectum. Sed omnes huiusmodi viae insufficientes +sunt. Quia dato quod aliqui defectus corporales a parente transeant +in prolem per originem; et etiam aliqui defectus animae ex +consequenti, propter corporis indispositionem, sicut interdum ex +fatuis fatui generantur, tamen hoc ipsum quod est ex origine +aliquem defectum habere, videtur excludere rationem culpae, de +cuius ratione est quod sit voluntaria. Unde etiam posito quod anima +rationalis traduceretur, ex hoc ipso quod infectio animae prolis +non esset in eius voluntate, amitteret rationem culpae obligantis +ad poenam, quia, ut philosophus dicit in III Ethic., <i>nullus +improperabit caeco nato, sed magis miserebitur</i>. Et ideo alia +via procedendum est, dicendo quod omnes homines qui nascuntur ex +Adam, possunt considerari ut unus homo, inquantum conveniunt in +natura, quam a primo parente accipiunt; secundum quod in civilibus +omnes qui sunt unius communitatis, reputantur quasi unum corpus, et +tota communitas quasi unus homo. Porphyrius etiam dicit quod +<i>participatione speciei plures homines sunt unus homo</i>. Sic +igitur multi homines ex Adam derivati, sunt tanquam multa membra +unius corporis. Actus autem unius membri corporalis, puta manus, +non est voluntarius voluntate ipsius manus, sed voluntate animae, +quae primo movet membra. Unde homicidium quod manus committit, non +imputaretur manui ad peccatum, si consideraretur manus secundum se +ut divisa a corpore, sed imputatur ei inquantum est aliquid hominis +quod movetur a primo principio motivo hominis. Sic igitur +inordinatio quae est in isto homine, ex Adam generato, non est +voluntaria voluntate ipsius sed voluntate primi parentis, qui movet +motione generationis omnes qui ex eius origine derivantur, sicut +voluntas animae movet omnia membra ad actum. Unde peccatum quod sic +a primo parente in posteros derivatur, dicitur originale, sicut +peccatum quod ab anima derivatur ad membra corporis, dicitur +actuale. Et sicut peccatum actuale quod per membrum aliquod +committitur, non est peccatum illius membri nisi inquantum illud +membrum est aliquid ipsius hominis, propter quod vocatur peccatum +humanum; ita peccatum originale non est peccatum huius personae, +nisi inquantum haec persona recipit naturam a primo parente. Unde +et vocatur peccatum naturae; secundum illud Ephes. II, <i>eramus +natura filii irae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The son is said not to bear the iniquity of his father, because he is not punished for his father's sin, unless he share + in his guilt. It is thus in the case before us: because guilt is transmitted by the way of origin from father to son, even + as actual sin is transmitted through being imitated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37037" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37037] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod filius dicitur non portare peccatum patris, quia +non punitur pro peccato patris, nisi sit particeps culpae. Et sic +est in proposito, derivatur enim per originem culpa a patre in +filium, sicut et peccatum actuale per imitationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the soul is not transmitted, because the power in the semen is not able to cause the rational soul, nevertheless + the motion of the semen is a disposition to the transmission of the rational soul: so that the semen by its own power transmits + the human nature from parent to child, and with that nature, the stain which infects it: for he that is born is associated + with his first parent in his guilt, through the fact that he inherits his nature + from him by a kind of movement which is that of generation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37038" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37038] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, etsi anima non traducatur, quia virtus seminis non +potest causare animam rationalem; movet tamen ad ipsam dispositive. +Unde per virtutem seminis traducitur humana natura a parente in +prolem, et simul cum natura naturae infectio, ex hoc enim fit iste +qui nascitur consors culpae primi parentis, quod naturam ab eo +sortitur per quandam generativam motionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the guilt is not actually in the semen, yet human nature is there virtually accompanied by that guilt. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37039" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37039] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, etsi culpa non sit actu in semine, est tamen ibi +virtute humana natura, quam concomitatur talis culpa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The semen is the principle of generation, which is an act proper to nature, by helping it to propagate itself. Hence the + soul is more infected by the semen, than by the flesh which is already perfect, and already affixed to a certain person. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="37040" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37040] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod semen est principium generationis, quae est proprius +actus naturae, eius propagationi deserviens. Et ideo magis +inficitur anima per semen quam per carnem iam perfectam, quae iam +determinata est ad personam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> A man is not blamed for that which he has from his origin, if we consider the man born, in himself. But it we consider him + as referred to a principle, then he may be reproached for it: thus a man may from his birth be under a family disgrace, on + account of a crime committed by one of his forbears. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="37041" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37041] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod illud quod est per originem, non est increpabile, si +consideretur iste qui nascitur secundum se. Sed si consideretur +prout refertur ad aliquod principium, sic potest esse ei +increpabile, sicut aliquis qui nascitur patitur ignominiam generis +ex culpa alicuius progenitorum causatam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q81_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q81_A2-p0.1">Q. 81. A. 2. Whether also other sins of the first parent or of nearer ancestors are transmitted to their descendants?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that also other sins, whether of the first parent or of nearer ancestors, are transmitted to their descendants. + For punishment is never due unless for fault. Now some are punished by the judgment of God for the sin of their immediate + parents, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.5" target="asv">Ex. 20:5</a>: "I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation." + Furthermore, according to human law, the children of those + who are guilty of high treason are disinherited. Therefore the guilt of nearer ancestors is also transmitted to their descendants. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37042" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37042] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod etiam alia peccata vel ipsius primi +parentis, vel proximorum parentum, traducantur in posteros. Poena +enim nunquam debetur nisi culpae. Sed aliqui puniuntur iudicio +divino pro peccato proximorum parentum; secundum illud Exod. XX, +<i>ego sum Deus Zelotes, visitans iniquitatem patrum in filios, in +tertiam et quartam generationem</i>. Iudicio etiam humano, in +crimine laesae maiestatis, filii exheredantur pro peccato parentum. +Ergo etiam culpa proximorum parentum transit ad posteros.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a man can better transmit to another, that which he has of himself, than that which he has received from another: + thus fire heats better than hot water does. Now a man transmits to his children, by the way, of origin, the sin which he has + from Adam. Much more therefore should he transmit the sin which he has contracted of himself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37043" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37043] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +magis potest transferre in alterum id quod habet aliquis a seipso, +quam id quod habet ex alio, sicut ignis magis potest calefacere +quam aqua calefacta, sed homo transfert in prolem per originem +peccatum quod habet ab Adam. Ergo multo magis peccatum quod ipse +commisit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the reason why we contract original sin from our first parent is because we were in him as in the principle of our + nature, which he corrupted. But we were likewise in our nearer ancestors, as in principles of our nature, which however it + be corrupt, can be corrupted yet more by sin, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.22.11" target="asv"> Apoc. 22:11</a>: "He that is filthy, let him be filthier still." Therefore children contract, by the way of origin, the sins of their nearer + ancestors, even as they contract the sin of their first parent. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37044" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37044] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +ideo contrahimus a primo parente peccatum originale, quia in eo +fuimus sicut in principio naturae, quam ipse corrupit. Sed +similiter fuimus in proximis parentibus sicut in quibusdam +principiis naturae, quae etsi sit corrupta, potest adhuc magis +corrumpi per peccatum, secundum illud Apoc. ult., <i>qui in +sordibus est, sordescat adhuc</i>. Ergo filii contrahunt peccata +proximorum parentum per originem, sicut et primi parentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Good is more self-diffusive than evil. But the merits of the nearer ancestors are not transmitted to their descendants. Much + less therefore are their sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37045" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37045] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +bonum est magis diffusivum sui quam malum. Sed merita proximorum +parentum non traducuntur ad posteros. Ergo multo minus peccata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q81_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Augustine puts this question in the Enchiridion xlvi, xlvii, and leaves it unsolved. Yet if we look into the matter carefully + we shall see that it is impossible for the sins of the nearer ancestors, or even any other but the first sin of our first + parent to be transmitted by way of origin. The reason is that a man begets his like in species but not in individual. Consequently + those things that pertain directly to the individual, such as personal actions and + matters affecting them, are not transmitted by parents to their children: for a grammarian does not transmit to his son the + knowledge of grammar that he has acquired by his own studies. On the other hand, those things that concern the nature of the + species, are transmitted by parents to their children, unless there be a defect of nature: thus a man with eyes begets a son + having eyes, unless nature fails. And if nature be strong, even certain accidents of the individual pertaining to natural + disposition, are transmitted to the children, e.g. fleetness of body, acuteness of intellect, and so forth; but nowise those + that are purely personal, as stated above. + </p><p id="FS_Q81_A2-p7"> Now just as something may belong to the person as such, and also something through the gift of grace, so may something belong + to the nature as such, viz. whatever is caused by the principles of nature, and something too through the gift of grace. In + this way original justice, as stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q100_A1" id="FS_Q81_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[100], A[1]</a>, was a gift of grace, conferred by God on all human nature in our first parent. This gift the first man lost by his first + sin. Wherefore as that + original justice together with the nature was to have been transmitted to his posterity, so also was its disorder. Other actual + sins, however, whether of the first parent or of others, do not corrupt the nature as nature, but only as the nature of that + person, i.e. in respect of the proneness to sin: and consequently other sins are not transmitted. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 2 co."><a name="37046" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37046] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod Augustinus hanc quaestionem movet in Enchiridio, et +insolutam relinquit. Sed si quis diligenter attendit, impossibile +est quod aliqua peccata proximorum parentum, vel etiam primi +parentis praeter primum, per originem traducantur. Cuius ratio est +quia homo generat sibi idem in specie, non autem secundum +individuum. Et ideo ea quae directe pertinent ad individuum, sicut +personales actus et quae ad eos pertinent, non traducuntur a +parentibus in filios, non enim grammaticus traducit in filium +scientiam grammaticae, quam proprio studio acquisivit. Sed ea quae +pertinent ad naturam speciei, traducuntur a parentibus in filios, +nisi sit defectus naturae, sicut oculatus generat oculatum, nisi +natura deficiat. Et si natura sit fortis, etiam aliqua accidentia +individualia propagantur in filios, pertinentia ad dispositionem +naturae, sicut velocitas corporis, bonitas ingenii, et alia +huiusmodi, nullo autem modo ea quae sunt pure personalia, ut dictum +est. Sicut autem ad personam pertinet aliquid secundum seipsam, et +aliquid ex dono gratiae; ita etiam ad naturam potest aliquid +pertinere secundum seipsam, scilicet quod causatur ex principiis +eius, et aliquid ex dono gratiae. Et hoc modo iustitia originalis, +sicut in primo dictum est, erat quoddam donum gratiae toti humanae +naturae divinitus collatum in primo parente. Quod quidem primus +homo amisit per primum peccatum. Unde sicut illa originalis +iustitia traducta fuisset in posteros simul cum natura, ita etiam +inordinatio opposita. Sed alia peccata actualia vel primi parentis +vel aliorum, non corrumpunt naturam quantum ad id quod naturae est; +sed solum quantum ad id quod personae est, idest secundum +pronitatem ad actum. Unde alia peccata non traducuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to Augustine in his letter to Avitus [*Ep. ad Auxilium ccl.], children are never inflicted with spiritual punishment + on account of their parents, unless they share in their guilt, either in their origin, or by imitation, because every soul + is God's immediate property, as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.18.4" target="asv"> Ezech. 18:4.</a> Sometimes, however, by Divine or human judgment, children receive bodily punishment on their parents' account, inasmuch as + the + child, as to its body, is part of its father. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37047" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37047] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod poena spirituali, sicut Augustinus dicit in +epistola ad avitum, nunquam puniuntur filii pro parentibus, nisi +communicent in culpa, vel per originem vel per imitationem, quia +omnes animae immediate sunt Dei, ut dicitur Ezech. XVIII. Sed poena +corporali interdum, iudicio divino vel humano, puniuntur filii pro +parentibus, inquantum filius est aliquid patris secundum +corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man can more easily transmit that which he has of himself, provided it be transmissible. But the actual sins of our nearer + ancestors are not transmissible, because they are purely personal, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37048" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37048] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod illud quod habet aliquis ex se, magis potest +traducere, dummodo sit traducibile. Sed peccata actualia proximorum +parentum non sunt traducibilia, quia sunt pure personalia, ut +dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The first sin infects nature with a human corruption pertaining to nature; whereas other sins infect it with a corruption + pertaining only to the person. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37049" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37049] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod primum peccatum corrumpit naturam humanam corruptione +ad naturam pertinente, alia vero peccata corrumpunt eam corruptione +pertinente ad solam personam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q81_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q81_A3-p0.1">Q. 81. A. 3. Whether the sin of the first parent is transmitted, by the way of origin, to all men?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sin of the first parent is not transmitted, by the way of origin, to all men. Because death is a punishment + consequent upon original sin. But not all those, who are born of the seed of Adam, will die: since those who will be still + living at the coming of our Lord, will never die, as, seemingly, may be gathered from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iThess.4.14" target="asv">1 Thess. 4:14</a>: "We who are alive . . . unto the coming of the Lord, shall not prevent them who have + slept." Therefore they do not contract original sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37050" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37050] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum primi parentis non transeat +per originem in omnes homines. Mors enim est poena consequens +originale peccatum. Sed non omnes qui procedunt seminaliter ex +Adam, morientur, illi enim qui vivi reperientur in adventu domini, +nunquam morientur, ut videtur per quod dicitur I Thessal. IV, +<i>nos qui vivimus, non praeveniemus in adventu domini eos qui +dormierunt</i>. Ergo illi non contrahunt originale peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no one gives another what he has not himself. Now a man who has been baptized has not original sin. Therefore he + does not transmit it to his children. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37051" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37051] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +nullus dat alteri quod ipse non habet. Sed homo baptizatus non +habet peccatum originale. Ergo non traducit ipsum in prolem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the gift of Christ is greater than the sin of Adam, as the Apostle declares ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.15" target="asv">Rom. 5:15, </a> seqq). But the gift of Christ is not transmitted to all men: neither, therefore, is the sin of Adam. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37052" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37052] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +donum Christi est maius quam peccatum Adae, ut apostolus dicit, +Rom. V. Sed donum Christi non transit in omnes homines. Ergo nec +peccatum Adae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>): "Death passed upon all men in whom all have sinned." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37053" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37053] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. V, <i>mors in omnes pertransiit, in +quo omnes peccaverunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Catholic Faith we must firmly believe that, Christ alone excepted, all men descended from Adam contract + original sin from him; else all would not need redemption [*Cf. Translator's note inserted before TP, Q[27]] which is through + Christ; and this is erroneous. The reason for this may be gathered from what has been stated + <a href="#FS_Q81_A1" id="FS_Q81_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, viz. that original sin, in virtue of the sin of our first parent, is transmitted to his + posterity, just as, from the soul's will, actual sin is transmitted to the members of the body, through their being moved + by the will. Now it is evident that actual sin can be transmitted to all such members as have an inborn aptitude to be moved + by the will. Therefore original sin is transmitted to all those who are moved by Adam by the movement of generation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 3 co."><a name="37054" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37054] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod secundum fidem Catholicam firmiter est tenendum quod +omnes homines, praeter solum Christum, ex Adam derivati, peccatum +originale ex eo contrahunt, alioquin non omnes indigerent +redemptione quae est per Christum; quod est erroneum. Ratio autem +sumi potest ex hoc quod supra dictum est, quod sic ex peccato primi +parentis traducitur culpa originalis in posteros, sicut a voluntate +animae per motionem membrorum traducitur peccatum actuale ad membra +corporis. Manifestum est autem quod peccatum actuale traduci potest +ad omnia membra quae nata sunt moveri a voluntate. Unde et culpa +originalis traducitur ad omnes illos qui moventur ab Adam motione +generationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is held with greater probability and more commonly that all those that are alive at the coming of our Lord, will die, + and rise again shortly, as we shall state more fully in the TP ( + <a href="XP_iii.html#XP_Q78_A1" id="FS_Q81_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">XP, Q[78], A[1]</a>, OBJ[1]). If, however, it be true, as others hold, that they will never die, (an opinion which Jerome mentions among others + in a letter to Minerius, on the Resurrection of the Body---Ep. cxix), then we must say in reply to the + objection, that although they are not to die, the debt of death is none the less in them, and that the punishment of death + will be remitted by God, since He can also forgive the punishment due for actual sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37055" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37055] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod probabilius et communius tenetur quod omnes illi +qui in adventu domini reperientur, morientur, et post modicum +resurgent, ut in tertio plenius dicetur. Si tamen hoc verum sit +quod alii dicunt, quod illi nunquam morientur, sicut Hieronymus +narrat diversorum opiniones in quadam epistola ad Minerium, de +resurrectione carnis; dicendum est ad argumentum, quod illi etsi +non moriantur, est tamen in eis reatus mortis, sed poena aufertur a +Deo, qui etiam peccatorum actualium poenas condonare potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Original sin is taken away by Baptism as to the guilt, in so far as the soul recovers grace as regards the mind. Nevertheless + original sin remains in its effect as regards the "fomes," which is the disorder of the lower parts of the soul and of the + body itself, in respect of which, and not of the mind, man exercises his power of generation. Consequently those who are baptized + transmit original sin: since they do not beget as being renewed in Baptism, + but as still retaining something of the oldness of the first sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37056" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37056] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod peccatum originale per Baptismum aufertur reatu, +inquantum anima recuperat gratiam quantum ad mentem. Remanet tamen +peccatum originale actu quantum ad fomitem, qui est inordinatio +inferiorum partium animae et ipsius corporis, secundum quod homo +generat, et non secundum mentem. Et ideo baptizati traducunt +peccatum originale, non enim generant inquantum sunt renovati per +Baptismum, sed inquantum retinent adhuc aliquid de vetustate primi +peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as Adam's sin is transmitted to all who are born of Adam corporally, so is the grace of Christ transmitted to all that + are begotten of Him spiritually, by faith and Baptism: and this, not only unto the removal of sin of their first parent, but + also unto the removal of actual sins, and the obtaining of glory. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37057" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37057] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut peccatum Adae traducitur in omnes qui ab Adam +corporaliter generantur, ita gratia Christi traducitur in omnes qui +ab eo spiritualiter generantur per fidem et Baptismum, et non solum +ad removendam culpam primi parentis, sed etiam ad removendum +peccata actualia, et ad introducendum in gloriam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q81_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q81_A4-p0.1">Q. 81. A. 4. Whether original sin would be contracted by a person formed miraculously from human flesh?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin would be contracted by a person formed miraculously from human flesh. For a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.4.1" target="asv"> Gn. 4:1 </a>says that "Adam's entire posterity was corrupted in his loins, because they were not severed from him in the place of life, + before he sinned, but in the place of exile after he had sinned." But if a man were to be formed in the aforesaid manner, + his flesh would be severed in the place of exile. Therefore it would + contract original sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37058" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37058] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod, si aliquis formaretur ex carne humana +miraculose, contraheret originale peccatum. Dicit enim quaedam +Glossa Gen. IV, quod <i>in lumbis Adae fuit tota posteritas +corrupta, quia non est separata prius in loco vitae, sed postea in +loco exilii</i>. Sed si aliquis homo sic formaretur sicut dictum +est, caro eius separaretur in loco exilii. Ergo contraheret +originale peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, original sin is caused in us by the soul being infected through the flesh. But man's flesh is entirely corrupted. + Therefore a man's soul would contract the infection of original sin, from whatever part of the flesh it was formed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37059" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37059] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum originale causatur in nobis inquantum anima inficitur ex +carne. Sed caro tota hominis est infecta. Ergo ex quacumque parte +carnis homo formaretur, anima eius inficeretur infectione +originalis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, original sin comes upon all from our first parent, in so far as we were all in him when he sinned. But those who + might be formed out of human flesh, would have been in Adam. Therefore they would contract original sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37060" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37060] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum originale a primo parente pervenit in omnes, inquantum +omnes in eo peccante fuerunt. Sed illi qui ex carne humana +formarentur, in Adam fuissent. Ergo peccatum originale +contraherent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> They would not have been in Adam "according to seminal virtue," which alone is the cause of the transmission of original + sin, as Augustine states (Gen. ad lit. x, 18, seqq.). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37061" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37061] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quia non fuissent in Adam secundum seminalem rationem; quod +solum causat traductionem peccati originalis, ut Augustinus dicit, +X super Gen. ad Litt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q81_A1" id="FS_Q81_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,3), original sin is transmitted from the first parent to his posterity, inasmuch as they are moved by him through generation, + even as the members are moved by the soul to actual sin. Now there is no movement to generation except by the active power + of generation: so that those alone contract original sin, who are descended from Adam through the active power of generation + originally derived from Adam, i.e. who + are descended from him through seminal power; for the seminal power is nothing else than the active power of generation. But + if anyone were to be formed by God out of human flesh, it is evident that the active power would not be derived from Adam. + Consequently he would not contract original sin: even as a hand would have no part in a human sin, if it were moved, not by + the man's will, but by some external power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 4 co."><a name="37062" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37062] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, peccatum originale a primo +parente traducitur in posteros, inquantum moventur ab ipso per +generationem, sicut membra moventur ab anima ad peccatum actuale. +Non autem est motio ad generationem nisi per virtutem activam in +generatione. Unde illi soli peccatum originale contrahunt, qui ab +Adam descendunt per virtutem activam in generatione originaliter ab +Adam derivatam, quod est secundum seminalem rationem ab eo +descendere, nam ratio seminalis nihil aliud est quam vis activa in +generatione. Si autem aliquis formaretur virtute divina ex carne +humana, manifestum est quod vis activa non derivaretur ab Adam. +Unde non contraheret peccatum originale, sicut nec actus manus +pertineret ad peccatum humanum, si manus non moveretur a voluntate +hominis, sed ab aliquo extrinseco movente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Adam was not in the place of exile until after his sin. Consequently it is not on account of the place of exile, but on account + of the sin, that original sin is transmitted to those to whom his active generation extends. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37063" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37063] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Adam non fuit in loco exilii nisi post peccatum. +Unde non propter locum exilii, sed propter peccatum, traducitur +originalis culpa ad eos ad quos activa eius generatio pervenit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The flesh does not corrupt the soul, except in so far as it is the active principle in generation, as we have stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37064" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37064] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod caro non inficit animam nisi inquantum est principium +activum in generatione, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If a man were to be formed from human flesh, he would have been in Adam, "by way of bodily substance" [*The expression is + St. Augustine's (Gen. ad lit. x). Cf. Summa Theologica + <a href="TP_ii.html#TP_Q31_A6" id="FS_Q81_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">TP, Q[31], A[6]</a>, Reply to OBJ[1]], but not according to seminal virtue, as stated above. Therefore he would not contract original sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37065" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37065] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ille qui formaretur ex carne humana, fuisset in Adam +secundum corpulentam substantiam; sed non secundum seminalem +rationem, ut dictum est. Et ideo non contraheret originale +peccatum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q81_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q81_A5-p0.1">Q. 81. A. 5. Whether if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would have contracted original sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would have contracted original sin. Because we contract + original sin from our parents, in so far as we were once in them, according to the word of the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>): "In whom all have sinned." Now a man pre-exist in his mother as well as in his father. Therefore a man would have contracted + original sin from his mother's sin as well as from his father's. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="37066" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37066] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod, si Adam non peccasset, Eva peccante, +filii originale peccatum contraherent. Peccatum enim originale a +parentibus contrahimus, inquantum in eis fuimus, secundum illud +apostoli, Rom. V, <i>in quo omnes peccaverunt</i>. Sed sicut homo +praeexistit in patre suo, ita in matre. Ergo ex peccato matris homo +peccatum originale contraheret, sicut et ex peccato patris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would have been born liable to suffering and death, since it is + "the mother" that "provides the matter in generation" as the Philosopher states (De Gener. Animal. ii, 1,4), when death and + liability to suffering are the necessary results of matter. Now liability to suffering and the necessity of dying are punishments + of original sin. Therefore if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would + contract original sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="37067" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37067] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +si Eva peccasset, Adam non peccante, filii passibiles et mortales +nascerentur, mater enim dat materiam in generatione, ut dicit +philosophus, in II de Generat. Animal.; mors autem, et omnis +passibilitas, provenit ex necessitate materiae. Sed passibilitas et +necessitas moriendi sunt poena peccati originalis. Ergo, si Eva +peccasset, Adam non peccante, filii contraherent originale +peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3) that "the Holy Ghost came upon the Virgin," (of whom Christ was to be born + without original sin) "purifying her." But this purification would not have been necessary, if the infection of original sin + were not contracted from the mother. Therefore the infection of original sin is contracted from the mother: so that if Eve + had sinned, her children would have contracted original sin, even if Adam had not sinned. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="37068" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37068] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Damascenus dicit, in libro III, quod spiritus sanctus praevenit in +virginem, de qua Christus erat absque peccato originali nasciturus, +purgans eam. Sed illa purgatio non fuisset necessaria, si infectio +originalis peccati non traheretur ex matre. Ergo infectio +originalis peccati ex matre trahitur. Et sic, Eva peccante, eius +filii peccatum originale contraherent, etiam si Adam non +peccasset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>): "By one man sin entered into this world." Now if the woman would have transmitted original sin to her children, he should + have said that it entered by two, since both of them sinned, or rather that it entered by a woman, since she sinned first. + Therefore original sin is transmitted to the children, not by the mother, but by the father. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 5 s. c."><a name="37069" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37069] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. V, <i>per unum hominem peccatum in +hunc mundum intravit</i>. Magis autem fuisset dicendum quod per +duos intrasset, cum ambo peccaverint; vel potius per mulierem, quae +primo peccavit; si femina peccatum originale in prolem +transmitteret. Non ergo peccatum originale derivatur in filios a +matre, sed a patre.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The solution of this question is made clear by what has been said. For it has been stated + <a href="#FS_Q81_A1" id="FS_Q81_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that original sin is transmitted by the first parent in so far as he is the mover in the begetting of his children: wherefore + it has been said + <a href="#FS_Q81_A4" id="FS_Q81_A5-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[4])</a> that if anyone were begotten materially only, of human flesh, they would not contract original sin. Now it is evident that + in the opinion of philosophers, the active + principle of generation is from the father, while the mother provides the matter. Therefore original sin, is contracted, not + from the mother, but from the father: so that, accordingly, if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would not contract + original sin: whereas, if Adam, and not Eve, had sinned, they would contract it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 5 co."><a name="37070" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37070] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod huius dubitationis solutio ex praemissis apparet. +Dictum est enim supra quod peccatum originale a primo parente +traducitur inquantum ipse movet ad generationem natorum, unde +dictum est quod, si materialiter tantum aliquis ex carne humana +generaretur, originale peccatum non contraheret. Manifestum est +autem secundum doctrinam philosophorum, quod principium activum in +generatione est a patre, materiam autem mater ministrat. Unde +peccatum originale non contrahitur a matre, sed a patre. Et +secundum hoc, si, Adam non peccante, Eva peccasset, filii originale +peccatum non contraherent. E converso autem esset, si Adam +peccasset, et Eva non peccasset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The child pre-exists in its father as in its active principle, and in its mother, as in its material and passive principle. + Consequently the comparison fails. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="37071" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37071] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod in patre praeexistit filius sicut in principio +activo, sed in matre sicut in principio materiali et passivo. Unde +non est similis ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some hold that if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would be immune from the sin, but would have been subject + to the necessity of dying and to other forms of suffering that are a necessary result of the matter which is provided by the + mother, not as punishments, but as actual defects. This, however, seems unreasonable. Because, as stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q97_A1" id="FS_Q81_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[97], AA[1]</a>, 2, ad 4, immortality and impassibility, in the + original state, were a result, not of the condition of matter, but of original justice, whereby the body was subjected to + the soul, so long as the soul remained subject to God. Now privation of original justice is original sin. If, therefore, supposing + Adam had not sinned, original sin would not have been transmitted to posterity on account of Eve's sin; it is evident that + the children would not have been deprived of original justice: and consequently they would not have been liable to suffer + and subject to the necessity of dying. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="37072" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37072] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod quibusdam videtur quod, Eva peccante, si Adam non +peccasset, filii essent immunes a culpa, paterentur tamen +necessitatem moriendi, et alias passibilitates provenientes ex +necessitate materiae, quam mater ministrat, non sub ratione poenae, +sed sicut quosdam naturales defectus. Sed hoc non videtur +conveniens. Immortalitas enim et impassibilitas primi status non +erat ex conditione materiae, ut in primo dictum est; sed ex +originali iustitiae, per quam corpus subdebatur animae, quandiu +anima esset subiecta Deo. Defectus autem originalis iustitiae est +peccatum originale. Si igitur, Adam non peccante, peccatum +originale non transfunderetur in posteros propter peccatum Evae; +manifestum est quod in filiis non esset defectus originalis +iustitiae. Unde non esset in eis passibilitas vel necessitas +moriendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This prevenient purification in the Blessed Virgin was not needed to hinder the transmission of original sin, but because + it behooved the Mother of God "to shine with the greatest purity" [*Cf. Anselm, De Concep. Virg. xviii.]. For nothing is worthy + to receive God unless it be pure, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.92.5" target="asv"> Ps. 92:5</a>: "Holiness becometh Thy House, O Lord." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="37073" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37073] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod illa purgatio praeveniens in beata virgine, non +requirebatur ad auferendum transfusionem originalis peccati, sed +quia oportebat ut mater Dei maxima puritate niteret. Non enim est +aliquid digne receptaculum Dei, nisi sit mundum; secundum illud +Psalmi XCII, <i>domum tuam, domine, decet sanctitudo</i>.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q82" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q82-p0.1">Q. 82. OF ORIGINAL SIN, AS TO ITS ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q82-p2"> We must now consider original sin as to its essence, and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q82-p3"><a href="#FS_Q82_A1"> (1) Whether original sin is a habit?</a></p><p id="FS_Q82-p4"><a href="#FS_Q82_A2"> (2) Whether there is but one original sin in each man?</a></p><p id="FS_Q82-p5"><a href="#FS_Q82_A3"> (3) Whether original sin is concupiscence?</a></p><p id="FS_Q82-p6"><a href="#FS_Q82_A4"> (4) Whether original sin is equally in all?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 pr."><a name="37074" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37074] +Iª-IIae q. 82 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +peccato originali quantum ad suam essentiam. Et circa hoc +quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum originale peccatum sit habitus. +Secundo, utrum sit unum tantum in uno homine. Tertio, utrum sit +concupiscentia. Quarto, utrum sit aequaliter in omnibus.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q82_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q82_A1-p0.1">Q. 82. A. 1. Whether original sin is a habit?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin is not a habit. For original sin is the absence of original justice, as Anselm states (De + Concep. Virg. ii, iii, xxvi), so that original sin is a privation. But privation is opposed to habit. Therefore original sin + is not a habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37075" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37075] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod originale peccatum non sit habitus. +Originale enim peccatum est carentia originalis iustitiae, ut +Anselmus dicit, in libro de concepto virginali, et sic originale +peccatum est quaedam privatio. Sed privatio opponitur habitui. Ergo +originale peccatum non est habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, actual sin has the nature of fault more than original sin, in so far as it is more voluntary. Now the habit of actual + sin has not the nature of a fault, else it would follow that a man while asleep, would be guilty of sin. Therefore no original + habit has the nature of a fault. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37076" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37076] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +actuale peccatum habet plus de ratione culpae quam originale, +inquantum habet plus de ratione voluntarii. Sed habitus actualis +peccati non habet rationem culpae, alioquin sequeretur quod homo +dormiens culpabiliter, peccaret. Ergo nullus habitus originalis +habet rationem culpae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in wickedness act always precedes habit, because evil habits are not infused, but acquired. Now original sin is + not preceded by an act. Therefore original sin is not a habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37077" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37077] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +in malis actus semper praecedit habitum, nullus enim habitus malus +est infusus, sed acquisitus. Sed originale peccatum non praecedit +aliquis actus. Ergo originale peccatum non est habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says in his book on the Baptism of infants (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 39) that on account of original sin little + children have the aptitude of concupiscence though they have not the act. Now aptitude denotes some kind of habit. Therefore + original sin is a habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37078" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37078] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Baptismo puerorum, quod +secundum peccatum originale parvuli sunt concupiscibiles, etsi non +sint actu concupiscentes. Sed habilitas dicitur secundum aliquem +habitum. Ergo peccatum originale est habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q49_A4" id="FS_Q82_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[4]</a>; + <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q50_A1" id="FS_Q82_A1-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[50], A[1]</a>), habit is twofold. The first is a habit whereby power is inclined to an act: thus science and virtue are called habits. + In this way original sin is not a habit. The second kind of habit is the disposition of a complex nature, whereby that nature + is well or ill disposed to something, chiefly when such a disposition has become like a second nature, as in the case of + sickness or health. In this sense original sin is a habit. For it is an inordinate disposition, arising from the destruction + of the harmony which was essential to original justice, even as bodily sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body, + by reason of the destruction of that equilibrium which is essential to health. Hence it is that original sin is called the + "languor of nature" [*Cf. Augustine, In + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q82_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.118" target="asv">Ps. 118</a>, serm. iii]. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 1 co."><a name="37079" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37079] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, duplex est habitus. Unus +quidem quo inclinatur potentia ad agendum, sicut scientiae et +virtutes habitus dicuntur. Et hoc modo peccatum originale non est +habitus. Alio modo dicitur habitus dispositio alicuius naturae ex +multis compositae, secundum quam bene se habet vel male ad aliquid, +et praecipue cum talis dispositio versa fuerit quasi in naturam, ut +patet de aegritudine et sanitate. Et hoc modo peccatum originale +est habitus. Est enim quaedam inordinata dispositio proveniens ex +dissolutione illius harmoniae in qua consistebat ratio originalis +iustitiae, sicut etiam aegritudo corporalis est quaedam inordinata +dispositio corporis, secundum quam solvitur aequalitas in qua +consistit ratio sanitatis. Unde peccatum originale languor naturae +dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As bodily sickness is partly a privation, in so far as it denotes the destruction of the equilibrium of health, and partly + something positive, viz. the very humors that are inordinately disposed, so too original sin denotes the privation of original + justice, and besides this, the inordinate disposition of the parts of the soul. Consequently it is not a pure privation, but + a corrupt habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37080" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37080] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut aegritudo corporalis habet aliquid de +privatione, inquantum tollitur aequalitas sanitatis; et aliquid +habet positive, scilicet ipsos humores inordinate dispositos, ita +etiam peccatum originale habet privationem originalis iustitiae, et +cum hoc inordinatam dispositionem partium animae. Unde non est +privatio pura, sed est quidam habitus corruptus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Actual sin is an inordinateness of an act: whereas original sin, being the sin of nature, is an inordinate disposition of + nature, and has the character of fault through being transmitted from our first parent, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q81_A1" id="FS_Q82_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[81], A[1]</a>). Now this inordinate disposition of nature is a kind of habit, whereas the inordinate disposition of an act is not: and + for this reason original sin can be a habit, whereas actual sin + cannot. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37081" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37081] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod actuale peccatum est inordinatio quaedam actus, +originale vero, cum sit peccatum naturae, est quaedam inordinata +dispositio ipsius naturae, quae habet rationem culpae inquantum +derivatur ex primo parente, ut dictum est. Huiusmodi autem +dispositio naturae inordinata habet rationem habitus, sed +inordinata dispositio actus non habet rationem habitus. Et propter +hoc, peccatum originale potest esse habitus, non autem peccatum +actuale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection considers the habit which inclines a power to an act: but original sin is not this kind of habit. Nevertheless + a certain inclination to an inordinate act does follow from original sin, not directly, but indirectly, viz. by the removal + of the obstacle, i.e. original justice, which hindered inordinate movements: just as an inclination to inordinate bodily movements + results indirectly from bodily sickness. Nor is it necessary to says that + original sin is a habit "infused," or a habit "acquired" (except by the act of our first parent, but not by our own act): + but it is a habit "inborn" due to our corrupt origin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37082" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37082] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de habitu quo potentia +inclinatur in actum, talis autem habitus non est peccatum +originale. Quamvis etiam ex peccato originali sequatur aliqua +inclinatio in actum inordinatum, non directe, sed indirecte, +scilicet per remotionem prohibentis, idest originalis iustitiae, +quae prohibebat inordinatos motus, sicut etiam ex aegritudine +corporali indirecte sequitur inclinatio ad motus corporales +inordinatos. Nec debet dici quod peccatum originale sit habitus +infusus; aut acquisitus per actum nisi primi parentis, non autem +huius personae; sed per vitiatam originem innatus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q82_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q82_A2-p0.1">Q. 82. A. 2. Whether there are several original sins in one man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are many original sins in one man. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q82_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.1.7" target="asv">Ps. 1:7</a>): "Behold I was conceived in iniquities, and in sins did my mother conceive me." But the sin in which a man is conceived + is original sin. Therefore there are several original sins in man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37083" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37083] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod in uno homine sint multa originalia +peccata. Dicitur enim in Psalmo l, <i>ecce enim in iniquitatibus +conceptus sum, et in peccatis concepit me mater mea</i>. Sed +peccatum in quo homo concipitur, est originale. Ergo plura peccata +originalia sunt in uno homine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one and the same habit does not incline its subject to contraries: since the inclination of habit is like that of + nature which tends to one thing. Now original sin, even in one man, inclines to various and contrary sins. Therefore original + sin is not one habit; but several. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37084" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37084] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +unus et idem habitus non inclinat ad contraria, habitus enim +inclinat per modum naturae, quae tendit in unum. Sed peccatum +originale, etiam in uno homine, inclinat ad diversa peccata et +contraria. Ergo peccatum originale non est unus habitus, sed +plures.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, original sin infects every part of the soul. Now the different parts of the soul are different subjects of sin, + as shown above ( + <a href="#FS_Q74" id="FS_Q82_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[74])</a>. Since then one sin cannot be in different subjects, it seems that original sin is not one but several. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37085" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37085] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum originale inficit omnes animae partes. Sed diversae partes +animae sunt diversa subiecta peccati, ut ex praemissis patet. Cum +igitur unum peccatum non possit esse in diversis subiectis, videtur +quod peccatum originale non sit unum, sed multa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q82_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.29" target="asv">Jn. 1:29</a>): "Behold the Lamb of God, behold Him Who taketh away the sin of the world": and the reason for the employment of the singular + is that the "sin of the world" is original sin, as a gloss expounds this passage. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37086" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37086] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Ioan. I, <i>ecce agnus Dei, ecce qui tollit +peccatum mundi</i>. Quod singulariter dicitur, quia peccatum mundi, +quod est peccatum originale, est unum; ut Glossa ibidem +exponit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In one man there is one original sin. Two reasons may be assigned for this. The first is on the part of the cause of original + sin. For it has been stated ( + <a href="#FS_Q81_A2" id="FS_Q82_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[81], A[2]</a>), that the first sin alone of our first parent was transmitted to his posterity. Wherefore in one man original sin is one + in number; and in all men, it is one in proportion, i.e. in relation to its first principle. The second reason may be taken + from the very essence of + original sin. Because in every inordinate disposition, unity of species depends on the cause, while the unity of number is + derived from the subject. For example, take bodily sickness: various species of sickness proceed from different causes, e.g. + from excessive heat or cold, or from a lesion in the lung or liver; while one specific sickness in one man will be one in + number. Now the cause of this corrupt disposition that is called original sin, is one only, viz. the privation of original + justice, removing the subjection of man's mind to God. Consequently original sin is specifically one, and, in one man, can + be only one in number; while, in different men, it is one in species and in proportion, but is numerically many. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 2 co."><a name="37087" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37087] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod in uno homine est unum peccatum originale. Cuius +ratio dupliciter accipi potest. Uno modo, ex parte causae peccati +originalis. Dictum est enim supra quod solum primum peccatum primi +parentis in posteros traducitur. Unde peccatum originale in uno +homine est unum numero; et in omnibus hominibus est unum +proportione, in respectu scilicet ad primum principium. Alio modo +potest accipi ratio eius ex ipsa essentia originalis peccati. In +omni enim inordinata dispositione unitas speciei consideratur ex +parte causae; unitas autem secundum numerum, ex parte subiecti. +Sicut patet in aegritudine corporali, sunt enim diversae +aegritudines specie quae ex diversis causis procedunt, puta ex +superabundantia calidi vel frigidi, vel ex laesione pulmonis vel +hepatis; una autem aegritudo secundum speciem, in uno homine non +est nisi una numero. Causa autem huius corruptae dispositionis quae +dicitur originale peccatum, est una tantum, scilicet privatio +originalis iustitiae, per quam sublata est subiectio humanae mentis +ad Deum. Et ideo peccatum originale est unum specie. Et in uno +homine non potest esse nisi unum numero, in diversis autem +hominibus est unum specie et proportione, diversum autem +numero.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The employment of the plural---"in sins"---may be explained by the custom of the Divine Scriptures in the frequent use of + the plural for the singular, e.g. "They are dead that sought the life of the child"; or by the fact that all actual sins virtually + pre-exist in original sin, as in a principle so that it is virtually many; or by the fact of there being many deformities + in the sin of our first parent, viz. pride, disobedience, gluttony, and so + forth; or by several parts of the soul being infected by original sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37088" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37088] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod pluraliter dicitur in peccatis, secundum illum +morem divinae Scripturae quo frequenter ponitur pluralis numerus +pro singulari, sicut Matth. II, <i>defuncti sunt qui quaerebant +animam pueri</i>. Vel quia in peccato originali virtualiter +praeexistunt omnia peccata actualia, sicut in quodam principio, +unde est multiplex virtute. Vel quia in peccato primi parentis quod +per originem traducitur, fuerunt plures deformitates, scilicet +superbiae, inobedientiae, gulae, et alia huiusmodi. Vel quia multae +partes animae inficiuntur per peccatum originale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Of itself and directly, i.e. by its own form, one habit cannot incline its subject to contraries. But there is no reason + why it should not do so, indirectly and accidentally, i.e. by the removal of an obstacle: thus, when the harmony of a mixed + body is destroyed, the elements have contrary local tendencies. In like manner, when the harmony of original justice is destroyed, + the various powers of the soul have various opposite tendencies. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37089" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37089] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod unus habitus non potest inclinare per se et directe, +idest per propriam formam, ad contraria. Sed indirecte et per +accidens, scilicet per remotionem prohibentis, nihil prohibet, +sicut, soluta harmonia corporis mixti, elementa tendunt in loca +contraria. Et similiter, soluta harmonia originalis iustitiae, +diversae animae potentiae in diversa feruntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Original sin infects the different parts of the soul, in so far as they are the parts of one whole; even as original justice + held all the soul's parts together in one. Consequently there is but one original sin: just as there is but one fever in one + man, although the various parts of the body are affected. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37090" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37090] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod peccatum originale inficit diversas partes animae, +secundum quod sunt partes unius totius, sicut et iustitia +originalis continebat omnes animae partes in unum. Et ideo est unum +tantum peccatum originale. Sicut etiam est una febris in uno +homine, quamvis diversae partes corporis graventur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q82_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q82_A3-p0.1">Q. 82. A. 3. Whether original sin is concupiscence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin is not concupiscence. For every sin is contrary to nature, according to Damascene (De Fide + Orth. ii, 4,30). But concupiscence is in accordance with nature, since it is the proper act of the concupiscible faculty which + is a natural power. Therefore concupiscence is not original sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37091" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37091] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum originale non sit +concupiscentia. Omne enim peccatum est contra naturam, ut dicit +Damascenus, in II libro. Sed concupiscentia est secundum naturam, +est enim proprius actus virtutis concupiscibilis, quae est potentia +naturalis. Ergo concupiscentia non est peccatum originale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, through original sin "the passions of sins" are in us, according to the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q82_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.5" target="asv">Rom. 7:5</a>). Now there are several other passions besides concupiscence, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q82_A3-p3.2" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a>). Therefore original sin is not concupiscence any more than another passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37092" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37092] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +per peccatum originale sunt in nobis passiones peccatorum; ut patet +per apostolum, Rom. VII. Sed multae aliae sunt passiones praeter +concupiscentiam, ut supra habitum est. Ergo peccatum originale non +magis est concupiscentia quam aliqua alia passio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by original sin, all the parts of the soul are disordered, as stated above (A[2], OBJ[3]). But the intellect is + the highest of the soul's parts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 7). Therefore original sin is ignorance rather than + concupiscence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37093" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37093] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +per peccatum originale deordinantur omnes animae partes, ut dictum +est. Sed intellectus est suprema inter animae partes; ut patet per +philosophum, in X Ethic. Ergo peccatum originale magis est +ignorantia quam concupiscentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Retract. i, 15): "Concupiscence is the guilt of original sin." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37094" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37094] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro Retract., <i>concupiscentia est +reatus originalis peccati</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Everything takes its species from its form: and it has been stated + <a href="#FS_Q82_A2" id="FS_Q82_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a> that the species of original sin is taken from its cause. Consequently the formal element of original sin must be considered + in respect of the cause of original sin. But contraries have contrary causes. Therefore the cause of original sin must be + considered with respect to the cause of original justice, which is opposed to it. Now the whole order of original + justice consists in man's will being subject to God: which subjection, first and chiefly, was in the will, whose function + it is to move all the other parts to the end, as stated above (Q[9], A[1] ), so that the will being turned away from God, + all the other powers of the soul become inordinate. Accordingly the privation of original justice, whereby the will was made + subject to God, is the formal element in original sin; while every other disorder of the soul's powers, is a kind of material + element in respect of original sin. Now the inordinateness of the other powers of the soul consists chiefly in their turning + inordinately to mutable good; which inordinateness may be called by the general name of concupiscence. Hence original sin + is concupiscence, materially, but privation of original justice, formally. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 3 co."><a name="37095" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37095] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod unumquodque habet speciem a sua forma. Dictum est +autem supra quod species peccati originalis sumitur ex sua causa. +Unde oportet quod id quod est formale in originali peccato, +accipiatur ex parte causae peccati originalis. Oppositorum autem +oppositae sunt causae. Est igitur attendenda causa originalis +peccati ex causa originalis iustitiae, quae ei opponitur. Tota +autem ordinatio originalis iustitiae ex hoc est, quod voluntas +hominis erat Deo subiecta. Quae quidem subiectio primo et +principaliter erat per voluntatem, cuius est movere omnes alias +partes in finem, ut supra dictum est. Unde ex aversione voluntatis +a Deo, consecuta est inordinatio in omnibus aliis animae viribus. +Sic ergo privatio originalis iustitiae, per quam voluntas +subdebatur Deo, est formale in peccato originali, omnis autem alia +inordinatio virium animae se habet in peccato originali sicut +quiddam materiale. Inordinatio autem aliarum virium animae +praecipue in hoc attenditur, quod inordinate convertuntur ad bonum +commutabile, quae quidem inordinatio communi nomine potest dici +concupiscentia. Et ita peccatum originale materialiter quidem est +concupiscentia; formaliter vero, defectus originalis iustitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since, in man, the concupiscible power is naturally governed by reason, the act of concupiscence is so far natural to man, + as it is in accord with the order of reason; while, in so far as it trespasses beyond the bounds of reason, it is, for a man, + contrary to reason. Such is the concupiscence of original sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37096" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37096] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, quia in homine concupiscibilis naturaliter +regitur ratione, intantum concupiscere est homini naturale, +inquantum est secundum rationis ordinem, concupiscentia autem quae +transcendit limites rationis, est homini contra naturam. Et talis +est concupiscentia originalis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q25_A1" id="FS_Q82_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[25], A[1]</a>), all the irascible passions are reducible to concupiscible passions, as holding the principle place: and of these, concupiscence + is the most impetuous in moving, and is felt most, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q25_A2" id="FS_Q82_A3-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[25], A[2]</a>, ad 1). Therefore original sin is ascribed to concupiscence, as being the chief passion, and as including all the others, + in a fashion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37097" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37097] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, omnes passiones irascibilis +ad passiones concupiscibilis reducuntur, sicut ad principaliores. +Inter quas concupiscentia vehementius movet, et magis sentitur, ut +supra habitum est. Et ideo concupiscentiae attribuitur, tanquam +principaliori, et in qua quodammodo omnes aliae passiones +includuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As, in good things, the intellect and reason stand first, so conversely in evil things, the lower part of the soul is found + to take precedence, for it clouds and draws the reason, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q77_A1" id="FS_Q82_A3-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[77], AA[1]</a>,2; + <a href="#FS_Q80_A2" id="FS_Q82_A3-p9.2" shape="rect"> Q[80], A[2]</a>). Hence original sin is called concupiscence rather than ignorance, although ignorance is comprised among the material defects + of original sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37098" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37098] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut in bonis intellectus et ratio principalitatem +habent, ita e converso in malis inferior pars animae principalior +invenitur, quae obnubilat et trahit rationem, ut supra dictum est. +Et propter hoc peccatum originale magis dicitur esse concupiscentia +quam ignorantia, licet etiam ignorantia inter defectus materiales +peccati originalis contineatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q82_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q82_A4-p0.1">Q. 82. A. 4. Whether original sin is equally in all?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin is not equally in all. Because original sin is inordinate concupiscence, as stated above + + <a href="#FS_Q82_A3" id="FS_Q82_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. Now all are not equally prone to acts of concupiscence. Therefore original sin is not equally in all. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37099" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37099] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum originale non sit aequaliter +in omnibus. Est enim peccatum originale concupiscentia inordinata, +ut dictum est. Sed non omnes aequaliter sunt proni ad +concupiscendum. Ergo peccatum originale non est aequaliter in +omnibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, original sin is an inordinate disposition of the soul, just as sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body. + But sickness is subject to degrees. Therefore original sin is subject to degrees. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37100" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37100] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum originale est quaedam inordinata dispositio animae, sicut +aegritudo est quaedam inordinata dispositio corporis. Sed aegritudo +recipit magis et minus. Ergo peccatum originale recipit magis et +minus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Nup. et Concep. i, 23) that "lust transmits original sin to the child." But the act of generation + may be more lustful in one than in another. Therefore original sin may be greater in one than in another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37101" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37101] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in libro de Nupt. et Concupisc., quod <i>libido +transmittit originale peccatum in prolem</i>. Sed contingit esse +maiorem libidinem unius in actu generationis, quam alterius. Ergo +peccatum originale potest esse maius in uno quam in alio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Original sin is the sin of nature, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q81_A1" id="FS_Q82_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[81], A[1]</a>). But nature is equally in all. Therefore original sin is too. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37102" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37102] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quia peccatum originale est peccatum naturae, ut dictum est. +Sed natura aequaliter est in omnibus. Ergo et peccatum +originale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There are two things in original sin: one is the privation of original justice; the other is the relation of this privation + to the sin of our first parent, from whom it is transmitted to man through his corrupt origin. As to the first, original sin + has no degrees, since the gift of original justice is taken away entirely; and privations that remove something entirely, + such as death and darkness, cannot be more or less, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q73_A2" id="FS_Q82_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[73], A[2]</a>). In like manner, neither is this possible, as to the second: since all are related equally to the first principle of our + corrupt origin, from which principle original sin takes the nature of guilt; for relations cannot be more or less. Consequently + it is evident that original sin cannot be more in one than in another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 4 co."><a name="37103" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37103] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod in originali peccato sunt duo, quorum unum est +defectus originalis iustitiae; aliud autem est relatio huius +defectus ad peccatum primi parentis, a quo per vitiatam originem +deducitur. Quantum autem ad primum, peccatum originale non recipit +magis et minus, quia totum donum originalis iustitiae est sublatum; +privationes autem totaliter aliquid privantes, ut mors et tenebrae, +non recipiunt magis et minus, sicut supra dictum est. Similiter +etiam nec quantum ad secundum, aequaliter enim omnes relationem +habent ad primum principium vitiatae originis, ex quo peccatum +originale recipit rationem culpae; relationes enim non recipiunt +magis et minus. Unde manifestum est quod peccatum originale non +potest esse magis in uno quam in alio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Through the bond of original justice being broken, which held together all the powers of the soul in a certain order, each + power of the soul tends to its own proper movement, and the more impetuously, as it is stronger. Now it happens that some + of the soul's powers are stronger in one man than in another, on account of the different bodily temperaments. Consequently + if one man is more prone than another to acts of concupiscence, this is not due to + original sin, because the bond of original justice is equally broken in all, and the lower parts of the soul are, in all, + left to themselves equally; but it is due to the various dispositions of the powers, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37104" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37104] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, soluto vinculo originalis iustitiae, sub quo +quodam ordine omnes vires animae continebantur, unaquaeque vis +animae tendit in suum proprium motum; et tanto vehementius, quanto +fuerit fortior. Contingit autem vires aliquas animae esse fortiores +in uno quam in alio, propter diversas corporis complexiones. Quod +ergo unus homo sit pronior ad concupiscendum quam alter, non est +ratione peccati originalis, cum in omnibus aequaliter solvatur +vinculum originalis iustitiae, et aequaliter in omnibus partes +inferiores animae sibi relinquantur, sed accidit hoc ex diversa +dispositione potentiarum, sicut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sickness of the body, even sickness of the same species, has not an equal cause in all; for instance if a fever be caused + by corruption of the bile, the corruption may be greater or less, and nearer to, or further from a vital principle. But the + cause of original sin is equal to all, so that there is not comparison. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37105" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37105] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod aegritudo corporalis non habet in omnibus aequalem +causam, etiam si sit eiusdem speciei, puta, si sit febris ex +cholera putrefacta, potest esse maior vel minor putrefactio, et +propinquior vel remotior a principio vitae. Sed causa originalis +peccati in omnibus est aequalis. Unde non est simile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is not the actual lust that transmits original sin: for, supposing God were to grant to a man to feel no inordinate lust + in the act of generation, he would still transmit original sin; we must understand this to be habitual lust, whereby the sensitive + appetite is not kept subject to reason by the bonds of original justice. This lust is equally in all. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37106" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37106] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod libido quae transmittit peccatum originale in prolem, +non est libido actualis, quia dato quod virtute divina concederetur +alicui quod nullam inordinatam libidinem in actu generationis +sentiret, adhuc transmitteret in prolem originale peccatum. Sed +libido illa est intelligenda habitualiter, secundum quod appetitus +sensitivus non continetur sub ratione vinculo originalis iustitiae. +Et talis libido in omnibus est aequalis.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q83" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q83-p0.1">Q. 83. OF THE SUBJECT OF ORIGINAL SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q83-p2"> We must now consider the subject of original sin, under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q83-p3"><a href="#FS_Q83_A1"> (1) Whether the subject of original sin is the flesh rather than the soul?</a></p><p id="FS_Q83-p4"><a href="#FS_Q83_A2"> (2) If it be the soul, whether this be through its essence, or through its powers?</a></p><p id="FS_Q83-p5"><a href="#FS_Q83_A3"> (3) Whether the will prior to the other powers is the subject of original sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q83-p6"><a href="#FS_Q83_A4"> (4) Whether certain powers of the soul are specially infected, viz. the generative power, the concupiscible part, and the + sense of touch? + </a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 pr."><a name="37107" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37107] +Iª-IIae q. 83 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +subiecto originalis peccati. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. +Primo, utrum subiectum originalis peccati per prius sit caro vel +anima. Secundo, si anima, utrum per essentiam aut per potentias +suas. Tertio, utrum voluntas per prius sit subiectum peccati +originalis quam aliae potentiae. Quarto, utrum aliquae potentiae +animae sint specialiter infectae, scilicet generativa, vis +concupiscibilis et sensus tactus.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q83_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q83_A1-p0.1">Q. 83. A. 1. Whether original sin is more in the flesh than in the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin is more in the flesh than in the soul. Because the rebellion of the flesh against the mind + arises from the corruption of original sin. Now the root of this rebellion is seated in the flesh: for the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q83_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.23" target="asv">Rom. 7:23</a>): "I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind." Therefore original sin is seated chiefly in the + flesh. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37108" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37108] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum originale magis sit in carne +quam in anima. Repugnantia enim carnis ad mentem ex corruptione +originalis peccati procedit. Sed radix huius repugnantiae in carne +consistit, dicit enim apostolus ad Rom. VII, <i>video aliam legem +in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae</i>. Ergo originale +peccatum in carne principaliter consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing is more in its cause than in its effect: thus heat is in the heating fire more than in the hot water. Now + the soul is infected with the corruption of original sin by the carnal semen. Therefore original sin is in the flesh rather + than in the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37109" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37109] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +unumquodque potius est in causa quam in effectu, sicut calor magis +est in igne calefaciente quam in aqua calefacta. Sed anima +inficitur infectione originalis peccati per semen carnale. Ergo +peccatum originale magis est in carne quam in anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we contract original sin from our first parent, in so far as we were in him by reason of seminal virtue. Now our + souls were not in him thus, but only our flesh. Therefore original sin is not in the soul, but in the flesh. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37110" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37110] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum originale ex primo parente contrahimus, prout in eo fuimus +secundum rationem seminalem. Sic autem non fuit ibi anima, sed sola +caro. Ergo originale peccatum non est in anima, sed in carne.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the rational soul created by God is infused into the body. If therefore the soul were infected with original sin, + it would follow that it is corrupted in its creation or infusion: and thus God would be the cause of sin, since He is the + author of the soul's creation and fusion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="37111" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37111] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +anima rationalis creata a Deo corpori infunditur. Si igitur anima +per peccatum originale inficeretur, consequens esset quod ex sua +creatione vel infusione inquinaretur. Et sic Deus esset causa +peccati, qui est auctor creationis et infusionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, no wise man pours a precious liquid into a vessel, knowing that the vessel will corrupt the liquid. But the rational + soul is more precious than any liquid. If therefore the soul, by being united with the body, could be corrupted with the infection + of original sin, God, Who is wisdom itself, would never infuse the soul into such a body. And yet He does; wherefore it is + not corrupted by the flesh. Therefore original sin is not in the soul but in the + flesh. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="37112" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37112] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +nullus sapiens liquorem pretiosum vasi infunderet ex quo sciret +ipsum liquorem infici. Sed anima rationalis est pretiosior omni +liquore. Si ergo anima ex corporis unione infici posset infectione +originalis culpae, Deus, qui ipsa sapientia est, nunquam animam +tali corpori infunderet. Infundit autem. Non ergo inquinatur ex +carne. Sic igitur peccatum originale non est in anima, sed in +carne.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The same is the subject of a virtue and of the vice or sin contrary to that virtue. But the flesh cannot be the subject of + virtue: for the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q83_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.18" target="asv">Rom. 7:18</a>): "I know that there dwelleth not in me, that is to say, in my flesh, that which is good." Therefore the flesh cannot be + the subject of original sin, but only the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37113" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37113] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod idem est subiectum virtutis et vitii sive peccati, quod +contrariatur virtuti. Sed caro non potest esse subiectum virtutis, +dicit enim apostolus, ad Rom. VII, <i>scio quod non habitat in me, +hoc est in carne mea, bonum</i>. Ergo caro non potest esse +subiectum originalis peccati, sed solum anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q83_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> One thing can be in another in two ways. First, as in its cause, either principal, or instrumental; secondly, as in its subject. + Accordingly the original sin of all men was in Adam indeed, as in its principal cause, according to the words of the Apostle + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q83_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>): "In whom all have sinned": whereas it is in the bodily semen, as in its instrumental cause, since it is by the active power + of the semen that original sin together with human + nature is transmitted to the child. But original sin can nowise be in the flesh as its subject, but only in the soul. + </p><p id="FS_Q83_A1-p9"> The reason for this is that, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q81_A1" id="FS_Q83_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[81], A[1]</a>), original sin is transmitted from the will of our first parent to this posterity by a certain movement of generation, in + the same way as actual sin is transmitted from any man's will to his other parts. Now in this transmission it is to be observed, + that whatever accrues from the motion of the will consenting to sin, to any part of man that can in any way share in that + guilt, either as its + subject or as its instrument, has the character of sin. Thus from the will consenting to gluttony, concupiscence of food accrues + to the concupiscible faculty, and partaking of food accrues to the hand and the mouth, which, in so far as they are moved + by the will to sin, are the instruments of sin. But that further action is evoked in the nutritive power and the internal + members, which have no natural aptitude for being moved by the will, does not bear the character of guilt. + </p><p id="FS_Q83_A1-p10"> Accordingly, since the soul can be the subject of guilt, while the flesh, of itself, cannot be the subject of guilt; whatever + accrues to the soul from the corruption of the first sin, has the character of guilt, while whatever accrues to the flesh, + has the character, not of guilt but of punishment: so that, therefore, the soul is the subject of original sin, and not the + flesh. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 co."><a name="37114" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37114] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod aliquid potest esse in aliquo dupliciter, uno modo, +sicut in causa, vel principali vel instrumentali; alio modo, sicut +in subiecto. Peccatum ergo originale omnium hominum fuit quidem in +ipso Adam sicut in prima causa principali; secundum illud apostoli, +Rom. V, <i>in quo omnes peccaverunt</i>. In semine autem corporali +est peccatum originale sicut in causa instrumentali, eo quod per +virtutem activam seminis traducitur peccatum originale in prolem, +simul cum natura humana. Sed sicut in subiecto, peccatum originale +nullo modo potest esse in carne, sed solum in anima. Cuius ratio +est quia, sicut supra dictum est, hoc modo ex voluntate primi +parentis peccatum originale traducitur in posteros per quandam +generativam motionem, sicut a voluntate alicuius hominis derivatur +peccatum actuale ad alias partes eius. In qua quidem derivatione +hoc potest attendi, quod quidquid provenit ex motione voluntatis +peccati ad quamcumque partem hominis quae quocumque modo potest +esse particeps peccati, vel per modum subiecti vel per modum +instrumenti, habet rationem culpae, sicut ex voluntate gulae +provenit concupiscentia cibi ad concupiscibilem, et sumptio cibi ad +manus et os, quae inquantum moventur a voluntate ad peccatum, sunt +instrumenta peccati. Quod vero ulterius derivatur ad vim nutritivam +et ad interiora membra, quae non sunt nata moveri a voluntate, non +habet rationem culpae. Sic igitur, cum anima possit esse subiectum +culpae, caro autem de se non habeat quod sit subiectum culpae; +quidquid provenit de corruptione primi peccati ad animam, habet +rationem culpae; quod autem provenit ad carnem, non habet rationem +culpae, sed poenae. Sic igitur anima est subiectum peccati +originalis, non autem caro.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (Retract. i, 27) [*Cf. QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 66], the Apostle is speaking, in that passage, of man already redeemed, + who is delivered from guilt, but is still liable to punishment, by reason of which sin is stated to dwell "in the flesh." + Consequently it follows that the flesh is the subject, not of guilt, but of punishment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37115" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37115] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro Retract., +apostolus loquitur ibi de homine iam redempto, qui liberatus est a +culpa, sed subiacet poenae, ratione cuius peccatum dicitur habitare +in carne. Unde ex hoc non sequitur quod caro sit subiectum culpae, +sed solum poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Original sin is caused by the semen as instrumental cause. Now there is no need for anything to be more in the instrumental + cause than in the effect; but only in the principal cause: and, in this way, original sin was in Adam more fully, since in + him it had the nature of actual sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37116" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37116] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod peccatum originale causatur ex semine sicut ex causa +instrumentali. Non autem oportet quod aliquid sit principalius in +causa instrumentali quam in effectu, sed solum in causa principali. +Et hoc modo peccatum originale potiori modo fuit in Adam, in quo +fuit secundum rationem actualis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The soul of any individual man was in Adam, in respect of his seminal power, not indeed as in its effective principle, but + as in a dispositive principle: because the bodily semen, which is transmitted from Adam, does not of its own power produce + the rational soul, but disposes the matter for it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37117" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37117] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod anima huius hominis non fuit secundum seminalem +rationem in Adam peccante sicut in principio effectivo, sed sicut +in principio dispositivo, eo quod semen corporale, quod ex Adam +traducitur, sua virtute non efficit animam rationalem, sed ad eam +disponit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The corruption of original sin is nowise caused by God, but by the sin alone of our first parent through carnal generation. + And so, since creation implies a relation in the soul to God alone, it cannot be said that the soul is tainted through being + created. On the other hand, infusion implies relation both to God infusing and to the flesh into which the soul is infused. + And so, with regard to God infusing, it cannot be said that the soul is stained + through being infused; but only with regard to the body into which it is infused. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="37118" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37118] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod infectio originalis peccati nullo modo causatur a +Deo, sed ex solo peccato primi parentis per carnalem generationem. +Et ideo, cum creatio importet respectum animae ad solum Deum, non +potest dici quod anima ex sua creatione inquinetur. Sed infusio +importat respectum et ad Deum infundentem, et ad carnem cui +infunditur anima. Et ideo, habito respectu ad Deum infundentem, non +potest dici quod anima per infusionem maculetur; sed solum habito +respectu ad corpus cui infunditur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The common good takes precedence of private good. Wherefore God, according to His wisdom, does not overlook the general order + of things (which is that such a soul be infused into such a body), lest this soul contract a singular corruption: all the + more that the nature of the soul demands that it should not exist prior to its infusion into the body, as stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q90_A4" id="FS_Q83_A1-p15.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[90], A[4]</a>; + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q118_A3" id="FS_Q83_A1-p15.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[118], A[3]</a>. + And it is better for the soul to be thus, according to its nature, than not to be at all, especially since it can avoid damnation, + by means of grace. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="37119" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37119] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod bonum commune praefertur bono singulari. Unde Deus, +secundum suam sapientiam, non praetermittit universalem ordinem +rerum, qui est ut tali corpori talis anima infundatur, ut vitetur +singularis infectio huius animae, praesertim cum natura animae hoc +habeat, ut esse non incipiat nisi in corpore, ut in primo habitum +est. Melius est autem ei sic esse secundum naturam, quam nullo modo +esse, praesertim cum possit per gratiam damnationem evadere.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q83_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q83_A2-p0.1">Q. 83. A. 2. Whether original sin is in the essence of the soul rather than in the powers?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin is not in the essence of the soul rather than in the powers. For the soul is naturally apt + to be the subject of sin, in respect of those parts which can be moved by the will. Now the soul is moved by the will, not + as to its essence but only as to the powers. Therefore original sin is in the soul, not according to its essence, but only + according to the powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37120" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37120] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum originale non sit per prius +in essentia animae quam in potentiis. Anima enim nata est esse +subiectum peccati, quantum ad id quod potest a voluntate moveri. +Sed anima non movetur a voluntate secundum suam essentiam, sed +solum secundum potentias. Ergo peccatum originale non est in anima +secundum suam essentiam, sed solum secundum potentias.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, original sin is opposed to original justice. Now original justice was in a power of the soul, because power is the + subject of virtue. Therefore original sin also is in a power of the soul, rather than in its essence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37121" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37121] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum originale opponitur originali iustitiae. Sed originalis +iustitia erat in aliqua potentia animae, quae est subiectum +virtutis. Ergo et peccatum originale est magis in potentia animae +quam in eius essentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as original sin is derived from the soul as from the flesh, so is it derived by the powers from the essence. + But original sin is more in the soul than in the flesh. Therefore it is more in the powers than in the essence of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37122" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37122] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut a carne peccatum originale derivatur ad animam, ita ab +essentia animae derivatur ad potentias. Sed peccatum originale +magis est in anima quam in carne. Ergo etiam magis est in potentiis +animae quam in essentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, original sin is said to be concupiscence, as stated ( + <a href="#FS_Q82_A3" id="FS_Q83_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[82], A[3]</a>). But concupiscence is in the powers of the soul. Therefore original sin is also. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="37123" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37123] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum originale dicitur esse concupiscentia, ut dictum est. Sed +concupiscentia est in potentiis animae. Ergo et peccatum +originale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Original sin is called the sin of nature, as stated above (Q[81], A[1]). Now the soul is the form and nature of the body, + in respect of its essence and not in respect of its powers, as stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q76_A6" id="FS_Q83_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[76], A[6]</a>. Therefore the soul is the subject of original sin chiefly in respect of its essence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37124" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37124] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod peccatum originale dicitur esse peccatum naturale, ut +supra dictum est. Anima autem est forma et natura corporis secundum +essentiam suam, et non secundum potentias, ut in primo habitum est. +Ergo anima est subiectum originalis peccati principaliter secundum +suam essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The subject of a sin is chiefly that part of the soul to which the motive cause of that sin primarily pertains: thus if the + motive cause of a sin is sensual pleasure, which regards the concupiscible power through being its proper object, it follows + that the concupiscible power is the proper subject of that sin. Now it is evident that original sin is caused through our + origin. Consequently that part of the soul which is first reached by man's origin, is the + primary subject of original sin. Now the origin reaches the soul as the term of generation, according as it is the form of + the body: and this belongs to the soul in respect of its essence, as was proved in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q76_A6" id="FS_Q83_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[76], A[6]</a>. Therefore the soul, in respect of its essence, is the primary subject of original sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 co."><a name="37125" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37125] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod illud animae est principaliter subiectum alicuius +peccati, ad quod primo pertinet causa motiva illius peccati, sicut +si causa motiva ad peccandum sit delectatio sensus, quae pertinet +ad vim concupiscibilem sicut obiectum proprium eius, sequitur quod +vis concupiscibilis sit proprium subiectum illius peccati. +Manifestum est autem quod peccatum originale causatur per originem. +Unde illud animae quod primo attingitur ab origine hominis, est +primum subiectum originalis peccati. Attingit autem origo animam ut +terminum generationis, secundum quod est forma corporis; quod +quidem convenit ei secundum essentiam propriam, ut in primo habitum +est. Unde anima secundum essentiam est primum subiectum originalis +peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the motion of the will of an individual reaches to the soul's powers and not to its essence, so the motion of the will + of the first generator, through the channel of generation, reaches first of all to the essence of the soul, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37126" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37126] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut motio voluntatis alicuius propriae +pervenit ad potentias animae, non autem ad animae essentiam; ita +motio voluntatis primi generantis, per viam generationis, pervenit +primo ad animae essentiam, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even original justice pertained radically to the essence of the soul, because it was God's gift to human nature, to which + the essence of the soul is related before the powers. For the powers seem to regard the person, in as much as they are the + principles of personal acts. Hence they are the proper subjects of actual sins, which are the sins of the person. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37127" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37127] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod etiam originalis iustitia pertinebat primordialiter +ad essentiam animae, erat enim donum divinitus datum humanae +naturae, quam per prius respicit essentia animae quam potentiae. +Potentiae enim magis videntur pertinere ad personam, inquantum sunt +principia personalium actuum. Unde sunt propria subiecta peccatorum +actualium, quae sunt peccata personalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The body is related to the soul as matter to form, which though it comes second in order of generation, nevertheless comes + first in the order of perfection and nature. But the essence of the soul is related to the powers, as a subject to its proper + accidents, which follow their subject both in the order of generation and in that of perfection. Consequently the comparison + fails. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37128" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37128] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod corpus comparatur ad animam sicut materia ad formam, +quae etsi sit posterior ordine generationis, est tamen prior ordine +perfectionis et naturae. Essentia autem animae comparatur ad +potentias sicut subiecta ad accidentia propria, quae sunt +posteriora subiecto et ordine generationis et etiam perfectionis. +Unde non est similis ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Concupiscence, in relation to original sin, holds the position of matter and effect, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q82_A3" id="FS_Q83_A2-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[82], A[3]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="37129" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37129] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod concupiscentia se habet materialiter et ex +consequenti in peccato originali, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q83_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q83_A3-p0.1">Q. 83. A. 3. Whether original sin infects the will before the other powers?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin does not infect the will before the other powers. For every sin belongs chiefly to that power + by whose act it was caused. Now original sin is caused by an act of the generative power. Therefore it seems to belong to + the generative power more than to the others. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37130" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37130] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum originale non per prius +inficiat voluntatem quam alias potentias. Omne enim peccatum +principaliter pertinet ad potentiam per cuius actum causatur. Sed +peccatum originale causatur per actum generativae potentiae. Ergo +inter ceteras potentias animae, videtur magis pertinere ad +generativam potentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, original sin is transmitted through the carnal semen. But the other powers of the soul are more akin to the flesh + than the will is, as is evident with regard to all the sensitive powers, which use a bodily organ. Therefore original sin + is in them more than in the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37131" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37131] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum originale per semen carnale traducitur. Sed aliae vires +animae propinquiores sunt carni quam voluntas, sicut patet de +omnibus sensitivis, quae utuntur organo corporali. Ergo in eis +magis est peccatum originale quam in voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellect precedes the will, for the object of the will is only the good understood. If therefore original sin + infects all the powers of the soul, it seems that it must first of all infect the intellect, as preceding the others. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37132" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37132] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +intellectus est prior voluntate, non enim est voluntas nisi de bono +intellecto. Si ergo peccatum originale inficit omnes potentias +animae, videtur quod per prius inficiat intellectum, tanquam +priorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Original justice has a prior relation to the will, because it is "rectitude of the will," as Anselm states (De Concep. Virg. + iii). Therefore original sin, which is opposed to it, also has a prior relation to the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37133" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37133] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod iustitia originalis per prius respicit voluntatem, est +enim rectitudo voluntatis, ut Anselmus dicit, in libro de conceptu +virginali. Ergo et peccatum originale, quod ei opponitur, per prius +respicit voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Two things must be considered in the infection of original sin. First, its inherence to its subject; and in this respect + it regards first the essence of the soul, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q83_A2" id="FS_Q83_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. In the second place we must consider its inclination to act; and in this way it regards the powers of the soul. It must + therefore regard first of all that power in which is seated the first inclination to commit a sin, and this is the will, as + stated + above (Q[74], AA[1],2). Therefore original sin regards first of all the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 3 co."><a name="37134" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37134] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod in infectione peccati originalis duo est considerare. +Primo quidem, inhaerentiam eius ad subiectum, et secundum hoc primo +respicit essentiam animae, ut dictum est. Deinde oportet +considerare inclinationem eius ad actum, et hoc modo respicit +potentias animae. Oportet ergo quod illam per prius respiciat, quae +primam inclinationem habet ad peccandum. Haec autem est voluntas, +ut ex supradictis patet. Unde peccatum originale per prius respicit +voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Original sin, in man, is not caused by the generative power of the child, but by the act of the parental generative power. + Consequently, it does not follow that the child's generative power is the subject of original sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37135" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37135] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod peccatum originale non causatur in homine per +potentiam generativam prolis, sed per actum potentiae generativae +parentis. Unde non oportet quod sua potentia generativa sit primum +subiectum originalis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Original sin spreads in two ways; from the flesh to the soul, and from the essence of the soul to the powers. The former + follows the order of generation, the latter follows the order of perfection. Therefore, although the other, viz. the sensitive + powers, are more akin to the flesh, yet, since the will, being the higher power, is more akin to the essence of the soul, + the infection of original sin reaches it first. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37136" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37136] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod peccatum originale habet duplicem processum, unum +quidem a carne ad animam; alium vero ab essentia animae ad +potentias. Primus quidem processus est secundum ordinem +generationis, secundus autem secundum ordinem perfectionis. Et ideo +quamvis aliae potentiae, scilicet sensitivae, propinquiores sint +carni; quia tamen voluntas est propinquior essentiae animae, +tanquam superior potentia, primo pervenit ad ipsam infectio +originalis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellect precedes the will, in one way, by proposing its object to it. In another way, the will precedes the intellect, + in the order of motion to act, which motion pertains to sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37137" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37137] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod intellectus quodam modo praecedit voluntatem, +inquantum proponit ei suum obiectum. Alio vero modo voluntas +praecedit intellectum, secundum ordinem motionis ad actum, quae +quidem motio pertinet ad peccatum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q83_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q83_A4-p0.1">Q. 83. A. 4. Whether the aforesaid powers are more infected than the others?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the aforesaid powers are not more infected than the others. For the infection of original sin seems to + pertain more to that part of the soul which can be first the subject of sin. Now this is the rational part, and chiefly the + will. Therefore that power is most infected by original sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37138" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37138] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod praedictae potentiae non sint magis +infectae quam aliae. Infectio enim originalis peccati magis videtur +pertinere ad illam animae partem quae prius potest esse subiectum +peccati. Haec autem est rationalis pars, et praecipue voluntas. +Ergo ipsa est magis infecta per peccatum originale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no power of the soul is infected by guilt, except in so far as it can obey reason. Now the generative power cannot + obey reason, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. Therefore the generative power is not the most infected by original sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37139" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37139] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +nulla vis animae inficitur per culpam, nisi inquantum potest +obedire rationi. Generativa autem non potest obedire, ut dicitur in +I Ethic. Ergo generativa non est maxime infecta per originale +peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, of all the senses the sight is the most spiritual and the nearest to reason, in so far "as it shows us how a number + of things differ" (Metaph. i). But the infection of guilt is first of all in the reason. Therefore the sight is more infected + than touch. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37140" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37140] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +visus inter alios sensus est spiritualior et propinquior rationi, +inquantum plures differentias rerum ostendit, ut dicitur in I +Metaphys. Sed infectio culpae primo est in ratione. Ergo visus +magis est infectus quam tactus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 16, seqq., 24) that the infection of original sin is most apparent in the movements of the + members of generation, which are not subject to reason. Now those members serve the generative power in the mingling of sexes, + wherein there is the delectation of touch, which is the most powerful incentive to concupiscence. Therefore the infection + of original sin regards these three chiefly, viz. the generative power, the + concupiscible faculty and the sense of touch. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37141" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37141] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quod infectio +originalis culpae maxime apparet in motu genitalium membrorum, qui +rationi non subditur. Sed illa membra deserviunt generativae +virtuti in commixtione sexuum, in qua est delectatio secundum +tactum, quae maxime concupiscentiam movet. Ergo infectio originalis +peccati maxime pertinet ad ista tria, scilicet potentiam +generativam, vim concupiscibilem et sensum tactus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Those corruptions especially are said to be infectious, which are of such a nature as to be transmitted from one subject + to another: hence contagious diseases, such as leprosy and murrain and the like, are said to be infectious. Now the corruption + of original sin is transmitted by the act of generation, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q81_A1" id="FS_Q83_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[81], A[1]</a>). Therefore the powers which concur in this act, are chiefly said to be infected. Now this act serves + the generative power, in as much as it is directed to generation; and it includes delectation of the touch, which is the most + powerful object of the concupiscible faculty. Consequently, while all the parts of the soul are said to be corrupted by original + sin, these three are said specially to be corrupted and infected. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 4 co."><a name="37142" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37142] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod illa corruptio praecipue infectio nominari solet, +quae nata est in aliud transferri, unde et morbi contagiosi, sicut +lepra et scabies et huiusmodi, infectiones dicuntur. Corruptio +autem originalis peccati traducitur per actum generationis, sicut +supra dictum est. Unde potentiae quae ad huiusmodi actum +concurrunt, maxime dicuntur esse infectae. Huiusmodi autem actus +deservit generativae, inquantum ad generationem ordinatur, habet +autem in se delectationem tactus, quae est maximum obiectum +concupiscibilis. Et ideo, cum omnes partes animae dicantur esse +corruptae per peccatum originale, specialiter tres praedictae +dicuntur esse corruptae et infectae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Original sin, in so far as it inclines to actual sins, belongs chiefly to the will, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q83_A3" id="FS_Q83_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. But in so far as it is transmitted to the offspring, it belongs to the aforesaid powers proximately, and to the will, remotely. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37143" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37143] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod peccatum originale ex ea parte qua inclinat in +peccata actualia, praecipue pertinet ad voluntatem, ut dictum est. +Sed ex ea parte qua traducitur in prolem, pertinet propinque ad +potentias praedictas, ad voluntatem autem remote.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The infection of actual sin belongs only to the powers which are moved by the will of the sinner. But the infection of original + sin is not derived from the will of the contractor, but through his natural origin, which is effected by the generative power. + Hence it is this power that is infected by original sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37144" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37144] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod infectio actualis culpae non pertinet nisi ad +potentias quae moventur a voluntate peccantis. Sed infectio +originalis culpae non derivatur a voluntate eius qui ipsam +contrahit, sed per originem naturae, cui deservit potentia +generativa. Et ideo in ea est infectio originalis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sight is not related to the act of generation except in respect of remote disposition, in so far as the concupiscible species + is seen through the sight. But the delectation is completed in the touch. Wherefore the aforesaid infection is ascribed to + the touch rather than to the sight. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37145" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37145] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod visus non pertinet ad actum generationis nisi +secundum dispositionem remotam, prout scilicet per visum apparet +species concupiscibilis. Sed delectatio perficitur in tactu. Et +ideo talis infectio magis attribuitur tactui quam visui.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q84" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q84-p0.1">Q. 84. OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, IN RESPECT OF ONE SIN BEING THE CAUSE OF ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q84-p2"> We must now consider the cause of sin, in so far as one sin can be the cause of another. Under this head there are four points + of inquiry: + </p><p id="FS_Q84-p3"><a href="#FS_Q84_A1"> (1) Whether covetousness is the root of all sins?</a></p><p id="FS_Q84-p4"><a href="#FS_Q84_A2"> (2) Whether pride is the beginning of every sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q84-p5"><a href="#FS_Q84_A3"> (3) Whether other special sins should be called capital vices, besides pride and covetousness?</a></p><p id="FS_Q84-p6"><a href="#FS_Q84_A4"> (4) How many capital vices there are, and which are they?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 pr."><a name="37146" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37146] +Iª-IIae q. 84 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causa +peccati secundum quod unum peccatum est causa alterius. Et circa +hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum cupiditas sit radix omnium +peccatorum. Secundo, utrum superbia sit initium omnis peccati. +Tertio, utrum praeter superbiam et avaritiam, debeant dici +capitalia vitia aliqua specialia peccata. Quarto, quot et quae sint +capitalia vitia.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q84_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q84_A1-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 1. Whether covetousness is the root of all sins?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that covetousness is not the root of all sins. For covetousness, which is immoderate desire for riches, is + opposed to the virtue of liberality. But liberality is not the root of all virtues. Therefore covetousness is not the root + of all sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37147" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37147] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod cupiditas non sit radix omnium +peccatorum. Cupiditas enim, quae est immoderatus appetitus +divitiarum, opponitur virtuti liberalitatis. Sed liberalitas non +est radix omnium virtutum. Ergo cupiditas non est radix omnium +peccatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the desire for the means proceeds from desire for the end. Now riches, the desire for which is called covetousness, + are not desired except as being useful for some end, as stated in Ethic. i, 5. Therefore covetousness is not the root of all + sins, but proceeds from some deeper root. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37148" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37148] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +appetitus eorum quae sunt ad finem, procedit ex appetitu finis. Sed +divitiae, quarum appetitus est cupiditas, non appetuntur nisi ut +utiles ad aliquem finem, sicut dicitur in I Ethic. Ergo cupiditas +non est radix omnis peccati, sed procedit ex alia priori +radice.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it often happens that avarice, which is another name for covetousness, arises from other sins; as when a man desires + money through ambition, or in order to sate his gluttony. Therefore it is not the root of all sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37149" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37149] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +frequenter invenitur quod avaritia, quae cupiditas nominatur, +oritur ex aliis peccatis, puta cum quis appetit pecuniam propter +ambitionem, vel ut satisfaciat gulae. Non ergo est radix omnium +peccatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q84_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.10" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:10</a>): "The desire of money is the root of all evil." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37150" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37150] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicit apostolus, I ad Tim. ult., <i>radix omnium malorum +est cupiditas</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q84_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to some, covetousness may be understood in different ways. First, as denoting inordinate desire for riches: and + thus it is a special sin. Secondly, as denoting inordinate desire for any temporal good: and thus it is a genus comprising + all sins, because every sin includes an inordinate turning to a mutable good, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q72_A2" id="FS_Q84_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[72], A[2]</a>). Thirdly, as denoting an inclination of a corrupt nature to desire corruptible goods + inordinately: and they say that in this sense covetousness is the root of all sins, comparing it to the root of a tree, which + draws its sustenance from earth, just as every sin grows out of the love of temporal things. + </p><p id="FS_Q84_A1-p7"> Now, though all this is true, it does not seem to explain the mind of the Apostle when he states that covetousness is the + root of all sins. For in that passage he clearly speaks against those who, because they "will become rich, fall into temptation, + and into the snare of the devil . . . for covetousness is the root of all evils." Hence it is evident that he is speaking + of covetousness as denoting the inordinate desire for riches. Accordingly, we must say that covetousness, as + denoting a special sin, is called the root of all sins, in likeness to the root of a tree, in furnishing sustenance to the + whole tree. For we see that by riches man acquires the means of committing any sin whatever, and of sating his desire for + any sin whatever, since money helps man to obtain all manner of temporal goods, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q84_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.10.19" target="asv"> Eccles. 10:19</a>: "All things obey money": so that in this desire for riches is the root of all sins. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 1 co."><a name="37151" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37151] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod secundum quosdam cupiditas multipliciter dicitur. Uno +modo, prout est appetitus inordinatus divitiarum. Et sic est +speciale peccatum. Alio modo, secundum quod significat inordinatum +appetitum cuiuscumque boni temporalis. Et sic est genus omnis +peccati, nam in omni peccato est inordinata conversio ad +commutabile bonum, ut dictum est. Tertio modo sumitur prout +significat quandam inclinationem naturae corruptae ad bona +corruptibilia inordinate appetenda. Et sic dicunt cupiditatem esse +radicem omnium peccatorum, ad similitudinem radicis arboris, quae +ex terra trahit alimentum, sic enim ex amore rerum temporalium omne +peccatum procedit. Et haec quidem quamvis vera sint, non tamen +videntur esse secundum intentionem apostoli, qui dixit cupiditatem +esse radicem omnium peccatorum. Manifeste enim ibi loquitur contra +eos qui, <i>cum velint divites fieri, incidunt in tentationes et in +laqueum Diaboli, eo quod radix omnium malorum est cupiditas</i>, +unde manifestum est quod loquitur de cupiditate secundum quod est +appetitus inordinatus divitiarum. Et secundum hoc, dicendum est +quod cupiditas, secundum quod est speciale peccatum, dicitur radix +omnium peccatorum, ad similitudinem radicis arboris, quae alimentum +praestat toti arbori. Videmus enim quod per divitias homo acquirit +facultatem perpetrandi quodcumque peccatum, et adimplendi +desiderium cuiuscumque peccati, eo quod ad habenda quaecumque +temporalia bona, potest homo per pecuniam iuvari; secundum quod +dicitur Eccle. X, <i>pecuniae obediunt omnia</i>. Et secundum hoc, +patet quod cupiditas divitiarum est radix omnium peccatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue and sin do not arise from the same source. For sin arises from the desire of mutable good; and consequently the desire + of that good which helps one to obtain all temporal goods, is called the root of all sins. But virtue arises from the desire + for the immutable God; and consequently charity, which is the love of God, is called the root of the virtues, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q84_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.17" target="asv"> Eph. 3:17</a>: "Rooted and founded in charity." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37152" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37152] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod non ab eodem oritur virtus et peccatum. Oritur +enim peccatum ex appetitu commutabilis boni, et ideo appetitus +illius boni quod iuvat ad consequenda omnia temporalia bona, radix +peccatorum dicitur. Virtus autem oritur ex appetitu incommutabilis +boni, et ideo caritas, quae est amor Dei, ponitur radix virtutum; +secundum illud Ephes. III, <i>in caritate radicati et +fundati</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The desire of money is said to be the root of sins, not as though riches were sought for their own sake, as being the last + end; but because they are much sought after as useful for any temporal end. And since a universal good is more desirable than + a particular good, they move the appetite more than any individual goods, which along with many others can be procured by + means of money. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37153" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37153] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod appetitus pecuniarum dicitur esse radix peccatorum, +non quia divitiae propter se quaerantur, tanquam ultimus finis, sed +quia multum quaeruntur ut utiles ad omnem temporalem finem. Et quia +universale bonum est appetibilius quam aliquod particulare bonum, +ideo magis movent appetitum quam quaedam bona singularia, quae +simul cum multis aliis per pecuniam haberi possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as in natural things we do not ask what always happens, but what happens most frequently, for the reason that the nature + of corruptible things can be hindered, so as not always to act in the same way; so also in moral matters, we consider what + happens in the majority of cases, not what happens invariably, for the reason that the will does not act of necessity. So + when we say that covetousness is the root of all evils, we do not assert that no + other evil can be its root, but that other evils more frequently arise therefrom, for the reason given. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37154" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37154] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut in rebus naturalibus non quaeritur quid semper +fiat, sed quid in pluribus accidit, eo quod natura corruptibilium +rerum impediri potest, ut non semper eodem modo operetur; ita etiam +in moralibus consideratur quod ut in pluribus est, non autem quod +est semper, eo quod voluntas non ex necessitate operatur. Non +igitur dicitur avaritia radix omnis mali, quin interdum aliquod +aliud malum sit radix eius, sed quia ex ipsa frequentius alia mala +oriuntur, ratione praedicta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q84_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q84_A2-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 2. Whether pride is the beginning of every sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pride is not the beginning of every sin. For the root is a beginning of a tree, so that the beginning + of a sin seems to be the same as the root of sin. Now covetousness is the root of every sin, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q84_A1" id="FS_Q84_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore it is also the beginning of every sin, and not pride. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37155" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37155] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod superbia non sit initium omnis +peccati. Radix enim est quoddam principium arboris, et ita videtur +idem esse radix peccati et initium peccati. Sed cupiditas est radix +omnis peccati, ut dictum est. Ergo ipsa etiam est initium omnis +peccati, non autem superbia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q84_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.14" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:14</a>): "The beginning of the pride of man is apostasy [Douay: 'to fall off'] from God." But apostasy from God is a sin. Therefore + another sin is the beginning of pride, so that the latter is not the beginning of every sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37156" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37156] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Eccli. X dicitur, <i>initium superbiae hominis apostatare a +Deo</i>. Sed apostasia a Deo est quoddam peccatum. Ergo aliquod +peccatum est initium superbiae, et ipsa non est initium omnis +peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the beginning of every sin would seem to be that which causes all sins. Now this is inordinate self-love, which, + according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv), "builds up the city of Babylon." Therefore self-love and not pride, is the beginning + of every sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37157" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37157] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +illud videtur esse initium omnis peccati, quod facit omnia peccata. +Sed hoc est inordinatus amor sui, qui facit civitatem Babylonis, ut +Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei. Ergo amor sui est initium +omnis peccati, non autem superbia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q84_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.15" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:15</a>): "Pride is the beginning of all sin." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37158" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37158] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Eccli. X, <i>initium omnis peccati +superbia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q84_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some say pride is to be taken in three ways. First, as denoting inordinate desire to excel; and thus it is a special sin. + Secondly, as denoting actual contempt of God, to the effect of not being subject to His commandment; and thus, they say, it + is a generic sin. Thirdly, as denoting an inclination to this contempt, owing to the corruption of nature; and in this sense + they say that it is the beginning of every sin, and that it differs from covetousness, + because covetousness regards sin as turning towards the mutable good by which sin is, as it were, nourished and fostered, + for which reason covetousness is called the "root"; whereas pride regards sin as turning away from God, to Whose commandment + man refuses to be subject, for which reason it is called the "beginning," because the beginning of evil consists in turning + away from God. + </p><p id="FS_Q84_A2-p7"> Now though all this is true, nevertheless it does not explain the mind of the wise man who said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q84_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.15" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:15</a>): "Pride is the beginning of all sin." For it is evident that he is speaking of pride as denoting inordinate desire to excel, + as is clear from what follows (verse 17): "God hath overturned the thrones of proud princes"; indeed this is the point of + nearly the whole chapter. We must therefore say that pride, even as denoting a special sin, is the + beginning of every sin. For we must take note that, in voluntary actions, such as sins, there is a twofold order, of intention, + and of execution. In the former order, the principle is the end, as we have stated many times before (Q[1], A[1], ad 1; Q[18], + A[7], ad 2; Q[15], A[1], ad 2; Q[25], A[2]). Now man's end in acquiring all temporal goods is that, through their means, he + may have some perfection and excellence. Therefore, from this point of view, pride, which is the desire to excel, is + said to be the "beginning" of every sin. On the other hand, in the order of execution, the first place belongs to that which + by furnishing the opportunity of fulfilling all desires of sin, has the character of a root, and such are riches; so that, + from this point of view, covetousness is said to be the "root" of all evils, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q84_A1" id="FS_Q84_A2-p7.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 2 co."><a name="37159" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37159] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod quidam dicunt superbiam dici tripliciter. Uno modo, +secundum quod superbia significat inordinatum appetitum propriae +excellentiae. Et sic est speciale peccatum. Alio modo, secundum +quod importat quendam actualem contemptum Dei, quantum ad hunc +effectum qui est non subdi eius praecepto. Et sic dicunt quod est +generale peccatum. Tertio modo, secundum quod importat quandam +inclinationem ad huiusmodi contemptum, ex corruptione naturae. Et +sic dicunt quod est initium omnis peccati. Et differt a cupiditate, +quia cupiditas respicit peccatum ex parte conversionis ad bonum +commutabile, ex quo peccatum quodammodo nutritur et fovetur, et +propter hoc cupiditas dicitur radix, sed superbia respicit peccatum +ex parte aversionis a Deo, cuius praecepto homo subdi recusat; et +ideo vocatur initium, quia ex parte aversionis incipit ratio mali. +Et haec quidem quamvis vera sint, tamen non sunt secundum +intentionem sapientis, qui dixit, initium omnis peccati est +superbia. Manifeste enim loquitur de superbia secundum quod est +inordinatus appetitus propriae excellentiae, ut patet per hoc quod +subdit, <i>sedes ducum superborum destruxit Deus</i>. Et de hac +materia fere loquitur in toto capitulo. Et ideo dicendum est quod +superbia, etiam secundum quod est speciale peccatum, est initium +omnis peccati. Considerandum est enim quod in actibus voluntariis, +cuiusmodi sunt peccata, duplex ordo invenitur, scilicet +intentionis, et executionis. In primo quidem ordine, habet rationem +principii finis, ut supra multoties dictum est. Finis autem in +omnibus bonis temporalibus acquirendis, est ut homo per illa +quandam perfectionem et excellentiam habeat. Et ideo ex hac parte +superbia, quae est appetitus excellentiae, ponitur initium omnis +peccati. Sed ex parte executionis, est primum id quod praebet +opportunitatem adimplendi omnia desideria peccati, quod habet +rationem radicis, scilicet divitiae. Et ideo ex hac parte avaritia +ponitur esse radix omnium malorum, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A2-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37160" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37160] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc +patet responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Apostasy from God is stated to be the beginning of pride, in so far as it denotes a turning away from God, because from the + fact that man wishes not to be subject to God, it follows that he desires inordinately his own excellence in temporal things. + Wherefore, in the passage quoted, apostasy from God does not denote the special sin, but rather that general condition of + every sin, consisting in its turning away from God. It may also be said that + apostasy from God is said to be the beginning of pride, because it is the first species of pride. For it is characteristic + of pride to be unwilling to be subject to any superior, and especially to God; the result being that a man is unduly lifted + up, in respect of the other species of pride. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37161" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37161] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod apostatare a Deo dicitur esse initium superbiae ex +parte aversionis, ex hoc enim quod homo non vult subdi Deo, +sequitur quod inordinate velit propriam excellentiam in rebus +temporalibus. Et sic apostasia a Deo non sumitur ibi quasi speciale +peccatum, sed magis ut quaedam conditio generalis omnis peccati, +quae est aversio ab incommutabili bono. Vel potest dici quod +apostatare a Deo dicitur esse initium superbiae, quia est prima +superbiae species. Ad superbiam enim pertinet cuicumque superiori +nolle subiici, et praecipue nolle subdi Deo; ex quo contingit quod +homo supra seipsum indebite extollatur, quantum ad alias superbiae +species.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In desiring to excel, man loves himself, for to love oneself is the same as to desire some good for oneself. Consequently + it amounts to the same whether we reckon pride or self-love as the beginning of every evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37162" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37162] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in hoc homo se amat, quod sui excellentiam vult, idem +enim est se amare quod sibi velle bonum. Unde ad idem pertinet quod +ponatur initium omnis peccati superbia, vel amor proprius.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q84_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q84_A3-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 3. Whether any other special sins, besides pride and avarice, should be called capital?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no other special sins, besides pride and avarice, should be called capital. Because "the head seems to + be to an animal, what the root is to a plant," as stated in De Anima ii, text. 38: for the roots are like a mouth. If therefore + covetousness is called the "root of all evils," it seems that it alone, and no other sin, should be called a capital vice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37163" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37163] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod praeter superbiam et avaritiam, non +sint quaedam alia peccata specialia quae dicantur capitalia. <i>Ita +enim se videtur habere caput ad animalia, sicut radix ad +plantas</i>, ut dicitur in II de anima, nam radices sunt ori +similes. Si igitur cupiditas dicitur radix omnium malorum, videtur +quod ipsa sola debeat dici vitium capitale, et nullum aliud +peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the head bears a certain relation of order to the other members, in so far as sensation and movement follow from + the head. But sin implies privation of order. Therefore sin has not the character of head: so that no sins should be called + capital. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37164" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37164] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +caput habet quendam ordinem ad alia membra, inquantum a capite +diffunditur quodammodo sensus et motus. Sed peccatum dicitur per +privationem ordinis. Ergo peccatum non habet rationem capitis. Et +ita non debent poni aliqua capitalia peccata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, capital crimes are those which receive capital punishment. But every kind of sin comprises some that are punished + thus. Therefore the capital sins are not certain specific sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37165" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37165] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +capitalia crimina dicuntur quae capite plectuntur. Sed tali poena +puniuntur quaedam peccata in singulis generibus. Ergo vitia +capitalia non sunt aliqua determinata secundum speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) enumerates certain special vices under the name of capital. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37166" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37166] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., enumerat quaedam specialia vitia, +quae dicit esse capitalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The word capital is derived from "caput" [a head]. Now the head, properly speaking, is that part of an animal's body, which + is the principle and director of the whole animal. Hence, metaphorically speaking, every principle is called a head, and even + men who direct and govern others are called heads. Accordingly a capital vice is so called, in the first place, from "head" + taken in the proper sense, and thus the name "capital" is given to a sin for which + capital punishment is inflicted. It is not in this sense that we are now speaking of capital sins, but in another sense, in + which the term "capital" is derived from head, taken metaphorically for a principle or director of others. In this way a capital + vice is one from which other vices arise, chiefly by being their final cause, which origin is formal, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q72_A6" id="FS_Q84_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[72], A[6]</a>). Wherefore a capital vice is not only the principle of others, but is also their director + and, in a way, their leader: because the art or habit, to which the end belongs, is always the principle and the commander + in matters concerning the means. Hence Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) compares these capital vices to the "leaders of an army." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 3 co."><a name="37167" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37167] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod capitale a capite dicitur. Caput autem proprie quidem +est quoddam membrum animalis, quod est principium et directivum +totius animalis. Unde metaphorice omne principium caput vocatur, et +etiam homines qui alios dirigunt et gubernant, capita aliorum +dicuntur. Dicitur ergo vitium capitale uno modo a capite proprie +dicto, et secundum hoc, peccatum capitale dicitur peccatum quod +capitis poena punitur. Sed sic nunc non intendimus de capitalibus +peccatis, sed secundum quod alio modo dicitur peccatum capitale a +capite prout metaphorice significat principium vel directivum +aliorum. Et sic dicitur vitium capitale ex quo alia vitia oriuntur, +et praecipue secundum originem causae finalis, quae est formalis +origo, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo vitium capitale non solum est +principium aliorum, sed etiam est directivum et quodammodo ductivum +aliorum, semper enim ars vel habitus ad quem pertinet finis, +principatur et imperat circa ea quae sunt ad finem. Unde Gregorius, +XXXI Moral., huiusmodi vitia capitalia ducibus exercituum +comparat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The term "capital" is taken from "caput" and applied to something connected with, or partaking of the head, as having some + property thereof, but not as being the head taken literally. And therefore the capital vices are not only those which have + the character of primary origin, as covetousness which is called the "root," and pride which is called the beginning, but + also those which have the character of proximate origin in respect of several sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37168" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37168] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod capitale dicitur denominative a capite, quod +quidem est per quandam derivationem vel participationem capitis, +sicut habens aliquam proprietatem capitis, non sicut simpliciter +caput. Et ideo capitalia vitia dicuntur non solum illa quae habent +rationem primae originis, sicut avaritia, quae dicitur radix, et +superbia, quae dicitur initium, sed etiam illa quae habent rationem +originis propinquae respectu plurium peccatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sin lacks order in so far as it turns away from God, for in this respect it is an evil, and evil, according to Augustine + (De Natura Boni iv), is "the privation of mode, species and order." But in so far as sin implies a turning to something, it + regards some good: wherefore, in this respect, there can be order in sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37169" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37169] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod peccatum caret ordine ex parte aversionis, ex hac +enim parte habet rationem mali; <i>malum autem</i>, secundum +Augustinum, in libro de natura boni, <i>est privatio modi, speciei +et ordinis</i>. Sed ex parte conversionis, respicit quoddam bonum. +Et ideo ex hac parte potest habere ordinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection considers capital sin as so called from the punishment it deserves, in which sense we are not taking it here. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37170" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37170] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod illa ratio procedit de capitali peccato secundum quod +dicitur a reatu poenae. Sic autem hic non loquimur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q84_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q84_A4-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 4. Whether the seven capital vices are suitably reckoned?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that we ought not to reckon seven capital vices, viz. vainglory, envy, anger, sloth, covetousness, gluttony, + lust. For sins are opposed to virtues. But there are four principal virtues, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q61_A2" id="FS_Q84_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[61], A[2]</a>). Therefore there are only four principal or capital vices. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37171" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37171] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit dicendum septem esse vitia +capitalia, quae sunt inanis gloria, invidia, ira, tristitia, +avaritia, gula, luxuria. Peccata enim virtutibus opponuntur. +Virtutes autem principales sunt quatuor, ut supra dictum est. Ergo +et vitia principalia, sive capitalia, non sunt nisi quatuor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the passions of the soul are causes of sin, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q77" id="FS_Q84_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[77])</a>. But there are four principal passions of the soul; two of which, viz. hope and fear, are not mentioned among the above sins, + whereas certain vices are mentioned to which pleasure and sadness belong, since pleasure belongs to gluttony and lust, and + sadness to sloth and envy. Therefore the principal sins are unfittingly enumerated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37172" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37172] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +passiones animae sunt quaedam causae peccati, ut supra dictum est. +Sed passiones animae principales sunt quatuor. De quarum duabus +nulla fit mentio inter praedicta peccata, scilicet de spe et +timore. Enumerantur autem aliqua vitia ad quae pertinet delectatio +et tristitia, nam delectatio pertinet ad gulam et luxuriam, +tristitia vero ad acediam et invidiam. Ergo inconvenienter +enumerantur principalia peccata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, anger is not a principal passion. Therefore it should not be placed among the principal vices. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37173" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37173] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +ira non est principalis passio. Non ergo debuit poni inter +principalia vitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as covetousness or avarice is the root of sin, so is pride the beginning of sin, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q84_A2" id="FS_Q84_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. But avarice is reckoned to be one of the capital vices. Therefore pride also should be placed among the capital vices. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="37174" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37174] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut cupiditas, sive avaritia, est radix peccati, ita superbia est +peccati initium, ut supra dictum est. Sed avaritia ponitur unum de +septem vitiis capitalibus. Ergo superbia inter vitia capitalia +enumeranda esset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, some sins are committed which cannot be caused through any of these: as, for instance, when one sins through ignorance, + or when one commits a sin with a good intention, e.g. steals in order to give an alms. Therefore the capital vices are insufficiently + enumerated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="37175" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37175] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +quaedam peccata committuntur quae ex nullo horum causari possunt, +sicut cum aliquis errat ex ignorantia; vel cum aliquis ex aliqua +bona intentione committit aliquod peccatum, puta cum aliquis +furatur ut det eleemosynam. Ergo insufficienter capitalia vitia +enumerantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Gregory who enumerates them in this way (Moral. xxxi, 17). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37176" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37176] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed in +contrarium est auctoritas Gregorii sic enumerantis, XXXI +Moralium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q84_A4-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q84_A3" id="FS_Q84_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, the capital vices are those which give rise to others, especially by way of final cause. Now this kind of origin may take + place in two ways. First, on account of the condition of the sinner, who is disposed so as to have a strong inclination for + one particular end, the result being that he frequently goes forward to other sins. But this kind of origin does not come + under the consideration of art, because man's + particular dispositions are infinite in number. Secondly, on account of a natural relationship of the ends to one another: + and it is in this way that most frequently one vice arises from another, so that this kind of origin can come under the consideration + of art. + </p><p id="FS_Q84_A4-p9"> Accordingly therefore, those vices are called capital, whose ends have certain fundamental reasons for moving the appetite; + and it is in respect of these fundamental reasons that the capital vices are differentiated. Now a thing moves the appetite + in two ways. First, directly and of its very nature: thus good moves the appetite to seek it, while evil, for the same reason, + moves the appetite to avoid it. Secondly, indirectly and on account of something else, as it were: thus one + seeks an evil on account of some attendant good, or avoids a good on account of some attendant evil. + </p><p id="FS_Q84_A4-p10"> Again, man's good is threefold. For, in the first place, there is a certain good of the soul, which derives its aspect of + appetibility, merely through being apprehended, viz. the excellence of honor and praise, and this good is sought inordinately + by "vainglory." Secondly, there is the good of the body, and this regards either the preservation of the individual, e.g. + meat and drink, which good is pursued inordinately by "gluttony," or the preservation of the species, e.g. sexual + intercourse, which good is sought inordinately by "lust." Thirdly, there is external good, viz. riches, to which "covetousness" + is referred. These same four vices avoid inordinately the contrary evils. + </p><p id="FS_Q84_A4-p11"> Or again, good moves the appetite chiefly through possessing some property of happiness, which all men seek naturally. Now + in the first place happiness implies perfection, since happiness is a perfect good, to which belongs excellence or renown, + which is desired by "pride" or "vainglory." Secondly, it implies satiety, which "covetousness" seeks in riches that give promise + thereof. Thirdly, it implies pleasure, without which happiness is impossible, as stated in Ethic. i, 7; x, + 6,7,[8] and this "gluttony" and "lust" pursue. + </p><p id="FS_Q84_A4-p12"> On the other hand, avoidance of good on account of an attendant evil occurs in two ways. For this happens either in respect + of one's own good, and thus we have "sloth," which is sadness about one's spiritual good, on account of the attendant bodily + labor: or else it happens in respect of another's good, and this, if it be without recrimination, belongs to "envy," which + is sadness about another's good as being a hindrance to one's own excellence, while if it be with recrimination + with a view to vengeance, it is "anger." Again, these same vices seek the contrary evils. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 co."><a name="37177" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37177] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, vitia capitalia dicuntur ex quibus +alia oriuntur, praecipue secundum rationem causae finalis. +Huiusmodi autem origo potest attendi dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, +secundum conditionem peccantis, qui sic dispositus est ut maxime +afficiatur ad unum finem, ex quo ut plurimum in alia peccata +procedat. Sed iste modus originis sub arte cadere non potest, eo +quod infinitae sunt particulares hominum dispositiones. Alio modo, +secundum naturalem habitudinem ipsorum finium ad invicem. Et +secundum hoc, ut in pluribus unum vitium ex alio oritur. Unde iste +modus originis sub arte cadere potest. Secundum hoc ergo, illa +vitia capitalia dicuntur, quorum fines habent quasdam primarias +rationes movendi appetitum, et secundum harum rationum +distinctionem, distinguuntur capitalia vitia. Movet autem aliquid +appetitum dupliciter. Uno modo, directe et per se, et hoc modo +bonum movet appetitum ad prosequendum, malum autem, secundum eandem +rationem, ad fugiendum. Alio modo, indirecte et quasi per aliud, +sicut aliquis aliquod malum prosequitur propter aliquod bonum +adiunctum, vel aliquod bonum fugit propter aliquod malum adiunctum. +Bonum autem hominis est triplex. Est enim primo quoddam bonum +animae, quod scilicet ex sola apprehensione rationem +appetibilitatis habet, scilicet excellentia laudis vel honoris, et +hoc bonum inordinate prosequitur inanis gloria. Aliud est bonum +corporis, et hoc vel pertinet ad conservationem individui, sicut +cibus et potus, et hoc bonum inordinate prosequitur gula; aut ad +conservationem speciei, sicut coitus, et ad hoc ordinatur luxuria. +Tertium bonum est exterius, scilicet divitiae, et ad hoc ordinatur +avaritia. Et eadem quatuor vitia inordinate fugiunt mala contraria. +Vel aliter, bonum praecipue movet appetitum ex hoc quod participat +aliquid de proprietate felicitatis, quam naturaliter omnes +appetunt. De cuius ratione est quidem primo quaedam perfectio, nam +felicitas est perfectum bonum, ad quod pertinet excellentia vel +claritas, quam appetit superbia vel inanis gloria. Secundo de +ratione eius est sufficientia, quam appetit avaritia in divitiis +eam promittentibus. Tertio est de conditione eius delectatio, sine +qua felicitas esse non potest, ut dicitur in I et X Ethic., et hanc +appetunt gula et luxuria. Quod autem aliquis bonum fugiat propter +aliquod malum coniunctum, hoc contingit dupliciter. Quia aut hoc +est respectu boni proprii, et sic est acedia, quae tristatur de +bono spirituali, propter laborem corporalem adiunctum. Aut est de +bono alieno, et hoc, si sit sine insurrectione, pertinet ad +invidiam, quae tristatur de bono alieno, inquantum est impeditivum +propriae excellentiae; aut est cum quadam insurrectione ad +vindictam, et sic est ira. Et ad eadem etiam vitia pertinet +prosecutio mali oppositi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue and vice do not originate in the same way: since virtue is caused by the subordination of the appetite to reason, + or to the immutable good, which is God, whereas vice arises from the appetite for mutable good. Wherefore there is no need + for the principal vices to be contrary to the principal virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37178" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37178] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod non est eadem ratio originis in virtutibus et +vitiis, nam virtutes causantur per ordinem appetitus ad rationem, +vel etiam ad bonum incommutabile, quod est Deus; vitia autem +oriuntur ex appetitu boni commutabilis. Unde non oportet quod +principalia vitia opponantur principalibus virtutibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Fear and hope are irascible passions. Now all the passions of the irascible part arise from passions of the concupiscible + part; and these are all, in a way, directed to pleasure or sorrow. Hence pleasure and sorrow have a prominent place among + the capital sins, as being the most important of the passions, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q25_A4" id="FS_Q84_A4-p14.1" shape="rect">Q[25], A[4]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37179" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37179] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod timor et spes sunt passiones irascibilis. Omnes autem +passiones irascibilis oriuntur ex passionibus concupiscibilis, quae +etiam omnes ordinantur quodammodo ad delectationem et tristitiam. +Et ideo delectatio et tristitia principaliter connumerantur in +peccatis capitalibus, tanquam principalissimae passiones, ut supra +habitum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although anger is not a principal passion, yet it has a distinct place among the capital vices, because it implies a special + kind of movement in the appetite, in so far as recrimination against another's good has the aspect of a virtuous good, i.e. + of the right to vengeance. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37180" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37180] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ira, licet non sit principalis passio, quia tamen +habet specialem rationem appetitivi motus, prout aliquis impugnat +bonum alterius sub ratione honesti, idest iusti vindicativi; ideo +distinguitur ab aliis capitalibus vitiis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Pride is said to be the beginning of every sin, in the order of the end, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q84_A2" id="FS_Q84_A4-p16.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>: and it is in the same order that we are to consider the capital sin as being principal. Wherefore pride, like a universal + vice, is not counted along with the others, but is reckoned as the "queen of them all," as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 27). + But covetousness is said to be the root from another point of view, as stated above + ( + <a href="#FS_Q84_A1" id="FS_Q84_A4-p16.2" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="37181" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37181] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod superbia dicitur esse initium omnis peccati secundum +rationem finis, ut dictum est. Et secundum eandem rationem +accipitur principalitas vitiorum capitalium. Et ideo superbia, +quasi universale vitium, non connumeratur, sed magis ponitur velut +regina quaedam omnium vitiorum, sicut Gregorius dicit. Avaritia +autem dicitur radix secundum aliam rationem, sicut supra dictum +est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> These vices are called capital because others, most frequently, arise from them: so that nothing prevents some sins from + arising out of other causes. Nevertheless we might say that all the sins which are due to ignorance, can be reduced to sloth, + to which pertains the negligence of a man who declines to acquire spiritual goods on account of the attendant labor; for the + ignorance that can cause sin, is due to negligence, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q76_A2" id="FS_Q84_A4-p17.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[2]</a>). That a man commit a sin with a good intention, seems to point to ignorance, in so far as he knows not that evil should + not be done that good may come of it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="37182" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37182] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod ista vitia dicuntur capitalia, quia ex eis ut +frequentius alia oriuntur. Unde nihil prohibet aliqua peccata +interdum ex aliis causis oriri. Potest tamen dici quod omnia +peccata quae ex ignorantia proveniunt, possunt reduci ad acediam, +ad quam pertinet negligentia qua aliquis recusat bona spiritualia +acquirere propter laborem, ignorantia enim quae potest esse causa +peccati, ex negligentia provenit, ut supra dictum est. Quod autem +aliquis committat aliquod peccatum ex bona intentione, videtur ad +ignorantiam pertinere, inquantum scilicet ignorat quod non sunt +facienda mala ut veniant bona.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q85" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q85-p0.1">Q. 85. OF THE EFFECTS OF SIN, AND, FIRST, OF THE CORRUPTION OF THE GOOD OF NATURE (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q85-p2"> We must now consider the effects of sin; and (1) the corruption of the good of nature; (2) the stain on the soul; (3) the + debt of punishment. + </p><p id="FS_Q85-p3"> Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q85-p4"><a href="#FS_Q85_A1"> (1) Whether the good of nature is diminished by sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q85-p5"><a href="#FS_Q85_A2"> (2) Whether it can be taken away altogether?</a></p><p id="FS_Q85-p6"><a href="#FS_Q85_A3"> (3) Of the four wounds, mentioned by Bede, with which human nature is stricken in consequence of sin.</a></p><p id="FS_Q85-p7"><a href="#FS_Q85_A4"> (4) Whether privation of mode, species and order is an effect of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q85-p8"><a href="#FS_Q85_A5"> (5) Whether death and other bodily defects are the result of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q85-p9"><a href="#FS_Q85_A6"> (6) Whether they are, in any way, natural to man?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 pr."><a name="37183" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37183] +Iª-IIae q. 85 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +effectibus peccati. Et primo quidem, de corruptione boni naturae; +secundo, de macula animae; tertio, de reatu poenae. Circa primum +quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum bonum naturae diminuatur per peccatum. +Secundo, utrum totaliter tolli possit. Tertio, de quatuor +vulneribus quae Beda ponit, quibus natura humana vulnerata est +propter peccatum. Quarto, utrum privatio modi, speciei et ordinis, +sit effectus peccati. Quinto, utrum mors et alii defectus +corporales sint effectus peccati. Sexto, utrum sint aliquo modo +homini naturales.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q85_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q85_A1-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 1. Whether sin diminishes the good of nature?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin does not diminish the good of nature. For man's sin is no worse than the devil's. But natural good + remains unimpaired in devils after sin, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore neither does sin diminish the good of + human nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37184" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37184] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non diminuat bonum naturae. +Peccatum enim hominis non est gravius quam peccatum Daemonis. Sed +bona naturalia in Daemonibus manent integra post peccatum, ut +Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo peccatum etiam bonum +naturae humanae non diminuit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, when that which follows is changed, that which precedes remains unchanged, since substance remains the same when + its accidents are changed. But nature exists before the voluntary action. Therefore, when sin has caused a disorder in a voluntary + act, nature is not changed on that account, so that the good of nature be diminished. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37185" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37185] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +transmutato posteriori, non transmutatur prius, manet enim +substantia eadem, transmutatis accidentibus. Sed natura praeexistit +actioni voluntariae. Ergo, facta deordinatione circa actionem +voluntariam per peccatum, non transmutatur propter hoc natura, ita +quod bonum naturae diminuatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sin is an action, while diminution is a passion. Now no agent is passive by the very reason of its acting, although + it is possible for it to act on one thing, and to be passive as regards another. Therefore he who sins, does not, by his sin, + diminish the good of his nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37186" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37186] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum est actus quidam, diminutio autem passio. Nullum autem +agens, ex hoc ipso quod agit, patitur, potest autem contingere quod +in unum agat, et ab alio patiatur. Ergo ille qui peccat, per +peccatum non diminuit bonum suae naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, no accident acts on its subject: because that which is patient is a potential being, while that which is subjected + to an accident, is already an actual being as regards that accident. But sin is in the good of nature as an accident in a + subject. Therefore sin does not diminish the good of nature, since to diminish is to act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="37187" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37187] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +nullum accidens agit in suum subiectum, quia quod patitur, est +potentia ens; quod autem subiicitur accidenti, iam est actu ens +secundum accidens illud. Sed peccatum est in bono naturae sicut +accidens in subiecto. Ergo peccatum non diminuit bonum naturae, +diminuere enim quoddam agere est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> "A certain man going down from Jerusalem to Jericho ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q85_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.10.30" target="asv">Lk. 10:30</a>), i.e. to the corruption of sin, was stripped of his gifts, and wounded in his nature," as Bede [*The quotation is from the + Glossa Ordinaria of Strabo] expounds the passage. Therefore sin diminishes the good of nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37188" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37188] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod, sicut dicitur Luc. X, <i>homo descendens a Ierusalem in +Iericho, idest in defectum peccati, expoliatur gratuitis et +vulneratur in naturalibus</i>, ut Beda exponit. Ergo peccatum +diminuit bonum naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q85_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The good of human nature is threefold. First, there are the principles of which nature is constituted, and the properties + that flow from them, such as the powers of the soul, and so forth. Secondly, since man has from nature an inclination to virtue, + as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q60_A1" id="FS_Q85_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[60], A[1]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q63_A1" id="FS_Q85_A1-p7.2" shape="rect"> Q[63], A[1]</a>), this inclination to virtue is a good of nature. Thirdly, the gift of original justice, conferred on the whole of + human nature in the person of the first man, may be called a good of nature. + </p><p id="FS_Q85_A1-p8"> Accordingly, the first-mentioned good of nature is neither destroyed nor diminished by sin. The third good of nature was + entirely destroyed through the sin of our first parent. But the second good of nature, viz. the natural inclination to virtue, + is diminished by sin. Because human acts produce an inclination to like acts, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q50_A1" id="FS_Q85_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[50], A[1]</a>). Now from the very fact that thing becomes inclined to one of two contraries, its inclination to the + other contrary must needs be diminished. Wherefore as sin is opposed to virtue, from the very fact that a man sins, there + results a diminution of that good of nature, which is the inclination to virtue. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 co."><a name="37189" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37189] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod bonum naturae humanae potest tripliciter dici. Primo, +ipsa principia naturae, ex quibus natura constituitur, et +proprietates ex his causatae, sicut potentiae animae et alia +huiusmodi. Secundo, quia homo a natura habet inclinationem ad +virtutem, ut supra habitum est, ipsa inclinatio ad virtutem est +quoddam bonum naturae. Tertio modo potest dici bonum naturae donum +originalis iustitiae, quod fuit in primo homine collatum toti +humanae naturae. Primum igitur bonum naturae nec tollitur nec +diminuitur per peccatum. Tertium vero bonum naturae totaliter est +ablatum per peccatum primi parentis. Sed medium bonum naturae, +scilicet ipsa naturalis inclinatio ad virtutem, diminuitur per +peccatum. Per actus enim humanos fit quaedam inclinatio ad similes +actus, ut supra habitum est. Oportet autem quod ex hoc quod aliquid +inclinatur ad unum contrariorum, diminuatur inclinatio eius ad +aliud. Unde cum peccatum sit contrarium virtuti, ex hoc ipso quod +homo peccat, diminuitur bonum naturae quod est inclinatio ad +virtutem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius is speaking of the first-mentioned good of nature, which consists in "being, living and understanding," as anyone + may see who reads the context. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37190" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37190] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Dionysius loquitur de bono primo naturae, quod +est esse, vivere et intelligere; ut patet eius verba intuenti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although nature precedes the voluntary action, it has an inclination to a certain voluntary action. Wherefore nature is not + changed in itself, through a change in the voluntary action: it is the inclination that is changed in so far as it is directed + to its term. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37191" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37191] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod natura, etsi sit prior quam voluntaria actio, tamen +habet inclinationem ad quandam voluntariam actionem. Unde ipsa +natura secundum se non variatur propter variationem voluntariae +actionis, sed ipsa inclinatio variatur ex illa parte qua ordinatur +ad terminum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A voluntary action proceeds from various powers, active and passive. The result is that through voluntary actions something + is caused or taken away in the man who acts, as we have stated when treating of the production of habits ( + <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q51_A2" id="FS_Q85_A1-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[51], A[2]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37192" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37192] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod actio voluntaria procedit ex diversis potentiis, +quarum una est activa et alia passiva. Et ex hoc contingit quod per +actiones voluntarias causatur aliquid, vel aufertur ab homine sic +agente, ut supra dictum est, cum de generatione habituum +ageretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> An accident does not act effectively on its subject, but it acts on it formally, in the same sense as when we say that whiteness + makes a thing white. In this way there is nothing to hinder sin from diminishing the good of nature; but only in so far as + sin is itself a diminution of the good of nature, through being an inordinateness of action. But as regards the inordinateness + of the agent, we must say that such like inordinateness is caused by the + fact that in the acts of the soul, there is an active, and a passive element: thus the sensible object moves the sensitive + appetite, and the sensitive appetite inclines the reason and will, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q77_A1" id="FS_Q85_A1-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[77], AA[1]</a>, 2). The result of this is the inordinateness, not as though an accident acted on its own subject, but in so far as the object + acts on the power, and one power acts on another and puts it out of order. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="37193" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37193] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod accidens non agit effective in subiectum; agit tamen +formaliter in ipsum, eo modo loquendi quo dicitur quod albedo facit +album. Et sic nihil prohibet quod peccatum diminuat bonum naturae, +eo tamen modo quo est ipsa diminutio boni naturae, inquantum +pertinet ad inordinationem actus. Sed quantum ad inordinationem +agentis, oportet dicere quod talis inordinatio causatur per hoc +quod in actibus animae aliquid est activum et aliquid passivum, +sicut sensibile movet appetitum sensitivum, et appetitus sensitivus +inclinat rationem et voluntatem, ut supra dictum est. Et ex hoc +causatur inordinatio, non quidem ita quod accidens agat in proprium +subiectum; sed secundum quod obiectum agit in potentiam, et una +potentia agit in aliam, et deordinat ipsam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q85_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q85_A2-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 2. Whether the entire good of human nature can be destroyed by sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the entire good of human nature can be destroyed by sin. For the good of human nature is finite, since + human nature itself is finite. Now any finite thing is entirely taken away, if the subtraction be continuous. Since therefore + the good of nature can be continually diminished by sin, it seems that in the end it can be entirely taken away. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37194" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37194] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod totum bonum humanae naturae possit per +peccatum auferri. Bonum enim naturae humanae finitum est, cum et +ipsa natura humana sit finita. Sed quodlibet finitum totaliter +consumitur, facta continua ablatione. Cum ergo bonum naturae +continue per peccatum diminui possit, videtur quod possit quandoque +totaliter consumi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in a thing of one nature, the whole and the parts are uniform, as is evidently the case with air, water, flesh and + all bodies with similar parts. But the good of nature is wholly uniform. Since therefore a part thereof can be taken away + by sin, it seems that the whole can also be taken away by sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37195" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37195] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +eorum quae sunt unius naturae, similis est ratio de toto et de +partibus, sicut patet in aere et in aqua et carne, et omnibus +corporibus similium partium. Sed bonum naturae est totaliter +uniforme. Cum igitur pars eius possit auferri per peccatum, totum +etiam per peccatum auferri posse videtur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the good of nature, that is weakened by sin, is aptitude for virtue. Now this aptitude is destroyed entirely in + some on account of sin: thus the lost cannot be restored to virtue any more than the blind can to sight. Therefore sin can + take away the good of nature entirely. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37196" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37196] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +bonum naturae quod per peccatum minuitur, est habilitas ad +virtutem. Sed in quibusdam propter peccatum habilitas praedicta +totaliter tollitur, ut patet in damnatis, qui reparari ad virtutem +non possunt, sicut nec caecus ad visum. Ergo peccatum potest +totaliter tollere bonum naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Enchiridion xiv) that "evil does not exist except in some good." But the evil of sin cannot be in the good + of virtue or of grace, because they are contrary to it. Therefore it must be in the good of nature, and consequently it does + not destroy it entirely. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37197" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37197] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., quod malum non est nisi in +bono. Sed malum culpae non potest esse in bono virtutis vel +gratiae, quia est ei contrarium. Ergo oportet quod sit in bono +naturae. Non ergo totaliter tollit ipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q85_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q85_A1" id="FS_Q85_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the good of nature, that is diminished by sin, is the natural inclination to virtue, which is befitting to man from the + very fact that he is a rational being; for it is due to this that he performs actions in accord with reason, which is to act + virtuously. Now sin cannot entirely take away from man the fact that he is a rational being, for then he would no longer be + capable of sin. Wherefore it is not possible + for this good of nature to be destroyed entirely. + </p><p id="FS_Q85_A2-p7"> Since, however, this same good of nature may be continually diminished by sin, some, in order to illustrate this, have made + use of the example of a finite thing being diminished indefinitely, without being entirely destroyed. For the Philosopher + says (Phys. i, text. 37) that if from a finite magnitude a continual subtraction be made in the same quantity, it will at + last be entirely destroyed, for instance if from any finite length I continue to subtract the length of a span. If, + however, the subtraction be made each time in the same proportion, and not in the same quantity, it may go on indefinitely, + as, for instance, if a quantity be halved, and one half be diminished by half, it will be possible to go on thus indefinitely, + provided that what is subtracted in each case be less than what was subtracted before. But this does not apply to the question + at issue, since a subsequent sin does not diminish the good of nature less than a previous sin, but perhaps more, if it + be a more grievous sin. + </p><p id="FS_Q85_A2-p8"> We must, therefore, explain the matter otherwise by saying that the aforesaid inclination is to be considered as a middle + term between two others: for it is based on the rational nature as on its root, and tends to the good of virtue, as to its + term and end. Consequently its diminution may be understood in two ways: first, on the part of its rood, secondly, on the + part of its term. In the first way, it is not diminished by sin, because sin does not diminish nature, as stated + above + <a href="#FS_Q85_A1" id="FS_Q85_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But it is diminished in the second way, in so far as an obstacle is placed against its attaining its term. Now if it were + diminished in the first way, it would needs be entirely destroyed at last by the rational nature being entirely destroyed. + Since, however, it is diminished on the part of the obstacle which is place against its attaining its term, it is evident + that it can be diminished indefinitely, because obstacles can be placed indefinitely, + inasmuch as man can go on indefinitely adding sin to sin: and yet it cannot be destroyed entirely, because the root of this + inclination always remains. An example of this may be seen in a transparent body, which has an inclination to receive light, + from the very fact that it is transparent; yet this inclination or aptitude is diminished on the part of supervening clouds, + although it always remains rooted in the nature of the body. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 2 co."><a name="37198" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37198] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, bonum naturae quod per peccatum +diminuitur, est naturalis inclinatio ad virtutem. Quae quidem +convenit homini ex hoc ipso quod rationalis est, ex hoc enim habet +quod secundum rationem operetur, quod est agere secundum virtutem. +Per peccatum autem non potest totaliter ab homine tolli quod sit +rationalis, quia iam non esset capax peccati. Unde non est +possibile quod praedictum naturae bonum totaliter tollatur. Cum +autem inveniatur huiusmodi bonum continue diminui per peccatum, +quidam ad huius manifestationem usi sunt quodam exemplo, in quo +invenitur aliquod finitum in infinitum diminui, nunquam tamen +totaliter consumi. Dicit enim philosophus, in III Physic., quod si +ab aliqua magnitudine finita continue auferatur aliquid secundum +eandem quantitatem, totaliter tandem consumetur, puta si a +quacumque quantitate finita semper subtraxero mensuram palmi. Si +vero fiat subtractio semper secundum eandem proportionem, et non +secundum eandem quantitatem, poterit in infinitum subtrahi, puta, +si quantitas dividatur in duas partes, et a dimidio subtrahatur +dimidium, ita in infinitum poterit procedi; ita tamen quod semper +quod posterius subtrahitur, erit minus eo quod prius subtrahebatur. +Sed hoc in proposito non habet locum, non enim sequens peccatum +minus diminuit bonum naturae quam praecedens, sed forte magis, si +sit gravius. Et ideo aliter est dicendum quod praedicta inclinatio +intelligitur ut media inter duo, fundatur enim sicut in radice in +natura rationali, et tendit in bonum virtutis sicut in terminum et +finem. Dupliciter igitur potest intelligi eius diminutio, uno modo, +ex parte radicis; alio modo, ex parte termini. Primo quidem modo +non diminuitur per peccatum, eo quod peccatum non diminuit ipsam +naturam, ut supra dictum est. Sed diminuitur secundo modo, +inquantum scilicet ponitur impedimentum pertingendi ad terminum. Si +autem primo modo diminueretur, oporteret quod quandoque totaliter +consumeretur, natura rationali totaliter consumpta. Sed quia +diminuitur ex parte impedimenti quod apponitur ne pertingat ad +terminum, manifestum est quod diminui quidem potest in infinitum, +quia in infinitum possunt impedimenta apponi, secundum quod homo +potest in infinitum addere peccatum peccato, non tamen potest +totaliter consumi, quia semper manet radix talis inclinationis. +Sicut patet in diaphano corpore, quod quidem habet inclinationem ad +susceptionem lucis ex hoc ipso quod est diaphanum, diminuitur autem +haec inclinatio vel habilitas ex parte nebularum supervenientium, +cum tamen semper maneat in radice naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection avails when diminution is made by subtraction. But here the diminution is made by raising obstacles, and this + neither diminishes nor destroys the root of the inclination, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37199" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37199] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit quando fit diminutio per +subtractionem. Hic autem fit diminutio per appositionem +impedimenti, quod neque tollit neque diminuit radicem +inclinationis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The natural inclination is indeed wholly uniform: nevertheless it stands in relation both to its principle and to its term, + in respect of which diversity of relation, it is diminished on the one hand, and not on the other. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37200" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37200] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod inclinatio naturalis est quidem tota uniformis, sed +tamen habet respectum et ad principium et ad terminum, secundum +quam diversitatem quodammodo diminuitur et quodammodo non +diminuitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even in the lost the natural inclination to virtue remains, else they would have no remorse of conscience. That it is not + reduced to act is owing to their being deprived of grace by Divine justice. Thus even in a blind man the aptitude to see remains + in the very root of his nature, inasmuch as he is an animal naturally endowed with sight: yet this aptitude is not reduced + to act, for the lack of a cause capable of reducing it, by forming the organ + requisite for sight. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37201" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37201] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod etiam in damnatis manet naturalis inclinatio ad +virtutem, alioquin non esset in eis remorsus conscientiae. Sed quod +non reducatur in actum, contingit quia deest gratia, secundum +divinam iustitiam. Sicut etiam in caeco remanet aptitudo ad +videndum in ipsa radice naturae, inquantum est animal naturaliter +habens visum, sed non reducitur in actum, quia deest causa quae +reducere possit formando organum quod requiritur ad videndum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q85_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q85_A3-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 3. Whether weakness, ignorance, malice and concupiscence are suitably reckoned as the wounds of nature consequent upon sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that weakness, ignorance, malice and concupiscence are not suitably reckoned as the wounds of nature consequent + upon sin. For one same thing is not both effect and cause of the same thing. But these are reckoned to be causes of sin, as + appears from what has been said above ( + <a href="#FS_Q76_A1" id="FS_Q85_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[1]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q77_A3" id="FS_Q85_A3-p2.2" shape="rect"> Q[77], AA[3]</a>,5; + <a href="#FS_Q78_A1" id="FS_Q85_A3-p2.3" shape="rect"> Q[78], A[1]</a>). Therefore they should not be reckoned as effects of + sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37202" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37202] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter ponantur vulnera +naturae esse, ex peccato consequentia, infirmitas, ignorantia, +malitia et concupiscentia. Non enim idem est effectus et causa +eiusdem. Sed ista ponuntur causae peccatorum, ut ex supradictis +patet. Ergo non debent poni effectus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, malice is the name of a sin. Therefore it should have no place among the effects of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37203" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37203] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +malitia nominat quoddam peccatum. Non ergo debet poni inter +effectus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, concupiscence is something natural, since it is an act of the concupiscible power. But that which is natural should + not be reckoned a wound of nature. Therefore concupiscence should not be reckoned a wound of nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37204" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37204] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +concupiscentia est quiddam naturale, cum sit actus virtutis +concupiscibilis. Sed illud quod est naturale, non debet poni vulnus +naturae. Ergo concupiscentia non debet poni vulnus naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it has been stated ( + <a href="#FS_Q77_A3" id="FS_Q85_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[77], A[3]</a>) that to sin from weakness is the same as to sin from passion. But concupiscence is a passion. Therefore it should not be + condivided with weakness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="37205" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37205] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +dictum est quod idem est peccare ex infirmitate, et ex passione. +Sed concupiscentia passio quaedam est. Ergo non debet contra +infirmitatem dividi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, Augustine (De Nat. et Grat. lxvii, 67) reckons "two things to be punishments inflicted on the soul of the sinner, + viz. ignorance and difficulty," from which arise "error and vexation," which four do not coincide with the four in question. + Therefore it seems that one or the other reckoning is incomplete. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 arg. 5"><a name="37206" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37206] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus, in libro de natura et gratia, ponit duo poenalia animae +peccanti, scilicet ignorantiam et difficultatem, ex quibus oritur +error et cruciatus, quae quidem quatuor non concordant istis +quatuor. Ergo videtur quod alterum eorum insufficienter +ponatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The authority of Bede suffices [*Reference not known]. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37207" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37207] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> In +contrarium est auctoritas Bedae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q85_A3-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As a result of original justice, the reason had perfect hold over the lower parts of the soul, while reason itself was perfected + by God, and was subject to Him. Now this same original justice was forfeited through the sin of our first parent, as already + stated ( + <a href="#FS_Q81_A2" id="FS_Q85_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[81], A[2]</a>); so that all the powers of the soul are left, as it were, destitute of their proper order, whereby they are naturally directed + to virtue; which destitution is + called a wounding of nature. + </p><p id="FS_Q85_A3-p9"> Again, there are four of the soul's powers that can be subject of virtue, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q61_A2" id="FS_Q85_A3-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[61], A[2]</a>), viz. the reason, where prudence resides, the will, where justice is, the irascible, the subject of fortitude, and the concupiscible, + the subject of temperance. Therefore in so far as the reason is deprived of its order to the true, there is the wound of ignorance; + in so far as the will is deprived of its order of good, there is the wound of malice; in + so far as the irascible is deprived of its order to the arduous, there is the wound of weakness; and in so far as the concupiscible + is deprived of its order to the delectable, moderated by reason, there is the wound of concupiscence. + </p><p id="FS_Q85_A3-p10"> Accordingly these are the four wounds inflicted on the whole of human nature as a result of our first parent's sin. But since + the inclination to the good of virtue is diminished in each individual on account of actual sin, as was explained above ( + <a href="#FS_Q85_A1" id="FS_Q85_A3-p10.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>, 2), these four wounds are also the result of other sins, in so far as, through sin, the reason is obscured, especially in + practical matters, the will hardened to evil, good actions become more difficult + and concupiscence more impetuous. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 co."><a name="37208" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37208] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod per iustitiam originalem perfecte ratio continebat +inferiores animae vires, et ipsa ratio a Deo perficiebatur ei +subiecta. Haec autem originalis iustitia subtracta est per peccatum +primi parentis, sicut iam dictum est. Et ideo omnes vires animae +remanent quodammodo destitutae proprio ordine, quo naturaliter +ordinantur ad virtutem, et ipsa destitutio vulneratio naturae +dicitur. Sunt autem quatuor potentiae animae quae possunt esse +subiecta virtutum, ut supra dictum est, scilicet ratio, in qua est +prudentia; voluntas, in qua est iustitia; irascibilis, in qua est +fortitudo; concupiscibilis, in qua est temperantia. Inquantum ergo +ratio destituitur suo ordine ad verum, est vulnus ignorantiae; +inquantum vero voluntas destituitur ordine ad bonum, est vulnus +malitiae; inquantum vero irascibilis destituitur suo ordine ad +arduum, est vulnus infirmitatis; inquantum vero concupiscentia +destituitur ordine ad delectabile moderatum ratione, est vulnus +concupiscentiae. Sic igitur ita quatuor sunt vulnera inflicta toti +humanae naturae ex peccato primi parentis. Sed quia inclinatio ad +bonum virtutis in unoquoque diminuitur per peccatum actuale, ut ex +dictis patet, et ista sunt quatuor vulnera ex aliis peccatis +consequentia, inquantum scilicet per peccatum et ratio hebetatur, +praecipue in agendis; et voluntas induratur ad bonum; et maior +difficultas bene agendi accrescit; et concupiscentia magis +exardescit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is no reason why the effect of one sin should not be the cause of another: because the soul, through sinning once, + is more easily inclined to sin again. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37209" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37209] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet id quod est effectus unius +peccati, esse causam peccati alterius. Ex hoc enim quod anima +deordinatur per peccatum praecedens, facilius inclinatur ad +peccandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Malice is not to be taken here as a sin, but as a certain proneness of the will to evil, according to the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q85_A3-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.8.21" target="asv"> Gn. 8:21</a>: "Man's senses are prone to evil from his youth" [*Vulgate: 'The imagination and thought of man's heart are prone to evil + from his youth.']. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37210" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37210] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod malitia non sumitur hic pro peccato, sed pro quadam +pronitate voluntatis ad malum; secundum quod dicitur Gen. VIII, +<i>proni sunt sensus hominis ad malum ab adolescentia sua</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q82_A3" id="FS_Q85_A3-p13.1" shape="rect">Q[82], A[3]</a>, ad 1), concupiscence is natural to man, in so far as it is subject to reason: whereas, in so far as it is goes beyond the + bounds of reason, it is unnatural to man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37211" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37211] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, concupiscentia intantum est +naturalis homini, inquantum subditur rationi. Quod autem excedat +limites rationis, hoc est homini contra naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Speaking in a general way, every passion can be called a weakness, in so far as it weakens the soul's strength and clogs + the reason. Bede, however, took weakness in the strict sense, as contrary to fortitude which pertains to the irascible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="37212" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37212] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod infirmitas communiter potest dici omnis passio, +inquantum debilitat robur animae et impedit rationem. Sed Beda +accepit infirmitatem stricte, secundum quod opponitur fortitudini, +quae pertinet ad irascibilem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The "difficulty" which is mentioned in this book of Augustine, includes the three wounds affecting the appetitive powers, + viz. "malice," "weakness" and "concupiscence," for it is owing to these three that a man finds it difficult to tend to the + good. "Error" and "vexation" are consequent wounds, since a man is vexed through being weakened in respect of the objects + of his concupiscence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 ad 5"><a name="37213" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37213] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod difficultas quae ponitur in libro Augustini, includit +ista tria quae pertinent ad appetitivas potentias, scilicet +malitiam, infirmitatem et concupiscentiam, ex his enim tribus +contingit quod aliquis non facile tendit in bonum. Error autem et +dolor sunt vulnera consequentia, ex hoc enim aliquis dolet, quod +infirmatur circa ea quae concupiscit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q85_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q85_A4-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 4. Whether privation of mode, species and order is the effect of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that privation of mode, species and order is not the effect of sin. For Augustine says (De Natura Boni iii) + that "where these three abound, the good is great; where they are less, there is less good; where they are not, there is no + good at all." But sin does not destroy the good of nature. Therefore it does not destroy mode, species and order. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37214" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37214] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod privatio modi, speciei et ordinis, non +sit effectus peccati. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de natura +boni, quod <i>ubi haec tria magna sunt, magnum bonum est; ubi +parva, parvum; ubi nulla, nullum</i>. Sed peccatum non annullat +bonum naturae. Ergo non privat modum, speciem et ordinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing is its own cause. But sin itself is the "privation of mode, species and order," as Augustine states (De + Natura Boni iv). Therefore privation of mode, species and order is not the effect of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37215" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37215] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +nihil est causa sui ipsius. Sed ipsum peccatum est privatio modi, +speciei et ordinis, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de natura boni. +Ergo privatio modi, speciei et ordinis, non est effectus +peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, different effects result from different sins. Now since mode, species and order are diverse, their corresponding + privations must be diverse also, and, consequently, must be the result of different sins. Therefore privation of mode, species + and order is not the effect of each sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37216" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37216] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +diversa peccata diversos habent effectus. Sed modus, species et +ordo, cum sint quaedam diversa, diversas privationes habere +videntur. Ergo per diversa peccata privantur. Non ergo est effectus +cuiuslibet peccati privatio modi, speciei et ordinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Sin is to the soul what weakness is to the body, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q85_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.6.3" target="asv"> Ps. 6:3, </a> "Have mercy on me, O Lord, for I am weak." Now weakness deprives the body of mode, species and order. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37217" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37217] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod peccatum est in anima sicut infirmitas in corpore; +secundum illud Psalmi VI, <i>miserere mei, domine, quoniam infirmus +sum</i>. Sed infirmitas privat modum, speciem et ordinem ipsius +corporis. Ergo peccatum privat modum, speciem et ordinem +animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q85_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in the + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q5_A5" id="FS_Q85_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[5], A[5]</a>, mode, species and order are consequent upon every created good, as such, and also upon every being. Because every being + and every good as such depends on its form from which it derives its "species." Again, any kind of form, whether substantial + or accidental, of anything whatever, is according to some measure, wherefore it is stated in Metaph. viii, that "the forms + of things are like numbers," so that + a form has a certain "mode" corresponding to its measure. Lastly owing to its form, each thing has a relation of "order" to + something else. + </p><p id="FS_Q85_A4-p7"> Accordingly there are different grades of mode, species and order, corresponding to the different degrees of good. For there + is a good belonging to the very substance of nature, which good has its mode, species and order, and is neither destroyed + nor diminished by sin. There is again the good of the natural inclination, which also has its mode, species and order; and + this is diminished by sin, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q85_A1" id="FS_Q85_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a> ,2), but is not entirely destroyed. + Again, there is the good of virtue and grace: this too has its mode, species and order, and is entirely taken away by sin. + Lastly, there is a good consisting in the ordinate act itself, which also has its mode, species and order, the privation of + which is essentially sin. Hence it is clear both how sin is privation of mode, species and order, and how it destroys or diminishes + mode, species and order. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 4 co."><a name="37218" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37218] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut in primo dictum est, modus, species et ordo +consequuntur unumquodque bonum creatum inquantum huiusmodi, et +etiam unumquodque ens. Omne enim esse et bonum consideratur per +aliquam formam, secundum quam sumitur species. Forma autem +uniuscuiusque rei, qualiscumque sit, sive substantialis sive +accidentalis, est secundum aliquam mensuram, unde et in VIII +Metaphys. dicitur quod formae rerum sunt sicut numeri. Et ex hoc +habet modum quendam, qui mensuram respicit. Ex forma vero sua +unumquodque ordinatur ad aliud. Sic igitur secundum diversos gradus +bonorum, sunt diversi gradus modi, speciei et ordinis. Est ergo +quoddam bonum pertinens ad ipsam substantiam naturae, quod habet +suum modum, speciem et ordinem, et illud nec privatur nec +diminuitur per peccatum. Est etiam quoddam bonum naturalis +inclinationis, et hoc etiam habet suum modum, speciem et ordinem, +et hoc diminuitur per peccatum, ut dictum est, sed non totaliter +tollitur. Est etiam quoddam bonum virtutis et gratiae, quod etiam +habet suum modum, speciem et ordinem, et hoc totaliter tollitur per +peccatum mortale. Est etiam quoddam bonum quod est ipse actus +ordinatus, quod etiam habet suum modum, speciem et ordinem, et +huius privatio est essentialiter ipsum peccatum. Et sic patet +qualiter peccatum et est privatio modi, speciei et ordinis; et +privat vel diminuit modum, speciem et ordinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A4-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1&2:</b> This suffices for the Replies to the first two Objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37219" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37219] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Unde patet +responsio ad duo prima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Mode, species and order follow one from the other, as explained above: and so they are destroyed or diminished together. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37220" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37220] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod modus, species et ordo se consequuntur, sicut ex +dictis patet. Unde simul privantur et diminuuntur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q85_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q85_A5-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 5. Whether death and other bodily defects are the result of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that death and other bodily defects are not the result of sin. Because equal causes have equal effects. Now + these defects are not equal in all, but abound in some more than in others, whereas original sin, from which especially these + defects seem to result, is equal in all, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q82_A4" id="FS_Q85_A5-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[82], A[4]</a>). Therefore death and suchlike defects are not the result of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="37221" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37221] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod mors et alii corporales defectus non +sint effectus peccati. Si enim causa fuerit aequalis, et effectus +erit aequalis. Sed huiusmodi defectus non sunt aequales in omnibus, +sed in quibusdam huiusmodi defectus magis abundant, cum tamen +peccatum originale sit in omnibus aequale, sicut dictum est, cuius +videntur huiusmodi defectus maxime esse effectus. Ergo mors et +huiusmodi defectus non sunt effectus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if the cause is removed, the effect is removed. But these defects are not removed, when all sin is removed by Baptism + or Penance. Therefore they are not the effect of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="37222" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37222] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +remota causa, removetur effectus. Sed remoto omni peccato per +Baptismum vel poenitentiam, non removentur huiusmodi defectus. Ergo +non sunt effectus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, actual sin has more of the character of guilt than original sin has. But actual sin does not change the nature of + the body by subjecting it to some defect. Much less, therefore, does original sin. Therefore death and other bodily defects + are not the result of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="37223" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37223] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum actuale habet plus de ratione culpae quam originale. Sed +peccatum actuale non transmutat naturam corporis ad aliquem +defectum. Ergo multo minus peccatum originale. Non ergo mors et +alii defectus corporales sunt effectus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q85_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>), "By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 5 s. c."><a name="37224" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37224] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. V, <i>per unum hominem peccatum in +hunc mundum intravit, et per peccatum mors</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q85_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> One thing causes another in two ways: first, by reason of itself; secondly, accidentally. By reason of itself, one thing + is the cause of another, if it produces its effect by reason of the power of its nature or form, the result being that the + effect is directly intended by the cause. Consequently, as death and such like defects are beside the intention of the sinner, + it is evident that sin is not, of itself, the cause of these defects. Accidentally, one + thing is the cause of another if it causes it by removing an obstacle: thus it is stated in Phys. viii, text. 32, that "by + displacing a pillar a man moves accidentally the stone resting thereon." In this way the sin of our first parent is the cause + of death and all such like defects in human nature, in so far as by the sin of our first parent original justice was taken + away, whereby not only were the lower powers of the soul held together under the control of reason, without any disorder + whatever, but also the whole body was held together in subjection to the soul, without any defect, as stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q97_A1" id="FS_Q85_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[97], A[1]</a>. Wherefore, original justice being forfeited through the sin of our first parent; just as human nature was stricken in the + soul by the disorder among the powers, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q85_A3" id="FS_Q85_A5-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[3];</a> Q[82], A[3]), so also it became subject to corruption, by reason of disorder in the body. + </p><p id="FS_Q85_A5-p7"> Now the withdrawal of original justice has the character of punishment, even as the withdrawal of grace has. Consequently, + death and all consequent bodily defects are punishments of original sin. And although the defects are not intended by the + sinner, nevertheless they are ordered according to the justice of God Who inflicts them as punishments. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 5 co."><a name="37225" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37225] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod aliquid est causa alterius dupliciter, uno quidem +modo, per se; alio modo, per accidens. Per se quidem est causa +alterius quod secundum virtutem suae naturae vel formae producit +effectum, unde sequitur quod effectus sit per se intentus a causa. +Unde cum mors et huiusmodi defectus sint praeter intentionem +peccantis, manifestum est quod peccatum non est per se causa +istorum defectuum. Per accidens autem aliquid est causa alterius, +si sit causa removendo prohibens, sicut dicitur in VIII Physic. +quod <i>divellens columnam, per accidens movet lapidem columnae +superpositum</i>. Et hoc modo peccatum primi parentis est causa +mortis et omnium huiusmodi defectuum in natura humana, inquantum +per peccatum primi parentis sublata est originalis iustitia, per +quam non solum inferiores animae vires continebantur sub ratione +absque omni deordinatione, sed totum corpus continebatur sub anima +absque omni defectu, ut in primo habitum est. Et ideo, subtracta +hac originali iustitia per peccatum primi parentis, sicut vulnerata +est humana natura quantum ad animam per deordinationem potentiarum, +ut supra dictum est; ita etiam est corruptibilis effecta per +deordinationem ipsius corporis. Subtractio autem originalis +iustitiae habet rationem poenae, sicut etiam subtractio gratiae. +Unde etiam mors, et omnes defectus corporales consequentes, sunt +quaedam poenae originalis peccati. Et quamvis huiusmodi defectus +non sint intenti a peccante, sunt tamen ordinati secundum iustitiam +Dei punientis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Causes that produce their effects of themselves, if equal, produce equal effects: for if such causes be increased or diminished, + the effect is increased or diminished. But equal causes of an obstacle being removed, do not point to equal effects. For supposing + a man employs equal force in displacing two columns, it does not follow that the movements of the stones resting on them will + be equal; but that one will move with greater velocity, which has the + greater weight according to the property of its nature, to which it is left when the obstacle to its falling is removed. Accordingly, + when original justice is removed, the nature of the human body is left to itself, so that according to diverse natural temperaments, + some men's bodies are subject to more defects, some to fewer, although original sin is equal in all. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="37226" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37226] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod aequalitas causae per se, causat aequalem +effectum, augmentata enim vel diminuta causa per se, augetur vel +diminuitur effectus. Sed aequalitas causae removentis prohibens, +non ostendit aequalitatem effectuum. Si quis enim aequali impulsu +divellat duas columnas, non sequitur quod lapides superpositi +aequaliter moveantur, sed ille velocius movebitur qui gravior erit +secundum proprietatem suae naturae, cui relinquitur remoto +prohibente. Sic igitur, remota originali iustitia, natura corporis +humani relicta est sibi, et secundum hoc, secundum diversitatem +naturalis complexionis, quorundam corpora pluribus defectibus +subiacent, quorundam vero paucioribus, quamvis existente originali +peccato aequali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Both original and actual sin are removed by the same cause that removes these defects, according to the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q85_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.11" target="asv">Rom. 8:11</a>): "He . . . shall quicken . . . your mortal bodies, because of His Spirit that dwelleth in you": but each is done according + to the order of Divine wisdom, at a fitting time. Because it is right that we should first of all be conformed to Christ's + sufferings, before attaining to the immortality and impassibility + of glory, which was begun in Him, and by Him acquired for us. Hence it behooves that our bodies should remain, for a time, + subject to suffering, in order that we may merit the impassibility of glory, in conformity with Christ. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="37227" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37227] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod culpa originalis et actualis removetur ab eodem a quo +etiam removentur et huiusmodi defectus, secundum illud apostoli, +Rom. VIII, <i>vivificabit mortalia corpora vestra per inhabitantem +spiritum eius in vobis</i>, sed utrumque fit secundum ordinem +divinae sapientiae, congruo tempore. Oportet enim quod ad +immortalitatem et impassibilitatem gloriae, quae in Christo +inchoata est, et per Christum nobis acquisita, perveniamus +conformati prius passionibus eius. Unde oportet quod ad tempus +passibilitas in nostris corporibus remaneat, ad impassibilitatem +gloriae promerendam conformiter Christo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Two things may be considered in actual sin, the substance of the act, and the aspect of fault. As regards the substance of + the act, actual sin can cause a bodily defect: thus some sicken and die through eating too much. But as regards the fault, + it deprives us of grace which is given to us that we may regulate the acts of the soul, but not that we may ward off defects + of the body, as original justice did. Wherefore actual sin does not cause those + defects, as original sin does. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="37228" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37228] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in peccato actuali duo possumus considerare, scilicet +ipsam substantiam actus, et rationem culpae. Ex parte quidem +substantiae actus, potest peccatum actuale aliquem defectum +corporalem causare, sicut ex superfluo cibo aliqui infirmantur et +moriuntur. Sed ex parte culpae, privat gratiam quae datur homini ad +rectificandum animae actus, non autem ad cohibendum defectus +corporales, sicut originalis iustitia cohibebat. Et ideo peccatum +actuale non causat huiusmodi defectus, sicut originale.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q85_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q85_A6-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 6. Whether death and other defects are natural to man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that death and such like defects are natural to man. For "the corruptible and the incorruptible differ generically" + (Metaph. x, text. 26). But man is of the same genus as other animals which are naturally corruptible. Therefore man is naturally + corruptible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="37229" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37229] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod mors et huiusmodi defectus sint homini +naturales. <i>Corruptibile enim et incorruptibile differunt +genere</i>, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed homo est eiusdem generis +cum aliis animalibus, quae sunt naturaliter corruptibilia. Ergo +homo est naturaliter corruptibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is composed of contraries is naturally corruptible, as having within itself the cause of corruption. But + such is the human body. Therefore it is naturally corruptible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="37230" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37230] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +omne quod est compositum ex contrariis, est naturaliter +corruptibile, quasi habens in se causam corruptionis suae. Sed +corpus humanum est huiusmodi. Ergo est naturaliter +corruptibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a hot thing naturally consumes moisture. Now human life is preserved by hot and moist elements. Since therefore + the vital functions are fulfilled by the action of natural heat, as stated in De Anima ii, text. 50, it seems that death and + such like defects are natural to man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="37231" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37231] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +calidum naturaliter consumit humidum. Vita autem hominis +conservatur per calidum et humidum. Cum igitur operationes vitae +expleantur per actum caloris naturalis, ut dicitur in II de anima, +videtur quod mors et huiusmodi defectus sint homini naturales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q85_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> (1) God made in man whatever is natural to him. Now "God made not death" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q85_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.13" target="asv">Wis. 1:13</a>). Therefore death is not natural to man. + </p><p id="FS_Q85_A6-p6"> (2) Further, that which is natural cannot be called either a punishment or an evil: since what is natural to a thing is suitable + to it. But death and such like defects are the punishment of original sin, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q85_A5" id="FS_Q85_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. Therefore they are not natural to man. + </p><p id="FS_Q85_A6-p7"> (3) Further, matter is proportionate to form, and everything to its end. Now man's end is everlasting happiness, as stated + above (Q[2], A[7]; Q[5] , AA[3],4): and the form of the human body is the rational soul, as was proved in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q75_A6" id="FS_Q85_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[75], A[6]</a>. Therefore the human body is naturally incorruptible. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><div class="latin"><p title="I-II q. 85 a. 6 s. c. 1"><a name="37232" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37232] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 s. c. 1</span></a> Sed +contra, quidquid est homini naturale, Deus in homine fecit. Sed +Deus mortem non fecit, ut dicitur Sap. I. Ergo mors non est homini +naturalis.</p><p title="I-II q. 85 a. 6 s. c. 2"><a name="37233" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37233] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 s. c. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +id quod est secundum naturam, non potest dici poena nec malum, quia +unicuique rei est conveniens id quod est ei naturale. Sed mors et +huiusmodi defectus sunt poena peccati originalis, ut supra dictum +est. Ergo non sunt homini naturales.</p><p title="I-II q. 85 a. 6 s. c. 3"><a name="37234" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37234] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 s. c. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +materia proportionatur formae, et quaelibet res suo fini. Finis +autem hominis est beatitudo perpetua, ut supra dictum est. Forma +etiam humani corporis est anima rationalis, quae est +incorruptibilis, ut in primo habitum est. Ergo corpus humanum est +naturaliter incorruptibile.</p></div></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q85_A6-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We may speak of any corruptible thing in two ways; first, in respect of its universal nature, secondly, as regards its particular + nature. A thing's particular nature is its own power of action and self-preservation. And in respect of this nature, every + corruption and defect is contrary to nature, as stated in De Coelo ii, text. 37, since this power tends to the being and preservation + of the thing to which it belongs. + </p><p id="FS_Q85_A6-p9"> On the other hand, the universal nature is an active force in some universal principle of nature, for instance in some heavenly + body; or again belonging to some superior substance, in which sense God is said by some to be "the Nature Who makes nature." + This force intends the good and the preservation of the universe, for which alternate generation and corruption in things + are requisite: and in this respect corruption and defect in things are natural, not indeed as regards the + inclination of the form which is the principle of being and perfection, but as regards the inclination of matter which is + allotted proportionately to its particular form according to the discretion of the universal agent. And although every form + intends perpetual being as far as it can, yet no form of a corruptible being can achieve its own perpetuity, except the rational + soul; for the reason that the latter is not entirely subject to matter, as other forms are; indeed it has an immaterial + operation of its own, as stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q75_A2" id="FS_Q85_A6-p9.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[75], A[2]</a>. Consequently as regards his form, incorruption is more natural to man than to other corruptible things. But since that very + form has a matter composed of contraries, from the inclination of that matter there results corruptibility in the whole. In + this respect man is naturally corruptible as regards the nature of his matter left to itself, but not as regards the nature + of his form. + </p><p id="FS_Q85_A6-p10"> The first three objections argue on the side of the matter; while the other three argue on the side of the form. Wherefore + in order to solve them, we must observe that the form of man which is the rational soul, in respect of its incorruptibility + is adapted to its end, which is everlasting happiness: whereas the human body, which is corruptible, considered in respect + of its nature, is, in a way, adapted to its form, and, in another way, it is not. For we may note a twofold + condition in any matter, one which the agent chooses, and another which is not chosen by the agent, and is a natural condition + of matter. Thus, a smith in order to make a knife, chooses a matter both hard and flexible, which can be sharpened so as to + be useful for cutting, and in respect of this condition iron is a matter adapted for a knife: but that iron be breakable and + inclined to rust, results from the natural disposition of iron, nor does the workman choose this in the iron, indeed he + would do without it if he could: wherefore this disposition of matter is not adapted to the workman's intention, nor to the + purpose of his art. In like manner the human body is the matter chosen by nature in respect of its being of a mixed temperament, + in order that it may be most suitable as an organ of touch and of the other sensitive and motive powers. Whereas the fact + that it is corruptible is due to a condition of matter, and is not chosen by nature: indeed nature would choose an + incorruptible matter if it could. But God, to Whom every nature is subject, in forming man supplied the defect of nature, + and by the gift of original justice, gave the body a certain incorruptibility, as was stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q97_A1" id="FS_Q85_A6-p10.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[97], A[1]</a>. It is in this sense that it is said that "God made not death," and that death is the punishment of sin. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 6 co."><a name="37235" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37235] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod de unaquaque re corruptibili dupliciter loqui +possumus, uno modo, secundum naturam universalem; alio modo, +secundum naturam particularem. Natura quidem particularis est +propria virtus activa et conservativa uniuscuiusque rei. Et +secundum hanc, omnis corruptio et defectus est contra naturam, ut +dicitur in II de caelo, quia huiusmodi virtus intendit esse et +conservationem eius cuius est. Natura vero universalis est virtus +activa in aliquo universali principio naturae, puta in aliquo +caelestium corporum; vel alicuius superioris substantiae, secundum +quod etiam Deus a quibusdam dicitur natura naturans. Quae quidem +virtus intendit bonum et conservationem universi, ad quod exigitur +alternatio generationis et corruptionis in rebus. Et secundum hoc, +corruptiones et defectus rerum sunt naturales, non quidem secundum +inclinationem formae, quae est principium essendi et perfectionis; +sed secundum inclinationem materiae, quae proportionaliter +attribuitur tali formae secundum distributionem universalis +agentis. Et quamvis omnis forma intendat perpetuum esse quantum +potest, nulla tamen forma rei corruptibilis potest assequi +perpetuitatem sui, praeter animam rationalem, eo quod ipsa non est +subiecta omnino materiae corporali, sicut aliae formae; quinimmo +habet propriam operationem immaterialem, ut in primo habitum est. +Unde ex parte suae formae, naturalior est homini incorruptio quam +aliis rebus corruptibilibus. Sed quia et ipsa habet materiam ex +contrariis compositam, ex inclinatione materiae sequitur +corruptibilitas in toto. Et secundum hoc, homo est naturaliter +corruptibilis secundum naturam materiae sibi relictae, sed non +secundum naturam formae. Primae autem tres rationes procedunt ex +parte materiae, aliae vero tres procedunt ex parte formae. Unde ad +earum solutionem, considerandum est quod forma hominis, quae est +anima rationalis, secundum suam incorruptibilitatem proportionata +est suo fini, qui est beatitudo perpetua. Sed corpus humanum, quod +est corruptibile secundum suam naturam consideratum, quodammodo +proportionatum est suae formae, et quodammodo non. Duplex enim +conditio potest attendi in aliqua materia, una scilicet quam agens +eligit; alia quae non est ab agente electa, sed est secundum +conditionem naturalem materiae. Sicut faber ad faciendum cultellum +eligit materiam duram et ductilem, quae subtiliari possit ut sit +apta incisioni, et secundum hanc conditionem ferrum est materia +proportionata cultello, sed hoc quod ferrum sit frangibile et +rubiginem contrahens, consequitur ex naturali dispositione ferri, +nec hoc eligit artifex in ferro, sed magis repudiaret si posset. +Unde haec dispositio materiae non est proportionata intentioni +artificis, nec intentioni artis. Similiter corpus humanum est +materia electa a natura quantum ad hoc, quod est temperatae +complexionis, ut possit esse convenientissimum organum tactus et +aliarum virtutum sensitivarum et motivarum. Sed quod sit +corruptibile, hoc est ex conditione materiae, nec est electum a +natura, quin potius natura eligeret materiam incorruptibilem, si +posset. Sed Deus, cui subiacet omnis natura, in ipsa institutione +hominis supplevit defectum naturae, et dono iustitiae originalis +dedit corpori incorruptibilitatem quandam, ut in primo dictum est. +Et secundum hoc dicitur quod Deus mortem non fecit, et quod mors +est poena peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A6-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 1--3:</b> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 6 ad arg."><a name="37236" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37236] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 ad arg.</span></a> Unde patet +responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q86" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q86-p0.1">Q. 86. OF THE STAIN OF SIN (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q86-p2"> We must now consider the stain of sin; under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q86-p3"><a href="#FS_Q86_A1"> (1) Whether an effect of sin is a stain on the soul?</a></p><p id="FS_Q86-p4"><a href="#FS_Q86_A2"> (2) Whether it remains in the soul after the act of sin?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 pr."><a name="37237" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37237] +Iª-IIae q. 86 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +macula peccati. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum macula +animae sit effectus peccati. Secundo, utrum remaneat in anima post +actum peccati.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q86_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q86_A1-p0.1">Q. 86. A. 1. Whether sin causes a stain on the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin causes no stain on the soul. For a higher nature cannot be defiled by contact with a lower nature: + hence the sun's ray is not defiled by contact with tainted bodies, as Augustine says (Contra Quinque Haereses v). Now the + human soul is of a much higher nature than mutable things, to which it turns by sinning. Therefore it does not contract a + stain from them by sinning. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37238" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37238] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non causet aliquam maculam in +anima. Natura enim superior non potest inquinari ex contactu +naturae inferioris, unde radius solaris non inquinatur per tactum +corporum fetidorum, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro contra quinque +haereses. Sed anima humana est multo superioris naturae quam res +commutabiles, ad quas peccando convertitur. Ergo ex eis maculam non +contrahit peccando.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is chiefly in the will, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q74_A1" id="FS_Q86_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[74], AA[1]</a>,2). Now the will is in the reason, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 42. But the reason or intellect is not stained by considering + anything whatever; rather indeed is it perfected thereby. Therefore neither is the will stained by sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37239" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37239] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum est principaliter in voluntate, ut supra dictum est. +Voluntas autem est in ratione, ut dicitur in III de anima. Sed +ratio, sive intellectus, non maculatur ex consideratione +quarumcumque rerum, sed magis perficitur. Ergo nec voluntas ex +peccato maculatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if sin causes a stain, this stain is either something positive, or a pure privation. If it be something positive, + it can only be either a disposition or a habit: for it seems that nothing else can be caused by an act. But it is neither + disposition nor habit: for it happens that a stain remains even after the removal of a disposition or habit; for instance, + in a man who after committing a mortal sin of prodigality, is so changed as to fall into a sin + of the opposite vice. Therefore the stain does not denote anything positive in the soul. Again, neither is it a pure privation. + Because all sins agree on the part of aversion and privation of grace: and so it would follow that there is but one stain + caused by all sins. Therefore the stain is not the effect of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37240" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37240] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +si peccatum maculam causat, aut macula illa est aliquid positive, +aut est privatio pura. Si sit aliquid positive, non potest esse +nisi dispositio vel habitus, nihil enim aliud videtur ex actu +causari. Dispositio autem et habitus non est, contingit enim, +remota dispositione vel habitu, adhuc remanere maculam; ut patet in +eo qui peccavit mortaliter prodigalitate, et postea transmutatur, +mortaliter peccando, in habitum vitii oppositi. Non ergo macula +ponit aliquid positive in anima. Similiter etiam nec est privatio +pura. Quia omnia peccata conveniunt ex parte aversionis et +privationis gratiae. Sequeretur ergo quod omnium peccatorum esset +macula una. Ergo macula non est effectus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It was said to Solomon ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q86_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.47.22" target="asv">Ecclus. 47:22</a>): "Thou hast stained thy glory": and it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q86_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.27" target="asv">Eph. 5:27</a>): "That He might present it to Himself a glorious church not having spot or wrinkle": and in each case it is question of + the stain of sin. Therefore a stain is the effect of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37241" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37241] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur, Eccli. XLVII, Salomoni, <i>dedisti maculam in +gloria tua</i>. Et Ephes. V, <i>ut exhiberet sibi gloriosam +Ecclesiam non habentem maculam aut rugam</i>. Et utrobique loquitur +de macula peccati. Ergo macula est effectus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A stain is properly ascribed to corporeal things, when a comely body loses its comeliness through contact with another body, + e.g. a garment, gold or silver, or the like. Accordingly a stain is ascribed to spiritual things in like manner. Now man's + soul has a twofold comeliness; one from the refulgence of the natural light of reason, whereby he is directed in his actions; + the other, from the refulgence of the Divine light, viz. of wisdom and grace, whereby + man is also perfected for the purpose of doing good and fitting actions. Now, when the soul cleaves to things by love, there + is a kind of contact in the soul: and when man sins, he cleaves to certain things, against the light of reason and of the + Divine law, as shown above ( + <a href="#FS_Q71_A6" id="FS_Q86_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[6]</a>). Wherefore the loss of comeliness occasioned by this contact, is metaphorically called a stain on the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 1 co."><a name="37242" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37242] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod macula proprie dicitur in corporalibus, quando +aliquod corpus nitidum perdit suum nitorem ex contactu alterius +corporis, sicut vestis et aurum et argentum, aut aliud huiusmodi. +In rebus autem spiritualibus ad similitudinem huius oportet maculam +dici. Habet autem anima hominis duplicem nitorem, unum quidem ex +refulgentia luminis naturalis rationis, per quam dirigitur in suis +actibus; alium vero ex refulgentia divini luminis, scilicet +sapientiae et gratiae, per quam etiam homo perficitur ad bene et +decenter agendum. Est autem quasi quidam animae tactus, quando +inhaeret aliquibus rebus per amorem. Cum autem peccat, adhaeret +rebus aliquibus contra lumen rationis et divinae legis, ut ex +supradictis patet. Unde ipsum detrimentum nitoris ex tali contactu +proveniens, macula animae metaphorice vocatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The soul is not defiled by inferior things, by their own power, as though they acted on the soul: on the contrary, the soul, + by its own action, defiles itself, through cleaving to them inordinately, against the light of reason and of the Divine law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37243" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37243] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod anima non inquinatur ex rebus inferioribus +virtute earum, quasi agentibus eis in animam, sed magis e converso +anima sua actione se inquinat, inordinate eis inhaerendo, contra +lumen rationis et divinae legis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The action of the intellect is accomplished by the intelligible thing being in the intellect, according to the mode of the + intellect, so that the intellect is not defiled, but perfected, by them. On the other hand, the act of the will consists in + a movement towards things themselves, so that love attaches the soul to the thing loved. Thus it is that the soul is stained, + when it cleaves inordinately, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q86_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Hos.9.10" target="asv"> Osee 9:10</a>: "They . + . . became abominable as those things were which they loved." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37244" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37244] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod actio intellectus perficitur secundum quod res +intelligibiles sunt in intellectu per modum ipsius intellectus, et +ideo intellectus ex eis non inficitur, sed magis perficitur. Sed +actus voluntatis consistit in motu ad ipsas res, ita quod amor +conglutinat animam rei amatae. Et ex hoc anima maculatur, quando in +ordinate inhaeret; secundum illud Osee IX, <i>facti sunt +abominabiles, sicut ea quae dilexerunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The stain is neither something positive in the soul, nor does it denote a pure privation: it denotes a privation of the soul's + brightness in relation to its cause, which is sin; wherefore diverse sins occasion diverse stains. It is like a shadow, which + is the privation of light through the interposition of a body, and which varies according to the diversity of the interposed + bodies. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37245" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37245] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod macula non est aliquid positive in anima, nec +significat privationem solam, sed significat privationem quandam +nitoris animae in ordine ad suam causam, quae est peccatum. Et ideo +diversa peccata diversas maculas inducunt. Et est simile de umbra, +quae est privatio luminis ex obiecto alicuius corporis, et secundum +diversitatem corporum obiectorum diversificantur umbrae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q86_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q86_A2-p0.1">Q. 86. A. 2. Whether the stain remains in the soul after the act of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the stain does not remain in the soul after the act of sin. For after an action, nothing remains in the + soul except habit or disposition. But the stain is not a habit or disposition, as stated above (A[1], OBJ[3]). Therefore the + stain does not remain in the soul after the act of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37246" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37246] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod macula non maneat in anima post actum +peccati. Nihil enim manet in anima post actum, nisi habitus vel +dispositio. Sed macula non est habitus vel dispositio, ut supra +habitum est. Ergo macula non manet in anima post actum peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the stain is to the sin what the shadow is to the body, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). But the shadow does not remain + when the body has passed by. Therefore the stain does not remain in the soul when the act of sin is past. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37247" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37247] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +hoc modo se habet macula ad peccatum, sicut umbra ad corpus, ut +supra dictum est. Sed transeunte corpore, non manet umbra. Ergo, +transeunte actu peccati, non manet macula.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every effect depends on its cause. Now the cause of the stain is the act of sin. Therefore when the act of sin is + no longer there, neither is the stain in the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37248" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37248] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +omnis effectus dependet ex sua causa. Causa autem maculae est actus +peccati. Ergo, remoto actu peccati, non remanet macula in +anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q86_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Josh.22.17" target="asv">Jos. 22:17</a>): "Is it a small thing to you that you sinned with Beelphegor, and the stain of that crime remaineth in you [Vulg.: 'us'] + to this day?" + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37249" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37249] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Iosue XXII, <i>an parum vobis est quod peccastis +in Beelphegor, et usque in praesentem diem macula huius sceleris in +vobis permanet?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The stain of sin remains in the soul even when the act of sin is past. The reason for this is that the stain, as stated above + (A[1] ), denotes a blemish in the brightness of the soul, on account of its withdrawing from the light of reason or of the + Divine law. And therefore so long as man remains out of this light, the stain of sin remains in him: but as soon as, moved + by grace, he returns to the Divine light and to the light of reason, the stain is removed. + For although the act of sin ceases, whereby man withdrew from the light of reason and of the Divine law, man does not at once + return to the state in which he was before, and it is necessary that his will should have a movement contrary to the previous + movement. Thus if one man be parted from another on account of some kind of movement, he is not reunited to him as soon as + the movement ceases, but he needs to draw nigh to him and to return by a contrary movement. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 2 co."><a name="37250" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37250] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod macula peccati remanet in anima, etiam transeunte +actu peccati. Cuius ratio est quia macula, sicut dictum est, +importat quendam defectum nitoris propter recessum a lumine +rationis vel divinae legis. Et ideo quandiu homo manet extra +huiusmodi lumen, manet in eo macula peccati, sed postquam redit ad +lumen divinum et ad lumen rationis, quod fit per gratiam, tunc +macula cessat. Licet autem cesset actus peccati, quo homo discessit +a lumine rationis vel legis divinae, non tamen statim homo ad illud +redit in quo fuerat, sed requiritur aliquis motus voluntatis +contrarius primo motui. Sicut si aliquis sit distans alicui per +aliquem motum, non statim cessante motu fit ei propinquus, sed +oportet quod appropinquet rediens per motum contrarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nothing positive remains in the soul after the act of sin, except the disposition or habit; but there does remain something + private, viz. the privation of union with the Divine light. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37251" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37251] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod post actum peccati nihil positive remanet in +anima nisi dispositio vel habitus, remanet tamen aliquid privative, +scilicet privatio coniunctionis ad divinum lumen.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> After the interposed body has passed by, the transparent body remains in the same position and relation as regards the illuminating + body, and so the shadow passes at once. But when the sin is past, the soul does not remain in the same relation to God: and + so there is no comparison. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37252" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37252] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, transeunte obstaculo corporis, remanet corpus +diaphanum in aequali propinquitate et habitudine ad corpus +illuminans, et ideo statim umbra transit. Sed remoto actu peccati, +non remanet anima in eadem habitudine ad Deum. Unde non est similis +ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The act of sin parts man from God, which parting causes the defect of brightness, just as local movement causes local parting. + Wherefore, just as when movement ceases, local distance is not removed, so neither, when the act of sin ceases, is the stain + removed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37253" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37253] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod actus peccati facit distantiam a Deo, quam quidem +distantiam sequitur defectus nitoris, hoc modo sicut motus localis +facit localem distantiam. Unde sicut, cessante motu, non tollitur +distantia localis; ita nec, cessante actu peccati, tollitur +macula.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q87" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q87-p0.1">Q. 87. OF THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q87-p2"> We must now consider the debt of punishment. We shall consider (1) the debt itself; (2) mortal and venial sin, which differ + in respect of the punishment due to them. + </p><p id="FS_Q87-p3"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q87-p4"><a href="#FS_Q87_A1"> (1) Whether the debt of punishment is an effect of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q87-p5"><a href="#FS_Q87_A2"> (2) Whether one sin can be the punishment of another?</a></p><p id="FS_Q87-p6"><a href="#FS_Q87_A3"> (3) Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?</a></p><p id="FS_Q87-p7"><a href="#FS_Q87_A4"> (4) Whether sin incurs a debt of punishment that is infinite in quantity?</a></p><p id="FS_Q87-p8"><a href="#FS_Q87_A5"> (5) Whether every sin incurs a debt of eternal and infinite punishment?</a></p><p id="FS_Q87-p9"><a href="#FS_Q87_A6"> (6) Whether the debt of punishment can remain after sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q87-p10"><a href="#FS_Q87_A7"> (7) Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q87-p11"><a href="#FS_Q87_A8"> (8) Whether one person can incur punishment for another's sin?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 pr."><a name="37254" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37254] +Iª-IIae q. 87 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de reatu +poenae. Et primo, de ipso reatu; secundo, de mortali et veniali +peccato, quae distinguuntur secundum reatum. Circa primum +quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum reatus poenae sit effectus peccati. +Secundo, utrum peccatum possit esse poena alterius peccati. Tertio, +utrum aliquod peccatum faciat reum aeterna poena. Quarto, utrum +faciat reum poena infinita secundum quantitatem. Quinto, utrum omne +peccatum faciat reum aeterna et infinita poena. Sexto, utrum reatus +poenae possit remanere post peccatum. Septimo, utrum omnis poena +inferatur pro aliquo peccato. Octavo, utrum unus sit reus poenae +pro peccato alterius.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q87_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q87_A1-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 1. Whether the debt of punishment is an effect of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the debt of punishment is not an effect of sin. For that which is accidentally related to a thing, does + not seem to be its proper effect. Now the debt of punishment is accidentally related to sin, for it is beside the intention + of the sinner. Therefore the debt of punishment is not an effect of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37255" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37255] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod reatus poenae non sit effectus +peccati. Quod enim per accidens se habet ad aliquid, non videtur +esse proprius effectus eius. Sed reatus poenae per accidens se +habet ad peccatum, cum sit praeter intentionem peccantis. Ergo +reatus poenae non est effectus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, evil is not the cause of good. But punishment is good, since it is just, and is from God. Therefore it is not an + effect of sin, which is evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37256" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37256] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +malum non est causa boni. Sed poena bona est, cum sit iusta, et a +Deo. Ergo non est effectus peccati, quod est malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Confess. i) that "every inordinate affection is its own punishment." But punishment does not incur + a further debt of punishment, because then it would go on indefinitely. Therefore sin does not incur the debt of punishment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37257" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37257] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in I Confess., quod <i>omnis inordinatus animus +sibi ipsi est poena</i>. Sed poena non causat reatum alterius +poenae, quia sic iretur in infinitum. Ergo peccatum non causat +reatum poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.9" target="asv">Rom. 2:9</a>): "Tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man that worketh evil." But to work evil is to sin. Therefore sin incurs a + punishment which is signified by the words "tribulation and anguish." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37258" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37258] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Rom. II, <i>tribulatio et angustia in animam omnem +operantis malum</i>. Sed operari malum est peccare. Ergo peccatum +inducit poenam, quae nomine tribulationis et angustiae +designatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q87_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It has passed from natural things to human affairs that whenever one thing rises up against another, it suffers some detriment + therefrom. For we observe in natural things that when one contrary supervenes, the other acts with greater energy, for which + reason "hot water freezes more rapidly," as stated in Meteor. i, 12. Wherefore we find that the natural inclination of man + is to repress those who rise up against him. Now it is evident that all things + contained in an order, are, in a manner, one, in relation to the principle of that order. Consequently, whatever rises up + against an order, is put down by that order or by the principle thereof. And because sin is an inordinate act, it is evident + that whoever sins, commits an offense against an order: wherefore he is put down, in consequence, by that same order, which + repression is punishment. + </p><p id="FS_Q87_A1-p7"> Accordingly, man can be punished with a threefold punishment corresponding to the three orders to which the human will is + subject. In the first place a man's nature is subjected to the order of his own reason; secondly, it is subjected to the order + of another man who governs him either in spiritual or in temporal matters, as a member either of the state or of the household; + thirdly, it is subjected to the universal order of the Divine government. Now each of these orders is + disturbed by sin, for the sinner acts against his reason, and against human and Divine law. Wherefore he incurs a threefold + punishment; one, inflicted by himself, viz. remorse of conscience; another, inflicted by man; and a third, inflicted by God. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 1 co."><a name="37259" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37259] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod ex rebus naturalibus ad res humanas derivatur ut id +quod contra aliquid insurgit, ab eo detrimentum patiatur. Videmus +enim in rebus naturalibus quod unum contrarium vehementius agit, +altero contrario superveniente, propter quod aquae calefactae magis +congelantur, ut dicitur in I Meteor. Unde in hominibus hoc ex +naturali inclinatione invenitur, ut unusquisque deprimat eum qui +contra ipsum insurgit. Manifestum est autem quod quaecumque +continentur sub aliquo ordine, sunt quodammodo unum in ordine ad +principium ordinis. Unde quidquid contra ordinem aliquem insurgit, +consequens est ut ab ipso ordine, vel principe ordinis, deprimatur. +Cum autem peccatum sit actus inordinatus, manifestum est quod +quicumque peccat, contra aliquem ordinem agit. Et ideo ab ipso +ordine consequens est quod deprimatur. Quae quidem depressio poena +est. Unde secundum tres ordines quibus subditur humana voluntas, +triplici poena potest homo puniri. Primo quidem enim subditur +humana natura ordini propriae rationis; secundo, ordini exterioris +hominis gubernantis vel spiritualiter vel temporaliter, politice +seu oeconomice; tertio, subditur universali ordini divini +regiminis. Quilibet autem horum ordinum per peccatum pervertitur, +dum ille qui peccat, agit et contra rationem, et contra legem +humanam, et contra legem divinam. Unde triplicem poenam incurrit, +unam quidem a seipso, quae est conscientiae remorsus, aliam vero ab +homine, tertiam vero a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Punishment follows sin, inasmuch as this is an evil by reason of its being inordinate. Wherefore just as evil is accidental + to the sinner's act, being beside his intention, so also is the debt of punishment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37260" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37260] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod poena consequitur peccatum inquantum malum est, +ratione suae inordinationis. Unde sicut malum est per accidens in +actu peccantis, praeter intentionem ipsius, ita et reatus +poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Further, a just punishment may be inflicted either by God or by man: wherefore the punishment itself is the effect of sin, + not directly but dispositively. Sin, however, makes man deserving of punishment, and that is an evil: for Dionysius says (Div. + Nom. iv) that "punishment is not an evil, but to deserve punishment is." Consequently the debt of punishment is considered + to be directly the effect of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37261" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37261] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod poena quidem iusta esse potest et a Deo et ab homine +inflicta, unde ipsa poena non est effectus peccati directe, sed +solum dispositive. Sed peccatum facit hominem esse reum poenae, +quod est malum, dicit enim Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod +<i>puniri non est malum, sed fieri poena dignum</i>. Unde reatus +poenae directe ponitur effectus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This punishment of the "inordinate affection" is due to sin as overturning the order of reason. Nevertheless sin incurs a + further punishment, through disturbing the order of the Divine or human law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37262" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37262] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod poena illa inordinati animi debetur peccato ex hoc +quod ordinem rationis pervertit. Fit autem reus alterius poenae, +per hoc quod pervertit ordinem legis divinae vel humanae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q87_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q87_A2-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 2. Whether sin can be the punishment of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin cannot be the punishment of sin. For the purpose of punishment is to bring man back to the good of + virtue, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. x, 9). Now sin does not bring man back to the good of virtue, but leads him in + the opposite direction. Therefore sin is not the punishment of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37263" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37263] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non possit esse poena +peccati. Poenae enim sunt inductae ut per eas homines reducantur ad +bonum virtutis, ut patet per philosophum, in X Ethic. Sed per +peccatum non reducitur homo in bonum virtutis, sed in oppositum. +Ergo peccatum non est poena peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just punishments are from God, as Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 82). But sin is not from God, and is an injustice. + Therefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37264" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37264] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +poenae iustae sunt a Deo, ut patet per Augustinum, in libro +octoginta trium quaest. Peccatum autem non est a Deo, et est +iniustum. Non ergo peccatum potest esse poena peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the nature of punishment is to be something against the will. But sin is something from the will, as shown above + ( + <a href="#FS_Q74_A1" id="FS_Q87_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[74], AA[1]</a> ,2). Therefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37265" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37265] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +de ratione poenae est quod sit contra voluntatem. Sed peccatum est +a voluntate, ut ex supradictis patet. Ergo peccatum non potest esse +poena peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory speaks (Hom. xi in Ezech.) that some sins are punishments of others. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37266" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37266] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., quod quaedam peccata sunt +poenae peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We may speak of sin in two ways: first, in its essence, as such; secondly, as to that which is accidental thereto. Sin as + such can nowise be the punishment of another. Because sin considered in its essence is something proceeding from the will, + for it is from this that it derives the character of guilt. Whereas punishment is essentially something against the will, + as stated in the + <a href="FP_vi.html#FP_Q48_A5" id="FS_Q87_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[48], A[5]</a>. Consequently it is evident that sin + regarded in its essence can nowise be the punishment of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 2 co."><a name="37267" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37267] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod de peccato dupliciter loqui possumus, per se, et per +accidens. Per se quidem nullo modo peccatum potest esse poena +peccati. Peccatum enim per se consideratur secundum quod egreditur +a voluntate, sic enim habet rationem culpae. De ratione autem +poenae est quod sit contra voluntatem, ut in primo habitum est. +Unde manifestum est quod nullo modo, per se loquendo, peccatum +potest esse poena peccati. Per accidens autem peccatum potest esse +poena peccati, tripliciter. Primo quidem, ex parte causae quae est +remotio prohibentis. Sunt enim causae inclinantes ad peccatum +passiones, tentatio Diaboli, et alia huiusmodi; quae quidem causae +impediuntur per auxilium divinae gratiae, quae subtrahitur per +peccatum. Unde cum ipsa subtractio gratiae sit quaedam poena, et a +Deo, ut supra dictum est; sequitur quod per accidens etiam peccatum +quod ex hoc sequitur, poena dicatur. Et hoc modo loquitur +apostolus, Rom. I, dicens, <i>propter quod tradidit eos Deus in +desideria cordis eorum</i>, quae sunt animae passiones, quia +scilicet deserti homines ab auxilio divinae gratiae, vincuntur a +passionibus. Et hoc modo semper peccatum dicitur esse poena +praecedentis peccati. Alio modo ex parte substantiae actus, quae +afflictionem inducit, sive sit actus interior, ut patet in ira et +invidia; sive actus exterior, ut patet cum aliqui gravi labore +opprimuntur et damno, ut expleant actum peccati, secundum illud +Sap. V, <i>lassati sumus in via iniquitatis</i>. Tertio modo, ex +parte effectus, ut scilicet aliquod peccatum dicatur poena respectu +effectus consequentis. Et his duobus ultimis modis, unum peccatum +non solum est poena praecedentis peccati, sed etiam sui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A2-p7"> On the other hand, sin can be the punishment of sin accidentally in three ways. First, when one sin is the cause of another, + by removing an impediment thereto. For passions, temptations of the devil, and the like are causes of sin, but are impeded + by the help of Divine grace which is withdrawn on account of sin. Wherefore since the withdrawal of grace is a punishment, + and is from God, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q79_A3" id="FS_Q87_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[79], A[3]</a>), the result is that the sin which ensues + from this is also a punishment accidentally. It is in this sense that the Apostle speaks ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.24" target="asv">Rom. 1:24</a>) when he says: "Wherefore God gave them up to the desires of their heart," i.e. to their passions; because, to wit, when + men are deprived of the help of Divine grace, they are overcome by their passions. In this way sin is always said to be the + punishment of a preceding sin. Secondly, by reason of the substance of the act, which is such as to cause pain, whether it + be an + interior act, as is clearly the case with anger or envy, or an exterior act, as is the case with one who endures considerable + trouble and loss in order to achieve a sinful act, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A2-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Wis.5.7" target="asv"> Wis. 5:7</a>: "We wearied ourselves in the way of iniquity." Thirdly, on the part of the effect, so that one sin is said to be a punishment + by reason of its effect. In the last two ways, a sin is a punishment not only in respect of a preceding sin, but also with + regard to itself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37268" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37268] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod hoc etiam quod aliqui puniuntur a Deo, dum +permittit eos in aliqua peccata profluere, ad bonum virtutis +ordinatur. Quandoque quidem etiam ipsorum qui peccant, cum scilicet +post peccatum humiliores et cautiores resurgunt. Semper autem est +ad emendationem aliorum, qui videntes aliquos ruere de peccato in +peccatum, magis reformidant peccare. In aliis autem duobus modis, +manifestum est quod poena ordinatur ad emendationem quia hoc ipsum +quod homo laborem et detrimentum patitur in peccando, natum est +retrahere homines a peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even when God punishes men by permitting them to fall into sin, this is directed to the good of virtue. Sometimes indeed + it is for the good of those who are punished, when, to wit, men arise from sin, more humble and more cautious. But it is always + for the amendment of others, who seeing some men fall from sin to sin, are the more fearful of sinning. With regard to the + other two ways, it is evident that the punishment is intended for the sinner's + amendment, since the very fact that man endures toil and loss in sinning, is of a nature to withdraw man from sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37269" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37269] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de peccato secundum se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This objection considers sin essentially as such: and the same answer applies to the Third Objection. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37270" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37270] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Et similiter +dicendum est ad tertium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q87_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q87_A3-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 3. Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment. For a just punishment is equal to the fault, since justice + is equality: wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.27.8" target="asv">Is. 27:8</a>): "In measure against measure, when it shall be cast off, thou shalt judge it." Now sin is temporal. Therefore it does not + incur a debt of eternal punishment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37271" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37271] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullum peccatum inducat reatum +aeternae poenae. Poena enim iusta adaequatur culpae, iustitia enim +aequalitas est. Unde dicitur Isaiae XXVII, <i>in mensura contra +mensuram, cum abiecta fuerit, iudicabit eam</i>. Sed peccatum est +temporale. Ergo non inducit reatum poenae aeternae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "punishments are a kind of medicine" (Ethic. ii, 3). But no medicine should be infinite, because it is directed + to an end, and "what is directed to an end, is not infinite," as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 6). Therefore no punishment + should be infinite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37272" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37272] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +poenae medicinae quaedam sunt, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed nulla +medicina debet esse infinita, quia ordinatur ad finem; <i>quod +autem ordinatur ad finem, non est infinitum</i>, ut philosophus +dicit, in I Polit. Ergo nulla poena debet esse infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one does a thing always unless he delights in it for its own sake. But "God hath not pleasure in the destruction + of men" [Vulg.: 'of the living']. Therefore He will not inflict eternal punishment on man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37273" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37273] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +nullus semper facit aliquid, nisi propter se in ipso delectetur. +<i>Sed Deus non delectatur in perditione hominum</i>, ut dicitur +Sap. I. Ergo non puniet homines poena sempiterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, nothing accidental is infinite. But punishment is accidental, for it is not natural to the one who is punished. + Therefore it cannot be of infinite duration. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="37274" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37274] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +nihil quod est per accidens, est infinitum. Sed poena est per +accidens, non est enim secundum naturam eius qui punitur. Ergo non +potest in infinitum durare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.46" target="asv">Mat. 25:46</a>): "These shall go into everlasting punishment"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Mark.3.29" target="asv">Mk. 3:29</a>): "He that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost, shall never have forgiveness, but shall be guilty of an everlasting sin." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37275" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37275] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Matth. XXV, <i>ibunt hi in supplicium +aeternum</i>. Et Marc. III dicitur, <i>qui autem blasphemaverit in +spiritum sanctum, non habebit remissionem in aeternum, sed erit +reus aeterni delicti</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q87_A1" id="FS_Q87_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, sin incurs a debt of punishment through disturbing an order. But the effect remains so long as the cause remains. Wherefore + so long as the disturbance of the order remains the debt of punishment must needs remain also. Now disturbance of an order + is sometimes reparable, sometimes irreparable: because a defect which destroys the principle is irreparable, whereas if the + principle be saved, defects can be + repaired by virtue of that principle. For instance, if the principle of sight be destroyed, sight cannot be restored except + by Divine power; whereas, if the principle of sight be preserved, while there arise certain impediments to the use of sight, + these can be remedied by nature or by art. Now in every order there is a principle whereby one takes part in that order. Consequently + if a sin destroys the principle of the order whereby man's will is subject to God, the disorder will be such as to + be considered in itself, irreparable, although it is possible to repair it by the power of God. Now the principle of this + order is the last end, to which man adheres by charity. Therefore whatever sins turn man away from God, so as to destroy charity, + considered in themselves, incur a debt of eternal punishment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 co."><a name="37276" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37276] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, peccatum ex hoc inducit +reatum poenae, quod pervertit aliquem ordinem. Manente autem causa, +manet effectus. Unde quandiu perversitas ordinis remanet, necesse +est quod remaneat reatus poenae. Pervertit autem aliquis ordinem +quandoque quidem reparabiliter, quandoque autem irreparabiliter. +Semper enim defectus quo subtrahitur principium, irreparabilis est, +si autem salvetur principium, eius virtute defectus reparari +possunt. Sicut si corrumpatur principium visivum, non potest fieri +visionis reparatio, nisi sola virtute divina, si vero, salvo +principio visivo, aliqua impedimenta adveniant visioni, reparari +possunt per naturam vel per artem. Cuiuslibet autem ordinis est +aliquod principium, per quod aliquis fit particeps illius ordinis. +Et ideo si per peccatum corrumpatur principium ordinis quo voluntas +hominis subditur Deo, erit inordinatio, quantum est de se, +irreparabilis, etsi reparari possit virtute divina. Principium +autem huius ordinis est ultimus finis, cui homo inhaeret per +caritatem. Et ideo quaecumque peccata avertunt a Deo, caritatem +auferentia, quantum est de se, inducunt reatum aeternae poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Punishment is proportionate to sin in point of severity, both in Divine and in human judgments. In no judgment, however, + as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11) is it requisite for punishment to equal fault in point of duration. For the fact that + adultery or murder is committed in a moment does not call for a momentary punishment: in fact they are punished sometimes + by imprisonment or banishment for life---sometimes even by death; wherein account is + not taken of the time occupied in killing, but rather of the expediency of removing the murderer from the fellowship of the + living, so that this punishment, in its own way, represents the eternity of punishment inflicted by God. Now according to + Gregory (Dial. iv, 44) it is just that he who has sinned against God in his own eternity should be punished in God's eternity. + A man is said to have sinned in his own eternity, not only as regards continual sinning throughout his whole life, but also + because, from the very fact that he fixes his end in sin, he has the will to sin, everlastingly. Wherefore Gregory says (Dial. + iv, 44) that the "wicked would wish to live without end, that they might abide in their sins for ever." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37277" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37277] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod poena peccato proportionatur secundum +acerbitatem, tam in iudicio divino quam in humano, sicut Augustinus +dicit, XXI de Civ. Dei, in nullo iudicio requiritur ut poena +adaequetur culpae secundum durationem. Non enim quia adulterium vel +homicidium in momento committitur, propter hoc momentanea poena +punitur, sed quandoque quidem perpetuo carcere vel exilio, +quandoque etiam morte. In qua non consideratur occisionis mora, sed +potius quod in perpetuum auferatur a societate viventium, et sic +repraesentat suo modo aeternitatem poenae inflictae divinitus. +Iustum autem est, secundum Gregorium, quod qui in suo aeterno +peccavit contra Deum, in aeterno Dei puniatur. Dicitur autem +aliquis in suo aeterno peccasse, non solum secundum continuationem +actus in tota hominis vita durantis, sed quia ex hoc ipso quod +finem in peccato constituit, voluntatem habet in aeternum peccandi. +Unde dicit Gregorius, XXXIV Moral., quod <i>iniqui voluissent sine +fine vivere, ut sine fine potuissent in iniquitatibus +permanere</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even the punishment that is inflicted according to human laws, is not always intended as a medicine for the one who is punished, + but sometimes only for others: thus when a thief is hanged, this is not for his own amendment, but for the sake of others, + that at least they may be deterred from crime through fear of the punishment, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.19.25" target="asv">Prov. 19:25</a>: "The wicked man being scourged, the fool shall be wiser." Accordingly the eternal punishments + inflicted by God on the reprobate, are medicinal punishments for those who refrain from sin through the thought of those punishments, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A3-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.59.6" target="asv"> Ps. 59:6</a>: "Thou hast given a warning to them that fear Thee, that they may flee from before the bow, that Thy beloved may be delivered." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37278" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37278] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod poena etiam quae secundum leges humanas infligitur, +non semper est medicinalis ei qui punitur, sed solum aliis, sicut +cum latro suspenditur, non ut ipse emendetur, sed propter alios, ut +saltem metu poenae peccare desistant; secundum illud Prov. XIX, +<i>pestilente flagellato, stultus sapientior erit</i>. Sic igitur +et aeternae poenae reproborum a Deo inflictae, sunt medicinales his +qui consideratione poenarum abstinent a peccatis; secundum illud +Psalmi LIX, <i>dedisti metuentibus te significationem, ut fugiant a +facie arcus, ut liberentur dilecti tui</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God does not delight in punishments for their own sake; but He does delight in the order of His justice, which requires them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37279" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37279] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod Deus non delectatur in poenis propter ipsas; sed +delectatur in ordine suae iustitiae, quae haec requirit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although punishment is related indirectly to nature, nevertheless it is essentially related to the disturbance of the order, + and to God's justice. Wherefore, so long as the disturbance lasts, the punishment endures. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="37280" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37280] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod poena, etsi per accidens ordinetur ad naturam, per se +tamen ordinatur ad privationem ordinis et ad Dei iustitiam. Et +ideo, durante inordinatione, semper durat poena.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q87_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q87_A4-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 4. Whether sin incurs a debt of punishment infinite in quantity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin incurs a debt of punishment infinite in quantity. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.10.24" target="asv">Jer. 10:24</a>): "Correct me, O Lord, but yet with judgment: and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to nothing." Now God's anger or fury + signifies metaphorically the vengeance of Divine justice: and to be brought to nothing is an infinite punishment, even as + to make a thing out of nothing denotes infinite power. Therefore according to God's vengeance, + sin is awarded a punishment infinite in quantity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37281" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37281] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccato debeatur poena infinita +secundum quantitatem. Dicitur enim Ierem. X, <i>corripe me, domine, +veruntamen in iudicio, et non in furore tuo, ne forte ad nihilum +redigas me</i>. Ira autem vel furor Dei metaphorice significat +vindictam divinae iustitiae, redigi autem in nihilum est poena +infinita, sicut et ex nihilo aliquid facere est virtutis infinitae. +Ergo secundum vindictam divinam, peccatum punitur poena infinita +secundum quantitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, quantity of punishment corresponds to quantity of fault, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.2" target="asv"> Dt. 25:2</a>: "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be." Now a sin which is committed against God, + is infinite: because the gravity of a sin increases according to the greatness of the person sinned against (thus it is a + more grievous sin to strike the sovereign than a private individual), and God's greatness is infinite. + Therefore an infinite punishment is due for a sin committed against God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37282" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37282] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quantitati culpae respondet quantitas poenae; secundum illud +Deuteron. XXV, <i>pro mensura peccati erit et plagarum modus</i>. +Sed peccatum quod contra Deum committitur, est infinitum, tanto +enim gravius est peccatum, quanto maior est persona contra quam +peccatur, sicut gravius peccatum est percutere principem quam +percutere hominem privatum; Dei autem magnitudo est infinita. Ergo +poena infinita debetur pro peccato quod contra Deum +committitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a thing may be infinite in two ways, in duration, and in quantity. Now the punishment is infinite in duration. Therefore + it is infinite in quantity also. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37283" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37283] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +dupliciter est aliquid infinitum, duratione scilicet, et +quantitate. Sed duratione est poena infinita. Ergo et +quantitate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> If this were the case, the punishments of all mortal sins would be equal; because one infinite is not greater than another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37284" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37284] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quia secundum hoc omnium mortalium peccatorum poenae essent +aequales, non enim est infinitum infinito maius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Punishment is proportionate to sin. Now sin comprises two things. First, there is the turning away from the immutable good, + which is infinite, wherefore, in this respect, sin is infinite. Secondly, there is the inordinate turning to mutable good. + In this respect sin is finite, both because the mutable good itself is finite, and because the movement of turning towards + it is finite, since the acts of a creature cannot be infinite. Accordingly, in so far as sin + consists in turning away from something, its corresponding punishment is the "pain of loss," which also is infinite, because + it is the loss of the infinite good, i.e. God. But in so far as sin turns inordinately to something, its corresponding punishment + is the "pain of sense," which is also finite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 4 co."><a name="37285" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37285] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod poena proportionatur peccato. In peccato autem duo +sunt. Quorum unum est aversio ab incommutabili bono, quod est +infinitum, unde ex hac parte peccatum est infinitum. Aliud quod est +in peccato, est inordinata conversio ad commutabile bonum. Et ex +hac parte peccatum est finitum, tum quia ipsum bonum commutabile +est finitum; tum quia ipsa conversio est finita, non enim possunt +esse actus creaturae infiniti. Ex parte igitur aversionis, +respondet peccato poena damni, quae etiam est infinita, est enim +amissio infiniti boni, scilicet Dei. Ex parte autem inordinatae +conversionis, respondet ei poena sensus, quae etiam est finita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It would be inconsistent with Divine justice for the sinner to be brought to nothing absolutely, because this would be incompatible + with the perpetuity of punishment that Divine justice requires, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q87_A3" id="FS_Q87_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. The expression "to be brought to nothing" is applied to one who is deprived of spiritual goods, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A4-p7.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.2" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:2</a>: "If I . . . have not charity, I am nothing." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37286" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37286] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod omnino redigi in nihilum eum qui peccat, non +convenit divinae iustitiae, quia repugnat perpetuitati poenae, quae +est secundum divinam iustitiam, ut dictum est. Sed in nihilum +redigi dicitur qui spiritualibus bonis privatur; secundum illud I +Cor. XIII, <i>si non habuero caritatem, nihil sum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument considers sin as turning away from something, for it is thus that man sins against God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37287" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37287] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de peccato ex parte aversionis, +sic enim homo contra Deum peccat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Duration of punishment corresponds to duration of fault, not indeed as regards the act, but on the part of the stain, for + as long as this remains, the debt of punishment remains. But punishment corresponds to fault in the point of severity. And + a fault which is irreparable, is such that, of itself, it lasts for ever; wherefore it incurs an everlasting punishment. But + it is not infinite as regards the thing it turns to; wherefore, in this respect, it + does not incur punishment of infinite quantity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37288" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37288] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod duratio poenae respondet durationi culpae, non quidem +ex parte actus, sed ex parte maculae, qua durante manet reatus +poenae. Sed acerbitas poenae respondet gravitati culpae. Culpa +autem quae est irreparabilis, de se habet quod perpetuo duret, et +ideo debetur ei poena aeterna. Non autem ex parte conversionis +habet infinitatem, et ideo non debetur ei ex hac parte poena +infinita secundum quantitatem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q87_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q87_A5-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 5. Whether every sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment. Because punishment, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q87_A4" id="FS_Q87_A5-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, is proportionate to the fault. Now eternal punishment differs infinitely from temporal punishment: whereas no sin, apparently, + differs infinitely from another, since every sin is a human act, which cannot be infinite. Since therefore some sins incur + a debt of everlasting punishment, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q87_A4" id="FS_Q87_A5-p2.2" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, it seems that no sin incurs a debt of mere temporal punishment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="37289" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37289] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod omne peccatum inducat reatum poenae +aeternae. Poena enim, ut dictum est, proportionatur culpae. Sed +poena aeterna differt a temporali in infinitum. Nullum autem +peccatum differre videtur ab altero in infinitum, cum omne peccatum +sit humanus actus, qui infinitus esse non potest. Cum ergo alicui +peccato debeatur poena aeterna, sicut dictum est, videtur quod +nulli peccato debeatur poena temporalis tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, original sin is the least of all sins, wherefore Augustine says (Enchiridion xciii) that "the lightest punishment + is incurred by those who are punished for original sin alone." But original sin incurs everlasting punishment, since children + who have died in original sin through not being baptized, will never see the kingdom of God, as shown by our Lord's words + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.3.3" target="asv">Jn. 3:3</a>): " Unless a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of + God." Much more, therefore, will the punishments of all other sins be everlasting. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="37290" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37290] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum originale est minimum peccatorum, unde et Augustinus +dicit, in Enchirid., quod <i>mitissima poena est eorum qui pro solo +peccato originali puniuntur</i>. Sed peccato originali debetur +poena perpetua, nunquam enim videbunt regnum Dei pueri qui sine +Baptismo decesserunt cum originali peccato; ut patet per id quod +dominus dicit, Ioan. III, <i>nisi quis renatus fuerit denuo, non +potest videre regnum Dei</i>. Ergo multo magis omnium aliorum +peccatorum poena erit aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a sin does not deserve greater punishment through being united to another sin; for Divine justice has allotted its + punishment to each sin. Now a venial sin deserves eternal punishment if it be united to a mortal sin in a lost soul, because + in hell there is no remission of sins. Therefore venial sin by itself deserves eternal punishment. Therefore temporal punishment + is not due for any sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="37291" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37291] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +peccato non debetur maior poena ex hoc quod alteri peccato +adiungitur, cum utrumque peccatum suam habeat poenam taxatam +secundum divinam iustitiam. Sed peccato veniali debetur poena +aeterna, si cum mortali peccato inveniatur in aliquo damnato, quia +in Inferno nulla potest esse remissio. Ergo peccato veniali +simpliciter debetur poena aeterna. Nulli ergo peccato debetur poena +temporalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Dial. iv, 39), that certain slighter sins are remitted after this life. Therefore all sins are not punished + eternally. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 5 s. c."><a name="37292" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37292] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Gregorius dicit, in IV Dialog., quod quaedam leviores +culpae post hanc vitam remittuntur. Non ergo omnia peccata aeterna +poena puniuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q87_A3" id="FS_Q87_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, a sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment, in so far as it causes an irreparable disorder in the order of Divine justice, + through being contrary to the very principle of that order, viz. the last end. Now it is evident that in some sins there is + disorder indeed, but such as not to involve contrariety in respect of the last end, but only in respect of things referable + to the end, in so far as one is too much or + too little intent on them without prejudicing the order to the last end: as, for instance, when a man is too fond of some + temporal thing, yet would not offend God for its sake, by breaking one of His commandments. Consequently such sins do not + incur everlasting, but only temporal punishment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 5 co."><a name="37293" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37293] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, peccatum causat reatum +poenae aeternae, inquantum irreparabiliter repugnat ordini divinae +iustitiae, per hoc scilicet quod contrariatur ipsi principio +ordinis, quod est ultimus finis. Manifestum est autem quod in +quibusdam peccatis est quidem aliqua inordinatio, non tamen per +contrarietatem ad ultimum finem, sed solum circa ea quae sunt ad +finem, inquantum plus vel minus debite eis intenditur, salvato +tamen ordine ad ultimum finem, puta cum homo, etsi nimis ad aliquam +rem temporalem afficiatur, non tamen pro ea vellet Deum offendere, +aliquid contra praeceptum eius faciendo. Unde huiusmodi peccatis +non debetur aeterna poena, sed temporalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sins do not differ infinitely from one another in respect of their turning towards mutable good, which constitutes the substance + of the sinful act; but they do differ infinitely in respect of their turning away from something. Because some sins consist + in turning away from the last end, and some in a disorder affecting things referable to the end: and the last end differs + infinitely from the things that are referred to it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="37294" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37294] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod peccata non differunt in infinitum ex parte +conversionis ad bonum commutabile, in qua consistit substantia +actus, differunt autem in infinitum ex parte aversionis. Nam +quaedam peccata committuntur per aversionem ab ultimo fine, quaedam +vero per inordinationem circa ea quae sunt ad finem. Finis autem +ultimus ab his quae sunt ad finem, in infinitum differt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Original sin incurs everlasting punishment, not on account of its gravity, but by reason of the condition of the subject, + viz. a human being deprived of grace, without which there is no remission of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="37295" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37295] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod peccato originali non debetur poena aeterna ratione +suae gravitatis, sed ratione conditionis subiecti, scilicet hominis +qui sine gratia invenitur, per quam solam fit remissio poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A5-p9"> The same answer applies to the Third Objection about venial sin. Because eternity of punishment does not correspond to the + quantity of the sin, but to its irremissibility, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q87_A3" id="FS_Q87_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="37296" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37296] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Et similiter +dicendum est ad tertium, de veniali peccato. Aeternitas enim poenae +non respondet quantitati culpae, sed irremissibilitati ipsius, ut +dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q87_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q87_A6-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 6. Whether the debt of punishment remains after sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there remains no debt of punishment after sin. For if the cause be removed the effect is removed. But + sin is the cause of the debt of punishment. Therefore, when the sin is removed, the debt of punishment ceases also. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="37297" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37297] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod reatus poenae non remaneat post +peccatum. Remota enim causa, removetur effectus. Sed peccatum est +causa reatus poenae. Ergo, remoto peccato, cessat reatus +poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is removed by man returning to virtue. Now a virtuous man deserves, not punishment, but reward. Therefore, when + sin is removed, the debt of punishment no longer remains. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="37298" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37298] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum removetur per hoc quod homo ad virtutem redit. Sed +virtuoso non debetur poena, sed magis praemium. Ergo, remoto +peccato, non remanet reatus poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "Punishments are a kind of medicine" (Ethic. ii, 3). But a man is not given medicine after being cured of his disease. + Therefore, when sin is removed the debt of punishment does not remain. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="37299" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37299] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +poenae sunt medicinae, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed postquam aliquis +iam est ab infirmitate curatus, non adhibetur sibi medicina. Ergo, +remoto peccato, non remanet debitum poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiKgdms.12.13" target="asv">2 Kings xii. 13,14</a>): "David said to Nathan: I have sinned against the Lord. And Nathan said to David: The Lord also hath taken away thy sin; + thou shalt not die. Nevertheless because thou hast given occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme . . . the child + that is born to thee shall die." Therefore a man is punished by God even after his sin is forgiven: and so the debt of punishment + remains, when the sin has been removed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 6 s. c."><a name="37300" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37300] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur II Reg. XII, quod <i>David dixit ad Nathan, +peccavi domino. Dixitque Nathan ad David, dominus quoque transtulit +peccatum tuum, non morieris. Veruntamen quia blasphemare fecisti +inimicos nomen domini, filius qui natus est tibi, morte +morietur</i>. Punitur ergo aliquis a Deo etiam postquam ei peccatum +dimittitur. Et sic reatus poenae remanet, peccato remoto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q87_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Two things may be considered in sin: the guilty act, and the consequent stain. Now it is evident that in all actual sins, + when the act of sin has ceased, the guilt remains; because the act of sin makes man deserving of punishment, in so far as + he transgresses the order of Divine justice, to which he cannot return except he pay some sort of penal compensation, which + restores him to the equality of justice; so that, according to the order of Divine justice, he + who has been too indulgent to his will, by transgressing God's commandments, suffers, either willingly or unwillingly, something + contrary to what he would wish. This restoration of the equality of justice by penal compensation is also to be observed in + injuries done to one's fellow men. Consequently it is evident that when the sinful or injurious act has ceased there still + remains the debt of punishment. + </p><p id="FS_Q87_A6-p7"> But if we speak of the removal of sin as to the stain, it is evident that the stain of sin cannot be removed from the soul, + without the soul being united to God, since it was through being separated from Him that it suffered the loss of its brightness, + in which the stain consists, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q86_A1" id="FS_Q87_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[86], A[1]</a>). Now man is united to God by his will. Wherefore the stain of sin cannot be removed from man, unless his will accept the + order of Divine justice, + that is to say, unless either of his own accord he take upon himself the punishment of his past sin, or bear patiently the + punishment which God inflicts on him; and in both ways punishment avails for satisfaction. Now when punishment is satisfactory, + it loses somewhat of the nature of punishment: for the nature of punishment is to be against the will; and although satisfactory + punishment, absolutely speaking, is against the will, nevertheless in this particular case and for this particular + purpose, it is voluntary. Consequently it is voluntary simply, but involuntary in a certain respect, as we have explained + when speaking of the voluntary and the involuntary ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q6_A6" id="FS_Q87_A6-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[6], A[6]</a>). We must, therefore, say that, when the stain of sin has been removed, there may remain a debt of punishment, not indeed + of punishment simply, but of satisfactory punishment. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 6 co."><a name="37301" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37301] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod in peccato duo possunt considerari, scilicet actus +culpae, et macula sequens. Planum est autem quod, cessante actu +peccati, remanet reatus, in omnibus peccatis actualibus. Actus enim +peccati facit hominem reum poenae, inquantum transgreditur ordinem +divinae iustitiae; ad quem non redit nisi per quandam +recompensationem poenae, quae ad aequalitatem iustitiae reducit; ut +scilicet qui plus voluntati suae indulsit quam debuit, contra +mandatum Dei agens, secundum ordinem divinae iustitiae, aliquid +contra illud quod vellet, spontaneus vel invitus patiatur. Quod +etiam in iniuriis hominibus factis observatur, ut per +recompensationem poenae reintegretur aequalitas iustitiae. Unde +patet quod, cessante actu peccati vel iniuriae illatae, adhuc +remanet debitum poenae. Sed si loquamur de ablatione peccati +quantum ad maculam, sic manifestum est quod macula peccati ab anima +auferri non potest, nisi per hoc quod anima Deo coniungitur, per +cuius distantiam detrimentum proprii nitoris incurrebat, quod est +macula, ut supra dictum est. Coniungitur autem homo Deo per +voluntatem. Unde macula peccati ab homine tolli non potest nisi +voluntas hominis ordinem divinae iustitiae acceptet, ut scilicet +vel ipse poenam sibi spontaneus assumat in recompensationem culpae +praeteritae, vel etiam a Deo illatam patienter sustineat, utroque +enim modo poena rationem satisfactionis habet. Poena autem +satisfactoria diminuit aliquid de ratione poenae. Est enim de +ratione poenae quod sit contra voluntatem. Poena autem +satisfactoria, etsi secundum absolutam considerationem sit contra +voluntatem, tamen tunc, et pro hoc, est voluntaria. Unde +simpliciter est voluntaria, secundum quid autem involuntaria, sicut +patet ex his quae supra de voluntario et involuntario dicta sunt. +Dicendum est ergo quod, remota macula culpae, potest quidem +remanere reatus non poenae simpliciter, sed satisfactoriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as after the act of sin has ceased, the stain remains, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q86_A2" id="FS_Q87_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[86], A[2]</a>), so the debt of punishment also can remain. But when the stain has been removed, the debt of punishment does not remain + in the same way, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="37302" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37302] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod sicut, cessante actu peccati, remanet macula, ut +supra dictum est; ita etiam potest remanere reatus. Cessante vero +macula, non remanet reatus secundum eandem rationem, ut dictum +est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The virtuous man does not deserve punishment simply, but he may deserve it as satisfactory: because his very virtue demands + that he should do satisfaction for his offenses against God or man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="37303" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37303] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod virtuoso non debetur poena simpliciter, potest tamen +sibi deberi poena ut satisfactoria, quia hoc ipsum ad virtutem +pertinet, ut satisfaciat pro his in quibus offendit vel Deum vel +hominem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When the stain is removed, the wound of sin is healed as regards the will. But punishment is still requisite in order that + the other powers of the soul be healed, since they were so disordered by the sin committed, so that, to wit, the disorder + may be remedied by the contrary of that which caused it. Moreover punishment is requisite in order to restore the equality + of justice, and to remove the scandal given to others, so that those who were + scandalized at the sin many be edified by the punishment, as may be seen in the example of David quoted above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="37304" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37304] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, remota macula, sanatum est vulnus peccati quantum ad +voluntatem. Requiritur autem adhuc poena ad sanationem aliarum +virium animae, quae per peccatum praecedens deordinatae fuerunt, ut +scilicet per contraria curentur. Requiritur etiam ad restituendum +aequalitatem iustitiae; et ad amovendum scandalum aliorum, ut +aedificentur in poena qui sunt scandalizati in culpa; ut patet ex +exemplo de David inducto.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q87_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q87_A7-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 7. Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not every punishment is inflicted for a sin. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.9.3" target="asv">Jn. 9:3</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p2.2" href="./asv.html#John.9.2" target="asv">2</a>) about the man born blind: "Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents . . . that he should be born blind." In like manner + we see that many children, those also who have been baptized, suffer grievous punishments, fevers, for instance, diabolical + possession, and so forth, and yet there is no sin in them after they have been baptized. Moreover + before they are baptized, there is no more sin in them than in the other children who do not suffer such things. Therefore + not every punishment is inflicted for a sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="37305" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37305] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnis poena sit propter aliquam +culpam. Dicitur enim Ioan. IX, de caeco nato, <i>neque hic +peccavit, neque parentes eius, ut nasceretur caecus</i>. Et +similiter videmus quod multi pueri, etiam baptizati, graves poenas +patiuntur, ut puta febres, Daemonum oppressiones, et multa +huiusmodi, cum tamen in eis non sit peccatum, postquam sunt +baptizati. Et antequam sint baptizati, non est in eis plus de +peccato quam in aliis pueris, qui haec non patiuntur. Non ergo +omnis poena est pro peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that sinners should thrive and that the innocent should be punished seem to come under the same head. Now each of + these is frequently observed in human affairs, for it is written about the wicked ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.72.5" target="asv">Ps. 72:5</a>): "They are not in the labor of men: neither shall they be scourged like other men"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Job.21.7" target="asv">Job 21:7</a>): "[Why then do] the wicked live, are [they] advanced, and strengthened with riches" (?)[*The words in + brackets show the readings of the Vulgate]; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Hab.1.13" target="asv">Hab. 1:13</a>): "Why lookest Thou upon the contemptuous [Vulg.: 'them that do unjust things'], and holdest Thy peace, when the wicked man + oppresseth [Vulg.: 'devoureth'], the man that is more just than himself?" Therefore not every punishment is inflicted for + a sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="37306" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37306] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +eiusdem rationis esse videtur quod peccatores prosperentur, et quod +aliqui innocentes puniantur. Utrumque autem in rebus humanis +frequenter invenimus, dicitur enim de iniquis in Psalmo LXXII, +<i>in labore hominum non sunt, et cum hominibus non +flagellabuntur</i>; et Iob XXI, <i>impii vivunt, sublevati sunt, +confortatique divitiis</i>; et Habacuc I, dicitur, <i>quare +respicis contemptores et taces, conculcante impio iustiorem se?</i> +Non ergo omnis poena infligitur pro culpa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written of Christ ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.2.22" target="asv">1 Pet. 2:22</a>) that "He did no sin, nor was guile found in His mouth." And yet it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iPet.2.21" target="asv">1 Pet. 2:21</a>) that "He suffered for us." Therefore punishment is not always inflicted by God for sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="37307" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37307] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +de Christo dicitur I Pet. II, quod <i>peccatum non fecit, nec +inventus est dolus in ore eius</i>. Et tamen ibidem dicitur quod +<i>passus est pro nobis</i>. Ergo non semper poena a Deo +dispensatur pro culpa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.4.7" target="asv">Job 4:7, </a> seqq.): "Who ever perished innocent? Or when were the just destroyed? On the contrary, I have seen those who work iniquity + . . . perishing by the blast of God"; and Augustine writes (Retract. i) that "all punishment is just, and is inflicted for + a sin." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 7 s. c."><a name="37308" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37308] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Iob IV, <i>quis unquam innocens periit? Aut quando +recti deleti sunt? Quin potius vidi eos qui operantur iniquitatem, +flante Deo, periisse</i>. Et Augustinus dicit, in I Retract., quod +<i>omnis poena iusta est, et pro peccato aliquo impenditur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q87_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As already stated + <a href="#FS_Q87_A6" id="FS_Q87_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[6])</a>, punishment can be considered in two ways---simply, and as being satisfactory. A satisfactory punishment is, in a way, voluntary. + And since those who differ as to the debt of punishment, may be one in will by the union of love, it happens that one who + has not sinned, bears willingly the punishment for another: thus even in human affairs we see men take the debts of another + upon themselves. If, however, we + speak of punishment simply, in respect of its being something penal, it has always a relation to a sin in the one punished. + Sometimes this is a relation to actual sin, as when a man is punished by God or man for a sin committed by him. Sometimes + it is a relation to original sin: and this, either principally or consequently---principally, the punishment of original sin + is that human nature is left to itself, and deprived of original justice: and consequently, all the penalties which result + from + this defect in human nature. + </p><p id="FS_Q87_A7-p7"> Nevertheless we must observe that sometimes a thing seems penal, and yet is not so simply. Because punishment is a species + of evil, as stated in the + <a href="FP_vi.html#FP_Q48_A5" id="FS_Q87_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[48], A[5]</a>. Now evil is privation of good. And since man's good is manifold, viz. good of the soul, good of the body, and external goods, + it happens sometimes that man suffers the loss of a lesser good, that he may profit in a greater good, as when he suffers + loss of money for the sake of bodily health, + or loss of both of these, for the sake of his soul's health and the glory of God. In such cases the loss is an evil to man, + not simply but relatively; wherefore it does not answer to the name of punishment simply, but of medicinal punishment, because + a medical man prescribes bitter potions to his patients, that he may restore them to health. And since such like are not punishments + properly speaking, they are not referred to sin as their cause, except in a restricted sense: because the very fact + that human nature needs a treatment of penal medicines, is due to the corruption of nature which is itself the punishment + of original sin. For there was no need, in the state of innocence, for penal exercises in order to make progress in virtue; + so that whatever is penal in the exercise of virtue, is reduced to original sin as its cause. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 7 co."><a name="37309" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37309] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, poena potest dupliciter +considerari, simpliciter, et inquantum est satisfactoria. Poena +quidem satisfactoria est quodammodo voluntaria. Et quia contingit +eos qui differunt in reatu poenae, esse unum secundum voluntatem +unione amoris, inde est quod interdum aliquis qui non peccavit, +poenam voluntarius pro alio portat, sicut etiam in rebus humanis +videmus quod aliquis in se transfert alterius debitum. Si vero +loquamur de poena simpliciter, secundum quod habet rationem poenae, +sic semper habet ordinem ad culpam propriam, sed quandoque quidem +ad culpam actualem, puta quando aliquis vel a Deo vel ab homine pro +peccato commisso punitur; quandoque vero ad culpam originalem. Et +hoc quidem vel principaliter, vel consequenter. Principaliter +quidem poena originalis peccati est quod natura humana sibi +relinquitur, destituta auxilio originalis iustitiae, sed ad hoc +consequuntur omnes poenalitates quae ex defectu naturae in +hominibus contingunt. Sciendum tamen est quod quandoque aliquid +videtur esse poenale, quod tamen non habet simpliciter rationem +poenae. Poena enim est species mali, ut in primo dictum est. Malum +autem est privatio boni. Cum autem sint plura hominis bona, +scilicet animae, corporis, et exteriorum rerum; contingit interdum +quod homo patiatur detrimentum in minori bono, ut augeatur in +maiori, sicut cum patitur detrimentum pecuniae propter sanitatem +corporis, vel in utroque horum propter salutem animae et propter +gloriam Dei. Et tunc tale detrimentum non est simpliciter malum +hominis, sed secundum quid. Unde non dicit simpliciter rationem +poenae, sed medicinae, nam et medici austeras potiones propinant +infirmis, ut conferant sanitatem. Et quia huiusmodi non proprie +habent rationem poenae, non reducuntur ad culpam sicut ad causam, +nisi pro tanto, quia hoc ipsum quod oportet humanae naturae +medicinas poenales exhibere, est ex corruptione naturae, quae est +poena originalis peccati. In statu enim innocentiae non oportuisset +aliquem ad profectum virtutis inducere per poenalia exercitia. Unde +hoc ipsum quod est poenale in talibus reducitur ad originalem +culpam sicut ad causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Such like defects of those who are born with them, or which children suffer from, are the effects and the punishments of + original sin, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q85_A5" id="FS_Q87_A7-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[85], A[5]</a>); and they remain even after baptism, for the cause stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q85_A5" id="FS_Q87_A7-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[85], A[5]</a>, ad 2): and that they are not equally in all, is due to the diversity of nature, which is left to itself, as stated above + ( + <a href="#FS_Q85_A5" id="FS_Q87_A7-p8.3" shape="rect">Q[85], A[5]</a>, ad + 1). Nevertheless, they are directed by Divine providence, to the salvation of men, either of those who suffer, or of others + who are admonished by their means---and also to the glory of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="37310" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37310] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod huiusmodi defectus eorum qui nascuntur, vel +etiam puerorum, sunt effectus et poenae originalis peccati, ut +dictum est. Et manent etiam post Baptismum, propter causam superius +dictam. Et quod non sint aequaliter in omnibus, contingit propter +naturae diversitatem, quae sibi relinquitur, ut supra dictum est. +Ordinantur tamen huiusmodi defectus, secundum divinam providentiam, +ad salutem hominum, vel eorum qui patiuntur, vel aliorum, qui +poenis admonentur; et etiam ad gloriam Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Temporal and bodily goods are indeed goods of man, but they are of small account: whereas spiritual goods are man's chief + goods. Consequently it belongs to Divine justice to give spiritual goods to the virtuous, and to award them as much temporal + goods or evils, as suffices for virtue: for, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii), "Divine justice does not enfeeble the fortitude + of the virtuous man, by material gifts." The very fact that others receive + temporal goods, is detrimental to their spiritual good; wherefore the psalm quoted concludes (verse 6): "Therefore pride hath + held them fast." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="37311" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37311] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod bona temporalia et corporalia sunt quidem aliqua bona +hominis, sed parva, bona vero spiritualia sunt magna hominis bona. +Pertinet igitur ad divinam iustitiam ut virtuosis det spiritualia +bona; et de temporalibus bonis vel malis tantum det eis, quantum +sufficit ad virtutem, ut enim Dionysius dicit, VIII cap. de Div. +Nom., <i>divinae iustitiae est non emollire optimorum fortitudinem +materialium donationibus</i>. Aliis vero hoc ipsum quod temporalia +dantur, in malum spiritualium cedit. Unde in Psalmo LXXII +concluditur, <i>ideo tenuit eos superbia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Christ bore a satisfactory punishment, not for His, but for our sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="37312" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37312] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod Christus poenam sustinuit satisfactoriam non pro +suis, sed pro nostris peccatis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q87_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q87_A8-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 8. Whether anyone is punished for another's sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one may be punished for another's sin. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.5" target="asv">Ex. 20:5</a>): "I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation + of them that hate Me"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A8-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.23.35" target="asv">Mat. 23:35</a>): "That upon you may come all the just blood that hath been shed upon the earth." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="37313" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37313] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis puniatur pro peccato alterius. +Dicitur enim Exodi XX, <i>ego sum Deus Zelotes, visitans +iniquitatem patrum in filios in tertiam et quartam generationem, +his qui oderunt me</i>. Et Matth. XXIII dicitur, <i>ut veniat super +vos omnis sanguis iustus qui effusus est super terram</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, human justice springs from Divine justice. Now, according to human justice, children are sometimes punished for + their parents, as in the case of high treason. Therefore also according to Divine justice, one is punished for another's sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="37314" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37314] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +iustitia humana derivatur a iustitia divina. Sed secundum iustitiam +humanam aliquando filii puniuntur pro parentibus, sicut patet in +crimine laesae maiestatis. Ergo etiam secundum divinam iustitiam, +unus punitur pro peccato alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it be replied that the son is punished, not for the father's sin, but for his own, inasmuch as he imitates his + father's wickedness; this would not be said of the children rather than of outsiders, who are punished in like manner as those + whose crimes they imitate. It seems, therefore, that children are punished, not for their own sins, but for those of their + parents. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="37315" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37315] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +si dicatur filius non puniri pro peccato patris, sed pro peccato +proprio, inquantum imitatur malitiam paternam, non magis hoc +diceretur de filiis quam de extraneis, qui simili poena puniuntur +his quorum peccata imitantur. Non ergo videtur quod filii pro +peccatis propriis puniantur, sed pro peccatis parentum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.18.20" target="asv">Ezech. 18:20</a>): "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 8 s. c."><a name="37316" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37316] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Ezech. XVIII, <i>filius non portabit iniquitatem +patris</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q87_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> If we speak of that satisfactory punishment, which one takes upon oneself voluntarily, one may bear another's punishment, + in so far as they are, in some way, one, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q87_A7" id="FS_Q87_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[7])</a>. If, however, we speak of punishment inflicted on account of sin, inasmuch as it is penal, then each one is punished for + his own sin only, because the sinful act is something personal. But if we speak of a punishment that is medicinal, in this + way it + does happen that one is punished for another's sin. For it has been stated + <a href="#FS_Q87_A7" id="FS_Q87_A8-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[7])</a> that ills sustained in bodily goods or even in the body itself, are medicinal punishments intended for the health of the + soul. Wherefore there is no reason why one should not have such like punishments inflicted on one for another's sin, either + by God or by man; e.g. on children for their parents, or on servants for their masters, inasmuch as they are their property + so to speak; in such a + way, however, that, if the children or the servants take part in the sin, this penal ill has the character of punishment in + regard to both the one punished and the one he is punished for. But if they do not take part in the sin, it has the character + of punishment in regard to the one for whom the punishment is borne, while, in regard to the one who is punished, it is merely + medicinal (except accidentally, if he consent to the other's sin), since it is intended for the good of his soul, if he + bears it patiently. + </p><p id="FS_Q87_A8-p7"> With regard to spiritual punishments, these are not merely medicinal, because the good of the soul is not directed to a yet + higher good. Consequently no one suffers loss in the goods of the soul without some fault of his own. Wherefore Augustine + says (Ep. ad Avit.) [*Ep. ad Auxilium, ccl.], such like punishments are not inflicted on one for another's sin, because, as + regards the soul, the son is not the father's property. Hence the Lord assigns the reason for this by saying + (Ezech. 18:4): "All souls are Mine." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 8 co."><a name="37317" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37317] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, si loquamur de poena satisfactoria, quae voluntarie +assumitur, contingit quod unus portet poenam alterius inquantum +sunt quodammodo unum, sicut iam dictum est. Si autem loquamur de +poena pro peccato inflicta, inquantum habet rationem poenae, sic +solum unusquisque pro peccato suo punitur, quia actus peccati +aliquid personale est. Si autem loquamur de poena quae habet +rationem medicinae, sic contingit quod unus punitur pro peccato +alterius. Dictum est enim quod detrimenta corporalium rerum, vel +etiam ipsius corporis, sunt quaedam poenales medicinae ordinatae ad +salutem animae. Unde nihil prohibet talibus poenis aliquem puniri +pro peccato alterius, vel a Deo vel ab homine, utpote filios pro +patribus, et subditos pro dominis, inquantum sunt quaedam res +eorum. Ita tamen quod, si filius vel subditus est particeps culpae, +huiusmodi poenalis defectus habet rationem poenae quantum ad +utrumque, scilicet eum qui punitur, et eum pro quo punitur. Si vero +non sit particeps culpae, habet rationem poenae quantum ad eum pro +quo punitur, quantum vero ad eum qui punitur, rationem medicinae +tantum, nisi per accidens, inquantum peccato alterius consentit; +ordinatur enim ei ad bonum animae, si patienter sustineat. Poenae +vero spirituales non sunt medicinales tantum, quia bonum animae non +ordinatur ad aliud melius bonum. Unde in bonis animae nullus +patitur detrimentum sine culpa propria. Et propter hoc etiam +talibus poenis, ut dicit Augustinus in epistola ad avitum, unus non +punitur pro alio, quia quantum ad animam, filius non est res +patris. Unde et huius causam dominus assignans, dicit, Ezech. +XVIII, <i>omnes animae meae sunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Both the passages quoted should, seemingly, be referred to temporal or bodily punishments, in so far as children are the + property of their parents, and posterity, of their forefathers. Else, if they be referred to spiritual punishments, they must + be understood in reference to the imitation of sin, wherefore in Exodus these words are added, "Of them that hate Me," and + in the chapter quoted from Matthew (verse 32) we read: "Fill ye up then the measure + of your fathers." The sins of the fathers are said to be punished in their children, because the latter are the more prone + to sin through being brought up amid their parents' crimes, both by becoming accustomed to them, and by imitating their parents' + example, conforming to their authority as it were. Moreover they deserve heavier punishment if, seeing the punishment of their + parents, they fail to mend their ways. The text adds, "to the third and fourth generation," because men are wont to live + long enough to see the third and fourth generation, so that both the children can witness their parents' sins so as to imitate + them, and the parents can see their children's punishments so as to grieve for them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="37318" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37318] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod utrumque dictum videtur esse referendum ad +poenas temporales vel corporales, inquantum filii sunt res quaedam +parentum, et successores praedecessorum. Vel si referatur ad poenas +spirituales, hoc dicitur propter imitationem culpae, unde in Exodo +additur, <i>his qui oderunt me</i>; et in Matthaeo dicitur, <i>et +vos implete mensuram patrum vestrorum</i>. Dicit autem puniri +peccata patrum in filiis, quia filii, in peccatis parentum nutriti, +proniores sunt ad peccandum, tum propter consuetudinem; tum etiam +propter exemplum, patrum quasi auctoritatem sequentes. Sunt etiam +maiori poena digni, si, poenas patrum videntes, correcti non sunt. +Ideo autem addidit, in tertiam et quartam generationem, quia tantum +consueverunt homines vivere, ut tertiam et quartam generationem +videant; et sic mutuo videre possunt et filii peccata patrum ad +imitandum, et patres poenas filiorum ad dolendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The punishments which human justice inflicts on one for another's sin are bodily and temporal. They are also remedies or + medicines against future sins, in order that either they who are punished, or others may be restrained from similar faults. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="37319" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37319] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod poenae illae sunt corporales et temporales quas +iustitia humana uni pro peccato alterius infligit. Et sunt remedia +quaedam, vel medicinae, contra culpas sequentes, ut vel ipsi qui +puniuntur, vel alii, cohibeantur a similibus culpis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those who are near of kin are said to be punished, rather than outsiders, for the sins of others, both because the punishment + of kindred redounds somewhat upon those who sinned, as stated above, in so far as the child is the father's property, and + because the examples and the punishments that occur in one's own household are more moving. Consequently when a man is brought + up amid the sins of his parents, he is more eager to imitate them, and if he is + not deterred by their punishments, he would seem to be the more obstinate, and, therefore, to deserve more severe punishment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="37320" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37320] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod magis dicuntur puniri pro peccatis aliorum propinqui +quam extranei, tum quia poena propinquorum quodammodo redundat in +illos qui peccaverunt, ut dictum est, inquantum filius est quaedam +res patris. Tum etiam quia et domestica exempla, et domesticae +poenae, magis movent. Unde quando aliquis nutritus est in peccatis +parentum, vehementius ea sequitur; et si ex eorum poenis non est +deterritus, obstinatior videtur; unde et maiori poena dignus.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q88" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q88-p0.1">Q. 88. OF VENIAL AND MORTAL SIN (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q88-p2"> In the next place, since venial and mortal sins differ in respect of the debt of punishment, we must consider them. First, + we shall consider venial sin as compared with mortal sin; secondly, we shall consider venial sin in itself. + </p><p id="FS_Q88-p3"> Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q88-p4"><a href="#FS_Q88_A1"> (1) Whether venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q88-p5"><a href="#FS_Q88_A2"> (2) Whether they differ generically?</a></p><p id="FS_Q88-p6"><a href="#FS_Q88_A3"> (3) Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q88-p7"><a href="#FS_Q88_A4"> (4) Whether a venial sin can become mortal?</a></p><p id="FS_Q88-p8"><a href="#FS_Q88_A5"> (5) Whether a venial sin can become mortal by reason of an aggravating circumstance?</a></p><p id="FS_Q88-p9"><a href="#FS_Q88_A6"> (6) Whether a mortal sin can become venial?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 pr."><a name="37321" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37321] +Iª-IIae q. 88 pr.</span></a> Deinde, quia peccatum veniale et +mortale distinguuntur secundum reatum, considerandum est de eis. Et +primo, considerandum est de veniali per comparationem ad mortale; +secundo, de veniali secundum se. Circa primum quaeruntur sex. +Primo, utrum veniale peccatum convenienter dividatur contra +mortale. Secundo, utrum distinguantur genere. Tertio, utrum veniale +peccatum sit dispositio ad mortale. Quarto, utrum veniale peccatum +possit fieri mortale. Quinto, utrum circumstantia aggravans possit +de veniali peccato facere mortale. Sexto, utrum peccatum mortale +possit fieri veniale.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q88_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q88_A1-p0.1">Q. 88. A. 1. Whether venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial sin is unfittingly condivided with mortal sin. For Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27): "Sin + is a word, deed or desire contrary to the eternal law." But the fact of being against the eternal law makes a sin to be mortal. + Consequently every sin is mortal. Therefore venial sin is not condivided with mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37322" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37322] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod veniale peccatum non convenienter +dividatur contra mortale. Dicit enim Augustinus, XXII libro contra +Faustum, <i>peccatum est dictum vel factum vel concupitum contra +legem aeternam</i>. Sed esse contra legem aeternam, dat peccato +quod sit mortale. Ergo omne peccatum est mortale. Non ergo peccatum +veniale dividitur contra mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q88_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.10.31" target="asv">1 Cor. 10:31</a>): "Whether you eat or drink, or whatever else you do; do all to the glory of God." Now whoever sins breaks this commandment, + because sin is not done for God's glory. Consequently, since to break a commandment is to commit a mortal sin, it seems that + whoever sins, sins mortally. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37323" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37323] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +apostolus dicit, I Cor. X, <i>sive manducatis, sive bibitis, sive +aliquid aliud facitis, omnia in gloriam Dei facite</i>. Sed contra +hoc praeceptum facit quicumque peccat, non enim peccatum fit +propter gloriam Dei. Cum ergo facere contra praeceptum sit peccatum +mortale, videtur quod quicumque peccat, mortaliter peccet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whoever cleaves to a thing by love, cleaves either as enjoying it, or as using it, as Augustine states (De Doctr. + Christ. i, 3,4). But no person, in sinning, cleaves to a mutable good as using it: because he does not refer it to that good + which gives us happiness, which, properly speaking, is to use, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 3,4). Therefore + whoever sins enjoys a mutable good. Now "to enjoy what we should use is human perverseness," + as Augustine again says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 30). Therefore, since "perverseness" [*The Latin 'pervertere' means to overthrow, + to destroy, hence 'perversion' of God's law is a mortal sin.] denotes a mortal sin, it seems that whoever sins, sins mortally. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37324" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37324] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quicumque amore alicui rei inhaeret, inhaeret ei vel sicut fruens, +vel sicut utens; ut patet per Augustinum, in I de Doctr. Christ. +Sed nullus peccans inhaeret bono commutabili quasi utens, non enim +refert ipsum ad bonum quod nos beatos facit, quod proprie est uti, +ut Augustinus dicit ibidem. Ergo quicumque peccat, fruitur bono +commutabili. <i>Sed frui rebus utendis est humana perversitas</i>, +ut Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest. Cum ergo +perversitas peccatum mortale nominet, videtur quod quicumque +peccat, mortaliter peccet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whoever approaches one term, from that very fact turns away from the opposite. Now whoever sins, approaches a mutable + good, and, consequently turns away from the immutable good, so that he sins mortally. Therefore venial sin is unfittingly + condivided with mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="37325" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37325] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +quicumque accedit ad unum terminum, ex hoc ipso recedit ab alio. +Sed quicumque peccat, accedit ad bonum commutabile. Ergo recedit a +bono incommutabili. Ergo peccat mortaliter. Non ergo convenienter +peccatum veniale contra mortale dividitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Tract. xli in Joan.), that "a crime is one that merits damnation, and a venial sin, one that does not." But + a crime denotes a mortal sin. Therefore venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37326" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37326] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in Homil. XLI super Ioan., <i>quod +crimen est quod damnationem meretur, veniale autem est quod non +meretur damnationem</i>. Sed crimen nominat peccatum mortale. Ergo +veniale peccatum convenienter dividitur contra mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q88_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Certain terms do not appear to be mutually opposed, if taken in their proper sense, whereas they are opposed if taken metaphorically: + thus "to smile" is not opposed to "being dry"; but if we speak of the smiling meadows when they are decked with flowers and + fresh with green hues this is opposed to drought. In like manner if mortal be taken literally as referring to the death of + the body, it does not imply opposition to venial, nor belong to the same genus. + But if mortal be taken metaphorically, as applied to sin, it is opposed to that which is venial. + </p><p id="FS_Q88_A1-p8"> For sin, being a sickness of the soul, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[1]</a>, ad 3; + <a href="#FS_Q72_A5" id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.2" shape="rect"> Q[72], A[5]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q74_A9" id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.3" shape="rect"> Q[74], A[9]</a>, ad 2), is said to be mortal by comparison with a disease, which is said to be mortal, through causing an irreparable defect + consisting in the corruption of a principle, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q72_A5" id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.4" shape="rect">Q[72], A[5]</a>). Now the principle of the spiritual life, which is a life in accord with virtue, is + the order to the last end, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q72_A5" id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.5" shape="rect">Q[72], A[5]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q87_A3" id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.6" shape="rect"> Q[87], A[3]</a>): and if this order be corrupted, it cannot be repaired by any intrinsic principle, but by the power of God alone, as stated + above ( + <a href="#FS_Q87_A3" id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.7" shape="rect">Q[87], A[3]</a>), because disorders in things referred to the end, are repaired through the end, even as an error about conclusions can be + repaired through the truth of the principles. Hence the defect of order to the last end + cannot be repaired through something else as a higher principle, as neither can an error about principles. Wherefore such + sins are called mortal, as being irreparable. On the other hand, sins which imply a disorder in things referred to the end, + the order to the end itself being preserved, are reparable. These sins are called venial: because a sin receives its acquittal + [veniam] when the debt of punishment is taken away, and this ceases when the sin ceases, as explained above ( + <a href="#FS_Q87_A6" id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.8" shape="rect">Q[87], A[6]</a>). + </p><p id="FS_Q88_A1-p9"> Accordingly, mortal and venial are mutually opposed as reparable and irreparable: and I say this with reference to the intrinsic + principle, but not to the Divine power, which can repair all diseases, whether of the body or of the soul. Therefore venial + sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 co."><a name="37327" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37327] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod aliqua, secundum quod proprie accipiuntur, non +videntur esse opposita, quae si metaphorice accipiantur, opponi +inveniuntur, sicut ridere non opponitur ei quod est arescere; sed +secundum quod ridere metaphorice de prato dicitur propter eius +floritionem et virorem, opponitur ei quod est arescere. Similiter +si mortale proprie accipiatur, prout refertur ad mortem corporalem, +non videtur oppositionem habere cum veniali, nec ad idem genus +pertinere. Sed si mortale accipiatur metaphorice, secundum quod +dicitur in peccatis, mortale opponitur ei quod est veniale. Cum +enim peccatum sit quaedam infirmitas animae, ut supra habitum est, +peccatum aliquod mortale dicitur ad similitudinem morbi, qui +dicitur mortalis ex eo quod inducit defectum irreparabilem per +destitutionem alicuius principii, ut dictum est. Principium autem +spiritualis vitae, quae est secundum virtutem, est ordo ad ultimum +finem, ut supra dictum est. Qui quidem si destitutus fuerit, +reparari non potest per aliquod principium intrinsecum, sed solum +per virtutem divinam, ut supra dictum est, quia inordinationes +eorum quae sunt ad finem, reparantur ex fine, sicut error qui +accidit circa conclusiones, per veritatem principiorum. Defectus +ergo ordinis ultimi finis non potest per aliquid aliud reparari +quod sit principalius; sicut nec error qui est circa principia. Et +ideo huiusmodi peccata dicuntur mortalia, quasi irreparabilia. +Peccata autem quae habent inordinationem circa ea quae sunt ad +finem, conservato ordine ad ultimum finem, reparabilia sunt. Et +haec dicuntur venialia, tunc enim peccatum veniam habet, quando +reatus poenae tollitur, qui cessat cessante peccato, ut dictum est. +Secundum hoc ergo, mortale et veniale opponuntur sicut reparabile +et irreparabile. Et hoc dico per principium interius, non autem per +comparationem ad virtutem divinam, quae omnem morbum et corporalem +et spiritualem potest reparare. Et propter hoc veniale peccatum +convenienter dividitur contra mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The division of sin into venial and mortal is not a division of a genus into its species which have an equal share of the + generic nature: but it is the division of an analogous term into its parts, of which it is predicated, of the one first, and + of the other afterwards. Consequently the perfect notion of sin, which Augustine gives, applies to mortal sin. On the other + hand, venial sin is called a sin, in reference to an imperfect notion of sin, and in + relation to mortal sin: even as an accident is called a being, in relation to substance, in reference to the imperfect notion + of being. For it is not "against" the law, since he who sins venially neither does what the law forbids, nor omits what the + law prescribes to be done; but he acts "beside" the law, through not observing the mode of reason, which the law intends. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37328" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37328] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod divisio peccati venialis et mortalis non est +divisio generis in species, quae aequaliter participent rationem +generis, sed analogi in ea de quibus praedicatur secundum prius et +posterius. Et ideo perfecta ratio peccati, quam Augustinus ponit, +convenit peccato mortali. Peccatum autem veniale dicitur peccatum +secundum rationem imperfectam, et in ordine ad peccatum mortale, +sicut accidens dicitur ens in ordine ad substantiam, secundum +imperfectam rationem entis. Non enim est contra legem, quia +venialiter peccans non facit quod lex prohibet, nec praetermittit +id ad quod lex per praeceptum obligat; sed facit praeter legem, +quia non observat modum rationis quem lex intendit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This precept of the Apostle is affirmative, and so it does not bind for all times. Consequently everyone who does not actually + refer all his actions to the glory of God, does not therefore act against this precept. In order, therefore, to avoid mortal + sin each time that one fails actually to refer an action to God's glory, it is enough to refer oneself and all that one has + to God habitually. Now venial sin excludes only actual reference of the human + act to God's glory, and not habitual reference: because it does not exclude charity, which refers man to God habitually. Therefore + it does not follow that he who sins venially, sins mortally. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37329" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37329] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod illud praeceptum apostoli est affirmativum, unde non +obligat ad semper. Et sic non facit contra hoc praeceptum quicumque +non actu refert in gloriam Dei omne quod facit. Sufficit ergo quod +aliquis habitualiter referat se et omnia sua in Deum, ad hoc quod +non semper mortaliter peccet, cum aliquem actum non refert in +gloriam Dei actualiter. Veniale autem peccatum non excludit +habitualem ordinationem actus humani in gloriam Dei, sed solum +actualem, quia non excludit caritatem, quae habitualiter ordinat in +Deum. Unde non sequitur quod ille qui peccat venialiter, peccet +mortaliter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He that sins venially, cleaves to temporal good, not as enjoying it, because he does not fix his end in it, but as using + it, by referring it to God, not actually but habitually. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37330" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37330] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ille qui peccat venialiter, inhaeret bono temporali +non ut fruens, quia non constituit in eo finem; sed ut utens, +referens in Deum non actu, sed habitu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Mutable good is not considered to be a term in contraposition to the immutable good, unless one's end is fixed therein: because + what is referred to the end has not the character of finality. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="37331" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37331] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod bonum commutabile non accipitur ut terminus +contrapositus incommutabili bono, nisi quando constituitur in eo +finis. Quod enim est ad finem, non habet rationem termini.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q88_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q88_A2-p0.1">Q. 88. A. 2. Whether mortal and venial sin differ generically?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial and mortal sin do not differ generically, so that some sins be generically mortal, and some generically + venial. Because human acts are considered to be generically good or evil according to their matter or object, as stated above + ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A2" id="FS_Q88_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[2]</a>). Now either mortal or venial sin may be committed in regard to any object or matter: since man can love any mutable good, + either less than God, which may be a venial + sin, or more than God, which is a mortal sin. Therefore venial and mortal sin do not differ generically. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37332" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37332] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum veniale et mortale non +differant genere, ita scilicet quod aliquod sit peccatum mortale ex +genere, et aliquod veniale ex genere. Bonum enim et malum ex genere +in actibus humanis accipitur per comparationem ad materiam sive ad +obiectum, ut supra dictum est. Sed secundum quodlibet obiectum vel +materiam, contingit peccare mortaliter et venialiter, quodlibet +enim bonum commutabile potest homo diligere vel infra Deum, quod +est peccare venialiter, vel supra Deum quod est peccare mortaliter. +Ergo peccatum veniale et mortale non differunt genere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q88_A1" id="FS_Q88_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[1];</a> Q[72], A[5]; Q[87], A[3]), a sin is called mortal when it is irreparable, venial when it can be repaired. Now irreparability + belongs to sin committed out of malice, which, according to some, is irremissible: whereas reparability belongs to sins committed + through weakness or ignorance, which are remissible. Therefore mortal and venial sin differ as sin committed through malice + differs from sin committed + through weakness or ignorance. But, in this respect, sins differ not in genus but in cause, as stated above (Q[77], A[8], + ad 1). Therefore venial and mortal sin do not differ generically. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37333" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37333] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut dictum est supra, peccatum mortale dicitur quod est +irreparabile, peccatum autem veniale quod est reparabile. Sed esse +irreparabile convenit peccato quod fit ex malitia, quod secundum +quosdam irremissibile dicitur, esse autem reparabile convenit +peccato quod fit per infirmitatem vel ignorantiam, quod dicitur +remissibile. Ergo peccatum mortale et veniale differunt sicut +peccatum quod est ex malitia commissum, vel ex infirmitate et +ignorantia. Sed secundum hoc non differunt peccata genere, sed +causa, ut supra dictum est. Ergo peccatum veniale et mortale non +differunt genere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it was stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q74_A3" id="FS_Q88_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[74], A[3]</a>, ad 3; A[10]) that sudden movements both of the sensuality and of the reason are venial sins. But sudden movements occur + in every kind of sin. Therefore no sins are generically venial. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37334" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37334] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +supra dictum est quod subiti motus tam sensualitatis quam rationis, +sunt peccata venialia. Sed subiti motus inveniuntur in quolibet +peccati genere. Ergo non sunt aliqua peccata venialia ex +genere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine, in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis, serm. xli), enumerates certain generic venial sins, and certain generic + mortal sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37335" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37335] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus, in sermone de Purgatorio, enumerat quaedam +genera peccatorum venialium, et quaedam genera peccatorum +mortalium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q88_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Venial sin is so called from "venia" [pardon]. Consequently a sin may be called venial, first of all, because it has been + pardoned: thus Ambrose says that "penance makes every sin venial": and this is called venial "from the result." Secondly, + a sin is called venial because it does not contain anything either partially or totally, to prevent its being pardoned: partially, + as when a sin contains something diminishing its guilt, e.g. a sin committed through + weakness or ignorance: and this is called venial "from the cause": totally, through not destroying the order to the last end, + wherefore it deserves temporal, but not everlasting punishment. It is of this venial sin that we wish to speak now. + </p><p id="FS_Q88_A2-p7"> For as regards the first two, it is evident that they have no determinate genus: whereas venial sin, taken in the third sense, + can have a determinate genus, so that one sin may be venial generically, and another generically mortal, according as the + genus or species of an act is determined by its object. For, when the will is directed to a thing that is in itself contrary + to charity, whereby man is directed to his last end, the sin is mortal by reason of its object. Consequently + it is a mortal sin generically, whether it be contrary to the love of God, e.g. blasphemy, perjury, and the like, or against + the love of one's neighbor, e.g. murder, adultery, and such like: wherefore such sins are mortal by reason of their genus. + Sometimes, however, the sinner's will is directed to a thing containing a certain inordinateness, but which is not contrary + to the love of God and one's neighbor, e.g. an idle word, excessive laughter, and so forth: and such sins are venial by reason + of their genus. + </p><p id="FS_Q88_A2-p8"> Nevertheless, since moral acts derive their character of goodness and malice, not only from their objects, but also from + some disposition of the agent, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A4" id="FS_Q88_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[18], AA[4]</a>,6), it happens sometimes that a sin which is venial generically by reason of its object, becomes mortal on the part of the + agent, either because he fixes his last end therein, or because he directs it to something that is a mortal sin in its own + genus; for example, if a man + direct an idle word to the commission of adultery. In like manner it may happen, on the part of the agent, that a sin generically + mortal because venial, by reason of the act being imperfect, i.e. not deliberated by reason, which is the proper principle + of an evil act, as we have said above in reference to sudden movements of unbelief. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 2 co."><a name="37336" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37336] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod peccatum veniale a venia dicitur. Potest igitur +aliquod peccatum dici veniale uno modo, quia est veniam consecutum, +et sic dicit Ambrosius quod <i>omne peccatum per poenitentiam fit +veniale</i>. Et hoc dicitur veniale ex eventu. Alio modo dicitur +veniale, quia non habet in se unde veniam non consequatur vel +totaliter vel in parte. In parte quidem, sicut cum habet in se +aliquid diminuens culpam, ut cum fit ex infirmitate vel ignorantia. +Et hoc dicitur veniale ex causa. In toto autem, ex eo quod non +tollit ordinem ad ultimum finem, unde non meretur poenam aeternam, +sed temporalem. Et de hoc veniali ad praesens intendimus. De primis +enim duobus constat quod non habent genus aliquod determinatum. Sed +veniale tertio modo dictum, potest habere genus determinatum, ita +quod aliquod peccatum dicatur veniale ex genere, et aliquod mortale +ex genere, secundum quod genus vel species actus determinantur ex +obiecto. Cum enim voluntas fertur in aliquid quod secundum se +repugnat caritati, per quam homo ordinatur in ultimum finem, +peccatum ex suo obiecto habet quod sit mortale. Unde est mortale ex +genere, sive sit contra dilectionem Dei, sicut blasphemia, +periurium, et huiusmodi; sive contra dilectionem proximi, sicut +homicidium, adulterium, et similia. Unde huiusmodi sunt peccata +mortalia ex suo genere. Quandoque vero voluntas peccantis fertur in +id quod in se continet quandam inordinationem, non tamen +contrariatur dilectioni Dei et proximi, sicut verbum otiosum, risus +superfluus, et alia huiusmodi. Et talia sunt peccata venialia ex +suo genere. Sed quia actus morales recipiunt rationem boni et mali +non solum ex obiecto, sed etiam ex aliqua dispositione agentis, ut +supra habitum est; contingit quandoque quod id quod est peccatum +veniale ex genere ratione sui obiecti, fit mortale ex parte +agentis, vel quia in eo constituit finem ultimum, vel quia ordinat +ipsum ad aliquid quod est peccatum mortale ex genere, puta cum +aliquis ordinat verbum otiosum ad adulterium committendum. +Similiter etiam ex parte agentis contingit quod aliquod peccatum +quod ex suo genere est mortale, fit veniale, propter hoc scilicet +quod actus est imperfectus, idest non deliberatus ratione, quae est +principium proprium mali actus, sicut supra dictum est de subitis +motibus infidelitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The very fact that anyone chooses something that is contrary to divine charity, proves that he prefers it to the love of + God, and consequently, that he loves it more than he loves God. Hence it belongs to the genus of some sins, which are of themselves + contrary to charity, that something is loved more than God; so that they are mortal by reason of their genus. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37337" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37337] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ex hoc ipso quod aliquis eligit id quod repugnat +divinae caritati, convincitur praeferre illud caritati divinae, et +per consequens plus amare ipsum quam Deum. Et ideo aliqua peccata +ex genere, quae de se repugnant caritati, habent quod aliquid +diligatur supra Deum. Et sic sunt ex genere suo mortalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument considers those sins which are venial from their cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37338" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37338] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de peccato veniali ex causa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers those sins which are venial by reason of the imperfection of the act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37339" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37339] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de peccato quod est veniale +propter imperfectionem actus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q88_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q88_A3-p0.1">Q. 88. A. 3. Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial sin is not a disposition to mortal sin. For one contrary does not dispose to another. But venial + and mortal sin are condivided as contrary to one another, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q88_A1" id="FS_Q88_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore venial sin is not a disposition to mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37340" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37340] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum veniale non sit dispositio ad +mortale. Unum enim oppositum non disponit ad aliud. Sed peccatum +veniale et mortale ex opposito dividuntur, ut dictum est. Ergo +peccatum veniale non est dispositio ad mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an act disposes to something of like species, wherefore it is stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2, that "from like acts like + dispositions and habits are engendered." But mortal and venial sin differ in genus or species, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q88_A2" id="FS_Q88_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore venial sin does not dispose to mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37341" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37341] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +actus disponit ad aliquid simile in specie sibi, unde in II Ethic. +dicitur quod <i>ex similibus actibus generantur similes +dispositiones et habitus</i>. Sed peccatum mortale et veniale +differunt genere seu specie, ut dictum est. Ergo peccatum veniale +non disponit ad mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if a sin is called venial because it disposes to mortal sin, it follows that whatever disposes to mortal sin is + a venial sin. Now every good work disposes to mortal sin; wherefore Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi) that "pride lies + in wait for good works that it may destroy them." Therefore even good works would be venial sins, which is absurd. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37342" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37342] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +si peccatum dicatur veniale quia disponit ad mortale, oportebit +quod quaecumque disponunt ad mortale peccatum, sint peccata +venialia. Sed omnia bona opera disponunt ad peccatum mortale, dicit +enim Augustinus, in regula, quod superbia bonis operibus +insidiatur, ut pereant. Ergo etiam bona opera erunt peccata +venialia, quod est inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q88_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.19.1" target="asv">Ecclus. 19:1</a>): "He that contemneth small things shall fall by little and little." Now he that sins venially seems to contemn small things. + Therefore by little and little he is disposed to fall away together into mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37343" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37343] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Eccli. XIX, <i>qui spernit minima, paulatim +defluit</i>. Sed ille qui peccat venialiter, videtur minima +spernere. Ergo paulatim disponitur ad hoc quod totaliter defluat +per peccatum mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A disposition is a kind of cause; wherefore as there is a twofold manner of cause, so is there a twofold manner of disposition. + For there is a cause which moves directly to the production of the effect, as a hot thing heats: and there is a cause which + moves indirectly, by removing an obstacle, as he who displaces a pillar is said to displace the stone that rests on it. Accordingly + an act of sin disposes to something in two ways. First, directly, and thus it + disposes to an act of like species. In this way, a sin generically venial does not, primarily and of its nature, dispose to + a sin generically mortal, for they differ in species. Nevertheless, in this same way, a venial sin can dispose, by way of + consequence, to a sin which is mortal on the part of the agent: because the disposition or habit may be so far strengthened + by acts of venial sin, that the lust of sinning increases, and the sinner fixes his end in that venial sin: since the end + for one + who has a habit, as such, is to work according to that habit; and the consequence will be that, by sinning often venially, + he becomes disposed to a mortal sin. Secondly, a human act disposes to something by removing an obstacle thereto. In this + way a sin generically venial can dispose to a sin generically mortal. Because he that commits a sin generically venial, turns + aside from some particular order; and through accustoming his will not to be subject to the due order in lesser matters, is + disposed not to subject his will even to the order of the last end, by choosing something that is a mortal sin in its genus. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 3 co."><a name="37344" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37344] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod disponens est quodammodo causa. Unde secundum +duplicem modum causae, est duplex dispositionis modus. Est enim +causa quaedam movens directe ad effectum, sicut calidum calefacit. +Est etiam causa indirecte movens, removendo prohibens, sicut +removens columnam dicitur removere lapidem superpositum. Et +secundum hoc, actus peccati dupliciter ad aliquid disponit. Uno +quidem modo, directe, et sic disponit ad actum similem secundum +speciem. Et hoc modo, primo et per se peccatum veniale ex genere +non disponit ad mortale ex genere, cum differant specie. Sed per +hunc modum peccatum veniale potest disponere, per quandam +consequentiam, ad peccatum quod est mortale ex parte agentis. +Augmentata enim dispositione vel habitu per actus peccatorum +venialium, intantum potest libido peccandi crescere, quod ille qui +peccat, finem suum constituet in peccato veniali, nam unicuique +habenti habitum, inquantum huiusmodi, finis est operatio secundum +habitum. Et sic, multoties peccando venialiter, disponetur ad +peccatum mortale. Alio modo actus humanus disponit ad aliquid +removendo prohibens. Et hoc modo peccatum veniale ex genere potest +disponere ad peccatum mortale ex genere. Qui enim peccat venialiter +ex genere, praetermittit aliquem ordinem, et ex hoc quod consuescit +voluntatem suam in minoribus debito ordini non subiicere, +disponitur ad hoc quod etiam voluntatem suam non subiiciat ordini +ultimi finis, eligendo id quod est peccatum mortale ex genere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Venial and mortal sin are not condivided in contrariety to one another, as though they were species of one genus, as stated + above (A[1], ad 1), but as an accident is condivided with substance. Wherefore an accident can be a disposition to a substantial + form, so can a venial sin dispose to mortal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37345" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37345] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod peccatum veniale et mortale non dividuntur ex +opposito, sicut duae species unius generis, ut dictum est, sed +sicut accidens contra substantiam dividitur. Unde sicut accidens +potest esse dispositio ad formam substantialem, ita et veniale +peccatum ad mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Venial sin is not like mortal sin in species; but it is in genus, inasmuch as they both imply a defect of due order, albeit + in different ways, as stated ( + <a href="#FS_Q88_A1" id="FS_Q88_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37346" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37346] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod peccatum veniale non est simile mortali in specie, +est tamen simile ei in genere, inquantum utrumque importat defectum +debiti ordinis, licet aliter et aliter, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A good work is not, of itself, a disposition to mortal sin; but it can be the matter or occasion of mortal sin accidentally; + whereas a venial sin, of its very nature, disposes to mortal sin, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37347" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37347] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod opus bonum non est per se dispositio ad mortale +peccatum, potest tamen esse materia vel occasio peccati mortalis +per accidens. Sed peccatum veniale per se disponit ad mortale, ut +dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q88_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q88_A4-p0.1">Q. 88. A. 4. Whether a venial sin can become mortal?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a venial sin can become a mortal sin. For Augustine in explaining the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q88_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.3.36" target="asv"> Jn. 3:36</a>: "He that believeth not the Son, shall not see life," says (Tract. xii in Joan.): "The slightest," i.e. venial, "sins kill + if we make little of them." Now a sin is called mortal through causing the spiritual death of the soul. Therefore a venial + sin can become mortal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37348" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37348] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum veniale possit fieri mortale. +Dicit enim Augustinus, exponens illud Ioan. III, <i>qui incredulus +est filio, non videbit vitam</i>, peccata minima (idest venialia), +si negligantur, occidunt. Sed ex hoc dicitur peccatum mortale, quod +spiritualiter occidit animam. Ergo peccatum veniale potest fieri +mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a movement in the sensuality before the consent of reason, is a venial sin, but after consent, is a mortal sin, + as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q74_A8" id="FS_Q88_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[74], A[8]</a>, ad 2). Therefore a venial sin can become mortal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37349" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37349] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +motus sensualitatis ante consensum rationis est peccatum veniale, +post consensum vero est peccatum mortale, ut supra dictum est. Ergo +peccatum veniale potest fieri mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, venial and mortal sin differ as curable and incurable disease, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q88_A1" id="FS_Q88_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But a curable disease may become incurable. Therefore a venial sin may become mortal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37350" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37350] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum veniale et mortale differunt sicut morbus curabilis et +incurabilis, ut dictum est. Sed morbus curabilis potest fieri +incurabilis. Ergo peccatum veniale potest fieri mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a disposition may become a habit. Now venial sin is a disposition to mortal, as stated + <a href="#FS_Q88_A3" id="FS_Q88_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. Therefore a venial sin can become mortal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="37351" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37351] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +dispositio potest fieri habitus. Sed peccatum veniale est +dispositio ad mortale, ut dictum est. Ergo veniale peccatum potest +fieri mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A4-p5a"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> +Those which differ infinitely, are not be transformed one to another. But a mortal sin +differs infinitely from a venial sin, as is apparent from the above <a href="#FS_Q87_A5" id="FS_Q88_A4-p5a" shape="rect">(Q[87] A[5])</a>. +Therefore venial [sin] cannot become mortal. [HST translation, missing +from original]</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37352" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37352] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +ea quae differunt in infinitum, non transmutantur in invicem. Sed +peccatum mortale et veniale differunt in infinitum, ut ex +praedictis patet. Ergo veniale non potest fieri mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q88_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The fact of a venial sin becoming a mortal sin may be understood in three ways. First, so that the same identical act be + at first a venial, and then a mortal sin. This is impossible: because a sin, like any moral act, consists chiefly in an act + of the will: so that an act is not one morally, if the will be changed, although the act be continuous physically. If, however, + the will be not changed, it is not possible for a venial sin to become mortal. + </p><p id="FS_Q88_A4-p7"> Secondly, this may be taken to mean that a sin generically venial, becomes mortal. This is possible, in so far as one may + fix one's end in that venial sin, or direct it to some mortal sin as end, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q88_A2" id="FS_Q88_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. + </p><p id="FS_Q88_A4-p8"> Thirdly, this may be understood in the sense of many venial sins constituting one mortal sin. If this be taken as meaning + that many venial sins added together make one mortal sin, it is false, because all the venial sins in the world cannot incur + a debt of punishment equal to that of one mortal sin. This is evident as regards the duration of the punishment, since mortal + sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment, while venial sin incurs a debt of temporal punishment, as stated + above ( + <a href="#FS_Q87_A3" id="FS_Q88_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[87], AA[3]</a>,5). It is also evident as regards the pain of loss, because mortal sins deserve to be punished by the privation of seeing + God, to which no other punishment is comparable, as Chrysostom states (Hom. xxiv in Matth.). It is also evident as regards + the pain of sense, as to the remorse of conscience; although as to the pain of fire, the punishments may perhaps not be improportionate + to one another. + </p><p id="FS_Q88_A4-p9"> If, however, this be taken as meaning that many venial sins make one mortal sin dispositively, it is true, as was shown above + + <a href="#FS_Q88_A3" id="FS_Q88_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a> with regard to the two different manners of disposition, whereby venial sin disposes to mortal sin. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 co."><a name="37353" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37353] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod peccatum veniale fieri mortale, potest tripliciter +intelligi. Uno modo sic quod idem actus numero, primo sit peccatum +veniale, et postea mortale. Et hoc esse non potest. Quia peccatum +principaliter consistit in actu voluntatis, sicut et quilibet actus +moralis. Unde non dicitur unus actus moraliter, si voluntas +mutetur, quamvis etiam actio secundum naturam sit continua. Si +autem voluntas non mutetur, non potest esse quod de veniali fiat +mortale. Alio modo potest intelligi ut id quod est veniale ex +genere, fiat mortale. Et hoc quidem possibile est, inquantum +constituitur in eo finis, vel inquantum refertur ad mortale +peccatum sicut ad finem, ut dictum est. Tertio modo potest +intelligi ita quod multa venialia peccata constituant unum peccatum +mortale. Quod si sic intelligatur quod ex multis peccatis +venialibus integraliter constituatur unum peccatum mortale, falsum +est. Non enim omnia peccata venialia de mundo, possunt habere +tantum de reatu, quantum unum peccatum mortale. Quod patet ex parte +durationis, quia peccatum mortale habet reatum poenae aeternae, +peccatum autem veniale reatum poenae temporalis, ut dictum est. +Patet etiam ex parte poenae damni, quia peccatum mortale meretur +carentiam visionis divinae, cui nulla alia poena comparari potest +ut Chrysostomus dicit. Patet etiam ex parte poenae sensus, quantum +ad vermem conscientiae, licet forte quantum ad poenam ignis, non +sint improportionales poenae. Si vero intelligatur quod multa +peccata venialia faciunt unum mortale dispositive, sic verum est, +sicut supra ostensum est, secundum duos modos dispositionis, quo +peccatum veniale disponit ad mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is referring to the fact of many venial sins making one mortal sin dispositively. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37354" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37354] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur in illo sensu, quod multa +peccata venialia dispositive causant mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same movement of the sensuality which preceded the consent of reason can never become a mortal sin; but the movement + of the reason in consenting is a mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37355" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37355] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ille idem motus sensualitatis qui praecessit +consensum rationis nunquam fiet peccatum mortale, sed ipse actus +rationis consentientis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Disease of the body is not an act, but an abiding disposition; wherefore, while remaining the same disease, it may undergo + change. On the other hand, venial sin is a transient act, which cannot be taken up again: so that in this respect the comparison + fails. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37356" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37356] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod morbus corporalis non est actus, sed dispositio +quaedam permanens, unde eadem manens, potest mutari. Sed peccatum +veniale est actus transiens, qui resumi non potest. Et quantum ad +hoc, non est simile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A disposition that becomes a habit, is like an imperfect thing in the same species; thus imperfect science, by being perfected, + becomes a habit. On the other hand, venial sin is a disposition to something differing generically, even as an accident which + disposes to a substantial form, into which it is never changed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="37357" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37357] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod dispositio quae fit habitus, est sicut imperfectum in +eadem specie, sicut imperfecta scientia, dum perficitur, fit +habitus. Sed veniale peccatum est dispositio alterius generis, +sicut accidens ad formam substantialem, in quam nunquam +mutatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q88_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q88_A5-p0.1">Q. 88. A. 5. Whether a circumstance can make a venial sin to be mortal?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a circumstance can make a venial sin mortal. For Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis, + serm. xli) that "if anger continue for a long time, or if drunkenness be frequent, they become mortal sins." But anger and + drunkenness are not mortal but venial sins generically, else they would always be mortal sins. Therefore a circumstance makes + a venial sin to be mortal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="37358" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37358] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod circumstantia possit de veniali +peccato facere mortale. Dicit enim Augustinus, in sermone de +Purgatorio, quod <i>si diu teneatur iracundia, et ebrietas si +assidua sit, transeunt in numerum peccatorum mortalium</i>. Sed ira +et ebrietas non sunt ex suo genere peccata mortalia, sed venialia, +alioquin semper essent mortalia. Ergo circumstantia facit peccatum +veniale esse mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Master says ( Sentent. ii, D, 24) that delectation, if morose [*See + <a href="#FS_Q74_A6" id="FS_Q88_A5-p3.1" shape="rect"> Q[74], A[6]</a>], is a mortal sin, but that if it be not morose, it is a venial sin. Now moroseness is a circumstance. Therefore a circumstance + makes a venial sin to be mortal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="37359" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37359] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Magister dicit, XXIV dist. II libri Sent., quod delectatio, si sit +morosa, est peccatum mortale; si autem non sit morosa, est peccatum +veniale. Sed morositas est quaedam circumstantia. Ergo +circumstantia facit de peccato veniali mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, evil and good differ more than venial and mortal sin, both of which are generically evil. But a circumstance makes + a good act to be evil, as when a man gives an alms for vainglory. Much more, therefore, can it make a venial sin to be mortal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="37360" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37360] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +plus differunt malum et bonum quam veniale peccatum et mortale, +quorum utrumque est in genere mali. Sed circumstantia facit de actu +bono malum, sicut patet cum quis dat eleemosynam propter inanem +gloriam. Ergo multo magis potest facere de peccato veniali +mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Since a circumstance is an accident, its quantity cannot exceed that of the act itself, derived from the act's genus, because + the subject always excels its accident. If, therefore, an act be venial by reason of its genus, it cannot become mortal by + reason of an accident: since, in a way, mortal sin infinitely surpasses the quantity of venial sin, as is evident from what + has been said ( + <a href="#FS_Q72_A5" id="FS_Q88_A5-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[72], A[5]</a>, ad 1; + <a href="#FS_Q87_A5" id="FS_Q88_A5-p5.2" shape="rect"> Q[87], + A[5] + </a>, ad 1). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 5 s. c."><a name="37361" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37361] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod, cum circumstantia sit accidens, quantitas eius non potest +excedere quantitatem ipsius actus, quam habet ex suo genere, semper +enim subiectum praeeminet accidenti. Si igitur actus ex suo genere +sit peccatum veniale, non poterit per circumstantiam fieri peccatum +mortale, cum peccatum mortale in infinitum quodammodo excedat +quantitatem venialis, ut ex dictis patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q88_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[7], A[1]; Q[18], A[5], ad 4; + <a href="#FS_Q88_A10" id="FS_Q88_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[10]</a> ,11), when we were treating of circumstances, a circumstance, as such, is an accident of the moral act: and yet a circumstance + may happen to be taken as the specific difference of a moral act, and then it loses its nature of circumstance, and constitutes + the species of the moral act. This happens in sins when a circumstance adds the deformity of another genus; thus when a man + has knowledge of another woman than his wife, the deformity of his act is opposed to chastity; but if this other be another + man's wife, there is an additional deformity opposed to justice which forbids one to take what belongs to another; and accordingly + this circumstance constitutes a new species of sin known as adultery. + </p><p id="FS_Q88_A5-p7"> It is, however, impossible for a circumstance to make a venial sin become mortal, unless it adds the deformity of another + species. For it has been stated above + <a href="#FS_Q88_A1" id="FS_Q88_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that the deformity of a venial sin consists in a disorder affecting things that are referred to the end, whereas the deformity + of a mortal sin consists in a disorder about the last end. Consequently it is evident that a circumstance cannot make a venial + sin to be mortal, so long as it + remains a circumstance, but only when it transfers the sin to another species, and becomes, as it were, the specific difference + of the moral act. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 5 co."><a name="37362" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37362] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum de circumstantiis +ageretur, circumstantia, inquantum huiusmodi, est accidens actus +moralis, contingit tamen circumstantiam accipi ut differentiam +specificam actus moralis, et tunc amittit rationem circumstantiae, +et constituit speciem moralis actus. Hoc autem contingit in +peccatis quando circumstantia addit deformitatem alterius generis +sicut cum aliquis accedit ad non suam, est actus deformis +deformitate opposita castitati; sed si accedat ad non suam quae est +alterius uxor, additur deformitas opposita iustitiae, contra quam +est ut aliquis usurpet rem alienam; et secundum hoc huiusmodi +circumstantia constituit novam speciem peccati, quae dicitur +adulterium. Impossibile est autem quod circumstantia de peccato +veniali faciat mortale, nisi afferat deformitatem alterius generis. +Dictum est enim quod peccatum veniale habet deformitatem per hoc +quod importat deordinationem circa ea quae sunt ad finem, peccatum +autem mortale habet deformitatem per hoc quod importat +deordinationem respectu ultimi finis. Unde manifestum est quod +circumstantia non potest de veniali peccato facere mortale, manens +circumstantia, sed solum tunc quando transfert in aliam speciem, et +fit quodammodo differentia specifica moralis actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q88_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Length of time is not a circumstance that draws a sin to another species, nor is frequency or custom, except perhaps by something + accidental supervening. For an action does not acquire a new species through being repeated or prolonged, unless by chance + something supervene in the repeated or prolonged act to change its species, e.g. disobedience, contempt, or the like. + </p><p id="FS_Q88_A5-p9"> We must therefore reply to the objection by saying that since anger is a movement of the soul tending to the hurt of one's + neighbor, if the angry movement tend to a hurt which is a mortal sin generically, such as murder or robbery, that anger will + be a mortal sin generically: and if it be a venial sin, this will be due to the imperfection of the act, in so far as it is + a sudden movement of the sensuality: whereas, if it last a long time, it returns to its generic nature, through + the consent of reason. If, on the other hand, the hurt to which the angry movement tends, is a sin generically venial, for + instance, if a man be angry with someone, so as to wish to say some trifling word in jest that would hurt him a little, the + anger will not be mortal sin, however long it last, unless perhaps accidentally; for instance, if it were to give rise to + great scandal or something of the kind. + </p><p id="FS_Q88_A5-p10"> With regard to drunkenness we reply that it is a mortal sin by reason of its genus; for, that a man, without necessity, and + through the mere lust of wine, make himself unable to use his reason, whereby he is directed to God and avoids committing + many sins, is expressly contrary to virtue. That it be a venial sin, is due some sort of ignorance or weakness, as when a + man is ignorant of the strength of the wine, or of his own unfitness, so that he has no thought of getting drunk, + for in that case the drunkenness is not imputed to him as a sin, but only the excessive drink. If, however, he gets drunk + frequently, this ignorance no longer avails as an excuse, for his will seems to choose to give way to drunkenness rather than + to refrain from excess of wine: wherefore the sin returns to its specific nature. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="37363" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37363] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod diuturnitas non est circumstantia trahens in +aliam speciem, similiter nec frequentia vel assiduitas, nisi forte +per accidens ex aliquo supervenienti. Non enim aliquid acquirit +novam speciem ex hoc quod multiplicatur vel protelatur, nisi forte +in actu protelato vel multiplicato superveniat aliquid quod variet +speciem, puta inobedientia vel contemptus, vel aliquid huiusmodi. +Dicendum est ergo quod, cum ira sit motus animi ad nocendum +proximo, si sit tale nocumentum in quod tendit motus irae, quod ex +genere suo sit peccatum mortale, sicut homicidium vel furtum, talis +ira ex genere suo est peccatum mortale. Sed quod sit peccatum +veniale, habet ex imperfectione actus, inquantum est motus subitus +sensualitatis. Si vero sit diuturna, redit ad naturam sui generis +per consensum rationis. Si vero nocumentum in quod tendit motus +irae, esset veniale ex genere suo, puta cum aliquis in hoc +irascitur contra aliquem, quod vult ei dicere aliquod verbum leve +et iocosum, quod modicum ipsum contristet; non erit ira peccatum +mortale, quantumcumque sit diuturna; nisi forte per accidens, puta +si ex hoc grave scandalum oriatur, vel propter aliquid huiusmodi. +De ebrietate vero dicendum est quod secundum suam rationem habet +quod sit peccatum mortale, quod enim homo absque necessitate reddat +se impotentem ad utendum ratione, per quam homo in Deum ordinatur +et multa peccata occurrentia vitat, ex sola voluptate vini, +expresse contrariatur virtuti. Sed quod sit peccatum veniale, +contingit propter ignorantiam quandam vel infirmitatem, puta cum +homo nescit virtutem vini, aut propriam debilitatem, unde non putat +se inebriari, tunc enim non imputatur ei ebrietas ad peccatum, sed +solum superabundantia potus. Sed quando frequenter inebriatur, non +potest per hanc ignorantiam excusari quin videatur voluntas eius +eligere magis pati ebrietatem, quam abstinere a vino superfluo. +Unde redit peccatum ad suam naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Morose delectation is not a mortal sin except in those matters which are mortal sins generically. In such matters, if the + delectation be not morose, there is a venial sin through imperfection of the act, as we have said with regard to anger (ad + 1): because anger is said to be lasting, and delectation to be morose, on account of the approval of the deliberating reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="37364" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37364] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod delectatio morosa non dicitur esse peccatum mortale, +nisi in his quae ex suo genere sunt peccata mortalia; in quibus si +delectatio non morosa sit, peccatum veniale est ex imperfectione +actus, sicut et de ira dictum est. Dicitur enim ira diuturna, et +delectatio morosa, propter approbationem rationis deliberantis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A circumstance does not make a good act to be evil, unless it constitute the species of a sin, as we have stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A5" id="FS_Q88_A5-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[5]</a> , ad 4). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="37365" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37365] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod circumstantia non facit de bono actu malum, nisi +constituens speciem peccati, ut supra etiam habitum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q88_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q88_A6-p0.1">Q. 88. A. 6. Whether a mortal sin can become venial?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a mortal sin can become venial. Because venial sin is equally distant from mortal, as mortal sin is from + venial. But a venial sin can become mortal, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q88_A5" id="FS_Q88_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. Therefore also a mortal sin can become venial. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="37366" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37366] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum mortale possit fieri veniale. +Aequaliter enim distat peccatum veniale a mortali, et e contrario. +Sed peccatum veniale fit mortale, ut dictum est. Ergo etiam +peccatum mortale potest fieri veniale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, venial and mortal sin are said to differ in this, that he who sins mortally loves a creature more than God, while + he who sins venially loves the creature less than God. Now it may happen that a person in committing a sin generically mortal, + loves a creature less than God; for instance, if anyone being ignorant that simple fornication is a mortal sin, and contrary + to the love of God, commits the sin of fornication, yet so as to be ready, for the love + of God, to refrain from that sin if he knew that by committing it he was acting counter to the love of God. Therefore his + will be a venial sin; and accordingly a mortal sin can become venial. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="37367" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37367] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum veniale et mortale ponuntur differre secundum hoc, quod +peccans mortaliter diligit creaturam plus quam Deum, peccans autem +venialiter diligit creaturam infra Deum. Contingit autem quod +aliquis committens id quod est ex genere suo peccatum mortale, +diligat creaturam infra Deum, puta si aliquis, nesciens +fornicationem simplicem esse peccatum mortale et contrariam divino +amori, fornicetur, ita tamen quod propter divinum amorem paratus +esset fornicationem praetermittere, si sciret fornicando se contra +divinum amorem agere. Ergo peccabit venialiter. Et sic peccatum +mortale potest fieri veniale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as stated above (A[5], OBJ[3]), good is more distant from evil, than venial from mortal sin. But an act which is + evil in itself, can become good; thus to kill a man may be an act of justice, as when a judge condemns a thief to death. Much + more therefore can a mortal sin become venial. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="37368" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37368] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut dictum est, plus differt bonum a malo quam veniale a mortali. +Sed actus qui est de se malus, potest fieri bonus, sicut homicidium +potest fieri actus iustitiae, sicut patet in iudice qui occidit +latronem. Ergo multo magis peccatum mortale potest fieri +veniale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> An eternal thing can never become temporal. But mortal sin deserves eternal punishment, whereas venial sin deserves temporal + punishment. Therefore a mortal sin can never become venial. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 6 s. c."><a name="37369" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37369] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod aeternum nunquam potest fieri temporale. Sed peccatum +mortale meretur poenam aeternam, peccatum autem veniale poenam +temporalem. Ergo peccatum mortale nunquam potest fieri veniale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q88_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Venial and mortal differ as perfect and imperfect in the genus of sin, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). Now the imperfect can + become perfect, by some sort of addition: and, consequently, a venial sin can become mortal, by the addition of some deformity + pertaining to the genus of mortal sin, as when a man utters an idle word for the purpose of fornication. On the other hand, + the perfect cannot become imperfect, by addition; and so a mortal sin cannot become + venial, by the addition of a deformity pertaining to the genus of venial sin, for the sin is not diminished if a man commit + fornication in order to utter an idle word; rather is it aggravated by the additional deformity. + </p><p id="FS_Q88_A6-p7"> Nevertheless a sin which is generically mortal, can become venial by reason of the imperfection of the act, because then + it does not completely fulfil the conditions of a moral act, since it is not a deliberate, but a sudden act, as is evident + from what we have said above + <a href="#FS_Q88_A2" id="FS_Q88_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. This happens by a kind of subtraction, namely, of deliberate reason. And since a moral act takes its species from deliberate + reason, the result is that by such a subtraction the + species of the act is destroyed. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 6 co."><a name="37370" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37370] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod veniale et mortale differunt sicut perfectum et +imperfectum in genere peccati, ut dictum est. Imperfectum autem per +aliquam additionem potest ad perfectionem venire. Unde et veniale, +per hoc quod additur ei deformitas pertinens ad genus peccati +mortalis, efficitur mortale, sicut cum quis dicit verbum otiosum ut +fornicetur. Sed id quod est perfectum, non potest fieri imperfectum +per additionem. Et ideo peccatum mortale non fit veniale per hoc +quod additur ei aliqua deformitas pertinens ad genus peccati +venialis, non enim diminuitur peccatum eius qui fornicatur ut dicat +verbum otiosum, sed magis aggravatur propter deformitatem +adiunctam. Potest tamen id quod est ex genere mortale, esse veniale +propter imperfectionem actus, quia non perfecte pertingit ad +rationem actus moralis, cum non sit deliberatus sed subitus, ut ex +dictis patet. Et hoc fit per subtractionem quandam, scilicet +deliberatae rationis. Et quia a ratione deliberata habet speciem +moralis actus, inde est quod per talem subtractionem solvitur +species.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Venial differs from mortal as imperfect from perfect, even as a boy differs from a man. But the boy becomes a man and not + vice versa. Hence the argument does not prove. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="37371" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37371] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod veniale differt a mortali sicut imperfectum a +perfecto, ut puer a viro. Fit autem ex puero vir, sed non +convertitur. Unde ratio non cogit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If the ignorance be such as to excuse sin altogether, as the ignorance of a madman or an imbecile, then he that commits fornication + in a state of such ignorance, commits no sin either mortal or venial. But if the ignorance be not invincible, then the ignorance + itself is a sin, and contains within itself the lack of the love of God, in so far as a man neglects to learn those things + whereby he can safeguard himself in the love of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="37372" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37372] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, si sit talis ignorantia quae peccatum omnino +excuset, sicut est furiosi vel amentis, tunc ex tali ignorantia +fornicationem committens nec mortaliter nec venialiter peccat. Si +vero sit ignorantia non invincibilis, tunc ignorantia ipsa est +peccatum, et continet in se defectum divini amoris, inquantum +negligit homo addiscere ea per quae potest se in divino amore +conservare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says (Contra Mendacium vii), "those things which are evil in themselves, cannot be well done for any good end." + Now murder is the slaying of the innocent, and this can nowise be well done. But, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. i, 4,5), + the judge who sentences a thief to death, or the soldier who slays the enemy of the common weal, are not murderers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="37373" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37373] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro contra mendacium, +<i>ea quae sunt secundum se mala, nullo fine bene fieri +possunt</i>. Homicidium autem est occisio innocentis, et hoc nullo +modo bene fieri potest. Sed iudex qui occidit latronem, vel miles +qui occidit hostem reipublicae, non appellantur homicidae, ut +Augustinus dicit, in libro de libero arbitrio.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q89" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q89-p0.1">Q. 89. OF VENIAL SIN IN ITSELF (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q89-p2"> We must now consider venial sin in itself, and under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q89-p3"><a href="#FS_Q89_A1"> (1) Whether venial sin causes a stain in the soul?</a></p><p id="FS_Q89-p4"><a href="#FS_Q89_A2"> (2) Of the different kinds of venial sin, as denoted by "wood," "hay," "stubble" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:12</a>); + </a></p><p id="FS_Q89-p5"><a href="#FS_Q89_A3"> (3) Whether man could sin venially in the state of innocence?</a></p><p id="FS_Q89-p6"><a href="#FS_Q89_A4"> (4) Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially?</a></p><p id="FS_Q89-p7"><a href="#FS_Q89_A5"> (5) Whether the movements of unbelievers are venial sins?</a></p><p id="FS_Q89-p8"><a href="#FS_Q89_A6"> (6) Whether venial sin can be in a man with original sin alone?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 pr."><a name="37374" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37374] +Iª-IIae q. 89 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +peccato veniali secundum se. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, +utrum peccatum veniale causet maculam in anima. Secundo, de +distinctione peccati venialis, prout figuratur per lignum, faenum +et stipulam, I Cor. III. Tertio, utrum homo in statu innocentiae +potuerit peccare venialiter. Quarto, utrum Angelus bonus vel malus +possit peccare venialiter. Quinto, utrum primi motus infidelium +sint peccata venialia. Sexto, utrum peccatum veniale possit esse in +aliquo simul cum solo peccato originali.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q89_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q89_A1-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 1. Whether venial sin causes a stain on the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial sin causes a stain in the soul. For Augustine says (De Poenit.) [*Hom. 50, inter. L., 2], that + if venial sins be multiplied, they destroy the beauty of our souls so as to deprive us of the embraces of our heavenly spouse. + But the stain of sin is nothing else but the loss of the soul's beauty. Therefore venial sins cause a stain in the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37375" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37375] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum veniale causet maculam in +anima. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Poenit., quod peccata +venialia, si multiplicentur, decorem nostrum ita exterminant, ut a +caelestis sponsi amplexibus nos separent. Sed nihil aliud est +macula quam detrimentum decoris. Ergo peccata venialia causant +maculam in anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, mortal sin causes a stain in the soul, on account of the inordinateness of the act and of the sinner's affections. + But, in venial sin, there is an inordinateness of the act and of the affections. Therefore venial sin causes a stain in the + soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37376" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37376] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum mortale causat maculam in anima propter inordinationem +actus et affectus ipsius peccantis. Sed in peccato veniali est +quaedam deordinatio actus et affectus. Ergo peccatum veniale causat +maculam in anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the stain on the soul is caused by contact with a temporal thing, through love thereof as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q86_A1" id="FS_Q89_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[86], A[1]</a>). But, in venial sin, the soul is in contact with a temporal thing through inordinate love. therefore, venial sin brings + a stain on the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37377" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37377] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +macula animae causatur ex contactu rei temporalis per amorem, ut +supra dictum est. Sed in peccato veniali anima inordinato amore +contingit rem temporalem. Ergo peccatum veniale inducit maculam in +anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> it is written, ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.27" target="asv">Eph. 5:27</a>): "That He might present it to Himself a glorious church, not having spot or wrinkle," on which the gloss says: "i.e., some + grievous sin." Therefore it seems proper to mortal sin to cause a stain on the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37378" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37378] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Ephes. V, <i>ut exhiberet ipse sibi gloriosam +Ecclesiam non habentem maculam</i>; Glossa, <i>idest aliquod +peccatum criminale</i>. Ergo proprium peccati mortalis esse videtur +quod maculam in anima causet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A1-p6"> I answer that as stated above (Q[86], A[1]), a stain denotes a loss of comeliness due to contact with something, as may be + seen in corporeal matters, from which the term has been transferred to the soul, by way of similitude. Now, just as in the + body there is a twofold comeliness, one resulting from the inward disposition of the members and colors, the other resulting + from outward refulgence supervening, so too, in the soul, there is a twofold comeliness, one habitual and, so to + speak, intrinsic, the other actual like an outward flash of light. Now venial sin is a hindrance to actual comeliness, but + not to habitual comeliness, because it neither destroys nor diminishes the habit of charity and of the other virtues, as we + shall show further on ( + <a href="SS_i.html#SS_Q24_A10" id="FS_Q89_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[24], A[10]</a>; Q[133], A[1], ad 2), but only hinders their acts. On the other hand a stain denotes something permanent in the thing stained, + wherefore it seems in the nature of a loss of habitual + rather than of actual comeliness. Therefore, properly speaking, venial sin does not cause a stain in the soul. If, however, + we find it stated anywhere that it does induce a stain, this is in a restricted sense, in so far as it hinders the comeliness + that results from acts of virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 1 co."><a name="37379" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37379] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ex dictis patet, macula importat detrimentum +nitoris ex aliquo contactu, sicut in corporalibus patet, ex quibus +per similitudinem nomen maculae ad animam transfertur. Sicut autem +in corpore est duplex nitor, unus quidem ex intrinseca dispositione +membrorum et coloris, alius autem ex exteriori claritate +superveniente; ita etiam in anima est duplex nitor, unus quidem +habitualis, quasi intrinsecus, alius autem actualis, quasi exterior +fulgor. Peccatum autem veniale impedit quidem nitorem actualem, non +tamen habitualem, quia non excludit neque diminuit habitum +caritatis et aliarum virtutum, ut infra patebit, sed solum impedit +earum actum. Macula autem importat aliquid manens in re maculata, +unde magis videtur pertinere ad detrimentum habitualis nitoris quam +actualis. Unde, proprie loquendo, peccatum veniale non causat +maculam in anima. Et si alicubi dicatur maculam inducere, hoc est +secundum quid, inquantum impedit nitorem qui est ex actibus +virtutum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking of the case in which many venial sins lead to mortal sin dispositively: because otherwise they would + not sever the soul from its heavenly spouse. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37380" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37380] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur in eo casu in quo multa +peccata venialia dispositive inducunt ad mortale. Aliter enim non +separarent ab amplexu caelestis sponsi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In mortal sin the inordinateness of the act destroys the habit of virtue, but not in venial sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37381" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37381] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod inordinatio actus in peccato mortali corrumpit +habitum virtutis, non autem in peccato veniali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In mortal sin the soul comes into contact with a temporal thing as its end, so that the shedding of the light of grace, which + accrues to those who, by charity, cleave to God as their last end, is entirely cut off. On the contrary, in venial sin, man + does not cleave to a creature as his last end: hence there is no comparison. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37382" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37382] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in peccato mortali anima per amorem contingit rem +temporalem quasi finem, et per hoc totaliter impeditur influxus +splendoris gratiae, qui provenit in eos qui Deo adhaerent ut ultimo +fini per caritatem. Sed in peccato veniali non adhaeret homo +creaturae tanquam fini ultimo. Unde non est simile.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q89_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q89_A2-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 2. Whether venial sins are suitably designated as "wood, hay, and stubble"?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial sins are unsuitably designated as "wood," "hay," and "stubble." Because wood hay and stubble are + said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:12</a>) to be built on a spiritual foundation. Now venial sins are something outside a spiritual foundation, even as false opinions + are outside the pale of science. Therefore, venial sins are not suitably designated as wood, hay and stubble. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37383" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37383] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter peccata venialia per +lignum, faenum et stipulam designentur. Lignum enim, faenum et +stipula dicuntur superaedificari spirituali fundamento. Sed peccata +venialia sunt praeter spirituale aedificium, sicut etiam quaelibet +falsae opiniones sunt praeter scientiam. Ergo peccata venialia non +convenienter designantur per lignum, faenum et stipulam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he who builds wood, hay and stubble, "shall be saved yet so as by fire" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:15</a>). But sometimes the man who commits a venial sin, will not be saved, even by fire, e.g. when a man dies in mortal sin to + which venial sins are attached. Therefore, venial sins are unsuitably designated by wood, hay, and stubble. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37384" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37384] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ille qui aedificat lignum, faenum et stipulam, sic salvus erit +quasi per ignem. Sed quandoque ille qui committit peccata venialia, +non erit salvus etiam per ignem, puta cum peccata venialia +inveniuntur in eo qui decedit cum peccato mortali. Ergo +inconvenienter per lignum, faenum et stipulam peccata venialia +designantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:12</a>) those who build "gold, silver, precious stones," i.e. love of God and our neighbor, and good works, are others from those + who build wood, hay, and stubble. But those even who love God and their neighbor, and do good works, commit venial sins: for + it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.1.8" target="asv">1 Jn. 1:8</a>): "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Therefore venial sins are not suitably + designated by these three. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37385" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37385] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +secundum apostolum, alii sunt qui aedificant aurum, argentum, +lapides pretiosos, idest amorem Dei et proximi et bona opera; et +alii qui aedificant lignum, faenum et stipulam. Sed peccata +venialia committunt etiam illi qui diligunt Deum et proximum, et +bona opera faciunt, dicitur enim I Ioan. I, <i>si dixerimus quia +peccatum non habemus, nosipsos seducimus</i>. Ergo non convenienter +designantur peccata venialia per ista tria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, there are many more than three differences and degrees of venial sins. Therefore they are unsuitably comprised under + these three. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="37386" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37386] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +multo plures differentiae et gradus sunt peccatorum venialium quam +tres. Ergo inconvenienter sub his tribus comprehenduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:15</a>) that the man who builds up wood, hay and stubble, "shall be saved yet so as by fire," so that he will suffer punishment, + but not everlasting. Now the debt of temporal punishment belongs properly to venial sin, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q87_A5" id="FS_Q89_A2-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[87], A[5]</a>). Therefore these three signify venial sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37387" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37387] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit de eo qui superaedificat lignum, faenum et +stipulam, quod salvus erit quasi per ignem, et sic patietur poenam, +sed non aeternam. Reatus autem poenae temporalis proprie pertinet +ad peccatum veniale, ut dictum est. Ergo per illa tria +significantur peccata venialia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q89_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some have understood the "foundation" to be dead faith, upon which some build good works, signified by gold, silver, and + precious stones, while others build mortal sins, which according to them are designated by wood, hay and stubble. But Augustine + disapproves of this explanation (De Fide et Oper. xv), because, as the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.21" target="asv">Gal. 5:21</a>), he who does the works of the flesh, "shall not obtain the kingdom of God," which signifies to be saved; whereas the + Apostle says that he who builds wood, hay, and stubble "shall be saved yet so as by fire." Consequently wood, hay, stubble + cannot be understood to denote mortal sins. + </p><p id="FS_Q89_A2-p8"> Others say that wood, hay, stubble designate good works, which are indeed built upon the spiritual edifice, but are mixed + with venial sins: as, when a man is charged with the care of a family, which is a good thing, excessive love of his wife or + of his children or of his possessions insinuates itself into his life, under God however, so that, to wit, for the sake of + these things he would be unwilling to do anything in opposition to God. But neither does this seem to be + reasonable. For it is evident that all good works are referred to the love of God, and one's neighbor, wherefore they are + designated by "gold," "silver," and "precious stones," and consequently not by "wood," "hay," and "stubble." + </p><p id="FS_Q89_A2-p9"> We must therefore say that the very venial sins that insinuate themselves into those who have a care for earthly things, + are designated by wood, hay, and stubble. For just as these are stored in a house, without belonging to the substance of the + house, and can be burnt, while the house is saved, so also venial sins are multiplied in a man, while the spiritual edifice + remains, and for them, man suffers fire, either of temporal trials in this life, or of purgatory after this life, + and yet he is saved for ever. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 co."><a name="37388" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37388] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod quidam intellexerunt fundamentum esse fidem informem, +super quam aliqui aedificant bona opera, quae significantur per +aurum, argentum et lapides pretiosos; quidam vero peccata etiam +mortalia, quae significantur, secundum eos, per lignum, faenum et +stipulam. Sed hanc expositionem improbat Augustinus, in libro de +fide et operibus, quia, ut apostolus dicit, ad Gal. V, qui opera +carnis facit, regnum Dei non consequetur, quod est salvum fieri; +apostolus autem dicit quod ille qui aedificat lignum, faenum et +stipulam, salvus erit quasi per ignem. Unde non potest intelligi +quod per lignum, faenum et stipulam peccata mortalia designentur. +Quidam vero dicunt quod per lignum, faenum et stipulam +significantur opera bona, quae superaedificantur quidem spirituali +aedificio, sed tamen commiscent se eis peccata venialia sicut, cum +aliquis habet curam rei familiaris, quod bonum est, commiscet se +superfluus amor vel uxoris vel filiorum vel possessionum, sub Deo +tamen, ita scilicet quod pro his homo nihil vellet facere contra +Deum. Sed hoc iterum non videtur convenienter dici. Manifestum est +enim quod omnia opera bona referuntur ad caritatem Dei et proximi, +unde pertinent ad aurum, argentum et lapides pretiosos. Non ergo ad +lignum, faenum et stipulam. Et ideo dicendum est quod ipsa peccata +venialia quae admiscent se procurantibus terrena, significantur per +lignum, faenum et stipulam. Sicut enim huiusmodi congregantur in +domo, et non pertinent ad substantiam aedificii, et possunt comburi +aedificio remanente; ita etiam peccata venialia multiplicantur in +homine, manente spirituali aedificio; et pro istis patitur ignem +vel temporalis tribulationis in hac vita, vel Purgatorii post hanc +vitam; et tamen salutem consequitur aeternam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Venial sins are not said to be built upon the spiritual foundation, as though they were laid directly upon it, but because + they are laid beside it; in the same sense as it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.136.1" target="asv">Ps. 136:1</a>): "Upon the waters of Babylon," i.e. "beside the waters": because venial sins do not destroy the edifice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37389" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37389] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod peccata venialia non dicuntur superaedificari +spirituali fundamento quasi directe supra ipsum posita, sed quia +ponuntur iuxta ipsum; sicut accipitur ibi, super flumina Babylonis, +idest iuxta. Quia peccata venialia non destruunt spirituale +aedificium, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not said that everyone who builds wood, hay and stubble, shall be saved as by fire, but only those who build "upon" + the "foundation." And this foundation is not dead faith, as some have esteemed, but faith quickened by charity, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.17" target="asv"> Eph. 3:17</a>: "Rooted and founded in charity." Accordingly, he that dies in mortal sin with venial sins, has indeed wood, hay, and stubble, + but not built upon the spiritual edifice; and + consequently he will not be saved so as by fire. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37390" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37390] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod non dicitur de quocumque aedificante lignum, faenum +et stipulam, quod salvus sit quasi per ignem, sed solum de eo qui +aedificat supra fundamentum. Quod quidem non est fides informis, ut +quidam aestimabant, sed fides formata caritate, secundum illud +Ephes. III, <i>in caritate radicati et fundati</i>. Ille ergo qui +decedit cum peccato mortali et venialibus, habet quidem lignum, +faenum et stipulam, sed non superaedificata supra fundamentum +spirituale. Et ideo non erit salvus sic quasi per ignem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although those who are withdrawn from the care of temporal things, sin venially sometimes, yet they commit but slight venial + sins, and in most cases they are cleansed by the fervor of charity: wherefore they do not build up venial sins, because these + do not remain long in them. But the venial sins of those who are busy about earthly remain longer, because they are unable + to have such frequent recourse to the fervor of charity in order to remove + them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37391" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37391] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod illi qui sunt abstracti a cura temporalium rerum, +etsi aliquando venialiter peccent, tamen levia peccata venialia +committunt, et frequentissime per fervorem caritatis purgantur. +Unde tales non superaedificant venialia, quia in eis modicum +manent. Sed peccata venialia ipsorum qui circa terrena occupantur, +diutius manent, quia non ita frequenter recurrere possunt ad +huiusmodi peccata delenda per caritatis fervorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As the Philosopher says (De Coelo i, text. 2), "all things are comprised under three, the beginning, the middle, the end." + Accordingly all degrees of venial sins are reduced to three, viz. to "wood," which remains longer in the fire; "stubble," + which is burnt up at once; and "hay," which is between these two: because venial sins are removed by fire, quickly or slowly, + according as man is more or less attached to them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="37392" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37392] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in I de caelo, omnia tribus +includuntur, scilicet principio, medio et fine. Et secundum hoc, +omnes gradus venialium peccatorum ad tria reducuntur, scilicet ad +lignum, quod diutius manet in igne; ad stipulam, quae citissime +expeditur; ad faenum, quod medio modo se habet. Secundum enim quod +peccata venialia sunt maioris vel minoris adhaerentiae vel +gravitatis, citius vel tardius per ignem purgantur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q89_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q89_A3-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 3. Whether man could commit a venial sin in the state of innocence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man could commit a venial sin in the state of innocence. Because on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.14" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:14, </a> "Adam was not seduced," a gloss says: "Having had no experience of God's severity, it was possible for him to be so mistaken + as to think that what he had done was a venial sin." But he would not have thought this unless he could have committed a venial + sin. Therefore he could commit a venial sin without sinning mortally. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37393" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37393] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo in statu innocentiae potuerit +peccare venialiter. Quia super illud I ad Tim. II, <i>Adam non est +seductus</i>, dicit Glossa, <i>inexpertus divinae severitatis, in +eo falli potuit, ut crederet veniale esse commissum</i>. Sed hoc +non credidisset, nisi venialiter peccare potuisset. Ergo venialiter +peccare potuit, non peccando mortaliter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 5): "We must not suppose that the tempter would have overcome man, unless first + of all there had arisen in man's soul a movement of vainglory which should have been checked." Now the vainglory which preceded + man's defeat, which was accomplished through his falling into mortal sin, could be nothing more than a venial sin. In like + manner, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 5) that "man was allured by a certain desire of + making the experiment, when he saw that the woman did not die when she had taken the forbidden fruit." Again there seems to + have been a certain movement of unbelief in Eve, since she doubted what the Lord had said, as appears from her saying ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.3" target="asv">Gn. 3:3</a>): "Lest perhaps we die." Now these apparently were venial sins. Therefore man could commit a venial sin before he committed + a mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37394" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37394] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, XI super Gen. ad Litt., <i>non est arbitrandum +quod esset hominem deiecturus tentator, nisi praecessisset in anima +hominis quaedam elatio comprimenda</i>. Elatio autem deiectionem +praecedens, quae facta est per peccatum mortale, non potuit esse +nisi peccatum veniale. Similiter etiam in eodem Augustinus dicit +quod <i>virum sollicitavit aliqua experiendi cupiditas, cum +mulierem videret, sumpto vetito pomo, non esse mortuam</i>. Videtur +etiam in Eva fuisse aliquis infidelitatis motus, in hoc quod de +verbis domini dubitavit, ut patet per hoc quod dixit, ne forte +moriamur, ut habetur Gen. III. Haec autem videntur esse venialia +peccata. Ergo homo potuit venialiter peccare, antequam mortaliter +peccaret.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, mortal sin is more opposed to the integrity of the original state, than venial sin is. Now man could sin mortally + notwithstanding the integrity of the original state. Therefore he could also sin venially. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37395" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37395] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum mortale magis opponitur integritati primi status quam +peccatum veniale. Sed homo potuit peccare mortaliter, non obstante +integritate primi status. Ergo etiam potuit peccare venialiter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Every sin deserves some punishment. But nothing penal was possible in the state of innocence, as Augustine declares (De Civ. + Dei xiv, 10). Therefore he could commit a sin that would not deprive him of that state of integrity. But venial sin does not + change man's state. Therefore he could not sin venially. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37396" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37396] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod cuilibet peccato debetur aliqua poena. Sed nihil poenale +esse potuit in statu innocentiae, ut Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. +Dei. Ergo non potuit peccare aliquo peccato quo non eiiceretur ab +illo integritatis statu. Sed peccatum veniale non mutat statum +hominis. Ergo non potuit peccare venialiter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q89_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is generally admitted that man could not commit a venial sin in the state of innocence. This, however, is not to be understood + as though on account of the perfection of his state, the sin which is venial for us would have been mortal for him, if he + had committed it. Because the dignity of a person is circumstance that aggravates a sin, but it does not transfer it to another + species, unless there be an additional deformity by reason of disobedience, or vow + or the like, which does not apply to the question in point. Consequently what is venial in itself could not be changed into + mortal by reason of the excellence of the original state. We must therefore understand this to mean that he could not sin + venially, because it was impossible for him to commit a sin which was venial in itself, before losing the integrity of the + original state by sinning mortally. + </p><p id="FS_Q89_A3-p7"> The reason for this is because venial sin occurs in us, either through the imperfection of the act, as in the case of sudden + movements, in a genus of mortal sin or through some inordinateness in respect of things referred to the end, the due order + of the end being safeguarded. Now each of these happens on account of some defect of order, by reason of the lower powers + not being checked by the higher. Because the sudden rising of a movement of the sensuality in us is due to the + sensuality not being perfectly subject to reason: and the sudden rising of a movement of reason itself is due, in us, to the + fact that the execution of the act of reason is not subject to the act of deliberation which proceeds from a higher good, + as stated above (Q[74], A[10]); and that the human mind be out of order as regards things directed to the end, the due order + of the end being safeguarded, is due to the fact that the things referred to the end are not infallibly directed under the + end, + which holds the highest place, being the beginning, as it were, in matters concerning the appetite, as stated above (Q[10], + AA[1],2, ad 3; Q[72], A[5]). Now, in the state of innocence, as stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q95_A1" id="FS_Q89_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[95], A[1]</a>, there was an unerring stability of order, so that the lower powers were always subjected to the higher, so long as man remained + subject to God, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13). Hence there can be no inordinateness in man, unless first of all + the + highest part of man were not subject to God, which constitutes a mortal sin. From this it is evident that, in the state of + innocence, man could not commit a venial sin, before committing a mortal sin. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 3 co."><a name="37397" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37397] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod communiter ponitur quod homo in statu innocentiae non +potuit venialiter peccare. Hoc autem non est sic intelligendum, +quasi id quod nobis est veniale, si ipse committeret, esset sibi +mortale, propter altitudinem sui status. Dignitas enim personae est +quaedam circumstantia aggravans peccatum, non tamen transfert in +aliam speciem, nisi forte superveniente deformitate inobedientiae +vel voti, vel alicuius huiusmodi, quod in proposito dici non +potest. Unde id quod est de se veniale, non potuit transferri in +mortale, propter dignitatem primi status. Sic ergo intelligendum +est quod non potuit peccare venialiter, quia non potuit esse ut +committeret aliquid quod esset de se veniale, antequam integritatem +primi status amitteret peccando mortaliter. Cuius ratio est quia +peccatum veniale in nobis contingit vel propter imperfectionem +actus, sicut subiti motus in genere peccatorum mortalium, vel +propter inordinationem existentem circa ea quae sunt ad finem, +servato debito ordine ad finem. Utrumque autem horum contingit +propter quendam defectum ordinis, ex eo quod inferius non +continetur firmiter sub superiori. Quod enim in nobis insurgat +subitus motus sensualitatis, contingit ex hoc quod sensualitas non +est omnino subdita rationi. Quod vero insurgat subitus motus in +ratione ipsa, provenit in nobis ex hoc quod ipsa executio actus +rationis non subditur deliberationi quae est ex altiori bono, ut +supra dictum est. Quod vero humanus animus inordinetur circa ea +quae sunt ad finem, servato debito ordine ad finem, provenit ex hoc +quod ea quae sunt ad finem non ordinantur infallibiliter sub fine, +qui tenet summum locum, quasi principium in appetibilibus, ut supra +dictum est. In statu autem innocentiae, ut in primo habitum est, +erat infallibilis ordinis firmitas, ut semper inferius contineretur +sub superiori, quandiu summum hominis contineretur sub Deo, ut +etiam Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei. Et ideo oportebat quod +inordinatio in homine non esset, nisi inciperet ab hoc quod summum +hominis non subderetur Deo; quod fit per peccatum mortale. Ex quo +patet quod homo in statu innocentiae non potuit peccare venialiter, +antequam peccaret mortaliter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the passage quoted, venial is not taken in the same sense as we take it now; but by venial sin we mean that which is easily + forgiven. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37398" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37398] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod veniale non sumitur ibi secundum quod nunc de +veniali loquimur, sed dicitur veniale quod est facile +remissibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This vainglory which preceded man's downfall, was his first mortal sin, for it is stated to have preceded his downfall into + the outward act of sin. This vainglory was followed, in the man, by the desire to make and experiment, and in the woman, by + doubt, for she gave way to vainglory, merely through hearing the serpent mention the precept, as though she refused to be + held in check by the precept. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37399" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37399] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod illa elatio quae praecessit in animo hominis, fuit +primum hominis peccatum mortale, dicitur autem praecessisse +deiectionem eius in exteriorem actum peccati. Huiusmodi autem +elationem subsecuta est et experiendi cupiditas in viro, et +dubitatio in muliere; quae ex hoc solo in quandam elationem +prorupit, quod praecepti mentionem a serpente audivit, quasi nollet +sub praecepto contineri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Mortal sin is opposed to the integrity of the original state in the fact of its destroying that state: this a venial sin + cannot do. And because the integrity of the primitive state is incompatible with any inordinateness whatever, the result is + that the first man could not sin venially, before committing a mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37400" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37400] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod peccatum mortale intantum opponitur integritati primi +status, quod corrumpit ipsum, quod peccatum veniale facere non +potest. Et quia non potest simul esse quaecumque inordinatio cum +integritate primi status, consequens est quod primus homo non +potuerit peccare venialiter, antequam peccaret mortaliter.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q89_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q89_A4-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 4. Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that a good or wicked angel can sin venially. Because man agrees with the angels in the higher part of his soul + which is called the mind, according to Gregory, who says (Hom. xxix in Evang.) that "man understands in common with the angels." + But man can commit a venial sin in the higher part of his soul. Therefore an angel can commit a venial sin also. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37401" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37401] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus bonus vel malus possit peccare +venialiter. Homo enim cum Angelis convenit in superiori animae +parte, quae mens vocatur; secundum illud Gregorii, in Homil., +<i>homo intelligit cum Angelis</i>. Sed homo secundum superiorem +partem animae potest peccare venialiter. Ergo et Angelus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, He that can do more can do less. But an angel could love a created good more than God, and he did, by sinning mortally. + Therefore he could also love a creature less than God inordinately, by sinning venially. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37402" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37402] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quicumque potest quod est plus, potest etiam quod est minus. Sed +Angelus potuit diligere bonum creatum plus quam Deum, quod fecit +peccando mortaliter. Ergo etiam potuit bonum creatum diligere infra +Deum inordinate, venialiter peccando.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, wicked angels seem to do things which are venial sins generically, by provoking men to laughter, and other like + frivolities. Now the circumstance of the person does not make a mortal sin to be venial as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q89_A3" id="FS_Q89_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, unless there is a special prohibition, which is not the case in point. Therefore an angel can sin venially. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37403" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37403] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Angeli mali videntur aliqua facere quae sunt ex genere suo venialia +peccata, provocando homines ad risum, et ad alias huiusmodi +levitates. Sed circumstantia personae non facit de veniali mortale, +ut dictum est, nisi speciali prohibitione superveniente, quod non +est in proposito. Ergo Angelus potest peccare venialiter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The perfection of an angel is greater than that of man in the primitive state. But man could not sin venially in the primitive + state, and much less, therefore, can an angel. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37404" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37404] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod maior est perfectio Angeli quam perfectio hominis in primo +statu. Sed homo in primo statu non potuit peccare venialiter. Ergo +multo minus Angelus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> An angel's intellect, as stated above in the + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q58_A3" id="FS_Q89_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[58], A[3]</a>; + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q79_A8" id="FS_Q89_A4-p6.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[79], A[8]</a>, is not discursive, i.e. it does not proceed from principles to conclusions, so as to understand both separately, as we do. + Consequently, whenever the angelic intellect considers a conclusion, it must, of necessity, consider it in its principles. + Now in matters of appetite, as we have often stated (Q[8], A[2]; Q[10], A[1]; Q[72], + A[5]), ends are like principles, while the means are like conclusions. Wherefore, an angel's mind is not directed to the means, + except as they stand under the order to the end. Consequently, from their very nature, they can have no inordinateness in + respect of the means, unless at the same time they have an inordinateness in respect of the end, and this is a mortal sin. + Now good angels are not moved to the means, except in subordination to the due end which is God: wherefore all their acts + are + acts of charity, so that no venial sin can be in them. On the other hand, wicked angels are moved to nothing except in subordination + to the end which is their sin of pride. Therefore they sin mortally in everything that they do of their own will. This does + not apply to the appetite for the natural good, which appetite we have stated to be in them ( + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q63_A4" id="FS_Q89_A4-p6.3" shape="rect">FP, Q[63], A[4]</a>; Q[64], A[2], ad 5). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 4 co."><a name="37405" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37405] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod intellectus Angeli, sicut in primo dictum est, non +est discursivus, ut scilicet procedat a principiis in conclusiones, +seorsum utrumque intelligens, sicut in nobis contingit. Unde +oportet quod quandocumque considerat conclusiones, consideret eas +prout sunt in principiis. In appetibilibus autem, sicut multoties +dictum est, fines sunt sicut principia; ea vero quae sunt ad finem, +sunt sicut conclusiones. Unde mens Angeli non fertur in ea quae +sunt ad finem, nisi secundum quod constant sub ordine finis. +Propter hoc ex natura sua habent quod non possit in eis esse +deordinatio circa ea quae sunt ad finem, nisi simul sit deordinatio +circa finem ipsum, quod est per peccatum mortale. Sed Angeli boni +non moventur in ea quae sunt ad finem, nisi in ordine ad finem +debitum, qui est Deus. Et propter hoc omnes eorum actus sunt actus +caritatis. Et sic in eis non potest esse peccatum veniale. Angeli +vero mali in nihil moventur nisi in ordine ad finem peccati +superbiae ipsorum. Et ideo in omnibus peccant mortaliter, +quaecumque propria voluntate agunt. Secus autem est de appetitu +naturalis boni qui est in eis, ut in primo dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man does indeed agree with the angels in the mind or intellect, but he differs in his mode of understanding, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37406" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37406] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod homo convenit quidem cum Angelis in mente, sive +in intellectu; sed differt in modo intelligendi, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An angel could not love a creature less than God, without, at the same time, either referring it to God, as the last end, + or to some inordinate end, for the reason given above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37407" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37407] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod Angelus non potuit minus diligere creaturam quam +Deum, nisi simul referens eam in Deum, sicut in ultimum finem, vel +aliquem finem inordinatum, ratione iam dicta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The demons incite man to all such things which seem venial, that he may become used to them, so as to lead him on to mortal + sin. Consequently in all such things they sin mortally, on account of the end they have in view. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37408" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37408] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod omnia illa quae videntur esse venialia, Daemones +procurant ut homines ad sui familiaritatem attrahant, et sic +deducant eos in peccatum mortale. Unde in omnibus talibus +mortaliter peccant, propter intentionem finis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q89_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q89_A5-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 5. Whether the first movements of the sensuality in unbelievers are mortal sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the first movements of the sensuality in unbelievers are mortal sins. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.1" target="asv">Rom. 8:1</a>) that "there is . . . no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus, who walk not according to the flesh": and he is speaking + there of the concupiscence of the sensuality, as appears from the context ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A5-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.7" target="asv">Rom. 7</a>). Therefore the reason why concupiscence is not a matter of condemnation to those who walk not according to the + flesh, i.e. by consenting to concupiscence, is because they are in Christ Jesus. But unbelievers are not in Christ Jesus. + Therefore in unbelievers this is a matter of condemnation. Therefore the first movements of unbelievers are mortal sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="37409" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37409] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod primi motus sensualitatis in +infidelibus sint peccata mortalia. Dicit enim apostolus, ad Rom. +VIII, quod <i>nihil est damnationis his qui sunt in Christo Iesu, +qui non secundum carnem ambulant</i>, et loquitur ibi de +concupiscentia sensualitatis, ut ex praemissis apparet. Haec ergo +causa est quare concupiscere non sit damnabile his qui non secundum +carnem ambulant, consentiendo scilicet concupiscentiae, quia sunt +in Christo Iesu. Sed infideles non sunt in Christo Iesu. Ergo in +infidelibus est damnabile. Primi igitur motus infidelium sunt +peccata mortalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further Anselm says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. vii): "Those who are not in Christ, when they feel the sting of the flesh, follow + the road of damnation, even if they walk not according to the flesh." But damnation is not due save to mortal sin. Therefore, + since man feels the sting of the flesh in the first movements of the concupiscence, it seems that the first movements of concupiscence + in unbelievers are mortal sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="37410" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37410] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Anselmus dicit, in libro de gratia et Lib. Arb., <i>qui non sunt in +Christo, sentientes carnem, sequuntur damnationem, etiam si non +secundum carnem ambulant</i>. Sed damnatio non debetur nisi peccato +mortali. Ergo, cum homo sentiat carnem secundum primum motum +concupiscentiae, videtur quod primus motus concupiscentiae in +infidelibus sit peccatum mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Anselm says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. vii): "Man was so made that he was not liable to feel concupiscence." Now this + liability seems to be remitted to man by the grace of Baptism, which the unbeliever has not. Therefore every act of concupiscence + in an unbeliever, even without his consent, is a mortal sin, because he acts against his duty. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="37411" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37411] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Anselmus dicit, in eodem libro, <i>sic factus est homo, ut +concupiscentiam sentire non deberet</i>. Hoc autem debitum videtur +homini remissum per gratiam baptismalem, quam infideles non habent. +Ergo quandocumque infidelis concupiscit, etiam si non consentiat, +peccat mortaliter, contra debitum faciens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.10.34" target="asv"> Acts 10:34 </a>that "God is not a respecter of persons." Therefore he does not impute to one unto condemnation, what He does not impute to + another. But he does not impute first movements to believers, unto condemnation. Neither therefore does He impute them to + unbelievers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 5 s. c."><a name="37412" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37412] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Act. X, <i>non est personarum acceptor Deus</i>. +Quod ergo uni non imputat ad damnationem, nec alteri. Sed primos +motus fidelibus non imputat ad damnationem. Ergo etiam nec +infidelibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is unreasonable to say that the first movements of unbelievers are mortal sins, when they do not consent to them. This + is evident for two reasons. First, because the sensuality itself could not be the subject of mortal sin, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q79_A4" id="FS_Q89_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[79], A[4]</a>). Now the sensuality has the same nature in unbelievers as in believers. Therefore it is not possible for the mere movements + of the sensuality in unbelievers, to be mortal sins. + Secondly, from the state of the sinner. Because excellence of the person of the person never diminishes sin, but, on the contrary, + increases it, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q73_A10" id="FS_Q89_A5-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[73], A[10]</a>). Therefore a sin is not less grievous in a believer than in an unbeliever, but much more so. For the sins of an unbeliever + are more deserving of forgiveness, on account of their ignorance, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A5-p6.3" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.13" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:13</a>: "I obtained the mercy of God, because I did it ignorantly in + my unbelief": whereas the sins of believers are more grievous on account of the sacraments of grace, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A5-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Heb.10.29" target="asv"> Heb. 10:29</a>: "How much more, do you think, he deserveth worse punishments . . . who hath esteemed the blood of the testament unclean, + by which he was sanctified?" + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 5 co."><a name="37413" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37413] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod irrationabiliter dicitur quod primi motus infidelium +sint peccata mortalia, si eis non consentiatur. Et hoc patet +dupliciter. Primo quidem, quia ipsa sensualitas non potest esse +subiectum peccati mortalis, ut supra habitum est. Est autem eadem +natura sensualitatis in infidelibus et fidelibus. Unde non potest +esse quod solus motus sensualitatis in infidelibus sit peccatum +mortale. Alio modo, ex statu ipsius peccantis. Nunquam enim +dignitas personae diminuit peccatum, sed magis auget, ut ex supra +dictis patet. Unde nec peccatum est minus in fideli quam in +infideli, sed multo maius. Nam et infidelium peccata magis merentur +veniam, propter ignorantiam, secundum illud I ad Tim. I, +<i>misericordiam Dei consecutus sum, quia ignorans feci in +incredulitate mea</i>; et peccata fidelium aggravantur propter +gratiae sacramenta, secundum illud Heb. X, <i>quanto magis putatis +deteriora mereri supplicia, qui sanguinem testamenti, in quo +sanctificatus est, pollutum duxerit?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle is speaking of the condemnation due to original sin, which condemnation is remitted by the grace of Jesus Christ, + although the "fomes" of concupiscence remain. Wherefore the fact that believers are subject to concupiscence is not in them + a sign of the condemnation due to original sin, as it is in unbelievers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="37414" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37414] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod apostolus loquitur de damnatione debita peccato +originali, quae aufertur per gratiam Iesu Christi, quamvis maneat +concupiscentiae fomes. Unde hoc quod fideles concupiscunt, non est +in eis signum damnationis originalis peccati, sicut est in +infidelibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A5-p8"> In this way also is to be understood the saying of Anselm, wherefore the Reply to the Second Objection is evident.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="37415" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37415] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Et hoc etiam +modo intelligendum est dictum Anselmi. Unde patet solutio ad +secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This freedom from liability to concupiscence was a result of original justice. Wherefore that which is opposed to such liability + pertains, not to actual but to original sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="37416" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37416] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod illud debitum non concupiscendi erat per originalem +iustitiam. Unde id quod opponitur tali debito, non pertinet ad +peccatum actuale, sed ad peccatum originale.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q89_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q89_A6-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 6. Whether venial sin can be in anyone with original sin alone?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial sin can be in a man with original sin alone. For disposition precedes habit. Now venial sin is + a disposition to mortal sin, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q88_A3" id="FS_Q89_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[88], A[3]</a>). Therefore in an unbeliever, in whom original sin is not remitted, venial sin exists before mortal sin: and so sometimes + unbelievers have venial together with original sin, and without mortal sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="37417" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37417] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum veniale possit esse in aliquo +cum solo originali. Dispositio enim praecedit habitum. Sed veniale +est dispositio ad mortale, ut supra dictum est. Ergo veniale in +infideli, cui non remittitur originale, invenitur ante mortale. Et +sic quandoque infideles habent peccata venialia cum originali, sine +mortalibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, venial sin has less in common, and less connection with mortal sin, than one mortal sin has with another. But an + unbeliever in the state of original sin, can commit one mortal sin without committing another. Therefore he can also commit + a venial sin without committing a mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="37418" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37418] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +minus habet de connexione et convenientia veniale cum mortali, quam +mortale peccatum cum mortali. Sed infidelis subiectus originali +peccato, potest committere unum peccatum mortale et non aliud. Ergo +etiam potest committere peccatum veniale, et non mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is possible to fix the time at which a child is first able to commit an actual sin: and when the child comes + to that time, it can stay a short time at least, without committing a mortal sin, because this happens in the worst criminals. + Now it is possible for the child to sin venially during that space of time, however short it may be. Therefore venial sin + can be in anyone with original sin alone and without mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="37419" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37419] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +determinari potest tempus in quo puer primo potest esse actor +peccati actualis. Ad quod tempus cum pervenerit, potest ad minus +per aliquod breve spatium stare, quin peccet mortaliter, quia hoc +etiam in maximis sceleratis contingit. In illo autem spatio, +quantumcumque brevi, potest peccare venialiter. Ergo peccatum +veniale potest esse in aliquo cum originali peccato, absque +mortali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Man is punished for original sin in the children's limbo, where there is no pain of sense as we shall state further on ( + <a href="SS_ii.html#SS_Q69_A6" id="FS_Q89_A6-p5.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[69], A[6]</a>): whereas men are punished in hell for no other than mortal sin. Therefore there will be no place where a man can be punished + for venial sin with no other than original sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 6 s. c."><a name="37420" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37420] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quia pro peccato originali puniuntur homines in Limbo puerorum, +ubi non est poena sensus, ut infra dicetur. In Inferno autem +detruduntur homines propter solum peccatum mortale. Ergo non erit +locus in quo possit puniri ille qui habet peccatum veniale cum +originali solo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for venial sin to be in anyone with original sin alone, and without mortal sin. The reason for this is because + before a man comes to the age of discretion, the lack of years hinders the use of reason and excuses him from mortal sin, + wherefore, much more does it excuse him from venial sin, if he does anything which is such generically. But when he begins + to have the use of reason, he is not entirely excused from the guilt of venial or mortal + sin. Now the first thing that occurs to a man to think about then, is to deliberate about himself. And if he then direct himself + to the due end, he will, by means of grace, receive the remission of original sin: whereas if he does not then direct himself + to the due end, and as far as he is capable of discretion at that particular age, he will sin mortally, for through not doing + that which is in his power to do. Accordingly thenceforward there cannot be venial sin in him without mortal, until + afterwards all sin shall have been remitted to him through grace. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 6 co."><a name="37421" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37421] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod impossibile est quod peccatum veniale sit in aliquo +cum originali peccato, absque mortali. Cuius ratio est quia +antequam ad annos discretionis perveniat, defectus aetatis, +prohibens usum rationis, excusat eum a peccato mortali, unde multo +magis excusat eum a peccato veniali, si committat aliquid quod sit +ex genere suo tale. Cum vero usum rationis habere inceperit, non +omnino excusatur a culpa venialis et mortalis peccati. Sed primum +quod tunc homini cogitandum occurrit, est deliberare de seipso. Et +si quidem seipsum ordinaverit ad debitum finem, per gratiam +consequetur remissionem originalis peccati. Si vero non ordinet +seipsum ad debitum finem, secundum quod in illa aetate est capax +discretionis, peccabit mortaliter, non faciens quod in se est. Et +ex tunc non erit in eo peccatum veniale sine mortali, nisi postquam +totum fuerit sibi per gratiam remissum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Venial sin always precedes mortal sin not as a necessary, but as a contingent disposition, just as work sometimes disposes + to fever, but not as heat disposes to the form of fire. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="37422" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37422] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod veniale non est dispositio ex necessitate +praecedens mortale, sed contingenter, sicut labor disponit +quandoque ad febrem, non autem sicut calor disponit ad formam +ignis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Venial sin is prevented from being with original sin alone, not on account of its want of connection or likeness, but on + account of the lack of use of reason, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="37423" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37423] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod non impeditur peccatum veniale esse simul cum solo +originali propter distantiam eius vel convenientiam; sed propter +defectum usus rationis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The child that is beginning to have the use of reason can refrain from other mortal sins for a time, but it is not free from + the aforesaid sin of omission, unless it turns to God as soon as possible. For the first thing that occurs to a man who has + discretion, is to think of himself, and to direct other things to himself as to their end, since the end is the first thing + in the intention. Therefore this is the time when man is bound by God's + affirmative precept, which the Lord expressed by saying ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A6-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Zech.1.3" target="asv">Zech. 1:3</a>): "Turn ye to Me . . . and I will turn to you." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="37424" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37424] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ab aliis peccatis mortalibus potest puer incipiens +habere usum rationis, per aliquod tempus abstinere, sed a peccato +omissionis praedictae non liberatur, nisi quam cito potest, se +convertat ad Deum. Primum enim quod occurrit homini discretionem +habenti est quod de seipso cogitet, ad quem alia ordinet sicut ad +finem, finis enim est prior in intentione. Et ideo hoc est tempus +pro quo obligatur ex Dei praecepto affirmativo, quo dominus dicit, +<i>convertimini ad me, et ego convertar ad vos</i>, Zachariae +I.</p></div></div></div></div> + + + ` + </div> + </body> + </html>
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/summa/bilingual/FS_vi.html Sat Sep 10 10:03:58 2022 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,16296 @@ + + <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:x="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + <head> + <title>Bilingual Aquinas</title> + <style> + h2, h3, h4 {margin-bottom: 0px; clear: both} + .bilingual {clear: both; margin-top: .5em} + div.eng {width: 45%; float: left} + div.lat {width: 45%; float: right} + @page { size: A4 portrait; margin: 1cm; + orphans: 2; widows: 2; + } + @media print {div.div3 {page-break-before: always}} + </style> + </head> + <body style="font-family: Bitstream Vera Serif"><div id="FS.vi" class="div2"> + + + <h2 id="FS.vi-p0.1">TREATISE ON LAW (QQ 90-108)</h2><div class="toc"><a href="#FS_Q90">Q. 90. OF THE ESSENCE OF LAW (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q91">Q. 91. OF THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q92">Q. 92. OF THE EFFECTS OF LAW (TWO ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q93">Q. 93. OF THE ETERNAL LAW (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q94">Q. 94. OF THE NATURAL LAW (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q95">Q. 95. OF HUMAN LAW (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q96">Q. 96. OF THE POWER OF HUMAN LAW (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q97">Q. 97. OF CHANGE IN LAWS (FOUR ARTICLES) </a><br/><a href="#FS_Q98">Q. 98. OF THE OLD LAW (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q99">Q. 99. OF THE PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q100">Q. 100. OF THE MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW (TWELVE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q101">Q. 101. OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS IN THEMSELVES (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q102">Q. 102. OF THE CAUSES OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q103">Q. 103. OF THE DURATION OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q104">Q. 104. OF THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q105">Q. 105. OF THE REASON FOR THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q106">Q. 106. OF THE LAW OF THE GOSPEL, CALLED THE NEW LAW, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q107">Q. 107. OF THE NEW LAW AS COMPARED WITH THE OLD (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q108">Q. 108. OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE CONTAINED IN THE NEW LAW (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/></div> + <div id="FS_Q90" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q90-p0.1">Q. 90. OF THE ESSENCE OF LAW (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q90-p2"> We have now to consider the extrinsic principles of acts. Now the extrinsic principle inclining to evil is the devil, of + whose temptations we have spoken in the + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q114" id="FS_Q90-p2.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[114].</a> But the extrinsic principle moving to good is God, Who both instructs us by means of His Law, and assists us by His Grace: + wherefore in the first place we must speak of law; in the second place, of grace. + </p><p id="FS_Q90-p3"> Concerning law, we must consider: (1) Law itself in general; (2) its parts. Concerning law in general three points offer + themselves for our consideration: (1) Its essence; (2) The different kinds of law; (3) The effects of law. + </p><p id="FS_Q90-p4"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q90-p5"><a href="#FS_Q90_A1"> (1) Whether law is something pertaining to reason?</a></p><p id="FS_Q90-p6"><a href="#FS_Q90_A2"> (2) Concerning the end of law;</a></p><p id="FS_Q90-p7"><a href="#FS_Q90_A3"> (3) Its cause;</a></p><p id="FS_Q90-p8"><a href="#FS_Q90_A4"> (4) The promulgation of law.</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 pr."><a name="37425" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37425] +Iª-IIae q. 90 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de +principiis exterioribus actuum. Principium autem exterius ad malum +inclinans est Diabolus, de cuius tentatione in primo dictum est. +Principium autem exterius movens ad bonum est Deus, qui et nos +instruit per legem, et iuvat per gratiam. Unde primo, de lege; +secundo, de gratia dicendum est. Circa legem autem, primo oportet +considerare de ipsa lege in communi; secundo, de partibus eius. +Circa legem autem in communi tria occurrunt consideranda, primo +quidem, de essentia ipsius; secundo, de differentia legum; tertio, +de effectibus legis. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum +lex sit aliquid rationis. Secundo, de fine legis. Tertio, de causa +eius. Quarto, de promulgatione ipsius.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q90_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q90_A1-p0.1">Q. 90. A. 1. Whether law is something pertaining to reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that law is not something pertaining to reason. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q90_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.23" target="asv">Rom. 7:23</a>): "I see another law in my members," etc. But nothing pertaining to reason is in the members; since the reason does not make + use of a bodily organ. Therefore law is not something pertaining to reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37426" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37426] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex non sit aliquid rationis. Dicit +enim apostolus, ad Rom. VII, <i>video aliam legem in membris +meis,</i> et cetera. Sed nihil quod est rationis, est in membris, +quia ratio non utitur organo corporali. Ergo lex non est aliquid +rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in the reason there is nothing else but power, habit, and act. But law is not the power itself of reason. In like + manner, neither is it a habit of reason: because the habits of reason are the intellectual virtues of which we have spoken + above ( + <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q57" id="FS_Q90_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[57])</a>. Nor again is it an act of reason: because then law would cease, when the act of reason ceases, for instance, while we are + asleep. Therefore law is nothing pertaining to reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37427" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37427] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +in ratione non est nisi potentia, habitus et actus. Sed lex non est +ipsa potentia rationis. Similiter etiam non est aliquis habitus +rationis, quia habitus rationis sunt virtutes intellectuales, de +quibus supra dictum est. Nec etiam est actus rationis, quia +cessante rationis actu, lex cessaret, puta in dormientibus. Ergo +lex non est aliquid rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the law moves those who are subject to it to act aright. But it belongs properly to the will to move to act, as + is evident from what has been said above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q90_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Therefore law pertains, not to the reason, but to the will; according to the words of the Jurist (Lib. i, ff., De Const. + Prin. leg. i): "Whatsoever pleaseth the sovereign, has force of law." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37428" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37428] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex movet eos qui subiiciuntur legi, ad recte agendum. Sed movere +ad agendum proprie pertinet ad voluntatem, ut patet ex praemissis. +Ergo lex non pertinet ad rationem, sed magis ad voluntatem, +secundum quod etiam iurisperitus dicit, <i>quod placuit principi, +legis habet vigorem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It belongs to the law to command and to forbid. But it belongs to reason to command, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q17_A1" id="FS_Q90_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[17], A[1]</a>). Therefore law is something pertaining to reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37429" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37429] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod ad legem pertinet praecipere et prohibere. Sed imperare +est rationis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo lex est aliquid +rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is induced to act or is restrained from acting: for "lex" [law] is derived + from "ligare" [to bind], because it binds one to act. Now the rule and measure of human acts is the reason, which is the first + principle of human acts, as is evident from what has been stated above ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A1" id="FS_Q90_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[1]</a>, ad 3); since it belongs to the reason to direct to the end, which is the first principle in all matters + of action, according to the Philosopher (Phys. ii). Now that which is the principle in any genus, is the rule and measure + of that genus: for instance, unity in the genus of numbers, and the first movement in the genus of movements. Consequently + it follows that law is something pertaining to reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 1 co."><a name="37430" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37430] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod lex quaedam regula est et mensura actuum, secundum +quam inducitur aliquis ad agendum, vel ab agendo retrahitur, +dicitur enim lex a ligando, quia obligat ad agendum. Regula autem +et mensura humanorum actuum est ratio, quae est primum principium +actuum humanorum, ut ex praedictis patet, rationis enim est +ordinare ad finem, qui est primum principium in agendis, secundum +philosophum. In unoquoque autem genere id quod est principium, est +mensura et regula illius generis, sicut unitas in genere numeri, et +motus primus in genere motuum. Unde relinquitur quod lex sit +aliquid pertinens ad rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since law is a kind of rule and measure, it may be in something in two ways. First, as in that which measures and rules: + and since this is proper to reason, it follows that, in this way, law is in the reason alone. Secondly, as in that which is + measured and ruled. In this way, law is in all those things that are inclined to something by reason of some law: so that + any inclination arising from a law, may be called a law, not essentially but by + participation as it were. And thus the inclination of the members to concupiscence is called "the law of the members." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37431" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37431] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, cum lex sit regula quaedam et mensura, dicitur +dupliciter esse in aliquo. Uno modo, sicut in mensurante et +regulante. Et quia hoc est proprium rationis, ideo per hunc modum +lex est in ratione sola. Alio modo, sicut in regulato et mensurato. +Et sic lex est in omnibus quae inclinantur in aliquid ex aliqua +lege, ita quod quaelibet inclinatio proveniens ex aliqua lege, +potest dici lex, non essentialiter, sed quasi participative. Et hoc +modo inclinatio ipsa membrorum ad concupiscendum lex membrorum +vocatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as, in external action, we may consider the work and the work done, for instance the work of building and the house + built; so in the acts of reason, we may consider the act itself of reason, i.e. to understand and to reason, and something + produced by this act. With regard to the speculative reason, this is first of all the definition; secondly, the proposition; + thirdly, the syllogism or argument. And since also the practical reason makes use of a + syllogism in respect of the work to be done, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q13_A3" id="FS_Q90_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[13], A[3]</a>; + <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q76_A1" id="FS_Q90_A1-p8.2" shape="rect"> Q[76], A[1]</a>) and since as the Philosopher teaches (Ethic. vii, 3); hence we find in the practical reason something that holds the same + position in regard to operations, as, in the speculative intellect, the proposition holds in regard to conclusions. Such like + universal propositions of the practical intellect that are directed to actions have the nature of law. And these + propositions are sometimes under our actual consideration, while sometimes they are retained in the reason by means of a habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37432" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37432] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut in actibus exterioribus est considerare +operationem et operatum, puta aedificationem et aedificatum; ita in +operibus rationis est considerare ipsum actum rationis, qui est +intelligere et ratiocinari, et aliquid per huiusmodi actum +constitutum. Quod quidem in speculativa ratione primo quidem est +definitio; secundo, enunciatio; tertio vero, syllogismus vel +argumentatio. Et quia ratio etiam practica utitur quodam syllogismo +in operabilibus, ut supra habitum est, secundum quod philosophus +docet in VII Ethic.; ideo est invenire aliquid in ratione practica +quod ita se habeat ad operationes, sicut se habet propositio in +ratione speculativa ad conclusiones. Et huiusmodi propositiones +universales rationis practicae ordinatae ad actiones, habent +rationem legis. Quae quidem propositiones aliquando actualiter +considerantur, aliquando vero habitualiter a ratione tenentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Reason has its power of moving from the will, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q17_A1" id="FS_Q90_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[17], A[1]</a>): for it is due to the fact that one wills the end, that the reason issues its commands as regards things ordained to the + end. But in order that the volition of what is commanded may have the nature of law, it needs to be in accord with some rule + of reason. And in this sense is to be understood the saying that the will of the sovereign has the force of + law; otherwise the sovereign's will would savor of lawlessness rather than of law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37433" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37433] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio habet vim movendi a voluntate, ut supra dictum +est, ex hoc enim quod aliquis vult finem, ratio imperat de his quae +sunt ad finem. Sed voluntas de his quae imperantur, ad hoc quod +legis rationem habeat, oportet quod sit aliqua ratione regulata. Et +hoc modo intelligitur quod voluntas principis habet vigorem legis, +alioquin voluntas principis magis esset iniquitas quam lex.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q90_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q90_A2-p0.1">Q. 90. A. 2. Whether the law is always something directed to the common good? </h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the law is not always directed to the common good as to its end. For it belongs to law to command and + to forbid. But commands are directed to certain individual goods. Therefore the end of the law is not always the common good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37434" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37434] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex non ordinetur semper ad bonum +commune sicut ad finem. Ad legem enim pertinet praecipere et +prohibere. Sed praecepta ordinantur ad quaedam singularia bona. Non +ergo semper finis legis est bonum commune.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the law directs man in his actions. But human actions are concerned with particular matters. Therefore the law is + directed to some particular good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37435" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37435] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +lex dirigit hominem ad agendum. Sed actus humani sunt in +particularibus. Ergo et lex ad aliquod particulare bonum +ordinatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Isidore says (Etym. v, 3): "If the law is based on reason, whatever is based on reason will be a law." But reason + is the foundation not only of what is ordained to the common good, but also of that which is directed private good. Therefore + the law is not only directed to the good of all, but also to the private good of an individual. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37436" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37436] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., <i>si ratione lex constat, lex +erit omne quod ratione constiterit</i>. Sed ratione consistit non +solum quod ordinatur ad bonum commune, sed etiam quod ordinatur ad +bonum privatum. Ergo lex non ordinatur solum ad bonum commune, sed +etiam ad bonum privatum unius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore says (Etym. v, 21) that "laws are enacted for no private profit, but for the common benefit of the citizens." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37437" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37437] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Isidorus dicit, in V Etymol., quod <i>lex est nullo +privato commodo, sed pro communi utilitate civium +conscripta</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q90_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q90_A1" id="FS_Q90_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the law belongs to that which is a principle of human acts, because it is their rule and measure. Now as reason is a principle + of human acts, so in reason itself there is something which is the principle in respect of all the rest: wherefore to this + principle chiefly and mainly law must needs be referred. Now the first principle in practical matters, which are the object + of the practical reason, is the last + end: and the last end of human life is bliss or happiness, as stated above (Q[2], A[7]; Q[3], A[1]). Consequently the law + must needs regard principally the relationship to happiness. Moreover, since every part is ordained to the whole, as imperfect + to perfect; and since one man is a part of the perfect community, the law must needs regard properly the relationship to universal + happiness. Wherefore the Philosopher, in the above definition of legal matters mentions both happiness and the body + politic: for he says (Ethic. v, 1) that we call those legal matters "just, which are adapted to produce and preserve happiness + and its parts for the body politic": since the state is a perfect community, as he says in Polit. i, 1. + </p><p id="FS_Q90_A2-p7"> Now in every genus, that which belongs to it chiefly is the principle of the others, and the others belong to that genus + in subordination to that thing: thus fire, which is chief among hot things, is the cause of heat in mixed bodies, and these + are said to be hot in so far as they have a share of fire. Consequently, since the law is chiefly ordained to the common good, + any other precept in regard to some individual work, must needs be devoid of the nature of a law, save in so + far as it regards the common good. Therefore every law is ordained to the common good. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 2 co."><a name="37438" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37438] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, lex pertinet ad id quod est +principium humanorum actuum, ex eo quod est regula et mensura. +Sicut autem ratio est principium humanorum actuum, ita etiam in +ipsa ratione est aliquid quod est principium respectu omnium +aliorum. Unde ad hoc oportet quod principaliter et maxime pertineat +lex. Primum autem principium in operativis, quorum est ratio +practica, est finis ultimus. Est autem ultimus finis humanae vitae +felicitas vel beatitudo, ut supra habitum est. Unde oportet quod +lex maxime respiciat ordinem qui est in beatitudinem. Rursus, cum +omnis pars ordinetur ad totum sicut imperfectum ad perfectum; unus +autem homo est pars communitatis perfectae, necesse est quod lex +proprie respiciat ordinem ad felicitatem communem. Unde et +philosophus, in praemissa definitione legalium, mentionem facit et +de felicitate et communione politica. Dicit enim, in V Ethic., quod +<i>legalia iusta dicimus factiva et conservativa felicitatis et +particularum ipsius, politica communicatione</i>, perfecta enim +communitas civitas est, ut dicitur in I Polit. In quolibet autem +genere id quod maxime dicitur, est principium aliorum, et alia +dicuntur secundum ordinem ad ipsum, sicut ignis, qui est maxime +calidus, est causa caliditatis in corporibus mixtis, quae intantum +dicuntur calida, inquantum participant de igne. Unde oportet quod, +cum lex maxime dicatur secundum ordinem ad bonum commune, +quodcumque aliud praeceptum de particulari opere non habeat +rationem legis nisi secundum ordinem ad bonum commune. Et ideo +omnis lex ad bonum commune ordinatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A command denotes an application of a law to matters regulated by the law. Now the order to the common good, at which the + law aims, is applicable to particular ends. And in this way commands are given even concerning particular matters. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37439" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37439] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod praeceptum importat applicationem legis ad ea +quae ex lege regulantur. Ordo autem ad bonum commune, qui pertinet +ad legem, est applicabilis ad singulares fines. Et secundum hoc, +etiam de particularibus quibusdam praecepta dantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Actions are indeed concerned with particular matters: but those particular matters are referable to the common good, not + as to a common genus or species, but as to a common final cause, according as the common good is said to be the common end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37440" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37440] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod operationes quidem sunt in particularibus, sed illa +particularia referri possunt ad bonum commune, non quidem +communitate generis vel speciei, sed communitate causae finalis, +secundum quod bonum commune dicitur finis communis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as nothing stands firm with regard to the speculative reason except that which is traced back to the first indemonstrable + principles, so nothing stands firm with regard to the practical reason, unless it be directed to the last end which is the + common good: and whatever stands to reason in this sense, has the nature of a law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37441" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37441] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut nihil constat firmiter secundum rationem +speculativam nisi per resolutionem ad prima principia +indemonstrabilia, ita firmiter nihil constat per rationem practicam +nisi per ordinationem ad ultimum finem, qui est bonum commune. Quod +autem hoc modo ratione constat, legis rationem habet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q90_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q90_A3-p0.1">Q. 90. A. 3. Whether the reason of any man is competent to make laws?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the reason of any man is competent to make laws. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q90_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.14" target="asv">Rom. 2:14</a>) that "when the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law . . . they are a law to themselves." + Now he says this of all in general. Therefore anyone can make a law for himself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37442" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37442] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod cuiuslibet ratio sit factiva legis. +Dicit enim apostolus, ad Rom. II, quod <i>cum gentes, quae legem +non habent, naturaliter ea quae legis sunt faciunt, ipsi sibi sunt +lex</i>. Hoc autem communiter de omnibus dicit. Ergo quilibet +potest facere sibi legem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1), "the intention of the lawgiver is to lead men to virtue." But every man + can lead another to virtue. Therefore the reason of any man is competent to make laws. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37443" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37443] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut philosophus dicit, in libro II Ethic., <i>intentio +legislatoris est ut inducat hominem ad virtutem</i>. Sed quilibet +homo potest alium inducere ad virtutem. Ergo cuiuslibet hominis +ratio est factiva legis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as the sovereign of a state governs the state, so every father of a family governs his household. But the sovereign + of a state can make laws for the state. Therefore every father of a family can make laws for his household. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37444" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37444] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut princeps civitatis est civitatis gubernator, ita quilibet +paterfamilias est gubernator domus. Sed princeps civitatis potest +legem in civitate facere. Ergo quilibet paterfamilias potest in sua +domo facere legem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore says (Etym. v, 10): "A law is an ordinance of the people, whereby something is sanctioned by the Elders together + with the Commonalty." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37445" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37445] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., et habetur in decretis, +dist. II, <i>lex est constitutio populi, secundum quam maiores natu +simul cum plebibus aliquid sanxerunt</i>. Non est ergo cuiuslibet +facere legem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A law, properly speaking, regards first and foremost the order to the common good. Now to order anything to the common good, + belongs either to the whole people, or to someone who is the viceregent of the whole people. And therefore the making of a + law belongs either to the whole people or to a public personage who has care of the whole people: since in all other matters + the directing of anything to the end concerns him to whom the end belongs. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 3 co."><a name="37446" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37446] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod lex proprie, primo et principaliter respicit ordinem +ad bonum commune. Ordinare autem aliquid in bonum commune est vel +totius multitudinis, vel alicuius gerentis vicem totius +multitudinis. Et ideo condere legem vel pertinet ad totam +multitudinem, vel pertinet ad personam publicam quae totius +multitudinis curam habet. Quia et in omnibus aliis ordinare in +finem est eius cuius est proprius ille finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (A[1], ad 1), a law is in a person not only as in one that rules, but also by participation as in one that + is ruled. In the latter way each one is a law to himself, in so far as he shares the direction that he receives from one who + rules him. Hence the same text goes on: "Who show the work of the law written in their hearts." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37447" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37447] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, lex est in aliquo non +solum sicut in regulante, sed etiam participative sicut in +regulato. Et hoc modo unusquisque sibi est lex, inquantum +participat ordinem alicuius regulantis. Unde et ibidem subditur, +<i>qui ostendunt opus legis scriptum in cordibus suis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A private person cannot lead another to virtue efficaciously: for he can only advise, and if his advice be not taken, it + has no coercive power, such as the law should have, in order to prove an efficacious inducement to virtue, as the Philosopher + says (Ethic. x, 9). But this coercive power is vested in the whole people or in some public personage, to whom it belongs + to inflict penalties, as we shall state further on (Q[92], A[2], ad 3; + + <a href="SS_ii.html#SS_Q64_A3" id="FS_Q90_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[64], A[3]</a>). Wherefore the framing of laws belongs to him alone. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37448" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37448] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod persona privata non potest inducere efficaciter ad +virtutem. Potest enim solum monere, sed si sua monitio non +recipiatur, non habet vim coactivam; quam debet habere lex, ad hoc +quod efficaciter inducat ad virtutem, ut philosophus dicit, in X +Ethic. Hanc autem virtutem coactivam habet multitudo vel persona +publica, ad quam pertinet poenas infligere, ut infra dicetur. Et +ideo solius eius est leges facere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As one man is a part of the household, so a household is a part of the state: and the state is a perfect community, according + to Polit. i, 1. And therefore, as the good of one man is not the last end, but is ordained to the common good; so too the + good of one household is ordained to the good of a single state, which is a perfect community. Consequently he that governs + a family, can indeed make certain commands or ordinances, but not such as to have + properly the force of law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37449" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37449] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut homo est pars domus, ita domus est pars +civitatis, civitas autem est communitas perfecta, ut dicitur in I +Politic. Et ideo sicut bonum unius hominis non est ultimus finis, +sed ordinatur ad commune bonum; ita etiam et bonum unius domus +ordinatur ad bonum unius civitatis, quae est communitas perfecta. +Unde ille qui gubernat aliquam familiam, potest quidem facere +aliqua praecepta vel statuta; non tamen quae proprie habeant +rationem legis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q90_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q90_A4-p0.1">Q. 90. A. 4. Whether promulgation is essential to a law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that promulgation is not essential to a law. For the natural law above all has the character of law. But the + natural law needs no promulgation. Therefore it is not essential to a law that it be promulgated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37450" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37450] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod promulgatio non sit de ratione legis. +Lex enim naturalis maxime habet rationem legis. Sed lex naturalis +non indiget promulgatione. Ergo non est de ratione legis quod +promulgetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs properly to a law to bind one to do or not to do something. But the obligation of fulfilling a law touches + not only those in whose presence it is promulgated, but also others. Therefore promulgation is not essential to a law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37451" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37451] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ad legem pertinet proprie obligare ad aliquid faciendum vel non +faciendum. Sed non solum obligantur ad implendam legem illi coram +quibus promulgatur lex, sed etiam alii. Ergo promulgatio non est de +ratione legis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the binding force of a law extends even to the future, since "laws are binding in matters of the future," as the + jurists say (Cod. 1, tit. De lege et constit. leg. vii). But promulgation concerns those who are present. Therefore it is + not essential to a law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37452" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37452] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +obligatio legis extenditur etiam in futurum, quia leges futuris +negotiis necessitatem imponunt, ut iura dicunt. Sed promulgatio fit +ad praesentes. Ergo promulgatio non est de necessitate legis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is laid down in the Decretals, dist. 4, that "laws are established when they are promulgated." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37453" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37453] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur in decretis, IV dist., quod <i>leges instituuntur +cum promulgantur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q90_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q90_A1" id="FS_Q90_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, a law is imposed on others by way of a rule and measure. Now a rule or measure is imposed by being applied to those who + are to be ruled and measured by it. Wherefore, in order that a law obtain the binding force which is proper to a law, it must + needs be applied to the men who have to be ruled by it. Such application is made by its being notified to them by promulgation. + Wherefore promulgation is necessary for + the law to obtain its force. + </p><p id="FS_Q90_A4-p7"> Thus from the four preceding articles, the definition of law may be gathered; and it is nothing else than an ordinance of + reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 4 co."><a name="37454" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37454] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, lex imponitur aliis per modum +regulae et mensurae. Regula autem et mensura imponitur per hoc quod +applicatur his quae regulantur et mensurantur. Unde ad hoc quod lex +virtutem obligandi obtineat, quod est proprium legis, oportet quod +applicetur hominibus qui secundum eam regulari debent. Talis autem +applicatio fit per hoc quod in notitiam eorum deducitur ex ipsa +promulgatione. Unde promulgatio necessaria est ad hoc quod lex +habeat suam virtutem. Et sic ex quatuor praedictis potest colligi +definitio legis, quae nihil est aliud quam quaedam rationis +ordinatio ad bonum commune, ab eo qui curam communitatis habet, +promulgata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The natural law is promulgated by the very fact that God instilled it into man's mind so as to be known by him naturally. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37455" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37455] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod promulgatio legis naturae est ex hoc ipso quod +Deus eam mentibus hominum inseruit naturaliter cognoscendam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those who are not present when a law is promulgated, are bound to observe the law, in so far as it is notified or can be + notified to them by others, after it has been promulgated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37456" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37456] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod illi coram quibus lex non promulgatur, obligantur ad +legem servandam, inquantum in eorum notitiam devenit per alios, vel +devenire potest, promulgatione facta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The promulgation that takes place now, extends to future time by reason of the durability of written characters, by which + means it is continually promulgated. Hence Isidore says (Etym. v, 3; ii, 10) that "lex [law] is derived from legere [to read] + because it is written." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37457" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37457] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod promulgatio praesens in futurum extenditur per +firmitatem Scripturae, quae quodammodo semper eam promulgat. Unde +Isidorus dicit, in II Etymol., quod <i>lex a legendo vocata est, +quia scripta est</i>.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q91" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q91-p0.1">Q. 91. OF THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q91-p2"> We must now consider the various kinds of law: under which head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q91-p3"><a href="#FS_Q91_A1"> (1) Whether there is an eternal law?</a></p><p id="FS_Q91-p4"><a href="#FS_Q91_A2"> (2) Whether there is a natural law?</a></p><p id="FS_Q91-p5"><a href="#FS_Q91_A3"> (3) Whether there is a human law?</a></p><p id="FS_Q91-p6"><a href="#FS_Q91_A4"> (4) Whether there is a Divine law?</a></p><p id="FS_Q91-p7"><a href="#FS_Q91_A5"> (5) Whether there is one Divine law, or several?</a></p><p id="FS_Q91-p8"><a href="#FS_Q91_A6"> (6) Whether there is a law of sin?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 pr."><a name="37458" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37458] +Iª-IIae q. 91 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +diversitate legum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum sit +aliqua lex aeterna. Secundo, utrum sit aliqua lex naturalis. +Tertio, utrum sit aliqua lex humana. Quarto, utrum sit aliqua lex +divina. Quinto, utrum sit una tantum, vel plures. Sexto, utrum sit +aliqua lex peccati.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q91_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q91_A1-p0.1">Q. 91. A. 1. Whether there is an eternal law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no eternal law. Because every law is imposed on someone. But there was not someone from eternity + on whom a law could be imposed: since God alone was from eternity. Therefore no law is eternal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37459" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37459] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit aliqua lex aeterna. Omnis enim +lex aliquibus imponitur. Sed non fuit ab aeterno aliquis cui lex +posset imponi, solus enim Deus fuit ab aeterno. Ergo nulla lex est +aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, promulgation is essential to law. But promulgation could not be from eternity: because there was no one to whom + it could be promulgated from eternity. Therefore no law can be eternal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37460" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37460] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +promulgatio est de ratione legis. Sed promulgatio non potuit esse +ab aeterno, quia non erat ab aeterno cui promulgaretur. Ergo nulla +lex potest esse aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a law implies order to an end. But nothing ordained to an end is eternal: for the last end alone is eternal. Therefore + no law is eternal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37461" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37461] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex importat ordinem ad finem. Sed nihil est aeternum quod +ordinetur ad finem, solus enim ultimus finis est aeternus. Ergo +nulla lex est aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): "That Law which is the Supreme Reason cannot be understood to be otherwise than unchangeable + and eternal." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37462" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37462] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib. Arb., <i>lex quae summa +ratio nominatur, non potest cuipiam intelligenti non incommutabilis +aeternaque videri</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[90], A[1], ad 2; + <a href="#FS_Q91_A3" id="FS_Q91_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[3]</a>,4), a law is nothing else but a dictate of practical reason emanating from the ruler who governs a perfect community. Now + it is evident, granted that the world is ruled by Divine Providence, as was stated in the + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q22_A1" id="FS_Q91_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[22], AA[1]</a>,2, that the whole community of the universe is governed by Divine Reason. Wherefore the very Idea of the government of things + in God the + Ruler of the universe, has the nature of a law. And since the Divine Reason's conception of things is not subject to time + but is eternal, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.23" target="asv"> Prov. 8:23, </a> therefore it is that this kind of law must be called eternal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 1 co."><a name="37463" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37463] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, nihil est aliud lex quam +quoddam dictamen practicae rationis in principe qui gubernat +aliquam communitatem perfectam. Manifestum est autem, supposito +quod mundus divina providentia regatur, ut in primo habitum est, +quod tota communitas universi gubernatur ratione divina. Et ideo +ipsa ratio gubernationis rerum in Deo sicut in principe +universitatis existens, legis habet rationem. Et quia divina ratio +nihil concipit ex tempore, sed habet aeternum conceptum, ut dicitur +Prov. VIII; inde est quod huiusmodi legem oportet dicere +aeternam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those things that are not in themselves, exist with God, inasmuch as they are foreknown and preordained by Him, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.4.17" target="asv">Rom. 4:17</a>: "Who calls those things that are not, as those that are." Accordingly the eternal concept of the Divine law bears the character + of an eternal law, in so far as it is ordained by God to the government of things foreknown by Him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37464" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37464] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ea quae in seipsis non sunt, apud Deum existunt, +inquantum sunt ab ipso praecognita et praeordinata; secundum illud +Rom. IV, <i>qui vocat ea quae non sunt, tanquam ea quae sunt</i>. +Sic igitur aeternus divinae legis conceptus habet rationem legis +aeternae, secundum quod a Deo ordinatur ad gubernationem rerum ab +ipso praecognitarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Promulgation is made by word of mouth or in writing; and in both ways the eternal law is promulgated: because both the Divine + Word and the writing of the Book of Life are eternal. But the promulgation cannot be from eternity on the part of the creature + that hears or reads. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37465" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37465] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod promulgatio fit et verbo et scripto; et utroque modo +lex aeterna habet promulgationem ex parte Dei promulgantis, quia et +verbum divinum est aeternum, et Scriptura libri vitae est aeterna. +Sed ex parte creaturae audientis aut inspicientis, non potest esse +promulgatio aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The law implies order to the end actively, in so far as it directs certain things to the end; but not passively---that is + to say, the law itself is not ordained to the end---except accidentally, in a governor whose end is extrinsic to him, and + to which end his law must needs be ordained. But the end of the Divine government is God Himself, and His law is not distinct + from Himself. Wherefore the eternal law is not ordained to another end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37466" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37466] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod lex importat ordinem ad finem active, inquantum +scilicet per eam ordinantur aliqua in finem, non autem passive, +idest quod ipsa lex ordinetur ad finem, nisi per accidens in +gubernante cuius finis est extra ipsum, ad quem etiam necesse est +ut lex eius ordinetur. Sed finis divinae gubernationis est ipse +Deus, nec eius lex est aliud ab ipso. Unde lex aeterna non +ordinatur in alium finem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q91_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q91_A2-p0.1">Q. 91. A. 2. Whether there is in us a natural law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no natural law in us. Because man is governed sufficiently by the eternal law: for Augustine + says (De Lib. Arb. i) that "the eternal law is that by which it is right that all things should be most orderly." But nature + does not abound in superfluities as neither does she fail in necessaries. Therefore no law is natural to man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37467" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37467] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit in nobis aliqua lex naturalis. +Sufficienter enim homo gubernatur per legem aeternam, dicit enim +Augustinus, in I de Lib. Arb., quod <i>lex aeterna est qua iustum +est ut omnia sint ordinatissima</i>. Sed natura non abundat in +superfluis, sicut nec deficit in necessariis. Ergo non est aliqua +lex homini naturalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, by the law man is directed, in his acts, to the end, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A2" id="FS_Q91_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[90], A[2]</a>). But the directing of human acts to their end is not a function of nature, as is the case in irrational creatures, which + act for an end solely by their natural appetite; whereas man acts for an end by his reason and will. Therefore no law is natural + to man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37468" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37468] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +per legem ordinatur homo in suis actibus ad finem, ut supra habitum +est. Sed ordinatio humanorum actuum ad finem non est per naturam, +sicut accidit in creaturis irrationabilibus, quae solo appetitu +naturali agunt propter finem, sed agit homo propter finem per +rationem et voluntatem. Ergo non est aliqua lex homini +naturalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more a man is free, the less is he under the law. But man is freer than all the animals, on account of his free-will, + with which he is endowed above all other animals. Since therefore other animals are not subject to a natural law, neither + is man subject to a natural law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37469" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37469] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quanto aliquis est liberior, tanto minus est sub lege. Sed homo est +liberior omnibus animalibus, propter liberum arbitrium, quod prae +aliis animalibus habet. Cum igitur alia animalia non subdantur legi +naturali, nec homo alicui legi naturali subditur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.14" target="asv"> Rom. 2:14</a>: "When the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law," comments as follows: "Although + they have no written law, yet they have the natural law, whereby each one knows, and is conscious of, what is good and what + is evil." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37470" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37470] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod, Rom. II, super illud, <i>cum gentes, quae legem non +habent, naturaliter ea quae legis sunt faciunt</i>, dicit Glossa, +<i>etsi non habent legem scriptam, habent tamen legem naturalem, +qua quilibet intelligit et sibi conscius est quid sit bonum et quid +malum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[90], A[1], ad 1), law, being a rule and measure, can be in a person in two ways: in one way, as in him + that rules and measures; in another way, as in that which is ruled and measured, since a thing is ruled and measured, in so + far as it partakes of the rule or measure. Wherefore, since all things subject to Divine providence are ruled and measured + by the eternal law, as was stated above + <a href="#FS_Q91_A1" id="FS_Q91_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>; it is evident that + all things partake somewhat of the eternal law, in so far as, namely, from its being imprinted on them, they derive their + respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends. Now among all others, the rational creature is subject to Divine providence + in the most excellent way, in so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by being provident both for itself and for others. + Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end: and + this participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law. Hence the Psalmist after saying + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.4.6" target="asv">Ps. 4:6</a>): "Offer up the sacrifice of justice," as though someone asked what the works of justice are, adds: "Many say, Who showeth + us good things?" in answer to which question he says: "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us": thus implying + that the light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is evil, which is the function of the + natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the Divine light. It is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing + else than the rational creature's participation of the eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 2 co."><a name="37471" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37471] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, lex, cum sit regula et +mensura, dupliciter potest esse in aliquo, uno modo, sicut in +regulante et mensurante; alio modo, sicut in regulato et mensurato, +quia inquantum participat aliquid de regula vel mensura, sic +regulatur vel mensuratur. Unde cum omnia quae divinae providentiae +subduntur, a lege aeterna regulentur et mensurentur, ut ex dictis +patet; manifestum est quod omnia participant aliqualiter legem +aeternam, inquantum scilicet ex impressione eius habent +inclinationes in proprios actus et fines. Inter cetera autem +rationalis creatura excellentiori quodam modo divinae providentiae +subiacet, inquantum et ipsa fit providentiae particeps, sibi ipsi +et aliis providens. Unde et in ipsa participatur ratio aeterna, per +quam habet naturalem inclinationem ad debitum actum et finem. Et +talis participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura lex +naturalis dicitur. Unde cum Psalmista dixisset, sacrificate +sacrificium iustitiae, quasi quibusdam quaerentibus quae sunt +iustitiae opera, subiungit, multi dicunt, quis ostendit nobis bona? +Cui quaestioni respondens, dicit, signatum est super nos lumen +vultus tui, domine, quasi lumen rationis naturalis, quo discernimus +quid sit bonum et malum, quod pertinet ad naturalem legem, nihil +aliud sit quam impressio divini luminis in nobis. Unde patet quod +lex naturalis nihil aliud est quam participatio legis aeternae in +rationali creatura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument would hold, if the natural law were something different from the eternal law: whereas it is nothing but a participation + thereof, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37472" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37472] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si lex naturalis esset +aliquid diversum a lege aeterna. Non autem est nisi quaedam +participatio eius, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Every act of reason and will in us is based on that which is according to nature, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q10_A1" id="FS_Q91_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[10], A[1]</a>): for every act of reasoning is based on principles that are known naturally, and every act of appetite in respect of the + means is derived from the natural appetite in respect of the last end. Accordingly the first direction of our acts to their + end must needs be in virtue of the natural law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37473" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37473] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod omnis operatio, rationis et voluntatis derivatur in +nobis ab eo quod est secundum naturam, ut supra habitum est, nam +omnis ratiocinatio derivatur a principiis naturaliter notis, et +omnis appetitus eorum quae sunt ad finem, derivatur a naturali +appetitu ultimi finis. Et sic etiam oportet quod prima directio +actuum nostrorum ad finem, fiat per legem naturalem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even irrational animals partake in their own way of the Eternal Reason, just as the rational creature does. But because the + rational creature partakes thereof in an intellectual and rational manner, therefore the participation of the eternal law + in the rational creature is properly called a law, since a law is something pertaining to reason, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A1" id="FS_Q91_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[90], A[1]</a>). Irrational creatures, however, do not partake thereof + in a rational manner, wherefore there is no participation of the eternal law in them, except by way of similitude. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37474" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37474] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod etiam animalia irrationalia participant rationem +aeternam suo modo, sicut et rationalis creatura. Sed quia +rationalis creatura participat eam intellectualiter et +rationaliter, ideo participatio legis aeternae in creatura +rationali proprie lex vocatur, nam lex est aliquid rationis, ut +supra dictum est. In creatura autem irrationali non participatur +rationaliter, unde non potest dici lex nisi per similitudinem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q91_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q91_A3-p0.1">Q. 91. A. 3. Whether there is a human law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is not a human law. For the natural law is a participation of the eternal law, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q91_A2" id="FS_Q91_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Now through the eternal law "all things are most orderly," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. i, 6). Therefore the natural + law suffices for the ordering of all human affairs. Consequently there is no need for a human law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37475" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37475] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit aliqua lex humana. Lex enim +naturalis est participatio legis aeternae, ut dictum est. Sed per +legem aeternam omnia sunt ordinatissima, ut Augustinus dicit, in I +de Lib. Arb. Ergo lex naturalis sufficit ad omnia humana ordinanda. +Non est ergo necessarium quod sit aliqua lex humana.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a law bears the character of a measure, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A1" id="FS_Q91_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[90], A[1]</a>). But human reason is not a measure of things, but vice versa, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 5. Therefore no law can emanate + from human reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37476" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37476] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +lex habet rationem mensurae, ut dictum est. Sed ratio humana non +est mensura rerum, sed potius e converso, ut in X Metaphys. +dicitur. Ergo ex ratione humana nulla lex procedere potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a measure should be most certain, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 3. But the dictates of human reason in matters of + conduct are uncertain, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.9.14" target="asv"> Wis. 9:14</a>: "The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain." Therefore no law can emanate from human reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37477" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37477] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +mensura debet esse certissima, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed +dictamen humanae rationis de rebus gerendis est incertum; secundum +illud Sap. IX, <i>cogitationes mortalium timidae, et incertae +providentiae nostrae</i>. Ergo ex ratione humana nulla lex +procedere potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) distinguishes two kinds of law, the one eternal, the other temporal, which he calls human. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37478" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37478] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus, in I de Lib. Arb., ponit duas leges, unam +aeternam et aliam temporalem, quam dicit esse humanam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A1" id="FS_Q91_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[90], A[1]</a>, ad 2), a law is a dictate of the practical reason. Now it is to be observed that the same procedure takes place in the practical + and in the speculative reason: for each proceeds from principles to conclusions, as stated above (De Lib. Arb. i, 6). Accordingly + we conclude that just as, in the speculative reason, from naturally known indemonstrable principles, we draw the conclusions + of the various + sciences, the knowledge of which is not imparted to us by nature, but acquired by the efforts of reason, so too it is from + the precepts of the natural law, as from general and indemonstrable principles, that the human reason needs to proceed to + the more particular determination of certain matters. These particular determinations, devised by human reason, are called + human laws, provided the other essential conditions of law be observed, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A2" id="FS_Q91_A3-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[90], + AA[2] + </a>,3,4). Wherefore Tully says in his Rhetoric (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "justice has its source in nature; thence certain things + came into custom by reason of their utility; afterwards these things which emanated from nature and were approved by custom, + were sanctioned by fear and reverence for the law." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 3 co."><a name="37479" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37479] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, lex est quoddam dictamen +practicae rationis. Similis autem processus esse invenitur rationis +practicae et speculativae, utraque enim ex quibusdam principiis ad +quasdam conclusiones procedit, ut superius habitum est. Secundum +hoc ergo dicendum est quod, sicut in ratione speculativa ex +principiis indemonstrabilibus naturaliter cognitis producuntur +conclusiones diversarum scientiarum, quarum cognitio non est nobis +naturaliter indita, sed per industriam rationis inventa; ita etiam +ex praeceptis legis naturalis, quasi ex quibusdam principiis +communibus et indemonstrabilibus, necesse est quod ratio humana +procedat ad aliqua magis particulariter disponenda. Et istae +particulares dispositiones adinventae secundum rationem humanam, +dicuntur leges humanae, servatis aliis conditionibus quae pertinent +ad rationem legis, ut supra dictum est. Unde et Tullius dicit, in +sua Rhetor., quod <i>initium iuris est a natura profectum; deinde +quaedam in consuetudinem ex utilitate rationis venerunt; postea res +et a natura profectas et a consuetudine probatas legum metus et +religio sanxit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The human reason cannot have a full participation of the dictate of the Divine Reason, but according to its own mode, and + imperfectly. Consequently, as on the part of the speculative reason, by a natural participation of Divine Wisdom, there is + in us the knowledge of certain general principles, but not proper knowledge of each single truth, such as that contained in + the Divine Wisdom; so too, on the part of the practical reason, man has a natural + participation of the eternal law, according to certain general principles, but not as regards the particular determinations + of individual cases, which are, however, contained in the eternal law. Hence the need for human reason to proceed further + to sanction them by law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37480" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37480] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ratio humana non potest participare ad plenum +dictamen rationis divinae, sed suo modo et imperfecte. Et ideo +sicut ex parte rationis speculativae, per naturalem participationem +divinae sapientiae, inest nobis cognitio quorundam communium +principiorum, non autem cuiuslibet veritatis propria cognitio, +sicut in divina sapientia continetur; ita etiam ex parte rationis +practicae naturaliter homo participat legem aeternam secundum +quaedam communia principia, non autem secundum particulares +directiones singulorum, quae tamen in aeterna lege continentur. Et +ideo necesse est ulterius quod ratio humana procedat ad +particulares quasdam legum sanctiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Human reason is not, of itself, the rule of things: but the principles impressed on it by nature, are general rules and measures + of all things relating to human conduct, whereof the natural reason is the rule and measure, although it is not the measure + of things that are from nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37481" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37481] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio humana secundum se non est regula rerum, sed +principia ei naturaliter indita, sunt quaedam regulae generales et +mensurae omnium eorum quae sunt per hominem agenda, quorum ratio +naturalis est regula et mensura, licet non sit mensura eorum quae +sunt a natura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The practical reason is concerned with practical matters, which are singular and contingent: but not with necessary things, + with which the speculative reason is concerned. Wherefore human laws cannot have that inerrancy that belongs to the demonstrated + conclusions of sciences. Nor is it necessary for every measure to be altogether unerring and certain, but according as it + is possible in its own particular genus. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37482" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37482] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio practica est circa operabilia, quae sunt +singularia et contingentia, non autem circa necessaria, sicut ratio +speculativa. Et ideo leges humanae non possunt illam +infallibilitatem habere quam habent conclusiones demonstrativae +scientiarum. Nec oportet quod omnis mensura sit omni modo +infallibilis et certa, sed secundum quod est possibile in genere +suo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q91_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q91_A4-p0.1">Q. 91. A. 4. Whether there was any need for a Divine law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there was no need for a Divine law. Because, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q91_A2" id="FS_Q91_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, the natural law is a participation in us of the eternal law. But the eternal law is a Divine law, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q91_A1" id="FS_Q91_A4-p2.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore there was no need for a Divine law in addition to the natural law, and human laws derived therefrom. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37483" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37483] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit necessarium esse aliquam +legem divinam. Quia, ut dictum est, lex naturalis est quaedam +participatio legis aeternae in nobis. Sed lex aeterna est lex +divina, ut dictum est. Ergo non oportet quod praeter legem +naturalem, et leges humanas ab ea derivatas, sit aliqua alia lex +divina.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.15.14" target="asv">Ecclus. 15:14</a>) that "God left man in the hand of his own counsel." Now counsel is an act of reason, as stated above (Q[14], A[1]). Therefore + man was left to the direction of his reason. But a dictate of human reason is a human law as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q91_A3" id="FS_Q91_A4-p3.2" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. Therefore there is no need for man to be governed also by a Divine law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37484" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37484] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Eccli. XV dicitur quod <i>Deus dimisit hominem in manu consilii +sui</i>. Consilium autem est actus rationis, ut supra habitum est. +Ergo homo dimissus est gubernationi suae rationis. Sed dictamen +rationis humanae est lex humana, ut dictum est. Ergo non oportet +quod homo alia lege divina gubernetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, human nature is more self-sufficing than irrational creatures. But irrational creatures have no Divine law besides + the natural inclination impressed on them. Much less, therefore, should the rational creature have a Divine law in addition + to the natural law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37485" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37485] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +natura humana est sufficientior irrationalibus creaturis. Sed +irrationales creaturae non habent aliquam legem divinam praeter +inclinationem naturalem eis inditam. Ergo multo minus creatura +rationalis debet habere aliquam legem divinam praeter naturalem +legem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> David prayed God to set His law before him, saying ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.33" target="asv">Ps. 118:33</a>): "Set before me for a law the way of Thy justifications, O Lord." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37486" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37486] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod David expetit legem a Deo sibi poni, dicens, <i>legem pone +mihi, domine, in via iustificationum tuarum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q91_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Besides the natural and the human law it was necessary for the directing of human conduct to have a Divine law. And this + for four reasons. First, because it is by law that man is directed how to perform his proper acts in view of his last end. + And indeed if man were ordained to no other end than that which is proportionate to his natural faculty, there would be no + need for man to have any further direction of the part of his reason, besides the natural law + and human law which is derived from it. But since man is ordained to an end of eternal happiness which is inproportionate + to man's natural faculty, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q5_A5" id="FS_Q91_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[5], A[5]</a>), therefore it was necessary that, besides the natural and the human law, man should be directed to his end by a law given + by God. + </p><p id="FS_Q91_A4-p7"> Secondly, because, on account of the uncertainty of human judgment, especially on contingent and particular matters, different + people form different judgments on human acts; whence also different and contrary laws result. In order, therefore, that man + may know without any doubt what he ought to do and what he ought to avoid, it was necessary for man to be directed in his + proper acts by a law given by God, for it is certain that such a law cannot err. + </p><p id="FS_Q91_A4-p8"> Thirdly, because man can make laws in those matters of which he is competent to judge. But man is not competent to judge + of interior movements, that are hidden, but only of exterior acts which appear: and yet for the perfection of virtue it is + necessary for man to conduct himself aright in both kinds of acts. Consequently human law could not sufficiently curb and + direct interior acts; and it was necessary for this purpose that a Divine law should supervene. + </p><p id="FS_Q91_A4-p9"> Fourthly, because, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5,6), human law cannot punish or forbid all evil deeds: since while + aiming at doing away with all evils, it would do away with many good things, and would hinder the advance of the common good, + which is necessary for human intercourse. In order, therefore, that no evil might remain unforbidden and unpunished, it was + necessary for the Divine law to supervene, whereby all sins are forbidden. + </p><p id="FS_Q91_A4-p10"> And these four causes are touched upon in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.8" target="asv"> Ps. 118:8, </a> where it is said: "The law of the Lord is unspotted," i.e. allowing no foulness of sin; "converting souls," because it directs + not only exterior, but also interior acts; "the testimony of the Lord is faithful," because of the certainty of what is true + and right; "giving wisdom to little ones," by directing man to an end supernatural and Divine. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 4 co."><a name="37487" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37487] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod praeter legem naturalem et legem humanam, necessarium +fuit ad directionem humanae vitae habere legem divinam. Et hoc +propter quatuor rationes. Primo quidem, quia per legem dirigitur +homo ad actus proprios in ordine ad ultimum finem. Et si quidem +homo ordinaretur tantum ad finem qui non excederet proportionem +naturalis facultatis hominis, non oporteret quod homo haberet +aliquid directivum ex parte rationis, supra legem naturalem et +legem humanitus positam, quae ab ea derivatur. Sed quia homo +ordinatur ad finem beatitudinis aeternae, quae excedit proportionem +naturalis facultatis humanae, ut supra habitum est; ideo +necessarium fuit ut supra legem naturalem et humanam, dirigeretur +etiam ad suum finem lege divinitus data. Secundo, quia propter +incertitudinem humani iudicii, praecipue de rebus contingentibus et +particularibus, contingit de actibus humanis diversorum esse +diversa iudicia, ex quibus etiam diversae et contrariae leges +procedunt. Ut ergo homo absque omni dubitatione scire possit quid +ei sit agendum et quid vitandum, necessarium fuit ut in actibus +propriis dirigeretur per legem divinitus datam, de qua constat quod +non potest errare. Tertio, quia de his potest homo legem ferre, de +quibus potest iudicare. Iudicium autem hominis esse non potest de +interioribus motibus, qui latent, sed solum de exterioribus +actibus, qui apparent. Et tamen ad perfectionem virtutis requiritur +quod in utrisque actibus homo rectus existat. Et ideo lex humana +non potuit cohibere et ordinare sufficienter interiores actus, sed +necessarium fuit quod ad hoc superveniret lex divina. Quarto quia, +sicut Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib. Arb., lex humana non potest +omnia quae male fiunt, punire vel prohibere, quia dum auferre +vellet omnia mala, sequeretur quod etiam multa bona tollerentur, et +impediretur utilitas boni communis, quod est necessarium ad +conversationem humanam. Ut ergo nullum malum improhibitum et +impunitum remaneat, necessarium fuit supervenire legem divinam, per +quam omnia peccata prohibentur. Et istae quatuor causae tanguntur +in Psalmo XVIII, ubi dicitur, lex domini immaculata, idest nullam +peccati turpitudinem permittens; convertens animas, quia non solum +exteriores actus, sed etiam interiores dirigit; testimonium domini +fidele, propter certitudinem veritatis et rectitudinis; sapientiam +praestans parvulis, inquantum ordinat hominem ad supernaturalem +finem et divinum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By the natural law the eternal law is participated proportionately to the capacity of human nature. But to his supernatural + end man needs to be directed in a yet higher way. Hence the additional law given by God, whereby man shares more perfectly + in the eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37488" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37488] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod per naturalem legem participatur lex aeterna +secundum proportionem capacitatis humanae naturae. Sed oportet ut +altiori modo dirigatur homo in ultimum finem supernaturalem. Et +ideo superadditur lex divinitus data, per quam lex aeterna +participatur altiori modo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Counsel is a kind of inquiry: hence it must proceed from some principles. Nor is it enough for it to proceed from principles + imparted by nature, which are the precepts of the natural law, for the reasons given above: but there is need for certain + additional principles, namely, the precepts of the Divine law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37489" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37489] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod consilium est inquisitio quaedam, unde oportet quod +procedat ex aliquibus principiis. Nec sufficit quod procedat ex +principiis naturaliter inditis, quae sunt praecepta legis naturae, +propter praedicta, sed oportet quod superaddantur quaedam alia +principia, scilicet praecepta legis divinae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Irrational creatures are not ordained to an end higher than that which is proportionate to their natural powers: consequently + the comparison fails. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37490" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37490] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod creaturae irrationales non ordinantur ad altiorem +finem quam sit finis qui est proportionatus naturali virtuti +ipsarum. Et ideo non est similis ratio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q91_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q91_A5-p0.1">Q. 91. A. 5. Whether there is but one Divine law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is but one Divine law. Because, where there is one king in one kingdom there is but one law. Now + the whole of mankind is compared to God as to one king, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.46.8" target="asv"> Ps. 46:8</a>: "God is the King of all the earth." Therefore there is but one Divine law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="37491" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37491] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex divina sit una tantum. Unius enim +regis in uno regno est una lex. Sed totum humanum genus comparatur +ad Deum sicut ad unum regem; secundum illud Psalmi XLVI, <i>rex +omnis terrae Deus</i>. Ergo est una tantum lex divina.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every law is directed to the end which the lawgiver intends for those for whom he makes the law. But God intends + one and the same thing for all men; since according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:4</a>: "He will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth." Therefore there is but one Divine law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="37492" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37492] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +omnis lex ordinatur ad finem quem legislator intendit in eis quibus +legem fert. Sed unum et idem est quod Deus intendit in omnibus +hominibus; secundum illud I ad Tim. II, <i>vult omnes homines +salvos fieri, et ad agnitionem veritatis venire</i>. Ergo una +tantum est lex divina.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Divine law seems to be more akin to the eternal law, which is one, than the natural law, according as the revelation + of grace is of a higher order than natural knowledge. Therefore much more is the Divine law but one. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="37493" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37493] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex divina propinquior esse videtur legi aeternae, quae est una, +quam lex naturalis, quanto altior est revelatio gratiae quam +cognitio naturae. Sed lex naturalis est una omnium hominum. Ergo +multo magis lex divina.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.7.12" target="asv">Heb. 7:12</a>): "The priesthood being translated, it is necessary that a translation also be made of the law." But the priesthood is twofold, + as stated in the same passage, viz. the levitical priesthood, and the priesthood of Christ. Therefore the Divine law is twofold, + namely the Old Law and the New Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 5 s. c."><a name="37494" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37494] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Heb. VII, <i>translato sacerdotio, +necesse est ut legis translatio fiat</i>. Sed sacerdotium est +duplex, ut ibidem dicitur, scilicet sacerdotium leviticum, et +sacerdotium Christi. Ergo etiam duplex est lex divina, scilicet lex +vetus, et lex nova.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q91_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in the + <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q30_A3" id="FS_Q91_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[30], A[3]</a>, distinction is the cause of number. Now things may be distinguished in two ways. First, as those things that are altogether + specifically different, e.g. a horse and an ox. Secondly, as perfect and imperfect in the same species, e.g. a boy and a man: + and in this way the Divine law is divided into Old and New. Hence the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.24" target="asv">Gal. 3:24,25</a>) compares the state of man under the Old + Law to that of a child "under a pedagogue"; but the state under the New Law, to that of a full grown man, who is "no longer + under a pedagogue." + </p><p id="FS_Q91_A5-p7"> Now the perfection and imperfection of these two laws is to be taken in connection with the three conditions pertaining to + law, as stated above. For, in the first place, it belongs to law to be directed to the common good as to its end, as stated + above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A2" id="FS_Q91_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[90], A[2]</a>). This good may be twofold. It may be a sensible and earthly good; and to this, man was directly ordained by the Old Law: + wherefore, at the very outset of the law, the people were invited to + the earthly kingdom of the Chananaeans ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A5-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.3.8" target="asv">Ex. 3:8</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A5-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.3.17" target="asv">17</a>). Again it may be an intelligible and heavenly good: and to this, man is ordained by the New Law. Wherefore, at the very + beginning of His preaching, Christ invited men to the kingdom of heaven, saying ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A5-p7.4" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.17" target="asv">Mat. 4:17</a>): "Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand." Hence Augustine says (Contra Faust. iv) that "promises of temporal + goods are contained in the Old Testament, for which reason it is called old; but the promise of + eternal life belongs to the New Testament." + </p><p id="FS_Q91_A5-p8"> Secondly, it belongs to the law to direct human acts according to the order of righteousness + <a href="#FS_Q91_A4" id="FS_Q91_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>: wherein also the New Law surpasses the Old Law, since it directs our internal acts, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A5-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.20" target="asv"> Mat. 5:20</a>: "Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven." + Hence the saying that "the Old Law restrains the hand, but the New Law controls the mind" ( Sentent. iii, + D, xl). + </p><p id="FS_Q91_A5-p9"> Thirdly, it belongs to the law to induce men to observe its commandments. This the Old Law did by the fear of punishment: + but the New Law, by love, which is poured into our hearts by the grace of Christ, bestowed in the New Law, but foreshadowed + in the Old. Hence Augustine says (Contra Adimant. Manich. discip. xvii) that "there is little difference [*The 'little difference' + refers to the Latin words 'timor' and 'amor'---'fear' and 'love.'] between the Law and the Gospel---fear + and love." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 5 co."><a name="37495" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37495] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut in primo dictum est, distinctio est causa +numeri. Dupliciter autem inveniuntur aliqua distingui. Uno modo, +sicut ea quae sunt omnino specie diversa, ut equus et bos. Alio +modo, sicut perfectum et imperfectum in eadem specie, sicut puer et +vir. Et hoc modo lex divina distinguitur in legem veterem et legem +novam. Unde apostolus, ad Gal. III, comparat statum veteris legis +statui puerili existenti sub paedagogo, statum autem novae legis +comparat statui viri perfecti, qui iam non est sub paedagogo. +Attenditur autem perfectio et imperfectio utriusque legis secundum +tria quae ad legem pertinent, ut supra dictum est. Primo enim ad +legem pertinet ut ordinetur ad bonum commune sicut ad finem, ut +supra dictum est. Quod quidem potest esse duplex. Scilicet bonum +sensibile et terrenum, et ad tale bonum ordinabat directe lex +vetus; unde statim, Exodi III, in principio legis, invitatur +populus ad regnum terrenum Chananaeorum. Et iterum bonum +intelligibile et caeleste, et ad hoc ordinat lex nova. Unde statim +Christus ad regnum caelorum in suae praedicationis principio +invitavit, dicens, <i>poenitentiam agite, appropinquavit enim +regnum caelorum</i>, Matth. IV. Et ideo Augustinus dicit, in IV +contra Faustum, quod <i>temporalium rerum promissiones testamento +veteri continentur, et ideo vetus appellatur, sed aeternae vitae +promissio ad novum pertinet testamentum</i>. Secundo ad legem +pertinet dirigere humanos actus secundum ordinem iustitiae. In quo +etiam superabundat lex nova legi veteri, interiores actus animi +ordinando; secundum illud Matth. V, <i>nisi abundaverit iustitia +vestra plus quam Scribarum et Pharisaeorum, non intrabitis in +regnum caelorum</i>. Et ideo dicitur quod <i>lex vetus cohibet +manum, lex nova animum</i>. Tertio ad legem pertinet inducere +homines ad observantias mandatorum. Et hoc quidem lex vetus +faciebat timore poenarum, lex autem nova facit hoc per amorem, qui +in cordibus nostris infunditur per gratiam Christi, quae in lege +nova confertur, sed in lege veteri figurabatur. Et ideo dicit +Augustinus, contra Adimantum Manichaei discipulum, <i>quod brevis +differentia est legis et Evangelii, timor et amor</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the father of a family issues different commands to the children and to the adults, so also the one King, God, in His + one kingdom, gave one law to men, while they were yet imperfect, and another more perfect law, when, by the preceding law, + they had been led to a greater capacity for Divine things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="37496" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37496] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut paterfamilias in domo alia mandata +proponit pueris et adultis, ita etiam unus rex Deus, in uno suo +regno, aliam legem dedit hominibus adhuc imperfectis existentibus; +et aliam perfectiorem iam manuductis per priorem legem ad maiorem +capacitatem divinorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The salvation of man could not be achieved otherwise than through Christ, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A5-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.4.12" target="asv"> Acts 4:12</a>: "There is no other name . . . given to men, whereby we must be saved." Consequently the law that brings all to salvation + could not be given until after the coming of Christ. But before His coming it was necessary to give to the people, of whom + Christ was to be born, a law containing certain rudiments of righteousness unto salvation, + in order to prepare them to receive Him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="37497" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37497] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod salus hominum non poterat esse nisi per Christum; +secundum illud Act. IV, <i>non est aliud nomen datum hominibus, in +quo oporteat nos salvos fieri</i>. Et ideo lex perfecte ad salutem +omnes inducens, dari non potuit nisi post Christi adventum. Antea +vero dari oportuit populo ex quo Christus erat nasciturus, legem +praeparatoriam ad Christi susceptionem, in qua quaedam rudimenta +salutaris iustitiae continerentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The natural law directs man by way of certain general precepts, common to both the perfect and the imperfect: wherefore it + is one and the same for all. But the Divine law directs man also in certain particular matters, to which the perfect and imperfect + do not stand in the same relation. Hence the necessity for the Divine law to be twofold, as already explained. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="37498" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37498] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod lex naturalis dirigit hominem secundum quaedam +praecepta communia, in quibus conveniunt tam perfecti quam +imperfecti, et ideo est una omnium. Sed lex divina dirigit hominem +etiam in quibusdam particularibus, ad quae non similiter se habent +perfecti et imperfecti. Et ideo oportuit legem divinam esse +duplicem, sicut iam dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q91_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q91_A6-p0.1">Q. 91. A. 6. Whether there is a law in the fomes of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no law of the "fomes" of sin. For Isidore says (Etym. v) that the "law is based on reason." But + the "fomes" of sin is not based on reason, but deviates from it. Therefore the "fomes" has not the nature of a law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="37499" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37499] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit aliqua lex fomitis. Dicit enim +Isidorus, in V Etymol., quod <i>lex ratione consistit</i>. Fomes +autem non consistit ratione, sed magis a ratione deviat. Ergo fomes +non habet rationem legis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every law is binding, so that those who do not obey it are called transgressors. But man is not called a transgressor, + from not following the instigations of the "fomes"; but rather from his following them. Therefore the "fomes" has not the + nature of a law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="37500" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37500] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +omnis lex obligatoria est, ita quod qui ipsam non servant, +transgressores dicuntur. Sed fomes non constituit aliquem +transgressorem ex hoc quod ipsum non sequitur, sed magis +transgressor redditur si quis ipsum sequatur. Ergo fomes non habet +rationem legis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the law is ordained to the common good, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A2" id="FS_Q91_A6-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[90], A[2]</a>). But the "fomes" inclines us, not to the common, but to our own private good. Therefore the "fomes" has not the nature of + sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="37501" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37501] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex ordinatur ad bonum commune, ut supra habitum est. Sed fomes non +inclinat ad bonum commune, sed magis ad bonum privatum. Ergo fomes +non habet rationem legis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.23" target="asv">Rom. 7:23</a>): "I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 6 s. c."><a name="37502" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37502] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. VII, <i>video aliam legem in membris +meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q91_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q91_A2" id="FS_Q91_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2];</a> Q[90], A[1], ad 1), the law, as to its essence, resides in him that rules and measures; but, by way of participation, in + that which is ruled and measured; so that every inclination or ordination which may be found in things subject to the law, + is called a law by participation, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q91_A2" id="FS_Q91_A6-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[2];</a> Q[90], A[1] , ad 1). Now those who are subject to a law may receive a twofold + inclination from the lawgiver. First, in so far as he directly inclines his subjects to something; sometimes indeed different + subjects to different acts; in this way we may say that there is a military law and a mercantile law. Secondly, indirectly; + thus by the very fact that a lawgiver deprives a subject of some dignity, the latter passes into another order, so as to be + under another law, as it were: thus if a soldier be turned out of the army, he becomes a subject of rural or of mercantile + legislation. + </p><p id="FS_Q91_A6-p7"> Accordingly under the Divine Lawgiver various creatures have various natural inclinations, so that what is, as it were, a + law for one, is against the law for another: thus I might say that fierceness is, in a way, the law of a dog, but against + the law of a sheep or another meek animal. And so the law of man, which, by the Divine ordinance, is allotted to him, according + to his proper natural condition, is that he should act in accordance with reason: and this law was so effective + in the primitive state, that nothing either beside or against reason could take man unawares. But when man turned his back + on God, he fell under the influence of his sensual impulses: in fact this happens to each one individually, the more he deviates + from the path of reason, so that, after a fashion, he is likened to the beasts that are led by the impulse of sensuality, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.48.21" target="asv"> Ps. 48:21</a>: "Man, when he was in honor, did not understand: he hath been compared to + senseless beasts, and made like to them." + </p><p id="FS_Q91_A6-p8"> So, then, this very inclination of sensuality which is called the "fomes," in other animals has simply the nature of a law + (yet only in so far as a law may be said to be in such things), by reason of a direct inclination. But in man, it has not + the nature of law in this way, rather is it a deviation from the law of reason. But since, by the just sentence of God, man + is destitute of original justice, and his reason bereft of its vigor, this impulse of sensuality, whereby he is + led, in so far as it is a penalty following from the Divine law depriving man of his proper dignity, has the nature of a law. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 6 co."><a name="37503" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37503] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, lex essentialiter invenitur +in regulante et mensurante, participative autem in eo quod +mensuratur et regulatur; ita quod omnis inclinatio vel ordinatio +quae invenitur in his quae subiecta sunt legi, participative +dicitur lex, ut ex supradictis patet. Potest autem in his quae +subduntur legi, aliqua inclinatio inveniri dupliciter a +legislatore. Uno modo, inquantum directe inclinat suos subditos ad +aliquid; et diversos interdum ad diversos actus; secundum quem +modum potest dici quod alia est lex militum, et alia est lex +mercatorum. Alio modo, indirecte, inquantum scilicet per hoc quod +legislator destituit aliquem sibi subditum aliqua dignitate, +sequitur quod transeat in alium ordinem et quasi in aliam legem, +puta si miles ex militia destituatur, transibit in legem rusticorum +vel mercatorum. Sic igitur sub Deo legislatore diversae creaturae +diversas habent naturales inclinationes, ita ut quod uni est +quodammodo lex, alteri sit contra legem, ut si dicam quod +furibundum esse est quodammodo lex canis, est autem contra legem +ovis vel alterius mansueti animalis. Est ergo hominis lex, quam +sortitur ex ordinatione divina secundum propriam conditionem, ut +secundum rationem operetur. Quae quidem lex fuit tam valida in +primo statu, ut nihil vel praeter rationem vel contra rationem +posset subrepere homini. Sed dum homo a Deo recessit, incurrit in +hoc quod feratur secundum impetum sensualitatis, et unicuique etiam +particulariter hoc contingit, quanto magis a ratione recesserit, ut +sic quodammodo bestiis assimiletur, quae sensualitatis impetu +feruntur; secundum illud Psalmi XLVIII, <i>homo, cum in honore +esset, non intellexit, comparatus est iumentis insipientibus, et +similis factus est illis</i>. Sic igitur ipsa sensualitatis +inclinatio, quae fomes dicitur, in aliis quidem animalibus +simpliciter habet rationem legis, illo tamen modo quo in talibus +lex dici potest, secundum directam inclinationem. In hominibus +autem secundum hoc non habet rationem legis, sed magis est deviatio +a lege rationis. Sed inquantum per divinam iustitiam homo +destituitur originali iustitia et vigore rationis, ipse impetus +sensualitatis qui eum ducit, habet rationem legis, inquantum est +poenalis et ex lege divina consequens, hominem destituente propria +dignitate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers the "fomes" in itself, as an incentive to evil. It is not thus that it has the nature of a law, as + stated above, but according as it results from the justice of the Divine law: it is as though we were to say that the law + allows a nobleman to be condemned to hard labor for some misdeed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="37504" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37504] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de fomite secundum se +considerato, prout inclinat ad malum. Sic enim non habet rationem +legis, ut dictum est, sed secundum quod sequitur ex divinae legis +iustitia, tanquam si diceretur lex esse quod aliquis nobilis, +propter suam culpam, ad servilia opera induci permitteretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument considers law in the light of a rule or measure: for it is in this sense that those who deviate from the law + become transgressors. But the "fomes" is not a law in this respect, but by a kind of participation, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="37505" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37505] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de eo quod est lex quasi +regula et mensura, sic enim deviantes a lege transgressores +constituuntur. Sic autem fomes non est lex, sed per quandam +participationem, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers the "fomes" as to its proper inclination, and not as to its origin. And yet if the inclination of + sensuality be considered as it is in other animals, thus it is ordained to the common good, namely, to the preservation of + nature in the species or in the individual. And this is in man also, in so far as sensuality is subject to reason. But it + is called "fomes" in so far as it strays from the order of reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="37506" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37506] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de fomite quantum ad +inclinationem propriam, non autem quantum ad suam originem. Et +tamen si consideretur inclinatio sensualitatis prout est in aliis +animalibus, sic ordinatur ad bonum commune, idest ad conservationem +naturae in specie vel in individuo. Et hoc est etiam in homine, +prout sensualitas subditur rationi. Sed fomes dicitur secundum quod +exit rationis ordinem.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q92" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q92-p0.1">Q. 92. OF THE EFFECTS OF LAW (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q92-p2"> We must now consider the effects of law; under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q92-p3"><a href="#FS_Q92_A1"> (1) Whether an effect of law is to make men good?</a></p><p id="FS_Q92-p4"><a href="#FS_Q92_A2"> (2) Whether the effects of law are to command, to forbid, to permit, and to punish, as the Jurist states?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 pr."><a name="37507" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37507] +Iª-IIae q. 92 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +effectibus legis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum +effectus legis sit homines facere bonos. Secundo, utrum effectus +legis sint imperare, vetare, permittere et punire, sicut +legisperitus dicit.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q92_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q92_A1-p0.1">Q. 92. A. 1. Whether an effect of law is to make men good?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q92_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that it is not an effect of law to make men good. For men are good through virtue, since virtue, as stated in Ethic. + ii, 6 is "that which makes its subject good." But virtue is in man from God alone, because He it is Who "works it in us without + us," as we stated above ( + <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q55_A4" id="FS_Q92_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[4]</a>) in giving the definition of virtue. Therefore the law does not make men good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37508" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37508] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod legis non sit facere homines bonos. +Homines enim sunt boni per virtutem, virtus enim est quae bonum +facit habentem, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed virtus est homini a +solo Deo, ipse enim eam facit in nobis sine nobis, ut supra dictum +est in definitione virtutis. Ergo legis non est facere homines +bonos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q92_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Law does not profit a man unless he obeys it. But the very fact that a man obeys a law is due to his being good. + Therefore in man goodness is presupposed to the law. Therefore the law does not make men good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37509" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37509] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +lex non prodest homini nisi legi obediat. Sed hoc ipsum quod homo +obedit legi, est ex bonitate. Ergo bonitas praeexigitur in homine +ad legem. Non igitur lex facit homines bonos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q92_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Law is ordained to the common good, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A2" id="FS_Q92_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[90], A[2]</a>). But some behave well in things regarding the community, who behave ill in things regarding themselves. Therefore it is + not the business of the law to make men good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37510" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37510] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex ordinatur ad bonum commune, ut supra dictum est. Sed quidam +bene se habent in his quae ad commune pertinent, qui tamen in +propriis non bene se habent. Non ergo ad legem pertinet quod faciat +homines bonos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q92_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, some laws are tyrannical, as the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 6). But a tyrant does not intend the good of his + subjects, but considers only his own profit. Therefore law does not make men good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="37511" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37511] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +quaedam leges sunt tyrannicae, ut philosophus dicit, in sua +politica. Sed tyrannus non intendit ad bonitatem subditorum, sed +solum ad propriam utilitatem. Non ergo legis est facere homines +bonos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q92_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that the "intention of every lawgiver is to make good citizens." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37512" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37512] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod <i>voluntas +cuiuslibet legislatoris haec est, ut faciat cives bonos</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q92_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> as stated above (Q[90], A[1], ad 2; + <a href="#FS_Q92_A3" id="FS_Q92_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">AA[3]</a>,4), a law is nothing else than a dictate of reason in the ruler by whom his subjects are governed. Now the virtue of any + subordinate thing consists in its being well subordinated to that by which it is regulated: thus we see that the virtue of + the irascible and concupiscible faculties consists in their being obedient to reason; and accordingly "the virtue of every + subject consists in his + being well subjected to his ruler," as the Philosopher says (Polit. i). But every law aims at being obeyed by those who are + subject to it. Consequently it is evident that the proper effect of law is to lead its subjects to their proper virtue: and + since virtue is "that which makes its subject good," it follows that the proper effect of law is to make those to whom it + is given, good, either simply or in some particular respect. For if the intention of the lawgiver is fixed on true good, which + is + the common good regulated according to Divine justice, it follows that the effect of the law is to make men good simply. If, + however, the intention of the lawgiver is fixed on that which is not simply good, but useful or pleasurable to himself, or + in opposition to Divine justice; then the law does not make men good simply, but in respect to that particular government. + In this way good is found even in things that are bad of themselves: thus a man is called a good robber, because he works + in a + way that is adapted to his end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 1 co."><a name="37513" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37513] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, lex nihil aliud est quam +dictamen rationis in praesidente, quo subditi gubernantur. +Cuiuslibet autem subditi virtus est ut bene subdatur ei a quo +gubernatur, sicut videmus quod virtus irascibilis et +concupiscibilis in hoc consistit quod sint bene obedientes rationi. +Et per hunc modum <i>virtus cuiuslibet subiecti est ut bene +subiiciatur principanti</i>, ut philosophus dicit, in I Polit. Ad +hoc autem ordinatur unaquaeque lex, ut obediatur ei a subditis. +Unde manifestum est quod hoc sit proprium legis, inducere subiectos +ad propriam ipsorum virtutem. Cum igitur virtus sit quae bonum +facit habentem, sequitur quod proprius effectus legis sit bonos +facere eos quibus datur, vel simpliciter vel secundum quid. Si enim +intentio ferentis legem tendat in verum bonum, quod est bonum +commune secundum iustitiam divinam regulatum, sequitur quod per +legem homines fiant boni simpliciter. Si vero intentio legislatoris +feratur ad id quod non est bonum simpliciter, sed utile vel +delectabile sibi, vel repugnans iustitiae divinae; tunc lex non +facit homines bonos simpliciter, sed secundum quid, scilicet in +ordine ad tale regimen. Sic autem bonum invenitur etiam in per se +malis, sicut aliquis dicitur bonus latro, quia operatur accommode +ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q92_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue is twofold, as explained above ( + <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q63_A2" id="FS_Q92_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[63], A[2]</a>), viz. acquired and infused. Now the fact of being accustomed to an action contributes to both, but in different ways; for + it causes the acquired virtue; while it disposes to infused virtue, and preserves and fosters it when it already exists. And + since law is given for the purpose of directing human acts; as far as human acts conduce to virtue, so far does law make men + good. + Wherefore the Philosopher says in the second book of the Politics (Ethic. ii) that "lawgivers make men good by habituating + them to good works." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37514" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37514] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod duplex est virtus, ut ex supradictis patet, +scilicet acquisita, et infusa. Ad utramque autem aliquid operatur +operum assuetudo, sed diversimode, nam virtutem quidem acquisitam +causat; ad virtutem autem infusam disponit, et eam iam habitam +conservat et promovet. Et quia lex ad hoc datur ut dirigat actus +humanos, inquantum actus humani operantur ad virtutem, intantum lex +facit homines bonos. Unde et philosophus dicit, II Polit., quod +<i>legislatores assuefacientes faciunt bonos</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q92_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not always through perfect goodness of virtue that one obeys the law, but sometimes it is through fear of punishment, + and sometimes from the mere dictates of reason, which is a beginning of virtue, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q63_A1" id="FS_Q92_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[63], A[1]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37515" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37515] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod non semper aliquis obedit legi ex bonitate perfecta +virtutis, sed quandoque quidem ex timore poenae; quandoque autem ex +solo dictamine rationis, quod est quoddam principium virtutis, ut +supra habitum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q92_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The goodness of any part is considered in comparison with the whole; hence Augustine says (Confess. iii) that "unseemly is + the part that harmonizes not with the whole." Since then every man is a part of the state, it is impossible that a man be + good, unless he be well proportionate to the common good: nor can the whole be well consistent unless its parts be proportionate + to it. Consequently the common good of the state cannot flourish, unless the + citizens be virtuous, at least those whose business it is to govern. But it is enough for the good of the community, that + the other citizens be so far virtuous that they obey the commands of their rulers. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, + 2) that "the virtue of a sovereign is the same as that of a good man, but the virtue of any common citizen is not the same + as that of a good man." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37516" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37516] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod bonitas cuiuslibet partis consideratur in proportione +ad suum totum, unde et Augustinus dicit, in III Confess., quod +<i>turpis omnis pars est quae suo toti non congruit</i>. Cum igitur +quilibet homo sit pars civitatis, impossibile est quod aliquis homo +sit bonus, nisi sit bene proportionatus bono communi, nec totum +potest bene consistere nisi ex partibus sibi proportionatis. Unde +impossibile est quod bonum commune civitatis bene se habeat, nisi +cives sint virtuosi, ad minus illi quibus convenit principari. +Sufficit autem, quantum ad bonum communitatis, quod alii intantum +sint virtuosi quod principum mandatis obediant. Et ideo philosophus +dicit, in III Polit., quod <i>eadem est virtus principis et boni +viri; non autem eadem est virtus cuiuscumque civis et boni +viri</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q92_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A tyrannical law, through not being according to reason, is not a law, absolutely speaking, but rather a perversion of law; + and yet in so far as it is something in the nature of a law, it aims at the citizens' being good. For all it has in the nature + of a law consists in its being an ordinance made by a superior to his subjects, and aims at being obeyed by them, which is + to make them good, not simply, but with respect to that particular + government. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="37517" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37517] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod lex tyrannica, cum non sit secundum rationem, non est +simpliciter lex, sed magis est quaedam perversitas legis. Et tamen +inquantum habet aliquid de ratione legis, intendit ad hoc quod +cives sint boni. Non enim habet de ratione legis nisi secundum hoc +quod est dictamen alicuius praesidentis in subditis, et ad hoc +tendit ut subditi legi sint bene obedientes; quod est eos esse +bonos, non simpliciter, sed in ordine ad tale regimen.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q92_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q92_A2-p0.1">Q. 92. A. 2. Whether the acts of law are suitably assigned?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q92_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the acts of law are not suitably assigned as consisting in "command," "prohibition," "permission" and + "punishment." For "every law is a general precept," as the jurist states. But command and precept are the same. Therefore + the other three are superfluous. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37518" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37518] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod legis actus non sint convenienter +assignati in hoc quod dicitur quod legis actus est imperare, +vetare, permittere et punire. Lex enim omnis praeceptum commune +est, ut legisconsultus dicit. Sed idem est imperare quod +praecipere. Ergo alia tria superfluunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q92_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the effect of a law is to induce its subjects to be good, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q92_A1" id="FS_Q92_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But counsel aims at a higher good than a command does. Therefore it belongs to law to counsel rather than to command. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37519" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37519] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +effectus legis est ut inducat subditos ad bonum, sicut supra dictum +est. Sed consilium est de meliori bono quam praeceptum. Ergo magis +pertinet ad legem consulere quam praecipere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q92_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as punishment stirs a man to good deeds, so does reward. Therefore if to punish is reckoned an effect of law, + so also is to reward. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37520" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37520] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut homo aliquis incitatur ad bonum per poenas, ita etiam et per +praemia. Ergo sicut punire ponitur effectus legis, ita etiam et +praemiare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q92_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the intention of a lawgiver is to make men good, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q92_A1" id="FS_Q92_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But he that obeys the law, merely through fear of being punished, is not good: because "although a good deed may be done + through servile fear, i.e. fear of punishment, it is not done well," as Augustine says (Contra duas Epist. Pelag. ii). Therefore + punishment is not a proper effect of law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="37521" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37521] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +intentio legislatoris est ut homines faciat bonos, sicut supra +dictum est. Sed ille qui solo metu poenarum obedit legi, non est +bonus, nam <i>timore servili, qui est timor poenarum, etsi bonum +aliquis faciat, non tamen bene aliquid fit</i>, ut Augustinus +dicit. Non ergo videtur esse proprium legis quod puniat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q92_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore says (Etym. v, 19): "Every law either permits something, as: 'A brave man may demand his reward'": or forbids something, + as: "No man may ask a consecrated virgin in marriage": or punishes, as: "Let him that commits a murder be put to death." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37522" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37522] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Isidorus dicit, in V Etymol., <i>omnis lex aut permittit +aliquid, ut, vir fortis praemium petat. Aut vetat, ut, sacrarum +virginum nuptias nulli liceat petere. Aut punit, ut, qui caedem +fecerit, capite plectatur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q92_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Just as an assertion is a dictate of reason asserting something, so is a law a dictate of reason, commanding something. Now + it is proper to reason to lead from one thing to another. Wherefore just as, in demonstrative sciences, the reason leads us + from certain principles to assent to the conclusion, so it induces us by some means to assent to the precept of the law. + </p><p id="FS_Q92_A2-p8"> Now the precepts of law are concerned with human acts, in which the law directs, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A1" id="FS_Q92_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[90], AA[1]</a>,2; + <a href="#FS_Q91_A4" id="FS_Q92_A2-p8.2" shape="rect"> Q[91], A[4]</a>). Again there are three kinds of human acts: for, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A8" id="FS_Q92_A2-p8.3" shape="rect">Q[18], A[8]</a>), some acts are good generically, viz. acts of virtue; and in respect of these the act of the law is a precept or command, + for "the law commands all acts of virtue" (Ethic. v, 1). Some acts are evil + generically, viz. acts of vice, and in respect of these the law forbids. Some acts are generically indifferent, and in respect + of these the law permits; and all acts that are either not distinctly good or not distinctly bad may be called indifferent. + And it is the fear of punishment that law makes use of in order to ensure obedience: in which respect punishment is an effect + of law. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 2 co."><a name="37523" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37523] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut enuntiatio est rationis dictamen per modum +enuntiandi, ita etiam lex per modum praecipiendi. Rationis autem +proprium est ut ex aliquo ad aliquid inducat. Unde sicut in +demonstrativis scientiis ratio inducit ut assentiatur conclusioni +per quaedam principia, ita etiam inducit ut assentiatur legis +praecepto per aliquid. Praecepta autem legis sunt de actibus +humanis, in quibus lex dirigit, ut supra dictum est. Sunt autem +tres differentiae humanorum actuum. Nam sicut supra dictum est, +quidam actus sunt boni ex genere, qui sunt actus virtutum, et +respectu horum, ponitur legis actus praecipere vel imperare; +praecipit enim lex omnes actus virtutum, ut dicitur in V Ethic. +Quidam vero sunt actus mali ex genere, sicut actus vitiosi, et +respectu horum, lex habet prohibere. Quidam vero ex genere suo sunt +actus indifferentes, et respectu horum, lex habet permittere. Et +possunt etiam indifferentes dici omnes illi actus qui sunt vel +parum boni vel parum mali. Id autem per quod inducit lex ad hoc +quod sibi obediatur, est timor poenae, et quantum ad hoc, ponitur +legis effectus punire.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q92_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as to cease from evil is a kind of good, so a prohibition is a kind of precept: and accordingly, taking precept in a + wide sense, every law is a kind of precept. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37524" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37524] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut cessare a malo habet quandam rationem +boni, ita etiam prohibitio habet quandam rationem praecepti. Et +secundum hoc, large accipiendo praeceptum, universaliter lex +praeceptum dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q92_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To advise is not a proper act of law, but may be within the competency even of a private person, who cannot make a law. Wherefore + too the Apostle, after giving a certain counsel ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q92_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:12</a>) says: "I speak, not the Lord." Consequently it is not reckoned as an effect of law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37525" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37525] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod consulere non est proprius actus legis, sed potest +pertinere etiam ad personam privatam, cuius non est condere legem. +Unde etiam apostolus, I ad Cor. VII, cum consilium quoddam daret, +dixit, ego dico, non dominus. Et ideo non ponitur inter effectus +legis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q92_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To reward may also pertain to anyone: but to punish pertains to none but the framer of the law, by whose authority the pain + is inflicted. Wherefore to reward is not reckoned an effect of law, but only to punish. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37526" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37526] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod etiam praemiare potest ad quemlibet pertinere, sed +punire non pertinet nisi ad ministrum legis, cuius auctoritate +poena infertur. Et ideo praemiare non ponitur actus legis, sed +solum punire.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q92_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> From becoming accustomed to avoid evil and fulfill what is good, through fear of punishment, one is sometimes led on to do + so likewise, with delight and of one's own accord. Accordingly, law, even by punishing, leads men on to being good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="37527" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37527] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod per hoc quod aliquis incipit assuefieri ad vitandum +mala et ad implendum bona propter metum poenae, perducitur +quandoque ad hoc quod delectabiliter et ex propria voluntate hoc +faciat. Et secundum hoc, lex etiam puniendo perducit ad hoc quod +homines sint boni.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q93" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q93-p0.1">Q. 93. OF THE ETERNAL LAW (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q93-p2"> We must now consider each law by itself; and (1) The eternal law; (2) The natural law; (3) The human law; (4) The old law; + (5) The new law, which is the law of the Gospel. Of the sixth law which is the law of the "fomes," suffice what we have said + when treating of original sin. + </p><p id="FS_Q93-p3"> Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q93-p4"><a href="#FS_Q93_A1"> (1) What is the eternal law?</a></p><p id="FS_Q93-p5"><a href="#FS_Q93_A2"> (2) Whether it is known to all?</a></p><p id="FS_Q93-p6"><a href="#FS_Q93_A3"> (3) Whether every law is derived from it?</a></p><p id="FS_Q93-p7"><a href="#FS_Q93_A4"> (4) Whether necessary things are subject to the eternal law?</a></p><p id="FS_Q93-p8"><a href="#FS_Q93_A5"> (5) Whether natural contingencies are subject to the eternal law?</a></p><p id="FS_Q93-p9"><a href="#FS_Q93_A6"> (6) Whether all human things are subject to it?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 pr."><a name="37528" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37528] +Iª-IIae q. 93 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +singulis legibus. Et primo, de lege aeterna; secundo, de lege +naturali; tertio, de lege humana; quarto, de lege veteri; quinto, +de lege nova, quae est lex Evangelii. De sexta autem lege, quae est +lex fomitis, sufficiat quod dictum est cum de peccato originali +ageretur. Circa primum quaeruntur sex. Primo, quid sit lex aeterna. +Secundo, utrum sit omnibus nota. Tertio, utrum omnis lex ab ea +derivetur. Quarto, utrum necessaria subiiciantur legi aeternae. +Quinto, utrum contingentia naturalia subiiciantur legi aeternae. +Sexto, utrum omnes res humanae ei subiiciantur.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q93_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q93_A1-p0.1">Q. 93. A. 1. Whether the eternal law is a sovereign type [*Ratio] existing in God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the eternal law is not a sovereign type existing in God. For there is only one eternal law. But there + are many types of things in the Divine mind; for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 46) that God "made each thing according + to its type." Therefore the eternal law does not seem to be a type existing in the Divine mind. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37529" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37529] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex aeterna non sit ratio summa in Deo +existens. Lex enim aeterna est una tantum. Sed rationes rerum in +mente divina sunt plures, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta +trium quaest., quod <i>Deus singula fecit propriis rationibus</i>. +Ergo lex aeterna non videtur esse idem quod ratio in mente divina +existens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is essential to a law that it be promulgated by word, as stated above (Q[90], A[4]). But Word is a Personal name + in God, as stated in the + <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q34_A1" id="FS_Q93_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[34], A[1]</a>: whereas type refers to the Essence. Therefore the eternal law is not the same as a Divine type. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37530" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37530] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +de ratione legis est quod verbo promulgetur, ut supra dictum est. +Sed verbum in divinis dicitur personaliter, ut in primo habitum +est, ratio autem dicitur essentialiter. Non igitur idem est lex +aeterna quod ratio divina.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxx): "We see a law above our minds, which is called truth." But the law which is + above our minds is the eternal law. Therefore truth is the eternal law. But the idea of truth is not the same as the idea + of a type. Therefore the eternal law is not the same as the sovereign type. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37531" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37531] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in libro de vera Relig., <i>apparet supra mentem +nostram legem esse, quae veritas dicitur</i>. Lex autem supra +mentem nostram existens est lex aeterna. Ergo veritas est lex +aeterna. Sed non est eadem ratio veritatis et rationis. Ergo lex +aeterna non est idem quod ratio summa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "the eternal law is the sovereign type, to which we must always conform." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37532" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37532] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib. Arb., quod <i>lex aeterna +est summa ratio, cui semper obtemperandum est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Just as in every artificer there pre-exists a type of the things that are made by his art, so too in every governor there + must pre-exist the type of the order of those things that are to be done by those who are subject to his government. And just + as the type of the things yet to be made by an art is called the art or exemplar of the products of that art, so too the type + in him who governs the acts of his subjects, bears the character of a law, provided the + other conditions be present which we have mentioned above (Q[90]). Now God, by His wisdom, is the Creator of all things in + relation to which He stands as the artificer to the products of his art, as stated in the + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q14_A8" id="FS_Q93_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[14], A[8]</a>. Moreover He governs all the acts and movements that are to be found in each single creature, as was also stated in the + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q103_A5" id="FS_Q93_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[103], A[5]</a>. Wherefore as the type of the Divine Wisdom, inasmuch as by It all things are + created, has the character of art, exemplar or idea; so the type of Divine Wisdom, as moving all things to their due end, + bears the character of law. Accordingly the eternal law is nothing else than the type of Divine Wisdom, as directing all actions + and movements. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 1 co."><a name="37533" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37533] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut in quolibet artifice praeexistit ratio eorum +quae constituuntur per artem, ita etiam in quolibet gubernante +oportet quod praeexistat ratio ordinis eorum quae agenda sunt per +eos qui gubernationi subduntur. Et sicut ratio rerum fiendarum per +artem vocatur ars vel exemplar rerum artificiatarum, ita etiam +ratio gubernantis actus subditorum, rationem legis obtinet, +servatis aliis quae supra esse diximus de legis ratione. Deus autem +per suam sapientiam conditor est universarum rerum, ad quas +comparatur sicut artifex ad artificiata, ut in primo habitum est. +Est etiam gubernator omnium actuum et motionum quae inveniuntur in +singulis creaturis, ut etiam in primo habitum est. Unde sicut ratio +divinae sapientiae inquantum per eam cuncta sunt creata, rationem +habet artis vel exemplaris vel ideae; ita ratio divinae sapientiae +moventis omnia ad debitum finem, obtinet rationem legis. Et +secundum hoc, lex aeterna nihil aliud est quam ratio divinae +sapientiae, secundum quod est directiva omnium actuum et +motionum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking in that passage of the ideal types which regard the proper nature of each single thing; and consequently + in them there is a certain distinction and plurality, according to their different relations to things, as stated in the + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q15_A2" id="FS_Q93_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[15], A[2]</a>. But law is said to direct human acts by ordaining them to the common good, as stated above (Q[90], A[2]). And things, which + are in themselves different, may be + considered as one, according as they are ordained to one common thing. Wherefore the eternal law is one since it is the type + of this order. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37534" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37534] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur ibi de rationibus idealibus, +quae respiciunt proprias naturas singularum rerum, et ideo in eis +invenitur quaedam distinctio et pluralitas, secundum diversos +respectus ad res, ut in primo habitum est. Sed lex dicitur +directiva actuum in ordine ad bonum commune, ut supra dictum est. +Ea autem quae sunt in seipsis diversa, considerantur ut unum, +secundum quod ordinantur ad aliquod commune. Et ideo lex aeterna +est una, quae est ratio huius ordinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> With regard to any sort of word, two points may be considered: viz. the word itself, and that which is expressed by the word. + For the spoken word is something uttered by the mouth of man, and expresses that which is signified by the human word. The + same applies to the human mental word, which is nothing else that something conceived by the mind, by which man expresses + his thoughts mentally. So then in God the Word conceived by the intellect of the + Father is the name of a Person: but all things that are in the Father's knowledge, whether they refer to the Essence or to + the Persons, or to the works of God, are expressed by this Word, as Augustine declares (De Trin. xv, 14). And among other + things expressed by this Word, the eternal law itself is expressed thereby. Nor does it follow that the eternal law is a Personal + name in God: yet it is appropriated to the Son, on account of the kinship between type and word. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37535" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37535] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod circa verbum quodcumque duo possunt considerari, +scilicet ipsum verbum, et ea quae verbo exprimuntur. Verbum enim +vocale est quiddam ab ore hominis prolatum; sed hoc verbo +exprimuntur quae verbis humanis significantur. Et eadem ratio est +de verbo hominis mentali, quod nihil est aliud quam quiddam mente +conceptum, quo homo exprimit mentaliter ea de quibus cogitat. Sic +igitur in divinis ipsum verbum, quod est conceptio paterni +intellectus, personaliter dicitur, sed omnia quaecumque sunt in +scientia patris, sive essentialia sive personalia, sive etiam Dei +opera exprimuntur hoc verbo, ut patet per Augustinum, in XV de +Trin. Et inter cetera quae hoc verbo exprimuntur, etiam ipsa lex +aeterna verbo ipso exprimitur. Nec tamen propter hoc sequitur quod +lex aeterna personaliter in divinis dicatur. Appropriatur tamen +filio, propter convenientiam quam habet ratio ad verbum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The types of the Divine intellect do not stand in the same relation to things, as the types of the human intellect. For the + human intellect is measured by things, so that a human concept is not true by reason of itself, but by reason of its being + consonant with things, since "an opinion is true or false according as it answers to the reality." But the Divine intellect + is the measure of things: since each thing has so far truth in it, as it represents + the Divine intellect, as was stated in the + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q16_A1" id="FS_Q93_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[16], A[1]</a>. Consequently the Divine intellect is true in itself; and its type is truth itself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37536" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37536] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio intellectus divini aliter se habet ad res quam +ratio intellectus humani. Intellectus enim humanus est mensuratus a +rebus, ut scilicet conceptus hominis non sit verus propter seipsum, +sed dicitur verus ex hoc quod consonat rebus, ex hoc enim quod res +est vel non est, opinio vera vel falsa est. Intellectus vero +divinus est mensura rerum, quia unaquaeque res intantum habet de +veritate, inquantum imitatur intellectum divinum, ut in primo +dictum est. Et ideo intellectus divinus est verus secundum se. Unde +ratio eius est ipsa veritas.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q93_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q93_A2-p0.1">Q. 93. A. 2. Whether the eternal law is known to all?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the eternal law is not known to all. Because, as the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:11</a>), "the things that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God." But the eternal law is a type existing in the Divine + mind. Therefore it is unknown to all save God alone. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37537" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37537] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex aeterna non sit omnibus nota. Quia +ut dicit apostolus, I ad Cor., <i>quae sunt Dei, nemo novit nisi +spiritus Dei</i>. Sed lex aeterna est quaedam ratio in mente divina +existens. Ergo omnibus est ignota nisi soli Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) "the eternal law is that by which it is right that all things should be most + orderly." But all do not know how all things are most orderly. Therefore all do not know the eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37538" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37538] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Lib. Arb., <i>lex aeterna est +qua iustum est ut omnia sint ordinatissima</i>. Sed non omnes +cognoscunt qualiter omnia sint ordinatissima. Non ergo omnes +cognoscunt legem aeternam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi) that "the eternal law is not subject to the judgment of man." But according + to Ethic. i, "any man can judge well of what he knows." Therefore the eternal law is not known to us. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37539" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37539] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in libro de vera Relig., quod <i>lex aeterna est +de qua homines iudicare non possunt</i>. Sed sicut in I Ethic. +dicitur, <i>unusquisque bene iudicat quae cognoscit</i>. Ergo lex +aeterna non est nobis nota.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "knowledge of the eternal law is imprinted on us." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37540" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37540] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Lib. Arb., quod <i>aeternae +legis notio nobis impressa est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A thing may be known in two ways: first, in itself; secondly, in its effect, wherein some likeness of that thing is found: + thus someone not seeing the sun in its substance, may know it by its rays. So then no one can know the eternal law, as it + is in itself, except the blessed who see God in His Essence. But every rational creature knows it in its reflection, greater + or less. For every knowledge of truth is a kind of reflection and participation of the + eternal law, which is the unchangeable truth, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi). Now all men know the truth to a certain + extent, at least as to the common principles of the natural law: and as to the others, they partake of the knowledge of truth, + some more, some less; and in this respect are more or less cognizant of the eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 2 co."><a name="37541" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37541] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod dupliciter aliquid cognosci potest, uno modo, in +seipso; alio modo, in suo effectu, in quo aliqua similitudo eius +invenitur; sicut aliquis non videns solem in sua substantia, +cognoscit ipsum in sua irradiatione. Sic igitur dicendum est quod +legem aeternam nullus potest cognoscere secundum quod in seipsa +est, nisi solum beati, qui Deum per essentiam vident. Sed omnis +creatura rationalis ipsam cognoscit secundum aliquam eius +irradiationem, vel maiorem vel minorem. Omnis enim cognitio +veritatis est quaedam irradiatio et participatio legis aeternae, +quae est veritas incommutabilis, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de +vera Relig. Veritatem autem omnes aliqualiter cognoscunt, ad minus +quantum ad principia communia legis naturalis. In aliis vero quidam +plus et quidam minus participant de cognitione veritatis; et +secundum hoc etiam plus vel minus cognoscunt legem aeternam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We cannot know the things that are of God, as they are in themselves; but they are made known to us in their effects, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.20" target="asv"> Rom. 1:20</a>: "The invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37542" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37542] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ea quae sunt Dei, in seipsis quidem cognosci a +nobis non possunt, sed tamen in effectibus suis nobis +manifestantur, secundum illud Rom. I, <i>invisibilia Dei per ea +quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although each one knows the eternal law according to his own capacity, in the way explained above, yet none can comprehend + it: for it cannot be made perfectly known by its effects. Therefore it does not follow that anyone who knows the eternal law + in the way aforesaid, knows also the whole order of things, whereby they are most orderly. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37543" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37543] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod legem aeternam etsi unusquisque cognoscat pro sua +capacitate, secundum modum praedictum, nullus tamen eam +comprehendere potest, non enim totaliter manifestari potest per +suos effectus. Et ideo non oportet quod quicumque cognoscit legem +aeternam secundum modum praedictum, cognoscat totum ordinem rerum, +quo omnia sunt ordinatissima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To judge a thing may be understood in two ways. First, as when a cognitive power judges of its proper object, according to + + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Job.12.11" target="asv">Job 12:11</a>: "Doth not the ear discern words, and the palate of him that eateth, the taste?" It is to this kind of judgment that the + Philosopher alludes when he says that "anyone can judge well of what he knows," by judging, namely, whether what is put forward + is true. In another way we speak of a superior judging of a subordinate + by a kind of practical judgment, as to whether he should be such and such or not. And thus none can judge of the eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37544" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37544] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod iudicare de aliquo potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno +modo, sicut vis cognitiva diiudicat de proprio obiecto; secundum +illud Iob XII, <i>nonne auris verba diiudicat, et fauces comedentis +saporem?</i> Et secundum istum modum iudicii, philosophus dicit +quod unusquisque bene iudicat quae cognoscit, iudicando scilicet an +sit verum quod proponitur. Alio modo, secundum quod superior +iudicat de inferiori quodam practico iudicio, an scilicet ita +debeat esse vel non ita. Et sic nullus potest iudicare de lege +aeterna.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q93_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q93_A3-p0.1">Q. 93. A. 3. Whether every law is derived from the eternal law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not every law is derived from the eternal law. For there is a law of the "fomes," as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q91_A6" id="FS_Q93_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[91], A[6]</a>), which is not derived from that Divine law which is the eternal law, since thereunto pertains the "prudence of the flesh," + of which the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.7" target="asv">Rom. 8:7</a>), that "it cannot be subject to the law of God." Therefore not every law is derived from the eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37545" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37545] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnis lex a lege aeterna +derivetur. Est enim quaedam lex fomitis, ut supra dictum est. Ipsa +autem non derivatur a lege divina, quae est lex aeterna, ad ipsam +enim pertinet prudentia carnis, de qua apostolus dicit, ad Rom. +VIII, quod <i>legi Dei non potest esse subiecta</i>. Ergo non omnis +lex procedit a lege aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing unjust can be derived from the eternal law, because, as stated above (A[2], OBJ[2]), "the eternal law is + that, according to which it is right that all things should be most orderly." But some laws are unjust, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.10.1" target="asv"> Is. 10:1</a>: "Woe to them that make wicked laws." Therefore not every law is derived from the eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37546" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37546] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +a lege aeterna nihil iniquum procedere potest, quia sicut dictum +est, lex aeterna est secundum quam iustum est ut omnia sint +ordinatissima. Sed quaedam leges sunt iniquae; secundum illud +Isaiae X, <i>vae qui condunt leges iniquas</i>. Ergo non omnis lex +procedit a lege aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) that "the law which is framed for ruling the people, rightly permits many things + which are punished by Divine providence." But the type of Divine providence is the eternal law, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q93_A1" id="FS_Q93_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore not even every good law is derived from the eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37547" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37547] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib. Arbit., quod <i>lex quae populo +regendo scribitur, recte multa permittit quae per divinam +providentiam vindicantur</i>. Sed ratio divinae providentiae est +lex aeterna, ut dictum est. Ergo nec etiam omnis lex recta procedit +a lege aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Divine Wisdom says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.15" target="asv">Prov. 8:15</a>): "By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things." But the type of Divine Wisdom is the eternal law, as stated above + + <a href="#FS_Q93_A1" id="FS_Q93_A3-p5.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore all laws proceed from the eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37548" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37548] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod, Prov. VIII, divina sapientia dicit, <i>per me reges +regnant, et legum conditores iusta decernunt</i>. Ratio autem +divinae sapientiae est lex aeterna, ut supra dictum est. Ergo omnes +leges a lege aeterna procedunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A1" id="FS_Q93_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[90], AA[1]</a>,2), the law denotes a kind of plan directing acts towards an end. Now wherever there are movers ordained to one another, + the power of the second mover must needs be derived from the power of the first mover; since the second mover does not move + except in so far as it is moved by the first. Wherefore we observe the same in all those who govern, so that the plan of government + is derived by secondary + governors from the governor in chief; thus the plan of what is to be done in a state flows from the king's command to his + inferior administrators: and again in things of art the plan of whatever is to be done by art flows from the chief craftsman + to the under-crafts-men, who work with their hands. Since then the eternal law is the plan of government in the Chief Governor, + all the plans of government in the inferior governors must be derived from the eternal law. But these plans of inferior + governors are all other laws besides the eternal law. Therefore all laws, in so far as they partake of right reason, are derived + from the eternal law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "in temporal law there is nothing just and lawful, but + what man has drawn from the eternal law." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 3 co."><a name="37549" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37549] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, lex importat rationem +quandam directivam actuum ad finem. In omnibus autem moventibus +ordinatis oportet quod virtus secundi moventis derivetur a virtute +moventis primi, quia movens secundum non movet nisi inquantum +movetur a primo. Unde et in omnibus gubernantibus idem videmus, +quod ratio gubernationis a primo gubernante ad secundos derivatur, +sicut ratio eorum quae sunt agenda in civitate, derivatur a rege +per praeceptum in inferiores administratores. Et in artificialibus +etiam ratio artificialium actuum derivatur ab architectore ad +inferiores artifices, qui manu operantur. Cum ergo lex aeterna sit +ratio gubernationis in supremo gubernante, necesse est quod omnes +rationes gubernationis quae sunt in inferioribus gubernantibus, a +lege aeterna deriventur. Huiusmodi autem rationes inferiorum +gubernantium sunt quaecumque aliae leges praeter legem aeternam. +Unde omnes leges, inquantum participant de ratione recta, intantum +derivantur a lege aeterna. Et propter hoc Augustinus dicit, in I de +Lib. Arb., quod <i>in temporali lege nihil est iustum ac legitimum, +quod non ex lege aeterna homines sibi derivaverunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The "fomes" has the nature of law in man, in so far as it is a punishment resulting from Divine justice; and in this respect + it is evident that it is derived from the eternal law. But in so far as it denotes a proneness to sin, it is contrary to the + Divine law, and has not the nature of law, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q91_A6" id="FS_Q93_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[91], A[6]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37550" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37550] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod fomes habet rationem legis in homine, inquantum +est poena consequens divinam iustitiam, et secundum hoc manifestum +est quod derivatur a lege aeterna. Inquantum vero inclinat ad +peccatum, sic contrariatur legi Dei, et non habet rationem legis, +ut ex supradictis patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Human law has the nature of law in so far as it partakes of right reason; and it is clear that, in this respect, it is derived + from the eternal law. But in so far as it deviates from reason, it is called an unjust law, and has the nature, not of law + but of violence. Nevertheless even an unjust law, in so far as it retains some appearance of law, though being framed by one + who is in power, is derived from the eternal law; since all power is from the + Lord God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.1" target="asv"> Rom. 13:1.</a> + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37551" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37551] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod lex humana intantum habet rationem legis, inquantum +est secundum rationem rectam, et secundum hoc manifestum est quod a +lege aeterna derivatur. Inquantum vero a ratione recedit, sic +dicitur lex iniqua, et sic non habet rationem legis, sed magis +violentiae cuiusdam. Et tamen in ipsa lege iniqua inquantum +servatur aliquid de similitudine legis propter ordinem potestatis +eius qui legem fert, secundum hoc etiam derivatur a lege aeterna, +omnis enim potestas a domino Deo est, ut dicitur Rom. XIII.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Human law is said to permit certain things, not as approving them, but as being unable to direct them. And many things are + directed by the Divine law, which human law is unable to direct, because more things are subject to a higher than to a lower + cause. Hence the very fact that human law does not meddle with matters it cannot direct, comes under the ordination of the + eternal law. It would be different, were human law to sanction what the eternal law + condemns. Consequently it does not follow that human law is not derived from the eternal law, but that it is not on a perfect + equality with it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37552" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37552] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod lex humana dicitur aliqua permittere, non quasi ea +approbans, sed quasi ea dirigere non potens. Multa autem diriguntur +lege divina quae dirigi non possunt lege humana, plura enim +subduntur causae superiori quam inferiori. Unde hoc ipsum quod lex +humana non se intromittat de his quae dirigere non potest, ex +ordine legis aeternae provenit. Secus autem esset si approbaret ea +quae lex aeterna reprobat. Unde ex hoc non habetur quod lex humana +non derivetur a lege aeterna, sed quod non perfecte eam assequi +possit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q93_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q93_A4-p0.1">Q. 93. A. 4. Whether necessary and eternal things are subject to the eternal law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that necessary and eternal things are subject to the eternal law. For whatever is reasonable is subject to + reason. But the Divine will is reasonable, for it is just. Therefore it is subject to (the Divine) reason. But the eternal + law is the Divine reason. Therefore God's will is subject to the eternal law. But God's will is eternal. Therefore eternal + and necessary things are subject to the eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37553" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37553] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod necessaria et aeterna subiiciantur +legi aeternae. Omne enim quod rationabile est, rationi subditur. +Sed voluntas divina est rationabilis, cum sit iusta. Ergo rationi +subditur. Sed lex aeterna est ratio divina. Ergo voluntas Dei +subditur legi aeternae. Voluntas autem Dei est aliquod aeternum. +Ergo etiam aeterna et necessaria legi aeternae subduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is subject to the King, is subject to the King's law. Now the Son, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.28" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:28,24, </a> "shall be subject . . . to God and the Father . . . when He shall have delivered up the Kingdom to Him." Therefore the Son, + Who is eternal, is subject to the eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37554" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37554] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quidquid subiicitur regi, subiicitur legi regis. <i>Filius +autem</i>, ut dicitur I ad Cor. XV, <i>subiectus erit Deo et patri, +cum tradiderit ei regnum</i>. Ergo filius, qui est aeternus, +subiicitur legi aeternae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the eternal law is Divine providence as a type. But many necessary things are subject to Divine providence: for + instance, the stability of incorporeal substances and of the heavenly bodies. Therefore even necessary things are subject + to the eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37555" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37555] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex aeterna est ratio divinae providentiae. Sed multa necessaria +subduntur divinae providentiae, sicut permanentia substantiarum +incorporalium et corporum caelestium. Ergo legi aeternae subduntur +etiam necessaria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Things that are necessary cannot be otherwise, and consequently need no restraining. But laws are imposed on men, in order + to restrain them from evil, as explained above ( + <a href="#FS_Q92_A2" id="FS_Q93_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[92], A[2]</a>). Therefore necessary things are not subject to the eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37556" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37556] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +ea quae sunt necessaria, impossibile est aliter se habere, unde +cohibitione non indigent. Sed imponitur hominibus lex ut +cohibeantur a malis, ut ex supradictis patet. Ergo ea quae sunt +necessaria, legi non subduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q93_A1" id="FS_Q93_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the eternal law is the type of the Divine government. Consequently whatever is subject to the Divine government, is subject + to the eternal law: while if anything is not subject to the Divine government, neither is it subject to the eternal law. The + application of this distinction may be gathered by looking around us. For those things are subject to human government, which + can be done by man; but what pertains + to the nature of man is not subject to human government; for instance, that he should have a soul, hands, or feet. Accordingly + all that is in things created by God, whether it be contingent or necessary, is subject to the eternal law: while things pertaining + to the Divine Nature or Essence are not subject to the eternal law, but are the eternal law itself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 4 co."><a name="37557" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37557] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, lex aeterna est ratio +divinae gubernationis. Quaecumque ergo divinae gubernationi +subduntur, subiiciuntur etiam legi aeternae, quae vero gubernationi +aeternae non subduntur, neque legi aeternae subduntur. Horum autem +distinctio attendi potest ex his quae circa nos sunt. Humanae enim +gubernationi subduntur ea quae per homines fieri possunt, quae vero +ad naturam hominis pertinent, non subduntur gubernationi humanae, +scilicet quod homo habeat animam, vel manus aut pedes. Sic igitur +legi aeternae subduntur omnia quae sunt in rebus a Deo creatis, +sive sint contingentia sive sint necessaria, ea vero quae pertinent +ad naturam vel essentiam divinam, legi aeternae non subduntur, sed +sunt realiter ipsa lex aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We may speak of God's will in two ways. First, as to the will itself: and thus, since God's will is His very Essence, it + is subject neither to the Divine government, nor to the eternal law, but is the same thing as the eternal law. Secondly, we + may speak of God's will, as to the things themselves that God wills about creatures; which things are subject to the eternal + law, in so far as they are planned by Divine Wisdom. In reference to these things + God's will is said to be reasonable [rationalis]: though regarded in itself it should rather be called their type [ratio]. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37558" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37558] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod de voluntate Dei dupliciter possumus loqui. Uno +modo, quantum ad ipsam voluntatem, et sic, cum voluntas Dei sit +ipsa eius essentia, non subditur gubernationi divinae neque legi +aeternae, sed est idem quod lex aeterna. Alio modo possumus loqui +de voluntate divina quantum ad ipsa quae Deus vult circa creaturas, +quae quidem subiecta sunt legi aeternae, inquantum horum ratio est +in divina sapientia. Et ratione horum, voluntas Dei dicitur +rationabilis. Alioquin, ratione sui ipsius, magis est dicenda ipsa +ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God the Son was not made by God, but was naturally born of God. Consequently He is not subject to Divine providence or to + the eternal law: but rather is Himself the eternal law by a kind of appropriation, as Augustine explains (De Vera Relig. xxxi). + But He is said to be subject to the Father by reason of His human nature, in respect of which also the Father is said to be + greater than He. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37559" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37559] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod filius Dei non est a Deo factus, sed naturaliter ab +ipso genitus. Et ideo non subditur divinae providentiae aut legi +aeternae, sed magis ipse est lex aeterna per quandam +appropriationem, ut patet per Augustinum, in libro de vera Relig. +Dicitur autem esse subiectus patri ratione humanae naturae, +secundum quam etiam pater dicitur esse maior eo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A4-p9"> The third objection we grant, because it deals with those necessary things that are created.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37560" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37560] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Tertium +concedimus, quia procedit de necessariis creatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 6), some necessary things have a cause of their necessity: and thus they derive + from something else the fact that they cannot be otherwise. And this is in itself a most effective restraint; for whatever + is restrained, is said to be restrained in so far as it cannot do otherwise than it is allowed to. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="37561" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37561] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in V Metaphys., quaedam +necessaria habent causam suae necessitatis, et sic hoc ipsum quod +impossibile est ea aliter esse, habent ab alio. Et hoc ipsum est +cohibitio quaedam efficacissima, nam quaecumque cohibentur, +intantum cohiberi dicuntur, inquantum non possunt aliter facere +quam de eis disponatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q93_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q93_A5-p0.1">Q. 93. A. 5. Whether natural contingents are subject to the eternal law? </h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that natural contingents are not subject to the eternal law. Because promulgation is essential to law, as stated + above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A4" id="FS_Q93_A5-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[90], A[4]</a>). But a law cannot be promulgated except to rational creatures, to whom it is possible to make an announcement. Therefore + none but rational creatures are subject to the eternal law; and consequently natural contingents are not. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="37562" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37562] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod naturalia contingentia non subsint +legi aeternae. Promulgatio enim est de ratione legis, ut supra +dictum est. Sed promulgatio non potest fieri nisi ad creaturas +rationales, quibus potest aliquid denuntiari. Ergo solae creaturae +rationales subsunt legi aeternae. Non ergo naturalia +contingentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Whatever obeys reason partakes somewhat of reason," as stated in Ethic. i. But the eternal law, is the supreme + type, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q93_A1" id="FS_Q93_A5-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Since then natural contingents do not partake of reason in any way, but are altogether void of reason, it seems that they + are not subject to the eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="37563" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37563] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ea quae obediunt rationi, participant aliqualiter ratione, ut +dicitur in I Ethic. Lex autem aeterna est ratio summa, ut supra +dictum est. Cum igitur naturalia contingentia non participent +aliqualiter ratione, sed penitus sint irrationabilia, videtur quod +non subsint legi aeternae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the eternal law is most efficient. But in natural contingents defects occur. Therefore they are not subject to the + eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="37564" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37564] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex aeterna est efficacissima. Sed in naturalibus contingentibus +accidit defectus. Non ergo subsunt legi aeternae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.29" target="asv">Prov. 8:29</a>): "When He compassed the sea with its bounds, and set a law to the waters, that they should not pass their limits." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 5 s. c."><a name="37565" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37565] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Prov. VIII, <i>quando circumdabat mari terminum +suum, et legem ponebat aquis ne transirent fines suos</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q93_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We must speak otherwise of the law of man, than of the eternal law which is the law of God. For the law of man extends only + to rational creatures subject to man. The reason of this is because law directs the actions of those that are subject to the + government of someone: wherefore, properly speaking, none imposes a law on his own actions. Now whatever is done regarding + the use of irrational things subject to man, is done by the act of man himself moving + those things, for these irrational creatures do not move themselves, but are moved by others, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A2" id="FS_Q93_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[2]</a>). Consequently man cannot impose laws on irrational beings, however much they may be subject to him. But he can impose laws + on rational beings subject to him, in so far as by his command or pronouncement of any kind, he imprints on their minds a + rule which is a principle of action. + </p><p id="FS_Q93_A5-p7"> Now just as man, by such pronouncement, impresses a kind of inward principle of action on the man that is subject to him, + so God imprints on the whole of nature the principles of its proper actions. And so, in this way, God is said to command the + whole of nature, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.148.6" target="asv"> Ps. 148:6</a>: "He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away." And thus all actions and movements of the whole of nature are subject + to the eternal law. Consequently irrational + creatures are subject to the eternal law, through being moved by Divine providence; but not, as rational creatures are, through + understanding the Divine commandment. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 5 co."><a name="37566" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37566] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod aliter dicendum est de lege hominis, et aliter de +lege aeterna, quae est lex Dei. Lex enim hominis non se extendit +nisi ad creaturas rationales quae homini subiiciuntur. Cuius ratio +est quia lex est directiva actuum qui conveniunt subiectis +gubernationi alicuius, unde nullus, proprie loquendo, suis actibus +legem imponit. Quaecumque autem aguntur circa usum rerum +irrationalium homini subditarum, aguntur per actum ipsius hominis +moventis huiusmodi res, nam huiusmodi irrationales creaturae non +agunt seipsas, sed ab aliis aguntur, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo +rebus irrationalibus homo legem imponere non potest, quantumcumque +ei subiiciantur. Rebus autem rationalibus sibi subiectis potest +imponere legem, inquantum suo praecepto, vel denuntiatione +quacumque, imprimit menti earum quandam regulam quae est principium +agendi. Sicut autem homo imprimit, denuntiando, quoddam interius +principium actuum homini sibi subiecto, ita etiam Deus imprimit +toti naturae principia propriorum actuum. Et ideo per hunc modum +dicitur Deus praecipere toti naturae; secundum illud Psalmi +CXLVIII, <i>praeceptum posuit, et non praeteribit</i>. Et per hanc +etiam rationem omnes motus et actiones totius naturae legi aeternae +subduntur. Unde alio modo creaturae irrationales subduntur legi +aeternae, inquantum moventur a divina providentia, non autem per +intellectum divini praecepti, sicut creaturae rationales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The impression of an inward active principle is to natural things, what the promulgation of law is to men: because law, by + being promulgated, imprints on man a directive principle of human actions, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="37567" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37567] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod hoc modo se habet impressio activi principii +intrinseci, quantum ad res naturales, sicut se habet promulgatio +legis quantum ad homines, quia per legis promulgationem imprimitur +hominibus quoddam directivum principium humanorum actuum, ut dictum +est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Irrational creatures neither partake of nor are obedient to human reason: whereas they do partake of the Divine Reason by + obeying it; because the power of Divine Reason extends over more things than human reason does. And as the members of the + human body are moved at the command of reason, and yet do not partake of reason, since they have no apprehension subordinate + to reason; so too irrational creatures are moved by God, without, on that account, + being rational. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="37568" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37568] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod creaturae irrationales non participant ratione +humana, nec ei obediunt, participant tamen, per modum obedientiae, +ratione divina. Ad plura enim se extendit virtus rationis divinae +quam virtus rationis humanae. Et sicut membra corporis humani +moventur ad imperium rationis, non tamen participant ratione, quia +non habent aliquam apprehensionem ordinatam ad rationem; ita etiam +creaturae irrationales moventur a Deo, nec tamen propter hoc sunt +rationales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the defects which occur in natural things are outside the order of particular causes, they are not outside the order + of universal causes, especially of the First Cause, i.e. God, from Whose providence nothing can escape, as stated in the + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q22_A2" id="FS_Q93_A5-p10.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[22], A[2]</a>. And since the eternal law is the type of Divine providence, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q93_A1" id="FS_Q93_A5-p10.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, hence the defects of natural things are subject to the + eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="37569" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37569] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod defectus qui accidunt in rebus naturalibus, quamvis +sint praeter ordinem causarum particularium, non tamen sunt praeter +ordinem causarum universalium; et praecipue causae primae, quae +Deus est, cuius providentiam nihil subterfugere potest, ut in primo +dictum est. Et quia lex aeterna est ratio divinae providentiae, ut +dictum est, ideo defectus rerum naturalium legi aeternae +subduntur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q93_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q93_A6-p0.1">Q. 93. A. 6. Whether all human affairs are subject to the eternal law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not all human affairs are subject to the eternal law. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.18" target="asv">Gal. 5:18</a>): "If you are led by the spirit you are not under the law." But the righteous who are the sons of God by adoption, are led + by the spirit of God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A6-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.14" target="asv"> Rom. 8:14</a>: "Whosoever are led by the spirit of God, they are the sons of God." Therefore not all men are under the eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="37570" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37570] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnes res humanae subiiciantur +legi aeternae. Dicit enim apostolus, ad Gal. V, <i>si spiritu +ducimini, non estis sub lege</i>. Sed viri iusti, qui sunt filii +Dei per adoptionem, spiritu Dei aguntur; secundum illud Rom. VIII, +<i>qui spiritu Dei aguntur, hi filii Dei sunt</i>. Ergo non omnes +homines sunt sub lege aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.7" target="asv">Rom. 8:7</a>): "The prudence [Vulg.: 'wisdom'] of the flesh is an enemy to God: for it is not subject to the law of God." But many are + those in whom the prudence of the flesh dominates. Therefore all men are not subject to the eternal law which is the law of + God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="37571" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37571] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +apostolus dicit, ad Rom. VIII, <i>prudentia carnis inimica est Deo, +legi enim Dei subiecta non est</i>. Sed multi homines sunt in +quibus prudentia carnis dominatur. Ergo legi aeternae, quae est lex +Dei, non subiiciuntur omnes homines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "the eternal law is that by which the wicked deserve misery, the good, a + life of blessedness." But those who are already blessed, and those who are already lost, are not in the state of merit. Therefore + they are not under the eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="37572" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37572] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib. Arb., quod <i>lex aeterna est qua +mali miseriam, boni vitam beatam merentur</i>. Sed homines iam +beati, vel iam damnati, non sunt in statu merendi. Ergo non subsunt +legi aeternae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 12): "Nothing evades the laws of the most high Creator and Governor, for by Him the peace + of the universe is administered." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 6 s. c."><a name="37573" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37573] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, <i>nullo modo aliquid +legibus summi creatoris ordinatorisque subtrahitur, a quo pax +universitatis administratur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q93_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There are two ways in which a thing is subject to the eternal law, as explained above + <a href="#FS_Q93_A5" id="FS_Q93_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>: first, by partaking of the eternal law by way of knowledge; secondly, by way of action and passion, i.e. by partaking of + the eternal law by way of an inward motive principle: and in this second way, irrational creatures are subject to the eternal + law, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q93_A5" id="FS_Q93_A6-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. But since the rational nature, together + with that which it has in common with all creatures, has something proper to itself inasmuch as it is rational, consequently + it is subject to the eternal law in both ways; because while each rational creature has some knowledge of the eternal law, + as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q93_A2" id="FS_Q93_A6-p6.3" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, it also has a natural inclination to that which is in harmony with the eternal law; for "we are naturally adapted to the + recipients of virtue" (Ethic. ii, 1). + </p><p id="FS_Q93_A6-p7"> Both ways, however, are imperfect, and to a certain extent destroyed, in the wicked; because in them the natural inclination + to virtue is corrupted by vicious habits, and, moreover, the natural knowledge of good is darkened by passions and habits + of sin. But in the good both ways are found more perfect: because in them, besides the natural knowledge of good, there is + the added knowledge of faith and wisdom; and again, besides the natural inclination to good, there is the added + motive of grace and virtue. + </p><p id="FS_Q93_A6-p8"> Accordingly, the good are perfectly subject to the eternal law, as always acting according to it: whereas the wicked are + subject to the eternal law, imperfectly as to their actions, indeed, since both their knowledge of good, and their inclination + thereto, are imperfect; but this imperfection on the part of action is supplied on the part of passion, in so far as they + suffer what the eternal law decrees concerning them, according as they fail to act in harmony with that law. + Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 15): "I esteem that the righteous act according to the eternal law; and (De Catech. + Rud. xviii): Out of the just misery of the souls which deserted Him, God knew how to furnish the inferior parts of His creation + with most suitable laws." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 6 co."><a name="37574" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37574] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod duplex est modus quo aliquid subditur legi aeternae, +ut ex supradictis patet, uno modo, inquantum participatur lex +aeterna per modum cognitionis; alio modo, per modum actionis et +passionis, inquantum participatur per modum principii motivi. Et +hoc secundo modo subduntur legi aeternae irrationales creaturae, ut +dictum est. Sed quia rationalis natura, cum eo quod est commune +omnibus creaturis, habet aliquid sibi proprium inquantum est +rationalis, ideo secundum utrumque modum legi aeternae subditur, +quia et notionem legis aeternae aliquo modo habet, ut supra dictum +est; et iterum unicuique rationali creaturae inest naturalis +inclinatio ad id quod est consonum legi aeternae; sumus enim innati +ad habendum virtutes, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Uterque tamen modus +imperfectus quidem est, et quodammodo corruptus, in malis; in +quibus et inclinatio naturalis ad virtutem depravatur per habitum +vitiosum; et iterum ipsa naturalis cognitio boni in eis +obtenebratur per passiones et habitus peccatorum. In bonis autem +uterque modus invenitur perfectior, quia et supra cognitionem +naturalem boni, superadditur eis cognitio fidei et sapientiae; et +supra naturalem inclinationem ad bonum, superadditur eis interius +motivum gratiae et virtutis. Sic igitur boni perfecte subsunt legi +aeternae, tanquam semper secundum eam agentes. Mali autem subsunt +quidem legi aeternae, imperfecte quidem quantum ad actiones +ipsorum, prout imperfecte cognoscunt et imperfecte inclinantur ad +bonum, sed quantum deficit ex parte actionis, suppletur ex parte +passionis, prout scilicet intantum patiuntur quod lex aeterna +dictat de eis, inquantum deficiunt facere quod legi aeternae +convenit. Unde Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib. Arb., <i>iustos sub +aeterna lege agere existimo</i>. Et in libro de catechizandis +rudibus, dicit quod <i>Deus ex iusta miseria animarum se +deserentium, convenientissimis legibus inferiores partes creaturae +suae novit ornare</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This saying of the Apostle may be understood in two ways. First, so that a man is said to be under the law, through being + pinned down thereby, against his will, as by a load. Hence, on the same passage a gloss says that "he is under the law, who + refrains from evil deeds, through fear of punishment threatened by the law, and not from love of virtue." In this way the + spiritual man is not under the law, because he fulfils the law willingly, through + charity which is poured into his heart by the Holy Ghost. Secondly, it can be understood as meaning that the works of a man, + who is led by the Holy Ghost, are the works of the Holy Ghost rather than his own. Therefore, since the Holy Ghost is not + under the law, as neither is the Son, as stated above (A[4], ad 2); it follows that such works, in so far as they are of the + Holy Ghost, are not under the law. The Apostle witnesses to this when he says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A6-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.17" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:17</a>): "Where the + Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="37575" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37575] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod illud verbum apostoli potest intelligi +dupliciter. Uno modo, ut esse sub lege intelligatur ille qui nolens +obligationi legis subditur, quasi cuidam ponderi. Unde Glossa +ibidem dicit quod <i>sub lege est qui timore supplicii quod lex +minatur, non amore iustitiae, a malo opere abstinet</i>. Et hoc +modo spirituales viri non sunt sub lege, quia per caritatem, quam +spiritus sanctus cordibus eorum infundit, voluntarie id quod legis +est, implent. Alio modo potest etiam intelligi inquantum hominis +opera qui spiritu sancto agitur, magis dicuntur esse opera spiritus +sancti quam ipsius hominis. Unde cum spiritus sanctus non sit sub +lege, sicut nec filius, ut supra dictum est; sequitur quod +huiusmodi opera, inquantum sunt spiritus sancti, non sint sub lege. +Et huic attestatur quod apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. III, <i>ubi +spiritus domini, ibi libertas</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The prudence of the flesh cannot be subject to the law of God as regards action; since it inclines to actions contrary to + the Divine law: yet it is subject to the law of God, as regards passion; since it deserves to suffer punishment according + to the law of Divine justice. Nevertheless in no man does the prudence of the flesh dominate so far as to destroy the whole + good of his nature: and consequently there remains in man the inclination to act in + accordance with the eternal law. For we have seen above ( + <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q85_A2" id="FS_Q93_A6-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[85], A[2]</a>) that sin does not destroy entirely the good of nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="37576" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37576] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod prudentia carnis non potest subiici legi Dei ex parte +actionis, quia inclinat ad actiones contrarias legi Dei. Subiicitur +tamen legi Dei ex parte passionis, quia meretur pati poenam +secundum legem divinae iustitiae. Nihilominus tamen in nullo homine +ita prudentia carnis dominatur, quod totum bonum naturae +corrumpatur. Et ideo remanet in homine inclinatio ad agendum ea +quae sunt legis aeternae. Habitum est enim supra quod peccatum non +tollit totum bonum naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A thing is maintained in the end and moved towards the end by one and the same cause: thus gravity which makes a heavy body + rest in the lower place is also the cause of its being moved thither. We therefore reply that as it is according to the eternal + law that some deserve happiness, others unhappiness, so is it by the eternal law that some are maintained in a happy state, + others in an unhappy state. Accordingly both the blessed and the damned are + under the eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="37577" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37577] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod idem est per quod aliquid conservatur in fine, et per +quod movetur ad finem, sicut corpus grave gravitate quiescit in +loco inferiori, per quam etiam ad locum ipsum movetur. Et sic +dicendum est quod, sicut secundum legem aeternam aliqui merentur +beatitudinem vel miseriam, ita per eandem legem in beatitudine vel +miseria conservantur. Et secundum hoc, et beati et damnati subsunt +legi aeternae.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q94" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q94-p0.1">Q. 94. OF THE NATURAL LAW (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q94-p2"> We must now consider the natural law; concerning which there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q94-p3"><a href="#FS_Q94_A1"> (1) What is the natural law?</a></p><p id="FS_Q94-p4"><a href="#FS_Q94_A2"> (2) What are the precepts of the natural law?</a></p><p id="FS_Q94-p5"><a href="#FS_Q94_A3"> (3) Whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law?</a></p><p id="FS_Q94-p6"><a href="#FS_Q94_A4"> (4) Whether the natural law is the same in all?</a></p><p id="FS_Q94-p7"><a href="#FS_Q94_A5"> (5) Whether it is changeable?</a></p><p id="FS_Q94-p8"><a href="#FS_Q94_A6"> (6) Whether it can be abolished from the heart of man?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 pr."><a name="37578" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37578] +Iª-IIae q. 94 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de lege +naturali. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, quid sit lex +naturalis. Secundo, quae sint praecepta legis naturalis. Tertio, +utrum omnes actus virtutum sint de lege naturali. Quarto, utrum lex +naturalis sit una apud omnes. Quinto, utrum sit mutabilis. Sexto, +utrum possit a mente hominis deleri.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q94_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q94_A1-p0.1">Q. 94. A. 1. Whether the natural law is a habit?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the natural law is a habit. Because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5), "there are three things in + the soul: power, habit, and passion." But the natural law is not one of the soul's powers: nor is it one of the passions; + as we may see by going through them one by one. Therefore the natural law is a habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37579" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37579] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex naturalis sit habitus. Quia ut +philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., <i>tria sunt in anima, potentia, +habitus et passio</i>. Sed naturalis lex non est aliqua potentiarum +animae, nec aliqua passionum, ut patet enumerando per singula. Ergo +lex naturalis est habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Basil [*Damascene, De Fide Orth. iv, 22] says that the conscience or "synderesis is the law of our mind"; which + can only apply to the natural law. But the "synderesis" is a habit, as was shown in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q79_A12" id="FS_Q94_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[79], A[12]</a>. Therefore the natural law is a habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37580" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37580] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Basilius dicit quod conscientia, sive synderesis, est lex +intellectus nostri, quod non potest intelligi nisi de lege +naturali. Sed synderesis est habitus quidam, ut in primo habitum +est. Ergo lex naturalis est habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the natural law abides in man always, as will be shown further on + <a href="#FS_Q94_A6" id="FS_Q94_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[6])</a>. But man's reason, which the law regards, does not always think about the natural law. Therefore the natural law is not an + act, but a habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37581" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37581] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex naturalis semper in homine manet, ut infra patebit. Sed non +semper ratio hominis, ad quam lex pertinet, cogitat de lege +naturali. Ergo lex naturalis non est actus, sed habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that "a habit is that whereby something is done when necessary." But such is not the + natural law: since it is in infants and in the damned who cannot act by it. Therefore the natural law is not a habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37582" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37582] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de bono coniugali, quod +<i>habitus est quo aliquid agitur cum opus est</i>. Sed naturalis +lex non est huiusmodi, est enim in parvulis et damnatis, qui per +eam agere non possunt. Ergo lex naturalis non est habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q94_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A thing may be called a habit in two ways. First, properly and essentially: and thus the natural law is not a habit. For + it has been stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A1" id="FS_Q94_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[90], A[1]</a>, ad 2) that the natural law is something appointed by reason, just as a proposition is a work of reason. Now that which a + man does is not the same as that whereby he does it: for he makes a becoming speech by the habit of grammar. Since then a + habit is that by which we act, a + law cannot be a habit properly and essentially. + </p><p id="FS_Q94_A1-p7"> Secondly, the term habit may be applied to that which we hold by a habit: thus faith may mean that which we hold by faith. + And accordingly, since the precepts of the natural law are sometimes considered by reason actually, while sometimes they are + in the reason only habitually, in this way the natural law may be called a habit. Thus, in speculative matters, the indemonstrable + principles are not the habit itself whereby we hold those principles, but are the principles the habit + of which we possess. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 1 co."><a name="37583" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37583] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod aliquid potest dici esse habitus dupliciter. Uno +modo, proprie et essentialiter, et sic lex naturalis non est +habitus. Dictum est enim supra quod lex naturalis est aliquid per +rationem constitutum, sicut etiam propositio est quoddam opus +rationis. Non est autem idem quod quis agit, et quo quis agit, +aliquis enim per habitum grammaticae agit orationem congruam. Cum +igitur habitus sit quo quis agit, non potest esse quod lex aliqua +sit habitus proprie et essentialiter. Alio modo potest dici habitus +id quod habitu tenetur, sicut dicitur fides id quod fide tenetur. +Et hoc modo, quia praecepta legis naturalis quandoque considerantur +in actu a ratione, quandoque autem sunt in ea habitualiter tantum, +secundum hunc modum potest dici quod lex naturalis sit habitus. +Sicut etiam principia indemonstrabilia in speculativis non sunt +ipse habitus principiorum, sed sunt principia quorum est +habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher proposes there to discover the genus of virtue; and since it is evident that virtue is a principle of action, + he mentions only those things which are principles of human acts, viz. powers, habits and passions. But there are other things + in the soul besides these three: there are acts; thus "to will" is in the one that wills; again, things known are in the knower; + moreover its own natural properties are in the soul, such as immortality + and the like. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37584" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37584] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod philosophus intendit ibi investigare genus +virtutis, et cum manifestum sit quod virtus sit quoddam principium +actus, illa tantum ponit quae sunt principia humanorum actuum, +scilicet potentias, habitus et passiones. Praeter haec autem tria +sunt quaedam alia in anima, sicut quidam actus, ut velle est in +volente; et etiam cognita sunt in cognoscente; et proprietates +naturales animae insunt ei, ut immortalitas et alia huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "Synderesis" is said to be the law of our mind, because it is a habit containing the precepts of the natural law, which are + the first principles of human actions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37585" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37585] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod synderesis dicitur lex intellectus nostri, inquantum +est habitus continens praecepta legis naturalis, quae sunt prima +principia operum humanorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument proves that the natural law is held habitually; and this is granted. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37586" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37586] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa concludit quod lex naturalis habitualiter +tenetur. Et hoc concedimus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> To the argument advanced in the contrary sense we reply that sometimes a man is unable to make use of that which is in him + habitually, on account of some impediment: thus, on account of sleep, a man is unable to use the habit of science. In like + manner, through the deficiency of his age, a child cannot use the habit of understanding of principles, or the natural law, + which is in him habitually. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="37587" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37587] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad id vero +quod in contrarium obiicitur, dicendum quod eo quod habitualiter +inest, quandoque aliquis uti non potest propter aliquod +impedimentum, sicut homo non potest uti habitu scientiae propter +somnum. Et similiter puer non potest uti habitu intellectus +principiorum, vel etiam lege naturali, quae ei habitualiter inest, +propter defectum aetatis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q94_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q94_A2-p0.1">Q. 94. A. 2. Whether the natural law contains several precepts, or only one?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the natural law contains, not several precepts, but one only. For law is a kind of precept, as stated + above ( + <a href="#FS_Q92_A2" id="FS_Q94_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[92], A[2]</a>). If therefore there were many precepts of the natural law, it would follow that there are also many natural laws. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37588" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37588] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex naturalis non contineat plura +praecepta, sed unum tantum. Lex enim continetur in genere +praecepti, ut supra habitum est. Si igitur essent multa praecepta +legis naturalis, sequeretur quod etiam essent multae leges +naturales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the natural law is consequent to human nature. But human nature, as a whole, is one; though, as to its parts, it + is manifold. Therefore, either there is but one precept of the law of nature, on account of the unity of nature as a whole; + or there are many, by reason of the number of parts of human nature. The result would be that even things relating to the + inclination of the concupiscible faculty belong to the natural law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37589" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37589] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +lex naturalis consequitur hominis naturam. Sed humana natura est +una secundum totum, licet sit multiplex secundum partes. Aut ergo +est unum praeceptum tantum legis naturae, propter unitatem totius, +aut sunt multa, secundum multitudinem partium humanae naturae. Et +sic oportebit quod etiam ea quae sunt de inclinatione +concupiscibilis, pertineant ad legem naturalem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, law is something pertaining to reason, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A1" id="FS_Q94_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[90], A[1]</a>). Now reason is but one in man. Therefore there is only one precept of the natural law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37590" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37590] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex est aliquid ad rationem pertinens, ut supra dictum est. Sed +ratio in homine est una tantum. Ergo solum unum praeceptum est +legis naturalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The precepts of the natural law in man stand in relation to practical matters, as the first principles to matters of demonstration. + But there are several first indemonstrable principles. Therefore there are also several precepts of the natural law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37591" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37591] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quia sic se habent praecepta legis naturalis in homine quantum +ad operabilia, sicut se habent prima principia in demonstrativis. +Sed prima principia indemonstrabilia sunt plura. Ergo etiam +praecepta legis naturae sunt plura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q94_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q91_A3" id="FS_Q94_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[91], A[3]</a>), the precepts of the natural law are to the practical reason, what the first principles of demonstrations are to the speculative + reason; because both are self-evident principles. Now a thing is said to be self-evident in two ways: first, in itself; secondly, + in relation to us. Any proposition is said to be self-evident in itself, if its predicate is contained in the notion of the + subject: although, to + one who knows not the definition of the subject, it happens that such a proposition is not self-evident. For instance, this + proposition, "Man is a rational being," is, in its very nature, self-evident, since who says "man," says "a rational being": + and yet to one who knows not what a man is, this proposition is not self-evident. Hence it is that, as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), + certain axioms or propositions are universally self-evident to all; and such are those propositions whose terms are + known to all, as, "Every whole is greater than its part," and, "Things equal to one and the same are equal to one another." + But some propositions are self-evident only to the wise, who understand the meaning of the terms of such propositions: thus + to one who understands that an angel is not a body, it is self-evident that an angel is not circumscriptively in a place: + but this is not evident to the unlearned, for they cannot grasp it. + </p><p id="FS_Q94_A2-p7"> Now a certain order is to be found in those things that are apprehended universally. For that which, before aught else, falls + under apprehension, is "being," the notion of which is included in all things whatsoever a man apprehends. Wherefore the first + indemonstrable principle is that "the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time," which is based on the notion + of "being" and "not-being": and on this principle all others are based, as is stated in Metaph. iv, + text. 9. Now as "being" is the first thing that falls under the apprehension simply, so "good" is the first thing that falls + under the apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed to action: since every agent acts for an end under the aspect + of good. Consequently the first principle of practical reason is one founded on the notion of good, viz. that "good is that + which all things seek after." Hence this is the first precept of law, that "good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to + be avoided." All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends + as man's good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided. + </p><p id="FS_Q94_A2-p8"> Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a contrary, hence it is that all those things to which + man has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and consequently as objects of pursuit, + and their contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations, is the order + of the precepts of the natural law. Because in man there is first of all an inclination to good in + accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substances: inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation + of its own being, according to its nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of preserving human life, + and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law. Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that pertain + to him more specially, according to that nature which he has in common with other animals: and in virtue of this inclination, + those things are said to belong to the natural law, "which nature has taught to all animals" [*Pandect. Just. I, tit. i], + such as sexual intercourse, education of offspring and so forth. Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to good, according + to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him: thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, + and to live in society: and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance, + to + shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 2 co."><a name="37592" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37592] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, praecepta legis naturae hoc +modo se habent ad rationem practicam, sicut principia prima +demonstrationum se habent ad rationem speculativam, utraque enim +sunt quaedam principia per se nota. Dicitur autem aliquid per se +notum dupliciter, uno modo, secundum se; alio modo, quoad nos. +Secundum se quidem quaelibet propositio dicitur per se nota, cuius +praedicatum est de ratione subiecti, contingit tamen quod ignoranti +definitionem subiecti, talis propositio non erit per se nota. Sicut +ista propositio, homo est rationale, est per se nota secundum sui +naturam, quia qui dicit hominem, dicit rationale, et tamen +ignoranti quid sit homo, haec propositio non est per se nota. Et +inde est quod, sicut dicit Boetius, in libro de Hebdomad., quaedam +sunt dignitates vel propositiones per se notae communiter omnibus, +et huiusmodi sunt illae propositiones quarum termini sunt omnibus +noti, ut, omne totum est maius sua parte, et, quae uni et eidem +sunt aequalia, sibi invicem sunt aequalia. Quaedam vero +propositiones sunt per se notae solis sapientibus, qui terminos +propositionum intelligunt quid significent, sicut intelligenti quod +Angelus non est corpus, per se notum est quod non est +circumscriptive in loco, quod non est manifestum rudibus, qui hoc +non capiunt. In his autem quae in apprehensione omnium cadunt, +quidam ordo invenitur. Nam illud quod primo cadit in apprehensione, +est ens, cuius intellectus includitur in omnibus quaecumque quis +apprehendit. Et ideo primum principium indemonstrabile est quod non +est simul affirmare et negare, quod fundatur supra rationem entis +et non entis, et super hoc principio omnia alia fundantur, ut +dicitur in IV Metaphys. Sicut autem ens est primum quod cadit in +apprehensione simpliciter, ita bonum est primum quod cadit in +apprehensione practicae rationis, quae ordinatur ad opus, omne enim +agens agit propter finem, qui habet rationem boni. Et ideo primum +principium in ratione practica est quod fundatur supra rationem +boni, quae est, bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Hoc est ergo primum +praeceptum legis, quod bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et +malum vitandum. Et super hoc fundantur omnia alia praecepta legis +naturae, ut scilicet omnia illa facienda vel vitanda pertineant ad +praecepta legis naturae, quae ratio practica naturaliter +apprehendit esse bona humana. Quia vero bonum habet rationem finis, +malum autem rationem contrarii, inde est quod omnia illa ad quae +homo habet naturalem inclinationem, ratio naturaliter apprehendit +ut bona, et per consequens ut opere prosequenda, et contraria eorum +ut mala et vitanda. Secundum igitur ordinem inclinationum +naturalium, est ordo praeceptorum legis naturae. Inest enim primo +inclinatio homini ad bonum secundum naturam in qua communicat cum +omnibus substantiis, prout scilicet quaelibet substantia appetit +conservationem sui esse secundum suam naturam. Et secundum hanc +inclinationem, pertinent ad legem naturalem ea per quae vita +hominis conservatur, et contrarium impeditur. Secundo inest homini +inclinatio ad aliqua magis specialia, secundum naturam in qua +communicat cum ceteris animalibus. Et secundum hoc, dicuntur ea +esse de lege naturali quae natura omnia animalia docuit, ut est +coniunctio maris et feminae, et educatio liberorum, et similia. +Tertio modo inest homini inclinatio ad bonum secundum naturam +rationis, quae est sibi propria, sicut homo habet naturalem +inclinationem ad hoc quod veritatem cognoscat de Deo, et ad hoc +quod in societate vivat. Et secundum hoc, ad legem naturalem +pertinent ea quae ad huiusmodi inclinationem spectant, utpote quod +homo ignorantiam vitet, quod alios non offendat cum quibus debet +conversari, et cetera huiusmodi quae ad hoc spectant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All these precepts of the law of nature have the character of one natural law, inasmuch as they flow from one first precept. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37593" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37593] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod omnia ista praecepta legis naturae, inquantum +referuntur ad unum primum praeceptum, habent rationem unius legis +naturalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All the inclinations of any parts whatsoever of human nature, e.g. of the concupiscible and irascible parts, in so far as + they are ruled by reason, belong to the natural law, and are reduced to one first precept, as stated above: so that the precepts + of the natural law are many in themselves, but are based on one common foundation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37594" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37594] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod omnes inclinationes quarumcumque partium humanae +naturae, puta concupiscibilis et irascibilis, secundum quod +regulantur ratione, pertinent ad legem naturalem, et reducuntur ad +unum primum praeceptum, ut dictum est. Et secundum hoc, sunt multa +praecepta legis naturae in seipsis, quae tamen communicant in una +radice.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although reason is one in itself, yet it directs all things regarding man; so that whatever can be ruled by reason, is contained + under the law of reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37595" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37595] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio, etsi in se una sit, tamen est ordinativa +omnium quae ad homines spectant. Et secundum hoc, sub lege rationis +continentur omnia ea quae ratione regulari possunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q94_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q94_A3-p0.1">Q. 94. A. 3. Whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law. Because, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A2" id="FS_Q94_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[90], A[2]</a>) it is essential to a law that it be ordained to the common good. But some acts of virtue are ordained to the private good + of the individual, as is evident especially in regards to acts of temperance. Therefore not all acts of virtue are the subject + of natural law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37596" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37596] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnes actus virtutum sint de lege +naturae. Quia, ut supra dictum est, de ratione legis est ut +ordinetur ad bonum commune. Sed quidam virtutum actus ordinantur ad +bonum privatum alicuius, ut patet praecipue in actibus +temperantiae. Non ergo omnes actus virtutum legi subduntur +naturali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every sin is opposed to some virtuous act. If therefore all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law, it + seems to follow that all sins are against nature: whereas this applies to certain special sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37597" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37597] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +omnia peccata aliquibus virtuosis actibus opponuntur. Si igitur +omnes actus virtutum sint de lege naturae, videtur ex consequenti +quod omnia peccata sint contra naturam. Quod tamen specialiter de +quibusdam peccatis dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, those things which are according to nature are common to all. But acts of virtue are not common to all: since a + thing is virtuous in one, and vicious in another. Therefore not all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37598" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37598] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +in his quae sunt secundum naturam, omnes conveniunt. Sed in actibus +virtutum non omnes conveniunt, aliquid enim est virtuosum uni, quod +est alteri vitiosum. Ergo non omnes actus virtutum sunt de lege +naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4) that "virtues are natural." Therefore virtuous acts also are a subject of the natural + law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37599" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37599] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, quod virtutes sunt +naturales. Ergo et actus virtuosi subiacent legi naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We may speak of virtuous acts in two ways: first, under the aspect of virtuous; secondly, as such and such acts considered + in their proper species. If then we speak of acts of virtue, considered as virtuous, thus all virtuous acts belong to the + natural law. For it has been stated + <a href="#FS_Q94_A2" id="FS_Q94_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a> that to the natural law belongs everything to which a man is inclined according to his nature. Now each thing is inclined + naturally to an operation + that is suitable to it according to its form: thus fire is inclined to give heat. Wherefore, since the rational soul is the + proper form of man, there is in every man a natural inclination to act according to reason: and this is to act according to + virtue. Consequently, considered thus, all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law: since each one's reason naturally + dictates to him to act virtuously. But if we speak of virtuous acts, considered in themselves, i.e. in their proper species, + thus not all virtuous acts are prescribed by the natural law: for many things are done virtuously, to which nature does not + incline at first; but which, through the inquiry of reason, have been found by men to be conducive to well-living. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 3 co."><a name="37600" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37600] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod de actibus virtuosis dupliciter loqui possumus, uno +modo, inquantum sunt virtuosi; alio modo, inquantum sunt tales +actus in propriis speciebus considerati. Si igitur loquamur de +actibus virtutum inquantum sunt virtuosi, sic omnes actus virtuosi +pertinent ad legem naturae. Dictum est enim quod ad legem naturae +pertinet omne illud ad quod homo inclinatur secundum suam naturam. +Inclinatur autem unumquodque naturaliter ad operationem sibi +convenientem secundum suam formam, sicut ignis ad calefaciendum. +Unde cum anima rationalis sit propria forma hominis, naturalis +inclinatio inest cuilibet homini ad hoc quod agat secundum +rationem. Et hoc est agere secundum virtutem. Unde secundum hoc, +omnes actus virtutum sunt de lege naturali, dictat enim hoc +naturaliter unicuique propria ratio, ut virtuose agat. Sed si +loquamur de actibus virtuosis secundum seipsos, prout scilicet in +propriis speciebus considerantur, sic non omnes actus virtuosi sunt +de lege naturae. Multa enim secundum virtutem fiunt, ad quae natura +non primo inclinat; sed per rationis inquisitionem ea homines +adinvenerunt, quasi utilia ad bene vivendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Temperance is about the natural concupiscences of food, drink and sexual matters, which are indeed ordained to the natural + common good, just as other matters of law are ordained to the moral common good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37601" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37601] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod temperantia est circa concupiscentias naturales +cibi et potus et venereorum, quae quidem ordinantur ad bonum +commune naturae, sicut et alia legalia ordinantur ad bonum commune +morale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By human nature we may mean either that which is proper to man---and in this sense all sins, as being against reason, are + also against nature, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): or we may mean that nature which is common to man and other + animals; and in this sense, certain special sins are said to be against nature; thus contrary to sexual intercourse, which + is natural to all animals, is unisexual lust, which has received the special name of + the unnatural crime. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37602" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37602] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod natura hominis potest dici vel illa quae est propria +homini, et secundum hoc, omnia peccata, inquantum sunt contra +rationem, sunt etiam contra naturam, ut patet per Damascenum, in II +libro. Vel illa quae est communis homini et aliis animalibus, et +secundum hoc, quaedam specialia peccata dicuntur esse contra +naturam; sicut contra commixtionem maris et feminae, quae est +naturalis omnibus animalibus, est concubitus masculorum, quod +specialiter dicitur vitium contra naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers acts in themselves. For it is owing to the various conditions of men, that certain acts are virtuous + for some, as being proportionate and becoming to them, while they are vicious for others, as being out of proportion to them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37603" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37603] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de actibus secundum seipsos +consideratis. Sic enim, propter diversas hominum conditiones, +contingit quod aliqui actus sunt aliquibus virtuosi, tanquam eis +proportionati et convenientes, qui tamen sunt aliis vitiosi, +tanquam eis non proportionati.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q94_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q94_A4-p0.1">Q. 94. A. 4. Whether the natural law is the same in all men?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the natural law is not the same in all. For it is stated in the Decretals (Dist. i) that "the natural + law is that which is contained in the Law and the Gospel." But this is not common to all men; because, as it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q94_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.10.16" target="asv">Rom. 10:16</a>), "all do not obey the gospel." Therefore the natural law is not the same in all men. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37604" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37604] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex naturae non sit una apud omnes. +Dicitur enim in decretis, dist. I, quod <i>ius naturale est quod in +lege et in Evangelio continetur</i>. Sed hoc non est commune +omnibus, quia, ut dicitur Rom. X, <i>non omnes obediunt +Evangelio</i>. Ergo lex naturalis non est una apud omnes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Things which are according to the law are said to be just," as stated in Ethic. v. But it is stated in the same + book that nothing is so universally just as not to be subject to change in regard to some men. Therefore even the natural + law is not the same in all men. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37605" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37605] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ea quae sunt secundum legem, iusta esse dicuntur, ut dicitur in V +Ethic. Sed in eodem libro dicitur quod nihil est ita iustum apud +omnes, quin apud aliquos diversificetur. Ergo lex etiam naturalis +non est apud omnes eadem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q94_A2" id="FS_Q94_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,3), to the natural law belongs everything to which a man is inclined according to his nature. Now different men are naturally + inclined to different things; some to the desire of pleasures, others to the desire of honors, and other men to other things. + Therefore there is not one natural law for all. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37606" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37606] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +ad legem naturae pertinet id ad quod homo secundum naturam suam +inclinatur, ut supra dictum est. Sed diversi homines naturaliter ad +diversa inclinantur, alii quidem ad concupiscentiam voluptatum, +alii ad desideria honorum, alii ad alia. Ergo non est una lex +naturalis apud omnes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore says (Etym. v, 4): "The natural law is common to all nations." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37607" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37607] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., <i>ius naturale est +commune omnium nationum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q94_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q94_A2" id="FS_Q94_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,3), to the natural law belongs those things to which a man is inclined naturally: and among these it is proper to man to + be inclined to act according to reason. Now the process of reason is from the common to the proper, as stated in Phys. i. + The speculative reason, however, is differently situated in this matter, from the practical reason. For, since the speculative + reason is busied chiefly with the necessary + things, which cannot be otherwise than they are, its proper conclusions, like the universal principles, contain the truth + without fail. The practical reason, on the other hand, is busied with contingent matters, about which human actions are concerned: + and consequently, although there is necessity in the general principles, the more we descend to matters of detail, the more + frequently we encounter defects. Accordingly then in speculative matters truth is the same in all men, both as to + principles and as to conclusions: although the truth is not known to all as regards the conclusions, but only as regards the + principles which are called common notions. But in matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all, + as to matters of detail, but only as to the general principles: and where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail, + it is not equally known to all. + </p><p id="FS_Q94_A4-p7"> It is therefore evident that, as regards the general principles whether of speculative or of practical reason, truth or rectitude + is the same for all, and is equally known by all. As to the proper conclusions of the speculative reason, the truth is the + same for all, but is not equally known to all: thus it is true for all that the three angles of a triangle are together equal + to two right angles, although it is not known to all. But as to the proper conclusions of the practical + reason, neither is the truth or rectitude the same for all, nor, where it is the same, is it equally known by all. Thus it + is right and true for all to act according to reason: and from this principle it follows as a proper conclusion, that goods + entrusted to another should be restored to their owner. Now this is true for the majority of cases: but it may happen in a + particular case that it would be injurious, and therefore unreasonable, to restore goods held in trust; for instance, if they + are + claimed for the purpose of fighting against one's country. And this principle will be found to fail the more, according as + we descend further into detail, e.g. if one were to say that goods held in trust should be restored with such and such a guarantee, + or in such and such a way; because the greater the number of conditions added, the greater the number of ways in which the + principle may fail, so that it be not right to restore or not to restore. + </p><p id="FS_Q94_A4-p8"> Consequently we must say that the natural law, as to general principles, is the same for all, both as to rectitude and as + to knowledge. But as to certain matters of detail, which are conclusions, as it were, of those general principles, it is the + same for all in the majority of cases, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge; and yet in some few cases it may fail, both + as to rectitude, by reason of certain obstacles (just as natures subject to generation and corruption fail in + some few cases on account of some obstacle), and as to knowledge, since in some the reason is perverted by passion, or evil + habit, or an evil disposition of nature; thus formerly, theft, although it is expressly contrary to the natural law, was not + considered wrong among the Germans, as Julius Caesar relates (De Bello Gall. vi). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 4 co."><a name="37608" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37608] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad legem naturae pertinent +ea ad quae homo naturaliter inclinatur; inter quae homini proprium +est ut inclinetur ad agendum secundum rationem. Ad rationem autem +pertinet ex communibus ad propria procedere, ut patet ex I Physic. +Aliter tamen circa hoc se habet ratio speculativa, et aliter ratio +practica. Quia enim ratio speculativa praecipue negotiatur circa +necessaria, quae impossibile est aliter se habere, absque aliquo +defectu invenitur veritas in conclusionibus propriis, sicut et in +principiis communibus. Sed ratio practica negotiatur circa +contingentia, in quibus sunt operationes humanae, et ideo, etsi in +communibus sit aliqua necessitas, quanto magis ad propria +descenditur, tanto magis invenitur defectus. Sic igitur in +speculativis est eadem veritas apud omnes tam in principiis quam in +conclusionibus, licet veritas non apud omnes cognoscatur in +conclusionibus, sed solum in principiis, quae dicuntur communes +conceptiones. In operativis autem non est eadem veritas vel +rectitudo practica apud omnes quantum ad propria, sed solum quantum +ad communia, et apud illos apud quos est eadem rectitudo in +propriis, non est aequaliter omnibus nota. Sic igitur patet quod, +quantum ad communia principia rationis sive speculativae sive +practicae, est eadem veritas seu rectitudo apud omnes, et +aequaliter nota. Quantum vero ad proprias conclusiones rationis +speculativae, est eadem veritas apud omnes, non tamen aequaliter +omnibus nota, apud omnes enim verum est quod triangulus habet tres +angulos aequales duobus rectis, quamvis hoc non sit omnibus notum. +Sed quantum ad proprias conclusiones rationis practicae, nec est +eadem veritas seu rectitudo apud omnes; nec etiam apud quos est +eadem, est aequaliter nota. Apud omnes enim hoc rectum est et +verum, ut secundum rationem agatur. Ex hoc autem principio sequitur +quasi conclusio propria, quod deposita sint reddenda. Et hoc quidem +ut in pluribus verum est, sed potest in aliquo casu contingere quod +sit damnosum, et per consequens irrationabile, si deposita +reddantur; puta si aliquis petat ad impugnandam patriam. Et hoc +tanto magis invenitur deficere, quanto magis ad particularia +descenditur, puta si dicatur quod deposita sunt reddenda cum tali +cautione, vel tali modo, quanto enim plures conditiones +particulares apponuntur, tanto pluribus modis poterit deficere, ut +non sit rectum vel in reddendo vel in non reddendo. Sic igitur +dicendum est quod lex naturae, quantum ad prima principia communia, +est eadem apud omnes et secundum rectitudinem, et secundum +notitiam. Sed quantum ad quaedam propria, quae sunt quasi +conclusiones principiorum communium, est eadem apud omnes ut in +pluribus et secundum rectitudinem et secundum notitiam, sed ut in +paucioribus potest deficere et quantum ad rectitudinem, propter +aliqua particularia impedimenta (sicut etiam naturae generabiles et +corruptibiles deficiunt ut in paucioribus, propter impedimenta), et +etiam quantum ad notitiam; et hoc propter hoc quod aliqui habent +depravatam rationem ex passione, seu ex mala consuetudine, seu ex +mala habitudine naturae; sicut apud germanos olim latrocinium non +reputabatur iniquum, cum tamen sit expresse contra legem naturae, +ut refert Iulius Caesar, in libro de bello Gallico.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The meaning of the sentence quoted is not that whatever is contained in the Law and the Gospel belongs to the natural law, + since they contain many things that are above nature; but that whatever belongs to the natural law is fully contained in them. + Wherefore Gratian, after saying that "the natural law is what is contained in the Law and the Gospel," adds at once, by way + of example, "by which everyone is commanded to do to others as he would be done + by." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37609" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37609] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod verbum illud non est sic intelligendum quasi +omnia quae in lege et in Evangelio continentur, sint de lege +naturae, cum multa tradantur ibi supra naturam, sed quia ea quae +sunt de lege naturae, plenarie ibi traduntur. Unde cum dixisset +Gratianus quod <i>ius naturale est quod in lege et in Evangelio +continetur</i>, statim, exemplificando, subiunxit, <i>quo quisque +iubetur alii facere quod sibi vult fieri</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The saying of the Philosopher is to be understood of things that are naturally just, not as general principles, but as conclusions + drawn from them, having rectitude in the majority of cases, but failing in a few. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37610" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37610] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod verbum philosophi est intelligendum de his quae sunt +naturaliter iusta non sicut principia communia, sed sicut quaedam +conclusiones ex his derivatae; quae ut in pluribus rectitudinem +habent, et ut in paucioribus deficiunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As, in man, reason rules and commands the other powers, so all the natural inclinations belonging to the other powers must + needs be directed according to reason. Wherefore it is universally right for all men, that all their inclinations should be + directed according to reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37611" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37611] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut ratio in homine dominatur et imperat aliis +potentiis, ita oportet quod omnes inclinationes naturales ad alias +potentias pertinentes ordinentur secundum rationem. Unde hoc est +apud omnes communiter rectum, ut secundum rationem dirigantur omnes +hominum inclinationes.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q94_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q94_A5-p0.1">Q. 94. A. 5. Whether the natural law can be changed?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the natural law can be changed. Because on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q94_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.17.9" target="asv"> Ecclus. 17:9, </a> "He gave them instructions, and the law of life," the gloss says: "He wished the law of the letter to be written, in order + to correct the law of nature." But that which is corrected is changed. Therefore the natural law can be changed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="37612" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37612] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex naturae mutari possit. Quia super +illud Eccli. XVII, <i>addidit eis disciplinam et legem vitae</i>, +dicit Glossa, <i>legem litterae, quantum ad correctionem legis +naturalis, scribi voluit</i>. Sed illud quod corrigitur, mutatur. +Ergo lex naturalis potest mutari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the slaying of the innocent, adultery, and theft are against the natural law. But we find these things changed by + God: as when God commanded Abraham to slay his innocent son ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q94_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.22.2" target="asv">Gn. 22:2</a>); and when he ordered the Jews to borrow and purloin the vessels of the Egyptians ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q94_A5-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.12.35" target="asv">Ex. 12:35</a>); and when He commanded Osee to take to himself "a wife of fornications" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q94_A5-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Hos.1.2" target="asv">Osee 1:2</a>). Therefore the natural law can be changed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="37613" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37613] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +contra legem naturalem est occisio innocentis, et etiam adulterium +et furtum. Sed ista inveniuntur esse mutata a Deo, puta cum Deus +praecepit Abrahae quod occideret filium innocentem, ut habetur Gen. +XXII; et cum praecepit Iudaeis ut mutuata Aegyptiorum vasa +subriperent, ut habetur Exod. XII; et cum praecepit Osee ut uxorem +fornicariam acciperet, ut habetur Osee I. Ergo lex naturalis potest +mutari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Isidore says (Etym. 5:4) that "the + possession of all things in common, and universal freedom, are matters of natural law." But these things are seen to be changed + by human laws. Therefore it seems that the natural law is subject to change. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="37614" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37614] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., quod <i>communis omnium +possessio, et una libertas, est de iure naturali</i>. Sed haec +videmus esse commutata per leges humanas. Ergo videtur quod lex +naturalis sit mutabilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in the Decretals (Dist. v): "The natural law dates from the creation of the rational creature. It does not vary + according to time, but remains unchangeable." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 5 s. c."><a name="37615" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37615] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur in decretis, dist. V, <i>naturale ius ab exordio +rationalis creaturae. Nec variatur tempore, sed immutabile +permanet</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q94_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A change in the natural law may be understood in two ways. First, by way of addition. In this sense nothing hinders the natural + law from being changed: since many things for the benefit of human life have been added over and above the natural law, both + by the Divine law and by human laws. + </p><p id="FS_Q94_A5-p7"> Secondly, a change in the natural law may be understood by way of subtraction, so that what previously was according to the + natural law, ceases to be so. In this sense, the natural law is altogether unchangeable in its first principles: but in its + secondary principles, which, as we have said + <a href="#FS_Q94_A4" id="FS_Q94_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, are certain detailed proximate conclusions drawn from the first principles, the natural law is not changed so that what + it prescribes be not right in most + cases. But it may be changed in some particular cases of rare occurrence, through some special causes hindering the observance + of such precepts, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q94_A4" id="FS_Q94_A5-p7.2" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 5 co."><a name="37616" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37616] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod lex naturalis potest intelligi mutari dupliciter. Uno +modo, per hoc quod aliquid ei addatur. Et sic nihil prohibet legem +naturalem mutari, multa enim supra legem naturalem superaddita +sunt, ad humanam vitam utilia, tam per legem divinam, quam etiam +per leges humanas. Alio modo intelligitur mutatio legis naturalis +per modum subtractionis, ut scilicet aliquid desinat esse de lege +naturali, quod prius fuit secundum legem naturalem. Et sic quantum +ad prima principia legis naturae, lex naturae est omnino +immutabilis. Quantum autem ad secunda praecepta, quae diximus esse +quasi quasdam proprias conclusiones propinquas primis principiis, +sic lex naturalis non immutatur quin ut in pluribus rectum sit +semper quod lex naturalis habet. Potest tamen immutari in aliquo +particulari, et in paucioribus, propter aliquas speciales causas +impedientes observantiam talium praeceptorum, ut supra dictum +est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The written law is said to be given for the correction of the natural law, either because it supplies what was wanting to + the natural law; or because the natural law was perverted in the hearts of some men, as to certain matters, so that they esteemed + those things good which are naturally evil; which perversion stood in need of correction. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="37617" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37617] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod lex scripta dicitur esse data ad correctionem +legis naturae, vel quia per legem scriptam suppletum est quod legi +naturae deerat, vel quia lex naturae in aliquorum cordibus, quantum +ad aliqua, corrupta erat intantum ut existimarent esse bona quae +naturaliter sunt mala; et talis corruptio correctione +indigebat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All men alike, both guilty and innocent, die the death of nature: which death of nature is inflicted by the power of God + on account of original sin, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q94_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.2.6" target="asv">1 Kings 2:6</a>: "The Lord killeth and maketh alive." Consequently, by the command of God, death can be inflicted on any man, guilty or innocent, + without any injustice whatever. In like manner adultery is intercourse with another's wife; who is allotted to him by the + law + emanating from God. Consequently intercourse with any woman, by the command of God, is neither adultery nor fornication. The + same applies to theft, which is the taking of another's property. For whatever is taken by the command of God, to Whom all + things belong, is not taken against the will of its owner, whereas it is in this that theft consists. Nor is it only in human + things, that whatever is commanded by God is right; but also in natural things, whatever is done by God, is, in some way, + natural, as stated in the + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q105_A6" id="FS_Q94_A5-p9.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[105], A[6]</a>, ad 1. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="37618" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37618] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod naturali morte moriuntur omnes communiter, tam +nocentes quam innocentes. Quae quidem naturalis mors divina +potestate inducitur propter peccatum originale; secundum illud I +Reg. II, <i>dominus mortificat et vivificat</i>. Et ideo absque +aliqua iniustitia, secundum mandatum Dei, potest infligi mors +cuicumque homini, vel nocenti vel innocenti. Similiter etiam +adulterium est concubitus cum uxore aliena, quae quidem est ei +deputata secundum legem divinitus traditam. Unde ad quamcumque +mulierem aliquis accedat ex mandato divino, non est adulterium nec +fornicatio. Et eadem ratio est de furto, quod est acceptio rei +alienae. Quidquid enim accipit aliquis ex mandato Dei, qui est +dominus universorum, non accipit absque voluntate domini, quod est +furari. Nec solum in rebus humanis quidquid a Deo mandatur, hoc +ipso est debitum, sed etiam in rebus naturalibus quidquid a Deo +fit, est quodammodo naturale, ut in primo dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A thing is said to belong to the natural law in two ways. First, because nature inclines thereto: e.g. that one should not + do harm to another. Secondly, because nature did not bring in the contrary: thus we might say that for man to be naked is + of the natural law, because nature did not give him clothes, but art invented them. In this sense, "the possession of all + things in common and universal freedom" are said to be of the natural law, because, to + wit, the distinction of possessions and slavery were not brought in by nature, but devised by human reason for the benefit + of human life. Accordingly the law of nature was not changed in this respect, except by addition. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="37619" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37619] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod aliquid dicitur esse de iure naturali dupliciter. Uno +modo, quia ad hoc natura inclinat, sicut non esse iniuriam alteri +faciendam. Alio modo, quia natura non induxit contrarium, sicut +possemus dicere quod hominem esse nudum est de iure naturali, quia +natura non dedit ei vestitum, sed ars adinvenit. Et hoc modo +communis omnium possessio, et omnium una libertas, dicitur esse de +iure naturali, quia scilicet distinctio possessionum et servitus +non sunt inductae a natura, sed per hominum rationem, ad utilitatem +humanae vitae. Et sic in hoc lex naturae non est mutata nisi per +additionem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q94_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q94_A6-p0.1">Q. 94. A. 6. Whether the law of nature can be abolished from the heart of man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the natural law can be abolished from the heart of man. Because on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q94_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.14" target="asv"> Rom. 2:14, </a> "When the Gentiles who have not the law," etc. a gloss says that "the law of righteousness, which sin had blotted out, is + graven on the heart of man when he is restored by grace." But the law of righteousness is the law of nature. Therefore the + law of nature can be blotted out. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="37620" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37620] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex naturae possit a corde hominis +aboleri. Quia Rom. II, super illud, <i>cum gentes, quae legem non +habent,</i> etc., dicit Glossa quod <i>in interiori homine per +gratiam innovato, lex iustitiae inscribitur, quam deleverat +culpa</i>. Sed lex iustitiae est lex naturae. Ergo lex naturae +potest deleri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the law of grace is more efficacious than the law of nature. But the law of grace is blotted out by sin. Much more + therefore can the law of nature be blotted out. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="37621" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37621] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +lex gratiae est efficacior quam lex naturae. Sed lex gratiae +deletur per culpam. Ergo multo magis lex naturae potest deleri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is established by law is made just. But many things are enacted by men, which are contrary to the law + of nature. Therefore the law of nature can be abolished from the heart of man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="37622" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37622] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +illud quod lege statuitur, inducitur quasi iustum. Sed multa sunt +ab hominibus statuta contra legem naturae. Ergo lex naturae potest +a cordibus hominum aboleri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. ii): "Thy law is written in the hearts of men, which iniquity itself effaces not." But the law which + is written in men's hearts is the natural law. Therefore the natural law cannot be blotted out. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 6 s. c."><a name="37623" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37623] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in II Confess., <i>lex tua scripta est +in cordibus hominum, quam nec ulla quidem delet iniquitas</i>. Sed +lex scripta in cordibus hominum est lex naturalis. Ergo lex +naturalis deleri non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q94_A4" id="FS_Q94_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[4]</a>,5), there belong to the natural law, first, certain most general precepts, that are known to all; and secondly, certain secondary + and more detailed precepts, which are, as it were, conclusions following closely from first principles. As to those general + principles, the natural law, in the abstract, can nowise be blotted out from men's hearts. But it is blotted out in the case + of a particular action, in so far + as reason is hindered from applying the general principle to a particular point of practice, on account of concupiscence or + some other passion, as stated above (Q[77], A[2]). But as to the other, i.e. the secondary precepts, the natural law can be + blotted out from the human heart, either by evil persuasions, just as in speculative matters errors occur in respect of necessary + conclusions; or by vicious customs and corrupt habits, as among some men, theft, and even unnatural vices, as the Apostle + states (Rom. i), were not esteemed sinful. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 6 co."><a name="37624" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37624] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad legem naturalem pertinent +primo quidem quaedam praecepta communissima, quae sunt omnibus +nota, quaedam autem secundaria praecepta magis propria, quae sunt +quasi conclusiones propinquae principiis. Quantum ergo ad illa +principia communia, lex naturalis nullo modo potest a cordibus +hominum deleri in universali. Deletur tamen in particulari +operabili, secundum quod ratio impeditur applicare commune +principium ad particulare operabile, propter concupiscentiam vel +aliquam aliam passionem, ut supra dictum est. Quantum vero ad alia +praecepta secundaria, potest lex naturalis deleri de cordibus +hominum, vel propter malas persuasiones, eo modo quo etiam in +speculativis errores contingunt circa conclusiones necessarias; vel +etiam propter pravas consuetudines et habitus corruptos; sicut apud +quosdam non reputabantur latrocinia peccata, vel etiam vitia contra +naturam, ut etiam apostolus dicit, ad Rom. I.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sin blots out the law of nature in particular cases, not universally, except perchance in regard to the secondary precepts + of the natural law, in the way stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="37625" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37625] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod culpa delet legem naturae in particulari, non +autem in universali, nisi forte quantum ad secunda praecepta legis +naturae, eo modo quo dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although grace is more efficacious than nature, yet nature is more essential to man, and therefore more enduring. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="37626" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37626] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod gratia etsi sit efficacior quam natura, tamen natura +essentialior est homini, et ideo magis permanens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument is true of the secondary precepts of the natural law, against which some legislators have framed certain enactments + which are unjust. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="37627" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37627] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de secundis praeceptis legis +naturae, contra quae aliqui legislatores statuta aliqua fecerunt, +quae sunt iniqua.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q95" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q95-p0.1">Q. 95. OF HUMAN LAW (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q95-p2"> We must now consider human law; and (1) this law considered in itself; (2) its power; (3) its mutability. Under the first + head there are four points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FS_Q95-p3"><a href="#FS_Q95_A1"> (1) Its utility.</a></p><p id="FS_Q95-p4"><a href="#FS_Q95_A2"> (2) Its origin.</a></p><p id="FS_Q95-p5"><a href="#FS_Q95_A3"> (3) Its quality.</a></p><p id="FS_Q95-p6"><a href="#FS_Q95_A4"> (4) Its division.</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 pr."><a name="37628" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37628] +Iª-IIae q. 95 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de lege +humana. Et primo quidem, de ipsa lege secundum se; secundo, de +potestate eius; tertio, de eius mutabilitate. Circa primum +quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, de utilitate ipsius. Secundo, de origine +eius. Tertio, de qualitate ipsius. Quarto, de divisione +eiusdem.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q95_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q95_A1-p0.1">Q. 95. A. 1. Whether it was useful for laws to be framed by men?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it was not useful for laws to be framed by men. Because the purpose of every law is that man be made good + thereby, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q92_A1" id="FS_Q95_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[92], A[1]</a>). But men are more to be induced to be good willingly by means of admonitions, than against their will, by means of laws. + Therefore there was no need to frame laws. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37629" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37629] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit utile aliquas leges poni ab +hominibus. Intentio enim cuiuslibet legis est ut per eam homines +fiant boni, sicut supra dictum est. Sed homines magis inducuntur ad +bonum voluntarii per monitiones, quam coacti per leges. Ergo non +fuit necessarium leges ponere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4), "men have recourse to a judge as to animate justice." But animate justice + is better than inanimate justice, which contained in laws. Therefore it would have been better for the execution of justice + to be entrusted to the decision of judges, than to frame laws in addition. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37630" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37630] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut dicit philosophus, in V Ethic., <i>ad iudicem confugiunt +homines sicut ad iustum animatum</i>. Sed iustitia animata est +melior quam inanimata, quae legibus continetur. Ergo melius fuisset +ut executio iustitiae committeretur arbitrio iudicum, quam quod +super hoc lex aliqua ederetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every law is framed for the direction of human actions, as is evident from what has been stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A1" id="FS_Q95_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[90], AA[1]</a>,2). But since human actions are about singulars, which are infinite in number, matter pertaining to the direction of human + actions cannot be taken into sufficient consideration except by a wise man, who looks into each one of them. Therefore it + would have been better for human acts to be directed by the judgment + of wise men, than by the framing of laws. Therefore there was no need of human laws. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37631" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37631] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex omnis directiva est actuum humanorum, ut ex supradictis patet. +Sed cum humani actus consistant in singularibus, quae sunt +infinita, non possunt ea quae ad directionem humanorum actuum +pertinent, sufficienter considerari, nisi ab aliquo sapiente, qui +inspiciat singula. Ergo melius fuisset arbitrio sapientum dirigi +actus humanos, quam aliqua lege posita. Ergo non fuit necessarium +leges humanas ponere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore says (Etym. v, 20): "Laws were made that in fear thereof human audacity might be held in check, that innocence might + be safeguarded in the midst of wickedness, and that the dread of punishment might prevent the wicked from doing harm." But + these things are most necessary to mankind. Therefore it was necessary that human laws should be made. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37632" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37632] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., <i>factae sunt leges ut +earum metu humana coerceretur audacia, tutaque sit inter improbos +innocentia, et in ipsis improbis formidato supplicio refrenetur +nocendi facultas</i>. Sed haec sunt maxime necessaria humano +generi. Ergo necessarium fuit ponere leges humanas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q63_A1" id="FS_Q95_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[63], A[1]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q94_A3" id="FS_Q95_A1-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[94], A[3]</a>), man has a natural aptitude for virtue; but the perfection of virtue must be acquired by man by means of some kind of training. + Thus we observe that man is helped by industry in his necessities, for instance, in food and clothing. Certain beginnings + of these he has from nature, viz. his reason and his hands; but he has not the full complement, as other animals have, + to whom nature has given sufficiency of clothing and food. Now it is difficult to see how man could suffice for himself in + the matter of this training: since the perfection of virtue consists chiefly in withdrawing man from undue pleasures, to which + above all man is inclined, and especially the young, who are more capable of being trained. Consequently a man needs to receive + this training from another, whereby to arrive at the perfection of virtue. And as to those young people who are inclined + to acts of virtue, by their good natural disposition, or by custom, or rather by the gift of God, paternal training suffices, + which is by admonitions. But since some are found to be depraved, and prone to vice, and not easily amenable to words, it + was necessary for such to be restrained from evil by force and fear, in order that, at least, they might desist from evil-doing, + and leave others in peace, and that they themselves, by being habituated in this way, might be brought to do willingly + what hitherto they did from fear, and thus become virtuous. Now this kind of training, which compels through fear of punishment, + is the discipline of laws. Therefore in order that man might have peace and virtue, it was necessary for laws to be framed: + for, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2), "as man is the most noble of animals if he be perfect in virtue, so is he the + lowest of all, if he be severed from law and righteousness"; because man can use his reason to devise means of satisfying + his lusts and evil passions, which other animals are unable to do. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 1 co."><a name="37633" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37633] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ex supradictis patet, homini naturaliter inest +quaedam aptitudo ad virtutem; sed ipsa virtutis perfectio necesse +est quod homini adveniat per aliquam disciplinam. Sicut etiam +videmus quod per aliquam industriam subvenitur homini in suis +necessitatibus, puta in cibo et vestitu, quorum initia quaedam +habet a natura, scilicet rationem et manus, non autem ipsum +complementum, sicut cetera animalia, quibus natura dedit +sufficienter tegumentum et cibum. Ad hanc autem disciplinam non de +facili invenitur homo sibi sufficiens. Quia perfectio virtutis +praecipue consistit in retrahendo hominem ab indebitis +delectationibus, ad quas praecipue homines sunt proni, et maxime +iuvenes, circa quos efficacior est disciplina. Et ideo oportet quod +huiusmodi disciplinam, per quam ad virtutem perveniatur, homines ab +alio sortiantur. Et quidem quantum ad illos iuvenes qui sunt proni +ad actus virtutum, ex bona dispositione naturae, vel consuetudine, +vel magis divino munere, sufficit disciplina paterna, quae est per +monitiones. Sed quia inveniuntur quidam protervi et ad vitia proni, +qui verbis de facili moveri non possunt; necessarium fuit ut per +vim et metum cohiberentur a malo, ut saltem sic male facere +desistentes, et aliis quietam vitam redderent, et ipsi tandem per +huiusmodi assuetudinem ad hoc perducerentur quod voluntarie +facerent quae prius metu implebant, et sic fierent virtuosi. +Huiusmodi autem disciplina cogens metu poenae, est disciplina +legum. Unde necessarium fuit ad pacem hominum et virtutem, ut leges +ponerentur, quia sicut philosophus dicit, in I Polit., <i>sicut +homo, si sit perfectus virtute, est optimum animalium; sic, si sit +separatus a lege et iustitia, est pessimum omnium</i>; quia homo +habet arma rationis ad explendas concupiscentias et saevitias, quae +non habent alia animalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Men who are well disposed are led willingly to virtue by being admonished better than by coercion: but men who are evilly + disposed are not led to virtue unless they are compelled. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37634" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37634] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod homines bene dispositi melius inducuntur ad +virtutem monitionibus voluntariis quam coactione, sed quidam male +dispositi non ducuntur ad virtutem nisi cogantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q95_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 1), "it is better that all things be regulated by law, than left to be decided by judges": + and this for three reasons. First, because it is easier to find a few wise men competent to frame right laws, than to find + the many who would be necessary to judge aright of each single case. Secondly, because those who make laws consider long beforehand + what laws to make; whereas judgment on each single case has to be + pronounced as soon as it arises: and it is easier for man to see what is right, by taking many instances into consideration, + than by considering one solitary fact. Thirdly, because lawgivers judge in the abstract and of future events; whereas those + who sit in judgment of things present, towards which they are affected by love, hatred, or some kind of cupidity; wherefore + their judgment is perverted. + </p><p id="FS_Q95_A1-p9"> Since then the animated justice of the judge is not found in every man, and since it can be deflected, therefore it was necessary, + whenever possible, for the law to determine how to judge, and for very few matters to be left to the decision of men. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37635" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37635] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, I Rhetor., <i>melius est +omnia ordinari lege, quam dimittere iudicum arbitrio</i>. Et hoc +propter tria. Primo quidem, quia facilius est invenire paucos +sapientes, qui sufficiant ad rectas leges ponendas, quam multos, +qui requirerentur ad recte iudicandum de singulis. Secundo, quia +illi qui leges ponunt, ex multo tempore considerant quid lege +ferendum sit, sed iudicia de singularibus factis fiunt ex casibus +subito exortis. Facilius autem ex multis consideratis potest homo +videre quid rectum sit, quam solum ex aliquo uno facto. Tertio, +quia legislatores iudicant in universali, et de futuris, sed +homines iudiciis praesidentes iudicant de praesentibus, ad quae +afficiuntur amore vel odio, aut aliqua cupiditate; et sic eorum +depravatur iudicium. Quia ergo iustitia animata iudicis non +invenitur in multis; et quia flexibilis est; ideo necessarium fuit, +in quibuscumque est possibile, legem determinare quid iudicandum +sit, et paucissima arbitrio hominum committere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Certain individual facts which cannot be covered by the law "have necessarily to be committed to judges," as the Philosopher + says in the same passage: for instance, "concerning something that has happened or not happened," and the like. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37636" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37636] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod quaedam singularia, quae non possunt lege +comprehendi, necesse est committere iudicibus, ut ibidem +philosophus dicit, puta de eo quod est factum esse vel non esse, et +de aliis huiusmodi.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q95_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q95_A2-p0.1">Q. 95. A. 2. Whether every human law is derived from the natural law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not every human law is derived from the natural law. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "the + legal just is that which originally was a matter of indifference." But those things which arise from the natural law are not + matters of indifference. Therefore the enactments of human laws are not derived from the natural law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37637" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37637] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnis lex humanitus posita a lege +naturali derivetur. Dicit enim philosophus, in V Ethic., quod +<i>iustum legale est quod ex principio quidem nihil differt utrum +sic vel aliter fiat</i>. Sed in his quae oriuntur ex lege naturali, +differt utrum sic vel aliter fiat. Ergo ea quae sunt legibus +humanis statuta, non omnia derivantur a lege naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, positive law is contrasted with natural law, as stated by Isidore (Etym. v, 4) and the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7). + But those things which flow as conclusions from the general principles of the natural law belong to the natural law, as stated + above ( + <a href="#FS_Q94_A4" id="FS_Q95_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[94], A[4]</a>). Therefore that which is established by human law does not belong to the natural law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37638" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37638] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ius positivum dividitur contra ius naturale, ut patet per Isidorum, +in libro Etymol., et per philosophum, in V Ethic. Sed ea quae +derivantur a principiis communibus legis naturae sicut +conclusiones, pertinent ad legem naturae, ut supra dictum est. Ergo +ea quae sunt de lege humana, non derivantur a lege naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the law of nature is the same for all; since the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "the natural just is that which + is equally valid everywhere." If therefore human laws were derived from the natural law, it would follow that they too are + the same for all: which is clearly false. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37639" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37639] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex naturae est eadem apud omnes, dicit enim philosophus, in V +Ethic., quod <i>naturale iustum est quod ubique habet eandem +potentiam</i>. Si igitur leges humanae a naturali lege +derivarentur, sequeretur quod etiam ipsae essent eaedem apud omnes. +Quod patet esse falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is possible to give a reason for things which are derived from the natural law. But "it is not possible to give + the reason for all the legal enactments of the lawgivers," as the jurist says [*Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff, tit. iii, v; + De Leg. et Senat.]. Therefore not all human laws are derived from the natural law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="37640" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37640] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +eorum quae a lege naturali derivantur, potest aliqua ratio +assignari. Sed non omnium quae a maioribus lege statuta sunt, ratio +reddi potest, ut iurisperitus dicit. Ergo non omnes leges humanae +derivantur a lege naturali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Tully says (Rhet. ii): "Things which emanated from nature and were approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and reverence + for the laws." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37641" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37641] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Tullius dicit, in sua Rhetor., <i>res a natura profectas, +et a consuetudine probatas, legum metus et religio sanxit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q95_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) "that which is not just seems to be no law at all": wherefore the force of a law depends + on the extent of its justice. Now in human affairs a thing is said to be just, from being right, according to the rule of + reason. But the first rule of reason is the law of nature, as is clear from what has been stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q91_A2" id="FS_Q95_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[91], A[2]</a>, ad 2). Consequently every human law has just so much of the nature of + law, as it is derived from the law of nature. But if in any point it deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law + but a perversion of law. + </p><p id="FS_Q95_A2-p8"> But it must be noted that something may be derived from the natural law in two ways: first, as a conclusion from premises, + secondly, by way of determination of certain generalities. The first way is like to that by which, in sciences, demonstrated + conclusions are drawn from the principles: while the second mode is likened to that whereby, in the arts, general forms are + particularized as to details: thus the craftsman needs to determine the general form of a house to some + particular shape. Some things are therefore derived from the general principles of the natural law, by way of conclusions; + e.g. that "one must not kill" may be derived as a conclusion from the principle that "one should do harm to no man": while + some are derived therefrom by way of determination; e.g. the law of nature has it that the evil-doer should be punished; but + that he be punished in this or that way, is a determination of the law of nature. + </p><p id="FS_Q95_A2-p9"> Accordingly both modes of derivation are found in the human law. But those things which are derived in the first way, are + contained in human law not as emanating therefrom exclusively, but have some force from the natural law also. But those things + which are derived in the second way, have no other force than that of human law. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 2 co."><a name="37642" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37642] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib. Arb., <i>non +videtur esse lex, quae iusta non fuerit</i>. Unde inquantum habet +de iustitia, intantum habet de virtute legis. In rebus autem +humanis dicitur esse aliquid iustum ex eo quod est rectum secundum +regulam rationis. Rationis autem prima regula est lex naturae, ut +ex supradictis patet. Unde omnis lex humanitus posita intantum +habet de ratione legis, inquantum a lege naturae derivatur. Si vero +in aliquo, a lege naturali discordet, iam non erit lex sed legis +corruptio. Sed sciendum est quod a lege naturali dupliciter potest +aliquid derivari, uno modo, sicut conclusiones ex principiis; alio +modo, sicut determinationes quaedam aliquorum communium. Primus +quidem modus est similis ei quo in scientiis ex principiis +conclusiones demonstrativae producuntur. Secundo vero modo simile +est quod in artibus formae communes determinantur ad aliquid +speciale, sicut artifex formam communem domus necesse est quod +determinet ad hanc vel illam domus figuram. Derivantur ergo quaedam +a principiis communibus legis naturae per modum conclusionum, sicut +hoc quod est non esse occidendum, ut conclusio quaedam derivari +potest ab eo quod est nulli esse malum faciendum. Quaedam vero per +modum determinationis, sicut lex naturae habet quod ille qui +peccat, puniatur; sed quod tali poena puniatur, hoc est quaedam +determinatio legis naturae. Utraque igitur inveniuntur in lege +humana posita. Sed ea quae sunt primi modi, continentur lege humana +non tanquam sint solum lege posita, sed habent etiam aliquid +vigoris ex lege naturali. Sed ea quae sunt secundi modi, ex sola +lege humana vigorem habent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is speaking of those enactments which are by way of determination or specification of the precepts of the + natural law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37643" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37643] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de illis quae sunt lege +posita per determinationem vel specificationem quandam praeceptorum +legis naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument avails for those things that are derived from the natural law, by way of conclusions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37644" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37644] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de his quae derivantur a lege +naturae tanquam conclusiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The general principles of the natural law cannot be applied to all men in the same way on account of the great variety of + human affairs: and hence arises the diversity of positive laws among various people. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37645" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37645] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod principia communia legis naturae non possunt eodem +modo applicari omnibus, propter multam varietatem rerum humanarum. +Et exinde provenit diversitas legis positivae apud diversos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q95_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> These words of the Jurist are to be understood as referring to decisions of rulers in determining particular points of the + natural law: on which determinations the judgment of expert and prudent men is based as on its principles; in so far, to wit, + as they see at once what is the best thing to decide. + </p><p id="FS_Q95_A2-p14"> Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11) that in such matters, "we ought to pay as much attention to the undemonstrated + sayings and opinions of persons who surpass us in experience, age and prudence, as to their demonstrations." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="37646" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37646] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod verbum illud iurisperiti intelligendum est in his +quae sunt introducta a maioribus circa particulares determinationes +legis naturalis; ad quas quidem determinationes se habet expertorum +et prudentum iudicium sicut ad quaedam principia; inquantum +scilicet statim vident quid congruentius sit particulariter +determinari. Unde philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod <i>in +talibus oportet attendere expertorum et seniorum vel prudentum +indemonstrabilibus enuntiationibus et opinionibus, non minus quam +demonstrationibus</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q95_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q95_A3-p0.1">Q. 95. A. 3. Whether Isidore's description of the quality of positive law is appropriate?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Isidore's description of the quality of positive law is not appropriate, when he says (Etym. v, 21): "Law + shall be virtuous, just, possible to nature, according to the custom of the country, suitable to place and time, necessary, + useful; clearly expressed, lest by its obscurity it lead to misunderstanding; framed for no private benefit, but for the common + good." Because he had previously expressed the quality of law in three conditions, + saying that "law is anything founded on reason, provided that it foster religion, be helpful to discipline, and further the + common weal." Therefore it was needless to add any further conditions to these. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37647" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37647] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod Isidorus inconvenienter qualitatem +legis positivae describat, dicens, <i>erit lex honesta, iusta, +possibilis secundum naturam, secundum consuetudinem patriae, loco +temporique conveniens, necessaria, utilis; manifesta quoque, ne +aliquid per obscuritatem in captionem contineat; nullo privato +commodo, sed pro communi utilitate civium scripta</i>. Supra enim +in tribus conditionibus qualitatem legis explicaverat, dicens, +<i>lex erit omne quod ratione constiterit, dumtaxat quod religioni +congruat, quod disciplinae conveniat, quod saluti proficiat</i>. +Ergo superflue postmodum conditiones legis multiplicat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Justice is included in honesty, as Tully says (De Offic. vii). Therefore after saying "honest" it was superfluous + to add "just." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37648" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37648] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +iustitia pars est honestatis; ut Tullius dicit, in I de Offic. Ergo +postquam dixerat honesta, superflue additur iusta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, written law is condivided with custom, according to Isidore (Etym. ii, 10). Therefore it should not be stated in + the definition of law that it is "according to the custom of the country." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37649" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37649] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex scripta, secundum Isidorum, contra consuetudinem dividitur. Non +ergo debuit in definitione legis poni quod esset secundum +consuetudinem patriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a thing may be necessary in two ways. It may be necessary simply, because it cannot be otherwise: and that which + is necessary in this way, is not subject to human judgment, wherefore human law is not concerned with necessity of this kind. + Again a thing may be necessary for an end: and this necessity is the same as usefulness. Therefore it is superfluous to say + both "necessary" and "useful." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="37650" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37650] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +necessarium dupliciter dicitur. Scilicet id quod est necessarium +simpliciter, quod impossibile est aliter se habere, et huiusmodi +necessarium non subiacet humano iudicio, unde talis necessitas ad +legem humanam non pertinet. Est etiam aliquid necessarium propter +finem, et talis necessitas idem est quod utilitas. Ergo superflue +utrumque ponitur, necessaria et utilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Isidore. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37651" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37651] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est auctoritas ipsius Isidori.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q95_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Whenever a thing is for an end, its form must be determined proportionately to that end; as the form of a saw is such as + to be suitable for cutting (Phys. ii, text. 88). Again, everything that is ruled and measured must have a form proportionate + to its rule and measure. Now both these conditions are verified of human law: since it is both something ordained to an end; + and is a rule or measure ruled or measured by a higher measure. And this higher measure is + twofold, viz. the Divine law and the natural law, as explained above + <a href="#FS_Q95_A2" id="FS_Q95_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[2];</a> Q[93], A[3] ). Now the end of human law is to be useful to man, as the jurist states [*Pandect. Justin. lib. xxv, ff., tit. + iii; De Leg. et Senat.]. Wherefore Isidore in determining the nature of law, lays down, at first, three conditions; viz. that + it "foster religion," inasmuch as it is proportionate to the Divine law; that it be "helpful to discipline," inasmuch as it + is proportionate to the + nature law; and that it "further the common weal," inasmuch as it is proportionate to the utility of mankind. + </p><p id="FS_Q95_A3-p8"> All the other conditions mentioned by him are reduced to these three. For it is called virtuous because it fosters religion. + And when he goes on to say that it should be "just, possible to nature, according to the customs of the country, adapted to + place and time," he implies that it should be helpful to discipline. For human discipline depends on first on the order of + reason, to which he refers by saying "just": secondly, it depends on the ability of the agent; because + discipline should be adapted to each one according to his ability, taking also into account the ability of nature (for the + same burdens should be not laid on children as adults); and should be according to human customs; since man cannot live alone + in society, paying no heed to others: thirdly, it depends on certain circumstances, in respect of which he says, "adapted + to place and time." The remaining words, "necessary, useful," etc. mean that law should further the common weal: so that + "necessity" refers to the removal of evils; "usefulness" to the attainment of good; "clearness of expression," to the need + of preventing any harm ensuing from the law itself. And since, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A2" id="FS_Q95_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[90], A[2]</a>), law is ordained to the common good, this is expressed in the last part of the description. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 3 co."><a name="37652" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37652] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod uniuscuiusque rei quae est propter finem, necesse est +quod forma determinetur secundum proportionem ad finem; sicut forma +serrae talis est qualis convenit sectioni; ut patet in II Physic. +Quaelibet etiam res recta et mensurata oportet quod habeat formam +proportionalem suae regulae et mensurae. Lex autem humana utrumque +habet, quia et est aliquid ordinatum ad finem; et est quaedam +regula vel mensura regulata vel mensurata quadam superiori mensura; +quae quidem est duplex, scilicet lex divina et lex naturae, ut ex +supradictis patet. Finis autem humanae legis est utilitas hominum; +sicut etiam iurisperitus dicit. Et ideo Isidorus in conditione +legis, primo quidem tria posuit, scilicet quod religioni congruat, +inquantum scilicet est proportionata legi divinae; quod disciplinae +conveniat, inquantum est proportionata legi naturae; quod saluti +proficiat, inquantum est proportionata utilitati humanae. Et ad +haec tria omnes aliae conditiones quas postea ponit, reducuntur. +Nam quod dicitur honesta, refertur ad hoc quod religioni congruat. +Quod autem subditur, <i>iusta, possibilis secundum naturam, +secundum consuetudinem patriae, loco temporique conveniens</i>, +additur ad hoc quod conveniat disciplinae. Attenditur enim humana +disciplina primum quidem quantum ad ordinem rationis, qui +importatur in hoc quod dicitur iusta. Secundo, quantum ad +facultatem agentium. Debet enim esse disciplina conveniens +unicuique secundum suam possibilitatem, observata etiam +possibilitate naturae (non enim eadem sunt imponenda pueris, quae +imponuntur viris perfectis); et secundum humanam consuetudinem; non +enim potest homo solus in societate vivere, aliis morem non gerens. +Tertio, quantum ad debitas circumstantias, dicit, loco temporique +conveniens. Quod vero subditur, necessaria, utilis, etc., refertur +ad hoc quod expediat saluti, ut necessitas referatur ad remotionem +malorum; utilitas, ad consecutionem bonorum; manifestatio vero, ad +cavendum nocumentum quod ex ipsa lege posset provenire. Et quia, +sicut supra dictum est, lex ordinatur ad bonum commune, hoc ipsum +in ultima parte determinationis ostenditur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objections:</b> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 3 ad arg."><a name="37653" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37653] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 3 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc +patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q95_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q95_A4-p0.1">Q. 95. A. 4. Whether Isidore's division of human laws is appropriate?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Isidore wrongly divided human statutes or human law (Etym. v, 4, seqq.). For under this law he includes + the "law of nations," so called, because, as he says, "nearly all nations use it." But as he says, "natural law is that which + is common to all nations." Therefore the law of nations is not contained under positive human law, but rather under natural + law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37654" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37654] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter Isidorus divisionem +legum humanarum ponat, sive iuris humani. Sub hoc enim iure +comprehendit ius gentium, quod ideo sic nominatur, ut ipse dicit, +quia eo omnes fere gentes utuntur. Sed sicut ipse dicit, <i>ius +naturale est quod est commune omnium nationum</i>. Ergo ius gentium +non continetur sub iure positivo humano, sed magis sub iure +naturali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those laws which have the same force, seem to differ not formally but only materially. But "statutes, decrees of + the commonalty, senatorial decrees," and the like which he mentions (Etym. v, 9), all have the same force. Therefore they + do not differ, except materially. But art takes no notice of such a distinction: since it may go on to infinity. Therefore + this division of human laws is not appropriate. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37655" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37655] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ea quae habent eandem vim, non videntur formaliter differre, sed +solum materialiter. Sed leges, plebiscita, senatusconsulta, et alia +huiusmodi quae ponit, omnia habent eandem vim. Ergo videtur quod +non differant nisi materialiter. Sed talis distinctio in arte non +est curanda, cum possit esse in infinitum. Ergo inconvenienter +huiusmodi divisio humanarum legum introducitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as, in the state, there are princes, priests and soldiers, so are there other human offices. Therefore it seems + that, as this division includes "military law," and "public law," referring to priests and magistrates; so also it should + include other laws pertaining to other offices of the state. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37656" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37656] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut in civitate sunt principes et sacerdotes et milites, ita +etiam sunt et alia hominum officia. Ergo videtur quod, sicut +ponitur quoddam ius militare, et ius publicum, quod consistit in +sacerdotibus et magistratibus; ita etiam debeant poni alia iura, ad +alia officia civitatis pertinentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, those things that are accidental should be passed over. But it is accidental to law that it be framed by this or + that man. Therefore it is unreasonable to divide laws according to the names of lawgivers, so that one be called the "Cornelian" + law, another the "Falcidian" law, etc. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="37657" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37657] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +ea quae sunt per accidens, sunt praetermittenda. Sed accidit legi +ut ab hoc vel illo homine feratur. Ergo inconvenienter ponitur +divisio legum humanarum ex nominibus legislatorum, ut scilicet +quaedam dicatur Cornelia, quaedam Falcidia, et cetera.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The authority of Isidore (OBJ[1]) suffices. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37658" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37658] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> In +contrarium auctoritas Isidori sufficiat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q95_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A thing can of itself be divided in respect of something contained in the notion of that thing. Thus a soul either rational + or irrational is contained in the notion of animal: and therefore animal is divided properly and of itself in respect of its + being rational or irrational; but not in the point of its being white or black, which are entirely beside the notion of animal. + Now, in the notion of human law, many things are contained, in respect of any of + which human law can be divided properly and of itself. For in the first place it belongs to the notion of human law, to be + derived from the law of nature, as explained above + <a href="#FS_Q95_A2" id="FS_Q95_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. In this respect positive law is divided into the "law of nations" and "civil law," according to the two ways in which something + may be derived from the law of nature, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q95_A2" id="FS_Q95_A4-p7.2" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Because, to the law of nations belong those things which are derived from + the law of nature, as conclusions from premises, e.g. just buyings and sellings, and the like, without which men cannot live + together, which is a point of the law of nature, since man is by nature a social animal, as is proved in Polit. i, 2. But + those things which are derived from the law of nature by way of particular determination, belong to the civil law, according + as each state decides on what is best for itself. + </p><p id="FS_Q95_A4-p8"> Secondly, it belongs to the notion of human law, to be ordained to the common good of the state. In this respect human law + may be divided according to the different kinds of men who work in a special way for the common good: e.g. priests, by praying + to God for the people; princes, by governing the people; soldiers, by fighting for the safety of the people. Wherefore certain + special kinds of law are adapted to these men. + </p><p id="FS_Q95_A4-p9"> Thirdly, it belongs to the notion of human law, to be framed by that one who governs the community of the state, as shown + above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A3" id="FS_Q95_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[90], A[3]</a>). In this respect, there are various human laws according to the various forms of government. Of these, according to the + Philosopher (Polit. iii, 10) one is "monarchy," i.e. when the state is governed by one; and then we have "Royal Ordinances." + Another form is "aristocracy," i.e. government by the best men or men + of highest rank; and then we have the "Authoritative legal opinions" [Responsa Prudentum] and "Decrees of the Senate" [Senatus + consulta]. Another form is "oligarchy," i.e. government by a few rich and powerful men; and then we have "Praetorian," also + called "Honorary," law. Another form of government is that of the people, which is called "democracy," and there we have "Decrees + of the commonalty" [Plebiscita]. There is also tyrannical government, which is altogether corrupt, which, therefore, + has no corresponding law. Finally, there is a form of government made up of all these, and which is the best: and in this + respect we have law sanctioned by the "Lords and Commons," as stated by Isidore (Etym. v, 4, seqq.). + </p><p id="FS_Q95_A4-p10"> Fourthly, it belongs to the notion of human law to direct human actions. In this respect, according to the various matters + of which the law treats, there are various kinds of laws, which are sometimes named after their authors: thus we have the + "Lex Julia" about adultery, the "Lex Cornelia" concerning assassins, and so on, differentiated in this way, not on account + of the authors, but on account of the matters to which they refer. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 4 co."><a name="37659" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37659] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod unumquodque potest per se dividi secundum id quod in +eius ratione continetur. Sicut in ratione animalis continetur +anima, quae est rationalis vel irrationalis, et ideo animal proprie +et per se dividitur secundum rationale et irrationale; non autem +secundum album et nigrum, quae sunt omnino praeter rationem eius. +Sunt autem multa de ratione legis humanae, secundum quorum +quodlibet lex humana proprie et per se dividi potest. Est enim +primo de ratione legis humanae quod sit derivata a lege naturae, ut +ex dictis patet. Et secundum hoc dividitur ius positivum in ius +gentium et ius civile, secundum duos modos quibus aliquid derivatur +a lege naturae, ut supra dictum est. Nam ad ius gentium pertinent +ea quae derivantur ex lege naturae sicut conclusiones ex +principiis, ut iustae emptiones, venditiones, et alia huiusmodi, +sine quibus homines ad invicem convivere non possent; quod est de +lege naturae, quia homo est naturaliter animal sociale, ut probatur +in I Polit. Quae vero derivantur a lege naturae per modum +particularis determinationis, pertinent ad ius civile, secundum +quod quaelibet civitas aliquid sibi accommodum determinat. Secundo +est de ratione legis humanae quod ordinetur ad bonum commune +civitatis. Et secundum hoc lex humana dividi potest secundum +diversitatem eorum qui specialiter dant operam ad bonum commune, +sicut sacerdotes, pro populo Deum orantes; principes, populum +gubernantes; et milites, pro salute populi pugnantes. Et ideo istis +hominibus specialia quaedam iura aptantur. Tertio est de ratione +legis humanae ut instituatur a gubernante communitatem civitatis, +sicut supra dictum est. Et secundum hoc distinguuntur leges humanae +secundum diversa regimina civitatum. Quorum unum, secundum +philosophum, in III Polit., est regnum, quando scilicet civitas +gubernatur ab uno, et secundum hoc accipiuntur constitutiones +principum. Aliud vero regimen est aristocratia, idest principatus +optimorum, vel optimatum, et secundum hoc sumuntur responsa +prudentum, et etiam senatusconsulta. Aliud regimen est oligarchia, +idest principatus paucorum divitum et potentum, et secundum hoc +sumitur ius praetorium, quod etiam honorarium dicitur. Aliud autem +regimen est populi, quod nominatur democratia, et secundum hoc +sumuntur plebiscita. Aliud autem est tyrannicum, quod est omnino +corruptum, unde ex hoc non sumitur aliqua lex. Est etiam aliquod +regimen ex istis commixtum, quod est optimum, et secundum hoc +sumitur lex, <i>quam maiores natu simul cum plebibus sanxerunt</i>, +ut Isidorus dicit. Quarto vero de ratione legis humanae est quod +sit directiva humanorum actuum. Et secundum hoc, secundum diversa +de quibus leges feruntur, distinguuntur leges, quae interdum ab +auctoribus nominantur, sicut distinguitur lex Iulia de adulteriis, +lex Cornelia de sicariis, et sic de aliis, non propter auctores, +sed propter res de quibus sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The law of nations is indeed, in some way, natural to man, in so far as he is a reasonable being, because it is derived from + the natural law by way of a conclusion that is not very remote from its premises. Wherefore men easily agreed thereto. Nevertheless + it is distinct from the natural law, especially it is distinct from the natural law which is common to all animals. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37660" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37660] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ius gentium est quidem aliquo modo naturale +homini, secundum quod est rationalis, inquantum derivatur a lege +naturali per modum conclusionis quae non est multum remota a +principiis. Unde de facili in huiusmodi homines consenserunt. +Distinguitur tamen a lege naturali, maxime ab eo quod est omnibus +animalibus communis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objections 2--4:</b> The Replies to the other Objections are evident from what has been said.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37661" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37661] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad alia patet +responsio ex his quae dicta sunt.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q96" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q96-p0.1">Q. 96. OF THE POWER OF HUMAN LAW (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q96-p2"> We must now consider the power of human law. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q96-p3"><a href="#FS_Q96_A1"> (1) Whether human law should be framed for the community?</a></p><p id="FS_Q96-p4"><a href="#FS_Q96_A2"> (2) Whether human law should repress all vices?</a></p><p id="FS_Q96-p5"><a href="#FS_Q96_A3"> (3) Whether human law is competent to direct all acts of virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q96-p6"><a href="#FS_Q96_A4"> (4) Whether it binds man in conscience?</a></p><p id="FS_Q96-p7"><a href="#FS_Q96_A5"> (5) Whether all men are subject to human law?</a></p><p id="FS_Q96-p8"><a href="#FS_Q96_A6"> (6) Whether those who are under the law may act beside the letter of the law?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 pr."><a name="37662" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37662] +Iª-IIae q. 96 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +potestate legis humanae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum +lex humana debeat poni in communi. Secundo, utrum lex humana debeat +omnia vitia cohibere. Tertio, utrum omnium virtutum actus habeat +ordinare. Quarto, utrum imponat homini necessitatem quantum ad +forum conscientiae. Quinto, utrum omnes homines legi humanae +subdantur. Sexto, utrum his qui sunt sub lege, liceat agere praeter +verba legis.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q96_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q96_A1-p0.1">Q. 96. A. 1. Whether human law should be framed for the community rather than for the individual?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that human law should be framed not for the community, but rather for the individual. For the Philosopher says + (Ethic. v, 7) that "the legal just . . . includes all particular acts of legislation . . . and all those matters which are + the subject of decrees," which are also individual matters, since decrees are framed about individual actions. Therefore law + is framed not only for the community, but also for the individual. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37663" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37663] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex humana non debeat poni in communi, +sed magis in particulari. Dicit enim philosophus, in V Ethic., quod +<i>legalia sunt quaecumque in singularibus lege ponunt; et etiam +sententialia</i>, quae sunt etiam singularia, quia de singularibus +actibus sententiae feruntur. Ergo lex non solum ponitur in communi, +sed etiam in singulari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, law is the director of human acts, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A1" id="FS_Q96_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[90], AA[1]</a>,2). But human acts are about individual matters. Therefore human laws should be framed, not for the community, but rather + for the individual. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37664" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37664] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +lex est directiva humanorum actuum, ut supra dictum est. Sed humani +actus in singularibus consistunt. Ergo leges humanae non debent in +universali ferri, sed magis in singulari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, law is a rule and measure of human acts, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A1" id="FS_Q96_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[90], AA[1]</a>,2). But a measure should be most certain, as stated in Metaph. x. Since therefore in human acts no general proposition can + be so certain as not to fail in some individual cases, it seems that laws should be framed not in general but for individual + cases. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37665" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37665] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex est regula et mensura humanorum actuum, ut supra dictum est. +Sed mensura debet esse certissima, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Cum +ergo in actibus humanis non possit esse aliquod universale certum, +quin in particularibus deficiat; videtur quod necesse sit leges non +in universali, sed in singulari poni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The jurist says (Pandect. Justin. lib. i, tit. iii, art. ii; De legibus, etc.) that "laws should be made to suit the majority + of instances; and they are not framed according to what may possibly happen in an individual case." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37666" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37666] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod iurisperitus dicit, quod <i>iura constitui oportet in his +quae saepius accidunt, ex his autem quae forte uno casu accidere +possunt, iura non constituuntur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Whatever is for an end should be proportionate to that end. Now the end of law is the common good; because, as Isidore says + (Etym. v, 21) that "law should be framed, not for any private benefit, but for the common good of all the citizens." Hence + human laws should be proportionate to the common good. Now the common good comprises many things. Wherefore law should take + account of many things, as to persons, as to matters, and as to times. Because the + community of the state is composed of many persons; and its good is procured by many actions; nor is it established to endure + for only a short time, but to last for all time by the citizens succeeding one another, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, + 21; xxii, 6). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 1 co."><a name="37667" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37667] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod unumquodque quod est propter finem, necesse est quod +sit fini proportionatum. Finis autem legis est bonum commune, quia, +ut Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., <i>nullo privato commodo, sed +pro communi utilitate civium lex debet esse conscripta</i>. Unde +oportet leges humanas esse proportionatas ad bonum commune. Bonum +autem commune constat ex multis. Et ideo oportet quod lex ad multa +respiciat, et secundum personas, et secundum negotia, et secundum +tempora. Constituitur enim communitas civitatis ex multis personis; +et eius bonum per multiplices actiones procuratur; nec ad hoc solum +instituitur quod aliquo modico tempore duret, sed quod omni tempore +perseveret per civium successionem, ut Augustinus dicit, in XXII de +Civ. Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7) divides the legal just, i.e. positive law, into three parts. For some things are laid down + simply in a general way: and these are the general laws. Of these he says that "the legal is that which originally was a matter + of indifference, but which, when enacted, is so no longer": as the fixing of the ransom of a captive. Some things affect the + community in one respect, and individuals in another. These are called + "privileges," i.e. "private laws," as it were, because they regard private persons, although their power extends to many matters; + and in regard to these, he adds, "and further, all particular acts of legislation." Other matters are legal, not through being + laws, but through being applications of general laws to particular cases: such are decrees which have the force of law; and + in regard to these, he adds "all matters subject to decrees." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37668" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37668] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod philosophus in V Ethic. ponit tres partes iusti +legalis, quod est ius positivum. Sunt enim quaedam quae simpliciter +in communi ponuntur. Et haec sunt leges communes. Et quantum ad +huiusmodi, dicit quod <i>legale est quod ex principio quidem nihil +differt sic vel aliter, quando autem ponitur, differt</i>, puta +quod captivi statuto pretio redimantur. Quaedam vero sunt quae sunt +communia quantum ad aliquid, et singularia quantum ad aliquid. Et +huiusmodi dicuntur privilegia, quasi leges privatae, quia +respiciunt singulares personas, et tamen potestas eorum extenditur +ad multa negotia. Et quantum ad hoc, subdit, <i>adhuc quaecumque in +singularibus lege ponunt</i>. Dicuntur etiam quaedam legalia, non +quia sint leges, sed propter applicationem legum communium ad +aliqua particularia facta; sicut sunt sententiae, quae pro iure +habentur. Et quantum ad hoc, subdit, et sententialia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A principle of direction should be applicable to many; wherefore (Metaph. x, text. 4) the Philosopher says that all things + belonging to one genus, are measured by one, which is the principle in that genus. For if there were as many rules or measures + as there are things measured or ruled, they would cease to be of use, since their use consists in being applicable to many + things. Hence law would be of no use, if it did not extend further than to one + single act. Because the decrees than to one single act. Because the decrees of prudent men are made for the purpose of directing + individual actions; whereas law is a general precept, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q92_A2" id="FS_Q96_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[92], A[2]</a>, OBJ[2]). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37669" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37669] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod illud quod est directivum, oportet esse plurium +directivum, unde in X Metaphys., philosophus dicit quod omnia quae +sunt unius generis, mensurantur aliquo uno, quod est primum in +genere illo. Si enim essent tot regulae vel mensurae quot sunt +mensurata vel regulata, cessaret utilitas regulae vel mensurae, +quae est ut ex uno multa possint cognosci. Et ita nulla esset +utilitas legis, si non se extenderet nisi ad unum singularem actum. +Ad singulares enim actus dirigendos dantur singularia praecepta +prudentium, sed lex est praeceptum commune, ut supra dictum +est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> "We must not seek the same degree of certainty in all things" (Ethic. i, 3). Consequently in contingent matters, such as + natural and human things, it is enough for a thing to be certain, as being true in the greater number of instances, though + at times and less frequently it fail. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37670" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37670] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod non est eadem certitudo quaerenda in omnibus, ut in I +Ethic. dicitur. Unde in rebus contingentibus, sicut sunt naturalia +et res humanae, sufficit talis certitudo ut aliquid sit verum ut in +pluribus, licet interdum deficiat in paucioribus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q96_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q96_A2-p0.1">Q. 96. A. 2. Whether it belongs to the human law to repress all vices?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it belongs to human law to repress all vices. For Isidore says (Etym. v, 20) that "laws were made in order + that, in fear thereof, man's audacity might be held in check." But it would not be held in check sufficiently, unless all + evils were repressed by law. Therefore human laws should repress all evils. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37671" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37671] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad legem humanam pertineat omnia vitia +cohibere. Dicit enim Isidorus, in libro Etymol., quod <i>leges sunt +factae ut earum metu coerceatur audacia</i>. Non autem sufficienter +coerceretur, nisi quaelibet mala cohiberentur per legem. Ergo lex +humana debet quaelibet mala cohibere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the intention of the lawgiver is to make the citizens virtuous. But a man cannot be virtuous unless he forbear from + all kinds of vice. Therefore it belongs to human law to repress all vices. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37672" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37672] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +intentio legislatoris est cives facere virtuosos. Sed non potest +esse aliquis virtuosus, nisi ab omnibus vitiis compescatur. Ergo ad +legem humanam pertinet omnia vitia compescere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, human law is derived from the natural law, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q95_A2" id="FS_Q96_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[95], A[2]</a>). But all vices are contrary to the law of nature. Therefore human law should repress all vices. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37673" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37673] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex humana a lege naturali derivatur, ut supra dictum est. Sed +omnia vitia repugnant legi naturae. Ergo lex humana omnia vitia +debet cohibere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> We read in De Lib. Arb. i, 5: "It seems to me that the law which is written for the governing of the people rightly permits + these things, and that Divine providence punishes them." But Divine providence punishes nothing but vices. Therefore human + law rightly allows some vices, by not repressing them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37674" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37674] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur in I de Lib. Arb., <i>videtur mihi legem istam +quae populo regendo scribitur, recte ista permittere, et divinam +providentiam vindicare</i>. Sed divina providentia non vindicat +nisi vitia. Ergo recte lex humana permittit aliqua vitia, non +cohibendo ipsa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q96_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A1" id="FS_Q96_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[90], AA[1]</a>,2), law is framed as a rule or measure of human acts. Now a measure should be homogeneous with that which it measures, as + stated in Metaph. x, text. 3,4, since different things are measured by different measures. Wherefore laws imposed on men should + also be in keeping with their condition, for, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 21), law should be "possible both according to nature, + and according to the customs + of the country." Now possibility or faculty of action is due to an interior habit or disposition: since the same thing is + not possible to one who has not a virtuous habit, as is possible to one who has. Thus the same is not possible to a child + as to a full-grown man: for which reason the law for children is not the same as for adults, since many things are permitted + to children, which in an adult are punished by law or at any rate are open to blame. In like manner many things are permissible + to + men not perfect in virtue, which would be intolerable in a virtuous man. + </p><p id="FS_Q96_A2-p7"> Now human law is framed for a number of human beings, the majority of whom are not perfect in virtue. Wherefore human laws + do not forbid all vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but only the more grievous vices, from which it is possible for + the majority to abstain; and chiefly those that are to the hurt of others, without the prohibition of which human society + could not be maintained: thus human law prohibits murder, theft and such like. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 2 co."><a name="37675" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37675] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, lex ponitur ut quaedam regula +vel mensura humanorum actuum. Mensura autem debet esse homogenea +mensurato, ut dicitur in X Metaphys., diversa enim diversis +mensuris mensurantur. Unde oportet quod etiam leges imponantur +hominibus secundum eorum conditionem, quia, ut Isidorus dicit. +<i>Lex debet esse possibilis et secundum naturam, et secundum +consuetudinem patriae</i>. Potestas autem sive facultas operandi ex +interiori habitu seu dispositione procedit, non enim idem est +possibile ei qui non habet habitum virtutis, et virtuoso; sicut +etiam non est idem possibile puero et viro perfecto. Et propter hoc +non ponitur eadem lex pueris quae ponitur adultis, multa enim +pueris permittuntur quae in adultis lege puniuntur, vel etiam +vituperantur. Et similiter multa sunt permittenda hominibus non +perfectis virtute, quae non essent toleranda in hominibus +virtuosis. Lex autem humana ponitur multitudini hominum, in qua +maior pars est hominum non perfectorum virtute. Et ideo lege humana +non prohibentur omnia vitia, a quibus virtuosi abstinent; sed solum +graviora, a quibus possibile est maiorem partem multitudinis +abstinere; et praecipue quae sunt in nocumentum aliorum, sine +quorum prohibitione societas humana conservari non posset, sicut +prohibentur lege humana homicidia et furta et huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Audacity seems to refer to the assailing of others. Consequently it belongs to those sins chiefly whereby one's neighbor + is injured: and these sins are forbidden by human law, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37676" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37676] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod audacia pertinere videtur ad invasionem aliorum. +Unde praecipue pertinet ad illa peccata quibus iniuria proximis +irrogatur; quae lege humana prohibentur, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The purpose of human law is to lead men to virtue, not suddenly, but gradually. Wherefore it does not lay upon the multitude + of imperfect men the burdens of those who are already virtuous, viz. that they should abstain from all evil. Otherwise these + imperfect ones, being unable to bear such precepts, would break out into yet greater evils: thus it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.30.33" target="asv">Ps. 30:33</a>): "He that violently bloweth his nose, bringeth out blood"; + and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A2-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.9.17" target="asv">Mat. 9:17</a>) that if "new wine," i.e. precepts of a perfect life, "is put into old bottles," i.e. into imperfect men, "the bottles break, + and the wine runneth out," i.e. the precepts are despised, and those men, from contempt, break into evils worse still. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37677" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37677] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod lex humana intendit homines inducere ad virtutem, non +subito, sed gradatim. Et ideo non statim multitudini imperfectorum +imponit ea quae sunt iam virtuosorum, ut scilicet ab omnibus malis +abstineant. Alioquin imperfecti, huiusmodi praecepta ferre non +valentes, in deteriora mala prorumperent, sicut dicitur Prov. XXX, +<i>qui nimis emungit, elicit sanguinem</i>; et Matth. IX dicitur +quod, si vinum novum, idest praecepta perfectae vitae, mittatur in +utres veteres, idest in homines imperfectos, utres rumpuntur, et +vinum effunditur, idest, praecepta contemnuntur, et homines ex +contemptu ad peiora mala prorumpunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The natural law is a participation in us of the eternal law: while human law falls short of the eternal law. Now Augustine + says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): "The law which is framed for the government of states, allows and leaves unpunished many things + that are punished by Divine providence. Nor, if this law does not attempt to do everything, is this a reason why it should + be blamed for what it does." Wherefore, too, human law does not prohibit everything + that is forbidden by the natural law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37678" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37678] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod lex naturalis est quaedam participatio legis aeternae +in nobis, lex autem humana deficit a lege aeterna. Dicit enim +Augustinus, in I de Lib. Arb., <i>lex ista quae regendis +civitatibus fertur, multa concedit atque impunita relinquit, quae +per divinam providentiam vindicantur. Neque enim quia non omnia +facit, ideo quae facit, improbanda sunt</i>. Unde etiam lex humana +non omnia potest prohibere quae prohibet lex naturae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q96_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q96_A3-p0.1">Q. 96. A. 3. Whether human law prescribes acts of all the virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that human law does not prescribe acts of all the virtues. For vicious acts are contrary to acts of virtue. + But human law does not prohibit all vices, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q96_A2" id="FS_Q96_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore neither does it prescribe all acts of virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37679" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37679] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex humana non praecipiat actus omnium +virtutum. Actibus enim virtutum opponuntur actus vitiosi. Sed lex +humana non prohibet omnia vitia, ut dictum est. Ergo etiam non +praecipit actus omnium virtutum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a virtuous act proceeds from a virtue. But virtue is the end of law; so that whatever is from a virtue, cannot come + under a precept of law. Therefore human law does not prescribe all acts of virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37680" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37680] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +actus virtutis a virtute procedit. Sed virtus est finis legis, et +ita quod est ex virtute, sub praecepto legis cadere non potest. +Ergo lex humana non praecipit actus omnium virtutum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, law is ordained to the common good, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A2" id="FS_Q96_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[90], A[2]</a>). But some acts of virtue are ordained, not to the common good, but to private good. Therefore the law does not prescribe + all acts of virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37681" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37681] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex ordinatur ad bonum commune, ut dictum est. Sed quidam actus +virtutum non ordinantur ad bonum commune, sed ad bonum privatum. +Ergo lex non praecipit actus omnium virtutum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that the law "prescribes the performance of the acts of a brave man . . . and the acts + of the temperate man . . . and the acts of the meek man: and in like manner as regards the other virtues and vices, prescribing + the former, forbidding the latter." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37682" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37682] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., quod <i>praecipit lex +fortis opera facere, et quae temperati, et quae mansueti; similiter +autem secundum alias virtutes et malitias, haec quidem iubens, haec +autem prohibens</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The species of virtues are distinguished by their objects, as explained above ( + <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q54_A2" id="FS_Q96_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[54], A[2]</a>; + <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q60_A1" id="FS_Q96_A3-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[60], A[1]</a>; + <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q62_A2" id="FS_Q96_A3-p6.3" shape="rect"> Q[62], A[2]</a>). Now all the objects of virtues can be referred either to the private good of an individual, or to the common good of the + multitude: thus matters of fortitude may be achieved either for the safety of the state, or for upholding the rights of a + friend, and in like + manner with the other virtues. But law, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A2" id="FS_Q96_A3-p6.4" shape="rect">Q[90], A[2]</a>) is ordained to the common good. Wherefore there is no virtue whose acts cannot be prescribed by the law. Nevertheless human + law does not prescribe concerning all the acts of every virtue: but only in regard to those that are ordainable to the common + good---either immediately, as when certain things are done directly for the common good---or mediately, as when a lawgiver + prescribes certain things + pertaining to good order, whereby the citizens are directed in the upholding of the common good of justice and peace. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 3 co."><a name="37683" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37683] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod species virtutum distinguuntur secundum obiecta, ut +ex supradictis patet. Omnia autem obiecta virtutum referri possunt +vel ad bonum privatum alicuius personae, vel ad bonum commune +multitudinis, sicut ea quae sunt fortitudinis potest aliquis exequi +vel propter conservationem civitatis, vel ad conservandum ius amici +sui; et simile est in aliis. Lex autem, ut dictum est, ordinatur ad +bonum commune. Et ideo nulla virtus est de cuius actibus lex +praecipere non possit. Non tamen de omnibus actibus omnium virtutum +lex humana praecipit, sed solum de illis qui sunt ordinabiles ad +bonum commune, vel immediate, sicut cum aliqua directe propter +bonum commune fiunt; vel mediate, sicut cum aliqua ordinantur a +legislatore pertinentia ad bonam disciplinam, per quam cives +informantur ut commune bonum iustitiae et pacis conservent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Human law does not forbid all vicious acts, by the obligation of a precept, as neither does it prescribe all acts of virtue. + But it forbids certain acts of each vice, just as it prescribes some acts of each virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37684" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37684] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod lex humana non prohibet omnes actus vitiosos, +secundum obligationem praecepti, sicut nec praecipit omnes actus +virtuosos. Prohibet tamen aliquos actus singulorum vitiorum, sicut +etiam praecipit quosdam actus singularum virtutum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An act is said to be an act of virtue in two ways. First, from the fact that a man does something virtuous; thus the act + of justice is to do what is right, and an act of fortitude is to do brave things: and in this way law prescribes certain acts + of virtue. Secondly an act of virtue is when a man does a virtuous thing in a way in which a virtuous man does it. Such an + act always proceeds from virtue: and it does not come under a precept of law, but is + the end at which every lawgiver aims. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37685" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37685] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod aliquis actus dicitur esse virtutis dupliciter. Uno +modo, ex eo quod homo operatur virtuosa, sicut actus iustitiae est +facere recta, et actus fortitudinis facere fortia. Et sic lex +praecipit aliquos actus virtutum. Alio modo dicitur actus virtutis, +quia aliquis operatur virtuosa eo modo quo virtuosus operatur. Et +talis actus semper procedit a virtute, nec cadit sub praecepto +legis, sed est finis ad quem legislator ducere intendit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is no virtue whose act is not ordainable to the common good, as stated above, either mediately or immediately. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37686" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37686] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod non est aliqua virtus cuius actus non sint +ordinabiles ad bonum commune, ut dictum est, vel mediate vel +immediate.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q96_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q96_A4-p0.1">Q. 96. A. 4. Whether human law binds a man in conscience?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that human law does not bind man in conscience. For an inferior power has no jurisdiction in a court of higher + power. But the power of man, which frames human law, is beneath the Divine power. Therefore human law cannot impose its precept + in a Divine court, such as is the court of conscience. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37687" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37687] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex humana non imponat homini +necessitatem in foro conscientiae. Inferior enim potestas non +potest imponere legem in iudicio superioris potestatis. Sed +potestas hominis, quae fert legem humanam, est infra potestatem +divinam. Ergo lex humana non potest imponere legem quantum ad +iudicium divinum, quod est iudicium conscientiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the judgment of conscience depends chiefly on the commandments of God. But sometimes God's commandments are made + void by human laws, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.6" target="asv"> Mat. 15:6</a>: "You have made void the commandment of God for your tradition." Therefore human law does not bind a man in conscience. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37688" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37688] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +iudicium conscientiae maxime dependet ex divinis mandatis. Sed +quandoque divina mandata evacuantur per leges humanas; secundum +illud Matth. XV, <i>irritum fecistis mandatum Dei propter +traditiones vestras</i>. Ergo lex humana non imponit necessitatem +homini quantum ad conscientiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, human laws often bring loss of character and injury on man, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.10.1" target="asv"> Is. 10:1 </a>et seqq.: "Woe to them that make wicked laws, and when they write, write injustice; to oppress the poor in judgment, and do + violence to the cause of the humble of My people." But it is lawful for anyone to avoid oppression and violence. Therefore + human laws do not bind man in conscience. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37689" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37689] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +leges humanae frequenter ingerunt calumniam et iniuriam hominibus; +secundum illud Isaiae X, <i>vae qui condunt leges iniquas, et +scribentes iniustitias scripserunt, ut opprimerent in iudicio +pauperes, et vim facerent causae humilium populi mei</i>. Sed +licitum est unicuique oppressionem et violentiam evitare. Ergo +leges humanae non imponunt necessitatem homini quantum ad +conscientiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.2.19" target="asv">1 Pet. + 2:19 + </a>): "This is thankworthy, if for conscience . . . a man endure sorrows, suffering wrongfully." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37690" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37690] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur I Petr. II, <i>haec est gratia, si propter +conscientiam sustineat quis tristitias, patiens iniuste</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q96_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Laws framed by man are either just or unjust. If they be just, they have the power of binding in conscience, from the eternal + law whence they are derived, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.15" target="asv"> Prov. 8:15</a>: "By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things." Now laws are said to be just, both from the end, when, to wit, they + are ordained to the common good---and from their author, that is to say, when the law that is made does not exceed the power + of the + lawgiver---and from their form, when, to wit, burdens are laid on the subjects, according to an equality of proportion and + with a view to the common good. For, since one man is a part of the community, each man in all that he is and has, belongs + to the community; just as a part, in all that it is, belongs to the whole; wherefore nature inflicts a loss on the part, in + order to save the whole: so that on this account, such laws as these, which impose proportionate burdens, are just and binding + in + conscience, and are legal laws. + </p><p id="FS_Q96_A4-p7"> On the other hand laws may be unjust in two ways: first, by being contrary to human good, through being opposed to the things + mentioned above---either in respect of the end, as when an authority imposes on his subjects burdensome laws, conducive, not + to the common good, but rather to his own cupidity or vainglory---or in respect of the author, as when a man makes a law that + goes beyond the power committed to him---or in respect of the form, as when burdens are imposed unequally + on the community, although with a view to the common good. The like are acts of violence rather than laws; because, as Augustine + says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5), "a law that is not just, seems to be no law at all." Wherefore such laws do not bind in conscience, + except perhaps in order to avoid scandal or disturbance, for which cause a man should even yield his right, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.40" target="asv"> Mat. 5:40,41</a>: "If a man . . . take away thy coat, let go thy cloak also unto him; and whosoever will + force thee one mile, go with him other two." + </p><p id="FS_Q96_A4-p8"> Secondly, laws may be unjust through being opposed to the Divine good: such are the laws of tyrants inducing to idolatry, + or to anything else contrary to the Divine law: and laws of this kind must nowise be observed, because, as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.5.29" target="asv"> Acts 5:29, </a> "we ought to obey God rather than man." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 4 co."><a name="37691" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37691] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod leges positae humanitus vel sunt iustae, vel +iniustae. Si quidem iustae sint, habent vim obligandi in foro +conscientiae a lege aeterna, a qua derivantur; secundum illud Prov. +VIII, <i>per me reges regnant, et legum conditores iusta +decernunt</i>. Dicuntur autem leges iustae et ex fine, quando +scilicet ordinantur ad bonum commune; et ex auctore, quando +scilicet lex lata non excedit potestatem ferentis; et ex forma, +quando scilicet secundum aequalitatem proportionis imponuntur +subditis onera in ordine ad bonum commune. Cum enim unus homo sit +pars multitudinis, quilibet homo hoc ipsum quod est et quod habet, +est multitudinis, sicut et quaelibet pars id quod est, est totius. +Unde et natura aliquod detrimentum infert parti, ut salvet totum. +Et secundum hoc, leges huiusmodi, onera proportionabiliter +inferentes, iustae sunt, et obligant in foro conscientiae, et sunt +leges legales. Iniustae autem sunt leges dupliciter. Uno modo, per +contrarietatem ad bonum humanum, e contrario praedictis, vel ex +fine, sicut cum aliquis praesidens leges imponit onerosas subditis +non pertinentes ad utilitatem communem, sed magis ad propriam +cupiditatem vel gloriam; vel etiam ex auctore, sicut cum aliquis +legem fert ultra sibi commissam potestatem; vel etiam ex forma, +puta cum inaequaliter onera multitudini dispensantur, etiam si +ordinentur ad bonum commune. Et huiusmodi magis sunt violentiae +quam leges, quia, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Lib. Arb., +<i>lex esse non videtur, quae iusta non fuerit</i>. Unde tales +leges non obligant in foro conscientiae, nisi forte propter +vitandum scandalum vel turbationem, propter quod etiam homo iuri +suo debet cedere, secundum illud Matth. V, <i>qui angariaverit te +mille passus, vade cum eo alia duo; et qui abstulerit tibi tunicam, +da ei et pallium</i>. Alio modo leges possunt esse iniustae per +contrarietatem ad bonum divinum, sicut leges tyrannorum inducentes +ad idololatriam, vel ad quodcumque aliud quod sit contra legem +divinam. Et tales leges nullo modo licet observare, quia sicut +dicitur Act. V, <i>obedire oportet Deo magis quam +hominibus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.1" target="asv">Rom. 13:1,2</a>), all human power is from God . . . "therefore he that resisteth the power," in matters that are within its scope, "resisteth + the ordinance of God"; so that he becomes guilty according to his conscience. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37692" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37692] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut apostolus dicit, ad Rom. XIII, <i>omnis +potestas humana a Deo est, et ideo qui potestati resistit</i>, in +his quae ad ordinem potestatis pertinent, Dei ordinationi resistit. +Et secundum hoc efficitur reus quantum ad conscientiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument is true of laws that are contrary to the commandments of God, which is beyond the scope of (human) power. Wherefore + in such matters human law should not be obeyed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37693" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37693] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de legibus humanis quae +ordinantur contra Dei mandatum. Et ad hoc ordo potestatis non se +extendit. Unde in talibus legi humanae non est parendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument is true of a law that inflicts unjust hurt on its subjects. The power that man holds from God does not extend + to this: wherefore neither in such matters is man bound to obey the law, provided he avoid giving scandal or inflicting a + more grievous hurt. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37694" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37694] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de lege quae infert gravamen +iniustum subditis, ad quod etiam ordo potestatis divinitus +concessus non se extendit. Unde nec in talibus homo obligatur ut +obediat legi, si sine scandalo vel maiori detrimento resistere +possit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q96_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q96_A5-p0.1">Q. 96. A. 5. Whether all are subject to the law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not all are subject to the law. For those alone are subject to a law for whom a law is made. But the Apostle + says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.9" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:9</a>): "The law is not made for the just man." Therefore the just are not subject to the law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="37695" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37695] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnes legi subiiciantur. Illi enim +soli subiiciuntur legi, quibus lex ponitur. Sed apostolus dicit, I +ad Tim. I, quod <i>iusto non est lex posita</i>. Ergo iusti non +subiiciuntur legi humanae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Pope Urban says [*Decretals. caus. xix, qu. 2]: "He that is guided by a private law need not for any reason be bound + by the public law." Now all spiritual men are led by the private law of the Holy Ghost, for they are the sons of God, of whom + it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.14" target="asv">Rom. 8:14</a>): "Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God." Therefore not all men are subject to human law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="37696" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37696] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Urbanus Papa dicit, et habetur in decretis, XIX qu. II, <i>qui lege +privata ducitur, nulla ratio exigit ut publica constringatur</i>. +Lege autem privata spiritus sancti ducuntur omnes viri spirituales, +qui sunt filii Dei; secundum illud Rom. VIII, <i>qui spiritu Dei +aguntur, hi filii Dei sunt</i>. Ergo non omnes homines legi humanae +subiiciuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the jurist says [*Pandect. Justin. i, ff., tit. 3, De Leg. et Senat.] that "the sovereign is exempt from the laws." + But he that is exempt from the law is not bound thereby. Therefore not all are subject to the law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="37697" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37697] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +iurisperitus dicit quod princeps legibus solutus est. Qui autem est +solutus a lege, non subditur legi. Ergo non omnes subiecti sunt +legi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.1" target="asv">Rom. 13:1</a>): "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers." But subjection to a power seems to imply subjection to the laws framed + by that power. Therefore all men should be subject to human law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 5 s. c."><a name="37698" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37698] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. XIII, <i>omnis anima potestatibus +sublimioribus subdita sit</i>. Sed non videtur esse subditus +potestati, qui non subiicitur legi quam fert potestas. Ergo omnes +homines debent esse legi humanae subiecti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q96_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A1" id="FS_Q96_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[90], AA[1]</a>,2; A[3], ad 2), the notion of law contains two things: first, that it is a rule of human acts; secondly, that it has coercive + power. Wherefore a man may be subject to law in two ways. First, as the regulated is subject to the regulator: and, in this + way, whoever is subject to a power, is subject to the law framed by that power. But it may happen in two ways that one is + not subject to a power. In one way, + by being altogether free from its authority: hence the subjects of one city or kingdom are not bound by the laws of the sovereign + of another city or kingdom, since they are not subject to his authority. In another way, by being under a yet higher law; + thus the subject of a proconsul should be ruled by his command, but not in those matters in which the subject receives his + orders from the emperor: for in these matters, he is not bound by the mandate of the lower authority, since he is directed + by that of a higher. In this way, one who is simply subject to a law, may not be a subject thereto in certain matters, in + respect of which he is ruled by a higher law. + </p><p id="FS_Q96_A5-p7"> Secondly, a man is said to be subject to a law as the coerced is subject to the coercer. In this way the virtuous and righteous + are not subject to the law, but only the wicked. Because coercion and violence are contrary to the will: but the will of the + good is in harmony with the law, whereas the will of the wicked is discordant from it. Wherefore in this sense the good are + not subject to the law, but only the wicked. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 5 co."><a name="37699" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37699] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ex supradictis patet, lex de sui ratione duo +habet, primo quidem, quod est regula humanorum actuum; secundo, +quod habet vim coactivam. Dupliciter ergo aliquis homo potest esse +legi subiectus. Uno modo, sicut regulatum regulae. Et hoc modo +omnes illi qui subduntur potestati, subduntur legi quam fert +potestas. Quod autem aliquis potestati non subdatur, potest +contingere dupliciter. Uno modo, quia est simpliciter absolutus ab +eius subiectione. Unde illi qui sunt de una civitate vel regno, non +subduntur legibus principis alterius civitatis vel regni, sicut nec +eius dominio. Alio modo, secundum quod regitur superiori lege. Puta +si aliquis subiectus sit proconsuli, regulari debet eius mandato, +non tamen in his quae dispensantur ei ab imperatore, quantum enim +ad illa, non adstringitur mandato inferioris, cum superiori mandato +dirigatur. Et secundum hoc contingit quod aliquis simpliciter +subiectus legi, secundum aliqua legi non adstringitur, secundum +quae regitur superiori lege. Alio vero modo dicitur aliquis subdi +legi sicut coactum cogenti. Et hoc modo homines virtuosi et iusti +non subduntur legi, sed soli mali. Quod enim est coactum et +violentum, est contrarium voluntati. Voluntas autem bonorum +consonat legi, a qua malorum voluntas discordat. Et ideo secundum +hoc boni non sunt sub lege, sed solum mali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument is true of subjection by way of coercion: for, in this way, "the law is not made for the just men": because + "they are a law to themselves," since they "show the work of the law written in their hearts," as the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.14" target="asv">Rom. 2:14,15</a>). Consequently the law does not enforce itself upon them as it does on the wicked. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="37700" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37700] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de subiectione quae est per +modum coactionis. Sic enim iusto non est lex posita, quia ipsi sibi +sunt lex, dum ostendunt opus legis scriptum in cordibus suis, sicut +apostolus, ad Rom. II, dicit. Unde in eos non habet lex vim +coactivam, sicut habet in iniustos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The law of the Holy Ghost is above all law framed by man: and therefore spiritual men, in so far as they are led by the law + of the Holy Ghost, are not subject to the law in those matters that are inconsistent with the guidance of the Holy Ghost. + Nevertheless the very fact that spiritual men are subject to law, is due to the leading of the Holy Ghost, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.2.13" target="asv">1 Pet. 2:13</a>: "Be ye subject . . . to every human creature for God's + sake." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="37701" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37701] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod lex spiritus sancti est superior omni lege humanitus +posita. Et ideo viri spirituales, secundum hoc quod lege spiritus +sancti ducuntur, non subduntur legi, quantum ad ea quae repugnant +ductioni spiritus sancti. Sed tamen hoc ipsum est de ductu spiritus +sancti, quod homines spirituales legibus humanis subdantur; +secundum illud I Petr. II, <i>subiecti estote omni humanae +creaturae, propter Deum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sovereign is said to be "exempt from the law," as to its coercive power; since, properly speaking, no man is coerced + by himself, and law has no coercive power save from the authority of the sovereign. Thus then is the sovereign said to be + exempt from the law, because none is competent to pass sentence on him, if he acts against the law. Wherefore on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A5-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.50.6" target="asv"> Ps. 50:6</a>: "To Thee only have I sinned," a gloss says that "there is no man who + can judge the deeds of a king." But as to the directive force of law, the sovereign is subject to the law by his own will, + according to the statement (Extra, De Constit. cap. Cum omnes) that "whatever law a man makes for another, he should keep + himself. And a wise authority [*Dionysius Cato, Dist. de Moribus] says: 'Obey the law that thou makest thyself.'" Moreover + the Lord reproaches those who "say and do not"; and who "bind heavy burdens and lay them on men's shoulders, but with a finger + of + their own they will not move them" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A5-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.23.3" target="asv">Mat. 23:3,4</a>). Hence, in the judgment of God, the sovereign is not exempt from the law, as to its directive force; but he should fulfil + it to his own free-will and not of constraint. Again the sovereign is above the law, in so far as, when it is expedient, he + can change the law, and dispense in it according to time and place. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="37702" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37702] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod princeps dicitur esse solutus a lege, quantum ad vim +coactivam legis, nullus enim proprie cogitur a seipso; lex autem +non habet vim coactivam nisi ex principis potestate. Sic igitur +princeps dicitur esse solutus a lege, quia nullus in ipsum potest +iudicium condemnationis ferre, si contra legem agat. Unde super +illud Psalmi l, <i>tibi soli peccavi</i> etc., dicit Glossa quod +<i>lex non habet hominem qui sua facta diiudicet</i>. Sed quantum +ad vim directivam legis, princeps subditur legi propria voluntate; +secundum quod dicitur extra, de constitutionibus, cap. cum omnes, +<i>quod quisque iuris in alterum statuit, ipse eodem iure uti +debet. Et sapientis dicit auctoritas, patere legem quam ipse +tuleris</i>. Improperatur etiam his a domino qui dicunt et non +faciunt; et qui aliis onera gravia imponunt, et ipsi nec digito +volunt ea movere; ut habetur Matth. XXIII. Unde quantum ad Dei +iudicium, princeps non est solutus a lege, quantum ad vim +directivam eius; sed debet voluntarius, non coactus, legem implere. +Est etiam princeps supra legem, inquantum, si expediens fuerit, +potest legem mutare, et in ea dispensare, pro loco et tempore.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q96_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q96_A6-p0.1">Q. 96. A. 6. Whether he who is under a law may act beside the letter of the law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that he who is subject to a law may not act beside the letter of the law. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 31): + "Although men judge about temporal laws when they make them, yet when once they are made they must pass judgment not on them, + but according to them." But if anyone disregard the letter of the law, saying that he observes the intention of the lawgiver, + he seems to pass judgment on the law. Therefore it is not right for one who is under the + law to disregard the letter of the law, in order to observe the intention of the lawgiver. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="37703" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37703] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non liceat ei qui subditur legi, +praeter verba legis agere. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de vera +Relig., <i>in temporalibus legibus, quamvis homines iudicent de his +cum eas instituunt, tamen quando fuerint institutae et firmatae, +non licebit de ipsis iudicare, sed secundum ipsas</i>. Sed si +aliquis praetermittat verba legis, dicens se intentionem +legislatoris servare, videtur iudicare de lege. Ergo non licet ei +qui subditur legi, ut praetermittat verba legis, ut intentionem +legislatoris servet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he alone is competent to interpret the law who can make the law. But those who are subject to the law cannot make + the law. Therefore they have no right to interpret the intention of the lawgiver, but should always act according to the letter + of the law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="37704" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37704] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ad eum solum pertinet leges interpretari, cuius est condere leges. +Sed hominum subditorum legi non est leges condere. Ergo eorum non +est interpretari legislatoris intentionem, sed semper secundum +verba legis agere debent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every wise man knows how to explain his intention by words. But those who framed the laws should be reckoned wise: + for Wisdom says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.15" target="asv">Prov. 8:15</a>): "By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things." Therefore we should not judge of the intention of the lawgiver otherwise + than by the words of the law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="37705" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37705] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +omnis sapiens intentionem suam verbis novit explicare. Sed illi qui +leges condiderunt, reputari debent sapientes, dicit enim sapientia, +Prov. VIII, <i>per me reges regnant, et legum conditores iusta +decernunt</i>. Ergo de intentione legislatoris non est iudicandum +nisi per verba legis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "The meaning of what is said is according to the motive for saying it: because things are not + subject to speech, but speech to things." Therefore we should take account of the motive of the lawgiver, rather than of his + very words. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 6 s. c."><a name="37706" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37706] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Hilarius dicit, in IV de Trin., <i>intelligentia dictorum +ex causis est assumenda dicendi, quia non sermoni res, sed rei +debet esse sermo subiectus</i>. Ergo magis est attendendum ad +causam quae movit legislatorem, quam ad ipsa verba legis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q96_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q96_A4" id="FS_Q96_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, every law is directed to the common weal of men, and derives the force and nature of law accordingly. Hence the jurist says + [*Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff., tit. 3, De Leg. et Senat.]: "By no reason of law, or favor of equity, is it allowable for + us to interpret harshly, and render burdensome, those useful measures which have been enacted for the welfare of man." Now + it happens often that the observance of some + point of law conduces to the common weal in the majority of instances, and yet, in some cases, is very hurtful. Since then + the lawgiver cannot have in view every single case, he shapes the law according to what happens most frequently, by directing + his attention to the common good. Wherefore if a case arise wherein the observance of that law would be hurtful to the general + welfare, it should not be observed. For instance, suppose that in a besieged city it be an established law that the gates + of the city are to be kept closed, this is good for public welfare as a general rule: but, it were to happen that the enemy + are in pursuit of certain citizens, who are defenders of the city, it would be a great loss to the city, if the gates were + not opened to them: and so in that case the gates ought to be opened, contrary to the letter of the law, in order to maintain + the common weal, which the lawgiver had in view. + </p><p id="FS_Q96_A6-p7"> Nevertheless it must be noted, that if the observance of the law according to the letter does not involve any sudden risk + needing instant remedy, it is not competent for everyone to expound what is useful and what is not useful to the state: those + alone can do this who are in authority, and who, on account of such like cases, have the power to dispense from the laws. + If, however, the peril be so sudden as not to allow of the delay involved by referring the matter to authority, + the mere necessity brings with it a dispensation, since necessity knows no law. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 6 co."><a name="37707" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37707] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, omnis lex ordinatur ad +communem hominum salutem, et intantum obtinet vim et rationem +legis; secundum vero quod ab hoc deficit, virtutem obligandi non +habet. Unde iurisperitus dicit quod <i>nulla iuris ratio aut +aequitatis benignitas patitur ut quae salubriter pro utilitate +hominum introducuntur, ea nos duriori interpretatione, contra +ipsorum commodum, perducamus ad severitatem</i>. Contingit autem +multoties quod aliquid observari communi saluti est utile ut in +pluribus, quod tamen in aliquibus casibus est maxime nocivum. Quia +igitur legislator non potest omnes singulares casus intueri, +proponit legem secundum ea quae in pluribus accidunt, ferens +intentionem suam ad communem utilitatem. Unde si emergat casus in +quo observatio talis legis sit damnosa communi saluti, non est +observanda. Sicut si in civitate obsessa statuatur lex quod portae +civitatis maneant clausae, hoc est utile communi saluti ut in +pluribus, si tamen contingat casus quod hostes insequantur aliquos +cives, per quos civitas conservatur, damnosissimum esset civitati +nisi eis portae aperirentur, et ideo in tali casu essent portae +aperiendae, contra verba legis, ut servaretur utilitas communis, +quam legislator intendit. Sed tamen hoc est considerandum, quod si +observatio legis secundum verba non habeat subitum periculum, cui +oportet statim occurri, non pertinet ad quemlibet ut interpretetur +quid sit utile civitati et quid inutile, sed hoc solum pertinet ad +principes, qui propter huiusmodi casus habent auctoritatem in +legibus dispensandi. Si vero sit subitum periculum, non patiens +tantam moram ut ad superiorem recurri possit, ipsa necessitas +dispensationem habet annexam, quia necessitas non subditur +legi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> He who in a case of necessity acts beside the letter of the law, does not judge the law; but of a particular case in which + he sees that the letter of the law is not to be observed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="37708" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37708] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ille qui in casu necessitatis agit praeter verba +legis, non iudicat de ipsa lege, sed iudicat de casu singulari, in +quo videt verba legis observanda non esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> He who follows the intention of the lawgiver, does not interpret the law simply; but in a case in which it is evident, by + reason of the manifest harm, that the lawgiver intended otherwise. For if it be a matter of doubt, he must either act according + to the letter of the law, or consult those in power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="37709" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37709] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ille qui sequitur intentionem legislatoris, non +interpretatur legem simpliciter; sed in casu in quo manifestum est +per evidentiam nocumenti, legislatorem aliud intendisse. Si enim +dubium sit, debet vel secundum verba legis agere, vel superiores +consulere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> No man is so wise as to be able to take account of every single case; wherefore he is not able sufficiently to express in + words all those things that are suitable for the end he has in view. And even if a lawgiver were able to take all the cases + into consideration, he ought not to mention them all, in order to avoid confusion: but should frame the law according to that + which is of most common occurrence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="37710" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37710] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod nullius hominis sapientia tanta est ut possit omnes +singulares casus excogitare, et ideo non potest sufficienter per +verba sua exprimere ea quae conveniunt ad finem intentum. Et si +posset legislator omnes casus considerare, non oporteret ut omnes +exprimeret, propter confusionem vitandam, sed legem ferre deberet +secundum ea quae in pluribus accidunt.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q97" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q97-p0.1">Q. 97. OF CHANGE IN LAWS (FOUR ARTICLES) </h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q97-p2"> We must now consider change in laws: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q97-p3"><a href="#FS_Q97_A1"> (1) Whether human law is changeable?</a></p><p id="FS_Q97-p4"><a href="#FS_Q97_A2"> (2) Whether it should be always changed, whenever anything better occurs?</a></p><p id="FS_Q97-p5"><a href="#FS_Q97_A3"> (3) Whether it is abolished by custom, and whether custom obtains the force of law?</a></p><p id="FS_Q97-p6"><a href="#FS_Q97_A4"> (4) Whether the application of human law should be changed by dispensation of those in authority?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 pr."><a name="37711" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37711] +Iª-IIae q. 97 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +mutatione legum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum lex +humana sit mutabilis. Secundo, utrum semper debeat mutari, quando +aliquid melius occurrerit. Tertio, utrum per consuetudinem +aboleatur; et utrum consuetudo obtineat vim legis. Quarto, utrum +usus legis humanae per dispensationem rectorum immutari debeat.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q97_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q97_A1-p0.1">Q. 97. A. 1. Whether human law should be changed in any way?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that human law should not be changed in any way at all. Because human law is derived from the natural law, + as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q95_A2" id="FS_Q97_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[95], A[2]</a>). But the natural law endures unchangeably. Therefore human law should also remain without any change. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37712" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37712] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex humana nullo modo debeat mutari. +Lex enim humana derivatur a lege naturali, ut supra dictum est. Sed +lex naturalis immobilis perseverat. Ergo et lex humana debet +immobilis permanere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5), a measure should be absolutely stable. But human law is the measure of human + acts, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A1" id="FS_Q97_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[90], AA[1]</a>,2). Therefore it should remain without change. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37713" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37713] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., mensura maxime debet esse +permanens. Sed lex humana est mensura humanorum actuum, ut supra +dictum est. Ergo debet immobiliter permanere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is of the essence of law to be just and right, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q95_A2" id="FS_Q97_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[95], A[2]</a>). But that which is right once is right always. Therefore that which is law once, should be always law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37714" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37714] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +de ratione legis est quod sit iusta et recta, ut supra dictum est. +Sed illud quod semel est rectum, semper est rectum. Ergo illud quod +semel est lex, semper debet esse lex.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): "A temporal law, however just, may be justly changed in course of time." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37715" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37715] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib. Arb., <i>lex temporalis +quamvis iusta sit, commutari tamen per tempora iuste +potest</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q97_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q91_A3" id="FS_Q97_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[91], A[3]</a>), human law is a dictate of reason, whereby human acts are directed. Thus there may be two causes for the just change of + human law: one on the part of reason; the other on the part of man whose acts are regulated by law. The cause on the part + of reason is that it seems natural to human reason to advance gradually from the imperfect to the perfect. Hence, in speculative + sciences, we see that the teaching + of the early philosophers was imperfect, and that it was afterwards perfected by those who succeeded them. So also in practical + matters: for those who first endeavored to discover something useful for the human community, not being able by themselves + to take everything into consideration, set up certain institutions which were deficient in many ways; and these were changed + by subsequent lawgivers who made institutions that might prove less frequently deficient in respect of the common weal. + </p><p id="FS_Q97_A1-p7"> On the part of man, whose acts are regulated by law, the law can be rightly changed on account of the changed condition of + man, to whom different things are expedient according to the difference of his condition. An example is proposed by Augustine + (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): "If the people have a sense of moderation and responsibility, and are most careful guardians of the common + weal, it is right to enact a law allowing such a people to choose their own magistrates for the government + of the commonwealth. But if, as time goes on, the same people become so corrupt as to sell their votes, and entrust the government + to scoundrels and criminals; then the right of appointing their public officials is rightly forfeit to such a people, and + the choice devolves to a few good men." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 1 co."><a name="37716" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37716] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod sicut supra dictum est, lex humana est quoddam +dictamen rationis, quo diriguntur humani actus. Et secundum hoc +duplex causa potest esse quod lex humana iuste mutetur, una quidem +ex parte rationis; alia vero ex parte hominum, quorum actus lege +regulantur. Ex parte quidem rationis, quia humanae rationi naturale +esse videtur ut gradatim ab imperfecto ad perfectum perveniat. Unde +videmus in scientiis speculativis quod qui primo philosophati sunt, +quaedam imperfecta tradiderunt, quae postmodum per posteriores sunt +magis perfecta. Ita etiam est in operabilibus. Nam primi qui +intenderunt invenire aliquid utile communitati hominum, non +valentes omnia ex seipsis considerare, instituerunt quaedam +imperfecta in multis deficientia quae posteriores mutaverunt, +instituentes aliqua quae in paucioribus deficere possent a communi +utilitate. Ex parte vero hominum, quorum actus lege regulantur, lex +recte mutari potest propter mutationem conditionum hominum, quibus +secundum diversas eorum conditiones diversa expediunt. Sicut +Augustinus ponit exemplum, in I de Lib. Arb., quod <i>si populus +sit bene moderatus et gravis, communisque utilitatis +diligentissimus custos, recte lex fertur qua tali populo liceat +creare sibi magistratus, per quos respublica administretur. Porro +si paulatim idem populus depravatus habeat venale suffragium, et +regimen flagitiosis sceleratisque committat; recte adimitur tali +populo potestas dandi honores, et ad paucorum bonorum redit +arbitrium</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The natural law is a participation of the eternal law, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q91_A2" id="FS_Q97_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[91], A[2]</a>), and therefore endures without change, owing to the unchangeableness and perfection of the Divine Reason, the Author of + nature. But the reason of man is changeable and imperfect: wherefore his law is subject to change. Moreover the natural law + contains certain universal precepts, which are everlasting: whereas human law contains certain + particular precepts, according to various emergencies. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37717" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37717] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod naturalis lex est participatio quaedam legis +aeternae, ut supra dictum est, et ideo immobilis perseverat, quod +habet ex immobilitate et perfectione divinae rationis instituentis +naturam. Sed ratio humana mutabilis est et imperfecta. Et ideo eius +lex mutabilis est. Et praeterea lex naturalis continet quaedam +universalia praecepta, quae semper manent, lex vero posita ab +homine continet praecepta quaedam particularia, secundum diversos +casus qui emergunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A measure should be as enduring as possible. But nothing can be absolutely unchangeable in things that are subject to change. + And therefore human law cannot be altogether unchangeable. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37718" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37718] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod mensura debet esse permanens quantum est possibile. +Sed in rebus mutabilibus non potest esse aliquid omnino +immutabiliter permanens. Et ideo lex humana non potest esse omnino +immutabilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In corporal things, right is predicated absolutely: and therefore, as far as itself is concerned, always remains right. But + right is predicated of law with reference to the common weal, to which one and the same thing is not always adapted, as stated + above: wherefore rectitude of this kind is subject to change. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37719" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37719] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod rectum in rebus corporalibus dicitur absolute, et +ideo semper, quantum est de se, manet rectum. Sed rectitudo legis +dicitur in ordine ad utilitatem communem, cui non semper +proportionatur una eademque res, sicut supra dictum est. Et ideo +talis rectitudo mutatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q97_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q97_A2-p0.1">Q. 97. A. 2. Whether human law should always be changed, whenever something better occurs?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that human law should be changed, whenever something better occurs. Because human laws are devised by human + reason, like other arts. But in the other arts, the tenets of former times give place to others, if something better occurs. + Therefore the same should apply to human laws. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37720" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37720] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod semper lex humana, quando aliquid +melius occurrit, sit mutanda. Leges enim humanae sunt adinventae +per rationem humanam, sicut etiam aliae artes. Sed in aliis artibus +mutatur id quod prius tenebatur, si aliquid melius occurrat. Ergo +idem est etiam faciendum in legibus humanis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, by taking note of the past we can provide for the future. Now unless human laws had been changed when it was found + possible to improve them, considerable inconvenience would have ensued; because the laws of old were crude in many points. + Therefore it seems that laws should be changed, whenever anything better occurs to be enacted. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37721" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37721] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ex his quae praeterita sunt, providere possumus de futuris. Sed +nisi leges humanae mutatae fuissent supervenientibus melioribus +adinventionibus, multa inconvenientia sequerentur, eo quod leges +antiquae inveniuntur multas ruditates continere. Ergo videtur quod +leges sint mutandae, quotiescumque aliquid melius occurrit +statuendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, human laws are enacted about single acts of man. But we cannot acquire perfect knowledge in singular matters, except + by experience, which "requires time," as stated in Ethic. ii. Therefore it seems that as time goes on it is possible for something + better to occur for legislation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37722" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37722] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +leges humanae circa singulares actus hominum statuuntur. In +singularibus autem perfectam cognitionem adipisci non possumus nisi +per experientiam, quae tempore indiget, ut dicitur in II Ethic. +Ergo videtur quod per successionem temporis possit aliquid melius +occurrere statuendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated in the Decretals (Dist. xii, 5): "It is absurd, and a detestable shame, that we should suffer those traditions + to be changed which we have received from the fathers of old." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37723" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37723] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur in decretis, dist. XII, <i>ridiculum est et satis +abominabile dedecus, ut traditiones quas antiquitus a patribus +suscepimus, infringi patiamur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q97_A1" id="FS_Q97_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, human law is rightly changed, in so far as such change is conducive to the common weal. But, to a certain extent, the mere + change of law is of itself prejudicial to the common good: because custom avails much for the observance of laws, seeing that + what is done contrary to general custom, even in slight matters, is looked upon as grave. Consequently, when a law is changed, + the binding power of the law is + diminished, in so far as custom is abolished. Wherefore human law should never be changed, unless, in some way or other, the + common weal be compensated according to the extent of the harm done in this respect. Such compensation may arise either from + some very great and every evident benefit conferred by the new enactment; or from the extreme urgency of the case, due to + the fact that either the existing law is clearly unjust, or its observance extremely harmful. Wherefore the jurist says + [*Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff., tit. 4, De Constit. Princip.] that "in establishing new laws, there should be evidence of + the benefit to be derived, before departing from a law which has long been considered just." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 2 co."><a name="37724" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37724] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, lex humana intantum recte mutatur, +inquantum per eius mutationem communi utilitati providetur. Habet +autem ipsa legis mutatio, quantum in se est, detrimentum quoddam +communis salutis. Quia ad observantiam legum plurimum valet +consuetudo, intantum quod ea quae contra communem consuetudinem +fiunt, etiam si sint leviora de se, graviora videantur. Unde quando +mutatur lex, diminuitur vis constrictiva legis, inquantum tollitur +consuetudo. Et ideo nunquam debet mutari lex humana, nisi ex aliqua +parte tantum recompensetur communi saluti, quantum ex ista parte +derogatur. Quod quidem contingit vel ex hoc quod aliqua maxima et +evidentissima utilitas ex novo statuto provenit, vel ex eo quod est +maxima necessitas, ex eo quod lex consueta aut manifestam +iniquitatem continet, aut eius observatio est plurimum nociva. Unde +dicitur a iurisperito quod <i>in rebus novis constituendis, evidens +debet esse utilitas, ut recedatur ab eo iure quod diu aequum visum +est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Rules of art derive their force from reason alone: and therefore whenever something better occurs, the rule followed hitherto + should be changed. But "laws derive very great force from custom," as the Philosopher states (Polit. ii, 5): consequently + they should not be quickly changed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37725" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37725] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ea quae sunt artis, habent efficaciam ex sola +ratione, et ideo ubicumque melior ratio occurrat, est mutandum quod +prius tenebatur. <i>Sed leges habent maximam virtutem ex +consuetudine</i>, ut philosophus dicit, in II Polit. Et inde non +sunt de facili mutandae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument proves that laws ought to be changed: not in view of any improvement, but for the sake of a great benefit or + in a case of great urgency, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37726" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37726] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa concludit quod leges sunt mutandae, non +tamen pro quacumque melioratione, sed pro magna utilitate vel +necessitate, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A2-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This answer applies also to the Third Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37727" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37727] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Et similiter +dicendum est ad tertium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q97_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q97_A3-p0.1">Q. 97. A. 3. Whether custom can obtain force of law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that custom cannot obtain force of law, nor abolish a law. Because human law is derived from the natural law + and from the Divine law, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q93_A3" id="FS_Q97_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[93], A[3]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q95_A2" id="FS_Q97_A3-p2.2" shape="rect"> Q[95], A[2]</a>). But human custom cannot change either the law of nature or the Divine law. Therefore neither can it change human law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37728" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37728] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod consuetudo non possit obtinere vim +legis, nec legem amovere. Lex enim humana derivatur a lege naturae +et a lege divina, ut ex supradictis patet. Sed consuetudo hominum +non potest immutare legem naturae, nec legem divinam. Ergo etiam +nec legem humanam immutare potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, many evils cannot make one good. But he who first acted against the law, did evil. Therefore by multiplying such + acts, nothing good is the result. Now a law is something good; since it is a rule of human acts. Therefore law is not abolished + by custom, so that the mere custom should obtain force of law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37729" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37729] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ex multis malis non potest fieri unum bonum. Sed ille qui incipit +primo contra legem agere, male facit. Ergo, multiplicatis similibus +actibus, non efficietur aliquod bonum. Lex autem est quoddam bonum, +cum sit regula humanorum actuum. Ergo per consuetudinem non potest +removeri lex, ut ipsa consuetudo vim legis obtineat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the framing of laws belongs to those public men whose business it is to govern the community; wherefore private + individuals cannot make laws. But custom grows by the acts of private individuals. Therefore custom cannot obtain force of + law, so as to abolish the law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37730" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37730] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +ferre legem pertinet ad publicas personas, ad quas pertinet regere +communitatem, unde privatae personae legem facere non possunt. Sed +consuetudo invalescit per actus privatarum personarum. Ergo +consuetudo non potest obtinere vim legis, per quam lex +removeatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Ep. ad Casulan. xxxvi): "The customs of God's people and the institutions of our ancestors are to be considered + as laws. And those who throw contempt on the customs of the Church ought to be punished as those who disobey the law of God." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37731" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37731] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in Epist. ad Casulan., <i>mos populi Dei +et instituta maiorum pro lege sunt tenenda. Et sicut +praevaricatores legum divinarum, ita et contemptores consuetudinum +ecclesiasticarum coercendi sunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> All law proceeds from the reason and will of the lawgiver; the Divine and natural laws from the reasonable will of God; the + human law from the will of man, regulated by reason. Now just as human reason and will, in practical matters, may be made + manifest by speech, so may they be made known by deeds: since seemingly a man chooses as good that which he carries into execution. + But it is evident that by human speech, law can be both changed and expounded, in so + far as it manifests the interior movement and thought of human reason. Wherefore by actions also, especially if they be repeated, + so as to make a custom, law can be changed and expounded; and also something can be established which obtains force of law, + in so far as by repeated external actions, the inward movement of the will, and concepts of reason are most effectually declared; + for when a thing is done again and again, it seems to proceed from a deliberate judgment of reason. Accordingly, + custom has the force of a law, abolishes law, and is the interpreter of law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 3 co."><a name="37732" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37732] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod omnis lex proficiscitur a ratione et voluntate +legislatoris, lex quidem divina et naturalis a rationabili Dei +voluntate; lex autem humana a voluntate hominis ratione regulata. +Sicut autem ratio et voluntas hominis manifestantur verbo in rebus +agendis, ita etiam manifestantur facto, hoc enim unusquisque +eligere videtur ut bonum, quod opere implet. Manifestum est autem +quod verbo humano potest et mutari lex, et etiam exponi, inquantum +manifestat interiorem motum et conceptum rationis humanae. Unde +etiam et per actus, maxime multiplicatos, qui consuetudinem +efficiunt, mutari potest lex, et exponi, et etiam aliquid causari +quod legis virtutem obtineat, inquantum scilicet per exteriores +actus multiplicatos interior voluntatis motus, et rationis +conceptus, efficacissime declaratur; cum enim aliquid multoties +fit, videtur ex deliberato rationis iudicio provenire. Et secundum +hoc, consuetudo et habet vim legis, et legem abolet, et est legum +interpretatrix.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The natural and Divine laws proceed from the Divine will, as stated above. Wherefore they cannot be changed by a custom proceeding + from the will of man, but only by Divine authority. Hence it is that no custom can prevail over the Divine or natural laws: + for Isidore says (Synon. ii, 16): "Let custom yield to authority: evil customs should be eradicated by law and reason." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37733" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37733] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod lex naturalis et divina procedit a voluntate +divina, ut dictum est. Unde non potest mutari per consuetudinem +procedentem a voluntate hominis, sed solum per auctoritatem divinam +mutari posset. Et inde est quod nulla consuetudo vim obtinere +potest contra legem divinam vel legem naturalem, dicit enim +Isidorus, in Synonym., <i>usus auctoritati cedat, pravum usum lex +et ratio vincat</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q96_A6" id="FS_Q97_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[96], A[6]</a>), human laws fail in some cases: wherefore it is possible sometimes to act beside the law; namely, in a case where the law + fails; yet the act will not be evil. And when such cases are multiplied, by reason of some change in man, then custom shows + that the law is no longer useful: just as it might be declared by the verbal promulgation of a law to the contrary. If, however, + the same reason remains, + for which the law was useful hitherto, then it is not the custom that prevails against the law, but the law that overcomes + the custom: unless perhaps the sole reason for the law seeming useless, be that it is not "possible according to the custom + of the country" [* + <a href="#FS_Q95_A3" id="FS_Q97_A3-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[95], A[3]</a>], which has been stated to be one of the conditions of law. For it is not easy to set aside the custom of a whole people. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37734" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37734] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, leges humanae in aliquibus +casibus deficiunt, unde possibile est quandoque praeter legem +agere, in casu scilicet in quo deficit lex, et tamen actus non erit +malus. Et cum tales casus multiplicantur, propter aliquam +mutationem hominum, tunc manifestatur per consuetudinem quod lex +ulterius utilis non est, sicut etiam manifestaretur si lex +contraria verbo promulgaretur. Si autem adhuc maneat ratio eadem +propter quam prima lex utilis erat, non consuetudo legem, sed lex +consuetudinem vincit, nisi forte propter hoc solum inutilis lex +videatur, quia non est possibilis secundum consuetudinem patriae, +quae erat una de conditionibus legis. Difficile enim est +consuetudinem multitudinis removere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The people among whom a custom is introduced may be of two conditions. For if they are free, and able to make their own laws, + the consent of the whole people expressed by a custom counts far more in favor of a particular observance, that does the authority + of the sovereign, who has not the power to frame laws, except as representing the people. Wherefore although each individual + cannot make laws, yet the whole people can. If however the people have + not the free power to make their own laws, or to abolish a law made by a higher authority; nevertheless with such a people + a prevailing custom obtains force of law, in so far as it is tolerated by those to whom it belongs to make laws for that people: + because by the very fact that they tolerate it they seem to approve of that which is introduced by custom. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37735" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37735] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod multitudo in qua consuetudo introducitur duplicis +conditionis esse potest. Si enim sit libera multitudo, quae possit +sibi legem facere, plus est consensus totius multitudinis ad +aliquid observandum, quem consuetudo manifestat, quam auctoritas +principis, qui non habet potestatem condendi legem, nisi inquantum +gerit personam multitudinis. Unde licet singulae personae non +possint condere legem, tamen totus populus legem condere potest. Si +vero multitudo non habeat liberam potestatem condendi sibi legem, +vel legem a superiori potestate positam removendi; tamen ipsa +consuetudo in tali multitudine praevalens obtinet vim legis, +inquantum per eos toleratur ad quos pertinet multitudini legem +imponere, ex hoc enim ipso videntur approbare quod consuetudo +induxit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q97_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q97_A4-p0.1">Q. 97. A. 4. Whether the rulers of the people can dispense from human laws?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the rulers of the people cannot dispense from human laws. For the law is established for the "common weal," + as Isidore says (Etym. v, 21). But the common good should not be set aside for the private convenience of an individual: because, + as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 2), "the good of the nation is more godlike than the good of one man." Therefore it seems + that a man should not be dispensed from acting in compliance with the general + law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37736" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37736] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod rectores multitudinis non possint in +legibus humanis dispensare. Lex enim statuta est pro communi +utilitate, ut Isidorus dicit. Sed bonum commune non debet +intermitti pro privato commodo alicuius personae, quia, ut dicit +philosophus, in I Ethic., <i>bonum gentis divinius est quam bonum +unius hominis</i>. Ergo videtur quod non debeat dispensari cum +aliquo ut contra legem communem agat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those who are placed over others are commanded as follows ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q97_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.1.17" target="asv">Dt. 1:17</a>): "You shall hear the little as well as the great; neither shall you respect any man's person, because it is the judgment + of God." But to allow one man to do that which is equally forbidden to all, seems to be respect of persons. Therefore the + rulers of a community cannot grant such dispensations, since this is against a precept of the Divine law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37737" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37737] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +illis qui super alios constituuntur, praecipitur Deut. I, <i>ita +parvum audietis ut magnum, nec accipietis cuiusquam personam, quia +Dei iudicium est</i>. Sed concedere alicui quod communiter +denegatur omnibus, videtur esse acceptio personarum. Ergo huiusmodi +dispensationes facere rectores multitudinis non possunt, cum hoc +sit contra praeceptum legis divinae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, human law, in order to be just, should accord with the natural and Divine laws: else it would not "foster religion," + nor be "helpful to discipline," which is requisite to the nature of law, as laid down by Isidore (Etym. v, 3). But no man + can dispense from the Divine and natural laws. Neither, therefore, can he dispense from the human law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37738" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37738] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex humana, si sit recta, oportet quod consonet legi naturali et +legi divinae, aliter enim non congrueret religioni, nec conveniret +disciplinae, quod requiritur ad legem, ut Isidorus dicit. Sed in +lege divina et naturali nullus homo potest dispensare. Ergo nec +etiam in lege humana.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q97_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.17" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:17</a>): "A dispensation is committed to me." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37739" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37739] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicit apostolus, I ad Cor. IX, <i>dispensatio mihi credita +est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Dispensation, properly speaking, denotes a measuring out to individuals of some common goods: thus the head of a household + is called a dispenser, because to each member of the household he distributes work and necessaries of life in due weight and + measure. Accordingly in every community a man is said to dispense, from the very fact that he directs how some general precept + is to be fulfilled by each individual. Now it happens at times that a precept, which is + conducive to the common weal as a general rule, is not good for a particular individual, or in some particular case, either + because it would hinder some greater good, or because it would be the occasion of some evil, as explained above ( + <a href="#FS_Q96_A6" id="FS_Q97_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[96], A[6]</a>). But it would be dangerous to leave this to the discretion of each individual, except perhaps by reason of an evident and + sudden emergency, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q96_A6" id="FS_Q97_A4-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[96], A[6]</a>). Consequently he who is + placed over a community is empowered to dispense in a human law that rests upon his authority, so that, when the law fails + in its application to persons or circumstances, he may allow the precept of the law not to be observed. If however he grant + this permission without any such reason, and of his mere will, he will be an unfaithful or an imprudent dispenser: unfaithful, + if he has not the common good in view; imprudent, if he ignores the reasons for granting dispensations. Hence Our Lord says + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q97_A4-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.42" target="asv">Lk. 12:42</a>): "Who, thinkest thou, is the faithful and wise dispenser [Douay: steward], whom his lord setteth over his family?" + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 4 co."><a name="37740" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37740] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod dispensatio proprie importat commensurationem +alicuius communis ad singula, unde etiam gubernator familiae +dicitur dispensator, inquantum unicuique de familia cum pondere et +mensura distribuit et operationes et necessaria vitae. Sic igitur +et in quacumque multitudine ex eo dicitur aliquis dispensare, quod +ordinat qualiter aliquod commune praeceptum sit a singulis +adimplendum. Contingit autem quandoque quod aliquod praeceptum quod +est ad commodum multitudinis ut in pluribus, non est conveniens +huic personae, vel in hoc casu, quia vel per hoc impediretur +aliquid melius, vel etiam induceretur aliquod malum, sicut ex +supradictis patet. Periculosum autem esset ut hoc iudicio +cuiuslibet committeretur, nisi forte propter evidens et subitum +periculum, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo ille qui habet regere +multitudinem, habet potestatem dispensandi in lege humana quae suae +auctoritati innititur, ut scilicet in personis vel casibus in +quibus lex deficit, licentiam tribuat ut praeceptum legis non +servetur. Si autem absque hac ratione, pro sola voluntate, +licentiam tribuat, non erit fidelis in dispensatione, aut erit +imprudens, infidelis quidem, si non habeat intentionem ad bonum +commune; imprudens autem, si rationem dispensandi ignoret. Propter +quod dominus dicit, Lucae XII, <i>quis, putas, est fidelis +dispensator et prudens, quem constituit dominus super familiam +suam?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When a person is dispensed from observing the general law, this should not be done to the prejudice of, but with the intention + of benefiting, the common good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37741" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37741] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, quando cum aliquo dispensatur ut legem communem +non servet, non debet fieri in praeiudicium boni communis; sed ea +intentione ut ad bonum commune proficiat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not respect of persons if unequal measures are served out to those who are themselves unequal. Wherefore when the condition + of any person requires that he should reasonably receive special treatment, it is not respect of persons if he be the object + of special favor. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37742" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37742] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod non est acceptio personarum si non serventur aequalia +in personis inaequalibus. Unde quando conditio alicuius personae +requirit ut rationabiliter in ea aliquid specialiter observetur, +non est personarum acceptio si sibi aliqua specialis gratia +fiat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Natural law, so far as it contains general precepts, which never fail, does not allow of dispensations. In other precepts, + however, which are as conclusions of the general precepts, man sometimes grants a dispensation: for instance, that a loan + should not be paid back to the betrayer of his country, or something similar. But to the Divine law each man stands as a private + person to the public law to which he is subject. Wherefore just as none can + dispense from public human law, except the man from whom the law derives its authority, or his delegate; so, in the precepts + of the Divine law, which are from God, none can dispense but God, or the man to whom He may give special power for that purpose. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37743" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37743] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod lex naturalis inquantum continet praecepta communia, +quae nunquam fallunt, dispensationem recipere non potest. In aliis +vero praeceptis, quae sunt quasi conclusiones praeceptorum +communium, quandoque per hominem dispensatur, puta quod mutuum non +reddatur proditori patriae, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Ad legem autem +divinam ita se habet quilibet homo, sicut persona privata ad legem +publicam cui subiicitur. Unde sicut in lege humana publica non +potest dispensare nisi ille a quo lex auctoritatem habet, vel is +cui ipse commiserit; ita in praeceptis iuris divini, quae sunt a +Deo, nullus potest dispensare nisi Deus, vel si cui ipse +specialiter committeret.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q98" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q98-p0.1">Q. 98. OF THE OLD LAW (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q98-p2"> In due sequence we must now consider the Old Law; and (1) The Law itself; (2) Its precepts. Under the first head there are + six points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FS_Q98-p3"><a href="#FS_Q98_A1"> (1) Whether the Old Law was good?</a></p><p id="FS_Q98-p4"><a href="#FS_Q98_A2"> (2) Whether it was from God?</a></p><p id="FS_Q98-p5"><a href="#FS_Q98_A3"> (3) Whether it came from Him through the angels?</a></p><p id="FS_Q98-p6"><a href="#FS_Q98_A4"> (4) Whether it was given to all?</a></p><p id="FS_Q98-p7"><a href="#FS_Q98_A5"> (5) Whether it was binding on all?</a></p><p id="FS_Q98-p8"><a href="#FS_Q98_A6"> (6) Whether it was given at a suitable time?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 pr."><a name="37744" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37744] +Iª-IIae q. 98 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de +lege veteri. Et primo, de ipsa lege; secundo, de praeceptis eius. +Circa primum quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum lex vetus sit bona. +Secundo, utrum sit a Deo. Tertio, utrum sit ab eo mediantibus +Angelis. Quarto, utrum data sit omnibus. Quinto, utrum omnes +obliget. Sexto, utrum congruo tempore fuerit data.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q98_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q98_A1-p0.1">Q. 98. A. 1. Whether the Old Law was good?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Old Law was not good. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.20.25" target="asv">Ezech. 20:25</a>): "I gave them statutes that were not good, and judgments in which they shall not live." But a law is not said to be good + except on account of the goodness of the precepts that it contains. Therefore the Old Law was not good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37745" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37745] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex vetus non fuerit bona. Dicitur +enim Ezech. XX <i>dedi eis praecepta non bona, et iudicia in quibus +non vivent</i>. Sed lex non dicitur bona nisi propter bonitatem +praeceptorum quae continet. Ergo lex vetus non fuit bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs to the goodness of a law that it conduce to the common welfare, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 3). But the + Old Law was not salutary; rather was it deadly and hurtful. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.8" target="asv">Rom. 7:8</a>, seqq.): "Without the law sin was dead. And I lived some time without the law. But when the commandment came sin revived; + and I died." Again he says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.20" target="asv">Rom. 5:20</a>): "Law entered in that sin might abound." Therefore the Old Law was not + good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37746" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37746] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ad bonitatem legis pertinet ut communi saluti proficiat sicut +Isidorus dicit. Sed lex vetus non fuit salutifera, sed magis +mortifera et nociva. Dicit enim apostolus, Rom. VII, <i>sine lege +peccatum mortuum erat. Ego autem vivebam sine lege aliquando, sed +cum venisset mandatum, peccatum revixit, ego autem mortuus sum</i>; +et Rom. V, <i>lex subintravit ut abundaret delictum</i>. Ergo lex +vetus non fuit bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it belongs to the goodness of the law that it should be possible to obey it, both according to nature, and according + to human custom. But such the Old Law was not: since Peter said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.15.10" target="asv">Acts 15:10</a>): "Why tempt you (God) to put a yoke on the necks of the disciples, which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear?" + Therefore it seems that the Old Law was not good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37747" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37747] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +ad bonitatem legis pertinet quod sit possibilis ad observandum et +secundum naturam, et secundum humanam consuetudinem. Sed hoc non +habuit lex vetus, dicit enim Petrus, Act. XV, <i>quid tentatis +imponere iugum super cervicem discipulorum, quod neque nos, neque +patres nostri, portare potuimus?</i> Ergo videtur quod lex vetus +non fuerit bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.12" target="asv">Rom. 7:12</a>): "Wherefore the law indeed is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37748" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37748] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. VII, itaque <i>lex quidem sancta +est, et mandatum sanctum et iustum et bonum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q98_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Without any doubt, the Old Law was good. For just as a doctrine is shown to be good by the fact that it accords with right + reason, so is a law proved to be good if it accords with reason. Now the Old Law was in accordance with reason. Because it + repressed concupiscence which is in conflict with reason, as evidenced by the commandment, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's + goods" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.17" target="asv">Ex. 20:17</a>). Moreover the same law forbade all kinds of sin; + and these too are contrary to reason. Consequently it is evident that it was a good law. The Apostle argues in the same way + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.7" target="asv">Rom. 7</a>): "I am delighted," says he (verse 22), "with the law of God, according to the inward man": and again (verse 16): "I consent + to the law, that is good." + </p><p id="FS_Q98_A1-p7"> But it must be noted that the good has various degrees, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv): for there is a perfect good, + and an imperfect good. In things ordained to an end, there is perfect goodness when a thing is such that it is sufficient + in itself to conduce to the end: while there is imperfect goodness when a thing is of some assistance in attaining the end, + but is not sufficient for the realization thereof. Thus a medicine is perfectly good, if it gives health to a man; + but it is imperfect, if it helps to cure him, without being able to bring him back to health. Again it must be observed that + the end of human law is different from the end of Divine law. For the end of human law is the temporal tranquillity of the + state, which end law effects by directing external actions, as regards those evils which might disturb the peaceful condition + of the state. On the other hand, the end of the Divine law is to bring man to that end which is everlasting happiness; which + end is hindered by any sin, not only of external, but also of internal action. Consequently that which suffices for the perfection + of human law, viz. the prohibition and punishment of sin, does not suffice for the perfection of the Divine law: but it is + requisite that it should make man altogether fit to partake of everlasting happiness. Now this cannot be done save by the + grace of the Holy Ghost, whereby "charity" which fulfilleth the law . . . "is spread abroad in our hearts" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv">Rom. + 5:5 + </a>): since "the grace of God is life everlasting" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.6.23" target="asv">Rom. 6:23</a>). But the Old Law could not confer this grace, for this was reserved to Christ; because, as it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p7.3" href="./asv.html#John.1.17" target="asv">Jn. 1:17</a>), the law was given "by Moses, grace and truth came by Jesus Christ." Consequently the Old Law was good indeed, but imperfect, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p7.4" href="./asv.html#Heb.7.19" target="asv"> Heb. 7:19</a>: "The law brought nothing to perfection." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 1 co."><a name="37749" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37749] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod absque omni dubio lex vetus bona fuit. Sicut enim +doctrina ostenditur esse vera ex hoc quod consonat rationi rectae, +ita etiam lex aliqua ostenditur esse bona ex eo quod consonat +rationi. Lex autem vetus rationi consonabat. Quia concupiscentiam +reprimebat, quae rationi adversatur; ut patet in illo mandato, non +concupisces rem proximi tui, quod ponitur Exod. XX. Ipsa etiam +omnia peccata prohibebat, quae sunt contra rationem. Unde +manifestum est quod bona erat. Et haec est ratio apostoli, Rom. +VII, condelector, inquit, legi Dei secundum interiorem hominem; et +iterum, consentio legi, quoniam bona est. Sed notandum est quod +bonum diversos gradus habet, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. +Nom., est enim aliquod bonum perfectum, et aliquod bonum +imperfectum. Perfecta quidem bonitas est, in his quae ad finem +ordinantur, quando aliquid est tale quod per se sufficiens est +inducere ad finem, imperfectum autem bonum est quod operatur +aliquid ad hoc quod perveniatur ad finem, non tamen sufficit ad hoc +quod ad finem perducat. Sicut medicina perfecte bona est quae +hominem sanat, imperfecta autem est quae hominem adiuvat, sed tamen +sanare non potest. Est autem sciendum quod est alius finis legis +humanae, et alius legis divinae. Legis enim humanae finis est +temporalis tranquillitas civitatis, ad quem finem pervenit lex +cohibendo exteriores actus, quantum ad illa mala quae possunt +perturbare pacificum statum civitatis. Finis autem legis divinae +est perducere hominem ad finem felicitatis aeternae; qui quidem +finis impeditur per quodcumque peccatum, et non solum per actus +exteriores, sed etiam per interiores. Et ideo illud quod sufficit +ad perfectionem legis humanae, ut scilicet peccata prohibeat et +poenam apponat, non sufficit ad perfectionem legis divinae, sed +oportet quod hominem totaliter faciat idoneum ad participationem +felicitatis aeternae. Quod quidem fieri non potest nisi per gratiam +spiritus sancti, per quam diffunditur caritas in cordibus nostris, +quae legem adimplet, gratia enim Dei vita aeterna, ut dicitur Rom. +VI. Hanc autem gratiam lex vetus conferre non potuit, reservabatur +enim hoc Christo, quia, ut dicitur Ioan. I, <i>lex per Moysen data +est; gratia et veritas per Iesum Christum facta est</i>. Et inde +est quod lex vetus bona quidem est, sed imperfecta; secundum illud +Heb. VII, <i>nihil ad perfectum adduxit lex</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Lord refers there to the ceremonial precepts; which are said not to be good, because they did not confer grace unto the + remission of sins, although by fulfilling these precepts man confessed himself a sinner. Hence it is said pointedly, "and + judgments in which they shall not live"; i.e. whereby they are unable to obtain life; and so the text goes on: "And I polluted + them," i.e. showed them to be polluted, "in their own gifts, when they offered all + that opened the womb, for their offenses." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37750" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37750] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod dominus loquitur ibi de praeceptis +caeremonialibus; quae quidem dicuntur non bona, quia gratiam non +conferebant, per quam homines a peccato mundarentur, cum tamen per +huiusmodi se peccatores ostenderent. Unde signanter dicitur, et +iudicia in quibus non vivent, idest per quae vitam gratiae obtinere +non possunt; et postea subditur, et pollui eos in muneribus suis, +idest pollutos ostendi, <i>cum offerrent omne quod aperit vulvam, +propter delicta sua</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The law is said to have been deadly, as being not the cause, but the occasion of death, on account of its imperfection: in + so far as it did not confer grace enabling man to fulfil what is prescribed, and to avoid what it forbade. Hence this occasion + was not given to men, but taken by them. Wherefore the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.11" target="asv">Rom. 5:11</a>): "Sin, taking occasion by the commandment, seduced me, and by it killed me." In the same sense when it is + said that "the law entered in that sin might abound," the conjunction "that" must be taken as consecutive and not final: in + so far as men, taking occasion from the law, sinned all the more, both because a sin became more grievous after law had forbidden + it, and because concupiscence increased, since we desire a thing the more from its being forbidden. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37751" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37751] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod lex dicitur occidisse, non quidem effective, sed +occasionaliter, ex sua imperfectione, inquantum scilicet gratiam +non conferebat, per quam homines implere possent quod mandabat, vel +vitare quod vetabat. Et sic occasio ista non erat data, sed sumpta +ab hominibus. Unde et apostolus ibidem dicit, <i>occasione accepta +peccatum per mandatum seduxit me, et per illud occidit</i>. Et ex +hac etiam ratione dicitur quod lex subintravit ut abundaret +delictum, ut ly ut teneatur consecutive, non causaliter, inquantum +scilicet homines, accipientes occasionem a lege, abundantius +peccaverunt; tum quia gravius fuit peccatum post legis +prohibitionem; tum etiam quia concupiscentia crevit, magis enim +concupiscimus quod nobis prohibetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The yoke of the law could not be borne without the help of grace, which the law did not confer: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.16" target="asv">Rom. 9:16</a>): "It is not him that willeth, nor of him that runneth," viz. that he wills and runs in the commandments of God, "but of + God that showeth mercy." Wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.32" target="asv">Ps. 118:32</a>): "I have run the way of Thy commandments, when Thou didst enlarge my heart," i.e. by giving me grace and + charity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37752" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37752] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod iugum legis servari non poterat sine gratia +adiuvante, quam lex non dabat, dicitur enim Rom. IX, <i>non est +volentis neque currentis</i>, scilicet velle et currere in +praeceptis Dei, sed miserentis Dei. Unde et in Psalmo CXVIII +dicitur, <i>viam mandatorum tuorum cucurri, cum dilatasti cor +meum</i>, scilicet per donum gratiae et caritatis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q98_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q98_A2-p0.1">Q. 98. A. 2. Whether the Old Law was from God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Old Law was not from God. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.32.4" target="asv">Dt. 32:4</a>): "The works of God are perfect." But the Law was imperfect, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q98_A1" id="FS_Q98_A2-p2.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore the Old Law was not from God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37753" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37753] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex vetus non fuerit a Deo. Dicitur +enim Deut. XXXII, <i>Dei perfecta sunt opera</i>. Sed lex fuit +imperfecta, ut supra dictum est. Ergo lex vetus non fuit a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.3.14" target="asv">Eccles. 3:14</a>): "I have learned that all the works which God hath made continue for ever." But the Old Law does not continue for ever: + since the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.7.18" target="asv">Heb. 7:18</a>): "There is indeed a setting aside of the former commandment, because of the weakness and unprofitableness thereof." Therefore + the Old Law was not from God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37754" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37754] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Eccle. III dicitur, <i>didici quod omnia opera quae fecit Deus, +perseverent in aeternum</i>. Sed lex vetus non perseverat in +aeternum, dicit enim apostolus, ad Heb. VII, <i>reprobatio fit +quidem praecedentis mandati, propter infirmitatem eius et +inutilitatem</i>. Ergo lex vetus non fuit a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a wise lawgiver should remove, not only evil, but also the occasions of evil. But the Old Law was an occasion of + sin, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). Therefore the giving of such a law does not pertain to God, to Whom "none is like among + the lawgivers" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.36.22" target="asv">Job 36:22</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37755" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37755] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +ad sapientem legislatorem pertinet non solum mala auferre, sed +etiam occasiones malorum. Sed vetus lex fuit occasio peccati, ut +supra dictum est. Ergo ad Deum, cui nullus est similis in +legislatoribus, ut dicitur Iob XXXVI, non pertinebat legem talem +dare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:4</a>) that God "will have all men to be saved." But the Old Law did not suffice to save man, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q98_A1" id="FS_Q98_A2-p5.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore the giving of such a law did not appertain to God. Therefore the Old Law was not from God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="37756" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37756] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +I ad Tim. II, dicitur quod <i>Deus vult omnes homines salvos +fieri</i>. Sed lex vetus non sufficiebat ad salutem hominum, ut +supra dictum est. Ergo ad Deum non pertinebat talem legem dare. Lex +ergo vetus non est a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.6" target="asv">Mat. 15:6</a>) while speaking to the Jews, to whom the Law was given: "You have made void the commandment of God for your tradition." And + shortly before (verse 4) He had said: "Honor thy father and mother," which is contained expressly in the Old Law ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.12" target="asv">Ex. 20:12</a>; + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.5.16" target="asv"> Dt. 5:16</a>). Therefore the Old Law was from God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37757" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37757] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dominus dicit, Matth. XV, loquens Iudaeis, quibus erat lex +vetus data, <i>irritum fecistis mandatum Dei propter traditiones +vestras</i>. Et paulo ante praemittitur, <i>honora patrem tuum et +matrem tuam</i>, quod manifeste in lege veteri continetur. Ergo lex +vetus est a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The Old Law was given by the good God, Who is the Father of Our Lord Jesus Christ. For the Old Law ordained men to Christ + in two ways. First by bearing witness to Christ; wherefore He Himself says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.24.44" target="asv">Lk. 24:44</a>): "All things must needs be fulfilled, which are written in the law . . . and in the prophets, and in the psalms, concerning + Me": and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#John.5.46" target="asv">Jn. 5:46</a>): "If you did believe Moses, you would perhaps believe Me also; for he wrote of Me." Secondly, as a kind of + disposition, since by withdrawing men from idolatrous worship, it enclosed [concludebat] them in the worship of one God, by + Whom the human race was to be saved through Christ. Wherefore the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.23" target="asv">Gal. 3:23</a>): "Before the faith came, we were kept under the law shut up [conclusi], unto that faith which was to be revealed." Now it + is evident that the same thing it is, which gives a disposition to the end, and which brings to the end; and when I say "the + same," I mean + that it does so either by itself or through its subjects. For the devil would not make a law whereby men would be led to Christ, + Who was to cast him out, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p7.4" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.26" target="asv"> Mat. 12:26</a>: "If Satan cast out Satan, his kingdom is divided" [Vulg.: 'he is divided against himself']. Therefore the Old Law was given + by the same God, from Whom came salvation to man, through the grace of Christ. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 2 co."><a name="37758" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37758] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod lex vetus a bono Deo data est, qui est pater domini +nostri Iesu Christi. Lex enim vetus homines ordinabat ad Christum +dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, testimonium Christo perhibendo, unde +ipse dicit, Lucae ult., <i>oportet impleri omnia quae scripta sunt +in lege et Psalmis et prophetis de me</i>; et Ioan. V, <i>si +crederetis Moysi, crederetis forsitan et mihi, de me enim ille +scripsit</i>. Alio modo, per modum cuiusdam dispositionis, dum, +retrahens homines a cultu idololatriae, concludebat eos sub cultu +unius Dei, a quo salvandum erat humanum genus per Christum, unde +apostolus dicit, ad Gal. III, <i>priusquam veniret fides, sub lege +custodiebamur conclusi in eam fidem quae revelanda erat</i>. +Manifestum est autem quod eiusdem est disponere ad finem et ad +finem perducere, et dico eiusdem per se vel per suos subiectos. Non +enim Diabolus legem tulisset per quam homines adducerentur ad +Christum, per quem erat eiiciendus; secundum illud Matth. XII, +<i>si Satanas Satanam eiicit, divisum est regnum eius</i>. Et ideo +ab eodem Deo a quo facta est salus hominum per gratiam Christi, lex +vetus data est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nothing prevents a thing being not perfect simply, and yet perfect in respect of time: thus a boy is said to be perfect, + not simply, but with regard to the condition of time. So, too, precepts that are given to children are perfect in comparison + with the condition of those to whom they are given, although they are not perfect simply. Hence the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.24" target="asv">Gal. 3:24</a>): "The law was our pedagogue in Christ." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37759" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37759] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquid non esse perfectum +simpliciter, quod tamen est perfectum secundum tempus, sicut +dicitur aliquis puer perfectus non simpliciter, sed secundum +temporis conditionem. Ita etiam praecepta quae pueris dantur, sunt +quidem perfecta secundum conditionem eorum quibus dantur, etsi non +sint perfecta simpliciter. Et talia fuerunt praecepta legis. Unde +apostolus dicit, ad Gal. III, <i>lex paedagogus noster fuit in +Christo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those works of God endure for ever which God so made that they would endure for ever; and these are His perfect works. But + the Old Law was set aside when there came the perfection of grace; not as though it were evil, but as being weak and useless + for this time; because, as the Apostle goes on to say, "the law brought nothing to perfection": hence he says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.25" target="asv">Gal. 3:25</a>): "After the faith is come, we are no longer under a + pedagogue." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37760" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37760] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod opera Dei perseverant in aeternum, quae sic Deus +fecit ut in aeternum perseverent, et haec sunt ea quae sunt +perfecta. Lex autem vetus reprobatur tempore perfectionis gratiae, +non tanquam mala, sed tanquam infirma et inutilis pro isto tempore, +quia, ut subditur, nihil ad perfectum adduxit lex. Unde ad Gal. +III, dicit apostolus, <i>ubi venit fides, iam non sumus sub +paedagogo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above ( + <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q79_A4" id="FS_Q98_A2-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[79], A[4]</a>), God sometimes permits certain ones to fall into sin, that they may thereby be humbled. So also did He wish to give such + a law as men by their own forces could not fulfill, so that, while presuming on their own powers, they might find themselves + to be sinners, and being humbled might have recourse to the help of grace. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37761" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37761] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, Deus aliquando permittit +aliquos cadere in peccatum, ut exinde humilientur. Ita etiam voluit +talem legem dare quam suis viribus homines implere non possent, ut +sic dum homines de se praesumentes peccatores se invenirent, +humiliati recurrerent ad auxilium gratiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although the Old Law did not suffice to save man, yet another help from God besides the Law was available for man, viz. faith + in the Mediator, by which the fathers of old were justified even as we were. Accordingly God did not fail man by giving him + insufficient aids to salvation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="37762" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37762] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, quamvis lex vetus non sufficeret ad salvandum +hominem, tamen aderat aliud auxilium a Deo hominibus simul cum +lege, per quod salvari poterant, scilicet fides mediatoris, per +quam iustificati sunt antiqui patres, sicut etiam nos iustificamur. +Et sic Deus non deficiebat hominibus quin daret eis salutis +auxilia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q98_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q98_A3-p0.1">Q. 98. A. 3. Whether the Old Law was given through the angels?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the Old Law was not given through the angels, but immediately by God. For an angel means a "messenger"; so + that the word "angel" denotes ministry, not lordship, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.102.20" target="asv"> Ps. 102:20,21</a>: "Bless the Lord, all ye His Angels . . . you ministers of His." But the Old Law is related to have been given by the Lord: + for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.1" target="asv">Ex. 20:1</a>): "And the Lord spoke . . . these words," and further on: "I am the Lord Thy God." + Moreover the same expression is often repeated in Exodus, and the later books of the Law. Therefore the Law was given by God + immediately. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37763" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37763] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex vetus non fuerit data per Angelos, +sed immediate a Deo. Angelus enim nuntius dicitur, et sic nomen +Angeli ministerium importat, non dominium; secundum illud Psalmi +CII, <i>benedicite domino, omnes Angeli eius, ministri eius</i>. +Sed vetus lex a domino tradita esse perhibetur, dicitur enim Exod. +XX, <i>locutusque est dominus sermones hos</i>, et postea subditur, +<i>ego enim sum dominus Deus tuus</i>. Et idem modus loquendi +frequenter repetitur in Exodo, et in libris consequentibus legis. +Ergo lex est immediate data a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.17" target="asv"> Jn. 1:17, </a> "the Law was given by Moses." But Moses received it from God immediately: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A3-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.33.11" target="asv">Ex. 33:11</a>): "The Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a man is wont to speak to his friend." Therefore the Old Law was given by God + immediately. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37764" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37764] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut dicitur Ioan. I, lex per Moysen data est. Sed Moyses +immediate accepit a Deo, dicitur enim Exod. XXXIII, <i>loquebatur +dominus ad Moysen facie ad faciem, sicut loqui solet homo ad amicum +suum</i>. Ergo lex vetus immediate data est a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it belongs to the sovereign alone to make a law, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A3" id="FS_Q98_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[90], A[3]</a>). But God alone is Sovereign as regards the salvation of souls: while the angels are the "ministering spirits," as stated + in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.14" target="asv"> Heb. 1:14.</a> Therefore it was not meet for the Law to be given through the angels, since it is ordained to the salvation of souls. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37765" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37765] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +ad solum principem pertinet legem ferre, ut supra dictum est. Sed +solus Deus est princeps salutis animarum, <i>Angeli vero sunt +administratorii spiritus</i>, ut dicitur ad Heb. I. Ergo lex vetus +per Angelos dari non debuit, cum ordinaretur ad animarum +salutem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.19" target="asv">Gal. 3:19</a>) that the Law was "given [Vulg.: 'ordained'] by angels in the hand of a Mediator." And Stephen said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Acts.7.53" target="asv">Acts 7:53</a>): "(Who) have received the Law by the disposition of angels." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37766" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37766] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicit apostolus, ad Gal. III, <i>lex data est per Angelos +in manu mediatoris</i>. Et Act. VII, dicit Stephanus, <i>accepistis +legem in dispositione Angelorum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The Law was given by God through the angels. And besides the general reason given by Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv), viz. that + "the gifts of God should be brought to men by means of the angels," there is a special reason why the Old Law should have + been given through them. For it has been stated ( + <a href="#FS_Q98_A1" id="FS_Q98_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2) that the Old Law was imperfect, and yet disposed man to that perfect salvation of the human race, which was to come through + Christ. + Now it is to be observed that wherever there is an order of powers or arts, he that holds the highest place, himself exercises + the principal and perfect acts; while those things which dispose to the ultimate perfection are effected by him through his + subordinates: thus the ship-builder himself rivets the planks together, but prepares the material by means of the workmen + who assist him under his direction. Consequently it was fitting that the perfect law of the New Testament should be given + by + the incarnate God immediately; but that the Old Law should be given to men by the ministers of God, i.e. by the angels. It + is thus that the Apostle at the beginning of his epistle to the Hebrews (1:2) proves the excellence of the New Law over the + Old; because in the New Testament "God . . . hath spoken to us by His Son," whereas in the Old Testament "the word was spoken + by angels" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.2.2" target="asv">Heb. 2:2</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 3 co."><a name="37767" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37767] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod lex data est a Deo per Angelos. Et praeter generalem +rationem, quam Dionysius assignat, in IV cap. Cael. Hier., quod +<i>divina debent deferri ad homines mediantibus Angelis</i>, +specialis ratio est quare legem veterem per Angelos dari oportuit. +Dictum est enim quod lex vetus imperfecta erat, sed disponebat ad +salutem perfectam generis humani, quae futura erat per Christum. +Sic autem videtur in omnibus potestatibus et artibus ordinatis, +quod ille qui est superior, principalem et perfectum actum operatur +per seipsum; ea vero quae disponunt ad perfectionem ultimam, +operatur per suos ministros; sicut navifactor compaginat navem per +seipsum, sed praeparat materiam per artifices subministrantes. Et +ideo conveniens fuit ut lex perfecta novi testamenti daretur +immediate per ipsum Deum hominem factum; lex autem vetus per +ministros Dei, scilicet per Angelos, daretur hominibus. Et per hunc +modum apostolus, in principio ad Heb., probat eminentiam novae +legis ad veterem, quia in novo testamento locutus est nobis Deus in +filio suo, in veteri autem testamento est sermo factus per +Angelos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Gregory says at the beginning of his Morals (Praef. chap. i), "the angel who is described to have appeared to Moses, is + sometimes mentioned as an angel, sometimes as the Lord: an angel, in truth, in respect of that which was subservient to the + external delivery; and the Lord, because He was the Director within, Who supported the effectual power of speaking." Hence + also it is that the angel spoke as personating the Lord. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37768" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37768] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut Gregorius dicit, in principio Moral., +<i>Angelus qui Moysi apparuisse describitur, modo Angelus, modo +dominus memoratur. Angelus videlicet, propter hoc quod exterius +loquendo serviebat; dominus autem dicitur, quia interius praesidens +loquendi efficaciam ministrabat</i>. Et inde est etiam quod quasi +ex persona domini Angelus loquebatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27), it is stated in Exodus that "the Lord spoke to Moses face to face"; and shortly + afterwards we read, "Show me Thy glory. Therefore He perceived what he saw and he desired what he saw not." Hence he did not + see the very Essence of God; and consequently he was not taught by Him immediately. Accordingly when Scripture states that + "He spoke to him face to face," this is to be understood as expressing the opinion of + the people, who thought that Moses was speaking with God mouth to mouth, when God spoke and appeared to him, by means of a + subordinate creature, i.e. an angel and a cloud. Again we may say that this vision "face to face" means some kind of sublime + and familiar contemplation, inferior to the vision of the Divine Essence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37769" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37769] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., in +Exodo dicitur, <i>locutus est dominus Moysi facie ad faciem</i>; et +paulo post subditur, <i>ostende mihi gloriam tuam. Sentiebat ergo +quid videbat; et quod non videbat, desiderabat</i>. Non ergo +videbat ipsam Dei essentiam, et ita non immediate ab eo +instruebatur. Quod ergo dicitur quod loquebatur ei facie ad faciem, +secundum opinionem populi loquitur Scriptura, qui putabat Moysen +ore ad os loqui cum Deo, cum per subiectam creaturam, idest per +Angelum et nubem, ei loqueretur et appareret. Vel per visionem +faciei intelligitur quaedam eminens contemplatio et familiaris, +infra essentiae divinae visionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is for the sovereign alone to make a law by his own authority; but sometimes after making a law, he promulgates it through + others. Thus God made the Law by His own authority, but He promulgated it through the angels. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37770" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37770] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod solius principis est sua auctoritate legem +instituere, sed quandoque legem institutam per alios promulgat. Et +ita Deus sua auctoritate instituit legem, sed per Angelos +promulgavit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q98_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q98_A4-p0.1">Q. 98. A. 4. Whether the Old Law should have been given to the Jews alone?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Old Law should not have been given to the Jews alone. For the Old Law disposed men for the salvation + which was to come through Christ, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q98_A2" id="FS_Q98_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,3). But that salvation was to come not to the Jews alone but to all nations, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.49.6" target="asv"> Is. 49:6</a>: "It is a small thing that thou shouldst be my servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to convert the dregs of Israel. + Behold I have + given thee to be the light of the Gentiles, that thou mayest be My salvation, even to the farthest part of the earth." Therefore + the Old Law should have been given to all nations, and not to one people only. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37771" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37771] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex vetus non debuerit dari soli +populo Iudaeorum. Lex enim vetus disponebat ad salutem quae futura +erat per Christum, ut dictum est. Sed salus illa non erat futura +solum in Iudaeis, sed in omnibus gentibus; secundum illud Isaiae +XLIX, <i>parum est ut sis mihi servus ad suscitandas tribus Iacob +et faeces Israel convertendas, dedi te in lucem gentium, ut sis +salus mea usque ad extremum terrae</i>. Ergo lex vetus dari debuit +omnibus gentibus, et non uni populo tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.10.34" target="asv"> Acts 10:34,35, </a> "God is not a respecter of persons: but in every nation, he that feareth Him, and worketh justice, is acceptable to Him." + Therefore the way of salvation should not have been opened to one people more than to another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37772" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37772] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut dicitur Act. X, <i>non est personarum acceptor Deus, sed in +omni gente qui timet Deum et facit iustitiam, acceptus est +illi</i>. Non ergo magis uni populo quam aliis viam salutis debuit +aperire.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the law was given through the angels, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q98_A3" id="FS_Q98_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. But God always vouchsafed the ministrations of the angels not to the Jews alone, but to all nations: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.17.14" target="asv">Ecclus. 17:14</a>): "Over every nation He set a ruler." Also on all nations He bestows temporal goods, which are of less account with God than + spiritual goods. Therefore He should have given the Law also to all peoples. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37773" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37773] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex data est per Angelos, sicut iam dictum est. Sed ministeria +Angelorum Deus non solum Iudaeis, sed omnibus gentibus semper +exhibuit, dicitur enim Eccli. XVII, <i>in unamquamque gentem +praeposuit rectorem</i>. Omnibus etiam gentibus temporalia bona +largitur, quae minus sunt curae Deo quam spiritualia bona. Ergo +etiam legem omnibus populis dare debuit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.1" target="asv">Rom. 3:1,2</a>): "What advantage then hath the Jew? . . . Much every way. First indeed, because the words of God were committed to them": + and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.147.9" target="asv">Ps. 147:9</a>): "He hath not done in like manner to every nation: and His judgments He hath not made manifest unto them." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37774" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37774] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Rom. III, <i>quid ergo amplius est Iudaeo? Multum +quidem per omnem modum. Primum quidem, quia credita sunt illis +eloquia Dei</i>. Et in Psalmo CXLVII dicitur, <i>non fecit taliter +omni nationi, et iudicia sua non manifestavit eis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q98_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It might be assigned as a reason for the Law being given to the Jews rather than to other peoples, that the Jewish people + alone remained faithful to the worship of one God, while the others turned away to idolatry; wherefore the latter were unworthy + to receive the Law, lest a holy thing should be given to dogs. + </p><p id="FS_Q98_A4-p7"> But this reason does not seem fitting: because that people turned to idolatry, even after the Law had been made, which was + more grievous, as is clear from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.32" target="asv">Ex. 32</a> and from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Amos.5.25" target="asv"> Amos 5:25,26</a>: "Did you offer victims and sacrifices to Me in the desert for forty years, O house of Israel? But you carried a tabernacle + for your Moloch, and the image of your idols, the star of your god, which you made to yourselves." Moreover it is stated expressly + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.9.6" target="asv">Dt. + 9:6 + </a>): "Know therefore that the Lord thy God giveth thee not this excellent land in possession for thy justices, for thou art + a very stiff-necked people": but the real reason is given in the preceding verse: "That the Lord might accomplish His word, + which He promised by oath to thy fathers Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob." + </p><p id="FS_Q98_A4-p8"> What this promise was is shown by the Apostle, who says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.16" target="asv">Gal. 3:16</a>) that "to Abraham were the promises made and to his seed. He saith not, 'And to his seeds,' as of many: but as of one, 'And + to thy seed,' which is Christ." And so God vouchsafed both the Law and other special boons to that people, on account of the + promised made to their fathers that Christ should be born of them. For it was fitting that the people, of whom Christ was + to be born, should be + signalized by a special sanctification, according to the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.2" target="asv"> Lev. 19:2</a>: "Be ye holy, because I . . . am holy." Nor again was it on account of the merit of Abraham himself that this promise was + made to him, viz. that Christ should be born of his seed: but of gratuitous election and vocation. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Isa.41.2" target="asv">Is. 41:2</a>): "Who hath raised up the just one form the east, hath called him to follow him?" + </p><p id="FS_Q98_A4-p9"> It is therefore evident that it was merely from gratuitous election that the patriarchs received the promise, and that the + people sprung from them received the law; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.4.36" target="asv"> Dt. 4:36, 37</a>: "Ye did [Vulg.: 'Thou didst'] hear His words out of the midst of the fire, because He loved thy fathers, and chose their + seed after them." And if again it asked why He chose this people, and not another, that Christ might be born thereof; a fitting + answer is given by + Augustine (Tract. super Joan. xxvi): "Why He draweth one and draweth not another, seek not thou to judge, if thou wish not + to err." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 4 co."><a name="37775" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37775] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod posset una ratio assignari quare potius populo +Iudaeorum data sit lex quam aliis populis, quia, aliis ad +idololatriam declinantibus, solus populus Iudaeorum in cultu unius +Dei remansit; et ideo alii populi indigni erant legem recipere, ne +sanctum canibus daretur. Sed ista ratio conveniens non videtur, +quia populus ille etiam post legem latam, ad idololatriam +declinavit, quod gravius fuit, ut patet Exod. XXXII; et Amos V, +<i>numquid hostias et sacrificium obtulistis mihi in deserto +quadraginta annis, domus Israel? Et portastis tabernaculum Moloch +vestro, et imaginem idolorum vestrorum, sidus Dei vestri, quae +fecistis vobis</i>. Expresse etiam dicitur Deut. IX, <i>scito quod +non propter iustitias tuas dominus Deus tuus dedit tibi terram hanc +in possessionem, cum durissimae cervici sis populus</i>. Sed ratio +ibi praemittitur, <i>ut compleret verbum suum dominus, quod sub +iuramento pollicitus est patribus tuis, Abraham, Isaac et +Iacob</i>. Quae autem promissio eis sit facta, ostendit apostolus, +ad Galat. III, dicens, <i>Abrahae dictae sunt promissiones, et +semini eius. Non dicit, seminibus, quasi in multis, sed quasi in +uno, et semini tuo, qui est Christus</i>. Deus igitur et legem et +alia beneficia specialia illi populo exhibuit propter promissionem +eorum patribus factam ut ex eis Christus nasceretur. Decebat enim +ut ille populus ex quo Christus nasciturus erat, quadam speciali +sanctificatione polleret; secundum illud quod dicitur Levit. XIX, +<i>sancti eritis, quia ego sanctus sum</i>. Nec etiam fuit propter +meritum ipsius Abrahae ut talis promissio ei fieret, ut scilicet +Christus ex eius semine nasceretur, sed ex gratuita electione et +vocatione. Unde dicitur Isaiae XLI, <i>quis suscitavit ab oriente +iustum, vocavit eum ut sequeretur se?</i> Sic ergo patet quod ex +sola gratuita electione patres promissionem acceperunt, et populus +ex eis progenitus legem accepit; secundum illud Deut. IV, +<i>audistis verba illius de medio ignis, quia dilexit patres, et +elegit semen eorum post illos</i>. Si autem rursus quaeratur quare +hunc populum elegit ut ex eo Christus nasceretur, et non alium, +conveniet responsio Augustini, quam dicit super Ioan., <i>quare +hunc trahat et illum non trahat, noli velle diiudicare, si non vis +errare</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the salvation, which was to come through Christ, was prepared for all nations, yet it was necessary that Christ + should be born of one people, which, for this reason, was privileged above other peoples; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.4" target="asv"> Rom. 9:4</a>: "To whom," namely the Jews, "belongeth the adoption as of children (of God) . . . and the testament, and the giving of the + Law . . . whose are the fathers, and of whom is Christ according to the + flesh." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37776" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37776] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, quamvis salus futura per Christum, esset +omnibus gentibus praeparata; tamen oportebat ex uno populo Christum +nasci, qui propter hoc prae aliis praerogativas habuit; secundum +illud Rom. IX, quorum, scilicet Iudaeorum, <i>est adoptio filiorum +Dei, et testamentum et legislatio; quorum patres; ex quibus +Christus est secundum carnem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Respect of persons takes place in those things which are given according to due; but it has no place in those things which + are bestowed gratuitously. Because he who, out of generosity, gives of his own to one and not to another, is not a respecter + of persons: but if he were a dispenser of goods held in common, and were not to distribute them according to personal merits, + he would be a respecter of persons. Now God bestows the benefits of salvation on + the human race gratuitously: wherefore He is not a respecter of persons, if He gives them to some rather than to others. Hence + Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. viii): "All whom God teaches, he teaches out of pity; but whom He teaches not, out of + justice He teaches not": for this is due to the condemnation of the human race for the sin of the first parent. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37777" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37777] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod acceptio personarum locum habet in his quae ex debito +dantur, in his vero quae ex gratuita voluntate conferuntur, +acceptio personarum locum non habet. Non enim est personarum +acceptor qui ex liberalitate de suo dat uni et non alteri, sed si +esset dispensator bonorum communium, et non distribueret aequaliter +secundum merita personarum, esset personarum acceptor. Salutaria +autem beneficia Deus humano generi confert ex sua gratia. Unde non +est personarum acceptor si quibusdam prae aliis conferat. Unde +Augustinus dicit, in libro de Praedest. Sanct., <i>omnes quos Deus +docet, misericordia docet, quos autem non docet, iudicio non +docet</i>. Hoc enim venit ex damnatione humani generis pro peccato +primi parentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The benefits of grace are forfeited by man on account of sin: but not the benefits of nature. Among the latter are the ministries + of the angels, which the very order of various natures demands, viz. that the lowest beings be governed through the intermediate + beings: and also bodily aids, which God vouchsafes not only to men, but also to beasts, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.35.7" target="asv"> Ps. 35:7</a>: "Men and beasts Thou wilt preserve, O Lord." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37778" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37778] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod beneficia gratiae subtrahuntur homini propter culpam, +sed beneficia naturalia non subtrahuntur. Inter quae sunt +ministeria Angelorum, quae ipse naturarum ordo requirit, ut +scilicet per media gubernentur infima; et etiam corporalia +subsidia, quae non solum hominibus, sed etiam iumentis Deus +administrat, secundum illud Psalmi XXXV, <i>homines et iumenta +salvabis, domine</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q98_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q98_A5-p0.1">Q. 98. A. 5. Whether all men were bound to observe the Old Law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all men were bound to observe the Old Law. Because whoever is subject to the king, must needs be subject + to his law. But the Old Law was given by God, Who is "King of all the earth" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.46.8" target="asv">Ps. 46:8</a>). Therefore all the inhabitants of the earth were bound to observe the Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="37779" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37779] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnes homines obligarentur ad +observandam veterem legem. Quicumque enim subditur regi, oportet +quod subdatur legi ipsius. Sed vetus lex est data a Deo, qui est +rex omnis terrae, ut in Psalmo XLVI dicitur. Ergo omnes habitantes +terram tenebantur ad observantiam legis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Jews could not be saved without observing the Old Law: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.27.26" target="asv">Dt. 27:26</a>): "Cursed be he that abideth not in the words of this law, and fulfilleth them not in work." If therefore other men could + be saved without the observance of the Old Law, the Jews would be in a worse plight than other men. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="37780" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37780] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Iudaei salvari non poterant nisi legem veterem observarent, dicitur +enim Deut. XXVII, <i>maledictus qui non permanet in sermonibus +legis huius, nec eos opere perficit</i>. Si igitur alii homines +sine observantia legis veteris potuissent salvari, peior fuisset +conditio Iudaeorum quam aliorum hominum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Gentiles were admitted to the Jewish ritual and to the observances of the Law: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.12.48" target="asv">Ex. 12:48</a>): "If any stranger be willing to dwell among you, and to keep the Phase of the Lord, all his males shall first be circumcised, + and then shall he celebrate it according to the manner; and he shall be as he that is born in the land." But it would have + been useless to admit strangers to the legal observances according to + Divine ordinance, if they could have been saved without the observance of the Law. Therefore none could be saved without observing + the Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="37781" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37781] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +gentiles ad ritum Iudaicum et ad observantias legis admittebantur, +dicitur enim Exod. XII, <i>si quis peregrinorum in vestram voluerit +transire coloniam, et facere phase domini, circumcidetur prius omne +masculinum eius, et tunc rite celebrabit, eritque simul sicut +indigena terrae</i>. Frustra autem ad observantias legales fuissent +extranei admissi ex ordinatione divina, si absque legalibus +observantiis salvari potuissent. Ergo nullus salvari poterat nisi +legem observaret.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix) that many of the Gentiles were brought back to God by the angels. But it is clear that the + Gentiles did not observe the Law. Therefore some could be saved without observing the Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 5 s. c."><a name="37782" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37782] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Dionysius dicit, IX cap. Cael. Hier., quod multi gentilium +per Angelos sunt reducti in Deum. Sed constat quod gentiles legem +non observabant. Ergo absque observantia legis poterant aliqui +salvari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q98_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The Old Law showed forth the precepts of the natural law, and added certain precepts of its own. Accordingly, as to those + precepts of the natural law contained in the Old Law, all were bound to observe the Old Law; not because they belonged to + the Old Law, but because they belonged to the natural law. But as to those precepts which were added by the Old Law, they + were not binding on save the Jewish people alone. + </p><p id="FS_Q98_A5-p7"> The reason of this is because the Old Law, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q98_A4" id="FS_Q98_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, was given to the Jewish people, that it might receive a prerogative of holiness, in reverence for Christ Who was to be born + of that people. Now whatever laws are enacted for the special sanctification of certain ones, are binding on them alone: thus + clerics who are set aside for the service of God are bound to certain obligations to which the laity are not bound; likewise + religious are + bound by their profession to certain works of perfection, to which people living in the world are not bound. In like manner + this people was bound to certain special observances, to which other peoples were not bound. Wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A5-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.18.13" target="asv">Dt. 18:13</a>): "Thou shalt be perfect and without spot before the Lord thy God": and for this reason they used a kind of form of profession, + as appears from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A5-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.26.3" target="asv"> Dt. 26:3</a>: "I profess this day before the Lord thy God," + etc. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 5 co."><a name="37783" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37783] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod lex vetus manifestabat praecepta legis naturae, et +superaddebat quaedam propria praecepta. Quantum igitur ad illa quae +lex vetus continebat de lege naturae, omnes tenebantur ad +observantiam veteris legis, non quia erant de veteri lege, sed quia +erant de lege naturae. Sed quantum ad illa quae lex vetus +superaddebat, non tenebantur aliqui ad observantiam veteris legis +nisi solus populus Iudaeorum. Cuius ratio est quia lex vetus, sicut +dictum est, data est populo Iudaeorum ut quandam praerogativam +sanctitatis obtineret, propter reverentiam Christi, qui ex illo +populo nasciturus erat. Quaecumque autem statuuntur ad specialem +aliquorum sanctificationem, non obligant nisi illos, sicut ad +quaedam obligantur clerici, qui mancipantur divino ministerio, ad +quae laici non obligantur; similiter et religiosi ad quaedam +perfectionis opera obligantur ex sua professione, ad quae +saeculares non obligantur. Et similiter ad quaedam specialia +obligabatur populus ille, ad quae alii populi non obligabantur. +Unde dicitur Deut. XVIII, <i>perfectus eris, et absque macula, cum +domino Deo tuo</i>. Et propter hoc etiam quadam professione +utebantur; ut patet Deut. XXVI, <i>profiteor hodie coram domino Deo +tuo</i> et cetera.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Whoever are subject to a king, are bound to observe his law which he makes for all in general. But if he orders certain things + to be observed by the servants of his household, others are not bound thereto. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="37784" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37784] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod quicumque subduntur regi, obligantur ad legem +eius observandam quam omnibus communiter proponit. Sed si instituat +aliqua observanda a suis familiaribus ministris, ad haec ceteri non +obligantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The more a man is united to God, the better his state becomes: wherefore the more the Jewish people were bound to the worship + of God, the greater their excellence over other peoples. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.4.8" target="asv">Dt. 4:8</a>): "What other nation is there so renowned that hath ceremonies and just judgments, and all the law?" In like manner, from + this point of view, the state of clerics is better than that of the laity, and the state of + religious than that of folk living in the world. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="37785" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37785] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod homo quanto Deo magis coniungitur, tanto efficitur +melioris conditionis. Et ideo quanto populus Iudaeorum erat +adstrictus magis ad divinum cultum, dignior aliis populis erat. +Unde dicitur Deut. IV, <i>quae est alia gens sic inclyta, ut habeat +caeremonias, iustaque iudicia, et universam legem?</i> Et similiter +etiam quantum ad hoc sunt melioris conditionis clerici quam laici, +et religiosi quam saeculares.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Gentiles obtained salvation more perfectly and more securely under the observances of the Law than under the mere natural + law: and for this reason they were admitted to them. So too the laity are now admitted to the ranks of the clergy, and secular + persons to those of the religious, although they can be saved without this. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="37786" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37786] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod gentiles perfectius et securius salutem +consequebantur sub observantiis legis quam sub sola lege naturali, +et ideo ad eas admittebantur. Sicut etiam nunc laici transeunt ad +clericatum, et saeculares ad religionem, quamvis absque hoc possint +salvari.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q98_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q98_A6-p0.1">Q. 98. A. 6. Whether the Old Law was suitably given at the time of Moses?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Old Law was not suitably given at the time of Moses. Because the Old Law disposed man for the salvation + which was to come through Christ, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q98_A2" id="FS_Q98_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,3). But man needed this salutary remedy immediately after he had sinned. Therefore the Law should have been given immediately + after sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="37787" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37787] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex vetus non convenienter fuerit data +tempore Moysi. Lex enim vetus disponebat ad salutem quae erat +futura per Christum, sicut dictum est. Sed statim homo post +peccatum indiguit huiusmodi salutis remedio. Ergo statim post +peccatum lex vetus debuit dari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Old Law was given for the sanctification of those from whom Christ was to be born. Now the promise concerning + the "seed, which is Christ" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.16" target="asv">Gal. 3:16</a>) was first made to Abraham, as related in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A6-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.12.7" target="asv">Gn. 12:7</a>. Therefore the Law should have been given at once at the time of Abraham. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="37788" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37788] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +lex vetus data est propter sanctificationem eorum ex quibus +Christus nasciturus erat. Sed Abrahae incoepit fieri promissio de +semine, quod est Christus, ut habetur Gen. XII. Ergo statim tempore +Abrahae debuit lex dari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as Christ was born of those alone who descended from Noe through Abraham, to whom the promise was made; so was He + born of no other of the descendants of Abraham but David, to whom the promise was renewed, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iiKgdms.23.1" target="asv">2 Kings 23:1</a>: "The man to whom it was appointed concerning the Christ of the God of Jacob . . . said." Therefore the Old Law should have + been given after David, just as it was given after Abraham. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="37789" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37789] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut Christus non est natus ex aliis descendentibus ex Noe nisi ex +Abraham, cui facta est promissio; ita etiam non est natus ex aliis +filiis Abrahae nisi ex David, cui est promissio renovata, secundum +illud II Reg. XXIII, <i>dixit vir cui constitutum est de Christo +Dei Iacob</i>. Ergo lex vetus debuit dari post David, sicut data +est post Abraham.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.19" target="asv">Gal. 3:19</a>) that the Law "was set because of transgressions, until the seed should come, to whom He made the promise, being ordained + by angels in the hand of a Mediator": ordained, i.e. "given in orderly fashion," as the gloss explains. Therefore it was fitting + that the Old Law should be given in this order of time. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 6 s. c."><a name="37790" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37790] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Gal. III, quod <i>lex propter +transgressionem posita est, donec veniret semen cui promiserat, +ordinata per Angelos in manu mediatoris</i>, idest ordinabiliter +data, ut Glossa dicit. Ergo congruum fuit ut lex vetus illo +temporis ordine traderetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q98_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It was most fitting for the Law to be given at the time of Moses. The reason for this may be taken from two things in respect + of which every law is imposed on two kinds of men. Because it is imposed on some men who are hard-hearted and proud, whom + the law restrains and tames: and it is imposed on good men, who, through being instructed by the law, are helped to fulfil + what they desire to do. Hence it was fitting that the Law should be given at such a time as + would be appropriate for the overcoming of man's pride. For man was proud of two things, viz. of knowledge and of power. He + was proud of his knowledge, as though his natural reason could suffice him for salvation: and accordingly, in order that his + pride might be overcome in this matter, man was left to the guidance of his reason without the help of a written law: and + man was able to learn from experience that his reason was deficient, since about the time of Abraham man had fallen headlong + into idolatry and the most shameful vices. Wherefore, after those times, it was necessary for a written law to be given as + a remedy for human ignorance: because "by the Law is the knowledge of sin" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.20" target="asv">Rom. 3:20</a>). But, after man had been instructed by the Law, his pride was convinced of his weakness, through his being unable to fulfil + what he knew. Hence, as the Apostle concludes ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A6-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.3" target="asv">Rom. 8:3,4</a>), "what the Law could not do in that it was weak through the flesh, + God sent [Vulg.: 'sending'] His own Son . . . that the justification of the Law might be fulfilled in us." + </p><p id="FS_Q98_A6-p7"> With regard to good men, the Law was given to them as a help; which was most needed by the people, at the time when the natural + law began to be obscured on account of the exuberance of sin: for it was fitting that this help should be bestowed on men + in an orderly manner, so that they might be led from imperfection to perfection; wherefore it was becoming that the Old Law + should be given between the law of nature and the law of grace. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 6 co."><a name="37791" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37791] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod convenientissime lex vetus data fuit tempore Moysi. +Cuius ratio potest accipi ex duobus, secundum quod quaelibet lex +duobus generibus hominum imponitur. Imponitur enim quibusdam duris +et superbis, qui per legem compescuntur et domantur, imponitur +etiam bonis, qui, per legem instructi, adiuvantur ad implendum quod +intendunt. Conveniens igitur fuit tali tempore legem veterem dari, +ad superbiam hominum convincendam. De duobus enim homo superbiebat, +scilicet de scientia, et de potentia. De scientia quidem, quasi +ratio naturalis ei posset sufficere ad salutem. Et ideo ut de hoc +eius superbia convinceretur permissus est homo regimini suae +rationis absque adminiculo legis scriptae, et experimento homo +discere potuit quod patiebatur rationis defectum, per hoc quod +homines usque ad idololatriam et turpissima vitia circa tempora +Abrahae sunt prolapsi. Et ideo post haec tempora fuit necessarium +legem scriptam dari in remedium humanae ignorantiae, quia per legem +est cognitio peccati, ut dicitur Rom. III. Sed postquam homo est +instructus per legem, convicta est eius superbia de infirmitate, +dum implere non poterat quod cognoscebat. Et ideo, sicut apostolus +concludit, ad Rom. VIII, <i>quod impossibile erat legi, in qua +infirmabatur per carnem, misit Deus filium suum, ut iustificatio +legis impleretur in nobis</i>. Ex parte vero bonorum, lex data est +in auxilium. Quod quidem tunc maxime populo necessarium fuit, +quando lex naturalis obscurari incipiebat propter exuberantiam +peccatorum. Oportebat autem huiusmodi auxilium quodam ordine dari, +ut per imperfecta ad perfectionem manuducerentur. Et ideo inter +legem naturae et legem gratiae, oportuit legem veterem dari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It was not fitting for the Old Law to be given at once after the sin of the first man: both because man was so confident + in his own reason, that he did not acknowledge his need of the Old Law; because as yet the dictate of the natural law was + not darkened by habitual sinning. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="37792" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37792] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod statim post peccatum primi hominis non +competebat legem veterem dari, tum quia nondum homo recognoscebat +se ea indigere, de sua ratione confisus. Tum quia adhuc dictamen +legis naturae nondum erat obtenebratum per consuetudinem +peccandi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A law should not be given save to the people, since it is a general precept, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A2" id="FS_Q98_A6-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[90], AA[2]</a>,3); wherefore at the time of Abraham God gave men certain familiar, and, as it were, household precepts: but when Abraham's + descendants had multiplied, so as to form a people, and when they had been freed from slavery, it was fitting that they should + be given a law; for "slaves are not that part of the people or state to + which it is fitting for the law to be directed," as the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2,4,5). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="37793" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37793] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod lex non debet dari nisi populo, est enim praeceptum +commune, ut dictum est. Et ideo tempore Abrahae data sunt quaedam +familiaria praecepta, et quasi domestica, Dei ad homines. Sed +postmodum, multiplicatis eius posteris intantum quod populus esset, +et liberatis eis a servitute, lex convenienter potuit dari, nam +servi non sunt pars populi vel civitatis, cui legem dari competit, +ut philosophus dicit, in III Polit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since the Law had to be given to the people, not only those, of whom Christ was born, received the Law, but the whole people, + who were marked with the seal of circumcision, which was the sign of the promise made to Abraham, and in which he believed, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A6-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.4.11" target="asv"> Rom. 4:11</a>: hence even before David, the Law had to be given to that people as soon as they were collected together. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="37794" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37794] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, quia legem oportebat alicui populo dari, non solum +illi ex quibus Christus natus est, legem acceperunt; sed totus +populus consignatus signaculo circumcisionis, quae fuit signum +promissionis Abrahae factae et ab eo creditae, ut dicit apostolus, +Rom. IV. Et ideo etiam ante David oportuit legem dari tali populo +iam collecto.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q99" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q99-p0.1">Q. 99. OF THE PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q99-p2"> We must now consider the precepts of the Old Law; and (1) how they are distinguished from one another; (2) each kind of precept. + Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FS_Q99-p3"><a href="#FS_Q99_A1"> (1) Whether the Old Law contains several precepts or only one?</a></p><p id="FS_Q99-p4"><a href="#FS_Q99_A2"> (2) Whether the Old Law contains any moral precepts?</a></p><p id="FS_Q99-p5"><a href="#FS_Q99_A3"> (3) Whether it contains ceremonial precepts in addition to the moral precepts?</a></p><p id="FS_Q99-p6"><a href="#FS_Q99_A4"> (4) Whether besides these it contains judicial precepts?</a></p><p id="FS_Q99-p7"><a href="#FS_Q99_A5"> (5) Whether it contains any others besides these?</a></p><p id="FS_Q99-p8"><a href="#FS_Q99_A6"> (6) How the Old Law induced men to keep its precepts.</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 pr."><a name="37795" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37795] +Iª-IIae q. 99 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +praeceptis veteris legis. Et primo, de distinctione ipsorum; +secundo, de singulis generibus distinctis. Circa primum quaeruntur +sex. Primo, utrum legis veteris sint plura praecepta, vel unum +tantum. Secundo, utrum lex vetus contineat aliqua praecepta +moralia. Tertio, utrum praeter moralia contineat caeremonialia. +Quarto, utrum contineat, praeter haec, iudicialia. Quinto, utrum +praeter ista tria contineat aliqua alia. Sexto, de modo quo lex +inducebat ad observantiam praedictorum.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q99_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q99_A1-p0.1">Q. 99. A. 1. Whether the Old Law contains only one precept?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Old Law contains but one precept. Because a law is nothing else than a precept, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A2" id="FS_Q99_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[90], AA[2]</a>,3). Now there is but one Old Law. Therefore it contains but one precept. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37796" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37796] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod in lege veteri non contineatur nisi +unum praeceptum. Lex enim est nihil aliud quam praeceptum, ut supra +habitum est. Sed lex vetus est una. Ergo non continet nisi unum +praeceptum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.9" target="asv">Rom. 13:9</a>): "If there be any other commandment, it is comprised in this word: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." But this is + only one commandment. Therefore the Old Law contained but one commandment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37797" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37797] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +apostolus dicit, Rom. XIII, <i>si quod est aliud mandatum, in hoc +verbo instauratur, diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum</i>. Sed +istud mandatum est unum. Ergo lex vetus non continet nisi unum +mandatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.12" target="asv">Mat. 7:12</a>): "All things . . . whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them. For this is the Law and the prophets." + But the whole of the Old Law is comprised in the Law and the prophets. Therefore the whole of the Old Law contains but one + commandment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37798" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37798] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Matth. VII, dicitur, <i>omnia quaecumque vultis ut faciant vobis +homines, et vos facite illis, haec est enim lex et prophetae</i>. +Sed tota lex vetus continetur in lege et prophetis. Ergo tota lex +vetus non habet nisi unum praeceptum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.15" target="asv">Eph. 2:15</a>): "Making void the Law of commandments contained in decrees": where he is referring to the Old Law, as the gloss comments, + on the passage. Therefore the Old Law comprises many commandments. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37799" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37799] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. II, <i>legem mandatorum +decretis evacuans</i>. Et loquitur de lege veteri, ut patet per +Glossam ibidem. Ergo lex vetus continet in se multa mandata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since a precept of law is binding, it is about something which must be done: and, that a thing must be done, arises from + the necessity of some end. Hence it is evident that a precept implies, in its very idea, relation to an end, in so far as + a thing is commanded as being necessary or expedient to an end. Now many things may happen to be necessary or expedient to + an end; and, accordingly, precepts may be given about various things as being ordained to one + end. Consequently we must say that all the precepts of the Old Law are one in respect of their relation to one end: and yet + they are many in respect of the diversity of those things that are ordained to that end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 1 co."><a name="37800" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37800] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod praeceptum legis, cum sit obligatorium, est de aliquo +quod fieri debet. Quod autem aliquid debeat fieri, hoc provenit ex +necessitate alicuius finis. Unde manifestum est quod de ratione +praecepti est quod importet ordinem ad finem, inquantum scilicet +illud praecipitur quod est necessarium vel expediens ad finem. +Contingit autem ad unum finem multa esse necessaria vel +expedientia. Et secundum hoc possunt de diversis rebus dari +praecepta inquantum ordinantur ad unum finem. Unde dicendum est +quod omnia praecepta legis veteris sunt unum secundum ordinem ad +unum finem, sunt tamen multa secundum diversitatem eorum quae +ordinantur ad finem illum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Old Law is said to be one as being ordained to one end: yet it comprises various precepts, according to the diversity + of the things which it directs to the end. Thus also the art of building is one according to the unity of its end, because + it aims at the building of a house: and yet it contains various rules, according to the variety of acts ordained thereto. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37801" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37801] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod lex vetus dicitur esse una secundum ordinem ad +finem unum, et tamen continet diversa praecepta, secundum +distinctionem eorum quae ordinat ad finem. Sicut etiam ars +aedificativa est una secundum unitatem finis, quia tendit ad +aedificationem domus, tamen continet diversa praecepta, secundum +diversos actus ad hoc ordinatos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.5" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:5</a>), "the end of the commandment is charity"; since every law aims at establishing friendship, either between man and man, or + between man and God. Wherefore the whole Law is comprised in this one commandment, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," + as expressing the end of all commandments: because love of one's neighbor includes love of God, when we love our neighbor + for God's sake. Hence the + Apostle put this commandment in place of the two which are about the love of God and of one's neighbor, and of which Our Lord + said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A1-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.40" target="asv">Mat. 22:40</a>): "On these two commandments dependeth the whole Law and the prophets." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37802" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37802] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut apostolus dicit, I ad Tim. I, <i>finis +praecepti caritas est</i>, ad hoc enim omnis lex tendit, ut +amicitiam constituat vel hominum ad invicem, vel hominis ad Deum. +Et ideo tota lex impletur in hoc uno mandato, <i>diliges proximum +tuum sicut teipsum</i>, sicut in quodam fine mandatorum omnium, in +dilectione enim proximi includitur etiam Dei dilectio, quando +proximus diligitur propter Deum. Unde apostolus hoc unum praeceptum +posuit pro duobus quae sunt de dilectione Dei et proximi, de quibus +dicit dominus, Matth. XXII, <i>in his duobus mandatis pendet omnis +lex et prophetae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated in Ethic. ix, 8, "friendship towards another arises from friendship towards oneself," in so far as man looks on + another as on himself. Hence when it is said, "All things whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them," + this is an explanation of the rule of neighborly love contained implicitly in the words, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as + thyself": so that it is an explanation of this commandment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37803" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37803] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in IX Ethic., <i>amicabilia quae sunt +ad alterum, venerunt ex amicabilibus quae sunt homini ad +seipsum</i>, dum scilicet homo ita se habet ad alterum sicut ad se. +Et ideo in hoc quod dicitur, <i>omnia quaecumque vultis ut faciant +vobis homines, et vos facite illis</i>, explicatur quaedam regula +dilectionis proximi, quae etiam implicite continetur in hoc quod +dicitur, <i>diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum</i>. Unde est +quaedam explicatio istius mandati.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q99_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q99_A2-p0.1">Q. 99. A. 2. Whether the Old Law contains moral precepts?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Old Law contains no moral precepts. For the Old Law is distinct from the law of nature, as stated + above ( + <a href="#FS_Q91_A4" id="FS_Q99_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[91], AA[4]</a>,5; + <a href="#FS_Q98_A5" id="FS_Q99_A2-p2.2" shape="rect"> Q[98], A[5]</a>). But the moral precepts belong to the law of nature. Therefore they do not belong to the Old Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37804" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37804] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex vetus non contineat praecepta +moralia. Lex enim vetus distinguitur a lege naturae, ut supra +habitum est. Sed praecepta moralia pertinent ad legem naturae. Ergo +non pertinent ad legem veterem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Divine Law should have come to man's assistance where human reason fails him: as is evident in regard to things + that are of faith, which are above reason. But man's reason seems to suffice for the moral precepts. Therefore the moral precepts + do not belong to the Old Law, which is a Divine law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37805" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37805] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ibi subvenire debuit homini lex divina, ubi deficit ratio humana, +sicut patet in his quae ad fidem pertinent, quae sunt supra +rationem. Sed ad praecepta moralia ratio hominis sufficere videtur. +Ergo praecepta moralia non sunt de lege veteri, quae est lex +divina.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Old Law is said to be "the letter that killeth" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.6" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:6</a>). But the moral precepts do not kill, but quicken, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.93" target="asv"> Ps. 118:93</a>: "Thy justifications I will never forget, for by them Thou hast given me life." Therefore the moral precepts do not belong + to the Old Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37806" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37806] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex vetus dicitur littera occidens, ut patet II ad Cor. III. Sed +praecepta moralia non occidunt, sed vivificant; secundum illud +Psalmi CXVIII, <i>in aeternum non obliviscar iustificationes tuas, +quia in ipsis vivificasti me</i>. Ergo praecepta moralia non +pertinent ad veterem legem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.17.9" target="asv">Ecclus. 17:9</a>): "Moreover, He gave them discipline [Douay: 'instructions'] and the law of life for an inheritance." Now discipline belongs + to morals; for this gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.12.11" target="asv">Heb. 12:11</a>: "Now all chastisement [disciplina]," etc., says: "Discipline is an exercise in morals by means of difficulties." Therefore + the Law which was given by God comprised moral precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37807" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37807] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Eccli. XVII, <i>addidit illis disciplinam, et +legem vitae haereditavit eos</i>. Disciplina autem pertinet ad +mores, dicit enim Glossa ad Heb. XII, super illud, omnis disciplina +etc., <i>disciplina est eruditio morum per difficilia</i>. Ergo lex +a Deo data, praecepta moralia continebat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The Old Law contained some moral precepts; as is evident from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.13" target="asv">Ex. 20:13</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.15" target="asv">15</a>: "Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal." This was reasonable: because, just as the principal intention of human law + is to created friendship between man and man; so the chief intention of the Divine law is to establish man in friendship with + God. Now since likeness is the reason of love, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A2-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Sir.13.19" target="asv"> Ecclus. 13:19</a>: "Every beast loveth its + like"; there cannot possibly be any friendship of man to God, Who is supremely good, unless man become good: wherefore it + is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A2-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.2" target="asv">Lev. 19:2</a>; 11:45): "You shall be holy, for I am holy." But the goodness of man is virtue, which "makes its possessor good" (Ethic. + ii, 6). Therefore it was necessary for the Old Law to include precepts about acts of virtue: and these are the moral precepts + of the Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 2 co."><a name="37808" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37808] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod lex vetus continebat praecepta quaedam moralia, ut +patet Exod. XX, <i>non occides, non furtum facies</i>. Et hoc +rationabiliter. Nam sicut intentio principalis legis humanae est ut +faciat amicitiam hominum ad invicem; ita intentio legis divinae est +ut constituat principaliter amicitiam hominis ad Deum. Cum autem +similitudo sit ratio amoris, secundum illud Eccli. XIII, <i>omne +animal diligit simile sibi</i>; impossibile est esse amicitiam +hominis ad Deum, qui est optimus, nisi homines boni efficiantur, +unde dicitur Levit. XIX, <i>sancti eritis, quoniam ego sanctus +sum</i>. Bonitas autem hominis est virtus, quae facit bonum +habentem. Et ideo oportuit praecepta legis veteris etiam de actibus +virtutum dari. Et haec sunt moralia legis praecepta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Old Law is distinct from the natural law, not as being altogether different from it, but as something added thereto. + For just as grace presupposes nature, so must the Divine law presuppose the natural law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37809" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37809] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod lex vetus distinguitur a lege naturae non +tanquam ab ea omnino aliena, sed tanquam aliquid ei superaddens. +Sicut enim gratia praesupponit naturam, ita oportet quod lex divina +praesupponat legem naturalem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It was fitting that the Divine law should come to man's assistance not only in those things for which reason is insufficient, + but also in those things in which human reason may happen to be impeded. Now human reason could not go astray in the abstract, + as to the universal principles of the natural law; but through being habituated to sin, it became obscured in the point of + things to be done in detail. But with regard to the other moral precepts, which + are like conclusions drawn from the universal principles of the natural law, the reason of many men went astray, to the extend + of judging to be lawful, things that are evil in themselves. Hence there was need for the authority of the Divine law to rescue + man from both these defects. Thus among the articles of faith not only are those things set forth to which reason cannot reach, + such as the Trinity of the Godhead; but also those to which right reason can attain, such as the Unity of the + Godhead; in order to remove the manifold errors to which reason is liable. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37810" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37810] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod legi divinae conveniens erat ut non solum provideret +homini in his ad quae ratio non potest, sed etiam in his circa quae +contingit rationem hominis impediri. Ratio autem hominis circa +praecepta moralia, quantum ad ipsa communissima praecepta legis +naturae, non poterat errare in universali, sed tamen, propter +consuetudinem peccandi, obscurabatur in particularibus agendis. +Circa alia vero praecepta moralia, quae sunt quasi conclusiones +deductae ex communibus principiis legis naturae, multorum ratio +oberrabat, ita ut quaedam quae secundum se sunt mala, ratio +multorum licita iudicaret. Unde oportuit contra utrumque defectum +homini subveniri per auctoritatem legis divinae. Sicut etiam inter +credenda nobis proponuntur non solum ea ad quae ratio attingere non +potest, ut Deum esse trinum; sed etiam ea ad quae ratio recta +pertingere potest, ut Deum esse unum; ad excludendum rationis +humanae errorem, qui accidebat in multis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine proves (De Spiritu et Litera xiv), even the letter of the law is said to be the occasion of death, as to the + moral precepts; in so far as, to wit, it prescribes what is good, without furnishing the aid of grace for its fulfilment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37811" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37811] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus probat in libro de spiritu et +littera, etiam littera legis quantum ad praecepta moralia, occidere +dicitur occasionaliter, inquantum scilicet praecipit quod bonum +est, non praebens auxilium gratiae ad implendum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q99_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q99_A3-p0.1">Q. 99. A. 3. Whether the Old Law comprises ceremonial, besides moral, precepts?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Old Law does not comprise ceremonial, besides moral, precepts. For every law that is given to man + is for the purpose of directing human actions. Now human actions are called moral, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A3" id="FS_Q99_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[3]</a>). Therefore it seems that the Old Law given to men should not comprise other than moral precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37812" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37812] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex vetus non contineat praecepta +caeremonialia, praeter moralia. Omnis enim lex quae hominibus +datur, est directiva humanorum actuum. Actus autem humani morales +dicuntur, ut supra dictum est. Ergo videtur quod in lege veteri +hominibus data, non debeant contineri nisi praecepta moralia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those precepts that are styled ceremonial seem to refer to the Divine worship. But Divine worship is the act of + a virtue, viz. religion, which, as Tully says (De Invent. ii) "offers worship and ceremony to the Godhead." Since, then, the + moral precepts are about acts of virtue, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q99_A2" id="FS_Q99_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, it seems that the ceremonial precepts should not be distinct from the moral. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37813" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37813] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +praecepta quae dicuntur caeremonialia, videntur ad divinum cultum +pertinere. Sed divinus cultus est actus virtutis, scilicet +religionis, quae, ut Tullius dicit in sua Rhetoric., <i>divinae +naturae cultum caeremoniamque affert</i>. Cum igitur praecepta +moralia sint de actibus virtutum, ut dictum est, videtur quod +praecepta caeremonialia non sint distinguenda a moralibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the ceremonial precepts seem to be those which signify something figuratively. But, as Augustine observes (De Doctr. + Christ. ii, 3,4), "of all signs employed by men words hold the first place." Therefore there is no need for the Law to contain + ceremonial precepts about certain figurative actions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37814" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37814] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +praecepta caeremonialia esse videntur quae figurative aliquid +significant. Sed sicut Augustinus dicit, in II de Doctr. Christ., +<i>verba inter homines obtinuerunt principatum significandi</i>. +Ergo nulla necessitas fuit ut in lege continerentur praecepta +caeremonialia de aliquibus actibus figurativis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.4.13" target="asv">Dt. 4:13,14</a>): "Ten words . . . He wrote in two tables of stone; and He commanded me at that time that I should teach you the ceremonies + and judgments which you shall do." But the ten commandments of the Law are moral precepts. Therefore besides the moral precepts + there are others which are ceremonial. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37815" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37815] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Deut. IV, <i>decem verba scripsit in duabus +tabulis lapideis, mihique mandavit in illo tempore ut docerem vos +caeremonias et iudicia quae facere deberetis</i>. Sed decem +praecepta legis sunt moralia. Ergo praeter praecepta moralia sunt +etiam alia praecepta caeremonialia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q99_A2" id="FS_Q99_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, the Divine law is instituted chiefly in order to direct men to God; while human law is instituted chiefly in order to direct + men in relation to one another. Hence human laws have not concerned themselves with the institution of anything relating to + Divine worship except as affecting the common good of mankind: and for this reason they have devised many institutions relating + to Divine matters, according as it + seemed expedient for the formation of human morals; as may be seen in the rites of the Gentiles. On the other hand the Divine + law directed men to one another according to the demands of that order whereby man is directed to God, which order was the + chief aim of that law. Now man is directed to God not only by the interior acts of the mind, which are faith, hope, and love, + but also by certain external works, whereby man makes profession of his subjection to God: and it is these works that are + said to belong to the Divine worship. This worship is called "ceremony" [the munia, i.e. gifts] of Ceres (who was the goddess + of fruits), as some say: because, at first, offerings were made to God from the fruits: or because, as Valerius Maximus states + [*Fact. et Dict. Memor. i, 1], the word "ceremony" was introduced among the Latins, to signify the Divine worship, being derived + from a town near Rome called "Caere": since, when Rome was taken by the Gauls, the sacred chattels of the Romans were + taken thither and most carefully preserved. Accordingly those precepts of the Law which refer to the Divine worship are specially + called ceremonial. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 3 co."><a name="37816" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37816] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, lex divina principaliter +instituitur ad ordinandum homines ad Deum; lex autem humana +principaliter ad ordinandum homines ad invicem. Et ideo leges +humanae non curaverunt aliquid instituere de cultu divino nisi in +ordine ad bonum commune hominum, et propter hoc etiam multa +confinxerunt circa res divinas, secundum quod videbatur eis +expediens ad informandos mores hominum; sicut patet in ritu +gentilium. Sed lex divina e converso homines ad invicem ordinavit +secundum quod conveniebat ordini qui est in Deum, quem +principaliter intendebat. Ordinatur autem homo in Deum non solum +per interiores actus mentis, qui sunt credere, sperare et amare; +sed etiam per quaedam exteriora opera, quibus homo divinam +servitutem profitetur. Et ista opera dicuntur ad cultum Dei +pertinere. Qui quidem cultus caeremonia vocatur, quasi munia, idest +dona, Caereris, quae dicebatur dea frugum, ut quidam dicunt, eo +quod primo ex frugibus oblationes Deo offerebantur. Sive, ut +maximus Valerius refert, nomen caeremoniae introductum est ad +significandum cultum divinum apud Latinos, a quodam oppido iuxta +Romam, quod Caere vocabatur, eo quod, Roma capta a gallis, illuc +sacra Romanorum ablata sunt, et reverentissime habita. Sic igitur +illa praecepta quae in lege pertinent ad cultum Dei, specialiter +caeremonialia dicuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Human acts extend also to the Divine worship: and therefore the Old Law given to man contains precepts about these matters + also. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37817" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37817] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod humani actus se extendunt etiam ad cultum +divinum. Et ideo etiam de his continet praecepta lex vetus +hominibus data.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q91_A3" id="FS_Q99_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[91], A[3]</a>), the precepts of the natural law are general, and require to be determined: and they are determined both by human law and + by Divine law. And just as these very determinations which are made by human law are said to be, not of natural, but of positive + law; so the determinations of the precepts of the natural law, effected by the Divine law, are distinct from the moral precepts + which belong to the + natural law. Wherefore to worship God, since it is an act of virtue, belongs to a moral precept; but the determination of + this precept, namely that He is to be worshipped by such and such sacrifices, and such and such offerings, belongs to the + ceremonial precepts. Consequently the ceremonial precepts are distinct from the moral precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37818" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37818] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, praecepta legis naturae +communia sunt, et indigent determinatione. Determinantur autem et +per legem humanam, et per legem divinam. Et sicut ipsae +determinationes quae fiunt per legem humanam, non dicuntur esse de +lege naturae, sed de iure positivo; ita ipsae determinationes +praeceptorum legis naturae quae fiunt per legem divinam, +distinguuntur a praeceptis moralibus, quae pertinent ad legem +naturae. Colere ergo Deum, cum sit actus virtutis, pertinet ad +praeceptum morale, sed determinatio huius praecepti, ut scilicet +colatur talibus hostiis et talibus muneribus, hoc pertinet ad +praecepta caeremonialia. Et ideo praecepta caeremonialia +distinguuntur a praeceptis moralibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i), the things of God cannot be manifested to men except by means of sensible similitudes. + Now these similitudes move the soul more when they are not only expressed in words, but also offered to the senses. Wherefore + the things of God are set forth in the Scriptures not only by similitudes expressed in words, as in the case of metaphorical + expressions; but also by similitudes of things set before the eyes, which pertains + to the ceremonial precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37819" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37819] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut Dionysius dicit, I cap. Cael. Hier., divina +hominibus manifestari non possunt nisi sub aliquibus +similitudinibus sensibilibus. Ipsae autem similitudines magis +movent animum quando non solum verbo exprimuntur, sed etiam sensui +offeruntur. Et ideo divina traduntur in Scripturis non solum per +similitudines verbo expressas, sicut patet in metaphoricis +locutionibus; sed etiam per similitudines rerum quae visui +proponuntur, quod pertinet ad praecepta caeremonialia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q99_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q99_A4-p0.1">Q. 99. A. 4. Whether, besides the moral and ceremonial precepts, there are also judicial precepts?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are no judicial precepts in addition to the moral and ceremonial precepts in the Old Law. For Augustine + says (Contra Faust. vi, 2) that in the Old Law there are "precepts concerning the life we have to lead, and precepts regarding + the life that is foreshadowed." Now the precepts of the life we have to lead are moral precepts; and the precepts of the life + that is foreshadowed are ceremonial. Therefore besides these two kinds of precepts + we should not put any judicial precepts in the Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37820" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37820] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod praeter praecepta moralia et +caeremonialia, non sint aliqua praecepta iudicialia in veteri lege. +Dicit enim Augustinus, contra Faustum, quod in lege veteri sunt +praecepta vitae agendae, et praecepta vitae significandae. Sed +praecepta vitae agendae sunt moralia; praecepta autem vitae +significandae sunt caeremonialia. Ergo praeter haec duo genera +praeceptorum, non sunt ponenda in lege alia praecepta +iudicialia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.102" target="asv"> Ps. 118:102, </a> "I have not declined from Thy judgments," says, i.e. "from the rule of life Thou hast set for me." But a rule of life belongs + to the moral precepts. Therefore the judicial precepts should not be considered as distinct from the moral precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37821" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37821] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +super illud Psalmi CXVIII, <i>a iudiciis tuis non declinavi</i>, +dicit Glossa, <i>idest ab his quae constituisti regulam +vivendi</i>. Sed regula vivendi pertinet ad praecepta moralia. Ergo +praecepta iudicialia non sunt distinguenda a moralibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, judgment seems to be an act of justice, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.93.15" target="asv">Ps. 93:15</a>: "Until justice be turned into judgment." But acts of justice, like the acts of other virtues, belong to the moral precepts. + Therefore the moral precepts include the judicial precepts, and consequently should not be held as distinct from them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37822" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37822] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +iudicium videtur esse actus iustitiae; secundum illud Psalmi XCIII, +<i>quoadusque iustitia convertatur in iudicium</i>. Sed actus +iustitiae, sicut et actus ceterarum virtutum, pertinet ad praecepta +moralia. Ergo praecepta moralia includunt in se iudicialia, et sic +non debent ab eis distingui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.1" target="asv">Dt. 6:1</a>): "These are the precepts and ceremonies, and judgments": where "precepts" stands for "moral precepts" antonomastically. + Therefore there are judicial precepts besides moral and ceremonial precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37823" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37823] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Deut. VI, <i>haec sunt praecepta et caeremoniae +atque iudicia</i>. Praecepta autem antonomastice dicuntur moralia. +Ergo praeter praecepta moralia et caeremonialia, sunt etiam +iudicialia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q99_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q99_A2" id="FS_Q99_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,3), it belongs to the Divine law to direct men to one another and to God. Now each of these belongs in the abstract to the + dictates of the natural law, to which dictates the moral precepts are to be referred: yet each of them has to be determined + by Divine or human law, because naturally known principles are universal, both in speculative and in practical matters. Accordingly + just as the determination of the + universal principle about Divine worship is effected by the ceremonial precepts, so the determination of the general precepts + of that justice which is to be observed among men is effected by the judicial precepts. + </p><p id="FS_Q99_A4-p7"> We must therefore distinguish three kinds of precept in the Old Law; viz. "moral" precepts, which are dictated by the natural + law; "ceremonial" precepts, which are determinations of the Divine worship; and "judicial" precepts, which are determinations + of the justice to be maintained among men. Wherefore the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.12" target="asv">Rom. 7:12</a>) after saying that the "Law is holy," adds that "the commandment is just, and holy, and good": "just," in respect of the + judicial + precepts; "holy," with regard to the ceremonial precepts (since the word "sanctus"---"holy"---is applied to that which is + consecrated to God); and "good," i.e. conducive to virtue, as to the moral precepts. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 4 co."><a name="37824" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37824] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ad legem divinam pertinet ut +ordinet homines ad invicem et ad Deum. Utrumque autem horum in +communi quidem pertinet ad dictamen legis naturae, ad quod +referuntur moralia praecepta, sed oportet quod determinetur +utrumque per legem divinam vel humanam, quia principia naturaliter +nota sunt communia tam in speculativis quam in activis. Sicut +igitur determinatio communis praecepti de cultu divino fit per +praecepta caeremonialia, sic et determinatio communis praecepti de +iustitia observanda inter homines, determinatur per praecepta +iudicialia. Et secundum hoc, oportet tria praecepta legis veteris +ponere; scilicet moralia, quae sunt de dictamine legis naturae; +caeremonialia, quae sunt determinationes cultus divini; et +iudicialia, quae sunt determinationes iustitiae inter homines +observandae. Unde cum apostolus, Rom. VII, dixisset quod lex est +sancta, subiungit quod mandatum est iustum et sanctum et bonum, +iustum quidem, quantum ad iudicialia; sanctum, quantum ad +caeremonialia (nam sanctum dicitur quod est Deo dicatum); bonum, +idest honestum, quantum ad moralia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Both the moral and the judicial precepts aim at the ordering of human life: and consequently they are both comprised under + one of the heads mentioned by Augustine, viz. under the precepts of the life we have to lead. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37825" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37825] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod tam praecepta moralia, quam etiam iudicialia, +pertinent ad directionem vitae humanae. Et ideo utraque continentur +sub uno membro illorum quae ponit Augustinus, scilicet sub +praeceptis vitae agendae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Judgment denotes execution of justice, by an application of the reason to individual cases in a determinate way. Hence the + judicial precepts have something in common with the moral precepts, in that they are derived from reason; and something in + common with the ceremonial precepts, in that they are determinations of general precepts. This explains why sometimes "judgments" + comprise both judicial and moral precepts, as in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.5.1" target="asv"> Dt. 5:1</a>: + "Hear, O Israel, the ceremonies and judgments"; and sometimes judicial and ceremonial precepts, as in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A4-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.18.4" target="asv"> Lev. 18:4</a>: "You shall do My judgments, and shall observe My precepts," where "precepts" denotes moral precepts, while "judgments" refers + to judicial and ceremonial precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37826" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37826] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod iudicium significat executionem iustitiae, quae +quidem est secundum applicationem rationis ad aliqua particularia +determinate. Unde praecepta iudicialia communicant in aliquo cum +moralibus, inquantum scilicet a ratione derivantur; et in aliquo +cum caeremonialibus, inquantum scilicet sunt quaedam +determinationes communium praeceptorum. Et ideo quandoque sub +iudiciis comprehenduntur praecepta iudicialia et moralia, sicut +Deut. V, audi, Israel, caeremonias atque iudicia; quandoque vero +iudicialia et caeremonialia, sicut Levit. XVIII, facietis iudicia +mea, et praecepta mea servabitis, ubi praecepta ad moralia +referuntur, iudicia vero ad iudicialia et caeremonialia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The act of justice, in general, belongs to the moral precepts; but its determination to some special kind of act belongs + to the judicial precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37827" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37827] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod actus iustitiae in generali pertinet ad praecepta +moralia, sed determinatio eius in speciali pertinet ad praecepta +iudicialia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q99_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q99_A5-p0.1">Q. 99. A. 5. Whether the Old Law contains any others besides the moral, judicial, and ceremonial precepts?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Old Law contains others besides the moral, judicial, and ceremonial precepts. Because the judicial + precepts belong to the act of justice, which is between man and man; while the ceremonial precepts belong to the act of religion, + whereby God is worshipped. Now besides these there are many other virtues, viz. temperance, fortitude, liberality, and several + others, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q60_A5" id="FS_Q99_A5-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[60], A[5]</a>). Therefore besides the + aforesaid precepts, the Old Law should comprise others. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="37828" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37828] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliqua alia praecepta contineantur in +lege veteri praeter moralia, iudicialia et caeremonialia. +Iudicialia enim praecepta pertinent ad actum iustitiae, quae est +hominis ad hominem; caeremonialia vero pertinent ad actum +religionis, qua Deus colitur. Sed praeter has sunt multae aliae +virtutes, scilicet temperantia, fortitudo, liberalitas, et aliae +plures, ut supra dictum est. Ergo praeter praedicta oportet plura +alia in lege veteri contineri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.11.1" target="asv">Dt. 11:1</a>): "Love the Lord thy God, and observe His precepts and ceremonies, His judgments and commandments." Now precepts concern + moral matters, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q99_A4" id="FS_Q99_A5-p3.2" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. Therefore besides the moral, judicial and ceremonial precepts, the Law contains others which are called "commandments." + [*The "commandments" (mandata) spoken of here and in the body of this article are not to be confused with + the Commandments (praecepta) in the ordinary acceptance of the word.] + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="37829" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37829] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Deut. XI dicitur, <i>ama dominum Deum tuum, et observa eius +praecepta et caeremonias et iudicia atque mandata</i>. Sed +praecepta pertinent ad moralia, ut dictum est. Ergo praeter +moralia, iudicialia et caeremonialia, adhuc alia continentur in +lege, quae dicuntur mandata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.17" target="asv">Dt. 6:17</a>): "Keep the precepts of the Lord thy God, and the testimonies and ceremonies which I have [Vulg.: 'He hath'] commanded thee." + Therefore in addition to the above, the Law comprises "testimonies." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="37830" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37830] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Deut. VI dicitur, <i>custodi praecepta domini Dei tui, ac +testimonia et caeremonias quas tibi praecepi</i>. Ergo praeter +omnia praedicta adhuc in lege testimonia continentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.93" target="asv">Ps. 118:93</a>): "Thy justifications (i.e. "Thy Law," according to a gloss) I will never forget." Therefore in the Old Law there are not + only moral, ceremonial and judicial precepts, but also others, called "justifications." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="37831" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37831] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +in Psalmo CXVIII dicitur, <i>in aeternum non obliviscar +iustificationes tuas</i>, Glossa, <i>idest legem</i>. Ergo +praecepta legis veteris non solum sunt moralia, caeremonialia et +iudicialia, sed etiam iustificationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A5-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.1" target="asv">Dt. 6:1</a>): "These are the precepts and ceremonies and judgments which the Lord your God commanded . . . you." And these words are + placed at the beginning of the Law. Therefore all the precepts of the Law are included under them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 5 s. c."><a name="37832" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37832] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Deut. VI, <i>haec sunt praecepta et caeremoniae +atque iudicia quae mandavit dominus Deus vobis</i>. Et haec +ponuntur in principio legis. Ergo omnia praecepta legis sub his +comprehenduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q99_A5-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some things are included in the Law by way of precept; other things, as being ordained to the fulfilment of the precepts. + Now the precepts refer to things which have to be done: and to their fulfilment man is induced by two considerations, viz. + the authority of the lawgiver, and the benefit derived from the fulfilment, which benefit consists in the attainment of some + good, useful, pleasurable or virtuous, or in the avoidance of some contrary evil. Hence it + was necessary that in the Old Law certain things should be set forth to indicate the authority of God the lawgiver: e.g. + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.4" target="asv"> Dt. 6:4</a>: "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord"; and + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A5-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.1" target="asv"> Gn. 1:1</a>: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth": and these are called "testimonies." Again it was necessary that in the + Law certain rewards should be appointed for those who observe the Law, and punishments for those who transgress; as it may + be seen in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A5-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.28" target="asv">Dt. 28</a>: "If + thou wilt hear the voice of the Lord thy God . . . He will make thee higher than all the nations," etc.: and these are called + "justifications," according as God punishes or rewards certain ones justly. + </p><p id="FS_Q99_A5-p8"> The things that have to be done do not come under the precept except in so far as they have the character of a duty. Now + a duty is twofold: one according to the rule of reason; the other according to the rule of a law which prescribes that duty: + thus the Philosopher distinguishes a twofold just---moral and legal (Ethic. v, 7). + </p><p id="FS_Q99_A5-p9"> Moral duty is twofold: because reason dictates that something must be done, either as being so necessary that without it + the order of virtue would be destroyed; or as being useful for the better maintaining of the order of virtue. And in this + sense some of the moral precepts are expressed by way of absolute command or prohibition, as "Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt + not steal": and these are properly called "precepts." Other things are prescribed or forbidden, not as an absolute + duty, but as something better to be done. These may be called "commandments"; because they are expressed by way of inducement + and persuasion: an example whereof is seen in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.26" target="asv"> Ex. 22:26</a>: "If thou take of thy neighbor a garment in pledge, thou shalt give it him again before sunset"; and in other like cases. + Wherefore Jerome (Praefat. in Comment. super Marc.) says that "justice is in the precepts, charity in the commandments." Duty + as fixed by the Law, belongs to the judicial + precepts, as regards human affairs; to the "ceremonial" precepts, as regards Divine matters. + </p><p id="FS_Q99_A5-p10"> Nevertheless those ordinances also which refer to punishments and rewards may be called "testimonies," in so far as they + testify to the Divine justice. Again all the precepts of the Law may be styled "justifications," as being executions of legal + justice. Furthermore the commandments may be distinguished from the precepts, so that those things be called "precepts" which + God Himself prescribed; and those things "commandments" which He enjoined [mandavit] through others, as the + very word seems to denote. + </p><p id="FS_Q99_A5-p11"> From this it is clear that all the precepts of the Law are either moral, ceremonial, or judicial; and that other ordinances + have not the character of a precept, but are directed to the observance of the precepts, as stated above. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 5 co."><a name="37833" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37833] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod in lege ponuntur aliqua tanquam praecepta; aliqua +vero tanquam ad praeceptorum adimpletionem ordinata. Praecepta +quidem sunt de his quae sunt agenda. Ad quorum impletionem ex +duobus homo inducitur, scilicet ex auctoritate praecipientis; et ex +utilitate impletionis, quae quidem est consecutio alicuius boni +utilis, delectabilis vel honesti, aut fuga alicuius mali contrarii. +Oportuit igitur in veteri lege proponi quaedam quae auctoritatem +Dei praecipientis indicarent, sicut illud Deut. VI, <i>audi, +Israel, dominus Deus tuus Deus unus est</i>; et illud Gen. I, <i>in +principio creavit Deus caelum et terram</i>. Et huiusmodi dicuntur +testimonia. Oportuit etiam quod in lege proponerentur quaedam +praemia observantium legem, et poenae transgredientium, ut patet +Deut. XXVIII, <i>si audieris vocem domini Dei tui, faciet te +excelsiorem cunctis gentibus,</i> et cetera. Et huiusmodi dicuntur +iustificationes, secundum quod Deus aliquos iuste punit vel +praemiat. Ipsa autem agenda sub praecepto non cadunt nisi inquantum +habent aliquam debiti rationem. Est autem duplex debitum, unum +quidem secundum regulam rationis, aliud autem secundum regulam +legis determinantis; sicut philosophus, in V Ethic., distinguit +duplex iustum, scilicet morale et legale. Debitum autem morale est +duplex, dictat enim ratio aliquid faciendum vel tanquam +necessarium, sine quo non potest esse ordo virtutis; vel tanquam +utile ad hoc quod ordo virtutis melius conservetur. Et secundum +hoc, quaedam moralium praecise praecipiuntur vel prohibentur in +lege, sicut, non occides, non furtum facies. Et haec proprie +dicuntur praecepta. Quaedam vero praecipiuntur vel prohibentur, non +quasi praecise debita, sed propter melius. Et ista possunt dici +mandata, quia quandam inductionem habent et persuasionem. Sicut +illud Exod. XXII, <i>si pignus acceperis vestimentum a proximo tuo, +ante solis occasum reddas ei</i>; et aliqua similia. Unde +Hieronymus dicit quod <i>in praeceptis est iustitia, in mandatis +vero caritas</i>. Debitum autem ex determinatione legis, in rebus +quidem humanis pertinet ad iudicialia; in rebus autem divinis, ad +caeremonialia. Quamvis etiam ea quae pertinent ad poenam vel +praemia, dici possint testimonia, inquantum sunt protestationes +quaedam divinae iustitiae. Omnia vero praecepta legis possunt dici +iustificationes, inquantum sunt quaedam executiones legalis +iustitiae. Possunt etiam aliter mandata a praeceptis distingui, ut +praecepta dicantur quae Deus per seipsum iussit; mandata autem, +quae per alios mandavit, ut ipsum nomen sonare videtur. Ex quibus +omnibus apparet quod omnia legis praecepta continentur sub +moralibus, caeremonialibus et iudicialibus, alia vero non habent +rationem praeceptorum, sed ordinantur ad praeceptorum +observationem, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Justice alone, of all the virtues, implies the notion of duty. Consequently moral matters are determinable by law in so far + as they belong to justice: of which virtue religion is a part, as Tully says (De Invent. ii). Wherefore the legal just cannot + be anything foreign to the ceremonial and judicial precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="37834" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37834] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod sola iustitia, inter alias virtutes, importat +rationem debiti. Et ideo moralia intantum sunt lege determinabilia, +inquantum pertinent ad iustitiam, cuius etiam quaedam pars est +religio, ut Tullius dicit. Unde iustum legale non potest esse +aliquod praeter caeremonialia et iudicialia praecepta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A5-p13"> <b>Reply to Objections 2--4:</b> The Replies to the other Objections are clear from what has been said.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="37835" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37835] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad alia patet +responsio per ea quae dicta sunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q99_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q99_A6-p0.1">Q. 99. A. 6. Whether the Old Law should have induced men to the observance of its precepts, by means of temporal promises and threats?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Old Law should not have induced men to the observance of its precepts, by means of temporal promises + and threats. For the purpose of the Divine law is to subject man to God by fear and love: hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.10.12" target="asv">Dt. 10:12</a>): "And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God, and walk in His ways, + and love Him?" But the desire for temporal goods leads man away from God: + for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36), that "covetousness is the bane of charity." Therefore temporal promises and threats + seem to be contrary to the intention of a lawgiver: and this makes a law worthy of rejection, as the Philosopher declares + (Polit. ii, 6). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="37836" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37836] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex vetus non debuerit inducere ad +observantiam praeceptorum per temporales promissiones et +comminationes. Intentio enim legis divinae est ut homines Deo +subdat per timorem et amorem, unde dicitur Deut. X, <i>et nunc, +Israel, quid dominus Deus tuus petit a te, nisi ut timeas dominum +Deum tuum, et ambules in viis eius, et diligas eum?</i> Sed +cupiditas rerum temporalium abducit a Deo, dicit enim Augustinus, +in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod <i>venenum caritatis est +cupiditas</i>. Ergo promissiones et comminationes temporales +videntur contrariari intentioni legislatoris, quod facit legem +reprobabilem, ut patet per philosophum, in II Polit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Divine law is more excellent than human law. Now, in sciences, we notice that the loftier the science, the higher + the means of persuasion that it employs. Therefore, since human law employs temporal threats and promises, as means of persuading + man, the Divine law should have used, not these, but more lofty means. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="37837" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37837] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +lex divina est excellentior quam lex humana. Videmus autem in +scientiis quod quanto aliqua est altior, tanto per altiora media +procedit. Ergo cum lex humana procedat ad inducendum homines per +temporales comminationes et promissiones, lex divina non debuit ex +his procedere, sed per aliqua maiora.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the reward of righteousness and the punishment of guilt cannot be that which befalls equally the good and the wicked. + But as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.9.2" target="asv"> Eccles. 9:2, </a> "all" temporal "things equally happen to the just and to the wicked, to the good and the evil, to the clean and to the unclean, + to him that offereth victims, and to him that despiseth sacrifices." Therefore temporal goods or evils are not suitably set + forth as punishments or rewards of + the commandments of the Divine law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="37838" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37838] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +illud non potest esse praemium iustitiae vel poena culpae, quod +aequaliter evenit et bonis et malis. Sed sicut dicitur Eccle. IX, +<i>universa, temporalia, aeque eveniunt iusto et impio, bono et +malo, mundo et immundo, immolanti victimas et sacrificia +contemnenti</i>. Ergo temporalia bona vel mala non convenienter +ponuntur ut poenae vel praemia mandatorum legis divinae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.1.19" target="asv">Is. 1:19,20</a>): "If you be willing, and will hearken to Me, you shall eat the good things of the land. But if you will not, and will provoke + Me to wrath: the sword shall devour you." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 6 s. c."><a name="37839" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37839] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Isaiae I, <i>si volueritis, et audieritis me, bona +terrae comedetis. Quod si nolueritis, et me ad iracundiam +provocaveritis, gladius devorabit vos</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As in speculative sciences men are persuaded to assent to the conclusions by means of syllogistic arguments, so too in every + law, men are persuaded to observe its precepts by means of punishments and rewards. Now it is to be observed that, in speculative + sciences, the means of persuasion are adapted to the conditions of the pupil: wherefore the process of argument in sciences + should be ordered becomingly, so that the instruction is based on principles more + generally known. And thus also he who would persuade a man to the observance of any precepts, needs to move him at first by + things for which he has an affection; just as children are induced to do something, by means of little childish gifts. Now + it has been said above ( + <a href="#FS_Q98_A1" id="FS_Q99_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[98], AA[1]</a>,2,3) that the Old Law disposed men to (the coming of) Christ, as the imperfect in comparison disposes to the perfect, wherefore + it was given to a people as yet imperfect in comparison to the + perfection which was to result from Christ's coming: and for this reason, that people is compared to a child that is still + under a pedagogue ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A6-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.24" target="asv">Gal. 3:24</a>). But the perfection of man consists in his despising temporal things and cleaving to things spiritual, as is clear from + the words of the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A6-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Phil.3.13" target="asv">Phil. 3:13</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A6-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Phil.3.15" target="asv">15</a>): "Forgetting the things that are behind, I stretch [Vulg.: 'and stretching'] forth myself to those that are before . . . + Let us therefore, as + many as are perfect, be thus minded." Those who are yet imperfect desire temporal goods, albeit in subordination to God: whereas + the perverse place their end in temporalities. It was therefore fitting that the Old Law should conduct men to God by means + of temporal goods for which the imperfect have an affection. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 6 co."><a name="37840" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37840] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut in scientiis speculativis inducuntur homines +ad assentiendum conclusionibus per media syllogistica, ita etiam in +quibuslibet legibus homines inducuntur ad observantias praeceptorum +per poenas et praemia. Videmus autem in scientiis speculativis quod +media proponuntur auditori secundum eius conditionem, unde oportet +ordinate in scientiis procedere, ut ex notioribus disciplina +incipiat. Ita etiam oportet eum qui vult inducere hominem ad +observantiam praeceptorum, ut ex illis eum movere incipiat quae +sunt in eius affectu, sicut pueri provocantur ad aliquid faciendum +aliquibus puerilibus munusculis. Dictum est autem supra quod lex +vetus disponebat ad Christum sicut imperfectum ad perfectum, unde +dabatur populo adhuc imperfecto in comparatione ad perfectionem +quae erat futura per Christum, et ideo populus ille comparatur +puero sub paedagogo existenti, ut patet Galat. III. Perfectio autem +hominis est ut, contemptis temporalibus, spiritualibus inhaereat, +ut patet per illud quod apostolus dicit, Philipp. III, <i>quae +quidem retro sunt obliviscens, ad ea quae priora sunt me extendo. +Quicumque ergo perfecti sumus, hoc sentiamus</i>. Imperfectorum +autem est quod temporalia bona desiderent, in ordine tamen ad Deum. +Perversorum autem est quod in temporalibus bonis finem constituant. +Unde legi veteri conveniebat ut per temporalia, quae erant in +affectu hominum imperfectorum, manuduceret homines ad Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Covetousness whereby man places his end in temporalities, is the bane of charity. But the attainment of temporal goods which + man desires in subordination to God is a road leading the imperfect to the love of God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.48.19" target="asv"> Ps. 48:19</a>: "He will praise Thee, when Thou shalt do well to him." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="37841" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37841] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod cupiditas, qua homo constituit finem in +temporalibus bonis, est caritatis venenum. Sed consecutio +temporalium bonorum quae homo desiderat in ordine ad Deum, est +quaedam via inducens imperfectos ad Dei amorem; secundum illud +Psalmi XLVIII, <i>confitebitur tibi cum benefeceris illi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Human law persuades men by means of temporal rewards or punishments to be inflicted by men: whereas the Divine law persuades + men by meas of rewards or punishments to be received from God. In this respect it employs higher means. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="37842" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37842] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod lex humana inducit homines ex temporalibus praemiis +vel poenis per homines inducendis, lex vero divina ex praemiis vel +poenis exhibendis per Deum. Et in hoc procedit per media +altiora.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As any one can see, who reads carefully the story of the Old Testament, the common weal of the people prospered under the + Law as long as they obeyed it; and as soon as they departed from the precepts of the Law they were overtaken by many calamities. + But certain individuals, although they observed the justice of the Law, met with misfortunes---either because they had already + become spiritual (so that misfortune might withdraw them all the more from + attachment to temporal things, and that their virtue might be tried)---or because, while outwardly fulfilling the works of + the Law, their heart was altogether fixed on temporal goods, and far removed from God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A6-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.29.13" target="asv">Is. 29:13</a> ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A6-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.8" target="asv">Mat. 15:8</a>): "This people honoreth Me with their lips; but their hearts is far from Me." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="37843" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37843] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut patet historias veteris testamenti revolventi, +communis status populi semper sub lege in prosperitate fuit, +quandiu legem observabant; et statim declinantes a praeceptis +legis, in multas adversitates incidebant. Sed aliquae personae +particulares etiam iustitiam legis observantes, in aliquas +adversitates incidebant, vel quia iam erant spirituales effecti, ut +per hoc magis ab affectu temporalium abstraherentur, et eorum +virtus probata redderetur; aut quia, opera legis exterius +implentes, cor totum habebant in temporalibus defixum et a Deo +elongatum, secundum quod dicitur Isaiae XXIX, <i>populus hic labiis +me honorat, cor autem eorum longe est a me</i>.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q100" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q100-p0.1">Q. 100. OF THE MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q100-p2"> We must now consider each kind of precept of the Old Law: and (1) the moral precepts, (2) the ceremonial precepts, (3) the + judicial precepts. Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FS_Q100-p3"><a href="#FS_Q100_A1"> (1) Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law belong to the law of nature?</a></p><p id="FS_Q100-p4"><a href="#FS_Q100_A2"> (2) Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law are about the acts of all the virtues?</a></p><p id="FS_Q100-p5"><a href="#FS_Q100_A3"> (3) Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reducible to the ten precepts of the decalogue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q100-p6"><a href="#FS_Q100_A4"> (4) How the precepts of the decalogue are distinguished from one another?</a></p><p id="FS_Q100-p7"><a href="#FS_Q100_A5"> (5) Their number;</a></p><p id="FS_Q100-p8"><a href="#FS_Q100_A6"> (6) Their order;</a></p><p id="FS_Q100-p9"><a href="#FS_Q100_A7"> (7) The manner in which they were given;</a></p><p id="FS_Q100-p10"><a href="#FS_Q100_A8"> (8) Whether they are dispensable?</a></p><p id="FS_Q100-p11"><a href="#FS_Q100_A9"> (9) Whether the mode of observing a virtue comes under the precept of the Law?</a></p><p id="FS_Q100-p12"><a href="#FS_Q100_A10"> (10) Whether the mode of charity comes under the precept?</a></p><p id="FS_Q100-p13"><a href="#FS_Q100_A11"> (11) The distinction of other moral precepts;</a></p><p id="FS_Q100-p14"><a href="#FS_Q100_A12"> (12) Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law justified man?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 pr."><a name="37844" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37844] Iª-IIae q. 100 pr.</span></a> Deinde +considerandum est de singulis generibus praeceptorum veteris legis. +Et primo, de praeceptis moralibus; secundo, de caeremonialibus; +tertio, de iudicialibus. Circa primum quaeruntur duodecim. Primo, +utrum omnia praecepta moralia veteris legis sint de lege naturae. +Secundo, utrum praecepta moralia veteris legis sint de actibus +omnium virtutum. Tertio, utrum omnia praecepta moralia veteris +legis reducantur ad decem praecepta Decalogi. Quarto, de +distinctione praeceptorum Decalogi. Quinto, de numero eorum. Sexto, +de ordine. Septimo, de modo tradendi ipsa. Octavo, utrum sint +dispensabilia. Nono, utrum modus observandi virtutem cadat sub +praecepto. Decimo, utrum modus caritatis cadat sub praecepto. +Undecimo, de distinctione aliorum praeceptorum moralium. Duodecimo, +utrum praecepta moralia veteris legis iustificent.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q100_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q100_A1-p0.1">Q. 100. A. 1. Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law belong to the law of nature?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not all the moral precepts belong to the law of nature. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.17.9" target="asv">Ecclus. 17:9</a>): "Moreover He gave them instructions, and the law of life for an inheritance." But instruction is in contradistinction to + the law of nature; since the law of nature is not learnt, but instilled by natural instinct. Therefore not all the moral precepts + belong to the natural law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37845" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37845] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnia praecepta moralia pertineant +ad legem naturae. Dicitur enim Eccli. XVII, <i>addidit illis +disciplinam, et legem vitae haereditavit illos</i>. Sed disciplina +dividitur contra legem naturae, eo quod lex naturalis non +addiscitur, sed ex naturali instinctu habetur. Ergo non omnia +praecepta moralia sunt de lege naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Divine law is more perfect than human law. But human law adds certain things concerning good morals, to those + that belong to the law of nature: as is evidenced by the fact that the natural law is the same in all men, while these moral + institutions are various for various people. Much more reason therefore was there why the Divine law should add to the law + of nature, ordinances pertaining to good morals. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37846" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37846] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +lex divina perfectior est quam lex humana. Sed lex humana +superaddit aliqua ad bonos mores pertinentia his quae sunt de lege +naturae, quod patet ex hoc quod lex naturae est eadem apud omnes, +huiusmodi autem morum instituta sunt diversa apud diversos. Ergo +multo fortius divina lex aliqua ad bonos mores pertinentia debuit +addere supra legem naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as natural reason leads to good morals in certain matters, so does faith: hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.6" target="asv">Gal. 5:6</a>) that faith "worketh by charity." But faith is not included in the law of nature; since that which is of faith is above nature. + Therefore not all the moral precepts of the Divine law belong to the law of nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37847" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37847] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut ratio naturalis inducit ad aliquos bonos mores, ita et fides, +unde etiam dicitur ad Galat. V, quod fides per dilectionem +operatur. Sed fides non continetur sub lege naturae, quia ea quae +sunt fidei, sunt supra rationem naturalem. Ergo non omnia praecepta +moralia legis divinae pertinent ad legem naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.14" target="asv">Rom. 2:14</a>) that "the Gentiles, who have not the Law, do by nature those things that are of the Law": which must be understood of things + pertaining to good morals. Therefore all the moral precepts of the Law belong to the law of nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37848" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37848] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicit apostolus, Rom. II, quod <i>gentes, quae legem non +habent, naturaliter ea quae legis sunt, faciunt</i>, quod oportet +intelligi de his quae pertinent ad bonos mores. Ergo omnia moralia +praecepta legis sunt de lege naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q100_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The moral precepts, distinct from the ceremonial and judicial precepts, are about things pertaining of their very nature + to good morals. Now since human morals depend on their relation to reason, which is the proper principle of human acts, those + morals are called good which accord with reason, and those are called bad which are discordant from reason. And as every judgment + of speculative reason proceeds from the natural knowledge of first principles, so + every judgment of practical reason proceeds from principles known naturally, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q94_A2" id="FS_Q100_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[94], AA[2]</a>,4): from which principles one may proceed in various ways to judge of various matters. For some matters connected with human + actions are so evident, that after very little consideration one is able at once to approve or disapprove of them by means + of these general first principles: while some matters cannot be the subject of judgment without much consideration of + the various circumstances, which all are not competent to do carefully, but only those who are wise: just as it is not possible + for all to consider the particular conclusions of sciences, but only for those who are versed in philosophy: and lastly there + are some matters of which man cannot judge unless he be helped by Divine instruction; such as the articles of faith. + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A1-p7"> It is therefore evident that since the moral precepts are about matters which concern good morals; and since good morals + are those which are in accord with reason; and since also every judgment of human reason must needs by derived in some way + from natural reason; it follows, of necessity, that all the moral precepts belong to the law of nature; but not all in the + same way. For there are certain things which the natural reason of every man, of its own accord and at once, judges + to be done or not to be done: e.g. "Honor thy father and thy mother," and "Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal": and + these belong to the law of nature absolutely. And there are certain things which, after a more careful consideration, wise + men deem obligatory. Such belong to the law of nature, yet so that they need to be inculcated, the wiser teaching the less + wise: e.g. "Rise up before the hoary head, and honor the person of the aged man," and the like. And there are some things, + to + judge of which, human reason needs Divine instruction, whereby we are taught about the things of God: e.g. "Thou shalt not + make to thyself a graven thing, nor the likeness of anything; Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 1 co."><a name="37849" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37849] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod praecepta moralia, a caeremonialibus et iudicialibus +distincta, sunt de illis quae secundum se ad bonos mores pertinent. +Cum autem humani mores dicantur in ordine ad rationem, quae est +proprium principium humanorum actuum, illi mores dicuntur boni qui +rationi congruunt, mali autem qui a ratione discordant. Sicut autem +omne iudicium rationis speculativae procedit a naturali cognitione +primorum principiorum, ita etiam omne iudicium rationis practicae +procedit ex quibusdam principiis naturaliter cognitis, ut supra +dictum est. Ex quibus diversimode procedi potest ad iudicandum de +diversis. Quaedam enim sunt in humanis actibus adeo explicita quod +statim, cum modica consideratione, possunt approbari vel reprobari +per illa communia et prima principia. Quaedam vero sunt ad quorum +iudicium requiritur multa consideratio diversarum circumstantiarum, +quas considerare diligenter non est cuiuslibet, sed sapientum, +sicut considerare particulares conclusiones scientiarum non +pertinet ad omnes, sed ad solos philosophos. Quaedam vero sunt ad +quae diiudicanda indiget homo adiuvari per instructionem divinam, +sicut est circa credenda. Sic igitur patet quod, cum moralia +praecepta sint de his quae pertinent ad bonos mores; haec autem +sunt quae rationi congruunt; omne autem rationis humanae iudicium +aliqualiter a naturali ratione derivatur, necesse est quod omnia +praecepta moralia pertineant ad legem naturae, sed diversimode. +Quaedam enim sunt quae statim per se ratio naturalis cuiuslibet +hominis diiudicat esse facienda vel non facienda, sicut <i>honora +patrem tuum et matrem tuam, et, non occides, non furtum facies</i>. +Et huiusmodi sunt absolute de lege naturae. Quaedam vero sunt quae +subtiliori consideratione rationis a sapientibus iudicantur esse +observanda. Et ista sic sunt de lege naturae, ut tamen indigeant +disciplina, qua minores a sapientioribus instruantur, sicut illud, +<i>coram cano capite consurge, et honora personam senis</i>, et +alia huiusmodi. Quaedam vero sunt ad quae iudicanda ratio humana +indiget instructione divina, per quam erudimur de divinis, sicut +est illud, <i>non facies tibi sculptile neque omnem similitudinem; +non assumes nomen Dei tui in vanum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A1-p8"><b>Reply to Objections</b> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 1 ad arg."><a name="37850" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37850] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 1 ad arg.</span></a> Et per +hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q100_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q100_A2-p0.1">Q. 100. A. 2. Whether the moral precepts of the Law are about all the acts of virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the moral precepts of the Law are not about all the acts of virtue. For observance of the precepts of + the Old Law is called justification, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.8" target="asv"> Ps. 118:8</a>: "I will keep Thy justifications." But justification is the execution of justice. Therefore the moral precepts are only about + acts of justice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37851" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37851] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad +secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praecepta moralia legis non +sint de omnibus actibus virtutum. Observatio enim praeceptorum +veteris legis iustificatio nominatur, secundum illud Psalmi CXVIII, +<i>iustificationes tuas custodiam</i>. Sed iustificatio est +executio iustitiae. Ergo praecepta moralia non sunt nisi de actibus +iustitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which comes under a precept has the character of a duty. But the character of duty belongs to justice alone + and to none of the other virtues, for the proper act of justice consists in rendering to each one his due. Therefore the precepts + of the moral law are not about the acts of the other virtues, but only about the acts of justice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37852" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37852] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +id quod cadit sub praecepto, habet rationem debiti. Sed ratio +debiti non pertinet ad alias virtutes nisi ad solam iustitiam, +cuius proprius actus est reddere unicuique debitum. Ergo praecepta +legis moralia non sunt de actibus aliarum virtutum, sed solum de +actibus iustitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every law is made for the common good, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 21). But of all the virtues justice alone regards + the common good, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore the moral precepts are only about the acts of justice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37853" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37853] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +omnis lex ponitur propter bonum commune, ut dicit Isidorus. Sed +inter virtutes sola iustitia respicit bonum commune, ut philosophus +dicit, in V Ethic. Ergo praecepta moralia sunt solum de actibus +iustitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Paradiso viii) that "a sin is a transgression of the Divine law, and a disobedience to the commandments + of heaven." But there are sins contrary to all the acts of virtue. Therefore it belongs to Divine law to direct all the acts + of virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37854" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37854] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Ambrosius dicit, quod <i>peccatum est transgressio legis +divinae, et caelestium inobedientia mandatorum</i>. Sed peccata +contrariantur omnibus actibus virtutum. Ergo lex divina habet +ordinare de actibus omnium virtutum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q100_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since the precepts of the Law are ordained to the common good, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A2" id="FS_Q100_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[90], A[2]</a>), the precepts of the Law must needs be diversified according to the various kinds of community: hence the Philosopher (Polit. + iv, 1) teaches that the laws which are made in a state which is ruled by a king must be different from the laws of a state + which is ruled by the people, or by a few powerful men in the state. Now human law is ordained + for one kind of community, and the Divine law for another kind. Because human law is ordained for the civil community, implying + mutual duties of man and his fellows: and men are ordained to one another by outward acts, whereby men live in communion with + one another. This life in common of man with man pertains to justice, whose proper function consists in directing the human + community. Wherefore human law makes precepts only about acts of justice; and if it commands acts of other virtues, this + is only in so far as they assume the nature of justice, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. v, 1). + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A2-p7"> But the community for which the Divine law is ordained, is that of men in relation to God, either in this life or in the + life to come. And therefore the Divine law proposes precepts about all those matters whereby men are well ordered in their + relations to God. Now man is united to God by his reason or mind, in which is God's image. Wherefore the Divine law proposes + precepts about all those matters whereby human reason is well ordered. But this is effected by the acts of all the + virtues: since the intellectual virtues set in good order the acts of the reason in themselves: while the moral virtues set + in good order the acts of the reason in reference to the interior passions and exterior actions. It is therefore evident that + the Divine law fittingly proposes precepts about the acts of all the virtues: yet so that certain matters, without which the + order of virtue, which is the order of reason, cannot even exist, come under an obligation of precept; while other matters, + which pertain to the well-being of perfect virtue, come under an admonition of counsel. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 2 co."><a name="37855" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37855] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, cum praecepta legis ordinentur ad bonum commune, +sicut supra habitum est, necesse est quod praecepta legis +diversificentur secundum diversos modos communitatum, unde et +philosophus, in sua politica, docet quod alias leges oportet +statuere in civitate quae regitur rege, et alias in ea quae regitur +per populum, vel per aliquos potentes de civitate. Est autem alius +modus communitatis ad quam ordinatur lex humana, et ad quam +ordinatur lex divina. Lex enim humana ordinatur ad communitatem +civilem, quae est hominum ad invicem. Homines autem ordinantur ad +invicem per exteriores actus, quibus homines sibi invicem +communicant. Huiusmodi autem communicatio pertinet ad rationem +iustitiae, quae est proprie directiva communitatis humanae. Et ideo +lex humana non proponit praecepta nisi de actibus iustitiae; et si +praecipiat actus aliarum virtutum, hoc non est nisi inquantum +assumunt rationem iustitiae; ut patet per philosophum, in V Ethic. +Sed communitas ad quam ordinat lex divina, est hominum ad Deum, vel +in praesenti vel in futura vita. Et ideo lex divina praecepta +proponit de omnibus illis per quae homines bene ordinentur ad +communicationem cum Deo. Homo autem Deo coniungitur ratione, sive +mente, in qua est Dei imago. Et ideo lex divina praecepta proponit +de omnibus illis per quae ratio hominis est bene ordinata. Hoc +autem contingit per actus omnium virtutum, nam virtutes +intellectuales ordinant bene actus rationis in seipsis; virtutes +autem morales ordinant bene actus rationis circa interiores +passiones et exteriores operationes. Et ideo manifestum est quod +lex divina convenienter proponit praecepta de actibus omnium +virtutum, ita tamen quod quaedam, sine quibus ordo virtutis, qui +est ordo rationis, observari non potest, cadunt sub obligatione +praecepti; quaedam vero, quae pertinent ad bene esse virtutis +perfectae, cadunt sub admonitione consilii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The fulfilment of the commandments of the Law, even of those which are about the acts of the other virtues, has the character + of justification, inasmuch as it is just that man should obey God: or again, inasmuch as it is just that all that belongs + to man should be subject to reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37856" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37856] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod adimpletio mandatorum legis etiam quae sunt de +actibus aliarum virtutum, habet rationem iustificationis, inquantum +iustum est ut homo obediat Deo. Vel etiam inquantum iustum est quod +omnia quae sunt hominis, rationi subdantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Justice properly so called regards the duty of one man to another: but all the other virtues regard the duty of the lower + powers to reason. It is in relation to this latter duty that the Philosopher speaks (Ethic. v, 11) of a kind of metaphorical + justice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37857" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37857] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod iustitia proprie dicta attendit debitum unius hominis +ad alium, sed in omnibus aliis virtutibus attenditur debitum +inferiorum virium ad rationem. Et secundum rationem huius debiti, +philosophus assignat, in V Ethic., quandam iustitiam +metaphoricam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A2-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3</b>The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said about the different kinds of community.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37858" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37858] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +patet responsio per ea quae dicta sunt de diversitate +communitatis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q100_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q100_A3-p0.1">Q. 100. A. 3. Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reducible to the ten precepts of the decalogue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reducible to the ten precepts of the decalogue. For the + first and principal precepts of the Law are, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God," and "Thou shalt love thy neighbor," as stated + in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.37" target="asv"> Mat. 22:37,39.</a> But these two are not contained in the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore not all the moral precepts are contained in the + precepts of the decalogue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37859" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37859] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnia praecepta moralia veteris +legis reducantur ad decem praecepta Decalogi. Prima enim et +principalia legis praecepta sunt, diliges dominum Deum tuum, et, +diliges proximum tuum, ut habetur Matth. XXII. Sed ista duo non +continentur in praeceptis Decalogi. Ergo non omnia praecepta +moralia continentur in praeceptis Decalogi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the moral precepts are not reducible to the ceremonial precepts, but rather vice versa. But among the precepts of + the decalogue, one is ceremonial, viz. "Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath-day." Therefore the moral precepts are not + reducible to all the precepts of the decalogue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37860" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37860] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +praecepta moralia non reducuntur ad praecepta caeremonialia, sed +potius e converso. Sed inter praecepta Decalogi est unum +caeremoniale, scilicet, <i>memento ut diem sabbati sanctifices</i>. +Ergo praecepta moralia non reducuntur ad omnia praecepta +Decalogi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the moral precepts are about all the acts of virtue. But among the precepts of the decalogue are only such as regard + acts of justice; as may be seen by going through them all. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue do not include all the + moral precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37861" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37861] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +praecepta moralia sunt de omnibus actibus virtutum. Sed inter +praecepta Decalogi ponuntur sola praecepta pertinentia ad actus +iustitiae; ut patet discurrenti per singula. Ergo praecepta +Decalogi non continent omnia praecepta moralia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.11" target="asv"> Mat. 5:11</a>: "Blessed are ye when they shall revile you," etc. says that "Moses, after propounding the ten precepts, set them out in + detail." Therefore all the precepts of the Law are so many parts of the precepts of the decalogue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37862" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37862] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod, Matth. V, super illud, <i>beati estis cum +maledixerint</i> etc., dicit Glossa quod <i>Moyses, decem praecepta +proponens, postea per partes explicat</i>. Ergo omnia praecepta +legis sunt quaedam partes praeceptorum Decalogi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The precepts of the decalogue differ from the other precepts of the Law, in the fact that God Himself is said to have given + the precepts of the decalogue; whereas He gave the other precepts to the people through Moses. Wherefore the decalogue includes + those precepts the knowledge of which man has immediately from God. Such are those which with but slight reflection can be + gathered at once from the first general principles: and those also which become known + to man immediately through divinely infused faith. Consequently two kinds of precepts are not reckoned among the precepts + of the decalogue: viz. first general principles, for they need no further promulgation after being once imprinted on the natural + reason to which they are self-evident; as, for instance, that one should do evil to no man, and other similar principles: + and again those which the careful reflection of wise men shows to be in accord with reason; since the people receive these + principles from God, through being taught by wise men. Nevertheless both kinds of precepts are contained in the precepts of + the decalogue; yet in different ways. For the first general principles are contained in them, as principles in their proximate + conclusions; while those which are known through wise men are contained, conversely, as conclusions in their principles. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 3 co."><a name="37863" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37863] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod praecepta Decalogi ab aliis praeceptis legis +differunt in hoc, quod praecepta Decalogi per seipsum Deus dicitur +populo proposuisse; alia vero praecepta proposuit populo per +Moysen. Illa ergo praecepta ad Decalogum pertinent, quorum notitiam +homo habet per seipsum a Deo. Huiusmodi vero sunt illa quae statim +ex principiis communibus primis cognosci possunt modica +consideratione, et iterum illa quae statim ex fide divinitus infusa +innotescunt. Inter praecepta ergo Decalogi non computantur duo +genera praeceptorum, illa scilicet quae sunt prima et communia, +quorum non oportet aliam editionem esse nisi quod sunt scripta in +ratione naturali quasi per se nota, sicut quod nulli debet homo +malefacere, et alia huiusmodi; et iterum illa quae per diligentem +inquisitionem sapientum inveniuntur rationi convenire, haec enim +proveniunt a Deo ad populum mediante disciplina sapientum. Utraque +tamen horum praeceptorum continentur in praeceptis Decalogi, sed +diversimode. Nam illa quae sunt prima et communia, continentur in +eis sicut principia in conclusionibus proximis, illa vero quae per +sapientes cognoscuntur, continentur in eis, e converso, sicut +conclusiones in principiis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those two principles are the first general principles of the natural law, and are self-evident to human reason, either through + nature or through faith. Wherefore all the precepts of the decalogue are referred to these, as conclusions to general principles. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37864" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37864] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod illa duo praecepta sunt prima et communia +praecepta legis naturae, quae sunt per se nota rationi humanae, vel +per naturam vel per fidem. Et ideo omnia praecepta Decalogi ad illa +duo referuntur sicut conclusiones ad principia communia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The precept of the Sabbath observance is moral in one respect, in so far as it commands man to give some time to the things + of God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.45.11" target="asv"> Ps. 45:11</a>: "Be still and see that I am God." In this respect it is placed among the precepts of the decalogue: but not as to the fixing + of the time, in which respect it is a ceremonial precept. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37865" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37865] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod praeceptum de observatione sabbati est secundum +aliquid morale, inquantum scilicet per hoc praecipitur quod homo +aliquo tempore vacet rebus divinis; secundum illud Psalmi XLV, +<i>vacate, et videte quoniam ego sum Deus</i>. Et secundum hoc, +inter praecepta Decalogi computatur. Non autem quantum ad +taxationem temporis, quia secundum hoc est caeremoniale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The notion of duty is not so patent in the other virtues as it is in justice. Hence the precepts about the acts of the other + virtues are not so well known to the people as are the precepts about acts of justice. Wherefore the acts of justice especially + come under the precepts of the decalogue, which are the primary elements of the Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37866" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37866] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio debiti in aliis virtutibus est magis latens +quam in iustitia. Et ideo praecepta de actibus aliarum virtutum non +sunt ita nota populo sicut praecepta de actibus iustitiae. Et +propter hoc actus iustitiae specialiter cadunt sub praeceptis +Decalogi, quae sunt prima legis elementa.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q100_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q100_A4-p0.1">Q. 100. A. 4. Whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably distinguished from one another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably distinguished from one another. For worship is a virtue distinct + from faith. Now the precepts are about acts of virtue. But that which is said at the beginning of the decalogue, "Thou shalt + not have strange gods before Me," belongs to faith: and that which is added, "Thou shalt not make . . . any graven thing," + etc. belongs to worship. Therefore these are not one precept, as Augustine asserts (Qq. + in Exod. qu. lxxi), but two. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37867" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37867] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter praecepta Decalogi +distinguantur. Latria enim est alia virtus a fide. Sed praecepta +dantur de actibus virtutum. Sed hoc quod dicitur in principio +Decalogi, non habebis deos alienos coram me, pertinet ad fidem, +quod autem subditur, non facies sculptile etc., pertinet ad +latriam. Ergo sunt duo praecepta, et non unum, sicut Augustinus +dicit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the affirmative precepts in the Law are distinct from the negative precepts; e.g. "Honor thy father and thy mother," + and, "Thou shalt not kill." But this, "I am the Lord thy God," is affirmative: and that which follows, "Thou shalt not have + strange gods before Me," is negative. Therefore these are two precepts, and do not, as Augustine says (Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi), + make one. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37868" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37868] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +praecepta affirmativa in lege distinguuntur a negativis, sicut, +honora patrem et matrem, et, non occides. Sed hoc quod dicitur, ego +sum dominus Deus tuus, est affirmativum, quod autem subditur, non +habebis deos alienos coram me, est negativum. Ergo sunt duo +praecepta, et non continentur sub uno, ut Augustinus ponit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.7" target="asv">Rom. 7:7</a>): "I had not known concupiscence, if the Law did not say: 'Thou shalt not covet.'" Hence it seems that this precept, "Thou + shalt not covet," is one precept; and, therefore, should not be divided into two. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37869" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37869] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +apostolus, ad Rom. VII, dicit, <i>concupiscentiam nesciebam, nisi +lex diceret, non concupisces</i>. Et sic videtur quod hoc +praeceptum, non concupisces, sit unum praeceptum. Non ergo debet +distingui in duo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Augustine who, in commenting on Exodus (Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi) distinguishes three precepts as referring + to God, and seven as referring to our neighbor. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37870" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37870] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est auctoritas Augustini, in Glossa super Exod., ubi ponit tria +praecepta pertinentia ad Deum, et septem ad proximum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q100_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The precepts of the decalogue are differently divided by different authorities. For Hesychius commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.26.26" target="asv"> Lev. 26:26, </a> "Ten women shall bake your bread in one oven," says that the precept of the Sabbath-day observance is not one of the ten + precepts, because its observance, in the letter, is not binding for all time. But he distinguishes four precepts pertaining + to God, the first being, "I am the Lord thy God"; the second, "Thou shalt + not have strange gods before Me," (thus also Jerome distinguishes these two precepts, in his commentary on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Hos.10.10" target="asv"> Osee 10:10, </a> "On thy" [Vulg.: "their"] "two iniquities"); the third precept according to him is, "Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven + thing"; and the fourth, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain." He states that there are six precepts + pertaining to our neighbor; the first, "Honor thy father and thy mother"; the second, "Thou shalt not kill"; + the third, "Thou shalt not commit adultery"; the fourth, "Thou shalt not steal"; the fifth, "Thou shalt not bear false witness"; + the sixth, "Thou shalt not covet." + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A4-p7"> But, in the first place, it seems unbecoming for the precept of the Sabbath-day observance to be put among the precepts of + the decalogue, if it nowise belonged to the decalogue. Secondly, because, since it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.24" target="asv">Mat. 6:24</a>), "No man can serve two masters," the two statements, "I am the Lord thy God," and, "Thou shalt not have strange gods before + Me" seem to be of the same nature and to form one precept. Hence Origen (Hom. viii in Exod.) who also + distinguishes four precepts as referring to God, unites these two under one precept; and reckons in the second place, "Thou + shalt not make . . . any graven thing"; as third, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain"; and as fourth, + "Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath-day." The other six he reckons in the same way as Hesychius. + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A4-p8"> Since, however, the making of graven things or the likeness of anything is not forbidden except as to the point of their + being worshipped as gods---for God commanded an image of the Seraphim [Vulg.: Cherubim] to be made and placed in the tabernacle, + as related in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.25.18" target="asv"> Ex. 25:18</a>---Augustine more fittingly unites these two, "Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me," and, "Thou shalt not make . . + . any graven thing," into one precept. Likewise to covet another's + wife, for the purpose of carnal knowledge, belongs to the concupiscence of the flesh; whereas, to covet other things, which + are desired for the purpose of possession, belongs to the concupiscence of the eyes; wherefore Augustine reckons as distinct + precepts, that which forbids the coveting of another's goods, and that which prohibits the coveting of another's wife. Thus + he distinguishes three precepts as referring to God, and seven as referring to our neighbor. And this is better. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 4 co."><a name="37871" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37871] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod praecepta Decalogi diversimode a diversis +distinguuntur. Hesychius enim, Levit. XXVI, super illud, <i>decem +mulieres in uno clibano coquunt panes</i>, dicit praeceptum de +observatione sabbati non esse de decem praeceptis, quia non est +observandum, secundum litteram, secundum omne tempus. Distinguit +tamen quatuor praecepta pertinentia ad Deum, ut primum sit, ego sum +dominus Deus tuus; secundum sit, non habebis deos alienos coram me +(et sic etiam distinguit haec duo Hieronymus, Osee X, super illud, +propter duas iniquitates tuas); tertium vero praeceptum esse dicit, +non facies tibi sculptile; quartum vero, non assumes nomen Dei tui +in vanum. Pertinentia vero ad proximum dicit esse sex, ut primum +sit, honora patrem tuum et matrem tuam; secundum, non occides; +tertium, non moechaberis; quartum, non furtum facies; quintum, non +falsum testimonium dices; sextum, non concupisces. Sed primo hoc +videtur inconveniens, quod praeceptum de observatione sabbati +praeceptis Decalogi interponatur, si nullo modo ad Decalogum +pertineat. Secundo quia, cum scriptum sit Matth. VI, nemo potest +duobus dominis servire, eiusdem rationis esse videtur, et sub eodem +praecepto cadere, ego sum dominus Deus tuus, et, non habebis deos +alienos. Unde Origenes, distinguens etiam quatuor praecepta +ordinantia ad Deum, ponit ista duo pro uno praecepto; secundum vero +ponit, non facies sculptile; tertium, non assumes nomen Dei tui in +vanum; quartum, memento ut diem sabbati sanctifices. Alia vero sex +ponit sicut Hesychius. Sed quia facere sculptile vel similitudinem +non est prohibitum nisi secundum hoc, ut non colantur pro diis (nam +et in tabernaculo Deus praecepit fieri imaginem Seraphim, ut +habetur Exod. XXV); convenientius Augustinus ponit sub uno +praecepto, non habebis deos alienos, et, non facies sculptile. +Similiter etiam concupiscentia uxoris alienae ad commixtionem, +pertinet ad concupiscentiam carnis; concupiscentiae autem aliarum +rerum, quae desiderantur ad possidendum, pertinent ad +concupiscentiam oculorum; unde etiam Augustinus ponit duo praecepta +de non concupiscendo rem alienam, et uxorem alienam. Et sic ponit +tria praecepta in ordine ad Deum, et septem in ordine ad proximum. +Et hoc melius est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Worship is merely a declaration of faith: wherefore the precepts about worship should not be reckoned as distinct from those + about faith. Nevertheless precepts should be given about worship rather than about faith, because the precept about faith + is presupposed to the precepts of the decalogue, as is also the precept of charity. For just as the first general principles + of the natural law are self-evident to a subject having natural reason, and need no + promulgation; so also to believe in God is a first and self-evident principle to a subject possessed of faith: "for he that + cometh to God, must believe that He is" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.6" target="asv">Heb. 11:6</a>). Hence it needs no other promulgation that the infusion of faith. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37872" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37872] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod latria non est nisi quaedam protestatio fidei, +unde non sunt alia praecepta danda de latria, et alia de fide. +Potius tamen sunt danda de latria quam de fide, quia praeceptum +fidei praesupponitur ad praecepta Decalogi, sicut praeceptum +dilectionis. Sicut enim prima praecepta communia legis naturae sunt +per se nota habenti rationem naturalem, et promulgatione non +indigent; ita etiam et hoc quod est credere in Deum, est primum et +per se notum ei qui habet fidem, accedentem enim ad Deum oportet +credere quia est, ut dicitur ad Heb. XI. Et ideo non indiget alia +promulgatione nisi infusione fidei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The affirmative precepts are distinct from the negative, when one is not comprised in the other: thus that man should honor + his parents does not include that he should not kill another man; nor does the latter include the former. But when an affirmative + precept is included in a negative, or vice versa, we do not find that two distinct precepts are given: thus there is not one + precept saying that "Thou shalt not steal," and another binding one to keep + another's property intact, or to give it back to its owner. In the same way there are not different precepts about believing + in God, and about not believing in strange gods. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37873" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37873] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod praecepta affirmativa distinguuntur a negativis, +quando unum non comprehenditur in alio, sicut in honoratione +parentum non includitur quod nullus homo occidatur, nec e converso. +Sed quando affirmativum comprehenditur in negativo vel e converso, +non dantur super hoc diversa praecepta, sicut non datur aliud +praeceptum de hoc quod est, non furtum facies, et de hoc quod est +conservare rem alienam, vel restituere eam. Et eadem ratione non +sunt diversa praecepta de credendo in Deum, et de hoc quod non +credatur in alienos deos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All covetousness has one common ratio: and therefore the Apostle speaks of the commandment about covetousness as though it + were one. But because there are various special kinds of covetousness, therefore Augustine distinguishes different prohibitions + against coveting: for covetousness differs specifically in respect of the diversity of actions or things coveted, as the Philosopher + says (Ethic. x, 5). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37874" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37874] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod omnis concupiscentia convenit in una communi ratione, +et ideo apostolus singulariter de mandato concupiscendi loquitur. +Quia tamen in speciali diversae sunt rationes concupiscendi, ideo +Augustinus distinguit diversa praecepta de non concupiscendo, +differunt enim specie concupiscentiae secundum diversitatem +actionum vel concupiscibilium, ut philosophus dicit, in X +Ethic.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q100_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q100_A5-p0.1">Q. 100. A. 5. Whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably set forth?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably set forth. Because sin, as stated by Ambrose (De Paradiso + viii), is "a transgression of the Divine law and a disobedience to the commandments of heaven." But sins are distinguished + according as man sins against God, or his neighbor, or himself. Since, then, the decalogue does not include any precepts directing + man in his relations to himself, but only such as direct him in his relations to God and + himself, it seems that the precepts of the decalogue are insufficiently enumerated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="37875" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37875] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter praecepta Decalogi +enumerentur. Peccatum enim, ut Ambrosius dicit, est <i>transgressio +legis divinae, et caelestium inobedientia mandatorum</i>. Sed +peccata distinguuntur per hoc quod homo peccat vel in Deum, vel in +proximum, vel in seipsum. Cum igitur in praeceptis Decalogi non +ponantur aliqua praecepta ordinantia hominem ad seipsum, sed solum +ordinantia ipsum ad Deum et proximum; videtur quod insufficiens sit +enumeratio praeceptorum Decalogi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as the Sabbath-day observance pertained to the worship of God, so also did the observance of other solemnities, + and the offering of sacrifices. But the decalogue contains a precept about the Sabbath-day observance. Therefore it should + contain others also, pertaining to the other solemnities, and to the sacrificial rite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="37876" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37876] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut ad cultum Dei pertinebat observatio sabbati, ita etiam +observatio aliarum solemnitatum, et immolatio sacrificiorum. Sed +inter praecepta Decalogi est unum pertinens ad observantiam +sabbati. Ergo etiam debent esse aliqua pertinentia ad alias +solemnitates, et ad ritum sacrificiorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as sins against God include the sin of perjury, so also do they include blasphemy, or other ways of lying against + the teaching of God. But there is a precept forbidding perjury, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain." + Therefore there should be also a precept of the decalogue forbidding blasphemy and false doctrine. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="37877" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37877] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut contra Deum peccare contingit periurando, ita etiam +blasphemando, vel alias contra doctrinam divinam mentiendo. Sed +ponitur unum praeceptum prohibens periurium, cum dicitur, <i>non +assumes nomen Dei tui in vanum</i>. Ergo peccatum blasphemiae, et +falsae doctrinae, debent aliquo praecepto Decalogi prohiberi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as man has a natural affection for his parents, so has he also for his children. Moreover the commandment of + charity extends to all our neighbors. Now the precepts of the decalogue are ordained unto charity, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.5" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:5</a>: "The end of the commandment is charity." Therefore as there is a precept referring to parents, so should there have been + some precepts referring to children and other neighbors. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="37878" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37878] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut homo naturalem dilectionem habet ad parentes, ita etiam ad +filios. Mandatum etiam caritatis ad omnes proximos extenditur. Sed +praecepta Decalogi ordinantur ad caritatem; secundum illud I Tim. +I, <i>finis praecepti caritas est</i>. Ergo sicut ponitur quoddam +praeceptum pertinens ad parentes, ita etiam debuerunt poni aliqua +praecepta pertinentia ad filios et ad alios proximos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A5-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, in every kind of sin, it is possible to sin in thought or in deed. But in some kinds of sin, namely in theft and + adultery, the prohibition of sins of deed, when it is said, "Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not steal," is distinct + from the prohibition of the sin of thought, when it is said, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods," and, "Thou shalt + not covet thy neighbor's wife." Therefore the same should have been done in regard to the + sins of homicide and false witness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 5 arg. 5"><a name="37879" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37879] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +in quolibet genere peccati contingit peccare corde et opere. Sed in +quibusdam generibus peccatorum, scilicet in furto et adulterio, +seorsum prohibetur peccatum operis, cum dicitur, non moechaberis, +non furtum facies; et seorsum peccatum cordis, cum dicitur, non +concupisces rem proximi tui, et, non concupisces uxorem proximi +tui. Ergo etiam idem debuit poni in peccato homicidii et falsi +testimonii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A5-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, just as sin happens through disorder of the concupiscible faculty, so does it arise through disorder of the irascible + part. But some precepts forbid inordinate concupiscence, when it is said, "Thou shalt not covet." Therefore the decalogue + should have included some precepts forbidding the disorders of the irascible faculty. Therefore it seems that the ten precepts + of the decalogue are unfittingly enumerated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 5 arg. 6"><a name="37880" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37880] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut contingit peccatum provenire ex inordinatione +concupiscibilis, ita etiam ex inordinatione irascibilis. Sed +quibusdam praeceptis prohibetur inordinata concupiscentia, cum +dicitur, non concupisces. Ergo etiam aliqua praecepta in Decalogo +debuerunt poni per quae prohiberetur inordinatio irascibilis. Non +ergo videtur quod convenienter decem praecepta Decalogi +enumerentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A5-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.4.13" target="asv">Dt. 4:13</a>): "He shewed you His covenant, which He commanded you to do, and the ten words that He wrote in two tablets of stone." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 5 s. c."><a name="37881" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37881] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Deut. IV, <i>ostendit vobis pactum suum, quod +praecepit ut faceretis; et decem verba quae scripsit in duabus +tabulis lapideis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q100_A5-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q100_A2" id="FS_Q100_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, just as the precepts of human law direct man in his relations to the human community, so the precepts of the Divine law + direct man in his relations to a community or commonwealth of men under God. Now in order that any man may dwell aright in + a community, two things are required: the first is that he behave well to the head of the community; the other is that he + behave well to those who are his fellows and + partners in the community. It is therefore necessary that the Divine law should contain in the first place precepts ordering + man in his relations to God; and in the second place, other precepts ordering man in his relations to other men who are his + neighbors and live with him under God. + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A5-p10"> Now man owes three things to the head of the community: first, fidelity; secondly, reverence; thirdly, service. Fidelity + to his master consists in his not giving sovereign honor to another: and this is the sense of the first commandment, in the + words "Thou shalt not have strange gods." Reverence to his master requires that he should do nothing injurious to him: and + this is conveyed by the second commandment, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain." Service is + due to the master in return for the benefits which his subjects receive from him: and to this belongs the third commandment + of the sanctification of the Sabbath in memory of the creation of all things. + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A5-p11"> To his neighbors a man behaves himself well both in particular and in general. In particular, as to those to whom he is indebted, + by paying his debts: and in this sense is to be taken the commandment about honoring one's parents. In general, as to all + men, by doing harm to none, either by deed, or by word, or by thought. By deed, harm is done to one's neighbor---sometimes + in his person, i.e. as to his personal existence; and this is forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt not kill": + sometimes in a person united to him, as to the propagation of offspring; and this is prohibited by the words, "Thou shalt + not commit adultery": sometimes in his possessions, which are directed to both the aforesaid; and with this regard to this + it is said, "Thou shalt not steal." Harm done by word is forbidden when it is said, "Thou shalt not bear false witness against + thy neighbor": harm done by thought is forbidden in the words, "Thou shalt not covet." + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A5-p12"> The three precepts that direct man in his behavior towards God may also be differentiated in this same way. For the first + refers to deeds; wherefore it is said, "Thou shalt not make . . . a graven thing": the second, to words; wherefore it is said, + "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain": the third, to thoughts; because the sanctification of the Sabbath, + as the subject of a moral precept, requires repose of the heart in God. Or, according to Augustine (In + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A5-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.32" target="asv">Ps. + 32 + </a>: Conc. 1), by the first commandment we reverence the unity of the First Principle; by the second, the Divine truth; by the + third, His goodness whereby we are sanctified, and wherein we rest as in our last end. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 5 co."><a name="37882" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37882] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, sicut praecepta legis +humanae ordinant hominem ad communitatem humanam, ita praecepta +legis divinae ordinant hominem ad quandam communitatem seu +rempublicam hominum sub Deo. Ad hoc autem quod aliquis in aliqua +communitate bene commoretur, duo requiruntur, quorum primum est ut +bene se habeat ad eum qui praeest communitati; aliud autem est ut +homo bene se habeat ad alios communitatis consocios et +comparticipes. Oportet igitur quod in lege divina primo ferantur +quaedam praecepta ordinantia hominem ad Deum; et deinde alia +praecepta ordinantia hominem ad alios proximos simul conviventes +sub Deo. Principi autem communitatis tria debet homo, primo quidem, +fidelitatem; secundo, reverentiam; tertio, famulatum. Fidelitas +quidem ad dominum in hoc consistit, ut honorem principatus ad alium +non deferat. Et quantum ad hoc accipitur primum praeceptum, cum +dicitur, non habebis deos alienos. Reverentia autem ad dominum +requiritur ut nihil iniuriosum in eum committatur. Et quantum ad +hoc accipitur secundum praeceptum, quod est, non assumes nomen +domini Dei tui in vanum. Famulatus autem debetur domino in +recompensationem beneficiorum quae ab ipso percipiunt subditi. Et +ad hoc pertinet tertium praeceptum, de sanctificatione sabbati in +memoriam creationis rerum. Ad proximos autem aliquis bene se habet +et specialiter, et generaliter. Specialiter quidem, quantum ad +illos quorum est debitor, ut eis debitum reddat. Et quantum ad hoc +accipitur praeceptum de honoratione parentum. Generaliter autem, +quantum ad omnes, ut nulli nocumentum inferatur, neque opere neque +ore neque corde. Opere quidem infertur nocumentum proximo, +quandoque quidem in personam propriam, quantum ad consistentiam +scilicet personae. Et hoc prohibetur per hoc quod dicitur, non +occides. Quandoque autem in personam coniunctam quantum ad +propagationem prolis. Et hoc prohibetur cum dicitur, non +moechaberis. Quandoque autem in rem possessam, quae ordinatur ad +utrumque. Et quantum ad hoc dicitur, non furtum facies. Nocumentum +autem oris prohibetur cum dicitur, <i>non loqueris contra proximum +tuum falsum testimonium</i>. Nocumentum autem cordis prohibetur cum +dicitur, non concupisces. Et secundum hanc etiam differentiam +possent distingui tria praecepta ordinantia in Deum. Quorum primum +pertinet ad opus, unde ibi dicitur, non facies sculptile. Secundum +ad os, unde dicitur, non assumes nomen Dei tui in vanum. Tertium +pertinet ad cor, quia in sanctificatione sabbati, secundum quod est +morale praeceptum, praecipitur quies cordis in Deum. Vel, secundum +Augustinum, per primum praeceptum reveremur unitatem primi +principii; per secundum, veritatem divinam; per tertium, eius +bonitatem, qua sanctificamur, et in qua quiescimus sicut in +fine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q100_A5-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection may be answered in two ways. First, because the precepts of the decalogue can be reduced to the precepts of + charity. Now there was need for man to receive a precept about loving God and his neighbor, because in this respect the natural + law had become obscured on account of sin: but not about the duty of loving oneself, because in this respect the natural law + retained its vigor: or again, because love of oneself is contained in the love + of God and of one's neighbor: since true self-love consists in directing oneself to God. And for this reason the decalogue + includes those precepts only which refer to our neighbor and to God. + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A5-p14"> Secondly, it may be answered that the precepts of the decalogue are those which the people received from God immediately; + wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A5-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.10.4" target="asv">Dt. 10:4</a>): "He wrote in the tables, according as He had written before, the ten words, which the Lord spoke to you." Hence the precepts + of the decalogue need to be such as the people can understand at once. Now a precept implies the notion of duty. But it is + easy for a man, especially for a believer, to understand + that, of necessity, he owes certain duties to God and to his neighbor. But that, in matters which regard himself and not another, + man has, of necessity, certain duties to himself, is not so evident: for, at the first glance, it seems that everyone is free + in matters that concern himself. And therefore the precepts which prohibit disorders of a man with regard to himself, reach + the people through the instruction of men who are versed through the instruction of men who are versed in such matters; + and, consequently, they are not contained in the decalogue. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="37883" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37883] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo potest responderi dupliciter. Primo quidem, quia praecepta +Decalogi referuntur ad praecepta dilectionis. Fuit autem dandum +praeceptum homini de dilectione Dei et proximi, quia quantum ad hoc +lex naturalis obscurata erat propter peccatum, non autem quantum ad +dilectionem sui ipsius, quia quantum ad hoc lex naturalis vigebat. +Vel quia etiam dilectio sui ipsius includitur in dilectione Dei et +proximi, in hoc enim homo vere se diligit, quod se ordinat in Deum. +Et ideo etiam in praeceptis Decalogi ponuntur solum praecepta +pertinentia ad proximum et ad Deum. Aliter potest dici quod +praecepta Decalogi sunt illa quae immediate populus recepit a Deo, +unde dicitur Deut. X, <i>scripsit in tabulis, iuxta id quod prius +scripserat, verba decem, quae locutus est ad vos dominus</i>. Unde +oportet praecepta Decalogi talia esse quae statim in mente populi +cadere possunt. Praeceptum autem habet rationem debiti. Quod autem +homo ex necessitate debeat aliquid Deo vel proximo, hoc de facili +cadit in conceptione hominis, et praecipue fidelis. Sed quod +aliquid ex necessitate sit debitum homini de his quae pertinent ad +seipsum et non ad alium, hoc non ita in promptu apparet, videtur +enim primo aspectu quod quilibet sit liber in his quae ad ipsum +pertinent. Et ideo praecepta quibus prohibentur inordinationes +hominis ad seipsum, perveniunt ad populum mediante instructione +sapientum. Unde non pertinent ad Decalogum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A5-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All the solemnities of the Old Law were instituted in celebration of some Divine favor, either in memory of past favors, + or in sign of some favor to come: in like manner all the sacrifices were offered up with the same purpose. Now of all the + Divine favors to be commemorated the chief was that of the Creation, which was called to mind by the sanctification of the + Sabbath; wherefore the reason for this precept is given in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A5-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.11" target="asv"> Ex. + 20:11 + </a>: "In six days the Lord made heaven and earth," etc. And of all future blessings, the chief and final was the repose of the + mind in God, either, in the present life, by grace, or, in the future life, by glory; which repose was also foreshadowed in + the Sabbath-day observance: wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A5-p15.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.58.13" target="asv">Is. 58:13</a>): "If thou turn away thy foot from the Sabbath, from doing thy own will in My holy day, and call the Sabbath delightful, + and the holy of the Lord + glorious." Because these favors first and chiefly are borne in mind by men, especially by the faithful. But other solemnities + were celebrated on account of certain particular favors temporal and transitory, such as the celebration of the Passover in + memory of the past favor of the delivery from Egypt, and as a sign of the future Passion of Christ, which though temporal + and transitory, brought us to the repose of the spiritual Sabbath. Consequently, the Sabbath alone, and none of the other + solemnities and sacrifices, is mentioned in the precepts of the decalogue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="37884" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37884] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod omnes solemnitates legis veteris sunt institutae in +commemorationem alicuius divini beneficii vel praeteriti +commemorati, vel futuri praefigurati. Et similiter propter hoc +omnia sacrificia offerebantur. Inter omnia autem beneficia Dei +commemoranda, primum et praecipuum erat beneficium creationis, quod +commemoratur in sanctificatione sabbati, unde Exod. XX pro ratione +huius praecepti ponitur, <i>sex enim diebus fecit Deus caelum et +terram</i> et cetera. Inter omnia autem futura beneficia, quae +erant praefiguranda, praecipuum et finale erat quies mentis in Deo, +vel in praesenti per gratiam, vel in futuro per gloriam, quae etiam +figurabatur per observantiam sabbati; unde dicitur Isaiae LVIII, +<i>si averteris a sabbato pedem tuum, facere voluntatem tuam in die +sancto meo, et vocaveris sabbatum delicatum, et sanctum domini +gloriosum</i>. Haec enim beneficia primo et principaliter sunt in +mente hominum, maxime fidelium. Aliae vero solemnitates celebrantur +propter aliqua particularia beneficia temporaliter transeuntia, +sicut celebratio phase propter beneficium praeteritae liberationis +ex Aegypto, et propter futuram passionem Christi, quae temporaliter +transivit, inducens nos in quietem sabbati spiritualis. Et ideo, +praetermissis omnibus aliis solemnitatibus et sacrificiis, de solo +sabbato fiebat mentio inter praecepta Decalogi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A5-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A5-p16.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.6.16" target="asv">Heb. 6:16</a>), "men swear by one greater than themselves; and an oath for confirmation is the end of all their controversy." Hence, since + oaths are common to all, inordinate swearing is the matter of a special prohibition by a precept of the decalogue. According + to one interpretation, however, the words, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain," are a prohibition of + false doctrine, for one gloss + expounds them thus: "Thou shalt not say that Christ is a creature." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="37885" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37885] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut apostolus dicit, ad Heb. VI, <i>homines per +maiorem sui iurant, et omnis controversiae eorum finis ad +confirmationem est iuramentum</i>. Et ideo, quia iuramentum est +omnibus commune, propter hoc prohibitio inordinationis circa +iuramentum, specialiter praecepto Decalogi prohibetur. Peccatum +vero falsae doctrinae non pertinet nisi ad paucos, unde non +oportebat ut de hoc fieret mentio inter praecepta Decalogi. Quamvis +etiam, quantum ad aliquem intellectum, in hoc quod dicitur, non +assumes nomen Dei tui in vanum, prohibeatur falsitas doctrinae, una +enim Glossa exponit, non dices Christum esse creaturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A5-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> That a man should not do harm to anyone is an immediate dictate of his natural reason: and therefore the precepts that forbid + the doing of harm are binding on all men. But it is not an immediate dictate of natural reason that a man should do one thing + in return for another, unless he happen to be indebted to someone. Now a son's debt to his father is so evident that one cannot + get away from it by denying it: since the father is the principle of + generation and being, and also of upbringing and teaching. Wherefore the decalogue does not prescribe deeds of kindness or + service to be done to anyone except to one's parents. On the other hand parents do not seem to be indebted to their children + for any favors received, but rather the reverse is the case. Again, a child is a part of his father; and "parents love their + children as being a part of themselves," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 12). Hence, just as the decalogue contains + no + ordinance as to man's behavior towards himself, so, for the same reason, it includes no precept about loving one's children. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="37886" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37886] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod statim ratio naturalis homini dictat quod nulli +iniuriam faciat, et ideo praecepta prohibentia nocumentum, +extendunt se ad omnes. Sed ratio naturalis non statim dictat quod +aliquid sit pro alio faciendum, nisi cui homo aliquid debet. +Debitum autem filii ad patrem adeo est manifestum quod nulla +tergiversatione potest negari, eo quod pater est principium +generationis et esse, et insuper educationis et doctrinae. Et ideo +non ponitur sub praecepto Decalogi ut aliquod beneficium vel +obsequium alicui impendatur nisi parentibus. Parentes autem non +videntur esse debitores filiis propter aliqua beneficia suscepta, +sed potius e converso. Filius etiam est aliquid patris; et patres +amant filios ut aliquid ipsorum, sicut dicit philosophus, in VIII +Ethic. Unde eisdem rationibus non ponuntur aliqua praecepta +Decalogi pertinentia ad amorem filiorum, sicut neque etiam aliqua +ordinantia hominem ad seipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A5-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The pleasure of adultery and the usefulness of wealth, in so far as they have the character of pleasurable or useful good, + are of themselves, objects of appetite: and for this reason they needed to be forbidden not only in the deed but also in the + desire. But murder and falsehood are, of themselves, objects of repulsion (since it is natural for man to love his neighbor + and the truth): and are desired only for the sake of something else. Consequently + with regard to sins of murder and false witness, it was necessary to proscribe, not sins of thought, but only sins of deed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 5 ad 5"><a name="37887" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37887] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod delectatio adulterii, et utilitas divitiarum, sunt +propter seipsa appetibilia, inquantum habent rationem boni +delectabilis vel utilis. Et propter hoc oportuit in eis prohiberi +non solum opus, sed etiam concupiscentiam. Sed homicidium et +falsitas sunt secundum seipsa horribilia, quia proximus et veritas +naturaliter amantur, et non desiderantur nisi propter aliud. Et +ideo non oportuit circa peccatum homicidii et falsi testimonii +prohibere peccatum cordis, sed solum operis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A5-p19"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> As stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q25_A1" id="FS_Q100_A5-p19.1" shape="rect">Q[25], A[1]</a>), all the passions of the irascible faculty arise from the passions of the concupiscible part. Hence, as the precepts of + the decalogue are, as it were, the first elements of the Law, there was no need for mention of the irascible passions, but + only of the concupiscible passions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 5 ad 6"><a name="37888" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37888] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, omnes passiones irascibilis +derivantur a passionibus concupiscibilis. Et ideo in praeceptis +Decalogi, quae sunt quasi prima elementa legis, non erat mentio +facienda de passionibus irascibilis, sed solum de passionibus +concupiscibilis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q100_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q100_A6-p0.1">Q. 100. A. 6. Whether the ten precepts of the decalogue are set in proper order?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the ten precepts of the decalogue are not set in proper order. Because love of one's neighbor is seemingly + previous to love of God, since our neighbor is better known to us than God is; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.20" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:20</a>: "He that loveth not his brother, whom he seeth, how can he love God, Whom he seeth not?" But the first three precepts belong + to the love of God, while the other seven pertain to the love of our neighbor. Therefore + the precepts of the decalogue are not set in proper order. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="37889" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37889] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter ordinentur decem +praecepta Decalogi. Dilectio enim proximi videtur esse praevia ad +dilectionem Dei, quia proximus est nobis magis notus quam Deus; +secundum illud I Ioan. IV, <i>qui fratrem suum, quem videt, non +diligit, Deum, quem non videt, quomodo potest diligere?</i> Sed +tria prima praecepta pertinent ad dilectionem Dei, septem vero alia +ad dilectionem proximi. Ergo inconvenienter praecepta Decalogi +ordinantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the acts of virtue are prescribed by the affirmative precepts, and acts of vice are forbidden by the negative precepts. + But according to Boethius in his commentary on the Categories [*Lib. iv, cap. De Oppos.], vices should be uprooted before + virtues are sown. Therefore among the precepts concerning our neighbor, the negative precepts should have preceded the affirmative. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="37890" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37890] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +per praecepta affirmativa imperantur actus virtutum, per praecepta +vero negativa prohibentur actus vitiorum. Sed secundum Boetium, in +commento praedicamentorum, prius sunt extirpanda vitia quam +inserantur virtutes. Ergo inter praecepta pertinentia ad proximum, +primo ponenda fuerunt praecepta negativa quam affirmativa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the precepts of the Law are about men's actions. But actions of thought precede actions of word or outward deed. + Therefore the precepts about not coveting, which regard our thoughts, are unsuitably placed last in order. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="37891" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37891] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +praecepta legis dantur de actibus hominum. Sed prior est actus +cordis quam oris vel exterioris operis. Ergo inconvenienti ordine +praecepta de non concupiscendo, quae pertinent ad cor, ultimo +ponuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.1" target="asv">Rom. 13:1</a>): "The things that are of God, are well ordered" [Vulg.: 'Those that are, are ordained of God']. But the precepts of the + decalogue were given immediately by God, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q100_A3" id="FS_Q100_A6-p5.2" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. Therefore they are arranged in becoming order. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 6 s. c."><a name="37892" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37892] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. XIII, <i>quae a Deo sunt, ordinata +sunt</i>. Sed praecepta Decalogi sunt immediate data a Deo, ut +dictum est. Ergo convenientem ordinem habent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q100_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q100_A3" id="FS_Q100_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[3]</a>,5, ad 1), the precepts of the decalogue are such as the mind of man is ready to grasp at once. Now it is evident that a thing + is so much the more easily grasped by the reason, as its contrary is more grievous and repugnant to reason. Moreover, it is + clear, since the order of reason begins with the end, that, for a man to be inordinately disposed towards his end, is supremely + contrary to reason. Now the end of + human life and society is God. Consequently it was necessary for the precepts of the decalogue, first of all, to direct man + to God; since the contrary to this is most grievous. Thus also, in an army, which is ordained to the commander as to its end, + it is requisite first that the soldier should be subject to the commander, and the opposite of this is most grievous; and + secondly it is requisite that he should be in coordination with the other soldiers. + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A6-p7"> Now among those things whereby we are ordained to God, the first is that man should be subjected to Him faithfully, by having + nothing in common with His enemies. The second is that he should show Him reverence: the third that he should offer Him service. + Thus, in an army, it is a greater sin for a soldier to act treacherously and make a compact with the foe, than to be insolent + to his commander: and this last is more grievous than if he be found wanting in some point of service + to him. + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A6-p8"> As to the precepts that direct man in his behavior towards his neighbor, it is evident that it is more repugnant to reason, + and a more grievous sin, if man does not observe the due order as to those persons to whom he is most indebted. Consequently, + among those precepts that direct man in his relations to his neighbor, the first place is given to that one which regards + his parents. Among the other precepts we again find the order to be according to the gravity of sin. For it is + more grave and more repugnant to reason, to sin by deed than by word; and by word than by thought. And among sins of deed, + murder which destroys life in one already living is more grievous than adultery, which imperils the life of the unborn child; + and adultery is more grave than theft, which regards external goods. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 6 co."><a name="37893" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37893] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, praecepta Decalogi dantur de his +quae statim in promptu mens hominis suscipit. Manifestum est autem +quod tanto aliquid magis a ratione suscipitur, quanto contrarium +est gravius et magis rationi repugnans. Manifestum est autem quod, +cum rationis ordo a fine incipiat, maxime est contra rationem ut +homo inordinate se habeat circa finem. Finis autem humanae vitae et +societatis est Deus. Et ideo primo oportuit per praecepta Decalogi +hominem ordinare ad Deum, cum eius contrarium sit gravissimum. +Sicut etiam in exercitu, qui ordinatur ad ducem sicut ad finem, +primum est quod miles subdatur duci, et huius contrarium est +gravissimum; secundum vero est ut aliis coordinetur. Inter ipsa +autem per quae ordinamur in Deum, primum occurrit quod homo +fideliter ei subdatur, nullam participationem cum inimicis habens. +Secundum autem est quod ei reverentiam exhibeat. Tertium autem est +quod etiam famulatum impendat. Maiusque peccatum est in exercitu si +miles, infideliter agens, cum hoste pactum habeat, quam si aliquam +irreverentiam faciat duci, et hoc est etiam gravius quam si in +aliquo obsequio ducis deficiens inveniatur. In praeceptis autem +ordinantibus ad proximum, manifestum est quod magis repugnat +rationi, et gravius peccatum est, si homo non servet ordinem +debitum ad personas quibus magis est debitor. Et ideo inter +praecepta ordinantia ad proximum, primo ponitur praeceptum +pertinens ad parentes. Inter alia vero praecepta etiam apparet ordo +secundum ordinem gravitatis peccatorum. Gravius est enim, et magis +rationi repugnans, peccare opere quam ore, et ore quam corde. Et +inter peccata operis, gravius est homicidium, per quod tollitur +vita hominis iam existentis, quam adulterium, per quod impeditur +certitudo prolis nasciturae; et adulterium gravius quam furtum, +quod pertinet ad bona exteriora.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although our neighbor is better known than God by the way of the senses, nevertheless the love of God is the reason for the + love of our neighbor, as shall be declared later on ( + <a href="SS_i.html#SS_Q25_A1" id="FS_Q100_A6-p9.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[25], A[1]</a>; + <a href="SS_i.html#SS_Q26_A2" id="FS_Q100_A6-p9.2" shape="rect">SS, Q[26], A[2]</a>). Hence the precepts ordaining man to God demanded precedence of the others. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="37894" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37894] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, quamvis secundum viam sensus proximus sit magis +notus quam Deus, tamen dilectio Dei est ratio dilectionis proximi, +ut infra patebit. Et ideo praecepta ordinantia ad Deum, fuerunt +praeordinanda.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as God is the universal principle of being in respect of all things, so is a father a principle of being in respect + of his son. Therefore the precept regarding parents was fittingly placed after the precepts regarding God. This argument holds + in respect of affirmative and negative precepts about the same kind of deed: although even then it is not altogether cogent. + For although in the order of execution, vices should be uprooted before virtues + are sown, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A6-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.33.15" target="asv"> Ps. 33:15</a>: "Turn away from evil, and do good," and + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A6-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.1.16" target="asv"> Is. 1:16,17</a>: "Cease to do perversely; learn to do well"; yet, in the order of knowledge, virtue precedes vice, because "the crooked line + is known by the straight" (De Anima i): and "by the law is the knowledge of sin" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A6-p10.3" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.20" target="asv">Rom. 3:20</a>). Wherefore the affirmation precept demanded the first place. However, this is not the reason for the order, but that which + is given + above. Because in the precepts regarding God, which belongs to the first table, an affirmative precept is placed last, since + its transgression implies a less grievous sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="37895" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37895] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut Deus est universale principium essendi +omnibus, ita etiam pater est principium quoddam essendi filio. Et +ideo convenienter post praecepta pertinentia ad Deum, ponitur +praeceptum pertinens ad parentes. Ratio autem procedit quando +affirmativa et negativa pertinent ad idem genus operis. Quamvis +etiam et in hoc non habeat omnimodam efficaciam. Etsi enim in +executione operis, prius extirpanda sint vitia quam inserendae +virtutes, secundum illud Psalmi XXXIII, <i>declina a malo, et fac +bonum</i>, et Isaiae I, <i>quiescite agere perverse, discite +benefacere</i>; tamen in cognitione prior est virtus quam peccatum, +quia per rectum cognoscitur obliquum, ut dicitur in I de anima. Per +legem autem cognitio peccati, ut Rom. III dicitur. Et secundum hoc, +praeceptum affirmativum debuisset primo poni. Sed non est ista +ratio ordinis, sed quae supra posita est. Quia in praeceptis +pertinentibus ad Deum, quae sunt primae tabulae, ultimo ponitur +praeceptum affirmativum, quia eius transgressio minorem reatum +inducit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although sin of thought stands first in the order of execution, yet its prohibition holds a later position in the order of + reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="37896" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37896] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod peccatum cordis etsi sit prius in executione, tamen +eius prohibitio posterius cadit in ratione.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q100_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q100_A7-p0.1">Q. 100. A. 7. Whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably formulated?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably formulated. Because the affirmative precepts direct man to + acts of virtue, while the negative precepts withdraw him from acts of vice. But in every matter there are virtues and vices + opposed to one another. Therefore in whatever matter there is an ordinance of a precept of the decalogue, there should have + been an affirmative and a negative precept. Therefore it was unfitting that affirmative + precepts should be framed in some matters, and negative precepts in others. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="37897" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37897] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad +septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praecepta Decalogi +inconvenienter tradantur. Praecepta enim affirmativa ordinant ad +actus virtutum, praecepta autem negativa abstrahunt ab actibus +vitiorum. Sed circa quamlibet materiam opponuntur sibi virtutes et +vitia. Ergo in qualibet materia de qua ordinat praeceptum Decalogi, +debuit poni praeceptum affirmativum et negativum. Inconvenienter +igitur ponuntur quaedam affirmativa et quaedam negativa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Isidore says (Etym. ii, 10) that every law is based on reason. But all the precepts of the decalogue belong to the + Divine law. Therefore the reason should have been pointed out in each precept, and not only in the first and third. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="37898" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37898] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Isidorus dicit quod omnis lex ratione constat. Sed omnia praecepta +Decalogi pertinent ad legem divinam. Ergo in omnibus debuit ratio +assignari, et non solum in primo et tertio praecepto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by observing the precepts man deserves to be rewarded by God. But the Divine promises concern the rewards of the + precepts. Therefore the promise should have been included in each precept, and not only in the second and fourth. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="37899" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37899] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +per observantiam praeceptorum meretur aliquis praemia a Deo. Sed +divinae promissiones sunt de praemiis praeceptorum. Ergo promissio +debuit poni in omnibus praeceptis, et non solum in primo et +quarto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A7-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Old Law is called "the law of fear," in so far as it induced men to observe the precepts, by means of the threat + of punishments. But all the precepts of the decalogue belong to the Old Law. Therefore a threat of punishment should have + been included in each, and not only in the first and second. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 7 arg. 4"><a name="37900" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37900] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 7 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +lex vetus dicitur lex timoris, inquantum per comminationes poenarum +inducebat ad observationes praeceptorum. Sed omnia praecepta +Decalogi pertinent ad legem veterem. Ergo in omnibus debuit poni +comminatio poenae, et non solum in primo et secundo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A7-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, all the commandments of God should be retained in the memory: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A7-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.3.3" target="asv">Prov. 3:3</a>): "Write them in the tables of thy heart." Therefore it was not fitting that mention of the memory should be made in the + third commandment only. Consequently it seems that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably formulated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 7 arg. 5"><a name="37901" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37901] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 7 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +omnia praecepta Dei sunt in memoria retinenda, dicitur enim Prov. +III, <i>describe ea in tabulis cordis tui</i>. Inconvenienter ergo +in solo tertio praecepto fit mentio de memoria. Et ita videntur +praecepta Decalogi inconvenienter tradita esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A7-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A7-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.21" target="asv">Wis. 11:21</a>) that "God made all things, in measure, number and weight." Much more therefore did He observe a suitable manner in formulating + His Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 7 s. c."><a name="37902" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37902] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Sap. XI, quod <i>Deus omnia fecit in numero, +pondere et mensura</i>. Multo magis ergo in praeceptis suae legis +congruum modum tradendi servavit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A7-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The highest wisdom is contained in the precepts of the Divine law: wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.4.6" target="asv">Dt. 4:6</a>): "This is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of nations." Now it belongs to wisdom to arrange all things in due + manner and order. Therefore it must be evident that the precepts of the Law are suitably set forth. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 7 co."><a name="37903" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37903] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod in praeceptis divinae legis maxima sapientia +continetur, unde dicitur Deut. IV, <i>haec est vestra sapientia et +intellectus coram populis</i>. Sapientis autem est omnia debito +modo et ordine disponere. Et ideo manifestum esse debet quod +praecepta legis convenienti modo sunt tradita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Affirmation of one thing always leads to the denial of its opposite: but the denial of one opposite does not always lead + to the affirmation of the other. For it follows that if a thing is white, it is not black: but it does not follow that if + it is not black, it is white: because negation extends further than affirmation. And hence too, that one ought not to do harm + to another, which pertains to the negative precepts, extends to more persons, as a + primary dictate of reason, than that one ought to do someone a service or kindness. Nevertheless it is a primary dictate of + reason that man is a debtor in the point of rendering a service or kindness to those from whom he has received kindness, if + he has not yet repaid the debt. Now there are two whose favors no man can sufficiently repay, viz. God and man's father, as + stated in Ethic. viii, 14. Therefore it is that there are only two affirmative precepts; one about the honor due to parents, + the other about the celebration of the Sabbath in memory of the Divine favor. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="37904" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37904] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod semper ad affirmationem sequitur negatio +oppositi, non autem semper ad negationem unius oppositi sequitur +affirmatio alterius. Sequitur enim, si est album, non est nigrum, +non tamen sequitur, si non est nigrum, ergo est album, quia ad +plura sese extendit negatio quam affirmatio. Et inde est etiam quod +non esse faciendum iniuriam, quod pertinet ad praecepta negativa, +ad plures personas se extendit, secundum primum dictamen rationis, +quam esse debitum ut alicui obsequium vel beneficium impendatur. +Inest autem primo dictamen rationis quod homo debitor est beneficii +vel obsequii exhibendi illis a quibus beneficia accepit, si nondum +recompensavit. Duo autem sunt quorum beneficiis sufficienter nullus +recompensare potest, scilicet Deus et pater, ut dicitur in VIII +Ethic. Et ideo sola duo praecepta affirmativa ponuntur, unum de +honoratione parentum; aliud de celebratione sabbati in +commemorationem divini beneficii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reasons for the purely moral precepts are manifest; hence there was no need to add the reason. But some of the precepts + include ceremonial matter, or a determination of a general moral precept; thus the first precept includes the determination, + "Thou shalt not make a graven thing"; and in the third precept the Sabbath-day is fixed. Consequently there was need to state + the reason in each case. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="37905" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37905] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod illa praecepta quae sunt pure moralia, habent +manifestam rationem, unde non oportuit quod in eis aliqua ratio +adderetur. Sed quibusdam praeceptis additur caeremoniale, vel +determinativum praecepti moralis communis, sicut in primo +praecepto, non facies sculptile; et in tertio praecepto +determinatur dies sabbati. Et ideo utrobique oportuit rationem +assignari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A7-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Generally speaking, men direct their actions to some point of utility. Consequently in those precepts in which it seemed + that there would be no useful result, or that some utility might be hindered, it was necessary to add a promise of reward. + And since parents are already on the way to depart from us, no benefit is expected from them: wherefore a promise of reward + is added to the precept about honoring one's parents. The same applies to the precept + forbidding idolatry: since thereby it seemed that men were hindered from receiving the apparent benefit which they think they + can get by entering into a compact with the demons. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="37906" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37906] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod homines ut plurimum actus suos ad aliquam utilitatem +ordinant. Et ideo in illis praeceptis necesse fuit promissionem +praemii apponere, ex quibus videbatur nulla utilitas sequi, vel +aliqua utilitas impediri. Quia vero parentes sunt iam in recedendo, +ab eis non expectatur utilitas. Et ideo praecepto de honore +parentum additur promissio. Similiter etiam praecepto de +prohibitione idololatriae, quia per hoc videbatur impediri apparens +utilitas quam homines credunt se posse consequi per pactum cum +Daemonibus initum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A7-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Punishments are necessary against those who are prone to evil, as stated in Ethic. x, 9. Wherefore a threat of punishment + is only affixed to those precepts of the law which forbade evils to which men were prone. Now men were prone to idolatry by + reason of the general custom of the nations. Likewise men are prone to perjury on account of the frequent use of oaths. Hence + it is that a threat is affixed to the first two precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 7 ad 4"><a name="37907" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37907] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 7 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod poenae praecipue necessariae sunt contra illos qui +sunt proni ad malum, ut dicitur in X Ethic. Et ideo illis solis +praeceptis legis additur comminatio poenarum, in quibus erat +pronitas ad malum. Erant autem homines proni ad idololatriam, +propter generalem consuetudinem gentium. Et similiter sunt etiam +homines proni ad periurium, propter frequentiam iuramenti. Et ideo +primis duobus praeceptis adiungitur comminatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A7-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The commandment about the Sabbath was made in memory of a past blessing. Wherefore special mention of the memory is made + therein. Or again, the commandment about the Sabbath has a determination affixed to it that does not belong to the natural + law, wherefore this precept needed a special admonition. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 7 ad 5"><a name="37908" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37908] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 7 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod praeceptum de sabbato ponitur ut commemorativum +beneficii praeteriti. Et ideo specialiter in eo fit mentio de +memoria. Vel quia praeceptum de sabbato habet determinationem +adiunctam quae non est de lege naturae; et ideo hoc praeceptum +speciali admonitione indiguit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q100_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q100_A8-p0.1">Q. 100. A. 8. Whether the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable. For the precepts of the decalogue belong to the natural + law. But the natural law fails in some cases and is changeable, like human nature, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7). + Now the failure of law to apply in certain particular cases is a reason for dispensation, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q96_A6" id="FS_Q100_A8-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[96], A[6]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q97_A4" id="FS_Q100_A8-p2.2" shape="rect"> Q[97], A[4]</a>). Therefore a dispensation can be + granted in the precepts of the decalogue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="37909" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37909] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod praecepta Decalogi sint dispensabilia. +Praecepta enim Decalogi sunt de iure naturali. Sed iustum naturale +in aliquibus deficit, et mutabile est, sicut et natura humana, ut +philosophus dicit, in V Ethic. Defectus autem legis in aliquibus +particularibus casibus est ratio dispensandi, ut supra dictum est. +Ergo in praeceptis Decalogi potest fieri dispensatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man stands in the same relation to human law as God does to Divine law. But man can dispense with the precepts of + a law made by man. Therefore, since the precepts of the decalogue are ordained by God, it seems that God can dispense with + them. Now our superiors are God's viceregents on earth; for the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.2.10" target="asv">2 Cor. 2:10</a>): "For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your sakes have I done it in the person of + Christ." Therefore superiors can dispense with the precepts of the decalogue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="37910" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37910] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut se habet homo ad legem humanam, ita se habet Deus ad legem +datam divinitus. Sed homo potest dispensare in praeceptis legis +quae homo statuit. Ergo, cum praecepta Decalogi sint instituta a +Deo, videtur quod Deus in eis possit dispensare. Sed praelati vice +Dei funguntur in terris, dicit enim apostolus, II ad Cor. II, +<i>nam et ego, si quid donavi, propter vos donavi in persona +Christi</i>. Ergo etiam praelati possunt in praeceptis Decalogi +dispensare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, among the precepts of the decalogue is one forbidding murder. But it seems that a dispensation is given by men in + this precept: for instance, when according to the prescription of human law, such as evil-doers or enemies are lawfully slain. + Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="37911" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37911] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +inter praecepta Decalogi continetur prohibitio homicidii. Sed in +isto praecepto videtur dispensari per homines, puta cum, secundum +praeceptum legis humanae, homines licite occiduntur, puta +malefactores vel hostes. Ergo praecepta Decalogi sunt +dispensabilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A8-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the observance of the Sabbath is ordained by a precept of the decalogue. But a dispensation was granted in this + precept; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iMacc.2.4" target="asv">1 Macc. 2:4</a>): "And they determined in that day, saying: Whosoever shall come up to fight against us on the Sabbath-day, we will fight + against him." Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 8 arg. 4"><a name="37912" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37912] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 8 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +observatio sabbati continetur inter praecepta Decalogi. Sed in hoc +praecepto fuit dispensatum, dicitur enim I Machab. II, <i>et +cogitaverunt in die illa dicentes, omnis homo quicumque venerit ad +nos in bello die sabbatorum, pugnemus adversus eum</i>. Ergo +praecepta Decalogi sunt dispensabilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A8-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> are the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A8-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.24.5" target="asv"> Is. 24:5, </a> where some are reproved for that "they have changed the ordinance, they have broken the everlasting covenant"; which, seemingly, + apply principally to the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue cannot be changed by dispensation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 8 s. c."><a name="37913" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37913] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Isaiae XXIV, quidam reprehenduntur de hoc quod +mutaverunt ius, dissipaverunt foedus sempiternum, quod maxime +videtur intelligendum de praeceptis Decalogi. Ergo praecepta +Decalogi mutari per dispensationem non possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q100_A8-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q96_A6" id="FS_Q100_A8-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[96], A[6]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q97_A4" id="FS_Q100_A8-p7.2" shape="rect"> Q[97], A[4]</a>), precepts admit of dispensation, when there occurs a particular case in which, if the letter of the law be observed, the + intention of the lawgiver is frustrated. Now the intention of every lawgiver is directed first and chiefly to the common good; + secondly, to the order of justice and virtue, whereby the common good is preserved and attained. If therefore there by + any precepts which contain the very preservation of the common good, or the very order of justice and virtue, such precepts + contain the intention of the lawgiver, and therefore are indispensable. For instance, if in some community a law were enacted, + such as this---that no man should work for the destruction of the commonwealth, or betray the state to its enemies, or that + no man should do anything unjust or evil, such precepts would not admit of dispensation. But if other precepts were enacted, + subordinate to the above, and determining certain special modes of procedure, these latter precepts would admit of dispensation, + in so far as the omission of these precepts in certain cases would not be prejudicial to the former precepts which contain + the intention of the lawgiver. For instance if, for the safeguarding of the commonwealth, it were enacted in some city that + from each ward some men should keep watch as sentries in case of siege, some might be dispensed from this on account of + some greater utility. + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A8-p8"> Now the precepts of the decalogue contain the very intention of the lawgiver, who is God. For the precepts of the first table, + which direct us to God, contain the very order to the common and final good, which is God; while the precepts of the second + table contain the order of justice to be observed among men, that nothing undue be done to anyone, and that each one be given + his due; for it is in this sense that we are to take the precepts of the decalogue. Consequently the + precepts of the decalogue admit of no dispensation whatever. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 8 co."><a name="37914" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37914] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, tunc in praeceptis debet +fieri dispensatio, quando occurrit aliquis particularis casus in +quo, si verbum legis observetur, contrariatur intentioni +legislatoris. Intentio autem legislatoris cuiuslibet ordinatur +primo quidem et principaliter ad bonum commune; secundo autem, ad +ordinem iustitiae et virtutis, secundum quem bonum commune +conservatur, et ad ipsum pervenitur. Si qua ergo praecepta dentur +quae contineant ipsam conservationem boni communis, vel ipsum +ordinem iustitiae et virtutis; huiusmodi praecepta continent +intentionem legislatoris, et ideo indispensabilia sunt. Puta si +poneretur hoc praeceptum in aliqua communitate, quod nullus +destrueret rempublicam, neque proderet civitatem hostibus, sive +quod nullus faceret aliquid iniuste vel male; huiusmodi praecepta +essent indispensabilia. Sed si aliqua alia praecepta traderentur +ordinata ad ista praecepta, quibus determinantur aliqui speciales +modi, in talibus praeceptis dispensatio posset fieri; inquantum per +omissionem huiusmodi praeceptorum in aliquibus casibus, non fieret +praeiudicium primis praeceptis, quae continent intentionem +legislatoris. Puta si, ad conservationem reipublicae, statueretur +in aliqua civitate quod de singulis vicis aliqui vigilarent ad +custodiam civitatis obsessae; posset cum aliquibus dispensari +propter aliquam maiorem utilitatem. Praecepta autem Decalogi +continent ipsam intentionem legislatoris, scilicet Dei. Nam +praecepta primae tabulae, quae ordinant ad Deum, continent ipsum +ordinem ad bonum commune et finale, quod Deus est; praecepta autem +secundae tabulae continent ipsum ordinem iustitiae inter homines +observandae, ut scilicet nulli fiat indebitum, et cuilibet reddatur +debitum; secundum hanc enim rationem sunt intelligenda praecepta +Decalogi. Et ideo praecepta Decalogi sunt omnino +indispensabilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is not speaking of the natural law which contains the very order of justice: for it is a never-failing principle + that "justice should be preserved." But he is speaking in reference to certain fixed modes of observing justice, which fail + to apply in certain cases. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="37915" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37915] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod philosophus non loquitur de iusto naturali quod +continet ipsum ordinem iustitiae, hoc enim nunquam deficit, +iustitiam esse servandam. Sed loquitur quantum ad determinatos +modos observationis iustitiae, qui in aliquibus fallunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A8-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.13" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:13</a>), "God continueth faithful, He cannot deny Himself." But He would deny Himself if He were to do away with the very order + of His own justice, since He is justice itself. Wherefore God cannot dispense a man so that it be lawful for him not to direct + himself to God, or not to be subject to His justice, even in those matters in which men are directed to one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="37916" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37916] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut apostolus dicit, II ad Tim. II, <i>Deus +fidelis permanet, negare seipsum non potest</i>. Negaret autem +seipsum, si ipsum ordinem suae iustitiae auferret, cum ipse sit +ipsa iustitia. Et ideo in hoc Deus dispensare non potest, ut homini +liceat non ordinate se habere ad Deum, vel non subdi ordini +iustitiae eius, etiam in his secundum quae homines ad invicem +ordinantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q100_A8-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The slaying of a man is forbidden in the decalogue, in so far as it bears the character of something undue: for in this sense + the precept contains the very essence of justice. Human law cannot make it lawful for a man to be slain unduly. But it is + not undue for evil-doers or foes of the common weal to be slain: hence this is not contrary to the precept of the decalogue; + and such a killing is no murder as forbidden by that precept, as Augustine + observes (De Lib. Arb. i, 4). In like manner when a man's property is taken from him, if it be due that he should lose it, + this is not theft or robbery as forbidden by the decalogue. + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A8-p12"> Consequently when the children of Israel, by God's command, took away the spoils of the Egyptians, this was not theft; since + it was due to them by the sentence of God. Likewise when Abraham consented to slay his son, he did not consent to murder, + because his son was due to be slain by the command of God, Who is Lord of life and death: for He it is Who inflicts the punishment + of death on all men, both godly and ungodly, on account of the sin of our first parent, and if a man be + the executor of that sentence by Divine authority, he will be no murderer any more than God would be. Again Osee, by taking + unto himself a wife of fornications, or an adulterous woman, was not guilty either of adultery or of fornication: because + he took unto himself one who was his by command of God, Who is the Author of the institution of marriage. + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A8-p13"> Accordingly, therefore, the precepts of the decalogue, as to the essence of justice which they contain, are unchangeable: + but as to any determination by application to individual actions---for instance, that this or that be murder, theft or adultery, + or not---in this point they admit of change; sometimes by Divine authority alone, namely, in such matters as are exclusively + of Divine institution, as marriage and the like; sometimes also by human authority, namely in such matters + as are subject to human jurisdiction: for in this respect men stand in the place of God: and yet not in all respects. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="37917" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37917] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod occisio hominis prohibetur in Decalogo secundum quod +habet rationem indebiti, sic enim praeceptum continet ipsam +rationem iustitiae. Lex autem humana hoc concedere non potest, quod +licite homo indebite occidatur. Sed malefactores occidi, vel hostes +reipublicae, hoc non est indebitum. Unde hoc non contrariatur +praecepto Decalogi, nec talis occisio est homicidium, quod +praecepto Decalogi prohibetur, ut Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib. +Arb. Et similiter si alicui auferatur quod suum erat, si debitum +est quod ipsum amittat, hoc non est furtum vel rapina, quae +praecepto Decalogi prohibentur. Et ideo quando filii Israel +praecepto Dei tulerunt Aegyptiorum spolia, non fuit furtum, quia +hoc eis debebatur ex sententia Dei. Similiter etiam Abraham, cum +consensit occidere filium, non consensit in homicidium, quia +debitum erat eum occidi per mandatum Dei, qui est dominus vitae et +mortis. Ipse enim est qui poenam mortis infligit omnibus hominibus, +iustis et iniustis, pro peccato primi parentis, cuius sententiae si +homo sit executor auctoritate divina, non erit homicida, sicut nec +Deus. Et similiter etiam Osee, accedens ad uxorem fornicariam, vel +ad mulierem adulteram, non est moechatus nec fornicatus, quia +accessit ad eam quae sua erat secundum mandatum divinum, qui est +auctor institutionis matrimonii. Sic igitur praecepta ipsa +Decalogi, quantum ad rationem iustitiae quam continent, immutabilia +sunt. Sed quantum ad aliquam determinationem per applicationem ad +singulares actus, ut scilicet hoc vel illud sit homicidium, furtum +vel adulterium, aut non, hoc quidem est mutabile, quandoque sola +auctoritate divina, in his scilicet quae a solo Deo sunt instituta, +sicut in matrimonio, et in aliis huiusmodi; quandoque etiam +auctoritate humana, sicut in his quae sunt commissa hominum +iurisdictioni. Quantum enim ad hoc, homines gerunt vicem Dei, non +autem quantum ad omnia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A8-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This determination was an interpretation rather than a dispensation. For a man is not taken to break the Sabbath, if he does + something necessary for human welfare; as Our Lord proves ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A8-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.3" target="asv">Mat. 12:3, </a> seqq.). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 8 ad 4"><a name="37918" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37918] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 8 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod illa excogitatio magis fuit interpretatio praecepti +quam dispensatio. Non enim intelligitur violare sabbatum qui facit +opus quod est necessarium ad salutem humanam; sicut dominus probat, +Matth. XII.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q100_A9" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q100_A9-p0.1">Q. 100. A. 9. Whether the mode of virtue falls under the precept of the law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A9-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the mode of virtue falls under the precept of the law. For the mode of virtue is that deeds of justice + should be done justly, that deeds of fortitude should be done bravely, and in like manner as to the other virtues. But it + is commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A9-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.26.20" target="asv">Dt. 26:20</a>) that "thou shalt follow justly after that which is just." Therefore the mode of virtue falls under the precept. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="37919" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37919] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod modus virtutis cadat sub praecepto +legis. Est enim modus virtutis ut aliquis iuste operetur iusta, et +fortiter fortia, et similiter de aliis virtutibus. Sed Deut. XVI +praecipitur, <i>iuste quod iustum est exequeris</i>. Ergo modus +virtutis cadit sub praecepto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A9-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which belongs to the intention of the lawgiver comes chiefly under the precept. But the intention of the lawgiver + is directed chiefly to make men virtuous, as stated in Ethic. ii: and it belongs to a virtuous man to act virtuously. Therefore + the mode of virtue falls under the precept. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="37920" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37920] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +illud maxime cadit sub praecepto quod est de intentione +legislatoris. Sed intentio legislatoris ad hoc principaliter fertur +ut homines faciat virtuosos, sicut dicitur in II Ethic. Virtuosi +autem est virtuose agere. Ergo modus virtutis cadit sub +praecepto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A9-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the mode of virtue seems to consist properly in working willingly and with pleasure. But this falls under a precept + of the Divine law, for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A9-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.99.2" target="asv">Ps. 99:2</a>): "Serve ye the Lord with gladness"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A9-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.9.7" target="asv">2 Cor. 9:7</a>): "Not with sadness or necessity: for God loveth a cheerful giver"; whereupon the gloss says: "Whatever ye do, do gladly; + and then you will do it well; whereas if you do it sorrowfully, it is done + in thee, not by thee." Therefore the mode of virtue falls under the precept of the law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="37921" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37921] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +modus virtutis proprie esse videtur ut aliquis voluntarie et +delectabiliter operetur. Sed hoc cadit sub praecepto legis divinae, +dicitur enim in Psalmo XCIX, <i>servite domino in laetitia</i>; et +II ad Cor. IX, <i>non ex tristitia aut ex necessitate, hilarem enim +datorem diligit Deus</i>; ubi Glossa dicit, <i>quidquid boni facis, +cum hilaritate fac, et tunc bene facis, si autem cum tristitia +facis, fit de te, non tu facis</i>. Ergo modus virtutis cadit sub +praecepto legis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A9-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> No man can act as a virtuous man acts unless he has the habit of virtue, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. ii, 4; v, 8). + Now whoever transgresses a precept of the law, deserves to be punished. Hence it would follow that a man who has not the habit + of virtue, would deserve to be punished, whatever he does. But this is contrary to the intention of the law, which aims at + leading man to virtue, by habituating him to good works. Therefore the mode of virtue + does not fall under the precept. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 9 s. c."><a name="37922" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37922] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +nullus potest operari eo modo quo operatur virtuosus, nisi habeat +habitum virtutis; ut patet per philosophum, in II et V Ethic. +Quicumque autem transgreditur praeceptum legis, meretur poenam. +Sequeretur ergo quod ille qui non habet habitum virtutis, quidquid +faceret, mereretur poenam. Hoc autem est contra intentionem legis, +quae intendit hominem, assuefaciendo ad bona opera, inducere ad +virtutem. Non ergo modus virtutis cadit sub praecepto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q100_A9-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A3" id="FS_Q100_A9-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[90], A[3]</a>, ad 2), a precept of law has compulsory power. Hence that on which the compulsion of the law is brought to bear, falls directly + under the precept of the law. Now the law compels through fear of punishment, as stated in Ethic. x, 9, because that properly + falls under the precept of the law, for which the penalty of the law is inflicted. But Divine law and human law are differently + situated as to the + appointment of penalties; since the penalty of the law is inflicted only for those things which come under the judgment of + the lawgiver; for the law punishes in accordance with the verdict given. Now man, the framer of human law, is competent to + judge only of outward acts; because "man seeth those things that appear," according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A9-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iKgs.16.7" target="asv">1 Kings 16:7</a>: while God alone, the framer of the Divine law, is competent to judge of the inward movements of wills, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A9-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.7.10" target="asv"> Ps. + 7:10 + </a>: "The searcher of hearts and reins is God." + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A9-p7"> Accordingly, therefore, we must say that the mode of virtue is in some sort regarded both by human and by Divine law; in + some respect it is regarded by the Divine, but not by the human law; and in another way, it is regarded neither by the human + nor by the Divine law. Now the mode of virtue consists in three things, as the Philosopher states in Ethic. ii. The first + is that man should act "knowingly": and this is subject to the judgment of both Divine and human law; because what + a man does in ignorance, he does accidentally. Hence according to both human and Divine law, certain things are judged in + respect of ignorance to be punishable or pardonable. + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A9-p8"> The second point is that a man should act "deliberately," i.e. "from choice, choosing that particular action for its own + sake"; wherein a twofold internal movement is implied, of volition and of intention, about which we have spoken above (QQ[8], + 12): and concerning these two, Divine law alone, and not human law, is competent to judge. For human law does not punish the + man who wishes to slay, and slays not: whereas the Divine law does, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A9-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.22" target="asv"> Mat. 5:22</a>: + "Whosoever is angry with his brother, shall be in danger of the judgment." + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A9-p9"> The third point is that he should "act from a firm and immovable principle": which firmness belongs properly to a habit, + and implies that the action proceeds from a rooted habit. In this respect, the mode of virtue does not fall under the precept + either of Divine or of human law, since neither by man nor by God is he punished as breaking the law, who gives due honor + to his parents and yet has not the habit of filial piety. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 9 co."><a name="37923" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37923] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, praeceptum legis habet vim +coactivam. Illud ergo directe cadit sub praecepto legis, ad quod +lex cogit. Coactio autem legis est per metum poenae, ut dicitur X +Ethic., nam illud proprie cadit sub praecepto legis, pro quo poena +legis infligitur. Ad instituendam autem poenam aliter se habet lex +divina, et lex humana. Non enim poena legis infligitur nisi pro +illis de quibus legislator habet iudicare, quia ex iudicio lex +punit. Homo autem, qui est legis lator humanae, non habet iudicare +nisi de exterioribus actibus, quia <i>homines vident ea quae +parent</i>, ut dicitur I Reg. XVI. Sed solius Dei, qui est lator +legis divinae est iudicare de interioribus motibus voluntatum; +secundum illud Psalmi VII, <i>scrutans corda et renes Deus</i>. +Secundum hoc igitur dicendum est quod modus virtutis quantum ad +aliquid respicitur a lege humana et divina; quantum ad aliquid +autem, a lege divina sed non a lege humana; quantum ad aliquid +vero, nec a lege humana nec a lege divina. Modus autem virtutis in +tribus consistit, secundum philosophum, in II Ethic. Quorum primum +est, si aliquis operetur sciens. Hoc autem diiudicatur et a lege +divina et a lege humana. Quod enim aliquis facit ignorans, per +accidens facit. Unde secundum ignorantiam aliqua diiudicantur ad +poenam vel ad veniam, tam secundum legem humanam quam secundum +legem divinam. Secundum autem est ut aliquis operetur volens, vel +eligens et propter hoc eligens; in quo importatur duplex motus +interior, scilicet voluntatis et intentionis, de quibus supra +dictum est. Et ista duo non diiudicat lex humana, sed solum lex +divina. Lex enim humana non punit eum qui vult occidere et non +occidit, punit autem eum lex divina, secundum illud Matth. V, +<i>qui irascitur fratri suo, reus erit iudicio</i>. Tertium autem +est ut firme et immobiliter habeat et operetur. Et ista firmitas +proprie pertinet ad habitum, ut scilicet aliquis ex habitu radicato +operetur. Et quantum ad hoc, modus virtutis non cadit sub praecepto +neque legis divinae neque legis humanae, neque enim ab homine neque +a Deo punitur tanquam praecepti transgressor, qui debitum honorem +impendit parentibus, quamvis non habeat habitum pietatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A9-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The mode of doing acts of justice, which falls under the precept, is that they be done in accordance with right; but not + that they be done from the habit of justice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="37924" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37924] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod modus faciendi actum iustitiae qui cadit sub +praecepto, est ut fiat aliquid secundum ordinem iuris, non autem +quod fiat ex habitu iustitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A9-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intention of the lawgiver is twofold. His aim, in the first place, is to lead men to something by the precepts of the + law: and this is virtue. Secondly, his intention is brought to bear on the matter itself of the precept: and this is something + leading or disposing to virtue, viz. an act of virtue. For the end of the precept and the matter of the precept are not the + same: just as neither in other things is the end the same as that which conduces + to the end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="37925" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37925] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod intentio legislatoris est de duobus. De uno quidem, +ad quod intendit per praecepta legis inducere, et hoc est virtus. +Aliud autem est de quo intendit praeceptum ferre, et hoc est id +quod ducit vel disponit ad virtutem, scilicet actus virtutis. Non +enim idem est finis praecepti et id de quo praeceptum datur, sicut +neque in aliis rebus idem est finis et quod est ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A9-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That works of virtue should be done without sadness, falls under the precept of the Divine law; for whoever works with sadness + works unwillingly. But to work with pleasure, i.e. joyfully or cheerfully, in one respect falls under the precept, viz. in + so far as pleasure ensues from the love of God and one's neighbor (which love falls under the precept), and love causes pleasure: + and in another respect does not fall under the precept, in so far as + pleasure ensues from a habit; for "pleasure taken in a work proves the existence of a habit," as stated in Ethic. ii, 3. For + an act may give pleasure either on account of its end, or through its proceeding from a becoming habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="37926" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37926] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod operari sine tristitia opus virtutis, cadit sub +praecepto legis divinae, quia quicumque cum tristitia operatur, non +volens operatur. Sed delectabiliter operari, sive cum laetitia vel +hilaritate, quodammodo cadit sub praecepto, scilicet secundum quod +sequitur delectatio ex dilectione Dei et proximi, quae cadit sub +praecepto, cum amor sit causa delectationis, et quodammodo non, +secundum quod delectatio consequitur habitum; delectatio enim +operis est signum habitus generati, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Potest +enim aliquis actus esse delectabilis vel propter finem, vel propter +convenientiam habitus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q100_A10" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q100_A10-p0.1">Q. 100. A. 10. Whether the mode of charity falls under the precept of the Divine law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A10-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the mode of charity falls under the precept of the Divine law. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A10-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.17" target="asv">Mat. 19:17</a>): "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments": whence it seems to follow that the observance of the commandments + suffices for entrance into life. But good works do not suffice for entrance into life, except they be done from charity: for + it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A10-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.3" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:3</a>): "If I should distribute all my + goods to feed the poor, and if I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing." Therefore + the mode of charity is included in the commandment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="37927" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37927] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad +decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod modus caritatis cadat sub +praecepto divinae legis. Dicitur enim Matth. XIX, <i>si vis ad +vitam ingredi, serva mandata</i>, ex quo videtur quod observatio +mandatorum sufficiat ad introducendum in vitam. Sed opera bona non +sufficiunt ad introducendum in vitam, nisi ex caritate fiant, +dicitur enim I ad Cor. XIII, <i>si distribuero in cibos pauperum +omnes facultates meas, et si tradidero corpus meum ita ut ardeam, +caritatem autem non habuero, nihil mihi prodest</i>. Ergo modus +caritatis est in praecepto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A10-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the mode of charity consists properly speaking in doing all things for God. But this falls under the precept; for + the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A10-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.10.31" target="asv">1 Cor. 10:31</a>): "Do all to the glory of God." Therefore the mode of charity falls under the precept. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="37928" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37928] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> +Praeterea, ad modum caritatis proprie pertinet ut omnia fiant +propter Deum. Sed istud cadit sub praecepto, dicit enim apostolus, +I ad Cor. X, <i>omnia in gloriam Dei facite</i>. Ergo modus +caritatis cadit sub praecepto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A10-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the mode of charity does not fall under the precept, it follows that one can fulfil the precepts of the law without + having charity. Now what can be done without charity can be done without grace, which is always united to charity. Therefore + one can fulfil the precepts of the law without grace. But this is the error of Pelagius, as Augustine declares (De Haeres. + lxxxviii). Therefore the mode of charity is included in the commandment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 10 arg. 3"><a name="37929" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37929] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 10 arg. 3</span></a> +Praeterea, si modus caritatis non cadit sub praecepto, ergo aliquis +potest implere praecepta legis non habens caritatem. Sed quod +potest fieri sine caritate, potest fieri sine gratia, quae semper +adiuncta est caritati. Ergo aliquis potest implere praecepta legis +sine gratia. Hoc autem est Pelagiani erroris; ut patet per +Augustinum, in libro de haeresibus. Ergo modus caritatis est in +praecepto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A10-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Whoever breaks a commandment sins mortally. If therefore the mode of charity falls under the precept, it follows that whoever + acts otherwise than from charity sins mortally. But whoever has not charity, acts otherwise than from charity. Therefore it + follows that whoever has not charity, sins mortally in whatever he does, however good this may be in itself: which is absurd. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 10 s. c."><a name="37930" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37930] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 10 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quia quicumque non servat praeceptum, peccat mortaliter. Si +igitur modus caritatis cadat sub praecepto, sequitur quod quicumque +operatur aliquid et non ex caritate, peccet mortaliter. Sed +quicumque non habet caritatem, operatur non ex caritate. Ergo +sequitur quod quicumque non habet caritatem, peccet mortaliter in +omni opere quod facit, quantumcumque sit de genere bonorum. Quod +est inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q100_A10-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Opinions have been contrary on this question. For some have said absolutely that the mode of charity comes under the precept; + and yet that it is possible for one not having charity to fulfil this precept: because he can dispose himself to receive charity + from God. Nor (say they) does it follow that a man not having charity sins mortally whenever he does something good of its + kind: because it is an affirmative precept that binds one to act from charity, and + is binding not for all time, but only for such time as one is in a state of charity. On the other hand, some have said that + the mode of charity is altogether outside the precept. + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A10-p7"> Both these opinions are true up to a certain point. Because the act of charity can be considered in two ways. First, as an + act by itself: and thus it falls under the precept of the law which specially prescribes it, viz. "Thou shalt love the Lord + thy God," and "Thou shalt love thy neighbor." In this sense, the first opinion is true. Because it is not impossible to observe + this precept which regards the act of charity; since man can dispose himself to possess charity, and when he + possesses it, he can use it. Secondly, the act of charity can be considered as being the mode of the acts of the other virtues, + i.e. inasmuch as the acts of the other virtues are ordained to charity, which is "the end of the commandment," as stated in + 1 Tim. i, 5: for it has been said above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q12_A4" id="FS_Q100_A10-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[12], A[4]</a>) that the intention of the end is a formal mode of the act ordained to that end. In this sense the second opinion is true + in saying that the mode of charity does not + fall under the precept, that is to say that this commandment, "Honor thy father," does not mean that a man must honor his + father from charity, but merely that he must honor him. Wherefore he that honors his father, yet has not charity, does not + break this precept: although he does break the precept concerning the act of charity, for which reason he deserves to be punished. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 10 co."><a name="37931" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37931] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod circa hoc fuerunt contrariae opiniones. Quidam enim +dixerunt absolute modum caritatis esse sub praecepto. Nec est +impossibile observare hoc praeceptum caritatem non habenti, quia +potest se disponere ad hoc quod caritas ei infundatur a Deo. Nec +quandocumque aliquis non habens caritatem facit aliquid de genere +bonorum, peccat mortaliter, quia hoc est praeceptum affirmativum, +ut ex caritate operetur, et non obligat ad semper, sed pro tempore +illo quo aliquis habet caritatem. Alii vero dixerunt quod omnino +modus caritatis non cadit sub praecepto. Utrique autem quantum ad +aliquid, verum dixerunt. Actus enim caritatis dupliciter +considerari potest. Uno modo, secundum quod est quidam actus per +se. Et hoc modo cadit sub praecepto legis quod de hoc specialiter +datur, scilicet, <i>diliges dominum Deum tuum, et, diliges proximum +tuum</i>. Et quantum ad hoc, primi verum dixerunt. Non enim est +impossibile hoc praeceptum observare, quod est de actu caritatis, +quia homo potest se disponere ad caritatem habendam, et quando +habuerit eam, potest ea uti. Alio modo potest considerari actus +caritatis secundum quod est modus actuum aliarum virtutum, hoc est +secundum quod actus aliarum virtutum ordinantur ad caritatem, quae +est finis praecepti, ut dicitur I ad Tim. I, dictum est enim supra +quod intentio finis est quidam modus formalis actus ordinati in +finem. Et hoc modo verum est quod secundi dixerunt, quod modus +caritatis non cadit sub praecepto, hoc est dictu, quod in hoc +praecepto, honora patrem, non includitur quod honoretur pater ex +caritate, sed solum quod honoretur pater. Unde qui honorat patrem, +licet non habens caritatem, non efficitur transgressor huius +praecepti, etsi sit transgressor praecepti quod est de actu +caritatis, propter quam transgressionem meretur poenam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A10-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our Lord did not say, "If thou wilt enter into life, keep one commandment"; but "keep" all "the commandments": among which + is included the commandment concerning the love of God and our neighbor. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="37932" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37932] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod dominus non dixit, si vis ad vitam ingredi, +serva unum mandatum, sed, serva omnia mandata. Inter quae etiam +continetur mandatum de dilectione Dei et proximi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A10-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The precept of charity contains the injunction that God should be loved from our whole heart, which means that all things + would be referred to God. Consequently man cannot fulfil the precept of charity, unless he also refer all things to God. Wherefore + he that honors his father and mother, is bound to honor them from charity, not in virtue of the precept, "Honor thy father + and mother," but in virtue of the precept, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God + with thy whole heart." And since these are two affirmative precepts, not binding for all times, they can be binding, each + one at a different time: so that it may happen that a man fulfils the precept of honoring his father and mother, without at + the same time breaking the precept concerning the omission of the mode of charity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="37933" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37933] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod sub mandato caritatis continetur ut diligatur Deus ex +toto corde, ad quod pertinet ut omnia referantur in Deum. Et ideo +praeceptum caritatis implere homo non potest, nisi etiam omnia +referantur in Deum. Sic ergo qui honorat parentes, tenetur ex +caritate honorare, non ex vi huius praecepti quod est, honora +parentes, sed ex vi huius praecepti, diliges dominum Deum tuum ex +toto corde tuo. Et cum ista sint duo praecepta affirmativa non +obligantia ad semper, possunt pro diversis temporibus obligare. Et +ita potest contingere quod aliquis implens praeceptum de +honoratione parentum, non tunc transgrediatur praeceptum de +omissione modi caritatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A10-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man cannot fulfil all the precepts of the law, unless he fulfil the precept of charity, which is impossible without charity. + Consequently it is not possible, as Pelagius maintained, for man to fulfil the law without grace. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 10 ad 3"><a name="37934" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37934] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 10 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod observare omnia praecepta legis homo non potest, nisi +impleat praeceptum caritatis, quod non fit sine gratia. Et ideo +impossibile est quod Pelagius dixit, hominem implere legem sine +gratia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q100_A11" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q100_A11-p0.1">Q. 100. A. 11. Whether it is right to distinguish other moral precepts of the law besides the decalogue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A11-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is wrong to distinguish other moral precepts of the law besides the decalogue. Because, as Our Lord + declared ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.40" target="asv">Mat. 22:40</a>), "on these two commandments" of charity "dependeth the whole law and the prophets." But these two commandments are explained + by the ten commandments of the decalogue. Therefore there is no need for other moral precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 11 arg. 1"><a name="37935" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37935] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 11 arg. 1</span></a> Ad +undecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter distinguantur +alia moralia praecepta legis praeter Decalogum. Quia ut dominus +dicit, Matth. XXII, <i>in duobus praeceptis caritatis pendet omnis +lex et prophetae</i>. Sed haec duo praecepta explicantur per decem +praecepta Decalogi. Ergo non oportet alia praecepta moralia +esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A11-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the moral precepts are distinct from the judicial and ceremonial precepts, as stated above (Q[99], AA[3],4). But + the determinations of the general moral precepts belong to the judicial and ceremonial precepts: and the general moral precepts + are contained in the decalogue, or are even presupposed to the decalogue, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q100_A3" id="FS_Q100_A11-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. Therefore it was unsuitable to lay down other moral precepts besides the decalogue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 11 arg. 2"><a name="37936" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37936] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 11 arg. 2</span></a> +Praeterea, praecepta moralia a iudicialibus et caeremonialibus +distinguuntur, ut dictum est. Sed determinationes communium +praeceptorum moralium pertinent ad iudicialia et caeremonialia +praecepta, communia autem praecepta moralia sub Decalogo +continentur, vel etiam Decalogo praesupponuntur, ut dictum est. +Ergo inconvenienter traduntur alia praecepta moralia praeter +Decalogum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A11-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the moral precepts are about the acts of all the virtues, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q100_A2" id="FS_Q100_A11-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore, as the Law contains, besides the decalogue, moral precepts pertaining to religion, liberality, mercy, and chastity; + so there should have been added some precepts pertaining to the other virtues, for instance, fortitude, sobriety, and so forth. + And yet such is not the case. It is therefore unbecoming to distinguish other moral precepts + in the Law besides those of the decalogue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 11 arg. 3"><a name="37937" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37937] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 11 arg. 3</span></a> +Praeterea, praecepta moralia sunt de actibus omnium virtutum, ut +supra dictum est. Sicut igitur in lege ponuntur praecepta moralia +praeter Decalogum pertinentia ad latriam, liberalitatem et +misericordiam, et castitatem; ita etiam deberent poni aliqua +praecepta pertinentia ad alias virtutes, puta ad fortitudinem, +sobrietatem, et alia huiusmodi. Quod tamen non invenitur. Non ergo +convenienter distinguuntur in lege alia praecepta moralia quae sunt +praeter Decalogum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A11-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.18.8" target="asv">Ps. 18:8</a>): "The law of the Lord is unspotted, converting souls." But man is preserved from the stain of sin, and his soul is converted + to God by other moral precepts besides those of the decalogue. Therefore it was right for the Law to include other moral precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 11 s. c."><a name="37938" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37938] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 11 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod in Psalmo XVIII dicitur, <i>lex domini immaculata, +convertens animas</i>. Sed per alia etiam moralia quae Decalogo +superadduntur, homo conservatur absque macula peccati, et anima +eius ad Deum convertitur. Ergo ad legem pertinebat etiam alia +praecepta moralia tradere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q100_A11-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As is evident from what has been stated (Q[99], AA[3],4), the judicial and ceremonial precepts derive their force from their + institution alone: since before they were instituted, it seemed of no consequence whether things were done in this or that + way. But the moral precepts derive their efficacy from the very dictate of natural reason, even if they were never included + in the Law. Now of these there are three grades: for some are most certain, and so evident + as to need no promulgation; such as the commandments of the love of God and our neighbor, and others like these, as stated + above + <a href="#FS_Q100_A3" id="FS_Q100_A11-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, which are, as it were, the ends of the commandments; wherefore no man can have an erroneous judgment about them. Some precepts + are more detailed, the reason of which even an uneducated man can easily grasp; and yet they need to be promulgated, because + human judgment, in a few instances, happens to be led astray concerning them: these + are the precepts of the decalogue. Again, there are some precepts the reason of which is not so evident to everyone, but only + the wise; these are moral precepts added to the decalogue, and given to the people by God through Moses and Aaron. + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A11-p7"> But since the things that are evident are the principles whereby we know those that are not evident, these other moral precepts + added to the decalogue are reducible to the precepts of the decalogue, as so many corollaries. Thus the first commandment + of the decalogue forbids the worship of strange gods: and to this are added other precepts forbidding things relating to worship + of idols: thus it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.18.10" target="asv">Dt. 18:10,11</a>): "Neither let there be found among you + anyone that shall expiate his son or daughter, making them to pass through the fire: . . . neither let there by any wizard + nor charmer, nor anyone that consulteth pythonic spirits, or fortune-tellers, or that seeketh the truth from the dead." The + second commandment forbids perjury. To this is added the prohibition of blasphemy ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.24.15" target="asv">Lev. 24:15, </a> seqq) and the prohibition of false doctrine ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.13" target="asv">Dt. 13</a>). To the third commandment are added all the ceremonial precepts. To the fourth + commandment prescribing the honor due to parents, is added the precept about honoring the aged, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p7.4" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.32" target="asv"> Lev. 19:32</a>: "Rise up before the hoary head, and honor the person of the aged man"; and likewise all the precepts prescribing the reverence + to be observed towards our betters, or kindliness towards our equals or inferiors. To the fifth commandment, which forbids + murder, is added the prohibition of hatred and of any kind of violence inflicted on our neighbor, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p7.5" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.16" target="asv"> Lev. 19:16</a>: "Thou shalt not stand against the blood of thy neighbor": likewise the prohibition against hating one's brother ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p7.6" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.17" target="asv">Lev. 19:17</a>): "Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart." To the sixth commandment which forbids adultery, is added the prohibition + about whoredom, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p7.7" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.17" target="asv"> Dt. 23:17</a>: "There shall be no whore among the daughters of Israel, nor whoremonger among the sons of Israel"; and the prohibition against + unnatural sins, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p7.8" href="./asv.html#Lev.28.22" target="asv"> Lev. 28:22,23</a>: "Thou shalt not lie with mankind . . . thou shalt not copulate with any beast." To the seventh commandment which prohibits + theft, is added the precept forbidding usury, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p7.9" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.19" target="asv"> Dt. 23:19</a>: "Thou shalt not lend to thy brother money to usury"; and the prohibition against fraud, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p7.10" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.13" target="asv"> Dt. 25:13</a>: "Thou shalt not have divers weights in thy bag"; and universally all prohibitions + relating to peculations and larceny. To the eighth commandment, forbidding false testimony, is added the prohibition against + false judgment, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p7.11" href="./asv.html#Exod.23.2" target="asv"> Ex. 23:2</a>: "Neither shalt thou yield in judgment, to the opinion of the most part, to stray from the truth"; and the prohibition against + lying ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p7.12" href="./asv.html#Exod.23.7" target="asv">Ex. 23:7</a>): "Thou shalt fly lying," and the prohibition against detraction, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p7.13" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.16" target="asv"> Lev. 19:16</a>: "Thou shalt not be a detractor, nor a + whisperer among the people." To the other two commandments no further precepts are added, because thereby are forbidden all + kinds of evil desires. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 11 co."><a name="37939" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37939] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 11 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ex dictis patet, praecepta iudicialia et +caeremonialia ex sola institutione vim habent, quia antequam +instituerentur, non videbatur differre utrum sic vel aliter fieret. +Sed praecepta moralia ex ipso dictamine naturalis rationis +efficaciam habent, etiam si nunquam in lege statuantur. Horum autem +triplex est gradus. Nam quaedam sunt certissima, et adeo manifesta +quod editione non indigent; sicut mandata de dilectione Dei et +proximi, et alia huiusmodi, ut supra dictum est, quae sunt quasi +fines praeceptorum, unde in eis nullus potest errare secundum +iudicium rationis. Quaedam vero sunt magis determinata, quorum +rationem statim quilibet, etiam popularis, potest de facili videre; +et tamen quia in paucioribus circa huiusmodi contingit iudicium +humanum perverti, huiusmodi editione indigent, et haec sunt +praecepta Decalogi. Quaedam vero sunt quorum ratio non est adeo +cuilibet manifesta, sed solum sapientibus, et ista sunt praecepta +moralia superaddita Decalogo, tradita a Deo populo per Moysen et +Aaron. Sed quia ea quae sunt manifesta, sunt principia cognoscendi +eorum quae non sunt manifesta; alia praecepta moralia superaddita +Decalogo reducuntur ad praecepta Decalogi, per modum cuiusdam +additionis ad ipsa. Nam in primo praecepto Decalogi prohibetur +cultus alienorum deorum, cui superadduntur alia praecepta +prohibitiva eorum quae ordinantur in cultum idolorum; sicut habetur +Deut. XVIII, <i>non inveniatur in te qui lustret filium suum aut +filiam, ducens per ignem, nec sit maleficus atque incantator, nec +Pythones consulat neque divinos, et quaerat a mortuis +veritatem</i>. Secundum autem praeceptum prohibet periurium. +Superadditur autem ei prohibitio blasphemiae, Levit. XXIV; et +prohibitio falsae doctrinae, Deut. XIII. Tertio vero praecepto +superadduntur omnia caeremonialia. Quarto autem praecepto, de +honore parentum, superadditur praeceptum de honoratione senum, +secundum illud Levit. XIX, <i>coram cano capite consurge, et honora +personam senis</i>; et universaliter omnia praecepta inducentia ad +reverentiam exhibendam maioribus, vel ad beneficia exhibenda vel +aequalibus vel minoribus. Quinto autem praecepto, quod est de +prohibitione homicidii, additur prohibitio odii et cuiuslibet +violationis contra proximum, sicut illud Levit. XIX, <i>non stabis +contra sanguinem proximi tui</i>; et etiam prohibitio odii fratris, +secundum illud, <i>ne oderis fratrem tuum in corde tuo</i>. +Praecepto autem sexto, quod est de prohibitione adulterii, +superadditur praeceptum de prohibitione meretricii, secundum illud +Deut. XXIII, <i>non erit meretrix de filiabus Israel, neque +fornicator de filiis Israel</i>; et iterum prohibitio vitii contra +naturam, secundum illud Levit. XVIII, <i>cum masculo non +commisceberis, cum omni pecore non coibis</i>. Septimo autem +praecepto, de prohibitione furti adiungitur praeceptum de +prohibitione usurae, secundum illud Deut. XXIII, <i>non foenerabis +fratri tuo ad usuram</i>; et prohibitio fraudis, secundum illud +Deut. XXV, <i>non habebis in sacculo diversa pondera</i>; et +universaliter omnia quae ad prohibitionem calumniae et rapinae +pertinent. Octavo vero praecepto, quod est de prohibitione falsi +testimonii, additur prohibitio falsi iudicii, secundum illud Exod. +XXIII, <i>nec in iudicio plurimorum acquiesces sententiae, ut a +veritate devies</i>; et prohibitio mendacii, sicut ibi subditur, +<i>mendacium fugies</i>; et prohibitio detractionis, secundum illud +Levit. XIX, <i>non eris criminator et susurro in populis</i>. Aliis +autem duobus praeceptis nulla alia adiunguntur, quia per ea +universaliter omnis mala concupiscentia prohibetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A11-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The precepts of the decalogue are ordained to the love of God and our neighbor as pertaining evidently to our duty towards + them; but the other precepts are so ordained as pertaining thereto less evidently. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 11 ad 1"><a name="37940" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37940] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 11 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ad dilectionem Dei et proximi ordinantur quidem +praecepta Decalogi secundum manifestam rationem debiti, alia vero +secundum rationem magis occultam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A11-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is in virtue of their institution that the ceremonial and judicial precepts "are determinations of the precepts of the + decalogue," not by reason of a natural instinct, as in the case of the superadded moral precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 11 ad 2"><a name="37941" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37941] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 11 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod praecepta caeremonialia et iudicialia sunt +determinativa praeceptorum Decalogi ex vi institutionis, non autem +ex vi naturalis instinctus, sicut praecepta moralia +superaddita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A11-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The precepts of a law are ordained for the common good, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A2" id="FS_Q100_A11-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[90], A[2]</a>). And since those virtues which direct our conduct towards others pertain directly to the common good, as also does the virtue + of chastity, in so far as the generative act conduces to the common good of the species; hence precepts bearing directly on + these virtues are given, both in the decalogue and in addition thereto. As to the act of + fortitude there are the order to be given by the commanders in the war, which is undertaken for the common good: as is clear + from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.20.3" target="asv">Dt. 20:3</a>, where the priest is commanded (to speak thus): "Be not afraid, do not give back." In like manner the prohibition of acts + of gluttony is left to paternal admonition, since it is contrary to the good of the household; hence it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p10.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.21.20" target="asv">Dt. 21:20</a>) in the person of parents: "He slighteth hearing our admonitions, he giveth himself to + revelling, and to debauchery and banquetings." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 11 ad 3"><a name="37942" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37942] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 11 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod praecepta legis ordinantur ad bonum commune, ut supra +dictum est. Et quia virtutes ordinantes ad alium directe pertinent +ad bonum commune; et similiter virtus castitatis, inquantum actus +generationis deservit bono communi speciei; ideo de istis +virtutibus directe dantur praecepta et Decalogi et superaddita. De +actu autem fortitudinis datur praeceptum proponendum per duces +exhortantes in bello, quod pro bono communi suscipitur, ut patet +Deut. XX, ubi mandatur sacerdoti, <i>nolite metuere, nolite +cedere</i>. Similiter etiam actus gulae prohibendus committitur +monitioni paternae, quia contrariatur bono domestico, unde dicitur +Deut. XXI, ex persona parentum, <i>monita nostra audire contemnit, +comessationibus vacat et luxuriae atque conviviis</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q100_A12" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q100_A12-p0.1">Q. 100. A. 12. Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law justified man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A12-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the moral precepts of the Old Law justified man. Because the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A12-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.13" target="asv">Rom. 2:13</a>): "For not the hearers of the Law are justified before God, but the doers of the Law shall be justified." But the doers of + the Law are those who fulfil the precepts of the Law. Therefore the fulfilling of the precepts of the Law was a cause of justification. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 12 arg. 1"><a name="37943" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37943] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 12 arg. 1</span></a> Ad +duodecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praecepta moralia veteris +legis iustificarent. Dicit enim apostolus, Rom. II, <i>non enim +auditores legis iusti sunt apud Deum, sed factores legis +iustificabuntur</i>. Sed factores legis dicuntur qui implent +praecepta legis. Ergo praecepta legis adimpleta iustificabant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A12-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A12-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.18.5" target="asv">Lev. 18:5</a>): "Keep My laws and My judgments, which if a man do, he shall live in them." But the spiritual life of man is through justice. + Therefore the fulfilling of the precepts of the Law was a cause of justification. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 12 arg. 2"><a name="37944" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37944] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 12 arg. 2</span></a> +Praeterea, Levit. XVIII dicitur, <i>custodite leges meas atque +iudicia, quae faciens homo vivet in eis</i>. Sed vita spiritualis +hominis est per iustitiam. Ergo praecepta legis adimpleta +iustificabant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A12-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Divine law is more efficacious than human law. But human law justifies man; since there is a kind of justice + consisting in fulfilling the precepts of law. Therefore the precepts of the Law justified man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 12 arg. 3"><a name="37945" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37945] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 12 arg. 3</span></a> +Praeterea, lex divina efficacior est quam lex humana. Sed lex +humana iustificat, est enim quaedam iustitia in hoc quod praecepta +legis adimplentur. Ergo praecepta legis iustificabant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A12-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A12-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.6" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:6</a>): "The letter killeth": which, according to Augustine (De Spir. et Lit. xiv), refers even to the moral precepts. Therefore + the moral precepts did not cause justice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 12 s. c."><a name="37946" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37946] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 12 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. III, littera occidit. Quod +secundum Augustinum, in libro de spiritu et littera, intelligitur +etiam de praeceptis moralibus. Ergo praecepta moralia non +iustificabant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q100_A12-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Just as "healthy" is said properly and first of that which is possessed of health, and secondarily of that which is a sign + or a safeguard of health; so justification means first and properly the causing of justice; while secondarily and improperly, + as it were, it may denote a sign of justice or a disposition thereto. If justice be taken in the last two ways, it is evident + that it was conferred by the precepts of the Law; in so far, to wit, as they disposed + men to the justifying grace of Christ, which they also signified, because as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 24), "even + the life of that people foretold and foreshadowed Christ." + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A12-p7"> But if we speak of justification properly so called, then we must notice that it can be considered as in the habit or as + in the act: so that accordingly justification may be taken in two ways. First, according as man is made just, by becoming + possessed of the habit of justice: secondly, according as he does works of justice, so that in this sense justification is + nothing else than the execution of justice. Now justice, like the other virtues, may denote either the acquired or + the infused virtue, as is clear from what has been stated ( + <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q63_A4" id="FS_Q100_A12-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[63], A[4]</a>). The acquired virtue is caused by works; but the infused virtue is caused by God Himself through His grace. The latter is + true justice, of which we are speaking now, and in this respect of which a man is said to be just before God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A12-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.4.2" target="asv"> Rom. 4:2</a>: "If Abraham were justified by works, he hath whereof to glory, but not before God." Hence this justice could not be caused + by + moral precepts, which are about human actions: wherefore the moral precepts could not justify man by causing justice. + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A12-p8"> If, on the other hand, by justification we understand the execution of justice, thus all the precepts of the Law justified + man, but in various ways. Because the ceremonial precepts taken as a whole contained something just in itself, in so far as + they aimed at offering worship to God; whereas taken individually they contained that which is just, not in itself, but by + being a determination of the Divine law. Hence it is said of these precepts that they did not justify man save + through the devotion and obedience of those who complied with them. On the other hand the moral and judicial precepts, either + in general or also in particular, contained that which is just in itself: but the moral precepts contained that which is just + in itself according to that "general justice" which is "every virtue" according to Ethic. v, 1: whereas the judicial precepts + belonged to "special justice," which is about contracts connected with the human mode of life, between one man and + another. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 12 co."><a name="37947" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37947] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 12 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut sanum proprie et primo dicitur quod habet +sanitatem, per posterius autem quod significat sanitatem, vel quod +conservat sanitatem; ita iustificatio primo et proprie dicitur ipsa +factio iustitiae; secundario vero, et quasi improprie, potest dici +iustificatio significatio iustitiae, vel dispositio ad iustitiam. +Quibus duobus modis manifestum est quod praecepta legis +iustificabant, inquantum scilicet disponebant homines ad gratiam +Christi iustificantem, quam etiam significabant; quia sicut dicit +Augustinus, contra Faustum, <i>etiam vita illius populi prophetica +erat, et Christi figurativa</i>. Sed si loquamur de iustificatione +proprie dicta, sic considerandum est quod iustitia potest accipi +prout est in habitu, vel prout est in actu, et secundum hoc, +iustificatio dupliciter dicitur. Uno quidem modo, secundum quod +homo fit iustus adipiscens habitum iustitiae. Alio vero modo, +secundum quod opera iustitiae operatur, ut secundum hoc +iustificatio nihil aliud sit quam iustitiae executio. Iustitia +autem, sicut et aliae virtutes potest accipi et acquisita et +infusa, ut ex supradictis patet. Acquisita quidem causatur ex +operibus, sed infusa causatur ab ipso Deo per eius gratiam. Et haec +est vera iustitia, de qua nunc loquimur, secundum quam aliquis +dicitur iustus apud Deum; secundum illud Rom. IV, <i>si Abraham ex +operibus legis iustificatus est, habet gloriam, sed non apud +Deum</i>. Haec igitur iustitia causari non poterat per praecepta +moralia, quae sunt de actibus humanis. Et secundum hoc, praecepta +moralia iustificare non poterant iustitiam causando. Si vero +accipiatur iustificatio pro executione iustitiae, sic omnia +praecepta legis iustificabant, aliter tamen et aliter. Nam +praecepta caeremonialia continebant quidem iustitiam secundum se in +generali, prout scilicet exhibebantur in cultum Dei, in speciali +vero non continebant secundum se iustitiam, nisi ex sola +determinatione legis divinae. Et ideo de huiusmodi praeceptis +dicitur quod non iustificabant nisi ex devotione et obedientia +facientium. Praecepta vero moralia et iudicialia continebant id +quod erat secundum se iustum vel in generali, vel etiam in +speciali. Sed moralia praecepta continebant id quod est secundum se +iustum secundum iustitiam generalem quae est omnis virtus, ut +dicitur in V Ethic. Praecepta vero iudicialia pertinebant ad +iustitiam specialem, quae consistit circa contractus humanae vitae, +qui sunt inter homines ad invicem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A12-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle takes justification for the execution of justice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 12 ad 1"><a name="37948" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37948] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 12 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod apostolus accipit ibi iustificationem pro +executione iustitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A12-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The man who fulfilled the precepts of the Law is said to live in them, because he did not incur the penalty of death, which + the Law inflicted on its transgressors: in this sense the Apostle quotes this passage ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A12-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.12" target="asv">Gal. 3:12</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 12 ad 2"><a name="37949" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37949] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 12 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod homo faciens praecepta legis dicitur vivere in eis, +quia non incurrebat poenam mortis, quam lex transgressoribus +infligebat. In quo sensu inducit hoc apostolus, Gal. III.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A12-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The precepts of human law justify man by acquired justice: it is not about this that we are inquiring now, but only about + that justice which is before God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 12 ad 3"><a name="37950" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37950] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 12 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod praecepta legis humanae iustificant iustitia +acquisita, de qua non quaeritur ad praesens, sed solum de iustitia +quae est apud Deum.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q101" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q101-p0.1">Q. 101. OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS IN THEMSELVES (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q101-p2"> We must now consider the ceremonial precepts: and first we must consider them in themselves; secondly, their cause; thirdly, + their duration. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FS_Q101-p3"><a href="#FS_Q101_A1"> (1) The nature of the ceremonial precepts;</a></p><p id="FS_Q101-p4"><a href="#FS_Q101_A2"> (2) Whether they are figurative?</a></p><p id="FS_Q101-p5"><a href="#FS_Q101_A3"> (3) Whether there should have been many of them?</a></p><p id="FS_Q101-p6"><a href="#FS_Q101_A4"> (4) Of their various kinds.</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 pr."><a name="37951" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37951] Iª-IIae q. 101 pr.</span></a> Consequenter +considerandum est de praeceptis caeremonialibus. Et primo, de ipsis +secundum se; secundo, de causa eorum; tertio, de duratione ipsorum. +Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, quae sit ratio praeceptorum +caeremonialium. Secundo, utrum sint figuralia. Tertio, utrum +debuerint esse multa. Quarto, de distinctione ipsorum.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q101_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q101_A1-p0.1">Q. 101. A. 1. Whether the nature of the ceremonial precepts consists in their pertaining to the worship of God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the nature of the ceremonial precepts does not consist in their pertaining to the worship of God. Because, + in the Old Law, the Jews were given certain precepts about abstinence from food ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.11" target="asv">Lev. 11</a>); and about refraining from certain kinds of clothes, e.g. ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.19" target="asv">Lev. 19:19</a>): "Thou shalt not wear a garment that is woven of two sorts"; and again ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A1-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Num.15.38" target="asv">Num. 15:38</a>): "To make to themselves fringes in the corners of their garments." But + these are not moral precepts; since they do not remain in the New Law. Nor are they judicial precepts; since they do not pertain + to the pronouncing of judgment between man and man. Therefore they are ceremonial precepts. Yet they seem in no way to pertain + to the worship of God. Therefore the nature of the ceremonial precepts does not consist in their pertaining to Divine worship. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37952" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37952] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ratio praeceptorum caeremonialium non +in hoc consistat quod pertinent ad cultum Dei. In lege enim veteri +dantur Iudaeis quaedam praecepta de abstinentia ciborum, ut patet +Levit. XI; et etiam de abstinendo ab aliquibus vestimentis, sicut +illud Levit. XIX, <i>vestem quae ex duobus texta est, non +indueris</i>; et iterum quod praecipitur Num. XV, <i>ut faciant +sibi fimbrias per angulos palliorum</i>. Sed huiusmodi non sunt +praecepta moralia, quia non manent in nova lege. Nec etiam +iudicialia, quia non pertinent ad iudicium faciendum inter homines. +Ergo sunt caeremonialia. Sed in nullo pertinere videntur ad cultum +Dei. Ergo non est ratio caeremonialium praeceptorum quod pertineant +ad cultum Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, some state that the ceremonial precepts are those which pertain to solemnities; as though they were so called from + the "cerei" [candles] which are lit up on those occasions. But many other things besides solemnities pertain to the worship + of God. Therefore it does not seem that the ceremonial precepts are so called from their pertaining to the Divine worship. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37953" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37953] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +dicunt quidam quod praecepta caeremonialia dicuntur illa quae +pertinent ad solemnitates, quasi dicerentur a cereis, qui in +solemnitatibus accenduntur. Sed multa alia sunt pertinentia ad +cultum Dei praeter solemnitates. Ergo non videtur quod praecepta +caeremonialia ea ratione dicantur, quia pertinent ad cultum +Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some say that the ceremonial precepts are patterns, i.e. rules, of salvation: because the Greek {chaire} is the + same as the Latin "salve." But all the precepts of the Law are rules of salvation, and not only those that pertain to the + worship of God. Therefore not only those precepts which pertain to Divine worship are called ceremonial. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37954" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37954] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +secundum quosdam praecepta caeremonialia dicuntur quasi normae, +idest regulae, salutis, nam chaire in Graeco idem est quod salve. +Sed omnia praecepta legis sunt regulae salutis, et non solum illa +quae pertinent ad Dei cultum. Ergo non solum illa praecepta +dicuntur caeremonialia quae pertinent ad cultum Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Rabbi Moses says (Doct. Perplex. iii) that the ceremonial precepts are those for which there is no evident reason. + But there is evident reason for many things pertaining to the worship of God; such as the observance of the Sabbath, the feasts + of the Passover and of the Tabernacles, and many other things, the reason for which is set down in the Law. Therefore the + ceremonial precepts are not those which pertain to the worship of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="37955" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37955] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +Rabbi Moyses dicit quod praecepta caeremonialia dicuntur quorum +ratio non est manifesta. Sed multa pertinentia ad cultum Dei habent +rationem manifestam, sicut observatio sabbati, et celebratio phase +et Scenopegiae, et multorum aliorum, quorum ratio assignatur in +lege. Ergo caeremonialia non sunt quae pertinent ad cultum Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.18.19" target="asv">Ex. 18:19,20</a>): "Be thou to the people in those things that pertain to God . . . and . . . shew the people the ceremonies and the manner + of worshipping." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37956" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37956] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Exod. XVIII, <i>esto populo in his quae ad Deum +pertinent, ostendasque populo caeremonias et ritum colendi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q99_A4" id="FS_Q101_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[99], A[4]</a>), the ceremonial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts whereby man is directed to God, just as the judicial precepts + are determinations of the moral precepts whereby he is directed to his neighbor. Now man is directed to God by the worship + due to Him. Wherefore those precepts are properly called ceremonial, which pertain to the Divine worship. The reason for their + being so called was given + above ( + <a href="#FS_Q99_A3" id="FS_Q101_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[99], A[3]</a>), when we established the distinction between the ceremonial and the other precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 1 co."><a name="37957" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37957] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, caeremonialia praecepta +determinant praecepta moralia in ordine ad Deum, sicut iudicialia +determinant praecepta moralia in ordine ad proximum. Homo autem +ordinatur ad Deum per debitum cultum. Et ideo caeremonialia proprie +dicuntur quae ad cultum Dei pertinent. Ratio autem huius nominis +posita est supra, ubi praecepta caeremonialia ab aliis sunt +distincta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Divine worship includes not only sacrifices and the like, which seem to be directed to God immediately, but also those + things whereby His worshippers are duly prepared to worship Him: thus too in other matters, whatever is preparatory to the + end comes under the science whose object is the end. Accordingly those precepts of the Law which regard the clothing and food + of God's worshippers, and other such matters, pertain to a certain preparation of + the ministers, with the view of fitting them for the Divine worship: just as those who administer to a king make use of certain + special observances. Consequently such are contained under the ceremonial precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37958" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37958] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ad cultum Dei pertinent non solum sacrificia et +alia huiusmodi, quae immediate ad Deum ordinari videntur, sed etiam +debita praeparatio colentium Deum ad cultum ipsius, sicut etiam in +aliis quaecumque sunt praeparatoria ad finem, cadunt sub scientia +quae est de fine. Huiusmodi autem praecepta quae dantur in lege de +vestibus et cibis colentium Deum, et aliis huiusmodi, pertinent ad +quandam praeparationem ipsorum ministrantium, ut sint idonei ad +cultum Dei, sicut etiam specialibus observantiis aliqui utuntur qui +sunt in ministerio regis. Unde etiam sub praeceptis caeremonialibus +continentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The alleged explanation of the name does not seem very probable: especially as the Law does not contain many instances of + the lighting of candles in solemnities; since, even the lamps of the Candlestick were furnished with "oil of olives," as stated + in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.24.2" target="asv"> Lev. 24:2.</a> Nevertheless we may say that all things pertaining to the Divine worship were more carefully observed on solemn festivals: + so that all ceremonial precepts may be included + under the observance of solemnities. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37959" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37959] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod illa expositio nominis non videtur esse multum +conveniens, praesertim cum non multum inveniatur in lege quod in +solemnitatibus cerei accenderentur, sed in ipso etiam candelabro +lucernae cum oleo olivarum praeparabantur, ut patet Lev. XXIV. +Nihilominus tamen potest dici quod in solemnitatibus omnia illa +quae pertinebant ad cultum Dei, diligentius observabantur, et +secundum hoc, in observatione solemnitatum omnia caeremonialia +includuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Neither does this explanation of the name appear to be very much to the point, since the word "ceremony" is not Greek but + Latin. We may say, however, that, since man's salvation is from God, those precepts above all seem to be rules of salvation, + which direct man to God: and accordingly those which refer to Divine worship are called ceremonial precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37960" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37960] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod nec illa expositio nominis videtur esse multum +conveniens, nomen enim caeremoniae non est Graecum, sed Latinum. +Potest tamen dici quod, cum salus hominis sit a Deo, praecipue illa +praecepta videntur esse salutis regulae, quae hominem ordinant ad +Deum. Et sic caeremonialia dicuntur quae ad cultum Dei +pertinent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This explanation of the ceremonial precepts has a certain amount of probability: not that they are called ceremonial precisely + because there is no evident reason for them; this is a kind of consequence. For, since the precepts referring to the Divine + worship must needs be figurative, as we shall state further on + <a href="#FS_Q101_A2" id="FS_Q101_A1-p11.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, the consequence is that the reason for them is not so very evident. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="37961" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37961] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod illa ratio caeremonialium est quodammodo probabilis, +non quod ex eo dicuntur caeremonialia quia eorum ratio non est +manifesta; sed hoc est quoddam consequens. Quia enim praecepta ad +cultum Dei pertinentia oportet esse figuralia, ut infra dicetur, +inde est quod eorum ratio non est adeo manifesta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q101_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q101_A2-p0.1">Q. 101. A. 2. Whether the ceremonial precepts are figurative?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the ceremonial precepts are not figurative. For it is the duty of every teacher to express himself in + such a way as to be easily understood, as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. iv, 4,10) and this seems very necessary in the + framing of a law: because precepts of law are proposed to the populace; for which reason a law should be manifest, as Isidore + declares (Etym. v, 21). If therefore the precepts of the Law were given as figures of + something, it seems unbecoming that Moses should have delivered these precepts without explaining what they signified. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37962" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37962] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad +secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praecepta caeremonialia non +sint figuralia. Pertinet enim ad officium cuiuslibet doctoris ut +sic pronunciet ut de facili intelligi possit, sicut Augustinus +dicit, in IV de Doctr. Christ. Et hoc maxime videtur esse +necessarium in legis latione, quia praecepta legis populo +proponuntur. Unde lex debet esse manifesta, ut Isidorus dicit. Si +igitur praecepta caeremonialia data sunt in alicuius rei figuram, +videtur inconvenienter tradidisse huiusmodi praecepta Moyses, non +exponens quid figurarent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is done for the worship of God, should be entirely free from unfittingness. But the performance of actions + in representation of others, seems to savor of the theatre or of the drama: because formerly the actions performed in theatres + were done to represent the actions of others. Therefore it seems that such things should not be done for the worship of God. + But the ceremonial precepts are ordained to the Divine worship, as stated above + + <a href="#FS_Q101_A1" id="FS_Q101_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore they should not be figurative. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37963" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37963] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ea quae in cultum Dei aguntur, maxime debent honestatem habere. Sed +facere aliqua facta ad alia repraesentanda, videtur esse +theatricum, sive poeticum, in theatris enim repraesentabantur olim +per aliqua quae ibi gerebantur, quaedam aliorum facta. Ergo videtur +quod huiusmodi non debeant fieri ad cultum Dei. Sed caeremonialia +ordinantur ad cultum Dei, ut dictum est. Ergo caeremonialia non +debent esse figuralia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion iii, iv) that "God is worshipped chiefly by faith, hope, and charity." But the precepts + of faith, hope, and charity are not figurative. Therefore the ceremonial precepts should not be figurative. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37964" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37964] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., quod <i>Deus maxime colitur fide, +spe et caritate</i>. Sed praecepta quae dantur de fide, spe et +caritate, non sunt figuralia. Ergo praecepta caeremonialia non +debent esse figuralia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.24" target="asv">Jn. 4:24</a>): "God is a spirit, and they that adore Him, must adore Him in spirit and in truth." But a figure is not the very truth: + in fact one is condivided with the other. Therefore the ceremonial precepts, which refer to the Divine worship, should not + be figurative. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="37965" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37965] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +dominus dicit, Ioan. IV, <i>spiritus est Deus, et eos qui adorant +eum, in spiritu et veritate adorare oportet</i>. Sed figura non est +ipsa veritas, immo contra se invicem dividuntur. Ergo +caeremonialia, quae pertinent ad cultum Dei, non debent esse +figuralia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Col.2.16" target="asv">Col. 2:16,17</a>): "Let no man . . . judge you in meat or in drink, or in respect of a festival day, or of the new moon, or of the sabbaths, + which are a shadow of things to come." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37966" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37966] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Colos. II, <i>nemo vos iudicet in cibo +aut in potu, aut in parte diei festi aut Neomeniae aut sabbatorum, +quae sunt umbra futurorum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q101_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q101_A1" id="FS_Q101_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1];</a> Q[99], AA[3],4), the ceremonial precepts are those which refer to the worship of God. Now the Divine worship is twofold: + internal, and external. For since man is composed of soul and body, each of these should be applied to the worship of God; + the soul by an interior worship; the body by an outward worship: hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.83.3" target="asv">Ps. 83:3</a>): "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living + God." And as the body is ordained to God through the soul, so the outward worship is ordained to the internal worship. Now + interior worship consists in the soul being united to God by the intellect and affections. Wherefore according to the various + ways in which the intellect and affections of the man who worships God are rightly united to God, his external actions are + applied in various ways to the Divine worship. + </p><p id="FS_Q101_A2-p8"> For in the state of future bliss, the human intellect will gaze on the Divine Truth in Itself. Wherefore the external worship + will not consist in anything figurative, but solely in the praise of God, proceeding from the inward knowledge and affection, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.51.3" target="asv"> Is. 51:3</a>: "Joy and gladness shall be found therein, thanksgiving and the voice of praise." + </p><p id="FS_Q101_A2-p9"> But in the present state of life, we are unable to gaze on the Divine Truth in Itself, and we need the ray of Divine light + to shine upon us under the form of certain sensible figures, as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. i); in various ways, however, + according to the various states of human knowledge. For under the Old Law, neither was the Divine Truth manifest in Itself, + nor was the way leading to that manifestation as yet opened out, as the Apostle declares ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.9.8" target="asv">Heb. + 9:8 + </a>). Hence the external worship of the Old Law needed to be figurative not only of the future truth to be manifested in our + heavenly country, but also of Christ, Who is the way leading to that heavenly manifestation. But under the New Law this way + is already revealed: and therefore it needs no longer to be foreshadowed as something future, but to be brought to our minds + as something past or present: and the truth of the glory to come, which is not yet revealed, alone needs to be + foreshadowed. This is what the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A2-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.1" target="asv">Heb. 11:1</a>): "The Law has [Vulg.: 'having'] a shadow of the good things to come, not the very image of the things": for a shadow is + less than an image; so that the image belongs to the New Law, but the shadow to the Old. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 2 co."><a name="37967" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37967] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, praecepta caeremonialia +dicuntur quae ordinantur ad cultum Dei. Est autem duplex cultus +Dei, interior, et exterior. Cum enim homo sit compositus ex anima +et corpore, utrumque debet applicari ad colendum Deum, ut scilicet +anima colat interiori cultu, et corpus exteriori, unde dicitur in +Psalmo LXXXIII, <i>cor meum et caro mea exultaverunt in Deum +vivum</i>. Et sicut corpus ordinatur in Deum per animam, ita cultus +exterior ordinatur ad interiorem cultum. Consistit autem interior +cultus in hoc quod anima coniungatur Deo per intellectum et +affectum. Et ideo secundum quod diversimode intellectus et affectus +colentis Deum Deo recte coniungitur, secundum hoc diversimode +exteriores actus hominis ad cultum Dei applicantur. In statu enim +futurae beatitudinis, intellectus humanus ipsam divinam veritatem +in seipsa intuebitur. Et ideo exterior cultus non consistet in +aliqua figura, sed solum in laude Dei, quae procedit ex interiori +cognitione et affectione; secundum illud Isaiae li, <i>gaudium et +laetitia invenietur in ea, gratiarum actio et vox laudis</i>. In +statu autem praesentis vitae, non possumus divinam veritatem in +seipsa intueri, sed oportet quod radius divinae veritatis nobis +illucescat sub aliquibus sensibilibus figuris, sicut Dionysius +dicit, I cap. Cael. Hier., diversimode tamen, secundum diversum +statum cognitionis humanae. In veteri enim lege neque ipsa divina +veritas in seipsa manifesta erat, neque etiam adhuc propalata erat +via ad hoc perveniendi, sicut apostolus dicit, ad Heb. IX. Et ideo +oportebat exteriorem cultum veteris legis non solum esse +figurativum futurae veritatis manifestandae in patria; sed etiam +esse figurativum Christi, qui est via ducens ad illam patriae +veritatem. Sed in statu novae legis, haec via iam est revelata. +Unde hanc praefigurari non oportet sicut futuram, sed commemorari +oportet per modum praeteriti vel praesentis, sed solum oportet +praefigurari futuram veritatem gloriae nondum revelatam. Et hoc est +quod apostolus dicit, ad Heb. X, <i>umbram habet lex futurorum +bonorum, non ipsam imaginem rerum</i>, umbra enim minus est quam +imago; tanquam imago pertineat ad novam legem, umbra vero ad +veterem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The things of God are not to be revealed to man except in proportion to his capacity: else he would be in danger of downfall, + were he to despise what he cannot grasp. Hence it was more beneficial that the Divine mysteries should be revealed to uncultured + people under a veil of figures, that thus they might know them at least implicitly by using those figures to the honor of + God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37968" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37968] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod divina non sunt revelanda hominibus nisi +secundum eorum capacitatem, alioquin daretur eis praecipitii +materia, dum contemnerent quae capere non possent. Et ideo utilius +fuit ut sub quodam figurarum velamine divina mysteria rudi populo +traderentur, ut sic saltem ea implicite cognoscerent, dum illis +figuris deservirent ad honorem Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as human reason fails to grasp poetical expressions on account of their being lacking in truth, so does it fail to grasp + Divine things perfectly, on account of the sublimity of the truth they contain: and therefore in both cases there is need + of signs by means of sensible figures. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37969" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37969] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut poetica non capiuntur a ratione humana propter +defectum veritatis qui est in eis, ita etiam ratio humana perfecte +capere non potest divina propter excedentem ipsorum veritatem. Et +ideo utrobique opus est repraesentatione per sensibiles +figuras.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Augustine is speaking there of internal worship; to which, however, external worship should be ordained, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37970" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37970] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur de cultu interiore; ad quem +tamen ordinari oportet exteriorem cultum, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A2-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 4</b> The same answer applies to the Fourth Objection: because men were taught by Him to practice more perfectly the spiritual + worship of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="37971" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37971] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Et similiter +dicendum est ad quartum, quia per Christum homines plenius ad +spiritualem Dei cultum sunt introducti.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q101_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q101_A3-p0.1">Q. 101. A. 3. Whether there should have been man ceremonial precepts?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there should not have been many ceremonial precepts. For those things which conduce to an end should be + proportionate to that end. But the ceremonial precepts, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q101_A1" id="FS_Q101_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2), are ordained to the worship of God, and to the foreshadowing of Christ. Now "there is but one God, of Whom are all things + . . . and one Lord Jesus Christ, by Whom are all things" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.8.6" target="asv">1 Cor. 8:6</a>). Therefore there + should not have been many ceremonial precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37972" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37972] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non debuerint esse multa caeremonialia +praecepta. Ea enim quae sunt ad finem, debent esse fini +proportionata. Sed caeremonialia praecepta, sicut dictum est, +ordinantur ad cultum Dei et in figuram Christi. Est autem <i>unus +Deus, a quo omnia; et unus dominus Iesus Christus, per quem +omnia</i>, ut dicitur I ad Cor. VIII. Ergo caeremonialia non +debuerunt multiplicari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the great number of the ceremonial precepts was an occasion of transgression, according to the words of Peter ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.15.10" target="asv">Acts 15:10</a>): "Why tempt you God, to put a yoke upon the necks of the disciples, which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear?" + Now the transgression of the Divine precepts is an obstacle to man's salvation. Since, therefore, every law should conduce + to man's salvation, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 3), it seems + that the ceremonial precepts should not have been given in great number. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37973" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37973] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +multitudo caeremonialium praeceptorum transgressionis erat occasio; +secundum illud quod dicit Petrus, Act. XV, <i>quid tentatis Deum, +imponere iugum super cervicem discipulorum, quod neque nos, neque +patres nostri, portare potuimus?</i> Sed transgressio divinorum +praeceptorum contrariatur humanae saluti. Cum igitur lex omnis +debeat saluti congruere hominum, ut Isidorus dicit, videtur quod +non debuerint multa praecepta caeremonialia dari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the ceremonial precepts referred to the outward and bodily worship of God, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q101_A2" id="FS_Q101_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. But the Law should have lessened this bodily worship: since it directed men to Christ, Who taught them to worship God "in + spirit and in truth," as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#John.4.23" target="asv"> Jn. 4:23.</a> Therefore there should not have been many ceremonial precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37974" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37974] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +praecepta caeremonialia pertinebant ad cultum Dei exteriorem et +corporalem, ut dictum est. Sed huiusmodi cultum corporalem lex +debebat diminuere, quia ordinabat ad Christum, qui docuit homines +Deum colere in spiritu et veritate, ut habetur Ioan. IV. Non ergo +debuerunt multa praecepta caeremonialia dari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Hos.8.12" target="asv">Osee 8:12</a>): "I shall write to them [Vulg.: 'him'] My manifold laws"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Job.11.6" target="asv">Job 11:6</a>): "That He might show thee the secrets of His wisdom, and that His Law is manifold." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37975" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37975] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Osee VIII, <i>scribam eis multiplices leges +intus</i>; et Iob XI, ut <i>ostenderet tibi secreta sapientiae, +quod multiplex sit lex eius</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q96_A1" id="FS_Q101_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[96], A[1]</a>), every law is given to a people. Now a people contains two kinds of men: some, prone to evil, who have to be coerced by + the precepts of the law, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q95_A1" id="FS_Q101_A3-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[95], A[1]</a>); some, inclined to good, either from nature or from custom, or rather from grace; and the like have to be taught and improved + by means of the precepts of the law. Accordingly, with regard to both kinds of + the law. Accordingly, with regard to both kinds of men it was expedient that the Old Law should contain many ceremonial precepts. + For in that people there were many prone to idolatry; wherefore it was necessary to recall them by means of ceremonial precepts + from the worship of idols to the worship of God. And since men served idols in many ways, it was necessary on the other hand + to devise many means of repressing every single one: and again, to lay many obligations on such like men, in order + that being burdened, as it were, by their duties to the Divine worship, they might have no time for the service of idols. + As to those who were inclined to good, it was again necessary that there should be many ceremonial precepts; both because + thus their mind turned to God in many ways, and more continually; and because the mystery of Christ, which was foreshadowed + by these ceremonial precepts, brought many boons to the world, and afforded men many considerations, which needed to be signified + by various ceremonies. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 3 co."><a name="37976" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37976] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, omnis lex alicui populo +datur. In populo autem duo genera hominum continentur, quidam proni +ad malum, qui sunt per praecepta legis coercendi, ut supra dictum +est; quidam habentes inclinationem ad bonum, vel ex natura vel ex +consuetudine, vel magis ex gratia; et tales sunt per legis +praeceptum instruendi et in melius promovendi. Quantum igitur ad +utrumque genus hominum, expediebat praecepta caeremonialia in +veteri lege multiplicari. Erant enim in illo populo aliqui ad +idololatriam proni, et ideo necesse erat ut ab idololatriae cultu +per praecepta caeremonialia revocarentur ad cultum Dei. Et quia +multipliciter homines idololatriae deserviebant, oportebat e +contrario multa institui ad singula reprimenda, et iterum multa +talibus imponi, ut, quasi oneratis ex his quae ad cultum Dei +impenderent, non vacaret idololatriae deservire. Ex parte vero +eorum qui erant prompti ad bonum, etiam necessaria fuit +multiplicatio caeremonialium praeceptorum. Tum quia per hoc +diversimode mens eorum referebatur in Deum, et magis assidue. Tum +etiam quia mysterium Christi, quod per huiusmodi caeremonialia +figurabatur, multiplices utilitates attulit mundo, et multa circa +ipsum consideranda erant, quae oportuit per diversa caeremonialia +figurari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When that which conduces to an end is sufficient to conduce thereto, then one such thing suffices for one end: thus one remedy, + if it be efficacious, suffices sometimes to restore men to health, and then the remedy needs not to be repeated. But when + that which conduces to an end is weak and imperfect, it needs to be multiplied: thus many remedies are given to a sick man, + when one is not enough to heal him. Now the ceremonies of the Old Law were weak + and imperfect, both for representing the mystery of Christ, on account of its surpassing excellence; and for subjugating men's + minds to God. Hence the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.7.18" target="asv">Heb. 7:18,19</a>): "There is a setting aside of the former commandment because of the weakness and unprofitableness thereof, for the law brought + nothing to perfection." Consequently these ceremonies needed to be in great number. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37977" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37977] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, quando id quod ordinatur ad finem, est +sufficiens ad ducendum in finem, tunc sufficit unum ad unum finem, +sicut una medicina, si sit efficax, sufficit quandoque ad sanitatem +inducendam, et tunc non oportet multiplicari medicinam. Sed propter +debilitatem et imperfectionem eius quod est ad finem, oportet eam +multiplicari, sicut multa remedia adhibentur infirmo, quando unum +non sufficit ad sanandum. Caeremoniae autem veteris legis invalidae +et imperfectae erant et ad repraesentandum Christi mysterium, quod +est superexcellens; et ad subiugandum mentes hominum Deo. Unde +apostolus dicit, ad Heb. VII, <i>reprobatio fit praecedentis +mandati, propter infirmitatem et inutilitatem, nihil enim ad +perfectum adduxit lex</i>. Et ideo oportuit huiusmodi caeremonias +multiplicari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A wise lawgiver should suffer lesser transgressions, that the greater may be avoided. And therefore, in order to avoid the + sin of idolatry, and the pride which would arise in the hearts of the Jews, were they to fulfil all the precepts of the Law, + the fact that they would in consequence find many occasions of disobedience did not prevent God from giving them many ceremonial + precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37978" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37978] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod sapientis legislatoris est minores transgressiones +permittere, ut maiores caveantur. Et ideo, ut caveretur +transgressio idololatriae, et superbiae quae in Iudaeorum cordibus +nasceretur si omnia praecepta legis implerent, non propter hoc +praetermisit Deus multa caeremonialia praecepta tradere, quia de +facili sumebant ex hoc transgrediendi occasionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Old Law lessened bodily worship in many ways. Thus it forbade sacrifices to be offered in every place and by any person. + Many such like things did it enact for the lessening of bodily worship; as Rabbi Moses, the Egyptian testifies (Doct. Perplex. + iii). Nevertheless it behooved not to attenuate the bodily worship of God so much as to allow men to fall away into the worship + of idols. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37979" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37979] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod vetus lex in multis diminuit corporalem cultum. +Propter quod statuit quod non in omni loco sacrificia offerrentur, +neque a quibuslibet. Et multa huiusmodi statuit ad diminutionem +exterioris cultus; sicut etiam Rabbi Moyses Aegyptius dicit. +Oportebat tamen non ita attenuare corporalem cultum Dei, ut homines +ad cultum Daemonum declinarent.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q101_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q101_A4-p0.1">Q. 101. A. 4. Whether the ceremonies of the Old Law are suitably divided into sacrifices, sacred things, sacraments, and observances?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the ceremonies of the Old Law are unsuitably divided into "sacrifices, sacred things, sacraments, and + observances." For the ceremonies of the Old Law foreshadowed Christ. But this was done only by the sacrifices, which foreshadowed + the sacrifice in which Christ "delivered Himself an oblation and a sacrifice to God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.2" target="asv">Eph. 5:2</a>). Therefore none but the sacrifices were ceremonies. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37980" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37980] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod caeremoniae veteris legis +inconvenienter dividantur in sacrificia, sacra, sacramenta et +observantias. Caeremoniae enim veteris legis figurabant Christum. +Sed hoc solum fiebat per sacrificia, per quae figurabatur +sacrificium quo Christus se obtulit oblationem et hostiam Deo, ut +dicitur ad Ephes. V. Ergo sola sacrificia erant caeremonialia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Old Law was ordained to the New. But in the New Law the sacrifice is the Sacrament of the Altar. Therefore in + the Old Law there should be no distinction between "sacrifices" and "sacraments." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37981" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37981] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +vetus lex ordinabatur ad novam. Sed in nova lege ipsum sacrificium +est sacramentum altaris. Ergo in veteri lege non debuerunt +distingui sacramenta contra sacrificia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a "sacred thing" is something dedicated to God: in which sense the tabernacle and its vessels were said to be consecrated. + But all the ceremonial precepts were ordained to the worship of God, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q101_A1" id="FS_Q101_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore all ceremonies were sacred things. Therefore "sacred things" should not be taken as a part of the ceremonies. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37982" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37982] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sacrum dicitur quod est Deo dicatum, secundum quem modum +tabernaculum et vasa eius sacrificari dicebantur. Sed omnia +caeremonialia erant ordinata ad cultum Dei, ut dictum est. Ergo +caeremonialia omnia sacra erant. Non ergo una pars caeremonialium +debet sacra nominari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, "observances" are so called from having to be observed. But all the precepts of the Law had to be observed: for + it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.8.11" target="asv">Dt. 8:11</a>): "Observe [Douay: 'Take heed'] and beware lest at any time thou forget the Lord thy God, and neglect His commandments and + judgments and ceremonies." Therefore the "observances" should not be considered as a part of the ceremonies. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="37983" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37983] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +observantiae ab observando dicuntur. Sed omnia praecepta legis +observari debebant, dicitur enim Deut. VIII, <i>observa et cave ne +quando obliviscaris domini Dei tui, et negligas mandata eius atque +iudicia et caeremonias</i>. Non ergo observantiae debent poni una +pars caeremonialium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the solemn festivals are reckoned as part of the ceremonial: since they were a shadow of things to come ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Col.2.16" target="asv">Col. 2:16,17</a>): and the same may be said of the oblations and gifts, as appears from the words of the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.9.9" target="asv">Heb. 9:9</a>): and yet these do not seem to be inclined in any of those mentioned above. Therefore the above division of ceremonies is + unsuitable. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="37984" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37984] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +solemnitates inter caeremonialia computantur, cum sint in umbram +futuri, ut patet ad Colos. II. Similiter etiam oblationes et +munera; ut patet per apostolum, ad Heb. IX. Quae tamen sub nullo +horum contineri videntur. Ergo inconveniens est praedicta +distinctio caeremonialium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A4-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> In the Old Law each of the above is called a ceremony. For the sacrifices are called ceremonies ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Num.15.24" target="asv">Num. 15:24</a>): "They shall offer a calf . . . and the sacrifices and libations thereof, as the ceremonies require." Of the sacrament of + Order it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A4-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.7.35" target="asv">Lev. 7:35</a>): "This is the anointing of Aaron and his sons in the ceremonies." Of sacred things also it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A4-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.38.21" target="asv">Ex. 38:21</a>): "These are the + instruments of the tabernacle of the testimony . . . in the ceremonies of the Levites." And again of the observances it is + written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A4-p7.4" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 9:6</a>): "If you . . . shall turn away from following Me, and will not observe [Douay: 'keep'] My . . . ceremonies which I have + set before you." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37985" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37985] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod in veteri lege singula praedicta caeremoniae vocantur. +Sacrificia enim dicuntur caeremoniae Num. XV, <i>offerat vitulum et +sacrificia eius ac libamenta, ut caeremoniae eius postulant</i>. De +sacramento etiam ordinis dicitur Levit. VII, <i>haec est unctio +Aaron et filiorum eius in caeremoniis</i>. De sacris etiam dicitur +Exod. XXXVIII, haec sunt <i>instrumenta tabernaculi testimonii in +caeremoniis Levitarum</i>. De observantiis etiam dicitur III Reg. +IX, <i>si aversi fueritis, non sequentes me, nec observantes +caeremonias quas proposui vobis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A4-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q101_A1" id="FS_Q101_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2), the ceremonial precepts are ordained to the Divine worship. Now in this worship we may consider the worship itself, the + worshippers, and the instruments of worship. The worship consists specially in "sacrifices," which are offered up in honor + of God. The instruments of worship refer to the "sacred things," such as the tabernacle, the vessels and so forth. With regard + to the worshippers two points may be + considered. The first point is their preparation for Divine worship, which is effected by a sort of consecration either of + the people or of the ministers; and to this the "sacraments" refer. The second point is their particular mode of life, whereby + they are distinguished from those who do not worship God: and to this pertain the "observances," for instance, in matters + of food, clothing, and so forth. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 4 co."><a name="37986" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37986] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, caeremonialia praecepta +ordinantur ad cultum Dei. In quo quidem cultu considerari possunt +et ipse cultus, et colentes, et instrumenta colendi. Ipse autem +cultus specialiter consistit in sacrificiis, quae in Dei +reverentiam offeruntur. Instrumenta autem colendi pertinent ad +sacra, sicut est tabernaculum, et vasa, et alia huiusmodi. Ex parte +autem colentium duo possunt considerari. Scilicet et eorum +institutio ad cultum divinum, quod fit per quandam consecrationem +vel populi, vel ministrorum, et ad hoc pertinent sacramenta. Et +iterum eorum singularis conversatio, per quam distinguuntur ab his +qui Deum non colunt, et ad hoc pertinent observantiae, puta in +cibis et vestimentis et aliis huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It was necessary for the sacrifices to be offered both in some certain place and by some certain men: and all this pertained + to the worship of God. Wherefore just as their sacrifices signified Christ the victim, so too their sacraments and sacred + things of the New Law; while their observances foreshadowed the mode of life of the people under the New Law: all of which + things pertain to Christ. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37987" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37987] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod sacrificia oportebat offerri et in aliquibus +locis, et per aliquos homines, et totum hoc ad cultum Dei pertinet. +Unde sicut per sacrificia significatur Christus immolatus, ita +etiam per sacramenta et sacra illorum figurabantur sacramenta et +sacra novae legis; et per eorum observantias figurabatur +conversatio populi novae legis. Quae omnia ad Christum +pertinent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The sacrifice of the New Law, viz. the Eucharist, contains Christ Himself, the Author of our Sanctification: for He sanctified + "the people by His own blood" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.13.12" target="asv">Heb. 13:12</a>). Hence this Sacrifice is also a sacrament. But the sacrifices of the Old Law did not contain Christ, but foreshadowed Him; + hence they are not called sacraments. In order to signify this there were certain sacraments apart from the sacrifices of + the Old Law, which + sacraments were figures of the sanctification to come. Nevertheless to certain consecrations certain sacrifices were united. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37988" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37988] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod sacrificium novae legis, idest Eucharistia, continet +ipsum Christum, qui est sanctificationis auctor, sanctificavit enim +per suum sanguinem populum, ut dicitur ad Heb. ult. Et ideo hoc +sacrificium etiam est sacramentum. Sed sacrificia veteris legis non +continebant Christum, sed ipsum figurabant, et ideo non dicuntur +sacramenta. Sed ad hoc designandum seorsum erant quaedam sacramenta +in veteri lege, quae erant figurae futurae consecrationis. Quamvis +etiam quibusdam consecrationibus quaedam sacrificia +adiungerentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sacrifices and sacraments were of course sacred things. But certain things were sacred, through being dedicated to the + Divine worship, and yet were not sacrifices or sacraments: wherefore they retained the common designation of sacred things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37989" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37989] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod etiam sacrificia et sacramenta erant sacra. Sed +quaedam erant quae erant sacra, utpote ad cultum Dei dicata, nec +tamen erant sacrificia nec sacramenta, et ideo retinebant sibi +commune nomen sacrorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Those things which pertained to the mode of life of the people who worshipped God, retained the common designation of observances, + in so far as they fell short of the above. For they were not called sacred things, because they had no immediate connection + with the worship of God, such as the tabernacle and its vessels had. But by a sort of consequence they were matters of ceremony, + in so far as they affected the fitness of the people who worshipped + God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="37990" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37990] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod ea quae pertinebant ad conversationem populi colentis +Deum, retinebant sibi commune nomen observantiarum, inquantum a +praemissis deficiebant. Non enim dicebantur sacra, quia non +habebant immediatum respectum ad cultum Dei, sicut tabernaculum et +vasa eius. Sed per quandam consequentiam erant caeremonialia, +inquantum pertinebant ad quandam idoneitatem populi colentis +Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Just as the sacrifices were offered in a fixed place, so were they offered at fixed times: for which reason the solemn festivals + seem to be reckoned among the sacred things. The oblations and gifts are counted together with the sacrifices; hence the Apostle + says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A4-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.5.1" target="asv">Heb. 5:1</a>): "Every high-priest taken from among men, is ordained for men in things that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts + and sacrifices." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="37991" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37991] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod, sicut sacrificia offerebantur in determinato loco +ita etiam offerebantur in determinatis temporibus, unde etiam +solemnitates inter sacra computari videntur. Oblationes autem et +munera computantur cum sacrificiis, quia Deo offerebantur, unde +apostolus dicit, ad Heb. V, <i>omnis pontifex ex hominibus +assumptus, pro hominibus constituitur in his quae sunt ad Deum, ut +offerat dona et sacrificia</i>.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q102" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q102-p0.1">Q. 102. OF THE CAUSES OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q102-p2"> We must now consider the causes of the ceremonial precepts: under which head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q102-p3"><a href="#FS_Q102_A1"> (1) Whether there was any cause for the ceremonial precepts?</a></p><p id="FS_Q102-p4"><a href="#FS_Q102_A2"> (2) Whether the cause of the ceremonial precepts was literal or figurative?</a></p><p id="FS_Q102-p5"><a href="#FS_Q102_A3"> (3) The causes of the sacrifices;</a></p><p id="FS_Q102-p6"><a href="#FS_Q102_A4"> (4) The causes of the sacrifices;</a></p><p id="FS_Q102-p7"><a href="#FS_Q102_A5"> (5) The causes of the sacred things;</a></p><p id="FS_Q102-p8"><a href="#FS_Q102_A6"> (6) The causes of the observances.</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 pr."><a name="37992" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37992] Iª-IIae q. 102 pr.</span></a> Deinde +considerandum est de causis caeremonialium praeceptorum. Et circa +hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum praecepta caeremonialia habeant +causam. Secundo, utrum habeant causam litteralem, vel solum +figuralem. Tertio, de causis sacrificiorum. Quarto, de causis +sacramentorum. Quinto, de causis sacrorum. Sexto, de causis +observantiarum.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q102_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q102_A1-p0.1">Q. 102. A. 1. Whether there was any cause for the ceremonial precepts?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there was no cause for the ceremonial precepts. Because on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.15" target="asv"> Eph. 2:15, </a> "Making void the law of the commandments," the gloss says, (i.e.) "making void the Old Law as to the carnal observances, + by substituting decrees, i.e. evangelical precepts, which are based on reason." But if the observances of the Old Law were + based on reason, it would have been useless to void them by the reasonable decrees of the New Law. Therefore + there was no reason for the ceremonial observances of the Old Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37993" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37993] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod caeremonialia praecepta non habeant +causam. Quia super illud Ephes. II, legem mandatorum decretis +evacuans, dicit Glossa, <i>idest, evacuans legem veterem quantum ad +carnales observantias, decretis, idest praeceptis evangelicis, quae +ex ratione sunt</i>. Sed si observantiae veteris legis ex ratione +erant, frustra evacuarentur per rationabilia decreta novae legis. +Non ergo caeremoniales observantiae veteris legis habebant aliquam +rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Old Law succeeded the law of nature. But in the law of nature there was a precept for which there was no reason + save that man's obedience might be tested; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 6,13), concerning the prohibition about the + tree of life. Therefore in the Old Law there should have been some precepts for the purpose of testing man's obedience, having + no reason in themselves. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37994" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37994] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +vetus lex successit legi naturae. Sed in lege naturae fuit aliquod +praeceptum quod nullam rationem habebat nisi ut hominis obedientia +probaretur; sicut Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., de +prohibitione ligni vitae. Ergo etiam in veteri lege aliqua +praecepta danda erant in quibus hominis obedientia probaretur, quae +de se nullam rationem haberent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man's works are called moral according as they proceed from reason. If therefore there is any reason for the ceremonial + precepts, they would not differ from the moral precepts. It seems therefore that there was no cause for the ceremonial precepts: + for the reason of a precept is taken from some cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37995" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37995] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +opera hominis dicuntur moralia secundum quod sunt a ratione. Si +igitur caeremonialium praeceptorum sit aliqua ratio, non different +a moralibus praeceptis. Videtur ergo quod caeremonialia praecepta +non habeant aliquam causam, ratio enim praecepti ex aliqua causa +sumitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.18.9" target="asv">Ps. 18:9</a>): "The commandment of the Lord is lightsome, enlightening the eyes." But the ceremonial precepts are commandments of God. + Therefore they are lightsome: and yet they would not be so, if they had no reasonable cause. Therefore the ceremonial precepts + have a reasonable cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37996" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37996] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur in Psalmo XVIII, <i>praeceptum domini lucidum, +illuminans oculos</i>. Sed caeremonialia sunt praecepta Dei. Ergo +sunt lucida. Quod non esset nisi haberent rationabilem causam. Ergo +praecepta caeremonialia habent rationabilem causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 2), it is the function of a "wise man to do everything in order," those things + which proceed from the Divine wisdom must needs be well ordered, as the Apostle states ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.1" target="asv">Rom. 13:1</a>). Now there are two conditions required for things to be well ordered. First, that they be ordained to their due end, which + is the principle of the whole order in matters of action: since those things that happen by + chance outside the intention of the end, or which are not done seriously but for fun, are said to be inordinate. Secondly, + that which is done in view of the end should be proportionate to the end. From this it follows that the reason for whatever + conduces to the end is taken from the end: thus the reason for the disposition of a saw is taken from cutting, which is its + end, as stated in Phys. ii, 9. Now it is evident that the ceremonial precepts, like all the other precepts of the Law, were + institutions of Divine wisdom: hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.4.6" target="asv">Dt. 4:6</a>): "This is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of nations." Consequently we must needs say that the ceremonial precepts + were ordained to a certain end, wherefrom their reasonable causes can be gathered. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 1 co."><a name="37997" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37997] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, cum sapientis sit ordinare, secundum philosophum, in +I Metaphys., ea quae ex divina sapientia procedunt, oportet esse +ordinata, ut apostolus dicit, ad Rom. XIII. Ad hoc autem quod +aliqua sint ordinata, duo requiruntur. Primo quidem, quod aliqua +ordinentur ad debitum finem, qui est principium totius ordinis in +rebus agendis, ea enim quae casu eveniunt praeter intentionem +finis, vel quae non serio fiunt sed ludo, dicimus esse inordinata. +Secundo oportet quod id quod est ad finem, sit proportionatum fini. +Et ex hoc sequitur quod ratio eorum quae sunt ad finem, sumitur ex +fine, sicut ratio dispositionis serrae sumitur ex sectione, quae +est finis eius, ut dicitur in II Physic. Manifestum est autem quod +praecepta caeremonialia, sicut et omnia alia praecepta legis, sunt +ex divina sapientia instituta, unde dicitur Deut. IV, <i>haec est +sapientia vestra et intellectus coram populis</i>. Unde necesse est +dicere quod praecepta caeremonialia sint ordinata ad aliquem finem, +ex quo eorum rationabiles causae assignari possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It may be said there was no reason for the observances of the Old Law, in the sense that there was no reason in the very + nature of the thing done: for instance that a garment should not be made of wool and linen. But there could be a reason for + them in relation to something else: namely, in so far as something was signified or excluded thereby. On the other hand, the + decrees of the New Law, which refer chiefly to faith and the love of God, are + reasonable from the very nature of the act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37998" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37998] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod observantiae veteris legis possunt dici sine +ratione quantum ad hoc, quod ipsa facta in sui natura rationem non +habebant, puta quod vestis non conficeretur ex lana et lino. +Poterant tamen habere rationem ex ordine ad aliud, inquantum +scilicet vel aliquid per hoc figurabatur, vel aliquid excludebatur. +Sed decreta novae legis, quae praecipue consistunt in fide et +dilectione Dei, ex ipsa natura actus rationabilia sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reason for the prohibition concerning the tree of knowledge of good and evil was not that this tree was naturally evil: + and yet this prohibition was reasonable in its relation to something else, in as much as it signified something. And so also + the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law were reasonable on account of their relation to something else. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37999" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37999] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod prohibitio ligni scientiae boni et mali non fuit +propter hoc quod illud lignum esset naturaliter malum, sed tamen +ipsa prohibitio habuit aliquam rationem ex ordine ad aliud, +inquantum scilicet per hoc aliquid figurabatur. Et sic etiam +caeremonialia praecepta veteris legis habent rationem in ordine ad +aliud.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The moral precepts in their very nature have reasonable causes: as for instance, "Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal." + But the ceremonial precepts have a reasonable cause in their relation to something else, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="38000" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38000] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod praecepta moralia secundum suam naturam habent +rationabiles causas, sicut, non occides, non furtum facies. Sed +praecepta caeremonialia habent rationabiles causas ex ordine ad +aliud, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q102_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q102_A2-p0.1">Q. 102. A. 2. Whether the ceremonial precepts have a literal cause or merely a figurative cause?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the ceremonial precepts have not a literal, but merely a figurative cause. For among the ceremonial precepts, + the chief was circumcision and the sacrifice of the paschal lamb. But neither of these had any but a figurative cause: because + each was given as a sign. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.17.11" target="asv">Gn. 17:11</a>): "You shall circumcise the flesh of your foreskin, that it may be a sign of the covenant between Me and you": and of the + celebration of the Passover it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A2-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.13.9" target="asv">Ex. 13:9</a>): "It shall be as a sign in thy hand, and as a memorial before thy eyes." Therefore much more did the other ceremonial precepts + have none but a figurative reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="38001" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38001] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad +secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praecepta caeremonialia non +habeant causam litteralem, sed figuralem tantum. Inter praecepta +enim caeremonialia praecipua erant circumcisio, et immolatio agni +paschalis. Sed utrumque istorum non habebat nisi causam figuralem, +quia utrumque istorum datum est in signum. Dicitur enim Gen. XVII, +<i>circumcidetis carnem praeputii vestri, ut sit in signum foederis +inter me et vos</i>. Et de celebratione phase dicitur Exod. XIII, +<i>erit quasi signum in manu tua, et quasi monumentum ante oculos +tuos</i>. Ergo multo magis alia caeremonialia non habent nisi +causam figuralem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an effect is proportionate to its cause. But all the ceremonial precepts are figurative, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q101_A2" id="FS_Q102_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[101], A[2]</a>). Therefore they have no other than a figurative cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="38002" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38002] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +effectus proportionatur suae causae. Sed omnia caeremonialia sunt +figuralia, ut supra dictum est. Ergo non habent nisi causam +figuralem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it be a matter of indifference whether a certain thing, considered in itself, be done in a particular way or + not, it seems that it has not a literal cause. Now there are certain points in the ceremonial precepts, which appear to be + a matter of indifference, as to whether they be done in one way or in another: for instance, the number of animals to be offered, + and other such particular circumstances. Therefore there is no literal cause for the + precepts of the Old Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="38003" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38003] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +illud quod de se est indifferens utrum sic vel non sic fiat, non +videtur habere aliquam litteralem causam. Sed quaedam sunt in +praeceptis caeremonialibus quae non videntur differre utrum sic vel +sic fiant, sicut est de numero animalium offerendorum, et aliis +huiusmodi particularibus circumstantiis. Ergo praecepta veteris +legis non habent rationem litteralem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Just as the ceremonial precepts foreshadowed Christ, so did the stories of the Old Testament: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.10.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 10:11</a>) that "all (these things) happened to them in figure." Now in the stories of the Old Testament, besides the mystical or figurative, + there is the literal sense. Therefore the ceremonial precepts had also literal, besides their figurative causes. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 2 s. c."><a name="38004" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38004] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +sicut praecepta caeremonialia figurabant Christum, ita etiam +historiae veteris testamenti, dicitur enim I ad Cor. X, quod omnia +in figuram contingebant illis. Sed in historiis veteris testamenti, +praeter intellectum mysticum seu figuralem, est etiam intellectus +litteralis. Ergo etiam praecepta caeremonialia, praeter causas +figurales, habebant etiam causas litterales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q102_A1" id="FS_Q102_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the reason for whatever conduces to an end must be taken from that end. Now the end of the ceremonial precepts was twofold: + for they were ordained to the Divine worship, for that particular time, and to the foreshadowing of Christ; just as the words + of the prophets regarded the time being in such a way as to be utterances figurative of the time to come, as Jerome says on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Hos.1.3" target="asv"> Osee 1:3.</a> + Accordingly the reasons for the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law can be taken in two ways. First, in respect of the Divine + worship which was to be observed for that particular time: and these reasons are literal: whether they refer to the shunning + of idolatry; or recall certain Divine benefits; or remind men of the Divine excellence; or point out the disposition of mind + which was then required in those who worshipped God. Secondly, their reasons can be gathered from the point of view of their + being ordained to foreshadow Christ: and thus their reasons are figurative and mystical: whether they be taken from Christ + Himself and the Church, which pertains to the allegorical sense; or to the morals of the Christian people, which pertains + to the moral sense; or to the state of future glory, in as much as we are brought thereto by Christ, which refers to the anagogical + sense. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 2 co."><a name="38005" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38005] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ratio eorum quae sunt ad +finem, oportet quod a fine sumatur. Finis autem praeceptorum +caeremonialium est duplex, ordinabatur enim ad cultum Dei pro +tempore illo, et ad figurandum Christum; sicut etiam verba +prophetarum sic respiciebant praesens tempus, quod etiam in figuram +futuri dicebantur, ut Hieronymus dicit, super Osee. Sic igitur +rationes praeceptorum caeremonialium veteris legis dupliciter +accipi possunt. Uno modo, ex ratione cultus divini qui erat pro +tempore illo observandus. Et rationes istae sunt litterales, sive +pertineant ad vitandum idololatriae cultum; sive ad rememoranda +aliqua Dei beneficia; sive ad insinuandam excellentiam divinam; vel +etiam ad designandam dispositionem mentis quae tunc requirebatur in +colentibus Deum. Alio modo possunt eorum rationes assignari +secundum quod ordinantur ad figurandum Christum. Et sic habent +rationes figurales et mysticas, sive accipiantur ex ipso Christo et +Ecclesia, quod pertinet ad allegoriam; sive ad mores populi +Christiani, quod pertinet ad moralitatem; sive ad statum futurae +gloriae, prout in eam introducimur per Christum, quod pertinet ad +anagogiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as the use of metaphorical expressions in Scripture belongs to the literal sense, because the words are employed in + order to convey that particular meaning; so also the meaning of those legal ceremonies which commemorated certain Divine benefits, + on account of which they were instituted, and of others similar which belonged to that time, does not go beyond the order + of literal causes. Consequently when we assert that the cause of the celebration + of the Passover was its signification of the delivery from Egypt, or that circumcision was a sign of God's covenant with Abraham, + we assign the literal cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="38006" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38006] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut intellectus metaphoricae locutionis in +Scripturis est litteralis, quia verba ad hoc proferuntur ut hoc +significent; ita etiam significationes caeremoniarum legis quae +sunt commemorativae beneficiorum Dei propter quae instituta sunt, +vel aliorum huiusmodi quae ad illum statum pertinebant, non +transcendunt ordinem litteralium causarum. Unde quod assignetur +causa celebrationis phase quia est signum liberationis ex Aegypto, +et quod circumcisio est signum pacti quod Deus habuit cum Abraham, +pertinet ad causam litteralem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument would avail if the ceremonial precepts had been given merely as figures of things to come, and not for the + purpose of worshipping God then and there. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="38007" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38007] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si caeremonialia praecepta +essent data solum ad figurandum futurum, non autem ad +praesentialiter Deum colendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As we have stated when speaking of human laws ( + <a href="#FS_Q96_A1" id="FS_Q102_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[96], AA[1]</a> ,6), there is a reason for them in the abstract, but not in regard to particular conditions, which depend on the judgment + of those who frame them; so also many particular determinations in the ceremonies of the Old Law have no literal cause, but + only a figurative cause; whereas in the abstract they have a literal cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="38008" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38008] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut in legibus humanis dictum est quod in +universali habent rationem, non autem quantum ad particulares +conditiones, sed haec sunt ex arbitrio instituentium; ita etiam +multae particulares determinationes in caeremoniis veteris legis +non habent aliquam causam litteralem, sed solam figuralem; in +communi vero habent etiam causam litteralem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q102_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q102_A3-p0.1">Q. 102. A. 3. Whether a suitable cause can be assigned for the ceremonies which pertained to sacrifices?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no suitable cause can be assigned for the ceremonies pertaining to sacrifices. For those things which + were offered in sacrifice, are those which are necessary for sustaining human life: such as certain animals and certain loaves. + But God needs no such sustenance; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.49.13" target="asv"> Ps. 49:13</a>: "Shall I eat the flesh of bullocks? Or shall I drink the blood of goats?" Therefore such sacrifices were unfittingly offered + to God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="38009" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38009] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non possit conveniens ratio assignari +caeremoniarum quae ad sacrificia pertinent. Ea enim quae in +sacrificium offerebantur, sunt illa quae sunt necessaria ad +sustentandam humanam vitam, sicut animalia quaedam, et panes +quidam. Sed tali sustentamento Deus non indiget; secundum illud +Psalmi XLIX, <i>numquid manducabo carnes taurorum, aut sanguinem +hircorum potabo?</i> Ergo inconvenienter huiusmodi sacrificia Deo +offerebantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, only three kinds of quadrupeds were offered in sacrifice to God, viz. oxen, sheep and goats; of birds, generally + the turtledove and the dove; but specially, in the cleansing of a leper, an offering was made of sparrows. Now many other + animals are more noble than these. Since therefore whatever is best should be offered to God, it seems that not only of these + three should sacrifices have been offered to Him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="38010" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38010] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +in sacrificium divinum non offerebantur nisi de tribus generibus +animalium quadrupedum, scilicet de genere bovum, ovium et caprarum; +et de avibus, communiter quidem turtur et columba; specialiter +autem in emundatione leprosi fiebat sacrificium de passeribus. +Multa autem alia animalia sunt eis nobiliora. Cum igitur omne quod +est optimum Deo sit exhibendum, videtur quod non solum de istis +rebus fuerint Deo sacrificia offerenda.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as man has received from God the dominion over birds and beasts, so also has he received dominion over fishes. + Consequently it was unfitting for fishes to be excluded from the divine sacrifices. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="38011" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38011] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut homo a Deo habet dominium volatilium et bestiarum, ita etiam +piscium. Inconvenienter igitur pisces a divino sacrificio +excludebantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, turtledoves and doves indifferently are commanded to be offered up. Since then the young of the dove are commanded + to be offered, so also should the young of the turtledove. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="38012" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38012] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +indifferenter offerri mandantur turtures et columbae. Sicut igitur +mandantur offerri pulli columbarum, ita etiam pulli turturum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, God is the Author of life, not only of men, but also of animals, as is clear from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.20" target="asv"> Gn. 1:20, </a> seqq. Now death is opposed to life. Therefore it was fitting that living animals rather than slain animals should be offered + to God, especially as the Apostle admonishes us ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.1" target="asv">Rom. 12:1</a>), to present our bodies "a living sacrifice, holy, pleasing unto God." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 arg. 5"><a name="38013" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38013] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +Deus est auctor vitae non solum hominum, sed etiam animalium; ut +patet per id quod dicitur Gen. I. Mors autem opponitur vitae. Non +ergo debuerunt Deo offerri animalia occisa, sed magis animalia +viventia. Praecipue quia etiam apostolus monet, Rom. XII, <i>ut +exhibeamus nostra corpora hostiam viventem, sanctam, Deo +placentem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, if none but slain animals were offered in sacrifice to God, it seems that it mattered not how they were slain. Therefore + it was unfitting that the manner of immolation should be determined, especially as regards birds ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.1.15" target="asv">Lev. 1:15, </a> seqq.). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 arg. 6"><a name="38014" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38014] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, +si animalia Deo in sacrificium non offerebantur nisi occisa, nulla +videtur esse differentia qualiter occidantur. Inconvenienter igitur +determinatur modus immolationis, praecipue in avibus, ut patet +Levit. I.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p8"> + <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, every defect in an animal is a step towards corruption and death. If therefore slain animals were offered to God, + it was unreasonable to forbid the offering of an imperfect animal, e.g. a lame, or a blind, or otherwise defective animal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 arg. 7"><a name="38015" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38015] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 7</span></a> Praeterea, +omnis defectus animalis via est ad corruptionem et mortem. Si +igitur animalia occisa Deo offerebantur, inconveniens fuit +prohibere oblationem animalis imperfecti, puta claudi aut caeci, +aut aliter maculosi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p9"> + <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, those who offer victims to God should partake thereof, according to the words of the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.10.18" target="asv">1 Cor. 10:18</a>): "Are not they that eat of the sacrifices partakers of the altar?" It was therefore unbecoming for the offerers to be denied + certain parts of the victims, namely, the blood, the fat, the breastbone and the right shoulder. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 arg. 8"><a name="38016" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38016] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 8</span></a> Praeterea, +illi qui offerunt hostias Deo, debent de his participare; secundum +illud apostoli, I Cor. X, <i>nonne qui edunt hostias, participes +sunt altaris?</i> Inconvenienter igitur quaedam partes hostiarum +offerentibus subtrahebantur, scilicet sanguis et adeps, et +pectusculum et armus dexter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p10"> + <b>Objection 9:</b> Further, just as holocausts were offered up in honor of God, so also were the peace-offerings and sin-offerings. But no female + animals was offered up to God as a holocaust, although holocausts were offered of both quadrupeds and birds. Therefore it + was inconsistent that female animals should be offered up in peace-offerings and sin-offerings, and that nevertheless birds + should not be offered up in peace-offerings. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 arg. 9"><a name="38017" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38017] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 9</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut holocausta offerebantur in honorem Dei, ita etiam hostiae +pacificae et hostiae pro peccato. Sed nullum animal feminini sexus +offerebatur Deo in holocaustum, fiebant tamen holocausta tam de +quadrupedibus quam de avibus. Ergo inconvenienter in hostiis +pacificis et pro peccato offerebantur animalia feminini sexus; et +tamen in hostiis pacificis non offerebantur aves.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p11"> + <b>Objection 10:</b> Further, all the peace-offerings seem to be of one kind. Therefore it was unfitting to make a distinction among them, so + that it was forbidden to eat the flesh of certain peace-offerings on the following day, while it was allowed to eat the flesh + of other peace-offerings, as laid down in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.7.15" target="asv"> Lev. 7:15, </a> seqq. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 arg. 10"><a name="38018" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38018] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 10</span></a> +Praeterea, omnes hostiae pacificae unius generis esse videntur. Non +ergo debuit poni ista differentia, quod quorundam pacificorum +carnes non possent vesci in crastino, quorundam autem possent, ut +mandatur Levit. VII.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p12"> + <b>Objection 11:</b> Further, all sins agree in turning us from God. Therefore, in order to reconcile us to God, one kind of sacrifice should + have been offered up for all sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 arg. 11"><a name="38019" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38019] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 11</span></a> +Praeterea, omnia peccata in hoc conveniunt quod a Deo avertunt. +Ergo pro omnibus peccatis, in Dei reconciliationem, unum genus +sacrificii debuit offerri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p13"> + <b>Objection 12:</b> Further, all animals that were offered up in sacrifice, were offered up in one way, viz. slain. Therefore it does not seem + to be suitable that products of the soil should be offered up in various ways; for sometimes an offering was made of ears + of corn, sometimes of flour, sometimes of bread, this being baked sometimes in an oven, sometimes in a pan, sometimes on a + gridiron. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 arg. 12"><a name="38020" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38020] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 12</span></a> +Praeterea, omnia animalia quae offerebantur in sacrificium, uno +modo offerebantur, scilicet occisa. Non videtur ergo conveniens +quod de terrae nascentibus diversimode fiebat oblatio, nunc enim +offerebantur spicae, nunc simila, nunc panis, quandoque quidem +coctus in clibano, quandoque in sartagine, quandoque in +craticula.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p14"> + <b>Objection 13:</b> Further, whatever things are serviceable to us should be recognized as coming from God. It was therefore unbecoming that + besides animals, nothing but bread, wine, oil, incense, and salt should be offered to God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 arg. 13"><a name="38021" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38021] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 13</span></a> +Praeterea, omnia quae in usum nostrum veniunt, a Deo recognoscere +debemus. Inconvenienter ergo praeter animalia, solum haec Deo +offerebantur, panis, vinum, oleum, thus et sal.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p15"> + <b>Objection 14:</b> Further, bodily sacrifices denote the inward sacrifice of the heart, whereby man offers his soul to God. But in the inward + sacrifice, the sweetness, which is denoted by honey, surpasses the pungency which salt represents; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.24.27" target="asv">Ecclus. 24:27</a>): "My spirit is sweet above honey." Therefore it was unbecoming that the use of honey, and of leaven which makes bread savory, + should be forbidden in a sacrifice; while the use was + prescribed, of salt which is pungent, and of incense which has a bitter taste. Consequently it seems that things pertaining + to the ceremonies of the sacrifices have no reasonable cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 arg. 14"><a name="38022" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38022] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 14</span></a> +Praeterea, sacrificia corporalia exprimunt interius sacrificium +cordis, quo homo spiritum suum offert Deo. Sed in interiori +sacrificio plus est de dulcedine, quam repraesentat mel, quam de +mordacitate, quam repraesentat sal, dicitur enim Eccli. XXIV, +<i>spiritus meus super mel dulcis</i>. Ergo inconvenienter +prohibebatur in sacrificio apponi mel et fermentum, quod etiam +facit panem sapidum; et praecipiebatur ibi apponi sal, quod est +mordicativum, et thus, quod habet saporem amarum. Videtur ergo quod +ea quae pertinent ad caeremonias sacrificiorum, non habeant +rationabilem causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p16"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p16.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.1.13" target="asv">Lev. 1:13</a>): "The priest shall offer it all and burn it all upon the altar, for a holocaust, and most sweet savor to the Lord." Now + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p16.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.28" target="asv"> Wis. 7:28, </a> "God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom": whence it seems to follow that whatever is acceptable to God is wisely + done. Therefore these ceremonies of the sacrifices were wisely done, as having reasonable causes. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 s. c."><a name="38023" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38023] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Levit. I, <i>oblata omnia adolebit sacerdos super +altare in holocaustum et odorem suavissimum domino</i>. Sed sicut +dicitur Sap. VII, <i>neminem diligit Deus nisi qui cum sapientia +inhabitat</i>, ex quo potest accipi quod quidquid est Deo acceptum, +est cum sapientia. Ergo illae caeremoniae sacrificiorum cum +sapientia erant, velut habentes rationabiles causas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A3-p17"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q102_A2" id="FS_Q102_A3-p17.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, the ceremonies of the Old Law had a twofold cause, viz. a literal cause, according as they were intended for Divine worship; + and a figurative or mystical cause, according as they were intended to foreshadow Christ: and on either hand the ceremonies + pertaining to the sacrifices can be assigned to a fitting cause. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A3-p18"> For, according as the ceremonies of the sacrifices were intended for the divine worship, the causes of the sacrifices can + be taken in two ways. First, in so far as the sacrifice represented the directing of the mind to God, to which the offerer + of the sacrifice was stimulated. Now in order to direct his mind to God aright, man must recognize that whatever he has is + from God as from its first principle, and direct it to God as its last end. This was denoted in the offerings and + sacrifices, by the fact that man offered some of his own belongings in honor of God, as though in recognition of his having + received them from God, according to the saying of David (1 Paral. xxix, 14): "All things are Thine: and we have given Thee + what we received of Thy hand." Wherefore in offering up sacrifices man made protestation that God is the first principle of + the creation of all things, and their last end, to which all things must be directed. And since, for the human mind to be + directed to God aright, it must recognize no first author of things other than God, nor place its end in any other; for this + reason it was forbidden in the Law to offer sacrifice to any other but God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p18.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.20" target="asv"> Ex. 22:20</a>: "He that sacrificeth to gods, shall be put to death, save only to the Lord." Wherefore another reasonable cause may be assigned + to the ceremonies of the sacrifices, from the fact that thereby men were withdrawn from offering sacrifices to idols. Hence + too it is that the precepts about the sacrifices were not given to the Jewish people until after they had fallen into idolatry, + by worshipping the molten calf: as though those sacrifices were instituted, that the people, being ready to offer sacrifices, + might offer those sacrifices to God rather than to idols. Thus it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p18.2" href="./asv.html#Jer.7.22" target="asv">Jer. 7:22</a>): "I spake not to your fathers and I commanded them not, in the day that I brought them out of the land of Egypt, concerning + the matter + of burnt-offerings and sacrifices." + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A3-p19"> Now of all the gifts which God vouchsafed to mankind after they had fallen away by sin, the chief is that He gave His Son; + wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p19.1" href="./asv.html#John.3.16" target="asv">Jn. 3:16</a>): "God so loved the world, as to give His only-begotten Son; that whosoever believeth in Him, may not perish, but may have + life everlasting." Consequently the chief sacrifice is that whereby Christ Himself "delivered Himself . . . to God for an + odor of sweetness" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p19.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.2" target="asv">Eph. 5:2</a>). And for this reason all the + other sacrifices of the Old Law were offered up in order to foreshadow this one individual and paramount sacrifice---the imperfect + forecasting the perfect. Hence the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p19.3" href="./asv.html#Heb.10.11" target="asv">Heb. 10:11</a>) that the priest of the Old Law "often" offered "the same sacrifices, which can never take away sins: but" Christ offered + "one sacrifice for sins, for ever." And since the reason of the figure is taken from that which the figure represents, therefore + the reasons of the figurative + sacrifices of the Old Law should be taken from the true sacrifice of Christ. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 co."><a name="38024" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38024] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, caeremoniae veteris legis +duplicem causam habebant, unam scilicet litteralem, secundum quod +ordinabantur ad cultum Dei; aliam vero figuralem, sive mysticam, +secundum quod ordinabantur ad figurandum Christum. Et ex utraque +parte potest convenienter assignari causa caeremoniarum quae ad +sacrificia pertinebant. Secundum enim quod sacrificia ordinabantur +ad cultum Dei, causa sacrificiorum dupliciter accipi potest. Uno +modo, secundum quod per sacrificia repraesentabatur ordinatio +mentis in Deum, ad quam excitabatur sacrificium offerens. Ad rectam +autem ordinationem mentis in Deum pertinet quod omnia quae homo +habet, recognoscat a Deo tanquam a primo principio, et ordinet in +Deum tanquam in ultimum finem. Et hoc repraesentabatur in +oblationibus et sacrificiis, secundum quod homo ex rebus suis, +quasi in recognitionem quod haberet ea a Deo, in honorem Dei ea +offerebat; secundum quod dixit David, I Paral. XXIX, <i>tua sunt +omnia; et quae de manu tua accepimus, dedimus tibi</i>. Et ideo in +oblatione sacrificiorum protestabatur homo quod Deus esset primum +principium creationis rerum et ultimus finis, ad quem essent omnia +referenda. Et quia pertinet ad rectam ordinationem mentis in Deum +ut mens humana non recognoscat alium primum auctorem rerum nisi +solum Deum, neque in aliquo alio finem suum constituat; propter hoc +prohibebatur in lege offerre sacrificium alicui alteri nisi Deo, +secundum illud Exod. XXII, <i>qui immolat diis, occidetur, praeter +domino soli</i>. Et ideo de causa caeremoniarum circa sacrificia +potest assignari ratio alio modo, ex hoc quod per huiusmodi homines +retrahebantur a sacrificiis idolorum. Unde etiam praecepta de +sacrificiis non fuerunt data populo Iudaeorum nisi postquam +declinavit ad idololatriam, adorando vitulum conflatilem, quasi +huiusmodi sacrificia sint instituta ut populus ad sacrificandum +promptus, huiusmodi sacrificia magis Deo quam idolis offerret. Unde +dicitur Ierem. VII, <i>non sum locutus cum patribus vestris, et non +praecepi eis, in die qua eduxi eos de terra Aegypti, de verbo +holocautomatum et victimarum</i>. Inter omnia autem dona quae Deus +humano generi iam per peccatum lapso dedit, praecipuum est quod +dedit filium suum, unde dicitur Ioan. III, <i>sic Deus dilexit +mundum ut filium suum unigenitum daret, ut omnis qui credit in +ipsum non pereat, sed habeat vitam aeternam</i>. Et ideo potissimum +sacrificium est quo ipse Christus seipsum obtulit Deo in odorem +suavitatis, ut dicitur ad Ephes. V. Et propter hoc omnia alia +sacrificia offerebantur in veteri lege ut hoc unum singulare et +praecipuum sacrificium figuraretur, tanquam perfectum per +imperfecta. Unde apostolus dicit, ad Heb. X, quod <i>sacerdos +veteris legis easdem saepe offerebat hostias, quae nunquam possunt +auferre peccata, Christus autem pro peccatis obtulit unam in +sempiternum</i>. Et quia ex figurato sumitur ratio figurae, ideo +rationes sacrificiorum figuralium veteris legis sunt sumendae ex +vero sacrificio Christi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p20"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God did not wish these sacrifices to be offered to Him on account of the things themselves that were offered, as though He + stood in need of them: wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p20.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.1.11" target="asv">Is. 1:11</a>): "I desire not holocausts of rams, and fat of fatlings, and blood of calves and lambs and buckgoats." But, as stated above, + He wished them to be offered to Him, in order to prevent idolatry; in order to signify the right ordering of man's mind to + God; + and in order to represent the mystery of the Redemption of man by Christ. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="38025" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38025] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Deus non volebat huiusmodi sacrificia sibi +offerri propter ipsas res quae offerebantur, quasi eis indigeret, +unde dicitur Isaiae I, <i>holocausta arietum, et adipem pinguium, +et sanguinem vitulorum et hircorum et agnorum, nolui</i>. Sed +volebat ea sibi offerri, ut supra dictum est, tum ad excludendam +idololatriam; tum ad significandum debitum ordinem mentis humanae +in Deum; tum etiam ad figurandum mysterium redemptionis humanae +factae per Christum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A3-p21"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In all the respects mentioned above (ad 1), there was a suitable reason for these animals, rather than others, being offered + in sacrifice to God. First, in order to prevent idolatry. Because idolaters offered all other animals to their gods, or made + use of them in their sorceries: while the Egyptians (among whom the people had been dwelling) considered it abominable to + slay these animals, wherefore they used not to offer them in sacrifice to their + gods. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p21.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.8.26" target="asv">Ex. 8:26</a>): "We shall sacrifice the abominations of the Egyptians to the Lord our God." For they worshipped the sheep; they reverenced + the ram (because demons appeared under the form thereof); while they employed oxen for agriculture, which was reckoned by + them as something sacred. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A3-p22"> Secondly, this was suitable for the aforesaid right ordering of man's mind to God: and in two ways. First, because it is + chiefly by means of these animals that human life is sustained: and moreover they are most clean, and partake of a most clean + food: whereas other animals are either wild, and not deputed to ordinary use among men: or, if they be tame, they have unclean + food, as pigs and geese: and nothing but what is clean should be offered to God. These birds especially were + offered in sacrifice because there were plenty of them in the land of promise. Secondly, because the sacrificing of these + animals represented purity of heart. Because as the gloss says on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p22.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.1" target="asv">Lev. 1</a>, "We offer a calf, when we overcome the pride of the flesh; a lamb, when we restrain our unreasonable motions; a goat, when + we conquer wantonness; a turtledove, when we keep chaste; unleavened bread, when we feast on the unleavened bread of sincerity." + And it is evident that the dove denotes charity and + simplicity of heart. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A3-p23"> Thirdly, it was fitting that these animals should be offered, that they might foreshadow Christ. Because, as the gloss observes, + "Christ is offered in the calf, to denote the strength of the cross; in the lamb, to signify His innocence; in the ram, to + foreshadow His headship; and in the goat, to signify the likeness of 'sinful flesh' [*An allusion to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p23.1" href="./asv.html#Col.2.11" target="asv">Col. 2:11</a> (Textus Receptus)]. The turtledove and dove denoted the union of the two natures"; or else the turtledove signified + chastity; while the dove was a figure of charity. "The wheat-flour foreshadowed the sprinkling of believers with the water + of Baptism." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="38026" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38026] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod quantum ad omnia praedicta, conveniens ratio fuit +quare ista animalia offerebantur Deo in sacrificium, et non alia. +Primo quidem, ad excludendum idololatriam. Quia omnia alia animalia +offerebant idololatrae diis suis, vel eis ad maleficia utebantur, +ista autem animalia apud Aegyptios, cum quibus conversati erant, +abominabilia erant ad occidendum, unde ea non offerebant in +sacrificium diis suis; unde dicitur Exod. VIII, <i>abominationes +Aegyptiorum immolabimus domino Deo nostro</i>. Oves enim colebant; +hircos venerabantur, quia in eorum figura Daemones apparebant; +bobus autem utebantur ad agriculturam, quam inter res sacras +habebant. Secundo, hoc conveniens erat ad praedictam ordinationem +mentis in Deum. Et hoc dupliciter. Primo quidem, quia huiusmodi +animalia maxime sunt per quae sustentatur humana vita, et cum hoc +mundissima sunt, et mundissimum habent nutrimentum. Alia vero +animalia vel sunt silvestria, et non sunt communiter hominum usui +deputata, vel, si sunt domestica, immundum habent nutrimentum, ut +porcus et gallina; solum autem id quod est purum, Deo est +attribuendum. Huiusmodi autem aves specialiter offerebantur, quia +habentur in copia in terra promissionis. Secundo, quia per +immolationem huiusmodi animalium puritas mentis designatur. Quia, +ut dicitur in Glossa Levit. I, <i>vitulum offerimus, cum carnis +superbiam vincimus; agnum, cum irrationales motus corrigimus; +haedum, cum lasciviam superamus; turturem, dum castitatem servamus; +panes azymos, cum in azymis sinceritatis epulamur</i>. In columba +vero manifestum est quod significatur caritas et simplicitas +mentis. Tertio vero, conveniens fuit haec animalia offerri in +figuram Christi. Quia, ut in eadem Glossa dicitur, <i>Christus in +vitulo offertur, propter virtutem crucis; in agno, propter +innocentiam; in ariete, propter principatum; in hirco, propter +similitudinem carnis peccati. In turture et columba duarum +naturarum coniunctio monstrabatur</i>, vel in turture castitas, in +columba caritas significatur. <i>In similagine aspersio credentium +per aquam Baptismi figurabatur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p24"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Fish through living in water are further removed from man than other animals, which, like man, live in the air. Again, fish + die as soon as they are taken out of water; hence they could not be offered in the temple like other animals. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="38027" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38027] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod pisces, quia in aquis vivunt, magis sunt alieni ab +homine quam alia animalia, quae vivunt in aere, sicut et homo. Et +iterum pisces, ex aqua extracti, statim moriuntur, unde non +poterant in templo offerri, sicut alia animalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p25"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Among turtledoves the older ones are better than the young; while with doves the case is the reverse. Wherefore, as Rabbi + Moses observes (Doct. Perplex. iii), turtledoves and young doves are commanded to be offered, because nothing should be offered + to God but what is best. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="38028" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38028] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod in turturibus meliores sunt maiores quam pulli; in +columbis autem e converso. Et ideo, ut Rabbi Moyses dicit, +mandantur offerri turtures et pulli columbarum, quia omne quod est +optimum, Deo est attribuendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p26"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The animals which were offered in sacrifice were slain, because it is by being killed that they become useful to man, forasmuch + as God gave them to man for food. Wherefore also they were burnt with fire: because it is by being cooked that they are made + fit for human consumption. Moreover the slaying of the animals signified the destruction of sins: and also that man deserved + death on account of his sins; as though those animals were slain in man's + stead, in order to betoken the expiation of sins. Again the slaying of these animals signified the slaying of Christ. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 ad 5"><a name="38029" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38029] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod animalia in sacrificium oblata occidebantur, quia +veniunt in usum hominis occisa, secundum quod a Deo dantur homini +ad esum. Et ideo etiam igni cremabantur, quia per ignem decocta +fiunt apta humano usui. Similiter etiam per occisionem animalium +significatur destructio peccatorum. Et quod homines erant digni +occisione pro peccatis suis, ac si illa animalia loco eorum +occiderentur, ad significandum expiationem peccatorum. Per +occisionem etiam huiusmodi animalium significabatur occisio +Christi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p27"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The Law fixed the special manner of slaying the sacrificial animals in order to exclude other ways of killing, whereby idolaters + sacrificed animals to idols. Or again, as Rabbi Moses says (Doct. Perplex. iii), "the Law chose that manner of slaying which + was least painful to the slain animal." This excluded cruelty on the part of the offerers, and any mangling of the animals + slain. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 ad 6"><a name="38030" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38030] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum +dicendum quod specialis modus occidendi animalia immolata +determinabatur in lege ad excludendum alios modos, quibus +idololatrae animalia idolis immolabant. Vel etiam, ut Rabbi Moyses +dicit, <i>lex elegit genus occisionis quo animalia minus +affligebantur occisa</i>. Per quod excludebatur etiam +immisericordia offerentium, et deterioratio animalium +occisorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p28"> + <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> It is because unclean animals are wont to be held in contempt among men, that it was forbidden to offer them in sacrifice + to God: and for this reason too they were forbidden ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p28.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.18" target="asv">Dt. 23:18</a>) to offer "the hire of a strumpet or the price of a dog in the house of . . . God." For the same reason they did not offer + animals before the seventh day, because such were abortive as it were, the flesh being not yet firm on account of its + exceeding softness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 ad 7"><a name="38031" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38031] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 7</span></a> Ad septimum +dicendum quod, quia animalia maculosa solent haberi contemptui +etiam apud homines, ideo prohibitum est ne Deo in sacrificium +offerrentur, propter quod etiam prohibitum erat <i>ne mercedem +prostibuli, aut pretium canis, in domum Dei offerrent</i>. Et eadem +etiam ratione non offerebant animalia ante septimum diem, quia +talia animalia erant quasi abortiva, nondum plene consistentia, +propter teneritudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A3-p29"> + <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> There were three kinds of sacrifices. There was one in which the victim was entirely consumed by fire: this was called "a + holocaust, i.e. all burnt." For this kind of sacrifice was offered to God specially to show reverence to His majesty, and + love of His goodness: and typified the state of perfection as regards the fulfilment of the counsels. Wherefore the whole + was burnt up: so that as the whole animal by being dissolved into vapor soared aloft, so + it might denote that the whole man, and whatever belongs to him, are subject to the authority of God, and should be offered + to Him. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A3-p30"> Another sacrifice was the "sin-offering," which was offered to God on account of man's need for the forgiveness of sin: and + this typifies the state of penitents in satisfying for sins. It was divided into two parts: for one part was burnt; while + the other was granted to the use of the priests to signify that remission of sins is granted by God through the ministry of + His priests. When, however, this sacrifice was offered for the sins of the whole people, or specially for the sin + of the priest, the whole victim was burnt up. For it was not fitting that the priests should have the use of that which was + offered for their own sins, to signify that nothing sinful should remain in them. Moreover, this would not be satisfaction + for sin: for if the offering were granted to the use of those for whose sins it was offered, it would seem to be the same + as if it had not been offered. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A3-p31"> The third kind of sacrifice was called the "peace-offering," which was offered to God, either in thanksgiving, or for the + welfare and prosperity of the offerers, in acknowledgment of benefits already received or yet to be received: and this typifies + the state of those who are proficient in the observance of the commandments. These sacrifices were divided into three parts: + for one part was burnt in honor of God; another part was allotted to the use of the priests; and the third + part to the use of the offerers; in order to signify that man's salvation is from God, by the direction of God's ministers, + and through the cooperation of those who are saved. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A3-p32"> But it was the universal rule that the blood and fat were not allotted to the use either of the priests or of the offerers: + the blood being poured out at the foot of the altar, in honor of God, while the fat was burnt upon the altar ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p32.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.9.9" target="asv">Lev. 9:9,10</a>). The reason for this was, first, in order to prevent idolatry: because idolaters used to drink the blood and eat the fat + of the victims, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p32.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.32.38" target="asv"> Dt. 32:38</a>: "Of whose victims they eat the + fat, and drank the wine of their drink-offerings." Secondly, in order to form them to a right way of living. For they were + forbidden the use of the blood that they might abhor the shedding of human blood; wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p32.3" href="./asv.html#Gen.9.4" target="asv">Gn. 9:4,5</a>): "Flesh with blood you shall not eat: for I will require the blood of your lives": and they were forbidden to eat the fat, + in order to withdraw them from lasciviousness; hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p32.4" href="./asv.html#Ezek.34.3" target="asv">Ezech. 34:3</a>): "You have + killed that which was fat." Thirdly, on account of the reverence due to God: because blood is most necessary for life, for + which reason "life" is said to be "in the blood" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p32.5" href="./asv.html#Lev.17.11" target="asv">Lev. 17:11</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p32.6" href="./asv.html#Lev.17.14" target="asv">14</a>): while fat is a sign of abundant nourishment. Wherefore, in order to show that to God we owe both life and a sufficiency + of all good things, the blood was poured out, and the fat burnt up in His honor. Fourthly, in order to foreshadow the shedding + of Christ's blood, and the abundance of His charity, whereby He + offered Himself to God for us. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A3-p33"> In the peace-offerings, the breast-bone and the right shoulder were allotted to the use of the priest, in order to prevent + a certain kind of divination which is known as "spatulamantia," so called because it was customary in divining to use the + shoulder-blade [spatula], and the breast-bone of the animals offered in sacrifice; wherefore these things were taken away + from the offerers. This is also denoted the priest's need of wisdom in the heart, to instruct the people---this was + signified by the breast-bone, which covers the heart; and his need of fortitude, in order to bear with human frailty---and + this was signified by the right shoulder. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 ad 8"><a name="38032" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38032] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 8</span></a> Ad octavum +dicendum quod triplex erat sacrificiorum genus. Quoddam erat quod +totum comburebatur, et hoc dicebatur holocaustum, quasi totum +incensum. Huiusmodi enim sacrificium offerebatur Deo specialiter ad +reverentiam maiestatis ipsius, et amorem bonitatis eius, et +conveniebat perfectionis statui in impletione consiliorum. Et ideo +totum comburebatur, ut sicut totum animal, resolutum in vaporem, +sursum ascendebat, ita etiam significaretur totum hominem, et omnia +quae ipsius sunt, Dei dominio esse subiecta, et ei esse offerenda. +Aliud autem erat sacrificium pro peccato, quod offerebatur Deo ex +necessitate remissionis peccati, et conveniebat statui poenitentium +in satisfactione peccatorum. Quod dividebatur in duas partes, nam +una pars eius comburebatur, alia vero cedebat in usum sacerdotum; +ad significandum quod expiatio peccatorum fit a Deo per ministerium +sacerdotum. Nisi quando offerebatur sacrificium pro peccato totius +populi, vel specialiter pro peccato sacerdotis, tunc enim totum +comburebatur. Non enim debebant in usum sacerdotum venire ea quae +pro peccato eorum offerebantur, ut nihil peccati in eis remaneret. +Et quia hoc non esset satisfactio pro peccato, si enim cederet in +usum eorum pro quorum peccatis offerebatur, idem esse videretur ac +si non offerrent. Tertium vero sacrificium vocabatur hostia +pacifica, quae offerebatur Deo vel pro gratiarum actione, vel pro +salute et prosperitate offerentium, ex debito beneficii vel accepti +vel accipiendi, et convenit statui proficientium in impletione +mandatorum. Et ista dividebantur in tres partes, nam una pars +incendebatur ad honorem Dei, alia pars cedebat in usum sacerdotum, +tertia vero pars in usum offerentium; ad significandum quod salus +hominis procedit a Deo, dirigentibus ministris Dei, et +cooperantibus ipsis hominibus qui salvantur. Hoc autem generaliter +observabatur, quod sanguis et adeps non veniebant neque in usum +sacerdotum, neque in usum offerentium, sed sanguis effundebatur ad +crepidinem altaris, in honorem Dei; adeps vero adurebatur in igne. +Cuius ratio una quidem fuit ad excludendam idololatriam. +Idololatrae enim bibebant de sanguine victimarum, et comedebant +adipes; secundum illud Deut. XXXII, <i>de quorum victimis +comedebant adipes, et bibebant vinum libaminum</i>. Secunda ratio +est ad informationem humanae vitae. Prohibebatur enim eis usus +sanguinis, ad hoc quod horrerent humani sanguinis effusionem, unde +dicitur Gen. IX, <i>carnem cum sanguine non comedetis, sanguinem +enim animarum vestrarum requiram</i>. Esus vero adipum prohibebatur +eis ad vitandam lasciviam, unde dicitur Ezech. XXXIV, <i>quod +crassum erat, occidebatis</i>. Tertia ratio est propter reverentiam +divinam. Quia sanguis est maxime necessarius ad vitam, ratione +cuius dicitur anima esse in sanguine, adeps autem abundantiam +nutrimenti demonstrat. Et ideo ut ostenderetur quod a Deo nobis est +et vita et omnis bonorum sufficientia, ad honorem Dei effundebatur +sanguis, et adurebatur adeps. Quarta ratio est quia per hoc +figurabatur effusio sanguinis Christi, et pinguedo caritatis eius, +per quam se obtulit Deo pro nobis. De hostiis autem pacificis in +usum sacerdotis cedebat pectusculum et armus dexter, ad excludendum +quandam divinationis speciem quae vocatur spatulamantia, quia +scilicet in spatulis animalium immolatorum divinabant, et similiter +in osse pectoris. Et ideo ista offerentibus subtrahebantur. Per hoc +etiam significabatur quod sacerdoti erat necessaria sapientia +cordis ad instruendum populum, quod significabatur per pectus, quod +est tegumentum cordis; et etiam fortitudo ad sustentandum defectus, +quae significatur per armum dextrum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p34"> + <b>Reply to Objection 9:</b> Because the holocaust was the most perfect kind of sacrifice, therefore none but a male was offered for a holocaust: because + the female is an imperfect animal. The offering of turtledoves and doves was on account of the poverty of the offerers, who + were unable to offer bigger animals. And since peace-victims were offered freely, and no one was bound to offer them against + his will, hence these birds were offered not among the peace-victims, but among + the holocausts and victims for sin, which man was obliged to offer at times. Moreover these birds, on account of their lofty + flight, while befitting the perfection of the holocausts: and were suitable for sin-offerings because their song is doleful. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 ad 9"><a name="38033" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38033] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 9</span></a> Ad nonum +dicendum quod, quia holocaustum erat perfectissimum inter +sacrificia, ideo non offerebatur in holocaustum nisi masculus, nam +femina est animal imperfectum. Oblatio autem turturum et columbarum +erat propter paupertatem offerentium, qui maiora animalia offerre +non poterant. Et quia hostiae pacificae gratis offerebantur, et +nullus eas offerre cogebatur nisi spontaneus; ideo huiusmodi aves +non offerebantur inter hostias pacificas, sed inter holocausta et +hostias pro peccato, quas quandoque oportebat offerre. Aves etiam +huiusmodi, propter altitudinem volatus, congruunt perfectioni +holocaustorum, et etiam hostiis pro peccato, quia habent gemitum +pro cantu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p35"> + <b>Reply to Objection 10:</b> The holocaust was the chief of all the sacrifices: because all were burnt in honor of God, and nothing of it was eaten. The + second place in holiness, belongs to the sacrifice for sins, which was eaten in the court only, and on the very day of the + sacrifice ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p35.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.7.6" target="asv">Lev. 7:6</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p35.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.7.15" target="asv">15</a>). The third place must be given to the peace-offerings of thanksgiving, which were eaten on the same day, but anywhere in + Jerusalem. Fourth in order were the + "ex-voto" peace-offerings, the flesh of which could be eaten even on the morrow. The reason for this order is that man is + bound to God, chiefly on account of His majesty; secondly, on account of the sins he has committed; thirdly, because of the + benefits he has already received from Him; fourthly, by reason of the benefits he hopes to receive from Him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 ad 10"><a name="38034" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38034] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 10</span></a> Ad decimum +dicendum quod inter omnia sacrificia holocaustum erat praecipuum, +quia totum comburebatur in honorem Dei, et nihil ex eo comedebatur. +Secundum vero locum in sanctitate tenebat hostia pro peccato, quae +comedebatur solum in atrio a sacerdotibus, et in ipsa die +sacrificii. Tertium vero gradum tenebant hostiae pacificae pro +gratiarum actione, quae comedebantur ipso die, sed ubique in +Ierusalem. Quartum vero locum tenebant hostiae pacificae ex voto, +quarum carnes poterant etiam in crastino comedi. Et est ratio huius +ordinis quia maxime obligatur homo Deo propter eius maiestatem, +secundo, propter offensam commissam; tertio, propter beneficia iam +suscepta; quarto, propter beneficia sperata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p36"> + <b>Reply to Objection 11:</b> Sins are more grievous by reason of the state of the sinner, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q73_A10" id="FS_Q102_A3-p36.1" shape="rect">Q[73], A[10]</a>): wherefore different victims are commanded to be offered for the sin of a priest, or of a prince, or of some other private + individual. "But," as Rabbi Moses says (Doct. Perplex. iii), "we must take note that the more grievous the sin, the lower + the species of animals offered for it. Wherefore the goat, which is a very base animal, was + offered for idolatry; while a calf was offered for a priest's ignorance, and a ram for the negligence of a prince." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 ad 11"><a name="38035" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38035] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 11</span></a> Ad +undecimum dicendum quod peccata aggravantur ex statu peccantis, ut +supra dictum est. Et ideo alia hostia mandatur offerri pro peccato +sacerdotis et principis, vel alterius privatae personae. Est autem +attendendum, ut Rabbi Moyses dicit, quod <i>quanto gravius erat +peccatum, tanto vilior species animalis offerebatur pro eo. Unde +capra, quod est vilissimum animal, offerebatur pro idololatria, +quod est gravissimum peccatum; pro ignorantia vero sacerdotis +offerebatur vitulus; pro negligentia autem principis, +hircus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A3-p37"> + <b>Reply to Objection 12:</b> In the matter of sacrifices the Law had in view the poverty of the offerers; so that those who could not have a four-footed + animal at their disposal, might at least offer a bird; and that he who could not have a bird might at least offer bread; and + that if a man had not even bread he might offer flour or ears of corn. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A3-p38"> The figurative cause is that the bread signifies Christ Who is the "living bread" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p38.1" href="./asv.html#John.6.41" target="asv">Jn. 6:41</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p38.2" href="./asv.html#John.6.51" target="asv">51</a>). He was indeed an ear of corn, as it were, during the state of the law of nature, in the faith of the patriarchs; He was + like flour in the doctrine of the Law of the prophets; and He was like perfect bread after He had taken human nature; baked + in the fire, i.e. formed by the Holy Ghost in the oven of the virginal womb; baked again in a pan by the toils which He + suffered in the world; and consumed by fire on the cross as on a gridiron. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 ad 12"><a name="38036" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38036] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 12</span></a> Ad +duodecimum dicendum quod lex in sacrificiis providere voluit +paupertati offerentium, ut qui non posset habere animal quadrupes, +saltem offerret avem; quam qui habere non posset, saltem offerret +panem; et si hunc habere non posset, saltem offerret farinam vel +spicas. Causa vero figuralis est quia panis significat Christum, +qui est panis vivus, ut dicitur Ioan. VI. Qui quidem erat sicut in +spica, pro statu legis naturae, in fide patrum; erat autem sicut +simila in doctrina legis prophetarum; erat autem sicut panis +formatus post humanitatem assumptam; coctus igne, idest formatus +spiritu sancto in clibano uteri virginalis; qui etiam fuit coctus +in sartagine, per labores quos in mundo sustinebat; in cruce vero +quasi in craticula adustus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A3-p39"> + <b>Reply to Objection 13:</b> The products of the soil are useful to man, either as food, and of these bread was offered; or as drink, and of these wine + was offered; or as seasoning, and of these oil and salt were offered; or as healing, and of these they offered incense, which + both smells sweetly and binds easily together. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A3-p40"> Now the bread foreshadowed the flesh of Christ; and the wine, His blood, whereby we were redeemed; oil betokens the grace + of Christ; salt, His knowledge; incense, His prayer. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 ad 13"><a name="38037" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38037] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 13</span></a> Ad +decimumtertium dicendum quod ea quae in usum hominis veniunt de +terrae nascentibus, vel sunt in cibum, et de eis offerebatur panis. +Vel sunt in potum, et de his offerebatur vinum. Vel sunt in +condimentum, et de his offerebatur oleum et sal. Vel sunt in +medicamentum, et de his offerebatur thus, quod est aromaticum et +consolidativum. Per panem autem figuratur caro Christi; per vinum +autem sanguis eius, per quem redempti sumus; oleum figurat gratiam +Christi; sal scientiam; thus orationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A3-p41"> + <b>Reply to Objection 14:</b> Honey was not offered in the sacrifices to God, both because it was wont to be offered in the sacrifices to idols; and in + order to denote the absence of all carnal sweetness and pleasure from those who intend to sacrifice to God. Leaven was not + offered, to denote the exclusion of corruption. Perhaps too, it was wont to be offered in the sacrifices to idols. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A3-p42"> Salt, however, was offered, because it wards off the corruption of putrefaction: for sacrifices offered to God should be + incorrupt. Moreover, salt signifies the discretion of wisdom, or again, mortification of the flesh. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A3-p43"> Incense was offered to denote devotion of the heart, which is necessary in the offerer; and again, to signify the odor of + a good name: for incense is composed of matter, both rich and fragrant. And since the sacrifice "of jealousy" did not proceed + from devotion, but rather from suspicion, therefore incense was not offered therein ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p43.1" href="./asv.html#Num.5.15" target="asv">Num. 5:15</a>). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 ad 14"><a name="38038" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38038] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 14</span></a> Ad +decimumquartum dicendum quod mel non offerebatur in sacrificiis +Dei, tum quia consueverat offerri in sacrificiis idolorum. Tum +etiam ad excludendam omnem carnalem dulcedinem et voluptatem ab his +qui Deo sacrificare intendunt. Fermentum vero non offerebatur, ad +excludendam corruptionem. Et forte etiam in sacrificiis idolorum +solitum erat offerri. Sal autem offerebatur, quia impedit +corruptionem putredinis, sacrificia autem Dei debent esse +incorrupta. Et etiam quia in sale significatur discretio +sapientiae; vel etiam mortificatio carnis. Thus autem offerebatur +ad designandam devotionem mentis, quae est necessaria offerentibus; +et etiam ad designandum odorem bonae famae, nam thus et pingue est, +et odoriferum. Et quia sacrificium zelotypiae non procedebat ex +devotione, sed magis ex suspicione, ideo in eo non offerebatur +thus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q102_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q102_A4-p0.1">Q. 102. A. 4. Whether sufficient reason can be assigned for the ceremonies pertaining to holy things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no sufficient reason can be assigned for the ceremonies of the Old Law that pertain to holy things. For + Paul said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.17.24" target="asv">Acts 17:24</a>): "God Who made the world and all things therein; He being Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in temples made by hands." + It was therefore unfitting that in the Old Law a tabernacle or temple should be set up for the worship of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="38039" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38039] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod caeremoniarum veteris legis quae ad +sacra pertinent sufficiens ratio assignari non possit. Dicit enim +Paulus, Act. XVII, <i>Deus, qui fecit mundum et omnia quae in eo +sunt, hic, caeli et terrae cum sit dominus, non in manufactis +templis habitat</i>. Inconvenienter igitur ad cultum Dei +tabernaculum, vel templum, in lege veteri est institutum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the state of the Old Law was not changed except by Christ. But the tabernacle denoted the state of the Old Law. + Therefore it should not have been changed by the building of a temple. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="38040" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38040] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +status veteris legis non fuit immutatus nisi per Christum. Sed +tabernaculum designabat statum veteris legis. Non ergo debuit +mutari per aedificationem alicuius templi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Divine Law, more than any other indeed, should lead man to the worship of God. But an increase of divine worship + requires multiplication of altars and temples; as is evident in regard to the New Law. Therefore it seems that also under + the Old Law there should have been not only one tabernacle or temple, but many. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="38041" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38041] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +divina lex praecipue etiam debet homines inducere ad divinum +cultum. Sed ad augmentum divini cultus pertinet quod fiant multa +altaria et multa templa, sicut patet in nova lege. Ergo videtur +quod etiam in veteri lege non debuit esse solum unum templum aut +unum tabernaculum sed multa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the tabernacle or temple was ordained to the worship of God. But in God we should worship above all His unity and + simplicity. Therefore it seems unbecoming for the tabernacle or temple to be divided by means of veils. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="38042" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38042] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +tabernaculum, seu templum, ad cultum Dei ordinabatur. Sed in Deo +praecipue oportet venerari unitatem et simplicitatem. Non videtur +igitur fuisse conveniens ut tabernaculum, seu templum, per quaedam +vela distingueretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the power of the First Mover, i.e. God, appears first of all in the east, for it is in that quarter that the first + movement begins. But the tabernacle was set up for the worship of God. Therefore it should have been built so as to point + to the east rather than the west. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="38043" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38043] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +virtus primi moventis, qui est Deus, primo apparet in parte +orientis, a qua parte incipit primus motus. Sed tabernaculum fuit +institutum ad Dei adorationem. Ergo debebat esse dispositum magis +versus orientem quam versus occidentem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A4-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, the Lord commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.4" target="asv">Ex. 20:4</a>) that they should "not make . . . a graven thing, nor the likeness of anything." It was therefore unfitting for graven images + of the cherubim to be set up in the tabernacle or temple. In like manner, the ark, the propitiatory, the candlestick, the + table, the two altars, seem to have been placed there without reasonable cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 arg. 6"><a name="38044" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38044] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, +Exod. XX, dominus praecepit ut <i>non facerent sculptile, neque +aliquam similitudinem</i>. Inconvenienter igitur in tabernaculo, +vel in templo, fuerunt sculptae imagines Cherubim. Similiter etiam +et arca, et propitiatorium, et candelabrum, et mensa, et duplex +altare, sine rationabili causa ibi fuisse videntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A4-p8"> + <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, the Lord commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.24" target="asv">Ex. 20:24</a>): "You shall make an altar of earth unto Me": and again ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.26" target="asv">Ex. 20:26</a>): "Thou shalt not go up by steps unto My altar." It was therefore unfitting that subsequently they should be commanded to + make an altar of wood laid over with gold or brass; and of such a height that it was impossible to go up to it except by steps. + For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.27.1" target="asv">Ex. 27:1,2</a>): "Thou shalt + make also an altar of setim wood, which shall be five cubits long, and as many broad . . . and three cubits high . . . and + thou shalt cover it with brass": and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p8.4" href="./asv.html#Exod.30.1" target="asv">Ex. 30:1</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p8.5" href="./asv.html#Exod.30.3" target="asv">3</a>): "Thou shalt make . . . an altar to burn incense, of setim wood . . . and thou shalt overlay it with the purest gold." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 arg. 7"><a name="38045" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38045] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 arg. 7</span></a> Praeterea, +dominus praecepit, Exod. XX, altare de terra facietis mihi. Et +iterum, non ascendes ad altare meum per gradus. Inconvenienter +igitur mandatur postmodum altare fieri de lignis auro vel aere +contextis; et tantae altitudinis ut ad illud nisi per gradus +ascendi non posset. Dicitur enim Exod. XXVII, <i>facies et altare +de lignis setim, quod habebit quinque cubitos in longitudine, et +totidem in latitudine, et tres cubitos in altitudine; et operies +illud aere</i>. Et Exod. XXX dicitur, <i>facies altare ad adolendum +thymiamata, de lignis setim, vestiesque illud auro +purissimo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A4-p9"> + <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, in God's works nothing should be superfluous; for not even in the works of nature is anything superfluous to be + found. But one cover suffices for one tabernacle or house. Therefore it was unbecoming to furnish the tabernacle with many + coverings, viz. curtains, curtains of goats' hair, rams' skins dyed red, and violet-colored skins ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.26" target="asv">Ex. 26</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 arg. 8"><a name="38046" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38046] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 arg. 8</span></a> Praeterea, +in operibus Dei nihil debet esse superfluum, quia nec in operibus +naturae aliquid superfluum invenitur. Sed uni tabernaculo, vel +domui, sufficit unum operimentum. Inconvenienter igitur tabernaculo +fuerunt apposita multa tegumenta, scilicet cortinae, saga cilicina, +pelles arietum rubricatae, et pelles hyacintinae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A4-p10"> + <b>Objection 9:</b> Further, exterior consecration signifies interior holiness, the subject of which is the soul. It was therefore unsuitable + for the tabernacle and its vessels to be consecrated, since they were inanimate things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 arg. 9"><a name="38047" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38047] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 arg. 9</span></a> Praeterea, +consecratio exterior interiorem sanctitatem significat, cuius +subiectum est anima. Inconvenienter igitur tabernaculum et eius +vasa consecrabantur, cum essent quaedam corpora inanimata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A4-p11"> + <b>Objection 10:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.33.2" target="asv">Ps. 33:2</a>): "I will bless the Lord at all times, His praise shall always be in my mouth." But the solemn festivals were instituted + for the praise of God. Therefore it was not fitting that certain days should be fixed for keeping solemn festivals; so that + it seems that there was no suitable cause for the ceremonies relating to holy things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 arg. 10"><a name="38048" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38048] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 arg. 10</span></a> +Praeterea, in Psalmo XXXIII dicitur, <i>benedicam dominum in omni +tempore, semper laus eius in ore meo</i>. Sed solemnitates +instituuntur ad laudandum Deum. Non ergo fuit conveniens ut aliqui +certi dies statuerentur ad solemnitates peragendas. Sic igitur +videtur quod caeremoniae sacrorum convenientes causas non +haberent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A4-p12"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.8.4" target="asv">Heb. 8:4</a>) that those who "offer gifts according to the law . . . serve unto the example and shadow of heavenly things. As it was answered + to Moses, when he was to finish the tabernacle: See, says He, that thou make all things according to the pattern which was + shown thee on the mount." But that is most reasonable, which presents a likeness to heavenly things. Therefore the ceremonies + relating to holy things had a + reasonable cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 s. c."><a name="38049" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38049] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Heb. VIII, quod <i>illi qui offerunt +secundum legem munera, exemplari et umbrae deserviunt caelestium, +sicut responsum est Moysi, cum consummaret tabernaculum, vide, +inquit, omnia facito secundum exemplar quod tibi in monte +monstratum est</i>. Sed valde rationabile est quod imaginem +caelestium repraesentat. Ergo caeremoniae sacrorum rationabilem +causam habebant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p13"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The chief purpose of the whole external worship is that man may give worship to God. Now man's tendency is to reverence less + those things which are common, and indistinct from other things; whereas he admires and reveres those things which are distinct + from others in some point of excellence. Hence too it is customary among men for kings and princes, who ought to be reverenced + by their subjects, to be clothed in more precious garments, and to possess vaster + and more beautiful abodes. And for this reason it behooved special times, a special abode, special vessels, and special ministers + to be appointed for the divine worship, so that thereby the soul of man might be brought to greater reverence for God. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p14"> In like manner the state of the Old Law, as observed above + <a href="#FS_Q102_A2" id="FS_Q102_A4-p14.1" shape="rect">(A[2];</a> Q[100] , A[12]; Q[101], A[2]), was instituted that it might foreshadow the mystery of Christ. Now that which foreshadows + something should be determinate, so that it may present some likeness thereto. Consequently, certain special points had to + be observed in matters pertaining to the worship of God. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 co."><a name="38050" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38050] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod totus exterior cultus Dei ad hoc praecipue ordinatur +ut homines Deum in reverentia habeant. Habet autem hoc humanus +affectus, ut ea quae communia sunt, et non distincta ab aliis, +minus revereatur; ea vero quae habent aliquam excellentiae +discretionem ab aliis, magis admiretur et revereatur. Et inde etiam +hominum consuetudo inolevit ut reges et principes, quos oportet in +reverentia haberi a subditis, et pretiosioribus vestibus ornentur, +et etiam ampliores et pulchriores habitationes possideant. Et +propter hoc oportuit ut aliqua specialia tempora, et speciale +habitaculum, et specialia vasa, et speciales ministri ad cultum Dei +ordinarentur, ut per hoc animi hominum ad maiorem Dei reverentiam +adducerentur. Similiter etiam status veteris legis, sicut dictum +est, institutus erat ad figurandum mysterium Christi. Oportet autem +esse aliquid determinatum id per quod aliud figurari debet, ut +scilicet eius aliquam similitudinem repraesentet. Et ideo etiam +oportuit aliqua specialia observari in his quae pertinent ad cultum +Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine worship regards two things: namely, God Who is worshipped; and men, who worship Him. Accordingly God, Who is worshipped, + is confined to no bodily place: wherefore there was no need, on His part, for a tabernacle or temple to be set up. But men, + who worship Him, are corporeal beings: and for their sake there was need for a special tabernacle or temple to be set up for + the worship of God, for two reasons. First, that through coming together + with the thought that the place was set aside for the worship of God, they might approach thither with greater reverence. + Secondly, that certain things relating to the excellence of Christ's Divine or human nature might be signified by the arrangement + of various details in such temple or tabernacle. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p16"> To this Solomon refers ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p16.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 8:27</a>) when he says: "If heaven and the heavens of heavens cannot contain Thee, how much less this house which I have built" for + Thee? And further on ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p16.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 8:29</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p16.3" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">20</a>) he adds: "That Thy eyes may be open upon this house . . . of which Thou hast said: My name shall be there; . . . that Thou + mayest hearken to the supplication of Thy servant and of Thy people Israel." From this it is evident that the house of + the sanctuary was set up, not in order to contain God, as abiding therein locally, but that God might be made known there + by means of things done and said there; and that those who prayed there might, through reverence for the place, pray more + devoutly, so as to be heard more readily. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="38051" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38051] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod cultus Dei duo respicit, scilicet Deum, qui +colitur; et homines colentes. Ipse igitur Deus, qui colitur, nullo +corporali loco clauditur, unde propter ipsum non oportuit +tabernaculum fieri, aut templum. Sed homines ipsum colentes +corporales sunt, et propter eos oportuit speciale tabernaculum, vel +templum, institui ad cultum Dei, propter duo. Primo quidem, ut ad +huiusmodi locum convenientes cum hac cogitatione quod deputaretur +ad colendum Deum, cum maiori reverentia accederent. Secundo, ut per +dispositionem talis templi, vel tabernaculi, significarentur aliqua +pertinentia ad excellentiam divinitatis vel humanitatis Christi. Et +hoc est quod Salomon dicit, III Reg. VIII, <i>si caelum et caeli +caelorum te capere non possunt, quanto magis domus haec, quam +aedificavi tibi? Et</i> postea subdit, <i>sint oculi tui aperti +super domum hanc, de qua dixisti, erit nomen meum ibi; ut exaudias +deprecationem servi tui et populi tui Israel</i>. Ex quo patet quod +domus sanctuarii non est instituta ad hoc quod Deum capiat, quasi +localiter inhabitantem; sed ad hoc quod nomen Dei habitet ibi, +idest ut notitia Dei ibi manifestetur per aliqua quae ibi fiebant +vel dicebantur; et quod, propter reverentiam loci, orationes +fierent ibi magis exaudibiles ex devotione orantium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Before the coming of Christ, the state of the Old Law was not changed as regards the fulfilment of the Law, which was effected + in Christ alone: but it was changed as regards the condition of the people that were under the Law. Because, at first, the + people were in the desert, having no fixed abode: afterwards they were engaged in various wars with the neighboring nations; + and lastly, at the time of David and Solomon, the state of that people was one + of great peace. And then for the first time the temple was built in the place which Abraham, instructed by God, had chosen + for the purpose of sacrifice. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p17.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.22.2" target="asv">Gn. 22:2</a>) that the Lord commanded Abraham to "offer" his son "for a holocaust upon one of the mountains which I will show thee": and + it is related further on ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p17.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.22.14" target="asv">Gn. 22:14</a>) that "he calleth the name of that place, The Lord seeth," as though, according to the Divine prevision, that place + were chosen for the worship of God. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p17.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.12.5" target="asv">Dt. 12:5,6</a>): "You shall come to the place which the Lord your God shall choose . . . and you shall offer . . . your holocausts and victims." + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p18"> Now it was not meet for that place to be pointed out by the building of the temple before the aforesaid time; for three reasons + assigned by Rabbi Moses. First, lest the Gentiles might seize hold of that place. Secondly, lest the Gentiles might destroy + it. The third reason is lest each tribe might wish that place to fall to their lot, and strifes and quarrels be the result. + Hence the temple was not built until they had a king who would be able to quell such quarrels. Until that + time a portable tabernacle was employed for divine worship, no place being as yet fixed for the worship of God. This is the + literal reason for the distinction between the tabernacle and the temple. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p19"> The figurative reason may be assigned to the fact that they signify a twofold state. For the tabernacle, which was changeable, + signifies the state of the present changeable life: whereas the temple, which was fixed and stable, signifies the state of + future life which is altogether unchangeable. For this reason it is said that in the building of the temple no sound was heard + of hammer or saw, to signify that all movements of disturbance will be far removed from the future state. + Or else the tabernacle signifies the state of the Old Law; while the temple built by Solomon betokens the state of the New + Law. Hence the Jews alone worked at the building of the tabernacle; whereas the temple was built with the cooperation of the + Gentiles, viz. the Tyrians and Sidonians. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="38052" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38052] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod status veteris legis non fuit immutatus ante Christum +quantum ad impletionem legis, quae facta est solum per Christum, +est tamen immutatus quantum ad conditionem populi qui erat sub +lege. Nam primo populus fuit in deserto, non habens certam +mansionem; postmodum autem habuerunt varia bella cum finitimis +gentibus; ultimo autem, tempore David et Salomonis, populus ille +habuit quietissimum statum. Et tunc primo aedificatum fuit templum, +in loco quem designaverat Abraham, ex divina demonstratione, ad +immolandum. Dicitur enim Gen. XXII, quod dominus mandavit Abrahae +ut offerret filium suum <i>in holocaustum super unum montium quem +monstravero tibi</i>. Et postea dicit quod appellavit nomen illius +loci, <i>dominus videt</i>, quasi secundum Dei praevisionem esset +locus ille electus ad cultum divinum. Propter quod dicitur Deut. +XII, <i>ad locum quem elegerit dominus Deus vester, venietis, et +offeretis holocausta et victimas vestras</i>. Locus autem ille +designari non debuit per aedificationem templi ante tempus +praedictum, propter tres rationes, quas Rabbi Moyses assignat. +Prima est ne gentes appropriarent sibi locum illum. Secunda est ne +gentes ipsum destruerent. Tertia vero ratio est ne quaelibet tribus +vellet habere locum illum in sorte sua, et propter hoc orirentur +lites et iurgia. Et ideo non fuit aedificatum templum donec +haberent regem, per quem posset huiusmodi iurgium compesci. Antea +vero ad cultum Dei erat ordinatum tabernaculum portatile per +diversa loca, quasi nondum existente determinato loco divini +cultus. Et haec est ratio litteralis diversitatis tabernaculi et +templi. Ratio autem figuralis esse potest quia per haec duo +significatur duplex status. Per tabernaculum enim, quod est +mutabile, significatur status praesentis vitae mutabilis. Per +templum vero, quod erat fixum et stans, significatur status futurae +vitae, quae omnino invariabilis est. Et propter hoc in +aedificatione templi dicitur quod non est auditus sonitus mallei +vel securis, ad significandum quod omnis perturbationis tumultus +longe erit a statu futuro. Vel per tabernaculum significatur status +veteris legis, per templum autem a Salomone constructum, status +novae legis. Unde ad constructionem tabernaculi soli Iudaei sunt +operati, ad aedificationem vero templi cooperati sunt etiam +gentiles, scilicet Tyrii et Sidonii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p20"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason for the unity of the temple or tabernacle may be either literal or figurative. The literal reason was the exclusion + of idolatry. For the Gentiles put up various times to various gods: and so, to strengthen in the minds of men their belief + in the unity of the Godhead, God wished sacrifices to be offered to Him in one place only. Another reason was in order to + show that bodily worship is not acceptable of itself: and so they restrained from + offering sacrifices anywhere and everywhere. But the worship of the New Law, in the sacrifice whereof spiritual grace is contained, + is of itself acceptable to God; and consequently the multiplication of altars and temples is permitted in the New Law. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p21"> As to those matters that regarded the spiritual worship of God, consisting in the teaching of the Law and the Prophets, there + were, even under the Old Law, various places, called synagogues, appointed for the people to gather together for the praise + of God; just as now there are places called churches in which the Christian people gather together for the divine worship. + Thus our church takes the place of both temple and synagogue: since the very sacrifice of the Church is + spiritual; wherefore with us the place of sacrifice is not distinct from the place of teaching. The figurative reason may + be that hereby is signified the unity of the Church, whether militant or triumphant. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="38053" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38053] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio unitatis templi, vel tabernaculi, potest esse +et litteralis, et figuralis. Litteralis quidem est ratio ad +exclusionem idololatriae. Quia gentiles diversis diis diversa +templa constituebant, et ideo, ut firmaretur in animis hominum +fides unitatis divinae, voluit Deus ut in uno loco tantum sibi +sacrificium offerretur. Et iterum ut per hoc ostenderet quod +corporalis cultus non propter se erat ei acceptus. Et ideo +compescebantur ne passim et ubique sacrificia offerrent. Sed cultus +novae legis, in cuius sacrificio spiritualis gratia continetur, est +secundum se Deo acceptus. Et ideo multiplicatio altarium et +templorum acceptatur in nova lege. Quantum vero ad ea quae +pertinebant ad spiritualem cultum Dei, qui consistit in doctrina +legis et prophetarum, erant etiam in veteri lege diversa loca +deputata in quibus conveniebant ad laudem Dei, quae dicebantur +synagogae, sicut et nunc dicuntur Ecclesiae, in quibus populus +Christianus ad laudem Dei congregatur. Et sic Ecclesia nostra +succedit in locum et templi et synagogae, quia ipsum sacrificium +Ecclesiae spirituale est; unde non distinguitur apud nos locus +sacrificii a loco doctrinae. Ratio autem figuralis esse potest quia +per hoc significatur unitas Ecclesiae, vel militantis vel +triumphantis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p22"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Just as the unity of the temple or tabernacle betokened the unity of God, or the unity of the Church, so also the division + of the tabernacle or temple signified the distinction of those things that are subject to God, and from which we arise to + the worship of God. Now the tabernacle was divided into two parts: one was called the "Holy of Holies," and was placed to + the west; the other was called the "Holy Place" [*Or 'Sanctuary'. The Douay version uses + both expressions], which was situated to the east. Moreover there was a court facing the tabernacle. Accordingly there are + two reasons for this distinction. One is in respect of the tabernacle being ordained to the worship of God. Because the different + parts of the world are thus betokened by the division of the tabernacle. For that part which was called the Holy of Holies + signified the higher world, which is that of spiritual substances: while that part which is called the Holy Place signified + the corporeal world. Hence the Holy Place was separated from the Holy of Holies by a veil, which was of four different colors + (denoting the four elements), viz. of linen, signifying earth, because linen, i.e. flax, grows out of the earth; purple, signifying + water, because the purple tint was made from certain shells found in the sea; violet, signifying air, because it has the color + of the air; and scarlet twice dyed, signifying fire: and this because matter composed of the four elements is a + veil between us and incorporeal substances. Hence the high-priest alone, and that once a year, entered into the inner tabernacle, + i.e. the Holy of Holies: whereby we are taught that man's final perfection consists in his entering into that (higher) world: + whereas into the outward tabernacle, i.e. the Holy Place, the priests entered every day: whereas the people were only admitted + to the court; because the people were able to perceived material things, the inner nature of which only wise men by + dint of study are able to discover. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p23"> But regard to the figurative reason, the outward tabernacle, which was called the Holy Place, betokened the state of the + Old Law, as the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p23.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.9.6" target="asv">Heb. 9:6, </a> seqq.): because into that tabernacle "the priests always entered accomplishing the offices of sacrifices." But the inner + tabernacle, which was called the Holy of Holies, signified either the glory of heaven or the spiritual state of the New Law + to come. To the latter state Christ brought us; and this + was signified by the high-priest entering alone, once a year, into the Holy of Holies. The veil betokened the concealing of + the spiritual sacrifices under the sacrifices of old. This veil was adorned with four colors: viz. that of linen, to designate + purity of the flesh; purple, to denote the sufferings which the saints underwent for God; scarlet twice dyed, signifying the + twofold love of God and our neighbor; and violet, in token of heavenly contemplation. With regard to the state of the Old + Law the people and the priests were situated differently from one another. For the people saw the mere corporeal sacrifices + which were offered in the court: whereas the priests were intent on the inner meaning of the sacrifices, because their faith + in the mysteries of Christ was more explicit. Hence they entered into the outer tabernacle. This outer tabernacle was divided + from the court by a veil; because some matters relating to the mystery of Christ were hidden from the people, while they + were known to the priests: though they were not fully revealed to them, as they were subsequently in the New Testament (cf. + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p23.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.5" target="asv"> Eph. 3:5</a>). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="38054" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38054] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, sicut in unitate templi, vel tabernaculi, +repraesentabatur unitas Dei, vel unitas Ecclesiae; ita etiam in +distinctione tabernaculi, vel templi, repraesentabatur distinctio +eorum quae Deo sunt subiecta, ex quibus in Dei venerationem +consurgimus. Distinguebatur autem tabernaculum in duas partes, in +unam quae vocabatur sancta sanctorum, quae erat Occidentalis; et +aliam quae vocabatur sancta, quae erat ad orientem. Et iterum ante +tabernaculum erat atrium. Haec igitur distinctio duplicem habet +rationem. Unam quidem, secundum quod tabernaculum ordinatur ad +cultum Dei. Sic enim diversae partes mundi in distinctione +tabernaculi figurantur. Nam pars illa quae sancta sanctorum +dicitur, figurabat saeculum altius, quod est spiritualium +substantiarum, pars vero illa quae dicitur sancta, exprimebat +mundum corporalem. Et ideo sancta a sanctis sanctorum +distinguebantur quodam velo, quod quatuor coloribus erat +distinctum, per quos quatuor elementa designantur, scilicet bysso, +per quod designatur terra, quia byssus, idest linum, de terra +nascitur; purpura, per quam significatur aqua, fiebat enim +purpureus color ex quibusdam conchis quae inveniuntur in mari; +hyacintho, per quem significatur aer, quia habet aereum colorem; et +cocco bis tincto, per quem designatur ignis. Et hoc ideo quia +materia quatuor elementorum est impedimentum per quod velantur +nobis incorporales substantiae. Et ideo in interius tabernaculum, +idest in sancta sanctorum, solus summus sacerdos, et semel in anno, +introibat, ut designaretur quod haec est finalis perfectio hominis, +ut ad illud saeculum introducatur. In tabernaculum vero exterius, +idest in sancta, introibant sacerdotes quotidie, non autem populus, +qui solum ad atrium accedebat, quia ipsa corpora populus percipere +potest; ad interiores autem eorum rationes soli sapientes per +considerationem attingere possunt. Secundum vero rationem +figuralem, per exterius tabernaculum, quod dicitur sancta, +significatur status veteris legis, ut apostolus dicit, ad Heb. IX, +quia ad illud tabernaculum <i>semper introibant sacerdotes +sacrificiorum officia consummantes</i>. Per interius vero +tabernaculum, quod dicitur sancta sanctorum, significatur vel +caelestis gloria, vel etiam status spiritualis novae legis, qui est +quaedam inchoatio futurae gloriae. In quem statum nos Christus +introduxit, quod figurabatur per hoc quod summus sacerdos, semel in +anno, solus in sancta sanctorum intrabat. Velum autem figurabat +spiritualium occultationem sacrificiorum in veteribus sacrificiis. +Quod velum quatuor coloribus erat ornatum, bysso quidem, ad +designandam carnis puritatem; purpura autem, ad figurandum +passiones quas sancti sustinuerunt pro Deo; cocco bis tincto, ad +significandum caritatem geminam Dei et proximi; hyacintho autem +significabatur caelestis meditatio. Ad statum autem veteris legis +aliter se habebat populus, et aliter sacerdotes. Nam populus ipsa +corporalia sacrificia considerabat, quae in atrio offerebantur. +Sacerdotes vero rationem sacrificiorum considerabant, habentes +fidem magis explicitam de mysteriis Christi. Et ideo intrabant in +exterius tabernaculum. Quod etiam quodam velo distinguebatur ab +atrio, quia quaedam erant velata populo circa mysterium Christi, +quae sacerdotibus erant nota. Non tamen erant eis plene revelata, +sicut postea in novo testamento, ut habetur Ephes. III.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A4-p24"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Worship towards the west was introduced in the Law to the exclusion of idolatry: because all the Gentiles, in reverence to + the sun, worshipped towards the east; hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p24.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.8.16" target="asv">Ezech. 8:16</a>) that certain men "had their backs towards the temple of the Lord, and their faces to the east, and they adored towards the + rising of the sun." Accordingly, in order to prevent this, the tabernacle had the Holy of Holies to westward, that + they might adore toward the west. A figurative reason may also be found in the fact that the whole state of the first tabernacle + was ordained to foreshadow the death of Christ, which is signified by the west, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p24.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.67.5" target="asv"> Ps. 67:5</a>: "Who ascendeth unto the west; the Lord is His name." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="38055" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38055] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod adoratio ad occidentem fuit introducta in lege ad +excludendam idololatriam, nam omnes gentiles, in reverentiam solis, +adorabant ad orientem; unde dicitur Ezech. VIII, quod <i>quidam +habebant dorsa contra templum domini et facies ad orientem, et +adorabant ad ortum solis</i>. Unde ad hoc excludendum, tabernaculum +habebat sancta sanctorum ad occidentem, ut versus occidentem +adorarent. Ratio etiam figuralis esse potest quia totus status +prioris tabernaculi ordinabatur ad figurandum mortem Christi, quae +significatur per occasum; secundum illud Psalmi LXVII, <i>qui +ascendit super occasum, dominus nomen illi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p25"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Both literal and figurative reasons may be assigned for the things contained in the tabernacle. The literal reason is in + connection with the divine worship. And because, as already observed (ad 4), the inner tabernacle, called the Holy of Holies, + signified the higher world of spiritual substances, hence that tabernacle contained three things, viz. "the ark of the testament + in which was a golden pot that had manna, and the rod of Aaron that had + blossomed, and the tables" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p25.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.9.4" target="asv">Heb. 9:4</a>) on which were written the ten commandments of the Law. Now the ark stood between two "cherubim" that looked one towards + the other: and over the ark was a table, called the "propitiatory," raised above the wings of the cherubim, as though it were + held up by them; and appearing, to the imagination, to be the very seat of God. For this reason it was called the "propitiatory," + as though the people received propitiation thence at the prayers + of the high-priest. And so it was held up, so to speak, by the cherubim, in obedience, as it were, to God: while the ark of + the testament was like the foot-stool to Him that sat on the propitiatory. These three things denote three things in that + higher world: namely, God Who is above all, and incomprehensible to any creature. Hence no likeness of Him was set up; to + denote His invisibility. But there was something to represent his seat; since, to wit, the creature, which is beneath God, + as the + seat under the sitter, is comprehensible. Again in that higher world there are spiritual substances called angels. These are + signified by the two cherubim, looking one towards the other, to show that they are at peace with one another, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p25.2" href="./asv.html#Job.25.2" target="asv"> Job 25:2</a>: "Who maketh peace in . . . high places." For this reason, too, there was more than one cherub, to betoken the multitude + of heavenly spirits, and to prevent their receiving worship from those who had been commanded to + worship but one God. Moreover there are, enclosed as it were in that spiritual world, the intelligible types of whatsoever + takes place in this world, just as in every cause are enclosed the types of its effects, and in the craftsman the types of + the works of his craft. This was betokened by the ark, which represented, by means of the three things it contained, the three + things of greatest import in human affairs. These are wisdom, signified by the tables of the testament; the power of + governing, betokened by the rod of Aaron; and life, betokened by the manna which was the means of sustenance. Or else these + three things signified the three Divine attributes, viz. wisdom, in the tables; power, in the rod; goodness, in the manna---both + by reason of its sweetness, and because it was through the goodness of God that it was granted to man, wherefore it was preserved + as a memorial of the Divine mercy. Again, these three things were represented in Isaias' vision. For he "saw the + Lord sitting upon a throne high and elevated"; and the seraphim standing by; and that the house was filled with the glory + of the Lord; wherefrom the seraphim cried out: "All the earth is full of His glory" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p25.3" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.1" target="asv">Is. 6:1</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p25.4" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.3" target="asv">3</a>). And so the images of the seraphim were set up, not to be worshipped, for this was forbidden by the first commandment; but + as a sign of their function, as stated above. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p26"> The outer tabernacle, which denotes this present world, also contained three things, viz. the "altar of incense," which was + directly opposite the ark; the "table of proposition," with the twelve loaves of proposition on it, which stood on the northern + side; and the "candlestick," which was placed towards the south. These three things seem to correspond to the three which + were enclosed in the ark; and they represented the same things as the latter, but more clearly: because, in + order that wise men, denoted by the priests entering the temple, might grasp the meaning of these types, it was necessary + to express them more manifestly than they are in the Divine or angelic mind. Accordingly the candlestick betokened, as a sensible + sign thereof, the wisdom which was expressed on the tables (of the Law) in intelligible words. The altar of incense signified + the office of the priest, whose duty it was to bring the people to God: and this was signified also by the rod: because + on that altar the sweet-smelling incense was burnt, signifying the holiness of the people acceptable to God: for it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p26.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.8.3" target="asv">Apoc. 8:3</a>) that the smoke of the sweet-smelling spices signifies the "justifications of the saints" (cf. + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p26.2" href="./asv.html#Rev.19.8" target="asv"> Apoc. 19:8</a>). Moreover it was fitting that the dignity of the priesthood should be denoted, in the ark, by the rod, and, in the outer + tabernacle, by the altar of incense: because the priest is the mediator between God and the + people, governing the people by Divine power, denoted by the rod; and offering to God the fruit of His government, i.e. the + holiness of the people, on the altar of incense, so to speak. The table signified the sustenance of life, just as the manna + did: but the former, a more general and a coarser kind of nourishment; the latter, a sweeter and more delicate. Again, the + candlestick was fittingly placed on the southern side, while the table was placed to the north: because the south is the + right-hand side of the world, while the north is the left-hand side, as stated in De Coelo et Mundo ii; and wisdom, like other + spiritual goods, belongs to the right hand, while temporal nourishment belongs on the left, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p26.3" href="./asv.html#Prov.3.16" target="asv"> Prov. 3:16</a>: "In her left hand (are) riches and glory." And the priestly power is midway between temporal goods and spiritual wisdom; + because thereby both spiritual wisdom and temporal goods are dispensed. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p27"> Another literal signification may be assigned. For the ark contained the tables of the Law, in order to prevent forgetfulness + of the Law, wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p27.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.24.12" target="asv">Ex. 24:12</a>): "I will give thee two tables of stone, and the Law, and the commandments which I have written: that thou mayest teach them" + to the children of Israel. The rod of Aaron was placed there to restrain the people from insubordination to the priesthood + of Aaron; wherefore it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p27.2" href="./asv.html#Num.17.10" target="asv">Num. 17:10</a>): "Carry back the rod of Aaron into the tabernacle of the testimony, that it may be kept there for a token of the rebellious + children of Israel." The manna was kept in the ark to remind them of the benefit conferred by God on the children of Israel + in the desert; wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p27.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.16.32" target="asv">Ex. 16:32</a>): "Fill a gomor of it, and let it be kept unto generations to come hereafter, that they may know the bread wherewith I fed + you in the wilderness." + The candlestick was set up to enhance the beauty of the temple, for the magnificence of a house depends on its being well + lighted. Now the candlestick had seven branches, as Josephus observes (Antiquit. iii, 7,8), to signify the seven planets, + wherewith the whole world is illuminated. Hence the candlestick was placed towards the south; because for us the course of + the planets is from that quarter. The altar of incense was instituted that there might always be in the tabernacle a sweet-smelling + smoke; both through respect for the tabernacle, and as a remedy for the stenches arising from the shedding of blood and the + slaying of animals. For men despise evil-smelling things as being vile, whereas sweet-smelling things are much appreciated. + The table was place there to signify that the priests who served the temple should take their food in the temple: wherefore, + as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p27.4" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.4" target="asv"> Mat. 12:4, </a> it was lawful for none but the priests to eat the twelve loaves which were put on + the table in memory of the twelve tribes. And the table was not placed in the middle directly in front of the propitiatory, + in order to exclude an idolatrous rite: for the Gentiles, on the feasts of the moon, set up a table in front of the idol of + the moon, wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p27.5" href="./asv.html#Jer.7.18" target="asv">Jer. 7:18</a>): "The women knead the dough, to make cakes to the queen of heaven." + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p28"> In the court outside the tabernacle was the altar of holocausts, on which sacrifices of those things which the people possessed + were offered to God: and consequently the people who offered these sacrifices to God by the hands of the priest could be present + in the court. But the priests alone, whose function it was to offer the people to God, could approach the inner altar, whereon + the very devotion and holiness of the people was offered to God. And this altar was put up outside + the tabernacle and in the court, to the exclusion of idolatrous worship: for the Gentiles placed altars inside the temples + to offer up sacrifices thereon to idols. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p29"> The figurative reason for all these things may be taken from the relation of the tabernacle to Christ, who was foreshadowed + therein. Now it must be observed that to show the imperfection of the figures of the Law, various figures were instituted + in the temple to betoken Christ. For He was foreshadowed by the "propitiatory," since He is "a propitiation for our sins" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p29.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:2</a>). This propitiatory was fittingly carried by cherubim, since of Him it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p29.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.6" target="asv">Heb. 1:6</a>): "Let all the angels of God adore Him." He is also signified by the ark: because just as the ark was made of setim-wood, + so was Christ's body composed of most pure members. More over it was gilded: for Christ was full of wisdom and charity, which + are betokened by gold. And in the ark was a golden pot, i.e. His holy soul, having manna, i.e. "all the fulness of the Godhead" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p29.3" href="./asv.html#Col.2.9" target="asv">Col. 2:9</a>). Also there was a rod in the ark, i.e. His priestly power: + for "He was made a . . . priest for ever" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p29.4" href="./asv.html#Heb.6.20" target="asv">Heb. 6:20</a>). And therein were the tables of the Testament, to denote that Christ Himself is a lawgiver. Again, Christ was signified + by the candlestick, for He said Himself ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p29.5" href="./asv.html#John.8.12" target="asv">Jn. 8:12</a>): "I am the Light of the world"; while the seven lamps denoted the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost. He is also betokened in + the table, because He is our spiritual food, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p29.6" href="./asv.html#John.6.41" target="asv">Jn. 6:41</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p29.7" href="./asv.html#John.6.51" target="asv">51</a>: "I am the living bread": and the twelve + loaves signified the twelve apostles, or their teaching. Or again, the candlestick and table may signify the Church's teaching, + and faith, which also enlightens and refreshes. Again, Christ is signified by the two altars of holocausts and incense. Because + all works of virtue must be offered to us to God through Him; both those whereby we afflict the body, which are offered, as + it were, on the altar of holocausts; and those which, with greater perfection of mind, are offered to God in Christ, by + the spiritual desires of the perfect, on the altar of incense, as it were, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p29.8" href="./asv.html#Heb.13.15" target="asv"> Heb. 13:15</a>: "By Him therefore let us offer the sacrifice of praise always to God." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 ad 6"><a name="38056" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38056] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum +dicendum quod eorum quae in tabernaculo continebantur, ratio reddi +potest et litteralis et figuralis. Litteralis quidem, per +relationem ad cultum divinum. Et quia dictum est quod per +tabernaculum interius, quod dicebatur sancta sanctorum, +significabatur saeculum altius spiritualium substantiarum, ideo in +illo tabernaculo tria continebantur. Scilicet arca testamenti, in +qua erat urna aurea habens manna, et virga Aaron quae fronduerat, +et tabulae in quibus erant scripta decem praecepta legis. Haec +autem arca sita erat inter duos Cherubim, qui se mutuis vultibus +respiciebant. Et super arcam erat quaedam tabula, quae dicebatur +propitiatorium, super alas Cherubim, quasi ab ipsis Cherubim +portaretur, ac si imaginaretur quod illa tabula esset sedes Dei. +Unde et propitiatorium dicebatur, quasi exinde populo +propitiaretur, ad preces summi sacerdotis. Et ideo quasi portabatur +a Cherubim, quasi Deo obsequentibus, arca vero testamenti erat +quasi scabellum sedentis supra propitiatorium. Per haec autem tria +designantur tria quae sunt in illo altiori saeculo. Scilicet Deus, +qui super omnia est, et incomprehensibilis omni creaturae. Et +propter hoc nulla similitudo eius ponebatur, ad repraesentandam +eius invisibilitatem. Sed ponebatur quaedam figura sedis eius, quia +scilicet creatura comprehensibilis est, quae est subiecta Deo, +sicut sedes sedenti. Sunt etiam in illo altiori saeculo spirituales +substantiae, quae Angeli dicuntur. Et hi significantur per duos +Cherubim; mutuo se respicientes, ad designandam concordiam eorum ad +invicem, secundum illud Iob XXV, qui facit concordiam in +sublimibus. Et propter hoc etiam non fuit unus tantum Cherubim, ut +designaretur multitudo caelestium spirituum, et excluderetur cultus +eorum ab his quibus praeceptum erat ut solum unum Deum colerent. +Sunt etiam in illo intelligibili saeculo rationes omnium eorum quae +in hoc saeculo perficiuntur quodammodo clausae, sicut rationes +effectuum clauduntur in suis causis, et rationes artificiatorum in +artifice. Et hoc significabatur per arcam, in qua +repraesentabantur, per tria ibi contenta, tria quae sunt potissima +in rebus humanis, scilicet sapientia, quae repraesentabatur per +tabulas testamenti; potestas regiminis, quae repraesentabatur per +virgam Aaron; vita, quae repraesentabatur per manna, quod fuit +sustentamentum vitae. Vel per haec tria significabantur tria Dei +attributa, scilicet sapientia, in tabulis; potentia, in virga; +bonitas, in manna, tum propter dulcedinem, tum quia ex Dei +misericordia est populo datum, et ideo in memoriam divinae +misericordiae conservabatur. Et haec tria etiam figurata sunt in +visione Isaiae. Vidit enim dominum sedentem super solium excelsum +et elevatum; et Seraphim assistentes; et domum impleri a gloria +Dei. Unde et Seraphim dicebant, plena est omnis terra gloria eius. +Et sic similitudines Seraphim non ponebantur ad cultum, quod +prohibebatur primo legis praecepto, sed in signum ministerii, ut +dictum est. In exteriori vero tabernaculo, quod significat praesens +saeculum, continebantur etiam tria, scilicet altare thymiamatis, +quod erat directe contra arcam; mensa propositionis, super quam +duodecim panes apponebantur, erat posita ex parte aquilonari; +candelabrum vero ex parte Australi. Quae tria videntur respondere +tribus quae erant in arca clausa, sed magis manifeste eadem +repraesentabant, oportet enim rationes rerum ad manifestiorem +demonstrationem perduci quam sint in mente divina et Angelorum, ad +hoc quod homines sapientes eas cognoscere possint qui significantur +per sacerdotes ingredientes tabernaculum. In candelabro igitur +designabatur, sicut in signo sensibili, sapientia quae +intelligibilibus verbis exprimebatur in tabulis. Per altare vero +thymiamatis significabatur officium sacerdotum, quorum erat populum +ad Deum reducere, et hoc etiam significabatur per virgam. Nam in +illo altari incedebatur thymiama boni odoris, per quod +significabatur sanctitas populi acceptabilis Deo, dicitur enim +Apoc. VIII, quod per fumum aromatum significantur iustificationes +sanctorum. Convenienter autem sacerdotalis dignitas in arca +significabatur per virgam, in exteriori vero tabernaculo per altare +thymiamatis, quia sacerdos mediator est inter Deum et populum, +regens populum per potestatem divinam, quam virga significat; et +fructum sui regiminis, scilicet sanctitatem populi, Deo offert, +quasi in altari thymiamatis. Per mensam autem significatur +nutrimentum vitae, sicut et per manna. Sed hoc est communius et +grossius nutrimentum, illud autem suavius et subtilius. +Convenienter autem candelabrum ponebatur ex parte Australi, mensa +autem ex parte aquilonari, quia Australis pars est dextera pars +mundi, aquilonaris autem sinistra, ut dicitur in II de caelo et +mundo; sapientia autem pertinet ad dextram, sicut et cetera +spiritualia bona; temporale autem nutrimentum ad sinistram, +secundum illud Prov. III, in sinistra illius divitiae et gloria. +Potestas autem sacerdotalis media est inter temporalia et +spiritualem sapientiam, quia per eam et spiritualis sapientia et +temporalia dispensantur. Potest autem et horum alia ratio assignari +magis litteralis. In arca enim continebantur tabulae legis, ad +tollendam legis oblivionem, unde dicitur Exod. XXIV, <i>dabo tibi +duas tabulas lapideas et legem ac mandata quae scripsi, ut doceas +filios Israel</i>. Virga vero Aaron ponebatur ibi ad comprimendam +dissensionem populi de sacerdotio Aaron, unde dicitur Num. XVII, +<i>refer virgam Aaron in tabernaculum testimonii, ut servetur in +signum rebellium filiorum Israel</i>. Manna autem conservabatur in +arca, ad commemorandum beneficium quod dominus praestitit filiis +Israel in deserto, unde dicitur Exod. XVI, <i>imple gomor ex eo, et +custodiatur in futuras retro generationes, ut noverint panes de +quibus alui vos in solitudine</i>. Candelabrum vero erat institutum +ad honorificentiam tabernaculi, pertinet enim ad magnificentiam +domus quod sit bene luminosa. Habebat autem candelabrum septem +calamos, ut Iosephus dicit, ad significandum septem planetas, +quibus totus mundus illuminatur. Et ideo ponebatur candelabrum ex +parte Australi, quia ex illa parte est nobis planetarum cursus. +Altare vero thymiamatis erat institutum ut iugiter in tabernaculo +esset fumus boni odoris, tum propter venerationem tabernaculi; tum +etiam in remedium fetoris quem oportebat accidere ex effusione +sanguinis et occisione animalium. Ea enim quae sunt fetida, +despiciuntur quasi vilia, quae vero sunt boni odoris, homines magis +appretiant. Mensa autem apponebatur ad significandum quod +sacerdotes templo servientes, in templo victum habere debebant, +unde duodecim panes superpositos mensae, in memoriam duodecim +tribuum, solis sacerdotibus edere licitum erat, ut habetur Matth. +XII. Mensa autem non ponebatur directe in medio ante +propitiatorium, ad excludendum ritum idololatriae, nam gentiles in +sacris lunae proponebant mensam coram idolo lunae; unde dicitur +Ierem. VII, <i>mulieres conspergunt adipem ut faciant placentas +reginae caeli</i>. In atrio vero extra tabernaculum continebatur +altare holocaustorum, in quo offerebantur Deo sacrificia de his +quae erant a populo possessa. Et ideo in atrio poterat esse +populus, qui huiusmodi Deo offerebat per manus sacerdotum. Sed ad +altare interius, in quo ipsa devotio et sanctitas populi Deo +offerebatur, non poterant accedere nisi sacerdotes, quorum erat Deo +offerre populum. Est autem hoc altare extra tabernaculum in atrio +constitutum, ad removendum cultum idololatriae, nam gentiles infra +templa altaria constituebant ad immolandum idolis. Figuralis vero +ratio omnium horum assignari potest ex relatione tabernaculi ad +Christum, qui figurabatur. Est autem considerandum quod ad +designandum imperfectionem legalium figurarum, diversae figurae +fuerunt institutae in templo ad significandum Christum. Ipse enim +significatur per propitiatorium, quia ipse est propitiatio pro +peccatis nostris, ut dicitur I Ioan. II. Et convenienter hoc +propitiatorium a Cherubim portatur, quia de eo scriptum est, +adorent eum omnes Angeli Dei, ut habetur Heb. I. Ipse etiam +significatur per arcam, quia sicut arca erat constructa de lignis +setim, ita corpus Christi de membris purissimis constabat. Erat +autem deaurata, quia Christus fuit plenus sapientia et caritate, +quae per aurum significantur. Intra arcam autem erat urna aurea, +idest sancta anima; habens manna, idest omnem plenitudinem +divinitatis. Erat etiam in arca virga, idest potestas sacerdotalis, +quia ipse est factus sacerdos in aeternum. Erant etiam ibi tabulae +testamenti, ad designandum quod ipse Christus est legis dator. Ipse +etiam Christus significatur per candelabrum, quia ipse dicit, ego +sum lux mundi, per septem lucernas, septem dona spiritus sancti. +Ipse est spiritualis cibus, secundum illud Ioan. VI, ego sum panis +vivus, duodecim autem panes significant duodecim apostolos, vel +doctrinam eorum. Sive per candelabrum et mensam potest significari +doctrina et fides Ecclesiae, quae etiam illuminat et spiritualiter +reficit. Ipse etiam Christus significatur per duplex altare +holocaustorum et thymiamatis. Quia per ipsum oportet nos Deo +offerre omnia virtutum opera, sive illa quibus carnem affligimus, +quae offeruntur quasi in altari holocaustorum; sive illa quae, +maiore mentis perfectione, per spiritualia perfectorum desideria, +Deo offeruntur in Christo, quasi in altari thymiamatis, secundum +illud ad Heb. ult., <i>per ipsum ergo offeramus hostiam laudis +semper Deo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p30"> + <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> The Lord commanded an altar to be made for the offering of sacrifices and gifts, in honor of God, and for the upkeep of the + ministers who served the tabernacle. Now concerning the construction of the altar the Lord issued a twofold precept. One was + at the beginning of the Law ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p30.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.24" target="asv">Ex. 20:24, </a> seqq.) when the Lord commanded them to make "an altar of earth," or at least "not of hewn stones"; and again, not to make + the altar high, so as + to make it necessary to "go up" to it "by steps." This was in detestation of idolatrous worship: for the Gentiles made their + altars ornate and high, thinking that there was something holy and divine in such things. For this reason, too, the Lord commanded + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p30.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.16.21" target="asv">Dt. 16:21</a>): "Thou shalt plant no grove, nor any tree near the altar of the Lord thy God": since idolaters were wont to offer sacrifices + beneath trees, on account of the pleasantness and shade afforded by them. There was + also a figurative reason for these precepts. Because we must confess that in Christ, Who is our altar, there is the true nature + of flesh, as regards His humanity---and this is to make an altar of earth; and again, in regard to His Godhead, we must confess + His equality with the Father---and this is "not to go up" to the altar by steps. Moreover we should not couple the doctrine + of Christ to that of the Gentiles, which provokes men to lewdness. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p31"> But when once the tabernacle had been constructed to the honor of God, there was no longer reason to fear these occasions + of idolatry. Wherefore the Lord commanded the altar of holocausts to be made of brass, and to be conspicuous to all the people; + and the altar of incense, which was visible to none but the priests. Nor was brass so precious as to give the people an occasion + for idolatry. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p32"> Since, however, the reason for the precept, "Thou shalt not go up by steps unto My altar" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p32.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.26" target="asv">Ex. 20:26</a>) is stated to have been "lest thy nakedness be discovered," it should be observed that this too was instituted with the purpose + of preventing idolatry, for in the feasts of Priapus the Gentiles uncovered their nakedness before the people. But later on + the priests were prescribed the use of loin-cloths for the sake of decency: so that without any danger the + altar could be placed so high that the priests when offering sacrifices would go up by steps of wood, not fixed but movable. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 ad 7"><a name="38057" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38057] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 ad 7</span></a> Ad septimum +dicendum quod dominus praecepit altare construi ad sacrificia et +munera offerenda, in honorem Dei et sustentationem ministrorum qui +tabernaculo deserviebant. De constructione autem altaris datur a +domino duplex praeceptum. Unum quidem in principio legis, Exod. XX, +ubi dominus mandavit quod facerent altare de terra, vel saltem de +lapidibus non sectis; et iterum quod non facerent altare excelsum, +ad quod oporteret per gradus ascendere. Et hoc, ad detestandum +idololatriae cultum, gentiles enim idolis construebant altaria +ornata et sublimia, in quibus credebant aliquid sanctitatis et +numinis esse. Propter quod etiam dominus mandavit, Deut. XVI, +<i>non plantabis lucum, et omnem arborem, iuxta altare domini Dei +tui</i>, idololatrae enim consueverunt sub arboribus sacrificare, +propter amoenitatem et umbrositatem. Quorum etiam praeceptorum +ratio figuralis fuit. Quia in Christo, qui est nostrum altare, +debemus confiteri veram carnis naturam, quantum ad humanitatem, +quod est altare de terra facere, et quantum ad divinitatem, debemus +in eo confiteri patris aequalitatem, quod est non ascendere per +gradus ad altare. Nec etiam iuxta Christum debemus admittere +doctrinam gentilium, ad lasciviam provocantem. Sed facto +tabernaculo ad honorem Dei, non erant timendae huiusmodi occasiones +idololatriae. Et ideo dominus mandavit quod fieret altare +holocaustorum de aere, quod esset omni populo conspicuum; et altare +thymiamatis de auro, quod soli sacerdotes videbant. Nec erat tanta +pretiositas aeris ut per hoc populus ad aliquam idololatriam +provocaretur. Sed quia Exod. XX ponitur pro ratione huius +praecepti, <i>non ascendes per gradus ad altare meum</i>, id quod +subditur, ne reveletur turpitudo tua; considerandum est quod hoc +etiam fuit institutum ad excludendam idololatriam, nam in sacris +Priapi sua pudenda gentiles populo denudabant. Postmodum autem +indictus est sacerdotibus feminalium usus ad tegimen pudendorum. Et +ideo sine periculo institui potuit tanta altaris altitudo ut per +aliquos gradus ligneos, non stantes sed portatiles, in hora +sacrificii, sacerdotes ad altare ascenderent sacrificia +offerentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p33"> + <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> The body of the tabernacle consisted of boards placed on end, and covered on the inside with curtains of four different colors, + viz. twisted linen, violet, purple, and scarlet twice dyed. These curtains, however, covered the sides only of the tabernacle; + and the roof of the tabernacle was covered with violet-colored skins; and over this there was another covering of rams' skins + dyed red; and over this there was a third curtain made of goats' hair, + which covered not only the roof of the tabernacle, but also reached to the ground and covered the boards of the tabernacle + on the outside. The literal reason of these coverings taken altogether was the adornment and protection of the tabernacle, + that it might be an object of respect. Taken singly, according to some, the curtains denoted the starry heaven, which is adorned + with various stars; the curtain (of goats' skin) signified the waters which are above the firmament; the skins dyed red + denoted the empyrean heaven, where the angels are; the violet skins, the heaven of the Blessed Trinity. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p34"> The figurative meaning of these things is that the boards of which the tabernacle was constructed signify the faithful of + Christ, who compose the Church. The boards were covered on the inner side by curtains of four colors: because the faithful + are inwardly adorned with the four virtues: for "the twisted linen," as the gloss observes, "signifies the flesh refulgent + with purity; violet signifies the mind desirous of heavenly things; purple denotes the flesh subject to passions; + the twice dyed scarlet betokens the mind in the midst of the passions enlightened by the love of God and our neighbor." The + coverings of the building designate prelates and doctors, who ought to be conspicuous for their heavenly manner of life, signified + by the violet colored skins: and who should also be ready to suffer martyrdom, denoted by the skins dyed red; and austere + of life and patient in adversity, betokened by the curtains of goats' hair, which were exposed to wind and rain, as the + gloss observes. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 ad 8"><a name="38058" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38058] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 ad 8</span></a> Ad octavum +dicendum quod corpus tabernaculi constabat ex quibusdam tabulis in +longitudinem erectis, quae quidem interius tegebantur quibusdam +cortinis ex quatuor coloribus variatis, scilicet de bysso retorta, +et hyacintho, ac purpura, coccoque bis tincto. Sed huiusmodi +cortinae tegebant solum latera tabernaculi, in tecto autem +tabernaculi erat operimentum unum de pellibus hyacinthinis; et +super hoc aliud de pellibus arietum rubricatis; et desuper tertium +de quibusdam sagis cilicinis, quae non tantum operiebant tectum +tabernaculi, sed etiam descendebant usque terram, et tegebant +tabulas tabernaculi exterius. Horum autem operimentorum ratio +litteralis in communi erat ornatus et protectio tabernaculi, ut in +reverentia haberetur. In speciali vero, secundum quosdam, per +cortinas designabatur caelum sydereum, quod est diversis stellis +variatum; per saga, aquae quae sunt supra firmamentum; per pelles +rubricatas, caelum Empyreum, in quo sunt Angeli; per pelles +hyacinthinas, caelum sanctae Trinitatis. Figuralis autem ratio +horum est quia per tabulas ex quibus construebatur tabernaculum, +significantur Christi fideles, ex quibus construitur Ecclesia. +Tegebantur autem interius tabulae cortinis quadricoloribus, quia +fideles interius ornantur quatuor virtutibus; <i>nam in bysso +retorta</i>, ut Glossa dicit, <i>significatur caro castitate +renitens; in hyacintho, mens superna cupiens; in purpura, caro +passionibus subiacens; in cocco bis tincto, mens inter passiones +Dei et proximi dilectione praefulgens</i>. Per operimenta vero +tecti designantur praelati et doctores, in quibus debet renitere +caelestis conversatio, quod significatur per pelles hyacinthinas; +promptitudo ad martyrium, quod significant pelles rubricatae; +austeritas vitae et tolerantia adversorum, quae significantur per +saga cilicina, quae erant exposita ventis et pluviis, ut Glossa +dicit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A4-p35"> + <b>Reply to Objection 9:</b> The literal reason for the sanctification of the tabernacle and vessels was that they might be treated with greater reverence, + being deputed, as it were, to the divine worship by this consecration. The figurative reason is that this sanctification signified + the sanctification of the living tabernacle, i.e. the faithful of whom the Church of Christ is composed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 ad 9"><a name="38059" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38059] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 ad 9</span></a> Ad nonum +dicendum quod sanctificatio tabernaculi et vasorum eius habebat +causam litteralem ut in maiori reverentia haberetur, quasi per +huiusmodi consecrationem divino cultui deputatum. Figuralis autem +ratio est quia per huiusmodi sanctificationem significatur +spiritualis sanctificatio viventis tabernaculi, scilicet fidelium, +ex quibus constituitur Ecclesia Christi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p36"> + <b>Reply to Objection 10:</b> Under the Old Law there were seven temporal solemnities, and one continual solemnity, as may be gathered from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p36.1" href="./asv.html#Num.28" target="asv">Num. 28</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p36.2" href="./asv.html#Num.29" target="asv">29</a>. There was a continual feast, since the lamb was sacrificed every day, morning and evening: and this continual feast of an + abiding sacrifice signified the perpetuity of Divine bliss. Of the temporal feasts the first was that which was repeated every + week. This was the solemnity of the "Sabbath," celebrated in memory of the work of + the creation of the universe. Another solemnity, viz. the "New Moon," was repeated every month, and was observed in memory + of the work of the Divine government. For the things of this lower world owe their variety chiefly to the movement of the + moon; wherefore this feast was kept at the new moon: and not at the full moon, to avoid the worship of idolaters who used + to offer sacrifices to the moon at that particular time. And these two blessings are bestowed in common on the whole human + race; and + hence they were repeated more frequently. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p37"> The other five feasts were celebrated once a year: and they commemorated the benefits which had been conferred especially + on that people. For there was the feast of the "Passover" in the first month to commemorate the blessing of being delivered + out of Egypt. The feast of "Pentecost" was celebrated fifty days later, to recall the blessing of the giving of the Law. The + other three feasts were kept in the seventh month, nearly the whole of which was solemnized by them, just as the + seventh day. For on the first of the seventh month was the feast of "Trumpets," in memory of the delivery of Isaac, when Abraham + found the ram caught by its horns, which they represented by the horns which they blew. The feast of Trumpets was a kind of + invitation whereby they prepared themselves to keep the following feast which was kept on the tenth day. This was the feast + of "Expiation," in memory of the blessing whereby, at the prayer of Moses, God forgave the people's sin of worshipping the + calf. After this was the feast of "Scenopegia" or of "Tents," which was kept for seven days, to commemorate the blessing of + being protected and led by God through the desert, where they lived in tents. Hence during this feast they had to take "the + fruits of the fairest tree," i.e. the citron, "and the trees of dense foliage" [*Douay and A. V. and R. V. read: 'Boughs of + thick trees'], i.e. the myrtle, which is fragrant, "and the branches of palm-trees, and willows of the brook," which retain + their greenness a long time; and these are to be found in the Land of promise; to signify that God had brought them through + the arid land of the wilderness to a land of delights. On the eighth day another feast was observed, of "Assembly and Congregation," + on which the people collected the expenses necessary for the divine worship: and it signified the uniting of the people and + the peace granted to them in the Land of promise. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p38"> The figurative reason for these feasts was that the continual sacrifice of the lamb foreshadowed the perpetuity of Christ, + Who is the "Lamb of God," according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p38.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.13.8" target="asv"> Heb. 13:8</a>: "Jesus Christ yesterday and today, and the same for ever." The Sabbath signified the spiritual rest bestowed by Christ, + as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p38.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.4" target="asv">Heb. 4</a>. The Neomenia, which is the beginning of the new moon, signified the enlightening of the primitive Church by Christ's preaching + and miracles. The + feast of Pentecost signified the Descent of the Holy Ghost on the apostles. The feast of Trumpets signified the preaching + of the apostles. The feast of Expiation signified the cleansing of the Christian people from sins: and the feast of Tabernacles + signified their pilgrimage in this world, wherein they walk by advancing in virtue. The feast of Assembly or Congregation + foreshadowed the assembly of the faithful in the kingdom of heaven: wherefore this feast is described as "most holy" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p38.3" href="./asv.html#Lev.23.36" target="asv">Lev. 23:36</a>). These three feasts followed immediately on one another, because those who expiate their vices should advance in virtue, + until they come to see God, as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p38.4" href="./asv.html#Ps.83.8" target="asv"> Ps. 83:8.</a> + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 ad 10"><a name="38060" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38060] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 ad 10</span></a> Ad decimum +dicendum quod in veteri lege erant septem solemnitates temporales, +et una continua, ut potest colligi Num. XXVIII et XXIX. Erat enim +quasi continuum festum, quia quotidie mane et vespere immolabatur +agnus. Et per illud continuum festum iugis sacrificii +repraesentabatur perpetuitas divinae beatitudinis. Festorum autem +temporalium primum erat quod iterabatur qualibet septimana. Et haec +erat solemnitas sabbati, quod celebrabatur in memoriam creationis +rerum, ut supra dictum est. Alia autem solemnitas iterabatur +quolibet mense, scilicet festum Neomeniae, quod celebrabatur ad +commemorandum opus divinae gubernationis. Nam haec inferiora +praecipue variantur secundum motum lunae, et ideo celebrabatur hoc +festum in novitate lunae. Non autem in eius plenitudine, ad +evitandum idololatrarum cultum, qui in tali tempore lunae +sacrificabant. Haec autem duo beneficia sunt communia toti humano +generi, et ideo frequentius iterabantur. Alia vero quinque festa +celebrabantur semel in anno, et recolebantur in eis beneficia +specialiter illi populo exhibita. Celebrabatur enim festum phase +primo mense, ad commemorandum beneficium liberationis ex Aegypto. +Celebrabatur autem festum Pentecostes post quinquaginta dies, ad +recolendum beneficium legis datae. Alia vero tria festa +celebrabantur in mense septimo, qui quasi totus apud eos erat +solemnis, sicut et septimus dies. In prima enim die mensis septimi +erat festum tubarum, in memoriam liberationis Isaac, quando Abraham +invenit arietem haerentem cornibus, quem repraesentabant per cornua +quibus buccinabant. Erat autem festum tubarum quasi quaedam +invitatio ut praepararent se ad sequens festum, quod celebrabatur +decimo die. Et hoc erat festum expiationis, in memoriam illius +beneficii quo Deus propitiatus est peccato populi de adoratione +vituli, ad preces Moysi. Post hoc autem celebrabatur festum +Scenopegiae, idest tabernaculorum, septem diebus, ad commemorandum +beneficium divinae protectionis et deductionis per desertum, ubi in +tabernaculis habitaverunt. Unde in hoc festo debebant habere +fructum arboris pulcherrimae, idest citrum, et lignum densarum +frondium, idest myrtum, quae sunt odorifera; et spatulas palmarum, +et salices de torrente, quae diu retinent suum virorem; et haec +inveniuntur in terra promissionis; ad significandum quod per aridam +terram deserti eos duxerat Deus ad terram deliciosam. Octavo autem +die celebrabatur aliud festum, scilicet coetus atque collectae, in +quo colligebantur a populo ea quae erant necessaria ad expensas +cultus divini. Et significabatur adunatio populi et pax praestita +in terra promissionis. Figuralis autem ratio horum festorum est +quia per iuge sacrificium agni figuratur perpetuitas Christi, qui +est agnus Dei; secundum illud Heb. ult., <i>Iesus Christus heri et +hodie, ipse et in saecula</i>. Per sabbatum autem significatur +spiritualis requies nobis data per Christum, ut habetur ad Heb. IV. +Per Neomeniam autem, quae est incoeptio novae lunae, significatur +illuminatio primitivae Ecclesiae per Christum, eo praedicante et +miracula faciente. Per festum autem Pentecostes significatur +descensus spiritus sancti in apostolos. Per festum autem tubarum +significatur praedicatio apostolorum. Per festum autem expiationis +significatur emundatio a peccatis populi Christiani. Per festum +autem tabernaculorum, peregrinatio eorum in hoc mundo, in quo +ambulant in virtutibus proficiendo. Per festum autem coetus atque +collectae significatur congregatio fidelium in regno caelorum, et +ideo istud festum dicebatur sanctissimum esse. Et haec tria festa +erant continua ad invicem, quia oportet expiatos a vitiis proficere +in virtute, quousque perveniant ad Dei visionem, ut dicitur in +Psalmo LXXXIII.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q102_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q102_A5-p0.1">Q. 102. A. 5. Whether there can be any suitable cause for the sacraments of the Old Law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there can be no suitable cause for the sacraments of the Old Law. Because those things that are done for + the purpose of divine worship should not be like the observances of idolaters: since it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.12.31" target="asv">Dt. 12:31</a>): "Thou shalt not do in like manner to the Lord thy God: for they have done to their gods all the abominations which the + Lord abhorreth." Now worshippers of idols used to knive themselves to the shedding of + blood: for it is related ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p2.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 18:28</a>) that they "cut themselves after their manner with knives and lancets, till they were all covered with blood." For this reason + the Lord commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.14.1" target="asv">Dt. 14:1</a>): "You shall not cut yourselves nor make any baldness for the dead." Therefore it was unfitting for circumcision to be prescribed + by the Law ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p2.4" href="./asv.html#Lev.12.3" target="asv">Lev. 12:3</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="38061" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38061] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod sacramentorum veteris legis conveniens +causa esse non possit. Ea enim quae ad cultum divinum fiunt, non +debent esse similia his quae idololatrae observabant, dicitur enim +Deut. XII, <i>non facies similiter domino Deo tuo, omnes enim +abominationes quas aversatur dominus, fecerunt diis suis</i>. Sed +cultores idolorum in eorum cultu se incidebant usque ad effusionem +sanguinis, dicitur enim III Reg. XVIII, quod <i>incidebant se, +iuxta ritum suum, cultris et lanceolis, donec perfunderentur +sanguine</i>. Propter quod dominus mandavit, Deut. XIV, <i>non vos +incidetis, nec facietis calvitium super mortuo</i>. Inconvenienter +igitur circumcisio erat instituta in lege.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those things which are done for the worship of God should be marked with decorum and gravity; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.34.18" target="asv"> Ps. 34:18</a>: "I will praise Thee in a grave [Douay: 'strong'] people." But it seems to savor of levity for a man to eat with haste. Therefore + it was unfittingly commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.12.11" target="asv">Ex. 12:11</a>) that they should eat the Paschal lamb "in haste." Other things too relative to the eating of the lamb were prescribed, which + seem altogether unreasonable. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="38062" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38062] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ea quae in cultum divinum fiunt, debent honestatem et gravitatem +habere; secundum illud Psalmi XXXIV, <i>in populo gravi laudabo +te</i>. Sed ad levitatem quandam pertinere videtur ut homines +festinanter comedant. Inconvenienter igitur praeceptum est, Exod. +XII, ut comederent festinanter agnum paschalem. Et alia etiam circa +eius comestionem sunt instituta, quae videntur omnino +irrationabilia esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the sacraments of the Old Law were figures of the sacraments of the New Law. Now the Paschal lamb signified the + sacrament of the Eucharist, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.5.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 5:7</a>: "Christ our Pasch is sacrificed." Therefore there should also have been some sacraments of the Old Law to foreshadow the + other sacraments of the New Law, such as Confirmation, Extreme Unction, and Matrimony, and so forth. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="38063" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38063] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sacramenta veteris legis figurae fuerunt sacramentorum novae legis. +Sed per agnum paschalem significatur sacramentum Eucharistiae; +secundum illud I ad Cor. V, <i>Pascha nostrum immolatus est +Christus</i>. Ergo etiam debuerunt esse aliqua sacramenta in lege +quae praefigurarent alia sacramenta novae legis, sicut +confirmationem et extremam unctionem et matrimonium, et alia +sacramenta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, purification can scarcely be done except by removing something impure. But as far as God is concerned, no bodily + thing is reputed impure, because all bodies are God's creatures; and "every creature of God is good, and nothing to be rejected + that is received with thanksgiving" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.4.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 4:4</a>). It was therefore unfitting for them to be purified after contact with a corpse, or any similar corporeal infection. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="38064" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38064] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +purificatio non potest convenienter fieri nisi ab aliquibus +immunditiis. Sed quantum ad Deum, nullum corporale reputatur +immundum, quia omne corpus creatura Dei est; <i>et omnis creatura +Dei bona, et nihil reiiciendum quod cum gratiarum actione +percipitur</i>, ut dicitur I ad Tim. IV. Inconvenienter igitur +purificabantur propter contactum hominis mortui, vel alicuius +huiusmodi corporalis infectionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A5-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.34.4" target="asv">Ecclus. 34:4</a>): "What can be made clean by the unclean?" But the ashes of the red heifer [*Cf. + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.9.13" target="asv"> Heb. 9:13</a>] which was burnt, were unclean, since they made a man unclean: for it is stated ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Num.19.7" target="asv">Num. 19:7, </a> seqq.) that the priest who immolated her was rendered unclean "until the evening"; likewise he that burnt her; and he that + gathered up her ashes. Therefore it was unfittingly + prescribed there that the unclean should be purified by being sprinkled with those cinders. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 arg. 5"><a name="38065" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38065] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +Eccli. XXXIV dicitur, <i>ab immundo quid mundabitur?</i> Sed cinis +vitulae rufae quae comburebatur, immundus erat, quia immundum +reddebat, dicitur enim Num. XIX, quod sacerdos qui immolabat eam, +commaculatus erat usque ad vesperum; similiter et ille qui eam +comburebat; et etiam ille qui eius cineres colligebat. Ergo +inconvenienter praeceptum ibi fuit ut per huiusmodi cinerem +aspersum immundi purificarentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A5-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, sins are not something corporeal that can be carried from one place to another: nor can man be cleansed from sin + by means of something unclean. It was therefore unfitting for the purpose of expiating the sins of the people that the priest + should confess the sins of the children of Israel on one of the buck-goats, that it might carry them away into the wilderness: + while they were rendered unclean by the other, which they used for the purpose of + purification, by burning it together with the calf outside the camp; so that they had to wash their clothes and their bodies + with water ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.16" target="asv">Lev. 16</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 arg. 6"><a name="38066" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38066] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, +peccata non sunt aliquid corporale, quod possit deferri de loco ad +locum, neque etiam per aliquid immundum potest homo a peccato +mundari. Inconvenienter igitur ad expiationem peccatorum populi, +sacerdos super unum hircorum confitebatur peccata filiorum Israel, +ut portaret ea in desertum, per alium autem, quo utebantur ad +purificationes, simul cum vitulo comburentes extra castra, immundi +reddebantur, ita quod oportebat eos lavare vestimenta et carnem +aqua.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A5-p8"> + <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, what is already cleansed should not be cleansed again. It was therefore unfitting to apply a second purification + to a man cleansed from leprosy, or to a house; as laid down in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.14" target="asv">Lev. 14</a>. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 arg. 7"><a name="38067" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38067] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 arg. 7</span></a> Praeterea, +illud quod iam est mundatum, non oportet iterum mundari. +Inconvenienter igitur, mundata lepra hominis, vel etiam domus, alia +purificatio adhibebatur; ut habetur Levit. XIV.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A5-p9"> + <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, spiritual uncleanness cannot be cleansed by material water or by shaving the hair. Therefore it seems unreasonable + that the Lord ordered ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.30.18" target="asv">Ex. 30:18, </a> seqq.) the making of a brazen laver with its foot, that the priests might wash their hands and feet before entering the temple; + and that He commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Num.8.7" target="asv">Num. 8:7</a>) the Levites to be sprinkled with the water of purification, and to shave all the hairs of their + flesh. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 arg. 8"><a name="38068" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38068] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 arg. 8</span></a> Praeterea, +spiritualis immunditia non potest per corporalem aquam, vel pilorum +rasuram, emundari. Irrationabile igitur videtur quod dominus +praecepit Exod. XXX, ut fieret labium aeneum cum basi sua ad +lavandum manus et pedes sacerdotum qui ingressuri erant +tabernaculum; et quod praecipitur Num. VIII, quod Levitae +abstergerentur aqua lustrationis, et raderent omnes pilos carnis +suae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A5-p10"> + <b>Objection 9:</b> Further, that which is greater cannot be cleansed by that which is less. Therefore it was unfitting that, in the Law, the + higher and lower priests, as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.8" target="asv">Lev. 8</a> [*Cf. + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.29" target="asv">Ex. 29</a>], and the Levites, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p10.3" href="./asv.html#Num.8" target="asv">Num. 8</a>, should be consecrated with any bodily anointing, bodily sacrifices, and bodily oblations. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 arg. 9"><a name="38069" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38069] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 arg. 9</span></a> Praeterea, +quod maius est, non potest sanctificari per illud quod minus est. +Inconvenienter igitur per quandam unctionem corporalem, et +corporalia sacrificia, et oblationes corporales, fiebat in lege +consecratio maiorum et minorum sacerdotum, ut habetur Levit. VIII; +et Levitarum, ut habetur Num. VIII.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A5-p11"> + <b>Objection 10:</b> Further, as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p11.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.16.7" target="asv">1 Kings 16:7, </a> "Man seeth those things that appear, but the Lord beholdeth the heart." But those things that appear outwardly in man are + the dispositions of his body and his clothes. Therefore it was unfitting for certain special garments to be appointed to the + higher and lower priests, as related in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p11.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.28" target="asv">Ex. 28</a> [*Cf. + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p11.3" href="./asv.html#Lev.8.7" target="asv"> Lev. 8:7, </a> seqq.]. It seems, moreover, unreasonable that anyone should be debarred from + the priesthood on account of defects in the body, as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p11.4" href="./asv.html#Lev.21.17" target="asv">Lev. 21:17</a>, seqq.: "Whosoever of thy seed throughout their families, hath a blemish, he shall not offer bread to his God . . . if he + be blind, if he be lame," etc. It seems, therefore, that the sacraments of the Old Law were unreasonable. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 arg. 10"><a name="38070" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38070] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 arg. 10</span></a> +Praeterea, sicut dicitur I Reg. XVI, <i>homines vident ea quae +parent, Deus autem intuetur cor</i>. Sed ea quae exterius parent in +homine, est corporalis dispositio, et etiam indumenta. +Inconvenienter igitur sacerdotibus maioribus et minoribus quaedam +specialia vestimenta deputabantur, de quibus habetur Exod. XXVIII. +Et sine ratione videtur quod prohiberetur aliquis a sacerdotio +propter corporales defectus, secundum quod dicitur Levit. XXI, +<i>homo de semine tuo per familias qui habuerit maculam, non +offeret panes Deo suo, si caecus fuerit, vel claudus</i>, et +cetera. Sic igitur videtur quod sacramenta veteris legis +irrationabilia fuerint.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A5-p12"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.20.8" target="asv">Lev. 20:8</a>): "I am the Lord that sanctify you." But nothing unreasonable is done by God, for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.103.24" target="asv">Ps. 103:24</a>): "Thou hast made all things in wisdom." Therefore there was nothing without a reasonable cause in the sacraments of the + Old Law, which were ordained to the sanctification of man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 s. c."><a name="38071" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38071] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Levit. XX, <i>ego sum dominus, qui sanctifico +vos</i>. Sed a Deo nihil sine ratione fit, dicitur enim in Psalmo +CIII, <i>omnia in sapientia fecisti</i>. Ergo in sacramentis +veteris legis, quae ordinabantur ad hominum sanctificationem, nihil +erat sine rationabili causa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p13"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q101_A4" id="FS_Q102_A5-p13.1" shape="rect">Q[101], A[4]</a>), the sacraments are, properly speaking, things applied to the worshippers of God for their consecration so as, in some way, + to depute them to the worship of God. Now the worship of God belonged in a general way to the whole people; but in a special + way, it belonged to the priests and Levites, who were the ministers of divine worship. Consequently, in these sacraments of + the Old Law, certain things + concerned the whole people in general; while others belonged to the ministers. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p14"> In regard to both, three things were necessary. The first was to be established in the state of worshipping God: and this + institution was brought about---for all in general, by circumcision, without which no one was admitted to any of the legal + observances---and for the priests, by their consecration. The second thing required was the use of those things that pertain + to divine worship. And thus, as to the people, there was the partaking of the paschal banquet, to which no + uncircumcised man was admitted, as is clear from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.12.43" target="asv"> Ex. 12:43, </a> seqq.: and, as to the priests, the offering of the victims, and the eating of the loaves of proposition and of other things + that were allotted to the use of the priests. The third thing required was the removal of all impediments to divine worship, + viz. of uncleannesses. And then, as to the people, certain purifications were instituted for the removal of certain external + uncleannesses; and also expiations from + sins; while, as to the priests and Levites, the washing of hands and feet and the shaving of the hair were instituted. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p15"> And all these things had reasonable causes, both literal, in so far as they were ordained to the worship of God for the time + being, and figurative, in so far as they were ordained to foreshadow Christ: as we shall see by taking them one by one. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 co."><a name="38072" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38072] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, sacramenta proprie dicuntur +illa quae adhibebantur Dei cultoribus ad quandam consecrationem, +per quam scilicet deputabantur quodammodo ad cultum Dei. Cultus +autem Dei generali quidem modo pertinebat ad totum populum; sed +speciali modo pertinebat ad sacerdotes et Levitas, qui erant +ministri cultus divini. Et ideo in istis sacramentis veteris legis +quaedam pertinebant communiter ad totum populum; quaedam autem +specialiter ad ministros. Et circa utrosque tria erant necessaria. +Quorum primum est institutio in statu colendi Deum. Et haec quidem +institutio communiter quantum ad omnes, fiebat per circumcisionem, +sine qua nullus admittebatur ad aliquid legalium, quantum vero ad +sacerdotes, per sacerdotum consecrationem. Secundo requirebatur +usus eorum quae pertinent ad divinum cultum. Et sic quantum ad +populum, erat esus paschalis convivii, ad quem nullus incircumcisus +admittebatur, ut patet Exod. XII, et quantum ad sacerdotes, oblatio +victimarum, et esus panum propositionis et aliorum quae erant +sacerdotum usibus deputata. Tertio requirebatur remotio eorum per +quae aliqui impediebantur a cultu divino, scilicet immunditiarum. +Et sic quantum ad populum, erant institutae quaedam purificationes +a quibusdam exterioribus immunditiis, et etiam expiationes a +peccatis, quantum vero ad sacerdotes et Levitas, erat instituta +ablutio manuum et pedum, et rasio pilorum. Et haec omnia habebant +rationabiles causas et litterales, secundum quod ordinabantur ad +cultum Dei pro tempore illo; et figurales, secundum quod +ordinabantur ad figurandum Christum; ut patebit per singula.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The chief literal reason for circumcision was in order that man might profess his belief in one God. And because Abraham + was the first to sever himself from the infidels, by going out from his house and kindred, for this reason he was the first + to receive circumcision. This reason is set forth by the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p16.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.4.9" target="asv">Rom. 4:9, </a> seqq.) thus: "He received the sign of circumcision, a seal of the justice of the faith which he had, being + uncircumcised"; because, to wit, we are told that "unto Abraham faith was reputed to justice," for the reason that "against + hope he believed in hope," i.e. against the hope that is of nature he believed in the hope that is of grace, "that he might + be made the father of many nations," when he was an old man, and his wife an old and barren woman. And in order that this + declaration, and imitation of Abraham's faith, might be fixed firmly in the hearts of the Jews, they received in their flesh + such + a sign as they could not forget, wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p16.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.17.13" target="asv">Gn. 17:13</a>): "My covenant shall be in your flesh for a perpetual covenant." This was done on the eighth day, because until then a child + is very tender, and so might be seriously injured; and is considered as something not yet consolidated: wherefore neither + are animals offered before the eighth day. And it was not delayed after that time, lest some might refuse the sign of circumcision + on account of the pain: and also lest the parents, + whose love for their children increases as they become used to their presence and as they grow older, should withdraw their + children from circumcision. A second reason may have been the weakening of concupiscence in that member. A third motive may + have been to revile the worship of Venus and Priapus, which gave honor to that part of the body. The Lord's prohibition extended + only to the cutting of oneself in honor of idols: and such was not the circumcision of which we have been speaking. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p17"> The figurative reason for circumcision was that it foreshadowed the removal of corruption, which was to be brought about + by Christ, and will be perfectly fulfilled in the eighth age, which is the age of those who rise from the dead. And since + all corruption of guilt and punishment comes to us through our carnal origin, from the sin of our first parent, therefore + circumcision was applied to the generative member. Hence the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p17.1" href="./asv.html#Col.2.11" target="asv">Col. 2:11</a>): "You are + circumcised" in Christ "with circumcision not made by hand in despoiling of the body of the flesh, but in the circumcision + of" Our Lord Jesus "Christ." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="38073" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38073] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod litteralis ratio circumcisionis principalis +quidem fuit ad protestationem fidei unius Dei. Et quia Abraham fuit +primus qui se ab infidelibus separavit, exiens de domo sua et de +cognatione sua, ideo ipse primus circumcisionem accepit. Et hanc +causam assignat apostolus, ad Rom. IV, <i>signum accepit +circumcisionis, signaculum iustitiae fidei quae est in +praeputio</i>, quia scilicet in hoc legitur Abrahae fides reputata +ad iustitiam, quod contra spem in spem credidit, scilicet contra +spem naturae in spem gratiae, ut fieret pater multarum gentium, cum +ipse esset senex, et uxor sua esset anus et sterilis. Et ut haec +protestatio, et imitatio fidei Abrahae, firmaretur in cordibus +Iudaeorum, acceperunt signum in carne sua, cuius oblivisci non +possent, unde dicitur Gen. XVII, <i>erit pactum meum in carne +vestra in foedus aeternum</i>. Ideo autem fiebat octava die, quia +antea puer est valde tenellus, et posset ex hoc graviter laedi, et +reputatur adhuc quasi quiddam non solidatum, unde etiam nec +animalia offerebantur ante octavum diem. Ideo vero non magis +tardabatur, ne propter dolorem aliqui signum circumcisionis +refugerent, et ne parentes etiam, quorum amor increscit ad filios +post frequentem conversationem et eorum augmentum, eos +circumcisioni subtraherent. Secunda ratio esse potuit ad +debilitationem concupiscentiae in membro illo. Tertia ratio, in +sugillationem sacrorum Veneris et Priapi, in quibus illa pars +corporis honorabatur. Dominus autem non prohibuit nisi incisionem +quae in cultum idolorum fiebat, cui non erat similis praedicta +circumcisio. Figuralis vero ratio circumcisionis erat quia +figurabatur ablatio corruptionis fienda per Christum, quae perfecte +complebitur in octava aetate, quae est aetas resurgentium. Et quia +omnis corruptio culpae et poenae provenit in nos per carnalem +originem ex peccato primi parentis, ideo talis circumcisio fiebat +in membro generationis. Unde apostolus dicit, ad Colos. II, +<i>circumcisi estis in Christo circumcisione non manu facta in +expoliatione corporis carnis, sed in circumcisione domini nostri +Iesu Christi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The literal reason of the paschal banquet was to commemorate the blessing of being led by God out of Egypt. Hence by celebrating + this banquet they declared that they belonged to that people which God had taken to Himself out of Egypt. For when they were + delivered from Egypt, they were commanded to sprinkle the lamb's blood on the transoms of their house doors, as though declaring + that they were averse to the rites of the Egyptians who worshipped the + ram. Wherefore they were delivered by the sprinkling or rubbing of the blood of the lamb on the door-posts, from the danger + of extermination which threatened the Egyptians. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p19"> Now two things are to be observed in their departure from Egypt: namely, their haste in going, for the Egyptians pressed + them to go forth speedily, as related in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p19.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.12.33" target="asv"> Ex. 12:33</a>; and there was danger that anyone who did not hasten to go with the crowd might be slain by the Egyptians. Their haste was + shown in two ways. First by what they ate. For they were commanded to eat unleavened bread, as a sign "that it could not be + leavened, the Egyptians pressing them to + depart"; and to eat roast meat, for this took less time to prepare; and that they should not break a bone thereof, because + in their haste there was no time to break bones. Secondly, as to the manner of eating. For it is written: "You shall gird + your reins, and you shall have shoes on your feet, holding staves in your hands, and you shall eat in haste": which clearly + designates men at the point of starting on a journey. To this also is to be referred the command: "In one house shall it be + eaten, + neither shall you carry forth of the flesh thereof out of the house": because, to wit, on account of their haste, they could + not send any gifts of it. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p20"> The stress they suffered while in Egypt was denoted by the wild lettuces. The figurative reason is evident, because the sacrifice + of the paschal lamb signified the sacrifice of Christ according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p20.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.5.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 5:7</a>: "Christ our pasch is sacrificed." The blood of the lamb, which ensured deliverance from the destroyer, by being sprinkled + on the transoms, signified faith in Christ's Passion, in the hearts and on the lips of the faithful, by which same Passion + we are + delivered from sin and death, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p20.2" href="./asv.html#iPet.1.18" target="asv">1 Pet. 1:18</a>: "You were . . . redeemed . . . with the precious blood . . . of a lamb unspotted." The partaking of its flesh signified + the eating of Christ's body in the Sacrament; and the flesh was roasted at the fire to signify Christ's Passion or charity. + And it was eaten with unleavened bread to signify the blameless life of the faithful who partake of Christ's body, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p20.3" href="./asv.html#iCor.5.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 5:8</a>: "Let us feast . . + . with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth." The wild lettuces were added to denote repentance for sins, which is + required of those who receive the body of Christ. Their loins were girt in sign of chastity: and the shoes of their feet are + the examples of our dead ancestors. The staves they were to hold in their hands denoted pastoral authority: and it was commanded + that the paschal lamb should be eaten in one house, i.e. in a catholic church, and not in the conventicles of heretics. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="38074" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38074] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod litteralis ratio paschalis convivii fuit in +commemorationem beneficii quo Deus eduxit eos de Aegypto. Unde per +huiusmodi convivii celebrationem profitebantur se ad illum populum +pertinere quem Deus sibi assumpserat ex Aegypto. Quando enim sunt +ex Aegypto liberati, praeceptum est eis ut sanguine agni linirent +superliminaria domorum, quasi protestantes se recedere a ritibus +Aegyptiorum, qui arietem colebant. Unde et liberati sunt per +sanguinis agni aspersionem vel linitionem in postibus domorum, a +periculo exterminii quod imminebat Aegyptiis. In illo autem exitu +eorum de Aegypto duo fuerunt, scilicet festinantia ad egrediendum, +impellebant enim eos Aegyptii ut exirent velociter, ut habetur +Exod. XII; imminebatque periculum ei qui non festinaret exire cum +multitudine, ne remanens occideretur ab Aegyptiis. Festinantia +autem designabatur dupliciter. Uno quidem modo per ea quae +comedebant. Praeceptum enim erat eis quod comederent panes azymos, +in huius signum, quod non poterant fermentari, cogentibus exire +Aegyptiis; et quod comederent assum igni, sic enim velocius +praeparabatur; et quod os non comminuerent ex eo, quia in +festinantia non vacat ossa frangere. Alio modo, quantum ad modum +comedendi. Dicitur enim, <i>renes vestros accingetis, calceamenta +habebitis in pedibus, tenentes baculos in manibus, et comedetis +festinanter</i>, quod manifeste designat homines existentes in +promptu itineris. Ad idem etiam pertinet quod eis praecipitur, +<i>in una domo comedetis, neque feretis de carnibus eius foras</i>, +quia scilicet, propter festinantiam, non vacabat invicem mittere +exennia. Amaritudo autem quam passi fuerant in Aegypto, +significabatur per lactucas agrestes. Figuralis autem ratio patet. +Quia per immolationem agni paschalis significabatur immolatio +Christi; secundum illud I ad Cor. V, <i>Pascha nostrum immolatus +est Christus</i>. Sanguis vero agni liberans ab exterminatore, +linitis superliminaribus domorum, significat fidem passionis +Christi in corde et ore fidelium, per quam liberamur a peccato et a +morte; secundum illud I Petr. I, <i>redempti estis pretioso +sanguine agni immaculati</i>. Comedebantur autem carnes illae, ad +significandum esum corporis Christi in sacramento. Erant autem +assae igni, ad significandum passionem, vel caritatem Christi. +Comedebantur autem cum azymis panibus, ad significandam puram +conversationem fidelium sumentium corpus Christi, secundum illud I +ad Cor. V, <i>epulemur in azymis sinceritatis et veritatis</i>. +Lactucae autem agrestes addebantur, in signum poenitentiae +peccatorum, quae necessaria est sumentibus corpus Christi. Renes +autem accingendi sunt cingulo castitatis. Calceamenta autem pedum +sunt exempla mortuorum patrum. Baculi autem habendi in manibus, +significant pastoralem custodiam. Praecipitur autem quod in una +domo agnus paschalis comedatur, idest in Ecclesia Catholicorum, non +in conventiculis haereticorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A5-p21"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some of the sacraments of the New Law had corresponding figurative sacraments in the Old Law. For Baptism, which is the sacrament + of Faith, corresponds to circumcision. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p21.1" href="./asv.html#Col.2.11" target="asv">Col. 2:11,12</a>): "You are circumcised . . . in the circumcision of" Our Lord Jesus "Christ: buried with Him in Baptism." In the New Law + the sacrament of the Eucharist corresponds to the banquet of the paschal lamb. The sacrament of Penance in the New Law corresponds + to all the purifications of the Old Law. The sacrament of Orders corresponds to the consecration of the pontiff and of the + priests. To the sacrament of Confirmation, which is the sacrament of the fulness of grace, there would be no corresponding + sacrament of the Old Law, because the time of fulness had not yet come, since "the Law brought no man [Vulg.: 'nothing'] to + perfection" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p21.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.7.19" target="asv">Heb. 7:19</a>). The same applies to the sacrament of Extreme Unction, which is an immediate + preparation for entrance into glory, to which the way was not yet opened out in the Old Law, since the price had not yet been + paid. Matrimony did indeed exist under the Old Law, as a function of nature, but not as the sacrament of the union of Christ + with the Church, for that union was not as yet brought about. Hence under the Old Law it was allowable to give a bill of divorce, + which is contrary to the nature of the sacrament. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="38075" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38075] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod quaedam sacramenta novae legis habuerunt in veteri +lege sacramenta figuralia sibi correspondentia. Nam circumcisioni +respondet Baptismus, qui est fidei sacramentum, unde dicitur ad +Col. II, <i>circumcisi estis in circumcisione domini nostri Iesu +Christi, consepulti ei in Baptismo</i>. Convivio vero agni +paschalis respondet in nova lege sacramentum Eucharistiae. Omnibus +autem purificationibus veteris legis respondet in nova lege +sacramentum poenitentiae. Consecrationi autem pontificum et +sacerdotum respondet sacramentum ordinis. Sacramento autem +confirmationis, quod est sacramentum plenitudinis gratiae, non +potest respondere in veteri lege aliquod sacramentum, quia nondum +advenerat tempus plenitudinis, eo quod neminem ad perfectum adduxit +lex. Similiter autem et sacramento extremae unctionis, quod est +quaedam immediata praeparatio ad introitum gloriae, cuius aditus +nondum patebat in veteri lege, pretio nondum soluto. Matrimonium +autem fuit quidem in veteri lege prout erat in officium naturae; +non autem prout est sacramentum coniunctionis Christi et Ecclesiae, +quae nondum erat facta. Unde et in veteri lege dabatur libellus +repudii, quod est contra sacramenti rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p22"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As already stated, the purifications of the Old Law were ordained for the removal of impediments to the divine worship: which + worship is twofold; viz. spiritual, consisting in devotion of the mind to God; and corporal, consisting in sacrifices, oblations, + and so forth. Now men are hindered in the spiritual worship by sins, whereby men were said to be polluted, for instance, by + idolatry, murder, adultery, or incest. From such pollutions men were + purified by certain sacrifices, offered either for the whole community in general, or also for the sins of individuals; not + that those carnal sacrifices had of themselves the power of expiating sin; but that they signified that expiation of sins + which was to be effected by Christ, and of which those of old became partakers by protesting their faith in the Redeemer, + while taking part in the figurative sacrifices. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p23"> The impediments to external worship consisted in certain bodily uncleannesses; which were considered in the first place as + existing in man, and consequently in other animals also, and in man's clothes, dwelling-place, and vessels. In man himself + uncleanness was considered as arising partly from himself and partly from contact with unclean things. Anything proceeding + from man was reputed unclean that was already subject to corruption, or exposed thereto: and consequently since + death is a kind of corruption, the human corpse was considered unclean. In like manner, since leprosy arises from corruption + of the humors, which break out externally and infect other persons, therefore were lepers also considered unclean; and, again, + women suffering from a flow of blood, whether from weakness, or from nature (either at the monthly course or at the time of + conception); and, for the same reason, men were reputed unclean if they suffered from a flow of seed, whether due to + weakness, to nocturnal pollution, or to sexual intercourse. Because every humor issuing from man in the aforesaid ways involves + some unclean infection. Again, man contracted uncleanness by touching any unclean thing whatever. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p24"> Now there was both a literal and a figurative reason for these uncleannesses. The literal reason was taken from the reverence + due to those things that belong to the divine worship: both because men are not wont, when unclean, to touch precious things: + and in order that by rarely approaching sacred things they might have greater respect for them. For since man could seldom + avoid all the aforesaid uncleannesses, the result was that men could seldom approach to touch things + belonging to the worship of God, so that when they did approach, they did so with greater reverence and humility. Moreover, + in some of these the literal reason was that men should not be kept away from worshipping God through fear of coming in contact + with lepers and others similarly afflicted with loathsome and contagious diseases. In others, again, the reason was to avoid + idolatrous worship: because in their sacrificial rites the Gentiles sometimes employed human blood and seed. All these + bodily uncleannesses were purified either by the mere sprinkling of water, or, in the case of those which were more grievous, + by some sacrifice of expiation for the sin which was the occasion of the uncleanness in question. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p25"> The figurative reason for these uncleannesses was that they were figures of various sins. For the uncleanness of any corpse + signifies the uncleanness of sin, which is the death of the soul. The uncleanness of leprosy betokened the uncleanness of + heretical doctrine: both because heretical doctrine is contagious just as leprosy is, and because no doctrine is so false + as not to have some truth mingled with error, just as on the surface of a leprous body one may distinguish the + healthy parts from those that are infected. The uncleanness of a woman suffering from a flow of blood denotes the uncleanness + of idolatry, on account of the blood which is offered up. The uncleanness of the man who has suffered seminal loss signifies + the uncleanness of empty words, for "the seed is the word of God." The uncleanness of sexual intercourse and of the woman + in child-birth signifies the uncleanness of original sin. The uncleanness of the woman in her periods signifies the + uncleanness of a mind that is sensualized by pleasure. Speaking generally, the uncleanness contracted by touching an unclean + thing denotes the uncleanness arising from consent in another's sin, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p25.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.6.17" target="asv">2 Cor. 6:17</a>: "Go out from among them, and be ye separate . . . and touch not the unclean thing." + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p26"> Moreover, this uncleanness arising from the touch was contracted even by inanimate objects; for whatever was touched in any + way by an unclean man, became itself unclean. Wherein the Law attenuated the superstition of the Gentiles, who held that uncleanness + was contracted not only by touch, but also by speech or looks, as Rabbi Moses states (Doct. Perplex. iii) of a woman in her + periods. The mystical sense of this was that "to God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful alike" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p26.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.9" target="asv">Wis. 14:9</a>). + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p27"> There was also an uncleanness of inanimate things considered in themselves, such as the uncleanness of leprosy in a house + or in clothes. For just as leprosy occurs in men through a corrupt humor causing putrefaction and corruption in the flesh; + so, too, through some corruption and excess of humidity or dryness, there arises sometimes a kind of corruption in the stones + with which a house is built, or in clothes. Hence the Law called this corruption by the name of leprosy, whereby + a house or a garment was deemed to be unclean: both because all corruption savored of uncleanness, as stated above, and because + the Gentiles worshipped their household gods as a preservative against this corruption. Hence the Law prescribed such houses, + where this kind of corruption was of a lasting nature, to be destroyed; and such garments to be burnt, in order to avoid all + occasion of idolatry. There was also an uncleanness of vessels, of which it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p27.1" href="./asv.html#Num.19.15" target="asv">Num. + 19:15 + </a>): "The vessel that hath no cover, and binding over it, shall be unclean." The cause of this uncleanness was that anything + unclean might easily drop into such vessels, so as to render them unclean. Moreover, this command aimed at the prevention + of idolatry. For idolaters believed that if mice, lizards, or the like, which they used to sacrifice to the idols, fell into + the vessels or into the water, these became more pleasing to the gods. Even now some women let down uncovered + vessels in honor of the nocturnal deities which they call "Janae." + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p28"> The figurative reason of these uncleannesses is that the leprosy of a house signified the uncleanness of the assembly of + heretics; the leprosy of a linen garment signified an evil life arising from bitterness of mind; the leprosy of a woolen garment + denoted the wickedness of flatterers; leprosy in the warp signified the vices of the soul; leprosy on the woof denoted sins + of the flesh, for as the warp is in the woof, so is the soul in the body. The vessel that has neither cover + nor binding, betokens a man who lacks the veil of taciturnity, and who is unrestrained by any severity of discipline. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="38076" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38076] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, purificationes veteris legis +ordinabantur ad removendum impedimenta cultus divini. Qui quidem +est duplex, scilicet spiritualis, qui consistit in devotione mentis +ad Deum; et corporalis, qui consistit in sacrificiis et +oblationibus et aliis huiusmodi. A cultu autem spirituali +impediuntur homines per peccata, quibus homines pollui dicebantur, +sicut per idololatriam et homicidium, per adulteria et incestus. Et +ab istis pollutionibus purificabantur homines per aliqua sacrificia +vel communiter oblata pro tota multitudine, vel etiam pro peccatis +singulorum. Non quod sacrificia illa carnalia haberent ex seipsis +virtutem expiandi peccatum, sed quia significabant expiationem +peccatorum futuram per Christum, cuius participes erant etiam +antiqui, protestantes fidem redemptoris in figuris sacrificiorum. A +cultu vero exteriori impediebantur homines per quasdam immunditias +corporales, quae quidem primo considerabantur in hominibus; +consequenter etiam in aliis animalibus, et in vestimentis et +domibus et vasis. In hominibus quidem immunditia reputabatur partim +quidem ex ipsis hominibus; partim autem ex contactu rerum +immundarum. Ex ipsis autem hominibus immundum reputabatur omne +illud quod corruptionem aliquam iam habebat, vel erat corruptioni +expositum. Et ideo, quia mors est corruptio quaedam, cadaver +hominis reputabatur immundum. Similiter etiam, quia lepra ex +corruptione humorum contingit, qui etiam exterius erumpunt et alios +inficiunt, leprosi etiam reputabantur immundi. Similiter etiam +mulieres patientes sanguinis fluxum, sive per infirmitatem, sive +etiam per naturam vel temporibus menstruis vel etiam tempore +conceptionis. Et eadem ratione viri reputabantur immundi fluxum +seminis patientes, vel per infirmitatem, vel per pollutionem +nocturnam, vel etiam per coitum. Nam omnis humiditas praedictis +modis ab homine egrediens, quandam immundam infectionem habet. +Inerat etiam hominibus immunditia quaedam ex contactu quarumcumque +rerum immundarum. Istarum autem immunditiarum ratio erat et +litteralis, et figuralis. Litteralis quidem, propter reverentiam +eorum quae ad divinum cultum pertinent. Tum quia homines pretiosas +res contingere non solent cum fuerint immundi. Tum etiam ut ex raro +accessu ad sacra, ea magis venerarentur. Cum enim omnes huiusmodi +immunditias raro aliquis cavere possit, contingebat quod raro +poterant homines accedere ad attingendum ea quae pertinebant ad +divinum cultum, et sic quando accedebant, cum maiori reverentia et +humilitate mentis accedebant. Erat autem in quibusdam horum ratio +litteralis ut homines non reformidarent accedere ad divinum cultum, +quasi refugientes consortium leprosorum et similium infirmorum, +quorum morbus abominabilis erat et contagiosus. In quibusdam etiam +ratio erat ad vitandum idololatriae cultum, quia gentiles in ritu +suorum sacrificiorum utebantur quandoque humano sanguine et semine. +Omnes autem huiusmodi immunditiae corporales purificabantur vel per +solam aspersionem aquae, vel quae maiores erant, per aliquod +sacrificium ad expiandum peccatum, ex quo tales infirmitates +contingebant. Ratio autem figuralis harum immunditiarum fuit quia +per huiusmodi exteriores immunditias figurabantur diversa peccata. +Nam immunditia cadaveris cuiuscumque significat immunditiam +peccati, quod est mors animae. Immunditia autem leprae significat +immunditiam haereticae doctrinae, tum quia haeretica doctrina +contagiosa est, sicut et lepra; tum etiam quia nulla falsa doctrina +est quae vera falsis non admisceat, sicut etiam in superficie +corporis leprosi apparet quaedam distinctio quarundam macularum ab +alia carne integra. Per immunditiam vero mulieris sanguinifluae, +designatur immunditia idololatriae, propter immolatitium cruorem. +Per immunditiam vero viri seminiflui, designatur immunditia vanae +locutionis, eo quod semen est verbum Dei. Per immunditiam vero +coitus, et mulieris parientis, designatur immunditia peccati +originalis. Per immunditiam vero mulieris menstruatae, designatur +immunditia mentis per voluptates emollitae. Universaliter vero per +immunditiam contactus rei immundae designatur immunditia consensus +in peccatum alterius; secundum illud II ad Cor. VI, <i>exite de +medio eorum et separamini, et immundum ne tetigeritis</i>. +Huiusmodi autem immunditia contactus derivabatur etiam ad res +inanimatas, quidquid enim quocumque modo tangebat immundus, +immundum erat. In quo lex attenuavit superstitionem gentilium, qui +non solum per contactum immundi dicebant immunditiam contrahi, sed +etiam per collocutionem aut per aspectum, ut Rabbi Moyses dicit de +muliere menstruata. Per hoc autem mystice significabatur id quod +dicitur Sap. XIV, <i>similiter odio sunt Deo impius et impietas +eius</i>. Erat autem et immunditia quaedam ipsarum rerum +inanimatarum secundum se, sicut erat immunditia leprae in domo et +in vestimentis. Sicut enim morbus leprae accidit in hominibus ex +humore corrupto putrefaciente carnem et corrumpente, ita etiam +propter aliquam corruptionem et excessum humiditatis vel +siccitatis, fit quandoque aliqua corrosio in lapidibus domus, vel +etiam in vestimento. Et ideo hanc corruptionem vocabat lex lepram, +ex qua domus vel vestis immunda iudicaretur. Tum quia omnis +corruptio ad immunditiam pertinebat, ut dictum est. Tum etiam quia +contra huiusmodi corruptionem gentiles deos Penates colebant, et +ideo lex praecepit huiusmodi domus, in quibus fuerit talis +corruptio perseverans, destrui, et vestes comburi, ad tollendam +idololatriae occasionem. Erat etiam et quaedam immunditia vasorum, +de qua dicitur Num. XIX, vas quod <i>non habuerit cooperculum et +ligaturam desuper, immundum erit</i>. Cuius immunditiae causa est +quia in talia vasa de facili poterat aliquid immundum cadere, unde +poterant immundari. Erat etiam hoc praeceptum ad declinandam +idololatriam, credebant enim idololatrae quod, si mures aut +lacertae, vel aliquid huiusmodi, quae immolabant idolis, cito +caderent in vasa vel in aquas, quod essent diis gratiosa. Adhuc +etiam aliquae mulierculae vasa dimittunt discooperta in obsequium +nocturnorum numinum, quae ianas vocant. Harum autem immunditiarum +ratio est figuralis quia per lepram domus significatur immunditia +congregationis haereticorum. Per lepram vero in veste linea +significatur perversitas morum ex amaritudine mentis. Per lepram +vero vestis laneae significatur perversitas adulatorum. Per lepram +in stamine significantur vitia animae, per lepram vero in +subtegmine significantur peccata carnalia, sicut enim stamen est in +subtegmine, ita anima in corpore. Per vas autem quod non habet +operculum nec ligaturam, significatur homo qui non habet aliquod +velamen taciturnitatis, et qui non constringitur aliqua censura +disciplinae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p29"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> As stated above (ad 4), there was a twofold uncleanness in the Law; one by way of corruption in the mind or in the body; + and this was the graver uncleanness; the other was by mere contact with an unclean thing, and this was less grave, and was + more easily expiated. Because the former uncleanness was expiated by sacrifices for sins, since all corruption is due to sin, + and signifies sin: whereas the latter uncleanness was expiated by the mere sprinkling + of a certain water, of which water we read in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p29.1" href="./asv.html#Num.19" target="asv">Num. 19</a>. For there God commanded them to take a red cow in memory of the sin they had committed in worshipping a calf. And a cow + is mentioned rather than a calf, because it was thus that the Lord was wont to designate the synagogue, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p29.2" href="./asv.html#Hos.4.16" target="asv"> Osee 4:16</a>: "Israel hath gone astray like a wanton heifer": and this was, perhaps, because they worshipped heifers after the custom + of Egypt, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p29.3" href="./asv.html#Hos.10.5" target="asv">Osee 10:5</a>: "(They) have + worshipped the kine of Bethaven." And in detestation of the sin of idolatry it was sacrificed outside the camp; in fact, whenever + sacrifice was offered up in expiation of the multitude of sins, it was all burnt outside the camp. Moreover, in order to show + that this sacrifice cleansed the people from all their sins, "the priest" dipped "his finger in her blood," and sprinkled + "it over against the door of the tabernacle seven times"; for the number seven signified universality. Further, the very + sprinkling of blood pertained to the detestation of idolatry, in which the blood that was offered up was not poured out, but + was collected together, and men gathered round it to eat in honor of the idols. Likewise it was burnt by fire, either because + God appeared to Moses in a fire, and the Law was given from the midst of fire; or to denote that idolatry, together with all + that was connected therewith, was to be extirpated altogether; just as the cow was burnt "with her skin and her flesh, her + blood and dung being delivered to the flames." To this burning were added "cedar-wood, and hyssop, and scarlet twice dyed," + to signify that just as cedar-wood is not liable to putrefaction, and scarlet twice dyed does not easily lose its color, and + hyssop retains its odor after it has been dried; so also was this sacrifice for the preservation of the whole people, and + for their good behavior and devotion. Hence it is said of the ashes of the cow: "That they may be reserved for the multitude + of + the children of Israel." Or, according to Josephus (Antiq. iii, 8,9,10), the four elements are indicated here: for "cedar-wood" + was added to the fire, to signify the earth, on account of its earthiness; "hyssop," to signify the air, on account of its + smell; "scarlet twice dyed," to signify water, for the same reason as purple, on account of the dyes which are taken out of + the water: thus denoting the fact that this sacrifice was offered to the Creator of the four elements. And since this + sacrifice was offered for the sin of idolatry, both "he that burned her," and "he that gathered up the ashes," and "he that + sprinkled the water" in which the ashes were placed, were deemed unclean in detestation of that sin, in order to show that + whatever was in any way connected with idolatry should be cast aside as being unclean. From this uncleanness they were purified + by the mere washing of their clothes; nor did they need to be sprinkled with the water on account of this kind of + uncleanness, because otherwise the process would have been unending, since he that sprinkled the water became unclean, so + that if he were to sprinkle himself he would remain unclean; and if another were to sprinkle him, that one would have become + unclean, and in like manner, whoever might sprinkle him, and so on indefinitely. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p30"> The figurative reason of this sacrifice was that the red cow signified Christ in respect his assumed weakness, denoted by + the female sex; while the color of the cow designated the blood of His Passion. And the "red cow was of full age," because + all Christ's works are perfect, "in which there" was "no blemish"; "and which" had "not carried the yoke," because Christ + was innocent, nor did He carry the yoke of sin. It was commanded to be taken to Moses, because they blamed Him for + transgressing the law of Moses by breaking the Sabbath. And it was commanded to be delivered "to Eleazar the priest," because + Christ was delivered into the hands of the priests to be slain. It was immolated "without the camp," because Christ "suffered + outside the gate" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p30.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.13.12" target="asv">Heb. 13:12</a>). And the priest dipped "his finger in her blood," because the mystery of Christ's Passion should be considered and imitated. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p31"> It was sprinkled "over against . . . the tabernacle," which denotes the synagogue, to signify either the condemnation of + the unbelieving Jews, or the purification of believers; and this "seven times," in token either of the seven gifts of the + Holy Ghost, or of the seven days wherein all time is comprised. Again, all things that pertain to the Incarnation of Christ + should be burnt with fire, i.e. they should be understood spiritually; for the "skin" and "flesh" signified Christ's + outward works; the "blood" denoted the subtle inward force which quickened His external deeds; the "dung" betokened His weariness, + His thirst, and all such like things pertaining to His weakness. Three things were added, viz. "cedar-wood," which denotes + the height of hope or contemplation; "hyssop," in token of humility or faith; "scarlet twice dyed," which denotes twofold + charity; for it is by these three that we should cling to Christ suffering. The ashes of this burning were gathered by "a + man that is clean," because the relics of the Passion came into the possession of the Gentiles, who were not guilty of Christ's + death. The ashes were put into water for the purpose of expiation, because Baptism receives from Christ's Passion the power + of washing away sins. The priest who immolated and burned the cow, and he who burned, and he who gathered together the ashes, + were unclean, as also he that sprinkled the water: either because the Jews became unclean through putting Christ to + death, whereby our sins are expiated; and this, until the evening, i.e. until the end of the world, when the remnants of Israel + will be converted; or else because they who handle sacred things with a view to the cleansing of others contract certain uncleannesses, + as Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 5); and this until the evening, i.e. until the end of this life. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 ad 5"><a name="38077" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38077] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, duplex erat immunditia in lege. +Una quidem per aliquam corruptionem mentis vel corporis, et haec +immunditia maior erat. Alia vero erat immunditia ex solo contactu +rei immundae, et haec minor erat, et faciliori ritu expiabatur. Nam +immunditia prima expiabatur sacrificio pro peccato, quia omnis +corruptio ex peccato procedit et peccatum significat, sed secunda +immunditia expiabatur per solam aspersionem aquae cuiusdam, de qua +quidem aqua expiationis habetur Num. XIX. Mandatur enim ibi a +domino quod accipiant vaccam rufam, in memoriam peccati quod +commiserunt in adoratione vituli. Et dicitur vacca magis quam +vitulus, quia sic dominus synagogam vocare consuevit; secundum +illud Osee IV, sicut vacca lasciviens declinavit Israel. Et hoc +forte ideo quia vaccas in morem Aegyptii, coluerunt; secundum illud +Osee X, vaccas Bethaven coluerunt. Et in detestationem peccati +idololatriae, immolabatur extra castra. Et ubicumque sacrificium +fiebat pro expiatione multitudinis peccatorum, cremabatur extra +castra totum. Et ut significaretur per hoc sacrificium emundari +populus ab universitate peccatorum, intingebat sacerdos digitum in +sanguine eius, et aspergebat contra fores sanctuarii septem +vicibus, quia septenarius universitatem significat. Et ipsa etiam +aspersio sanguinis pertinebat ad detestationem idololatriae, in qua +sanguis immolatitius non effundebatur, sed congregabatur, et circa +ipsum homines comedebant in honorem idolorum. Comburebatur autem in +igne. Vel quia Deus Moysi in igne apparuit, et in igne data est +lex. Vel quia per hoc significabatur quod idololatria totaliter +erat extirpanda, et omne quod ad idololatriam pertinebat, sicut +vacca cremabatur, tam pelle et carnibus, quam sanguine et fimo, +flammae traditis. Adiungebatur etiam in combustione lignum +cedrinum, hyssopus, coccusque bis tinctus, ad significandum quod, +sicut ligna cedrina non de facili putrescunt, et coccus bis tinctus +non amittit colorem, et hyssopus retinet odorem etiam postquam +fuerit desiccatus; ita etiam hoc sacrificium erat in conservationem +ipsius populi, et honestatis et devotionis ipsius. Unde dicitur de +cineribus vaccae, <i>ut sint multitudini filiorum Israel in +custodiam</i>. Vel, secundum Iosephum, quatuor elementa significata +sunt, igni enim apponebatur cedrus, significans terram, propter sui +terrestreitatem; hyssopus, significans aerem, propter odorem; +coccus, significans aquam, eadem ratione qua et purpura, propter +tincturas, quae ex aquis sumuntur, ut per hoc exprimeretur quod +illud sacrificium offerebatur creatori quatuor elementorum. Et quia +huiusmodi sacrificium offerebatur pro peccato idololatriae, in eius +detestationem et comburens, et cineres colligens, et ille qui +aspergit aquas in quibus cinis ponebatur, immundi reputabantur, ut +per hoc ostenderetur quod quidquid quocumque modo ad idololatriam +pertinet, quasi immundum est abiiciendum. Ab hac autem immunditia +purificabantur per solam ablutionem vestimentorum, nec indigebant +aqua aspergi propter huiusmodi immunditiam, quia sic esset +processus in infinitum. Ille enim qui aspergebat aquam, immundus +fiebat, et sic si ipse seipsum aspergeret, immundus remaneret; si +autem alius eum aspergeret, ille immundus esset; et similiter ille +qui illum aspergeret, et sic in infinitum. Figuralis autem ratio +huius sacrificii est quia per vaccam rufam significatur Christus +secundum infirmitatem assumptam, quam femininus sexus designat. +Sanguinem passionis eius designat vaccae color. Erat autem vacca +rufa aetatis integrae, quia omnis operatio Christi est perfecta. In +qua nulla erat macula, nec portavit iugum, quia non portavit iugum +peccati. Praecipitur autem adduci ad Moysen, quia imputabant ei +transgressionem Mosaicae legis in violatione sabbati. Praecipitur +etiam tradi Eleazaro sacerdoti, quia Christus occidendus in manus +sacerdotum traditus est. Immolatur autem extra castra, quia extra +portam Christus passus est. Intingit autem sacerdos digitum in +sanguine eius, quia per discretionem, quam digitus significat, +mysterium passionis Christi est considerandum et imitandum. +Aspergitur autem contra tabernaculum, per quod synagoga designatur, +vel ad condemnationem Iudaeorum non credentium; vel ad +purificationem credentium. Et hoc septem vicibus, vel propter +septem dona spiritus sancti; vel propter septem dies, in quibus +omne tempus intelligitur. Sunt autem omnia quae ad Christi +incarnationem pertinent, igne cremanda, idest spiritualiter +intelligenda, nam per pellem et carnem exterior Christi operatio +significatur; per sanguinem, subtilis et interna virtus exteriora +vivificans; per fimum, lassitudo, sitis, et omnia huiusmodi ad +infirmitatem pertinentia. Adduntur autem tria, cedrus, quod +significat altitudinem spei, vel contemplationis; hyssopus, quod +significat humilitatem, vel fidem; coccus bis tinctus, quod +significat geminam caritatem; per haec enim debemus Christo passo +adhaerere. Iste autem cinis combustionis colligitur a viro mundo, +quia reliquiae passionis pervenerunt ad gentiles, qui non fuerunt +culpabiles in Christi morte. Apponuntur autem cineres in aqua ad +expiandum, quia ex passione Christi Baptismus sortitur virtutem +emundandi peccata. Sacerdos autem qui immolabat et comburebat +vaccam, et ille qui comburebat, et qui colligebat cineres, immundus +erat, et etiam qui aspergebat aquam, vel quia Iudaei facti sunt +immundi ex occisione Christi, per quam nostra peccata expiantur; et +hoc usque ad vesperum, idest usque ad finem mundi, quando reliquiae +Israel convertentur. Vel quia illi qui tractant sancta intendentes +ad emundationem aliorum, ipsi etiam aliquas immunditias contrahunt, +ut Gregorius dicit, in pastorali; et hoc usque ad vesperum, idest +usque ad finem praesentis vitae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p32"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> As stated above (ad 5), an uncleanness which was caused by corruption either of mind or of body was expiated by sin-offerings. + Now special sacrifices were wont to be offered for the sins of individuals: but since some were neglectful about expiating + such sins and uncleannesses; or, through ignorance, failed to offer this expiation; it was laid down that once a year, on + the tenth day of the seventh month, a sacrifice of expiation should be offered for + the whole people. And because, as the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p32.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.7.28" target="asv">Heb. 7:28</a>), "the Law maketh men priests, who have infirmity," it behooved the priest first of all to offer a calf for his own sins, + in memory of Aaron's sin in fashioning the molten calf; and besides, to offer a ram for a holocaust, which signified that + the priestly sovereignty denoted by the ram, who is the head of the flock, was to be ordained to the glory of God. Then he + offered two he-goats for the people: one of which + was offered in expiation of the sins of the multitude. For the he-goat is an evil-smelling animal; and from its skin clothes + are made having a pungent odor; to signify the stench, uncleanness and the sting of sin. After this he-goat had been immolated, + its blood was taken, together with the blood of the calf, into the Holy of Holies, and the entire sanctuary was sprinkled + with it; to signify that the tabernacle was cleansed from the uncleanness of the children of Israel. But the corpses of the + he-goat and calf which had been offered up for sin had to be burnt, to denote the destruction of sins. They were not, however, + burnt on the altar: since none but holocausts were burnt thereon; but it was prescribed that they should be burnt without + the camp, in detestation of sin: for this was done whenever sacrifice was offered for a grievous sin, or for the multitude + of sins. The other goat was let loose into the wilderness: not indeed to offer it to the demons, whom the Gentiles worshipped + in desert places, because it was unlawful to offer aught to them; but in order to point out the effect of the sacrifice which + had been offered up. Hence the priest put his hand on its head, while confessing the sins of the children of Israel: as though + that goat were to carry them away into the wilderness, where it would be devoured by wild beasts, because it bore the punishment + of the people's sins. And it was said to bear the sins of the people, either because the forgiveness of the people's + sins was signified by its being let loose, or because on its head written lists of sins were fastened. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p33"> The figurative reason of these things was that Christ was foreshadowed both by the calf, on account of His power; and by + the ram, because He is the Head of the faithful; and by the he-goat, on account of "the likeness of sinful flesh" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p33.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.3" target="asv">Rom. 8:3</a>). Moreover, Christ was sacrificed for the sins of both priests and people: since both those of high and those of low degree + are cleansed from sin by His Passion. The blood of the calf and of the goat was brought into + the Holies by the priest, because the entrance to the kingdom of heaven was opened to us by the blood of Christ's Passion. + Their bodies were burnt without the camp, because "Christ suffered without the gate," as the Apostle declares ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p33.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.13.12" target="asv">Heb. 13:12</a>). The scape-goat may denote either Christ's Godhead Which went away into solitude when the Man Christ suffered, not by going + to another place, but by restraining His power: or it may signify the base concupiscence which we ought to + cast away from ourselves, while we offer up to Our Lord acts of virtue. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p34"> With regard to the uncleanness contracted by those who burnt these sacrifices, the reason is the same as that which we assigned + (ad 5) to the sacrifice of the red heifer. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 ad 6"><a name="38078" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38078] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, immunditia quae ex corruptione +proveniebat vel mentis vel corporis, expiabatur per sacrificia pro +peccato. Offerebantur autem specialia sacrificia pro peccatis +singulorum, sed quia aliqui negligentes erant circa expiationem +huiusmodi peccatorum et immunditiarum; vel etiam propter +ignorantiam ab expiatione huiusmodi desistebant; institutum fuit ut +semel in anno, decima die septimi mensis, fieret sacrificium +expiationis pro toto populo. Et quia, sicut apostolus dicit, ad +Heb. VII, <i>lex constituit homines sacerdotes infirmitatem +habentes</i>, oportebat quod sacerdos prius offerret pro seipso +vitulum pro peccato, in commemorationem peccati quod Aaron fecerat +in conflatione vituli aurei; et arietem in holocaustum, per quod +significabatur quod sacerdotis praelatio, quam aries designat, qui +est dux gregis, erat ordinanda ad honorem Dei. Deinde autem +offerebat pro populo duos hircos. Quorum unus immolabatur, ad +expiandum peccatum multitudinis. Hircus enim animal fetidum est, et +de pilis eius fiunt vestimenta pungentia, ut per hoc significaretur +fetor et immunditia et aculei peccatorum. Huius autem hirci +immolati sanguis inferebatur, simul etiam cum sanguine vituli, in +sancta sanctorum, et aspergebatur ex eo totum sanctuarium, ad +significandum quod tabernaculum emundabatur ab immunditiis filiorum +Israel. Corpus vero hirci et vituli quae immolata sunt pro peccato, +oportebat comburi, ad ostendendum consumptionem peccatorum. Non +autem in altari, quia ibi non comburebantur totaliter nisi +holocausta. Unde mandatum erat ut comburerentur extra castra, in +detestationem peccati, hoc enim fiebat quandocumque immolabatur +sacrificium pro aliquo gravi peccato, vel pro multitudine +peccatorum. Alter vero hircus emittebatur in desertum, non quidem +ut offerretur Daemonibus, quos colebant gentiles in desertis, quia +eis nihil licebat immolari; sed ad designandum effectum illius +sacrificii immolati. Et ideo sacerdos imponebat manum super caput +eius, confitens peccata filiorum Israel, ac si ille hircus +deportaret ea in desertum, ubi a bestiis comederetur, quasi portans +poenam pro peccatis populi. Dicebatur autem portare peccata populi, +vel quia in eius emissione significabatur remissio peccatorum +populi, vel quia colligabatur super caput eius aliqua schedula ubi +erant scripta peccata. Ratio autem figuralis horum erat quia +Christus significatur et per vitulum, propter virtutem; et per +arietem, quia ipse est dux fidelium; et per hircum, propter +similitudinem carnis peccati. Et ipse Christus est immolatus pro +peccatis et sacerdotum et populi, quia per eius passionem et +maiores et minores a peccato mundantur. Sanguis autem vituli et +hirci infertur in sancta per pontificem, quia per sanguinem +passionis Christi patet nobis introitus in regnum caelorum. +Comburuntur autem eorum corpora extra castra, quia extra portam +Christus passus est, ut apostolus dicit, ad Heb. ult. Per hircum +autem qui emittebatur, potest significari vel ipsa divinitas +Christi, quae in solitudinem abiit, homine Christo patiente, non +quidem locum mutans, sed virtutem cohibens, vel significatur +concupiscentia mala, quam debemus a nobis abiicere, virtuosos autem +motus domino immolare. De immunditia vero eorum qui huiusmodi +sacrificia comburebant, eadem ratio est quae in sacrificio vitulae +rufae dicta est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p35"> + <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> The legal rite did not cleanse the leper of his deformity, but declared him to be cleansed. This is shown by the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p35.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.14.3" target="asv"> Lev. 14:3, </a> seqq., where it was said that the priest, "when he shall find that the leprosy is cleansed," shall command "him that is to + be purified": consequently, the leper was already healed: but he was said to be purified in so far as the verdict of the priest + restored him to the society of men and to the + worship of God. It happened sometimes, however, that bodily leprosy was miraculously cured by the legal rite, when the priest + erred in his judgment. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p36"> Now this purification of a leper was twofold: for, in the first place, he was declared to be clean; and, secondly, he was + restored, as clean, to the society of men and to the worship of God, to wit, after seven days. At the first purification the + leper who sought to be cleansed offered for himself "two living sparrows . . . cedar-wood, and scarlet, and hyssop," in such + wise that a sparrow and the hyssop should be tied to the cedar-wood with a scarlet thread, so that the + cedar-wood was like the handle of an aspersory: while the hyssop and sparrow were that part of the aspersory which was dipped + into the blood of the other sparrow which was "immolated . . . over living waters." These things he offered as an antidote + to the four defects of leprosy: for cedar-wood, which is not subject to putrefaction, was offered against the putrefaction; + hyssop, which is a sweet-smelling herb, was offered up against the stench; a living sparrow was offered up against numbness; + and scarlet, which has a vivid color, was offered up against the repulsive color of leprosy. The living sparrow was let loose + to fly away into the plain, because the leper was restored to his former liberty. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p37"> On the eighth day he was admitted to divine worship, and was restored to the society of men; but only after having shaved + all the hair of his body, and washed his clothes, because leprosy rots the hair, infects the clothes, and gives them an evil + smell. Afterwards a sacrifice was offered for his sin, since leprosy was frequently a result of sin: and some of the blood + of the sacrifice was put on the tip of the ear of the man that was to be cleansed, "and on the thumb of his right + hand, and the great toe of his right foot"; because it is in these parts that leprosy is first diagnosed and felt. In this + rite, moreover, three liquids were employed: viz. blood, against the corruption of the blood; oil, to denote the healing of + the disease; and living waters, to wash away the filth. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p38"> The figurative reason was that the Divine and human natures in Christ were denoted by the two sparrows, one of which, in + likeness of His human nature, was offered up in an earthen vessel over living waters, because the waters of Baptism are sanctified + by Christ's Passion. The other sparrow, in token of His impassible Godhead, remained living, because the Godhead cannot die: + hence it flew away, for the Godhead could not be encompassed by the Passion. Now this living sparrow, + together with the cedar-wood and scarlet or cochineal, and hyssop, i.e. faith, hope and charity, as stated above (ad 5), was + put into the water for the purpose of sprinkling, because we are baptized in the faith of the God-Man. By the waters of Baptism + or of his tears man washes his clothes, i.e. his works, and all his hair, i.e. his thoughts. The tip of the right ear of the + man to be cleansed is moistened with some the blood and oil, in order to strengthen his hearing against harmful words; + and the thumb and toe of his right hand and foot are moistened that his deeds may be holy. Other matters pertaining to this + purification, or to that also of any other uncleannesses, call for no special remark, beyond what applies to other sacrifices, + whether for sins or for trespasses. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 ad 7"><a name="38079" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38079] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 ad 7</span></a> Ad septimum +dicendum quod per ritum legis leprosus non emundabatur a macula +leprae, sed emundatus ostendebatur. Et hoc significatur Lev. XIV, +cum dicitur de sacerdote, <i>cum invenerit lepram esse emundatam, +praecipiet ei qui purificatur</i>. Iam ergo lepra mundata erat, sed +purificari dicebatur, inquantum iudicio sacerdotis restituebatur +consortio hominum et cultui divino. Contingebat tamen quandoque ut +divino miraculo per ritum legis corporalis mundaretur lepra, quando +sacerdos decipiebatur in iudicio. Huiusmodi autem purificatio +leprosi dupliciter fiebat, nam primo, iudicabatur esse mundus; +secundo autem, restituebatur tanquam mundus consortio hominum et +cultui divino, scilicet post septem dies. In prima autem +purificatione offerebat pro se leprosus mundandus duos passeres +vivos, et lignum cedrinum, et vermiculum, et hyssopum; hoc modo ut +filo coccineo ligarentur passer et hyssopus simul cum ligno +cedrino, ita scilicet quod lignum cedrinum esset quasi manubrium +aspersorii. Hyssopus vero et passer erant id quod de aspersorio +tingebatur in sanguine alterius passeris immolati in aquis vivis. +Haec autem quatuor offerebat contra quatuor defectus leprae, nam +contra putredinem, offerebatur cedrus, quae est arbor imputribilis; +contra fetorem, hyssopus, quae est herba odorifera; contra +insensibilitatem, passer vivus; contra turpitudinem coloris, +vermiculus, qui habet vivum colorem. Passer vero vivus avolare +dimittebatur in agrum, quia leprosus restituebatur pristinae +libertati. In octavo vero die admittebatur ad cultum divinum, et +restituebatur consortio hominum. Primo tamen rasis pilis totius +corporis et vestimentis, eo quod lepra pilos corrodit, et +vestimenta inquinat et fetida reddit. Et postmodum sacrificium +offerebatur pro delicto eius, quia lepra plerumque inducitur pro +peccato. De sanguine autem sacrificii tingebatur extremum auriculae +eius qui erat mundandus, et pollices manus dextrae et pedis, quia +in istis partibus primum lepra dignoscitur et sentitur. +Adhibebantur etiam huic ritui tres liquores, scilicet sanguis, +contra sanguinis corruptionem; oleum, ad designandam sanationem +morbi; aqua viva, ad emundandum spurcitiem. Figuralis autem ratio +erat quia per duos passeres significantur divinitas et humanitas +Christi. Quorum unus, scilicet humanitas, immolatur in vase fictili +super aquas viventes, quia per passionem Christi aquae Baptismi +consecrantur. Alius autem, scilicet impassibilis divinitas, vivus +remanebat, quia divinitas mori non potest. Unde et avolabat, quia +passione astringi non poterat. Hic autem passer vivus, simul cum +ligno cedrino et cocco, vel vermiculo, et hyssopo, idest fide, spe +et caritate, ut supra dictum est, mittitur in aquam ad aspergendum, +quia in fide Dei et hominis baptizamur. Lavat autem homo, per aquam +Baptismi vel lacrymarum, vestimenta sua, idest opera, et omnes +pilos, idest cogitationes. Tingitur autem extremum auriculae +dextrae eius qui mundatur, de sanguine et de oleo, ut eius auditum +muniat contra corrumpentia verba, pollices autem manus dextrae et +pedis tinguntur, ut sit eius actio sancta. Alia vero quae ad hanc +purificationem pertinent, vel etiam aliarum immunditiarum, non +habent aliquid speciale praeter alia sacrificia pro peccatis vel +pro delictis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p39"><b>Reply to Objections 8&9</b> Just as the people were initiated by circumcision to the divine worship, so were the ministers by some + special purification or consecration: wherefore they are commanded to be separated from other men, as being specially deputed, + rather than others, to the ministry of the divine worship. And all that was done touching them in their consecration or institution, + was with a view to show that they were in possession of a prerogative of purity, power and dignity. + Hence three things were done in the institution of ministers: for first, they were purified; secondly, they were adorned [*'Ornabantur.' + Some editions have 'ordinabantur'---'were ordained': the former reading is a reference to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p39.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.8.7" target="asv"> Lev. 8:7-9</a>] and consecrated; thirdly, they were employed in the ministry. All in general used to be purified by washing in water, and + by certain sacrifices; but the Levites in particular shaved all the hair of their bodies, as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p39.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.8" target="asv">Lev. 8</a> (cf. + + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p39.3" href="./asv.html#Num.8" target="asv">Num. 8</a>). + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p40"> With regard to the high-priests and priests the consecration was performed as follows. First, when they had been washed, + they were clothed with certain special garments in designation of their dignity. In particular, the high-priest was anointed + on the head with the oil of unction: to denote that the power of consecration was poured forth by him on to others, just as + oil flows from the head on to the lower parts of the body; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p40.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.132.2" target="asv"> Ps. 132:2</a>: "Like the + precious ointment on the head that ran down upon the beard, the beard of Aaron." But the Levites received no other consecration + besides being offered to the Lord by the children of Israel through the hands of the high-priest, who prayed for them. The + lesser priests were consecrated on the hands only, which were to be employed in the sacrifices. The tip of their right ear + and the thumb of their right hand, and the great toe of their right foot were tinged with the blood of the sacrificial + animal, to denote that they should be obedient to God's law in offering the sacrifices (this is denoted by touching their + right ear); and that they should be careful and ready in performing the sacrifices (this is signified by the moistening of + the right foot and hand). They themselves and their garments were sprinkled with the blood of the animal that had been sacrificed, + in memory of the blood of the lamb by which they had been delivered in Egypt. At their consecration the following + sacrifices were offered: a calf, for sin, in memory of Aaron's sin in fashioning the molten calf; a ram, for a holocaust, + in memory of the sacrifice of Abraham, whose obedience it behooved the high-priest to imitate; again, a ram of consecration, + which was a peace-offering, in memory of the delivery form Egypt through the blood of the lamb; and a basket of bread, in + memory of the manna vouchsafed to the people. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p41"> In reference to their being destined to the ministry, the fat of the ram, one roll of bread, and the right shoulder were + placed on their hands, to show that they received the power of offering these things to the Lord: while the Levites were initiated + to the ministry by being brought into the tabernacle of the covenant, as being destined to the ministry touching the vessels + of the sanctuary. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p42"> The figurative reason of these things was that those who are to be consecrated to the spiritual ministry of Christ, should + be first of all purified by the waters of Baptism, and by the waters of tears, in their faith in Christ's Passion, which is + a sacrifice both of expiation and of purification. They have also to shave all the hair of their body, i.e. all evil thoughts. + They should, moreover, be decked with virtues, and be consecrated with the oil of the Holy Ghost, and with + the sprinkling of Christ's blood. And thus they should be intent on the fulfilment of their spiritual ministry. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 ad 8"><a name="38080" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38080] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 ad 8</span></a> Ad octavum +et nonum dicendum quod, sicut populus instituebatur ad cultum Dei +per circumcisionem, ita ministri per aliquam specialem +purificationem vel consecrationem, unde et separari ab aliis +praecipiuntur, quasi specialiter ad ministerium cultus divini prae +aliis deputati. Et totum quod circa eos fiebat in eorum +consecratione vel institutione ad hoc pertinebat ut ostenderetur +eos habere quandam praerogativam puritatis et virtutis et +dignitatis. Et ideo in institutione ministrorum tria fiebant, primo +enim, purificabantur; secundo, ornabantur et consecrabantur; +tertio, applicabantur ad usum ministerii. Purificabantur quidem +communiter omnes per ablutionem aquae, et per quaedam sacrificia; +specialiter autem Levitae radebant omnes pilos carnis suae; ut +habetur Lev. VIII. Consecratio vero circa pontifices et sacerdotes +hoc ordine fiebat. Primo enim, postquam abluti erant, induebantur +quibusdam vestimentis specialibus pertinentibus ad designandum +dignitatem ipsorum. Specialiter autem pontifex oleo unctionis in +capite ungebatur, ut designaretur quod ab ipso diffundebatur +potestas consecrandi ad alios, sicut oleum a capite derivatur ad +inferiora; ut habetur in Psalmo CXXXII, <i>sicut unguentum in +capite, quod descendit in barbam, barbam Aaron</i>. Levitae vero +non habebant aliam consecrationem, nisi quod offerebantur domino a +filiis Israel per manus pontificis, qui orabat pro eis. Minorum +vero sacerdotum solae manus consecrabantur, quae erant applicandae +ad sacrificia. Et de sanguine animalis immolatitii tingebatur +extremum auriculae dextrae ipsorum, et pollices pedis ac manus +dextrae, ut scilicet essent obedientes legi Dei in oblatione +sacrificiorum, quod significatur in intinctione auris dextrae; et +quod essent solliciti et prompti in executione sacrificiorum, quod +significatur in intinctione pedis et manus dextrae. Aspergebantur +etiam ipsi, et vestimenta eorum, sanguine animalis immolati, in +memoriam sanguinis agni per quem fuerunt liberati in Aegypto. +Offerebantur autem in eorum consecratione huiusmodi sacrificia, +vitulus pro peccato, in memoriam remissionis peccati Aaron circa +conflationem vituli; aries in holocaustum, in memoriam oblationis +Abrahae, cuius obedientiam pontifex imitari debebat; aries etiam +consecrationis, qui erat quasi hostia pacifica, in memoriam +liberationis de Aegypto per sanguinem agni; canistrum panum, in +memoriam mannae praestiti populo. Pertinebat autem ad applicationem +ministerii quod imponebantur super manus eorum adeps arietis, et +torta panis unius, et armus dexter, ut ostenderetur quod +accipiebant potestatem huiusmodi offerendi domino. Levitae vero +applicabantur ad ministerium per hoc quod intromittebantur in +tabernaculum foederis, quasi ad ministrandum circa vasa sanctuarii. +Figuralis vero horum ratio erat quia illi qui sunt consecrandi ad +spirituale ministerium Christi, debent primo purificari per aquam +Baptismi et lacrymarum in fide passionis Christi, quod est +expiativum et purgativum sacrificium. Et debent radere omnes pilos +carnis, idest omnes pravas cogitationes. Debent etiam ornari +virtutibus; et consecrari oleo spiritus sancti; et aspersione +sanguinis Christi. Et sic debent esse intenti ad exequenda +spiritualia ministeria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p43"> + <b>Reply to Objection 10:</b> As already stated + <a href="#FS_Q102_A4" id="FS_Q102_A5-p43.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, the purpose of the Law was to induce men to have reverence for the divine worship: and this in two ways; first, by excluding + from the worship of God whatever might be an object of contempt; secondly, by introducing into the divine worship all that + seemed to savor of reverence. And, indeed, if this was observed in regard to the tabernacle and its vessels, and in the animals + to be sacrificed, much + more was it to be observed in the very ministers. Wherefore, in order to obviate contempt for the ministers, it was prescribed + that they should have no bodily stain or defect: since men so deformed are wont to be despised by others. For the same reason + it was also commanded that the choice of those who were to be destined to the service of God was not to be made in a broadcast + manner from any family, but according to their descent from one particular stock, thus giving them distinction and + nobility. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p44"> In order that they might be revered, special ornate vestments were appointed for their use, and a special form of consecration. + This indeed is the general reason of ornate garments. But the high-priest in particular had eight vestments. First, he had + a linen tunic. Secondly, he had a purple tunic; round the bottom of which were placed "little bells" and "pomegranates of + violet, and purple, and scarlet twice dyed." Thirdly, he had the ephod, which covered his shoulders and his + breast down to the girdle; and it was made of gold, and violet and purple, and scarlet twice dyed and twisted linen: and on + his shoulders he bore two onyx stones, on which were graven the names of the children of Israel. Fourthly, he had the rational, + made of the same material; it was square in shape, and was worn on the breast, and was fastened to the ephod. On this rational + there were twelve precious stones set in four rows, on which also were graven the names of the children of Israel, in + token that the priest bore the burden of the whole people, since he bore their names on his shoulders; and that it was his + duty ever to think of their welfare, since he wore them on his breast, bearing them in his heart, so to speak. And the Lord + commanded the "Doctrine and Truth" to be put in the rational: for certain matters regarding moral and dogmatic truth were + written on it. The Jews indeed pretend that on the rational was placed a stone which changed color according to the various + things + which were about to happen to the children of Israel: and this they call the "Truth and Doctrine." Fifthly, he wore a belt + or girdle made of the four colors mentioned above. Sixthly, there was the tiara or mitre which was made of linen. Seventhly, + there was the golden plate which hung over his forehead; on it was inscribed the Lord's name. Eighthly, there were "the linen + breeches to cover the flesh of their nakedness," when they went up to the sanctuary or altar. Of these eight vestments the + lesser priests had four, viz. the linen tunic and breeches, the belt and the tiara. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p45"> According to some, the literal reason for these vestments was that they denoted the disposition of the terrestrial globe; + as though the high-priest confessed himself to be the minister of the Creator of the world, wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p45.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.18.24" target="asv">Wis. 18:24</a>): "In the robe" of Aaron "was the whole world" described. For the linen breeches signified the earth out of which the flax + grows. The surrounding belt signified the ocean which surrounds the earth. The violet + tunic denoted the air by its color: its little bells betoken the thunder; the pomegranates, the lightning. The ephod, by its + many colors, signified the starry heaven; the two onyx stones denoted the two hemispheres, or the sun and moon. The twelve + precious stones on the breast are the twelve signs of the zodiac: and they are said to have been placed on the rational because + in heaven, are the types [rationes] of earthly things, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p45.2" href="./asv.html#Job.38.33" target="asv"> Job 38:33</a>: "Dost thou know the + order of heaven, and canst thou set down the reason [rationem] thereof on the earth?" The turban or tiara signified the empyrean: + the golden plate was a token of God, the governor of the universe. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p46"> The figurative reason is evident. Because bodily stains or defects wherefrom the priests had to be immune, signify the various + vices and sins from which they should be free. Thus it is forbidden that he should be blind, i.e. he ought not to be ignorant: + he must not be lame, i.e. vacillating and uncertain of purpose: that he must have "a little, or a great, or a crooked nose," + i.e. that he should not, from lack of discretion, exceed in one direction or in another, or even + exercise some base occupation: for the nose signifies discretion, because it discerns odors. It is forbidden that he should + have "a broken foot" or "hand," i.e. he should not lose the power of doing good works or of advancing in virtue. He is rejected, + too, if he have a swelling either in front or behind [Vulg.: 'if he be crook-backed']: by which is signified too much love + of earthly things: if he be blear-eyed, i.e. if his mind is darkened by carnal affections: for running of the eyes is + caused by a flow of matter. He is also rejected if he had "a pearl in his eye," i.e. if he presumes in his own estimation + that he is clothed in the white robe of righteousness. Again, he is rejected "if he have a continued scab," i.e. lustfulness + of the flesh: also, if he have "a dry scurf," which covers the body without giving pain, and is a blemish on the comeliness + of the members; which denotes avarice. Lastly, he is rejected "if he have a rupture" or hernia; through baseness rending his + heart, though it appear not in his deeds. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p47"> The vestments denote the virtues of God's ministers. Now there are four things that are necessary to all His ministers, viz. + chastity denoted by the breeches; a pure life, signified by the linen tunic; the moderation of discretion, betokened by the + girdle; and rectitude of purpose, denoted by the mitre covering the head. But the high-priests needed four other things in + addition to these. First, a continual recollection of God in their thoughts; and this was signified by the + golden plate worn over the forehead, with the name of God engraved thereon. Secondly, they had to bear with the shortcomings + of the people: this was denoted by the ephod which they bore on their shoulders. Thirdly, they had to carry the people in + their mind and heart by the solicitude of charity, in token of which they wore the rational. Fourthly, they had to lead a + godly life by performing works of perfection; and this was signified by the violet tunic. Hence little golden bells were fixed + to + the bottom of the violet tunic, which bells signified the teaching of divine things united in the high-priest to his godly + mode of life. In addition to these were the pomegranates, signifying unity of faith and concord in good morals: because his + doctrine should hold together in such a way that it should not rend asunder the unity of faith and peace. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 ad 10"><a name="38081" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38081] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 ad 10</span></a> Ad decimum +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, intentio legis erat inducere +ad reverentiam divini cultus. Et hoc dupliciter, uno modo, +excludendo a cultu divino omne id quod poterat esse contemptibile; +alio modo, apponendo ad cultum divinum omne illud quod videbatur ad +honorificentiam pertinere. Et si hoc quidem observabatur in +tabernaculo et vasis eius, et animalibus immolandis, multo magis +hoc observandum erat in ipsis ministris. Et ideo ad removendum +contemptum ministrorum, praeceptum fuit ut non haberent maculam vel +defectum corporalem, quia huiusmodi homines solent apud alios in +contemptu haberi. Propter quod etiam institutum fuit ut non sparsim +ex quolibet genere ad Dei ministerium applicarentur, sed ex certa +prosapia secundum generis successionem, ut ex hoc clariores et +nobiliores haberentur. Ad hoc autem quod in reverentia haberentur, +adhibebatur eis specialis ornatus vestium, et specialis +consecratio. Et haec est in communi causa ornatus vestium. In +speciali autem sciendum est quod pontifex habebat octo ornamenta. +Primo enim, habebat vestem lineam. Secundo, habebat tunicam +hyacinthinam; in cuius extremitate versus pedes, ponebantur per +circuitum tintinabula quaedam, et mala Punica facta ex hyacintho et +purpura coccoque bis tincto. Tertio, habebat superhumerale, quod +tegebat humeros et anteriorem partem usque ad cingulum; quod erat +ex auro et hyacintho et purpura, coccoque bis tincto, et bysso +retorta. Et super humeros habebat duos onychinos, in quibus erant +sculpta nomina filiorum Israel. Quartum erat rationale, ex eadem +materia factum; quod erat quadratum, et ponebatur in pectore, et +coniungebatur superhumerali. Et in hoc rationali erant duodecim +lapides pretiosi distincti per quatuor ordines, in quibus etiam +sculpta erant nomina filiorum Israel, quasi ad designandum quod +ferret onus totius populi, per hoc quod habebat nomina eorum in +humeris; et quod iugiter debebat de eorum salute cogitare, per hoc +quod portabat eos in pectore, quasi in corde habens. In quo etiam +rationali mandavit dominus poni doctrinam et veritatem, quia +quaedam pertinentia ad veritatem iustitiae et doctrinae, +scribebantur in illo rationali. Iudaei tamen fabulantur quod in +rationali erat lapis qui secundum diversos colores mutabatur, +secundum diversa quae debebant accidere filiis Israel, et hoc +vocant veritatem et doctrinam. Quintum erat balteus, idest cingulus +quidam, factus ex praedictis quatuor coloribus. Sextum erat tiara, +idest mitra quaedam, de bysso. Septimum autem erat lamina aurea, +pendens in fronte eius, in qua erat nomen domini. Octavum autem +erant femoralia linea, ut operirent carnem turpitudinis suae, +quando accederent ad sanctuarium vel ad altare. Ex istis autem octo +ornamentis minores sacerdotes habebant quatuor, scilicet tunicam +lineam, femoralia, balteum et tiaram. Horum autem ornamentorum +quidam rationem litteralem assignant, dicentes quod in istis +ornamentis designatur dispositio orbis terrarum, quasi pontifex +protestaretur se esse ministrum creatoris mundi, unde etiam Sap. +XVIII dicitur quod in veste Aaron erat descriptus orbis terrarum. +Nam femoralia linea figurabant terram, ex qua linum nascitur. +Baltei circumvolutio significabat Oceanum, qui circumcingit terram. +Tunica hyacinthina suo colore significabat aerem, per cuius +tintinabula significabantur tonitrua; per mala granata, +coruscationes. Superhumerale vero significabat sua varietate caelum +sidereum, duo onychini, duo hemisphaeria, vel solem et lunam. +Duodecim gemmae in pectore, duodecim signa in zodiaco, quae +dicebantur posita in rationali, quia in caelestibus sunt rationes +terrenorum, secundum illud Iob XXXVIII, <i>numquid nosti ordinem +caeli, et ponis rationem eius in terra?</i> Cidaris autem, vel +tiara, significabat caelum Empyreum. Lamina aurea, Deum omnibus +praesidentem. Figuralis vero ratio manifesta est. Nam maculae vel +defectus corporales a quibus debebant sacerdotes esse immunes, +significant diversa vitia et peccata quibus debent carere. +Prohibetur enim esse caecus, idest, ne sit ignorans. Ne sit +claudus, idest instabilis, et ad diversa se inclinans. Ne sit +parvo, vel grandi, vel torto naso, idest ne per defectum +discretionis, vel in plus vel in minus excedat, aut etiam aliqua +prava exerceat; per nasum enim discretio designatur, quia est +discretivus odoris. Ne sit fracto pede vel manus, idest ne amittat +virtutem bene operandi, vel procedendi in virtutem. Repudiatur +etiam si habeat gibbum vel ante vel retro, per quem significatur +superfluus amor terrenorum. Si est lippus, idest per carnalem +affectum eius ingenium obscuratur, contingit enim lippitudo ex +fluxu humoris. Repudiatur etiam si habeat albuginem in oculo, idest +praesumptionem candoris iustitiae in sua cogitatione. Repudiatur +etiam si habuerit iugem scabiem, idest petulantiam carnis. Et si +habuerit impetiginem, quae sine dolore corpus occupat, et membrorum +decorem foedat, per quam avaritia designatur. Et etiam si sit +herniosus vel ponderosus, qui scilicet gestat pondus turpitudinis +in corde, licet non exerceat in opere. Per ornamenta vero +designantur virtutes ministrorum Dei. Sunt autem quatuor quae sunt +necessariae omnibus ministris, scilicet castitas, quae significatur +per femoralia; puritas vero vitae, quae significatur per lineam +tunicam; moderatio discretionis quae significatur per cingulum; +rectitudo intentionis, quae significatur per tiaram protegentem +caput. Sed prae his pontifices debent quatuor habere. Primo quidem, +iugem Dei memoriam in contemplatione, et hoc significat lamina +aurea habens nomen Dei, in fronte. Secundo, quod supportent +infirmitates populi, quod significat superhumerale. Tertio, quod +habeant populum in corde et in visceribus per sollicitudinem +caritatis, quod significatur per rationale. Quarto, quod habeant +conversationem caelestem per opera perfectionis, quod significatur +per tunicam hyacinthinam. Unde et tunicae hyacinthinae adiunguntur +in extremitate tintinabula aurea, per quae significatur doctrina +divinorum, quae debet coniungi caelesti conversationi pontificis. +Adiunguntur autem mala Punica, per quae significatur unitas fidei +et concordia in bonis moribus, quia sic coniuncta debet esse eius +doctrina, ut per eam fidei et pacis unitas non rumpatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q102_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q102_A6-p0.1">Q. 102. A. 6. Whether there was any reasonable cause for the ceremonial observances?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there was no reasonable cause for the ceremonial observances. Because, as the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.4.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 4:4</a>), "every creature of God is good, and nothing to be rejected that is received with thanksgiving." It was therefore unfitting + that they should be forbidden to eat certain foods, as being unclean according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.11" target="asv">Lev. 11</a> [*Cf. + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.14" target="asv">Dt. 14</a>]. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="38082" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38082] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod observantiarum caeremonialium nulla +fuerit rationabilis causa. Quia ut apostolus dicit, I ad Tim. IV, +<i>omnis creatura Dei est bona, et nihil reiiciendum quod cum +gratiarum actione percipitur</i>. Inconvenienter igitur prohibiti +sunt ab esu quorundam ciborum tanquam immundorum, ut patet Lev. +XI.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as animals are given to man for food, so also are herbs: wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.9.3" target="asv">Gn. 9:3</a>): "As the green herbs have I delivered all" flesh "to you." But the Law did not distinguish any herbs from the rest as being + unclean, although some are most harmful, for instance, those that are poisonous. Therefore it seems that neither should any + animals have been prohibited as being unclean. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="38083" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38083] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut animalia dantur in cibum hominis, ita etiam et herbae, unde +dicitur Gen. IX, <i>quasi olera virentia dedi vobis omnem +carnem</i>. Sed in herbis lex non distinxit aliquas immundas, cum +tamen aliquae illarum sint maxime nocivae, ut puta venenosae. Ergo +videtur quod nec de animalibus aliqua debuerint prohiberi tanquam +immunda.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the matter from which a thing is generated be unclean, it seems that likewise the thing generated therefrom is + unclean. But flesh is generated from blood. Since therefore all flesh was not prohibited as unclean, it seems that in like + manner neither should blood have been forbidden as unclean; nor the fat which is engendered from blood. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="38084" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38084] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +si materia est immunda ex qua aliquid generatur, pari ratione +videtur quod id quod generatur ex ea, sit immundum. Sed ex sanguine +generatur caro. Cum igitur non omnes carnes prohiberentur tanquam +immundae, pari ratione nec sanguis debuit prohiberi quasi immundus; +aut adeps, qui ex sanguine generatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A6-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.10.28" target="asv">Mat. 10:28</a>; cf. + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.4" target="asv"> Lk. 12:4</a>), that those should not be feared "that kill the body," since after death they "have no more that they can do": which would + not be true if after death harm might come to man through anything done with his body. Much less therefore does it matter + to an animal already dead how its flesh be cooked. Consequently there seems to be no reason in what is said, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p5.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.23.19" target="asv">Ex. 23:19</a>: "Thou + shalt not boil a kid in the milk of its dam." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 arg. 4"><a name="38085" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38085] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +dominus dicit, Matth. X, eos non esse timendos qui occidunt corpus, +quia post mortem non habent quid faciant, quod non esset verum, si +in nocumentum homini cederet quid ex eo fieret. Multo igitur minus +pertinet ad animal iam occisum qualiter eius carnes decoquantur. +Irrationabile igitur videtur esse quod dicitur Exod. XXIII, <i>non +coques haedum in lacte matris suae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A6-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, all that is first brought forth of man and beast, as being most perfect, is commanded to be offered to the Lord + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.13" target="asv">Ex. 13</a>). Therefore it is an unfitting command that is set forth in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.23" target="asv"> Lev. 19:23</a>: "when you shall be come into the land, and shall have planted in it fruit trees, you shall take away the uncircumcision + [*'Praeputia,' which Douay version renders 'first fruits'] of them," i.e. the first crops, and they "shall be unclean to + you, neither shall you eat of them." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 arg. 5"><a name="38086" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38086] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +ea quae sunt primitiva in hominibus et animalibus, tanquam +perfectiora, praecipiuntur domino offerri. Inconvenienter igitur +praecipitur Lev. XIX, <i>quando ingressi fueritis terram, et +plantaveritis in ea ligna pomifera, auferetis praeputia eorum</i>, +idest prima germina, et immunda erunt vobis, nec edetis ex eis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A6-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, clothing is something extraneous to man's body. Therefore certain kinds of garments should not have been forbidden + to the Jews: for instance ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.19" target="asv">Lev. 19:19</a>): "Thou shalt not wear a garment that is woven of two sorts": and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.22.5" target="asv">Dt. 22:5</a>): "A woman shall not be clothed with man's apparel, neither shall a man use woman's apparel": and further on ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.22.11" target="asv">Dt. 22:11</a>): "Thou shalt not wear a garment that is + woven of woolen and linen together." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 arg. 6"><a name="38087" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38087] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, +vestimentum extra corpus hominis est. Non igitur debuerunt quaedam +specialia vestimenta Iudaeis interdici, puta quod dicitur Lev. XIX, +<i>vestem quae ex duobus texta est, non indueris</i>; et Deut. +XXII, <i>non induetur mulier veste virili, et vir non induetur +veste feminea</i>; et infra, <i>non indueris vestimento quod ex +lana linoque contextum est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A6-p8"> + <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, to be mindful of God's commandments concerns not the body but the heart. Therefore it is unsuitably prescribed ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.8" target="asv">Dt. 6:8, </a> seqq.) that they should "bind" the commandments of God "as a sign" on their hands; and that they should "write them in the + entry"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Num.15.38" target="asv">Num. 15:38</a>, seqq.) that they should "make to themselves fringes in the corners of their garments, putting in them ribands of blue . + . . they may remember . . . the commandments + of the Lord." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 arg. 7"><a name="38088" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38088] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 arg. 7</span></a> Praeterea, +memoria mandatorum Dei non pertinet ad corpus, sed ad cor. +Inconvenienter igitur praecipitur Deut. VI, quod <i>ligarent +praecepta Dei quasi signum in manu sua, et quod scriberentur in +limine ostiorum; et quod per angulos palliorum facerent fimbrias, +in quibus ponerent vittas hyacinthinas, in memoriam mandatorum +Dei</i>, ut habetur Num. XV.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A6-p9"> + <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:9</a>) that God does not "take care for oxen," and, therefore, neither of other irrational animals. Therefore without reason is + it commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.22.6" target="asv">Dt. 22:6</a>): "If thou find, as thou walkest by the way, a bird's nest in a tree . . . thou shalt not take the dam with her young"; and + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p9.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.4" target="asv">Dt. 25:4</a>): "Thou shalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out thy corn"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p9.4" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.19" target="asv">Lev. + 19:19 + </a>): "Thou shalt not make thy cattle to gender with beasts of any other kind." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 arg. 8"><a name="38089" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38089] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 arg. 8</span></a> Praeterea, +apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. IX, quod non est cura Deo de bobus, et +per consequens neque de aliis animalibus irrationalibus. +Inconvenienter igitur praecipitur Deut. XXII, <i>si ambulaveris per +viam, et inveneris nidum avis, non tenebis matrem cum filiis</i>; +et Deut. XXV, <i>non alligabis os bovis triturantis</i>; et Lev. +XIX, <i>iumenta tua non facies coire cum alterius generis +animantibus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A6-p10"> + <b>Objection 9:</b> Further, no distinction was made between clean and unclean plants. Much less therefore should any distinction have been made + about the cultivation of plants. Therefore it was unfittingly prescribed ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.19" target="asv">Lev. 19:19</a>): "Thou shalt not sow thy field with different seeds"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.22.9" target="asv">Dt. 22:9</a>, seqq.): "Thou shalt sow thy vineyard with divers seeds"; and: "Thou shalt not plough with an ox and an ass together." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 arg. 9"><a name="38090" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38090] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 arg. 9</span></a> Praeterea, +inter plantas non fiebat discretio mundorum ab immundis. Ergo multo +minus circa culturam plantarum debuit aliqua discretio adhiberi. +Ergo inconvenienter praecipitur Lev. XIX, <i>agrum non seres +diverso semine</i>; et Deut. XXII, <i>non seres vineam tuam altero +semine; et, non arabis in bove simul et asino</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A6-p11"> + <b>Objection 10:</b> Further, it is apparent that inanimate things are most of all subject to the power of man. Therefore it was unfitting to + debar man from taking silver and gold of which idols were made, or anything they found in the houses of idols, as expressed + in the commandment of the Law ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.7.25" target="asv">Dt. 7:25, </a> seqq.). It also seems an absurd commandment set forth in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p11.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.13" target="asv">Dt. 23:13</a>, that they should "dig round about and . . . cover with earth that which they were eased + of." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 arg. 10"><a name="38091" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38091] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 arg. 10</span></a> +Praeterea, ea quae sunt inanimata, maxime videmus hominum potestati +esse subiecta. Inconvenienter igitur arcetur homo ab argento et +auro ex quibus fabricata sunt idola, et ab aliis quae in idolorum +domibus inveniuntur, praecepto legis quod habetur Deut. VII. +Ridiculum etiam videtur esse praeceptum quod habetur Deut. XXIII, +ut <i>egestiones humo operirent, fodientes in terra</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A6-p12"> + <b>Objection 11:</b> Further, piety is required especially in priests. But it seems to be an act of piety to assist at the burial of one's friends: + wherefore Tobias is commended for so doing ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Tob.1.20" target="asv">Tob. 1:20, </a> seqq.). In like manner it is sometimes an act of piety to marry a loose woman, because she is thereby delivered from sin + and infamy. Therefore it seems inconsistent for these things to be forbidden to priests ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.21" target="asv">Lev. 21</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 arg. 11"><a name="38092" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38092] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 arg. 11</span></a> +Praeterea, pietas maxime in sacerdotibus requiritur. Sed ad +pietatem pertinere videtur quod aliquis funeribus amicorum +intersit, unde etiam de hac Tobias laudatur, ut habetur Tob. I. +Similiter etiam quandoque ad pietatem pertinet quod aliquis in +uxorem accipiat meretricem, quia per hoc eam a peccato et infamia +liberat. Ergo videtur quod haec inconvenienter prohibeantur +sacerdotibus, Lev. XXI.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A6-p13"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.18.14" target="asv">Dt. 18:14</a>): "But thou art otherwise instructed by the Lord thy God": from which words we may gather that these observances were instituted + by God to be a special prerogative of that people. Therefore they are not without reason or cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 s. c."><a name="38093" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38093] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Deut. XVIII, <i>tu autem a domino Deo tuo aliter +institutus es</i>, ex quo potest accipi quod huiusmodi observantiae +sunt institutae a Deo ad quandam specialem illius populi +praerogativam. Non ergo sunt irrationabiles, aut sine causa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A6-p14"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The Jewish people, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q102_A5" id="FS_Q102_A6-p14.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>, were specially chosen for the worship of God, and among them the priests themselves were specially set apart for that purpose. + And just as other things that are applied to the divine worship, need to be marked in some particular way so that they be + worthy of the worship of God; so too in that people's, and especially the priests', mode of life, there needed to be certain + special things + befitting the divine worship, whether spiritual or corporal. Now the worship prescribed by the Law foreshadowed the mystery + of Christ: so that whatever they did was a figure of things pertaining to Christ, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p14.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.10.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 10:11</a>: "All these things happened to them in figures." Consequently the reasons for these observances may be taken in two ways, + first according to their fittingness to the worship of God; secondly, according as they foreshadow something touching the + Christian mode of life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 co."><a name="38094" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38094] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod populus Iudaeorum, ut supra dictum est, specialiter +erat deputatus ad cultum divinum; et inter eos, specialiter +sacerdotes. Et sicut aliae res quae applicantur ad cultum divinum, +aliquam specialitatem debent habere, quod pertinet ad +honorificentiam divini cultus; ita etiam et in conversatione illius +populi, et praecipue sacerdotum, debuerunt esse aliqua specialia +congruentia ad cultum divinum, vel spiritualem vel corporalem. +Cultus autem legis figurabat mysterium Christi, unde omnia eorum +gesta figurabant ea quae ad Christum pertinent; secundum illud I +Cor. X, <i>omnia in figuram contingebant illis</i>. Et ideo +rationes harum observantiarum dupliciter assignari possunt, uno +modo, secundum congruentiam ad divinum cultum; alio modo, secundum +quod figurant aliquid circa Christianorum vitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A6-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (A[5], ad 4,5), the Law distinguished a twofold pollution or uncleanness; one, that of sin, whereby the soul + was defiled; and another consisting in some kind of corruption, whereby the body was in some way infected. Speaking then of + the first-mentioned uncleanness, no kind of food is unclean, or can defile a man, by reason of its nature; wherefore we read + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.11" target="asv">Mat. 15:11</a>): "Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a + man; but what cometh out of the mouth, this defileth a man": which words are explained ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p15.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.17" target="asv">Mat. 15:17</a>) as referring to sins. Yet certain foods can defile the soul accidentally; in so far as man partakes of them against obedience + or a vow, or from excessive concupiscence; or through their being an incentive to lust, for which reason some refrain from + wine and flesh-meat. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A6-p16"> If, however, we speak of bodily uncleanness, consisting in some kind of corruption, the flesh of certain animals is unclean, + either because like the pig they feed on unclean things; or because their life is among unclean surroundings: thus certain + animals, like moles and mice and such like, live underground, whence they contract a certain unpleasant smell; or because + their flesh, through being too moist or too dry, engenders corrupt humors in the human body. Hence they were + forbidden to eat the flesh of flat-footed animals, i.e. animals having an uncloven hoof, on account of their earthiness; and + in like manner they were forbidden to eat the flesh of animals that have many clefts in their feet, because such are very + fierce and their flesh is very dry, such as the flesh of lions and the like. For the same reason they were forbidden to eat + certain birds of prey the flesh of which is very dry, and certain water-fowl on account of their exceeding humidity. In like + manner certain fish lacking fins and scales were prohibited on account of their excessive moisture; such as eels and the like. + They were, however, allowed to eat ruminants and animals with a divided hoof, because in such animals the humors are well + absorbed, and their nature well balanced: for neither are they too moist, as is indicated by the hoof; nor are they too earthly, + which is shown by their having not a flat but a cloven hoof. Of fishes they were allowed to partake of the drier kinds, + of which the fins and scales are an indication, because thereby the moist nature of the fish is tempered. Of birds they were + allowed to eat the tamer kinds, such as hens, partridges, and the like. Another reason was detestation of idolatry: because + the Gentiles, and especially the Egyptians, among whom they had grown up, offered up these forbidden animals to their idols, + or employed them for the purpose of sorcery: whereas they did not eat those animals which the Jews were allowed to eat, but + worshipped them as gods, or abstained, for some other motive, from eating them, as stated above (A[3], ad 2). The third reason + was to prevent excessive care about food: wherefore they were allowed to eat those animals which could be procured easily + and promptly. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A6-p17"> With regard to blood and fat, they were forbidden to partake of those of any animals whatever without exception. Blood was + forbidden, both in order to avoid cruelty, that they might abhor the shedding of human blood, as stated above (A[3], ad 8); + and in order to shun idolatrous rite whereby it was customary for men to collect the blood and to gather together around it + for a banquet in honor of the idols, to whom they held the blood to be most acceptable. Hence the Lord commanded + the blood to be poured out and to be covered with earth ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p17.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.17.13" target="asv">Lev. 17:13</a>). For the same reason they were forbidden to eat animals that had been suffocated or strangled: because the blood of these + animals would not be separated from the body: or because this form of death is very painful to the victim; and the Lord wished + to withdraw them from cruelty even in regard to irrational animals, so as to be less inclined to be cruel to other men, through + being used to be kind to beasts. + They were forbidden to eat the fat: both because idolaters ate it in honor of their gods; and because it used to be burnt + in honor of God; and, again, because blood and fat are not nutritious, which is the cause assigned by Rabbi Moses (Doct. Perplex. + iii). The reason why they were forbidden to eat the sinews is given in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p17.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.32.32" target="asv"> Gn. 32:32, </a> where it is stated that "the children of Israel . . . eat not the sinew . . . because he touched the sinew of" Jacob's "thing + and it shrank." + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A6-p18"> The figurative reason for these things is that all these animals signified certain sins, in token of which those animals + were prohibited. Hence Augustine says (Contra Faustum iv, 7): "If the swine and lamb be called in question, both are clean + by nature, because all God's creatures are good: yet the lamb is clean, and the pig is unclean in a certain signification. + Thus if you speak of a foolish, and of a wise man, each of these expressions is clean considered in the nature of + the sound, letters and syllables of which it is composed: but in signification, the one is clean, the other unclean." The + animal that chews the cud and has a divided hoof, is clean in signification. Because division of the hoof is a figure of the + two Testaments: or of the Father and Son: or of the two natures in Christ: of the distinction of good and evil. While chewing + the cud signifies meditation on the Scriptures and a sound understanding thereof; and whoever lacks either of these is + spiritually unclean. In like manner those fish that have scales and fins are clean in signification. Because fins signify + the heavenly or contemplative life; while scales signify a life of trials, each of which is required for spiritual cleanness. + Of birds certain kinds were forbidden. In the eagle which flies at a great height, pride is forbidden: in the griffon which + is hostile to horses and men, cruelty of powerful men is prohibited. The osprey, which feeds on very small birds, signifies + those who oppress the poor. The kite, which is full of cunning, denotes those who are fraudulent in their dealings. The vulture, + which follows an army, expecting to feed on the carcases of the slain, signifies those who like others to die or to fight + among themselves that they may gain thereby. Birds of the raven kind signify those who are blackened by their lusts; or those + who lack kindly feelings, for the raven did not return when once it had been let loose from the ark. The ostrich which, + though a bird, cannot fly, and is always on the ground, signifies those who fight God's cause, and at the same time are taken + up with worldly business. The owl, which sees clearly at night, but cannot see in the daytime, denotes those who are clever + in temporal affairs, but dull in spiritual matters. The gull, which flies both in the air and swims in the water, signifies + those who are partial both to Circumcision and to Baptism: or else it denotes those who would fly by contemplation, yet dwell + in the waters of sensual delights. The hawk, which helps men to seize the prey, is a figure of those who assist the strong + to prey on the poor. The screech-owl, which seeks its food by night but hides by day, signifies the lustful man who seeks + to lie hidden in his deeds of darkness. The cormorant, so constituted that it can stay a long time under water, denotes the + glutton who plunges into the waters of pleasure. The ibis is an African bird with a long beak, and feeds on snakes; and perhaps + it + is the same as the stork: it signifies the envious man, who refreshes himself with the ills of others, as with snakes. The + swan is bright in color, and by the aid of its long neck extracts its food from deep places on land or water: it may denote + those who seek earthly profit though an external brightness of virtue. The bittern is a bird of the East: it has a long beak, + and its jaws are furnished with follicules, wherein it stores its food at first, after a time proceeding to digest it: it + is a + figure of the miser, who is excessively careful in hoarding up the necessaries of life. The coot [*Douay: 'porphyrion.' St. + Thomas' description tallies with the coot or moorhen: though of course he is mistaken about the feet differing from one another.] + has this peculiarity apart from other birds, that it has a webbed foot for swimming, and a cloven foot for walking: for it + swims like a duck in the water, and walks like a partridge on land: it drinks only when it bites, since it dips all its + food in water: it is a figure of a man who will not take advice, and does nothing but what is soaked in the water of his own + will. The heron [*Vulg.: 'herodionem'], commonly called a falcon, signifies those whose "feet are swift to shed blood" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p18.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.13.3" target="asv">Ps. 13:3</a>). The plover [*Here, again, the Douay translators transcribed from the Vulgate: 'charadrion'; 'charadrius' is the generic + name for all plovers.], which is a garrulous bird, signifies the gossip. The hoopoe, which builds its + nest on dung, feeds on foetid ordure, and whose song is like a groan, denotes worldly grief which works death in those who + are unclean. The bat, which flies near the ground, signifies those who being gifted with worldly knowledge, seek none but + earthly things. Of fowls and quadrupeds those alone were permitted which have the hind-legs longer than the forelegs, so that + they can leap: whereas those were forbidden which cling rather to the earth: because those who abuse the doctrine of the four + Evangelists, so that they are not lifted up thereby, are reputed unclean. By the prohibition of blood, fat and nerves, we + are to understand the forbidding of cruelty, lust, and bravery in committing sin. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="38095" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38095] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, duplex pollutio, vel +immunditia, observabatur in lege, una quidem culpae, per quam +polluebatur anima; alia autem corruptionis cuiusdam, per quam +quodammodo inquinatur corpus. Loquendo igitur de prima immunditia, +nulla genera ciborum immunda sunt, vel hominem inquinare possunt, +secundum suam naturam, unde dicitur Matth. XV, <i>non quod intrat +in os, coinquinat hominem; sed quae procedunt de ore, haec +coinquinant hominem</i>; et exponitur hoc de peccatis. Possunt +tamen aliqui cibi per accidens inquinare animam, inquantum scilicet +contra obedientiam vel votum, vel nimia concupiscentia comeduntur; +vel inquantum praebent fomentum luxuriae, propter quod aliqui a +vino et carnibus abstinent. Secundum autem corporalem immunditiam, +quae est corruptionis cuiusdam, aliquae animalium carnes +immunditiam habent, vel quia ex rebus immundis nutriuntur, sicut +porcus; aut immunde conversantur, sicut quaedam animalia sub terra +habitantia, sicut talpae et mures et alia huiusmodi, unde etiam +quendam fetorem contrahunt; vel quia eorum carnes, propter +superfluam umiditatem vel siccitatem, corruptos humores in +corporibus humanis generant. Et ideo prohibitae sunt eis carnes +animalium habentium soleas, idest ungulam unam non fissam, propter +eorum terrestreitatem. Et similiter sunt eis prohibitae carnes +animalium habentium multas fissuras in pedibus, quia sunt nimis +cholerica et adusta, sicut carnes leonis et huiusmodi. Et eadem +ratione prohibitae sunt eis aves quaedam rapaces, quae sunt nimiae +siccitatis; et quaedam aves aquaticae, propter excessum +humiditatis. Similiter etiam quidam pisces non habentes pinnulas et +squamas, ut anguillae et huiusmodi, propter excessum humiditatis. +Sunt autem eis concessa ad esum animalia ruminantia et findentia +ungulam, quia habent humores bene digestos, et sunt medie +complexionata, quia nec sunt nimis humida, quod significant +ungulae; neque sunt nimis terrestria, cum non habeant ungulam +continuam, sed fissam. In piscibus etiam concessi sunt eis pisces +sicciores, quod significatur per hoc quod habent squamas et +pinnulas, per hoc enim efficitur temperata complexio humida +piscium. In avibus etiam sunt eis concessae magis temperatae, sicut +gallinae, perdices, et aliae huiusmodi. Alia ratio fuit in +detestationem idololatriae. Nam gentiles, et praecipue Aegyptii, +inter quos erant nutriti, huiusmodi animalia prohibita idolis +immolabant, vel eis ad maleficia utebantur. Animalia vero quae +Iudaeis sunt concessa ad esum non comedebant, sed ea tanquam deos +colebant; vel propter aliam causam ab eis abstinebant, ut supra +dictum est. Tertia ratio est ad tollendam nimiam diligentiam circa +cibaria. Et ideo conceduntur illa animalia quae de facili et in +promptu haberi possunt. Generaliter tamen prohibitus est eis esus +sanguinis et adipis cuiuslibet animalis. Sanguinis quidem tum ad +vitandam crudelitatem, ut detestarentur humanum sanguinem +effundere, sicut supra dictum est. Tum etiam ad vitandum +idololatriae ritum, quia eorum consuetudo erat ut circa sanguinem +congregatum adunarentur ad comedendum in honorem idolorum, quibus +reputabant sanguinem acceptissimum esse. Et ideo dominus mandavit +quod sanguis effunderetur, et quod pulvere operiretur. Et propter +hoc etiam prohibitum est eis comedere animalia suffocata vel +strangulata, quia sanguis eorum non separaretur a carne. Vel quia +in tali morte animalia multum affliguntur; et dominus voluit eos a +crudelitate prohibere etiam circa animalia bruta, ut per hoc magis +recederent a crudelitate hominis, habentes exercitium pietatis +etiam circa bestias. Adipis etiam esus prohibitus est eis, tum quia +idololatrae comedebant illum in honorem deorum suorum. Tum etiam +quia cremabatur in honorem Dei. Tum etiam quia sanguis et adeps non +generant bonum nutrimentum, quod pro causa inducit Rabbi Moyses. +Causa autem prohibitionis esus nervorum exprimitur Gen. XXXII, ubi +dicitur quod <i>non comedunt filii Israel nervum, eo quod tetigerit +nervum femoris Iacob, et obstupuerit</i>. Figuralis autem ratio +horum est quia per omnia huiusmodi animalia prohibita designantur +aliqua peccata, in quorum figuram illa animalia prohibentur. Unde +dicit Augustinus, in libro contra Faustum, <i>si de porco et agno +requiratur, utrumque natura mundum est, quia omnis creatura Dei +bona est, quadam vero significatione, agnus mundus, porcus immundus +est. Tanquam, si stultum et sapientem diceres, utrumque hoc verbum +natura vocis et litterarum et syllabarum ex quibus constat, mundum +est, significatione autem unum est mundum, et aliud immundum</i>. +Animal enim quod ruminat et ungulam findit, mundum est +significatione. Quia fissio ungulae significat distinctionem duorum +testamentorum; vel patris et filii; vel duarum naturarum in +Christo; vel discretionem boni et mali. Ruminatio autem significat +meditationem Scripturarum, et sanum intellectum earum. Cuicumque +autem horum alterum deest, spiritualiter immundus est. Similiter +etiam in piscibus illi qui habent squamas et pinnulas, +significatione mundi sunt. Quia per pinnulas significatur vita +sublimis, vel contemplatio; per squamas autem significatur aspera +vita; quorum utrumque necessarium est ad munditiam spiritualem. In +avibus autem specialia quaedam genera prohibentur. In aquila enim, +quae alte volat, prohibetur superbia. In gryphe autem, qui equis et +hominibus infestus est, crudelitas potentum prohibetur. In +haliaeeto autem, qui pascitur minutis avibus, significantur illi +qui sunt pauperibus molesti. In milvo autem, qui maxime insidiis +utitur, designantur fraudulenti. In vulture autem, qui sequitur +exercitum expectans comedere cadavera mortuorum, significantur illi +qui mortes et seditiones hominum affectant ut inde lucrentur. Per +animalia corvini generis significantur illi qui sunt voluptatibus +denigrati, vel qui sunt expertes bonae affectionis, quia corvus, +semel emissus ab arca, non est reversus. Per struthionem, qui, cum +sit avis, volare non potest, sed semper est circa terram, +significantur Deo militantes et se negotiis saecularibus +implicantes. Nycticorax, quae in nocte acuti est visus, in die +autem non videt, significat eos qui in temporalibus sunt astuti, in +spiritualibus hebetes. Larus autem, qui et volat in aere et natat +in aqua, significat eos qui et circumcisionem et Baptismum +venerantur, vel significat eos qui per contemplationem volare +volunt, et tamen vivunt in aquis voluptatum. Accipiter vero, qui +deservit hominibus ad praedam, significat eos qui ministrant +potentibus ad depraedandum pauperes. Per bubonem, qui in nocte +pastum quaerit, de die autem latet, significantur luxuriosi, qui +occultari quaerunt in nocturnis operibus quae agunt. Mergulus +autem, cuius natura est ut sub undis diutius immoretur, significat +gulosos, qui aquis deliciarum se immergunt. Ibis vero avis est in +Africa habens longum rostrum, quae serpentibus pascitur, et forte +est idem quod ciconia, et significat invidos, qui de malis aliorum, +quasi de serpentibus, reficiuntur. Cygnus autem est coloris +candidi, et longo collo quod habet, ex profunditate terrae vel +aquae cibum trahit, et potest significare homines qui per +exteriorem iustitiae candorem lucra terrena quaerunt. Onocrotalus +autem avis est in partibus orientis, longo rostro, quae in faucibus +habet quosdam folliculos, in quibus primo cibum reponit, et post +horam in ventrem mittit, et significat avaros, qui immoderata +sollicitudine vitae necessaria congregant. Porphyrio autem, praeter +modum aliarum avium, habet unum pedem latum ad natandum, alium +fissum ad ambulandum, quia et in aqua natat ut anates, et in terra +ambulat ut perdices, solo morsu bibit, omnem cibum aqua tingens, et +significat eos qui nihil ad alterius arbitrium facere volunt, sed +solum quod fuerit tinctum aqua propriae voluntatis. Per Herodionem +qui vulgariter falco dicitur, significantur illi quorum pedes sunt +veloces ad effundendum sanguinem. Charadrius autem, quae est avis +garrula, significat loquaces. Upupa autem, quae nidificat in +stercoribus et fetenti pascitur fimo, et gemitum in cantu simulat, +significat tristitiam saeculi, quae in hominibus immundis mortem +operatur. Per vespertilionem autem, quae circa terram volitat, +significantur illi qui, saeculari scientia praediti, sola terrena +sapiunt. Circa volatilia autem et quadrupedia, illa sola +conceduntur eis quae posteriora crura habent longiora, ut salire +possint. Alia vero, quae terrae magis adhaerent, prohibentur, quia +illi qui abutuntur doctrina quatuor Evangelistarum, ut per eam in +altum non subleventur, immundi reputantur. In sanguine vero et +adipe et nervo, intelligitur prohiberi crudelitas, et voluptas, et +fortitudo ad peccandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A6-p19"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Men were wont to eat plants and other products of the soil even before the deluge: but the eating of flesh seems to have + been introduced after the deluge; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p19.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.9.3" target="asv">Gn. 9:3</a>): "Even as the green herbs have I delivered . . . all" flesh "to you." The reason for this was that the eating of the products + of the soil savors rather of a simple life; whereas the eating of flesh savors of delicate and over-careful living. For the + soil gives birth to the herb of its own accord; and such like products of the earth may be had in great quantities with very + little effort: whereas no small trouble is necessary either to rear or to catch an animal. Consequently God being wishful + to bring His people back to a more simple way of living, forbade them to eat many kinds of animals, but not those things that + are produced by the soil. Another reason may be that animals were offered to idols, while the products of the soil were + not. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A6-p20"> The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said (ad 1).</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="38096" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38096] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod esus plantarum et aliorum terrae nascentium adfuit +apud homines etiam ante diluvium, sed esus carnium videtur esse +post diluvium introductus; dicitur enim Gen. IX, <i>quasi olera +virentia dedi vobis omnem carnem</i>. Et hoc ideo, quia esus terrae +nascentium magis pertinet ad quandam simplicitatem vitae; esus +autem carnium ad quasdam delicias et curiositatem vivendi. Sponte +enim terra herbam germinat, vel cum modico studio huiusmodi terrae +nascentia in magna copia procurantur, oportet autem cum magno +studio animalia vel nutrire, vel etiam capere. Et ideo volens +dominus populum suum reducere ad simpliciorem victum, multa in +genere animalium eis prohibuit, non autem in genere terrae +nascentium. Vel etiam quia animalia immolabantur idolis, non autem +terrae nascentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A6-p21"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although the kid that is slain has no perception of the manner in which its flesh is cooked, yet it would seem to savor of + heartlessness if the dam's milk, which was intended for the nourishment of her offspring, were served up on the same dish. + It might also be said that the Gentiles in celebrating the feasts of their idols prepared the flesh of kids in this manner, + for the purpose of sacrifice or banquet: hence ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p21.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.23" target="asv">Ex. 23</a>) after the solemnities to be + celebrated under the Law had been foretold, it is added: "Thou shalt not boil a kid in the milk of its dam." The figurative + reason for this prohibition is this: the kid, signifying Christ, on account of "the likeness of sinful flesh" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p21.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.3" target="asv">Rom. 8:3</a>), was not to be seethed, i.e. slain, by the Jews, "in the milk of its dam," i.e. during His infancy. Or else it signifies + that the kid, i.e. the sinner, should not be boiled in the milk of its dam, i.e. should not be cajoled by flattery. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="38097" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38097] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +patet responsio ex dictis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A6-p22"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The Gentiles offered their gods the first-fruits, which they held to bring them good luck: or they burnt them for the purpose + of secrecy. Consequently (the Israelites) were commanded to look upon the fruits of the first three years as unclean: for + in that country nearly all the trees bear fruit in three years' time; those trees, to wit, that are cultivated either from + seed, or from a graft, or from a cutting: but it seldom happens that the + fruit-stones or seeds encased in a pod are sown: since it would take a longer time for these to bear fruit: and the Law considered + what happened most frequently. The fruits, however, of the fourth year, as being the firstlings of clean fruits, were offered + to God: and from the fifth year onward they were eaten. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A6-p23"> The figurative reason was that this foreshadowed the fact that after the three states of the Law (the first lasting from + Abraham to David, the second, until they were carried away to Babylon, the third until the time of Christ), the Fruit of the + Law, i.e. Christ, was to be offered to God. Or again, that we must mistrust our first efforts, on account of their imperfection. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 ad 4"><a name="38098" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38098] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, etsi haedus occisus non sentiat qualiter carnes eius +coquantur, tamen in animo decoquentis ad quandam crudelitatem +pertinere videtur si lac matris, quod datum est ei pro nutrimento, +adhibeatur ad consumptionem carnium ipsius. Vel potest dici quod +gentiles in solemnitatibus idolorum taliter carnes haedi coquebant, +ad immolandum vel ad comedendum. Et ideo Exod. XXIII, postquam +praedictum fuerat de solemnitatibus celebrandis in lege, subditur, +<i>non coques haedum in lacte matris suae</i>. Figuralis autem +ratio huius prohibitionis est quia praefigurabatur quod Christus, +qui est haedus propter similitudinem carnis peccati, non erat a +Iudaeis coquendus, idest occidendus, in lacte matris, idest tempore +infantiae. Vel significatur quod haedus idest peccator, non est +coquendus in lacte matris, idest non est blanditiis +deliniendus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A6-p24"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> It is said of a man in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p24.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.19.27" target="asv"> Ecclus. 19:27, </a> that "the attire of the body . . . " shows "what he is." Hence the Lord wished His people to be distinguished from other + nations, not only by the sign of the circumcision, which was in the flesh, but also by a certain difference of attire. Wherefore + they were forbidden to wear garments woven of woolen and linen together, and for a woman to be clothed with man's apparel, + or vice versa, for two + reasons. First, to avoid idolatrous worship. Because the Gentiles, in their religious rites, used garments of this sort, made + of various materials. Moreover in the worship of Mars, women put on men's armor; while, conversely, in the worship of Venus + men donned women's attire. The second reason was to preserve them from lust: because the employment of various materials in + the making of garments signified inordinate union of sexes, while the use of male attire by a woman, or vice versa, has an + incentive to evil desires, and offers an occasion of lust. The figurative reason is that the prohibition of wearing a garment + woven of woolen and linen signified that it was forbidden to unite the simplicity of innocence, denoted by wool, with the + duplicity of malice, betokened by linen. It also signifies that woman is forbidden to presume to teach, or perform other duties + of men: or that man should not adopt the effeminate manners of a woman. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 ad 5"><a name="38099" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38099] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod gentiles fructus primitivos, quos fortunatos +aestimabant, diis suis offerebant, vel etiam comburebant eos ad +quaedam magica facienda. Et ideo praeceptum est eis ut fructus +trium primorum annorum immundos reputarent. In tribus enim annis +fere omnes arbores terrae illius fructum producunt, quae scilicet +vel seminando, vel inserendo, vel plantando coluntur. Raro autem +contingit quod ossa fructuum arboris, vel semina latentia, +seminentur, haec enim tardius facerent fructum, sed lex respexit ad +id quod frequentius fit. Poma autem quarti anni, tanquam primitiae +mundorum fructuum, Deo offerebantur, a quinto autem anno, et +deinceps, comedebantur. Figuralis autem ratio est quia per hoc +praefiguratur quod post tres status legis, quorum unus est ab +Abraham usque ad David, secundus usque ad transmigrationem +Babylonis, tertius usque ad Christum, erat Christus Deo offerendus, +qui est fructus legis. Vel quia primordia nostrorum operum debent +esse nobis suspecta, propter imperfectionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A6-p25"> + <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> As Jerome says on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p25.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.23.6" target="asv"> Mat. 23:6, </a> "the Lord commanded them to make violet-colored fringes in the four corners of their garments, so that the Israelites might + be distinguished from other nations." Hence, in this way, they professed to be Jews: and consequently the very sight of this + sign reminded them of their law. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A6-p26"> When we read: "Thou shalt bind them on thy hand, and they shall be ever before thy eyes [Vulg.: 'they shall be and shall + move between thy eyes'], the Pharisees gave a false interpretation to these words, and wrote the decalogue of Moses on a parchment, + and tied it on their foreheads like a wreath, so that it moved in front of their eyes": whereas the intention of the Lord + in giving this commandment was that they should be bound in their hands, i.e. in their works; and that they + should be before their eyes, i.e. in their thoughts. The violet-colored fillets which were inserted in their cloaks signify + the godly intention which should accompany our every deed. It may, however, be said that, because they were a carnal-minded + and stiff-necked people, it was necessary for them to be stirred by these sensible things to the observance of the Law. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 ad 6"><a name="38100" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38100] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum +dicendum quod sicut dicitur Eccli. XIX, <i>amictus corporis +enuntiat de homine</i>. Et ideo voluit dominus ut populus eius +distingueretur ab aliis populis non solum signo circumcisionis, +quod erat in carne, sed etiam certa habitus distinctione. Et ideo +prohibitum fuit eis ne induerentur vestimento ex lana et lino +contexto, et ne mulier indueretur veste virili, aut e converso, +propter duo. Primo quidem, ad vitandum idololatriae cultum. +Huiusmodi enim variis vestibus ex diversis confectis gentiles in +cultu suorum deorum utebantur. Et etiam in cultu Martis mulieres +utebantur armis virorum; in cultu autem Veneris e converso viri +utebantur vestibus mulierum. Alia ratio est ad declinandam +luxuriam. Nam per commixtiones varias in vestimentis omnis +inordinata commixtio coitus excluditur. Quod autem mulier induatur +veste virili, aut e converso, incentivum est concupiscentiae, et +occasionem libidini praestat. Figuralis autem ratio est quia in +vestimento contexto ex lana et lino interdicitur coniunctio +simplicitatis innocentiae, quae figuratur per lanam, et +subtilitatis malitiae, quae figuratur per linum. Prohibetur etiam +quod mulier non usurpet sibi doctrinam, vel alia virorum officia; +vel vir declinet ad mollities mulierum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A6-p27"> + <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> Affection in man is twofold: it may be an affection of reason, or it may be an affection of passion. If a man's affection + be one of reason, it matters not how man behaves to animals, because God has subjected all things to man's power, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p27.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.8.8" target="asv"> Ps. 8:8</a>: "Thou hast subjected all things under his feet": and it is in this sense that the Apostle says that "God has no care for + oxen"; because God does not ask of man what he does + with oxen or other animals. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A6-p28"> But if man's affection be one of passion, then it is moved also in regard to other animals: for since the passion of pity + is caused by the afflictions of others; and since it happens that even irrational animals are sensible to pain, it is possible + for the affection of pity to arise in a man with regard to the sufferings of animals. Now it is evident that if a man practice + a pitiful affection for animals, he is all the more disposed to take pity on his fellow-men: wherefore it + is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p28.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.11.10" target="asv">Prov. 11:10</a>): "The just regardeth the lives of his beasts: but the bowels of the wicked are cruel." Consequently the Lord, in order to + inculcate pity to the Jewish people, who were prone to cruelty, wished them to practice pity even with regard to dumb animals, + and forbade them to do certain things savoring of cruelty to animals. Hence He prohibited them to "boil a kid in the milk + of its dam"; and to "muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn"; and to slay "the dam with her young." + It may, nevertheless, be also said that these prohibitions were made in hatred of idolatry. For the Egyptians held it to be + wicked to allow the ox to eat of the grain while threshing the corn. Moreover certain sorcerers were wont to ensnare the mother + bird with her young during incubation, and to employ them for the purpose of securing fruitfulness and good luck in bringing + up children: also because it was held to be a good omen to find the mother sitting on her young. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A6-p29"> As to the mingling of animals of divers species, the literal reason may have been threefold. The first was to show detestation + for the idolatry of the Egyptians, who employed various mixtures in worshipping the planets, which produce various effects, + and on various kinds of things according to their various conjunctions. The second reason was in condemnation of unnatural + sins. The third reason was the entire removal of all occasions of concupiscence. Because animals of different + species do not easily breed, unless this be brought about by man; and movements of lust are aroused by seeing such things. + Wherefore in the Jewish traditions we find it prescribed as stated by Rabbi Moses that men shall turn away their eyes from + such sights. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A6-p30"> The figurative reason for these things is that the necessities of life should not be withdrawn from the ox that treadeth + the corn, i.e. from the preacher bearing the sheaves of doctrine, as the Apostle states ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p30.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:4</a>, seqq.). Again, we should not take the dam with her young: because in certain things we have to keep the spiritual senses, + i.e. the offspring, and set aside the observance of the letter, i.e. the mother, for instance, in all the ceremonies of the + Law. It is also + forbidden that beast of burden, i.e. any of the common people, should be allowed to engender, i.e. to have any connection, + with animals of another kind, i.e. with Gentiles or Jews. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 ad 7"><a name="38101" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38101] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 ad 7</span></a> Ad septimum +dicendum quod, sicut Hieronymus dicit, super Matth., <i>dominus +iussit ut in quatuor angulis palliorum hyacinthinas fimbrias +facerent, ad populum Israel dignoscendum ab aliis populis</i>. Unde +per hoc se esse Iudaeos profitebantur, et ideo per aspectum huius +signi inducebantur in memoriam suae legis. Quod autem dicitur, +<i>ligabis ea in manu tua, et erunt semper ante oculos tuos, +Pharisaei male interpretabantur, scribentes in membranis Decalogum +Moysi, et ligabant in fronte, quasi coronam, ut ante oculos +moverentur</i>, cum tamen intentio domini mandantis fuerit ut +ligarentur in manu, idest in operatione; et essent ante oculos, +idest in meditatione. In hyacinthinis etiam vittis, quae palliis +inserebantur, significatur caelestis intentio, quae omnibus +operibus nostris debet adiungi. Potest tamen dici quod, quia +populus ille carnalis erat et durae cervicis, oportuit etiam per +huiusmodi sensibilia eos ad legis observantiam excitari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A6-p31"> + <b>Reply to Objection 9:</b> All these minglings were forbidden in agriculture; literally, in detestation of idolatry. For the Egyptians in worshipping + the stars employed various combinations of seeds, animals and garments, in order to represent the various connections of the + stars. Or else all these minglings were forbidden in detestation of the unnatural vice. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A6-p32"> They have, however, a figurative reason. For the prohibition: "Thou shalt not sow thy field with different seeds," is to + be understood, in the spiritual sense, of the prohibition to sow strange doctrine in the Church, which is a spiritual vineyard. + Likewise "the field," i.e. the Church, must not be sown "with different seeds," i.e. with Catholic and heretical doctrines. + Neither is it allowed to plough "with an ox and an ass together"; thus a fool should not accompany a wise man + in preaching, for one would hinder the other. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 ad 8"><a name="38102" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38102] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 ad 8</span></a> Ad octavum +dicendum quod affectus hominis est duplex, unus quidem secundum +rationem; alius vero secundum passionem. Secundum igitur affectum +rationis, non refert quid homo circa bruta animalia agat, quia +omnia sunt subiecta eius potestati a Deo, secundum illud Psalmi +VIII, <i>omnia subiecisti sub pedibus eius</i>. Et secundum hoc +apostolus dicit quod non est cura Deo de bobus, quia Deus non +requirit ab homine quid circa boves agat, vel circa alia animalia. +Quantum vero ad affectum passionis, movetur affectus hominis etiam +circa alia animalia, quia enim passio misericordiae consurgit ex +afflictionibus aliorum, contingit autem etiam bruta animalia poenas +sentire, potest in homine consurgere misericordiae affectus etiam +circa afflictiones animalium. Proximum autem est ut qui exercetur +in affectu misericordiae circa animalia, magis ex hoc disponatur ad +affectum misericordiae circa homines, unde dicitur Prov. XII, +<i>novit iustus animas iumentorum suorum; viscera autem impiorum +crudelia</i>. Et ideo ut dominus populum Iudaicum, ad crudelitatem +pronum, ad misericordiam revocaret, voluit eos exerceri ad +misericordiam etiam circa bruta animalia, prohibens quaedam circa +animalia fieri quae ad crudelitatem quandam pertinere videntur. Et +ideo prohibuit ne coqueretur haedus in lacte matris; et quod non +alligaretur os bovi trituranti; et quod non occideretur mater cum +filiis. Quamvis etiam dici possit quod haec prohibita sunt eis in +detestationem idololatriae. Nam Aegyptii nefarium reputabant ut +boves triturantes de frugibus comederent. Aliqui etiam malefici +utebantur matre avis incubante et pullis eius simul captis, ad +fecunditatem et fortunam circa nutritionem filiorum. Et etiam quia +in auguriis reputabatur hoc esse fortunatum, quod inveniretur mater +incubans filiis. Circa commixtionem vero animalium diversae +speciei, ratio litteralis potuit esse triplex. Una quidem, ad +detestationem idololatriae Aegyptiorum, qui diversis commixtionibus +utebantur in servitium planetarum, qui secundum diversas +coniunctiones habent diversos effectus, et super diversas species +rerum. Alia ratio est ad excludendum concubitus contra naturam. +Tertia ratio est ad tollendam universaliter occasionem +concupiscentiae. Animalia enim diversarum specierum non +commiscentur de facili ad invicem, nisi hoc per homines procuretur; +et in aspectu coitus animalium excitatur homini concupiscentiae +motus. Unde etiam in traditionibus Iudaeorum praeceptum invenitur, +ut Rabbi Moyses dicit, ut homines avertant oculos ab animalibus +coeuntibus. Figuralis autem horum ratio est quia bovi trituranti, +idest praedicatori deferenti segetes doctrinae, non sunt necessaria +victus subtrahenda; ut apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. IX. Matrem etiam +non simul debemus tenere cum filiis, quia in quibusdam retinendi +sunt spirituales sensus, quasi filii, et dimittenda est litteralis +observantia, quasi mater; sicut in omnibus caeremoniis legis. +Prohibetur etiam quod iumenta, idest populares homines, non +faciamus coire, idest coniunctionem habere, cum alterius generis +animantibus, idest cum gentilibus vel Iudaeis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A6-p33"> + <b>Reply to Objection 10:</b> [*The Reply to the Tenth Objection is lacking in the codices. The solution given here is found in some editions, and was + supplied by Nicolai.] Silver and gold were reasonably forbidden ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p33.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.7" target="asv">Dt. 7</a>) not as though they were not subject to the power of man, but because, like the idols themselves, all materials out of which + idols were made, were anathematized as hateful in God's sight. This is clear from the same chapter, where we read further + on + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p33.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.7.26" target="asv">Dt. 7:26</a>): "Neither shalt thou bring anything of the idol into thy house, lest thou become an anathema like it." Another reason was + lest, by taking silver and gold, they should be led by avarice into idolatry to which the Jews were inclined. The other precept + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p33.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.23" target="asv">Dt. 23</a>) about covering up excretions, was just and becoming, both for the sake of bodily cleanliness; and in order to keep the air + wholesome; and by reason of the respect due to the tabernacle of the covenant which + stood in the midst of the camp, wherein the Lord was said to dwell; as is clearly set forth in the same passage, where after + expressing the command, the reason thereof is at once added, to wit: "For the Lord thy God walketh in the midst of thy camp, + to deliver thee, and to give up thy enemies to thee, and let thy camp be holy [i.e. clean], and let no uncleanness appear + therein." The figurative reason for this precept, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi), is that sins which are the fetid + excretions of the mind should be covered over by repentance, that we may become acceptable to God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p33.4" href="./asv.html#Ps.31.1" target="asv"> Ps. 31:1</a>: "Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered." Or else according to a gloss, that we should + recognize the unhappy condition of human nature, and humbly cover and purify the stains of a puffed-up and proud spirit in + the deep furrow of self-examination. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 ad 9"><a name="38103" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38103] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 ad 9</span></a> Ad nonum +dicendum quod omnes illae commixtiones in agricultura sunt +prohibitae, ad litteram, in detestationem idololatriae. Quia +Aegyptii, in venerationem stellarum, diversas commixtiones +faciebant et in seminibus et in animalibus et in vestibus, +repraesentantes diversas coniunctiones stellarum. Vel omnes +huiusmodi commixtiones variae prohibentur ad detestationem coitus +contra naturam. Habent tamen figuralem rationem. Quia quod dicitur, +non seres vineam tuam altero semine, est spiritualiter +intelligendum, quod in Ecclesia, quae est spiritualis vinea, non +est seminanda aliena doctrina. Et similiter ager, idest Ecclesia, +non est seminandus diverso semine, idest Catholica doctrina et +haeretica. Non est etiam simul arandum in bove et asino, quia +fatuus sapienti in praedicatione non est sociandus, quia unus +impedit alium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A6-p34"> + <b>Reply to Objection 11:</b> Sorcerers and idolatrous priests made use, in their rites, of the bones and flesh of dead men. Wherefore, in order to extirpate + the customs of idolatrous worship, the Lord commanded that the priests of inferior degree, who at fixed times served in the + temple, should not "incur an uncleanness at the death" of anyone except of those who were closely related to them, viz. their + father or mother, and others thus near of kin to them. But the high-priest + had always to be ready for the service of the sanctuary; wherefore he was absolutely forbidden to approach the dead, however + nearly related to him. They were also forbidden to marry a "harlot" or "one that has been put away," or any other than a virgin: + both on account of the reverence due to the priesthood, the honor of which would seem to be tarnished by such a marriage: + and for the sake of the children who would be disgraced by the mother's shame: which was most of all to be avoided when the + priestly dignity was passed on from father to son. Again, they were commanded to shave neither head nor beard, and not to + make incisions in their flesh, in order to exclude the rites of idolatry. For the priests of the Gentiles shaved both head + and beard, wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p34.1" href="./asv.html#Bar.6.30" target="asv">Bar 6:30</a>): "Priests sit in their temples having their garments rent, and their heads and beards shaven." Moreover, in worshipping + their idols "they cut themselves with knives and lancets" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p34.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 18:28</a>). For this reason the priests of the Old Law were commanded to do the contrary. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A6-p35"> The spiritual reason for these things is that priests should be entirely free from dead works, i.e. sins. And they should + not shave their heads, i.e. set wisdom aside; nor should they shave their beards, i.e. set aside the perfection of wisdom; + nor rend their garments or cut their flesh, i.e. they should not incur the sin of schism. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 ad 11"><a name="38104" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38104] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 ad 11</span></a> Ad +undecimum dicendum quod malefici et sacerdotes idolorum utebantur +in suis ritibus ossibus vel carnibus hominum mortuorum. Et ideo, ad +extirpandum idololatriae cultum, praecepit dominus ut sacerdotes +minores, qui per tempora certa ministrabant in sanctuario, non +inquinarentur in mortibus nisi valde propinquorum, scilicet patris +et matris et huiusmodi coniunctarum personarum. Pontifex autem +semper debebat esse paratus ad ministerium sanctuarii, et ideo +totaliter prohibitus erat ei accessus ad mortuos, quantumcumque +propinquos. Praeceptum etiam est eis ne ducerent uxorem meretricem +ac repudiatam, sed virginem. Tum propter reverentiam sacerdotum, +quorum dignitas quodammodo ex tali coniugio diminui videretur. Tum +etiam propter filios, quibus esset ad ignominiam turpitudo matris, +quod maxime tunc erat vitandum, quando sacerdotii dignitas secundum +successionem generis conferebatur. Praeceptum etiam erat eis ut non +raderent caput nec barbam, nec in carnibus suis facerent incisuram, +ad removendum idololatriae ritum. Nam sacerdotes gentilium radebant +caput et barbam, unde dicitur Baruch VI, <i>sacerdotes sedent +habentes tunicas scissas, et capita et barbam rasam</i>. Et etiam +in cultu idolorum incidebant se cultris et lanceolis, ut dicitur +III regum XVIII. Unde contraria praecepta sunt sacerdotibus veteris +legis. Spiritualis autem ratio horum est quia sacerdotes omnino +debent esse immunes ab operibus mortuis, quae sunt opera peccati. +Et etiam non debent radere caput, idest deponere sapientiam; neque +deponere barbam, idest sapientiae perfectionem; neque etiam +scindere vestimenta aut incidere carnes, ut scilicet vitium +schismatis non incurrant.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q103" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q103-p0.1">Q. 103. OF THE DURATION OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q103-p2"> We must now consider the duration of the ceremonial precepts: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q103-p3"><a href="#FS_Q103_A1"> (1) Whether the ceremonial precepts were in existence before the Law?</a></p><p id="FS_Q103-p4"><a href="#FS_Q103_A2"> (2) Whether at the time of the Law the ceremonies of the Old Law had any power of justification?</a></p><p id="FS_Q103-p5"><a href="#FS_Q103_A3"> (3) Whether they ceased at the coming of Christ?</a></p><p id="FS_Q103-p6"><a href="#FS_Q103_A4"> (4) Whether it is a mortal sin to observe them after the coming of Christ?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 pr."><a name="38105" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38105] Iª-IIae q. 103 pr.</span></a> Deinde +considerandum est de duratione caeremonialium praeceptorum. Et +circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum praecepta caeremonialia +fuerint ante legem. Secundo, utrum in lege aliquam virtutem +habuerint iustificandi. Tertio, utrum cessaverint Christo veniente. +Quarto, utrum sit peccatum mortale observare ea post Christum.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q103_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q103_A1-p0.1">Q. 103. A. 1. Whether the ceremonies of the Law were in existence before the Law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the ceremonies of the Law were in existence before the Law. For sacrifices and holocausts were ceremonies + of the Old Law, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q101_A4" id="FS_Q103_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[101], A[4]</a>). But sacrifices and holocausts preceded the Law: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.4.3" target="asv">Gn. 4:3,4</a>) that "Cain offered, of the fruits of the earth, gifts to the Lord," and that "Abel offered of the firstlings of his flock, + and of their fat." Noe also "offered + holocausts" to the Lord ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A1-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Gen.18.20" target="asv">Gn. 18:20</a>), and Abraham did in like manner ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A1-p2.4" href="./asv.html#Gen.22.13" target="asv">Gn. 22:13</a>). Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law preceded the Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="38106" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38106] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod caeremoniae legis fuerint ante legem. +Sacrificia enim et holocausta pertinent ad caeremonias veteris +legis, ut supra dictum est. Sed sacrificia et holocausta fuerunt +ante legem. Dicitur enim Gen. IV, quod <i>Cain obtulit de fructibus +terrae munera domino; Abel autem obtulit de primogenitis gregis +sui, et de adipibus eorum</i>. Noe etiam obtulit holocausta domino, +ut dicitur Gen. VIII; et Abraham similiter, ut dicitur Gen. XXII. +Ergo caeremoniae veteris legis fuerunt ante legem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the erecting and consecrating of the altar were part of the ceremonies relating to holy things. But these preceded + the Law. For we read ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.13.18" target="asv">Gn. 13:18</a>) that "Abraham . . . built . . . an altar to the Lord"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.28.18" target="asv">Gn. 28:18</a>) that "Jacob . . . took the stone . . . and set it up for a title, pouring oil upon the top of it." Therefore the legal ceremonies + preceded the Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="38107" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38107] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ad caeremonias sacrorum pertinet constructio altaris, et eius +inunctio. Sed ista fuerunt ante legem. Legitur enim Gen. XIII, quod +Abraham aedificavit altare domino; et de Iacob dicitur Gen. XXVIII, +quod <i>tulit lapidem et erexit in titulum fundens oleum +desuper</i>. Ergo caeremoniae legales fuerunt ante legem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the first of the legal sacraments seems to have been circumcision. But circumcision preceded the Law, as appears + from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.17" target="asv">Gn. 17</a>. In like manner the priesthood preceded the Law; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.14.18" target="asv">Gn. 14:18</a>) that "Melchisedech . . . was the priest of the most high God." Therefore the sacramental ceremonies preceded the Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="38108" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38108] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +inter sacramenta legalia primum videtur fuisse circumcisio. Sed +circumcisio fuit ante legem, ut patet Gen. XVII. Similiter etiam +sacerdotium fuit ante legem, dicitur enim Gen. XIV, quod +Melchisedech erat sacerdos Dei summi. Ergo caeremoniae +sacramentorum fuerunt ante legem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the distinction of clean from unclean animals belongs to the ceremonies of observances, as stated above (Q[100], + 2, A[6], ad 1). But this distinction preceded the Law; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.7.2" target="asv">Gn. 7:2,3</a>): "Of all clean beasts take seven and seven . . . but of the beasts that are unclean, two and two." Therefore the legal ceremonies + preceded the Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="38109" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38109] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +discretio mundorum animalium ab immundis pertinet ad caeremonias +observantiarum, ut supra dictum est. Sed talis discretio fuit ante +legem, dicitur enim Gen. VII, <i>ex omnibus mundis animalibus tolle +septena et septena; de animantibus vero immundis, duo et duo</i>. +Ergo caeremoniae legales fuerunt ante legem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.1" target="asv">Dt. 6:1</a>): "These are the precepts and ceremonies . . . which the Lord your God commanded that I should teach you." But they would + not have needed to be taught about these things, if the aforesaid ceremonies had been already in existence. Therefore the + legal ceremonies did not precede the Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 1 s. c."><a name="38110" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38110] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Deut. VI, <i>haec sunt praecepta et caeremoniae +quae mandavit dominus Deus vester ut docerem vos</i>. Non autem +indiguissent super his doceri, si prius praedictae caeremoniae +fuissent. Ergo caeremoniae legis non fuerunt ante legem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As is clear from what has been said ( + <a href="#FS_Q101_A2" id="FS_Q103_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[101], A[2]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q102_A2" id="FS_Q103_A1-p7.2" shape="rect"> Q[102] , A[2]</a>), the legal ceremonies were ordained for a double purpose; the worship of God, and the foreshadowing of Christ. Now whoever + worships God must needs worship Him by means of certain fixed things pertaining to external worship. But the fixing of the + divine worship belongs to the ceremonies; just as the determining of our relations with our + neighbor is a matter determined by the judicial precepts, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q99_A4" id="FS_Q103_A1-p7.3" shape="rect">Q[99], A[4]</a>). Consequently, as among men in general there were certain judicial precepts, not indeed established by Divine authority, + but ordained by human reason; so also there were some ceremonies fixed, not by the authority of any law, but according to + the will and devotion of those that worship God. Since, however, even before the Law some of the leading men were gifted with + the spirit of + prophecy, it is to be believed that a heavenly instinct, like a private law, prompted them to worship God in a certain definite + way, which would be both in keeping with the interior worship, and a suitable token of Christ's mysteries, which were foreshadowed + also by other things that they did, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A1-p7.4" href="./asv.html#iCor.10.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 10:11</a>: "All . . . things happened to them in figure." Therefore there were some ceremonies before the Law, but they were not legal + ceremonies, because they were not as yet established + by legislation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 1 co."><a name="38111" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38111] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ex dictis patet, caeremoniae legis ad duo +ordinabantur, scilicet ad cultum Dei, et ad figurandum Christum. +Quicumque autem colit Deum, oportet quod per aliqua determinata eum +colat, quae ad exteriorem cultum pertinent. Determinatio autem +divini cultus ad caeremonias pertinet; sicut etiam determinatio +eorum per quae ordinamur ad proximum, pertinet ad praecepta +iudicialia; ut supra dictum est. Et ideo sicut inter homines +communiter erant aliqua iudicialia, non tamen ex auctoritate legis +divinae instituta, sed ratione hominum ordinata; ita etiam erant +quaedam caeremoniae, non quidem ex auctoritate alicuius legis +determinatae, sed solum secundum voluntatem et devotionem hominum +Deum colentium. Sed quia etiam ante legem fuerunt quidam viri +praecipui prophetico spiritu pollentes, credendum est quod ex +instinctu divino, quasi ex quadam privata lege, inducerentur ad +aliquem certum modum colendi Deum, qui et conveniens esset +interiori cultui, et etiam congrueret ad significandum Christi +mysteria, quae figurabantur etiam per alia eorum gesta, secundum +illud I ad Cor. X, <i>omnia in figuram contingebant illis</i>. +Fuerunt igitur ante legem quaedam caeremoniae, non tamen +caeremoniae legis, quia non erant per aliquam legislationem +institutae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The patriarchs offered up these oblations, sacrifices and holocausts previously to the Law, out of a certain devotion of + their own will, according as it seemed proper to them to offer up in honor of God those things which they had received from + Him, and thus to testify that they worshipped God Who is the beginning and end of all. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="38112" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38112] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod huiusmodi oblationes et sacrificia et holocausta +offerebant antiqui ante legem ex quadam devotione propriae +voluntatis, secundum quod eis videbatur conveniens ut in rebus quas +a Deo acceperant, quas in reverentiam divinam offerrent, +protestarentur se colere Deum, qui est omnium principium et +finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> They also established certain sacred things, because they thought that the honor due to God demanded that certain places + should be set apart from others for the purpose of divine worship. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="38113" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38113] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod etiam sacra quaedam instituerunt, quia videbatur eis +conveniens ut in reverentiam divinam essent aliqua loca ab aliis +discreta, divino cultui mancipata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sacrament of circumcision was established by command of God before the Law. Hence it cannot be called a sacrament of + the Law as though it were an institution of the Law, but only as an observance included in the Law. Hence Our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#John.7.20" target="asv">Jn. 7:20</a>) that circumcision was "not of Moses, but of his fathers." Again, among those who worshipped God, the priesthood was in existence + before the Law by human appointment, for the Law + allotted the priestly dignity to the firstborn. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="38114" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38114] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod sacramentum circumcisionis praecepto divino fuit +statutum ante legem. Unde non potest dici sacramentum legis quasi +in lege institutum, sed solum quasi in lege observatum. Et hoc est +quod dominus dicit, Ioan. VII, <i>circumcisio non ex Moyse est, sed +ex patribus eius</i>. Sacerdotium etiam erat ante legem apud +colentes Deum, secundum humanam determinationem, quia hanc +dignitatem primogenitis attribuebant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The distinction of clean from unclean animals was in vogue before the Law, not with regard to eating them, since it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.9.3" target="asv">Gn. 9:3</a>): "Everything that moveth and liveth shall be meat for you": but only as to the offering of sacrifices because they used + only certain animals for that purpose. If, however, they did make any distinction in regard to eating; it was not that it + was considered illegal to eat such animals, since this was not forbidden by + any law, but from dislike or custom: thus even now we see that certain foods are looked upon with disgust in some countries, + while people partake of them in others. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="38115" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38115] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod distinctio mundorum animalium et immundorum non fuit +ante legem quantum ad esum, cum dictum sit Gen. IX, <i>omne quod +movetur et vivit, erit vobis in cibum</i>, sed solum quantum ad +sacrificiorum oblationem, quia de quibusdam determinatis animalibus +sacrificia offerebant. Si tamen quantum ad esum erat aliqua +discretio animalium, hoc non erat quia esus illorum reputaretur +illicitus, cum nulla lege esset prohibitus, sed propter +abominationem vel consuetudinem, sicut et nunc videmus quod aliqua +cibaria sunt in aliquibus terris abominabilia, quae in aliis +comeduntur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q103_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q103_A2-p0.1">Q. 103. A. 2. Whether, at the time of the Law, the ceremonies of the Old Law had any power of justification?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the ceremonies of the Old Law had the power of justification at the time of the Law. Because expiation + from sin and consecration pertains to justification. But it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.39.21" target="asv">Ex. 39:21</a>) that the priests and their apparel were consecrated by the sprinkling of blood and the anointing of oil; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.16.16" target="asv">Lev. 16:16</a>) that, by sprinkling the blood of the calf, the priest expiated "the sanctuary from the + uncleanness of the children of Israel, and from their transgressions and . . . their sins." Therefore the ceremonies of the + Old Law had the power of justification. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="38116" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38116] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad +secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod caeremoniae veteris legis +habuerint virtutem iustificandi tempore legis. Expiatio enim a +peccato, et consecratio hominis, ad iustificationem pertinent, sed +Exod. XXIX, dicitur quod per aspersionem sanguinis et inunctionem +olei consecrabantur sacerdotes et vestes eorum; et Levit. XVI, +dicitur quod sacerdos per aspersionem sanguinis vituli <i>expiabat +sanctuarium ab immunditiis filiorum Israel, et a praevaricationibus +eorum atque peccatis</i>. Ergo caeremoniae veteris legis habebant +virtutem iustificandi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that by which man pleases God pertains to justification, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.10.8" target="asv"> Ps. 10:8</a>: "The Lord is just and hath loved justice." But some pleased God by means of ceremonies, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.10.19" target="asv"> Lev. 10:19</a>: "How could I . . . please the Lord in the ceremonies, having a sorrowful heart?" Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law + had the power of justification. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="38117" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38117] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +id per quod homo placet Deo, ad iustitiam pertinet; secundum illud +Psalmi X, <i>iustus dominus, et iustitias dilexit</i>, sed per +caeremonias aliqui Deo placebant, secundum illud Levit. X, +<i>quomodo potui placere domino in caeremoniis mente lugubri?</i> +Ergo caeremoniae veteris legis habebant virtutem iustificandi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things relating to the divine worship regard the soul rather than the body, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.18.8" target="asv"> Ps. 18:8</a>: "The Law of the Lord is unspotted, converting souls." But the leper was cleansed by means of the ceremonies of the Old Law, + as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.14" target="asv">Lev. 14</a>. Much more therefore could the ceremonies of the Old Law cleanse the soul by justifying it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="38118" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38118] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +ea quae sunt divini cultus magis pertinent ad animam quam ad +corpus; secundum illud Psalmi XVIII, <i>lex domini immaculata, +convertens animas</i>. Sed per caeremonias veteris legis mundabatur +leprosus, ut dicitur Levit. XIV. Ergo multo magis caeremoniae +veteris legis poterant mundare animam, iustificando.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.2" target="asv">Gal. 2</a>) [*The first words of the quotation are from 3:21: St. Thomas probably quoting from memory, substituted them for 2:21, which + runs thus: 'If justice be by the Law, then Christ died in vain.']: "If there had been a law given which could justify [Vulg.: + 'give life'], Christ died in vain," i.e. without cause. But this is inadmissible. Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law + did not confer justice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 2 s. c."><a name="38119" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38119] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, Galat. II, <i>si data esset lex quae +posset iustificare, Christus gratis mortuus esset</i>, idest sine +causa. Sed hoc est inconveniens. Ergo caeremoniae veteris legis non +iustificabant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q103_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q102_A5" id="FS_Q103_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[102], A[5]</a>, ad 4), a twofold uncleanness was distinguished in the Old Law. One was spiritual and is the uncleanness of sin. The other + was corporal, which rendered a man unfit for divine worship; thus a leper, or anyone that touched carrion, was said to be + unclean: and thus uncleanness was nothing but a kind of irregularity. From this uncleanness, then, the ceremonies of the Old + Law had the power to cleanse: + because they were ordered by the Law to be employed as remedies for the removal of the aforesaid uncleannesses which were + contracted in consequence of the prescription of the Law. Hence the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.9.13" target="asv">Heb. 9:13</a>) that "the blood of goats and of oxen, and the ashes of a heifer, being sprinkled, sanctify such as are defiled, to the cleansing + of the flesh." And just as this uncleanness which was washed away by such like ceremonies, affected the flesh rather than + the soul, so + also the ceremonies themselves are called by the Apostle shortly before ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Heb.9.10" target="asv">Heb. 9:10</a>) justices of the flesh: "justices of the flesh," says he, "being laid on them until the time of correction." + </p><p id="FS_Q103_A2-p7"> On the other hand, they had no power of cleansing from uncleanness of the soul, i.e. from the uncleanness of sin. The reason + of this was that at no time could there be expiation from sin, except through Christ, "Who taketh away the sins [Vulg.: 'sin'] + of the world" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.29" target="asv">Jn. 1:29</a>). And since the mystery of Christ's Incarnation and Passion had not yet really taken place, those ceremonies of the Old Law + could not really contain in themselves a power flowing from + Christ already incarnate and crucified, such as the sacraments of the New Law contain. Consequently they could not cleanse + from sin: thus the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.10.4" target="asv">Heb. 10:4</a>) that "it is impossible that with the blood of oxen and goats sin should be taken away"; and for this reason he calls them + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Gal.4.9" target="asv">Gal. 4:9</a>) "weak and needy elements": weak indeed, because they cannot take away sin; but this weakness results from their being needy, + i.e. from the fact that they do + not contain grace within themselves. + </p><p id="FS_Q103_A2-p8"> However, it was possible at the time of the Law, for the minds of the faithful, to be united by faith to Christ incarnate + and crucified; so that they were justified by faith in Christ: of which faith the observance of these ceremonies was a sort + of profession, inasmuch as they foreshadowed Christ. Hence in the Old Law certain sacrifices were offered up for sins, not + as though the sacrifices themselves washed sins away, but because they were professions of faith which cleansed + from sin. In fact, the Law itself implies this in the terms employed: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.4.26" target="asv">Lev. 4:26</a>; 5:16) that in offering the sacrifice for sin "the priest shall pray for him . . . and it shall be forgiven him," as though + the sin were forgiven, not in virtue of the sacrifices, but through the faith and devotion of those who offered them. It must + be observed, however, that the very fact that the ceremonies of the Old Law washed away uncleanness of the body, was a figure + of + that expiation from sins which was effected by Christ. + </p><p id="FS_Q103_A2-p9"> It is therefore evident that under the state of the Old Law the ceremonies had no power of justification.</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 2 co."><a name="38120" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38120] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in veteri lege duplex +immunditia observabatur. Una quidem spiritualis, quae est +immunditia culpae. Alia vero corporalis, quae tollebat idoneitatem +ad cultum divinum, sicut leprosus dicebatur immundus, vel ille qui +tangebat aliquod morticinum, et sic immunditia nihil aliud erat +quam irregularitas quaedam. Ab hac igitur immunditia caeremoniae +veteris legis habebant virtutem emundandi, quia huiusmodi +caeremoniae erant quaedam remedia adhibita ex ordinatione legis ad +tollendas praedictas immunditias ex statuto legis inductas. Et ideo +apostolus dicit, ad Heb. IX, quod <i>sanguis hircorum et taurorum, +et cinis vitulae aspersus, inquinatos sanctificat ad emundationem +carnis</i>. Et sicut ista immunditia quae per huiusmodi caeremonias +emundabatur, erat magis carnis quam mentis; ita etiam ipsae +caeremoniae iustitiae carnis dicuntur ab ipso apostolo, parum +supra, <i>iustitiis, inquit, carnis usque ad tempus correctionis +impositis</i>. Ab immunditia vero mentis, quae est immunditia +culpae, non habebant virtutem expiandi. Et hoc ideo quia expiatio a +peccatis nunquam fieri potuit nisi per Christum, qui tollit peccata +mundi, ut dicitur Ioan. I, et quia mysterium incarnationis et +passionis Christi nondum erat realiter peractum, illae veteris +legis caeremoniae non poterant in se continere realiter virtutem +profluentem a Christo incarnato et passo, sicut continent +sacramenta novae legis. Et ideo non poterant a peccato mundare, +sicut apostolus dicit, ad Heb. X, quod <i>impossibile est sanguine +taurorum aut hircorum auferri peccata</i>. Et hoc est quod, Gal. +IV, apostolus vocat ea egena et infirma elementa, infirma quidem, +quia non possunt a peccato mundare; sed haec infirmitas provenit ex +eo quod sunt egena, idest eo quod non continent in se gratiam. +Poterat autem mens fidelium, tempore legis, per fidem coniungi +Christo incarnato et passo, et ita ex fide Christi iustificabantur. +Cuius fidei quaedam protestatio erat huiusmodi caeremoniarum +observatio, inquantum erant figura Christi. Et ideo pro peccatis +offerebantur sacrificia quaedam in veteri lege, non quia ipsa +sacrificia a peccato emundarent, sed quia erant quaedam +protestationes fidei, quae a peccato mundabat. Et hoc etiam ipsa +lex innuit ex modo loquendi, dicitur enim Levit. IV et V, quod in +oblatione hostiarum pro peccato orabit pro eo sacerdos, et +dimittetur ei; quasi peccatum dimittatur non ex vi sacrificiorum, +sed ex fide et devotione offerentium. Sciendum est tamen quod hoc +ipsum quod veteris legis caeremoniae a corporalibus immunditiis +expiabant, erat in figura expiationis a peccatis quae fit per +Christum. Sic igitur patet quod caeremoniae in statu veteris legis +non habebant virtutem iustificandi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That sanctification of priests and their sons, and of their apparel or of anything else belonging to them, by sprinkling + them with blood, had no other effect but to appoint them to the divine worship, and to remove impediments from them, "to the + cleansing of the flesh," as the Apostle states ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.9.13" target="asv">Heb. 9:13</a>) in token of that sanctification whereby "Jesus" sanctified "the people by His own blood" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.13.12" target="asv">Heb. 13:12</a>). + Moreover, the expiation must be understood as referring to the removal of these bodily uncleannesses, not to the forgiveness + of sin. Hence even the sanctuary which could not be the subject of sin is stated to be expiated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="38121" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38121] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod illa sanctificatio sacerdotum et filiorum eius, +et vestium ipsorum, vel quorumcumque aliorum, per aspersionem +sanguinis, nihil aliud erat quam deputatio ad divinum cultum, et +remotio impedimentorum ad emundationem carnis, ut apostolus dicit; +in praefigurationem illius sanctificationis qua Iesus per suum +sanguinem sanctificavit populum. Expiatio etiam ad remotionem +huiusmodi corporalium immunditiarum referenda est, non ad +remotionem culpae. Unde etiam sanctuarium expiari dicitur, quod +culpae subiectum esse non poterat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The priests pleased God in the ceremonies by their obedience and devotion, and by their faith in the reality foreshadowed; + not by reason of the things considered in themselves. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="38122" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38122] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod sacerdotes placebant Deo in caeremoniis propter +obedientiam et devotionem et fidem rei praefiguratae, non autem +propter ipsas res secundum se consideratas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those ceremonies which were prescribed in the cleansing of a leper, were not ordained for the purpose of taking away the + defilement of leprosy. This is clear from the fact that these ceremonies were not applied to a man until he was already healed: + hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.14.3" target="asv">Lev. 14:3,4</a>) that the priest, "going out of the camp, when he shall find that the leprosy is cleansed, shall command him that is to be + purified to offer," etc.; whence it is evident + that the priest was appointed the judge of leprosy, not before, but after cleansing. But these ceremonies were employed for + the purpose of taking away the uncleanness of irregularity. They do say, however, that if a priest were to err in his judgment, + the leper would be cleansed miraculously by the power of God, but not in virtue of the sacrifice. Thus also it was by miracle + that the thigh of the adulterous woman rotted, when she had drunk the water "on which" the priest had "heaped curses," as + stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Num.5.19" target="asv"> Num. 5:19-27.</a> + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="38123" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38123] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod caeremoniae illae quae erant institutae in +emundatione leprosi, non ordinabantur ad tollendam immunditiam +infirmitatis leprae. Quod patet ex hoc quod non adhibebantur +huiusmodi caeremoniae nisi iam emundato, unde dicitur Levit. XIV, +quod <i>sacerdos, egressus de castris, cum invenerit lepram esse +mundatam, praecipiet ei qui purificatur ut offerat</i>, etc.; ex +quo patet quod sacerdos constituebatur iudex leprae emundatae, non +autem emundandae. Adhibebantur autem huiusmodi caeremoniae ad +tollendam immunditiam irregularitatis. Dicunt tamen quod quandoque, +si contingeret sacerdotem errare in iudicando, miraculose leprosus +mundabatur a Deo virtute divina, non autem virtute sacrificiorum. +Sicut etiam miraculose mulieris adulterae computrescebat femur, +bibitis aquis in quibus sacerdos maledicta congesserat, ut habetur +Num. V.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q103_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q103_A3-p0.1">Q. 103. A. 3. Whether the ceremonies of the Old Law ceased at the coming of Christ?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the ceremonies of the Old Law did not cease at the coming of Christ. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Bar.4.1" target="asv">Bar 4:1</a>): "This is the book of the commandments of God, and the law that is for ever." But the legal ceremonies were part of the + Law. Therefore the legal ceremonies were to last for ever. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="38124" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38124] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod caeremoniae veteris legis non +cessaverint in Christi adventu. Dicitur enim Baruch IV, <i>hic est +liber mandatorum Dei, et lex quae est in aeternum</i>. Sed ad legem +pertinebant legis caeremoniae. Ergo legis caeremoniae in aeternum +duraturae erant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the offering made by a leper after being cleansed was a ceremony of the Law. But the Gospel commands the leper, + who has been cleansed, to make this offering ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.8.4" target="asv">Mat. 8:4</a>). Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law did not cease at Christ's coming. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="38125" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38125] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +oblatio leprosi mundati ad legis caeremonias pertinebat. Sed etiam +in Evangelio praecipitur leproso emundato ut huiusmodi oblationes +offerat. Ergo caeremoniae veteris legis non cessaverunt Christo +veniente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as long as the cause remains, the effect remains. But the ceremonies of the Old Law had certain reasonable causes, + inasmuch as they were ordained to the worship of God, besides the fact that they were intended to be figures of Christ. Therefore + the ceremonies of the Old Law should not have ceased. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="38126" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38126] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +manente causa, manet effectus. Sed caeremoniae veteris legis +habebant quasdam rationabiles causas, inquantum ordinabantur ad +divinum cultum; etiam praeter hoc quod ordinabantur in figuram +Christi. Ergo caeremoniae veteris legis cessare non debuerunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, circumcision was instituted as a sign of Abraham's faith: the observance of the sabbath, to recall the blessing + of creation: and other solemnities, in memory of other Divine favors, as state above ( + <a href="#FS_Q102_A4" id="FS_Q103_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[102], A[4]</a>, ad 10; A[5], ad 1). But Abraham's faith is ever to be imitated even by us: and the blessing of creation and other Divine + favors should never be forgotten. Therefore at least circumcision and the other legal + solemnities should not have ceased. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="38127" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38127] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +circumcisio erat instituta in signum fidei Abrahae; observatio +autem sabbati ad recolendum beneficium creationis; et aliae +solemnitates legis ad recolendum alia beneficia Dei; ut supra +dictum est. Sed fides Abrahae est semper imitanda etiam a nobis; et +beneficium creationis, et alia Dei beneficia, semper sunt +recolenda. Ergo ad minus circumcisio et solemnitates legis cessare +non debuerunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Col.2.16" target="asv">Col. 2:16,17</a>): "Let no man . . . judge you in meat or in drink, or in respect of a festival day, or of the new moon, or of the sabbaths, + which are a shadow of things to come": and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.8.13" target="asv">Heb. 8:13</a>): "In saying a new (testament), he hath made the former old: and that which decayeth and groweth old, is near its end." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 3 s. c."><a name="38128" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38128] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Coloss. II, <i>nemo vos iudicet in +cibo aut in potu, aut in parte diei festi aut Neomeniae aut +sabbatorum, quae sunt umbra futurorum</i>. Et ad Heb. VIII dicitur +quod, <i>dicendo novum testamentum, veteravit prius, quod autem +antiquatur et senescit, prope interitum est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q103_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> All the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law were ordained to the worship of God as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q101_A1" id="FS_Q103_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[101], AA[1]</a>,2). Now external worship should be in proportion to the internal worship, which consists in faith, hope and charity. Consequently + exterior worship had to be subject to variations according to the variations in the internal worship, in which a threefold + state may be distinguished. One state was in respect of faith and hope, + both in heavenly goods, and in the means of obtaining them---in both of these considered as things to come. Such was the state + of faith and hope in the Old Law. Another state of interior worship is that in which we have faith and hope in heavenly goods + as things to come; but in the means of obtaining heavenly goods, as in things present or past. Such is the state of the New + Law. The third state is that in which both are possessed as present; wherein nothing is believed in as lacking, nothing + hoped for as being yet to come. Such is the state of the Blessed. + </p><p id="FS_Q103_A3-p8"> In this state of the Blessed, then, nothing in regard to worship of God will be figurative; there will be naught but "thanksgiving + and voice of praise" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.51.3" target="asv">Is. 51:3</a>). Hence it is written concerning the city of the Blessed ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A3-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.22" target="asv">Apoc. 21:22</a>): "I saw no temple therein: for the Lord God Almighty is the temple thereof, and the Lamb." Proportionately, therefore, the + ceremonies of the first-mentioned state which foreshadowed the second and third + states, had need to cease at the advent of the second state; and other ceremonies had to be introduced which would be in keeping + with the state of divine worship for that particular time, wherein heavenly goods are a thing of the future, but the Divine + favors whereby we obtain the heavenly boons are a thing of the present. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 3 co."><a name="38129" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38129] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod omnia praecepta caeremonialia veteris legis ad cultum +Dei sunt ordinata, ut supra dictum est. Exterior autem cultus +proportionari debet interiori cultui, qui consistit in fide, spe et +caritate. Unde secundum diversitatem interioris cultus, debuit +diversificari cultus exterior. Potest autem triplex status +distingui interioris cultus. Unus quidem secundum quem habetur +fides et spes et de bonis caelestibus, et de his per quae in +caelestia introducimur, de utrisque quidem sicut de quibusdam +futuris. Et talis fuit status fidei et spei in veteri lege. Alius +autem est status interioris cultus in quo habetur fides et spes de +caelestibus bonis sicut de quibusdam futuris, sed de his per quae +introducimur in caelestia, sicut de praesentibus vel praeteritis. +Et iste est status novae legis. Tertius autem status est in quo +utraque habentur ut praesentia, et nihil creditur ut absens, neque +speratur ut futurum. Et iste est status beatorum. In illo ergo +statu beatorum nihil erit figurale ad divinum cultum pertinens, sed +solum gratiarum actio et vox laudis. Et ideo dicitur Apoc. XXI, de +civitate beatorum, <i>templum non vidi in ea, dominus enim Deus +omnipotens templum illius est, et agnus</i>. Pari igitur ratione, +caeremoniae primi status, per quas figurabatur et secundus et +tertius, veniente secundo statu, cessare debuerunt; et aliae +caeremoniae induci, quae convenirent statui cultus divini pro +tempore illo, in quo bona caelestia sunt futura, beneficia autem +Dei per quae ad caelestia introducimur, sunt praesentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Old Law is said to be "for ever" simply and absolutely, as regards its moral precepts; but as regards the ceremonial + precepts it lasts for even in respect of the reality which those ceremonies foreshadowed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="38130" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38130] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod lex vetus dicitur esse in aeternum, secundum +moralia quidem, simpliciter et absolute, secundum caeremonialia +vero, quantum ad veritatem per ea figuratam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The mystery of the redemption of the human race was fulfilled in Christ's Passion: hence Our Lord said then: "It is consummated" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A3-p10.1" href="./asv.html#John.19.30" target="asv">Jn. 19:30</a>). Consequently the prescriptions of the Law must have ceased then altogether through their reality being fulfilled. As a + sign of this, we read that at the Passion of Christ "the veil of the temple was rent" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A3-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.27.51" target="asv">Mat. 27:51</a>). Hence, before Christ's Passion, while Christ was + preaching and working miracles, the Law and the Gospel were concurrent, since the mystery of Christ had already begun, but + was not as yet consummated. And for this reason Our Lord, before His Passion, commanded the leper to observe the legal ceremonies. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="38131" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38131] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod mysterium redemptionis humani generis completum fuit +in passione Christi, unde tunc dominus <i>dixit, consummatum +est</i>, ut habetur Ioan. XIX. Et ideo tunc totaliter debuerunt +cessare legalia, quasi iam veritate eorum consummata. In cuius +signum, in passione Christi velum templi legitur esse scissum, +Matth. XXVII. Et ideo ante passionem Christi, Christo praedicante +et miracula faciente, currebant simul lex et Evangelium, quia iam +mysterium Christi erat inchoatum, sed nondum consummatum. Et +propter hoc mandavit dominus, ante passionem suam, leproso, ut +legales caeremonias observaret.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The literal reasons already given ( + <a href="#FS_Q102" id="FS_Q103_A3-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[102])</a> for the ceremonies refer to the divine worship, which was founded on faith in that which was to come. Hence, at the advent + of Him Who was to come, both that worship ceased, and all the reasons referring thereto. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="38132" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38132] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod rationes litterales caeremoniarum supra assignatae +referuntur ad divinum cultum, qui quidem cultus erat in fide +venturi. Et ideo, iam veniente eo qui venturus erat, et cultus ille +cessat, et omnes rationes ad hunc cultum ordinatae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q103_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The faith of Abraham was commended in that he believed in God's promise concerning his seed to come, in which all nations + were to blessed. Wherefore, as long as this seed was yet to come, it was necessary to make profession of Abraham's faith by + means of circumcision. But now that it is consummated, the same thing needs to be declared by means of another sign, viz. + Baptism, which, in this respect, took the place of circumcision, according to the + saying of the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A3-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Col.2.11" target="asv">Col. 2:11, 12</a>): "You are circumcised with circumcision not made by hand, in despoiling of the body of the flesh, but in the circumcision + of Christ, buried with Him in Baptism." + </p><p id="FS_Q103_A3-p13"> As to the sabbath, which was a sign recalling the first creation, its place is taken by the "Lord's Day," which recalls the + beginning of the new creature in the Resurrection of Christ. In like manner other solemnities of the Old Law are supplanted + by new solemnities: because the blessings vouchsafed to that people, foreshadowed the favors granted us by Christ. Hence the + feast of the Passover gave place to the feast of Christ's Passion and Resurrection: the feast of Pentecost + when the Old Law was given, to the feast of Pentecost on which was given the Law of the living spirit: the feast of the New + Moon, to Lady Day, when appeared the first rays of the sun, i.e. Christ, by the fulness of grace: the feast of Trumpets, to + the feasts of the Apostles: the feast of Expiation, to the feasts of Martyrs and Confessors: the feast of Tabernacles, to + the feast of the Church Dedication: the feast of the Assembly and Collection, to feast of the Angels, or else to the feast + of All + Hallows. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="38133" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38133] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod fides Abrahae fuit commendata in hoc quod credidit +divinae promissioni de futuro semine, in quo benedicerentur omnes +gentes. Et ideo quandiu hoc erat futurum, oportebat protestari +fidem Abrahae in circumcisione. Sed postquam iam hoc est perfectum, +oportet idem alio signo declarari, scilicet Baptismo, qui in hoc +circumcisioni succedit; secundum illud apostoli, ad Coloss. II, +<i>circumcisi estis circumcisione non manu facta in expoliatione +corporis carnis, sed in circumcisione domini nostri Iesu Christi, +consepulti ei in Baptismo</i>. Sabbatum autem, quod significabat +primam creationem, mutatur in diem dominicum, in quo commemoratur +nova creatura inchoata in resurrectione Christi. Et similiter aliis +solemnitatibus veteris legis novae solemnitates succedunt, quia +beneficia illi populo exhibita, significant beneficia nobis +concessa per Christum. Unde festo phase succedit festum passionis +Christi et resurrectionis. Festo Pentecostes, in quo fuit data lex +vetus, succedit festum Pentecostes in quo fuit data lex spiritus +vitae. Festo Neomeniae succedit festum beatae virginis, in qua +primo apparuit illuminatio solis, idest Christi, per copiam +gratiae. Festo tubarum succedunt festa apostolorum. Festo +expiationis succedunt festa martyrum et confessorum. Festo +tabernaculorum succedit festum consecrationis Ecclesiae. Festo +coetus atque collectae succedit festum Angelorum; vel etiam festum +omnium sanctorum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q103_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q103_A4-p0.1">Q. 103. A. 4. Whether since Christ's Passion the legal ceremonies can be observed without committing mortal sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that since Christ's Passion the legal ceremonies can be observed without committing mortal sin. For we must + not believe that the apostles committed mortal sin after receiving the Holy Ghost: since by His fulness they were "endued + with power from on high" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.24.49" target="asv">Lk. 24:49</a>). But the apostles observed the legal ceremonies after the coming of the Holy Ghost: for it is stated ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Acts.16.3" target="asv">Acts 16:3</a>) that Paul circumcised Timothy: and + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A4-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Acts.21.26" target="asv">Acts 21:26</a>) that Paul, at the advice of James, "took the men, and . . . being purified with them, entered into the temple, giving notice + of the accomplishment of the days of purification, until an oblation should be offered for every one of them." Therefore the + legal ceremonies can be observed since the Passion of Christ without mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="38134" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38134] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod post passionem Christi legalia possint +sine peccato mortali observari. Non est enim credendum quod +apostoli, post acceptum spiritum sanctum, mortaliter peccaverint, +eius enim plenitudine sunt induti virtute ex alto, ut dicitur Lucae +ult. Sed apostoli post adventum spiritus sancti legalia +observaverunt, dicitur enim Act. XVI, quod Paulus circumcidit +Timotheum; et Act. XXI, dicitur quod Paulus, secundum consilium +Iacobi, <i>assumptis viris, purificatus cum eis intravit in +templum, annuntians expletionem dierum purificationis, donec +offerretur pro unoquoque eorum oblatio</i>. Ergo sine peccato +mortali possunt post Christi passionem legalia observari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one of the legal ceremonies consisted in shunning the fellowship of Gentiles. But the first Pastor of the Church + complied with this observance; for it is stated ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.2.12" target="asv">Gal. 2:12</a>) that, "when" certain men "had come" to Antioch, Peter "withdrew and separated himself" from the Gentiles. Therefore the + legal ceremonies can be observed since Christ's Passion without committing mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="38135" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38135] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +vitare consortia gentilium ad caeremonias legis pertinebat. Sed hoc +observavit primus pastor Ecclesiae, dicitur enim ad Gal. II, quod, +cum venissent quidam Antiochiam, <i>subtrahebat et segregabat se +Petrus a gentilibus</i>. Ergo absque peccato post passionem Christi +legis caeremoniae observari possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the commands of the apostles did not lead men into sin. But it was commanded by apostolic decree that the Gentiles + should observe certain ceremonies of the Law: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.15.28" target="asv">Acts 15:28,29</a>): "It hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us, to lay no further burden upon you than these necessary things: that you + abstain from things sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled, and from fornication." Therefore + the legal ceremonies can be observed since Christ's Passion without committing mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="38136" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38136] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +praecepta apostolorum non induxerunt homines ad peccatum. Sed ex +decreto apostolorum statutum fuit quod gentiles quaedam de +caeremoniis legis observarent, dicitur enim Act. XV, <i>visum est +spiritui sancto et nobis nihil ultra imponere oneris vobis quam +haec necessaria, ut abstineatis vos ab immolatis simulacrorum, et +sanguine, et suffocato, et fornicatione</i>. Ergo absque peccato +caeremoniae legales possunt post Christi passionem observari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.2" target="asv">Gal. 5:2</a>): "If you be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing." But nothing save mortal sin hinders us from receiving Christ's + fruit. Therefore since Christ's Passion it is a mortal sin to be circumcised, or to observe the other legal ceremonies. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 4 s. c."><a name="38137" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38137] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Gal. V, <i>si circumcidimini, Christus +nihil vobis proderit</i>. Sed nihil excludit fructum Christi nisi +peccatum mortale. Ergo circumcidi, et alias caeremonias observare, +post passionem Christi est peccatum mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> All ceremonies are professions of faith, in which the interior worship of God consists. Now man can make profession of his + inward faith, by deeds as well as by words: and in either profession, if he make a false declaration, he sins mortally. Now, + though our faith in Christ is the same as that of the fathers of old; yet, since they came before Christ, whereas we come + after Him, the same faith is expressed in different words, by us and by them. For by them + was it said: "Behold a virgin shall conceive and bear a son," where the verbs are in the future tense: whereas we express + the same by means of verbs in the past tense, and say that she "conceived and bore." In like manner the ceremonies of the + Old Law betokened Christ as having yet to be born and to suffer: whereas our sacraments signify Him as already born and having + suffered. Consequently, just as it would be a mortal sin now for anyone, in making a profession of faith, to say that Christ + is + yet to be born, which the fathers of old said devoutly and truthfully; so too it would be a mortal sin now to observe those + ceremonies which the fathers of old fulfilled with devotion and fidelity. Such is the teaching Augustine (Contra Faust. xix, + 16), who says: "It is no longer promised that He shall be born, shall suffer and rise again, truths of which their sacraments + were a kind of image: but it is declared that He is already born, has suffered and risen again; of which our sacraments, in + which Christians share, are the actual representation." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 4 co."><a name="38138" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38138] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod omnes caeremoniae sunt quaedam protestationes fidei, +in qua consistit interior Dei cultus. Sic autem fidem interiorem +potest homo protestari factis, sicut et verbis, et in utraque +protestatione, si aliquid homo falsum protestatur, peccat +mortaliter. Quamvis autem sit eadem fides quam habemus de Christo, +et quam antiqui patres habuerunt; tamen quia ipsi praecesserunt +Christum, nos autem sequimur, eadem fides diversis verbis +significatur a nobis et ab eis. Nam ab eis dicebatur, ecce virgo +concipiet et pariet filium, quae sunt verba futuri temporis, nos +autem idem repraesentamus per verba praeteriti temporis, dicentes +quod concepit et peperit. Et similiter caeremoniae veteris legis +significabant Christum ut nasciturum et passurum, nostra autem +sacramenta significant ipsum ut natum et passum. Sicut igitur +peccaret mortaliter qui nunc, suam fidem protestando, diceret +Christum nasciturum, quod antiqui pie et veraciter dicebant; ita +etiam peccaret mortaliter, si quis nunc caeremonias observaret, +quas antiqui pie et fideliter observabant. Et hoc est quod +Augustinus dicit, contra Faustum, <i>iam non promittitur +nasciturus, passurus, resurrecturus, quod illa sacramenta +quodammodo personabant, sed annuntiatur quod natus sit, passus sit, +resurrexerit; quod haec sacramenta quae a Christianis aguntur, iam +personant</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q103_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> On this point there seems to have been a difference of opinion between Jerome and Augustine. For Jerome (Super Galat. ii, + 11, seqq.) distinguished two periods of time. One was the time previous to Christ's Passion, during which the legal ceremonies + were neither dead, since they were obligatory, and did expiate in their own fashion; nor deadly, because it was not sinful + to observe them. But immediately after Christ's Passion they began to be not only + dead, so as no longer to be either effectual or binding; but also deadly, so that whoever observed them was guilty of mortal + sin. Hence he maintained that after the Passion the apostles never observed the legal ceremonies in real earnest; but only + by a kind of pious pretense, lest, to wit, they should scandalize the Jews and hinder their conversion. This pretense, however, + is to be understood, not as though they did not in reality perform those actions, but in the sense that they performed them + without the mind to observe the ceremonies of the Law: thus a man might cut away his foreskin for health's sake, not with + the intention of observing legal circumcision. + </p><p id="FS_Q103_A4-p8"> But since it seems unbecoming that the apostles, in order to avoid scandal, should have hidden things pertaining to the truth + of life and doctrine, and that they should have made use of pretense, in things pertaining to the salvation of the faithful; + therefore Augustine (Epist. lxxxii) more fittingly distinguished three periods of time. One was the time that preceded the + Passion of Christ, during which the legal ceremonies were neither deadly nor dead: another period was after + the publication of the Gospel, during which the legal ceremonies are both dead and deadly. The third is a middle period, viz. + from the Passion of Christ until the publication of the Gospel, during which the legal ceremonies were dead indeed, because + they had neither effect nor binding force; but were not deadly, because it was lawful for the Jewish converts to Christianity + to observe them, provided they did not put their trust in them so as to hold them to be necessary unto salvation, as though + faith in Christ could not justify without the legal observances. On the other hand, there was no reason why those who were + converted from heathendom to Christianity should observe them. Hence Paul circumcised Timothy, who was born of a Jewish mother; + but was unwilling to circumcise Titus, who was of heathen nationality. + </p><p id="FS_Q103_A4-p9"> The reason why the Holy Ghost did not wish the converted Jews to be debarred at once from observing the legal ceremonies, + while converted heathens were forbidden to observe the rites of heathendom, was in order to show that there is a difference + between these rites. For heathenish ceremonial was rejected as absolutely unlawful, and as prohibited by God for all time; + whereas the legal ceremonial ceased as being fulfilled through Christ's Passion, being instituted by God as a + figure of Christ. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="38139" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38139] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod circa hoc diversimode sensisse videntur +Hieronymus et Augustinus. Hieronymus enim distinxit duo tempora. +Unum tempus ante passionem Christi, in quo legalia nec erant +mortua, quasi non habentia vim obligatoriam, aut expiativam pro suo +modo; nec etiam mortifera, quia non peccabant ea observantes. +Statim autem post passionem Christi incoeperunt esse non solum +mortua, idest non habentia virtutem et obligationem; sed etiam +mortifera, ita scilicet quod peccabant mortaliter quicumque ea +observabant. Unde dicebat quod apostoli nunquam legalia +observaverunt post passionem secundum veritatem; sed solum quadam +pia simulatione, ne scilicet scandalizarent Iudaeos et eorum +conversionem impedirent. Quae quidem simulatio sic intelligenda +est, non quidem ita quod illos actus secundum rei veritatem non +facerent, sed quia non faciebant tanquam legis caeremonias +observantes; sicut si quis pelliculam virilis membri abscinderet +propter sanitatem, non causa legalis circumcisionis observandae. +Sed quia indecens videtur quod apostoli ea occultarent propter +scandalum quae pertinent ad veritatem vitae et doctrinae, et quod +simulatione uterentur in his quae pertinent ad salutem fidelium; +ideo convenientius Augustinus distinxit tria tempora. Unum quidem +ante Christi passionem, in quo legalia non erant neque mortifera +neque mortua. Aliud autem post tempus Evangelii divulgati, in quo +legalia sunt et mortua et mortifera. Tertium autem est tempus +medium, scilicet a passione Christi usque ad divulgationem +Evangelii, in quo legalia fuerunt quidem mortua, quia neque vim +aliquam habebant, neque aliquis ea observare tenebatur; non tamen +fuerunt mortifera, quia illi qui conversi erant ad Christum ex +Iudaeis, poterant illa legalia licite observare, dummodo non sic +ponerent spem in eis quod ea reputarent sibi necessaria ad salutem, +quasi sine legalibus fides Christi iustificare non posset. His +autem qui convertebantur ex gentilitate ad Christum, non inerat +causa ut ea observarent. Et ideo Paulus circumcidit Timotheum, qui +ex matre Iudaea genitus erat; Titum autem, qui ex gentilibus natus +erat, circumcidere noluit. Ideo autem noluit spiritus sanctus ut +statim inhiberetur his qui ex Iudaeis convertebantur observatio +legalium, sicut inhibebatur his qui ex gentilibus convertebantur +gentilitatis ritus, ut quaedam differentia inter hos ritus +ostenderetur. Nam gentilitatis ritus repudiabatur tanquam omnino +illicitus, et a Deo semper prohibitus, ritus autem legis cessabat +tanquam impletus per Christi passionem, utpote a Deo in figuram +Christi institutus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to Jerome, Peter withdrew himself from the Gentiles by pretense, in order to avoid giving scandal to the Jews, + of whom he was the Apostle. Hence he did not sin at all in acting thus. On the other hand, Paul in like manner made a pretense + of blaming him, in order to avoid scandalizing the Gentiles, whose Apostle he was. But Augustine disapproves of this solution: + because in the canonical Scripture (viz. + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.2.11" target="asv"> Gal. 2:11</a>), + wherein we must not hold anything to be false, Paul says that Peter "was to be blamed." Consequently it is true that Peter + was at fault: and Paul blamed him in very truth and not with pretense. Peter, however, did not sin, by observing the legal + ceremonial for the time being; because this was lawful for him who was a converted Jew. But he did sin by excessive minuteness + in the observance of the legal rites lest he should scandalize the Jews, the result being that he gave scandal to the + Gentiles. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="38140" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38140] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, secundum Hieronymum, Petrus simulatorie se a +gentilibus subtrahebat, ut vitaret Iudaeorum scandalum, quorum erat +apostolus. Unde in hoc nullo modo peccavit, sed Paulus eum +similiter simulatorie reprehendit, ut vitaret scandalum gentilium, +quorum erat apostolus. Sed Augustinus hoc improbat, quia Paulus in +canonica Scriptura, scilicet Gal. II, in qua nefas est credere +aliquid esse falsum, dicit quod Petrus reprehensibilis erat. Unde +verum est quod Petrus peccavit, et Paulus vere eum, non +simulatorie, reprehendit. Non autem peccavit Petrus in hoc quod ad +tempus legalia observabat, quia hoc sibi licebat, tanquam ex +Iudaeis converso. Sed peccabat in hoc quod circa legalium +observantiam nimiam diligentiam adhibebat ne scandalizaret Iudaeos, +ita quod ex hoc sequebatur gentilium scandalum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q103_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some have held that this prohibition of the apostles is not to be taken literally, but spiritually: namely, that the prohibition + of blood signifies the prohibition of murder; the prohibition of things strangled, that of violence and rapine; the prohibition + of things offered to idols, that of idolatry; while fornication is forbidden as being evil in itself: which opinion they gathered + from certain glosses, which expound these prohibitions in a mystical + sense. Since, however, murder and rapine were held to be unlawful even by the Gentiles, there would have been no need to give + this special commandment to those who were converted to Christ from heathendom. Hence others maintain that those foods were + forbidden literally, not to prevent the observance of legal ceremonies, but in order to prevent gluttony. Thus Jerome says + on Ezech. 44:31 ("The priest shall not eat of anything that is dead"): "He condemns those priests who from gluttony did not + keep these precepts." + </p><p id="FS_Q103_A4-p12"> But since certain foods are more delicate than these and more conducive to gluttony, there seems no reason why these should + have been forbidden more than the others. + </p><p id="FS_Q103_A4-p13"> We must therefore follow the third opinion, and hold that these foods were forbidden literally, not with the purpose of enforcing + compliance with the legal ceremonies, but in order to further the union of Gentiles and Jews living side by side. Because + blood and things strangled were loathsome to the Jews by ancient custom; while the Jews might have suspected the Gentiles + of relapse into idolatry if the latter had partaken of things offered to idols. Hence these things were + prohibited for the time being, during which the Gentiles and Jews were to become united together. But as time went on, with + the lapse of the cause, the effect lapsed also, when the truth of the Gospel teaching was divulged, wherein Our Lord taught + that "not that which entereth into the mouth defileth a man" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A4-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.11" target="asv">Mat. 15:11</a>); and that "nothing is to be rejected that is received with thanksgiving" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A4-p13.2" href="./asv.html#iTim.4.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 4:4</a>). With regard to fornication a special prohibition + was made, because the Gentiles did not hold it to be sinful. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="38141" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38141] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod illa prohibitio apostolorum non +est intelligenda ad litteram, sed secundum spiritualem intellectum, +ut scilicet in prohibitione sanguinis, intelligatur prohibitio +homicidii; in prohibitione suffocati, intelligatur prohibitio +violentiae et rapinae; in prohibitione immolatorum, intelligatur +prohibitio idololatriae; fornicatio autem prohibetur tanquam per se +malum. Et hanc opinionem accipiunt ex quibusdam Glossis, quae +huiusmodi praecepta mystice exponunt. Sed quia homicidium et rapina +etiam apud gentiles reputabantur illicita, non oportuisset super +hoc speciale mandatum dari his qui erant ex gentilitate conversi ad +Christum. Unde alii dicunt quod ad litteram illa comestibilia +fuerunt prohibita, non propter observantiam legalium, sed propter +gulam comprimendam. Unde dicit Hieronymus, super illud Ezech. XLIV, +<i>omne morticinum etc., condemnat sacerdotes qui in turdis et +ceteris huiusmodi, haec, cupiditate gulae, non custodiunt</i>. Sed +quia sunt quaedam cibaria magis delicata et gulam provocantia, non +videtur ratio quare fuerunt haec magis quam alia prohibita. Et ideo +dicendum, secundum tertiam opinionem, quod ad litteram ista sunt +prohibita, non ad observandum caeremonias legis, sed ad hoc quod +posset coalescere unio gentilium et Iudaeorum insimul habitantium. +Iudaeis enim, propter antiquam consuetudinem, sanguis et suffocatum +erant abominabilia, comestio autem immolatorum simulacris, poterat +in Iudaeis aggenerare circa gentiles suspicionem reditus ad +idololatriam. Et ideo ista fuerunt prohibita pro tempore illo, in +quo de novo oportebat convenire in unum gentiles et Iudaeos. +Procedente autem tempore, cessante causa, cessat effectus; +manifestata evangelicae doctrinae veritate, in qua dominus docet +quod nihil quod per os intrat, coinquinat hominem, ut dicitur +Matth. XV; <i>et quod nihil est reiiciendum quod cum gratiarum +actione percipitur</i>, ut I ad Tim. IV dicitur. Fornicatio autem +prohibetur specialiter, quia gentiles eam non reputabant esse +peccatum.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q104" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q104-p0.1">Q. 104. OF THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q104-p2"> We must now consider the judicial precepts: and first of all we shall consider them in general; in the second place we shall + consider their reasons. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FS_Q104-p3"><a href="#FS_Q104_A1"> (1) What is meant by the judicial precepts?</a></p><p id="FS_Q104-p4"><a href="#FS_Q104_A2"> (2) Whether they are figurative?</a></p><p id="FS_Q104-p5"><a href="#FS_Q104_A3"> (3) Their duration;</a></p><p id="FS_Q104-p6"><a href="#FS_Q104_A4"> (4) Their division.</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 pr."><a name="38142" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38142] Iª-IIae q. 104 pr.</span></a> Consequenter +considerandum est de praeceptis iudicialibus. Et primo, +considerandum est de ipsis in communi; secundo, de rationibus +eorum. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, quae sint iudicialia +praecepta. Secundo, utrum sint figuralia. Tertio, de duratione +eorum. Quarto, de distinctione eorum.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q104_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q104_A1-p0.1">Q. 104. A. 1. Whether the judicial precepts were those which directed man in relation to his neighbor?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the judicial precepts were not those which directed man in his relations to his neighbor. For judicial + precepts take their name from "judgment." But there are many things that direct man as to his neighbor, which are not subordinate + to judgment. Therefore the judicial precepts were not those which directed man in his relations to his neighbor. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="38143" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38143] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ratio praeceptorum iudicialium non +consistat in hoc quod sunt ordinantia ad proximum. Iudicialia enim +praecepta a iudicio dicuntur. Sed multa sunt alia quibus homo ad +proximum ordinatur, quae non pertinent ad ordinem iudiciorum. Non +ergo praecepta iudicialia dicuntur quibus homo ordinatur ad +proximum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the judicial precepts are distinct from the moral precepts, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q99_A4" id="FS_Q104_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[99], A[4]</a>). But there are many moral precepts which direct man as to his neighbor: as is evidently the case with the seven precepts + of the second table. Therefore the judicial precepts are not so called from directing man as to his neighbor. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="38144" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38144] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +praecepta iudicialia a moralibus distinguuntur, ut supra dictum +est. Sed multa praecepta moralia sunt quibus homo ordinatur ad +proximum, sicut patet in septem praeceptis secundae tabulae. Non +ergo praecepta iudicialia dicuntur ex hoc quod ad proximum +ordinant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the ceremonial precepts relate to God, so do the judicial precepts relate to one's neighbor, as stated above + ( + <a href="#FS_Q99_A4" id="FS_Q104_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[99], A[4]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q101_A1" id="FS_Q104_A1-p4.2" shape="rect"> Q[101], A[1]</a>). But among the ceremonial precepts there are some which concern man himself, such as observances in matter of food and apparel, + of which we have already spoken ( + <a href="#FS_Q102_A6" id="FS_Q104_A1-p4.3" shape="rect">Q[102], A[6]</a>, ad 1,6). Therefore the judicial precepts are not so called from + directing man as to his neighbor. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="38145" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38145] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut se habent praecepta caeremonialia ad Deum, ita se habent +iudicialia praecepta ad proximum, ut supra dictum est. Sed inter +praecepta caeremonialia sunt quaedam quae pertinent ad seipsum, +sicut observantiae ciborum et vestimentorum, de quibus supra dictum +est. Ergo praecepta iudicialia non ex hoc dicuntur quod ordinent +hominem ad proximum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is reckoned ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q104_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.18.8" target="asv">Ezech. 18:8</a>) among other works of a good and just man, that "he hath executed true judgment between man and man." But judicial precepts + are so called from "judgment." Therefore it seems that the judicial precepts were those which directed the relations between + man and man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 1 s. c."><a name="38146" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38146] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Ezech. XVIII, inter cetera bona opera viri iusti, +<i>si iudicium verum fecerit inter virum et virum</i>. Sed +iudicialia praecepta a iudicio dicuntur. Ergo praecepta iudicialia +videntur dici illa quae pertinent ad ordinationem hominum ad +invicem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As is evident from what we have stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q95_A2" id="FS_Q104_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[95], A[2]</a> ; + <a href="#FS_Q99_A4" id="FS_Q104_A1-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[99], A[4]</a>), in every law, some precepts derive their binding force from the dictate of reason itself, because natural reason dictates + that something ought to be done or to be avoided. These are called "moral" precepts: since human morals are based on reason. + At the same time there are other precepts which derive their binding force, not from the + very dictate of reason (because, considered in themselves, they do not imply an obligation of something due or undue); but + from some institution, Divine or human: and such are certain determinations of the moral precepts. When therefore the moral + precepts are fixed by Divine institution in matters relating to man's subordination to God, they are called "ceremonial" precepts: + but when they refer to man's relations to other men, they are called "judicial" precepts. Hence there are two conditions + attached to the judicial precepts: viz. first, that they refer to man's relations to other men; secondly, that they derive + their binding force not from reason alone, but in virtue of their institution. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 1 co."><a name="38147" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38147] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ex supradictis patet, praeceptorum cuiuscumque +legis quaedam habent vim obligandi ex ipso dictamine rationis, quia +naturalis ratio dictat hoc esse debitum fieri vel vitari. Et +huiusmodi praecepta dicuntur moralia, eo quod a ratione dicuntur +mores humani. Alia vero praecepta sunt quae non habent vim +obligandi ex ipso dictamine rationis, quia scilicet in se +considerata non habent absolute rationem debiti vel indebiti; sed +habent vim obligandi ex aliqua institutione divina vel humana. Et +huiusmodi sunt determinationes quaedam moralium praeceptorum. Si +igitur determinentur moralia praecepta per institutionem divinam in +his per quae ordinatur homo ad Deum, talia dicentur praecepta +caeremonialia. Si autem in his quae pertinent ad ordinationem +hominum ad invicem, talia dicentur praecepta iudicialia. In duobus +ergo consistit ratio iudicialium praeceptorum, scilicet ut +pertineant ad ordinationem hominum ad invicem; et ut non habeant +vim obligandi ex sola ratione, sed ex institutione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Judgments emanate through the official pronouncement of certain men who are at the head of affairs, and in whom the judicial + power is vested. Now it belongs to those who are at the head of affairs to regulate not only litigious matters, but also voluntary + contracts which are concluded between man and man, and whatever matters concern the community at large and the government + thereof. Consequently the judicial precepts are not only those which concern + actions at law; but also all those that are directed to the ordering of one man in relation to another, which ordering is + subject to the direction of the sovereign as supreme judge. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="38148" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38148] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod iudicia exercentur officio aliquorum principum, +qui habent potestatem iudicandi. Ad principem autem pertinet non +solum ordinare de his quae veniunt in litigium, sed etiam de +voluntariis contractibus qui inter homines fiunt, et de omnibus +pertinentibus ad populi communitatem et regimen. Unde praecepta +iudicialia non solum sunt illa quae pertinent ad lites iudiciorum; +sed etiam quaecumque pertinent ad ordinationem hominum ad invicem, +quae subest ordinationi principis tanquam supremi iudicis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument holds in respect of those precepts which direct man in his relations to his neighbor, and derive their binding + force from the mere dictate of reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="38149" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38149] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de illis praeceptis ordinantibus +ad proximum, quae habent vim obligandi ex solo dictamine +rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even in those precepts which direct us to God, some are moral precepts, which the reason itself dictates when it is quickened + by faith; such as that God is to be loved and worshipped. There are also ceremonial precepts, which have no binding force + except in virtue of their Divine institution. Now God is concerned not only with the sacrifices that are offered to Him, but + also with whatever relates to the fitness of those who offer sacrifices to Him and + worship Him. Because men are ordained to God as to their end; wherefore it concerns God and, consequently, is a matter of + ceremonial precept, that man should show some fitness for the divine worship. On the other hand, man is not ordained to his + neighbor as to his end, so as to need to be disposed in himself with regard to his neighbor, for such is the relationship + of a slave to his master, since a slave "is his master's in all that he is," as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2). Hence + there are + no judicial precepts ordaining man in himself; all such precepts are moral: because the reason, which is the principal in + moral matters, holds the same position, in man, with regard to things that concern him, as a prince or judge holds in the + state. Nevertheless we must take note that, since the relations of man to his neighbor are more subject to reason than the + relations of man to God, there are more precepts whereby man is directed in his relations to his neighbor, than whereby he + is + directed to God. For the same reason there had to be more ceremonial than judicial precepts in the Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="38150" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38150] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod etiam in his quae ordinant ad Deum, quaedam sunt +moralia, quae ipsa ratio fide informata dictat, sicut Deum esse +amandum et colendum. Quaedam vero sunt caeremonialia, quae non +habent vim obligationis nisi ex institutione divina. Ad Deum autem +pertinent non solum sacrificia oblata Deo, sed etiam quaecumque +pertinent ad idoneitatem offerentium et Deum colentium. Homines +enim ordinantur in Deum sicut in finem, et ideo ad cultum Dei +pertinet, et per consequens ad caeremonialia praecepta, quod homo +habeat quandam idoneitatem respectu cultus divini. Sed homo non +ordinatur ad proximum sicut in finem, ut oporteat eum disponi in +seipso in ordine ad proximum, haec enim est comparatio servorum ad +dominos, <i>qui id quod sunt, dominorum sunt</i>, secundum +philosophum, in I Polit. Et ideo non sunt aliqua praecepta +iudicialia ordinantia hominem in seipso, sed omnia talia sunt +moralia, quia ratio, quae est principium moralium, se habet in +homine respectu eorum quae ad ipsum pertinent, sicut princeps vel +iudex in civitate. Sciendum tamen quod, quia ordo hominis ad +proximum magis subiacet rationi quam ordo hominis ad Deum, plura +praecepta moralia inveniuntur per quae ordinatur homo ad proximum, +quam per quae ordinatur ad Deum. Et propter hoc etiam oportuit +plura esse caeremonialia in lege quam iudicialia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q104_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q104_A2-p0.1">Q. 104. A. 2. Whether the judicial precepts were figurative?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the judicial precepts were not figurative. Because it seems proper to the ceremonial precepts to be instituted + as figures of something else. Therefore, if the judicial precepts are figurative, there will be no difference between the + judicial and ceremonial precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="38151" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38151] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad +secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praecepta iudicialia non +figurent aliquid. Hoc enim videtur esse proprium caeremonialium +praeceptorum, quod sint in figuram alicuius rei instituta. Si +igitur etiam praecepta iudicialia aliquid figurent, non erit +differentia inter iudicialia et caeremonialia praecepta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as certain judicial precepts were given to the Jewish people, so also were some given to other heathen peoples. + But the judicial precepts given to other peoples were not figurative, but stated what had to be done. Therefore it seems that + neither were the judicial precepts of the Old Law figures of anything. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="38152" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38152] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicuti illi populo Iudaeorum data sunt quaedam iudicialia +praecepta, ita etiam aliis populis gentilium. Sed iudicialia +praecepta aliorum populorum non figurant aliquid, sed ordinant quid +fieri debeat. Ergo videtur quod neque praecepta iudicialia veteris +legis aliquid figurarent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, those things which relate to the divine worship had to be taught under certain figures, because the things of God + are above our reason, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q101_A2" id="FS_Q104_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[101], A[2]</a>, ad 2). But things concerning our neighbor are not above our reason. Therefore the judicial precepts which direct us in relation + to our neighbor should not have been figurative. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="38153" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38153] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +ea quae ad cultum divinum pertinent, figuris quibusdam tradi +oportuit, quia ea quae Dei sunt, supra nostram rationem sunt, ut +supra dictum est. Sed ea quae sunt proximorum, non excedunt nostram +rationem. Ergo per iudicialia, quae ad proximum nos ordinant, non +oportuit aliquid figurari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The judicial precepts are expounded both in the allegorical and in the moral sense ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q104_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.21" target="asv">Ex. 21</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 2 s. c."><a name="38154" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38154] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Exod. XXI iudicialia praecepta allegorice et moraliter +exponuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A precept may be figurative in two ways. First, primarily and in itself: because, to wit, it is instituted principally that + it may be the figure of something. In this way the ceremonial precepts are figurative; since they were instituted for the + very purpose that they might foreshadow something relating to the worship of God and the mystery of Christ. But some precepts + are figurative, not primarily and in themselves, but consequently. In this way the + judicial precepts of the Old Law are figurative. For they were not instituted for the purpose of being figurative, but in + order that they might regulate the state of that people according to justice and equity. Nevertheless they did foreshadow + something consequently: since, to wit, the entire state of that people, who were directed by these precepts, was figurative, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q104_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.10.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 10:11</a>: "All . . . things happened to them in figure." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 2 co."><a name="38155" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38155] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod dupliciter contingit aliquod praeceptum esse +figurale. Uno modo, primo et per se, quia scilicet principaliter +est institutum ad aliquid figurandum. Et hoc modo praecepta +caeremonialia sunt figuralia, ad hoc enim sunt instituta, ut +aliquid figurent pertinens ad cultum Dei et ad mysterium Christi. +Quaedam vero praecepta sunt figuralia non primo et per se, sed ex +consequenti. Et hoc modo praecepta iudicialia veteris legis sunt +figuralia. Non enim sunt instituta ad aliquid figurandum; sed ad +ordinandum statum illius populi secundum iustitiam et aequitatem. +Sed ex consequenti aliquid figurabant, inquantum scilicet totus +status illius populi, qui per huiusmodi praecepta disponebatur, +figuralis erat; secundum illud I ad Cor. X, <i>omnia in figuram +contingebant illis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The ceremonial precepts are not figurative in the same way as the judicial precepts, as explained above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="38156" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38156] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod praecepta caeremonialia alio modo sunt figuralia +quam iudicialia, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Jewish people were chosen by God that Christ might be born of them. Consequently the entire state of that people had + to be prophetic and figurative, as Augustine states (Contra Faust. xxii, 24). For this reason even the judicial precepts that + were given to this people were more figurative that those which were given to other nations. Thus, too, the wars and deeds + of this people are expounded in the mystical sense: but not the wars and deeds of the + Assyrians or Romans, although the latter are more famous in the eyes of men. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="38157" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38157] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod populus Iudaeorum ad hoc electus erat a Deo, quod ex +eo Christus nasceretur. Et ideo oportuit totum illius populi statum +esse propheticum et figuralem, ut Augustinus dicit, contra Faustum. +Et propter hoc etiam iudicialia illi populo tradita, magis sunt +figuralia quam iudicialia aliis populis tradita. Sicut etiam bella +et gesta illius populi exponuntur mystice; non autem bella vel +gesta Assyriorum vel Romanorum, quamvis longe clariora secundum +homines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In this people the direction of man in regard to his neighbor, considered in itself, was subject to reason. But in so far + as it was referred to the worship of God, it was above reason: and in this respect it was figurative. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="38158" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38158] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ordo ad proximum in populo illo, secundum se +consideratus, pervius erat rationi. Sed secundum quod referebatur +ad cultum Dei, superabat rationem. Et ex hac parte erat +figuralis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q104_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q104_A3-p0.1">Q. 104. A. 3. Whether the judicial precepts of the Old Law bind for ever?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the judicial precepts of the Old Law bind for ever. Because the judicial precepts relate to the virtue + of justice: since a judgment is an execution of the virtue of justice. Now "justice is perpetual and immortal" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q104_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.15" target="asv">Wis. 1:15</a>). Therefore the judicial precepts bind for ever. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="38159" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38159] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod praecepta iudicialia veteris legis +perpetuam obligationem habeant. Praecepta enim iudicialia pertinent +ad virtutem iustitiae, nam iudicium dicitur iustitiae executio. +Iustitia autem est perpetua et immortalis, ut dicitur Sap. I. Ergo +obligatio praeceptorum iudicialium est perpetua.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Divine institutions are more enduring than human institutions. But the judicial precepts of human laws bind for + ever. Therefore much more do the judicial precepts of the Divine Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="38160" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38160] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +institutio divina est stabilior quam institutio humana. Sed +praecepta iudicialia humanarum legum habent perpetuam obligationem. +Ergo multo magis praecepta iudicialia legis divinae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q104_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.7.18" target="asv">Heb. 7:18</a>) that "there is a setting aside of the former commandment, because of the weakness and unprofitableness thereof." Now this + is true of the ceremonial precept, which "could [Vulg.: 'can'] not, as to the conscience, make him perfect that serveth only + in meats and in drinks, and divers washings and justices of the flesh," as the Apostle declares ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q104_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.9.9" target="asv">Heb. 9:9,10</a>). On the other hand, the + judicial precepts were useful and efficacious in respect of the purpose for which they were instituted, viz. to establish + justice and equity among men. Therefore the judicial precepts of the Old Law are not set aside, but still retain their efficacy. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="38161" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38161] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +apostolus dicit, ad Heb. VII, quod <i>reprobatio fit praecedentis +mandati propter infirmitatem ipsius et inutilitatem</i>. Quod +quidem verum est de mandato caeremoniali quod <i>non poterat facere +perfectum iuxta conscientiam servientem solummodo in cibis et in +potibus et variis Baptismatibus et iustitiis carnis</i>, ut +apostolus dicit, ad Heb. IX. Sed praecepta iudicialia utilia erant +et efficacia ad id ad quod ordinabantur, scilicet ad iustitiam et +aequitatem inter homines constituendam. Ergo praecepta iudicialia +veteris legis non reprobantur, sed adhuc efficaciam habent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q104_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.7.12" target="asv">Heb. 7:12</a>) that "the priesthood being translated it is necessary that a translation also be made of the Law." But the priesthood was + transferred from Aaron to Christ. Therefore the entire Law was also transferred. Therefore the judicial precepts are no longer + in force. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 3 s. c."><a name="38162" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38162] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Heb. VII, quod <i>translato +sacerdotio, necesse est ut legis translatio fiat</i>. Sed +sacerdotium est translatum ab Aaron ad Christum. Ergo etiam et tota +lex est translata. Non ergo iudicialia praecepta adhuc obligationem +habent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q104_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The judicial precepts did not bind for ever, but were annulled by the coming of Christ: yet not in the same way as the ceremonial + precepts. For the ceremonial precepts were annulled so far as to be not only "dead," but also deadly to those who observe + them since the coming of Christ, especially since the promulgation of the Gospel. On the other hand, the judicial precepts + are dead indeed, because they have no binding force: but they are not deadly. For if a + sovereign were to order these judicial precepts to be observed in his kingdom, he would not sin: unless perchance they were + observed, or ordered to be observed, as though they derived their binding force through being institutions of the Old Law: + for it would be a deadly sin to intend to observe them thus. + </p><p id="FS_Q104_A3-p7"> The reason for this difference may be gathered from what has been said above + <a href="#FS_Q104_A2" id="FS_Q104_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. For it has been stated that the ceremonial precepts are figurative primarily and in themselves, as being instituted chiefly + for the purpose of foreshadowing the mysteries of Christ to come. On the other hand, the judicial precepts were not instituted + that they might be figures, but that they might shape the state of that people who were directed to Christ. Consequently, + when the state of that people changed with the coming of Christ, the judicial precepts lost their binding force: for the Law + was a pedagogue, leading men to Christ, as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q104_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.24" target="asv"> Gal. 3:24.</a> Since, however, these judicial precepts are instituted, not for the purpose of being figures, but for the performance of + certain deeds, the observance thereof is not prejudicial to the truth of faith. But the intention of observing them, as though + one were bound by the Law, is + prejudicial to the truth of faith: because it would follow that the former state of the people still lasts, and that Christ + has not yet come. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 3 co."><a name="38163" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38163] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod iudicialia praecepta non habuerunt perpetuam +obligationem, sed sunt evacuata per adventum Christi, aliter tamen +quam caeremonialia. Nam caeremonialia adeo sunt evacuata ut non +solum sint mortua, sed etiam mortifera observantibus post Christum, +maxime post Evangelium divulgatum. Praecepta autem iudicialia sunt +quidem mortua, quia non habent vim obligandi, non tamen sunt +mortifera. Quia si quis princeps ordinaret in regno suo illa +iudicialia observari, non peccaret, nisi forte hoc modo +observarentur, vel observari mandarentur, tanquam habentia vim +obligandi ex veteris legis institutione. Talis enim intentio +observandi esset mortifera. Et huius differentiae ratio potest +accipi ex praemissis. Dictum est enim quod praecepta caeremonialia +sunt figuralia primo et per se, tanquam instituta principaliter ad +figurandum Christi mysteria ut futura. Et ideo ipsa observatio +eorum praeiudicat fidei veritati, secundum quam confitemur illa +mysteria iam esse completa. Praecepta autem iudicialia non sunt +instituta ad figurandum, sed ad disponendum statum illius populi, +qui ordinabatur ad Christum. Et ideo, mutato statu illius populi, +Christo iam veniente, iudicialia praecepta obligationem amiserunt, +lex enim fuit paedagogus ducens ad Christum, ut dicitur ad Gal. +III. Quia tamen huiusmodi iudicialia praecepta non ordinantur ad +figurandum, sed ad aliquid fiendum, ipsa eorum observatio absolute +non praeiudicat fidei veritati. Sed intentio observandi tanquam ex +obligatione legis, praeiudicat veritati fidei, quia per hoc +haberetur quod status prioris populi adhuc duraret, et quod +Christus nondum venisset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The obligation of observing justice is indeed perpetual. But the determination of those things that are just, according to + human or Divine institution, must needs be different, according to the different states of mankind. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="38164" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38164] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod iustitia quidem perpetuo est observanda. Sed +determinatio eorum quae sunt iusta secundum institutionem humanam +vel divinam, oportet quod varietur secundum diversum hominum +statum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The judicial precepts established by men retain their binding force for ever, so long as the state of government remains + the same. But if the state or nation pass to another form of government, the laws must needs be changed. For democracy, which + is government by the people, demands different laws from those of oligarchy, which is government by the rich, as the Philosopher + shows (Polit. iv, 1). Consequently when the state of that people changed, the + judicial precepts had to be changed also. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="38165" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38165] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod praecepta iudicialia ab hominibus instituta habent +perpetuam obligationem, manente illo statu regiminis. Sed si +civitas vel gens ad aliud regimen deveniat, oportet leges mutari. +Non enim eaedem leges conveniunt in democratia, quae est potestas +populi, et in oligarchia, quae est potestas divitum; ut patet per +philosophum, in sua politica. Et ideo etiam, mutato statu illius +populi, oportuit praecepta iudicialia mutari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those judicial precepts directed the people to justice and equity, in keeping with the demands of that state. But after the + coming of Christ, there had to be a change in the state of that people, so that in Christ there was no distinction between + Gentile and Jew, as there had been before. For this reason the judicial precepts needed to be changed also. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="38166" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38166] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod illa praecepta iudicialia disponebant populum ad +iustitiam et aequitatem secundum quod conveniebat illi statui. Sed +post Christum, statum illius populi oportuit mutari, ut iam in +Christo non esset discretio gentilis et Iudaei, sicut antea erat. +Et propter hoc oportuit etiam praecepta iudicialia mutari.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q104_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q104_A4-p0.1">Q. 104. A. 4. Whether it is possible to assign a distinct division of the judicial precepts?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is impossible to assign a distinct division of the judicial precepts. Because the judicial precepts + direct men in their relations to one another. But those things which need to be directed, as pertaining to the relationship + between man and man, and which are made use of by men, are not subject to division, since they are infinite in number. Therefore + it is not possible to assign a distinct division of the judicial precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="38167" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38167] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod praecepta iudicialia non possint +habere aliquam certam divisionem. Praecepta enim iudicialia +ordinant homines ad invicem. Sed ea quae inter homines ordinari +oportet, in usum eorum venientia, non cadunt sub certa +distinctione, cum sint infinita. Ergo praecepta iudicialia non +possunt habere certam distinctionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the judicial precepts are decisions on moral matters. But moral precepts do not seem to be capable of division, + except in so far as they are reducible to the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore there is no distinct division of the judicial + precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="38168" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38168] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +praecepta iudicialia sunt determinationes moralium. Sed moralia +praecepta non videntur habere aliquam distinctionem, nisi secundum +quod reducuntur ad praecepta Decalogi. Ergo praecepta iudicialia +non habent aliquam certam distinctionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, because there is a distinct division of the ceremonial precepts, the Law alludes to this division, by describing + some as "sacrifices," others as "observances." But the Law contains no allusion to a division of the judicial precepts. Therefore + it seems that they have no distinct division. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="38169" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38169] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +praecepta caeremonialia quia certam distinctionem habent, eorum +distinctio in lege innuitur, dum quaedam vocantur sacrificia, +quaedam observantiae. Sed nulla distinctio innuitur in lege +praeceptorum iudicialium. Ergo videtur quod non habeant certam +distinctionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Wherever there is order there must needs be division. But the notion of order is chiefly applicable to the judicial precepts, + since thereby that people was ordained. Therefore it is most necessary that they should have a distinct division. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 4 s. c."><a name="38170" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38170] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +ubi est ordo, oportet quod sit distinctio. Sed ratio ordinis maxime +pertinet ad praecepta iudicialia, per quae populus ille +ordinabatur. Ergo maxime debent habere distinctionem certam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q104_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since law is the art, as it were, of directing or ordering the life of man, as in every art there is a distinct division + in the rules of art, so, in every law, there must be a distinct division of precepts: else the law would be rendered useless + by confusion. We must therefore say that the judicial precepts of the Old Law, whereby men were directed in their relations + to one another, are subject to division according to the divers ways in which man is + directed. + </p><p id="FS_Q104_A4-p7"> Now in every people a fourfold order is to be found: one, of the people's sovereign to his subjects; a second of the subjects + among themselves; a third, of the citizens to foreigners; a fourth, of members of the same household, such as the order of + the father to his son; of the wife to her husband; of the master to his servant: and according to these four orders we may + distinguish different kinds of judicial precepts in the Old Law. For certain precepts are laid down concerning + the institution of the sovereign and relating to his office, and about the respect due to him: this is one part of the judicial + precepts. Again, certain precepts are given in respect of a man to his fellow citizens: for instance, about buying and selling, + judgments and penalties: this is the second part of the judicial precepts. Again, certain precepts are enjoined with regard + to foreigners: for instance, about wars waged against their foes, and about the way to receive travelers and strangers: + this is the third part of the judicial precepts. Lastly, certain precepts are given relating to home life: for instance, about + servants, wives and children: this is the fourth part of the judicial precepts. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 4 co."><a name="38171" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38171] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, cum lex sit quasi quaedam ars humanae vitae +instituendae vel ordinandae, sicut in unaquaque arte est certa +distinctio regularum artis, ita oportet in qualibet lege esse +certam distinctionem praeceptorum, aliter enim ipsa confusio +utilitatem legis auferret. Et ideo dicendum est quod praecepta +iudicialia veteris legis, per quae homines ad invicem ordinabantur, +distinctionem habent secundum distinctionem ordinationis humanae. +Quadruplex autem ordo in aliquo populo inveniri potest, unus +quidem, principum populi ad subditos; alius autem, subditorum ad +invicem; tertius autem, eorum qui sunt de populo ad extraneos; +quartus autem, ad domesticos, sicut patris ad filium, uxoris ad +virum, et domini ad servum. Et secundum istos quatuor ordines +distingui possunt praecepta iudicialia veteris legis. Dantur enim +quaedam praecepta de institutione principum et officio eorum, et de +reverentia eis exhibenda, et haec est una pars iudicialium +praeceptorum. Dantur etiam quaedam praecepta pertinentia ad +concives ad invicem, puta circa emptiones et venditiones, et +iudicia et poenas. Et haec est secunda pars iudicialium +praeceptorum. Dantur etiam quaedam praecepta pertinentia ad +extraneos, puta de bellis contra hostes, et de susceptione +peregrinorum et advenarum. Et haec est tertia pars iudicialium +praeceptorum. Dantur etiam in lege quaedam praecepta pertinentia ad +domesticam conversationem, sicut de servis, et uxoribus, et filiis. +Et haec est quarta pars iudicialium praeceptorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Things pertaining to the ordering of relations between one man and another are indeed infinite in number: yet they are reducible + to certain distinct heads, according to the different relations in which one man stands to another, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="38172" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38172] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ea quae pertinent ad ordinationem hominum ad +invicem, sunt quidem numero infinita; sed tamen reduci possunt ad +aliqua certa, secundum differentiam ordinationis humanae, ut dictum +est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The precepts of the decalogue held the first place in the moral order, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q100_A3" id="FS_Q104_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[100], A[3]</a>): and consequently it is fitting that other moral precepts should be distinguished in relation to them. But the judicial + and ceremonial precepts have a different binding force, derived, not from natural reason, but from their institution alone. + Hence there is a distinct reason for distinguishing them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="38173" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38173] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod praecepta Decalogi sunt prima in genere moralium, ut +supra dictum est, et ideo convenienter alia praecepta moralia +secundum ea distinguuntur. Sed praecepta iudicialia et +caeremonialia habent aliam rationem obligationis non quidem ex +ratione naturali sed ex sola institutione. Et ideo distinctionis +eorum est alia ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Law alludes to the division of the judicial precepts in the very things themselves which are prescribed by the judicial + precepts of the Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="38174" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38174] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ex ipsis rebus quae per praecepta iudicialia +ordinantur in lege, innuit lex distinctionem iudicialium +praeceptorum.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q105" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q105-p0.1">Q. 105. OF THE REASON FOR THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q105-p2"> We must now consider the reason for the judicial precepts: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q105-p3"><a href="#FS_Q105_A1"> (1) Concerning the reason for the judicial precepts relating to the rulers;</a></p><p id="FS_Q105-p4"><a href="#FS_Q105_A2"> (2) Concerning the fellowship of one man with another;</a></p><p id="FS_Q105-p5"><a href="#FS_Q105_A3"> (3) Concerning matters relating to foreigners;</a></p><p id="FS_Q105-p6"><a href="#FS_Q105_A4"> (4) Concerning things relating to domestic matters.</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 pr."><a name="38175" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38175] Iª-IIae q. 105 pr.</span></a> Deinde +considerandum est de ratione iudicialium praeceptorum. Et circa hoc +quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, de ratione praeceptorum iudicialium quae +pertinent ad principes. Secundo, de his quae pertinent ad convictum +hominum ad invicem. Tertio, de his quae pertinent ad extraneos. +Quarto, de his quae pertinent ad domesticam conversationem.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q105_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q105_A1-p0.1">Q. 105. A. 1. Whether the Old Law enjoined fitting precepts concerning rulers?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Old Law made unfitting precepts concerning rulers. Because, as the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 4), + "the ordering of the people depends mostly on the chief ruler." But the Law contains no precept relating to the institution + of the chief ruler; and yet we find therein prescriptions concerning the inferior rulers: firstly ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.18.21" target="asv">Ex. 18:21</a>): "Provide out of all the people wise [Vulg.: 'able'] men," etc.; again ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Num.11.16" target="asv">Num. 11:16</a>): + "Gather unto Me seventy men of the ancients of Israel"; and again ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.1.13" target="asv">Dt. 1:13</a>): "Let Me have from among you wise and understanding men," etc. Therefore the Law provided insufficiently in regard to the + rulers of the people. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="38176" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38176] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter lex vetus de +principibus ordinaverit. Quia, ut philosophus dicit, in III Polit., +<i>ordinatio populi praecipue dependet ex maximo principatu</i>. +Sed in lege non invenitur qualiter debeat institui supremus +princeps. Invenitur autem de inferioribus principibus, primo +quidem, Exod. XVIII, provide de omni plebe viros sapientes, etc.; +et Num. XI, congrega mihi septuaginta viros de senioribus Israel; +et Deut. I, date ex vobis viros sapientes et gnaros, et cetera. +Ergo insufficienter lex vetus principes populi ordinavit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "The best gives of the best," as Plato states (Tim. ii). Now the best ordering of a state or of any nation is to + be ruled by a king: because this kind of government approaches nearest in resemblance to the Divine government, whereby God + rules the world from the beginning. Therefore the Law should have set a king over the people, and they should not have been + allowed a choice in the matter, as indeed they were allowed ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.17.14" target="asv">Dt. + 17:14,15 + </a>): "When thou . . . shalt say: I will set a king over me . . . thou shalt set him," etc. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="38177" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38177] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +optimi est optima adducere, ut Plato dicit. Sed optima ordinatio +civitatis vel populi cuiuscumque est ut gubernetur per regem, quia +huiusmodi regimen maxime repraesentat divinum regimen, quo unus +Deus mundum gubernat. A principio igitur lex debuit regem populo +instituere; et non permittere hoc eorum arbitrio, sicut permittitur +Deut. XVII, <i>cum dixeris, constituam super me regem, eum +constitues,</i> et cetera.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.25" target="asv"> Mat. 12:25</a>: "Every kingdom divided against itself shall be made desolate": a saying which was verified in the Jewish people, whose destruction + was brought about by the division of the kingdom. But the Law should aim chiefly at things pertaining to the general well-being + of the people. Therefore it should have forbidden the kingdom to be divided under two kings: nor should this have been introduced + even by Divine + authority; as we read of its being introduced by the authority of the prophet Ahias the Silonite ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 11:29, </a> seqq.). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="38178" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38178] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut dicitur Matth. XII, omne regnum in se divisum desolabitur, +quod etiam experimento patuit in populo Iudaeorum, in quo divisio +regni fuit destructionis causa. Sed lex praecipue debet intendere +ea quae pertinent ad communem salutem populi. Ergo debuit in lege +prohiberi divisio regni in duos reges. Nec etiam debuit hoc +auctoritate divina introduci; sicut legitur introductum auctoritate +domini per Ahiam Silonitem prophetam, III Reg. XI.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as priests are instituted for the benefit of the people in things concerning God, as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.5.1" target="asv"> Heb. 5:1</a>; so are rulers set up for the benefit of the people in human affairs. But certain things were allotted as a means of livelihood + for the priests and Levites of the Law: such as the tithes and first-fruits, and many like things. Therefore in like manner + certain things should have been determined for the livelihood of the + rulers of the people: the more that they were forbidden to accept presents, as is clearly stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.23.8" target="asv"> Ex. 23:8</a>: "You shall not [Vulg.: 'Neither shalt thou'] take bribes, which even blind the wise, and pervert the words of the just." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="38179" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38179] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut sacerdotes instituuntur ad utilitatem populi in his quae ad +Deum pertinent, ut patet Heb. V; ita etiam principes instituuntur +ad utilitatem populi in rebus humanis. Sed sacerdotibus et Levitis +qui sunt in lege, deputantur aliqua ex quibus vivere debeant, sicut +decimae et primitiae, et multa alia huiusmodi. Ergo similiter +principibus populi debuerunt aliqua ordinari unde sustentarentur, +et praecipue cum inhibita sit eis munerum acceptio, ut patet Exod. +XXIII, <i>non accipietis munera, quae excaecant etiam prudentes, et +subvertunt verba iustorum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, as a kingdom is the best form of government, so is tyranny the most corrupt. But when the Lord appointed the king, + He established a tyrannical law; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.8.11" target="asv">1 Kings 8:11</a>): "This will be the right of the king, that shall reign over you: He will take your sons," etc. Therefore the Law made unfitting + provision with regard to the institution of rulers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="38180" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38180] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut regnum est optimum regimen, ita tyrannis est pessima +corruptio regiminis. Sed dominus regi instituendo instituit ius +tyrannicum, dicitur enim I Reg. VIII, <i>hoc erit ius regis qui +imperaturus est vobis, filios vestros tollet</i>, et cetera. Ergo +inconvenienter fuit provisum per legem circa principum +ordinationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A1-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The people of Israel is commended for the beauty of its order ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Num.24.5" target="asv">Num. 24:5</a>): "How beautiful are thy tabernacles, O Jacob, and thy tents." But the beautiful ordering of a people depends on the right + establishment of its rulers. Therefore the Law made right provision for the people with regard to its rulers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 1 s. c."><a name="38181" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38181] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod populus Israel de pulchritudine ordinationis commendatur, +Num. XXIV, <i>quam pulchra tabernacula tua, Iacob; et tentoria tua, +Israel</i>. Sed pulchritudo ordinationis populi dependet ex +principibus bene institutis. Ergo per legem populus fuit circa +principes bene institutus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q105_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Two points are to be observed concerning the right ordering of rulers in a state or nation. One is that all should take some + share in the government: for this form of constitution ensures peace among the people, commends itself to all, and is most + enduring, as stated in Polit. ii, 6. The other point is to be observed in respect of the kinds of government, or the different + ways in which the constitutions are established. For whereas these differ in kind, as + the Philosopher states (Polit. iii, 5), nevertheless the first place is held by the "kingdom," where the power of government + is vested in one; and "aristocracy," which signifies government by the best, where the power of government is vested in a + few. Accordingly, the best form of government is in a state or kingdom, where one is given the power to preside over all; + while under him are others having governing powers: and yet a government of this kind is shared by all, both because all are + eligible to govern, and because the rules are chosen by all. For this is the best form of polity, being partly kingdom, since + there is one at the head of all; partly aristocracy, in so far as a number of persons are set in authority; partly democracy, + i.e. government by the people, in so far as the rulers can be chosen from the people, and the people have the right to choose + their rulers. + </p><p id="FS_Q105_A1-p9"> Such was the form of government established by the Divine Law. For Moses and his successors governed the people in such a + way that each of them was ruler over all; so that there was a kind of kingdom. Moreover, seventy-two men were chosen, who + were elders in virtue: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.1.15" target="asv">Dt. 1:15</a>): "I took out of your tribes wise and honorable, and appointed them rulers": so that there was an element of aristocracy. + But it was a democratical government in so + far as the rulers were chosen from all the people; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.18.21" target="asv">Ex. 18:21</a>): "Provide out of all the people wise [Vulg.: 'able'] men," etc.; and, again, in so far as they were chosen by the people; + wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p9.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.1.13" target="asv">Dt. 1:13</a>): "Let me have from among you wise [Vulg.: 'able'] men," etc. Consequently it is evident that the ordering of the rulers + was well provided for by the Law. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 1 co."><a name="38182" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38182] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod circa bonam ordinationem principum in aliqua civitate +vel gente, duo sunt attendenda. Quorum unum est ut omnes aliquam +partem habeant in principatu, per hoc enim conservatur pax populi, +et omnes talem ordinationem amant et custodiunt, ut dicitur in II +Polit. Aliud est quod attenditur secundum speciem regiminis, vel +ordinationis principatuum. Cuius cum sint diversae species, ut +philosophus tradit, in III Polit., praecipuae tamen sunt regnum, in +quo unus principatur secundum virtutem; et aristocratia, idest +potestas optimorum, in qua aliqui pauci principantur secundum +virtutem. Unde optima ordinatio principum est in aliqua civitate +vel regno, in qua unus praeficitur secundum virtutem qui omnibus +praesit; et sub ipso sunt aliqui principantes secundum virtutem; et +tamen talis principatus ad omnes pertinet, tum quia ex omnibus +eligi possunt, tum quia etiam ab omnibus eliguntur. Talis enim est +optima politia, bene commixta ex regno, inquantum unus praeest; et +aristocratia, inquantum multi principantur secundum virtutem; et ex +democratia, idest potestate populi, inquantum ex popularibus +possunt eligi principes, et ad populum pertinet electio principum. +Et hoc fuit institutum secundum legem divinam. Nam Moyses et eius +successores gubernabant populum quasi singulariter omnibus +principantes, quod est quaedam species regni. Eligebantur autem +septuaginta duo seniores secundum virtutem, dicitur enim Deut. I, +<i>tuli de vestris tribubus viros sapientes et nobiles, et +constitui eos principes</i>, et hoc erat aristocraticum. Sed +democraticum erat quod isti de omni populo eligebantur; dicitur +enim Exod. XVIII, <i>provide de omni plebe viros sapientes,</i> +etc., et etiam quod populus eos eligebat; unde dicitur Deut. I, +date ex vobis viros sapientes, et cetera. Unde patet quod optima +fuit ordinatio principum quam lex instituit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This people was governed under the special care of God: wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.7.6" target="asv">Dt. 7:6</a>): "The Lord thy God hath chosen thee to be His peculiar people": and this is why the Lord reserved to Himself the institution + of the chief ruler. For this too did Moses pray ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Num.27.16" target="asv">Num. 27:16</a>): "May the Lord the God of the spirits of all the flesh provide a man, that may be over this multitude." Thus by God's orders + Josue was + set at the head in place of Moses; and we read about each of the judges who succeeded Josue that God "raised . . . up a saviour" + for the people, and that "the spirit of the Lord was" in them ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p10.3" href="./asv.html#Judg.3.9" target="asv">Judges 3:9</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p10.4" href="./asv.html#Judg.3.10" target="asv">10</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p10.5" href="./asv.html#Judg.3.15" target="asv">15</a>). Hence the Lord did not leave the choice of a king to the people; but reserved this to Himself, as appears from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p10.6" href="./asv.html#Deut.17.15" target="asv"> Dt. 17:15</a>: "Thou shalt set him whom the Lord thy God shall choose." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="38183" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38183] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod populus ille sub speciali cura Dei regebatur, +unde dicitur Deut. VII, <i>te elegit dominus Deus tuus ut sis ei +populus peculiaris</i>. Et ideo institutionem summi principis +dominus sibi reservavit. Et hoc est quod Moyses petivit, Num. +XXVII, <i>provideat dominus Deus spirituum omnis carnis, hominem +qui sit super multitudinem hanc</i>. Et sic ex Dei ordinatione +institutus est Iosue in principatu post Moysen, et de singulis +iudicibus qui post Iosue fuerunt, legitur quod Deus suscitavit +populo salvatorem, et quod spiritus domini fuit in eis, ut patet +Iudic. III. Et ideo etiam electionem regis non commisit dominus +populo, sed sibi reservavit; ut patet Deut. XVII, <i>eum constitues +regem, quem dominus Deus tuus elegerit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q105_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A kingdom is the best form of government of the people, so long as it is not corrupt. But since the power granted to a king + is so great, it easily degenerates into tyranny, unless he to whom this power is given be a very virtuous man: for it is only + the virtuous man that conducts himself well in the midst of prosperity, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 3). Now perfect + virtue is to be found in few: and especially were the Jews inclined to + cruelty and avarice, which vices above all turn men into tyrants. Hence from the very first the Lord did not set up the kingly + authority with full power, but gave them judges and governors to rule them. But afterwards when the people asked Him to do + so, being indignant with them, so to speak, He granted them a king, as is clear from His words to Samuel ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.8.7" target="asv">1 Kings 8:7</a>): "They have not rejected thee, but Me, that I should not reign over them." + </p><p id="FS_Q105_A1-p12"> Nevertheless, as regards the appointment of a king, He did establish the manner of election from the very beginning ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.17.14" target="asv">Dt. 17:14, </a> seqq.): and then He determined two points: first, that in choosing a king they should wait for the Lord's decision; and that + they should not make a man of another nation king, because such kings are wont to take little interest in the people they + are set over, and consequently to have no care for their welfare: secondly, He + prescribed how the king after his appointment should behave, in regard to himself; namely, that he should not accumulate chariots + and horses, nor wives, nor immense wealth: because through craving for such things princes become tyrants and forsake justice. + He also appointed the manner in which they were to conduct themselves towards God: namely, that they should continually read + and ponder on God's Law, and should ever fear and obey God. Moreover, He decided how they should behave towards their + subjects: namely, that they should not proudly despise them, or ill-treat them, and that they should not depart from the paths + of justice. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="38184" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38184] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod regnum est optimum regimen populi, si non +corrumpatur. Sed propter magnam potestatem quae regi conceditur, de +facili regnum degenerat in tyrannidem, nisi sit perfecta virtus +eius cui talis potestas conceditur, quia non est nisi virtuosi bene +ferre bonas fortunas, ut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic. Perfecta +autem virtus in paucis invenitur, et praecipue Iudaei crudeles +erant et ad avaritiam proni, per quae vitia maxime homines in +tyrannidem decidunt. Et ideo dominus a principio eis regem non +instituit cum plena potestate, sed iudicem et gubernatorem in eorum +custodiam. Sed postea regem ad petitionem populi, quasi indignatus, +concessit, ut patet per hoc quod dixit ad Samuelem, I Reg. VIII, +<i>non te abiecerunt, sed me, ne regnem super eos</i>. Instituit +tamen a principio circa regem instituendum, primo quidem, modum +eligendi. In quo duo determinavit, ut scilicet in eius electione +expectarent iudicium domini; et ut non facerent regem alterius +gentis, quia tales reges solent parum affici ad gentem cui +praeficiuntur, et per consequens non curare de eis. Secundo, +ordinavit circa reges institutos qualiter deberent se habere +quantum ad seipsos, ut scilicet non multiplicarent currus et equos, +neque uxores, neque etiam immensas divitias; quia ex cupiditate +horum principes ad tyrannidem declinant, et iustitiam derelinquunt. +Instituit etiam qualiter se deberent habere ad Deum, ut scilicet +semper legerent et cogitarent de lege Dei, et semper essent in Dei +timore et obedientia. Instituit etiam qualiter se haberent ad +subditos suos, ut scilicet non superbe eos contemnerent, aut +opprimerent, neque etiam a iustitia declinarent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The division of the kingdom, and a number of kings, was rather a punishment inflicted on that people for their many dissensions, + specially against the just rule of David, than a benefit conferred on them for their profit. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Hos.13.11" target="asv">Osee 13:11</a>): "I will give thee a king in My wrath"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p13.2" href="./asv.html#Hos.8.4" target="asv">Osee 8:4</a>): "They have reigned, but not by Me: they have been princes, and I knew not." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="38185" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38185] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod divisio regni, et multitudo regum, magis est populo +illi data in poenam pro multis dissensionibus eorum, quas maxime +contra regnum David iustum moverant, quam ad eorum profectum. Unde +dicitur Osee XIII, <i>dabo tibi regem in furore meo</i>; et Osee +VIII, <i>ipsi regnaverunt, et non ex me, principes extiterunt, et +non cognovi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The priestly office was bequeathed by succession from father to son: and this, in order that it might be held in greater + respect, if not any man from the people could become a priest: since honor was given to them out of reverence for the divine + worship. Hence it was necessary to put aside certain things for them both as to tithes and as to first-fruits, and, again, + as to oblations and sacrifices, that they might be afforded a means of livelihood. On + the other hand, the rulers, as stated above, were chosen from the whole people; wherefore they had their own possessions, + from which to derive a living: and so much the more, since the Lord forbade even a king to have superabundant wealth to make + too much show of magnificence: both because he could scarcely avoid the excesses of pride and tyranny, arising from such things, + and because, if the rulers were not very rich, and if their office involved much work and anxiety, it would not tempt the + ambition of the common people; and would not become an occasion of sedition. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="38186" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38186] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod sacerdotes per successionem originis sacris +deputabantur. Et hoc ideo ut in maiori reverentia haberentur, si +non quilibet ex populo posset sacerdos fieri, quorum honor cedebat +in reverentiam divini cultus. Et ideo oportuit ut eis specialia +quaedam deputarentur, tam in decimis quam in primitiis, quam etiam +in oblationibus et sacrificiis, ex quibus viverent. Sed principes, +sicut dictum est, assumebantur ex toto populo, et ideo habebant +certas possessiones proprias, ex quibus vivere poterant. Et +praecipue cum dominus prohiberet etiam in rege ne superabundaret +divitiis aut magnifico apparatu, tum quia non erat facile quin ex +his in superbiam et tyrannidem erigeretur; tum etiam quia, si +principes non erant multum divites, et erat laboriosus principatus +et sollicitudine plenus, non multum affectabatur a popularibus, et +sic tollebatur seditionis materia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> That right was not given to the king by Divine institution: rather was it foretold that kings would usurp that right, by + framing unjust laws, and by degenerating into tyrants who preyed on their subjects. This is clear from the context that follows: + "And you shall be his slaves [Douay: 'servants']": which is significative of tyranny, since a tyrant rules is subjects as + though they were his slaves. Hence Samuel spoke these words to deter them from + asking for a king; since the narrative continues: "But the people would not hear the voice of Samuel." It may happen, however, + that even a good king, without being a tyrant, may take away the sons, and make them tribunes and centurions; and may take + many things from his subjects in order to secure the common weal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="38187" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38187] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod illud ius non dabatur regi ex institutione divina; +sed magis praenuntiatur usurpatio regum, qui sibi ius iniquum +constituunt in tyrannidem degenerantes, et subditos depraedantes. +Et hoc patet per hoc quod in fine subdit, <i>vosque eritis ei +servi</i>, quod proprie pertinet ad tyrannidem, quia tyranni suis +subditis principantur ut servis. Unde hoc dicebat Samuel ad +deterrendum eos ne regem peterent, sequitur enim, <i>noluit autem +audire populus vocem Samuelis</i>. Potest tamen contingere quod +etiam bonus rex, absque tyrannide, filios tollat, et constituat +tribunos et centuriones, et multa accipiat a subditis, propter +commune bonum procurandum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q105_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q105_A2-p0.1">Q. 105. A. 2. Whether the judicial precepts were suitably framed as to the relations of one man with another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the judicial precepts were not suitably framed as regards the relations of one man with another. Because + men cannot live together in peace, if one man takes what belongs to another. But this seems to have been approved by the Law: + since it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.24" target="asv">Dt. 23:24</a>): "Going into thy neighbor's vineyard, thou mayest eat as many grapes as thou pleasest." Therefore the Old Law did not make + suitable provisions for man's + peace. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="38188" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38188] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad +secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter fuerint +tradita praecepta iudicialia quantum ad popularium convictum. Non +enim possunt homines pacifice vivere ad invicem, si unus accipiat +ea quae sunt alterius. Sed hoc videtur esse inductum in lege, +dicitur enim Deut. XXIII, <i>ingressus vineam proximi tui, comede +uvas quantum tibi placuerit</i>. Ergo lex vetus non convenienter +providebat hominum paci.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one of the chief causes of the downfall of states has been the holding of property by women, as the Philosopher + says (Polit. ii, 6). But this was introduced by the Old Law; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Num.27.8" target="asv">Num. 27:8</a>): "When a man dieth without a son, his inheritance shall pass to his daughter." Therefore the Law made unsuitable provision + for the welfare of the people. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="38189" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38189] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ex hoc maxime multae civitates et regna destruuntur, quod +possessiones ad mulieres perveniunt, ut philosophus dicit, in II +Polit. Sed hoc fuit introductum in veteri lege, dicitur enim Num. +XXVII, <i>homo cum mortuus fuerit absque filio, ad filiam eius +transibit hereditas</i>. Ergo non convenienter providit lex saluti +populi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is most conducive to the preservation of human society that men may provide themselves with necessaries by buying + and selling, as stated in Polit. i. But the Old Law took away the force of sales; since it prescribes that in the 50th year + of the jubilee all that is sold shall return to the vendor ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.25.28" target="asv">Lev. 25:28</a>). Therefore in this matter the Law gave the people an unfitting command. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="38190" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38190] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +societas hominum maxime per hoc conservatur, quod homines emendo et +vendendo sibi invicem res suas commutant quibus indigent, ut +dicitur in I Polit. Sed lex vetus abstulit virtutem venditionis, +mandavit enim quod possessio vendita reverteretur ad venditorem in +quinquagesimo anno iubilaei, ut patet Levit. XXV. Inconvenienter +igitur lex populum illum circa hoc instituit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, man's needs require that men should be ready to lend: which readiness ceases if the creditors do not return the + pledges: hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.29.10" target="asv">Ecclus. 29:10</a>): "Many have refused to lend, not out of wickedness, but they were afraid to be defrauded without cause." And yet this was + encouraged by the Law. First, because it prescribed ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.15.2" target="asv">Dt. 15:2</a>): "He to whom any thing is owing from his friend or neighbor or brother, + cannot demand it again, because it is the year of remission of the Lord"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p5.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.15" target="asv">Ex. 22:15</a>) it is stated that if a borrowed animal should die while the owner is present, the borrower is not bound to make restitution. + Secondly, because the security acquired through the pledge is lost: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p5.4" href="./asv.html#Deut.24.10" target="asv">Dt. 24:10</a>): "When thou shalt demand of thy neighbor any thing that he oweth thee, thou shalt not go into his house to take away a pledge"; + and again + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p5.5" href="./asv.html#Deut.24.12" target="asv">Dt. 24:12,13</a>): "The pledge shall not lodge with thee that night, but thou shalt restore it to him presently." Therefore the Law made insufficient + provision in the matter of loans. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="38191" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38191] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +necessitatibus hominum maxime expedit ut homines sint prompti ad +mutuum concedendum. Quae quidem promptitudo tollitur per hoc quod +creditores accepta non reddunt, unde dicitur Eccli. XXIX, <i>multi +non causa nequitiae non faenerati sunt, sed fraudari gratis +timuerunt</i>. Hoc autem induxit lex. Primo quidem, quia mandavit +Deut. XV, <i>cui debetur aliquid ab amico vel proximo ac fratre +suo, repetere non poterit, quia annus remissionis est domini</i>; +et Exod. XXII dicitur quod si praesente domino animal mutuatum +mortuum fuerit, reddere non tenetur. Secundo, quia aufertur ei +securitas quae habetur per pignus, dicitur enim Deut. XXIV, <i>cum +repetes a proximo tuo rem aliquam quam debet tibi, non ingredieris +domum eius ut pignus auferas</i>; et iterum, <i>non pernoctabit +apud te pignus, sed statim reddes ei</i>. Ergo insufficienter fuit +ordinatum in lege de mutuis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A2-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, considerable risk attaches to goods deposited with a fraudulent depositary: wherefore great caution should be observed + in such matters: hence it is stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iiMacc.3.15" target="asv">2 Mac. 3:15 </a>that "the priests . . . called upon Him from heaven, Who made the law concerning things given to be kept, that He would preserve + them safe, for them that had deposited them." But the precepts of the Old Law observed little caution in regard to deposits: + since it + is prescribed ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.10" target="asv">Ex. 22:10,11</a>) that when goods deposited are lost, the owner is to stand by the oath of the depositary. Therefore the Law made unsuitable + provision in this matter. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 arg. 5"><a name="38192" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38192] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +ex defraudatione depositi maximum periculum imminet, et ideo est +maxima cautela adhibenda, unde etiam dicitur II Mach. III, quod +<i>sacerdotes invocabant de caelo eum qui de depositis legem +posuit, ut his qui deposuerant ea, salva custodiret</i>. Sed in +praeceptis veteris legis parva cautela circa deposita adhibetur, +dicitur enim Exod. XXII quod in amissione depositi statur iuramento +eius apud quem fuit depositum. Ergo non fuit circa hoc legis +ordinatio conveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A2-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, just as a workman offers his work for hire, so do men let houses and so forth. But there is no need for the tenant + to pay his rent as soon as he takes a house. Therefore it seems an unnecessarily hard prescription ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.13" target="asv">Lev. 19:13</a>) that "the wages of him that hath been hired by thee shall not abide with thee until morning." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 arg. 6"><a name="38193" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38193] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut aliquis mercenarius locat operas suas, ita etiam aliqui +locant domum, vel quaecumque alia huiusmodi. Sed non est +necessarium ut statim pretium locatae domus conductor exhibeat. +Ergo etiam nimis durum fuit quod praecipitur Levit. XIX, <i>non +morabitur opus mercenarii tui apud te usque mane</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A2-p8"> + <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, since there is often pressing need for a judge, it should be easy to gain access to one. It was therefore unfitting + that the Law ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.17.8" target="asv">Dt. 17:8,9</a>) should command them to go to a fixed place to ask for judgment on doubtful matters. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 arg. 7"><a name="38194" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38194] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 arg. 7</span></a> Praeterea, +cum frequenter immineat iudiciorum necessitas, facilis debet esse +accessus ad iudicem. Inconvenienter igitur statuit lex, Deut. XVII, +ut irent ad unum locum expetituri iudicium de suis dubiis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A2-p9"> + <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, it is possible that not only two, but three or more, should agree to tell a lie. Therefore it is unreasonably stated + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.19.15" target="asv">Dt. 19:15</a>) that "in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word shall stand." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 arg. 8"><a name="38195" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38195] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 arg. 8</span></a> Praeterea, +possibile est non solum duos, sed etiam tres vel plures concordare +ad mentiendum. Inconvenienter igitur dicitur Deut. XIX, <i>in ore +duorum vel trium testium stabit omne verbum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A2-p10"> + <b>Objection 9:</b> Further, punishment should be fixed according to the gravity of the fault: for which reason also it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.2" target="asv">Dt. 25:2</a>): "According to the measure of the sin, shall the measure also of the stripes be." Yet the Law fixed unequal punishments + for certain faults: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.1" target="asv">Ex. 22:1</a>) that the thief "shall restore five oxen for one ox, and four sheep for one sheep." Moreover, certain slight offenses are + severely + punished: thus ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p10.3" href="./asv.html#Num.15.32" target="asv">Num. 15:32, </a> seqq.) a man is stoned for gathering sticks on the sabbath day: and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p10.4" href="./asv.html#Deut.21.18" target="asv">Dt. 21:18, </a> seqq.) the unruly son is commanded to be stoned on account of certain small transgressions, viz. because "he gave himself + to revelling . . . and banquetings." Therefore the Law prescribed punishments in an unreasonable manner. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 arg. 9"><a name="38196" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38196] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 arg. 9</span></a> Praeterea, +poena debet taxari secundum quantitatem culpae, unde dicitur etiam +Deut. XXV, <i>pro mensura peccati erit et plagarum modus</i>. Sed +quibusdam aequalibus culpis lex statuit inaequales poenas, dicitur +enim Exod. XXII, quod restituet fur quinque boves pro uno bove, et +quatuor oves pro una ove. Quaedam etiam non multum gravia peccata +gravi poena puniuntur, sicut Num. XV, lapidatus est qui collegerat +ligna in sabbato. Filius etiam protervus propter parva delicta, +quia scilicet comessationibus vacabat et conviviis, mandatur +lapidari, Deut. XXI. Igitur inconvenienter in lege sunt institutae +poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A2-p11"> + <b>Objection 10:</b> Further, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11), "Tully writes that the laws recognize eight forms of punishment, indemnity, + prison, stripes, retaliation, public disgrace, exile, death, slavery." Now some of these were prescribed by the Law. "Indemnity," + as when a thief was condemned to make restitution fivefold or fourfold. "Prison," as when ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Num.15.34" target="asv">Num. 15:34</a>) a certain man is ordered to be imprisoned. "Stripes"; thus ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p11.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.2" target="asv">Dt. + 25:2 + </a>), "if they see that the offender be worthy of stripes; they shall lay him down, and shall cause him to be beaten before them." + "Public disgrace" was brought on to him who refused to take to himself the wife of his deceased brother, for she took "off + his shoe from his foot, and" did "spit in his face" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p11.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.9" target="asv">Dt. 25:9</a>). It prescribed the "death" penalty, as is clear from ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p11.4" href="./asv.html#Lev.20.9" target="asv">Lev. 20:9</a>): "He that curseth his father, or mother, dying let him die." + The Law also recognized the "lex talionis," by prescribing ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p11.5" href="./asv.html#Exod.21.24" target="asv">Ex. 21:24</a>): "Eye for eye, tooth for tooth." Therefore it seems unreasonable that the Law should not have inflicted the two other punishments, + viz. "exile" and "slavery." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 arg. 10"><a name="38197" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38197] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 arg. 10</span></a> +Praeterea, sicut Augustinus dicit, XXI de Civ. Dei, <i>octo genera +poenarum in legibus esse scribit Tullius, damnum, vincula, verbera, +talionem, ignominiam, exilium, mortem, servitutem</i>. Ex quibus +aliqua sunt in lege statuta. Damnum quidem, sicut cum fur +condemnabatur ad quintuplum vel quadruplum. Vincula vero, sicut +Num. XV, mandatur de quodam quod in carcerem includatur. Verbera +vero, sicut Deut. XXV, <i>si eum qui peccavit dignum viderint +plagis, prosternent, et coram se facient verberari</i>. Ignominiam +etiam inferebat illi qui nolebat accipere uxorem fratris sui +defuncti, quae tollebat calceamentum illius, et spuebat in faciem +illius. Mortem etiam inferebat, ut patet Levit. XX, <i>qui +maledixerit patri suo aut matri, morte moriatur</i>. Poenam etiam +talionis lex induxit, dicens Exod. XXI, <i>oculum pro oculo, dentem +pro dente</i>. Inconveniens igitur videtur quod alias duas poenas, +scilicet exilium et servitutem, lex vetus non inflixit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A2-p12"> + <b>Objection 11:</b> Further, no punishment is due except for a fault. But dumb animals cannot commit a fault. Therefore the Law is unreasonable + in punishing them ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.21.29" target="asv">Ex. 21:29</a>): "If the ox . . . shall kill a man or a woman," it "shall be stoned": and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.20.16" target="asv">Lev. 20:16</a>): "The woman that shall lie under any beast, shall be killed together with the same." Therefore it seems that matters pertaining + to the relations of one man with another were + unsuitably regulated by the Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 arg. 11"><a name="38198" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38198] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 arg. 11</span></a> +Praeterea, poena non debetur nisi culpae. Sed bruta animalia non +possunt habere culpam. Ergo inconvenienter eis infligitur poena, +Exod. XXI, <i>bos lapidibus obruetur qui occiderit virum aut +mulierem</i>. Et Levit. XX dicitur, <i>mulier quae succubuerit +cuilibet iumento, simul interficiatur cum eo</i>. Sic igitur +videtur quod inconvenienter ea quae pertinent ad convictum hominum +ad invicem, fuerint in lege veteri ordinata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A2-p13"> + <b>Objection 12:</b> Further, the Lord commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.21.12" target="asv">Ex. 21:12</a>) a murderer to be punished with death. But the death of a dumb animal is reckoned of much less account than the slaying of + a man. Hence murder cannot be sufficiently punished by the slaying of a dumb animal. Therefore it is unfittingly prescribed + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p13.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.21.1" target="asv">Dt. 21:1</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p13.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.21.4" target="asv">4</a>) that "when there shall be found . . . the corpse of a man slain, and it is not known who is guilty of the murder . . . the + ancients" of the nearest city "shall take a heifer of the herd, that hath not drawn in the yoke, nor ploughed the ground, + and they shall bring her into a rough and stony valley, that never was ploughed, nor sown; and there they shall strike off + the head of the heifer." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 arg. 12"><a name="38199" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38199] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 arg. 12</span></a> +Praeterea, dominus mandavit Exod. XXI, quod homicidium morte +hominis puniretur. Sed mors bruti animalis multo minus reputatur +quam occisio hominis. Ergo non potest sufficienter recompensari +poena homicidii per occisionem bruti animalis. Inconvenienter +igitur mandatur Deut. XXI quod <i>quando inventum fuerit cadaver +occisi hominis, et ignorabitur caedis reus, seniores propinquioris +civitatis tollant vitulam de armento quae non traxit iugum nec +terram scidit vomere, et ducent eam ad vallem asperam atque saxosam +quae numquam arata est nec sementa recepit, et caedent in ea +cervices vitulae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A2-p14"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is recalled as a special blessing ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.147.20" target="asv">Ps. 147:20</a>) that "He hath not done in like manner to every nation; and His judgments He hath not made manifest to them." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 s. c."><a name="38200" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38200] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod pro speciali beneficio commemoratur in Psalmo CXLVII, +<i>non fecit taliter omni nationi, et iudicia sua non manifestavit +eis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q105_A2-p15"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21), quoting Tully, "a nation is a body of men united together by consent to the law and + by community of welfare." Consequently it is of the essence of a nation that the mutual relations of the citizens be ordered + by just laws. Now the relations of one man with another are twofold: some are effected under the guidance of those in authority: + others are effected by the will of private individuals. And since whatever is + subject to the power of an individual can be disposed of according to his will, hence it is that the decision of matters between + one man and another, and the punishment of evildoers, depend on the direction of those in authority, to whom men are subject. + On the other hand, the power of private persons is exercised over the things they possess: and consequently their dealings + with one another, as regards such things, depend on their own will, for instance in buying, selling, giving, and so + forth. Now the Law provided sufficiently in respect of each of these relations between one man and another. For it established + judges, as is clearly indicated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.16.18" target="asv"> Dt. 16:18</a>: "Thou shalt appoint judges and magistrates in all its [Vulg.: 'thy'] gates . . . that they may judge the people with just + judgment." It is also directed the manner of pronouncing just judgments, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p15.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.1.16" target="asv">Dt. 1:16,17</a>: "Judge that which is just, whether he be one of your own country or a stranger: + there shall be no difference of persons." It also removed an occasion of pronouncing unjust judgment, by forbidding judges + to accept bribes ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p15.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.23.8" target="asv">Ex. 23:8</a>; + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p15.4" href="./asv.html#Deut.16.19" target="asv"> Dt. 16:19</a>). It prescribed the number of witnesses, viz. two or three: and it appointed certain punishments to certain crimes, as we + shall state farther on (ad 10). + </p><p id="FS_Q105_A2-p16"> But with regard to possessions, it is a very good thing, says the Philosopher (Polit. ii, 2) that the things possessed should + be distinct, and the use thereof should be partly common, and partly granted to others by the will of the possessors. These + three points were provided for by the Law. Because, in the first place, the possessions themselves were divided among individuals: + for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p16.1" href="./asv.html#Num.33.53" target="asv">Num. 33:53,54</a>): "I have given you" the land "for a possession: + and you shall divide it among you by lot." And since many states have been ruined through want of regulations in the matter + of possessions, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii, 6); therefore the Law provided a threefold remedy against the regularity + of possessions. The first was that they should be divided equally, wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p16.2" href="./asv.html#Num.33.54" target="asv">Num. 33:54</a>): "To the more you shall give a larger part, and to the fewer, a lesser." A second remedy was that possessions could not + be alienated for ever, but after a certain lapse of time should return to their former owner, so as to avoid confusion of + possessions (cf. ad 3). The third remedy aimed at the removal of this confusion, and provided that the dead should be succeeded + by their next of kin: in the first place, the son; secondly, the daughter; thirdly, the brother; fourthly, the father's brother; + fifthly, any other next of kin. Furthermore, in order to preserve the distinction of property, the Law enacted that + heiresses should marry within their own tribe, as recorded in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p16.3" href="./asv.html#Num.36.6" target="asv"> Num. 36:6.</a> + </p><p id="FS_Q105_A2-p17"> Secondly, the Law commanded that, in some respects, the use of things should belong to all in common. Firstly, as regards + the care of them; for it was prescribed ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p17.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.22.1" target="asv">Dt. 22:1-4</a>): "Thou shalt not pass by, if thou seest thy brother's ox or his sheep go astray; but thou shalt bring them back to thy brother," + and in like manner as to other things. Secondly, as regards fruits. For all alike were allowed on entering a friend's vineyard + to eat of the fruit, but not to + take any away. And, specially, with respect to the poor, it was prescribed that the forgotten sheaves, and the bunches of + grapes and fruit, should be left behind for them ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p17.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.9" target="asv">Lev. 19:9</a>; + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p17.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.24.19" target="asv"> Dt. 24:19</a>). Moreover, whatever grew in the seventh year was common property, as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p17.4" href="./asv.html#Exod.23.11" target="asv"> Ex. 23:11 </a>and + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p17.5" href="./asv.html#Lev.25.4" target="asv"> Lev. 25:4.</a> + </p><p id="FS_Q105_A2-p18"> Thirdly, the law recognized the transference of goods by the owner. There was a purely gratuitous transfer: thus it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p18.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.14.28" target="asv">Dt. 14:28,29</a>): "The third day thou shalt separate another tithe . . . and the Levite . . . and the stranger, and the fatherless, and the + widow . . . shall come and shall eat and be filled." And there was a transfer for a consideration, for instance, by selling + and buying, by letting out and hiring, by loan and also by deposit, concerning all of which we + find that the Law made ample provision. Consequently it is clear that the Old Law provided sufficiently concerning the mutual + relations of one man with another. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 co."><a name="38201" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38201] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus in II de Civ. Dei introducit a +Tullio dictum, <i>populus est coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et +utilitatis communione sociatus</i>. Unde ad rationem populi +pertinet ut communicatio hominum ad invicem iustis praeceptis legis +ordinetur. Est autem duplex communicatio hominum ad invicem, una +quidem quae fit auctoritate principum; alia autem fit propria +voluntate privatarum personarum. Et quia voluntate uniuscuiusque +disponi potest quod eius subditur potestati, ideo auctoritate +principum, quibus subiecti sunt homines, oportet quod iudicia inter +homines exerceantur, et poenae malefactoribus inferantur. Potestati +vero privatarum personarum subduntur res possessae, et ideo propria +voluntate in his possunt sibi invicem communicare, puta emendo, +vendendo, donando, et aliis huiusmodi modis. Circa utramque autem +communicationem lex sufficienter ordinavit. Statuit enim iudices, +ut patet Deut. XVI, <i>iudices et magistros constitues in omnibus +portis eius, ut iudicent populum iusto iudicio</i>. Instituit etiam +iustum iudicii ordinem, ut dicitur Deut. I, <i>quod iustum est +iudicate, sive civis ille sit sive peregrinus, nulla erit +personarum distantia</i>. Sustulit etiam occasionem iniusti +iudicii, acceptionem munerum iudicibus prohibendo; ut patet Exod. +XXIII, et Deut. XVI. Instituit etiam numerum testium duorum vel +trium; ut patet Deut. XVII, et XIX. Instituit etiam certas poenas +pro diversis delictis, ut post dicetur. Sed circa res possessas +optimum est, sicut dicit philosophus, in II Polit., quod +possessiones sint distinctae, et usus sit partim communis, partim +autem per voluntatem possessorum communicetur. Et haec tria fuerunt +in lege statuta. Primo enim, ipsae possessiones divisae erant in +singulos, dicitur enim Num. XXXIII, <i>ego dedi vobis terram in +possessionem, quam sorte dividetis vobis</i>. Et quia per +possessionum irregularitatem plures civitates destruuntur, ut +philosophus dicit, in II Polit.; ideo circa possessiones regulandas +triplex remedium lex adhibuit. Unum quidem, ut secundum numerum +hominum aequaliter dividerentur, unde dicitur Num. XXXIII, +<i>pluribus dabitis latiorem, et paucioribus angustiorem</i>. Aliud +remedium est ut possessiones non in perpetuum alienentur, sed certo +tempore ad suos possessores revertantur, ut non confundantur sortes +possessionum. Tertium remedium est ad huiusmodi confusionem +tollendam, ut proximi succedant morientibus, primo quidem gradu, +filius; secundo autem, filia; tertio, fratres; quarto, patrui; +quinto, quicumque propinqui. Et ad distinctionem sortium +conservandam, ulterius lex statuit ut mulieres quae sunt haeredes, +nuberent suae tribus hominibus, ut habetur Num. XXXVI. Secundo +vero, instituit lex ut quantum ad aliqua usus rerum esset communis. +Et primo, quantum ad curam, praeceptum est enim Deut. XXII, <i>non +videbis bovem et ovem fratris tui errantem, et praeteribis, sed +reduces fratri tuo</i>; et similiter de aliis. Secundo, quantum ad +fructum. Concedebatur enim communiter quantum ad omnes, ut +ingressus in vineam amici posset licite comedere, dum tamen extra +non auferret. Quantum ad pauperes vero specialiter, ut eis +relinquerentur manipuli obliti, et fructus et racemi remanentes, ut +habetur Lev. XIX, et Deut. XXIV. Et etiam communicabantur ea quae +nascebantur in septimo anno; ut habetur Exod. XXIII, et Lev. XXV. +Tertio vero, statuit lex communicationem factam per eos qui sunt +domini rerum. Unam pure gratuitam, unde dicitur Deut. XIV, <i>anno +tertio separabis aliam decimam, venientque Levites et peregrinus et +pupillus et vidua, et comedent et saturabuntur</i>. Aliam vero cum +recompensatione utilitatis, sicut per venditionem et emptionem, et +locationem et conductionem, et per mutuum, et iterum per depositum, +de quibus omnibus inveniuntur ordinationes certae in lege. Unde +patet quod lex vetus sufficienter ordinavit convictum illius +populi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A2-p19"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p19.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.8" target="asv">Rom. 13:8</a>), "he that loveth his neighbor hath fulfilled the Law": because, to wit, all the precepts of the Law, chiefly those concerning + our neighbor, seem to aim at the end that men should love one another. Now it is an effect of love that men give their own + goods to others: because, as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p19.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.17" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:17</a>: "He that . . . shall see his brother in need, and shall shut up his bowels from + him: how doth the charity of God abide in him?" Hence the purpose of the Law was to accustom men to give of their own to others + readily: thus the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p19.3" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.18" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:18</a>) commands the rich "to give easily and to communicate to others." Now a man does not give easily to others if he will not + suffer another man to take some little thing from him without any great injury to him. And so the Law laid down that it should + be lawful for a man, on entering his neighbor's vineyard, to + eat of the fruit there: but not to carry any away, lest this should lead to the infliction of a grievous harm, and cause a + disturbance of the peace: for among well-behaved people, the taking of a little does not disturb the peace; in fact, it rather + strengthens friendship and accustoms men to give things to one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="38202" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38202] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut apostolus dicit, Rom. XIII, <i>qui +diligit proximum, legem implevit</i>, quia scilicet omnia praecepta +legis, praecipue ordinata ad proximum, ad hunc finem ordinari +videntur, ut homines se invicem diligant. Ex dilectione autem +procedit quod homines sibi invicem bona sua communicent, quia ut +dicitur I Ioan. III, <i>qui viderit fratrem suum necessitatem +patientem, et clauserit viscera sua ab eo, quomodo caritas Dei +manet in illo?</i> Et ideo intendebat lex homines assuefacere ut +facile sibi invicem sua communicarent, sicut et apostolus, I ad +Tim. VI, divitibus mandat facile tribuere et communicare. Non autem +facile communicativus est qui non sustinet quod proximus aliquid +modicum de suo accipiat, absque magno sui detrimento. Et ideo lex +ordinavit ut liceret intrantem in vineam proximi, racemos ibi +comedere, non autem extra deferre, ne ex hoc daretur occasio gravis +damni inferendi, ex quo pax perturbaretur. Quae inter disciplinatos +non perturbatur ex modicorum acceptione, sed magis amicitia +confirmatur, et assuefiunt homines ad facile communicandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A2-p20"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Law did not prescribe that women should succeed to their father's estate except in default of male issue: failing which + it was necessary that succession should be granted to the female line in order to comfort the father, who would have been + sad to think that his estate would pass to strangers. Nevertheless the Law observed due caution in the matter, by providing + that those women who succeeded to their father's estate, should marry within their + own tribe, in order to avoid confusion of tribal possessions, as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p20.1" href="./asv.html#Num.36.7" target="asv"> Num. 36:7,8.</a> + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="38203" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38203] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod lex non statuit quod mulieres succederent in bonis +paternis, nisi in defectu filiorum masculorum. Tunc autem +necessarium erat ut successio mulieribus concederetur in +consolationem patris, cui grave fuisset si eius hereditas omnino ad +extraneos transiret. Adhibuit tamen circa hoc lex cautelam debitam, +praecipiens ut mulieres succedentes in haereditate paterna, +nuberent suae tribus hominibus, ad hoc quod sortes tribuum non +confunderentur, ut habetur Num. ult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q105_A2-p21"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 4), the regulation of possessions conduces much to the preservation of a state or nation. + Consequently, as he himself observes, it was forbidden by the law in some of the heathen states, "that anyone should sell + his possessions, except to avoid a manifest loss." For if possessions were to be sold indiscriminately, they might happen + to come into the hands of a few: so that it might become necessary for a state or + country to become void of inhabitants. Hence the Old Law, in order to remove this danger, ordered things in such a way that + while provision was made for men's needs, by allowing the sale of possessions to avail for a certain period, at the same time + the said danger was removed, by prescribing the return of those possessions after that period had elapsed. The reason for + this law was to prevent confusion of possessions, and to ensure the continuance of a definite distinction among the tribes. + </p><p id="FS_Q105_A2-p22"> But as the town houses were not allotted to distinct estates, therefore the Law allowed them to be sold in perpetuity, like + movable goods. Because the number of houses in a town was not fixed, whereas there was a fixed limit to the amount of estates, + which could not be exceeded, while the number of houses in a town could be increased. On the other hand, houses situated not + in a town, but "in a village that hath no walls," could not be sold in perpetuity: because such houses are + built merely with a view to the cultivation and care of possessions; wherefore the Law rightly made the same prescription + in regard to both ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p22.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.25" target="asv">Lev. 25</a>). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="38204" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38204] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in II Polit., regulatio +possessionum multum confert ad conservationem civitatis vel gentis. +Unde, sicut ipse dicit, apud quasdam gentilium civitates statutum +fuit <i>ut nullus possessionem vendere posset, nisi pro manifesto +detrimento</i>. Si enim passim possessiones vendantur, potest +contingere quod omnes possessiones ad paucos deveniant, et ita +necesse erit civitatem vel regionem habitatoribus evacuari. Et ideo +lex vetus, ad huiusmodi periculum amovendum, sic ordinavit quod et +necessitatibus hominum subveniretur, concedens possessionum +venditionem usque ad certum tempus; et tamen periculum removit, +praecipiens ut certo tempore possessio vendita ad vendentem +rediret. Et hoc instituit ut sortes non confunderentur, sed semper +remaneret eadem distinctio determinata in tribubus. Quia vero domus +urbanae non erant sorte distinctae, ideo concessit quod in +perpetuum vendi possent, sicut et mobilia bona. Non enim erat +statutus numerus domorum civitatis, sicut erat certa mensura +possessionis, ad quam non addebatur, poterat autem aliquid addi ad +numerum domorum civitatis. Domus vero quae non erant in urbe, sed +in villa muros non habente, in perpetuum vendi non poterant, quia +huiusmodi domus non construuntur nisi ad cultum et ad custodiam +possessionum; et ideo lex congrue statuit idem ius circa +utrumque.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q105_A2-p23"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As stated above (ad 1), the purpose of the Law was to accustom men to its precepts, so as to be ready to come to one another's + assistance: because this is a very great incentive to friendship. The Law granted these facilities for helping others in the + matter not only of gratuitous and absolute donations, but also of mutual transfers: because the latter kind of succor is more + frequent and benefits the greater number: and it granted facilities for this + purpose in many ways. First of all by prescribing that men should be ready to lend, and that they should not be less inclined + to do so as the year of remission drew nigh, as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p23.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.15.7" target="asv"> Dt. 15:7, </a> seqq. Secondly, by forbidding them to burden a man to whom they might grant a loan, either by exacting usury, or by accepting + necessities of life in security; and by prescribing that when this had been done they should be restored at once. For it is + written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p23.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.19" target="asv">Dt. + 23:19 + </a>): "Thou shalt not lend to thy brother money to usury": and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p23.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.24.6" target="asv">Dt. 24:6</a>): "Thou shalt not take the nether nor the upper millstone to pledge; for he hath pledged his life to thee": and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p23.4" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.26" target="asv">Ex. 22:26</a>): "If thou take of thy neighbor a garment in pledge, thou shalt give it him again before sunset." Thirdly, by forbidding + them to be importunate in exacting payment. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p23.5" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.25" target="asv">Ex. 22:25</a>): "If thou lend money to any of + my people that is poor that dwelleth with thee, thou shalt not be hard upon them as an extortioner." For this reason, too, + it is enacted ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p23.6" href="./asv.html#Deut.24.10" target="asv">Dt. 24:10,11</a>): "When thou shalt demand of thy neighbor anything that he oweth thee, thou shalt not go into his house to take away a pledge, + but thou shalt stand without, and he shall bring out to thee what he hath": both because a man's house is his surest refuge, + wherefore it is offensive to a man to be set upon in his own house; and because the Law does not + allow the creditor to take away whatever he likes in security, but rather permits the debtor to give what he needs least. + Fourthly, the Law prescribed that debts should cease together after the lapse of seven years. For it was probable that those + who could conveniently pay their debts, would do so before the seventh year, and would not defraud the lender without cause. + But if they were altogether insolvent, there was the same reason for remitting the debt from love for them, as there was for + renewing the loan on account of their need. + </p><p id="FS_Q105_A2-p24"> As regards animals granted in loan, the Law enacted that if, through the neglect of the person to whom they were lent, they + perished or deteriorated in his absence, he was bound to make restitution. But if they perished or deteriorated while he was + present and taking proper care of them, he was not bound to make restitution, especially if they were hired for a consideration: + because they might have died or deteriorated in the same way if they had remained in possession of the + lender, so that if the animal had been saved through being lent, the lender would have gained something by the loan which + would no longer have been gratuitous. And especially was this to be observed when animals were hired for a consideration: + because then the owner received a certain price for the use of the animals; wherefore he had no right to any profit, by receiving + indemnity for the animal, unless the person who had charge of it were negligent. In the case, however, of animals not hired + for a consideration, equity demanded that he should receive something by way of restitution at least to the value of the hire + of the animal that had perished or deteriorated. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="38205" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38205] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, intentio legis erat assuefacere +homines suis praeceptis ad hoc quod sibi invicem de facili in +necessitatibus subvenirent, quia hoc maxime est amicitiae fomentum. +Et hanc quidem facilitatem subveniendi non solum statuit in his +quae gratis et absolute donantur, sed etiam in his quae mutuo +conceduntur, quia huiusmodi subventio frequentior est, et pluribus +necessaria. Huiusmodi autem subventionis facilitatem multipliciter +instituit. Primo quidem, ut faciles se praeberent ad mutuum +exhibendum, nec ab hoc retraherentur anno remissionis +appropinquante, ut habetur Deut. XV. Secundo, ne eum cui mutuum +concederent, gravarent vel usuris, vel etiam aliqua pignora omnino +vitae necessaria accipiendo, et si accepta fuerint, quod statim +restituerentur. Dicitur enim Deut. XXIII, <i>non faeneraberis +fratri tuo ad usuram</i>; et XXIV, <i>non accipies loco pignoris +inferiorem et superiorem molam, quia animam suam apposuit tibi</i>; +et Exod. XXII dicitur, <i>si pignus a proximo tuo acceperis +vestimentum, ante solis occasum reddes ei</i>. Tertio, ut non +importune exigerent. Unde dicitur Exod. XXII, <i>si pecuniam mutuam +dederis populo meo pauperi qui habitat tecum, non urgebis eum quasi +exactor</i>. Et propter hoc etiam mandatur Deut. XXIV, <i>cum +repetes a proximo tuo rem aliquam quam debet tibi, non ingredieris +in domum eius ut pignus auferas; sed stabis foris, et ille tibi +proferet quod habuerit</i>, tum quia domus est tutissimum +uniuscuiusque receptaculum, unde molestum homini est ut in domo sua +invadatur; tum etiam quia non concedit creditori ut accipiat pignus +quod voluerit, sed magis debitori ut det quo minus indiguerit. +Quarto, instituit quod in septimo anno debita penitus +remitterentur. Probabile enim erat ut illi qui commode reddere +possent, ante septimum annum redderent, et gratis mutuantem non +defraudarent. Si autem omnino impotentes essent, eadem ratione eis +erat debitum remittendum ex dilectione, qua etiam erat eis de novo +dandum propter indigentiam. Circa animalia vero mutuata haec lex +statuit, ut propter negligentiam eius cui mutuata sunt, si in +ipsius absentia moriantur vel debilitentur, reddere ea compellatur. +Si vero eo praesente et diligenter custodiente, mortua fuerint vel +debilitata, non cogebatur restituere, et maxime si erant mercede +conducta, quia ita etiam potuissent mori et debilitari apud +mutuantem; et ita, si conservationem animalis consequeretur, iam +aliquod lucrum reportaret ex mutuo, et non esset gratuitum mutuum. +Et maxime hoc observandum erat quando animalia erant mercede +conducta, quia tunc habebat certum pretium pro usu animalium; unde +nihil accrescere debebat per restitutionem animalium, nisi propter +negligentiam custodientis. Si autem non essent mercede conducta, +potuisset habere aliquam aequitatem ut saltem tantum restitueret +quantum usus animalis mortui vel debilitati conduci potuisset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A2-p25"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The difference between a loan and a deposit is that a loan is in respect of goods transferred for the use of the person to + whom they are transferred, whereas a deposit is for the benefit of the depositor. Hence in certain cases there was a stricter + obligation of returning a loan than of restoring goods held in deposit. Because the latter might be lost in two ways. First, + unavoidably: i.e. either through a natural cause, for instance if an animal held + in deposit were to die or depreciate in value; or through an extrinsic cause, for instance, if it were taken by an enemy, + or devoured by a beast (in which case, however, a man was bound to restore to the owner what was left of the animal thus slain): + whereas in the other cases mentioned above, he was not bound to make restitution; but only to take an oath in order to clear + himself of suspicion. Secondly, the goods deposited might be lost through an avoidable cause, for instance by theft: and + then the depositary was bound to restitution on account of his neglect. But, as stated above (ad 4), he who held an animal + on loan, was bound to restitution, even if he were absent when it depreciated or died: because he was held responsible for + less negligence than a depositary, who was only held responsible in case of theft. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 ad 5"><a name="38206" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38206] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod haec differentia est inter mutuum et depositum, quia +mutuum traditur in utilitatem eius cui traditur; sed depositum +traditur in utilitatem deponentis. Et ideo magis arctabatur aliquis +in aliquibus casibus ad restituendum mutuum, quam ad restituendum +depositum. Depositum enim perdi poterat dupliciter. Uno modo, ex +causa inevitabili, vel naturali, puta si esset mortuum vel +debilitatum animal depositum; vel extrinseca, puta si esset captum +ab hostibus, vel si esset comestum a bestia; in quo tamen casu +tenebatur deferre ad dominum animalis id quod de animali occiso +supererat. In aliis autem praedictis casibus nihil reddere +tenebatur, sed solum, ad expurgandam suspicionem fraudis, tenebatur +iuramentum praestare. Alio modo poterat perdi ex causa evitabili, +puta per furtum. Et tunc, propter negligentiam custodis, reddere +tenebatur. Sed, sicut dictum est, ille qui mutuo accipiebat animal, +tenebatur reddere, etiam si debilitatum aut mortuum fuisset in eius +absentia. De minori enim negligentia tenebatur quam depositarius, +qui non tenebatur nisi de furto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A2-p26"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Workmen who offer their labor for hire, are poor men who toil for their daily bread: and therefore the Law commanded wisely + that they should be paid at once, lest they should lack food. But they who offer other commodities for hire, are wont to be + rich: nor are they in such need of their price in order to gain a livelihood: and consequently the comparison does not hold. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 ad 6"><a name="38207" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38207] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum +dicendum quod mercenarii qui locant operas suas, pauperes sunt, de +laboribus suis victum quaerentes quotidianum, et ideo lex provide +ordinavit ut statim eis merces solveretur, ne victus eis deficeret. +Sed illi qui locant alias res, divites esse consueverunt, nec ita +indigent locationis pretio ad suum victum quotidianum. Et ideo non +est eadem ratio in utroque.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A2-p27"> + <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> The purpose for which judges are appointed among men, is that they may decide doubtful points in matters of justice. Now + a matter may be doubtful in two ways. First, among simple-minded people: and in order to remove doubts of this kind, it was + prescribed ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p27.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.16.18" target="asv">Dt. 16:18</a>) that "judges and magistrates" should be appointed in each tribe, "to judge the people with just judgment." Secondly, a matter + may be doubtful even among experts: and + therefore, in order to remove doubts of this kind, the Law prescribed that all should foregather in some chief place chosen + by God, where there would be both the high-priest, who would decide doubtful matters relating to the ceremonies of divine + worship; and the chief judge of the people, who would decide matters relating to the judgments of men: just as even now cases + are taken from a lower to a higher court either by appeal or by consultation. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p27.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.17.8" target="asv">Dt. + 17:8,9 + </a>): "If thou perceive that there be among you a hard and doubtful matter in judgment . . . and thou see that the words of the + judges within thy gates do vary; arise and go up to the place, which the Lord thy God shall choose; and thou shalt come to + the priests of the Levitical race, and to the judge that shall be at that time." But such like doubtful matters did not often + occur for judgment: wherefore the people were not burdened on this account. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 ad 7"><a name="38208" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38208] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 ad 7</span></a> Ad septimum +dicendum quod iudices ad hoc inter homines constituuntur, quod +determinent quod ambiguum inter homines circa iustitiam esse +potest. Dupliciter autem aliquid potest esse ambiguum. Uno modo, +apud simplices. Et ad hoc dubium tollendum, mandatur Deut. XVI, ut +<i>iudices et magistri constituerentur per singulas tribus, ut +iudicarent populum iusto iudicio</i>. Alio modo contingit aliquid +esse dubium etiam apud peritos. Et ideo ad hoc dubium tollendum, +constituit lex ut omnes recurrerent ad locum principalem a Deo +electum, in quo et summus sacerdos esset, qui determinaret dubia +circa caeremonias divini cultus; et summus iudex populi, qui +determinaret quae pertinent ad iudicia hominum, sicut etiam nunc +per appellationem, vel per consultationem, causae ab inferioribus +iudicibus ad superiores deferuntur. Unde dicitur Deut. XVII, <i>si +difficile et ambiguum apud te iudicium perspexeris, et iudicum +intra portas tuas videris verba variari; ascende ad locum quem +elegerit dominus, veniesque ad sacerdotes levitici generis, et ad +iudicem qui fuerit illo tempore</i>. Huiusmodi autem ambigua +iudicia non frequenter emergebant. Unde ex hoc populus non +gravabatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q105_A2-p28"> + <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> In the business affairs of men, there is no such thing as demonstrative and infallible proof, and we must be content with + a certain conjectural probability, such as that which an orator employs to persuade. Consequently, although it is quite possible + for two or three witnesses to agree to a falsehood, yet it is neither easy nor probable that they succeed in so doing: wherefore + their testimony is taken as being true, especially if they do not waver in + giving it, or are not otherwise suspect. Moreover, in order that witnesses might not easily depart from the truth, the Law + commanded that they should be most carefully examined, and that those who were found untruthful should be severely punished, + as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p28.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.19.16" target="asv"> Dt. 19:16, </a> seqq. + </p><p id="FS_Q105_A2-p29"> There was, however, a reason for fixing on this particular number, in token of the unerring truth of the Divine Persons, + Who are sometimes mentioned as two, because the Holy Ghost is the bond of the other two Persons; and sometimes as three: as + Augustine observes on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p29.1" href="./asv.html#John.8.17" target="asv"> Jn. 8:17</a>: "In your law it is written that the testimony of two men is true." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 ad 8"><a name="38209" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38209] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 ad 8</span></a> Ad octavum +dicendum quod in negotiis humanis non potest haberi probatio +demonstrativa et infallibilis, sed sufficit aliqua coniecturalis +probabilitas, secundum quam rhetor persuadet. Et ideo, licet sit +possibile duos aut tres testes in mendacium convenire, non tamen +est facile nec probabile quod conveniant; et ideo accipitur eorum +testimonium tanquam verum; et praecipue si in suo testimonio non +vacillent, vel alias suspecti non fuerint. Et ad hoc etiam quod non +de facili a veritate testes declinarent, instituit lex ut testes +diligentissime examinarentur, et graviter punirentur qui +invenirentur mendaces, ut habetur Deut. XIX. Fuit tamen aliqua +ratio huiusmodi numeri determinandi, ad significandam infallibilem +veritatem personarum divinarum, quae quandoque numerantur duae, +quia spiritus sanctus est nexus duorum, quandoque exprimuntur tres; +ut Augustinus dicit, super illud Ioan. VIII, <i>in lege vestra +scriptum est quia duorum hominum testimonium verum est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q105_A2-p30"> + <b>Reply to Objection 9:</b> A severe punishment is inflicted not only on account of the gravity of a fault, but also for other reasons. First, on account + of the greatness of the sin, because a greater sin, other things being equal, deserves a greater punishment. Secondly, on + account of a habitual sin, since men are not easily cured of habitual sin except by severe punishments. Thirdly, on account + of a great desire for or a great pleasure in the sin: for men are not easily + deterred from such sins unless they be severely punished. Fourthly, on account of the facility of committing a sin and of + concealing it: for such like sins, when discovered, should be more severely punished in order to deter others from committing + them. + </p><p id="FS_Q105_A2-p31"> Again, with regard to the greatness of a sin, four degrees may be observed, even in respect of one single deed. The first + is when a sin is committed unwillingly; because then, if the sin be altogether involuntary, man is altogether excused from + punishment; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p31.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.22.25" target="asv">Dt. 22:25, </a> seqq.) that a damsel who suffers violence in a field is not guilty of death, because "she cried, and there was no man to + help her." But if a man sinned in any way voluntarily, + and yet through weakness, as for instance when a man sins from passion, the sin is diminished: and the punishment, according + to true judgment, should be diminished also; unless perchance the common weal requires that the sin be severely punished in + order to deter others from committing such sins, as stated above. The second degree is when a man sins through ignorance: + and then he was held to be guilty to a certain extent, on account of his negligence in acquiring knowledge: yet he was not + punished by the judges but expiated his sin by sacrifices. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p31.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.4.2" target="asv">Lev. 4:2</a>): "The soul that sinneth through ignorance," etc. This is, however, to be taken as applying to ignorance of fact; and not + to ignorance of the Divine precept, which all were bound to know. The third degree was when a man sinned from pride, i.e. + through deliberate choice or malice: and then he was punished according to the greatness of the sin [*Cf. + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p31.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.2" target="asv"> Dt. 25:2</a>]. The + fourth degree was when a man sinned from stubbornness or obstinacy: and then he was to be utterly cut off as a rebel and a + destroyer of the commandment of the Law [*Cf. + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p31.4" href="./asv.html#Num.15.30" target="asv"> Num. 15:30,31</a>]. + </p><p id="FS_Q105_A2-p32"> Accordingly we must say that, in appointing the punishment for theft, the Law considered what would be likely to happen most + frequently ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p32.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.1" target="asv">Ex. 22:1-9</a>): wherefore, as regards theft of other things which can easily be safeguarded from a thief, the thief restored only twice + their value. But sheep cannot be easily safeguarded from a thief, because they graze in the fields: wherefore it happened + more frequently that sheep were stolen in the fields. Consequently the Law inflicted a + heavier penalty, by ordering four sheep to be restored for the theft of one. As to cattle, they were yet more difficult to + safeguard, because they are kept in the fields, and do not graze in flocks as sheep do; wherefore a yet more heavy penalty + was inflicted in their regard, so that five oxen were to be restored for one ox. And this I say, unless perchance the animal + itself were discovered in the thief's possession: because in that case he had to restore only twice the number, as in the + case + of other thefts: for there was reason to presume that he intended to restore the animal, since he kept it alive. Again, we + might say, according to a gloss, that "a cow is useful in five ways: it may be used for sacrifice, for ploughing, for food, + for milk, and its hide is employed for various purposes": and therefore for one cow five had to be restored. But the sheep + was useful in four ways: "for sacrifice, for meat, for milk, and for its wool." The unruly son was slain, not because he ate + and + drank: but on account of his stubbornness and rebellion, which was always punished by death, as stated above. As to the man + who gathered sticks on the sabbath, he was stoned as a breaker of the Law, which commanded the sabbath to be observed, to + testify the belief in the newness of the world, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q100_A5" id="FS_Q105_A2-p32.2" shape="rect">Q[100], A[5]</a>): wherefore he was slain as an unbeliever. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 ad 9"><a name="38210" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38210] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 ad 9</span></a> Ad nonum +dicendum quod non solum propter gravitatem culpae, sed etiam +propter alias causas gravis poena infligitur. Primo quidem, propter +quantitatem peccati, quia maiori peccato, ceteris paribus, gravior +poena debetur. Secundo, propter peccati consuetudinem, quia a +peccatis consuetis non faciliter homines abstrahuntur nisi per +graves poenas. Tertio, propter multam concupiscentiam vel +delectationem in peccato, ab his enim non de facili homines +abstrahuntur nisi per graves poenas. Quarto, propter facilitatem +committendi peccatum, et latendi in ipso, huiusmodi enim peccata, +quando manifestantur, sunt magis punienda, ad terrorem aliorum. +Circa ipsam etiam quantitatem peccati quadruplex gradus est +attendendus, etiam circa unum et idem factum. Quorum primus est +quando involuntarius peccatum committit. Tunc enim, si omnino est +involuntarius, totaliter excusatur a poena, dicitur enim Deut. +XXII, quod puella quae opprimitur in agro, <i>non est rea mortis, +quia clamavit, et nullus affuit qui liberaret eam</i>. Si vero +aliquo modo fuerit voluntarius, sed tamen ex infirmitate peccat, +puta cum quis peccat ex passione, minuitur peccatum, et poena, +secundum veritatem iudicii, diminui debet; nisi forte, propter +communem utilitatem, poena aggravetur, ad abstrahendum homines ab +huiusmodi peccatis, sicut dictum est. Secundus gradus est quando +quis per ignorantiam peccavit. Et tunc aliquo modo reus +reputabatur, propter negligentiam addiscendi; sed tamen non +puniebatur per iudices, sed expiabat peccatum suum per sacrificia. +Unde dicitur Levit. IV, <i>anima quae peccaverit per +ignorantiam,</i> et cetera. Sed hoc intelligendum est de ignorantia +facti, non autem de ignorantia praecepti divini, quod omnes scire +tenebantur. Tertius gradus est quando aliquis ex superbia peccabat, +idest ex certa electione vel ex certa malitia. Et tunc puniebatur +secundum quantitatem delicti. Quartus autem gradus est quando +peccabat per proterviam et pertinaciam. Et tunc, quasi rebellis et +destructor ordinationis legis, omnino occidendus erat. Secundum +hoc, dicendum est quod in poena furti considerabatur secundum legem +id quod frequenter accidere poterat. Et ideo pro furto aliarum +rerum, quae de facili custodiri possunt a furibus, non reddebat fur +nisi duplum. Oves autem non de facili possunt custodiri a furto, +quia pascuntur in agris, et ideo frequentius contingebat quod oves +furto subtraherentur. Unde lex maiorem poenam apposuit, ut scilicet +quatuor oves pro una ove redderentur. Adhuc autem boves difficilius +custodiuntur, quia habentur in agris, et non ita pascuntur gregatim +sicut oves. Et ideo adhuc hic maiorem poenam apposuit, ut scilicet +quinque boves pro uno bove redderentur. Et hoc dico, nisi forte +idem animal inventum fuerit vivens apud eum, quia tunc solum duplum +restituebat, sicut et in ceteris furtis; poterat enim haberi +praesumptio quod cogitaret restituere, ex quo vivum servasset. Vel +potest dici, secundum Glossam, quod <i>bos habet quinque +utilitates, quia immolatur, arat, pascit carnibus, lactat, et +corium etiam diversis usibus ministrat</i>, et ideo pro uno bove +quinque boves reddebantur. Ovis autem habet quatuor utilitates, +quia immolatur, pascit, lac dat, et lanam ministrat. Filius autem +contumax, non quia comedebat et bibebat, occidebatur, sed propter +contumaciam et rebellionem, quae semper morte puniebatur, ut dictum +est. Ille vero qui colligebat ligna in sabbato, lapidatus fuit +tanquam legis violator, quae sabbatum observari praecipiebat in +commemorationem fidei novitatis mundi, sicut supra dictum est. Unde +occisus fuit tanquam infidelis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q105_A2-p33"> + <b>Reply to Objection 10:</b> The Old Law inflicted the death penalty for the more grievous crimes, viz. for those which are committed against God, and + for murder, for stealing a man, irreverence towards one's parents, adultery and incest. In the case of thief of other things + it inflicted punishment by indemnification: while in the case of blows and mutilation it authorized punishment by retaliation; + and likewise for the sin of bearing false witness. In other faults of less + degree it prescribed the punishment of stripes or of public disgrace. + </p><p id="FS_Q105_A2-p34"> The punishment of slavery was prescribed by the Law in two cases. First, in the case of a slave who was unwilling to avail + himself of the privilege granted by the Law, whereby he was free to depart in the seventh year of remission: wherefore he + was punished by remaining a slave for ever. Secondly, in the case of a thief, who had not wherewith to make restitution, as + stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p34.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.3" target="asv"> Ex. 22:3.</a> + </p><p id="FS_Q105_A2-p35"> The punishment of absolute exile was not prescribed by the Law: because God was worshipped by that people alone, whereas + all other nations were given to idolatry: wherefore if any man were exiled from that people absolutely, he would be in danger + of falling into idolatry. For this reason it is related ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p35.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.26.19" target="asv">1 Kings 26:19</a>) that David said to Saul: "They are cursed in the sight of the Lord, who have case me out this day, that I should not dwell + in the inheritance of + the Lord, saying: Go, serve strange gods." There was, however, a restricted sort of exile: for it is written in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p35.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.19.4" target="asv"> Dt. 19:4</a> [*Cf. + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p35.3" href="./asv.html#Num.35.25" target="asv"> Num. 35:25</a>] that "he that striketh [Vulg.: 'killeth'] his neighbor ignorantly, and is proved to have had no hatred against him, shall + flee to one of the cities" of refuge and "abide there until the death of the high-priest." For then it became lawful for him + to return home, because when the whole people thus suffered a loss they + forgot their private quarrels, so that the next of kin of the slain were not so eager to kill the slayer. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 ad 10"><a name="38211" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38211] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 ad 10</span></a> Ad decimum +dicendum quod lex vetus poenam mortis inflixit in gravioribus +criminibus, scilicet in his quae contra Deum peccantur, et in +homicidio, et in furto hominum, et in irreverentia ad parentes, et +in adulterio, et in incestibus. In furto autem aliarum rerum +adhibuit poenam damni. In percussuris autem et mutilationibus +induxit poenam talionis; et similiter in peccato falsi testimonii. +In aliis autem minoribus culpis induxit poenam flagellationis vel +ignominiae. Poenam autem servitutis induxit in duobus casibus. In +uno quidem, quando, septimo anno remissionis, ille qui erat servus, +nolebat beneficio legis uti ut liber exiret. Unde pro poena ei +infligebatur ut in perpetuum servus remaneret. Secundo, +infligebatur furi, quando non habebat quod posset restituere, sicut +habetur Exod. XXII. Poenam autem exilii universaliter lex non +statuit. Quia in solo populo illo Deus colebatur, omnibus aliis +populis per idololatriam corruptis, unde si quis a populo illo +universaliter exclusus esset, daretur ei occasio idololatriae. Et +ideo I Reg. XXVI dicitur quod David dixit ad Saul, <i>maledicti +sunt qui eiecerunt me hodie, ut non habitem in hereditate domini, +dicentes, vade, servi diis alienis</i>. Erat tamen aliquod +particulare exilium. Dicitur enim Deut. XIX quod <i>qui percusserit +proximum suum nesciens, et qui nullum contra ipsum habuisse odium +comprobatur</i>, ad unam urbium refugii confugiebat, et ibi manebat +usque ad mortem summi sacerdotis. Tunc enim licebat ei redire ad +domum suam, quia in universali damno populi consueverunt +particulares irae sedari, et ita proximi defuncti non sic proni +erant ad eius occisionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A2-p36"> + <b>Reply to Objection 11:</b> Dumb animals were ordered to be slain, not on account of any fault of theirs; but as a punishment to their owners, who had + not safeguarded their beasts from these offenses. Hence the owner was more severely punished if his ox had butted anyone "yesterday + or the day before" (in which case steps might have been taken to butting suddenly). Or again, the animal was slain in detestation + of the sin; and lest men should be horrified at the sight + thereof. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 ad 11"><a name="38212" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38212] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 ad 11</span></a> Ad +undecimum dicendum quod animalia bruta mandabantur occidi, non +propter aliquam ipsorum culpam; sed in poenam dominorum, qui talia +animalia non custodierant ab huiusmodi peccatis. Et ideo magis +puniebatur dominus si bos cornupeta fuerat ab heri et +nudiustertius, in quo casu poterat occurri periculo; quam si subito +cornupeta efficeretur. Vel occidebantur animalia in detestationem +peccati; et ne ex eorum aspectu aliquis horror hominibus +incuteretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q105_A2-p37"> + <b>Reply to Objection 12:</b> The literal reason for this commandment, as Rabbi Moses declares (Doct. Perplex. iii), was because the slayer was frequently + from the nearest city: wherefore the slaying of the calf was a means of investigating the hidden murder. This was brought + about in three ways. In the first place the elders of the city swore that they had taken every measure for safeguarding the + roads. Secondly, the owner of the heifer was indemnified for the slaying of his + beast, and if the murder was previously discovered, the beast was not slain. Thirdly, the place, where the heifer was slain, + remained uncultivated. Wherefore, in order to avoid this twofold loss, the men of the city would readily make known the murderer, + if they knew who he was: and it would seldom happen but that some word or sign would escape about the matter. Or again, this + was done in order to frighten people, in detestation of murder. Because the slaying of a heifer, which is a useful + animal and full of strength, especially before it has been put under the yoke, signified that whoever committed murder, however + useful and strong he might be, was to forfeit his life; and that, by a cruel death, which was implied by the striking off + of its head; and that the murderer, as vile and abject, was to be cut off from the fellowship of men, which was betokened + by the fact that the heifer after being slain was left to rot in a rough and uncultivated place. + </p><p id="FS_Q105_A2-p38"> Mystically, the heifer taken from the herd signifies the flesh of Christ; which had not drawn a yoke, since it had done no + sin; nor did it plough the ground, i.e. it never knew the stain of revolt. The fact of the heifer being killed in an uncultivated + valley signified the despised death of Christ, whereby all sins are washed away, and the devil is shown to be the arch-murderer. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 ad 12"><a name="38213" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38213] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 ad 12</span></a> Ad +duodecimum dicendum quod ratio litteralis illius mandati fuit, ut +Rabbi Moyses dicit, quia frequenter interfector est de civitate +propinquiori. Unde occisio vitulae fiebat ad explorandum homicidium +occultum. Quod quidem fiebat per tria. Quorum unum est quod +seniores civitatis iurabant nihil se praetermisisse in custodia +viarum. Aliud est quia ille cuius erat vitula damnificabatur in +occisione animalis, et si prius manifestaretur homicidium, animal +non occideretur. Tertium est quia locus in quo occidebatur vitula, +remanebat incultus. Et ideo, ad evitandum utrumque damnum, homines +civitatis de facili manifestarent homicidam, si scirent, et raro +poterat esse quin aliqua verba vel iudicia super hoc facta essent. +Vel hoc fiebat ad terrorem, in detestationem homicidii. Per +occisionem enim vitulae, quae est animal utile et fortitudine +plenum, praecipue antequam laboret sub iugo, significabatur quod +quicumque homicidium fecisset, quamvis esset utilis et fortis, +occidendus erat; et morte crudeli, quod cervicis concisio +significabat; et quod tanquam vilis et abiectus a consortio hominum +excludendus erat, quod significabatur per hoc quod vitula occisa in +loco aspero et inculto relinquebatur, in putredinem convertenda. +Mystice autem per vitulam de armento significatur caro Christi; +quae non traxit iugum, quia non fecit peccatum; nec terram scidit +vomere, idest seditionis maculam non admisit. Per hoc autem quod in +valle inculta occidebatur, significabatur despecta mors Christi; +per quam purgantur omnia peccata, et Diabolus esse homicidii auctor +ostenditur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q105_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q105_A3-p0.1">Q. 105. A. 3. Whether the judicial precepts regarding foreigners were framed in a suitable manner?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the judicial precepts regarding foreigners were not suitably framed. For Peter said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.10.34" target="asv">Acts 10:34,35</a>): "In very deed I perceive that God is not a respecter of persons, but in every nation, he that feareth Him and worketh justice + is acceptable to Him." But those who are acceptable to God should not be excluded from the Church of God. Therefore it is + unsuitably commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.3" target="asv">Dt. 23:3</a>) that "the Ammonite and + the Moabite, even after the tenth generation, shall not enter into the church of the Lord for ever": whereas, on the other + hand, it is prescribed ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.7" target="asv">Dt. 23:7</a>) to be observed with regard to certain other nations: "Thou shalt not abhor the Edomite, because he is thy brother; nor the + Egyptian because thou wast a stranger in his land." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="38214" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38214] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod iudicialia praecepta non sint +convenienter tradita quantum ad extraneos. Dicit enim Petrus, Act. +X, <i>in veritate comperi quoniam non est acceptor personarum Deus; +sed in omni gente qui timet Deum et operatur iustitiam, acceptus +est illi</i>. Sed illi qui sunt Deo accepti, non sunt ab Ecclesia +Dei excludendi. Inconvenienter igitur mandatur Deut. XXIII, quod +<i>Ammonites et Moabites, etiam post decimam generationem, non +intrabunt Ecclesiam domini in aeternum</i>; e contrario autem +ibidem praecipitur de quibusdam gentibus, <i>non abominaberis +Idumaeum, quia frater tuus est; nec Aegyptium, quia advena fuisti +in terra eius</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we do not deserve to be punished for those things which are not in our power. But it is not in man's power to be + an eunuch, or born of a prostitute. Therefore it is unsuitably commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.1" target="asv">Dt. 23:1,2</a>) that "an eunuch and one born of a prostitute shalt not enter into the church of the Lord." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="38215" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38215] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ea quae non sunt in potestate nostra, non merentur aliquam poenam. +Sed quod homo sit eunuchus, vel ex scorto natus, non est in +potestate eius. Ergo inconvenienter mandatur Deut. XXIII, quod +<i>eunuchus, et ex scorto natus, non ingrediatur Ecclesiam +domini</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Old Law mercifully forbade strangers to be molested: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.21" target="asv">Ex. 22:21</a>): "Thou shalt not molest a stranger, nor afflict him; for yourselves also were strangers in the land of Egypt": and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.23.9" target="asv">Ex. 23:9</a>): "Thou shalt not molest a stranger, for you know the hearts of strangers, for you also were strangers in the land of Egypt." + But it is an affliction to be burdened with usury. Therefore the Law + unsuitably permitted them ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p4.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.19" target="asv">Dt. 23:19,20</a>) to lend money to the stranger for usury. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="38216" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38216] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex vetus misericorditer mandavit ut advenae non affligantur, +dicitur enim Exod. XXII, <i>advenam non contristabis, neque +affliges eum, advenae enim et ipsi fuistis in terra Aegypti</i>; et +XXIII, <i>peregrino molestus non eris, scitis enim advenarum +animas, quia et ipsi peregrini fuistis in terra Aegypti</i>. Sed ad +afflictionem alicuius pertinet quod usuris opprimatur. +Inconvenienter igitur lex permisit, Deut. XXIII, ut alienis ad +usuram pecuniam mutuarent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, men are much more akin to us than trees. But we should show greater care and love for these things that are nearest + to us, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.13.19" target="asv"> Ecclus. 13:19</a>: "Every beast loveth its like: so also every man him that is nearest to himself." Therefore the Lord unsuitably commanded + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.20.13" target="asv">Dt. 20:13-19</a>) that all the inhabitants of a captured hostile city were to be slain, but that the fruit-trees should not be cut down. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="38217" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38217] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +multo magis appropinquant nobis homines quam arbores. Sed his quae +sunt nobis magis propinqua, magis debemus affectum et effectum +dilectionis impendere; secundum illud Eccli. XIII, <i>omne animal +diligit simile sibi, sic et omnis homo proximum sibi</i>. +Inconvenienter igitur dominus, Deut. XX, mandavit quod de +civitatibus hostium captis omnes interficerent, et tamen arbores +fructiferas non succiderent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A3-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, every one should prefer the common good of virtue to the good of the individual. But the common good is sought in + a war which men fight against their enemies. Therefore it is unsuitably commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.20.5" target="asv">Dt. 20:5-7</a>) that certain men should be sent home, for instance a man that had built a new house, or who had planted a vineyard, or who + had married a wife. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 3 arg. 5"><a name="38218" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38218] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +bonum commune secundum virtutem est bono privato praeferendum ab +unoquoque. Sed in bello quod committitur contra hostes, quaeritur +bonum commune. Inconvenienter igitur mandatur Deut. XX, quod, +imminente proelio, aliqui domum remittantur, puta qui aedificavit +domum novam, qui plantavit vineam, vel qui despondit uxorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A3-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, no man should profit by his own fault. But it is a man's fault if he be timid or faint-hearted: since this is contrary + to the virtue of fortitude. Therefore the timid and faint-hearted are unfittingly excused from the toil of battle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.20.8" target="asv">Dt. 20:8</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 3 arg. 6"><a name="38219" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38219] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, +ex culpa non debet quis commodum reportare. Sed quod homo sit +formidolosus et corde pavido, culpabile est, contrariatur enim +virtuti fortitudinis. Inconvenienter igitur a labore proelii +excusabantur formidolosi et pavidum cor habentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A3-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Divine Wisdom declares ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.8" target="asv">Prov. 8:8</a>): "All my words are just, there is nothing wicked nor perverse in them." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 3 s. c."><a name="38220" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38220] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod sapientia divina dicit, Prov. VIII, <i>recti sunt omnes +sermones mei, non est in eis pravum quid neque perversum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q105_A3-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Man's relations with foreigners are twofold: peaceful, and hostile: and in directing both kinds of relation the Law contained + suitable precepts. For the Jews were offered three opportunities of peaceful relations with foreigners. First, when foreigners + passed through their land as travelers. Secondly, when they came to dwell in their land as newcomers. And in both these respects + the Law made kind provision in its precepts: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.21" target="asv">Ex. + 22:21 + </a>): "Thou shalt not molest a stranger [advenam]"; and again ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.9" target="asv">Ex. 22:9</a>): "Thou shalt not molest a stranger [peregrino]." Thirdly, when any foreigners wished to be admitted entirely to their fellowship + and mode of worship. With regard to these a certain order was observed. For they were not at once admitted to citizenship: + just as it was law with some nations that no one was deemed a citizen except after two or three generations, as the Philosopher + says (Polit. + iii, 1). The reason for this was that if foreigners were allowed to meddle with the affairs of a nation as soon as they settled + down in its midst, many dangers might occur, since the foreigners not yet having the common good firmly at heart might attempt + something hurtful to the people. Hence it was that the Law prescribed in respect of certain nations that had close relations + with the Jews (viz., the Egyptians among whom they were born and educated, and the Idumeans, the children of Esau, + Jacob's brother), that they should be admitted to the fellowship of the people after the third generation; whereas others + (with whom their relations had been hostile, such as the Ammonites and Moabites) were never to be admitted to citizenship; + while the Amalekites, who were yet more hostile to them, and had no fellowship of kindred with them, were to be held as foes + in perpetuity: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p9.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.17.16" target="asv">Ex. 17:16</a>): "The war of the Lord shall be against Amalec from generation + to generation." + </p><p id="FS_Q105_A3-p10"> In like manner with regard to hostile relations with foreigners, the Law contained suitable precepts. For, in the first place, + it commanded that war should be declared for a just cause: thus it is commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.20.10" target="asv">Dt. 20:10</a>) that when they advanced to besiege a city, they should at first make an offer of peace. Secondly, it enjoined that when + once they had entered on a war they should undauntedly persevere in it, putting their trust in God. And in order that they + might be the more heedful of this command, it ordered that on the approach of battle the priest should hearten them by promising + them God's aid. Thirdly, it prescribed the removal of whatever might prove an obstacle to the fight, and that certain men, + who might be in the way, should be sent home. Fourthly, it enjoined that they should use moderation in pursuing the advantage + of victory, by sparing women and children, and by not cutting down fruit-trees of that country. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 3 co."><a name="38221" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38221] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod cum extraneis potest esse hominum conversatio +dupliciter, uno modo, pacifice; alio modo, hostiliter. Et quantum +ad utrumque modum ordinandum, lex convenientia praecepta +continebat. Tripliciter enim offerebatur Iudaeis occasio ut cum +extraneis pacifice communicarent. Primo quidem, quando extranei per +terram eorum transitum faciebant quasi peregrini. Alio modo, quando +in terram eorum adveniebant ad inhabitandum sicut advenae. Et +quantum ad utrumque, lex misericordiae praecepta proposuit, nam +Exod. XXII dicitur, <i>advenam non contristabis</i>; et XXIII +dicitur, <i>peregrino molestus non eris</i>. Tertio vero, quando +aliqui extranei totaliter in eorum consortium et ritum admitti +volebant. Et in his quidam ordo attendebatur. Non enim statim +recipiebantur quasi cives, sicut etiam apud quosdam gentilium +statutum erat ut non reputarentur cives nisi qui ex avo, vel abavo, +cives existerent, ut philosophus dicit, in III Polit. Et hoc ideo +quia, si statim extranei advenientes reciperentur ad tractandum ea +quae sunt populi, possent multa pericula contingere; dum extranei, +non habentes adhuc amorem firmatum ad bonum publicum, aliqua contra +populum attentarent. Et ideo lex statuit ut de quibusdam gentibus +habentibus aliquam affinitatem ad Iudaeos, scilicet de Aegyptiis, +apud quos nati fuerant et nutriti, et de Idumaeis, filiis Esau +fratris Iacob, in tertia generatione reciperentur in consortium +populi; quidam vero, quia hostiliter se ad eos habuerant, sicut +Ammonitae et Moabitae, nunquam in consortium populi admitterentur; +Amalecitae autem, qui magis eis fuerant adversati, et cum eis +nullum cognationis habebant consortium, quasi hostes perpetui +haberentur; dicitur enim Exod. XVII, <i>bellum Dei erit contra +Amalec a generatione in generationem</i>. Similiter etiam quantum +ad hostilem communicationem cum extraneis, lex convenientia +praecepta tradidit. Nam primo quidem, instituit ut bellum iuste +iniretur, mandatur enim Deut. XX, quod quando accederent ad +expugnandum civitatem, offerrent ei primum pacem. Secundo, +instituit ut fortiter bellum susceptum exequerentur, habentes de +Deo fiduciam. Et ad hoc melius observandum, instituit quod, +imminente proelio, sacerdos eos confortaret, promittendo auxilium +Dei. Tertio, mandavit ut impedimenta proelii removerentur, +remittendo quosdam ad domum, qui possent impedimenta praestare. +Quarto, instituit ut victoria moderate uterentur, parcendo +mulieribus et parvulis, et etiam ligna fructifera regionis non +incidendo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q105_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Law excluded the men of no nation from the worship of God and from things pertaining to the welfare of the soul: for + it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.12.48" target="asv">Ex. 12:48</a>): "If any stranger be willing to dwell among you, and to keep the Phase of the Lord; all his males shall first be circumcised, + and then shall he celebrate it according to the manner, and he shall be as that which is born in the land." But in temporal + matters concerning the public life of + the people, admission was not granted to everyone at once, for the reason given above: but to some, i.e. the Egyptians and + Idumeans, in the third generation; while others were excluded in perpetuity, in detestation of their past offense, i.e. the + peoples of Moab, Ammon, and Amalec. For just as one man is punished for a sin committed by him, in order that others seeing + this may be deterred and refrain from sinning; so too may one nation or city be punished for a crime, that others may refrain + from similar crimes. + </p><p id="FS_Q105_A3-p12"> Nevertheless it was possible by dispensation for a man to be admitted to citizenship on account of some act of virtue: thus + it is related ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Jdt.14.6" target="asv">Judith 14:6</a>) that Achior, the captain of the children of Ammon, "was joined to the people of Israel, with all the succession of his kindred." + The same applies to Ruth the Moabite who was "a virtuous woman" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Ruth.3.11" target="asv">Ruth 3:11</a>): although it may be said that this prohibition regarded men and not women, who are not competent to be + citizens absolutely speaking. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="38222" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38222] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod homines nullius gentis exclusit lex a cultu Dei +et ab his quae pertinent ad animae salutem, dicitur enim Exod. XII, +<i>si quis peregrinorum in vestram voluerit transire coloniam, et +facere phase domini; circumcidetur prius omne masculinum eius, et +tunc rite celebrabit, eritque simul sicut indigena terrae</i>. Sed +in temporalibus, quantum ad ea quae pertinebant ad communitatem +populi, non statim quilibet admittebatur, ratione supra dicta, sed +quidam in tertia generatione, scilicet Aegyptii et Idumaei; alii +vero perpetuo excludebantur, in detestationem culpae praeteritae, +sicut Moabitae et Ammonitae et Amalecitae. Sicut enim punitur unus +homo propter peccatum quod commisit, ut alii videntes timeant et +peccare desistant; ita etiam propter aliquod peccatum gens vel +civitas potest puniri, ut alii a simili peccato abstineant. Poterat +tamen dispensative aliquis in collegium populi admitti propter +aliquem virtutis actum, sicut Iudith XIV dicitur quod Achior, dux +filiorum Ammon, <i>appositus est ad populum Israel, et omnis +successio generis eius</i>. Et similiter Ruth Moabitis, quae mulier +virtutis erat. Licet possit dici quod illa prohibitio extendebatur +ad viros, non ad mulieres, quibus non competit simpliciter esse +cives.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 3), a man is said to be a citizen in two ways: first, simply; secondly, in a restricted + sense. A man is a citizen simply if he has all the rights of citizenship, for instance, the right of debating or voting in + the popular assembly. On the other hand, any man may be called citizen, only in a restricted sense, if he dwells within the + state, even common people or children or old men, who are not fit to enjoy power in + matters pertaining to the common weal. For this reason bastards, by reason of their base origin, were excluded from the "ecclesia," + i.e. from the popular assembly, down to the tenth generation. The same applies to eunuchs, who were not competent to receive + the honor due to a father, especially among the Jews, where the divine worship was continued through carnal generation: for + even among the heathens, those who had many children were marked with special honor, as the Philosopher remarks + (Polit. ii, 6). Nevertheless, in matters pertaining to the grace of God, eunuchs were not discriminated from others, as neither + were strangers, as already stated: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.56.3" target="asv">Isa. 56:3</a>): "Let not the son of the stranger that adhereth to the Lord speak, saying: The Lord will divide and separate me from His + people. And let not the eunuch say: Behold I am a dry tree." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="38223" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38223] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in III Polit., dupliciter +aliquis dicitur esse civis, uno modo, simpliciter; et alio modo, +secundum quid. Simpliciter quidem civis est qui potest agere ea +quae sunt civium, puta dare consilium vel iudicium in populo. +Secundum quid autem civis dici potest quicumque civitatem +inhabitat, etiam viles personae et pueri et senes, qui non sunt +idonei ad hoc quod habeant potestatem in his quae pertinent ad +commune. Ideo ergo spurii, propter vilitatem originis, +excludebantur ab Ecclesia, idest a collegio populi, usque ad +decimam generationem. Et similiter eunuchi, quibus non poterat +competere honor qui patribus debebatur, et praecipue in populo +Iudaeorum, in quo Dei cultus conservabatur per carnis generationem, +nam etiam apud gentiles, qui multos filios genuerant, aliquo +insigni honore donabantur, sicut philosophus dicit, in II Polit. +Tamen quantum ad ea quae ad gratiam Dei pertinent, eunuchi ab aliis +non separabantur, sicut nec advenae, ut dictum est, dicitur enim +Isaiae LVI, <i>non dicat filius advenae qui adhaeret domino, +dicens, separatione dividet me dominus a populo suo. Et non dicat +eunuchus, ecce ego lignum aridum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A3-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It was not the intention of the Law to sanction the acceptance of usury from strangers, but only to tolerate it on account + of the proneness of the Jews to avarice; and in order to promote an amicable feeling towards those out of whom they made a + profit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="38224" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38224] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod accipere usuras ab alienis non erat secundum +intentionem legis, sed ex quadam permissione, propter pronitatem +Iudaeorum ad avaritiam; et ut magis pacifice se haberent ad +extraneos, a quibus lucrabantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A3-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A distinction was observed with regard to hostile cities. For some of them were far distant, and were not among those which + had been promised to them. When they had taken these cities, they killed all the men who had fought against God's people; + whereas the women and children were spared. But in the neighboring cities which had been promised to them, all were ordered + to be slain, on account of their former crimes, to punish which God sent the + Israelites as executor of Divine justice: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.9.5" target="asv">Dt. 9:5</a>) "because they have done wickedly, they are destroyed at thy coming in." The fruit-trees were commanded to be left untouched, + for the use of the people themselves, to whom the city with its territory was destined to be subjected. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="38225" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38225] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod circa civitates hostium quaedam distinctio +adhibebatur. Quaedam enim erant remotae, non de numero illarum +urbium quae eis erant repromissae, et in talibus urbibus expugnatis +occidebantur masculi, qui pugnaverant contra populum Dei; +mulieribus autem et infantibus parcebatur. Sed in civitatibus +vicinis, quae erant eis repromissae omnes mandabantur interfici, +propter iniquitates eorum priores, ad quas puniendas dominus +populum Israel quasi divinae iustitiae executorem mittebat, dicitur +enim Deut. IX, <i>quia illae egerunt impie, introeunte te deletae +sunt</i>. Ligna autem fructifera mandabantur reservari propter +utilitatem ipsius populi, cuius ditioni civitas et eius territorium +erat subiiciendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A3-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The builder of a new house, the planter of a vineyard, the newly married husband, were excluded from fighting, for two reasons. + First, because man is wont to give all his affection to those things which he has lately acquired, or is on the point of having, + and consequently he is apt to dread the loss of these above other things. Wherefore it was likely enough that on account of + this affection they would fear death all the more, and be so much the less + brave in battle. Secondly, because, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 5), "it is a misfortune for a man if he is prevented + from obtaining something good when it is within his grasp." And so lest the surviving relations should be the more grieved + at the death of these men who had not entered into the possession of the good things prepared for them; and also lest the + people should be horror-stricken at the sight of their misfortune: these men were taken away from the danger of death by being + removed from the battle. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 3 ad 5"><a name="38226" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38226] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod novus aedificator domus, aut plantator vineae, vel +desponsator uxoris, excludebatur a proelio propter duo. Primo +quidem, quia ea quae homo de novo habet, vel statim paratus est ad +habendum, magis solet amare, et per consequens eorum amissionem +timere. Unde probabile erat quod ex tali amore magis mortem +timerent, et sic minus fortes essent ad pugnandum. Secundo quia, +sicut philosophus dicit, in II Physic., <i>infortunium videtur +quando aliquis appropinquat ad aliquod bonum habendum, si postea +impediatur ab illo</i>. Et ideo ne propinqui remanentes magis +contristarentur de morte talium, qui bonis sibi paratis potiti non +fuerunt; et etiam populus, considerans hoc, horreret; huiusmodi +homines a mortis periculo sunt sequestrati per subtractionem a +proelio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A3-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The timid were sent back home, not that they might be the gainers thereby; but lest the people might be the losers by their + presence, since their timidity and flight might cause others to be afraid and run away. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 3 ad 6"><a name="38227" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38227] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum +dicendum quod timidi remittebantur ad domum, non ut ipsi ex hoc +commodum consequerentur; sed ne populus ex eorum praesentia +incommodum consequeretur, dum per eorum timorem et fugam etiam alii +ad timendum et fugiendum provocarentur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q105_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q105_A4-p0.1">Q. 105. A. 4. Whether the Old Law set forth suitable precepts about the members of the household?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Old Law set forth unsuitable precepts about the members of the household. For a slave "is in every + respect his master's property," as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 2). But that which is a man's property should be his + always. Therefore it was unfitting for the Law to command ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.21.2" target="asv">Ex. 21:2</a>) that slaves should "go out free" in the seventh year. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="38228" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38228] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter lex vetus praecepta +ediderit circa personas domesticas. Servus enim id quod est, domini +est, ut philosophus dicit, in I Polit. Sed id quod est alicuius, +perpetuo eius esse debet. Ergo inconvenienter lex mandavit Exod. +XXI, quod servi septimo anno liberi abscederent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a slave is his master's property, just as an animal, e.g. an ass or an ox. But it is commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.22.1" target="asv">Dt. 22:1-3</a>) with regard to animals, that they should be brought back to the owner if they be found going astray. Therefore it was unsuitably + commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.15" target="asv">Dt. 23:15</a>): "Thou shalt not deliver to his master the servant that is fled to thee." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="38229" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38229] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut animal aliquod, ut asinus aut bos, est possessio domini, ita +etiam servus. Sed de animalibus praecipitur Deut. XXII, quod +restituantur dominis suis, si errare inveniantur. Inconvenienter +ergo mandatur Deut. XXIII, <i>non tradas servum domino suo, qui ad +te confugerit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Divine Law should encourage mercy more even than the human law. But according to human laws those who ill-treat + their servants and maidservants are severely punished: and the worse treatment of all seems to be that which results in death. + Therefore it is unfittingly commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.21.20" target="asv">Ex. 21:20,21</a>) that "he that striketh his bondman or bondwoman with a rod, and they die under his hands . . . if the party remain alive + a day . . . he + shall not be subject to the punishment, because it is his money." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="38230" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38230] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex divina debet magis ad misericordiam provocare quam etiam lex +humana. Sed secundum leges humanas graviter puniuntur qui nimis +aspere affligunt servos aut ancillas. Asperrima autem videtur esse +afflictio ex qua sequitur mors. Inconvenienter igitur statuitur +Exod. XXI, quod <i>qui percusserit servum suum vel ancillam virga, +si uno die supervixerit, non subiacebit poenae, quia pecunia illius +est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the dominion of a master over his slave differs from that of the father over his son (Polit. i, 3). But the dominion + of master over slave gives the former the right to sell his servant or maidservant. Therefore it was unfitting for the Law + to allow a man to sell his daughter to be a servant or handmaid ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.21.7" target="asv">Ex. 21:7</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="38231" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38231] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +alius est principatus domini ad servum, et patris ad filium, ut +dicitur in I et III Polit. Sed hoc ad principatum domini ad servum +pertinet, ut aliquis servum vel ancillam vendere possit. +Inconvenienter igitur lex permisit quod aliquis venderet filiam +suam in famulam vel ancillam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, a father has power over his son. But he who has power over the sinner has the right to punish him for his offenses. + Therefore it is unfittingly commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.21.18" target="asv">Dt. 21:18, </a> seqq.) that a father should bring his son to the ancients of the city for punishment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="38232" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38232] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +pater habet sui filii potestatem. Sed eius est punire excessus, qui +habet potestatem super peccantem. Inconvenienter igitur mandatur +Deut. XXI, quod pater ducat filium ad seniores civitatis +puniendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A4-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, the Lord forbade them ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.7.3" target="asv">Dt. 7:3, </a> seqq.) to make marriages with strange nations; and commanded the dissolution of such as had been contracted ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p7.2" href="./asv.html#iEsd.10" target="asv">1 Esdras 10</a>). Therefore it was unfitting to allow them to marry captive women from strange nations ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.21.10" target="asv">Dt. 21:10, </a> seqq.). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 arg. 6"><a name="38233" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38233] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, +dominus prohibuit, Deut. VII, ut cum alienigenis non sociarent +coniugia; et coniuncta etiam separarentur, ut patet I Esdrae X. +Inconvenienter igitur Deut. XXI conceditur eis ut captivas +alienigenarum ducere possint uxores.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A4-p8"> + <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, the Lord forbade them to marry within certain degrees of consanguinity and affinity, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.18" target="asv">Lev. 18</a>. Therefore it was unsuitably commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.5" target="asv">Dt. 25:5</a>) that if any man died without issue, his brother should marry his wife. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 arg. 7"><a name="38234" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38234] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 arg. 7</span></a> Praeterea, +dominus in uxoribus ducendis quosdam consanguinitatis et +affinitatis gradus praecepit esse vitandos, ut patet Lev. XVIII. +Inconvenienter igitur mandatur Deut. XXV, quod si aliquis esset +mortuus absque liberis, uxorem ipsius frater eius acciperet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A4-p9"> + <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, as there is the greatest familiarity between man and wife, so should there be the staunchest fidelity. But this + is impossible if the marriage bond can be sundered. Therefore it was unfitting for the Lord to allow ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.24.1" target="asv">Dt. 24:1-4</a>) a man to put his wife away, by writing a bill of divorce; and besides, that he could not take her again to wife. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 arg. 8"><a name="38235" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38235] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 arg. 8</span></a> Praeterea, +inter virum et uxorem, sicut est maxima familiaritas, ita debet +esse firmissima fides. Sed hoc non potest esse, si matrimonium +dissolubile fuerit. Inconvenienter igitur dominus permisit, Deut. +XXIV, quod aliquis posset uxorem dimittere, scripto libello +repudii; et quod etiam ulterius eam recuperare non posset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A4-p10"> + <b>Objection 9:</b> Further, just as a wife can be faithless to her husband, so can a slave be to his master, and a son to his father. But the + Law did not command any sacrifice to be offered in order to investigate the injury done by a servant to his master, or by + a son to his father. Therefore it seems to have been superfluous for the Law to prescribe the "sacrifice of jealousy" in order + to investigate a wife's adultery ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Num.5.12" target="asv">Num. 5:12, </a> seqq.). Consequently it + seems that the Law put forth unsuitable judicial precepts about the members of the household. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 arg. 9"><a name="38236" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38236] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 arg. 9</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut uxor potest frangere fidem marito, ita etiam servus domino, +et filius patri. Sed ad investigandam iniuriam servi in dominum, +vel filii in patrem, non est institutum in lege aliquod +sacrificium. Superflue igitur videtur institui sacrificium +zelotypiae ad investigandum uxoris adulterium, Num. V. Sic igitur +inconvenienter videntur esse tradita in lege praecepta iudicialia +circa personas domesticas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A4-p11"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.18.10" target="asv">Ps. 18:10</a>): "The judgments of the Lord are true, justified in themselves." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 s. c."><a name="38237" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38237] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur in Psalmo XVIII, <i>iudicia domini vera, +iustificata in semetipsa</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q105_A4-p12"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The mutual relations of the members of a household regard everyday actions directed to the necessities of life, as the Philosopher + states (Polit. i, 1). Now the preservation of man's life may be considered from two points of view. First, from the point + of view of the individual, i.e. in so far as man preserves his individuality: and for the purpose of the preservation of life, + considered from this standpoint, man has at his service external goods, by means + of which he provides himself with food and clothing and other such necessaries of life: in the handling of which he has need + of servants. Secondly man's life is preserved from the point of view of the species, by means of generation, for which purpose + man needs a wife, that she may bear him children. Accordingly the mutual relations of the members of a household admit of + a threefold combination: viz. those of master and servant, those of husband and wife, and those of father and son: and in + respect of all these relationships the Old Law contained fitting precepts. Thus, with regard to servants, it commanded them + to be treated with moderation---both as to their work, lest, to wit, they should be burdened with excessive labor, wherefore + the Lord commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.5.14" target="asv">Dt. 5:14</a>) that on the Sabbath day "thy manservant and thy maidservant" should "rest even as thyself"---and also as to the infliction + of punishment, for it ordered those who maimed their servants, to set them + free ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.21.26" target="asv">Ex. 21:26,27</a>). Similar provision was made in favor of a maidservant when married to anyone ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p12.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.21.7" target="asv">Ex. 21:7, </a> seqq.). Moreover, with regard to those servants in particular who were taken from among the people, the Law prescribed that + they should go out free in the seventh year taking whatever they brought with them, even their clothes ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p12.4" href="./asv.html#Exod.21.2" target="asv">Ex. 21:2, </a> seqq.): and furthermore it was commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p12.5" href="./asv.html#Deut.15.13" target="asv">Dt. 15:13</a>) that they should + be given provision for the journey. + </p><p id="FS_Q105_A4-p13"> With regard to wives the Law made certain prescriptions as to those who were to be taken in marriage: for instance, that + they should marry a wife from their own tribe ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Num.36.6" target="asv">Num. 36:6</a>): and this lest confusion should ensue in the property of various tribes. Also that a man should marry the wife of his deceased + brother when the latter died without issue, as prescribed in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p13.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.5" target="asv"> Dt. 25:5,6</a>: and this in order that he who could not have successors + according to carnal origin, might at least have them by a kind of adoption, and that thus the deceased might not be entirely + forgotten. It also forbade them to marry certain women; to wit, women of strange nations, through fear of their losing their + faith; and those of their near kindred, on account of the natural respect due to them. Furthermore it prescribed in what way + wives were to be treated after marriage. To wit, that they should not be slandered without grave reason: wherefore it + ordered punishment to be inflicted on the man who falsely accused his wife of a crime ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p13.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.22.13" target="asv">Dt. 22:13, </a> seqq.). Also that a man's hatred of his wife should not be detrimental to his son ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p13.4" href="./asv.html#Deut.21.15" target="asv">Dt. 21:15, </a> seqq.). Again, that a man should not ill-use his wife through hatred of her, but rather that he should write a bill of divorce + and send her away ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p13.5" href="./asv.html#Deut.24.1" target="asv">Dt. 24:1</a>). Furthermore, in order to foster conjugal love from the very outset, it was prescribed + that no public duties should be laid on a recently married man, so that he might be free to rejoice with his wife. + </p><p id="FS_Q105_A4-p14"> With regard to children, the Law commanded parents to educate them by instructing them in the faith: hence it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.12.26" target="asv">Ex. 12:26, </a> seqq.): "When your children shall say to you: What is the meaning of this service? You shall say to them: It is the victim + of the passage of the Lord." Moreover, they are commanded to teach them the rules of right conduct: wherefore it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p14.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.21.20" target="asv">Dt. 21:20</a>) that the parents had to say: "He slighteth + hearing our admonitions, he giveth himself to revelling and to debauchery." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 co."><a name="38238" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38238] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod communio domesticarum personarum ad invicem, ut +philosophus dicit, in I Polit., est secundum quotidianos actus qui +ordinantur ad necessitatem vitae. Vita autem hominis conservatur +dupliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad individuum, prout scilicet homo +idem numero vivit, et ad talem vitae conservationem opitulantur +homini exteriora bona, ex quibus homo habet victum et vestitum et +alia huiusmodi necessaria vitae; in quibus administrandis indiget +homo servis. Alio modo conservatur vita hominis secundum speciem +per generationem, ad quam indiget homo uxore, ut ex ea generet +filium. Sic igitur in domestica communione sunt tres combinationes, +scilicet domini ad servum, viri ad uxorem, patris ad filium. Et +quantum ad omnia ista lex vetus convenientia praecepta tradidit. +Nam quantum ad servos, instituit ut modeste tractarentur et quantum +ad labores, ne scilicet immoderatis laboribus affligerentur, unde +Deut. V, dominus mandavit ut in die sabbati requiesceret servus et +ancilla tua sicut et tu, et iterum quantum ad poenas infligendas, +imposuit enim poenam mutilatoribus servorum ut dimitterent eos +liberos, sicut habetur Exod. XXI. Et simile etiam statuit in +ancilla quam in uxorem aliquis duxerit. Statuit etiam specialiter +circa servos qui erant ex populo, ut septimo anno liberi +egrederentur cum omnibus quae apportaverant, etiam vestimentis, ut +habetur Exod. XXI. Mandatur etiam insuper Deut. XV, ut ei detur +viaticum. Circa uxores vero, statuitur in lege quantum ad uxores +ducendas. Ut scilicet ducant uxores suae tribus, sicut habetur Num. +ult., et hoc ideo, ne sortes tribuum confundantur. Et quod aliquis +in uxorem ducat uxorem fratris defuncti sine liberis, ut habetur +Deut. XXV, et hoc ideo, ut ille qui non potuit habere successores +secundum carnis originem, saltem habeat per quandam adoptionem, et +sic non totaliter memoria defuncti deleretur. Prohibuit etiam +quasdam personas ne in coniugium ducerentur, scilicet alienigenas, +propter periculum seductionis; et propinquas, propter reverentiam +naturalem quae eis debetur. Statuit etiam qualiter uxores iam +ductae tractari deberent. Ut scilicet non leviter infamarentur, +unde mandatur puniri ille qui falso crimen imponit uxori, ut +habetur Deut. XXII. Et quod etiam propter uxoris odium filius +detrimentum non pateretur, ut habetur Deut. XXI. Et etiam quod, +propter odium uxorem non affligeret, sed potius, scripto libello, +eam dimitteret, ut patet Deut. XXIV. Et ut etiam maior dilectio +inter coniuges a principio contrahatur, praecipitur quod, cum +aliquis nuper uxorem acceperit, nihil ei publicae necessitatis +iniungatur, ut libere possit laetari cum uxore sua. Circa filios +autem, instituit ut patres eis disciplinam adhiberent, instruendo +eos in fide, unde habetur Exod. XII, <i>cum dixerint vobis filii +vestri, quae est ista religio? Dicetis eis, victima transitus +domini est</i>. Et quod etiam instruerent eos in moribus, unde +dicitur Deut. XXI, quod patres dicere debent, <i>monita nostra +audire contemnit, commessationibus vacat et luxuriae atque +conviviis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A4-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the children of Israel had been delivered by the Lord from slavery, and for this reason were bound to the service of God, + He did not wish them to be slaves in perpetuity. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.25.39" target="asv">Lev. 25:39</a>, seqq.): "If thy brother, constrained by poverty, sell himself to thee, thou shalt not oppress him with the service of bondservants: + but he shall be as a hireling and a sojourner . . . for they are My servants, and I brought them out of the land of + Egypt: let them not be sold as bondmen": and consequently, since they were slaves, not absolutely but in a restricted sense, + after a lapse of time they were set free. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="38239" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38239] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, quia filii Israel erant a domino de servitute +liberati, et per hoc divinae servituti addicti, noluit dominus ut +in perpetuum servi essent. Unde dicitur Lev. XXV, <i>si paupertate +compulsus vendiderit se tibi frater tuus, non eum opprimes +servitute famulorum, sed quasi mercenarius et colonus erit. Mei +enim sunt servi, et ego eduxi eos de terra Aegypti, non veneant +conditione servorum</i>. Et ideo, quia simpliciter servi non erant, +sed secundum quid, finito tempore, dimittebantur liberi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A4-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This commandment is to be understood as referring to a servant whom his master seeks to kill, or to help him in committing + some sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="38240" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38240] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod mandatum illud intelligitur de servo qui a domino +quaeritur ad occidendum, vel ad aliquod peccati ministerium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A4-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> With regard to the ill-treatment of servants, the Law seems to have taken into consideration whether it was certain or not: + since if it were certain, the Law fixed a penalty: for maiming, the penalty was forfeiture of the servant, who was ordered + to be given his liberty: while for slaying, the punishment was that of a murderer, when the slave died under the blow of his + master. If, however, the hurt was not certain, but only probable, the Law did not + impose any penalty as regards a man's own servant: for instance if the servant did not die at once after being struck, but + after some days: for it would be uncertain whether he died as a result of the blows he received. For when a man struck a free + man, yet so that he did not die at once, but "walked abroad again upon his staff," he that struck him was quit of murder, + even though afterwards he died. Nevertheless he was bound to pay the doctor's fees incurred by the victim of his assault. + But + this was not the case if a man killed his own servant: because whatever the servant had, even his very person, was the property + of his master. Hence the reason for his not being subject to a pecuniary penalty is set down as being "because it is his money." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="38241" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38241] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod circa laesiones servis illatas, lex considerasse +videtur utrum sit certa vel incerta. Si enim laesio certa esset, +lex poenam adhibuit, pro mutilatione quidem, amissionem servi qui +mandabatur libertati donandus; pro morte autem, homicidii poenam, +cum servus in manu domini verberantis moreretur. Si vero laesio non +esset certa, sed aliquam apparentiam haberet, lex nullam poenam +infligebat in proprio servo, puta cum percussus servus non statim +moriebatur, sed post aliquos dies. Incertum enim erat utrum ex +percussione mortuus esset. Quia si percussisset liberum hominem, +ita tamen quod statim non moreretur, sed super baculum suum +ambularet, non erat homicidii reus qui percusserat, etiam si postea +moreretur. Tenebatur tamen ad impensas solvendas quas percussus in +medicos fecerat. Sed hoc in servo proprio locum non habebat, quia +quidquid servus habebat, et etiam ipsa persona servi, erat quaedam +possessio domini. Et ideo pro causa assignatur quare non subiaceat +poenae pecuniariae, quia pecunia illius est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A4-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As stated above (ad 1), no Jew could own a Jew as a slave absolutely: but only in a restricted sense, as a hireling for a + fixed time. And in this way the Law permitted that through stress of poverty a man might sell his son or daughter. This is + shown by the very words of the Law, where we read: "If any man sell his daughter to be a servant, she shall not go out as + bondwomen are wont to go out." Moreover, in this way a man might sell not only his son, + but even himself, rather as a hireling than as a slave, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p18.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.25.39" target="asv"> Lev. 25:39,40</a>: "If thy brother, constrained by poverty, sell himself to thee, thou shalt not oppress him with the service of bondservants: + but he shall be as a hireling and a sojourner." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="38242" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38242] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, nullus Iudaeus poterat possidere +Iudaeum quasi simpliciter servum; sed erat servus secundum quid, +quasi mercenarius, usque ad tempus. Et per hunc modum permittebat +lex quod, paupertate cogente, aliquis filium aut filiam venderet. +Et hoc etiam verba ipsius legis ostendunt, dicit enim, <i>si quis +vendiderit filiam suam in famulam, non egredietur sicut ancillae +exire consueverunt</i>. Per hunc etiam modum non solum filium, sed +etiam seipsum aliquis vendere poterat, magis quasi mercenarium quam +quasi servum; secundum illud Levit. XXV, <i>si paupertate compulsus +vendiderit se tibi frater tuus, non eum opprimes servitute +famulorum, sed quasi mercenarius et colonus erit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A4-p19"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 9), the paternal authority has the power only of admonition; but not that of coercion, + whereby rebellious and headstrong persons can be compelled. Hence in this case the Lord commanded the stubborn son to be punished + by the rulers of the city. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="38243" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38243] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., principatus +paternus habet solam admonendi potestatem; non autem habet vim +coactivam, per quam rebelles et contumaces comprimi possunt. Et +ideo in hoc casu lex mandabat ut filius contumax a principibus +civitatis puniretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A4-p20"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The Lord forbade them to marry strange women on account of the danger of seduction, lest they should be led astray into idolatry. + And specially did this prohibition apply with respect to those nations who dwelt near them, because it was more probable that + they would adopt their religious practices. When, however, the woman was willing to renounce idolatry, and become an adherent + of the Law, it was lawful to take her in marriage: as was the case with + Ruth whom Booz married. Wherefore she said to her mother-in-law ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p20.1" href="./asv.html#Ruth.1.16" target="asv">Ruth 1:16</a>): "Thy people shall be my people, and thy God my God." Accordingly it was not permitted to marry a captive woman unless she + first shaved her hair, and pared her nails, and put off the raiment wherein she was taken, and mourned for her father and + mother, in token that she renounced idolatry for ever. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 ad 6"><a name="38244" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38244] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum +dicendum quod dominus alienigenas prohibuit in matrimonium duci +propter periculum seductionis, ne inducerentur in idololatriam. Et +specialiter hoc prohibuit de illis gentibus quae in vicino +habitabant, de quibus erat magis probabile quod suos ritus +retinerent. Si qua vero idololatriae cultum dimittere vellet, et ad +legis cultum se transferre, poterat in matrimonium duci, sicut +patet de Ruth, quam duxit Booz in uxorem. Unde ipsa dixerat socrui +suae, <i>populus tuus populus meus, Deus tuus Deus meus</i>, ut +habetur Ruth I. Et ideo captiva non aliter permittebatur in uxorem +duci nisi prius rasa caesarie, et circumcisis unguibus, et deposita +veste in qua capta est, et fleret patrem et matrem, per quae +significatur idololatriae perpetua abiectio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A4-p21"> + <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> As Chrysostom says (Hom. xlviii super Matth.), "because death was an unmitigated evil for the Jews, who did everything with + a view to the present life, it was ordained that children should be born to the dead man through his brother: thus affording + a certain mitigation to his death. It was not, however, ordained that any other than his brother or one next of kin should + marry the wife of the deceased, because" the offspring of this union "would not be + looked upon as that of the deceased: and moreover, a stranger would not be under the obligation to support the household of + the deceased, as his brother would be bound to do from motives of justice on account of his relationship." Hence it is evident + that in marrying the wife of his dead brother, he took his dead brother's place. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 ad 7"><a name="38245" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38245] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 ad 7</span></a> Ad septimum +dicendum quod, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., <i>quia +immitigabile malum mors erat apud Iudaeos, qui omnia pro praesenti +vita faciebant, statutum fuit ut defuncto filius nasceretur ex +fratre, quod erat quaedam mortis mitigatio. Non autem alius quam +frater vel propinquus iubebatur accipere uxorem defuncti, quia non +ita crederetur</i> (qui ex tali coniunctione erat nasciturus) +<i>esse filius eius qui obiit; et iterum extraneus non ita haberet +necessitatem statuere domum eius qui obierat, sicut frater, cui +etiam ex cognatione hoc facere iustum erat</i>. Ex quo patet quod +frater in accipiendo uxorem fratris sui, persona fratris defuncti +fungebatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A4-p22"> + <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> The Law permitted a wife to be divorced, not as though it were just absolutely speaking, but on account of the Jews' hardness + of heart, as Our Lord declared ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p22.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.8" target="asv">Mat. 19:8</a>). Of this, however, we must speak more fully in the treatise on Matrimony ( + <a href="unknown.html#SP_Q67" id="FS_Q105_A4-p22.2" shape="rect">SP, Q[67])</a>. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 ad 8"><a name="38246" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38246] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 ad 8</span></a> Ad octavum +dicendum quod lex permisit repudium uxoris, non quia simpliciter +iustum esset, sed propter duritiam Iudaeorum; ut dominus dicit, +Matth. XIX. Sed de hoc oportet plenius tractari cum de matrimonio +agetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A4-p23"> + <b>Reply to Objection 9:</b> Wives break their conjugal faith by adultery, both easily, for motives of pleasure, and hiddenly, since "the eye of the adulterer + observeth darkness" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p23.1" href="./asv.html#Job.24.15" target="asv">Job 24:15</a>). But this does not apply to a son in respect of his father, or to a servant in respect of his master: because the latter + infidelity is not the result of the lust of pleasure, but rather of malice: nor can it remain hidden like the infidelity of + an adulterous woman. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 ad 9"><a name="38247" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38247] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 ad 9</span></a> Ad nonum +dicendum quod uxores fidem matrimonii frangunt per adulterium et de +facili, propter delectationem; et latenter, <i>quia oculus adulteri +observat caliginem</i>, ut dicitur Iob XXIV. Non autem est similis +ratio de filio ad patrem, vel de servo ad dominum, quia talis +infidelitas non procedit ex concupiscentia delectationis, sed magis +ex malitia; nec potest ita latere sicut infidelitas mulieris +adulterae.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q106" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q106-p0.1">Q. 106. OF THE LAW OF THE GOSPEL, CALLED THE NEW LAW, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q106-p2"> In proper sequence we have to consider now the Law of the Gospel which is called the New Law: and in the first place we must + consider it in itself; secondly, in comparison with the Old Law; thirdly, we shall treat of those things that are contained + in the New Law. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FS_Q106-p3"><a href="#FS_Q106_A1"> (1) What kind of law is it? i.e. Is it a written law or is it instilled in the heart?</a></p><p id="FS_Q106-p4"><a href="#FS_Q106_A2"> (2) Of its efficacy, i.e. does it justify?</a></p><p id="FS_Q106-p5"><a href="#FS_Q106_A3"> (3) Of its beginning: should it have been given at the beginning of the world?</a></p><p id="FS_Q106-p6"><a href="#FS_Q106_A4"> (4) Of its end: i.e. whether it will last until the end, or will another law take its place?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 pr."><a name="38248" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38248] Iª-IIae q. 106 pr.</span></a> Consequenter +considerandum est de lege Evangelii, quod dicitur lex nova. Et +primo, de ipsa secundum se; secundo, de ipsa per comparationem ad +legem veterem; tertio, de his quae in lege nova continentur. Circa +primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, qualis sit, utrum scilicet +scripta vel indita. Secundo, de virtute eius, utrum iustificet. +Tertio, de principio eius, utrum debuerit dari a principio mundi. +Quarto, de termino eius utrum scilicet sit duratura usque ad finem, +an debeat ei alia lex succedere.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q106_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q106_A1-p0.1">Q. 106. A. 1. Whether the New Law is a written law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the New Law is a written law. For the New Law is just the same as the Gospel. But the Gospel is set forth + in writing, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.20.31" target="asv"> Jn. 20:31</a>: "But these are written that you may believe." Therefore the New Law is a written law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="38249" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38249] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex nova sit lex scripta. Lex enim +nova est ipsum Evangelium. Sed Evangelium est descriptum, Ioan. XX, +<i>haec autem scripta sunt ut credatis</i>. Ergo lex nova est lex +scripta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the law that is instilled in the heart is the natural law, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.14" target="asv"> Rom. 2:14,15</a>: "(The Gentiles) do by nature those things that are of the law . . . who have [Vulg.: 'show'] the work of the law written + in their hearts." If therefore the law of the Gospel were instilled in our hearts, it would not be distinct from the law of + nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="38250" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38250] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +lex indita est lex naturae; secundum illud Rom. II, <i>naturaliter +ea quae legis sunt faciunt, qui habent opus legis scriptum in +cordibus suis</i>. Si igitur lex Evangelii esset lex indita, non +differret a lege naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the law of the Gospel is proper to those who are in the state of the New Testament. But the law that is instilled + in the heart is common to those who are in the New Testament and to those who are in the Old Testament: for it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.27" target="asv">Wis. 7:27</a>) that Divine Wisdom "through nations conveyeth herself into holy souls, she maketh the friends of God and prophets." Therefore + the New Law is not instilled in our hearts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="38251" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38251] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex Evangelii propria est eorum qui sunt in statu novi testamenti. +Sed lex indita communis est et eis qui sunt in novo testamento, et +eis qui sunt in veteri testamento, dicitur enim Sap. VII, quod +<i>divina sapientia per nationes in animas sanctas se transfert, +amicos Dei et prophetas constituit</i>. Ergo lex nova non est lex +indita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The New Law is the law of the New Testament. But the law of the New Testament is instilled in our hearts. For the Apostle, + quoting the authority of + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.31.31" target="asv">Jeremiah 31:31</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Jer.31.33" target="asv">33</a>: "Behold the days shall come, saith the Lord; and I will perfect unto the house of Israel, and unto the house of Judah, a + new testament," says, explaining what this statement is ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A1-p5.3" href="./asv.html#Heb.8.8" target="asv">Heb. 8:8</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A1-p5.4" href="./asv.html#Heb.8.10" target="asv">10</a>): "For this is the testament which I will make to the house + of Israel . . . by giving [Vulg.: 'I will give'] My laws into their mind, and in their heart will I write them." Therefore + the New Law is instilled in our hearts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 1 s. c."><a name="38252" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38252] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod lex nova est lex novi testamenti. Sed lex novi testamenti +est indita in corde. Apostolus enim, ad Heb. VIII, dicit, inducens +auctoritatem quae habetur Ierem. XXXI, <i>ecce dies venient, dicit +dominus, et consummabo super domum Israel et super domum Iuda +testamentum novum</i>, et exponens quid sit hoc testamentum, dicit, +<i>quia hoc est testamentum quod disponam domui Israel, dando leges +meas in mentem eorum, et in corde eorum superscribam eas</i>. Ergo +lex nova est lex indita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q106_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> "Each thing appears to be that which preponderates in it," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 8). Now that which is preponderant + in the law of the New Testament, and whereon all its efficacy is based, is the grace of the Holy Ghost, which is given through + faith in Christ. Consequently the New Law is chiefly the grace itself of the Holy Ghost, which is given to those who believe + in Christ. This is manifestly stated by the Apostle who says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.27" target="asv">Rom. + 3:27 + </a>): "Where is . . . thy boasting? It is excluded. By what law? Of works? No, but by the law of faith": for he calls the grace + itself of faith "a law." And still more clearly it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.2" target="asv">Rom. 8:2</a>): "The law of the spirit of life, in Christ Jesus, hath delivered me from the law of sin and of death." Hence Augustine says + (De Spir. et Lit. xxiv) that "as the law of deeds was written on tables of stone, so is the law of faith inscribed on the + hearts of the + faithful": and elsewhere, in the same book (xxi): "What else are the Divine laws written by God Himself on our hearts, but + the very presence of His Holy Spirit?" + </p><p id="FS_Q106_A1-p7"> Nevertheless the New Law contains certain things that dispose us to receive the grace of the Holy Ghost, and pertaining to + the use of that grace: such things are of secondary importance, so to speak, in the New Law; and the faithful need to be instructed + concerning them, both by word and writing, both as to what they should believe and as to what they should do. Consequently + we must say that the New Law is in the first place a law that is inscribed on our hearts, but that + secondarily it is a written law. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 1 co."><a name="38253" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38253] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod <i>unaquaeque res illud videtur esse quod in ea est +potissimum</i>, ut philosophus dicit, in IX Ethic. Id autem quod +est potissimum in lege novi testamenti, et in quo tota virtus eius +consistit, est gratia spiritus sancti, quae datur per fidem +Christi. Et ideo principaliter lex nova est ipsa gratia spiritus +sancti, quae datur Christi fidelibus. Et hoc manifeste apparet per +apostolum, qui, ad Rom. III, dicit, <i>ubi est ergo gloriatio tua? +Exclusa est. Per quam legem? Factorum? Non, sed per legem +fidei</i>, ipsam enim fidei gratiam legem appellat. Et expressius +ad Rom. VIII dicitur, <i>lex spiritus vitae in Christo Iesu +liberavit me a lege peccati et mortis</i>. Unde et Augustinus +dicit, in libro de spiritu et littera, quod <i>sicut lex factorum +scripta fuit in tabulis lapideis, ita lex fidei scripta est in +cordibus fidelium</i>. Et alibi dicit in eodem libro, <i>quae sunt +leges Dei ab ipso Deo scriptae in cordibus, nisi ipsa praesentia +spiritus sancti?</i> Habet tamen lex nova quaedam sicut dispositiva +ad gratiam spiritus sancti, et ad usum huius gratiae pertinentia, +quae sunt quasi secundaria in lege nova, de quibus oportuit instrui +fideles Christi et verbis et scriptis, tam circa credenda quam +circa agenda. Et ideo dicendum est quod principaliter nova lex est +lex indita, secundario autem est lex scripta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Gospel writings contain only such things as pertain to the grace of the Holy Ghost, either by disposing us thereto, or + by directing us to the use thereof. Thus with regard to the intellect, the Gospel contains certain matters pertaining to the + manifestation of Christ's Godhead or humanity, which dispose us by means of faith through which we receive the grace of the + Holy Ghost: and with regard to the affections, it contains matters touching the + contempt of the world, whereby man is rendered fit to receive the grace of the Holy Ghost: for "the world," i.e. worldly men, + "cannot receive" the Holy Ghost ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.17" target="asv">Jn. 14:17</a>). As to the use of spiritual grace, this consists in works of virtue to which the writings of the New Testament exhort men + in divers ways. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="38254" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38254] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod in Scriptura Evangelii non continentur nisi ea +quae pertinent ad gratiam spiritus sancti vel sicut dispositiva, +vel sicut ordinativa ad usum huius gratiae. Sicut dispositiva +quidem quantum ad intellectum per fidem, per quam datur spiritus +sancti gratia, continentur in Evangelio ea quae pertinent ad +manifestandam divinitatem vel humanitatem Christi. Secundum +affectum vero, continentur in Evangelio ea quae pertinent ad +contemptum mundi, per quem homo fit capax gratiae spiritus sancti, +mundus enim, idest amatores mundi, non potest capere spiritum +sanctum, ut habetur Ioan. XIV. Usus vero spiritualis gratiae est in +operibus virtutum, ad quae multipliciter Scriptura novi testamenti +homines exhortatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There are two ways in which a thing may be instilled into man. First, through being part of his nature, and thus the natural + law is instilled into man. Secondly, a thing is instilled into man by being, as it were, added on to his nature by a gift + of grace. In this way the New Law is instilled into man, not only by indicating to him what he should do, but also by helping + him to accomplish it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="38255" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38255] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod dupliciter est aliquid inditum homini. Uno modo, +pertinens ad naturam humanam, et sic lex naturalis est lex indita +homini. Alio modo est aliquid inditum homini quasi naturae +superadditum per gratiae donum. Et hoc modo lex nova est indita +homini, non solum indicans quid sit faciendum, sed etiam adiuvans +ad implendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> No man ever had the grace of the Holy Ghost except through faith in Christ either explicit or implicit: and by faith in Christ + man belongs to the New Testament. Consequently whoever had the law of grace instilled into them belonged to the New Testament. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="38256" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38256] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod nullus unquam habuit gratiam spiritus sancti nisi per +fidem Christi explicitam vel implicitam. Per fidem autem Christi +pertinet homo ad novum testamentum. Unde quibuscumque fuit lex +gratiae indita, secundum hoc ad novum testamentum pertinebant.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q106_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q106_A2-p0.1">Q. 106. A. 2. Whether the New Law justifies?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the New Law does not justify. For no man is justified unless he obeys God's law, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.5.9" target="asv"> Heb. 5:9</a>: "He," i.e. Christ, "became to all that obey Him the cause of eternal salvation." But the Gospel does not always cause men + to believe in it: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A2-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.10.16" target="asv">Rom. 10:16</a>): "All do not obey the Gospel." Therefore the New Law does not justify. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="38257" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38257] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad +secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex nova non iustificet. +Nullus enim iustificatur nisi legi Dei obediat; secundum illud ad +Heb. V, <i>factus est</i>, scilicet Christus, <i>omnibus +obtemperantibus sibi causa salutis aeternae</i>. Sed Evangelium non +semper hoc operatur quod homines ei obediant, dicitur enim Rom. X, +non omnes obediunt Evangelio. Ergo lex nova non iustificat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle proves in his epistle to the Romans that the Old Law did not justify, because transgression increased + at its advent: for it is stated ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.4.15" target="asv">Rom. 4:15</a>): "The Law worketh wrath: for where there is no law, neither is there transgression." But much more did the New Law increase + transgression: since he who sins after the giving of the New Law deserves greater punishment, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.10.28" target="asv"> Heb. 10:28,29</a>: "A man + making void the Law of Moses dieth without any mercy under two or three witnesses. How much more, do you think, he deserveth + worse punishments, who hath trodden underfoot the Son of God," etc.? Therefore the New Law, like the Old Law, does not justify. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="38258" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38258] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +apostolus probat, ad Rom., quod lex vetus non iustificabat, quia ea +adveniente praevaricatio crevit, habetur enim ad Rom. IV, <i>lex +iram operatur, ubi enim non est lex, nec praevaricatio</i>. Sed +multo magis lex nova praevaricationem addidit, maiori enim poena +est dignus qui post legem novam datam adhuc peccat; secundum illud +Heb. X, <i>irritam quis faciens legem Moysi, sine ulla miseratione, +duobus vel tribus testibus, moritur. Quanto magis putatis deteriora +mereri supplicia, qui filium Dei conculcaverit, et cetera?</i> Ergo +lex nova non iustificat, sicut nec vetus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, justification is an effect proper to God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.33" target="asv"> Rom. 8:33</a>: "God that justifieth." But the Old Law was from God just as the New Law. Therefore the New Law does not justify any more + than the Old Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="38259" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38259] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +iustificare est proprius effectus Dei; secundum illud ad Rom. VIII, +Deus qui iustificat. Sed lex vetus fuit a Deo, sicut et lex nova. +Ergo lex nova non magis iustificat quam lex vetus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.16" target="asv">Rom. 1:16</a>): "I am not ashamed of the Gospel: for it is in the power of God unto salvation to everyone that believeth." But there is + no salvation but to those who are justified. Therefore the Law of the Gospel justifies. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 2 s. c."><a name="38260" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38260] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Rom. I, <i>non erubesco Evangelium, +virtus enim Dei est in salutem omni credenti</i>. Non autem est +salus nisi iustificatis. Ergo lex Evangelii iustificat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q106_A1" id="FS_Q106_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, there is a twofold element in the Law of the Gospel. There is the chief element, viz. the grace of the Holy Ghost bestowed + inwardly. And as to this, the New Law justifies. Hence Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xvii): "There," i.e. in the Old Testament, + "the Law was set forth in an outward fashion, that the ungodly might be afraid"; "here," i.e. in the New Testament, "it is + given in an inward manner, that + they may be justified." The other element of the Evangelical Law is secondary: namely, the teachings of faith, and those commandments + which direct human affections and human actions. And as to this, the New Law does not justify. Hence the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.6" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:6</a>) "The letter killeth, but the spirit quickeneth": and Augustine explains this (De Spir. et Lit. xiv, xvii) by saying that + the letter denotes any writing external to man, even that of the moral precepts such as are + contained in the Gospel. Wherefore the letter, even of the Gospel would kill, unless there were the inward presence of the + healing grace of faith. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 2 co."><a name="38261" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38261] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ad legem Evangelii duo pertinent. +Unum quidem principaliter, scilicet ipsa gratia spiritus sancti +interius data. Et quantum ad hoc, nova lex iustificat. Unde +Augustinus dicit, in libro de spiritu et littera, ibi, scilicet in +veteri testamento, lex extrinsecus posita est, qua iniusti +terrerentur, hic, scilicet in novo testamento, intrinsecus data +est, qua iustificarentur. Aliud pertinet ad legem Evangelii +secundario, scilicet documenta fidei, et praecepta ordinantia +affectum humanum et humanos actus. Et quantum ad hoc, lex nova non +iustificat. Unde apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. III, <i>littera +occidit, spiritus autem vivificat</i>. Et Augustinus exponit, in +libro de spiritu et littera, quod per litteram intelligitur +quaelibet Scriptura extra homines existens, etiam moralium +praeceptorum qualia continentur in Evangelio. Unde etiam littera +Evangelii occideret, nisi adesset interius gratia fidei sanans.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument holds true of the New Law, not as to its principal, but as to its secondary element: i.e. as to the dogmas + and precepts outwardly put before man either in words or in writing. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="38262" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38262] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod illa obiectio procedit de lege nova non quantum +ad id quod est principale in ipsa, sed quantum ad id quod est +secundarium in ipsa, scilicet quantum ad documenta et praecepta +exterius homini proposita vel verbo vel scripto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the grace of the New Testament helps man to avoid sin, yet it does not so confirm man in good that he cannot sin: + for this belongs to the state of glory. Hence if a man sin after receiving the grace of the New Testament, he deserves greater + punishment, as being ungrateful for greater benefits, and as not using the help given to him. And this is why the New Law + is not said to "work wrath": because as far as it is concerned it gives man + sufficient help to avoid sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="38263" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38263] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod gratia novi testamenti, etsi adiuvet hominem ad non +peccandum, non tamen ita confirmat in bono ut homo peccare non +possit, hoc enim pertinet ad statum gloriae. Et ideo si quis post +acceptam gratiam novi testamenti peccaverit, maiori poena est +dignus, tanquam maioribus beneficiis ingratus, et auxilio sibi dato +non utens. Nec tamen propter hoc dicitur quod lex nova iram +operatur, quia quantum est de se, sufficiens auxilium dat ad non +peccandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same God gave both the New and the Old Law, but in different ways. For He gave the Old Law written on tables of stone: + whereas He gave the New Law written "in the fleshly tables of the heart," as the Apostle expresses it ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.3" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:3</a>). Wherefore, as Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xviii), "the Apostle calls this letter which is written outside man, a ministration + of death and a ministration of condemnation: whereas he calls + the other letter, i.e. the Law of the New Testament, the ministration of the spirit and the ministration of justice: because + through the gift of the Spirit we work justice, and are delivered from the condemnation due to transgression." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="38264" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38264] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod legem novam et veterem unus Deus dedit, sed aliter et +aliter. Nam legem veterem dedit scriptam in tabulis lapideis, legem +autem novam dedit scriptam in tabulis cordis carnalibus, ut +apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. III. Proinde sicut Augustinus dicit, in +libro de spiritu et littera, <i>litteram istam extra hominem +scriptam, et ministrationem mortis et ministrationem damnationis +apostolus appellat. Hanc autem, scilicet novi testamenti legem, +ministrationem spiritus et ministrationem iustitiae dicit, quia per +donum spiritus operamur iustitiam, et a praevaricationis damnatione +liberamur</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q106_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q106_A3-p0.1">Q. 106. A. 3. Whether the New Law should have been given from the beginning of the world?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the New Law should have been given from the beginning of the world. "For there is no respect of persons + with God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.11" target="asv">Rom. 2:11</a>). But "all" men "have sinned and do need the glory of God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.23" target="asv">Rom. 3:23</a>). Therefore the Law of the Gospel should have been given from the beginning of the world, in order that it might bring succor + to all. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="38265" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38265] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex nova debuerit dari a principio +mundi. Non enim est personarum acceptio apud Deum, ut dicitur ad +Rom. II. Sed omnes homines peccaverunt, et egent gloria Dei, ut +dicitur ad Rom. III. Ergo a principio mundi lex Evangelii dari +debuit, ut omnibus per eam subveniretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as men dwell in various places, so do they live in various times. But God, "Who will have all men to be saved" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:4</a>), commanded the Gospel to be preached in all places, as may be seen in the last chapters of Matthew and Mark. Therefore the + Law of the Gospel should have been at hand for all times, so as to be given from the beginning of the world. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="38266" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38266] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut in diversis locis sunt diversi homines, ita etiam in diversis +temporibus. Sed Deus, <i>qui vult omnes homines salvos fieri</i>, +ut dicitur I ad Tim. II, mandavit Evangelium praedicari in omnibus +locis; ut patet Matth. ult., et Marc. ult. Ergo omnibus temporibus +debuit adesse lex Evangelii, ita quod a principio mundi +daretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man needs to save his soul, which is for all eternity, more than to save his body, which is a temporal matter. But + God provided man from the beginning of the world with things that are necessary for the health of his body, by subjecting + to his power whatever was created for the sake of man ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26-29</a>). Therefore the New Law also, which is very necessary for the health of the soul, should have been given to man from the + beginning + of the world. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="38267" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38267] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +magis est necessaria homini salus spiritualis, quae est aeterna, +quam salus corporalis, quae est temporalis. Sed Deus ab initio +mundi providit homini ea quae sunt necessaria ad salutem +corporalem, tradens eius potestati omnia quae erant propter hominem +creata, ut patet Gen. I. Ergo etiam lex nova, quae maxime est +necessaria ad salutem spiritualem, debuit hominibus a principio +mundi dari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.46" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:46</a>): "That was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural." But the New Law is highly spiritual. Therefore it was + not fitting for it to be given from the beginning of the world. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 3 s. c."><a name="38268" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38268] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XV, <i>non prius quod +spirituale est, sed quod animale</i>. Sed lex nova est maxime +spiritualis. Ergo lex nova non debuit dari a principio mundi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q106_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Three reasons may be assigned why it was not fitting for the New Law to be given from the beginning of the world. The first + is because the New Law, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q106_A1" id="FS_Q106_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, consists chiefly in the grace of the Holy Ghost: which it behoved not to be given abundantly until sin, which is an obstacle + to grace, had been cast out of man through the accomplishment of his redemption by Christ: wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#John.7.39" target="asv">Jn. + 7:39 + </a>): "As yet the Spirit was not given, because Jesus was not yet glorified." This reason the Apostle states clearly ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A3-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.2" target="asv">Rom. 8:2, </a> seqq.) where, after speaking of "the Law of the Spirit of life," he adds: "God sending His own Son, in the likeness of sinful + flesh, of sin* hath condemned sin in the flesh, that the justification of the Law might be fulfilled in us." [*St. Thomas, + quoting perhaps from memory, omits the "et" (and), after "sinful flesh." The text quoted + should read thus: "in the likeness of sinful flesh, and a sin offering ({peri hamartias}), hath," etc.] + </p><p id="FS_Q106_A3-p7"> A second reason may be taken from the perfection of the New Law. Because a thing is not brought to perfection at once from + the outset, but through an orderly succession of time; thus one is at first a boy, and then a man. And this reason is stated + by the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.24" target="asv">Gal. 3:24,25</a>): "The Law was our pedagogue in Christ that we might be justified by faith. But after the faith is come, we are no longer + under a pedagogue." + </p><p id="FS_Q106_A3-p8"> The third reason is found in the fact that the New Law is the law of grace: wherefore it behoved man first of all to be left + to himself under the state of the Old Law, so that through falling into sin, he might realize his weakness, and acknowledge + his need of grace. This reason is set down by the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.20" target="asv">Rom. 5:20</a>): "The Law entered in, that sin might abound: and when sin abounded grace did more abound." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 3 co."><a name="38269" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38269] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod triplex ratio potest assignari quare lex nova non +debuit dari a principio mundi. Quarum prima est quia lex nova, +sicut dictum est, principaliter est gratia spiritus sancti; quae +abundanter dari non debuit antequam impedimentum peccati ab humano +genere tolleretur, consummata redemptione per Christum; unde +dicitur Ioan. VII, <i>nondum erat spiritus datus, quia Iesus nondum +erat glorificatus</i>. Et hanc rationem manifeste assignat +apostolus ad Rom. VIII, ubi, postquam praemiserat de lege spiritus +vitae, subiungit, <i>Deus, filium suum mittens in similitudinem +carnis peccati, de peccato damnavit peccatum in carne, ut +iustificatio legis impleretur in nobis</i>. Secunda ratio potest +assignari ex perfectione legis novae. Non enim aliquid ad perfectum +adducitur statim a principio, sed quodam temporali successionis +ordine, sicut aliquis prius fit puer, et postmodum vir. Et hanc +rationem assignat apostolus ad Gal. III, <i>lex paedagogus noster +fuit in Christo, ut ex fide iustificemur. At ubi venit fides, iam +non sumus sub paedagogo</i>. Tertia ratio sumitur ex hoc quod lex +nova est lex gratiae, et ideo primo oportuit quod homo +relinqueretur sibi in statu veteris legis, ut, in peccatum cadendo, +suam infirmitatem cognoscens, recognosceret se gratia indigere. Et +hanc rationem assignat apostolus ad Rom. V, dicens, <i>lex +subintravit ut abundaret delictum, ubi autem abundavit delictum, +superabundavit et gratia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Mankind on account of the sin of our first parents deserved to be deprived of the aid of grace: and so "from whom it is withheld + it is justly withheld, and to whom it is given, it is mercifully given," as Augustine states (De Perfect. Justit. iv) [*Cf. + Ep. ccvii; De Pecc. Mer. et Rem. ii, 19]. Consequently it does not follow that there is respect of persons with God, from + the fact that He did not offer the Law of grace to all from the beginning of the + world, which Law was to be published in due course of time, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="38270" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38270] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod humanum genus propter peccatum primi parentis +meruit privari auxilio gratiae. <i>Et ideo quibuscumque non datur, +hoc est ex iustitia, quibuscumque autem datur, hoc est ex +gratia</i>, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Perfect. Iustit. Unde +non est acceptio personarum apud Deum ex hoc quod non omnibus a +principio mundi legem gratiae proposuit, quae erat debito ordine +proponenda, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The state of mankind does not vary according to diversity of place, but according to succession of time. Hence the New Law + avails for all places, but not for all times: although at all times there have been some persons belonging to the New Testament, + as stated above (A[1], ad 3). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="38271" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38271] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod diversitas locorum non variat diversum statum humani +generis, qui variatur per temporis successionem. Et ideo omnibus +locis proponitur lex nova, non autem omnibus temporibus, licet omni +tempore fuerint aliqui ad novum testamentum pertinentes, ut supra +dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Things pertaining to the health of the body are of service to man as regards his nature, which sin does not destroy: whereas + things pertaining to the health of the soul are ordained to grace, which is forfeit through sin. Consequently the comparison + will not hold. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="38272" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38272] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ea quae pertinent ad salutem corporalem, deserviunt +homini quantum ad naturam, quae non tollitur per peccatum. Sed ea +quae pertinent ad spiritualem salutem, ordinantur ad gratiam, quae +amittitur per peccatum. Et ideo non est similis ratio de +utrisque.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q106_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q106_A4-p0.1">Q. 106. A. 4. Whether the New Law will last till the end of the world?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the New Law will not last until the end of the world. Because, as the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:10</a>), "when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away." But the New Law is "in part," since the + Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:9</a>): "We know in part and we prophesy in part." Therefore the New Law is to be done away, and will be succeeded by a more perfect + state. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="38273" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38273] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex nova non sit duratura usque ad +finem mundi. Quia ut apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XIII, <i>cum +venerit quod perfectum est, evacuabitur quod ex parte est</i>. Sed +lex nova ex parte est, dicit enim apostolus ibidem, <i>ex parte +cognoscimus, et ex parte prophetamus</i>. Ergo lex nova evacuanda +est, alio perfectiori statu succedente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Our Lord ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.16.13" target="asv">Jn. 16:13</a>) promised His disciples the knowledge of all truth when the Holy Ghost, the Comforter, should come. But the Church knows + not yet all truth in the state of the New Testament. Therefore we must look forward to another state, wherein all truth will + be revealed by the Holy Ghost. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="38274" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38274] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +dominus, Ioan. XVI, promisit discipulis suis in adventu spiritus +sancti Paracleti cognitionem omnis veritatis. Sed nondum Ecclesia +omnem veritatem cognoscit, in statu novi testamenti. Ergo +expectandus est alius status, in quo per spiritum sanctum omnis +veritas manifestetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as the Father is distinct from the Son and the Son from the Father, so is the Holy Ghost distinct from the + Father and the Son. But there was a state corresponding with the Person of the Father, viz. the state of the Old Law, wherein + men were intent on begetting children: and likewise there is a state corresponding to the Person of the Son: viz. the state + of the New Law, wherein the clergy who are intent on wisdom (which is appropriated to the + Son) hold a prominent place. Therefore there will be a third state corresponding to the Holy Ghost, wherein spiritual men + will hold the first place. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="38275" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38275] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut pater est alius a filio et filius a patre, ita spiritus +sanctus a patre et filio. Sed fuit quidam status conveniens +personae patris, scilicet status veteris legis, in quo homines +generationi intendebant. Similiter etiam est alius status +conveniens personae filii, scilicet status novae legis, in quo +clerici, intendentes sapientiae, quae appropriatur filio, +principantur. Ergo erit status tertius spiritus sancti, in quo +spirituales viri principabuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.24.14" target="asv">Mat. 24:14</a>): "This Gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in the whole world . . . and then shall the consummation come." But the Gospel + of Christ is already preached throughout the whole world: and yet the consummation has not yet come. Therefore the Gospel + of Christ is not the Gospel of the kingdom, but another Gospel, that of the Holy Ghost, is to come yet, like unto another + Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="38276" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38276] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +dominus dicit, Matth. XXIV, praedicabitur hoc <i>Evangelium regni +in universo orbe, et tunc veniet consummatio</i>. Sed Evangelium +Christi iamdiu est praedicatum in universo orbe; nec tamen adhuc +venit consummatio. Ergo Evangelium Christi non est Evangelium +regni, sed futurum est aliud Evangelium spiritus sancti, quasi alia +lex.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.24.34" target="asv">Mat. 24:34</a>): "I say to you that this generation shall not pass till all (these) things be done": which passage Chrysostom (Hom. lxxvii) + explains as referring to "the generation of those that believe in Christ." Therefore the state of those who believe in Christ + will last until the consummation of the world. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 4 s. c."><a name="38277" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38277] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dominus dicit, Matth. XXIV, <i>dico vobis quia non +praeteribit generatio haec donec omnia fiant</i>, quod Chrysostomus +exponit de generatione fidelium Christi. Ergo status fidelium +Christi manebit usque ad consummationem saeculi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q106_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The state of the world may change in two ways. In one way, according to a change of law: and thus no other state will succeed + this state of the New Law. Because the state of the New Law succeeded the state of the Old Law, as a more perfect law a less + perfect one. Now no state of the present life can be more perfect that the state of the New Law: since nothing can approach + nearer to the last end than that which is the immediate cause of our being brought to + the last end. But the New Law does this: wherefore the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.10.19" target="asv">Heb. 10:19-22</a>): "Having therefore, brethren, a confidence in the entering into the Holies by the blood of Christ, a new . . . way which + He hath dedicated for us . . . let us draw near." Therefore no state of the present life can be more perfect than that of + the New Law, since the nearer a thing is to the last end the more perfect it is. + </p><p id="FS_Q106_A4-p8"> In another way the state of mankind may change according as man stands in relation to one and the same law more or less perfectly. + And thus the state of the Old Law underwent frequent changes, since at times the laws were very well kept, and at other times + were altogether unheeded. Thus, too, the state of the New Law is subject to change with regard to various places, times, and + persons, according as the grace of the Holy Ghost dwells in man more or less perfectly. Nevertheless + we are not to look forward to a state wherein man is to possess the grace of the Holy Ghost more perfectly than he has possessed + it hitherto, especially the apostles who "received the firstfruits of the Spirit, i.e. sooner and more abundantly than others," + as a gloss expounds on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.23" target="asv"> Rom. 8:23.</a> + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 4 co."><a name="38278" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38278] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod status mundi variari potest dupliciter. Uno modo, +secundum diversitatem legis. Et sic huic statui novae legis nullus +alius status succedet. Successit enim status novae legis statui +veteris legis tanquam perfectior imperfectiori. Nullus autem status +praesentis vitae potest esse perfectior quam status novae legis. +Nihil enim potest esse propinquius fini ultimo quam quod immediate +in finem ultimum introducit. Hoc autem facit nova lex, unde +apostolus dicit, ad Heb. X, <i>habentes itaque, fratres, fiduciam +in introitu sanctorum in sanguine Christi, quam initiavit nobis +viam novam, accedamus ad eum</i>. Unde non potest esse aliquis +perfectior status praesentis vitae quam status novae legis, quia +tanto est unumquodque perfectius, quanto ultimo fini propinquius. +Alio modo status hominum variari potest secundum quod homines +diversimode se habent ad eandem legem, vel perfectius vel minus +perfecte. Et sic status veteris legis frequenter fuit mutatus, cum +quandoque leges optime custodirentur, quandoque omnino +praetermitterentur. Sic etiam status novae legis diversificatur, +secundum diversa loca et tempora et personas, inquantum gratia +spiritus sancti perfectius vel minus perfecte ab aliquibus habetur. +Non est tamen expectandum quod sit aliquis status futurus in quo +perfectius gratia spiritus sancti habeatur quam hactenus habita +fuerit, maxime ab apostolis, qui primitias spiritus acceperunt, +<i>idest et tempore prius et ceteris abundantius</i>, ut Glossa +dicit Rom. VIII.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v), there is a threefold state of mankind; the first was under the Old Law; the second is + that of the New Law; the third will take place not in this life, but in heaven. But as the first state is figurative and imperfect + in comparison with the state of the Gospel; so is the present state figurative and imperfect in comparison with the heavenly + state, with the advent of which the present state will be done away as + expressed in that very passage ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:12</a>): "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="38279" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38279] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut Dionysius dicit, in Eccl. Hier., triplex +est hominum status, primus quidem veteris legis; secundus novae +legis; tertius status succedit non in hac vita, sed in patria. Sed +sicut primus status est figuralis et imperfectus respectu status +evangelici, ita hic status est figuralis et imperfectus respectu +status patriae; quo veniente, iste status evacuatur, sicut ibi +dicitur, <i>videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem +facie ad faciem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q106_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix, 31), Montanus and Priscilla pretended that Our Lord's promise to give the Holy Ghost + was fulfilled, not in the apostles, but in themselves. In like manner the Manicheans maintained that it was fulfilled in Manes + whom they held to be the Paraclete. Hence none of the above received the Acts of the Apostles, where it is clearly shown that + the aforesaid promise was fulfilled in the apostles: just as Our Lord promised + them a second time ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.1.5" target="asv">Acts 1:5</a>): "You shall be baptized with the Holy Ghost, not many days hence": which we read as having been fulfilled in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Acts.2" target="asv">Acts 2</a>. However, these foolish notions are refuted by the statement ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p10.3" href="./asv.html#John.7.39" target="asv">Jn. 7:39</a>) that "as yet the Spirit was not given, because Jesus was not yet glorified"; from which we gather that the Holy Ghost was + given as soon as Christ was glorified in His Resurrection and Ascension. Moreover, this puts out of court the + senseless idea that the Holy Ghost is to be expected to come at some other time. + </p><p id="FS_Q106_A4-p11"> Now the Holy Ghost taught the apostles all truth in respect of matters necessary for salvation; those things, to wit, that + we are bound to believe and to do. But He did not teach them about all future events: for this did not regard them according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.1.7" target="asv"> Acts 1:7</a>: "It is not for you to know the times or moments which the Father hath put in His own power." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="38280" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38280] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro contra Faustum, +Montanus et Priscilla posuerunt quod promissio domini de spiritu +sancto dando non fuit completa in apostolis, sed in eis. Et +similiter Manichaei posuerunt quod fuit completa in Manichaeo, quem +dicebant esse spiritum Paracletum. Et ideo utrique non recipiebant +actus apostolorum, in quibus manifeste ostenditur quod illa +promissio fuit in apostolis completa, sicut dominus iterato eis +promisit, Act. I, <i>baptizamini in spiritu sancto non post multos +hos dies</i>; quod impletum legitur Act. II. Sed istae vanitates +excluduntur per hoc quod dicitur Ioan. VII, <i>nondum erat spiritus +datus, quia Iesus nondum erat glorificatus</i>, ex quo datur +intelligi quod statim glorificato Christo in resurrectione et +ascensione, fuit spiritus sanctus datus. Et per hoc etiam +excluditur quorumcumque vanitas qui dicerent esse expectandum aliud +tempus spiritus sancti. Docuit autem spiritus sanctus apostolos +omnem veritatem de his quae pertinent ad necessitatem salutis, +scilicet de credendis et agendis. Non tamen docuit eos de omnibus +futuris eventibus, hoc enim ad eos non pertinebat, secundum illud +Act. I, <i>non est vestrum nosse tempora vel momenta, quae pater +posuit in sua potestate</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Old Law corresponded not only to the Father, but also to the Son: because Christ was foreshadowed in the Old Law. Hence + Our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p12.1" href="./asv.html#John.5.46" target="asv">Jn. 5:46</a>): "If you did believe Moses, you would perhaps believe me also; for he wrote of Me." In like manner the New Law corresponds + not only to Christ, but also to the Holy Ghost; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.2" target="asv"> Rom. 8:2</a>: "The Law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus," etc. Hence we are not + to look forward to another law corresponding to the Holy Ghost. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="38281" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38281] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod lex vetus non solum fuit patris, sed etiam filii, +quia Christus in veteri lege figurabatur. Unde dominus dicit, Ioan. +V, <i>si crederetis Moysi, crederetis forsitan et mihi, de me enim +ille scripsit</i>. Similiter etiam lex nova non solum est Christi, +sed etiam spiritus sancti; secundum illud Rom. VIII, <i>lex +spiritus vitae in Christo Iesu,</i> et cetera. Unde non est +expectanda alia lex, quae sit spiritus sancti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Since Christ said at the very outset of the preaching of the Gospel: "The kingdom of heaven is at hand" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.17" target="asv">Mat. 4:17</a>), it is most absurd to say that the Gospel of Christ is not the Gospel of the kingdom. But the preaching of the Gospel of + Christ may be understood in two ways. First, as denoting the spreading abroad of the knowledge of Christ: and thus the Gospel + was preached throughout the world even at the time of the apostles, as + Chrysostom states (Hom. lxxv in Matth.). And in this sense the words that follow---"and then shall the consummation come," + refer to the destruction of Jerusalem, of which He was speaking literally. Secondly, the preaching of the Gospel may be understood + as extending throughout the world and producing its full effect, so that, to wit, the Church would be founded in every nation. + And in these sense, as Augustine writes to Hesychius (Epist. cxcix), the Gospel is not preached to the whole world + yet, but, when it is, the consummation of the world will come. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="38282" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38282] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, cum Christus statim in principio evangelicae +praedicationis dixerit, appropinquavit regnum caelorum, +stultissimum est dicere quod Evangelium Christi non sit Evangelium +regni. Sed praedicatio Evangelii Christi potest intelligi +dupliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad divulgationem notitiae Christi, et +sic praedicatum fuit Evangelium in universo orbe etiam tempore +apostolorum, ut Chrysostomus dicit. Et secundum hoc, quod additur, +et tunc erit consummatio, intelligitur de destructione Ierusalem, +de qua tunc ad litteram loquebatur. Alio modo potest intelligi +praedicatio Evangelii in universo orbe cum pleno effectu, ita +scilicet quod in qualibet gente fundetur Ecclesia. Et ita, sicut +dicit Augustinus, in epistola ad Hesych., nondum est praedicatum +Evangelium in universo orbe, sed, hoc facto, veniet consummatio +mundi.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q107" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q107-p0.1">Q. 107. OF THE NEW LAW AS COMPARED WITH THE OLD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q107-p2"> We must now consider the New Law as compared with the Old: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q107-p3"><a href="#FS_Q107_A1"> (1) Whether the New Law is distinct from the Old Law?</a></p><p id="FS_Q107-p4"><a href="#FS_Q107_A2"> (2) Whether the New Law fulfils the Old?</a></p><p id="FS_Q107-p5"><a href="#FS_Q107_A3"> (3) Whether the New Law is contained in the Old?</a></p><p id="FS_Q107-p6"><a href="#FS_Q107_A4"> (4) Which is the more burdensome, the New or the Old Law?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 pr."><a name="38283" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38283] Iª-IIae q. 107 pr.</span></a> Deinde +considerandum est de comparatione legis novae ad legem veterem. Et +circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum lex nova sit alia lex a +lege veteri. Secundo, utrum lex nova impleat veterem. Tertio, utrum +lex nova contineatur in veteri. Quarto, quae sit gravior, utrum lex +nova vel vetus.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q107_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q107_A1-p0.1">Q. 107. A. 1. Whether the New Law is distinct from the Old Law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the New Law is not distinct from the Old. Because both these laws were given to those who believe in God: + since "without faith it is impossible to please God," according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.6" target="asv"> Heb. 11:6.</a> But the faith of olden times and of nowadays is the same, as the gloss says on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.21.9" target="asv"> Mat. 21:9.</a> Therefore the law is the same also. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="38284" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38284] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex nova non sit alia a lege veteri. +Utraque enim lex datur fidem Dei habentibus, quia <i>sine fide +impossibile est placere Deo</i>, ut dicitur Heb. XI. Sed eadem +fides est antiquorum et modernorum, ut dicitur in Glossa Matth. +XXI. Ergo etiam est eadem lex.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (Contra Adamant. Manich. discip. xvii) that "there is little difference between the Law and Gospel" + [*The 'little difference' refers to the Latin words 'timor' and 'amor']---"fear and love." But the New and Old Laws cannot + be differentiated in respect of these two things: since even the Old Law comprised precepts of charity: "Thou shalt love thy + neighbor" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.18" target="asv">Lev. 19:18</a>), and: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.5" target="asv">Dt. 6:5</a>). In like manner neither can they differ according to the other difference which Augustine assigns (Contra Faust. iv, 2), + viz. that "the Old Testament contained temporal promises, whereas the New Testament contains spiritual and eternal promises": + since even the New Testament contains temporal promises, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Mark.10.30" target="asv"> Mk. 10:30</a>: He shall receive "a hundred times as much . . . in this time, houses and brethren," etc.: while in the Old Testament + they hoped in promises spiritual and eternal, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p3.4" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.16" target="asv"> Heb. 11:16</a>: "But now they desire a better, that is to say, a heavenly country," which is said of the patriarchs. Therefore it seems + that the New Law is not distinct from the Old. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="38285" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38285] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in libro contra Adamantum Manich. Discip., quod +<i>brevis differentia legis et Evangelii est timor et amor</i>. Sed +secundum haec duo nova lex et vetus diversificari non possunt, quia +etiam in veteri lege proponuntur praecepta caritatis; Lev. XIX, +<i>diliges proximum tuum</i>; et Deut. VI, <i>diliges dominum Deum +tuum</i>. Similiter etiam diversificari non possunt per aliam +differentiam quam Augustinus assignat, contra Faustum, quod +<i>vetus testamentum habuit promissa temporalia, novum testamentum +habet promissa spiritualia et aeterna</i>. Quia etiam in novo +testamento promittuntur aliqua promissa temporalia; secundum illud +Marc. X, <i>accipiet centies tantum in tempore hoc, domos et +fratres,</i> et cetera. Et in veteri testamento sperabantur +promissa spiritualia et aeterna; secundum illud ad Heb. XI, <i>nunc +autem meliorem patriam appetunt, idest caelestem</i>, quod dicitur +de antiquis patribus. Ergo videtur quod nova lex non sit alia a +veteri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Apostle seems to distinguish both laws by calling the Old Law "a law of works," and the New Law "a law of faith" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.27" target="asv">Rom. 3:27</a>). But the Old Law was also a law of faith, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.39" target="asv"> Heb. 11:39</a>: "All were [Vulg.: 'All these being'] approved by the testimony of faith," which he says of the fathers of the Old Testament. + In like manner the New Law is a law of works: since it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p4.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.44" target="asv">Mat. 5:44</a>): "Do good to + them that hate you"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p4.4" href="./asv.html#Luke.22.19" target="asv">Lk. 22:19</a>): "Do this for a commemoration of Me." Therefore the New Law is not distinct from the Old. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="38286" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38286] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +apostolus videtur distinguere utramque legem, ad Rom. III, veterem +legem appellans legem factorum, legem vero novam appellans legem +fidei. Sed lex vetus fuit etiam fidei; secundum illud Heb. XI, +<i>omnes testimonio fidei probati sunt</i>, quod dicit de patribus +veteris testamenti. Similiter etiam lex nova est lex factorum, +dicitur enim Matth. V, <i>benefacite his qui oderunt vos</i>; et +Luc. XXII, <i>hoc facite in meam commemorationem</i>. Ergo lex nova +non est alia a lege veteri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.7.12" target="asv">Heb. 7:12</a>): "The priesthood being translated it is necessary that a translation also be made of the Law." But the priesthood of the + New Testament is distinct from that of the Old, as the Apostle shows in the same place. Therefore the Law is also distinct. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 1 s. c."><a name="38287" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38287] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Heb. VII, <i>translato sacerdotio, +necesse est ut legis translatio fiat</i>. Sed aliud est sacerdotium +novi et veteris testamenti, ut ibidem apostolus probat. Ergo est +etiam alia lex.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q107_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A2" id="FS_Q107_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[90], A[2]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q91_A4" id="FS_Q107_A1-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[91], A[4]</a>), every law ordains human conduct to some end. Now things ordained to an end may be divided in two ways, considered from + the point of view of the end. First, through being ordained to different ends: and this difference will be specific, especially + if such ends are proximate. Secondly, by reason of being closely or remotely connected with the end. Thus it is clear + that movements differ in species through being directed to different terms: while according as one part of a movement is nearer + to the term than another part, the difference of perfect and imperfect movement is assessed. + </p><p id="FS_Q107_A1-p7"> Accordingly then two laws may be distinguished from one another in two ways. First, through being altogether diverse, from + the fact that they are ordained to diverse ends: thus a state-law ordained to democratic government, would differ specifically + from a law ordained to government by the aristocracy. Secondly, two laws may be distinguished from one another, through one + of them being more closely connected with the end, and the other more remotely: thus in one and the same + state there is one law enjoined on men of mature age, who can forthwith accomplish that which pertains to the common good; + and another law regulating the education of children who need to be taught how they are to achieve manly deeds later on. + </p><p id="FS_Q107_A1-p8"> We must therefore say that, according to the first way, the New Law is not distinct from the Old Law: because they both have + the same end, namely, man's subjection to God; and there is but one God of the New and of the Old Testament, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.30" target="asv"> Rom. 3:30</a>: "It is one God that justifieth circumcision by faith, and uncircumcision through faith." According to the second way, the + New Law is distinct from the Old Law: because the Old Law is like a pedagogue of + children, as the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.24" target="asv">Gal. 3:24</a>), whereas the New Law is the law of perfection, since it is the law of charity, of which the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Col.3.14" target="asv">Col. 3:14</a>) that it is "the bond of perfection." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 1 co."><a name="38288" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38288] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, omnis lex ordinat +conversationem humanam in ordine ad aliquem finem. Ea autem quae +ordinantur ad finem, secundum rationem finis dupliciter +diversificari possunt. Uno modo, quia ordinantur ad diversos fines, +et haec est diversitas speciei, maxime si sit finis proximus. Alio +modo, secundum propinquitatem ad finem vel distantiam ab ipso. +Sicut patet quod motus differunt specie secundum quod ordinantur ad +diversos terminos, secundum vero quod una pars motus est +propinquior termino quam alia, attenditur differentia in motu +secundum perfectum et imperfectum. Sic ergo duae leges distingui +possunt dupliciter. Uno modo, quasi omnino diversae, utpote +ordinatae ad diversos fines, sicut lex civitatis quae esset +ordinata ad hoc quod populus dominaretur, esset specie differens ab +illa lege quae esset ad hoc ordinata quod optimates civitatis +dominarentur. Alio modo duae leges distingui possunt secundum quod +una propinquius ordinat ad finem, alia vero remotius. Puta in una +et eadem civitate dicitur alia lex quae imponitur viris perfectis, +qui statim possunt exequi ea quae pertinent ad bonum commune; et +alia lex de disciplina puerorum, qui sunt instruendi qualiter +postmodum opera virorum exequantur. Dicendum est ergo quod secundum +primum modum, lex nova non est alia a lege veteri, quia utriusque +est unus finis, scilicet ut homines subdantur Deo; est autem unus +Deus et novi et veteris testamenti, secundum illud Rom. III, +<i>unus Deus est qui iustificat circumcisionem ex fide, et +praeputium per fidem</i>. Alio modo, lex nova est alia a veteri. +Quia lex vetus est quasi paedagogus puerorum, ut apostolus dicit, +ad Gal. III, lex autem nova est lex perfectionis, quia est lex +caritatis, de qua apostolus dicit, ad Colos. III, quod est vinculum +perfectionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The unity of faith under both Testaments witnesses to the unity of end: for it has been stated above ( + <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q62_A2" id="FS_Q107_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[62], A[2]</a>) that the object of the theological virtues, among which is faith, is the last end. Yet faith had a different state in the + Old and in the New Law: since what they believed as future, we believe as fact. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="38289" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38289] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod unitas fidei utriusque testamenti attestatur +unitati finis, dictum est enim supra quod obiectum theologicarum +virtutum, inter quas est fides, est finis ultimus. Sed tamen fides +habuit alium statum in veteri et in nova lege, nam quod illi +credebant futurum, nos credimus factum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q107_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All the differences assigned between the Old and New Laws are gathered from their relative perfection and imperfection. For + the precepts of every law prescribe acts of virtue. Now the imperfect, who as yet are not possessed of a virtuous habit, are + directed in one way to perform virtuous acts, while those who are perfected by the possession of virtuous habits are directed + in another way. For those who as yet are not endowed with virtuous habits, are + directed to the performance of virtuous acts by reason of some outward cause: for instance, by the threat of punishment, or + the promise of some extrinsic rewards, such as honor, riches, or the like. Hence the Old Law, which was given to men who were + imperfect, that is, who had not yet received spiritual grace, was called the "law of fear," inasmuch as it induced men to + observe its commandments by threatening them with penalties; and is spoken of as containing temporal promises. On the other + hand, those who are possessed of virtue, are inclined to do virtuous deeds through love of virtue, not on account of some + extrinsic punishment or reward. Hence the New Law which derives its pre-eminence from the spiritual grace instilled into our + hearts, is called the "Law of love": and it is described as containing spiritual and eternal promises, which are objects of + the virtues, chiefly of charity. Accordingly such persons are inclined of themselves to those objects, not as to something + foreign but as to something of their own. For this reason, too, the Old Law is described as "restraining the hand, not the + will" [*Peter Lombard, Sent. iii, D, 40]; since when a man refrains from some sins through fear of being punished, his will + does not shrink simply from sin, as does the will of a man who refrains from sin through love of righteousness: and hence + the New Law, which is the Law of love, is said to restrain the will. + </p><p id="FS_Q107_A1-p11"> Nevertheless there were some in the state of the Old Testament who, having charity and the grace of the Holy Ghost, looked + chiefly to spiritual and eternal promises: and in this respect they belonged to the New Law. In like manner in the New Testament + there are some carnal men who have not yet attained to the perfection of the New Law; and these it was necessary, even under + the New Testament, to lead to virtuous action by the fear of punishment and by temporal promises. + </p><p id="FS_Q107_A1-p12"> But although the Old Law contained precepts of charity, nevertheless it did not confer the Holy Ghost by Whom "charity . + . . is spread abroad in our hearts" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv">Rom. 5:5</a>). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="38290" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38290] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod omnes differentiae quae assignantur inter novam legem +et veterem, accipiuntur secundum perfectum et imperfectum. +Praecepta enim legis cuiuslibet dantur de actibus virtutum. Ad +operanda autem virtutum opera aliter inclinantur imperfecti, qui +nondum habent virtutis habitum; et aliter illi qui sunt per habitum +virtutis perfecti. Illi enim qui nondum habent habitum virtutis, +inclinantur ad agendum virtutis opera ex aliqua causa extrinseca, +puta ex comminatione poenarum, vel ex promissione aliquarum +extrinsecarum remunerationum, puta honoris vel divitiarum vel +alicuius huiusmodi. Et ideo lex vetus, quae dabatur imperfectis, +idest nondum consecutis gratiam spiritualem, dicebatur lex timoris, +inquantum inducebat ad observantiam praeceptorum per comminationem +quarundam poenarum. Et dicitur habere temporalia quaedam promissa. +Illi autem qui habent virtutem, inclinantur ad virtutis opera +agenda propter amorem virtutis, non propter aliquam poenam aut +remunerationem extrinsecam. Et ideo lex nova, cuius principalitas +consistit in ipsa spirituali gratia indita cordibus, dicitur lex +amoris. Et dicitur habere promissa spiritualia et aeterna, quae +sunt obiecta virtutis, praecipue caritatis. Et ita per se in ea +inclinantur, non quasi in extranea, sed quasi in propria. Et +propter hoc etiam lex vetus dicitur cohibere manum, non animum, +quia qui timore poenae ab aliquo peccato abstinet, non simpliciter +eius voluntas a peccato recedit, sicut recedit voluntas eius qui +amore iustitiae abstinet a peccato. Et propter hoc lex nova, quae +est lex amoris, dicitur animum cohibere. Fuerunt tamen aliqui in +statu veteris testamenti habentes caritatem et gratiam spiritus +sancti, qui principaliter expectabant promissiones spirituales et +aeternas. Et secundum hoc pertinebant ad legem novam. Similiter +etiam in novo testamento sunt aliqui carnales nondum pertingentes +ad perfectionem novae legis, quos oportuit etiam in novo testamento +induci ad virtutis opera per timorem poenarum, et per aliqua +temporalia promissa. Lex autem vetus etsi praecepta caritatis +daret, non tamen per eam dabatur spiritus sanctus, per quem +diffunditur caritas in cordibus nostris, ut dicitur Rom. V.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q106_A1" id="FS_Q107_A1-p13.1" shape="rect">Q[106], AA[1]</a>,2), the New Law is called the law of faith, in so far as its pre-eminence is derived from that very grace which is given + inwardly to believers, and for this reason is called the grace of faith. Nevertheless it consists secondarily in certain deeds, + moral and sacramental: but the New Law does not consist chiefly in these latter things, as did the Old Law. As to those under + the Old Testament who + through faith were acceptable to God, in this respect they belonged to the New Testament: for they were not justified except + through faith in Christ, Who is the Author of the New Testament. Hence of Moses the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p13.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.26" target="asv">Heb. 11:26</a>) that he esteemed "the reproach of Christ greater riches than the treasure of the Egyptians." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="38291" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38291] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, lex nova dicitur lex fidei, +inquantum eius principalitas consistit in ipsa gratia quae interius +datur credentibus, unde dicitur gratia fidei. Habet autem +secundario aliqua facta et moralia et sacramentalia, sed in his non +consistit principalitas legis novae, sicut principalitas veteris +legis in eis consistebat. Illi autem qui in veteri testamento Deo +fuerunt accepti per fidem, secundum hoc ad novum testamentum +pertinebant, non enim iustificabantur nisi per fidem Christi, qui +est auctor novi testamenti. Unde et de Moyse dicit apostolus, ad +Heb. XI, quod <i>maiores divitias aestimabat thesauro Aegyptiorum, +improperium Christi</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q107_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q107_A2-p0.1">Q. 107. A. 2. Whether the New Law fulfils the Old?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the New Law does not fulfil the Old. Because to fulfil and to void are contrary. But the New Law voids + or excludes the observances of the Old Law: for the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.2" target="asv">Gal. 5:2</a>): "If you be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing." Therefore the New Law is not a fulfilment of the Old. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="38292" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38292] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad +secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex nova legem veterem non +impleat. Impletio enim contrariatur evacuationi. Sed lex nova +evacuat, vel excludit observantias legis veteris, dicit enim +apostolus, ad Gal. V, <i>si circumcidimini, Christus nihil vobis +proderit</i>. Ergo lex nova non est impletiva veteris legis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one contrary is not the fulfilment of another. But Our Lord propounded in the New Law precepts that were contrary + to precepts of the Old Law. For we read ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.27" target="asv">Mat. 5:27-32</a>): You have heard that it was said to them of old: . . . "Whosoever shall put away his wife, let him give her a bill of divorce. + But I say to you that whosoever shall put away his wife . . . maketh her to commit adultery." Furthermore, the same evidently + applies to + the prohibition against swearing, against retaliation, and against hating one's enemies. In like manner Our Lord seems to + have done away with the precepts of the Old Law relating to the different kinds of foods ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.11" target="asv">Mat. 15:11</a>): "Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth the man: but what cometh out of the mouth, this defileth a man." Therefore + the New Law is not a fulfilment of the Old. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="38293" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38293] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +contrarium non est impletivum sui contrarii. Sed dominus in lege +nova proposuit quaedam praecepta contraria praeceptis veteris +legis. Dicitur enim Matth. V, <i>audistis quia dictum est antiquis, +quicumque dimiserit uxorem suam, det ei libellum repudii. Ego autem +dico vobis, quicumque dimiserit uxorem suam, facit eam +moechari</i>. Et idem consequenter patet in prohibitione iuramenti, +et etiam in prohibitione talionis, et in odio inimicorum. Similiter +etiam videtur dominus exclusisse praecepta veteris legis de +discretione ciborum, Matth. XV, <i>non quod intrat in os, +coinquinat hominem</i>. Ergo lex nova non est impletiva +veteris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whoever acts against a law does not fulfil the law. But Christ in certain cases acted against the Law. For He touched + the leper ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.8.3" target="asv">Mat. 8:3</a>), which was contrary to the Law. Likewise He seems to have frequently broken the sabbath; since the Jews used to say of Him + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#John.9.16" target="asv">Jn. 9:16</a>): "This man is not of God, who keepeth not the sabbath." Therefore Christ did not fulfil the Law: and so the New Law given + by Christ is not a fulfilment of the + Old. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="38294" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38294] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quicumque contra legem agit, non implet legem. Sed Christus in +aliquibus contra legem fecit. Tetigit enim leprosum, ut dicitur +Matth. VIII, quod erat contra legem. Similiter etiam videtur +sabbatum pluries violasse, unde de eo dicebant Iudaei, Ioan. IX, +<i>non est hic homo a Deo, qui sabbatum non custodit</i>. Ergo +Christus non implevit legem. Et ita lex nova data a Christo, non +est veteris impletiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Old Law contained precepts, moral, ceremonial, and judicial, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q99_A4" id="FS_Q107_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[99], A[4]</a>). But Our Lord ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.5" target="asv">Mat. 5</a>) fulfilled the Law in some respects, but without mentioning the judicial and ceremonial precepts. Therefore it seems that + the New Law is not a complete fulfilment of the Old. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="38295" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38295] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +in veteri lege continebantur praecepta moralia, caeremonialia et +iudicialia, ut supra dictum est. Sed dominus, Matth. V, ubi quantum +ad aliqua legem implevit, nullam mentionem videtur facere de +iudicialibus et caeremonialibus. Ergo videtur quod lex nova non sit +totaliter veteris impletiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.17" target="asv">Mat. 5:17</a>): "I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil": and went on to say ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.18" target="asv">Mat. 5:18</a>): "One jot or one tittle shall not pass of the Law till all be fulfilled." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 2 s. c."><a name="38296" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38296] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dominus dicit, Matth. V, <i>non veni solvere legem, sed +adimplere</i>. Et postea, subdit, <i>iota unum, aut unus apex, non +praeteribit a lege, donec omnia fiant</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q107_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q107_A1" id="FS_Q107_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the New Law is compared to the Old as the perfect to the imperfect. Now everything perfect fulfils that which is lacking + in the imperfect. And accordingly the New Law fulfils the Old by supplying that which was lacking in the Old Law. + </p><p id="FS_Q107_A2-p8"> Now two things of every law is to make men righteous and virtuous, as was stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q92_A1" id="FS_Q107_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[92], A[1]</a>): and consequently the end of the Old Law was the justification of men. The Law, however, could not accomplish this: but + foreshadowed it by certain ceremonial actions, and promised it in words. And in this respect, the New Law fulfils the Old + by justifying men through the power of Christ's Passion. This is what the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.3" target="asv">Rom. + 8:3,4 + </a>): "What the Law could not do . . . God sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh . . . hath condemned sin in the + flesh, that the justification of the Law might be fulfilled in us." And in this respect, the New Law gives what the Old Law + promised, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p8.3" href="./asv.html#iiCor.1.20" target="asv">2 Cor. 1:20</a>: "Whatever are the promises of God, in Him," i.e. in Christ, "they are 'Yea'." [*The Douay version reads thus: "All the promises + of God are in Him, 'It is'."] Again, in this respect, it also fulfils + what the Old Law foreshadowed. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p8.4" href="./asv.html#Col.2.17" target="asv">Col. 2:17</a>) concerning the ceremonial precepts that they were "a shadow of things to come, but the body is of Christ"; in other words, + the reality is found in Christ. Wherefore the New Law is called the law of reality; whereas the Old Law is called the law + of shadow or of figure. + </p><p id="FS_Q107_A2-p9"> Now Christ fulfilled the precepts of the Old Law both in His works and in His doctrine. In His works, because He was willing + to be circumcised and to fulfil the other legal observances, which were binding for the time being; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.4.4" target="asv"> Gal. 4:4</a>: "Made under the Law." In His doctrine He fulfilled the precepts of the Law in three ways. First, by explaining the true + sense of the Law. This is clear in the case of murder and adultery, the prohibition of which + the Scribes and Pharisees thought to refer only to the exterior act: wherefore Our Lord fulfilled the Law by showing that + the prohibition extended also to the interior acts of sins. Secondly, Our Lord fulfilled the precepts of the Law by prescribing + the safest way of complying with the statutes of the Old Law. Thus the Old Law forbade perjury: and this is more safely avoided, + by abstaining altogether from swearing, save in cases of urgency. Thirdly, Our Lord fulfilled the precepts of the Law, + by adding some counsels of perfection: this is clearly seen in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.21" target="asv"> Mat. 19:21, </a> where Our Lord said to the man who affirmed that he had kept all the precepts of the Old Law: "One thing is wanting to thee: + If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell whatsoever thou hast," etc. [*St. Thomas combines + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p9.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.21" target="asv"> Mat. 19:21 </a>with + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p9.4" href="./asv.html#Mark.10.21" target="asv"> Mk. 10:21</a>]. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 2 co."><a name="38297" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38297] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, lex nova comparatur ad veterem +sicut perfectum ad imperfectum. Omne autem perfectum adimplet id +quod imperfecto deest. Et secundum hoc lex nova adimplet veterem +legem, inquantum supplet illud quod veteri legi deerat. In veteri +autem lege duo possunt considerari, scilicet finis; et praecepta +contenta in lege. Finis vero cuiuslibet legis est ut homines +efficiantur iusti et virtuosi, ut supra dictum est. Unde et finis +veteris legis erat iustificatio hominum. Quam quidem lex efficere +non poterat, sed figurabat quibusdam caeremonialibus factis, et +promittebat verbis. Et quantum ad hoc, lex nova implet veterem +legem iustificando virtute passionis Christi. Et hoc est quod +apostolus dicit, ad Rom. VIII, <i>quod impossibile erat legi, Deus, +filium suum mittens in similitudinem carnis peccati, damnavit +peccatum in carne, ut iustificatio legis impleretur in nobis</i>. +Et quantum ad hoc, lex nova exhibet quod lex vetus promittebat; +secundum illud II ad Cor. I, quotquot promissiones Dei sunt, in +illo est, idest in Christo. Et iterum quantum ad hoc etiam complet +quod vetus lex figurabat. Unde ad Colos. II dicitur de +caeremonialibus quod erant umbra futurorum, corpus autem Christi, +idest, veritas pertinet ad Christum. Unde lex nova dicitur lex +veritatis, lex autem vetus umbrae vel figurae. Praecepta vero +veteris legis adimplevit Christus et opere, et doctrina. Opere +quidem, quia circumcidi voluit, et alia legalia observare, quae +erant illo tempore observanda; secundum illud Gal. IV, <i>factum +sub lege</i>. Sua autem doctrina adimplevit praecepta legis +tripliciter. Primo quidem, verum intellectum legis exprimendo. +Sicut patet in homicidio et adulterio, in quorum prohibitione +Scribae et Pharisaei non intelligebant nisi exteriorem actum +prohibitum, unde dominus legem adimplevit, ostendendo etiam +interiores actus peccatorum cadere sub prohibitione. Secundo, +adimplevit dominus praecepta legis, ordinando quomodo tutius +observaretur quod lex vetus statuerat. Sicut lex vetus statuerat ut +homo non peiuraret, et hoc tutius observatur si omnino a iuramento +abstineat, nisi in casu necessitatis. Tertio, adimplevit dominus +praecepta legis, superaddendo quaedam perfectionis consilia, ut +patet Matth. XIX, ubi dominus dicenti se observasse praecepta +veteris legis, dicit, unum tibi deest. <i>Si vis perfectus esse, +vade et vende omnia quae habes,</i> et cetera.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The New Law does not void observance of the Old Law except in the point of ceremonial precepts, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q103_A3" id="FS_Q107_A2-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[103], AA[3]</a>,4). Now the latter were figurative of something to come. Wherefore from the very fact that the ceremonial precepts were fulfilled + when those things were accomplished which they foreshadowed, it follows that they are no longer to be observed: for it they + were to be observed, this would mean that + something is still to be accomplished and is not yet fulfilled. Thus the promise of a future gift holds no longer when it + has been fulfilled by the presentation of the gift. In this way the legal ceremonies are abolished by being fulfilled. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="38298" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38298] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod lex nova non evacuat observantiam veteris legis +nisi quantum ad caeremonialia, ut supra habitum est. Haec autem +erant in figuram futuri. Unde ex hoc ipso quod caeremonialia +praecepta sunt impleta, perfectis his quae figurabantur, non sunt +ulterius observanda, quia si observarentur, adhuc significaretur +aliquid ut futurum et non impletum. Sicut etiam promissio futuri +doni locum iam non habet, promissione iam impleta per doni +exhibitionem et per hunc modum, caeremoniae legis tolluntur cum +implentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix, 26), those precepts of Our Lord are not contrary to the precepts of the Old Law. For + what Our Lord commanded about a man not putting away his wife, is not contrary to what the Law prescribed. "For the Law did + not say: 'Let him that wills, put his wife away': the contrary of which would be not to put her away. On the contrary, the + Law was unwilling that a man should put away his wife, since it prescribed a delay, + so that excessive eagerness for divorce might cease through being weakened during the writing of the bill. Hence Our Lord, + in order to impress the fact that a wife ought not easily to be put away, allowed no exception save in the case of fornication." + The same applies to the prohibition about swearing, as stated above. The same is also clear with respect to the prohibition + of retaliation. For the Law fixed a limit to revenge, by forbidding men to seek vengeance unreasonably: whereas Our Lord + deprived them of vengeance more completely by commanding them to abstain from it altogether. With regard to the hatred of + one's enemies, He dispelled the false interpretation of the Pharisees, by admonishing us to hate, not the person, but his + sin. As to discriminating between various foods, which was a ceremonial matter, Our Lord did not forbid this to be observed: + but He showed that no foods are naturally unclean, but only in token of something else, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q102_A6" id="FS_Q107_A2-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[102], A[6]</a>, ad 1). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="38299" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38299] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, contra Faustum, praecepta +illa domini non sunt contraria praeceptis veteris legis <i>quod +enim dominus praecepit de uxore non dimittenda, non est contrarium +ei quod lex praecepit. Neque enim ait lex, qui voluerit, dimittat +uxorem; cui esset contrarium non dimittere. Sed utique nolebat +dimitti uxorem a viro, qui hanc interposuit moram, ut in dissidium +animus praeceps libelli conscriptione refractus absisteret. Unde +dominus, ad hoc confirmandum ut non facile uxor dimittatur, solam +causam fornicationis excepit</i>. Et idem etiam dicendum est in +prohibitione iuramenti, sicut dictum est. Et idem etiam patet in +prohibitione talionis. Taxavit enim modum vindictae lex, ut non +procederetur ad immoderatam vindictam, a qua dominus perfectius +removit eum quem monuit omnino a vindicta abstinere. Circa odium +vero inimicorum, removit falsum Pharisaeorum intellectum, nos +monens ut persona odio non haberetur, sed culpa. Circa discretionem +vero ciborum, quae caeremonialis erat, dominus non mandavit ut tunc +non observaretur, sed ostendit quod nulli cibi secundum suam +naturam erant immundi, sed solum secundum figuram, ut supra dictum +est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It was forbidden by the Law to touch a leper; because by doing so, man incurred a certain uncleanness of irregularity, as + also by touching the dead, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q102_A5" id="FS_Q107_A2-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[102], A[5]</a>, ad 4). But Our Lord, Who healed the leper, could not contract an uncleanness. By those things which He did on the sabbath, + He did not break the sabbath in reality, as the Master Himself shows in the Gospel: both because He worked miracles by His + Divine power, which is ever active among things; and because He worked miracles by His Divine power, which is ever active + among things; and because His works were concerned with the salvation of man, while the Pharisees were concerned for the well-being + of animals even on the sabbath; and again because on account of urgency He excused His disciples for gathering the ears of + corn on the sabbath. But He did seem to break the sabbath according to the superstitious interpretation of the Pharisees, + who thought that man ought to abstain from doing even works of kindness on the sabbath; which was contrary to the intention + of the Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="38300" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38300] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod tactus leprosi erat prohibitus in lege, quia ex hoc +incurrebat homo quandam irregularitatis immunditiam, sicut et ex +tactu mortui, ut supra dictum est. Sed dominus, qui erat mundator +leprosi, immunditiam incurrere non poterat. Per ea autem quae fecit +in sabbato, sabbatum non solvit secundum rei veritatem, sicut ipse +magister in Evangelio ostendit, tum quia operabatur miracula +virtute divina, quae semper operatur in rebus; tum quia salutis +humanae opera faciebat, cum Pharisaei etiam saluti animalium in die +sabbati providerent; tum quia etiam ratione necessitatis discipulos +excusavit in sabbato spicas colligentes. Sed videbatur solvere +secundum superstitiosum intellectum Pharisaeorum, qui credebant +etiam a salubribus operibus esse in die sabbati abstinendum, quod +erat contra intentionem legis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The reason why the ceremonial precepts of the Law are not mentioned in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5" target="asv">Mat. 5</a> is because, as stated above (ad 1), their observance was abolished by their fulfilment. But of the judicial precepts He mentioned + that of retaliation: so that what He said about it should refer to all the others. With regard to this precept, He taught + that the intention of the Law was that retaliation should be sought out of love of justice, and not as a punishment out of + revengeful spite, which He forbade, admonishing man to be ready to suffer yet greater insults; and this remains still in the + New Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="38301" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38301] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod caeremonialia praecepta legis non commemorantur +Matth. V, quia eorum observantia totaliter excluditur per +impletionem, ut dictum est. De iudicialibus vero praeceptis +commemoravit praeceptum talionis, ut quod de hoc diceretur, de +omnibus aliis esset intelligendum. In quo quidem praecepto docuit +legis intentionem non esse ad hoc quod poena talionis quaereretur +propter livorem vindictae, quem ipse excludit, monens quod homo +debet esse paratus etiam maiores iniurias sufferre, sed solum +propter amorem iustitiae. Quod adhuc in nova lege remanet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q107_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q107_A3-p0.1">Q. 107. A. 3. Whether the New Law is contained in the Old?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the New Law is not contained in the Old. Because the New Law consists chiefly in faith: wherefore it is + called the "law of faith" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.27" target="asv">Rom. 3:27</a>). But many points of faith are set forth in the New Law, which are not contained in the Old. Therefore the New Law is not + contained in the Old. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="38302" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38302] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex nova in lege veteri non +contineatur. Lex enim nova praecipue in fide consistit, unde +dicitur lex fidei, ut patet Rom. III. Sed multa credenda traduntur +in nova lege quae in veteri non continentur. Ergo lex nova non +continetur in veteri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a gloss says on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.19" target="asv"> Mat. 5:19, </a> "He that shall break one of these least commandments," that the lesser commandments are those of the Law, and the greater + commandments, those contained in the Gospel. Now the greater cannot be contained in the lesser. Therefore the New Law is not + contained in the Old. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="38303" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38303] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quaedam Glossa dicit, Matth. V, super illud, qui solverit unum de +mandatis istis minimis, quod mandata legis sunt minora, in +Evangelio vero sunt mandata maiora. Maius autem non potest +contineri in minori. Ergo lex nova non continetur in veteri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, who holds the container holds the contents. If, therefore, the New Law is contained in the Old, it follows that + whoever had the Old Law had the New: so that it was superfluous to give men a New Law when once they had the Old. Therefore + the New Law is not contained in the Old. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="38304" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38304] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quod continetur in altero, simul habetur habito illo. Si igitur lex +nova contineretur in veteri, sequeretur quod, habita veteri lege, +habeatur et nova. Superfluum igitur fuit, habita veteri lege, +iterum dari novam. Non ergo nova lex continetur in veteri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> As expressed in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.1.16" target="asv"> Ezech. 1:16, </a> there was "a wheel in the midst of a wheel," i.e. "the New Testament within the Old," according to Gregory's exposition. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 3 s. c."><a name="38305" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38305] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod, sicut dicitur Ezech. I, <i>rota erat in rota</i>, idest +novum testamentum in veteri, ut Gregorius exponit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> One thing may be contained in another in two ways. First, actually; as a located thing is in a place. Secondly, virtually; + as an effect in its cause, or as the complement in that which is incomplete; thus a genus contains its species, and a seed + contains the whole tree, virtually. It is in this way that the New Law is contained in the Old: for it has been stated + <a href="#FS_Q107_A1" id="FS_Q107_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that the New Law is compared to the Old as perfect to imperfect. + Hence Chrysostom, expounding + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Mark.4.28" target="asv"> Mk. 4:28, </a> "The earth of itself bringeth forth fruit, first the blade, then the ear, afterwards the full corn in the ear," expresses + himself as follows: "He brought forth first the blade, i.e. the Law of Nature; then the ear, i.e. the Law of Moses; lastly, + the full corn, i.e. the Law of the Gospel." Hence then the New Law is in the Old as the corn in the ear. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 3 co."><a name="38306" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38306] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod aliquid continetur in alio dupliciter. Uno modo, in +actu, sicut locatum in loco. Alio modo, virtute, sicut effectus in +causa, vel complementum in incompleto, sicut genus continet species +potestate, et sicut tota arbor continetur in semine. Et per hunc +modum nova lex continetur in veteri, dictum est enim quod nova lex +comparatur ad veterem sicut perfectum ad imperfectum. Unde +Chrysostomus exponens illud quod habetur Marc. IV, <i>ultro terra +fructificat primum herbam, deinde spicam, deinde plenum frumentum +in spica</i>, sic dicit, <i>primo herbam fructificat in lege +naturae; postmodum spicas in lege Moysi; postea plenum frumentum, +in Evangelio</i>. Sic igitur est lex nova in veteri sicut fructus +in spica.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Whatsoever is set down in the New Testament explicitly and openly as a point of faith, is contained in the Old Testament + as a matter of belief, but implicitly, under a figure. And accordingly, even as to those things which we are bound to believe, + the New Law is contained in the Old. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="38307" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38307] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod omnia quae credenda traduntur in novo testamento +explicite et aperte, traduntur credenda in veteri testamento, sed +implicite sub figura. Et secundum hoc etiam quantum ad credenda lex +nova continetur in veteri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The precepts of the New Law are said to be greater than those of the Old Law, in the point of their being set forth explicitly. + But as to the substance itself of the precepts of the New Testament, they are all contained in the Old. Hence Augustine says + (Contra Faust. xix, 23,28) that "nearly all Our Lord's admonitions or precepts, where He expressed Himself by saying: 'But + I say unto you,' are to be found also in those ancient books. Yet, since they + thought that murder was only the slaying of the human body, Our Lord declared to them that every wicked impulse to hurt our + brother is to be looked on as a kind of murder." And it is in the point of declarations of this kind that the precepts of + the New Law are said to be greater than those of the Old. Nothing, however, prevents the greater from being contained in the + lesser virtually; just as a tree is contained in the seed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="38308" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38308] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod praecepta novae legis dicuntur esse maiora quam +praecepta veteris legis, quantum ad explicitam manifestationem. Sed +quantum ad ipsam substantiam praeceptorum novi testamenti, omnia +continentur in veteri testamento. Unde Augustinus dicit, contra +Faustum, quod <i>pene omnia quae monuit vel praecepit dominus, ubi +adiungebat, ego autem dico vobis, inveniuntur etiam in illis +veteribus libris. Sed quia non intelligebant homicidium nisi +peremptionem corporis humani, aperuit dominus omnem iniquum motum +ad nocendum fratri, in homicidii genere deputari</i>. Et quantum ad +huiusmodi manifestationes, praecepta novae legis dicuntur maiora +praeceptis veteris legis. Nihil tamen prohibet maius in minori +virtute contineri, sicut arbor continetur in semine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> What is set forth implicitly needs to be declared explicitly. Hence after the publishing of the Old Law, a New Law also had + to be given. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="38309" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38309] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod illud quod implicite datum est, oportet explicari. Et +ideo post veterem legem latam, oportuit etiam novam legem dari.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q107_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q107_A4-p0.1">Q. 107. A. 4. Whether the New Law is more burdensome than the Old?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the New Law is more burdensome than the Old. For Chrysostom (Opus Imp. in Matth., Hom. x [*The work of + an unknown author]) say: "The commandments given to Moses are easy to obey: Thou shalt not kill; Thou shalt not commit adultery: + but the commandments of Christ are difficult to accomplish, for instance: Thou shalt not give way to anger, or to lust." Therefore + the New Law is more burdensome than the Old. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="38310" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38310] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex nova sit gravior quam lex vetus. +Matth. enim V, super illud, qui solverit unum de mandatis his +minimis, dicit Chrysostomus, <i>mandata Moysi in actu facilia sunt, +non occides, non adulterabis. Mandata autem Christi, idest, non +irascaris, non concupiscas, in actu difficilia sunt</i>. Ergo lex +nova est gravior quam vetus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is easier to make use of earthly prosperity than to suffer tribulations. But in the Old Testament observance + of the Law was followed by temporal prosperity, as may be gathered from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.28.1" target="asv"> Dt. 28:1-14</a>; whereas many kinds of trouble ensue to those who observe the New Law, as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A4-p3.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.6.4" target="asv">2 Cor. 6:4-10</a>: "Let us exhibit ourselves as the ministers of God, in much patience, in tribulation, in necessities, in distresses," + etc. Therefore the New Law is more burdensome than the Old. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="38311" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38311] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +facilius est terrena prosperitate uti quam tribulationes perpeti. +Sed in veteri testamento observationem veteris legis consequebatur +prosperitas temporalis, ut patet Deut. XXVIII. Observatores autem +novae legis consequitur multiplex adversitas, prout dicitur II ad +Cor. VI, <i>exhibeamus nosmetipsos sicut Dei ministros in multa +patientia, in tribulationibus, in necessitatibus, in angustiis,</i> +et cetera. Ergo lex nova est gravior quam lex vetus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> The more one has to do, the more difficult it is. But the New Law is something added to the Old. For the Old Law forbade + perjury, while the New Law proscribed even swearing: the Old Law forbade a man to cast off his wife without a bill of divorce, + while the New Law forbade divorce altogether; as is clearly stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.31" target="asv"> Mat. 5:31, </a> seqq., according to Augustine's expounding. Therefore the New Law is more burdensome than the Old. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="38312" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38312] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quod se habet ex additione ad alterum, videtur esse difficilius. +Sed lex nova se habet ex additione ad veterem. Nam lex vetus +prohibuit periurium, lex nova etiam iuramentum, lex vetus prohibuit +discidium uxoris sine libello repudii, lex autem nova omnino +discidium prohibuit, ut patet Matth. V, secundum expositionem +Augustini. Ergo lex nova est gravior quam vetus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.28" target="asv">Mat. 11:28</a>): "Come to Me, all you that labor and are burdened": which words are expounded by Hilary thus: "He calls to Himself all those + that labor under the difficulty of observing the Law, and are burdened with the sins of this world." And further on He says + of the yoke of the Gospel: "For My yoke is sweet and My burden light." Therefore the New Law is a lighter burden than the + Old. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 4 s. c."><a name="38313" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38313] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Matth. XI, <i>venite ad me omnes qui laboratis et +onerati estis</i>. Quod exponens Hilarius dicit, <i>legis +difficultatibus laborantes, et peccatis saeculi oneratos, ad se +advocat</i>. Et postmodum de iugo Evangelii subdit, <i>iugum enim +meum suave est, et onus meum leve</i>. Ergo lex nova est levior +quam vetus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q107_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A twofold difficult may attach to works of virtue with which the precepts of the Law are concerned. One is on the part of + the outward works, which of themselves are, in a way, difficult and burdensome. And in this respect the Old Law is a much + heavier burden than the New: since the Old Law by its numerous ceremonies prescribed many more outward acts than the New Law, + which, in the teaching of Christ and the apostles, added very few precepts to those of the + natural law; although afterwards some were added, through being instituted by the holy Fathers. Even in these Augustine says + that moderation should be observed, lest good conduct should become a burden to the faithful. For he says in reply to the + queries of Januarius (Ep. lv) that, "whereas God in His mercy wished religion to be a free service rendered by the public + solemnization of a small number of most manifest sacraments, certain persons make it a slave's burden; so much so that the + state + of the Jews who were subject to the sacraments of the Law, and not to the presumptuous devices of man, was more tolerable." + </p><p id="FS_Q107_A4-p7"> The other difficulty attaches to works of virtue as to interior acts: for instance, that a virtuous deed be done with promptitude + and pleasure. It is this difficulty that virtue solves: because to act thus is difficult for a man without virtue: but through + virtue it becomes easy for him. In this respect the precepts of the New Law are more burdensome than those of the Old; because + the New Law prohibits certain interior movements of the soul, which were not expressly forbidden in + the Old Law in all cases, although they were forbidden in some, without, however, any punishment being attached to the prohibition. + Now this is very difficult to a man without virtue: thus even the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 9) that it is easy to do what + a righteous man does; but that to do it in the same way, viz. with pleasure and promptitude, is difficult to a man who is + not righteous. Accordingly we read also ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.5.3" target="asv">1 Jn. 5:3</a>) that "His commandments are not heavy": which + words Augustine expounds by saying that "they are not heavy to the man that loveth; whereas they are a burden to him that + loveth not." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 4 co."><a name="38314" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38314] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod circa opera virtutis, de quibus praecepta legis +dantur, duplex difficultas attendi potest. Una quidem ex parte +exteriorum operum, quae ex seipsis quandam difficultatem habent et +gravitatem. Et quantum ad hoc, lex vetus est multo gravior quam +nova, quia ad plures actus exteriores obligabat lex vetus in +multiplicibus caeremoniis, quam lex nova, quae praeter praecepta +legis naturae, paucissima superaddidit in doctrina Christi et +apostolorum; licet aliqua sint postmodum superaddita ex +institutione sanctorum patrum. In quibus etiam Augustinus dicit +esse moderationem attendendam, ne conversatio fidelium onerosa +reddatur. Dicit enim, ad inquisitiones Ianuarii, de quibusdam, quod +<i>ipsam religionem nostram, quam in manifestissimis et paucissimis +celebrationum sacramentis Dei misericordia voluit esse liberam, +servilibus premunt oneribus, adeo ut tolerabilior sit conditio +Iudaeorum, qui legalibus sacramentis, non humanis praesumptionibus +subiiciuntur</i>. Alia autem difficultas est circa opera virtutum +in interioribus actibus, puta quod aliquis opus virtutis exerceat +prompte et delectabiliter. Et circa hoc difficile est virtus, hoc +enim non habenti virtutem est valde difficile; sed per virtutem +redditur facile. Et quantum ad hoc, praecepta novae legis sunt +graviora praeceptis veteris legis, quia in nova lege prohibentur +interiores motus animi, qui expresse in veteri lege non +prohibebantur in omnibus, etsi in aliquibus prohiberentur; in +quibus tamen prohibendis poena non apponebatur. Hoc autem est +difficillimum non habenti virtutem, sicut etiam philosophus dicit, +in V Ethic., quod operari ea quae iustus operatur, facile est; sed +operari ea eo modo quo iustus operatur, scilicet delectabiliter et +prompte, est difficile non habenti iustitiam. Et sic etiam dicitur +I Ioan. V, quod mandata eius gravia non sunt, quod exponens +Augustinus dicit quod <i>non sunt gravia amanti, sed non amanti +sunt gravia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passage quoted speaks expressly of the difficulty of the New Law as to the deliberate curbing of interior movements. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="38315" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38315] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod auctoritas illa expresse loquitur de +difficultate novae legis quantum ad expressam cohibitionem +interiorum motuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The tribulations suffered by those who observe the New Law are not imposed by the Law itself. Moreover they are easily borne, + on account of the love in which the same Law consists: since, as Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxx), "love makes light + and nothing of things that seem arduous and beyond our power." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="38316" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38316] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod adversitates quas patiuntur observatores novae legis, +non sunt ab ipsa lege impositae. Sed tamen propter amorem, in quo +ipsa lex consistit, faciliter tollerantur, quia sicut Augustinus +dicit, in libro de verbis domini, <i>omnia saeva et immania facilia +et prope nulla efficit amor</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The object of these additions to the precepts of the Old Law was to render it easier to do what it prescribed, as Augustine + states [*De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 17,21; xix, 23,26]. Accordingly this does not prove that the New Law is more burdensome, + but rather that it is a lighter burden. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="38317" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38317] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod illae additiones ad praecepta veteris legis, ad hoc +ordinantur ut facilius impleatur quod vetus lex mandabat, sicut +Augustinus dicit. Et ideo per hoc non ostenditur quod lex nova sit +gravior, sed magis quod sit facilior.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q108" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q108-p0.1">Q. 108. OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE CONTAINED IN THE NEW LAW (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q108-p2"> We must now consider those things that are contained in the New Law: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q108-p3"><a href="#FS_Q108_A1"> (1) Whether the New Law ought to prescribe or to forbid any outward works?</a></p><p id="FS_Q108-p4"><a href="#FS_Q108_A2"> (2) Whether the New Law makes sufficient provision in prescribing and forbidding external acts?</a></p><p id="FS_Q108-p5"><a href="#FS_Q108_A3"> (3) Whether in the matter of internal acts it directs man sufficiently?</a></p><p id="FS_Q108-p6"><a href="#FS_Q108_A4"> (4) Whether it fittingly adds counsels to precepts?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 pr."><a name="38318" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38318] Iª-IIae q. 108 pr.</span></a> Deinde +considerandum est de his quae continentur in lege nova. Et circa +hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum lex nova debeat aliqua opera +exteriora praecipere vel prohibere. Secundo, utrum sufficienter se +habeat in exterioribus actibus praecipiendis vel prohibendis. +Tertio, utrum convenienter instituat homines quantum ad actus +interiores. Quarto, utrum convenienter superaddat consilia +praeceptis.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q108_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q108_A1-p0.1">Q. 108. A. 1. Whether the New Law ought to prescribe or prohibit any external acts?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the New Law should not prescribe or prohibit any external acts. For the New Law is the Gospel of the kingdom, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.24.14" target="asv"> Mat. 24:14</a>: "This Gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in the whole world." But the kingdom of God consists not in exterior, but + only in interior acts, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.17.21" target="asv"> Lk. 17:21</a>: "The kingdom of God is within you"; and + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A1-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Rom.14.17" target="asv"> Rom. 14:17</a>: "The kingdom of God is not + meat and drink; but justice and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost." Therefore the New Law should not prescribe or forbid any + external acts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="38319" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38319] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex nova nullos exteriores actus +debeat praecipere vel prohibere. Lex enim nova est Evangelium +regni; secundum illud Matth. XXIV, <i>praedicabitur hoc Evangelium +regni in universo orbe</i>. Sed regnum Dei non consistit in +exterioribus actibus, sed solum in interioribus; secundum illud +Luc. XVII, <i>regnum Dei intra vos est</i>; et Rom. XIV, <i>non est +regnum Dei esca et potus, sed iustitia et pax et gaudium in spiritu +sancto</i>. Ergo lex nova non debet praecipere vel prohibere +aliquos exteriores actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the New Law is "the law of the Spirit" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.2" target="asv">Rom. 8:2</a>). But "where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.17" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:17</a>). Now there is no liberty when man is bound to do or avoid certain external acts. Therefore the New Law does not prescribe + or forbid any external acts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="38320" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38320] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +lex nova est lex spiritus, ut dicitur Rom. VIII. Sed ubi spiritus +domini, ibi libertas, ut dicitur II ad Cor. III. Non est autem +libertas ubi homo obligatur ad aliqua exteriora opera facienda vel +vitanda. Ergo lex nova non continet aliqua praecepta vel +prohibitiones exteriorum actuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all external acts are understood as referable to the hand, just as interior acts belong to the mind. But this is + assigned as the difference between the New and Old Laws that the "Old Law restrains the hand, whereas the New Law curbs the + will" [*Peter Lombard, Sent. iii, D, 40]. Therefore the New Law should not contain prohibitions and commands about exterior + deeds, but only about interior acts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="38321" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38321] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +omnes exteriores actus pertinere intelliguntur ad manum, sicut +interiores actus pertinent ad animum. Sed haec ponitur differentia +inter novam legem et veterem, quod <i>vetus lex cohibet manum, sed +lex nova cohibet animum</i>. Ergo in lege nova non debent poni +prohibitiones et praecepta exteriorum actuum, sed solum +interiorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Through the New Law, men are made "children of light": wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.12.36" target="asv">Jn. 12:36</a>): "Believe in the light that you may be the children of light." Now it is becoming that children of the light should do deeds + of light and cast aside deeds of darkness, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.8" target="asv"> Eph. 5:8</a>: "You were heretofore darkness, but now light in the Lord. Walk . . . as children of the light." Therefore the New Law had + to forbid + certain external acts and prescribe others. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 1 s. c."><a name="38322" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38322] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod per legem novam efficiuntur homines filii lucis, unde +dicitur Ioan. XII, <i>credite in lucem, ut filii lucis sitis</i>. +Sed filios lucis decet opera lucis facere, et opera tenebrarum +abiicere; secundum illud Ephes. V, <i>eratis aliquando tenebrae, +nunc autem lux in domino. Ut filii lucis ambulate</i>. Ergo lex +nova quaedam exteriora opera debuit prohibere, et quaedam +praecipere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q108_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q106_A1" id="FS_Q108_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[106], AA[1]</a>,2), the New Law consists chiefly in the grace of the Holy Ghost, which is shown forth by faith that worketh through love. + Now men become receivers of this grace through God's Son made man, Whose humanity grace filled first, and thence flowed forth + to us. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#John.1.14" target="asv">Jn. 1:14</a>): "The Word was made flesh," and afterwards: "full of grace and truth"; and further on: "Of His + fulness we all have received, and grace for grace." Hence it is added that "grace and truth came by Jesus Christ." Consequently + it was becoming that the grace flows from the incarnate Word should be given to us by means of certain external sensible objects; + and that from this inward grace, whereby the flesh is subjected to the Spirit, certain external works should ensue. + </p><p id="FS_Q108_A1-p7"> Accordingly external acts may have a twofold connection with grace. In the first place, as leading in some way to grace. + Such are the sacramental acts which are instituted in the New Law, e.g. Baptism, the Eucharist, and the like. + </p><p id="FS_Q108_A1-p8"> In the second place there are those external acts which ensue from the promptings of grace: and herein we must observe a + difference. For there are some which are necessarily in keeping with, or in opposition to inward grace consisting in faith + that worketh through love. Such external works are prescribed or forbidden in the New Law; thus confession of faith is prescribed, + and denial of faith is forbidden; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.10.32" target="asv">Mat. 10:32,33</a>) "(Every one) that + shall confess Me before men, I will also confess him before My Father . . . But he that shall deny Me before men, I will also + deny him before My Father." On the other hand, there are works which are not necessarily opposed to, or in keeping with faith + that worketh through love. Such works are not prescribed or forbidden in the New Law, by virtue of its primitive institution; + but have been left by the Lawgiver, i.e. Christ, to the discretion of each individual. And so to each one it is free to + decide what he should do or avoid; and to each superior, to direct his subjects in such matters as regards what they must + do or avoid. Wherefore also in this respect the Gospel is called the "law of liberty" [*Cf. Reply OBJ[2]]: since the Old Law + decided many points and left few to man to decide as he chose. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 1 co."><a name="38323" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38323] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, principalitas legis novae est +gratia spiritus sancti, quae manifestatur in fide per dilectionem +operante. Hanc autem gratiam consequuntur homines per Dei filium +hominem factum, cuius humanitatem primo replevit gratia, et exinde +est ad nos derivata. Unde dicitur Ioan. I, <i>verbum caro factum +est</i>; et postea subditur, <i>plenum gratiae et veritatis</i>; et +infra, <i>de plenitudine eius nos omnes accepimus, et gratiam pro +gratia</i>. Unde subditur quod gratia et veritas per Iesum Christum +facta est. Et ideo convenit ut per aliqua exteriora sensibilia +gratia a verbo incarnato profluens in nos deducatur; et ex hac +interiori gratia, per quam caro spiritui subditur, exteriora +quaedam opera sensibilia producantur. Sic igitur exteriora opera +dupliciter ad gratiam pertinere possunt. Uno modo, sicut inducentia +aliqualiter ad gratiam. Et talia sunt opera sacramentorum quae in +lege nova sunt instituta, sicut Baptismus, Eucharistia, et alia +huiusmodi. Alia vero sunt opera exteriora quae ex instinctu gratiae +producuntur. Et in his est quaedam differentia attendenda. Quaedam +enim habent necessariam convenientiam vel contrarietatem ad +interiorem gratiam, quae in fide per dilectionem operante +consistit. Et huiusmodi exteriora opera sunt praecepta vel +prohibita in lege nova, sicut praecepta est confessio fidei, et +prohibita negatio; dicitur enim Matth. X, <i>qui confitebitur me +coram hominibus, confitebor et ego eum coram patre meo. Qui autem +negaverit me coram hominibus, negabo et ego eum coram patre +meo</i>. Alia vero sunt opera quae non habent necessariam +contrarietatem vel convenientiam ad fidem per dilectionem +operantem. Et talia opera non sunt in nova lege praecepta vel +prohibita ex ipsa prima legis institutione; sed relicta sunt a +legislatore, scilicet Christo, unicuique, secundum quod aliquis +curam gerere debet. Et sic unicuique liberum est circa talia +determinare quid sibi expediat facere vel vitare; et cuicumque +praesidenti, circa talia ordinare suis subditis quid sit in talibus +faciendum vel vitandum. Unde etiam quantum ad hoc dicitur lex +Evangelii lex libertatis, nam lex vetus multa determinabat, et +pauca relinquebat hominum libertati determinanda.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The kingdom of God consists chiefly in internal acts: but as a consequence all things that are essential to internal acts + belong also to the kingdom of God. Thus if the kingdom of God is internal righteousness, peace, and spiritual joy, all external + acts that are incompatible with righteousness, peace, and spiritual joy, are in opposition to the kingdom of God; and consequently + should be forbidden in the Gospel of the kingdom. On the other hand, those + things that are indifferent as regards the aforesaid, for instance, to eat of this or that food, are not part of the kingdom + of God; wherefore the Apostle says before the words quoted: "The kingdom of God is not meat and drink." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="38324" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38324] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod regnum Dei in interioribus actibus principaliter +consistit, sed ex consequenti etiam ad regnum Dei pertinent omnia +illa sine quibus interiores actus esse non possunt. Sicut si regnum +Dei est interior iustitia et pax et gaudium spirituale, necesse est +quod omnes exteriores actus qui repugnant iustitiae aut paci aut +gaudio spirituali, repugnent regno Dei, et ideo sunt in Evangelio +regni prohibendi. Illa vero quae indifferenter se habent respectu +horum, puta comedere hos vel illos cibos, in his non est regnum +Dei, unde apostolus praemittit, <i>non est regnum Dei esca et +potus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q108_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 2), what is "free is cause of itself." Therefore he acts freely, who acts of his + own accord. Now man does of his own accord that which he does from a habit that is suitable to his nature: since a habit inclines + one as a second nature. If, however, a habit be in opposition to nature, man would not act according to his nature, but according + to some corruption affecting that nature. Since then the grace of the + Holy Ghost is like an interior habit bestowed on us and inclining us to act aright, it makes us do freely those things that + are becoming to grace, and shun what is opposed to it. + </p><p id="FS_Q108_A1-p11"> Accordingly the New Law is called the law of liberty in two respects. First, because it does not bind us to do or avoid certain + things, except such as are of themselves necessary or opposed to salvation, and come under the prescription or prohibition + of the law. Secondly, because it also makes us comply freely with these precepts and prohibitions, inasmuch as we do so through + the promptings of grace. It is for these two reasons that the New Law is called "the law of perfect + liberty" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.25" target="asv">James 1:25</a>). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="38325" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38325] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, in I Metaphys., <i>liber est +qui sui causa est</i>. Ille ergo libere aliquid agit qui ex seipso +agit. Quod autem homo agit ex habitu suae naturae convenienti, ex +seipso agit, quia habitus inclinat in modum naturae. Si vero +habitus esset naturae repugnans, homo non ageret secundum quod est +ipse, sed secundum aliquam corruptionem sibi supervenientem. Quia +igitur gratia spiritus sancti est sicut interior habitus nobis +infusus inclinans nos ad recte operandum, facit nos libere operari +ea quae conveniunt gratiae, et vitare ea quae gratiae repugnant. +Sic igitur lex nova dicitur lex libertatis dupliciter. Uno modo, +quia non arctat nos ad facienda vel vitanda aliqua, nisi quae de se +sunt vel necessaria vel repugnantia saluti, quae cadunt sub +praecepto vel prohibitione legis. Secundo, quia huiusmodi etiam +praecepta vel prohibitiones facit nos libere implere, inquantum ex +interiori instinctu gratiae ea implemus. Et propter haec duo lex +nova dicitur lex perfectae libertatis, Iac. I.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The New Law, by restraining the mind from inordinate movements, must needs also restrain the hand from inordinate acts, which + ensue from inward movements. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="38326" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38326] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod lex nova, cohibendo animum ab inordinatis motibus, +oportet quod etiam cohibeat manum ab inordinatis actibus, qui sunt +effectus interiorum motuum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q108_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q108_A2-p0.1">Q. 108. A. 2. Whether the New Law made sufficient ordinations about external acts?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the New Law made insufficient ordinations about external acts. Because faith that worketh through charity + seems chiefly to belong to the New Law, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.6" target="asv"> Gal. 5:6</a>: "In Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision: but faith that worketh through charity." But + the New Law declared explicitly certain points of faith which were not set forth explicitly in the Old Law; for instance, + belief in + the Trinity. Therefore it should also have added certain outward moral deeds, which were not fixed in the Old Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="38327" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38327] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad +secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex nova insufficienter +exteriores actus ordinaverit. Ad legem enim novam praecipue +pertinere videtur fides per dilectionem operans; secundum illud ad +Gal. V, <i>in Christo Iesu neque circumcisio aliquid valet neque +praeputium, sed fides quae per dilectionem operatur</i>. Sed lex +nova explicavit quaedam credenda quae non erant in veteri lege +explicita, sicut de fide Trinitatis. Ergo etiam debuit superaddere +aliqua exteriora opera moralia, quae non erant in veteri lege +determinata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in the Old Law not only were sacraments instituted, but also certain sacred things, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q101_A4" id="FS_Q108_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[101], A[4]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q102_A4" id="FS_Q108_A2-p3.2" shape="rect"> Q[102], A[4]</a>). But in the New Law, although certain sacraments are instituted by Our Lord; for instance, pertaining either to the sanctification + of a temple or of the vessels, or to the celebration of some particular feast. Therefore the New Law made insufficient ordinations + about + external matters. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="38328" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38328] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +in veteri lege non solum instituta sunt sacramenta, sed etiam +aliqua sacra, ut supra dictum est. Sed in nova lege, etsi sint +instituta aliqua sacramenta, nulla tamen sacra instituta a domino +videntur, puta quae pertineant vel ad sanctificationem alicuius +templi aut vasorum, vel etiam ad aliquam solemnitatem celebrandam. +Ergo lex nova insufficienter exteriora ordinavit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the Old Law, just as there were certain observances pertaining to God's ministers, so also were there certain + observances pertaining to the people: as was stated above when we were treating of the ceremonial of the Old Law ( + <a href="#FS_Q101_A4" id="FS_Q108_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[101], A[4]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q102_A6" id="FS_Q108_A2-p4.2" shape="rect"> Q[102], A[6]</a>). Now in the New Law certain observances seem to have been prescribed to the ministers of God; as may be gathered from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A2-p4.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.10.9" target="asv"> Mat. 10:9</a>: + "Do not possess gold, nor silver, nor money in your purses," nor other things which are mentioned here and + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A2-p4.4" href="./asv.html#Luke.9" target="asv">Lk. 9</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A2-p4.5" href="./asv.html#Luke.10" target="asv">10</a>. Therefore certain observances pertaining to the faithful should also have been instituted in the New Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="38329" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38329] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +in veteri lege, sicut erant quaedam observantiae pertinentes ad Dei +ministros, ita etiam erant quaedam observantiae pertinentes ad +populum; ut supra dictum est, cum de caeremonialibus veteris legis +ageretur. Sed in nova lege videntur aliquae observantiae esse datae +ministris Dei, ut patet Matth. X, <i>nolite possidere aurum neque +argentum, neque pecuniam in zonis vestris</i>, et cetera quae ibi +sequuntur, et quae dicuntur Luc. IX et X. Ergo etiam debuerunt +aliquae observantiae institui in nova lege ad populum fidelem +pertinentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in the Old Law, besides moral and ceremonial precepts, there were certain judicial precepts. But in the New Law + there are no judicial precepts. Therefore the New Law made insufficient ordinations about external works. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="38330" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38330] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +in veteri lege, praeter moralia et caeremonialia, fuerunt quaedam +iudicialia praecepta. Sed in lege nova non traduntur aliqua +iudicialia praecepta. Ergo lex nova insufficienter exteriora opera +ordinavit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.24" target="asv">Mat. 7:24</a>): "Every one . . . that heareth these My words, and doth them, shall be likened to a wise man that built his house upon a + rock." But a wise builder leaves out nothing that is necessary to the building. Therefore Christ's words contain all things + necessary for man's salvation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 2 s. c."><a name="38331" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38331] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dominus dicit, Matth. VII, <i>omnis qui audit verba mea +haec et facit ea, assimilabitur viro sapienti qui aedificavit domum +suam supra petram</i>. Sed sapiens aedificator nihil omittit eorum +quae sunt necessaria ad aedificium. Ergo in verbis Christi +sufficienter sunt omnia posita quae pertinent ad salutem +humanam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q108_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q108_A1" id="FS_Q108_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the New Law had to make such prescriptions or prohibitions alone as are essential for the reception or right use of grace. + And since we cannot of ourselves obtain grace, but through Christ alone, hence Christ of Himself instituted the sacraments + whereby we obtain grace: viz. Baptism, Eucharist, Orders of the ministers of the New Law, by the institution of the apostles + and seventy-two disciples, Penance, and + indissoluble Matrimony. He promised Confirmation through the sending of the Holy Ghost: and we read that by His institution + the apostles healed the sick by anointing them with oil ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Mark.6.13" target="asv">Mk. 6:13</a>). These are the sacraments of the New Law. + </p><p id="FS_Q108_A2-p8"> The right use of grace is by means of works of charity. These, in so far as they are essential to virtue, pertain to the + moral precepts, which also formed part of the Old Law. Hence, in this respect, the New Law had nothing to add as regards external + action. The determination of these works in their relation to the divine worship, belongs to the ceremonial precepts of the + Law; and, in relation to our neighbor, to the judicial precepts, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q99_A4" id="FS_Q108_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[99], A[4]</a>). And therefore, since these determinations are not in themselves necessarily connected with inward grace wherein the Law + consists, they do not come under a precept of the New Law, but are left to the decision of man; some relating to inferiors---as + when a precept is given to an individual; others, relating to superiors, temporal or spiritual, referring, namely, to the + common good. + </p><p id="FS_Q108_A2-p9"> Accordingly the New Law had no other external works to determine, by prescribing or forbidding, except the sacraments, and + those moral precepts which have a necessary connection with virtue, for instance, that one must not kill, or steal, and so + forth. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 2 co."><a name="38332" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38332] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, lex nova in exterioribus illa +solum praecipere debuit vel prohibere, per quae in gratiam +introducimur, vel quae pertinent ad rectum gratiae usum ex +necessitate. Et quia gratiam ex nobis consequi non possumus, sed +per Christum solum, ideo sacramenta, per quae gratiam consequimur, +ipse dominus instituit per seipsum, scilicet Baptismum, +Eucharistiam, ordinem ministrorum novae legis, instituendo +apostolos et septuaginta duos discipulos, et poenitentiam, et +matrimonium indivisibile. Confirmationem etiam promisit per +spiritus sancti missionem. Ex eius etiam institutione apostoli +leguntur oleo infirmos ungendo sanasse, ut habetur Marc. VI. Quae +sunt novae legis sacramenta. Rectus autem gratiae usus est per +opera caritatis. Quae quidem secundum quod sunt de necessitate +virtutis, pertinent ad praecepta moralia, quae etiam in veteri lege +tradebantur. Unde quantum ad hoc, lex nova super veterem addere non +debuit circa exteriora agenda. Determinatio autem praedictorum +operum in ordine ad cultum Dei, pertinet ad praecepta caeremonialia +legis; in ordine vero ad proximum, ad iudicialia; ut supra dictum +est. Et ideo, quia istae determinationes non sunt secundum se de +necessitate interioris gratiae, in qua lex consistit; idcirco non +cadunt sub praecepto novae legis, sed relinquuntur humano arbitrio; +quaedam quidem quantum ad subditos, quae scilicet pertinent +singillatim ad unumquemque; quaedam vero ad praelatos temporales +vel spirituales, quae scilicet pertinent ad utilitatem communem. +Sic igitur lex nova nulla alia exteriora opera determinare debuit +praecipiendo vel prohibendo, nisi sacramenta, et moralia praecepta +quae de se pertinent ad rationem virtutis, puta non esse +occidendum, non esse furandum, et alia huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Matters of faith are above human reason, and so we cannot attain to them except through grace. Consequently, when grace came + to be bestowed more abundantly, the result was an increase in the number of explicit points of faith. On the other hand, it + is through human reason that we are directed to works of virtue, for it is the rule of human action, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q19_A3" id="FS_Q108_A2-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[3]</a>; + <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q63_A2" id="FS_Q108_A2-p10.2" shape="rect"> Q[63], A[2]</a>). Wherefore + in such matters as these there was no need for any precepts to be given besides the moral precepts of the Law, which proceed + from the dictate of reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="38333" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38333] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ea quae sunt fidei, sunt supra rationem humanam, +unde in ea non possumus pervenire nisi per gratiam. Et ideo, +abundantiori gratia superveniente, oportuit plura credenda +explicari. Sed ad opera virtutum dirigimur per rationem naturalem, +quae est regula quaedam operationis humanae, ut supra dictum est. +Et ideo in his non oportuit aliqua praecepta dari ultra moralia +legis praecepta, quae sunt de dictamine rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the sacraments of the New Law grace is bestowed, which cannot be received except through Christ: consequently they had + to be instituted by Him. But in the sacred things no grace is given: for instance, in the consecration of a temple, an altar + or the like, or, again, in the celebration of feasts. Wherefore Our Lord left the institution of such things to the discretion + of the faithful, since they have not of themselves any necessary connection with + inward grace. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="38334" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38334] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod in sacramentis novae legis datur gratia, quae non est +nisi a Christo, et ideo oportuit quod ab ipso institutionem +haberent. Sed in sacris non datur aliqua gratia, puta in +consecratione templi vel altaris vel aliorum huiusmodi, aut etiam +in ipsa celebritate solemnitatum. Et ideo talia, quia secundum +seipsa non pertinent ad necessitatem interioris gratiae, dominus +fidelibus instituenda reliquit pro suo arbitrio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q108_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Our Lord gave the apostles those precepts not as ceremonial observances, but as moral statutes: and they can be understood + in two ways. First, following Augustine (De Consensu Evang. 30), as being not commands but permissions. For He permitted them + to set forth to preach without scrip or stick, and so on, since they were empowered to accept their livelihood from those + to whom they preached: wherefore He goes on to say: "For the laborer is worthy of + his hire." Nor is it a sin, but a work of supererogation for a preacher to take means of livelihood with him, without accepting + supplies from those to whom he preaches; as Paul did ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A2-p12.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:4, </a> seqq.). + </p><p id="FS_Q108_A2-p13"> Secondly, according to the explanation of other holy men, they may be considered as temporal commands laid upon the apostles + for the time during which they were sent to preach in Judea before Christ's Passion. For the disciples, being yet as little + children under Christ's care, needed to receive some special commands from Christ, such as all subjects receive from their + superiors: and especially so, since they were to be accustomed little by little to renounce the care of + temporalities, so as to become fitted for the preaching of the Gospel throughout the whole world. Nor must we wonder if He + established certain fixed modes of life, as long as the state of the Old Law endured and the people had not as yet achieved + the perfect liberty of the Spirit. These statutes He abolished shortly before His Passion, as though the disciples had by + their means become sufficiently practiced. Hence He said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A2-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.22.35" target="asv">Lk. 22:35,36</a>) "When I sent you without purse and + scrip and shoes, did you want anything? But they said: Nothing. Then said He unto them: But now, he that hath a purse, let + him take it, and likewise a scrip." Because the time of perfect liberty was already at hand, when they would be left entirely + to their own judgment in matters not necessarily connected with virtue. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="38335" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38335] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod illa praecepta dominus dedit apostolis non tanquam +caeremoniales observantias, sed tanquam moralia instituta. Et +possunt intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum Augustinum, in +libro de consensu Evangelist., ut non sint praecepta, sed +concessiones. Concessit enim eis ut possent pergere ad +praedicationis officium sine pera et baculo et aliis huiusmodi, +tanquam habentes potestatem necessaria vitae accipiendi ab illis +quibus praedicabant, unde subdit, dignus enim est operarius cibo +suo. Non autem peccat, sed supererogat, qui sua portat, ex quibus +vivat in praedicationis officio, non accipiens sumptum ab his +quibus Evangelium praedicat, sicut Paulus fecit. Alio modo possunt +intelligi, secundum aliorum sanctorum expositionem, ut sint quaedam +statuta temporalia apostolis data pro illo tempore quo mittebantur +ad praedicandum in Iudaea ante Christi passionem. Indigebant enim +discipuli, quasi adhuc parvuli sub Christi cura existentes, +accipere aliqua specialia instituta a Christo, sicut et quilibet +subditi a suis praelatis, et praecipue quia erant paulatim +exercitandi ut temporalium sollicitudinem abdicarent, per quod +reddebantur idonei ad hoc quod Evangelium per universum orbem +praedicarent. Nec est mirum si, adhuc durante statu veteris legis, +et nondum perfectam libertatem spiritus consecutis, quosdam +determinatos modos vivendi instituit. Quae quidem statuta, +imminente passione, removit, tanquam discipulis iam per ea +sufficienter exercitatis. Unde Luc. XXII, dixit, <i>quando misi vos +sine sacculo et pera et calceamentis, numquid aliquid defuit vobis? +At illi dixerunt, nihil. Dixit ergo eis, sed nunc qui habet +sacculum, tollat; similiter et peram</i>. Iam enim imminebat tempus +perfectae libertatis, ut totaliter suo dimitterentur arbitrio in +his quae secundum se non pertinent ad necessitatem virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A2-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Judicial precepts also, are not essential to virtue in respect of any particular determination, but only in regard to the + common notion of justice. Consequently Our Lord left the judicial precepts to the discretion of those who were to have spiritual + or temporal charge of others. But as regards the judicial precepts of the Old Law, some of them He explained, because they + were misunderstood by the Pharisees, as we shall state later on (A[3], ad 2). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="38336" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38336] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod iudicialia etiam, secundum se considerata, non sunt +de necessitate virtutis quantum ad talem determinationem sed solum +quantum ad communem rationem iustitiae. Et ideo iudicialia +praecepta reliquit dominus disponenda his qui curam aliorum erant +habituri vel spiritualem vel temporalem. Sed circa iudicialia +praecepta veteris legis quaedam explanavit, propter malum +intellectum Pharisaeorum, ut infra dicetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q108_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q108_A3-p0.1">Q. 108. A. 3. Whether the New Law directed man sufficiently as regards interior actions?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the New Law directed man insufficiently as regards interior actions. For there are ten commandments of + the decalogue directing man to God and his neighbor. But Our Lord partly fulfilled only three of them: as regards, namely, + the prohibition of murder, of adultery, and of perjury. Therefore it seems that, by omitting to fulfil the other precepts, + He directed man insufficiently. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="38337" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38337] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod circa interiores actus lex nova +insufficienter hominem ordinaverit. Sunt enim decem praecepta +Decalogi ordinantia hominem ad Deum et proximum. Sed dominus solum +circa tria illorum aliquid adimplevit, scilicet circa prohibitionem +homicidii, et circa prohibitionem adulterii, et circa prohibitionem +periurii. Ergo videtur quod insufficienter hominem ordinaverit, +adimpletionem aliorum praeceptorum praetermittens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as regards the judicial precepts, Our Lord ordained nothing in the Gospel, except in the matter of divorcing of + wife, of punishment by retaliation, and of persecuting one's enemies. But there are many other judicial precepts of the Old + Law, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q104_A4" id="FS_Q108_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[104], A[4]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q105" id="FS_Q108_A3-p3.2" shape="rect"> Q[105])</a>. Therefore, in this respect, He directed human life insufficiently. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="38338" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38338] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +dominus nihil ordinavit in Evangelio de iudicialibus praeceptis +nisi circa repudium uxoris, et circa poenam talionis, et circa +persecutionem inimicorum. Sed multa sunt alia iudicialia praecepta +veteris legis, ut supra dictum est. Ergo quantum ad hoc, +insufficienter vitam hominum ordinavit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the Old Law, besides moral and judicial, there were ceremonial precepts about which Our Lord made no ordination. + Therefore it seems that He ordained insufficiently. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="38339" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38339] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +in veteri lege, praeter praecepta moralia et iudicialia, erant +quaedam caeremonialia. Circa quae dominus nihil ordinavit. Ergo +videtur insufficienter ordinasse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in order that the mind be inwardly well disposed, man should do no good deed for any temporal whatever. But there + are many other temporal goods besides the favor of man: and there are many other good works besides fasting, alms-deeds, and + prayer. Therefore Our Lord unbecomingly taught that only in respect of these three works, and of no other earthly goods ought + we to shun the glory of human favor. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="38340" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38340] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +ad interiorem bonam mentis dispositionem pertinet ut nullum bonum +opus homo faciat propter quemcumque temporalem finem. Sed multa +sunt alia temporalia bona quam favor humanus, multa etiam alia sunt +bona opera quam ieiunium, eleemosyna et oratio. Ergo inconveniens +fuit quod dominus docuit solum circa haec tria opera gloriam +favoris humani vitari, et nihil aliud terrenorum bonorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A3-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, solicitude for the necessary means of livelihood is by nature instilled into man, and this solicitude even other + animals share with man: wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.6.6" target="asv">Prov. 6:6</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.6.8" target="asv">8</a>): "Go to the ant, O sluggard, and consider her ways . . . she provideth her meat for herself in the summer, and gathereth + her food in the harvest." But every command issued against the inclination of nature is an unjust command, forasmuch as it + is contrary to + the law of nature. Therefore it seems that Our Lord unbecomingly forbade solicitude about food and raiment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 3 arg. 5"><a name="38341" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38341] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +naturaliter homini inditum est ut sollicitetur circa ea quae sunt +sibi necessaria ad vivendum, in qua etiam sollicitudine alia +animalia cum homine conveniunt, unde dicitur Prov. VI, <i>vade ad +formicam, o piger, et considera vias eius. Parat in aestate cibum +sibi, et congregat in messe quod comedat</i>. Sed omne praeceptum +quod datur contra inclinationem naturae, est iniquum, utpote contra +legem naturalem existens. Ergo inconvenienter videtur dominus +prohibuisse sollicitudinem victus et vestitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A3-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, no act of virtue should be the subject of a prohibition. Now judgment is an act of justice, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.18.15" target="asv"> Ps. 18:15</a>: "Until justice be turned into judgment." Therefore it seems that Our Lord unbecomingly forbade judgment: and consequently + that the New Law directed man insufficiently in the matter of interior acts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 3 arg. 6"><a name="38342" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38342] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, +nullus actus virtutis est prohibendus. Sed iudicium est actus +iustitiae; secundum illud Psalmi XCIII, <i>quousque iustitia +convertatur in iudicium</i>. Ergo inconvenienter videtur dominus +iudicium prohibuisse. Et ita videtur lex nova insufficienter +hominem ordinasse circa interiores actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A3-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 1): We should take note that, when He said: "'He that heareth these My words,' + He indicates clearly that this sermon of the Lord is replete with all the precepts whereby a Christian's life is formed." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 3 s. c."><a name="38343" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38343] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, +<i>considerandum est quia, cum dixit, qui audit verba mea haec, +satis significat sermonem istum domini omnibus praeceptis quibus +Christiana vita formatur, esse perfectum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q108_A3-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As is evident from Augustine's words just quoted, the sermon, contains the whole process of forming the life of a Christian. + Therein man's interior movements are ordered. Because after declaring that his end is Beatitude; and after commending the + authority of the apostles, through whom the teaching of the Gospel was to be promulgated, He orders man's interior movements, + first in regard to man himself, secondly in regard to his neighbor. + </p><p id="FS_Q108_A3-p10"> This he does in regard to man himself, in two ways, corresponding to man's two interior movements in respect of any prospective + action, viz. volition of what has to be done, and intention of the end. Wherefore, in the first place, He directs man's will + in respect of the various precepts of the Law: by prescribing that man should refrain not merely from those external works + that are evil in themselves, but also from internal acts, and from the occasions of evil deeds. In the + second place He directs man's intention, by teaching that in our good works, we should seek neither human praise, nor worldly + riches, which is to lay up treasures on earth. + </p><p id="FS_Q108_A3-p11"> Afterwards He directs man's interior movement in respect of his neighbor, by forbidding us, on the one hand, to judge him + rashly, unjustly, or presumptuously; and, on the other, to entrust him too readily with sacred things if he be unworthy. + </p><p id="FS_Q108_A3-p12"> Lastly, He teaches us how to fulfil the teaching of the Gospel; viz. by imploring the help of God; by striving to enter by + the narrow door of perfect virtue; and by being wary lest we be led astray by evil influences. Moreover, He declares that + we must observe His commandments, and that it is not enough to make profession of faith, or to work miracles, or merely to + hear His words. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 3 co."><a name="38344" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38344] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ex inducta auctoritate Augustini apparet, +sermo quem dominus in monte proposuit, totam informationem +Christianae vitae continet. In quo perfecte interiores motus +hominis ordinantur. Nam post declaratum beatitudinis finem; et +commendata apostolica dignitate, per quos erat doctrina evangelica +promulganda; ordinat interiores hominis motus, primo quidem quantum +ad seipsum; et deinde quantum ad proximum. Quantum autem ad +seipsum, dupliciter; secundum duos interiores hominis motus circa +agenda, qui sunt voluntas de agendis, et intentio de fine. Unde +primo ordinat hominis voluntatem secundum diversa legis praecepta, +ut scilicet abstineat aliquis non solum ab exterioribus operibus +quae sunt secundum se mala, sed etiam ab interioribus, et ab +occasionibus malorum. Deinde ordinat intentionem hominis, docens +quod in bonis quae agimus, neque quaeramus humanam gloriam, neque +mundanas divitias, quod est thesaurizare in terra. Consequenter +autem ordinat interiorem hominis motum quoad proximum, ut scilicet +eum non temerarie aut iniuste iudicemus, aut praesumptuose; neque +tamen sic simus apud proximum remissi, ut eis sacra committamus, si +sint indigni. Ultimo autem docet modum adimplendi evangelicam +doctrinam, scilicet implorando divinum auxilium; et conatum +apponendo ad ingrediendum per angustam portam perfectae virtutis; +et cautelam adhibendo ne a seductoribus corrumpamur. Et quod +observatio mandatorum eius est necessaria ad virtutem, non autem +sufficit sola confessio fidei, vel miraculorum operatio, vel solus +auditus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our Lord explained the manner of fulfilling those precepts which the Scribes and Pharisees did not rightly understand: and + this affected chiefly those precepts of the decalogue. For they thought that the prohibition of adultery and murder covered + the external act only, and not the internal desire. And they held this opinion about murder and adultery rather than about + theft and false witness, because the movement of anger tending to murder, and the + movement of desire tending to adultery, seem to be in us from nature somewhat, but not the desire of stealing or bearing false + witness. They held a false opinion about perjury, for they thought that perjury indeed was a sin; but that oaths were of themselves + to be desired and to be taken frequently, since they seem to proceed from reverence to God. Hence Our Lord shows that an oath + is not desirable as a good thing; and that it is better to speak without oaths, unless necessity forces us to have + recourse to them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="38345" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38345] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod dominus circa illa legis praecepta adimpletionem +apposuit, in quibus Scribae et Pharisaei non rectum intellectum +habebant. Et hoc contingebat praecipue circa tria praecepta +Decalogi. Nam circa prohibitionem adulterii et homicidii, +aestimabant solum exteriorem actum prohiberi, non autem interiorem +appetitum. Quod magis credebant circa homicidium et adulterium quam +circa furtum vel falsum testimonium, quia motus irae in homicidium +tendens, et concupiscentiae motus tendens in adulterium, videntur +aliqualiter nobis a natura inesse; non autem appetitus furandi, vel +falsum testimonium dicendi. Circa periurium vero habebant falsum +intellectum, credentes periurium quidem esse peccatum; iuramentum +autem per se esse appetendum et frequentandum, quia videtur ad Dei +reverentiam pertinere. Et ideo dominus ostendit iuramentum non esse +appetendum tanquam bonum; sed melius esse absque iuramento loqui, +nisi necessitas cogat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q108_A3-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Scribes and Pharisees erred about the judicial precepts in two ways. First, because they considered certain matters contained + in the Law of Moses by way of permission, to be right in themselves: namely, divorce of a wife, and the taking of usury from + strangers. Wherefore Our Lord forbade a man to divorce his wife ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A3-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.32" target="asv">Mat. 5:32</a>); and to receive usury ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A3-p14.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.35" target="asv">Lk. 6:35</a>), when He said: "Lend, hoping for nothing + thereby." + </p><p id="FS_Q108_A3-p15"> In another way they erred by thinking that certain things which the Old Law commanded to be done for justice's sake, should + be done out of desire for revenge, or out of lust for temporal goods, or out of hatred of one's enemies; and this in respect + of three precepts. For they thought that desire for revenge was lawful, on account of the precept concerning punishment by + retaliation: whereas this precept was given that justice might be safeguarded, not that man might seek revenge. + Wherefore, in order to do away with this, Our Lord teaches that man should be prepared in his mind to suffer yet more if necessary. + They thought that movements of covetousness were lawful on account of those judicial precepts which prescribed restitution + of what had been purloined, together with something added thereto, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q105_A2" id="FS_Q108_A3-p15.1" shape="rect">Q[105], A[2]</a>, ad 9); whereas the Law commanded this to be done in order to safeguard justice, not to encourage covetousness. Wherefore + Our Lord teaches that we should not demand our goods from motives of cupidity, and that we should be ready to give yet more + if necessary. They thought that the movement of hatred was lawful, on account of the commandments of the Law about the slaying + of one's enemies: whereas the Law ordered this for the fulfilment of justice, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q105_A3" id="FS_Q108_A3-p15.2" shape="rect">Q[105], A[3]</a>, ad 4), not to satisfy hatred. Wherefore Our Lord teaches us that we ought to love our enemies, and to be ready to + do good to them if necessary. For these precepts are to be taken as binding "the mind to be prepared to fulfil them," as Augustine + says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="38346" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38346] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod circa iudicialia praecepta dupliciter Scribae et +Pharisaei errabant. Primo quidem, quia quaedam quae in lege Moysi +erant tradita tanquam permissiones, aestimabant esse per se iusta, +scilicet repudium uxoris, et usuras accipere ab extraneis. Et ideo +dominus prohibuit uxoris repudium, Matth. V; et usurarum +acceptionem, Luc. VI, dicens, <i>date mutuum nihil inde +sperantes</i>. Alio modo errabant credentes quaedam quae lex vetus +instituerat facienda propter iustitiam, esse exequenda ex appetitu +vindictae; vel ex cupiditate temporalium rerum; vel ex odio +inimicorum. Et hoc in tribus praeceptis. Appetitum enim vindictae +credebant esse licitum, propter praeceptum datum de poena talionis. +Quod quidem fuit datum ut iustitia servaretur, non ut homo +vindictam quaereret. Et ideo dominus, ad hoc removendum, docet +animum hominis sic debere esse praeparatum ut, si necesse sit, +etiam paratus sit plura sustinere. Motum autem cupiditatis +aestimabant esse licitum, propter praecepta iudicialia in quibus +mandabatur restitutio rei ablatae fieri etiam cum aliqua additione, +ut supra dictum est. Et hoc quidem lex mandavit propter iustitiam +observandam, non ut daret cupiditati locum. Et ideo dominus docet +ut ex cupiditate nostra non repetamus, sed simus parati, si necesse +fuerit, etiam ampliora dare. Motum vero odii credebant esse +licitum, propter praecepta legis data de hostium interfectione. +Quod quidem lex statuit propter iustitiam implendam, ut supra +dictum est, non propter odia exsaturanda. Et ideo dominus docet ut +ad inimicos dilectionem habeamus, et parati simus, si opus fuerit, +etiam benefacere. Haec enim praecepta secundum praeparationem animi +sunt accipienda, ut Augustinus exponit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A3-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The moral precepts necessarily retained their force under the New Law, because they are of themselves essential to virtue: + whereas the judicial precepts did not necessarily continue to bind in exactly the same way as had been fixed by the Law: this + was left to man to decide in one way or another. Hence Our Lord directed us becomingly with regard to these two kinds of precepts. + On the other hand, the observance of the ceremonial precepts was totally + abolished by the advent of the reality; wherefore in regard to these precepts He commanded nothing on this occasion when He + was giving the general points of His doctrine. Elsewhere, however, He makes it clear that the entire bodily worship which + was fixed by the Law, was to be changed into spiritual worship: as is evident from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A3-p16.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.21" target="asv"> Jn. 4:21,23, </a> where He says: "The hour cometh when you shall neither on this mountain, nor in Jerusalem adore the Father . . . but . . + . the true + adorers shall adore the Father in spirit and in truth." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="38347" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38347] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod praecepta moralia omnino in nova lege remanere +debebant, quia secundum se pertinent ad rationem virtutis. +Praecepta autem iudicialia non remanebant ex necessitate secundum +modum quem lex determinavit; sed relinquebatur arbitrio hominum +utrum sic vel aliter esset determinandum. Et ideo convenienter +dominus circa haec duo genera praeceptorum nos ordinavit. +Praeceptorum autem caeremonialium observatio totaliter per rei +impletionem tollebatur. Et ideo circa huiusmodi praecepta, in illa +communi doctrina, nihil ordinavit. Ostendit tamen alibi quod totus +corporalis cultus qui erat determinatus in lege, erat in +spiritualem commutandus; ut patet Ioan. IV, ubi dixit, <i>venit +hora quando neque in monte hoc neque in Ierosolymis adorabitis +patrem; sed veri adoratores adorabunt patrem in spiritu et +veritate</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A3-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> All worldly goods may be reduced to three---honors, riches, and pleasures; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A3-p17.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:16</a>: "All that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh," which refers to pleasures of the flesh, "and the concupiscence + of the eyes," which refers to riches, "and the pride of life," which refers to ambition for renown and honor. Now the Law + did not promise an abundance of carnal pleasures; on the contrary, it forbade them. But + it did promise exalted honors and abundant riches; for it is written in reference to the former ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A3-p17.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.28.1" target="asv">Dt. 28:1</a>): "If thou wilt hear the voice of the Lord thy God . . . He will make thee higher than all the nations"; and in reference + to the latter, we read a little further on ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A3-p17.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.28.11" target="asv">Dt. 28:11</a>): "He will make thee abound with all goods." But the Jews so distorted the true meaning of these promises, as to think that + we ought to serve God, with these things as the end + in view. Wherefore Our Lord set this aside by teaching, first of all, that works of virtue should not be done for human glory. + And He mentions three works, to which all others may be reduced: since whatever a man does in order to curb his desires, comes + under the head of fasting; and whatever a man does for the love of his neighbor, comes under the head of alms-deeds; and whatever + a man does for the worship of God, comes under the head of prayer. And He mentions these three specifically, as + they hold the principal place, and are most often used by men in order to gain glory. In the second place He taught us that + we must not place our end in riches, when He said: "Lay not up to yourselves treasures on earth" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A3-p17.4" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.19" target="asv">Mat. 6:19</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="38348" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38348] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod omnes res mundanae ad tria reducuntur, scilicet ad +honores, divitias et delicias; secundum illud I Ioan. II, omne quod +est in mundo, concupiscentia carnis est, quod pertinet ad delicias +carnis; et concupiscentia oculorum, quod pertinet ad divitias; et +superbia vitae, quod pertinet ad ambitum gloriae et honoris. +Superfluas autem carnis delicias lex non repromisit, sed magis +prohibuit. Repromisit autem celsitudinem honoris, et abundantiam +divitiarum, dicitur enim Deut. XXVIII, <i>si audieris vocem domini +Dei tui, faciet te excelsiorem cunctis gentibus</i>, quantum ad +primum; et post pauca subdit, <i>abundare te faciet omnibus +bonis</i>, quantum ad secundum. Quae quidem promissa sic prave +intelligebant Iudaei, ut propter ea esset Deo serviendum, sicut +propter finem. Et ideo dominus hoc removit, docens primo, quod +opera virtutis non sunt facienda propter humanam gloriam. Et ponit +tria opera, ad quae omnia alia reducuntur, nam omnia quae aliquis +facit ad refrenandum seipsum in suis concupiscentiis, reducuntur ad +ieiunium; quaecumque vero fiunt propter dilectionem proximi, +reducuntur ad eleemosynam; quaecumque vero propter cultum Dei +fiunt, reducuntur ad orationem. Ponit autem haec tria specialiter +quasi praecipua, et per quae homines maxime solent gloriam venari. +Secundo, docuit quod non debemus finem constituere in divitiis, cum +dixit, <i>nolite thesaurizare vobis thesauros in terra</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A3-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Our Lord forbade, not necessary, but inordinate solicitude. Now there is a fourfold solicitude to be avoided in temporal + matters. First, we must not place our end in them, nor serve God for the sake of the necessities of food and raiment. Wherefore + He says: "Lay not up for yourselves," etc. Secondly, we must not be so anxious about temporal things, as to despair of God's + help: wherefore Our Lord says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A3-p18.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.32" target="asv">Mat. 6:32</a>): "Your Father + knoweth that you have need of all these things." Thirdly, we must not add presumption to our solicitude; in other words, we + must not be confident of getting the necessaries of life by our own efforts without God's help: such solicitude Our Lord sets + aside by saying that a man cannot add anything to his stature ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A3-p18.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.27" target="asv">Mat. 6:27</a>). We must not anticipate the time for anxiety; namely, by being solicitous now, for the needs, not of the present, but of + a future time: wherefore He says + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A3-p18.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.34" target="asv">Mat. 6:34</a>): "Be not . . . solicitous for tomorrow." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 3 ad 5"><a name="38349" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38349] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod dominus sollicitudinem necessariam non prohibuit, sed +sollicitudinem inordinatam. Est autem quadruplex inordinatio +sollicitudinis vitanda circa temporalia. Primo quidem, ut in eis +finem non constituamus, neque Deo serviamus propter necessaria +victus et vestitus. Unde dicit, <i>nolite thesaurizare vobis</i> et +cetera. Secundo, ut non sic sollicitemur de temporalibus, cum +desperatione divini auxilii. Unde dominus dicit, <i>scit pater +vester quia his omnibus indigetis</i>. Tertio, ne sit sollicitudo +praesumptuosa, ut scilicet homo confidat se necessaria vitae per +suam sollicitudinem posse procurare, absque divino auxilio. Quod +dominus removet per hoc quod <i>homo non potest aliquid adiicere ad +staturam suam</i>. Quarto, per hoc quod homo sollicitudinis tempus +praeoccupat, quia scilicet de hoc sollicitus est nunc, quod non +pertinet ad curam praesentis temporis, sed ad curam futuri. Unde +dicit, nolite solliciti esse in crastinum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A3-p19"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Our Lord did not forbid the judgment of justice, without which holy things could not be withdrawn from the unworthy. But + he forbade inordinate judgment, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 3 ad 6"><a name="38350" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38350] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum +dicendum quod dominus non prohibet iudicium iustitiae, sine quo non +possent sancta subtrahi ab indignis. Sed prohibet iudicium +inordinatum, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q108_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q108_A4-p0.1">Q. 108. A. 4. Whether certain definite counsels are fittingly proposed in the New Law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that certain definite counsels are not fittingly proposed in the New Law. For counsels are given about that + which is expedient for an end, as we stated above, when treating of counsel ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q14_A2" id="FS_Q108_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[14] , A[2]</a>). But the same things are not expedient for all. Therefore certain definite counsels should not be proposed to all. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="38351" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38351] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter in lege nova consilia +quaedam determinata sint proposita. Consilia enim dantur de rebus +expedientibus ad finem; ut supra dictum est, cum de consilio +ageretur. Sed non eadem omnibus expediunt. Ergo non sunt aliqua +consilia determinata omnibus proponenda.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, counsels regard a greater good. But there are no definite degrees to the greater good. Therefore definite counsels + should not be given. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="38352" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38352] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +consilia dantur de meliori bono. Sed non sunt determinati gradus +melioris boni. Ergo non debent aliqua determinata consilia +dari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, counsels pertain to the life of perfection. But obedience pertains to the life of perfection. Therefore it was unfitting + that no counsel of obedience should be contained in the Gospel. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="38353" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38353] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +consilia pertinent ad perfectionem vitae. Sed obedientia pertinet +ad perfectionem vitae. Ergo inconvenienter de ea consilium non +datur in Evangelio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, many matters pertaining to the life of perfection are found among the commandments, as, for instance, "Love your + enemies" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.44" target="asv">Mat. 5:44</a>), and those precepts which Our Lord gave His apostles ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.10" target="asv">Mat. 10</a>). Therefore the counsels are unfittingly given in the New Law: both because they are not all mentioned; and because they + are not distinguished from the commandments. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="38354" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38354] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +multa ad perfectionem vitae pertinentia inter praecepta ponuntur, +sicut hoc quod dicitur, diligite inimicos vestros; et praecepta +etiam quae dedit dominus apostolis, Matth. X. Ergo inconvenienter +traduntur consilia in nova lege, tum quia non omnia ponuntur; tum +etiam quia a praeceptis non distinguuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The counsels of a wise friend are of great use, according to Prov. (27:9): "Ointment and perfumes rejoice the heart: and + the good counsels of a friend rejoice the soul." But Christ is our wisest and greatest friend. Therefore His counsels are + supremely useful and becoming. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 4 s. c."><a name="38355" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38355] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +consilia sapientis amici magnam utilitatem afferunt; secundum illud +Prov. XXVII, <i>unguento et variis odoribus delectatur cor, et +bonis amici consiliis anima dulcoratur</i>. Sed Christus maxime est +sapiens et amicus. Ergo eius consilia maximam utilitatem continent, +et convenientia sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q108_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The difference between a counsel and a commandment is that a commandment implies obligation, whereas a counsel is left to + the option of the one to whom it is given. Consequently in the New Law, which is the law of liberty, counsels are added to + the commandments, and not in the Old Law, which is the law of bondage. We must therefore understand the commandments of the + New Law to have been given about matters that are necessary to gain the end of eternal bliss, + to which end the New Law brings us forthwith: but that the counsels are about matters that render the gaining of this end + more assured and expeditious. + </p><p id="FS_Q108_A4-p8"> Now man is placed between the things of this world, and spiritual goods wherein eternal happiness consists: so that the more + he cleaves to the one, the more he withdraws from the other, and conversely. Wherefore he that cleaves wholly to the things + of this world, so as to make them his end, and to look upon them as the reason and rule of all he does, falls away altogether + from spiritual goods. Hence this disorder is removed by the commandments. Nevertheless, for man to gain the + end aforesaid, he does not need to renounce the things of the world altogether: since he can, while using the things of this + world, attain to eternal happiness, provided he does not place his end in them: but he will attain more speedily thereto by + giving up the goods of this world entirely: wherefore the evangelical counsels are given for this purpose. + </p><p id="FS_Q108_A4-p9"> Now the goods of this world which come into use in human life, consist in three things: viz. in external wealth pertaining + to the "concupiscence of the eyes"; carnal pleasures pertaining to the "concupiscence of the flesh"; and honors, which pertain + to the "pride of life," according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:16</a>: and it is in renouncing these altogether, as far as possible, that the evangelical counsels consist. Moreover, every form + of the religious life that professes the + state of perfection is based on these three: since riches are renounced by poverty; carnal pleasures by perpetual chastity; + and the pride of life by the bondage of obedience. + </p><p id="FS_Q108_A4-p10"> Now if a man observe these absolutely, this is in accordance with the counsels as they stand. But if a man observe any one + of them in a particular case, this is taking that counsel in a restricted sense, namely, as applying to that particular case. + For instance, when anyone gives an alms to a poor man, not being bound so to do, he follows the counsels in that particular + case. In like manner, when a man for some fixed time refrains from carnal pleasures that he may give himself + to prayer, he follows the counsel for that particular time. And again, when a man follows not his will as to some deed which + he might do lawfully, he follows the counsel in that particular case: for instance, if he do good to his enemies when he is + not bound to, or if he forgive an injury of which he might justly seek to be avenged. In this way, too, all particular counsels + may be reduced to these three general and perfect counsels. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 4 co."><a name="38356" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38356] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod haec est differentia inter consilium et praeceptum, +quod praeceptum importat necessitatem, consilium autem in optione +ponitur eius cui datur. Et ideo convenienter in lege nova, quae est +lex libertatis, supra praecepta sunt addita consilia, non autem in +veteri lege, quae erat lex servitutis. Oportet igitur quod +praecepta novae legis intelligantur esse data de his quae sunt +necessaria ad consequendum finem aeternae beatitudinis, in quem lex +nova immediate introducit. Consilia vero oportet esse de illis per +quae melius et expeditius potest homo consequi finem praedictum. +Est autem homo constitutus inter res mundi huius et spiritualia +bona, in quibus beatitudo aeterna consistit, ita quod quanto plus +inhaeret uni eorum, tanto plus recedit ab altero, et e converso. +Qui ergo totaliter inhaeret rebus huius mundi, ut in eis finem +constituat, habens eas quasi rationes et regulas suorum operum, +totaliter excidit a spiritualibus bonis. Et ideo huiusmodi +inordinatio tollitur per praecepta. Sed quod homo totaliter ea quae +sunt mundi abiiciat, non est necessarium ad perveniendum in finem +praedictum, quia potest homo utens rebus huius mundi, dummodo in +eis finem non constituat, ad beatitudinem aeternam pervenire. Sed +expeditius perveniet totaliter bona huius mundi abdicando. Et ideo +de hoc dantur consilia Evangelii. Bona autem huius mundi, quae +pertinent ad usum humanae vitae, in tribus consistunt, scilicet in +divitiis exteriorum bonorum, quae pertinent ad concupiscentiam +oculorum; in deliciis carnis, quae pertinent ad concupiscentiam +carnis; et in honoribus, quae pertinent ad superbiam vitae; sicut +patet I Ioan. II. Haec autem tria totaliter derelinquere, secundum +quod possibile est, pertinet ad consilia evangelica. In quibus +etiam tribus fundatur omnis religio, quae statum perfectionis +profitetur, nam divitiae abdicantur per paupertatem; deliciae +carnis per perpetuam castitatem; superbia vitae per obedientiae +servitutem. Haec autem simpliciter observata pertinent ad consilia +simpliciter proposita. Sed observatio uniuscuiusque eorum in aliquo +speciali casu, pertinet ad consilium secundum quid, scilicet in +casu illo. Puta cum homo dat aliquam eleemosynam pauperi quam dare +non tenetur, consilium sequitur quantum ad factum illud. Similiter +etiam quando aliquo tempore determinato a delectationibus carnis +abstinet ut orationibus vacet, consilium sequitur pro tempore illo. +Similiter etiam quando aliquis non sequitur voluntatem suam in +aliquo facto quod licite posset facere, consilium sequitur in casu +illo, puta si benefaciat inimicis quando non tenetur, vel si +offensam remittat cuius iuste posset exigere vindictam. Et sic +etiam omnia consilia particularia ad illa tria generalia et +perfecta reducuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The aforesaid counsels, considered in themselves, are expedient to all; but owing to some people being ill-disposed, it happens + that some of them are inexpedient, because their disposition is not inclined to such things. Hence Our Lord, in proposing + the evangelical counsels, always makes mention of man's fitness for observing the counsels. For in giving the counsel of perpetual + poverty ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A4-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.21" target="asv">Mat. 19:21</a>), He begins with the words: "If + thou wilt be perfect," and then He adds: "Go, sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast." In like manner when He gave the counsel + of perpetual chastity, saying ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A4-p11.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.12" target="asv">Mat. 19:12</a>): "There are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven," He adds straightway: "He that can take, + let him take it." And again, the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A4-p11.3" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.35" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:35</a>), after giving the counsel of virginity, says: "And this I speak for your profit; not to cast a snare upon you." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="38357" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38357] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod praedicta consilia, quantum est de se sunt +omnibus expedientia, sed ex indispositione aliquorum contingit quod +alicui expedientia non sunt, quia eorum affectus ad haec non +inclinatur. Et ideo dominus, consilia evangelica proponens, semper +facit mentionem de idoneitate hominum ad observantiam consiliorum. +Dans enim consilium perpetuae paupertatis, Matth. XIX, praemittit, +<i>si vis perfectus esse</i>; et postea subdit, <i>vade et vende +omnia quae habes</i>. Similiter, dans consilium perpetuae +castitatis, cum dixit, <i>sunt eunuchi qui castraverunt seipsos +propter regnum caelorum</i>, statim subdit, <i>qui potest capere, +capiat</i>. Et similiter apostolus, I ad Cor. VII, praemisso +consilio virginitatis, dicit, <i>porro hoc ad utilitatem vestram +dico, non ut laqueum vobis iniiciam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The greater goods are not definitely fixed in the individual; but those which are simply and absolutely the greater good + in general are fixed: and to these all the above particular goods may be reduced, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="38358" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38358] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod meliora bona particulariter in singulis sunt +indeterminata. Sed illa quae sunt simpliciter et absolute meliora +bona in universali, sunt determinata. Ad quae etiam omnia illa +particularia reducuntur, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even the counsel of obedience is understood to have been given by Our Lord in the words: "And [let him] follow Me." For we + follow Him not only by imitating His works, but also by obeying His commandments, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A4-p13.1" href="./asv.html#John.10.27" target="asv"> Jn. 10:27</a>: "My sheep hear My voice . . . and they follow Me." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="38359" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38359] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod etiam consilium obedientiae dominus intelligitur +dedisse in hoc quod dixit, et sequatur me; quem sequimur non solum +imitando opera, sed etiam obediendo mandatis ipsius; secundum illud +Ioan. X. <i>Oves meae vocem meam audiunt, et sequuntur me</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A4-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Those things which Our Lord prescribed about the true love of our enemies, and other similar sayings ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A4-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5" target="asv">Mat. 5</a>; + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A4-p14.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.6" target="asv">Lk. 6</a>), may be referred to the preparation of the mind, and then they are necessary for salvation; for instance, that man be prepared + to do good to his enemies, and other similar actions, when there is need. Hence these things are placed among the precepts. + But that anyone should actually and promptly behave thus towards an enemy when there is + no special need, is to be referred to the particular counsels, as stated above. As to those matters which are set down in + + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A4-p14.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.10" target="asv">Mat. 10</a> and + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A4-p14.4" href="./asv.html#Luke.9" target="asv">Lk. 9</a> and 10, they were either disciplinary commands for that particular time, or concessions, as stated above (A[2], ad 3). Hence + they are not set down among the counsels. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="38360" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38360] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod ea quae de vera dilectione inimicorum, et similibus, +dominus dicit Matth. V et Luc. VI, si referantur ad praeparationem +animi, sunt de necessitate salutis, ut scilicet homo sit paratus +benefacere inimicis, et alia huiusmodi facere, cum necessitas hoc +requirat. Et ideo inter praecepta ponuntur. Sed ut aliquis hoc +inimicis exhibeat prompte in actu, ubi specialis necessitas non +occurrit, pertinet ad consilia particularia, ut dictum est. Illa +autem quae ponuntur Matth. X, et Luc. IX, et X, fuerunt quaedam +praecepta disciplinae pro tempore illo, vel concessiones quaedam, +ut supra dictum est. Et ideo non inducuntur tanquam consilia.</p></div></div></div></div> + + + ` + </div> + </body> + </html>