After treating of human acts and passions, we now pass on to the consideration of the principles of human acts, and firstly + of intrinsic principles, secondly of extrinsic principles. The intrinsic principle is power and habit; but as we have treated + of powers in the FP, Q[77], seqq., it remains for us to consider them in general: in the second place we shall consider virtues + and vices and other like habits, which are the principles of human acts. +
Concerning habits in general there are four points to consider: First, the substance of habits; second, their subject; third, + the cause of their generation, increase, and corruption; fourth, how they are distinguished from one another. +
Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether habit is a quality?
(2) Whether it is a distinct species of quality?
+[35593] +Iª-IIae q. 49 pr. Post actus et passiones, +considerandum est de principiis humanorum actuum. Et primo, de +principiis intrinsecis; secundo, de principiis extrinsecis. +Principium autem intrinsecum est potentia et habitus; sed quia de +potentiis in prima parte dictum est, nunc restat de habitibus +considerandum. Et primo quidem, in generali; secundo vero, de +virtutibus et vitiis, et aliis huiusmodi habitibus, qui sunt +humanorum actuum principia. Circa ipsos autem habitus in generali, +quatuor consideranda sunt, primo quidem, de ipsa substantia +habituum, secundo, de subiecto eorum; tertio, de causa +generationis, augmenti et corruptionis ipsorum; quarto, de +distinctione ipsorum. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum +habitus sit qualitas. Secundo, utrum sit determinata species +qualitatis. Tertio, utrum habitus importet ordinem ad actum. +Quarto, de necessitate habitus.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that habit is not a quality. For Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 73): "this word 'habit' is derived from the + verb 'to have.'" But "to have" belongs not only to quality, but also to the other categories: for we speak of ourselves as + "having" quantity and money and other like things. Therefore habit is not a quality. +
[35594] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus non sit qualitas. Dicit enim +Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod hoc nomen +habitus dictum est ab hoc verbo quod est habere. Sed habere non +solum pertinet ad qualitatem, sed ad alia genera, dicimur enim +habere etiam quantitatem, et pecuniam, et alia huiusmodi. Ergo +habitus non est qualitas.
+ Objection 2: Further, habit is reckoned as one of the predicaments; as may be clearly seen in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi). + But one predicament is not contained under another. Therefore habit is not a quality. +
[35595] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +habitus ponitur unum praedicamentum; ut patet in libro +praedicamentorum. Sed unum praedicamentum non continetur sub alio. +Ergo habitus non est qualitas.
+ Objection 3: Further, "every habit is a disposition," as is stated in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi). Now disposition is "the + order of that which has parts," as stated in Metaph. v, text. 24. But this belongs to the predicament Position. Therefore + habit is not a quality. +
[35596] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 arg. 3 +Praeterea, omnis habitus est dispositio, ut dicitur in +praedicamentis. Sed dispositio est ordo habentis partes, ut dicitur +in V Metaphys. Hoc autem pertinet ad praedicamentum situs. Ergo +habitus non est qualitas.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says in the Book of Predicaments (Categor. vi) that "habit is a quality which is difficult to change." +
[35597] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in praedicamentis, quod habitus est +qualitas de difficili mobilis.
+ I answer that, This word "habitus" [habit] is derived from "habere" [to have]. Now habit is taken from this word in two ways; in one way, + inasmuch as man, or any other thing, is said to "have" something; in another way, inasmuch as a particular thing has a relation + [se habet] either in regard to itself, or in regard to something else. +
Concerning the first, we must observe that "to have," as said in regard to anything that is "had," is common to the various + predicaments. And so the Philosopher puts "to have" among the "post-predicaments," so called because they result from the + various predicaments; as, for instance, opposition, priority, posterity, and such like. Now among things which are had, there + seems to be this distinction, that there are some in which there is no medium between the "haver" and that + which is had: as, for instance, there is no medium between the subject and quality or quantity. Then there are some in which + there is a medium, but only a relation: as, for instance, a man is said to have a companion or a friend. And, further, there + are some in which there is a medium, not indeed an action or passion, but something after the manner of action or passion: + thus, for instance, something adorns or covers, and something else is adorned or covered: wherefore the Philosopher says + (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "a habit is said to be, as it were, an action or a passion of the haver and that which is had"; + as is the case in those things which we have about ourselves. And therefore these constitute a special genus of things, which + are comprised under the predicament of "habit": of which the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "there is a habit + between clothing and the man who is clothed." +
But if "to have" be taken according as a thing has a relation in regard to itself or to something else; in that case habit + is a quality; since this mode of having is in respect of some quality: and of this the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. + 25) that "habit is a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill, and this, either in regard to itself + or in regard to another: thus health is a habit." And in this sense we speak of habit now. Wherefore we must say + that habit is a quality. +
[35598] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod hoc nomen habitus ab habendo est sumptum. A quo +quidem nomen habitus dupliciter derivatur, uno quidem modo, +secundum quod homo, vel quaecumque alia res, dicitur aliquid +habere; alio modo, secundum quod aliqua res aliquo modo se habet in +seipsa vel ad aliquid aliud. Circa primum autem, considerandum est +quod habere, secundum quod dicitur respectu cuiuscumque quod +habetur, commune est ad diversa genera. Unde philosophus inter post +praedicamenta habere ponit, quae scilicet diversa rerum genera +consequuntur; sicut sunt opposita, et prius et posterius, et alia +huiusmodi. Sed inter ea quae habentur, talis videtur esse +distinctio, quod quaedam sunt in quibus nihil est medium inter +habens et id quod habetur, sicut inter subiectum et qualitatem vel +quantitatem nihil est medium. Quaedam vero sunt in quibus est +aliquid medium inter utrumque, sed sola relatio, sicut dicitur +aliquis habere socium vel amicum. Quaedam vero sunt inter quae est +aliquid medium, non quidem actio vel passio, sed aliquid per modum +actionis vel passionis, prout scilicet unum est ornans vel tegens, +et aliud ornatum aut tectum, unde philosophus dicit, in V +Metaphys., quod habitus dicitur tanquam actio quaedam habentis +et habiti, sicut est in illis quae circa nos habemus. Et ideo +in his constituitur unum speciale genus rerum, quod dicitur +praedicamentum habitus, de quo dicit philosophus, in V Metaphys., +quod inter habentem indumentum, et indumentum quod habetur, est +habitus medius. Si autem sumatur habere prout res aliqua +dicitur quodam modo se habere in seipsa vel ad aliud; cum iste +modus se habendi sit secundum aliquam qualitatem, hoc modo habitus +quaedam qualitas est, de quo philosophus, in V Metaphys., dicit +quod habitus dicitur dispositio secundum quam bene vel male +disponitur dispositum, et aut secundum se aut ad aliud, ut sanitas +habitus quidam est. Et sic loquimur nunc de habitu. Unde dicendum +est quod habitus est qualitas.
+ Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes "to have" in the general sense: for thus it is common to many predicaments, as we have said. +
[35599] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de habere communiter +sumpto, sic enim est commune ad multa genera, ut dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 2: This argument takes habit in the sense in which we understand it to be a medium between the haver, and that which is had: + and in this sense it is a predicament, as we have said. +
[35600] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de habitu secundum quod +intelligitur aliquid medium inter habens et id quod habetur, sic +enim est quoddam praedicamentum, ut dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Disposition does always, indeed, imply an order of that which has parts: but this happens in three ways, as the Philosopher + goes on at once to says (Metaph. v, text. 25): namely, "either as to place, or as to power, or as to species." "In saying + this," as Simplicius observes in his Commentary on the Predicaments, "he includes all dispositions: bodily dispositions, when + he says 'as to place,'" and this belongs to the predicament "Position," which is + the order of parts in a place: "when he says 'as to power,' he includes all those dispositions which are in course of formation + and not yet arrived at perfect usefulness," such as inchoate science and virtue: "and when he says, 'as to species,' he includes + perfect dispositions, which are called habits," such as perfected science and virtue. +
[35601] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod dispositio quidem semper importat ordinem alicuius +habentis partes, sed hoc contingit tripliciter, ut statim ibidem +philosophus subdit, scilicet aut secundum locum, aut secundum +potentiam, aut secundum speciem. In quo, ut Simplicius dicit in +commento praedicamentorum, comprehendit omnes dispositiones. +Corporales quidem, in eo quod dicit secundum locum, et hoc pertinet +ad praedicamentum situs, qui est ordo partium in loco. Quod autem +dicit secundum potentiam, includit illas dispositiones quae sunt in +praeparatione et idoneitate nondum perfecte, sicut scientia et +virtus inchoata. Quod autem dicit secundum speciem, includit +perfectas dispositiones, quae dicuntur habitus, sicut scientia et +virtus complete.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that habit is not a distinct species of quality. Because, as we have said + (A[1]), habit, in so far as it is a quality, is "a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill." But this + happens in regard to any quality: for a thing happens to be well or ill disposed in regard also to shape, and in like manner, + in regard to heat and cold, and in regard to all such things. Therefore habit is not a distinct + species of quality. +
[35602] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus non sit determinata species +qualitatis. Quia, ut dictum est, habitus, secundum quod est +qualitas, dicitur dispositio secundum quam bene aut male disponitur +dispositum. Sed hoc contingit secundum quamlibet qualitatem, nam et +secundum figuram contingit aliquid bene vel male esse dispositum, +et similiter secundum calorem et frigus, et secundum omnia +huiusmodi. Ergo habitus non est determinata species qualitatis.
+ Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi), that heat and cold are dispositions or habits, + just as sickness and health. Therefore habit or disposition is not distinct from the other species of quality. +
[35603] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +philosophus, in praedicamentis, caliditatem et frigiditatem dicit +esse dispositiones vel habitus, sicut aegritudinem et sanitatem. +Sed calor et frigus sunt in tertia specie qualitatis. Ergo habitus +vel dispositio non distinguuntur ab aliis speciebus qualitatis.
+ Objection 3: Further, "difficult to change" is not a difference belonging to the predicament of quality, but rather to movement or passion. + Now, no genus should be contracted to a species by a difference of another genus; but "differences should be proper to a genus," + as the Philosopher says in Metaph. vii, text. 42. Therefore, since habit is "a quality difficult to change," it seems not + to be a distinct species of quality. +
[35604] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +difficile mobile non est differentia pertinens ad genus qualitatis, +sed magis pertinet ad motum vel passionem. Nullum autem genus +determinatur ad speciem per differentiam alterius generis; sed +oportet differentias per se advenire generi, ut philosophus dicit, +in VII Metaphys. Ergo, cum habitus dicatur esse qualitas difficile +mobilis, videtur quod non sit determinata species qualitatis.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi) that "one species of quality is habit and disposition." +
[35605] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in praedicamentis, quod una species +qualitatis est habitus et dispositio.
+ I answer that, The Philosopher in the Book of Predicaments (Categor. vi) reckons disposition and habit as the first species of quality. + Now Simplicius, in his Commentary on the Predicaments, explains the difference of these species as follows. He says "that + some qualities are natural, and are in their subject in virtue of its nature, and are always there: but some are adventitious, + being caused from without, and these can be lost. Now the latter," i.e. those which are + adventitious, "are habits and dispositions, differing in the point of being easily or difficultly lost. As to natural qualities, + some regard a thing in the point of its being in a state of potentiality; and thus we have the second species of quality: + while others regard a thing which is in act; and this either deeply rooted therein or only on its surface. If deeply rooted, + we have the third species of quality: if on the surface, we have the fourth species of quality, as shape, and form which is + the shape of an animated being." But this distinction of the species of quality seems unsuitable. For there are many shapes, + and passion-like qualities, which are not natural but adventitious: and there are also many dispositions which are not adventitious + but natural, as health, beauty, and the like. Moreover, it does not suit the order of the species, since that which is the + more natural is always first. +
Therefore we must explain otherwise the distinction of dispositions and habits from other qualities. For quality, properly + speaking, implies a certain mode of substance. Now mode, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3), "is that which a measure + determines": wherefore it implies a certain determination according to a certain measure. Therefore, just as that in accordance + with which the material potentiality [potentia materiae] is determined to its substantial being, is called + quality, which is a difference affecting the substance, so that, in accordance with the potentiality of the subject is determined + to its accidental being, is called an accidental quality, which is also a kind of difference, as is clear from the Philosopher + (Metaph. v, text. 19). +
Now the mode of determination of the subject to accidental being may be taken in regard to the very nature of the subject, + or in regard to action, and passion resulting from its natural principles, which are matter and form; or again in regard to + quantity. If we take the mode or determination of the subject in regard to quantity, we shall then have the fourth species + of quality. And because quantity, considered in itself, is devoid of movement, and does not imply the notion of + good or evil, so it does not concern the fourth species of quality whether a thing be well or ill disposed, nor quickly or + slowly transitory. +
But the mode of determination of the subject, in regard to action or passion, is considered in the second and third species + of quality. And therefore in both, we take into account whether a thing be done with ease or difficulty; whether it be transitory + or lasting. But in them, we do not consider anything pertaining to the notion of good or evil: because movements and passions + have not the aspect of an end, whereas good and evil are said in respect of an end. +
On the other hand, the mode or determination of the subject, in regard to the nature of the thing, belongs to the first species + of quality, which is habit and disposition: for the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17), when speaking of habits of the + soul and of the body, that they are "dispositions of the perfect to the best; and by perfect I mean that which is disposed + in accordance with its nature." And since the form itself and the nature of a thing is the end and the cause + why a thing is made (Phys. ii, text. 25), therefore in the first species we consider both evil and good, and also changeableness, + whether easy or difficult; inasmuch as a certain nature is the end of generation and movement. And so the Philosopher (Metaph. + v, text. 25) defines habit, a "disposition whereby someone is disposed, well or ill"; and in Ethic. ii, 4, he says that by + "habits we are directed well or ill in reference to the passions." For when the mode is suitable to the thing's nature, + it has the aspect of good: and when it is unsuitable, it has the aspect of evil. And since nature is the first object of consideration + in anything, for this reason habit is reckoned as the first species of quality. +
[35606] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod philosophus, in praedicamentis, ponit inter quatuor +species qualitatis primam, dispositionem et habitum. Quarum quidem +specierum differentias sic assignat Simplicius, in commento +praedicamentorum, dicens quod qualitatum quaedam sunt naturales, +quae secundum naturam insunt, et semper, quaedam autem sunt +adventitiae, quae ab extrinseco efficiuntur, et possunt amitti. Et +haec quidem, quae sunt adventitiae, sunt habitus et +dispositiones, secundum facile et difficile amissibile differentes. +Naturalium autem qualitatum quaedam sunt secundum id quod aliquid +est in potentia, et sic est secunda species qualitatis. Quaedam +vero secundum quod aliquid est in actu, et hoc vel in profundum, +vel secundum superficiem. Si in profundum quidem, sic est tertia +species qualitatis, secundum vero superficiem, est quarta species +qualitatis, sicut figura et forma, quae est figura animati. Sed +ista distinctio specierum qualitatis inconveniens videtur. Sunt +enim multae figurae et qualitates passibiles non naturales, sed +adventitiae, et multae dispositiones non adventitiae, sed +naturales, sicut sanitas et pulchritudo et huiusmodi. Et praeterea +hoc non convenit ordini specierum, semper enim quod naturalius est, +prius est. Et ideo aliter accipienda est distinctio dispositionum +et habituum ab aliis qualitatibus. Proprie enim qualitas importat +quendam modum substantiae. Modus autem est, ut dicit Augustinus, +super Gen. ad litteram, quem mensura praefigit, unde importat +quandam determinationem secundum aliquam mensuram. Et ideo sicut id +secundum quod determinatur potentia materiae secundum esse +substantiale dicitur qualitas quae est differentia substantiae; ita +id secundum quod determinatur potentia subiecti secundum esse +accidentale, dicitur qualitas accidentalis, quae est etiam quaedam +differentia, ut patet per philosophum in V Metaphys. Modus autem +sive determinatio subiecti secundum esse accidentale, potest accipi +vel in ordine ad ipsam naturam subiecti; vel secundum actionem et +passionem quae consequuntur principia naturae, quae sunt materia et +forma; vel secundum quantitatem. Si autem accipiatur modus vel +determinatio subiecti secundum quantitatem, sic est quarta species +qualitatis. Et quia quantitas, secundum sui rationem, est sine +motu, et sine ratione boni et mali; ideo ad quartam speciem +qualitatis non pertinet quod aliquid sit bene vel male, cito vel +tarde transiens. Modus autem sive determinatio subiecti secundum +actionem et passionem, attenditur in secunda et tertia specie +qualitatis. Et ideo in utraque consideratur quod aliquid facile vel +difficile fiat, vel quod sit cito transiens aut diuturnum. Non +autem consideratur in his aliquid pertinens ad rationem boni vel +mali, quia motus et passiones non habent rationem finis, bonum +autem et malum dicitur per respectum ad finem. Sed modus et +determinatio subiecti in ordine ad naturam rei, pertinet ad primam +speciem qualitatis, quae est habitus et dispositio, dicit enim +philosophus, in VII Physic., loquens de habitibus animae et +corporis, quod sunt dispositiones quaedam perfecti ad optimum; +dico autem perfecti, quod est dispositum secundum naturam. Et quia +ipsa forma et natura rei est finis et cuius causa fit aliquid, +ut dicitur in II Physic. ideo in prima specie consideratur et bonum +et malum; et etiam facile et difficile mobile, secundum quod aliqua +natura est finis generationis et motus. Unde in V Metaphys. +philosophus definit habitum, quod est dispositio secundum quam +aliquis disponitur bene vel male. Et in II Ethic. dicit quod +habitus sunt secundum quos ad passiones nos habemus bene vel +male. Quando enim est modus conveniens naturae rei, tunc habet +rationem boni, quando autem non convenit, tunc habet rationem mali. +Et quia natura est id quod primum consideratur in re, ideo habitus +ponitur prima species qualitatis.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Disposition implies a certain order, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). Wherefore a man is not said to be disposed by some quality + except in relation to something else. And if we add "well or ill," which belongs to the essential notion of habit, we must + consider the quality's relation to the nature, which is the end. So in regard to shape, or heat, or cold, a man is not said + to be well or ill disposed, except by reason of a relation to the nature of a + thing, with regard to its suitability or unsuitability. Consequently even shapes and passion-like qualities, in so far as + they are considered to be suitable or unsuitable to the nature of a thing, belong to habits or dispositions: for shape and + color, according to their suitability to the nature of thing, concern beauty; while heat and cold, according to their suitability + to the nature of a thing, concern health. And in this way heat and cold are put, by the Philosopher, in the first species + of + quality. +
[35607] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod dispositio ordinem quendam importat, ut dictum +est. Unde non dicitur aliquis disponi per qualitatem, nisi in +ordine ad aliquid. Et si addatur bene vel male, quod pertinet ad +rationem habitus, oportet quod attendatur ordo ad naturam, quae est +finis. Unde secundum figuram, vel secundum calorem vel frigus, non +dicitur aliquis disponi bene vel male, nisi secundum ordinem ad +naturam rei, secundum quod est conveniens vel non conveniens. Unde +et ipsae figurae et passibiles qualitates, secundum quod +considerantur ut convenientes vel non convenientes naturae rei, +pertinent ad habitus vel dispositiones, nam figura, prout convenit +naturae rei, et color, pertinent ad pulchritudinem; calor autem et +frigus, secundum quod conveniunt naturae rei, pertinent ad +sanitatem. Et hoc modo caliditas et frigiditas ponuntur a +philosopho in prima specie qualitatis.
Reply to Objection 2: Wherefore it is clear how to answer the second objection: though some give another solution, as Simplicius says in his Commentary + on the Predicaments. +
[35608] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 ad 2 Unde patet +solutio ad secundum. Licet a quibusdam aliter solvatur, ut +Simplicius dicit, in commento praedicamentorum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: This difference, "difficult to change," does not distinguish habit from the other species of quality, but from disposition. + Now disposition may be taken in two ways; in one way, as the genus of habit, for disposition is included in the definition + of habit (Metaph. v, text. 25): in another way, according as it is divided against habit. Again, disposition, properly so + called, can be divided against habit in two ways: first, as perfect and imperfect + within the same species; and thus we call it a disposition, retaining the name of the genus, when it is had imperfectly, so + as to be easily lost: whereas we call it a habit, when it is had perfectly, so as not to be lost easily. And thus a disposition + becomes a habit, just as a boy becomes a man. Secondly, they may be distinguished as diverse species of the one subaltern + genus: so that we call dispositions, those qualities of the first species, which by reason of their very nature are easily + lost, because they have changeable causes; e.g. sickness and health: whereas we call habits those qualities which, by reason + of their very nature, are not easily changed, in that they have unchangeable causes, e.g. sciences and virtues. And in this + sense, disposition does not become habit. The latter explanation seems more in keeping with the intention of Aristotle: for + in order to confirm this distinction he adduces the common mode of speaking, according to which, when a quality is, by reason + of its nature, easily changeable, and, through some accident, becomes difficultly changeable, then it is called a habit: while + the contrary happens in regard to qualities, by reason of their nature, difficultly changeable: for supposing a man to have + a science imperfectly, so as to be liable to lose it easily, we say that he is disposed to that science, rather than that + he has the science. From this it is clear that the word "habit" implies a certain lastingness: while the word "disposition" + does not. +
Nor does it matter that thus to be easy and difficult to change are specific differences (of a quality), although they belong + to passion and movement, and not the genus of quality. For these differences, though apparently accidental to quality, nevertheless + designate differences which are proper and essential to quality. In the same way, in the genus of substance we often take + accidental instead of substantial differences, in so far as by the former, essential principles are + designated. +
[35609] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ista differentia, difficile mobile, non diversificat +habitum ab aliis speciebus qualitatis, sed a dispositione. +Dispositio autem dupliciter accipitur, uno modo, secundum quod est +genus habitus, nam in V Metaphys. dispositio ponitur in definitione +habitus; alio modo, secundum quod est aliquid contra habitum +divisum. Et potest intelligi dispositio proprie dicta condividi +contra habitum, dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut perfectum et +imperfectum in eadem specie, ut scilicet dispositio dicatur, +retinens nomen commune, quando imperfecte inest, ita quod de facile +amittitur; habitus autem, quando perfecte inest, ut non de facili +amittatur. Et sic dispositio fit habitus, sicut puer fit vir. Alio +modo possunt distingui sicut diversae species unius generis +subalterni, ut dicantur dispositiones illae qualitates primae +speciei, quibus convenit secundum propriam rationem ut de facili +amittantur, quia habent causas transmutabiles, ut aegritudo et +sanitas; habitus vero dicuntur illae qualitates quae secundum suam +rationem habent quod non de facili transmutentur, quia habent +causas immobiles, sicut scientiae et virtutes. Et secundum hoc +dispositio non fit habitus. Et hoc videtur magis consonum +intentioni Aristotelis. Unde ad huius distinctionis probationem +inducit communem loquendi consuetudinem, secundum quam qualitates +quae secundum rationem suam sunt facile mobiles, si ex aliquo +accidenti difficile mobiles reddantur, habitus dicuntur, et e +converso est de qualitatibus quae secundum suam rationem sunt +difficile mobiles; nam si aliquis imperfecte habeat scientiam, ut +de facili possit ipsam amittere, magis dicitur disponi ad scientiam +quam scientiam habere. Ex quo patet quod nomen habitus +diuturnitatem quandam importat; non autem nomen dispositionis. Nec +impeditur quin secundum hoc facile et difficile mobile sint +specificae differentiae, propter hoc quod ista pertinent ad +passionem et motum, et non ad genus qualitatis. Nam istae +differentiae, quamvis per accidens videantur se habere ad +qualitatem, designant tamen proprias et per se differentias +qualitatum. Sicut etiam in genere substantiae frequenter +accipiuntur differentiae accidentales loco substantialium, +inquantum per eas designantur principia essentialia.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that habit does not imply order to an act. For everything acts according as it is in act. But the Philosopher + says (De Anima iii, text 8), that "when one is become knowing by habit, one is still in a state of potentiality, but otherwise + than before learning." Therefore habit does not imply the relation of a principle to an act. +
[35610] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus non importet ordinem ad actum. +Unumquodque enim agit secundum quod est actu. Sed philosophus +dicit, in III de anima, quod cum aliquis fit sciens secundum +habitum, est etiam tunc in potentia, aliter tamen quam ante +addiscere. Ergo habitus non importat habitudinem principii ad +actum.
+ Objection 2: Further, that which is put in the definition of a thing, belongs to it essentially. But to be a principle of action, is put + in the definition of power, as we read in Metaph. v, text. 17. Therefore to be the principle of an act belongs to power essentially. + Now that which is essential is first in every genus. If therefore, habit also is a principle of act, it follows that it is + posterior to power. And so habit and disposition will not be the first species of + quality. +
[35611] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +illud quod ponitur in definitione alicuius, per se convenit illi. +Sed esse principium actionis ponitur in definitione potentiae; ut +patet in V Metaphys. Ergo esse principium actus per se convenit +potentiae. Quod autem est per se, est primum in unoquoque genere. +Si ergo etiam habitus sit principium actus, sequitur quod sit +posterior quam potentia. Et sic non erit prima species qualitatis +habitus vel dispositio.
+ Objection 3: Further, health is sometimes a habit, and so are leanness and beauty. But these do not indicate relation to an act. Therefore + it is not essential to habit to be a principle of act. +
[35612] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sanitas quandoque est habitus, et similiter macies et pulchritudo. +Sed ista non dicuntur per ordinem ad actum. Non ergo est de ratione +habitus quod sit principium actus.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that "habit is that whereby something is done when necessary." And the Commentator says + (De Anima iii) that "habit is that whereby we act when we will." +
[35613] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de bono coniugali, quod +habitus est quo aliquid agitur cum opus est. Et Commentator +dicit, in III de anima, quod habitus est quo quis agit cum +voluerit.
+ I answer that, To have relation to an act may belong to habit, both in regard to the nature of habit, and in regard to the subject in which + the habit is. In regard to the nature of habit, it belongs to every habit to have relation to an act. For it is essential + to habit to imply some relation to a thing's nature, in so far as it is suitable or unsuitable thereto. But a thing's nature, + which is the end of generation, is further ordained to another end, which is either an + operation, or the product of an operation, to which one attains by means of operation. Wherefore habit implies relation not + only to the very nature of a thing, but also, consequently, to operation, inasmuch as this is the end of nature, or conducive + to the end. Whence also it is stated (Metaph. v, text. 25) in the definition of habit, that it is a disposition whereby that + which is disposed, is well or ill disposed either in regard to itself, that is to its nature, or in regard to something + else, that is to the end. +
But there are some habits, which even on the part of the subject in which they are, imply primarily and principally relation + to an act. For, as we have said, habit primarily and of itself implies a relation to the thing's nature. If therefore the + nature of a thing, in which the habit is, consists in this very relation to an act, it follows that the habit principally + implies relation to an act. Now it is clear that the nature and the notion of power is that it should be a + principle of act. Wherefore every habit is subjected in a power, implies principally relation to an act. +
[35614] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod habere ordinem ad actum potest competere habitui et +secundum rationem habitus; et secundum rationem subiecti in quo est +habitus. Secundum quidem rationem habitus, convenit omni habitui +aliquo modo habere ordinem ad actum. Est enim de ratione habitus ut +importet habitudinem quandam in ordine ad naturam rei, secundum +quod convenit vel non convenit. Sed natura rei, quae est finis +generationis, ulterius etiam ordinatur ad alium finem, qui vel est +operatio, vel aliquod operatum, ad quod quis pervenit per +operationem. Unde habitus non solum importat ordinem ad ipsam +naturam rei, sed etiam consequenter ad operationem, inquantum est +finis naturae, vel perducens ad finem. Unde et in V Metaphys. +dicitur in definitione habitus, quod est dispositio secundum quam +bene vel male disponitur dispositum aut secundum se, idest secundum +suam naturam, aut ad aliud, idest in ordine ad finem. Sed sunt +quidam habitus qui etiam ex parte subiecti in quo sunt, primo et +principaliter important ordinem ad actum. Quia ut dictum est, +habitus primo et per se importat habitudinem ad naturam rei. Si +igitur natura rei in qua est habitus, consistat in ipso ordine ad +actum, sequitur quod habitus principaliter importet ordinem ad +actum. Manifestum est autem quod natura et ratio potentiae est ut +sit principium actus. Unde omnis habitus qui est alicuius potentiae +ut subiecti, principaliter importat ordinem ad actum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Habit is an act, in so far as it is a quality: and in this respect it can be a principle of operation. It is, however, in + a state of potentiality in respect to operation. Wherefore habit is called first act, and operation, second act; as it is + explained in De Anima ii, text. 5. +
[35615] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod habitus est actus quidam, inquantum est +qualitas, et secundum hoc potest esse principium operationis. Sed +est in potentia per respectum ad operationem. Unde habitus dicitur +actus primus, et operatio actus secundus; ut patet in II de +anima.
+ Reply to Objection 2: It is not the essence of habit to be related to power, but to be related to nature. And as nature precedes action, to which + power is related, therefore habit is put before power as a species of quality. +
[35616] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod non est de ratione habitus quod respiciat potentiam, +sed quod respiciat naturam. Et quia natura praecedit actionem, quam +respicit potentia; ideo prior species qualitatis ponitur habitus +quam potentia.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Health is said to be a habit, or a habitual disposition, in relation to nature, as stated above. But in so far as nature + is a principle of act, it consequently implies a relation to act. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Hist. Animal. x, 1), + that man, or one of his members, is called healthy, "when he can perform the operation of a healthy man." And the same applies + to other habits. +
[35617] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod sanitas dicitur habitus, vel habitualis dispositio, +in ordine ad naturam, sicut dictum est. Inquantum tamen natura est +principium actus, ex consequenti importat ordinem ad actum. Unde +philosophus dicit, in X de historia Animal., quod homo dicitur +sanus, vel membrum aliquod, quando potest facere operationem sani. +Et est simile in aliis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that habits are not necessary. For by habits we are well or ill disposed in respect of something, as stated + above. But a thing is well or ill disposed by its form: for in respect of its form a thing is good, even as it is a being. + Therefore there is no necessity for habits. +
[35618] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit necessarium esse habitus. +Habitus enim sunt quibus aliquid disponitur bene vel male ad +aliquid, sicut dictum est. Sed per suam formam aliquid bene vel +male disponitur, nam secundum formam aliquid est bonum, sicut et +ens. Ergo nulla necessitas est habituum.
+ Objection 2: Further, habit implies relation to an act. But power implies sufficiently a principle of act: for even the natural powers, + without any habits, are principles of acts. Therefore there was no necessity for habits. +
[35619] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +habitus importat ordinem ad actum. Sed potentia importat principium +actus sufficienter, nam et potentiae naturales absque habitibus +sunt principia actuum. Ergo non fuit necessarium habitus esse.
+ Objection 3: Further, as power is related to good and evil, so also is habit: and as power does not always act, so neither does habit. + Given, therefore, the powers, habits become superfluous. +
[35620] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sicut potentia se habet ad bonum et malum, ita et habitus, et sicut +potentia non semper agit, ita nec habitus. Existentibus igitur +potentiis, superfluum fuit habitum esse.
+ On the contrary, Habits are perfections (Phys. vii, text. 17). But perfection is of the greatest necessity to a thing: since it is in the + nature of an end. Therefore it is necessary that there should be habits. +
[35621] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod habitus sunt perfectiones quaedam, ut dicitur in VII +Physic. Sed perfectio est maxime necessaria rei, cum habeat +rationem finis. Ergo necessarium fuit habitus esse.
+ I answer that, As we have said above ( + AA[2],3), habit implies a disposition in relation to a thing's nature, and to its operation or end, by reason of which disposition + a thing is well or ill disposed thereto. Now for a thing to need to be disposed to something else, three conditions are necessary. + The first condition is that which is disposed should be distinct from that to which it is disposed; and so, that it should + be related to it as + potentiality is to act. Whence, if there is a being whose nature is not composed of potentiality and act, and whose substance + is its own operation, which itself is for itself, there we can find no room for habit and disposition, as is clearly the case + in God. +
The second condition is, that that which is in a state of potentiality in regard to something else, be capable of determination + in several ways and to various things. Whence if something be in a state of potentiality in regard to something else, but + in regard to that only, there we find no room for disposition and habit: for such a subject from its own nature has the due + relation to such an act. Wherefore if a heavenly body be composed of matter and form, since that matter is + not in a state of potentiality to another form, as we said in the + FP, Q[56], A[2], there is no need for disposition or habit in respect of the form, or even in respect of operation, since the nature of the + heavenly body is not in a state of potentiality to more than one fixed movement. +
The third condition is that in disposing the subject to one of those things to which it is in potentiality, several things + should occur, capable of being adjusted in various ways: so as to dispose the subject well or ill to its form or to its operation. + Wherefore the simple qualities of the elements which suit the natures of the elements in one single fixed way, are not called + dispositions or habits, but "simple qualities": but we call dispositions or habits, such things as + health, beauty, and so forth, which imply the adjustment of several things which may vary in their relative adjustability. + For this reason the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 24,25) that "habit is a disposition": and disposition is "the order + of that which has parts either as to place, or as to potentiality, or as to species," as we have said above (A[1], ad 3). + Wherefore, since there are many things for whose natures and operations several things must concur which may vary in their + relative + adjustability, it follows that habit is necessary. +
[35622] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus importat +dispositionem quandam in ordine ad naturam rei, et ad operationem +vel finem eius, secundum quam bene vel male aliquid ad hoc +disponitur. Ad hoc autem quod aliquid indigeat disponi ad alterum, +tria requiruntur. Primo quidem, ut id quod disponitur, sit alterum +ab eo ad quod disponitur; et sic se habeat ad ipsum ut potentia ad +actum. Unde si aliquid sit cuius natura non sit composita ex +potentia et actu, et cuius substantia sit sua operatio, et ipsum +sit propter seipsum; ibi habitus vel dispositio locum non habet, +sicut patet in Deo. Secundo requiritur quod id quod est in potentia +ad alterum, possit pluribus modis determinari, et ad diversa. Unde +si aliquid sit in potentia ad alterum, ita tamen quod non sit in +potentia nisi ad ipsum, ibi dispositio et habitus locum non habet, +quia tale subiectum ex sua natura habet debitam habitudinem ad +talem actum. Unde si corpus caeleste sit compositum ex materia et +forma, cum illa materia non sit in potentia ad aliam formam, ut in +primo dictum est, non habet ibi locum dispositio vel habitus ad +formam; aut etiam ad operationem, quia natura caelestis corporis +non est in potentia nisi ad unum motum determinatum. Tertio +requiritur quod plura concurrant ad disponendum subiectum ad unum +eorum ad quae est in potentia, quae diversis modis commensurari +possunt, ut sic disponatur bene vel male ad formam vel ad +operationem. Unde qualitates simplices elementorum, quae secundum +unum modum determinatum naturis elementorum conveniunt, non dicimus +dispositiones vel habitus, sed simplices qualitates, dicimus autem +dispositiones vel habitus sanitatem, pulchritudinem et alia +huiusmodi, quae important quandam commensurationem plurium quae +diversis modis commensurari possunt. Propter quod philosophus +dicit, in V Metaphys., quod habitus est dispositio, et +dispositio est ordo habentis partes vel secundum locum, vel +secundum potentiam, vel secundum speciem; ut supra dictum est. +Quia igitur multa sunt entium ad quorum naturas et operationes +necesse est plura concurrere quae diversis modis commensurari +possunt, ideo necesse est habitus esse.
+ Reply to Objection 1: By the form the nature of a thing is perfected: yet the subject needs to be disposed in regard to the form by some disposition. + But the form itself is further ordained to operation, which is either the end, or the means to the end. And if the form is + limited to one fixed operation, no further disposition, besides the form itself, is needed for the operation. But if the form + be such that it can operate in diverse ways, as the soul; it needs to be + disposed to its operations by means of habits. +
[35623] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod per formam perficitur natura rei, sed oportet +quod in ordine ad ipsam formam disponatur subiectum aliqua +dispositione. Ipsa tamen forma ordinatur ulterius ad operationem, +quae vel est finis, vel via in finem. Et si quidem habeat forma +determinate unam tantum operationem determinatam, nulla alia +dispositio requiritur ad operationem praeter ipsam formam. Si autem +sit talis forma quae possit diversimode operari, sicut est anima; +oportet quod disponatur ad suas operationes per aliquos +habitus.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Power sometimes has a relation to many things: and then it needs to be determined by something else. But if a power has not + a relation to many things, it does not need a habit to determine it, as we have said. For this reason the natural forces do + not perform their operations by means of habits: because they are of themselves determined to one mode of operation. +
[35624] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod potentia quandoque se habet ad multa, et ideo oportet +quod aliquo alio determinetur. Si vero sit aliqua potentia quae non +se habeat ad multa, non indiget habitu determinante, ut dictum est. +Et propter hoc vires naturales non agunt operationes suas +mediantibus aliquibus habitibus, quia secundum seipsas sunt +determinatae ad unum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The same habit has not a relation to good and evil, as will be made clear further on ( + Q[54], A[3]): whereas the same power has a relation to good and evil. And, therefore, habits are necessary that the powers be determined + to good. +
[35625] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod non idem habitus se habet ad bonum et malum, sicut +infra patebit. Eadem autem potentia se habet ad bonum et malum. Et +ideo necessarii sunt habitus ut potentiae determinentur ad +bonum.
We consider next the subject of habits: and under this head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is a habit in the body?
(2) Whether the soul is a subject of habit, in respect of its essence or in respect of its power?
(3) Whether in the powers of the sensitive part there can be a habit?
(4) Whether there is a habit in the intellect?
+[35626] +Iª-IIae q. 50 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +subiecto habituum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum in +corpore sit aliquis habitus. Secundo, utrum anima sit subiectum +habitus secundum suam essentiam, vel secundum suam potentiam. +Tertio, utrum in potentiis sensitivae partis possit esse aliquis +habitus. Quarto, utrum in ipso intellectu sit aliquis habitus. +Quinto, utrum in voluntate sit aliquis habitus. Sexto, utrum in +substantiis separatis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a habit in the body. For, as the Commentator says (De Anima iii), "a habit is that whereby + we act when we will." But bodily actions are not subject to the will, since they are natural. Therefore there can be no habit + in the body. +
[35627] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod in corpore non sit aliquis habitus. Ut +enim Commentator dicit, in III de anima, habitus est quo quis +agit cum voluerit. Sed actiones corporales non subiacent +voluntati, cum sint naturales. Ergo in corpore non potest esse +aliquis habitus.
+ Objection 2: Further, all bodily dispositions are easy to change. But habit is a quality, difficult to change. Therefore no bodily disposition + can be a habit. +
[35628] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +omnes dispositiones corporales sunt facile mobiles. Sed habitus est +qualitas difficile mobilis. Ergo nulla dispositio corporalis potest +esse habitus.
+ Objection 3: Further, all bodily dispositions are subject to change. But change can only be in the third species of quality, which is + divided against habit. Therefore there is no habit in the body. +
[35629] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +omnes dispositiones corporales subiacent alterationi. Sed alteratio +non est nisi in tertia specie qualitatis, quae dividitur contra +habitum. Ergo nullus habitus est in corpore.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says in the Book of Predicaments (De Categor. vi) that health of the body and incurable disease are called + habits. +
[35630] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus, in praedicamentis, sanitatem corporis, vel +infirmitatem insanabilem, habitum nominari dicit.
+ I answer that, As we have said above ( + Q[49], AA[2] seqq.), habit is a disposition of a subject which is in a state of potentiality either to form or to operation. Therefore + in so far as habit implies disposition to operation, no habit is principally in the body as its subject. For every operation + of the body proceeds either from a natural quality of the body or from the soul moving the body. Consequently, as to those + operations which proceed from + its nature, the body is not disposed by a habit: because the natural forces are determined to one mode of operation; and we + have already said ( + Q[49], A[4]) that it is when the subject is in potentiality to many things that a habitual disposition is required. As to the operations + which proceed from the soul through the body, they belong principally to the soul, and secondarily to the body. Now habits + are in proportion to their operations: whence "by like acts like habits + are formed" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). And therefore the dispositions to such operations are principally in the soul. But they can + be secondarily in the body: to wit, in so far as the body is disposed and enabled with promptitude to help in the operations + of the soul. +
If, however, we speak of the disposition of the subject to form, thus a habitual disposition can be in the body, which is + related to the soul as a subject is to its form. And in this way health and beauty and such like are called habitual dispositions. + Yet they have not the nature of habit perfectly: because their causes, of their very nature, are easily changeable. +
On the other hand, as Simplicius reports in his Commentary on the Predicaments, Alexander denied absolutely that habits or + dispositions of the first species are in the body: and held that the first species of quality belonged to the soul alone. + And he held that Aristotle mentions health and sickness in the Book on the Predicaments not as though they belonged to the + first species of quality, but by way of example: so that he would mean that just as health and sickness may be easy + or difficult to change, so also are all the qualities of the first species, which are called habits and dispositions. But + this is clearly contrary to the intention of Aristotle: both because he speaks in the same way of health and sickness as examples, + as of virtue and science; and because in Phys. vii, text. 17, he expressly mentions beauty and health among habits. +
[35631] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus est quaedam +dispositio alicuius subiecti existentis in potentia vel ad formam, +vel ad operationem. Secundum ergo quod habitus importat +dispositionem ad operationem, nullus habitus est principaliter in +corpore sicut in subiecto. Omnis enim operatio corporis est aut a +naturali qualitate corporis; aut est ab anima movente corpus. +Quantum igitur ad illas operationes quae sunt a natura, non +disponitur corpus per aliquem habitum, quia virtutes naturales sunt +determinatae ad unum; dictum est autem quod habitualis dispositio +requiritur ubi subiectum est in potentia ad multa. Operationes vero +quae sunt ab anima per corpus, principaliter quidem sunt ipsius +animae, secundario vero ipsius corporis. Habitus autem +proportionantur operationibus, unde ex similibus actibus similes +habitus causantur, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Et ideo dispositiones ad +tales operationes principaliter sunt in anima. In corpore vero +possunt esse secundario, inquantum scilicet corpus disponitur et +habilitatur ad prompte deserviendum operationibus animae. Si vero +loquamur de dispositione subiecti ad formam, sic habitualis +dispositio potest esse in corpore, quod comparatur ad animam sicut +subiectum ad formam. Et hoc modo sanitas et pulchritudo, et +huiusmodi, habituales dispositiones dicuntur. Non tamen perfecte +habent rationem habituum, quia causae eorum ex sua natura de facili +transmutabiles sunt. Alexander vero posuit nullo modo habitum vel +dispositionem primae speciei esse in corpore, ut Simplicius refert +in commento Praedicament., sed dicebat primam speciem qualitatis +pertinere tantum ad animam. Et quod Aristoteles inducit in +praedicamentis de sanitate et aegritudine, non inducit quasi haec +pertineant ad primam speciem qualitatis, sed per modum exempli, ut +sit sensus quod sicut aegritudo et sanitas possunt esse facile vel +difficile mobiles, ita etiam qualitates primae speciei, quae +dicuntur habitus et dispositio. Sed patet hoc esse contra +intentionem Aristotelis. Tum quia eodem modo loquendi utitur +exemplificando de sanitate et aegritudine, et de virtute et de +scientia. Tum quia in VII Physic. expresse ponit inter habitus +pulchritudinem et sanitatem.
+ Reply to Objection 1: This objection runs in the sense of habit as a disposition to operation, and of those actions of the body which are from + nature: but not in the sense of those actions which proceed from the soul, and the principle of which is the will. +
[35632] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de habitu secundum quod +est dispositio ad operationem, et de actibus corporis qui sunt a +natura, non autem de his qui sunt ab anima, quorum principium est +voluntas.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Bodily dispositions are not simply difficult to change on account of the changeableness of their bodily causes. But they + may be difficult to change by comparison to such a subject, because, to wit, as long as such a subject endures, they cannot + be removed; or because they are difficult to change, by comparison to other dispositions. But qualities of the soul are simply + difficult to change, on account of the unchangeableness of the subject. And + therefore he does not say that health which is difficult to change is a habit simply: but that it is "as a habit," as we read + in the Greek [*{isos hexin} (Categor. viii)]. On the other hand, the qualities of the soul are called habits simply. +
[35633] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod dispositiones corporales non sunt simpliciter +difficile mobiles, propter mutabilitatem corporalium causarum. +Possunt tamen esse difficile mobiles per comparationem ad tale +subiectum, quia scilicet, tali subiecto durante, amoveri non +possunt, vel quia sunt difficile mobiles per comparationem ad alias +dispositiones. Sed qualitates animae sunt simpliciter difficile +mobiles, propter immobilitatem subiecti. Et ideo non dicit quod +sanitas difficile mobilis simpliciter sit habitus, sed quod est ut +habitus, sicut in Graeco habetur. Qualitates autem animae dicuntur +simpliciter habitus.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Bodily dispositions which are in the first species of quality, as some maintained, differ from qualities of the third species, + in this, that the qualities of the third species consist in some "becoming" and movement, as it were, wherefore they are called + passions or passible qualities. But when they have attained to perfection (specific perfection, so to speak), they have then + passed into the first species of quality. But Simplicius in his Commentary + disapproves of this; for in this way heating would be in the third species, and heat in the first species of quality; whereas + Aristotle puts heat in the third. +
Wherefore Porphyrius, as Simplicius reports (Commentary), says that passion or passion-like quality, disposition and habit, + differ in bodies by way of intensity and remissness. For when a thing receives heat in this only that it is being heated, + and not so as to be able to give heat, then we have passion, if it is transitory; or passion-like quality if it is permanent. + But when it has been brought to the point that it is able to heat something else, then it is a disposition; and + if it goes so far as to be firmly fixed and to become difficult to change, then it will be a habit: so that disposition would + be a certain intensity of passion or passion-like quality, and habit an intensity or disposition. But Simplicius disapproves + of this, for such intensity and remissness do not imply diversity on the part of the form itself, but on the part of the diverse + participation thereof by the subject; so that there would be no diversity among the species of quality. And therefore + we must say otherwise that, as was explained above ( + Q[49], A[2], ad 1), the adjustment of the passion-like qualities themselves, according to their suitability to nature, implies the notion + of disposition: and so, when a change takes place in these same passion-like qualities, which are heat and cold, moisture + and dryness, there results a change as to sickness and health. But change does not occur in regard to like habits and dispositions, + primarily and of + themselves. +
[35634] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod dispositiones corporales quae sunt in prima specie +qualitatis, ut quidam posuerunt, differunt a qualitatibus tertiae +speciei in hoc, quod qualitates tertiae speciei sunt ut in fieri et +ut in motu, unde dicuntur passiones vel passibiles qualitates. +Quando autem iam pervenerint ad perfectum, quasi ad speciem, tunc +iam sunt in prima specie qualitatis. Sed hoc improbat Simplicius, +in commento praedicamentorum, quia secundum hoc calefactio esset in +tertia specie qualitatis, calor autem in prima, Aristoteles autem +ponit calorem in tertia. Unde Porphyrius dicit, sicut idem +Simplicius refert, quod passio vel passibilis qualitas, et +dispositio et habitus, differunt in corporibus secundum intensionem +et remissionem. Quando enim aliquid recipit caliditatem secundum +calefieri tantum, non autem ut calefacere possit; tunc est passio, +si sit cito transiens, vel passibilis qualitas, si sit manens. +Quando autem iam ad hoc perducitur quod potest etiam alterum +calefacere, tunc est dispositio, si autem ulterius intantum +confirmetur quod sit difficile mobilis, tunc erit habitus, ut sic +dispositio sit quaedam intensio seu perfectio passionis vel +passibilis qualitatis, habitus autem dispositionis. Sed hoc +improbat Simplicius, quia talis intensio et remissio non important +diversitatem ex parte ipsius formae, sed ex diversa participatione +subiecti. Et ita non diversificarentur per hoc species qualitatis. +Et ideo aliter dicendum est quod, sicut supra dictum est, +commensuratio ipsarum qualitatum passibilium secundum convenientiam +ad naturam, habet rationem dispositionis, et ideo, facta +alteratione circa ipsas qualitates passibiles, quae sunt calidum et +frigidum, humidum et siccum, fit ex consequenti alteratio secundum +aegritudinem et sanitatem. Primo autem et per se non est alteratio +secundum huiusmodi habitus et dispositiones.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that habit is in the soul in respect of its essence rather than in respect of its powers. For we speak of dispositions + and habits in relation to nature, as stated above ( + Q[49], A[2]). But nature regards the essence of the soul rather than the powers; because it is in respect of its essence that the soul + is the nature of such a body and the form thereof. Therefore habits are in the soul in respect of its essence and not in + respect of its powers. +
[35635] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus sint in anima magis secundum +essentiam quam secundum potentiam. Dispositiones enim et habitus +dicuntur in ordine ad naturam, ut dictum est. Sed natura magis +attenditur secundum essentiam animae quam secundum potentias, quia +anima secundum suam essentiam est natura corporis talis, et forma +eius. Ergo habitus sunt in anima secundum eius essentiam et non +secundum potentiam.
+ Objection 2: Further, accident is not the subject of accident. Now habit is an accident. But the powers of the soul are in the genus of + accident, as we have said in the + FP, Q[77], A[1], ad 5. Therefore habit is not in the soul in respect of its powers. +
[35636] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +accidentis non est accidens. Habitus autem est quoddam accidens. +Sed potentiae animae sunt de genere accidentium, ut in primo dictum +est. Ergo habitus non est in anima ratione suae potentiae.
+ Objection 3: Further, the subject is prior to that which is in the subject. But since habit belongs to the first species of quality, it + is prior to power, which belongs to the second species. Therefore habit is not in a power of the soul as its subject. +
[35637] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +subiectum est prius eo quod est in subiecto. Sed habitus, cum +pertineat ad primam speciem qualitatis, est prior quam potentia, +quae pertinet ad secundam speciem. Ergo habitus non est in potentia +animae sicut in subiecto.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) puts various habits in the various powers of the soul. +
[35638] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus, in I Ethic., ponit diversos habitus in +diversis partibus animae.
+ I answer that, As we have said above ( + Q[49], AA[2],3), habit implies a certain disposition in relation to nature or to operation. If therefore we take habit as having a relation + to nature, it cannot be in the soul---that is, if we speak of human nature: for the soul itself is the form completing the + human nature; so that, regarded in this way, habit or disposition is rather to be found in the body by reason of its relation + to the soul, than in the + soul by reason of its relation to the body. But if we speak of a higher nature, of which man may become a partaker, according + to 2 Pet. 1, "that we may be partakers of the Divine Nature": thus nothing hinders some habit, namely, grace, from being in + the soul in respect of its essence, as we shall state later on ( + Q[110], A[4]). +
On the other hand, if we take habit in its relation to operation, it is chiefly thus that habits are found in the soul: in + so far as the soul is not determined to one operation, but is indifferent to many, which is a condition for a habit, as we + have said above ( + Q[49], A[4]). And since the soul is the principle of operation through its powers, therefore, regarded in this sense, habits are in the + soul in respect of its powers. +
[35639] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus importat +dispositionem quandam in ordine ad naturam, vel ad operationem. Si +ergo accipiatur habitus secundum quod habet ordinem ad naturam, sic +non potest esse in anima, si tamen de natura humana loquamur, quia +ipsa anima est forma completiva humanae naturae; unde secundum hoc, +magis potest esse aliquis habitus vel dispositio in corpore per +ordinem ad animam, quam in anima per ordinem ad corpus. Sed si +loquamur de aliqua superiori natura, cuius homo potest esse +particeps, secundum illud II Petr. I, ut simus consortes naturae +divinae, sic nihil prohibet in anima secundum suam essentiam +esse aliquem habitum, scilicet gratiam, ut infra dicetur. Si vero +accipiatur habitus in ordine ad operationem, sic maxime habitus +inveniuntur in anima, inquantum anima non determinatur ad unam +operationem, sed se habet ad multas, quod requiritur ad habitum, ut +supra dictum est. Et quia anima est principium operationum per suas +potentias, ideo secundum hoc, habitus sunt in anima secundum suas +potentias.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The essence of the soul belongs to human nature, not as a subject requiring to be disposed to something further, but as a + form and nature to which someone is disposed. +
[35640] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod essentia animae pertinet ad naturam humanam, non +sicut subiectum disponendum ad aliquid aliud, sed sicut forma et +natura ad quam aliquis disponitur.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Accident is not of itself the subject of accident. But since among accidents themselves there is a certain order, the subject, + according as it is under one accident, is conceived as the subject of a further accident. In this way we say that one accident + is the subject of another; as superficies is the subject of color, in which sense power is the subject of habit. +
[35641] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod accidens per se non potest esse subiectum accidentis. +Sed quia etiam in ipsis accidentibus est ordo quidam, subiectum +secundum quod est sub uno accidente, intelligitur esse subiectum +alterius. Et sic dicitur unum accidens esse subiectum alterius, ut +superficies coloris. Et hoc modo potest potentia esse subiectum +habitus.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Habit takes precedence of power, according as it implies a disposition to nature: whereas power always implies a relation + to operation, which is posterior, since nature is the principle of operation. But the habit whose subject is a power, does + not imply relation to nature, but to operation. Wherefore it is posterior to power. Or, we may say that habit takes precedence + of power, as the complete takes precedence of the incomplete, and as act takes + precedence of potentiality. For act is naturally prior to potentiality, though potentiality is prior in order of generation + and time, as stated in Metaph. vii, text. 17; ix, text. 13. +
[35642] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod habitus praemittitur potentiae, secundum quod +importat dispositionem ad naturam, potentia autem semper importat +ordinem ad operationem, quae est posterior, cum natura sit +operationis principium. Sed habitus cuius potentia est subiectum, +non importat ordinem ad naturam, sed ad operationem. Unde est +posterior potentia. Vel potest dici quod habitus praeponitur +potentiae sicut completum incompleto, et actus potentiae. Actus +enim naturaliter est prior; quamvis potentia sit prior ordine +generationis et temporis, ut dicitur in VII et IX Metaphys.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be any habits in the powers of the sensitive part. For as the nutritive power is an irrational + part, so is the sensitive power. But there can be no habits in the powers of the nutritive part. Therefore we ought not to + put any habit in the powers of the sensitive part. +
[35643] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod in potentiis sensitivae partis non +possit esse aliquis habitus. Sicut enim potentia nutritiva pars est +irrationalis, ita et sensitiva. Sed in potentiis nutritivae partis +non ponitur aliquis habitus. Ergo nec in potentiis sensitivae +partis aliquis habitus debet poni.
+ Objection 2: Further, the sensitive parts are common to us and the brutes. But there are not any habits in brutes: for in them there is + no will, which is put in the definition of habit, as we have said above ( + Q[49], A[3]). Therefore there are no habits in the sensitive powers. +
[35644] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +sensitivae partes sunt communes nobis et brutis. Sed in brutis non +sunt aliqui habitus, quia non est in eis voluntas, quae in +definitione habitus ponitur, ut supra dictum est. Ergo in potentiis +sensitivis non sunt aliqui habitus.
+ Objection 3: Further, the habits of the soul are sciences and virtues: and just as science is related to the apprehensive power, so it + virtue related to the appetitive power. But in the sensitive powers there are no sciences: since science is of universals, + which the sensitive powers cannot apprehend. Therefore, neither can there be habits of virtue in the sensitive part. +
[35645] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +habitus animae sunt scientiae et virtutes, et sicut scientia +refertur ad vim apprehensivam, ita virtus ad vim appetitivam. Sed +in potentiis sensitivis non sunt aliquae scientiae, cum scientia +sit universalium, quae vires sensitivae apprehendere non possunt. +Ergo etiam nec habitus virtutum in partibus sensitivis esse +possunt.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "some virtues," namely, temperance and fortitude, "belong to the irrational part." +
[35646] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod aliquae virtutes, +scilicet temperantia et fortitudo, sunt irrationabilium +partium.
+ I answer that, The sensitive powers can be considered in two ways: first, according as they act from natural instinct: secondly, according + as they act at the command of reason. According as they act from natural instinct, they are ordained to one thing, even as + nature is; but according as they act at the command of reason, they can be ordained to various things. And thus there can + be habits in them, by which they are well or ill disposed in regard to something. +
[35647] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod vires sensitivae dupliciter possunt considerari, uno +modo, secundum quod operantur ex instinctu naturae; alio modo, +secundum quod operantur ex imperio rationis. Secundum igitur quod +operantur ex instinctu naturae, sic ordinantur ad unum, sicut et +natura. Et ideo sicut in potentiis naturalibus non sunt aliqui +habitus, ita etiam nec in potentiis sensitivis, secundum quod ex +instinctu naturae operantur. Secundum vero quod operantur ex +imperio rationis, sic ad diversa ordinari possunt. Et sic possunt +in eis esse aliqui habitus, quibus bene aut male ad aliquid +disponuntur.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The powers of the nutritive part have not an inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason, and therefore there are no habits + in them. But the sensitive powers have an inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason; and therefore habits can be in them: + for in so far as they obey reason, in a certain sense they are said to be rational, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. +
[35648] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod vires nutritivae partis non sunt natae obedire +imperio rationis, et ideo non sunt in eis aliqui habitus. Sed vires +sensitivae natae sunt obedire imperio rationis, et ideo in eis esse +possunt aliqui habitus; nam secundum quod obediunt rationi, +quodammodo rationales dicuntur, ut in I Ethic. dicitur.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The sensitive powers of dumb animals do not act at the command of reason; but if they are left to themselves, such animals + act from natural instinct: and so in them there are no habits ordained to operations. There are in them, however, certain + dispositions in relation to nature, as health and beauty. But whereas by man's reason brutes are disposed by a sort of custom + to do things in this or that way, so in this sense, to a certain extent, we can + admit the existence of habits in dumb animals: wherefore Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 36): "We find the most untamed beasts, + deterred by fear of pain, from that wherein they took the keenest pleasure; and when this has become a custom in them, we + say that they are tame and gentle." But the habit is incomplete, as to the use of the will, for they have not that power of + using or of refraining, which seems to belong to the notion of habit: and therefore, properly speaking, there can be no + habits in them. +
[35649] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod vires sensitivae in brutis animalibus non operantur +ex imperio rationis; sed si sibi relinquantur bruta animalia, +operantur ex instinctu naturae. Et sic in brutis animalibus non +sunt aliqui habitus ordinati ad operationes. Sunt tamen in eis +aliquae dispositiones in ordine ad naturam, ut sanitas et +pulchritudo. Sed quia bruta animalia a ratione hominis per quandam +consuetudinem disponuntur ad aliquid operandum sic vel aliter, hoc +modo in brutis animalibus habitus quodammodo poni possunt, unde +Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod videmus +immanissimas bestias a maximis voluptatibus absterreri dolorum +metu, quod cum in earum consuetudinem verterit, domitae et +mansuetae vocantur. Deficit tamen ratio habitus quantum ad usum +voluntatis, quia non habent dominium utendi vel non utendi, quod +videtur ad rationem habitus pertinere. Et ideo, proprie loquendo, +in eis habitus esse non possunt.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The sensitive appetite has an inborn aptitude to be moved by the rational appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 57: + but the rational powers of apprehension have an inborn aptitude to receive from the sensitive powers. And therefore it is + more suitable that habits should be in the powers of sensitive appetite than in the powers of sensitive apprehension, since + in the powers of sensitive appetite habits do not exist except according as they act at + the command of the reason. And yet even in the interior powers of sensitive apprehension, we may admit of certain habits whereby + man has a facility of memory, thought or imagination: wherefore also the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. ii) that "custom + conduces much to a good memory": the reason of which is that these powers also are moved to act at the command of the reason. +
On the other hand the exterior apprehensive powers, as sight, hearing and the like, are not susceptible of habits, but are + ordained to their fixed acts, according to the disposition of their nature, just as the members of the body, for there are + no habits in them, but rather in the powers which command their movements. +
[35650] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod appetitus sensitivus natus est moveri ab appetitu +rationali, ut dicitur in III de anima, sed vires rationales +apprehensivae natae sunt accipere a viribus sensitivis. Et ideo +magis convenit quod habitus sint in viribus sensitivis appetitivis +quam in viribus sensitivis apprehensivis, cum in viribus sensitivis +appetitivis non sint habitus nisi secundum quod operantur ex +imperio rationis. Quamvis etiam in ipsis interioribus viribus +sensitivis apprehensivis possint poni aliqui habitus, secundum quos +homo fit bene memorativus vel cogitativus vel imaginativus, unde +etiam philosophus dicit, in cap. de memoria, quod consuetudo +multum operatur ad bene memorandum, quia etiam istae vires +moventur ad operandum ex imperio rationis. Vires autem +apprehensivae exteriores, ut visus et auditus et huiusmodi, non +sunt susceptivae aliquorum habituum, sed secundum dispositionem +suae naturae ordinantur ad suos actus determinatos; sicut et membra +corporis, in quibus non sunt habitus, sed magis in viribus +imperantibus motum ipsorum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that there are no habits in the intellect. For habits are in conformity with operations, as stated above + (A[1]). But the operations of man are common to soul and body, as stated in De Anima i, text. 64. Therefore also are habits. But + the intellect is not an act of the body (De Anima iii, text. 6). Therefore the intellect is not the subject of a habit. +
[35651] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod in intellectu non sint aliqui habitus. +Habitus enim operationibus conformantur, ut dictum est. Sed +operationes hominis sunt communes animae et corpori, ut dicitur in +I de anima. Ergo et habitus. Sed intellectus non est actus +corporis, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo intellectus non est +subiectum alicuius habitus.
+ Objection 2: Further, whatever is in a thing, is there according to the mode of that in which it is. But that which is form without matter, + is act only: whereas what is composed of form and matter, has potentiality and act at the same time. Therefore nothing at + the same time potential and actual can be in that which is form only, but only in that which is composed of matter and form. + Now the intellect is form without matter. Therefore habit, which has potentiality at the + same time as act, being a sort of medium between the two, cannot be in the intellect; but only in the "conjunction," which + is composed of soul and body. +
[35652] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +omne quod est in aliquo, est in eo per modum eius in quo est. Sed +id quod est forma sine materia, est actus tantum, quod autem est +compositum ex forma et materia, habet potentiam et actum simul. +Ergo in eo quod est forma tantum, non potest esse aliquid quod sit +simul in potentia et actu, sed solum in eo quod est compositum ex +materia et forma. Sed intellectus est forma sine materia. Ergo +habitus, qui habet potentiam simul cum actu, quasi medium inter +utrumque existens, non potest esse in intellectu; sed solum in +coniuncto, quod est compositum ex anima et corpore.
+ Objection 3: Further, habit is a disposition whereby we are well or ill disposed in regard to something, as is said (Metaph. v, text. + 25). But that anyone should be well or ill disposed to an act of the intellect is due to some disposition of the body: wherefore + also it is stated (De Anima ii, text. 94) that "we observe men with soft flesh to be quick witted." Therefore the habits of + knowledge are not in the intellect, which is separate, but in some power which is the act + of some part of the body. +
[35653] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +habitus est dispositio secundum quam aliquis bene vel male +disponitur ad aliquid, ut dicitur in V Metaph. Sed quod aliquis +bene vel male sit dispositus ad actum intellectus, provenit ex +aliqua corporis dispositione, unde etiam in II de anima dicitur +quod molles carne bene aptos mente videmus. Ergo habitus +cognoscitivi non sunt in intellectu, qui est separatus; sed in +aliqua potentia quae est actus alicuius partis corporis.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2,3,10) puts science, wisdom and understanding, which is the habit of first principles, in the + intellective part of the soul. +
[35654] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus, in VI Ethic., ponit scientiam et sapientiam +et intellectum, qui est habitus principiorum, in ipsa intellectiva +parte animae.
+ I answer that, concerning intellective habits there have been various opinions. Some, supposing that there was only one "possible" [* + FP, Q[79], A[2], ad 2] intellect for all men, were bound to hold that habits of knowledge are not in the intellect itself, but in the interior + sensitive powers. For it is manifest that men differ in habits; and so it was impossible to put the habits of knowledge directly + in that, which, being only one, would be common + to all men. Wherefore if there were but one single "possible" intellect of all men, the habits of science, in which men differ + from one another, could not be in the "possible" intellect as their subject, but would be in the interior sensitive powers, + which differ in various men. +
Now, in the first place, this supposition is contrary to the mind of Aristotle. For it is manifest that the sensitive powers + are rational, not by their essence, but only by participation (Ethic. i, 13). Now the Philosopher puts the intellectual virtues, + which are wisdom, science and understanding, in that which is rational by its essence. Wherefore they are not in the sensitive + powers, but in the intellect itself. Moreover he says expressly (De Anima iii, text. 8,18) that when + the "possible" intellect "is thus identified with each thing," that is, when it is reduced to act in respect of singulars + by the intelligible species, "then it is said to be in act, as the knower is said to be in act; and this happens when the + intellect can act of itself," i.e. by considering: "and even then it is in potentiality in a sense; but not in the same way + as before learning and discovering." Therefore the "possible" intellect itself is the subject of the habit of science, by + which the + intellect, even though it be not actually considering, is able to consider. In the second place, this supposition is contrary + to the truth. For as to whom belongs the operation, belongs also the power to operate, belongs also the habit. But to understand + and to consider is the proper act of the intellect. Therefore also the habit whereby one considers is properly in the intellect + itself. +
[35655] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod circa habitus cognoscitivos diversimode sunt aliqui +opinati. Quidam enim, ponentes intellectum possibilem esse unum in +omnibus hominibus, coacti sunt ponere quod habitus cognoscitivi non +sunt in ipso intellectu, sed in viribus interioribus sensitivis. +Manifestum est enim quod homines in habitibus diversificantur, unde +non possunt habitus cognoscitivi directe poni in eo quod, unum +numero existens, est omnibus hominibus commune. Unde si intellectus +possibilis sit unus numero omnium hominum, habitus scientiarum, +secundum quos homines diversificantur, non poterunt esse in +intellectu possibili sicut in subiecto, sed erunt in viribus +interioribus sensitivis, quae sunt diversae in diversis. Sed ista +positio, primo quidem, est contra intentionem Aristotelis. +Manifestum est enim quod vires sensitivae non sunt rationales per +essentiam, sed solum per participationem, ut dicitur in I Ethic. +Philosophus autem ponit intellectuales virtutes, quae sunt +sapientia, scientia et intellectus, in eo quod est rationale per +essentiam. Unde non sunt in viribus sensitivis, sed in ipso +intellectu. Expresse etiam dicit, in III de anima, quod intellectus +possibilis, cum sic fiat singula, idest cum reducatur in actum +singulorum per species intelligibiles, tunc fit secundum actum eo +modo quo sciens dicitur esse in actu, quod quidem accidit cum +aliquis possit operari per seipsum, scilicet considerando. Est +quidem igitur et tunc potentia quodammodo; non tamen similiter ut +ante addiscere aut invenire. Ipse ergo intellectus possibilis est +in quo est habitus scientiae quo potest considerare etiam cum non +considerat. Secundo etiam, haec positio est contra rei veritatem. +Sicut enim eius est potentia cuius est operatio, ita etiam eius est +habitus cuius est operatio. Intelligere autem et considerare est +proprius actus intellectus. Ergo et habitus quo consideratur, est +proprie in ipso intellectu.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Some said, as Simplicius reports in his Commentary on the Predicaments, that, since every operation of man is to a certain + extent an operation of the "conjunctum," as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, text. 64); therefore no habit is in the soul + only, but in the "conjunctum." And from this it follows that no habit is in the intellect, for the intellect is separate, + as ran the argument, given above. But the argument is no cogent. For habit is not a + disposition of the object to the power, but rather a disposition of the power to the object: wherefore the habit needs to + be in that power which is principle of the act, and not in that which is compared to the power as its object. +
Now the act of understanding is not said to be common to soul and body, except in respect of the phantasm, as is stated in + De Anima, text. 66. But it is clear that the phantasm is compared as object to the passive intellect (De Anima iii, text. + 3,39). Whence it follows that the intellective habit is chiefly on the part of the intellect itself; and not on the part of + the phantasm, which is common to soul and body. And therefore we must say that the "possible" intellect is the + subject of habit, which is in potentiality to many: and this belongs, above all, to the "possible" intellect. Wherefore the + "possible" intellect is the subject of intellectual habits. +
[35656] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod quidam dixerunt, ut Simplicius refert in +commento praedicamentorum, quod quia omnis operatio hominis est +quodammodo coniuncti, ut philosophus dicit in I de anima; ideo +nullus habitus est animae tantum, sed coniuncti. Et per hoc +sequitur quod nullus habitus sit in intellectu, cum intellectus sit +separatus, ut ratio proposita procedebat. Sed ista ratio non cogit. +Habitus enim non est dispositio obiecti ad potentiam, sed magis +dispositio potentiae ad obiectum, unde habitus oportet quod sit in +ipsa potentia quae est principium actus, non autem in eo quod +comparatur ad potentiam sicut obiectum. Ipsum autem intelligere non +dicitur commune esse animae et corpori, nisi ratione phantasmatis, +ut dicitur in I de anima. Patet autem quod phantasma comparatur ad +intellectum possibilem ut obiectum, ut dicitur in III de anima. +Unde relinquitur quod habitus intellectivus sit principaliter ex +parte ipsius intellectus, non autem ex parte phantasmatis, quod est +commune animae et corpori. Et ideo dicendum est quod intellectus +possibilis est subiectum habitus, illi enim competit esse subiectum +habitus, quod est in potentia ad multa; et hoc maxime competit +intellectui possibili. Unde intellectus possibilis est subiectum +habituum intellectualium.
+ Reply to Objection 2: As potentiality to sensible being belongs to corporeal matter, so potentiality to intellectual being belongs to the "possible" + intellect. Wherefore nothing forbids habit to be in the "possible" intellect, for it is midway between pure potentiality and + perfect act. +
[35657] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut potentia ad esse sensibile convenit materiae +corporali, ita potentia ad esse intelligibile convenit intellectui +possibili. Unde nihil prohibet in intellectu possibili esse +habitum, qui est medius inter puram potentiam et actum +perfectum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Because the apprehensive powers inwardly prepare their proper objects for the "possible intellect," therefore it is by the + good disposition of these powers, to which the good disposition of the body cooperates, that man is rendered apt to understand. + And so in a secondary way the intellective habit can be in these powers. But principally it is in the "possible" intellect. +
[35658] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, quia vires apprehensivae interius praeparant +intellectui possibili proprium obiectum; ideo ex bona dispositione +harum virium, ad quam cooperatur bona dispositio corporis, redditur +homo habilis ad intelligendum. Et sic habitus intellectivus +secundario potest esse in istis viribus. Principaliter autem est in +intellectu possibili.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a habit in the will. For the habit which is in the intellect is the intelligible species, + by means of which the intellect actually understands. But the will does not act by means of species. Therefore the will is + not the subject of habit. +
[35659] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod in voluntate non sit aliquis habitus. +Habitus enim qui in intellectu est, sunt species intelligibiles, +quibus intelligit actu. Sed voluntas non operatur per aliquas +species. Ergo voluntas non est subiectum alicuius habitus.
+ Objection 2: Further, no habit is allotted to the active intellect, as there is to the "possible" intellect, because the former is an + active power. But the will is above all an active power, because it moves all the powers to their acts, as stated above ( + Q[9], A[1]). Therefore there is no habit in the will. +
[35660] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +in intellectu agente non ponitur aliquis habitus, sicut in +intellectu possibili, quia est potentia activa. Sed voluntas est +maxime potentia activa, quia movet omnes potentias ad suos actus, +ut supra dictum est. Ergo in ipsa non est aliquis habitus.
+ Objection 3: Further, in the natural powers there is no habit, because, by reason of their nature, they are determinate to one thing. + But the will, by reason of its nature, is ordained to tend to the good which reason directs. Therefore there is no habit in + the will. +
[35661] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +in potentiis naturalibus non est aliquis habitus, quia ex sua +natura sunt ad aliquid determinatae. Sed voluntas ex sua natura +ordinatur ad hoc quod tendat in bonum ordinatum ratione. Ergo in +voluntate non est aliquis habitus.
+ On the contrary, Justice is a habit. But justice is in the will; for it is "a habit whereby men will and do that which is just" (Ethic. v, + 1). Therefore the will is the subject of a habit. +
[35662] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra +est quod iustitia est habitus quidam. Sed iustitia est in +voluntate, est enim iustitia habitus secundum quem aliqui volunt +et operantur iusta, ut dicitur in V Ethic. Ergo voluntas est +subiectum alicuius habitus.
+ I answer that, Every power which may be variously directed to act, needs a habit whereby it is well disposed to its act. Now since the will + is a rational power, it may be variously directed to act. And therefore in the will we must admit the presence of a habit + whereby it is well disposed to its act. Moreover, from the very nature of habit, it is clear that it is principally related + to the will; inasmuch as habit "is that which one uses when one wills," as stated above + + (A[1]). +
[35663] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod omnis potentia quae diversimode potest ordinari ad +agendum, indiget habitu quo bene disponatur ad suum actum. Voluntas +autem, cum sit potentia rationalis, diversimode potest ad agendum +ordinari. Et ideo oportet in voluntate aliquem habitum ponere, quo +bene disponatur ad suum actum. Ex ipsa etiam ratione habitus +apparet quod habet quendam principalem ordinem ad voluntatem, prout +habitus est quo quis utitur cum voluerit, ut supra dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Even as in the intellect there is a species which is the likeness of the object; so in the will, and in every appetitive + power there must be something by which the power is inclined to its object; for the act of the appetitive power is nothing + but a certain inclination, as we have said above ( + Q[6], A[4]; + Q[22], A[2]). And therefore in respect of those things to which it is inclined sufficiently by the + nature of the power itself, the power needs no quality to incline it. But since it is necessary, for the end of human life, + that the appetitive power be inclined to something fixed, to which it is not inclined by the nature of the power, which has + a relation to many and various things, therefore it is necessary that, in the will and in the other appetitive powers, there + be certain qualities to incline them, and these are called habits. +
[35664] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut in intellectu est aliqua species quae est +similitudo obiecti, ita oportet in voluntate, et in qualibet vi +appetitiva, esse aliquid quo inclinetur in suum obiectum, cum nihil +aliud sit actus appetitivae virtutis quam inclinatio quaedam, ut +supra dictum est. Ad ea ergo ad quae sufficienter inclinatur per +naturam ipsius potentiae, non indiget aliqua qualitate inclinante. +Sed quia necessarium est ad finem humanae vitae, quod vis +appetitiva inclinetur in aliquid determinatum, ad quod non +inclinatur ex natura potentiae, quae se habet ad multa et diversa; +ideo necesse est quod in voluntate, et in aliis viribus +appetitivis, sint quaedam qualitates inclinantes, quae dicuntur +habitus.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The active intellect is active only, and in no way passive. But the will, and every appetitive power, is both mover and moved + (De Anima iii, text. 54). And therefore the comparison between them does not hold; for to be susceptible of habit belongs + to that which is somehow in potentiality. +
[35665] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod intellectus agens est agens tantum, et nullo modo +patiens. Sed voluntas, et quaelibet vis appetitiva, est movens +motum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Et ideo non est similis ratio de +utroque, nam esse susceptivum habitus convenit ei quod est +quodammodo in potentia.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The will from the very nature of the power inclined to the good of the reason. But because this good is varied in many ways, + the will needs to be inclined, by means of a habit, to some fixed good of the reason, in order that action may follow more + promptly. +
[35666] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod voluntas ex ipsa natura potentiae inclinatur in bonum +rationis. Sed quia hoc bonum multipliciter diversificatur, +necessarium est ut ad aliquod determinatum bonum rationis voluntas +per aliquem habitum inclinetur, ad hoc quod sequatur promptior +operatio.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that there are no habits in the angels. For Maximus, commentator of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), says: "It + is not proper to suppose that there are intellectual (i.e. spiritual) powers in the divine intelligences (i.e. in the angels) + after the manner of accidents, as in us: as though one were in the other as in a subject: for accident of any kind is foreign + to them." But every habit is an accident. Therefore there are no habits in the angels. +
[35667] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Angelis non sint habitus. Dicit +enim maximus, Commentator Dionysii, in VII cap. de Cael. Hier., non +convenit arbitrari virtutes intellectuales, idest spirituales, more +accidentium, quemadmodum et in nobis sunt, in divinis +intellectibus, scilicet Angelis, esse, ut aliud in alio sit sicut +in subiecto, accidens enim omne illinc repulsum est. Sed omnis +habitus est accidens. Ergo in Angelis non sunt habitus.
+ Objection 2: Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "The holy dispositions of the heavenly essences participate, above all other + things, in God's goodness." But that which is of itself [per se] is prior to and more power than that which is by another + [per aliud]. Therefore the angelic essences are perfected of themselves unto conformity with God, and therefore not by means + of habits. And this seems to have been the reasoning of Maximus, who in the same passage adds: + "For if this were the case, surely their essence would not remain in itself, nor could it have been as far as possible deified + of itself." +
[35668] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, +sicut Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Cael. Hier., sanctae +caelestium essentiarum dispositiones super omnia alia Dei bonitatem +participant. Sed semper quod est per se, est prius et potius eo +quod est per aliud. Ergo Angelorum essentiae per seipsas +perficiuntur ad conformitatem Dei. Non ergo per aliquos habitus. Et +haec videtur esse ratio maximi, qui ibidem subdit, si enim hoc +esset, non utique maneret in semetipsa harum essentia, nec +deificari per se, quantum foret possibile, valuisset.
+ Objection 3: Further, habit is a disposition (Metaph. v, text. 25). But disposition, as is said in the same book, is "the order of that + which has parts." Since, therefore, angels are simple substances, it seems that there are no dispositions and habits in them. +
[35669] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, +habitus est dispositio quaedam, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. Sed +dispositio, ut ibidem dicitur, est ordo habentis partes. Cum ergo +Angeli sint simplices substantiae, videtur quod in eis non sint +dispositiones et habitus.
+ On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that the angels are of the first hierarchy are called: "Fire-bearers and Thrones and Outpouring + of Wisdom, by which is indicated the godlike nature of their habits." +
[35670] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Dionysius dicit, VII cap. Cael. Hier., quod Angeli +primae hierarchiae nominantur calefacientes et throni et effusio +sapientiae, manifestatio deiformis ipsorum habituum.
+ I answer that, Some have thought that there are no habits in the angels, and that whatever is said of them, is said essentially. Whence + Maximus, after the words which we have quoted, says: "Their dispositions, and the powers which are in them, are essential, + through the absence of matter in them." And Simplicius says the same in his Commentary on the Predicaments: "Wisdom which + is in the soul is its habit: but that which is in the intellect, is its substance. For + everything divine is sufficient of itself, and exists in itself." +
Now this opinion contains some truth, and some error. For it is manifest from what we have said ( + Q[49], A[4]) that only a being in potentiality is the subject of habit. So the above-mentioned commentators considered that angels are + immaterial substances, and that there is no material potentiality in them, and on that account, excluded from them habit and + any kind of accident. Yet since though there is no material potentiality in angels, there is still + some potentiality in them (for to be pure act belongs to God alone), therefore, as far as potentiality is found to be in them, + so far may habits be found in them. But because the potentiality of matter and the potentiality of intellectual substance + are not of the same kind. Whence, Simplicius says in his Commentary on the Predicaments that: "The habits of the intellectual + substance are not like the habits here below, but rather are they like simple and immaterial images which it contains in + itself." +
However, the angelic intellect and the human intellect differ with regard to this habit. For the human intellect, being the + lowest in the intellectual order, is in potentiality as regards all intelligible things, just as primal matter is in respect + of all sensible forms; and therefore for the understanding of all things, it needs some habit. But the angelic intellect is + not as a pure potentiality in the order of intelligible things, but as an act; not indeed as pure act (for + this belongs to God alone), but with an admixture of some potentiality: and the higher it is, the less potentiality it has. + And therefore, as we said in the + FP, Q[55], A[1], so far as it is in potentiality, so far is it in need of habitual perfection by means of intelligible species in regard + to its proper operation: but so far as it is in act, through its own essence it can understand some things, at least itself, + and other things according to the mode of its + substance, as stated in De Causis: and the more perfect it is, the more perfectly will it understand. +
But since no angel attains to the perfection of God, but all are infinitely distant therefrom; for this reason, in order + to attain to God Himself, through intellect and will, the angels need some habits, being as it were in potentiality in regard + to that Pure Act. Wherefore Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that their habits are "godlike," that is to say, that by them + they are made like to God. +
But those habits that are dispositions to the natural being are not in angels, since they are immaterial.
[35671] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod quidam posuerunt in Angelis non esse habitus; sed +quaecumque dicuntur de eis, essentialiter dicuntur. Unde maximus, +post praedicta verba quae induximus, dicit, habitudines earum, +atque virtutes quae in eis sunt, essentiales sunt, propter +immaterialitatem. Et hoc etiam Simplicius dicit, in commento +praedicamentorum, sapientia quae est in anima, habitus est, quae +autem in intellectu, substantia. Omnia enim quae sunt divina, et +per se sufficientia sunt, et in seipsis existentia. Quae quidem +positio partim habet veritatem, et partim continet falsitatem. +Manifestum est enim ex praemissis quod subiectum habitus non est +nisi ens in potentia. Considerantes igitur praedicti commentatores +quod Angeli sunt substantiae immateriales, et quod non est in illis +potentia materiae; secundum hoc, ab eis habitum excluserunt, et +omne accidens. Sed quia, licet in Angelis non sit potentia +materiae, est tamen in eis aliqua potentia (esse enim actum purum +est proprium Dei); ideo inquantum invenitur in eis de potentia, +intantum in eis possunt habitus inveniri. Sed quia potentia +materiae et potentia intellectualis substantiae non est unius +rationis, ideo per consequens nec habitus unius rationis est +utrobique. Unde Simplicius dicit, in commento praedicamentorum, +quod habitus intellectualis substantiae non sunt similes his qui +sunt hic habitibus; sed magis sunt similes simplicibus et +immaterialibus speciebus quas continet in seipsa. Circa +huiusmodi tamen habitum aliter se habet intellectus angelicus, et +aliter intellectus humanus. Intellectus enim humanus, cum sit +infimus in ordine intellectuum, est in potentia respectu omnium +intelligibilium, sicut materia prima respectu omnium formarum +sensibilium, et ideo ad omnia intelligenda indiget aliquo habitu. +Sed intellectus angelicus non se habet sicut pura potentia in +genere intelligibilium, sed sicut actus quidam, non autem sicut +actus purus (hoc enim solius Dei est), sed cum permixtione alicuius +potentiae, et tanto minus habet de potentialitate, quanto est +superior. Et ideo, ut in primo dictum est, inquantum est in +potentia, indiget perfici habitualiter per aliquas species +intelligibiles ad operationem propriam, sed inquantum est actu, per +essentiam suam potest aliqua intelligere, ad minus seipsum, et alia +secundum modum suae substantiae, ut dicitur in Lib. de causis, et +tanto perfectius, quanto est perfectior. Sed quia nullus Angelus +pertingit ad perfectionem Dei, sed in infinitum distat; propter +hoc, ad attingendum ad ipsum Deum per intellectum et voluntatem, +indigent aliquibus habitibus, tanquam in potentia existentes +respectu illius puri actus. Unde Dionysius dicit habitus eorum esse +deiformes, quibus scilicet Deo conformantur. Habitus autem qui sunt +dispositiones ad esse naturale, non sunt in Angelis, cum sint +immateriales.
+ Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Maximus must be understood of material habits and accidents. +
[35672] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod verbum maximi intelligendum est de habitibus et +accidentibus materialibus.
+ Reply to Objection 2: As to that which belongs to angels by their essence, they do not need a habit. But as they are not so far beings of themselves, + as not to partake of Divine wisdom and goodness, therefore, so far as they need to partake of something from without, so far + do they need to have habits. +
[35673] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod quantum ad hoc quod convenit Angelis per suam +essentiam, non indigent habitu. Sed quia non ita sunt per seipsos +entes, quin participent sapientiam et bonitatem divinam; ideo +inquantum indigent participare aliquid ab exteriori, intantum +necesse est in eis ponere habitus.
+ Reply to Objection 3: In angels there are no essential parts: but there are potential parts, in so far as their intellect is perfected by several + species, and in so far as their will has a relation to several things. +
[35674] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod in Angelis non sunt partes essentiae, sed sunt partes +secundum potentiam, inquantum intellectus eorum per plures species +perficitur, et voluntas eorum se habet ad plura.
We must next consider the cause of habits: and firstly, as to their formation; secondly, as to their increase; thirdly, as + to their diminution and corruption. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: +
(1) Whether any habit is from nature?
(2) Whether any habit is caused by acts?
+[35675] +Iª-IIae q. 51 pr. Deinde considerandum est de causa +habituum. Et primo, quantum ad generationem ipsorum; secundo, +quantum ad augmentum; tertio, quantum ad diminutionem et +corruptionem. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum aliquis +habitus sit a natura. Secundo, utrum aliquis habitus ex actibus +causetur. Tertio, utrum per unum actum possit generari habitus. +Quarto, utrum aliqui habitus sint in hominibus infusi a Deo.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that no habit is from nature. For the use of those things which are from nature does not depend on the will. + But habit "is that which we use when we will," as the Commentator says on De Anima iii. Therefore habit is not from nature. +
[35676] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullus habitus sit a natura. Eorum +enim quae sunt a natura, usus non subiacet voluntati. Sed habitus +est quo quis utitur cum voluerit, ut dicit Commentator, in III de +anima. Ergo habitus non est a natura.
+ Objection 2: Further, nature does not employ two where one is sufficient. But the powers of the soul are from nature. If therefore the + habits of the powers were from nature, habit and power would be one. +
[35677] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +natura non facit per duo quod per unum potest facere. Sed potentiae +animae sunt a natura. Si igitur habitus potentiarum a natura +essent, habitus et potentia essent unum.
+ Objection 3: Further, nature does not fail in necessaries. But habits are necessary in order to act well, as we have stated above ( + Q[49], A[4]). If therefore any habits were from nature, it seems that nature would not fail to cause all necessary habits: but this is + clearly false. Therefore habits are not from nature. +
[35678] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +natura non deficit in necessariis. Sed habitus sunt necessarii ad +bene operandum, ut supra dictum est. Si igitur habitus aliqui +essent a natura, videtur quod natura non deficeret quin omnes +habitus necessarios causaret. Patet autem hoc esse falsum. Ergo +habitus non sunt a natura.
+ On the contrary, In Ethic. vi, 6, among other habits, place is given to understanding of first principles, which habit is from nature: wherefore + also first principles are said to be known naturally. +
[35679] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod in VI Ethic., inter alios habitus ponitur intellectus +principiorum, qui est a natura, unde et principia prima dicuntur +naturaliter cognita.
+ I answer that, One thing can be natural to another in two ways. First in respect of the specific nature, as the faculty of laughing is natural + to man, and it is natural to fire to have an upward tendency. Secondly, in respect of the individual nature, as it is natural + to Socrates or Plato to be prone to sickness or inclined to health, in accordance with their respective temperaments. Again, + in respect of both natures, something may be called natural in two ways: first, + because it entirely is from the nature; secondly, because it is partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic principle. + For instance, when a man is healed by himself, his health is entirely from nature; but when a man is healed by means of medicine, + health is partly from nature, partly from an extrinsic principle. +
Thus, then, if we speak of habit as a disposition of the subject in relation to form or nature, it may be natural in either + of the foregoing ways. For there is a certain natural disposition demanded by the human species, so that no man can be without + it. And this disposition is natural in respect of the specific nature. But since such a disposition has a certain latitude, + it happens that different grades of this disposition are becoming to different men in respect of the + individual nature. And this disposition may be either entirely from nature, or partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic + principle, as we have said of those who are healed by means of art. +
But the habit which is a disposition to operation, and whose subject is a power of the soul, as stated above (Q[50], A[2]), + may be natural whether in respect of the specific nature or in respect of the individual nature: in respect of the specific + nature, on the part of the soul itself, which, since it is the form of the body, is the specific principle; but in respect + of the individual nature, on the part of the body, which is the material principle. Yet in neither way does it + happen that there are natural habits in man, so that they be entirely from nature. In the angels, indeed, this does happen, + since they have intelligible species naturally impressed on them, which cannot be said of the human soul, as we have said + in the + FP, Q[55], A[2]; + FP, Q[84], A[3]. +
There are, therefore, in man certain natural habits, owing their existence, partly to nature, and partly to some extrinsic + principle: in one way, indeed, in the apprehensive powers; in another way, in the appetitive powers. For in the apprehensive + powers there may be a natural habit by way of a beginning, both in respect of the specific nature, and in respect of the individual + nature. This happens with regard to the specific nature, on the part of the soul itself: thus the + understanding of first principles is called a natural habit. For it is owing to the very nature of the intellectual soul that + man, having once grasped what is a whole and what is a part, should at once perceive that every whole is larger than its part: + and in like manner with regard to other such principles. Yet what is a whole, and what is a part---this he cannot know except + through the intelligible species which he has received from phantasms: and for this reason, the Philosopher at the end + of the Posterior Analytics shows that knowledge of principles comes to us from the senses. +
But in respect of the individual nature, a habit of knowledge is natural as to its beginning, in so far as one man, from + the disposition of his organs of sense, is more apt than another to understand well, since we need the sensitive powers for + the operation of the intellect. +
In the appetitive powers, however, no habit is natural in its beginning, on the part of the soul itself, as to the substance + of the habit; but only as to certain principles thereof, as, for instance, the principles of common law are called the "nurseries + of virtue." The reason of this is because the inclination to its proper objects, which seems to be the beginning of a habit, + does not belong to the habit, but rather to the very nature of the powers. +
But on the part of the body, in respect of the individual nature, there are some appetitive habits by way of natural beginnings. + For some are disposed from their own bodily temperament to chastity or meekness or such like. +
[35680] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod aliquid potest esse naturale alicui dupliciter. Uno +modo, secundum naturam speciei, sicut naturale est homini esse +risibile, et igni ferri sursum. Alio modo, secundum naturam +individui, sicut naturale est Socrati vel Platoni esse aegrotativum +vel sanativum, secundum propriam complexionem. Rursus, secundum +utramque naturam potest dici aliquid naturale dupliciter, uno modo, +quia totum est a natura; alio modo, quia secundum aliquid est a +natura, et secundum aliquid est ab exteriori principio. Sicut cum +aliquis sanatur per seipsum, tota sanitas est a natura, cum autem +aliquis sanatur auxilio medicinae, sanitas partim est a natura, +partim ab exteriori principio. Sic igitur si loquamur de habitu +secundum quod est dispositio subiecti in ordine ad formam vel +naturam, quolibet praedictorum modorum contingit habitum esse +naturalem. Est enim aliqua dispositio naturalis quae debetur +humanae speciei, extra quam nullus homo invenitur. Et haec est +naturalis secundum naturam speciei. Sed quia talis dispositio +quandam latitudinem habet, contingit diversos gradus huiusmodi +dispositionis convenire diversis hominibus secundum naturam +individui. Et huiusmodi dispositio potest esse vel totaliter a +natura, vel partim a natura et partim ab exteriori principio, sicut +dictum est de his qui sanantur per artem. Sed habitus qui est +dispositio ad operationem, cuius subiectum est potentia animae, ut +dictum est, potest quidem esse naturalis et secundum naturam +speciei, et secundum naturam individui. Secundum quidem naturam +speciei, secundum quod se tenet ex parte ipsius animae, quae, cum +sit forma corporis, est principium specificum. Secundum autem +naturam individui, ex parte corporis, quod est materiale +principium. Sed tamen neutro modo contingit in hominibus esse +habitus naturales ita quod sint totaliter a natura. In Angelis +siquidem contingit, eo quod habent species intelligibiles +naturaliter inditas, quod non competit animae humanae, ut in primo +dictum est. Sunt ergo in hominibus aliqui habitus naturales, +tanquam partim a natura existentes et partim ab exteriori +principio; aliter quidem in apprehensivis potentiis, et aliter in +appetitivis. In apprehensivis enim potentiis potest esse habitus +naturalis secundum inchoationem, et secundum naturam speciei, et +secundum naturam individui. Secundum quidem naturam speciei, ex +parte ipsius animae, sicut intellectus principiorum dicitur esse +habitus naturalis. Ex ipsa enim natura animae intellectualis, +convenit homini quod statim, cognito quid est totum et quid est +pars, cognoscat quod omne totum est maius sua parte, et simile est +in ceteris. Sed quid sit totum, et quid sit pars, cognoscere non +potest nisi per species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus acceptas. +Et propter hoc philosophus, in fine posteriorum, ostendit quod +cognitio principiorum provenit nobis ex sensu. Secundum vero +naturam individui, est aliquis habitus cognoscitivus secundum +inchoationem naturalis, inquantum unus homo, ex dispositione +organorum, est magis aptus ad bene intelligendum quam alius, +inquantum ad operationem intellectus indigemus virtutibus +sensitivis. In appetitivis autem potentiis non est aliquis habitus +naturalis secundum inchoationem, ex parte ipsius animae, quantum ad +ipsam substantiam habitus, sed solum quantum ad principia quaedam +ipsius, sicut principia iuris communis dicuntur esse seminalia +virtutum. Et hoc ideo, quia inclinatio ad obiecta propria, quae +videtur esse inchoatio habitus, non pertinet ad habitum, sed magis +pertinet ad ipsam rationem potentiarum. Sed ex parte corporis, +secundum naturam individui, sunt aliqui habitus appetitivi secundum +inchoationes naturales. Sunt enim quidam dispositi ex propria +corporis complexione ad castitatem vel mansuetudinem, vel ad +aliquid huiusmodi.
+ Reply to Objection 1: This objection takes nature as divided against reason and will; whereas reason itself and will belong to the nature of man. +
[35681] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de natura secundum quod +dividitur contra rationem et voluntatem, cum tamen ipsa ratio et +voluntas ad naturam hominis pertineant.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Something may be added even naturally to the nature of a power, while it cannot belong to the power itself. For instance, + with regard to the angels, it cannot belong to the intellective power itself capable of knowing all things: for thus it would + have to be the act of all things, which belongs to God alone. Because that by which something is known, must needs be the + actual likeness of the thing known: whence it would follow, if the power of the angel + knew all things by itself, that it was the likeness and act of all things. Wherefore there must needs be added to the angels' + intellective power, some intelligible species, which are likenesses of things understood: for it is by participation of the + Divine wisdom and not by their own essence, that their intellect can be actually those things which they understand. And so + it is clear that not everything belonging to a natural habit can belong to the power. +
[35682] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod aliquid etiam naturaliter potest superaddi potentiae, +quod tamen ad ipsam potentiam pertinere non potest. Sicut in +Angelis non potest pertinere ad ipsam potentiam intellectivam quod +sit per se cognoscitiva omnium, quia oporteret quod esset actus +omnium, quod solius Dei est. Id enim quo aliquid cognoscitur, +oportet esse actualem similitudinem eius quod cognoscitur, unde +sequeretur, si potentia Angeli per seipsam cognosceret omnia, quod +esset similitudo et actus omnium. Unde oportet quod superaddantur +potentiae intellectivae ipsius aliquae species intelligibiles, quae +sunt similitudines rerum intellectarum, quia per participationem +divinae sapientiae, et non per essentiam propriam, possunt +intellectus eorum esse actu ea quae intelligunt. Et sic patet quod +non omne id quod pertinet ad habitum naturalem, potest ad potentiam +pertinere.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Nature is not equally inclined to cause all the various kinds of habits: since some can be caused by nature, and some not, + as we have said above. And so it does not follow that because some habits are natural, therefore all are natural. +
[35683] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod natura non aequaliter se habet ad causandas omnes +diversitates habituum, quia quidam possunt causari a natura, quidam +non, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo non sequitur, si aliqui habitus +sint naturales, quod omnes sint naturales.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that no habit is caused by acts. For habit is a quality, as we have said above ( + Q[49], A[1]). Now every quality is caused in a subject, according to the latter's receptivity. Since then the agent, inasmuch as it acts, + does not receive but rather gives: it seems impossible for a habit to be caused in an agent by its own acts. +
[35684] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullus habitus possit ex actu causari. +Habitus enim est qualitas quaedam, ut supra dictum est. Omnis autem +qualitas causatur in aliquo subiecto, inquantum est alicuius +receptivum. Cum igitur agens ex hoc quod agit, non recipiat +aliquid, sed magis ex se emittat; videtur quod non possit aliquis +habitus in agente ex propriis actibus generari.
+ Objection 2: Further, the thing wherein a quality is caused is moved to that quality, as may be clearly seen in that which is heated or + cooled: whereas that which produces the act that causes the quality, moves, as may be seen in that which heats or cools. If + therefore habits were caused in anything by its own act, it would follow that the same would be mover and moved, active and + passive: which is impossible, as stated in Physics iii, 8. +
[35685] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +illud in quo causatur aliqua qualitas, movetur ad qualitatem illam, +sicut patet in re calefacta vel infrigidata, quod autem producit +actum causantem qualitatem, movet, ut patet de calefaciente vel +infrigidante. Si igitur in aliquo causaretur habitus per actum sui +ipsius, sequeretur quod idem esset movens et motum, agens et +patiens. Quod est impossibile, ut dicitur in VII Physic.
+ Objection 3: Further, the effect cannot be more noble than its cause. But habit is more noble than the act which precedes the habit; as + is clear from the fact that the latter produces more noble acts. Therefore habit cannot be caused by an act which precedes + the habit. +
[35686] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +effectus non potest esse nobilior sua causa. Sed habitus est +nobilior quam actus praecedens habitum, quod patet ex hoc, quod +nobiliores actus reddit. Ergo habitus non potest causari ab actu +praecedente habitum.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1,2) teaches that habits of virtue and vice are caused by acts. +
[35687] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus, in II Ethic., docet habitus virtutum et +vitiorum ex actibus causari.
+ I answer that, In the agent there is sometimes only the active principle of its act: for instance in fire there is only the active principle + of heating. And in such an agent a habit cannot be caused by its own act: for which reason natural things cannot become accustomed + or unaccustomed, as is stated in Ethic. ii, 1. But a certain agent is to be found, in which there is both the active and the + passive principle of its act, as we see in human acts. For the acts of the + appetitive power proceed from that same power according as it is moved by the apprehensive power presenting the object: and + further, the intellective power, according as it reasons about conclusions, has, as it were, an active principle in a self-evident + proposition. Wherefore by such acts habits can be caused in their agents; not indeed with regard to the first active principle, + but with regard to that principle of the act, which principle is a mover moved. For everything that is passive and + moved by another, is disposed by the action of the agent; wherefore if the acts be multiplied a certain quality is formed + in the power which is passive and moved, which quality is called a habit: just as the habits of moral virtue are caused in + the appetitive powers, according as they are moved by the reason, and as the habits of science are caused in the intellect, + according as it is moved by first propositions. +
[35688] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod in agente quandoque est solum activum principium sui +actus, sicut in igne est solum principium activum calefaciendi. Et +in tali agente non potest aliquis habitus causari ex proprio actu, +et inde est quod res naturales non possunt aliquid consuescere vel +dissuescere, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Invenitur autem aliquod agens +in quo est principium activum et passivum sui actus, sicut patet in +actibus humanis. Nam actus appetitivae virtutis procedunt a vi +appetitiva secundum quod movetur a vi apprehensiva repraesentante +obiectum, et ulterius vis intellectiva, secundum quod ratiocinatur +de conclusionibus, habet sicut principium activum propositionem per +se notam. Unde ex talibus actibus possunt in agentibus aliqui +habitus causari, non quidem quantum ad primum activum principium, +sed quantum ad principium actus quod movet motum. Nam omne quod +patitur et movetur ab alio, disponitur per actum agentis, unde ex +multiplicatis actibus generatur quaedam qualitas in potentia +passiva et mota, quae nominatur habitus. Sicut habitus virtutum +moralium causantur in appetitivis potentiis, secundum quod moventur +a ratione, et habitus scientiarum causantur in intellectu, secundum +quod movetur a primis propositionibus.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The agent, as agent, does not receive anything. But in so far as it moves through being moved by another, it receives something + from that which moves it: and thus is a habit caused. +
[35689] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod agens, inquantum est agens, non recipit aliquid. +Sed inquantum agit motum ab alio, sic recipit aliquid a movente, et +sic causatur habitus.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The same thing, and in the same respect, cannot be mover and moved; but nothing prevents a thing from being moved by itself + as to different respects, as is proved in Physics viii, text. 28,29. +
[35690] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod idem, secundum idem, non potest esse movens et motum. +Nihil autem prohibet idem a seipso moveri secundum diversa, ut in +VIII Physic. probatur.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The act which precedes the habit, in so far as it comes from an active principle, proceeds from a more excellent principle + than is the habit caused thereby: just as the reason is a more excellent principle than the habit of moral virtue produced + in the appetitive power by repeated acts, and as the understanding of first principles is a more excellent principle than + the science of conclusions. +
[35691] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod actus praecedens habitum inquantum procedit a +principio activo, procedit a nobiliori principio quam sit habitus +generatus, sicut ipsa ratio est nobilius principium quam sit +habitus virtutis moralis in vi appetitiva per actuum consuetudines +generatus; et intellectus principiorum est nobilius principium quam +scientia conclusionum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that a habit can be caused by one act. For demonstration is an act of reason. But science, which is the habit + of one conclusion, is caused by one demonstration. Therefore habit can be caused by one act. +
[35692] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod per unum actum possit habitus +generari. Demonstratio enim actus rationis est. Sed per unam +demonstrationem causatur scientia quae est habitus conclusionis +unius. Ergo habitus potest causari ex uno actu.
+ Objection 2: Further, as acts happen to increase by multiplication so do they happen to increase by intensity. But a habit is caused by + multiplication of acts. Therefore also if an act be very intense, it can be the generating cause of a habit. +
[35693] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +sicut contingit actus crescere per multiplicationem, ita contingit +actum crescere per intensionem. Sed multiplicatis actibus, +generatur habitus. Ergo etiam si multum intendatur unus actus, +poterit esse causa generativa habitus.
+ Objection 3: Further, health and sickness are habits. But it happens that a man is healed or becomes ill, by one act. Therefore one act + can cause a habit. +
[35694] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sanitas et aegritudo sunt habitus quidam. Sed ex uno actu contingit +hominem vel sanari vel infirmari. Ergo unus actus potest habitum +causare.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7): "As neither does one swallow nor one day make spring: so neither does one day nor a short + time make a man blessed and happy." But "happiness is an operation in respect of a habit of perfect virtue" (Ethic. i, 7,10,13). + Therefore a habit of virtue, and for the same reason, other habits, is not caused by one act. +
[35695] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod una hirundo ver +non facit, nec una dies, ita utique nec beatum nec felicem una +dies, nec paucum tempus. Sed beatitudo est operatio secundum +habitum perfectae virtutis, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Ergo habitus +virtutis, et eadem ratione alius habitus, non causatur per unum +actum.
+ I answer that, As we have said already + (A[2]), habit is caused by act, because a passive power is moved by an active principle. But in order that some quality be caused + in that which is passive the active principle must entirely overcome the passive. Whence we see that because fire cannot at + once overcome the combustible, it does not enkindle at once; but it gradually expels contrary dispositions, so that by overcoming + it entirely, it may impress + its likeness on it. Now it is clear that the active principle which is reason, cannot entirely overcome the appetitive power + in one act: because the appetitive power is inclined variously, and to many things; while the reason judges in a single act, + what should be willed in regard to various aspects and circumstances. Wherefore the appetitive power is not thereby entirely + overcome, so as to be inclined like nature to the same thing, in the majority of cases; which inclination belongs to the + habit of virtue. Therefore a habit of virtue cannot be caused by one act, but only by many. +
[35696] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, habitus per actum generatur +inquantum potentia passiva movetur ab aliquo principio activo. Ad +hoc autem quod aliqua qualitas causetur in passivo, oportet quod +activum totaliter vincat passivum. Unde videmus quod, quia ignis +non potest statim vincere suum combustibile, non statim inflammat +ipsum, sed paulatim abiicit contrarias dispositiones, ut sic +totaliter vincens ipsum, similitudinem suam ipsi imprimat. +Manifestum est autem quod principium activum quod est ratio, non +totaliter potest supervincere appetitivam potentiam in uno actu, eo +quod appetitiva potentia se habet diversimode et ad multa; +iudicatur autem per rationem, in uno actu, aliquid appetendum +secundum determinatas rationes et circumstantias. Unde ex hoc non +totaliter vincitur appetitiva potentia, ut feratur in idem ut in +pluribus, per modum naturae, quod pertinet ad habitum virtutis. Et +ideo habitus virtutis non potest causari per unum actum, sed per +multos.
But in the apprehensive powers, we must observe that there are two passive principles: one is the "possible" [*See + FP, Q[79], A[2] ad 2] intellect itself; the other is the intellect which Aristotle (De Anima iii, text. 20) calls "passive," and is the "particular + reason," that is the cogitative power, with memory and imagination. With regard then to the former passive principle, it is + possible for a certain active principle to entirely overcome, by one + act, the power of its passive principle: thus one self-evident proposition convinces the intellect, so that it gives a firm + assent to the conclusion, but a probable proposition cannot do this. Wherefore a habit of opinion needs to be caused by many + acts of the reason, even on the part of the "possible" intellect: whereas a habit of science can be caused by a single act + of the reason, so far as the "possible" intellect is concerned. But with regard to the lower apprehensive powers, the same + acts + need to be repeated many times for anything to be firmly impressed on the memory. And so the Philosopher says (De Memor. et + Remin. 1) that "meditation strengthens memory." Bodily habits, however, can be caused by one act, if the active principle + is of great power: sometimes, for instance, a strong dose of medicine restores health at once. +
In apprehensivis autem potentiis considerandum est quod +duplex est passivum, unum quidem ipse intellectus possibilis; aliud +autem intellectus quem vocat Aristoteles passivum, qui est ratio +particularis, idest vis cogitativa cum memorativa et imaginativa. +Respectu igitur primi passivi, potest esse aliquod activum quod uno +actu totaliter vincit potentiam sui passivi, sicut una propositio +per se nota convincit intellectum ad assentiendum firmiter +conclusioni; quod quidem non facit propositio probabilis. Unde ex +multis actibus rationis oportet causari habitum opinativum, etiam +ex parte intellectus possibilis, habitum autem scientiae possibile +est causari ex uno rationis actu, quantum ad intellectum +possibilem. Sed quantum ad inferiores vires apprehensivas, +necessarium est eosdem actus pluries reiterari, ut aliquid firmiter +memoriae imprimatur. Unde philosophus, in libro de memoria et +reminiscentia, dicit quod meditatio confirmat memoriam. +Habitus autem corporales possibile est causari ex uno actu, si +activum fuerit magnae virtutis, sicut quandoque medicina fortis +statim inducit sanitatem.
Hence the solutions to the objections are clear.
[35697] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 3 ad arg. Et per hoc +patet responsio ad obiecta.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that no habit is infused in man by God. For God treats all equally. If therefore He infuses habits into some, + He would infuse them into all: which is clearly untrue. +
[35698] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullus habitus hominibus infundatur a +Deo. Deus enim aequaliter se habet ad omnes. Si igitur quibusdam +infundit habitus aliquos, omnibus eos infunderet. Quod patet esse +falsum.
+ Objection 2: Further, God works in all things according to the mode which is suitable to their nature: for "it belongs to Divine providence + to preserve nature," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But habits are naturally caused in man by acts, as we have said above + + (A[2]). Therefore God does not cause habits to be in man except by acts. +
[35699] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Deus operatur in omnibus secundum modum qui convenit naturae +ipsorum, quia divinae providentiae est naturam salvare, ut dicit +Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed habitus in homine naturaliter +causantur ex actibus, ut dictum est. Non ergo causat Deus in +hominibus aliquos habitus absque actibus.
+ Objection 3: Further, if any habit be infused into man by God, man can by that habit perform many acts. But "from those acts a like habit + is caused" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Consequently there will be two habits of the same species in the same man, one acquired, the + other infused. Now this seems impossible: for the two forms of the same species cannot be in the same subject. Therefore a + habit is not infused into man by God. +
[35700] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +si aliquis habitus a Deo infunditur, per illum habitum homo potest +multos actus producere. Sed ex illis actibus causatur similis +habitus, ut in II Ethic. dicitur. Sequitur ergo duos habitus +eiusdem speciei esse in eodem, unum acquisitum, et alterum infusum. +Quod videtur esse impossibile, non enim duae formae unius speciei +possunt esse in eodem subiecto. Non ergo habitus aliquis infunditur +homini a Deo.
+ On the contrary, it is written ( + Ecclus. 15:5): "God filled him with the spirit of wisdom and understanding." Now wisdom and understanding are habits. Therefore some habits + are infused into man by God. +
[35701] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Eccli. XV, implevit eum dominus spiritu +sapientiae et intellectus. Sed sapientia et intellectus quidam +habitus sunt. Ergo aliqui habitus homini a Deo infunduntur.
+ I answer that, Some habits are infused by God into man, for two reasons. +
The first reason is because there are some habits by which man is disposed to an end which exceeds the proportion of human + nature, namely, the ultimate and perfect happiness of man, as stated above ( + Q[5], A[5]). And since habits need to be in proportion with that to which man is disposed by them, therefore is it necessary that those + habits, which dispose to this end, exceed the proportion of human nature. Wherefore such habits can never be in man except + by Divine infusion, as is the case with all gratuitous virtues. +
The other reason is, because God can produce the effects of second causes, without these second causes, as we have said in + the + FP, Q[105], A[6]. Just as, therefore, sometimes, in order to show His power, He causes health, without its natural cause, but which nature + could have caused, so also, at times, for the manifestation of His power, He infuses into man even those habits which can + be caused by a natural power. Thus He gave to the apostles the + science of the Scriptures and of all tongues, which men can acquire by study or by custom, but not so perfectly. +
[35702] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod duplici ratione aliqui habitus homini a Deo +infunduntur. Prima ratio est, quia aliqui habitus sunt quibus homo +bene disponitur ad finem excedentem facultatem humanae naturae, qui +est ultima et perfecta hominis beatitudo, ut supra dictum est. Et +quia habitus oportet esse proportionatos ei ad quod homo disponitur +secundum ipsos, ideo necesse est quod etiam habitus ad huiusmodi +finem disponentes, excedant facultatem humanae naturae. Unde tales +habitus nunquam possunt homini inesse nisi ex infusione divina, +sicut est de omnibus gratuitis virtutibus. Alia ratio est, quia +Deus potest producere effectus causarum secundarum absque ipsis +causis secundis, ut in primo dictum est. Sicut igitur quandoque, ad +ostensionem suae virtutis, producit sanitatem absque naturali +causa, quae tamen per naturam posset causari; ita etiam quandoque, +ad ostendendam suam virtutem, infundit homini illos etiam habitus +qui naturali virtute possunt causari. Sicut apostolis dedit +scientiam Scripturarum et omnium linguarum, quam homines per +studium vel consuetudinem acquirere possunt, licet non ita +perfecte.
+ Reply to Objection 1: God, in respect of His Nature, is the same to all, but in respect of the order of His Wisdom, for some fixed motive, gives + certain things to some, which He does not give to others. +
[35703] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Deus, quantum ad suam naturam, aequaliter se +habet ad omnes, sed secundum ordinem suae sapientiae certa ratione +quaedam tribuit aliquibus, quae non tribuit aliis.
+ Reply to Objection 2: That God works in all according to their mode, does not hinder God from doing what nature cannot do: but it follows from + this that He does nothing contrary to that which is suitable to nature. +
[35704] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod hoc quod Deus in omnibus operatur secundum modum +eorum, non excludit quin Deus quaedam operetur quae natura operari +non potest, sed ex hoc sequitur quod nihil operatur contra id quod +naturae convenit.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Acts produced by an infused habit, do not cause a habit, but strengthen the already existing habit; just as the remedies + of medicine given to a man who is naturally health, do not cause a kind of health, but give new strength to the health he + had before. +
[35705] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod actus qui producuntur ex habitu infuso, non causant +aliquem habitum, sed confirmant habitum praeexistentem, sicut +medicinalia remedia adhibita homini sano per naturam, non causant +aliquam sanitatem, sed sanitatem prius habitam corroborant.
We have now to consider the increase of habits; under which head there are three points of inquiry:
+[35706] +Iª-IIae q. 52 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +augmento habituum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo, utrum +habitus augeantur. Secundo, utrum augeantur per additionem. Tertio, +utrum quilibet actus augeat habitum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that habits cannot increase. For increase concerns quantity (Phys. v, text. 18). But habits are not in the + genus quantity, but in that of quality. Therefore there can be no increase of habits. +
[35707] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus augeri non possint. Augmentum +enim est circa quantitatem, ut dicitur in V Physic. Sed habitus non +sunt in genere quantitatis, sed in genere qualitatis. Ergo circa +eos augmentum esse non potest.
+ Objection 2: Further, habit is a perfection (Phys. vii, text. 17,18). But since perfection conveys a notion of end and term, it seems + that it cannot be more or less. Therefore a habit cannot increase. +
[35708] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +habitus est perfectio quaedam, ut dicitur in VII Physic. Sed +perfectio, cum importet finem et terminum, non videtur posse +recipere magis et minus. Ergo habitus augeri non potest.
+ Objection 3: Further, those things which can be more or less are subject to alteration: for that which from being less hot becomes more + hot, is said to be altered. But in habits there is no alteration, as is proved in Phys. vii, text. 15,17. Therefore habits + cannot increase. +
[35709] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +in his quae recipiunt magis et minus, contingit esse alterationem, +alterari enim dicitur quod de minus calido fit magis calidum. Sed +in habitibus non est alteratio, ut probatur in VII Physic. Ergo +habitus augeri non possunt.
+ On the contrary, Faith is a habit, and yet it increases: wherefore the disciples said to our Lord ( + Lk. 17:5): "Lord, increase our faith." Therefore habits increase. +
[35710] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod fides est quidam habitus, et tamen augetur, unde discipuli +domino dicunt, domine, adauge nobis fidem, ut habetur Luc. XVII. +Ergo habitus augentur.
+ I answer that, Increase, like other things pertaining to quantity, is transferred from bodily quantities to intelligible spiritual things, + on account of the natural connection of the intellect with corporeal things, which come under the imagination. Now in corporeal + quantities, a thing is said to be great, according as it reaches the perfection of quantity due to it; wherefore a certain + quantity is reputed great in man, which is not reputed great in an elephant. And so + also in forms, we say a thing is great because it is perfect. And since good has the nature of perfection, therefore "in things + which are great, but not in quantity, to be greater is the same as to be better," as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 8). +
Now the perfection of a form may be considered in two ways: first, in respect of the form itself: secondly, in respect of + the participation of the form by its subject. In so far as we consider the perfections of a form in respect of the form itself, + thus the form is said to be "little" or "great": for instance great or little health or science. But in so far as we consider + the perfection of a form in respect of the participation thereof by the subject, it is said to be "more" or + "less": for instance more or less white or healthy. Now this distinction is not to be understood as implying that the form + has a being outside its matter or subject, but that it is one thing to consider the form according to its specific nature, + and another to consider it in respect of its participation by a subject. +
In this way, then, there were four opinions among philosophers concerning intensity and remission of habits and forms, as + Simplicius relates in his Commentary on the Predicaments. For Plotinus and the other Platonists held that qualities and habits + themselves were susceptible of more or less, for the reason that they were material and so had a certain want of definiteness, + on account of the infinity of matter. Others, on the contrary, held that qualities and habits of themselves + were not susceptible of more or less; but that the things affected by them [qualia] are said to be more or less, in respect + of the participation of the subject: that, for instance, justice is not more or less, but the just thing. Aristotle alludes + to this opinion in the Predicaments (Categor. vi). The third opinion was that of the Stoics, and lies between the two preceding + opinions. For they held that some habits are of themselves susceptible of more and less, for instance, the arts; and that + some are not, as the virtues. The fourth opinion was held by some who said that qualities and immaterial forms are not susceptible + of more or less, but that material forms are. +
In order that the truth in this matter be made clear, we must observe that, in respect of which a thing receives its species, + must be something fixed and stationary, and as it were indivisible: for whatever attains to that thing, is contained under + the species, and whatever recedes from it more or less, belongs to another species, more or less perfect. Wherefore, the Philosopher + says (Metaph. viii, text. 10) that species of things are like numbers, in which addition or + subtraction changes the species. If, therefore, a form, or anything at all, receives its specific nature in respect of itself, + or in respect of something belonging to it, it is necessary that, considered in itself, it be something of a definite nature, + which can be neither more nor less. Such are heat, whiteness or other like qualities which are not denominated from a relation + to something else: and much more so, substance, which is "per se" being. But those things which receive their species + from something to which they are related, can be diversified, in respect of themselves, according to more or less: and nonetheless + they remain in the same species, on account of the oneness of that to which they are related, and from which they receive + their species. For example, movement is in itself more intense or more remiss: and yet it remains in the same species, on + account of the oneness of the term by which it is specified. We may observe the same thing in health; for a body attains to + the nature of health, according as it has a disposition suitable to an animal's nature, to which various dispositions may + be suitable; which disposition is therefore variable as regards more or less, and withal the nature of health remains. Whence + the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 2,3): "Health itself may be more or less: for the measure is not the same in all, nor is it + always the same in one individual; but down to a certain point it may decrease and still remain health." +
Now these various dispositions and measures of health are by way of excess and defect: wherefore if the name of health were + given to the most perfect measure, then we should not speak of health as greater or less. Thus therefore it is clear how a + quality or form may increase or decrease of itself, and how it cannot. +
But if we consider a quality or form in respect of its participation by the subject, thus again we find that some qualities + and forms are susceptible of more or less, and some not. Now Simplicius assigns the cause of this diversity to the fact that + substance in itself cannot be susceptible of more or less, because it is "per se" being. And therefore every form which is + participated substantially by its subject, cannot vary in intensity and remission: wherefore in the genus of + substance nothing is said to be more or less. And because quantity is nigh to substance, and because shape follows on quantity, + therefore is it that neither in these can there be such a thing as more or less. Whence the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. + 15) that when a thing receives form and shape, it is not said to be altered, but to be made. But other qualities which are + further removed from quantity, and are connected with passions and actions, are susceptible of more or less, in respect + of their participation by the subject. +
Now it is possible to explain yet further the reason of this diversity. For, as we have said, that from which a thing receives + its species must remain indivisibly fixed and constant in something indivisible. Wherefore in two ways it may happen that + a form cannot be participated more or less. First because the participator has its species in respect of that form. And for + this reason no substantial form is participated more or less. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, + text. 10) that, "as a number cannot be more or less, so neither can that which is in the species of substance," that is, in + respect of its participation of the specific form: "but in so far as substance may be with matter," i.e. in respect of material + dispositions, "more or less are found in substance." +
Secondly this may happen from the fact that the form is essentially indivisible: wherefore if anything participate that form, + it must needs participate it in respect of its indivisibility. For this reason we do not speak of the species of number as + varying in respect of more or less; because each species thereof is constituted by an indivisible unity. The same is to be + said of the species of continuous quantity, which are denominated from numbers, as two-cubits-long, + three-cubits-long, and of relations of quantity, as double and treble, and of figures of quantity, as triangle and tetragon. +
This same explanation is given by Aristotle in the Predicaments (Categor. vi), where in explaining why figures are not susceptible + of more or less, he says: "Things which are given the nature of a triangle or a circle, are accordingly triangles and circles": + to wit, because indivisibility is essential to the motion of such, wherefore whatever participates their nature must participate + it in its indivisibility. +
It is clear, therefore, since we speak of habits and dispositions in respect of a relation to something (Phys. vii, text. + 17), that in two ways intensity and remission may be observed in habits and dispositions. First, in respect of the habit itself: + thus, for instance, we speak of greater or less health; greater or less science, which extends to more or fewer things. Secondly, + in respect of participation by the subject: in so far as equal science or health is participated more + in one than in another, according to a diverse aptitude arising either from nature, or from custom. For habit and disposition + do not give species to the subject: nor again do they essentially imply indivisibility. +
We shall say further on ( + Q[66], A[1]) how it is with the virtues. +
[35711] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod augmentum, sicut et alia ad quantitatem pertinentia, +a quantitatibus corporalibus ad res spirituales intelligibiles +transfertur; propter connaturalitatem intellectus nostri ad res +corporeas, quae sub imaginatione cadunt. Dicitur autem in +quantitatibus corporeis aliquid magnum, secundum quod ad debitam +perfectionem quantitatis perducitur, unde aliqua quantitas +reputatur magna in homine, quae non reputatur magna in elephante. +Unde et in formis dicimus aliquid magnum, ex hoc quod est +perfectum. Et quia bonum habet rationem perfecti, propter hoc in +his quae non mole magna sunt, idem est esse maius quod melius, +ut Augustinus dicit, in VI de Trin. Perfectio autem formae +dupliciter potest considerari, uno modo, secundum ipsam formam; +alio modo, secundum quod subiectum participat formam. Inquantum +igitur attenditur perfectio formae secundum ipsam formam, sic +dicitur ipsa esse parva vel magna; puta magna vel parva sanitas vel +scientia. Inquantum vero attenditur perfectio formae secundum +participationem subiecti, dicitur magis et minus; puta magis vel +minus album vel sanum. Non autem ista distinctio procedit secundum +hoc, quod forma habeat esse praeter materiam aut subiectum, sed +quia alia est consideratio eius secundum rationem speciei suae, et +alia secundum quod participatur in subiecto. Secundum hoc igitur, +circa intensionem et remissionem habituum et formarum, fuerunt +quatuor opiniones apud philosophos, ut Simplicius narrat in +commento praedicamentorum. Plotinus enim et alii Platonici ponebant +ipsas qualitates et habitus suscipere magis et minus, propter hoc +quod materiales erant, et ex hoc habebant indeterminationem +quandam, propter materiae infinitatem. Alii vero in contrarium +ponebant quod ipsae qualitates et habitus secundum se non +recipiebant magis et minus; sed qualia dicuntur magis et minus, +secundum diversam participationem; puta quod iustitia non dicatur +magis et minus, sed iustum. Et hanc opinionem tangit Aristoteles in +praedicamentis. Tertia fuit opinio Stoicorum, media inter has. +Posuerunt enim quod aliqui habitus secundum se recipiunt magis et +minus, sicuti artes; quidam autem non, sicut virtutes. Quarta +opinio fuit quorundam dicentium quod qualitates et formae +immateriales non recipiunt magis et minus, materiales autem +recipiunt. Ut igitur huius rei veritas manifestetur, considerandum +est quod illud secundum quod sortitur aliquid speciem, oportet esse +fixum et stans, et quasi indivisibile, quaecumque enim ad illud +attingunt, sub specie continentur; quaecumque autem recedunt ab +illo, vel in plus vel in minus, pertinent ad aliam speciem, vel +perfectiorem vel imperfectiorem. Unde philosophus dicit, in VIII +Metaphys., quod species rerum sunt sicut numeri, in quibus additio +vel diminutio variat speciem. Si igitur aliqua forma, vel +quaecumque res, secundum seipsam vel secundum aliquid sui, +sortiatur rationem speciei; necesse est quod, secundum se +considerata, habeat determinatam rationem, quae neque in plus +excedere, neque in minus deficere possit. Et huiusmodi sunt calor +et albedo, et aliae huiusmodi qualitates quae non dicuntur in +ordine ad aliud, et multo magis substantia, quae est per se ens. +Illa vero quae recipiunt speciem ex aliquo ad quod ordinantur, +possunt secundum seipsa diversificari in plus vel in minus, et +nihilominus sunt eadem specie, propter unitatem eius ad quod +ordinantur, ex quo recipiunt speciem. Sicut motus secundum se est +intensior et remissior, et tamen remanet eadem species, propter +unitatem termini, ex quo specificatur. Et idem potest considerari +in sanitate, nam corpus pertingit ad rationem sanitatis, secundum +quod habet dispositionem convenientem naturae animalis, cui possunt +dispositiones diversae convenientes esse; unde potest variari +dispositio in plus vel in minus, et tamen semper remanet ratio +sanitatis. Unde philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., quod sanitas +ipsa recipit magis et minus, non enim eadem est commensuratio in +omnibus, neque in uno et eodem semper; sed remissa permanet sanitas +usque ad aliquid. Huiusmodi autem diversae dispositiones vel +commensurationes sanitatis se habent secundum excedens et excessum, +unde si nomen sanitatis esset impositum soli perfectissimae +commensurationi, tunc ipsa sanitas non diceretur maior vel minor. +Sic igitur patet qualiter aliqua qualitas vel forma possit secundum +seipsam augeri vel minui, et qualiter non. Si vero consideremus +qualitatem vel formam secundum participationem subiecti, sic etiam +inveniuntur quaedam qualitates et formae recipere magis et minus, +et quaedam non. Huiusmodi autem diversitatis causam Simplicius +assignat ex hoc, quod substantia secundum seipsam non potest +recipere magis et minus, quia est ens per se. Et ideo omnis forma +quae substantialiter participatur in subiecto, caret intensione et +remissione, unde in genere substantiae nihil dicitur secundum magis +et minus. Et quia quantitas propinqua est substantiae, et figura +etiam consequitur quantitatem; inde est quod neque etiam in istis +dicitur aliquid secundum magis aut minus. Unde philosophus dicit, +in VII Physic., quod cum aliquid accipit formam et figuram, non +dicitur alterari, sed magis fieri. Aliae vero qualitates, quae sunt +magis distantes a substantia, et coniunguntur passionibus et +actionibus, recipiunt magis et minus secundum participationem +subiecti. Potest autem et magis explicari huiusmodi diversitatis +ratio. Ut enim dictum est, id a quo aliquid habet speciem, oportet +manere fixum et stans in indivisibili. Duobus igitur modis potest +contingere quod forma non participatur secundum magis et minus. Uno +modo, quia participans habet speciem secundum ipsam. Et inde est +quod nulla forma substantialis participatur secundum magis et +minus. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit, in VIII Metaphys., quod, +sicut numerus non habet magis neque minus, sic neque substantia +quae est secundum speciem, idest quantum ad participationem formae +specificae; sed si quidem quae cum materia, idest, secundum +materiales dispositiones invenitur magis et minus in substantia. +Alio modo potest contingere ex hoc quod ipsa indivisibilitas est de +ratione formae, unde oportet quod, si aliquid participet formam +illam, quod participet illam secundum rationem indivisibilitatis. +Et inde est quod species numeri non dicuntur secundum magis et +minus, quia unaquaeque species in eis constituitur per +indivisibilem unitatem. Et eadem ratio est de speciebus quantitatis +continuae quae secundum numeros accipiuntur ut bicubitum et +tricubitum; et de relationibus, ut duplum et triplum; et de +figuris, ut trigonum et tetragonum. Et hanc rationem ponit +Aristoteles in praedicamentis, ubi, assignans rationem quare +figurae non recipiunt magis et minus, dicit, quae quidem enim +recipiunt trigoni rationem et circuli, similiter trigona vel +circuli sunt, quia scilicet indivisibilitas est de ipsa eorum +ratione, unde quaecumque participant rationem eorum, oportet quod +indivisibiliter participent. Sic igitur patet quod, cum habitus et +dispositiones dicantur secundum ordinem ad aliquid, ut dicitur in +VII Physic., dupliciter potest intensio et remissio in habitibus et +dispositionibus considerari. Uno modo, secundum se, prout dicitur +maior vel minor sanitas; vel maior vel minor scientia, quae ad +plura vel pauciora se extendit. Alio modo, secundum participationem +subiecti, prout scilicet aequalis scientia vel sanitas magis +recipitur in uno quam in alio, secundum diversam aptitudinem vel ex +natura vel ex consuetudine. Non enim habitus et dispositio dat +speciem subiecto, neque iterum in sui ratione includit +indivisibilitatem. Quomodo autem circa virtutes se habeat, infra +dicetur.
+ Reply to Objection 1: As the word "great" is taken from corporeal quantities and applied to the intelligible perfections of forms; so also is the + word "growth," the term of which is something great. +
[35712] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut nomen magnitudinis derivatur a +quantitatibus corporalibus ad intelligibiles perfectiones formarum; +ita etiam et nomen augmenti, cuius terminus est magnum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Habit is indeed a perfection, but not a perfection which is the term of its subject; for instance, a term giving the subject + its specific being. Nor again does the nature of a habit include the notion of term, as do the species of numbers. Wherefore + there is nothing to hinder it from being susceptible of more or less. +
[35713] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod habitus quidem perfectio est, non tamen talis +perfectio quae sit terminus sui subiecti, puta dans ei esse +specificum. Neque etiam in sui ratione terminum includit, sicut +species numerorum. Unde nihil prohibet quin recipiat magis et +minus.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Alteration is primarily indeed in the qualities of the third species; but secondarily it may be in the qualities of the first + species: for, supposing an alteration as to hot and cold, there follows in an animal an alteration as to health and sickness. + In like manner, if an alteration take place in the passions of the sensitive appetite, or the sensitive powers of apprehension, + an alteration follows as to science and virtue (Phys. viii, text. 20). +
[35714] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod alteratio primo quidem est in qualitatibus tertiae +speciei. In qualitatibus vero primae speciei potest esse alteratio +per posterius, facta enim alteratione secundum calidum et frigidum, +sequitur animal alterari secundum sanum et aegrum. Et similiter, +facta alteratione secundum passiones appetitus sensitivi, vel +secundum vires sensitivas apprehensivas, sequitur alteratio +secundum scientias et virtutes, ut dicitur in VII Physic.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the increase of habits is by way of addition. For the word "increase," as we have said, is transferred + to forms, from corporeal quantities. But in corporeal quantities there is no increase without addition: wherefore (De Gener. + i, text. 31) it is said that "increase is an addition to a magnitude already existing." Therefore in habits also there is + no increase without addition. +
[35715] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod augmentum habituum fiat per +additionem. Nomen enim augmenti, ut dictum est, a quantitatibus +corporalibus transfertur ad formas. Sed in quantitatibus +corporalibus non fit augmentum sine additione, unde in I de +Generat. dicitur quod augmentum est praeexistenti magnitudini +additamentum. Ergo et in habitibus non fit augmentum nisi per +additionem.
+ Objection 2: Further, habit is not increased except by means of some agent. But every agent does something in the passive subject: for + instance, that which heats, causes heat in that which is heated. Therefore there is no increase without addition. +
[35716] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +habitus non augetur nisi aliquo agente. Sed omne agens aliquid +facit in subiecto patiente, sicut calefaciens facit calorem in ipso +calefacto. Ergo non potest esse augmentum nisi aliqua fiat +additio.
+ Objection 3: Further, as that which is not white, is in potentiality to be white: so that which is less white, is in potentiality to be + more white. But that which is not white, is not made white except by the addition of whiteness. Therefore that which is less + white, is not made more white, except by an added whiteness. +
[35717] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sicut id quod non est album, est in potentia ad album; ita id quod +est minus album, est in potentia ad magis album. Sed id quod non +est album, non fit album nisi per adventum albedinis. Ergo id quod +est minus album, non fit magis album nisi per aliquam aliam +albedinem supervenientem.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text. 84): "That which is hot is made hotter, without making, in the matter, something hot, + that was not hot, when the thing was less hot." Therefore, in like manner, neither is any addition made in other forms when + they increase. +
[35718] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in IV Physic., ex calido fit magis +calidum, nullo facto in materia calido, quod non esset calidum +quando erat minus calidum. Ergo, pari ratione, nec in aliis +formis quae augentur, est aliqua additio.
+ I answer that, The solution of this question depends on what we have said above + (A[1]). For we said that increase and decrease in forms which are capable of intensity and remissness, happen in one way not on + the part of the very form considered in itself, through the diverse participation thereof by the subject. Wherefore such increase + of habits and other forms, is not caused by an addition of form to form; but by the subject participating more or + less perfectly, one and the same form. And just as, by an agent which is in act, something is made actually hot, beginning, + as it were, to participate a form, not as though the form itself were made, as is proved in Metaph. vii, text. 32, so, by + an intense action of the agent, something is made more hot, as it were participating the form more perfectly, not as though + something were added to the form. +
For if this increase in forms were understood to be by way of addition, this could only be either in the form itself or in + the subject. If it be understood of the form itself, it has already been stated + (A[1]) that such an addition or subtraction would change the species; even as the species of color is changed when a thing from + being pale becomes white. If, on the other hand, this addition be understood as applying to the subject, this could only be + either because one part of the subject receives a form which it had not previously (thus we may say cold increases in a man + who, after being cold in one part of his body, is cold in several parts), or because some other subject is added sharing in + the same form (as when a hot thing is added to another, or one white thing to another). But in either of these two ways we + have not a more white or a more hot thing, but a greater white or hot thing. +
Since, however, as stated above + (A[1]), certain accidents are of themselves susceptible of more or less, in some of these we may find increase by addition. For + movement increases by an addition either to the time it lasts, or to the course it follows: and yet the species remains the + same on account of the oneness of the term. Yet movement increases the intensity as to participation in its subject: i.e. + in so far as the same movement can be executed more + or less speedily or readily. In like manner, science can increase in itself by addition; thus when anyone learns several conclusions + of geometry, the same specific habit of science increases in that man. Yet a man's science increases, as to the subject's + participation thereof, in intensity, in so far as one man is quicker and readier than another in considering the same conclusions. +
As to bodily habits, it does not seem very probable that they receive increase by way of addition. For an animal is not said + to be simply healthy or beautiful, unless it be such in all its parts. And if it be brought to a more perfect measure, this + is the result of a change in the simple qualities, which are not susceptible of increase save in intensity on the part of + the subject partaking of them. +
How this question affects virtues we shall state further on ( + Q[66], A[1] ). +
[35719] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod huius quaestionis solutio dependet ex praemissa. +Dictum est enim supra quod augmentum et diminutio in formis quae +intenduntur et remittuntur, accidit uno modo non ex parte ipsius +formae secundum se consideratae, sed ex diversa participatione +subiecti. Et ideo huiusmodi augmentum habituum et aliarum formarum, +non fit per additionem formae ad formam; sed fit per hoc quod +subiectum magis vel minus perfecte participat unam et eandem +formam. Et sicut per agens quod est actu, fit aliquid actu calidum, +quasi de novo incipiens participare formam, non quod fiat ipsa +forma, ut probatur VII Metaphys.; ita per actionem intensam ipsius +agentis efficitur magis calidum, tanquam perfectius participans +formam, non tanquam formae aliquid addatur. Si enim per additionem +intelligeretur huiusmodi augmentum in formis, hoc non posset esse +nisi vel ex parte ipsius formae, vel ex parte subiecti. Si autem ex +parte ipsius formae, iam dictum est quod talis additio vel +subtractio speciem variaret; sicut variatur species coloris, quando +de pallido fit album. Si vero huiusmodi additio intelligatur ex +parte subiecti, hoc non posset esse nisi vel quia aliqua pars +subiecti recipit formam quam prius non habebat, ut si dicatur +frigus crescere in homine qui prius frigebat in una parte, quando +iam in pluribus partibus friget, vel quia aliquod aliud subiectum +additur participans eandem formam, sicut si calidum adiungatur +calido, vel album albo. Sed secundum utrumque istorum duorum +modorum, non dicitur aliquid magis album vel calidum, sed maius. +Sed quia quaedam accidentia augentur secundum seipsa, ut supra +dictum est, in quibusdam eorum fieri potest augmentum per +additionem. Augetur enim motus per hoc quod ei aliquid additur vel +secundum tempus in quo est, vel secundum viam per quam est, et +tamen manet eadem species, propter unitatem termini. Augetur etiam +nihilominus motus per intensionem, secundum participationem +subiecti, inquantum scilicet idem motus potest vel magis vel minus +expedite aut prompte fieri. Similiter etiam et scientia potest +augeri secundum seipsam per additionem, sicut cum aliquis plures +conclusiones geometriae addiscit, augetur in eo habitus eiusdem +scientiae secundum speciem. Augetur nihilominus scientia in aliquo, +secundum participationem subiecti, per intensionem, prout scilicet +expeditius et clarius unus homo se habet alio in eisdem +conclusionibus considerandis. In habitibus autem corporalibus non +multum videtur fieri augmentum per additionem. Quia non dicitur +animal sanum simpliciter, aut pulchrum, nisi secundum omnes partes +suas sit tale. Quod autem ad perfectiorem commensurationem +perducatur, hoc contingit secundum transmutationem simplicium +qualitatum; quae non augentur nisi secundum intensionem, ex parte +subiecti participantis. Quomodo autem se habeat circa virtutes, +infra dicetur.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Even in bodily bulk increase is twofold. First, by addition of one subject to another; such is the increase of living things. + Secondly, by mere intensity, without any addition at all; such is the case with things subject to rarefaction, as is stated + in Phys. iv, text. 63. +
[35720] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod etiam in magnitudine corporali contingit +dupliciter esse augmentum. Uno modo, per additionem subiecti ad +subiectum; sicut est in augmento viventium. Alio modo, per solam +intensionem, absque omni additione; sicut est in his quae +rarefiunt, ut dicitur in IV Physic.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The cause that increases a habit, always effects something in the subject, but not a new form. But it causes the subject + to partake more perfectly of a pre-existing form, or it makes the form to extend further. +
[35721] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod causa augens habitum, facit quidem semper aliquid in +subiecto, non autem novam formam. Sed facit quod subiectum +perfectius participet formam praeexistentem, aut quod amplius se +extendat.
+ Reply to Objection 3: What is not already white, is potentially white, as not yet possessing the form of whiteness: hence the agent causes a new + form in the subject. But that which is less hot or white, is not in potentiality to those forms, since it has them already + actually: but it is in potentiality to a perfect mode of participation; and this it receives through the agent's action. +
[35722] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod id quod nondum est album, est in potentia ad formam +ipsam, tanquam nondum habens formam, et ideo agens causat novam +formam in subiecto. Sed id quod est minus calidum aut album, non +est in potentia ad formam, cum iam actu formam habeat, sed est in +potentia ad perfectum participationis modum. Et hoc consequitur per +actionem agentis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that every act increases its habit. For when the cause is increased the effect is increased. Now acts are causes + of habits, as stated above ( + Q[51], A[2]). Therefore a habit increases when its acts are multiplied. +
[35723] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod quilibet actus augeat habitum. +Multiplicata enim causa, multiplicatur effectus. Sed actus sunt +causa habituum aliquorum, ut supra dictum est. Ergo habitus +augetur, multiplicatis actibus.
+ Objection 2: Further, of like things a like judgment should be formed. But all the acts proceeding from one and the same habit are alike + (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Therefore if some acts increase a habit, every act should increase it. +
[35724] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +de similibus idem est iudicium. Sed omnes actus ab eodem habitu +procedentes sunt similes, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Ergo, si aliqui +actus augeant habitum, quilibet actus augebit ipsum.
+ Objection 3: Further, like is increased by like. But any act is like the habit whence it proceeds. Therefore every act increases the habit. +
[35725] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +simile augetur suo simili. Sed quilibet actus est similis habitui a +quo procedit. Ergo quilibet actus auget habitum.
+ On the contrary, Opposite effects do not result from the same cause. But according to Ethic. ii, 2, some acts lessen the habit whence they + proceed, for instance if they be done carelessly. Therefore it is not every act that increases a habit. +
[35726] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra, +idem non est contrariorum causa. Sed, sicut dicitur in II Ethic., +aliqui actus ab habitu procedentes diminuunt ipsum; utpote cum +negligenter fiunt. Ergo non omnis actus habitum auget.
+ I answer that, "Like acts cause like habits" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Now things are like or unlike not only in respect of their qualities being + the same or various, but also in respect of the same or a different mode of participation. For it is not only black that is + unlike white, but also less white is unlike more white, since there is movement from less white to more white, even as from + one opposite to another, as stated in Phys. v, text. 52. +
[35727] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod similes actus similes habitus causant, ut dicitur in +II Ethic. Similitudo autem et dissimilitudo non solum attenditur +secundum qualitatem eandem vel diversam; sed etiam secundum eundem +vel diversum participationis modum. Est enim dissimile non solum +nigrum albo, sed etiam minus album magis albo, nam etiam motus fit +a minus albo in magis album, tanquam ex opposito in oppositum, ut +dicitur in V Physic.
But since use of habits depends on the will, as was shown above ( + Q[50], A[5]); just as one who has a habit may fail to use it or may act contrary to it; so may he happen to use the habit by performing + an act that is not in proportion to the intensity of the habit. Accordingly, if the intensity of the act correspond in proportion + to the intensity of the habit, or even surpass it, every such act either increases the habit or disposes to an increase + thereof, if we may speak of the increase of habits as we do of the increase of an animal. For not every morsel of food actually + increases the animal's size as neither does every drop of water hollow out the stone: but the multiplication of food results + at last in an increase of the body. So, too, repeated acts cause a habit to grow. If, however, the act falls short of the + intensity of the habit, such an act does not dispose to an increase of that habit, but rather to a lessening thereof. +
Quia vero usus habituum in voluntate hominis +consistit, ut ex supradictis patet; sicut contingit quod aliquis +habens habitum non utitur illo, vel etiam agit actum contrarium; +ita etiam potest contingere quod utitur habitu secundum actum non +respondentem proportionaliter intensioni habitus. Si igitur +intensio actus proportionaliter aequetur intensioni habitus, vel +etiam superexcedat; quilibet actus vel auget habitum, vel disponit +ad augmentum ipsius; ut loquamur de augmento habituum ad +similitudinem augmenti animalis. Non enim quodlibet alimentum +assumptum actu auget animal, sicut nec quaelibet gutta cavat +lapidem, sed, multiplicato alimento, tandem fit augmentum. Ita +etiam, multiplicatis actibus, crescit habitus. Si vero intensio +actus proportionaliter deficiat ab intensione habitus, talis actus +non disponit ad augmentum habitus, sed magis ad diminutionem +ipsius.
From this it is clear how to solve the objections.
[35728] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 ad arg. Et per hoc +patet responsio ad obiecta.
We must now consider how habits are lost or weakened; and under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a habit can be corrupted?
+[35729] +Iª-IIae q. 53 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +corruptione et diminutione habituum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. +Primo, utrum habitus corrumpi possit. Secundo, utrum possit +diminui. Tertio, de modo corruptionis et diminutionis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that a habit cannot be corrupted. For habit is within its subject like a second nature; wherefore it is pleasant + to act from habit. Now so long as a thing is, its nature is not corrupted. Therefore neither can a habit be corrupted so long + as its subject remains. +
[35730] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus corrumpi non possit. Habitus +enim inest sicut natura quaedam, unde operationes secundum habitum +sunt delectabiles. Sed natura non corrumpitur, manente eo cuius est +natura. Ergo neque habitus corrumpi potest, manente subiecto.
+ Objection 2: Further, whenever a form is corrupted, this is due either to corruption of its subject, or to its contrary: thus sickness + ceases through corruption of the animal, or through the advent of health. Now science, which is a habit, cannot be lost through + corruption of its subject: since "the intellect," which is its subject, "is a substance that is incorruptible" (De Anima i, + text. 65). In like manner, neither can it be lost through the action of its contrary: + since intelligible species are not contrary to one another (Metaph. vii, text. 52). Therefore the habit of science can nowise + be lost. +
[35731] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +omnis corruptio formae vel est per corruptionem subiecti, vel est a +contrario, sicut aegritudo corrumpitur corrupto animali, vel etiam +superveniente sanitate. Sed scientia, quae est quidam habitus, non +potest corrumpi per corruptionem subiecti, quia intellectus, qui +est subiectum eius, est substantia quaedam, et non corrumpitur, ut +dicitur in I de anima. Similiter etiam non potest corrumpi a +contrario, nam species intelligibiles non sunt ad invicem +contrariae, ut dicitur in VII Metaphys. Ergo habitus scientiae +nullo modo corrumpi potest.
+ Objection 3: Further, all corruption results from some movement. But the habit of science, which is in the soul, cannot be corrupted by + a direct movement of the soul itself, since the soul is not moved directly. It is, however, moved indirectly through the movement + of the body: and yet no bodily change seems capable of corrupting the intelligible species residing in the intellect: since + the intellect independently of the body is the proper abode of the species; for which + reason it is held that habits are not lost either through old age or through death. Therefore science cannot be corrupted. + For the same reason neither can habits of virtue be corrupted, since they also are in the rational soul, and, as the Philosopher + declares (Ethic. i, 10), "virtue is more lasting than learning." +
[35732] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +omnis corruptio est per aliquem motum. Sed habitus scientiae, qui +est in anima, non potest corrumpi per motum per se ipsius animae, +quia anima per se non movetur. Movetur autem per accidens per motum +corporis. Nulla autem transmutatio corporalis videtur posse +corrumpere species intelligibiles existentes in intellectu, cum +intellectus sit per se locus specierum, sine corpore, unde ponitur +quod nec per senium nec per mortem corrumpuntur habitus. Ergo +scientia corrumpi non potest. Et per consequens, nec habitus +virtutis, qui etiam est in anima rationali, et, sicut philosophus +dicit in I Ethic., virtutes sunt permanentiores +disciplinis.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) that "forgetfulness and deception are the corruption of science." Moreover, + by sinning a man loses a habit of virtue: and again, virtues are engendered and corrupted by contrary acts (Ethic. ii, 2). +
[35733] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in libro de longitudine et brevitate +vitae, quod scientiae corruptio est oblivio et deceptio. Peccando +etiam aliquis habitum virtutis amittit. Et ex contrariis actibus +virtutes generantur et corrumpuntur, ut dicitur II Ethic.
+ I answer that, A form is said to be corrupted directly by its contrary; indirectly, through its subject being corrupted. When therefore + a habit has a corruptible subject, and a cause that has a contrary, it can be corrupted both ways. This is clearly the case + with bodily habits---for instance, health and sickness. But those habits that have an incorruptible subject, cannot be corrupted + indirectly. There are, however, some habits which, while residing chiefly in an + incorruptible subject, reside nevertheless secondarily in a corruptible subject; such is the habit of science which is chiefly + indeed in the "possible" intellect, but secondarily in the sensitive powers of apprehension, as stated above ( + Q[50], A[3], ad 3). Consequently the habit of science cannot be corrupted indirectly, on the part of the "possible" intellect, but only + on the part of the lower sensitive powers. +
We must therefore inquire whether habits of this kind can be corrupted directly. If then there be a habit having a contrary, + either on the part of itself or on the part of its cause, it can be corrupted directly: but if it has no contrary, it cannot + be corrupted directly. Now it is evident that an intelligible species residing in the "possible" intellect, has no contrary; + nor can the active intellect, which is the cause of that species, have a contrary. Wherefore if in the + "possible" intellect there be a habit caused immediately by the active intellect, such a habit is incorruptible both directly + and indirectly. Such are the habits of the first principles, both speculative and practical, which cannot be corrupted by + any forgetfulness or deception whatever: even as the Philosopher says about prudence (Ethic. vi, 5) that "it cannot be lost + by being forgotten." There is, however, in the "possible" intellect a habit caused by the reason, to wit, the habit of + conclusions, which is called science, to the cause of which something may be contrary in two ways. First, on the part of those + very propositions which are the starting point of the reason: for the assertion "Good is not good" is contrary to the assertion + "Good is good" (Peri Herm. ii). Secondly, on the part of the process of reasoning; forasmuch as a sophistical syllogism is + contrary to a dialectic or demonstrative syllogism. Wherefore it is clear that a false reason can corrupt the habit of a + true opinion or even of science. Hence the Philosopher, as stated above, says that "deception is the corruption of science." + As to virtues, some of them are intellectual, residing in reason itself, as stated in Ethic. vi, 1: and to these applies what + we have said of science and opinion. Some, however, viz. the moral virtues, are in the appetitive part of the soul; and the + same may be said of the contrary vices. Now the habits of the appetitive part are caused therein because it is natural to + it + to be moved by the reason. Therefore a habit either of virtue or of vice, may be corrupted by a judgment of reason, whenever + its motion is contrary to such vice or virtue, whether through ignorance, passion or deliberate choice. +
[35734] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod secundum se dicitur aliqua forma corrumpi per +contrarium suum, per accidens autem, per corruptionem sui subiecti. +Si igitur fuerit aliquis habitus cuius subiectum est corruptibile, +et cuius causa habet contrarium, utroque modo corrumpi poterit, +sicut patet de habitibus corporalibus, scilicet sanitate et +aegritudine. Illi vero habitus quorum subiectum est incorruptibile, +non possunt corrumpi per accidens. Sunt tamen habitus quidam qui, +etsi principaliter sint in subiecto incorruptibili, secundario +tamen sunt in subiecto corruptibili, sicut habitus scientiae, qui +principaliter est quidem in intellectu possibili, secundario autem +in viribus apprehensivis sensitivis, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo +ex parte intellectus possibilis, habitus scientiae non potest +corrumpi per accidens; sed solum ex parte inferiorum virium +sensitivarum. Est igitur considerandum si possunt huiusmodi habitus +per se corrumpi. Si igitur fuerit aliquis habitus qui habeat +aliquod contrarium, vel ex parte sua vel ex parte suae causae, +poterit per se corrumpi, si vero non habet contrarium, non poterit +per se corrumpi. Manifestum est autem quod species intelligibilis +in intellectu possibili existens, non habet aliquid contrarium. +Neque iterum intellectui agenti, qui est causa eius, potest aliquid +esse contrarium. Unde si aliquis habitus sit in intellectu +possibili immediate ab intellectu agente causatus, talis habitus +est incorruptibilis et per se et per accidens. Huiusmodi autem sunt +habitus primorum principiorum, tam speculabilium quam practicorum, +qui nulla oblivione vel deceptione corrumpi possunt, sicut +philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., de prudentia, quod non perditur +per oblivionem. Aliquis vero habitus est in intellectu possibili ex +ratione causatus, scilicet habitus conclusionum, qui dicitur +scientia, cuius causae dupliciter potest aliquid contrarium esse. +Uno modo, ex parte ipsarum propositionum ex quibus ratio procedit, +etenim enuntiationi quae est, bonum est bonum, contraria est ea +quae est, bonum non est bonum, secundum philosophum, in II +Periherm. Alio modo, quantum ad ipsum processum rationis; prout +syllogismus sophisticus opponitur syllogismo dialectico vel +demonstrativo. Sic igitur patet quod per falsam rationem potest +corrumpi habitus verae opinionis, aut etiam scientiae. Unde +philosophus dicit quod deceptio est corruptio scientiae, sicut +supra dictum est. Virtutum vero quaedam sunt intellectuales, quae +sunt in ipsa ratione, ut dicitur in VI Ethic., de quibus est eadem +ratio quae est de scientia vel opinione. Quaedam vero sunt in parte +animae appetitiva, quae sunt virtutes morales, et eadem ratio est +de vitiis oppositis. Habitus autem appetitivae partis causantur per +hoc quod ratio nata est appetitivam partem movere. Unde per +iudicium rationis in contrarium moventis quocumque modo, scilicet +sive ex ignorantia, sive ex passione, vel etiam ex electione, +corrumpitur habitus virtutis vel vitii.
+ Reply to Objection 1: As stated in Ethic. vii, 10, a habit is like a second nature, and yet it falls short of it. And so it is that while the nature + of a thing cannot in any way be taken away from a thing, a habit is removed, though with difficulty. +
[35735] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in VII Ethic., habitus +similitudinem habet naturae, deficit tamen ab ipsa. Et ideo, cum +natura rei nullo modo removeatur ab ipsa, habitus difficile +removetur.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Although there is no contrary to intelligible species, yet there can be a contrary to assertions and to the process of reason, + as stated above. +
[35736] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, etsi speciebus intelligibilibus non sit aliquid +contrarium, enuntiationibus tamen et processui rationis potest +aliquid esse contrarium, ut dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Science is not taken away by movement of the body, if we consider the root itself of the habit, but only as it may prove + an obstacle to the act of science; in so far as the intellect, in its act, has need of the sensitive powers, which are impeded + by corporal transmutation. But the intellectual movement of the reason can corrupt the habit of science, even as regards the + very root of the habit. In like manner a habit of virtue can be corrupted. + Nevertheless when it is said that "virtue is more lasting than learning," this must be understood in respect, not of the subject + or cause, but of the act: because the use of virtue continues through the whole of life, whereas the use of learning does + not. +
[35737] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod scientia non removetur per motum corporalem quantum +ad ipsam radicem habitus, sed solum quantum ad impedimentum actus; +inquantum intellectus indiget in suo actu viribus sensitivis, +quibus impedimentum affertur per corporalem transmutationem. Sed +per intelligibilem motum rationis potest corrumpi habitus +scientiae, etiam quantum ad ipsam radicem habitus. Et similiter +etiam potest corrumpi habitus virtutis. Tamen quod dicitur, +virtutes esse permanentiores disciplinis, intelligendum est non ex +parte subiecti vel causae, sed ex parte actus, nam virtutum usus +est continuus per totam vitam, non autem usus disciplinarum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that a habit cannot diminish. Because a habit is a simple quality and form. Now a simple thing is possessed + either wholly or not at all. Therefore although a habit can be lost it cannot diminish. +
[35738] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus diminui non possit. Habitus +enim est quaedam qualitas et forma simplex. Simplex autem aut totum +habetur, aut totum amittitur. Ergo habitus, etsi corrumpi possit, +diminui non potest.
+ Objection 2: Further, if a thing is befitting an accident, this is by reason either of the accident or of its subject. Now a habit does + not become more or less intense by reason of itself; else it would follow that a species might be predicated of its individuals + more or less. And if it can become less intense as to its participation by its subject, it would follow that something is + accidental to a habit, proper thereto and not common to the habit and its subject. Now + whenever a form has something proper to it besides its subject, that form can be separate, as stated in De Anima i, text. + 13. Hence it follows that a habit is a separable form; which is impossible. +
[35739] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +omne quod convenit accidenti, convenit eidem secundum se, vel +ratione sui subiecti. Habitus autem secundum seipsum non intenditur +et remittitur, alioquin sequeretur quod aliqua species de suis +individuis praedicaretur secundum magis et minus. Si igitur +secundum participationem subiecti diminui possit, sequeretur quod +aliquid accidat habitui proprium, quod non sit commune ei et +subiecto. Cuicumque autem formae convenit aliquid proprium praeter +suum subiectum, illa forma est separabilis, ut dicitur in I de +anima. Sequitur ergo quod habitus sit forma separabilis, quod est +impossibile.
+ Objection 3: Further, the very notion and nature of a habit as of any accident, is inherence in a subject: wherefore any accident is defined + with reference to its subject. Therefore if a habit does not become more or less intense in itself, neither can it in its + inherence in its subject: and consequently it will be nowise less intense. +
[35740] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +ratio et natura habitus, sicut et cuiuslibet accidentis, consistit +in concretione ad subiectum, unde et quodlibet accidens definitur +per suum subiectum. Si igitur habitus secundum seipsum non +intenditur neque remittitur, neque etiam secundum concretionem sui +ad subiectum diminui poterit. Et ita nullo modo diminuetur.
+ On the contrary, It is natural for contraries to be applicable to the same thing. Now increase and decrease are contraries. Since therefore + a habit can increase, it seems that it can also diminish. +
[35741] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod contraria nata sunt fieri circa idem. Augmentum autem et +diminutio sunt contraria. Cum igitur habitus possit augeri, videtur +quod etiam possit diminui.
+ I answer that, Habits diminish, just as they increase, in two ways, as we have already explained ( + Q[52], A[1]). And since they increase through the same cause as that which engenders them, so too they diminish by the same cause as + that which corrupts them: since the diminishing of a habit is the road which leads to its corruption, even as, on the other + hand, the engendering of a habit is a foundation of its increase. +
[35742] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod habitus dupliciter diminuuntur, sicut et augentur, ut +ex supradictis patet. Et sicut ex eadem causa augentur ex qua +generantur, ita ex eadem causa diminuuntur ex qua corrumpuntur, nam +diminutio habitus est quaedam via ad corruptionem, sicut e converso +generatio habitus est quoddam fundamentum augmenti ipsius.
+ Reply to Objection 1: A habit, considered in itself, is a simple form. It is not thus that it is subject to decrease; but according to the different + ways in which its subject participates in it. This is due to the fact that the subject's potentiality is indeterminate, through + its being able to participate a form in various ways, or to extend to a greater or a smaller number of things. +
[35743] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod habitus secundum se consideratus, est forma +simplex, et secundum hoc non accidit ei diminutio, sed secundum +diversum modum participandi, qui provenit ex indeterminatione +potentiae ipsius participantis, quae scilicet diversimode potest +unam formam participare, vel quae potest ad plura vel ad pauciora +extendi.
+ Reply to Objection 2: This argument would hold, if the essence itself of a habit were nowise subject to decrease. This we do not say; but that + a certain decrease in the essence of a habit has its origin, not in the habit, but in its subject. +
[35744] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si ipsa essentia habitus nullo +modo diminueretur. Hoc autem non ponimus, sed quod quaedam +diminutio essentiae habitus non habet principium ab habitu, sed a +participante.
+ Reply to Objection 3: No matter how we take an accident, its very notion implies dependence on a subject, but in different ways. For if we take + an accident in the abstract, it implies relation to a subject, which relation begins in the accident and terminates in the + subject: for "whiteness is that whereby a thing is white." Accordingly in defining an accident in the abstract, we do not + put the subject as though it were the first part of the definition, viz. the genus; but + we give it the second place, which is that of the difference; thus we say that "simitas" is "a curvature of the nose." But + if we take accidents in the concrete, the relation begins in the subject and terminates in the concrete, the relation begins + in the subject and terminates at the accident: for "a white thing" is "something that has whiteness." Accordingly in defining + this kind of accident, we place the subject as the genus, which is the first part of a definition; for we say that a "simum" + is a "snub-nose." Accordingly whatever is befitting an accident on the part of the subject, but is not of the very essence + of the accident, is ascribed to that accident, not in the abstract, but in the concrete. Such are increase and decrease in + certain accidents: wherefore to be more or less white is not ascribed to whiteness but to a white thing. The same applies + to habits and other qualities; save that certain habits and other qualities; save that certain habits increase or diminish + by a + kind of addition, as we have already clearly explained ( + Q[52], A[2]). +
[35745] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, quocumque modo significetur accidens, habet +dependentiam ad subiectum secundum suam rationem, aliter tamen et +aliter. Nam accidens significatum in abstracto, importat +habitudinem ad subiectum quae incipit ab accidente, et terminatur +ad subiectum, nam albedo dicitur qua aliquid est album. Et ideo in +definitione accidentis abstracti non ponitur subiectum quasi prima +pars definitionis, quae est genus; sed quasi secunda, quae est +differentia; dicimus enim quod simitas est curvitas nasi. Sed in +concretis incipit habitudo a subiecto, et terminatur ad accidens, +dicitur enim album quod habet albedinem. Propter quod in +definitione huiusmodi accidentis ponitur subiectum tanquam genus, +quod est prima pars definitionis, dicimus enim quod simum est nasus +curvus. Sic igitur id quod convenit accidentibus ex parte subiecti, +non autem ex ipsa ratione accidentis, non attribuitur accidenti in +abstracto, sed in concreto. Et huiusmodi est intensio et remissio +in quibusdam accidentibus, unde albedo non dicitur magis et minus, +sed album. Et eadem ratio est in habitibus et aliis qualitatibus, +nisi quod quidam habitus augentur vel diminuuntur per quandam +additionem, ut ex supradictis patet.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that a habit is not corrupted or diminished through mere cessation from act. For habits are more lasting than + passion-like qualities, as we have explained above ( + Q[49], A[2], ad 3; + Q[50], A[1]). But passion-like qualities are neither corrupted nor diminished by cessation from act: for whiteness is not lessened through + not affecting the sight, nor heat through ceasing to make something hot. + Therefore neither are habits diminished or corrupted through cessation from act. +
[35746] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus non corrumpatur aut diminuatur +per solam cessationem ab opere. Habitus enim permanentiores sunt +quam passibiles qualitates, ut ex supradictis apparet. Sed +passibiles qualitates non corrumpuntur neque diminuuntur per +cessationem ab actu, non enim albedo diminuitur si visum non +immutet, neque calor si non calefaciat. Ergo neque habitus +diminuuntur vel corrumpuntur per cessationem ab actu.
+ Objection 2: Further, corruption and diminution are changes. Now nothing is changed without a moving cause. Since therefore cessation + from act does not imply a moving cause, it does not appear how a habit can be diminished or corrupted through cessation from + act. +
[35747] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +corruptio et diminutio sunt quaedam mutationes. Sed nihil mutatur +absque aliqua causa movente. Cum igitur cessatio ab actu non +importet aliquam causam moventem, non videtur quod per cessationem +ab actu possit esse diminutio vel corruptio habitus.
+ Objection 3: Further, the habits of science and virtue are in the intellectual soul which is above time. Now those things that are above + time are neither destroyed nor diminished by length of time. Neither, therefore, are such habits destroyed or diminished through + length of time, if one fails for long to exercise them. +
[35748] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +habitus scientiae et virtutis sunt in anima intellectiva, quae est +supra tempus. Ea vero quae sunt supra tempus, non corrumpuntur +neque diminuuntur per temporis diuturnitatem. Ergo neque huiusmodi +habitus corrumpuntur vel diminuuntur per temporis diuturnitatem, si +diu aliquis absque exercitio permaneat.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) that not only "deception," but also "forgetfulness, is the corruption of + science." Moreover he says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "want of intercourse has dissolved many a friendship." In like manner other + habits of virtue are diminished or destroyed through cessation from act. +
[35749] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus, in libro de Longit. et Brevit. vitae, dicit +quod corruptio scientiae non solum est deceptio, sed etiam oblivio. +Et in VIII Ethic. dicitur quod multas amicitias inappellatio +dissolvit. Et eadem ratione, alii habitus virtutum per cessationem +ab actu diminuuntur vel tolluntur.
+ I answer that, As stated in Phys. vii, text. 27, a thing is a cause of movement in two ways. First, directly; and such a thing causes movement + by reason of its proper form; thus fire causes heat. Secondly, indirectly; for instance, that which removes an obstacle. It + is in this latter way that the destruction or diminution of a habit results through cessation from act, in so far, to wit, + as we cease from exercising an act which overcame the causes that destroyed or weakened + that habit. For it has been stated + (A[1]) that habits are destroyed or diminished directly through some contrary agency. Consequently all habits that are gradually + undermined by contrary agencies which need to be counteracted by acts proceeding from those habits, are diminished or even + destroyed altogether by long cessation from act, as is clearly seen in the case both of science and of virtue. For it is evident + that a habit of moral virtue makes a man ready to choose + the mean in deeds and passions. And when a man fails to make use of his virtuous habit in order to moderate his own passions + or deeds, the necessary result is that many passions and deeds fail to observe the mode of virtue, by reason of the inclination + of the sensitive appetite and of other external agencies. Wherefore virtue is destroyed or lessened through cessation from + act. The same applies to the intellectual habits, which render man ready to judge aright of those things that are pictured + by his imagination. Hence when man ceases to make use of his intellectual habits, strange fancies, sometimes in opposition + to them, arise in his imagination; so that unless those fancies be, as it were, cut off or kept back by frequent use of his + intellectual habits, man becomes less fit to judge aright, and sometimes is even wholly disposed to the contrary, and thus + the intellectual habit is diminished or even wholly destroyed by cessation from act. +
[35750] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in VIII Physic., aliquid potest esse +movens dupliciter, uno modo, per se, quod scilicet movet secundum +rationem propriae formae, sicut ignis calefacit; alio modo, per +accidens, sicut id quod removet prohibens. Et hoc modo cessatio ab +actu causat corruptionem vel diminutionem habituum, inquantum +scilicet removetur actus qui prohibebat causas corrumpentes vel +diminuentes habitum. Dictum est enim quod habitus per se +corrumpuntur vel diminuuntur ex contrario agente. Unde quorumcumque +habituum contraria subcrescunt per temporis tractum, quae oportet +subtrahi per actum ab habitu procedentem; huiusmodi habitus +diminuuntur, vel etiam tolluntur totaliter, per diuturnam +cessationem ab actu; ut patet et in scientia et in virtute. +Manifestum est enim quod habitus virtutis moralis facit hominem +promptum ad eligendum medium in operationibus et passionibus. Cum +autem aliquis non utitur habitu virtutis ad moderandas passiones +vel operationes proprias, necesse est quod proveniant multae +passiones et operationes praeter modum virtutis, ex inclinatione +appetitus sensitivi, et aliorum quae exterius movent. Unde +corrumpitur virtus, vel diminuitur, per cessationem ab actu. +Similiter etiam est ex parte habituum intellectualium, secundum +quos est homo promptus ad recte iudicandum de imaginatis. Cum +igitur homo cessat ab usu intellectualis habitus, insurgunt +imaginationes extraneae, et quandoque ad contrarium ducentes; ita +quod, nisi per frequentem usum intellectualis habitus, quodammodo +succidantur vel comprimantur, redditur homo minus aptus ad recte +iudicandum, et quandoque totaliter disponitur ad contrarium. Et sic +per cessationem ab actu diminuitur, vel etiam corrumpitur +intellectualis habitus.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Even heat would be destroyed through ceasing to give heat, if, for this same reason, cold which is destructive of heat were + to increase. +
[35751] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ita etiam calor per cessationem a calefaciendo +corrumperetur, si per hoc incresceret frigidum, quod est calidi +corruptivum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Cessation from act is a moving cause, conducive of corruption or diminution, by removing the obstacles, thereto, as explained + above. +
[35752] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod cessatio ab actu est movens ad corruptionem vel +diminutionem, sicut removens prohibens, ut dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The intellectual part of the soul, considered in itself, is above time, but the sensitive part is subject to time, and therefore + in course of time it undergoes change as to the passions of the sensitive part, and also as to the powers of apprehension. + Hence the Philosopher says (Phys. iv. text. 117) that time makes us forget. +
[35753] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod pars intellectiva animae secundum se est supra +tempus, sed pars sensitiva subiacet tempori. Et ideo per temporis +cursum, transmutatur quantum ad passiones appetitivae partis et +etiam quantum ad vires apprehensivas. Unde philosophus dicit, in IV +Physic., quod tempus est causa oblivionis.
We have now to consider the distinction of habits; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether many habits can be in one power?
(2) Whether habits are distinguished by their objects?
+[35754] +Iª-IIae q. 54 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +distinctione habituum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, +utrum multi habitus possint esse in una potentia. Secundo, utrum +habitus distinguantur secundum obiecta. Tertio, utrum habitus +distinguantur secundum bonum et malum. Quarto, utrum unus habitus +ex multis habitibus constituatur.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be many habits in one power. For when several things are distinguished in respect of the + same thing, if one of them be multiplied, the others are too. Now habits and powers are distinguished in respect of the same + thing, viz. their acts and objects. Therefore they are multiplied in like manner. Therefore there cannot be many habits in + one power. +
[35755] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non possint esse multi habitus in una +potentia. Eorum enim quae secundum idem distinguuntur multiplicato +uno, multiplicatur et aliud. Sed secundum idem potentiae et habitus +distinguuntur, scilicet secundum actus et obiecta. Similiter ergo +multiplicantur. Non ergo possunt esse multi habitus in una +potentia.
+ Objection 2: Further, a power is a simple force. Now in one simple subject there cannot be diversity of accidents; for the subject is + the cause of its accidents; and it does not appear how diverse effects can proceed from one simple cause. Therefore there + cannot be many habits in one power. +
[35756] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +potentia est virtus quaedam simplex. Sed in uno subiecto simplici +non potest esse diversitas accidentium, quia subiectum est causa +accidentis; ab uno autem simplici non videtur procedere nisi unum. +Ergo in una potentia non possunt esse multi habitus.
+ Objection 3: Further, just as the body is informed by its shape, so is a power informed by a habit. But one body cannot be informed at + the same time by various shapes. Therefore neither can a power be informed at the same time by many habits. Therefore several + habits cannot be at the same time in one power. +
[35757] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sicut corpus formatur per figuram, ita potentia formatur per +habitum. Sed unum corpus non potest simul formari diversis figuris. +Ergo neque una potentia potest simul formari diversis habitibus. +Non ergo plures habitus possunt simul esse in una potentia.
+ On the contrary, The intellect is one power; wherein, nevertheless, are the habits of various sciences. +
[35758] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod intellectus est una potentia, in qua tamen sunt diversarum +scientiarum habitus.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + Q[49], A[4]), habits are dispositions of a thing that is in potentiality to something, either to nature, or to operation, which is the + end of nature. As to those habits which are dispositions to nature, it is clear that several can be in one same subject: since + in one subject we may take parts in various ways, according to the various dispositions of which parts there are various habits. + Thus, if we take the humors + as being parts of the human body, according to their disposition in respect of human nature, we have the habit or disposition + of health: while, if we take like parts, such as nerves, bones, and flesh, the disposition of these in respect of nature is + strength or weakness; whereas, if we take the limbs, i.e. the hands, feet, and so on, the disposition of these in proportion + to nature, is beauty: and thus there are several habits or dispositions in the same subject. +
If, however, we speak of those habits that are dispositions to operation, and belong properly to the powers; thus, again, + there may be several habits in one power. The reason for this is that the subject of a habit is a passive power, as stated + above ( + Q[51], A[2]): for it is only an active power that cannot be the subject of a habit, as was clearly shown above ( + Q[51], A[2]). Now a passive power is compared to the determinate act + of any species, as matter to form: because, just as matter is determinate to one form by one agent, so, too, is a passive + power determined by the nature of one active object to an act specifically one. Wherefore, just as several objects can move + one passive power, so can one passive power be the subject of several acts or perfections specifically diverse. Now habits + are qualities or forms adhering to a power, and inclining that power to acts of a determinate species. Consequently several + habits, even as several specifically different acts, can belong to one power. +
[35759] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus sunt dispositiones +quaedam alicuius in potentia existentis ad aliquid, sive ad +naturam, sive ad operationem vel finem naturae. Et de illis quidem +habitibus qui sunt dispositiones ad naturam, manifestum est quod +possunt plures esse in uno subiecto, eo quod unius subiecti possunt +diversimode partes accipi, secundum quarum dispositionem habitus +dicuntur. Sicut, si accipiantur humani corporis partes humores, +prout disponuntur secundum naturam humanam, est habitus vel +dispositio sanitatis, si vero accipiantur partes similes ut nervi +et ossa et carnes, earum dispositio in ordine ad naturam, est +fortitudo aut macies, si vero accipiantur membra, ut manus et pes +et huiusmodi, earum dispositio naturae conveniens, est pulchritudo. +Et sic sunt plures habitus vel dispositiones in eodem. Si vero +loquamur de habitibus qui sunt dispositiones ad opera, qui proprie +pertinent ad potentias; sic etiam contingit unius potentiae esse +habitus plures. Cuius ratio est, quia subiectum habitus est +potentia passiva, ut supra dictum est, potentia enim activa tantum +non est alicuius habitus subiectum, ut ex supradictis patet. +Potentia autem passiva comparatur ad actum determinatum unius +speciei, sicut materia ad formam, eo quod, sicut materia +determinatur ad unam formam per unum agens, ita etiam potentia +passiva a ratione unius obiecti activi determinatur ad unum actum +secundum speciem. Unde sicut plura obiecta possunt movere unam +potentiam passivam, ita una potentia passiva potest esse subiectum +diversorum actuum vel perfectionum secundum speciem. Habitus autem +sunt quaedam qualitates aut formae inhaerentes potentiae, quibus +inclinatur potentia ad determinatos actus secundum speciem. Unde ad +unam potentiam possunt plures habitus pertinere, sicut et plures +actus specie differentes.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Even as in natural things, diversity of species is according to the form, and diversity of genus, according to matter, as + stated in Metaph. v, text. 33 (since things that differ in matter belong to different genera): so, too, generic diversity + of objects entails a difference of powers (wherefore the Philosopher says in Ethic. vi, 1, that "those objects that differ + generically belong to different departments of the soul"); while specific difference of + objects entails a specific difference of acts, and consequently of habits also. Now things that differ in genus differ in + species, but not vice versa. Wherefore the acts and habits of different powers differ in species: but it does not follow that + different habits are in different powers, for several can be in one power. And even as several genera may be included in one + genus, and several species be contained in one species; so does it happen that there are several species of habits and + powers. +
[35760] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut in rebus naturalibus diversitas specierum +est secundum formam, diversitas autem generum est secundum +materiam, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. (ea enim sunt diversa genere, +quorum est materia diversa), ita etiam diversitas obiectorum +secundum genus, facit distinctionem potentiarum (unde philosophus +dicit, in VI Ethic., quod ad ea quae sunt genere altera, sunt +etiam animae particulae aliae); diversitas vero obiectorum +secundum speciem, facit diversitatem actuum secundum speciem, et +per consequens habituum. Quaecumque autem sunt diversa genere, sunt +etiam specie diversa, sed non convertitur. Et ideo diversarum +potentiarum sunt diversi actus specie, et diversi habitus, non +autem oportet quod diversi habitus sint diversarum potentiarum, sed +possunt esse plures unius. Et sicut sunt genera generum, et species +specierum; ita etiam contingit esse diversas species habituum et +potentiarum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Although a power is simple as to its essence, it is multiple virtually, inasmuch as it extends to many specifically different + acts. Consequently there is nothing to prevent many superficially different habits from being in one power. +
[35761] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod potentia, etsi sit quidem simplex secundum essentiam, +est tamen multiplex virtute, secundum quod ad multos actus specie +differentes se extendit. Et ideo nihil prohibet in una potentia +esse multos habitus specie differentes.
+ Reply to Objection 3: A body is informed by its shape as by its own terminal boundaries: whereas a habit is not the terminal boundary of a power, + but the disposition of a power to an act as to its ultimate term. Consequently one same power cannot have several acts at + the same time, except in so far as perchance one act is comprised in another; just as neither can a body have several shapes, + save in so far as one shape enters into another, as a three-sided in a four-sided + figure. For the intellect cannot understand several things at the same time "actually"; and yet it can know several things + at the same time "habitually." +
[35762] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod corpus formatur per figuram sicut per propriam +terminationem, habitus autem non est terminatio potentiae, sed est +dispositio ad actum sicut ad ultimum terminum. Et ideo non possunt +esse unius potentiae simul plures actus, nisi forte secundum quod +unus comprehenditur sub alio, sicut nec unius corporis plures +figurae, nisi secundum quod una est in alia, sicut trigonum in +tetragono. Non enim potest intellectus simul multa actu +intelligere. Potest tamen simul habitu multa scire.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that habits are not distinguished by their objects. For contraries differ in species. Now the same habit of + science regards contraries: thus medicine regards the healthy and the unhealthy. Therefore habits are not distinguished by + objects specifically distinct. +
[35763] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus non distinguantur secundum +obiecta. Contraria enim sunt specie differentia. Sed idem habitus +scientiae est contrariorum, sicut medicina sani et aegri. Non ergo +secundum obiecta specie differentia, habitus distinguuntur.
+ Objection 2: Further, different sciences are different habits. But the same scientific truth belongs to different sciences: thus both + the physicist and the astronomer prove the earth to be round, as stated in Phys. ii, text. 17. Therefore habits are not distinguished + by their objects. +
[35764] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +diversae scientiae sunt diversi habitus. Sed idem scibile pertinet +ad diversas scientias, sicut terram esse rotundam demonstrat et +naturalis et astrologus, ut dicitur in II Physic. Ergo habitus non +distinguuntur secundum obiecta.
+ Objection 3: Further, wherever the act is the same, the object is the same. But the same act can belong to different habits of virtue, + if it be directed to different ends; thus to give money to anyone, if it be done for God's sake, is an act of charity; while, + if it be done in order to pay a debt, it is an act of justice. Therefore the same object can also belong to different habits. + Therefore diversity of habits does not follow diversity of objects. +
[35765] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +eiusdem actus est idem obiectum. Sed idem actus potest pertinere ad +diversos habitus virtutum, si ad diversos fines referatur, sicut +dare pecuniam alicui, si sit propter Deum, pertinet ad caritatem; +si vero sit propter debitum solvendum, pertinet ad iustitiam. Ergo +etiam idem obiectum potest ad diversos habitus pertinere. Non ergo +est diversitas habituum secundum diversitatem obiectorum.
+ On the contrary, Acts differ in species according to the diversity of their objects, as stated above ( + Q[18], A[5]). But habits are dispositions to acts. Therefore habits also are distinguished according to the diversity of objects. +
[35766] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra, +actus differunt specie secundum diversitatem obiectorum, ut supra +dictum est. Sed habitus sunt dispositiones quaedam ad actus. Ergo +etiam habitus distinguuntur secundum diversa obiecta.
+ I answer that, A habit is both a form and a habit. Hence the specific distinction of habits may be taken in the ordinary way in which forms + differ specifically; or according to that mode of distinction which is proper to habits. Accordingly forms are distinguished + from one another in reference to the diversity of their active principles, since every agent produces its like in species. + Habits, however, imply order to something: and all things that imply order to something, + are distinguished according to the distinction of the things to which they are ordained. Now a habit is a disposition implying + a twofold order: viz. to nature and to an operation consequent to nature. +
Accordingly habits are specifically distinct in respect of three things. First, in respect of the active principles of such + dispositions; secondly, in respect of nature; thirdly, in respect of specifically different objects, as will appear from what + follows. +
[35767] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod habitus et est forma quaedam, et est habitus. Potest +ergo distinctio habituum secundum speciem attendi aut secundum +communem modum quo formae specie distinguuntur; aut secundum +proprium modum distinctionis habituum. Distinguuntur siquidem +formae ad invicem secundum diversa principia activa, eo quod omne +agens facit simile secundum speciem. Habitus autem importat ordinem +ad aliquid. Omnia autem quae dicuntur secundum ordinem ad aliquid, +distinguuntur secundum distinctionem eorum ad quae dicuntur. Est +autem habitus dispositio quaedam ad duo ordinata, scilicet ad +naturam, et ad operationem consequentem naturam. Sic igitur +secundum tria, habitus specie distinguuntur. Uno quidem modo, +secundum principia activa talium dispositionum; alio vero modo, +secundum naturam; tertio vero modo, secundum obiecta specie +differentia; ut per sequentia explicabitur.
+ Reply to Objection 1: In distinguishing powers, or also habits, we must consider the object not in its material but in its formal aspect, which + may differ in species or even in genus. And though the distinction between specific contraries is a real distinction yet they + are both known under one aspect, since one is known through the other. And consequently in so far as they concur in the one + aspect of cognoscibility, they belong to one cognitive habit. +
[35768] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod in distinctione potentiarum, vel etiam habituum, +non est considerandum ipsum obiectum materialiter; sed ratio +obiecti differens specie, vel etiam genere. Quamvis autem contraria +specie differant diversitate rerum, tamen eadem ratio est +cognoscendi utrumque, quia unum per aliud cognoscitur. Et ideo +inquantum conveniunt in una ratione cognoscibilis, pertinent ad +unum habitum cognoscitivum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The physicist proves the earth to be round by one means, the astronomer by another: for the latter proves this by means of + mathematics, e.g. by the shapes of eclipses, or something of the sort; while the former proves it by means of physics, e.g. + by the movement of heavy bodies towards the center, and so forth. Now the whole force of a demonstration, which is "a syllogism + producing science," as stated in Poster. i, text. 5, depends on the mean. And + consequently various means are as so many active principles, in respect of which the habits of science are distinguished. +
[35769] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod terram esse rotundam per aliud medium demonstrat +naturalis, et per aliud astrologus, astrologus enim hoc demonstrat +per media mathematica, sicut per figuras eclipsium, vel per aliud +huiusmodi; naturalis vero hoc demonstrat per medium naturale, sicut +per motum gravium ad medium, vel per aliud huiusmodi. Tota autem +virtus demonstrationis, quae est syllogismus faciens scire, ut +dicitur in I Poster., dependet ex medio. Et ideo diversa media sunt +sicut diversa principia activa, secundum quae habitus scientiarum +diversificantur.
+ Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, text. 89; Ethic. vii, 8), the end is, in practical matters, what the principle is in speculative + matters. Consequently diversity of ends demands a diversity of virtues, even as diversity of active principles does. Moreover + the ends are objects of the internal acts, with which, above all, the virtues are concerned, as is evident from what has been + said ( + Q[18], A[6]; + Q[19], + A[2] + , ad 1; + Q[34], A[4]). +
[35770] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in II Physic. et in VII +Ethic., ita se habet finis in operabilibus, sicut principium in +demonstrativis. Et ideo diversitas finium diversificat virtutes +sicut et diversitas activorum principiorum. Sunt etiam ipsi fines +obiecta actuum interiorum, qui maxime pertinent ad virtutes, ut ex +supradictis patet.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that habits are not divided into good and bad. For good and bad are contraries. Now the same habit regards + contraries, as was stated above (A[2], OBJ[1]). Therefore habits are not divided into good and bad. +
[35771] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus non distinguantur secundum +bonum et malum. Bonum enim et malum sunt contraria. Sed idem +habitus est contrariorum, ut supra habitum est. Ergo habitus non +distinguuntur secundum bonum et malum.
+ Objection 2: Further, good is convertible with being; so that, since it is common to all, it cannot be accounted a specific difference, + as the Philosopher declares (Topic. iv). Again, evil, since it is a privation and a non-being, cannot differentiate any being. + Therefore habits cannot be specifically divided into good and evil. +
[35772] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +bonum convertitur cum ente, et sic, cum sit commune omnibus, non +potest sumi ut differentia alicuius speciei; ut patet per +philosophum in IV Topic. Similiter etiam malum, cum sit privatio et +non ens, non potest esse alicuius entis differentia. Non ergo +secundum bonum et malum possunt habitus specie distingui.
+ Objection 3: Further, there can be different evil habits about one same object; for instance, intemperance and insensibility about matters + of concupiscence: and in like manner there can be several good habits; for instance, human virtue and heroic or godlike virtue, + as the Philosopher clearly states (Ethic. vii, 1). Therefore, habits are not divided into good and bad. +
[35773] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +circa idem obiectum contingit esse diversos habitus malos, sicut +circa concupiscentias intemperantiam et insensibilitatem, et +similiter etiam plures habitus bonos, scilicet virtutem humanam et +virtutem heroicam sive divinam, ut patet per philosophum in VII +Ethic. Non ergo distinguuntur habitus secundum bonum et malum.
+ On the contrary, A good habit is contrary to a bad habit, as virtue to vice. Now contraries are divided specifically into good and bad habits. +
[35774] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod habitus bonus contrariatur habitui malo, sicut virtus +vitio. Sed contraria sunt diversa secundum speciem. Ergo habitus +differunt specie secundum differentiam boni et mali.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[2]), habits are specifically distinct not only in respect of their objects and active principles, but also in their relation + to nature. Now, this happens in two ways. First, by reason of their suitableness or unsuitableness to nature. In this way + a good habit is specifically distinct from a bad habit: since a good habit is one which disposes to an act suitable to the + agent's nature, while an evil habit is one which + disposes to an act unsuitable to nature. Thus, acts of virtue are suitable to human nature, since they are according to reason, + whereas acts of vice are discordant from human nature, since they are against reason. Hence it is clear that habits are distinguished + specifically by the difference of good and bad. +
Secondly, habits are distinguished in relation to nature, from the fact that one habit disposes to an act that is suitable + to a lower nature, while another habit disposes to an act befitting a higher nature. And thus human virtue, which disposes + to an act befitting human nature, is distinct from godlike or heroic virtue, which disposes to an act befitting some higher + nature. +
[35775] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, habitus specie distinguuntur non +solum secundum obiecta et principia activa, sed etiam in ordine ad +naturam. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum +convenientiam ad naturam, vel etiam secundum disconvenientiam ab +ipsa. Et hoc modo distinguuntur specie habitus bonus et malus, nam +habitus bonus dicitur qui disponit ad actum convenientem naturae +agentis; habitus autem malus dicitur qui disponit ad actum non +convenientem naturae. Sicut actus virtutum naturae humanae +conveniunt, eo quod sunt secundum rationem, actus vero vitiorum, +cum sint contra rationem, a natura humana discordant. Et sic +manifestum est quod secundum differentiam boni et mali, habitus +specie distinguuntur. Alio modo secundum naturam habitus +distinguuntur, ex eo quod habitus unus disponit ad actum +convenientem naturae inferiori; alius autem habitus disponit ad +actum convenientem naturae superiori. Et sic virtus humana, quae +disponit ad actum convenientem naturae humanae, distinguitur a +divina virtute vel heroica, quae disponit ad actum convenientem +cuidam superiori naturae.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The same habit may be about contraries in so far as contraries agree in one common aspect. Never, however, does it happen + that contrary habits are in one species: since contrariety of habits follows contrariety of aspect. Accordingly habits are + divided into good and bad, namely, inasmuch as one habit is good, and another bad; but not by reason of one habit being something + good, and another about something bad. +
[35776] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod contrariorum potest esse unus habitus, secundum +quod contraria conveniunt in una ratione. Nunquam tamen contingit +quod habitus contrarii sint unius speciei, contrarietas enim +habituum est secundum contrarias rationes. Et ita secundum bonum et +malum habitus distinguuntur, scilicet inquantum unus habitus est +bonus et alius malus, non autem ex hoc quod unus est boni et alius +mali.
+ Reply to Objection 2: It is not the good which is common to every being, that is a difference constituting the species of a habit; but some determinate + good by reason of suitability to some determinate, viz. the human, nature. In like manner the evil that constitutes a difference + of habits is not a pure privation, but something determinate repugnant to a determinate nature. +
[35777] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod bonum commune omni enti non est differentia +constituens speciem alicuius habitus, sed quoddam bonum +determinatum, quod est secundum convenientiam ad determinatam +naturam, scilicet humanam. Similiter etiam malum quod est +differentia constitutiva habitus, non est privatio pura, sed est +aliquid determinatum repugnans determinatae naturae.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Several good habits about one same specific thing are distinct in reference to their suitability to various natures, as stated + above. But several bad habits in respect of one action are distinct in reference to their diverse repugnance to that which + is in keeping with nature: thus, various vices about one same matter are contrary to one virtue. +
[35778] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod plures habitus boni circa idem specie, distinguuntur +secundum convenientiam ad diversas naturas, ut dictum est. Plures +vero habitus mali distinguuntur circa idem agendum secundum +diversas repugnantias ad id quod est secundum naturam, sicut uni +virtuti contrariantur diversa vitia circa eandem materiam.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that one habit is made up of many habits. For whatever is engendered, not at once, but little by little, seems + to be made up of several parts. But a habit is engendered, not at once, but little by little out of several acts, as stated + above ( + Q[51], A[3]). Therefore one habit is made up of several. +
[35779] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod unus habitus ex pluribus habitibus +constituatur. Illud enim cuius generatio non simul perficitur, sed +successive, videtur constitui ex pluribus partibus. Sed generatio +habitus non est simul, sed successive ex pluribus actibus, ut supra +habitum est. Ergo unus habitus constituitur ex pluribus +habitibus.
+ Objection 2: Further, a whole is made up of its parts. Now many parts are assigned to one habit: thus Tully assigns many parts of fortitude, + temperance, and other virtues. Therefore one habit is made up of many. +
[35780] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +ex partibus constituitur totum. Sed uni habitui assignantur multae +partes, sicut Tullius ponit multas partes fortitudinis, +temperantiae et aliarum virtutum. Ergo unus habitus constituitur ex +pluribus.
+ Objection 3: Further, one conclusion suffices both for an act and for a habit of scientific knowledge. But many conclusions belong to + but one science, to geometry, for instance, or to arithmetic. Therefore one habit is made up of many. +
[35781] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +de una sola conclusione potest scientia haberi et actu et habitu. +Sed multae conclusiones pertinent ad unam scientiam totam, sicut ad +geometriam vel arithmeticam. Ergo unus habitus constituitur ex +multis.
+ On the contrary, A habit, since it is a quality, is a simple form. But nothing simple is made up of many. Therefore one habit is not made + up of many. +
[35782] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra, +habitus, cum sit qualitas quaedam, est forma simplex. Sed nullum +simplex constituitur ex pluribus. Ergo unus habitus non +constituitur ex pluribus habitibus.
+ I answer that, A habit directed to operation, such as we are chiefly concerned with at present, is a perfection of a power. Now every perfection + should be in proportion with that which it perfects. Hence, just as a power, while it is one, extends to many things, in so + far as they have something in common, i.e. some general objective aspect, so also a habit extends to many things, in so far + as they are related to one, for instance, to some specific objective aspect, or to + one nature, or to one principle, as was clearly stated above ( + AA[2],3). +
If then we consider a habit as to the extent of its object, we shall find a certain multiplicity therein. But since this + multiplicity is directed to one thing, on which the habit is chiefly intent, hence it is that a habit is a simple quality, + not composed to several habits, even though it extend to many things. For a habit does not extend to many things save in relation + to one, whence it derives its unity. +
[35783] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod habitus ad operationem ordinatus, de quo nunc +principaliter intendimus, est perfectio quaedam potentiae. Omnis +autem perfectio proportionatur suo perfectibili. Unde sicut +potentia, cum sit una, ad multa se extendit secundum quod +conveniunt in aliquo uno, idest in generali quadam ratione obiecti; +ita etiam habitus ad multa se extendit secundum quod habent ordinem +ad aliquod unum, puta ad unam specialem rationem obiecti, vel unam +naturam, vel unum principium, ut ex supradictis patet. Si igitur +consideremus habitum secundum ea ad quae se extendit, sic +inveniemus in eo quandam multiplicitatem. Sed quia illa +multiplicitas est ordinata ad aliquid unum, ad quod principaliter +respicit habitus, inde est quod habitus est qualitas simplex, non +constituta ex pluribus habitibus, etiam si ad multa se extendat. +Non enim unus habitus se extendit ad multa, nisi in ordine ad unum, +ex quo habet unitatem.
+ Reply to Objection 1: That a habit is engendered little by little, is due, not to one part being engendered after another, but to the fact that + the subject does not acquire all at once a firm and difficultly changeable disposition; and also to the fact that it begins + by being imperfectly in the subject, and is gradually perfected. The same applies to other qualities. +
[35784] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod successio in generatione habitus non contingit +ex hoc quod pars eius generetur post partem, sed ex eo quod +subiectum non statim consequitur dispositionem firmam et difficile +mobilem; et ex eo quod primo imperfecte incipit esse in subiecto, +et paulatim perficitur. Sicut etiam est de aliis qualitatibus.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The parts which are assigned to each cardinal virtue, are not integral parts that combine to form a whole; but subjective + or potential parts, as we shall explain further on (Q[57], A[6], ad 4; + SS, Q[48]). +
[35785] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod partes quae singulis virtutibus cardinalibus +assignantur, non sunt partes integrales, ex quibus constituatur +totum sed partes subiectivae sive potentiales, ut infra +patebit.
+ Reply to Objection 3: In any science, he who acquires, by demonstration, scientific knowledge of one conclusion, has the habit indeed, yet imperfectly. + And when he obtains, by demonstration, the scientific knowledge of another conclusion, no additional habit is engendered in + him: but the habit which was in him previously is perfected, forasmuch as it has increased in extent; because the conclusions + and demonstrations of one science are coordinate, and one flows from + another. +
[35786] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ille qui in aliqua scientia acquirit per +demonstrationem scientiam conclusionis unius, habet quidem habitum, +sed imperfecte. Cum vero acquirit per aliquam demonstrationem +scientiam conclusionis alterius, non aggeneratur in eo alius +habitus; sed habitus qui prius inerat fit perfectior, utpote ad +plura se extendens; eo quod conclusiones et demonstrationes unius +scientiae ordinatae sunt, et una derivatur ex alia.
We come now to the consideration of habits specifically. And since habits, as we have said ( + Q[54], A[3]), are divided into good and bad, we must speak in the first place of good habits, which are virtues, and of other matters + connected with them, namely the Gifts, Beatitudes and Fruits; in the second place, of bad habits, namely of vices and sins. + Now five things must be considered about virtues: (1) the essence of virtue; (2) its subject; (3) the division + of virtue; (4) the cause of virtue; (5) certain properties of virtue. +
Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether human virtue is a habit?
(2) Whether it is an operative habit?
+[35787] +Iª-IIae q. 55 pr. Consequenter considerandum est de +habitibus in speciali. Et quia habitus, ut dictum est, +distinguuntur per bonum et malum, primo dicendum est de habitibus +bonis, qui sunt virtutes et alia eis adiuncta, scilicet dona, +beatitudines et fructus; secundo, de habitibus malis, scilicet de +vitiis et peccatis. Circa virtutes autem quinque consideranda sunt, +primo, de essentia virtutis; secundo, de subiecto eius; tertio, de +divisione virtutum; quarto, de causa virtutis; quinto, de quibusdam +proprietatibus virtutis. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, +utrum virtus humana sit habitus. Secundo, utrum sit habitus +operativus. Tertio, utrum sit habitus bonus. Quarto, de definitione +virtutis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that human virtue is not a habit: For virtue is "the limit of power" (De Coelo i, text. 116). But the limit + of anything is reducible to the genus of that of which it is the limit; as a point is reducible to the genus of line. Therefore + virtue is reducible to the genus of power, and not to the genus of habit. +
[35788] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus humana non sit habitus. Virtus +enim est ultimum potentiae, ut dicitur in I de caelo. Sed +ultimum uniuscuiusque reducitur ad genus illud cuius est ultimum, +sicut punctum ad genus lineae. Ergo virtus reducitur ad genus +potentiae, et non ad genus habitus.
+ Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii) [*Retract. ix; cf. De Lib. Arb. ii, 19] that "virtue is good use of free-will." + But use of free-will is an act. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an act. +
[35789] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in II de libero Arbit., quod virtus est bonus +usus liberi arbitrii. Sed usus liberi arbitrii est actus. Ergo +virtus non est habitus, sed actus.
+ Objection 3: Further, we do not merit by our habits, but by our actions: otherwise a man would merit continually, even while asleep. But + we do merit by our virtues. Therefore virtues are not habits, but acts. +
[35790] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +habitibus non meremur, sed actibus, alioquin homo mereretur +continue, etiam dormiendo. Sed virtutibus meremur. Ergo virtutes +non sunt habitus, sed actus.
+ Objection 4: Further, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that "virtue is the order of love," and (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 30) that "the ordering + which is called virtue consists in enjoying what we ought to enjoy, and using what we ought to use." Now order, or ordering, + denominates either an action or a relation. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an action or a relation. +
[35791] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in libro de moribus Eccles., quod virtus est +ordo amoris. Et in libro octoginta trium quaest., dicit quod +ordinatio quae virtus vocatur, est fruendis frui, et utendis +uti. Ordo autem, seu ordinatio, nominat vel actum, vel +relationem. Ergo virtus non est habitus, sed actus vel relatio.
+ Objection 5: Further, just as there are human virtues, so are there natural virtues. But natural virtues are not habits, but powers. Neither + therefore are human virtues habits. +
[35792] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 arg. 5 Praeterea, +sicut inveniuntur virtutes humanae, ita et virtutes naturales. Sed +virtutes naturales non sunt habitus, sed potentiae quaedam. Ergo +etiam neque virtutes humanae.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Categor. vi) that science and virtue are habits. +
[35793] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus, in libro Praedicament., scientiam et virtutem +ponit esse habitus.
+ I answer that, Virtue denotes a certain perfection of a power. Now a thing's perfection is considered chiefly in regard to its end. But + the end of power is act. Wherefore power is said to be perfect, according as it is determinate to its act. +
Now there are some powers which of themselves are determinate to their acts; for instance, the active natural powers. And + therefore these natural powers are in themselves called virtues. But the rational powers, which are proper to man, are not + determinate to one particular action, but are inclined indifferently to many: and they are determinate to acts by means of + habits, as is clear from what we have said above ( + Q[49], A[4] ). Therefore human virtues + are habits. +
[35794] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod virtus nominat quandam potentiae perfectionem. +Uniuscuiusque autem perfectio praecipue consideratur in ordine ad +suum finem. Finis autem potentiae actus est. Unde potentia dicitur +esse perfecta, secundum quod determinatur ad suum actum. Sunt autem +quaedam potentiae quae secundum seipsas sunt determinatae ad suos +actus; sicut potentiae naturales activae. Et ideo huiusmodi +potentiae naturales secundum seipsas dicuntur virtutes. Potentiae +autem rationales, quae sunt propriae hominis, non sunt determinatae +ad unum, sed se habent indeterminate ad multa, determinantur autem +ad actus per habitus, sicut ex supradictis patet. Et ideo virtutes +humanae habitus sunt.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes we give the name of a virtue to that to which the virtue is directed, namely, either to its object, or to its act: + for instance, we give the name Faith, to that which we believe, or to the act of believing, as also to the habit by which + we believe. When therefore we say that "virtue is the limit of power," virtue is taken for the object of virtue. For the furthest + point to which a power can reach, is said to be its virtue; for instance, if a + man can carry a hundredweight and not more, his virtue [*In English we should say 'strength,' which is the original signification + of the Latin 'virtus': thus we speak of an engine being so many horse-power, to indicate its 'strength'] is put at a hundredweight, + and not at sixty. But the objection takes virtue as being essentially the limit of power. +
[35795] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod quandoque virtus dicitur id ad quod est virtus, +scilicet vel obiectum virtutis, vel actus eius, sicut fides dicitur +quandoque id quod creditur, quandoque vero ipsum credere, quandoque +autem ipse habitus quo creditur. Unde quando dicitur quod virtus +est ultimum potentiae, sumitur virtus pro obiecto virtutis. Id enim +in quod ultimo potentia potest, est id ad quod dicitur virtus rei, +sicut si aliquis potest ferre centum libras et non plus, virtus +eius consideratur secundum centum libras, non autem secundum +sexaginta. Obiectio autem procedebat ac si essentialiter virtus +esset ultimum potentiae.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Good use of free-will is said to be a virtue, in the same sense as above (ad 1); that is to say, because it is that to which + virtue is directed as to its proper act. For the act of virtue is nothing else than the good use of free-will. +
[35796] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod bonus usus liberi arbitrii dicitur esse virtus, +secundum eandem rationem, quia scilicet est id ad quod ordinatur +virtus sicut ad proprium actum. Nihil est enim aliud actus virtutis +quam bonus usus liberi arbitrii.
+ Reply to Objection 3: We are said to merit by something in two ways. First, as by merit itself, just as we are said to run by running; and thus + we merit by acts. Secondly, we are said to merit by something as by the principle whereby we merit, as we are said to run + by the motive power; and thus are we said to merit by virtues and habits. +
[35797] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod aliquo dicimur mereri dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut +ipso merito, eo modo quo dicimur currere cursu, et hoc modo meremur +actibus. Alio modo dicimur mereri aliquo sicut principio merendi, +sicut dicimur currere potentia motiva, et sic dicimur mereri +virtutibus et habitibus.
+ Reply to Objection 4: When we say that virtue is the order or ordering of love, we refer to the end to which virtue is ordered: because in us love + is set in order by virtue. +
[35798] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod virtus dicitur ordo vel ordinatio amoris, sicut id ad +quod est virtus, per virtutem enim ordinatur amor in nobis.
+ Reply to Objection 5: Natural powers are of themselves determinate to one act: not so the rational powers. And so there is no comparison, as we + have said. +
[35799] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 ad 5 Ad quintum +dicendum quod potentiae naturales sunt de se determinatae ad unum, +non autem potentiae rationales. Et ideo non est simile, ut dictum +est.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that it is not essential to human virtue to be an operative habit. For Tully says (Tuscul. iv) that as health + and beauty belong to the body, so virtue belongs to the soul. But health and beauty are not operative habits. Therefore neither + is virtue. +
[35800] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit de ratione virtutis humanae +quod sit habitus operativus. Dicit enim Tullius, in IV de Tuscul. +quaest., quod sicut est sanitas et pulchritudo corporis, ita est +virtus animae. Sed sanitas et pulchritudo non sunt habitus +operativi. Ergo neque etiam virtus.
+ Objection 2: Further, in natural things we find virtue not only in reference to act, but also in reference to being: as is clear from + the Philosopher (De Coelo i), since some have a virtue to be always, while some have a virtue to be not always, but at some + definite time. Now as natural virtue is in natural things, so is human virtue in rational beings. Therefore also human virtue + is referred not only to act, but also to being. +
[35801] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +in rebus naturalibus invenitur virtus non solum ad agere, sed etiam +ad esse, ut patet per philosophum, in I de caelo, quod quaedam +habent virtutem ut sint semper, quaedam vero non ad hoc quod sint +semper, sed aliquo tempore determinato. Sed sicut se habet virtus +naturalis in rebus naturalibus, ita se habet virtus humana in +rationalibus. Ergo etiam virtus humana non solum est ad agere, sed +etiam ad esse.
+ Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that virtue "is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best." + Now the best thing to which man needs to be disposed by virtue is God Himself, as Augustine proves (De Moribus + Eccl. 3, + 6, + 14) to Whom the soul is disposed by being made like to Him. Therefore it seems that virtue is a quality of the soul in reference + to God, likening it, as it were, to Him; and not in reference to operation. It is not, + therefore, an operative habit. +
[35802] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in VII Physic., quod virtus est dispositio +perfecti ad optimum. Optimum autem ad quod hominem oportet disponi +per virtutem, est ipse Deus, ut probat Augustinus in libro II de +moribus Eccles.; ad quem disponitur anima per assimilationem ad +ipsum. Ergo videtur quod virtus dicatur qualitas quaedam animae in +ordine ad Deum, tanquam assimilativa ad ipsum, non autem in ordine +ad operationem. Non igitur est habitus operativus.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) says that "virtue of a thing is that which makes its work good." +
[35803] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod virtus +uniuscuiusque rei est quae opus eius bonum reddit.
+ I answer that, Virtue, from the very nature of the word, implies some perfection of power, as we have said above + (A[1]). Wherefore, since power [*The one Latin word 'potentia' is rendered 'potentiality' in the first case, and 'power' in the + second] is of two kinds, namely, power in reference to being, and power in reference to act; the perfection of each of these + is called virtue. But power in reference to being is on the part of matter, which is + potential being, whereas power in reference to act, is on the part of the form, which is the principle of action, since everything + acts in so far as it is in act. +
Now man is so constituted that the body holds the place of matter, the soul that of form. The body, indeed, man has in common + with other animals; and the same is to be said of the forces which are common to the soul and body: and only those forces + which are proper to the soul, namely, the rational forces, belong to man alone. And therefore, human virtue, of which we are + speaking now, cannot belong to the body, but belongs only to that which is proper to the soul. Wherefore human + virtue does not imply reference to being, but rather to act. Consequently it is essential to human virtue to be an operative + habit. +
[35804] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod virtus, ex ipsa ratione nominis, importat quandam +perfectionem potentiae, ut supra dictum est. Unde, cum duplex sit +potentia, scilicet potentia ad esse et potentia ad agere, utriusque +potentiae perfectio virtus vocatur. Sed potentia ad esse se tenet +ex parte materiae, quae est ens in potentia, potentia autem ad +agere se tenet ex parte formae, quae est principium agendi, eo quod +unumquodque agit inquantum est actu. In constitutione autem +hominis, corpus se habet sicut materia, anima vero sicut forma. Et +quantum quidem ad corpus, homo communicat cum aliis animalibus; et +similiter quantum ad vires quae sunt animae et corpori communes; +solae autem illae vires quae sunt propriae animae, scilicet +rationales, sunt hominis tantum. Et ideo virtus humana, de qua +loquimur, non potest pertinere ad corpus; sed pertinet tantum ad id +quod est proprium animae. Unde virtus humana non importat ordinem +ad esse, sed magis ad agere. Et ideo de ratione virtutis humanae +est quod sit habitus operativus.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Mode of action follows on the disposition of the agent: for such as a thing is, such is its act. And therefore, since virtue + is the principle of some kind of operation, there must needs pre-exist in the operator in respect of virtue some corresponding + disposition. Now virtue causes an ordered operation. Therefore virtue itself is an ordered disposition of the soul, in so + far as, to wit, the powers of the soul are in some way ordered to one another, + and to that which is outside. Hence virtue, inasmuch as it is a suitable disposition of the soul, is like health and beauty, + which are suitable dispositions of the body. But this does not hinder virtue from being a principle of operation. +
[35805] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod modus actionis sequitur dispositionem agentis, +unumquodque enim quale est, talia operatur. Et ideo, cum virtus sit +principium aliqualis operationis, oportet quod in operante +praeexistat secundum virtutem aliqua conformis dispositio. Facit +autem virtus operationem ordinatam. Et ideo ipsa virtus est quaedam +dispositio ordinata in anima, secundum scilicet quod potentiae +animae ordinantur aliqualiter ad invicem, et ad id quod est extra. +Et ideo virtus, inquantum est conveniens dispositio animae, +assimilatur sanitati et pulchritudini, quae sunt debitae +dispositiones corporis. Sed per hoc non excluditur quin virtus +etiam sit operationis principium.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Virtue which is referred to being is not proper to man; but only that virtue which is referred to works of reason, which + are proper to man. +
[35806] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod virtus quae est ad esse, non est propria hominis, sed +solum virtus quae est ad opera rationis, quae sunt propria +hominis.
+ Reply to Objection 3: As God's substance is His act, the highest likeness of man to God is in respect of some operation. Wherefore, as we have + said above ( + Q[3], A[2]), happiness or bliss by which man is made most perfectly conformed to God, and which is the end of human life, consists in + an operation. +
[35807] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, cum Dei substantia sit eius actio, summa assimilatio +hominis ad Deum est secundum aliquam operationem. Unde, sicut supra +dictum est, felicitas sive beatitudo, per quam homo maxime Deo +conformatur, quae est finis humanae vitae, in operatione +consistit.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that it is not essential to virtue that it should be a good habit. For sin is always taken in a bad sense. + But there is a virtue even of sin; according to + 1 Cor. 15:56: "The virtue [Douay: 'strength'] of sin is the Law." Therefore virtue is not always a good habit. +
[35808] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit de ratione virtutis quod sit +habitus bonus. Peccatum enim in malo semper sumitur. Sed etiam +peccati est aliqua virtus; secundum illud I ad Cor. XV, virtus +peccati lex. Ergo virtus non semper est habitus bonus.
+ Objection 2: Further, Virtue corresponds to power. But power is not only referred to good, but also to evil: according to + Is. 5: "Woe to you that are mighty to drink wine, and stout men at drunkenness." Therefore virtue also is referred to good and + evil. +
[35809] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +virtus potentiae respondet. Sed potentia non solum se habet ad +bonum, sed etiam ad malum; secundum illud Isaiae V, vae, qui +potentes estis ad bibendum vinum, et viri fortes ad miscendam +ebrietatem. Ergo etiam virtus se habet et ad bonum et ad +malum.
+ Objection 3: Further, according to the Apostle ( + 2 Cor. 12:9): "Virtue [Douay: 'power'] is made perfect in infirmity." But infirmity is an evil. Therefore virtue is referred not only + to good, but also to evil. +
[35810] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +secundum apostolum, II ad Cor. XII, virtus in infirmitate +perficitur. Sed infirmitas est quoddam malum. Ergo virtus non solum +se habet ad bonum, sed etiam ad malum.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi): "No one can doubt that virtue makes the soul exceeding good": and the Philosopher says + (Ethic. ii, 6): "Virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise." +
[35811] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de moribus Eccles., nemo +autem dubitaverit quod virtus animam facit optimam. Et +philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod virtus est quae bonum +facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit.
+ I answer that, As we have said above + (A[1]), virtue implies a perfection of power: wherefore the virtue of a thing is fixed by the limit of its power (De Coelo i). Now + the limit of any power must needs be good: for all evil implies defect; wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Hom. ii) that every + evil is a weakness. And for this reason the virtue of a thing must be regarded in reference to good. Therefore human virtue + which is an operative habit, is a + good habit, productive of good works. +
[35812] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtus importat perfectionem +potentiae, unde virtus cuiuslibet rei determinatur ad ultimum in +quod res potest, ut dicitur in I de caelo. Ultimum autem in quod +unaquaeque potentia potest, oportet quod sit bonum, nam omne malum +defectum quendam importat; unde Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Div. +Nom., quod omne malum est infirmum. Et propter hoc oportet quod +virtus cuiuslibet rei dicatur in ordine ad bonum. Unde virtus +humana, quae est habitus operativus, est bonus habitus, et boni +operativus.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Just as bad things are said metaphorically to be perfect, so are they said to be good: for we speak of a perfect thief or + robber; and of a good thief or robber, as the Philosopher explains (Metaph. v, text. 21). In this way therefore virtue is + applied to evil things: so that the "virtue" of sin is said to be law, in so far as occasionally sin is aggravated through + the law, so as to attain to the limit of its possibility. +
[35813] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod sicut perfectum, ita et bonum dicitur +metaphorice in malis, dicitur enim et perfectus fur sive latro, et +bonus fur sive latro; ut patet per philosophum, in V Metaphys. +Secundum hoc ergo, etiam virtus metaphorice in malis dicitur. Et +sic virtus peccati dicitur lex, inquantum scilicet per legem +occasionaliter est peccatum augmentatum, et quasi ad maximum suum +posse pervenit.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The evil of drunkenness and excessive drink, consists in a falling away from the order of reason. Now it happens that, together + with this falling away from reason, some lower power is perfect in reference to that which belongs to its own kind, even in + direct opposition to reason, or with some falling away therefrom. But the perfection of that power, since it is compatible + with a falling away from reason, cannot be called a human virtue. +
[35814] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod malum ebrietatis et nimiae potationis, consistit in +defectu ordinis rationis. Contingit autem, cum defectu rationis, +esse aliquam potentiam inferiorem perfectam ad id quod est sui +generis, etiam cum repugnantia vel cum defectu rationis. Perfectio +autem talis potentiae, cum sit cum defectu rationis, non posset +dici virtus humana.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Reason is shown to be so much the more perfect, according as it is able to overcome or endure more easily the weakness of + the body and of the lower powers. And therefore human virtue, which is attributed to reason, is said to be "made perfect in + infirmity," not of the reason indeed, but of the body and of the lower powers. +
[35815] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod tanto ratio perfectior esse ostenditur, quanto +infirmitates corporis et inferiorum partium magis potest vincere +seu tolerare. Et ideo virtus humana, quae rationi attribuitur, in +infirmitate perfici dicitur, non quidem rationis, sed in +infirmitate corporis et inferiorum partium.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the definition, usually given, of virtue, is not suitable, to wit: "Virtue is a good quality of the mind, + by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God works in us, without us." For virtue is man's goodness, + since virtue it is that makes its subject good. But goodness does not seem to be good, as neither is whiteness white. It is + therefore unsuitable to describe virtue as a "good quality." +
[35816] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit conveniens definitio virtutis +quae solet assignari, scilicet, virtus est bona qualitas mentis, +qua recte vivitur, qua nullus male utitur, quam Deus in nobis sine +nobis operatur. Virtus enim est bonitas hominis, ipsa enim est quae +bonum facit habentem. Sed bonitas non videtur esse bona, sicut nec +albedo est alba. Igitur inconvenienter dicitur quod virtus est bona +qualitas.
+ Objection 2: Further, no difference is more common than its genus; since it is that which divides the genus. But good is more common than + quality, since it is convertible with being. Therefore "good" should not be put in the definition of virtue, as a difference + of quality. +
[35817] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +nulla differentia est communior suo genere, cum sit generis +divisiva. Sed bonum est communius quam qualitas, convertitur enim +cum ente. Ergo bonum non debet poni in definitione virtutis, ut +differentia qualitatis.
+ Objection 3: Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 3): "When we come across anything that is not common to us and the beasts of the + field, it is something appertaining to the mind." But there are virtues even of the irrational parts; as the Philosopher says + (Ethic. iii, 10). Every virtue, therefore, is not a good quality "of the mind." +
[35818] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sicut Augustinus dicit, in XII de Trin., ubi primo occurrit +aliquid quod non sit nobis pecoribusque commune, illud ad mentem +pertinet. Sed quaedam virtutes sunt etiam irrationabilium +partium; ut philosophus dicit, in III Ethic. Non ergo omnis virtus +est bona qualitas mentis.
+ Objection 4: Further, righteousness seems to belong to justice; whence the righteous are called just. But justice is a species of virtue. + It is therefore unsuitable to put "righteous" in the definition of virtue, when we say that virtue is that "by which we live + righteously." +
[35819] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 arg. 4 Praeterea, +rectitudo videtur ad iustitiam pertinere, unde idem dicuntur recti, +et iusti. Sed iustitia est species virtutis. Inconvenienter ergo +ponitur rectum in definitione virtutis, cum dicitur, qua recte +vivitur.
+ Objection 5: Further, whoever is proud of a thing, makes bad use of it. But many are proud of virtue, for Augustine says in his Rule, + that "pride lies in wait for good works in order to slay them." It is untrue, therefore, "that no one can make bad use of + virtue." +
[35820] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 arg. 5 Praeterea, +quicumque superbit de aliquo, male utitur eo. Sed multi superbiunt +de virtute, dicit enim Augustinus, in regula, quod superbia +etiam bonis operibus insidiatur, ut pereant. Falsum est ergo +quod nemo virtute male utatur.
+ Objection 6: Further, man is justified by virtue. But Augustine commenting on + Jn. 15:11: "He shall do greater things than these," says [*Tract. xxvii in Joan.: Serm. xv de Verb. + Ap. 11]: "He who created thee without thee, will not justify thee without thee." It is therefore unsuitable to say that "God works + virtue in us, without us." +
[35821] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 arg. 6 Praeterea, +homo per virtutem iustificatur. Sed Augustinus dicit, super illud +Ioan., maiora horum faciet, qui creavit te sine te, non +iustificabit te sine te. Inconvenienter ergo dicitur quod +virtutem Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur.
+ On the contrary, We have the authority of Augustine from whose words this definition is gathered, and principally in De Libero Arbitrio ii, + 19. +
[35822] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est auctoritas Augustini, ex cuius verbis praedicta definitio +colligitur, et praecipue in II de libero arbitrio.
+ I answer that, This definition comprises perfectly the whole essential notion of virtue. For the perfect essential notion of anything is + gathered from all its causes. Now the above definition comprises all the causes of virtue. For the formal cause of virtue, + as of everything, is gathered from its genus and difference, when it is defined as "a good quality": for "quality" is the + genus of virtue, and the difference, "good." But the definition would be more suitable if for + "quality" we substitute "habit," which is the proximate genus. +
Now virtue has no matter "out of which" it is formed, as neither has any other accident; but it has matter "about which" + it is concerned, and matter "in which" it exits, namely, the subject. The matter about which virtue is concerned is its object, + and this could not be included in the above definition, because the object fixes the virtue to a certain species, and here + we are giving the definition of virtue in general. And so for material cause we have the subject, which is + mentioned when we say that virtue is a good quality "of the mind." +
The end of virtue, since it is an operative habit, is operation. But it must be observed that some operative habits are always + referred to evil, as vicious habits: others are sometimes referred to good, sometimes to evil; for instance, opinion is referred + both to the true and to the untrue: whereas virtue is a habit which is always referred to good: and so the distinction of + virtue from those habits which are always referred to evil, is expressed in the words "by which we live + righteously": and its distinction from those habits which are sometimes directed unto good, sometimes unto evil, in the words, + "of which no one makes bad use." +
Lastly, God is the efficient cause of infused virtue, to which this definition applies; and this is expressed in the words + "which God works in us without us." If we omit this phrase, the remainder of the definition will apply to all virtues in general, + whether acquired or infused. +
[35823] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod ista definitio perfecte complectitur totam rationem +virtutis. Perfecta enim ratio uniuscuiusque rei colligitur ex +omnibus causis eius. Comprehendit autem praedicta definitio omnes +causas virtutis. Causa namque formalis virtutis, sicut et +cuiuslibet rei, accipitur ex eius genere et differentia, cum +dicitur qualitas bona, genus enim virtutis qualitas est, +differentia autem bonum. Esset tamen convenientior definitio, si +loco qualitatis habitus poneretur, qui est genus propinquum. Virtus +autem non habet materiam ex qua, sicut nec alia accidentia, sed +habet materiam circa quam; et materiam in qua, scilicet subiectum. +Materia autem circa quam est obiectum virtutis; quod non potuit in +praedicta definitione poni, eo quod per obiectum determinatur +virtus ad speciem; hic autem assignatur definitio virtutis in +communi. Unde ponitur subiectum loco causae materialis, cum dicitur +quod est bona qualitas mentis. Finis autem virtutis, cum sit +habitus operativus, est ipsa operatio. Sed notandum quod habituum +operativorum aliqui sunt semper ad malum, sicut habitus vitiosi; +aliqui vero quandoque ad bonum, et quandoque ad malum, sicut opinio +se habet ad verum et ad falsum; virtus autem est habitus semper se +habens ad bonum. Et ideo, ut discernatur virtus ab his quae semper +se habent ad malum, dicitur, qua recte vivitur, ut autem +discernatur ab his quae se habent quandoque ad bonum, quandoque ad +malum, dicitur, qua nullus male utitur. Causa autem efficiens +virtutis infusae, de qua definitio datur, Deus est. Propter quod +dicitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. Quae quidem +particula si auferatur, reliquum definitionis erit commune omnibus +virtutibus, et acquisitis et infusis.
+ Reply to Objection 1: That which is first seized by the intellect is being: wherefore everything that we apprehend we consider as being, and consequently + as gone, and as good, which are convertible with being. Wherefore we say that essence is being and is one and is good; and + that oneness is being and one and good: and in like manner goodness. But this is not the case with specific forms, as whiteness + and health; for everything that we apprehend, is not apprehended with + the notion of white and healthy. We must, however, observe that, as accidents and non-subsistent forms are called beings, + not as if they themselves had being, but because things are by them; so also are they called good or one, not by some distinct + goodness or oneness, but because by them something is good or one. So also is virtue called good, because by it something + is good. +
[35824] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod id quod primo cadit in intellectu, est ens, unde +unicuique apprehenso a nobis attribuimus quod sit ens; et per +consequens quod sit unum et bonum, quae convertuntur cum ente. Unde +dicimus quod essentia est ens et una et bona; et quod unitas est +ens et una et bona; et similiter de bonitate. Non autem hoc habet +locum in specialibus formis, sicut est albedo et sanitas, non enim +omne quod apprehendimus, sub ratione albi et sani apprehendimus. +Sed tamen considerandum quod sicut accidentia et formae non +subsistentes dicuntur entia, non quia ipsa habeant esse, sed quia +eis aliquid est; ita etiam dicuntur bona vel una, non quidem aliqua +alia bonitate vel unitate, sed quia eis est aliquid bonum vel unum. +Sic igitur et virtus dicitur bona, quia ea aliquid est bonum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Good, which is put in the definition of virtue, is not good in general which is convertible with being, and which extends + further than quality, but the good as fixed by reason, with regard to which Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) "that the good of + the soul is to be in accord with reason." +
[35825] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod bonum quod ponitur in definitione virtutis, non est +bonum commune, quod convertitur cum ente, et est in plus quam +qualitas, sed est bonum rationis, secundum quod Dionysius dicit, in +IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod bonum animae est secundum rationem +esse.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Virtue cannot be in the irrational part of the soul, except in so far as this participates in the reason (Ethic. i, 13). + And therefore reason, or the mind, is the proper subject of virtue. +
[35826] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod virtus non potest esse in irrationali parte animae, +nisi inquantum participat rationem, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Et ideo +ratio, sive mens, est proprium subiectum virtutis humanae.
+ Reply to Objection 4: Justice has a righteousness of its own by which it puts those outward things right which come into human use, and are the + proper matter of justice, as we shall show further on (Q[60], A[2]; + SS, Q[58], A[8]). But the righteousness which denotes order to a due end and to the Divine law, which is the rule of the human will, as stated + above (Q[19], A[4]), is common to all virtues. +
[35827] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod iustitiae est propria rectitudo quae constituitur +circa res exteriores quae in usum hominis veniunt, quae sunt +propria materia iustitiae, ut infra patebit. Sed rectitudo quae +importat ordinem ad finem debitum et ad legem divinam, quae est +regula voluntatis humanae, ut supra dictum est, communis est omni +virtuti.
+ Reply to Objection 5: One can make bad use of a virtue objectively, for instance by having evil thoughts about a virtue, e.g. by hating it, or + by being proud of it: but one cannot make bad use of virtue as principle of action, so that an act of virtue be evil. +
[35828] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 ad 5 Ad quintum +dicendum quod virtute potest aliquis male uti tanquam obiecto, puta +cum male sentit de virtute, cum odit eam, vel superbit de ea, non +autem tanquam principio usus, ita scilicet quod malus sit actus +virtutis.
+ Reply to Objection 6: Infused virtue is caused in us by God without any action on our part, but not without our consent. This is the sense of the + words, "which God works in us without us." As to those things which are done by us, God causes them in us, yet not without + action on our part, for He works in every will and in every nature. +
[35829] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 ad 6 Ad sextum +dicendum quod virtus infusa causatur in nobis a Deo sine nobis +agentibus, non tamen sine nobis consentientibus. Et sic est +intelligendum quod dicitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. +Quae vero per nos aguntur, Deus in nobis causat non sine nobis +agentibus, ipse enim operatur in omni voluntate et natura.
We now have to consider the subject of virtue, about which there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the subject of virtue is a power of the soul?
(2) Whether one virtue can be in several powers?
(3) Whether the intellect can be the subject of virtue?
(4) Whether the irascible and concupiscible faculties can be the subject of virtue?
(5) Whether the sensitive powers of apprehension can be the subject of virtue?
+[35830] +Iª-IIae q. 56 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +subiecto virtutis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum virtus +sit in potentia animae sicut in subiecto. Secundo, utrum una virtus +possit esse in pluribus potentiis. Tertio, utrum intellectus possit +esse subiectum virtutis. Quarto, utrum irascibilis et +concupiscibilis. Quinto, utrum vires apprehensivae sensitivae. +Sexto, utrum voluntas.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the subject of virtue is not a power of the soul. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that "virtue + is that by which we live righteously." But we live by the essence of the soul, and not by a power of the soul. Therefore virtue + is not a power, but in the essence of the soul. +
[35831] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus non sit in potentia animae +sicut in subiecto. Dicit enim Augustinus, in II de Lib. Arbit., +quod virtus est qua recte vivitur. Vivere autem non est per +potentiam animae, sed per eius essentiam. Ergo virtus non est in +potentia animae, sed in eius essentia.
+ Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise." + But as work is set up by power, so he that has a virtue is set up by the essence of the soul. Therefore virtue does not belong + to the power, any more than to the essence of the soul. +
[35832] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., virtus est quae bonum facit +habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit. Sed sicut opus +constituitur per potentiam, ita habens virtutem constituitur per +essentiam animae. Ergo virtus non magis pertinet ad potentiam +animae, quam ad eius essentiam.
+ Objection 3: Further, power is in the second species of quality. But virtue is a quality, as we have said above ( + Q[55], A[4]): and quality is not the subject of quality. Therefore a power of the soul is not the subject of virtue. +
[35833] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +potentia est in secunda specie qualitatis. Virtus autem est quaedam +qualitas, ut supra dictum est. Qualitatis autem non est qualitas. +Ergo virtus non est in potentia animae sicut in subiecto.
+ On the contrary, "Virtue is the limit of power" (De Coelo ii). But the limit is in that of which it is the limit. Therefore virtue is in a + power of the soul. +
[35834] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra, +virtus est ultimum potentiae, ut dicitur in I de caelo. Sed ultimum +est in eo cuius est ultimum. Ergo virtus est in potentia +animae.
+ I answer that, It can be proved in three ways that virtue belongs to a power of the soul. First, from the notion of the very essence of + virtue, which implies perfection of a power; for perfection is in that which it perfects. Secondly, from the fact that virtue + is an operative habit, as we have said above ( + Q[55], A[2]): for all operation proceeds from the soul through a power. Thirdly, from the fact that virtue disposes to that which is + best: for + the best is the end, which is either a thing's operation, or something acquired by an operation proceeding from the thing's + power. Therefore a power of the soul is the subject of virtue. +
[35835] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod virtutem pertinere ad potentiam animae, ex tribus +potest esse manifestum. Primo quidem, ex ipsa ratione virtutis, +quae importat perfectionem potentiae, perfectio autem est in eo +cuius est perfectio. Secundo, ex hoc quod est habitus operativus, +ut supra dictum est, omnis autem operatio est ab anima per aliquam +potentiam. Tertio, ex hoc quod disponit ad optimum, optimum autem +est finis, qui vel est operatio rei, vel aliquid consecutum per +operationem a potentia egredientem. Unde virtus humana est in +potentia animae sicut in subiecto.
+ Reply to Objection 1: "To live" may be taken in two ways. Sometimes it is taken for the very existence of the living thing: in this way it belongs + to the essence of the soul, which is the principle of existence in the living thing. But sometimes "to live" is taken for + the operation of the living thing: in this sense, by virtue we live righteously, inasmuch as by virtue we perform righteous + actions. +
[35836] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod vivere dupliciter sumitur. Quandoque enim +dicitur vivere ipsum esse viventis, et sic pertinet ad essentiam +animae, quae est viventi essendi principium. Alio modo vivere +dicitur operatio viventis, et sic virtute recte vivitur, inquantum +per eam aliquis recte operatur.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Good is either the end, or something referred to the end. And therefore, since the good of the worker consists in the work, + this fact also, that virtue makes the worker good, is referred to the work, and consequently, to the power. +
[35837] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod bonum vel est finis, vel in ordine ad finem dicitur. +Et ideo, cum bonum operantis consistat in operatione, hoc etiam +ipsum quod virtus facit operantem bonum, refertur ad operationem, +et per consequens ad potentiam.
+ Reply to Objection 3: One accident is said to be the subject of another, not as though one accident could uphold another; but because one accident + inheres to substance by means of another, as color to the body by means of the surface; so that surface is said to be the + subject of color. In this way a power of the soul is said to be the subject of virtue. +
[35838] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod unum accidens dicitur esse in alio sicut in subiecto, +non quia accidens per seipsum possit sustentare aliud accidens, sed +quia unum accidens inhaeret substantiae mediante alio accidente, ut +color corpori mediante superficie; unde superficies dicitur esse +subiectum coloris. Et eo modo potentia animae dicitur esse +subiectum virtutis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that one virtue can be in several powers. For habits are known by their acts. But one act proceeds in various + way from several powers: thus walking proceeds from the reason as directing, from the will as moving, and from the motive + power as executing. Therefore also one habit can be in several powers. +
[35839] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod una virtus possit esse in duabus +potentiis. Habitus enim cognoscuntur per actus. Sed unus actus +progreditur diversimode a diversis potentiis, sicut ambulatio +procedit a ratione ut a dirigente, a voluntate sicut a movente, et +a potentia motiva sicut ab exequente. Ergo etiam unus habitus +virtutis potest esse in pluribus potentiis.
+ Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that three things are required for virtue, namely: "to know, to will, and to + work steadfastly." But "to know" belongs to the intellect, and "to will" belongs to the will. Therefore virtue can be in several + powers. +
[35840] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod ad virtutem tria requiruntur, +scilicet scire, velle et immobiliter operari. Sed scire pertinet ad +intellectum, velle ad voluntatem. Ergo virtus potest esse in +pluribus potentiis.
+ Objection 3: Further, prudence is in the reason since it is "the right reason of things to be done" (Ethic. vi, 5). And it is also in + the will: for it cannot exist together with a perverse will (Ethic. vi, 12). Therefore one virtue can be in two powers. +
[35841] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +prudentia est in ratione, cum sit recta ratio agibilium, ut dicitur +in VI Ethic. Est etiam in voluntate, quia non potest esse cum +voluntate perversa, ut in eodem libro dicitur. Ergo una virtus +potest esse in duabus potentiis.
+ On the contrary, The subject of virtue is a power of the soul. But the same accident cannot be in several subjects. Therefore one virtue cannot + be in several powers of the soul. +
[35842] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra, +virtus est in potentia animae sicut in subiecto. Sed idem accidens +non potest esse in pluribus subiectis. Ergo una virtus non potest +esse in pluribus potentiis animae.
+ I answer that, It happens in two ways that one thing is subjected in two. First, so that it is in both on an equal footing. In this way + it is impossible for one virtue to be in two powers: since diversity of powers follows the generic conditions of the objects, + while diversity of habits follows the specific conditions thereof: and so wherever there is diversity of powers, there is + diversity of habits; but not vice versa. In another way one thing can be subjected in two or + more, not on an equal footing, but in a certain order. And thus one virtue can belong to several powers, so that it is in + one chiefly, while it extends to others by a kind of diffusion, or by way of a disposition, in so far as one power is moved + by another, and one power receives from another. +
[35843] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod aliquid esse in duobus, contingit dupliciter. Uno +modo, sic quod ex aequo sit in utroque. Et sic impossibile est unam +virtutem esse in duabus potentiis, quia diversitas potentiarum +attenditur secundum generales conditiones obiectorum, diversitas +autem habituum secundum speciales; unde ubicumque est diversitas +potentiarum, est diversitas habituum, sed non convertitur. Alio +modo potest esse aliquid in duobus vel pluribus, non ex aequo, sed +ordine quodam. Et sic una virtus pertinere potest ad plures +potentias; ita quod in una sit principaliter, et se extendat ad +alias per modum diffusionis, vel per modum dispositionis; secundum +quod una potentia movetur ab alia, et secundum quod una potentia +accipit ab alia.
+ Reply to Objection 1: One act cannot belong to several powers equally, and in the same degree; but only from different points of view, and in various + degrees. +
[35844] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod idem actus non potest aequaliter, et eodem +ordine, pertinere ad diversas potentias, sed secundum diversas +rationes, et diverso ordine.
+ Reply to Objection 2: "To know" is a condition required for moral virtue, inasmuch as moral virtue works according to right reason. But moral virtue + is essentially in the appetite. +
[35845] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod scire praeexigitur ad virtutem moralem, inquantum +virtus moralis operatur secundum rationem rectam. Sed essentialiter +in appetendo virtus moralis consistit.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Prudence is really subjected in reason: but it presupposes as its principle the rectitude of the will, as we shall see further + on + (A[3]; Q[57], A[4]). +
[35846] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod prudentia realiter est in ratione sicut in subiecto, +sed praesupponit rectitudinem voluntatis sicut principium, ut infra +dicetur.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect is not the subject of virtue. For Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that all virtue is + love. But the subject of love is not the intellect, but the appetitive power alone. Therefore no virtue is in the intellect. +
[35847] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus non sit subiectum +virtutis. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de moribus Eccles., quod +omnis virtus est amor. Subiectum autem amoris non est intellectus, +sed solum vis appetitiva. Ergo nulla virtus est in intellectu.
+ Objection 2: Further, virtue is referred to good, as is clear from what has been said above ( + Q[55], A[3]). Now good is not the object of the intellect, but of the appetitive power. Therefore the subject of virtue is not the intellect, + but the appetitive power. +
[35848] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +virtus ordinatur ad bonum, sicut ex supradictis patet. Bonum autem +non est obiectum intellectus, sed appetitivae virtutis. Ergo +subiectum virtutis non est intellectus, sed appetitiva virtus.
+ Objection 3: Further, virtue is that "which makes its possessor good," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6). But the habit which perfects + the intellect does not make its possessor good: since a man is not said to be a good man on account of his science or his + art. Therefore the intellect is not the subject of virtue. +
[35849] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 arg. 3 +Praeterea, virtus est quae bonum facit habentem, ut +philosophus dicit. Sed habitus perficiens intellectum non facit +bonum habentem, non enim propter scientiam vel artem dicitur homo +bonus. Ergo intellectus non est subiectum virtutis.
+ On the contrary, The mind is chiefly called the intellect. But the subject of virtue is the mind, as is clear from the definition, above given, + of virtue ( + Q[55], A[4]). Therefore the intellect is the subject of virtue. +
[35850] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod mens maxime dicitur intellectus. Subiectum autem virtutis +est mens; ut patet ex definitione virtutis supra inducta. Ergo +intellectus est subiectum virtutis.
+ I answer that, As we have said above ( + Q[55], A[3]), a virtue is a habit by which we work well. Now a habit may be directed to a good act in two ways. First, in so far as by + the habit a man acquires an aptness to a good act; for instance, by the habit of grammar man has the aptness to speak correctly. + But grammar does not make a man always speak correctly: for a grammarian may be guilty of a barbarism or make a solecism: + and the case is the same + with other sciences and arts. Secondly, a habit may confer not only aptness to act, but also the right use of that aptness: + for instance, justice not only gives man the prompt will to do just actions, but also makes him act justly. +
And since good, and, in like manner, being, is said of a thing simply, in respect, not of what it is potentially, but of + what it is actually: therefore from having habits of the latter sort, man is said simply to do good, and to be good; for instance, + because he is just, or temperate; and in like manner as regards other such virtues. And since virtue is that "which makes + its possessor good, and his work good likewise," these latter habits are called virtuous simply: because they + make the work to be actually good, and the subject good simply. But the first kind of habits are not called virtues simply: + because they do not make the work good except in regard to a certain aptness, nor do they make their possessor good simply. + For through being gifted in science or art, a man is said to be good, not simply, but relatively; for instance, a good grammarian + or a good smith. And for this reason science and art are often divided against virtue; while at other times they are + called virtues (Ethic. vi, 2). +
Hence the subject of a habit which is called a virtue in a relative sense, can be the intellect, and not only the practical + intellect, but also the speculative, without any reference to the will: for thus the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3) holds that + science, wisdom and understanding, and also art, are intellectual virtues. But the subject of a habit which is called a virtue + simply, can only be the will, or some power in so far as it is moved by the will. And the reason of this is, + that the will moves to their acts all those other powers that are in some way rational, as we have said above (Q[9], A[1]; + Q[17], AA[1],5; + FP, Q[82], A[4]): and therefore if man do well actually, this is because he has a good will. Therefore the virtue which makes a man to do + well actually, and not merely to have the aptness to do well, must be either in the will itself; or in some power as moved + by the will. +
Now it happens that the intellect is moved by the will, just as are the other powers: for a man considers something actually, + because he wills to do so. And therefore the intellect, in so far as it is subordinate to the will, can be the subject of + virtue absolutely so called. And in this way the speculative intellect, or the reason, is the subject of Faith: for the intellect + is moved by the command of the will to assent to what is of faith: for "no man believeth, unless he will" + [*Augustine: Tract. xxvi in Joan.]. But the practical intellect is the subject of prudence. For since prudence is the right + reason of things to be done, it is a condition thereof that man be rightly disposed in regard to the principles of this reason + of things to be done, that is in regard to their ends, to which man is rightly disposed by the rectitude of the will, just + as to the principles of speculative truth he is rightly disposed by the natural light of the active intellect. And therefore + as the subject of science, which is the right reason of speculative truths, is the speculative intellect in its relation to + the active intellect, so the subject of prudence is the practical intellect in its relation to the right will. +
[35851] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtus est habitus quo quis +bene operatur. Dupliciter autem habitus aliquis ordinatur ad bonum +actum. Uno modo, inquantum per huiusmodi habitum acquiritur homini +facultas ad bonum actum, sicut per habitum grammaticae habet homo +facultatem recte loquendi. Non tamen grammatica facit ut homo +semper recte loquatur, potest enim grammaticus barbarizare aut +soloecismum facere. Et eadem ratio est in aliis scientiis et +artibus. Alio modo, aliquis habitus non solum facit facultatem +agendi, sed etiam facit quod aliquis recte facultate utatur, sicut +iustitia non solum facit quod homo sit promptae voluntatis ad iusta +operandum, sed etiam facit ut iuste operetur. Et quia bonum, sicut +et ens, non dicitur simpliciter aliquid secundum id quod est in +potentia, sed secundum id quod est in actu; ideo ab huiusmodi +habitibus simpliciter dicitur homo bonum operari, et esse bonus, +puta quia est iustus vel temperatus; et eadem ratio est de +similibus. Et quia virtus est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus +eius bonum reddit, huiusmodi habitus simpliciter dicuntur virtutes, +quia reddunt bonum opus in actu, et simpliciter faciunt bonum +habentem. Primi vero habitus non simpliciter dicuntur virtutes, +quia non reddunt bonum opus nisi in quadam facultate, nec +simpliciter faciunt bonum habentem. Non enim dicitur simpliciter +aliquis homo bonus, ex hoc quod est sciens vel artifex, sed dicitur +bonus solum secundum quid, puta bonus grammaticus, aut bonus faber. +Et propter hoc, plerumque scientia et ars contra virtutem +dividitur, quandoque autem virtutes dicuntur, ut patet in VI Ethic. +Subiectum igitur habitus qui secundum quid dicitur virtus, potest +esse intellectus, non solum practicus, sed etiam intellectus +speculativus, absque omni ordine ad voluntatem, sic enim +philosophus, in VI Ethic., scientiam, sapientiam et intellectum, et +etiam artem, ponit esse intellectuales virtutes. Subiectum vero +habitus qui simpliciter dicitur virtus, non potest esse nisi +voluntas; vel aliqua potentia secundum quod est mota a voluntate. +Cuius ratio est, quia voluntas movet omnes alias potentias quae +aliqualiter sunt rationales, ad suos actus, ut supra habitum est, +et ideo quod homo actu bene agat, contingit ex hoc quod homo habet +bonam voluntatem. Unde virtus quae facit bene agere in actu, non +solum in facultate, oportet quod vel sit in ipsa voluntate; vel in +aliqua potentia secundum quod est a voluntate mota. Contingit autem +intellectum a voluntate moveri, sicut et alias potentias, +considerat enim aliquis aliquid actu, eo quod vult. Et ideo +intellectus, secundum quod habet ordinem ad voluntatem, potest esse +subiectum virtutis simpliciter dictae. Et hoc modo intellectus +speculativus, vel ratio, est subiectum fidei, movetur enim +intellectus ad assentiendum his quae sunt fidei, ex imperio +voluntatis; nullus enim credit nisi volens. Intellectus vero +practicus est subiectum prudentiae. Cum enim prudentia sit recta +ratio agibilium, requiritur ad prudentiam quod homo se bene habeat +ad principia huius rationis agendorum, quae sunt fines; ad quos +bene se habet homo per rectitudinem voluntatis, sicut ad principia +speculabilium per naturale lumen intellectus agentis. Et ideo sicut +subiectum scientiae, quae est ratio recta speculabilium, est +intellectus speculativus in ordine ad intellectum agentem; ita +subiectum prudentiae est intellectus practicus in ordine ad +voluntatem rectam.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The saying of Augustine is to be understood of virtue simply so called: not that every virtue is love simply: but that it + depends in some way on love, in so far as it depends on the will, whose first movement consists in love, as we have said above + (Q[25], AA[1],2,3; Q[27], A[4]; + FP, Q[20], A[1]). +
[35852] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod verbum Augustini intelligendum est de virtute +simpliciter dicta non quod omnis talis virtus sit simpliciter amor; +sed quia dependet aliqualiter ab amore, inquantum dependet a +voluntate, cuius prima affectio est amor, ut supra dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The good of each thing is its end: and therefore, as truth is the end of the intellect, so to know truth is the good act + of the intellect. Whence the habit, which perfects the intellect in regard to the knowledge of truth, whether speculative + or practical, is a virtue. +
[35853] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod bonum uniuscuiusque est finis eius, et ideo, cum +verum sit finis intellectus, cognoscere verum est bonus actus +intellectus. Unde habitus perficiens intellectum ad verum +cognoscendum, vel in speculativis vel in practicis, dicitur +virtus.
+ Reply to Objection 3: This objection considers virtue simply so called. +
[35854] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de virtute simpliciter dicta.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the irascible and concupiscible powers cannot be the subject of virtue. For these powers are common to + us and dumb animals. But we are now speaking of virtue as proper to man, since for this reason it is called human virtue. + It is therefore impossible for human virtue to be in the irascible and concupiscible powers which are parts of the sensitive + appetite, as we have said in the + FP, Q[81], A[2]. +
[35855] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis non +possint esse subiectum virtutis. Huiusmodi enim vires sunt communes +nobis et brutis. Sed nunc loquimur de virtute secundum quod est +propria homini, sic enim dicitur virtus humana. Non igitur humanae +virtutis potest esse subiectum irascibilis et concupiscibilis, quae +sunt partes appetitus sensitivi, ut in primo dictum est.
+ Objection 2: Further, the sensitive appetite is a power which makes use of a corporeal organ. But the good of virtue cannot be in man's + body: for the Apostle says ( + Rom. 7): "I know that good does not dwell in my flesh." Therefore the sensitive appetite cannot be the subject of virtue. +
[35856] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +appetitus sensitivus est vis utens organo corporali. Sed bonum +virtutis non potest esse in corpore hominis, dicit enim apostolus, +Rom. VII, scio quod non habitat in carne mea bonum. Ergo +appetitus sensitivus non potest esse subiectum virtutis.
+ Objection 3: Further, Augustine proves (De Moribus Eccl. v) that virtue is not in the body but in the soul, for the reason that the body + is ruled by the soul: wherefore it is entirely due to his soul that a man make good use of his body: "For instance, if my + coachman, through obedience to my orders, guides well the horses which he is driving; this is all due to me." But just as + the soul rules the body, so also does the reason rule the sensitive appetite. Therefore that the + irascible and concupiscible powers are rightly ruled, is entirely due to the rational powers. Now "virtue is that by which + we live rightly," as we have said above ( + Q[55], A[4]). Therefore virtue is not in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but only in the rational powers. +
[35857] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +Augustinus probat, in libro de moribus Eccles., quod virtus non est +in corpore, sed in anima, eo quod per animam corpus regitur, unde +quod aliquis corpore bene utatur, totum refertur ad animam; +sicut si mihi auriga obtemperans, equos quibus praeest, recte +regit, hoc totum mihi debetur. Sed sicut anima regit corpus, +ita etiam ratio regit appetitum sensitivum. Ergo totum rationali +parti debetur, quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis recte regantur. +Sed virtus est qua recte vivitur, ut supra dictum est. Virtus +igitur non est in irascibili et concupiscibili, sed solum in parte +rationali.
+ Objection 4: Further, "the principal act of moral virtue is choice" (Ethic. viii, 13). Now choice is not an act of the irascible and concupiscible + powers, but of the rational power, as we have said above ( + Q[13], A[2]). Therefore moral virtue is not in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but in the reason. +
[35858] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 arg. 4 Praeterea, +principalis actus virtutis moralis est electio, ut dicitur in VIII +Ethic. Sed electio non est actus irascibilis et concupiscibilis, +sed rationis, ut supra dictum est. Ergo virtus moralis non est in +irascibili et concupiscibili, sed in ratione.
+ On the contrary, Fortitude is assigned to the irascible power, and temperance to the concupiscible power. Whence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, + 10) says that "these virtues belong to the irrational part of the soul." +
[35859] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod fortitudo ponitur esse in irascibili, temperantia autem in +concupiscibili. Unde philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod hae +virtutes sunt irrationabilium partium.
+ I answer that, The irascible and concupiscible powers can be considered in two ways. First, in themselves, in so far as they are parts of + the sensitive appetite: and in this way they are not competent to be the subject of virtue. Secondly, they can be considered + as participating in the reason, from the fact that they have a natural aptitude to obey reason. And thus the irascible or + concupiscible power can be the subject of human virtue: for, in so far as it participates in + the reason, it is the principle of a human act. And to these powers we must needs assign virtues. +
For it is clear that there are some virtues in the irascible and concupiscible powers. Because an act, which proceeds from + one power according as it is moved by another power, cannot be perfect, unless both powers be well disposed to the act: for + instance, the act of a craftsman cannot be successful unless both the craftsman and his instrument be well disposed to act. + Therefore in the matter of the operations of the irascible and concupiscible powers, according as they are moved + by reason, there must needs be some habit perfecting in respect of acting well, not only the reason, but also the irascible + and concupiscible powers. And since the good disposition of the power which moves through being moved, depends on its conformity + with the power that moves it: therefore the virtue which is in the irascible and concupiscible powers is nothing else but + a certain habitual conformity of these powers to reason. +
[35860] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis dupliciter considerari +possunt. Uno modo secundum se, inquantum sunt partes appetitus +sensitivi. Et hoc modo, non competit eis quod sint subiectum +virtutis. Alio modo possunt considerari inquantum participant +rationem, per hoc quod natae sunt rationi obedire. Et sic +irascibilis vel concupiscibilis potest esse subiectum virtutis +humanae, sic enim est principium humani actus, inquantum participat +rationem. Et in his potentiis necesse est ponere virtutes. Quod +enim in irascibili et concupiscibili sint aliquae virtutes, patet. +Actus enim qui progreditur ab una potentia secundum quod est ab +alia mota, non potest esse perfectus, nisi utraque potentia sit +bene disposita ad actum, sicut actus artificis non potest esse +congruus, nisi et artifex sit bene dispositus ad agendum, et etiam +ipsum instrumentum. In his igitur circa quae operatur irascibilis +et concupiscibilis secundum quod sunt a ratione motae, necesse est +ut aliquis habitus perficiens ad bene agendum sit non solum in +ratione, sed etiam in irascibili et concupiscibili. Et quia bona +dispositio potentiae moventis motae, attenditur secundum +conformitatem ad potentiam moventem; ideo virtus quae est in +irascibili et concupiscibili, nihil aliud est quam quaedam +habitualis conformitas istarum potentiarum ad rationem.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The irascible and concupiscible powers considered in themselves, as parts of the sensitive appetite, are common to us and + dumb animals. But in so far as they are rational by participation, and are obedient to the reason, they are proper to man. + And in this way they can be the subject of human virtue. +
[35861] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis secundum se +consideratae, prout sunt partes appetitus sensitivi, communes sunt +nobis et brutis. Sed secundum quod sunt rationales per +participationem, ut obedientes rationi, sic sunt propriae hominis. +Et hoc modo possunt esse subiectum virtutis humanae.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Just as human flesh has not of itself the good of virtue, but is made the instrument of a virtuous act, inasmuch as being + moved by reason, we "yield our members to serve justice"; so also, the irascible and concupiscible powers, of themselves indeed, + have not the good of virtue, but rather the infection of the "fomes": whereas, inasmuch as they are in conformity with reason, + the good of reason is begotten in them. +
[35862] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut caro hominis ex se quidem non habet bonum +virtutis, fit tamen instrumentum virtuosi actus, inquantum, movente +ratione, membra nostra exhibemus ad serviendum iustitiae, ita etiam +irascibilis et concupiscibilis ex se quidem non habent bonum +virtutis sed magis infectionem fomitis; inquantum vero conformantur +rationi, sic in eis adgeneratur bonum virtutis moralis.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The body is ruled by the soul, and the irascible and concupiscible powers by the reason, but in different ways. For the body + obeys the soul blindly without any contradiction, in those things in which it has a natural aptitude to be moved by the soul: + whence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that the "soul rules the body with a despotic command" as the master rules his slave: + wherefore the entire movement of the body is referred to the soul. For this + reason virtue is not in the body, but in the soul. But the irascible and concupiscible powers do not obey the reason blindly; + on the contrary, they have their own proper movements, by which, at times, they go against reason, whence the Philosopher + says (Polit. i, 3) that the "reason rules the irascible and concupiscible powers by a political command" such as that by which + free men are ruled, who have in some respects a will of their own. And for this reason also must there be some virtues in + the irascible and concupiscible powers, by which these powers are well disposed to act. +
[35863] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod alia ratione regitur corpus ab anima, et irascibilis +et concupiscibilis a ratione. Corpus enim ad nutum obedit animae +absque contradictione, in his in quibus natum est ab anima moveri, +unde philosophus dicit, in I Polit., quod anima regit corpus +despotico principatu, idest sicut dominus servum. Et ideo totus +motus corporis refertur ad animam. Et propter hoc in corpore non +est virtus, sed solum in anima. Sed irascibilis et concupiscibilis +non ad nutum obediunt rationi, sed habent proprios motus suos, +quibus interdum rationi repugnant, unde in eodem libro philosophus +dicit quod ratio regit irascibilem et concupiscibilem principatu +politico, quo scilicet reguntur liberi, qui habent in aliquibus +propriam voluntatem. Et propter hoc etiam oportet in irascibili et +concupiscibili esse aliquas virtutes, quibus bene disponantur ad +actum.
+ Reply to Objection 4: In choice there are two things, namely, the intention of the end, and this belongs to the moral virtue; and the preferential + choice of that which is unto the end, and this belongs to prudence (Ethic. vi, 2,5). But that the irascible and concupiscible + powers have a right intention of the end in regard to the passions of the soul, is due to the good disposition of these powers. + And therefore those moral virtues which are concerned with the passions are + in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but prudence is in the reason. +
[35864] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod in electione duo sunt, scilicet intentio finis, quae +pertinet ad virtutem moralem; et praeacceptio eius quod est ad +finem, quod pertinet ad prudentiam; ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Quod +autem habeat rectam intentionem finis circa passiones animae, hoc +contingit ex bona dispositione irascibilis et concupiscibilis. Et +ideo virtutes morales circa passiones, sunt in irascibili et +concupiscibili, sed prudentia est in ratione.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that it is possible for virtue to be in the interior sensitive powers of apprehension. For the sensitive appetite + can be the subject of virtue, in so far as it obeys reason. But the interior sensitive powers of apprehension obey reason: + for the powers of imagination, of cogitation, and of memory [*Cf. + FP, Q[78], A[4]] act at the command of reason. Therefore in these powers there can be virtue. +
[35865] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod in viribus sensitivis apprehensivis +interius, possit esse aliqua virtus. Appetitus enim sensitivus +potest esse subiectum virtutis, inquantum obedit rationi. Sed vires +sensitivae apprehensivae interius, rationi obediunt, ad imperium +enim rationis operatur et imaginativa et cogitativa et memorativa. +Ergo in his viribus potest esse virtus.
+ Objection 2: Further, as the rational appetite, which is the will, can be hindered or helped in its act, by the sensitive appetite, so + also can the intellect or reason be hindered or helped by the powers mentioned above. As, therefore, there can be virtue in + the interior powers of appetite, so also can there be virtue in the interior powers of apprehension. +
[35866] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +sicut appetitus rationalis, qui est voluntas, in suo actu potest +impediri, vel etiam adiuvari, per appetitum sensitivum; ita etiam +intellectus vel ratio potest impediri, vel etiam iuvari, per vires +praedictas. Sicut ergo in viribus sensitivis appetitivis potest +esse virtus, ita etiam in apprehensivis.
+ Objection 3: Further, prudence is a virtue, of which Cicero (De Invent. Rhetor. ii) says that memory is a part. Therefore also in the + power of memory there can be a virtue: and in like manner, in the other interior sensitive powers of apprehension. +
[35867] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +prudentia est quaedam virtus, cuius partem ponit Tullius memoriam, +in sua rhetorica. Ergo etiam in vi memorativa potest esse aliqua +virtus. Et eadem ratione, in aliis interioribus apprehensivis +viribus.
+ On the contrary, All virtues are either intellectual or moral (Ethic. ii, 1). Now all the moral virtues are in the appetite; while the intellectual + virtues are in the intellect or reason, as is clear from Ethic. vi, 1. Therefore there is no virtue in the interior sensitive + powers of apprehension. +
[35868] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra +est quod omnes virtutes vel sunt intellectuales, vel morales, ut +dicitur in II Ethic. Morales autem virtutes omnes sunt in parte +appetitiva, intellectuales autem in intellectu vel ratione, sicut +patet in VI Ethic. Nulla ergo virtus est in viribus sensitivis +apprehensivis interius.
+ I answer that, In the interior sensitive powers of apprehension there are some habits. And this is made clear principally from what the + Philosopher says (De Memoria ii), that "in remembering one thing after another, we become used to it; and use is a second + nature." Now a habit of use is nothing else than a habit acquired by use, which is like unto nature. Wherefore Tully says + of virtue in his Rhetoric that "it is a habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Yet, + in man, that which he acquires by use, in his memory and other sensitive powers of apprehension, is not a habit properly so + called, but something annexed to the habits of the intellective faculty, as we have said above ( + Q[50], A[4], ad 3). +
[35869] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod in viribus sensitivis apprehensivis interius, +ponuntur aliqui habitus. Quod patet ex hoc praecipue quod +philosophus dicit, in libro de memoria, quod in memorando unum +post aliud, operatur consuetudo, quae est quasi quaedam natura, +nihil autem est aliud habitus consuetudinalis quam habitudo +acquisita per consuetudinem, quae est in modum naturae. Unde de +virtute dicit Tullius, in sua rhetorica, quod est habitus in +modum naturae, rationi consentaneus. In homine tamen id quod ex +consuetudine acquiritur in memoria, et in aliis viribus sensitivis +apprehensivis, non est habitus per se; sed aliquid annexum +habitibus intellectivae partis, ut supra dictum est.
Nevertheless even if there be habits in such powers, they cannot be virtues. For virtue is a perfect habit, by which it never + happens that anything but good is done: and so virtue must needs be in that power which consummates the good act. But the + knowledge of truth is not consummated in the sensitive powers of apprehension: for such powers prepare the way to the intellective + knowledge. And therefore in these powers there are none of the virtues, by which we know truth: these + are rather in the intellect or reason. +
Sed tamen si +qui sunt habitus in talibus viribus, virtutes dici non possunt. +Virtus enim est habitus perfectus, quo non contingit nisi bonum +operari, unde oportet quod virtus sit in illa potentia quae est +consummativa boni operis. Cognitio autem veri non consummatur in +viribus sensitivis apprehensivis; sed huiusmodi vires sunt quasi +praeparatoriae ad cognitionem intellectivam. Et ideo in huiusmodi +viribus non sunt virtutes, quibus cognoscitur verum; sed magis in +intellectu vel ratione.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The sensitive appetite is related to the will, which is the rational appetite, through being moved by it. And therefore the + act of the appetitive power is consummated in the sensitive appetite: and for this reason the sensitive appetite is the subject + of virtue. Whereas the sensitive powers of apprehension are related to the intellect rather through moving it; for the reason + that the phantasms are related to the intellective soul, as colors to sight + (De Anima iii, text. 18). And therefore the act of knowledge is terminated in the intellect; and for this reason the cognoscitive + virtues are in the intellect itself, or the reason. +
[35870] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod appetitus sensitivus se habet ad voluntatem, +quae est appetitus rationis, sicut motus ab eo. Et ideo opus +appetitivae virtutis consummatur in appetitu sensitivo. Et propter +hoc, appetitus sensitivus est subiectum virtutis. Virtutes autem +sensitivae apprehensivae magis se habent ut moventes respectu +intellectus, eo quod phantasmata se habent ad animam intellectivam, +sicut colores ad visum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Et ideo opus +cognitionis in intellectu terminatur. Et propter hoc, virtutes +cognoscitivae sunt in ipso intellectu vel ratione.
And thus is made clear the Reply to the Second Objection.
[35871] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 ad 2 Et per hoc +patet solutio ad secundum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Memory is not a part of prudence, as species is of a genus, as though memory were a virtue properly so called: but one of + the conditions required for prudence is a good memory; so that, in a fashion, it is after the manner of an integral part. +
[35872] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod memoria non ponitur pars prudentiae, sicut species +est pars generis, quasi ipsa memoria sit quaedam virtus per se, sed +quia unum eorum quae requiruntur ad prudentiam, est bonitas +memoriae; ut sic quodammodo se habeat per modum partis +integralis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not the subject of virtue. Because no habit is required for that which belongs to a power + by reason of its very nature. But since the will is in the reason, it is of the very essence of the will, according to the + Philosopher (De Anima iii, text. 42), to tend to that which is good, according to reason. And to this good every virtue is + ordered, since everything naturally desires its own proper good; for virtue, as Tully says in his + Rhetoric, is a "habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Therefore the will is not the subject of virtue. +
[35873] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non sit subiectum alicuius +virtutis. Ad id enim quod convenit potentiae ex ipsa ratione +potentiae, non requiritur aliquis habitus. Sed de ipsa ratione +voluntatis, cum sit in ratione, secundum philosophum in III de +anima, est quod tendat in id quod est bonum secundum rationem, ad +quod ordinatur omnis virtus, quia unumquodque naturaliter appetit +proprium bonum, virtus enim est habitus per modum naturae, +consentaneus rationi, ut Tullius dicit in sua rhetorica. Ergo +voluntas non est subiectum virtutis.
+ Objection 2: Further, every virtue is either intellectual or moral (Ethic. i, 13; ii, 1). But intellectual virtue is subjected in the + intellect and reason, and not in the will: while moral virtue is subjected in the irascible and concupiscible powers which + are rational by participation. Therefore no virtue is subjected in the will. +
[35874] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, +omnis virtus aut est intellectualis, aut moralis, ut dicitur in I +et II Ethic. Sed virtus intellectualis est, sicut in subiecto, in +intellectu et ratione, non autem in voluntate, virtus autem moralis +est, sicut in subiecto, in irascibili et concupiscibili, quae sunt +rationales per participationem. Ergo nulla virtus est in voluntate +sicut in subiecto.
+ Objection 3: Further, all human acts, to which virtues are ordained, are voluntary. If therefore there be a virtue in the will in respect + of some human acts, in like manner there will be a virtue in the will in respect of all human acts. Either, therefore, there + will be no virtue in any other power, or there will be two virtues ordained to the same act, which seems unreasonable. Therefore + the will cannot be the subject of virtue. +
[35875] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, +omnes actus humani, ad quos virtutes ordinantur, sunt voluntarii. +Si igitur respectu aliquorum humanorum actuum sit aliqua virtus in +voluntate, pari ratione respectu omnium actuum humanorum erit +virtus in voluntate. Aut ergo in nulla alia potentia erit aliqua +virtus, aut ad eundem actum ordinabuntur duae virtutes, quod +videtur inconveniens. Voluntas ergo non potest esse subiectum +virtutis.
+ On the contrary, Greater perfection is required in the mover than in the moved. But the will moves the irascible and concupiscible powers. + Much more therefore should there be virtue in the will than in the irascible and concupiscible powers. +
[35876] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra +est quod maior perfectio requiritur in movente quam in moto. Sed +voluntas movet irascibilem et concupiscibilem. Multo ergo magis +debet esse virtus in voluntate, quam in irascibili et +concupiscibili.
+ I answer that, Since the habit perfects the power in reference to act, then does the power need a habit perfecting it unto doing well, which + habit is a virtue, when the power's own proper nature does not suffice for the purpose. +
Now the proper nature of a power is seen in its relation to its object. Since, therefore, as we have said above ( + Q[19], A[3]), the object of the will is the good of reason proportionate to the will, in respect of this the will does not need a virtue + perfecting it. But if man's will is confronted with a good that exceeds its capacity, whether as regards the whole human species, + such as Divine good, which transcends the limits of human nature, or as + regards the individual, such as the good of one's neighbor, then does the will need virtue. And therefore such virtues as + those which direct man's affections to God or to his neighbor are subjected in the will, as charity, justice, and such like. +
[35877] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, cum per habitum perficiatur potentia ad agendum, ibi +indiget potentia habitu perficiente ad bene agendum, qui quidem +habitus est virtus, ubi ad hoc non sufficit propria ratio +potentiae. Omnis autem potentiae propria ratio attenditur in ordine +ad obiectum. Unde cum, sicut dictum est, obiectum voluntati sit +bonum rationis voluntati proportionatum, quantum ad hoc non indiget +voluntas virtute perficiente. Sed si quod bonum immineat homini +volendum, quod excedat proportionem volentis; sive quantum ad totam +speciem humanam, sicut bonum divinum, quod transcendit limites +humanae naturae, sive quantum ad individuum, sicut bonum proximi; +ibi voluntas indiget virtute. Et ideo huiusmodi virtutes quae +ordinant affectum hominis in Deum vel in proximum, sunt in +voluntate sicut in subiecto; ut caritas, iustitia et huiusmodi.
+ Reply to Objection 1: This objection is true of those virtues which are ordained to the willer's own good; such as temperance and fortitude, which + are concerned with the human passions, and the like, as is clear from what we have said ( + Q[35], A[6]). +
[35878] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ratio illa habet locum de virtute quae ordinat +ad bonum proprium ipsius volentis, sicut temperantia et fortitudo, +quae sunt circa passiones humanas et alia huiusmodi, ut ex dictis +patet.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Not only the irascible and concupiscible powers are rational by participation but "the appetitive power altogether," i.e. + in its entirety (Ethic. i, 13). Now the will is included in the appetitive power. And therefore whatever virtue is in the + will must be a moral virtue, unless it be theological, as we shall see later on ( + Q[62], A[3]). +
[35879] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod rationale per participationem non solum est +irascibilis et concupiscibilis; sed omnino, idest universaliter, +appetitivum, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Sub appetitivo autem +comprehenditur voluntas. Et ideo, si qua virtus est in voluntate, +erit moralis, nisi sit theologica, ut infra patebit.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Some virtues are directed to the good of moderated passion, which is the proper good of this or that man: and in these cases + there is no need for virtue in the will, for the nature of the power suffices for the purpose, as we have said. This need + exists only in the case of virtues which are directed to some extrinsic good. +
[35880] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod quaedam virtutes ordinantur ad bonum passionis +moderatae, quod est proprium huius vel illius hominis, et in +talibus non est necessarium quod sit aliqua virtus in voluntate, +cum ad hoc sufficiat natura potentiae, ut dictum est. Sed hoc solum +necessarium est in illis virtutibus quae ordinantur ad aliquod +bonum extrinsecum.
We now have to consider the various kinds of virtue: and (1) the intellectual virtues; (2) the moral virtues; (3) the theological + virtues. Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry: +
(1) Whether habits of the speculative intellect are virtues?
(2) Whether they are three, namely, wisdom, science and understanding?
(3) Whether the intellectual habit, which is art, is a virtue?
(4) Whether prudence is a virtue distinct from art?
(5) Whether prudence is a virtue necessary to man?
(6) Whether "eubulia," "synesis" and "gnome" are virtues annexed to prudence?
+[35881] +Iª-IIae q. 57 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +distinctione virtutum. Et primo, quantum ad virtutes +intellectuales; secundo, quantum ad morales; tertio, quantum ad +theologicas. Circa primum quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum habitus +intellectuales speculativi sint virtutes. Secundo, utrum sint tres, +scilicet sapientia, scientia et intellectus. Tertio, utrum habitus +intellectualis qui est ars, sit virtus. Quarto, utrum prudentia sit +virtus distincta ab arte. Quinto, utrum prudentia sit virtus +necessaria homini. Sexto, utrum eubulia, synesis et gnome sint +virtutes adiunctae prudentiae.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the habits of the speculative intellect are not virtues. For virtue is an operative habit, as we have + said above ( + Q[55], A[2]). But speculative habits are not operative: for speculative matter is distinct from practical, i.e. operative matter. Therefore + the habits of the speculative intellect are not virtues. +
[35882] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus intellectuales speculativi non +sint virtutes. Virtus enim est habitus operativus, ut supra dictum +est. Sed habitus speculativi non sunt operativi, distinguitur enim +speculativum a practico, idest operativo. Ergo habitus +intellectuales speculativi non sunt virtutes.
+ Objection 2: Further, virtue is about those things by which man is made happy or blessed: for "happiness is the reward of virtue" (Ethic. + i, 9). Now intellectual habits do not consider human acts or other human goods, by which man acquires happiness, but rather + things pertaining to nature or to God. Therefore such like habits cannot be called virtues. +
[35883] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +virtus est eorum per quae fit homo felix sive beatus, eo quod +felicitas est virtutis praemium, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Sed habitus +intellectuales non considerant actus humanos, aut alia bona humana, +per quae homo beatitudinem adipiscitur, sed magis res naturales et +divinas. Ergo huiusmodi habitus virtutes dici non possunt.
+ Objection 3: Further, science is a speculative habit. But science and virtue are distinct from one another as genera which are not subalternate, + as the Philosopher proves in Topic. iv. Therefore speculative habits are not virtues. +
[35884] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +scientia est habitus speculativus. Sed scientia et virtus +distinguuntur sicut diversa genera non subalternatim posita; ut +patet per philosophum, in IV Topic. Ergo habitus speculativi non +sunt virtutes.
+ On the contrary, The speculative habits alone consider necessary things which cannot be otherwise than they are. Now the Philosopher (Ethic. + vi, 1) places certain intellectual virtues in that part of the soul which considers necessary things that cannot be otherwise + than they are. Therefore the habits of the speculative intellect are virtues. +
[35885] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra, +soli habitus speculativi considerant necessaria quae impossibile +est aliter se habere. Sed philosophus ponit, in VI Ethic., quasdam +virtutes intellectuales in parte animae quae considerat necessaria +quae non possunt aliter se habere. Ergo habitus intellectuales +speculativi sunt virtutes.
+ I answer that, Since every virtue is ordained to some good, as stated above ( + Q[55], A[3]), a habit, as we have already observed ( + Q[56], A[3]), may be called a virtue for two reasons: first, because it confers aptness in doing good; secondly, because besides aptness, + it confers the right use of it. The latter condition, as above stated ( + Q[55], A[3]), belongs to those habits alone which affect the + appetitive part of the soul: since it is the soul's appetitive power that puts all the powers and habits to their respective + uses. +
Since, then, the habits of the speculative intellect do not perfect the appetitive part, nor affect it in any way, but only + the intellective part; they may indeed be called virtues in so far as they confer aptness for a good work, viz. the consideration + of truth (since this is the good work of the intellect): yet they are not called virtues in the second way, as though they + conferred the right use of a power or habit. For if a man possess a habit of speculative science, it does + not follow that he is inclined to make use of it, but he is made able to consider the truth in those matters of which he has + scientific knowledge: that he make use of the knowledge which he has, is due to the motion of his will. Consequently a virtue + which perfects the will, as charity or justice, confers the right use of these speculative habits. And in this way too there + can be merit in the acts of these habits, if they be done out of charity: thus Gregory says (Moral. vi) that the + "contemplative life has greater merit than the active life." +
[35886] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, cum omnis virtus dicatur in ordine ad bonum, sicut +supra dictum est, duplici ratione aliquis habitus dicitur virtus, +ut supra dictum est, uno modo, quia facit facultatem bene operandi; +alio modo, quia cum facultate, facit etiam usum bonum. Et hoc, +sicut supra dictum est, pertinet solum ad illos habitus qui +respiciunt partem appetitivam, eo quod vis appetitiva animae est +quae facit uti omnibus potentiis et habitibus. Cum igitur habitus +intellectuales speculativi non perficiant partem appetitivam, nec +aliquo modo ipsam respiciant, sed solam intellectivam; possunt +quidem dici virtutes inquantum faciunt facultatem bonae +operationis, quae est consideratio veri (hoc enim est bonum opus +intellectus), non tamen dicuntur virtutes secundo modo, quasi +facientes bene uti potentia seu habitu. Ex hoc enim quod aliquis +habet habitum scientiae speculativae, non inclinatur ad utendum, +sed fit potens speculari verum in his quorum habet scientiam, sed +quod utatur scientia habita, hoc est movente voluntate. Et ideo +virtus quae perficit voluntatem, ut caritas vel iustitia, facit +etiam bene uti huiusmodi speculativis habitibus. Et secundum hoc +etiam, in actibus horum habituum potest esse meritum, si ex +caritate fiant, sicut Gregorius dicit, in VI Moral., quod +contemplativa est maioris meriti quam activa.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Work is of two kinds, exterior and interior. Accordingly the practical or active faculty which is contrasted with the speculative + faculty, is concerned with exterior work, to which the speculative habit is not ordained. Yet it is ordained to the interior + act of the intellect which is to consider the truth. And in this way it is an operative habit. +
[35887] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod duplex est opus, scilicet exterius, et interius. +Practicum ergo, vel operativum, quod dividitur contra speculativum, +sumitur ab opere exteriori, ad quod non habet ordinem habitus +speculativus. Sed tamen habet ordinem ad interius opus intellectus, +quod est speculari verum. Et secundum hoc est habitus +operativus.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Virtue is about certain things in two ways. In the first place a virtue is about its object. And thus these speculative virtues + are not about those things whereby man is made happy; except perhaps, in so far as the word "whereby" indicates the efficient + cause or object of complete happiness, i.e. God, Who is the supreme object of contemplation. Secondly, a virtue is said to + be about its acts: and in this sense the intellectual virtues are about those + things whereby a man is made happy; both because the acts of these virtues can be meritorious, as stated above, and because + they are a kind of beginning of perfect bliss, which consists in the contemplation of truth, as we have already stated ( + Q[3], A[7]). +
[35888] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod virtus est aliquorum dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut +obiectorum. Et sic huiusmodi virtutes speculativae non sunt eorum +per quae homo fit beatus; nisi forte secundum quod ly per dicit +causam efficientem vel obiectum completae beatitudinis, quod est +Deus, quod est summum speculabile. Alio modo dicitur virtus esse +aliquorum sicut actuum. Et hoc modo virtutes intellectuales sunt +eorum per quae homo fit beatus. Tum quia actus harum virtutum +possunt esse meritorii, sicut dictum est. Tum etiam quia sunt +quaedam inchoatio perfectae beatitudinis, quae in contemplatione +veri consistit, sicut supra dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Science is contrasted with virtue taken in the second sense, wherein it belongs to the appetitive faculty. +
[35889] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod scientia dividitur contra virtutem secundo modo +dictam, quae pertinet ad vim appetitivam.
+ Objection 1: It would seem unfitting to distinguish three virtues of the speculative intellect, viz. wisdom, science and understanding. + Because a species is a kind of science, as stated in Ethic. vi, 7. Therefore wisdom should not be condivided with science + among the intellectual virtues. +
[35890] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter distinguantur tres +virtutes intellectuales speculativae, scilicet sapientia, scientia +et intellectus. Species enim non debet condividi generi. Sed +sapientia est quaedam scientia, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Ergo +sapientia non debet condividi scientiae, in numero virtutum +intellectualium.
+ Objection 2: Further, in differentiating powers, habits and acts in respect of their objects, we consider chiefly the formal aspect of + these objects, as we have already explained ( + FP, Q[77], A[3]). Therefore diversity of habits is taken, not from their material objects, but from the formal aspect of those objects. Now + the principle of a demonstration is the formal aspect under which the conclusion is known. Therefore the understanding of + principles + should not be set down as a habit or virtue distinct from the knowledge of conclusions. +
[35891] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +in distinctione potentiarum, habituum et actuum, quae attenditur +secundum obiecta, attenditur principaliter distinctio quae est +secundum rationem formalem obiectorum, ut ex supradictis patet. Non +ergo diversi habitus debent distingui secundum materiale obiectum; +sed secundum rationem formalem illius obiecti. Sed principium +demonstrationis est ratio sciendi conclusiones. Non ergo +intellectus principiorum debet poni habitus alius, aut alia virtus, +a scientia conclusionum.
+ Objection 3: Further, an intellectual virtue is one which resides in the essentially rational faculty. Now even the speculative reason + employs the dialectic syllogism for the sake of argument, just as it employs the demonstrative syllogism. Therefore as science, + which is the result of a demonstrative syllogism, is set down as an intellectual virtue, so also should opinion be. +
[35892] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +virtus intellectualis dicitur quae est in ipso rationali per +essentiam. Sed ratio, etiam speculativa, sicut ratiocinatur +syllogizando demonstrative; ita etiam ratiocinatur syllogizando +dialectice. Ergo sicut scientia, quae causatur ex syllogismo +demonstrativo, ponitur virtus intellectualis speculativa; ita etiam +et opinio.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 1) reckons these three alone as being intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science and understanding. +
[35893] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus, VI Ethic., ponit has solum tres virtutes +intellectuales speculativas, scilicet sapientiam, scientiam et +intellectum.
+ I answer that, As already stated + (A[1]), the virtues of the speculative intellect are those which perfect the speculative intellect for the consideration of truth: + for this is its good work. Now a truth is subject to a twofold consideration---as known in itself, and as known through another. + What is known in itself, is as a "principle," and is at once understood by the intellect: wherefore the habit that perfects + the intellect for the consideration + of such truth is called "understanding," which is the habit of principles. +
On the other hand, a truth which is known through another, is understood by the intellect, not at once, but by means of the + reason's inquiry, and is as a "term." This may happen in two ways: first, so that it is the last in some particular genus; + secondly, so that it is the ultimate term of all human knowledge. And, since "things that are knowable last from our standpoint, + are knowable first and chiefly in their nature" (Phys. i, text. 2, 3); hence that which is last with + respect to all human knowledge, is that which is knowable first and chiefly in its nature. And about these is "wisdom," which + considers the highest causes, as stated in Metaph. i, 1,2. Wherefore it rightly judges all things and sets them in order, + because there can be no perfect and universal judgment that is not based on the first causes. But in regard to that which + is last in this or that genus of knowable matter, it is "science" which perfects the intellect. Wherefore according to the + different kinds of knowable matter, there are different habits of scientific knowledge; whereas there is but one wisdom. +
[35894] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, virtus intellectualis +speculativa est per quam intellectus speculativus perficitur ad +considerandum verum, hoc enim est bonum opus eius. Verum autem est +dupliciter considerabile, uno modo, sicut per se notum; alio modo, +sicut per aliud notum. Quod autem est per se notum, se habet ut +principium; et percipitur statim ab intellectu. Et ideo habitus +perficiens intellectum ad huiusmodi veri considerationem, vocatur +intellectus, qui est habitus principiorum. Verum autem quod est per +aliud notum, non statim percipitur ab intellectu, sed per +inquisitionem rationis, et se habet in ratione termini. Quod quidem +potest esse dupliciter, uno modo, ut sit ultimum in aliquo genere; +alio modo, ut sit ultimum respectu totius cognitionis humanae. +Et quia ea quae sunt posterius nota quoad nos, sunt priora et +magis nota secundum naturam, ut dicitur in I Physic.; ideo id +quod est ultimum respectu totius cognitionis humanae, est id quod +est primum et maxime cognoscibile secundum naturam. Et circa +huiusmodi est sapientia, quae considerat altissimas causas, ut +dicitur in I Metaphys. Unde convenienter iudicat et ordinat de +omnibus, quia iudicium perfectum et universale haberi non potest +nisi per resolutionem ad primas causas. Ad id vero quod est ultimum +in hoc vel in illo genere cognoscibilium, perficit intellectum +scientia. Et ideo secundum diversa genera scibilium, sunt diversi +habitus scientiarum, cum tamen sapientia non sit nisi una.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Wisdom is a kind of science, in so far as it has that which is common to all the sciences; viz. to demonstrate conclusions + from principles. But since it has something proper to itself above the other sciences, inasmuch as it judges of them all, + not only as to their conclusions, but also as to their first principles, therefore it is a more perfect virtue than science. +
[35895] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod sapientia est quaedam scientia, inquantum habet +id quod est commune omnibus scientiis, ut scilicet ex principiis +conclusiones demonstret. Sed quia habet aliquid proprium supra +alias scientias, inquantum scilicet de omnibus iudicat; et non +solum quantum ad conclusiones, sed etiam quantum ad prima +principia, ideo habet rationem perfectioris virtutis quam +scientia.
+ Reply to Objection 2: When the formal aspect of the object is referred to a power or habit by one same act, there is no distinction of habit or + power in respect of the formal aspect and of the material object: thus it belongs to the same power of sight to see both color, + and light, which is the formal aspect under which color is seen, and is seen at the same time as the color. On the other hand, + the principles of a demonstration can be considered apart, without the + conclusion being considered at all. Again they can be considered together with the conclusions, since the conclusions can + be deduced from them. Accordingly, to consider the principles in this second way, belongs to science, which considers the + conclusions also: while to consider the principles in themselves belongs to understanding. +
Consequently, if we consider the point aright, these three virtues are distinct, not as being on a par with one another, + but in a certain order. The same is to be observed in potential wholes, wherein one part is more perfect than another; for + instance, the rational soul is more perfect than the sensitive soul; and the sensitive, than the vegetal. For it is thus that + science depends on understanding as on a virtue of higher degree: and both of these depend on wisdom, as + obtaining the highest place, and containing beneath itself both understanding and science, by judging both of the conclusions + of science, and of the principles on which they are based. +
[35896] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod quando ratio obiecti sub uno actu refertur ad +potentiam vel habitum, tunc non distinguuntur habitus vel potentiae +penes rationem obiecti et obiectum materiale, sicut ad eandem +potentiam visivam pertinet videre colorem, et lumen, quod est ratio +videndi colorem et simul cum ipso videtur. Principia vero +demonstrationis possunt seorsum considerari, absque hoc quod +considerentur conclusiones. Possunt etiam considerari simul cum +conclusionibus, prout principia in conclusiones deducuntur. +Considerare ergo hoc secundo modo principia, pertinet ad scientiam, +quae considerat etiam conclusiones, sed considerare principia +secundum seipsa, pertinet ad intellectum. Unde, si quis recte +consideret, istae tres virtutes non ex aequo distinguuntur ab +invicem, sed ordine quodam; sicut accidit in totis potentialibus, +quorum una pars est perfectior altera, sicut anima rationalis est +perfectior quam sensibilis, et sensibilis quam vegetabilis. Hoc +enim modo, scientia dependet ab intellectu sicut a principaliori. +Et utrumque dependet a sapientia sicut a principalissimo, quae sub +se continet et intellectum et scientiam, ut de conclusionibus +scientiarum diiudicans, et de principiis earundem.
+ Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ( + Q[55], AA[3],4), a virtuous habit has a fixed relation to good, and is nowise referable to evil. Now the good of the intellect is truth, + and falsehood is its evil. Wherefore those habits alone are called intellectual virtues, whereby we tell the truth and never + tell a falsehood. But opinion and suspicion can be about both truth and falsehood: and so, as stated in Ethic. vi, 3, they + are not intellectual + virtues. +
[35897] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus virtutis determinate +se habet ad bonum, nullo autem modo ad malum. Bonum autem +intellectus est verum, malum autem eius est falsum. Unde soli illi +habitus virtutes intellectuales dicuntur, quibus semper dicitur +verum, et nunquam falsum. Opinio vero et suspicio possunt esse veri +et falsi. Et ideo non sunt intellectuales virtutes, ut dicitur in +VI Ethic.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that art is not an intellectual virtue. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19) that "no one makes bad + use of virtue." But one may make bad use of art: for a craftsman can work badly according to the knowledge of his art. Therefore + art is not a virtue. +
[35898] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ars non sit virtus intellectualis. +Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de libero arbitrio, quod virtute +nullus male utitur. Sed arte aliquis male utitur, potest enim +aliquis artifex, secundum scientiam artis suae, male operari. Ergo +ars non est virtus.
+ Objection 2: Further, there is no virtue of a virtue. But "there is a virtue of art," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore + art is not a virtue. +
[35899] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +virtutis non est virtus. Artis autem est aliqua virtus, ut dicitur +in VI Ethic. Ergo ars non est virtus.
+ Objection 3: Further, the liberal arts excel the mechanical arts. But just as the mechanical arts are practical, so the liberal arts are + speculative. Therefore, if art were an intellectual virtue, it would have to be reckoned among the speculative virtues. +
[35900] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +artes liberales sunt excellentiores quam artes mechanicae. Sed +sicut artes mechanicae sunt practicae, ita artes liberales sunt +speculativae. Ergo si ars esset virtus intellectualis, deberet +virtutibus speculativis annumerari.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3,4) says that art is a virtue; and yet he does not reckon it among the speculative virtues, + which, according to him, reside in the scientific part of the soul. +
[35901] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus, in VI Ethic., ponit artem esse virtutem; nec +tamen connumerat eam virtutibus speculativis, quarum subiectum +ponit scientificam partem animae.
+ I answer that, Art is nothing else but "the right reason about certain works to be made." And yet the good of these things depends, not + on man's appetitive faculty being affected in this or that way, but on the goodness of the work done. For a craftsman, as + such, is commendable, not for the will with which he does a work, but for the quality of the work. Art, therefore, properly + speaking, is an operative habit. And yet it has something in common with the speculative + habits: since the quality of the object considered by the latter is a matter of concern to them also, but not how the human + appetite may be affected towards that object. For as long as the geometrician demonstrates the truth, it matters not how his + appetitive faculty may be affected, whether he be joyful or angry: even as neither does this matter in a craftsman, as we + have observed. And so art has the nature of a virtue in the same way as the speculative habits, in so far, to wit, as neither + art nor speculative habit makes a good work as regards the use of the habit, which is the property of a virtue that perfects + the appetite, but only as regards the aptness to work well. +
[35902] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod ars nihil aliud est quam ratio recta aliquorum operum +faciendorum. Quorum tamen bonum non consistit in eo quod appetitus +humanus aliquo modo se habet, sed in eo quod ipsum opus quod fit, +in se bonum est. Non enim pertinet ad laudem artificis, inquantum +artifex est, qua voluntate opus faciat; sed quale sit opus quod +facit. Sic igitur ars, proprie loquendo, habitus operativus est. Et +tamen in aliquo convenit cum habitibus speculativis, quia etiam ad +ipsos habitus speculativos pertinet qualiter se habeat res quam +considerant, non autem qualiter se habeat appetitus humanus ad +illas. Dummodo enim verum geometra demonstret, non refert qualiter +se habeat secundum appetitivam partem, utrum sit laetus vel iratus, +sicut nec in artifice refert, ut dictum est. Et ideo eo modo ars +habet rationem virtutis, sicut et habitus speculativi, inquantum +scilicet nec ars, nec habitus speculativus, faciunt bonum opus +quantum ad usum, quod est proprium virtutis perficientis appetitum; +sed solum quantum ad facultatem bene agendi.
+ Reply to Objection 1: When anyone endowed with an art produces bad workmanship, this is not the work of that art, in fact it is contrary to the + art: even as when a man lies, while knowing the truth, his words are not in accord with his knowledge, but contrary thereto. + Wherefore, just as science has always a relation to good, as stated above (A[2], ad 3), so it is with art: and it is for this + reason that it is called a virtue. And yet it falls short of being a perfect + virtue, because it does not make its possessor to use it well; for which purpose something further is requisite: although + there cannot be a good use without the art. +
[35903] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, cum aliquis habens artem operatur malum +artificium, hoc non est opus artis, immo est contra artem, sicut +etiam cum aliquis sciens verum mentitur, hoc quod dicit non est +secundum scientiam, sed contra scientiam. Unde sicut scientia se +habet semper ad bonum, ut dictum est, ita et ars, et secundum hoc +dicitur virtus. In hoc tamen deficit a perfecta ratione virtutis, +quia non facit ipsum bonum usum, sed ad hoc aliquid aliud +requiritur, quamvis bonus usus sine arte esse non possit.
+ Reply to Objection 2: In order that man may make good use of the art he has, he needs a good will, which is perfected by moral virtue; and for + this reason the Philosopher says that there is a virtue of art; namely, a moral virtue, in so far as the good use of art requires + a moral virtue. For it is evident that a craftsman is inclined by justice, which rectifies his will, to do his work faithfully. +
[35904] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, quia ad hoc ut homo bene utatur arte quam habet, +requiritur bona voluntas, quae perficitur per virtutem moralem; +ideo philosophus dicit quod artis est virtus, scilicet moralis, +inquantum ad bonum usum eius aliqua virtus moralis requiritur. +Manifestum est enim quod artifex per iustitiam, quae facit +voluntatem rectam, inclinatur ut opus fidele faciat.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Even in speculative matters there is something by way of work: e.g. the making of a syllogism or of a fitting speech, or + the work of counting or measuring. Hence whatever habits are ordained to such like works of the speculative reason, are, by + a kind of comparison, called arts indeed, but "liberal" arts, in order to distinguish them from those arts that are ordained + to works done by the body, which arts are, in a fashion, servile, inasmuch as the + body is in servile subjection to the soul, and man, as regards his soul, is free [liber]. On the other hand, those sciences + which are not ordained to any such like work, are called sciences simply, and not arts. Nor, if the liberal arts be more excellent, + does it follow that the notion of art is more applicable to them. +
[35905] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod etiam in ipsis speculabilibus est aliquid per modum +cuiusdam operis, puta constructio syllogismi aut orationis congruae +aut opus numerandi vel mensurandi. Et ideo quicumque ad huiusmodi +opera rationis habitus speculativi ordinantur, dicuntur per quandam +similitudinem artes, sed liberales; ad differentiam illarum artium +quae ordinantur ad opera per corpus exercita, quae sunt quodammodo +serviles, inquantum corpus serviliter subditur animae, et homo +secundum animam est liber. Illae vero scientiae quae ad nullum +huiusmodi opus ordinantur, simpliciter scientiae dicuntur, non +autem artes. Nec oportet, si liberales artes sunt nobiliores, quod +magis eis conveniat ratio artis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not a distinct virtue from art. For art is the right reason about certain works. But diversity + of works does not make a habit cease to be an art; since there are various arts about works widely different. Since therefore + prudence is also right reason about works, it seems that it too should be reckoned a virtue. +
[35906] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod prudentia non sit alia virtus ab arte. +Ars enim est ratio recta aliquorum operum. Sed diversa genera +operum non faciunt ut aliquid amittat rationem artis, sunt enim +diversae artes circa opera valde diversa. Cum igitur etiam +prudentia sit quaedam ratio recta operum, videtur quod etiam ipsa +debeat dici ars.
+ Objection 2: Further, prudence has more in common with art than the speculative habits have; for they are both "about contingent matters + that may be otherwise than they are" (Ethic. vi, 4,5). Now some speculative habits are called arts. Much more, therefore, + should prudence be called an art. +
[35907] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +prudentia magis convenit cum arte quam habitus speculativi, +utrumque enim eorum est circa contingens aliter se habere, ut +dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed quidam habitus speculativi dicuntur artes. +Ergo multo magis prudentia debet dici ars.
+ Objection 3: Further, it belongs to prudence, "to be of good counsel" (Ethic. vi, 5). But counselling takes place in certain arts also, + as stated in Ethic. iii, 3, e.g. in the arts of warfare, of seamanship, and of medicine. Therefore prudence is not distinct + from art. +
[35908] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +ad prudentiam pertinet bene consiliari, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed +etiam in quibusdam artibus consiliari contingit, ut dicitur in III +Ethic., sicut in arte militari, et gubernativa, et medicinali. Ergo +prudentia ab arte non distinguitur.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher distinguishes prudence from art (Ethic. vi, 5). +
[35909] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus distinguit prudentiam ab arte, in VI +Ethic.
+ I answer that, Where the nature of virtue differs, there is a different kind of virtue. Now it has been stated above + (A[1]; Q[56], A[3]) that some habits have the nature of virtue, through merely conferring aptness for a good work: while some habits + are virtues, not only through conferring aptness for a good work, but also through conferring the use. But art confers the + mere aptness for good work; since it does not regard the appetite; whereas + prudence confers not only aptness for a good work, but also the use: for it regards the appetite, since it presupposes the + rectitude thereof. +
The reason for this difference is that art is the "right reason of things to be made"; whereas prudence is the "right reason + of things to be done." Now "making" and "doing" differ, as stated in Metaph. ix, text. 16, in that "making" is an action passing + into outward matter, e.g. "to build," "to saw," and so forth; whereas "doing" is an action abiding in the agent, e.g. "to + see," "to will," and the like. Accordingly prudence stands in the same relation to such like human actions, + consisting in the use of powers and habits, as art does to outward making: since each is the perfect reason about the things + with which it is concerned. But perfection and rectitude of reason in speculative matters, depend on the principles from which + reason argues; just as we have said above (A[2], ad 2) that science depends on and presupposes understanding, which is the + habit of principles. Now in human acts the end is what the principles are in speculative matters, as stated in Ethic. vii, + 8. Consequently, it is requisite for prudence, which is right reason about things to be done, that man be well disposed with + regard to the ends: and this depends on the rectitude of his appetite. Wherefore, for prudence there is need of a moral virtue, + which rectifies the appetite. On the other hand the good things made by art is not the good of man's appetite, but the good + of those things themselves: wherefore art does not presuppose rectitude of the appetite. The consequence is that more + praise is given to a craftsman who is at fault willingly, than to one who is unwillingly; whereas it is more contrary to prudence + to sin willingly than unwillingly, since rectitude of the will is essential to prudence, but not to art. Accordingly it is + evident that prudence is a virtue distinct from art. +
[35910] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod ubi invenitur diversa ratio virtutis, ibi oportet +virtutes distingui. Dictum est autem supra quod aliquis habitus +habet rationem virtutis ex hoc solum quod facit facultatem boni +operis, aliquis autem ex hoc quod facit non solum facultatem boni +operis, sed etiam usum. Ars autem facit solum facultatem boni +operis, quia non respicit appetitum. Prudentia autem non solum +facit boni operis facultatem, sed etiam usum, respicit enim +appetitum, tanquam praesupponens rectitudinem appetitus. Cuius +differentiae ratio est, quia ars est recta ratio factibilium; +prudentia vero est recta ratio agibilium. Differt autem facere et +agere quia, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys., factio est actus transiens +in exteriorem materiam, sicut aedificare, secare, et huiusmodi; +agere autem est actus permanens in ipso agente, sicut videre, +velle, et huiusmodi. Sic igitur hoc modo se habet prudentia ad +huiusmodi actus humanos, qui sunt usus potentiarum et habituum, +sicut se habet ars ad exteriores factiones, quia utraque est +perfecta ratio respectu illorum ad quae comparatur. Perfectio autem +et rectitudo rationis in speculativis, dependet ex principiis, ex +quibus ratio syllogizat, sicut dictum est quod scientia dependet ab +intellectu, qui est habitus principiorum, et praesupponit ipsum. In +humanis autem actibus se habent fines sicut principia in +speculativis, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Et ideo ad prudentiam, quae +est recta ratio agibilium, requiritur quod homo sit bene dispositus +circa fines, quod quidem est per appetitum rectum. Et ideo ad +prudentiam requiritur moralis virtus, per quam fit appetitus +rectus. Bonum autem artificialium non est bonum appetitus humani, +sed bonum ipsorum operum artificialium, et ideo ars non +praesupponit appetitum rectum. Et inde est quod magis laudatur +artifex qui volens peccat, quam qui peccat nolens; magis autem +contra prudentiam est quod aliquis peccet volens, quam nolens, quia +rectitudo voluntatis est de ratione prudentiae, non autem de +ratione artis. Sic igitur patet quod prudentia est virtus distincta +ab arte.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The various kinds of things made by art are all external to man: hence they do not cause a different kind of virtue. But + prudence is right reason about human acts themselves: hence it is a distinct kind of virtue, as stated above. +
[35911] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod diversa genera artificialium omnia sunt extra +hominem, et ideo non diversificatur ratio virtutis. Sed prudentia +est recta ratio ipsorum actuum humanorum, unde diversificatur ratio +virtutis, ut dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Prudence has more in common with art than a speculative habit has, if we consider their subject and matter: for they are + both in the thinking part of the soul, and about things that may be otherwise than they are. But if we consider them as virtues, + then art has more in common with the speculative habits, as is clear from what has been said. +
[35912] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod prudentia magis convenit cum arte quam habitus +speculativi, quantum ad subiectum et materiam, utrumque enim est in +opinativa parte animae, et circa contingens aliter se habere. Sed +ars magis convenit cum habitibus speculativis in ratione virtutis, +quam cum prudentia, ut ex dictis patet.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Prudence is of good counsel about matters regarding man's entire life, and the end of human life. But in some arts there + is counsel about matters concerning the ends proper to those arts. Hence some men, in so far as they are good counselors in + matters of warfare, or seamanship, are said to be prudent officers or pilots, but not simply prudent: only those are simply + prudent who give good counsel about all the concerns of life. +
[35913] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod prudentia est bene consiliativa de his quae pertinent +ad totam vitam hominis, et ad ultimum finem vitae humanae. Sed in +artibus aliquibus est consilium de his quae pertinent ad fines +proprios illarum artium. Unde aliqui, inquantum sunt bene +consiliativi in rebus bellicis vel nauticis, dicuntur prudentes +duces vel gubernatores, non autem prudentes simpliciter, sed illi +solum qui bene consiliantur de his quae conferunt ad totam +vitam.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not a virtue necessary to lead a good life. For as art is to things that are made, of which + it is the right reason, so is prudence to things that are done, in respect of which we judge of a man's life: for prudence + is the right reason about these things, as stated in Ethic. vi, 5. Now art is not necessary in things that are made, save + in order that they be made, but not after they have been made. Neither, therefore is prudence + necessary to man in order to lead a good life, after he has become virtuous; but perhaps only in order that he may become + virtuous. +
[35914] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod prudentia non sit virtus necessaria ad +bene vivendum. Sicut enim se habet ars ad factibilia, quorum est +ratio recta; ita se habet prudentia ad agibilia, secundum quae vita +hominis consideratur, est enim eorum recta ratio prudentia, ut +dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed ars non est necessaria in rebus +factibilibus nisi ad hoc quod fiant, non autem postquam sunt +factae. Ergo nec prudentia est necessaria homini ad bene vivendum, +postquam est virtuosus, sed forte solum quantum ad hoc quod +virtuosus fiat.
+ Objection 2: Further, "It is by prudence that we are of good counsel," as stated in Ethic. vi, 5. But man can act not only from his own, + but also from another's good counsel. Therefore man does not need prudence in order to lead a good life, but it is enough + that he follow the counsels of prudent men. +
[35915] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +prudentia est per quam recte consiliamur, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. +Sed homo potest ex bono consilio agere non solum proprio, sed etiam +alieno. Ergo non est necessarium ad bene vivendum quod ipse homo +habeat prudentiam; sed sufficit quod prudentum consilia +sequatur.
+ Objection 3: Further, an intellectual virtue is one by which one always tells the truth, and never a falsehood. But this does not seem + to be the case with prudence: for it is not human never to err in taking counsel about what is to be done; since human actions + are about things that may be otherwise than they are. Hence it is written ( + Wis. 9:14): "The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain." Therefore it seems that prudence + should not be reckoned an intellectual virtue. +
[35916] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +virtus intellectualis est secundum quam contingit semper dicere +verum, et nunquam falsum. Sed hoc non videtur contingere secundum +prudentiam, non enim est humanum quod in consiliando de agendis +nunquam erretur; cum humana agibilia sint contingentia aliter se +habere. Unde dicitur Sap. IX, cogitationes mortalium timidae, et +incertae providentiae nostrae. Ergo videtur quod prudentia non +debeat poni intellectualis virtus.
+ On the contrary, It is reckoned with other virtues necessary for human life, when it is written ( + Wis. 8:7) of Divine Wisdom: "She teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude, which are such things as men can have + nothing more profitable in life." +
[35917] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Sap. VIII, connumeratur aliis virtutibus necessariis ad +vitam humanam, cum dicitur de divina sapientia, sobrietatem et +prudentiam docet, iustitiam et virtutem, quibus utilius nihil est +in vita hominibus.
+ I answer that, Prudence is a virtue most necessary for human life. For a good life consists in good deeds. Now in order to do good deeds, + it matters not only what a man does, but also how he does it; to wit, that he do it from right choice and not merely from + impulse or passion. And, since choice is about things in reference to the end, rectitude of choice requires two things: namely, + the due end, and something suitably ordained to that due end. Now man is suitably + directed to his due end by a virtue which perfects the soul in the appetitive part, the object of which is the good and the + end. And to that which is suitably ordained to the due end man needs to be rightly disposed by a habit in his reason, because + counsel and choice, which are about things ordained to the end, are acts of the reason. Consequently an intellectual virtue + is needed in the reason, to perfect the reason, and make it suitably affected towards things ordained to the end; and this + virtue is prudence. Consequently prudence is a virtue necessary to lead a good life. +
[35918] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod prudentia est virtus maxime necessaria ad vitam +humanam. Bene enim vivere consistit in bene operari. Ad hoc autem +quod aliquis bene operetur, non solum requiritur quid faciat, sed +etiam quomodo faciat; ut scilicet secundum electionem rectam +operetur, non solum ex impetu aut passione. Cum autem electio sit +eorum quae sunt ad finem, rectitudo electionis duo requirit, +scilicet debitum finem; et id quod convenienter ordinatur ad +debitum finem. Ad debitum autem finem homo convenienter disponitur +per virtutem quae perficit partem animae appetitivam, cuius +obiectum est bonum et finis. Ad id autem quod convenienter in finem +debitum ordinatur, oportet quod homo directe disponatur per habitum +rationis, quia consiliari et eligere, quae sunt eorum quae sunt ad +finem, sunt actus rationis. Et ideo necesse est in ratione esse +aliquam virtutem intellectualem, per quam perficiatur ratio ad hoc +quod convenienter se habeat ad ea quae sunt ad finem. Et haec +virtus est prudentia. Unde prudentia est virtus necessaria ad bene +vivendum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The good of an art is to be found, not in the craftsman, but in the product of the art, since art is right reason about things + to be made: for since the making of a thing passes into external matter, it is a perfection not of the maker, but of the thing + made, even as movement is the act of the thing moved: and art is concerned with the making of things. On the other hand, the + good of prudence is in the active principle, whose activity is its + perfection: for prudence is right reason about things to be done, as stated above + (A[4]). Consequently art does not require of the craftsman that his act be a good act, but that his work be good. Rather would it + be necessary for the thing made to act well (e.g. that a knife should carve well, or that a saw should cut well), if it were + proper to such things to act, rather than to be acted on, because they have not dominion over their actions. Wherefore the + craftsman + needs art, not that he may live well, but that he may produce a good work of art, and have it in good keeping: whereas prudence + is necessary to man, that he may lead a good life, and not merely that he may be a good man. +
[35919] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod bonum artis consideratur non in ipso artifice, +sed magis in ipso artificiato, cum ars sit ratio recta factibilium, +factio enim, in exteriorem materiam transiens, non est perfectio +facientis, sed facti, sicut motus est actus mobilis; ars autem +circa factibilia est. Sed prudentiae bonum attenditur in ipso +agente, cuius perfectio est ipsum agere, est enim prudentia recta +ratio agibilium, ut dictum est. Et ideo ad artem non requiritur +quod artifex bene operetur, sed quod bonum opus faciat. +Requireretur autem magis quod ipsum artificiatum bene operaretur, +sicut quod cultellus bene incideret, vel serra bene secaret; si +proprie horum esset agere, et non magis agi, quia non habent +dominium sui actus. Et ideo ars non est necessaria ad bene vivendum +ipsi artificis; sed solum ad faciendum artificiatum bonum, et ad +conservandum ipsum. Prudentia autem est necessaria homini ad bene +vivendum, non solum ad hoc quod fiat bonus.
+ Reply to Objection 2: When a man does a good deed, not of his own counsel, but moved by that of another, his deed is not yet quite perfect, as + regards his reason in directing him and his appetite in moving him. Wherefore, if he do a good deed, he does not do well simply; + and yet this is required in order that he may lead a good life. +
[35920] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, cum homo bonum operatur non secundum propriam +rationem, sed motus ex consilio alterius; nondum est omnino +perfecta operatio ipsius, quantum ad rationem dirigentem, et +quantum ad appetitum moventem. Unde si bonum operetur, non tamen +simpliciter bene; quod est bene vivere.
+ Reply to Objection 3: As stated in Ethic. vi, 2, truth is not the same for the practical as for the speculative intellect. Because the truth of + the speculative intellect depends on conformity between the intellect and the thing. And since the intellect cannot be infallibly + in conformity with things in contingent matters, but only in necessary matters, therefore no speculative habit about contingent + things is an intellectual virtue, but only such as is about necessary + things. On the other hand, the truth of the practical intellect depends on conformity with right appetite. This conformity + has no place in necessary matters, which are not affected by the human will; but only in contingent matters which can be effected + by us, whether they be matters of interior action, or the products of external work. Hence it is only about contingent matters + that an intellectual virtue is assigned to the practical intellect, viz. art, as regards things to be made, and + prudence, as regards things to be done. +
[35921] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod verum intellectus practici aliter accipitur quam +verum intellectus speculativi, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Nam verum +intellectus speculativi accipitur per conformitatem intellectus ad +rem. Et quia intellectus non potest infallibiliter conformari rebus +in contingentibus, sed solum in necessariis; ideo nullus habitus +speculativus contingentium est intellectualis virtus, sed solum est +circa necessaria. Verum autem intellectus practici accipitur per +conformitatem ad appetitum rectum. Quae quidem conformitas in +necessariis locum non habet, quae voluntate humana non fiunt, sed +solum in contingentibus quae possunt a nobis fieri, sive sint +agibilia interiora, sive factibilia exteriora. Et ideo circa sola +contingentia ponitur virtus intellectus practici, circa factibilia +quidem, ars; circa agibilia vero prudentia.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that "{euboulia, synesis}, and {gnome}" are unfittingly assigned as virtues annexed to prudence. For "{euboulia}" + is "a habit whereby we take good counsel" (Ethic. vi, 9). Now it "belongs to prudence to take good counsel," as stated (Ethic. + vi, 9). Therefore "{euboulia}" is not a virtue annexed to prudence, but rather is prudence itself. +
[35922] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter adiungantur prudentiae +eubulia, synesis et gnome. Eubulia enim est habitus quo bene +consiliamur, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed bene consiliari pertinet +ad prudentiam, ut in eodem libro dicitur. Ergo eubulia non est +virtus adiuncta prudentiae, sed magis est ipsa prudentia.
+ Objection 2: Further, it belongs to the higher to judge the lower. The highest virtue would therefore seem to be the one whose act is + judgment. Now "{synesis}" enables us to judge well. Therefore "{synesis}" is not a virtue annexed to prudence, but rather + is a principal virtue. +
[35923] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, +ad superiorem pertinet de inferioribus iudicare. Illa ergo virtus +videtur suprema, cuius est actus iudicium. Sed synesis est bene +iudicativa. Ergo synesis non est virtus adiuncta prudentiae, sed +magis ipsa est principalis.
+ Objection 3: Further, just as there are various matters to pass judgment on, so are there different points on which one has to take counsel. + But there is one virtue referring to all matters of counsel. Therefore, in order to judge well of what has to be done, there + is no need, besides "{synesis}" of the virtue of "{gnome}." +
[35924] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sicut diversa sunt ea de quibus est iudicandum, ita etiam diversa +sunt ea de quibus est consiliandum. Sed circa omnia consiliabilia +ponitur una virtus, scilicet eubulia. Ergo ad bene iudicandum de +agendis, non oportet ponere, praeter synesim, aliam virtutem, +scilicet gnomen.
+ Objection 4: Further, Cicero (De Invent. Rhet. iii) mentions three other parts of prudence; viz. "memory of the past, understanding of + the present, and foresight of the future." Moreover, Macrobius (Super Somn. Scip. 1) mentions yet others: viz. "caution, docility," + and the like. Therefore it seems that the above are not the only virtues annexed to prudence. +
[35925] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 arg. 4 Praeterea, +Tullius ponit, in sua rhetorica, tres alias partes prudentiae, +scilicet memoriam praeteritorum, intelligentiam praesentium, et +providentiam futurorum. Macrobius etiam ponit, super somnium +Scipionis, quasdam alias partes prudentiae, scilicet cautionem, +docilitatem, et alia huiusmodi. Non videntur igitur solae huiusmodi +virtutes prudentiae adiungi.
+ On the contrary, stands the authority of the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9,10,11), who assigns these three virtues as being annexed to prudence. +
[35926] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra +est auctoritas philosophi, in VI Ethic., qui has tres virtutes +ponit prudentiae adiunctas.
+ I answer that, Wherever several powers are subordinate to one another, that power is the highest which is ordained to the highest act. Now + there are three acts of reason in respect of anything done by man: the first of these is counsel; the second, judgment; the + third, command. The first two correspond to those acts of the speculative intellect, which are inquiry and judgment, for counsel + is a kind of inquiry: but the third is proper to the practical intellect, in so far + as this is ordained to operation; for reason does not have to command in things that man cannot do. Now it is evident that + in things done by man, the chief act is that of command, to which all the rest are subordinate. Consequently, that virtue + which perfects the command, viz. prudence, as obtaining the highest place, has other secondary virtues annexed to it, viz. + "{eustochia}," which perfects counsel; and "{synesis}" and "{gnome}," which are parts of prudence in relation to judgment, + and of + whose distinction we shall speak further on (ad 3). +
[35927] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod in omnibus potentiis ordinatis illa est principalior, +quae ad principaliorem actum ordinatur. Circa agibilia autem humana +tres actus rationis inveniuntur, quorum primus est consiliari, +secundus iudicare, tertius est praecipere. Primi autem duo +respondent actibus intellectus speculativi qui sunt inquirere et +iudicare, nam consilium inquisitio quaedam est. Sed tertius actus +proprius est practici intellectus, inquantum est operativus, non +enim ratio habet praecipere ea quae per hominem fieri non possunt. +Manifestum est autem quod in his quae per hominem fiunt, +principalis actus est praecipere, ad quem alii ordinantur. Et ideo +virtuti quae est bene praeceptiva, scilicet prudentiae, tanquam +principaliori, adiunguntur tanquam secundariae, eubulia, quae est +bene consiliativa, et synesis et gnome, quae sunt partes +iudicativae; de quarum distinctione dicetur.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Prudence makes us be of good counsel, not as though its immediate act consisted in being of good counsel, but because it + perfects the latter act by means of a subordinate virtue, viz. "{euboulia}." +
[35928] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod prudentia est bene consiliativa, non quasi bene +consiliari sit immediate actus eius, sed quia hunc actum perficit +mediante virtute sibi subiecta, quae est eubulia.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Judgment about what is to be done is directed to something further: for it may happen in some matter of action that a man's + judgment is sound, while his execution is wrong. The matter does not attain to its final complement until the reason has commanded + aright in the point of what has to be done. +
[35929] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod iudicium in agendis ad aliquid ulterius ordinatur, +contingit enim aliquem bene iudicare de aliquo agendo, et tamen non +recte exequi. Sed ultimum complementum est, quando ratio iam bene +praecipit de agendis.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Judgment of anything should be based on that thing's proper principles. But inquiry does not reach to the proper principles: + because, if we were in possession of these, we should need no more to inquire, the truth would be already discovered. Hence + only one virtue is directed to being of good counsel, wheres there are two virtues for good judgment: because difference is + based not on common but on proper principles. Consequently, even in speculative + matters, there is one science of dialectics, which inquires about all matters; whereas demonstrative sciences, which pronounce + judgment, differ according to their different objects. "{Synesis}" and "{gnome}" differ in respect of the different rules + on which judgment is based: for "{synesis}" judges of actions according to the common law; while "{gnome}" bases its judgment + on the natural law, in those cases where the common law fails to apply, as we shall explain further on ( + SS, Q[51], A[4]). +
[35930] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod iudicium de unaquaque re fit per propria principia +eius. Inquisitio autem nondum est per propria principia, quia his +habitis, non esset opus inquisitione, sed iam res esset inventa. Et +ideo una sola virtus ordinatur ad bene consiliandum, duae autem +virtutes ad bene iudicandum, quia distinctio non est in communibus +principiis, sed in propriis. Unde et in speculativis una est +dialectica inquisitiva de omnibus, scientiae autem demonstrativae, +quae sunt iudicativae, sunt diversae de diversis. Distinguuntur +autem synesis et gnome secundum diversas regulas quibus iudicatur, +nam synesis est iudicativa de agendis secundum communem legem; +gnome autem secundum ipsam rationem naturalem, in his in quibus +deficit lex communis; sicut plenius infra patebit.
+ Reply to Objection 4: Memory, understanding and foresight, as also caution and docility and the like, are not virtues distinct from prudence: but + are, as it were, integral parts thereof, in so far as they are all requisite for perfect prudence. There are, moreover, subjective + parts or species of prudence, e.g. domestic and political economy, and the like. But the three first names are, in a fashion, + potential parts of prudence; because they are subordinate thereto, as + secondary virtues to a principal virtue: and we shall speak of them later (SS, Q[48], seqq.). +
[35931] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod memoria, intelligentia et providentia, similiter +etiam cautio et docilitas, et alia huiusmodi, non sunt virtutes +diversae a prudentia, sed quodammodo comparantur ad ipsam sicut +partes integrales, inquantum omnia ista requiruntur ad perfectionem +prudentiae. Sunt etiam et quaedam partes subiectivae, seu species +prudentiae, sicut oeconomica, regnativa, et huiusmodi. Sed +praedicta tria sunt quasi partes potentiales prudentiae, quia +ordinantur sicut secundarium ad principale. Et de his infra +dicetur.
We must now consider moral virtues. We shall speak (1) of the difference between them and intellectual virtues; (2) of their + distinction, one from another, in respect of their proper matter; (3) of the difference between the chief or cardinal virtues + and the others. +
Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether every virtue is a moral virtue?
(2) Whether moral virtue differs from intellectual virtue?
(3) Whether virtue is adequately divided into moral and intellectual virtue?
(4) Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue?
(5) Whether, on the other hand, there can be intellectual without moral virtue?
+[35932] +Iª-IIae q. 58 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +virtutibus moralibus. Et primo, de distinctione earum a virtutibus +intellectualibus; secundo, de distinctione earum ab invicem, +secundum propriam materiam; tertio, de distinctione principalium, +vel cardinalium, ab aliis. Circa primum quaeruntur quinque. Primo, +utrum omnis virtus sit virtus moralis. Secundo, utrum virtus +moralis distinguatur ab intellectuali. Tertio, utrum sufficienter +dividatur virtus per intellectualem et moralem. Quarto, utrum +moralis virtus possit esse sine intellectuali. Quinto, utrum e +converso, intellectualis virtus possit esse sine morali.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that every virtue is a moral virtue. Because moral virtue is so called from the Latin "mos," i.e. custom. Now, + we can accustom ourselves to the acts of all the virtues. Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue. +
[35933] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis virtus sit moralis. Virtus enim +moralis dicitur a more, idest consuetudine. Sed omnium virtutum +actus consuescere possumus. Ergo omnis virtus est moralis.
+ Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that moral virtue is "a habit of choosing the rational mean." But every virtue + is a habit of choosing: since the acts of any virtue can be done from choice. And, moreover, every virtue consists in following + the rational mean in some way, as we shall explain further on ( + Q[64], AA[1],2,3). Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue. +
[35934] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod virtus moralis est habitus +electivus in medietate rationis consistens. Sed omnis virtus +videtur esse habitus electivus, quia actus cuiuslibet virtutis +possumus ex electione facere. Omnis etiam virtus aliqualiter in +medio rationis consistit, ut infra patebit. Ergo omnis virtus est +moralis.
+ Objection 3: Further, Cicero says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "virtue is a habit like a second nature, in accord with reason." But since + every human virtue is directed to man's good, it must be in accord with reason: since man's good "consists in that which agrees + with his reason," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue. +
[35935] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +Tullius dicit, in sua rhetorica, quod virtus est habitus in +modum naturae, rationi consentaneus. Sed cum omnis virtus +humana ordinetur ad bonum hominis, oportet quod sit consentanea +rationi, cum bonum hominis sit secundum rationem esse, ut Dionysius +dicit. Ergo omnis virtus est moralis.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13): "When we speak of a man's morals, we do not say that he is wise or intelligent, but that + he is gentle or sober." Accordingly, then, wisdom and understanding are not moral virtues: and yet they are virtues, as stated + above ( + Q[57], A[2]). Therefore not every virtue is a moral virtue. +
[35936] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., dicentes de moribus, +non dicimus quoniam sapiens vel intelligens; sed quoniam mitis vel +sobrius. Sic igitur sapientia et intellectus non sunt morales. +Quae tamen sunt virtutes, sicut supra dictum est. Non ergo omnis +virtus est moralis.
+ I answer that, In order to answer this question clearly, we must consider the meaning of the Latin word "mos"; for thus we shall be able + to discover what a "moral" virtue is. Now "mos" has a twofold meaning. For sometimes it means custom, in which sense we read + ( + Acts 15:1): "Except you be circumcised after the manner (morem) of Moses, you cannot be saved." Sometimes it means a natural or quasi-natural + inclination to do some particular action, in which + sense the word is applied to dumb animals. Thus we read ( + 2 Macc. 1:2) that "rushing violently upon the enemy, like lions [*Leonum more, i.e. as lions are in the habit of doing], they slew them": + and the word is used in the same sense in + Ps. 67:7, where we read: "Who maketh men of one manner [moris] to dwell in a house." For both these significations there is but one + word in Latin; but in the Greek there is a distinct word for each, for the word "ethos" is written sometimes + with a long, and sometimes a short "e". +
Now "moral" virtue is so called from "mos" in the sense of a natural or quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action. + And the other meaning of "mos," i.e. "custom," is akin to this: because custom becomes a second nature, and produces an inclination + similar to a natural one. But it is evident that inclination to an action belongs properly to the appetitive power, whose + function it is to move all the powers to their acts, as explained above ( + Q[9], + A[1] + ). Therefore not every virtue is a moral virtue, but only those that are in the appetitive faculty. +
[35937] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod ad huius evidentiam, considerare oportet quid sit +mos, sic enim scire poterimus quid sit moralis virtus. Mos autem +duo significat. Quandoque enim significat consuetudinem, sicut +dicitur Act. XV, nisi circumcidamini secundum morem Moysi, non +poteritis salvi fieri. Quandoque vero significat inclinationem +quandam naturalem, vel quasi naturalem, ad aliquid agendum, unde +etiam et brutorum animalium dicuntur aliqui mores; unde dicitur II +Machab. XI, quod leonum more irruentes in hostes, prostraverunt +eos. Et sic accipitur mos in Psalmo LXVII, ubi dicitur, qui +habitare facit unius moris in domo. Et hae quidem duae +significationes in nullo distinguuntur, apud Latinos, quantum ad +vocem. In Graeco autem distinguuntur, nam ethos, quod apud nos +morem significat, quandoque habet primam longam, et scribitur per +eta, Graecam litteram; quandoque habet primam correptam, et +scribitur per epsilon. Dicitur autem virtus moralis a more, +secundum quod mos significat quandam inclinationem naturalem, vel +quasi naturalem, ad aliquid agendum. Et huic significationi moris +propinqua est alia significatio, qua significat consuetudinem, nam +consuetudo quodammodo vertitur in naturam, et facit inclinationem +similem naturali. Manifestum est autem quod inclinatio ad actum +proprie convenit appetitivae virtuti, cuius est movere omnes +potentias ad agendum, ut ex supradictis patet. Et ideo non omnis +virtus dicitur moralis, sed solum illa quae est in vi +appetitiva.
+ Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes "mos" in the sense of "custom." +
[35938] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de more, secundum quod +significat consuetudinem.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Every act of virtue can be done from choice: but no virtue makes us choose aright, save that which is in the appetitive part + of the soul: for it has been stated above that choice is an act of the appetitive faculty ( + Q[13], A[1]). Wherefore a habit of choosing, i.e. a habit which is the principle whereby we choose, is that habit alone which perfects + the appetitive faculty: although the acts of other habits also may be a matter + of choice. +
[35939] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod omnis actus virtutis potest ex electione agi, sed +electionem rectam agit sola virtus quae est in appetitiva parte +animae, dictum est enim supra quod eligere est actus appetitivae +partis. Unde habitus electivus, qui scilicet est electionis +principium, est solum ille qui perficit vim appetitivam, quamvis +etiam aliorum habituum actus sub electione cadere possint.
+ Reply to Objection 3: "Nature is the principle of movement" (Phys. ii, text. 3). Now to move the faculties to act is the proper function of the + appetitive power. Consequently to become as a second nature by consenting to the reason, is proper to those virtues which + are in the appetitive faculty. +
[35940] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod natura est principium motus, sicut dicitur in II +Physic. Movere autem ad agendum proprium est appetitivae partis. Et +ideo assimilari naturae in consentiendo rationi, est proprium +virtutum quae sunt in vi appetitiva.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue does not differ from intellectual virtue. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv, 21) "that virtue + is the art of right conduct." But art is an intellectual virtue. Therefore moral and intellectual virtue do not differ. +
[35941] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus moralis ab intellectuali non +distinguatur. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Civ. Dei, quod +virtus est ars recte vivendi. Sed ars est virtus +intellectualis. Ergo virtus moralis ab intellectuali non +differt.
+ Objection 2: Further, some authors put science in the definition of virtues: thus some define perseverance as a "science or habit regarding + those things to which we should hold or not hold"; and holiness as "a science which makes man to be faithful and to do his + duty to God." Now science is an intellectual virtue. Therefore moral virtue should not be distinguished from intellectual + virtue. +
[35942] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +plerique in definitione virtutum moralium ponunt scientiam, sicut +quidam definiunt quod perseverantia est scientia vel habitus eorum +quibus est immanendum vel non immanendum; et sanctitas est scientia +faciens fideles et servantes quae ad Deum iusta. Scientia autem est +virtus intellectualis. Ergo virtus moralis non debet distingui ab +intellectuali.
+ Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 6) that "virtue is the rectitude and perfection of reason." But this belongs to the + intellectual virtues, as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Therefore moral virtue does not differ from intellectual. +
[35943] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in I Soliloq., quod virtus est recta et +perfecta ratio. Sed hoc pertinet ad virtutem intellectualem, ut +patet in VI Ethic. ergo virtus moralis non est distincta ab +intellectuali.
+ Objection 4: Further, a thing does not differ from that which is included in its definition. But intellectual virtue is included in the + definition of moral virtue: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "moral virtue is a habit of choosing the mean appointed + by reason as a prudent man would appoint it." Now this right reason that fixes the mean of moral virtue, belongs to an intellectual + virtue, as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Therefore moral virtue does not differ from + intellectual. +
[35944] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, +nihil distinguitur ab eo quod in eius definitione ponitur. Sed +virtus intellectualis ponitur in definitione virtutis moralis, +dicit enim philosophus, in II Ethic., quod virtus moralis est +habitus electivus existens in medietate determinata ratione, prout +sapiens determinabit. Huiusmodi autem recta ratio determinans +medium virtutis moralis, pertinet ad virtutem intellectualem, ut +dicitur in VI Ethic. Ergo virtus moralis non distinguitur ab +intellectuali.
+ On the contrary, It is stated in Ethic. i, 13 that "there are two kinds of virtue: some we call intellectual; some moral." +
[35945] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur in I Ethic., determinatur virtus secundum +differentiam hanc, dicimus enim harum has quidem intellectuales, +has vero morales.
+ I answer that, Reason is the first principle of all human acts; and whatever other principles of human acts may be found, they obey reason + somewhat, but in various ways. For some obey reason blindly and without any contradiction whatever: such are the limbs of + the body, provided they be in a healthy condition, for as soon as reason commands, the hand or the foot proceeds to action. + Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "the soul rules the body like a despot," i.e. + as a master rules his slave, who has no right to rebel. Accordingly some held that all the active principles in man are subordinate + to reason in this way. If this were true, for man to act well it would suffice that his reason be perfect. Consequently, since + virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good actions, it would follow that it is only in the reason, so that + there would be none but intellectual virtues. This was the opinion of Socrates, who said "every virtue is a kind of + prudence," as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Hence he maintained that as long as man is in possession of knowledge, he cannot sin; + and that every one who sins, does so through ignorance. +
[35946] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod omnium humanorum operum principium primum ratio est, +et quaecumque alia principia humanorum operum inveniantur, +quodammodo rationi obediunt; diversimode tamen. Nam quaedam rationi +obediunt omnino ad nutum, absque omni contradictione, sicut +corporis membra, si fuerint in sua natura consistentia; statim enim +ad imperium rationis, manus aut pes movetur ad opus. Unde +philosophus dicit, in I Polit., quod anima regit corpus despotico +principatu, idest sicut dominus servum, qui ius contradicendi non +habet. Posuerunt igitur quidam quod omnia principia activa quae +sunt in homine, hoc modo se habent ad rationem. Quod quidem si +verum esset, sufficeret quod ratio esset perfecta, ad bene agendum. +Unde, cum virtus sit habitus quo perficimur ad bene agendum, +sequeretur quod in sola ratione esset, et sic nulla virtus esset +nisi intellectualis. Et haec fuit opinio Socratis, qui dixit omnes +virtutes esse prudentias, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Unde ponebat quod +homo, scientia in eo existente, peccare non poterat; sed quicumque +peccabat, peccabat propter ignorantiam.
Now this is based on a false supposition. Because the appetitive faculty obeys the reason, not blindly, but with a certain + power of opposition; wherefore the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "reason commands the appetitive faculty by a politic + power," whereby a man rules over subjects that are free, having a certain right of opposition. Hence Augustine says on + Ps. 118 (Serm. 8) that "sometimes we understand [what is right] while desire is slow, or follows not at all," in so + far as the habits or passions of the appetitive faculty cause the use of reason to be impeded in some particular action. And + in this way, there is some truth in the saying of Socrates that so long as a man is in possession of knowledge he does not + sin: provided, however, that this knowledge is made to include the use of reason in this individual act of choice. +
Hoc autem procedit ex +suppositione falsi. Pars enim appetitiva obedit rationi non omnino +ad nutum, sed cum aliqua contradictione, unde philosophus dicit, in +I Polit., quod ratio imperat appetitivae principatu politico, quo +scilicet aliquis praeest liberis, qui habent ius in aliquo +contradicendi. Unde Augustinus dicit, super Psalm., quod +interdum praecedit intellectus, et sequitur tardus aut nullus +affectus, intantum quod quandoque passionibus vel habitibus +appetitivae partis hoc agitur, ut usus rationis in particulari +impediatur. Et secundum hoc, aliqualiter verum est quod Socrates +dixit, quod scientia praesente, non peccatur, si tamen hoc +extendatur usque ad usum rationis in particulari eligibili.
Accordingly for a man to do a good deed, it is requisite not only that his reason be well disposed by means of a habit of + intellectual virtue; but also that his appetite be well disposed by means of a habit of moral virtue. And so moral differs + from intellectual virtue, even as the appetite differs from the reason. Hence just as the appetite is the principle of human + acts, in so far as it partakes of reason, so are moral habits to be considered virtues in so far as they are in + conformity with reason. +
Sic +igitur ad hoc quod homo bene agat, requiritur quod non solum ratio +sit bene disposita per habitum virtutis intellectualis; sed etiam +quod vis appetitiva sit bene disposita per habitum virtutis +moralis. Sicut igitur appetitus distinguitur a ratione, ita virtus +moralis distinguitur ab intellectuali. Unde sicut appetitus est +principium humani actus secundum quod participat aliqualiter +rationem, ita habitus moralis habet rationem virtutis humanae, +inquantum rationi conformatur.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Augustine usually applies the term "art" to any form of right reason; in which sense art includes prudence which is the right + reason about things to be done, even as art is the right reason about things to be made. Accordingly, when he says that "virtue + is the art of right conduct," this applies to prudence essentially; but to other virtues, by participation, for as much as + they are directed by prudence. +
[35947] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Augustinus communiter accipit artem, pro +qualibet recta ratione. Et sic sub arte includitur etiam prudentia, +quae ita est recta ratio agibilium, sicut ars est recta ratio +factibilium. Et secundum hoc, quod dicit quod virtus est ars recte +vivendi, essentialiter convenit prudentiae, participative autem +aliis virtutibus, prout secundum prudentiam diriguntur.
+ Reply to Objection 2: All such definitions, by whomsoever given, were based on the Socratic theory, and should be explained according to what we + have said about art (ad 1). +
[35948] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod tales definitiones, a quibuscumque inveniantur datae, +processerunt ex opinione Socratica, et sunt exponendae eo modo quo +de arte praedictum est.
Reply to Objection 3: The same applies to the Third Objection.
[35949] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 ad 3 Et similiter +dicendum est ad tertium.
+ Reply to Objection 4: Right reason which is in accord with prudence is included in the definition of moral virtue, not as part of its essence, + but as something belonging by way of participation to all the moral virtues, in so far as they are all under the direction + of prudence. +
[35950] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod recta ratio, quae est secundum prudentiam, ponitur in +definitione virtutis moralis, non tanquam pars essentiae eius, sed +sicut quiddam participatum in omnibus virtutibus moralibus, +inquantum prudentia dirigit omnes virtutes morales.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that virtue is not adequately divided into moral and intellectual. For prudence seems to be a mean between + moral and intellectual virtue, since it is reckoned among the intellectual virtues (Ethic. vi, 3,5); and again is placed by + all among the four cardinal virtues, which are moral virtues, as we shall show further on ( + Q[61], A[1]). Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral, as though there + were no mean between them. +
[35951] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus humana non sufficienter +dividatur per virtutem moralem et intellectualem. Prudentia enim +videtur esse aliquid medium inter virtutem moralem et +intellectualem, connumeratur enim virtutibus intellectualibus in VI +Ethic.; et etiam ab omnibus communiter connumeratur inter quatuor +virtutes cardinales, quae sunt morales, ut infra patebit. Non ergo +sufficienter dividitur virtus per intellectualem et moralem, sicut +per immediata.
+ Objection 2: Further, contingency, perseverance, and patience are not reckoned to be intellectual virtues. Yet neither are they moral + virtues; since they do not reduce the passions to a mean, and are consistent with an abundance of passion. Therefore virtue + is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral. +
[35952] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +continentia et perseverantia, et etiam patientia, non computantur +inter virtutes intellectuales. Nec etiam sunt virtutes morales, +quia non tenent medium in passionibus, sed abundant in eis +passiones. Non ergo sufficienter dividitur virtus per +intellectuales et morales.
+ Objection 3: Further, faith, hope, and charity are virtues. Yet they are not intellectual virtues: for there are only five of these, viz. + science, wisdom, understanding, prudence, and art, as stated above ( + Q[57], AA[2] ,3,5). Neither are they moral virtues; since they are not about the passions, which are the chief concern of moral virtue. + Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral. +
[35953] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +fides, spes et caritas quaedam virtutes sunt. Non tamen sunt +virtutes intellectuales, hae enim solum sunt quinque, scilicet +scientia, sapientia, intellectus, prudentia et ars, ut dictum est. +Nec etiam sunt virtutes morales, quia non sunt circa passiones, +circa quas maxime est moralis virtus. Ergo virtus non sufficienter +dividitur per intellectuales et morales.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "virtue is twofold, intellectual and moral." +
[35954] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., duplicem esse +virtutem, hanc quidem intellectualem, illam autem moralem.
+ I answer that, Human virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good deeds. Now, in man there are but two principles of human + actions, viz. the intellect or reason and the appetite: for these are the two principles of movement in man as stated in De + Anima iii, text. 48. Consequently every human virtue must needs be a perfection of one of these principles. Accordingly if + it perfects man's speculative or practical intellect in order that his deed may be good, it + will be an intellectual virtue: whereas if it perfects his appetite, it will be a moral virtue. It follows therefore that + every human virtue is either intellectual or moral. +
[35955] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod virtus humana est quidam habitus perficiens hominem +ad bene operandum. Principium autem humanorum actuum in homine non +est nisi duplex, scilicet intellectus sive ratio, et appetitus, +haec enim sunt duo moventia in homine, ut dicitur in III de anima. +Unde omnis virtus humana oportet quod sit perfectiva alicuius +istorum principiorum. Si quidem igitur sit perfectiva intellectus +speculativi vel practici ad bonum hominis actum, erit virtus +intellectualis, si autem sit perfectiva appetitivae partis, erit +virtus moralis. Unde relinquitur quod omnis virtus humana vel est +intellectualis vel moralis.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Prudence is essentially an intellectual virtue. But considered on the part of its matter, it has something in common with + the moral virtues: for it is right reason about things to be done, as stated above ( + Q[57], A[4]). It is in this sense that it is reckoned with the moral virtues. +
[35956] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod prudentia, secundum essentiam suam, est +intellectualis virtus. Sed secundum materiam, convenit cum +virtutibus moralibus, est enim recta ratio agibilium, ut supra +dictum est. Et secundum hoc, virtutibus moralibus connumeratur.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Contingency and perseverance are not perfections of the sensitive appetite. This is clear from the fact that passions abound + in the continent and persevering man, which would not be the case if his sensitive appetite were perfected by a habit making + it conformable to reason. Contingency and perseverance are, however, perfections of the rational faculty, and withstand the + passions lest reason be led astray. But they fall short of being virtues: since + intellectual virtue, which makes reason to hold itself well in respect of moral matters, presupposes a right appetite of the + end, so that it may hold itself aright in respect of principles, i.e. the ends, on which it builds its argument: and this + is wanting in the continent and persevering man. Nor again can an action proceeding from two principles be perfect, unless + each principle be perfected by the habit corresponding to that operation: thus, however perfect be the principal agent employing + an instrument, it will produce an imperfect effect, if the instrument be not well disposed also. Hence if the sensitive faculty, + which is moved by the rational faculty, is not perfect; however perfect the rational faculty may be, the resulting action + will be imperfect: and consequently the principle of that action will not be a virtue. And for this reason, contingency, desisting + from pleasures, and perseverance in the midst of pains, are not virtues, but something less than a virtue, as the + Philosopher maintains (Ethic. vii, 1,9). +
[35957] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod continentia et perseverantia non sunt perfectiones +appetitivae virtutis sensitivae. Quod ex hoc patet, quod in +continente et perseverante superabundant inordinatae passiones, +quod non esset, si appetitus sensitivus esset perfectus aliquo +habitu conformante ipsum rationi. Est autem continentia, seu +perseverantia, perfectio rationalis partis, quae se tenet contra +passiones ne deducatur. Deficit tamen a ratione virtutis, quia +virtus intellectiva quae facit rationem se bene habere circa +moralia, praesupponit appetitum rectum finis, ut recte se habeat +circa principia, idest fines, ex quibus ratiocinatur; quod +continenti et perseveranti deest. Neque etiam potest esse perfecta +operatio quae a duabus potentiis procedit, nisi utraque potentia +perficiatur per debitum habitum, sicut non sequitur perfecta actio +alicuius agentis per instrumentum, si instrumentum non sit bene +dispositum, quantumcumque principale agens sit perfectum. Unde si +appetitus sensitivus, quem movet rationalis pars, non sit +perfectus; quantumcumque rationalis pars sit perfecta, actio +consequens non erit perfecta. Unde nec principium actionis erit +virtus. Et propter hoc, continentia a delectationibus, et +perseverantia a tristitiis, non sunt virtutes, sed aliquid minus +virtute, ut philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Faith, hope, and charity are superhuman virtues: for they are virtues of man as sharing in the grace of God. +
[35958] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod fides, spes et caritas sunt supra virtutes humanas, +sunt enim virtutes hominis prout est factus particeps divinae +gratiae.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that moral can be without intellectual virtue. Because moral virtue, as Cicero says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) is + "a habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Now though nature may be in accord with some sovereign reason that moves + it, there is no need for that reason to be united to nature in the same subject, as is evident of natural things devoid of + knowledge. Therefore in a man there may be a moral virtue like a second nature, inclining + him to consent to his reason, without his reason being perfected by an intellectual virtue. +
[35959] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus moralis possit esse sine +intellectuali. Virtus enim moralis, ut dicit Tullius, est +habitus in modum naturae, rationi consentaneus. Sed natura etsi +consentiat alicui superiori rationi moventi, non tamen oportet quod +illa ratio naturae coniungatur in eodem, sicut patet in rebus +naturalibus cognitione carentibus. Ergo potest esse in homine +virtus moralis in modum naturae, inclinans ad consentiendum +rationi, quamvis illius hominis ratio non sit perfecta per virtutem +intellectualem.
+ Objection 2: Further, by means of intellectual virtue man obtains perfect use of reason. But it happens at times that men are virtuous + and acceptable to God, without being vigorous in the use of reason. Therefore it seems that moral virtue can be without intellectual. +
[35960] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +per virtutem intellectualem homo consequitur rationis usum +perfectum. Sed quandoque contingit quod aliqui in quibus non multum +viget usus rationis, sunt virtuosi et Deo accepti. Ergo videtur +quod virtus moralis possit esse sine virtute intellectuali.
+ Objection 3: Further moral virtue makes us inclined to do good works. But some, without depending on the judgment of reason, have a natural + inclination to do good works. Therefore moral virtues can be without intellectual virtues. +
[35961] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +virtus moralis facit inclinationem ad bene operandum. Sed quidam +habent naturalem inclinationem ad bene operandum, etiam absque +rationis iudicio. Ergo virtutes morales possunt esse sine +intellectuali.
+ On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxii) that "the other virtues, unless we do prudently what we desire to do, cannot be real virtues." + But prudence is an intellectual virtue, as stated above ( + Q[57], A[5]). Therefore moral virtues cannot be without intellectual virtues. +
[35962] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Gregorius dicit, in XXII Moral., quod ceterae virtutes, +nisi ea quae appetunt, prudenter agant, virtutes esse nequaquam +possunt. Sed prudentia est virtus intellectualis, ut supra +dictum est. Ergo virtutes morales non possunt esse sine +intellectualibus.
+ I answer that, Moral virtue can be without some of the intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science, and art; but not without understanding + and prudence. Moral virtue cannot be without prudence, because it is a habit of choosing, i.e. making us choose well. Now + in order that a choice be good, two things are required. First, that the intention be directed to a due end; and this is done + by moral virtue, which inclines the appetitive faculty to the good that is in accord with + reason, which is a due end. Secondly, that man take rightly those things which have reference to the end: and this he cannot + do unless his reason counsel, judge and command aright, which is the function of prudence and the virtues annexed to it, as + stated above ( + Q[57], AA[5],6). Wherefore there can be no moral virtue without prudence: and consequently neither can there be without understanding. + For it is by the virtue of understanding that we know self-evident + principles both in speculative and in practical matters. Consequently just as right reason in speculative matters, in so far + as it proceeds from naturally known principles, presupposes the understanding of those principles, so also does prudence, + which is the right reason about things to be done. +
[35963] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod virtus moralis potest quidem esse sine quibusdam +intellectualibus virtutibus, sicut sine sapientia, scientia et +arte, non autem potest esse sine intellectu et prudentia. Sine +prudentia quidem esse non potest moralis virtus, quia moralis +virtus est habitus electivus, idest faciens bonam electionem. Ad +hoc autem quod electio sit bona, duo requiruntur. Primo, ut sit +debita intentio finis, et hoc fit per virtutem moralem, quae vim +appetitivam inclinat ad bonum conveniens rationi, quod est finis +debitus. Secundo, ut homo recte accipiat ea quae sunt ad finem, et +hoc non potest esse nisi per rationem recte consiliantem, +iudicantem et praecipientem; quod pertinet ad prudentiam et ad +virtutes sibi annexas, ut supra dictum est. Unde virtus moralis +sine prudentia esse non potest. Et per consequens nec sine +intellectu. Per intellectum enim cognoscuntur principia naturaliter +nota, tam in speculativis quam in operativis. Unde sicut recta +ratio in speculativis, inquantum procedit ex principiis naturaliter +cognitis, praesupponit intellectum principiorum; ita etiam +prudentia, quae est recta ratio agibilium.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The inclination of nature in things devoid of reason is without choice: wherefore such an inclination does not of necessity + require reason. But the inclination of moral virtue is with choice: and consequently in order that it may be perfect it requires + that reason be perfected by intellectual virtue. +
[35964] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod inclinatio naturae in rebus carentibus ratione, +est absque electione, et ideo talis inclinatio non requirit ex +necessitate rationem. Sed inclinatio virtutis moralis est cum +electione, et ideo ad suam perfectionem indiget quod sit ratio +perfecta per virtutem intellectualem.
+ Reply to Objection 2: A man may be virtuous without having full use of reason as to everything, provided he have it with regard to those things + which have to be done virtuously. In this way all virtuous men have full use of reason. Hence those who seem to be simple, + through lack of worldly cunning, may possibly be prudent, according to + Mat. 10:16: "Be ye therefore prudent [Douay: 'wise'] as serpents, and simple as doves." +
[35965] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod in virtuoso non oportet quod vigeat usus rationis +quantum ad omnia, sed solum quantum ad ea quae sunt agenda secundum +virtutem. Et sic usus rationis viget in omnibus virtuosis. Unde +etiam qui videntur simplices, eo quod carent mundana astutia, +possunt esse prudentes; secundum illud Matth. X, estote +prudentes sicut serpentes, et simplices sicut columbae.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The natural inclination to a good of virtue is a kind of beginning of virtue, but is not perfect virtue. For the stronger + this inclination is, the more perilous may it prove to be, unless it be accompanied by right reason, which rectifies the choice + of fitting means towards the due end. Thus if a running horse be blind, the faster it runs the more heavily will it fall, + and the more grievously will it be hurt. And consequently, although moral virtue be + not right reason, as Socrates held, yet not only is it "according to right reason," in so far as it inclines man to that which + is, according to right reason, as the Platonists maintained [*Cf. Plato, Meno xli.]; but also it needs to be "joined with + right reason," as Aristotle declares (Ethic. vi, 13). +
[35966] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod naturalis inclinatio ad bonum virtutis, est quaedam +inchoatio virtutis, non autem est virtus perfecta. Huiusmodi enim +inclinatio, quanto est fortior, tanto potest esse periculosior, +nisi recta ratio adiungatur, per quam fiat recta electio eorum quae +conveniunt ad debitum finem, sicut equus currens, si sit caecus, +tanto fortius impingit et laeditur, quanto fortius currit. Et ideo, +etsi virtus moralis non sit ratio recta, ut Socrates dicebat; non +tamen solum est secundum rationem rectam, inquantum inclinat ad id +quod est secundum rationem rectam, ut Platonici posuerunt; sed +etiam oportet quod sit cum ratione recta, ut Aristoteles dicit, in +VI Ethic.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that there can be intellectual without moral virtue. Because perfection of what precedes does not depend on + the perfection of what follows. Now reason precedes and moves the sensitive appetite. Therefore intellectual virtue, which + is a perfection of the reason, does not depend on moral virtue, which is a perfection of the appetitive faculty; and can be + without it. +
[35967] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus intellectualis possit esse sine +virtute morali. Perfectio enim prioris non dependet a perfectione +posterioris. Sed ratio est prior appetitu sensitivo, et movens +ipsum. Ergo virtus intellectualis quae est perfectio rationis, non +dependet a virtute morali, quae est perfectio appetitivae partis. +Potest ergo esse sine ea.
+ Objection 2: Further, morals are the matter of prudence, even as things makeable are the matter of art. Now art can be without its proper + matter, as a smith without iron. Therefore prudence can be without the moral virtue, although of all the intellectual virtues, + it seems most akin to the moral virtues. +
[35968] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +moralia sunt materia prudentiae, sicut factibilia sunt materia +artis. Sed ars potest esse sine propria materia, sicut faber sine +ferro. Ergo et prudentia potest esse sine virtutibus moralibus, +quae tamen inter omnes intellectuales virtutes, maxime moralibus +coniuncta videtur.
+ Objection 3: Further, prudence is "a virtue whereby we are of good counsel" (Ethic. vi, 9). Now many are of good counsel without having + the moral virtues. Therefore prudence can be without a moral virtue. +
[35969] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +prudentia est virtus bene consiliativa, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed +multi bene consiliantur, quibus tamen virtutes morales desunt. Ergo +prudentia potest esse sine virtute morali.
+ On the contrary, To wish to do evil is directly opposed to moral virtue; and yet it is not opposed to anything that can be without moral virtue. + Now it is contrary to prudence "to sin willingly" (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore prudence cannot be without moral virtue. +
[35970] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra, +velle malum facere opponitur directe virtuti morali; non autem +opponitur alicui quod sine virtute morali esse potest. Opponitur +autem prudentiae quod volens peccet, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Non +ergo prudentia potest esse sine virtute morali.
+ I answer that, Other intellectual virtues can, but prudence cannot, be without moral virtue. The reason for this is that prudence is the + right reason about things to be done (and this, not merely in general, but also in particular); about which things actions + are. Now right reason demands principles from which reason proceeds to argue. And when reason argues about particular cases, + it needs not only universal but also particular principles. As to universal principles of + action, man is rightly disposed by the natural understanding of principles, whereby he understands that he should do no evil; + or again by some practical science. But this is not enough in order that man may reason aright about particular cases. For + it happens sometimes that the aforesaid universal principle, known by means of understanding or science, is destroyed in a + particular case by a passion: thus to one who is swayed by concupiscence, when he is overcome thereby, the object of his desire + seems good, although it is opposed to the universal judgment of his reason. Consequently, as by the habit of natural understanding + or of science, man is made to be rightly disposed in regard to the universal principles of action; so, in order that he be + rightly disposed with regard to the particular principles of action, viz. the ends, he needs to be perfected by certain habits, + whereby it becomes connatural, as it were, to man to judge aright to the end. This is done by moral virtue: for the + virtuous man judges aright of the end of virtue, because "such a man is, such does the end seem to him" (Ethic. iii, 5). Consequently + the right reason about things to be done, viz. prudence, requires man to have moral virtue. +
[35971] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod aliae virtutes intellectuales sine virtute morali +esse possunt, sed prudentia sine virtute morali esse non potest. +Cuius ratio est, quia prudentia est recta ratio agibilium; non +autem solum in universali, sed etiam in particulari, in quibus sunt +actiones. Recta autem ratio praeexigit principia ex quibus ratio +procedit. Oportet autem rationem circa particularia procedere non +solum ex principiis universalibus, sed etiam ex principiis +particularibus. Circa principia quidem universalia agibilium, homo +recte se habet per naturalem intellectum principiorum, per quem +homo cognoscit quod nullum malum est agendum; vel etiam per aliquam +scientiam practicam. Sed hoc non sufficit ad recte ratiocinandum +circa particularia. Contingit enim quandoque quod huiusmodi +universale principium cognitum per intellectum vel scientiam, +corrumpitur in particulari per aliquam passionem, sicut +concupiscenti, quando concupiscentia vincit, videtur hoc esse bonum +quod concupiscit, licet sit contra universale iudicium rationis. Et +ideo, sicut homo disponitur ad recte se habendum circa principia +universalia, per intellectum naturalem vel per habitum scientiae; +ita ad hoc quod recte se habeat circa principia particularia +agibilium, quae sunt fines, oportet quod perficiatur per aliquos +habitus secundum quos fiat quodammodo homini connaturale recte +iudicare de fine. Et hoc fit per virtutem moralem, virtuosus enim +recte iudicat de fine virtutis, quia qualis unusquisque est, +talis finis videtur ei, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Et ideo ad +rectam rationem agibilium, quae est prudentia, requiritur quod homo +habeat virtutem moralem.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Reason, as apprehending the end, precedes the appetite for the end: but appetite for the end precedes the reason, as arguing + about the choice of the means, which is the concern of prudence. Even so, in speculative matters the understanding of principles + is the foundation on which the syllogism of the reason is based. +
[35972] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ratio, secundum quod est apprehensiva finis, +praecedit appetitum finis, sed appetitus finis praecedit rationem +ratiocinantem ad eligendum ea quae sunt ad finem, quod pertinet ad +prudentiam. Sicut etiam in speculativis, intellectus principiorum +est principium rationis syllogizantis.
+ Reply to Objection 2: It does not depend on the disposition of our appetite whether we judge well or ill of the principles of art, as it does, + when we judge of the end which is the principle in moral matters: in the former case our judgment depends on reason alone. + Hence art does not require a virtue perfecting the appetite, as prudence does. +
[35973] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod principia artificialium non diiudicantur a nobis bene +vel male secundum dispositionem appetitus nostri, sicut fines, qui +sunt moralium principia, sed solum per considerationem rationis. Et +ideo ars non requirit virtutem perficientem appetitum, sicut +requirit prudentia.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Prudence not only helps us to be of good counsel, but also to judge and command well. This is not possible unless the impediment + of the passions, destroying the judgment and command of prudence, be removed; and this is done by moral virtue. +
[35974] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod prudentia non solum est bene consiliativa, sed etiam +bene iudicativa et bene praeceptiva. Quod esse non potest, nisi +removeatur impedimentum passionum corrumpentium iudicium et +praeceptum prudentiae; et hoc per virtutem moralem.
We must now consider the difference of one moral virtue from another. And since those moral virtues which are about the passions, + differ accordingly to the difference of passions, we must consider (1) the relation of virtue to passion; (2) the different + kinds of moral virtue in relation to the passions. Under the first head there are five points of inquiry: +
(1) Whether moral virtue is a passion?
(2) Whether there can be moral virtue with passion?
(3) Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue?
+[35975] +Iª-IIae q. 59 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +distinctione moralium virtutum ad invicem. Et quia virtutes morales +quae sunt circa passiones, distinguuntur secundum diversitatem +passionum, oportet primo considerare comparationem virtutis ad +passionem; secundo, distinctionem moralium virtutum secundum +passiones. Circa primum quaeruntur quinque. Primo, utrum virtus +moralis sit passio. Secundo, utrum virtus moralis possit esse cum +passione. Tertio, utrum possit esse cum tristitia. Quarto, utrum +omnis virtus moralis sit circa passionem. Quinto, utrum aliqua +virtus moralis possit esse sine passione.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue is a passion. Because the mean is of the same genus as the extremes. But moral virtue is + a mean between two passions. Therefore moral virtue is a passion. +
[35976] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus moralis sit passio. Medium enim +est eiusdem generis cum extremis. Sed virtus moralis est medium +inter passiones. Ergo virtus moralis est passio.
+ Objection 2: Further, virtue and vice, being contrary to one another, are in the same genus. But some passions are reckoned to be vices, + such as envy and anger. Therefore some passions are virtues. +
[35977] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +virtus et vitium, cum sint contraria, sunt in eodem genere. Sed +quaedam passiones vitia esse dicuntur, ut invidia et ira. Ergo +etiam quaedam passiones sunt virtutes.
+ Objection 3: Further, pity is a passion, since it is sorrow for another's ills, as stated above ( + Q[35], A[8]). Now "Cicero the renowned orator did not hesitate to call pity a virtue," as Augustine states in De Civ. Dei ix, 5. Therefore + a passion may be a moral virtue. +
[35978] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +misericordia quaedam passio est, est enim tristitia de alienis +malis, ut supra dictum est. Hanc autem Cicero, locutor egregius, +non dubitavit appellare virtutem; ut Augustinus dicit, in IX de +Civ. Dei. Ergo passio potest esse virtus moralis.
+ On the contrary, It is stated in Ethic. ii, 5 that "passions are neither virtues nor vices." +
[35979] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur in II Ethic., quod passiones neque virtutes +sunt neque malitiae.
+ I answer that, Moral virtue cannot be a passion. This is clear for three reasons. First, because a passion is a movement of the sensitive + appetite, as stated above ( + Q[22], A[3]): whereas moral virtue is not a movement, but rather a principle of the movement of the appetite, being a kind of habit. + Secondly, because passions are not in themselves good or evil. For man's good or evil is something in reference to reason: + wherefore the passions, + considered in themselves, are referable both to good and evil, for as much as they may accord or disaccord with reason. Now + nothing of this sort can be a virtue: since virtue is referable to good alone, as stated above ( + Q[55], A[3]). Thirdly, because, granted that some passions are, in some way, referable to good only, or to evil only; even then the movement + of passion, as passion, begins in the appetite, and ends in the reason, since the appetite tends to conformity + with reason. On the other hand, the movement of virtue is the reverse, for it begins in the reason and ends in the appetite, + inasmuch as the latter is moved by reason. Hence the definition of moral virtue (Ethic. ii, 6) states that it is "a habit + of choosing the mean appointed by reason as a prudent man would appoint it." +
[35980] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod virtus moralis non potest esse passio. Et hoc patet +triplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia passio est motus quidam +appetitus sensitivi, ut supra dictum est. Virtus autem moralis non +est motus aliquis, sed magis principium appetitivi motus, habitus +quidam existens. Secundo quia passiones ex seipsis non habent +rationem boni vel mali. Bonum enim vel malum hominis est secundum +rationem, unde passiones, secundum se consideratae, se habent et ad +bonum et ad malum, secundum quod possunt convenire rationi vel non +convenire. Nihil autem tale potest esse virtus, cum virtus solum ad +bonum se habeat, ut supra dictum est. Tertio quia, dato quod aliqua +passio se habeat solum ad bonum, vel solum ad malum, secundum +aliquem modum; tamen motus passionis, inquantum passio est, +principium habet in ipso appetitu, et terminum in ratione, in cuius +conformitatem appetitus tendit. Motus autem virtutis est e +converso, principium habens in ratione et terminum in appetitu, +secundum quod a ratione movetur. Unde in definitione virtutis +moralis dicitur, in II Ethic., quod est habitus electivus in +medietate consistens determinata ratione, prout sapiens +determinabit.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Virtue is a mean between passions, not by reason of its essence, but on account of its effect; because, to wit, it establishes + the mean between passions. +
[35981] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod virtus, secundum suam essentiam, non est medium +inter passiones, sed secundum suum effectum, quia scilicet inter +passiones medium constituit.
+ Reply to Objection 2: If by vice we understand a habit of doing evil deeds, it is evident that no passion is a vice. But if vice is taken to mean + sin which is a vicious act, nothing hinders a passion from being a vice, or, on the other hand, from concurring in an act + of virtue; in so far as a passion is either opposed to reason or in accordance with reason. +
[35982] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, si vitium dicatur habitus secundum quem quis male +operatur, manifestum est quod nulla passio est vitium. Si vero +dicatur vitium peccatum, quod est actus vitiosus, sic nihil +prohibet passionem esse vitium, et e contrario concurrere ad actum +virtutis; secundum quod passio vel contrariatur rationi, vel +sequitur actum rationis.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Pity is said to be a virtue, i.e. an act of virtue, in so far as "that movement of the soul is obedient to reason"; viz. + "when pity is bestowed without violating right, as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent forgiven," as Augustine says + (De Civ. Dei ix, 5). But if by pity we understand a habit perfecting man so that he bestows pity reasonably, nothing hinders + pity, in this sense, from being a virtue. The same applies to similar passions. +
[35983] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod misericordia dicitur esse virtus, idest virtutis +actus, secundum quod motus ille animi rationi servit, quando +scilicet ita praebetur misericordia, ut iustitia conservetur, sive +cum indigenti tribuitur, sive cum ignoscitur poenitenti, ut +Augustinus dicit ibidem. Si tamen misericordia dicatur aliquis +habitus quo homo perficitur ad rationabiliter miserendum, nihil +prohibet misericordiam sic dictam esse virtutem. Et eadem est ratio +de similibus passionibus.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue cannot be with passion. For the Philosopher says (Topic. iv) that "a gentle man is one who + is not passionate; but a patient man is one who is passionate but does not give way." The same applies to all the moral virtues. + Therefore all moral virtues are without passion. +
[35984] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus moralis cum passione esse non +possit. Dicit enim philosophus, in IV Topic., quod mitis est qui +non patitur, patiens autem qui patitur et non deducitur. Et +eadem ratio est de omnibus virtutibus moralibus. Ergo omnis virtus +moralis est sine passione.
+ Objection 2: Further, virtue is a right affection of the soul, as health is to the body, as stated Phys. vii, text. 17: wherefore "virtue + is a kind of health of the soul," as Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. iv). But the soul's passions are "the soul's diseases," as + he says in the same book. Now health is incompatible with disease. Therefore neither is passion compatible with virtue. +
[35985] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +virtus est quaedam recta habitudo animae, sicut sanitas corporis, +ut dicitur in VII Physic., unde virtus quaedam sanitas animae esse +videtur, ut Tullius dicit, in IV de Tuscul. quaest. Passiones autem +animae dicuntur morbi quidam animae, ut in eodem libro Tullius +dicit. Sanitas autem non compatitur secum morbum. Ergo neque virtus +compatitur animae passionem.
+ Objection 3: Further, moral virtue requires perfect use of reason even in particular matters. But the passions are an obstacle to this: + for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "pleasures destroy the judgment of prudence": and Sallust says (Catilin.) that + "when they," i.e. the soul's passions, "interfere, it is not easy for the mind to grasp the truth." Therefore passion is incompatible + with moral virtue. +
[35986] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +virtus moralis requirit perfectum usum rationis etiam in +particularibus. Sed hoc impeditur per passiones, dicit enim +philosophus, in VI Ethic., quod delectationes corrumpunt +existimationem prudentiae; et Sallustius dicit, in Catilinario, +quod non facile verum perspicit animus, ubi illa officiunt, +scilicet animi passiones. Virtus ergo moralis non potest esse cum +passione.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6): "If the will is perverse, these movements," viz. the passions, "are perverse also: but + if it is upright, they are not only blameless, but even praiseworthy." But nothing praiseworthy is incompatible with moral + virtue. Therefore moral virtue does not exclude the passions, but is consistent with them. +
[35987] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, si perversa est +voluntas, perversos habebit hos motus, scilicet passionum, si +autem recta est, non solum inculpabiles, verum etiam laudabiles +erunt. Sed nullum laudabile excluditur per virtutem moralem. +Virtus ergo moralis non excludit passiones, sed potest esse cum +ipsis.
+ I answer that, The Stoics and Peripatetics disagreed on this point, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei ix, 4). For the Stoics held that the + soul's passions cannot be in a wise or virtuous man: whereas the Peripatetics, who were founded by Aristotle, as Augustine + says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), maintained that the passions are compatible with moral virtue, if they be reduced to the mean. +
This difference, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), was one of words rather than of opinions. Because the Stoics, + through not discriminating between the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, and the sensitive appetite, which is divided + into irascible and concupiscible, did not, as the Peripatetics did, distinguish the passions from the other affections of + the human soul, in the point of their being movements of the sensitive appetite, whereas the other emotions of the + soul, which are not passions, are movements of the intellective appetite or will; but only in the point of the passions being, + as they maintained, any emotions in disaccord with reason. These emotions could not be in a wise or virtuous man if they arose + deliberately: while it would be possible for them to be in a wise man, if they arose suddenly: because, in the words of Aulus + Gellius [*Noct. Attic. xix, 1], quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), "it is not in our power to call up the visions + of the soul, known as its fancies; and when they arise from awesome things, they must needs disturb the mind of a wise man, + so that he is slightly startled by fear, or depressed with sorrow," in so far as "these passions forestall the use of reason + without his approving of such things or consenting thereto." +
Accordingly, if the passions be taken for inordinate emotions, they cannot be in a virtuous man, so that he consent to them + deliberately; as the Stoics maintained. But if the passions be taken for any movements of the sensitive appetite, they can + be in a virtuous man, in so far as they are subordinate to reason. Hence Aristotle says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "some describe + virtue as being a kind of freedom from passion and disturbance; this is incorrect, because the assertion should + be qualified": they should have said virtue is freedom from those passions "that are not as they should be as to manner and + time." +
[35988] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod circa hoc fuit discordia inter Stoicos et +Peripateticos, sicut Augustinus dicit, IX de Civ. Dei. Stoici enim +posuerunt quod passiones animae non possunt esse in sapiente, sive +virtuoso, Peripatetici vero, quorum sectam Aristoteles instituit, +ut Augustinus dicit in IX de Civ. Dei, posuerunt quod passiones +simul cum virtute morali esse possunt, sed ad medium reductae. Haec +autem diversitas, sicut Augustinus ibidem dicit, magis erat +secundum verba, quam secundum eorum sententias. Quia enim Stoici +non distinguebant inter appetitum intellectivum, qui est voluntas, +et inter appetitum sensitivum, qui per irascibilem et +concupiscibilem dividitur; non distinguebant in hoc passiones +animae ab aliis affectionibus humanis, quod passiones animae sint +motus appetitus sensitivi, aliae vero affectiones, quae non sunt +passiones animae, sunt motus appetitus intellectivi, qui dicitur +voluntas, sicut Peripatetici distinxerunt, sed solum quantum ad hoc +quod passiones esse dicebant quascumque affectiones rationi +repugnantes. Quae si ex deliberatione oriantur, in sapiente, seu in +virtuoso, esse non possunt. Si autem subito oriantur, hoc in +virtuoso potest accidere, eo quod animi visa quae appellant +phantasias, non est in potestate nostra utrum aliquando incidant +animo; et cum veniunt ex terribilibus rebus, necesse est ut +sapientis animum moveant, ita ut paulisper vel pavescat metu, vel +tristitia contrahatur, tanquam his passionibus praevenientibus +rationis officium; nec tamen approbant ista, eisque +consentiunt; ut Augustinus narrat in IX de Civ. Dei, ab Agellio +dictum. Sic igitur, si passiones dicantur inordinatae affectiones, +non possunt esse in virtuoso, ita quod post deliberationem eis +consentiatur; ut Stoici posuerunt. Si vero passiones dicantur +quicumque motus appetitus sensitivi, sic possunt esse in virtuoso, +secundum quod sunt a ratione ordinati. Unde Aristoteles dicit, in +II Ethic., quod non bene quidam determinant virtutes +impassibilitates quasdam et quietes, quoniam simpliciter +dicunt, sed deberent dicere quod sunt quietes a passionibus +quae sunt ut non oportet, et quando non oportet.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher quotes this, as well as many other examples in his books on Logic, in order to illustrate, not his own mind, + but that of others. It was the opinion of the Stoics that the passions of the soul were incompatible with virtue: and the + Philosopher rejects this opinion (Ethic. ii, 3), when he says that virtue is not freedom from passion. It may be said, however, + that when he says "a gentle man is not passionate," we are to understand this of + inordinate passion. +
[35989] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod philosophus exemplum illud inducit, sicut et +multa alia in libris logicalibus, non secundum opinionem propriam, +sed secundum opinionem aliorum. Haec autem fuit opinio Stoicorum, +quod virtutes essent sine passionibus animae. Quam opinionem +philosophus excludit in II Ethic., dicens virtutes non esse +impassibilitates. Potest tamen dici quod, cum dicitur quod mitis +non patitur, intelligendum est secundum passionem inordinatam.
+ Reply to Objection 2: This and all similar arguments which Tully brings forward in De Tusc. Quaest. iv take the passions in the execution of reason's + command. +
[35990] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa, et omnes similes quas Tullius ad hoc +inducit in IV libro de Tuscul. quaest., procedit de passionibus +secundum quod significant inordinatas affectiones.
+ Reply to Objection 3: When a passion forestalls the judgment of reason, so as to prevail on the mind to give its consent, it hinders counsel and + the judgment of reason. But when it follows that judgment, as through being commanded by reason, it helps towards the execution + of reason's command. +
[35991] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod passio praeveniens iudicium rationis, si in animo +praevaleat ut ei consentiatur, impedit consilium et iudicium +rationis. Si vero sequatur, quasi ex ratione imperata, adiuvat ad +exequendum imperium rationis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is incompatible with virtue. Because the virtues are effects of wisdom, according to + Wis. 8:7: "She," i.e. Divine wisdom, "teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude." Now the "conversation" of wisdom + "hath no bitterness," as we read further on (verse 16). Therefore sorrow is incompatible with virtue also. +
[35992] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus cum tristitia esse non possit. +Virtutes enim sunt sapientiae effectus, secundum illud Sap. VIII, +sobrietatem et iustitiam docet, scilicet divina sapientia, +prudentiam et virtutem. Sed sapientiae convictus non habet +amaritudinem, ut postea subditur. Ergo nec virtutes cum tristitia +esse possunt.
+ Objection 2: Further, sorrow is a hindrance to work, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 13; x, 5). But a hindrance to good works is + incompatible with virtue. Therefore sorrow is incompatible with virtue. +
[35993] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +tristitia est impedimentum operationis; ut patet per philosophum, +in VII et X Ethic. Sed impedimentum bonae operationis repugnat +virtuti. Ergo tristitia repugnat virtuti.
+ Objection 3: Further, Tully calls sorrow a disease of the mind (De Tusc. Quaest. iv). But disease of the mind is incompatible with virtue, + which is a good condition of the mind. Therefore sorrow is opposed to virtue and is incompatible with it. +
[35994] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +tristitia est quaedam animi aegritudo; ut Tullius eam vocat, in III +de Tuscul. quaest. Sed aegritudo animae contrariatur virtuti, quae +est bona animae habitudo. Ergo tristitia contrariatur virtuti, nec +potest simul esse cum ea.
+ On the contrary, Christ was perfect in virtue. But there was sorrow in Him, for He said ( + Mat. 26:38): "My soul is sorrowful even unto death." Therefore sorrow is compatible with virtue. +
[35995] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Christus fuit perfectus virtute. Sed in eo fuit tristitia, +dicit enim, ut habetur Matth. XXVI, tristis est anima mea usque +ad mortem. Ergo tristitia potest esse cum virtute.
+ I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8), the Stoics held that in the mind of the wise man there are three {eupatheiai}, i.e. + "three good passions," in place of the three disturbances: viz. instead of covetousness, "desire"; instead of mirth, "joy"; + instead of fear, "caution." But they denied that anything corresponding to sorrow could be in the mind of a wise man, for + two reasons. +
First, because sorrow is for an evil that is already present. Now they held that no evil can happen to a wise man: for they + thought that, just as man's only good is virtue, and bodily goods are no good to man; so man's only evil is vice, which cannot + be in a virtuous man. But this is unreasonable. For, since man is composed of soul and body, whatever conduces to preserve + the life of the body, is some good to man; yet not his supreme good, because he can abuse it. Consequently + the evil which is contrary to this good can be in a wise man, and can cause him moderate sorrow. Again, although a virtuous + man can be without grave sin, yet no man is to be found to live without committing slight sins, according to + 1 Jn. 1:8: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." A third reason is because a virtuous man, though not actually in + a state of sin, may have been so in the past. And he is to be commended if he sorrow for that sin, according to + + 2 Cor. 7:10: "The sorrow that is according to God worketh penance steadfast unto salvation." Fourthly, because he may praiseworthily + sorrow for another's sin. Therefore sorrow is compatible with moral virtue in the same way as the other passions are when + moderated by reason. +
Their second reason for holding this opinion was that sorrow is about evil present, whereas fear is for evil to come: even + as pleasure is about a present good, while desire is for a future good. Now the enjoyment of a good possessed, or the desire + to have good that one possesses not, may be consistent with virtue: but depression of the mind resulting from sorrow for a + present evil, is altogether contrary to reason: wherefore it is incompatible with virtue. But this is + unreasonable. For there is an evil which can be present to the virtuous man, as we have just stated; which evil is rejected + by reason. Wherefore the sensitive appetite follows reason's rejection by sorrowing for that evil; yet moderately, according + as reason dictates. Now it pertains to virtue that the sensitive appetite be conformed to reason, as stated above (A[1], ad + 2). Wherefore moderated sorrow for an object which ought to make us sorrowful, is a mark of virtue; as also the Philosopher + says (Ethic. ii, 6,7). Moreover, this proves useful for avoiding evil: since, just as good is more readily sought for the + sake of pleasure, so is evil more undauntedly shunned on account of sorrow. +
Accordingly we must allow that sorrow for things pertaining to virtue is incompatible with virtue: since virtue rejoices + in its own. On the other hand, virtue sorrows moderately for all that thwarts virtue, no matter how. +
[35996] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod sicut dicit Augustinus, XIV de Civ. Dei, Stoici +voluerunt, pro tribus perturbationibus, in animo sapientis esse +tres eupathias, idest tres bonas passiones, pro cupiditate scilicet +voluntatem; pro laetitia, gaudium; pro metu, cautionem. Pro +tristitia vero, negaverunt posse aliquid esse in animo sapientis, +duplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia tristitia est de malo quod iam +accidit. Nullum autem malum aestimant posse accidere sapienti, +crediderunt enim quod, sicut solum hominis bonum est virtus, bona +autem corporalia nulla bona hominis sunt; ita solum inhonestum est +hominis malum, quod in virtuoso esse non potest. Sed hoc +irrationabiliter dicitur. Cum enim homo sit ex anima et corpore +compositus, id quod confert ad vitam corporis conservandam, aliquod +bonum hominis est, non tamen maximum, quia eo potest homo male uti. +Unde et malum huic bono contrarium in sapiente esse potest, et +tristitiam moderatam inducere. Praeterea, etsi virtuosus sine gravi +peccato esse possit, nullus tamen invenitur qui absque levibus +peccatis vitam ducat, secundum illud I Ioan. I, si dixerimus +quia peccatum non habemus, nos ipsos seducimus. Tertio, quia +virtuosus, etsi peccatum non habeat, forte quandoque habuit. Et de +hoc laudabiliter dolet; secundum illud II ad Cor. VII, quae +secundum Deum est tristitia, poenitentiam in salutem stabilem +operatur. Quarto, quia potest etiam dolere laudabiliter de +peccato alterius. Unde eo modo quo virtus moralis compatitur alias +passiones ratione moderatas, compatitur etiam tristitiam. Secundo, +movebantur ex hoc, quod tristitia est de praesenti malo, timor +autem de malo futuro, sicut delectatio de bono praesenti, +desiderium vero de bono futuro. Potest autem hoc ad virtutem +pertinere, quod aliquis bono habito fruatur, vel non habitum habere +desideret, vel quod etiam malum futurum caveat. Sed quod malo +praesenti animus hominis substernatur, quod fit per tristitiam, +omnino videtur contrarium rationi, unde cum virtute esse non +potest. Sed hoc irrationabiliter dicitur. Est enim aliquod malum +quod potest esse virtuoso praesens, ut dictum est. Quod quidem +malum ratio detestatur. Unde appetitus sensitivus in hoc sequitur +detestationem rationis, quod de huiusmodi malo tristatur, moderate +tamen, secundum rationis iudicium. Hoc autem pertinet ad virtutem, +ut appetitus sensitivus rationi conformetur, ut dictum est. Unde ad +virtutem pertinet quod tristetur moderate in quibus tristandum est, +sicut etiam philosophus dicit in II Ethic. Et hoc etiam utile est +ad fugiendum mala. Sicut enim bona propter delectationem promptius +quaeruntur, ita mala propter tristitiam fortius fugiuntur. Sic +igitur dicendum est quod tristitia de his quae conveniunt virtuti, +non potest simul esse cum virtute, quia virtus in propriis +delectatur. Sed de his quae quocumque modo repugnant virtuti, +virtus moderate tristatur.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted proves that the wise man is not made sorrowful by wisdom. Yet he sorrows for anything that hinders wisdom. + Consequently there is no room for sorrow in the blessed, in whom there can be no hindrance to wisdom. +
[35997] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ex illa auctoritate habetur quod de sapientia +sapiens non tristetur. Tristatur tamen de his quae sunt impeditiva +sapientiae. Et ideo in beatis, in quibus nullum impedimentum +sapientiae esse potest, tristitia locum non habet.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Sorrow hinders the work that makes us sorrowful: but it helps us to do more readily whatever banishes sorrow. +
[35998] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod tristitia impedit operationem de qua tristamur, sed +adiuvat ad ea promptius exequenda per quae tristitia fugitur.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Immoderate sorrow is a disease of the mind: but moderate sorrow is the mark of a well-conditioned mind, according to the + present state of life. +
[35999] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod tristitia immoderata est animae aegritudo, tristitia +autem moderata ad bonam habitudinem animae pertinet, secundum +statum praesentis vitae.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that all the moral virtues are about the passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "moral virtue + is about objects of pleasure and sorrow." But pleasure and sorrow are passions, as stated above ( + Q[23], A[4]; + Q[31], A[1]; + Q[35], AA[1], 2). Therefore all the moral virtues are about the passions. +
[36000] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis virtus moralis sit circa +passiones. Dicit enim philosophus, in II Ethic., quod circa +voluptates et tristitias est moralis virtus. Sed delectatio et +tristitia sunt passiones, ut supra dictum est. Ergo omnis virtus +moralis est circa passiones.
+ Objection 2: Further, the subject of the moral virtues is a faculty which is rational by participation, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. + i, 13). But the passions are in this part of the soul, as stated above ( + Q[22], A[3]). Therefore every moral virtue is about the passions. +
[36001] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +rationale per participationem est subiectum moralium virtutum, ut +dicitur in I Ethic. Sed huiusmodi pars animae est in qua sunt +passiones, ut supra dictum est. Ergo omnis virtus moralis est circa +passiones.
+ Objection 3: Further, some passion is to be found in every moral virtue: and so either all are about the passions, or none are. But some + are about the passions, as fortitude and temperance, as stated in Ethic. iii, 6,10. Therefore all the moral virtues are about + the passions. +
[36002] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +in omni virtute morali est invenire aliquam passionem. Aut ergo +omnes sunt circa passiones, aut nulla. Sed aliquae sunt circa +passiones, ut fortitudo et temperantia, ut dicitur in III Ethic. +Ergo omnes virtutes morales sunt circa passiones.
+ On the contrary, Justice, which is a moral virtue, is not about the passions; as stated in Ethic. v, 1, seqq. +
[36003] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod iustitia, quae est virtus moralis, non est circa +passiones, ut dicitur in V Ethic.
+ I answer that, Moral virtue perfects the appetitive part of the soul by directing it to good as defined by reason. Now good as defined by + reason is that which is moderated or directed by reason. Consequently there are moral virtues about all matters that are subject + to reason's direction and moderation. Now reason directs, not only the passions of the sensitive appetite, but also the operations + of the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, which is not the subject of a + passion, as stated above ( + Q[22], A[3]). Therefore not all the moral virtues are about passions, but some are about passions, some about operations. +
[36004] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod virtus moralis perficit appetitivam partem animae +ordinando ipsam in bonum rationis. Est autem rationis bonum id quod +est secundum rationem moderatum seu ordinatum. Unde circa omne id +quod contingit ratione ordinari et moderari, contingit esse +virtutem moralem. Ratio autem ordinat non solum passiones appetitus +sensitivi; sed etiam ordinat operationes appetitus intellectivi, +qui est voluntas, quae non est subiectum passionis, ut supra dictum +est. Et ideo non omnis virtus moralis est circa passiones; sed +quaedam circa passiones, quaedam circa operationes.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The moral virtues are not all about pleasures and sorrows, as being their proper matter; but as being something resulting + from their proper acts. For every virtuous man rejoices in acts of virtue, and sorrows for the contrary. Hence the Philosopher, + after the words quoted, adds, "if virtues are about actions and passions; now every action and passion is followed by pleasure + or sorrow, so that in this way virtue is about pleasures and sorrows," viz. as + about something that results from virtue. +
[36005] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod non omnis virtus moralis est circa delectationes +et tristitias sicut circa propriam materiam, sed sicut circa +aliquid consequens proprium actum. Omnis enim virtuosus delectatur +in actu virtutis, et tristatur in contrario. Unde philosophus post +praemissa verba subdit quod, si virtutes sunt circa actus et +passiones; omni autem passioni et omni actui sequitur delectatio et +tristitia; propter hoc virtus erit circa delectationes et +tristitias, scilicet sicut circa aliquid consequens.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Not only the sensitive appetite which is the subject of the passions, is rational by participation, but also the will, where + there are no passions, as stated above. +
[36006] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod rationale per participationem non solum est appetitus +sensitivus, qui est subiectum passionum; sed etiam voluntas, in qua +non sunt passiones, ut dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Some virtues have passions as their proper matter, but some virtues not. Hence the comparison does not hold for all cases. +
[36007] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod in quibusdam virtutibus sunt passiones sicut propria +materia, in quibusdam autem non. Unde non est eadem ratio de +omnibus, ut infra ostendetur.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue can be without passion. For the more perfect moral virtue is, the more does it overcome the + passions. Therefore at its highest point of perfection it is altogether without passion. +
[36008] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus moralis possit esse absque +passione. Quanto enim virtus moralis est perfectior, tanto magis +superat passiones. Ergo in suo perfectissimo esse, est omnino +absque passionibus.
+ Objection 2: Further, then is a thing perfect, when it is removed from its contrary and from whatever inclines to its contrary. Now the + passions incline us to sin which is contrary to virtue: hence ( + Rom. 7:5) they are called "passions of sins." Therefore perfect virtue is altogether without passion. +
[36009] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +tunc unumquodque est perfectum, quando est remotum a suo contrario, +et ab his quae ad contrarium inclinant. Sed passiones inclinant ad +peccatum, quod virtuti contrariatur, unde Rom. VII, nominantur +passiones peccatorum. Ergo perfecta virtus est omnino absque +passione.
+ Objection 3: Further, it is by virtue that we are conformed to God, as Augustine declares (De Moribus Eccl. vi, xi, xiii). But God does + all things without passion at all. Therefore the most perfect virtue is without any passion. +
[36010] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +secundum virtutem Deo conformamur; ut patet per Augustinum, in +libro de moribus Eccles. Sed Deus omnia operatur sine passione. +Ergo virtus perfectissima est absque omni passione.
+ On the contrary, "No man is just who rejoices not in his deeds," as stated in Ethic. i, 8. But joy is a passion. Therefore justice cannot + be without passion; and still less can the other virtues be. +
[36011] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra +est quod nullus iustus est qui non gaudet iusta operatione, ut +dicitur in I Ethic. Sed gaudium est passio. Ergo iustitia non +potest esse sine passione. Et multo minus aliae virtutes.
+ I answer that, If we take the passions as being inordinate emotions, as the Stoics did, it is evident that in this sense perfect virtue + is without the passions. But if by passions we understand any movement of the sensitive appetite, it is plain that moral virtues, + which are about the passions as about their proper matter, cannot be without passions. The reason for this is that otherwise + it would follow that moral virtue makes the sensitive appetite altogether idle: + whereas it is not the function of virtue to deprive the powers subordinate to reason of their proper activities, but to make + them execute the commands of reason, by exercising their proper acts. Wherefore just as virtue directs the bodily limbs to + their due external acts, so does it direct the sensitive appetite to its proper regulated movements. +
Those moral virtues, however, which are not about the passions, but about operations, can be without passions. Such a virtue + is justice: because it applies the will to its proper act, which is not a passion. Nevertheless, joy results from the act + of justice; at least in the will, in which case it is not a passion. And if this joy be increased through the perfection of + justice, it will overflow into the sensitive appetite; in so far as the lower powers follow the movement of the + higher, as stated above ( + Q[17], A[7]; + Q[24], A[3]). Wherefore by reason of this kind of overflow, the more perfect a virtue is, the more does it cause passion. +
[36012] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, si passiones dicamus inordinatas affectiones, sicut +Stoici posuerunt; sic manifestum est quod virtus perfecta est sine +passionibus. Si vero passiones dicamus omnes motus appetitus +sensitivi, sic planum est quod virtutes morales quae sunt circa +passiones sicut circa propriam materiam, sine passionibus esse non +possunt. Cuius ratio est, quia secundum hoc, sequeretur quod virtus +moralis faceret appetitum sensitivum omnino otiosum. Non autem ad +virtutem pertinet quod ea quae sunt subiecta rationi, a propriis +actibus vacent, sed quod exequantur imperium rationis, proprios +actus agendo. Unde sicut virtus membra corporis ordinat ad actus +exteriores debitos, ita appetitum sensitivum ad motus proprios +ordinatos. Virtutes vero morales quae non sunt circa passiones, sed +circa operationes, possunt esse sine passionibus (et huiusmodi +virtus est iustitia), quia per eas applicatur voluntas ad proprium +actum, qui non est passio. Sed tamen ad actum iustitiae sequitur +gaudium, ad minus in voluntate, quod non est passio. Et si hoc +gaudium multiplicetur per iustitiae perfectionem, fiet gaudii +redundantia usque ad appetitum sensitivum; secundum quod vires +inferiores sequuntur motum superiorum, ut supra dictum est. Et sic +per redundantiam huiusmodi, quanto virtus fuerit perfectior, tanto +magis passionem causat.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Virtue overcomes inordinate passion; it produces ordinate passion. +
[36013] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod virtus passiones inordinatas superat, moderatas +autem producit.
+ Reply to Objection 2: It is inordinate, not ordinate, passion that leads to sin. +
[36014] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod passiones inordinatae inducunt ad peccandum, non +autem si sunt moderatae.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The good of anything depends on the condition of its nature. Now there is no sensitive appetite in God and the angels, as + there is in man. Consequently good operation in God and the angels is altogether without passion, as it is without a body: + whereas the good operation of man is with passion, even as it is produced with the body's help. +
[36015] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod bonum in unoquoque consideratur secundum conditionem +suae naturae. In Deo autem et Angelis non est appetitus sensitivus, +sicut est in homine. Et ideo bona operatio Dei et Angeli est omnino +sine passione, sicut et sine corpore, bona autem operatio hominis +est cum passione, sicut et cum corporis ministerio.
We must now consider how the moral virtues differ from one another: under which head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is only one moral virtue?
(3) Whether there is but one moral virtue about operations?
(4) Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions?
(5) Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the passions?
+[36016] +Iª-IIae q. 60 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +distinctione virtutum moralium ad invicem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur +quinque. Primo, utrum sit tantum una virtus moralis. Secundo, utrum +distinguantur virtutes morales quae sunt circa operationes, ab his +quae sunt circa passiones. Tertio, utrum circa operationes sit una +tantum moralis virtus. Quarto, utrum circa diversas passiones sint +diversae morales virtutes. Quinto, utrum virtutes morales +distinguantur secundum diversa obiecta passionum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that there is only one moral virtue. Because just as the direction of moral actions belongs to reason which + is the subject of the intellectual virtues; so does their inclination belong to the appetite which is the subject of moral + virtues. But there is only one intellectual virtue to direct all moral acts, viz. prudence. Therefore there is also but one + moral virtue to give all moral acts their respective inclinations. +
[36017] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod sit una tantum moralis virtus. Sicut +enim in actibus moralibus directio pertinet ad rationem, quae est +subiectum intellectualium virtutum; ita inclinatio pertinet ad vim +appetitivam, quae est subiectum moralium virtutum. Sed una est +intellectualis virtus dirigens in omnibus moralibus actibus, +scilicet prudentia. Ergo etiam una tantum est moralis virtus +inclinans in omnibus moralibus actibus.
+ Objection 2: Further, habits differ, not in respect of their material objects, but according to the formal aspect of their objects. Now + the formal aspect of the good to which moral virtue is directed, is one thing, viz. the mean defined by reason. Therefore, + seemingly, there is but one moral virtue. +
[36018] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +habitus non distinguuntur secundum materialia obiecta, sed secundum +formales rationes obiectorum. Formalis autem ratio boni ad quod +ordinatur virtus moralis, est unum, scilicet modus rationis. Ergo +videtur quod sit una tantum moralis virtus.
+ Objection 3: Further, things pertaining to morals are specified by their end, as stated above ( + Q[1], A[3]). Now there is but one common end of all moral virtues, viz. happiness, while the proper and proximate ends are infinite + in number. But the moral virtues themselves are not infinite in number. Therefore it seems that there is but one. +
[36019] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +moralia recipiunt speciem a fine, ut supra dictum est. Sed finis +omnium virtutum moralium communis est unus, scilicet felicitas; +proprii autem et propinqui sunt infiniti. Non sunt autem infinitae +virtutes morales. Ergo videtur quod sit una tantum.
+ On the contrary, One habit cannot be in several powers, as stated above (Q[56], A[2]). But the subject of the moral virtues is the appetitive + part of the soul, which is divided into several powers, as stated in the + FP, Q[80], A[2]; + FP, Q[81], A[2]. Therefore there cannot be only one moral virtue. +
[36020] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod unus habitus non potest esse in diversis potentiis, ut +supra dictum est. Sed subiectum virtutum moralium est pars +appetitiva animae, quae per diversas potentias distinguitur, ut in +primo dictum est. Ergo non potest esse una tantum virtus +moralis.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + Q[58], AA[1],2,3), the moral virtues are habits of the appetitive faculty. Now habits differ specifically according to the specific differences + of their objects, as stated above ( + Q[54], A[2]). Again, the species of the object of appetite, as of any thing, depends on its specific form which it receives from the + agent. But we must observe that the matter of the passive subject bears a twofold + relation to the agent. For sometimes it receives the form of the agent, in the same kind specifically as the agent has that + form, as happens with all univocal agents, so that if the agent be one specifically, the matter must of necessity receive + a form specifically one: thus the univocal effect of fire is of necessity something in the species of fire. Sometimes, however, + the matter receives the form from the agent, but not in the same kind specifically as the agent, as is the case with + non-univocal causes of generation: thus an animal is generated by the sun. In this case the forms received into matter are + not of one species, but vary according to the adaptability of the matter to receive the influx of the agent: for instance, + we see that owing to the one action of the sun, animals of various species are produced by putrefaction according to the various + adaptability of matter. +
Now it is evident that in moral matters the reason holds the place of commander and mover, while the appetitive power is + commanded and moved. But the appetite does not receive the direction of reason univocally so to say; because it is rational, + not essentially, but by participation (Ethic. i, 13). Consequently objects made appetible by the direction of reason belong + to various species, according to their various relations to reason: so that it follows that moral virtues are of + various species and are not one only. +
[36021] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtutes morales sunt +habitus quidam appetitivae partis. Habitus autem specie differunt +secundum speciales differentias obiectorum, ut supra dictum est. +Species autem obiecti appetibilis, sicut et cuiuslibet rei, +attenditur secundum formam specificam, quae est ab agente. Est +autem considerandum quod materia patientis se habet ad agens +dupliciter. Quandoque enim recipit formam agentis secundum eandem +rationem, prout est in agente, sicut est in omnibus agentibus +univocis. Et sic necesse est quod, si agens est unum specie, quod +materia recipiat formam unius speciei, sicut ab igne non generatur +univoce nisi aliquid existens in specie ignis. Aliquando vero +materia recipit formam ab agente non secundum eandem rationem, +prout est in agente, sicut patet in generantibus non univocis, ut +animal generatur a sole. Et tunc formae receptae in materia ab +eodem agente, non sunt unius speciei sed diversificantur secundum +diversam proportionem materiae ad recipiendum influxum agentis, +sicut videmus quod ab una actione solis generantur per +putrefactionem animalia diversarum specierum secundum diversam +proportionem materiae. Manifestum est autem quod in moralibus ratio +est sicut imperans et movens; vis autem appetitiva est sicut +imperata et mota. Non autem appetitus recipit impressionem rationis +quasi univoce, quia non fit rationale per essentiam, sed per +participationem, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Unde appetibilia secundum +motionem rationis constituuntur in diversis speciebus, secundum +quod diversimode se habent ad rationem. Et ita sequitur quod +virtutes morales sint diversae secundum speciem, et non una +tantum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The object of the reason is truth. Now in all moral matters, which are contingent matters of action, there is but one kind + of truth. Consequently, there is but one virtue to direct all such matters, viz. prudence. On the other hand, the object of + the appetitive power is the appetible good, which varies in kind according to its various relations to reason, the directing + power. +
[36022] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod obiectum rationis est verum. Est autem eadem +ratio veri in omnibus moralibus, quae sunt contingentia agibilia. +Unde est una sola virtus in eis dirigens, scilicet prudentia. +Obiectum autem appetitivae virtutis est bonum appetibile. Cuius est +diversa ratio, secundum diversam habitudinem ad rationem +dirigentem.
+ Reply to Objection 2: This formal element is one generically, on account of the unity of the agent: but it varies in species, on account of the + various relations of the receiving matter, as explained above. +
[36023] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod illud formale est unum genere, propter unitatem +agentis. Sed diversificatur specie, propter diversas habitudines +recipientium, ut supra dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Moral matters do not receive their species from the last end, but from their proximate ends: and these, although they be + infinite in number, are not infinite in species. +
[36024] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod moralia non habent speciem a fine ultimo sed a +finibus proximis, qui quidem, etsi infiniti sint numero, non tamen +infiniti sunt specie.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtues are not divided into those which are about operations and those which are about passions. + For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that moral virtue is "an operative habit whereby we do what is best in matters of + pleasure or sorrow." Now pleasure and sorrow are passions, as stated above ( + Q[31], A[1]; + Q[35], A[1]). Therefore the same virtue which is about passions is also about + operations, since it is an operative habit. +
[36025] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales non distinguantur ab +invicem per hoc quod quaedam sunt circa operationes, quaedam circa +passiones. Dicit enim philosophus, in II Ethic., quod virtus +moralis est circa delectationes et tristitias optimorum operativa. +Sed voluptates et tristitiae sunt passiones quaedam, ut supra +dictum est. Ergo eadem virtus quae est circa passiones, est etiam +circa operationes, utpote operativa existens.
+ Objection 2: Further, the passions are principles of external action. If therefore some virtues regulate the passions, they must, as a + consequence, regulate operations also. Therefore the same moral virtues are about both passions and operations. +
[36026] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +passiones sunt principia exteriorum operationum. Si ergo aliquae +virtutes rectificant passiones, oportet quod etiam per consequens +rectificent operationes. Eaedem ergo virtutes morales sunt circa +passiones et operationes.
+ Objection 3: Further, the sensitive appetite is moved well or ill towards every external operation. Now movements of the sensitive appetite + are passions. Therefore the same virtues that are about operations are also about passions. +
[36027] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +ad omnem operationem exteriorem movetur appetitus sensitivus bene +vel male. Sed motus appetitus sensitivi sunt passiones. Ergo eaedem +virtutes quae sunt circa operationes, sunt circa passiones.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons justice to be about operations; and temperance, fortitude and gentleness, about passions (Ethic. + ii, 3,7; v, 1, seqq.). +
[36028] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus ponit iustitiam circa operationes; +temperantiam autem et fortitudinem et mansuetudinem, circa +passiones quasdam.
+ I answer that, Operation and passion stand in a twofold relation to virtue. First, as its effects; and in this way every moral virtue has + some good operations as its product; and a certain pleasure or sorrow which are passions, as stated above ( + Q[59], A[4], ad 1). +
Secondly, operation may be compared to moral virtue as the matter about which virtue is concerned: and in this sense those + moral virtues which are about operations must needs differ from those which are about passions. The reason for this is that + good and evil, in certain operations, are taken from the very nature of those operations, no matter how man may be affected + towards them: viz. in so far as good and evil in them depend on their being commensurate with someone else. In + operations of this kind there needs to be some power to regulate the operations in themselves: such are buying and selling, + and all such operations in which there is an element of something due or undue to another. For this reason justice and its + parts are properly about operations as their proper matter. On the other hand, in some operations, good and evil depend only + on commensuration with the agent. Consequently good and evil in these operations depend on the way in which man is affected + to + them. And for this reason in such like operations virtue must needs be chiefly about internal emotions which are called the + passions of the soul, as is evidently the case with temperance, fortitude and the like. +
It happens, however, in operations which are directed to another, that the good of virtue is overlooked by reason of some + inordinate passion of the soul. In such cases justice is destroyed in so far as the due measure of the external act is destroyed: + while some other virtue is destroyed in so far as the internal passions exceed their due measure. Thus when through anger, + one man strikes another, justice is destroyed in the undue blow; while gentleness is destroyed by the + immoderate anger. The same may be clearly applied to other virtues. +
[36029] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod operatio et passio dupliciter potest comparari ad +virtutem. Uno modo, sicut effectus. Et hoc modo, omnis moralis +virtus habet aliquas operationes bonas, quarum est productiva; et +delectationem aliquam vel tristitiam, quae sunt passiones, ut supra +dictum est. Alio modo potest comparari operatio ad virtutem +moralem, sicut materia circa quam est. Et secundum hoc, oportet +alias esse virtutes morales circa operationes, et alias circa +passiones. Cuius ratio est, quia bonum et malum in quibusdam +operationibus attenditur secundum seipsas, qualitercumque homo +afficiatur ad eas, inquantum scilicet bonum in eis et malum +accipitur secundum rationem commensurationis ad alterum. Et in +talibus oportet quod sit aliqua virtus directiva operationum +secundum seipsas, sicut sunt emptio et venditio, et omnes huiusmodi +operationes in quibus attenditur ratio debiti vel indebiti ad +alterum. Et propter hoc, iustitia et partes eius proprie sunt circa +operationes sicut circa propriam materiam. In quibusdam vero +operationibus bonum et malum attenditur solum secundum +commensurationem ad operantem. Et ideo oportet in his bonum et +malum considerari, secundum quod homo bene vel male afficitur circa +huiusmodi. Et propter hoc, oportet quod virtutes in talibus sint +principaliter circa interiores affectiones, quae dicuntur animae +passiones, sicut patet de temperantia, fortitudine et aliis +huiusmodi. Contingit autem quod in operationibus quae sunt ad +alterum, praetermittatur bonum virtutis propter inordinatam animi +passionem. Et tunc, inquantum corrumpitur commensuratio exterioris +operationis, est corruptio iustitiae, inquantum autem corrumpitur +commensuratio interiorum passionum, est corruptio alicuius alterius +virtutis. Sicut cum propter iram aliquis alium percutit, in ipsa +percussione indebita corrumpitur iustitia, in immoderantia vero +irae corrumpitur mansuetudo. Et idem patet in aliis.
Reply to Objections: This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first considers operations as the effect of virtue, while the other + two consider operation and passion as concurring in the same effect. But in some cases virtue is chiefly about operations, + in others, about passions, for the reason given above. +
[36030] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 2 ad 1 Et per hoc +patet responsio ad obiecta. Nam prima ratio procedit de operatione, +secundum quod est effectus virtutis. Aliae vero duae rationes +procedunt ex hoc, quod ad idem concurrunt operatio et passio. Sed +in quibusdam virtus est principaliter circa operationem, in +quibusdam circa passionem, ratione praedicta.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that there is but one moral virtue about operations. Because the rectitude of all external operations seems + to belong to justice. Now justice is but one virtue. Therefore there is but one virtue about operations. +
[36031] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod sit una tantum virtus moralis circa +operationes. Rectitudo enim omnium operationum exteriorum videtur +ad iustitiam pertinere. Sed iustitia est una virtus. Ergo una sola +virtus est circa operationes.
+ Objection 2: Further, those operations seem to differ most, which are directed on the one side to the good of the individual, and on the + other to the good of the many. But this diversity does not cause diversity among the moral virtues: for the Philosopher says + (Ethic. v, 1) that legal justice, which directs human acts to the common good, does not differ, save logically, from the virtue + which directs a man's actions to one man only. Therefore diversity of operations does + not cause a diversity of moral virtues. +
[36032] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +operationes maxime differentes esse videntur quae ordinantur ad +bonum unius, et quae ordinantur ad bonum multitudinis. Sed ista +diversitas non diversificat virtutes morales, dicit enim +philosophus, in V Ethic., quod iustitia legalis, quae ordinat actus +hominum ad commune bonum, non est aliud a virtute quae ordinat +actus hominis ad unum tantum, nisi secundum rationem. Ergo +diversitas operationum non causat diversitatem virtutum +moralium.
+ Objection 3: Further, if there are various moral virtues about various operations, diversity of moral virtues would needs follow diversity + of operations. But this is clearly untrue: for it is the function of justice to establish rectitude in various kinds of commutations, + and again in distributions, as is set down in Ethic. v, 2. Therefore there are not different virtues about different operations. +
[36033] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +si sunt diversae virtutes morales circa diversas operationes, +oporteret quod secundum diversitatem operationum, esset diversitas +virtutum moralium. Sed hoc patet esse falsum, nam ad iustitiam +pertinet in diversis generibus commutationum rectitudinem statuere, +et etiam in distributionibus, ut patet in V Ethic. Non ergo +diversae virtutes sunt diversarum operationum.
+ On the contrary, Religion is a moral virtue distinct from piety, both of which are about operations. +
[36034] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod religio est alia virtus a pietate, quarum tamen utraque +est circa operationes quasdam.
+ I answer that, All the moral virtues that are about operations agree in one general notion of justice, which is in respect of something + due to another: but they differ in respect of various special notions. The reason for this is that in external operations, + the order of reason is established, as we have stated + (A[2]), not according as how man is affected towards such operations, but according to the becomingness of the thing itself; from + which + becomingness we derive the notion of something due which is the formal aspect of justice: for, seemingly, it pertains to justice + that a man give another his due. Wherefore all such virtues as are about operations, bear, in some way, the character of justice. + But the thing due is not of the same kind in all these virtues: for something is due to an equal in one way, to a superior, + in another way, to an inferior, in yet another; and the nature of a debt differs according as it arises from a + contract, a promise, or a favor already conferred. And corresponding to these various kinds of debt there are various virtues: + e.g. "Religion" whereby we pay our debt to God; "Piety," whereby we pay our debt to our parents or to our country; "Gratitude," + whereby we pay our debt to our benefactors, and so forth. +
[36035] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod omnes virtutes morales quae sunt circa operationes, +conveniunt in quadam generali ratione iustitiae, quae attenditur +secundum debitum ad alterum, distinguuntur autem secundum diversas +speciales rationes. Cuius ratio est quia in operationibus +exterioribus ordo rationis instituitur sicut dictum est, non +secundum proportionem ad affectionem hominis, sed secundum ipsam +convenientiam rei in seipsa; secundum quam convenientiam accipitur +ratio debiti, ex quo constituitur ratio iustitiae, ad iustitiam +enim pertinere videtur ut quis debitum reddat. Unde omnes huiusmodi +virtutes quae sunt circa operationes, habent aliquo modo rationem +iustitiae. Sed debitum non est unius rationis in omnibus, aliter +enim debetur aliquid aequali, aliter superiori, aliter minori; et +aliter ex pacto, vel ex promisso, vel ex beneficio suscepto. Et +secundum has diversas rationes debiti, sumuntur diversae virtutes, +puta religio est per quam redditur debitum Deo; pietas est per quam +redditur debitum parentibus vel patriae; gratia est per quam +redditur debitum benefactoribus; et sic de aliis.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Justice properly so called is one special virtue, whose object is the perfect due, which can be paid in the equivalent. But + the name of justice is extended also to all cases in which something due is rendered: in this sense it is not as a special + virtue. +
[36036] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod iustitia proprie dicta est una specialis virtus, +quae attendit perfectam rationem debiti, quod secundum +aequivalentiam potest restitui. Dicitur tamen et ampliato nomine +iustitia, secundum quamcumque debiti redditionem. Et sic non est +una specialis virtus.
+ Reply to Objection 2: That justice which seeks the common good is another virtue from that which is directed to the private good of an individual: + wherefore common right differs from private right; and Tully (De Inv. ii) reckons as a special virtue, piety which directs + man to the good of his country. But that justice which directs man to the common good is a general virtue through its act + of command: since it directs all the acts of the virtues to its own end, viz. the + common good. And the virtues, in so far as they are commanded by that justice, receive the name of justice: so that virtue + does not differ, save logically, from legal justice; just as there is only a logical difference between a virtue that is active + of itself, and a virtue that is active through the command of another virtue. +
[36037] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod iustitia quae intendit bonum commune, est alia virtus +a iustitia quae ordinatur ad bonum privatum alicuius, unde et ius +commune distinguitur a iure privato; et Tullius ponit unam +specialem virtutem, pietatem, quae ordinat ad bonum patriae. Sed +iustitia ordinans hominem ad bonum commune, est generalis per +imperium, quia omnes actus virtutum ordinat ad finem suum, scilicet +ad bonum commune. Virtus autem secundum quod a tali iustitia +imperatur, etiam iustitiae nomen accipit. Et sic virtus a iustitia +legali non differt nisi ratione, sicut sola ratione differt virtus +operans secundum seipsam, et virtus operans ad imperium +alterius.
+ Reply to Objection 3: There is the same kind of due in all the operations belonging to special justice. Consequently, there is the same virtue + of justice, especially in regard to commutations. For it may be that distributive justice is of another species from commutative + justice; but about this we shall inquire later on ( + SS, Q[61], A[1]). +
[36038] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod in omnibus operationibus ad iustitiam specialem +pertinentibus, est eadem ratio debiti. Et ideo est eadem virtus +iustitiae, praecipue quantum ad commutationes. Forte enim +distributiva est alterius speciei a commutativa, sed de hoc infra +quaeretur.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that there are not different moral virtues about different passions. For there is but one habit about things + that concur in their source and end: as is evident especially in the case of sciences. But the passions all concur in one + source, viz. love; and they all terminate in the same end, viz. joy or sorrow, as we stated above ( + Q[25], AA[1],2,4; + Q[27], A[4]). Therefore there is but one moral + virtue about all the passions. +
[36039] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod circa diversas passiones non sint +diversae virtutes morales. Eorum enim quae conveniunt in principio +et fine, unus est habitus, sicut patet maxime in scientiis. Sed +omnium passionum unum est principium, scilicet amor; et omnes ad +eundem finem terminantur, scilicet ad delectationem vel tristitiam; +ut supra habitum est. Ergo circa omnes passiones est una tantum +moralis virtus.
+ Objection 2: Further, if there were different moral virtues about different passions, it would follow that there are as many moral virtues + as passions. But this clearly is not the case: since there is one moral virtue about contrary passions; namely, fortitude, + about fear and daring; temperance, about pleasure and sorrow. Therefore there is no need for different moral virtues about + different passions. +
[36040] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +si circa diversas passiones essent diversae virtutes morales, +sequeretur quod tot essent virtutes morales quot passiones. Sed hoc +patet esse falsum, quia circa oppositas passiones est una et eadem +virtus moralis, sicut fortitudo circa timores et audacias, +temperantia circa delectationes et tristitias. Non ergo oportet +quod circa diversas passiones sint diversae virtutes morales.
+ Objection 3: Further, love, desire, and pleasure are passions of different species, as stated above ( + Q[23], A[4]). Now there is but one virtue about all these three, viz. temperance. Therefore there are not different moral virtues about + different passions. +
[36041] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +amor, concupiscentia et delectatio sunt passiones specie +differentes, ut supra habitum est. Sed circa omnes has est una +virtus, scilicet temperantia. Ergo virtutes morales non sunt +diversae circa diversas passiones.
+ On the contrary, Fortitude is about fear and daring; temperance about desire; meekness about anger; as stated in Ethic. iii, 6,10; iv, 5. +
[36042] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod fortitudo est circa timores et audacias; temperantia circa +concupiscentias; mansuetudo circa iras; ut dicitur in III et IV +Ethic.
+ I answer that, It cannot be said that there is only one moral virtue about all the passions: since some passions are not in the same power + as other passions; for some belong to the irascible, others to the concupiscible faculty, as stated above ( + Q[23], A[1]). +
On the other hand, neither does every diversity of passions necessarily suffice for a diversity of moral virtues. First, + because some passions are in contrary opposition to one another, such as joy and sorrow, fear and daring, and so on. About + such passions as are thus in opposition to one another there must needs be one same virtue. Because, since moral virtue consists + in a kind of mean, the mean in contrary passions stands in the same ratio to both, even as in the natural + order there is but one mean between contraries, e.g. between black and white. Secondly, because there are different passions + contradicting reason in the same manner, e.g. by impelling to that which is contrary to reason, or by withdrawing from that + which is in accord with reason. Wherefore the different passions of the concupiscible faculty do not require different moral + virtues, because their movements follow one another in a certain order, as being directed to the one same thing, viz. the + attainment of some good or the avoidance of some evil: thus from love proceeds desire, and from desire we arrive at pleasure; + and it is the same with the opposite passions, for hatred leads to avoidance or dislike, and this leads to sorrow. On the + other hand, the irascible passions are not all of one order, but are directed to different things: for daring and fear are + about some great danger; hope and despair are about some difficult good; while anger seeks to overcome something contrary + which + has wrought harm. Consequently there are different virtues about such like passions: e.g. temperance, about the concupiscible + passions; fortitude, about fear and daring; magnanimity, about hope and despair; meekness, about anger. +
[36043] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod non potest dici quod circa omnes passiones sit una +sola virtus moralis, sunt enim quaedam passiones ad diversas +potentias pertinentes; aliae namque pertinent ad irascibilem, aliae +ad concupiscibilem, ut supra dictum est. Nec tamen oportet quod +omnis diversitas passionum sufficiat ad virtutes morales +diversificandas. Primo quidem, quia quaedam passiones sunt quae +sibi opponuntur secundum contrarietatem, sicut gaudium et +tristitia, timor et audacia, et alia huiusmodi. Et circa huiusmodi +passiones sic oppositas, oportet esse unam et eandem virtutem. Cum +enim virtus moralis in quadam medietate consistat, medium in +contrariis passionibus secundum eandem rationem instituitur, sicut +et in naturalibus idem est medium inter contraria, ut inter album +et nigrum. Secundo, quia diversae passiones inveniuntur secundum +eundem modum rationi repugnantes, puta secundum impulsum ad id quod +est contra rationem; vel secundum retractionem ab eo quod est +secundum rationem. Et ideo diversae passiones concupiscibilis non +pertinent ad diversas virtutes morales, quia earum motus secundum +quendam ordinem se invicem consequuntur, utpote ad idem ordinati, +scilicet ad consequendum bonum, vel ad fugiendum malum; sicut ex +amore procedit concupiscentia, et ex concupiscentia pervenitur ad +delectationem. Et eadem ratio est de oppositis, quia ex odio +sequitur fuga vel abominatio, quae perducit ad tristitiam. Sed +passiones irascibilis non sunt unius ordinis, sed ad diversa +ordinantur, nam audacia et timor ordinantur ad aliquod magnum +periculum; spes et desperatio ad aliquod bonum arduum; ira autem ad +superandum aliquod contrarium quod nocumentum intulit. Et ideo +circa has passiones diversae virtutes ordinantur, utpote +temperantia circa passiones concupiscibilis; fortitudo circa +timores et audacias; magnanimitas circa spem et desperationem; +mansuetudo circa iras.
+ Reply to Objection 1: All the passions concur in one common principle and end; but not in one proper principle or end: and so this does not suffice + for the unity of moral virtue. +
[36044] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod omnes passiones conveniunt in uno principio et +fine communi, non autem in uno proprio principio seu fine. Unde hoc +non sufficit ad unitatem virtutis moralis.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Just as in the natural order the same principle causes movement from one extreme and movement towards the other; and as in + the intellectual order contraries have one common ratio; so too between contrary passions there is but one moral virtue, which, + like a second nature, consents to reason's dictates. +
[36045] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut in naturalibus idem est principium quo +receditur ab uno principio, et acceditur ad aliud; et in +rationalibus est eadem ratio contrariorum, ita etiam virtus +moralis, quae in modum naturae rationi consentit, est eadem +contrariarum passionum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Those three passions are directed to the same object in a certain order, as stated above: and so they belong to the same + virtue. +
[36046] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod illae tres passiones ad idem obiectum ordinantur +secundum quendam ordinem, ut dictum est. Et ideo ad eandem virtutem +moralem pertinent.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues do not differ according to the objects of the passions. For just as there are objects + of passions, so are there objects of operations. Now those moral virtues that are about operations, do not differ according + to the objects of those operations: for the buying and selling either of a house or of a horse belong to the one same virtue + of justice. Therefore neither do those moral virtues that are about passions differ + according to the objects of those passions. +
[36047] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales non distinguantur +secundum obiecta passionum. Sicut enim sunt obiecta passionum, ita +sunt obiecta operationum. Sed virtutes morales quae sunt circa +operationes, non distinguuntur secundum obiecta operationum, ad +eandem enim virtutem iustitiae pertinet emere vel vendere domum, et +equum. Ergo etiam nec virtutes morales quae sunt circa passiones, +diversificantur per obiecta passionum.
+ Objection 2: Further, the passions are acts or movements of the sensitive appetite. Now it needs a greater difference to differentiate + habits than acts. Hence diverse objects which do not diversify the species of passions, do not diversify the species of moral + virtue: so that there is but one moral virtue about all objects of pleasure, and the same applies to the other passions. +
[36048] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +passiones sunt quidam actus vel motus appetitus sensitivi. Sed +maior diversitas requiritur ad diversitatem habituum, quam ad +diversitatem actuum. Diversa igitur obiecta quae non diversificant +speciem passionis, non diversificabunt speciem virtutis moralis. +Ita scilicet quod de omnibus delectabilibus erit una virtus +moralis, et similiter est de aliis.
+ Objection 3: Further, more or less do not change a species. Now various objects of pleasure differ only by reason of being more or less + pleasurable. Therefore all objects of pleasure belong to one species of virtue: and for the same reason so do all fearful + objects, and the same applies to others. Therefore moral virtue is not diversified according to the objects of the passions. +
[36049] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +magis et minus non diversificant speciem. Sed diversa delectabilia +non differunt nisi secundum magis et minus. Ergo omnia delectabilia +pertinent ad unam speciem virtutis. Et eadem ratione, omnia +terribilia, et similiter de aliis. Non ergo virtus moralis +distinguitur secundum obiecta passionum.
+ Objection 4: Further, virtue hinders evil, even as it produces good. But there are various virtues about the desires for good things: + thus temperance is about desires for the pleasure of touch, and "eutrapelia" [*{eutrapelia}] about pleasures in games. Therefore + there should be different virtues about fears of evils. +
[36050] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 arg. 4 Praeterea, +sicut virtus est operativa boni, ita est impeditiva mali. Sed circa +concupiscentias bonorum sunt diversae virtutes, sicut temperantia +circa concupiscentias delectationum tactus, et eutrapelia circa +delectationes ludi. Ergo etiam circa timores malorum debent esse +diversae virtutes.
+ On the contrary, Chastity is about sexual pleasures, abstinence about pleasures of the table, and "eutrapelia" about pleasures in games. +
[36051] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra +est quod castitas est circa delectabilia venereorum; abstinentia +vero est circa delectabilia ciborum; et eutrapelia circa +delectabilia ludorum.
+ I answer that, The perfection of a virtue depends on the reason; whereas the perfection of a passion depends on the sensitive appetite. + Consequently virtues must needs be differentiated according to their relation to reason, but the passions according to their + relation to the appetite. Hence the objects of the passions, according as they are variously related to the sensitive appetite, + cause the different species of passions: while, according as they are related to reason, + they cause the different species of virtues. Now the movement of reason is not the same as that of the sensitive appetite. + Wherefore nothing hinders a difference of objects from causing diversity of passions, without causing diversity of virtues, + as when one virtue is about several passions, as stated above + (A[4]); and again, a difference of objects from causing different virtues, without causing a difference of passions, since several + virtues are directed about one + passion, e.g. pleasure. +
And because diverse passions belonging to diverse powers, always belong to diverse virtues, as stated above + (A[4]); therefore a difference of objects that corresponds to a difference of powers always causes a specific difference of virtues---for + instance the difference between that which is good absolutely speaking, and that which is good and difficult to obtain. Moreover + since the reason rules man's lower powers in a certain order, and even extends to + outward things; hence, one single object of the passions, according as it is apprehended by sense, imagination, or reason, + and again, according as it belongs to the soul, body, or external things, has various relations to reason, and consequently + is of a nature to cause a difference of virtues. Consequently man's good which is the object of love, desire and pleasure, + may be taken as referred either to a bodily sense, or to the inner apprehension of the mind: and this same good may be directed + to man's good in himself, either in his body or in his soul, or to man's good in relation to other men. And every such difference, + being differently related to reason, differentiates virtues. +
Accordingly, if we take a good, and it be something discerned by the sense of touch, and something pertaining to the upkeep + of human life either in the individual or in the species, such as the pleasures of the table or of sexual intercourse, it + will belong to the virtue of "temperance." As regards the pleasures of the other senses, they are not intense, and so do not + present much difficulty to the reason: hence there is no virtue corresponding to them; for virtue, "like art, is + about difficult things" (Ethic. ii, 3). +
On the other hand, good discerned not by the senses, but by an inner power, and belonging to man in himself, is like money + and honor; the former, by its very nature, being employable for the good of the body, while the latter is based on the apprehension + of the mind. These goods again may be considered either absolutely, in which way they concern the concupiscible faculty, or + as being difficult to obtain, in which way they belong to the irascible part: which distinction, + however, has no place in pleasurable objects of touch; since such are of base condition, and are becoming to man in so far + as he has something in common with irrational animals. Accordingly in reference to money considered as a good absolutely, + as an object of desire, pleasure, or love, there is "liberality": but if we consider this good as difficult to get, and as + being the object of our hope, there is "magnificence" [*{megaloprepeia}]. With regard to that good which we call honor, taken + absolutely, as the object of love, we have a virtue called "philotimia" [*{philotimia}], i.e. "love of honor": while if we + consider it as hard to attain, and as an object of hope, then we have "magnanimity." Wherefore liberality and "philotimia" + seem to be in the concupiscible part, while magnificence and magnanimity are in the irascible. +
As regards man's good in relation to other men, it does not seem hard to obtain, but is considered absolutely, as the object + of the concupiscible passions. This good may be pleasurable to a man in his behavior towards another either in some serious + matter, in actions, to wit, that are directed by reason to a due end, or in playful actions, viz. that are done for mere pleasure, + and which do not stand in the same relation to reason as the former. Now one man behaves towards + another in serious matters, in two ways. First, as being pleasant in his regard, by becoming speech and deeds: and this belongs + to a virtue which Aristotle (Ethic. ii, 7) calls "friendship" [*{philia}], and may be rendered "affability." Secondly, one + man behaves towards another by being frank with him, in words and deeds: this belongs to another virtue which (Ethic. iv, + 7) he calls "truthfulness" [*{aletheia}]. For frankness is more akin to the reason than pleasure, and serious matters than + play. Hence there is another virtue about the pleasures of games, which the Philosopher "eutrapelia" [*{eutrapelia}] (Ethic. + iv, 8). +
It is therefore evident that, according to Aristotle, there are ten moral virtues about the passions, viz. fortitude, temperance, + liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, "philotimia," gentleness, friendship, truthfulness, and "eutrapelia," all of which + differ in respect of their diverse matter, passions, or objects: so that if we add "justice," which is about operations, there + will be eleven in all. +
[36052] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod perfectio virtutis ex ratione dependet, perfectio +autem passionis, ex ipso appetitu sensitivo. Unde oportet quod +virtutes diversificentur secundum ordinem ad rationem, passiones +autem, secundum ordinem ad appetitum. Obiecta igitur passionum, +secundum quod diversimode comparantur ad appetitum sensitivum, +causant diversas passionum species, secundum vero quod comparantur +ad rationem, causant diversas species virtutum. Non est autem idem +motus rationis, et appetitus sensitivi. Unde nihil prohibet aliquam +differentiam obiectorum causare diversitatem passionum, quae non +causat diversitatem virtutum, sicut quando una virtus est circa +multas passiones, ut dictum est, et aliquam etiam differentiam +obiectorum causare diversitatem virtutum, quae non causat +diversitatem passionum, cum circa unam passionem, puta +delectationem, diversae virtutes ordinentur. Et quia diversae +passiones ad diversas potentias pertinentes, semper pertinent ad +diversas virtutes, ut dictum est; ideo diversitas obiectorum quae +respicit diversitatem potentiarum, semper diversificat species +virtutum; puta quod aliquid sit bonum absolute, et aliquid bonum +cum aliqua arduitate. Et quia ordine quodam ratio inferiores +hominis partes regit, et etiam se ad exteriora extendit; ideo etiam +secundum quod unum obiectum passionis apprehenditur sensu vel +imaginatione, aut etiam ratione; et secundum etiam quod pertinet ad +animam, corpus, vel exteriores res; diversam habitudinem habet ad +rationem; et per consequens natum est diversificare virtutes. Bonum +igitur hominis, quod est obiectum amoris, concupiscentiae et +delectationis, potest accipi vel ad sensum corporis pertinens; vel +ad interiorem animae apprehensionem. Et hoc, sive ordinetur ad +bonum hominis in seipso, vel quantum ad corpus vel quantum ad +animam; sive ordinetur ad bonum hominis in ordine ad alios. Et +omnis talis diversitas, propter diversum ordinem ad rationem, +diversificat virtutem. Sic igitur si consideretur aliquod bonum, si +quidem sit per sensum tactus apprehensum, et ad consistentiam +humanae vitae pertinens in individuo vel in specie, sicut sunt +delectabilia ciborum et venereorum; erit pertinens ad virtutem +temperantiae. Delectationes autem aliorum sensuum, cum non sint +vehementes, non praestant aliquam difficultatem rationi, et ideo +circa eas non ponitur aliqua virtus, quae est circa difficile, +sicut et ars, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Bonum autem non sensu, sed +interiori virtute apprehensum, ad ipsum hominem pertinens secundum +seipsum, est sicut pecunia et honor; quorum pecunia ordinabilis est +de se ad bonum corporis; honor autem consistit in apprehensione +animae. Et haec quidem bona considerari possunt vel absolute, +secundum quod pertinent ad concupiscibilem; vel cum arduitate +quadam, secundum quod pertinent ad irascibilem. Quae quidem +distinctio non habet locum in bonis quae delectant tactum, quia +huiusmodi sunt quaedam infima, et competunt homini secundum quod +convenit cum brutis. Circa bonum igitur pecuniae absolute sumptum, +secundum quod est obiectum concupiscentiae vel delectationis aut +amoris, est liberalitas. Circa bonum autem huiusmodi cum arduitate +sumptum, secundum quod est obiectum spei, est magnificentia. Circa +bonum vero quod est honor, si quidem sit absolute sumptum, secundum +quod est obiectum amoris, sic est quaedam virtus quae vocatur +philotimia, idest amor honoris. Si vero cum arduitate consideretur, +secundum quod est obiectum spei, sic est magnanimitas. Unde +liberalitas et philotimia videntur esse in concupiscibili, +magnificentia vero et magnanimitas in irascibili. Bonum vero +hominis in ordine ad alium, non videtur arduitatem habere, sed +accipitur ut absolute sumptum, prout est obiectum passionum +concupiscibilis. Quod quidem bonum potest esse alicui delectabile +secundum quod praebet se alteri vel in his quae serio fiunt, idest +in actionibus per rationem ordinatis ad debitum finem; vel in his +quae fiunt ludo, idest in actionibus ordinatis ad delectationem +tantum, quae non eodem modo se habent ad rationem sicut prima. In +seriis autem se exhibet aliquis alteri dupliciter. Uno modo, ut +delectabilem decentibus verbis et factis, et hoc pertinet ad +quandam virtutem quam Aristoteles nominat amicitiam; et potest dici +affabilitas. Alio modo praebet se aliquis alteri ut manifestum, per +dicta et facta, et hoc pertinet ad aliam virtutem, quam nominat +veritatem. Manifestatio enim propinquius accedit ad rationem quam +delectatio; et seria quam iocosa. Unde et circa delectationes +ludorum est alia virtus, quam philosophus eutrapeliam nominat. Sic +igitur patet quod, secundum Aristotelem, sunt decem virtutes +morales circa passiones, scilicet fortitudo, temperantia, +liberalitas, magnificentia, magnanimitas, philotimia, mansuetudo, +amicitia, veritas et eutrapelia. Et distinguuntur secundum diversas +materias vel secundum diversas passiones; vel secundum diversa +obiecta. Si igitur addatur iustitia, quae est circa operationes, +erunt omnes undecim.
+ Reply to Objection 1: All objects of the same specific operation have the same relation to reason: not so all the objects of the same specific + passion; because operations do not thwart reason as the passions do. +
[36053] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod omnia obiecta eiusdem operationis secundum +speciem, eandem habitudinem habent ad rationem; non autem omnia +obiecta eiusdem passionis secundum speciem, quia operationes non +repugnant rationi, sicut passiones.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Passions are not differentiated by the same rule as virtues are, as stated above. +
[36054] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod alia ratione diversificantur passiones, et alia +virtutes, sicut dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: More and less do not cause a difference of species, unless they bear different relations to reason. +
[36055] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod magis et minus non diversificant speciem, nisi +propter diversam habitudinem ad rationem.
+ Reply to Objection 4: Good is a more potent mover than evil: because evil does not cause movement save in virtue of good, as Dionysius states (Div. + Nom. iv). Hence an evil does not prove an obstacle to reason, so as to require virtues unless that evil be great; there being, + seemingly, one such evil corresponding to each kind of passion. Hence there is but one virtue, meekness, for every form of + anger; and, again, but one virtue, fortitude, for all forms of daring. On the + other hand, good involves difficulty, which requires virtue, even if it be not a great good in that particular kind of passion. + Consequently there are various moral virtues about desires, as stated above. +
[36056] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod bonum fortius est ad movendum quam malum quia malum +non agit nisi virtute boni, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. +Nom. Unde malum non facit difficultatem rationi quae requirat +virtutem, nisi sit excellens, quod videtur esse unum in uno genere +passionis. Unde circa iras non ponitur nisi una virtus, scilicet +mansuetudo, et similiter circa audacias una sola, scilicet +fortitudo. Sed bonum ingerit difficultatem, quae requirit virtutem, +etiam si non sit excellens in genere talis passionis. Et ideo circa +concupiscentias ponuntur diversae virtutes morales, ut dictum +est.
We must now consider the cardinal virtues: under which head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal virtues?
(4) Whether they differ from one another?
(5) Whether they are fittingly divided into social, perfecting, perfect, and exemplar virtues?
+[36057] +Iª-IIae q. 61 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +virtutibus cardinalibus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. Primo, +utrum virtutes morales debeant dici cardinales, vel principales. +Secundo, de numero earum. Tertio, quae sint. Quarto, utrum +differant ab invicem. Quinto, utrum dividantur convenienter in +virtutes politicas, et purgatorias, et purgati animi, et +exemplares.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtues should not be called cardinal or principal virtues. For "the opposite members of a division + are by nature simultaneous" (Categor. x), so that one is not principal rather than another. Now all the virtues are opposite + members of the division of the genus "virtue." Therefore none of them should be called principal. +
[36058] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales non debeant dici +cardinales, seu principales. Quae enim ex opposito dividuntur, sunt +simul natura, ut dicitur in praedicamentis, et sic unum non est +altero principalius. Sed omnes virtutes ex opposito dividunt genus +virtutis. Ergo nullae earum debent dici principales.
+ Objection 2: Further, the end is principal as compared to the means. But the theological virtues are about the end; while the moral virtues + are about the means. Therefore the theological virtues, rather than the moral virtues, should be called principal or cardinal. +
[36059] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +finis principalior est his quae sunt ad finem. Sed virtutes +theologicae sunt circa finem, virtutes autem morales circa ea quae +sunt ad finem. Ergo virtutes morales non debent dici principales, +seu cardinales; sed magis theologicae.
+ Objection 3: Further, that which is essentially so is principal in comparison with that which is so by participation. But the intellectual + virtues belong to that which is essentially rational: whereas the moral virtues belong to that which is rational by participation, + as stated above ( + Q[58] , A[3]). Therefore the intellectual virtues are principal, rather than the moral virtues. +
[36060] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +principalius est quod est per essentiam, quam quod est per +participationem. Sed virtutes intellectuales pertinent ad rationale +per essentiam, virtutes autem morales ad rationale per +participationem, ut supra dictum est. Ergo virtutes morales non +sunt principales, sed magis virtutes intellectuales.
+ On the contrary, Ambrose in explaining the words, "Blessed are the poor in spirit" ( + Lk. 6:20) says: "We know that there are four cardinal virtues, viz. temperance, justice, prudence, and fortitude." But these are moral + virtues. Therefore the moral virtues are cardinal virtues. +
[36061] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Ambrosius dicit, super Lucam, exponens illud, beati +pauperes spiritu, scimus virtutes esse quatuor cardinales, scilicet +temperantiam, iustitiam, prudentiam, fortitudinem. Hae autem +sunt virtutes morales. Ergo virtutes morales sunt cardinales.
+ I answer that, When we speak of virtue simply, we are understood to speak of human virtue. Now human virtue, as stated above ( + Q[56], A[3]), is one that answers to the perfect idea of virtue, which requires rectitude of the appetite: for such like virtue not only + confers the faculty of doing well, but also causes the good deed done. On the other hand, the name virtue is applied to one + that answers imperfectly to the idea of virtue, and does not + require rectitude of the appetite: because it merely confers the faculty of doing well without causing the good deed to be + done. Now it is evident that the perfect is principal as compared to the imperfect: and so those virtues which imply rectitude + of the appetite are called principal virtues. Such are the moral virtues, and prudence alone, of the intellectual virtues, + for it is also something of a moral virtue, as was clearly shown above ( + Q[57], A[4]). Consequently, + those virtues which are called principal or cardinal are fittingly placed among the moral virtues. +
[36062] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, cum simpliciter de virtute loquimur, intelligimur +loqui de virtute humana. Virtus autem humana, ut supra dictum est, +secundum perfectam rationem virtutis dicitur, quae requirit +rectitudinem appetitus, huiusmodi enim virtus non solum facit +facultatem bene agendi, sed ipsum etiam usum boni operis causat. +Sed secundum imperfectam rationem virtutis dicitur virtus quae non +requirit rectitudinem appetitus, quia solum facit facultatem bene +agendi, non autem causat boni operis usum. Constat autem quod +perfectum est principalius imperfecto. Et ideo virtutes quae +continent rectitudinem appetitus, dicuntur principales. Huiusmodi +autem sunt virtutes morales; et inter intellectuales, sola +prudentia, quae etiam quodammodo moralis est, secundum materiam, ut +ex supradictis patet, unde convenienter inter virtutes morales +ponuntur illae quae dicuntur principales, seu cardinales.
+ Reply to Objection 1: When a univocal genus is divided into its species, the members of the division are on a par in the point of the generic idea; + although considered in their nature as things, one species may surpass another in rank and perfection, as man in respect of + other animals. But when we divide an analogous term, which is applied to several things, but to one before it is applied to + another, nothing hinders one from ranking before another, even in the point of + the generic idea; as the notion of being is applied to substance principally in relation to accident. Such is the division + of virtue into various kinds of virtue: since the good defined by reason is not found in the same way in all things. +
[36063] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, quando genus univocum dividitur in suas +species, tunc partes divisionis ex aequo se habent secundum +rationem generis; licet secundum naturam rei, una species sit +principalior et perfectior alia, sicut homo aliis animalibus. Sed +quando est divisio alicuius analogi, quod dicitur de pluribus +secundum prius et posterius; tunc nihil prohibet unum esse +principalius altero, etiam secundum communem rationem; sicut +substantia principalius dicitur ens quam accidens. Et talis est +divisio virtutum in diversa genera virtutum, eo quod bonum rationis +non secundum eundem ordinem invenitur in omnibus.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The theological virtues are above man, as stated above ( + Q[58], A[3], ad 3). Hence they should properly be called not human, but "super-human" or godlike virtues. +
[36064] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod virtutes theologicae sunt supra hominem, ut supra +dictum est. Unde non proprie dicuntur virtutes humanae, sed +superhumanae, vel divinae.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Although the intellectual virtues, except in prudence, rank before the moral virtues, in the point of their subject, they + do not rank before them as virtues; for a virtue, as such, regards good, which is the object of the appetite. +
[36065] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum, quod aliae virtutes intellectuales a prudentia, etsi sint +principaliores quam morales quantum ad subiectum; non tamen sunt +principaliores quantum ad rationem virtutis, quae respicit bonum, +quod est obiectum appetitus.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that there are not four cardinal virtues. For prudence is the directing principle of the other moral virtues, + as is clear from what has been said above ( + Q[58], A[4]). But that which directs other things ranks before them. Therefore prudence alone is a principal virtue. +
[36066] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sint quatuor virtutes cardinales. +Prudentia enim est directiva aliarum virtutum moralium, ut ex +supradictis patet. Sed id quod est directivum aliorum, principalius +est. Ergo prudentia sola est virtus principalis.
+ Objection 2: Further, the principal virtues are, in a way, moral virtues. Now we are directed to moral works both by the practical reason, + and by a right appetite, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2. Therefore there are only two cardinal virtues. +
[36067] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +virtutes principales sunt aliquo modo morales. Sed ad operationes +morales ordinamur per rationem practicam, et appetitum rectum, ut +dicitur in VI Ethic. Ergo solae duae virtutes cardinales sunt.
+ Objection 3: Further, even among the other virtues one ranks higher than another. But in order that a virtue be principal, it needs not + to rank above all the others, but above some. Therefore it seems that there are many more principal virtues. +
[36068] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +inter alias etiam virtutes una est principalior altera. Sed ad hoc +quod virtus dicatur principalis, non requiritur quod sit +principalis respectu omnium, sed respectu quarundam. Ergo videtur +quod sint multo plures principales virtutes.
+ On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii): "The entire structure of good works is built on four virtues." +
[36069] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Gregorius dicit, in II Moral., in quatuor virtutibus +tota boni operis structura consurgit.
+ I answer that, Things may be numbered either in respect of their formal principles, or according to the subjects in which they are: and + either way we find that there are four cardinal virtues. +
For the formal principle of the virtue of which we speak now is good as defined by reason; which good is considered in two + ways. First, as existing in the very act of reason: and thus we have one principal virtue, called "Prudence." Secondly, according + as the reason puts its order into something else; either into operations, and then we have "Justice"; or into passions, and + then we need two virtues. For the need of putting the order of reason into the passions is due to their + thwarting reason: and this occurs in two ways. First, by the passions inciting to something against reason, and then the passions + need a curb, which we call "Temperance." Secondly, by the passions withdrawing us from following the dictate of reason, e.g. + through fear of danger or toil: and then man needs to be strengthened for that which reason dictates, lest he turn back; and + to this end there is "Fortitude." +
In like manner, we find the same number if we consider the subjects of virtue. For there are four subjects of the virtue + we speak of now: viz. the power which is rational in its essence, and this is perfected by "Prudence"; and that which is rational + by participation, and is threefold, the will, subject of "Justice," the concupiscible faculty, subject of "Temperance," and + the irascible faculty, subject of "Fortitude." +
[36070] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod numerus aliquorum accipi potest aut secundum +principia formalia aut secundum subiecta, et utroque modo +inveniuntur quatuor cardinales virtutes. Principium enim formale +virtutis de qua nunc loquimur, est rationis bonum. Quod quidem +dupliciter potest considerari. Uno modo, secundum quod in ipsa +consideratione rationis consistit. Et sic erit una virtus +principalis, quae dicitur prudentia. Alio modo, secundum quod circa +aliquid ponitur rationis ordo. Et hoc vel circa operationes, et sic +est iustitia, vel circa passiones, et sic necesse est esse duas +virtutes. Ordinem enim rationis necesse est ponere circa passiones, +considerata repugnantia ipsarum ad rationem. Quae quidem potest +esse dupliciter. Uno modo secundum quod passio impellit ad aliquid +contrarium rationi, et sic necesse est quod passio reprimatur, et +ab hoc denominatur temperantia. Alio modo, secundum quod passio +retrahit ab eo quod ratio dictat, sicut timor periculorum vel +laborum, et sic necesse est quod homo firmetur in eo quod est +rationis, ne recedat; et ab hoc denominatur fortitudo. Similiter +secundum subiecta, idem numerus invenitur. Quadruplex enim +invenitur subiectum huius virtutis de qua nunc loquimur, scilicet +rationale per essentiam, quod prudentia perficit; et rationale per +participationem, quod dividitur in tria; idest in voluntatem, quae +est subiectum iustitiae; et in concupiscibilem, quae est subiectum +temperantiae; et in irascibilem, quae est subiectum +fortitudinis.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Prudence is the principal of all the virtues simply. The others are principal, each in its own genus. +
[36071] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod prudentia est simpliciter principalior omnibus. +Sed aliae ponuntur principales unaquaeque in suo genere.
+ Reply to Objection 2: That part of the soul which is rational by participation is threefold, as stated above. +
[36072] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod rationale per participationem dividitur in tria, ut +dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: All the other virtues among which one ranks before another, are reducible to the above four, both as to the subject and as + to the formal principle. +
[36073] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod omnes aliae virtutes, quarum una est principalior +alia, reducuntur ad praedictas quatuor, et quantum ad subiectum, et +quantum ad rationes formales.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that other virtues should be called principal rather than these. For, seemingly, the greatest is the principal + in any genus. Now "magnanimity has a great influence on all the virtues" (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore magnanimity should more + than any be called a principal virtue. +
[36074] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliae virtutes debeant dici magis +principales quam istae. Id enim quod est maximum in unoquoque +genere, videtur esse principalius. Sed magnanimitas operatur magnum +in omnibus virtutibus, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Ergo magnanimitas +maxime debet dici principalis virtus.
+ Objection 2: Further, that which strengthens the other virtues should above all be called a principal virtue. But such is humility: for + Gregory says (Hom. iv in Ev.) that "he who gathers the other virtues without humility is as one who carries straw against + the wind." Therefore humility seems above all to be a principal virtue. +
[36075] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +illud per quod aliae virtutes firmantur, videtur esse maxime +principalis virtus. Sed humilitas est huiusmodi, dicit enim +Gregorius quod qui ceteras virtutes sine humilitate congregat, +quasi paleas in ventum portat. Ergo humilitas videtur esse +maxime principalis.
+ Objection 3: Further, that which is most perfect seems to be principal. But this applies to patience, according to + James 1:4: "Patience hath a perfect work." Therefore patience should be reckoned a principal virtue. +
[36076] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +illud videtur esse principale, quod est perfectissimum. Sed hoc +pertinet ad patientiam; secundum illud Iacobi I, patientia opus +perfectum habet. Ergo patientia debet poni principalis.
+ On the contrary, Cicero reduces all other virtues to these four (De Invent. Rhet. ii). +
[36077] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Tullius, in sua rhetorica, ad has quatuor omnes alias +reducit.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[2]), these four are reckoned as cardinal virtues, in respect of the four formal principles of virtue as we understand it now. + These principles are found chiefly in certain acts and passions. Thus the good which exists in the act of reason, is found + chiefly in reason's command, but not in its counsel or its judgment, as stated above (Q[57], A[6]). Again, good as defined + by reason and put into our operations as + something right and due, is found chiefly in commutations and distributions in respect of another person, and on a basis of + equality. The good of curbing the passions is found chiefly in those passions which are most difficult to curb, viz. in the + pleasures of touch. The good of being firm in holding to the good defined by reason, against the impulse of passion, is found + chiefly in perils of death, which are most difficult to withstand. +
Accordingly the above four virtues may be considered in two ways. First, in respect of their common formal principles. In + this way they are called principal, being general, as it were, in comparison with all the virtues: so that, for instance, + any virtue that causes good in reason's act of consideration, may be called prudence; every virtue that causes the good of + right and due in operation, be called justice; every virtue that curbs and represses the passions, be called + temperance; and every virtue that strengthens the mind against any passions whatever, be called fortitude. Many, both holy + doctors, as also philosophers, speak about these virtues in this sense: and in this way the other virtues are contained under + them. Wherefore all the objections fail. +
Secondly, they may be considered in point of their being denominated, each one from that which is foremost in its respective + matter, and thus they are specific virtues, condivided with the others. Yet they are called principal in comparison with the + other virtues, on account of the importance of their matter: so that prudence is the virtue which commands; justice, the virtue + which is about due actions between equals; temperance, the virtue which suppresses desires for the + pleasures of touch; and fortitude, the virtue which strengthens against dangers of death.
[36078] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod sicut supra dictum est, huiusmodi quatuor virtutes +cardinales accipiuntur secundum quatuor formales rationes virtutis +de qua loquimur. Quae quidem in aliquibus actibus vel passionibus +principaliter inveniuntur. Sicut bonum consistens in consideratione +rationis, principaliter invenitur in ipso rationis imperio; non +autem in consilio, neque in iudicio, ut supra dictum est. Similiter +autem bonum rationis prout ponitur in operationibus secundum +rationem recti et debiti, principaliter invenitur in +commutationibus vel distributionibus quae sunt ad alterum cum +aequalitate. Bonum autem refraenandi passiones principaliter +invenitur in passionibus quas maxime difficile est reprimere, +scilicet in delectationibus tactus. Bonum autem firmitatis ad +standum in bono rationis contra impetum passionum, praecipue +invenitur in periculis mortis, contra quae difficillimum est stare. +Sic igitur praedictas quatuor virtutes dupliciter considerare +possumus. Uno modo, secundum communes rationes formales. Et +secundum hoc, dicuntur principales, quasi generales ad omnes +virtutes, utputa quod omnis virtus quae facit bonum in +consideratione rationis, dicatur prudentia; et quod omnis virtus +quae facit bonum debiti et recti in operationibus, dicatur +iustitia; et omnis virtus quae cohibet passiones et deprimit, +dicatur temperantia; et omnis virtus quae facit firmitatem animi +contra quascumque passiones, dicatur fortitudo. Et sic multi +loquuntur de istis virtutibus, tam sacri doctores quam etiam +philosophi. Et sic aliae virtutes sub ipsis continentur unde +cessant omnes obiectiones. Alio vero modo possunt accipi, secundum +quod istae virtutes denominantur ab eo quod est praecipuum in +unaquaque materia. Et sic sunt speciales virtutes, contra alias +divisae. Dicuntur tamen principales respectu aliarum, propter +principalitatem materiae, puta quod prudentia dicatur quae +praeceptiva est; iustitia, quae est circa actiones debitas inter +aequales; temperantia, quae reprimit concupiscentias delectationum +tactus; fortitudo, quae firmat contra pericula mortis.
Reply to Objections: Thus again do the objections fail: + because the other virtues may be principal in some other way, but these are called principal by reason of their matter, as + stated above.
[36079] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 3 ad 1 Et sic etiam +cessant obiectiones, quia aliae virtutes possunt habere aliquas +alias principalitates, sed istae dicuntur principales ratione +materiae, ut supra dictum est.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the above four virtues are not diverse and distinct from one another. For Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 1): + "There is no true prudence, unless it be just, temperate and brave; no perfect temperance, that is not brave, just and prudent; + no sound fortitude, that is not prudent, temperate and just; no real justice, without prudence, fortitude and temperance." + But this would not be so, if the above virtues were distinct from one another: since the + different species of one genus do not qualify one another. Therefore the aforesaid virtues are not distinct from one another. +
[36080] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod quatuor praedictae virtutes non sint +diversae virtutes, et ab invicem distinctae. Dicit enim Gregorius, +in XXII Moral., prudentia vera non est, quae iusta, temperans et +fortis non est; nec perfecta temperantia, quae fortis, iusta et +prudens non est; nec fortitudo integra, quae prudens, temperans et +iusta non est; nec vera iustitia, quae prudens, fortis et temperans +non est. Hoc autem non contingeret, si praedictae quatuor +virtutes essent ab invicem distinctae, diversae enim species +eiusdem generis non denominant se invicem. Ergo praedictae virtutes +non sunt ab invicem distinctae.
+ Objection 2: Further, among things distinct from one another the function of one is not attributed to another. But the function of temperance + is attributed to fortitude: for Ambrose says (De Offic. xxxvi): "Rightly do we call it fortitude, when a man conquers himself, + and is not weakened and bent by any enticement." And of temperance he says (De Offic. xliii, xlv) that it "safeguards the + manner and order in all things that we decide to do and say." Therefore it seems that + these virtues are not distinct from one another. +
[36081] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +eorum quae ab invicem sunt distincta, quod est unius, non +attribuitur alteri. Sed illud quod est temperantiae, attribuitur +fortitudini, dicit enim Ambrosius, in I libro de Offic., iure ea +fortitudo vocatur, quando unusquisque seipsum vincit, nullis +illecebris emollitur atque inflectitur. De temperantia etiam +dicit quod modum vel ordinem servat omnium quae vel agenda vel +dicenda arbitramur. Ergo videtur quod huiusmodi virtutes non +sunt ab invicem distinctae.
+ Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that the necessary conditions of virtue are first of all "that a man should + have knowledge; secondly, that he should exercise choice for a particular end; thirdly, that he should possess the habit and + act with firmness and steadfastness." But the first of these seems to belong to prudence which is rectitude of reason in things + to be done; the second, i.e. choice, belongs to temperance, whereby a man, holding his + passions on the curb, acts, not from passion but from choice; the third, that a man should act for the sake of a due end, + implies a certain rectitude, which seemingly belongs to justice; while the last, viz. firmness and steadfastness, belongs + to fortitude. Therefore each of these virtues is general in comparison to other virtues. Therefore they are not distinct from + one another. +
[36082] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod ad virtutem haec requiruntur, +primum quidem, si sciens; deinde, si eligens, et eligens propter +hoc; tertium autem, si firme et immobiliter habeat et operetur. +Sed horum primum videtur ad prudentiam pertinere, quae est recta +ratio agibilium; secundum, scilicet eligere, ad temperantiam, ut +aliquis non ex passione, sed ex electione agat, passionibus +refraenatis; tertium, ut aliquis propter debitum finem operetur, +rectitudinem quandam continet, quae videtur ad iustitiam pertinere +aliud, scilicet firmitas et immobilitas, pertinet ad fortitudinem. +Ergo quaelibet harum virtutum est generalis ad omnes virtutes. Ergo +non distinguuntur ad invicem.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi) that "there are four virtues, corresponding to the various emotions of love," and he + applies this to the four virtues mentioned above. Therefore the same four virtues are distinct from one another. +
[36083] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de moribus Eccles., quod +quadripartita dicitur virtus, ex ipsius amoris vario +affectu, et subiungit de praedictis quatuor virtutibus. +Praedictae ergo quatuor virtutes sunt ab invicem distinctae.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[3]), these four virtues are understood differently by various writers. For some take them as signifying certain general conditions + of the human mind, to be found in all the virtues: so that, to wit, prudence is merely a certain rectitude of discretion in + any actions or matters whatever; justice, a certain rectitude of the mind, whereby a man does what he ought in any matters; + temperance, a disposition of the mind, + moderating any passions or operations, so as to keep them within bounds; and fortitude, a disposition whereby the soul is + strengthened for that which is in accord with reason, against any assaults of the passions, or the toil involved by any operations. + To distinguish these four virtues in this way does not imply that justice, temperance and fortitude are distinct virtuous + habits: because it is fitting that every moral virtue, from the fact that it is a "habit," should be accompanied by a + certain firmness so as not to be moved by its contrary: and this, we have said, belongs to fortitude. Moreover, inasmuch as + it is a "virtue," it is directed to good which involves the notion of right and due; and this, we have said, belongs to justice. + Again, owing to the fact that it is a "moral virtue" partaking of reason, it observes the mode of reason in all things, and + does not exceed its bounds, which has been stated to belong to temperance. It is only in the point of having discretion, + which we ascribed to prudence, that there seems to be a distinction from the other three, inasmuch as discretion belongs essentially + to reason; whereas the other three imply a certain share of reason by way of a kind of application (of reason) to passions + or operations. According to the above explanation, then, prudence would be distinct from the other three virtues: but these + would not be distinct from one another; for it is evident that one and the same virtue is both habit, and virtue, and + moral virtue. +
Others, however, with better reason, take these four virtues, according as they have their special determinate matter; each + of its own matter, in which special commendation is given to that general condition from which the virtue's name is taken + as stated above + (A[3]). In this way it is clear that the aforesaid virtues are distinct habits, differentiated in respect of their diverse objects. +
[36084] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, praedictae quatuor virtutes +dupliciter a diversis accipiuntur. Quidam enim accipiunt eas, prout +significant quasdam generales conditiones humani animi, quae +inveniuntur in omnibus virtutibus, ita scilicet quod prudentia +nihil sit aliud quam quaedam rectitudo discretionis in quibuscumque +actibus vel materiis; iustitia vero sit quaedam rectitudo animi, +per quam homo operatur quod debet in quacumque materia; temperantia +vero sit quaedam dispositio animi quae modum quibuscumque +passionibus vel operationibus imponit, ne ultra debitum efferantur; +fortitudo vero sit quaedam dispositio animae per quam firmetur in +eo quod est secundum rationem, contra quoscumque impetus passionum +vel operationum labores. Haec autem quatuor sic distincta, non +important diversitatem habituum virtuosorum quantum ad iustitiam, +temperantiam et fortitudinem. Cuilibet enim virtuti morali, ex hoc +quod est habitus, convenit quaedam firmitas, ut a contrario non +moveatur, quod dictum est ad fortitudinem pertinere. Ex hoc vero +quod est virtus, habet quod ordinetur ad bonum, in quo importatur +ratio recti vel debiti, quod dicebatur ad iustitiam pertinere. In +hoc vero quod est virtus moralis rationem participans, habet quod +modum rationis in omnibus servet, et ultra se non extendat, quod +dicebatur pertinere ad temperantiam. Solum autem hoc quod est +discretionem habere, quod attribuebatur prudentiae, videtur +distingui ab aliis tribus, inquantum hoc est ipsius rationis per +essentiam; alia vero tria important quandam participationem +rationis, per modum applicationis cuiusdam ad passiones vel +operationes. Sic igitur, secundum praedicta, prudentia quidem esset +virtus distincta ab aliis tribus, sed aliae tres non essent +virtutes distinctae ab invicem; manifestum est enim quod una et +eadem virtus et est habitus, et est virtus, et est moralis. Alii +vero, et melius, accipiunt has quatuor virtutes secundum quod +determinantur ad materias speciales; unaquaeque quidem illarum ad +unam materiam, in qua principaliter laudatur illa generalis +conditio a qua nomen virtutis accipitur, ut supra dictum est. Et +secundum hoc, manifestum est quod praedictae virtutes sunt diversi +habitus, secundum diversitatem obiectorum distincti.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Gregory is speaking of these four virtues in the first sense given above. It may also be said that these four virtues qualify + one another by a kind of overflow. For the qualities of prudence overflow on to the other virtues in so far as they are directed + by prudence. And each of the others overflows on to the rest, for the reason that whoever can do what is harder, can do what + is less difficult. Wherefore whoever can curb his desires for the pleasures + of touch, so that they keep within bounds, which is a very hard thing to do, for this very reason is more able to check his + daring in dangers of death, so as not to go too far, which is much easier; and in this sense fortitude is said to be temperate. + Again, temperance is said to be brave, by reason of fortitude overflowing into temperance: in so far, to wit, as he whose + mind is strengthened by fortitude against dangers of death, which is a matter of very great difficulty, is more able to + remain firm against the onslaught of pleasures; for as Cicero says (De Offic. i), "it would be inconsistent for a man to be + unbroken by fear, and yet vanquished by cupidity; or that he should be conquered by lust, after showing himself to be unconquered + by toil." +
[36085] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Gregorius loquitur de praedictis quatuor +virtutibus secundum primam acceptionem. Vel potest dici quod istae +quatuor virtutes denominantur ab invicem per redundantiam quandam. +Id enim quod est prudentiae, redundat in alias virtutes, inquantum +a prudentia diriguntur. Unaquaeque vero aliarum redundat in alias +ea ratione, quod qui potest quod est difficilius, potest et id quod +minus est difficile. Unde qui potest refraenare concupiscentias +delectabilium secundum tactum, ne modum excedant, quod est +difficillimum; ex hoc ipso redditur habilior ut refraenet audaciam +in periculis mortis, ne ultra modum procedat, quod est longe +facilius; et secundum hoc, fortitudo dicitur temperata. Temperantia +etiam dicitur fortis, ex redundantia fortitudinis in temperantiam, +inquantum scilicet ille qui per fortitudinem habet animum firmum +contra pericula mortis, quod est difficillimum, est habilior ut +retineat animi firmitatem contra impetus delectationum; quia, ut +dicit Tullius in I de Offic., non est consentaneum ut qui metu +non frangitur, cupiditate frangatur; nec qui invictum se a labore +praestiterit, vinci a voluptate.
Reply to Objection 2: From this the Reply to the Second Objection is clear. For temperance observes the mean in all things, and fortitude keeps + the mind unbent by the enticements of pleasures, either in so far as these virtues are taken to denote certain general conditions + of virtue, or in the sense that they overflow on to one another, as explained above. +
[36086] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 ad 2 Et per hoc +etiam patet responsio ad secundum. Sic enim temperantia in omnibus +modum servat, et fortitudo contra illecebras voluptatum animum +servat inflexum, vel inquantum istae virtutes denominant quasdam +generales conditiones virtutum; vel per redundantiam +praedictam.
+ Reply to Objection 3: These four general conditions of virtue set down by the Philosopher, are not proper to the aforesaid virtues. They may, however, + be appropriated to them, in the way above stated. +
[36087] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod illae quatuor generales virtutum conditiones quas +ponit philosophus, non sunt propriae praedictis virtutibus. Sed +possunt eis appropriari, secundum modum iam dictum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that these four virtues are unfittingly divided into exemplar virtues, perfecting virtues, perfect virtues, + and social virtues. For as Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1), the "exemplar virtues are such as exist in the mind of God." + Now the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that "it is absurd to ascribe justice, fortitude, temperance, and prudence to God." + Therefore these virtues cannot be exemplar. +
[36088] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter huiusmodi quatuor +virtutes dividantur in virtutes exemplares, purgati animi, +purgatorias, et politicas. Ut enim Macrobius dicit, in I super +somnium Scipionis, virtutes exemplares sunt quae in ipsa divina +mente consistunt. Sed philosophus, in X Ethic., dicit quod +ridiculum est Deo iustitiam, fortitudinem, temperantiam et +prudentiam attribuere. Ergo virtutes huiusmodi non possunt esse +exemplares.
+ Objection 2: Further, the "perfect" virtues are those which are without any passion: for Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1) that "in + a soul that is cleansed, temperance has not to check worldly desires, for it has forgotten all about them: fortitude knows + nothing about the passions; it does not have to conquer them." Now it was stated above ( + Q[59], A[5]) that the aforesaid virtues cannot be without passions. Therefore there is no such thing as + "perfect" virtue. +
[36089] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +virtutes purgati animi dicuntur quae sunt absque passionibus, dicit +enim ibidem Macrobius quod temperantiae purgati animi est +terrenas cupiditates non reprimere, sed penitus oblivisci; +fortitudinis autem passiones ignorare, non vincere. Dictum est +autem supra quod huiusmodi virtutes sine passionibus esse non +possunt. Ergo huiusmodi virtutes purgati animi esse non +possunt.
+ Objection 3: Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the "perfecting" virtues are those of the man "who flies from human + affairs and devotes himself exclusively to the things of God." But it seems wrong to do this, for Cicero says (De Offic. i): + "I reckon that it is not only unworthy of praise, but wicked for a man to say that he despises what most men admire, viz. + power and office." Therefore there are no "perfecting" virtues. +
[36090] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +virtutes purgatorias dicit esse eorum qui quadam humanorum fuga +solis se inserunt divinis. Sed hoc videtur esse vitiosum, dicit +enim Tullius, in I de Offic., quod qui despicere se dicunt ea +quae plerique mirantur imperia et magistratus, his non modo non +laudi, verum etiam vitio dandum puto. Ergo non sunt aliquae +virtutes purgatoriae.
+ Objection 4: Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the "social" virtues are those "whereby good men work for the good + of their country and for the safety of the city." But it is only legal justice that is directed to the common weal, as the + Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore other virtues should not be called "social." +
[36091] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 arg. 4 Praeterea, +virtutes politicas esse dicit quibus boni viri reipublicae +consulunt, urbesque tuentur. Sed ad bonum commune sola iustitia +legalis ordinatur; ut philosophus dicit, in V Ethic. Ergo aliae +virtutes non debent dici politicae.
+ On the contrary, Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1): "Plotinus, together with Plato foremost among teachers of philosophy, says: 'The four + kinds of virtue are fourfold: In the first place there are social* virtues; secondly, there are perfecting virtues [*Virtutes + purgatoriae: literally meaning, cleansing virtues]; thirdly, there are perfect [*Virtutes purgati animi: literally, virtues + of the clean soul] virtues; and fourthly, there are exemplar virtues.'" [*Cf. + Chrysostom's fifteenth homily on St. Matthew, where he says: "The gentle, the modest, the merciful, the just man does not + shut up his good deeds within himself . . . He that is clean of heart and peaceful, and suffers persecution for the sake of + the truth, lives for the common weal."] +
[36092] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Macrobius ibidem dicit, Plotinus, inter philosophiae +professores cum Platone princeps, quatuor sunt, inquit, quaternarum +genera virtutum. Ex his primae politicae vocantur; secundae, +purgatoriae; tertiae autem, iam purgati animi; quartae, +exemplares.
+ I answer that, As Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi), "the soul needs to follow something in order to give birth to virtue: this something + is God: if we follow Him we shall live aright." Consequently the exemplar of human virtue must needs pre-exist in God, just + as in Him pre-exist the types of all things. Accordingly virtue may be considered as existing originally in God, and thus + we speak of "exemplar" virtues: so that in God the Divine Mind itself may be called + prudence; while temperance is the turning of God's gaze on Himself, even as in us it is that which conforms the appetite to + reason. God's fortitude is His unchangeableness; His justice is the observance of the Eternal Law in His works, as Plotinus + states (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1). +
Again, since man by his nature is a social [*See above note on Chrysostom] animal, these virtues, in so far as they are in + him according to the condition of his nature, are called "social" virtues; since it is by reason of them that man behaves + himself well in the conduct of human affairs. It is in this sense that we have been speaking of these virtues until now. +
But since it behooves a man to do his utmost to strive onward even to Divine things, as even the Philosopher declares in + Ethic. x, 7, and as Scripture often admonishes us---for instance: "Be ye . . . perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect" + ( + Mat. 5:48), we must needs place some virtues between the social or human virtues, and the exemplar virtues which are Divine. Now these + virtues differ by reason of a difference of movement and term: so that some are + virtues of men who are on their way and tending towards the Divine similitude; and these are called "perfecting" virtues. + Thus prudence, by contemplating the things of God, counts as nothing all things of the world, and directs all the thoughts + of the soul to God alone: temperance, so far as nature allows, neglects the needs of the body; fortitude prevents the soul + from being afraid of neglecting the body and rising to heavenly things; and justice consists in the soul giving a whole-hearted + consent to follow the way thus proposed. Besides these there are the virtues of those who have already attained to the Divine + similitude: these are called the "perfect virtues." Thus prudence sees nought else but the things of God; temperance knows + no earthly desires; fortitude has no knowledge of passion; and justice, by imitating the Divine Mind, is united thereto by + an everlasting covenant. Such as the virtues attributed to the Blessed, or, in this life, to some who are at the summit of + perfection. +
[36093] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro de moribus Eccles., +oportet quod anima aliquid sequatur, ad hoc quod ei possit +virtus innasci, et hoc Deus est, quem si sequimur, bene +vivimus. Oportet igitur quod exemplar humanae virtutis in Deo +praeexistat, sicut et in eo praeexistunt omnium rerum rationes. Sic +igitur virtus potest considerari vel prout est exemplariter in Deo, +et sic dicuntur virtutes exemplares. Ita scilicet quod ipsa divina +mens in Deo dicatur prudentia; temperantia vero, conversio divinae +intentionis ad seipsum, sicut in nobis temperantia dicitur per hoc +quod concupiscibilis conformatur rationi; fortitudo autem Dei est +eius immutabilitas; iustitia vero Dei est observatio legis aeternae +in suis operibus, sicut Plotinus dixit. Et quia homo secundum suam +naturam est animal politicum, virtutes huiusmodi, prout in homine +existunt secundum conditionem suae naturae, politicae vocantur, +prout scilicet homo secundum has virtutes recte se habet in rebus +humanis gerendis. Secundum quem modum hactenus de his virtutibus +locuti sumus. Sed quia ad hominem pertinet ut etiam ad divina se +trahat quantum potest, ut etiam philosophus dicit, in X Ethic.; et +hoc nobis in sacra Scriptura multipliciter commendatur, ut est +illud Matth. V, estote perfecti, sicut et pater vester caelestis +perfectus est, necesse est ponere quasdam virtutes medias inter +politicas, quae sunt virtutes humanae, et exemplares, quae sunt +virtutes divinae. Quae quidem virtutes distinguuntur secundum +diversitatem motus et termini. Ita scilicet quod quaedam sunt +virtutes transeuntium et in divinam similitudinem tendentium, et +hae vocantur virtutes purgatoriae. Ita scilicet quod prudentia +omnia mundana divinorum contemplatione despiciat, omnemque animae +cogitationem in divina sola dirigat; temperantia vero relinquat, +inquantum natura patitur, quae corporis usus requirit; fortitudinis +autem est ut anima non terreatur propter excessum a corpore, et +accessum ad superna; iustitia vero est ut tota anima consentiat ad +huius propositi viam. Quaedam vero sunt virtutes iam assequentium +divinam similitudinem, quae vocantur virtutes iam purgati animi. +Ita scilicet quod prudentia sola divina intueatur; temperantia +terrenas cupiditates nesciat; fortitudo passiones ignoret; iustitia +cum divina mente perpetuo foedere societur, eam scilicet imitando. +Quas quidem virtutes dicimus esse beatorum, vel aliquorum in hac +vita perfectissimorum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of these virtues according as they relate to human affairs; for instance, justice, about buying + and selling; fortitude, about fear; temperance, about desires; for in this sense it is absurd to attribute them to God. +
[36094] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de his virtutibus secundum +quod sunt circa res humanas, puta iustitia circa emptiones et +venditiones, fortitudo circa timores, temperantia circa +concupiscentias. Sic enim ridiculum est eas Deo attribuere.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Human virtues, that is to say, virtues of men living together in this world, are about the passions. But the virtues of those + who have attained to perfect bliss are without passions. Hence Plotinus says (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1) that "the + social virtues check the passions," i.e. they bring them to the relative mean; "the second kind," viz. the perfecting virtues, + "uproot them"; "the third kind," viz. the perfect virtues, "forget them; while + it is impious to mention them in connection with virtues of the fourth kind," viz. the exemplar virtues. It may also be said + that here he is speaking of passions as denoting inordinate emotions. +
[36095] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod virtutes humanae sunt circa passiones, scilicet +virtutes hominum in hoc mundo conversantium. Sed virtutes eorum qui +plenam beatitudinem assequuntur, sunt absque passionibus. Unde +Plotinus dicit quod passiones politicae virtutes molliunt, idest ad +medium reducunt; secundae, scilicet purgatoriae, auferunt; tertiae, +quae sunt purgati animi, obliviscuntur; in quartis, scilicet +exemplaribus, nefas est nominari. Quamvis dici possit quod loquitur +hic de passionibus secundum quod significant aliquos inordinatos +motus.
+ Reply to Objection 3: To neglect human affairs when necessity forbids is wicked; otherwise it is virtuous. Hence Cicero says a little earlier: + "Perhaps one should make allowances for those who by reason of their exceptional talents have devoted themselves to learning; + as also to those who have retired from public life on account of failing health, or for some other yet weightier motive; when + such men yielded to others the power and renown of authority." This agrees with + what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): "The love of truth demands a hollowed leisure; charity necessitates good works. + If no one lays this burden on us we may devote ourselves to the study and contemplation of truth; but if the burden is laid + on us it is to be taken up under the pressure of charity." +
[36096] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod deserere res humanas ubi necessitas imponitur, +vitiosum est, alias est virtuosum. Unde parum supra Tullius +praemittit, his forsitan concedendum est rempublicam non +capessentibus, qui excellenti ingenio doctrinae se dederunt; et his +qui aut valetudinis imbecillitate, aut aliqua graviori causa +impediti, a republica recesserunt; cum eius administrandae +potestatem aliis laudemque concederent. Quod consonat ei quod +Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, otium sanctum quaerit caritas +veritatis; negotium iustum suscipit necessitas caritatis. Quam +sarcinam si nullus imponit, percipiendae atque intuendae vacandum +est veritati, si autem imponitur, suscipienda est, propter +caritatis necessitatem.
+ Reply to Objection 4: Legal justice alone regards the common weal directly: but by commanding the other virtues it draws them all into the service + of the common weal, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1). For we must take note that it concerns the human virtues, as + we understand them here, to do well not only towards the community, but also towards the parts of the community, viz. towards + the household, or even towards one individual. +
[36097] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod sola iustitia legalis directe respicit bonum commune, +sed per imperium omnes alias virtutes ad bonum commune trahit, ut +in V Ethic. dicit philosophus. Est enim considerandum quod ad +politicas virtutes, secundum quod hic dicuntur, pertinet non solum +bene operari ad commune, sed etiam bene operari ad partes communis, +scilicet ad domum, vel aliquam singularem personam.
We must now consider the Theological Virtues: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there are any theological virtues?
(2) Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and moral virtues?
+[36098] +Iª-IIae q. 62 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +virtutibus theologicis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, +utrum sint aliquae virtutes theologicae. Secundo, utrum virtutes +theologicae distinguantur ab intellectualibus et moralibus. Tertio, +quot, et quae sint. Quarto, de ordine earum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that there are not any theological virtues. For according to Phys. vii, text. 17, "virtue is the disposition + of a perfect thing to that which is best: and by perfect, I mean that which is disposed according to nature." But that which + is Divine is above man's nature. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of a man. +
[36099] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sint aliquae virtutes theologicae. +Ut enim dicitur in VII Physic., virtus est dispositio perfecti +ad optimum, dico autem perfectum, quod est dispositum secundum +naturam. Sed id quod est divinum, est supra naturam hominis. +Ergo virtutes theologicae non sunt virtutes hominis.
+ Objection 2: Further, theological virtues are quasi-Divine virtues. But the Divine virtues are exemplars, as stated above ( + Q[61], A[5]), which are not in us but in God. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of man. +
[36100] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +virtutes theologicae dicuntur quasi virtutes divinae. Sed virtutes +divinae sunt exemplares, ut dictum est, quae quidem non sunt in +nobis, sed in Deo. Ergo virtutes theologicae non sunt virtutes +hominis.
+ Objection 3: Further, the theological virtues are so called because they direct us to God, Who is the first beginning and last end of + all things. But by the very nature of his reason and will, man is directed to his first beginning and last end. Therefore + there is no need for any habits of theological virtue, to direct the reason and will to God. +
[36101] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +virtutes theologicae dicuntur quibus ordinamur in Deum, qui est +primum principium et ultimus finis rerum. Sed homo ex ipsa natura +rationis et voluntatis, habet ordinem ad primum principium et +ultimum finem. Non ergo requiruntur aliqui habitus virtutum +theologicarum, quibus ratio et voluntas ordinetur in Deum.
+ On the contrary, The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. Now the Divine Law contains precepts about the acts of faith, hope, and + charity: for it is written ( + Ecclus. 2:8, seqq.): "Ye that fear the Lord believe Him," and again, "hope in Him," and again, "love Him." Therefore faith, hope, and + charity are virtues directing us to God. Therefore they are theological virtues. +
[36102] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod praecepta legis sunt de actibus virtutum. Sed de actibus +fidei, spei et caritatis dantur praecepta in lege divina, dicitur +enim Eccli. II, qui timetis Deum, credite illi; item, sperate in +illum; item, diligite illum. Ergo fides, spes et caritas sunt +virtutes in Deum ordinantes. Sunt ergo theologicae.
+ I answer that, Man is perfected by virtue, for those actions whereby he is directed to happiness, as was explained above ( + Q[5], A[7]). Now man's happiness is twofold, as was also stated above ( + Q[5], A[5]). One is proportionate to human nature, a happiness, to wit, which man can obtain by means of his natural principles. The + other is a happiness surpassing man's nature, and which man can obtain by the power of God alone, by a + kind of participation of the Godhead, about which it is written (2 Pet. 1:4) that by Christ we are made "partakers of the + Divine nature." And because such happiness surpasses the capacity of human nature, man's natural principles which enable him + to act well according to his capacity, do not suffice to direct man to this same happiness. Hence it is necessary for man + to receive from God some additional principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness, even as he is directed + to his + connatural end, by means of his natural principles, albeit not without Divine assistance. Such like principles are called + "theological virtues": first, because their object is God, inasmuch as they direct us aright to God: secondly, because they + are infused in us by God alone: thirdly, because these virtues are not made known to us, save by Divine revelation, contained + in Holy Writ. +
[36103] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod per virtutem perficitur homo ad actus quibus in +beatitudinem ordinatur, ut ex supradictis patet. Est autem duplex +hominis beatitudo sive felicitas, ut supra dictum est. Una quidem +proportionata humanae naturae, ad quam scilicet homo pervenire +potest per principia suae naturae. Alia autem est beatitudo naturam +hominis excedens, ad quam homo sola divina virtute pervenire +potest, secundum quandam divinitatis participationem; secundum quod +dicitur II Petr. I, quod per Christum facti sumus consortes divinae +naturae. Et quia huiusmodi beatitudo proportionem humanae naturae +excedit, principia naturalia hominis, ex quibus procedit ad bene +agendum secundum suam proportionem, non sufficiunt ad ordinandum +hominem in beatitudinem praedictam. Unde oportet quod superaddantur +homini divinitus aliqua principia, per quae ita ordinetur ad +beatitudinem supernaturalem, sicut per principia naturalia +ordinatur ad finem connaturalem, non tamen absque adiutorio divino. +Et huiusmodi principia virtutes dicuntur theologicae, tum quia +habent Deum pro obiecto, inquantum per eas recte ordinamur in Deum; +tum quia a solo Deo nobis infunduntur; tum quia sola divina +revelatione, in sacra Scriptura, huiusmodi virtutes traduntur.
+ Reply to Objection 1: A certain nature may be ascribed to a certain thing in two ways. First, essentially: and thus these theological virtues surpass + the nature of man. Secondly, by participation, as kindled wood partakes of the nature of fire: and thus, after a fashion, + man becomes a partaker of the Divine Nature, as stated above: so that these virtues are proportionate to man in respect of + the Nature of which he is made a partaker. +
[36104] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod aliqua natura potest attribui alicui rei +dupliciter. Uno modo, essentialiter, et sic huiusmodi virtutes +theologicae excedunt hominis naturam. Alio modo, participative, +sicut lignum ignitum participat naturam ignis, et sic quodammodo +fit homo particeps divinae naturae, ut dictum est. Et sic istae +virtutes conveniunt homini secundum naturam participatam.
+ Reply to Objection 2: These virtues are called Divine, not as though God were virtuous by reason of them, but because of them God makes us virtuous, + and directs us to Himself. Hence they are not exemplar but exemplate virtues. +
[36105] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod istae virtutes non dicuntur divinae, sicut quibus +Deus sit virtuosus, sed sicut quibus nos efficimur virtuosi a Deo, +et in ordine ad Deum. Unde non sunt exemplares, sed exemplatae.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The reason and will are naturally directed to God, inasmuch as He is the beginning and end of nature, but in proportion to + nature. But the reason and will, according to their nature, are not sufficiently directed to Him in so far as He is the object + of supernatural happiness. +
[36106] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ad Deum naturaliter ratio et voluntas ordinatur prout +est naturae principium et finis, secundum tamen proportionem +naturae. Sed ad ipsum secundum quod est obiectum beatitudinis +supernaturalis, ratio et voluntas secundum suam naturam non +ordinantur sufficienter.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues. For the theological + virtues, if they be in a human soul, must needs perfect it, either as to the intellective, or as to the appetitive part. Now + the virtues which perfect the intellective part are called intellectual; and the virtues which perfect the appetitive part, + are called moral. Therefore, the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral and + intellectual virtues. +
[36107] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes theologicae non distinguantur +a moralibus et intellectualibus. Virtutes enim theologicae, si sunt +in anima humana, oportet quod perficiant ipsam vel secundum partem +intellectivam vel secundum partem appetitivam. Sed virtutes quae +perficiunt partem intellectivam, dicuntur intellectuales, virtutes +autem quae perficiunt partem appetitivam, sunt morales. Ergo +virtutes theologicae non distinguuntur a virtutibus moralibus et +intellectualibus.
+ Objection 2: Further, the theological virtues are those which direct us to God. Now, among the intellectual virtues there is one which + directs us to God: this is wisdom, which is about Divine things, since it considers the highest cause. Therefore the theological + virtues are not distinct from the intellectual virtues. +
[36108] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +virtutes theologicae dicuntur quae ordinant nos ad Deum. Sed inter +intellectuales virtutes est aliqua quae ordinat nos ad Deum, +scilicet sapientia, quae est de divinis, utpote causam altissimam +considerans. Ergo virtutes theologicae ab intellectualibus +virtutibus non distinguuntur.
+ Objection 3: Further, Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv) shows how the four cardinal virtues are the "order of love." Now love is charity, + which is a theological virtue. Therefore the moral virtues are not distinct from the theological. +
[36109] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +Augustinus, in libro de moribus Eccles., manifestat in quatuor +virtutibus cardinalibus quod sunt ordo amoris. Sed amor est +caritas, quae ponitur virtus theologica. Ergo virtutes morales non +distinguuntur a theologicis.
+ On the contrary, That which is above man's nature is distinct from that which is according to his nature. But the theological virtues are + above man's nature; while the intellectual and moral virtues are in proportion to his nature, as clearly shown above ( + Q[58], A[3]). Therefore they are distinct from one another. +
[36110] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra, +id quod est supra naturam hominis, distinguitur ab eo quod est +secundum naturam hominis. Sed virtutes theologicae sunt super +naturam hominis, cui secundum naturam conveniunt virtutes +intellectuales et morales, ut ex supradictis patet. Ergo +distinguuntur ab invicem.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + Q[54], A[2], ad 1), habits are specifically distinct from one another in respect of the formal difference of their objects. Now the object + of the theological virtues is God Himself, Who is the last end of all, as surpassing the knowledge of our reason. On the other + hand, the object of the intellectual and moral virtues is something comprehensible to human reason. Wherefore the theological + virtues are specifically + distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues. +
[36111] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus specie distinguuntur +secundum formalem differentiam obiectorum. Obiectum autem +theologicarum virtutum est ipse Deus, qui est ultimus rerum finis, +prout nostrae rationis cognitionem excedit. Obiectum autem virtutum +intellectualium et moralium est aliquid quod humana ratione +comprehendi potest. Unde virtutes theologicae specie distinguuntur +a moralibus et intellectualibus.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The intellectual and moral virtues perfect man's intellect and appetite according to the capacity of human nature; the theological + virtues, supernaturally. +
[36112] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod virtutes intellectuales et morales perficiunt +intellectum et appetitum hominis secundum proportionem naturae +humanae, sed theologicae supernaturaliter.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The wisdom which the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3,7) reckons as an intellectual virtue, considers Divine things so far as they + are open to the research of human reason. Theological virtue, on the other hand, is about those same things so far as they + surpass human reason. +
[36113] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod sapientia quae a philosopho ponitur intellectualis +virtus, considerat divina secundum quod sunt investigabilia ratione +humana. Sed theologica virtus est circa ea secundum quod rationem +humanam excedunt.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Though charity is love, yet love is not always charity. When, then, it is stated that every virtue is the order of love, + this can be understood either of love in the general sense, or of the love of charity. If it be understood of love, commonly + so called, then each virtue is stated to be the order of love, in so far as each cardinal virtue requires ordinate emotions; + and love is the root and cause of every emotion, as stated above (Q[27], A[4]; + Q[28], A[6], ad 2; Q[41], A[2], ad 1). If, however, it be understood of the love of charity, it does not mean that every other + virtue is charity essentially: but that all other virtues depend on charity in some way, as we shall show further on (Q[65], + AA[2],5; + SS, Q[23], A[7]). +
[36114] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, licet caritas sit amor, non tamen omnis amor est +caritas. Cum ergo dicitur quod omnis virtus est ordo amoris, potest +intelligi vel de amore communiter dicto; vel de amore caritatis. Si +de amore communiter dicto, sic dicitur quaelibet virtus esse ordo +amoris, inquantum ad quamlibet cardinalium virtutum requiritur +ordinata affectio, omnis autem affectionis radix et principium est +amor, ut supra dictum est. Si autem intelligatur de amore +caritatis, non datur per hoc intelligi quod quaelibet alia virtus +essentialiter sit caritas, sed quod omnes aliae virtutes +aliqualiter a caritate dependeant, ut infra patebit.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that faith, hope, and charity are not fittingly reckoned as three theological virtues. For the theological + virtues are in relation to Divine happiness, what the natural inclination is in relation to the connatural end. Now among + the virtues directed to the connatural end there is but one natural virtue, viz. the understanding of principles. Therefore + there should be but one theological virtue. +
[36115] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter ponantur tres virtutes +theologicae, fides, spes et caritas. Virtutes enim theologicae se +habent in ordine ad beatitudinem divinam, sicut inclinatio naturae +ad finem connaturalem. Sed inter virtutes ordinatas ad finem +connaturalem, ponitur una sola virtus naturalis, scilicet +intellectus principiorum. Ergo debet poni una sola virtus +theologica.
+ Objection 2: Further, the theological virtues are more perfect than the intellectual and moral virtues. Now faith is not reckoned among + the intellectual virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is imperfect knowledge. Likewise hope is not reckoned + among the moral virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is a passion. Much less therefore should they be reckoned + as theological virtues. +
[36116] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +theologicae virtutes sunt perfectiores virtutibus intellectualibus +et moralibus. Sed inter intellectuales virtutes fides non ponitur, +sed est aliquid minus virtute, cum sit cognitio imperfecta. +Similiter etiam inter virtutes morales non ponitur spes, sed est +aliquid minus virtute, cum sit passio. Ergo multo minus debent poni +virtutes theologicae.
+ Objection 3: Further, the theological virtues direct man's soul to God. Now man's soul cannot be directed to God, save through the intellective + part, wherein are the intellect and will. Therefore there should be only two theological virtues, one perfecting the intellect, + the other, the will. +
[36117] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +virtutes theologicae ordinant animam hominis ad Deum. Sed ad Deum +non potest anima hominis ordinari nisi per intellectivam partem, in +qua est intellectus et voluntas. Ergo non debent esse nisi duae +virtutes theologicae, una quae perficiat intellectum, alia quae +perficiat voluntatem.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle says ( + 1 Cor. 13:13): "Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three." +
[36118] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XIII, nunc autem manent +fides, spes, caritas, tria haec.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[1]), the theological virtues direct man to supernatural happiness in the same way as by the natural inclination man is directed + to his connatural end. Now the latter happens in respect of two things. First, in respect of the reason or intellect, in so + far as it contains the first universal principles which are known to us by the natural light of the intellect, and which are + reason's starting-point, both in + speculative and in practical matters. Secondly, through the rectitude of the will which tends naturally to good as defined + by reason. +
But these two fall short of the order of supernatural happiness, according to + 1 Cor. 2:9: "The eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for + them that love Him." Consequently in respect of both the above things man needed to receive in addition something supernatural + to direct him to a supernatural end. First, as regards the intellect, man receives certain supernatural principles, which + are + held by means of a Divine light: these are the articles of faith, about which is faith. Secondly, the will is directed to + this end, both as to that end as something attainable---and this pertains to hope---and as to a certain spiritual union, whereby + the will is, so to speak, transformed into that end---and this belongs to charity. For the appetite of a thing is moved and + tends towards its connatural end naturally; and this movement is due to a certain conformity of the thing with its end. +
[36119] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtutes theologicae hoc +modo ordinant hominem ad beatitudinem supernaturalem, sicut per +naturalem inclinationem ordinatur homo in finem sibi connaturalem. +Hoc autem contingit secundum duo. Primo quidem, secundum rationem +vel intellectum, inquantum continet prima principia universalia +cognita nobis per naturale lumen intellectus, ex quibus procedit +ratio tam in speculandis quam in agendis. Secundo, per rectitudinem +voluntatis naturaliter tendentis in bonum rationis. Sed haec duo +deficiunt ab ordine beatitudinis supernaturalis; secundum illud I +ad Cor. II, oculus non vidit, et auris non audivit, et in cor +hominis non ascendit, quae praeparavit Deus diligentibus se. +Unde oportuit quod quantum ad utrumque, aliquid homini +supernaturaliter adderetur, ad ordinandum ipsum in finem +supernaturalem. Et primo quidem, quantum ad intellectum, adduntur +homini quaedam principia supernaturalia, quae divino lumine +capiuntur, et haec sunt credibilia, de quibus est fides. Secundo +vero, voluntas ordinatur in illum finem et quantum ad motum +intentionis, in ipsum tendentem sicut in id quod est possibile +consequi, quod pertinet ad spem, et quantum ad unionem quandam +spiritualem, per quam quodammodo transformatur in illum finem, quod +fit per caritatem. Appetitus enim uniuscuiusque rei naturaliter +movetur et tendit in finem sibi connaturalem, et iste motus +provenit ex quadam conformitate rei ad suum finem.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The intellect requires intelligible species whereby to understand: consequently there is need of a natural habit in addition + to the power. But the very nature of the will suffices for it to be directed naturally to the end, both as to the intention + of the end and as to its conformity with the end. But the nature of the power is insufficient in either of these respects, + for the will to be directed to things that are above its nature. Consequently there + was need for an additional supernatural habit in both respects. +
[36120] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod intellectus indiget speciebus intelligibilibus, +per quas intelligat, et ideo oportet quod in eo ponatur aliquis +habitus naturalis superadditus potentiae. Sed ipsa natura +voluntatis sufficit ad naturalem ordinem in finem, sive quantum ad +intentionem finis, sive quantum ad conformitatem ad ipsum. Sed in +ordine ad ea quae supra naturam sunt, ad nihil horum sufficit +natura potentiae. Et ideo oportet fieri superadditionem habitus +supernaturalis quantum ad utrumque.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Faith and hope imply a certain imperfection: since faith is of things unseen, and hope, of things not possessed. Hence faith + and hope, in things that are subject to human power, fall short of the notion of virtue. But faith and hope in things which + are above the capacity of human nature surpass all virtue that is in proportion to man, according to + 1 Cor. 1:25: "The weakness of God is stronger than men." +
[36121] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod fides et spes imperfectionem quandam important, quia +fides est de his quae non videntur, et spes de his quae non +habentur. Unde habere fidem et spem de his quae subduntur humanae +potestati, deficit a ratione virtutis. Sed habere fidem et spem de +his quae sunt supra facultatem naturae humanae, excedit omnem +virtutem homini proportionatam; secundum illud I ad Cor. I, quod +infirmum est Dei, fortius est hominibus.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Two things pertain to the appetite, viz. movement to the end, and conformity with the end by means of love. Hence there must + needs be two theological virtues in the human appetite, namely, hope and charity. +
[36122] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ad appetitum duo pertinent, scilicet motus in finem; +et conformatio ad finem per amorem. Et sic oportet quod in appetitu +humano duae virtutes theologicae ponantur, scilicet spes et +caritas.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the order of the theological virtues is not that faith precedes hope, and hope charity. For the root precedes + that which grows from it. Now charity is the root of all the virtues, according to + Eph. 3:17: "Being rooted and founded in charity." Therefore charity precedes the others. +
[36123] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit hic ordo theologicarum +virtutum, quod fides sit prior spe, et spes prior caritate. Radix +enim est prior eo quod est ex radice. Sed caritas est radix omnium +virtutum; secundum illud ad Ephes. III, in caritate radicati et +fundati. Ergo caritas est prior aliis.
+ Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i): "A man cannot love what he does not believe to exist. But if he believes and + loves, by doing good works he ends in hoping." Therefore it seems that faith precedes charity, and charity hope. +
[36124] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in I de Doct. Christ., non potest aliquis +diligere quod esse non crediderit. Porro si credit et diligit, bene +agendo efficit ut etiam speret. Ergo videtur quod fides +praecedat caritatem, et caritas spem.
+ Objection 3: Further, love is the principle of all our emotions, as stated above (A[2], ad 3). Now hope is a kind of emotion, since it + is a passion, as stated above ( + Q[25], A[2]). Therefore charity, which is love, precedes hope. +
[36125] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +amor est principium omnis affectionis, ut supra dictum est. Sed +spes nominat quandam affectionem; est enim quaedam passio, ut supra +dictum est. Ergo caritas, quae est amor, est prior spe.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle enumerates them thus ( + 1 Cor. 13:13): "Now there remain faith, hope, charity." +
[36126] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est ordo quo apostolus ista enumerat, dicens, nunc autem manent +fides, spes, caritas.
+ I answer that, Order is twofold: order of generation, and order of perfection. By order of generation, in respect of which matter precedes + form, and the imperfect precedes the perfect, in one same subject faith precedes hope, and hope charity, as to their acts: + because habits are all infused together. For the movement of the appetite cannot tend to anything, either by hoping or loving, + unless that thing be apprehended by the sense or by the intellect. Now it is by faith + that the intellect apprehends the object of hope and love. Hence in the order of generation, faith precedes hope and charity. + In like manner a man loves a thing because he apprehends it as his good. Now from the very fact that a man hopes to be able + to obtain some good through someone, he looks on the man in whom he hopes as a good of his own. Hence for the very reason + that a man hopes in someone, he proceeds to love him: so that in the order of generation, hope precedes charity as regards + their respective acts. +
But in the order of perfection, charity precedes faith and hope: because both faith and hope are quickened by charity, and + receive from charity their full complement as virtues. For thus charity is the mother and the root of all the virtues, inasmuch + as it is the form of them all, as we shall state further on ( + SS, Q[23], A[8]). +
[36127] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod duplex est ordo, scilicet generationis, et +perfectionis. Ordine quidem generationis, quo materia est prior +forma, et imperfectum perfecto, in uno et eodem; fides praecedit +spem, et spes caritatem, secundum actus (nam habitus simul +infunduntur). Non enim potest in aliquid motus appetitivus tendere +vel sperando vel amando, nisi quod est apprehensum sensu aut +intellectu. Per fidem autem apprehendit intellectus ea quae sperat +et amat. Unde oportet quod, ordine generationis, fides praecedat +spem et caritatem. Similiter autem ex hoc homo aliquid amat, quod +apprehendit illud ut bonum suum. Per hoc autem quod homo ab aliquo +sperat se bonum consequi posse, reputat ipsum in quo spem habet, +quoddam bonum suum. Unde ex hoc ipso quod homo sperat de aliquo, +procedit ad amandum ipsum. Et sic, ordine generationis, secundum +actus, spes praecedit caritatem. Ordine vero perfectionis, caritas +praecedit fidem et spem, eo quod tam fides quam spes per caritatem +formatur, et perfectionem virtutis acquirit. Sic enim caritas est +mater omnium virtutum et radix, inquantum est omnium virtutum +forma, ut infra dicetur.
Reply to Objection 1: This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
[36128] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 ad 1 Et per hoc +patet responsio ad primum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Augustine is speaking of that hope whereby a man hopes to obtain bliss through the merits which he has already: this belongs + to hope quickened by and following charity. But it is possible for a man before having charity, to hope through merits not + already possessed, but which he hopes to possess. +
[36129] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de spe qua quis sperat ex meritis +iam habitis se ad beatitudinem perventurum, quod est spei formatae, +quae sequitur caritatem. Potest autem aliquis sperare antequam +habeat caritatem, non ex meritis quae iam habet, sed quae sperat se +habiturum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ( + Q[40], A[7]), in treating of the passions, hope regards two things. One as its principal object, viz. the good hoped for. With regard + to this, love always precedes hope: for good is never hoped for unless it be desired and loved. Hope also regards the person + from whom a man hopes to be able to obtain some good. With regard to this, hope precedes love at first; though afterwards + hope is increased by love. + Because from the fact that a man thinks that he can obtain a good through someone, he begins to love him: and from the fact + that he loves him, he then hopes all the more in him. +
[36130] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum de passionibus ageretur, +spes respicit duo. Unum quidem sicut principale obiectum, scilicet +bonum quod speratur. Et respectu huius, semper amor praecedit spem, +nunquam enim speratur aliquod bonum nisi desideratum et amatum. +Respicit etiam spes illum a quo se sperat posse consequi bonum. Et +respectu huius, primo quidem spes praecedit amorem; quamvis postea +ex ipso amore spes augeatur. Per hoc enim quod aliquis reputat per +aliquem se posse consequi aliquod bonum, incipit amare ipsum, et ex +hoc ipso quod ipsum amat, postea fortius de eo sperat.
We must now consider the cause of virtues; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether virtue is in us by nature?
(2) Whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation?
(3) Whether any moral virtues are in us by infusion?
(4) Whether virtue acquired by habituation, is of the same species as infused virtue?
+[36131] +Iª-IIae q. 63 pr. Deinde considerandum est de causa +virtutum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum virtus sit +in nobis a natura. Secundo, utrum aliqua virtus causetur in nobis +ex assuetudine operum. Tertio, utrum aliquae virtutes morales sint +in nobis per infusionem. Quarto, utrum virtus quam acquirimus ex +assuetudine operum, sit eiusdem speciei cum virtute infusa.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that virtue is in us by nature. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14): "Virtues are natural to us and + are equally in all of us." And Antony says in his sermon to the monks: "If the will contradicts nature it is perverse, if + it follow nature it is virtuous." Moreover, a gloss on + Mat. 4:23, "Jesus went about," etc., says: "He taught them natural virtues, i.e. chastity, justice, humility, which man possesses naturally." +
[36132] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus sit in nobis a natura. Dicit +enim Damascenus, in III libro, naturales sunt virtutes, et +aequaliter insunt omnibus. Et Antonius dicit, in sermone ad +monachos, si naturam voluntas mutaverit, perversitas est; +conditio servetur, et virtus est. Et Matth. IV, super illud, +circuibat Iesus etc., dicit Glossa, docet naturales +iustitias, scilicet castitatem, iustitiam, humilitatem, quas +naturaliter habet homo.
+ Objection 2: Further, the virtuous good consists in accord with reason, as was clearly shown above ( + Q[55], A[4], ad 2). But that which accords with reason is natural to man; since reason is part of man's nature. Therefore virtue is in + man by nature. +
[36133] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +bonum virtutis est secundum rationem esse, ut ex dictis patet. Sed +id quod est secundum rationem, est homini naturale, cum ratio sit +hominis natura. Ergo virtus inest homini a natura.
+ Objection 3: Further, that which is in us from birth is said to be natural to us. Now virtues are in some from birth: for it is written + ( + Job 31:18): "From my infancy mercy grew up with me; and it came out with me from my mother's womb." Therefore virtue is in man by nature. +
[36134] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +illud dicitur esse nobis naturale, quod nobis a nativitate inest. +Sed virtutes quibusdam a nativitate insunt, dicitur enim Iob XXXI, +ab infantia crevit mecum miseratio, et de utero egressa est +mecum. Ergo virtus inest homini a natura.
+ On the contrary, Whatever is in man by nature is common to all men, and is not taken away by sin, since even in the demons natural gifts remain, + as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). But virtue is not in all men; and is cast out by sin. Therefore it is not in man by nature. +
[36135] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra, +id quod inest homini a natura, est omnibus hominibus commune, et +non tollitur per peccatum, quia etiam in Daemonibus bona naturalia +manent, ut Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed virtus non +inest omnibus hominibus; et abiicitur per peccatum. Ergo non inest +homini a natura.
+ I answer that, With regard to corporeal forms, it has been maintained by some that they are wholly from within, by those, for instance, + who upheld the theory of "latent forms" [*Anaxagoras; Cf. + FP, Q[45], A[8]; Q[65], A[4]]. Others held that forms are entirely from without, those, for instance, who thought that corporeal forms originated + from some separate cause. Others, however, esteemed that they are partly from within, in so far as they + pre-exist potentially in matter; and partly from without, in so far as they are brought into act by the agent. +
In like manner with regard to sciences and virtues, some held that they are wholly from within, so that all virtues and sciences + would pre-exist in the soul naturally, but that the hindrances to science and virtue, which are due to the soul being weighed + down by the body, are removed by study and practice, even as iron is made bright by being polished. This was the opinion of + the Platonists. Others said that they are wholly from without, being due to the inflow of the active + intellect, as Avicenna maintained. Others said that sciences and virtues are within us by nature, so far as we are adapted + to them, but not in their perfection: this is the teaching of the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1), and is nearer the truth. +
To make this clear, it must be observed that there are two ways in which something is said to be natural to a man; one is + according to his specific nature, the other according to his individual nature. And, since each thing derives its species + from its form, and its individuation from matter, and, again, since man's form is his rational soul, while his matter is his + body, whatever belongs to him in respect of his rational soul, is natural to him in respect of his specific + nature; while whatever belongs to him in respect of the particular temperament of his body, is natural to him in respect of + his individual nature. For whatever is natural to man in respect of his body, considered as part of his species, is to be + referred, in a way, to the soul, in so far as this particular body is adapted to this particular soul. +
In both these ways virtue is natural to man inchoatively. This is so in respect of the specific nature, in so far as in man's + reason are to be found instilled by nature certain naturally known principles of both knowledge and action, which are the + nurseries of intellectual and moral virtues, and in so far as there is in the will a natural appetite for good in accordance + with reason. Again, this is so in respect of the individual nature, in so far as by reason of a disposition in + the body, some are disposed either well or ill to certain virtues: because, to wit, certain sensitive powers are acts of certain + parts of the body, according to the disposition of which these powers are helped or hindered in the exercise of their acts, + and, in consequence, the rational powers also, which the aforesaid sensitive powers assist. In this way one man has a natural + aptitude for science, another for fortitude, another for temperance: and in these ways, both intellectual and moral + virtues are in us by way of a natural aptitude, inchoatively, but not perfectly, since nature is determined to one, while + the perfection of these virtues does not depend on one particular mode of action, but on various modes, in respect of the + various matters, which constitute the sphere of virtue's action, and according to various circumstances. +
It is therefore evident that all virtues are in us by nature, according to aptitude and inchoation, but not according to + perfection, except the theological virtues, which are entirely from without. +
[36136] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod circa formas corporales, aliqui dixerunt quod sunt +totaliter ab intrinseco, sicut ponentes latitationem formarum. +Aliqui vero, quod totaliter sint ab extrinseco, sicut ponentes +formas corporales esse ab aliqua causa separata. Aliqui vero, quod +partim sint ab intrinseco, inquantum scilicet praeexistunt in +materia in potentia; et partim ab extrinseco, inquantum scilicet +reducuntur ad actum per agens. Ita etiam circa scientias et +virtutes, aliqui quidem posuerunt eas totaliter esse ab intrinseco, +ita scilicet quod omnes virtutes et scientiae naturaliter +praeexistunt in anima; sed per disciplinam et exercitium +impedimenta scientiae et virtutis tolluntur, quae adveniunt animae +ex corporis gravitate; sicut cum ferrum clarificatur per +limationem. Et haec fuit opinio Platonicorum. Alii vero dixerunt +quod sunt totaliter ab extrinseco, idest ex influentia +intelligentiae agentis, ut ponit Avicenna. Alii vero dixerunt quod +secundum aptitudinem scientiae et virtutes sunt in nobis a natura, +non autem secundum perfectionem, ut philosophus dicit, in II Ethic. +Et hoc verius est. Ad cuius manifestationem, oportet considerare +quod aliquid dicitur alicui homini naturale dupliciter, uno modo, +ex natura speciei; alio modo, ex natura individui. Et quia +unumquodque habet speciem secundum suam formam, individuatur vero +secundum materiam; forma vero hominis est anima rationalis, materia +vero corpus, id quod convenit homini secundum animam rationalem, +est ei naturale secundum rationem speciei; id vero quod est ei +naturale secundum determinatam corporis complexionem, est ei +naturale secundum naturam individui. Quod enim est naturale homini +ex parte corporis secundum speciem, quodammodo refertur ad animam, +inquantum scilicet tale corpus est tali animae proportionatum. +Utroque autem modo virtus est homini naturalis secundum quandam +inchoationem. Secundum quidem naturam speciei, inquantum in ratione +homini insunt naturaliter quaedam principia naturaliter cognita tam +scibilium quam agendorum, quae sunt quaedam seminalia +intellectualium virtutum et moralium; et inquantum in voluntate +inest quidam naturalis appetitus boni quod est secundum rationem. +Secundum vero naturam individui, inquantum ex corporis dispositione +aliqui sunt dispositi vel melius vel peius ad quasdam virtutes, +prout scilicet vires quaedam sensitivae actus sunt quarundam +partium corporis, ex quarum dispositione adiuvantur vel impediuntur +huiusmodi vires in suis actibus, et per consequens vires +rationales, quibus huiusmodi sensitivae vires deserviunt. Et +secundum hoc, unus homo habet naturalem aptitudinem ad scientiam, +alius ad fortitudinem, alius ad temperantiam. Et his modis tam +virtutes intellectuales quam morales, secundum quandam aptitudinis +inchoationem, sunt in nobis a natura. Non autem consummatio earum. +Quia natura determinatur ad unum, consummatio autem huiusmodi +virtutum non est secundum unum modum actionis, sed diversimode, +secundum diversas materias in quibus virtutes operantur, et +secundum diversas circumstantias. Sic ergo patet quod virtutes in +nobis sunt a natura secundum aptitudinem et inchoationem, non autem +secundum perfectionem, praeter virtutes theologicas, quae sunt +totaliter ab extrinseco.
Reply to Objections: This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two argue about the nurseries of virtue which are in us by + nature, inasmuch as we are rational beings. The third objection must be taken in the sense that, owing to the natural disposition + which the body has from birth, one has an aptitude for pity, another for living temperately, another for some other virtue. +
[36137] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 1 ad 1 Et per hoc +patet responsio ad obiecta. Nam primae duae rationes procedunt +secundum quod seminalia virtutum insunt nobis a natura, inquantum +rationales sumus. Tertia vero ratio procedit secundum quod ex +naturali dispositione corporis, quam habet ex nativitate, unus +habet aptitudinem ad miserendum, alius ad temperate vivendum, alius +ad aliam virtutem.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that virtues can not be caused in us by habituation. Because a gloss of Augustine [*Cf. Lib. Sentent. Prosperi + cvi.] commenting on + Rom. 14:23, "All that is not of faith is sin," says: "The whole life of an unbeliever is a sin: and there is no good without the Sovereign + Good. Where knowledge of the truth is lacking, virtue is a mockery even in the best behaved people." Now faith cannot be acquired + by means of works, but is + caused in us by God, according to + Eph. 2:8: "By grace you are saved through faith." Therefore no acquired virtue can be in us by habituation. +
[36138] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes in nobis causari non possint +ex assuetudine operum. Quia super illud Rom. XIV, omne quod non +est ex fide, peccatum est, dicit Glossa Augustini, omnis +infidelium vita peccatum est; et nihil est bonum sine summo bono. +Ubi deest cognitio veritatis, falsa est virtus etiam in optimis +moribus. Sed fides non potest acquiri ex operibus, sed causatur +in nobis a Deo; secundum illud Ephes. II, gratia estis salvati +per fidem. Ergo nulla virtus potest in nobis acquiri ex +assuetudine operum.
+ Objection 2: Further, sin and virtue are contraries, so that they are incompatible. Now man cannot avoid sin except by the grace of God, + according to + Wis. 8:21: "I knew that I could not otherwise be continent, except God gave it." Therefore neither can any virtues be caused in us + by habituation, but only by the gift of God. +
[36139] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +peccatum, cum contrarietur virtuti, non compatitur secum virtutem. +Sed homo non potest vitare peccatum nisi per gratiam Dei; secundum +illud Sap. VIII, didici quod non possum esse aliter continens, +nisi Deus det. Ergo nec virtutes aliquae possunt in nobis +causari ex assuetudine operum; sed solum dono Dei.
+ Objection 3: Further, actions which lead toward virtue, lack the perfection of virtue. But an effect cannot be more perfect than its cause. + Therefore a virtue cannot be caused by actions that precede it. +
[36140] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +actus qui sunt in virtutem, deficiunt a perfectione virtutis. Sed +effectus non potest esse perfectior causa. Ergo virtus non potest +causari ex actibus praecedentibus virtutem.
+ On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that good is more efficacious than evil. But vicious habits are caused by evil acts. Much more, + therefore, can virtuous habits be caused by good acts. +
[36141] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod bonum est +virtuosius quam malum. Sed ex malis actibus causantur habitus +vitiorum. Ergo multo magis ex bonis actibus possunt causari habitus +virtutum.
+ I answer that, We have spoken above ( + Q[51], AA[2],3) in a general way about the production of habits from acts; and speaking now in a special way of this matter in relation + to virtue, we must take note that, as stated above ( + Q[55], AA[3],4), man's virtue perfects him in relation to good. Now since the notion of good consists in "mode, species, and order," as + Augustine states (De Nat. Boni. iii) or in "number, weight, and + measure," as expressed in + Wis. 11:21, man's good must needs be appraised with respect to some rule. Now this rule is twofold, as stated above ( + Q[19], AA[3],4), viz. human reason and Divine Law. And since Divine Law is the higher rule, it extends to more things, so that whatever + is ruled by human reason, is ruled by the Divine Law too; but the converse does not hold. +
[36142] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod de generatione habituum ex actibus, supra in generali +dictum est. Nunc autem specialiter quantum ad virtutem, +considerandum est quod sicut supra dictum est, virtus hominis +perficit ipsum ad bonum. Cum autem ratio boni consistat in modo, +specie et ordine, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de natura boni; sive +in numero, pondere et mensura, ut dicitur Sap. XI, oportet quod +bonum hominis secundum aliquam regulam consideretur. Quae quidem +est duplex, ut supra dictum est, scilicet ratio humana, et lex +divina. Et quia lex divina est superior regula, ideo ad plura se +extendit, ita quod quidquid regulatur ratione humana, regulatur +etiam lege divina, sed non convertitur. Virtus igitur hominis +ordinata ad bonum quod modificatur secundum regulam rationis +humanae, potest ex actibus humanis causari, inquantum huiusmodi +actus procedunt a ratione, sub cuius potestate et regula tale bonum +consistit. Virtus vero ordinans hominem ad bonum secundum quod +modificatur per legem divinam, et non per rationem humanam, non +potest causari per actus humanos, quorum principium est ratio, sed +causatur solum in nobis per operationem divinam. Et ideo, huiusmodi +virtutem definiens, Augustinus posuit in definitione virtutis, quam +Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur.
It follows that human virtue directed to the good which is defined according to the rule of human reason can be caused by + human acts: inasmuch as such acts proceed from reason, by whose power and rule the aforesaid good is established. On the other + hand, virtue which directs man to good as defined by the Divine Law, and not by human reason, cannot be caused by human acts, + the principle of which is reason, but is produced in us by the Divine operation alone. Hence Augustine in + giving the definition of the latter virtue inserts the words, "which God works in us without us" (Super + Ps. 118, Serm. xxvi). It is also of these virtues that the First Objection holds good. +
[36143] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 ad 1 Et de +huiusmodi etiam virtutibus prima ratio procedit.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Mortal sin is incompatible with divinely infused virtue, especially if this be considered in its perfect state. But actual + sin, even mortal, is compatible with humanly acquired virtue; because the use of a habit in us is subject to our will, as + stated above ( + Q[49], A[3]): and one sinful act does not destroy a habit of acquired virtue, since it is not an act but a habit, that is directly contrary + to a habit. Wherefore, though + man cannot avoid mortal sin without grace, so as never to sin mortally, yet he is not hindered from acquiring a habit of virtue, + whereby he may abstain from evil in the majority of cases, and chiefly in matters most opposed to reason. There are also certain + mortal sins which man can nowise avoid without grace, those, namely, which are directly opposed to the theological virtues, + which are in us through the gift of grace. This, however, will be more fully explained later ( + Q[109], A[4]). +
[36144] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod virtus divinitus infusa, maxime si in sua perfectione +consideretur, non compatitur secum aliquod peccatum mortale. Sed +virtus humanitus acquisita potest secum compati aliquem actum +peccati, etiam mortalis, quia usus habitus in nobis est nostrae +voluntati subiectus, ut supra dictum est; non autem per unum actum +peccati corrumpitur habitus virtutis acquisitae; habitui enim non +contrariatur directe actus, sed habitus. Et ideo, licet sine gratia +homo non possit peccatum mortale vitare, ita quod nunquam peccet +mortaliter; non tamen impeditur quin possit habitum virtutis +acquirere, per quam a malis operibus abstineat ut in pluribus, et +praecipue ab his quae sunt valde rationi contraria. Sunt etiam +quaedam peccata mortalia quae homo sine gratia nullo modo potest +vitare, quae scilicet directe opponuntur virtutibus theologicis, +quae ex dono gratiae sunt in nobis. Hoc tamen infra manifestius +fiet.
+ Reply to Objection 3: As stated above + (A[1]; Q[51], A[1]), certain seeds or principles of acquired virtue pre-exist in us by nature. These principles are more excellent + than the virtues acquired through them: thus the understanding of speculative principles is more excellent than the science + of conclusions, and the natural rectitude of the reason is more excellent than the rectification of the appetite which results + through the appetite partaking + of reason, which rectification belongs to moral virtue. Accordingly human acts, in so far as they proceed from higher principles, + can cause acquired human virtues. +
[36145] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, virtutum acquisitarum praeexistunt +in nobis quaedam semina sive principia, secundum naturam. Quae +quidem principia sunt nobiliora virtutibus eorum virtute +acquisitis, sicut intellectus principiorum speculabilium est +nobilior scientia conclusionum; et naturalis rectitudo rationis est +nobilior rectificatione appetitus quae fit per participationem +rationis, quae quidem rectificatio pertinet ad virtutem moralem. +Sic igitur actus humani, inquantum procedunt ex altioribus +principiis, possunt causare virtutes acquisitas humanas.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that no virtues besides the theological virtues are infused in us by God. Because God does not do by Himself, + save perhaps sometimes miraculously, those things that can be done by second causes; for, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv), + "it is God's rule to bring about extremes through the mean." Now intellectual and moral virtues can be caused in us by our + acts, as stated above + (A[2]). Therefore it is not reasonable that + they should be caused in us by infusion. +
[36146] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod praeter virtutes theologicas, non sint +aliae virtutes nobis infusae a Deo. Ea enim quae possunt fieri a +causis secundis, non fiunt immediate a Deo, nisi forte aliquando +miraculose, quia, ut Dionysius dicit, lex divinitatis est ultima +per media adducere. Sed virtutes intellectuales et morales possunt +in nobis causari per nostros actus, ut dictum est. Non ergo +convenienter causantur in nobis per infusionem.
+ Objection 2: Further, much less superfluity is found in God's works than in the works of nature. Now the theological virtues suffice to + direct us to supernatural good. Therefore there are no other supernatural virtues needing to be caused in us by God. +
[36147] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +in operibus Dei multo minus est aliquid superfluum quam in operibus +naturae. Sed ad ordinandum nos in bonum supernaturale, sufficiunt +virtutes theologicae. Ergo non sunt aliae virtutes supernaturales, +quas oporteat in nobis causari a Deo.
+ Objection 3: Further, nature does not employ two means where one suffices: much less does God. But God sowed the seeds of virtue in our + souls, according to a gloss on + Heb. 1 [*Cf. Jerome on + Gal. 1: 15,16]. Therefore it is unfitting for Him to cause in us other virtues by means of infusion. +
[36148] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +natura non facit per duo, quod potest facere per unum, et multo +minus Deus. Sed Deus inseruit animae nostrae semina virtutum, ut +dicit Glossa Heb. I. Ergo non oportet quod alias virtutes in nobis +per infusionem causet.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Wis. 8:7): "She teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude." +
[36149] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Sap. VIII, sobrietatem et iustitiam docet, +prudentiam et virtutem.
+ I answer that, Effects must needs be proportionate to their causes and principles. Now all virtues, intellectual and moral, that are acquired + by our actions, arise from certain natural principles pre-existing in us, as above stated + (A[1]; Q[51], A[1]): instead of which natural principles, God bestows on us the theological virtues, whereby we are directed to + a supernatural end, as stated (Q[62], A[1]). Wherefore we need to receive from God other + habits corresponding, in due proportion, to the theological virtues, which habits are to the theological virtues, what the + moral and intellectual virtues are to the natural principles of virtue. +
[36150] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod oportet effectus esse suis causis et principiis +proportionatos. Omnes autem virtutes tam intellectuales quam +morales, quae ex nostris actibus acquiruntur, procedunt ex +quibusdam naturalibus principiis in nobis praeexistentibus, ut +supra dictum est. Loco quorum naturalium principiorum, conferuntur +nobis a Deo virtutes theologicae, quibus ordinamur ad finem +supernaturalem, sicut supra dictum est. Unde oportet quod his etiam +virtutibus theologicis proportionaliter respondeant alii habitus +divinitus causati in nobis, qui sic se habeant ad virtutes +theologicas sicut se habent virtutes morales et intellectuales ad +principia naturalia virtutum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Some moral and intellectual virtues can indeed be caused in us by our actions: but such are not proportionate to the theological + virtues. Therefore it was necessary for us to receive, from God immediately, others that are proportionate to these virtues. +
[36151] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod aliquae quidem virtutes morales et +intellectuales possunt causari in nobis ex nostris actibus, tamen +illae non sunt proportionatae virtutibus theologicis. Et ideo +oportet alias, eis proportionatas, immediate a Deo causari.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The theological virtues direct us sufficiently to our supernatural end, inchoatively: i.e. to God Himself immediately. But + the soul needs further to be perfected by infused virtues in regard to other things, yet in relation to God. +
[36152] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod virtutes theologicae sufficienter nos ordinant in +finem supernaturalem, secundum quandam inchoationem, quantum +scilicet ad ipsum Deum immediate. Sed oportet quod per alias +virtutes infusas perficiatur anima circa alias res, in ordine tamen +ad Deum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The power of those naturally instilled principles does not extend beyond the capacity of nature. Consequently man needs in + addition to be perfected by other principles in relation to his supernatural end. +
[36153] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod virtus illorum principiorum naturaliter inditorum, +non se extendit ultra proportionem naturae. Et ideo in ordine ad +finem supernaturalem, indiget homo perfici per alia principia +superaddita.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that infused virtue does not differ in species from acquired virtue. Because acquired and infused virtues, + according to what has been said + (A[3]), do not differ seemingly, save in relation to the last end. Now human habits and acts are specified, not by their last, but + by their proximate end. Therefore the infused moral or intellectual virtue does not differ from the acquired virtue. +
[36154] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes infusae non sint alterius +speciei a virtutibus acquisitis. Virtus enim acquisita et virtus +infusa, secundum praedicta, non videntur differre nisi secundum +ordinem ad ultimum finem. Sed habitus et actus humani non recipiunt +speciem ab ultimo fine, sed a proximo. Non ergo virtutes morales +vel intellectuales infusae differunt specie ab acquisitis.
+ Objection 2: Further, habits are known by their acts. But the act of infused and acquired temperance is the same, viz. to moderate desires + of touch. Therefore they do not differ in species. +
[36155] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +habitus per actus cognoscuntur. Sed idem est actus temperantiae +infusae, et acquisitae, scilicet moderari concupiscentias tactus. +Ergo non differunt specie.
+ Objection 3: Further, acquired and infused virtue differ as that which is wrought by God immediately, from that which is wrought by a + creature. But the man whom God made, is of the same species as a man begotten naturally; and the eye which He gave to the + man born blind, as one produced by the power of generation. Therefore it seems that acquired and infused virtue belong to + the same species. +
[36156] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +virtus acquisita et infusa differunt secundum illud quod est +immediate a Deo factum, et a creatura. Sed idem est specie homo +quem Deus formavit, et quem generat natura; et oculus quem caeco +nato dedit, et quem virtus formativa causat. Ergo videtur quod est +eadem specie virtus acquisita, et infusa.
+ On the contrary, Any change introduced into the difference expressed in a definition involves a difference of species. But the definition + of infused virtue contains the words, "which God works in us without us," as stated above ( + Q[55], A[4]). Therefore acquired virtue, to which these words cannot apply, is not of the same species as infused virtue. +
[36157] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra, +quaelibet differentia in definitione posita, mutata diversificat +speciem. Sed in definitione virtutis infusae ponitur, quam Deus in +nobis sine nobis operatur, ut supra dictum est. Ergo virtus +acquisita, cui hoc non convenit, non est eiusdem speciei cum +infusa.
+ I answer that, There is a twofold specific difference among habits. The first, as stated above ( + Q[54], A[2]; + Q[56], A[2]; + Q[60], A[1]), is taken from the specific and formal aspects of their objects. Now the object of every virtue is a good considered as + in that virtue's proper matter: thus the object of temperance is a good in respect of the pleasures connected with the concupiscence + of touch. The + formal aspect of this object is from reason which fixes the mean in these concupiscences: while the material element is something + on the part of the concupiscences. Now it is evident that the mean that is appointed in such like concupiscences according + to the rule of human reason, is seen under a different aspect from the mean which is fixed according to Divine rule. For instance, + in the consumption of food, the mean fixed by human reason, is that food should not harm the health of the body, + nor hinder the use of reason: whereas, according to the Divine rule, it behooves man to "chastise his body, and bring it into + subjection" ( + 1 Cor. 9:27), by abstinence in food, drink and the like. It is therefore evident that infused and acquired temperance differ in species; + and the same applies to the other virtues. +
The other specific differences among habits is taken from the things to which they are directed: for a man's health and a + horse's are not of the same species, on account of the difference between the natures to which their respective healths are + directed. In the same sense, the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 3) that citizens have diverse virtues according as they are + well directed to diverse forms of government. In the same way, too, those infused moral virtues, whereby men + behave well in respect of their being "fellow-citizens with the saints, and of the household [Douay: 'domestics'] of God" + ( + Eph. 2:19), differ from the acquired virtues, whereby man behaves well in respect of human affairs. +
[36158] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod dupliciter habitus distinguuntur specie. Uno modo, +sicut praedictum est, secundum speciales et formales rationes +obiectorum. Obiectum autem virtutis cuiuslibet est bonum +consideratum in materia propria, sicut temperantiae obiectum est +bonum delectabilium in concupiscentiis tactus. Cuius quidem obiecti +formalis ratio est a ratione, quae instituit modum in his +concupiscentiis, materiale autem est id quod est ex parte +concupiscentiarum. Manifestum est autem quod alterius rationis est +modus qui imponitur in huiusmodi concupiscentiis secundum regulam +rationis humanae, et secundum regulam divinam. Puta in sumptione +ciborum, ratione humana modus statuitur ut non noceat valetudini +corporis, nec impediat rationis actum, secundum autem regulam legis +divinae, requiritur quod homo castiget corpus suum, et in +servitutem redigat, per abstinentiam cibi et potus, et aliorum +huiusmodi. Unde manifestum est quod temperantia infusa et acquisita +differunt specie, et eadem ratio est de aliis virtutibus. Alio modo +habitus distinguuntur specie secundum ea ad quae ordinantur, non +enim est eadem specie sanitas hominis et equi, propter diversas +naturas ad quas ordinantur. Et eodem modo dicit philosophus, in III +Polit., quod diversae sunt virtutes civium, secundum quod bene se +habent ad diversas politias. Et per hunc etiam modum differunt +specie virtutes morales infusae, per quas homines bene se habent in +ordine ad hoc quod sint cives sanctorum et domestici Dei; et aliae +virtutes acquisitae, secundum quas homo se bene habet in ordine ad +res humanas.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Infused and acquired virtue differ not only in relation to the ultimate end, but also in relation to their proper objects, + as stated. +
[36159] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod virtus infusa et acquisita non solum differunt +secundum ordinem ad ultimum finem; sed etiam secundum ordinem ad +propria obiecta, ut dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Both acquired and infused temperance moderate desires for pleasures of touch, but for different reasons, as stated: wherefore + their respective acts are not identical. +
[36160] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod alia ratione modificat concupiscentias delectabilium +tactus temperantia acquisita, et temperantia infusa, ut dictum est. +Unde non habent eundem actum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: God gave the man born blind an eye for the same act as the act for which other eyes are formed naturally: consequently it + was of the same species. It would be the same if God wished to give a man miraculously virtues, such as those that are acquired + by acts. But the case is not so in the question before us, as stated. +
[36161] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod oculum caeci nati Deus fecit ad eundem actum ad quem +formantur alii oculi secundum naturam, et ideo fuit eiusdem +speciei. Et eadem ratio esset, si Deus vellet miraculose causare in +homine virtutes quales acquiruntur ex actibus. Sed ita non est in +proposito, ut dictum est.
We must now consider the properties of virtues: and (1) the mean of virtue, (2) the connection between virtues, (3) equality + of virtues, (4) the duration of virtues. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: +
(1) Whether moral virtue observes the mean?
(2) Whether the mean of moral virtue is the real mean or the rational mean?
+[36162] +Iª-IIae q. 64 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +proprietatibus virtutum. Et primo quidem, de medio virtutum; +secundo, de connexione virtutum; tertio, de aequalitate earum; +quarto, de ipsarum duratione. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. +Primo, utrum virtutes morales sint in medio. Secundo, utrum medium +virtutis moralis sit medium rei, vel rationis. Tertio, utrum +intellectuales virtutes consistant in medio. Quarto, utrum virtutes +theologicae.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue does not observe the mean. For the nature of a mean is incompatible with that which is extreme. + Now the nature of virtue is to be something extreme; for it is stated in De Coelo i that "virtue is the limit of power." Therefore + moral virtue does not observe the mean. +
[36163] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus moralis non consistat in medio. +Ultimum enim repugnat rationi medii. Sed de ratione virtutis est +ultimum, dicitur enim in I de caelo, quod virtus est ultimum +potentiae. Ergo virtus moralis non consistit in medio.
+ Objection 2: Further, the maximum is not a mean. Now some moral virtues tend to a maximum: for instance, magnanimity to very great honors, + and magnificence to very large expenditure, as stated in Ethic. iv, 2,3. Therefore not every moral virtue observes the mean. +
[36164] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +illud quod est maximum, non est medium. Sed quaedam virtutes +morales tendunt in aliquod maximum, sicut magnanimitas est circa +maximos honores, et magnificentia circa maximos sumptus, ut dicitur +in IV Ethic. Ergo non omnis virtus moralis est in medio.
+ Objection 3: Further, if it is essential to a moral virtue to observe the mean, it follows that a moral virtue is not perfected, but the + contrary corrupted, through tending to something extreme. Now some moral virtues are perfected by tending to something extreme; + thus virginity, which abstains from all sexual pleasure, observes the extreme, and is the most perfect chastity: and to give + all to the poor is the most perfect mercy or liberality. Therefore it seems that it is + not essential to moral virtue that it should observe the mean. +
[36165] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +si de ratione virtutis moralis sit in medio esse, oportet quod +virtus moralis non perficiatur, sed magis corrumpatur, per hoc quod +tendit ad extremum. Sed quaedam virtutes morales perficiuntur per +hoc quod tendunt ad extremum, sicut virginitas, quae abstinet ab +omni delectabili venereo, et sic tenet extremum, et est +perfectissima castitas. Et dare omnia pauperibus est perfectissima +misericordia vel liberalitas. Ergo videtur quod non sit de ratione +virtutis moralis esse in medio.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "moral virtue is a habit of choosing the mean." +
[36166] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod virtus moralis +est habitus electivus in medietate existens.
+ I answer that, As already explained ( + Q[55], A[3]), the nature of virtue is that it should direct man to good. Now moral virtue is properly a perfection of the appetitive + part of the soul in regard to some determinate matter: and the measure or rule of the appetitive movement in respect of appetible + objects is the reason. But the good of that which is measured or ruled consists in its conformity with its rule: thus the + good things made by art is + that they follow the rule of art. Consequently, in things of this sort, evil consists in discordance from their rule or measure. + Now this may happen either by their exceeding the measure or by their falling short of it; as is clearly the case in all things + ruled or measured. Hence it is evident that the good of moral virtue consists in conformity with the rule of reason. Now it + is clear that between excess and deficiency the mean is equality or conformity. Therefore it is evident that moral + virtue observes the mean. +
[36167] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ex supradictis patet, virtus de sui ratione +ordinat hominem ad bonum. Moralis autem virtus proprie est +perfectiva appetitivae partis animae circa aliquam determinatam +materiam. Mensura autem et regula appetitivi motus circa +appetibilia, est ipsa ratio. Bonum autem cuiuslibet mensurati et +regulati consistit in hoc quod conformetur suae regulae, sicut +bonum in artificiatis est ut consequantur regulam artis. Malum +autem per consequens in huiusmodi est per hoc quod aliquid +discordat a sua regula vel mensura. Quod quidem contingit vel per +hoc quod superexcedit mensuram, vel per hoc quod deficit ab ea, +sicut manifeste apparet in omnibus regulatis et mensuratis. Et ideo +patet quod bonum virtutis moralis consistit in adaequatione ad +mensuram rationis. Manifestum est autem quod inter excessum et +defectum medium est aequalitas sive conformitas. Unde manifeste +apparet quod virtus moralis in medio consistit.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Moral virtue derives goodness from the rule of reason, while its matter consists in passions or operations. If therefore + we compare moral virtue to reason, then, if we look at that which is has of reason, it holds the position of one extreme, + viz. conformity; while excess and defect take the position of the other extreme, viz. deformity. But if we consider moral + virtue in respect of its matter, then it holds the position of mean, in so far as it makes + the passion conform to the rule of reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "virtue, as to its essence, is a + mean state," in so far as the rule of virtue is imposed on its proper matter: "but it is an extreme in reference to the 'best' + and the 'excellent,'" viz. as to its conformity with reason. +
[36168] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod virtus moralis bonitatem habet ex regula +rationis, pro materia autem habet passiones vel operationes. Si +ergo comparetur virtus moralis ad rationem, sic, secundum id quod +rationis est, habet rationem extremi unius, quod est conformitas, +excessus vero et defectus habet rationem alterius extremi, quod est +difformitas. Si vero consideretur virtus moralis secundum suam +materiam, sic habet rationem medii, inquantum passionem reducit ad +regulam rationis. Unde philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod virtus +secundum substantiam medietas est, inquantum regula virtutis +ponitur circa propriam materiam, secundum optimum autem et bene, +est extremitas, scilicet secundum conformitatem rationis.
+ Reply to Objection 2: In actions and passions the mean and the extremes depend on various circumstances: hence nothing hinders something from being + extreme in a particular virtue as to one circumstance, while the same thing is a mean in respect of other circumstances, through + being in conformity with reason. This is the case with magnanimity and magnificence. For if we look at the absolute quantity + of the respective objects of these virtues, we shall call it an extreme and + a maximum: but if we consider the quantity in relation to other circumstances, then it has the character of a mean: since + these virtues tend to this maximum in accordance with the rule of reason, i.e. "where" it is right, "when" it is right, and + for an "end" that is right. There will be excess, if one tends to this maximum "when" it is not right, or "where" it is not + right, or for an undue "end"; and there will be deficiency if one fails to tend thereto "where" one ought, and "when" one + aught. + This agrees with the saying of the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) that the "magnanimous man observes the extreme in quantity, + but the mean in the right mode of his action." +
[36169] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod medium et extrema considerantur in actionibus et +passionibus secundum diversas circumstantias, unde nihil prohibet +in aliqua virtute esse extremum secundum unam circumstantiam, quod +tamen est medium secundum alias circumstantias, per conformitatem +ad rationem. Et sic est in magnificentia et magnanimitate. Nam si +consideretur quantitas absoluta eius in quod tendit magnificus et +magnanimus, dicetur extremum et maximum, sed si consideretur hoc +ipsum per comparationem ad alias circumstantias, sic habet rationem +medii; quia in hoc tendunt huiusmodi virtutes secundum regulam +rationis, idest ubi oportet, et quando oportet, et propter quod +oportet. Excessus autem, si in hoc maximum tendatur quando non +oportet, vel ubi non oportet, vel propter quod non oportet; +defectus autem est, si non tendatur in hoc maximum ubi oportet, et +quando oportet. Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., +quod magnanimus est quidem magnitudine extremus; eo autem quod +ut oportet, medius.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The same is to be said of virginity and poverty as of magnanimity. For virginity abstains from all sexual matters, and poverty + from all wealth, for a right end, and in a right manner, i.e. according to God's word, and for the sake of eternal life. But + if this be done in an undue manner, i.e. out of unlawful superstition, or again for vainglory, it will be in excess. And if + it be not done when it ought to be done, or as it ought to be done, it is a + vice by deficiency: for instance, in those who break their vows of virginity or poverty. +
[36170] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod eadem ratio est de virginitate et paupertate, quae +est de magnanimitate. Abstinet enim virginitas ab omnibus venereis, +et paupertas ab omnibus divitiis, propter quod oportet, et secundum +quod oportet; idest secundum mandatum Dei, et propter vitam +aeternam. Si autem hoc fiat secundum quod non oportet, idest +secundum aliquam superstitionem illicitam, vel etiam propter inanem +gloriam; erit superfluum. Si autem non fiat quando oportet, vel +secundum quod oportet, est vitium per defectum, ut patet in +transgredientibus votum virginitatis vel paupertatis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the mean of moral virtue is not the rational mean, but the real mean. For the good of moral virtue consists + in its observing the mean. Now, good, as stated in Metaph. ii, text. 8, is in things themselves. Therefore the mean of moral + virtue is a real mean. +
[36171] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod medium virtutis moralis non sit medium +rationis, sed medium rei. Bonum enim virtutis moralis consistit in +hoc quod est in medio. Bonum autem, ut dicitur in VI Metaphys., est +in rebus ipsis. Ergo medium virtutis moralis est medium rei.
+ Objection 2: Further, the reason is a power of apprehension. But moral virtue does not observe a mean between apprehensions, but rather + a mean between operations or passions. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is not the rational, but the real mean. +
[36172] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +ratio est vis apprehensiva. Sed virtus moralis non consistit in +medio apprehensionum; sed magis in medio operationum et passionum. +Ergo medium virtutis moralis non est medium rationis, sed medium +rei.
+ Objection 3: Further, a mean that is observed according to arithmetical or geometrical proportion is a real mean. Now such is the mean + of justice, as stated in Ethic. v, 3. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is not the rational, but the real mean. +
[36173] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +medium quod accipitur secundum proportionem arithmeticam vel +geometricam, est medium rei. Sed tale est medium iustitiae, ut +dicitur in V Ethic. Ergo medium virtutis moralis non est medium +rationis, sed rei.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "moral virtue observes the mean fixed, in our regard, by reason." +
[36174] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod virtus moralis in +medio consistit quoad nos, determinata ratione.
+ I answer that, The rational mean can be understood in two ways. First, according as the mean is observed in the act itself of reason, as + though the very act of reason were made to observe the mean: in this sense, since moral virtue perfects not the act of reason, + but the act of the appetitive power, the mean of moral virtue is not the rational mean. Secondly, the mean of reason may be + considered as that which the reason puts into some particular matter. In this sense every + mean of moral virtue is a rational mean, since, as above stated + (A[1]), moral virtue is said to observe the mean, through conformity with right reason. +
But it happens sometimes that the rational mean is also the real mean: in which case the mean of moral virtue is the real + mean, for instance, in justice. On the other hand, sometimes the rational mean is not the real mean, but is considered in + relation to us: and such is the mean in all the other moral virtues. The reason for this is that justice is about operations, + which deal with external things, wherein the right has to be established simply and absolutely, as stated above + ( + Q[60], A[2]): wherefore the rational mean in justice is the same as the real mean, in so far, to wit as justice gives to each one his + due, neither more nor less. But the other moral virtues deal with interior passions wherein the right cannot be established + in the same way, since men are variously situated in relation to their passions; hence the rectitude of reason has to be established + in the passions, with due regard to us, who are moved in respect of the + passions. +
[36175] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod medium rationis dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno +modo, secundum quod medium in ipso actu rationis existit, quasi +ipse actus rationis ad medium reducatur. Et sic, quia virtus +moralis non perficit actum rationis, sed actum virtutis +appetitivae; medium virtutis moralis non est medium rationis. Alio +modo potest dici medium rationis id quod a ratione ponitur in +aliqua materia. Et sic omne medium virtutis moralis est medium +rationis, quia, sicut dictum est, virtus moralis dicitur consistere +in medio, per conformitatem ad rationem rectam. Sed quandoque +contingit quod medium rationis est etiam medium rei, et tunc +oportet quod virtutis moralis medium sit medium rei; sicut est in +iustitia. Quandoque autem medium rationis non est medium rei, sed +accipitur per comparationem ad nos, et sic est medium in omnibus +aliis virtutibus moralibus. Cuius ratio est quia iustitia est circa +operationes, quae consistunt in rebus exterioribus, in quibus +rectum institui debet simpliciter et secundum se, ut supra dictum +est, et ideo medium rationis in iustitia est idem cum medio rei, +inquantum scilicet iustitia dat unicuique quod debet, et non plus +nec minus. Aliae vero virtutes morales consistunt circa passiones +interiores, in quibus non potest rectum constitui eodem modo, +propter hoc quod homines diversimode se habent ad passiones, et +ideo oportet quod rectitudo rationis in passionibus instituatur per +respectum ad nos, qui afficimur secundum passiones.
Reply to Objections: This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two arguments take the rational mean as being in the very + act of reason, while the third argues from the mean of justice. +
[36176] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 2 ad 1 Et per hoc +patet responsio ad obiecta. Nam, primae duae rationes procedunt de +medio rationis quod scilicet invenitur in ipso actu rationis. +Tertia vero ratio procedit de medio iustitiae.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual virtues do not observe the mean. Because moral virtue observes the mean by conforming + to the rule of reason. But the intellectual virtues are in reason itself, so that they seem to have no higher rule. Therefore + the intellectual virtues do not observe the mean. +
[36177] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes intellectuales non consistant +in medio. Virtutes enim morales consistunt in medio, inquantum +conformantur regulae rationis. Sed virtutes intellectuales sunt in +ipsa ratione; et sic non videntur habere superiorem regulam. Ergo +virtutes intellectuales non consistunt in medio.
+ Objection 2: Further, the mean of moral virtue is fixed by an intellectual virtue: for it is stated in Ethic. ii, 6, that "virtue observes + the mean appointed by reason, as a prudent man would appoint it." If therefore intellectual virtue also observe the mean, + this mean will have to be appointed for them by another virtue, so that there would be an indefinite series of virtues. +
[36178] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +medium virtutis moralis determinatur a virtute intellectuali, +dicitur enim in II Ethic., quod virtus consistit in medietate +determinata ratione, prout sapiens determinabit. Si igitur +virtus intellectualis iterum consistat in medio, oportet quod +determinetur sibi medium per aliquam aliam virtutem. Et sic +procedetur in infinitum in virtutibus.
+ Objection 3: Further, a mean is, properly speaking, between contraries, as the Philosopher explains (Metaph. x, text. 22,23). But there + seems to be no contrariety in the intellect; since contraries themselves, as they are in the intellect, are not in opposition + to one another, but are understood together, as white and black, healthy and sick. Therefore there is no mean in the intellectual + virtues. +
[36179] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +medium proprie est inter contraria; ut patet per philosophum, in X +Metaphys. Sed in intellectu non videtur esse aliqua contrarietas, +cum etiam ipsa contraria, secundum quod sunt in intellectu, non +sint contraria, sed simul intelligantur, ut album et nigrum, sanum +et aegrum. Ergo in intellectualibus virtutibus non est medium.
+ On the contrary, Art is an intellectual virtue; and yet there is a mean in art (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore also intellectual virtue observes + the mean. +
[36180] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod ars est virtus intellectualis, ut dicitur in VI Ethic.; et +tamen artis est aliquod medium, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Ergo etiam +virtus intellectualis consistit in medio.
+ I answer that, The good of anything consists in its observing the mean, by conforming with a rule or measure in respect of which it may + happen to be excessive or deficient, as stated above + (A[1]). Now intellectual virtue, like moral virtue, is directed to the good, as stated above (Q[56], A[3]). Hence the good of an + intellectual virtue consists in observing the mean, in so far as it is subject to a measure. Now the good of intellectual + virtue is + the true; in the case of contemplative virtue, it is the true taken absolutely (Ethic. vi, 2); in the case of practical virtue, + it is the true in conformity with a right appetite. +
Now truth apprehended by our intellect, if we consider it absolutely, is measured by things; since things are the measure + of our intellect, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 5; because there is truth in what we think or say, according as the thing + is so or not. Accordingly the good of speculative intellectual virtue consists in a certain mean, by way of conformity with + things themselves, in so far as the intellect expresses them as being what they are, or as not being what they are + not: and it is in this that the nature of truth consists. There will be excess if something false is affirmed, as though something + were, which in reality it is not: and there will be deficiency if something is falsely denied, and declared not to be, whereas + in reality it is. +
The truth of practical intellectual virtue, if we consider it in relation to things, is by way of that which is measured; + so that both in practical and in speculative intellectual virtues, the mean consists in conformity with things. But if we + consider it in relation to the appetite, it has the character of a rule and measure. Consequently the rectitude of reason + is the mean of moral virtue, and also the mean of prudence---of prudence as ruling and measuring, of moral virtue, as + ruled and measured by that mean. In like manner the difference between excess and deficiency is to be applied in both cases. +
[36181] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod bonum alicuius rei consistit in medio, secundum quod +conformatur regulae vel mensurae quam contingit transcendere et ab +ea deficere, sicut dictum est. Virtus autem intellectualis +ordinatur ad bonum, sicut et moralis, ut supra dictum est. Unde +secundum quod bonum virtutis intellectualis se habet ad mensuram, +sic se habet ad rationem medii. Bonum autem virtutis intellectualis +est verum, speculativae quidem virtutis, verum absolute, ut in VI +Ethic. dicitur; practicae autem virtutis, verum secundum +conformitatem ad appetitum rectum. Verum autem intellectus nostri +absolute consideratum, est sicut mensuratum a re, res enim est +mensura intellectus nostri, ut dicitur in X Metaphys.; ex eo enim +quod res est vel non est, veritas est in opinione et in oratione. +Sic igitur bonum virtutis intellectualis speculativae consistit in +quodam medio, per conformitatem ad ipsam rem, secundum quod dicit +esse quod est, vel non esse quod non est; in quo ratio veri +consistit. Excessus autem est secundum affirmationem falsam, per +quam dicitur esse quod non est, defectus autem accipitur secundum +negationem falsam, per quam dicitur non esse quod est. Verum autem +virtutis intellectualis practicae, comparatum quidem ad rem, habet +rationem mensurati. Et sic eodem modo accipitur medium per +conformitatem ad rem, in virtutibus intellectualibus practicis, +sicut in speculativis. Sed respectu appetitus, habet rationem +regulae et mensurae. Unde idem medium, quod est virtutis moralis, +etiam est ipsius prudentiae, scilicet rectitudo rationis, sed +prudentiae quidem est istud medium ut regulantis et mensurantis; +virtutis autem moralis, ut mensuratae et regulatae. Similiter +excessus et defectus accipitur diversimode utrobique.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Intellectual virtues also have their measure, as stated, and they observe the mean according as they conform to that measure. +
[36182] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod etiam virtus intellectualis habet suam mensuram, +ut dictum est, et per conformitatem ad ipsam, accipitur in ipsa +medium.
+ Reply to Objection 2: There is no need for an indefinite series of virtues: because the measure and rule of intellectual virtue is not another + kind of virtue, but things themselves. +
[36183] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod non est necesse in infinitum procedere in virtutibus, +quia mensura et regula intellectualis virtutis non est aliquod +aliud genus virtutis, sed ipsa res.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The things themselves that are contrary have no contrariety in the mind, because one is the reason for knowing the other: + nevertheless there is in the intellect contrariety of affirmation and negation, which are contraries, as stated at the end + of Peri Hermenias. For though "to be" and "not to be" are not in contrary, but in contradictory opposition to one another, + so long as we consider their signification in things themselves, for on the one hand we + have "being" and on the other we have simply "non-being"; yet if we refer them to the act of the mind, there is something + positive in both cases. Hence "to be" and "not to be" are contradictory: but the opinion stating that "good is good" is contrary + to the opinion stating that "good is not good": and between two such contraries intellectual virtue observes the mean. +
[36184] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ipsae res contrariae non habent contrarietatem in +anima, quia unum est ratio cognoscendi alterum, et tamen in +intellectu est contrarietas affirmationis et negationis, quae sunt +contraria, ut dicitur in fine peri hermeneias. Quamvis enim esse et +non esse non sint contraria, sed contradictorie opposita, si +considerentur ipsa significata prout sunt in rebus, quia alterum +est ens, et alterum est pure non ens, tamen si referantur ad actum +animae, utrumque ponit aliquid. Unde esse et non esse sunt +contradictoria, sed opinio qua opinamur quod bonum est bonum, est +contraria opinioni qua opinamur quod bonum non est bonum. Et inter +huiusmodi contraria medium est virtus intellectualis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that theological virtue observes the mean. For the good of other virtues consists in their observing the mean. + Now the theological virtues surpass the others in goodness. Therefore much more does theological virtue observe the mean. +
[36185] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus theologica consistat in medio. +Bonum enim aliarum virtutum consistit in medio. Sed virtus +theologica excedit in bonitate alias virtutes. Ergo virtus +theologica multo magis est in medio.
+ Objection 2: Further, the mean of moral virtue depends on the appetite being ruled by reason; while the mean of intellectual virtue consists + in the intellect being measured by things. Now theological virtue perfects both intellect and appetite, as stated above ( + Q[62], A[3]). Therefore theological virtue also observes the mean. +
[36186] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +medium virtutis accipitur, moralis quidem secundum quod appetitus +regulatur per rationem; intellectualis vero secundum quod +intellectus noster mensuratur a re. Sed virtus theologica et +perficit intellectum, et appetitum, ut supra dictum est. Ergo etiam +virtus theologica consistit in medio.
+ Objection 3: Further, hope, which is a theological virtue, is a mean between despair and presumption. Likewise faith holds a middle course + between contrary heresies, as Boethius states (De Duab. Natur. vii): thus, by confessing one Person and two natures in Christ, + we observe the mean between the heresy of Nestorius, who maintained the existence of two persons and two natures, and the + heresy of Eutyches, who held to one person and one nature. Therefore theological virtue + observes the mean. +
[36187] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +spes quae est virtus theologica, medium est inter desperationem et +praesumptionem. Similiter etiam fides incedit media inter +contrarias haereses, ut Boetius dicit, in libro de duabus naturis, +quod enim confitemur in Christo unam personam et duas naturas, +medium est inter haeresim Nestorii, qui dicit duas personas et duas +naturas; et haeresim Eutychis, qui dicit unam personam et unam +naturam. Ergo virtus theologica consistit in medio.
+ On the contrary, Wherever virtue observes the mean it is possible to sin by excess as well as by deficiency. But there is no sinning by excess + against God, Who is the object of theological virtue: for it is written ( + Ecclus. 43:33): "Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as much as you can: for He is above all praise." Therefore theological virtue does not observe + the mean. +
[36188] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra, +in omnibus in quibus consistit virtus in medio, contingit peccare +per excessum, sicut et per defectum. Sed circa Deum, qui est +obiectum virtutis theologicae, non contingit peccare per excessum, +dicitur enim Eccli. XLIII, benedicentes Deum, exaltate illum +quantum potestis, maior enim est omni laude. Ergo virtus +theologica non consistit in medio.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[1]), the mean of virtue depends on conformity with virtue's rule or measure, in so far as one may exceed or fall short of that + rule. Now the measure of theological virtue may be twofold. One is taken from the very nature of virtue, and thus the measure + and rule of theological virtue is God Himself: because our faith is ruled according to Divine truth; charity, according to + His goodness; hope, according to the + immensity of His omnipotence and loving kindness. This measure surpasses all human power: so that never can we love God as + much as He ought to be loved, nor believe and hope in Him as much as we should. Much less therefore can there be excess in + such things. Accordingly the good of such virtues does not consist in a mean, but increases the more we approach to the summit. +
The other rule or measure of theological virtue is by comparison with us: for although we cannot be borne towards God as + much as we ought, yet we should approach to Him by believing, hoping and loving, according to the measure of our condition. + Consequently it is possible to find a mean and extremes in theological virtue, accidentally and in reference to us. +
[36189] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, medium virtutis accipitur per +conformitatem ad suam regulam vel mensuram, secundum quod contingit +ipsam transcendere vel ab ea deficere. Virtutis autem theologicae +duplex potest accipi mensura. Una quidem secundum ipsam rationem +virtutis. Et sic mensura et regula virtutis theologicae est ipse +Deus, fides enim nostra regulatur secundum veritatem divinam, +caritas autem secundum bonitatem eius, spes autem secundum +magnitudinem omnipotentiae et pietatis eius. Et ista est mensura +excellens omnem humanam facultatem, unde nunquam potest homo tantum +diligere Deum quantum diligi debet, nec tantum credere aut sperare +in ipsum, quantum debet. Unde multo minus potest ibi esse excessus. +Et sic bonum talis virtutis non consistit in medio, sed tanto est +melius, quanto magis acceditur ad summum. Alia vero regula vel +mensura virtutis theologicae est ex parte nostra, quia etsi non +possumus ferri in Deum quantum debemus, debemus tamen ferri in +ipsum credendo, sperando et amando, secundum mensuram nostrae +conditionis. Unde per accidens potest in virtute theologica +considerari medium et extrema, ex parte nostra.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The good of intellectual and moral virtues consists in a mean of reason by conformity with a measure that may be exceeded: + whereas this is not so in the case of theological virtue, considered in itself, as stated above. +
[36190] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod bonum virtutum intellectualium et moralium +consistit in medio per conformitatem ad regulam vel mensuram quam +transcendere contingit. Quod non est in virtutibus theologicis, per +se loquendo, ut dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Moral and intellectual virtues perfect our intellect and appetite in relation to a created measure and rule; whereas the + theological virtues perfect them in relation to an uncreated rule and measure. Wherefore the comparison fails. +
[36191] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod virtutes morales et intellectuales perficiunt +intellectum et appetitum nostrum in ordine ad mensuram et regulam +creatam, virtutes autem theologicae in ordine ad mensuram et +regulam increatam. Unde non est similis ratio.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Hope observes the mean between presumption and despair, in relation to us, in so far, to wit, as a man is said to be presumptuous, + through hoping to receive from God a good in excess of his condition; or to despair through failing to hope for that which + according to his condition he might hope for. But there can be no excess of hope in comparison with God, Whose goodness is + infinite. In like manner faith holds a middle course between contrary + heresies, not by comparison with its object, which is God, in Whom we cannot believe too much; but in so far as human opinion + itself takes a middle position between contrary opinions, as was explained above. +
[36192] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod spes est media inter praesumptionem et desperationem, +ex parte nostra, inquantum scilicet aliquis praesumere dicitur ex +eo quod sperat a Deo bonum quod excedit suam conditionem; vel non +sperat quod secundum suam conditionem sperare posset. Non autem +potest esse superabundantia spei ex parte Dei, cuius bonitas est +infinita. Similiter etiam fides est media inter contrarias +haereses, non per comparationem ad obiectum, quod est Deus, cui non +potest aliquis nimis credere, sed inquantum ipsa opinio humana est +media inter contrarias opiniones, ut ex supradictis patet.
We must now consider the connection of virtues: under which head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the moral virtues are connected with one another?
(2) Whether the moral virtues can be without charity?
(3) Whether charity can be without them?
+[36193] +Iª-IIae q. 65 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +connexione virtutum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. Primo, utrum +virtutes morales sint ad invicem connexae. Secundo, utrum virtutes +morales possint esse sine caritate. Tertio, utrum caritas possit +esse sine eis. Quarto, utrum fides et spes possint esse sine +caritate. Quinto, utrum caritas possit esse sine eis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues are not connected with one another. Because moral virtues are sometimes caused by the + exercise of acts, as is proved in Ethic. ii, 1,2. But man can exercise himself in the acts of one virtue, without exercising + himself in the acts of some other virtue. Therefore it is possible to have one moral virtue without another. +
[36194] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales non sint ex +necessitate connexae. Virtutes enim morales quandoque causantur ex +exercitio actuum, ut probatur in II Ethic. Sed homo potest +exercitari in actibus alicuius virtutis sine hoc quod exercitetur +in actibus alterius virtutis. Ergo una virtus moralis potest haberi +sine altera.
+ Objection 2: Further, magnificence and magnanimity are moral virtues. Now a man may have other moral virtues without having magnificence + or magnanimity: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2,3) that "a poor man cannot be magnificent," and yet he may have other + virtues; and (Ethic. iv) that "he who is worthy of small things, and so accounts his worth, is modest, but not magnanimous." + Therefore the moral virtues are not connected with one another. +
[36195] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +magnificentia et magnanimitas sunt quaedam virtutes morales. Sed +aliquis potest habere alias virtutes morales, sine hoc quod habeat +magnificentiam et magnanimitatem, dicit enim philosophus, in IV +Ethic., quod inops non potest esse magnificus, qui tamen potest +habere quasdam alias virtutes; et quod ille qui parvis est +dignus, et his se dignificat, temperatus est, magnanimus autem non +est. Ergo virtutes morales non sunt connexae.
+ Objection 3: Further, as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive part of the soul, so do the intellectual virtues perfect the intellective + part. But the intellectual virtues are not mutually connected: since we may have one science, without having another. Neither, + therefore, are the moral virtues connected with one another. +
[36196] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sicut virtutes morales perficiunt partem appetitivam animae, ita +virtutes intellectuales perficiunt partem intellectivam. Sed +virtutes intellectuales non sunt connexae, potest enim aliquis +habere unam scientiam, sine hoc quod habeat aliam. Ergo etiam neque +virtutes morales sunt connexae.
+ Objection 4: Further, if the moral virtues are mutually connected, this can only be because they are united together in prudence. But + this does not suffice to connect the moral virtues together. For, seemingly, one may be prudent about things to be done in + relation to one virtue, without being prudent in those that concern another virtue: even as one may have the art of making + certain things, without the art of making certain others. Now prudence is right reason about + things to be done. Therefore the moral virtues are not necessarily connected with one another. +
[36197] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, +si virtutes morales sint connexae, hoc non est nisi quia +connectuntur in prudentia. Sed hoc non sufficit ad connexionem +virtutum moralium. Videtur enim quod aliquis possit esse prudens +circa agibilia quae pertinent ad unam virtutem, sine hoc quod sit +prudens in his quae pertinent ad aliam, sicut etiam aliquis potest +habere artem circa quaedam factibilia, sine hoc quod habeat artem +circa alia. Prudentia autem est recta ratio agibilium. Ergo non est +necessarium virtutes morales esse connexas.
+ On the contrary, Ambrose says on + Lk. 6:20: "The virtues are connected and linked together, so that whoever has one, is seen to have several": and Augustine says (De + Trin. vi, 4) that "the virtues that reside in the human mind are quite inseparable from one another": and Gregory says (Moral. + xxii, 1) that "one virtue without the other is either of no account whatever, or very imperfect": and Cicero says (Quaest. + Tusc. ii): "If you confess to not having + one particular virtue, it must needs be that you have none at all." +
[36198] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Ambrosius dicit, super Lucam, connexae sibi sunt, +concatenataeque virtutes, ut qui unam habet, plures habere +videatur. Augustinus etiam dicit, in VI de Trin., quod +virtutes quae sunt in animo humano, nullo modo separantur ab +invicem. Et Gregorius dicit, XXII Moral., quod una virtus +sine aliis aut omnino nulla est, aut imperfecta. Et Tullius +dicit, in II de Tuscul. quaest., si unam virtutem confessus es +te non habere, nullam necesse est te habiturum.
+ I answer that, Moral virtue may be considered either as perfect or as imperfect. An imperfect moral virtue, temperance for instance, or + fortitude, is nothing but an inclination in us to do some kind of good deed, whether such inclination be in us by nature or + by habituation. If we take the moral virtues in this way, they are not connected: since we find men who, by natural temperament + or by being accustomed, are prompt in doing deeds of liberality, but are not prompt in + doing deeds of chastity. +
But the perfect moral virtue is a habit that inclines us to do a good deed well; and if we take moral virtues in this way, + we must say that they are connected, as nearly as all are agreed in saying. For this two reasons are given, corresponding + to the different ways of assigning the distinction of the cardinal virtues. For, as we stated above ( + Q[61], AA[3],4), some distinguish them according to certain general properties of the virtues: for instance, by + saying that discretion belongs to prudence, rectitude to justice, moderation to temperance, and strength of mind to fortitude, + in whatever matter we consider these properties to be. In this way the reason for the connection is evident: for strength + of mind is not commended as virtuous, if it be without moderation or rectitude or discretion: and so forth. This, too, is + the reason assigned for the connection by Gregory, who says (Moral. xxii, 1) that "a virtue cannot be perfect" as a virtue, + "if + isolated from the others: for there can be no true prudence without temperance, justice and fortitude": and he continues to + speak in like manner of the other virtues (cf. + Q[61], A[4], OBJ[1]). Augustine also gives the same reason (De Trin. vi, 4). +
Others, however, differentiate these virtues in respect of their matters, and it is in this way that Aristotle assigns the + reason for their connection (Ethic. vi, 13). Because, as stated above ( + Q[58], A[4]), no moral virtue can be without prudence; since it is proper to moral virtue to make a right choice, for it is an elective + habit. Now right choice requires not only the inclination to a due end, which inclination is the direct outcome of moral virtue, + but also correct choice of things conducive to the end, which choice is made by prudence, that counsels, judges, and commands + in those things that are directed to the end. In like manner one cannot have prudence unless one has the moral virtues: since + prudence is "right reason about things to be done," and the starting point of reason is the end of the thing to be done, to + which end man is rightly disposed by moral virtue. Hence, just as we cannot have speculative science unless we have the + understanding of the principles, so neither can we have prudence without the moral virtues: and from this it follows clearly + that the moral virtues are connected with one another. +
[36199] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod virtus moralis potest accipi vel perfecta vel +imperfecta. Imperfecta quidem moralis virtus, ut temperantia vel +fortitudo, nihil aliud est quam aliqua inclinatio in nobis existens +ad opus aliquod de genere bonorum faciendum, sive talis inclinatio +sit in nobis a natura, sive ex assuetudine. Et hoc modo accipiendo +virtutes morales, non sunt connexae, videmus enim aliquem ex +naturali complexione, vel ex aliqua consuetudine, esse promptum ad +opera liberalitatis, qui tamen non est promptus ad opera +castitatis. Perfecta autem virtus moralis est habitus inclinans in +bonum opus bene agendum. Et sic accipiendo virtutes morales, +dicendum est eas connexas esse; ut fere ab omnibus ponitur. Cuius +ratio duplex assignatur, secundum quod diversimode aliqui virtutes +cardinales distinguunt. Ut enim dictum est, quidam distinguunt eas +secundum quasdam generales conditiones virtutum, utpote quod +discretio pertineat ad prudentiam, rectitudo ad iustitiam, +moderantia ad temperantiam, firmitas animi ad fortitudinem, in +quacumque materia ista considerentur. Et secundum hoc, manifeste +apparet ratio connexionis, non enim firmitas habet laudem virtutis, +si sit sine moderatione, vel rectitudine, aut discretione; et eadem +ratio est de aliis. Et hanc rationem connexionis assignat +Gregorius, XXII Moral., dicens quod virtutes, si sint +disiunctae, non possunt esse perfectae, secundum rationem +virtutis, quia nec prudentia vera est quae iusta, temperans et +fortis non est; et idem subdit de aliis virtutibus. Et similem +rationem assignat Augustinus, in VI de Trin. Alii vero distinguunt +praedictas virtutes secundum materias. Et secundum hoc assignatur +ratio connexionis ab Aristotele, in VI Ethic. Quia sicut supra +dictum est, nulla virtus moralis potest sine prudentia haberi, eo +quod proprium virtutis moralis est facere electionem rectam, cum +sit habitus electivus; ad rectam autem electionem non solum +sufficit inclinatio in debitum finem, quod est directe per habitum +virtutis moralis; sed etiam quod aliquis directe eligat ea quae +sunt ad finem, quod fit per prudentiam, quae est consiliativa et +iudicativa et praeceptiva eorum quae sunt ad finem. Similiter etiam +prudentia non potest haberi nisi habeantur virtutes morales, cum +prudentia sit recta ratio agibilium, quae, sicut ex principiis, +procedit ex finibus agibilium, ad quos aliquis recte se habet per +virtutes morales. Unde sicut scientia speculativa non potest haberi +sine intellectu principiorum, ita nec prudentia sine virtutibus +moralibus. Ex quo manifeste sequitur virtutes morales esse +connexas.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Some moral virtues perfect man as regards his general state, in other words, with regard to those things which have to be + done in every kind of human life. Hence man needs to exercise himself at the same time in the matters of all moral virtues. + And if he exercise himself, by good deeds, in all such matters, he will acquire the habits of all the moral virtues. But if + he exercise himself by good deeds in regard to one matter, but not in regard to + another, for instance, by behaving well in matters of anger, but not in matters of concupiscence; he will indeed acquire a + certain habit of restraining his anger; but this habit will lack the nature of virtue, through the absence of prudence, which + is wanting in matters of concupiscence. In the same way, natural inclinations fail to have the complete character of virtue, + if prudence be lacking. +
But there are some moral virtues which perfect man with regard to some eminent state, such as magnificence and magnanimity; + and since it does not happen to all in common to be exercised in the matter of such virtues, it is possible for a man to have + the other moral virtues, without actually having the habits of these virtues---provided we speak of acquired virtue. Nevertheless, + when once a man has acquired those other virtues he possesses these in proximate potentiality. Because + when, by practice, a man has acquired liberality in small gifts and expenditure, if he were to come in for a large sum of + money, he would acquire the habit of magnificence with but little practice: even as a geometrician, by dint of little study, + acquires scientific knowledge about some conclusion which had never been presented to his mind before. Now we speak of having + a thing when we are on the point of having it, according to the saying of the Philosopher (Phys. ii, text. 56): "That which + is + scarcely lacking is not lacking at all." +
[36200] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod virtutum moralium quaedam perficiunt hominem +secundum communem statum, scilicet quantum ad ea quae communiter in +omni vita hominum occurrunt agenda. Unde oportet quod homo simul +exercitetur circa materias omnium virtutum moralium. Et si quidem +circa omnes exercitetur bene operando, acquiret habitus omnium +virtutum moralium. Si autem exercitetur bene operando circa unam +materiam, non autem circa aliam, puta bene se habendo circa iras, +non autem circa concupiscentias; acquiret quidem habitum aliquem ad +refrenandum iras, qui tamen non habebit rationem virtutis, propter +defectum prudentiae, quae circa concupiscentias corrumpitur. Sicut +etiam naturales inclinationes non habent perfectam rationem +virtutis, si prudentia desit. Quaedam vero virtutes morales sunt +quae perficiunt hominem secundum aliquem eminentem statum, sicut +magnificentia, et magnanimitas. Et quia exercitium circa materias +harum virtutum non occurrit unicuique communiter, potest aliquis +habere alias virtutes morales, sine hoc quod habitus harum virtutum +habeat actu, loquendo de virtutibus acquisitis. Sed tamen, +acquisitis aliis virtutibus, habet istas virtutes in potentia +propinqua. Cum enim aliquis per exercitium adeptus est +liberalitatem circa mediocres donationes et sumptus, si superveniat +ei abundantia pecuniarum, modico exercitio acquiret magnificentiae +habitum, sicut geometer modico studio acquirit scientiam alicuius +conclusionis quam nunquam consideravit. Illud autem habere dicimur, +quod in promptu est ut habeamus; secundum illud philosophi, in II +Physic., quod parum deest, quasi nihil deesse videtur.
Reply to Objection 2: This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
[36201] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 ad 2 Et per hoc +patet responsio ad secundum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The intellectual virtues are about divers matters having no relation to one another, as is clearly the case with the various + sciences and arts. Hence we do not observe in them the connection that is to be found among the moral virtues, which are about + passions and operations, that are clearly related to one another. For all the passions have their rise in certain initial + passions, viz. love and hatred, and terminate in certain others, viz. pleasure + and sorrow. In like manner all the operations that are the matter of moral virtue are related to one another, and to the passions. + Hence the whole matter of moral virtues falls under the one rule of prudence. +
Nevertheless, all intelligible things are related to first principles. And in this way, all the intellectual virtues depend + on the understanding of principles; even as prudence depends on the moral virtues, as stated. On the other hand, the universal + principles which are the object of the virtue of understanding of principles, do not depend on the conclusions, which are + the objects of the other intellectual virtues, as do the moral virtues depend on prudence, because the + appetite, in a fashion, moves the reason, and the reason the appetite, as stated above ( + Q[9], A[1]; + Q[58], A[5], ad 1). +
[36202] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod virtutes intellectuales sunt circa diversas materias +ad invicem non ordinatas, sicut patet in diversis scientiis et +artibus. Et ideo non invenitur in eis connexio quae invenitur in +virtutibus moralibus existentibus circa passiones et operationes, +quae manifeste habent ordinem ad invicem. Nam omnes passiones, a +quibusdam primis procedentes, scilicet amore et odio, ad quasdam +alias terminantur, scilicet delectationem et tristitiam. Et +similiter omnes operationes quae sunt virtutis moralis materia, +habent ordinem ad invicem, et etiam ad passiones. Et ideo tota +materia moralium virtutum sub una ratione prudentiae cadit. Habent +tamen omnia intelligibilia ordinem ad prima principia. Et secundum +hoc, omnes virtutes intellectuales dependent ab intellectu +principiorum; sicut prudentia a virtutibus moralibus, ut dictum +est. Principia autem universalia, quorum est intellectus +principiorum, non dependent a conclusionibus, de quibus sunt +reliquae intellectuales virtutes; sicut morales dependent a +prudentia, eo quod appetitus movet quodammodo rationem, et ratio +appetitum, ut supra dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 4: Those things to which the moral virtues incline, are as the principles of prudence: whereas the products of art are not the + principles, but the matter of art. Now it is evident that, though reason may be right in one part of the matter, and not in + another, yet in no way can it be called right reason, if it be deficient in any principle whatever. Thus, if a man be wrong + about the principle, "A whole is greater than its part," he cannot acquire the + science of geometry, because he must necessarily wander from the truth in his conclusion. Moreover, things "done" are related + to one another, but not things "made," as stated above (ad 3). Consequently the lack of prudence in one department of things + to be done, would result in a deficiency affecting other things to be done: whereas this does not occur in things to be made. +
[36203] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod ea ad quae inclinant virtutes morales, se habent ad +prudentiam sicut principia, non autem factibilia se habent ad artem +sicut principia, sed solum sicut materia. Manifestum est autem +quod, etsi ratio possit esse recta in una parte materiae, et non in +alia; nullo tamen modo potest dici ratio recta, si sit defectus +cuiuscumque principii. Sicut si quis erraret circa hoc principium, +omne totum est maius sua parte, non posset habere scientiam +geometricam, quia oporteret multum recedere a veritate in +sequentibus. Et praeterea, agibilia sunt ordinata ad invicem; non +autem factibilia, ut dictum est. Et ideo defectus prudentiae circa +unam partem agibilium, induceret defectum etiam circa alia +agibilia. Quod in factibilibus non contingit.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtues can be without charity. For it is stated in the Liber Sentent. Prosperi vii, that "every + virtue save charity may be common to the good and bad." But "charity can be in none except the good," as stated in the same + book. Therefore the other virtues can be had without charity. +
[36204] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales possint esse sine +caritate. Dicitur enim in libro sententiarum prosperi, quod +omnis virtus praeter caritatem, potest esse communis bonis et +malis. Sed caritas non potest esse nisi in bonis, ut dicitur +ibidem. Ergo aliae virtutes possunt haberi sine caritate.
+ Objection 2: Further, moral virtues can be acquired by means of human acts, as stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2, whereas charity cannot be had + otherwise than by infusion, according to + Rom. 5:5: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us." Therefore it is possible to have + the other virtues without charity. +
[36205] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +virtutes morales possunt acquiri ex actibus humanis, ut dicitur in +II Ethic. Sed caritas non habetur nisi ex infusione; secundum illud +Rom. V, caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum +sanctum, qui datus est nobis. Ergo aliae virtutes possunt +haberi sine caritate.
+ Objection 3: Further, the moral virtues are connected together, through depending on prudence. But charity does not depend on prudence; + indeed, it surpasses prudence, according to + Eph. 3:19: "The charity of Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge." Therefore the moral virtues are not connected with charity, and + can be without it. +
[36206] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +virtutes morales connectuntur ad invicem, inquantum dependent a +prudentia. Sed caritas non dependet a prudentia; immo prudentiam +excedit, secundum illud Ephes. III, supereminentem scientiae +caritatem Christi. Ergo virtutes morales non connectuntur +caritati, sed sine ea esse possunt.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + 1 Jn. 3:14): "He that loveth not, abideth in death." Now the spiritual life is perfected by the virtues, since it is "by them" that + "we lead a good life," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 17,19). Therefore they cannot be without the love of charity. +
[36207] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur I Ioan. III, qui non diligit, manet in +morte. Sed per virtutes perficitur vita spiritualis, ipsae enim +sunt quibus recte vivitur, ut Augustinus dicit, in II de Lib. +Arbit. Ergo non possunt esse sine dilectione caritatis.
+ I answer that, As stated above (Q[63], A[2]), it is possible by means of human works to acquire moral virtues, in so far as they produce + good works that are directed to an end not surpassing the natural power of man: and when they are acquired thus, they can + be without charity, even as they were in many of the Gentiles. But in so far as they produce good works in proportion to a + supernatural last end, thus they have the character of virtue, truly and perfectly; and cannot + be acquired by human acts, but are infused by God. Such like moral virtues cannot be without charity. For it has been stated + above + (A[1]; Q[58], AA[4],5) that the other moral virtues cannot be without prudence; and that prudence cannot be without the moral virtues, + because these latter make man well disposed to certain ends, which are the starting-point of the procedure of prudence. Now + for prudence to proceed aright, it is much more necessary that man be well disposed + towards his ultimate end, which is the effect of charity, than that he be well disposed in respect of other ends, which is + the effect of moral virtue: just as in speculative matters right reason has greatest need of the first indemonstrable principle, + that "contradictories cannot both be true at the same time." It is therefore evident that neither can infused prudence be + without charity; nor, consequently, the other moral virtues, since they cannot be without prudence. +
It is therefore clear from what has been said that only the infused virtues are perfect, and deserve to be called virtues + simply: since they direct man well to the ultimate end. But the other virtues, those, namely, that are acquired, are virtues + in a restricted sense, but not simply: for they direct man well in respect of the last end in some particular genus of action, + but not in respect of the last end simply. Hence a gloss of Augustine [*Cf. Lib. Sentent. Prosperi cvi.] on + the words, "All that is not of faith is sin" ( + Rom. 14:23), says: "He that fails to acknowledge the truth, has no true virtue, even if his conduct be good." +
[36208] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtutes morales prout sunt +operativae boni in ordine ad finem qui non excedit facultatem +naturalem hominis, possunt per opera humana acquiri. Et sic +acquisitae sine caritate esse possunt, sicut fuerunt in multis +gentilibus. Secundum autem quod sunt operativae boni in ordine ad +ultimum finem supernaturalem, sic perfecte et vere habent rationem +virtutis; et non possunt humanis actibus acquiri, sed infunduntur a +Deo. Et huiusmodi virtutes morales sine caritate esse non possunt. +Dictum est enim supra quod aliae virtutes morales non possunt esse +sine prudentia; prudentia autem non potest esse sine virtutibus +moralibus, inquantum virtutes morales faciunt bene se habere ad +quosdam fines, ex quibus procedit ratio prudentiae. Ad rectam autem +rationem prudentiae multo magis requiritur quod homo bene se habeat +circa ultimum finem, quod fit per caritatem, quam circa alios +fines, quod fit per virtutes morales, sicut ratio recta in +speculativis maxime indiget primo principio indemonstrabili, quod +est contradictoria non simul esse vera. Unde manifestum fit quod +nec prudentia infusa potest esse sine caritate; nec aliae virtutes +morales consequenter, quae sine prudentia esse non possunt. Patet +igitur ex dictis quod solae virtutes infusae sunt perfectae, et +simpliciter dicendae virtutes, quia bene ordinant hominem ad finem +ultimum simpliciter. Aliae vero virtutes, scilicet acquisitae, sunt +secundum quid virtutes, non autem simpliciter, ordinant enim +hominem bene respectu finis ultimi in aliquo genere, non autem +respectu finis ultimi simpliciter. Unde Rom. XIV super illud, +omne quod non est ex fide, peccatum est, dicit Glossa +Augustini, ubi deest agnitio veritatis, falsa est virtus etiam +in bonis moribus.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Virtue, in the words quoted, denotes imperfect virtue. Else if we take moral virtue in its perfect state, "it makes its possessor + good," and consequently cannot be in the wicked. +
[36209] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod virtutes ibi accipiuntur secundum imperfectam +rationem virtutis. Alioquin, si virtus moralis secundum perfectam +rationem virtutis accipiatur, bonum facit habentem; et per +consequens in malis esse non potest.
+ Reply to Objection 2: This argument holds good of virtue in the sense of acquired virtue. +
[36210] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de virtutibus moralibus +acquisitis.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Though charity surpasses science and prudence, yet prudence depends on charity, as stated: and consequently so do all the + infused moral virtues. +
[36211] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, etsi caritas excedat scientiam et prudentiam, tamen +prudentia dependet a caritate, ut dictum est. Et per consequens, +omnes virtutes morales infusae.
+ Objection 1: It would seem possible to have charity without the moral virtues. For when one thing suffices for a certain purpose, it is + superfluous to employ others. Now charity alone suffices for the fulfilment of all the works of virtue, as is clear from + 1 Cor. 13:4, seqq.: "Charity is patient, is kind," etc. Therefore it seems that if one has charity, other virtues are superfluous. +
[36212] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas sine aliis virtutibus +moralibus haberi possit. Ad id enim ad quod sufficit unum, +indebitum est quod plura ordinentur. Sed sola caritas sufficit ad +omnia opera virtutis implenda, ut patet per id quod dicitur I ad +Cor. XIII, caritas patiens est, benigna est, et cetera. Ergo +videtur quod, habita caritate, aliae virtutes superfluerent.
+ Objection 2: Further, he that has a habit of virtue easily performs the works of that virtue, and those works are pleasing to him for + their own sake: hence "pleasure taken in a work is a sign of habit" (Ethic. ii, 3). Now many have charity, being free from + mortal sin, and yet they find it difficult to do works of virtue; nor are these works pleasing to them for their own sake, + but only for the sake of charity. Therefore many have charity without the other virtues. +
[36213] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +qui habet habitum virtutis, de facili operatur ea quae sunt +virtutis, et ei secundum se placent, unde et signum habitus est +delectatio quae fit in opere, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed multi +habent caritatem, absque peccato mortali existentes, qui tamen +difficultatem in operibus virtutum patiuntur, neque eis secundum se +placent, sed solum secundum quod referuntur ad caritatem. Ergo +multi habent caritatem, qui non habent alias virtutes.
+ Objection 3: Further, charity is to be found in every saint: and yet there are some saints who are without certain virtues. For Bede says + (on + Lk. 17:10) that the saints are more humbled on account of their not having certain virtues, than rejoiced at the virtues they have. + Therefore, if a man has charity, it does not follow of necessity that he has all the moral virtues. +
[36214] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +caritas in omnibus sanctis invenitur. Sed quidam sunt sancti qui +tamen aliquibus virtutibus carent, dicit enim Beda quod sancti +magis humiliantur de virtutibus quas non habent, quam de virtutibus +quas habent, glorientur. Ergo non est necessarium quod qui habet +caritatem, omnes virtutes morales habeat.
+ On the contrary, The whole Law is fulfilled through charity, for it is written ( + Rom. 13:8): "He that loveth his neighbor, hath fulfilled the Law." Now it is not possible to fulfil the whole Law, without having all + the moral virtues: since the law contains precepts about all acts of virtue, as stated in Ethic. v, 1,2. Therefore he that + has charity, has all the moral virtues. Moreover, Augustine says in a letter (Epis. clxvii) [*Cf. Serm. xxxix and xlvi + de Temp.] that charity contains all the cardinal virtues. +
[36215] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod per caritatem tota lex impletur, dicitur enim Rom. XIII, +qui diligit proximum, legem implevit. Sed tota lex impleri +non potest nisi per omnes virtutes morales, quia lex praecipit de +omnibus actibus virtutum, ut dicitur in V Ethic. Ergo qui habet +caritatem, habet omnes virtutes morales. Augustinus etiam dicit, in +quadam epistola, quod caritas includit in se omnes virtutes +cardinales.
+ I answer that, All the moral virtues are infused together with charity. The reason for this is that God operates no less perfectly in works + of grace than in works of nature. Now, in the works of nature, we find that whenever a thing contains a principle of certain + works, it has also whatever is necessary for their execution: thus animals are provided with organs whereby to perform the + actions that their souls empower them to do. Now it is evident that charity, inasmuch as + it directs man to his last end, is the principle of all the good works that are referable to his last end. Wherefore all the + moral virtues must needs be infused together with charity, since it is through them that man performs each different kind + of good work. +
It is therefore clear that the infused moral virtues are connected, not only through prudence, but also on account of charity: + and, again, that whoever loses charity through mortal sin, forfeits all the infused moral virtues. +
[36216] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod cum caritate simul infunduntur omnes virtutes +morales. Cuius ratio est quia Deus non minus perfecte operatur in +operibus gratiae, quam in operibus naturae. Sic autem videmus in +operibus naturae, quod non invenitur principium aliquorum operum in +aliqua re, quin inveniantur in ea quae sunt necessaria ad huiusmodi +opera perficienda, sicut in animalibus inveniuntur organa quibus +perfici possunt opera ad quae peragenda anima habet potestatem. +Manifestum est autem quod caritas, inquantum ordinat hominem ad +finem ultimum, est principium omnium bonorum operum quae in finem +ultimum ordinari possunt. Unde oportet quod cum caritate simul +infundantur omnes virtutes morales, quibus homo perficit singula +genera bonorum operum. Et sic patet quod virtutes morales infusae +non solum habent connexionem propter prudentiam; sed etiam propter +caritatem. Et quod qui amittit caritatem per peccatum mortale, +amittit omnes virtutes morales infusas.
+ Reply to Objection 1: In order that the act of a lower power be perfect, not only must there be perfection in the higher, but also in the lower + power: for if the principal agent were well disposed, perfect action would not follow, if the instrument also were not well + disposed. Consequently, in order that man work well in things referred to the end, he needs not only a virtue disposing him + well to the end, but also those virtues which dispose him well to whatever is + referred to the end: for the virtue which regards the end is the chief and moving principle in respect of those things that + are referred to the end. Therefore it is necessary to have the moral virtues together with charity. +
[36217] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ad hoc quod actus inferioris potentiae sit +perfectus, requiritur quod non solum adsit perfectio in superiori +potentia, sed etiam in inferiori, si enim principale agens debito +modo se haberet, non sequeretur actio perfecta, si instrumentum non +esset bene dispositum. Unde oportet ad hoc quod homo bene operetur +in his quae sunt ad finem, quod non solum habeat virtutem qua bene +se habeat circa finem, sed etiam virtutes quibus bene se habeat +circa ea quae sunt ad finem, nam virtus quae est circa finem, se +habet ut principalis et motiva respectu earum quae sunt ad finem. +Et ideo cum caritate necesse est etiam habere alias virtutes +morales.
+ Reply to Objection 2: It happens sometimes that a man who has a habit, finds it difficult to act in accordance with the habit, and consequently + feels no pleasure and complacency in the act, on account of some impediment supervening from without: thus a man who has a + habit of science, finds it difficult to understand, through being sleepy or unwell. In like manner sometimes the habits of + moral virtue experience difficulty in their works, by reason of certain ordinary + dispositions remaining from previous acts. This difficulty does not occur in respect of acquired moral virtue: because the + repeated acts by which they are acquired, remove also the contrary dispositions. +
[36218] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod quandoque contingit quod aliquis habens habitum, +patitur difficultatem in operando, et per consequens non sentit +delectationem et complacentiam in actu, propter aliquod +impedimentum extrinsecus superveniens, sicut ille qui habet habitum +scientiae, patitur difficultatem in intelligendo, propter +somnolentiam vel aliquam infirmitatem. Et similiter habitus +moralium virtutum infusarum patiuntur interdum difficultatem in +operando, propter aliquas dispositiones contrarias ex +praecedentibus actibus relictas. Quae quidem difficultas non ita +accidit in virtutibus moralibus acquisitis, quia per exercitium +actuum, quo acquiruntur, tolluntur etiam contrariae +dispositiones.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Certain saints are said not to have certain virtues, in so far as they experience difficulty in the acts of those virtues, + for the reason stated; although they have the habits of all the virtues. +
[36219] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod aliqui sancti dicuntur aliquas virtutes non habere, +inquantum patiuntur difficultatem in actibus earum, ratione iam +dicta; quamvis habitus omnium virtutum habeant.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that faith and hope are never without charity. Because, since they are theological virtues, they seem to be + more excellent than even the infused moral virtues. But the infused moral virtues cannot be without charity. Neither therefore + can faith and hope be without charity. +
[36220] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod fides et spes nunquam sint sine +caritate. Cum enim sint virtutes theologicae, digniores esse +videntur virtutibus moralibus, etiam infusis. Sed virtutes morales +infusae non possunt esse sine caritate. Ergo neque fides et +spes.
+ Objection 2: Further, "no man believes unwillingly" as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.). But charity is in the will as a perfection + thereof, as stated above ( + Q[62], A[3]). Therefore faith cannot be without charity. +
[36221] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +nullus credit nisi volens, sed caritas est in voluntate ut +Augustinus dicit, super Ioan. Sicut perfectio eius, ut supra dictum +est. Ergo fides non potest esse sine caritate.
+ Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that "there can be no hope without love." But love is charity: for it is of this + love that he speaks. Therefore hope cannot be without charity. +
[36222] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., quod spes sine amore esse non +potest. Amor autem est caritas, de hoc enim amore ibi loquitur. +Ergo spes non potest esse sine caritate.
+ On the contrary, A gloss on + Mat. 1:2 says that "faith begets hope, and hope, charity." Now the begetter precedes the begotten, and can be without it. Therefore + faith can be without hope; and hope, without charity. +
[36223] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Matth. I, dicitur in Glossa quod fides generat spem, +spes vero caritatem. Sed generans est prius generato, et potest +esse sine eo. Ergo fides potest esse sine spe; et spes sine +caritate.
+ I answer that, Faith and hope, like the moral virtues, can be considered in two ways; first in an inchoate state; secondly, as complete + virtues. For since virtue is directed to the doing of good works, perfect virtue is that which gives the faculty of doing + a perfectly good work, and this consists in not only doing what is good, but also in doing it well. Else, if what is done + is good, but not well done, it will not be perfectly good; wherefore neither will the habit that + is the principle of such an act, have the perfect character of virtue. For instance, if a man do what is just, what he does + is good: but it will not be the work of a perfect virtue unless he do it well, i.e. by choosing rightly, which is the result + of prudence; for which reason justice cannot be a perfect virtue without prudence. +
Accordingly faith and hope can exist indeed in a fashion without charity: but they have not the perfect character of virtue + without charity. For, since the act of faith is to believe in God; and since to believe is to assent to someone of one's own + free will: to will not as one ought, will not be a perfect act of faith. To will as one ought is the outcome of charity which + perfects the will: since every right movement of the will proceeds from a right love, as Augustine says (De + Civ. Dei xiv, 9). Hence faith may be without charity, but not as a perfect virtue: just as temperance and fortitude can be + without prudence. The same applies to hope. Because the act of hope consists in looking to God for future bliss. This act + is perfect, if it is based on the merits which we have; and this cannot be without charity. But to expect future bliss through + merits which one has not yet, but which one proposes to acquire at some future time, will be an imperfect act; and this is + possible without charity. Consequently, faith and hope can be without charity; yet, without charity, they are not virtues + properly so-called; because the nature of virtue requires that by it, we should not only do what is good, but also that we + should do it well (Ethic. ii, 6). +
[36224] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod fides et spes, sicut et virtutes morales, dupliciter +considerari possunt. Uno modo, secundum inchoationem quandam; alio +modo, secundum perfectum esse virtutis. Cum enim virtus ordinetur +ad bonum opus agendum, virtus quidem perfecta dicitur ex hoc quod +potest in opus perfecte bonum, quod quidem est dum non solum bonum +est quod fit, sed etiam bene fit. Alioquin, si bonum sit quod fit, +non autem bene fiat, non erit perfecte bonum, unde nec habitus qui +est talis operis principium, habebit perfecte rationem virtutis. +Sicut si aliquis operetur iusta, bonum quidem facit, sed non erit +opus perfectae virtutis, nisi hoc bene faciat, idest secundum +electionem rectam, quod est per prudentiam, et ideo iustitia sine +prudentia non potest esse virtus perfecta. Sic igitur fides et spes +sine caritate possunt quidem aliqualiter esse, perfectae autem +virtutis rationem sine caritate non habent. Cum enim fidei opus sit +credere Deo; credere autem sit alicui propria voluntate assentire, +si non debito modo velit, non erit fidei opus perfectum. Quod autem +debito modo velit, hoc est per caritatem, quae perficit voluntatem, +omnis enim rectus motus voluntatis ex recto amore procedit, ut +Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei. Sic igitur fides est quidem +sine caritate, sed non perfecta virtus, sicut temperantia vel +fortitudo sine prudentia. Et similiter dicendum est de spe. Nam +actus spei est expectare futuram beatitudinem a Deo. Qui quidem +actus perfectus est, si fiat ex meritis quae quis habet, quod non +potest esse sine caritate. Si autem hoc expectet ex meritis quae +nondum habet, sed proponit in futurum acquirere, erit actus +imperfectus, et hoc potest esse sine caritate. Et ideo fides et +spes possunt esse sine caritate, sed sine caritate, proprie +loquendo, virtutes non sunt; nam ad rationem virtutis pertinet ut +non solum secundum ipsam aliquod bonum operemur, sed etiam bene, ut +dicitur in II Ethic.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Moral virtue depends on prudence: and not even infused prudence has the character of prudence without charity; for this involves + the absence of due order to the first principle, viz. the ultimate end. On the other hand faith and hope, as such, do not + depend either on prudence or charity; so that they can be without charity, although they are not virtues without charity, + as stated. +
[36225] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod virtutes morales dependent a prudentia, +prudentia autem infusa nec rationem prudentiae habere potest absque +caritate, utpote deficiente debita habitudine ad primum principium, +quod est ultimus finis. Fides autem et spes, secundum proprias +rationes, nec a prudentia nec a caritate dependent. Et ideo sine +caritate esse possunt; licet non sint virtutes sine caritate, ut +dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 2: This argument is true of faith considered as a perfect virtue. +
[36226] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de fide quae habet perfectam +rationem virtutis.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Augustine is speaking here of that hope whereby we look to gain future bliss through merits which we have already; and this + is not without charity. +
[36227] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur ibi de spe, secundum quod aliquis +expectat futuram beatitudinem per merita quae iam habet, quod non +est sine caritate.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that charity can be without faith and hope. For charity is the love of God. But it is possible for us to love + God naturally, without already having faith, or hope in future bliss. Therefore charity can be without faith and hope. +
[36228] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas possit esse sine fide et spe. +Caritas enim est amor Dei. Sed Deus potest a nobis amari +naturaliter, etiam non praesupposita fide, vel spe futurae +beatitudinis. Ergo caritas potest esse sine fide et spe.
+ Objection 2: Further, charity is the root of all the virtues, according to + Eph. 3:17: "Rooted and founded in charity." Now the root is sometimes without branches. Therefore charity can sometimes be without + faith and hope, and the other virtues. +
[36229] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +caritas est radix omnium virtutum; secundum illud Ephes. III, in +caritate radicati et fundati. Sed radix aliquando est sine +ramis. Ergo caritas potest esse aliquando sine fide et spe et aliis +virtutibus.
+ Objection 3: Further, there was perfect charity in Christ. And yet He had neither faith nor hope: because He was a perfect comprehensor, + as we shall explain further on ( + TP, Q[7], AA[3],4). Therefore charity can be without faith and hope. +
[36230] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +in Christo fuit perfecta caritas. Ipse tamen non habuit fidem et +spem, quia fuit perfectus comprehensor, ut infra dicetur. Ergo +caritas potest esse sine fide et spe.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle says ( + Heb. 11:6): "Without faith it is impossible to please God"; and this evidently belongs most to charity, according to + Prov. 8:17: "I love them that love me." Again, it is by hope that we are brought to charity, as stated above ( + Q[62], A[4]). Therefore it is not possible to have charity without faith and hope. +
[36231] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, Heb. XI, sine fide impossibile est +placere Deo; quod maxime pertinet ad caritatem, ut patet; +secundum illud Proverb. VIII, ego diligentes me diligo. Spes +etiam est quae introducit ad caritatem, ut supra dictum est. Ergo +caritas non potest haberi sine fide et spe.
+ I answer that, Charity signifies not only the love of God, but also a certain friendship with Him; which implies, besides love, a certain + mutual return of love, together with mutual communion, as stated in Ethic. viii, 2. That this belongs to charity is evident + from + 1 Jn. 4:16: "He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him," and from + 1 Cor. 1:9, where it is written: "God is faithful, by Whom you are called unto the + fellowship of His Son." Now this fellowship of man with God, which consists in a certain familiar colloquy with Him, is begun + here, in this life, by grace, but will be perfected in the future life, by glory; each of which things we hold by faith and + hope. Wherefore just as friendship with a person would be impossible, if one disbelieved in, or despaired of, the possibility + of their fellowship or familiar colloquy; so too, friendship with God, which is charity, is impossible without faith, so as + to believe in this fellowship and colloquy with God, and to hope to attain to this fellowship. Therefore charity is quite + impossible without faith and hope. +
[36232] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod caritas non solum significat amorem Dei, sed etiam +amicitiam quandam ad ipsum; quae quidem super amorem addit mutuam +redamationem cum quadam mutua communicatione, ut dicitur in VIII +Ethic. Et quod hoc ad caritatem pertineat, patet per id quod +dicitur I Ioan. IV, qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus +in eo. Et I ad Cor. I dicitur, fidelis Deus, per quem vocati +estis in societatem filii eius. Haec autem societas hominis ad +Deum, quae est quaedam familiaris conversatio cum ipso, inchoatur +quidem hic in praesenti per gratiam, perficietur autem in futuro +per gloriam, quorum utrumque fide et spe tenetur. Unde sicut +aliquis non posset cum aliquo amicitiam habere, si discrederet vel +desperaret se posse habere aliquam societatem vel familiarem +conversationem cum ipso; ita aliquis non potest habere amicitiam ad +Deum, quae est caritas, nisi fidem habeat, per quam credat +huiusmodi societatem et conversationem hominis cum Deo, et speret +se ad hanc societatem pertinere. Et sic caritas sine fide et spe +nullo modo esse potest.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Charity is not any kind of love of God, but that love of God, by which He is loved as the object of bliss, to which object + we are directed by faith and hope. +
[36233] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod caritas non est qualiscumque amor Dei, sed amor +Dei quo diligitur ut beatitudinis obiectum, ad quod ordinamur per +fidem et spem.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Charity is the root of faith and hope, in so far as it gives them the perfection of virtue. But faith and hope as such are + the precursors of charity, as stated above ( + Q[62], A[4]), and so charity is impossible without them. +
[36234] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod caritas est radix fidei et spei, inquantum dat eis +perfectionem virtutis. Sed fides et spes, secundum rationem +propriam, praesupponuntur ad caritatem, ut supra dictum est. Et sic +caritas sine eis esse non potest.
+ Reply to Objection 3: In Christ there was neither faith nor hope, on account of their implying an imperfection. But instead of faith, He had manifest + vision, and instead of hope, full comprehension [*See above + , Q[4], A[3]]: so that in Him was perfect charity. +
[36235] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod Christo defuit fides et spes, propter id quod est +imperfectionis in eis. Sed loco fidei, habuit apertam visionem; et +loco spei, plenam comprehensionem. Et sic fuit perfecta caritas in +eo.
We must now consider equality among the virtues: under which head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether one virtue can be greater or less than another?
(2) Whether all the virtues existing together in one subject are equal?
(3) Of moral virtue in comparison with intellectual virtue;
(4) Of the moral virtues as compared with one another;
(5) Of the intellectual virtues in comparison with one another;
(6) Of the theological virtues in comparison with one another.
+[36236] +Iª-IIae q. 66 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +aequalitate virtutum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum +virtus possit esse maior vel minor. Secundo, utrum omnes virtutes +simul in eodem existentes, sint aequales. Tertio, de comparatione +virtutum moralium ad intellectuales. Quarto, de comparatione +virtutum moralium ad invicem. Quinto, de comparatione virtutum +intellectualium ad invicem. Sexto, de comparatione virtutum +theologicarum ad invicem.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that one virtue cannot be greater or less than another. For it is written ( + Apoc. 21:16) that the sides of the city of Jerusalem are equal; and a gloss says that the sides denote the virtues. Therefore all virtues + are equal; and consequently one cannot be greater than another. +
[36237] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus non possit esse maior vel +minor. Dicitur enim in Apoc. XXI, quod latera civitatis Ierusalem +sunt aequalia. Per haec autem significantur virtutes, ut Glossa +dicit ibidem. Ergo omnes virtutes sunt aequales. Non ergo potest +esse virtus maior virtute.
+ Objection 2: Further, a thing that, by its nature, consists in a maximum, cannot be more or less. Now the nature of virtue consists in + a maximum, for virtue is "the limit of power," as the Philosopher states (De Coelo i, text. 116); and Augustine says (De Lib. + Arb. ii, 19) that "virtues are very great boons, and no one can use them to evil purpose." Therefore it seems that one virtue + cannot be greater or less than another. +
[36238] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +omne illud cuius ratio consistit in maximo, non potest esse maius +vel minus. Sed ratio virtutis consistit in maximo, est enim virtus +ultimum potentiae, ut philosophus dicit in I de caelo; et +Augustinus etiam dicit, in II de Lib. Arb., quod virtutes sunt +maxima bona, quibus nullus potest male uti. Ergo videtur quod +virtus non possit esse maior neque minor.
+ Objection 3: Further, the quantity of an effect is measured by the power of the agent. But perfect, viz. infused virtues, are from God + Whose power is uniform and infinite. Therefore it seems that one virtue cannot be greater than another. +
[36239] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +quantitas effectus pensatur secundum virtutem agentis. Sed virtutes +perfectae, quae sunt virtutes infusae, sunt a Deo, cuius virtus est +uniformis et infinita. Ergo videtur quod virtus non possit esse +maior virtute.
+ On the contrary, Wherever there can be increase and greater abundance, there can be inequality. Now virtues admit of greater abundance and + increase: for it is written ( + Mat. 5:20): "Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven": + and ( + Prov. 15:5): "In abundant justice there is the greatest strength [virtus]." Therefore it seems that a virtue can be greater or + less than another. +
[36240] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra, +ubicumque potest esse augmentum et superabundantia, potest esse +inaequalitas. Sed in virtutibus invenitur superabundantia et +augmentum, dicitur enim Matth. V, nisi abundaverit iustitia +vestra plus quam Scribarum et Pharisaeorum, non intrabitis in +regnum caelorum; et Proverb. XV dicitur, in abundanti +iustitia virtus maxima est. Ergo videtur quod virtus possit +esse maior vel minor.
+ I answer that, When it is asked whether one virtue can be greater than another, the question can be taken in two senses. First, as applying + to virtues of different species. In this sense it is clear that one virtue is greater than another; since a cause is always + more excellent than its effect; and among effects, those nearest to the cause are the most excellent. Now it is clear from + what has been said ( + Q[18], A[5]; + Q[61], + A[2] + ) that the cause and root of human good is the reason. Hence prudence which perfects the reason, surpasses in goodness the + other moral virtues which perfect the appetitive power, in so far as it partakes of reason. And among these, one is better + than another, according as it approaches nearer to the reason. Consequently justice, which is in the will, excels the remaining + moral virtues; and fortitude, which is in the irascible part, stands before temperance, which is in the + concupiscible, which has a smaller share of reason, as stated in Ethic. vii, 6. +
The question can be taken in another way, as referring to virtues of the same species. In this way, according to what was + said above ( + Q[52], A[1] ), when we were treating of the intensity of habits, virtue may be said to be greater or less in two ways: first, in itself; + secondly with regard to the subject that partakes of it. If we consider it in itself, we shall call it greater or little, + according to the things to which it extends. Now whosoever has a + virtue, e.g. temperance, has it in respect of whatever temperance extends to. But this does not apply to science and art: + for every grammarian does not know everything relating to grammar. And in this sense the Stoics said rightly, as Simplicius + states in his Commentary on the Predicaments, that virtue cannot be more or less, as science and art can; because the nature + of virtue consists in a maximum. +
If, however, we consider virtue on the part of the subject, it may then be greater or less, either in relation to different + times, or in different men. Because one man is better disposed than another to attain to the mean of virtue which is defined + by right reason; and this, on account of either greater habituation, or a better natural disposition, or a more discerning + judgment of reason, or again a greater gift of grace, which is given to each one "according to the measure of + the giving of Christ," as stated in + Eph. 4:9. And here the Stoics erred, for they held that no man should be deemed virtuous, unless he were, in the highest degree, disposed + to virtue. Because the nature of virtue does not require that man should reach the mean of right reason as though it were + an indivisible point, as the Stoics thought; but it is enough that he should approach the mean, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. + Moreover, one same indivisible mark is reached more nearly + and more readily by one than by another: as may be seen when several arches aim at a fixed target. +
[36241] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod cum quaeritur utrum virtus una possit esse maior +alia, dupliciter intelligi potest quaestio. Uno modo, in virtutibus +specie differentibus. Et sic manifestum est quod una virtus est +alia maior. Semper enim est potior causa suo effectu, et in +effectibus, tanto aliquid est potius, quanto est causae +propinquius. Manifestum est autem ex dictis quod causa et radix +humani boni est ratio. Et ideo prudentia, quae perficit rationem, +praefertur in bonitate aliis virtutibus moralibus, perficientibus +vim appetitivam inquantum participat rationem. Et in his etiam +tanto est una altera melior, quanto magis ad rationem accedit. Unde +et iustitia, quae est in voluntate, praefertur aliis virtutibus +moralibus, et fortitudo, quae est in irascibili, praefertur +temperantiae, quae est in concupiscibili, quae minus participat +rationem, ut patet in VII Ethic. Alio modo potest intelligi +quaestio in virtute eiusdem speciei. Et sic, secundum ea quae dicta +sunt supra, cum de intensionibus habituum ageretur, virtus potest +dupliciter dici maior et minor, uno modo, secundum seipsam; alio +modo, ex parte participantis subiecti. Si igitur secundum seipsam +consideretur, magnitudo vel parvitas eius attenditur secundum ea ad +quae se extendit. Quicumque autem habet aliquam virtutem, puta +temperantiam, habet ipsam quantum ad omnia ad quae se temperantia +extendit. Quod de scientia et arte non contingit, non enim +quicumque est grammaticus, scit omnia quae ad grammaticam +pertinent. Et secundum hoc bene dixerunt Stoici, ut Simplicius +dicit in commento praedicamentorum, quod virtus non recipit magis +et minus, sicut scientia vel ars; eo quod ratio virtutis consistit +in maximo. Si vero consideretur virtus ex parte subiecti +participantis, sic contingit virtutem esse maiorem vel minorem, +sive secundum diversa tempora, in eodem; sive in diversis +hominibus. Quia ad attingendum medium virtutis, quod est secundum +rationem rectam, unus est melius dispositus quam alius, vel propter +maiorem assuetudinem, vel propter meliorem dispositionem naturae, +vel propter perspicacius iudicium rationis, aut etiam propter maius +gratiae donum, quod unicuique donatur secundum mensuram donationis +Christi, ut dicitur ad Ephes. IV. Et in hoc deficiebant Stoici, +aestimantes nullum esse virtuosum dicendum, nisi qui summe fuerit +dispositus ad virtutem. Non enim exigitur ad rationem virtutis, +quod attingat rectae rationis medium in indivisibili, sicut Stoici +putabant, sed sufficit prope medium esse, ut in II Ethic. dicitur. +Idem etiam indivisibile signum unus propinquius et promptius +attingit quam alius, sicut etiam patet in sagittatoribus +trahentibus ad certum signum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: This equality is not one of absolute quantity, but of proportion: because all virtues grow in a man proportionately, as we + shall see further on + (A[2]). +
[36242] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod aequalitas illa non est secundum quantitatem +absolutam, sed est secundum proportionem intelligenda, quia omnes +virtutes proportionaliter crescunt in homine, ut infra dicetur.
+ Reply to Objection 2: This "limit" which belongs to virtue, can have the character of something "more" or "less" good, in the ways explained above: + since, as stated, it is not an indivisible limit. +
[36243] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod illud ultimum quod pertinet ad virtutem, potest +habere rationem magis vel minus boni secundum praedictos modos, cum +non sit ultimum indivisibile, ut dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: God does not work by necessity of nature, but according to the order of His wisdom, whereby He bestows on men various measures + of virtue, according to + Eph. 4:7: "To every one of you [Vulg.: 'us'] is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ." +
[36244] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod Deus non operatur secundum necessitatem naturae, sed +secundum ordinem suae sapientiae, secundum quam diversam mensuram +virtutis hominibus largitur, secundum illud ad Ephes. IV, +unicuique vestrum data est gratia secundum mensuram donationis +Christi.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the virtues in one same man are not all equally intense. For the Apostle says ( + 1 Cor. 7:7): "Everyone hath his proper gift from God; one after this manner, and another after that." Now one gift would not be more + proper than another to a man, if God infused all the virtues equally into each man. Therefore it seems that the virtues are + not all equal in one and the same man. +
[36245] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnes virtutes in uno et eodem +sint aequaliter intensae. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. VII, +unusquisque habet proprium donum a Deo, alius quidem sic, alius +autem sic. Non esset autem unum donum magis proprium alicui +quam aliud, si omnes virtutes dono Dei infusas quilibet aequaliter +haberet. Ergo videtur quod non omnes virtutes sint aequales in uno +et eodem.
+ Objection 2: Further, if all the virtues were equally intense in one and the same man, it would follow that whoever surpasses another + in one virtue, would surpass him in all the others. But this is clearly not the case: since various saints are specially praised + for different virtues; e.g. Abraham for faith ( + Rom. 4), Moses for his meekness ( + Num. 7:3), Job for his patience ( + Tob. 2:12). This is why of each Confessor the Church sings: + "There was not found his like in keeping the law of the most High," [*See Lesson in the Mass Statuit (Dominican Missal)], + since each one was remarkable for some virtue or other. Therefore the virtues are not all equal in one and the same man. +
[36246] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +si omnes virtutes essent aeque intensae in uno et eodem, sequeretur +quod quicumque excederet aliquem in una virtute, excederet ipsum in +omnibus aliis virtutibus. Sed hoc patet esse falsum, quia diversi +sancti de diversis virtutibus praecipue laudantur; sicut Abraham de +fide, Moyses de mansuetudine, Iob de patientia. Unde et de quolibet +confessore cantatur in Ecclesia, non est inventus similis illi, +qui conservaret legem excelsi; eo quod quilibet habuit +praerogativam alicuius virtutis. Non ergo omnes virtutes sunt +aequales in uno et eodem.
+ Objection 3: Further, the more intense a habit is, the greater one's pleasure and readiness in making use of it. Now experience shows + that a man is more pleased and ready to make use of one virtue than of another. Therefore the virtues are not all equal in + one and the same man. +
[36247] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +quanto habitus est intensior, tanto homo secundum ipsum +delectabilius et promptius operatur. Sed experimento patet quod +unus homo delectabilius et promptius operatur actum unius virtutis +quam actum alterius. Non ergo omnes virtutes sunt aequales in uno +et eodem.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 4) that "those who are equal in fortitude are equal in prudence and temperance," and so on. + Now it would not be so, unless all the virtues in one man were equal. Therefore all virtues are equal in one man. +
[36248] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in VI de Trin., quod quicumque sunt +aequales in fortitudine, aequales sunt in prudentia et +temperantia; et sic de aliis. Hoc autem non esset, nisi omnes +virtutes unius hominis essent aequales. Ergo omnes virtutes unius +hominis sunt aequales.
+ I answer that, As explained above + (A[1]), the comparative greatness of virtues can be understood in two ways. First, as referring to their specific nature: and in + this way there is no doubt that in a man one virtue is greater than another, for example, charity, than faith and hope. Secondly, + it may be taken as referring to the degree of participation by the subject, according as a virtue becomes intense or remiss + in its subject. In this sense all + the virtues in one man are equal with an equality of proportion, in so far as their growth in man is equal: thus the fingers + are unequal in size, but equal in proportion, since they grow in proportion to one another. +
Now the nature of this equality is to be explained in the same way as the connection of virtues; for equality among virtues + is their connection as to greatness. Now it has been stated above ( + Q[65], A[1]) that a twofold connection of virtues may be assigned. The first is according to the opinion of those who understood these + four virtues to be four general properties of virtues, each of which is found together with the other in any matter. In this + way + virtues cannot be said to be equal in any matter unless they have all these properties equal. Augustine alludes to this kind + of equality (De Trin. vi, 4) when he says: "If you say these men are equal in fortitude, but that one is more prudent than + the other; it follows that the fortitude of the latter is less prudent. Consequently they are not really equal in fortitude, + since the former's fortitude is more prudent. You will find that this applies to the other virtues if you run over them all + in + the same way." +
The other kind of connection among virtues followed the opinion of those who hold these virtues to have their own proper + respective matters ( + Q[65] , AA[1],2). In this way the connection among moral virtues results from prudence, and, as to the infused virtues, from charity, and + not from the inclination, which is on the part of the subject, as stated above ( + Q[65], A[1]). Accordingly the nature of the equality among virtues can + also be considered on the part of prudence, in regard to that which is formal in all the moral virtues: for in one and the + same man, so long as his reason has the same degree of perfection, the mean will be proportionately defined according to right + reason in each matter of virtue. +
But in regard to that which is material in the moral virtues, viz. the inclination to the virtuous act, one may be readier + to perform the act of one virtue, than the act of another virtue, and this either from nature, or from habituation, or again + by the grace of God. +
[36249] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod quantitas virtutum, sicut ex dictis patet, potest +attendi dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum rationem speciei. Et sic non +est dubium quod una virtus unius hominis sit maior quam alia, sicut +caritas fide et spe. Alio modo potest attendi secundum +participationem subiecti, prout scilicet intenditur vel remittitur +in subiecto. Et secundum hoc, omnes virtutes unius hominis sunt +aequales quadam aequalitate proportionis, inquantum aequaliter +crescunt in homine, sicut digiti manus sunt inaequales secundum +quantitatem, sed sunt aequales secundum proportionem, cum +proportionaliter augeantur. Huiusmodi autem aequalitatis oportet +eodem modo rationem accipere, sicut et connexionis, aequalitas enim +est quaedam connexio virtutum secundum quantitatem. Dictum est +autem supra quod ratio connexionis virtutum dupliciter assignari +potest. Uno modo, secundum intellectum eorum qui intelligunt per +has quatuor virtutes, quatuor conditiones generales virtutum, +quarum una simul invenitur cum aliis in qualibet materia. Et sic +virtus in qualibet materia non potest aequalis dici, nisi habeat +omnes istas conditiones aequales. Et hanc rationem aequalitatis +virtutum assignat Augustinus, in VI de Trin., dicens, si dixeris +aequales esse istos fortitudine, sed illum praestare prudentia; +sequitur quod huius fortitudo minus prudens sit. Ac per hoc, nec +fortitudine aequales sunt, quando est illius fortitudo prudentior. +Atque ita de ceteris virtutibus invenies, si omnes eadem +consideratione percurras. Alio modo assignata est ratio +connexionis virtutum secundum eos qui intelligunt huiusmodi +virtutes habere materias determinatas. Et secundum hoc, ratio +connexionis virtutum moralium accipitur ex parte prudentiae, et ex +parte caritatis quantum ad virtutes infusas, non autem ex parte +inclinationis, quae est ex parte subiecti, ut supra dictum est. Sic +igitur et ratio aequalitatis virtutum potest accipi ex parte +prudentiae, quantum ad id quod est formale in omnibus virtutibus +moralibus, existente enim ratione aequaliter perfecta in uno et +eodem, oportet quod proportionaliter secundum rationem rectam +medium constituatur in qualibet materia virtutum. Quantum vero ad +id quod est materiale in virtutibus moralibus, scilicet +inclinationem ipsam ad actum virtutis; potest esse unus homo magis +promptus ad actum unius virtutis quam ad actum alterius, vel ex +natura, vel ex consuetudine, vel etiam ex gratiae dono.
+ Reply to Objection 1: This saying of the Apostle may be taken to refer to the gifts of gratuitous grace, which are not common to all, nor are all + of them equal in the one same subject. We might also say that it refers to the measure of sanctifying grace, by reason of + which one man has all the virtues in greater abundance than another man, on account of his greater abundance of prudence, + or also of charity, in which all the infused virtues are connected. +
[36250] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod verbum apostoli potest intelligi de donis +gratiae gratis datae, quae non sunt communia omnibus, nec omnia +aequalia in uno et eodem. Vel potest dici quod refertur ad mensuram +gratiae gratum facientis; secundum quam unus abundat in omnibus +virtutibus plus quam alius, propter maiorem abundantiam prudentiae, +vel etiam caritatis, in qua connectuntur omnes virtutes +infusae.
+ Reply to Objection 2: One saint is praised chiefly for one virtue, another saint for another virtue, on account of his more admirable readiness + for the act of one virtue than for the act of another virtue. +
[36251] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod unus sanctus laudatur praecipue de una virtute, et +alius de alia, propter excellentiorem promptitudinem ad actum unius +virtutis, quam ad actum alterius.
Reply to Objection 3: This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.
[36252] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 ad 3 Et per hoc +etiam patet responsio ad tertium.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues are better than the intellectual. Because that which is more necessary, and more lasting, + is better. Now the moral virtues are "more lasting even than the sciences" (Ethic. i) which are intellectual virtues: and, + moreover, they are more necessary for human life. Therefore they are preferable to the intellectual virtues. +
[36253] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales praeemineant +intellectualibus. Quod enim magis est necessarium, et permanentius, +est melius. Sed virtutes morales sunt permanentiores etiam +disciplinis, quae sunt virtutes intellectuales, et sunt etiam magis +necessariae ad vitam humanam. Ergo sunt praeferendae virtutibus +intellectualibus.
+ Objection 2: Further, virtue is defined as "that which makes its possessor good." Now man is said to be good in respect of moral virtue, + and art in respect of intellectual virtue, except perhaps in respect of prudence alone. Therefore moral is better than intellectual + virtue. +
[36254] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +de ratione virtutis est quod bonum faciat habentem. Sed secundum +virtutes morales dicitur homo bonus, non autem secundum virtutes +intellectuales, nisi forte secundum solam prudentiam. Ergo virtus +moralis est melior quam intellectualis.
+ Objection 3: Further, the end is more excellent than the means. But according to Ethic. vi, 12, "moral virtue gives right intention of + the end; whereas prudence gives right choice of the means." Therefore moral virtue is more excellent than prudence, which + is the intellectual virtue that regards moral matters. +
[36255] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +finis est nobilior his quae sunt ad finem. Sed sicut dicitur in VI +Ethic., virtus moralis facit rectam intentionem finis; prudentia +autem facit rectam electionem eorum quae sunt ad finem. Ergo +virtus moralis est nobilior prudentia, quae est virtus +intellectualis circa moralia.
+ On the contrary, Moral virtue is in that part of the soul which is rational by participation; while intellectual virtue is in the essentially + rational part, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. Now rational by essence is more excellent than rational by participation. Therefore + intellectual virtue is better than moral virtue. +
[36256] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra, +virtus moralis est in rationali per participationem; virtus autem +intellectualis in rationali per essentiam, sicut dicitur in I +Ethic. Sed rationale per essentiam est nobilius quam rationale per +participationem. Ergo virtus intellectualis est nobilior virtute +morali.
+ I answer that, A thing may be said to be greater or less in two ways: first, simply; secondly, relatively. For nothing hinders something + from being better simply, e.g. "learning than riches," and yet not better relatively, i.e. "for one who is in want" [*Aristotle, + Topic. iii.]. Now to consider a thing simply is to consider it in its proper specific nature. Accordingly, a virtue takes + its species from its object, as explained above ( + Q[54], A[2]; + Q[60], A[1]). Hence, speaking simply, that virtue is more excellent, which has the more excellent object. Now it is evident that the + object of the reason is more excellent than the object of the appetite: since the reason apprehends things in the universal, + while the appetite tends to things themselves, whose being is restricted to the particular. Consequently, speaking simply, + the intellectual virtues, which perfect the reason, are more excellent than the moral virtues, + which perfect the appetite. +
But if we consider virtue in its relation to act, then moral virtue, which perfects the appetite, whose function it is to + move the other powers to act, as stated above ( + Q[9], A[1]), is more excellent. And since virtue is so called from its being a principle of action, for it is the perfection of a power, + it follows again that the nature of virtue agrees more with moral than with intellectual virtue, though the intellectual virtues + are more excellent + habits, simply speaking. +
[36257] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod aliquid potest dici maius vel minus, dupliciter, uno +modo, simpliciter; alio modo, secundum quid. Nihil enim prohibet +aliquid esse melius simpliciter, ut philosophari quam ditari, quod +tamen non est melius secundum quid, idest necessitatem patienti. +Simpliciter autem consideratur unumquodque, quando consideratur +secundum propriam rationem suae speciei. Habet autem virtus speciem +ex obiecto, ut ex dictis patet. Unde, simpliciter loquendo, illa +virtus nobilior est quae habet nobilius obiectum. Manifestum est +autem quod obiectum rationis est nobilius quam obiectum appetitus, +ratio enim apprehendit aliquid in universali; sed appetitus tendit +in res, quae habent esse particulare. Unde, simpliciter loquendo, +virtutes intellectuales, quae perficiunt rationem, sunt nobiliores +quam morales, quae perficiunt appetitum. Sed si consideretur virtus +in ordine ad actum, sic virtus moralis, quae perficit appetitum, +cuius est movere alias potentias ad actum, ut supra dictum est, +nobilior est. Et quia virtus dicitur ex eo quod est principium +alicuius actus, cum sit perfectio potentiae, sequitur etiam quod +ratio virtutis magis competat virtutibus moralibus quam virtutibus +intellectualibus, quamvis virtutes intellectuales sint nobiliores +habitus simpliciter.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The moral virtues are more lasting than the intellectual virtues, because they are practised in matters pertaining to the + life of the community. Yet it is evident that the objects of the sciences, which are necessary and invariable, are more lasting + than the objects of moral virtue, which are certain particular matters of action. That the moral virtues are more necessary + for human life, proves that they are more excellent, not simply, but relatively. + Indeed, the speculative intellectual virtues, from the very fact that they are not referred to something else, as a useful + thing is referred to an end, are more excellent. The reason for this is that in them we have a kind of beginning of that happiness + which consists in the knowledge of truth, as stated above ( + Q[3], A[6]). +
[36258] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod virtutes morales sunt magis permanentes quam +intellectuales, propter exercitium earum in his quae pertinent ad +vitam communem. Sed manifestum est quod obiecta disciplinarum, quae +sunt necessaria et semper eodem modo se habentia, sunt +permanentiora quam obiecta virtutum moralium, quae sunt quaedam +particularia agibilia. Quod autem virtutes morales sunt magis +necessariae ad vitam humanam, non ostendit eas esse nobiliores +simpliciter, sed quoad hoc. Quinimmo virtutes intellectuales +speculativae, ex hoc ipso quod non ordinantur ad aliud sicut utile +ordinatur ad finem, sunt digniores. Hoc enim contingit quia +secundum eas quodammodo inchoatur in nobis beatitudo, quae +consistit in cognitione veritatis, sicut supra dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The reason why man is said to be good simply, in respect of moral virtue, but not in respect of intellectual virtue, is because + the appetite moves the other powers to their acts, as stated above ( + Q[56], A[3]). Wherefore this argument, too, proves merely that moral virtue is better relatively. +
[36259] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod secundum virtutes morales dicitur homo bonus +simpliciter, et non secundum intellectuales, ea ratione, quia +appetitus movet alias potentias ad suum actum, ut supra dictum est. +Unde per hoc etiam non probatur nisi quod virtus moralis sit melior +secundum quid.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Prudence directs the moral virtues not only in the choice of the means, but also in appointing the end. Now the end of each + moral virtue is to attain the mean in the matter proper to that virtue; which mean is appointed according to the right ruling + of prudence, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6; vi, 13. +
[36260] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod prudentia non solum dirigit virtutes morales in +eligendo ea quae sunt ad finem, sed etiam in praestituendo finem. +Est autem finis uniuscuiusque virtutis moralis attingere medium in +propria materia, quod quidem medium determinatur secundum rectam +rationem prudentiae, ut dicitur in II et VI Ethic.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not the chief of the moral virtues. For it is better to give of one's own than to pay what + is due. Now the former belongs to liberality, the latter to justice. Therefore liberality is apparently a greater virtue than + justice. +
[36261] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod iustitia non sit praecipua inter +virtutes morales. Maius enim est dare alicui de proprio, quam +reddere alicui quod ei debetur. Sed primum pertinet ad +liberalitatem; secundum autem ad iustitiam. Ergo videtur quod +liberalitas sit maior virtus quam iustitia.
+ Objection 2: Further, the chief quality of a thing is, seemingly, that in which it is most perfect. Now, according to + Jam. 1:4, "Patience hath a perfect work." Therefore it would seem that patience is greater than justice. +
[36262] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +illud videtur esse maximum in unoquoque, quod est perfectissimum in +ipso. Sed sicut dicitur Iac. I, patientia opus perfectum +habet. Ergo videtur quod patientia sit maior quam iustitia.
+ Objection 3: Further, "Magnanimity has a great influence on every virtue," as stated in Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore it magnifies even justice. + Therefore it is greater than justice. +
[36263] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 arg. 3 +Praeterea, magnanimitas operatur magnum, in omnibus +virtutibus, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Ergo magnificat etiam ipsam +iustitiam. Est igitur maior quam iustitia.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "justice is the most excellent of the virtues." +
[36264] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., quod iustitia est +praeclarissima virtutum.
+ I answer that, A virtue considered in its species may be greater or less, either simply or relatively. A virtue is said to be greater simply, + whereby a greater rational good shines forth, as stated above + (A[1]). In this way justice is the most excellent of all the moral virtues, as being most akin to reason. This is made evident by + considering its subject and its object: its subject, because this is the will, and the will is the rational appetite, + as stated above (Q[8], A[1]; Q[26], A[1]): its object or matter, because it is about operations, whereby man is set in order + not only in himself, but also in regard to another. Hence "justice is the most excellent of virtues" (Ethic. v, 1). Among + the other moral virtues, which are about the passions, the more excellent the matter in which the appetitive movement is subjected + to reason, so much the more does the rational good shine forth in each. Now in things touching man, the chief of all is + life, on which all other things depend. Consequently fortitude which subjects the appetitive movement to reason in matters + of life and death, holds the first place among those moral virtues that are about the passions, but is subordinate to justice. + Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. 1) that "those virtues must needs be greatest which receive the most praise: since virtue + is a power of doing good. Hence the brave man and the just man are honored more than others; because the former," i.e. + fortitude, "is useful in war, and the latter," i.e. justice, "both in war and in peace." After fortitude comes temperance, + which subjects the appetite to reason in matters directly relating to life, in the one individual, or in the one species, + viz. in matters of food and of sex. And so these three virtues, together with prudence, are called principal virtues, in excellence + also. +
A virtue is said to be greater relatively, by reason of its helping or adorning a principal virtue: even as substance is + more excellent simply than accident: and yet relatively some particular accident is more excellent than substance in so far + as it perfects substance in some accidental mode of being. +
[36265] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod virtus aliqua secundum suam speciem potest dici maior +vel minor, vel simpliciter, vel secundum quid. Simpliciter quidem +virtus dicitur maior, secundum quod in ea maius bonum rationis +relucet, ut supra dictum est. Et secundum hoc, iustitia inter omnes +virtutes morales praecellit, tanquam propinquior rationi. Quod +patet et ex subiecto, et ex obiecto. Ex subiecto quidem, quia est +in voluntate sicut in subiecto, voluntas autem est appetitus +rationalis, ut ex dictis patet. Secundum autem obiectum sive +materiam, quia est circa operationes, quibus homo ordinatur non +solum in seipso, sed etiam ad alterum. Unde iustitia est +praeclarissima virtutum, ut dicitur in V Ethic. Inter alias autem +virtutes morales, quae sunt circa passiones, tanto in unaquaque +magis relucet rationis bonum, quanto circa maiora motus appetitivus +subditur rationi. Maximum autem in his quae ad hominem pertinent, +est vita, a qua omnia alia dependent. Et ideo fortitudo, quae +appetitivum motum subdit rationi in his quae ad mortem et vitam +pertinent, primum locum tenet inter virtutes morales quae sunt +circa passiones, tamen ordinatur infra iustitiam. Unde philosophus +dicit, in I Rhetoric., quod necesse est maximas esse virtutes, +quae sunt aliis honoratissimae, siquidem est virtus potentia +benefactiva. Propter hoc, fortes et iustos maxime honorant, haec +quidem enim in bello, scilicet fortitudo; haec autem, scilicet +iustitia, et in bello et in pace utilis est. Post fortitudinem +autem ordinatur temperantia, quae subiicit rationi appetitum circa +ea quae immediate ordinantur ad vitam, vel in eodem secundum +numerum, vel in eodem secundum speciem, scilicet in cibis et +venereis. Et sic istae tres virtutes, simul cum prudentia, dicuntur +esse principales etiam dignitate. Secundum quid autem dicitur +aliqua virtus esse maior, secundum quod adminiculum vel ornamentum +praebet principali virtuti. Sicut substantia est simpliciter +dignior accidente; aliquod tamen accidens est secundum quid dignius +substantia, inquantum perficit substantiam in aliquo esse +accidentali.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The act of liberality needs to be founded on an act of justice, for "a man is not liberal in giving, unless he gives of his + own" (Polit. ii, 3). Hence there could be no liberality apart from justice, which discerns between "meum" and "tuum": whereas + justice can be without liberality. Hence justice is simply greater than liberality, as being more universal, and as being + its foundation: while liberality is greater relatively since it is an ornament and + an addition to justice. +
[36266] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod actus liberalitatis oportet quod fundetur super +actum iustitiae, non enim esset liberalis datio, si non de +proprio daret, ut in II Polit. dicitur. Unde liberalitas sine +iustitia esse non posset, quae secernit suum a non suo. Iustitia +autem potest esse sine liberalitate. Unde iustitia simpliciter est +maior liberalitate, tanquam communior, et fundamentum ipsius, +liberalitas autem est secundum quid maior, cum sit quidam ornatus +iustitiae, et complementum eius.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Patience is said to have "a perfect work," by enduring evils, wherein it excludes not only unjust revenge, which is also + excluded by justice; not only hatred, which is also suppressed by charity; nor only anger, which is calmed by gentleness; + but also inordinate sorrow, which is the root of all the above. Wherefore it is more perfect and excellent through plucking + up the root in this matter. It is not, however, more perfect than all the other virtues + simply. Because fortitude not only endures trouble without being disturbed, but also fights against it if necessary. Hence + whoever is brave is patient; but the converse does not hold, for patience is a part of fortitude. +
[36267] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod patientia dicitur habere opus perfectum in tolerantia +malorum, in quibus non solum excludit iniustam vindictam, quam +etiam excludit iustitia; neque solum odium quod facit caritas; +neque solum iram, quod facit mansuetudo; sed etiam excludit +tristitiam inordinatam, quae est radix omnium praedictorum. Et ideo +in hoc est perfectior et maior, quod in hac materia extirpat +radicem. Non autem est simpliciter perfectior omnibus aliis +virtutibus. Quia fortitudo non solum sustinet molestias absque +perturbatione, quod est patientiae, sed etiam ingerit se eis, cum +opus fuerit. Unde quicumque est fortis, est patiens, sed non +convertitur, est enim patientia quaedam fortitudinis pars.
+ Reply to Objection 3: There can be no magnanimity without the other virtues, as stated in Ethic. iv, 3. Hence it is compared to them as their ornament, + so that relatively it is greater than all the others, but not simply. +
[36268] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod magnanimitas non potest esse nisi aliis virtutibus +praeexistentibus, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Unde comparatur ad alias +sicut ornatus earum. Et sic secundum quid est maior omnibus aliis, +non tamen simpliciter.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not the greatest of the intellectual virtues. Because the commander is greater than the one + commanded. Now prudence seems to command wisdom, for it is stated in Ethic. i, 2 that political science, which belongs to + prudence (Ethic. vi, 8), "orders that sciences should be cultivated in states, and to which of these each individual should + devote himself, and to what extent." Since, then, wisdom is one of the sciences, it seems that + prudence is greater than wisdom. +
[36269] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod sapientia non sit maxima inter +virtutes intellectuales. Imperans enim maius est eo cui imperatur. +Sed prudentia videtur imperare sapientiae, dicitur enim I Ethic., +quod quales disciplinarum debitum est esse in civitatibus, et +quales unumquemque addiscere, et usquequo, haec praeordinat, +scilicet politica, quae ad prudentiam pertinet, ut dicitur in VI +Ethic. Cum igitur inter disciplinas etiam sapientia contineatur, +videtur quod prudentia sit maior quam sapientia.
+ Objection 2: Further, it belongs to the nature of virtue to direct man to happiness: because virtue is "the disposition of a perfect thing + to that which is best," as stated in Phys. vii, text. 17. Now prudence is "right reason about things to be done," whereby + man is brought to happiness: whereas wisdom takes no notice of human acts, whereby man attains happiness. Therefore prudence + is a greater virtue than wisdom. +
[36270] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +de ratione virtutis est quod ordinet hominem ad felicitatem, est +enim virtus dispositio perfecti ad optimum, ut dicitur in VII +Physic. Sed prudentia est recta ratio agibilium, per quae homo ad +felicitatem perducitur, sapientia autem non considerat humanos +actus, quibus ad beatitudinem pervenitur. Ergo prudentia est maior +virtus quam sapientia.
+ Objection 3: Further, the more perfect knowledge is, the greater it seems to be. Now we can have more perfect knowledge of human affairs, + which are the subject of science, than of Divine things, which are the object of wisdom, which is the distinction given by + Augustine (De Trin. xii, 14): because Divine things are incomprehensible, according to + Job 26:26: "Behold God is great, exceeding our knowledge." Therefore science is a greater virtue than + wisdom. +
[36271] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +quanto cognitio est perfectior, tanto videtur esse maior. Sed +perfectiorem cognitionem habere possumus de rebus humanis, de +quibus est scientia, quam de rebus divinis, de quibus est +sapientia, ut distinguit Augustinus in XII de Trin., quia divina +incomprehensibilia sunt, secundum illud Iob XXXVI, ecce Deus +magnus, vincens scientiam nostram. Ergo scientia est maior +virtus quam sapientia.
+ Objection 4: Further, knowledge of principles is more excellent than knowledge of conclusions. But wisdom draws conclusions from indemonstrable + principles which are the object of the virtue of understanding, even as other sciences do. Therefore understanding is a greater + virtue than wisdom. +
[36272] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 arg. 4 Praeterea, +cognitio principiorum est dignior quam cognitio conclusionum. Sed +sapientia concludit ex principiis indemonstrabilibus, quorum est +intellectus; sicut et aliae scientiae. Ergo intellectus est maior +virtus quam sapientia.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that wisdom is "the head" among "the intellectual virtues." +
[36273] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod sapientia est sicut +caput inter virtutes intellectuales.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[3]), the greatness of a virtue, as to its species, is taken from its object. Now the object of wisdom surpasses the objects of + all the intellectual virtues: because wisdom considers the Supreme Cause, which is God, as stated at the beginning of the + Metaphysics. And since it is by the cause that we judge of an effect, and by the higher cause that we judge of the lower effects; + hence it is that wisdom exercises + judgment over all the other intellectual virtues, directs them all, and is the architect of them all. +
[36274] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, magnitudo virtutis secundum suam +speciem, consideratur ex obiecto. Obiectum autem sapientiae +praecellit inter obiecta omnium virtutum intellectualium, +considerat enim causam altissimam, quae Deus est, ut dicitur in +principio Metaphys. Et quia per causam iudicatur de effectu, et per +causam superiorem de causis inferioribus; inde est quod sapientia +habet iudicium de omnibus aliis virtutibus intellectualibus; et +eius est ordinare omnes; et ipsa est quasi architectonica respectu +omnium.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Since prudence is about human affairs, and wisdom about the Supreme Cause, it is impossible for prudence to be a greater + virtue than wisdom, "unless," as stated in Ethic. vi, 7, "man were the greatest thing in the world." Wherefore we must say, + as stated in the same book (Ethic. vi), that prudence does not command wisdom, but vice versa: because "the spiritual man + judgeth all things; and he himself is judged by no man" ( + 1 Cor. + 2:15 + ). For prudence has no business with supreme matters which are the object of wisdom: but its command covers things directed + to wisdom, viz. how men are to obtain wisdom. Wherefore prudence, or political science, is, in this way, the servant of wisdom; + for it leads to wisdom, preparing the way for her, as the doorkeeper for the king. +
[36275] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, cum prudentia sit circa res humanas, sapientia +vero circa causam altissimam; impossibile est quod prudentia sit +maior virtus quam sapientia, nisi, ut dicitur in VI Ethic., +maximum eorum quae sunt in mundo, esset homo. Unde dicendum +est, sicut in eodem libro dicitur, quod prudentia non imperat ipsi +sapientiae, sed potius e converso, quia spiritualis iudicat +omnia, et ipse a nemine iudicatur, ut dicitur I ad Cor. II. Non +enim prudentia habet se intromittere de altissimis, quae considerat +sapientia, sed imperat de his quae ordinantur ad sapientiam, +scilicet quomodo homines debeant ad sapientiam pervenire. Unde in +hoc est prudentia, seu politica, ministra sapientiae, introducit +enim ad eam, praeparans ei viam, sicut ostiarius ad regem.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Prudence considers the means of acquiring happiness, but wisdom considers the very object of happiness, viz. the Supreme + Intelligible. And if indeed the consideration of wisdom were perfect in respect of its object, there would be perfect happiness + in the act of wisdom: but as, in this life, the act of wisdom is imperfect in respect of its principal object, which is God, + it follows that the act of wisdom is a beginning or participation of future + happiness, so that wisdom is nearer than prudence to happiness. +
[36276] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod prudentia considerat ea quibus pervenitur ad +felicitatem, sed sapientia considerat ipsum obiectum felicitatis, +quod est altissimum intelligibile. Et si quidem esset perfecta +consideratio sapientiae respectu sui obiecti, esset perfecta +felicitas in actu sapientiae. Sed quia actus sapientiae in hac vita +est imperfectus respectu principalis obiecti, quod est Deus; ideo +actus sapientiae est quaedam inchoatio seu participatio futurae +felicitatis. Et sic propinquius se habet ad felicitatem quam +prudentia.
+ Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (De Anima i, text. 1), "one knowledge is preferable to another, either because it is about a higher + object, or because it is more certain." Hence if the objects be equally good and sublime, that virtue will be greater which + possesses more certain knowledge. But a virtue which is less certain about a higher and better object, is preferable to that + which is more certain about an object of inferior degree. Wherefore the + Philosopher says (De Coelo ii, text. 60) that "it is a great thing to be able to know something about celestial beings, though + it be based on weak and probable reasoning"; and again (De Part. Animal. i, 5) that "it is better to know a little about sublime + things, than much about mean things." Accordingly wisdom, to which knowledge about God pertains, is beyond the reach of man, + especially in this life, so as to be his possession: for this "belongs to God alone" (Metaph. i, 2): and yet this + little knowledge about God which we can have through wisdom is preferable to all other knowledge. +
[36277] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in I de anima, una +notitia praefertur alteri aut ex eo quod est nobiliorum, aut +propter certitudinem. Si igitur subiecta sint aequalia in +bonitate et nobilitate, illa quae est certior, erit maior virtus. +Sed illa quae est minus certa de altioribus et maioribus, +praefertur ei quae est magis certa de inferioribus rebus. Unde +philosophus dicit, in II de caelo, quod magnum est de rebus +caelestibus aliquid posse cognoscere etiam debili et topica +ratione. Et in I de partibus Animal., dicit quod amabile est +magis parvum aliquid cognoscere de rebus nobilioribus quam multa +cognoscere de rebus ignobilioribus. Sapientia igitur ad quam +pertinet Dei cognitio, homini, maxime in statu huius vitae, non +potest perfecte advenire, ut sit quasi eius possessio; sed hoc +solius Dei est, ut dicitur in I Metaphys. Sed tamen illa modica +cognitio quae per sapientiam de Deo haberi potest, omni alii +cognitioni praefertur.
+ Reply to Objection 4: The truth and knowledge of indemonstrable principles depends on the meaning of the terms: for as soon as we know what is + a whole, and what is a part, we know at once that every whole is greater than its part. Now to know the meaning of being and + non-being, of whole and part, and of other things consequent to being, which are the terms whereof indemonstrable principles + are constituted, is the function of wisdom: since universal being is the proper + effect of the Supreme Cause, which is God. And so wisdom makes use of indemonstrable principles which are the object of understanding, + not only by drawing conclusions from them, as other sciences do, but also by passing its judgment on them, and by vindicating + them against those who deny them. Hence it follows that wisdom is a greater virtue than understanding. +
[36278] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod veritas et cognitio principiorum indemonstrabilium +dependet ex ratione terminorum, cognito enim quid est totum et quid +pars, statim cognoscitur quod omne totum est maius sua parte. +Cognoscere autem rationem entis et non entis, et totius et partis, +et aliorum quae consequuntur ad ens, ex quibus sicut ex terminis +constituuntur principia indemonstrabilia, pertinet ad sapientiam, +quia ens commune est proprius effectus causae altissimae, scilicet +Dei. Et ideo sapientia non solum utitur principiis +indemonstrabilibus, quorum est intellectus, concludendo ex eis, +sicut aliae scientiae; sed etiam iudicando de eis, et disputando +contra negantes. Unde sequitur quod sapientia sit maior virtus quam +intellectus.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not the greatest of the theological virtues. Because, since faith is in the intellect, while + hope and charity are in the appetitive power, it seems that faith is compared to hope and charity, as intellectual to moral + virtue. Now intellectual virtue is greater than moral virtue, as was made evident above ( + Q[62], A[3]). Therefore faith is greater than hope and charity. +
[36279] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas non sit maxima inter virtutes +theologicas. Cum enim fides sit in intellectu, spes autem et +caritas in vi appetitiva, ut supra dictum est; videtur quod fides +comparetur ad spem et caritatem, sicut virtus intellectualis ad +moralem. Sed virtus intellectualis est maior morali, ut ex dictis +patet. Ergo fides est maior spe et caritate.
+ Objection 2: Further, when two things are added together, the result is greater than either one. Now hope results from something added + to charity; for it presupposes love, as Augustine says (Enchiridion viii), and it adds a certain movement of stretching forward + to the beloved. Therefore hope is greater than charity. +
[36280] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, +quod se habet ex additione ad aliud, videtur esse maius eo. Sed +spes, ut videtur, se habet ex additione ad caritatem, praesupponit +enim spes amorem, ut Augustinus dicit in Enchirid.; addit autem +quendam motum protensionis in rem amatam. Ergo spes est maior +caritate.
+ Objection 3: Further, a cause is more noble than its effect. Now faith and hope are the cause of charity: for a gloss on + Mat. 1:3 says that "faith begets hope, and hope charity." Therefore faith and hope are greater than charity. +
[36281] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, +causa est potior effectu. Sed fides et spes sunt causa caritatis, +dicitur enim Matth. I, in Glossa, quod fides generat spem, et +spes caritatem. Ergo fides et spes sunt maiores caritate.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle says ( + 1 Cor. 13:13): "Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity." +
[36282] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XIII, nunc autem manent +fides, spes, caritas, tria haec; maior autem horum est +caritas.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[3]), the greatness of a virtue, as to its species, is taken from its object. Now, since the three theological virtues look at + God as their proper object, it cannot be said that any one of them is greater than another by reason of its having a greater + object, but only from the fact that it approaches nearer than another to that object; and in this way charity is greater than + the others. Because the others, in their + very nature, imply a certain distance from the object: since faith is of what is not seen, and hope is of what is not possessed. + But the love of charity is of that which is already possessed: since the beloved is, in a manner, in the lover, and, again, + the lover is drawn by desire to union with the beloved; hence it is written ( + 1 Jn. 4:16): "He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him." +
[36283] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, magnitudo virtutis secundum +suam speciem, consideratur ex obiecto. Cum autem tres virtutes +theologicae respiciant Deum sicut proprium obiectum, non potest una +earum dici maior altera ex hoc quod sit circa maius obiectum; sed +ex eo quod una se habet propinquius ad obiectum quam alia. Et hoc +modo caritas est maior aliis. Nam aliae important in sui ratione +quandam distantiam ab obiecto, est enim fides de non visis, spes +autem de non habitis. Sed amor caritatis est de eo quod iam +habetur, est enim amatum quodammodo in amante, et etiam amans per +affectum trahitur ad unionem amati; propter quod dicitur I Ioan. +IV, qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Faith and hope are not related to charity in the same way as prudence to moral virtue; and for two reasons. First, because + the theological virtues have an object surpassing the human soul: whereas prudence and the moral virtues are about things + beneath man. Now in things that are above man, to love them is more excellent than to know them. Because knowledge is perfected + by the known being in the knower: whereas love is perfected by the lover being + drawn to the beloved. Now that which is above man is more excellent in itself than in man: since a thing is contained according + to the mode of the container. But it is the other way about in things beneath man. Secondly, because prudence moderates the + appetitive movements pertaining to the moral virtues, whereas faith does not moderate the appetitive movement tending to God, + which movement belongs to the theological virtues: it only shows the object. And this appetitive movement towards its + object surpasses human knowledge, according to + Eph. 3:19: "The charity of Christ which surpasseth all knowledge." +
[36284] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod non hoc modo se habent fides et spes ad +caritatem, sicut prudentia ad virtutem moralem. Et hoc propter duo. +Primo quidem, quia virtutes theologicae habent obiectum quod est +supra animam humanam, sed prudentia et virtutes morales sunt circa +ea quae sunt infra hominem. In his autem quae sunt supra hominem, +nobilior est dilectio quam cognitio. Perficitur enim cognitio, +secundum quod cognita sunt in cognoscente, dilectio vero, secundum +quod diligens trahitur ad rem dilectam. Id autem quod est supra +hominem, nobilius est in seipso quam sit in homine, quia +unumquodque est in altero per modum eius in quo est. E converso +autem est in his quae sunt infra hominem. Secundo, quia prudentia +moderatur motus appetitivos ad morales virtutes pertinentes, sed +fides non moderatur motum appetitivum tendentem in Deum, qui +pertinet ad virtutes theologicas; sed solum ostendit obiectum. +Motus autem appetitivus in obiectum, excedit cognitionem humanam; +secundum illud ad Ephes. III, supereminentem scientiae caritatem +Christi.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Hope presupposes love of that which a man hopes to obtain; and such love is love of concupiscence, whereby he who desires + good, loves himself rather than something else. On the other hand, charity implies love of friendship, to which we are led + by hope, as stated above ( + Q[62], A[4]). +
[36285] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod spes praesupponit amorem eius quod quis adipisci se +sperat, qui est amor concupiscentiae, quo quidem amore magis se +amat qui concupiscit bonum, quam aliquid aliud. Caritas autem +importat amorem amicitiae, ad quam pervenitur spe, ut supra dictum +est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: An efficient cause is more noble than its effect: but not a disposing cause. For otherwise the heat of fire would be more + noble than the soul, to which the heat disposes the matter. It is in this way that faith begets hope, and hope charity: in + the sense, to wit, that one is a disposition to the other. +
[36286] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod causa perficiens est potior effectu, non autem causa +disponens. Sic enim calor ignis esset potior quam anima, ad quam +disponit materiam, quod patet esse falsum. Sic autem fides generat +spem, et spes caritatem, secundum scilicet quod una disponit ad +alteram.
We must now consider the duration of virtues after this life, under which head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the moral virtues remain after this life?
(2) Whether the intellectual virtues remain?
+[36287] +Iª-IIae q. 67 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +duratione virtutum post hanc vitam. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. +Primo, utrum virtutes morales maneant post hanc vitam. Secundo, +utrum virtutes intellectuales. Tertio, utrum fides. Quarto, utrum +remaneat spes. Quinto, utrum aliquid fidei maneat, vel spei. Sexto, +utrum maneat caritas.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues doe not remain after this life. For in the future state of glory men will be like angels, + according to + Mat. 22:30. But it is absurd to put moral virtues in the angels [*"Whatever relates to moral action is petty, and unworthy of the gods" + (Ethic. x, 8)], as stated in Ethic. x, 8. Therefore neither in man will there be moral virtues after this life. +
[36288] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales non maneant post hanc +vitam. Homines enim in statu futurae gloriae erunt similes Angelis, +ut dicitur Matth. XXII. Sed ridiculum est in Angelis ponere +virtutes morales, ut dicitur in X Ethic. Ergo neque in hominibus, +post hanc vitam, erunt virtutes morales.
+ Objection 2: Further, moral virtues perfect man in the active life. But the active life does not remain after this life: for Gregory says + (Moral. iv, 18): "The works of the active life pass away from the body." Therefore moral virtues do not remain after this + life. +
[36289] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +virtutes morales perficiunt hominem in vita activa. Sed vita activa +non manet post hanc vitam, dicit enim Gregorius, in VI Moral., +activae vitae opera cum corpore transeunt. Ergo virtutes +morales non manent post hanc vitam.
+ Objection 3: Further, temperance and fortitude, which are moral virtues, are in the irrational parts of the soul, as the Philosopher states + (Ethic. iii, 10). Now the irrational parts of the soul are corrupted, when the body is corrupted: since they are acts of bodily + organs. Therefore it seems that the moral virtues do not remain after this life. +
[36290] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +temperantia et fortitudo, quae sunt virtutes morales, sunt +irrationalium partium, ut philosophus dicit, in III Ethic. Sed +irrationales partes animae corrumpuntur, corrupto corpore, eo quod +sunt actus organorum corporalium. Ergo videtur quod virtutes +morales non maneant post hanc vitam.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Wis. 1:15) that "justice is perpetual and immortal." +
[36291] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Sap. I, quod iustitia perpetua est et +immortalis.
+ I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9), Cicero held that the cardinal virtues do not remain after this life; and that, as Augustine + says (De Trin. xiv, 9), "in the other life men are made happy by the mere knowledge of that nature, than which nothing is + better or more lovable, that Nature, to wit, which created all others." Afterwards he concludes that these four virtues remain + in the future life, but after a different manner. +
[36292] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Trin., Tullius +posuit post hanc vitam quatuor virtutes cardinales non esse; sed in +alia vita homines esse beatos sola cognitione naturae, in qua nihil +est melius aut amabilius, ut Augustinus dicit ibidem, ea natura +quae creavit omnes naturas. Ipse autem postea determinat huiusmodi +quatuor virtutes in futura vita existere, tamen alio modo.
In order to make this evident, we must note that in these virtues there is a formal element, and a quasi-material element. + The material element in these virtues is a certain inclination of the appetitive part to the passions and operations according + to a certain mode: and since this mode is fixed by reason, the formal element is precisely this order of reason. +
Ad cuius +evidentiam, sciendum est quod in huiusmodi virtutibus aliquid est +formale; et aliquid quasi materiale. Materiale quidem est in his +virtutibus inclinatio quaedam partis appetitivae ad passiones vel +operationes secundum modum aliquem. Sed quia iste modus +determinatur a ratione, ideo formale in omnibus virtutibus est ipse +ordo rationis.
Accordingly we must say that these moral virtues do not remain in the future life, as regards their material element. For + in the future life there will be no concupiscences and pleasures in matters of food and sex; nor fear and daring about dangers + of death; nor distributions and commutations of things employed in this present life. But, as regards the formal element, + they will remain most perfect, after this life, in the Blessed, in as much as each one's reason will have most + perfect rectitude in regard to things concerning him in respect of that state of life: and his appetitive power will be moved + entirely according to the order of reason, in things pertaining to that same state. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9) + that "prudence will be there without any danger of error; fortitude, without the anxiety of bearing with evil; temperance, + without the rebellion of the desires: so that prudence will neither prefer nor equal any good to God; fortitude will adhere + to + Him most steadfastly; and temperance will delight in Him Who knows no imperfection." As to justice, it is yet more evident + what will be its act in that life, viz. "to be subject to God": because even in this life subjection to a superior is part + of justice. +
Sic igitur dicendum est quod huiusmodi virtutes +morales in futura vita non manent, quantum ad id quod est materiale +in eis. Non enim habebunt in futura vita locum concupiscentiae et +delectationes ciborum et venereorum; neque etiam timores et +audaciae circa pericula mortis; neque etiam distributiones et +communicationes rerum quae veniunt in usum praesentis vitae. Sed +quantum ad id quod est formale, remanebunt in beatis perfectissimae +post hanc vitam, inquantum ratio uniuscuiusque rectissima erit +circa ea quae ad ipsum pertinent secundum statum illum; et vis +appetitiva omnino movebitur secundum ordinem rationis, in his quae +ad statum illum pertinent. Unde Augustinus ibidem dicit quod +prudentia ibi erit sine ullo periculo erroris; fortitudo, sine +molestia tolerandorum malorum; temperantia, sine repugnatione +libidinum. Ut prudentiae sit nullum bonum Deo praeponere vel +aequare; fortitudinis, ei firmissime cohaerere; temperantiae, nullo +defectu noxio delectari. De iustitia vero manifestius est quem +actum ibi habebit, scilicet esse subditum Deo, quia etiam in hac +vita ad iustitiam pertinet esse subditum superiori.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of these moral virtues, as to their material element; thus he speaks of justice, as regards + "commutations and distributions"; of fortitude, as to "matters of terror and danger"; of temperance, in respect of "lewd desires." +
[36293] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod philosophus loquitur ibi de huiusmodi virtutibus +moralibus, quantum ad id quod materiale est in eis, sicut de +iustitia, quantum ad commutationes et depositiones; de fortitudine, +quantum ad terribilia et pericula; de temperantia, quantum ad +concupiscentias pravas.
Reply to Objection 2: The same applies to the Second Objection. For those things that concern the active life, belong to the material element of + the virtues. +
[36294] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 ad 2 Et similiter +dicendum est ad secundum. Ea enim quae sunt activae vitae, +materialiter se habent ad virtutes.
+ Reply to Objection 3: There is a twofold state after this life; one before the resurrection, during which the soul will be separate from the body; + the other, after the resurrection, when the souls will be reunited to their bodies. In this state of resurrection, the irrational + powers will be in the bodily organs, just as they now are. Hence it will be possible for fortitude to be in the irascible, + and temperance in the concupiscible part, in so far as each power will be + perfectly disposed to obey the reason. But in the state preceding the resurrection, the irrational parts will not be in the + soul actually, but only radically in its essence, as stated in the + FP, Q[77], A[8]. Wherefore neither will these virtues be actually, but only in their root, i.e. in the reason and will, wherein are certain + nurseries of these virtues, as stated above (Q[63], A[1]). Justice, however, will remain because it is in the will. Hence + of justice it is + specially said that it is "perpetual and immortal"; both by reason of its subject, since the will is incorruptible; and because + its act will not change, as stated. +
[36295] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod status post hanc vitam est duplex, unus quidem ante +resurrectionem, quando animae erunt a corporibus separatae; alius +autem post resurrectionem, quando animae iterato corporibus suis +unientur. In illo ergo resurrectionis statu, erunt vires +irrationales in organis corporis, sicut et nunc sunt. Unde et +poterit in irascibili esse fortitudo, et in concupiscibili +temperantia, inquantum utraque vis perfecte erit disposita ad +obediendum rationi. Sed in statu ante resurrectionem, partes +irrationales non erunt actu in anima, sed solum radicaliter in +essentia ipsius, ut in primo dictum est. Unde nec huiusmodi +virtutes erunt in actu nisi in radice, scilicet in ratione et +voluntate, in quibus sunt seminalia quaedam harum virtutum, ut +dictum est. Sed iustitia, quae est in voluntate, etiam actu +remanebit. Unde specialiter de ea dictum est quod est perpetua et +immortalis, tum ratione subiecti, quia voluntas incorruptibilis +est; tum etiam propter similitudinem actus, ut prius dictum +est.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual virtues do not remain after this life. For the Apostle says ( + 1 Cor. 13:8,9) that "knowledge shall be destroyed," and he states the reason to be because "we know in part." Now just as the knowledge + of science is in part, i.e. imperfect; so also is the knowledge of the other intellectual virtues, as long as this life lasts. + Therefore all the intellectual virtues will cease after this life. +
[36296] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes intellectuales non maneant +post hanc vitam. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. XIII, quod +scientia destruetur, et ratio est quia ex parte cognoscimus. Sed +sicut cognitio scientiae est ex parte, idest imperfecta; ita etiam +cognitio aliarum virtutum intellectualium, quandiu haec vita durat. +Ergo omnes virtutes intellectuales post hanc vitam cessabunt.
+ Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Categor. vi) that since science is a habit, it is a quality difficult to remove: for it is + not easily lost, except by reason of some great change or sickness. But no bodily change is so great as that of death. Therefore + science and the other intellectual virtues do not remain after death. +
[36297] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in praedicamentis, quod scientia, cum sit +habitus, est qualitas difficile mobilis, non enim de facili +amittitur, nisi ex aliqua forti transmutatione vel aegritudine. Sed +nulla est tanta transmutatio corporis humani sicut per mortem. Ergo +scientia et aliae virtutes intellectuales non manent post hanc +vitam.
+ Objection 3: Further, the intellectual virtues perfect the intellect so that it may perform its proper act well. Now there seems to be + no act of the intellect after this life, since "the soul understands nothing without a phantasm" (De Anima iii, text. 30); + and, after this life, the phantasms do not remain, since their only subject is an organ of the body. Therefore the intellectual + virtues do not remain after this life. +
[36298] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +virtutes intellectuales perficiunt intellectum ad bene operandum +proprium actum. Sed actus intellectus non videtur esse post hanc +vitam, eo quod nihil intelligit anima sine phantasmate, ut dicitur +in III de anima; phantasmata autem post hanc vitam non manent, cum +non sint nisi in organis corporeis. Ergo virtutes intellectuales +non manent post hanc vitam.
+ On the contrary, The knowledge of what is universal and necessary is more constant than that of particular and contingent things. Now the + knowledge of contingent particulars remains in man after this life; for instance, the knowledge of what one has done or suffered, + according to + Lk. 16:25: "Son, remember that thou didst receive good things in thy life-time, and likewise Lazarus evil things." Much more, therefore, + does the knowledge of universal and + necessary things remain, which belong to science and the other intellectual virtues. +
[36299] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod firmior est cognitio universalium et necessariorum, quam +particularium et contingentium. Sed in homine remanet post hanc +vitam cognitio particularium contingentium, puta eorum quae quis +fecit vel passus est; secundum illud Luc. XVI, recordare quia +recepisti bona in vita tua, et Lazarus similiter mala. Ergo +multo magis remanet cognitio universalium et necessariorum, quae +pertinent ad scientiam et ad alias virtutes intellectuales.
+ I answer that, As stated in the + FP, Q[79], A[6] some have held that the intelligible species do not remain in the passive intellect except when it actually understands; + and that so long as actual consideration ceases, the species are not preserved save in the sensitive powers which are acts + of bodily organs, viz. in the powers of imagination and memory. Now these powers cease when the body is corrupted: and consequently, + according to this opinion, + neither science nor any other intellectual virtue will remain after this life when once the body is corrupted. +
But this opinion is contrary to the mind of Aristotle, who states (De Anima iii, text. 8) that "the possible intellect is + in act when it is identified with each thing as knowing it; and yet, even then, it is in potentiality to consider it actually." + It is also contrary to reason, because intelligible species are contained by the "possible" intellect immovably, according + to the mode of their container. Hence the "possible" intellect is called "the abode of the species" (De Anima + iii) because it preserves the intelligible species. +
And yet the phantasms, by turning to which man understands in this life, by applying the intelligible species to them as + stated in the + FP, Q[84], A[7]; + FP, Q[85], A[1], ad 5, cease as soon as the body is corrupted. Hence, so far as the phantasms are concerned, which are the quasi-material + element in the intellectual virtues, these latter cease when the body is destroyed: but as regards the intelligible species, + which are in the + "possible" intellect, the intellectual virtues remain. Now the species are the quasi-formal element of the intellectual virtues. + Therefore these remain after this life, as regards their formal element, just as we have stated concerning the moral virtues + + (A[1]). +
[36300] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut in primo dictum est, quidam posuerunt quod +species intelligibiles non permanent in intellectu possibili nisi +quandiu actu intelligit, nec est aliqua conservatio specierum, +cessante consideratione actuali, nisi in viribus sensitivis, quae +sunt actus corporalium organorum, scilicet in imaginativa et +memorativa. Huiusmodi autem vires corrumpuntur, corrupto corpore. +Et ideo secundum hoc, scientia nullo modo post hanc vitam +remanebit, corpore corrupto; neque aliqua alia intellectualis +virtus. Sed haec opinio est contra sententiam Aristotelis, qui in +III de anima dicit quod intellectus possibilis est in actu, cum +fit singula, sicut sciens; cum tamen sit in potentia ad +considerandum in actu. Est etiam contra rationem, quia species +intelligibiles recipiuntur in intellectu possibili immobiliter, +secundum modum recipientis. Unde et intellectus possibilis dicitur +locus specierum, quasi species intelligibiles conservans. Sed +phantasmata, ad quae respiciendo homo intelligit in hac vita, +applicando ad ipsa species intelligibiles, ut in primo dictum est, +corrupto corpore corrumpuntur. Unde quantum ad ipsa phantasmata, +quae sunt quasi materialia in virtutibus intellectualibus, virtutes +intellectuales destruuntur, destructo corpore, sed quantum ad +species intelligibiles, quae sunt in intellectu possibili, virtutes +intellectuales manent. Species autem se habent in virtutibus +intellectualibus sicut formales. Unde intellectuales virtutes +manent post hanc vitam, quantum ad id quod est formale in eis, non +autem quantum ad id quod est materiale, sicut et de moralibus +dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The saying of the Apostle is to be understood as referring to the material element in science, and to the mode of understanding; + because, to it, neither do the phantasms remain, when the body is destroyed; nor will science be applied by turning to the + phantasms. +
[36301] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod verbum apostoli est intelligendum quantum ad id +quod est materiale in scientia, et quantum ad modum intelligendi, +quia scilicet neque phantasmata remanebunt, destructo corpore; +neque erit usus scientiae per conversionem ad phantasmata.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Sickness destroys the habit of science as to its material element, viz. the phantasms, but not as to the intelligible species, + which are in the "possible" intellect. +
[36302] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod per aegritudinem corrumpitur habitus scientiae +quantum ad id quod est materiale in eo, scilicet quantum ad +phantasmata, non autem quantum ad species intelligibiles, quae sunt +in intellectu possibili.
+ Reply to Objection 3: As stated in the + FP, Q[89], A[1] the separated soul has a mode of understanding, other than by turning to the phantasms. Consequently science remains, yet + not as to the same mode of operation; as we have stated concerning the moral virtues + (A[1]). +
[36303] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod anima separata post mortem habet alium modum +intelligendi quam per conversionem ad phantasmata, ut in primo +dictum est. Et sic scientia manet, non tamen secundum eundem modum +operandi, sicut et de virtutibus moralibus dictum est.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that faith remains after this life. Because faith is more excellent than science. Now science remains after + this life, as stated above + (A[2]). Therefore faith remains also. +
[36304] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod fides maneat post hanc vitam. Nobilior +enim est fides quam scientia. Sed scientia manet post hanc vitam, +ut dictum est. Ergo et fides.
+ Objection 2: Further, it is written ( + 1 Cor. 3:11): "Other foundation no man can lay, but that which is laid; which is Christ Jesus," i.e. faith in Jesus Christ. Now if the + foundation is removed, that which is built upon it remains no more. Therefore, if faith remains not after this life, no other + virtue remains. +
[36305] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +I ad Cor. III, dicitur, fundamentum aliud nemo potest ponere, +praeter id quod positum est, quod est Christus Iesus, idest +fides Christi Iesu. Sed sublato fundamento, non remanet id quod +superaedificatur. Ergo, si fides non remanet post hanc vitam, nulla +alia virtus remaneret.
+ Objection 3: Further, the knowledge of faith and the knowledge of glory differ as perfect from imperfect. Now imperfect knowledge is compatible + with perfect knowledge: thus in an angel there can be "evening" and "morning" knowledge [*Cf. + FP, Q[58], A[6]]; and a man can have science through a demonstrative syllogism, together with opinion through a probable syllogism, about + one same conclusion. Therefore after this life faith also is compatible with + the knowledge of glory. +
[36306] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +cognitio fidei et cognitio gloriae differunt secundum perfectum et +imperfectum. Sed cognitio imperfecta potest esse simul cum +cognitione perfecta, sicut in Angelo simul potest esse cognitio +vespertina cum cognitione matutina; et aliquis homo potest simul +habere de eadem conclusione scientiam per syllogismum +demonstrativum, et opinionem per syllogismum dialecticum. Ergo +etiam fides simul esse potest, post hanc vitam, cum cognitione +gloriae.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle says ( + 2 Cor. 5:6,7): "While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord: for we walk by faith and not by sight." But those who are in glory + are not absent from the Lord, but present to Him. Therefore after this life faith does not remain in the life of glory. +
[36307] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. V, quandiu sumus in +corpore, peregrinamur a domino, per fidem enim ambulamus, et non +per speciem. Sed illi qui sunt in gloria, non peregrinantur a +domino, sed sunt ei praesentes. Ergo fides non manet post hanc +vitam in gloria.
+ I answer that, Opposition is of itself the proper cause of one thing being excluded from another, in so far, to wit, as wherever two things + are opposite to one another, we find opposition of affirmation and negation. Now in some things we find opposition in respect + of contrary forms; thus in colors we find white and black. In others we find opposition in respect of perfection and imperfection: + wherefore in alterations, more and less are considered to be contraries, as when + a thing from being less hot is made more hot (Phys. v, text. 19). And since perfect and imperfect are opposite to one another, + it is impossible for perfection and imperfection to affect the same thing at the same time. +
[36308] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod oppositio est per se et propria causa quod unum +excludatur ab alio, inquantum scilicet in omnibus oppositis +includitur oppositio affirmationis et negationis. Invenitur autem +in quibusdam oppositio secundum contrarias formas, sicut in +coloribus album et nigrum. In quibusdam autem, secundum perfectum +et imperfectum, unde in alterationibus magis et minus accipiuntur +ut contraria, ut cum de minus calido fit magis calidum, ut dicitur +in V Physic. Et quia perfectum et imperfectum opponuntur, +impossibile est quod simul, secundum idem, sit perfectio et +imperfectio.
Now we must take note that sometimes imperfection belongs to a thing's very nature, and belongs to its species: even as lack + of reason belongs to the very specific nature of a horse and an ox. And since a thing, so long as it remains the same identically, + cannot pass from one species to another, it follows that if such an imperfection be removed, the species of that thing is + changed: even as it would no longer be an ox or a horse, were it to be rational. Sometimes, however, the + imperfection does not belong to the specific nature, but is accidental to the individual by reason of something else; even + as sometimes lack of reason is accidental to a man, because he is asleep, or because he is drunk, or for some like reason; + and it is evident, that if such an imperfection be removed, the thing remains substantially. +
Est autem considerandum quod imperfectio quidem +quandoque est de ratione rei, et pertinet ad speciem ipsius, sicut +defectus rationis pertinet ad rationem speciei equi vel bovis. Et +quia unum et idem numero manens non potest transferri de una specie +in aliam, inde est quod, tali imperfectione sublata, tollitur +species rei, sicut iam non esset bos vel equus, si esset +rationalis. Quandoque vero imperfectio non pertinet ad rationem +speciei, sed accidit individuo secundum aliquid aliud, sicut alicui +homini quandoque accidit defectus rationis, inquantum impeditur in +eo rationis usus, propter somnum vel ebrietatem vel aliquid +huiusmodi. Patet autem quod, tali imperfectione remota, nihilominus +substantia rei manet.
Now it is clear that imperfect knowledge belongs to the very nature of faith: for it is included in its definition; faith + being defined as "the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not" ( + Heb. 11:1). Wherefore Augustine says (Tract. xl in Joan.): "Where is faith? Believing without seeing." But it is an imperfect knowledge + that is of things unapparent or unseen. Consequently imperfect knowledge belongs to the very nature of + faith: therefore it is clear that the knowledge of faith cannot be perfect and remain identically the same. +
Manifestum est autem quod imperfectio +cognitionis est de ratione fidei. Ponitur enim in eius definitione, +fides enim est substantia sperandarum rerum, argumentum non +apparentium, ut dicitur ad Heb. XI. Et Augustinus dicit, +quid est fides? Credere quod non vides. Quod autem cognitio +sit sine apparitione vel visione, hoc ad imperfectionem cognitionis +pertinet. Et sic imperfectio cognitionis est de ratione fidei. Unde +manifestum est quod fides non potest esse perfecta cognitio, eadem +numero manens.
But we must also consider whether it is compatible with perfect knowledge: for there is nothing to prevent some kind of imperfect + knowledge from being sometimes with perfect knowledge. Accordingly we must observe that knowledge can be imperfect in three + ways: first, on the part of the knowable object; secondly, on the part of the medium; thirdly, on the part of the subject. + The difference of perfect and imperfect knowledge on the part of the knowable object is seen in the + "morning" and "evening" knowledge of the angels: for the "morning" knowledge is about things according to the being which + they have in the Word, while the "evening" knowledge is about things according as they have being in their own natures, which + being is imperfect in comparison with the First Being. On the part of the medium, perfect and imperfect knowledge are exemplified + in the knowledge of a conclusion through a demonstrative medium, and through a probable medium. On the part of the + subject the difference of perfect and imperfect knowledge applies to opinion, faith, and science. For it is essential to opinion + that we assent to one of two opposite assertions with fear of the other, so that our adhesion is not firm: to science it is + essential to have firm adhesion with intellectual vision, for science possesses certitude which results from the understanding + of principles: while faith holds a middle place, for it surpasses opinion in so far as its adhesion is firm, but falls + short of science in so far as it lacks vision. +
Sed ulterius considerandum est utrum simul possit +esse cum cognitione perfecta, nihil enim prohibet aliquam +cognitionem imperfectam simul esse aliquando cum cognitione +perfecta. Est igitur considerandum quod cognitio potest esse +imperfecta tripliciter, uno modo, ex parte obiecti cognoscibilis; +alio modo, ex parte medii; tertio modo, ex parte subiecti. Ex parte +quidem obiecti cognoscibilis, differunt secundum perfectum et +imperfectum cognitio matutina et vespertina in Angelis, nam +cognitio matutina est de rebus secundum quod habent esse in verbo; +cognitio autem vespertina est de eis secundum quod habent esse in +propria natura, quod est imperfectum respectu primi esse. Ex parte +vero medii, differunt secundum perfectum et imperfectum cognitio +quae est de aliqua conclusione per medium demonstrativum, et per +medium probabile. Ex parte vero subiecti differunt secundum +perfectum et imperfectum opinio, fides et scientia. Nam de ratione +opinionis est quod accipiatur unum cum formidine alterius oppositi, +unde non habet firmam inhaesionem. De ratione vero scientiae est +quod habeat firmam inhaesionem cum visione intellectiva, habet enim +certitudinem procedentem ex intellectu principiorum. Fides autem +medio modo se habet, excedit enim opinionem, in hoc quod habet +firmam inhaesionem; deficit vero a scientia, in hoc quod non habet +visionem.
Now it is evident that a thing cannot be perfect and imperfect in the same respect; yet the things which differ as perfect + and imperfect can be together in the same respect in one and the same other thing. Accordingly, knowledge which is perfect + on the part of the object is quite incompatible with imperfect knowledge about the same object; but they are compatible with + one another in respect of the same medium or the same subject: for nothing hinders a man from having at one and + the same time, through one and the same medium, perfect and imperfect knowledge about two things, one perfect, the other imperfect, + e.g. about health and sickness, good and evil. In like manner knowledge that is perfect on the part of the medium is incompatible + with imperfect knowledge through one and the same medium: but nothing hinders them being about the same subject or in the + same subject: for one man can know the same conclusions through a probable and through a demonstrative medium. + Again, knowledge that is perfect on the part of the subject is incompatible with imperfect knowledge in the same subject. + Now faith, of its very nature, contains an imperfection on the part of the subject, viz. that the believer sees not what he + believes: whereas bliss, of its very nature, implies perfection on the part of the subject, viz. that the Blessed see that + which makes them happy, as stated above ( + Q[3], A[8]). Hence it is manifest that faith and bliss are + incompatible in one and the same subject. +
Manifestum est autem quod perfectum et imperfectum non +possunt simul esse secundum idem, sed ea quae differunt secundum +perfectum et imperfectum, secundum aliquid idem possunt simul esse +in aliquo alio eodem. Sic igitur cognitio perfecta et imperfecta ex +parte obiecti, nullo modo possunt esse de eodem obiecto. Possunt +tamen convenire in eodem medio, et in eodem subiecto, nihil enim +prohibet quod unus homo simul et semel per unum et idem medium +habeat cognitionem de duobus, quorum unum est perfectum et aliud +imperfectum, sicut de sanitate et aegritudine, et bono et malo. +Similiter etiam impossibile est quod cognitio perfecta et +imperfecta ex parte medii, conveniant in uno medio. Sed nihil +prohibet quin conveniant in uno obiecto, et in uno subiecto, potest +enim unus homo cognoscere eandem conclusionem per medium probabile, +et demonstrativum. Et est similiter impossibile quod cognitio +perfecta et imperfecta ex parte subiecti, sint simul in eodem +subiecto. Fides autem in sui ratione habet imperfectionem quae est +ex parte subiecti, ut scilicet credens non videat id quod credit, +beatitudo autem de sui ratione habet perfectionem ex parte +subiecti, ut scilicet beatus videat id quo beatificatur, ut supra +dictum est. Unde manifestum est quod impossibile est quod fides +maneat simul cum beatitudine in eodem subiecto.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Faith is more excellent than science, on the part of the object, because its object is the First Truth. Yet science has a + more perfect mode of knowing its object, which is not incompatible with vision which is the perfection of happiness, as the + mode of faith is incompatible. +
[36309] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod fides est nobilior quam scientia, ex parte +obiecti, quia eius obiectum est veritas prima. Sed scientia habet +perfectiorem modum cognoscendi, qui non repugnat perfectioni +beatitudinis, scilicet visioni, sicut repugnat ei modus fidei.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Faith is the foundation in as much as it is knowledge: consequently when this knowledge is perfected, the foundation will + be perfected also. +
[36310] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod fides est fundamentum quantum ad id quod habet de +cognitione. Et ideo quando perficietur cognitio, erit perfectius +fundamentum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.
[36311] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +patet solutio ex his quae dicta sunt.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that hope remains after death, in the state of glory. Because hope perfects the human appetite in a more excellent + manner than the moral virtues. But the moral virtues remain after this life, as Augustine clearly states (De Trin. xiv, 9). + Much more then does hope remain. +
[36312] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod spes maneat post mortem in statu +gloriae. Spes enim nobiliori modo perficit appetitum humanum quam +virtutes morales. Sed virtutes morales manent post hanc vitam, ut +patet per Augustinum, in XIV de Trin. Ergo multo magis spes.
+ Objection 2: Further, fear is opposed to hope. But fear remains after this life: in the Blessed, filial fear, which abides for ever---in + the lost, the fear of punishment. Therefore, in a like manner, hope can remain. +
[36313] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +spei opponitur timor. Sed timor manet post hanc vitam, et in beatis +quidem timor filialis, qui manet in saeculum; et in damnatis timor +poenarum. Ergo spes, pari ratione, potest permanere.
+ Objection 3: Further, just as hope is of future good, so is desire. Now in the Blessed there is desire for future good; both for the glory + of the body, which the souls of the Blessed desire, as Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35); and for the glory of the + soul, according to + Ecclus. 24:29: "They that eat me, shall yet hunger, and they that drink me, shall yet thirst," and + 1 Pet. 1:12: "On Whom the angels desire to look." Therefore it seems that + there can be hope in the Blessed after this life is past. +
[36314] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sicut spes est futuri boni, ita et desiderium. Sed in beatis est +desiderium futuri boni, et quantum ad gloriam corporis, quam animae +beatorum desiderant, ut dicit Augustinus, XII super Gen. ad Litt.; +et etiam quantum ad gloriam animae, secundum illud Eccli. XXIV, +qui edunt me, adhuc esurient, et qui bibunt me, adhuc +sitient; et I Petr. I, dicitur, in quem desiderant Angeli +prospicere. Ergo videtur quod possit esse spes post hanc vitam +in beatis.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle says ( + Rom. 8:24): "What a man seeth, why doth he hope for?" But the Blessed see that which is the object of hope, viz. God. Therefore they + do not hope. +
[36315] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. VIII, quod videt quis, quid +sperat? Sed beati vident id quod est obiectum spei, scilicet +Deum. Ergo non sperant.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[3]), that which, in its very nature, implies imperfection of its subject, is incompatible with the opposite perfection in that + subject. Thus it is evident that movement of its very nature implies imperfection of its subject, since it is "the act of + that which is in potentiality as such" (Phys. iii): so that as soon as this potentiality is brought into act, the movement + ceases; for a thing does not continue to + become white, when once it is made white. Now hope denotes a movement towards that which is not possessed, as is clear from + what we have said above about the passion of hope (Q[40], AA[1],2). Therefore when we possess that which we hope for, viz. + the enjoyment of God, it will no longer be possible to have hope. +
[36316] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, id quod de ratione sui importat +imperfectionem subiecti, non potest simul stare cum subiecto +opposita perfectione perfecto. Sicut patet quod motus in ratione +sui importat imperfectionem subiecti, est enim actus existentis in +potentia, inquantum huiusmodi, unde quando illa potentia reducitur +ad actum, iam cessat motus; non enim adhuc albatur, postquam iam +aliquid factum est album. Spes autem importat motum quendam in id +quod non habetur; ut patet ex his quae supra de passione spei +diximus. Et ideo quando habebitur id quod speratur, scilicet divina +fruitio, iam spes esse non poterit.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Hope surpasses the moral virtues as to its object, which is God. But the acts of the moral virtues are not incompatible with + the perfection of happiness, as the act of hope is; except perhaps, as regards their matter, in respect of which they do not + remain. For moral virtue perfects the appetite, not only in respect of what is not yet possessed, but also as regards something + which is in our actual possession. +
[36317] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod spes est nobilior virtutibus moralibus quantum +ad obiectum, quod est Deus. Sed actus virtutum moralium non +repugnant perfectioni beatitudinis, sicut actus spei; nisi forte +ratione materiae, secundum quam non manent. Non enim virtus moralis +perficit appetitum solum in id quod nondum habetur; sed etiam circa +id quod praesentialiter habetur.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Fear is twofold, servile and filial, as we shall state further on ( + SS, Q[19], A[2]). Servile fear regards punishment, and will be impossible in the life of glory, since there will no longer be possibility + of being punished. Filial fear has two acts: one is an act of reverence to God, and with regard to this act, it remains: the + other is an act of fear lest we be separated from God, and as regards this act, it does not remain. + Because separation from God is in the nature of an evil: and no evil will be feared there, according to + Prov. 1:33: "He . . . shall enjoy abundance without fear of evils." Now fear is opposed to hope by opposition of good and evil, as stated + above (Q[23], A[2]; Q[40], A[1] ), and therefore the fear which will remain in glory is not opposed to hope. In the lost there + can be fear of punishment, rather than hope of glory in the Blessed. Because in the lost there will be a + succession of punishments, so that the notion of something future remains there, which is the object of fear: but the glory + of the saints has no succession, by reason of its being a kind of participation of eternity, wherein there is neither past + nor future, but only the present. And yet, properly speaking, neither in the lost is there fear. For, as stated above (Q[42], + A[2]), fear is never without some hope of escape: and the lost have no such hope. Consequently neither will there be fear + in + them; except speaking in a general way, in so far as any expectation of future evil is called fear. +
[36318] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod timor est duplex, servilis et filialis, ut infra +dicetur. Servilis quidem est timor poenae, qui non poterit esse in +gloria, nulla possibilitate ad poenam remanente. Timor vero +filialis habet duos actus, scilicet revereri Deum, et quantum ad +hunc actum manet; et timere separationem ab ipso, et quantum ad +hunc actum non manet. Separari enim a Deo habet rationem mali, +nullum autem malum ibi timebitur, secundum illud Proverb. I, +abundantia perfruetur, malorum timore sublato. Timor autem +opponitur spei oppositione boni et mali, ut supra dictum est, et +ideo timor qui remanet in gloria, non opponitur spei. In damnatis +autem magis potest esse timor poenae, quam in beatis spes gloriae. +Quia in damnatis erit successio poenarum, et sic remanet ibi ratio +futuri, quod est obiectum timoris, sed gloria sanctorum est absque +successione, secundum quandam aeternitatis participationem, in qua +non est praeteritum et futurum, sed solum praesens. Et tamen nec +etiam in damnatis est proprie timor. Nam sicut supra dictum est, +timor nunquam est sine aliqua spe evasionis, quae omnino in +damnatis non erit. Unde nec timor; nisi communiter loquendo, +secundum quod quaelibet expectatio mali futuri dicitur timor.
+ Reply to Objection 3: As to the glory of the soul, there can be no desire in the Blessed, in so far as desire looks for something future, for the + reason already given (ad 2). Yet hunger and thirst are said to be in them because they never weary, and for the same reason + desire is said to be in the angels. With regard to the glory of the body, there can be desire in the souls of the saints, + but not hope, properly speaking; neither as a theological virtue, for thus its object + is God, and not a created good; nor in its general signification. Because the object of hope is something difficult, as stated + above ( + Q[40], A[1]): while a good whose unerring cause we already possess, is not compared to us as something difficult. Hence he that has money + is not, properly speaking, said to hope for what he can buy at once. In like manner those who have the glory of the soul are + not, properly speaking, said to hope for the glory of the body, but only to + desire it. +
[36319] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod quantum ad gloriam animae, non potest esse in beatis +desiderium, secundum quod respicit futurum, ratione iam dicta. +Dicitur autem ibi esse esuries et sitis, per remotionem fastidii, +et eadem ratione dicitur esse desiderium in Angelis. Respectu autem +gloriae corporis, in animabus sanctorum potest quidem esse +desiderium, non tamen spes, proprie loquendo, neque secundum quod +spes est virtus theologica, sic enim eius obiectum est Deus, non +autem aliquod bonum creatum; neque secundum quod communiter +sumitur. Quia obiectum spei est arduum, ut supra dictum est, bonum +autem cuius iam inevitabilem causam habemus, non comparatur ad nos +in ratione ardui. Unde non proprie dicitur aliquis qui habet +argentum, sperare se habiturum aliquid quod statim in potestate +eius est ut emat. Et similiter illi qui habent gloriam animae, non +proprie dicuntur sperare gloriam corporis; sed solum +desiderare.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that something of faith and hope remains in glory. For when that which is proper to a thing is removed, there + remains what is common; thus it is stated in De Causis that "if you take away rational, there remains living, and when you + remove living, there remains being." Now in faith there is something that it has in common with beatitude, viz. knowledge: + and there is something proper to it, viz. darkness, for faith is knowledge in a dark manner. + Therefore, the darkness of faith removed, the knowledge of faith still remains. +
[36320] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquid fidei vel spei remaneat in +gloria. Remoto enim eo quod est proprium, remanet id quod est +commune, sicut dicitur in libro de causis, quod, remoto +rationali, remanet vivum; et remoto vivo, remanet ens. Sed in +fide est aliquid quod habet commune cum beatitudine, scilicet ipsa +cognitio, aliquid autem quod est sibi proprium, scilicet aenigma; +est enim fides cognitio aenigmatica. Ergo, remoto aenigmate fidei, +adhuc remanet ipsa cognitio fidei.
+ Objection 2: Further, faith is a spiritual light of the soul, according to + Eph. 1:17,18: "The eyes of your heart enlightened . . . in the knowledge of God"; yet this light is imperfect in comparison with the light + of glory, of which it is written ( + Ps. 35:10): "In Thy light we shall see light." Now an imperfect light remains when a perfect light supervenes: for a candle is not + extinguished when the sun's rays appear. Therefore it + seems that the light of faith itself remains with the light of glory. +
[36321] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +fides est quoddam spirituale lumen animae, secundum illud Ephes. I, +illuminatos oculos cordis vestri in agnitionem Dei; sed hoc +lumen est imperfectum respectu luminis gloriae, de quo dicitur in +Psalmo XXXV, in lumine tuo videbimus lumen. Lumen autem +imperfectum remanet, superveniente lumine perfecto, non enim +candela extinguitur, claritate solis superveniente. Ergo videtur +quod ipsum lumen fidei maneat cum lumine gloriae.
+ Objection 3: Further, the substance of a habit does not cease through the withdrawal of its matter: for a man may retain the habit of + liberality, though he have lost his money: yet he cannot exercise the act. Now the object of faith is the First Truth as unseen. + Therefore when this ceases through being seen, the habit of faith can still remain. +
[36322] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +substantia habitus non tollitur per hoc quod subtrahitur materia, +potest enim homo habitum liberalitatis retinere, etiam amissa +pecunia; sed actum habere non potest. Obiectum autem fidei est +veritas prima non visa. Ergo, hoc remoto per hoc quod videtur +veritas prima, adhuc potest remanere ipse habitus fidei.
+ On the contrary, Faith is a simple habit. Now a simple thing is either withdrawn entirely, or remains entirely. Since therefore faith does + not remain entirely, but is taken away as stated above + (A[3]), it seems that it is withdrawn entirely. +
[36323] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra +est quod fides est quidam habitus simplex. Simplex autem vel totum +tollitur, vel totum manet. Cum igitur fides non totaliter maneat, +sed evacuetur, ut dictum est; videtur quod totaliter tollatur.
+ I answer that, Some have held that hope is taken away entirely: but that faith is taken away in part, viz. as to its obscurity, and remains + in part, viz. as to the substance of its knowledge. And if this be understood to mean that it remains the same, not identically + but generically, it is absolutely true; since faith is of the same genus, viz. knowledge, as the beatific vision. On the other + hand, hope is not of the same genus as heavenly bliss: because it is compared to + the enjoyment of bliss, as movement is to rest in the term of movement. +
But if it be understood to mean that in heaven the knowledge of faith remains identically the same, this is absolutely impossible. + Because when you remove a specific difference, the substance of the genus does not remain identically the same: thus if you + remove the difference constituting whiteness, the substance of color does not remain identically the same, as though the identical + color were at one time whiteness, and, at another, blackness. The reason is that genus is not + related to difference as matter to form, so that the substance of the genus remains identically the same, when the difference + is removed, as the substance of matter remains identically the same, when the form is changed: for genus and difference are + not the parts of a species, else they would not be predicated of the species. But even as the species denotes the whole, i.e. + the compound of matter and form in material things, so does the difference, and likewise the genus; the genus denotes the + whole by signifying that which is material; the difference, by signifying that which is formal; the species, by signifying + both. Thus, in man, the sensitive nature is as matter to the intellectual nature, and animal is predicated of that which has + a sensitive nature, rational of that which has an intellectual nature, and man of that which has both. So that the one same + whole is denoted by these three, but not under the same aspect. +
It is therefore evident that, since the signification of the difference is confined to the genus if the difference be removed, + the substance of the genus cannot remain the same: for the same animal nature does not remain, if another kind of soul constitute + the animal. Hence it is impossible for the identical knowledge, which was previously obscure, to become clear vision. It is + therefore evident that, in heaven, nothing remains of faith, either identically or specifically the + same, but only generically. +
[36324] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod spes totaliter tollitur, fides +autem partim tollitur, scilicet quantum ad aenigma, et partim +manet, scilicet quantum ad substantiam cognitionis. Quod quidem si +sic intelligatur quod maneat non idem numero, sed idem genere, +verissime dictum est, fides enim cum visione patriae convenit in +genere, quod est cognitio. Spes autem non convenit cum beatitudine +in genere, comparatur enim spes ad beatitudinis fruitionem, sicut +motus ad quietem in termino. Si autem intelligatur quod eadem +numero cognitio quae est fidei, maneat in patria; hoc est omnino +impossibile. Non enim, remota differentia alicuius speciei, remanet +substantia generis eadem numero, sicut, remota differentia +constitutiva albedinis, non remanet eadem substantia coloris +numero, ut sic idem numero color sit quandoque albedo, quandoque +vero nigredo. Non enim comparatur genus ad differentiam sicut +materia ad formam, ut remaneat substantia generis eadem numero, +differentia remota; sicut remanet eadem numero substantia materiae, +remota forma. Genus enim et differentia non sunt partes speciei, +alioquin non praedicarentur de specie. Sed sicut species significat +totum, idest compositum ex materia et forma in rebus materialibus, +ita differentia significat totum, et similiter genus, sed genus +denominat totum ab eo quod est sicut materia; differentia vero ab +eo quod est sicut forma; species vero ab utroque. Sicut in homine +sensitiva natura materialiter se habet ad intellectivam, animal +autem dicitur quod habet naturam sensitivam; rationale quod habet +intellectivam; homo vero quod habet utrumque. Et sic idem totum +significatur per haec tria, sed non ab eodem. Unde patet quod, cum +differentia non sit nisi designativa generis, remota differentia, +non potest substantia generis eadem remanere, non enim remanet +eadem animalitas, si sit alia anima constituens animal. Unde non +potest esse quod eadem numero cognitio, quae prius fuit +aenigmatica, postea fiat visio aperta. Et sic patet quod nihil idem +numero vel specie quod est in fide, remanet in patria; sed solum +idem genere.
+ Reply to Objection 1: If "rational" be withdrawn, the remaining "living" thing is the same, not identically, but generically, as stated. +
[36325] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, remoto rationali, non remanet vivum idem +numero, sed idem genere, ut ex dictis patet.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The imperfection of candlelight is not opposed to the perfection of sunlight, since they do not regard the same subject: + whereas the imperfection of faith and the perfection of glory are opposed to one another and regard the same subject. Consequently + they are incompatible with one another, just as light and darkness in the air. +
[36326] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod imperfectio luminis candelae non opponitur +perfectioni solaris luminis, quia non respiciunt idem subiectum. +Sed imperfectio fidei et perfectio gloriae opponuntur ad invicem, +et respiciunt idem subiectum. Unde non possunt esse simul, sicut +nec claritas aeris cum obscuritate eius.
+ Reply to Objection 3: He that loses his money does not therefore lose the possibility of having money, and therefore it is reasonable for the habit + of liberality to remain. But in the state of glory not only is the object of faith, which is the unseen, removed actually, + but even its possibility, by reason of the unchangeableness of heavenly bliss: and so such a habit would remain to no purpose. +
[36327] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ille qui amittit pecuniam, non amittit possibilitatem +habendi pecuniam, et ideo convenienter remanet habitus +liberalitatis. Sed in statu gloriae non solum actu tollitur +obiectum fidei, quod est non visum; sed etiam secundum +possibilitatem, propter beatitudinis stabilitatem. Et ideo frustra +talis habitus remaneret.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that charity does not remain after this life, in glory. Because according to + 1 Cor. 13:10, "when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part," i.e. that which is imperfect, "shall be done away." Now the + charity of the wayfarer is imperfect. Therefore it will be done away when the perfection of glory is attained. +
[36328] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas non maneat post hanc vitam in +gloria. Quia, ut dicitur I ad Cor. XIII, cum venerit quod +perfectum est, evacuabitur quod ex parte est, idest quod est +imperfectum. Sed caritas viae est imperfecta. Ergo evacuabitur, +adveniente perfectione gloriae.
+ Objection 2: Further, habits and acts are differentiated by their objects. But the object of love is good apprehended. Since therefore + the apprehension of the present life differs from the apprehension of the life to come, it seems that charity is not the same + in both cases. +
[36329] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, +habitus et actus distinguuntur secundum obiecta. Sed obiectum +amoris est bonum apprehensum. Cum ergo alia sit apprehensio +praesentis vitae, et alia apprehensio futurae vitae; videtur quod +non maneat eadem caritas utrobique.
+ Objection 3: Further, things of the same kind can advance from imperfection to perfection by continuous increase. But the charity of the + wayfarer can never attain to equality with the charity of heaven, however much it be increased. Therefore it seems that the + charity of the wayfarer does not remain in heaven. +
[36330] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, +eorum quae sunt unius rationis, imperfectum potest venire ad +aequalitatem perfectionis, per continuum augmentum. Sed caritas +viae nunquam potest pervenire ad aequalitatem caritatis patriae, +quantumcumque augeatur. Ergo videtur quod caritas viae non remaneat +in patria.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle says ( + 1 Cor. 13:8): "Charity never falleth away." +
[36331] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XIII, caritas nunquam +excidit.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[3]), when the imperfection of a thing does not belong to its specific nature, there is nothing to hinder the identical thing + passing from imperfection to perfection, even as man is perfected by growth, and whiteness by intensity. Now charity is love, + the nature of which does not include imperfection, since it may relate to an object either possessed or not possessed, either + seen or not seen. Therefore charity is + not done away by the perfection of glory, but remains identically the same. +
[36332] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, quando imperfectio alicuius +rei non est de ratione speciei ipsius, nihil prohibet idem numero +quod prius fuit imperfectum, postea perfectum esse, sicut homo per +augmentum perficitur, et albedo per intensionem. Caritas autem est +amor; de cuius ratione non est aliqua imperfectio, potest enim esse +et habiti et non habiti, et visi et non visi. Unde caritas non +evacuatur per gloriae perfectionem, sed eadem numero manet.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The imperfection of charity is accidental to it; because imperfection is not included in the nature of love. Now although + that which is accidental to a thing be withdrawn, the substance remains. Hence the imperfection of charity being done away, + charity itself is not done away. +
[36333] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod imperfectio caritatis per accidens se habet ad +ipsam, quia non est de ratione amoris imperfectio. Remoto autem eo +quod est per accidens, nihilominus remanet substantia rei. Unde, +evacuata imperfectione caritatis, non evacuatur ipsa caritas.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The object of charity is not knowledge itself; if it were, the charity of the wayfarer would not be the same as the charity + of heaven: its object is the thing known, which remains the same, viz. God Himself. +
[36334] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod caritas non habet pro obiecto ipsam cognitionem, sic +enim non esset eadem in via et in patria. Sed habet pro obiecto +ipsam rem cognitam, quae est eadem, scilicet ipsum Deum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The reason why charity of the wayfarer cannot attain to the perfection of the charity of heaven, is a difference on the part + of the cause: for vision is a cause of love, as stated in Ethic. ix, 5: and the more perfectly we know God, the more perfectly + we love Him. +
[36335] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod caritas viae per augmentum non potest pervenire ad +aequalitatem caritatis patriae, propter differentiam quae est ex +parte causae, visio enim est quaedam causa amoris, ut dicitur in IX +Ethic. Deus autem quanto perfectius cognoscitur, tanto perfectius +amatur.
We now come to consider the Gifts; under which head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the Gifts differ from the virtues?
(2) Of the necessity of the Gifts?
(3) Whether the Gifts are habits?
(4) Which, and how many are they?
(5) Whether the Gifts are connected?
(6) Whether they remain in heaven?
+[36336] +Iª-IIae q. 68 pr. Consequenter considerandum est de +donis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum dona differant a +virtutibus. Secundo, de necessitate donorum. Tertio, utrum dona +sint habitus. Quarto, quae, et quot sint. Quinto, utrum dona sint +connexa. Sexto, utrum maneant in patria. Septimo, de comparatione +eorum ad invicem. Octavo, de comparatione eorum ad virtutes.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts do not differ from the virtues. For Gregory commenting on + Job 1:2, "There were born to him seven sons," says (Moral. i, 12): "Seven sons were born to us, when through the conception of heavenly + thought, the seven virtues of the Holy Ghost take birth in us": and he quotes the words of + Is. 11:2,3: "And the Spirit . . . of understanding . . . shall rest upon him," etc. where the seven gifts of + the Holy Ghost are enumerated. Therefore the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are virtues. +
[36337] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod dona non distinguantur a virtutibus. +Dicit enim Gregorius, in I Moral., exponens illud Iob, nati sunt +ei septem filii, septem nobis nascuntur filii, cum per conceptionem +bonae cogitationis, sancti spiritus septem in nobis virtutes +oriuntur. Et inducit illud quod habetur Isaiae XI, requiescet +super eum spiritus intellectus etc., ubi enumerantur septem +spiritus sancti dona. Ergo septem dona spiritus sancti sunt +virtutes.
+ Objection 2: Further, Augustine commenting on + Mat. 12:45, "Then he goeth and taketh with him seven other spirits," etc., says (De Quaest. Evang. i, qu. 8): "The seven vices are opposed + to the seven virtues of the Holy Ghost," i.e. to the seven gifts. Now the seven vices are opposed to the seven virtues, commonly + so called. Therefore the gifts do not differ from the virtues commonly so called. +
[36338] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in libro de Quaestionib. Evang., exponens illud +quod habetur Matth. XII, tunc vadit, et assumit septem alios +spiritus etc., septem vitia sunt contraria septem virtutibus +spiritus sancti, idest septem donis. Sunt autem septem vitia +contraria virtutibus communiter dictis. Ergo dona non distinguuntur +a virtutibus communiter dictis.
+ Objection 3: Further, things whose definitions are the same, are themselves the same. But the definition of virtue applies to the gifts; + for each gift is "a good quality of the mind, whereby we lead a good life," etc. [*Cf. + Q[55], A[4]]. Likewise the definition of a gift can apply to the infused virtues: for a gift is "an unreturnable giving," according to + the Philosopher (Topic. iv, 4). Therefore the virtues and gifts do not differ from one + another. +
[36339] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +quorum est definitio eadem, ipsa quoque sunt eadem. Sed definitio +virtutis convenit donis, unumquodque enim donum est bona qualitas +mentis qua recte vivitur, et cetera. Similiter definitio doni +convenit virtutibus infusis, est enim donum datio irreddibilis, +secundum philosophum. Ergo virtutes et dona non distinguuntur.
+ Objection 4: Several of the things mentioned among the gifts, are virtues: for, as stated above ( + Q[57], A[2]), wisdom, understanding, and knowledge are intellectual virtues, counsel pertains to prudence, piety to a kind of justice, + and fortitude is a moral virtue. Therefore it seems that the gifts do not differ from the virtues. +
[36340] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, +plura eorum quae enumerantur inter dona, sunt virtutes. Nam sicut +supra dictum est, sapientia et intellectus et scientia sunt +virtutes intellectuales; consilium autem ad prudentiam pertinet; +pietas autem species est iustitiae; fortitudo autem quaedam virtus +est moralis. Ergo videtur quod virtutes non distinguantur a +donis.
+ On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. i, 12) distinguishes seven gifts, which he states to be denoted by the seven sons of Job, from the three + theological virtues, which, he says, are signified by Job's three daughters. He also distinguishes (Moral. ii, 26) the same + seven gifts from the four cardinal virtues, which he says were signified by the four corners of the house. +
[36341] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Gregorius, I Moral., distinguit septem dona, quae dicit +significari per septem filios Iob, a tribus virtutibus theologicis, +quas dicit significari per tres filias Iob. Et in II Moral., +distinguit eadem septem dona a quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus, +quae dicit significari per quatuor angulos domus.
+ I answer that, If we speak of gift and virtue with regard to the notion conveyed by the words themselves, there is no opposition between + them. Because the word "virtue" conveys the notion that it perfects man in relation to well-doing, while the word "gift" refers + to the cause from which it proceeds. Now there is no reason why that which proceeds from one as a gift should not perfect + another in well-doing: especially as we have already stated ( + Q[63], + A[3] + ) that some virtues are infused into us by God. Wherefore in this respect we cannot differentiate gifts from virtues. Consequently + some have held that the gifts are not to be distinguished from the virtues. But there remains no less a difficulty for them + to solve; for they must explain why some virtues are called gifts and some not; and why among the gifts there are some, fear, + for instance, that are not reckoned virtues. +
Hence it is that others have said that the gifts should be held as being distinct from the virtues; yet they have not assigned + a suitable reason for this distinction, a reason, to wit, which would apply either to all the virtues, and to none of the + gifts, or vice versa. For, seeing that of the seven gifts, four belong to the reason, viz. wisdom, knowledge, understanding + and counsel, and three to the appetite, viz. fortitude, piety and fear; they held that the gifts perfect the + free-will according as it is a faculty of the reason, while the virtues perfect it as a faculty of the will: since they observed + only two virtues in the reason or intellect, viz. faith and prudence, the others being in the appetitive power or the affections. + If this distinction were true, all the virtues would have to be in the appetite, and all the gifts in the reason. +
Others observing that Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift of the Holy Ghost, by coming into the soul endows it with + prudence, temperance, justice, and fortitude, and at the same time strengthens it against every kind of temptation by His + sevenfold gift," said that the virtues are given us that we may do good works, and the gifts, that we may resist temptation. + But neither is this distinction sufficient. Because the virtues also resist those temptations which lead to the + sins that are contrary to the virtues; for everything naturally resists its contrary: which is especially clear with regard + to charity, of which it is written ( + Cant 8:7): "Many waters cannot quench charity." +
Others again, seeing that these gifts are set down in Holy Writ as having been in Christ, according to + Is. 11:2,3, said that the virtues are given simply that we may do good works, but the gifts, in order to conform us to Christ, chiefly + with regard to His Passion, for it was then that these gifts shone with the greatest splendor. Yet neither does this appear + to be a satisfactory distinction. Because Our Lord Himself wished us to be conformed to Him, chiefly + in humility and meekness, according to + Mat. 11:29: "Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart," and in charity, according to + Jn. 15:12: "Love one another, as I have loved you." Moreover, these virtues were especially resplendent in Christ's Passion. +
Accordingly, in order to differentiate the gifts from the virtues, we must be guided by the way in which Scripture expresses + itself, for we find there that the term employed is "spirit" rather than "gift." For thus it is written ( + Is. 11:2,3): "The spirit . . . of wisdom and of understanding . . . shall rest upon him," etc.: from which words we are clearly given + to understand that these seven are there set down as being in us by Divine inspiration. Now + inspiration denotes motion from without. For it must be noted that in man there is a twofold principle of movement, one within + him, viz. the reason; the other extrinsic to him, viz. God, as stated above ( + Q[9], AA[4],6): moreover the Philosopher says this in the chapter On Good Fortune (Ethic. Eudem. vii, 8). +
Now it is evident that whatever is moved must be proportionate to its mover: and the perfection of the mobile as such, consists + in a disposition whereby it is disposed to be well moved by its mover. Hence the more exalted the mover, the more perfect + must be the disposition whereby the mobile is made proportionate to its mover: thus we see that a disciple needs a more perfect + disposition in order to receive a higher teaching from his master. Now it is manifest that human virtues + perfect man according as it is natural for him to be moved by his reason in his interior and exterior actions. Consequently + man needs yet higher perfections, whereby to be disposed to be moved by God. These perfections are called gifts, not only + because they are infused by God, but also because by them man is disposed to become amenable to the Divine inspiration, according + to + Is. 50:5: "The Lord . . . hath opened my ear, and I do not resist; I have not gone back." Even the + Philosopher says in the chapter On Good Fortune (Ethic. Eudem., vii, 8) that for those who are moved by Divine instinct, there + is no need to take counsel according to human reason, but only to follow their inner promptings, since they are moved by a + principle higher than human reason. This then is what some say, viz. that the gifts perfect man for acts which are higher + than acts of virtue. +
[36342] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, si loquamur de dono et virtute secundum nominis +rationem, sic nullam oppositionem habent ad invicem. Nam ratio +virtutis sumitur secundum quod perficit hominem ad bene agendum, ut +supra dictum est, ratio autem doni sumitur secundum comparationem +ad causam a qua est. Nihil autem prohibet illud quod est ab alio ut +donum, esse perfectivum alicuius ad bene operandum, praesertim cum +supra dixerimus quod virtutes quaedam nobis sunt infusae a Deo. +Unde secundum hoc, donum a virtute distingui non potest. Et ideo +quidam posuerunt quod dona non essent a virtutibus distinguenda. +Sed eis remanet non minor difficultas, ut scilicet rationem +assignent quare quaedam virtutes dicantur dona, et non omnes; et +quare aliqua computantur inter dona, quae non computantur inter +virtutes, ut patet de timore. Unde alii dixerunt dona a virtutibus +esse distinguenda; sed non assignaverunt convenientem distinctionis +causam, quae scilicet ita communis esset virtutibus, quod nullo +modo donis, aut e converso. Considerantes enim aliqui quod, inter +septem dona, quatuor pertinent ad rationem, scilicet sapientia +scientia, intellectus et consilium; et tria ad vim appetitivam, +scilicet fortitudo, pietas et timor; posuerunt quod dona +perficiebant liberum arbitrium secundum quod est facultas rationis, +virtutes vero secundum quod est facultas voluntatis, quia +invenerunt duas solas virtutes in ratione vel intellectu, scilicet +fidem et prudentiam, alias vero in vi appetitiva vel affectiva. +Oporteret autem, si haec distinctio esset conveniens, quod omnes +virtutes essent in vi appetitiva, et omnia dona in ratione. Quidam +vero, considerantes quod Gregorius dicit, in II Moral., quod +donum spiritus sancti, quod in mente sibi subiecta format +temperantiam, prudentiam, iustitiam et fortitudinem; eandem mentem +munit contra singula tentamenta per septem dona, dixerunt quod +virtutes ordinantur ad bene operandum, dona vero ad resistendum +tentationibus. Sed nec ista distinctio sufficit. Quia etiam +virtutes tentationibus resistunt, inducentibus ad peccata, quae +contrariantur virtutibus, unumquodque enim resistit naturaliter suo +contrario. Quod praecipue patet de caritate, de qua dicitur Cantic. +VIII, aquae multae non potuerunt extinguere caritatem. Alii +vero, considerantes quod ista dona traduntur in Scriptura secundum +quod fuerunt in Christo, ut patet Isaiae XI; dixerunt quod virtutes +ordinantur simpliciter ad bene operandum; sed dona ordinantur ad +hoc ut per ea conformemur Christo, praecipue quantum ad ea quae +passus est, quia in passione eius praecipue huiusmodi dona +resplenduerunt. Sed hoc etiam non videtur esse sufficiens. Quia +ipse dominus praecipue nos inducit ad sui conformitatem secundum +humilitatem et mansuetudinem, Matth. XI, discite a me, quia +mitis sum et humilis corde; et secundum caritatem, ut Ioan. XV, +diligatis invicem, sicut dilexi vos. Et hae etiam virtutes +praecipue in passione Christi refulserunt. Et ideo ad distinguendum +dona a virtutibus, debemus sequi modum loquendi Scripturae, in qua +nobis traduntur non quidem sub nomine donorum, sed magis sub nomine +spirituum, sic enim dicitur Isaiae XI, requiescet super eum +spiritus sapientiae et intellectus, et cetera. Ex quibus verbis +manifeste datur intelligi quod ista septem enumerantur ibi, +secundum quod sunt in nobis ab inspiratione divina. Inspiratio +autem significat quandam motionem ab exteriori. Est enim +considerandum quod in homine est duplex principium movens, unum +quidem interius, quod est ratio; aliud autem exterius, quod est +Deus, ut supra dictum est; et etiam philosophus hoc dicit, in cap. +de bona fortuna. Manifestum est autem quod omne quod movetur, +necesse est proportionatum esse motori, et haec est perfectio +mobilis inquantum est mobile, dispositio qua disponitur ad hoc quod +bene moveatur a suo motore. Quanto igitur movens est altior, tanto +necesse est quod mobile perfectiori dispositione ei proportionetur, +sicut videmus quod perfectius oportet esse discipulum dispositum, +ad hoc quod altiorem doctrinam capiat a docente. Manifestum est +autem quod virtutes humanae perficiunt hominem secundum quod homo +natus est moveri per rationem in his quae interius vel exterius +agit. Oportet igitur inesse homini altiores perfectiones, secundum +quas sit dispositus ad hoc quod divinitus moveatur. Et istae +perfectiones vocantur dona, non solum quia infunduntur a Deo; sed +quia secundum ea homo disponitur ut efficiatur prompte mobilis ab +inspiratione divina, sicut dicitur Isaiae l, dominus aperuit +mihi aurem; ego autem non contradico, retrorsum non abii. Et +philosophus etiam dicit, in cap. de bona fortuna, quod his qui +moventur per instinctum divinum, non expedit consiliari secundum +rationem humanam, sed quod sequantur interiorem instinctum, quia +moventur a meliori principio quam sit ratio humana. Et hoc est quod +quidam dicunt, quod dona perficiunt hominem ad altiores actus quam +sint actus virtutum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes these gifts are called virtues, in the broad sense of the word. Nevertheless, they have something over and above + the virtues understood in this broad way, in so far as they are Divine virtues, perfecting man as moved by God. Hence the + Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 1) above virtue commonly so called, places a kind of "heroic" or "divine virtue [*{arete heroike + kai theia}]," in respect of which some men are called "divine." +
[36343] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod huiusmodi dona nominantur quandoque virtutes, +secundum communem rationem virtutis. Habent tamen aliquid +supereminens rationi communi virtutis, inquantum sunt quaedam +divinae virtutes, perficientes hominem inquantum est a Deo motus. +Unde et philosophus, in VII Ethic., supra virtutem communem ponit +quandam virtutem heroicam vel divinam, secundum quam dicuntur +aliqui divini viri.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The vices are opposed to the virtues, in so far as they are opposed to the good as appointed by reason; but they are opposed + to the gifts, in as much as they are opposed to the Divine instinct. For the same thing is opposed both to God and to reason, + whose light flows from God. +
[36344] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod vitia, inquantum sunt contra bonum rationis, +contrariantur virtutibus, inquantum autem sunt contra divinum +instinctum, contrariantur donis. Idem enim contrariatur Deo et +rationi, cuius lumen a Deo derivatur.
+ Reply to Objection 3: This definition applies to virtue taken in its general sense. Consequently, if we wish to restrict it to virtue as distinguished + from the gifts, we must explain the words, "whereby we lead a good life" as referring to the rectitude of life which is measured + by the rule of reason. Likewise the gifts, as distinct from infused virtue, may be defined as something given by God in relation + to His motion; something, to wit, that makes man to follow well the + promptings of God. +
[36345] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod definitio illa datur de virtute secundum communem +modum virtutis. Unde si volumus definitionem restringere ad +virtutes prout distinguuntur a donis, dicemus quod hoc quod +dicitur, qua recte vivitur, intelligendum est de rectitudine vitae +quae accipitur secundum regulam rationis. Similiter autem donum, +prout distinguitur a virtute infusa, potest dici id quod datur a +Deo in ordine ad motionem ipsius; quod scilicet facit hominem bene +sequentem suos instinctus.
+ Reply to Objection 4: Wisdom is called an intellectual virtue, so far as it proceeds from the judgment of reason: but it is called a gift, according + as its work proceeds from the Divine prompting. The same applies to the other virtues. +
[36346] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod sapientia dicitur intellectualis virtus, secundum +quod procedit ex iudicio rationis, dicitur autem donum, secundum +quod operatur ex instinctu divino. Et similiter dicendum est de +aliis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts are not necessary to man for salvation. Because the gifts are ordained to a perfection surpassing + the ordinary perfection of virtue. Now it is not necessary for man's salvation that he should attain to a perfection surpassing + the ordinary standard of virtue; because such perfection falls, not under the precept, but under a counsel. Therefore the + gifts are not necessary to man for salvation. +
[36347] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod dona non sint necessaria homini ad +salutem. Dona enim ordinantur ad quandam perfectionem ultra +communem perfectionem virtutis. Non autem est homini necessarium ad +salutem ut huiusmodi perfectionem consequatur, quae est ultra +communem statum virtutis, quia huiusmodi perfectio non cadit sub +praecepto, sed sub consilio. Ergo dona non sunt necessaria homini +ad salutem.
+ Objection 2: Further, it is enough, for man's salvation, that he behave well in matters concerning God and matters concerning man. Now + man's behavior to God is sufficiently directed by the theological virtues; and his behavior towards men, by the moral virtues. + Therefore gifts are not necessary to man for salvation. +
[36348] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +ad salutem hominis sufficit quod homo se bene habeat et circa +divina et circa humana. Sed per virtutes theologicas homo se habet +bene circa divina; per virtutes autem morales, circa humana. Ergo +dona non sunt homini necessaria ad salutem.
+ Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the Holy Ghost gives wisdom against folly, understanding against dullness, counsel + against rashness, fortitude against fears, knowledge against ignorance, piety against hardness of our heart, and fear against + pride." But a sufficient remedy for all these things is to be found in the virtues. Therefore the gifts are not necessary + to man for salvation. +
[36349] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +Gregorius dicit, in II Moral., quod spiritus sanctus dat +sapientiam contra stultitiam, intellectum contra hebetudinem, +consilium contra praecipitationem, fortitudinem contra timorem, +scientiam contra ignorantiam, pietatem contra duritiam, timorem +contra superbiam. Sed sufficiens remedium potest adhiberi ad +omnia ista tollenda per virtutes. Ergo dona non sunt necessaria +homini ad salutem.
+ On the contrary, Of all the gifts, wisdom seems to be the highest, and fear the lowest. Now each of these is necessary for salvation: since + of wisdom it is written ( + Wis. 7:28): "God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom"; and of fear ( + Ecclus. 1:28): "He that is without fear cannot be justified." Therefore the other gifts that are placed between these are also necessary + for salvation. +
[36350] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra, +inter dona summum videtur esse sapientia, infimum autem timor. +Utrumque autem horum necessarium est ad salutem, quia de sapientia +dicitur, Sap. VII, neminem diligit Deus nisi eum qui cum +sapientia inhabitat; et de timore dicitur, Eccli. I, qui +sine timore est, non poterit iustificari. Ergo etiam alia dona +media sunt necessaria ad salutem.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[1]), the gifts are perfections of man, whereby he is disposed so as to be amenable to the promptings of God. Wherefore in those + matters where the prompting of reason is not sufficient, and there is need for the prompting of the Holy Ghost, there is, + in consequence, need for a gift. +
Now man's reason is perfected by God in two ways: first, with its natural perfection, to wit, the natural light of reason; + secondly, with a supernatural perfection, to wit, the theological virtues, as stated above ( + Q[62], A[1]). And, though this latter perfection is greater than the former, yet the former is possessed by man in a more perfect manner + than the latter: because man has the former in his full possession, whereas he possesses the latter + imperfectly, since we love and know God imperfectly. Now it is evident that anything that has a nature or a form or a virtue + perfectly, can of itself work according to them: not, however, excluding the operation of God, Who works inwardly in every + nature and in every will. On the other hand, that which has a nature, or form, or virtue imperfectly, cannot of itself work, + unless it be moved by another. Thus the sun which possesses light perfectly, can shine by itself; whereas the moon which has + the nature of light imperfectly, sheds only a borrowed light. Again, a physician, who knows the medical art perfectly, can + work by himself; but his pupil, who is not yet fully instructed, cannot work by himself, but needs to receive instructions + from him. +
Accordingly, in matters subject to human reason, and directed to man's connatural end, man can work through the judgment + of his reason. If, however, even in these things man receive help in the shape of special promptings from God, this will be + out of God's superabundant goodness: hence, according to the philosophers, not every one that had the acquired moral virtues, + had also the heroic or divine virtues. But in matters directed to the supernatural end, to which man's reason + moves him, according as it is, in a manner, and imperfectly, informed by the theological virtues, the motion of reason does + not suffice, unless it receive in addition the prompting or motion of the Holy Ghost, according to + Rom. 8:14, + 17: "Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are sons of God . . . and if sons, heirs also": and + Ps. 142:10: "Thy good Spirit shall lead me into the right land," because, to wit, none can receive the inheritance of that + land of the Blessed, except he be moved and led thither by the Holy Ghost. Therefore, in order to accomplish this end, it + is necessary for man to have the gift of the Holy Ghost. +
[36351] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, dona sunt quaedam hominis +perfectiones, quibus homo disponitur ad hoc quod bene sequatur +instinctum divinum. Unde in his in quibus non sufficit instinctus +rationis, sed est necessarius spiritus sancti instinctus, per +consequens est necessarium donum. Ratio autem hominis est perfecta +dupliciter a Deo, primo quidem, naturali perfectione, scilicet +secundum lumen naturale rationis; alio modo, quadam supernaturali +perfectione, per virtutes theologicas, ut dictum est supra. Et +quamvis haec secunda perfectio sit maior quam prima, tamen prima +perfectiori modo habetur ab homine quam secunda, nam prima habetur +ab homine quasi plena possessio, secunda autem habetur quasi +imperfecta; imperfecte enim diligimus et cognoscimus Deum. +Manifestum est autem quod unumquodque quod perfecte habet naturam +vel formam aliquam aut virtutem, potest per se secundum illam +operari, non tamen exclusa operatione Dei, qui in omni natura et +voluntate interius operatur. Sed id quod imperfecte habet naturam +aliquam vel formam aut virtutem, non potest per se operari, nisi ab +altero moveatur. Sicut sol, quia est perfecte lucidus, per seipsum +potest illuminare, luna autem, in qua est imperfecte natura lucis, +non illuminat nisi illuminata. Medicus etiam, qui perfecte novit +artem medicinae, potest per se operari, sed discipulus eius, qui +nondum est plene instructus, non potest per se operari, nisi ab eo +instruatur. Sic igitur quantum ad ea quae subsunt humanae rationi, +in ordine scilicet ad finem connaturalem homini; homo potest +operari, per iudicium rationis. Si tamen etiam in hoc homo +adiuvetur a Deo per specialem instinctum, hoc erit superabundantis +bonitatis, unde secundum philosophos, non quicumque habebat +virtutes morales acquisitas, habebat virtutes heroicas vel divinas. +Sed in ordine ad finem ultimum supernaturalem, ad quem ratio movet +secundum quod est aliqualiter et imperfecte formata per virtutes +theologicas; non sufficit ipsa motio rationis, nisi desuper adsit +instinctus et motio spiritus sancti; secundum illud Rom. VIII, +qui spiritu Dei aguntur, hi filii Dei sunt; et si filii, et +haeredes, et in Psalmo CXLII, dicitur, spiritus tuus bonus +deducet me in terram rectam; quia scilicet in haereditatem +illius terrae beatorum nullus potest pervenire, nisi moveatur et +deducatur a spiritu sancto. Et ideo ad illum finem consequendum, +necessarium est homini habere donum spiritus sancti.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The gifts surpass the ordinary perfection of the virtues, not as regards the kind of works (as the counsels surpass the commandments), + but as regards the manner of working, in respect of man being moved by a higher principle. +
[36352] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod dona excedunt communem perfectionem virtutum, +non quantum ad genus operum, eo modo quo consilia excedunt +praecepta, sed quantum ad modum operandi, secundum quod movetur +homo ab altiori principio.
+ Reply to Objection 2: By the theological and moral virtues, man is not so perfected in respect of his last end, as not to stand in continual need + of being moved by the yet higher promptings of the Holy Ghost, for the reason already given. +
[36353] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod per virtutes theologicas et morales non ita +perficitur homo in ordine ad ultimum finem, quin semper indigeat +moveri quodam superiori instinctu spiritus sancti, ratione iam +dicta.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Whether we consider human reason as perfected in its natural perfection, or as perfected by the theological virtues, it does + not know all things, nor all possible things. Consequently it is unable to avoid folly and other like things mentioned in + the objection. God, however, to Whose knowledge and power all things are subject, by His motion safeguards us from all folly, + ignorance, dullness of mind and hardness of heart, and the rest. Consequently the + gifts of the Holy Ghost, which make us amenable to His promptings, are said to be given as remedies to these defects. +
[36354] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod rationi humanae non sunt omnia cognita, neque omnia +possibilia, sive accipiatur ut perfecta perfectione naturali, sive +accipiatur ut perfecta theologicis virtutibus. Unde non potest +quantum ad omnia repellere stultitiam, et alia huiusmodi, de quibus +ibi fit mentio. Sed Deus cuius scientiae et potestati omnia +subsunt, sua motione ab omni stultitia et ignorantia et hebetudine +et duritia et ceteris huiusmodi, nos tutos reddit. Et ideo dona +spiritus sancti, quae faciunt nos bene sequentes instinctum ipsius, +dicuntur contra huiusmodi defectus dari.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits. Because a habit is a quality abiding in man, being defined + as "a quality difficult to remove," as stated in the Predicaments (Categor. vi). Now it is proper to Christ that the gifts + of the Holy Ghost rest in Him, as stated in + Is. 11:2,3: "He upon Whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it is that baptizeth"; on which words Gregory + comments as + follows (Moral. ii, 27): "The Holy Ghost comes upon all the faithful; but, in a singular way, He dwells always in the Mediator." + Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits. +
[36355] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod dona spiritus sancti non sint habitus. +Habitus enim est qualitas in homine manens, est enim qualitas +difficile mobilis, ut dicitur in praedicamentis. Sed proprium +Christi est quod dona spiritus sancti in eo requiescant; ut dicitur +Isaiae XI. Et Ioan. I, dicitur, super quem videris spiritum +descendentem, et manentem super eum, hic est qui baptizat, quod +exponens Gregorius, in II Moral., dicit, in cunctis fidelibus +spiritus sanctus venit; sed in solo mediatore semper singulariter +permanet. Ergo dona spiritus sancti non sunt habitus.
+ Objection 2: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man according as he is moved by the Spirit of God, as stated above ( + AA[1],2). But in so far as man is moved by the Spirit of God, he is somewhat like an instrument in His regard. Now to be perfected + by a habit is befitting, not an instrument, but a principal agent. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits. +
[36356] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +dona spiritus sancti perficiunt hominem secundum quod agitur a +spiritu Dei, sicut dictum est. Sed inquantum homo agitur a spiritu +Dei, se habet quodammodo ut instrumentum respectu eius. Non autem +convenit ut instrumentum perficiatur per habitum, sed principale +agens. Ergo dona spiritus sancti non sunt habitus.
+ Objection 3: Further, as the gifts of the Holy Ghost are due to Divine inspiration, so is the gift of prophecy. Now prophecy is not a + habit: for "the spirit of prophecy does not always reside in the prophets," as Gregory states (Hom. i in Ezechiel). Neither, + therefore, are the gifts of the Holy Ghost. +
[36357] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sicut dona spiritus sancti sunt ex inspiratione divina, ita et +donum prophetiae. Sed prophetia non est habitus, non enim semper +spiritus prophetiae adest prophetis, ut Gregorius dicit, in I +homilia Ezechielis. Ergo neque etiam dona spiritus sancti sunt +habitus.
+ On the contrary, Our Lord in speaking of the Holy Ghost said to His disciples ( + Jn. 14:17): "He shall abide with you, and shall be in you." Now the Holy Ghost is not in a man without His gifts. Therefore His gifts + abide in man. Therefore they are not merely acts or passions but abiding habits. +
[36358] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dominus dicit discipulis, de spiritu sancto loquens, Ioan. +XIV, apud vos manebit, et in vobis erit. Spiritus autem +sanctus non est in hominibus absque donis eius. Ergo dona eius +manent in hominibus. Ergo non solum sunt actus vel passiones, sed +etiam habitus permanentes.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[1]), the gifts are perfections of man, whereby he becomes amenable to the promptings of the Holy Ghost. Now it is evident from + what has been already said (Q[56], A[4]; Q[58], A[2]), that the moral virtues perfect the appetitive power according as it + partakes somewhat of the reason, in so far, to wit, as it has a natural aptitude to be moved by the command of reason. Accordingly + the gifts of the Holy Ghost, as + compared with the Holy Ghost Himself, are related to man, even as the moral virtues, in comparison with the reason, are related + to the appetitive power. Now the moral virtues are habits, whereby the powers of appetite are disposed to obey reason promptly. + Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits whereby man is perfected to obey readily the Holy Ghost. +
[36359] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, dona sunt quaedam perfectiones +hominis, quibus disponitur ad hoc quod homo bene sequatur +instinctum spiritus sancti. Manifestum est autem ex supradictis +quod virtutes morales perficiunt vim appetitivam secundum quod +participat aliqualiter rationem, inquantum scilicet nata est moveri +per imperium rationis. Hoc igitur modo dona spiritus sancti se +habent ad hominem in comparatione ad spiritum sanctum, sicut +virtutes morales se habent ad vim appetitivam in comparatione ad +rationem. Virtutes autem morales habitus quidam sunt, quibus vires +appetitivae disponuntur ad prompte obediendum rationi. Unde et dona +spiritus sancti sunt quidam habitus, quibus homo perficitur ad +prompte obediendum spiritui sancto.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Gregory solves this objection (Moral. ii, 27) by saying that "by those gifts without which one cannot obtain life, the Holy + Ghost ever abides in all the elect, but not by His other gifts." Now the seven gifts are necessary for salvation, as stated + above + (A[2]). Therefore, with regard to them, the Holy Ghost ever abides in holy men. +
[36360] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Gregorius ibidem solvit, dicens quod in illis +donis sine quibus ad vitam perveniri non potest, spiritus sanctus +in electis omnibus semper manet, sed in aliis non semper manet. +Septem autem dona sunt necessaria ad salutem, ut dictum est. Unde +quantum ad ea, spiritus sanctus semper manet in sanctis.
+ Reply to Objection 2: This argument holds, in the case of an instrument which has no faculty of action, but only of being acted upon. But man is + not an instrument of that kind; for he is so acted upon, by the Holy Ghost, that he also acts himself, in so far as he has + a free-will. Therefore he needs a habit. +
[36361] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de instrumento cuius non est +agere, sed solum agi. Tale autem instrumentum non est homo; sed sic +agitur a spiritu sancto, quod etiam agit, inquantum est liberi +arbitrii. Unde indiget habitu.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Prophecy is one of those gifts which are for the manifestation of the Spirit, not for the necessity of salvation: hence the + comparison fails. +
[36362] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod prophetia est de donis quae sunt ad manifestationem +spiritus, non autem ad necessitatem salutis. Unde non est +simile.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are unsuitably enumerated. For in that enumeration four are set down corresponding + to the intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, understanding, knowledge, and counsel, which corresponds to prudence; whereas nothing + is set down corresponding to art, which is the fifth intellectual virtue. Moreover, something is included corresponding to + justice, viz. piety, and something corresponding to fortitude, viz. the gift of + fortitude; while there is nothing to correspond to temperance. Therefore the gifts are enumerated insufficiently. +
[36363] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter septem dona spiritus +sancti enumerentur. In illa enim enumeratione ponuntur quatuor +pertinentia ad virtutes intellectuales, scilicet sapientia, +intellectus, scientia et consilium, quod pertinet ad prudentiam, +nihil autem ibi ponitur quod pertineat ad artem, quae est quinta +virtus intellectualis. Similiter etiam ponitur aliquid pertinens ad +iustitiam, scilicet pietas, et aliquid pertinens ad fortitudinem, +scilicet donum fortitudinis, nihil autem ponitur ibi pertinens ad +temperantiam. Ergo insufficienter enumerantur dona.
+ Objection 2: Further, piety is a part of justice. But no part of fortitude is assigned to correspond thereto, but fortitude itself. Therefore + justice itself, and not piety, ought to have been set down. +
[36364] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +pietas est pars iustitiae. Sed circa fortitudinem non ponitur +aliqua pars eius, sed ipsa fortitudo. Ergo non debuit poni pietas, +sed ipsa iustitia.
+ Objection 3: Further, the theological virtues, more than any, direct us to God. Since, then, the gifts perfect man according as he is + moved by God, it seems that some gifts, corresponding to the theological virtues, should have been included. +
[36365] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +virtutes theologicae maxime ordinant nos ad Deum. Cum ergo dona +perficiant hominem secundum quod movetur a Deo, videtur quod +debuissent poni aliqua dona pertinentia ad theologicas +virtutes.
+ Objection 4: Further, even as God is an object of fear, so is He of love, of hope, and of joy. Now love, hope, and joy are passions condivided + with fear. Therefore, as fear is set down as a gift, so ought the other three. +
[36366] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 arg. 4 Praeterea, +sicut Deus timetur, ita etiam amatur, et in ipsum aliquis sperat, +et de eo delectatur. Amor autem, spes et delectatio sunt passiones +condivisae timori. Ergo, sicut timor ponitur donum, ita et alia +tria debent poni dona.
+ Objection 5: Further, wisdom is added in order to direct understanding; counsel, to direct fortitude; knowledge, to direct piety. Therefore, + some gift should have been added for the purpose of directing fear. Therefore the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are unsuitably + enumerated. +
[36367] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 arg. 5 Praeterea, +intellectui adiungitur sapientia quae regit ipsum; fortitudini +autem consilium, pietati vero scientia. Ergo et timori debuit addi +aliquod donum directivum. Inconvenienter ergo septem dona spiritus +sancti enumerantur.
+ On the contrary, stands the authority of Holy Writ ( + Is. 11:2,3). +
[36368] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 s. c. Sed in +contrarium est auctoritas Scripturae, Isaiae XI.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[3]), the gifts are habits perfecting man so that he is ready to follow the promptings of the Holy Ghost, even as the moral virtues + perfect the appetitive powers so that they obey the reason. Now just as it is natural for the appetitive powers to be moved + by the command of reason, so it is natural for all the forces in man to be moved by the instinct of God, as by a superior + power. Therefore whatever powers in man + can be the principles of human actions, can also be the subjects of gifts, even as they are virtues; and such powers are the + reason and appetite. +
Now the reason is speculative and practical: and in both we find the apprehension of truth (which pertains to the discovery + of truth), and judgment concerning the truth. Accordingly, for the apprehension of truth, the speculative reason is perfected + by "understanding"; the practical reason, by "counsel." In order to judge aright, the speculative reason is perfected by "wisdom"; + the practical reason by "knowledge." The appetitive power, in matters touching a man's relations to + another, is perfected by "piety"; in matters touching himself, it is perfected by "fortitude" against the fear of dangers; + and against inordinate lust for pleasures, by "fear," according to + Prov. 15:27: "By the fear of the Lord every one declineth from evil," and + Ps. 118:120: "Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear: for I am afraid of Thy judgments." Hence it is clear that these gifts extend to all + those things to which the virtues, both intellectual and + moral, extend. +
[36369] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, dona sunt quidam habitus +perficientes hominem ad hoc quod prompte sequatur instinctum +spiritus sancti, sicut virtutes morales perficiunt vires +appetitivas ad obediendum rationi. Sicut autem vires appetitivae +natae sunt moveri per imperium rationis, ita omnes vires humanae +natae sunt moveri per instinctum Dei, sicut a quadam superiori +potentia. Et ideo in omnibus viribus hominis quae possunt esse +principia humanorum actuum, sicut sunt virtutes, ita etiam sunt +dona, scilicet in ratione, et in vi appetitiva. Ratio autem est +speculativa et practica, et in utraque consideratur apprehensio +veritatis, quae pertinet ad inventionem; et iudicium de veritate. +Ad apprehensionem igitur veritatis, perficitur speculativa ratio +per intellectum; practica vero per consilium. Ad recte autem +iudicandum, speculativa quidem per sapientiam, practica vero per +scientiam perficitur. Appetitiva autem virtus, in his quidem quae +sunt ad alterum, perficitur per pietatem. In his autem quae sunt ad +seipsum, perficitur per fortitudinem contra terrorem periculorum, +contra concupiscentiam vero inordinatam delectabilium, per timorem, +secundum illud Proverb. XV, per timorem domini declinat omnis a +malo; et in Psalmo CXVIII, confige timore tuo carnes meas, a +iudiciis enim tuis timui. Et sic patet quod haec dona extendunt +se ad omnia ad quae se extendunt virtutes tam intellectuales quam +morales.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man in matters concerning a good life: whereas art is not directed to such matters, but + to external things that can be made, since art is the right reason, not about things to be done, but about things to be made + (Ethic. vi, 4). However, we may say that, as regards the infusion of the gifts, the art is on the part of the Holy Ghost, + Who is the principal mover, and not on the part of men, who are His organs when He + moves them. The gift of fear corresponds, in a manner, to temperance: for just as it belongs to temperance, properly speaking, + to restrain man from evil pleasures for the sake of the good appointed by reason, so does it belong to the gift of fear, to + withdraw man from evil pleasures through fear of God. +
[36370] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod dona spiritus sancti perficiunt hominem in his +quae pertinent ad bene vivendum, ad quae non ordinatur ars, sed ad +exteriora factibilia; est enim ars ratio recta non agibilium, sed +factibilium, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Potest tamen dici quod, +quantum ad infusionem donorum, ars pertinet ad spiritum sanctum, +qui est principaliter movens; non autem ad homines, qui sunt +quaedam organa eius dum ab eo moventur. Temperantiae autem +respondet quodammodo donum timoris. Sicut enim ad virtutem +temperantiae pertinet, secundum eius propriam rationem, ut aliquis +recedat a delectationibus pravis propter bonum rationis; ita ad +donum timoris pertinet quod aliquis recedat a delectationibus +pravis propter Dei timorem.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Justice is so called from the rectitude of the reason, and so it is more suitably called a virtue than a gift. But the name + of piety denotes the reverence which we give to our father and to our country. And since God is the Father of all, the worship + of God is also called piety, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1). Therefore the gift whereby a man, through reverence for + God, works good to all, is fittingly called piety. +
[36371] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod nomen iustitiae imponitur a rectitudine rationis, et +ideo nomen virtutis est convenientius quam nomen doni. Sed nomen +pietatis importat reverentiam quam habemus ad patrem et ad patriam. +Et quia pater omnium Deus est, etiam cultus Dei pietas nominatur; +ut Augustinus dicit, X de Civ. Dei. Et ideo convenienter donum quo +aliquis propter reverentiam Dei bonum operatur ad omnes, pietas +nominatur.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The mind of man is not moved by the Holy Ghost, unless in some way it be united to Him: even as the instrument is not moved + by the craftsman, unless there by contact or some other kind of union between them. Now the primal union of man with God is + by faith, hope and charity: and, consequently, these virtues are presupposed to the gifts, as being their roots. Therefore + all the gifts correspond to these three virtues, as being derived therefrom. +
[36372] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod animus hominis non movetur a spiritu sancto, nisi ei +secundum aliquem modum uniatur, sicut instrumentum non movetur ab +artifice nisi per contactum, aut per aliquam aliam unionem. Prima +autem unio hominis est per fidem, spem et caritatem. Unde istae +virtutes praesupponuntur ad dona, sicut radices quaedam donorum. +Unde omnia dona pertinent ad has tres virtutes, sicut quaedam +derivationes praedictarum virtutum.
+ Reply to Objection 4: Love, hope and joy have good for their object. Now God is the Sovereign Good: wherefore the names of these passions are transferred + to the theological virtues which unite man to God. On the other hand, the object of fear is evil, which can nowise apply to + God: hence fear does not denote union with God, but withdrawal from certain things through reverence for God. Hence it does + not give its name to a theological virtue, but to a gift, which withdraws + us from evil, for higher motives than moral virtue does. +
[36373] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod amor et spes et delectatio habent bonum pro obiecto. +Summum autem bonum Deus est, unde nomina harum passionum +transferuntur ad virtutes theologicas, quibus anima coniungitur +Deo. Timoris autem obiectum est malum, quod Deo nullo modo +competit, unde non importat coniunctionem ad Deum, sed magis +recessum ab aliquibus rebus propter reverentiam Dei. Et ideo non +est nomen virtutis theologicae, sed doni, quod eminentius retrahit +a malis quam virtus moralis.
+ Reply to Objection 5: Wisdom directs both the intellect and the affections of man. Hence two gifts are set down as corresponding to wisdom as their + directing principle; on the part of the intellect, the gift of understanding; on the part of the affections, the gift of fear. + Because the principal reason for fearing God is taken from a consideration of the Divine excellence, which wisdom considers. +
[36374] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 ad 5 Ad quintum +dicendum quod per sapientiam dirigitur et hominis intellectus, et +hominis affectus. Et ideo ponuntur duo correspondentia sapientiae +tanquam directivo, ex parte quidem intellectus, donum intellectus; +ex parte autem affectus, donum timoris. Ratio enim timendi Deum +praecipue sumitur ex consideratione excellentiae divinae, quam +considerat sapientia.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts are not connected, for the Apostle says ( + 1 Cor. 12:8): "To one . . . by the Spirit, is given the word of wisdom, and to another, the word of knowledge, according to the same + Spirit." Now wisdom and knowledge are reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are + given to divers men, and are not connected together in the same man. +
[36375] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod dona non sint connexa. Dicit enim +apostolus, I ad Cor. XII, alii datur per spiritum sermo +sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae secundum eundem spiritum. Sed +sapientia et scientia inter dona spiritus sancti computantur. Ergo +dona spiritus sancti dantur diversis, et non connectuntur sibi +invicem in eodem.
+ Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "many of the faithful have not knowledge, though they have faith." But some + of the gifts, at least the gift of fear, accompany faith. Therefore it seems that the gifts are not necessarily connected + together in one and the same man. +
[36376] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Trin., quod scientia non pollent +fideles plurimi, quamvis polleant ipsa fide. Sed fidem +concomitatur aliquod de donis, ad minus donum timoris. Ergo videtur +quod dona non sint ex necessitate connexa in uno et eodem.
+ Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. i) that wisdom "is of small account if it lack understanding, and understanding is wholly useless + if it be not based upon wisdom . . . Counsel is worthless, when the strength of fortitude is lacking thereto . . . and fortitude + is very weak if it be not supported by counsel . . . Knowledge is nought if it hath not the use of piety . . . and piety is + very useless if it lack the discernment of knowledge . . . and assuredly, unless it + has these virtues with it, fear itself rises up to the doing of no good action": from which it seems that it is possible to + have one gift without another. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not connected. +
[36377] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +Gregorius, in I Moral., dicit quod minor est sapientia, si +intellectu careat; et valde inutilis est intellectus, si ex +sapientia non subsistat. Vile est consilium, cui opus fortitudinis +deest; et valde fortitudo destruitur, nisi per consilium fulciatur. +Nulla est scientia, si utilitatem pietatis non habet; et valde +inutilis est pietas, si scientiae discretione caret. Timor quoque +ipse, si non has virtutes habuerit, ad nullum opus bonae actionis +surgit. Ex quibus videtur quod unum donum possit sine alio +haberi. Non ergo dona spiritus sancti sunt connexa.
+ On the contrary, Gregory prefaces the passage above quoted, with the following remark: "It is worthy of note in this feast of Job's sons, + that by turns they fed one another." Now the sons of Job, of whom he is speaking, denote the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore + the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected together by strengthening one another. +
[36378] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra +est quod ibidem Gregorius praemittit, dicens, illud in hoc +filiorum convivio perscrutandum videtur, quod semetipsos invicem +pascunt. Per filios autem Iob, de quibus loquitur, designantur +dona spiritus sancti. Ergo dona spiritus sancti sunt connexa, per +hoc quod se invicem reficiunt.
+ I answer that, The true answer to this question is easily gathered from what has been already set down. For it has been stated + (A[3]) that as the powers of the appetite are disposed by the moral virtues as regards the governance of reason, so all the powers + of the soul are disposed by the gifts as regards the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now the Holy Ghost dwells in us by charity, + according to + Rom. 5:5: "The charity of God is + poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us," even as our reason is perfected by prudence. Wherefore, + just as the moral virtues are united together in prudence, so the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected together in charity: + so that whoever has charity has all the gifts of the Holy Ghost, none of which can one possess without charity. +
[36379] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod huius quaestionis veritas de facili ex praemissis +potest haberi. Dictum est enim supra quod sicut vires appetitivae +disponuntur per virtutes morales in comparatione ad regimen +rationis, ita omnes vires animae disponuntur per dona in +comparatione ad spiritum sanctum moventem. Spiritus autem sanctus +habitat in nobis per caritatem, secundum illud Rom. V, caritas +Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui datus +est nobis, sicut et ratio nostra perficitur per prudentiam. +Unde sicut virtutes morales connectuntur sibi invicem in prudentia, +ita dona spiritus sancti connectuntur sibi invicem in caritate, ita +scilicet quod qui caritatem habet, omnia dona spiritus sancti +habet; quorum nullum sine caritate haberi potest.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Wisdom and knowledge can be considered in one way as gratuitous graces, in so far, to wit, as man so far abounds in the knowledge + of things Divine and human, that he is able both to instruct the believer and confound the unbeliever. It is in this sense + that the Apostle speaks, in this passage, about wisdom and knowledge: hence he mentions pointedly the "word" of wisdom and + the "word" of knowledge. They may be taken in another way for the gifts of the + Holy Ghost: and thus wisdom and knowledge are nothing else but perfections of the human mind, rendering it amenable to the + promptings of the Holy Ghost in the knowledge of things Divine and human. Consequently it is clear that these gifts are in + all who are possessed of charity. +
[36380] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod sapientia et scientia uno modo possunt +considerari secundum quod sunt gratiae gratis datae, prout scilicet +aliquis abundat intantum in cognitione rerum divinarum et +humanarum, ut possit et fideles instruere et adversarios confutare. +Et sic loquitur ibi apostolus de sapientia et scientia, unde +signanter fit mentio de sermone sapientiae et scientiae. Alio modo +possunt accipi prout sunt dona spiritus sancti. Et sic sapientia et +scientia nihil aliud sunt quam quaedam perfectiones humanae mentis, +secundum quas disponitur ad sequendum instinctus spiritus sancti in +cognitione divinorum vel humanorum. Et sic patet quod huiusmodi +dona sunt in omnibus habentibus caritatem.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Augustine is speaking there of knowledge, while expounding the passage of the Apostle quoted above (OBJ 1): hence he is referring + to knowledge, in the sense already explained, as a gratuitous grace. This is clear from the context which follows: "For it + is one thing to know only what a man must believe in order to gain the blissful life, which is no other than eternal life; + and another, to know how to impart this to godly souls, and to defend it + against the ungodly, which latter the Apostle seems to have styled by the proper name of knowledge." +
[36381] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur de scientia exponens +praedictam auctoritatem apostoli, unde loquitur de scientia +praedicto modo accepta, secundum quod est gratia gratis data. Quod +patet ex hoc quod subdit, aliud enim est scire tantummodo quid +homo credere debeat propter adipiscendam vitam beatam, quae non +nisi aeterna est; aliud autem scire quemadmodum hoc ipsum et piis +opituletur, et contra impios defendatur; quam proprio appellare +vocabulo scientiam videtur apostolus.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Just as the connection of the cardinal virtues is proved in one way from the fact that one is, in a manner, perfected by + another, as stated above ( + Q[65], A[1]); so Gregory wishes to prove the connection of the gifts, in the same way, from the fact that one cannot be perfect without + the other. Hence he had already observed that "each particular virtue is to the last degree destitute, unless one virtue lend + its support to + another." We are therefore not to understand that one gift can be without another; but that if understanding were without + wisdom, it would not be a gift; even as temperance, without justice, would not be a virtue. +
[36382] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut uno modo connexio virtutum cardinalium +probatur per hoc quod una earum perficitur quodammodo per aliam, ut +supra dictum est; ita Gregorius eodem modo vult probare connexionem +donorum, per hoc quod unum sine alio non potest esse perfectum. +Unde praemittit dicens, valde singula quaelibet destituitur, si +non una alii virtus virtuti suffragetur. Non ergo datur +intelligi quod unum donum possit esse sine alio, sed quod +intellectus, si esset sine sapientia, non esset donum; sicut +temperantia, si esset sine iustitia, non esset virtus.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost do not remain in heaven. For Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that by means of + His sevenfold gift the "Holy Ghost instructs the mind against all temptations." Now there will be no temptations in heaven, + according to + Is. 11:9: "They shall not hurt, nor shall they kill in all My holy mountain." Therefore there will be no gifts of the Holy Ghost in + heaven. +
[36383] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod dona spiritus sancti non maneant in +patria. Dicit enim Gregorius, in II Moral., quod spiritus +sanctus contra singula tentamenta septem donis erudit mentem. +Sed in patria non erunt aliqua tentamenta; secundum illud Isaiae +XI, non nocebunt et non occident in universo monte sancto +meo. Ergo dona spiritus sancti non erunt in patria.
+ Objection 2: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits, as stated above + (A[3]). But habits are of no use, where their acts are impossible. Now the acts of some gifts are not possible in heaven; for Gregory + says (Moral. i, 15) that "understanding . . . penetrates the truths heard . . . counsel . . . stays us from acting rashly + . . . fortitude . . . has no fear of adversity . . . piety satisfies the inmost heart with deeds of mercy," all of + which are incompatible with the heavenly state. Therefore these gifts will not remain in the state of glory. +
[36384] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, +dona spiritus sancti sunt habitus quidam, ut supra dictum est. +Frustra autem essent habitus, ubi actus esse non possunt. Actus +autem quorundam donorum in patria esse non possunt, dicit enim +Gregorius, in I Moral., quod intellectus facit audita penetrare, +et consilium prohibet esse praecipitem, et fortitudo facit non +metuere adversa, et pietas replet cordis viscera operibus +misericordiae; haec autem non competunt statui patriae. Ergo +huiusmodi dona non erunt in statu gloriae.
+ Objection 3: Further, some of the gifts perfect man in the contemplative life, e.g. wisdom and understanding: and some in the active life, + e.g. piety and fortitude. Now the active life ends with this as Gregory states (Moral. vi). Therefore not all the gifts of + the Holy Ghost will be in the state of glory. +
[36385] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, +donorum quaedam perficiunt hominem in vita contemplativa, ut +sapientia et intellectus; quaedam in vita activa, ut pietas et +fortitudo. Sed activa vita cum hac vita terminatur; ut Gregorius +dicit, in VI Moral. Ergo in statu gloriae non erunt omnia dona +spiritus sancti.
+ On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Spiritu Sancto i, 20): "The city of God, the heavenly Jerusalem is not washed with the waters of an earthly + river: it is the Holy Ghost, of Whose outpouring we but taste, Who, proceeding from the Fount of life, seems to flow more + abundantly in those celestial spirits, a seething torrent of sevenfold heavenly virtue." +
[36386] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Ambrosius dicit, in libro de spiritu sancto, civitas +Dei illa, Ierusalem caelestis, non meatu alicuius fluvii terrestris +abluitur; sed ex vitae fonte procedens spiritus sanctus, cuius nos +brevi satiamur haustu, in illis caelestibus spiritibus redundantius +videtur affluere, pleno septem virtutum spiritualium fervens +meatu.
+ I answer that, We may speak of the gifts in two ways: first, as to their essence; and thus they will be most perfectly in heaven, as may + be gathered from the passage of Ambrose, just quoted. The reason for this is that the gifts of the Holy Ghost render the human + mind amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost: which will be especially realized in heaven, where God will be "all in all" + ( + 1 Cor. 15:28), and man entirely subject unto Him. Secondly, they may + be considered as regards the matter about which their operations are: and thus, in the present life they have an operation + about a matter, in respect of which they will have no operation in the state of glory. Considered in this way, they will not + remain in the state of glory; just as we have stated to be the case with regard to the cardinal virtues ( + Q[67], A[1]). +
[36387] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod de donis dupliciter possumus loqui. Uno modo, quantum +ad essentiam donorum, et sic perfectissime erunt in patria, sicut +patet per auctoritatem Ambrosii inductam. Cuius ratio est quia dona +spiritus sancti perficiunt mentem humanam ad sequendam motionem +spiritus sancti, quod praecipue erit in patria, quando Deus erit +omnia in omnibus, ut dicitur I ad Cor. XV, et quando homo erit +totaliter subditus Deo. Alio modo possunt considerari quantum ad +materiam circa quam operantur, et sic in praesenti habent +operationem circa aliquam materiam circa quam non habebunt +operationem in statu gloriae. Et secundum hoc, non manebunt in +patria, sicut supra de virtutibus cardinalibus dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Gregory is speaking there of the gifts according as they are compatible with the present state: for it is thus that they + afford us protection against evil temptations. But in the state of glory, where all evil will have ceased, we shall be perfected + in good by the gifts of the Holy Ghost. +
[36388] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Gregorius loquitur ibi de donis secundum quod +competunt statui praesenti, sic enim donis protegimur contra +tentamenta malorum. Sed in statu gloriae, cessantibus malis, per +dona spiritus sancti perficiemur in bono.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Gregory, in almost every gift, includes something that passes away with the present state, and something that remains in + the future state. For he says that "wisdom strengthens the mind with the hope and certainty of eternal things"; of which two, + hope passes, and certainty remains. Of understanding, he says "that it penetrates the truths heard, refreshing the heart and + enlightening its darkness," of which, hearing passes away, since "they shall teach + no more every man . . . his brother" ( + Jer. 31:3,4); but the enlightening of the mind remains. Of counsel he says that it "prevents us from being impetuous," which is necessary + in the present life; and also that "it makes the mind full of reason," which is necessary even in the future state. Of fortitude + he says that it "fears not adversity," which is necessary in the present life; and further, that it "sets before us the viands + of confidence," which remains also in the + future life. With regard to knowledge he mentions only one thing, viz. that "she overcomes the void of ignorance," which refers + to the present state. When, however, he adds "in the womb of the mind," this may refer figuratively to the fulness of knowledge, + which belongs to the future state. Of piety he says that "it satisfies the inmost heart with deeds of mercy." These words + taken literally refer only to the present state: yet the inward regard for our neighbor, signified by "the inmost + heart," belongs also to the future state, when piety will achieve, not works of mercy, but fellowship of joy. Of fear he say + that "it oppresses the mind, lest it pride itself in present things," which refers to the present state, and that "it strengthens + it with the meat of hope for the future," which also belongs to the present state, as regards hope, but may also refer to + the future state, as regards being "strengthened" for things we hope are here, and obtain there. +
[36389] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod Gregorius quasi in singulis donis ponit aliquid quod +transit cum statu praesenti, et aliquid quod permanet etiam in +futuro. Dicit enim quod sapientia mentem de aeternorum spe et +certitudine reficit, quorum duorum spes transit, sed certitudo +remanet. Et de intellectu dicit quod in eo quod audita penetrat, +reficiendo cor, tenebras eius illustrat, quorum auditus transit, +quia non docebit vir fratrem suum, ut dicitur Ierem. XXXI; sed +illustratio mentis manebit. De consilio autem dicit quod prohibet +esse praecipitem, quod est necessarium in praesenti, et iterum quod +ratione animum replet, quod est necessarium etiam in futuro. De +fortitudine vero dicit quod adversa non metuit, quod est +necessarium in praesenti, et iterum quod confidentiae cibos +apponit, quod permanet etiam in futuro. De scientia vero unum +tantum ponit, scilicet quod ignorantiae ieiunium superat, quod +pertinet ad statum praesentem. Sed quod addit, in ventre mentis, +potest figuraliter intelligi repletio cognitionis, quae pertinet +etiam ad statum futurum. De pietate vero dicit quod cordis viscera +misericordiae operibus replet. Quod quidem secundum verba, pertinet +tantum ad statum praesentem. Sed ipse intimus affectus proximorum, +per viscera designatus, pertinet etiam ad futurum statum; in quo +pietas non exhibebit misericordiae opera, sed congratulationis +affectum. De timore vero dicit quod premit mentem, ne de +praesentibus superbiat, quod pertinet ad statum praesentem; et quod +de futuris cibo spei confortat, quod etiam pertinet ad statum +praesentem, quantum ad spem; sed potest etiam ad statum futurum +pertinere, quantum ad confortationem de rebus hic speratis, et ibi +obtentis.
+ Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the gifts as to their matter. For the matter of the gifts will not be the works of the active life; + but all the gifts will have their respective acts about things pertaining to the contemplative life, which is the life of + heavenly bliss. +
[36390] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de donis quantum ad materiam. +Opera enim activae vitae non erunt materia donorum, sed omnia +habebunt actus suos circa ea quae pertinent ad vitam +contemplativam, quae est vita beata.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts are not set down by Isaias in their order of dignity. For the principal gift is, seemingly, + that which, more than the others, God requires of man. Now God requires of man fear, more than the other gifts: for it is + written ( + Dt. 10:12): "And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God?" and ( + Malachi 1:6): "If . . . I be a master, where is My + fear?" Therefore it seems that fear, which is mentioned last, is not the lowest but the greatest of the gifts. +
[36391] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod dignitas donorum non attenditur +secundum enumerationem qua enumerantur Isaiae XI. Illud enim +videtur esse potissimum in donis, quod maxime Deus ab homine +requirit. Sed maxime requirit Deus ab homine timorem, dicitur enim +Deut. X, et nunc, Israel, quid dominus Deus tuus petit a te, +nisi ut timeas dominum Deum tuum? Et Malach. I, dicitur, si +ego dominus, ubi timor meus? Ergo videtur quod timor, qui +enumeratur ultimo, non sit infimum donorum, sed maximum.
+ Objection 2: Further, piety seems to be a kind of common good; since the Apostle says ( + 1 Tim. 4:8): "Piety [Douay: 'Godliness'] is profitable to all things." Now a common good is preferable to particular goods. Therefore + piety, which is given the last place but one, seems to be the most excellent gift. +
[36392] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, +pietas videtur esse quoddam bonum universale, dicit enim apostolus, +I ad Tim. IV, quod pietas ad omnia utilis est. Sed bonum +universale praefertur particularibus bonis. Ergo pietas, quae +penultimo enumeratur, videtur esse potissimum donorum.
+ Objection 3: Further, knowledge perfects man's judgment, while counsel pertains to inquiry. But judgment is more excellent than inquiry. + Therefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than counsel; and yet it is set down as being below it. +
[36393] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, +scientia perficit iudicium hominis; consilium autem ad +inquisitionem pertinet. Sed iudicium praeeminet inquisitioni. Ergo +scientia est potius donum quam consilium, cum tamen post +enumeretur.
+ Objection 4: Further, fortitude pertains to the appetitive power, while science belongs to reason. But reason is a more excellent power + than the appetite. Therefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than fortitude; and yet the latter is given the precedence. + Therefore the gifts are not set down in their order of dignity. +
[36394] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 arg. 4 Praeterea, +fortitudo pertinet ad vim appetitivam; scientia autem ad rationem. +Sed ratio est eminentior quam vis appetitiva. Ergo et scientia est +eminentius donum quam fortitudo, quae tamen primo enumeratur. Non +ergo dignitas donorum attenditur secundum ordinem enumerationis +eorum.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says [*De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4]: "It seems to me that the sevenfold operation of the Holy Ghost, of which Isaias + speaks, agrees in degrees and expression with these [of which we read in + Mat. 5:3]: but there is a difference of order, for there [viz. in Isaias] the enumeration begins with the more excellent gifts, here, + with the lower gifts." +
[36395] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, +videtur mihi septiformis operatio spiritus sancti, de qua Isaias +loquitur, his gradibus sententiisque congruere (de quibus fit +mentio Matth. V); sed interest ordinis. Nam ibi (scilicet in Isaia) +enumeratio ab excellentioribus coepit, hic vero, ab +inferioribus.
+ I answer that, The excellence of the gifts can be measured in two ways: first, simply, viz. by comparison to their proper acts as proceeding + from their principles; secondly, relatively, viz. by comparison to their matter. If we consider the excellence of the gifts + simply, they follow the same rule as the virtues, as to their comparison one with another; because the gifts perfect man for + all the acts of the soul's powers, even as the virtues do, as stated above + + (A[4]). Hence, as the intellectual virtues have the precedence of the moral virtues, and among the intellectual virtues, the contemplative + are preferable to the active, viz. wisdom, understanding and science to prudence and art (yet so that wisdom stands before + understanding, and understanding before science, and prudence and synesis before eubulia): so also among the gifts, wisdom, + understanding, knowledge, and counsel are more excellent than piety, fortitude, and + fear; and among the latter, piety excels fortitude, and fortitude fear, even as justice surpasses fortitude, and fortitude + temperance. But in regard to their matter, fortitude and counsel precede knowledge and piety: because fortitude and counsel + are concerned with difficult matters, whereas piety and knowledge regard ordinary matters. Consequently the excellence of + the gifts corresponds with the order in which they are enumerated; but so far as wisdom and understanding are given the preference + to the others, their excellence is considered simply, while, so far, as counsel and fortitude are preferred to knowledge and + piety, it is considered with regard to their matter. +
[36396] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod dignitas donorum dupliciter potest attendi, uno modo, +simpliciter, scilicet per comparationem ad proprios actus prout +procedunt a suis principiis; alio modo, secundum quid, scilicet per +comparationem ad materiam. Simpliciter autem loquendo de dignitate +donorum, eadem est ratio comparationis in ipsis et in virtutibus, +quia dona ad omnes actus potentiarum animae perficiunt hominem, ad +quos perficiunt virtutes, ut supra dictum est. Unde sicut virtutes +intellectuales praeferuntur virtutibus moralibus; et in ipsis +virtutibus intellectualibus contemplativae praeferuntur activis, ut +sapientia intellectui, et scientia prudentiae et arti; ita tamen +quod sapientia praefertur intellectui, et intellectus scientiae, +sicut prudentia et synesis eubuliae, ita etiam in donis sapientia +et intellectus, scientia et consilium, praeferuntur pietati et +fortitudini et timori; in quibus etiam pietas praefertur +fortitudini, et fortitudo timori, sicut iustitia fortitudini, et +fortitudo temperantiae. Sed quantum ad materiam, fortitudo et +consilium praeferuntur scientiae et pietati, quia scilicet +fortitudo et consilium in arduis locum habent; pietas autem, et +etiam scientia, in communibus. Sic igitur donorum dignitas ordini +enumerationis respondet, partim quidem simpliciter, secundum quod +sapientia et intellectus omnibus praeferuntur, partim autem +secundum ordinem materiae, secundum quod consilium et fortitudo +praeferuntur scientiae et pietati.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Fear is chiefly required as being the foundation, so to speak, of the perfection of the other gifts, for "the fear of the + Lord is the beginning of wisdom" ( + Ps. 110:10; + Ecclus. 1:16), and not as though it were more excellent than the others. Because, in the order of generation, man departs from evil on + account of fear ( + Prov. 16:16), before doing good works, and which result from the other + gifts. +
[36397] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod timor maxime requiritur quasi primordium quoddam +perfectionis donorum, quia initium sapientiae timor domini, non +propter hoc quod sit ceteris dignius. Prius enim est, secundum +ordinem generationis, ut aliquis recedat a malo, quod fit per +timorem, ut dicitur Proverb. XVI; quam quod operetur bonum, quod +fit per alia dona.
+ Reply to Objection 2: In the words quoted from the Apostle, piety is not compared with all God's gifts, but only with "bodily exercise," of which + he had said it "is profitable to little." +
[36398] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod pietas non comparatur in verbis apostoli, omnibus +donis Dei, sed soli corporali exercitationi, de qua praemittit quod +ad modicum utilis est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Although knowledge stands before counsel by reason of its judgment, yet counsel is more excellent by reason of its matter: + for counsel is only concerned with matters of difficulty (Ethic. iii, 3), whereas the judgment of knowledge embraces all matters. +
[36399] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod scientia etsi praeferatur consilio ratione iudicii, +tamen consilium praefertur ratione materiae, nam consilium non +habet locum nisi in arduis, ut dicitur in III Ethic.; sed iudicium +scientiae in omnibus locum habet.
+ Reply to Objection 4: The directive gifts which pertain to the reason are more excellent than the executive gifts, if we consider them in relation + to their acts as proceeding from their powers, because reason transcends the appetite as a rule transcends the thing ruled. + But on the part of the matter, counsel is united to fortitude as the directive power to the executive, and so is knowledge + united to piety: because counsel and fortitude are concerned with matters of + difficulty, while knowledge and piety are concerned with ordinary matters. Hence counsel together with fortitude, by reason + of their matter, are given the preference to knowledge and piety. +
[36400] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod dona directiva, quae pertinent ad rationem, donis +exequentibus digniora sunt, si considerentur per comparationem ad +actus prout egrediuntur a potentiis, ratio enim appetitivae +praeeminet, ut regulans regulato. Sed ratione materiae, adiungitur +consilium fortitudini, sicut directivum exequenti, et similiter +scientia pietati, quia scilicet consilium et fortitudo in arduis +locum habent, scientia autem et pietas etiam in communibus. Et ideo +consilium simul cum fortitudine, ratione materiae, numeratur ante +scientiam et pietatem.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the virtues are more excellent than the gifts. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18) while speaking of + charity: "No gift of God is more excellent than this. It is this alone which divides the children of the eternal kingdom from + the children of eternal damnation. Other gifts are bestowed by the Holy Ghost, but, without charity, they avail nothing." + But charity is a virtue. Therefore a virtue is more excellent than the gifts of the Holy + Ghost. +
[36401] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes sint praeferendae donis. +Dicit enim Augustinus, in XV de Trin., de caritate loquens, +nullum est isto Dei dono excellentius. Solum est quod dividit +inter filios regni aeterni, et filios perditionis aeternae, dantur +et alia per spiritum sanctum munera, sed sine caritate nihil +prosunt. Sed caritas est virtus. Ergo virtus est potior donis +spiritus sancti.
+ Objection 2: Further, that which is first naturally, seems to be more excellent. Now the virtues precede the gifts of the Holy Ghost; + for Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift of the Holy Ghost in the mind it works on, forms first of all justice, prudence, + fortitude, temperance . . . and doth afterwards give it a temper in the seven virtues" [viz. the gifts], so "as against folly + to bestow wisdom; against dullness, understanding; against rashness, counsel; against + fear, fortitude; against ignorance, knowledge; against hardness of heart, piety; against piety, fear." Therefore the virtues + are more excellent than the gifts. +
[36402] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, +ea quae sunt priora naturaliter, videntur esse potiora. Sed +virtutes sunt priores donis spiritus sancti, dicit enim Gregorius, +in II Moral., quod donum spiritus sancti in subiecta mente ante +alia iustitiam, prudentiam, fortitudinem et temperantiam format, et +sic eandem mentem septem mox virtutibus (idest donis) +temperat, ut contra stultitiam, sapientiam; contra hebetudinem, +intellectum; contra praecipitationem, consilium; contra timorem, +fortitudinem; contra ignorantiam, scientiam; contra duritiam, +pietatem; contra superbiam, det timorem. Ergo virtutes sunt +potiores donis.
+ Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that "the virtues cannot be used to evil purpose." But it is possible to make + evil use of the gifts, for Gregory says (Moral. i, 18): "We offer up the sacrifice of prayer . . . lest wisdom may uplift; + or understanding, while it runs nimbly, deviate from the right path; or counsel, while it multiplies itself, grow into confusion; + that fortitude, while it gives confidence, may not make us rash; lest knowledge, while + it knows and yet loves not, may swell the mind; lest piety, while it swerves from the right line, may become distorted; and + lest fear, while it is unduly alarmed, may plunge us into the pit of despair." Therefore the virtues are more excellent than + the gifts of the Holy Ghost. +
[36403] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, +virtutibus nullus male uti potest, ut Augustinus dicit. Donis autem +potest aliquis male uti, dicit enim Gregorius, in I Moral., quod +hostiam nostrae precis immolamus ne sapientia elevet; ne +intellectus, dum subtiliter currit, oberret; ne consilium, dum se +multiplicat, confundat; ne fortitudo, dum fiduciam praebet, +praecipitet; ne scientia, dum novit et non diligit, inflet; ne +pietas, dum se extra rectitudinem inclinat, intorqueat; ne timor, +dum plus iusto trepidat, in desperationis foveam mergat. Ergo +virtutes sunt digniores donis spiritus sancti.
+ On the contrary, The gifts are bestowed to assist the virtues and to remedy certain defects, as is shown in the passage quoted (OBJ 2), so + that, seemingly, they accomplish what the virtues cannot. Therefore the gifts are more excellent than the virtues. +
[36404] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dona dantur in adiutorium virtutum contra defectus, ut +patet in auctoritate inducta; et sic videtur quod perficiant quod +virtutes perficere non possunt. Sunt ergo dona potiora +virtutibus.
+ I answer that, As was shown above ( + Q[58], A[3]; + Q[62], A[1]), there are three kinds of virtues: for some are theological, some intellectual, and some moral. The theological virtues + are those whereby man's mind is united to God; the intellectual virtues are those whereby reason itself is perfected; and + the moral virtues are those which perfect the powers of appetite in obedience to the reason. On the other hand the gifts of + the Holy Ghost dispose all the powers of the soul to be amenable to the Divine motion. +
Accordingly the gifts seem to be compared to the theological virtues, by which man is united to the Holy Ghost his Mover, + in the same way as the moral virtues are compared to the intellectual virtues, which perfect the reason, the moving principle + of the moral virtues. Wherefore as the intellectual virtues are more excellent than the moral virtues and control them, so + the theological virtues are more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost and regulate them. Hence Gregory + says (Moral. i, 12) that "the seven sons," i.e. the seven gifts, "never attain the perfection of the number ten, unless all + they do be done in faith, hope, and charity." +
But if we compare the gifts to the other virtues, intellectual and moral, then the gifts have the precedence of the virtues. + Because the gifts perfect the soul's powers in relation to the Holy Ghost their Mover; whereas the virtues perfect, either + the reason itself, or the other powers in relation to reason: and it is evident that the more exalted the mover, the more + excellent the disposition whereby the thing moved requires to be disposed. Therefore the gifts are more perfect + than the virtues. +
[36405] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ex supradictis patet, virtutes in tria genera +distinguuntur, sunt enim quaedam virtutes theologicae, quaedam +intellectuales, quaedam morales. Virtutes quidem theologicae sunt +quibus mens humana Deo coniungitur; virtutes autem intellectuales +sunt quibus ratio ipsa perficitur; virtutes autem morales sunt +quibus vires appetitivae perficiuntur ad obediendum rationi. Dona +autem spiritus sancti sunt quibus omnes vires animae disponuntur ad +hoc quod subdantur motioni divinae. Sic ergo eadem videtur esse +comparatio donorum ad virtutes theologicas, per quas homo unitur +spiritui sancto moventi; sicut virtutum moralium ad virtutes +intellectuales, per quas perficitur ratio, quae est virtutum +moralium motiva. Unde sicut virtutes intellectuales praeferuntur +virtutibus moralibus, et regulant eas; ita virtutes theologicae +praeferuntur donis spiritus sancti, et regulant ea. Unde Gregorius +dicit, in I Moral., quod neque ad denarii perfectionem septem +filii (idest septem dona) perveniunt, nisi in fide, spe et +caritate fuerit omne quod agunt. Sed si comparemus dona ad +alias virtutes intellectuales vel morales, dona praeferuntur +virtutibus. Quia dona perficiunt vires animae in comparatione ad +spiritum sanctum moventem, virtutes autem perficiunt vel ipsam +rationem, vel alias vires in ordine ad rationem. Manifestum est +autem quod ad altiorem motorem oportet maiori perfectione mobile +esse dispositum. Unde perfectiora sunt dona virtutibus.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Charity is a theological virtue; and such we grant to be more perfect than the gifts. +
[36406] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod caritas est virtus theologica; de qua concedimus +quod sit potior donis.
+ Reply to Objection 2: There are two ways in which one thing precedes another. One is in order of perfection and dignity, as love of God precedes + love of our neighbor: and in this way the gifts precede the intellectual and moral virtues, but follow the theological virtues. + The other is the order of generation or disposition: thus love of one's neighbor precedes love of God, as regards the act: + and in this way moral and intellectual virtues precede the gifts, since man, + through being well subordinate to his own reason, is disposed to be rightly subordinate to God. +
[36407] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod aliquid est prius altero dupliciter. Uno modo, ordine +perfectionis et dignitatis, sicut dilectio Dei est prior dilectione +proximi. Et hoc modo dona sunt priora virtutibus intellectualibus +et moralibus, posteriora vero virtutibus theologicis. Alio modo, +ordine generationis seu dispositionis, sicut dilectio proximi +praecedit dilectionem Dei, quantum ad actum. Et sic virtutes +morales et intellectuales praecedunt dona, quia per hoc quod homo +bene se habet circa rationem propriam, disponitur ad hoc quod se +bene habeat in ordine ad Deum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Wisdom and understanding and the like are gifts of the Holy Ghost, according as they are quickened by charity, which "dealeth + not perversely" ( + 1 Cor. 13:4). Consequently wisdom and understanding and the like cannot be used to evil purpose, in so far as they are gifts of the Holy + Ghost. But, lest they depart from the perfection of charity, they assist one another. This is what Gregory means to say. +
[36408] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod sapientia et intellectus et alia huiusmodi sunt dona +spiritus sancti, secundum quod caritate informantur; quae non agit +perperam, ut dicitur I ad Cor. XIII. Et ideo sapientia et +intellectu et aliis huiusmodi nullus male utitur, secundum quod +sunt dona spiritus sancti. Sed ad hoc quod a caritatis perfectione +non recedant, unum ab altero adiuvatur. Et hoc est quod Gregorius +dicere intendit.
We must now consider the beatitudes: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the beatitudes differ from the gifts and virtues?
(2) Of the rewards of the beatitudes: whether they refer to this life?
(3) Of the number of the beatitudes;
(4) Of the fittingness of the rewards ascribed to the beatitudes.
+[36409] +Iª-IIae q. 69 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +beatitudinibus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum +beatitudines a donis et virtutibus distinguantur. Secundo, de +praemiis beatitudinum, utrum pertineant ad hanc vitam. Tertio, de +numero beatitudinum. Quarto, de convenientia praemiorum quae eis +attribuuntur.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts. For Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) assigns + the beatitudes recited by Matthew (v 3, seqq.) to the gifts of the Holy Ghost; and Ambrose in his commentary on + Luke 6:20, seqq., ascribes the beatitudes mentioned there, to the four cardinal virtues. Therefore the beatitudes do not differ from + the virtues and gifts. +
[36410] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudines a virtutibus et donis non +distinguantur. Augustinus enim, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, +attribuit beatitudines in Matthaeo enumeratas, donis spiritus +sancti, Ambrosius autem, super Lucam, attribuit beatitudines ibi +enumeratas quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus. Ergo beatitudines non +distinguuntur a virtutibus et donis.
+ Objection 2: Further, there are but two rules of the human will: the reason and the eternal law, as stated above ( + Q[19], A[3]; + Q[21], A[1]). Now the virtues perfect man in relation to reason; while the gifts perfect him in relation to the eternal law of the Holy + Ghost, as is clear from what has been said ( + Q[68], AA[1],3, seqq.). Therefore there cannot be anything else pertaining to the rectitude of + the human will, besides the virtues and gifts. Therefore the beatitudes do not differ from them. +
[36411] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +humanae voluntatis non est nisi duplex regula, scilicet ratio, et +lex aeterna, ut supra habitum est. Sed virtutes perficiunt hominem +in ordine ad rationem; dona autem in ordine ad legem aeternam +spiritus sancti, ut ex dictis patet. Ergo non potest esse aliquid +aliud pertinens ad rectitudinem voluntatis humanae, praeter +virtutes et dona. Non ergo beatitudines ab eis distinguuntur.
+ Objection 3: Further, among the beatitudes are included meekness, justice, and mercy, which are said to be virtues. Therefore the beatitudes + do not differ from the virtues and gifts. +
[36412] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +in enumeratione beatitudinum ponitur mititas, et iustitia, et +misericordia; quae dicuntur esse quaedam virtutes. Ergo +beatitudines non distinguuntur a virtutibus et donis.
+ On the contrary, Certain things are included among the beatitudes, that are neither virtues nor gifts, e.g. poverty, mourning, and peace. + Therefore the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts. +
[36413] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod quaedam enumerantur inter beatitudines, quae nec sunt +virtutes nec dona; sicut paupertas, et luctus, et pax. Differunt +ergo beatitudines et a virtutibus et a donis.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + Q[2], A[7]; + Q[3], A[1]), happiness is the last end of human life. Now one is said to possess the end already, when one hopes to possess it; wherefore + the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9) that "children are said to be happy because they are full of hope"; and the Apostle says + ( + Rom. 8:24): "We are saved by hope." Again, we hope to obtain an end, because we are suitably moved + towards that end, and approach thereto; and this implies some action. And a man is moved towards, and approaches the happy + end by works of virtue, and above all by the works of the gifts, if we speak of eternal happiness, for which our reason is + not sufficient, since we need to be moved by the Holy Ghost, and to be perfected with His gifts that we may obey and follow + him. Consequently the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts, not as habit, but as act from habit. +
[36414] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, beatitudo est ultimus finis +humanae vitae. Dicitur autem aliquis iam finem habere, propter spem +finis obtinendi, unde et philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod +pueri dicuntur beati propter spem; et apostolus dicit, Rom. +VIII, spe salvi facti sumus. Spes autem de fine consequendo +insurgit ex hoc quod aliquis convenienter movetur ad finem, et +appropinquat ad ipsum, quod quidem fit per aliquam actionem. Ad +finem autem beatitudinis movetur aliquis et appropinquat per +operationes virtutum; et praecipue per operationes donorum, si +loquamur de beatitudine aeterna, ad quam ratio non sufficit, sed in +eam inducit spiritus sanctus, ad cuius obedientiam et sequelam per +dona perficimur. Et ideo beatitudines distinguuntur quidem a +virtutibus et donis, non sicut habitus ab eis distincti, sed sicut +actus distinguuntur ab habitibus.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Augustine and Ambrose assign the beatitudes to the gifts and virtues, as acts are ascribed to habits. But the gifts are more + excellent than the cardinal virtues, as stated above ( + Q[68], A[8]). Wherefore Ambrose, in explaining the beatitudes propounded to the throng, assigns them to the cardinal virtues, whereas + Augustine, who is explaining the beatitudes delivered to the disciples on the mountain, and so to those who were more + perfect, ascribes them to the gifts of the Holy Ghost. +
[36415] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Augustinus et Ambrosius attribuunt beatitudines +donis et virtutibus, sicut actus attribuuntur habitibus. Dona autem +sunt eminentiora virtutibus cardinalibus, ut supra dictum est. Et +ideo Ambrosius, exponens beatitudines turbis propositas, attribuit +eas virtutibus cardinalibus; Augustinus autem, exponens +beatitudines discipulis propositas in monte, tanquam +perfectioribus, attribuit eas donis spiritus sancti.
+ Reply to Objection 2: This argument proves that no other habits, besides the virtues and gifts, rectify human conduct. +
[36416] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa probat quod non sunt alii habitus +rectificantes humanam vitam, praeter virtutes et dona.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Meekness is to be taken as denoting the act of meekness: and the same applies to justice and mercy. And though these might + seem to be virtues, they are nevertheless ascribed to gifts, because the gifts perfect man in all matters wherein the virtues + perfect him, as stated above ( + Q[68], A[2]). +
[36417] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod mititas accipitur pro actu mansuetudinis, et +similiter dicendum est de iustitia et de misericordia. Et quamvis +haec videantur esse virtutes, attribuuntur tamen donis, quia etiam +dona perficiunt hominem circa omnia circa quae perficiunt virtutes, +ut dictum est.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the rewards assigned to the beatitudes do not refer to this life. Because some are said to be happy because + they hope for a reward, as stated above + (A[1]). Now the object of hope is future happiness. Therefore these rewards refer to the life to come. +
[36418] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod praemia quae attribuuntur +beatitudinibus, non pertineant ad hanc vitam. Dicuntur enim aliqui +beati propter spem praemiorum, ut dictum est. Sed obiectum spei +beatitudo est futura. Ergo praemia ista pertinent ad vitam +futuram.
+ Objection 2: Further, certain punishments are set down in opposition to the beatitudes, + Lk. 6:25, where we read: "Woe to you that are filled; for you shall hunger. Woe to you that now laugh, for you shall mourn and weep." + Now these punishments do not refer to this life, because frequently men are not punished in this life, according to + Job 21:13: "They spend their days in wealth." Therefore neither do the rewards of the beatitudes + refer to this life. +
[36419] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Luc. VI, ponuntur quaedam poenae per oppositum ad beatitudines, cum +dicitur, vae vobis qui saturati estis, quia esurietis. Vae vobis +qui ridetis nunc, quia lugebitis et flebitis. Sed istae poenae +non intelliguntur in hac vita, quia frequenter homines in hac vita +non puniuntur, secundum illud Iob XXI, ducunt in bonis dies +suos. Ergo nec praemia beatitudinum pertinent ad hanc +vitam.
+ Objection 3: Further, the kingdom of heaven which is set down as the reward of poverty is the happiness of heaven, as Augustine says (De + Civ. Dei xix) [*Cf. De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 1]. Again, abundant fullness is not to be had save in the life to come, according + to + Ps. 16:15: "I shall be filled [Douay: 'satisfied'] when Thy glory shall appear." Again, it is only in the future life that we shall + see God, and that our Divine sonship will be made + manifest, according to + 1 Jn. 3:2: "We are now the sons of God; and it hath not yet appeared what we shall be. We know that, when He shall appear, we shall + be like to Him, because we shall see Him as He is." Therefore these rewards refer to the future life. +
[36420] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +regnum caelorum, quod ponitur praemium paupertatis, est beatitudo +caelestis; ut Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei. Plena etiam +saturitas non nisi in futura vita habetur; secundum illud Psalmi +XVI, satiabor cum apparuerit gloria tua. Visio etiam Dei, et +manifestatio filiationis divinae, ad vitam futuram pertinent; +secundum illud I Ioan. III, nunc filii Dei sumus, et nondum +apparuit quid erimus. Scimus quoniam cum apparuerit, similes ei +erimus, quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est. Ergo praemia illa +pertinent ad vitam futuram.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): "These promises can be fulfilled in this life, as we believe them to have been + fulfilled in the apostles. For no words can express that complete change into the likeness even of an angel, which is promised + to us after this life." +
[36421] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, ista +quidem in hac vita compleri possunt, sicut completa esse in +apostolis credimus. Nam illa omnimoda, et in angelicam formam +mutatio, quae post hanc vitam promittitur, nullis verbis exponi +potest.
+ I answer that, Expounders of Holy Writ are not agreed in speaking of these rewards. For some, with Ambrose (Super Luc. v), hold that all + these rewards refer to the life to come; while Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) holds them to refer to the present + life; and Chrysostom in his homilies (In Matth. xv) says that some refer to the future, and some to the present life. +
In order to make the matter clear we must take note that hope of future happiness may be in us for two reasons. First, by + reason of our having a preparation for, or a disposition to future happiness; and this is by way of merit; secondly, by a + kind of imperfect inchoation of future happiness in holy men, even in this life. For it is one thing to hope that the tree + will bear fruit, when the leaves begin to appear, and another, when we see the first signs of the fruit. +
Accordingly, those things which are set down as merits in the beatitudes, are a kind of preparation for, or disposition to + happiness, either perfect or inchoate: while those that are assigned as rewards, may be either perfect happiness, so as to + refer to the future life, or some beginning of happiness, such as is found in those who have attained perfection, in which + case they refer to the present life. Because when a man begins to make progress in the acts of the virtues and + gifts, it is to be hoped that he will arrive at perfection, both as a wayfarer, and as a citizen of the heavenly kingdom. +
[36422] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod circa ista praemia expositores sacrae Scripturae +diversimode sunt locuti. Quidam enim omnia ista praemia ad futuram +beatitudinem pertinere dicunt, sicut Ambrosius, super Lucam. +Augustinus vero dicit ea ad praesentem vitam pertinere. +Chrysostomus autem, in suis homiliis, quaedam eorum dicit pertinere +ad futuram vitam, quaedam autem ad praesentem. Ad cuius evidentiam, +considerandum est quod spes futurae beatitudinis potest esse in +nobis propter duo, primo quidem, propter aliquam praeparationem vel +dispositionem ad futuram beatitudinem, quod est per modum meriti; +alio modo, per quandam inchoationem imperfectam futurae +beatitudinis in viris sanctis, etiam in hac vita. Aliter enim +habetur spes fructificationis arboris cum virescit frondibus, et +aliter cum iam primordia fructuum incipiunt apparere. Sic igitur ea +quae in beatitudinibus tanguntur tanquam merita, sunt quaedam +praeparationes vel dispositiones ad beatitudinem, vel perfectam vel +inchoatam. Ea vero quae ponuntur tanquam praemia, possunt esse vel +ipsa beatitudo perfecta, et sic pertinent ad futuram vitam, vel +aliqua inchoatio beatitudinis, sicut est in viris perfectis, et sic +praemia pertinent ad praesentem vitam. Cum enim aliquis incipit +proficere in actibus virtutum et donorum, potest sperari de eo quod +perveniet et ad perfectionem viae, et ad perfectionem patriae.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Hope regards future happiness as the last end: yet it may also regard the assistance of grace as that which leads to that + end, according to + Ps. 27:7: "In Him hath my heart hoped, and I have been helped." +
[36423] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod spes est de futura beatitudine sicut de ultimo +fine, potest etiam esse et de auxilio gratiae, sicut de eo quod +ducit ad finem, secundum illud Psalmi XXVII, in Deo speravit cor +meum, et adiutus sum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Although sometimes the wicked do not undergo temporal punishment in this life, yet they suffer spiritual punishment. Hence + Augustine says (Confess. i): "Thou hast decreed, and it is so, Lord---that the disordered mind should be its own punishment." + The Philosopher, too, says of the wicked (Ethic. ix, 4) that "their soul is divided against itself . . . one part pulls this + way, another that"; and afterwards he concludes, saying: "If wickedness makes a + man so miserable, he should strain every nerve to avoid vice." In like manner, although, on the other hand, the good sometimes + do not receive material rewards in this life, yet they never lack spiritual rewards, even in this life, according to + Mat. 19:29, and + Mk. 10:30: "Ye shall receive a hundred times as much" even "in this time." +
[36424] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod mali, etsi interdum in hac vita temporales poenas non +patiantur, patiuntur tamen spirituales. Unde Augustinus dicit, in I +Confess., iussisti, domine, et sic est, ut poena sibi sit +inordinatus animus. Et philosophus dicit, in IX Ethic., de +malis, quod contendit ipsorum anima, et hoc quidem huc trahit, +illud autem illuc; et postea concludit, si autem sic miserum +est malum esse, fugiendum est malitiam intense. Et similiter e +converso boni, etsi in hac vita quandoque non habeant corporalia +praemia, nunquam tamen deficiunt a spiritualibus, etiam in hac +vita; secundum illud Matth. XIX, et Marc. X, centuplum +accipietis etiam in hoc saeculo.
+ Reply to Objection 3: All these rewards will be fully consummated in the life to come: but meanwhile they are, in a manner, begun, even in this + life. Because the "kingdom of heaven," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv; *Cf. De Serm. Dom. in Monte, i, 1), can denote + the beginning of perfect wisdom, in so far as "the spirit" begins to reign in men. The "possession" of the land denotes the + well-ordered affections of the soul that rests, by its desire, on the solid foundation + of the eternal inheritance, signified by "the land." They are "comforted" in this life, by receiving the Holy Ghost, Who is + called the "Paraclete," i.e. the Comforter. They "have their fill," even in this life, of that food of which Our Lord said + ( + Jn. 4:34): "My meat is to do the will of Him that sent Me." Again, in this life, men "obtain" God's "Mercy." Again, the eye being + cleansed by the gift of understanding, we can, so to speak, "see God." Likewise, in this life, those + who are the "peacemakers" of their own movements, approach to likeness to God, and are called "the children of God." Nevertheless + these things will be more perfectly fulfilled in heaven. +
[36425] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod omnia illa praemia perfecte quidem consummabuntur in +vita futura, sed interim etiam in hac vita quodammodo inchoantur. +Nam regnum caelorum, ut Augustinus dicit, potest intelligi +perfectae sapientiae initium, secundum quod incipit in eis spiritus +regnare. Possessio etiam terrae significat affectum bonum animae +requiescentis per desiderium in stabilitate haereditatis perpetuae, +per terram significatae. Consolantur autem in hac vita, spiritum +sanctum, qui Paracletus, idest consolator, dicitur, participando. +Saturantur etiam in hac vita illo cibo de quo dominus dicit, +meus cibus est ut faciam voluntatem patris mei. In hac etiam +vita consequuntur homines misericordiam Dei. In hac etiam vita, +purgato oculo per donum intellectus, Deus quodammodo videri potest. +Similiter etiam in hac vita qui motus suos pacificant, ad +similitudinem Dei accedentes, filii Dei nominantur. Tamen haec +perfectius erunt in patria.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the beatitudes are unsuitably enumerated. For the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts, as stated above + (A[1], ad 1). Now some of the gifts, viz. wisdom and understanding, belong to the contemplative life: yet no beatitude is + assigned to the act of contemplation, for all are assigned to matters connected with the active life. Therefore the beatitudes + are insufficiently enumerated. +
[36426] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter enumerentur +beatitudines. Attribuuntur enim beatitudines donis, ut dictum est. +Donorum autem quaedam pertinent ad vitam contemplativam, scilicet +sapientia et intellectus, nulla autem beatitudo ponitur in actu +contemplationis, sed omnes in his quae pertinent ad vitam activam. +Ergo insufficienter beatitudines enumerantur.
+ Objection 2: Further, not only do the executive gifts belong to the active life, but also some of the directive gifts, e.g. knowledge + and counsel: yet none of the beatitudes seems to be directly connected with the acts of knowledge or counsel. Therefore the + beatitudes are insufficiently indicated. +
[36427] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +ad vitam activam non solum pertinent dona exequentia; sed etiam +quaedam dona dirigentia, ut scientia et consilium. Nihil autem +ponitur inter beatitudines quod directe ad actum scientiae vel +consilii pertinere videatur. Ergo insufficienter beatitudines +tanguntur.
+ Objection 3: Further, among the executive gifts connected with the active life, fear is said to be connected with poverty, while piety + seems to correspond to the beatitude of mercy: yet nothing is included directly connected with justice. Therefore the beatitudes + are insufficiently enumerated. +
[36428] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +inter dona exequentia in vita activa, timor ponitur ad paupertatem +pertinere; pietas autem videtur pertinere ad beatitudinem +misericordiae. Nihil autem ponitur directe ad fortitudinem +pertinens. Ergo insufficienter enumerantur beatitudines.
+ Objection 4: Further, many other beatitudes are mentioned in Holy Writ. Thus, it is written ( + Job 5:17): "Blessed is the man whom God correcteth"; and (Ps. i, 1): "Blessed is the man who hath not walked in the counsel of the + ungodly"; and ( + Prov. 3:13): "Blessed is the man that findeth wisdom." Therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently enumerated. +
[36429] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 arg. 4 Praeterea, +in sacra Scriptura tanguntur multae aliae beatitudines, sicut Iob +V, dicitur, beatus homo qui corripitur a domino; et in +Psalmo I, beatus vir qui non abiit in consilio impiorum; et +Proverb. III, beatus vir qui invenit sapientiam. Ergo +insufficienter beatitudines enumerantur.
+ Objection 5: On the other hand, it seems that too many are mentioned. For there are seven gifts of the Holy Ghost: whereas eight beatitudes + are indicated. +
[36430] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 s. c. 1 Sed +contra, videtur quod superflue enumerentur. Sunt enim septem dona +spiritus sancti. Beatitudines autem tanguntur octo.
[36431] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 s. c. 2 Praeterea, +Luc. VI, ponuntur quatuor tantum beatitudines. Superflue ergo +enumerantur septem, vel octo, in Matthaeo.
+ Objection 6: Further, only four beatitudes are indicated in the sixth chapter of Luke. Therefore the seven or eight mentioned in + Matthew 5 are too many. +
[36432] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod beatitudines istae convenientissime enumerantur. Ad +cuius evidentiam, est considerandum quod triplicem beatitudinem +aliqui posuerunt, quidam enim posuerunt beatitudinem in vita +voluptuosa; quidam in vita activa; quidam vero in vita +contemplativa. Hae autem tres beatitudines diversimode se habent ad +beatitudinem futuram, cuius spe dicimur hic beati. Nam beatitudo +voluptuosa, quia falsa est et rationi contraria, impedimentum est +beatitudinis futurae. Beatitudo vero activae vitae dispositiva est +ad beatitudinem futuram. Beatitudo autem contemplativa, si sit +perfecta, est essentialiter ipsa futura beatitudo, si autem sit +imperfecta, est quaedam inchoatio eius.
+ I answer that, These beatitudes are most suitably enumerated. To make this evident it must be observed that beatitude has been held to consist + in one of three things: for some have ascribed it to a sensual life, some, to an active life, and some, to a contemplative + life [*See Q[3]]. Now these three kinds of happiness stand in different relations to future beatitude, by hoping for which + we are said to be happy. Because sensual happiness, being false and contrary to reason, + is an obstacle to future beatitude; while happiness of the active life is a disposition of future beatitude; and contemplative + happiness, if perfect, is the very essence of future beatitude, and, if imperfect, is a beginning thereof. +
And so Our Lord, in the first place, indicated certain beatitudes as removing the obstacle of sensual happiness. For a life + of pleasure consists of two things. First, in the affluence of external goods, whether riches or honors; from which man is + withdrawn---by a virtue so that he uses them in moderation---and by a gift, in a more excellent way, so that he despises them + altogether. Hence the first beatitude is: "Blessed are the poor in spirit," which may refer either to the + contempt of riches, or to the contempt of honors, which results from humility. Secondly, the sensual life consists in following + the bent of one's passions, whether irascible or concupiscible. From following the irascible passions man is withdrawn---by + a virtue, so that they are kept within the bounds appointed by the ruling of reason---and by a gift, in a more excellent manner, + so that man, according to God's will, is altogether undisturbed by them: hence the second beatitude is: "Blessed are + the meek." From following the concupiscible passions, man is withdrawn---by a virtue, so that man uses these passions in moderation---and + by gift, so that, if necessary, he casts them aside altogether; nay more, so that, if need be, he makes a deliberate choice + of sorrow [*Cf. + Q[35], A[3]]; hence the third beatitude is: "Blessed are they that mourn." +
Active life consists chiefly in man's relations with his neighbor, either by way of duty or by way of spontaneous gratuity. + To the former we are disposed---by a virtue, so that we do not refuse to do our duty to our neighbor, which pertains to justice---and + by a gift, so that we do the same much more heartily, by accomplishing works of justice with an ardent desire, even as a hungry + and thirsty man eats and drinks with eager appetite. Hence the fourth beatitude is: "Blessed are + they that hunger and thirst after justice." With regard to spontaneous favors we are perfected---by a virtue, so that we give + where reason dictates we should give, e.g. to our friends or others united to us; which pertains to the virtue of liberality--and + by a gift, so that, through reverence for God, we consider only the needs of those on whom we bestow our gratuitous bounty: + hence it is written ( + Lk. 14:12,13): "When thou makest a dinner or supper, call not thy friends, + nor thy brethren," etc . . . "but . . . call the poor, the maimed," etc.; which, properly, is to have mercy: hence the fifth + beatitude is: "Blessed are the merciful." +
Those things which concern the contemplative life, are either final beatitude itself, or some beginning thereof: wherefore + they are included in the beatitudes, not as merits, but as rewards. Yet the effects of the active life, which dispose man + for the contemplative life, are included in the beatitudes. Now the effect of the active life, as regards those virtues and + gifts whereby man is perfected in himself, is the cleansing of man's heart, so that it is not defiled by the + passions: hence the sixth beatitude is: "Blessed are the clean of heart." But as regards the virtues and gifts whereby man + is perfected in relation to his neighbor, the effect of the active life is peace, according to + Is. 32:17: "The work of justice shall be peace": hence the seventh beatitude is "Blessed are the peacemakers." +
Et ideo dominus primo +quidem posuit quasdam beatitudines quasi removentes impedimentum +voluptuosae beatitudinis. Consistit enim voluptuosa vita in duobus. +Primo quidem, in affluentia exteriorum bonorum, sive sint divitiae, +sive sint honores. A quibus quidem retrahitur homo per virtutem sic +ut moderate eis utatur, per donum autem excellentiori modo, ut +scilicet homo totaliter ea contemnat. Unde prima beatitudo ponitur, +beati pauperes spiritu, quod potest referri vel ad contemptum +divitiarum; vel ad contemptum honorum, quod fit per humilitatem. +Secundo vero voluptuosa vita consistit in sequendo proprias +passiones, sive irascibilis sive concupiscibilis. A sequela autem +passionum irascibilis, retrahit virtus ne homo in eis superfluat, +secundum regulam rationis, donum autem excellentiori modo, ut +scilicet homo, secundum voluntatem divinam, totaliter ab eis +tranquillus reddatur. Unde secunda beatitudo ponitur, beati mites. +A sequela vero passionum concupiscibilis, retrahit virtus, moderate +huiusmodi passionibus utendo, donum vero, eas, si necesse fuerit, +totaliter abiiciendo; quinimmo, si necessarium fuerit, voluntarium +luctum assumendo. Unde tertia beatitudo ponitur, beati qui lugent. +Activa vero vita in his consistit praecipue quae proximis +exhibemus, vel sub ratione debiti, vel sub ratione spontanei +beneficii. Et ad primum quidem nos virtus disponit, ut ea quae +debemus proximis, non recusemus exhibere, quod pertinet ad +iustitiam. Donum autem ad hoc ipsum abundantiori quodam affectu nos +inducit, ut scilicet ferventi desiderio opera iustitiae impleamus, +sicut ferventi desiderio esuriens et sitiens cupit cibum vel potum. +Unde quarta beatitudo ponitur, beati qui esuriunt et sitiunt +iustitiam. Circa spontanea vero dona nos perficit virtus ut illis +donemus quibus ratio dictat esse donandum, puta amicis aut aliis +nobis coniunctis, quod pertinet ad virtutem liberalitatis. Sed +donum, propter Dei reverentiam, solam necessitatem considerat in +his quibus gratuita beneficia praestat, unde dicitur Luc. XIV, +cum facis prandium aut coenam, noli vocare amicos neque fratres +tuos etc., sed voca pauperes et debiles etc., quod proprie est +misereri. Et ideo quinta beatitudo ponitur, beati misericordes. Ea +vero quae ad contemplativam vitam pertinent, vel sunt ipsa +beatitudo finalis, vel aliqua inchoatio eius, et ideo non ponuntur +in beatitudinibus tanquam merita, sed tanquam praemia. Ponuntur +autem tanquam merita effectus activae vitae, quibus homo disponitur +ad contemplativam vitam. Effectus autem activae vitae, quantum ad +virtutes et dona quibus homo perficitur in seipso, est munditia +cordis, ut scilicet mens hominis passionibus non inquinetur. Unde +sexta beatitudo ponitur, beati mundo corde. Quantum vero ad +virtutes et dona quibus homo perficitur in comparatione ad +proximum, effectus activae vitae est pax; secundum illud Isaiae +XXXII, opus iustitiae pax. Et ideo septima beatitudo +ponitur, beati pacifici.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The acts of the gifts which belong to the active life are indicated in the merits: but the acts of the gifts pertaining to + the contemplative life are indicated in the rewards, for the reason given above. Because to "see God" corresponds to the gift + of understanding; and to be like God by being adoptive "children of God," corresponds to the gift of wisdom. +
[36433] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod actus donorum pertinentium ad vitam activam, +exprimuntur in ipsis meritis, sed actus donorum pertinentium ad +vitam contemplativam, exprimuntur in praemiis, ratione iam dicta. +Videre enim Deum respondet dono intellectus; et conformari Deo +quadam filiatione adoptiva, pertinet ad donum sapientiae.
+ Reply to Objection 2: In things pertaining to the active life, knowledge is not sought for its own sake, but for the sake of operation, as even + the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 2). And therefore, since beatitude implies something ultimate, the beatitudes do not include + the acts of those gifts which direct man in the active life, such acts, to wit, as are elicited by those gifts, as, e.g. to + counsel is the act of counsel, and to judge, the act of knowledge: but, on the + other hand, they include those operative acts of which the gifts have the direction, as, e.g. mourning in respect of knowledge, + and mercy in respect of counsel. +
[36434] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod in his quae pertinent ad activam vitam, cognitio non +quaeritur propter seipsam, sed propter operationem, ut etiam +philosophus dicit, in II Ethic. Et ideo, quia beatitudo aliquid +ultimum importat, non computantur inter beatitudines actus donorum +dirigentium in vita activa, quos scilicet eliciunt, sicut +consiliari est actus consilii, et iudicare est actus scientiae, sed +magis attribuuntur eis actus operativi in quibus dirigunt, sicut +scientiae lugere, et consilio misereri.
+ Reply to Objection 3: In applying the beatitudes to the gifts we may consider two things. One is likeness of matter. In this way all the first + five beatitudes may be assigned to knowledge and counsel as to their directing principles: whereas they must be distributed + among the executive gifts: so that, to wit, hunger and thirst for justice, and mercy too, correspond to piety, which perfects + man in his relations to others; meekness to fortitude, for Ambrose says on + + Lk. 6:22 + : "It is the business of fortitude to conquer anger, and to curb indignation," fortitude being about the irascible passions: + poverty and mourning to the gift of fear, whereby man withdraws from the lusts and pleasures of the world. +
Secondly, we may consider the motives of the beatitudes: and, in this way, some of them will have to be assigned differently. + Because the principal motive for meekness is reverence for God, which belongs to piety. The chief motive for mourning is knowledge, + whereby man knows his failings and those of worldly things, according to + Eccles. 1:18: "He that addeth knowledge, addeth also sorrow [Vulg: labor]." The principal motive for hungering after the works of + justice is fortitude of the soul: and the chief motive for being merciful is God's counsel, according to + Dan. 4:24: "Let my counsel be acceptable to the king [Vulg: to thee, O king]: and redeem thou thy sins with alms, and thy iniquities + with works of mercy to the poor." It is thus that Augustine assigns them (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4). +
[36435] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod in attributione beatitudinum ad dona, possunt duo +considerari. Quorum unum est conformitas materiae. Et secundum hoc, +omnes primae quinque beatitudines possunt attribui scientiae et +consilio, tanquam dirigentibus. Sed inter dona exequentia +distribuuntur, ita scilicet quod esuries et sitis iustitiae, et +etiam misericordia, pertineant ad pietatem, quae perficit hominem +in his quae sunt ad alterum; mititas autem ad fortitudinem, dicit +enim Ambrosius, super Lucam, quod fortitudinis est iram vincere, +indignationem cohibere, est enim fortitudo circa passiones +irascibilis; paupertas vero et luctus ad donum timoris, quo homo se +retrahit a cupiditatibus et delectationibus mundi. Alio modo +possumus in his beatitudinibus considerare motiva ipsarum, et sic, +quantum ad aliqua eorum, oportet aliter attribuere. Praecipue enim +ad mansuetudinem movet reverentia ad Deum; quae pertinet ad +pietatem. Ad lugendum autem movet praecipue scientia, per quam homo +cognoscit defectus suos et rerum mundanarum; secundum illud Eccle. +I, qui addit scientiam, addit et dolorem. Ad esuriendum +autem iustitiae opera, praecipue movet animi fortitudo. Ad +miserendum vero praecipue movet consilium Dei; secundum illud Dan. +IV, consilium meum regi placeat, peccata tua eleemosynis redime, +et iniquitates tuas misericordiis pauperum. Et hunc modum +attributionis sequitur Augustinus, in libro de Serm. Dom. in +monte.
+ Reply to Objection 4: All the beatitudes mentioned in Holy Writ must be reduced to these, either as to the merits or as to the rewards: because + they must all belong either to the active or to the contemplative life. Accordingly, when we read, "Blessed is the man whom + the Lord correcteth," we must refer this to the beatitude of mourning: when we read, "Blessed is the man that hath not walked + in the counsel of the ungodly," we must refer it to cleanness of heart: and when we + read, "Blessed is the man that findeth wisdom," this must be referred to the reward of the seventh beatitude. The same applies + to all others that can be adduced. +
[36436] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod necesse est beatitudines omnes quae in sacra +Scriptura ponuntur, ad has reduci vel quantum ad merita, vel +quantum ad praemia, quia necesse est quod omnes pertineant aliquo +modo vel ad vitam activam, vel ad vitam contemplativam. Unde quod +dicitur, beatus vir qui corripitur a domino, pertinet ad +beatitudinem luctus. Quod vero dicitur, beatus vir qui non abiit in +consilio impiorum, pertinet ad munditiam cordis. Quod vero dicitur, +beatus vir qui invenit sapientiam, pertinet ad praemium septimae +beatitudinis. Et idem patet de omnibus aliis quae possunt +induci.
+ Reply to Objection 5: The eighth beatitude is a confirmation and declaration of all those that precede. Because from the very fact that a man is + confirmed in poverty of spirit, meekness, and the rest, it follows that no persecution will induce him to renounce them. Hence + the eighth beatitude corresponds, in a way, to all the preceding seven. +
[36437] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 ad 5 Ad quintum +dicendum quod octava beatitudo est quaedam confirmatio et +manifestatio omnium praecedentium. Ex hoc enim quod aliquis est +confirmatus in paupertate spiritus et mititate et aliis +sequentibus, provenit quod ab his bonis propter nullam +persecutionem recedit. Unde octava beatitudo quodammodo ad septem +praecedentes pertinet.
+ Reply to Objection 6: Luke relates Our Lord's sermon as addressed to the multitude ( + Lk. 6:17). Hence he sets down the beatitudes according to the capacity of the multitude, who know no other happiness than pleasure, + temporal and earthly: wherefore by these four beatitudes Our Lord excludes four things which seem to belong to such happiness. + The first of these is abundance of external goods, which he sets aside by saying: "Blessed are ye poor." The + second is that man be well off as to his body, in food and drink, and so forth; this he excludes by saying in the second place: + "Blessed are ye that hunger." The third is that it should be well with man as to joyfulness of heart, and this he puts aside + by saying: "Blessed are ye that weep now." The fourth is the outward favor of man; and this he excludes, saying, fourthly: + "Blessed shall you be, when men shall hate you." And as Ambrose says on + Lk. 6:20, "poverty corresponds + to temperance, which is unmoved by delights; hunger, to justice, since who hungers is compassionate and, through compassion + gives; mourning, to prudence, which deplores perishable things; endurance of men's hatred belongs to fortitude." +
[36438] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 ad 6 Ad sextum +dicendum quod Lucas narrat sermonem domini factum esse ad turbas. +Unde beatitudines numerantur ab eo secundum capacitatem turbarum, +quae solam voluptuosam et temporalem et terrenam beatitudinem +noverunt. Unde dominus per quatuor beatitudines quatuor excludit +quae ad praedictam beatitudinem pertinere videntur. Quorum primum +est abundantia bonorum exteriorum, quod excludit per hoc quod +dicit, beati pauperes. Secundum est quod sit bene homini quantum ad +corpus, in cibis et potibus et aliis huiusmodi, et hoc excludit per +secundum quod ponit, beati qui esuritis. Tertium est quod sit +homini bene quantum ad cordis iucunditatem, et hoc excludit tertio, +dicens, beati qui nunc fletis. Quartum est exterior hominum favor, +et hoc excludit quarto, dicens, beati eritis cum vos oderint +homines. Et sicut Ambrosius dicit, paupertas pertinet ad +temperantiam, quae illecebrosa non quaerit; esuries ad iustitiam, +quia qui esurit, compatitur, et, compatiendo, largitur; fletus ad +prudentiam, cuius est flere occidua; pati odium hominum, ad +fortitudinem.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the rewards of the beatitudes are unsuitably enumerated. Because the kingdom of heaven, which is eternal + life, contains all good things. Therefore, once given the kingdom of heaven, no other rewards should be mentioned. +
[36439] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod praemia beatitudinum inconvenienter +enumerentur. In regno enim caelorum, quod est vita aeterna, bona +omnia continentur. Posito ergo regno caelorum, non oportuit alia +praemia ponere.
+ Objection 2: Further, the kingdom of heaven is assigned as the reward, both of the first and of the eighth beatitude. Therefore, on the + same ground it should have been assigned to all. +
[36440] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +regnum caelorum ponitur pro praemio et in prima beatitudine et in +octava. Ergo, eadem ratione, debuit poni in omnibus.
+ Objection 3: Further, the beatitudes are arranged in the ascending order, as Augustine remarks (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): whereas + the rewards seem to be placed in the descending order, since to "possess the land" is less than to possess "the kingdom of + heaven." Therefore these rewards are unsuitably enumerated. +
[36441] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +in beatitudinibus proceditur ascendendo, sicut Augustinus dicit. In +praemiis autem videtur procedi descendendo, nam possessio terrae +est minus quam regnum caelorum. Ergo inconvenienter huiusmodi +praemia assignantur.
+ On the contrary, stands the authority of Our Lord Who propounded these rewards. +
[36442] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est auctoritas ipsius domini, praemia huiusmodi proponentis.
+ I answer that, These rewards are most suitably assigned, considering the nature of the beatitudes in relation to the three kinds of happiness + indicated above + (A[3]). For the first three beatitudes concerned the withdrawal of man from those things in which sensual happiness consists: which + happiness man desires by seeking the object of his natural desire, not where he should seek it, viz. in God, but in temporal + and perishable things. Wherefore the + rewards of the first three beatitudes correspond to these things which some men seek to find in earthly happiness. For men + seek in external things, viz. riches and honors, a certain excellence and abundance, both of which are implied in the kingdom + of heaven, whereby man attains to excellence and abundance of good things in God. Hence Our Lord promised the kingdom of heaven + to the poor in spirit. Again, cruel and pitiless men seek by wrangling and fighting to destroy their enemies so as to gain + security for themselves. Hence Our Lord promised the meek a secure and peaceful possession of the land of the living, whereby + the solid reality of eternal goods is denoted. Again, men seek consolation for the toils of the present life, in the lusts + and pleasures of the world. Hence Our Lord promises comfort to those that mourn. +
Two other beatitudes belong to the works of active happiness, which are the works of virtues directing man in his relations + to his neighbor: from which operations some men withdraw through inordinate love of their own good. Hence Our Lord assigns + to these beatitudes rewards in correspondence with the motives for which men recede from them. For there are some who recede + from acts of justice, and instead of rendering what is due, lay hands on what is not theirs, that they may + abound in temporal goods. Wherefore Our Lord promised those who hunger after justice, that they shall have their fill. Some, + again, recede from works of mercy, lest they be busied with other people's misery. Hence Our Lord promised the merciful that + they should obtain mercy, and be delivered from all misery. +
The last two beatitudes belong to contemplative happiness or beatitude: hence the rewards are assigned in correspondence + with the dispositions included in the merit. For cleanness of the eye disposes one to see clearly: hence the clean of heart + are promised that they shall see God. Again, to make peace either in oneself or among others, shows a man to be a follower + of God, Who is the God of unity and peace. Hence, as a reward, he is promised the glory of the Divine sonship, + consisting in perfect union with God through consummate wisdom. +
[36443] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod praemia ista convenientissime assignantur, +considerata conditione beatitudinum secundum tres beatitudines +supra assignatas. Tres enim primae beatitudines accipiuntur per +retractionem ab his in quibus voluptuosa beatitudo consistit, quam +homo desiderat quaerens id quod naturaliter desideratur, non ubi +quaerere debet, scilicet in Deo, sed in rebus temporalibus et +caducis. Et ideo praemia trium primarum beatitudinum accipiuntur +secundum ea quae in beatitudine terrena aliqui quaerunt. Quaerunt +enim homines in rebus exterioribus, scilicet divitiis et honoribus, +excellentiam quandam et abundantiam, quorum utrumque importat +regnum caelorum, per quod homo consequitur excellentiam et +abundantiam bonorum in Deo. Et ideo regnum caelorum dominus +pauperibus spiritu repromisit. Quaerunt autem homines feroces et +immites per litigia et bella securitatem sibi acquirere, inimicos +suos destruendo. Unde dominus repromisit mitibus securam et quietam +possessionem terrae viventium, per quam significatur soliditas +aeternorum bonorum. Quaerunt autem homines in concupiscentiis et +delectationibus mundi, habere consolationem contra praesentis vitae +labores. Et ideo dominus consolationem lugentibus repromittit. +Aliae vero duae beatitudines pertinent ad opera activae +beatitudinis, quae sunt opera virtutum ordinantium hominem ad +proximum, a quibus operibus aliqui retrahuntur propter inordinatum +amorem proprii boni. Et ideo dominus attribuit illa praemia his +beatitudinibus, propter quae homines ab eis discedunt. Discedunt +enim aliqui ab operibus iustitiae, non reddentes debitum, sed +potius aliena rapientes ut bonis temporalibus repleantur. Et ideo +dominus esurientibus iustitiam, saturitatem repromisit. Discedunt +etiam aliqui ab operibus misericordiae, ne se immisceant miseriis +alienis. Et ideo dominus misericordibus repromittit misericordiam, +per quam ab omni miseria liberentur. Aliae vero duae ultimae +beatitudines pertinent ad contemplativam felicitatem seu +beatitudinem, et ideo secundum convenientiam dispositionum quae +ponuntur in merito, praemia redduntur. Nam munditia oculi disponit +ad clare videndum, unde mundis corde divina visio repromittitur. +Constituere vero pacem vel in seipso vel inter alios, manifestat +hominem esse Dei imitatorem, qui est Deus unitatis et pacis. Et +ideo pro praemio redditur ei gloria divinae filiationis, quae est +in perfecta coniunctione ad Deum per sapientiam consummatam.
+ Reply to Objection 1: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv in Matth.), all these rewards are one in reality, viz. eternal happiness, which the human intellect + cannot grasp. Hence it was necessary to describe it by means of various boons known to us, while observing due proportion + to the merits to which those rewards are assigned. +
[36444] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, omnia praemia ista +unum sunt in re, scilicet beatitudo aeterna; quam intellectus +humanus non capit. Et ideo oportuit quod per diversa bona nobis +nota, describeretur, observata convenientia ad merita quibus +praemia attribuuntur.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Just as the eighth beatitude is a confirmation of all the beatitudes, so it deserves all the rewards of the beatitudes. Hence + it returns to the first, that we may understand all the other rewards to be attributed to it in consequence. Or else, according + to Ambrose (Super Luc. v), the kingdom of heaven is promised to the poor in spirit, as regards the glory of the soul; but + to those who suffer persecution in their bodies, it is promised as regards the + glory of the body. +
[36445] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut octava beatitudo est firmitas quaedam omnium +beatitudinum, ita debentur sibi omnium beatitudinum praemia. Et +ideo redit ad caput, ut intelligantur sibi consequenter omnia +praemia attribui. Vel, secundum Ambrosium, pauperibus spiritu +repromittitur regnum caelorum, quantum ad gloriam animae, sed +passis persecutionem in corpore, quantum ad gloriam corporis.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The rewards are also arranged in ascending order. For it is more to possess the land of the heavenly kingdom than simply + to have it: since we have many things without possessing them firmly and peacefully. Again, it is more to be comforted in + the kingdom than to have and possess it, for there are many things the possession of which is accompanied by sorrow. Again, + it is more to have one's fill than simply to be comforted, because fulness implies + abundance of comfort. And mercy surpasses satiety, for thereby man receives more than he merited or was able to desire. And + yet more is it to see God, even as he is a greater man who not only dines at court, but also sees the king's countenance. + Lastly, the highest place in the royal palace belongs to the king's son. +
[36446] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod etiam praemia secundum additionem se habent ad +invicem. Nam plus est possidere terram regni caelorum, quam +simpliciter habere, multa enim habemus quae non firmiter et +pacifice possidemus. Plus est etiam consolari in regno, quam habere +et possidere, multa enim cum dolore possidemus. Plus est etiam +saturari quam simpliciter consolari, nam saturitas abundantiam +consolationis importat. Misericordia vero excedit saturitatem, ut +plus scilicet homo accipiat quam meruerit, vel desiderare potuerit. +Adhuc autem maius est Deum videre, sicut maior est qui in curia +regis non solum prandet, sed etiam faciem regis videt. Summam autem +dignitatem in domo regia filius regis habet.
We must now consider the Fruits of the Holy Ghost: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost are acts?
+[36447] +Iª-IIae q. 70 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +fructibus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum fructus +spiritus sancti sint actus. Secundo, utrum differant a +beatitudinibus. Tertio, de eorum numero. Quarto, de oppositione +eorum ad opera carnis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the fruits of the Holy Ghost, enumerated by the Apostle ( + Gal. 5:22,23), are not acts. For that which bears fruit, should not itself be called a fruit, else we should go on indefinitely. But our + actions bear fruit: for it is written ( + Wis. 3:15): "The fruit of good labor is glorious," and ( + Jn. 4:36): "He that reapeth receiveth wages, and gathereth fruit unto life everlasting." + Therefore our actions are not to be called fruits. +
[36448] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod fructus spiritus sancti quos apostolus +nominat ad Galat. V, non sint actus. Id enim cuius est alius +fructus, non debet dici fructus, sic enim in infinitum iretur. Sed +actuum nostrorum est aliquis fructus, dicitur enim Sap. III, +bonorum laborum gloriosus est fructus; et Ioan. IV, qui +metit, mercedem accipit, et fructum congregat in vitam +aeternam. Ergo ipsi actus nostri non dicuntur fructus.
+ Objection 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10), "we enjoy [*'Fruimur', from which verb we have the Latin 'fructus' and the English + 'fruit'] the things we know, when the will rests by rejoicing in them." But our will should not rest in our actions for their + own sake. Therefore our actions should not be called fruits. +
[36449] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +sicut Augustinus dicit, in X de Trin., fruimur cognitis in +quibus voluntas propter ipsa delectata conquiescit. Sed +voluntas nostra non debet conquiescere in actibus nostris propter +se. Ergo actus nostri fructus dici non debent.
+ Objection 3: Further, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, the Apostle numbers certain virtues, viz. charity, meekness, faith, and chastity. + Now virtues are not actions but habits, as stated above ( + Q[55], A[1]). Therefore the fruits are not actions. +
[36450] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +inter fructus spiritus sancti enumerantur ab apostolo aliquae +virtutes scilicet caritas, mansuetudo, fides et castitas. Virtutes +autem non sunt actus, sed habitus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo +fructus non sunt actus.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Mat. 12:33): "By the fruit the tree is known"; that is to say, man is known by his works, as holy men explain the passage. Therefore + human actions are called fruits. +
[36451] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Matth. XII, ex fructu arbor cognoscitur; +idest, ex operibus suis homo, ut ibi exponitur a sanctis. Ergo ipsi +actus humani dicuntur fructus.
+ I answer that, The word "fruit" has been transferred from the material to the spiritual world. Now fruit, among material things, is the + product of a plant when it comes to perfection, and has a certain sweetness. This fruit has a twofold relation: to the tree + that produces it, and to the man who gathers the fruit from the tree. Accordingly, in spiritual matters, we may take the word + "fruit" in two ways: first, so that the fruit of man, who is likened to the tree, is that + which he produces; secondly, so that man's fruit is what he gathers. +
[36452] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod nomen fructus a corporalibus ad spiritualia est +translatum. Dicitur autem in corporalibus fructus, quod ex planta +producitur cum ad perfectionem pervenerit, et quandam in se +suavitatem habet. Qui quidem fructus ad duo comparari potest, +scilicet ad arborem producentem ipsum; et ad hominem qui fructum ex +arbore adipiscitur. Secundum hoc igitur, nomen fructus in rebus +spiritualibus dupliciter accipere possumus, uno modo, ut dicatur +fructus hominis, quasi arboris, id quod ab eo producitur; alio +modo, ut dicatur fructus hominis id quod homo adipiscitur.
Yet not all that man gathers is fruit, but only that which is last and gives pleasure. For a man has both a field and a tree, + and yet these are not called fruits; but that only which is last, to wit, that which man intends to derive from the field + and from the tree. In this sense man's fruit is his last end which is intended for his enjoyment. +
Non +autem omne id quod adipiscitur homo, habet rationem fructus, sed id +quod est ultimum, delectationem habens. Habet enim homo et agrum et +arborem, quae fructus non dicuntur; sed solum id quod est ultimum, +quod scilicet ex agro et arbore homo intendit habere. Et secundum +hoc, fructus hominis dicitur ultimus hominis finis, quo debet frui.
If, however, by man's fruit we understand a product of man, then human actions are called fruits: because operation is the + second act of the operator, and gives pleasure if it is suitable to him. If then man's operation proceeds from man in virtue + of his reason, it is said to be the fruit of his reason: but if it proceeds from him in respect of a higher power, which is + the power of the Holy Ghost, then man's operation is said to be the fruit of the Holy Ghost, as of a Divine + seed, for it is written ( + 1 Jn. 3:9): "Whosoever is born of God, committeth no sin, for His seed abideth in him." +
+Si autem dicatur fructus hominis id quod ex homine producitur, sic +ipsi actus humani fructus dicuntur, operatio enim est actus +secundus operantis, et delectationem habet, si sit conveniens +operanti. Si igitur operatio hominis procedat ab homine secundum +facultatem suae rationis, sic dicitur esse fructus rationis. Si +vero procedat ab homine secundum altiorem virtutem, quae est virtus +spiritus sancti; sic dicitur esse operatio hominis fructus spiritus +sancti, quasi cuiusdam divini seminis, dicitur enim I Ioan. III, +omnis qui natus est ex Deo, peccatum non facit, quoniam semen +ipsius in eo manet.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Since fruit is something last and final, nothing hinders one fruit bearing another fruit, even as one end is subordinate + to another. And so our works, in so far as they are produced by the Holy Ghost working in us, are fruits: but, in so far as + they are referred to the end which is eternal life, they should rather be called flowers: hence it is written ( + Ecclus. 24:23): "My flowers are the fruits of honor and riches." +
[36453] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, cum fructus habeat quodammodo rationem ultimi +et finis, nihil prohibet alicuius fructus esse alium fructum, sicut +finis ad finem ordinatur. Opera igitur nostra inquantum sunt +effectus quidam spiritus sancti in nobis operantis, habent rationem +fructus, sed inquantum ordinantur ad finem vitae aeternae, sic +magis habent rationem florum. Unde dicitur Eccli. XXIV, flores +mei fructus honoris et honestatis.
+ Reply to Objection 2: When the will is said to delight in a thing for its own sake, this may be understood in two ways. First, so that the expression + "for the sake of" be taken to designate the final cause; and in this way, man delights in nothing for its own sake, except + the last end. Secondly, so that it expresses the formal cause; and in this way, a man may delight in anything that is delightful + by reason of its form. Thus it is clear that a sick man delights in health, + for its own sake, as in an end; in a nice medicine, not as in an end, but as in something tasty; and in a nasty medicine, + nowise for its own sake, but only for the sake of something else. Accordingly we must say that man must delight in God for + His own sake, as being his last end, and in virtuous deeds, not as being his end, but for the sake of their inherent goodness + which is delightful to the virtuous. Hence Ambrose says (De Parad. xiii) that virtuous deeds are called fruits because "they + refresh those that have them, with a holy and genuine delight." +
[36454] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, cum dicitur voluntas in aliquo propter se delectari, +potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod ly propter +dicit causam finalem, et sic propter se non delectatur aliquis nisi +in ultimo fine. Alio modo, secundum quod designat causam formalem, +et sic propter se aliquis potest delectari in omni eo quod +delectabile est secundum suam formam. Sicut patet quod infirmus +delectatur in sanitate propter se, sicut in fine; in medicina autem +suavi, non sicut in fine, sed sicut in habente saporem +delectabilem; in medicina autem austera, nullo modo propter se, sed +solum propter aliud. Sic igitur dicendum est quod in Deo delectari +debet homo propter se, sicut propter ultimum finem, in actibus +autem virtuosis, non sicut propter finem, sed propter honestatem +quam continent, delectabilem virtuosis. Unde Ambrosius dicit quod +opera virtutum dicuntur fructus, quia suos possessores sancta et +sincera delectatione reficiunt.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Sometimes the names of the virtues are applied to their actions: thus Augustine writes (Tract. xl in Joan.): "Faith is to + believe what thou seest not"; and (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 10): "Charity is the movement of the soul in loving God and our + neighbor." It is thus that the names of the virtues are used in reckoning the fruits. +
[36455] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod nomina virtutum sumuntur quandoque pro actibus earum, +sicut Augustinus dicit quod fides est credere quod non vides; et +caritas est motus animi ad diligendum Deum et proximum. Et hoc +modo sumuntur nomina virtutum in enumeratione fructuum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the fruits do not differ from the beatitudes. For the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts, as stated + above ( + Q[69], A[1], ad 1). But the gifts perfect man in so far as he is moved by the Holy Ghost. Therefore the beatitudes themselves are fruits + of the Holy Ghost. +
[36456] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod fructus a beatitudinibus non +differant. Beatitudines enim attribuuntur donis, ut supra dictum +est. Sed dona perficiunt hominem secundum quod movetur a spiritu +sancto. Ergo beatitudines ipsae sunt fructus spiritus sancti.
+ Objection 2: Further, as the fruit of eternal life is to future beatitude which is that of actual possession, so are the fruits of the + present life to the beatitudes of the present life, which are based on hope. Now the fruit of eternal life is identified with + future beatitude. Therefore the fruits of the present life are the beatitudes. +
[36457] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +sicut se habet fructus vitae aeternae ad beatitudinem futuram, quae +est rei; ita se habent fructus praesentis vitae ad beatitudines +praesentis vitae, quae sunt spei. Sed fructus vitae aeternae est +ipsa beatitudo futura. Ergo fructus vitae praesentis sunt ipsae +beatitudines.
+ Objection 3: Further, fruit is essentially something ultimate and delightful. Now this is the very nature of beatitude, as stated above + ( + Q[3], A[1]; + Q[4], A[1]). Therefore fruit and beatitude have the same nature, and consequently should not be distinguished from one another. +
[36458] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +de ratione fructus est quod sit quiddam ultimum et delectabile. Sed +hoc pertinet ad rationem beatitudinis, ut supra dictum est. Ergo +eadem ratio est fructus et beatitudinis. Ergo non debent ab invicem +distingui.
+ On the contrary, Things divided into different species, differ from one another. But fruits and beatitudes are divided into different parts, + as is clear from the way in which they are enumerated. Therefore the fruits differ from the beatitudes. +
[36459] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra, +quorum species sunt diversae, ipsa quoque sunt diversa. Sed in +diversas partes dividuntur et fructus et beatitudines; ut patet per +numerationem utrorumque. Ergo fructus differunt a +beatitudinibus.
+ I answer that, More is required for a beatitude than for a fruit. Because it is sufficient for a fruit to be something ultimate and delightful; + whereas for a beatitude, it must be something perfect and excellent. Hence all the beatitudes may be called fruits, but not + vice versa. For the fruits are any virtuous deeds in which one delights: whereas the beatitudes are none but perfect works, + and which, by reason of their perfection, are assigned to the gifts rather than to + the virtues, as already stated ( + Q[69], A[1], ad 1). +
[36460] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod plus requiritur ad rationem beatitudinis, quam ad +rationem fructus. Nam ad rationem fructus sufficit quod sit aliquid +habens rationem ultimi et delectabilis, sed ad rationem +beatitudinis, ulterius requiritur quod sit aliquid perfectum et +excellens. Unde omnes beatitudines possunt dici fructus, sed non +convertitur. Sunt enim fructus quaecumque virtuosa opera, in quibus +homo delectatur. Sed beatitudines dicuntur solum perfecta opera, +quae etiam, ratione suae perfectionis, magis attribuuntur donis +quam virtutibus, ut supra dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 1: This argument proves the beatitudes to be fruits, but not that all the fruits are beatitudes. +
[36461] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ratio illa probat quod beatitudines sint +fructus, non autem quod omnes fructus beatitudines sint.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The fruit of eternal life is ultimate and perfect simply: hence it nowise differs from future beatitude. On the other hand + the fruits of the present life are not simply ultimate and perfect; wherefore not all the fruits are beatitudes. +
[36462] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod fructus vitae aeternae est simpliciter ultimus et +perfectus, et ideo in nullo distinguitur a beatitudine futura. +Fructus autem praesentis vitae non sunt simpliciter ultimi et +perfecti, et ideo non omnes fructus sunt beatitudines.
+ Reply to Objection 3: More is required for a beatitude than for a fruit, as stated. +
[36463] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod aliquid amplius est de ratione beatitudinis quam de +ratione fructus, ut dictum est.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the fruits are unsuitably enumerated by the Apostle ( + Gal. 5:22,23). Because, elsewhere, he says that there is only one fruit of the present life; according to + Rom. 6:22: "You have your fruit unto sanctification." Moreover it is written ( + Is. 27:9): "This is all the fruit . . . that the sin . . . be taken away." Therefore we should not reckon twelve fruits. +
[36464] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod apostolus inconvenienter enumeret, ad +Galat. V, duodecim fructus. Alibi enim dicit esse tantum unum +fructum praesentis vitae; secundum illud Rom. VI, habetis fructum +vestrum in sanctificatione et Isaiae XXVII dicitur, hic est +omnis fructus, ut auferatur peccatum. Non ergo ponendi sunt +duodecim fructus.
+ Objection 2: Further, fruit is the product of spiritual seed, as stated (A[1] ). But Our Lord mentions ( + Mat. 13:23) a threefold fruit as growing from a spiritual seed in a good ground, viz. "hundredfold, sixtyfold," and "thirtyfold." Therefore + one should not reckon twelve fruits. +
[36465] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +fructus est qui ex spirituali semine exoritur, ut dictum est. Sed +dominus, Matth. XIII, ponit triplicem terrae bonae fructum ex +spirituali semine provenientem, scilicet centesimum, et +sexagesimum, et trigesimum. Ergo non sunt ponendi duodecim +fructus.
+ Objection 3: Further, the very nature of fruit is to be something ultimate and delightful. But this does not apply to all the fruits mentioned + by the Apostle: for patience and long-suffering seem to imply a painful object, while faith is not something ultimate, but + rather something primary and fundamental. Therefore too many fruits are enumerated. +
[36466] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +fructus habet in sui ratione quod sit ultimum et delectabile. Sed +ratio ista non invenitur in omnibus fructibus ab apostolo +enumeratis, patientia enim et longanimitas videntur in rebus +contristantibus esse; fides autem non habet rationem ultimi, sed +magis rationem primi fundamenti. Superflue igitur huiusmodi fructus +enumerantur.
+ Objection 4: On the other hand, It seems that they are enumerated insufficiently and incompletely. For it has been stated + (A[2]) that all the beatitudes may be called fruits; yet not all are mentioned here. Nor is there anything corresponding to the + acts of wisdom, and of many other virtues. Therefore it seems that the fruits are insufficiently enumerated. +
[36467] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra, +videtur quod insufficienter et diminute enumerentur. Dictum est +enim quod omnes beatitudines fructus dici possunt, sed non omnes +hic enumerantur. Nihil etiam hic ponitur ad actum sapientiae +pertinens, et multarum aliarum virtutum. Ergo videtur quod +insufficienter enumerentur fructus.
+ I answer that, The number of the twelve fruits enumerated by the Apostle is suitable, and that there may be a reference to them in the twelve + fruits of which it is written ( + Apoc. 22:2): "On both sides of the river was the tree bearing twelve fruits." Since, however, a fruit is something that proceeds from + a source as from a seed or root, the difference between these fruits must be gathered from the various ways in which the Holy + Ghost proceeds in us: + which process consists in this, that the mind of man is set in order, first of all, in regard to itself; secondly, in regard + to things that are near it; thirdly, in regard to things that are below it. +
Accordingly man's mind is well disposed in regard to itself when it has a good disposition towards good things and towards + evil things. Now the first disposition of the human mind towards the good is effected by love, which is the first of our emotions + and the root of them all, as stated above ( + Q[27], A[4]). Wherefore among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, we reckon "charity," wherein the Holy Ghost is given in a special manner, + as in His own likeness, + since He Himself is love. Hence it is written ( + Rom. 5:5): "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us." The necessary result of the love + of charity is joy: because every lover rejoices at being united to the beloved. Now charity has always actual presence in + God Whom it loves, according to + 1 Jn. 4:16: "He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in Him": wherefore the sequel of charity is "joy." Now the perfection + of joy + is peace in two respects. First, as regards freedom from outward disturbance; for it is impossible to rejoice perfectly in + the beloved good, if one is disturbed in the enjoyment thereof; and again, if a man's heart is perfectly set at peace in one + object, he cannot be disquieted by any other, since he accounts all others as nothing; hence it is written ( + Ps. 118:165): "Much peace have they that love Thy Law, and to them there is no stumbling-block," because, to wit, external + things do not disturb them in their enjoyment of God. Secondly, as regards the calm of the restless desire: for he does not + perfectly rejoice, who is not satisfied with the object of his joy. Now peace implies these two things, namely, that we be + not disturbed by external things, and that our desires rest altogether in one object. Wherefore after charity and joy, "peace" + is given the third place. In evil things the mind has a good disposition, in respect of two things. First, by not being + disturbed whenever evil threatens: which pertains to "patience"; secondly, by not being disturbed, whenever good things are + delayed; which belongs to "long suffering," since "to lack good is a kind of evil" (Ethic. v, 3). +
Man's mind is well disposed as regards what is near him, viz. his neighbor, first, as to the will to do good; and to this + belongs "goodness." Secondly, as to the execution of well-doing; and to this belongs "benignity," for the benign are those + in whom the salutary flame [bonus ignis] of love has enkindled the desire to be kind to their neighbor. Thirdly, as to his + suffering with equanimity the evils his neighbor inflicts on him. To this belongs "meekness," which curbs anger. + Fourthly, in the point of our refraining from doing harm to our neighbor not only through anger, but also through fraud or + deceit. To this pertains "faith," if we take it as denoting fidelity. But if we take it for the faith whereby we believe in + God, then man is directed thereby to that which is above him, so that he subject his intellect and, consequently, all that + is his, to God. +
Man is well disposed in respect of that which is below him, as regards external action, by "modesty," whereby we observe + the "mode" in all our words and deeds: as regards internal desires, by "contingency" and "chastity": whether these two differ + because chastity withdraws man from unlawful desires, contingency also from lawful desires: or because the continent man is + subject to concupiscence, but is not led away; whereas the chaste man is neither subject to, nor led away from + them. +
[36468] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod numerus duodecim fructuum ab apostolo enumeratorum, +conveniens est, et possunt significari per duodecim fructus de +quibus dicitur Apoc. ult., ex utraque parte fluminis lignum +vitae, afferens fructus duodecim. Quia vero fructus dicitur +quod ex aliquo principio procedit sicut ex semine vel radice, +attendenda est distinctio horum fructuum secundum diversum +processum spiritus sancti in nobis. Qui quidem processus attenditur +secundum hoc, ut primo mens hominis in seipsa ordinetur; secundo +vero, ordinetur ad ea quae sunt iuxta; tertio vero, ad ea quae sunt +infra. Tunc autem bene mens hominis disponitur in seipsa, quando +mens hominis bene se habet et in bonis et in malis. Prima autem +dispositio mentis humanae ad bonum, est per amorem, qui est prima +affectio et omnium affectionum radix, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo +inter fructus spiritus primo ponitur caritas; in qua specialiter +spiritus sanctus datur, sicut in propria similitudine, cum et ipse +sit amor. Unde dicitur Rom. V, caritas Dei diffusa est in +cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis. Ad +amorem autem caritatis ex necessitate sequitur gaudium. Omnis enim +amans gaudet ex coniunctione amati. Caritas autem semper habet +praesentem Deum, quem amat; secundum illud I Ioan. IV, qui manet +in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo. Unde sequela +caritatis est gaudium. Perfectio autem gaudii est pax, quantum ad +duo. Primo quidem, quantum ad quietem ab exterioribus +conturbantibus, non enim potest perfecte gaudere de bono amato, qui +in eius fruitione ab aliis perturbatur; et iterum, qui perfecte cor +habet in uno pacatum, a nullo alio molestari potest, cum alia quasi +nihil reputet; unde dicitur in Psalmo CXVIII, pax multa +diligentibus legem tuam, et non est illis scandalum, quia +scilicet ab exterioribus non perturbantur, quin Deo fruantur. +Secundo, quantum ad sedationem desiderii fluctuantis, non enim +perfecte gaudet de aliquo, cui non sufficit id de quo gaudet. Haec +autem duo importat pax, scilicet ut neque ab exterioribus +perturbemur; et ut desideria nostra conquiescant in uno. Unde post +caritatem et gaudium, tertio ponitur pax. In malis autem bene se +habet mens quantum ad duo. Primo quidem, ut non perturbetur mens +per imminentiam malorum, quod pertinet ad patientiam. Secundo, ut +non perturbetur in dilatione bonorum, quod pertinet ad +longanimitatem, nam carere bono habet rationem mali, ut dicitur in +V Ethic. Ad id autem quod est iuxta hominem, scilicet proximum, +bene disponitur mens hominis, primo quidem, quantum ad voluntatem +bene faciendi. Et ad hoc pertinet bonitas. Secundo, quantum ad +beneficentiae executionem. Et ad hoc pertinet benignitas, dicuntur +enim benigni quos bonus ignis amoris fervere facit ad benefaciendum +proximis. Tertio, quantum ad hoc quod aequanimiter tolerentur mala +ab eis illata. Et ad hoc pertinet mansuetudo, quae cohibet iras. +Quarto, quantum ad hoc quod non solum per iram proximis non +noceamus, sed etiam neque per fraudem vel per dolum. Et ad hoc +pertinet fides, si pro fidelitate sumatur. Sed si sumatur pro fide +qua creditur in Deum, sic per hanc ordinatur homo ad id quod est +supra se, ut scilicet homo intellectum suum Deo subiiciat, et per +consequens omnia quae ipsius sunt. Sed ad id quod infra est, bene +disponitur homo, primo quidem, quantum ad exteriores actiones, per +modestiam, quae in omnibus dictis et factis modum observat. Quantum +ad interiores concupiscentias, per continentiam et castitatem, sive +haec duo distinguantur per hoc, quod castitas refrenat hominem ad +illicitis, continentia vero etiam a licitis; sive per hoc quod +continens patitur concupiscentias sed non deducitur, castus autem +neque patitur neque deducitur.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Sanctification is effected by all the virtues, by which also sins are taken away. Consequently fruit is mentioned there in + the singular, on account of its being generically one, though divided into many species which are spoken of as so many fruits. +
[36469] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod sanctificatio fit per omnes virtutes per quas +etiam peccata tolluntur. Unde fructus ibi singulariter nominatur +propter unitatem generis, quod in multas species dividitur, +secundum quas dicuntur multi fructus.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The hundredfold, sixtyfold, and thirtyfold fruits do not differ as various species of virtuous acts, but as various degrees + of perfection, even in the same virtue. Thus contingency of the married state is said to be signified by the thirtyfold fruit; + the contingency of widowhood, by the sixtyfold; and virginal contingency, by the hundredfold fruit. There are, moreover, other + ways in which holy men distinguish three evangelical fruits according to the + three degrees of virtue: and they speak of three degrees, because the perfection of anything is considered with respect to + its beginning, its middle, and its end. +
[36470] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod fructus centesimus, sexagesimus et trigesimus non +diversificantur secundum diversas species virtuosorum actuum, sed +secundum diversos perfectionis gradus etiam unius virtutis. Sicut +continentia coniugalis dicitur significari per fructum trigesimum; +continentia vidualis per sexagesimum; virginalis autem per +centesimum. Et aliis etiam modis sancti distinguunt tres +evangelicos fructus secundum tres gradus virtutis. Et ponuntur tres +gradus, quia cuiuslibet rei perfectio attenditur secundum +principium, medium et finem.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The fact of not being disturbed by painful things is something to delight in. And as to faith, if we consider it as the foundation, + it has the aspect of being ultimate and delightful, in as much as it contains certainty: hence a gloss expounds thus: "Faith, + which is certainly about the unseen." +
[36471] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ipsum quod est in tristitiis non perturbari, rationem +delectabilis habet. Et fides etiam si accipiatur prout est +fundamentum, habet quandam rationem ultimi et delectabilis, +secundum quod continet certitudinem, unde Glossa exponit, fides, +idest de invisibilibus certitudo.
+ Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine says on + Gal. 5:22,23, "the Apostle had no intention of teaching us how many [either works of the flesh, or fruits of the Spirit] there are; but + to show how the former should be avoided, and the latter sought after." Hence either more or fewer fruits might have been + mentioned. Nevertheless, all the acts of the gifts and virtues can be reduced to these by a certain kind of fittingness, in + so far as all the virtues and + gifts must needs direct the mind in one of the above-mentioned ways. Wherefore the acts of wisdom and of any gifts directing + to good, are reduced to charity, joy and peace. The reason why he mentions these rather than others, is that these imply either + enjoyment of good things, or relief from evils, which things seem to belong to the notion of fruit. +
[36472] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, super epistolam ad Galat., +apostolus non hoc ita suscepit, ut doceret quod sunt (vel +opera carnis, vel fructus spiritus); sed ut ostenderet in quo +genere illa vitanda, illa vero sectanda sint. Unde potuissent +vel plures, vel etiam pauciores fructus enumerari. Et tamen omnes +donorum et virtutum actus possunt secundum quandam convenientiam ad +haec reduci, secundum quod omnes virtutes et dona necesse est quod +ordinent mentem aliquo praedictorum modorum. Unde et actus +sapientiae, et quorumcumque donorum ordinantium ad bonum, +reducuntur ad caritatem, gaudium et pacem. Ideo tamen potius haec +quam alia enumeravit, quia hic enumerata magis important vel +fruitionem bonorum, vel sedationem malorum; quod videtur ad +rationem fructus pertinere.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the fruits of the Holy Ghost are not contrary to the works of the flesh, which the Apostle enumerates + ( + Gal. 5:19, seqq.). Because contraries are in the same genus. But the works of the flesh are not called fruits. Therefore the fruits + of the Spirit are not contrary to them. +
[36473] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod fructus non contrarientur operibus +carnis quae apostolus enumerat. Contraria enim sunt in eodem +genere. Sed opera carnis non dicuntur fructus. Ergo fructus +spiritus eis non contrariantur.
+ Objection 2: Further, one thing has a contrary. Now the Apostle mentions more works of the flesh than fruits of the Spirit. Therefore + the fruits of the Spirit and the works of the flesh are not contrary to one another. +
[36474] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +unum uni est contrarium. Sed plura enumerat apostolus opera carnis +quam fructus spiritus. Ergo fructus spiritus et opera carnis non +contrariantur.
+ Objection 3: Further, among the fruits of the Spirit, the first place is given to charity, joy, and peace: to which, fornication, uncleanness, + and immodesty, which are the first of the works of the flesh are not opposed. Therefore the fruits of the Spirit are not contrary + to the works of the flesh. +
[36475] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +inter fructus spiritus primo ponuntur caritas, gaudium, pax, quibus +non correspondent ea quae primo enumerantur inter opera carnis, +quae sunt fornicatio, immunditia, impudicitia. Ergo fructus +spiritus non contrariantur operibus carnis.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle says ( + Gal. 5:17) that "the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh." +
[36476] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit ibidem, quod caro concupiscit adversus +spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem.
+ I answer that, The works of the flesh and the fruits of the Spirit may be taken in two ways. First, in general: and in this way the fruits + of the Holy Ghost considered in general are contrary to the works of the flesh. Because the Holy Ghost moves the human mind + to that which is in accord with reason, or rather to that which surpasses reason: whereas the fleshly, viz. the sensitive, + appetite draws man to sensible goods which are beneath him. Wherefore, since upward and + downward are contrary movements in the physical order, so in human actions the works of the flesh are contrary to the fruits + of the Spirit. +
Secondly, both fruits and fleshly works as enumerated may be considered singly, each according to its specific nature. And + in this they are not of necessity contrary each to each: because, as stated above (A[3], ad 4), the Apostle did not intend + to enumerate all the works, whether spiritual or carnal. However, by a kind of adaptation, Augustine, commenting on + Gal. 5:22,23, contrasts the fruits with the carnal works, each to each. Thus "to fornication, which + is the love of satisfying lust outside lawful wedlock, we may contrast charity, whereby the soul is wedded to God: wherein + also is true chastity. By uncleanness we must understand whatever disturbances arise from fornication: and to these the joy + of tranquillity is opposed. Idolatry, by reason of which war was waged against the Gospel of God, is opposed to peace. Against + witchcrafts, enmities, contentions, emulations, wraths and quarrels, there is longsuffering, which helps us to bear the evils + inflicted on us by those among whom we dwell; while kindness helps us to cure those evils; and goodness, to forgive them. + In contrast to heresy there is faith; to envy, mildness; to drunkenness and revellings, contingency." +
[36477] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod opera carnis et fructus spiritus possunt accipi +dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum communem rationem. Et hoc modo in +communi fructus spiritus sancti contrariantur operibus carnis. +Spiritus enim sanctus movet humanam mentem ad id quod est secundum +rationem, vel potius ad id quod est supra rationem, appetitus autem +carnis, qui est appetitus sensitivus, trahit ad bona sensibilia, +quae sunt infra hominem. Unde sicut motus sursum et motus deorsum +contrariantur in naturalibus, ita in operibus humanis contrariantur +opera carnis fructibus spiritus. Alio modo possunt considerari +secundum proprias rationes singulorum fructuum enumeratorum, et +operum carnis. Et sic non oportet quod singula singulis +contraponantur, quia, sicut dictum est, apostolus non intendit +enumerare omnia opera spiritualia, nec omnia opera carnalia. Sed +tamen, secundum quandam adaptationem, Augustinus, super epistolam +ad Galat., contraponit singulis operibus carnis singulos fructus. +Sicut fornicationi, quae est amor explendae libidinis a legitimo +connubio solutus, opponitur caritas, per quam anima coniungitur Deo +in qua etiam est vera castitas. Immunditiae autem sunt omnes +perturbationes de illa fornicatione conceptae, quibus gaudium +tranquillitatis opponitur. Idolorum autem servitus, propter quam +bellum est gestum adversus Evangelium Dei, opponitur paci. Contra +veneficia autem, et inimicitias et contentiones et aemulationes, +animositates et dissensiones, opponuntur longanimitas, ad +sustinendum mala hominum inter quos vivimus; et ad curandum, +benignitas; et ad ignoscendum, bonitas. Haeresibus autem opponitur +fides, invidiae, mansuetudo; ebrietatibus et comessationibus, +continentia.
+ Reply to Objection 1: That which proceeds from a tree against the tree's nature, is not called its fruit, but rather its corruption. And since + works of virtue are connatural to reason, while works of vice are contrary to nature, therefore it is that works of virtue + are called fruits, but not so works of vice. +
[36478] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod id quod procedit ab arbore contra naturam +arboris, non dicitur esse fructus eius, sed magis corruptio +quaedam. Et quia virtutum opera sunt connaturalia rationi, opera +vero vitiorum sunt contra rationem; ideo opera virtutum fructus +dicuntur, non autem opera vitiorum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: "Good happens in one way, evil in all manner of ways," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): so that to one virtue many vices + are contrary. Consequently we must not be surprised if the works of the flesh are more numerous than the fruits of the spirit. +
[36479] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod bonum contingit uno modo, malum vero +omnifariam, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., unde et +uni virtuti plura vitia opponuntur. Et propter hoc, non est mirum +si plura ponuntur opera carnis quam fructus spiritus.
Reply to Objection 3: The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.
[36480] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +patet solutio ex dictis.
OF VICE AND SIN CONSIDERED IN THEMSELVES (SIX ARTICLES)
We have in the next place to consider vice and sin: about which six points have to be considered: (1) Vice and sin considered + in themselves; (2) their distinction; (3) their comparison with one another; (4) the subject of sin; (5) the cause of sin; + (6) the effect of sin. +
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether vice is contrary to virtue?
(2) Whether vice is contrary to nature?
(3) Which is worse, a vice or a vicious act?
(4) Whether a vicious act is compatible with virtue?
+[36481] +Iª-IIae q. 71 pr. Consequenter considerandum est de +vitiis et peccatis. Circa quae sex consideranda occurrunt, primo +quidem, de ipsis vitiis et peccatis secundum se; secundo, de +distinctione eorum; tertio, de comparatione eorum ad invicem; +quarto, de subiecto peccati; quinto, de causa eius; sexto, de +effectu ipsius. Circa primum quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum vitium +contrarietur virtuti. Secundo, utrum vitium sit contra naturam. +Tertio, quid sit peius, utrum vitium vel actus vitiosus. Quarto, +utrum actus vitiosus possit esse simul cum virtute. Quinto, utrum +in omni peccato sit aliquis actus. Sexto, de definitione peccati +quam Augustinus ponit, XXII contra Faustum, peccatum est dictum +vel factum vel concupitum contra legem aeternam.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that vice is not contrary to virtue. For one thing has one contrary, as proved in Metaph. x, text. 17. Now + sin and malice are contrary to virtue. Therefore vice is not contrary to it: since vice applies also to undue disposition + of bodily members or of any things whatever. +
[36482] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod vitium non contrarietur virtuti. Uni +enim unum est contrarium, ut probatur in X Metaphys. Sed virtuti +contrariantur peccatum et malitia. Non ergo contrariatur ei vitium, +quia vitium dicitur etiam si sit indebita dispositio membrorum +corporalium, vel quarumcumque rerum.
+ Objection 2: Further, virtue denotes a certain perfection of power. But vice does not denote anything relative to power. Therefore vice + is not contrary to virtue. +
[36483] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +virtus nominat quandam perfectionem potentiae. Sed vitium nihil +nominat ad potentiam pertinens. Ergo vitium non contrariatur +virtuti.
+ Objection 3: Further, Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv) says that "virtue is the soul's health." Now sickness or disease, rather than vice, + is opposed to health. Therefore vice is not contrary to virtue. +
[36484] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +Tullius dicit, in IV de Tusculanis quaest., quod virtus est +quaedam sanitas animae. Sanitati autem opponitur aegritudo vel +morbus, magis quam vitium. Ergo virtuti non contrariatur +vitium.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. ii) that "vice is a quality in respect of which the soul is evil." But "virtue is a quality + which makes its subject good," as was shown above ( + Q[55], AA[3],4). Therefore vice is contrary to virtue. +
[36485] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de perfectione iustitiae, quod +vitium est qualitas secundum quam malus est animus. Virtus +autem est qualitas quae facit bonum habentem, ut ex supradictis +patet. Ergo vitium contrariatur virtuti.
+ I answer that, Two things may be considered in virtue---the essence of virtue, and that to which virtue is ordained. In the essence of virtue + we may consider something directly, and we may consider something consequently. Virtue implies "directly" a disposition whereby + the subject is well disposed according to the mode of its nature: wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that + "virtue is a disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best; and by perfect I + mean that which is disposed according to its nature." That which virtue implies "consequently" is that it is a kind of goodness: + because the goodness of a thing consists in its being well disposed according to the mode of its nature. That to which virtue + is directed is a good act, as was shown above ( + Q[56], A[3]). +
Accordingly three things are found to be contrary to virtue. One of these is "sin," which is opposed to virtue in respect + of that to which virtue is ordained: since, properly speaking, sin denotes an inordinate act; even as an act of virtue is + an ordinate and due act: in respect of that which virtue implies consequently, viz. that it is a kind of goodness, the contrary + of virtue is "malice": while in respect of that which belongs to the essence of virtue directly, its contrary + is "vice": because the vice of a thing seems to consist in its not being disposed in a way befitting its nature: hence Augustine + says (De Lib. Arb. iii): "Whatever is lacking for a thing's natural perfection may be called a vice." +
[36486] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod circa virtutem duo possumus considerare, scilicet +ipsam essentiam virtutis; et id ad quod est virtus. In essentia +quidem virtutis aliquid considerari potest directe; et aliquid ex +consequenti. Directe quidem virtus importat dispositionem quandam +alicuius convenienter se habentis secundum modum suae naturae, unde +philosophus dicit, in VII Physic. quod virtus est dispositio +perfecti ad optimum; dico autem perfecti, quod est dispositum +secundum naturam. Ex consequenti autem sequitur quod virtus sit +bonitas quaedam, in hoc enim consistit uniuscuiusque rei bonitas, +quod convenienter se habeat secundum modum suae naturae. Id autem +ad quod virtus ordinatur, est actus bonus, ut ex supradictis patet. +Secundum hoc igitur tria inveniuntur opponi virtuti. Quorum unum +est peccatum, quod opponitur sibi ex parte eius ad quod virtus +ordinatur, nam peccatum proprie nominat actum inordinatum, sicut +actus virtutis est actus ordinatus et debitus. Secundum autem quod +ad rationem virtutis consequitur quod sit bonitas quaedam, +opponitur virtuti malitia. Sed secundum id quod directe est de +ratione virtutis, opponitur virtuti vitium, vitium enim +uniuscuiusque rei esse videtur quod non sit disposita secundum quod +convenit suae naturae. Unde Augustinus dicit, in III de Lib. Arb., +quod perfectioni naturae deesse perspexeris, id voca +vitium.
+ Reply to Objection 1: These three things are contrary to virtue, but not in the same respect: for sin is opposed to virtue, according as the latter + is productive of a good work; malice, according as virtue is a kind of goodness; while vice is opposed to virtue properly + as such. +
[36487] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod illa tria non contrariantur virtuti secundum +idem, sed peccatum quidem contrariatur secundum quod virtus est +operativa boni; malitia autem secundum quod est bonitas quaedam; +vitium autem proprie secundum quod est virtus.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Virtue implies not only perfection of power, the principle of action; but also the due disposition of its subject. The reason + for this is because a thing operates according as it is in act: so that a thing needs to be well disposed if it has to produce + a good work. It is in this respect that vice is contrary to virtue. +
[36488] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod virtus non solum importat perfectionem potentiae quae +est principium agendi, sed etiam importat debitam dispositionem +eius cuius est virtus, et hoc ideo quia unumquodque operatur +secundum quod actu est. Requiritur ergo quod aliquid sit in se bene +dispositum, quod debet esse boni operativum. Et secundum hoc +virtuti vitium opponitur.
+ Reply to Objection 3: As Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv), "disease and sickness are vicious qualities," for in speaking of the body "he calls + it" disease "when the whole body is infected," for instance, with fever or the like; he calls it sickness "when the disease + is attended with weakness"; and vice "when the parts of the body are not well compacted together." And although at times there + may be disease in the body without sickness, for instance, when a man has a hidden + complaint without being hindered outwardly from his wonted occupations; "yet, in the soul," as he says, "these two things + are indistinguishable, except in thought." For whenever a man is ill-disposed inwardly, through some inordinate affection, + he is rendered thereby unfit for fulfilling his duties: since "a tree is known by its fruit," i.e. man by his works, according + to + Mat. 12:33. But "vice of the soul," as Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv), "is a habit or affection of + the soul discordant and inconsistent with itself through life": and this is to be found even without disease and sickness, + e.g. when a man sins from weakness or passion. Consequently vice is of wider extent than sickness or disease; even as virtue + extends to more things than health; for health itself is reckoned a kind of virtue (Phys. vii, text. 17). Consequently vice + is reckoned as contrary to virtue, more fittingly than sickness or disease. +
[36489] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut Tullius dicit, in IV de Tusculanis quaest., +morbi et aegrotationes partes sunt vitiositatis, in corporibus enim +morbum appellant totius corporis corruptionem, puta febrem vel +aliquid huiusmodi; aegrotationem vero, morbum cum imbecillitate; +vitium autem, cum partes corporis inter se dissident. Et quamvis in +corpore quandoque sit morbus sine aegrotatione, puta cum aliquis +est interius male dispositus, non tamen exterius praepeditur a +solitis operationibus; in animo tamen, ut ipse dicit, haec duo non +possunt nisi cogitatione secerni. Necesse est enim quod +quandocumque aliquis interius est male dispositus, habens +inordinatum affectum, quod ex hoc imbecillis reddatur ad debitas +operationes exercendas, quia unaquaeque arbor ex suo fructu +cognoscitur, idest homo ex opere, ut dicitur Matth. XII. Sed +vitium animi, ut Tullius ibidem dicit, est habitus aut +affectio animi in tota vita inconstans, et a seipsa +dissentiens. Quod quidem invenitur etiam absque morbo vel +aegrotatione, ut puta cum aliquis ex infirmitate vel ex passione +peccat. Unde in plus se habet vitium quam aegrotatio vel morbus, +sicut etiam virtus in plus se habet quam sanitas, nam sanitas etiam +quaedam virtus ponitur in VII Physic. Et ideo virtuti convenientius +opponitur vitium quam aegrotatio vel morbus.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that vice is not contrary to nature. Because vice is contrary to virtue, as stated above + (A[1]). Now virtue is in us, not by nature but by infusion or habituation, as stated above (Q[63], AA[1] ,2,3). Therefore vice is + not contrary to nature. +
[36490] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod vitium non sit contra naturam. Vitium +enim contrariatur virtuti, ut dictum est. Sed virtutes non sunt in +nobis a natura, sed causantur in nobis per infusionem aut ab +assuetudine, ut dictum est. Ergo vitia non sunt contra naturam.
+ Objection 2: Further, it is impossible to become habituated to that which is contrary to nature: thus "a stone never becomes habituated + to upward movement" (Ethic. ii, 1). But some men become habituated to vice. Therefore vice is not contrary to nature. +
[36491] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +ea quae sunt contra naturam, non possunt assuefieri, sicut lapis +nunquam assuescit ferri sursum, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed aliqui +assuefiunt ad vitia. Ergo vitia non sunt contra naturam.
+ Objection 3: Further, anything contrary to a nature, is not found in the greater number of individuals possessed of that nature. Now vice + is found in the greater number of men; for it is written ( + Mat. 7:13): "Broad is the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who go in thereat." Therefore vice is not contrary to + nature. +
[36492] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +nihil quod est contra naturam, invenitur in habentibus illam +naturam ut in pluribus. Sed vitia inveniuntur in hominibus ut in +pluribus, quia, sicut dicitur Matth. VII, lata est via quae +ducit ad perditionem, et multi vadunt per eam. Ergo vitium non +est contra naturam.
+ Objection 4: Further, sin is compared to vice, as act to habit, as stated above + (A[1]). Now sin is defined as "a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the Law of God," as Augustine shows (Contra Faust. xxii, 27). + But the Law of God is above nature. Therefore we should say that vice is contrary to the Law, rather than to nature. +
[36493] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, +peccatum comparatur ad vitium sicut actus ad habitum, ut ex +supradictis patet. Sed peccatum definitur esse dictum vel factum +vel concupitum contra legem Dei; ut patet per Augustinum, XXII +contra Faustum. Lex autem Dei est supra naturam. Magis ergo +dicendum est quod vitium sit contra legem, quam sit contra +naturam.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 13): "Every vice, simply because it is a vice, is contrary to nature." +
[36494] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in III de Lib. Arb., omne vitium, eo +ipso quod vitium est, contra naturam est.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[1]), vice is contrary to virtue. Now the virtue of a thing consists in its being well disposed in a manner befitting its nature, + as stated above + (A[1]). Hence the vice of any thing consists in its being disposed in a manner not befitting its nature, and for this reason is + that thing "vituperated," which word is derived from "vice" according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii, 14). +
But it must be observed that the nature of a thing is chiefly the form from which that thing derives its species. Now man + derives his species from his rational soul: and consequently whatever is contrary to the order of reason is, properly speaking, + contrary to the nature of man, as man; while whatever is in accord with reason, is in accord with the nature of man, as man. + Now "man's good is to be in accord with reason, and his evil is to be against reason," as Dionysius states + (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore human virtue, which makes a man good, and his work good, is in accord with man's nature, for as + much as it accords with his reason: while vice is contrary to man's nature, in so far as it is contrary to the order of reason. +
[36495] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, vitium virtuti contrariatur. +Virtus autem uniuscuiusque rei consistit in hoc quod sit bene +disposita secundum convenientiam suae naturae, ut supra dictum est. +Unde oportet quod in qualibet re vitium dicatur ex hoc quod est +disposita contra id quod convenit naturae. Unde et de hoc +unaquaeque res vituperatur, a vitio autem nomen vituperationis +tractum creditur, ut Augustinus dicit, in III de Lib. Arb. Sed +considerandum est quod natura uniuscuiusque rei potissime est forma +secundum quam res speciem sortitur. Homo autem in specie +constituitur per animam rationalem. Et ideo id quod est contra +ordinem rationis, proprie est contra naturam hominis inquantum est +homo; quod autem est secundum rationem, est secundum naturam +hominis inquantum est homo. Bonum autem hominis est secundum +rationem esse, et malum hominis est praeter rationem esse, ut +Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Unde virtus humana, quae +hominem facit bonum, et opus ipsius bonum reddit, intantum est +secundum naturam hominis, inquantum convenit rationi, vitium autem +intantum est contra naturam hominis, inquantum est contra ordinem +rationis.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Although the virtues are not caused by nature as regards their perfection of being, yet they incline us to that which accords + with reason, i.e. with the order of reason. For Cicero says (De Inv. Rhet. ii) that "virtue is a habit in accord with reason, + like a second nature": and it is in this sense that virtue is said to be in accord with nature, and on the other hand that + vice is contrary to nature. +
[36496] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod virtutes, etsi non causentur a natura secundum +suum esse perfectum, tamen inclinant ad id quod est secundum +naturam, idest secundum ordinem rationis, dicit enim Tullius, in +sua rhetorica, quod virtus est habitus in modum naturae rationi +consentaneus. Et hoc modo virtus dicitur esse secundum naturam, +et per contrarium intelligitur quod vitium sit contra naturam.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher is speaking there of a thing being against nature, in so far as "being against nature" is contrary to "being + from nature": and not in so far as "being against nature" is contrary to "being in accord with nature," in which latter sense + virtues are said to be in accord with nature, in as much as they incline us to that which is suitable to nature. +
[36497] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod philosophus ibi loquitur de his quae sunt contra +naturam, secundum quod esse contra naturam opponitur ei quod est +esse a natura, non autem secundum quod esse contra naturam +opponitur ei quod est esse secundum naturam, eo modo quo virtutes +dicuntur esse secundum naturam, inquantum inclinant ad id quod +naturae convenit.
+ Reply to Objection 3: There is a twofold nature in man, rational nature, and the sensitive nature. And since it is through the operation of his + senses that man accomplishes acts of reason, hence there are more who follow the inclinations of the sensitive nature, than + who follow the order of reason: because more reach the beginning of a business than achieve its completion. Now the presence + of vices and sins in man is owing to the fact that he follows the inclination of his + sensitive nature against the order of his reason. +
[36498] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod in homine est duplex natura, scilicet rationalis et +sensitiva. Et quia per operationem sensus homo pervenit ad actus +rationis, ideo plures sequuntur inclinationes naturae sensitivae +quam ordinem rationis, plures enim sunt qui assequuntur principium +rei, quam qui ad consummationem perveniunt. Ex hoc autem vitia et +peccata in hominibus proveniunt, quod sequuntur inclinationem +naturae sensitivae contra ordinem rationis.
+ Reply to Objection 4: Whatever is irregular in a work of art, is unnatural to the art which produced that work. Now the eternal law is compared + to the order of human reason, as art to a work of art. Therefore it amounts to the same that vice and sin are against the + order of human reason, and that they are contrary to the eternal law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 6) that "every + nature, as such, is from God; and is a vicious nature, in so far as it fails from the + Divine art whereby it was made." +
[36499] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod quidquid est contra rationem artificiati, est etiam +contra naturam artis, qua artificiatum producitur. Lex autem +aeterna comparatur ad ordinem rationis humanae sicut ars ad +artificiatum. Unde eiusdem rationis est quod vitium et peccatum sit +contra ordinem rationis humanae, et quod sit contra legem aeternam. +Unde Augustinus dicit, in III de Lib. Arb., quod a Deo habent +omnes naturae quod naturae sunt, et intantum sunt vitiosae, +inquantum ab eius, qua factae sunt, arte discedunt.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that vice, i.e. a bad habit, is worse than a sin, i.e. a bad act. For, as the more lasting a good is, the better + it is, so the longer an evil lasts, the worse it is. Now a vicious habit is more lasting than vicious acts, that pass forthwith. + Therefore a vicious habit is worse than a vicious act. +
[36500] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod vitium, idest habitus malus sit peius +quam peccatum, idest actus malus. Sicut enim bonum quod est +diuturnius, est melius; ita malum quod est diuturnius, est peius. +Sed habitus vitiosus est diuturnior quam actus vitiosi, qui statim +transeunt. Ergo habitus vitiosus est peior quam actus vitiosus.
+ Objection 2: Further, several evils are more to be shunned than one. But a bad habit is virtually the cause of many bad acts. Therefore + a vicious habit is worse than a vicious act. +
[36501] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +plura mala sunt magis fugienda quam unum malum. Sed habitus malus +virtualiter est causa multorum malorum actuum. Ergo habitus +vitiosus est peior quam actus vitiosus.
+ Objection 3: Further, a cause is more potent than its effect. But a habit produces its actions both as to their goodness and as to their + badness. Therefore a habit is more potent than its act, both in goodness and in badness. +
[36502] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +causa est potior quam effectus. Sed habitus perficit actum tam in +bonitate quam in malitia. Ergo habitus est potior actu et in +bonitate et in malitia.
+ On the contrary, A man is justly punished for a vicious act; but not for a vicious habit, so long as no act ensues. Therefore a vicious action + is worse than a vicious habit. +
[36503] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra, +pro actu vitioso aliquis iuste punitur, non autem pro habitu +vitioso, si non procedat ad actum. Ergo actus vitiosus est peior +quam habitus vitiosus.
+ I answer that, A habit stands midway between power and act. Now it is evident that both in good and in evil, act precedes power, as stated + in Metaph. ix, 19. For it is better to do well than to be able to do well, and in like manner, it is more blameworthy to do + evil, than to be able to do evil: whence it also follows that both in goodness and in badness, habit stands midway between + power and act, so that, to wit, even as a good or evil habit stands above the corresponding + power in goodness or in badness, so does it stand below the corresponding act. This is also made clear from the fact that + a habit is not called good or bad, save in so far as it induces to a good or bad act: wherefore a habit is called good or + bad by reason of the goodness or badness of its act: so that an act surpasses its habit in goodness or badness, since "the + cause of a thing being such, is yet more so." +
[36504] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod habitus medio modo se habet inter potentiam et actum. +Manifestum est autem quod actus in bono et in malo praeeminet +potentiae, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys., melius est enim bene agere +quam posse bene agere; et similiter vituperabilius est male agere +quam posse male agere. Unde etiam sequitur quod habitus in bonitate +et in malitia medium gradum obtineat inter potentiam et actum, ut +scilicet, sicut habitus bonus vel malus praeeminet in bonitate vel +malitia potentiae, ita etiam subdatur actui. Quod etiam ex hoc +apparet, quod habitus non dicitur bonus vel malus nisi ex hoc quod +inclinat ad actum bonum vel malum. Unde propter bonitatem vel +malitiam actus, dicitur habitus bonus vel malus. Et sic potior est +actus in bonitate vel malitia quam habitus, quia propter quod +unumquodque tale, et illud magis est.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders one thing from standing above another simply, and below it in some respect. Now a thing is deemed above another + simply if it surpasses it in a point which is proper to both; while it is deemed above it in a certain respect, if it surpasses + it in something which is accidental to both. Now it has been shown from the very nature of act and habit, that act surpasses + habit both in goodness and in badness. Whereas the fact that habit is more + lasting than act, is accidental to them, and is due to the fact that they are both found in a nature such that it cannot always + be in action, and whose action consists in a transient movement. Consequently act simply excels in goodness and badness, but + habit excels in a certain respect. +
[36505] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquid esse simpliciter altero +potius, quod tamen secundum quid ab eo deficit. Simpliciter enim +potius iudicatur quod praeeminet quantum ad id quod per se +consideratur in utroque, secundum quid autem quod praeeminet +secundum id quod per accidens se habet ad utrumque. Ostensum est +autem ex ipsa ratione actus et habitus, quod actus est potior in +bonitate et malitia quam habitus. Quod autem habitus sit diuturnior +quam actus, accidit ex eo quod utrumque invenitur in tali natura +quae non potest semper agere, et cuius actio est in motu +transeunte. Unde simpliciter actus est potior tam in bonitate quam +in malitia, sed habitus est potior secundum quid.
+ Reply to Objection 2: A habit is several acts, not simply, but in a certain respect, i.e. virtually. Wherefore this does not prove that habit precedes + act simply, both in goodness and in badness. +
[36506] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod habitus non est simpliciter plures actus, sed +secundum quid, idest virtute. Unde ex hoc non potest concludi quod +habitus sit simpliciter potior in bonitate vel malitia quam +actus.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Habit causes act by way of efficient causality: but act causes habit, by way of final causality, in respect of which we consider + the nature of good and evil. Consequently act surpasses habit both in goodness and in badness. +
[36507] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod habitus est causa actus in genere causae efficientis, +sed actus est causa habitus in genere causae finalis, secundum quam +consideratur ratio boni et mali. Et ideo in bonitate et malitia +actus praeeminet habitui.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that a vicious act, i.e. sin, is incompatible with virtue. For contraries cannot be together in the same subject. + Now sin is, in some way, contrary to virtue, as stated above + (A[1]). Therefore sin is incompatible with virtue. +
[36508] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus vitiosus, sive peccatum, non +possit simul esse cum virtute. Contraria enim non possunt esse +simul in eodem. Sed peccatum quodammodo contrariatur virtuti, ut +dictum est. Ergo peccatum non potest simul esse cum virtute.
+ Objection 2: Further, sin is worse than vice, i.e. evil act than evil habit. But vice cannot be in the same subject with virtue: neither, + therefore, can sin. +
[36509] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +peccatum est peius quam vitium, idest actus malus quam habitus +malus. Sed vitium non potest simul esse in eodem cum virtute. Ergo +neque peccatum.
+ Objection 3: Further, sin occurs in natural things, even as in voluntary matters (Phys. ii, text. 82). Now sin never happens in natural + things, except through some corruption of the natural power; thus monsters are due to corruption of some elemental force in + the seed, as stated in Phys. ii. Therefore no sin occurs in voluntary matters, except through the corruption of some virtue + in the soul: so that sin and virtue cannot be together in the same subject. +
[36510] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sicut peccatum accidit in rebus voluntariis, ita et in rebus +naturalibus, ut dicitur in II Physic. Sed nunquam in rebus +naturalibus accidit peccatum nisi per aliquam corruptionem virtutis +naturalis, sicut monstra accidunt corrupto aliquo principio in +semine, ut dicitur in II Physic. Ergo etiam in rebus voluntariis +non accidit peccatum nisi corrupta aliqua virtute animae. Et sic +peccatum et virtus non possunt esse in eodem.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 2,3) that "virtue is engendered and corrupted by contrary causes." Now one virtuous act + does not cause a virtue, as stated above ( + Q[51], A[3]): and, consequently, one sinful act does not corrupt virtue. Therefore they can be together in the same subject. +
[36511] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod per contraria virtus +generatur et corrumpitur. Sed unus actus virtuosus non causat +virtutem, ut supra habitum est. Ergo neque unus actus peccati +tollit virtutem. Possunt ergo simul in eodem esse.
+ I answer that, Sin is compared to virtue, as evil act to good habit. Now the position of a habit in the soul is not the same as that of + a form in a natural thing. For the form of a natural thing produces, of necessity, an operation befitting itself; wherefore + a natural form is incompatible with the act of a contrary form: thus heat is incompatible with the act of cooling, and lightness + with downward movement (except perhaps violence be used by some extrinsic mover): + whereas the habit that resides in the soul, does not, of necessity, produce its operation, but is used by man when he wills. + Consequently man, while possessing a habit, may either fail to use the habit, or produce a contrary act; and so a man having + a virtue may produce an act of sin. And this sinful act, so long as there is but one, cannot corrupt virtue, if we compare + the act to the virtue itself as a habit: since, just as habit is not engendered by one act, so neither is it destroyed by + one + act as stated above ( + Q[63], A[2], ad 2). But if we compare the sinful act to the cause of the virtues, then it is possible for some virtues to be destroyed + by one sinful act. For every mortal sin is contrary to charity, which is the root of all the infused virtues, as virtues; + and consequently, charity being banished by one act of mortal sin, it follows that all the infused virtues are expelled "as + virtues." And I say on account of faith and hope, whose habits remain + unquickened after mortal sin, so that they are no longer virtues. On the other hand, since venial sin is neither contrary + to charity, nor banishes it, as a consequence, neither does it expel the other virtues. As to the acquired virtues, they are + not destroyed by one act of any kind of sin. +
Accordingly, mortal sin is incompatible with the infused virtues, but is consistent with acquired virtue: while venial sin + is compatible with virtues, whether infused or acquired. +
[36512] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod peccatum comparatur ad virtutem sicut actus malus ad +habitum bonum. Aliter autem se habet habitus in anima, et forma in +re naturali. Forma enim naturalis ex necessitate producit +operationem sibi convenientem, unde non potest esse simul cum forma +naturali actus formae contrariae; sicut non potest esse cum calore +actus infrigidationis, neque simul cum levitate motus descensionis, +nisi forte ex violentia exterioris moventis. Sed habitus in anima +non ex necessitate producit suam operationem, sed homo utitur eo +cum voluerit. Unde simul habitu in homine existente, potest non uti +habitu, aut agere contrarium actum. Et sic potest habens virtutem +procedere ad actum peccati. Actus autem peccati, si comparetur ad +ipsam virtutem prout est habitus quidam, non potest ipsam +corrumpere, si sit unus tantum, sicut enim non generatur habitus +per unum actum, ita nec per unum actum corrumpitur, ut supra dictum +est. Sed si comparetur actus peccati ad causam virtutum, sic +possibile est quod per unum actum peccati aliquae virtutes +corrumpantur. Quodlibet enim peccatum mortale contrariatur +caritati, quae est radix omnium virtutum infusarum, inquantum sunt +virtutes, et ideo per unum actum peccati mortalis, exclusa +caritate, excluduntur per consequens omnes virtutes infusae, +quantum ad hoc quod sunt virtutes. Et hoc dico propter fidem et +spem, quarum habitus remanent informes post peccatum mortale, et +sic non sunt virtutes. Sed peccatum veniale, quod non contrariatur +caritati nec excludit ipsam, per consequens etiam non excludit +alias virtutes. Virtutes vero acquisitae non tolluntur per unum +actum cuiuscumque peccati. Sic igitur peccatum mortale non potest +simul esse cum virtutibus infusis, potest tamen simul esse cum +virtutibus acquisitis. Peccatum vero veniale potest simul esse et +cum virtutibus infusis, et cum acquisitis.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Sin is contrary to virtue, not by reason of itself, but by reason of its act. Hence sin is incompatible with the act, but + not with the habit, of virtue. +
[36513] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod peccatum non contrariatur virtuti secundum se, +sed secundum suum actum. Et ideo peccatum non potest simul esse cum +actu virtutis, potest tamen simul esse cum habitu.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Vice is directly contrary to virtue, even as sin to virtuous act: and so vice excludes virtue, just as sin excludes acts + of virtue. +
[36514] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod vitium directe contrariatur virtuti, sicut et +peccatum actui virtuoso. Et ideo vitium excludit virtutem, sicut +peccatum excludit actum virtutis.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The natural powers act of necessity, and hence so long as the power is unimpaired, no sin can be found in the act. On the + other hand, the virtues of the soul do not produce their acts of necessity; hence the comparison fails. +
[36515] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod virtutes naturales agunt ex necessitate, et ideo, +integra existente virtute, nunquam peccatum potest in actu +inveniri. Sed virtutes animae non producunt actus ex necessitate, +unde non est similis ratio.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that every sin includes an action. For as merit is compared with virtue, even so is sin compared with vice. + Now there can be no merit without an action. Neither, therefore, can there be sin without action. +
[36516] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod in quolibet peccato sit aliquis actus. +Sicut enim meritum comparatur ad virtutem, ita peccatum ad vitium +comparatur. Sed meritum non potest esse absque aliquo actu. Ergo +nec peccatum potest esse absque aliquo actu.
+ Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) [*Cf. De Vera Relig. xiv.]: So "true is it that every sin is voluntary, that, + unless it be voluntary, it is no sin at all." Now nothing can be voluntary, save through an act of the will. Therefore every + sin implies an act. +
[36517] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in libro de Lib. Arb., quod omne peccatum adeo +est voluntarium, quod si non sit voluntarium, non est peccatum. +Sed non potest esse aliquid voluntarium nisi per actum voluntatis. +Ergo omne peccatum habet aliquem actum.
+ Objection 3: Further, if sin could be without act, it would follow that a man sins as soon as he ceases doing what he ought. Now he who + never does something that he ought to do, ceases continually doing what he ought. Therefore it would follow that he sins continually; + and this is untrue. Therefore there is no sin without an act. +
[36518] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +si peccatum esset absque aliquo actu, sequeretur quod ex hoc ipso +quod aliquis cessat ab actu debito, peccaret. Sed continue aliquis +cessat ab actu debito, ille scilicet qui nunquam actum debitum +operatur. Ergo sequeretur quod continue peccaret, quod est falsum. +Non ergo est aliquod peccatum absque actu.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + James 4:17): "To him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin." Now "not to do" does not imply an act. Therefore + sin can be without act. +
[36519] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Iac. IV, scienti bonum facere et non facienti, +peccatum est illi. Sed non facere non importat aliquem actum. +Ergo peccatum potest esse absque actu.
+ I answer that, The reason for urging this question has reference to the sin of omission, about which there have been various opinions. For + some say that in every sin of omission there is some act, either interior or exterior---interior, as when a man wills "not + to go to church," when he is bound to go---exterior, as when a man, at the very hour that he is bound to go to church (or + even before), occupies himself in such a way that he is hindered from going. This seems, in a + way, to amount to the same as the first, for whoever wills one thing that is incompatible with this other, wills, consequently, + to go without this other: unless, perchance, it does not occur to him, that what he wishes to do, will hinder him from that + which he is bound to do, in which case he might be deemed guilty of negligence. On the other hand, others say, that a sin + of omission does not necessarily suppose an act: for the mere fact of not doing what one is bound to do is a sin. +
Now each of these opinions has some truth in it. For if in the sin of omission we look merely at that in which the essence + of the sin consists, the sin of omission will be sometimes with an interior act, as when a man wills "not to go to church": + while sometimes it will be without any act at all, whether interior or exterior, as when a man, at the time that he is bound + to go to church, does not think of going or not going to church. +
If, however, in the sin of omission, we consider also the causes, or occasions of the omission, then the sin of omission + must of necessity include some act. For there is no sin of omission, unless we omit what we can do or not do: and that we + turn aside so as not to do what we can do or not do, must needs be due to some cause or occasion, either united with the omission + or preceding it. Now if this cause be not in man's power, the omission will not be sinful, as when anyone + omits going to church on account of sickness: but if the cause or occasion be subject to the will, the omission is sinful; + and such cause, in so far as it is voluntary, must needs always include some act, at least the interior act of the will: which + act sometimes bears directly on the omission, as when a man wills "not to go to church," because it is too much trouble; and + in this case this act, of its very nature, belongs to the omission, because the volition of any sin whatever, pertains, of + itself, to that sin, since voluntariness is essential to sin. Sometimes, however, the act of the will bears directly on something + else which hinders man from doing what he ought, whether this something else be united with the omission, as when a man wills + to play at the time he ought to go to church---or, precede the omission, as when a man wills to sit up late at night, the + result being that he does not go to church in the morning. In this case the act, interior or exterior, is accidental to + the omission, since the omission follows outside the intention, and that which is outside the intention is said to be accidental + (Phys. ii, text. 49,50). Wherefore it is evident that then the sin of omission has indeed an act united with, or preceding + the omission, but that this act is accidental to the sin of omission. +
Now in judging about things, we must be guided by that which is proper to them, and not by that which is accidental: and + consequently it is truer to say that a sin can be without any act; else the circumstantial acts and occasions would be essential + to other actual sins. +
[36520] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod quaestio ista principaliter movetur propter peccatum +omissionis, de quo aliqui diversimode opinantur. Quidam enim dicunt +quod in omni peccato omissionis est aliquis actus vel interior vel +exterior. Interior quidem, sicut cum aliquis vult non ire ad +Ecclesiam quando ire tenetur. Exterior autem, sicut cum aliquis +illa hora qua ad Ecclesiam ire tenetur, vel etiam ante, occupat se +talibus quibus ab eundo ad Ecclesiam impeditur. Et hoc quodammodo +videtur in primum redire, qui enim vult aliquid cum quo aliud simul +esse non potest, ex consequenti vult illo carere; nisi forte non +perpendat quod per hoc quod vult facere, impeditur ab eo quod +facere tenetur; in quo casu posset per negligentiam culpabilis +iudicari. Alii vero dicunt quod in peccato omissionis non +requiritur aliquis actus, ipsum enim non facere quod quis facere +tenetur, peccatum est. Utraque autem opinio secundum aliquid +veritatem habet. Si enim intelligatur in peccato omissionis illud +solum quod per se pertinet ad rationem peccati, sic quandoque +omissionis peccatum est cum actu interiori, ut cum aliquis vult non +ire ad Ecclesiam, quandoque vero absque omni actu vel interiori vel +exteriori, sicut cum aliquis hora qua tenetur ire ad Ecclesiam, +nihil cogitat de eundo vel non eundo ad Ecclesiam. Si vero in +peccato omissionis intelligantur etiam causae vel occasiones +omittendi, sic necesse est in peccato omissionis aliquem actum +esse. Non enim est peccatum omissionis nisi cum aliquis +praetermittit quod potest facere et non facere. Quod autem aliquis +declinet ad non faciendum illud quod potest facere et non facere, +non est nisi ex aliqua causa vel occasione coniuncta vel +praecedente. Et si quidem causa illa non sit in potestate hominis, +omissio non habet rationem peccati, sicut cum aliquis propter +infirmitatem praetermittit ad Ecclesiam ire. Si vero causa vel +occasio omittendi subiaceat voluntati, omissio habet rationem +peccati, et tunc semper oportet quod ista causa, inquantum est +voluntaria, habeat aliquem actum, ad minus interiorem voluntatis. +Qui quidem actus quandoque directe fertur in ipsam omissionem, puta +cum aliquis vult non ire ad Ecclesiam, vitans laborem. Et tunc +talis actus per se pertinet ad omissionem, voluntas enim +cuiuscumque peccati per se pertinet ad peccatum illud, eo quod +voluntarium est de ratione peccati. Quandoque autem actus +voluntatis directe fertur in aliud, per quod homo impeditur ab actu +debito, sive illud in quod fertur voluntas, sit coniunctum +omissioni, puta cum aliquis vult ludere quando ad Ecclesiam debet +ire; sive etiam sit praecedens, puta cum aliquis vult diu vigilare +de sero, ex quo sequitur quod non vadat hora matutinali ad +Ecclesiam. Et tunc actus iste interior vel exterior per accidens se +habet ad omissionem, quia omissio sequitur praeter intentionem; hoc +autem dicimus per accidens esse, quod est praeter intentionem, ut +patet in II Physic. Unde manifestum est quod tunc peccatum +omissionis habet quidem aliquem actum coniunctum vel praecedentem, +qui tamen per accidens se habet ad peccatum omissionis. Iudicium +autem de rebus dandum est secundum illud quod est per se, et non +secundum illud quod est per accidens. Unde verius dici potest quod +aliquod peccatum possit esse absque omni actu. Alioquin etiam ad +essentiam aliorum peccatorum actualium pertinerent actus et +occasiones circumstantes.
+ Reply to Objection 1: More things are required for good than for evil, since "good results from a whole and entire cause, whereas evil results + from each single defect," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv): so that sin may arise from a man doing what he ought not, or + by his not doing what he ought; while there can be no merit, unless a man do willingly what he ought to do: wherefore there + can be no merit without act, whereas there can be sin without act. +
[36521] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod plura requiruntur ad bonum quam ad malum, eo +quod bonum contingit ex tota integra causa, malum autem ex +singularibus defectibus, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. +Nom. Et ideo peccatum potest contingere sive aliquis faciat quod +non debet, sive non faciendo quod debet, sed meritum non potest +esse nisi aliquis faciat voluntarie quod debet. Et ideo meritum non +potest esse sine actu, sed peccatum potest esse sine actu.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The term "voluntary" is applied not only to that on which the act of the will is brought to bear, but also to that which + we have the power to do or not to do, as stated in Ethic. iii, 5. Hence even not to will may be called voluntary, in so far + as man has it in his power to will, and not to will. +
[36522] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod aliquid dicitur voluntarium non solum quia cadit +super ipsum actus voluntatis, sed quia in potestate nostra est ut +fiat vel non fiat, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Unde etiam ipsum non +velle potest dici voluntarium, inquantum in potestate hominis est +velle et non velle.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The sin of omission is contrary to an affirmative precept which binds always, but not for always. Hence, by omitting to act, + a man sins only for the time at which the affirmative precept binds him to act. +
[36523] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod peccatum omissionis contrariatur praecepto +affirmativo, quod obligat semper, sed non ad semper. Et ideo solum +pro tempore illo aliquis cessando ab actu peccat, pro quo +praeceptum affirmativum obligat.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that sin is unfittingly defined by saying: "Sin is a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the eternal law." Because + "Word," "deed," and "desire" imply an act; whereas not every sin implies an act, as stated above + (A[5]). Therefore this definition does not include every sin. +
[36524] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter definiatur peccatum, +cum dicitur, peccatum est dictum vel factum vel concupitum +contra legem aeternam. Dictum enim, vel factum, vel concupitum, +importat aliquem actum. Sed non omne peccatum importat aliquem +actum, ut dictum est. Ergo haec definitio non includit omne +peccatum.
+ Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Duab. Anim. xii): "Sin is the will to retain or obtain what justice forbids." Now will is comprised + under desire, in so far as desire denotes any act of the appetite. Therefore it was enough to say: "Sin is a desire contrary + to the eternal law," nor was there need to add "word" or "deed." +
[36525] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in libro de duabus animabus, peccatum est +voluntas retinendi vel consequendi quod iustitia vetat. Sed +voluntas sub concupiscentia comprehenditur, secundum quod +concupiscentia largo modo sumitur, pro omni appetitu. Ergo +suffecisset dicere, peccatum est concupitum contra legem aeternam; +nec oportuit addere, dictum vel factum.
+ Objection 3: Further, sin apparently consists properly in aversion from the end: because good and evil are measured chiefly with regard + to the end as explained above ( + Q[1], A[3]; + Q[18], AA[4],6; + Q[20], AA[2],3): wherefore Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i) defines sin in reference to the end, by saying that "sin is nothing else than to + neglect eternal things, and seek after temporal things": and again he + says (Qq. lxxxii, qu. 30) that "all human wickedness consists in using what we should enjoy, and in enjoying what we should + use." Now the definition is question contains no mention of aversion from our due end: therefore it is an insufficient definition + of sin. +
[36526] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, +peccatum proprie consistere videtur in aversione a fine, nam bonum +et malum principaliter considerantur secundum finem, ut ex +supradictis patet. Unde et Augustinus, in I de Lib. Arb., per +comparationem ad finem definit peccatum, dicens quod peccare +nihil est aliud quam, neglectis rebus aeternis, temporalia +sectari, et in libro octoginta trium quaest., dicit quod +omnis humana perversitas est uti fruendis et frui utendis. +Sed in praemissa definitione nulla fit mentio de aversione a debito +fine. Ergo insufficienter definitur peccatum.
+ Objection 4: Further, a thing is said to be forbidden, because it is contrary to the law. Now not all sins are evil through being forbidden, + but some are forbidden because they are evil. Therefore sin in general should not be defined as being against the law of God. +
[36527] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 arg. 4 Praeterea, +ex hoc dicitur aliquid esse prohibitum, quia legi contrariatur. Sed +non omnia peccata sunt mala quia prohibita, sed quaedam sunt +prohibita quia mala. Non ergo in communi definitione peccati debuit +poni quod sit contra legem Dei.
+ Objection 5: Further, a sin denotes a bad human act, as was explained above + (A[1]). Now man's evil is to be against reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore it would have been better to say that + sin is against reason than to say that it is contrary to the eternal law. +
[36528] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 arg. 5 Praeterea, +peccatum significat malum hominis actum, ut ex dictis patet. Sed +malum hominis est contra rationem esse, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. +de Div. Nom. Ergo potius debuit dici quod peccatum sit contra +rationem, quam quod peccatum sit contra legem aeternam.
+ On the contrary, the authority of Augustine suffices (Contra Faust. xxii, 27). +
[36529] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 s. c. In +contrarium sufficit auctoritas Augustini.
+ I answer that, As was shown above + (A[1]), sin is nothing else than a bad human act. Now that an act is a human act is due to its being voluntary, as stated above + (Q[1], A[1]), whether it be voluntary, as being elicited by the will, e.g. to will or to choose, or as being commanded by + the will, e.g. the exterior actions of speech or operation. Again, a human act is evil through lacking conformity with its + due measure: and conformity of measure in a + thing depends on a rule, from which if that thing depart, it is incommensurate. Now there are two rules of the human will: + one is proximate and homogeneous, viz. the human reason; the other is the first rule, viz. the eternal law, which is God's + reason, so to speak. Accordingly Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 27) includes two things in the definition of sin; one, pertaining + to the substance of a human act, and which is the matter, so to speak, of sin, when he says "word," "deed," or "desire"; + the other, pertaining to the nature of evil, and which is the form, as it were, of sin, when he says, "contrary to the eternal + law." +
[36530] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ex dictis patet, peccatum nihil aliud est quam +actus humanus malus. Quod autem aliquis actus sit humanus, habet ex +hoc quod est voluntarius, sicut ex supradictis patet, sive sit +voluntarius quasi a voluntate elicitus, ut ipsum velle et eligere; +sive quasi a voluntate imperatus, ut exteriores actus vel +locutionis vel operationis. Habet autem actus humanus quod sit +malus, ex eo quod caret debita commensuratione. Omnis autem +commensuratio cuiuscumque rei attenditur per comparationem ad +aliquam regulam, a qua si divertat, incommensurata erit. Regula +autem voluntatis humanae est duplex, una propinqua et homogenea, +scilicet ipsa humana ratio; alia vero est prima regula, scilicet +lex aeterna, quae est quasi ratio Dei. Et ideo Augustinus in +definitione peccati posuit duo, unum quod pertinet ad substantiam +actus humani, quod est quasi materiale in peccato, cum dixit, +dictum vel factum vel concupitum; aliud autem quod pertinet ad +rationem mali, quod est quasi formale in peccato, cum dixit, contra +legem aeternam.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Affirmation and negation are reduced to one same genus: e.g. in Divine things, begotten and unbegotten are reduced to the + genus "relation," as Augustine states (De Trin. v, 6,7): and so "word" and "deed" denote equally what is said and what is + not said, what is done and what is not done. +
[36531] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod affirmatio et negatio reducuntur ad idem genus, +sicut in divinis genitum et ingenitum ad relationem, ut Augustinus +dicit, in V de Trin. Et ideo pro eodem est accipiendum dictum et +non dictum, factum et non factum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The first cause of sin is in the will, which commands all voluntary acts, in which alone is sin to be found: and hence it + is that Augustine sometimes defines sin in reference to the will alone. But since external acts also pertain to the substance + of sin, through being evil of themselves, as stated, it was necessary in defining sin to include something referring to external + action. +
[36532] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod prima causa peccati est in voluntate, quae imperat +omnes actus voluntarios, in quibus solum invenitur peccatum, et +ideo Augustinus quandoque per solam voluntatem definit peccatum. +Sed quia etiam ipsi exteriores actus pertinent ad substantiam +peccati, cum sint secundum se mali, ut dictum est, necesse fuit +quod in definitione peccati poneretur etiam aliquid pertinens ad +exteriores actus.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The eternal law first and foremost directs man to his end, and in consequence, makes man to be well disposed in regard to + things which are directed to the end: hence when he says, "contrary to the eternal law," he includes aversion from the end + and all other forms of inordinateness. +
[36533] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod lex aeterna primo et principaliter ordinat hominem ad +finem, consequenter autem facit hominem bene se habere circa ea +quae sunt ad finem. Et ideo in hoc quod dicit contra legem +aeternam, tangit aversionem a fine, et omnes alias +inordinationes.
+ Reply to Objection 4: When it is said that not every sin is evil through being forbidden, this must be understood of prohibition by positive law. + If, however, the prohibition be referred to the natural law, which is contained primarily in the eternal law, but secondarily + in the natural code of the human reason, then every sin is evil through being prohibited: since it is contrary to natural + law, precisely because it is inordinate. +
[36534] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod, cum dicitur quod non omne peccatum ideo est malum +quia est prohibitum, intelligitur de prohibitione facta per ius +positivum. Si autem referatur ad ius naturale, quod continetur +primo quidem in lege aeterna, secundario vero in naturali +iudicatorio rationis humanae, tunc omne peccatum est malum quia +prohibitum, ex hoc enim ipso quod est inordinatum, iuri naturali +repugnat.
+ Reply to Objection 5: The theologian considers sin chiefly as an offense against God; and the moral philosopher, as something contrary to reason. + Hence Augustine defines sin with reference to its being "contrary to the eternal law," more fittingly than with reference + to its being contrary to reason; the more so, as the eternal law directs us in many things that surpass human reason, e.g. + in matters of faith. +
[36535] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 ad 5 Ad quintum +dicendum quod a theologis consideratur peccatum praecipue secundum +quod est offensa contra Deum, a philosopho autem morali, secundum +quod contrariatur rationi. Et ideo Augustinus convenientius definit +peccatum ex hoc quod est contra legem aeternam, quam ex hoc quod +est contra rationem, praecipue cum per legem aeternam regulemur in +multis quae excedunt rationem humanam, sicut in his quae sunt +fidei.
We must now consider the distinction of sins or vices: under which head there are nine points of inquiry:
(1) Whether sins are distinguished specifically by their objects?
(2) Of the distinction between spiritual and carnal sins;
(3) Whether sins differ in reference to their causes?
(4) Whether they differ with respect to those who are sinned against?
(5) Whether sins differ in relation to the debt of punishment?
(6) Whether they differ in regard to omission and commission?
(7) Whether they differ according to their various stages?
(8) Whether they differ in respect of excess and deficiency?
(9) Whether they differ according to their various circumstances?
+[36536] +Iª-IIae q. 72 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +distinctione peccatorum vel vitiorum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur +novem. Primo, utrum peccata distinguantur specie secundum obiecta. +Secundo, de distinctione peccatorum spiritualium et carnalium. +Tertio, utrum secundum causas. Quarto, utrum secundum eos in quos +peccatur. Quinto, utrum secundum diversitatem reatus. Sexto, utrum +secundum omissionem et commissionem. Septimo, utrum secundum +diversum processum peccati. Octavo, utrum secundum abundantiam et +defectum. Nono, utrum secundum diversas circumstantias.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that sins do not differ in species, according to their objects. For acts are said to be good or evil, in relation, + chiefly, to their end, as shown above ( + Q[1], A[3]; + Q[18], AA[4],6). Since then sin is nothing else than a bad human act, as stated above ( + Q[71], A[1]), it seems that sins should differ specifically according to their ends rather than according to their objects. +
[36537] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccata non differant specie secundum +obiecta. Actus enim humani praecipue dicuntur boni vel mali per +comparationem ad finem, ut supra ostensum est. Cum igitur peccatum +nihil aliud sit quam actus hominis malus, sicut dictum est, videtur +quod secundum fines peccata debeant distingui specie, magis quam +secundum obiecta.
+ Objection 2: Further, evil, being a privation, differs specifically according to the different species of opposites. Now sin is an evil + in the genus of human acts. Therefore sins differ specifically according to their opposites rather than according to their + objects. +
[36538] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +malum, cum sit privatio, distinguitur specie secundum diversas +species oppositorum. Sed peccatum est quoddam malum in genere +humanorum actuum. Ergo peccata magis distinguuntur specie secundum +opposita, quam secundum obiecta.
+ Objection 3: Further, if sins differed specifically according to their objects, it would be impossible to find the same specific sin with + diverse objects: and yet such sins are to be found. For pride is about things spiritual and material as Gregory says (Moral. + xxxiv, 18); and avarice is about different kinds of things. Therefore sins do not differ in species according to their objects. +
[36539] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +si peccata specie differrent secundum obiecta, impossibile esset +idem peccatum specie circa diversa obiecta inveniri. Sed +inveniuntur aliqua huiusmodi peccata, nam superbia est et in rebus +spiritualibus et in corporalibus, ut Gregorius dicit, in libro +XXXIV Moral.; avaritia etiam est circa diversa genera rerum. Ergo +peccata non distinguuntur specie secundum obiecta.
+ On the contrary, "Sin is a word, deed, or desire against God's law." Now words, deeds, and desires differ in species according to their various + objects: since acts differ by their objects, as stated above ( + Q[18], A[2] ). Therefore sins, also differ in species according to their objects. +
[36540] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod peccatum est dictum vel factum vel concupitum contra legem +Dei. Sed dicta vel facta vel concupita distinguuntur specie +secundum diversa obiecta, quia actus per obiecta distinguuntur, ut +supra dictum est. Ergo etiam peccata secundum obiecta specie +distinguuntur.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + Q[71], A[6]), two things concur in the nature of sin, viz. the voluntary act, and its inordinateness, which consists in departing from + God's law. Of these two, one is referred essentially to the sinner, who intends such and such an act in such and such matter; + while the other, viz. the inordinateness of the act, is referred accidentally to the intention of the sinner, for "no one + acts intending evil," as Dionysius + declares (Div. Nom. iv). Now it is evident that a thing derives its species from that which is essential and not from that + which is accidental: because what is accidental is outside the specific nature. Consequently sins differ specifically on the + part of the voluntary acts rather than of the inordinateness inherent to sin. Now voluntary acts differ in species according + to their objects, as was proved above ( + Q[18], A[2]). Therefore it follows that sins are properly + distinguished in species by their objects. +
[36541] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ad rationem peccati duo +concurrunt, scilicet actus voluntarius; et inordinatio eius, quae +est per recessum a lege Dei. Horum autem duorum unum per se +comparatur ad peccantem, qui intendit talem actum voluntarium +exercere in tali materia, aliud autem, scilicet inordinatio actus, +per accidens se habet ad intentionem peccantis; nullus enim +intendens ad malum operatur, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. +Nom. Manifestum est autem quod unumquodque, consequitur speciem +secundum illud quod est per se, non autem secundum id quod est per +accidens, quia ea quae sunt per accidens, sunt extra rationem +speciei. Et ideo peccata specie distinguuntur ex parte actuum +voluntariorum, magis quam ex parte inordinationis in peccato +existentis. Actus autem voluntarii distinguuntur specie secundum +obiecta, ut in superioribus ostensum est. Unde sequitur quod +peccata proprie distinguantur specie secundum obiecta.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The aspect of good is found chiefly in the end: and therefore the end stands in the relation of object to the act of the + will which is at the root of every sin. Consequently it amounts to the same whether sins differ by their objects or by their + ends. +
[36542] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod finis principaliter habet rationem boni, et ideo +comparatur ad actum voluntatis, qui est primordialis in omni +peccato, sicut obiectum. Unde in idem redit quod peccata differant +secundum obiecta, vel secundum fines.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Sin is not a pure privation but an act deprived of its due order: hence sins differ specifically according to their objects + of their acts rather than according to their opposites, although, even if they were distinguished in reference to their opposite + virtues, it would come to the same: since virtues differ specifically according to their objects, as stated above ( + Q[60], A[5]). +
[36543] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod peccatum non est pura privatio, sed est actus debito +ordine privatus. Et ideo peccata magis distinguuntur specie +secundum obiecta actuum, quam secundum opposita. Quamvis etiam si +distinguantur secundum oppositas virtutes, in idem rediret, +virtutes enim distinguuntur specie secundum obiecta, ut supra +habitum est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: In various things, differing in species or genus, nothing hinders our finding one formal aspect of the object, from which + aspect sin receives its species. It is thus that pride seeks excellence in reference to various things; and avarice seeks + abundance of things adapted to human use. +
[36544] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod nihil prohibet in diversis rebus specie vel genere +differentibus, invenire unam formalem rationem obiecti, a qua +peccatum speciem recipit. Et hoc modo superbia circa diversas res +excellentiam quaerit, avaritia vero abundantiam eorum quae usui +humano accommodantur.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that spiritual sins are unfittingly distinguished from carnal sins. For the Apostle says ( + Gal. 5:19): "The works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, luxury, idolatry, witchcrafts," etc. + from which it seems that all kinds of sins are works of the flesh. Now carnal sins are called works of the flesh. Therefore + carnal sins should not be distinguished from spiritual sins. +
[36545] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter distinguantur peccata +spiritualia a carnalibus. Dicit enim apostolus, ad Galat. V, +manifesta sunt opera carnis, quae sunt fornicatio, immunditia, +impudicitia, luxuria, idolorum servitus, veneficia, etc., ex +quo videtur quod omnia peccatorum genera sunt opera carnis. Sed +peccata carnalia dicuntur opera carnis. Ergo non sunt distinguenda +peccata carnalia a spiritualibus.
+ Objection 2: Further, whosoever sins, walks according to the flesh, as stated in + Rom. 8:13: "If you live according to the flesh, you shall die. But if by the spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall live." + Now to live or walk according to the flesh seems to pertain to the nature of carnal sin. Therefore carnal sins should not + be distinguished from spiritual sins. +
[36546] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +quicumque peccat, secundum carnem ambulat, secundum illud Rom. +VIII, si secundum carnem vixeritis, moriemini; si autem spiritu +facta carnis mortificaveritis, vivetis. Sed vivere vel ambulare +secundum carnem, videtur pertinere ad rationem peccati carnalis. +Ergo omnia peccata sunt carnalia. Non ergo sunt distinguenda +peccata carnalia a spiritualibus.
+ Objection 3: Further, the higher part of the soul, which is the mind or reason, is called the spirit, according to + Eph. 4:23: "Be renewed in the spirit of your mind," where spirit stands for reason, according to a gloss. Now every sin, which is committed + in accordance with the flesh, flows from the reason by its consent; since consent in a sinful act belongs to the higher reason, + as we shall state further on ( + Q[74], A[7]). + Therefore the same sins are both carnal and spiritual, and consequently they should not be distinguished from one another. +
[36547] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +superior pars animae, quae est mens vel ratio, spiritus nominatur, +secundum illud Ephes. IV, renovamini spiritu mentis vestrae, +ubi spiritus pro ratione ponitur, ut ibi Glossa dicit. Sed omne +peccatum quod secundum carnem committitur, a ratione derivatur per +consensum, quia superioris rationis est consentire in actum +peccati, ut infra dicetur. Ergo eadem peccata sunt carnalia et +spiritualia. Non ergo sunt distinguenda ad invicem.
+ Objection 4: Further, if some sins are carnal specifically, this, seemingly, should apply chiefly to those sins whereby man sins against + his own body. But, according to the Apostle ( + 1 Cor. 6:18), "every sin that a man doth, is without the body: but he that committeth fornication, sinneth against his own body." Therefore + fornication would be the only carnal sin, whereas the Apostle ( + Eph. 5:3) reckons covetousness with the carnal + sins. +
[36548] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, +si aliqua peccata specialiter sunt carnalia, hoc potissime +intelligendum videtur de illis peccatis quibus aliquis in corpus +suum peccat. Sed sicut apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. VI, omne +peccatum quodcumque fecerit homo, extra corpus est, qui autem +fornicatur, in corpus suum peccat. Ergo sola fornicatio esset +peccatum carnale, cum tamen apostolus, ad Ephes. V, etiam avaritiam +carnalibus peccatis annumeret.
+ On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) says that "of the seven capital sins five are spiritual, and two carnal." +
[36549] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., dicit quod septem capitalium +vitiorum quinque sunt spiritualia, et duo carnalia.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[1]), sins take their species from their objects. Now every sin consists in the desire for some mutable good, for which man has + an inordinate desire, and the possession of which gives him inordinate pleasure. Now, as explained above (Q[31], A[3]), pleasure + is twofold. One belongs to the soul, and is consummated in the mere apprehension of a thing possessed in accordance with desire; + this can also be called spiritual + pleasure, e.g. when one takes pleasure in human praise or the like. The other pleasure is bodily or natural, and is realized + in bodily touch, and this can also be called carnal pleasure. +
Accordingly, those sins which consist in spiritual pleasure, are called spiritual sins; while those which consist in carnal + pleasure, are called carnal sins, e.g. gluttony, which consists in the pleasures of the table; and lust, which consists in + sexual pleasures. Hence the Apostle says ( + 2 Cor. 7:1): "Let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of the flesh and of the spirit." +
[36550] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, peccata recipiunt speciem ex +obiectis. Omne autem peccatum consistit in appetitu alicuius +commutabilis boni quod inordinate appetitur, et per consequens in +eo iam habito inordinate aliquis delectatur. Ut autem ex +superioribus patet, duplex est delectatio. Una quidem animalis, +quae consummatur in sola apprehensione alicuius rei ad votum +habitae, et haec etiam potest dici delectatio spiritualis, sicut +cum aliquis delectatur in laude humana, vel in aliquo huiusmodi. +Alia vero delectatio est corporalis, sive naturalis, quae in ipso +tactu corporali perficitur, quae potest etiam dici delectatio +carnalis. Sic igitur illa peccata quae perficiuntur in delectatione +spirituali, vocantur peccata spiritualia, illa vero quae +perficiuntur in delectatione carnali, vocantur peccata carnalia; +sicut gula, quae perficitur in delectatione ciborum, et luxuria, +quae perficitur in delectatione venereorum. Unde et apostolus dicit +II ad Cor. VII. Emundemus nos ab omni inquinamento, carnis et +spiritus.
+ Reply to Objection 1: As a gloss says on the same passage, these vices are called works of the flesh, not as though they consisted in carnal pleasure; + but flesh here denotes man, who is said to live according to the flesh, when he lives according to himself, as Augustine says + (De Civ. Dei xiv, 2,3). The reason of this is because every failing in the human reason is due in some way to the carnal sense. +
[36551] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut Glossa ibidem dicit, illa vitia dicuntur +opera carnis, non quia in voluptate carnis perficiantur, sed +caro sumitur ibi pro homine, qui dum secundum se vivit, secundum +carnem vivere dicitur; ut etiam Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. +Dei. Et huius ratio est ex hoc, quod omnis rationis humanae +defectus ex sensu carnali aliquo modo initium habet.
Reply to Objection 2: This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
[36552] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 ad 2 Et per hoc +etiam patet responsio ad secundum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Even in the carnal sins there is a spiritual act, viz. the act of reason: but the end of these sins, from which they are + named, is carnal pleasure. +
[36553] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod in peccatis etiam carnalibus est aliquis actus +spiritualis, scilicet actus rationis, sed finis horum peccatorum, a +quo denominantur, est delectatio carnis.
+ Reply to Objection 4: As the gloss says, "in the sin of fornication the soul is the body's slave in a special sense, because at the moment of sinning + it can think of nothing else": whereas the pleasure of gluttony, although carnal, does not so utterly absorb the reason. It + may also be said that in this sin, an injury is done to the body also, for it is defiled inordinately: wherefore by this sin + alone is man said specifically to sin against his body. While covetousness, + which is reckoned among the carnal sins, stands here for adultery, which is the unjust appropriation of another's wife. Again, + it may be said that the thing in which the covetous man takes pleasure is something bodily, and in this respect covetousness + is numbered with the carnal sins: but the pleasure itself does not belong to the body, but to the spirit, wherefore Gregory + says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that it is a spiritual sin. +
[36554] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod, sicut Glossa ibidem dicit, specialiter in +fornicationis peccato servit anima corpori, intantum ut nihil aliud +in ipso momento cogitare homini liceat. Delectatio autem gulae, +etsi sit carnalis, non ita absorbet rationem. Vel potest dici quod +in hoc peccato etiam quaedam iniuria fit corpori, dum inordinate +maculatur. Et ideo per hoc solum peccatum dicitur specialiter homo +in corpus peccare. Avaritia vero quae in carnalibus peccatis +connumeratur, pro adulterio ponitur, quod est iniusta usurpatio +uxoris alienae. Vel potest dici quod res in qua delectatur avarus, +corporale quoddam est, et quantum ad hoc, connumeratur peccatis +carnalibus. Sed ipsa delectatio non pertinet ad carnem, sed ad +spiritum, et ideo secundum Gregorium, est spirituale peccatum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that sins differ specifically in reference to their causes. For a thing takes its species from that whence + it derives its being. Now sins derive their being from their causes. Therefore they take their species from them also. Therefore + they differ specifically in reference to their causes. +
[36555] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccata distinguantur specie secundum +causas. Ab eodem enim habet res speciem, a quo habet esse. Sed +peccata habent esse ex suis causis. Ergo ab eis etiam speciem +sortiuntur. Differunt ergo specie secundum diversitatem +causarum.
+ Objection 2: Further, of all the causes the material cause seems to have least reference to the species. Now the object in a sin is like + its material cause. Since, therefore, sins differ specifically according to their objects, it seems that much more do they + differ in reference to their other causes. +
[36556] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +inter alias causas minus videtur pertinere ad speciem causa +materialis. Sed obiectum in peccato est sicut causa materialis. Cum +ergo secundum obiecta peccata specie distinguantur, videtur quod +peccata multo magis secundum alias causas distinguantur specie.
+ Objection 3: Further, Augustine, commenting on + Ps. 79:17, "Things set on fire and dug down," says that "every sin is due either to fear inducing false humility, or to love enkindling + us to undue ardor." For it is written ( + 1 Jn. 2:16) that "all that is in the world, is the concupiscence of the flesh, or [Vulg.: 'and'] the concupiscence of the eyes, or [Vulg.: + 'and'] the pride of life." Now a thing is said to be in the world on + account of sin, in as much as the world denotes lovers of the world, as Augustine observes (Tract. ii in Joan.). Gregory, + too (Moral. xxxi, 17), distinguishes all sins according to the seven capital vices. Now all these divisions refer to the causes + of sins. Therefore, seemingly, sins differ specifically according to the diversity of their causes. +
[36557] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +Augustinus, super illud Psalmi, incensa igni et suffossa, dicit +quod omne peccatum est ex timore male humiliante, vel ex amore +male inflammante. Dicitur etiam I Ioan. II, quod omne quod +est in mundo, aut est concupiscentia carnis, aut concupiscentia +oculorum, aut superbia vitae, dicitur autem aliquid esse in +mundo, propter peccatum, secundum quod mundi nomine amatores mundi +significantur, ut Augustinus dicit, super Ioan. Gregorius etiam, +XXXI Moral., distinguit omnia peccata secundum septem vitia +capitalia. Omnes autem huiusmodi divisiones respiciunt causas +peccatorum. Ergo videtur quod peccata differant specie secundum +diversitatem causarum.
+ On the contrary, If this were the case all sins would belong to one species, since they are due to one cause. For it is written ( + Ecclus. 10:15) that "pride is the beginning of all sin," and ( + 1 Tim. 6:10) that "the desire of money is the root of all evils." Now it is evident that there are various species of sins. Therefore + sins do not differ specifically according to their different causes. +
[36558] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quia secundum hoc omnia peccata essent unius speciei, cum ex +una causa causentur, dicitur enim Eccli. X, quod initium omnis +peccati est superbia; et I ad Tim. ult., quod radix omnium +malorum est cupiditas. Manifestum est autem esse diversas +species peccatorum. Non ergo peccata distinguuntur specie secundum +diversitates causarum.
+ I answer that, Since there are four kinds of causes, they are attributed to various things in various ways. Because the "formal" and the + "material" cause regard properly the substance of a thing; and consequently substances differ in respect of their matter and + form, both in species and in genus. The "agent" and the "end" regard directly movement and operation: wherefore movements + and operations differ specifically in respect of these causes; in different ways, however, + because the natural active principles are always determined to the same acts; so that the different species of natural acts + are taken not only from the objects, which are the ends or terms of those acts, but also from their active principles: thus + heating and cooling are specifically distinct with reference to hot and cold. On the other hand, the active principles in + voluntary acts, such as the acts of sins, are not determined, of necessity, to one act, and consequently from one active or + motive principle, diverse species of sins can proceed: thus from fear engendering false humility man may proceed to theft, + or murder, or to neglect the flock committed to his care; and these same things may proceed from love enkindling to undue + ardor. Hence it is evident that sins do not differ specifically according to their various active or motive causes, but only + in respect of diversity in the final cause, which is the end and object of the will. For it has been shown above ( + Q[1], A[3]; + Q[18], AA[4],6) that human acts take their species from the end. +
[36559] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, cum quatuor sint causarum genera, diversimode +diversis attribuuntur. Causa enim formalis et materialis respiciunt +proprie substantiam rei, et ideo substantiae secundum formam et +materiam specie et genere distinguuntur. Agens autem et finis +respiciunt directe motum et operationem, et ideo motus et +operationes secundum huiusmodi causas specie distinguuntur; +diversimode tamen. Nam principia activa naturalia sunt determinata +semper ad eosdem actus, et ideo diversae species in actibus +naturalibus attenduntur non solum secundum obiecta, quae sunt fines +vel termini, sed etiam secundum principia activa; sicut calefacere +et infrigidare distinguuntur specie secundum calidum et frigidum. +Sed principia activa in actibus voluntariis, cuiusmodi sunt actus +peccatorum, non se habent ex necessitate ad unum, et ideo ex uno +principio activo vel motivo possunt diversae species peccatorum +procedere; sicut ex timore male humiliante potest procedere quod +homo furetur, et quod occidat, et quod deserat gregem sibi +commissum; et haec eadem possunt procedere ex amore. Unde +manifestum est quod peccata non differant specie secundum diversas +causas activas vel motivas; sed solum secundum diversitatem causae +finalis. Finis autem est obiectum voluntatis, ostensum est enim +supra quod actus humani habent speciem ex fine.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The active principles in voluntary acts, not being determined to one act, do not suffice for the production of human acts, + unless the will be determined to one by the intention of the end, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. ix, text. 15,16), and + consequently sin derives both its being and its species from the end. +
[36560] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod principia activa in actibus voluntariis, cum non +sint determinata ad unum, non sufficiunt ad producendum humanos +actus, nisi determinetur voluntas ad unum per intentionem finis; ut +patet per philosophum, in IX Metaphys. Et ideo a fine perficitur et +esse et species peccati.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Objects, in relation to external acts, have the character of matter "about which"; but, in relation to the interior act of + the will, they have the character of end; and it is owing to this that they give the act its species. Nevertheless, even considered + as the matter "about which," they have the character of term, from which movement takes its species (Phys. v, text. 4; Ethic. + x, 4); yet even terms of movement specify movements, in so far as term has + the character of end. +
[36561] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod obiecta, secundum quod comparantur ad actus +exteriores, habent rationem materiae circa quam, sed secundum quod +comparantur ad actum interiorem voluntatis, habent rationem finium; +et ex hoc habent quod dent speciem actui. Quamvis etiam secundum +quod sunt materia circa quam, habeant rationem terminorum; a quibus +motus specificantur, ut dicitur in V Physic. et in X Ethic. Sed +tamen etiam termini motus dant speciem motibus, inquantum habent +rationem finis.
+ Reply to Objection 3: These distinctions of sins are given, not as distinct species of sins, but to show their various causes. +
[36562] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod illae divisiones peccatorum non dantur ad +distinguendas species peccatorum; sed ad manifestandas diversas +causas eorum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that sin is unfittingly divided into sin against God, against one's neighbor, and against oneself. For that + which is common to all sins should not be reckoned as a part in the division of sin. But it is common to all sins to be against + God: for it is stated in the definition of sin that it is "against God's law," as stated above ( + Q[66], A[6]). Therefore sin against God should not be reckoned a part of the division of + sin. +
[36563] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter peccatum distinguatur +per peccatum quod est in Deum, in proximum, et in seipsum. Illud +enim quod est commune omni peccato, non debet poni quasi pars in +divisione peccati. Sed commune est omni peccato quod sit contra +Deum, ponitur enim in definitione peccati quod sit contra legem +Dei, ut supra dictum est. Non ergo peccatum in Deum debet poni +quasi pars in divisione peccatorum.
+ Objection 2: Further, every division should consist of things in opposition to one another. But these three kinds of sin are not opposed + to one another: for whoever sins against his neighbor, sins against himself and against God. Therefore sin is not fittingly + divided into these three. +
[36564] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +omnis divisio debet fieri per opposita. Sed ista tria genera +peccatorum non sunt opposita, quicumque enim peccat in proximum, +peccat etiam in seipsum et in Deum. Non ergo peccatum convenienter +dividitur secundum haec tria.
+ Objection 3: Further, specification is not taken from things external. But God and our neighbor are external to us. Therefore sins are + not distinguished specifically with regard to them: and consequently sin is unfittingly divided according to these three. +
[36565] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +ea quae sunt extrinsecus, non conferunt speciem. Sed Deus et +proximus sunt extra nos. Ergo per haec non distinguuntur peccata +secundum speciem. Inconvenienter igitur secundum haec tria peccatum +dividitur.
+ On the contrary, Isidore (De Summo Bono), in giving the division of sins, says that "man is said to sin against himself, against God, and + against his neighbor." +
[36566] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Isidorus, in libro de summo bono, distinguens peccata, +dicit quod homo dicitur peccare in se, in Deum, et in +proximum.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + Q[71], AA[1],6), sin is an inordinate act. Now there should be a threefold order in man: one in relation to the rule of reason, in so + far as all our actions and passions should be commensurate with the rule of reason: another order is in relation to the rule + of the Divine Law, whereby man should be directed in all things: and if man were by nature a solitary animal, this twofold + order would suffice. But since man is + naturally a civic and social animal, as is proved in Polit. i, 2, hence a third order is necessary, whereby man is directed + in relation to other men among whom he has to dwell. Of these orders the second contains the first and surpasses it. For whatever + things are comprised under the order of reason, are comprised under the order of God Himself. Yet some things are comprised + under the order of God, which surpass the human reason, such as matters of faith, and things due to God alone. Hence he + that sins in such matters, for instance, by heresy, sacrilege, or blasphemy, is said to sin against God. In like manner, the + first order includes the third and surpasses it, because in all things wherein we are directed in reference to our neighbor, + we need to be directed according to the order of reason. Yet in some things we are directed according to reason, in relation + to ourselves only, and not in reference to our neighbor; and when man sins in these matters, he is said to sin against + himself, as is seen in the glutton, the lustful, and the prodigal. But when man sins in matters concerning his neighbor, he + is said to sin against his neighbor, as appears in the thief and murderer. Now the things whereby man is directed to God, + his neighbor, and himself are diverse. Wherefore this distinction of sins is in respect of their objects, according to which + the species of sins are diversified: and consequently this distinction of sins is properly one of different species of sins: + because the virtues also, to which sins are opposed, differ specifically in respect of these three. For it is evident from + what has been said ( + Q[62], AA[1],2,3) that by the theological virtues man is directed to God; by temperance and fortitude, to himself; and by justice to his + neighbor. +
[36567] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, peccatum est actus +inordinatus. Triplex autem ordo in homine debet esse. Unus quidem +secundum comparationem ad regulam rationis, prout scilicet omnes +actiones et passiones nostrae debent secundum regulam rationis +commensurari. Alius autem ordo est per comparationem ad regulam +divinae legis, per quam homo in omnibus dirigi debet. Et si quidem +homo naturaliter esset animal solitarium, hic duplex ordo +sufficeret, sed quia homo est naturaliter animal politicum et +sociale, ut probatur in I Polit., ideo necesse est quod sit tertius +ordo, quo homo ordinetur ad alios homines, quibus convivere debet. +Horum autem ordinum secundus continet primum, et excedit ipsum. +Quaecumque enim continentur sub ordine rationis, continentur sub +ordine ipsius Dei, sed quaedam continentur sub ordine ipsius Dei, +quae excedunt rationem humanam, sicut ea quae sunt fidei, et quae +debentur soli Deo. Unde qui in talibus peccat, dicitur in Deum +peccare, sicut haereticus et sacrilegus et blasphemus. Similiter +etiam secundus ordo includit tertium, et excedit ipsum. Quia in +omnibus in quibus ordinamur ad proximum, oportet nos dirigi +secundum regulam rationis, sed in quibusdam dirigimur secundum +rationem quantum ad nos tantum, non autem quantum ad proximum. Et +quando in his peccatur, dicitur homo peccare in seipsum, sicut +patet de guloso, luxurioso et prodigo. Quando vero peccat homo in +his quibus ad proximum ordinatur, dicitur peccare in proximum, +sicut patet de fure et homicida. Sunt autem diversa quibus homo +ordinatur ad Deum, et ad proximum, et ad seipsum. Unde haec +distinctio peccatorum est secundum obiecta, secundum quae +diversificantur species peccatorum. Unde haec distinctio peccatorum +proprie est secundum diversas peccatorum species. Nam et virtutes, +quibus peccata opponuntur, secundum hanc differentiam specie +distinguuntur, manifestum est enim ex dictis quod virtutibus +theologicis homo ordinatur ad Deum, temperantia vero et fortitudine +ad seipsum, iustitia autem ad proximum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: To sin against God is common to all sins, in so far as the order to God includes every human order; but in so far as order + to God surpasses the other two orders, sin against God is a special kind of sin. +
[36568] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod peccare in Deum, secundum quod ordo qui est ad +Deum, includit omnem humanum ordinem, commune est omni peccato. Sed +quantum ad id quod ordo Dei excedit alios duos ordines, sic +peccatum in Deum est speciale genus peccati.
+ Reply to Objection 2: When several things, of which one includes another, are distinct from one another, this distinction is understood to refer, + not to the part contained in another, but to that in which one goes beyond another. This may be seen in the division of numbers + and figures: for a triangle is distinguished from a four-sided figure not in respect of its being contained thereby, but in + respect of that in which it is surpassed thereby: and the same applies to the + numbers three and four. +
[36569] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod quando aliqua quorum unum includit alterum, ab +invicem distinguuntur, intelligitur fieri distinctio non secundum +illud quod unum continetur in altero, sed secundum illud quod unum +excedit alterum. Sicut patet in divisione numerorum et figurarum, +non enim triangulus dividitur contra quadratum secundum quod +continetur in eo, sed secundum quod exceditur ab eo; et similiter +est de ternario et quaternario.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Although God and our neighbor are external to the sinner himself, they are not external to the act of sin, but are related + to it as to its object. +
[36570] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod Deus et proximus, quamvis sint exteriora respectu +ipsius peccantis, non tamen sunt extranea respectu actus peccati; +sed comparantur ad ipsum sicut propria obiecta ipsius.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the division of sins according to their debt of punishment diversifies their species; for instance, when + sin is divided into "mortal" and "venial." For things which are infinitely apart, cannot belong to the same species, nor even + to the same genus. But venial and mortal sin are infinitely apart, since temporal punishment is due to venial sin, and eternal + punishment to mortal sin; and the measure of the punishment corresponds to the gravity + of the fault, according to + Dt. 25:2: "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure be also of the stripes be." Therefore venial and mortal sins are + not of the same genus, nor can they be said to belong to the same species. +
[36571] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod divisio peccatorum quae est secundum +reatum, diversificet speciem, puta cum dividitur secundum veniale +et mortale. Ea enim quae in infinitum differunt, non possunt esse +unius speciei, nec etiam unius generis. Sed veniale et mortale +peccatum differunt in infinitum, veniali enim debetur poena +temporalis, mortali poena aeterna; mensura autem poenae respondet +quantitati culpae, secundum illud Deut. XXV, pro mensura delicti +erit et plagarum modus. Ergo veniale et mortale non sunt unius +generis, nedum quod sint unius speciei.
+ Objection 2: Further, some sins are mortal in virtue of their species [*"Ex genere," genus in this case denoting the species], as murder + and adultery; and some are venial in virtue of their species, as in an idle word, and excessive laughter. Therefore venial + and mortal sins differ specifically. +
[36572] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +quaedam peccata sunt mortalia ex genere, sicut homicidium et +adulterium, quaedam vero ex suo genere sunt peccata venialia, sicut +verbum otiosum et risus superfluus. Ergo peccatum veniale et +mortale specie differunt.
+ Objection 3: Further, just as a virtuous act stands in relation to its reward, so does sin stand in relation to punishment. But the reward + is the end of the virtuous act. Therefore punishment is the end of sin. Now sins differ specifically in relation to their + ends, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). Therefore they are also specifically distinct according to the debt of punishment. +
[36573] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sicut se habet actus virtuosus ad praemium, ita se habet peccatum +ad poenam. Sed praemium est finis virtuosi actus. Ergo et poena est +finis peccati. Sed peccata distinguuntur specie secundum fines, ut +dictum est. Ergo etiam distinguuntur specie secundum reatum +poenae.
+ On the contrary, Those things that constitute a species are prior to the species, e.g. specific differences. But punishment follows sin as + the effect thereof. Therefore sins do not differ specifically according to the debt of punishment. +
[36574] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra, +ea quae constituunt speciem, sunt priora, sicut differentiae +specificae. Sed poena sequitur culpam, sicut effectus eius. Ergo +peccata non differunt specie secundum reatum poenae.
+ I answer that, In things that differ specifically we find a twofold difference: the first causes the diversity of species, and is not to + be found save in different species, e.g. "rational" and "irrational," "animate," and "inanimate": the other difference is + consequent to specific diversity; and though, in some cases, it may be consequent to specific diversity, yet, in others, it + may be found within the same species; thus "white" and "black" are consequent to the specific + diversity of crow and swan, and yet this difference is found within the one species of man. +
We must therefore say that the difference between venial and mortal sin, or any other difference is respect of the debt of + punishment, cannot be a difference constituting specific diversity. For what is accidental never constitutes a species; and + what is outside the agent's intention is accidental (Phys. ii, text. 50). Now it is evident that punishment is outside the + intention of the sinner, wherefore it is accidentally referred to sin on the part of the sinner. Nevertheless it + is referred to sin by an extrinsic principle, viz. the justice of the judge, who imposes various punishments according to + the various manners of sin. Therefore the difference derived from the debt of punishment, may be consequent to the specific + diversity of sins, but cannot constitute it. +
Now the difference between venial and mortal sin is consequent to the diversity of that inordinateness which constitutes + the notion of sin. For inordinateness is twofold, one that destroys the principle of order, and another which, without destroying + the principle of order, implies inordinateness in the things which follow the principle: thus, in an animal's body, the frame + may be so out of order that the vital principle is destroyed; this is the inordinateness of death; while, + on the other hand, saving the vital principle, there may be disorder in the bodily humors; and then there is sickness. Now + the principle of the entire moral order is the last end, which stands in the same relation to matters of action, as the indemonstrable + principle does to matters of speculation (Ethic. vii, 8). Therefore when the soul is so disordered by sin as to turn away + from its last end, viz. God, to Whom it is united by charity, there is mortal sin; but when it is disordered without + turning away from God, there is venial sin. For even as in the body, the disorder of death which results from the destruction + of the principle of life, is irreparable according to nature, while the disorder of sickness can be repaired by reason of + the vital principle being preserved, so it is in matters concerning the soul. Because, in speculative matters, it is impossible + to convince one who errs in the principles, whereas one who errs, but retains the principles, can be brought back to the + truth by means of the principles. Likewise in practical matters, he who, by sinning, turns away from his last end, if we consider + the nature of his sin, falls irreparably, and therefore is said to sin mortally and to deserve eternal punishment: whereas + when a man sins without turning away from God, by the very nature of his sin, his disorder can be repaired, because the principle + of the order is not destroyed; wherefore he is said to sin venially, because, to wit, he does not sin so as to + deserve to be punished eternally. +
[36575] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod eorum quae specie differunt, duplex differentia +invenitur. Una quidem quae constituit diversitatem specierum, et +talis differentia nunquam invenitur nisi in speciebus diversis; +sicut rationale et irrationale, animatum et inanimatum. Alia autem +differentia est consequens diversitatem speciei, et talis +differentia, etsi in aliquibus consequatur diversitatem speciei, in +aliis tamen potest inveniri in eadem specie; sicut album et nigrum +consequuntur diversitatem speciei corvi et cygni, tamen invenitur +huiusmodi differentia in eadem hominis specie. Dicendum est ergo +quod differentia venialis et mortalis peccati, vel quaecumque alia +differentia sumitur penes reatum, non potest esse differentia +constituens diversitatem speciei. Nunquam enim id quod est per +accidens, constituit speciem. Id autem quod est praeter intentionem +agentis, est per accidens, ut patet in II Physic. Manifestum est +autem quod poena est praeter intentionem peccantis. Unde per +accidens se habet ad peccatum, ex parte ipsius peccantis. Ordinatur +tamen ad peccatum ab exteriori, scilicet ex iustitia iudicantis, +qui secundum diversas conditiones peccatorum diversas poenas +infligit. Unde differentia quae est ex reatu poenae, potest +consequi diversam speciem peccatorum; non autem constituit +diversitatem speciei. Differentia autem peccati venialis et +mortalis consequitur diversitatem inordinationis, quae complet +rationem peccati. Duplex enim est inordinatio, una per +subtractionem principii ordinis; alia qua, salvato principio +ordinis, fit inordinatio circa ea quae sunt post principium. Sicut +in corpore animalis quandoque quidem inordinatio complexionis +procedit usque ad destructionem principii vitalis, et haec est +mors, quandoque vero, salvo principio vitae, fit inordinatio +quaedam in humoribus, et tunc est aegritudo. Principium autem +totius ordinis in moralibus est finis ultimus, qui ita se habet in +operativis, sicut principium indemonstrabile in speculativis, ut +dicitur in VII Ethic. Unde quando anima deordinatur per peccatum +usque ad aversionem ab ultimo fine, scilicet Deo, cui unimur per +caritatem, tunc est peccatum mortale, quando vero fit deordinatio +citra aversionem a Deo, tunc est peccatum veniale. Sicut enim in +corporalibus deordinatio mortis, quae est per remotionem principii +vitae, est irreparabilis secundum naturam; inordinatio autem +aegritudinis reparari potest, propter id quod salvatur principium +vitae; similiter est in his quae pertinent ad animam. Nam in +speculativis qui errat circa principia, impersuasibilis est, qui +autem errat salvatis principiis, per ipsa principia revocari +potest. Et similiter in operativis qui peccando avertitur ab ultimo +fine, quantum est ex natura peccati, habet lapsum irreparabilem, et +ideo dicitur peccare mortaliter, aeternaliter puniendus. Qui vero +peccat citra aversionem a Deo, ex ipsa ratione peccati +reparabiliter deordinatur, quia salvatur principium, et ideo +dicitur peccare venialiter, quia scilicet non ita peccat ut +mereatur interminabilem poenam.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Mortal and venial sins are infinitely apart as regards what they "turn away from," not as regards what they "turn to," viz. + the object which specifies them. Hence nothing hinders the same species from including mortal and venial sins; for instance, + in the species "adultery" the first movement is a venial sin; while an idle word, which is, generally speaking, venial, may + even be a mortal sin. +
[36576] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod peccatum mortale et veniale differunt in +infinitum ex parte aversionis, non autem ex parte conversionis, per +quam respicit obiectum, unde peccatum speciem habet. Unde nihil +prohibet in eadem specie inveniri aliquod peccatum mortale et +veniale, sicut primus motus in genere adulterii est peccatum +veniale; et verbum otiosum, quod plerumque est veniale, potest +etiam esse mortale.
+ Reply to Objection 2: From the fact that one sin is mortal by reason of its species, and another venial by reason of its species, it follows that + this difference is consequent to the specific difference of sins, not that it is the cause thereof. And this difference may + be found even in things of the same species, as stated above. +
[36577] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod ex hoc quod invenitur aliquod peccatum mortale ex +genere, et aliquod peccatum veniale ex genere, sequitur quod talis +differentia consequatur diversitatem peccatorum secundum speciem, +non autem quod causet eam. Talis autem differentia potest inveniri +etiam in his quae sunt eiusdem speciei, ut dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The reward is intended by him that merits or acts virtually; whereas the punishment is not intended by the sinner, but, on + the contrary, is against his will. Hence the comparison fails. +
[36578] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod praemium est de intentione merentis vel virtuose +agentis, sed poena non est de intentione peccantis, sed magis est +contra voluntatem ipsius. Unde non est similis ratio.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that sins of commission and omission differ specifically. For "offense" and "sin" are condivided with one another + ( + Eph. 2:1), where it is written: "When you were dead in your offenses and sins," which words a gloss explains, saying: "'Offenses,' + by omitting to do what was commanded, and 'sins,' by doing what was forbidden." Whence it is evident that "offenses" here + denotes sins of omission; while "sin" denotes sins of + commission. Therefore they differ specifically, since they are contrasted with one another as different species. +
[36579] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum commissionis et omissionis +specie differant. Delictum enim contra peccatum dividitur, Ephes. +II, ubi dicitur, cum essetis mortui delictis et peccatis +vestris. Et exponit ibi Glossa, delictis, idest dimittendo +quae iubentur; et peccatis, scilicet agendo prohibita, ex quo +patet quod per delictum intelligitur peccatum omissionis, per +peccatum, peccatum commissionis. Differunt igitur specie, cum ex +opposito dividantur, tanquam diversae species.
+ Objection 2: Further, it is essential to sin to be against God's law, for this is part of its definition, as is clear from what has been + said ( + Q[71], A[6]). Now in God's law, the affirmative precepts, against which is the sin of omission, are different from the negative precepts, + against which is the sin of omission. Therefore sins of omission and commission differ specifically. +
[36580] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, +peccato per se convenit quod sit contra legem Dei, ponitur enim in +eius definitione, ut ex supradictis patet. Sed in lege Dei alia +sunt praecepta affirmativa, contra quae est peccatum omissionis; et +alia praecepta negativa, contra quae est peccatum commissionis. +Ergo peccatum omissionis et peccatum commissionis differunt +specie.
+ Objection 3: Further, omission and commission differ as affirmation and negation. Now affirmation and negation cannot be in the same species, + since negation has no species; for "there is neither species nor difference of non-being," as the Philosopher states (Phys. + iv, text. 67). Therefore omission and commission cannot belong to the same species. +
[36581] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, +omissio et commissio differunt sicut affirmatio et negatio. Sed +affirmatio et negatio non possunt esse unius speciei, quia negatio +non habet speciem; non entis enim non sunt neque species neque +differentiae, ut philosophus dicit. Ergo omissio et commissio non +possunt esse unius speciei.
+ On the contrary, Omission and commission are found in the same species of sin. For the covetous man both takes what belongs to others, which + is a sin of commission; and gives not of his own to whom he should give, which is a sin of omission. Therefore omission and + commission do not differ specifically. +
[36582] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra, +in eadem specie peccati invenitur omissio et commissio, avarus enim +et aliena rapit, quod est peccatum commissionis; et sua non dat +quibus dare debet, quod est peccatum omissionis. Ergo omissio et +commissio non differunt specie.
+ I answer that, There is a twofold difference in sins; a material difference and a formal difference: the material difference is to be observed + in the natural species of the sinful act; while the formal difference is gathered from their relation to one proper end, which + is also their proper object. Hence we find certain acts differing from one another in the material specific difference, which + are nevertheless formally in the same species of sin, because they are directed + to the one same end: thus strangling, stoning, and stabbing come under the one species of murder, although the actions themselves + differ specifically according to the natural species. Accordingly, if we refer to the material species in sins of omission + and commission, they differ specifically, using species in a broad sense, in so far as negation and privation may have a species. + But if we refer to the formal species of sins of omission and commission, they do not differ specifically, because + they are directed to the same end, and proceed from the same motive. For the covetous man, in order to hoard money, both robs, + and omits to give what he ought, and in like manner, the glutton, to satiate his appetite, both eats too much and omits the + prescribed fasts. The same applies to other sins: for in things, negation is always founded on affirmation, which, in a manner, + is its cause. Hence in the physical order it comes under the same head, that fire gives forth heat, and that it does not + give forth cold. +
[36583] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod in peccatis invenitur duplex differentia, una +materialis, et alia formalis. Materialis quidem attenditur secundum +naturalem speciem actuum peccati, formalis autem secundum ordinem +ad unum finem proprium, quod est obiectum proprium. Unde +inveniuntur aliqui actus materialiter specie differentes, qui tamen +formaliter sunt in eadem specie peccati, quia ad idem ordinantur, +sicut ad eandem speciem homicidii pertinet iugulatio, lapidatio et +perforatio, quamvis actus sint specie differentes secundum speciem +naturae. Sic ergo si loquamur de specie peccati omissionis et +commissionis materialiter, differunt specie, large tamen loquendo +de specie, secundum quod negatio vel privatio speciem habere +potest. Si autem loquamur de specie peccati omissionis et +commissionis formaliter, sic non differunt specie, quia ad idem +ordinantur, et ex eodem motivo procedunt. Avarus enim ad +congregandum pecuniam et rapit, et non dat ea quae dare debet; et +similiter gulosus ad satisfaciendum gulae, et superflua comedit, et +ieiunia debita praetermittit; et idem est videre in ceteris. Semper +enim in rebus negatio fundatur super aliqua affirmatione, quae est +quodammodo causa eius, unde etiam in rebus naturalibus eiusdem +rationis est quod ignis calefaciat, et quod non infrigidet.
+ Reply to Objection 1: This division in respect of commission and omission, is not according to different formal species, but only according to + material species, as stated. +
[36584] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod illa divisio quae est per commissionem et +omissionem, non est secundum diversas species formales, sed +materiales tantum, ut dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 2: In God's law, the necessity for various affirmative and negative precepts, was that men might be gradually led to virtue, + first by abstaining from evil, being induced to this by the negative precepts, and afterwards by doing good, to which we are + induced by the affirmative precepts. Wherefore the affirmative and negative precepts do not belong to different virtues, but + to different degrees of virtue; and consequently they are not of necessity, opposed + to sins of different species. Moreover sin is not specified by that from which it turns away, because in this respect it is + a negation or privation, but by that to which it turns, in so far as sin is an act. Consequently sins do not differ specifically + according to the various precepts of the Law. +
[36585] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod necesse fuit in lege Dei proponi diversa praecepta +affirmativa et negativa, ut gradatim homines introducerentur ad +virtutem, prius quidem abstinendo a malo, ad quod inducimur per +praecepta negativa; et postmodum faciendo bonum, ad quod inducimur +per praecepta affirmativa. Et sic praecepta affirmativa et negativa +non pertinent ad diversas virtutes, sed ad diversos gradus +virtutis. Et per consequens non oportet quod contrarientur diversis +peccatis secundum speciem. Peccatum etiam non habet speciem ex +parte aversionis, quia secundum hoc est negatio vel privatio, sed +ex parte conversionis, secundum quod est actus quidam. Unde +secundum diversa praecepta legis non diversificantur peccata +secundum speciem.
+ Reply to Objection 3: This objection considers the material diversity of sins. It must be observed, however, that although, properly speaking, + negation is not in a species, yet it is allotted to a species by reduction to the affirmation on which it is based. +
[36586] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de materiali diversitate +speciei. Sciendum est tamen quod negatio, etsi proprie non sit in +specie, constituitur tamen in specie per reductionem ad aliquam +affirmationem quam sequitur.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that sins are unfittingly divided into sins of thought, word, and deed. For Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) describes + three stages of sin, of which the first is "when the carnal sense offers a bait," which is the sin of thought; the second + stage is reached "when one is satisfied with the mere pleasure of thought"; and the third stage, "when consent is given to + the deed." Now these three belong to the sin of thought. Therefore it is unfitting to + reckon sin of thought as one kind of sin. +
[36587] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter dividatur peccatum in +peccatum cordis, oris, et operis. Augustinus enim, in XII de Trin., +ponit tres gradus peccati, quorum primus est, cum carnalis sensus +illecebram quandam ingerit, quod est peccatum cogitationis, +secundus gradus est, quando sola cogitationis delectatione aliquis +contentus est; tertius gradus est, quando faciendum decernitur per +consensum. Sed tria haec pertinent ad peccatum cordis. Ergo +inconvenienter peccatum cordis ponitur quasi unum genus +peccati.
+ Objection 2: Further, Gregory (Moral. iv, 25) reckons four degrees of sin; the first of which is "a fault hidden in the heart"; the second, + "when it is done openly"; the third, "when it is formed into a habit"; and the fourth, "when man goes so far as to presume + on God's mercy or to give himself up to despair": where no distinction is made between sins of deed and sins of word, and + two other degrees of sin are added. Therefore the first division was unfitting. +
[36588] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Gregorius, in IV Moral., ponit quatuor gradus peccati, quorum +primus est culpa latens in corde; secundus, cum exterius +publicatur; tertius est, cum consuetudine roboratur; quartus est, +cum usque ad praesumptionem divinae misericordiae, vel ad +desperationem, homo procedit. Ubi non distinguitur peccatum operis +a peccato oris; et adduntur duo alii peccatorum gradus. Ergo +inconveniens fuit prima divisio.
+ Objection 3: Further, there can be no sin of word or deed unless there precede sin of thought. Therefore these sins do not differ specifically. + Therefore they should not be condivided with one another. +
[36589] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, +non potest esse peccatum in ore vel in opere, nisi fiat prius in +corde. Ergo ista peccata specie non differunt. Non ergo debent +contra se invicem dividi.
+ On the contrary, Jerome in commenting on + Ezech. 43:23: "The human race is subject to three kinds of sin, for when we sin, it is either by thought, or word, or deed." +
[36590] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Hieronymus dicit, super Ezech., tria sunt generalia +delicta quibus humanum subiacet genus, aut enim cogitatione, aut +sermone, aut opere peccamus.
+ I answer that, Things differ specifically in two ways: first, when each has the complete species; thus a horse and an ox differ specifically: + secondly, when the diversity of species is derived from diversity of degree in generation or movement: thus the building is + the complete generation of a house, while the laying of the foundations, and the setting up of the walls are incomplete species, + as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. x, 4); and the same can apply to the + generation of animals. Accordingly sins are divided into these three, viz. sins of thought, word, and deed, not as into various + complete species: for the consummation of sin is in the deed, wherefore sins of deed have the complete species; but the first + beginning of sin is its foundation, as it were, in the sin of thought; the second degree is the sin of word, in so far as + man is ready to break out into a declaration of his thought; while the third degree consists in the consummation of the + deed. Consequently these three differ in respect of the various degrees of sin. Nevertheless it is evident that these three + belong to the one complete species of sin, since they proceed from the same motive. For the angry man, through desire of vengeance, + is at first disturbed in thought, then he breaks out into words of abuse, and lastly he goes on to wrongful deeds; and the + same applies to lust and to any other sin. +
[36591] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod aliqua inveniuntur differre specie dupliciter. Uno +modo, ex eo quod utrumque habet speciem completam, sicut equus et +bos differunt specie. Alio modo, secundum diversos gradus in aliqua +generatione vel motu accipiuntur diversae species, sicut +aedificatio est completa generatio domus, collocatio autem +fundamenti et erectio parietis sunt species incompletae, ut patet +per philosophum, in X Ethic.; et idem etiam potest dici in +generationibus animalium. Sic igitur peccatum dividitur per haec +tria, scilicet peccatum oris, cordis et operis, non sicut per +diversas species completas, nam consummatio peccati est in opere, +unde peccatum operis habet speciem completam. Sed prima inchoatio +eius est quasi fundatio in corde; secundus autem gradus eius est in +ore, secundum quod homo prorumpit facile ad manifestandum conceptum +cordis; tertius autem gradus iam est in consummatione operis. Et +sic haec tria differunt secundum diversos gradus peccati. Patet +tamen quod haec tria pertinent ad unam perfectam peccati speciem, +cum ab eodem motivo procedant, iracundus enim, ex hoc quod appetit +vindictam, primo quidem perturbatur in corde; secundo, in verba +contumeliosa prorumpit; tertio vero, procedit usque ad facta +iniuriosa. Et idem patet in luxuria, et in quolibet alio +peccato.
+ Reply to Objection 1: All sins of thought have the common note of secrecy, in respect of which they form one degree, which is, however, divided + into three stages, viz. of cogitation, pleasure, and consent. +
[36592] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod omne peccatum cordis convenit in ratione +occulti, et secundum hoc ponitur unus gradus. Qui tamen per tres +gradus distinguitur, scilicet cogitationis, delectationis et +consensus.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Sins of words and deed are both done openly, and for this reason Gregory (Moral. iv, 25) reckons them under one head: whereas + Jerome (in commenting on + Ezech. 43:23) distinguishes between them, because in sins of word there is nothing but manifestation which is intended principally; while + in sins of deed, it is the consummation of the inward thought which is principally intended, and the outward manifestation + is by way of sequel. + Habit and despair are stages following the complete species of sin, even as boyhood and youth follow the complete generation + of a man. +
[36593] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod peccatum oris et operis conveniunt in manifestatione, +et propter hoc a Gregorio sub uno computantur. Hieronymus autem +distinguit ea, quia in peccato oris est manifestatio tantum, et +principaliter intenta, in peccato vero operis est principaliter +expletio interioris conceptus cordis, sed manifestatio est ex +consequenti. Consuetudo vero et desperatio sunt gradus consequentes +post speciem perfectam peccati, sicut adolescentia et iuventus post +perfectam hominis generationem.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Sin of thought and sin of word are not distinct from the sin of deed when they are united together with it, but when each + is found by itself: even as one part of a movement is not distinct from the whole movement, when the movement is continuous, + but only when there is a break in the movement. +
[36594] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod peccatum cordis et oris non distinguuntur a peccato +operis, quando simul cum eo coniunguntur, sed prout quodlibet horum +per se invenitur. Sicut etiam pars motus non distinguitur a toto +motu, quando motus est continuus, sed solum quando motus sistit in +medio.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins. For excess and deficiency differ in respect + of more and less. Now "more" and "less" do not diversify a species. Therefore excess and deficiency do not diversify the species + of sins. +
[36595] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod superabundantia et defectus non +diversificent species peccatorum. Superabundantia enim et defectus +differunt secundum magis et minus. Sed magis et minus non +diversificant speciem. Ergo superabundantia et defectus non +diversificant speciem peccatorum.
+ Objection 2: Further, just as sin, in matters of action, is due to straying from the rectitude of reason, so falsehood, in speculative + matters, is due to straying from the truth of the reality. Now the species of falsehood is not diversified by saying more + or less than the reality. Therefore neither is the species of sin diversified by straying more or less from the rectitude + of reason. +
[36596] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, +sicut peccatum in agibilibus est ex hoc quod receditur a +rectitudine rationis, ita falsitas in speculativis est ex hoc quod +receditur a veritate rei. Sed non diversificatur species falsitatis +ex hoc quod aliquis dicit plus vel minus esse quam sit in re. Ergo +etiam non diversificatur species peccati ex hoc quod recedit a +rectitudine rationis in plus vel in minus.
+ Objection 3: Further, "one species cannot be made out of two," as Porphyry declares [*Isagog.; cf. Arist. Metaph. i]. Now excess and deficiency + are united in one sin; for some are at once illiberal and wasteful---illiberality being a sin of deficiency, and prodigality, + by excess. Therefore excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins. +
[36597] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 arg. 3 +Praeterea, ex duabus speciebus non constituitur una species, +ut Porphyrius dicit. Sed superabundantia et defectus uniuntur in +uno peccato, sunt enim simul quidam illiberales et prodigi, quorum +duorum illiberalitas est peccatum secundum defectum, prodigalitas +autem secundum superabundantiam. Ergo superabundantia et defectus +non diversificant speciem peccatorum.
+ On the contrary, Contraries differ specifically, for "contrariety is a difference of form," as stated in Metaph. x, text. 13,14. Now vices + that differ according to excess and deficiency are contrary to one another, as illiberality to wastefulness. Therefore they + differ specifically. +
[36598] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra, +contraria differunt secundum speciem, nam contrarietas est +differentia secundum formam, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed vitia +quae differunt secundum superabundantiam et defectum, sunt +contraria, sicut illiberalitas prodigalitati. Ergo differunt +secundum speciem.
+ I answer that, While there are two things in sin, viz. the act itself and its inordinateness, in so far as sin is a departure from the order + of reason and the Divine law, the species of sin is gathered, not from its inordinateness, which is outside the sinner's intention, + as stated above + (A[1]), but one the contrary, from the act itself as terminating in the object to which the sinner's intention is directed. Consequently + wherever we find a + different motive inclining the intention to sin, there will be a different species of sin. Now it is evident that the motive + for sinning, in sins by excess, is not the same as the motive for sinning, in sins of deficiency; in fact, they are contrary + to one another, just as the motive in the sin of intemperance is love for bodily pleasures, while the motive in the sin of + insensibility is hatred of the same. Therefore these sins not only differ specifically, but are contrary to one another. +
[36599] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, cum in peccato sint duo, scilicet ipse actus, et +inordinatio eius, prout receditur ab ordine rationis et legis +divinae; species peccati attenditur non ex parte inordinationis, +quae est praeter intentionem peccantis, ut supra dictum est; sed +magis ex parte ipsius actus, secundum quod terminatur ad obiectum, +in quod fertur intentio peccantis. Et ideo ubicumque occurrit +diversum motivum inclinans intentionem ad peccandum, ibi est +diversa species peccati. Manifestum est autem quod non est idem +motivum ad peccandum in peccatis quae sunt secundum +superabundantiam, et in peccatis quae sunt secundum defectum; +quinimmo sunt contraria motiva; sicut motivum in peccato +intemperantiae est amor delectationum corporalium, motivum autem in +peccato insensibilitatis est odium earum. Unde huiusmodi peccata +non solum differunt specie, sed etiam sunt sibi invicem +contraria.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Although "more" and "less" do not cause diversity of species, yet they are sometimes consequent to specific difference, in + so far as they are the result of diversity of form; thus we may say that fire is lighter than air. Hence the Philosopher says + (Ethic. viii, 1) that "those who held that there are no different species of friendship, by reason of its admitting of degree, + were led by insufficient proof." In this way to exceed reason or to fall short + thereof belongs to sins specifically different, in so far as they result from different motives. +
[36600] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod magis et minus, etsi non sint causa diversitatis +speciei, consequuntur tamen quandoque species differentes, prout +proveniunt ex diversis formis, sicut si dicatur quod ignis est +levior aere. Unde philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic., quod qui +posuerunt non esse diversas species amicitiarum propter hoc quod +dicuntur secundum magis et minus, non sufficienti crediderunt +signo. Et hoc modo superexcedere rationem, vel deficere ab ea, +pertinet ad diversa peccata secundum speciem, inquantum +consequuntur diversa motiva.
+ Reply to Objection 2: It is not the sinner's intention to depart from reason; and so sins of excess and deficiency do not become of one kind through + departing from the one rectitude of reason. On the other hand, sometimes he who utters a falsehood, intends to hide the truth, + wherefore in this respect, it matters not whether he tells more or less. If, however, departure from the truth be not outside + the intention, it is evident that then one is moved by different causes to + tell more or less; and in this respect there are different kinds of falsehood, as is evident of the "boaster," who exceeds + in telling untruths for the sake of fame, and the "cheat," who tells less than the truth, in order to escape from paying his + debts. This also explains how some false opinions are contrary to one another. +
[36601] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod intentio peccantis non est ut recedat a ratione, et +ideo non efficitur eiusdem rationis peccatum superabundantiae et +defectus propter recessum ab eadem rationis rectitudine. Sed +quandoque ille qui dicit falsum, intendit veritatem occultare, unde +quantum ad hoc, non refert utrum dicat vel plus vel minus. Si tamen +recedere a veritate sit praeter intentionem, tunc manifestum est +quod ex diversis causis aliquis movetur ad dicendum plus vel minus, +et secundum hoc diversa est ratio falsitatis. Sicut patet de +iactatore, qui superexcedit dicendo falsum, quaerens gloriam; et de +deceptore, qui diminuit, evadens debiti solutionem. Unde et quaedam +falsae opiniones sunt sibi invicem contrariae.
+ Reply to Objection 3: One may be prodigal and illiberal with regard to different objects: for instance one may be illiberal [*Cf. + SS, Q[119], A[1], ad 1] in taking what one ought not: and nothing hinders contraries from being in the same subject, in different respects. +
[36602] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod prodigus et illiberalis potest esse aliquis secundum +diversa, ut scilicet sit aliquis illiberalis in accipiendo quae non +debet, et prodigus in dando quae non debet. Nihil autem prohibet +contraria inesse eidem secundum diversa.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that vices and sins differ in respect of different circumstances. For, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "evil + results from each single defect." Now individual defects are corruptions of individual circumstances. Therefore from the corruption + of each circumstance there results a corresponding species of sin. +
[36603] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 arg. 1 Ad nonum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod vitia et peccata diversificentur +specie secundum diversas circumstantias. Quia, ut dicit Dionysius, +IV cap. de Div. Nom., malum contingit ex singularibus +defectibus. Singulares autem defectus sunt corruptiones +singularum circumstantiarum. Ergo ex singulis circumstantiis +corruptis singulae species peccatorum consequuntur.
+ Objection 2: Further, sins are human acts. But human acts sometimes take their species from circumstances, as stated above ( + Q[18], A[10]). Therefore sins differ specifically according as different circumstances are corrupted. +
[36604] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 arg. 2 Praeterea, +peccata sunt quidam actus humani. Sed actus humani interdum +accipiunt speciem a circumstantiis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo +peccata differunt specie secundum quod diversae circumstantiae +corrumpuntur.
+ Objection 3: Further, diverse species are assigned to gluttony, according to the words contained in the following verse: +
'Hastily, sumptuously, too much, greedily, daintily.' Now these pertain to various circumstances, for "hastily" means sooner + than is right; "too much," more than is right, and so on with the others. Therefore the species of sin is diversified according + to the various circumstances. +
[36605] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 arg. 3 Praeterea, +diversae species gulae assignantur secundum particulas quae in hoc +versiculo continentur, praepropere, laute, nimis, ardenter, +studiose. Haec autem pertinent ad diversas circumstantias, nam +praepropere est antequam oportet, nimis plus quam oportet, et idem +patet in aliis. Ergo species peccati diversificantur secundum +diversas circumstantias.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7; iv, 1) that "every vice sins by doing more than one ought, and when one ought not"; + and in like manner as to the other circumstances. Therefore the species of sins are not diversified in this respect. +
[36606] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in III et IV Ethic., quod singula vitia +peccant agendo et plus quam oportet, et quando non oportet, et +similiter secundum omnes alias circumstantias. Non ergo secundum +hoc diversificantur peccatorum species.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[8]), wherever there is a special motive for sinning, there is a different species of sin, because the motive for sinning is the + end and object of sin. Now it happens sometimes that although different circumstances are corrupted, there is but one motive: + thus the illiberal man, for the same motive, takes when he ought not, where he ought not, and more than he ought, and so on + with the circumstances, since he does + this through an inordinate desire of hoarding money: and in such cases the corruption of different circumstances does not + diversify the species of sins, but belongs to one and the same species. +
Sometimes, however, the corruption of different circumstances arises from different motives: for instance that a man eat + hastily, may be due to the fact that he cannot brook the delay in taking food, on account of a rapid exhaustion of the digestive + humors; and that he desire too much food, may be due to a naturally strong digestion; that he desire choice meats, is due + to his desire for pleasure in taking food. Hence in such matters, the corruption of different circumstances + entails different species of sins. +
[36607] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ubi occurrit aliud motivum ad +peccandum, ibi est alia peccati species, quia motivum ad peccandum +est finis et obiectum. Contingit autem quandoque quod in +corruptionibus diversarum circumstantiarum est idem motivum, sicut +illiberalis ab eodem movetur quod accipiat quando non oportet, et +ubi non oportet, et plus quam oportet, et similiter de aliis +circumstantiis; hoc enim facit propter inordinatum appetitum +pecuniae congregandae. Et in talibus diversarum circumstantiarum +corruptiones non diversificant species peccatorum, sed pertinent ad +unam et eandem peccati speciem. Quandoque vero contingit quod +corruptiones diversarum circumstantiarum proveniunt a diversis +motivis. Puta quod aliquis praepropere comedat, potest provenire ex +hoc quod homo non potest ferre dilationem cibi, propter facilem +consumptionem humiditatis; quod vero appetat immoderatum cibum, +potest contingere propter virtutem naturae potentem ad convertendum +multum cibum; quod autem aliquis appetat cibos deliciosos, +contingit propter appetitum delectationis quae est in cibo. Unde in +talibus diversarum circumstantiarum corruptiones inducunt diversas +peccati species.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Evil, as such, is a privation, and so it has different species in respect of the thing which the subject is deprived, even + as other privations. But sin does not take its species from the privation or aversion, as stated above + (A[1]), but from turning to the object of the act. +
[36608] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod malum, inquantum huiusmodi, privatio est, et +ideo diversificatur specie secundum ea quae privantur, sicut et +ceterae privationes. Sed peccatum non sortitur speciem ex parte +privationis vel aversionis, ut supra dictum est; sed ex conversione +ad obiectum actus.
+ Reply to Objection 2: A circumstance never transfers an act from one species to another, save when there is another motive. +
[36609] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod circumstantia nunquam transfert actum in aliam +speciem, nisi quando est aliud motivum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: In the various species of gluttony there are various motives, as stated. +
[36610] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod in diversis speciebus gulae diversa sunt motiva, +sicut dictum est.
We must now consider the comparison of one sin with another: under which head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether all sins and vices are connected with one another?
(3) Whether the gravity of sin depends on its object?
(4) Whether it depends on the excellence of the virtue to which it is opposed?
(5) Whether carnal sins are more grievous than spiritual sins?
(6) Whether the gravity of sins depends on their causes?
(7) Whether it depends on their circumstances?
(8) Whether it depends on how much harm ensues?
(9) Whether on the position of the person sinned against?
(10) Whether sin is aggravated by reason of the excellence of the person sinning?
+[36611] +Iª-IIae q. 73 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +comparatione peccatorum ad invicem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur decem. +Primo, utrum omnia peccata et vitia sint connexa. Secundo, utrum +omnia sint paria. Tertio, utrum gravitas peccatorum attendatur +secundum obiecta. Quarto, utrum secundum dignitatem virtutum quibus +peccata opponuntur. Quinto, utrum peccata carnalia sint graviora +quam spiritualia. Sexto, utrum secundum causas peccatorum +attendatur gravitas peccatorum. Septimo, utrum secundum +circumstantias. Octavo, utrum secundum quantitatem nocumenti. Nono, +utrum secundum conditionem personae in quam peccatur. Decimo, utrum +propter magnitudinem personae peccantis aggravetur peccatum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that all sins are connected. For it is written ( + James 2:10): "Whosoever shall keep the whole Law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all." Now to be guilty of transgressing + all the precepts of Law, is the same as to commit all sins, because, as Ambrose says (De Parad. viii), "sin is a transgression + of the Divine law, and disobedience of the heavenly commandments." Therefore whoever commits one sin is guilty of + all. +
[36612] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnia peccata sint connexa. Dicitur +enim Iac. II, quicumque totam legem servaverit, offendat autem +in uno, factus est omnium reus. Sed idem est esse reum omnium +mandatorum legis, quod habere omnia peccata, quia, sicut Ambrosius +dicit, peccatum est transgressio legis divinae, et caelestium +inobedientia mandatorum. Ergo quicumque peccat uno peccato, +subiicitur omnibus peccatis.
+ Objection 2: Further, each sin banishes its opposite virtue. Now whoever lacks one virtue lacks them all, as was shown above ( + Q[65], A[1]). Therefore whoever commits one sin, is deprived of all the virtues. Therefore whoever commits one sin, is guilty of all + sins. +
[36613] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +quodlibet peccatum excludit virtutem sibi oppositam. Sed qui caret +una virtute, caret omnibus, ut patet ex supradictis. Ergo qui +peccat uno peccato, privatur omnibus virtutibus. Sed qui caret +virtute, habet vitium sibi oppositum. Ergo qui habet unum peccatum, +habet omnia peccata.
+ Objection 3: Further, all virtues are connected, because they have a principle in common, as stated above ( + Q[65], AA[1],2). Now as the virtues have a common principle, so have sins, because, as the love of God, which builds the city of God, + is the beginning and root of all the virtues, so self-love, which builds the city of Babylon, is the root of all sins, as + Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28). Therefore all vices and sins are also connected + so that whoever has one, has them all. +
[36614] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +virtutes omnes sunt connexae quae conveniunt in uno principio, ut +supra habitum est. Sed sicut virtutes conveniunt in uno principio, +ita et peccata, quia sicut amor Dei, qui facit civitatem Dei, est +principium et radix omnium virtutum, ita amor sui, qui facit +civitatem Babylonis, est radix omnium peccatorum; ut patet per +Augustinum, XIV de Civ. Dei. Ergo etiam omnia vitia et peccata sunt +connexa, ita ut qui unum habet, habeat omnia.
+ On the contrary, Some vices are contrary to one another, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 8). But contraries cannot be together in the + same subject. Therefore it is impossible for all sins and vices to be connected with one another. +
[36615] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra, +quaedam vitia sunt sibi invicem contraria, ut patet per +philosophum, in II Ethic. Sed impossibile est contraria simul +inesse eidem. Ergo impossibile est omnia peccata et vitia esse sibi +invicem connexa.
+ I answer that, The intention of the man who acts according to virtue in pursuance of his reason, is different from the intention of the + sinner in straying from the path of reason. For the intention of every man acting according to virtue is to follow the rule + of reason, wherefore the intention of all the virtues is directed to the same end, so that all the virtues are connected together + in the right reason of things to be done, viz. prudence, as stated above ( + Q[65], A[1]). But the intention of the sinner is not directed to the point of straying from the path of reason; rather is it directed + to tend to some appetible good whence it derives its species. Now these goods, to which the sinner's intention is directed + when departing from reason, are of various kinds, having no mutual connection; in fact they are sometimes contrary to one + another. Since, therefore, vices and sins take their species from that to which they turn, it is + evident that, in respect of that which completes a sin's species, sins are not connected with one another. For sin does not + consist in passing from the many to the one, as is the case with virtues, which are connected, but rather in forsaking the + one for the many. +
[36616] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod aliter se habet intentio agentis secundum virtutem ad +sequendum rationem, et aliter intentio peccantis ad divertendum a +ratione. Cuiuslibet enim agentis secundum virtutem intentio est ut +rationis regulam sequatur, et ideo omnium virtutum intentio in idem +tendit. Et propter hoc omnes virtutes habent connexionem ad invicem +in ratione recta agibilium, quae est prudentia, sicut supra dictum +est. Sed intentio peccantis non est ad hoc quod recedat ab eo quod +est secundum rationem, sed potius ut tendat in aliquod bonum +appetibile, a quo speciem sortitur. Huiusmodi autem bona in quae +tendit intentio peccantis a ratione recedens, sunt diversa, nullam +connexionem habentia ad invicem, immo etiam interdum sunt +contraria. Cum igitur vitia et peccata speciem habeant secundum +illud ad quod convertuntur, manifestum est quod, secundum illud +quod perficit speciem peccatorum, nullam connexionem habent peccata +ad invicem. Non enim peccatum committitur in accedendo a +multitudine ad unitatem, sicut accidit in virtutibus quae sunt +connexae, sed potius in recedendo ab unitate ad multitudinem.
+ Reply to Objection 1: James is speaking of sin, not as regards the thing to which it turns and which causes the distinction of sins, as stated + above ( + Q[72] , A[1]), but as regards that from which sin turns away, in as much as man, by sinning, departs from a commandment of the law. Now + all the commandments of the law are from one and the same, as he also says in the same passage, so that the same God is despised + in every sin; and in this sense he + says that whoever "offends in one point, is become guilty of all," for as much as, by committing one sin, he incurs the debt + of punishment through his contempt of God, which is the origin of all sins. +
[36617] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Iacobus loquitur de peccato non ex parte +conversionis, secundum quod peccata distinguuntur, sicut dictum +est, sed loquitur de eis ex parte aversionis, inquantum scilicet +homo peccando recedit a legis mandato. Omnia autem legis mandata +sunt ab uno et eodem, ut ipse ibidem dicit, et ideo idem Deus +contemnitur in omni peccato. Et ex hac parte dicit quod qui +offendit in uno, factus est omnium reus, quia scilicet uno peccato +peccando, incurrit poenae reatum ex hoc quod contemnit Deum, ex +cuius contemptu provenit omnium peccatorum reatus.
+ Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ( + Q[71], A[4]), the opposite virtue is not banished by every act of sin; because venial sin does not destroy virtue; while mortal sin destroys + infused virtue, by turning man away from God. Yet one act, even of mortal sin, does not destroy the habit of acquired virtue; + though if such acts be repeated so as to engender a contrary habit, the habit of acquired virtue is destroyed, the destruction + of which entails + the loss of prudence, since when man acts against any virtue whatever, he acts against prudence, without which no moral virtue + is possible, as stated above ( + Q[58], A[4]; + Q[65], A[1]). Consequently all the moral virtues are destroyed as to the perfect and formal being of virtue, which they have in so far + as they partake of prudence, yet there remain the inclinations to virtuous acts, which inclinations, however, are not virtues. + Nevertheless it + does not follow that for this reason man contracts all vices of sins---first, because several vices are opposed to one virtue, + so that a virtue can be destroyed by one of them, without the others being present; secondly, because sin is directly opposed + to virtue, as regards the virtue's inclination to act, as stated above ( + Q[71], A[1]). Wherefore, as long as any virtuous inclinations remain, it cannot be said that man has the opposite vices or sins. +
[36618] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, non per quemlibet actum +peccati tollitur virtus opposita, nam peccatum veniale virtutem non +tollit; peccatum autem mortale tollit virtutem infusam, inquantum +avertit a Deo; sed unus actus peccati etiam mortalis, non tollit +habitum virtutis acquisitae. Sed si multiplicentur actus intantum +quod generetur contrarius habitus, excluditur habitus virtutis +acquisitae. Qua exclusa, excluditur prudentia, quia cum homo agit +contra quamcumque virtutem, agit contra prudentiam. Sine prudentia +autem nulla virtus moralis esse potest, ut supra habitum est. Et +ideo per consequens excluduntur omnes virtutes morales, quantum ad +perfectum et formale esse virtutis, quod habent secundum quod +participant prudentiam, remanent tamen inclinationes ad actus +virtutum, non habentes rationem virtutis. Sed non sequitur quod +propter hoc homo incurrat omnia vitia vel peccata. Primo quidem, +quia uni virtuti plura vitia opponuntur, ita quod virtus potest +privari per unum eorum, etsi alterum non adsit. Secundo, quia +peccatum directe opponitur virtuti quantum ad inclinationem +virtutis ad actum, ut supra dictum est, unde, remanentibus +aliquibus inclinationibus virtuosis, non potest dici quod homo +habeat vitia vel peccata opposita.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The love of God is unitive, in as much as it draws man's affections from the many to the one; so that the virtues, which + flow from the love of God, are connected together. But self-love disunites man's affections among different things, in so + far as man loves himself, by desiring for himself temporal goods, which are various and of many kinds: hence vices and sins, + which arise from self-love, are not connected together. +
[36619] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod amor Dei est congregativus, inquantum affectum +hominis a multis ducit in unum, et ideo virtutes, quae ex amore Dei +causantur, connexionem habent. Sed amor sui disgregat affectum +hominis in diversa, prout scilicet homo se amat appetendo sibi bona +temporalia, quae sunt varia et diversa, et ideo vitia et peccata, +quae causantur ex amore sui, non sunt connexa.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that all sins are equal. Because sin is to do what is unlawful. Now to do what is unlawful is reproved in one + and the same way in all things. Therefore sin is reproved in one and the same way. Therefore one sin is not graver than another. +
[36620] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnia peccata sint paria. Hoc enim est +peccare, facere quod non licet. Sed facere quod non licet, uno et +eodem modo in omnibus reprehenditur. Ergo peccare uno et eodem modo +reprehenditur. Non ergo unum peccatum est alio gravius.
+ Objection 2: Further, every sin is a transgression of the rule of reason, which is to human acts what a linear rule is in corporeal things. + Therefore to sin is the same as to pass over a line. But passing over a line occurs equally and in the same way, even if one + go a long way from it or stay near it, since privations do not admit of more or less. Therefore all sins are equal. +
[36621] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +omne peccatum consistit in hoc quod homo transgreditur regulam +rationis, quae ita se habet ad actus humanos, sicut regula linearis +in corporalibus rebus. Ergo peccare simile est ei quod est lineas +transilire. Sed lineas transilire est aequaliter et uno modo, etiam +si aliquis longius recedat vel propinquius stet, quia privationes +non recipiunt magis et minus. Ergo omnia peccata sunt aequalia.
+ Objection 3: Further, sins are opposed to virtues. But all virtues are equal, as Cicero states (Paradox. iii). Therefore all sins are + equal. +
[36622] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +peccata virtutibus opponuntur. Sed omnes virtutes aequales sunt, ut +Tullius dicit, in paradoxis. Ergo omnia peccata sunt paria.
+ On the contrary, Our Lord said to Pilate ( + Jn. 19:11): "He that hath delivered me to thee, hath the greater sin," and yet it is evident that Pilate was guilty of some sin. Therefore + one sin is greater than another. +
[36623] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dominus dicit ad Pilatum, Ioan. XIX, qui tradidit me +tibi, maius peccatum habet. Et tamen constat quod Pilatus +aliquod peccatum habuit. Ergo unum peccatum est maius alio.
+ I answer that, The opinion of the Stoics, which Cicero adopts in the book on Paradoxes (Paradox. iii), was that all sins are equal: from + which opinion arose the error of certain heretics, who not only hold all sins to be equal, but also maintain that all the + pains of hell are equal. So far as can be gathered from the words of Cicero the Stoics arrived at their conclusion through + looking at sin on the side of the privation only, in so far, to wit, as it is a departure from + reason; wherefore considering simply that no privation admits of more or less, they held that all sins are equal. Yet, if + we consider the matter carefully, we shall see that there are two kinds of privation. For there is a simple and pure privation, + which consists, so to speak, in "being" corrupted; thus death is privation of life, and darkness is privation of light. Such + like privations do not admit of more or less, because nothing remains of the opposite habit; hence a man is not less dead + on + the first day after his death, or on the third or fourth days, than after a year, when his corpse is already dissolved; and, + in like manner, a house is no darker if the light be covered with several shades, than if it were covered by a single shade + shutting out all the light. There is, however, another privation which is not simple, but retains something of the opposite + habit; it consists in "becoming" corrupted rather than in "being" corrupted, like sickness which is a privation of the due + commensuration of the humors, yet so that something remains of that commensuration, else the animal would cease to live: and + the same applies to deformity and the like. Such privations admit of more or less on the part of what remains or the contrary + habit. For it matters much in sickness or deformity, whether one departs more or less from the due commensuration of humors + or members. The same applies to vices and sins: because in them the privation of the due commensuration of reason is such + as + not to destroy the order of reason altogether; else evil, if total, destroys itself, as stated in Ethic. iv, 5. For the substance + of the act, or the affection of the agent could not remain, unless something remained of the order of reason. Therefore it + matters much to the gravity of a sin whether one departs more or less from the rectitude of reason: and accordingly we must + say that sins are not all equal. +
[36624] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod opinio Stoicorum fuit, quam Tullius prosequitur in +paradoxis, quod omnia peccata sunt paria. Et ex hoc etiam derivatus +est quorundam haereticorum error, qui, ponentes omnia peccata esse +paria, dicunt etiam omnes poenas Inferni esse pares. Et quantum ex +verbis Tullii perspici potest, Stoici movebantur ex hoc quod +considerabant peccatum ex parte privationis tantum, prout scilicet +est recessus a ratione, unde simpliciter aestimantes quod nulla +privatio susciperet magis et minus, posuerunt omnia peccata esse +paria. Sed si quis diligenter consideret, inveniet duplex +privationum genus. Est enim quaedam simplex et pura privatio, quae +consistit quasi in corruptum esse, sicut mors est privatio vitae, +et tenebra est privatio luminis. Et tales privationes non recipiunt +magis et minus, quia nihil residuum est de habitu opposito. Unde +non minus est mortuus aliquis primo die mortis, et tertio vel +quarto, quam post annum, quando iam cadaver fuerit resolutum. Et +similiter non est magis tenebrosa domus, si lucerna sit operta +pluribus velaminibus, quam si sit operta uno solo velamine totum +lumen intercludente. Est autem alia privatio non simplex, sed +aliquid retinens de habitu opposito; quae quidem privatio magis +consistit in corrumpi, quam in corruptum esse, sicut aegritudo, +quae privat debitam commensurationem humorum, ita tamen quod +aliquid eius remanet, alioquin non remaneret animal vivum; et +simile est de turpitudine, et aliis huiusmodi. Huiusmodi autem +privationes recipiunt magis et minus ex parte eius quod remanet de +habitu contrario, multum enim refert ad aegritudinem vel +turpitudinem, utrum plus vel minus a debita commensuratione humorum +vel membrorum recedatur. Et similiter dicendum est de vitiis et +peccatis, sic enim in eis privatur debita commensuratio rationis, +ut non totaliter ordo rationis tollatur; alioquin malum, si sit +integrum, destruit seipsum, ut dicitur in IV Ethic.; non enim +posset remanere substantia actus, vel affectio agentis, nisi +aliquid remaneret de ordine rationis. Et ideo multum interest ad +gravitatem peccati, utrum plus vel minus recedatur a rectitudine +rationis. Et secundum hoc dicendum est quod non omnia peccata sunt +paria.
+ Reply to Objection 1: To commit sin is lawful on account of some inordinateness therein: wherefore those which contain a greater inordinateness + are more unlawful, and consequently graver sins. +
[36625] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod peccata committere non licet, propter aliquam +deordinationem quam habent. Unde illa quae maiorem deordinationem +continent, sunt magis illicita; et per consequens graviora +peccata.
+ Reply to Objection 2: This argument looks upon sin as though it were a pure privation. +
[36626] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de peccato, ac si esset privatio +pura.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Virtues are proportionately equal in one and the same subject: yet one virtue surpasses another in excellence according to + its species; and again, one man is more virtuous than another, in the same species of virtue, as stated above ( + Q[66], AA[1],2). Moreover, even if virtues were equal, it would not follow that vices are equal, since virtues are connected, and vices + or sins are not. +
[36627] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod virtutes sunt aequales proportionaliter in uno et +eodem, tamen una virtus praecedit aliam dignitate secundum suam +speciem; et unus etiam homo est alio virtuosior in eadem specie +virtutis, ut supra habitum est. Et tamen si virtutes essent pares, +non sequeretur vitia esse paria, quia virtutes habent connexionem, +non autem vitia seu peccata.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the gravity of sins does not vary according to their objects. Because the gravity of a sin pertains to + its mode or quality: whereas the object is the matter of the sin. Therefore the gravity of sins does not vary according to + their various objects. +
[36628] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatorum gravitas non varietur +secundum obiecta. Gravitas enim peccati pertinet ad modum vel +qualitatem ipsius peccati. Sed obiectum est materia ipsius peccati. +Ergo secundum diversa obiecta, peccatorum gravitas non +variatur.
+ Objection 2: Further, the gravity of a sin is the intensity of its malice. Now sin does not derive its malice from its proper object to + which it turns, and which is some appetible good, but rather from that which it turns away from. Therefore the gravity of + sins does not vary according to their various objects. +
[36629] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +gravitas peccati est intensio malitiae ipsius. Peccatum autem non +habet rationem malitiae ex parte conversionis ad proprium obiectum, +quod est quoddam bonum appetibile; sed magis ex parte aversionis. +Ergo gravitas peccatorum non variatur secundum diversa obiecta.
+ Objection 3: Further, sins that have different objects are of different kinds. But things of different kinds cannot be compared with one + another, as is proved in Phys. vii, text. 30, seqq. Therefore one sin is not graver than another by reason of the difference + of objects. +
[36630] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +peccata quae habent diversa obiecta, sunt diversorum generum. Sed +ea quae sunt diversorum generum, non sunt comparabilia, ut probatur +in VII Physic. Ergo unum peccatum non est gravius altero secundum +diversitatem obiectorum.
+ On the contrary, Sins take their species from their objects, as was shown above ( + Q[72], A[1]). But some sins are graver than others in respect of their species, as murder is graver than theft. Therefore the gravity + of sins varies according to their objects. +
[36631] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra, +peccata recipiunt speciem ex obiectis, ut ex supradictis patet. Sed +aliquorum peccatorum unum est gravius altero secundum suam speciem, +sicut homicidium furto. Ergo gravitas peccatorum differt secundum +obiecta.
+ I answer that, As is clear from what has been said ( + Q[71], A[5]), the gravity of sins varies in the same way as one sickness is graver than another: for just as the good of health consists + in a certain commensuration of the humors, in keeping with an animal's nature, so the good of virtue consists in a certain + commensuration of the human act in accord with the rule of reason. Now it is evident that the higher the principle the disorder + of which + causes the disorder in the humors, the graver is the sickness: thus a sickness which comes on the human body from the heart, + which is the principle of life, or from some neighboring part, is more dangerous. Wherefore a sin must needs be so much the + graver, as the disorder occurs in a principle which is higher in the order of reason. Now in matters of action the reason + directs all things in view of the end: wherefore the higher the end which attaches to sins in human acts, the graver the sin. + Now the object of an act is its end, as stated above ( + Q[72], A[3], ad 2); and consequently the difference of gravity in sins depends on their objects. Thus it is clear that external things + are directed to man as their end, while man is further directed to God as his end. Wherefore a sin which is about the very + substance of man, e.g. murder, is graver than a sin which is about external things, e.g. theft; and graver still is a sin + committed directly against God, e.g. + unbelief, blasphemy, and the like: and in each of these grades of sin, one sin will be graver than another according as it + is about a higher or lower principle. And forasmuch as sins take their species from their objects, the difference of gravity + which is derived from the objects is first and foremost, as resulting from the species. +
[36632] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ex supradictis patet, gravitas peccatorum +differt eo modo quo una aegritudo est alia gravior, sicut enim +bonum sanitatis consistit in quadam commensuratione humorum per +convenientiam ad naturam animalis, ita bonum virtutis consistit in +quadam commensuratione humani actus secundum convenientiam ad +regulam rationis. Manifestum est autem quod tanto est gravior +aegritudo, quanto tollitur debita humorum commensuratio per +commensurationem prioris principii, sicut aegritudo quae provenit +in corpore humano ex corde, quod est principium vitae, vel ex +aliquo quod appropinquat cordi, periculosior est. Unde oportet +etiam quod peccatum sit tanto gravius, quanto deordinatio contingit +circa aliquod principium quod est prius in ordine rationis. Ratio +autem ordinat omnia in agibilibus ex fine. Et ideo quanto peccatum +contingit in actibus humanis ex altiori fine, tanto peccatum est +gravius. Obiecta autem actuum sunt fines eorum, ut ex supradictis +patet. Et ideo secundum diversitatem obiectorum attenditur +diversitas gravitatis in peccatis. Sicut patet quod res exteriores +ordinantur ad hominem sicut ad finem; homo autem ordinatur ulterius +in Deum sicut in finem. Unde peccatum quod est circa ipsam +substantiam hominis, sicut homicidium est gravius peccato quod est +circa res exteriores, sicut furtum; et adhuc est gravius peccatum +quod immediate contra Deum committitur, sicut infidelitas, +blasphemia et huiusmodi. Et in ordine quorumlibet horum peccatorum +unum peccatum est gravius altero, secundum quod est circa aliquid +principalius vel minus principale. Et quia peccata habent speciem +ex obiectis, differentia gravitatis quae attenditur penes obiecta, +est prima et principalis, quasi consequens speciem.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Although the object is the matter about which an act is concerned, yet it has the character of an end, in so far as the intention + of the agent is fixed on it, as stated above ( + Q[72], A[3], ad 2). Now the form of a moral act depends on the end, as was shown above ( + Q[72], A[6]; + Q[18], A[6]). +
[36633] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod obiectum, etsi sit materia circa quam terminatur +actus, habet tamen rationem finis, secundum quod intentio agentis +fertur in ipsum, ut supra dictum est. Forma autem actus moralis +dependet ex fine, ut ex superioribus patet.
+ Reply to Objection 2: From the very fact that man turns unduly to some mutable good, it follows that he turns away from the immutable Good, which + aversion completes the nature of evil. Hence the various degrees of malice in sins must needs follow the diversity of those + things to which man turns. +
[36634] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod ex ipsa indebita conversione ad aliquod bonum +commutabile, sequitur aversio ab incommutabili bono, in qua +perficitur ratio mali. Et ideo oportet quod secundum diversitatem +eorum quae pertinent ad conversionem, sequatur diversa gravitas +malitiae in peccatis.
+ Reply to Objection 3: All the objects of human acts are related to one another, wherefore all human acts are somewhat of one kind, in so far as + they are directed to the last end. Therefore nothing prevents all sins from being compared with one another. +
[36635] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod omnia obiecta humanorum actuum habent ordinem ad +invicem, et ideo omnes actus humani quodammodo conveniunt in uno +genere, secundum quod ordinantur ad ultimum finem. Et ideo nihil +prohibet omnia peccata esse comparabilia.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the gravity of sins does not vary according to the excellence of the virtues to which they are opposed, + so that, to wit, the graver the sin is opposed to the greater virtue. For, according to + Prov. 15:5, "In abundant justice there is the greatest strength." Now, as Our Lord says ( + Mat. 5:20, seqq.) abundant justice restrains anger, which is a less grievous sin than murder, which less abundant justice + restrains. Therefore the least grievous sin is opposed to the greatest virtue. +
[36636] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod gravitas peccatorum non differat +secundum dignitatem virtutum quibus peccata opponuntur, ut scilicet +maiori virtuti gravius peccatum opponatur. Quia ut dicitur Prov. +XV, in abundanti iustitia virtus maxima est. Sed sicut dicit +dominus, Matth. V, abundans iustitia cohibet iram; quae est minus +peccatum quam homicidium, quod cohibet minor iustitia. Ergo maximae +virtuti opponitur minimum peccatum.
+ Objection 2: Further, it is stated in Ethic. ii, 3 that "virtue is about the difficult and the good": whence it seems to follow that the + greater virtue is about what is more difficult. But it is a less grievous sin to fail in what is more difficult, than in what + is less difficult. Therefore the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue. +
[36637] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +in II Ethic. dicitur quod virtus est circa difficile et bonum, ex +quo videtur quod maior virtus sit circa magis difficile. Sed minus +est peccatum si homo deficiat in magis difficili, quam si deficiat +in minus difficili. Ergo maiori virtuti minus peccatum +opponitur.
+ Objection 3: Further, charity is a greater virtue than faith or hope ( + 1 Cor. 13:13). Now hatred which is opposed to charity is a less grievous sin than unbelief or despair which are opposed to faith and hope. + Therefore the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue. +
[36638] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +caritas est maior virtus quam fides et spes, ut dicitur I ad Cor. +XIII. Odium autem, quod opponitur caritati, est minus peccatum quam +infidelitas vel desperatio, quae opponuntur fidei et spei. Ergo +maiori virtuti opponitur minus peccatum.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. 8:10) that the "worst is opposed to the best." Now in morals the best is the greatest virtue; + and the worst is the most grievous sin. Therefore the most grievous sin is opposed to the greatest virtue. +
[36639] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic., quod pessimum optimo +contrarium est. Optimum autem in moralibus est maxima virtus; +pessimum autem, gravissimum peccatum. Ergo maximae virtuti +opponitur gravissimum peccatum.
+ I answer that, A sin is opposed to a virtue in two ways: first, principally and directly; that sin, to with, which is about the same object: + because contraries are about the same thing. In this way, the more grievous sin must needs be opposed to the greater virtue: + because, just as the degrees of gravity in a sin depend on the object, so also does the greatness of a virtue, since both + sin and virtue take their species from the object, as shown above ( + Q[60], A[5]; + Q[72], A[1]). Wherefore the greatest sin must needs be directly opposed to the greatest virtue, as being furthest removed from it in + the same genus. Secondly, the opposition of virtue to sin may be considered in respect of a certain extension of the virtue + in checking sin. For the greater a virtue is, the further it removes man from the contrary sin, so that it withdraws man not + only from that sin, but also from whatever leads to it. + And thus it is evident that the greater a virtue is, the more it withdraws man also from less grievous sins: even as the more + perfect health is, the more does it ward off even minor ailments. And in this way the less grievous sin is opposed to the + greater virtue, on the part of the latter's effect. +
[36640] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod virtuti opponitur aliquod peccatum, uno quidem modo +principaliter et directe, quod scilicet est circa idem obiectum, +nam contraria circa idem sunt. Et hoc modo oportet quod maiori +virtuti opponatur gravius peccatum. Sicut enim ex parte obiecti +attenditur maior gravitas peccati, ita etiam maior dignitas +virtutis, utrumque enim ex obiecto speciem sortitur, ut ex +supradictis patet. Unde oportet quod maximae virtuti directe +contrarietur maximum peccatum, quasi maxime ab eo distans in eodem +genere. Alio modo potest considerari oppositio virtutis ad +peccatum, secundum quandam extensionem virtutis cohibentis +peccatum, quanto enim fuerit virtus maior, tanto magis elongat +hominem a peccato sibi contrario, ita quod non solum ipsum +peccatum, sed etiam inducentia ad peccatum cohibet. Et sic +manifestum est quod quanto aliqua virtus fuerit maior, tanto etiam +minora peccata cohibet, sicut etiam sanitas, quanto fuerit maior, +tanto etiam minores distemperantias excludit. Et per hunc modum +maiori virtuti minus peccatum opponitur ex parte effectus.
+ Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the opposition which consists in restraining from sin; for thus abundant justice checks even minor + sins. +
[36641] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de oppositione quae +attenditur secundum cohibitionem peccati, sic enim abundans +iustitia etiam minora peccata cohibet.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The greater virtue that is about a more difficult good is opposed directly to the sin which is about a more difficult evil. + For in each case there is a certain superiority, in that the will is shown to be more intent on good or evil, through not + being overcome by the difficulty. +
[36642] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod maiori virtuti, quae est circa bonum magis difficile, +contrariatur directe peccatum quod est circa malum magis difficile. +Utrobique enim invenitur quaedam eminentia, ex hoc quod ostenditur +voluntas proclivior in bonum vel in malum, ex hoc quod difficultate +non vincitur.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Charity is not any kind of love, but the love of God: hence not any kind of hatred is opposed to it directly, but the hatred + of God, which is the most grievous of all sins. +
[36643] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod caritas non est quicumque amor, sed amor Dei. Unde +non opponitur ei quodcumque odium directe, sed odium Dei, quod est +gravissimum peccatorum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that carnal sins are not of less guilt than spiritual sins. Because adultery is a more grievous sin than theft: + for it is written ( + Prov. 6:30, + 32): "The fault is not so great when a man has stolen . . . but he that is an adulterer, for the folly of his heart shall destroy + his own soul." Now theft belongs to covetousness, which is a spiritual sin; while adultery pertains to lust, which is a carnal + sin. Therefore carnal sins are + of greater guilt than spiritual sins. +
[36644] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccata carnalia non sint minoris +culpae quam peccata spiritualia. Adulterium enim gravius peccatum +est quam furtum, dicitur enim Prov. VI, non grandis est culpae +cum quis furatus fuerit. Qui autem adulter est, propter cordis +inopiam perdet animam suam. Sed furtum pertinet ad avaritiam, +quae est peccatum spirituale; adulterium autem ad luxuriam, quae +est peccatum carnale. Ergo peccata carnalia sunt maioris +culpae.
+ Objection 2: Further, Augustine says in his commentary on Leviticus [*The quotation is from De Civ. Dei ii, 4 and iv, 31.] that "the devil + rejoices chiefly in lust and idolatry." But he rejoices more in the greater sin. Therefore, since lust is a carnal sin, it + seems that the carnal sins are of most guilt. +
[36645] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, super Levit., quod Diabolus maxime gaudet de +peccato luxuriae et idololatriae. Sed de maiori culpa magis gaudet. +Ergo, cum luxuria sit peccatum carnale, videtur quod peccata +carnalia sint maximae culpae.
+ Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher proves (Ethic. vii, 6) that "it is more shameful to be incontinent in lust than in anger." But anger + is a spiritual sin, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17); while lust pertains to carnal sins. Therefore carnal sin is more + grievous than spiritual sin. +
[36646] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +philosophus probat, in VII Ethic., quod incontinens +concupiscentiae est turpior quam incontinens irae. Sed ira est +peccatum spirituale, secundum Gregorium, XXXI Moral.; +concupiscentia autem pertinet ad peccata carnalia. Ergo peccatum +carnale est gravius quam peccatum spirituale.
+ On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 11) that carnal sins are of less guilt, but of more shame than spiritual sins. +
[36647] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Gregorius dicit, quod peccata carnalia sunt minoris +culpae, et maioris infamiae.
+ I answer that, Spiritual sins are of greater guilt than carnal sins: yet this does not mean that each spiritual sin is of greater guilt + than each carnal sin; but that, considering the sole difference between spiritual and carnal, spiritual sins are more grievous + than carnal sins, other things being equal. Three reasons may be assigned for this. The first is on the part of the subject: + because spiritual sins belong to the spirit, to which it is proper to turn to God, and to + turn away from Him; whereas carnal sins are consummated in the carnal pleasure of the appetite, to which it chiefly belongs + to turn to goods of the body; so that carnal sin, as such, denotes more a "turning to" something, and for that reason, implies + a closer cleaving; whereas spiritual sin denotes more a "turning from" something, whence the notion of guilt arises; and for + this reason it involves greater guilt. A second reason may be taken on the part of the person against whom sin is + committed: because carnal sin, as such, is against the sinner's own body, which he ought to love less, in the order of charity, + than God and his neighbor, against whom he commits spiritual sins, and consequently spiritual sins, as such, are of greater + guilt. A third reason may be taken from the motive, since the stronger the impulse to sin, the less grievous the sin, as we + shall state further on + (A[6]). Now carnal sins have a stronger impulse, viz. our innate + concupiscence of the flesh. Therefore spiritual sins, as such, are of greater guilt. +
[36648] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod peccata spiritualia sunt maioris culpae quam peccata +carnalia. Quod non est sic intelligendum quasi quodlibet peccatum +spirituale sit maioris culpae quolibet peccato carnali, sed quia, +considerata hac sola differentia spiritualitatis et carnalitatis, +graviora sunt quam cetera peccata, ceteris paribus. Cuius ratio +triplex potest assignari. Prima quidem ex parte subiecti. Nam +peccata spiritualia pertinent ad spiritum, cuius est converti ad +Deum et ab eo averti, peccata vero carnalia consummantur in +delectatione carnalis appetitus, ad quem principaliter pertinet ad +bonum corporale converti. Et ideo peccatum carnale, inquantum +huiusmodi, plus habet de conversione, propter quod etiam est +maioris adhaesionis, sed peccatum spirituale habet plus de +aversione, ex qua procedit ratio culpae. Et ideo peccatum +spirituale, inquantum huiusmodi, est maioris culpae. Secunda ratio +potest sumi ex parte eius in quem peccatur. Nam peccatum carnale, +inquantum huiusmodi, est in corpus proprium; quod est minus +diligendum, secundum ordinem caritatis, quam Deus et proximus, in +quos peccatur per peccata spiritualia. Et ideo peccata spiritualia, +inquantum huiusmodi, sunt maioris culpae. Tertia ratio potest sumi +ex parte motivi. Quia quanto est gravius impulsivum ad peccandum, +tanto homo minus peccat, ut infra dicetur. Peccata autem carnalia +habent vehementius impulsivum, idest ipsam concupiscentiam carnis +nobis innatam. Et ideo peccata spiritualia, inquantum huiusmodi, +sunt maioris culpae.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Adultery belongs not only to the sin of lust, but also to the sin of injustice, and in this respect may be brought under + the head of covetousness, as a gloss observes on + Eph. 5:5. "No fornicator, or unclean, or covetous person," etc.; so that adultery is so much more grievous than theft, as a man loves + his wife more than his chattels. +
[36649] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod adulterium non solum pertinet ad peccatum +luxuriae, sed etiam pertinet ad peccatum iniustitiae. Et quantum ad +hoc, potest ad avaritiam reduci; ut Glossa dicit, ad Ephes., super +illud, omnis fornicator, aut immundus, aut avarus. Et tunc +gravius est adulterium quam furtum, quanto homini carior est uxor +quam res possessa.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The devil is said to rejoice chiefly in the sin of lust, because it is of the greatest adhesion, and man can with difficulty + be withdrawn from it. "For the desire of pleasure is insatiable," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 12). +
[36650] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod Diabolus dicitur maxime gaudere de peccato luxuriae, +quia est maximae adhaerentiae, et difficile ab eo homo potest +eripi, insatiabilis est enim delectabilis appetitus ut philosophus +dicit, in III Ethic.
+ Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher himself says (Ethic. vii, 6), the reason why it is more shameful to be incontinent in lust than in anger, + is that lust partakes less of reason; and in the same sense he says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "sins of intemperance are most worthy + of reproach, because they are about those pleasures which are common to us and irrational minds": hence, by these sins man + is, so to speak, brutalized; for which same reason Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, + 17) that they are more shameful. +
[36651] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod philosophus dicit, turpiorem esse incontinentem +concupiscentiae quam incontinentem irae, quia minus participat de +ratione. Et secundum hoc etiam dicit, in III Ethic., quod peccata +intemperantiae sunt maxime exprobrabilia, quia sunt circa illas +delectationes quae sunt communes nobis et brutis, unde quodammodo +per ista peccata homo brutalis redditur. Et inde est quod, sicut +Gregorius dicit, sunt maioris infamiae.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the gravity of a sin does not depend on its cause. Because the greater a sin's cause, the more forcibly + it moves to sin, and so the more difficult is it to resist. But sin is lessened by the fact that it is difficult to resist; + for it denotes weakness in the sinner, if he cannot easily resist sin; and a sin that is due to weakness is deemed less grievous. + Therefore sin does not derive its gravity from its cause. +
[36652] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod gravitas peccatorum non attendatur +secundum causam peccati. Quanto enim peccati causa fuerit maior, +tanto vehementius movet ad peccandum, et ita difficilius potest ei +resisti. Sed peccatum diminuitur ex hoc quod ei difficilius +resistitur, hoc enim pertinet ad infirmitatem peccantis, ut non +facile resistat peccato; peccatum autem quod est ex infirmitate, +levius iudicatur. Non ergo peccatum habet gravitatem ex parte suae +causae.
+ Objection 2: Further, concupiscence is a general cause of sin; wherefore a gloss on + Rom. 7:7, "For I had not known concupiscence," says: "The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evils." Now + the greater the concupiscence by which man is overcome, the less grievous his sin. Therefore the gravity of a sin is diminished + by the greatness of its cause. +
[36653] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, +concupiscentia est generalis quaedam causa peccati, unde dicit +Glossa, super illud Rom. VII, nam concupiscentiam nesciebam +etc., bona est lex, quae, dum concupiscentiam prohibet, omne malum +prohibet. Sed quanto homo fuerit victus maiori concupiscentia, +tanto est minus peccatum. Gravitas ergo peccati diminuitur ex +magnitudine causae.
+ Objection 3: Further, as rectitude of the reason is the cause of a virtuous act, so defect in the reason seems to be the cause of sin. + Now the greater the defect in the reason, the less grievous the sin: so much so that he who lacks the use of reason, is altogether + excused from sin, and he who sins through ignorance, sins less grievously. Therefore the gravity of a sin is not increased + by the greatness of its cause. +
[36654] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sicut rectitudo rationis est causa virtuosi actus, ita defectus +rationis videtur esse causa peccati. Sed defectus rationis, quanto +fuerit maior, tanto est minus peccatum, intantum quod qui carent +usu rationis, omnino excusentur a peccato; et qui ex ignorantia +peccat, levius peccat. Ergo gravitas peccati non augetur ex +magnitudine causae.
+ On the contrary, If the cause be increased, the effect is increased. Therefore the greater the cause of sin, the more grievous the sin. +
[36655] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra, +multiplicata causa, multiplicatur effectus. Ergo, si causa peccati +maior fuerit, peccatum erit gravius.
+ I answer that, In the genus of sin, as in every other genus, two causes may be observed. The first is the direct and proper cause of sin, + and is the will to sin: for it is compared to the sinful act, as a tree to its fruit, as a gloss observes on + Mat. 7:18, "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit": and the greater this cause is, the more grievous will the sin be, since the + greater the will to sin, the more grievously does man sin. +
The other causes of sin are extrinsic and remote, as it were, being those whereby the will is inclined to sin. Among these + causes we must make a distinction; for some of them induce the will to sin in accord with the very nature of the will: such + is the end, which is the proper object of the will; and by a such like cause sin is made more grievous, because a man sins + more grievously if his will is induced to sin by the intention of a more evil end. Other causes incline the will + to sin, against the nature and order of the will, whose natural inclination is to be moved freely of itself in accord with + the judgment of reason. Wherefore those causes which weaken the judgment of reason (e.g. ignorance), or which weaken the free + movement of the will, (e.g. weakness, violence, fear, or the like), diminish the gravity of sin, even as they diminish its + voluntariness; and so much so, that if the act be altogether involuntary, it is no longer sinful. +
[36656] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod in genere peccati, sicut et in quolibet alio genere, +potest accipi duplex causa. Una quae est propria et per se causa +peccati, quae est ipsa voluntas peccandi, comparatur enim ad actum +peccati sicut arbor ad fructum, ut dicitur in Glossa, super illud +Matth. VII, non potest arbor bona fructus malos facere. Et +huiusmodi causa quanto fuerit maior, tanto peccatum erit gravius, +quanto enim voluntas fuerit maior ad peccandum, tanto homo gravius +peccat. Aliae vero causae peccati accipiuntur quasi extrinsecae et +remotae, ex quibus scilicet voluntas inclinatur ad peccandum. Et in +his causis est distinguendum. Quaedam enim harum inducunt +voluntatem ad peccandum, secundum ipsam naturam voluntatis, sicut +finis, quod est proprium obiectum voluntatis. Et ex tali causa +augetur peccatum, gravius enim peccat cuius voluntas ex intentione +peioris finis inclinatur ad peccandum. Aliae vero causae sunt quae +inclinant voluntatem ad peccandum, praeter naturam et ordinem +ipsius voluntatis, quae nata est moveri libere ex seipsa secundum +iudicium rationis. Unde causae quae diminuunt iudicium rationis, +sicut ignorantia; vel quae diminuunt liberum motum voluntatis, +sicut infirmitas vel violentia aut metus, aut aliquid huiusmodi, +diminuunt peccatum, sicut et diminuunt voluntarium, intantum quod +si actus sit omnino involuntarius, non habet rationem peccati.
+ Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the extrinsic moving cause, which diminishes voluntariness. The increase of such a cause diminishes + the sin, as stated. +
[36657] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de causa movente +extrinseca, quae diminuit voluntarium, cuius quidem causae +augmentum diminuit peccatum, ut dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 2: If concupiscence be understood to include the movement of the will, then, where there is greater concupiscence, there is + a greater sin. But if by concupiscence we understand a passion, which is a movement of the concupiscible power, then a greater + concupiscence, forestalling the judgment of reason and the movement of the will, diminishes the sin, because the man who sins, + being stimulated by a greater concupiscence, falls through a more grievous + temptation, wherefore he is less to be blamed. On the other hand, if concupiscence be taken in this sense follows the judgment + of reason, and the movement of the will, then the greater concupiscence, the graver the sin: because sometimes the movement + of concupiscence is redoubled by the will tending unrestrainedly to its object. +
[36658] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod si sub concupiscentia includatur etiam ipse motus +voluntatis, sic ubi est maior concupiscentia, est maius peccatum. +Si vero concupiscentia dicatur passio quaedam, quae est motus vis +concupiscibilis, sic maior concupiscentia praecedens iudicium +rationis et motum voluntatis, diminuit peccatum, quia qui maiori +concupiscentia stimulatus peccat, cadit ex graviori tentatione; +unde minus ei imputatur. Si vero concupiscentia sic sumpta sequatur +iudicium rationis et motum voluntatis, sic ubi est maior +concupiscentia, est maius peccatum, insurgit enim interdum maior +concupiscentiae motus ex hoc quod voluntas ineffrenate tendit in +suum obiectum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the cause which renders the act involuntary, and such a cause diminishes the gravity of sin, as stated. +
[36659] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de causa quae causat +involuntarium, et haec diminuit peccatum, ut dictum est.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that a circumstance does not aggravate a sin. Because sin takes its gravity from its species. Now a circumstance + does not specify a sin, for it is an accident thereof. Therefore the gravity of a sin is not taken from a circumstance. +
[36660] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod circumstantia non aggravet peccatum. +Peccatum enim habet gravitatem ex sua specie. Circumstantia autem +non dat speciem peccato, cum sit quoddam accidens eius. Ergo +gravitas peccati non consideratur ex circumstantia.
+ Objection 2: Further, a circumstance is either evil or not: if it is evil, it causes, of itself, a species of evil; and if it is not evil, + it cannot make a thing worse. Therefore a circumstance nowise aggravates a sin. +
[36661] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, +aut circumstantia est mala, aut non. Si circumstantia mala est, +ipsa per se causat quandam speciem mali, si vero non sit mala, non +habet unde augeat malum. Ergo circumstantia nullo modo auget +peccatum.
+ Objection 3: Further, the malice of a sin is derived from its turning away (from God). But circumstances affect sin on the part of the + object to which it turns. Therefore they do not add to the sin's malice. +
[36662] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, +malitia peccati est ex parte aversionis. Sed circumstantiae +consequuntur peccatum ex parte conversionis. Ergo non augent +malitiam peccati.
+ On the contrary, Ignorance of a circumstance diminishes sin: for he who sins through ignorance of a circumstance, deserves to be forgiven + (Ethic. iii, 1). Now this would not be the case unless a circumstance aggravated a sin. Therefore a circumstance makes a sin + more grievous. +
[36663] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra +est quod ignorantia circumstantiae diminuit peccatum, qui enim +peccat ex ignorantia circumstantiae, meretur veniam, ut dicitur in +III Ethic. Hoc autem non esset, nisi circumstantia aggravaret +peccatum. Ergo circumstantia peccatum aggravat.
+ I answer that, As the Philosopher says in speaking of habits of virtue (Ethic. ii, 1,2), "it is natural for a thing to be increased by that + which causes it." Now it is evident that a sin is caused by a defect in some circumstance: because the fact that a man departs + from the order of reason is due to his not observing the due circumstances in his action. Wherefore it is evident that it + is natural for a sin to be aggravated by reason of its circumstances. This happens in + three ways. First, in so far as a circumstance draws a sin from one kind to another: thus fornication is the intercourse of + a man with one who is not his wife: but if to this be added the circumstance that the latter is the wife of another, the sin + is drawn to another kind of sin, viz. injustice, in so far as he usurps another's property; and in this respect adultery is + a more grievous sin than fornication. Secondly, a circumstance aggravates a sin, not by drawing it into another genus, but + only by multiplying the ratio of sin: thus if a wasteful man gives both when he ought not, and to whom he ought not to give, + he commits the same kind of sin in more ways than if he were to merely to give to whom he ought not, and for that very reason + his sin is more grievous; even as that sickness is the graver which affects more parts of the body. Hence Cicero says (Paradox. + iii) that "in taking his father's life a man commits many sins; for he outrages one who begot him, who fed him, who + educated him, to whom he owes his lands, his house, his position in the republic." Thirdly, a circumstance aggravates a sin + by adding to the deformity which the sin derives from another circumstance: thus, taking another's property constitutes the + sin of theft; but if to this be added the circumstance that much is taken of another's property, the sin will be more grievous; + although in itself, to take more or less has not the character of a good or of an evil act. +
[36664] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod unumquodque ex eodem natum est augeri, ex quo +causatur; sicut philosophus dicit de habitu virtutis, in II Ethic. +Manifestum est autem quod peccatum causatur ex defectu alicuius +circumstantiae, ex hoc enim receditur ab ordine rationis, quod +aliquis in operando non observat debitas circumstantias. Unde +manifestum est quod peccatum natum est aggravari per +circumstantiam. Sed hoc quidem contingit tripliciter. Uno quidem +modo, inquantum circumstantia transfert in aliud genus peccati. +Sicut peccatum fornicationis consistit in hoc quod homo accedit ad +non suam, si autem addatur haec circumstantia, ut illa ad quam +accedit sit alterius uxor, transfertur iam in aliud genus peccati, +scilicet in iniustitiam, inquantum homo usurpat rem alterius. Et +secundum hoc, adulterium est gravius peccatum quam fornicatio. +Aliquando vero circumstantia non aggravat peccatum quasi trahens in +aliud genus peccati, sed solum quia multiplicat rationem peccati. +Sicut si prodigus det quando non debet, et cui non debet, +multiplicius peccat eodem genere peccati, quam si solum det cui non +debet. Et ex hoc ipso peccatum fit gravius, sicut etiam aegritudo +est gravior quae plures partes corporis inficit. Unde et Tullius +dicit, in paradoxis, quod in patris vita violanda, multa +peccantur, violatur enim is qui procreavit, qui aluit, qui +erudivit, qui in sede ac domo, atque in republica collocavit. +Tertio modo circumstantia aggravat peccatum ex eo quod auget +deformitatem provenientem ex alia circumstantia. Sicut accipere +alienum constituit peccatum furti, si autem addatur haec +circumstantia, ut multum accipiat de alieno, est peccatum gravius; +quamvis accipere multum vel parum, de se non dicat rationem boni +vel mali.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Some circumstances do specify a moral act, as stated above ( + Q[18], A[10]). Nevertheless a circumstance which does not give the species, may aggravate a sin; because, even as the goodness of a thing + is weighed, not only in reference to its species, but also in reference to an accident, so the malice of an act is measured, + not only according to the species of that act, but also according to a circumstance. +
[36665] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod aliqua circumstantia dat speciem actui morali, +ut supra habitum est. Et tamen circumstantia quae non dat speciem, +potest aggravare peccatum. Quia sicut bonitas rei non solum +pensatur ex sua specie, sed etiam ex aliquo accidente; ita malitia +actus non solum pensatur ex specie actus, sed etiam ex +circumstantia.
+ Reply to Objection 2: A circumstance may aggravate a sin either way. For if it is evil, it does not follow that it constitutes the sin's species; + because it may multiply the ratio of evil within the same species, as stated above. And if it be not evil, it may aggravate + a sin in relation to the malice of another circumstance. +
[36666] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod utroque modo circumstantia potest aggravare peccatum. +Si enim sit mala, non tamen propter hoc oportet quod semper +constituat speciem peccati, potest enim addere rationem malitiae in +eadem specie, ut dictum est. Si autem non sit mala, potest +aggravare peccatum in ordine ad malitiam alterius +circumstantiae.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Reason should direct the action not only as regards the object, but also as regards every circumstance. Therefore one may + turn aside from the rule of reason through corruption of any single circumstance; for instance, by doing something when one + ought not or where one ought not; and to depart thus from the rule of reason suffices to make the act evil. This turning aside + from the rule of reason results from man's turning away from God, to Whom man + ought to be united by right reason. +
[36667] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio debet ordinare actum non solum quantum ad +obiectum, sed etiam quantum ad omnes circumstantias. Et ideo +aversio quaedam a regula rationis attenditur secundum corruptionem +cuiuslibet circumstantiae, puta si aliquis operetur quando non +debet, vel ubi non debet. Et huiusmodi aversio sufficit ad rationem +mali. Hanc autem aversionem a regula rationis, sequitur aversio a +Deo, cui debet homo per rectam rationem coniungi.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that a sin is not aggravated by reason of its causing more harm. Because the harm done is an issue consequent + to the sinful act. But the issue of an act does not add to its goodness or malice, as stated above ( + Q[20], A[5]). Therefore a sin is not aggravated on account of its causing more harm. +
[36668] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod gravitas peccati non augeatur secundum +maius nocumentum. Nocumentum enim est quidam eventus consequens +actum peccati. Sed eventus sequens non addit ad bonitatem vel +malitiam actus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo peccatum non aggravatur +propter maius nocumentum.
+ Objection 2: Further, harm is inflicted by sins against our neighbor. Because no one wishes to harm himself: and no one can harm God, + according to + Job 35:6, + 8: "If thy iniquities be multiplied, what shalt thou do against Him? . . . Thy wickedness may hurt a man that is like thee." + If, therefore, sins were aggravated through causing more harm, it would follow that sins against our neighbor are more grievous + than sins against God or oneself. +
[36669] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, +nocumentum maxime invenitur in peccatis quae sunt contra proximum, +quia sibi ipsi nemo vult nocere; Deo autem nemo potest nocere, +secundum illud Iob XXXV, si multiplicatae fuerint iniquitates +tuae, quid facies contra illum? Homini, qui similis tibi est, +nocebit impietas tua. Si ergo peccatum aggravaretur propter +maius nocumentum, sequeretur quod peccatum quo quis peccat in +proximum, esset gravius peccato quo quis peccat in Deum vel in +seipsum.
+ Objection 3: Further, greater harm is inflicted on a man by depriving him of the life of grace, than by taking away his natural life; + because the life of grace is better than the life of nature, so far that man ought to despise his natural life lest he lose + the life of grace. Now, speaking absolutely, a man who leads a woman to commit fornication deprives her of the life of grace + by leading her into mortal sin. If therefore a sin were more grievous on account of its + causing a greater harm, it would follow that fornication, absolutely speaking, is a more grievous sin than murder, which is + evidently untrue. Therefore a sin is not more grievous on account of its causing a greater harm. +
[36670] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, +maius nocumentum infertur alicui cum privatur vita gratiae, quam +cum privatur vita naturae, quia vita gratiae est melior quam vita +naturae, intantum quod homo debet vitam naturae contemnere ne +amittat vitam gratiae. Sed ille qui inducit aliquam mulierem ad +fornicandum, quantum est de se, privat eam vita gratiae, inducens +eam ad peccatum mortale. Si ergo peccatum esset gravius propter +maius nocumentum, sequeretur quod simplex fornicator gravius +peccaret quam homicida, quod est manifeste falsum. Non ergo +peccatum est gravius propter maius nocumentum.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 14): "Since vice is contrary to nature, a vice is the more grievous according as it diminishes + the integrity of nature." Now the diminution of the integrity of nature is a harm. Therefore a sin is graver according as + it does more harm. +
[36671] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in III de Lib. Arb., quia vitium +naturae adversatur, tantum additur malitiae vitiorum, quantum +integritati naturarum minuitur. Sed diminutio integritatis +naturae est nocumentum. Ergo tanto gravius est peccatum, quanto +maius est nocumentum.
+ I answer that, Harm may bear a threefold relation to sin. Because sometimes the harm resulting from a sin is foreseen and intended, as when + a man does something with a mind to harm another, e.g. a murderer or a thief. In this case the quantity of harm aggravates + the sin directly, because then the harm is the direct object of the sin. Sometimes the harm is foreseen, but not intended; + for instance, when a man takes a short cut through a field, the result being that he + knowingly injures the growing crops, although his intention is not to do this harm, but to commit fornication. In this case + again the quantity of the harm done aggravates the sin; indirectly, however, in so far, to wit, as it is owing to his will + being strongly inclined to sin, that a man does not forbear from doing, to himself or to another, a harm which he would not + wish simply. Sometimes, however, the harm is neither foreseen nor intended: and then if this harm is connected with the sin + accidentally, it does not aggravate the sin directly; but, on account of his neglecting to consider the harm that might ensue, + a man is deemed punishable for the evil results of his action if it be unlawful. If, on the other hand, the harm follow directly + from the sinful act, although it be neither foreseen nor intended, it aggravates the sin directly, because whatever is directly + consequent to a sin, belongs, in a manner, to the very species of that sin: for instance, if a man is a notorious + fornicator, the result is that many are scandalized; and although such was not his intention, nor was it perhaps foreseen + by him, yet it aggravates his sin directly. +
But this does not seem to apply to penal harm, which the sinner himself incurs. Such like harm, if accidentally connected + with the sinful act, and if neither foreseen nor intended, does not aggravate a sin, nor does it correspond with the gravity + of the sin: for instance, if a man in running to slay, slips and hurts his foot. If, on the other hand, this harm is directly + consequent to the sinful act, although perhaps it be neither foreseen nor intended, then greater harm does not + make greater sin, but, on the contrary, a graver sin calls for the infliction of a greater harm. Thus, an unbeliever who has + heard nothing about the pains of hell, would suffer greater pain in hell for a sin of murder than for a sin of theft: but + his sin is not aggravated on account of his neither intending nor foreseeing this, as it would be in the case of a believer, + who, seemingly, sins more grievously in the very fact that he despises a greater punishment, that he may satisfy his desire + to + sin; but the gravity of this harm is caused by the sole gravity of sin. +
[36672] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod nocumentum tripliciter se habere potest ad peccatum. +Quandoque enim nocumentum quod provenit ex peccato, est praevisum +et intentum, sicut cum aliquis aliquid operatur animo nocendi +alteri, ut homicida vel fur. Et tunc directe quantitas nocumenti +adauget gravitatem peccati, quia tunc nocumentum est per se +obiectum peccati. Quandoque autem nocumentum est praevisum, sed non +intentum, sicut cum aliquis transiens per agrum ut compendiosius +vadat ad fornicandum, infert nocumentum his quae sunt seminata in +agro, scienter, licet non animo nocendi. Et sic etiam quantitas +nocumenti aggravat peccatum, sed indirecte, inquantum scilicet ex +voluntate multum inclinata ad peccandum, procedit quod aliquis non +praetermittat facere damnum sibi vel alii, quod simpliciter non +vellet. Quandoque autem nocumentum nec est praevisum nec intentum. +Et tunc si per accidens se habeat ad peccatum, non aggravat +peccatum directe, sed propter negligentiam considerandi nocumenta +quae consequi possent, imputantur homini ad poenam mala quae +eveniunt praeter eius intentionem, si dabat operam rei illicitae. +Si vero nocumentum per se sequatur ex actu peccati, licet non sit +intentum nec praevisum, directe peccatum aggravat, quia quaecumque +per se consequuntur ad peccatum, pertinent quodammodo ad ipsam +peccati speciem. Puta si aliquis publice fornicetur, sequitur +scandalum plurimorum, quod quamvis ipse non intendat, nec forte +praevideat, directe per hoc aggravatur peccatum. Aliter tamen +videtur se habere circa nocumentum poenale, quod incurrit ipse qui +peccat. Huiusmodi enim nocumentum, si per accidens se habeat ad +actum peccati, et non sit praevisum nec intentum, non aggravat +peccatum, neque sequitur maiorem gravitatem peccati, sicut si +aliquis currens ad occidendum, impingat et laedat sibi pedem. Si +vero tale nocumentum per se consequatur ad actum peccati, licet +forte nec sit praevisum nec intentum, tunc maius nocumentum non +facit gravius peccatum; sed e converso gravius peccatum inducit +gravius nocumentum. Sicut aliquis infidelis, qui nihil audivit de +poenis Inferni, graviorem poenam in Inferno patietur pro peccato +homicidii quam pro peccato furti, quia enim hoc nec intendit nec +praevidet, non aggravatur ex hoc peccatum (sicut contingit circa +fidelem, qui ex hoc ipso videtur peccare gravius, quod maiores +poenas contemnit ut impleat voluntatem peccati), sed gravitas +huiusmodi nocumenti solum causatur ex gravitate peccati.
+ Reply to Objection 1: As we have already stated ( + Q[20], A[5]), in treating of the goodness and malice of external actions, the result of an action if foreseen and intended adds to the + goodness and malice of an act. +
[36673] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut etiam supra dictum est, cum de bonitate +et malitia exteriorum actuum ageretur, eventus sequens, si sit +praevisus et intentus, addit ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Although the harm done aggravates a sin, it does not follow that this alone renders a sin more grievous: in fact, it is inordinateness + which of itself aggravates a sin. Wherefore the harm itself that ensues aggravates a sin, in so far only as it renders the + act more inordinate. Hence it does not follow, supposing harm to be inflicted chiefly by sins against our neighbor, that such + sins are the most grievous, since a much greater inordinateness is to + be found against which man commits against God, and in some which he commits against himself. Moreover we might say that although + no man can do God any harm in His substance, yet he can endeavor to do so in things concerning Him, e.g. by destroying faith, + by outraging holy things, which are most grievous sins. Again, a man sometimes knowingly and freely inflicts harm on himself, + as in the case of suicide, though this be referred finally to some apparent good, for example, delivery from some + anxiety. +
[36674] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, quamvis nocumentum aggravet peccatum, non tamen +sequitur quod ex solo nocumento peccatum aggravetur, quinimmo +peccatum per se est gravius propter inordinationem, ut supra dictum +est. Unde et ipsum nocumentum aggravat peccatum, inquantum facit +actum esse magis inordinatum. Unde non sequitur quod, si nocumentum +maxime habeat locum in peccatis quae sunt contra proximum, quod +illa peccata sunt gravissima, quia multo maior inordinatio +invenitur in peccatis quae sunt contra Deum, et in quibusdam eorum +quae sunt contra seipsum. Et tamen potest dici quod, etsi Deo +nullus possit nocere quantum ad eius substantiam, potest tamen +nocumentum attentare in his quae Dei sunt, sicut extirpando fidem, +violando sacra, quae sunt peccata gravissima. Sibi etiam aliquis +quandoque scienter et volenter infert nocumentum, sicut patet in +his qui se interimunt, licet finaliter hoc referant ad aliquod +bonum apparens, puta ad hoc quod liberentur ab aliqua angustia.
+ Reply to Objection 3: This argument does not prove, for two reasons: first, because the murderer intends directly to do harm to his neighbors; + whereas the fornicator who solicits the woman intends not to harm but pleasure; secondly, because murder is the direct and + sufficient cause of bodily death; whereas no man can of himself be the sufficient cause of another's spiritual death, because + no man dies spiritually except by sinning of his own will. +
[36675] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod illa ratio non sequitur, propter duo. Primo quidem, +quia homicida intendit directe nocumentum proximi, fornicator autem +qui provocat mulierem, non intendit nocumentum, sed delectationem. +Secundo, quia homicida est per se et sufficiens causa corporalis +mortis, spiritualis autem mortis nullus potest esse alteri causa +per se et sufficiens; quia nullus spiritualiter moritur nisi +propria voluntate peccando.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that sin is not aggravated by reason of the condition of the person against whom it is committed. For if this + were the case a sin would be aggravated chiefly by being committed against a just and holy man. But this does not aggravate + a sin: because a virtuous man who bears a wrong with equanimity is less harmed by the wrong done him, than others, who, through + being scandalized, are also hurt inwardly. Therefore the condition of the person against + whom a sin is committed does not aggravate the sin. +
[36676] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 arg. 1 Ad nonum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod propter conditionem personae in quam +peccatur, peccatum non aggravetur. Si enim hoc esset, maxime +aggravaretur ex hoc quod aliquis peccat contra aliquem virum iustum +et sanctum. Sed ex hoc non aggravatur peccatum, minus enim laeditur +ex iniuria illata virtuosus, qui aequanimiter tolerat, quam alii, +qui etiam interius scandalizati laeduntur. Ergo conditio personae +in quam peccatur, non aggravat peccatum.
+ Objection 2: Further, if the condition of the person aggravated the sin, this would be still more the case if the person be near of kin, + because, as Cicero says (Paradox. iii): "The man who kills his slave sins once: he that takes his father's life sins many + times." But the kinship of a person sinned against does not apparently aggravate a sin, because every man is most akin to + himself; and yet it is less grievous to harm oneself than another, e.g. to kill one's own, than + another's horse, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Therefore kinship of the person sinned against does not aggravate + the sin. +
[36677] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 arg. 2 Praeterea, +si conditio personae aggravaret peccatum, maxime aggravaretur ex +propinquitate, quia sicut Tullius dicit in paradoxis, in servo +necando semel peccatur, in patris vita violanda multa +peccantur. Sed propinquitas personae in quam peccatur, non +videtur aggravare peccatum, quia unusquisque sibi ipsi maxime est +propinquus; et tamen minus peccat qui aliquod damnum sibi infert, +quam si inferret alteri, puta si occideret equum suum, quam si +occideret equum alterius, ut patet per philosophum, in V Ethic. +Ergo propinquitas personae non aggravat peccatum.
+ Objection 3: Further, the condition of the person who sins aggravates a sin chiefly on account of his position or knowledge, according + to + Wis. 6:7: "The mighty shall be mightily tormented," and + Lk. 12:47: "The servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did it not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes." Therefore, in + like manner, on the part of the person sinned against, the sin is made more grievous by reason of his position + and knowledge. But, apparently, it is not a more grievous sin to inflict an injury on a rich and powerful person than on a + poor man, since "there is no respect of persons with God" ( + Col. 3:25), according to Whose judgment the gravity of a sin is measured. Therefore the condition of the person sinned against does + not aggravate the sin. +
[36678] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 arg. 3 Praeterea, +conditio personae peccantis praecipue aggravat peccatum ratione +dignitatis vel scientiae, secundum illud Sap. VI, potentes +potenter tormenta patientur; et Luc. XII, servus sciens +voluntatem domini, et non faciens, plagis vapulabit multis. +Ergo, pari ratione, ex parte personae in quam peccatur, magis +aggravaret peccatum dignitas aut scientia personae in quam +peccatur. Sed non videtur gravius peccare qui facit iniuriam +personae ditiori vel potentiori, quam alicui pauperi, quia non est +personarum acceptio apud Deum, secundum cuius iudicium gravitas +peccati pensatur. Ergo conditio personae in quam peccatur, non +aggravat peccatum.
+ On the contrary, Holy Writ censures especially those sins that are committed against the servants of God. Thus it is written ( + 3 Kings 19:14): "They have destroyed Thy altars, they have slain Thy prophets with the sword." Moreover much blame is attached to the sin + committed by a man against those who are akin to him, according to + Micah 7:6: "the son dishonoreth the father, and the daughter riseth up against her mother." Furthermore + sins committed against persons of rank are expressly condemned: thus it is written ( + Job 34:18): "Who saith to the king: 'Thou art an apostate'; who calleth rulers ungodly." Therefore the condition of the person sinned + against aggravates the sin. +
[36679] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 s. c. Sed contra +est quod in sacra Scriptura specialiter vituperatur peccatum quod +contra servos Dei committitur, sicut III Reg. XIX, altaria tua +destruxerunt, et prophetas tuos occiderunt gladio. Vituperatur +etiam specialiter peccatum commissum contra personas propinquas, +secundum illud Mich. VII, filius contumeliam facit patri, filia +consurgit adversus matrem suam. Vituperatur etiam specialiter +peccatum quod committitur contra personas in dignitate constitutas, +ut patet Iob XXXIV, qui dicit regi, apostata; qui vocat duces +impios. Ergo conditio personae in quam peccatur, aggravat +peccatum.
+ I answer that, The person sinned against is, in a manner, the object of the sin. Now it has been stated above + (A[3]) that the primary gravity of a sin is derived from its object; so that a sin is deemed to be so much the more grave, as its + object is a more principal end. But the principal ends of human acts are God, man himself, and his neighbor: for whatever + we do, it is on account of one of these that we do it; although one of them is subordinate + to the other. Therefore the greater or lesser gravity of a sin, in respect of the person sinned against, may be considered + on the part of these three. +
First, on the part of God, to Whom man is the more closely united, as he is more virtuous or more sacred to God: so that + an injury inflicted on such a person redounds on to God according to + Zech. 2:8: "He that toucheth you, toucheth the apple of My eye." Wherefore a sin is the more grievous, according as it is committed + against a person more closely united to God by reason of personal sanctity, or official station. On the part of man himself, + it is evident + that he sins all the more grievously, according as the person against whom he sins, is more united to him, either through + natural affinity or kindness received or any other bond; because he seems to sin against himself rather than the other, and, + for this very reason, sins all the more grievously, according to + Ecclus. 14:5: "He that is evil to himself, to whom will he be good?" On the part of his neighbor, a man sins the more grievously, according + as his sin affects more persons: so that a sin + committed against a public personage, e.g. a sovereign prince who stands in the place of the whole people, is more grievous + than a sin committed against a private person; hence it is expressly prohibited ( + Ex. 22:28): "The prince of thy people thou shalt not curse." In like manner it would seem that an injury done to a person of prominence, + is all the more grave, on account of the scandal and the disturbance it would cause among many people. +
[36680] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod persona in quam peccatur, est quodammodo obiectum +peccati. Dictum est autem supra quod prima gravitas peccati +attenditur ex parte obiecti. Ex quo quidem tanto attenditur maior +gravitas in peccato, quanto obiectum eius est principalior finis. +Fines autem principales humanorum actuum sunt Deus, ipse homo, et +proximus, quidquid enim facimus, propter aliquod horum facimus; +quamvis etiam horum trium unum sub altero ordinetur. Potest igitur +ex parte horum trium considerari maior vel minor gravitas in +peccato secundum conditionem personae in quam peccatur. Primo +quidem, ex parte Dei, cui tanto magis aliquis homo coniungitur, +quanto est virtuosior vel Deo sacratior. Et ideo iniuria tali +personae illata, magis redundat in Deum, secundum illud Zach. II, +qui vos tetigerit, tangit pupillam oculi mei. Unde peccatum +fit gravius ex hoc quod peccatur in personam magis Deo coniunctam, +vel ratione virtutis vel ratione officii. Ex parte vero sui ipsius, +manifestum est quod tanto aliquis gravius peccat, quanto in magis +coniunctam personam, seu naturali necessitudine, seu beneficiis, +seu quacumque coniunctione, peccaverit, quia videtur in seipsum +magis peccare, et pro tanto gravius peccat, secundum illud Eccli. +XIV, qui sibi nequam est, cui bonus erit? Ex parte vero +proximi, tanto gravius peccatur, quanto peccatum plures tangit. Et +ideo peccatum quod fit in personam publicam, puta regem vel +principem, qui gerit personam totius multitudinis, est gravius quam +peccatum quod committitur contra unam personam privatam, unde +specialiter dicitur Exod. XXII, principi populi tui non +maledices. Et similiter iniuria quae fit alicui famosae +personae, videtur esse gravior, ex hoc quod in scandalum et in +turbationem plurimorum redundat.
+ Reply to Objection 1: He who inflicts an injury on a virtuous person, so far as he is concerned, disturbs him internally and externally; but that + the latter is not disturbed internally is due to his goodness, which does not extenuate the sin of the injurer. +
[36681] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ille qui infert iniuriam virtuoso, quantum est +in se, turbat eum et interius et exterius. Sed quod iste interius +non turbetur, contingit ex eius bonitate, quae non diminuit +peccatum iniuriantis.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The injury which a man inflicts on himself in those things which are subject to the dominion of his will, for instance his + possessions, is less sinful than if it were inflicted on another, because he does it of his own will; but in those things + that are not subject to the dominion of his will, such as natural and spiritual goods, it is a graver sin to inflict an injury + on oneself: for it is more grievous for a man to kill himself than another. Since, + however, things belonging to our neighbor are not subject to the dominion of our will, the argument fails to prove, in respect + of injuries done to such like things, that it is less grievous to sin in their regard, unless indeed our neighbor be willing, + or give his approval. +
[36682] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod nocumentum quod quis sibi ipsi infert in his quae +subsunt dominio propriae voluntatis, sicut in rebus possessis, +habet minus de peccato quam si alteri inferatur, quia propria +voluntate hoc agit. Sed in his quae non subduntur dominio +voluntatis, sicut sunt naturalia et spiritualia bona, est gravius +peccatum nocumentum sibi ipsi inferre, gravius enim peccat qui +occidit seipsum, quam qui occidit alterum. Sed quia res +propinquorum nostrorum non subduntur voluntatis nostrae dominio, +non procedit ratio quantum ad nocumenta rebus illorum illata, quod +circa ea minus peccetur; nisi forte velint, vel ratum habeant.
+ Reply to Objection 3: There is no respect for persons if God punishes more severely those who sin against a person of higher rank; for this is + done because such an injury redounds to the harm of many. +
[36683] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod non est acceptio personarum si Deus gravius punit +peccantem contra excellentiores personas, hoc enim fit propter hoc +quod hoc redundat in plurium nocumentum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the excellence of the person sinning does not aggravate the sin. For man becomes great chiefly by cleaving + to God, according to + Ecclus. 25:13: "How great is he that findeth wisdom and knowledge! but there is none above him that feareth the Lord." Now the more a man + cleaves to God, the less is a sin imputed to him: for it is written ( + 2 Paral. 30: 18,19): "The Lord Who is good will show mercy to all + them, who with their whole heart seek the Lord the God of their fathers; and will not impute it to them that they are not + sanctified." Therefore a sin is not aggravated by the excellence of the person sinning. +
[36684] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 arg. 1 Ad decimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod magnitudo personae peccantis non +aggravet peccatum. Homo enim maxime redditur magnus ex hoc quod Deo +adhaeret, secundum illud Eccli. XXV, quam magnus est qui invenit +sapientiam et scientiam. Sed non est super timentem Deum. Sed +quanto aliquis magis Deo adhaeret, tanto minus imputatur ei aliquid +ad peccatum, dicitur enim II Paralip. XXX, dominus bonus +propitiabitur cunctis qui in toto corde requirunt dominum Deum +patrum suorum, et non imputabitur eis quod minus sanctificati +sunt. Ergo peccatum non aggravatur ex magnitudine personae +peccantis.
+ Objection 2: Further, "there is no respect of persons with God" ( + Rom. 2:11). Therefore He does not punish one man more than another, for one and the same sin. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by + the excellence of the person sinning. +
[36685] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 arg. 2 Praeterea, +non est personarum acceptio apud Deum, ut dicitur Rom. II. Ergo non +magis punit pro uno et eodem peccato, unum quam alium. Non ergo +aggravatur ex magnitudine personae peccantis.
+ Objection 3: Further, no one should reap disadvantage from good. But he would, if his action were the more blameworthy on account of his + goodness. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by reason of the excellence of the person sinning. +
[36686] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 arg. 3 Praeterea, +nullus debet ex bono incommodum reportare. Reportaret autem, si id +quod agit, magis ei imputaretur ad culpam. Ergo propter +magnitudinem personae peccantis non aggravatur peccatum.
+ On the contrary, Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 18): "A sin is deemed so much the more grievous as the sinner is held to be a more excellent + person." +
[36687] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Isidorus dicit, in II de summo bono, tanto maius +cognoscitur peccatum esse, quanto maior qui peccat habetur.
+ I answer that, Sin is twofold. There is a sin which takes us unawares on account of the weakness of human nature: and such like sins are + less imputable to one who is more virtuous, because he is less negligent in checking those sins, which nevertheless human + weakness does not allow us to escape altogether. But there are other sins which proceed from deliberation: and these sins + are all the more imputed to man according as he is more excellent. Four reasons may be assigned + for this. First, because a more excellent person, e.g. one who excels in knowledge and virtue, can more easily resist sin; + hence Our Lord said ( + Lk. 12:47) that the "servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did it not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes." Secondly, + on account of ingratitude, because every good in which a man excels, is a gift of God, to Whom man is ungrateful when he sins: + and in this respect any excellence, even in temporal goods, aggravates a + sin, according to + Wis. 6:7: "The mighty shall be mightily tormented." Thirdly, on account of the sinful act being specially inconsistent with the excellence + of the person sinning: for instance, if a prince were to violate justice, whereas he is set up as the guardian of justice, + or if a priest were to be a fornicator, whereas he has taken the vow of chastity. Fourthly, on account of the example or scandal; + because, as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 2): "Sin becomes much more + scandalous, when the sinner is honored for his position": and the sins of the great are much more notorious and men are wont + to bear them with more indignation. +
[36688] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod duplex est peccatum. Quoddam ex subreptione +proveniens, propter infirmitatem humanae naturae. Et tale peccatum +minus imputatur ei qui est maior in virtute, eo quod minus negligit +huiusmodi peccata reprimere, quae tamen omnino subterfugere +infirmitas humana non sinit. Alia vero peccata sunt ex +deliberatione procedentia. Et ista peccata tanto magis alicui +imputantur, quanto maior est. Et hoc potest esse propter quatuor. +Primo quidem, quia facilius possunt resistere peccato maiores, puta +qui excedunt in scientia et virtute. Unde dominus dicit, Luc. XII, +quod servus sciens voluntatem domini sui, et non faciens, plagis +vapulabit multis. Secundo, propter ingratitudinem, quia omne +bonum quo quis magnificatur, est Dei beneficium, cui homo fit +ingratus peccando. Et quantum ad hoc, quaelibet maioritas, etiam in +temporalibus bonis peccatum aggravat, secundum illud Sap. VI, +potentes potenter tormenta patientur. Tertio, propter +specialem repugnantiam actus peccati ad magnitudinem personae, +sicut si princeps iustitiam violet, qui ponitur iustitiae custos; +et si sacerdos fornicetur, qui castitatem vovit. Quarto, propter +exemplum, sive scandalum, quia, ut Gregorius dicit in pastorali, +in exemplum culpa vehementer extenditur, quando pro reverentia +gradus peccator honoratur. Ad plurium etiam notitiam perveniunt +peccata magnorum; et magis homines ea indigne ferunt.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted alludes to those things which are done negligently when we are taken unawares through human weakness. +
[36689] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod auctoritas illa loquitur de his quae per +subreptionem infirmitatis humanae negligenter aguntur.
+ Reply to Objection 2: God does not respect persons in punishing the great more severely, because their excellence conduces to the gravity of their + sin, as stated. +
[36690] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod Deus non accipit personas, si maiores plus punit, +quia ipsorum maioritas facit ad gravitatem peccati, ut dictum +est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The man who excels in anything reaps disadvantage, not from the good which he has, but from his abuse thereof. +
[36691] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod homo magnus non reportat incommodum ex bono quod +habet, sed ex malo usu illius.
We must now consider the subject of vice or sin: under which head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the will can be the subject of sin?
(2) Whether the will alone is the subject of sin?
(3) Whether the sensuality can be the subject of sin?
(4) Whether it can be the subject of mortal sin?
(5) Whether the reason can be the subject of sin?
(6) Whether morose delectation or non-morose delectation be subjected in the higher reason?
(7) Whether the sin of consent in the act of sin is subjected in the higher reason?
(8) Whether the lower reason can be the subject of mortal sin?
(9) Whether the higher reason can be the subject of venial sin?
(10) Whether there can be in the higher reason a venial sin directed to its proper object?
+[36692] +Iª-IIae q. 74 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +subiecto vitiorum, sive peccatorum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur decem. +Primo, utrum voluntas possit esse subiectum peccati. Secundo, utrum +voluntas sola sit peccati subiectum. Tertio, utrum sensualitas +possit esse subiectum peccati. Quarto, utrum possit esse subiectum +peccati mortalis. Quinto, utrum ratio possit esse subiectum +peccati. Sexto, utrum delectatio morosa, vel non morosa, sit in +ratione inferiori sicut in subiecto. Septimo, utrum peccatum +consensus in actum sit in superiori ratione sicut in subiecto. +Octavo, utrum ratio inferior possit esse subiectum peccati +mortalis. Nono, utrum ratio superior possit esse subiectum peccati +venialis. Decimo, utrum in ratione superiori possit esse peccatum +veniale circa proprium obiectum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the will cannot be a subject of sin. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is outside the will + and the intention." But sin has the character of evil. Therefore sin cannot be in the will. +
[36693] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non possit esse subiectum +peccati. Dicit enim Dionysius, in IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod +malum est praeter voluntatem et intentionem. Sed peccatum +habet rationem mali. Ergo peccatum non potest esse in +voluntate.
+ Objection 2: Further, the will is directed either to the good or to what seems good. Now from the fact that will wishes the good, it does + not sin: and that it wishes what seems good but is not truly good, points to a defect in the apprehensive power rather than + in the will. Therefore sin is nowise in the will. +
[36694] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +voluntas est boni, vel apparentis boni. Ex hoc autem quod voluntas +vult bonum, non peccat, hoc autem quod vult apparens bonum quod non +est vere bonum, magis pertinere videtur ad defectum virtutis +apprehensivae quam ad defectum voluntatis. Ergo peccatum nullo modo +est in voluntate.
+ Objection 3: Further, the same thing cannot be both subject and efficient cause of sin: because "the efficient and the material cause + do not coincide" (Phys. 2, text. 70). Now the will is the efficient cause of sin: because the first cause of sinning is the + will, as Augustine states (De Duabus Anim. x, 10,11). Therefore it is not the subject of sin. +
[36695] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +non potest esse idem subiectum peccati, et causa efficiens, quia +causa efficiens et materialis non incidunt in idem, ut dicitur in +II Physic. Sed voluntas est causa efficiens peccati, prima enim +causa peccandi est voluntas, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de +duabus animabus. Ergo non est subiectum peccati.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that "it is by the will that we sin, and live righteously." +
[36696] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro Retract., quod voluntas est +qua peccatur, et recte vivitur.
+ I answer that, Sin is an act, as stated above ( + Q[71], AA[1],6). Now some acts pass into external matter, e.g. "to cut" and "to burn": and such acts have for their matter and subject, + the thing into which the action passes: thus the Philosopher states (Phys. iii, text. 18) that "movement is the act of the + thing moved, caused by a mover." On the other hand, there are acts which do not pass into external matter, but remain in the + agent, e.g. "to + desire" and "to know": and such are all moral acts, whether virtuous or sinful. Consequently the proper subject of sin must + needs be the power which is the principle of the act. Now since it is proper to moral acts that they are voluntary, as stated + above ( + Q[1], A[1] ; + Q[18], A[6]), it follows that the will, which is the principle of voluntary acts, both of good acts, and of evil acts or sins, is the + principle of sins. Therefore it follows that + sin is in the will as its subject. +
[36697] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod peccatum quidam actus est, sicut supra dictum est. +Actuum autem quidam transeunt in exteriorem materiam, ut urere et +secare, et huiusmodi actus habent pro materia et subiecto id in +quod transit actio; sicut philosophus dicit, in III Physic., quod +motus est actus mobilis a movente. Quidam vero actus sunt non +transeuntes in exteriorem materiam, sed manentes in agente, sicut +appetere et cognoscere, et tales actus sunt omnes actus morales, +sive sint actus virtutum, sive peccatorum. Unde oportet quod +proprium subiectum actus peccati sit potentia quae est principium +actus. Cum autem proprium sit actuum moralium quod sint voluntarii, +ut supra habitum est; sequitur quod voluntas, quae est principium +actuum voluntariorum, sive bonorum sive malorum, quae sunt peccata, +sit principium peccatorum. Et ideo sequitur quod peccatum sit in +voluntate sicut in subiecto.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Evil is said to be outside the will, because the will does not tend to it under the aspect of evil. But since some evil is + an apparent good, the will sometimes desires an evil, and in this sense is in the will. +
[36698] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod malum dicitur esse praeter voluntatem, quia +voluntas non tendit in ipsum sub ratione mali. Sed quia aliquod +malum est apparens bonum, ideo voluntas aliquando appetit aliquod +malum. Et secundum hoc peccatum est in voluntate.
+ Reply to Objection 2: If the defect in the apprehensive power were nowise subject to the will, there would be no sin, either in the will, or in + the apprehensive power, as in the case of those whose ignorance is invincible. It remains therefore that when there is in + the apprehensive power a defect that is subject to the will, this defect also is deemed a sin. +
[36699] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod si defectus apprehensivae virtutis nullo modo +subiaceret voluntati, non esset peccatum nec in voluntate nec in +apprehensiva virtute, sicut patet in his qui habent ignorantiam +invincibilem. Et ideo relinquitur quod etiam defectus apprehensivae +virtutis subiacens voluntati, deputetur in peccatum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: This argument applies to those efficient causes whose actions pass into external matter, and which do not move themselves, + but move other things; the contrary of which is to be observed in the will; hence the argument does not prove. +
[36700] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit in causis efficientibus quarum +actiones transeunt in materiam exteriorem, et quae non movent se, +sed alia. Cuius contrarium est in voluntate. Unde ratio non +sequitur.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the will alone is the subject of sin. For Augustine says (De Duabus Anim. x, 10) that "no one sins except + by the will." Now the subject of sin is the power by which we sin. Therefore the will alone is the subject of sin. +
[36701] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod sola voluntas sit subiectum peccati. +Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de duabus animabus, quod non +nisi voluntate peccatur. Sed peccatum est sicut in subiecto in +potentia qua peccatur. Ergo sola voluntas est subiectum +peccati.
+ Objection 2: Further, sin is an evil contrary to reason. Now good and evil pertaining to reason are the object of the will alone. Therefore + the will alone is the subject of sin. +
[36702] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +peccatum est quoddam malum contra rationem. Sed bonum et malum ad +rationem pertinens, est obiectum solius voluntatis. Ergo sola +voluntas est subiectum peccati.
+ Objection 3: Further, every sin is a voluntary act, because, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) [*Cf. De Vera Relig. xiv.], "so + true is it that every sin is voluntary, that unless it be voluntary, it is no sin at all." Now the acts of the other powers + are not voluntary, except in so far as those powers are moved by the will; nor does this suffice for them to be the subject + of sin, because then even the external members of the body, which are moved by the will, + would be a subject of sin; which is clearly untrue. Therefore the will alone is the subject of sin. +
[36703] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +omne peccatum est actus voluntarius, quia, ut dicit Augustinus, in +libro de Lib. Arb., peccatum adeo est voluntarium, quod si non +sit voluntarium, non est peccatum. Sed actus aliarum virium non +sunt voluntarii nisi inquantum illae vires moventur a voluntate. +Hoc autem non sufficit ad hoc quod sint subiectum peccati, quia +secundum hoc etiam membra exteriora, quae moventur a voluntate, +essent subiectum peccati; quod patet esse falsum. Ergo sola +voluntas est subiectum peccati.
+ On the contrary, Sin is contrary to virtue: and contraries are about one same thing. But the other powers of the soul, besides the will, are + the subject of virtues, as stated above ( + Q[56]). Therefore the will is not the only subject of sin. +
[36704] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra, +peccatum virtuti contrariatur. Contraria autem sunt circa idem. Sed +aliae etiam vires animae praeter voluntatem, sunt subiecta +virtutum, ut supra dictum est. Ergo non sola voluntas est subiectum +peccati.
+ I answer that, As was shown above + (A[1]), whatever is the a principle of a voluntary act is a subject of sin. Now voluntary acts are not only those which are elicited + by the will, but also those which are commanded by the will, as we stated above (Q[6], A[4]) in treating of voluntariness. + Therefore not only the will can be a subject of sin, but also all those powers which can be moved to their acts, or restrained + from their acts, by the will; and + these same powers are the subjects of good and evil moral habits, because act and habit belong to the same subject. +
[36705] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ex praedictis patet, omne quod est principium +voluntarii actus, est subiectum peccati. Actus autem voluntarii +dicuntur non solum illi qui eliciuntur a voluntate, sed etiam illi +qui a voluntate imperantur; ut supra dictum est, cum de voluntario +ageretur. Unde non sola voluntas potest esse subiectum peccati, sed +omnes illae potentiae quae possunt moveri ad suos actus, vel ab eis +reprimi, per voluntatem. Et eaedem etiam potentiae sunt subiecta +habituum moralium bonorum vel malorum, quia eiusdem est actus et +habitus.
+ Reply to Objection 1: We do not sin except by the will as first mover; but we sin by the other powers as moved by the will. +
[36706] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod non peccatur nisi voluntate sicut primo movente, +aliis autem potentiis peccatur sicut ab ea motis.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Good and evil pertain to the will as its proper objects; but the other powers have certain determinate goods and evils, by + reason of which they can be the subject of virtue, vice, and sin, in so far as they partake of will and reason. +
[36707] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod bonum et malum pertinent ad voluntatem sicut per se +obiecta ipsius, sed aliae potentiae habent aliquod determinatum +bonum et malum, ratione cuius potest in eis esse et virtus et +vitium et peccatum, secundum quod participant voluntate et +ratione.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The members of the body are not principles but merely organs of action: wherefore they are compared to the soul which moves + them, as a slave who is moved but moves no other. On the other hand, the internal appetitive powers are compared to reason + as free agents, because they both act and are acted upon, as is made clear in Polit. i, 3. Moreover, the acts of the external + members are actions that pass into external matter, as may be seen in the blow + that is inflicted in the sin of murder. Consequently there is no comparison. +
[36708] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod membra corporis non sunt principia actuum, sed solum +organa, unde et comparantur ad animam moventem sicut servus, qui +agitur et non agit. Potentiae autem appetitivae interiores +comparantur ad rationem quasi liberae, quia agunt quodammodo et +aguntur, ut patet per id quod dicitur I Polit. Et praeterea actus +exteriorum membrorum sunt actiones in exteriorem materiam +transeuntes, sicut patet de percussione in peccato homicidii. Et +propter hoc non est similis ratio.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be sin in the sensuality. For sin is proper to man who is praised or blamed for his actions. + Now sensuality is common to us and irrational animals. Therefore sin cannot be in the sensuality. +
[36709] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod in sensualitate non possit esse +peccatum. Peccatum enim est proprium homini, qui ex suis actibus +laudatur vel vituperatur. Sed sensualitas est communis nobis et +brutis. Ergo in sensualitate non potest esse peccatum.
+ Objection 2: Further, "no man sins in what he cannot avoid," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18). But man cannot prevent the movement + of the sensuality from being inordinate, since "the sensuality ever remains corrupt, so long as we abide in this mortal life; + wherefore it is signified by the serpent," as Augustine declares (De Trin. xii, 12,13). Therefore the inordinate movement + of the sensuality is not a sin. +
[36710] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 arg. 2 +Praeterea, nullus peccat in eo quod vitare non potest; sicut +Augustinus dicit, in libro de Lib. Arb. Sed homo non potest vitare +quin actus sensualitatis sit inordinatus, est enim sensualitas +perpetuae corruptionis, quandiu in hac mortali vita vivimus; unde +et per serpentem significatur, ut Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin. +Ergo inordinatio motus sensualitatis non est peccatum.
+ Objection 3: Further, that which man himself does not do is not imputed to him as a sin. Now "that alone do we seem to do ourselves, which + we do with the deliberation of reason," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8). Therefore the movement of the sensuality, + which is without the deliberation of reason, is not imputed to a man as a sin. +
[36711] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +illud quod homo ipse non facit, non imputatur ei ad peccatum. Sed +hoc solum videmur nos ipsi facere, quod cum deliberatione rationis +facimus; ut philosophus dicit, in IX Ethic. Ergo motus +sensualitatis qui est sine deliberatione rationis, non imputatur +homini ad peccatum.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Rom. 7:19): "The good which I will I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do": which words Augustine explains (Contra Julian. + iii, 26; De Verb. Apost. xii, 2,3), as referring to the evil of concupiscence, which is clearly a movement of the sensuality. + Therefore there can be sin in the sensuality. +
[36712] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Rom. VII, non enim quod volo bonum, hoc ago; +sed quod odi malum, illud facio, quod exponit Augustinus de +malo concupiscentiae, quam constat esse motum quendam +sensualitatis. Ergo in sensualitate est aliquod peccatum.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + AA[2],3), sin may be found in any power whose act can be voluntary and inordinate, wherein consists the nature of sin. Now it is + evident that the act of the sensuality, or sensitive appetite, is naturally inclined to be moved by the will. Wherefore it + follows that sin can be in the sensuality. +
[36713] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, peccatum potest inveniri in +qualibet potentia cuius actus potest esse voluntarius et +inordinatus, in quo consistit ratio peccati. Manifestum est autem +quod actus sensualitatis potest esse voluntarius, inquantum +sensualitas, idest appetitus sensitivus, nata est a voluntate +moveri. Unde relinquitur quod in sensualitate possit esse +peccatum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Although some of the powers of the sensitive part are common to us and irrational animals, nevertheless, in us, they have + a certain excellence through being united to the reason; thus we surpass other animals in the sensitive part for as much as + we have the powers of cogitation and reminiscence, as stated in the + FP, Q[78], A[4]. In the same way our sensitive appetite surpasses that of other animals by reason of a certain + excellence consisting in its natural aptitude to obey the reason; and in this respect it can be the principle of a voluntary + action, and, consequently, the subject of sin. +
[36714] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod aliquae vires sensitivae partis, etsi sint +communes nobis et brutis, tamen in nobis habent aliquam +excellentiam ex hoc quod rationi iunguntur, sicut nos, prae aliis +animalibus, habemus in parte sensitiva cogitativam et +reminiscentiam, ut in primo dictum est. Et per hunc modum etiam +appetitus sensitivus in nobis prae aliis animalibus habet quandam +excellentiam, scilicet quod natus est obedire rationi. Et quantum +ad hoc, potest esse principium actus voluntarii; et per consequens +subiectum peccati.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The continual corruption of the sensuality is to be understood as referring to the "fomes," which is never completely destroyed + in this life, since, though the stain of original sin passes, its effect remains. However, this corruption of the "fomes" + does not hinder man from using his rational will to check individual inordinate movements, if he be presentient to them, for + instance by turning his thoughts to other things. Yet while he is turning his + thoughts to something else, an inordinate movement may arise about this also: thus when a man, in order to avoid the movements + of concupiscence, turns his thoughts away from carnal pleasures, to the considerations of science, sometimes an unpremeditated + movement of vainglory will arise. Consequently, a man cannot avoid all such movements, on account of the aforesaid corruption: + but it is enough, for the conditions of a voluntary sin, that he be able to avoid each single one. +
[36715] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod perpetua corruptio sensualitatis est intelligenda +quantum ad fomitem, qui nunquam totaliter tollitur in hac vita, +transit enim peccatum originale reatu, et remanet actu. Sed talis +corruptio fomitis non impedit quin homo rationabili voluntate +possit reprimere singulos motus inordinatos sensualitatis, si +praesentiat, puta divertendo cogitationem ad alia. Sed dum homo ad +aliud cogitationem divertit, potest etiam circa illud aliquis +inordinatus motus insurgere, sicut cum aliquis transfert +cogitationem suam a delectabilibus carnis, volens concupiscentiae +motus vitare, ad speculationem scientiae, insurgit quandoque +aliquis motus inanis gloriae impraemeditatus. Et ideo non potest +homo vitare omnes huiusmodi motus, propter corruptionem praedictam, +sed hoc solum sufficit ad rationem peccati voluntarii, quod possit +vitare singulos.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Man does not do perfectly himself what he does without the deliberation of reason, since the principal part of man does nothing + therein: wherefore such is not perfectly a human act; and consequently it cannot be a perfect act of virtue or of sin, but + is something imperfect of that kind. Therefore such movement of the sensuality as forestalls the reason, is a venial sin, + which is something imperfect in the genus of sin. +
[36716] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod illud quod homo facit sine deliberatione rationis, +non perfecte ipse facit, quia nihil operatur ibi id quod est +principale in homine. Unde non est perfecte actus humanus. Et per +consequens non potest esse perfecte actus virtutis vel peccati, sed +aliquid imperfectum in genere horum. Unde talis motus sensualitatis +rationem praeveniens, est peccatum veniale, quod est quiddam +imperfectum in genere peccati.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that mortal sin can be in the sensuality. Because an act is discerned by its object. Now it is possible to + commit a mortal sin about the objects of the sensuality, e.g. about carnal pleasures. Therefore the act of the sensuality + can be a mortal sin, so that mortal sin can be found in the sensuality. +
[36717] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod in sensualitate possit esse peccatum +mortale. Actus enim ex obiecto cognoscitur. Sed circa obiecta +sensualitatis contingit peccare mortaliter, sicut circa +delectabilia carnis. Ergo actus sensualitatis potest esse peccatum +mortale. Et ita in sensualitate peccatum mortale invenitur.
+ Objection 2: Further, mortal sin is opposed to virtue. But virtue can be in the sensuality; for temperance and fortitude are virtues of + the irrational parts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 10). Therefore, since it is natural to contraries to be about + the same subject, sensuality can be the subject of mortal sin. +
[36718] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +peccatum mortale contrariatur virtuti. Sed virtus potest esse in +sensualitate, temperantia enim et fortitudo sunt virtutes +irrationabilium partium, ut philosophus dicit, in III Ethic. Ergo +in sensualitate potest esse peccatum mortale, cum contraria sint +nata fieri circa idem.
+ Objection 3: Further, venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin. Now disposition and habit are in the same subject. Since therefore venial + sin may be in the sensuality, as stated above (A[3], ad 3), mortal sin can be there also. +
[36719] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +veniale peccatum est dispositio ad mortale. Sed dispositio et +habitus sunt in eodem. Cum igitur veniale peccatum sit in +sensualitate, ut dictum est; etiam mortale peccatum esse poterit in +eadem.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 23): "The inordinate movement of concupiscence, which is the sin of the sensuality, can even + be in those who are in a state of grace," in whom, however, mortal sin is not to be found. Therefore the inordinate movement + of the sensuality is not a mortal sin. +
[36720] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro Retract., et habetur in Glossa +Rom. VII, inordinatus concupiscentiae motus (qui est peccatum +sensualitatis) potest etiam esse in his qui sunt in gratia, in +quibus tamen peccatum mortale non invenitur. Ergo inordinatus motus +sensualitatis non est peccatum mortale.
+ I answer that, Just as a disorder which destroys the principle of the body's life causes the body's death, so too a disorder which destroys + the principle of spiritual life, viz. the last end, causes spiritual death, which is mortal sin, as stated above ( + Q[72], A[5]). Now it belongs to the reason alone, and not to the sensuality, to order anything to the end: and disorder in respect of + the end can only belong to the power whose function it is to + order others to the end. Wherefore mortal sin cannot be in the sensuality, but only in the reason. +
[36721] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut inordinatio corrumpens principium vitae +corporalis, causat corporalem mortem; ita etiam inordinatio +corrumpens principium spiritualis vitae, quod est finis ultimus, +causat mortem spiritualem peccati mortalis, ut supra dictum est. +Ordinare autem aliquid in finem non est sensualitatis, sed solum +rationis. Inordinatio autem a fine non est nisi eius cuius est +ordinare in finem. Unde peccatum mortale non potest esse in +sensualitate, sed solum in ratione.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The act of the sensuality can concur towards a mortal sin: yet the fact of its being a mortal sin is due, not to its being + an act of the sensuality, but to its being an act of reason, to whom the ordering to the end belongs. Consequently mortal + sin is imputed, not to the sensuality, but to reason. +
[36722] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod actus sensualitatis potest concurrere ad +peccatum mortale, sed tamen actus peccati mortalis non habet quod +sit peccatum mortale, ex eo quod est sensualitatis; sed ex eo quod +est rationis, cuius est ordinare in finem. Et ideo peccatum mortale +non attribuitur sensualitati, sed rationi.
+ Reply to Objection 2: An act of virtue is perfected not only in that it is an act of the sensuality, but still more in the fact of its being an + act of reason and will, whose function it is to choose: for the act of moral virtue is not without the exercise of choice: + wherefore the act of moral virtue, which perfects the appetitive power, is always accompanied by an act of prudence, which + perfects the rational power; and the same applies to mortal sin, as stated (ad 1). +
[36723] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod etiam actus virtutis non perficitur per id quod est +sensualitatis tantum, sed magis per id quod est rationis et +voluntatis, cuius est eligere, nam actus virtutis moralis non est +sine electione. Unde semper cum actu virtutis moralis, quae +perficit vim appetitivam, est etiam actus prudentiae, quae perficit +vim rationalem. Et idem est etiam de peccato mortali, sicut dictum +est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: A disposition may be related in three ways to that to which it disposes: for sometimes it is the same thing and is in the + same subject; thus inchoate science is a disposition to perfect science: sometimes it is in the same subject, but is not the + same thing; thus heat is a disposition to the form of fire: sometimes it is neither the same thing, nor in the same subject, + as in those things which are subordinate to one another in such a way that we can + arrive at one through the other, e.g. goodness of the imagination is a disposition to science which is in the intellect. In + this way the venial sin that is in the sensuality, may be a disposition to mortal sin, which is in the reason. +
[36724] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod dispositio tripliciter se habet ad id ad quod +disponit. Quandoque enim est idem et in eodem, sicut scientia +inchoata dicitur esse dispositio ad scientiam perfectam. Quandoque +autem est in eodem, sed non idem, sicut calor est dispositio ad +formam ignis. Quandoque vero nec idem nec in eodem, sicut in his +quae habent ordinem ad invicem ut ex uno perveniatur in aliud, +sicut bonitas imaginationis est dispositio ad scientiam, quae est +in intellectu. Et hoc modo veniale peccatum, quod est in +sensualitate, potest esse dispositio ad peccatum mortale, quod est +in ratione.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that sin cannot be in the reason. For the sin of any power is a defect thereof. But the fault of the reason + is not a sin, on the contrary, it excuses sin: for a man is excused from sin on account of ignorance. Therefore sin cannot + be in the reason. +
[36725] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non possit esse in ratione. +Cuiuslibet enim potentiae peccatum est aliquis defectus ipsius. Sed +defectus rationis non est peccatum, sed magis excusat peccatum, +excusatur enim aliquis a peccato propter ignorantiam. Ergo in +ratione non potest esse peccatum.
+ Objection 2: Further, the primary object of sin is the will, as stated above + (A[1]). Now reason precedes the will, since it directs it. Therefore sin cannot be in the reason. +
[36726] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +primum subiectum peccati est voluntas, ut dictum est. Sed ratio +praecedit voluntatem, cum sit directiva ipsius. Ergo peccatum esse +non potest in ratione.
+ Objection 3: Further, there can be no sin except about things which are under our control. Now perfection and defect of reason are not + among those things which are under our control: since by nature some are mentally deficient, and some shrewd-minded. Therefore + no sin is in the reason. +
[36727] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +non potest esse peccatum nisi circa ea quae sunt in nobis. Sed +perfectio et defectus rationis non est eorum quae sunt in nobis, +quidam enim sunt naturaliter ratione deficientes, vel ratione +solertes. Ergo in ratione non est peccatum.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that sin is in the lower and in the higher reason. +
[36728] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro XII de Trin., quod peccatum est +in ratione inferiori et in ratione superiori.
+ I answer that, The sin of any power is an act of that power, as we have clearly shown ( + AA[1],2,3). Now reason has a twofold act: one is its proper act in respect of its proper object, and this is the act of knowing + the truth; the other is the act of reason as directing the other powers. Now in both of these ways there may be sin in the + reason. First, in so far as it errs in the knowledge of truth, which error is imputed to the reason as a sin, when + it is in ignorance or error about what it is able and ought to know: secondly, when it either commands the inordinate movements + of the lower powers, or deliberately fails to check them. +
[36729] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod peccatum cuiuslibet potentiae consistit in actu +ipsius, sicut ex dictis patet. Habet autem ratio duplicem actum, +unum quidem secundum se, in comparatione ad proprium obiectum, quod +est cognoscere aliquod verum; alius autem actus rationis est +inquantum est directiva aliarum virium. Utroque igitur modo +contingit esse peccatum in ratione. Et primo quidem, inquantum +errat in cognitione veri, quod quidem tunc imputatur ei ad +peccatum, quando habet ignorantiam vel errorem circa id quod potest +et debet scire. Secundo, quando inordinatos actus inferiorum virium +vel imperat, vel etiam post deliberationem non coercet.
+ Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the defect in the proper act of the reason in respect of its proper object, and with regard to the + case when it is a defect of knowledge about something which one is unable to know: for then this defect of reason is not a + sin, and excuses from sin, as is evident with regard to the actions of madmen. If, however, the defect of reason be about + something which a man is able and ought to know, he is not altogether excused from sin, + and the defect is imputed to him as a sin. The defect which belongs only to the act of directing the other powers, is always + imputed to reason as a sin, because it can always obviate this defect by means of its proper act. +
[36730] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de defectu rationis qui +pertinet ad actum proprium respectu proprii obiecti, et hoc quando +est defectus cognitionis eius quod quis non potest scire. Tunc enim +talis defectus rationis non est peccatum, sed excusat a peccato, +sicut patet in his quae per furiosos committuntur. Si vero sit +defectus rationis circa id quod homo potest et debet scire, non +omnino homo excusatur a peccato, sed ipse defectus imputatur ei ad +peccatum. Defectus autem qui est solum in dirigendo alias vires, +semper imputatur ei ad peccatum, quia huic defectui occurrere +potest per proprium actum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ( + Q[17], A[1]), when we were treating of the acts of the will and reason, the will moves and precedes the reason, in one way, and the reason + moves and precedes the will in another: so that both the movement of the will can be called rational, and the act of the reason, + voluntary. Accordingly sin is found in the reason, either through being a voluntary defect of the reason, or through the reason + being the + principle of the will's act. +
[36731] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum de actibus voluntatis et +rationis ageretur, voluntas quodammodo movet et praecedit rationem, +et ratio quodammodo voluntatem, unde et motus voluntatis dici +potest rationalis, et actus rationis potest dici voluntarius. Et +secundum hoc in ratione invenitur peccatum, vel prout est defectus +eius voluntarius, vel prout actus rationis est principium actus +voluntatis.
The Reply to the Third Objection is evident from what has been said (ad 1).
[36732] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +patet responsio ex dictis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of morose delectation is not in the reason. For delectation denotes a movement of the appetitive + power, as stated above ( + Q[31], A[1]). But the appetitive power is distinct from the reason, which is an apprehensive power. Therefore morose delectation is not + in the reason. +
[36733] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum morosae delectationis non sit +in ratione. Delectatio enim importat motum appetitivae virtutis, ut +supra dictum est. Sed vis appetitiva distinguitur a ratione, quae +est vis apprehensiva. Ergo delectatio morosa non est in +ratione.
+ Objection 2: Further, the object shows to which power an act belongs, since it is through the act that the power is directed to its object. + Now a morose delectation is sometimes about sensible goods, and not about the goods of the reason. Therefore the sin of morose + delectation is not in the reason. +
[36734] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, +ex obiectis cognosci potest ad quam potentiam actus pertineat, per +quem potentia ordinatur ad obiectum. Sed quandoque est delectatio +morosa circa bona sensibilia, et non circa bona rationis. Ergo +peccatum delectationis morosae non est in ratione.
+ Objection 3: Further, a thing is said to be morose [*From the Latin 'mora'---delay] through taking a length of time. But length of time + is no reason why an act should belong to a particular power. Therefore morose delectation does not belong to the reason. +
[36735] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, +morosum dicitur aliquid propter diuturnitatem temporis. Sed +diuturnitas temporis non est ratio quod aliquis actus pertineat ad +aliquam potentiam. Ergo delectatio morosa non pertinet ad +rationem.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that "if the consent to a sensual delectation goes no further than the mere thought of + the pleasure, I deem this to be like as though the woman alone had partaken of the forbidden fruit." Now "the woman" denotes + the lower reason, as he himself explains (De Trin. xii, 12). Therefore the sin of morose delectation is in the reason. +
[36736] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin., quod consensus +illecebrae si sola cogitationis delectatione contentus est, sic +habendum existimo velut cibum vetitum mulier sola comederit. +Per mulierem autem intelligitur ratio inferior, sicut ibidem ipse +exponit. Ergo peccatum morosae delectationis est in ratione.
+ I answer that, As stated + (A[5]), sin may be in the reason, not only in respect of reason's proper act, but sometimes in respect of its directing human actions. + Now it is evident that reason directs not only external acts, but also internal passions. Consequently when the reason fails + in directing the internal passions, sin is said to be in the reason, as also when it fails in directing external actions. + Now it fails, in two ways, in directing + internal passions: first, when it commands unlawful passions; for instance, when a man deliberately provokes himself to a + movement of anger, or of lust: secondly, when it fails to check the unlawful movement of a passion; for instance, when a man, + having deliberately considered that a rising movement of passion is inordinate, continues, notwithstanding, to dwell [immoratur] + upon it, and fails to drive it away. And in this sense the sin of morose delectation is said to be in the reason. +
[36737] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, peccatum contingit esse in +ratione quandoque quidem inquantum est directiva humanorum actuum. +Manifestum est autem quod ratio non solum est directiva exteriorum +actuum, sed etiam interiorum passionum. Et ideo quando deficit +ratio in directione interiorum passionum, dicitur esse peccatum in +ratione, sicut etiam quando deficit in directione exteriorum +actuum. Deficit autem in directione passionum interiorum +dupliciter. Uno modo, quando imperat illicitas passiones, sicut +quando homo ex deliberatione provocat sibi motum irae vel +concupiscentiae. Alio modo, quando non reprimit illicitum passionis +motum, sicut cum aliquis, postquam deliberavit quod motus passionis +insurgens est inordinatus, nihilominus circa ipsum immoratur, et +ipsum non expellit. Et secundum hoc dicitur peccatum delectationis +morosae esse in ratione.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Delectation is indeed in the appetitive power as its proximate principle; but it is in the reason as its first mover, in + accordance with what has been stated above + (A[1]), viz. that actions which do not pass into external matter are subjected in their principles. +
[36738] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod delectatio quidem est in vi appetitiva sicut in +proximo principio, sed in ratione est sicut in primo motivo, +secundum hoc quod supra dictum est, quod actiones quae non +transeunt in exteriorem materiam, sunt sicut in subiecto in suis +principiis.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Reason has its proper elicited act about its proper object; but it exercises the direction of all the objects of those lower + powers that can be directed by the reason: and accordingly delectation about sensible objects comes also under the direction + of reason. +
[36739] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio actum proprium illicitum habet circa proprium +obiectum, sed directionem habet circa omnia obiecta inferiorum +virium quae per rationem dirigi possunt. Et secundum hoc etiam +delectatio circa sensibilia obiecta pertinet ad rationem.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Delectation is said to be morose not from a delay of time, but because the reason in deliberating dwells [immoratur] thereon, + and fails to drive it away, "deliberately holding and turning over what should have been cast aside as soon as it touched + the mind," as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12). +
[36740] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod delectatio dicitur morosa non ex mora temporis; sed +ex eo quod ratio deliberans circa eam immoratur, nec tamen eam +repellit, tenens et volvens libenter quae statim ut attigerunt +animum, respui debuerunt, ut Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher reason. For consent is an act of the appetitive power, + as stated above ( + Q[15], A[1]): whereas the reason is an apprehensive power. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher reason. +
[36741] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum consensus in actum non sit in +ratione superiori. Consentire enim est actus appetitivae virtutis, +ut supra habitum est. Sed ratio est vis apprehensiva. Ergo peccatum +consensus in actum non est in ratione superiori.
+ Objection 2: Further, "the higher reason is intent on contemplating and consulting the eternal law," as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, + 7). [*'Rationes aeternae,' cf. + FP, Q[15], AA[2],[3] where as in similar passages 'ratio' has been rendered by the English 'type,' because St. Thomas was speaking of the + Divine 'idea' as the archetype of the creature. Hence the type or idea is a rule of conduct, and is identified with the eternal + law, (cf. A[8], + OBJ[1]; A[9])]. But sometimes consent is given to an act, without consulting the eternal law: since man does not always think + about Divine things, whenever he consents to an act. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not always in the higher reason. +
[36742] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, +ratio superior intendit rationibus aeternis inspiciendis et +consulendis, ut Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin. Sed quandoque +consentitur in actum non consultis rationibus aeternis, non enim +semper homo cogitat de rebus divinis, quando consentit in aliquem +actum. Ergo peccatum consensus in actum non semper est in ratione +superiori.
+ Objection 3: Further, just as man can regulate his external actions according to the eternal law, so can he regulate his internal pleasures + or other passions. But "consent to a pleasure without deciding to fulfil it by deed, belongs to the lower reason," as Augustine + states (De Trin. xii, 2). Therefore the consent to a sinful act should also be sometimes ascribed to the lower reason. +
[36743] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sicut per rationes aeternas potest homo regulare actus exteriores, +ita etiam interiores delectationes, vel alias passiones. Sed +consensus in delectationem absque hoc quod opere statuatur +implendum, est rationis inferioris; ut dicit Augustinus, XII de +Trin. Ergo etiam consensus in actum peccati debet interdum attribui +rationi inferiori.
+ Objection 4: Further, just as the higher reason excels the lower, so does the reason excel the imagination. Now sometimes man proceeds + to act through the apprehension of the power of imagination, without any deliberation of his reason, as when, without premeditation, + he moves his hand, or foot. Therefore sometimes also the lower reason may consent to a sinful act, independently of the higher + reason. +
[36744] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 arg. 4 Praeterea, +sicut ratio superior excedit inferiorem, ita ratio excedit vim +imaginativam. Sed quandoque procedit homo in actum per +apprehensionem virtutis imaginativae, absque omni deliberatione +rationis, sicut cum aliquis ex impraemeditato movet manum aut +pedem. Ergo etiam quandoque potest ratio inferior consentire in +actum peccati, absque ratione superiori.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12): "If the consent to the evil use of things that can be perceived by the bodily senses, + so far approves of any sin, as to point, if possible, to its consummation by deed, we are to understand that the woman has + offered the forbidden fruit to her husband." +
[36745] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin., si in consensione male +utendi rebus quae per sensum corporis sentiuntur, ita decernitur +quodcumque peccatum, ut, si potestas sit, etiam corpore compleatur, +intelligenda est mulier cibum illicitum viro dedisse, per quem +superior ratio significatur. Ergo ad rationem superiorem pertinet +consentire in actum peccati.
+ I answer that, Consent implies a judgment about the thing to which consent is given. For just as the speculative reason judges and delivers + its sentence about intelligible matters, so the practical reason judges and pronounces sentence on matters of action. Now + we must observe that in every case brought up for judgment, the final sentence belongs to the supreme court, even as we see + that in speculative matters the final sentence touching any proposition is delivered by + referring it to the first principles; since, so long as there remains a yet higher principle, the question can yet be submitted + to it: wherefore the judgment is still in suspense, the final sentence not being as yet pronounced. But it is evident that + human acts can be regulated by the rule of human reason, which rule is derived from the created things that man knows naturally; + and further still, from the rule of the Divine law, as stated above ( + Q[19], A[4]). + Consequently, since the rule of the Divine law is the higher rule, it follows that the ultimate sentence, whereby the judgment + is finally pronounced, belongs to the higher reason which is intent on the eternal types. Now when judgment has to be pronounced + on several points, the final judgment deals with that which comes last; and, in human acts, the action itself comes last, + and the delectation which is the inducement to the action is a preamble thereto. Therefore the consent to an action + belongs properly to the higher reason, while the preliminary judgment which is about the delectation belongs to the lower + reason, which delivers judgment in a lower court: although the higher reason can also judge of the delectation, since whatever + is subject to the judgment of the lower court, is subject also to the judgment of the higher court, but not conversely. +
[36746] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod consensus importat iudicium quoddam de eo in quod +consentitur, sicut enim ratio speculativa iudicat et sententiat de +rebus intelligibilibus, ita ratio practica iudicat et sententiat de +agendis. Est autem considerandum quod in omni iudicio ultima +sententia pertinet ad supremum iudicatorium, sicut videmus in +speculativis quod ultima sententia de aliqua propositione datur per +resolutionem ad prima principia. Quandiu enim remanet aliquod +principium altius, adhuc per ipsum potest examinari id de quo +quaeritur, unde adhuc est suspensum iudicium, quasi nondum data +finali sententia. Manifestum est autem quod actus humani regulari +possunt ex regula rationis humanae, quae sumitur ex rebus creatis, +quas naturaliter homo cognoscit; et ulterius ex regula legis +divinae, ut supra dictum est. Unde cum regula legis divinae sit +superior, consequens est ut ultima sententia, per quam iudicium +finaliter terminatur, pertineat ad rationem superiorem, quae +intendit rationibus aeternis. Cum autem de pluribus occurrit +iudicandum, finale iudicium est de eo quod ultimo occurrit. In +actibus autem humanis ultimo occurrit ipse actus; praeambulum autem +est delectatio, quae inducit ad actum. Et ideo ad rationem +superiorem proprie pertinet consensus in actum; ad rationem vero +inferiorem, quae habet inferius iudicium, pertinet iudicium +praeambulum, quod est de delectatione. Quamvis etiam et de +delectatione superior ratio iudicare possit, quia quidquid iudicio +subditur inferioris, subditur etiam iudicio superioris, sed non +convertitur.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Consent is an act of the appetitive power, not absolutely, but in consequence of an act of reason deliberating and judging, + as stated above ( + Q[15], A[3]). Because the fact that the consent is finally given to a thing is due to the fact that the will tends to that upon which + the reason has already passed its judgment. Hence consent may be ascribed both to the will and to the reason. +
[36747] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod consentire est actus appetitivae virtutis non +absolute, sed consequenter ad actum rationis deliberantis et +iudicantis, ut supra dictum est, in hoc enim terminatur consensus, +quod voluntas tendit in id quod est ratione iudicatum. Unde +consensus potest attribui et voluntati et rationi.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The higher reason is said to consent, from the very fact that it fails to direct the human act according to the Divine law, + whether or not it advert to the eternal law. For if it thinks of God's law, it holds it in actual contempt: and if not, it + neglects it by a kind of omission. Therefore the consent to a sinful act always proceeds from the higher reason: because, + as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12), "the mind cannot effectively decide on the + commission of a sin, unless by its consent, whereby it wields its sovereign power of moving the members to action, or of restraining + them from action, it become the servant or slave of the evil deed." +
[36748] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod ex hoc ipso quod ratio superior non dirigit actus +humanos secundum legem divinam, impediens actum peccati, dicitur +ipsa consentire; sive cogitet de lege aeterna, sive non. Cum enim +cogitat de lege Dei, actu eam contemnit, cum vero non cogitat, eam +negligit per modum omissionis cuiusdam. Unde omnibus modis +consensus in actum peccati procedit ex superiori ratione, quia, ut +Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin., non potest peccatum efficaciter +perpetrandum mente decerni, nisi illa mentis intentio penes quam +summa potestas est membra in opus movendi vel ab opere cohibendi, +malae actioni cedat aut serviat.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The higher reason, by considering the eternal law, can direct or restrain the internal delectation, even as it can direct + or restrain the external action: nevertheless, before the judgment of the higher reason is pronounced the lower reason, while + deliberating the matter in reference to temporal principles, sometimes approves of this delectation: and then the consent + to the delectation belongs to the lower reason. If, however, after considering the + eternal law, man persists in giving the same consent, such consent will then belong to the higher reason. +
[36749] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio superior, per considerationem legis aeternae, +sicut potest dirigere vel cohibere actum exteriorem, ita etiam +delectationem interiorem. Sed tamen antequam ad iudicium superioris +rationis deveniatur, statim ut sensualitas proponit delectationem, +inferior ratio, per rationes temporales deliberans, quandoque +huiusmodi delectationem acceptat, et tunc consensus in +delectationem pertinet ad inferiorem rationem. Si vero etiam +consideratis rationibus aeternis, homo in eodem consensu +perseveret, iam talis consensus ad superiorem rationem +pertinebit.
+ Reply to Objection 4: The apprehension of the power of imagination is sudden and indeliberate: wherefore it can cause an act before the higher + or lower reason has time to deliberate. But the judgment of the lower reason is deliberate, and so requires time, during which + the higher reason can also deliberate; consequently, if by its deliberation it does not check the sinful act, this will deservedly + by imputed to it. +
[36750] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod apprehensio virtutis imaginativae est subita et sine +deliberatione, et ideo potest aliquem actum causare antequam +superior vel inferior ratio etiam habeat tempus deliberandi. Sed +iudicium rationis inferioris est cum deliberatione, quae indiget +tempore, in quo etiam ratio superior deliberare potest. Unde si non +cohibeat ab actu peccati per suam deliberationem, ei imputatur.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that consent to delectation is not a mortal sin, for consent to delectation belongs to the lower reason, which + does not consider the eternal types, i.e. the eternal law, and consequently does not turn away from them. Now every mortal + sin consists in turning away from Augustine's definition of mortal sin, which was quoted above ( + Q[71], A[6]). Therefore consent to delectation is not a mortal sin. +
[36751] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod consensus in delectationem non sit +peccatum mortale. Consentire enim in delectationem pertinet ad +rationem inferiorem, cuius non est intendere rationibus aeternis +vel legi divinae, et per consequens nec ab eis averti. Sed omne +peccatum mortale est per aversionem a lege divina; ut patet per +definitionem Augustini, de peccato mortali datam, quae supra posita +est. Ergo consensus in delectationem non est peccatum mortale.
+ Objection 2: Further, consent to a thing is not evil, unless the thing to which consent is given be evil. Now "the cause of anything being + such is yet more so," or at any rate not less. Consequently the thing to which a man consents cannot be a lesser evil than + his consent. But delectation without deed is not a mortal sin, but only a venial sin. Therefore neither is the consent to + the delectation a mortal sin. +
[36752] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, +consentire in aliquid non est malum nisi quia illud est malum in +quod consentitur. Sed propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis, vel +saltem non minus. Non ergo illud in quod consentitur, potest esse +minus malum quam consensus. Sed delectatio sine opere non est +peccatum mortale, sed veniale tantum. Ergo nec consensus in +delectationem est peccatum mortale.
+ Objection 3: Further, delectations differ in goodness and malice, according to the difference of the deeds, as the Philosopher states + (Ethic. x, 3,5). Now the inward thought is one thing, and the outward deed, e.g. fornication, is another. Therefore the delectation + consequent to the act of inward thought, differs in goodness and malice from the pleasure of fornication, as much as the inward + thought differs from the outward deed; and consequently there is a like difference + of consent on either hand. But the inward thought is not a mortal sin, nor is the consent to that thought: and therefore neither + is the consent to the delectation. +
[36753] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, +delectationes differunt in bonitate et malitia secundum +differentiam operationum, ut dicit philosophus, in X Ethic. Sed +alia operatio est interior cogitatio, et alia actus exterior, puta +fornicationis. Ergo et delectatio consequens actum interioris +cogitationis, tantum differt a delectatione fornicationis in +bonitate vel malitia, quantum differt cogitatio interior ab actu +exteriori. Et per consequens etiam eodem modo differt consentire in +utrumque. Sed cogitatio interior non est peccatum mortale; nec +etiam consensus in cogitationem. Ergo per consequens nec consensus +in delectationem.
+ Objection 4: Further, the external act of fornication or adultery is a mortal sin, not by reason of the delectation, since this is found + also in the marriage act, but by reason of an inordinateness in the act itself. Now he that consents to the delectation does + not, for this reason, consent to the inordinateness of the act. Therefore he seems not to sin mortally. +
[36754] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 arg. 4 Praeterea, +exterior actus fornicationis vel adulterii non est peccatum mortale +ratione delectationis, quae etiam invenitur in actu matrimoniali; +sed ratione inordinationis ipsius actus. Sed ille qui consentit in +delectationem, non propter hoc consentit in deordinationem actus. +Ergo non videtur mortaliter peccare.
+ Objection 5: Further, the sin of murder is more grievous than simple fornication. Now it is not a mortal sin to consent to the delectation + resulting from the thought of murder. Much less therefore is it a mortal sin to consent to the delectation resulting from + the thought of fornication. +
[36755] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 arg. 5 Praeterea, +peccatum homicidii est gravius quam simplicis fornicationis. Sed +consentire in delectationem quae consequitur cogitationem de +homicidio, non est peccatum mortale. Ergo multo minus consentire in +delectationem quae consequitur cogitationem de fornicatione, est +peccatum mortale.
+ Objection 6: Further, the Lord's prayer is recited every day for the remission of venial sins, as Augustine asserts (Enchiridion lxxviii). + Now Augustine teaches that consent to delectation may be driven away by means of the Lord's Prayer: for he says (De Trin. + xii, 12) that "this sin is much less grievous than if it be decided to fulfil it by deed: wherefore we ought to ask pardon + for such thoughts also, and we should strike our breasts and say: 'Forgive us our + trespasses.'" Therefore consent to delectation is a venial sin. +
[36756] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 arg. 6 Praeterea, +oratio dominica quotidie dicitur pro remissione venialium, ut +Augustinus dicit. Sed consensum in delectationem Augustinus docet +esse abolendum per orationem dominicam, dicit enim, in XII de +Trin., quod hoc est longe minus peccatum quam si opere statuatur +implendum, et ideo de talibus quoque cogitationibus venia petenda +est, pectusque percutiendum, atque dicendum, dimitte nobis debita +nostra. Ergo consensus in delectationem est peccatum +veniale.
+ On the contrary, Augustine adds after a few words: "Man will be altogether lost unless, through the grace of the Mediator, he be forgiven + those things which are deemed mere sins of thought, since without the will to do them, he desires nevertheless to enjoy them." + But no man is lost except through mortal sin. Therefore consent to delectation is a mortal sin. +
[36757] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus post pauca subdit, totus homo damnabitur, +nisi haec quae, sine voluntate operandi, sed tamen cum voluntate +animum talibus oblectandi, solius cogitationis sentiuntur esse +peccata, per mediatoris gratiam remittantur. Sed nullus +damnatur nisi pro peccato mortali. Ergo consensus in delectationem +est peccatum mortale.
+ I answer that, There have been various opinions on this point, for some have held that consent to delectation is not a mortal sin, but only + a venial sin, while others have held it to be a mortal sin, and this opinion is more common and more probable. For we must + take note that since every delectation results from some action, as stated in Ethic. x, 4, and again, that since every delectation + may be compared to two things, viz. to the operation from which it results, and to + the object in which a person takes delight. Now it happens that an action, just as a thing, is an object of delectation, because + the action itself can be considered as a good and an end, in which the person who delights in it, rests. Sometimes the action + itself, which results in delectation, is the object of delectation, in so far as the appetitive power, to which it belongs + to take delight in anything, is brought to bear on the action itself as a good: for instance, when a man thinks and + delights in his thought, in so far as his thought pleases him; while at other times the delight consequent to an action, e.g. + a thought, has for its object another action, as being the object of his thought; and then his thought proceeds from the inclination + of the appetite, not indeed to the thought, but to the action thought of. Accordingly a man who is thinking of fornication, + may delight in either of two things: first, in the thought itself, secondly, in the fornication thought of. Now the + delectation in the thought itself results from the inclination of the appetite to the thought; and the thought itself is not + in itself a mortal sin; sometimes indeed it is only a venial sin, as when a man thinks of such a thing for no purpose; and + sometimes it is no sin at all, as when a man has a purpose in thinking of it; for instance, he may wish to preach or dispute + about it. Consequently such affection or delectation in respect of the thought of fornication is not a mortal sin in virtue + of + its genus, but is sometimes a venial sin and sometimes no sin at all: wherefore neither is it a mortal sin to consent to such + a thought. In this sense the first opinion is true. +
But that a man in thinking of fornication takes pleasure in the act thought of, is due to his desire being inclined to this + act. Wherefore the fact that a man consents to such a delectation, amounts to nothing less than a consent to the inclination + of his appetite to fornication: for no man takes pleasure except in that which is in conformity with his appetite. Now it + is a mortal sin, if a man deliberately chooses that his appetite be conformed to what is in itself a mortal sin. + Wherefore such a consent to delectation in a mortal sin, is itself a mortal sin, as the second opinion maintains. +
[36758] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod circa hoc aliqui diversimode opinati sunt. Quidam +enim dixerunt quod consensus in delectationem non est peccatum +mortale, sed veniale tantum. Alii vero dixerunt quod est peccatum +mortale, et haec opinio est communior et verisimilior. Est enim +considerandum quod, cum omnis delectatio consequatur aliquam +operationem, ut dicitur in X Ethic.; et iterum cum omnis delectatio +habeat aliquod obiectum, delectatio quaelibet potest comparari ad +duo, scilicet ad operationem quam consequitur, et ad obiectum in +quo quis delectatur. Contingit autem quod aliqua operatio sit +obiectum delectationis, sicut et aliqua alia res, quia ipsa +operatio potest accipi ut bonum et finis, in quo quis delectatus +requiescit. Et quandoque quidem ipsamet operatio quam consequitur +delectatio, est obiectum delectationis, inquantum scilicet vis +appetitiva, cuius est delectari, reflectitur in ipsam operationem +sicut in quoddam bonum; puta cum aliquis cogitat, et delectatur de +hoc ipso quod cogitat, inquantum sua cogitatio placet. Quandoque +vero delectatio consequens unam operationem, puta cogitationem +aliquam, habet pro obiecto aliam operationem quasi rem cogitatam, +et tunc talis delectatio procedit ex inclinatione appetitus non +quidem in cogitationem, sed in operationem cogitatam. Sic igitur +aliquis de fornicatione cogitans, de duobus potest delectari, uno +modo, de ipsa cogitatione; alio modo, de fornicatione cogitata. +Delectatio autem de cogitatione ipsa sequitur inclinationem +affectus in cogitationem ipsam. Cogitatio autem ipsa secundum se +non est peccatum mortale, immo quandoque est veniale tantum, puta +cum aliquis inutiliter cogitat; quandoque autem sine peccato +omnino, puta cum aliquis utiliter de ea cogitat, sicut cum vult de +ea praedicare vel disputare. Et ideo per consequens affectio et +delectatio quae sic est de cogitatione fornicationis, non est de +genere peccati mortalis; sed quandoque est peccatum veniale, +quandoque nullum. Unde nec consensus in talem delectationem est +peccatum mortale. Et secundum hoc prima opinio habet veritatem. +Quod autem aliquis cogitans de fornicatione, delectetur de ipso +actu cogitato, hoc contingit ex hoc quod affectio eius inclinata +est in hunc actum. Unde quod aliquis consentiat in talem +delectationem, hoc nihil aliud est quam quod ipse consentiat in hoc +quod affectus suus sit inclinatus in fornicationem, nullus enim +delectatur nisi in eo quod est conforme appetitui eius. Quod autem +aliquis ex deliberatione eligat quod affectus suus conformetur his +quae secundum se sunt peccata mortalia, est peccatum mortale. Unde +talis consensus in delectationem peccati mortalis, est peccatum +mortale; ut secunda opinio ponit.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Consent to delectation may be not only in the lower reason, but also in the higher reason, as stated above + (A[7]). Nevertheless the lower reason may turn away from the eternal types, for, though it is not intent on them, as regulating + according to them, which is proper to the higher reason, yet, it is intent on them, as being regulated according to them: + and by turning from them in this sense, it may sin mortally; since even + the acts of the lower powers and of the external members may be mortal sins, in so far as the direction of the higher reason + fails in directing them according to the eternal types. +
[36759] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod consensus in delectationem potest esse non solum +rationis inferioris, sed etiam superioris, ut dictum est. Et tamen +ipsa etiam ratio inferior potest averti a rationibus aeternis. Quia +etsi non intendit eis ut secundum eas regulans, quod est proprium +superioris rationis; intendit tamen eis ut secundum eas regulata. +Et hoc modo, ab eis se avertens, potest peccare mortaliter. Nam et +actus inferiorum virium, et etiam exteriorum membrorum, possunt +esse peccata mortalia, secundum quod deficit ordinatio superioris +rationis regulantis eos secundum rationes aeternas.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Consent to a sin that is venial in its genus, is itself a venial sin, and accordingly one may conclude that the consent to + take pleasure in a useless thought about fornication, is a venial sin. But delectation in the act itself of fornication is, + in its genus, a mortal sin: and that it be a venial sin before the consent is given, is accidental, viz. on account of the + incompleteness of the act: which incompleteness ceases when the deliberate consent + has been given, so that therefore it has its complete nature and is a mortal sin. +
[36760] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod consensus in peccatum quod est veniale ex genere, est +veniale peccatum. Et secundum hoc potest concludi quod consensus in +delectationem quae est de ipsa vana cogitatione fornicationis, est +peccatum veniale. Sed delectatio quae est in ipso actu +fornicationis, de genere suo est peccatum mortale. Sed quod ante +consensum sit veniale peccatum tantum, hoc est per accidens, +scilicet propter imperfectionem actus. Quae quidem imperfectio +tollitur per consensum deliberatum supervenientem. Unde ex hoc +adducitur in suam naturam, ut sit peccatum mortale.
+ Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the delectation which has the thought for its object. +
[36761] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de delectatione quae habet +cogitationem pro obiecto.
+ Reply to Objection 4: The delectation which has an external act for its object, cannot be without complacency in the external act as such, even + though there be no decision to fulfil it, on account of the prohibition of some higher authority: wherefore the act is inordinate, + and consequently the delectation will be inordinate also. +
[36762] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod delectatio quae habet actum exteriorem pro obiecto, +non potest esse absque complacentia exterioris actus secundum se; +etiam si non statuatur implendum, propter prohibitionem alicuius +superioris. Unde actus fit inordinatus, et per consequens +delectatio erit inordinata.
+ Reply to Objection 5: The consent to delectation, resulting from complacency in an act of murder thought of, is a mortal sin also: but not the + consent to delectation resulting from complacency in the thought of murder. +
[36763] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 ad 5 Ad quintum +dicendum quod etiam consensus in delectationem quae procedit ex +complacentia ipsius actus homicidii cogitati, est peccatum mortale. +Non autem consensus in delectationem quae procedit ex complacentia +cogitationis de homicidio.
+ Reply to Objection 6: The Lord's Prayer is to be said in order that we may be preserved not only from venial sin, but also from mortal sin. +
[36764] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 ad 6 Ad sextum +dicendum quod oratio dominica non solum contra peccata venialia +dicenda est, sed etiam contra mortalia.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be venial sin in the higher reason as directing the lower powers, i.e. as consenting to a + sinful act. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 7) that the "higher reason is intent on considering and consulting the eternal + law." But mortal sin consists in turning away from the eternal law. Therefore it seems that there can be no other than mortal + sin in the higher reason. +
[36765] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 arg. 1 Ad nonum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod in superiori ratione non possit esse +peccatum veniale, secundum quod est directiva inferiorum virium, +idest secundum quod consentit in actum peccati. Dicit enim +Augustinus, in XII de Trin., quod ratio superior inhaeret +rationibus aeternis. Sed peccare mortaliter est per aversionem a +rationibus aeternis. Ergo videtur quod in superiori ratione non +possit esse peccatum nisi mortale.
+ Objection 2: Further, the higher reason is the principle of the spiritual life, as the heart is of the body's life. But the diseases of + the heart are deadly. Therefore the sins of the higher reason are mortal. +
[36766] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 arg. 2 Praeterea, +superior ratio se habet in vita spirituali tanquam principium; +sicut et cor in vita corporali. Sed infirmitates cordis sunt +mortales. Ergo peccata superioris rationis sunt mortalia.
+ Objection 3: Further, a venial sin becomes a mortal sin if it be done out of contempt. But it would seem impossible to commit even a venial + sin, deliberately, without contempt. Since then the consent of the higher reason is always accompanied by deliberate consideration + of the eternal law, it seems that it cannot be without mortal sin, on account of the contempt of the Divine law. +
[36767] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 arg. 3 Praeterea, +peccatum veniale fit mortale, si fiat ex contemptu. Sed hoc non +videtur esse sine contemptu, quod aliquis ex deliberatione peccet +etiam venialiter. Cum ergo consensus rationis superioris semper sit +cum deliberatione legis divinae, videtur quod non possit esse sine +peccato mortali, propter contemptum divinae legis.
+ On the contrary, Consent to a sinful act belongs to the higher reason, as stated above + (A[7]). But consent to an act of venial sin is itself a venial sin. Therefore a venial sin can be in the higher reason. +
[36768] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 s. c. Sed contra, +consensus in actum peccati pertinet ad rationem superiorem, ut +supra dictum est. Sed consensus in actum peccati venialis est +peccatum veniale. Ergo in superiori ratione potest esse peccatum +veniale.
+ I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 7), the higher reason "is intent on contemplating or consulting the eternal law"; it contemplates + it by considering its truth; it consults it by judging and directing other things according to it: and to this pertains the + fact that by deliberating through the eternal types, it consents to an act or dissents from it. Now it may happen that the + inordinateness of the act to which it consents, is not contrary to the eternal law, + in the same way as mortal sin is, because it does not imply aversion from the last end, but is beside that law, as an act + of venial sin is. Therefore when the higher reason consents to the act of a venial sin, it does not turn away from the eternal + law: wherefore it sins, not mortally, but venially. +
[36769] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in XII de Trin., ratio +superior inhaeret rationibus aeternis conspiciendis aut +consulendis, conspiciendis quidem, secundum quod earum +veritatem speculatur; consulendis autem, secundum quod per rationes +aeternas de aliis iudicat et ordinat; ad quod pertinet quod, +deliberando per rationes aeternas, consentit in aliquem actum, vel +dissentit ab eo. Contingit autem quod inordinatio actus in quem +consentit, non contrariatur rationibus aeternis, quia non est cum +aversione a fine ultimo, sicut contrariatur actus peccati mortalis, +sed est praeter eas, sicut actus peccati venialis. Unde quando +ratio superior in actum peccati venialis consentit, non avertitur a +rationibus aeternis. Unde non peccat mortaliter, sed +venialiter.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
[36770] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 ad 1 Et per hoc +patet responsio ad primum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Disease of the heart is twofold: one which is in the very substance of the heart, and affects its natural consistency, and + such a disease is always mortal: the other is a disease of the heart consisting in some disorder either of the movement or + of the parts surrounding the heart, and such a disease is not always mortal. In like manner there is mortal sin in the higher + reason whenever the order itself of the higher reason to its proper object which is + the eternal law, is destroyed; but when the disorder leaves this untouched, the sin is not mortal but venial. +
[36771] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod duplex est infirmitas cordis. Una quae est in ipsa +substantia cordis, et immutat naturalem complexionem ipsius, et +talis infirmitas semper est mortalis. Alia est autem infirmitas +cordis propter aliquam inordinationem vel motus eius, vel alicuius +eorum quae circumstant cor, et talis infirmitas non semper est +mortalis. Et similiter in ratione superiori semper est peccatum +mortale, quando tollitur ipsa ordinatio rationis superioris ad +proprium obiectum, quod est rationes aeternae. Sed quando est +inordinatio circa hoc, non est peccatum mortale, sed veniale.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Deliberate consent to a sin does not always amount to contempt of the Divine law, but only when the sin is contrary to the + Divine law. +
[36772] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod deliberatus consensus in peccatum non semper pertinet +ad contemptum legis divinae, sed solum quando peccatum legi divinae +contrariatur.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin cannot be in the higher reason as such, i.e. as considering the eternal law. For the act of + a power is not found to fail except that power be inordinately disposed with regard to its object. Now the object of the higher + reason is the eternal law, in respect of which there can be no disorder without mortal sin. Therefore there can be no venial + sin in the higher reason as such. +
[36773] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 arg. 1 Ad decimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod in superiori ratione non possit esse +peccatum veniale secundum seipsam, idest secundum quod inspicit +rationes aeternas. Actus enim potentiae non invenitur esse +deficiens, nisi per hoc quod inordinate se habet circa suum +obiectum. Sed obiectum superioris rationis sunt aeternae rationes, +a quibus deordinari non est sine peccato mortali. Ergo in superiori +ratione non potest esse peccatum veniale secundum seipsam.
+ Objection 2: Further, since the reason is a deliberative power, there can be no act of reason without deliberation. Now every inordinate + movement in things concerning God, if it be deliberate, is a mortal sin. Therefore venial sin is never in the higher reason + as such. +
[36774] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 arg. 2 Praeterea, +cum ratio sit vis deliberativa, actus rationis semper est cum +deliberatione. Sed omnis inordinatus motus in his quae Dei sunt, si +sit cum deliberatione, est peccatum mortale. Ergo in ratione +superiori secundum seipsam, nunquam est peccatum veniale.
+ Objection 3: Further, it happens sometimes that a sin which takes us unawares, is a venial sin. Now a deliberate sin is a mortal sin, + through the reason, in deliberating, having recourse to some higher good, by acting against which, man sins more grievously; + just as when the reason in deliberating about an inordinate pleasurable act, considers that it is contrary to the law of God, + it sins more grievously in consenting, than if it only considered that it is contrary to + moral virtue. But the higher reason cannot have recourse to any higher tribunal than its own object. Therefore if a movement + that takes us unawares is not a mortal sin, neither will the subsequent deliberation make it a mortal sin; which is clearly + false. Therefore there can be no venial sin in the higher reason as such. +
[36775] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 arg. 3 Praeterea, +contingit quandoque quod peccatum ex subreptione est peccatum +veniale, peccatum autem ex deliberatione est peccatum mortale, per +hoc quod ratio deliberans recurrit ad aliquod maius bonum, contra +quod homo agens gravius peccat, sicut cum de actu delectabili +inordinato ratio deliberat quod est contra legem Dei, gravius +peccat consentiendo, quam si solum consideraret quod est contra +virtutem moralem. Sed ratio superior non potest recurrere ad +aliquod altius quam sit suum obiectum. Ergo si motus ex subreptione +non sit peccatum mortale, neque etiam deliberatio superveniens +faciet ipsum esse peccatum mortale, quod patet esse falsum. Non +ergo in ratione superiori secundum seipsam, potest esse peccatum +veniale.
+ On the contrary, A sudden movement of unbelief is a venial sin. But it belongs to the higher reason as such. Therefore there can be a venial + sin in the higher reason as such. +
[36776] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 s. c. Sed contra, +motus subreptitius infidelitatis est peccatum veniale. Sed pertinet +ad superiorem rationem secundum seipsam. Ergo in ratione superiori +potest esse peccatum veniale secundum seipsam.
+ I answer that, The higher reason regards its own object otherwise than the objects of the lower powers that are directed by the higher reason. + For it does not regard the objects of the lower powers, except in so far as it consults the eternal law about them, and so + it does not regard them save by way of deliberation. Now deliberate consent to what is a mortal sin in its genus, is itself + a mortal sin; and consequently the higher reason always sins mortally, if the acts of + the lower powers to which it consents are mortal sins. +
With regard to its own object it has a twofold act, viz. simple "intuition," and "deliberation," in respect of which it again + consults the eternal law about its own object. But in respect of simple intuition, it can have an inordinate movement about + Divine things, as when a man suffers a sudden movement of unbelief. And although unbelief, in its genus, is a mortal sin, + yet a sudden movement of unbelief is a venial sin, because there is no mortal sin unless it be contrary to the + law of God. Now it is possible for one of the articles of faith to present itself to the reason suddenly under some other + aspect, before the eternal law, i.e. the law of God, is consulted, or can be consulted, on the matter; as, for instance, when + a man suddenly apprehends the resurrection of the dead as impossible naturally, and rejects it, as soon as he had thus apprehended + it, before he has had time to deliberate and consider that this is proposed to our belief in accordance with the Divine + law. If, however, the movement of unbelief remains after this deliberation, it is a mortal sin. Therefore, in sudden movements, + the higher reason may sin venially in respect of its proper object, even if it be a mortal sin in its genus; or it may sin + mortally in giving a deliberate consent; but in things pertaining to the lower powers, it always sins mortally, in things + which are mortal sins in their genus, but not in those which are venial sins in their genus. +
[36777] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod ratio superior aliter fertur in suum obiectum, atque +aliter in obiecta inferiorum virium quae per ipsam diriguntur. In +obiecta enim inferiorum virium non fertur nisi inquantum de eis +consulit rationes aeternas. Unde non fertur in ea nisi per modum +deliberationis. Deliberatus autem consensus in his quae ex genere +suo sunt mortalia, est mortale peccatum. Et ideo ratio superior +semper mortaliter peccat, si actus inferiorum virium in quos +consentit, sint peccata mortalia. Sed circa proprium obiectum habet +duos actus, scilicet simplicem intuitum; et deliberationem, +secundum quod etiam de proprio obiecto consulit rationes aeternas. +Secundum autem simplicem intuitum, potest aliquem inordinatum motum +habere circa divina, puta cum quis patitur subitum infidelitatis +motum. Et quamvis infidelitas secundum suum genus sit peccatum +mortale, tamen subitus motus infidelitatis est peccatum veniale. +Quia peccatum mortale non est nisi sit contra legem Dei, potest +autem aliquid eorum quae pertinent ad fidem, subito rationi +occurrere sub quadam alia ratione, antequam super hoc consulatur, +vel consuli possit, ratio aeterna, idest lex Dei; puta cum quis +resurrectionem mortuorum subito apprehendit ut impossibilem +secundum naturam, et simul apprehendendo renititur, antequam tempus +habeat deliberandi quod hoc est nobis traditum ut credendum +secundum legem divinam. Si vero post hanc deliberationem motus +infidelitatis maneat, est peccatum mortale. Et ideo circa proprium +obiectum, etsi sit peccatum mortale ex genere, potest ratio +superior peccare venialiter in subitis motibus; vel etiam +mortaliter per deliberatum consensum. In his autem quae pertinent +ad inferiores vires, semper peccat mortaliter in his quae sunt +peccata mortalia ex suo genere, non autem in his quae secundum suum +genus sunt venialia peccata.
+ Reply to Objection 1: A sin which is against the eternal law, though it be mortal in its genus, may nevertheless be venial, on account of the incompleteness + of a sudden action, as stated. +
[36778] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod peccatum quod est contra rationes aeternas, etsi +sit peccatum mortale ex genere, potest tamen esse peccatum veniale +propter imperfectionem actus subiti, ut dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 2: In matters of action, the simple intuition of the principles from which deliberation proceeds, belongs to the reason, as + well as the act of deliberation: even as in speculative matters it belongs to the reason both to syllogize and to form propositions: + consequently the reason also can have a sudden movement. +
[36779] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod in operativis ad rationem, ad quam pertinet +deliberatio, pertinet etiam simplex intuitus eorum ex quibus +deliberatio procedit, sicut etiam in speculativis ad rationem +pertinet et syllogizare, et propositiones formare. Et ideo etiam +ratio potest habere subitum motum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: One and the same thing may be the subject of different considerations, of which one is higher than the other; thus the existence + of God may be considered, either as possible to be known by the human reason, or as delivered to us by Divine revelation, + which is a higher consideration. And therefore, although the object of the higher reason is, in its nature, something sublime, + yet it is reducible to some yet higher consideration: and in this way, that + which in the sudden movement was not a mortal sin, becomes a mortal sin in virtue of the deliberation which brought it into + the light of a higher consideration, as was explained above. +
[36780] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod una et eadem res potest diversas considerationes +habere, quarum una est altera altior, sicut Deum esse potest +considerari vel inquantum est cognoscibile ratione humana, vel +inquantum creditur revelatione divina, quae est consideratio +altior. Et ideo quamvis obiectum rationis superioris sit quiddam +secundum naturam rei altissimum, tamen potest etiam reduci in +quandam altiorem considerationem. Et hac ratione, quod in motu +subito non erat peccatum mortale, per deliberationem reducentem in +altiorem considerationem fit peccatum mortale, sicut supra +expositum est.
We must now consider the causes of sin: (1) in general; (2) in particular. Under the first head there are four points of + inquiry: +
(2) Whether it has an internal cause?
+[36781] +Iª-IIae q. 75 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +causis peccatorum. Et primo, in generali; secundo, in speciali. +Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum peccatum habeat +causam. Secundo, utrum habeat causam interiorem. Tertio, utrum +habeat causam exteriorem. Quarto, utrum peccatum sit causa +peccati.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that sin has no cause. For sin has the nature of evil, as stated above ( + Q[71], A[6]). But evil has no cause, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore sin has no cause. +
[36782] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non habeat causam. Peccatum +enim habet rationem mali, ut dictum est. Sed malum non habet +causam, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo peccatum non +habet causam.
+ Objection 2: Further, a cause is that from which something follows of necessity. Now that which is of necessity, seems to be no sin, for + every sin is voluntary. Therefore sin has no cause. +
[36783] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +causa est ad quam de necessitate sequitur aliud. Sed quod est ex +necessitate, non videtur esse peccatum, eo quod omne peccatum est +voluntarium. Ergo peccatum non habet causam.
+ Objection 3: Further, if sin has a cause, this cause is either good or evil. It is not a good, because good produces nothing but good, + for "a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit" ( + Mat. 7:18). Likewise neither can evil be the cause of sin, because the evil of punishment is a sequel to sin, and the evil of guilt + is the same as sin. Therefore sin has no cause. +
[36784] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +si peccatum habet causam, aut habet pro causa bonum, aut malum. Non +autem bonum, quia bonum non facit nisi bonum; non enim potest +arbor bona fructus malos facere, ut dicitur Matth. VII +similiter autem nec malum potest esse causa peccati, quia malum +poenae sequitur ad peccatum; malum autem culpae est idem quod +peccatum. Peccatum igitur non habet causam.
+ On the contrary, Whatever is done has a cause, for, according to + Job 5:6, "nothing upon earth is done without a cause." But sin is something done; since it a "word, deed, or desire contrary to the + law of God." Therefore sin has a cause. +
[36785] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra, +omne quod fit, habet causam, quia, ut dicitur Iob V, nihil in terra +sine causa fit. Sed peccatum fit, est enim dictum vel factum vel +concupitum contra legem Dei. Ergo peccatum habet causam.
+ I answer that, A sin is an inordinate act. Accordingly, so far as it is an act, it can have a direct cause, even as any other act; but, + so far as it is inordinate, it has a cause, in the same way as a negation or privation can have a cause. Now two causes may + be assigned to a negation: in the first place, absence of the cause of affirmation; i.e. the negation of the cause itself, + is the cause of the negation in itself; since the result of the removing the cause is the + removal of the effect: thus the absence of the sun is the cause of darkness. In the second place, the cause of an affirmation, + of which a negation is a sequel, is the accidental cause of the resulting negation: thus fire by causing heat in virtue of + its principal tendency, consequently causes a privation of cold. The first of these suffices to cause a simple negation. But, + since the inordinateness of sin and of every evil is not a simple negation, but the privation of that which something ought + naturally to have, such an inordinateness must needs have an accidental efficient cause. For that which naturally is and ought + to be in a thing, is never lacking except on account of some impeding cause. And accordingly we are wont to say that evil, + which consists in a certain privation, has a deficient cause, or an accidental efficient cause. Now every accidental cause + is reducible to the direct cause. Since then sin, on the part of its inordinateness, has an accidental efficient cause, and + on + the part of the act, a direct efficient cause, it follows that the inordinateness of sin is a result of the cause of the act. + Accordingly then, the will lacking the direction of the rule of reason and of the Divine law, and intent on some mutable good, + causes the act of sin directly, and the inordinateness of the act, indirectly, and beside the intention: for the lack of order + in the act results from the lack of direction in the will. +
[36786] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod peccatum est quidam actus inordinatus. Ex parte +igitur actus, potest habere per se causam, sicut et quilibet alius +actus. Ex parte autem inordinationis, habet causam eo modo quo +negatio vel privatio potest habere causam. Negationis autem +alicuius potest duplex causa assignari. Primo quidem, defectus +causae, idest ipsius causae negatio, est causa negationis secundum +seipsam, ad remotionem enim causae sequitur remotio effectus; sicut +obscuritatis causa est absentia solis. Alio modo, causa +affirmationis ad quam sequitur negatio, est per accidens causa +negationis consequentis, sicut ignis, causando calorem ex +principali intentione, consequenter causat privationem +frigiditatis. Quorum primum potest sufficere ad simplicem +negationem. Sed cum inordinatio peccati, et quodlibet malum, non +sit simplex negatio, sed privatio eius quod quid natum est et debet +habere; necesse est quod talis inordinatio habeat causam agentem +per accidens, quod enim natum est inesse et debet, nunquam abesset +nisi propter causam aliquam impedientem. Et secundum hoc consuevit +dici quod malum, quod in quadam privatione consistit, habet causam +deficientem, vel agentem per accidens. Omnis autem causa per +accidens reducitur ad causam per se. Cum igitur peccatum ex parte +inordinationis habeat causam agentem per accidens, ex parte autem +actus habeat causam agentem per se; sequitur quod inordinatio +peccati consequatur ex ipsa causa actus. Sic igitur voluntas carens +directione regulae rationis et legis divinae, intendens aliquod +bonum commutabile, causat actum quidem peccati per se, sed +inordinationem actus per accidens et praeter intentionem, provenit +enim defectus ordinis in actu, ex defectu directionis in +voluntate.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Sin signifies not only the privation of good, which privation is its inordinateness, but also the act which is the subject + of that privation, which has the nature of evil: and how this evil has a cause, has been explained. +
[36787] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod peccatum non solum significat ipsam privationem +boni, quae est inordinatio; sed significat actum sub tali +privatione, quae habet rationem mali. Quod quidem qualiter habeat +causam, dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 2: If this definition is to be verified in all cases, it must be understood as applying to a cause which is sufficient and not + impeded. For it happens that a thing is the sufficient cause of something else, and that the effect does not follow of necessity, + on account of some supervening impediment: else it would follow that all things happen of necessity, as is proved in Metaph. + vi, text. 5. Accordingly, though sin has a cause, it does not follow that + this is a necessary cause, since its effect can be impeded. +
[36788] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, si illa definitio causae universaliter debeat +verificari, oportet ut intelligatur de causa sufficienti et non +impedita. Contingit enim aliquid esse causam sufficientem alterius, +et tamen non ex necessitate sequitur effectus, propter aliquod +impedimentum superveniens, alioquin sequeretur quod omnia ex +necessitate contingerent, ut patet in VI Metaphys. Sic igitur, etsi +peccatum habeat causam, non tamen sequitur quod sit necessaria, +quia effectus potest impediri.
+ Reply to Objection 3: As stated above, the will in failing to apply the rule of reason or of the Divine law, is the cause of sin. Now the fact + of not applying the rule of reason or of the Divine law, has not in itself the nature of evil, whether of punishment or of + guilt, before it is applied to the act. Wherefore accordingly, evil is not the cause of the first sin, but some good lacking + some other good. +
[36789] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, voluntas sine adhibitione regulae +rationis vel legis divinae, est causa peccati. Hoc autem quod est +non adhibere regulam rationis vel legis divinae, secundum se non +habet rationem mali, nec poenae nec culpae, antequam applicetur ad +actum. Unde secundum hoc, peccati primi non est causa aliquod +malum, sed bonum aliquod cum absentia alicuius alterius boni.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that sin has no internal cause. For that which is within a thing is always in it. If therefore sin had an internal + cause, man would always be sinning, since given the cause, the effect follows. +
[36790] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non habeat causam interiorem. +Id enim quod est interius alicui rei, semper adest ei. Si igitur +peccatum habeat causam interiorem, semper homo peccaret, cum, +posita causa, ponatur effectus.
+ Objection 2: Further, a thing is not its own cause. But the internal movements of a man are sins. Therefore they are not the cause of + sin. +
[36791] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +idem non est causa sui ipsius. Sed interiores motus hominis sunt +peccatum. Ergo non sunt causa peccati.
+ Objection 3: Further, whatever is within man is either natural or voluntary. Now that which is natural cannot be the cause of sin, for + sin is contrary to nature, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 3; iv, 21); while that which is voluntary, if it be inordinate, + is already a sin. Therefore nothing intrinsic can be the cause of the first sin. +
[36792] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +quidquid est intra hominem, aut est naturale, aut voluntarium. Sed +id quod est naturale, non potest esse peccati causa, quia peccatum +est contra naturam, ut dicit Damascenus. Quod autem est +voluntarium, si sit inordinatum, iam est peccatum. Non ergo aliquid +intrinsecum potest esse causa primi peccati.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Duabus Anim. x, 10,11; Retract. i, 9) that "the will is the cause of sin." +
[36793] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, quod voluntas est causa peccati.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[1]), the direct cause of sin must be considered on the part of the act. Now we may distinguish a twofold internal cause of human + acts, one remote, the other proximate. The proximate internal cause of the human act is the reason and will, in respect of + which man has a free-will; while the remote cause is the apprehension of the sensitive part, and also the sensitive appetite. + For just as it is due to the judgment of + reason, that the will is moved to something in accord with reason, so it is due to an apprehension of the senses that the + sensitive appetite is inclined to something; which inclination sometimes influences the will and reason, as we shall explain + further on (Q[77], A[1]). Accordingly a double interior cause of sin may be assigned; one proximate, on the part of the reason + and will; and the other remote, on the part of the imagination or sensitive appetite. +
But since we have said above (A[1], ad 3) that the cause of sin is some apparent good as motive, yet lacking the due motive, + viz. the rule of reason or the Divine law, this motive which is an apparent good, appertains to the apprehension of the senses + and to the appetite; while the lack of the due rule appertains to the reason, whose nature it is to consider this rule; and + the completeness of the voluntary sinful act appertains to the will, so that the act of the will, given the + conditions we have just mentioned, is already a sin. +
[36794] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, per se causam peccati oportet +accipere ex parte ipsius actus. Actus autem humani potest accipi +causa interior et mediata, et immediata. Immediata quidem causa +humani actus est ratio et voluntas, secundum quam homo est liber +arbitrio. Causa autem remota est apprehensio sensitivae partis, et +etiam appetitus sensitivus, sicut enim ex iudicio rationis voluntas +movetur ad aliquid secundum rationem, ita etiam ex apprehensione +sensus appetitus sensitivus in aliquid inclinatur. Quae quidem +inclinatio interdum trahit voluntatem et rationem, sicut infra +patebit. Sic igitur duplex causa peccati interior potest assignari, +una proxima, ex parte rationis et voluntatis; alia vero remota, ex +parte imaginationis vel appetitus sensitivi. Sed quia supra dictum +est quod causa peccati est aliquod bonum apparens motivum cum +defectu debiti motivi, scilicet regulae rationis vel legis divinae; +ipsum motivum quod est apparens bonum, pertinet ad apprehensionem +sensus et appetitum. Ipsa autem absentia debitae regulae pertinet +ad rationem, quae nata est huiusmodi regulam considerare. Sed ipsa +perfectio voluntarii actus peccati pertinet ad voluntatem, ita quod +ipse voluntatis actus, praemissis suppositis, iam est quoddam +peccatum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: That which is within a thing as its natural power, is always in it: but that which is within it, as the internal act of the + appetitive or apprehensive power, is not always in it. Now the power of the will is the potential cause of sin, but is made + actual by the preceding movements, both of the sensitive part, in the first place, and afterwards, of the reason. For it is + because a thing is proposed as appetible to the senses, and because the appetite is + inclined, that the reason sometimes fails to consider the due rule, so that the will produces the act of sin. Since therefore + the movements that precede it are not always actual, neither is man always actually sinning. +
[36795] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod id quod est intrinsecum sicut potentia +naturalis, semper inest, id autem quod est intrinsecum sicut actus +interior appetitivae vel apprehensivae virtutis, non semper inest. +Ipsa autem potentia voluntatis est causa peccati in potentia, sed +reducitur in actum per motus praecedentes et sensitivae partis +primo, et rationis consequenter. Ex hoc enim quod aliquid +proponitur ut appetibile secundum sensum et appetitus sensitivus +inclinatur in illud, ratio interdum cessat a consideratione regulae +debitae, et sic voluntas producit actum peccati. Quia igitur motus +praecedentes non semper sunt in actu, neque peccatum semper est in +actu.
+ Reply to Objection 2: It is not true that all the internal acts belong to the substance of sin, for this consists principally in the act of the + will; but some precede and some follow the sin itself. +
[36796] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod non omnes motus interiores sunt de substantia +peccati, quod consistit principaliter in actu voluntatis, sed +quidam praecedunt, et quidam consequuntur ipsum peccatum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: That which causes sin, as a power produces its act, is natural; and again, the movement of the sensitive part, from which + sin follows, is natural sometimes, as, for instance, when anyone sins through appetite for food. Yet sin results in being + unnatural from the very fact that the natural rule fails, which man, in accord with his nature, ought to observe. +
[36797] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod illud quod est causa peccati sicut potentia producens +actum, est naturale. Motus etiam sensitivae partis, ex quo sequitur +peccatum, interdum est naturalis, sicut cum propter appetitum cibi +aliquis peccat. Sed efficitur peccatum innaturale ex hoc ipso quod +deficit regula naturalis, quam homo secundum naturam suam debet +attendere.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that sin has no external cause. For sin is a voluntary act. Now voluntary acts belong to principles that are + within us, so that they have no external cause. Therefore sin has no external cause. +
[36798] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non habeat causam exteriorem. +Peccatum enim est actus voluntarius. Voluntaria autem sunt eorum +quae sunt in nobis; et ita non habent exteriorem causam. Ergo +peccatum non habet exteriorem causam.
+ Objection 2: Further, as nature is an internal principle, so is the will. Now in natural things sin can be due to no other than an internal + cause; for instance, the birth of a monster is due to the corruption of some internal principle. Therefore in the moral order, + sin can arise from no other than an internal cause. Therefore it has no external cause. +
[36799] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +sicut natura est principium interius, ita etiam voluntas. Sed +peccatum in rebus naturalibus nunquam accidit nisi ex aliqua +interiori causa, ut puta monstruosi partus proveniunt ex +corruptione alicuius principii interioris. Ergo neque in moralibus +potest contingere peccatum nisi ex interiori causa. Non ergo habet +peccatum causam exteriorem.
+ Objection 3: Further, if the cause is multiplied, the effect is multiplied. Now the more numerous and weighty the external inducements + to sin are, the less is a man's inordinate act imputed to him as a sin. Therefore nothing external is a cause of sin. +
[36800] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +multiplicata causa, multiplicatur effectus. Sed quanto plura sunt +et maiora exterius inducentia ad peccandum, tanto minus id quod +quis inordinate agit, ei imputatur ad peccatum. Ergo nihil exterius +est causa peccati.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Num. 21:16): "Are not these they, that deceived the children of Israel by the counsel of Balaam, and made you transgress against the + Lord by the sin of Phogor?" Therefore something external can be a cause of sin. +
[36801] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Num. XXXI, nonne istae sunt quae deceperunt +filios Israel, et praevaricari vos fecerunt in domino super peccato +Phogor? Ergo aliquid exterius potest esse causa faciens +peccare.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[2]), the internal cause of sin is both the will, as completing the sinful act, and the reason, as lacking the due rule, and the + appetite, as inclining to sin. Accordingly something external might be a cause of sin in three ways, either by moving the + will itself immediately, or by moving the reason, or by moving the sensitive appetite. Now, as stated above (Q[9], A[6]; Q[10], + A[4]), none can move the will inwardly + save God alone, who cannot be a cause of sin, as we shall prove further on (Q[79], A[1]). Hence it follows that nothing external + can be a cause of sin, except by moving the reason, as a man or devil by enticing to sin; or by moving the sensitive appetite, + as certain external sensibles move it. Yet neither does external enticement move the reason, of necessity, in matters of action, + nor do things proposed externally, of necessity move the sensitive appetite, except perhaps it be disposed thereto + in a certain way; and even the sensitive appetite does not, of necessity, move the reason and will. Therefore something external + can be a cause moving to sin, but not so as to be a sufficient cause thereof: and the will alone is the sufficient completive + cause of sin being accomplished. +
[36802] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, causa interior peccati est +et voluntas, ut perficiens actum peccati; et ratio, quantum ad +carentiam debitae regulae; et appetitus sensitivus inclinans. Sic +ergo aliquid extrinsecum tripliciter posset esse causa peccati, vel +quia moveret immediate ipsam voluntatem; vel quia moveret rationem; +vel quia moveret appetitum sensitivum. Voluntatem autem, ut supra +dictum est, interius movere non potest nisi Deus; qui non potest +esse causa peccati, ut infra ostendetur. Unde relinquitur quod +nihil exterius potest esse causa peccati, nisi vel inquantum movet +rationem, sicut homo vel Daemon persuadens peccatum; vel sicut +movens appetitum sensitivum, sicut aliqua sensibilia exteriora +movent appetitum sensitivum. Sed neque persuasio exterior in rebus +agendis ex necessitate movet rationem; neque etiam res exterius +propositae ex necessitate movent appetitum sensitivum, nisi forte +aliquo modo dispositum; et tamen etiam appetitus sensitivus non ex +necessitate movet rationem et voluntatem. Unde aliquid exterius +potest esse aliqua causa movens ad peccandum, non tamen +sufficienter ad peccatum inducens, sed causa sufficienter complens +peccatum est sola voluntas.
+ Reply to Objection 1: From the very fact that the external motive causes of sin do not lead to sin sufficiently and necessarily, it follows that + it remains in our power to sin or not to sin. +
[36803] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ex hoc ipso quod exteriora moventia ad peccandum +non sufficienter et ex necessitate inducunt, sequitur quod remaneat +in nobis peccare et non peccare.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The fact that sin has an internal cause does not prevent its having an external cause; for nothing external is a cause of + sin, except through the medium of the internal cause, as stated. +
[36804] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod per hoc quod ponitur interior causa peccati, non +excluditur exterior, non enim id quod est exterius est causa +peccati, nisi mediante causa interiori, ut dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: If the external causes inclining to sin be multiplied, the sinful acts are multiplied, because they incline to the sinful + act in both greater numbers and greater frequency. Nevertheless the character of guilt is lessened, since this depends on + the act being voluntary and in our power. +
[36805] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, multiplicatis exterioribus causis inclinantibus ad +peccandum, multiplicantur actus peccati, quia plures ex illis +causis, et pluries, inclinantur ad actus peccati. Sed tamen +minuitur ratio culpae, quae consistit in hoc quod aliquid sit +voluntarium et in nobis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that one sin cannot be the cause of another. For there are four kinds of cause, none of which will fit in with + one sin causing another. Because the end has the character of good; which is inconsistent with sin, which has the character + of evil. In like manner neither can a sin be an efficient cause, since "evil is not an efficient cause, but is weak and powerless," + as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). The material and formal cause seems to have + no place except in natural bodies, which are composed of matter and form. Therefore sin cannot have either a material or a + formal cause. +
[36806] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non sit causa peccati. Sunt +enim quatuor genera causarum, quorum nullum potest ad hoc congruere +quod peccatum sit causa peccati. Finis enim habet rationem boni, +quod non competit peccato, quod de sua ratione est malum. Et eadem +ratione nec peccatum potest esse causa efficiens, quia malum non +est causa agens, sed est infirmum et impotens, ut Dionysius dicit, +IV cap. de Div. Nom. Causa autem materialis et formalis videntur +habere solum locum in naturalibus corporibus quae sunt composita ex +materia et forma. Ergo peccatum non potest habere causam materialem +et formalem.
+ Objection 2: Further, "to produce its like belongs to a perfect thing," as stated in Meteor. iv, 2 [*Cf. De Anima ii.]. But sin is essentially + something imperfect. Therefore one sin cannot be a cause of another. +
[36807] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +agere sibi simile est rei perfectae, ut dicitur in IV Meteor. Sed +peccatum de sui ratione est imperfectum. Ergo peccatum non potest +esse causa peccati.
+ Objection 3: Further, if one sin is the cause of a second sin, in the same way, yet another sin will be the cause of the first, and thus + we go on indefinitely, which is absurd. Therefore one sin is not the cause of another. +
[36808] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +si huius peccati sit causa aliud peccatum, eadem ratione et illius +erit causa aliquod aliud peccatum, et sic procedetur in infinitum, +quod est inconveniens. Non ergo peccatum est causa peccati.
+ On the contrary, Gregory says on Ezechiel (Hom. xi): "A sin is not quickly blotted out by repentance, is both a sin and a cause of sin." +
[36809] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., peccatum quod per +poenitentiam citius non deletur, peccatum est et causa +peccati.
+ I answer that, Forasmuch as a sin has a cause on the part of the act of sin, it is possible for one sin to be the cause of another, in the + same way as one human act is the cause of another. Hence it happens that one sin may be the cause of another in respect of + the four kinds of causes. First, after the manner of an efficient or moving cause, both directly and indirectly. Indirectly, + as that which removes an impediment is called an indirect cause of movement: for when man, + by one sinful act, loses grace, or charity, or shame, or anything else that withdraws him from sin, he thereby falls into + another sin, so that the first sin is the accidental cause of the second. Directly, as when, by one sinful act, man is disposed + to commit more readily another like act: because acts cause dispositions and habits inclining to like acts. Secondly, after + the manner of a material cause, one sin is the cause of another, by preparing its matter: thus covetousness prepares the + matter for strife, which is often about the wealth a man has amassed together. Thirdly, after the manner of a final cause, + one sin causes another, in so far as a man commits one sin for the sake of another which is his end; as when a man is guilty + of simony for the end of ambition, or fornication for the purpose of theft. And since the end gives the form to moral matters, + as stated above ( + Q[1], A[3]; + Q[18], AA[4],6), it follows that one sin is + also the formal cause of another: because in the act of fornication committed for the purpose of theft, the former is material + while the latter is formal. +
[36810] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, cum peccatum habeat causam ex parte actus, hoc modo +unum peccatum posset esse causa alterius, sicut unus actus humanus +potest esse causa alterius. Contingit igitur unum peccatum esse +causam alterius secundum quatuor genera causarum. Primo quidem, +secundum modum causae efficientis vel moventis, et per se et per +accidens. Per accidens quidem, sicut removens prohibens dicitur +movens per accidens, cum enim per unum actum peccati homo amittit +gratiam, vel caritatem, vel verecundiam, vel quodcumque aliud +retrahens a peccato, incidit ex hoc in aliud peccatum; et sic +primum peccatum est causa secundi per accidens. Per se autem, sicut +cum ex uno actu peccati homo disponitur ad hoc quod alium actum +consimilem facilius committit, ex actibus enim causantur +dispositiones et habitus inclinantes ad similes actus. Secundum +vero genus causae materialis, unum peccatum est causa alterius, +inquantum praeparat ei materiam, sicut avaritia praeparat materiam +litigio, quod plerumque est de divitiis congregatis. Secundum vero +genus causae finalis, unum peccatum est causa alterius, inquantum +propter finem unius peccati aliquis committit aliud peccatum, sicut +cum aliquis committit simoniam propter finem ambitionis, vel +fornicationem propter furtum. Et quia finis dat formam in +moralibus, ut supra habitum est, ex hoc etiam sequitur quod unum +peccatum sit formalis causa alterius, in actu enim fornicationis +quae propter furtum committitur, est quidem fornicatio sicut +materiale, furtum vero sicut formale.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Sin, in so far as it is inordinate, has the character of evil; but, in so far as it is an act, it has some good, at least + apparent, for its end: so that, as an act, but not as being inordinate, it can be the cause, both final and efficient, of + another sin. A sin has matter, not "of which" but "about which" it is: and it has its form from its end. Consequently one + sin can be the cause of another, in respect of the four kinds of cause, as stated + above. +
[36811] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod peccatum, inquantum est inordinatum, habet +rationem mali, sed inquantum est actus quidam, habet aliquod bonum, +saltem apparens, pro fine. Et ita ex parte actus potest esse causa +et finalis et effectiva alterius peccati, licet non ex parte +inordinationis. Materiam autem habet peccatum non ex qua, sed circa +quam. Formam autem habet ex fine. Et ideo secundum quatuor genera +causarum peccatum potest dici causa peccati, ut dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Sin is something imperfect on account of its moral imperfection on the part of its inordinateness. Nevertheless, as an act + it can have natural perfection: and thus it can be the cause of another sin. +
[36812] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod peccatum est imperfectum imperfectione morali ex +parte inordinationis, sed ex parte actus potest habere perfectionem +naturae. Et secundum hoc potest esse causa peccati.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Not every cause of one sin is another sin; so there is no need to go on indefinitely: for one may come to one sin which is + not caused by another sin. +
[36813] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod non omnis causa peccati est peccatum. Unde non +oportet quod procedatur in infinitum; sed potest perveniri ad +aliquod primum peccatum, cuius causa non est aliud peccatum.
We must now consider the causes of sin, in particular, and (1) The internal causes of sin; (2) its external causes; and (3) + sins which are the causes of other sins. In view of what has been said above + (A[2]), the first consideration will be threefold: so that in the first place we shall treat of ignorance, which is the cause of + sin on the part of reason; secondly, of weakness or passion, which is the cause of sin on the part of the sensitive appetite; + thirdly, of malice, which is the cause of sin on the part of the will. +
Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether ignorance is a cause of sin?
(2) Whether ignorance is a sin?
+[36814] +Iª-IIae q. 76 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +causis peccati in speciali. Et primo, de causis interioribus +peccati; secundo, de exterioribus; tertio, de peccatis quae sunt +causa aliorum peccatorum. Prima autem consideratio, secundum +praemissa, erit tripartita, nam primo, agetur de ignorantia, quae +est causa peccati ex parte rationis; secundo, de infirmitate seu +passione, quae est causa peccati ex parte appetitus sensitivi; +tertio, de malitia, quae est causa peccati ex parte voluntatis. +Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum ignorantia sit causa +peccati. Secundo, utrum ignorantia sit peccatum. Tertio, utrum +totaliter a peccato excuset. Quarto, utrum diminuat peccatum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that ignorance cannot be a cause of sin: because a non-being is not the cause of anything. Now ignorance is + a non-being, since it is a privation of knowledge. Therefore ignorance is not a cause of sin. +
[36815] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ignorantia non possit esse causa +peccati. Quia quod non est, nullius est causa. Sed ignorantia est +non ens, cum sit privatio quaedam scientiae. Ergo ignorantia non +est causa peccati.
+ Objection 2: Further, causes of sin should be reckoned in respect of sin being a "turning to" something, as was stated above ( + Q[75], A[1]). Now ignorance seems to savor of "turning away" from something. Therefore it should not be reckoned a cause of sin. +
[36816] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +causae peccati sunt accipiendae ex parte conversionis, ut ex +supradictis patet. Sed ignorantia videtur respicere aversionem. +Ergo non debet poni causa peccati.
+ Objection 3: Further, every sin is seated in the will. Now the will does not turn to that which is not known, because its object is the + good apprehended. Therefore ignorance cannot be a cause of sin. +
[36817] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +omne peccatum in voluntate consistit, ut supra dictum est. Sed +voluntas non fertur nisi in aliquod cognitum, quia bonum +apprehensum est obiectum voluntatis. Ergo ignorantia non potest +esse causa peccati.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. lxvii) "that some sin through ignorance." +
[36818] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de natura et gratia, quod +quidam per ignorantiam peccant.
+ I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 27) a moving cause is twofold, direct and indirect. A direct cause is one that + moves by its own power, as the generator is the moving cause of heavy and light things. An indirect cause, is either one that + removes an impediment, or the removal itself of an impediment: and it is in this way that ignorance can be the cause of a + sinful act; because it is a privation of knowledge perfecting the reason that forbids the act + of sin, in so far as it directs human acts. +
Now we must observe that the reason directs human acts in accordance with a twofold knowledge, universal and particular: + because in conferring about what is to be done, it employs a syllogism, the conclusion of which is an act of judgment, or + of choice, or an operation. Now actions are about singulars: wherefore the conclusion of a practical syllogism is a singular + proposition. But a singular proposition does not follow from a universal proposition, except through the medium of + a particular proposition: thus a man is restrained from an act of parricide, by the knowledge that it is wrong to kill one's + father, and that this man is his father. Hence ignorance about either of these two propositions, viz. of the universal principle + which is a rule of reason, or of the particular circumstance, could cause an act of parricide. Hence it is clear that not + every kind of ignorance is the cause of a sin, but that alone which removes the knowledge which would prevent the sinful + act. Consequently if a man's will be so disposed that he would not be restrained from the act of parricide, even though he + recognized his father, his ignorance about his father is not the cause of his committing the sin, but is concomitant with + the sin: wherefore such a man sins, not "through ignorance" but "in ignorance," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 1). +
[36819] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, in VIII Physic., causa movens +est duplex, una per se, et alia per accidens. Per se quidem, quae +propria virtute movet, sicut generans est causa movens gravia et +levia. Per accidens autem, sicut removens prohibens, vel sicut ipsa +remotio prohibentis. Et hoc modo ignorantia potest esse causa actus +peccati, est enim privatio scientiae perficientis rationem, quae +prohibet actum peccati, inquantum dirigit actus humanos. +Considerandum est autem quod ratio secundum duplicem scientiam est +humanorum actuum directiva, scilicet secundum scientiam +universalem, et particularem. Conferens enim de agendis, utitur +quodam syllogismo, cuius conclusio est iudicium seu electio vel +operatio. Actiones autem in singularibus sunt. Unde conclusio +syllogismi operativi est singularis. Singularis autem propositio +non concluditur ex universali nisi mediante aliqua propositione +singulari, sicut homo prohibetur ab actu parricidii per hoc quod +scit patrem non esse occidendum, et per hoc quod scit hunc esse +patrem. Utriusque ergo ignorantia potest causare parricidii actum, +scilicet et universalis principii, quod est quaedam regula +rationis; et singularis circumstantiae. Unde patet quod non +quaelibet ignorantia peccantis est causa peccati, sed illa tantum +quae tollit scientiam prohibentem actum peccati. Unde si voluntas +alicuius esset sic disposita quod non prohiberetur ab actu +parricidii, etiam si patrem agnosceret; ignorantia patris non est +huic causa peccati, sed concomitanter se habet ad peccatum. Et ideo +talis non peccat propter ignorantiam, sed peccat ignorans, secundum +philosophum, in III Ethic.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Non-being cannot be the direct cause of anything: but it can be an accidental cause, as being the removal of an impediment. +
[36820] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod non ens non potest esse alicuius causa per se, +potest tamen esse causa per accidens, sicut remotio +prohibentis.
+ Reply to Objection 2: As knowledge, which is removed by ignorance, regards sin as turning towards something, so too, ignorance of this respect + of a sin is the cause of that sin, as removing its impediment. +
[36821] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod sicut scientia quam tollit ignorantia, respicit +peccatum ex parte conversionis; ita etiam ignorantia ex parte +conversionis est causa peccati ut removens prohibens.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The will cannot turn to that which is absolutely unknown: but if something be known in one respect, and unknown in another, + the will can will it. It is thus that ignorance is the cause of sin: for instance, when a man knows that what he is killing + is a man, but not that it is his own father; or when one knows that a certain act is pleasurable, but not that it is a sin. +
[36822] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod in illud quod est quantum ad omnia ignotum, non +potest ferri voluntas, sed si aliquid est secundum aliquid notum et +secundum aliquid ignotum, potest voluntas illud velle. Et hoc modo +ignorantia est causa peccati, sicut cum aliquis scit hunc quem +occidit, esse hominem, sed nescit eum esse patrem; vel cum aliquis +scit aliquem actum esse delectabilem, nescit tamen eum esse +peccatum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that ignorance is not a sin. For sin is "a word, deed or desire contrary to God's law," as stated above ( + Q[71], A[5]). Now ignorance does not denote an act, either internal or external. Therefore ignorance is not a sin. +
[36823] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ignorantia non sit peccatum. Peccatum +enim est dictum vel factum vel concupitum contra legem Dei, ut +supra habitum est. Sed ignorantia non importat aliquem actum, neque +interiorem neque exteriorem. Ergo ignorantia non est peccatum.
+ Objection 2: Further, sin is more directly opposed to grace than to knowledge. Now privation of grace is not a sin, but a punishment resulting + from sin. Therefore ignorance which is privation of knowledge is not a sin. +
[36824] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +peccatum directius opponitur gratiae quam scientiae. Sed privatio +gratiae non est peccatum, sed magis poena quaedam consequens +peccatum. Ergo ignorantia, quae est privatio scientiae, non est +peccatum.
+ Objection 3: Further, if ignorance is a sin, this can only be in so far as it is voluntary. But if ignorance is a sin, through being voluntary, + it seems that the sin will consist in the act itself of the will, rather than in the ignorance. Therefore the ignorance will + not be a sin, but rather a result of sin. +
[36825] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +si ignorantia est peccatum, hoc non est nisi inquantum est +voluntaria. Sed si ignorantia sit peccatum inquantum est +voluntaria, videtur peccatum in ipso actu voluntatis consistere +magis quam in ignorantia. Ergo ignorantia non erit peccatum, sed +magis aliquid consequens ad peccatum.
+ Objection 4: Further, every sin is taken away by repentance, nor does any sin, except only original sin, pass as to guilt, yet remain + in act. Now ignorance is not removed by repentance, but remains in act, all its guilt being removed by repentance. Therefore + ignorance is not a sin, unless perchance it be original sin. +
[36826] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, +omne peccatum per poenitentiam tollitur; nec aliquod peccatum +transiens reatu remanet actu, nisi solum originale. Ignorantia +autem non tollitur per poenitentiam, sed adhuc remanet actu, omni +reatu per poenitentiam remoto. Ergo ignorantia non est peccatum, +nisi forte sit originale.
+ Objection 5: Further, if ignorance be a sin, then a man will be sinning, as long as he remains in ignorance. But ignorance is continual + in the one who is ignorant. Therefore a person in ignorance would be continually sinning, which is clearly false, else ignorance + would be a most grievous sin. Therefore ignorance is not a sin. +
[36827] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 arg. 5 Praeterea, +si ipsa ignorantia sit peccatum, quandiu ignorantia remaneret in +homine, tandiu actu peccaret. Sed continue manet ignorantia in +ignorante. Ergo ignorans continue peccaret. Quod patet esse falsum, +quia sic ignorantia esset gravissimum. Non ergo ignorantia est +peccatum.
+ On the contrary, Nothing but sin deserves punishment. But ignorance deserves punishment, according to + 1 Cor. 14:38: "If any man know not, he shall not be known." Therefore ignorance is a sin. +
[36828] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra, +nihil meretur poenam nisi peccatum. Sed ignorantia meretur poenam, +secundum illud I ad Cor. XIV, si quis ignorat, ignorabitur. +Ergo ignorantia est peccatum.
+ I answer that, Ignorance differs from nescience, in that nescience denotes mere absence of knowledge; wherefore whoever lacks knowledge + about anything, can be said to be nescient about it: in which sense Dionysius puts nescience in the angels (Coel. Hier. vii). + On the other hand, ignorance denotes privation of knowledge, i.e. lack of knowledge of those things that one has a natural + aptitude to know. Some of these we are under an obligation to know, those, to wit, without + the knowledge of which we are unable to accomplish a due act rightly. Wherefore all are bound in common to know the articles + of faith, and the universal principles of right, and each individual is bound to know matters regarding his duty or state. + Meanwhile there are other things which a man may have a natural aptitude to know, yet he is not bound to know them, such as + the geometrical theorems, and contingent particulars, except in some individual case. Now it is evident that whoever neglects + to have or do what he ought to have or do, commits a sin of omission. Wherefore through negligence, ignorance of what one + is bound to know, is a sin; whereas it is not imputed as a sin to man, if he fails to know what he is unable to know. Consequently + ignorance of such like things is called "invincible," because it cannot be overcome by study. For this reason such like ignorance, + not being voluntary, since it is not in our power to be rid of it, is not a sin: wherefore it is evident that no + invincible ignorance is a sin. On the other hand, vincible ignorance is a sin, if it be about matters one is bound to know; + but not, if it be about things one is not bound to know. +
[36829] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod ignorantia in hoc a nescientia differt, quod +nescientia dicit simplicem scientiae negationem, unde cuicumque +deest aliquarum rerum scientia, potest dici nescire illas; secundum +quem modum Dionysius in Angelis nescientiam ponit, VII cap. Cael. +Hier. Ignorantia vero importat scientiae privationem, dum scilicet +alicui deest scientia eorum quae aptus natus est scire. Horum autem +quaedam aliquis scire tenetur, illa scilicet sine quorum scientia +non potest debitum actum recte exercere. Unde omnes tenentur scire +communiter ea quae sunt fidei, et universalia iuris praecepta, +singuli autem ea quae ad eorum statum vel officium spectant. +Quaedam vero sunt quae etsi aliquis natus est scire, non tamen ea +scire tenetur, sicut theoremata geometriae, et contingentia +particularia, nisi in casu. Manifestum est autem quod quicumque +negligit habere vel facere id quod tenetur habere vel facere, +peccat peccato omissionis. Unde propter negligentiam, ignorantia +eorum quae aliquis scire tenetur, est peccatum. Non autem imputatur +homini ad negligentiam, si nesciat ea quae scire non potest. Unde +horum ignorantia invincibilis dicitur, quia scilicet studio +superari non potest. Et propter hoc talis ignorantia, cum non sit +voluntaria, eo quod non est in potestate nostra eam repellere, non +est peccatum. Ex quo patet quod nulla ignorantia invincibilis est +peccatum, ignorantia autem vincibilis est peccatum, si sit eorum +quae aliquis scire tenetur; non autem si sit eorum quae quis scire +non tenetur.
+ Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ( + Q[71], A[6], ad 1), when we say that sin is a "word, deed or desire," we include the opposite negations, by reason of which omissions + have the character of sin; so that negligence, in as much as ignorance is a sin, is comprised in the above definition of sin; + in so far as one omits to say what one ought, or to do what one ought, or to desire what one ought, in order to acquire the + knowledge which we ought to + have. +
[36830] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in hoc quod dicitur +dictum vel factum vel concupitum, sunt intelligendae etiam +negationes oppositae, secundum quod omissio habet rationem peccati. +Et ita negligentia, secundum quam ignorantia est peccatum, +continetur sub praedicta definitione peccati, inquantum +praetermittitur aliquid quod debuit dici vel fieri vel concupisci, +ad scientiam debitam acquirendam.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Although privation of grace is not a sin in itself, yet by reason of negligence in preparing oneself for grace, it may have + the character of sin, even as ignorance; nevertheless even here there is a difference, since man can acquire knowledge by + his acts, whereas grace is not acquired by acts, but by God's favor. +
[36831] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod privatio gratiae, etsi secundum se non sit peccatum, +tamen ratione negligentiae praeparandi se ad gratiam, potest habere +rationem peccati, sicut et ignorantia. Et tamen quantum ad hoc est +dissimile, quia homo potest aliquam scientiam acquirere per suos +actus, gratia vero non acquiritur ex nostris actibus, sed ex Dei +munere.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Just as in a sin of transgression, the sin consists not only in the act of the will, but also in the act willed, which is + commanded by the will; so in a sin of omission not only the act of the will is a sin, but also the omission, in so far as + it is in some way voluntary; and accordingly, the neglect to know, or even lack of consideration is a sin. +
[36832] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut in peccato transgressionis peccatum non +consistit in solo actu voluntatis, sed etiam in actu volito qui est +imperatus a voluntate; ita in peccato omissionis non solum actus +voluntatis est peccatum, sed etiam ipsa omissio, inquantum est +aliqualiter voluntaria. Et hoc modo ipsa negligentia sciendi, vel +inconsideratio, est peccatum.
+ Reply to Objection 4: Although when the guilt has passed away through repentance, the ignorance remains, according as it is a privation of knowledge, + nevertheless the negligence does not remain, by reason of which the ignorance is said to be a sin. +
[36833] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod licet, transeunte reatu per poenitentiam, remaneat +ignorantia secundum quod est privatio scientiae; non tamen remanet +negligentia, secundum quam ignorantia peccatum dicitur.
+ Reply to Objection 5: Just as in other sins of omission, man sins actually only at the time at which the affirmative precept is binding, so is + it with the sin of ignorance. For the ignorant man sins actually indeed, not continually, but only at the time for acquiring + the knowledge that he ought to have. +
[36834] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 ad 5 Ad quintum +dicendum quod, sicut in aliis peccatis omissionis solo illo tempore +homo actu peccat, pro quo praeceptum affirmativum obligat; ita est +etiam de peccato ignorantiae. Non enim continuo ignorans actu +peccat, sed solum quando est tempus acquirendi scientiam quam +habere tenetur.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that ignorance excuses from sin altogether. For as Augustine says (Retract. i, 9), every sin is voluntary. + Now ignorance causes involuntariness, as stated above ( + Q[6], A[8]). Therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether. +
[36835] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ignorantia, ex toto excuset a peccato. +Quia, ut Augustinus dicit, omne peccatum voluntarium est. Sed +ignorantia causat involuntarium ut supra habitum est. Ergo +ignorantia totaliter excusat peccatum.
+ Objection 2: Further, that which is done beside the intention, is done accidentally. Now the intention cannot be about what is unknown. + Therefore what a man does through ignorance is accidental in human acts. But what is accidental does not give the species. + Therefore nothing that is done through ignorance in human acts, should be deemed sinful or virtuous. +
[36836] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +id quod aliquis facit praeter intentionem, per accidens agit. Sed +intentio non potest esse de eo quod est ignotum. Ergo id quod per +ignorantiam homo agit, per accidens se habet in actibus humanis. +Sed quod est per accidens, non dat speciem. Nihil ergo quod est per +ignorantiam factum, debet iudicari peccatum vel virtuosum in +humanis actibus.
+ Objection 3: Further, man is the subject of virtue and sin, inasmuch as he is partaker of reason. Now ignorance excludes knowledge which + perfects the reason. Therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether. +
[36837] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +homo est subiectum virtutis et peccati inquantum est particeps +rationis. Sed ignorantia excludit scientiam, per quam ratio +perficitur. Ergo ignorantia totaliter excusat a peccato.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) that "some things done through ignorance are rightly reproved." Now those things alone + are rightly reproved which are sins. Therefore some things done through ignorance are sins. Therefore ignorance does not altogether + excuse from sin. +
[36838] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Lib. Arb., quod quaedam +per ignorantiam facta, recte improbantur. Sed solum illa recte +improbantur quae sunt peccata. Ergo quaedam per ignorantiam facta, +sunt peccata. Non ergo ignorantia omnino excusat a peccato.
+ I answer that, Ignorance, by its very nature, renders the act which it causes involuntary. Now it has already been stated ( + AA[1],2) that ignorance is said to cause the act which the contrary knowledge would have prevented; so that this act, if knowledge + were to hand, would be contrary to the will, which is the meaning of the word involuntary. If, however, the knowledge, which + is removed by ignorance, would not have prevented the act, on account of + the inclination of the will thereto, the lack of this knowledge does not make that man unwilling, but not willing, as stated + in Ethic. iii, 1: and such like ignorance which is not the cause of the sinful act, as already stated, since it does not make + the act to be involuntary, does not excuse from sin. The same applies to any ignorance that does not cause, but follows or + accompanies the sinful act. +
On the other hand, ignorance which is the cause of the act, since it makes it to be involuntary, of its very nature excuses + from sin, because voluntariness is essential to sin. But it may fail to excuse altogether from sin, and this for two reasons. + First, on the part of the thing itself which is not known. For ignorance excuses from sin, in so far as something is not known + to be a sin. Now it may happen that a person ignores some circumstance of a sin, the knowledge of which + circumstance would prevent him from sinning, whether it belong to the substance of the sin, or not; and nevertheless his knowledge + is sufficient for him to be aware that the act is sinful; for instance, if a man strike someone, knowing that it is a man + (which suffices for it to be sinful) and yet be ignorant of the fact that it is his father, (which is a circumstance constituting + another species of sin); or, suppose that he is unaware that this man will defend himself and strike him back, and + that if he had known this, he would not have struck him (which does not affect the sinfulness of the act). Wherefore, though + this man sins through ignorance, yet he is not altogether excused, because, not withstanding, he has knowledge of the sin. + Secondly, this may happen on the part of the ignorance itself, because, to wit, this ignorance is voluntary, either directly, + as when a man wishes of set purpose to be ignorant of certain things that he may sin the more freely; or indirectly, as when + a man, through stress of work or other occupations, neglects to acquire the knowledge which would restrain him from sin. For + such like negligence renders the ignorance itself voluntary and sinful, provided it be about matters one is bound and able + to know. Consequently this ignorance does not altogether excuse from sin. If, however, the ignorance be such as to be entirely + involuntary, either through being invincible, or through being of matters one is not bound to know, then such like ignorance + excuses from sin altogether. +
[36839] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod ignorantia de se habet quod faciat actum quem causat, +involuntarium esse. Iam autem dictum est quod ignorantia dicitur +causare actum quem scientia opposita prohibebat. Et ita talis +actus, si scientia adesset, esset contrarius voluntati, quod +importat nomen involuntarii. Si vero scientia quae per ignorantiam +privatur, non prohiberet actum, propter inclinationem voluntatis in +ipsum; ignorantia huius scientiae non facit hominem involuntarium, +sed non volentem, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Et talis ignorantia, +quae non est causa actus peccati, ut dictum est, quia non causat +involuntarium, non excusat a peccato. Et eadem ratio est de +quacumque ignorantia non causante, sed consequente vel concomitante +actum peccati. Sed ignorantia quae est causa actus, quia causat +involuntarium, de se habet quod excuset a peccato, eo quod +voluntarium est de ratione peccati. Sed quod aliquando non +totaliter excuset a peccato, potest contingere ex duobus. Uno modo, +ex parte ipsius rei ignoratae. Intantum enim ignorantia excusat a +peccato, inquantum ignoratur aliquid esse peccatum. Potest autem +contingere quod aliquis ignoret quidem aliquam circumstantiam +peccati, quam si sciret, retraheretur a peccando, sive illa +circumstantia faciat ad rationem peccati sive non; et tamen adhuc +remanet in eius scientia aliquid per quod cognoscit illud esse +actum peccati. Puta si aliquis percutiens aliquem, sciat quidem +ipsum esse hominem, quod sufficit ad rationem peccati; non tamen +scit eum esse patrem, quod est circumstantia constituens novam +speciem peccati; vel forte nescit quod ille se defendens +repercutiat eum, quod si sciret, non percuteret, quod non pertinet +ad rationem peccati. Unde licet talis propter ignorantiam peccet, +non tamen totaliter excusatur a peccato, quia adhuc remanet ei +cognitio peccati. Alio modo potest hoc contingere ex parte ipsius +ignorantiae, quia scilicet ipsa ignorantia est voluntaria, vel +directe, sicut cum aliquis studiose vult nescire aliqua, ut +liberius peccet; vel indirecte, sicut cum aliquis propter laborem, +vel propter alias occupationes, negligit addiscere id per quod a +peccato retraheretur. Talis enim negligentia facit ignorantiam +ipsam esse voluntariam et peccatum, dummodo sit eorum quae quis +scire tenetur et potest. Et ideo talis ignorantia non totaliter +excusat a peccato. Si vero sit talis ignorantia quae omnino sit +involuntaria, sive quia est invincibilis, sive quia est eius quod +quis scire non tenetur; talis ignorantia omnino excusat a +peccato.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Not every ignorance causes involuntariness, as stated above ( + Q[6], A[8]). Hence not every ignorance excuses from sin altogether. +
[36840] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod non omnis ignorantia causat involuntarium, sicut +supra dictum est. Unde non omnis ignorantia totaliter excusat a +peccato.
+ Reply to Objection 2: So far as voluntariness remains in the ignorant person, the intention of sin remains in him: so that, in this respect, his + sin is not accidental. +
[36841] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod inquantum remanet in ignorante de voluntario, +intantum remanet de intentione peccati. Et secundum hoc, non erit +per accidens peccatum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: If the ignorance be such as to exclude the use of reason entirely, it excuses from sin altogether, as is the case with madmen + and imbeciles: but such is not always the ignorance that causes the sin; and so it does not always excuse from sin altogether. +
[36842] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, si esset talis ignorantia quae totaliter usum +rationis excluderet, omnino a peccato excusaret, sicut patet in +furiosis et amentibus. Non autem semper ignorantia causans peccatum +est talis. Et ideo non semper totaliter excusat a peccato.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that ignorance does not diminish a sin. For that which is common to all sins does not diminish sin. Now ignorance + is common to all sins, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that "every evil man is ignorant." Therefore ignorance does + not diminish sin. +
[36843] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ignorantia non diminuat peccatum. +Illud enim quod est commune in omni peccato, non diminuit peccatum. +Sed ignorantia est communis in omni peccato, dicit enim +philosophus, in III Ethic., quod omnis malus est ignorans. Ergo +ignorantia non diminuit peccatum.
+ Objection 2: Further, one sin added to another makes a greater sin. But ignorance is itself a sin, as stated above + (A[2]). Therefore it does not diminish a sin. +
[36844] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +peccatum additum peccato facit maius peccatum. Sed ipsa ignorantia +est peccatum, ut dictum est. Ergo non diminuit peccatum.
+ Objection 3: Further, the same thing does not both aggravate and diminish sin. Now ignorance aggravates sin; for Ambrose commenting on + Rom. 2:4, "Knowest thou not that the benignity of God leadeth thee to penance?" says: "Thy sin is most grievous if thou knowest not." + Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin. +
[36845] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +non est eiusdem aggravare et diminuere peccatum. Sed ignorantia +aggravat peccatum, quoniam super illud apostoli, ignoras quoniam +benignitas Dei, etc., dicit Ambrosius, gravissime peccas, si +ignoras. Ergo ignorantia non diminuit peccatum.
+ Objection 4: Further, if any kind of ignorance diminishes a sin, this would seem to be chiefly the case as regards the ignorance which + removes the use of reason altogether. Now this kind of ignorance does not diminish sin, but increases it: for the Philosopher + says (Ethic. iii, 5) that the "punishment is doubled for a drunken man." Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin. +
[36846] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 arg. 4 Praeterea, +si aliqua ignorantia diminuit peccatum, hoc maxime videtur de illa +quae totaliter tollit usum rationis. Sed huiusmodi ignorantia non +minuit peccatum, sed magis auget, dicit enim philosophus, in III +Ethic., quod ebrius meretur duplices maledictiones. Ergo +ignorantia non minuit peccatum.
+ On the contrary, Whatever is a reason for sin to be forgiven, diminishes sin. Now such is ignorance, as is clear from + 1 Tim. 1:13: "I obtained . . . mercy . . . because I did it ignorantly." Therefore ignorance diminishes or alleviates sin. +
[36847] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra, +quidquid est ratio remissionis peccati, alleviat peccatum. Sed +ignorantia est huiusmodi, ut patet I ad Tim. I, misericordiam +consecutus sum, quia ignorans feci. Ergo ignorantia diminuit, +vel alleviat peccatum.
+ I answer that, Since every sin is voluntary, ignorance can diminish sin, in so far as it diminishes its voluntariness; and if it does not + render it less voluntary, it nowise alleviates the sin. Now it is evident that the ignorance which excuses from sin altogether + (through making it altogether involuntary) does not diminish a sin, but does away with it altogether. On the other hand, ignorance + which is not the cause of the sin being committed, but is concomitant with it, + neither diminishes nor increases the sin. +
Therefore sin cannot be alleviated by any ignorance, but only by such as is a cause of the sin being committed, and yet does + not excuse from the sin altogether. Now it happens sometimes that such like ignorance is directly and essentially voluntary, + as when a man is purposely ignorant that he may sin more freely, and ignorance of this kind seems rather to make the act more + voluntary and more sinful, since it is through the will's intention to sin that he is willing to bear the + hurt of ignorance, for the sake of freedom in sinning. Sometimes, however, the ignorance which is the cause of a sin being + committed, is not directly voluntary, but indirectly or accidentally, as when a man is unwilling to work hard at his studies, + the result being that he is ignorant, or as when a man willfully drinks too much wine, the result being that he becomes drunk + and indiscreet, and this ignorance diminishes voluntariness and consequently alleviates the sin. For when a thing is not + known to be a sin, the will cannot be said to consent to the sin directly, but only accidentally; wherefore, in that case + there is less contempt, and therefore less sin. +
[36848] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, quia omne peccatum est voluntarium, intantum +ignorantia potest diminuere peccatum, inquantum diminuit +voluntarium, si autem voluntarium non diminuat, nullo modo diminuet +peccatum. Manifestum est autem quod ignorantia quae totaliter a +peccato excusat, quia totaliter voluntarium tollit, peccatum non +minuit, sed omnino aufert. Ignorantia vero quae non est causa +peccati, sed concomitanter se habet ad peccatum, nec minuit +peccatum nec auget. Illa igitur sola ignorantia potest peccatum +minuere, quae est causa peccati, et tamen totaliter a peccato non +excusat. Contingit autem quandoque quod talis ignorantia directe et +per se est voluntaria, sicut cum aliquis sua sponte nescit aliquid, +ut liberius peccet. Et talis ignorantia videtur augere voluntarium +et peccatum, ex intensione enim voluntatis ad peccandum provenit +quod aliquis vult subire ignorantiae damnum, propter libertatem +peccandi. Quandoque vero ignorantia quae est causa peccati, non est +directe voluntaria, sed indirecte vel per accidens, puta cum +aliquis non vult laborare in studio, ex quo sequitur eum esse +ignorantem; vel cum aliquis vult bibere vinum immoderate, ex quo +sequitur eum inebriari et discretione carere. Et talis ignorantia +diminuit voluntarium, et per consequens peccatum. Cum enim aliquid +non cognoscitur esse peccatum, non potest dici quod voluntas +directe et per se feratur in peccatum, sed per accidens, unde est +ibi minor contemptus, et per consequens minus peccatum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The ignorance whereby "every evil man is ignorant," is not the cause of sin being committed, but something resulting from + that cause, viz. of the passion or habit inclining to sin. +
[36849] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ignorantia secundum quam omnis malus est +ignorans, non est causa peccati; sed aliquid consequens ad causam, +scilicet ad passionem vel habitum inclinantem in peccatum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: One sin is added to another makes more sins, but it does not always make a sin greater, since, perchance, the two sins do + not coincide, but are separate. It may happen, if the first diminishes the second, that the two together have not the same + gravity as one of them alone would have; thus murder is a more grievous sin if committed by a man when sober, than if committed + by a man when drunk, although in the latter case there are two sins: because + drunkenness diminishes the sinfulness of the resulting sin more than its own gravity implies. +
[36850] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod peccatum peccato additum facit plura peccata, non +tamen facit semper maius peccatum, quia forte non coincidunt in +idem peccatum, sed sunt plura. Et potest contingere, si primum +diminuat secundum, quod ambo simul non habeant tantam gravitatem +quantam unum solum haberet. Sicut homicidium gravius peccatum est a +sobrio homine factum, quam si fiat ab ebrio, quamvis haec sint duo +peccata, quia ebrietas plus diminuit de ratione sequentis peccati, +quam sit sua gravitas.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The words of Ambrose may be understood as referring to simply affected ignorance; or they may have reference to a species + of the sin of ingratitude, the highest degree of which is that man even ignores the benefits he has received; or again, they + may be an allusion to the ignorance of unbelief, which undermines the foundation of the spiritual edifice. +
[36851] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod verbum Ambrosii potest intelligi de ignorantia +simpliciter affectata. Vel potest intelligi in genere peccati +ingratitudinis, in qua summus gradus est quod homo etiam beneficia +non recognoscat. Vel potest intelligi de ignorantia infidelitatis, +quae fundamentum spiritualis aedificii subvertit.
+ Reply to Objection 4: The drunken man deserves a "double punishment" for the two sins which he commits, viz. drunkenness, and the sin which results + from his drunkenness: and yet drunkenness, on account of the ignorance connected therewith, diminishes the resulting sin, + and more, perhaps, than the gravity of the drunkenness implies, as stated above (ad 2). It might also be said that the words + quoted refer to an ordinance of the legislator named Pittacus, who ordered + drunkards to be more severely punished if they assaulted anyone; having an eye, not to the indulgence which the drunkard might + claim, but to expediency, since more harm is done by the drunk than by the sober, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii). +
[36852] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod ebrius meretur quidem duplices maledictiones, propter +duo peccata quae committit, scilicet ebrietatem et aliud peccatum +quod ex ebrietate sequitur. Tamen ebrietas, ratione ignorantiae +adiunctae, diminuit sequens peccatum, et forte plus quam sit +gravitas ipsius ebrietatis, ut dictum est. Vel potest dici quod +illud verbum inducitur secundum ordinationem cuiusdam Pittaci +legislatoris, qui statuit ebrios, si percusserint, amplius +puniendos; non ad veniam respiciens, quam ebrii debent magis +habere; sed ad utilitatem, quia plures iniuriantur ebrii quam +sobrii; ut patet per philosophum, in II politicorum.
We must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of the sensitive appetite, as to whether a passion of the soul may be + a cause of sin: and under this head there are eight points of inquiry: +
(1) Whether a passion of the sensitive appetite can move or incline the will?
(2) Whether it can overcome the reason against the latter's knowledge?
(3) Whether a sin resulting from a passion is a sin of weakness?
(4) Whether the passion of self-love is the cause of every sin?
(5) Of three causes mentioned in + 1 Jn. 2:16: "Concupiscence of the eyes, Concupiscence of the flesh," and "Pride of life." +
(6) Whether the passion which causes a sin diminishes it?
+[36853] +Iª-IIae q. 77 pr. Deinde considerandum est de causa +peccati ex parte appetitus sensitivi, utrum passio animae sit causa +peccati. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum passio +appetitus sensitivi possit movere vel inclinare voluntatem. +Secundo, utrum possit superare rationem contra eius scientiam. +Tertio, utrum peccatum quod ex passione provenit, sit peccatum ex +infirmitate. Quarto, utrum haec passio quae est amor sui, sit causa +omnis peccati. Quinto, de illis tribus causis quae ponuntur I Ioan. +II, concupiscentia oculorum, concupiscentia carnis, et superbia +vitae. Sexto, utrum passio quae est causa peccati, diminuat +ipsum. Septimo, utrum totaliter excuset. Octavo, utrum peccatum +quod ex passione est, possit esse mortale.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by a passion of the sensitive appetite. For no passive power is moved except by + its object. Now the will is a power both passive and active, inasmuch as it is mover and moved, as the Philosopher says of + the appetitive power in general (De Anima iii, text. 54). Since therefore the object of the will is not a passion of the sensitive + appetite, but good defined by the reason, it seems that a passion of the sensitive + appetite does not move the will. +
[36854] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non moveatur a passione +appetitus sensitivi. Nulla enim potentia passiva movetur nisi a suo +obiecto. Voluntas autem est potentia passiva et activa simul, +inquantum est movens et mota, sicut in III de anima philosophus +dicit universaliter de vi appetitiva. Cum ergo obiectum voluntatis +non sit passio appetitus sensitivi, sed magis bonum rationis; +videtur quod passio appetitus sensitivi non moveat voluntatem.
+ Objection 2: Further, the higher mover is not moved by the lower; thus the soul is not moved by the body. Now the will, which is the rational + appetite, is compared to the sensitive appetite, as a higher mover to a lower: for the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. + 57) that "the rational appetite moves the sensitive appetite, even as, in the heavenly bodies, one sphere moves another." + Therefore the will cannot be moved by a passion of the sensitive appetite. +
[36855] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +superior motor non movetur ab inferiori, sicut anima non movetur a +corpore. Sed voluntas, quae est appetitus rationis, comparatur ad +appetitum sensitivum sicut motor superior ad inferiorem, dicit enim +philosophus, in III de anima, quod appetitus rationis movet +appetitum sensitivum, sicut in corporibus caelestibus sphaera movet +sphaeram. Ergo voluntas non potest moveri a passione appetitus +sensitivi.
+ Objection 3: Further, nothing immaterial can be moved by that which is material. Now the will is an immaterial power, because it does + not use a corporeal organ, since it is in the reason, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 42: whereas the sensitive appetite + is a material force, since it is seated in an organ of the body. Therefore a passion of the sensitive appetite cannot move + the intellective appetite. +
[36856] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +nullum immateriale potest moveri ab aliquo materiali. Sed voluntas +est quaedam potentia immaterialis, non enim utitur organo +corporali, cum sit in ratione, ut dicitur in III de anima. +Appetitus autem sensitivus est vis materialis, utpote fundata in +organo corporali. Ergo passio appetitus sensitivi non potest movere +appetitum intellectivum.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Dan. 13:56): "Lust hath perverted thy heart." +
[36857] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Dan. XIII, concupiscentia subvertit cor +tuum.
+ I answer that, A passion of the sensitive appetite cannot draw or move the will directly; but it can do so indirectly, and this in two ways. + First, by a kind of distraction: because, since all the soul's powers are rooted in the one essence of the soul, it follows + of necessity that, when one power is intent in its act, another power becomes remiss, or is even altogether impeded, in its + act, both because all energy is weakened through being divided, so that, on the + contrary, through being centered on one thing, it is less able to be directed to several; and because, in the operations of + the soul, a certain attention is requisite, and if this be closely fixed on one thing, less attention is given to another. + In this way, by a kind of distraction, when the movement of the sensitive appetite is enforced in respect of any passion whatever, + the proper movement of the rational appetite or will must, of necessity, become remiss or altogether impeded. +
Secondly, this may happen on the part of the will's object, which is good apprehended by reason. Because the judgment and + apprehension of reason is impeded on account of a vehement and inordinate apprehension of the imagination and judgment of + the estimative power, as appears in those who are out of their mind. Now it is evident that the apprehension of the imagination + and the judgment of the estimative power follow the passion of the sensitive appetite, even as the verdict of + the taste follows the disposition of the tongue: for which reason we observe that those who are in some kind of passion, do + not easily turn their imagination away from the object of their emotion, the result being that the judgment of the reason + often follows the passion of the sensitive appetite, and consequently the will's movement follows it also, since it has a + natural inclination always to follow the judgment of the reason. +
[36858] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod passio appetitus sensitivi non potest directe trahere +aut movere voluntatem, sed indirecte potest. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno +quidem modo, secundum quandam abstractionem. Cum enim omnes +potentiae animae in una essentia animae radicentur, necesse est +quod quando una potentia intenditur in suo actu, altera in suo actu +remittatur, vel etiam totaliter impediatur. Tum quia omnis virtus +ad plura dispersa fit minor, unde e contrario, quando intenditur +circa unum, minus potest ad alia dispergi. Tum quia in operibus +animae requiritur quaedam intentio, quae dum vehementer applicatur +ad unum, non potest alteri vehementer attendere. Et secundum hunc +modum, per quandam distractionem, quando motus appetitus sensitivi +fortificatur secundum quamcumque passionem, necesse est quod +remittatur, vel totaliter impediatur motus proprius appetitus +rationalis, qui est voluntas. Alio modo, ex parte obiecti +voluntatis, quod est bonum ratione apprehensum. Impeditur enim +iudicium et apprehensio rationis propter vehementem et inordinatam +apprehensionem imaginationis, et iudicium virtutis aestimativae, ut +patet in amentibus. Manifestum est autem quod passionem appetitus +sensitivi sequitur imaginationis apprehensio, et iudicium +aestimativae, sicut etiam dispositionem linguae sequitur iudicium +gustus. Unde videmus quod homines in aliqua passione existentes, +non facile imaginationem avertunt ab his circa quae afficiuntur. +Unde per consequens iudicium rationis plerumque sequitur passionem +appetitus sensitivi; et per consequens motus voluntatis, qui natus +est sequi iudicium rationis.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Although the passion of the sensitive appetite is not the direct object of the will, yet it occasions a certain change in + the judgment about the object of the will, as stated. +
[36859] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod per passionem appetitus sensitivi fit aliqua +immutatio circa iudicium de obiecto voluntatis, sicut dictum est; +quamvis ipsa passio appetitus sensitivi non sit directe voluntatis +obiectum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The higher mover is not directly moved by the lower; but, in a manner, it can be moved by it indirectly, as stated. +
[36860] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod superius non movetur ab inferiori directe, sed +indirecte quodammodo moveri potest, sicut dictum est.
Reply to Objection 3: The Third Objection is solved in like manner.
[36861] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 ad 3 Et similiter +dicendum est ad tertium.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the reason cannot be overcome by a passion, against its knowledge. For the stronger is not overcome by + the weaker. Now knowledge, on account of its certitude, is the strongest thing in us. Therefore it cannot be overcome by a + passion, which is weak and soon passes away. +
[36862] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ratio non possit superari a passione +contra suam scientiam. Fortius enim non vincitur a debiliori. Sed +scientia, propter suam certitudinem, est fortissimum eorum quae in +nobis sunt. Ergo non potest superari a passione, quae est debilis +et cito transiens.
+ Objection 2: Further, the will is not directed save to the good or the apparent good. Now when a passion draws the will to that which + is really good, it does not influence the reason against its knowledge; and when it draws it to that which is good apparently, + but not really, it draws it to that which appears good to the reason. But what appears to the reason is in the knowledge of + the reason. Therefore a passion never influences the reason against its knowledge. +
[36863] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +voluntas non est nisi boni vel apparentis boni. Sed cum passio +trahit voluntatem in id quod est vere bonum, non inclinat rationem +contra scientiam. Cum autem trahit eam in id quod est apparens +bonum et non existens, trahit eam in id quod rationi videtur, hoc +autem est in scientia rationis, quod ei videtur. Ergo passio +nunquam inclinat rationem contra suam scientiam.
+ Objection 3: Further, if it be said that it draws the reason from its knowledge of something in general, to form a contrary judgment about + a particular matter---on the contrary, if a universal and a particular proposition be opposed, they are opposed by contradiction, + e.g. "Every man," and "Not every man." Now if two opinions contradict one another, they are contrary to one another, as stated + in Peri Herm. ii. If therefore anyone, while knowing something in general, were + to pronounce an opposite judgment in a particular case, he would have two contrary opinions at the same time, which is impossible. +
[36864] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 arg. 3 Si dicatur +quod trahit rationem scientem aliquid in universali, ut contrarium +iudicet in particulari, contra, universalis et particularis +propositio, si opponantur, opponuntur secundum contradictionem, +sicut omnis homo et non omnis homo. Sed duae opiniones quae sunt +contradictoriarum, sunt contrariae, ut dicitur in II peri Herm. Si +igitur aliquis sciens aliquid in universali, iudicaret oppositum in +singulari, sequeretur quod haberet simul contrarias opiniones, quod +est impossibile.
+ Objection 4: Further, whoever knows the universal, knows also the particular which he knows to be contained in the universal: thus who + knows that every mule is sterile, knows that this particular animal is sterile, provided he knows it to be a mule, as is clear + from Poster. i, text. 2. Now he who knows something in general, e.g. that "no fornication is lawful," knows this general proposition + to contain, for example, the particular proposition, "This is an act of + fornication." Therefore it seems that his knowledge extends to the particular. +
[36865] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, +quicumque scit universale, scit etiam particulare quod novit sub +universali contineri; sicut quicumque scit omnem mulam esse +sterilem, scit hoc animal esse sterile, dummodo sciat quod sit +mula; ut patet per id quod dicitur in I Poster. Sed ille qui scit +aliquid in universali, puta nullam fornicationem esse faciendam, +scit hoc particulare sub universali contineri, puta hunc actum esse +fornicarium. Ergo videtur quod etiam in particulari sciat.
+ Objection 5: Further, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), "words express the thoughts of the mind." Now it often happens that + man, while in a state of passion, confesses that what he has chosen is an evil, even in that particular case. Therefore he + has knowledge, even in particular. +
Therefore it seems that the passions cannot draw the reason against its universal knowledge; because it is impossible for + it to have universal knowledge together with an opposite particular judgment. +
[36866] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 arg. 5 Praeterea, +ea quae sunt in voce, sunt signa intellectus animae, secundum +philosophum. Sed homo in passione existens frequenter confitetur id +quod eligit esse malum etiam in particulari. Ergo etiam in +particulari habet scientiam. Sic igitur videtur quod passiones non +possint trahere rationem contra scientiam universalem, quia non +potest esse quod habeat scientiam universalem, et existimet +oppositum in particulari.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle says ( + Rom. 7:23): "I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin." Now the law + that is in the members is concupiscence, of which he had been speaking previously. Since then concupiscence is a passion, + it seems that a passion draws the reason counter to its knowledge. +
[36867] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicit apostolus, Rom. VII, video aliam legem in membris +meis repugnantem legi mentis meae, et captivantem me in lege +peccati. Lex autem quae est in membris, est concupiscentia, de +qua supra locutus fuerat. Cum igitur concupiscentia sit passio +quaedam, videtur quod passio trahat rationem etiam contra hoc quod +scit.
+ I answer that, As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 2), the opinion of Socrates was that knowledge can never be overcome by passion; wherefore + he held every virtue to be a kind of knowledge, and every sin a kind of ignorance. In this he was somewhat right, because, + since the object of the will is a good or an apparent good, it is never moved to an evil, unless that which is not good appear + good in some respect to the reason; so that the will would never tend to evil, + unless there were ignorance or error in the reason. Hence it is written ( + Prov. 14:22): "They err that work evil." +
Experience, however, shows that many act contrary to the knowledge that they have, and this is confirmed by Divine authority, + according to the words of + Lk. 12:47: "The servant who knew that the will of his lord . . . and did not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes," and of + James 4:17: "To him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin." Consequently he was not altogether right, and + it is necessary, with the + Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 3) to make a distinction. Because, since man is directed to right action by a twofold knowledge, + viz. universal and particular, a defect in either of them suffices to hinder the rectitude of the will and of the deed, as + stated above (Q[76], A[1]). It may happen, then, that a man has some knowledge in general, e.g. that no fornication is lawful, + and yet he does not know in particular that this act, which is fornication, must not be done; and this suffices for the will + not to follow the universal knowledge of the reason. Again, it must be observed that nothing prevents a thing which is known + habitually from not being considered actually: so that it is possible for a man to have correct knowledge not only in general + but also in particular, and yet not to consider his knowledge actually: and in such a case it does not seem difficult for + a man to act counter to what he does not actually consider. Now, that a man sometimes fails to consider in particular what + he + knows habitually, may happen through mere lack of attention: for instance, a man who knows geometry, may not attend to the + consideration of geometrical conclusions, which he is ready to consider at any moment. Sometimes man fails to consider actually + what he knows habitually, on account of some hindrance supervening, e.g. some external occupation, or some bodily infirmity; + and, in this way, a man who is in a state of passion, fails to consider in particular what he knows in general, in so far + as the passions hinder him from considering it. Now it hinders him in three ways. First, by way of distraction, as explained + above + (A[1]). Secondly, by way of opposition, because a passion often inclines to something contrary to what man knows in general. Thirdly, + by way of bodily transmutation, the result of which is that the reason is somehow fettered so as not to exercise its act freely; + even as sleep or drunkenness, on account of some change wrought on the body, + fetters the use of reason. That this takes place in the passions is evident from the fact that sometimes, when the passions + are very intense, man loses the use of reason altogether: for many have gone out of their minds through excess of love or + anger. It is in this way that passion draws the reason to judge in particular, against the knowledge which it has in general. +
[36868] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod opinio Socratis fuit, ut philosophus dicit in VII +Ethic., quod scientia nunquam posset superari a passione. Unde +ponebat omnes virtutes esse scientias, et omnia peccata esse +ignorantias. In quo quidem aliqualiter recte sapiebat. Quia cum +voluntas sit boni vel apparentis boni, nunquam voluntas in malum +moveretur, nisi id quod non est bonum, aliqualiter rationi bonum +appareret, et propter hoc voluntas nunquam in malum tenderet, nisi +cum aliqua ignorantia vel errore rationis. Unde dicitur Prov. XIV, +errant qui operantur malum. Sed quia experimento patet quod +multi agunt contra ea quorum scientiam habent; et hoc etiam +auctoritate divina confirmatur, secundum illud Luc. XII, servus +qui cognovit voluntatem domini sui et non fecit, plagis vapulabit +multis; et Iac. IV dicitur, scienti bonum facere et non +facienti, peccatum est illi, non simpliciter verum dixit, sed +oportet distinguere, ut philosophus tradit in VII Ethic. Cum enim +ad recte agendum homo dirigatur duplici scientia, scilicet +universali et particulari; utriusque defectus sufficit ad hoc quod +impediatur rectitudo operis et voluntatis, ut supra dictum est. +Contingit igitur quod aliquis habeat scientiam in universali, puta +nullam fornicationem esse faciendam; sed tamen non cognoscat in +particulari hunc actum qui est fornicatio, non esse faciendum. Et +hoc sufficit ad hoc quod voluntas non sequatur universalem +scientiam rationis. Iterum considerandum est quod nihil prohibet +aliquid sciri in habitu, quod tamen actu non consideratur. Potest +igitur contingere quod aliquis etiam rectam scientiam habeat in +singulari, et non solum in universali, sed tamen in actu non +consideret. Et tunc non videtur difficile quod praeter id quod actu +non considerat, homo agat. Quod autem homo non consideret in +particulari id quod habitualiter scit, quandoque quidem contingit +ex solo defectu intentionis, puta cum homo sciens geometriam, non +intendit ad considerandum geometriae conclusiones, quas statim in +promptu habet considerare. Quandoque autem homo non considerat id +quod habet in habitu propter aliquod impedimentum superveniens, +puta propter aliquam occupationem exteriorem, vel propter aliquam +infirmitatem corporalem. Et hoc modo ille qui est in passione +constitutus, non considerat in particulari id quod scit in +universali, inquantum passio impedit talem considerationem. Impedit +autem tripliciter. Primo, per quandam distractionem, sicut supra +expositum est. Secundo, per contrarietatem, quia plerumque passio +inclinat ad contrarium huius quod scientia universalis habet. +Tertio, per quandam immutationem corporalem, ex qua ratio +quodammodo ligatur, ne libere in actum exeat, sicut etiam somnus +vel ebrietas, quadam corporali transmutatione facta, ligant usum +rationis. Et quod hoc contingat in passionibus, patet ex hoc quod +aliquando, cum passiones multum intenduntur, homo amittit totaliter +usum rationis, multi enim propter abundantiam amoris et irae, sunt +in insaniam conversi. Et per hunc modum passio trahit rationem ad +iudicandum in particulari contra scientiam quam habet in +universali.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Universal knowledge, which is most certain, does not hold the foremost place in action, but rather particular knowledge, + since actions are about singulars: wherefore it is not astonishing that, in matters of action, passion acts counter to universal + knowledge, if the consideration of particular knowledge be lacking. +
[36869] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod scientia universalis, quae est certissima, non +habet principalitatem in operatione, sed magis scientia +particularis, eo quod operationes sunt circa singularia. Unde non +est mirum si in operabilibus passio agit contra scientiam +universalem, absente consideratione in particulari.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The fact that something appears good in particular to the reason, whereas it is not good, is due to a passion: and yet this + particular judgment is contrary to the universal knowledge of the reason. +
[36870] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod rationi videatur in particulari +aliquid bonum quod non est bonum, contingit ex aliqua passione. Et +tamen hoc particulare iudicium est contra universalem scientiam +rationis.
+ Reply to Objection 3: It is impossible for anyone to have an actual knowledge or true opinion about a universal affirmative proposition, and at + the same time a false opinion about a particular negative proposition, or vice versa: but it may well happen that a man has + true habitual knowledge about a universal affirmative proposition, and actually a false opinion about a particular negative: + because an act is directly opposed, not to a habit, but to an act. +
[36871] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod non posset contingere quod aliquis haberet simul in +actu scientiam aut opinionem veram de universali affirmativo, et +opinionem falsam de particulari negativo, aut e converso. Sed bene +potest contingere quod aliquis habeat veram scientiam habitualiter +de universali affirmativo, et falsam opinionem in actu de +particulari negativo, actus enim directe non contrariatur habitui, +sed actui.
+ Reply to Objection 4: He that has knowledge in a universal, is hindered, on account of a passion, from reasoning about that universal, so as to + draw the conclusion: but he reasons about another universal proposition suggested by the inclination of the passion, and draws + his conclusion accordingly. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that the syllogism of an incontinent man has four propositions, + two particular and two universal, of which one is of the reason, e.g. + No fornication is lawful, and the other, of passion, e.g. Pleasure is to be pursued. Hence passion fetters the reason, and + hinders it from arguing and concluding under the first proposition; so that while the passions lasts, the reason argues and + concludes under the second. +
[36872] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod ille qui habet scientiam in universali, propter +passionem impeditur ne possit sub illa universali sumere, et ad +conclusionem pervenire, sed assumit sub alia universali, quam +suggerit inclinatio passionis, et sub ea concludit. Unde +philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod syllogismus incontinentis +habet quatuor propositiones, duas universales, quarum una est +rationis, puta nullam fornicationem esse committendam; alia est +passionis, puta delectationem esse sectandam. Passio igitur ligat +rationem ne assumat et concludat sub prima, unde, ea durante, +assumit et concludit sub secunda.
+ Reply to Objection 5: Even as a drunken man sometimes gives utterance to words of deep signification, of which, however, he is incompetent to judge, + his drunkenness hindering him; so that a man who is in a state of passion, may indeed say in words that he ought not to do + so and so, yet his inner thought is that he must do it, as stated in Ethic. vii, 3. +
[36873] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 ad 5 Ad quintum +dicendum quod, sicut ebrius quandoque proferre potest verba +significantia profundas sententias, quas tamen mente diiudicare non +potest, ebrietate prohibente; ita in passione existens, etsi ore +proferat hoc non esse faciendum, tamen interius hoc animo sentit +quod sit faciendum, ut dicitur in VII Ethic.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that a sin committed through passion should not be called a sin of weakness. For a passion is a vehement movement + of the sensitive appetite, as stated above + (A[1]). Now vehemence of movements is evidence of strength rather than of weakness. Therefore a sin committed through passion, should + not be called a sin of weakness. +
[36874] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum quod est ex passione, non +debeat dici ex infirmitate. Passio enim est quidam vehemens motus +appetitus sensitivi, ut dictum est. Vehementia autem motus magis +attestatur fortitudini quam infirmitati. Ergo peccatum quod est ex +passione, non debet dici ex infirmitate.
+ Objection 2: Further, weakness in man regards that which is most fragile in him. Now this is the flesh; whence it is written ( + Ps. 77:39): "He remembered that they are flesh." Therefore sins of weakness should be those which result from bodily defects, rather + than those which are due to a passion. +
[36875] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +infirmitas hominis maxime attenditur secundum illud quod est in eo +fragilius. Hoc autem est caro, unde dicitur in Psalmo LXXVII, +recordatus est quia caro sunt. Ergo magis debet dici +peccatum ex infirmitate quod est ex aliquo corporis defectu, quam +quod est ex animae passione.
+ Objection 3: Further, man does not seem to be weak in respect of things which are subject to his will. Now it is subject to man's will, + whether he do or do not the things to which his passions incline him, according to + Gn. 4:7: "Thy appetite shall be under thee [*Vulg.: 'The lust thereof shall be under thee.'], and thou shalt have dominion over it." + Therefore sin committed through passion is not a sin of weakness. +
[36876] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +ad ea non videtur homo esse infirmus, quae eius voluntati +subduntur. Sed facere vel non facere ea ad quae passio inclinat, +hominis voluntati subditur, secundum illud Gen. IV, sub te erit +appetitus tuus, et tu dominaberis illius. Ergo peccatum quod +est ex passione, non est ex infirmitate.
+ On the contrary, Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv) calls the passions diseases of the soul. Now weakness is another name for disease. Therefore + a sin that arises from passion should be called a sin of weakness. +
[36877] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Tullius, in IV libro de Tuscul. quaest., passiones animae +aegritudines vocat. Aegritudines autem alio nomine infirmitates +dicuntur. Ergo peccatum quod est ex passione, debet dici ex +infirmitate.
+ I answer that, The cause of sin is on the part of the soul, in which, chiefly, sin resides. Now weakness may be applied to the soul by way + of likeness to weakness of the body. Accordingly, man's body is said to be weak, when it is disabled or hindered in the execution + of its proper action, through some disorder of the body's parts, so that the humors and members of the human body cease to + be subject to its governing and motive power. Hence a member is said to be weak, when + it cannot do the work of a healthy member, the eye, for instance, when it cannot see clearly, as the Philosopher states (De + Hist. Animal. x, 1). Therefore weakness of the soul is when the soul is hindered from fulfilling its proper action on account + of a disorder in its parts. Now as the parts of the body are said to be out of order, when they fail to comply with the order + of nature, so too the parts of the soul are said to be inordinate, when they are not subject to the order of reason, for + the reason is the ruling power of the soul's parts. Accordingly, when the concupiscible or irascible power is affected by + any passion contrary to the order of reason, the result being that an impediment arises in the aforesaid manner to the due + action of man, it is said to be a sin of weakness. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) compares the incontinent man to an + epileptic, whose limbs move in a manner contrary to his intention. +
[36878] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod causa peccati propria est ex parte animae in qua +principaliter est peccatum. Potest autem dici infirmitas in anima +ad similitudinem infirmitatis corporis. Dicitur autem corpus +hominis esse infirmum, quando debilitatur vel impeditur in +executione propriae operationis, propter aliquam inordinationem +partium corporis, ita scilicet quod humores et membra hominis non +subduntur virtuti regitivae et motivae corporis. Unde et membrum +dicitur esse infirmum, quando non potest perficere operationem +membri sani, sicut oculus quando non potest clare videre, ut dicit +philosophus, in X de historiis animalium. Unde et infirmitas animae +dicitur quando impeditur anima in propria operatione, propter +inordinationem partium ipsius. Sicut autem partes corporis dicuntur +esse inordinatae, quando non sequuntur ordinem naturae; ita et +partes animae dicuntur inordinatae, quando non subduntur ordini +rationis, ratio enim est vis regitiva partium animae. Sic ergo +quando extra ordinem rationis vis concupiscibilis aut irascibilis +aliqua passione afficitur, et per hoc impedimentum praestatur modo +praedicto debitae actioni hominis, dicitur peccatum esse ex +infirmitate. Unde et philosophus, in I Ethic., comparat +incontinentem paralytico, cuius partes moventur in contrarium eius +quod ipse disponit.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Just as in the body the stronger the movement against the order of nature, the greater the weakness, so likewise, the stronger + the movement of passion against the order of reason, the greater the weakness of the soul. +
[36879] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut quanto fuerit motus fortior in corpore +praeter ordinem naturae, tanto est maior infirmitas; ita quanto +fuerit motus fortior passionis praeter ordinem rationis, tanto est +maior infirmitas animae.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, which is not hindered by weakness of the body: for he that is weak in body may + have a will ready for action, and yet be hindered by a passion, as stated above + (A[1]). Hence when we speak of sins of weakness, we refer to weakness of soul rather than of body. And yet even weakness of soul + is called weakness of the flesh, in so far as it is owing to a condition of the flesh that the + passions of the soul arise in us through the sensitive appetite being a power using a corporeal organ. +
[36880] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod peccatum principaliter consistit in actu voluntatis, +qui non impeditur per corporis infirmitatem, potest enim qui est +corpore infirmus, promptam habere voluntatem ad aliquid faciendum. +Impeditur autem per passionem, ut supra dictum est. Unde cum +dicitur peccatum esse ex infirmitate, magis est referendum ad +infirmitatem animae quam ad infirmitatem corporis. Dicitur tamen +etiam ipsa infirmitas animae infirmitas carnis, inquantum ex +conditione carnis passiones animae insurgunt in nobis, eo quod +appetitus sensitivus est virtus utens organo corporali.
+ Reply to Objection 3: It is in the will's power to give or refuse its consent to what passion inclines us to do, and it is in this sense that our + appetite is said to be under us; and yet this consent or dissent of the will is hindered in the way already explained + (A[1]). +
[36881] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod in potestate quidem voluntatis est assentire vel non +assentire his in quae passio inclinat, et pro tanto dicitur noster +appetitus sub nobis esse. Sed tamen ipse assensus vel dissensus +voluntatis impeditur per passionem, modo praedicto.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that self-love is not the source of every sin. For that which is good and right in itself is not the proper + cause of sin. Now love of self is a good and right thing in itself: wherefore man is commanded to love his neighbor as himself + ( + Lev. 19:18). Therefore self-love cannot be the proper cause of sin. +
[36882] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor sui non sit principium omnis +peccati. Id enim quod est secundum se bonum et debitum, non est +propria causa peccati. Sed amor sui est secundum se bonum et +debitum, unde et praecipitur homini ut diligat proximum sicut +seipsum, Levit. XIX. Ergo amor sui non potest esse propria causa +peccati.
+ Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says ( + Rom. 7:8): "Sin taking occasion by the commandment wrought in me all manner of concupiscence"; on which words a gloss says that "the + law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evils," the reason for which is that concupiscence is the cause + of every sin. Now concupiscence is a distinct passion from love, as stated above ( + Q[3], A[2]; + Q[23], A[4]). + Therefore self-love is not the cause of every sin. +
[36883] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +apostolus dicit, Rom. VII, occasione accepta, peccatum per +mandatum operatum est in me omnem concupiscentiam, ubi Glossa +dicit quod bona est lex, quae, dum concupiscentiam prohibet, +omne malum prohibet, quod dicitur propter hoc, quia +concupiscentia est causa omnis peccati. Sed concupiscentia est alia +passio ab amore, ut supra habitum est. Ergo amor sui non est causa +omnis peccati.
+ Objection 3: Further, Augustine in commenting on + Ps. 79:17, "Things set on fire and dug down," says that "every sin is due either to love arousing us to undue ardor or to fear inducing + false humility." Therefore self-love is not the only cause of sin. +
[36884] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +Augustinus, super illud Psalmi, incensa igni et suffossa, dicit +quod omne peccatum est ex amore male inflammante, vel ex timore +male humiliante. Non ergo solus amor sui est causa peccati.
+ Objection 4: Further, as man sins at times through inordinate love of self, so does he sometimes through inordinate love of his neighbor. + Therefore self-love is not the cause of every sin. +
[36885] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 arg. 4 Praeterea, +sicut homo quandoque peccat propter inordinatum sui amorem, ita +etiam interdum peccat propter inordinatum amorem proximi. Ergo amor +sui non est causa omnis peccati.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) that "self-love, amounting to contempt of God, builds up the city of Babylon." Now every + sin makes man a citizen of Babylon. Therefore self-love is the cause of every sin. +
[36886] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod amor sui usque +ad contemptum Dei, facit civitatem Babylonis. Sed per quodlibet +peccatum pertinet homo ad civitatem Babylonis. Ergo amor sui est +causa omnis peccati.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + Q[75], A[1]), the proper and direct cause of sin is to be considered on the part of the adherence to a mutable good; in which respect + every sinful act proceeds from inordinate desire for some temporal good. Now the fact that anyone desires a temporal good + inordinately, is due to the fact that he loves himself inordinately; for to wish anyone some good is to love him. Therefore + it is evident that inordinate love of + self is the cause of every sin. +
[36887] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, propria et per se causa +peccati accipienda est ex parte conversionis ad commutabile bonum; +ex qua quidem parte omnis actus peccati procedit ex aliquo +inordinato appetitu alicuius temporalis boni. Quod autem aliquis +appetat inordinate aliquod temporale bonum, procedit ex hoc quod +inordinate amat seipsum, hoc enim est amare aliquem, velle ei +bonum. Unde manifestum est quod inordinatus amor sui est causa +omnis peccati.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Well ordered self-love, whereby man desires a fitting good for himself, is right and natural; but it is inordinate self-love, + leading to contempt of God, that Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) reckons to be the cause of sin. +
[36888] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod amor sui ordinatus est debitus et naturalis, ita +scilicet quod velit sibi bonum quod congruit. Sed amor sui +inordinatus, qui perducit ad contemptum Dei, ponitur esse causa +peccati secundum Augustinum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Concupiscence, whereby a man desires good for himself, is reduced to self-love as to its cause, as stated. +
[36889] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod concupiscentia, qua aliquis appetit sibi bonum, +reducitur ad amorem sui sicut ad causam, ut iam dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Man is said to love both the good he desires for himself, and himself to whom he desires it. Love, in so far as it is directed + to the object of desire (e.g. a man is said to love wine or money) admits, as its cause, fear which pertains to avoidance + of evil: for every sin arises either from inordinate desire for some good, or from inordinate avoidance of some evil. But + each of these is reduced to self-love, since it is through loving himself that man + either desires good things, or avoids evil things. +
[36890] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod aliquis dicitur amare et illud bonum quod optat sibi, +et se, cui bonum optat. Amor igitur secundum quod dicitur eius esse +quod optatur, puta quod aliquis dicitur amare vinum vel pecuniam, +recipit pro causa timorem, qui pertinet ad fugam mali. Omne enim +peccatum provenit vel ex inordinato appetitu alicuius boni, vel ex +inordinata fuga alicuius mali. Sed utrumque horum reducitur ad +amorem sui. Propter hoc enim homo vel appetit bona vel fugit mala, +quia amat seipsum.
+ Reply to Objection 4: A friend is like another self (Ethic. ix): wherefore the sin which is committed through love for a friend, seems to be committed + through self-love. +
[36891] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod amicus est quasi alter ipse. Et ideo quod peccatur +propter amorem amici, videtur propter amorem sui peccari.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that "concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life" are unfittingly described as + causes of sin. Because, according to the Apostle ( + 1 Tim. 6:10), "covetousness [*Douay: 'The desire of money'] is the root of all evils." Now pride of life is not included in covetousness. + Therefore it should not be reckoned among the causes of sin. +
[36892] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter ponantur causae +peccatorum esse concupiscentia carnis, concupiscentia oculorum, et +superbia vitae. Quia secundum apostolum, I ad Tim. ult., radix +omnium malorum est cupiditas. Sed superbia vitae sub cupiditate +non continetur. Ergo non oportet poni inter causas peccatorum.
+ Objection 2: Further, concupiscence of the flesh is aroused chiefly by what is seen by the eyes, according to + Dan. 13:56: "Beauty hath deceived thee." Therefore concupiscence of the eyes should not be condivided with concupiscence of the flesh. +
[36893] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +concupiscentia carnis maxime ex visione oculorum excitatur, +secundum illud Dan. XIII, species decepit te. Ergo non debet +dividi concupiscentia oculorum contra concupiscentiam carnis.
+ Objection 3: Further, concupiscence is desire for pleasure, as stated above ( + Q[30], A[2]). Now objects of pleasure are perceived not only by the sight, but also by the other senses. Therefore "concupiscence of + the hearing" and of the other senses should also have been mentioned. +
[36894] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +concupiscentia est delectabilis appetitus, ut supra habitum est. +Delectationes autem contingunt non solum secundum visum, sed etiam +secundum alios sensus. Ergo deberet etiam poni concupiscentia +auditus, et aliorum sensuum.
+ Objection 4: Further, just as man is induced to sin, through inordinate desire of good things, so is he also, through inordinate avoidance + of evil things, as stated above (A[4], ad 3). But nothing is mentioned here pertaining to avoidance of evil. Therefore the + causes of sin are insufficiently described. +
[36895] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 arg. 4 Praeterea, +sicut homo inducitur ad peccandum ex inordinata concupiscentia +boni, ita etiam ex inordinata fuga mali, ut dictum est. Sed nihil +hic enumeratur pertinens ad fugam mali. Ergo insufficienter causae +peccatorum tanguntur.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + 1 Jn. 2:16): "All that is in the world is concupiscence of the flesh, or [Vulg.: 'and'] pride of life." Now a thing is said to be "in + the world" by reason of sin: wherefore it is written ( + 1 Jn. 5:19): "The whole world is seated in wickedness." Therefore these three are causes of sin. +
[36896] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur I Ioan. II, omne quod est in mundo, aut est +concupiscentia carnis, aut concupiscentia oculorum, aut superbia +vitae. In mundo autem dicitur aliquid esse propter peccatum, +unde et ibidem, dicit quod totus mundus in maligno positus +est. Ergo praedicta tria sunt causae peccatorum.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[4]), inordinate self-love is the cause of every sin. Now self-love includes inordinate desire of good: for a man desires good + for the one he loves. Hence it is evident that inordinate desire of good is the cause of every sin. Now good is, in two ways, + the object of the sensitive appetite, wherein are the passions which are the cause of sin: first, absolutely, according as + it is the object of the concupiscible part; + secondly, under the aspect of difficulty, according as it is the object of the irascible part, as stated above (Q[23], A[1]). + Again, concupiscence is twofold, as stated above (Q[30], A[3]). One is natural, and is directed to those things which sustain + the nature of the body, whether as regards the preservation of the individual, such as food, drink, and the like, or as regards + the preservation of the species, such as sexual matters: and the inordinate appetite of such things is called + "concupiscence of the flesh." The other is spiritual concupiscence, and is directed to those things which do not afford sustentation + or pleasure in respect of the fleshly senses, but are delectable in respect of the apprehension or imagination, or some similar + mode of perception; such are money, apparel, and the like; and this spiritual concupiscence is called "concupiscence of the + eyes," whether this be taken as referring to the sight itself, of which the eyes are the organ, so as to denote + curiosity according to Augustine's exposition (Confess. x); or to the concupiscence of things which are proposed outwardly + to the eyes, so as to denote covetousness, according to the explanation of others. +
The inordinate appetite of the arduous good pertains to the "pride of life"; for pride is the inordinate appetite of excellence, + as we shall state further on (Q[84], A[2]; + SS, Q[162], A[1]). +
It is therefore evident that all passions that are a cause of sin can be reduced to these three: since all the passions of + the concupiscible part can be reduced to the first two, and all the irascible passions to the third, which is not divided + into two because all the irascible passions conform to spiritual concupiscence. +
[36897] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, inordinatus amor sui est causa +omnis peccati. In amore autem sui includitur inordinatus appetitus +boni, unusquisque enim appetit bonum ei quem amat. Unde manifestum +est quod inordinatus appetitus boni est causa omnis peccati. Bonum +autem dupliciter est obiectum sensibilis appetitus, in quo sunt +animae passiones, quae sunt causa peccati, uno modo, absolute, +secundum quod est obiectum concupiscibilis; alio modo, sub ratione +ardui, prout est obiectum irascibilis, ut supra dictum est. Est +autem duplex concupiscentia, sicut supra habitum est. Una quidem +naturalis, quae est eorum quibus natura corporis sustentatur; sive +quantum ad conservationem individui, sicut cibus et potus et alia +huiusmodi; sive quantum ad conservationem speciei, sicut in +venereis. Et horum inordinatus appetitus dicitur concupiscentia +carnis. Alia est concupiscentia animalis, eorum scilicet quae per +sensum carnis sustentationem aut delectationem non afferunt, sed +sunt delectabilia secundum apprehensionem imaginationis, aut +alicuius huiusmodi acceptionis, sicut sunt pecunia, ornatus +vestium, et alia huiusmodi. Et haec quidem animalis concupiscentia +vocatur concupiscentia oculorum, sive intelligatur concupiscentia +oculorum, idest ipsius visionis, quae fit per oculos, ut referatur +ad curiositatem, secundum quod Augustinus exponit, X Confess.; sive +referatur ad concupiscentiam rerum quae exterius oculis +proponuntur, ut referatur ad cupiditatem, secundum quod ab aliis +exponitur. Appetitus autem inordinatus boni ardui pertinet ad +superbiam vitae, nam superbia est appetitus inordinatus +excellentiae, ut inferius dicetur. Et sic patet quod ad ista tria +reduci possunt omnes passiones, quae sunt causa peccati. Nam ad duo +prima reducuntur omnes passiones concupiscibilis, ad tertium autem +omnes passiones irascibilis; quod ideo non dividitur in duo, quia +omnes passiones irascibilis conformantur concupiscentiae +animali.
+ Reply to Objection 1: "Pride of life" is included in covetousness according as the latter denotes any kind of appetite for any kind of good. How + covetousness, as a special vice, which goes by the name of "avarice," is the root of all sins, shall be explained further + on ( + Q[84], A[1]). +
[36898] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod secundum quod cupiditas importat universaliter +appetitum cuiuscumque boni, sic etiam superbia vitae continetur sub +cupiditate. Quomodo autem cupiditas, secundum quod est speciale +vitium, quod avaritia nominatur, sit radix omnium peccatorum, infra +dicetur.
+ Reply to Objection 2: "Concupiscence of the eyes" does not mean here the concupiscence for all things which can be seen by the eyes, but only for + such things as afford, not carnal pleasure in respect of touch, but in respect of the eyes, i.e. of any apprehensive power. +
[36899] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod concupiscentia oculorum non dicitur hic +concupiscentia omnium rerum quae oculis videri possunt, sed solum +earum in quibus non quaeritur delectatio carnis, quae est secundum +tactum, sed solum delectatio oculi, idest cuiuscumque apprehensivae +virtutis.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The sense of sight is the most excellent of all the senses, and covers a larger ground, as stated in Metaph. i: and so its + name is transferred to all the other senses, and even to the inner apprehensions, as Augustine states (De Verb. Dom., serm. + xxxiii). +
[36900] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod sensus visus est excellentior inter omnes sensus, et +ad plura se extendens, ut dicitur in I Metaphys. Et ideo nomen eius +transfertur ad omnes alios sensus, et etiam ad omnes interiores +apprehensiones, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de verbis domini.
+ Reply to Objection 4: Avoidance of evil is caused by the appetite for good, as stated above ( + Q[25], A[2]; + Q[39], A[2]); and so those passions alone are mentioned which incline to good, as being the causes of those which cause inordinately + the avoidance of evil. +
[36901] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod fuga mali causatur ex appetitu boni, ut supra dictum +est. Et ideo ponuntur solum passiones inclinantes ad bonum, tanquam +causae earum quae faciunt inordinate fugam mali.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that sin is not alleviated on account of passion. For increase of cause adds to the effect: thus if a hot thing + causes something to melt, a hotter will do so yet more. Now passion is a cause of sin, as stated + (A[5]). Therefore the more intense the passion, the greater the sin. Therefore passion does not diminish sin, but increases it. +
[36902] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non allevietur propter +passionem. Augmentum enim causae auget effectum, si enim calidum +dissolvit, magis calidum magis dissolvit. Sed passio est causa +peccati, ut habitum est. Ergo quanto est intensior passio, tanto +est maius peccatum. Passio igitur non minuit peccatum, sed +auget.
+ Objection 2: Further, a good passion stands in the same relation to merit, as an evil passion does to sin. Now a good passion increases + merit: for a man seems to merit the more, according as he is moved by a greater pity to help a poor man. Therefore an evil + passion also increases rather than diminishes a sin. +
[36903] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, +sicut se habet passio bona ad meritum, ita se habet mala passio ad +peccatum. Sed bona passio auget meritum, tanto enim aliquis magis +videtur mereri, quanto ex maiori misericordia pauperi subvenit. +Ergo etiam mala passio magis aggravat peccatum quam alleviat.
+ Objection 3: Further, a man seems to sin the more grievously, according as he sins with a more intense will. But the passion that impels + the will makes it tend with greater intensity to the sinful act. Therefore passion aggravates a sin. +
[36904] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, +quanto intensiori voluntate aliquis facit peccatum, tanto gravius +videtur peccare. Sed passio impellens voluntatem, facit eam +vehementius ferri in actum peccati. Ergo passio aggravat +peccatum.
+ On the contrary, The passion of concupiscence is called a temptation of the flesh. But the greater the temptation that overcomes a man, the + less grievous his sin, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei iv, 12). +
[36905] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra, +passio ipsa concupiscentiae vocatur tentatio carnis. Sed quanto +aliquis maiori tentatione prosternitur, tanto minus peccat, ut +patet per Augustinum. Ergo passio diminuit peccatum.
+ I answer that, Sin consists essentially in an act of the free will, which is a faculty of the will and reason; while passion is a movement + of the sensitive appetite. Now the sensitive appetite can be related to the free-will, antecedently and consequently: antecedently, + according as a passion of the sensitive appetite draws or inclines the reason or will, as stated above ( + AA[1],2; Q[10], A[3]); and consequently, in so far as the movements of the + higher powers redound on to the lower, since it is not possible for the will to be moved to anything intensely, without a + passion being aroused in the sensitive appetite. +
Accordingly if we take passion as preceding the sinful act, it must needs diminish the sin: because the act is a sin in so + far as it is voluntary, and under our control. Now a thing is said to be under our control, through the reason and will: and + therefore the more the reason and will do anything of their own accord, and not through the impulse of a passion, the more + is it voluntary and under our control. In this respect passion diminishes sin, in so far as it diminishes its + voluntariness. +
On the other hand, a consequent passion does not diminish a sin, but increases it; or rather it is a sign of its gravity, + in so far, to wit, as it shows the intensity of the will towards the sinful act; and so it is true that the greater the pleasure + or the concupiscence with which anyone sins, the greater the sin. +
[36906] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod peccatum essentialiter consistit in actu liberi +arbitrii, quod est facultas voluntatis et rationis. Passio autem +est motus appetitus sensitivi. Appetitus autem sensitivus potest se +habere ad liberum arbitrium et antecedenter, et consequenter. +Antecedenter quidem, secundum quod passio appetitus sensitivi +trahit vel inclinat rationem et voluntatem, ut supra dictum est. +Consequenter autem, secundum quod motus superiorum virium, si sint +vehementes, redundant in inferiores, non enim potest voluntas +intense moveri in aliquid, quin excitetur aliqua passio in appetitu +sensitivo. Si igitur accipiatur passio secundum quod praecedit +actum peccati, sic necesse est quod diminuat peccatum. Actus enim +intantum est peccatum, inquantum est voluntarium et in nobis +existens. In nobis autem aliquid esse dicitur per rationem et +voluntatem. Unde quanto ratio et voluntas ex se aliquid agunt, non +ex impulsu passionis, magis est voluntarium et in nobis existens. +Et secundum hoc passio minuit peccatum, inquantum minuit +voluntarium. Passio autem consequens non diminuit peccatum, sed +magis auget, vel potius est signum magnitudinis eius, inquantum +scilicet demonstrat intensionem voluntatis ad actum peccati. Et sic +verum est quod quanto aliquis maiori libidine vel concupiscentia +peccat, tanto magis peccat.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Passion is the cause of sin on the part of that to which the sinner turns. But the gravity of a sin is measured on the part + of that from which he turns, which results accidentally from his turning to something else---accidentally, i.e. beside his + intention. Now an effect is increased by the increase, not of its accidental cause, but of its direct cause. +
[36907] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod passio est causa peccati ex parte conversionis. +Gravitas autem peccati magis attenditur ex parte aversionis; quae +quidem ex conversione sequitur per accidens, idest praeter +intentionem peccantis. Causae autem per accidens augmentatae non +augmentant effectus, sed solum causae per se.
+ Reply to Objection 2: A good passion consequent to the judgment of reason increases merit; but if it precede, so that a man is moved to do well, + rather by his passion than by the judgment of his reason, such a passion diminishes the goodness and praiseworthiness of his + action. +
[36908] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod bona passio consequens iudicium rationis, augmentat +meritum. Si autem praecedat, ut scilicet homo magis ex passione +quam ex iudicio rationis moveatur ad bene agendum, talis passio +diminuit bonitatem et laudem actus.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Although the movement of the will incited by the passion is more intense, yet it is not so much the will's own movement, + as if it were moved to sin by the reason alone. +
[36909] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, etsi motus voluntatis sit intensior ex passione +incitatus, non tamen ita est voluntatis proprius, sicut si sola +ratione moveretur ad peccandum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that passion excuses from sin altogether. For whatever causes an act to be involuntary, excuses from sin altogether. + But concupiscence of the flesh, which is a passion, makes an act to be involuntary, according to + Gal. 5:17: "The flesh lusteth against the spirit . . . so that you do not the things that you would." Therefore passion excuses from + sin altogether. +
[36910] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod passio totaliter excuset a peccato. +Quidquid enim causat involuntarium, excusat totaliter a peccato. +Sed concupiscentia carnis, quae est quaedam passio, causat +involuntarium, secundum illud Gal. V, caro concupiscit adversus +spiritum, ut non quaecumque vultis, illa faciatis. Ergo passio +totaliter excusat a peccato.
+ Objection 2: Further, passion causes a certain ignorance of a particular matter, as stated above + (A[2]; Q[76], A[3]). But ignorance of a particular matter excuses from sin altogether, as stated above (Q[6], A[8]). Therefore passion + excuses from sin altogether. +
[36911] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, +passio causat ignorantiam quandam in particulari, ut dictum est. +Sed ignorantia particularis totaliter excusat a peccato, sicut +supra habitum est. Ergo passio totaliter excusat a peccato.
+ Objection 3: Further, disease of the soul is graver than disease of the body. But bodily disease excuses from sin altogether, as in the + case of mad people. Much more, therefore, does passion, which is a disease of the soul. +
[36912] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, +infirmitas animae gravior est quam infirmitas corporis. Sed +infirmitas corporis totaliter excusat a peccato, ut patet in +phreneticis. Ergo multo magis passio, quae est infirmitas +animae.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle ( + Rom. 7:5) speaks of the passions as "passions of sins," for no other reason than that they cause sin: which would not be the case + if they excused from sin altogether. Therefore passion does not excuse from sin altogether. +
[36913] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra +est quod apostolus, Rom. VII, vocat passiones peccatorum, non nisi +quia peccata causant. Quod non esset, si a peccato totaliter +excusarent. Ergo passiones non totaliter a peccato excusant.
+ I answer that, An act which, in its genus, is evil, cannot be excused from sin altogether, unless it be rendered altogether involuntary. + Consequently, if the passion be such that it renders the subsequent act wholly involuntary, it entirely excuses from sin; + otherwise, it does not excuse entirely. In this matter two points apparently should be observed: first, that a thing may be + voluntary either "in itself," as when the will tends towards it directly; or "in its cause," + when the will tends towards that cause and not towards the effect; as is the case with one who wilfully gets drunk, for in + that case he is considered to do voluntarily whatever he does through being drunk. Secondly, we must observe that a thing + is said to be voluntary "directly" or "indirectly"; directly, if the will tends towards it; indirectly, if the will could + have prevented it, but did not. +
Accordingly therefore we must make a distinction: because a passion is sometimes so strong as to take away the use of reason + altogether, as in the case of those who are mad through love or anger; and then if such a passion were voluntary from the + beginning, the act is reckoned a sin, because it is voluntary in its cause, as we have stated with regard to drunkenness. + If, however, the cause be not voluntary but natural, for instance, if anyone through sickness or some such cause + fall into such a passion as deprives him of the use of reason, his act is rendered wholly involuntary, and he is entirely + excused from sin. Sometimes, however, the passion is not such as to take away the use of reason altogether; and then reason + can drive the passion away, by turning to other thoughts, or it can prevent it from having its full effect; since the members + are not put to work, except by the consent of reason, as stated above ( + Q[17], A[9]): wherefore such a + passion does not excuse from sin altogether. +
[36914] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod secundum hoc solum actus aliquis qui de genere suo +est malus, totaliter a peccato excusatur, quod totaliter +involuntarius redditur. Unde si sit talis passio quae totaliter +involuntarium reddat actum sequentem, totaliter a peccato excusat, +alioquin, non totaliter. Circa quod duo consideranda videntur. +Primo quidem, quod aliquid potest esse voluntarium vel secundum se, +sicut quando voluntas directe in ipsum fertur, vel secundum suam +causam, quando voluntas fertur in causam et non in effectum, ut +patet in eo qui voluntarie inebriatur; ex hoc enim quasi +voluntarium ei imputatur quod per ebrietatem committit. Secundo +considerandum est quod aliquid dicitur voluntarium directe, vel +indirecte, directe quidem, id in quod voluntas fertur; indirecte +autem, illud quod voluntas potuit prohibere, sed non prohibet. +Secundum hoc igitur distinguendum est. Quia passio quandoque quidem +est tanta quod totaliter aufert usum rationis, sicut patet in his +qui propter amorem vel iram insaniunt. Et tunc si talis passio a +principio fuit voluntaria, imputatur actus ad peccatum, quia est +voluntarius in sua causa, sicut etiam de ebrietate dictum est. Si +vero causa non fuit voluntaria, sed naturalis, puta cum aliquis ex +aegritudine, vel aliqua huiusmodi causa, incidit in talem passionem +quae totaliter aufert usum rationis; actus omnino redditur +involuntarius, et per consequens totaliter a peccato excusatur. +Quandoque vero passio non est tanta quod totaliter intercipiat usum +rationis. Et tunc ratio potest passionem excludere, divertendo ad +alias cogitationes; vel impedire ne suum consequatur effectum, quia +membra non applicantur operi nisi per consensum rationis, ut supra +dictum est. Unde talis passio non totaliter excusat a peccato.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The words, "So that you do not the things that you would" are not to be referred to outward deeds, but to the inner movement + of concupiscence; for a man would wish never to desire evil, in which sense we are to understand the words of + Rom. 7:19: "The evil which I will not, that I do." Or again they may be referred to the will as preceding the passion, as is the case + with the incontinent, who act counter to their resolution on + account of their concupiscence. +
[36915] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod hoc quod dicitur, ut non quaecumque vultis, +illa faciatis, non est referendum ad ea quae fiunt per +exteriorem actum, sed ad interiorem concupiscentiae motum, vellet +enim homo nunquam concupiscere malum. Sicut etiam exponitur id quod +dicitur Rom. VII, quod odi malum, illud facio. Vel potest +referri ad voluntatem praecedentem passionem, ut patet in +continentibus qui contra suum propositum agunt propter suam +concupiscentiam.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The particular ignorance which excuses altogether, is ignorance of a circumstance, which a man is unable to know even after + taking due precautions. But passion causes ignorance of law in a particular case, by preventing universal knowledge from being + applied to a particular act, which passion the reason is able to drive away, as stated. +
[36916] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod ignorantia particularis quae totaliter excusat, est +ignorantia circumstantiae quam quidem quis scire non potest, debita +diligentia adhibita. Sed passio causat ignorantiam iuris in +particulari, dum impedit applicationem communis scientiae ad +particularem actum. Quam quidem passionem ratio repellere potest, +ut dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Bodily disease is involuntary: there would be a comparison, however, if it were voluntary, as we have stated about drunkenness, + which is a kind of bodily disease. +
[36917] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod infirmitas corporis est involuntaria. Esset autem +simile, si esset voluntaria, sicut de ebrietate dictum est, quae +est quaedam corporalis infirmitas.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that sin committed through passion cannot be mortal. Because venial sin is condivided with mortal sin. Now + sin committed from weakness is venial, since it has in itself a motive for pardon [venia]. Since therefore sin committed through + passion is a sin of weakness, it seems that it cannot be mortal. +
[36918] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum quod est ex passione, non +possit esse mortale. Veniale enim peccatum dividitur contra +mortale. Sed peccatum quod est ex infirmitate, est veniale, cum +habeat in se causam veniae. Cum igitur peccatum quod est ex +passione, sit ex infirmitate, videtur quod non possit esse +mortale.
+ Objection 2: Further, the cause is more powerful than its effect. But passion cannot be a mortal sin, for there is no mortal sin in the + sensuality, as stated above ( + Q[74], A[4]). Therefore a sin committed through passion cannot be mortal. +
[36919] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, +causa non est potior effectu. Sed passio non potest esse peccatum +mortale, non enim in sensualitate est peccatum mortale, ut supra +habitum est. Ergo peccatum quod est ex passione, non potest esse +mortale.
+ Objection 3: Further, passion is a hindrance to reason, as explained above ( + AA[1],2). Now it belongs to the reason to turn to God, or to turn away from Him, which is the essence of a mortal sin. Therefore + a sin committed through passion cannot be mortal. +
[36920] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, +passio abducit a ratione, ut ex dictis patet. Sed rationis est +converti ad Deum vel averti ab eo, in quo consistit ratio peccati +mortalis. Peccatum ergo quod est ex passione, non potest esse +mortale.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle says ( + Rom. 7:5) that "the passions of the sins . . . work [Vulg.: 'did work'] in our members to bring forth fruit unto death." Now it is + proper to mortal sin to bring forth fruit unto death. Therefore sin committed through passion may be mortal. +
[36921] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. VII, quod passiones peccatorum +operantur in membris nostris ad fructificandum morti. Hoc autem +est proprium mortalis peccati, quod fructificet morti. Ergo +peccatum quod est ex passione, potest esse mortale.
+ I answer that, Mortal sin, as stated above ( + Q[72], A[5]), consists in turning away from our last end which is God, which aversion pertains to the deliberating reason, whose function + it is also to direct towards the end. Therefore that which is contrary to the last end can happen not to be a mortal sin, + only when the deliberating reason is unable to come to the rescue, which is the case in sudden movements. Now when anyone + proceeds from passion to a + sinful act, or to a deliberate consent, this does not happen suddenly: and so the deliberating reason can come to the rescue + here, since it can drive the passion away, or at least prevent it from having its effect, as stated above: wherefore if it + does not come to the rescue, there is a mortal sin; and it is thus, as we see, that many murders and adulteries are committed + through passion. +
[36922] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod peccatum mortale, ut supra dictum est, consistit in +aversione ab ultimo fine, qui est Deus, quae quidem aversio +pertinet ad rationem deliberantem, cuius etiam est ordinare in +finem. Hoc igitur solo modo potest contingere quod inclinatio +animae in aliquid quod contrariatur ultimo fini, non sit peccatum +mortale quia ratio deliberans non potest occurrere, quod contingit +in subitis motibus. Cum autem ex passione aliquis procedit ad actum +peccati, vel ad consensum deliberatum, hoc non fit subito. Unde +ratio deliberans potest hic occurrere, potest enim excludere, vel +saltem impedire passionem, ut dictum est. Unde si non occurrat, est +peccatum mortale, sicut videmus quod multa homicidia et adulteria +per passionem committuntur.
+ Reply to Objection 1: A sin may be venial in three ways. First, through its cause, i.e. through having cause to be forgiven, which cause lessens + the sin; thus a sin that is committed through weakness or ignorance is said to be venial. Secondly, through its issue; thus + every sin, through repentance, becomes venial, i.e. receives pardon [veniam]. Thirdly, by its genus, e.g. an idle word. This + is the only kind of venial sin that is opposed to mortal sin: whereas the objection + regards the first kind. +
[36923] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod veniale dicitur tripliciter. Uno modo, ex causa, +quia scilicet habet aliquam causam veniae, quae diminuit peccatum, +et sic peccatum ex infirmitate et ignorantia dicitur veniale. Alio +modo, ex eventu, sicut omne peccatum per poenitentiam fit veniale, +idest veniam consecutum. Tertio modo dicitur veniale ex genere, +sicut verbum otiosum. Et hoc solum veniale opponitur mortali, +obiectio autem procedit de primo.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Passion causes sin as regards the adherence to something. But that this be a mortal sin regards the aversion, which follows + accidentally from the adherence, as stated above (A[6], ad 1): hence the argument does not prove. +
[36924] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod passio est causa peccati ex parte conversionis. Quod +autem sit mortale, est ex parte aversionis, quae per accidens +sequitur ad conversionem, ut dictum est. Unde ratio non +sequitur.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Passion does not always hinder the act of reason altogether: consequently the reason remains in possession of its free-will, + so as to turn away from God, or turn to Him. If, however, the use of reason be taken away altogether, the sin is no longer + either mortal or venial. +
[36925] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio non semper in suo actu totaliter a passione +impeditur, unde remanet ei liberum arbitrium, ut possit averti vel +converti ad Deum. Si autem totaliter tolleretur usus rationis, iam +non esset peccatum nec mortale nec veniale.
We must now consider the cause of sin on the part of the will, viz. malice: and under this head there are four points of + inquiry: +
(1) Whether it is possible for anyone to sin through certain malice, i.e. purposely?
(2) Whether everyone that sins through habit, sins through certain malice?
(3) Whether every one that sins through certain malice, sins through habit?
(4) Whether it is more grievous to sin through certain malice, than through passion?
+[36926] +Iª-IIae q. 78 pr. Deinde considerandum est de causa +peccati quae est ex parte voluntatis, quae dicitur malitia. Et +circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum aliquis possit ex certa +malitia, seu industria, peccare. Secundo, utrum quicumque peccat ex +habitu, peccet ex certa malitia. Tertio, utrum quicumque peccat ex +certa malitia, peccet ex habitu. Quarto, utrum ille qui peccat ex +certa malitia, gravius peccet quam ille qui peccat ex passione.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that no one sins purposely, or through certain malice. Because ignorance is opposed to purpose or certain malice. + Now "every evil man is ignorant," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1); and it is written ( + Prov. 14:22): "They err that work evil." Therefore no one sins through certain malice. +
[36927] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullus peccet ex industria, sive ex +certa malitia. Ignorantia enim opponitur industriae, seu certae +malitiae. Sed omnis malus est ignorans, secundum philosophum. Et +Prov. XIV, dicitur, errant qui operantur malum. Ergo nullus +peccat ex certa malitia.
+ Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "no one works intending evil." Now to sin through malice seems to denote the + intention of doing evil [*Alluding to the derivation of "malitia" (malice) from "malum" (evil)] in sinning, because an act + is not denominated from that which is unintentional and accidental. Therefore no one sins through malice. +
[36928] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod nullus intendens ad +malum operatur. Sed hoc videtur esse peccare ex malitia, +intendere malum in peccando, quod enim est praeter intentionem, est +quasi per accidens, et non denominat actum. Ergo nullus ex malitia +peccat.
+ Objection 3: Further, malice itself is a sin. If therefore malice is a cause of sin, it follows that sin goes on causing sin indefinitely, + which is absurd. Therefore no one sins through malice. +
[36929] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +malitia ipsa peccatum est. Si igitur malitia sit causa peccati, +sequetur quod peccatum sit causa peccati in infinitum, quod est +inconveniens. Nullus igitur ex malitia peccat.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Job 34:27): "[Who] as it were on purpose have revolted from God [Vulg.: 'Him'], and would not understand all His ways." Now to revolt + from God is to sin. Therefore some sin purposely or through certain malice. +
[36930] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Iob XXXIV, quasi de industria recesserunt a +Deo, et vias eius intelligere noluerunt. Sed recedere a Deo est +peccare. Ergo aliqui peccant ex industria, seu ex certa +malitia.
+ I answer that, Man like any other being has naturally an appetite for the good; and so if his appetite incline away to evil, this is due + to corruption or disorder in some one of the principles of man: for it is thus that sin occurs in the actions of natural things. + Now the principles of human acts are the intellect, and the appetite, both rational (i.e. the will) and sensitive. Therefore + even as sin occurs in human acts, sometimes through a defect of the intellect, as when + anyone sins through ignorance, and sometimes through a defect in the sensitive appetite, as when anyone sins through passion, + so too does it occur through a defect consisting in a disorder of the will. Now the will is out of order when it loves more + the lesser good. Again, the consequence of loving a thing less is that one chooses to suffer some hurt in its regard, in order + to obtain a good that one loves more: as when a man, even knowingly, suffers the loss of a limb, that he may save his life + which he loves more. Accordingly when an inordinate will loves some temporal good, e.g. riches or pleasure, more than the + order of reason or Divine law, or Divine charity, or some such thing, it follows that it is willing to suffer the loss of + some spiritual good, so that it may obtain possession of some temporal good. Now evil is merely the privation of some good; + and so a man wishes knowingly a spiritual evil, which is evil simply, whereby he is deprived of a spiritual good, in order + to + possess a temporal good: wherefore he is said to sin through certain malice or on purpose, because he chooses evil knowingly. +
[36931] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod homo, sicut et quaelibet alia res, naturaliter habet +appetitum boni. Unde quod ad malum eius appetitus declinet, +contingit ex aliqua corruptione seu inordinatione in aliquo +principiorum hominis, sic enim in actionibus rerum naturalium +peccatum invenitur. Principia autem humanorum actuum sunt +intellectus et appetitus, tam rationalis, qui dicitur voluntas, +quam sensitivus. Peccatum igitur in humanis actibus contingit +quandoque, sicut ex defectu intellectus, puta cum aliquis per +ignorantiam peccat; et ex defectu appetitus sensitivi, sicut cum +aliquis ex passione peccat; ita etiam ex defectu voluntatis, qui +est inordinatio ipsius. Est autem voluntas inordinata, quando minus +bonum magis amat. Consequens autem est ut aliquis eligat pati +detrimentum in bono minus amato, ad hoc quod potiatur bono magis +amato, sicut cum homo vult pati abscissionem membri etiam scienter, +ut conservet vitam, quam magis amat. Et per hunc modum, quando +aliqua inordinata voluntas aliquod bonum temporale plus amat, puta +divitias vel voluptatem, quam ordinem rationis vel legis divinae, +vel caritatem Dei, vel aliquid huiusmodi; sequitur quod velit +dispendium pati in aliquo spiritualium bonorum, ut potiatur aliquo +temporali bono. Nihil autem est aliud malum quam privatio alicuius +boni. Et secundum hoc aliquis scienter vult aliquod malum +spirituale, quod est malum simpliciter, per quod bonum spirituale +privatur, ut bono temporali potiatur. Unde dicitur ex certa +malitia, vel ex industria peccare, quasi scienter malum +eligens.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Ignorance sometimes excludes the simple knowledge that a particular action is evil, and then man is said to sin through ignorance: + sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a particular action is evil at this particular moment, as when he sins through passion: + and sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a particular evil is not to be suffered for the sake of possessing a particular + good, but not the simple knowledge that it is an evil: it is thus that + a man is ignorant, when he sins through certain malice. +
[36932] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ignorantia quandoque quidem excludit scientiam +qua aliquis simpliciter scit hoc esse malum quod agitur, et tunc +dicitur ex ignorantia peccare. Quandoque autem excludit scientiam +qua homo scit hoc nunc esse malum, sicut cum ex passione peccatur. +Quandoque autem excludit scientiam qua aliquis scit hoc malum non +sustinendum esse propter consecutionem illius boni, scit tamen +simpliciter hoc esse malum, et sic dicitur ignorare qui ex certa +malitia peccat.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Evil cannot be intended by anyone for its own sake; but it can be intended for the sake of avoiding another evil, or obtaining + another good, as stated above: and in this case anyone would choose to obtain a good intended for its own sake, without suffering + loss of the other good; even as a lustful man would wish to enjoy a pleasure without offending God; but with the two set before + him to choose from, he prefers sinning and thereby incurring God's + anger, to being deprived of the pleasure. +
[36933] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod malum non potest esse secundum se intentum ab aliquo, +potest tamen esse intentum ad vitandum aliud malum, vel ad +consequendum aliud bonum, ut dictum est. Et in tali casu aliquis +eligeret consequi bonum per se intentum, absque hoc quod pateretur +detrimentum alterius boni. Sicut aliquis lascivus vellet frui +delectatione absque offensa Dei, sed duobus propositis, magis vult +peccando incurrere offensam Dei, quam delectatione privetur.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The malice through which anyone sins, may be taken to denote habitual malice, in the sense in which the Philosopher (Ethic. + v, 1) calls an evil habit by the name of malice, just as a good habit is called virtue: and in this way anyone is said to + sin through malice when he sins through the inclination of a habit. It may also denote actual malice, whether by malice we + mean the choice itself of evil (and thus anyone is said to sin through malice, in so + far as he sins through making a choice of evil), or whether by malice we mean some previous fault that gives rise to a subsequent + fault, as when anyone impugns the grace of his brother through envy. Nor does this imply that a thing is its own cause: for + the interior act is the cause of the exterior act, and one sin is the cause of another; not indefinitely, however, since we + can trace it back to some previous sin, which is not caused by any previous sin, as was explained above ( + Q[75], A[4], ad 3). +
[36934] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod malitia ex qua aliquis dicitur peccare, potest +intelligi malitia habitualis, secundum quod habitus malus a +philosopho nominatur malitia, sicut habitus bonus nominatur virtus. +Et secundum hoc aliquis dicitur ex malitia peccare, quia peccat ex +inclinatione habitus. Potest etiam intelligi malitia actualis. Sive +ipsa mali electio malitia nominetur, et sic dicitur aliquis ex +malitia peccare, inquantum ex mali electione peccat. Sive etiam +malitia dicatur aliqua praecedens culpa, ex qua oritur subsequens +culpa, sicut cum aliquis impugnat fraternam gratiam ex invidia. Et +tunc idem non est causa sui ipsius, sed actus interior est causa +actus exterioris. Et unum peccatum est causa alterius, non tamen in +infinitum, quia est devenire ad aliquod primum peccatum, quod non +causatur ex aliquo priori peccato, ut ex supradictis patet.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that not every one who sins through habit, sins through certain malice. Because sin committed through certain + malice, seems to be most grievous. Now it happens sometimes that a man commits a slight sin through habit, as when he utters + an idle word. Therefore sin committed from habit is not always committed through certain malice. +
[36935] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnis qui peccat ex habitu, peccet +ex certa malitia. Peccatum enim quod est ex certa malitia, videtur +esse gravissimum. Sed quandoque homo aliquod leve peccatum +committit ex habitu, sicut cum dicit verbum otiosum. Non ergo omne +peccatum quod est ex habitu, est ex certa malitia.
+ Objection 2: Further, "Acts proceeding from habits are like the acts by which those habits were formed" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). But the acts + which precede a vicious habit are not committed through certain malice. Therefore the sins that arise from habit are not committed + through certain malice. +
[36936] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 arg. 2 +Praeterea, actus ex habitu procedentes sunt similes actibus ex +quibus habitus generantur, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed actus +praecedentes habitum vitiosum non sunt ex certa malitia. Ergo etiam +peccata quae sunt ex habitu, non sunt ex certa malitia.
+ Objection 3: Further, when a man commits a sin through certain malice, he is glad after having done it, according to + Prov. 2:14: "Who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things": and this, because it is pleasant to obtain what + we desire, and to do those actions which are connatural to us by reason of habit. But those who sin through habit, are sorrowful + after committing a sin: because "bad men," i.e. those who have a vicious + habit, "are full of remorse" (Ethic. ix, 4). Therefore sins that arise from habit are not committed through certain malice. +
[36937] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +in his quae aliquis ex certa malitia committit, gaudet postquam +commisit, secundum illud Prov. II, qui laetantur cum male +fecerint et exultant in rebus pessimis. Et hoc ideo, quia +unicuique est delectabile cum consequitur id quod intendit, et qui +operatur quod est ei quodammodo connaturale secundum habitum. Sed +illi qui peccant ex habitu, post peccatum commissum dolent, +poenitudine enim replentur pravi, idest habentes habitum vitiosum, +ut dicitur in IX Ethic. Ergo peccata quae sunt ex habitu, non sunt +ex certa malitia.
+ On the contrary, A sin committed through certain malice is one that is done through choice of evil. Now we make choice of those things to + which we are inclined by habit, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2 with regard to virtuous habits. Therefore a sin that arises from + habit is committed through certain malice. +
[36938] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra, +peccatum ex certa malitia dicitur esse quod est ex electione mali. +Sed unicuique est eligibile id ad quod inclinatur per proprium +habitum; ut dicitur in VI Ethic. de habitu virtuoso. Ergo peccatum +quod est ex habitu, est ex certa malitia.
+ I answer that, There is a difference between a sin committed by one who has the habit, and a sin committed by habit: for it is not necessary + to use a habit, since it is subject to the will of the person who has that habit. Hence habit is defined as being "something + we use when we will," as stated above ( + Q[50], A[1]). And thus, even as it may happen that one who has a vicious habit may break forth into a virtuous act, because a bad habit + does not + corrupt reason altogether, something of which remains unimpaired, the result being that a sinner does some works which are + generically good; so too it may happen sometimes that one who has a vicious habit, acts, not from that habit, but through + the uprising of a passion, or again through ignorance. But whenever he uses the vicious habit he must needs sin through certain + malice: because to anyone that has a habit, whatever is befitting to him in respect of that habit, has the aspect of something + lovable, since it thereby becomes, in a way, connatural to him, according as custom and habit are a second nature. Now the + very thing which befits a man in respect of a vicious habit, is something that excludes a spiritual good: the result being + that a man chooses a spiritual evil, that he may obtain possession of what befits him in respect of that habit: and this is + to sin through certain malice. Wherefore it is evident that whoever sins through habit, sins through certain malice. +
[36939] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod non est idem peccare habentem habitum, et peccare ex +habitu. Uti enim habitu non est necessarium, sed subiacet voluntati +habentis, unde et habitus definitur esse quo quis utitur cum +voluerit. Et ideo sicut potest contingere quod aliquis habens +habitum vitiosum, prorumpat in actum virtutis, eo quod ratio non +totaliter corrumpitur per malum habitum, sed aliquid eius integrum +manet, ex quo provenit quod peccator aliqua operatur de genere +bonorum; ita etiam potest contingere quod aliquis habens habitum, +interdum non ex habitu operetur, sed ex passione insurgente, vel +etiam ex ignorantia. Sed quandocumque utitur habitu vitioso, +necesse est quod ex certa malitia peccet. Quia unicuique habenti +habitum, est per se diligibile id quod est ei conveniens secundum +proprium habitum, quia fit ei quodammodo connaturale, secundum quod +consuetudo et habitus vertitur in naturam. Hoc autem quod est +alicui conveniens secundum habitum vitiosum, est id quod excludit +bonum spirituale. Ex quo sequitur quod homo eligat malum +spirituale, ut adipiscatur bonum quod est ei secundum habitum +conveniens. Et hoc est ex certa malitia peccare. Unde manifestum +est quod quicumque peccat ex habitu, peccet ex certa malitia.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Venial sin does not exclude spiritual good, consisting in the grace of God or charity. Wherefore it is an evil, not simply, + but in a relative sense: and for that reason the habit thereof is not a simple but a relative evil. +
[36940] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod peccata venialia non excludunt bonum spirituale, +quod est gratia Dei vel caritas. Unde non dicuntur mala +simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Et propter hoc nec habitus ipsorum +possunt dici simpliciter mali, sed solum secundum quid.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Acts proceeding from habits are of like species as the acts from which those habits were formed: but they differ from them + as perfect from imperfect. Such is the difference between sin committed through certain malice and sin committed through passion. +
[36941] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod actus qui procedunt ex habitibus, sunt similes +secundum speciem actibus ex quibus habitus generantur, differunt +tamen ab eis sicut perfectum ab imperfecto. Et talis est +differentia peccati quod committitur ex certa malitia, ad peccatum +quod committitur ex aliqua passione.
+ Reply to Objection 3: He that sins through habit is always glad for what he does through habit, as long as he uses the habit. But since he is able + not to use the habit, and to think of something else, by means of his reason, which is not altogether corrupted, it may happen + that while not using the habit he is sorry for what he has done through the habit. And so it often happens that such a man + is sorry for his sin not because sin in itself is displeasing to him, but on + account of his reaping some disadvantage from the sin. +
[36942] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ille qui peccat ex habitu, semper gaudet de hoc quod +ex habitu operatur, quandiu habitu utitur. Sed quia potest habitu +non uti, sed per rationem, quae non est totaliter corrupta, aliquid +aliud meditari; potest contingere quod, non utens habitu, doleat de +hoc quod per habitum commisit. Plerumque tamen tales poenitent de +peccato, non quia eis peccatum secundum se displiceat; sed propter +aliquod incommodum quod ex peccato incurrunt.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that whoever sins through certain malice, sins through habit. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 9) that "an + unjust action is not done as an unjust man does it," i.e. through choice, "unless it be done through habit." Now to sin through + certain malice is to sin through making a choice of evil, as stated above + (A[1]). Therefore no one sins through certain malice, unless he has the habit of sin. +
[36943] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod quicumque peccat ex certa malitia, +peccet ex habitu. Dicit enim philosophus, in V Ethic., quod non est +cuiuslibet iniusta facere qualiter iniustus facit, scilicet ex +electione, sed solum habentis habitum. Sed peccare ex certa malitia +est peccare ex electione mali, ut dictum est. Ergo peccare ex certa +malitia non est nisi habentis habitum.
+ Objection 2: Further, Origen says (Peri Archon iii) that "a man is not suddenly ruined and lost, but must needs fall away little by little." + But the greatest fall seems to be that of the man who sins through certain malice. Therefore a man comes to sin through certain + malice, not from the outset, but from inveterate custom, which may engender a habit. +
[36944] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Origenes dicit, in I peri archon, quod non ad subitum quis +evacuatur aut deficit, sed paulatim per partes defluere necesse +est. Sed maximus defluxus esse videtur ut aliquis ex certa +malitia peccet. Ergo non statim a principio, sed per multam +consuetudinem, ex qua habitus generari potest, aliquis ad hoc +devenit ut ex certa malitia peccet.
+ Objection 3: Further, whenever a man sins through certain malice, his will must needs be inclined of itself to the evil he chooses. But + by the nature of that power man is inclined, not to evil but to good. Therefore if he chooses evil, this must be due to something + supervening, which is passion or habit. Now when a man sins through passion, he sins not through certain malice, but through + weakness, as stated ( + Q[77], A[3]). Therefore whenever anyone + sins through certain malice, he sins through habit. +
[36945] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +quandocumque aliquis ex certa malitia peccat, oportet quod ipsa +voluntas de se inclinetur ad malum quod eligit. Sed ex natura +potentiae non inclinatur homo ad malum, sed magis ad bonum. Ergo +oportet, si eligit malum, quod hoc sit ex aliquo supervenienti, +quod est passio vel habitus. Sed quando aliquis peccat ex passione, +non peccat ex certa malitia, sed ex infirmitate, ut dictum est. +Ergo quandocumque aliquis peccat ex certa malitia, oportet quod +peccet ex habitu.
+ On the contrary, The good habit stands in the same relation to the choice of something good, as the bad habit to the choice of something evil. + But it happens sometimes that a man, without having the habit of a virtue, chooses that which is good according to that virtue. + Therefore sometimes also a man, without having the habit of a vice, may choose evil, which is to sin through certain malice. +
[36946] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra, +sicut se habet habitus bonus ad electionem boni, ita habitus malus +ad electionem mali. Sed quandoque aliquis non habens habitum +virtutis, eligit id quod est bonum secundum virtutem. Ergo etiam +quandoque aliquis non habens habitum vitiosum, potest eligere +malum, quod est ex certa malitia peccare.
+ I answer that, The will is related differently to good and to evil. Because from the very nature of the power, it is inclined to the rational + good, as its proper object; wherefore every sin is said to be contrary to nature. Hence, if a will be inclined, by its choice, + to some evil, this must be occasioned by something else. Sometimes, in fact, this is occasioned through some defect in the + reason, as when anyone sins through ignorance; and sometimes this arises through the + impulse of the sensitive appetite, as when anyone sins through passion. Yet neither of these amounts to a sin through certain + malice; for then alone does anyone sin through certain malice, when his will is moved to evil of its own accord. This may + happen in two ways. First, through his having a corrupt disposition inclining him to evil, so that, in respect of that disposition, + some evil is, as it were, suitable and similar to him; and to this thing, by reason of its suitableness, the will + tends, as to something good, because everything tends, of its own accord, to that which is suitable to it. Moreover this corrupt + disposition is either a habit acquired by custom, or a sickly condition on the part of the body, as in the case of a man who + is naturally inclined to certain sins, by reason of some natural corruption in himself. Secondly, the will, of its own accord, + may tend to an evil, through the removal of some obstacle: for instance, if a man be prevented from sinning, not + through sin being in itself displeasing to him, but through hope of eternal life, or fear of hell, if hope give place to despair, + or fear to presumption, he will end in sinning through certain malice, being freed from the bridle, as it were. +
[36947] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod voluntas aliter se habet ad bonum, et aliter ad +malum. Ex natura enim suae potentiae inclinatur ad bonum rationis, +sicut ad proprium obiectum, unde et omne peccatum dicitur esse +contra naturam. Quod ergo in aliquod malum voluntas eligendo +inclinetur, oportet quod aliunde contingat. Et quandoque quidem +contingit ex defectu rationis, sicut cum aliquis ex ignorantia +peccat, quandoque autem ex impulsu appetitus sensitivi, sicut cum +peccat ex passione. Sed neutrum horum est ex certa malitia peccare; +sed tunc solum ex certa malitia aliquis peccat, quando ipsa +voluntas ex seipsa movetur ad malum. Quod potest contingere +dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, per hoc quod homo habet aliquam +dispositionem corruptam inclinantem ad malum, ita quod secundum +illam dispositionem fit homini quasi conveniens et simile aliquod +malum, et in hoc, ratione convenientiae, tendit voluntas quasi in +bonum, quia unumquodque secundum se tendit in id quod sibi est +conveniens. Talis autem dispositio corrupta vel est aliquis habitus +acquisitus ex consuetudine, quae vertitur in naturam, vel est +aliqua aegritudinalis habitudo ex parte corporis, sicut aliquis +habens quasdam naturales inclinationes ad aliqua peccata, propter +corruptionem naturae in ipso. Alio modo contingit quod voluntas per +se tendit in aliquod malum, per remotionem alicuius prohibentis. +Puta si aliquis prohibeatur peccare non quia peccatum ei secundum +se displiceat, sed propter spem vitae aeternae vel propter timorem +Gehennae; remota spe per desperationem, vel timore per +praesumptionem, sequitur quod ex certa malitia, quasi absque freno, +peccet. Sic igitur patet quod peccatum quod est ex certa malitia, +semper praesupponit in homine aliquam inordinationem, quae tamen +non semper est habitus. Unde non est necessarium quod quicumque +peccat ex certa malitia, peccet ex habitu.
It is evident, therefore, that sin committed through certain malice, always presupposes some inordinateness in man, which, + however, is not always a habit: so that it does not follow of necessity, if a man sins through certain malice, that he sins + through habit. +
[36948] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod operari qualiter iniustus operatur, non solum +est operari iniusta ex certa malitia, sed etiam delectabiliter, et +sine gravi renisu rationis. Quod non est nisi eius qui habet +habitum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: To do an action as an unjust man does, may be not only to do unjust things through certain malice, but also to do them with + pleasure, and without any notable resistance on the part of reason, and this occurs only in one who has a habit. +
[36949] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod non statim ad hoc aliquis labitur quod ex certa +malitia peccet, sed praesupponitur aliquid, quod tamen non semper +est habitus, ut dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 2: It is true that a man does not fall suddenly into sin from certain malice, and that something is presupposed; but this something + is not always a habit, as stated above. +
[36950] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod illud propter quod voluntas inclinatur ad malum, non +semper habitus est vel passio, sed quaedam alia, ut dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: That which inclines the will to evil, is not always a habit or a passion, but at times is something else. Moreover, there + is no comparison between choosing good and choosing evil: because evil is never without some good of nature, whereas good + can be perfect without the evil of fault. +
[36951] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod non est similis ratio de electione boni, et de +electione mali. Quia malum nunquam est sine bono naturae, sed bonum +potest esse sine malo culpae perfecte.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that it is not more grievous to sin through certain malice than through passion. Because ignorance excuses + from sin either altogether or in part. Now ignorance is greater in one who sins through certain malice, than in one who sins + through passion; since he that sins through certain malice suffers from the worst form of ignorance, which according to the + Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) is ignorance of principle, for he has a false estimation of the + end, which is the principle in matters of action. Therefore there is more excuse for one who sins through certain malice, + than for one who sins through passion. +
[36952] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ille qui peccat ex certa malitia, non +peccet gravius quam ille qui peccat ex passione. Ignorantia enim +excusat peccatum vel in toto vel in parte. Sed maior est ignorantia +in eo qui peccat ex certa malitia, quam in eo qui peccat ex +passione, nam ille qui peccat ex certa malitia, patitur ignorantiam +principii, quae est maxima, ut philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic.; +habet enim malam existimationem de fine, qui est principium in +operativis. Ergo magis excusatur a peccato qui peccat ex certa +malitia, quam ille qui peccat ex passione.
+ Objection 2: Further, the more a man is impelled to sin, the less grievous his sin, as is clear with regard to a man who is thrown headlong + into sin by a more impetuous passion. Now he that sins through certain malice, is impelled by habit, the impulse of which + is stronger than that of passion. Therefore to sin through habit is less grievous than to sin through passion. +
[36953] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +quanto aliquis habet maius impellens ad peccandum, tanto minus +peccat, sicut patet de eo qui maiori impetu passionis deiicitur in +peccatum. Sed ille qui peccat ex certa malitia, impellitur ab +habitu, cuius est fortior impulsio quam passionis. Ergo ille qui +peccat ex habitu, minus peccat quam ille qui peccat ex +passione.
+ Objection 3: Further, to sin through certain malice is to sin through choosing evil. Now he that sins through passion, also chooses evil. + Therefore he does not sin less than the man who sins through certain malice. +
[36954] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +peccare ex certa malitia est peccare ex electione mali. Sed ille +qui peccat ex passione, etiam eligit malum. Ergo non minus peccat +quam ille qui peccat ex certa malitia.
+ On the contrary, A sin that is committed on purpose, for this very reason deserves heavier punishment, according to + Job 34:26: "He hath struck them as being wicked, in open sight, who, as it were, on purpose, have revolted from Him." Now punishment + is not increased except for a graver fault. Therefore a sin is aggravated through being done on purpose, i.e. through certain + malice. +
[36955] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod peccatum quod ex industria committitur, ex hoc ipso +graviorem poenam meretur, secundum illud Iob XXXIV, quasi impios +percussit eos in loco videntium, qui quasi de industria recesserunt +ab eo. Sed poena non augetur nisi propter gravitatem culpae. +Ergo peccatum ex hoc aggravatur, quod est ex industria, seu certa +malitia.
+ I answer that, A sin committed through malice is more grievous than a sin committed through passion, for three reasons. First, because, + as sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, it follows that, other things being equal, a sin is all the more grievous, + according as the movement of the sin belongs more to the will. Now when a sin is committed through malice, the movement of + sin belongs more to the will, which is then moved to evil of its own accord, than when a sin is + committed through passion, when the will is impelled to sin by something extrinsic, as it were. Wherefore a sin is aggravated + by the very fact that it is committed through certain malice, and so much the more, as the malice is greater; whereas it is + diminished by being committed through passion, and so much the more, as the passion is stronger. Secondly, because the passion + which incites the will to sin, soon passes away, so that man repents of his sin, and soon returns to his good intentions; + whereas the habit, through which a man sins, is a permanent quality, so that he who sins through malice, abides longer in + his sin. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) compares the intemperate man, who sins through malice, to a sick + man who suffers from a chronic disease, while he compares the incontinent man, who sins through passion, to one who suffers + intermittently. Thirdly, because he who sins through certain malice is ill-disposed in respect of the end itself, which is + the + principle in matters of action; and so the defect is more dangerous than in the case of the man who sins through passion, + whose purpose tends to a good end, although this purpose is interrupted on account of the passion, for the time being. Now + the worst of all defects is defect of principle. Therefore it is evident that a sin committed through malice is more grievous + than one committed through passion. +
[36956] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod peccatum quod est ex certa malitia, est gravius +peccato quod est ex passione, triplici ratione. Primo quidem quia, +cum peccatum principaliter in voluntate consistat, quanto motus +peccati est magis proprius voluntati, tanto peccatum est gravius, +ceteris paribus. Cum autem ex certa malitia peccatur, motus peccati +est magis proprius voluntati, quae ex seipsa in malum movetur, quam +quando ex passione peccatur, quasi ex quodam extrinseco impulsu ad +peccandum. Unde peccatum ex hoc ipso quod est ex malitia, +aggravatur, et tanto magis, quanto fuerit vehementior malitia. Ex +eo vero quod est ex passione, diminuitur, et tanto magis, quanto +passio fuerit magis vehemens. Secundo, quia passio quae inclinat +voluntatem ad peccandum, cito transit, et sic homo cito redit ad +bonum propositum, poenitens de peccato. Sed habitus, quo homo ex +malitia peccat, est qualitas permanens, et ideo qui ex malitia +peccat, diuturnius peccat. Unde philosophus, in VII Ethic., +comparat intemperatum, qui peccat ex malitia, infirmo qui continue +laborat; incontinentem autem, qui peccat ex passione, ei qui +laborat interpolate. Tertio, quia ille qui peccat ex certa malitia, +est male dispositus quantum ad ipsum finem, qui est principium in +operabilibus. Et sic eius defectus est periculosior quam eius qui +ex passione peccat, cuius propositum tendit in bonum finem, licet +hoc propositum interrumpatur ad horam propter passionem. Semper +autem defectus principii est pessimus. Unde manifestum est quod +gravius est peccatum quod est ex malitia, quam quod est ex +passione.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Ignorance of choice, to which the objection refers, neither excuses nor diminishes a sin, as stated above ( + Q[76], A[4]). Therefore neither does a greater ignorance of the kind make a sin to be less grave. +
[36957] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ignorantia electionis, de qua obiectio procedit, +neque excusat neque diminuit peccatum, ut supra dictum est. Unde +neque maior ignorantia talis facit esse minus peccatum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The impulse due to passion, is, as it were, due to a defect which is outside the will: whereas, by a habit, the will is inclined + from within. Hence the comparison fails. +
[36958] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod impulsio quae est ex passione, est quasi ex exteriori +respectu voluntatis, sed per habitum inclinatur voluntas quasi ab +interiori. Unde non est similis ratio.
+ Reply to Objection 3: It is one thing to sin while choosing, and another to sin through choosing. For he that sins through passion, sins while + choosing, but not through choosing, because his choosing is not for him the first principle of his sin; for he is induced + through the passion, to choose what he would not choose, were it not for the passion. On the other hand, he that sins through + certain malice, chooses evil of his own accord, in the way already explained ( + AA[2],3), so that his choosing, of which he has full control, is the principle of his sin: and for this reason he is said to sin + "through" choosing. +
[36959] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod aliud est peccare eligentem, et aliud peccare ex +electione. Ille enim qui peccat ex passione, peccat quidem eligens, +non tamen ex electione, quia electio non est in eo primum peccati +principium, sed inducitur ex passione ad eligendum id quod extra +passionem existens non eligeret. Sed ille qui peccat ex certa +malitia, secundum se eligit malum, eo modo quo dictum est. Et ideo +electio in ipso est principium peccati; et propter hoc dicitur ex +electione peccare.
We must now consider the external causes of sin, and (1) on the part of God; (2) on the part of the devil; (3) on the part + of man. +
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is a cause of sin?
(2) Whether the act of sin is from God?
(3) Whether God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart?
(4) Whether these things are directed to the salvation of those who are blinded or hardened?
+[36960] +Iª-IIae q. 79 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +causis exterioribus peccati. Et primo, ex parte Dei; secundo, ex +parte Diaboli; tertio, ex parte hominis. Circa primum quaeruntur +quatuor. Primo, utrum Deus sit causa peccati. Secundo, utrum actus +peccati sit a Deo. Tertio, utrum Deus sit causa excaecationis et +obdurationis. Quarto, utrum haec ordinentur ad salutem eorum qui +excaecantur vel obdurantur.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that God is a cause of sin. For the Apostle says of certain ones ( + Rom. 1:28): "God delivered them up to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are not right [Douay: 'convenient']," and a gloss + comments on this by saying that "God works in men's hearts, by inclining their wills to whatever He wills, whether to good + or to evil." Now sin consists in doing what is not right, and in having a will inclined to evil. Therefore + God is to man a cause of sin. +
[36961] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus sit causa peccati. Dicit enim +apostolus, Rom. I, de quibusdam, tradidit eos Deus in reprobum +sensum, ut faciant ea quae non conveniunt. Et Glossa ibidem +dicit quod Deus operatur in cordibus hominum, inclinando +voluntates eorum in quodcumque voluerit, sive in bonum sive in +malum. Sed facere quae non conveniunt, et inclinari secundum +voluntatem ad malum, est peccatum. Ergo Deus hominibus est causa +peccati.
+ Objection 2: Further, it is written ( + Wis. 14:11): "The creatures of God are turned to an abomination; and a temptation to the souls of men." But a temptation usually denotes + a provocation to sin. Since therefore creatures were made by God alone, as was established in the + FP, Q[44], A[1], it seems that God is a cause of sin, by provoking man to sin. +
[36962] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Sap. XIV, dicitur, creaturae Dei in odium factae sunt, et in +tentationem animae hominum. Sed tentatio solet dici provocatio +ad peccandum. Cum ergo creaturae non sint factae nisi a Deo, ut in +primo habitum est, videtur quod Deus sit causa peccati provocans +homines ad peccandum.
+ Objection 3: Further, the cause of the cause is the cause of the effect. Now God is the cause of the free-will, which itself is the cause + of sin. Therefore God is the cause of sin. +
[36963] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +quidquid est causa causae, est causa effectus. Sed Deus est causa +liberi arbitrii, quod est causa peccati. Ergo Deus est causa +peccati.
+ Objection 4: Further, every evil is opposed to good. But it is not contrary to God's goodness that He should cause the evil of punishment; + since of this evil it is written ( + Is. 45:7) that God creates evil, and ( + Amos 3:6): "Shall there be evil in the city which God [Vulg.: 'the Lord'] hath not done?" Therefore it is not incompatible with God's + goodness that He should cause the evil of fault. +
[36964] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, +omne malum opponitur bono. Sed non repugnat divinae bonitati quod +ipse sit causa mali poenae, de isto enim malo dicitur Isaiae XLV, +quod Deus est creans malum; et Amos III, si est malum in +civitate quod Deus non fecerit? Ergo etiam divinae bonitati non +repugnat quod Deus sit causa culpae.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Wis. 11:25): "Thou . . . hatest none of the things which Thou hast made." Now God hates sin, according to + Wis. 14:9: "To God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful." Therefore God is not a cause of sin. +
[36965] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra, +Sap. XI, dicitur de Deo, nihil odisti eorum quae fecisti. +Odit autem Deus peccatum, secundum illud Sap. XIV, odio est Deo +impius, et impietas eius. Ergo Deus non est causa peccati.
+ I answer that, Man is, in two ways, a cause either of his own or of another's sin. First, directly, namely be inclining his or another's + will to sin; secondly, indirectly, namely be not preventing someone from sinning. Hence ( + Ezech. 3:18) it is said to the watchman: "If thou say not to the wicked: 'Thou shalt surely die' [*Vulg.: "If, when I say to the wicked, + 'Thou shalt surely die,' thou declare it not to him."] . . . I will require his blood at thy + hand." Now God cannot be directly the cause of sin, either in Himself or in another, since every sin is a departure from the + order which is to God as the end: whereas God inclines and turns all things to Himself as to their last end, as Dionysius + states (Div. Nom. i): so that it is impossible that He should be either to Himself or to another the cause of departing from + the order which is to Himself. Therefore He cannot be directly the cause of sin. In like manner neither can He cause sin + indirectly. For it happens that God does not give some the assistance, whereby they may avoid sin, which assistance were He + to give, they would not sin. But He does all this according to the order of His wisdom and justice, since He Himself is Wisdom + and Justice: so that if someone sin it is not imputable to Him as though He were the cause of that sin; even as a pilot is + not said to cause the wrecking of the ship, through not steering the ship, unless he cease to steer while able and bound to + steer. It is therefore evident that God is nowise a cause of sin. +
[36966] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod homo dupliciter est causa peccati vel sui vel +alterius. Uno modo, directe, inclinando scilicet voluntatem suam +vel alterius ad peccandum. Alio modo, indirecte, dum scilicet non +retrahit aliquos a peccato, unde Ezech. III speculatori dicitur, +si non dixeris impio, morte morieris, sanguinem eius de manu tua +requiram. Deus autem non potest esse directe causa peccati vel +sui vel alterius. Quia omne peccatum est per recessum ab ordine qui +est in ipsum sicut in finem. Deus autem omnia inclinat et convertit +in seipsum sicut in ultimum finem, sicut Dionysius dicit, I cap. de +Div. Nom. Unde impossibile est quod sit sibi vel aliis causa +discedendi ab ordine qui est in ipsum. Unde non potest directe esse +causa peccati. Similiter etiam neque indirecte. Contingit enim quod +Deus aliquibus non praebet auxilium ad vitandum peccata, quod si +praeberet, non peccarent. Sed hoc totum facit secundum ordinem suae +sapientiae et iustitiae, cum ipse sit sapientia et iustitia. Unde +non imputatur ei quod alius peccat, sicut causae peccati, sicut +gubernator non dicitur causa submersionis navis ex hoc quod non +gubernat navem, nisi quando subtrahit gubernationem potens et +debens gubernare. Et sic patet quod Deus nullo modo est causa +peccati.
+ Reply to Objection 1: As to the words of the Apostle, the solution is clear from the text. For if God delivered some up to a reprobate sense, it + follows that they already had a reprobate sense, so as to do what was not right. Accordingly He is said to deliver them up + to a reprobate sense, in so far as He does not hinder them from following that reprobate sense, even as we are said to expose + a person to danger if we do not protect him. The saying of Augustine (De Grat. et + Lib. Arb. xxi, whence the gloss quoted is taken) to the effect that "God inclines men's wills to good and evil," is to be + understood as meaning that He inclines the will directly to good; and to evil, in so far as He does not hinder it, as stated + above. And yet even this is due as being deserved through a previous sin. +
[36967] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, quantum ad verba apostoli, ex ipso textu patet +solutio. Si enim Deus tradit aliquos in reprobum sensum, iam ergo +reprobum sensum habent ad faciendum ea quae non conveniunt. Dicitur +ergo tradere eos in reprobum sensum, inquantum non prohibet eos +quin suum sensum reprobum sequantur, sicut dicimur exponere illos +quos non tuemur. Quod autem Augustinus dicit, in libro de gratia et +libero arbitrio, unde sumpta est Glossa, quod Deus inclinat +voluntates hominum in bonum et malum; sic intelligendum est +quod in bonum quidem directe inclinat voluntatem, in malum autem +inquantum non prohibet, sicut dictum est. Et tamen hoc etiam +contingit ex merito praecedentis peccati.
+ Reply to Objection 2: When it is said the "creatures of God are turned 'to' an abomination, and a temptation to the souls of men," the preposition + "to" does not denote causality but sequel [*This is made clear by the Douay Version: the Latin "factae sunt in abominationem" + admits of the translation "were made to be an abomination," which might imply causality.]; for God did not make the creatures + that they might be an evil to man; this was the result of man's folly, + wherefore the text goes on to say, "and a snare to the feet of the unwise," who, to wit, in their folly, use creatures for + a purpose other than that for which they were made. +
[36968] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, cum dicitur, creaturae Dei factae sunt in odium +et in tentationem animae hominum, haec praepositio in non +ponitur causaliter, sed consecutive, non enim Deus fecit creaturas +ad malum hominum, sed hoc consecutum est propter insipientiam +hominum. Unde subditur, et in muscipulam pedibus insipientium, qui +scilicet per suam insipientiam utuntur creaturis ad aliud quam ad +quod factae sunt.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The effect which proceeds from the middle cause, according as it is subordinate to the first cause, is reduced to that first + cause; but if it proceed from the middle cause, according as it goes outside the order of the first cause, it is not reduced + to that first cause: thus if a servant do anything contrary to his master's orders, it is not ascribed to the master as though + he were the cause thereof. In like manner sin, which the free-will commits + against the commandment of God, is not attributed to God as being its cause. +
[36969] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod effectus causae mediae procedens ab ea secundum quod +subditur ordini causae primae, reducitur etiam in causam primam. +Sed si procedat a causa media secundum quod exit ordinem causae +primae, non reducitur in causam primam, sicut si minister faciat +aliquid contra mandatum domini, hoc non reducitur in dominum sicut +in causam. Et similiter peccatum quod liberum arbitrium committit +contra praeceptum Dei, non reducitur in Deum sicut in causam.
+ Reply to Objection 4: Punishment is opposed to the good of the person punished, who is thereby deprived of some good or other: but fault is opposed + to the good of subordination to God; and so it is directly opposed to the Divine goodness; consequently there is no comparison + between fault and punishment. +
[36970] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod poena opponitur bono eius qui punitur, qui privatur +quocumque bono. Sed culpa opponitur bono ordinis qui est in Deum, +unde directe opponitur bonitati divinae. Et propter hoc non est +similis ratio de culpa et poena.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the act of sin is not from God. For Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. ii) that "the act of sin is not + a thing." Now whatever is from God is a thing. Therefore the act of sin is not from God. +
[36971] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus peccati non sit a Deo. Dicit +enim Augustinus, in libro de perfectione iustitiae, quod actus +peccati non est res aliqua. Omne autem quod est a Deo, est res +aliqua. Ergo actus peccati non est a Deo.
+ Objection 2: Further, man is not said to be the cause of sin, except because he is the cause of the sinful act: for "no one works, intending + evil," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Now God is not a cause of sin, as stated above + (A[1]). Therefore God is not the cause of the act of sin. +
[36972] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +homo non dicitur esse causa peccati nisi quia homo est causa actus +peccati, nullus enim intendens ad malum operatur, ut Dionysius +dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed Deus non est causa peccati, ut +dictum est. Ergo Deus non est causa actus peccati.
+ Objection 3: Further, some actions are evil and sinful in their species, as was shown above (Q[18], AA[2],8). Now whatever is the cause + of a thing, causes whatever belongs to it in respect of its species. If therefore God caused the act of sin, He would be the + cause of sin, which is false, as was proved above + (A[1]). Therefore God is not the cause of the act of sin. +
[36973] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +aliqui actus secundum suam speciem sunt mali et peccata, ut ex +supradictis patet. Sed quidquid est causa alicuius, est causa eius +quod convenit ei secundum suam speciem. Si ergo Deus esset causa +actus peccati, sequeretur quod esset causa peccati. Sed hoc non est +verum, ut ostensum est. Ergo Deus non est causa actus peccati.
+ On the contrary, The act of sin is a movement of the free-will. Now "the will of God is the cause of every movement," as Augustine declares + (De Trin. iii, 4,9). Therefore God's will is the cause of the act of sin. +
[36974] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra, +actus peccati est quidam motus liberi arbitrii. Sed voluntas Dei +est causa omnium motionum, ut Augustinus dicit, III de Trin. Ergo +voluntas Dei est causa actus peccati.
+ I answer that, The act of sin is both a being and an act; and in both respects it is from God. Because every being, whatever the mode of + its being, must be derived from the First Being, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. v). Again every action is caused by something + existing in act, since nothing produces an action save in so far as it is in act; and every being in act is reduced to the + First Act, viz. God, as to its cause, Who is act by His Essence. Therefore God is the + cause of every action, in so far as it is an action. But sin denotes a being and an action with a defect: and this defect + is from the created cause, viz. the free-will, as falling away from the order of the First Agent, viz. God. Consequently this + defect is not reduced to God as its cause, but to the free-will: even as the defect of limping is reduced to a crooked leg + as its cause, but not to the motive power, which nevertheless causes whatever there is of movement in the limping. Accordingly + God is the cause of the act of sin: and yet He is not the cause of sin, because He does not cause the act to have a defect. +
[36975] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod actus peccati et est ens, et est actus; et ex utroque +habet quod sit a Deo. Omne enim ens, quocumque modo sit, oportet +quod derivetur a primo ente; ut patet per Dionysium, V cap. de Div. +Nom. Omnis autem actio causatur ab aliquo existente in actu, quia +nihil agit nisi secundum quod est actu, omne autem ens actu +reducitur in primum actum, scilicet Deum, sicut in causam, qui est +per suam essentiam actus. Unde relinquitur quod Deus sit causa +omnis actionis, inquantum est actio. Sed peccatum nominat ens et +actionem cum quodam defectu. Defectus autem ille est ex causa +creata, scilicet libero arbitrio, inquantum deficit ab ordine primi +agentis, scilicet Dei. Unde defectus iste non reducitur in Deum +sicut in causam, sed in liberum arbitrium, sicut defectus +claudicationis reducitur in tibiam curvam sicut in causam, non +autem in virtutem motivam, a qua tamen causatur quidquid est +motionis in claudicatione. Et secundum hoc, Deus est causa actus +peccati, non tamen est causa peccati, quia non est causa huius, +quod actus sit cum defectu.
+ Reply to Objection 1: In this passage Augustine calls by the name of "thing," that which is a thing simply, viz. substance; for in this sense the + act of sin is not a thing. +
[36976] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Augustinus nominat ibi rem id quod est res +simpliciter, scilicet substantiam. Sic enim actus peccati non est +res.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Not only the act, but also the defect, is reduced to man as its cause, which defect consists in man not being subject to + Whom he ought to be, although he does not intend this principally. Wherefore man is the cause of the sin: while God is the + cause of the act, in such a way, that nowise is He the cause of the defect accompanying the act, so that He is not the cause + of the sin. +
[36977] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod in hominem sicut in causam reducitur non solum actus, +sed etiam ipse defectus, quia scilicet non subditur ei cui debet +subdi, licet hoc ipse non intendat principaliter. Et ideo homo est +causa peccati. Sed Deus sic est causa actus, quod nullo modo est +causa defectus concomitantis actum. Et ideo non est causa +peccati.
+ Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ( + Q[72], A[1]), acts and habits do not take their species from the privation itself, wherein consists the nature of evil, but from some + object, to which that privation is united: and so this defect which consists in not being from God, belongs to the species + of the act consequently, and not as a specific difference. +
[36978] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est supra, actus et habitus non +recipiunt speciem ex ipsa privatione, in qua consistit ratio mali; +sed ex aliquo obiecto cui coniungitur talis privatio. Et sic ipse +defectus, qui dicitur non esse a Deo, pertinet ad speciem actus +consequenter, et non quasi differentia specifica.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. + 3) that God is not the cause of that which makes man worse. Now man is made worse by spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. + Therefore God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. +
[36979] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit causa excaecationis et +indurationis. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium +quaest., quod Deus non est causa eius quod homo sit +deterior. Sed per excaecationem et obdurationem fit homo +deterior. Ergo Deus non est causa excaecationis et +obdurationis.
+ Objection 2: Further, Fulgentius says (De Dupl. Praedest. i, 19): "God does not punish what He causes." Now God punishes the hardened + heart, according to + Ecclus. 3:27: "A hard heart shall fear evil at the last." Therefore God is not the cause of hardness of heart. +
[36980] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Fulgentius dicit quod Deus non est ultor illius rei cuius est +auctor. Sed Deus est ultor cordis obdurati, secundum illud +Eccli. III, cor durum male habebit in novissimo. Ergo Deus +non est causa obdurationis.
+ Objection 3: Further, the same effect is not put down to contrary causes. But the cause of spiritual blindness is said to be the malice + of man, according to + Wis. 2:21: "For their own malice blinded them," and again, according to + 2 Cor. 4:4: "The god of this world hath blinded the minds of unbelievers": which causes seem to be opposed to God. Therefore God is + not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. +
[36981] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +idem effectus non attribuitur causis contrariis. Sed causa +excaecationis dicitur esse malitia hominis, secundum illud Sap. II, +excaecavit enim eos malitia eorum; et etiam Diabolus, +secundum illud II ad Cor. IV, Deus huius saeculi excaecavit +mentes infidelium; quae quidem causae videntur esse contrariae +Deo. Deus ergo non est causa excaecationis et obdurationis.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Is. 6:10): "Blind the heart of this people, and make their ears heavy," and + Rom. 9:18: "He hath mercy on whom He will, and whom He will He hardeneth." +
[36982] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Isaiae VI, excaeca cor populi huius, et aures +eius aggrava. Et Rom. IX dicitur, cuius vult, miseretur; et +quem vult, indurat.
+ I answer that, Spiritual blindness and hardness of heart imply two things. One is the movement of the human mind in cleaving to evil, and + turning away from the Divine light; and as regards this, God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart, + just as He is not the cause of sin. The other thing is the withdrawal of grace, the result of which is that the mind is not + enlightened by God to see aright, and man's heart is not softened to live aright; and as + regards this God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. +
Now we must consider that God is the universal cause of the enlightening of souls, according to + Jn. 1:9: "That was the true light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world," even as the sun is the universal cause + of the enlightening of bodies, though not in the same way; for the sun enlightens by necessity of nature, whereas God works + freely, through the order of His wisdom. Now although the sun, so far as it is concerned, enlightens all + bodies, yet if it be encountered by an obstacle in a body, it leaves it in darkness, as happens to a house whose window-shutters + are closed, although the sun is in no way the cause of the house being darkened, since it does not act of its own accord in + failing to light up the interior of the house; and the cause of this is the person who closed the shutters. On the other hand, + God, of His own accord, withholds His grace from those in whom He finds an obstacle: so that the cause of grace being + withheld is not only the man who raises an obstacle to grace; but God, Who, of His own accord, withholds His grace. In this + way, God is the cause of spiritual blindness, deafness of ear, and hardness of heart. +
These differ from one another in respect of the effects of grace, which both perfects the intellect by the gift of wisdom, + and softens the affections by the fire of charity. And since two of the senses excel in rendering service to the intellect, + viz. sight and hearing, of which the former assists "discovery," and the latter, "teaching," hence it is that spiritual "blindness" + corresponds to sight, "heaviness of the ears" to hearing, and "hardness of heart" to the affections. +
[36983] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod excaecatio et obduratio duo important. Quorum unum +est motus animi humani inhaerentis malo, et aversi a divino lumine. +Et quantum ad hoc Deus non est causa excaecationis et obdurationis, +sicut non est causa peccati. Aliud autem est subtractio gratiae, ex +qua sequitur quod mens divinitus non illuminetur ad recte videndum, +et cor hominis non emolliatur ad recte vivendum. Et quantum ad hoc +Deus est causa excaecationis et obdurationis. Est autem +considerandum quod Deus est causa universalis illuminationis +animarum, secundum illud Ioan. I, erat lux vera quae illuminat +omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum, sicut sol est +universalis causa illuminationis corporum. Aliter tamen et aliter, +nam sol agit illuminando per necessitatem naturae; Deus autem agit +voluntarie, per ordinem suae sapientiae. Sol autem, licet quantum +est de se omnia corpora illuminet, si quod tamen impedimentum +inveniat in aliquo corpore, relinquit illud tenebrosum, sicut patet +de domo cuius fenestrae sunt clausae. Sed tamen illius +obscurationis nullo modo causa est sol, non enim suo iudicio agit +ut lumen interius non immittat, sed causa eius est solum ille qui +claudit fenestram. Deus autem proprio iudicio lumen gratiae non +immittit illis in quibus obstaculum invenit. Unde causa +subtractionis gratiae est non solum ille qui ponit obstaculum +gratiae, sed etiam Deus, qui suo iudicio gratiam non apponit. Et +per hunc modum Deus est causa excaecationis, et aggravationis +aurium, et obdurationis cordis. Quae quidem distinguuntur secundum +effectus gratiae, quae et perficit intellectum dono sapientiae, et +affectum emollit igne caritatis. Et quia ad cognitionem intellectus +maxime deserviunt duo sensus, scilicet visus et auditus, quorum +unus deservit inventioni, scilicet visus, alius disciplinae, +scilicet auditus, ideo quantum ad visum, ponitur excaecatio; +quantum ad auditum, aurium aggravatio; quantum ad affectum, +obduratio.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Blindness and hardheartedness, as regards the withholding of grace, are punishments, and therefore, in this respect, they + make man no worse. It is because he is already worsened by sin that he incurs them, even as other punishments. +
[36984] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, cum excaecatio et induratio, ex parte +subtractionis gratiae, sint quaedam poenae, ex hac parte eis homo +non fit deterior, sed deterior factus per culpam, haec incurrit, +sicut et ceteras poenas.
+ Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers hardheartedness in so far as it is a sin. +
[36985] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de obduratione secundum quod +est culpa.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Malice is the demeritorious cause of blindness, just as sin is the cause of punishment: and in this way too, the devil is + said to blind, in so far as he induces man to sin. +
[36986] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod malitia est causa excaecationis meritoria, sicut +culpa est causa poenae. Et hoc etiam modo Diabolus excaecare +dicitur, inquantum inducit ad culpam.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that blindness and hardness of heart are always directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened. + For Augustine says (Enchiridion xi) that "as God is supremely good, He would nowise allow evil to be done, unless He could + draw some good from every evil." Much more, therefore, does He direct to some good, the evil of which He Himself is the cause. + Now God is the cause of blindness and hardness of heart, as stated above + + (A[3]). Therefore they are directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened. +
[36987] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod excaecatio et obduratio semper +ordinentur ad salutem eius qui excaecatur et obduratur. Dicit enim +Augustinus, in Enchirid., quod Deus, cum sit summe bonus, nullo +modo permitteret fieri aliquod malum, nisi posset ex quolibet malo +elicere bonum. Multo igitur magis ordinat ad bonum illud malum +cuius ipse est causa. Sed excaecationis et obdurationis Deus est +causa, ut dictum est. Ergo haec ordinantur ad salutem eius qui +excaecatur vel induratur.
+ Objection 2: Further, it is written ( + Wis. 1:13) that "God hath no pleasure in the destruction of the ungodly [*Vulg.: 'God made not death, neither hath He pleasure in the + destruction of the living.']." Now He would seem to take pleasure in their destruction, if He did not turn their blindness + to their profit: just as a physician would seem to take pleasure in torturing the invalid, if he did not intend to heal the + invalid when he prescribes a bitter + medicine for him. Therefore God turns blindness to the profit of those who are blinded. +
[36988] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Sap. I dicitur quod Deus non delectatur in perditione +impiorum. Videretur autem in eorum perditione delectari, si +eorum excaecationem in bonum eorum non converteret, sicut medicus +videretur delectari in afflictione infirmi, si medicinam amaram, +quam infirmo propinat, ad eius sanitatem non ordinaret. Ergo Deus +excaecationem convertit in bonum excaecatorum.
+ Objection 3: Further, "God is not a respecter of persons" ( + Acts 10:34). Now He directs the blinding of some, to their salvation, as in the case of some of the Jews, who were blinded so as not + to believe in Christ, and, through not believing, to slay Him, and afterwards were seized with compunction, and converted, + as related by Augustine (De Quaest. Evang. iii). Therefore God turns all blindness to the spiritual welfare of those who are + blinded. +
[36989] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 arg. 3 +Praeterea, Deus non est personarum acceptor, ut dicitur Act. +X. Sed quorundam excaecationem ordinat ad eorum salutem, sicut +quorundam Iudaeorum, qui excaecati sunt ut Christo non crederent, +et non credentes occiderent, et postmodum compuncti converterentur, +sicut de quibusdam legitur Act. II; ut patet per Augustinum, in +libro de quaest. Evang. Ergo Deus omnium excaecationem convertit in +eorum salutem.
+ Objection 4: On the other hand, according to + Rom. 3:8, evil should not be done, that good may ensue. Now blindness is an evil. Therefore God does not blind some for the sake of + their welfare. +
[36990] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra, +non sunt facienda mala ut veniant bona, ut dicitur Rom. III. Sed +excaecatio est malum. Ergo Deus non excaecat aliquos propter eorum +bonum.
+ I answer that, Blindness is a kind of preamble to sin. Now sin has a twofold relation---to one thing directly, viz. to the sinner's damnation---to + another, by reason of God's mercy or providence, viz. that the sinner may be healed, in so far as God permits some to fall + into sin, that by acknowledging their sin, they may be humbled and converted, as Augustine states (De Nat. et Grat. xxii). + Therefore blindness, of its very nature, is directed to the damnation of those who + are blinded; for which reason it is accounted an effect of reprobation. But, through God's mercy, temporary blindness is directed + medicinally to the spiritual welfare of those who are blinded. This mercy, however, is not vouchsafed to all those who are + blinded, but only to the predestinated, to whom "all things work together unto good" ( + Rom. 8:28). Therefore as regards some, blindness is directed to their healing; but as regards others, to their damnation; as Augustine + says + (De Quaest. Evang. iii). +
[36991] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod excaecatio est quoddam praeambulum ad peccatum. +Peccatum autem ad duo ordinatur, ad unum quidem per se, scilicet ad +damnationem; ad aliud autem ex misericordi Dei providentia, +scilicet ad sanationem, inquantum Deus permittit aliquos cadere in +peccatum, ut peccatum suum agnoscentes, humilientur et +convertantur, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de natura et gratia. +Unde et excaecatio ex sui natura ordinatur ad damnationem eius qui +excaecatur, propter quod etiam ponitur reprobationis effectus, sed +ex divina misericordia excaecatio ad tempus ordinatur medicinaliter +ad salutem eorum qui excaecantur. Sed haec misericordia non omnibus +impenditur excaecatis, sed praedestinatis solum, quibus omnia +cooperantur in bonum, sicut dicitur Rom. VIII. Unde quantum ad +quosdam, excaecatio ordinatur ad sanationem, quantum autem ad +alios, ad damnationem, ut Augustinus dicit, in III de quaest. +Evang.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Every evil that God does, or permits to be done, is directed to some good; yet not always to the good of those in whom the + evil is, but sometimes to the good of others, or of the whole universe: thus He directs the sin of tyrants to the good of + the martyrs, and the punishment of the lost to the glory of His justice. +
[36992] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod omnia mala quae Deus facit vel permittit fieri, +ordinantur in aliquod bonum, non tamen semper in bonum eius in quo +est malum, sed quandoque ad bonum alterius, vel etiam totius +universi. Sicut culpam tyrannorum ordinavit in bonum martyrum; et +poenam damnatorum ordinat in gloriam suae iustitiae.
+ Reply to Objection 2: God does not take pleasure in the loss of man, as regards the loss itself, but by reason of His justice, or of the good that + ensues from the loss. +
[36993] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod Deus non delectatur in perditione hominum quantum ad +ipsam perditionem, sed ratione suae iustitiae, vel propter bonum +quod inde provenit.
+ Reply to Objection 3: That God directs the blindness of some to their spiritual welfare, is due to His mercy; but that the blindness of others + is directed to their loss is due to His justice: and that He vouchsafes His mercy to some, and not to all, does not make God + a respecter of persons, as explained in the + FP, Q[23], A[5], ad 3. +
[36994] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod hoc quod Deus aliquorum excaecationem ordinat in +eorum salutem, misericordiae est, quod autem excaecatio aliorum +ordinetur ad eorum damnationem, iustitiae est. Quod autem +misericordiam quibusdam impendit et non omnibus, non facit +personarum acceptionem in Deo, sicut in primo dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 4: Evil of fault must not be done, that good may ensue; but evil of punishment must be inflicted for the sake of good. +
[36995] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod mala culpae non sunt facienda ut veniant bona, sed +mala poenae sunt inferenda propter bonum.
We must now consider the cause of sin, as regards the devil; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the devil is directly the cause of sin?
(2) Whether the devil induces us to sin, by persuading us inwardly?
+[36996] +Iª-IIae q. 80 pr. Deinde considerandum est de causa +peccati ex parte Diaboli. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, +utrum Diabolus sit directe causa peccati. Secundo, utrum Diabolus +inducat ad peccandum interius persuadendo. Tertio, utrum possit +necessitatem peccandi inducere. Quarto, utrum omnia peccata ex +Diaboli suggestione proveniant.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the devil is directly the cause of man's sinning. For sin consists directly in an act of the appetite. + Now Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 12) that "the devil inspires his friends with evil desires"; and Bede, commenting on + Acts 5:3, says that the devil "draws the mind to evil desires"; and Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 41; iii, 5) that the devil "fills + men's hearts with secret lusts." Therefore the devil is directly the + cause of sin. +
[36997] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod Diabolus sit homini directe causa +peccandi. Peccatum enim directe in affectu consistit. Sed +Augustinus dicit, IV de Trin., quod Diabolus suae societati +malignos affectus inspirat. Et Beda, super Act., dicit quod +Diabolus animam in affectum malitiae trahit. Et Isidorus +dicit, in libro de summo bono, quod Diabolus corda hominum +occultis cupiditatibus replet. Ergo Diabolus directe est causa +peccati.
+ Objection 2: Further, Jerome says (Contra Jovin. ii, 2) that "as God is the perfecter of good, so is the devil the perfecter of evil." + But God is directly the cause of our good. Therefore the devil is directly the cause of our sins. +
[36998] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Hieronymus dicit quod sicut Deus est perfector boni, ita +Diabolus est perfector mali. Sed Deus est directe causa bonorum +nostrorum. Ergo Diabolus est directe causa peccatorum +nostrorum.
+ Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says in a chapter of the Eudemein Ethics (vii, 18): "There must needs be some extrinsic principle + of human counsel." Now human counsel is not only about good things but also about evil things. Therefore, as God moves man + to take good counsel, and so is the cause of good, so the devil moves him to take evil counsel, and consequently is directly + the cause of sin. +
[36999] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +philosophus probat, in quodam cap. Ethicae Eudemicae, quod oportet +esse quoddam principium extrinsecum humani consilii. Consilium +autem humanum non solum est de bonis, sed etiam de malis. Ergo +sicut Deus movet ad consilium bonum, et per hoc directe est causa +boni; ita Diabolus movet hominem ad consilium malum, et per hoc +sequitur quod Diabolus directe sit causa peccati.
+ On the contrary, Augustine proves (De Lib. Arb. i, 11) that "nothing else than his own will makes man's mind the slave of his desire." Now + man does not become a slave to his desires, except through sin. Therefore the cause of sin cannot be the devil, but man's + own will alone. +
[37000] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus probat, in I et III de Lib. Arb., quod nulla +alia re fit mens hominis serva libidinis, nisi propria +voluntate. Sed homo non fit servus libidinis nisi per peccatum. +Ergo causa peccati non potest esse Diabolus, sed sola propria +voluntas.
+ I answer that, Sin is an action: so that a thing can be directly the cause of sin, in the same way as anyone is directly the cause of an + action; and this can only happen by moving that action's proper principle to act. Now the proper principle of a sinful action + is the will, since every sin is voluntary. Consequently nothing can be directly the cause of sin, except that which can move + the will to act. +
Now the will, as stated above ( + Q[9], AA[3],4,6), can be moved by two things: first by its object, inasmuch as the apprehended appetible is said to move the appetite: + secondly by that agent which moves the will inwardly to will, and this is no other than the will itself, or God, as was shown + above ( + Q[9], AA[3],4,6). Now God cannot be the cause of sin, as stated above ( + Q[79], A[1]). Therefore it follows that + in this respect, a man's will alone is directly the cause of his sin. +
As regards the object, a thing may be understood as moving the will in three ways. First, the object itself which is proposed + to the will: thus we say that food arouses man's desire to eat. Secondly, he that proposes or offers this object. Thirdly, + he that persuades the will that the object proposed has an aspect of good, because he also, in a fashion, offers the will + its proper object, which is a real or apparent good of reason. Accordingly, in the first way the sensible + things, which approach from without, move a man's will to sin. In the second and third ways, either the devil or a man may + incite to sin, either by offering an object of appetite to the senses, or by persuading the reason. But in none of these three + ways can anything be the direct cause of sin, because the will is not, of necessity, moved by any object except the last end, + as stated above ( + Q[10], AA[1],2). Consequently neither the thing offered from without, nor he that + proposes it, nor he that persuades, is the sufficient cause of sin. Therefore it follows that the devil is a cause of sin, + neither directly nor sufficiently, but only by persuasion, or by proposing the object of appetite. +
[37001] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod peccatum actus quidam est. Unde hoc modo potest esse +aliquid directe causa peccati, per quem modum aliquis directe est +causa alicuius actus. Quod quidem non contingit nisi per hoc quod +proprium principium illius actus movet ad agendum. Proprium autem +principium actus peccati est voluntas, quia omne peccatum est +voluntarium. Unde nihil potest directe esse causa peccati, nisi +quod potest movere voluntatem ad agendum. Voluntas autem, sicut +supra dictum est, a duobus moveri potest, uno modo, ab obiecto, +sicut dicitur quod appetibile apprehensum movet appetitum; alio +modo, ab eo quod interius inclinat voluntatem ad volendum. Hoc +autem non est nisi vel ipsa voluntas, vel Deus, ut supra ostensum +est. Deus autem non potest esse causa peccati, ut dictum est. +Relinquitur ergo quod ex hac parte sola voluntas hominis sit +directe causa peccati eius. Ex parte autem obiecti, potest +intelligi quod aliquid moveat voluntatem tripliciter. Uno modo, +ipsum obiectum propositum, sicut dicimus quod cibus excitat +desiderium hominis ad comedendum. Alio modo, ille qui proponit vel +offert huiusmodi obiectum. Tertio modo, ille qui persuadet obiectum +propositum habere rationem boni, quia et hic aliqualiter proponit +proprium obiectum voluntati, quod est rationis bonum verum vel +apparens. Primo igitur modo, res sensibiles exterius apparentes +movent voluntatem hominis ad peccandum, secundo autem et tertio +modo, vel Diabolus, vel etiam homo, potest incitare ad peccandum, +vel offerendo aliquid appetibile sensui, vel persuadendo rationi. +Sed nullo istorum trium modorum potest aliquid esse directa causa +peccati, quia voluntas non ex necessitate movetur ab aliquo obiecto +nisi ab ultimo fine, ut supra dictum est; unde non est sufficiens +causa peccati neque res exterius oblata, neque ille qui eam +proponit, neque ille qui persuadet. Unde sequitur quod Diabolus non +sit causa peccati directe et sufficienter; sed solum per modum +persuadentis, vel proponentis appetibile.
+ Reply to Objection 1: All these, and other like authorities, if we meet with them, are to be understood as denoting that the devil induces man + to affection for a sin, either by suggesting to him, or by offering him objects of appetite. +
[37002] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod omnes illae auctoritates, et si quae similes +inveniantur, sunt referendae ad hoc quod Diabolus suggerendo, vel +aliqua appetibilia proponendo, inducit in affectum peccati.
+ Reply to Objection 2: This comparison is true in so far as the devil is somewhat the cause of our sins, even as God is in a certain way the cause + of our good actions, but does not extend to the mode of causation: for God causes good things in us by moving the will inwardly, + whereas the devil cannot move us in this way. +
[37003] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod similitudo illa est attendenda quantum ad hoc, quod +Diabolus quodammodo est causa peccatorum nostrorum, sicut Deus est +aliquo modo causa bonorum nostrorum. Non tamen attenditur quantum +ad modum causandi, nam Deus causat bona interius movendo +voluntatem, quod Diabolo convenire non potest.
+ Reply to Objection 3: God is the universal principle of all inward movements of man; but that the human will be determined to an evil counsel, + is directly due to the human will, and to the devil as persuading or offering the object of appetite. +
[37004] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod Deus est universale principium omnis interioris motus +humani, sed quod determinetur ad malum consilium voluntas humana, +hoc directe quidem est ex voluntate humana; et a Diabolo per modum +persuadentis, vel appetibilia proponentis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the devil cannot induce man to sin, by internal instigations. Because the internal movements of the soul + are vital functions. Now no vital functions can be exercised except by an intrinsic principle, not even those of the vegetal + soul, which are the lowest of vital functions. Therefore the devil cannot instigate man to evil through his internal movements. +
[37005] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod Diabolus non possit inducere ad +peccandum interius instigando. Interiores enim motus animae sunt +quaedam opera vitae. Sed nullum opus vitae potest esse nisi a +principio intrinseco; nec etiam opus animae vegetabilis, quod est +infimum inter opera vitae. Ergo Diabolus secundum interiores motus +non potest hominem instigare ad malum.
+ Objection 2: Further, all the internal movements arise from the external senses according to the order of nature. Now it belongs to God + alone to do anything beside the order of nature, as was stated in the + FP, Q[110], A[4]. Therefore the devil cannot effect anything in man's internal movements, except in respect of things which are perceived + by the external senses. +
[37006] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +omnes interiores motus, secundum ordinem naturae, a sensibus +exterioribus oriuntur. Sed praeter ordinem naturae aliquid operari +est solius Dei, ut in primo dictum est. Ergo Diabolus non potest in +interioribus motibus hominis aliquid operari, nisi secundum ea quae +exterioribus sensibus apparent.
+ Objection 3: Further, the internal acts of the soul are to understand and to imagine. Now the devil can do nothing in connection with + either of these, because, as stated in the + FP, Q[111], AA[2],3, ad 2, the devil cannot impress species on the human intellect, nor does it seem possible for him to produce imaginary + species, since imaginary forms, being more spiritual, are more excellent than those which are in sensible matter, which, nevertheless, + the devil is unable to produce, as is clear from what we have said in the + FP, Q[110], A[2]; + FP, Q[111], AA[2],3, ad 2. Therefore the devil cannot through man's internal movements induce him to sin. +
[37007] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +interiores actus animae sunt intelligere et imaginari. Sed quantum +ad neutrum horum potest Diabolus aliquid operari. Quia, ut in primo +habitum est, Diabolus non imprimit in intellectum humanum. In +phantasiam etiam videtur quod imprimere non possit, quia formae +imaginatae, tanquam magis spirituales, sunt digniores quam formae +quae sunt in materia sensibili; quas tamen Diabolus imprimere non +potest, ut patet ex his quae in primo habita sunt. Ergo Diabolus +non potest secundum interiores motus inducere hominem ad +peccatum.
+ On the contrary, In that case, the devil would never tempt man, unless he appeared visibly; which is evidently false. +
[37008] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quia secundum hoc nunquam tentaret hominem nisi visibiliter +apparendo. Quod patet esse falsum.
+ I answer that, The interior part of the soul is intellective and sensitive; and the intellective part contains the intellect and the will. + As regards the will, we have already stated + (A[1]; + FP, Q[111], A[1]) what is the devil's relation thereto. Now the intellect, of its very nature, is moved by that which enlightens it in the + knowledge of truth, which the devil has no intention of doing in man's regard; rather does he + darken man's reason so that it may consent to sin, which darkness is due to the imagination and sensitive appetite. Consequently + the operation of the devil seems to be confined to the imagination and sensitive appetite, by moving either of which he can + induce man to sin. For his operation may result in presenting certain forms to the imagination; and he is able to incite the + sensitive appetite to some passion or other. +
The reason of this is, that as stated in the + FP, Q[110], A[3], the corporeal nature has a natural aptitude to be moved locally by the spiritual nature: so that the devil can produce all + those effects which can result from the local movement of bodies here below, except he be restrained by the Divine power. + Now the representation of forms to the imagination is due, sometimes, to local movement: for the Philosopher says (De Somno + et Vigil.) [*De Insomn. + iii, iv.] that "when an animal sleeps, the blood descends in abundance to the sensitive principle, and the movements descend + with it, viz. the impressions left by the action of sensible objects, which impressions are preserved by means of sensible + species, and continue to move the apprehensive principle, so that they appear just as though the sensitive principles were + being affected by them at the time." Hence such a local movement of the vital spirits or humors can be procured by the demons, + whether man sleep or wake: and so it happens that man's imagination is brought into play. +
In like manner, the sensitive appetite is incited to certain passions according to certain fixed movements of the heart and + the vital spirits: wherefore the devil can cooperate in this also. And through certain passions being aroused in the sensitive + appetite, the result is that man more easily perceives the movement or sensible image which is brought in the manner explained, + before the apprehensive principle, since, as the Philosopher observes (De Somno et Virgil.: De Insomn. + iii, iv), "lovers are moved, by even a slight likeness, to an apprehension of the beloved." It also happens, through the rousing + of a passion, that what is put before the imagination, is judged, as being something to be pursued, because, to him who is + held by a passion, whatever the passion inclines him to, seems good. In this way the devil induces man inwardly to sin. +
[37009] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod interior pars animae est intellectiva et sensitiva. +Intellectiva autem continet intellectum et voluntatem. Et de +voluntate quidem iam dictum est quomodo ad eam Diabolus se habet. +Intellectus autem per se quidem movetur ab aliquo illuminante ipsum +ad cognitionem veritatis, quod Diabolus circa hominem non intendit, +sed magis obtenebrare rationem ipsius ad consentiendum peccato. +Quae quidem obtenebratio provenit ex phantasia et appetitu +sensitivo. Unde tota interior operatio Diaboli esse videtur circa +phantasiam et appetitum sensitivum. Quorum utrumque commovendo, +potest inducere ad peccatum, potest enim operari ad hoc quod +imaginationi aliquae formae imaginariae praesententur; potest etiam +facere quod appetitus sensitivus concitetur ad aliquam passionem. +Dictum est enim in primo libro quod natura corporalis spirituali +naturaliter obedit ad motum localem. Unde et Diabolus omnia illa +causare potest quae ex motu locali corporum inferiorum provenire +possunt, nisi virtute divina reprimatur. Quod autem aliquae formae +repraesententur imaginationi, consequitur quandoque ad motum +localem. Dicit enim philosophus, in libro de somno et vigilia, quod +cum animal dormierit, descendente plurimo sanguine ad principium +sensitivum, simul descendunt motus, sive impressiones relictae +ex sensibilium motionibus, quae in sensibilibus speciebus +conservantur, et movent principium apprehensivum, ita quod apparent +ac si tunc principium sensitivum a rebus ipsis exterioribus +immutaretur. Unde talis motus localis spirituum vel humorum potest +procurari a Daemonibus, sive dormiant sive vigilent homines, et sic +sequitur quod homo aliqua imaginetur. Similiter etiam appetitus +sensitivus concitatur ad aliquas passiones secundum quendam +determinatum motum cordis et spirituum. Unde ad hoc etiam Diabolus +potest cooperari. Et ex hoc quod passiones aliquae concitantur in +appetitu sensitivo, sequitur quod et motum sive intentionem +sensibilem praedicto modo reductam ad principium apprehensivum, +magis homo percipiat, quia, ut philosophus in eodem libro dicit, +amantes modica similitudine in apprehensionem rei amatae +moventur. Contingit etiam ex hoc quod passio est concitata, ut +id quod proponitur imaginationi, iudicetur prosequendum, quia ei +qui a passione detinetur, videtur esse bonum id ad quod per +passionem inclinatur. Et per hunc modum Diabolus interius inducit +ad peccandum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Although vital functions are always from an intrinsic principle, yet an extrinsic agent can cooperate with them, even as + external heat cooperates with the functions of the vegetal soul, that food may be more easily digested. +
[37010] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod opera vitae semper etsi sint ab aliquo principio +intrinseco, tamen ad ea potest cooperari aliquod exterius agens, +sicut etiam ad opera animae vegetabilis operatur calor exterior, ut +facilius digeratur cibus.
+ Reply to Objection 2: This apparition of imaginary forms is not altogether outside the order of nature, nor is it due to a command alone, but according + to local movement, as explained above. +
[37011] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod huiusmodi apparitio formarum imaginabilium non est +omnino praeter ordinem naturae. Nec est per solum imperium, sed per +motum localem, ut dictum est.
Reply to Objection 3: Consequently the Reply to the Third Objection is clear, because these forms are received originally from the senses.
[37012] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 ad 3 Unde patet +responsio ad tertium, quia formae illae sunt a sensibus acceptae +primordialiter.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the devil can induce man to sin of necessity. Because the greater can compel the lesser. Now it is said + of the devil ( + Job 41:24) that "there is no power on earth that can compare with him." Therefore he can compel man to sin, while he dwells on the + earth. +
[37013] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod Diabolus possit necessitatem inferre +ad peccandum. Potestas enim maior potest necessitatem inferre +minori. Sed de Diabolo dicitur Iob XLI, non est potestas super +terram quae ei valeat comparari. Ergo potest homini terreno +necessitatem inferre ad peccandum.
+ Objection 2: Further, man's reason cannot be moved except in respect of things that are offered outwardly to the senses, or are represented + to the imagination: because "all our knowledge arises from the senses, and we cannot understand without a phantasm" (De Anima + iii, text. 30. 39). Now the devil can move man's imagination, as stated above + (A[2]); and also the external senses, for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 12) that "this evil," of which, + to wit, the devil is the cause, "extends gradually through all the approaches to the senses, it adapts itself to shapes, blends + with colors, mingles with sounds, seasons every flavor." Therefore it can incline man's reason to sin of necessity. +
[37014] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +ratio hominis non potest moveri nisi secundum ea quae exterius +sensibus proponuntur et imaginationi repraesentantur, quia omnis +nostra cognitio ortum habet a sensu, et non est intelligere sine +phantasmate, ut dicitur in libro de anima. Sed Diabolus potest +movere imaginationem hominis, ut dictum est, et etiam exteriores +sensus, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., +quod serpit hoc malum, scilicet quod est a Diabolo, per +omnes aditus sensuales; dat se figuris, accommodat coloribus, +adhaeret sonis, infundit saporibus. Ergo potest rationem +hominis ex necessitate inclinare ad peccandum.
+ Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 4) that "there is some sin when the flesh lusteth against the spirit." Now the + devil can cause concupiscence of the flesh, even as other passions, in the way explained above + (A[2]). Therefore he can induce man to sin of necessity. +
[37015] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +secundum Augustinum, nonnullum peccatum est, cum caro +concupiscit adversus spiritum. Sed concupiscentiam carnis +Diabolus potest causare, sicut et ceteras passiones, eo modo quo +supra dictum est. Ergo ex necessitate potest inducere ad +peccandum.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + 1 Pet. 5:8): "Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about seeking whom he may devour." Now it would be useless to admonish + thus, if it were true that man were under the necessity of succumbing to the devil. Therefore he cannot induce man to sin + of necessity. +
Further, it is likewise written ( + Jam. 4:7): "Be subject . . . to God, but resist the devil, and he will fly from you," which would be said neither rightly nor truly, + if the devil were able to compel us, in any way whatever, to sin; for then neither would it be possible to resist him, nor + would he fly from those who do. Therefore he does not compel to sin. +
[37016] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur I Petr. ult., adversarius vester Diabolus +tanquam leo rugiens circuit, quaerens quem devoret, cui resistite +fortes in fide. Frustra autem talis admonitio daretur, si homo +ei ex necessitate succumberet. Non ergo potest homini necessitatem +inducere ad peccandum.
+ I answer that, The devil, by his own power, unless he be restrained by God, can compel anyone to do an act which, in its genus, is a sin; + but he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning. This is evident from the fact that man does not resist that which moves + him to sin, except by his reason; the use of which the devil is able to impede altogether, by moving the imagination and the + sensitive appetite; as is the case with one who is possessed. But then, the reason being + thus fettered, whatever man may do, it is not imputed to him as a sin. If, however, the reason is not altogether fettered, + then, in so far as it is free, it can resist sin, as stated above ( + Q[77], A[7]). It is consequently evident that the devil can nowise compel man to sin. +
[37017] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod Diabolus propria virtute, nisi refraenetur a Deo, +potest aliquem inducere ex necessitate ad faciendum aliquem actum +qui de suo genere peccatum est, non autem potest inducere +necessitatem peccandi. Quod patet ex hoc quod homo motivo ad +peccandum non resistit nisi per rationem, cuius usum totaliter +impedire potest movendo imaginationem et appetitum sensitivum, +sicut in arreptitiis patet. Sed tunc, ratione sic ligata, quidquid +homo agat, non imputatur ei ad peccatum. Sed si ratio non sit +totaliter ligata, ex ea parte qua est libera, potest resistere +peccato, sicut supra dictum est. Unde manifestum est quod Diabolus +nullo modo potest necessitatem inducere homini ad peccandum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Not every power that is greater than man, can move man's will; God alone can do this, as stated above ( + Q[9], A[6]). +
[37018] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod non quaelibet potestas maior homine, potest +movere voluntatem hominis, sed solus Deus, ut supra habitum +est.
+ Reply to Objection 2: That which is apprehended by the senses or the imagination does not move the will, of necessity, so long as man has the use + of reason; nor does such an apprehension always fetter the reason. +
[37019] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod illud quod est apprehensum per sensum vel +imaginationem, non ex necessitate movet voluntatem, si homo habeat +usum rationis. Nec semper huiusmodi apprehensio ligat rationem.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The lusting of the flesh against the spirit, when the reason actually resists it, is not a sin, but is matter for the exercise + of virtue. That reason does not resist, is not in the devil's power; wherefore he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning. +
[37020] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod concupiscentia carnis contra spiritum, quando ratio +ei actualiter resistit, non est peccatum, sed materia exercendae +virtutis. Quod autem ratio ei non resistat, non est in potestate +Diaboli. Et ideo non potest inducere necessitatem peccati.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that all the sins of men are due to the devil's suggestion. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the "crowd + of demons are the cause of all evils, both to themselves and to others." +
[37021] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnia peccata hominum sint ex +suggestione Diaboli. Dicit enim Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., +quod multitudo Daemonum causa est omnium malorum et sibi et +aliis.
+ Objection 2: Further, whoever sins mortally, becomes the slave of the devil, according to + Jn. 8:34: "Whosoever committeth sin is the slave [Douay: 'servant'] of sin." Now "by whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is + the slave" ( + 2 Pet. 2:19). Therefore whoever commits a sin, has been overcome by the devil. +
[37022] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +quicumque peccat mortaliter, efficitur servus Diaboli; secundum +illud Ioan. VIII, qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati. Sed ei +aliquis in servitutem addicitur, a quo superatus est, ut +dicitur II Petr. II. Ergo quicumque facit peccatum, superatus est a +Diabolo.
+ Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. iv, 10) the sin of the devil is irreparable, because he sinned at no other's suggestion. Therefore, + if any men were to sin of their own free-will and without suggestion from any other, their sin would be irremediable: which + is clearly false. Therefore all the sins of men are due to the devil's suggestion. +
[37023] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +Gregorius dicit quod peccatum Diaboli est irreparabile, quia +cecidit nullo suggerente. Si igitur aliqui homines peccarent per +liberum arbitrium, nullo suggerente, eorum peccatum esset +irremediabile, quod patet esse falsum. Ergo omnia peccata humana a +Diabolo suggeruntur.
+ On the contrary, It is written (De Eccl. Dogm. lxxxii): "Not all our evil thoughts are incited by the devil; sometimes they are due to a movement + of the free-will." +
[37024] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur in libro de ecclesiasticis dogmatibus, non +omnes cogitationes nostrae malae a Diabolo excitantur, sed +aliquoties ex nostri arbitrii motu emergunt.
+ I answer that, the devil is the occasional and indirect cause of all our sins, in so far as he induced the first man to sin, by reason of + whose sin human nature is so infected, that we are all prone to sin: even as the burning of wood might be imputed to the man + who dried the wood so as to make it easily inflammable. He is not, however, the direct cause of all the sins of men, as though + each were the result of his suggestion. Origen proves this (Peri Archon iii, 2) from + the fact that even if the devil were no more, men would still have the desire for food, sexual pleasures and the like; which + desire might be inordinate, unless it were subordinate to reason, a matter that is subject to the free-will. +
[37025] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod occasionaliter quidem et indirecte Diabolus est causa +omnium peccatorum nostrorum, inquantum induxit primum hominem ad +peccandum, ex cuius peccato intantum vitiata est humana natura, ut +omnes simus ad peccandum proclives, sicut diceretur esse causa +combustionis lignorum qui ligna siccaret, ex quo sequeretur quod +facile incenderentur. Directe autem non est causa omnium peccatorum +humanorum, ita quod singula peccata persuadeat. Quod Origenes +probat ex hoc, quia etiam si Diabolus non esset, homines haberent +appetitum cibi et venereorum et similium, qui posset esse +inordinatus nisi ratione ordinaretur, quod subiacet libero +arbitrio.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The crowd of demons are the cause of all our evils, as regards their original cause, as stated. +
[37026] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod multitudo Daemonum est causa omnium malorum +nostrorum secundum primam originem, ut dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 2: A man becomes another's slave not only by being overcome by him, but also by subjecting himself to him spontaneously: it + is thus that one who sins of his own accord, becomes the slave of the devil. +
[37027] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod non solum fit servus alicuius qui ab eo superatur, +sed etiam qui se ei voluntarie subiicit. Et hoc modo fit servus +Diaboli qui motu proprio peccat.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The devil's sin was irremediable, not only because he sinned without another's suggestion; but also because he was not already + prone to sin, on account of any previous sin; which can be said of no sin of man. +
[37028] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod peccatum Diaboli fuit irremediabile, quia nec aliquo +suggerente peccavit, nec habuit aliquam pronitatem ad peccandum ex +praecedenti suggestione causatam. Quod de nullo hominis peccato +dici potest.
We must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of man. Now, while man, like the devil, is the cause of another's sin, + by outward suggestion, he has a certain special manner of causing sin, by way of origin. Wherefore we must speak about original + sin, the consideration of which will be three-fold: (1) Of its transmission; (2) of its essence; (3) of its subject. +
Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether man's first sin is transmitted, by way of origin to his descendants?
(4) Whether it would be contracted by anyone formed miraculously from some part of the human body?
(5) Whether original sin would have been contracted if the woman, and not the man, had sinned?
+[37029] +Iª-IIae q. 81 pr. Deinde considerandum est de causa +peccati ex parte hominis. Cum autem homo sit causa peccati alteri +homini exterius suggerendo, sicut et Diabolus, habet quendam +specialem modum causandi peccatum in alterum per originem. Unde de +peccato originali dicendum est. Circa quod tria consideranda +occurrunt, primo, de eius traductione; secundo, de eius essentia; +tertio, de eius subiecto. Circa primum quaeruntur quinque. Primo, +utrum primum peccatum hominis derivetur per originem in posteros. +Secundo, utrum omnia alia peccata primi parentis, vel etiam aliorum +parentum, per originem in posteros deriventur. Tertio, utrum +peccatum originale derivetur ad omnes qui ex Adam per viam seminis +generantur. Quarto, utrum derivaretur ad illos qui miraculose ex +aliqua parte humani corporis formarentur. Quinto, utrum si femina +peccasset, viro non peccante, traduceretur originale peccatum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the first sin of our first parent is not contracted by others, by way of origin. For it is written ( + Ezech. 18:20): "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father." But he would bear the iniquity if he contracted it from him. Therefore + no one contracts any sin from one of his parents by way of origin. +
[37030] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod primum peccatum primi parentis non +traducatur ad alios per originem. Dicitur enim Ezech. XVIII, +filius non portabit iniquitatem patris. Portaret autem, si +ab eo iniquitatem traheret. Ergo nullus trahit ab aliquo parentum +per originem aliquod peccatum.
+ Objection 2: Further, an accident is not transmitted by way of origin, unless its subject be also transmitted, since accidents do not + pass from one subject to another. Now the rational soul which is the subject of sin, is not transmitted by way of origin, + as was shown in the + FP, Q[118], A[2]. Therefore neither can any sin be transmitted by way of origin. +
[37031] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +accidens non traducitur per originem, nisi traducto subiecto, eo +quod accidens non transit de subiecto in subiectum. Sed anima +rationalis, quae est subiectum culpae, non traducitur per originem, +ut in primo ostensum est. Ergo neque aliqua culpa per originem +traduci potest.
+ Objection 3: Further, whatever is transmitted by way of human origin, is caused by the semen. But the semen cannot cause sin, because + it lacks the rational part of the soul, which alone can be a cause of sin. Therefore no sin can be contracted by way of origin. +
[37032] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +omne illud quod traducitur per originem humanam, causatur ex +semine. Sed semen non potest causare peccatum, eo quod caret +rationali parte animae, quae sola potest esse causa peccati. Ergo +nullum peccatum potest trahi per originem.
+ Objection 4: Further, that which is more perfect in nature, is more powerful in action. Now perfect flesh cannot infect the soul united + to it, else the soul could not be cleansed of original sin, so long as it is united to the body. Much less, therefore, can + the semen infect the soul. +
[37033] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, +quod est perfectius in natura, virtuosius est ad agendum. Sed caro +perfecta non potest inficere animam sibi unitam, alioquin anima non +posset emundari a culpa originali dum est carni unita. Ergo multo +minus semen potest inficere animam.
+ Objection 5: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "No one finds fault with those who are ugly by nature, but only those who + are so through want of exercise and through carelessness." Now those are said to be "naturally ugly," who are so from their + origin. Therefore nothing which comes by way of origin is blameworthy or sinful. +
[37034] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 arg. 5 Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod propter naturam turpes +nullus increpat, sed eos qui propter desidiam et negligentiam. +Dicuntur autem natura turpes qui habent turpitudinem ex sua +origine. Ergo nihil quod est per originem, est increpabile, neque +peccatum.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle says ( + Rom. 5:12): "By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death." Nor can this be understood as denoting imitation or suggestion, + since it is written ( + Wis. 2:24): "By the envy of the devil, death came into this world." It follows therefore that through origin from the first man sin + entered into the world. +
[37035] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. V, per unum hominem peccatum in +hunc mundum intravit. Quod non potest intelligi per modum +imitationis, propter hoc quod dicitur Sap. II, invidia Diaboli +mors intravit in orbem terrarum. Restat ergo quod per originem +a primo homine peccatum in mundo intravit.
+ I answer that, According to the Catholic Faith we are bound to hold that the first sin of the first man is transmitted to his descendants, + by way of origin. For this reason children are taken to be baptized soon after their birth, to show that they have to be washed + from some uncleanness. The contrary is part of the Pelagian heresy, as is clear from Augustine in many of his books [*For + instance, Retract. i, 9; De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. ix; Contra Julian. iii, 1; De Dono + Persev. xi, xii.] +
In endeavoring to explain how the sin of our first parent could be transmitted by way of origin to his descendants, various + writers have gone about it in various ways. For some, considering that the subject of sin is the rational soul, maintained + that the rational soul is transmitted with the semen, so that thus an infected soul would seem to produce other infected souls. + Others, rejecting this as erroneous, endeavored to show how the guilt of the parent's soul can be + transmitted to the children, even though the soul be not transmitted, from the fact that defects of the body are transmitted + from parent to child---thus a leper may beget a leper, or a gouty man may be the father of a gouty son, on account of some + seminal corruption, although this corruption is not leprosy or gout. Now since the body is proportionate to the soul, and + since the soul's defects redound into the body, and vice versa, in like manner, say they, a culpable defect of the soul is + passed + on to the child, through the transmission of the semen, albeit the semen itself is not the subject of the guilt. +
But all these explanations are insufficient. Because, granted that some bodily defects are transmitted by way of origin from + parent to child, and granted that even some defects of the soul are transmitted in consequence, on account of a defect in + the bodily habit, as in the case of idiots begetting idiots; nevertheless the fact of having a defect by the way of origin + seems to exclude the notion of guilt, which is essentially something voluntary. Wherefore granted that the + rational soul were transmitted, from the very fact that the stain on the child's soul is not in its will, it would cease to + be a guilty stain binding its subject to punishment; for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5), "no one reproaches a man + born blind; one rather takes pity on him." +
Therefore we must explain the matter otherwise by saying that all men born of Adam may be considered as one man, inasmuch + as they have one common nature, which they receive from their first parents; even as in civil matters, all who are members + of one community are reputed as one body, and the whole community as one man. Indeed Porphyry says (Praedic., De Specie) that + "by sharing the same species, many men are one man." Accordingly the multitude of men born of Adam, are as so + many members of one body. Now the action of one member of the body, of the hand for instance, is voluntary not by the will + of that hand, but by the will of the soul, the first mover of the members. Wherefore a murder which the hand commits would + not be imputed as a sin to the hand, considered by itself as apart from the body, but is imputed to it as something belonging + to man and moved by man's first moving principle. In this way, then, the disorder which is in this man born of Adam, is + voluntary, not by his will, but by the will of his first parent, who, by the movement of generation, moves all who originate + from him, even as the soul's will moves all the members to their actions. Hence the sin which is thus transmitted by the first + parent to his descendants is called "original," just as the sin which flows from the soul into the bodily members is called + "actual." And just as the actual sin that is committed by a member of the body, is not the sin of that member, except + inasmuch as that member is a part of the man, for which reason it is called a "human sin"; so original sin is not the sin + of this person, except inasmuch as this person receives his nature from his first parent, for which reason it is called the + "sin of nature," according to + Eph. 2:3: "We . . . were by nature children of wrath." +
[37036] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod secundum fidem Catholicam est tenendum quod primum +peccatum primi hominis originaliter transit in posteros. Propter +quod etiam pueri mox nati deferuntur ad Baptismum, tanquam ab +aliqua infectione culpae abluendi. Contrarium autem est haeresis +Pelagianae, ut patet per Augustinum in plurimis suis libris. Ad +investigandum autem qualiter peccatum primi parentis originaliter +possit transire in posteros, diversi diversis viis processerunt. +Quidam enim, considerantes quod peccati subiectum est anima +rationalis, posuerunt quod cum semine rationalis anima traducatur, +ut sic ex infecta anima animae infectae derivari videantur. Alii +vero, hoc repudiantes tanquam erroneum, conati sunt ostendere +quomodo culpa animae parentis traducitur in prolem, etiam si anima +non traducatur, per hoc quod corporis defectus traducuntur a +parente in prolem, sicut si leprosus generat leprosum, et +podagricus podagricum, propter aliquam corruptionem seminis, licet +talis corruptio non dicatur lepra vel podagra. Cum autem corpus sit +proportionatum animae, et defectus animae redundent in corpus, et e +converso; simili modo dicunt quod culpabilis defectus animae per +traductionem seminis in prolem derivatur, quamvis semen actualiter +non sit culpae subiectum. Sed omnes huiusmodi viae insufficientes +sunt. Quia dato quod aliqui defectus corporales a parente transeant +in prolem per originem; et etiam aliqui defectus animae ex +consequenti, propter corporis indispositionem, sicut interdum ex +fatuis fatui generantur, tamen hoc ipsum quod est ex origine +aliquem defectum habere, videtur excludere rationem culpae, de +cuius ratione est quod sit voluntaria. Unde etiam posito quod anima +rationalis traduceretur, ex hoc ipso quod infectio animae prolis +non esset in eius voluntate, amitteret rationem culpae obligantis +ad poenam, quia, ut philosophus dicit in III Ethic., nullus +improperabit caeco nato, sed magis miserebitur. Et ideo alia +via procedendum est, dicendo quod omnes homines qui nascuntur ex +Adam, possunt considerari ut unus homo, inquantum conveniunt in +natura, quam a primo parente accipiunt; secundum quod in civilibus +omnes qui sunt unius communitatis, reputantur quasi unum corpus, et +tota communitas quasi unus homo. Porphyrius etiam dicit quod +participatione speciei plures homines sunt unus homo. Sic +igitur multi homines ex Adam derivati, sunt tanquam multa membra +unius corporis. Actus autem unius membri corporalis, puta manus, +non est voluntarius voluntate ipsius manus, sed voluntate animae, +quae primo movet membra. Unde homicidium quod manus committit, non +imputaretur manui ad peccatum, si consideraretur manus secundum se +ut divisa a corpore, sed imputatur ei inquantum est aliquid hominis +quod movetur a primo principio motivo hominis. Sic igitur +inordinatio quae est in isto homine, ex Adam generato, non est +voluntaria voluntate ipsius sed voluntate primi parentis, qui movet +motione generationis omnes qui ex eius origine derivantur, sicut +voluntas animae movet omnia membra ad actum. Unde peccatum quod sic +a primo parente in posteros derivatur, dicitur originale, sicut +peccatum quod ab anima derivatur ad membra corporis, dicitur +actuale. Et sicut peccatum actuale quod per membrum aliquod +committitur, non est peccatum illius membri nisi inquantum illud +membrum est aliquid ipsius hominis, propter quod vocatur peccatum +humanum; ita peccatum originale non est peccatum huius personae, +nisi inquantum haec persona recipit naturam a primo parente. Unde +et vocatur peccatum naturae; secundum illud Ephes. II, eramus +natura filii irae.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The son is said not to bear the iniquity of his father, because he is not punished for his father's sin, unless he share + in his guilt. It is thus in the case before us: because guilt is transmitted by the way of origin from father to son, even + as actual sin is transmitted through being imitated. +
[37037] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod filius dicitur non portare peccatum patris, quia +non punitur pro peccato patris, nisi sit particeps culpae. Et sic +est in proposito, derivatur enim per originem culpa a patre in +filium, sicut et peccatum actuale per imitationem.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Although the soul is not transmitted, because the power in the semen is not able to cause the rational soul, nevertheless + the motion of the semen is a disposition to the transmission of the rational soul: so that the semen by its own power transmits + the human nature from parent to child, and with that nature, the stain which infects it: for he that is born is associated + with his first parent in his guilt, through the fact that he inherits his nature + from him by a kind of movement which is that of generation. +
[37038] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, etsi anima non traducatur, quia virtus seminis non +potest causare animam rationalem; movet tamen ad ipsam dispositive. +Unde per virtutem seminis traducitur humana natura a parente in +prolem, et simul cum natura naturae infectio, ex hoc enim fit iste +qui nascitur consors culpae primi parentis, quod naturam ab eo +sortitur per quandam generativam motionem.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Although the guilt is not actually in the semen, yet human nature is there virtually accompanied by that guilt. +
[37039] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, etsi culpa non sit actu in semine, est tamen ibi +virtute humana natura, quam concomitatur talis culpa.
+ Reply to Objection 4: The semen is the principle of generation, which is an act proper to nature, by helping it to propagate itself. Hence the + soul is more infected by the semen, than by the flesh which is already perfect, and already affixed to a certain person. +
[37040] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod semen est principium generationis, quae est proprius +actus naturae, eius propagationi deserviens. Et ideo magis +inficitur anima per semen quam per carnem iam perfectam, quae iam +determinata est ad personam.
+ Reply to Objection 5: A man is not blamed for that which he has from his origin, if we consider the man born, in himself. But it we consider him + as referred to a principle, then he may be reproached for it: thus a man may from his birth be under a family disgrace, on + account of a crime committed by one of his forbears. +
[37041] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 ad 5 Ad quintum +dicendum quod illud quod est per originem, non est increpabile, si +consideretur iste qui nascitur secundum se. Sed si consideretur +prout refertur ad aliquod principium, sic potest esse ei +increpabile, sicut aliquis qui nascitur patitur ignominiam generis +ex culpa alicuius progenitorum causatam.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that also other sins, whether of the first parent or of nearer ancestors, are transmitted to their descendants. + For punishment is never due unless for fault. Now some are punished by the judgment of God for the sin of their immediate + parents, according to + Ex. 20:5: "I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation." + Furthermore, according to human law, the children of those + who are guilty of high treason are disinherited. Therefore the guilt of nearer ancestors is also transmitted to their descendants. +
[37042] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod etiam alia peccata vel ipsius primi +parentis, vel proximorum parentum, traducantur in posteros. Poena +enim nunquam debetur nisi culpae. Sed aliqui puniuntur iudicio +divino pro peccato proximorum parentum; secundum illud Exod. XX, +ego sum Deus Zelotes, visitans iniquitatem patrum in filios, in +tertiam et quartam generationem. Iudicio etiam humano, in +crimine laesae maiestatis, filii exheredantur pro peccato parentum. +Ergo etiam culpa proximorum parentum transit ad posteros.
+ Objection 2: Further, a man can better transmit to another, that which he has of himself, than that which he has received from another: + thus fire heats better than hot water does. Now a man transmits to his children, by the way, of origin, the sin which he has + from Adam. Much more therefore should he transmit the sin which he has contracted of himself. +
[37043] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +magis potest transferre in alterum id quod habet aliquis a seipso, +quam id quod habet ex alio, sicut ignis magis potest calefacere +quam aqua calefacta, sed homo transfert in prolem per originem +peccatum quod habet ab Adam. Ergo multo magis peccatum quod ipse +commisit.
+ Objection 3: Further, the reason why we contract original sin from our first parent is because we were in him as in the principle of our + nature, which he corrupted. But we were likewise in our nearer ancestors, as in principles of our nature, which however it + be corrupt, can be corrupted yet more by sin, according to + Apoc. 22:11: "He that is filthy, let him be filthier still." Therefore children contract, by the way of origin, the sins of their nearer + ancestors, even as they contract the sin of their first parent. +
[37044] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +ideo contrahimus a primo parente peccatum originale, quia in eo +fuimus sicut in principio naturae, quam ipse corrupit. Sed +similiter fuimus in proximis parentibus sicut in quibusdam +principiis naturae, quae etsi sit corrupta, potest adhuc magis +corrumpi per peccatum, secundum illud Apoc. ult., qui in +sordibus est, sordescat adhuc. Ergo filii contrahunt peccata +proximorum parentum per originem, sicut et primi parentis.
+ On the contrary, Good is more self-diffusive than evil. But the merits of the nearer ancestors are not transmitted to their descendants. Much + less therefore are their sins. +
[37045] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra, +bonum est magis diffusivum sui quam malum. Sed merita proximorum +parentum non traducuntur ad posteros. Ergo multo minus peccata.
+ I answer that, Augustine puts this question in the Enchiridion xlvi, xlvii, and leaves it unsolved. Yet if we look into the matter carefully + we shall see that it is impossible for the sins of the nearer ancestors, or even any other but the first sin of our first + parent to be transmitted by way of origin. The reason is that a man begets his like in species but not in individual. Consequently + those things that pertain directly to the individual, such as personal actions and + matters affecting them, are not transmitted by parents to their children: for a grammarian does not transmit to his son the + knowledge of grammar that he has acquired by his own studies. On the other hand, those things that concern the nature of the + species, are transmitted by parents to their children, unless there be a defect of nature: thus a man with eyes begets a son + having eyes, unless nature fails. And if nature be strong, even certain accidents of the individual pertaining to natural + disposition, are transmitted to the children, e.g. fleetness of body, acuteness of intellect, and so forth; but nowise those + that are purely personal, as stated above. +
Now just as something may belong to the person as such, and also something through the gift of grace, so may something belong + to the nature as such, viz. whatever is caused by the principles of nature, and something too through the gift of grace. In + this way original justice, as stated in the + FP, Q[100], A[1], was a gift of grace, conferred by God on all human nature in our first parent. This gift the first man lost by his first + sin. Wherefore as that + original justice together with the nature was to have been transmitted to his posterity, so also was its disorder. Other actual + sins, however, whether of the first parent or of others, do not corrupt the nature as nature, but only as the nature of that + person, i.e. in respect of the proneness to sin: and consequently other sins are not transmitted. +
[37046] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod Augustinus hanc quaestionem movet in Enchiridio, et +insolutam relinquit. Sed si quis diligenter attendit, impossibile +est quod aliqua peccata proximorum parentum, vel etiam primi +parentis praeter primum, per originem traducantur. Cuius ratio est +quia homo generat sibi idem in specie, non autem secundum +individuum. Et ideo ea quae directe pertinent ad individuum, sicut +personales actus et quae ad eos pertinent, non traducuntur a +parentibus in filios, non enim grammaticus traducit in filium +scientiam grammaticae, quam proprio studio acquisivit. Sed ea quae +pertinent ad naturam speciei, traducuntur a parentibus in filios, +nisi sit defectus naturae, sicut oculatus generat oculatum, nisi +natura deficiat. Et si natura sit fortis, etiam aliqua accidentia +individualia propagantur in filios, pertinentia ad dispositionem +naturae, sicut velocitas corporis, bonitas ingenii, et alia +huiusmodi, nullo autem modo ea quae sunt pure personalia, ut dictum +est. Sicut autem ad personam pertinet aliquid secundum seipsam, et +aliquid ex dono gratiae; ita etiam ad naturam potest aliquid +pertinere secundum seipsam, scilicet quod causatur ex principiis +eius, et aliquid ex dono gratiae. Et hoc modo iustitia originalis, +sicut in primo dictum est, erat quoddam donum gratiae toti humanae +naturae divinitus collatum in primo parente. Quod quidem primus +homo amisit per primum peccatum. Unde sicut illa originalis +iustitia traducta fuisset in posteros simul cum natura, ita etiam +inordinatio opposita. Sed alia peccata actualia vel primi parentis +vel aliorum, non corrumpunt naturam quantum ad id quod naturae est; +sed solum quantum ad id quod personae est, idest secundum +pronitatem ad actum. Unde alia peccata non traducuntur.
+ Reply to Objection 1: According to Augustine in his letter to Avitus [*Ep. ad Auxilium ccl.], children are never inflicted with spiritual punishment + on account of their parents, unless they share in their guilt, either in their origin, or by imitation, because every soul + is God's immediate property, as stated in + Ezech. 18:4. Sometimes, however, by Divine or human judgment, children receive bodily punishment on their parents' account, inasmuch as + the + child, as to its body, is part of its father. +
[37047] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod poena spirituali, sicut Augustinus dicit in +epistola ad avitum, nunquam puniuntur filii pro parentibus, nisi +communicent in culpa, vel per originem vel per imitationem, quia +omnes animae immediate sunt Dei, ut dicitur Ezech. XVIII. Sed poena +corporali interdum, iudicio divino vel humano, puniuntur filii pro +parentibus, inquantum filius est aliquid patris secundum +corpus.
+ Reply to Objection 2: A man can more easily transmit that which he has of himself, provided it be transmissible. But the actual sins of our nearer + ancestors are not transmissible, because they are purely personal, as stated above. +
[37048] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod illud quod habet aliquis ex se, magis potest +traducere, dummodo sit traducibile. Sed peccata actualia proximorum +parentum non sunt traducibilia, quia sunt pure personalia, ut +dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The first sin infects nature with a human corruption pertaining to nature; whereas other sins infect it with a corruption + pertaining only to the person. +
[37049] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod primum peccatum corrumpit naturam humanam corruptione +ad naturam pertinente, alia vero peccata corrumpunt eam corruptione +pertinente ad solam personam.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of the first parent is not transmitted, by the way of origin, to all men. Because death is a punishment + consequent upon original sin. But not all those, who are born of the seed of Adam, will die: since those who will be still + living at the coming of our Lord, will never die, as, seemingly, may be gathered from + 1 Thess. 4:14: "We who are alive . . . unto the coming of the Lord, shall not prevent them who have + slept." Therefore they do not contract original sin. +
[37050] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum primi parentis non transeat +per originem in omnes homines. Mors enim est poena consequens +originale peccatum. Sed non omnes qui procedunt seminaliter ex +Adam, morientur, illi enim qui vivi reperientur in adventu domini, +nunquam morientur, ut videtur per quod dicitur I Thessal. IV, +nos qui vivimus, non praeveniemus in adventu domini eos qui +dormierunt. Ergo illi non contrahunt originale peccatum.
+ Objection 2: Further, no one gives another what he has not himself. Now a man who has been baptized has not original sin. Therefore he + does not transmit it to his children. +
[37051] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +nullus dat alteri quod ipse non habet. Sed homo baptizatus non +habet peccatum originale. Ergo non traducit ipsum in prolem.
+ Objection 3: Further, the gift of Christ is greater than the sin of Adam, as the Apostle declares ( + Rom. 5:15, seqq). But the gift of Christ is not transmitted to all men: neither, therefore, is the sin of Adam. +
[37052] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +donum Christi est maius quam peccatum Adae, ut apostolus dicit, +Rom. V. Sed donum Christi non transit in omnes homines. Ergo nec +peccatum Adae.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle says ( + Rom. 5:12): "Death passed upon all men in whom all have sinned." +
[37053] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. V, mors in omnes pertransiit, in +quo omnes peccaverunt.
+ I answer that, According to the Catholic Faith we must firmly believe that, Christ alone excepted, all men descended from Adam contract + original sin from him; else all would not need redemption [*Cf. Translator's note inserted before TP, Q[27]] which is through + Christ; and this is erroneous. The reason for this may be gathered from what has been stated + (A[1]), viz. that original sin, in virtue of the sin of our first parent, is transmitted to his + posterity, just as, from the soul's will, actual sin is transmitted to the members of the body, through their being moved + by the will. Now it is evident that actual sin can be transmitted to all such members as have an inborn aptitude to be moved + by the will. Therefore original sin is transmitted to all those who are moved by Adam by the movement of generation. +
[37054] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod secundum fidem Catholicam firmiter est tenendum quod +omnes homines, praeter solum Christum, ex Adam derivati, peccatum +originale ex eo contrahunt, alioquin non omnes indigerent +redemptione quae est per Christum; quod est erroneum. Ratio autem +sumi potest ex hoc quod supra dictum est, quod sic ex peccato primi +parentis traducitur culpa originalis in posteros, sicut a voluntate +animae per motionem membrorum traducitur peccatum actuale ad membra +corporis. Manifestum est autem quod peccatum actuale traduci potest +ad omnia membra quae nata sunt moveri a voluntate. Unde et culpa +originalis traducitur ad omnes illos qui moventur ab Adam motione +generationis.
+ Reply to Objection 1: It is held with greater probability and more commonly that all those that are alive at the coming of our Lord, will die, + and rise again shortly, as we shall state more fully in the TP ( + XP, Q[78], A[1], OBJ[1]). If, however, it be true, as others hold, that they will never die, (an opinion which Jerome mentions among others + in a letter to Minerius, on the Resurrection of the Body---Ep. cxix), then we must say in reply to the + objection, that although they are not to die, the debt of death is none the less in them, and that the punishment of death + will be remitted by God, since He can also forgive the punishment due for actual sins. +
[37055] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod probabilius et communius tenetur quod omnes illi +qui in adventu domini reperientur, morientur, et post modicum +resurgent, ut in tertio plenius dicetur. Si tamen hoc verum sit +quod alii dicunt, quod illi nunquam morientur, sicut Hieronymus +narrat diversorum opiniones in quadam epistola ad Minerium, de +resurrectione carnis; dicendum est ad argumentum, quod illi etsi +non moriantur, est tamen in eis reatus mortis, sed poena aufertur a +Deo, qui etiam peccatorum actualium poenas condonare potest.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Original sin is taken away by Baptism as to the guilt, in so far as the soul recovers grace as regards the mind. Nevertheless + original sin remains in its effect as regards the "fomes," which is the disorder of the lower parts of the soul and of the + body itself, in respect of which, and not of the mind, man exercises his power of generation. Consequently those who are baptized + transmit original sin: since they do not beget as being renewed in Baptism, + but as still retaining something of the oldness of the first sin. +
[37056] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod peccatum originale per Baptismum aufertur reatu, +inquantum anima recuperat gratiam quantum ad mentem. Remanet tamen +peccatum originale actu quantum ad fomitem, qui est inordinatio +inferiorum partium animae et ipsius corporis, secundum quod homo +generat, et non secundum mentem. Et ideo baptizati traducunt +peccatum originale, non enim generant inquantum sunt renovati per +Baptismum, sed inquantum retinent adhuc aliquid de vetustate primi +peccati.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Just as Adam's sin is transmitted to all who are born of Adam corporally, so is the grace of Christ transmitted to all that + are begotten of Him spiritually, by faith and Baptism: and this, not only unto the removal of sin of their first parent, but + also unto the removal of actual sins, and the obtaining of glory. +
[37057] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut peccatum Adae traducitur in omnes qui ab Adam +corporaliter generantur, ita gratia Christi traducitur in omnes qui +ab eo spiritualiter generantur per fidem et Baptismum, et non solum +ad removendam culpam primi parentis, sed etiam ad removendum +peccata actualia, et ad introducendum in gloriam.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that original sin would be contracted by a person formed miraculously from human flesh. For a gloss on + Gn. 4:1 says that "Adam's entire posterity was corrupted in his loins, because they were not severed from him in the place of life, + before he sinned, but in the place of exile after he had sinned." But if a man were to be formed in the aforesaid manner, + his flesh would be severed in the place of exile. Therefore it would + contract original sin. +
[37058] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod, si aliquis formaretur ex carne humana +miraculose, contraheret originale peccatum. Dicit enim quaedam +Glossa Gen. IV, quod in lumbis Adae fuit tota posteritas +corrupta, quia non est separata prius in loco vitae, sed postea in +loco exilii. Sed si aliquis homo sic formaretur sicut dictum +est, caro eius separaretur in loco exilii. Ergo contraheret +originale peccatum.
+ Objection 2: Further, original sin is caused in us by the soul being infected through the flesh. But man's flesh is entirely corrupted. + Therefore a man's soul would contract the infection of original sin, from whatever part of the flesh it was formed. +
[37059] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +peccatum originale causatur in nobis inquantum anima inficitur ex +carne. Sed caro tota hominis est infecta. Ergo ex quacumque parte +carnis homo formaretur, anima eius inficeretur infectione +originalis peccati.
+ Objection 3: Further, original sin comes upon all from our first parent, in so far as we were all in him when he sinned. But those who + might be formed out of human flesh, would have been in Adam. Therefore they would contract original sin. +
[37060] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +peccatum originale a primo parente pervenit in omnes, inquantum +omnes in eo peccante fuerunt. Sed illi qui ex carne humana +formarentur, in Adam fuissent. Ergo peccatum originale +contraherent.
+ On the contrary, They would not have been in Adam "according to seminal virtue," which alone is the cause of the transmission of original + sin, as Augustine states (Gen. ad lit. x, 18, seqq.). +
[37061] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quia non fuissent in Adam secundum seminalem rationem; quod +solum causat traductionem peccati originalis, ut Augustinus dicit, +X super Gen. ad Litt.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + AA[1],3), original sin is transmitted from the first parent to his posterity, inasmuch as they are moved by him through generation, + even as the members are moved by the soul to actual sin. Now there is no movement to generation except by the active power + of generation: so that those alone contract original sin, who are descended from Adam through the active power of generation + originally derived from Adam, i.e. who + are descended from him through seminal power; for the seminal power is nothing else than the active power of generation. But + if anyone were to be formed by God out of human flesh, it is evident that the active power would not be derived from Adam. + Consequently he would not contract original sin: even as a hand would have no part in a human sin, if it were moved, not by + the man's will, but by some external power. +
[37062] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, peccatum originale a primo +parente traducitur in posteros, inquantum moventur ab ipso per +generationem, sicut membra moventur ab anima ad peccatum actuale. +Non autem est motio ad generationem nisi per virtutem activam in +generatione. Unde illi soli peccatum originale contrahunt, qui ab +Adam descendunt per virtutem activam in generatione originaliter ab +Adam derivatam, quod est secundum seminalem rationem ab eo +descendere, nam ratio seminalis nihil aliud est quam vis activa in +generatione. Si autem aliquis formaretur virtute divina ex carne +humana, manifestum est quod vis activa non derivaretur ab Adam. +Unde non contraheret peccatum originale, sicut nec actus manus +pertineret ad peccatum humanum, si manus non moveretur a voluntate +hominis, sed ab aliquo extrinseco movente.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Adam was not in the place of exile until after his sin. Consequently it is not on account of the place of exile, but on account + of the sin, that original sin is transmitted to those to whom his active generation extends. +
[37063] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Adam non fuit in loco exilii nisi post peccatum. +Unde non propter locum exilii, sed propter peccatum, traducitur +originalis culpa ad eos ad quos activa eius generatio pervenit.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The flesh does not corrupt the soul, except in so far as it is the active principle in generation, as we have stated. +
[37064] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod caro non inficit animam nisi inquantum est principium +activum in generatione, ut dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: If a man were to be formed from human flesh, he would have been in Adam, "by way of bodily substance" [*The expression is + St. Augustine's (Gen. ad lit. x). Cf. Summa Theologica + TP, Q[31], A[6], Reply to OBJ[1]], but not according to seminal virtue, as stated above. Therefore he would not contract original sin. +
[37065] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ille qui formaretur ex carne humana, fuisset in Adam +secundum corpulentam substantiam; sed non secundum seminalem +rationem, ut dictum est. Et ideo non contraheret originale +peccatum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would have contracted original sin. Because we contract + original sin from our parents, in so far as we were once in them, according to the word of the Apostle ( + Rom. 5:12): "In whom all have sinned." Now a man pre-exist in his mother as well as in his father. Therefore a man would have contracted + original sin from his mother's sin as well as from his father's. +
[37066] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod, si Adam non peccasset, Eva peccante, +filii originale peccatum contraherent. Peccatum enim originale a +parentibus contrahimus, inquantum in eis fuimus, secundum illud +apostoli, Rom. V, in quo omnes peccaverunt. Sed sicut homo +praeexistit in patre suo, ita in matre. Ergo ex peccato matris homo +peccatum originale contraheret, sicut et ex peccato patris.
+ Objection 2: Further, if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would have been born liable to suffering and death, since it is + "the mother" that "provides the matter in generation" as the Philosopher states (De Gener. Animal. ii, 1,4), when death and + liability to suffering are the necessary results of matter. Now liability to suffering and the necessity of dying are punishments + of original sin. Therefore if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would + contract original sin. +
[37067] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +si Eva peccasset, Adam non peccante, filii passibiles et mortales +nascerentur, mater enim dat materiam in generatione, ut dicit +philosophus, in II de Generat. Animal.; mors autem, et omnis +passibilitas, provenit ex necessitate materiae. Sed passibilitas et +necessitas moriendi sunt poena peccati originalis. Ergo, si Eva +peccasset, Adam non peccante, filii contraherent originale +peccatum.
+ Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3) that "the Holy Ghost came upon the Virgin," (of whom Christ was to be born + without original sin) "purifying her." But this purification would not have been necessary, if the infection of original sin + were not contracted from the mother. Therefore the infection of original sin is contracted from the mother: so that if Eve + had sinned, her children would have contracted original sin, even if Adam had not sinned. +
[37068] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +Damascenus dicit, in libro III, quod spiritus sanctus praevenit in +virginem, de qua Christus erat absque peccato originali nasciturus, +purgans eam. Sed illa purgatio non fuisset necessaria, si infectio +originalis peccati non traheretur ex matre. Ergo infectio +originalis peccati ex matre trahitur. Et sic, Eva peccante, eius +filii peccatum originale contraherent, etiam si Adam non +peccasset.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle says ( + Rom. 5:12): "By one man sin entered into this world." Now if the woman would have transmitted original sin to her children, he should + have said that it entered by two, since both of them sinned, or rather that it entered by a woman, since she sinned first. + Therefore original sin is transmitted to the children, not by the mother, but by the father. +
[37069] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. V, per unum hominem peccatum in +hunc mundum intravit. Magis autem fuisset dicendum quod per +duos intrasset, cum ambo peccaverint; vel potius per mulierem, quae +primo peccavit; si femina peccatum originale in prolem +transmitteret. Non ergo peccatum originale derivatur in filios a +matre, sed a patre.
+ I answer that, The solution of this question is made clear by what has been said. For it has been stated + (A[1]) that original sin is transmitted by the first parent in so far as he is the mover in the begetting of his children: wherefore + it has been said + (A[4]) that if anyone were begotten materially only, of human flesh, they would not contract original sin. Now it is evident that + in the opinion of philosophers, the active + principle of generation is from the father, while the mother provides the matter. Therefore original sin, is contracted, not + from the mother, but from the father: so that, accordingly, if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would not contract + original sin: whereas, if Adam, and not Eve, had sinned, they would contract it. +
[37070] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod huius dubitationis solutio ex praemissis apparet. +Dictum est enim supra quod peccatum originale a primo parente +traducitur inquantum ipse movet ad generationem natorum, unde +dictum est quod, si materialiter tantum aliquis ex carne humana +generaretur, originale peccatum non contraheret. Manifestum est +autem secundum doctrinam philosophorum, quod principium activum in +generatione est a patre, materiam autem mater ministrat. Unde +peccatum originale non contrahitur a matre, sed a patre. Et +secundum hoc, si, Adam non peccante, Eva peccasset, filii originale +peccatum non contraherent. E converso autem esset, si Adam +peccasset, et Eva non peccasset.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The child pre-exists in its father as in its active principle, and in its mother, as in its material and passive principle. + Consequently the comparison fails. +
[37071] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod in patre praeexistit filius sicut in principio +activo, sed in matre sicut in principio materiali et passivo. Unde +non est similis ratio.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Some hold that if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would be immune from the sin, but would have been subject + to the necessity of dying and to other forms of suffering that are a necessary result of the matter which is provided by the + mother, not as punishments, but as actual defects. This, however, seems unreasonable. Because, as stated in the + FP, Q[97], AA[1], 2, ad 4, immortality and impassibility, in the + original state, were a result, not of the condition of matter, but of original justice, whereby the body was subjected to + the soul, so long as the soul remained subject to God. Now privation of original justice is original sin. If, therefore, supposing + Adam had not sinned, original sin would not have been transmitted to posterity on account of Eve's sin; it is evident that + the children would not have been deprived of original justice: and consequently they would not have been liable to suffer + and subject to the necessity of dying. +
[37072] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod quibusdam videtur quod, Eva peccante, si Adam non +peccasset, filii essent immunes a culpa, paterentur tamen +necessitatem moriendi, et alias passibilitates provenientes ex +necessitate materiae, quam mater ministrat, non sub ratione poenae, +sed sicut quosdam naturales defectus. Sed hoc non videtur +conveniens. Immortalitas enim et impassibilitas primi status non +erat ex conditione materiae, ut in primo dictum est; sed ex +originali iustitiae, per quam corpus subdebatur animae, quandiu +anima esset subiecta Deo. Defectus autem originalis iustitiae est +peccatum originale. Si igitur, Adam non peccante, peccatum +originale non transfunderetur in posteros propter peccatum Evae; +manifestum est quod in filiis non esset defectus originalis +iustitiae. Unde non esset in eis passibilitas vel necessitas +moriendi.
+ Reply to Objection 3: This prevenient purification in the Blessed Virgin was not needed to hinder the transmission of original sin, but because + it behooved the Mother of God "to shine with the greatest purity" [*Cf. Anselm, De Concep. Virg. xviii.]. For nothing is worthy + to receive God unless it be pure, according to + Ps. 92:5: "Holiness becometh Thy House, O Lord." +
[37073] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod illa purgatio praeveniens in beata virgine, non +requirebatur ad auferendum transfusionem originalis peccati, sed +quia oportebat ut mater Dei maxima puritate niteret. Non enim est +aliquid digne receptaculum Dei, nisi sit mundum; secundum illud +Psalmi XCII, domum tuam, domine, decet sanctitudo.
We must now consider original sin as to its essence, and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether original sin is a habit?
(2) Whether there is but one original sin in each man?
+[37074] +Iª-IIae q. 82 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +peccato originali quantum ad suam essentiam. Et circa hoc +quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum originale peccatum sit habitus. +Secundo, utrum sit unum tantum in uno homine. Tertio, utrum sit +concupiscentia. Quarto, utrum sit aequaliter in omnibus.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is not a habit. For original sin is the absence of original justice, as Anselm states (De + Concep. Virg. ii, iii, xxvi), so that original sin is a privation. But privation is opposed to habit. Therefore original sin + is not a habit. +
[37075] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod originale peccatum non sit habitus. +Originale enim peccatum est carentia originalis iustitiae, ut +Anselmus dicit, in libro de concepto virginali, et sic originale +peccatum est quaedam privatio. Sed privatio opponitur habitui. Ergo +originale peccatum non est habitus.
+ Objection 2: Further, actual sin has the nature of fault more than original sin, in so far as it is more voluntary. Now the habit of actual + sin has not the nature of a fault, else it would follow that a man while asleep, would be guilty of sin. Therefore no original + habit has the nature of a fault. +
[37076] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +actuale peccatum habet plus de ratione culpae quam originale, +inquantum habet plus de ratione voluntarii. Sed habitus actualis +peccati non habet rationem culpae, alioquin sequeretur quod homo +dormiens culpabiliter, peccaret. Ergo nullus habitus originalis +habet rationem culpae.
+ Objection 3: Further, in wickedness act always precedes habit, because evil habits are not infused, but acquired. Now original sin is + not preceded by an act. Therefore original sin is not a habit. +
[37077] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +in malis actus semper praecedit habitum, nullus enim habitus malus +est infusus, sed acquisitus. Sed originale peccatum non praecedit +aliquis actus. Ergo originale peccatum non est habitus.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says in his book on the Baptism of infants (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 39) that on account of original sin little + children have the aptitude of concupiscence though they have not the act. Now aptitude denotes some kind of habit. Therefore + original sin is a habit. +
[37078] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Baptismo puerorum, quod +secundum peccatum originale parvuli sunt concupiscibiles, etsi non +sint actu concupiscentes. Sed habilitas dicitur secundum aliquem +habitum. Ergo peccatum originale est habitus.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + Q[49], A[4]; + Q[50], A[1]), habit is twofold. The first is a habit whereby power is inclined to an act: thus science and virtue are called habits. + In this way original sin is not a habit. The second kind of habit is the disposition of a complex nature, whereby that nature + is well or ill disposed to something, chiefly when such a disposition has become like a second nature, as in the case of + sickness or health. In this sense original sin is a habit. For it is an inordinate disposition, arising from the destruction + of the harmony which was essential to original justice, even as bodily sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body, + by reason of the destruction of that equilibrium which is essential to health. Hence it is that original sin is called the + "languor of nature" [*Cf. Augustine, In + Ps. 118, serm. iii]. +
[37079] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, duplex est habitus. Unus +quidem quo inclinatur potentia ad agendum, sicut scientiae et +virtutes habitus dicuntur. Et hoc modo peccatum originale non est +habitus. Alio modo dicitur habitus dispositio alicuius naturae ex +multis compositae, secundum quam bene se habet vel male ad aliquid, +et praecipue cum talis dispositio versa fuerit quasi in naturam, ut +patet de aegritudine et sanitate. Et hoc modo peccatum originale +est habitus. Est enim quaedam inordinata dispositio proveniens ex +dissolutione illius harmoniae in qua consistebat ratio originalis +iustitiae, sicut etiam aegritudo corporalis est quaedam inordinata +dispositio corporis, secundum quam solvitur aequalitas in qua +consistit ratio sanitatis. Unde peccatum originale languor naturae +dicitur.
+ Reply to Objection 1: As bodily sickness is partly a privation, in so far as it denotes the destruction of the equilibrium of health, and partly + something positive, viz. the very humors that are inordinately disposed, so too original sin denotes the privation of original + justice, and besides this, the inordinate disposition of the parts of the soul. Consequently it is not a pure privation, but + a corrupt habit. +
[37080] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut aegritudo corporalis habet aliquid de +privatione, inquantum tollitur aequalitas sanitatis; et aliquid +habet positive, scilicet ipsos humores inordinate dispositos, ita +etiam peccatum originale habet privationem originalis iustitiae, et +cum hoc inordinatam dispositionem partium animae. Unde non est +privatio pura, sed est quidam habitus corruptus.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Actual sin is an inordinateness of an act: whereas original sin, being the sin of nature, is an inordinate disposition of + nature, and has the character of fault through being transmitted from our first parent, as stated above ( + Q[81], A[1]). Now this inordinate disposition of nature is a kind of habit, whereas the inordinate disposition of an act is not: and + for this reason original sin can be a habit, whereas actual sin + cannot. +
[37081] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod actuale peccatum est inordinatio quaedam actus, +originale vero, cum sit peccatum naturae, est quaedam inordinata +dispositio ipsius naturae, quae habet rationem culpae inquantum +derivatur ex primo parente, ut dictum est. Huiusmodi autem +dispositio naturae inordinata habet rationem habitus, sed +inordinata dispositio actus non habet rationem habitus. Et propter +hoc, peccatum originale potest esse habitus, non autem peccatum +actuale.
+ Reply to Objection 3: This objection considers the habit which inclines a power to an act: but original sin is not this kind of habit. Nevertheless + a certain inclination to an inordinate act does follow from original sin, not directly, but indirectly, viz. by the removal + of the obstacle, i.e. original justice, which hindered inordinate movements: just as an inclination to inordinate bodily movements + results indirectly from bodily sickness. Nor is it necessary to says that + original sin is a habit "infused," or a habit "acquired" (except by the act of our first parent, but not by our own act): + but it is a habit "inborn" due to our corrupt origin. +
[37082] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de habitu quo potentia +inclinatur in actum, talis autem habitus non est peccatum +originale. Quamvis etiam ex peccato originali sequatur aliqua +inclinatio in actum inordinatum, non directe, sed indirecte, +scilicet per remotionem prohibentis, idest originalis iustitiae, +quae prohibebat inordinatos motus, sicut etiam ex aegritudine +corporali indirecte sequitur inclinatio ad motus corporales +inordinatos. Nec debet dici quod peccatum originale sit habitus +infusus; aut acquisitus per actum nisi primi parentis, non autem +huius personae; sed per vitiatam originem innatus.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that there are many original sins in one man. For it is written ( + Ps. 1:7): "Behold I was conceived in iniquities, and in sins did my mother conceive me." But the sin in which a man is conceived + is original sin. Therefore there are several original sins in man. +
[37083] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod in uno homine sint multa originalia +peccata. Dicitur enim in Psalmo l, ecce enim in iniquitatibus +conceptus sum, et in peccatis concepit me mater mea. Sed +peccatum in quo homo concipitur, est originale. Ergo plura peccata +originalia sunt in uno homine.
+ Objection 2: Further, one and the same habit does not incline its subject to contraries: since the inclination of habit is like that of + nature which tends to one thing. Now original sin, even in one man, inclines to various and contrary sins. Therefore original + sin is not one habit; but several. +
[37084] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +unus et idem habitus non inclinat ad contraria, habitus enim +inclinat per modum naturae, quae tendit in unum. Sed peccatum +originale, etiam in uno homine, inclinat ad diversa peccata et +contraria. Ergo peccatum originale non est unus habitus, sed +plures.
+ Objection 3: Further, original sin infects every part of the soul. Now the different parts of the soul are different subjects of sin, + as shown above ( + Q[74]). Since then one sin cannot be in different subjects, it seems that original sin is not one but several. +
[37085] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +peccatum originale inficit omnes animae partes. Sed diversae partes +animae sunt diversa subiecta peccati, ut ex praemissis patet. Cum +igitur unum peccatum non possit esse in diversis subiectis, videtur +quod peccatum originale non sit unum, sed multa.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Jn. 1:29): "Behold the Lamb of God, behold Him Who taketh away the sin of the world": and the reason for the employment of the singular + is that the "sin of the world" is original sin, as a gloss expounds this passage. +
[37086] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Ioan. I, ecce agnus Dei, ecce qui tollit +peccatum mundi. Quod singulariter dicitur, quia peccatum mundi, +quod est peccatum originale, est unum; ut Glossa ibidem +exponit.
+ I answer that, In one man there is one original sin. Two reasons may be assigned for this. The first is on the part of the cause of original + sin. For it has been stated ( + Q[81], A[2]), that the first sin alone of our first parent was transmitted to his posterity. Wherefore in one man original sin is one + in number; and in all men, it is one in proportion, i.e. in relation to its first principle. The second reason may be taken + from the very essence of + original sin. Because in every inordinate disposition, unity of species depends on the cause, while the unity of number is + derived from the subject. For example, take bodily sickness: various species of sickness proceed from different causes, e.g. + from excessive heat or cold, or from a lesion in the lung or liver; while one specific sickness in one man will be one in + number. Now the cause of this corrupt disposition that is called original sin, is one only, viz. the privation of original + justice, removing the subjection of man's mind to God. Consequently original sin is specifically one, and, in one man, can + be only one in number; while, in different men, it is one in species and in proportion, but is numerically many. +
[37087] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod in uno homine est unum peccatum originale. Cuius +ratio dupliciter accipi potest. Uno modo, ex parte causae peccati +originalis. Dictum est enim supra quod solum primum peccatum primi +parentis in posteros traducitur. Unde peccatum originale in uno +homine est unum numero; et in omnibus hominibus est unum +proportione, in respectu scilicet ad primum principium. Alio modo +potest accipi ratio eius ex ipsa essentia originalis peccati. In +omni enim inordinata dispositione unitas speciei consideratur ex +parte causae; unitas autem secundum numerum, ex parte subiecti. +Sicut patet in aegritudine corporali, sunt enim diversae +aegritudines specie quae ex diversis causis procedunt, puta ex +superabundantia calidi vel frigidi, vel ex laesione pulmonis vel +hepatis; una autem aegritudo secundum speciem, in uno homine non +est nisi una numero. Causa autem huius corruptae dispositionis quae +dicitur originale peccatum, est una tantum, scilicet privatio +originalis iustitiae, per quam sublata est subiectio humanae mentis +ad Deum. Et ideo peccatum originale est unum specie. Et in uno +homine non potest esse nisi unum numero, in diversis autem +hominibus est unum specie et proportione, diversum autem +numero.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The employment of the plural---"in sins"---may be explained by the custom of the Divine Scriptures in the frequent use of + the plural for the singular, e.g. "They are dead that sought the life of the child"; or by the fact that all actual sins virtually + pre-exist in original sin, as in a principle so that it is virtually many; or by the fact of there being many deformities + in the sin of our first parent, viz. pride, disobedience, gluttony, and so + forth; or by several parts of the soul being infected by original sin. +
[37088] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod pluraliter dicitur in peccatis, secundum illum +morem divinae Scripturae quo frequenter ponitur pluralis numerus +pro singulari, sicut Matth. II, defuncti sunt qui quaerebant +animam pueri. Vel quia in peccato originali virtualiter +praeexistunt omnia peccata actualia, sicut in quodam principio, +unde est multiplex virtute. Vel quia in peccato primi parentis quod +per originem traducitur, fuerunt plures deformitates, scilicet +superbiae, inobedientiae, gulae, et alia huiusmodi. Vel quia multae +partes animae inficiuntur per peccatum originale.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Of itself and directly, i.e. by its own form, one habit cannot incline its subject to contraries. But there is no reason + why it should not do so, indirectly and accidentally, i.e. by the removal of an obstacle: thus, when the harmony of a mixed + body is destroyed, the elements have contrary local tendencies. In like manner, when the harmony of original justice is destroyed, + the various powers of the soul have various opposite tendencies. +
[37089] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod unus habitus non potest inclinare per se et directe, +idest per propriam formam, ad contraria. Sed indirecte et per +accidens, scilicet per remotionem prohibentis, nihil prohibet, +sicut, soluta harmonia corporis mixti, elementa tendunt in loca +contraria. Et similiter, soluta harmonia originalis iustitiae, +diversae animae potentiae in diversa feruntur.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Original sin infects the different parts of the soul, in so far as they are the parts of one whole; even as original justice + held all the soul's parts together in one. Consequently there is but one original sin: just as there is but one fever in one + man, although the various parts of the body are affected. +
[37090] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod peccatum originale inficit diversas partes animae, +secundum quod sunt partes unius totius, sicut et iustitia +originalis continebat omnes animae partes in unum. Et ideo est unum +tantum peccatum originale. Sicut etiam est una febris in uno +homine, quamvis diversae partes corporis graventur.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is not concupiscence. For every sin is contrary to nature, according to Damascene (De Fide + Orth. ii, 4,30). But concupiscence is in accordance with nature, since it is the proper act of the concupiscible faculty which + is a natural power. Therefore concupiscence is not original sin. +
[37091] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum originale non sit +concupiscentia. Omne enim peccatum est contra naturam, ut dicit +Damascenus, in II libro. Sed concupiscentia est secundum naturam, +est enim proprius actus virtutis concupiscibilis, quae est potentia +naturalis. Ergo concupiscentia non est peccatum originale.
+ Objection 2: Further, through original sin "the passions of sins" are in us, according to the Apostle ( + Rom. 7:5). Now there are several other passions besides concupiscence, as stated above ( + Q[23], A[4]). Therefore original sin is not concupiscence any more than another passion. +
[37092] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +per peccatum originale sunt in nobis passiones peccatorum; ut patet +per apostolum, Rom. VII. Sed multae aliae sunt passiones praeter +concupiscentiam, ut supra habitum est. Ergo peccatum originale non +magis est concupiscentia quam aliqua alia passio.
+ Objection 3: Further, by original sin, all the parts of the soul are disordered, as stated above (A[2], OBJ[3]). But the intellect is + the highest of the soul's parts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 7). Therefore original sin is ignorance rather than + concupiscence. +
[37093] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +per peccatum originale deordinantur omnes animae partes, ut dictum +est. Sed intellectus est suprema inter animae partes; ut patet per +philosophum, in X Ethic. Ergo peccatum originale magis est +ignorantia quam concupiscentia.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 15): "Concupiscence is the guilt of original sin." +
[37094] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro Retract., concupiscentia est +reatus originalis peccati.
+ I answer that, Everything takes its species from its form: and it has been stated + (A[2]) that the species of original sin is taken from its cause. Consequently the formal element of original sin must be considered + in respect of the cause of original sin. But contraries have contrary causes. Therefore the cause of original sin must be + considered with respect to the cause of original justice, which is opposed to it. Now the whole order of original + justice consists in man's will being subject to God: which subjection, first and chiefly, was in the will, whose function + it is to move all the other parts to the end, as stated above (Q[9], A[1] ), so that the will being turned away from God, + all the other powers of the soul become inordinate. Accordingly the privation of original justice, whereby the will was made + subject to God, is the formal element in original sin; while every other disorder of the soul's powers, is a kind of material + element in respect of original sin. Now the inordinateness of the other powers of the soul consists chiefly in their turning + inordinately to mutable good; which inordinateness may be called by the general name of concupiscence. Hence original sin + is concupiscence, materially, but privation of original justice, formally. +
[37095] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod unumquodque habet speciem a sua forma. Dictum est +autem supra quod species peccati originalis sumitur ex sua causa. +Unde oportet quod id quod est formale in originali peccato, +accipiatur ex parte causae peccati originalis. Oppositorum autem +oppositae sunt causae. Est igitur attendenda causa originalis +peccati ex causa originalis iustitiae, quae ei opponitur. Tota +autem ordinatio originalis iustitiae ex hoc est, quod voluntas +hominis erat Deo subiecta. Quae quidem subiectio primo et +principaliter erat per voluntatem, cuius est movere omnes alias +partes in finem, ut supra dictum est. Unde ex aversione voluntatis +a Deo, consecuta est inordinatio in omnibus aliis animae viribus. +Sic ergo privatio originalis iustitiae, per quam voluntas +subdebatur Deo, est formale in peccato originali, omnis autem alia +inordinatio virium animae se habet in peccato originali sicut +quiddam materiale. Inordinatio autem aliarum virium animae +praecipue in hoc attenditur, quod inordinate convertuntur ad bonum +commutabile, quae quidem inordinatio communi nomine potest dici +concupiscentia. Et ita peccatum originale materialiter quidem est +concupiscentia; formaliter vero, defectus originalis iustitiae.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Since, in man, the concupiscible power is naturally governed by reason, the act of concupiscence is so far natural to man, + as it is in accord with the order of reason; while, in so far as it trespasses beyond the bounds of reason, it is, for a man, + contrary to reason. Such is the concupiscence of original sin. +
[37096] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, quia in homine concupiscibilis naturaliter +regitur ratione, intantum concupiscere est homini naturale, +inquantum est secundum rationis ordinem, concupiscentia autem quae +transcendit limites rationis, est homini contra naturam. Et talis +est concupiscentia originalis peccati.
+ Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ( + Q[25], A[1]), all the irascible passions are reducible to concupiscible passions, as holding the principle place: and of these, concupiscence + is the most impetuous in moving, and is felt most, as stated above ( + Q[25], A[2], ad 1). Therefore original sin is ascribed to concupiscence, as being the chief passion, and as including all the others, + in a fashion. +
[37097] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, omnes passiones irascibilis +ad passiones concupiscibilis reducuntur, sicut ad principaliores. +Inter quas concupiscentia vehementius movet, et magis sentitur, ut +supra habitum est. Et ideo concupiscentiae attribuitur, tanquam +principaliori, et in qua quodammodo omnes aliae passiones +includuntur.
+ Reply to Objection 3: As, in good things, the intellect and reason stand first, so conversely in evil things, the lower part of the soul is found + to take precedence, for it clouds and draws the reason, as stated above ( + Q[77], AA[1],2; + Q[80], A[2]). Hence original sin is called concupiscence rather than ignorance, although ignorance is comprised among the material defects + of original sin. +
[37098] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut in bonis intellectus et ratio principalitatem +habent, ita e converso in malis inferior pars animae principalior +invenitur, quae obnubilat et trahit rationem, ut supra dictum est. +Et propter hoc peccatum originale magis dicitur esse concupiscentia +quam ignorantia, licet etiam ignorantia inter defectus materiales +peccati originalis contineatur.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is not equally in all. Because original sin is inordinate concupiscence, as stated above + + (A[3]). Now all are not equally prone to acts of concupiscence. Therefore original sin is not equally in all. +
[37099] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum originale non sit aequaliter +in omnibus. Est enim peccatum originale concupiscentia inordinata, +ut dictum est. Sed non omnes aequaliter sunt proni ad +concupiscendum. Ergo peccatum originale non est aequaliter in +omnibus.
+ Objection 2: Further, original sin is an inordinate disposition of the soul, just as sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body. + But sickness is subject to degrees. Therefore original sin is subject to degrees. +
[37100] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +peccatum originale est quaedam inordinata dispositio animae, sicut +aegritudo est quaedam inordinata dispositio corporis. Sed aegritudo +recipit magis et minus. Ergo peccatum originale recipit magis et +minus.
+ Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Nup. et Concep. i, 23) that "lust transmits original sin to the child." But the act of generation + may be more lustful in one than in another. Therefore original sin may be greater in one than in another. +
[37101] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in libro de Nupt. et Concupisc., quod libido +transmittit originale peccatum in prolem. Sed contingit esse +maiorem libidinem unius in actu generationis, quam alterius. Ergo +peccatum originale potest esse maius in uno quam in alio.
+ On the contrary, Original sin is the sin of nature, as stated above ( + Q[81], A[1]). But nature is equally in all. Therefore original sin is too. +
[37102] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quia peccatum originale est peccatum naturae, ut dictum est. +Sed natura aequaliter est in omnibus. Ergo et peccatum +originale.
+ I answer that, There are two things in original sin: one is the privation of original justice; the other is the relation of this privation + to the sin of our first parent, from whom it is transmitted to man through his corrupt origin. As to the first, original sin + has no degrees, since the gift of original justice is taken away entirely; and privations that remove something entirely, + such as death and darkness, cannot be more or less, as stated above ( + Q[73], A[2]). In like manner, neither is this possible, as to the second: since all are related equally to the first principle of our + corrupt origin, from which principle original sin takes the nature of guilt; for relations cannot be more or less. Consequently + it is evident that original sin cannot be more in one than in another. +
[37103] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod in originali peccato sunt duo, quorum unum est +defectus originalis iustitiae; aliud autem est relatio huius +defectus ad peccatum primi parentis, a quo per vitiatam originem +deducitur. Quantum autem ad primum, peccatum originale non recipit +magis et minus, quia totum donum originalis iustitiae est sublatum; +privationes autem totaliter aliquid privantes, ut mors et tenebrae, +non recipiunt magis et minus, sicut supra dictum est. Similiter +etiam nec quantum ad secundum, aequaliter enim omnes relationem +habent ad primum principium vitiatae originis, ex quo peccatum +originale recipit rationem culpae; relationes enim non recipiunt +magis et minus. Unde manifestum est quod peccatum originale non +potest esse magis in uno quam in alio.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Through the bond of original justice being broken, which held together all the powers of the soul in a certain order, each + power of the soul tends to its own proper movement, and the more impetuously, as it is stronger. Now it happens that some + of the soul's powers are stronger in one man than in another, on account of the different bodily temperaments. Consequently + if one man is more prone than another to acts of concupiscence, this is not due to + original sin, because the bond of original justice is equally broken in all, and the lower parts of the soul are, in all, + left to themselves equally; but it is due to the various dispositions of the powers, as stated. +
[37104] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, soluto vinculo originalis iustitiae, sub quo +quodam ordine omnes vires animae continebantur, unaquaeque vis +animae tendit in suum proprium motum; et tanto vehementius, quanto +fuerit fortior. Contingit autem vires aliquas animae esse fortiores +in uno quam in alio, propter diversas corporis complexiones. Quod +ergo unus homo sit pronior ad concupiscendum quam alter, non est +ratione peccati originalis, cum in omnibus aequaliter solvatur +vinculum originalis iustitiae, et aequaliter in omnibus partes +inferiores animae sibi relinquantur, sed accidit hoc ex diversa +dispositione potentiarum, sicut dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Sickness of the body, even sickness of the same species, has not an equal cause in all; for instance if a fever be caused + by corruption of the bile, the corruption may be greater or less, and nearer to, or further from a vital principle. But the + cause of original sin is equal to all, so that there is not comparison. +
[37105] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod aegritudo corporalis non habet in omnibus aequalem +causam, etiam si sit eiusdem speciei, puta, si sit febris ex +cholera putrefacta, potest esse maior vel minor putrefactio, et +propinquior vel remotior a principio vitae. Sed causa originalis +peccati in omnibus est aequalis. Unde non est simile.
+ Reply to Objection 3: It is not the actual lust that transmits original sin: for, supposing God were to grant to a man to feel no inordinate lust + in the act of generation, he would still transmit original sin; we must understand this to be habitual lust, whereby the sensitive + appetite is not kept subject to reason by the bonds of original justice. This lust is equally in all. +
[37106] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod libido quae transmittit peccatum originale in prolem, +non est libido actualis, quia dato quod virtute divina concederetur +alicui quod nullam inordinatam libidinem in actu generationis +sentiret, adhuc transmitteret in prolem originale peccatum. Sed +libido illa est intelligenda habitualiter, secundum quod appetitus +sensitivus non continetur sub ratione vinculo originalis iustitiae. +Et talis libido in omnibus est aequalis.
We must now consider the subject of original sin, under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the subject of original sin is the flesh rather than the soul?
(2) If it be the soul, whether this be through its essence, or through its powers?
(3) Whether the will prior to the other powers is the subject of original sin?
+[37107] +Iª-IIae q. 83 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +subiecto originalis peccati. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. +Primo, utrum subiectum originalis peccati per prius sit caro vel +anima. Secundo, si anima, utrum per essentiam aut per potentias +suas. Tertio, utrum voluntas per prius sit subiectum peccati +originalis quam aliae potentiae. Quarto, utrum aliquae potentiae +animae sint specialiter infectae, scilicet generativa, vis +concupiscibilis et sensus tactus.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is more in the flesh than in the soul. Because the rebellion of the flesh against the mind + arises from the corruption of original sin. Now the root of this rebellion is seated in the flesh: for the Apostle says ( + Rom. 7:23): "I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind." Therefore original sin is seated chiefly in the + flesh. +
[37108] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum originale magis sit in carne +quam in anima. Repugnantia enim carnis ad mentem ex corruptione +originalis peccati procedit. Sed radix huius repugnantiae in carne +consistit, dicit enim apostolus ad Rom. VII, video aliam legem +in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae. Ergo originale +peccatum in carne principaliter consistit.
+ Objection 2: Further, a thing is more in its cause than in its effect: thus heat is in the heating fire more than in the hot water. Now + the soul is infected with the corruption of original sin by the carnal semen. Therefore original sin is in the flesh rather + than in the soul. +
[37109] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +unumquodque potius est in causa quam in effectu, sicut calor magis +est in igne calefaciente quam in aqua calefacta. Sed anima +inficitur infectione originalis peccati per semen carnale. Ergo +peccatum originale magis est in carne quam in anima.
+ Objection 3: Further, we contract original sin from our first parent, in so far as we were in him by reason of seminal virtue. Now our + souls were not in him thus, but only our flesh. Therefore original sin is not in the soul, but in the flesh. +
[37110] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +peccatum originale ex primo parente contrahimus, prout in eo fuimus +secundum rationem seminalem. Sic autem non fuit ibi anima, sed sola +caro. Ergo originale peccatum non est in anima, sed in carne.
+ Objection 4: Further, the rational soul created by God is infused into the body. If therefore the soul were infected with original sin, + it would follow that it is corrupted in its creation or infusion: and thus God would be the cause of sin, since He is the + author of the soul's creation and fusion. +
[37111] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, +anima rationalis creata a Deo corpori infunditur. Si igitur anima +per peccatum originale inficeretur, consequens esset quod ex sua +creatione vel infusione inquinaretur. Et sic Deus esset causa +peccati, qui est auctor creationis et infusionis.
+ Objection 5: Further, no wise man pours a precious liquid into a vessel, knowing that the vessel will corrupt the liquid. But the rational + soul is more precious than any liquid. If therefore the soul, by being united with the body, could be corrupted with the infection + of original sin, God, Who is wisdom itself, would never infuse the soul into such a body. And yet He does; wherefore it is + not corrupted by the flesh. Therefore original sin is not in the soul but in the + flesh. +
[37112] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 arg. 5 Praeterea, +nullus sapiens liquorem pretiosum vasi infunderet ex quo sciret +ipsum liquorem infici. Sed anima rationalis est pretiosior omni +liquore. Si ergo anima ex corporis unione infici posset infectione +originalis culpae, Deus, qui ipsa sapientia est, nunquam animam +tali corpori infunderet. Infundit autem. Non ergo inquinatur ex +carne. Sic igitur peccatum originale non est in anima, sed in +carne.
+ On the contrary, The same is the subject of a virtue and of the vice or sin contrary to that virtue. But the flesh cannot be the subject of + virtue: for the Apostle says ( + Rom. 7:18): "I know that there dwelleth not in me, that is to say, in my flesh, that which is good." Therefore the flesh cannot be + the subject of original sin, but only the soul. +
[37113] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod idem est subiectum virtutis et vitii sive peccati, quod +contrariatur virtuti. Sed caro non potest esse subiectum virtutis, +dicit enim apostolus, ad Rom. VII, scio quod non habitat in me, +hoc est in carne mea, bonum. Ergo caro non potest esse +subiectum originalis peccati, sed solum anima.
+ I answer that, One thing can be in another in two ways. First, as in its cause, either principal, or instrumental; secondly, as in its subject. + Accordingly the original sin of all men was in Adam indeed, as in its principal cause, according to the words of the Apostle + ( + Rom. 5:12): "In whom all have sinned": whereas it is in the bodily semen, as in its instrumental cause, since it is by the active power + of the semen that original sin together with human + nature is transmitted to the child. But original sin can nowise be in the flesh as its subject, but only in the soul. +
The reason for this is that, as stated above ( + Q[81], A[1]), original sin is transmitted from the will of our first parent to this posterity by a certain movement of generation, in + the same way as actual sin is transmitted from any man's will to his other parts. Now in this transmission it is to be observed, + that whatever accrues from the motion of the will consenting to sin, to any part of man that can in any way share in that + guilt, either as its + subject or as its instrument, has the character of sin. Thus from the will consenting to gluttony, concupiscence of food accrues + to the concupiscible faculty, and partaking of food accrues to the hand and the mouth, which, in so far as they are moved + by the will to sin, are the instruments of sin. But that further action is evoked in the nutritive power and the internal + members, which have no natural aptitude for being moved by the will, does not bear the character of guilt. +
Accordingly, since the soul can be the subject of guilt, while the flesh, of itself, cannot be the subject of guilt; whatever + accrues to the soul from the corruption of the first sin, has the character of guilt, while whatever accrues to the flesh, + has the character, not of guilt but of punishment: so that, therefore, the soul is the subject of original sin, and not the + flesh. +
[37114] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod aliquid potest esse in aliquo dupliciter, uno modo, +sicut in causa, vel principali vel instrumentali; alio modo, sicut +in subiecto. Peccatum ergo originale omnium hominum fuit quidem in +ipso Adam sicut in prima causa principali; secundum illud apostoli, +Rom. V, in quo omnes peccaverunt. In semine autem corporali +est peccatum originale sicut in causa instrumentali, eo quod per +virtutem activam seminis traducitur peccatum originale in prolem, +simul cum natura humana. Sed sicut in subiecto, peccatum originale +nullo modo potest esse in carne, sed solum in anima. Cuius ratio +est quia, sicut supra dictum est, hoc modo ex voluntate primi +parentis peccatum originale traducitur in posteros per quandam +generativam motionem, sicut a voluntate alicuius hominis derivatur +peccatum actuale ad alias partes eius. In qua quidem derivatione +hoc potest attendi, quod quidquid provenit ex motione voluntatis +peccati ad quamcumque partem hominis quae quocumque modo potest +esse particeps peccati, vel per modum subiecti vel per modum +instrumenti, habet rationem culpae, sicut ex voluntate gulae +provenit concupiscentia cibi ad concupiscibilem, et sumptio cibi ad +manus et os, quae inquantum moventur a voluntate ad peccatum, sunt +instrumenta peccati. Quod vero ulterius derivatur ad vim nutritivam +et ad interiora membra, quae non sunt nata moveri a voluntate, non +habet rationem culpae. Sic igitur, cum anima possit esse subiectum +culpae, caro autem de se non habeat quod sit subiectum culpae; +quidquid provenit de corruptione primi peccati ad animam, habet +rationem culpae; quod autem provenit ad carnem, non habet rationem +culpae, sed poenae. Sic igitur anima est subiectum peccati +originalis, non autem caro.
+ Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Retract. i, 27) [*Cf. QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 66], the Apostle is speaking, in that passage, of man already redeemed, + who is delivered from guilt, but is still liable to punishment, by reason of which sin is stated to dwell "in the flesh." + Consequently it follows that the flesh is the subject, not of guilt, but of punishment. +
[37115] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro Retract., +apostolus loquitur ibi de homine iam redempto, qui liberatus est a +culpa, sed subiacet poenae, ratione cuius peccatum dicitur habitare +in carne. Unde ex hoc non sequitur quod caro sit subiectum culpae, +sed solum poenae.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Original sin is caused by the semen as instrumental cause. Now there is no need for anything to be more in the instrumental + cause than in the effect; but only in the principal cause: and, in this way, original sin was in Adam more fully, since in + him it had the nature of actual sin. +
[37116] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod peccatum originale causatur ex semine sicut ex causa +instrumentali. Non autem oportet quod aliquid sit principalius in +causa instrumentali quam in effectu, sed solum in causa principali. +Et hoc modo peccatum originale potiori modo fuit in Adam, in quo +fuit secundum rationem actualis peccati.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The soul of any individual man was in Adam, in respect of his seminal power, not indeed as in its effective principle, but + as in a dispositive principle: because the bodily semen, which is transmitted from Adam, does not of its own power produce + the rational soul, but disposes the matter for it. +
[37117] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod anima huius hominis non fuit secundum seminalem +rationem in Adam peccante sicut in principio effectivo, sed sicut +in principio dispositivo, eo quod semen corporale, quod ex Adam +traducitur, sua virtute non efficit animam rationalem, sed ad eam +disponit.
+ Reply to Objection 4: The corruption of original sin is nowise caused by God, but by the sin alone of our first parent through carnal generation. + And so, since creation implies a relation in the soul to God alone, it cannot be said that the soul is tainted through being + created. On the other hand, infusion implies relation both to God infusing and to the flesh into which the soul is infused. + And so, with regard to God infusing, it cannot be said that the soul is stained + through being infused; but only with regard to the body into which it is infused. +
[37118] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod infectio originalis peccati nullo modo causatur a +Deo, sed ex solo peccato primi parentis per carnalem generationem. +Et ideo, cum creatio importet respectum animae ad solum Deum, non +potest dici quod anima ex sua creatione inquinetur. Sed infusio +importat respectum et ad Deum infundentem, et ad carnem cui +infunditur anima. Et ideo, habito respectu ad Deum infundentem, non +potest dici quod anima per infusionem maculetur; sed solum habito +respectu ad corpus cui infunditur.
+ Reply to Objection 5: The common good takes precedence of private good. Wherefore God, according to His wisdom, does not overlook the general order + of things (which is that such a soul be infused into such a body), lest this soul contract a singular corruption: all the + more that the nature of the soul demands that it should not exist prior to its infusion into the body, as stated in the + FP, Q[90], A[4]; + FP, Q[118], A[3]. + And it is better for the soul to be thus, according to its nature, than not to be at all, especially since it can avoid damnation, + by means of grace. +
[37119] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 ad 5 Ad quintum +dicendum quod bonum commune praefertur bono singulari. Unde Deus, +secundum suam sapientiam, non praetermittit universalem ordinem +rerum, qui est ut tali corpori talis anima infundatur, ut vitetur +singularis infectio huius animae, praesertim cum natura animae hoc +habeat, ut esse non incipiat nisi in corpore, ut in primo habitum +est. Melius est autem ei sic esse secundum naturam, quam nullo modo +esse, praesertim cum possit per gratiam damnationem evadere.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is not in the essence of the soul rather than in the powers. For the soul is naturally apt + to be the subject of sin, in respect of those parts which can be moved by the will. Now the soul is moved by the will, not + as to its essence but only as to the powers. Therefore original sin is in the soul, not according to its essence, but only + according to the powers. +
[37120] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum originale non sit per prius +in essentia animae quam in potentiis. Anima enim nata est esse +subiectum peccati, quantum ad id quod potest a voluntate moveri. +Sed anima non movetur a voluntate secundum suam essentiam, sed +solum secundum potentias. Ergo peccatum originale non est in anima +secundum suam essentiam, sed solum secundum potentias.
+ Objection 2: Further, original sin is opposed to original justice. Now original justice was in a power of the soul, because power is the + subject of virtue. Therefore original sin also is in a power of the soul, rather than in its essence. +
[37121] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +peccatum originale opponitur originali iustitiae. Sed originalis +iustitia erat in aliqua potentia animae, quae est subiectum +virtutis. Ergo et peccatum originale est magis in potentia animae +quam in eius essentia.
+ Objection 3: Further, just as original sin is derived from the soul as from the flesh, so is it derived by the powers from the essence. + But original sin is more in the soul than in the flesh. Therefore it is more in the powers than in the essence of the soul. +
[37122] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sicut a carne peccatum originale derivatur ad animam, ita ab +essentia animae derivatur ad potentias. Sed peccatum originale +magis est in anima quam in carne. Ergo etiam magis est in potentiis +animae quam in essentia.
+ Objection 4: Further, original sin is said to be concupiscence, as stated ( + Q[82], A[3]). But concupiscence is in the powers of the soul. Therefore original sin is also. +
[37123] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, +peccatum originale dicitur esse concupiscentia, ut dictum est. Sed +concupiscentia est in potentiis animae. Ergo et peccatum +originale.
+ On the contrary, Original sin is called the sin of nature, as stated above (Q[81], A[1]). Now the soul is the form and nature of the body, + in respect of its essence and not in respect of its powers, as stated in the + FP, Q[76], A[6]. Therefore the soul is the subject of original sin chiefly in respect of its essence. +
[37124] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod peccatum originale dicitur esse peccatum naturale, ut +supra dictum est. Anima autem est forma et natura corporis secundum +essentiam suam, et non secundum potentias, ut in primo habitum est. +Ergo anima est subiectum originalis peccati principaliter secundum +suam essentiam.
+ I answer that, The subject of a sin is chiefly that part of the soul to which the motive cause of that sin primarily pertains: thus if the + motive cause of a sin is sensual pleasure, which regards the concupiscible power through being its proper object, it follows + that the concupiscible power is the proper subject of that sin. Now it is evident that original sin is caused through our + origin. Consequently that part of the soul which is first reached by man's origin, is the + primary subject of original sin. Now the origin reaches the soul as the term of generation, according as it is the form of + the body: and this belongs to the soul in respect of its essence, as was proved in the + FP, Q[76], A[6]. Therefore the soul, in respect of its essence, is the primary subject of original sin. +
[37125] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod illud animae est principaliter subiectum alicuius +peccati, ad quod primo pertinet causa motiva illius peccati, sicut +si causa motiva ad peccandum sit delectatio sensus, quae pertinet +ad vim concupiscibilem sicut obiectum proprium eius, sequitur quod +vis concupiscibilis sit proprium subiectum illius peccati. +Manifestum est autem quod peccatum originale causatur per originem. +Unde illud animae quod primo attingitur ab origine hominis, est +primum subiectum originalis peccati. Attingit autem origo animam ut +terminum generationis, secundum quod est forma corporis; quod +quidem convenit ei secundum essentiam propriam, ut in primo habitum +est. Unde anima secundum essentiam est primum subiectum originalis +peccati.
+ Reply to Objection 1: As the motion of the will of an individual reaches to the soul's powers and not to its essence, so the motion of the will + of the first generator, through the channel of generation, reaches first of all to the essence of the soul, as stated. +
[37126] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut motio voluntatis alicuius propriae +pervenit ad potentias animae, non autem ad animae essentiam; ita +motio voluntatis primi generantis, per viam generationis, pervenit +primo ad animae essentiam, ut dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Even original justice pertained radically to the essence of the soul, because it was God's gift to human nature, to which + the essence of the soul is related before the powers. For the powers seem to regard the person, in as much as they are the + principles of personal acts. Hence they are the proper subjects of actual sins, which are the sins of the person. +
[37127] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod etiam originalis iustitia pertinebat primordialiter +ad essentiam animae, erat enim donum divinitus datum humanae +naturae, quam per prius respicit essentia animae quam potentiae. +Potentiae enim magis videntur pertinere ad personam, inquantum sunt +principia personalium actuum. Unde sunt propria subiecta peccatorum +actualium, quae sunt peccata personalia.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The body is related to the soul as matter to form, which though it comes second in order of generation, nevertheless comes + first in the order of perfection and nature. But the essence of the soul is related to the powers, as a subject to its proper + accidents, which follow their subject both in the order of generation and in that of perfection. Consequently the comparison + fails. +
[37128] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod corpus comparatur ad animam sicut materia ad formam, +quae etsi sit posterior ordine generationis, est tamen prior ordine +perfectionis et naturae. Essentia autem animae comparatur ad +potentias sicut subiecta ad accidentia propria, quae sunt +posteriora subiecto et ordine generationis et etiam perfectionis. +Unde non est similis ratio.
+ Reply to Objection 4: Concupiscence, in relation to original sin, holds the position of matter and effect, as stated above ( + Q[82], A[3]). +
[37129] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod concupiscentia se habet materialiter et ex +consequenti in peccato originali, ut supra dictum est.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that original sin does not infect the will before the other powers. For every sin belongs chiefly to that power + by whose act it was caused. Now original sin is caused by an act of the generative power. Therefore it seems to belong to + the generative power more than to the others. +
[37130] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum originale non per prius +inficiat voluntatem quam alias potentias. Omne enim peccatum +principaliter pertinet ad potentiam per cuius actum causatur. Sed +peccatum originale causatur per actum generativae potentiae. Ergo +inter ceteras potentias animae, videtur magis pertinere ad +generativam potentiam.
+ Objection 2: Further, original sin is transmitted through the carnal semen. But the other powers of the soul are more akin to the flesh + than the will is, as is evident with regard to all the sensitive powers, which use a bodily organ. Therefore original sin + is in them more than in the will. +
[37131] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +peccatum originale per semen carnale traducitur. Sed aliae vires +animae propinquiores sunt carni quam voluntas, sicut patet de +omnibus sensitivis, quae utuntur organo corporali. Ergo in eis +magis est peccatum originale quam in voluntate.
+ Objection 3: Further, the intellect precedes the will, for the object of the will is only the good understood. If therefore original sin + infects all the powers of the soul, it seems that it must first of all infect the intellect, as preceding the others. +
[37132] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +intellectus est prior voluntate, non enim est voluntas nisi de bono +intellecto. Si ergo peccatum originale inficit omnes potentias +animae, videtur quod per prius inficiat intellectum, tanquam +priorem.
+ On the contrary, Original justice has a prior relation to the will, because it is "rectitude of the will," as Anselm states (De Concep. Virg. + iii). Therefore original sin, which is opposed to it, also has a prior relation to the will. +
[37133] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod iustitia originalis per prius respicit voluntatem, est +enim rectitudo voluntatis, ut Anselmus dicit, in libro de conceptu +virginali. Ergo et peccatum originale, quod ei opponitur, per prius +respicit voluntatem.
+ I answer that, Two things must be considered in the infection of original sin. First, its inherence to its subject; and in this respect + it regards first the essence of the soul, as stated above + (A[2]). In the second place we must consider its inclination to act; and in this way it regards the powers of the soul. It must + therefore regard first of all that power in which is seated the first inclination to commit a sin, and this is the will, as + stated + above (Q[74], AA[1],2). Therefore original sin regards first of all the will. +
[37134] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod in infectione peccati originalis duo est considerare. +Primo quidem, inhaerentiam eius ad subiectum, et secundum hoc primo +respicit essentiam animae, ut dictum est. Deinde oportet +considerare inclinationem eius ad actum, et hoc modo respicit +potentias animae. Oportet ergo quod illam per prius respiciat, quae +primam inclinationem habet ad peccandum. Haec autem est voluntas, +ut ex supradictis patet. Unde peccatum originale per prius respicit +voluntatem.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Original sin, in man, is not caused by the generative power of the child, but by the act of the parental generative power. + Consequently, it does not follow that the child's generative power is the subject of original sin. +
[37135] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod peccatum originale non causatur in homine per +potentiam generativam prolis, sed per actum potentiae generativae +parentis. Unde non oportet quod sua potentia generativa sit primum +subiectum originalis peccati.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Original sin spreads in two ways; from the flesh to the soul, and from the essence of the soul to the powers. The former + follows the order of generation, the latter follows the order of perfection. Therefore, although the other, viz. the sensitive + powers, are more akin to the flesh, yet, since the will, being the higher power, is more akin to the essence of the soul, + the infection of original sin reaches it first. +
[37136] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod peccatum originale habet duplicem processum, unum +quidem a carne ad animam; alium vero ab essentia animae ad +potentias. Primus quidem processus est secundum ordinem +generationis, secundus autem secundum ordinem perfectionis. Et ideo +quamvis aliae potentiae, scilicet sensitivae, propinquiores sint +carni; quia tamen voluntas est propinquior essentiae animae, +tanquam superior potentia, primo pervenit ad ipsam infectio +originalis peccati.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The intellect precedes the will, in one way, by proposing its object to it. In another way, the will precedes the intellect, + in the order of motion to act, which motion pertains to sin. +
[37137] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod intellectus quodam modo praecedit voluntatem, +inquantum proponit ei suum obiectum. Alio vero modo voluntas +praecedit intellectum, secundum ordinem motionis ad actum, quae +quidem motio pertinet ad peccatum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the aforesaid powers are not more infected than the others. For the infection of original sin seems to + pertain more to that part of the soul which can be first the subject of sin. Now this is the rational part, and chiefly the + will. Therefore that power is most infected by original sin. +
[37138] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod praedictae potentiae non sint magis +infectae quam aliae. Infectio enim originalis peccati magis videtur +pertinere ad illam animae partem quae prius potest esse subiectum +peccati. Haec autem est rationalis pars, et praecipue voluntas. +Ergo ipsa est magis infecta per peccatum originale.
+ Objection 2: Further, no power of the soul is infected by guilt, except in so far as it can obey reason. Now the generative power cannot + obey reason, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. Therefore the generative power is not the most infected by original sin. +
[37139] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +nulla vis animae inficitur per culpam, nisi inquantum potest +obedire rationi. Generativa autem non potest obedire, ut dicitur in +I Ethic. Ergo generativa non est maxime infecta per originale +peccatum.
+ Objection 3: Further, of all the senses the sight is the most spiritual and the nearest to reason, in so far "as it shows us how a number + of things differ" (Metaph. i). But the infection of guilt is first of all in the reason. Therefore the sight is more infected + than touch. +
[37140] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +visus inter alios sensus est spiritualior et propinquior rationi, +inquantum plures differentias rerum ostendit, ut dicitur in I +Metaphys. Sed infectio culpae primo est in ratione. Ergo visus +magis est infectus quam tactus.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 16, seqq., 24) that the infection of original sin is most apparent in the movements of the + members of generation, which are not subject to reason. Now those members serve the generative power in the mingling of sexes, + wherein there is the delectation of touch, which is the most powerful incentive to concupiscence. Therefore the infection + of original sin regards these three chiefly, viz. the generative power, the + concupiscible faculty and the sense of touch. +
[37141] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quod infectio +originalis culpae maxime apparet in motu genitalium membrorum, qui +rationi non subditur. Sed illa membra deserviunt generativae +virtuti in commixtione sexuum, in qua est delectatio secundum +tactum, quae maxime concupiscentiam movet. Ergo infectio originalis +peccati maxime pertinet ad ista tria, scilicet potentiam +generativam, vim concupiscibilem et sensum tactus.
+ I answer that, Those corruptions especially are said to be infectious, which are of such a nature as to be transmitted from one subject + to another: hence contagious diseases, such as leprosy and murrain and the like, are said to be infectious. Now the corruption + of original sin is transmitted by the act of generation, as stated above ( + Q[81], A[1]). Therefore the powers which concur in this act, are chiefly said to be infected. Now this act serves + the generative power, in as much as it is directed to generation; and it includes delectation of the touch, which is the most + powerful object of the concupiscible faculty. Consequently, while all the parts of the soul are said to be corrupted by original + sin, these three are said specially to be corrupted and infected. +
[37142] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod illa corruptio praecipue infectio nominari solet, +quae nata est in aliud transferri, unde et morbi contagiosi, sicut +lepra et scabies et huiusmodi, infectiones dicuntur. Corruptio +autem originalis peccati traducitur per actum generationis, sicut +supra dictum est. Unde potentiae quae ad huiusmodi actum +concurrunt, maxime dicuntur esse infectae. Huiusmodi autem actus +deservit generativae, inquantum ad generationem ordinatur, habet +autem in se delectationem tactus, quae est maximum obiectum +concupiscibilis. Et ideo, cum omnes partes animae dicantur esse +corruptae per peccatum originale, specialiter tres praedictae +dicuntur esse corruptae et infectae.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Original sin, in so far as it inclines to actual sins, belongs chiefly to the will, as stated above + (A[3]). But in so far as it is transmitted to the offspring, it belongs to the aforesaid powers proximately, and to the will, remotely. +
[37143] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod peccatum originale ex ea parte qua inclinat in +peccata actualia, praecipue pertinet ad voluntatem, ut dictum est. +Sed ex ea parte qua traducitur in prolem, pertinet propinque ad +potentias praedictas, ad voluntatem autem remote.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The infection of actual sin belongs only to the powers which are moved by the will of the sinner. But the infection of original + sin is not derived from the will of the contractor, but through his natural origin, which is effected by the generative power. + Hence it is this power that is infected by original sin. +
[37144] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod infectio actualis culpae non pertinet nisi ad +potentias quae moventur a voluntate peccantis. Sed infectio +originalis culpae non derivatur a voluntate eius qui ipsam +contrahit, sed per originem naturae, cui deservit potentia +generativa. Et ideo in ea est infectio originalis peccati.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Sight is not related to the act of generation except in respect of remote disposition, in so far as the concupiscible species + is seen through the sight. But the delectation is completed in the touch. Wherefore the aforesaid infection is ascribed to + the touch rather than to the sight. +
[37145] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod visus non pertinet ad actum generationis nisi +secundum dispositionem remotam, prout scilicet per visum apparet +species concupiscibilis. Sed delectatio perficitur in tactu. Et +ideo talis infectio magis attribuitur tactui quam visui.
We must now consider the cause of sin, in so far as one sin can be the cause of another. Under this head there are four points + of inquiry: +
(1) Whether covetousness is the root of all sins?
(2) Whether pride is the beginning of every sin?
(3) Whether other special sins should be called capital vices, besides pride and covetousness?
+[37146] +Iª-IIae q. 84 pr. Deinde considerandum est de causa +peccati secundum quod unum peccatum est causa alterius. Et circa +hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum cupiditas sit radix omnium +peccatorum. Secundo, utrum superbia sit initium omnis peccati. +Tertio, utrum praeter superbiam et avaritiam, debeant dici +capitalia vitia aliqua specialia peccata. Quarto, quot et quae sint +capitalia vitia.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that covetousness is not the root of all sins. For covetousness, which is immoderate desire for riches, is + opposed to the virtue of liberality. But liberality is not the root of all virtues. Therefore covetousness is not the root + of all sins. +
[37147] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod cupiditas non sit radix omnium +peccatorum. Cupiditas enim, quae est immoderatus appetitus +divitiarum, opponitur virtuti liberalitatis. Sed liberalitas non +est radix omnium virtutum. Ergo cupiditas non est radix omnium +peccatorum.
+ Objection 2: Further, the desire for the means proceeds from desire for the end. Now riches, the desire for which is called covetousness, + are not desired except as being useful for some end, as stated in Ethic. i, 5. Therefore covetousness is not the root of all + sins, but proceeds from some deeper root. +
[37148] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +appetitus eorum quae sunt ad finem, procedit ex appetitu finis. Sed +divitiae, quarum appetitus est cupiditas, non appetuntur nisi ut +utiles ad aliquem finem, sicut dicitur in I Ethic. Ergo cupiditas +non est radix omnis peccati, sed procedit ex alia priori +radice.
+ Objection 3: Further, it often happens that avarice, which is another name for covetousness, arises from other sins; as when a man desires + money through ambition, or in order to sate his gluttony. Therefore it is not the root of all sins. +
[37149] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +frequenter invenitur quod avaritia, quae cupiditas nominatur, +oritur ex aliis peccatis, puta cum quis appetit pecuniam propter +ambitionem, vel ut satisfaciat gulae. Non ergo est radix omnium +peccatorum.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle says ( + 1 Tim. 6:10): "The desire of money is the root of all evil." +
[37150] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicit apostolus, I ad Tim. ult., radix omnium malorum +est cupiditas.
+ I answer that, According to some, covetousness may be understood in different ways. First, as denoting inordinate desire for riches: and + thus it is a special sin. Secondly, as denoting inordinate desire for any temporal good: and thus it is a genus comprising + all sins, because every sin includes an inordinate turning to a mutable good, as stated above ( + Q[72], A[2]). Thirdly, as denoting an inclination of a corrupt nature to desire corruptible goods + inordinately: and they say that in this sense covetousness is the root of all sins, comparing it to the root of a tree, which + draws its sustenance from earth, just as every sin grows out of the love of temporal things. +
Now, though all this is true, it does not seem to explain the mind of the Apostle when he states that covetousness is the + root of all sins. For in that passage he clearly speaks against those who, because they "will become rich, fall into temptation, + and into the snare of the devil . . . for covetousness is the root of all evils." Hence it is evident that he is speaking + of covetousness as denoting the inordinate desire for riches. Accordingly, we must say that covetousness, as + denoting a special sin, is called the root of all sins, in likeness to the root of a tree, in furnishing sustenance to the + whole tree. For we see that by riches man acquires the means of committing any sin whatever, and of sating his desire for + any sin whatever, since money helps man to obtain all manner of temporal goods, according to + Eccles. 10:19: "All things obey money": so that in this desire for riches is the root of all sins. +
[37151] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod secundum quosdam cupiditas multipliciter dicitur. Uno +modo, prout est appetitus inordinatus divitiarum. Et sic est +speciale peccatum. Alio modo, secundum quod significat inordinatum +appetitum cuiuscumque boni temporalis. Et sic est genus omnis +peccati, nam in omni peccato est inordinata conversio ad +commutabile bonum, ut dictum est. Tertio modo sumitur prout +significat quandam inclinationem naturae corruptae ad bona +corruptibilia inordinate appetenda. Et sic dicunt cupiditatem esse +radicem omnium peccatorum, ad similitudinem radicis arboris, quae +ex terra trahit alimentum, sic enim ex amore rerum temporalium omne +peccatum procedit. Et haec quidem quamvis vera sint, non tamen +videntur esse secundum intentionem apostoli, qui dixit cupiditatem +esse radicem omnium peccatorum. Manifeste enim ibi loquitur contra +eos qui, cum velint divites fieri, incidunt in tentationes et in +laqueum Diaboli, eo quod radix omnium malorum est cupiditas, +unde manifestum est quod loquitur de cupiditate secundum quod est +appetitus inordinatus divitiarum. Et secundum hoc, dicendum est +quod cupiditas, secundum quod est speciale peccatum, dicitur radix +omnium peccatorum, ad similitudinem radicis arboris, quae alimentum +praestat toti arbori. Videmus enim quod per divitias homo acquirit +facultatem perpetrandi quodcumque peccatum, et adimplendi +desiderium cuiuscumque peccati, eo quod ad habenda quaecumque +temporalia bona, potest homo per pecuniam iuvari; secundum quod +dicitur Eccle. X, pecuniae obediunt omnia. Et secundum hoc, +patet quod cupiditas divitiarum est radix omnium peccatorum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Virtue and sin do not arise from the same source. For sin arises from the desire of mutable good; and consequently the desire + of that good which helps one to obtain all temporal goods, is called the root of all sins. But virtue arises from the desire + for the immutable God; and consequently charity, which is the love of God, is called the root of the virtues, according to + Eph. 3:17: "Rooted and founded in charity." +
[37152] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod non ab eodem oritur virtus et peccatum. Oritur +enim peccatum ex appetitu commutabilis boni, et ideo appetitus +illius boni quod iuvat ad consequenda omnia temporalia bona, radix +peccatorum dicitur. Virtus autem oritur ex appetitu incommutabilis +boni, et ideo caritas, quae est amor Dei, ponitur radix virtutum; +secundum illud Ephes. III, in caritate radicati et +fundati.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The desire of money is said to be the root of sins, not as though riches were sought for their own sake, as being the last + end; but because they are much sought after as useful for any temporal end. And since a universal good is more desirable than + a particular good, they move the appetite more than any individual goods, which along with many others can be procured by + means of money. +
[37153] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod appetitus pecuniarum dicitur esse radix peccatorum, +non quia divitiae propter se quaerantur, tanquam ultimus finis, sed +quia multum quaeruntur ut utiles ad omnem temporalem finem. Et quia +universale bonum est appetibilius quam aliquod particulare bonum, +ideo magis movent appetitum quam quaedam bona singularia, quae +simul cum multis aliis per pecuniam haberi possunt.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Just as in natural things we do not ask what always happens, but what happens most frequently, for the reason that the nature + of corruptible things can be hindered, so as not always to act in the same way; so also in moral matters, we consider what + happens in the majority of cases, not what happens invariably, for the reason that the will does not act of necessity. So + when we say that covetousness is the root of all evils, we do not assert that no + other evil can be its root, but that other evils more frequently arise therefrom, for the reason given. +
[37154] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut in rebus naturalibus non quaeritur quid semper +fiat, sed quid in pluribus accidit, eo quod natura corruptibilium +rerum impediri potest, ut non semper eodem modo operetur; ita etiam +in moralibus consideratur quod ut in pluribus est, non autem quod +est semper, eo quod voluntas non ex necessitate operatur. Non +igitur dicitur avaritia radix omnis mali, quin interdum aliquod +aliud malum sit radix eius, sed quia ex ipsa frequentius alia mala +oriuntur, ratione praedicta.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not the beginning of every sin. For the root is a beginning of a tree, so that the beginning + of a sin seems to be the same as the root of sin. Now covetousness is the root of every sin, as stated above + (A[1]). Therefore it is also the beginning of every sin, and not pride. +
[37155] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod superbia non sit initium omnis +peccati. Radix enim est quoddam principium arboris, et ita videtur +idem esse radix peccati et initium peccati. Sed cupiditas est radix +omnis peccati, ut dictum est. Ergo ipsa etiam est initium omnis +peccati, non autem superbia.
+ Objection 2: Further, it is written ( + Ecclus. 10:14): "The beginning of the pride of man is apostasy [Douay: 'to fall off'] from God." But apostasy from God is a sin. Therefore + another sin is the beginning of pride, so that the latter is not the beginning of every sin. +
[37156] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Eccli. X dicitur, initium superbiae hominis apostatare a +Deo. Sed apostasia a Deo est quoddam peccatum. Ergo aliquod +peccatum est initium superbiae, et ipsa non est initium omnis +peccati.
+ Objection 3: Further, the beginning of every sin would seem to be that which causes all sins. Now this is inordinate self-love, which, + according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv), "builds up the city of Babylon." Therefore self-love and not pride, is the beginning + of every sin. +
[37157] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +illud videtur esse initium omnis peccati, quod facit omnia peccata. +Sed hoc est inordinatus amor sui, qui facit civitatem Babylonis, ut +Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei. Ergo amor sui est initium +omnis peccati, non autem superbia.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Ecclus. 10:15): "Pride is the beginning of all sin." +
[37158] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Eccli. X, initium omnis peccati +superbia.
+ I answer that, Some say pride is to be taken in three ways. First, as denoting inordinate desire to excel; and thus it is a special sin. + Secondly, as denoting actual contempt of God, to the effect of not being subject to His commandment; and thus, they say, it + is a generic sin. Thirdly, as denoting an inclination to this contempt, owing to the corruption of nature; and in this sense + they say that it is the beginning of every sin, and that it differs from covetousness, + because covetousness regards sin as turning towards the mutable good by which sin is, as it were, nourished and fostered, + for which reason covetousness is called the "root"; whereas pride regards sin as turning away from God, to Whose commandment + man refuses to be subject, for which reason it is called the "beginning," because the beginning of evil consists in turning + away from God. +
Now though all this is true, nevertheless it does not explain the mind of the wise man who said ( + Ecclus. 10:15): "Pride is the beginning of all sin." For it is evident that he is speaking of pride as denoting inordinate desire to excel, + as is clear from what follows (verse 17): "God hath overturned the thrones of proud princes"; indeed this is the point of + nearly the whole chapter. We must therefore say that pride, even as denoting a special sin, is the + beginning of every sin. For we must take note that, in voluntary actions, such as sins, there is a twofold order, of intention, + and of execution. In the former order, the principle is the end, as we have stated many times before (Q[1], A[1], ad 1; Q[18], + A[7], ad 2; Q[15], A[1], ad 2; Q[25], A[2]). Now man's end in acquiring all temporal goods is that, through their means, he + may have some perfection and excellence. Therefore, from this point of view, pride, which is the desire to excel, is + said to be the "beginning" of every sin. On the other hand, in the order of execution, the first place belongs to that which + by furnishing the opportunity of fulfilling all desires of sin, has the character of a root, and such are riches; so that, + from this point of view, covetousness is said to be the "root" of all evils, as stated above + (A[1]). +
[37159] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod quidam dicunt superbiam dici tripliciter. Uno modo, +secundum quod superbia significat inordinatum appetitum propriae +excellentiae. Et sic est speciale peccatum. Alio modo, secundum +quod importat quendam actualem contemptum Dei, quantum ad hunc +effectum qui est non subdi eius praecepto. Et sic dicunt quod est +generale peccatum. Tertio modo, secundum quod importat quandam +inclinationem ad huiusmodi contemptum, ex corruptione naturae. Et +sic dicunt quod est initium omnis peccati. Et differt a cupiditate, +quia cupiditas respicit peccatum ex parte conversionis ad bonum +commutabile, ex quo peccatum quodammodo nutritur et fovetur, et +propter hoc cupiditas dicitur radix, sed superbia respicit peccatum +ex parte aversionis a Deo, cuius praecepto homo subdi recusat; et +ideo vocatur initium, quia ex parte aversionis incipit ratio mali. +Et haec quidem quamvis vera sint, tamen non sunt secundum +intentionem sapientis, qui dixit, initium omnis peccati est +superbia. Manifeste enim loquitur de superbia secundum quod est +inordinatus appetitus propriae excellentiae, ut patet per hoc quod +subdit, sedes ducum superborum destruxit Deus. Et de hac +materia fere loquitur in toto capitulo. Et ideo dicendum est quod +superbia, etiam secundum quod est speciale peccatum, est initium +omnis peccati. Considerandum est enim quod in actibus voluntariis, +cuiusmodi sunt peccata, duplex ordo invenitur, scilicet +intentionis, et executionis. In primo quidem ordine, habet rationem +principii finis, ut supra multoties dictum est. Finis autem in +omnibus bonis temporalibus acquirendis, est ut homo per illa +quandam perfectionem et excellentiam habeat. Et ideo ex hac parte +superbia, quae est appetitus excellentiae, ponitur initium omnis +peccati. Sed ex parte executionis, est primum id quod praebet +opportunitatem adimplendi omnia desideria peccati, quod habet +rationem radicis, scilicet divitiae. Et ideo ex hac parte avaritia +ponitur esse radix omnium malorum, ut dictum est.
Reply to Objection 1: This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
[37160] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 ad 1 Et per hoc +patet responsio ad primum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Apostasy from God is stated to be the beginning of pride, in so far as it denotes a turning away from God, because from the + fact that man wishes not to be subject to God, it follows that he desires inordinately his own excellence in temporal things. + Wherefore, in the passage quoted, apostasy from God does not denote the special sin, but rather that general condition of + every sin, consisting in its turning away from God. It may also be said that + apostasy from God is said to be the beginning of pride, because it is the first species of pride. For it is characteristic + of pride to be unwilling to be subject to any superior, and especially to God; the result being that a man is unduly lifted + up, in respect of the other species of pride. +
[37161] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod apostatare a Deo dicitur esse initium superbiae ex +parte aversionis, ex hoc enim quod homo non vult subdi Deo, +sequitur quod inordinate velit propriam excellentiam in rebus +temporalibus. Et sic apostasia a Deo non sumitur ibi quasi speciale +peccatum, sed magis ut quaedam conditio generalis omnis peccati, +quae est aversio ab incommutabili bono. Vel potest dici quod +apostatare a Deo dicitur esse initium superbiae, quia est prima +superbiae species. Ad superbiam enim pertinet cuicumque superiori +nolle subiici, et praecipue nolle subdi Deo; ex quo contingit quod +homo supra seipsum indebite extollatur, quantum ad alias superbiae +species.
+ Reply to Objection 3: In desiring to excel, man loves himself, for to love oneself is the same as to desire some good for oneself. Consequently + it amounts to the same whether we reckon pride or self-love as the beginning of every evil. +
[37162] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod in hoc homo se amat, quod sui excellentiam vult, idem +enim est se amare quod sibi velle bonum. Unde ad idem pertinet quod +ponatur initium omnis peccati superbia, vel amor proprius.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that no other special sins, besides pride and avarice, should be called capital. Because "the head seems to + be to an animal, what the root is to a plant," as stated in De Anima ii, text. 38: for the roots are like a mouth. If therefore + covetousness is called the "root of all evils," it seems that it alone, and no other sin, should be called a capital vice. +
[37163] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod praeter superbiam et avaritiam, non +sint quaedam alia peccata specialia quae dicantur capitalia. Ita +enim se videtur habere caput ad animalia, sicut radix ad +plantas, ut dicitur in II de anima, nam radices sunt ori +similes. Si igitur cupiditas dicitur radix omnium malorum, videtur +quod ipsa sola debeat dici vitium capitale, et nullum aliud +peccatum.
+ Objection 2: Further, the head bears a certain relation of order to the other members, in so far as sensation and movement follow from + the head. But sin implies privation of order. Therefore sin has not the character of head: so that no sins should be called + capital. +
[37164] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +caput habet quendam ordinem ad alia membra, inquantum a capite +diffunditur quodammodo sensus et motus. Sed peccatum dicitur per +privationem ordinis. Ergo peccatum non habet rationem capitis. Et +ita non debent poni aliqua capitalia peccata.
+ Objection 3: Further, capital crimes are those which receive capital punishment. But every kind of sin comprises some that are punished + thus. Therefore the capital sins are not certain specific sins. +
[37165] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +capitalia crimina dicuntur quae capite plectuntur. Sed tali poena +puniuntur quaedam peccata in singulis generibus. Ergo vitia +capitalia non sunt aliqua determinata secundum speciem.
+ On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) enumerates certain special vices under the name of capital. +
[37166] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., enumerat quaedam specialia vitia, +quae dicit esse capitalia.
+ I answer that, The word capital is derived from "caput" [a head]. Now the head, properly speaking, is that part of an animal's body, which + is the principle and director of the whole animal. Hence, metaphorically speaking, every principle is called a head, and even + men who direct and govern others are called heads. Accordingly a capital vice is so called, in the first place, from "head" + taken in the proper sense, and thus the name "capital" is given to a sin for which + capital punishment is inflicted. It is not in this sense that we are now speaking of capital sins, but in another sense, in + which the term "capital" is derived from head, taken metaphorically for a principle or director of others. In this way a capital + vice is one from which other vices arise, chiefly by being their final cause, which origin is formal, as stated above ( + Q[72], A[6]). Wherefore a capital vice is not only the principle of others, but is also their director + and, in a way, their leader: because the art or habit, to which the end belongs, is always the principle and the commander + in matters concerning the means. Hence Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) compares these capital vices to the "leaders of an army." +
[37167] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod capitale a capite dicitur. Caput autem proprie quidem +est quoddam membrum animalis, quod est principium et directivum +totius animalis. Unde metaphorice omne principium caput vocatur, et +etiam homines qui alios dirigunt et gubernant, capita aliorum +dicuntur. Dicitur ergo vitium capitale uno modo a capite proprie +dicto, et secundum hoc, peccatum capitale dicitur peccatum quod +capitis poena punitur. Sed sic nunc non intendimus de capitalibus +peccatis, sed secundum quod alio modo dicitur peccatum capitale a +capite prout metaphorice significat principium vel directivum +aliorum. Et sic dicitur vitium capitale ex quo alia vitia oriuntur, +et praecipue secundum originem causae finalis, quae est formalis +origo, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo vitium capitale non solum est +principium aliorum, sed etiam est directivum et quodammodo ductivum +aliorum, semper enim ars vel habitus ad quem pertinet finis, +principatur et imperat circa ea quae sunt ad finem. Unde Gregorius, +XXXI Moral., huiusmodi vitia capitalia ducibus exercituum +comparat.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The term "capital" is taken from "caput" and applied to something connected with, or partaking of the head, as having some + property thereof, but not as being the head taken literally. And therefore the capital vices are not only those which have + the character of primary origin, as covetousness which is called the "root," and pride which is called the beginning, but + also those which have the character of proximate origin in respect of several sins. +
[37168] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod capitale dicitur denominative a capite, quod +quidem est per quandam derivationem vel participationem capitis, +sicut habens aliquam proprietatem capitis, non sicut simpliciter +caput. Et ideo capitalia vitia dicuntur non solum illa quae habent +rationem primae originis, sicut avaritia, quae dicitur radix, et +superbia, quae dicitur initium, sed etiam illa quae habent rationem +originis propinquae respectu plurium peccatorum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Sin lacks order in so far as it turns away from God, for in this respect it is an evil, and evil, according to Augustine + (De Natura Boni iv), is "the privation of mode, species and order." But in so far as sin implies a turning to something, it + regards some good: wherefore, in this respect, there can be order in sin. +
[37169] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod peccatum caret ordine ex parte aversionis, ex hac +enim parte habet rationem mali; malum autem, secundum +Augustinum, in libro de natura boni, est privatio modi, speciei +et ordinis. Sed ex parte conversionis, respicit quoddam bonum. +Et ideo ex hac parte potest habere ordinem.
+ Reply to Objection 3: This objection considers capital sin as so called from the punishment it deserves, in which sense we are not taking it here. +
[37170] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod illa ratio procedit de capitali peccato secundum quod +dicitur a reatu poenae. Sic autem hic non loquimur.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to reckon seven capital vices, viz. vainglory, envy, anger, sloth, covetousness, gluttony, + lust. For sins are opposed to virtues. But there are four principal virtues, as stated above ( + Q[61], A[2]). Therefore there are only four principal or capital vices. +
[37171] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit dicendum septem esse vitia +capitalia, quae sunt inanis gloria, invidia, ira, tristitia, +avaritia, gula, luxuria. Peccata enim virtutibus opponuntur. +Virtutes autem principales sunt quatuor, ut supra dictum est. Ergo +et vitia principalia, sive capitalia, non sunt nisi quatuor.
+ Objection 2: Further, the passions of the soul are causes of sin, as stated above ( + Q[77]). But there are four principal passions of the soul; two of which, viz. hope and fear, are not mentioned among the above sins, + whereas certain vices are mentioned to which pleasure and sadness belong, since pleasure belongs to gluttony and lust, and + sadness to sloth and envy. Therefore the principal sins are unfittingly enumerated. +
[37172] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +passiones animae sunt quaedam causae peccati, ut supra dictum est. +Sed passiones animae principales sunt quatuor. De quarum duabus +nulla fit mentio inter praedicta peccata, scilicet de spe et +timore. Enumerantur autem aliqua vitia ad quae pertinet delectatio +et tristitia, nam delectatio pertinet ad gulam et luxuriam, +tristitia vero ad acediam et invidiam. Ergo inconvenienter +enumerantur principalia peccata.
+ Objection 3: Further, anger is not a principal passion. Therefore it should not be placed among the principal vices. +
[37173] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +ira non est principalis passio. Non ergo debuit poni inter +principalia vitia.
+ Objection 4: Further, just as covetousness or avarice is the root of sin, so is pride the beginning of sin, as stated above + (A[2]). But avarice is reckoned to be one of the capital vices. Therefore pride also should be placed among the capital vices. +
[37174] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 arg. 4 Praeterea, +sicut cupiditas, sive avaritia, est radix peccati, ita superbia est +peccati initium, ut supra dictum est. Sed avaritia ponitur unum de +septem vitiis capitalibus. Ergo superbia inter vitia capitalia +enumeranda esset.
+ Objection 5: Further, some sins are committed which cannot be caused through any of these: as, for instance, when one sins through ignorance, + or when one commits a sin with a good intention, e.g. steals in order to give an alms. Therefore the capital vices are insufficiently + enumerated. +
[37175] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 arg. 5 Praeterea, +quaedam peccata committuntur quae ex nullo horum causari possunt, +sicut cum aliquis errat ex ignorantia; vel cum aliquis ex aliqua +bona intentione committit aliquod peccatum, puta cum aliquis +furatur ut det eleemosynam. Ergo insufficienter capitalia vitia +enumerantur.
+ On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory who enumerates them in this way (Moral. xxxi, 17). +
[37176] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 s. c. Sed in +contrarium est auctoritas Gregorii sic enumerantis, XXXI +Moralium.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[3]), the capital vices are those which give rise to others, especially by way of final cause. Now this kind of origin may take + place in two ways. First, on account of the condition of the sinner, who is disposed so as to have a strong inclination for + one particular end, the result being that he frequently goes forward to other sins. But this kind of origin does not come + under the consideration of art, because man's + particular dispositions are infinite in number. Secondly, on account of a natural relationship of the ends to one another: + and it is in this way that most frequently one vice arises from another, so that this kind of origin can come under the consideration + of art. +
Accordingly therefore, those vices are called capital, whose ends have certain fundamental reasons for moving the appetite; + and it is in respect of these fundamental reasons that the capital vices are differentiated. Now a thing moves the appetite + in two ways. First, directly and of its very nature: thus good moves the appetite to seek it, while evil, for the same reason, + moves the appetite to avoid it. Secondly, indirectly and on account of something else, as it were: thus one + seeks an evil on account of some attendant good, or avoids a good on account of some attendant evil. +
Again, man's good is threefold. For, in the first place, there is a certain good of the soul, which derives its aspect of + appetibility, merely through being apprehended, viz. the excellence of honor and praise, and this good is sought inordinately + by "vainglory." Secondly, there is the good of the body, and this regards either the preservation of the individual, e.g. + meat and drink, which good is pursued inordinately by "gluttony," or the preservation of the species, e.g. sexual + intercourse, which good is sought inordinately by "lust." Thirdly, there is external good, viz. riches, to which "covetousness" + is referred. These same four vices avoid inordinately the contrary evils. +
Or again, good moves the appetite chiefly through possessing some property of happiness, which all men seek naturally. Now + in the first place happiness implies perfection, since happiness is a perfect good, to which belongs excellence or renown, + which is desired by "pride" or "vainglory." Secondly, it implies satiety, which "covetousness" seeks in riches that give promise + thereof. Thirdly, it implies pleasure, without which happiness is impossible, as stated in Ethic. i, 7; x, + 6,7,[8] and this "gluttony" and "lust" pursue. +
On the other hand, avoidance of good on account of an attendant evil occurs in two ways. For this happens either in respect + of one's own good, and thus we have "sloth," which is sadness about one's spiritual good, on account of the attendant bodily + labor: or else it happens in respect of another's good, and this, if it be without recrimination, belongs to "envy," which + is sadness about another's good as being a hindrance to one's own excellence, while if it be with recrimination + with a view to vengeance, it is "anger." Again, these same vices seek the contrary evils. +
[37177] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, vitia capitalia dicuntur ex quibus +alia oriuntur, praecipue secundum rationem causae finalis. +Huiusmodi autem origo potest attendi dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, +secundum conditionem peccantis, qui sic dispositus est ut maxime +afficiatur ad unum finem, ex quo ut plurimum in alia peccata +procedat. Sed iste modus originis sub arte cadere non potest, eo +quod infinitae sunt particulares hominum dispositiones. Alio modo, +secundum naturalem habitudinem ipsorum finium ad invicem. Et +secundum hoc, ut in pluribus unum vitium ex alio oritur. Unde iste +modus originis sub arte cadere potest. Secundum hoc ergo, illa +vitia capitalia dicuntur, quorum fines habent quasdam primarias +rationes movendi appetitum, et secundum harum rationum +distinctionem, distinguuntur capitalia vitia. Movet autem aliquid +appetitum dupliciter. Uno modo, directe et per se, et hoc modo +bonum movet appetitum ad prosequendum, malum autem, secundum eandem +rationem, ad fugiendum. Alio modo, indirecte et quasi per aliud, +sicut aliquis aliquod malum prosequitur propter aliquod bonum +adiunctum, vel aliquod bonum fugit propter aliquod malum adiunctum. +Bonum autem hominis est triplex. Est enim primo quoddam bonum +animae, quod scilicet ex sola apprehensione rationem +appetibilitatis habet, scilicet excellentia laudis vel honoris, et +hoc bonum inordinate prosequitur inanis gloria. Aliud est bonum +corporis, et hoc vel pertinet ad conservationem individui, sicut +cibus et potus, et hoc bonum inordinate prosequitur gula; aut ad +conservationem speciei, sicut coitus, et ad hoc ordinatur luxuria. +Tertium bonum est exterius, scilicet divitiae, et ad hoc ordinatur +avaritia. Et eadem quatuor vitia inordinate fugiunt mala contraria. +Vel aliter, bonum praecipue movet appetitum ex hoc quod participat +aliquid de proprietate felicitatis, quam naturaliter omnes +appetunt. De cuius ratione est quidem primo quaedam perfectio, nam +felicitas est perfectum bonum, ad quod pertinet excellentia vel +claritas, quam appetit superbia vel inanis gloria. Secundo de +ratione eius est sufficientia, quam appetit avaritia in divitiis +eam promittentibus. Tertio est de conditione eius delectatio, sine +qua felicitas esse non potest, ut dicitur in I et X Ethic., et hanc +appetunt gula et luxuria. Quod autem aliquis bonum fugiat propter +aliquod malum coniunctum, hoc contingit dupliciter. Quia aut hoc +est respectu boni proprii, et sic est acedia, quae tristatur de +bono spirituali, propter laborem corporalem adiunctum. Aut est de +bono alieno, et hoc, si sit sine insurrectione, pertinet ad +invidiam, quae tristatur de bono alieno, inquantum est impeditivum +propriae excellentiae; aut est cum quadam insurrectione ad +vindictam, et sic est ira. Et ad eadem etiam vitia pertinet +prosecutio mali oppositi.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Virtue and vice do not originate in the same way: since virtue is caused by the subordination of the appetite to reason, + or to the immutable good, which is God, whereas vice arises from the appetite for mutable good. Wherefore there is no need + for the principal vices to be contrary to the principal virtues. +
[37178] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod non est eadem ratio originis in virtutibus et +vitiis, nam virtutes causantur per ordinem appetitus ad rationem, +vel etiam ad bonum incommutabile, quod est Deus; vitia autem +oriuntur ex appetitu boni commutabilis. Unde non oportet quod +principalia vitia opponantur principalibus virtutibus.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Fear and hope are irascible passions. Now all the passions of the irascible part arise from passions of the concupiscible + part; and these are all, in a way, directed to pleasure or sorrow. Hence pleasure and sorrow have a prominent place among + the capital sins, as being the most important of the passions, as stated above ( + Q[25], A[4]). +
[37179] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod timor et spes sunt passiones irascibilis. Omnes autem +passiones irascibilis oriuntur ex passionibus concupiscibilis, quae +etiam omnes ordinantur quodammodo ad delectationem et tristitiam. +Et ideo delectatio et tristitia principaliter connumerantur in +peccatis capitalibus, tanquam principalissimae passiones, ut supra +habitum est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Although anger is not a principal passion, yet it has a distinct place among the capital vices, because it implies a special + kind of movement in the appetite, in so far as recrimination against another's good has the aspect of a virtuous good, i.e. + of the right to vengeance. +
[37180] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ira, licet non sit principalis passio, quia tamen +habet specialem rationem appetitivi motus, prout aliquis impugnat +bonum alterius sub ratione honesti, idest iusti vindicativi; ideo +distinguitur ab aliis capitalibus vitiis.
+ Reply to Objection 4: Pride is said to be the beginning of every sin, in the order of the end, as stated above + (A[2]): and it is in the same order that we are to consider the capital sin as being principal. Wherefore pride, like a universal + vice, is not counted along with the others, but is reckoned as the "queen of them all," as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 27). + But covetousness is said to be the root from another point of view, as stated above + ( + AA[1],2). +
[37181] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod superbia dicitur esse initium omnis peccati secundum +rationem finis, ut dictum est. Et secundum eandem rationem +accipitur principalitas vitiorum capitalium. Et ideo superbia, +quasi universale vitium, non connumeratur, sed magis ponitur velut +regina quaedam omnium vitiorum, sicut Gregorius dicit. Avaritia +autem dicitur radix secundum aliam rationem, sicut supra dictum +est.
+ Reply to Objection 5: These vices are called capital because others, most frequently, arise from them: so that nothing prevents some sins from + arising out of other causes. Nevertheless we might say that all the sins which are due to ignorance, can be reduced to sloth, + to which pertains the negligence of a man who declines to acquire spiritual goods on account of the attendant labor; for the + ignorance that can cause sin, is due to negligence, as stated above ( + Q[76], A[2]). That a man commit a sin with a good intention, seems to point to ignorance, in so far as he knows not that evil should + not be done that good may come of it. +
[37182] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 ad 5 Ad quintum +dicendum quod ista vitia dicuntur capitalia, quia ex eis ut +frequentius alia oriuntur. Unde nihil prohibet aliqua peccata +interdum ex aliis causis oriri. Potest tamen dici quod omnia +peccata quae ex ignorantia proveniunt, possunt reduci ad acediam, +ad quam pertinet negligentia qua aliquis recusat bona spiritualia +acquirere propter laborem, ignorantia enim quae potest esse causa +peccati, ex negligentia provenit, ut supra dictum est. Quod autem +aliquis committat aliquod peccatum ex bona intentione, videtur ad +ignorantiam pertinere, inquantum scilicet ignorat quod non sunt +facienda mala ut veniant bona.
We must now consider the effects of sin; and (1) the corruption of the good of nature; (2) the stain on the soul; (3) the + debt of punishment. +
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the good of nature is diminished by sin?
(2) Whether it can be taken away altogether?
(4) Whether privation of mode, species and order is an effect of sin?
(5) Whether death and other bodily defects are the result of sin?
+[37183] +Iª-IIae q. 85 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +effectibus peccati. Et primo quidem, de corruptione boni naturae; +secundo, de macula animae; tertio, de reatu poenae. Circa primum +quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum bonum naturae diminuatur per peccatum. +Secundo, utrum totaliter tolli possit. Tertio, de quatuor +vulneribus quae Beda ponit, quibus natura humana vulnerata est +propter peccatum. Quarto, utrum privatio modi, speciei et ordinis, +sit effectus peccati. Quinto, utrum mors et alii defectus +corporales sint effectus peccati. Sexto, utrum sint aliquo modo +homini naturales.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that sin does not diminish the good of nature. For man's sin is no worse than the devil's. But natural good + remains unimpaired in devils after sin, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore neither does sin diminish the good of + human nature. +
[37184] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non diminuat bonum naturae. +Peccatum enim hominis non est gravius quam peccatum Daemonis. Sed +bona naturalia in Daemonibus manent integra post peccatum, ut +Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo peccatum etiam bonum +naturae humanae non diminuit.
+ Objection 2: Further, when that which follows is changed, that which precedes remains unchanged, since substance remains the same when + its accidents are changed. But nature exists before the voluntary action. Therefore, when sin has caused a disorder in a voluntary + act, nature is not changed on that account, so that the good of nature be diminished. +
[37185] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +transmutato posteriori, non transmutatur prius, manet enim +substantia eadem, transmutatis accidentibus. Sed natura praeexistit +actioni voluntariae. Ergo, facta deordinatione circa actionem +voluntariam per peccatum, non transmutatur propter hoc natura, ita +quod bonum naturae diminuatur.
+ Objection 3: Further, sin is an action, while diminution is a passion. Now no agent is passive by the very reason of its acting, although + it is possible for it to act on one thing, and to be passive as regards another. Therefore he who sins, does not, by his sin, + diminish the good of his nature. +
[37186] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +peccatum est actus quidam, diminutio autem passio. Nullum autem +agens, ex hoc ipso quod agit, patitur, potest autem contingere quod +in unum agat, et ab alio patiatur. Ergo ille qui peccat, per +peccatum non diminuit bonum suae naturae.
+ Objection 4: Further, no accident acts on its subject: because that which is patient is a potential being, while that which is subjected + to an accident, is already an actual being as regards that accident. But sin is in the good of nature as an accident in a + subject. Therefore sin does not diminish the good of nature, since to diminish is to act. +
[37187] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, +nullum accidens agit in suum subiectum, quia quod patitur, est +potentia ens; quod autem subiicitur accidenti, iam est actu ens +secundum accidens illud. Sed peccatum est in bono naturae sicut +accidens in subiecto. Ergo peccatum non diminuit bonum naturae, +diminuere enim quoddam agere est.
+ On the contrary, "A certain man going down from Jerusalem to Jericho ( + Lk. 10:30), i.e. to the corruption of sin, was stripped of his gifts, and wounded in his nature," as Bede [*The quotation is from the + Glossa Ordinaria of Strabo] expounds the passage. Therefore sin diminishes the good of nature. +
[37188] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod, sicut dicitur Luc. X, homo descendens a Ierusalem in +Iericho, idest in defectum peccati, expoliatur gratuitis et +vulneratur in naturalibus, ut Beda exponit. Ergo peccatum +diminuit bonum naturae.
+ I answer that, The good of human nature is threefold. First, there are the principles of which nature is constituted, and the properties + that flow from them, such as the powers of the soul, and so forth. Secondly, since man has from nature an inclination to virtue, + as stated above ( + Q[60], A[1]; + Q[63], A[1]), this inclination to virtue is a good of nature. Thirdly, the gift of original justice, conferred on the whole of + human nature in the person of the first man, may be called a good of nature. +
Accordingly, the first-mentioned good of nature is neither destroyed nor diminished by sin. The third good of nature was + entirely destroyed through the sin of our first parent. But the second good of nature, viz. the natural inclination to virtue, + is diminished by sin. Because human acts produce an inclination to like acts, as stated above ( + Q[50], A[1]). Now from the very fact that thing becomes inclined to one of two contraries, its inclination to the + other contrary must needs be diminished. Wherefore as sin is opposed to virtue, from the very fact that a man sins, there + results a diminution of that good of nature, which is the inclination to virtue. +
[37189] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod bonum naturae humanae potest tripliciter dici. Primo, +ipsa principia naturae, ex quibus natura constituitur, et +proprietates ex his causatae, sicut potentiae animae et alia +huiusmodi. Secundo, quia homo a natura habet inclinationem ad +virtutem, ut supra habitum est, ipsa inclinatio ad virtutem est +quoddam bonum naturae. Tertio modo potest dici bonum naturae donum +originalis iustitiae, quod fuit in primo homine collatum toti +humanae naturae. Primum igitur bonum naturae nec tollitur nec +diminuitur per peccatum. Tertium vero bonum naturae totaliter est +ablatum per peccatum primi parentis. Sed medium bonum naturae, +scilicet ipsa naturalis inclinatio ad virtutem, diminuitur per +peccatum. Per actus enim humanos fit quaedam inclinatio ad similes +actus, ut supra habitum est. Oportet autem quod ex hoc quod aliquid +inclinatur ad unum contrariorum, diminuatur inclinatio eius ad +aliud. Unde cum peccatum sit contrarium virtuti, ex hoc ipso quod +homo peccat, diminuitur bonum naturae quod est inclinatio ad +virtutem.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius is speaking of the first-mentioned good of nature, which consists in "being, living and understanding," as anyone + may see who reads the context. +
[37190] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Dionysius loquitur de bono primo naturae, quod +est esse, vivere et intelligere; ut patet eius verba intuenti.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Although nature precedes the voluntary action, it has an inclination to a certain voluntary action. Wherefore nature is not + changed in itself, through a change in the voluntary action: it is the inclination that is changed in so far as it is directed + to its term. +
[37191] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod natura, etsi sit prior quam voluntaria actio, tamen +habet inclinationem ad quandam voluntariam actionem. Unde ipsa +natura secundum se non variatur propter variationem voluntariae +actionis, sed ipsa inclinatio variatur ex illa parte qua ordinatur +ad terminum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: A voluntary action proceeds from various powers, active and passive. The result is that through voluntary actions something + is caused or taken away in the man who acts, as we have stated when treating of the production of habits ( + Q[51], A[2]). +
[37192] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod actio voluntaria procedit ex diversis potentiis, +quarum una est activa et alia passiva. Et ex hoc contingit quod per +actiones voluntarias causatur aliquid, vel aufertur ab homine sic +agente, ut supra dictum est, cum de generatione habituum +ageretur.
+ Reply to Objection 4: An accident does not act effectively on its subject, but it acts on it formally, in the same sense as when we say that whiteness + makes a thing white. In this way there is nothing to hinder sin from diminishing the good of nature; but only in so far as + sin is itself a diminution of the good of nature, through being an inordinateness of action. But as regards the inordinateness + of the agent, we must say that such like inordinateness is caused by the + fact that in the acts of the soul, there is an active, and a passive element: thus the sensible object moves the sensitive + appetite, and the sensitive appetite inclines the reason and will, as stated above ( + Q[77], AA[1], 2). The result of this is the inordinateness, not as though an accident acted on its own subject, but in so far as the object + acts on the power, and one power acts on another and puts it out of order. +
[37193] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod accidens non agit effective in subiectum; agit tamen +formaliter in ipsum, eo modo loquendi quo dicitur quod albedo facit +album. Et sic nihil prohibet quod peccatum diminuat bonum naturae, +eo tamen modo quo est ipsa diminutio boni naturae, inquantum +pertinet ad inordinationem actus. Sed quantum ad inordinationem +agentis, oportet dicere quod talis inordinatio causatur per hoc +quod in actibus animae aliquid est activum et aliquid passivum, +sicut sensibile movet appetitum sensitivum, et appetitus sensitivus +inclinat rationem et voluntatem, ut supra dictum est. Et ex hoc +causatur inordinatio, non quidem ita quod accidens agat in proprium +subiectum; sed secundum quod obiectum agit in potentiam, et una +potentia agit in aliam, et deordinat ipsam.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the entire good of human nature can be destroyed by sin. For the good of human nature is finite, since + human nature itself is finite. Now any finite thing is entirely taken away, if the subtraction be continuous. Since therefore + the good of nature can be continually diminished by sin, it seems that in the end it can be entirely taken away. +
[37194] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod totum bonum humanae naturae possit per +peccatum auferri. Bonum enim naturae humanae finitum est, cum et +ipsa natura humana sit finita. Sed quodlibet finitum totaliter +consumitur, facta continua ablatione. Cum ergo bonum naturae +continue per peccatum diminui possit, videtur quod possit quandoque +totaliter consumi.
+ Objection 2: Further, in a thing of one nature, the whole and the parts are uniform, as is evidently the case with air, water, flesh and + all bodies with similar parts. But the good of nature is wholly uniform. Since therefore a part thereof can be taken away + by sin, it seems that the whole can also be taken away by sin. +
[37195] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +eorum quae sunt unius naturae, similis est ratio de toto et de +partibus, sicut patet in aere et in aqua et carne, et omnibus +corporibus similium partium. Sed bonum naturae est totaliter +uniforme. Cum igitur pars eius possit auferri per peccatum, totum +etiam per peccatum auferri posse videtur.
+ Objection 3: Further, the good of nature, that is weakened by sin, is aptitude for virtue. Now this aptitude is destroyed entirely in + some on account of sin: thus the lost cannot be restored to virtue any more than the blind can to sight. Therefore sin can + take away the good of nature entirely. +
[37196] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +bonum naturae quod per peccatum minuitur, est habilitas ad +virtutem. Sed in quibusdam propter peccatum habilitas praedicta +totaliter tollitur, ut patet in damnatis, qui reparari ad virtutem +non possunt, sicut nec caecus ad visum. Ergo peccatum potest +totaliter tollere bonum naturae.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xiv) that "evil does not exist except in some good." But the evil of sin cannot be in the good + of virtue or of grace, because they are contrary to it. Therefore it must be in the good of nature, and consequently it does + not destroy it entirely. +
[37197] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., quod malum non est nisi in +bono. Sed malum culpae non potest esse in bono virtutis vel +gratiae, quia est ei contrarium. Ergo oportet quod sit in bono +naturae. Non ergo totaliter tollit ipsum.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[1]), the good of nature, that is diminished by sin, is the natural inclination to virtue, which is befitting to man from the + very fact that he is a rational being; for it is due to this that he performs actions in accord with reason, which is to act + virtuously. Now sin cannot entirely take away from man the fact that he is a rational being, for then he would no longer be + capable of sin. Wherefore it is not possible + for this good of nature to be destroyed entirely. +
Since, however, this same good of nature may be continually diminished by sin, some, in order to illustrate this, have made + use of the example of a finite thing being diminished indefinitely, without being entirely destroyed. For the Philosopher + says (Phys. i, text. 37) that if from a finite magnitude a continual subtraction be made in the same quantity, it will at + last be entirely destroyed, for instance if from any finite length I continue to subtract the length of a span. If, + however, the subtraction be made each time in the same proportion, and not in the same quantity, it may go on indefinitely, + as, for instance, if a quantity be halved, and one half be diminished by half, it will be possible to go on thus indefinitely, + provided that what is subtracted in each case be less than what was subtracted before. But this does not apply to the question + at issue, since a subsequent sin does not diminish the good of nature less than a previous sin, but perhaps more, if it + be a more grievous sin. +
We must, therefore, explain the matter otherwise by saying that the aforesaid inclination is to be considered as a middle + term between two others: for it is based on the rational nature as on its root, and tends to the good of virtue, as to its + term and end. Consequently its diminution may be understood in two ways: first, on the part of its rood, secondly, on the + part of its term. In the first way, it is not diminished by sin, because sin does not diminish nature, as stated + above + (A[1]). But it is diminished in the second way, in so far as an obstacle is placed against its attaining its term. Now if it were + diminished in the first way, it would needs be entirely destroyed at last by the rational nature being entirely destroyed. + Since, however, it is diminished on the part of the obstacle which is place against its attaining its term, it is evident + that it can be diminished indefinitely, because obstacles can be placed indefinitely, + inasmuch as man can go on indefinitely adding sin to sin: and yet it cannot be destroyed entirely, because the root of this + inclination always remains. An example of this may be seen in a transparent body, which has an inclination to receive light, + from the very fact that it is transparent; yet this inclination or aptitude is diminished on the part of supervening clouds, + although it always remains rooted in the nature of the body. +
[37198] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, bonum naturae quod per peccatum +diminuitur, est naturalis inclinatio ad virtutem. Quae quidem +convenit homini ex hoc ipso quod rationalis est, ex hoc enim habet +quod secundum rationem operetur, quod est agere secundum virtutem. +Per peccatum autem non potest totaliter ab homine tolli quod sit +rationalis, quia iam non esset capax peccati. Unde non est +possibile quod praedictum naturae bonum totaliter tollatur. Cum +autem inveniatur huiusmodi bonum continue diminui per peccatum, +quidam ad huius manifestationem usi sunt quodam exemplo, in quo +invenitur aliquod finitum in infinitum diminui, nunquam tamen +totaliter consumi. Dicit enim philosophus, in III Physic., quod si +ab aliqua magnitudine finita continue auferatur aliquid secundum +eandem quantitatem, totaliter tandem consumetur, puta si a +quacumque quantitate finita semper subtraxero mensuram palmi. Si +vero fiat subtractio semper secundum eandem proportionem, et non +secundum eandem quantitatem, poterit in infinitum subtrahi, puta, +si quantitas dividatur in duas partes, et a dimidio subtrahatur +dimidium, ita in infinitum poterit procedi; ita tamen quod semper +quod posterius subtrahitur, erit minus eo quod prius subtrahebatur. +Sed hoc in proposito non habet locum, non enim sequens peccatum +minus diminuit bonum naturae quam praecedens, sed forte magis, si +sit gravius. Et ideo aliter est dicendum quod praedicta inclinatio +intelligitur ut media inter duo, fundatur enim sicut in radice in +natura rationali, et tendit in bonum virtutis sicut in terminum et +finem. Dupliciter igitur potest intelligi eius diminutio, uno modo, +ex parte radicis; alio modo, ex parte termini. Primo quidem modo +non diminuitur per peccatum, eo quod peccatum non diminuit ipsam +naturam, ut supra dictum est. Sed diminuitur secundo modo, +inquantum scilicet ponitur impedimentum pertingendi ad terminum. Si +autem primo modo diminueretur, oporteret quod quandoque totaliter +consumeretur, natura rationali totaliter consumpta. Sed quia +diminuitur ex parte impedimenti quod apponitur ne pertingat ad +terminum, manifestum est quod diminui quidem potest in infinitum, +quia in infinitum possunt impedimenta apponi, secundum quod homo +potest in infinitum addere peccatum peccato, non tamen potest +totaliter consumi, quia semper manet radix talis inclinationis. +Sicut patet in diaphano corpore, quod quidem habet inclinationem ad +susceptionem lucis ex hoc ipso quod est diaphanum, diminuitur autem +haec inclinatio vel habilitas ex parte nebularum supervenientium, +cum tamen semper maneat in radice naturae.
+ Reply to Objection 1: This objection avails when diminution is made by subtraction. But here the diminution is made by raising obstacles, and this + neither diminishes nor destroys the root of the inclination, as stated above. +
[37199] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit quando fit diminutio per +subtractionem. Hic autem fit diminutio per appositionem +impedimenti, quod neque tollit neque diminuit radicem +inclinationis, ut dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The natural inclination is indeed wholly uniform: nevertheless it stands in relation both to its principle and to its term, + in respect of which diversity of relation, it is diminished on the one hand, and not on the other. +
[37200] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod inclinatio naturalis est quidem tota uniformis, sed +tamen habet respectum et ad principium et ad terminum, secundum +quam diversitatem quodammodo diminuitur et quodammodo non +diminuitur.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Even in the lost the natural inclination to virtue remains, else they would have no remorse of conscience. That it is not + reduced to act is owing to their being deprived of grace by Divine justice. Thus even in a blind man the aptitude to see remains + in the very root of his nature, inasmuch as he is an animal naturally endowed with sight: yet this aptitude is not reduced + to act, for the lack of a cause capable of reducing it, by forming the organ + requisite for sight. +
[37201] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod etiam in damnatis manet naturalis inclinatio ad +virtutem, alioquin non esset in eis remorsus conscientiae. Sed quod +non reducatur in actum, contingit quia deest gratia, secundum +divinam iustitiam. Sicut etiam in caeco remanet aptitudo ad +videndum in ipsa radice naturae, inquantum est animal naturaliter +habens visum, sed non reducitur in actum, quia deest causa quae +reducere possit formando organum quod requiritur ad videndum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that weakness, ignorance, malice and concupiscence are not suitably reckoned as the wounds of nature consequent + upon sin. For one same thing is not both effect and cause of the same thing. But these are reckoned to be causes of sin, as + appears from what has been said above ( + Q[76], A[1]; + Q[77], AA[3],5; + Q[78], A[1]). Therefore they should not be reckoned as effects of + sin. +
[37202] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter ponantur vulnera +naturae esse, ex peccato consequentia, infirmitas, ignorantia, +malitia et concupiscentia. Non enim idem est effectus et causa +eiusdem. Sed ista ponuntur causae peccatorum, ut ex supradictis +patet. Ergo non debent poni effectus peccati.
+ Objection 2: Further, malice is the name of a sin. Therefore it should have no place among the effects of sin. +
[37203] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +malitia nominat quoddam peccatum. Non ergo debet poni inter +effectus peccati.
+ Objection 3: Further, concupiscence is something natural, since it is an act of the concupiscible power. But that which is natural should + not be reckoned a wound of nature. Therefore concupiscence should not be reckoned a wound of nature. +
[37204] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +concupiscentia est quiddam naturale, cum sit actus virtutis +concupiscibilis. Sed illud quod est naturale, non debet poni vulnus +naturae. Ergo concupiscentia non debet poni vulnus naturae.
+ Objection 4: Further, it has been stated ( + Q[77], A[3]) that to sin from weakness is the same as to sin from passion. But concupiscence is a passion. Therefore it should not be + condivided with weakness. +
[37205] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 arg. 4 Praeterea, +dictum est quod idem est peccare ex infirmitate, et ex passione. +Sed concupiscentia passio quaedam est. Ergo non debet contra +infirmitatem dividi.
+ Objection 5: Further, Augustine (De Nat. et Grat. lxvii, 67) reckons "two things to be punishments inflicted on the soul of the sinner, + viz. ignorance and difficulty," from which arise "error and vexation," which four do not coincide with the four in question. + Therefore it seems that one or the other reckoning is incomplete. +
[37206] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 arg. 5 Praeterea, +Augustinus, in libro de natura et gratia, ponit duo poenalia animae +peccanti, scilicet ignorantiam et difficultatem, ex quibus oritur +error et cruciatus, quae quidem quatuor non concordant istis +quatuor. Ergo videtur quod alterum eorum insufficienter +ponatur.
+ On the contrary, The authority of Bede suffices [*Reference not known]. +
[37207] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 s. c. In +contrarium est auctoritas Bedae.
+ I answer that, As a result of original justice, the reason had perfect hold over the lower parts of the soul, while reason itself was perfected + by God, and was subject to Him. Now this same original justice was forfeited through the sin of our first parent, as already + stated ( + Q[81], A[2]); so that all the powers of the soul are left, as it were, destitute of their proper order, whereby they are naturally directed + to virtue; which destitution is + called a wounding of nature. +
Again, there are four of the soul's powers that can be subject of virtue, as stated above ( + Q[61], A[2]), viz. the reason, where prudence resides, the will, where justice is, the irascible, the subject of fortitude, and the concupiscible, + the subject of temperance. Therefore in so far as the reason is deprived of its order to the true, there is the wound of ignorance; + in so far as the will is deprived of its order of good, there is the wound of malice; in + so far as the irascible is deprived of its order to the arduous, there is the wound of weakness; and in so far as the concupiscible + is deprived of its order to the delectable, moderated by reason, there is the wound of concupiscence. +
Accordingly these are the four wounds inflicted on the whole of human nature as a result of our first parent's sin. But since + the inclination to the good of virtue is diminished in each individual on account of actual sin, as was explained above ( + AA[1], 2), these four wounds are also the result of other sins, in so far as, through sin, the reason is obscured, especially in + practical matters, the will hardened to evil, good actions become more difficult + and concupiscence more impetuous. +
[37208] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod per iustitiam originalem perfecte ratio continebat +inferiores animae vires, et ipsa ratio a Deo perficiebatur ei +subiecta. Haec autem originalis iustitia subtracta est per peccatum +primi parentis, sicut iam dictum est. Et ideo omnes vires animae +remanent quodammodo destitutae proprio ordine, quo naturaliter +ordinantur ad virtutem, et ipsa destitutio vulneratio naturae +dicitur. Sunt autem quatuor potentiae animae quae possunt esse +subiecta virtutum, ut supra dictum est, scilicet ratio, in qua est +prudentia; voluntas, in qua est iustitia; irascibilis, in qua est +fortitudo; concupiscibilis, in qua est temperantia. Inquantum ergo +ratio destituitur suo ordine ad verum, est vulnus ignorantiae; +inquantum vero voluntas destituitur ordine ad bonum, est vulnus +malitiae; inquantum vero irascibilis destituitur suo ordine ad +arduum, est vulnus infirmitatis; inquantum vero concupiscentia +destituitur ordine ad delectabile moderatum ratione, est vulnus +concupiscentiae. Sic igitur ita quatuor sunt vulnera inflicta toti +humanae naturae ex peccato primi parentis. Sed quia inclinatio ad +bonum virtutis in unoquoque diminuitur per peccatum actuale, ut ex +dictis patet, et ista sunt quatuor vulnera ex aliis peccatis +consequentia, inquantum scilicet per peccatum et ratio hebetatur, +praecipue in agendis; et voluntas induratur ad bonum; et maior +difficultas bene agendi accrescit; et concupiscentia magis +exardescit.
+ Reply to Objection 1: There is no reason why the effect of one sin should not be the cause of another: because the soul, through sinning once, + is more easily inclined to sin again. +
[37209] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet id quod est effectus unius +peccati, esse causam peccati alterius. Ex hoc enim quod anima +deordinatur per peccatum praecedens, facilius inclinatur ad +peccandum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Malice is not to be taken here as a sin, but as a certain proneness of the will to evil, according to the words of + Gn. 8:21: "Man's senses are prone to evil from his youth" [*Vulgate: 'The imagination and thought of man's heart are prone to evil + from his youth.']. +
[37210] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod malitia non sumitur hic pro peccato, sed pro quadam +pronitate voluntatis ad malum; secundum quod dicitur Gen. VIII, +proni sunt sensus hominis ad malum ab adolescentia sua.
+ Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ( + Q[82], A[3], ad 1), concupiscence is natural to man, in so far as it is subject to reason: whereas, in so far as it is goes beyond the + bounds of reason, it is unnatural to man. +
[37211] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, concupiscentia intantum est +naturalis homini, inquantum subditur rationi. Quod autem excedat +limites rationis, hoc est homini contra naturam.
+ Reply to Objection 4: Speaking in a general way, every passion can be called a weakness, in so far as it weakens the soul's strength and clogs + the reason. Bede, however, took weakness in the strict sense, as contrary to fortitude which pertains to the irascible. +
[37212] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod infirmitas communiter potest dici omnis passio, +inquantum debilitat robur animae et impedit rationem. Sed Beda +accepit infirmitatem stricte, secundum quod opponitur fortitudini, +quae pertinet ad irascibilem.
+ Reply to Objection 5: The "difficulty" which is mentioned in this book of Augustine, includes the three wounds affecting the appetitive powers, + viz. "malice," "weakness" and "concupiscence," for it is owing to these three that a man finds it difficult to tend to the + good. "Error" and "vexation" are consequent wounds, since a man is vexed through being weakened in respect of the objects + of his concupiscence. +
[37213] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 ad 5 Ad quintum +dicendum quod difficultas quae ponitur in libro Augustini, includit +ista tria quae pertinent ad appetitivas potentias, scilicet +malitiam, infirmitatem et concupiscentiam, ex his enim tribus +contingit quod aliquis non facile tendit in bonum. Error autem et +dolor sunt vulnera consequentia, ex hoc enim aliquis dolet, quod +infirmatur circa ea quae concupiscit.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that privation of mode, species and order is not the effect of sin. For Augustine says (De Natura Boni iii) + that "where these three abound, the good is great; where they are less, there is less good; where they are not, there is no + good at all." But sin does not destroy the good of nature. Therefore it does not destroy mode, species and order. +
[37214] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod privatio modi, speciei et ordinis, non +sit effectus peccati. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de natura +boni, quod ubi haec tria magna sunt, magnum bonum est; ubi +parva, parvum; ubi nulla, nullum. Sed peccatum non annullat +bonum naturae. Ergo non privat modum, speciem et ordinem.
+ Objection 2: Further, nothing is its own cause. But sin itself is the "privation of mode, species and order," as Augustine states (De + Natura Boni iv). Therefore privation of mode, species and order is not the effect of sin. +
[37215] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +nihil est causa sui ipsius. Sed ipsum peccatum est privatio modi, +speciei et ordinis, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de natura boni. +Ergo privatio modi, speciei et ordinis, non est effectus +peccati.
+ Objection 3: Further, different effects result from different sins. Now since mode, species and order are diverse, their corresponding + privations must be diverse also, and, consequently, must be the result of different sins. Therefore privation of mode, species + and order is not the effect of each sin. +
[37216] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +diversa peccata diversos habent effectus. Sed modus, species et +ordo, cum sint quaedam diversa, diversas privationes habere +videntur. Ergo per diversa peccata privantur. Non ergo est effectus +cuiuslibet peccati privatio modi, speciei et ordinis.
+ On the contrary, Sin is to the soul what weakness is to the body, according to + Ps. 6:3, "Have mercy on me, O Lord, for I am weak." Now weakness deprives the body of mode, species and order. +
[37217] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod peccatum est in anima sicut infirmitas in corpore; +secundum illud Psalmi VI, miserere mei, domine, quoniam infirmus +sum. Sed infirmitas privat modum, speciem et ordinem ipsius +corporis. Ergo peccatum privat modum, speciem et ordinem +animae.
+ I answer that, As stated in the + FP, Q[5], A[5], mode, species and order are consequent upon every created good, as such, and also upon every being. Because every being + and every good as such depends on its form from which it derives its "species." Again, any kind of form, whether substantial + or accidental, of anything whatever, is according to some measure, wherefore it is stated in Metaph. viii, that "the forms + of things are like numbers," so that + a form has a certain "mode" corresponding to its measure. Lastly owing to its form, each thing has a relation of "order" to + something else. +
Accordingly there are different grades of mode, species and order, corresponding to the different degrees of good. For there + is a good belonging to the very substance of nature, which good has its mode, species and order, and is neither destroyed + nor diminished by sin. There is again the good of the natural inclination, which also has its mode, species and order; and + this is diminished by sin, as stated above ( + AA[1] ,2), but is not entirely destroyed. + Again, there is the good of virtue and grace: this too has its mode, species and order, and is entirely taken away by sin. + Lastly, there is a good consisting in the ordinate act itself, which also has its mode, species and order, the privation of + which is essentially sin. Hence it is clear both how sin is privation of mode, species and order, and how it destroys or diminishes + mode, species and order. +
[37218] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut in primo dictum est, modus, species et ordo +consequuntur unumquodque bonum creatum inquantum huiusmodi, et +etiam unumquodque ens. Omne enim esse et bonum consideratur per +aliquam formam, secundum quam sumitur species. Forma autem +uniuscuiusque rei, qualiscumque sit, sive substantialis sive +accidentalis, est secundum aliquam mensuram, unde et in VIII +Metaphys. dicitur quod formae rerum sunt sicut numeri. Et ex hoc +habet modum quendam, qui mensuram respicit. Ex forma vero sua +unumquodque ordinatur ad aliud. Sic igitur secundum diversos gradus +bonorum, sunt diversi gradus modi, speciei et ordinis. Est ergo +quoddam bonum pertinens ad ipsam substantiam naturae, quod habet +suum modum, speciem et ordinem, et illud nec privatur nec +diminuitur per peccatum. Est etiam quoddam bonum naturalis +inclinationis, et hoc etiam habet suum modum, speciem et ordinem, +et hoc diminuitur per peccatum, ut dictum est, sed non totaliter +tollitur. Est etiam quoddam bonum virtutis et gratiae, quod etiam +habet suum modum, speciem et ordinem, et hoc totaliter tollitur per +peccatum mortale. Est etiam quoddam bonum quod est ipse actus +ordinatus, quod etiam habet suum modum, speciem et ordinem, et +huius privatio est essentialiter ipsum peccatum. Et sic patet +qualiter peccatum et est privatio modi, speciei et ordinis; et +privat vel diminuit modum, speciem et ordinem.
Reply to Objection 1&2: This suffices for the Replies to the first two Objections.
[37219] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 4 ad 1 Unde patet +responsio ad duo prima.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Mode, species and order follow one from the other, as explained above: and so they are destroyed or diminished together. +
[37220] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod modus, species et ordo se consequuntur, sicut ex +dictis patet. Unde simul privantur et diminuuntur.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that death and other bodily defects are not the result of sin. Because equal causes have equal effects. Now + these defects are not equal in all, but abound in some more than in others, whereas original sin, from which especially these + defects seem to result, is equal in all, as stated above ( + Q[82], A[4]). Therefore death and suchlike defects are not the result of sin. +
[37221] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod mors et alii corporales defectus non +sint effectus peccati. Si enim causa fuerit aequalis, et effectus +erit aequalis. Sed huiusmodi defectus non sunt aequales in omnibus, +sed in quibusdam huiusmodi defectus magis abundant, cum tamen +peccatum originale sit in omnibus aequale, sicut dictum est, cuius +videntur huiusmodi defectus maxime esse effectus. Ergo mors et +huiusmodi defectus non sunt effectus peccati.
+ Objection 2: Further, if the cause is removed, the effect is removed. But these defects are not removed, when all sin is removed by Baptism + or Penance. Therefore they are not the effect of sin. +
[37222] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +remota causa, removetur effectus. Sed remoto omni peccato per +Baptismum vel poenitentiam, non removentur huiusmodi defectus. Ergo +non sunt effectus peccati.
+ Objection 3: Further, actual sin has more of the character of guilt than original sin has. But actual sin does not change the nature of + the body by subjecting it to some defect. Much less, therefore, does original sin. Therefore death and other bodily defects + are not the result of sin. +
[37223] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +peccatum actuale habet plus de ratione culpae quam originale. Sed +peccatum actuale non transmutat naturam corporis ad aliquem +defectum. Ergo multo minus peccatum originale. Non ergo mors et +alii defectus corporales sunt effectus peccati.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle says ( + Rom. 5:12), "By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death." +
[37224] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. V, per unum hominem peccatum in +hunc mundum intravit, et per peccatum mors.
+ I answer that, One thing causes another in two ways: first, by reason of itself; secondly, accidentally. By reason of itself, one thing + is the cause of another, if it produces its effect by reason of the power of its nature or form, the result being that the + effect is directly intended by the cause. Consequently, as death and such like defects are beside the intention of the sinner, + it is evident that sin is not, of itself, the cause of these defects. Accidentally, one + thing is the cause of another if it causes it by removing an obstacle: thus it is stated in Phys. viii, text. 32, that "by + displacing a pillar a man moves accidentally the stone resting thereon." In this way the sin of our first parent is the cause + of death and all such like defects in human nature, in so far as by the sin of our first parent original justice was taken + away, whereby not only were the lower powers of the soul held together under the control of reason, without any disorder + whatever, but also the whole body was held together in subjection to the soul, without any defect, as stated in the + FP, Q[97], A[1]. Wherefore, original justice being forfeited through the sin of our first parent; just as human nature was stricken in the + soul by the disorder among the powers, as stated above + (A[3]; Q[82], A[3]), so also it became subject to corruption, by reason of disorder in the body. +
Now the withdrawal of original justice has the character of punishment, even as the withdrawal of grace has. Consequently, + death and all consequent bodily defects are punishments of original sin. And although the defects are not intended by the + sinner, nevertheless they are ordered according to the justice of God Who inflicts them as punishments. +
[37225] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod aliquid est causa alterius dupliciter, uno quidem +modo, per se; alio modo, per accidens. Per se quidem est causa +alterius quod secundum virtutem suae naturae vel formae producit +effectum, unde sequitur quod effectus sit per se intentus a causa. +Unde cum mors et huiusmodi defectus sint praeter intentionem +peccantis, manifestum est quod peccatum non est per se causa +istorum defectuum. Per accidens autem aliquid est causa alterius, +si sit causa removendo prohibens, sicut dicitur in VIII Physic. +quod divellens columnam, per accidens movet lapidem columnae +superpositum. Et hoc modo peccatum primi parentis est causa +mortis et omnium huiusmodi defectuum in natura humana, inquantum +per peccatum primi parentis sublata est originalis iustitia, per +quam non solum inferiores animae vires continebantur sub ratione +absque omni deordinatione, sed totum corpus continebatur sub anima +absque omni defectu, ut in primo habitum est. Et ideo, subtracta +hac originali iustitia per peccatum primi parentis, sicut vulnerata +est humana natura quantum ad animam per deordinationem potentiarum, +ut supra dictum est; ita etiam est corruptibilis effecta per +deordinationem ipsius corporis. Subtractio autem originalis +iustitiae habet rationem poenae, sicut etiam subtractio gratiae. +Unde etiam mors, et omnes defectus corporales consequentes, sunt +quaedam poenae originalis peccati. Et quamvis huiusmodi defectus +non sint intenti a peccante, sunt tamen ordinati secundum iustitiam +Dei punientis.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Causes that produce their effects of themselves, if equal, produce equal effects: for if such causes be increased or diminished, + the effect is increased or diminished. But equal causes of an obstacle being removed, do not point to equal effects. For supposing + a man employs equal force in displacing two columns, it does not follow that the movements of the stones resting on them will + be equal; but that one will move with greater velocity, which has the + greater weight according to the property of its nature, to which it is left when the obstacle to its falling is removed. Accordingly, + when original justice is removed, the nature of the human body is left to itself, so that according to diverse natural temperaments, + some men's bodies are subject to more defects, some to fewer, although original sin is equal in all. +
[37226] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod aequalitas causae per se, causat aequalem +effectum, augmentata enim vel diminuta causa per se, augetur vel +diminuitur effectus. Sed aequalitas causae removentis prohibens, +non ostendit aequalitatem effectuum. Si quis enim aequali impulsu +divellat duas columnas, non sequitur quod lapides superpositi +aequaliter moveantur, sed ille velocius movebitur qui gravior erit +secundum proprietatem suae naturae, cui relinquitur remoto +prohibente. Sic igitur, remota originali iustitia, natura corporis +humani relicta est sibi, et secundum hoc, secundum diversitatem +naturalis complexionis, quorundam corpora pluribus defectibus +subiacent, quorundam vero paucioribus, quamvis existente originali +peccato aequali.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Both original and actual sin are removed by the same cause that removes these defects, according to the Apostle ( + Rom. 8:11): "He . . . shall quicken . . . your mortal bodies, because of His Spirit that dwelleth in you": but each is done according + to the order of Divine wisdom, at a fitting time. Because it is right that we should first of all be conformed to Christ's + sufferings, before attaining to the immortality and impassibility + of glory, which was begun in Him, and by Him acquired for us. Hence it behooves that our bodies should remain, for a time, + subject to suffering, in order that we may merit the impassibility of glory, in conformity with Christ. +
[37227] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod culpa originalis et actualis removetur ab eodem a quo +etiam removentur et huiusmodi defectus, secundum illud apostoli, +Rom. VIII, vivificabit mortalia corpora vestra per inhabitantem +spiritum eius in vobis, sed utrumque fit secundum ordinem +divinae sapientiae, congruo tempore. Oportet enim quod ad +immortalitatem et impassibilitatem gloriae, quae in Christo +inchoata est, et per Christum nobis acquisita, perveniamus +conformati prius passionibus eius. Unde oportet quod ad tempus +passibilitas in nostris corporibus remaneat, ad impassibilitatem +gloriae promerendam conformiter Christo.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Two things may be considered in actual sin, the substance of the act, and the aspect of fault. As regards the substance of + the act, actual sin can cause a bodily defect: thus some sicken and die through eating too much. But as regards the fault, + it deprives us of grace which is given to us that we may regulate the acts of the soul, but not that we may ward off defects + of the body, as original justice did. Wherefore actual sin does not cause those + defects, as original sin does. +
[37228] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod in peccato actuali duo possumus considerare, scilicet +ipsam substantiam actus, et rationem culpae. Ex parte quidem +substantiae actus, potest peccatum actuale aliquem defectum +corporalem causare, sicut ex superfluo cibo aliqui infirmantur et +moriuntur. Sed ex parte culpae, privat gratiam quae datur homini ad +rectificandum animae actus, non autem ad cohibendum defectus +corporales, sicut originalis iustitia cohibebat. Et ideo peccatum +actuale non causat huiusmodi defectus, sicut originale.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that death and such like defects are natural to man. For "the corruptible and the incorruptible differ generically" + (Metaph. x, text. 26). But man is of the same genus as other animals which are naturally corruptible. Therefore man is naturally + corruptible. +
[37229] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod mors et huiusmodi defectus sint homini +naturales. Corruptibile enim et incorruptibile differunt +genere, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed homo est eiusdem generis +cum aliis animalibus, quae sunt naturaliter corruptibilia. Ergo +homo est naturaliter corruptibilis.
+ Objection 2: Further, whatever is composed of contraries is naturally corruptible, as having within itself the cause of corruption. But + such is the human body. Therefore it is naturally corruptible. +
[37230] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, +omne quod est compositum ex contrariis, est naturaliter +corruptibile, quasi habens in se causam corruptionis suae. Sed +corpus humanum est huiusmodi. Ergo est naturaliter +corruptibile.
+ Objection 3: Further, a hot thing naturally consumes moisture. Now human life is preserved by hot and moist elements. Since therefore + the vital functions are fulfilled by the action of natural heat, as stated in De Anima ii, text. 50, it seems that death and + such like defects are natural to man. +
[37231] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, +calidum naturaliter consumit humidum. Vita autem hominis +conservatur per calidum et humidum. Cum igitur operationes vitae +expleantur per actum caloris naturalis, ut dicitur in II de anima, +videtur quod mors et huiusmodi defectus sint homini naturales.
+ On the contrary, (1) God made in man whatever is natural to him. Now "God made not death" ( + Wis. 1:13). Therefore death is not natural to man. +
(2) Further, that which is natural cannot be called either a punishment or an evil: since what is natural to a thing is suitable + to it. But death and such like defects are the punishment of original sin, as stated above + (A[5]). Therefore they are not natural to man. +
(3) Further, matter is proportionate to form, and everything to its end. Now man's end is everlasting happiness, as stated + above (Q[2], A[7]; Q[5] , AA[3],4): and the form of the human body is the rational soul, as was proved in the + FP, Q[75], A[6]. Therefore the human body is naturally incorruptible. +
[37232] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 s. c. 1 Sed +contra, quidquid est homini naturale, Deus in homine fecit. Sed +Deus mortem non fecit, ut dicitur Sap. I. Ergo mors non est homini +naturalis.
[37233] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 s. c. 2 Praeterea, +id quod est secundum naturam, non potest dici poena nec malum, quia +unicuique rei est conveniens id quod est ei naturale. Sed mors et +huiusmodi defectus sunt poena peccati originalis, ut supra dictum +est. Ergo non sunt homini naturales.
[37234] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 s. c. 3 Praeterea, +materia proportionatur formae, et quaelibet res suo fini. Finis +autem hominis est beatitudo perpetua, ut supra dictum est. Forma +etiam humani corporis est anima rationalis, quae est +incorruptibilis, ut in primo habitum est. Ergo corpus humanum est +naturaliter incorruptibile.
+ I answer that, We may speak of any corruptible thing in two ways; first, in respect of its universal nature, secondly, as regards its particular + nature. A thing's particular nature is its own power of action and self-preservation. And in respect of this nature, every + corruption and defect is contrary to nature, as stated in De Coelo ii, text. 37, since this power tends to the being and preservation + of the thing to which it belongs. +
On the other hand, the universal nature is an active force in some universal principle of nature, for instance in some heavenly + body; or again belonging to some superior substance, in which sense God is said by some to be "the Nature Who makes nature." + This force intends the good and the preservation of the universe, for which alternate generation and corruption in things + are requisite: and in this respect corruption and defect in things are natural, not indeed as regards the + inclination of the form which is the principle of being and perfection, but as regards the inclination of matter which is + allotted proportionately to its particular form according to the discretion of the universal agent. And although every form + intends perpetual being as far as it can, yet no form of a corruptible being can achieve its own perpetuity, except the rational + soul; for the reason that the latter is not entirely subject to matter, as other forms are; indeed it has an immaterial + operation of its own, as stated in the + FP, Q[75], A[2]. Consequently as regards his form, incorruption is more natural to man than to other corruptible things. But since that very + form has a matter composed of contraries, from the inclination of that matter there results corruptibility in the whole. In + this respect man is naturally corruptible as regards the nature of his matter left to itself, but not as regards the nature + of his form. +
The first three objections argue on the side of the matter; while the other three argue on the side of the form. Wherefore + in order to solve them, we must observe that the form of man which is the rational soul, in respect of its incorruptibility + is adapted to its end, which is everlasting happiness: whereas the human body, which is corruptible, considered in respect + of its nature, is, in a way, adapted to its form, and, in another way, it is not. For we may note a twofold + condition in any matter, one which the agent chooses, and another which is not chosen by the agent, and is a natural condition + of matter. Thus, a smith in order to make a knife, chooses a matter both hard and flexible, which can be sharpened so as to + be useful for cutting, and in respect of this condition iron is a matter adapted for a knife: but that iron be breakable and + inclined to rust, results from the natural disposition of iron, nor does the workman choose this in the iron, indeed he + would do without it if he could: wherefore this disposition of matter is not adapted to the workman's intention, nor to the + purpose of his art. In like manner the human body is the matter chosen by nature in respect of its being of a mixed temperament, + in order that it may be most suitable as an organ of touch and of the other sensitive and motive powers. Whereas the fact + that it is corruptible is due to a condition of matter, and is not chosen by nature: indeed nature would choose an + incorruptible matter if it could. But God, to Whom every nature is subject, in forming man supplied the defect of nature, + and by the gift of original justice, gave the body a certain incorruptibility, as was stated in the + FP, Q[97], A[1]. It is in this sense that it is said that "God made not death," and that death is the punishment of sin. +
[37235] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod de unaquaque re corruptibili dupliciter loqui +possumus, uno modo, secundum naturam universalem; alio modo, +secundum naturam particularem. Natura quidem particularis est +propria virtus activa et conservativa uniuscuiusque rei. Et +secundum hanc, omnis corruptio et defectus est contra naturam, ut +dicitur in II de caelo, quia huiusmodi virtus intendit esse et +conservationem eius cuius est. Natura vero universalis est virtus +activa in aliquo universali principio naturae, puta in aliquo +caelestium corporum; vel alicuius superioris substantiae, secundum +quod etiam Deus a quibusdam dicitur natura naturans. Quae quidem +virtus intendit bonum et conservationem universi, ad quod exigitur +alternatio generationis et corruptionis in rebus. Et secundum hoc, +corruptiones et defectus rerum sunt naturales, non quidem secundum +inclinationem formae, quae est principium essendi et perfectionis; +sed secundum inclinationem materiae, quae proportionaliter +attribuitur tali formae secundum distributionem universalis +agentis. Et quamvis omnis forma intendat perpetuum esse quantum +potest, nulla tamen forma rei corruptibilis potest assequi +perpetuitatem sui, praeter animam rationalem, eo quod ipsa non est +subiecta omnino materiae corporali, sicut aliae formae; quinimmo +habet propriam operationem immaterialem, ut in primo habitum est. +Unde ex parte suae formae, naturalior est homini incorruptio quam +aliis rebus corruptibilibus. Sed quia et ipsa habet materiam ex +contrariis compositam, ex inclinatione materiae sequitur +corruptibilitas in toto. Et secundum hoc, homo est naturaliter +corruptibilis secundum naturam materiae sibi relictae, sed non +secundum naturam formae. Primae autem tres rationes procedunt ex +parte materiae, aliae vero tres procedunt ex parte formae. Unde ad +earum solutionem, considerandum est quod forma hominis, quae est +anima rationalis, secundum suam incorruptibilitatem proportionata +est suo fini, qui est beatitudo perpetua. Sed corpus humanum, quod +est corruptibile secundum suam naturam consideratum, quodammodo +proportionatum est suae formae, et quodammodo non. Duplex enim +conditio potest attendi in aliqua materia, una scilicet quam agens +eligit; alia quae non est ab agente electa, sed est secundum +conditionem naturalem materiae. Sicut faber ad faciendum cultellum +eligit materiam duram et ductilem, quae subtiliari possit ut sit +apta incisioni, et secundum hanc conditionem ferrum est materia +proportionata cultello, sed hoc quod ferrum sit frangibile et +rubiginem contrahens, consequitur ex naturali dispositione ferri, +nec hoc eligit artifex in ferro, sed magis repudiaret si posset. +Unde haec dispositio materiae non est proportionata intentioni +artificis, nec intentioni artis. Similiter corpus humanum est +materia electa a natura quantum ad hoc, quod est temperatae +complexionis, ut possit esse convenientissimum organum tactus et +aliarum virtutum sensitivarum et motivarum. Sed quod sit +corruptibile, hoc est ex conditione materiae, nec est electum a +natura, quin potius natura eligeret materiam incorruptibilem, si +posset. Sed Deus, cui subiacet omnis natura, in ipsa institutione +hominis supplevit defectum naturae, et dono iustitiae originalis +dedit corpori incorruptibilitatem quandam, ut in primo dictum est. +Et secundum hoc dicitur quod Deus mortem non fecit, et quod mors +est poena peccati.
Reply to Objection 1--3: This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
[37236] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 ad arg. Unde patet +responsio ad obiecta.
We must now consider the stain of sin; under which head there are two points of inquiry:
+[37237] +Iª-IIae q. 86 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +macula peccati. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum macula +animae sit effectus peccati. Secundo, utrum remaneat in anima post +actum peccati.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that sin causes no stain on the soul. For a higher nature cannot be defiled by contact with a lower nature: + hence the sun's ray is not defiled by contact with tainted bodies, as Augustine says (Contra Quinque Haereses v). Now the + human soul is of a much higher nature than mutable things, to which it turns by sinning. Therefore it does not contract a + stain from them by sinning. +
[37238] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non causet aliquam maculam in +anima. Natura enim superior non potest inquinari ex contactu +naturae inferioris, unde radius solaris non inquinatur per tactum +corporum fetidorum, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro contra quinque +haereses. Sed anima humana est multo superioris naturae quam res +commutabiles, ad quas peccando convertitur. Ergo ex eis maculam non +contrahit peccando.
+ Objection 2: Further, sin is chiefly in the will, as stated above ( + Q[74], AA[1],2). Now the will is in the reason, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 42. But the reason or intellect is not stained by considering + anything whatever; rather indeed is it perfected thereby. Therefore neither is the will stained by sin. +
[37239] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +peccatum est principaliter in voluntate, ut supra dictum est. +Voluntas autem est in ratione, ut dicitur in III de anima. Sed +ratio, sive intellectus, non maculatur ex consideratione +quarumcumque rerum, sed magis perficitur. Ergo nec voluntas ex +peccato maculatur.
+ Objection 3: Further, if sin causes a stain, this stain is either something positive, or a pure privation. If it be something positive, + it can only be either a disposition or a habit: for it seems that nothing else can be caused by an act. But it is neither + disposition nor habit: for it happens that a stain remains even after the removal of a disposition or habit; for instance, + in a man who after committing a mortal sin of prodigality, is so changed as to fall into a sin + of the opposite vice. Therefore the stain does not denote anything positive in the soul. Again, neither is it a pure privation. + Because all sins agree on the part of aversion and privation of grace: and so it would follow that there is but one stain + caused by all sins. Therefore the stain is not the effect of sin. +
[37240] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +si peccatum maculam causat, aut macula illa est aliquid positive, +aut est privatio pura. Si sit aliquid positive, non potest esse +nisi dispositio vel habitus, nihil enim aliud videtur ex actu +causari. Dispositio autem et habitus non est, contingit enim, +remota dispositione vel habitu, adhuc remanere maculam; ut patet in +eo qui peccavit mortaliter prodigalitate, et postea transmutatur, +mortaliter peccando, in habitum vitii oppositi. Non ergo macula +ponit aliquid positive in anima. Similiter etiam nec est privatio +pura. Quia omnia peccata conveniunt ex parte aversionis et +privationis gratiae. Sequeretur ergo quod omnium peccatorum esset +macula una. Ergo macula non est effectus peccati.
+ On the contrary, It was said to Solomon ( + Ecclus. 47:22): "Thou hast stained thy glory": and it is written ( + Eph. 5:27): "That He might present it to Himself a glorious church not having spot or wrinkle": and in each case it is question of + the stain of sin. Therefore a stain is the effect of sin. +
[37241] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur, Eccli. XLVII, Salomoni, dedisti maculam in +gloria tua. Et Ephes. V, ut exhiberet sibi gloriosam +Ecclesiam non habentem maculam aut rugam. Et utrobique loquitur +de macula peccati. Ergo macula est effectus peccati.
+ I answer that, A stain is properly ascribed to corporeal things, when a comely body loses its comeliness through contact with another body, + e.g. a garment, gold or silver, or the like. Accordingly a stain is ascribed to spiritual things in like manner. Now man's + soul has a twofold comeliness; one from the refulgence of the natural light of reason, whereby he is directed in his actions; + the other, from the refulgence of the Divine light, viz. of wisdom and grace, whereby + man is also perfected for the purpose of doing good and fitting actions. Now, when the soul cleaves to things by love, there + is a kind of contact in the soul: and when man sins, he cleaves to certain things, against the light of reason and of the + Divine law, as shown above ( + Q[71], A[6]). Wherefore the loss of comeliness occasioned by this contact, is metaphorically called a stain on the soul. +
[37242] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod macula proprie dicitur in corporalibus, quando +aliquod corpus nitidum perdit suum nitorem ex contactu alterius +corporis, sicut vestis et aurum et argentum, aut aliud huiusmodi. +In rebus autem spiritualibus ad similitudinem huius oportet maculam +dici. Habet autem anima hominis duplicem nitorem, unum quidem ex +refulgentia luminis naturalis rationis, per quam dirigitur in suis +actibus; alium vero ex refulgentia divini luminis, scilicet +sapientiae et gratiae, per quam etiam homo perficitur ad bene et +decenter agendum. Est autem quasi quidam animae tactus, quando +inhaeret aliquibus rebus per amorem. Cum autem peccat, adhaeret +rebus aliquibus contra lumen rationis et divinae legis, ut ex +supradictis patet. Unde ipsum detrimentum nitoris ex tali contactu +proveniens, macula animae metaphorice vocatur.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The soul is not defiled by inferior things, by their own power, as though they acted on the soul: on the contrary, the soul, + by its own action, defiles itself, through cleaving to them inordinately, against the light of reason and of the Divine law. +
[37243] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod anima non inquinatur ex rebus inferioribus +virtute earum, quasi agentibus eis in animam, sed magis e converso +anima sua actione se inquinat, inordinate eis inhaerendo, contra +lumen rationis et divinae legis.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The action of the intellect is accomplished by the intelligible thing being in the intellect, according to the mode of the + intellect, so that the intellect is not defiled, but perfected, by them. On the other hand, the act of the will consists in + a movement towards things themselves, so that love attaches the soul to the thing loved. Thus it is that the soul is stained, + when it cleaves inordinately, according to + Osee 9:10: "They . + . . became abominable as those things were which they loved." +
[37244] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod actio intellectus perficitur secundum quod res +intelligibiles sunt in intellectu per modum ipsius intellectus, et +ideo intellectus ex eis non inficitur, sed magis perficitur. Sed +actus voluntatis consistit in motu ad ipsas res, ita quod amor +conglutinat animam rei amatae. Et ex hoc anima maculatur, quando in +ordinate inhaeret; secundum illud Osee IX, facti sunt +abominabiles, sicut ea quae dilexerunt.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The stain is neither something positive in the soul, nor does it denote a pure privation: it denotes a privation of the soul's + brightness in relation to its cause, which is sin; wherefore diverse sins occasion diverse stains. It is like a shadow, which + is the privation of light through the interposition of a body, and which varies according to the diversity of the interposed + bodies. +
[37245] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod macula non est aliquid positive in anima, nec +significat privationem solam, sed significat privationem quandam +nitoris animae in ordine ad suam causam, quae est peccatum. Et ideo +diversa peccata diversas maculas inducunt. Et est simile de umbra, +quae est privatio luminis ex obiecto alicuius corporis, et secundum +diversitatem corporum obiectorum diversificantur umbrae.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the stain does not remain in the soul after the act of sin. For after an action, nothing remains in the + soul except habit or disposition. But the stain is not a habit or disposition, as stated above (A[1], OBJ[3]). Therefore the + stain does not remain in the soul after the act of sin. +
[37246] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod macula non maneat in anima post actum +peccati. Nihil enim manet in anima post actum, nisi habitus vel +dispositio. Sed macula non est habitus vel dispositio, ut supra +habitum est. Ergo macula non manet in anima post actum peccati.
+ Objection 2: Further, the stain is to the sin what the shadow is to the body, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). But the shadow does not remain + when the body has passed by. Therefore the stain does not remain in the soul when the act of sin is past. +
[37247] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +hoc modo se habet macula ad peccatum, sicut umbra ad corpus, ut +supra dictum est. Sed transeunte corpore, non manet umbra. Ergo, +transeunte actu peccati, non manet macula.
+ Objection 3: Further, every effect depends on its cause. Now the cause of the stain is the act of sin. Therefore when the act of sin is + no longer there, neither is the stain in the soul. +
[37248] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +omnis effectus dependet ex sua causa. Causa autem maculae est actus +peccati. Ergo, remoto actu peccati, non remanet macula in +anima.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Jos. 22:17): "Is it a small thing to you that you sinned with Beelphegor, and the stain of that crime remaineth in you [Vulg.: 'us'] + to this day?" +
[37249] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Iosue XXII, an parum vobis est quod peccastis +in Beelphegor, et usque in praesentem diem macula huius sceleris in +vobis permanet?
+ I answer that, The stain of sin remains in the soul even when the act of sin is past. The reason for this is that the stain, as stated above + (A[1] ), denotes a blemish in the brightness of the soul, on account of its withdrawing from the light of reason or of the + Divine law. And therefore so long as man remains out of this light, the stain of sin remains in him: but as soon as, moved + by grace, he returns to the Divine light and to the light of reason, the stain is removed. + For although the act of sin ceases, whereby man withdrew from the light of reason and of the Divine law, man does not at once + return to the state in which he was before, and it is necessary that his will should have a movement contrary to the previous + movement. Thus if one man be parted from another on account of some kind of movement, he is not reunited to him as soon as + the movement ceases, but he needs to draw nigh to him and to return by a contrary movement. +
[37250] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod macula peccati remanet in anima, etiam transeunte +actu peccati. Cuius ratio est quia macula, sicut dictum est, +importat quendam defectum nitoris propter recessum a lumine +rationis vel divinae legis. Et ideo quandiu homo manet extra +huiusmodi lumen, manet in eo macula peccati, sed postquam redit ad +lumen divinum et ad lumen rationis, quod fit per gratiam, tunc +macula cessat. Licet autem cesset actus peccati, quo homo discessit +a lumine rationis vel legis divinae, non tamen statim homo ad illud +redit in quo fuerat, sed requiritur aliquis motus voluntatis +contrarius primo motui. Sicut si aliquis sit distans alicui per +aliquem motum, non statim cessante motu fit ei propinquus, sed +oportet quod appropinquet rediens per motum contrarium.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Nothing positive remains in the soul after the act of sin, except the disposition or habit; but there does remain something + private, viz. the privation of union with the Divine light. +
[37251] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod post actum peccati nihil positive remanet in +anima nisi dispositio vel habitus, remanet tamen aliquid privative, +scilicet privatio coniunctionis ad divinum lumen.
+ Reply to Objection 2: After the interposed body has passed by, the transparent body remains in the same position and relation as regards the illuminating + body, and so the shadow passes at once. But when the sin is past, the soul does not remain in the same relation to God: and + so there is no comparison. +
[37252] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, transeunte obstaculo corporis, remanet corpus +diaphanum in aequali propinquitate et habitudine ad corpus +illuminans, et ideo statim umbra transit. Sed remoto actu peccati, +non remanet anima in eadem habitudine ad Deum. Unde non est similis +ratio.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The act of sin parts man from God, which parting causes the defect of brightness, just as local movement causes local parting. + Wherefore, just as when movement ceases, local distance is not removed, so neither, when the act of sin ceases, is the stain + removed. +
[37253] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod actus peccati facit distantiam a Deo, quam quidem +distantiam sequitur defectus nitoris, hoc modo sicut motus localis +facit localem distantiam. Unde sicut, cessante motu, non tollitur +distantia localis; ita nec, cessante actu peccati, tollitur +macula.
We must now consider the debt of punishment. We shall consider (1) the debt itself; (2) mortal and venial sin, which differ + in respect of the punishment due to them. +
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the debt of punishment is an effect of sin?
(2) Whether one sin can be the punishment of another?
(3) Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?
(4) Whether sin incurs a debt of punishment that is infinite in quantity?
(5) Whether every sin incurs a debt of eternal and infinite punishment?
(6) Whether the debt of punishment can remain after sin?
(7) Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin?
(8) Whether one person can incur punishment for another's sin?
+[37254] +Iª-IIae q. 87 pr. Deinde considerandum est de reatu +poenae. Et primo, de ipso reatu; secundo, de mortali et veniali +peccato, quae distinguuntur secundum reatum. Circa primum +quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum reatus poenae sit effectus peccati. +Secundo, utrum peccatum possit esse poena alterius peccati. Tertio, +utrum aliquod peccatum faciat reum aeterna poena. Quarto, utrum +faciat reum poena infinita secundum quantitatem. Quinto, utrum omne +peccatum faciat reum aeterna et infinita poena. Sexto, utrum reatus +poenae possit remanere post peccatum. Septimo, utrum omnis poena +inferatur pro aliquo peccato. Octavo, utrum unus sit reus poenae +pro peccato alterius.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the debt of punishment is not an effect of sin. For that which is accidentally related to a thing, does + not seem to be its proper effect. Now the debt of punishment is accidentally related to sin, for it is beside the intention + of the sinner. Therefore the debt of punishment is not an effect of sin. +
[37255] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod reatus poenae non sit effectus +peccati. Quod enim per accidens se habet ad aliquid, non videtur +esse proprius effectus eius. Sed reatus poenae per accidens se +habet ad peccatum, cum sit praeter intentionem peccantis. Ergo +reatus poenae non est effectus peccati.
+ Objection 2: Further, evil is not the cause of good. But punishment is good, since it is just, and is from God. Therefore it is not an + effect of sin, which is evil. +
[37256] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +malum non est causa boni. Sed poena bona est, cum sit iusta, et a +Deo. Ergo non est effectus peccati, quod est malum.
+ Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Confess. i) that "every inordinate affection is its own punishment." But punishment does not incur + a further debt of punishment, because then it would go on indefinitely. Therefore sin does not incur the debt of punishment. +
[37257] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in I Confess., quod omnis inordinatus animus +sibi ipsi est poena. Sed poena non causat reatum alterius +poenae, quia sic iretur in infinitum. Ergo peccatum non causat +reatum poenae.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Rom. 2:9): "Tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man that worketh evil." But to work evil is to sin. Therefore sin incurs a + punishment which is signified by the words "tribulation and anguish." +
[37258] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Rom. II, tribulatio et angustia in animam omnem +operantis malum. Sed operari malum est peccare. Ergo peccatum +inducit poenam, quae nomine tribulationis et angustiae +designatur.
+ I answer that, It has passed from natural things to human affairs that whenever one thing rises up against another, it suffers some detriment + therefrom. For we observe in natural things that when one contrary supervenes, the other acts with greater energy, for which + reason "hot water freezes more rapidly," as stated in Meteor. i, 12. Wherefore we find that the natural inclination of man + is to repress those who rise up against him. Now it is evident that all things + contained in an order, are, in a manner, one, in relation to the principle of that order. Consequently, whatever rises up + against an order, is put down by that order or by the principle thereof. And because sin is an inordinate act, it is evident + that whoever sins, commits an offense against an order: wherefore he is put down, in consequence, by that same order, which + repression is punishment. +
Accordingly, man can be punished with a threefold punishment corresponding to the three orders to which the human will is + subject. In the first place a man's nature is subjected to the order of his own reason; secondly, it is subjected to the order + of another man who governs him either in spiritual or in temporal matters, as a member either of the state or of the household; + thirdly, it is subjected to the universal order of the Divine government. Now each of these orders is + disturbed by sin, for the sinner acts against his reason, and against human and Divine law. Wherefore he incurs a threefold + punishment; one, inflicted by himself, viz. remorse of conscience; another, inflicted by man; and a third, inflicted by God. +
[37259] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod ex rebus naturalibus ad res humanas derivatur ut id +quod contra aliquid insurgit, ab eo detrimentum patiatur. Videmus +enim in rebus naturalibus quod unum contrarium vehementius agit, +altero contrario superveniente, propter quod aquae calefactae magis +congelantur, ut dicitur in I Meteor. Unde in hominibus hoc ex +naturali inclinatione invenitur, ut unusquisque deprimat eum qui +contra ipsum insurgit. Manifestum est autem quod quaecumque +continentur sub aliquo ordine, sunt quodammodo unum in ordine ad +principium ordinis. Unde quidquid contra ordinem aliquem insurgit, +consequens est ut ab ipso ordine, vel principe ordinis, deprimatur. +Cum autem peccatum sit actus inordinatus, manifestum est quod +quicumque peccat, contra aliquem ordinem agit. Et ideo ab ipso +ordine consequens est quod deprimatur. Quae quidem depressio poena +est. Unde secundum tres ordines quibus subditur humana voluntas, +triplici poena potest homo puniri. Primo quidem enim subditur +humana natura ordini propriae rationis; secundo, ordini exterioris +hominis gubernantis vel spiritualiter vel temporaliter, politice +seu oeconomice; tertio, subditur universali ordini divini +regiminis. Quilibet autem horum ordinum per peccatum pervertitur, +dum ille qui peccat, agit et contra rationem, et contra legem +humanam, et contra legem divinam. Unde triplicem poenam incurrit, +unam quidem a seipso, quae est conscientiae remorsus, aliam vero ab +homine, tertiam vero a Deo.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Punishment follows sin, inasmuch as this is an evil by reason of its being inordinate. Wherefore just as evil is accidental + to the sinner's act, being beside his intention, so also is the debt of punishment. +
[37260] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod poena consequitur peccatum inquantum malum est, +ratione suae inordinationis. Unde sicut malum est per accidens in +actu peccantis, praeter intentionem ipsius, ita et reatus +poenae.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Further, a just punishment may be inflicted either by God or by man: wherefore the punishment itself is the effect of sin, + not directly but dispositively. Sin, however, makes man deserving of punishment, and that is an evil: for Dionysius says (Div. + Nom. iv) that "punishment is not an evil, but to deserve punishment is." Consequently the debt of punishment is considered + to be directly the effect of sin. +
[37261] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod poena quidem iusta esse potest et a Deo et ab homine +inflicta, unde ipsa poena non est effectus peccati directe, sed +solum dispositive. Sed peccatum facit hominem esse reum poenae, +quod est malum, dicit enim Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod +puniri non est malum, sed fieri poena dignum. Unde reatus +poenae directe ponitur effectus peccati.
+ Reply to Objection 3: This punishment of the "inordinate affection" is due to sin as overturning the order of reason. Nevertheless sin incurs a + further punishment, through disturbing the order of the Divine or human law. +
[37262] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod poena illa inordinati animi debetur peccato ex hoc +quod ordinem rationis pervertit. Fit autem reus alterius poenae, +per hoc quod pervertit ordinem legis divinae vel humanae.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that sin cannot be the punishment of sin. For the purpose of punishment is to bring man back to the good of + virtue, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. x, 9). Now sin does not bring man back to the good of virtue, but leads him in + the opposite direction. Therefore sin is not the punishment of sin. +
[37263] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non possit esse poena +peccati. Poenae enim sunt inductae ut per eas homines reducantur ad +bonum virtutis, ut patet per philosophum, in X Ethic. Sed per +peccatum non reducitur homo in bonum virtutis, sed in oppositum. +Ergo peccatum non est poena peccati.
+ Objection 2: Further, just punishments are from God, as Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 82). But sin is not from God, and is an injustice. + Therefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin. +
[37264] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +poenae iustae sunt a Deo, ut patet per Augustinum, in libro +octoginta trium quaest. Peccatum autem non est a Deo, et est +iniustum. Non ergo peccatum potest esse poena peccati.
+ Objection 3: Further, the nature of punishment is to be something against the will. But sin is something from the will, as shown above + ( + Q[74], AA[1] ,2). Therefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin. +
[37265] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +de ratione poenae est quod sit contra voluntatem. Sed peccatum est +a voluntate, ut ex supradictis patet. Ergo peccatum non potest esse +poena peccati.
+ On the contrary, Gregory speaks (Hom. xi in Ezech.) that some sins are punishments of others. +
[37266] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., quod quaedam peccata sunt +poenae peccati.
+ I answer that, We may speak of sin in two ways: first, in its essence, as such; secondly, as to that which is accidental thereto. Sin as + such can nowise be the punishment of another. Because sin considered in its essence is something proceeding from the will, + for it is from this that it derives the character of guilt. Whereas punishment is essentially something against the will, + as stated in the + FP, Q[48], A[5]. Consequently it is evident that sin + regarded in its essence can nowise be the punishment of sin. +
[37267] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod de peccato dupliciter loqui possumus, per se, et per +accidens. Per se quidem nullo modo peccatum potest esse poena +peccati. Peccatum enim per se consideratur secundum quod egreditur +a voluntate, sic enim habet rationem culpae. De ratione autem +poenae est quod sit contra voluntatem, ut in primo habitum est. +Unde manifestum est quod nullo modo, per se loquendo, peccatum +potest esse poena peccati. Per accidens autem peccatum potest esse +poena peccati, tripliciter. Primo quidem, ex parte causae quae est +remotio prohibentis. Sunt enim causae inclinantes ad peccatum +passiones, tentatio Diaboli, et alia huiusmodi; quae quidem causae +impediuntur per auxilium divinae gratiae, quae subtrahitur per +peccatum. Unde cum ipsa subtractio gratiae sit quaedam poena, et a +Deo, ut supra dictum est; sequitur quod per accidens etiam peccatum +quod ex hoc sequitur, poena dicatur. Et hoc modo loquitur +apostolus, Rom. I, dicens, propter quod tradidit eos Deus in +desideria cordis eorum, quae sunt animae passiones, quia +scilicet deserti homines ab auxilio divinae gratiae, vincuntur a +passionibus. Et hoc modo semper peccatum dicitur esse poena +praecedentis peccati. Alio modo ex parte substantiae actus, quae +afflictionem inducit, sive sit actus interior, ut patet in ira et +invidia; sive actus exterior, ut patet cum aliqui gravi labore +opprimuntur et damno, ut expleant actum peccati, secundum illud +Sap. V, lassati sumus in via iniquitatis. Tertio modo, ex +parte effectus, ut scilicet aliquod peccatum dicatur poena respectu +effectus consequentis. Et his duobus ultimis modis, unum peccatum +non solum est poena praecedentis peccati, sed etiam sui.
On the other hand, sin can be the punishment of sin accidentally in three ways. First, when one sin is the cause of another, + by removing an impediment thereto. For passions, temptations of the devil, and the like are causes of sin, but are impeded + by the help of Divine grace which is withdrawn on account of sin. Wherefore since the withdrawal of grace is a punishment, + and is from God, as stated above ( + Q[79], A[3]), the result is that the sin which ensues + from this is also a punishment accidentally. It is in this sense that the Apostle speaks ( + Rom. 1:24) when he says: "Wherefore God gave them up to the desires of their heart," i.e. to their passions; because, to wit, when + men are deprived of the help of Divine grace, they are overcome by their passions. In this way sin is always said to be the + punishment of a preceding sin. Secondly, by reason of the substance of the act, which is such as to cause pain, whether it + be an + interior act, as is clearly the case with anger or envy, or an exterior act, as is the case with one who endures considerable + trouble and loss in order to achieve a sinful act, according to + Wis. 5:7: "We wearied ourselves in the way of iniquity." Thirdly, on the part of the effect, so that one sin is said to be a punishment + by reason of its effect. In the last two ways, a sin is a punishment not only in respect of a preceding sin, but also with + regard to itself. +
[37268] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod hoc etiam quod aliqui puniuntur a Deo, dum +permittit eos in aliqua peccata profluere, ad bonum virtutis +ordinatur. Quandoque quidem etiam ipsorum qui peccant, cum scilicet +post peccatum humiliores et cautiores resurgunt. Semper autem est +ad emendationem aliorum, qui videntes aliquos ruere de peccato in +peccatum, magis reformidant peccare. In aliis autem duobus modis, +manifestum est quod poena ordinatur ad emendationem quia hoc ipsum +quod homo laborem et detrimentum patitur in peccando, natum est +retrahere homines a peccato.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Even when God punishes men by permitting them to fall into sin, this is directed to the good of virtue. Sometimes indeed + it is for the good of those who are punished, when, to wit, men arise from sin, more humble and more cautious. But it is always + for the amendment of others, who seeing some men fall from sin to sin, are the more fearful of sinning. With regard to the + other two ways, it is evident that the punishment is intended for the sinner's + amendment, since the very fact that man endures toil and loss in sinning, is of a nature to withdraw man from sin. +
[37269] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de peccato secundum se.
+ Reply to Objection 2: This objection considers sin essentially as such: and the same answer applies to the Third Objection. +
[37270] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 ad 3 Et similiter +dicendum est ad tertium.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that no sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment. For a just punishment is equal to the fault, since justice + is equality: wherefore it is written ( + Is. 27:8): "In measure against measure, when it shall be cast off, thou shalt judge it." Now sin is temporal. Therefore it does not + incur a debt of eternal punishment. +
[37271] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullum peccatum inducat reatum +aeternae poenae. Poena enim iusta adaequatur culpae, iustitia enim +aequalitas est. Unde dicitur Isaiae XXVII, in mensura contra +mensuram, cum abiecta fuerit, iudicabit eam. Sed peccatum est +temporale. Ergo non inducit reatum poenae aeternae.
+ Objection 2: Further, "punishments are a kind of medicine" (Ethic. ii, 3). But no medicine should be infinite, because it is directed + to an end, and "what is directed to an end, is not infinite," as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 6). Therefore no punishment + should be infinite. +
[37272] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +poenae medicinae quaedam sunt, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed nulla +medicina debet esse infinita, quia ordinatur ad finem; quod +autem ordinatur ad finem, non est infinitum, ut philosophus +dicit, in I Polit. Ergo nulla poena debet esse infinita.
+ Objection 3: Further, no one does a thing always unless he delights in it for its own sake. But "God hath not pleasure in the destruction + of men" [Vulg.: 'of the living']. Therefore He will not inflict eternal punishment on man. +
[37273] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +nullus semper facit aliquid, nisi propter se in ipso delectetur. +Sed Deus non delectatur in perditione hominum, ut dicitur +Sap. I. Ergo non puniet homines poena sempiterna.
+ Objection 4: Further, nothing accidental is infinite. But punishment is accidental, for it is not natural to the one who is punished. + Therefore it cannot be of infinite duration. +
[37274] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 arg. 4 Praeterea, +nihil quod est per accidens, est infinitum. Sed poena est per +accidens, non est enim secundum naturam eius qui punitur. Ergo non +potest in infinitum durare.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Mat. 25:46): "These shall go into everlasting punishment"; and ( + Mk. 3:29): "He that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost, shall never have forgiveness, but shall be guilty of an everlasting sin." +
[37275] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Matth. XXV, ibunt hi in supplicium +aeternum. Et Marc. III dicitur, qui autem blasphemaverit in +spiritum sanctum, non habebit remissionem in aeternum, sed erit +reus aeterni delicti.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[1]), sin incurs a debt of punishment through disturbing an order. But the effect remains so long as the cause remains. Wherefore + so long as the disturbance of the order remains the debt of punishment must needs remain also. Now disturbance of an order + is sometimes reparable, sometimes irreparable: because a defect which destroys the principle is irreparable, whereas if the + principle be saved, defects can be + repaired by virtue of that principle. For instance, if the principle of sight be destroyed, sight cannot be restored except + by Divine power; whereas, if the principle of sight be preserved, while there arise certain impediments to the use of sight, + these can be remedied by nature or by art. Now in every order there is a principle whereby one takes part in that order. Consequently + if a sin destroys the principle of the order whereby man's will is subject to God, the disorder will be such as to + be considered in itself, irreparable, although it is possible to repair it by the power of God. Now the principle of this + order is the last end, to which man adheres by charity. Therefore whatever sins turn man away from God, so as to destroy charity, + considered in themselves, incur a debt of eternal punishment. +
[37276] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, peccatum ex hoc inducit +reatum poenae, quod pervertit aliquem ordinem. Manente autem causa, +manet effectus. Unde quandiu perversitas ordinis remanet, necesse +est quod remaneat reatus poenae. Pervertit autem aliquis ordinem +quandoque quidem reparabiliter, quandoque autem irreparabiliter. +Semper enim defectus quo subtrahitur principium, irreparabilis est, +si autem salvetur principium, eius virtute defectus reparari +possunt. Sicut si corrumpatur principium visivum, non potest fieri +visionis reparatio, nisi sola virtute divina, si vero, salvo +principio visivo, aliqua impedimenta adveniant visioni, reparari +possunt per naturam vel per artem. Cuiuslibet autem ordinis est +aliquod principium, per quod aliquis fit particeps illius ordinis. +Et ideo si per peccatum corrumpatur principium ordinis quo voluntas +hominis subditur Deo, erit inordinatio, quantum est de se, +irreparabilis, etsi reparari possit virtute divina. Principium +autem huius ordinis est ultimus finis, cui homo inhaeret per +caritatem. Et ideo quaecumque peccata avertunt a Deo, caritatem +auferentia, quantum est de se, inducunt reatum aeternae poenae.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Punishment is proportionate to sin in point of severity, both in Divine and in human judgments. In no judgment, however, + as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11) is it requisite for punishment to equal fault in point of duration. For the fact that + adultery or murder is committed in a moment does not call for a momentary punishment: in fact they are punished sometimes + by imprisonment or banishment for life---sometimes even by death; wherein account is + not taken of the time occupied in killing, but rather of the expediency of removing the murderer from the fellowship of the + living, so that this punishment, in its own way, represents the eternity of punishment inflicted by God. Now according to + Gregory (Dial. iv, 44) it is just that he who has sinned against God in his own eternity should be punished in God's eternity. + A man is said to have sinned in his own eternity, not only as regards continual sinning throughout his whole life, but also + because, from the very fact that he fixes his end in sin, he has the will to sin, everlastingly. Wherefore Gregory says (Dial. + iv, 44) that the "wicked would wish to live without end, that they might abide in their sins for ever." +
[37277] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod poena peccato proportionatur secundum +acerbitatem, tam in iudicio divino quam in humano, sicut Augustinus +dicit, XXI de Civ. Dei, in nullo iudicio requiritur ut poena +adaequetur culpae secundum durationem. Non enim quia adulterium vel +homicidium in momento committitur, propter hoc momentanea poena +punitur, sed quandoque quidem perpetuo carcere vel exilio, +quandoque etiam morte. In qua non consideratur occisionis mora, sed +potius quod in perpetuum auferatur a societate viventium, et sic +repraesentat suo modo aeternitatem poenae inflictae divinitus. +Iustum autem est, secundum Gregorium, quod qui in suo aeterno +peccavit contra Deum, in aeterno Dei puniatur. Dicitur autem +aliquis in suo aeterno peccasse, non solum secundum continuationem +actus in tota hominis vita durantis, sed quia ex hoc ipso quod +finem in peccato constituit, voluntatem habet in aeternum peccandi. +Unde dicit Gregorius, XXXIV Moral., quod iniqui voluissent sine +fine vivere, ut sine fine potuissent in iniquitatibus +permanere.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Even the punishment that is inflicted according to human laws, is not always intended as a medicine for the one who is punished, + but sometimes only for others: thus when a thief is hanged, this is not for his own amendment, but for the sake of others, + that at least they may be deterred from crime through fear of the punishment, according to + Prov. 19:25: "The wicked man being scourged, the fool shall be wiser." Accordingly the eternal punishments + inflicted by God on the reprobate, are medicinal punishments for those who refrain from sin through the thought of those punishments, + according to + Ps. 59:6: "Thou hast given a warning to them that fear Thee, that they may flee from before the bow, that Thy beloved may be delivered." +
[37278] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod poena etiam quae secundum leges humanas infligitur, +non semper est medicinalis ei qui punitur, sed solum aliis, sicut +cum latro suspenditur, non ut ipse emendetur, sed propter alios, ut +saltem metu poenae peccare desistant; secundum illud Prov. XIX, +pestilente flagellato, stultus sapientior erit. Sic igitur +et aeternae poenae reproborum a Deo inflictae, sunt medicinales his +qui consideratione poenarum abstinent a peccatis; secundum illud +Psalmi LIX, dedisti metuentibus te significationem, ut fugiant a +facie arcus, ut liberentur dilecti tui.
+ Reply to Objection 3: God does not delight in punishments for their own sake; but He does delight in the order of His justice, which requires them. +
[37279] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod Deus non delectatur in poenis propter ipsas; sed +delectatur in ordine suae iustitiae, quae haec requirit.
+ Reply to Objection 4: Although punishment is related indirectly to nature, nevertheless it is essentially related to the disturbance of the order, + and to God's justice. Wherefore, so long as the disturbance lasts, the punishment endures. +
[37280] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod poena, etsi per accidens ordinetur ad naturam, per se +tamen ordinatur ad privationem ordinis et ad Dei iustitiam. Et +ideo, durante inordinatione, semper durat poena.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that sin incurs a debt of punishment infinite in quantity. For it is written ( + Jer. 10:24): "Correct me, O Lord, but yet with judgment: and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to nothing." Now God's anger or fury + signifies metaphorically the vengeance of Divine justice: and to be brought to nothing is an infinite punishment, even as + to make a thing out of nothing denotes infinite power. Therefore according to God's vengeance, + sin is awarded a punishment infinite in quantity. +
[37281] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccato debeatur poena infinita +secundum quantitatem. Dicitur enim Ierem. X, corripe me, domine, +veruntamen in iudicio, et non in furore tuo, ne forte ad nihilum +redigas me. Ira autem vel furor Dei metaphorice significat +vindictam divinae iustitiae, redigi autem in nihilum est poena +infinita, sicut et ex nihilo aliquid facere est virtutis infinitae. +Ergo secundum vindictam divinam, peccatum punitur poena infinita +secundum quantitatem.
+ Objection 2: Further, quantity of punishment corresponds to quantity of fault, according to + Dt. 25:2: "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be." Now a sin which is committed against God, + is infinite: because the gravity of a sin increases according to the greatness of the person sinned against (thus it is a + more grievous sin to strike the sovereign than a private individual), and God's greatness is infinite. + Therefore an infinite punishment is due for a sin committed against God. +
[37282] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +quantitati culpae respondet quantitas poenae; secundum illud +Deuteron. XXV, pro mensura peccati erit et plagarum modus. +Sed peccatum quod contra Deum committitur, est infinitum, tanto +enim gravius est peccatum, quanto maior est persona contra quam +peccatur, sicut gravius peccatum est percutere principem quam +percutere hominem privatum; Dei autem magnitudo est infinita. Ergo +poena infinita debetur pro peccato quod contra Deum +committitur.
+ Objection 3: Further, a thing may be infinite in two ways, in duration, and in quantity. Now the punishment is infinite in duration. Therefore + it is infinite in quantity also. +
[37283] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +dupliciter est aliquid infinitum, duratione scilicet, et +quantitate. Sed duratione est poena infinita. Ergo et +quantitate.
+ On the contrary, If this were the case, the punishments of all mortal sins would be equal; because one infinite is not greater than another. +
[37284] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quia secundum hoc omnium mortalium peccatorum poenae essent +aequales, non enim est infinitum infinito maius.
+ I answer that, Punishment is proportionate to sin. Now sin comprises two things. First, there is the turning away from the immutable good, + which is infinite, wherefore, in this respect, sin is infinite. Secondly, there is the inordinate turning to mutable good. + In this respect sin is finite, both because the mutable good itself is finite, and because the movement of turning towards + it is finite, since the acts of a creature cannot be infinite. Accordingly, in so far as sin + consists in turning away from something, its corresponding punishment is the "pain of loss," which also is infinite, because + it is the loss of the infinite good, i.e. God. But in so far as sin turns inordinately to something, its corresponding punishment + is the "pain of sense," which is also finite. +
[37285] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod poena proportionatur peccato. In peccato autem duo +sunt. Quorum unum est aversio ab incommutabili bono, quod est +infinitum, unde ex hac parte peccatum est infinitum. Aliud quod est +in peccato, est inordinata conversio ad commutabile bonum. Et ex +hac parte peccatum est finitum, tum quia ipsum bonum commutabile +est finitum; tum quia ipsa conversio est finita, non enim possunt +esse actus creaturae infiniti. Ex parte igitur aversionis, +respondet peccato poena damni, quae etiam est infinita, est enim +amissio infiniti boni, scilicet Dei. Ex parte autem inordinatae +conversionis, respondet ei poena sensus, quae etiam est finita.
+ Reply to Objection 1: It would be inconsistent with Divine justice for the sinner to be brought to nothing absolutely, because this would be incompatible + with the perpetuity of punishment that Divine justice requires, as stated above + (A[3]). The expression "to be brought to nothing" is applied to one who is deprived of spiritual goods, according to + 1 Cor. 13:2: "If I . . . have not charity, I am nothing." +
[37286] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod omnino redigi in nihilum eum qui peccat, non +convenit divinae iustitiae, quia repugnat perpetuitati poenae, quae +est secundum divinam iustitiam, ut dictum est. Sed in nihilum +redigi dicitur qui spiritualibus bonis privatur; secundum illud I +Cor. XIII, si non habuero caritatem, nihil sum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers sin as turning away from something, for it is thus that man sins against God. +
[37287] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de peccato ex parte aversionis, +sic enim homo contra Deum peccat.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Duration of punishment corresponds to duration of fault, not indeed as regards the act, but on the part of the stain, for + as long as this remains, the debt of punishment remains. But punishment corresponds to fault in the point of severity. And + a fault which is irreparable, is such that, of itself, it lasts for ever; wherefore it incurs an everlasting punishment. But + it is not infinite as regards the thing it turns to; wherefore, in this respect, it + does not incur punishment of infinite quantity. +
[37288] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod duratio poenae respondet durationi culpae, non quidem +ex parte actus, sed ex parte maculae, qua durante manet reatus +poenae. Sed acerbitas poenae respondet gravitati culpae. Culpa +autem quae est irreparabilis, de se habet quod perpetuo duret, et +ideo debetur ei poena aeterna. Non autem ex parte conversionis +habet infinitatem, et ideo non debetur ei ex hac parte poena +infinita secundum quantitatem.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that every sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment. Because punishment, as stated above + (A[4]), is proportionate to the fault. Now eternal punishment differs infinitely from temporal punishment: whereas no sin, apparently, + differs infinitely from another, since every sin is a human act, which cannot be infinite. Since therefore some sins incur + a debt of everlasting punishment, as stated above + (A[4]), it seems that no sin incurs a debt of mere temporal punishment. +
[37289] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod omne peccatum inducat reatum poenae +aeternae. Poena enim, ut dictum est, proportionatur culpae. Sed +poena aeterna differt a temporali in infinitum. Nullum autem +peccatum differre videtur ab altero in infinitum, cum omne peccatum +sit humanus actus, qui infinitus esse non potest. Cum ergo alicui +peccato debeatur poena aeterna, sicut dictum est, videtur quod +nulli peccato debeatur poena temporalis tantum.
+ Objection 2: Further, original sin is the least of all sins, wherefore Augustine says (Enchiridion xciii) that "the lightest punishment + is incurred by those who are punished for original sin alone." But original sin incurs everlasting punishment, since children + who have died in original sin through not being baptized, will never see the kingdom of God, as shown by our Lord's words + ( + Jn. 3:3): " Unless a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of + God." Much more, therefore, will the punishments of all other sins be everlasting. +
[37290] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +peccatum originale est minimum peccatorum, unde et Augustinus +dicit, in Enchirid., quod mitissima poena est eorum qui pro solo +peccato originali puniuntur. Sed peccato originali debetur +poena perpetua, nunquam enim videbunt regnum Dei pueri qui sine +Baptismo decesserunt cum originali peccato; ut patet per id quod +dominus dicit, Ioan. III, nisi quis renatus fuerit denuo, non +potest videre regnum Dei. Ergo multo magis omnium aliorum +peccatorum poena erit aeterna.
+ Objection 3: Further, a sin does not deserve greater punishment through being united to another sin; for Divine justice has allotted its + punishment to each sin. Now a venial sin deserves eternal punishment if it be united to a mortal sin in a lost soul, because + in hell there is no remission of sins. Therefore venial sin by itself deserves eternal punishment. Therefore temporal punishment + is not due for any sin. +
[37291] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +peccato non debetur maior poena ex hoc quod alteri peccato +adiungitur, cum utrumque peccatum suam habeat poenam taxatam +secundum divinam iustitiam. Sed peccato veniali debetur poena +aeterna, si cum mortali peccato inveniatur in aliquo damnato, quia +in Inferno nulla potest esse remissio. Ergo peccato veniali +simpliciter debetur poena aeterna. Nulli ergo peccato debetur poena +temporalis.
+ On the contrary, Gregory says (Dial. iv, 39), that certain slighter sins are remitted after this life. Therefore all sins are not punished + eternally. +
[37292] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Gregorius dicit, in IV Dialog., quod quaedam leviores +culpae post hanc vitam remittuntur. Non ergo omnia peccata aeterna +poena puniuntur.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[3]), a sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment, in so far as it causes an irreparable disorder in the order of Divine justice, + through being contrary to the very principle of that order, viz. the last end. Now it is evident that in some sins there is + disorder indeed, but such as not to involve contrariety in respect of the last end, but only in respect of things referable + to the end, in so far as one is too much or + too little intent on them without prejudicing the order to the last end: as, for instance, when a man is too fond of some + temporal thing, yet would not offend God for its sake, by breaking one of His commandments. Consequently such sins do not + incur everlasting, but only temporal punishment. +
[37293] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, peccatum causat reatum +poenae aeternae, inquantum irreparabiliter repugnat ordini divinae +iustitiae, per hoc scilicet quod contrariatur ipsi principio +ordinis, quod est ultimus finis. Manifestum est autem quod in +quibusdam peccatis est quidem aliqua inordinatio, non tamen per +contrarietatem ad ultimum finem, sed solum circa ea quae sunt ad +finem, inquantum plus vel minus debite eis intenditur, salvato +tamen ordine ad ultimum finem, puta cum homo, etsi nimis ad aliquam +rem temporalem afficiatur, non tamen pro ea vellet Deum offendere, +aliquid contra praeceptum eius faciendo. Unde huiusmodi peccatis +non debetur aeterna poena, sed temporalis.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Sins do not differ infinitely from one another in respect of their turning towards mutable good, which constitutes the substance + of the sinful act; but they do differ infinitely in respect of their turning away from something. Because some sins consist + in turning away from the last end, and some in a disorder affecting things referable to the end: and the last end differs + infinitely from the things that are referred to it. +
[37294] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod peccata non differunt in infinitum ex parte +conversionis ad bonum commutabile, in qua consistit substantia +actus, differunt autem in infinitum ex parte aversionis. Nam +quaedam peccata committuntur per aversionem ab ultimo fine, quaedam +vero per inordinationem circa ea quae sunt ad finem. Finis autem +ultimus ab his quae sunt ad finem, in infinitum differt.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Original sin incurs everlasting punishment, not on account of its gravity, but by reason of the condition of the subject, + viz. a human being deprived of grace, without which there is no remission of sin. +
[37295] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod peccato originali non debetur poena aeterna ratione +suae gravitatis, sed ratione conditionis subiecti, scilicet hominis +qui sine gratia invenitur, per quam solam fit remissio poenae.
The same answer applies to the Third Objection about venial sin. Because eternity of punishment does not correspond to the + quantity of the sin, but to its irremissibility, as stated above + (A[3]). +
[37296] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 ad 3 Et similiter +dicendum est ad tertium, de veniali peccato. Aeternitas enim poenae +non respondet quantitati culpae, sed irremissibilitati ipsius, ut +dictum est.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that there remains no debt of punishment after sin. For if the cause be removed the effect is removed. But + sin is the cause of the debt of punishment. Therefore, when the sin is removed, the debt of punishment ceases also. +
[37297] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod reatus poenae non remaneat post +peccatum. Remota enim causa, removetur effectus. Sed peccatum est +causa reatus poenae. Ergo, remoto peccato, cessat reatus +poenae.
+ Objection 2: Further, sin is removed by man returning to virtue. Now a virtuous man deserves, not punishment, but reward. Therefore, when + sin is removed, the debt of punishment no longer remains. +
[37298] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, +peccatum removetur per hoc quod homo ad virtutem redit. Sed +virtuoso non debetur poena, sed magis praemium. Ergo, remoto +peccato, non remanet reatus poenae.
+ Objection 3: Further, "Punishments are a kind of medicine" (Ethic. ii, 3). But a man is not given medicine after being cured of his disease. + Therefore, when sin is removed the debt of punishment does not remain. +
[37299] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, +poenae sunt medicinae, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed postquam aliquis +iam est ab infirmitate curatus, non adhibetur sibi medicina. Ergo, +remoto peccato, non remanet debitum poenae.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + 2 Kings xii. 13,14): "David said to Nathan: I have sinned against the Lord. And Nathan said to David: The Lord also hath taken away thy sin; + thou shalt not die. Nevertheless because thou hast given occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme . . . the child + that is born to thee shall die." Therefore a man is punished by God even after his sin is forgiven: and so the debt of punishment + remains, when the sin has been removed. +
[37300] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur II Reg. XII, quod David dixit ad Nathan, +peccavi domino. Dixitque Nathan ad David, dominus quoque transtulit +peccatum tuum, non morieris. Veruntamen quia blasphemare fecisti +inimicos nomen domini, filius qui natus est tibi, morte +morietur. Punitur ergo aliquis a Deo etiam postquam ei peccatum +dimittitur. Et sic reatus poenae remanet, peccato remoto.
+ I answer that, Two things may be considered in sin: the guilty act, and the consequent stain. Now it is evident that in all actual sins, + when the act of sin has ceased, the guilt remains; because the act of sin makes man deserving of punishment, in so far as + he transgresses the order of Divine justice, to which he cannot return except he pay some sort of penal compensation, which + restores him to the equality of justice; so that, according to the order of Divine justice, he + who has been too indulgent to his will, by transgressing God's commandments, suffers, either willingly or unwillingly, something + contrary to what he would wish. This restoration of the equality of justice by penal compensation is also to be observed in + injuries done to one's fellow men. Consequently it is evident that when the sinful or injurious act has ceased there still + remains the debt of punishment. +
But if we speak of the removal of sin as to the stain, it is evident that the stain of sin cannot be removed from the soul, + without the soul being united to God, since it was through being separated from Him that it suffered the loss of its brightness, + in which the stain consists, as stated above ( + Q[86], A[1]). Now man is united to God by his will. Wherefore the stain of sin cannot be removed from man, unless his will accept the + order of Divine justice, + that is to say, unless either of his own accord he take upon himself the punishment of his past sin, or bear patiently the + punishment which God inflicts on him; and in both ways punishment avails for satisfaction. Now when punishment is satisfactory, + it loses somewhat of the nature of punishment: for the nature of punishment is to be against the will; and although satisfactory + punishment, absolutely speaking, is against the will, nevertheless in this particular case and for this particular + purpose, it is voluntary. Consequently it is voluntary simply, but involuntary in a certain respect, as we have explained + when speaking of the voluntary and the involuntary ( + Q[6], A[6]). We must, therefore, say that, when the stain of sin has been removed, there may remain a debt of punishment, not indeed + of punishment simply, but of satisfactory punishment. +
[37301] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod in peccato duo possunt considerari, scilicet actus +culpae, et macula sequens. Planum est autem quod, cessante actu +peccati, remanet reatus, in omnibus peccatis actualibus. Actus enim +peccati facit hominem reum poenae, inquantum transgreditur ordinem +divinae iustitiae; ad quem non redit nisi per quandam +recompensationem poenae, quae ad aequalitatem iustitiae reducit; ut +scilicet qui plus voluntati suae indulsit quam debuit, contra +mandatum Dei agens, secundum ordinem divinae iustitiae, aliquid +contra illud quod vellet, spontaneus vel invitus patiatur. Quod +etiam in iniuriis hominibus factis observatur, ut per +recompensationem poenae reintegretur aequalitas iustitiae. Unde +patet quod, cessante actu peccati vel iniuriae illatae, adhuc +remanet debitum poenae. Sed si loquamur de ablatione peccati +quantum ad maculam, sic manifestum est quod macula peccati ab anima +auferri non potest, nisi per hoc quod anima Deo coniungitur, per +cuius distantiam detrimentum proprii nitoris incurrebat, quod est +macula, ut supra dictum est. Coniungitur autem homo Deo per +voluntatem. Unde macula peccati ab homine tolli non potest nisi +voluntas hominis ordinem divinae iustitiae acceptet, ut scilicet +vel ipse poenam sibi spontaneus assumat in recompensationem culpae +praeteritae, vel etiam a Deo illatam patienter sustineat, utroque +enim modo poena rationem satisfactionis habet. Poena autem +satisfactoria diminuit aliquid de ratione poenae. Est enim de +ratione poenae quod sit contra voluntatem. Poena autem +satisfactoria, etsi secundum absolutam considerationem sit contra +voluntatem, tamen tunc, et pro hoc, est voluntaria. Unde +simpliciter est voluntaria, secundum quid autem involuntaria, sicut +patet ex his quae supra de voluntario et involuntario dicta sunt. +Dicendum est ergo quod, remota macula culpae, potest quidem +remanere reatus non poenae simpliciter, sed satisfactoriae.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Just as after the act of sin has ceased, the stain remains, as stated above ( + Q[86], A[2]), so the debt of punishment also can remain. But when the stain has been removed, the debt of punishment does not remain + in the same way, as stated. +
[37302] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod sicut, cessante actu peccati, remanet macula, ut +supra dictum est; ita etiam potest remanere reatus. Cessante vero +macula, non remanet reatus secundum eandem rationem, ut dictum +est.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The virtuous man does not deserve punishment simply, but he may deserve it as satisfactory: because his very virtue demands + that he should do satisfaction for his offenses against God or man. +
[37303] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod virtuoso non debetur poena simpliciter, potest tamen +sibi deberi poena ut satisfactoria, quia hoc ipsum ad virtutem +pertinet, ut satisfaciat pro his in quibus offendit vel Deum vel +hominem.
+ Reply to Objection 3: When the stain is removed, the wound of sin is healed as regards the will. But punishment is still requisite in order that + the other powers of the soul be healed, since they were so disordered by the sin committed, so that, to wit, the disorder + may be remedied by the contrary of that which caused it. Moreover punishment is requisite in order to restore the equality + of justice, and to remove the scandal given to others, so that those who were + scandalized at the sin many be edified by the punishment, as may be seen in the example of David quoted above. +
[37304] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, remota macula, sanatum est vulnus peccati quantum ad +voluntatem. Requiritur autem adhuc poena ad sanationem aliarum +virium animae, quae per peccatum praecedens deordinatae fuerunt, ut +scilicet per contraria curentur. Requiritur etiam ad restituendum +aequalitatem iustitiae; et ad amovendum scandalum aliorum, ut +aedificentur in poena qui sunt scandalizati in culpa; ut patet ex +exemplo de David inducto.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that not every punishment is inflicted for a sin. For it is written ( + Jn. 9:3, + 2) about the man born blind: "Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents . . . that he should be born blind." In like manner + we see that many children, those also who have been baptized, suffer grievous punishments, fevers, for instance, diabolical + possession, and so forth, and yet there is no sin in them after they have been baptized. Moreover + before they are baptized, there is no more sin in them than in the other children who do not suffer such things. Therefore + not every punishment is inflicted for a sin. +
[37305] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnis poena sit propter aliquam +culpam. Dicitur enim Ioan. IX, de caeco nato, neque hic +peccavit, neque parentes eius, ut nasceretur caecus. Et +similiter videmus quod multi pueri, etiam baptizati, graves poenas +patiuntur, ut puta febres, Daemonum oppressiones, et multa +huiusmodi, cum tamen in eis non sit peccatum, postquam sunt +baptizati. Et antequam sint baptizati, non est in eis plus de +peccato quam in aliis pueris, qui haec non patiuntur. Non ergo +omnis poena est pro peccato.
+ Objection 2: Further, that sinners should thrive and that the innocent should be punished seem to come under the same head. Now each of + these is frequently observed in human affairs, for it is written about the wicked ( + Ps. 72:5): "They are not in the labor of men: neither shall they be scourged like other men"; and ( + Job 21:7): "[Why then do] the wicked live, are [they] advanced, and strengthened with riches" (?)[*The words in + brackets show the readings of the Vulgate]; and ( + Hab. 1:13): "Why lookest Thou upon the contemptuous [Vulg.: 'them that do unjust things'], and holdest Thy peace, when the wicked man + oppresseth [Vulg.: 'devoureth'], the man that is more just than himself?" Therefore not every punishment is inflicted for + a sin. +
[37306] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, +eiusdem rationis esse videtur quod peccatores prosperentur, et quod +aliqui innocentes puniantur. Utrumque autem in rebus humanis +frequenter invenimus, dicitur enim de iniquis in Psalmo LXXII, +in labore hominum non sunt, et cum hominibus non +flagellabuntur; et Iob XXI, impii vivunt, sublevati sunt, +confortatique divitiis; et Habacuc I, dicitur, quare +respicis contemptores et taces, conculcante impio iustiorem se? +Non ergo omnis poena infligitur pro culpa.
+ Objection 3: Further, it is written of Christ ( + 1 Pet. 2:22) that "He did no sin, nor was guile found in His mouth." And yet it is said ( + 1 Pet. 2:21) that "He suffered for us." Therefore punishment is not always inflicted by God for sin. +
[37307] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, +de Christo dicitur I Pet. II, quod peccatum non fecit, nec +inventus est dolus in ore eius. Et tamen ibidem dicitur quod +passus est pro nobis. Ergo non semper poena a Deo +dispensatur pro culpa.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Job 4:7, seqq.): "Who ever perished innocent? Or when were the just destroyed? On the contrary, I have seen those who work iniquity + . . . perishing by the blast of God"; and Augustine writes (Retract. i) that "all punishment is just, and is inflicted for + a sin." +
[37308] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Iob IV, quis unquam innocens periit? Aut quando +recti deleti sunt? Quin potius vidi eos qui operantur iniquitatem, +flante Deo, periisse. Et Augustinus dicit, in I Retract., quod +omnis poena iusta est, et pro peccato aliquo impenditur.
+ I answer that, As already stated + (A[6]), punishment can be considered in two ways---simply, and as being satisfactory. A satisfactory punishment is, in a way, voluntary. + And since those who differ as to the debt of punishment, may be one in will by the union of love, it happens that one who + has not sinned, bears willingly the punishment for another: thus even in human affairs we see men take the debts of another + upon themselves. If, however, we + speak of punishment simply, in respect of its being something penal, it has always a relation to a sin in the one punished. + Sometimes this is a relation to actual sin, as when a man is punished by God or man for a sin committed by him. Sometimes + it is a relation to original sin: and this, either principally or consequently---principally, the punishment of original sin + is that human nature is left to itself, and deprived of original justice: and consequently, all the penalties which result + from + this defect in human nature. +
Nevertheless we must observe that sometimes a thing seems penal, and yet is not so simply. Because punishment is a species + of evil, as stated in the + FP, Q[48], A[5]. Now evil is privation of good. And since man's good is manifold, viz. good of the soul, good of the body, and external goods, + it happens sometimes that man suffers the loss of a lesser good, that he may profit in a greater good, as when he suffers + loss of money for the sake of bodily health, + or loss of both of these, for the sake of his soul's health and the glory of God. In such cases the loss is an evil to man, + not simply but relatively; wherefore it does not answer to the name of punishment simply, but of medicinal punishment, because + a medical man prescribes bitter potions to his patients, that he may restore them to health. And since such like are not punishments + properly speaking, they are not referred to sin as their cause, except in a restricted sense: because the very fact + that human nature needs a treatment of penal medicines, is due to the corruption of nature which is itself the punishment + of original sin. For there was no need, in the state of innocence, for penal exercises in order to make progress in virtue; + so that whatever is penal in the exercise of virtue, is reduced to original sin as its cause. +
[37309] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, poena potest dupliciter +considerari, simpliciter, et inquantum est satisfactoria. Poena +quidem satisfactoria est quodammodo voluntaria. Et quia contingit +eos qui differunt in reatu poenae, esse unum secundum voluntatem +unione amoris, inde est quod interdum aliquis qui non peccavit, +poenam voluntarius pro alio portat, sicut etiam in rebus humanis +videmus quod aliquis in se transfert alterius debitum. Si vero +loquamur de poena simpliciter, secundum quod habet rationem poenae, +sic semper habet ordinem ad culpam propriam, sed quandoque quidem +ad culpam actualem, puta quando aliquis vel a Deo vel ab homine pro +peccato commisso punitur; quandoque vero ad culpam originalem. Et +hoc quidem vel principaliter, vel consequenter. Principaliter +quidem poena originalis peccati est quod natura humana sibi +relinquitur, destituta auxilio originalis iustitiae, sed ad hoc +consequuntur omnes poenalitates quae ex defectu naturae in +hominibus contingunt. Sciendum tamen est quod quandoque aliquid +videtur esse poenale, quod tamen non habet simpliciter rationem +poenae. Poena enim est species mali, ut in primo dictum est. Malum +autem est privatio boni. Cum autem sint plura hominis bona, +scilicet animae, corporis, et exteriorum rerum; contingit interdum +quod homo patiatur detrimentum in minori bono, ut augeatur in +maiori, sicut cum patitur detrimentum pecuniae propter sanitatem +corporis, vel in utroque horum propter salutem animae et propter +gloriam Dei. Et tunc tale detrimentum non est simpliciter malum +hominis, sed secundum quid. Unde non dicit simpliciter rationem +poenae, sed medicinae, nam et medici austeras potiones propinant +infirmis, ut conferant sanitatem. Et quia huiusmodi non proprie +habent rationem poenae, non reducuntur ad culpam sicut ad causam, +nisi pro tanto, quia hoc ipsum quod oportet humanae naturae +medicinas poenales exhibere, est ex corruptione naturae, quae est +poena originalis peccati. In statu enim innocentiae non oportuisset +aliquem ad profectum virtutis inducere per poenalia exercitia. Unde +hoc ipsum quod est poenale in talibus reducitur ad originalem +culpam sicut ad causam.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Such like defects of those who are born with them, or which children suffer from, are the effects and the punishments of + original sin, as stated above ( + Q[85], A[5]); and they remain even after baptism, for the cause stated above ( + Q[85], A[5], ad 2): and that they are not equally in all, is due to the diversity of nature, which is left to itself, as stated above + ( + Q[85], A[5], ad + 1). Nevertheless, they are directed by Divine providence, to the salvation of men, either of those who suffer, or of others + who are admonished by their means---and also to the glory of God. +
[37310] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod huiusmodi defectus eorum qui nascuntur, vel +etiam puerorum, sunt effectus et poenae originalis peccati, ut +dictum est. Et manent etiam post Baptismum, propter causam superius +dictam. Et quod non sint aequaliter in omnibus, contingit propter +naturae diversitatem, quae sibi relinquitur, ut supra dictum est. +Ordinantur tamen huiusmodi defectus, secundum divinam providentiam, +ad salutem hominum, vel eorum qui patiuntur, vel aliorum, qui +poenis admonentur; et etiam ad gloriam Dei.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Temporal and bodily goods are indeed goods of man, but they are of small account: whereas spiritual goods are man's chief + goods. Consequently it belongs to Divine justice to give spiritual goods to the virtuous, and to award them as much temporal + goods or evils, as suffices for virtue: for, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii), "Divine justice does not enfeeble the fortitude + of the virtuous man, by material gifts." The very fact that others receive + temporal goods, is detrimental to their spiritual good; wherefore the psalm quoted concludes (verse 6): "Therefore pride hath + held them fast." +
[37311] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod bona temporalia et corporalia sunt quidem aliqua bona +hominis, sed parva, bona vero spiritualia sunt magna hominis bona. +Pertinet igitur ad divinam iustitiam ut virtuosis det spiritualia +bona; et de temporalibus bonis vel malis tantum det eis, quantum +sufficit ad virtutem, ut enim Dionysius dicit, VIII cap. de Div. +Nom., divinae iustitiae est non emollire optimorum fortitudinem +materialium donationibus. Aliis vero hoc ipsum quod temporalia +dantur, in malum spiritualium cedit. Unde in Psalmo LXXII +concluditur, ideo tenuit eos superbia.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Christ bore a satisfactory punishment, not for His, but for our sins. +
[37312] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod Christus poenam sustinuit satisfactoriam non pro +suis, sed pro nostris peccatis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that one may be punished for another's sin. For it is written ( + Ex. 20:5): "I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation + of them that hate Me"; and ( + Mat. 23:35): "That upon you may come all the just blood that hath been shed upon the earth." +
[37313] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis puniatur pro peccato alterius. +Dicitur enim Exodi XX, ego sum Deus Zelotes, visitans +iniquitatem patrum in filios in tertiam et quartam generationem, +his qui oderunt me. Et Matth. XXIII dicitur, ut veniat super +vos omnis sanguis iustus qui effusus est super terram.
+ Objection 2: Further, human justice springs from Divine justice. Now, according to human justice, children are sometimes punished for + their parents, as in the case of high treason. Therefore also according to Divine justice, one is punished for another's sin. +
[37314] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, +iustitia humana derivatur a iustitia divina. Sed secundum iustitiam +humanam aliquando filii puniuntur pro parentibus, sicut patet in +crimine laesae maiestatis. Ergo etiam secundum divinam iustitiam, +unus punitur pro peccato alterius.
+ Objection 3: Further, if it be replied that the son is punished, not for the father's sin, but for his own, inasmuch as he imitates his + father's wickedness; this would not be said of the children rather than of outsiders, who are punished in like manner as those + whose crimes they imitate. It seems, therefore, that children are punished, not for their own sins, but for those of their + parents. +
[37315] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, +si dicatur filius non puniri pro peccato patris, sed pro peccato +proprio, inquantum imitatur malitiam paternam, non magis hoc +diceretur de filiis quam de extraneis, qui simili poena puniuntur +his quorum peccata imitantur. Non ergo videtur quod filii pro +peccatis propriis puniantur, sed pro peccatis parentum.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Ezech. 18:20): "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father." +
[37316] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Ezech. XVIII, filius non portabit iniquitatem +patris.
+ I answer that, If we speak of that satisfactory punishment, which one takes upon oneself voluntarily, one may bear another's punishment, + in so far as they are, in some way, one, as stated above + (A[7]). If, however, we speak of punishment inflicted on account of sin, inasmuch as it is penal, then each one is punished for + his own sin only, because the sinful act is something personal. But if we speak of a punishment that is medicinal, in this + way it + does happen that one is punished for another's sin. For it has been stated + (A[7]) that ills sustained in bodily goods or even in the body itself, are medicinal punishments intended for the health of the + soul. Wherefore there is no reason why one should not have such like punishments inflicted on one for another's sin, either + by God or by man; e.g. on children for their parents, or on servants for their masters, inasmuch as they are their property + so to speak; in such a + way, however, that, if the children or the servants take part in the sin, this penal ill has the character of punishment in + regard to both the one punished and the one he is punished for. But if they do not take part in the sin, it has the character + of punishment in regard to the one for whom the punishment is borne, while, in regard to the one who is punished, it is merely + medicinal (except accidentally, if he consent to the other's sin), since it is intended for the good of his soul, if he + bears it patiently. +
With regard to spiritual punishments, these are not merely medicinal, because the good of the soul is not directed to a yet + higher good. Consequently no one suffers loss in the goods of the soul without some fault of his own. Wherefore Augustine + says (Ep. ad Avit.) [*Ep. ad Auxilium, ccl.], such like punishments are not inflicted on one for another's sin, because, as + regards the soul, the son is not the father's property. Hence the Lord assigns the reason for this by saying + (Ezech. 18:4): "All souls are Mine." +
[37317] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, si loquamur de poena satisfactoria, quae voluntarie +assumitur, contingit quod unus portet poenam alterius inquantum +sunt quodammodo unum, sicut iam dictum est. Si autem loquamur de +poena pro peccato inflicta, inquantum habet rationem poenae, sic +solum unusquisque pro peccato suo punitur, quia actus peccati +aliquid personale est. Si autem loquamur de poena quae habet +rationem medicinae, sic contingit quod unus punitur pro peccato +alterius. Dictum est enim quod detrimenta corporalium rerum, vel +etiam ipsius corporis, sunt quaedam poenales medicinae ordinatae ad +salutem animae. Unde nihil prohibet talibus poenis aliquem puniri +pro peccato alterius, vel a Deo vel ab homine, utpote filios pro +patribus, et subditos pro dominis, inquantum sunt quaedam res +eorum. Ita tamen quod, si filius vel subditus est particeps culpae, +huiusmodi poenalis defectus habet rationem poenae quantum ad +utrumque, scilicet eum qui punitur, et eum pro quo punitur. Si vero +non sit particeps culpae, habet rationem poenae quantum ad eum pro +quo punitur, quantum vero ad eum qui punitur, rationem medicinae +tantum, nisi per accidens, inquantum peccato alterius consentit; +ordinatur enim ei ad bonum animae, si patienter sustineat. Poenae +vero spirituales non sunt medicinales tantum, quia bonum animae non +ordinatur ad aliud melius bonum. Unde in bonis animae nullus +patitur detrimentum sine culpa propria. Et propter hoc etiam +talibus poenis, ut dicit Augustinus in epistola ad avitum, unus non +punitur pro alio, quia quantum ad animam, filius non est res +patris. Unde et huius causam dominus assignans, dicit, Ezech. +XVIII, omnes animae meae sunt.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Both the passages quoted should, seemingly, be referred to temporal or bodily punishments, in so far as children are the + property of their parents, and posterity, of their forefathers. Else, if they be referred to spiritual punishments, they must + be understood in reference to the imitation of sin, wherefore in Exodus these words are added, "Of them that hate Me," and + in the chapter quoted from Matthew (verse 32) we read: "Fill ye up then the measure + of your fathers." The sins of the fathers are said to be punished in their children, because the latter are the more prone + to sin through being brought up amid their parents' crimes, both by becoming accustomed to them, and by imitating their parents' + example, conforming to their authority as it were. Moreover they deserve heavier punishment if, seeing the punishment of their + parents, they fail to mend their ways. The text adds, "to the third and fourth generation," because men are wont to live + long enough to see the third and fourth generation, so that both the children can witness their parents' sins so as to imitate + them, and the parents can see their children's punishments so as to grieve for them. +
[37318] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod utrumque dictum videtur esse referendum ad +poenas temporales vel corporales, inquantum filii sunt res quaedam +parentum, et successores praedecessorum. Vel si referatur ad poenas +spirituales, hoc dicitur propter imitationem culpae, unde in Exodo +additur, his qui oderunt me; et in Matthaeo dicitur, et +vos implete mensuram patrum vestrorum. Dicit autem puniri +peccata patrum in filiis, quia filii, in peccatis parentum nutriti, +proniores sunt ad peccandum, tum propter consuetudinem; tum etiam +propter exemplum, patrum quasi auctoritatem sequentes. Sunt etiam +maiori poena digni, si, poenas patrum videntes, correcti non sunt. +Ideo autem addidit, in tertiam et quartam generationem, quia tantum +consueverunt homines vivere, ut tertiam et quartam generationem +videant; et sic mutuo videre possunt et filii peccata patrum ad +imitandum, et patres poenas filiorum ad dolendum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The punishments which human justice inflicts on one for another's sin are bodily and temporal. They are also remedies or + medicines against future sins, in order that either they who are punished, or others may be restrained from similar faults. +
[37319] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod poenae illae sunt corporales et temporales quas +iustitia humana uni pro peccato alterius infligit. Et sunt remedia +quaedam, vel medicinae, contra culpas sequentes, ut vel ipsi qui +puniuntur, vel alii, cohibeantur a similibus culpis.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Those who are near of kin are said to be punished, rather than outsiders, for the sins of others, both because the punishment + of kindred redounds somewhat upon those who sinned, as stated above, in so far as the child is the father's property, and + because the examples and the punishments that occur in one's own household are more moving. Consequently when a man is brought + up amid the sins of his parents, he is more eager to imitate them, and if he is + not deterred by their punishments, he would seem to be the more obstinate, and, therefore, to deserve more severe punishment. +
[37320] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod magis dicuntur puniri pro peccatis aliorum propinqui +quam extranei, tum quia poena propinquorum quodammodo redundat in +illos qui peccaverunt, ut dictum est, inquantum filius est quaedam +res patris. Tum etiam quia et domestica exempla, et domesticae +poenae, magis movent. Unde quando aliquis nutritus est in peccatis +parentum, vehementius ea sequitur; et si ex eorum poenis non est +deterritus, obstinatior videtur; unde et maiori poena dignus.
In the next place, since venial and mortal sins differ in respect of the debt of punishment, we must consider them. First, + we shall consider venial sin as compared with mortal sin; secondly, we shall consider venial sin in itself. +
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin?
(2) Whether they differ generically?
(3) Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin?
(4) Whether a venial sin can become mortal?
(5) Whether a venial sin can become mortal by reason of an aggravating circumstance?
+[37321] +Iª-IIae q. 88 pr. Deinde, quia peccatum veniale et +mortale distinguuntur secundum reatum, considerandum est de eis. Et +primo, considerandum est de veniali per comparationem ad mortale; +secundo, de veniali secundum se. Circa primum quaeruntur sex. +Primo, utrum veniale peccatum convenienter dividatur contra +mortale. Secundo, utrum distinguantur genere. Tertio, utrum veniale +peccatum sit dispositio ad mortale. Quarto, utrum veniale peccatum +possit fieri mortale. Quinto, utrum circumstantia aggravans possit +de veniali peccato facere mortale. Sexto, utrum peccatum mortale +possit fieri veniale.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin is unfittingly condivided with mortal sin. For Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27): "Sin + is a word, deed or desire contrary to the eternal law." But the fact of being against the eternal law makes a sin to be mortal. + Consequently every sin is mortal. Therefore venial sin is not condivided with mortal sin. +
[37322] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod veniale peccatum non convenienter +dividatur contra mortale. Dicit enim Augustinus, XXII libro contra +Faustum, peccatum est dictum vel factum vel concupitum contra +legem aeternam. Sed esse contra legem aeternam, dat peccato +quod sit mortale. Ergo omne peccatum est mortale. Non ergo peccatum +veniale dividitur contra mortale.
+ Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says ( + 1 Cor. 10:31): "Whether you eat or drink, or whatever else you do; do all to the glory of God." Now whoever sins breaks this commandment, + because sin is not done for God's glory. Consequently, since to break a commandment is to commit a mortal sin, it seems that + whoever sins, sins mortally. +
[37323] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +apostolus dicit, I Cor. X, sive manducatis, sive bibitis, sive +aliquid aliud facitis, omnia in gloriam Dei facite. Sed contra +hoc praeceptum facit quicumque peccat, non enim peccatum fit +propter gloriam Dei. Cum ergo facere contra praeceptum sit peccatum +mortale, videtur quod quicumque peccat, mortaliter peccet.
+ Objection 3: Further, whoever cleaves to a thing by love, cleaves either as enjoying it, or as using it, as Augustine states (De Doctr. + Christ. i, 3,4). But no person, in sinning, cleaves to a mutable good as using it: because he does not refer it to that good + which gives us happiness, which, properly speaking, is to use, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 3,4). Therefore + whoever sins enjoys a mutable good. Now "to enjoy what we should use is human perverseness," + as Augustine again says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 30). Therefore, since "perverseness" [*The Latin 'pervertere' means to overthrow, + to destroy, hence 'perversion' of God's law is a mortal sin.] denotes a mortal sin, it seems that whoever sins, sins mortally. +
[37324] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +quicumque amore alicui rei inhaeret, inhaeret ei vel sicut fruens, +vel sicut utens; ut patet per Augustinum, in I de Doctr. Christ. +Sed nullus peccans inhaeret bono commutabili quasi utens, non enim +refert ipsum ad bonum quod nos beatos facit, quod proprie est uti, +ut Augustinus dicit ibidem. Ergo quicumque peccat, fruitur bono +commutabili. Sed frui rebus utendis est humana perversitas, +ut Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest. Cum ergo +perversitas peccatum mortale nominet, videtur quod quicumque +peccat, mortaliter peccet.
+ Objection 4: Further, whoever approaches one term, from that very fact turns away from the opposite. Now whoever sins, approaches a mutable + good, and, consequently turns away from the immutable good, so that he sins mortally. Therefore venial sin is unfittingly + condivided with mortal sin. +
[37325] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, +quicumque accedit ad unum terminum, ex hoc ipso recedit ab alio. +Sed quicumque peccat, accedit ad bonum commutabile. Ergo recedit a +bono incommutabili. Ergo peccat mortaliter. Non ergo convenienter +peccatum veniale contra mortale dividitur.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. xli in Joan.), that "a crime is one that merits damnation, and a venial sin, one that does not." But + a crime denotes a mortal sin. Therefore venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin. +
[37326] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in Homil. XLI super Ioan., quod +crimen est quod damnationem meretur, veniale autem est quod non +meretur damnationem. Sed crimen nominat peccatum mortale. Ergo +veniale peccatum convenienter dividitur contra mortale.
+ I answer that, Certain terms do not appear to be mutually opposed, if taken in their proper sense, whereas they are opposed if taken metaphorically: + thus "to smile" is not opposed to "being dry"; but if we speak of the smiling meadows when they are decked with flowers and + fresh with green hues this is opposed to drought. In like manner if mortal be taken literally as referring to the death of + the body, it does not imply opposition to venial, nor belong to the same genus. + But if mortal be taken metaphorically, as applied to sin, it is opposed to that which is venial. +
For sin, being a sickness of the soul, as stated above ( + Q[71], A[1], ad 3; + Q[72], A[5]; + Q[74], A[9], ad 2), is said to be mortal by comparison with a disease, which is said to be mortal, through causing an irreparable defect + consisting in the corruption of a principle, as stated above ( + Q[72], A[5]). Now the principle of the spiritual life, which is a life in accord with virtue, is + the order to the last end, as stated above ( + Q[72], A[5]; + Q[87], A[3]): and if this order be corrupted, it cannot be repaired by any intrinsic principle, but by the power of God alone, as stated + above ( + Q[87], A[3]), because disorders in things referred to the end, are repaired through the end, even as an error about conclusions can be + repaired through the truth of the principles. Hence the defect of order to the last end + cannot be repaired through something else as a higher principle, as neither can an error about principles. Wherefore such + sins are called mortal, as being irreparable. On the other hand, sins which imply a disorder in things referred to the end, + the order to the end itself being preserved, are reparable. These sins are called venial: because a sin receives its acquittal + [veniam] when the debt of punishment is taken away, and this ceases when the sin ceases, as explained above ( + Q[87], A[6]). +
Accordingly, mortal and venial are mutually opposed as reparable and irreparable: and I say this with reference to the intrinsic + principle, but not to the Divine power, which can repair all diseases, whether of the body or of the soul. Therefore venial + sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin. +
[37327] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod aliqua, secundum quod proprie accipiuntur, non +videntur esse opposita, quae si metaphorice accipiantur, opponi +inveniuntur, sicut ridere non opponitur ei quod est arescere; sed +secundum quod ridere metaphorice de prato dicitur propter eius +floritionem et virorem, opponitur ei quod est arescere. Similiter +si mortale proprie accipiatur, prout refertur ad mortem corporalem, +non videtur oppositionem habere cum veniali, nec ad idem genus +pertinere. Sed si mortale accipiatur metaphorice, secundum quod +dicitur in peccatis, mortale opponitur ei quod est veniale. Cum +enim peccatum sit quaedam infirmitas animae, ut supra habitum est, +peccatum aliquod mortale dicitur ad similitudinem morbi, qui +dicitur mortalis ex eo quod inducit defectum irreparabilem per +destitutionem alicuius principii, ut dictum est. Principium autem +spiritualis vitae, quae est secundum virtutem, est ordo ad ultimum +finem, ut supra dictum est. Qui quidem si destitutus fuerit, +reparari non potest per aliquod principium intrinsecum, sed solum +per virtutem divinam, ut supra dictum est, quia inordinationes +eorum quae sunt ad finem, reparantur ex fine, sicut error qui +accidit circa conclusiones, per veritatem principiorum. Defectus +ergo ordinis ultimi finis non potest per aliquid aliud reparari +quod sit principalius; sicut nec error qui est circa principia. Et +ideo huiusmodi peccata dicuntur mortalia, quasi irreparabilia. +Peccata autem quae habent inordinationem circa ea quae sunt ad +finem, conservato ordine ad ultimum finem, reparabilia sunt. Et +haec dicuntur venialia, tunc enim peccatum veniam habet, quando +reatus poenae tollitur, qui cessat cessante peccato, ut dictum est. +Secundum hoc ergo, mortale et veniale opponuntur sicut reparabile +et irreparabile. Et hoc dico per principium interius, non autem per +comparationem ad virtutem divinam, quae omnem morbum et corporalem +et spiritualem potest reparare. Et propter hoc veniale peccatum +convenienter dividitur contra mortale.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The division of sin into venial and mortal is not a division of a genus into its species which have an equal share of the + generic nature: but it is the division of an analogous term into its parts, of which it is predicated, of the one first, and + of the other afterwards. Consequently the perfect notion of sin, which Augustine gives, applies to mortal sin. On the other + hand, venial sin is called a sin, in reference to an imperfect notion of sin, and in + relation to mortal sin: even as an accident is called a being, in relation to substance, in reference to the imperfect notion + of being. For it is not "against" the law, since he who sins venially neither does what the law forbids, nor omits what the + law prescribes to be done; but he acts "beside" the law, through not observing the mode of reason, which the law intends. +
[37328] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod divisio peccati venialis et mortalis non est +divisio generis in species, quae aequaliter participent rationem +generis, sed analogi in ea de quibus praedicatur secundum prius et +posterius. Et ideo perfecta ratio peccati, quam Augustinus ponit, +convenit peccato mortali. Peccatum autem veniale dicitur peccatum +secundum rationem imperfectam, et in ordine ad peccatum mortale, +sicut accidens dicitur ens in ordine ad substantiam, secundum +imperfectam rationem entis. Non enim est contra legem, quia +venialiter peccans non facit quod lex prohibet, nec praetermittit +id ad quod lex per praeceptum obligat; sed facit praeter legem, +quia non observat modum rationis quem lex intendit.
+ Reply to Objection 2: This precept of the Apostle is affirmative, and so it does not bind for all times. Consequently everyone who does not actually + refer all his actions to the glory of God, does not therefore act against this precept. In order, therefore, to avoid mortal + sin each time that one fails actually to refer an action to God's glory, it is enough to refer oneself and all that one has + to God habitually. Now venial sin excludes only actual reference of the human + act to God's glory, and not habitual reference: because it does not exclude charity, which refers man to God habitually. Therefore + it does not follow that he who sins venially, sins mortally. +
[37329] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod illud praeceptum apostoli est affirmativum, unde non +obligat ad semper. Et sic non facit contra hoc praeceptum quicumque +non actu refert in gloriam Dei omne quod facit. Sufficit ergo quod +aliquis habitualiter referat se et omnia sua in Deum, ad hoc quod +non semper mortaliter peccet, cum aliquem actum non refert in +gloriam Dei actualiter. Veniale autem peccatum non excludit +habitualem ordinationem actus humani in gloriam Dei, sed solum +actualem, quia non excludit caritatem, quae habitualiter ordinat in +Deum. Unde non sequitur quod ille qui peccat venialiter, peccet +mortaliter.
+ Reply to Objection 3: He that sins venially, cleaves to temporal good, not as enjoying it, because he does not fix his end in it, but as using + it, by referring it to God, not actually but habitually. +
[37330] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ille qui peccat venialiter, inhaeret bono temporali +non ut fruens, quia non constituit in eo finem; sed ut utens, +referens in Deum non actu, sed habitu.
+ Reply to Objection 4: Mutable good is not considered to be a term in contraposition to the immutable good, unless one's end is fixed therein: because + what is referred to the end has not the character of finality. +
[37331] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod bonum commutabile non accipitur ut terminus +contrapositus incommutabili bono, nisi quando constituitur in eo +finis. Quod enim est ad finem, non habet rationem termini.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that venial and mortal sin do not differ generically, so that some sins be generically mortal, and some generically + venial. Because human acts are considered to be generically good or evil according to their matter or object, as stated above + ( + Q[18], A[2]). Now either mortal or venial sin may be committed in regard to any object or matter: since man can love any mutable good, + either less than God, which may be a venial + sin, or more than God, which is a mortal sin. Therefore venial and mortal sin do not differ generically. +
[37332] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum veniale et mortale non +differant genere, ita scilicet quod aliquod sit peccatum mortale ex +genere, et aliquod veniale ex genere. Bonum enim et malum ex genere +in actibus humanis accipitur per comparationem ad materiam sive ad +obiectum, ut supra dictum est. Sed secundum quodlibet obiectum vel +materiam, contingit peccare mortaliter et venialiter, quodlibet +enim bonum commutabile potest homo diligere vel infra Deum, quod +est peccare venialiter, vel supra Deum quod est peccare mortaliter. +Ergo peccatum veniale et mortale non differunt genere.
+ Objection 2: Further, as stated above + (A[1]; Q[72], A[5]; Q[87], A[3]), a sin is called mortal when it is irreparable, venial when it can be repaired. Now irreparability + belongs to sin committed out of malice, which, according to some, is irremissible: whereas reparability belongs to sins committed + through weakness or ignorance, which are remissible. Therefore mortal and venial sin differ as sin committed through malice + differs from sin committed + through weakness or ignorance. But, in this respect, sins differ not in genus but in cause, as stated above (Q[77], A[8], + ad 1). Therefore venial and mortal sin do not differ generically. +
[37333] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +sicut dictum est supra, peccatum mortale dicitur quod est +irreparabile, peccatum autem veniale quod est reparabile. Sed esse +irreparabile convenit peccato quod fit ex malitia, quod secundum +quosdam irremissibile dicitur, esse autem reparabile convenit +peccato quod fit per infirmitatem vel ignorantiam, quod dicitur +remissibile. Ergo peccatum mortale et veniale differunt sicut +peccatum quod est ex malitia commissum, vel ex infirmitate et +ignorantia. Sed secundum hoc non differunt peccata genere, sed +causa, ut supra dictum est. Ergo peccatum veniale et mortale non +differunt genere.
+ Objection 3: Further, it was stated above ( + Q[74], A[3], ad 3; A[10]) that sudden movements both of the sensuality and of the reason are venial sins. But sudden movements occur + in every kind of sin. Therefore no sins are generically venial. +
[37334] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +supra dictum est quod subiti motus tam sensualitatis quam rationis, +sunt peccata venialia. Sed subiti motus inveniuntur in quolibet +peccati genere. Ergo non sunt aliqua peccata venialia ex +genere.
+ On the contrary, Augustine, in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis, serm. xli), enumerates certain generic venial sins, and certain generic + mortal sins. +
[37335] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus, in sermone de Purgatorio, enumerat quaedam +genera peccatorum venialium, et quaedam genera peccatorum +mortalium.
+ I answer that, Venial sin is so called from "venia" [pardon]. Consequently a sin may be called venial, first of all, because it has been + pardoned: thus Ambrose says that "penance makes every sin venial": and this is called venial "from the result." Secondly, + a sin is called venial because it does not contain anything either partially or totally, to prevent its being pardoned: partially, + as when a sin contains something diminishing its guilt, e.g. a sin committed through + weakness or ignorance: and this is called venial "from the cause": totally, through not destroying the order to the last end, + wherefore it deserves temporal, but not everlasting punishment. It is of this venial sin that we wish to speak now. +
For as regards the first two, it is evident that they have no determinate genus: whereas venial sin, taken in the third sense, + can have a determinate genus, so that one sin may be venial generically, and another generically mortal, according as the + genus or species of an act is determined by its object. For, when the will is directed to a thing that is in itself contrary + to charity, whereby man is directed to his last end, the sin is mortal by reason of its object. Consequently + it is a mortal sin generically, whether it be contrary to the love of God, e.g. blasphemy, perjury, and the like, or against + the love of one's neighbor, e.g. murder, adultery, and such like: wherefore such sins are mortal by reason of their genus. + Sometimes, however, the sinner's will is directed to a thing containing a certain inordinateness, but which is not contrary + to the love of God and one's neighbor, e.g. an idle word, excessive laughter, and so forth: and such sins are venial by reason + of their genus. +
Nevertheless, since moral acts derive their character of goodness and malice, not only from their objects, but also from + some disposition of the agent, as stated above ( + Q[18], AA[4],6), it happens sometimes that a sin which is venial generically by reason of its object, becomes mortal on the part of the + agent, either because he fixes his last end therein, or because he directs it to something that is a mortal sin in its own + genus; for example, if a man + direct an idle word to the commission of adultery. In like manner it may happen, on the part of the agent, that a sin generically + mortal because venial, by reason of the act being imperfect, i.e. not deliberated by reason, which is the proper principle + of an evil act, as we have said above in reference to sudden movements of unbelief. +
[37336] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod peccatum veniale a venia dicitur. Potest igitur +aliquod peccatum dici veniale uno modo, quia est veniam consecutum, +et sic dicit Ambrosius quod omne peccatum per poenitentiam fit +veniale. Et hoc dicitur veniale ex eventu. Alio modo dicitur +veniale, quia non habet in se unde veniam non consequatur vel +totaliter vel in parte. In parte quidem, sicut cum habet in se +aliquid diminuens culpam, ut cum fit ex infirmitate vel ignorantia. +Et hoc dicitur veniale ex causa. In toto autem, ex eo quod non +tollit ordinem ad ultimum finem, unde non meretur poenam aeternam, +sed temporalem. Et de hoc veniali ad praesens intendimus. De primis +enim duobus constat quod non habent genus aliquod determinatum. Sed +veniale tertio modo dictum, potest habere genus determinatum, ita +quod aliquod peccatum dicatur veniale ex genere, et aliquod mortale +ex genere, secundum quod genus vel species actus determinantur ex +obiecto. Cum enim voluntas fertur in aliquid quod secundum se +repugnat caritati, per quam homo ordinatur in ultimum finem, +peccatum ex suo obiecto habet quod sit mortale. Unde est mortale ex +genere, sive sit contra dilectionem Dei, sicut blasphemia, +periurium, et huiusmodi; sive contra dilectionem proximi, sicut +homicidium, adulterium, et similia. Unde huiusmodi sunt peccata +mortalia ex suo genere. Quandoque vero voluntas peccantis fertur in +id quod in se continet quandam inordinationem, non tamen +contrariatur dilectioni Dei et proximi, sicut verbum otiosum, risus +superfluus, et alia huiusmodi. Et talia sunt peccata venialia ex +suo genere. Sed quia actus morales recipiunt rationem boni et mali +non solum ex obiecto, sed etiam ex aliqua dispositione agentis, ut +supra habitum est; contingit quandoque quod id quod est peccatum +veniale ex genere ratione sui obiecti, fit mortale ex parte +agentis, vel quia in eo constituit finem ultimum, vel quia ordinat +ipsum ad aliquid quod est peccatum mortale ex genere, puta cum +aliquis ordinat verbum otiosum ad adulterium committendum. +Similiter etiam ex parte agentis contingit quod aliquod peccatum +quod ex suo genere est mortale, fit veniale, propter hoc scilicet +quod actus est imperfectus, idest non deliberatus ratione, quae est +principium proprium mali actus, sicut supra dictum est de subitis +motibus infidelitatis.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The very fact that anyone chooses something that is contrary to divine charity, proves that he prefers it to the love of + God, and consequently, that he loves it more than he loves God. Hence it belongs to the genus of some sins, which are of themselves + contrary to charity, that something is loved more than God; so that they are mortal by reason of their genus. +
[37337] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ex hoc ipso quod aliquis eligit id quod repugnat +divinae caritati, convincitur praeferre illud caritati divinae, et +per consequens plus amare ipsum quam Deum. Et ideo aliqua peccata +ex genere, quae de se repugnant caritati, habent quod aliquid +diligatur supra Deum. Et sic sunt ex genere suo mortalia.
+ Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers those sins which are venial from their cause. +
[37338] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de peccato veniali ex causa.
+ Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers those sins which are venial by reason of the imperfection of the act. +
[37339] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de peccato quod est veniale +propter imperfectionem actus.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin is not a disposition to mortal sin. For one contrary does not dispose to another. But venial + and mortal sin are condivided as contrary to one another, as stated above + (A[1]). Therefore venial sin is not a disposition to mortal sin. +
[37340] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum veniale non sit dispositio ad +mortale. Unum enim oppositum non disponit ad aliud. Sed peccatum +veniale et mortale ex opposito dividuntur, ut dictum est. Ergo +peccatum veniale non est dispositio ad mortale.
+ Objection 2: Further, an act disposes to something of like species, wherefore it is stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2, that "from like acts like + dispositions and habits are engendered." But mortal and venial sin differ in genus or species, as stated above + (A[2]). Therefore venial sin does not dispose to mortal sin. +
[37341] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +actus disponit ad aliquid simile in specie sibi, unde in II Ethic. +dicitur quod ex similibus actibus generantur similes +dispositiones et habitus. Sed peccatum mortale et veniale +differunt genere seu specie, ut dictum est. Ergo peccatum veniale +non disponit ad mortale.
+ Objection 3: Further, if a sin is called venial because it disposes to mortal sin, it follows that whatever disposes to mortal sin is + a venial sin. Now every good work disposes to mortal sin; wherefore Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi) that "pride lies + in wait for good works that it may destroy them." Therefore even good works would be venial sins, which is absurd. +
[37342] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +si peccatum dicatur veniale quia disponit ad mortale, oportebit +quod quaecumque disponunt ad mortale peccatum, sint peccata +venialia. Sed omnia bona opera disponunt ad peccatum mortale, dicit +enim Augustinus, in regula, quod superbia bonis operibus +insidiatur, ut pereant. Ergo etiam bona opera erunt peccata +venialia, quod est inconveniens.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Ecclus. 19:1): "He that contemneth small things shall fall by little and little." Now he that sins venially seems to contemn small things. + Therefore by little and little he is disposed to fall away together into mortal sin. +
[37343] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Eccli. XIX, qui spernit minima, paulatim +defluit. Sed ille qui peccat venialiter, videtur minima +spernere. Ergo paulatim disponitur ad hoc quod totaliter defluat +per peccatum mortale.
+ I answer that, A disposition is a kind of cause; wherefore as there is a twofold manner of cause, so is there a twofold manner of disposition. + For there is a cause which moves directly to the production of the effect, as a hot thing heats: and there is a cause which + moves indirectly, by removing an obstacle, as he who displaces a pillar is said to displace the stone that rests on it. Accordingly + an act of sin disposes to something in two ways. First, directly, and thus it + disposes to an act of like species. In this way, a sin generically venial does not, primarily and of its nature, dispose to + a sin generically mortal, for they differ in species. Nevertheless, in this same way, a venial sin can dispose, by way of + consequence, to a sin which is mortal on the part of the agent: because the disposition or habit may be so far strengthened + by acts of venial sin, that the lust of sinning increases, and the sinner fixes his end in that venial sin: since the end + for one + who has a habit, as such, is to work according to that habit; and the consequence will be that, by sinning often venially, + he becomes disposed to a mortal sin. Secondly, a human act disposes to something by removing an obstacle thereto. In this + way a sin generically venial can dispose to a sin generically mortal. Because he that commits a sin generically venial, turns + aside from some particular order; and through accustoming his will not to be subject to the due order in lesser matters, is + disposed not to subject his will even to the order of the last end, by choosing something that is a mortal sin in its genus. +
[37344] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod disponens est quodammodo causa. Unde secundum +duplicem modum causae, est duplex dispositionis modus. Est enim +causa quaedam movens directe ad effectum, sicut calidum calefacit. +Est etiam causa indirecte movens, removendo prohibens, sicut +removens columnam dicitur removere lapidem superpositum. Et +secundum hoc, actus peccati dupliciter ad aliquid disponit. Uno +quidem modo, directe, et sic disponit ad actum similem secundum +speciem. Et hoc modo, primo et per se peccatum veniale ex genere +non disponit ad mortale ex genere, cum differant specie. Sed per +hunc modum peccatum veniale potest disponere, per quandam +consequentiam, ad peccatum quod est mortale ex parte agentis. +Augmentata enim dispositione vel habitu per actus peccatorum +venialium, intantum potest libido peccandi crescere, quod ille qui +peccat, finem suum constituet in peccato veniali, nam unicuique +habenti habitum, inquantum huiusmodi, finis est operatio secundum +habitum. Et sic, multoties peccando venialiter, disponetur ad +peccatum mortale. Alio modo actus humanus disponit ad aliquid +removendo prohibens. Et hoc modo peccatum veniale ex genere potest +disponere ad peccatum mortale ex genere. Qui enim peccat venialiter +ex genere, praetermittit aliquem ordinem, et ex hoc quod consuescit +voluntatem suam in minoribus debito ordini non subiicere, +disponitur ad hoc quod etiam voluntatem suam non subiiciat ordini +ultimi finis, eligendo id quod est peccatum mortale ex genere.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Venial and mortal sin are not condivided in contrariety to one another, as though they were species of one genus, as stated + above (A[1], ad 1), but as an accident is condivided with substance. Wherefore an accident can be a disposition to a substantial + form, so can a venial sin dispose to mortal. +
[37345] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod peccatum veniale et mortale non dividuntur ex +opposito, sicut duae species unius generis, ut dictum est, sed +sicut accidens contra substantiam dividitur. Unde sicut accidens +potest esse dispositio ad formam substantialem, ita et veniale +peccatum ad mortale.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Venial sin is not like mortal sin in species; but it is in genus, inasmuch as they both imply a defect of due order, albeit + in different ways, as stated ( + AA[1],2). +
[37346] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod peccatum veniale non est simile mortali in specie, +est tamen simile ei in genere, inquantum utrumque importat defectum +debiti ordinis, licet aliter et aliter, ut dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: A good work is not, of itself, a disposition to mortal sin; but it can be the matter or occasion of mortal sin accidentally; + whereas a venial sin, of its very nature, disposes to mortal sin, as stated. +
[37347] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod opus bonum non est per se dispositio ad mortale +peccatum, potest tamen esse materia vel occasio peccati mortalis +per accidens. Sed peccatum veniale per se disponit ad mortale, ut +dictum est.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that a venial sin can become a mortal sin. For Augustine in explaining the words of + Jn. 3:36: "He that believeth not the Son, shall not see life," says (Tract. xii in Joan.): "The slightest," i.e. venial, "sins kill + if we make little of them." Now a sin is called mortal through causing the spiritual death of the soul. Therefore a venial + sin can become mortal. +
[37348] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum veniale possit fieri mortale. +Dicit enim Augustinus, exponens illud Ioan. III, qui incredulus +est filio, non videbit vitam, peccata minima (idest venialia), +si negligantur, occidunt. Sed ex hoc dicitur peccatum mortale, quod +spiritualiter occidit animam. Ergo peccatum veniale potest fieri +mortale.
+ Objection 2: Further, a movement in the sensuality before the consent of reason, is a venial sin, but after consent, is a mortal sin, + as stated above ( + Q[74], A[8], ad 2). Therefore a venial sin can become mortal. +
[37349] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +motus sensualitatis ante consensum rationis est peccatum veniale, +post consensum vero est peccatum mortale, ut supra dictum est. Ergo +peccatum veniale potest fieri mortale.
+ Objection 3: Further, venial and mortal sin differ as curable and incurable disease, as stated above + (A[1]). But a curable disease may become incurable. Therefore a venial sin may become mortal. +
[37350] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +peccatum veniale et mortale differunt sicut morbus curabilis et +incurabilis, ut dictum est. Sed morbus curabilis potest fieri +incurabilis. Ergo peccatum veniale potest fieri mortale.
+ Objection 4: Further, a disposition may become a habit. Now venial sin is a disposition to mortal, as stated + (A[3]). Therefore a venial sin can become mortal. +
[37351] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 arg. 4 Praeterea, +dispositio potest fieri habitus. Sed peccatum veniale est +dispositio ad mortale, ut dictum est. Ergo veniale peccatum potest +fieri mortale.
+ On the contrary, +Those which differ infinitely, are not be transformed one to another. But a mortal sin +differs infinitely from a venial sin, as is apparent from the above (Q[87] A[5]). +Therefore venial [sin] cannot become mortal. [HST translation, missing +from original]
[37352] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra, +ea quae differunt in infinitum, non transmutantur in invicem. Sed +peccatum mortale et veniale differunt in infinitum, ut ex +praedictis patet. Ergo veniale non potest fieri mortale.
+ I answer that, The fact of a venial sin becoming a mortal sin may be understood in three ways. First, so that the same identical act be + at first a venial, and then a mortal sin. This is impossible: because a sin, like any moral act, consists chiefly in an act + of the will: so that an act is not one morally, if the will be changed, although the act be continuous physically. If, however, + the will be not changed, it is not possible for a venial sin to become mortal. +
Secondly, this may be taken to mean that a sin generically venial, becomes mortal. This is possible, in so far as one may + fix one's end in that venial sin, or direct it to some mortal sin as end, as stated above + (A[2]). +
Thirdly, this may be understood in the sense of many venial sins constituting one mortal sin. If this be taken as meaning + that many venial sins added together make one mortal sin, it is false, because all the venial sins in the world cannot incur + a debt of punishment equal to that of one mortal sin. This is evident as regards the duration of the punishment, since mortal + sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment, while venial sin incurs a debt of temporal punishment, as stated + above ( + Q[87], AA[3],5). It is also evident as regards the pain of loss, because mortal sins deserve to be punished by the privation of seeing + God, to which no other punishment is comparable, as Chrysostom states (Hom. xxiv in Matth.). It is also evident as regards + the pain of sense, as to the remorse of conscience; although as to the pain of fire, the punishments may perhaps not be improportionate + to one another. +
If, however, this be taken as meaning that many venial sins make one mortal sin dispositively, it is true, as was shown above + + (A[3]) with regard to the two different manners of disposition, whereby venial sin disposes to mortal sin. +
[37353] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod peccatum veniale fieri mortale, potest tripliciter +intelligi. Uno modo sic quod idem actus numero, primo sit peccatum +veniale, et postea mortale. Et hoc esse non potest. Quia peccatum +principaliter consistit in actu voluntatis, sicut et quilibet actus +moralis. Unde non dicitur unus actus moraliter, si voluntas +mutetur, quamvis etiam actio secundum naturam sit continua. Si +autem voluntas non mutetur, non potest esse quod de veniali fiat +mortale. Alio modo potest intelligi ut id quod est veniale ex +genere, fiat mortale. Et hoc quidem possibile est, inquantum +constituitur in eo finis, vel inquantum refertur ad mortale +peccatum sicut ad finem, ut dictum est. Tertio modo potest +intelligi ita quod multa venialia peccata constituant unum peccatum +mortale. Quod si sic intelligatur quod ex multis peccatis +venialibus integraliter constituatur unum peccatum mortale, falsum +est. Non enim omnia peccata venialia de mundo, possunt habere +tantum de reatu, quantum unum peccatum mortale. Quod patet ex parte +durationis, quia peccatum mortale habet reatum poenae aeternae, +peccatum autem veniale reatum poenae temporalis, ut dictum est. +Patet etiam ex parte poenae damni, quia peccatum mortale meretur +carentiam visionis divinae, cui nulla alia poena comparari potest +ut Chrysostomus dicit. Patet etiam ex parte poenae sensus, quantum +ad vermem conscientiae, licet forte quantum ad poenam ignis, non +sint improportionales poenae. Si vero intelligatur quod multa +peccata venialia faciunt unum mortale dispositive, sic verum est, +sicut supra ostensum est, secundum duos modos dispositionis, quo +peccatum veniale disponit ad mortale.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is referring to the fact of many venial sins making one mortal sin dispositively. +
[37354] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur in illo sensu, quod multa +peccata venialia dispositive causant mortale.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The same movement of the sensuality which preceded the consent of reason can never become a mortal sin; but the movement + of the reason in consenting is a mortal sin. +
[37355] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod ille idem motus sensualitatis qui praecessit +consensum rationis nunquam fiet peccatum mortale, sed ipse actus +rationis consentientis.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Disease of the body is not an act, but an abiding disposition; wherefore, while remaining the same disease, it may undergo + change. On the other hand, venial sin is a transient act, which cannot be taken up again: so that in this respect the comparison + fails. +
[37356] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod morbus corporalis non est actus, sed dispositio +quaedam permanens, unde eadem manens, potest mutari. Sed peccatum +veniale est actus transiens, qui resumi non potest. Et quantum ad +hoc, non est simile.
+ Reply to Objection 4: A disposition that becomes a habit, is like an imperfect thing in the same species; thus imperfect science, by being perfected, + becomes a habit. On the other hand, venial sin is a disposition to something differing generically, even as an accident which + disposes to a substantial form, into which it is never changed. +
[37357] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod dispositio quae fit habitus, est sicut imperfectum in +eadem specie, sicut imperfecta scientia, dum perficitur, fit +habitus. Sed veniale peccatum est dispositio alterius generis, +sicut accidens ad formam substantialem, in quam nunquam +mutatur.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that a circumstance can make a venial sin mortal. For Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis, + serm. xli) that "if anger continue for a long time, or if drunkenness be frequent, they become mortal sins." But anger and + drunkenness are not mortal but venial sins generically, else they would always be mortal sins. Therefore a circumstance makes + a venial sin to be mortal. +
[37358] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod circumstantia possit de veniali +peccato facere mortale. Dicit enim Augustinus, in sermone de +Purgatorio, quod si diu teneatur iracundia, et ebrietas si +assidua sit, transeunt in numerum peccatorum mortalium. Sed ira +et ebrietas non sunt ex suo genere peccata mortalia, sed venialia, +alioquin semper essent mortalia. Ergo circumstantia facit peccatum +veniale esse mortale.
+ Objection 2: Further, the Master says ( Sentent. ii, D, 24) that delectation, if morose [*See + Q[74], A[6]], is a mortal sin, but that if it be not morose, it is a venial sin. Now moroseness is a circumstance. Therefore a circumstance + makes a venial sin to be mortal. +
[37359] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Magister dicit, XXIV dist. II libri Sent., quod delectatio, si sit +morosa, est peccatum mortale; si autem non sit morosa, est peccatum +veniale. Sed morositas est quaedam circumstantia. Ergo +circumstantia facit de peccato veniali mortale.
+ Objection 3: Further, evil and good differ more than venial and mortal sin, both of which are generically evil. But a circumstance makes + a good act to be evil, as when a man gives an alms for vainglory. Much more, therefore, can it make a venial sin to be mortal. +
[37360] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +plus differunt malum et bonum quam veniale peccatum et mortale, +quorum utrumque est in genere mali. Sed circumstantia facit de actu +bono malum, sicut patet cum quis dat eleemosynam propter inanem +gloriam. Ergo multo magis potest facere de peccato veniali +mortale.
+ On the contrary, Since a circumstance is an accident, its quantity cannot exceed that of the act itself, derived from the act's genus, because + the subject always excels its accident. If, therefore, an act be venial by reason of its genus, it cannot become mortal by + reason of an accident: since, in a way, mortal sin infinitely surpasses the quantity of venial sin, as is evident from what + has been said ( + Q[72], A[5], ad 1; + Q[87], + A[5] + , ad 1). +
[37361] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra +est quod, cum circumstantia sit accidens, quantitas eius non potest +excedere quantitatem ipsius actus, quam habet ex suo genere, semper +enim subiectum praeeminet accidenti. Si igitur actus ex suo genere +sit peccatum veniale, non poterit per circumstantiam fieri peccatum +mortale, cum peccatum mortale in infinitum quodammodo excedat +quantitatem venialis, ut ex dictis patet.
+ I answer that, As stated above (Q[7], A[1]; Q[18], A[5], ad 4; + AA[10] ,11), when we were treating of circumstances, a circumstance, as such, is an accident of the moral act: and yet a circumstance + may happen to be taken as the specific difference of a moral act, and then it loses its nature of circumstance, and constitutes + the species of the moral act. This happens in sins when a circumstance adds the deformity of another genus; thus when a man + has knowledge of another woman than his wife, the deformity of his act is opposed to chastity; but if this other be another + man's wife, there is an additional deformity opposed to justice which forbids one to take what belongs to another; and accordingly + this circumstance constitutes a new species of sin known as adultery. +
It is, however, impossible for a circumstance to make a venial sin become mortal, unless it adds the deformity of another + species. For it has been stated above + (A[1]) that the deformity of a venial sin consists in a disorder affecting things that are referred to the end, whereas the deformity + of a mortal sin consists in a disorder about the last end. Consequently it is evident that a circumstance cannot make a venial + sin to be mortal, so long as it + remains a circumstance, but only when it transfers the sin to another species, and becomes, as it were, the specific difference + of the moral act. +
[37362] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum de circumstantiis +ageretur, circumstantia, inquantum huiusmodi, est accidens actus +moralis, contingit tamen circumstantiam accipi ut differentiam +specificam actus moralis, et tunc amittit rationem circumstantiae, +et constituit speciem moralis actus. Hoc autem contingit in +peccatis quando circumstantia addit deformitatem alterius generis +sicut cum aliquis accedit ad non suam, est actus deformis +deformitate opposita castitati; sed si accedat ad non suam quae est +alterius uxor, additur deformitas opposita iustitiae, contra quam +est ut aliquis usurpet rem alienam; et secundum hoc huiusmodi +circumstantia constituit novam speciem peccati, quae dicitur +adulterium. Impossibile est autem quod circumstantia de peccato +veniali faciat mortale, nisi afferat deformitatem alterius generis. +Dictum est enim quod peccatum veniale habet deformitatem per hoc +quod importat deordinationem circa ea quae sunt ad finem, peccatum +autem mortale habet deformitatem per hoc quod importat +deordinationem respectu ultimi finis. Unde manifestum est quod +circumstantia non potest de veniali peccato facere mortale, manens +circumstantia, sed solum tunc quando transfert in aliam speciem, et +fit quodammodo differentia specifica moralis actus.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Length of time is not a circumstance that draws a sin to another species, nor is frequency or custom, except perhaps by something + accidental supervening. For an action does not acquire a new species through being repeated or prolonged, unless by chance + something supervene in the repeated or prolonged act to change its species, e.g. disobedience, contempt, or the like. +
We must therefore reply to the objection by saying that since anger is a movement of the soul tending to the hurt of one's + neighbor, if the angry movement tend to a hurt which is a mortal sin generically, such as murder or robbery, that anger will + be a mortal sin generically: and if it be a venial sin, this will be due to the imperfection of the act, in so far as it is + a sudden movement of the sensuality: whereas, if it last a long time, it returns to its generic nature, through + the consent of reason. If, on the other hand, the hurt to which the angry movement tends, is a sin generically venial, for + instance, if a man be angry with someone, so as to wish to say some trifling word in jest that would hurt him a little, the + anger will not be mortal sin, however long it last, unless perhaps accidentally; for instance, if it were to give rise to + great scandal or something of the kind. +
With regard to drunkenness we reply that it is a mortal sin by reason of its genus; for, that a man, without necessity, and + through the mere lust of wine, make himself unable to use his reason, whereby he is directed to God and avoids committing + many sins, is expressly contrary to virtue. That it be a venial sin, is due some sort of ignorance or weakness, as when a + man is ignorant of the strength of the wine, or of his own unfitness, so that he has no thought of getting drunk, + for in that case the drunkenness is not imputed to him as a sin, but only the excessive drink. If, however, he gets drunk + frequently, this ignorance no longer avails as an excuse, for his will seems to choose to give way to drunkenness rather than + to refrain from excess of wine: wherefore the sin returns to its specific nature. +
[37363] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod diuturnitas non est circumstantia trahens in +aliam speciem, similiter nec frequentia vel assiduitas, nisi forte +per accidens ex aliquo supervenienti. Non enim aliquid acquirit +novam speciem ex hoc quod multiplicatur vel protelatur, nisi forte +in actu protelato vel multiplicato superveniat aliquid quod variet +speciem, puta inobedientia vel contemptus, vel aliquid huiusmodi. +Dicendum est ergo quod, cum ira sit motus animi ad nocendum +proximo, si sit tale nocumentum in quod tendit motus irae, quod ex +genere suo sit peccatum mortale, sicut homicidium vel furtum, talis +ira ex genere suo est peccatum mortale. Sed quod sit peccatum +veniale, habet ex imperfectione actus, inquantum est motus subitus +sensualitatis. Si vero sit diuturna, redit ad naturam sui generis +per consensum rationis. Si vero nocumentum in quod tendit motus +irae, esset veniale ex genere suo, puta cum aliquis in hoc +irascitur contra aliquem, quod vult ei dicere aliquod verbum leve +et iocosum, quod modicum ipsum contristet; non erit ira peccatum +mortale, quantumcumque sit diuturna; nisi forte per accidens, puta +si ex hoc grave scandalum oriatur, vel propter aliquid huiusmodi. +De ebrietate vero dicendum est quod secundum suam rationem habet +quod sit peccatum mortale, quod enim homo absque necessitate reddat +se impotentem ad utendum ratione, per quam homo in Deum ordinatur +et multa peccata occurrentia vitat, ex sola voluptate vini, +expresse contrariatur virtuti. Sed quod sit peccatum veniale, +contingit propter ignorantiam quandam vel infirmitatem, puta cum +homo nescit virtutem vini, aut propriam debilitatem, unde non putat +se inebriari, tunc enim non imputatur ei ebrietas ad peccatum, sed +solum superabundantia potus. Sed quando frequenter inebriatur, non +potest per hanc ignorantiam excusari quin videatur voluntas eius +eligere magis pati ebrietatem, quam abstinere a vino superfluo. +Unde redit peccatum ad suam naturam.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Morose delectation is not a mortal sin except in those matters which are mortal sins generically. In such matters, if the + delectation be not morose, there is a venial sin through imperfection of the act, as we have said with regard to anger (ad + 1): because anger is said to be lasting, and delectation to be morose, on account of the approval of the deliberating reason. +
[37364] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod delectatio morosa non dicitur esse peccatum mortale, +nisi in his quae ex suo genere sunt peccata mortalia; in quibus si +delectatio non morosa sit, peccatum veniale est ex imperfectione +actus, sicut et de ira dictum est. Dicitur enim ira diuturna, et +delectatio morosa, propter approbationem rationis deliberantis.
+ Reply to Objection 3: A circumstance does not make a good act to be evil, unless it constitute the species of a sin, as we have stated above ( + Q[18], A[5] , ad 4). +
[37365] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod circumstantia non facit de bono actu malum, nisi +constituens speciem peccati, ut supra etiam habitum est.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that a mortal sin can become venial. Because venial sin is equally distant from mortal, as mortal sin is from + venial. But a venial sin can become mortal, as stated above + (A[5]). Therefore also a mortal sin can become venial. +
[37366] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum mortale possit fieri veniale. +Aequaliter enim distat peccatum veniale a mortali, et e contrario. +Sed peccatum veniale fit mortale, ut dictum est. Ergo etiam +peccatum mortale potest fieri veniale.
+ Objection 2: Further, venial and mortal sin are said to differ in this, that he who sins mortally loves a creature more than God, while + he who sins venially loves the creature less than God. Now it may happen that a person in committing a sin generically mortal, + loves a creature less than God; for instance, if anyone being ignorant that simple fornication is a mortal sin, and contrary + to the love of God, commits the sin of fornication, yet so as to be ready, for the love + of God, to refrain from that sin if he knew that by committing it he was acting counter to the love of God. Therefore his + will be a venial sin; and accordingly a mortal sin can become venial. +
[37367] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, +peccatum veniale et mortale ponuntur differre secundum hoc, quod +peccans mortaliter diligit creaturam plus quam Deum, peccans autem +venialiter diligit creaturam infra Deum. Contingit autem quod +aliquis committens id quod est ex genere suo peccatum mortale, +diligat creaturam infra Deum, puta si aliquis, nesciens +fornicationem simplicem esse peccatum mortale et contrariam divino +amori, fornicetur, ita tamen quod propter divinum amorem paratus +esset fornicationem praetermittere, si sciret fornicando se contra +divinum amorem agere. Ergo peccabit venialiter. Et sic peccatum +mortale potest fieri veniale.
+ Objection 3: Further, as stated above (A[5], OBJ[3]), good is more distant from evil, than venial from mortal sin. But an act which is + evil in itself, can become good; thus to kill a man may be an act of justice, as when a judge condemns a thief to death. Much + more therefore can a mortal sin become venial. +
[37368] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sicut dictum est, plus differt bonum a malo quam veniale a mortali. +Sed actus qui est de se malus, potest fieri bonus, sicut homicidium +potest fieri actus iustitiae, sicut patet in iudice qui occidit +latronem. Ergo multo magis peccatum mortale potest fieri +veniale.
+ On the contrary, An eternal thing can never become temporal. But mortal sin deserves eternal punishment, whereas venial sin deserves temporal + punishment. Therefore a mortal sin can never become venial. +
[37369] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra +est quod aeternum nunquam potest fieri temporale. Sed peccatum +mortale meretur poenam aeternam, peccatum autem veniale poenam +temporalem. Ergo peccatum mortale nunquam potest fieri veniale.
+ I answer that, Venial and mortal differ as perfect and imperfect in the genus of sin, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). Now the imperfect can + become perfect, by some sort of addition: and, consequently, a venial sin can become mortal, by the addition of some deformity + pertaining to the genus of mortal sin, as when a man utters an idle word for the purpose of fornication. On the other hand, + the perfect cannot become imperfect, by addition; and so a mortal sin cannot become + venial, by the addition of a deformity pertaining to the genus of venial sin, for the sin is not diminished if a man commit + fornication in order to utter an idle word; rather is it aggravated by the additional deformity. +
Nevertheless a sin which is generically mortal, can become venial by reason of the imperfection of the act, because then + it does not completely fulfil the conditions of a moral act, since it is not a deliberate, but a sudden act, as is evident + from what we have said above + (A[2]). This happens by a kind of subtraction, namely, of deliberate reason. And since a moral act takes its species from deliberate + reason, the result is that by such a subtraction the + species of the act is destroyed. +
[37370] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod veniale et mortale differunt sicut perfectum et +imperfectum in genere peccati, ut dictum est. Imperfectum autem per +aliquam additionem potest ad perfectionem venire. Unde et veniale, +per hoc quod additur ei deformitas pertinens ad genus peccati +mortalis, efficitur mortale, sicut cum quis dicit verbum otiosum ut +fornicetur. Sed id quod est perfectum, non potest fieri imperfectum +per additionem. Et ideo peccatum mortale non fit veniale per hoc +quod additur ei aliqua deformitas pertinens ad genus peccati +venialis, non enim diminuitur peccatum eius qui fornicatur ut dicat +verbum otiosum, sed magis aggravatur propter deformitatem +adiunctam. Potest tamen id quod est ex genere mortale, esse veniale +propter imperfectionem actus, quia non perfecte pertingit ad +rationem actus moralis, cum non sit deliberatus sed subitus, ut ex +dictis patet. Et hoc fit per subtractionem quandam, scilicet +deliberatae rationis. Et quia a ratione deliberata habet speciem +moralis actus, inde est quod per talem subtractionem solvitur +species.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Venial differs from mortal as imperfect from perfect, even as a boy differs from a man. But the boy becomes a man and not + vice versa. Hence the argument does not prove. +
[37371] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod veniale differt a mortali sicut imperfectum a +perfecto, ut puer a viro. Fit autem ex puero vir, sed non +convertitur. Unde ratio non cogit.
+ Reply to Objection 2: If the ignorance be such as to excuse sin altogether, as the ignorance of a madman or an imbecile, then he that commits fornication + in a state of such ignorance, commits no sin either mortal or venial. But if the ignorance be not invincible, then the ignorance + itself is a sin, and contains within itself the lack of the love of God, in so far as a man neglects to learn those things + whereby he can safeguard himself in the love of God. +
[37372] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, si sit talis ignorantia quae peccatum omnino +excuset, sicut est furiosi vel amentis, tunc ex tali ignorantia +fornicationem committens nec mortaliter nec venialiter peccat. Si +vero sit ignorantia non invincibilis, tunc ignorantia ipsa est +peccatum, et continet in se defectum divini amoris, inquantum +negligit homo addiscere ea per quae potest se in divino amore +conservare.
+ Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Contra Mendacium vii), "those things which are evil in themselves, cannot be well done for any good end." + Now murder is the slaying of the innocent, and this can nowise be well done. But, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. i, 4,5), + the judge who sentences a thief to death, or the soldier who slays the enemy of the common weal, are not murderers. +
[37373] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro contra mendacium, +ea quae sunt secundum se mala, nullo fine bene fieri +possunt. Homicidium autem est occisio innocentis, et hoc nullo +modo bene fieri potest. Sed iudex qui occidit latronem, vel miles +qui occidit hostem reipublicae, non appellantur homicidae, ut +Augustinus dicit, in libro de libero arbitrio.
We must now consider venial sin in itself, and under this head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether venial sin causes a stain in the soul?
(2) Of the different kinds of venial sin, as denoted by "wood," "hay," "stubble" ( + 1 Cor. 3:12); +
(3) Whether man could sin venially in the state of innocence?
(4) Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially?
(5) Whether the movements of unbelievers are venial sins?
(6) Whether venial sin can be in a man with original sin alone?
+[37374] +Iª-IIae q. 89 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +peccato veniali secundum se. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, +utrum peccatum veniale causet maculam in anima. Secundo, de +distinctione peccati venialis, prout figuratur per lignum, faenum +et stipulam, I Cor. III. Tertio, utrum homo in statu innocentiae +potuerit peccare venialiter. Quarto, utrum Angelus bonus vel malus +possit peccare venialiter. Quinto, utrum primi motus infidelium +sint peccata venialia. Sexto, utrum peccatum veniale possit esse in +aliquo simul cum solo peccato originali.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin causes a stain in the soul. For Augustine says (De Poenit.) [*Hom. 50, inter. L., 2], that + if venial sins be multiplied, they destroy the beauty of our souls so as to deprive us of the embraces of our heavenly spouse. + But the stain of sin is nothing else but the loss of the soul's beauty. Therefore venial sins cause a stain in the soul. +
[37375] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum veniale causet maculam in +anima. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Poenit., quod peccata +venialia, si multiplicentur, decorem nostrum ita exterminant, ut a +caelestis sponsi amplexibus nos separent. Sed nihil aliud est +macula quam detrimentum decoris. Ergo peccata venialia causant +maculam in anima.
+ Objection 2: Further, mortal sin causes a stain in the soul, on account of the inordinateness of the act and of the sinner's affections. + But, in venial sin, there is an inordinateness of the act and of the affections. Therefore venial sin causes a stain in the + soul. +
[37376] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +peccatum mortale causat maculam in anima propter inordinationem +actus et affectus ipsius peccantis. Sed in peccato veniali est +quaedam deordinatio actus et affectus. Ergo peccatum veniale causat +maculam in anima.
+ Objection 3: Further, the stain on the soul is caused by contact with a temporal thing, through love thereof as stated above ( + Q[86], A[1]). But, in venial sin, the soul is in contact with a temporal thing through inordinate love. therefore, venial sin brings + a stain on the soul. +
[37377] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +macula animae causatur ex contactu rei temporalis per amorem, ut +supra dictum est. Sed in peccato veniali anima inordinato amore +contingit rem temporalem. Ergo peccatum veniale inducit maculam in +anima.
+ On the contrary, it is written, ( + Eph. 5:27): "That He might present it to Himself a glorious church, not having spot or wrinkle," on which the gloss says: "i.e., some + grievous sin." Therefore it seems proper to mortal sin to cause a stain on the soul. +
[37378] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Ephes. V, ut exhiberet ipse sibi gloriosam +Ecclesiam non habentem maculam; Glossa, idest aliquod +peccatum criminale. Ergo proprium peccati mortalis esse videtur +quod maculam in anima causet.
I answer that as stated above (Q[86], A[1]), a stain denotes a loss of comeliness due to contact with something, as may be + seen in corporeal matters, from which the term has been transferred to the soul, by way of similitude. Now, just as in the + body there is a twofold comeliness, one resulting from the inward disposition of the members and colors, the other resulting + from outward refulgence supervening, so too, in the soul, there is a twofold comeliness, one habitual and, so to + speak, intrinsic, the other actual like an outward flash of light. Now venial sin is a hindrance to actual comeliness, but + not to habitual comeliness, because it neither destroys nor diminishes the habit of charity and of the other virtues, as we + shall show further on ( + SS, Q[24], A[10]; Q[133], A[1], ad 2), but only hinders their acts. On the other hand a stain denotes something permanent in the thing stained, + wherefore it seems in the nature of a loss of habitual + rather than of actual comeliness. Therefore, properly speaking, venial sin does not cause a stain in the soul. If, however, + we find it stated anywhere that it does induce a stain, this is in a restricted sense, in so far as it hinders the comeliness + that results from acts of virtue. +
[37379] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ex dictis patet, macula importat detrimentum +nitoris ex aliquo contactu, sicut in corporalibus patet, ex quibus +per similitudinem nomen maculae ad animam transfertur. Sicut autem +in corpore est duplex nitor, unus quidem ex intrinseca dispositione +membrorum et coloris, alius autem ex exteriori claritate +superveniente; ita etiam in anima est duplex nitor, unus quidem +habitualis, quasi intrinsecus, alius autem actualis, quasi exterior +fulgor. Peccatum autem veniale impedit quidem nitorem actualem, non +tamen habitualem, quia non excludit neque diminuit habitum +caritatis et aliarum virtutum, ut infra patebit, sed solum impedit +earum actum. Macula autem importat aliquid manens in re maculata, +unde magis videtur pertinere ad detrimentum habitualis nitoris quam +actualis. Unde, proprie loquendo, peccatum veniale non causat +maculam in anima. Et si alicubi dicatur maculam inducere, hoc est +secundum quid, inquantum impedit nitorem qui est ex actibus +virtutum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of the case in which many venial sins lead to mortal sin dispositively: because otherwise they would + not sever the soul from its heavenly spouse. +
[37380] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur in eo casu in quo multa +peccata venialia dispositive inducunt ad mortale. Aliter enim non +separarent ab amplexu caelestis sponsi.
+ Reply to Objection 2: In mortal sin the inordinateness of the act destroys the habit of virtue, but not in venial sin. +
[37381] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod inordinatio actus in peccato mortali corrumpit +habitum virtutis, non autem in peccato veniali.
+ Reply to Objection 3: In mortal sin the soul comes into contact with a temporal thing as its end, so that the shedding of the light of grace, which + accrues to those who, by charity, cleave to God as their last end, is entirely cut off. On the contrary, in venial sin, man + does not cleave to a creature as his last end: hence there is no comparison. +
[37382] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod in peccato mortali anima per amorem contingit rem +temporalem quasi finem, et per hoc totaliter impeditur influxus +splendoris gratiae, qui provenit in eos qui Deo adhaerent ut ultimo +fini per caritatem. Sed in peccato veniali non adhaeret homo +creaturae tanquam fini ultimo. Unde non est simile.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that venial sins are unsuitably designated as "wood," "hay," and "stubble." Because wood hay and stubble are + said ( + 1 Cor. 3:12) to be built on a spiritual foundation. Now venial sins are something outside a spiritual foundation, even as false opinions + are outside the pale of science. Therefore, venial sins are not suitably designated as wood, hay and stubble. +
[37383] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter peccata venialia per +lignum, faenum et stipulam designentur. Lignum enim, faenum et +stipula dicuntur superaedificari spirituali fundamento. Sed peccata +venialia sunt praeter spirituale aedificium, sicut etiam quaelibet +falsae opiniones sunt praeter scientiam. Ergo peccata venialia non +convenienter designantur per lignum, faenum et stipulam.
+ Objection 2: Further, he who builds wood, hay and stubble, "shall be saved yet so as by fire" ( + 1 Cor. 3:15). But sometimes the man who commits a venial sin, will not be saved, even by fire, e.g. when a man dies in mortal sin to + which venial sins are attached. Therefore, venial sins are unsuitably designated by wood, hay, and stubble. +
[37384] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +ille qui aedificat lignum, faenum et stipulam, sic salvus erit +quasi per ignem. Sed quandoque ille qui committit peccata venialia, +non erit salvus etiam per ignem, puta cum peccata venialia +inveniuntur in eo qui decedit cum peccato mortali. Ergo +inconvenienter per lignum, faenum et stipulam peccata venialia +designantur.
+ Objection 3: Further, according to the Apostle ( + 1 Cor. 3:12) those who build "gold, silver, precious stones," i.e. love of God and our neighbor, and good works, are others from those + who build wood, hay, and stubble. But those even who love God and their neighbor, and do good works, commit venial sins: for + it is written ( + 1 Jn. 1:8): "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Therefore venial sins are not suitably + designated by these three. +
[37385] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +secundum apostolum, alii sunt qui aedificant aurum, argentum, +lapides pretiosos, idest amorem Dei et proximi et bona opera; et +alii qui aedificant lignum, faenum et stipulam. Sed peccata +venialia committunt etiam illi qui diligunt Deum et proximum, et +bona opera faciunt, dicitur enim I Ioan. I, si dixerimus quia +peccatum non habemus, nosipsos seducimus. Ergo non convenienter +designantur peccata venialia per ista tria.
+ Objection 4: Further, there are many more than three differences and degrees of venial sins. Therefore they are unsuitably comprised under + these three. +
[37386] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, +multo plures differentiae et gradus sunt peccatorum venialium quam +tres. Ergo inconvenienter sub his tribus comprehenduntur.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle says ( + 1 Cor. 3:15) that the man who builds up wood, hay and stubble, "shall be saved yet so as by fire," so that he will suffer punishment, + but not everlasting. Now the debt of temporal punishment belongs properly to venial sin, as stated above ( + Q[87], A[5]). Therefore these three signify venial sins. +
[37387] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit de eo qui superaedificat lignum, faenum et +stipulam, quod salvus erit quasi per ignem, et sic patietur poenam, +sed non aeternam. Reatus autem poenae temporalis proprie pertinet +ad peccatum veniale, ut dictum est. Ergo per illa tria +significantur peccata venialia.
+ I answer that, Some have understood the "foundation" to be dead faith, upon which some build good works, signified by gold, silver, and + precious stones, while others build mortal sins, which according to them are designated by wood, hay and stubble. But Augustine + disapproves of this explanation (De Fide et Oper. xv), because, as the Apostle says ( + Gal. 5:21), he who does the works of the flesh, "shall not obtain the kingdom of God," which signifies to be saved; whereas the + Apostle says that he who builds wood, hay, and stubble "shall be saved yet so as by fire." Consequently wood, hay, stubble + cannot be understood to denote mortal sins. +
Others say that wood, hay, stubble designate good works, which are indeed built upon the spiritual edifice, but are mixed + with venial sins: as, when a man is charged with the care of a family, which is a good thing, excessive love of his wife or + of his children or of his possessions insinuates itself into his life, under God however, so that, to wit, for the sake of + these things he would be unwilling to do anything in opposition to God. But neither does this seem to be + reasonable. For it is evident that all good works are referred to the love of God, and one's neighbor, wherefore they are + designated by "gold," "silver," and "precious stones," and consequently not by "wood," "hay," and "stubble." +
We must therefore say that the very venial sins that insinuate themselves into those who have a care for earthly things, + are designated by wood, hay, and stubble. For just as these are stored in a house, without belonging to the substance of the + house, and can be burnt, while the house is saved, so also venial sins are multiplied in a man, while the spiritual edifice + remains, and for them, man suffers fire, either of temporal trials in this life, or of purgatory after this life, + and yet he is saved for ever. +
[37388] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod quidam intellexerunt fundamentum esse fidem informem, +super quam aliqui aedificant bona opera, quae significantur per +aurum, argentum et lapides pretiosos; quidam vero peccata etiam +mortalia, quae significantur, secundum eos, per lignum, faenum et +stipulam. Sed hanc expositionem improbat Augustinus, in libro de +fide et operibus, quia, ut apostolus dicit, ad Gal. V, qui opera +carnis facit, regnum Dei non consequetur, quod est salvum fieri; +apostolus autem dicit quod ille qui aedificat lignum, faenum et +stipulam, salvus erit quasi per ignem. Unde non potest intelligi +quod per lignum, faenum et stipulam peccata mortalia designentur. +Quidam vero dicunt quod per lignum, faenum et stipulam +significantur opera bona, quae superaedificantur quidem spirituali +aedificio, sed tamen commiscent se eis peccata venialia sicut, cum +aliquis habet curam rei familiaris, quod bonum est, commiscet se +superfluus amor vel uxoris vel filiorum vel possessionum, sub Deo +tamen, ita scilicet quod pro his homo nihil vellet facere contra +Deum. Sed hoc iterum non videtur convenienter dici. Manifestum est +enim quod omnia opera bona referuntur ad caritatem Dei et proximi, +unde pertinent ad aurum, argentum et lapides pretiosos. Non ergo ad +lignum, faenum et stipulam. Et ideo dicendum est quod ipsa peccata +venialia quae admiscent se procurantibus terrena, significantur per +lignum, faenum et stipulam. Sicut enim huiusmodi congregantur in +domo, et non pertinent ad substantiam aedificii, et possunt comburi +aedificio remanente; ita etiam peccata venialia multiplicantur in +homine, manente spirituali aedificio; et pro istis patitur ignem +vel temporalis tribulationis in hac vita, vel Purgatorii post hanc +vitam; et tamen salutem consequitur aeternam.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Venial sins are not said to be built upon the spiritual foundation, as though they were laid directly upon it, but because + they are laid beside it; in the same sense as it is written ( + Ps. 136:1): "Upon the waters of Babylon," i.e. "beside the waters": because venial sins do not destroy the edifice. +
[37389] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod peccata venialia non dicuntur superaedificari +spirituali fundamento quasi directe supra ipsum posita, sed quia +ponuntur iuxta ipsum; sicut accipitur ibi, super flumina Babylonis, +idest iuxta. Quia peccata venialia non destruunt spirituale +aedificium, ut dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 2: It is not said that everyone who builds wood, hay and stubble, shall be saved as by fire, but only those who build "upon" + the "foundation." And this foundation is not dead faith, as some have esteemed, but faith quickened by charity, according + to + Eph. 3:17: "Rooted and founded in charity." Accordingly, he that dies in mortal sin with venial sins, has indeed wood, hay, and stubble, + but not built upon the spiritual edifice; and + consequently he will not be saved so as by fire. +
[37390] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod non dicitur de quocumque aedificante lignum, faenum +et stipulam, quod salvus sit quasi per ignem, sed solum de eo qui +aedificat supra fundamentum. Quod quidem non est fides informis, ut +quidam aestimabant, sed fides formata caritate, secundum illud +Ephes. III, in caritate radicati et fundati. Ille ergo qui +decedit cum peccato mortali et venialibus, habet quidem lignum, +faenum et stipulam, sed non superaedificata supra fundamentum +spirituale. Et ideo non erit salvus sic quasi per ignem.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Although those who are withdrawn from the care of temporal things, sin venially sometimes, yet they commit but slight venial + sins, and in most cases they are cleansed by the fervor of charity: wherefore they do not build up venial sins, because these + do not remain long in them. But the venial sins of those who are busy about earthly remain longer, because they are unable + to have such frequent recourse to the fervor of charity in order to remove + them. +
[37391] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod illi qui sunt abstracti a cura temporalium rerum, +etsi aliquando venialiter peccent, tamen levia peccata venialia +committunt, et frequentissime per fervorem caritatis purgantur. +Unde tales non superaedificant venialia, quia in eis modicum +manent. Sed peccata venialia ipsorum qui circa terrena occupantur, +diutius manent, quia non ita frequenter recurrere possunt ad +huiusmodi peccata delenda per caritatis fervorem.
+ Reply to Objection 4: As the Philosopher says (De Coelo i, text. 2), "all things are comprised under three, the beginning, the middle, the end." + Accordingly all degrees of venial sins are reduced to three, viz. to "wood," which remains longer in the fire; "stubble," + which is burnt up at once; and "hay," which is between these two: because venial sins are removed by fire, quickly or slowly, + according as man is more or less attached to them. +
[37392] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in I de caelo, omnia tribus +includuntur, scilicet principio, medio et fine. Et secundum hoc, +omnes gradus venialium peccatorum ad tria reducuntur, scilicet ad +lignum, quod diutius manet in igne; ad stipulam, quae citissime +expeditur; ad faenum, quod medio modo se habet. Secundum enim quod +peccata venialia sunt maioris vel minoris adhaerentiae vel +gravitatis, citius vel tardius per ignem purgantur.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that man could commit a venial sin in the state of innocence. Because on + 1 Tim. 2:14, "Adam was not seduced," a gloss says: "Having had no experience of God's severity, it was possible for him to be so mistaken + as to think that what he had done was a venial sin." But he would not have thought this unless he could have committed a venial + sin. Therefore he could commit a venial sin without sinning mortally. +
[37393] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo in statu innocentiae potuerit +peccare venialiter. Quia super illud I ad Tim. II, Adam non est +seductus, dicit Glossa, inexpertus divinae severitatis, in +eo falli potuit, ut crederet veniale esse commissum. Sed hoc +non credidisset, nisi venialiter peccare potuisset. Ergo venialiter +peccare potuit, non peccando mortaliter.
+ Objection 2: Further Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 5): "We must not suppose that the tempter would have overcome man, unless first + of all there had arisen in man's soul a movement of vainglory which should have been checked." Now the vainglory which preceded + man's defeat, which was accomplished through his falling into mortal sin, could be nothing more than a venial sin. In like + manner, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 5) that "man was allured by a certain desire of + making the experiment, when he saw that the woman did not die when she had taken the forbidden fruit." Again there seems to + have been a certain movement of unbelief in Eve, since she doubted what the Lord had said, as appears from her saying ( + Gn. 3:3): "Lest perhaps we die." Now these apparently were venial sins. Therefore man could commit a venial sin before he committed + a mortal sin. +
[37394] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, XI super Gen. ad Litt., non est arbitrandum +quod esset hominem deiecturus tentator, nisi praecessisset in anima +hominis quaedam elatio comprimenda. Elatio autem deiectionem +praecedens, quae facta est per peccatum mortale, non potuit esse +nisi peccatum veniale. Similiter etiam in eodem Augustinus dicit +quod virum sollicitavit aliqua experiendi cupiditas, cum +mulierem videret, sumpto vetito pomo, non esse mortuam. Videtur +etiam in Eva fuisse aliquis infidelitatis motus, in hoc quod de +verbis domini dubitavit, ut patet per hoc quod dixit, ne forte +moriamur, ut habetur Gen. III. Haec autem videntur esse venialia +peccata. Ergo homo potuit venialiter peccare, antequam mortaliter +peccaret.
+ Objection 3: Further, mortal sin is more opposed to the integrity of the original state, than venial sin is. Now man could sin mortally + notwithstanding the integrity of the original state. Therefore he could also sin venially. +
[37395] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +peccatum mortale magis opponitur integritati primi status quam +peccatum veniale. Sed homo potuit peccare mortaliter, non obstante +integritate primi status. Ergo etiam potuit peccare venialiter.
+ On the contrary, Every sin deserves some punishment. But nothing penal was possible in the state of innocence, as Augustine declares (De Civ. + Dei xiv, 10). Therefore he could commit a sin that would not deprive him of that state of integrity. But venial sin does not + change man's state. Therefore he could not sin venially. +
[37396] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod cuilibet peccato debetur aliqua poena. Sed nihil poenale +esse potuit in statu innocentiae, ut Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. +Dei. Ergo non potuit peccare aliquo peccato quo non eiiceretur ab +illo integritatis statu. Sed peccatum veniale non mutat statum +hominis. Ergo non potuit peccare venialiter.
+ I answer that, It is generally admitted that man could not commit a venial sin in the state of innocence. This, however, is not to be understood + as though on account of the perfection of his state, the sin which is venial for us would have been mortal for him, if he + had committed it. Because the dignity of a person is circumstance that aggravates a sin, but it does not transfer it to another + species, unless there be an additional deformity by reason of disobedience, or vow + or the like, which does not apply to the question in point. Consequently what is venial in itself could not be changed into + mortal by reason of the excellence of the original state. We must therefore understand this to mean that he could not sin + venially, because it was impossible for him to commit a sin which was venial in itself, before losing the integrity of the + original state by sinning mortally. +
The reason for this is because venial sin occurs in us, either through the imperfection of the act, as in the case of sudden + movements, in a genus of mortal sin or through some inordinateness in respect of things referred to the end, the due order + of the end being safeguarded. Now each of these happens on account of some defect of order, by reason of the lower powers + not being checked by the higher. Because the sudden rising of a movement of the sensuality in us is due to the + sensuality not being perfectly subject to reason: and the sudden rising of a movement of reason itself is due, in us, to the + fact that the execution of the act of reason is not subject to the act of deliberation which proceeds from a higher good, + as stated above (Q[74], A[10]); and that the human mind be out of order as regards things directed to the end, the due order + of the end being safeguarded, is due to the fact that the things referred to the end are not infallibly directed under the + end, + which holds the highest place, being the beginning, as it were, in matters concerning the appetite, as stated above (Q[10], + AA[1],2, ad 3; Q[72], A[5]). Now, in the state of innocence, as stated in the + FP, Q[95], A[1], there was an unerring stability of order, so that the lower powers were always subjected to the higher, so long as man remained + subject to God, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13). Hence there can be no inordinateness in man, unless first of all + the + highest part of man were not subject to God, which constitutes a mortal sin. From this it is evident that, in the state of + innocence, man could not commit a venial sin, before committing a mortal sin. +
[37397] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod communiter ponitur quod homo in statu innocentiae non +potuit venialiter peccare. Hoc autem non est sic intelligendum, +quasi id quod nobis est veniale, si ipse committeret, esset sibi +mortale, propter altitudinem sui status. Dignitas enim personae est +quaedam circumstantia aggravans peccatum, non tamen transfert in +aliam speciem, nisi forte superveniente deformitate inobedientiae +vel voti, vel alicuius huiusmodi, quod in proposito dici non +potest. Unde id quod est de se veniale, non potuit transferri in +mortale, propter dignitatem primi status. Sic ergo intelligendum +est quod non potuit peccare venialiter, quia non potuit esse ut +committeret aliquid quod esset de se veniale, antequam integritatem +primi status amitteret peccando mortaliter. Cuius ratio est quia +peccatum veniale in nobis contingit vel propter imperfectionem +actus, sicut subiti motus in genere peccatorum mortalium, vel +propter inordinationem existentem circa ea quae sunt ad finem, +servato debito ordine ad finem. Utrumque autem horum contingit +propter quendam defectum ordinis, ex eo quod inferius non +continetur firmiter sub superiori. Quod enim in nobis insurgat +subitus motus sensualitatis, contingit ex hoc quod sensualitas non +est omnino subdita rationi. Quod vero insurgat subitus motus in +ratione ipsa, provenit in nobis ex hoc quod ipsa executio actus +rationis non subditur deliberationi quae est ex altiori bono, ut +supra dictum est. Quod vero humanus animus inordinetur circa ea +quae sunt ad finem, servato debito ordine ad finem, provenit ex hoc +quod ea quae sunt ad finem non ordinantur infallibiliter sub fine, +qui tenet summum locum, quasi principium in appetibilibus, ut supra +dictum est. In statu autem innocentiae, ut in primo habitum est, +erat infallibilis ordinis firmitas, ut semper inferius contineretur +sub superiori, quandiu summum hominis contineretur sub Deo, ut +etiam Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei. Et ideo oportebat quod +inordinatio in homine non esset, nisi inciperet ab hoc quod summum +hominis non subderetur Deo; quod fit per peccatum mortale. Ex quo +patet quod homo in statu innocentiae non potuit peccare venialiter, +antequam peccaret mortaliter.
+ Reply to Objection 1: In the passage quoted, venial is not taken in the same sense as we take it now; but by venial sin we mean that which is easily + forgiven. +
[37398] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod veniale non sumitur ibi secundum quod nunc de +veniali loquimur, sed dicitur veniale quod est facile +remissibile.
+ Reply to Objection 2: This vainglory which preceded man's downfall, was his first mortal sin, for it is stated to have preceded his downfall into + the outward act of sin. This vainglory was followed, in the man, by the desire to make and experiment, and in the woman, by + doubt, for she gave way to vainglory, merely through hearing the serpent mention the precept, as though she refused to be + held in check by the precept. +
[37399] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod illa elatio quae praecessit in animo hominis, fuit +primum hominis peccatum mortale, dicitur autem praecessisse +deiectionem eius in exteriorem actum peccati. Huiusmodi autem +elationem subsecuta est et experiendi cupiditas in viro, et +dubitatio in muliere; quae ex hoc solo in quandam elationem +prorupit, quod praecepti mentionem a serpente audivit, quasi nollet +sub praecepto contineri.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Mortal sin is opposed to the integrity of the original state in the fact of its destroying that state: this a venial sin + cannot do. And because the integrity of the primitive state is incompatible with any inordinateness whatever, the result is + that the first man could not sin venially, before committing a mortal sin. +
[37400] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod peccatum mortale intantum opponitur integritati primi +status, quod corrumpit ipsum, quod peccatum veniale facere non +potest. Et quia non potest simul esse quaecumque inordinatio cum +integritate primi status, consequens est quod primus homo non +potuerit peccare venialiter, antequam peccaret mortaliter.
+ Objection 1: It seems that a good or wicked angel can sin venially. Because man agrees with the angels in the higher part of his soul + which is called the mind, according to Gregory, who says (Hom. xxix in Evang.) that "man understands in common with the angels." + But man can commit a venial sin in the higher part of his soul. Therefore an angel can commit a venial sin also. +
[37401] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus bonus vel malus possit peccare +venialiter. Homo enim cum Angelis convenit in superiori animae +parte, quae mens vocatur; secundum illud Gregorii, in Homil., +homo intelligit cum Angelis. Sed homo secundum superiorem +partem animae potest peccare venialiter. Ergo et Angelus.
+ Objection 2: Further, He that can do more can do less. But an angel could love a created good more than God, and he did, by sinning mortally. + Therefore he could also love a creature less than God inordinately, by sinning venially. +
[37402] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +quicumque potest quod est plus, potest etiam quod est minus. Sed +Angelus potuit diligere bonum creatum plus quam Deum, quod fecit +peccando mortaliter. Ergo etiam potuit bonum creatum diligere infra +Deum inordinate, venialiter peccando.
+ Objection 3: Further, wicked angels seem to do things which are venial sins generically, by provoking men to laughter, and other like + frivolities. Now the circumstance of the person does not make a mortal sin to be venial as stated above + (A[3]), unless there is a special prohibition, which is not the case in point. Therefore an angel can sin venially. +
[37403] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +Angeli mali videntur aliqua facere quae sunt ex genere suo venialia +peccata, provocando homines ad risum, et ad alias huiusmodi +levitates. Sed circumstantia personae non facit de veniali mortale, +ut dictum est, nisi speciali prohibitione superveniente, quod non +est in proposito. Ergo Angelus potest peccare venialiter.
+ On the contrary, The perfection of an angel is greater than that of man in the primitive state. But man could not sin venially in the primitive + state, and much less, therefore, can an angel. +
[37404] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod maior est perfectio Angeli quam perfectio hominis in primo +statu. Sed homo in primo statu non potuit peccare venialiter. Ergo +multo minus Angelus.
+ I answer that, An angel's intellect, as stated above in the + FP, Q[58], A[3]; + FP, Q[79], A[8], is not discursive, i.e. it does not proceed from principles to conclusions, so as to understand both separately, as we do. + Consequently, whenever the angelic intellect considers a conclusion, it must, of necessity, consider it in its principles. + Now in matters of appetite, as we have often stated (Q[8], A[2]; Q[10], A[1]; Q[72], + A[5]), ends are like principles, while the means are like conclusions. Wherefore, an angel's mind is not directed to the means, + except as they stand under the order to the end. Consequently, from their very nature, they can have no inordinateness in + respect of the means, unless at the same time they have an inordinateness in respect of the end, and this is a mortal sin. + Now good angels are not moved to the means, except in subordination to the due end which is God: wherefore all their acts + are + acts of charity, so that no venial sin can be in them. On the other hand, wicked angels are moved to nothing except in subordination + to the end which is their sin of pride. Therefore they sin mortally in everything that they do of their own will. This does + not apply to the appetite for the natural good, which appetite we have stated to be in them ( + FP, Q[63], A[4]; Q[64], A[2], ad 5). +
[37405] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod intellectus Angeli, sicut in primo dictum est, non +est discursivus, ut scilicet procedat a principiis in conclusiones, +seorsum utrumque intelligens, sicut in nobis contingit. Unde +oportet quod quandocumque considerat conclusiones, consideret eas +prout sunt in principiis. In appetibilibus autem, sicut multoties +dictum est, fines sunt sicut principia; ea vero quae sunt ad finem, +sunt sicut conclusiones. Unde mens Angeli non fertur in ea quae +sunt ad finem, nisi secundum quod constant sub ordine finis. +Propter hoc ex natura sua habent quod non possit in eis esse +deordinatio circa ea quae sunt ad finem, nisi simul sit deordinatio +circa finem ipsum, quod est per peccatum mortale. Sed Angeli boni +non moventur in ea quae sunt ad finem, nisi in ordine ad finem +debitum, qui est Deus. Et propter hoc omnes eorum actus sunt actus +caritatis. Et sic in eis non potest esse peccatum veniale. Angeli +vero mali in nihil moventur nisi in ordine ad finem peccati +superbiae ipsorum. Et ideo in omnibus peccant mortaliter, +quaecumque propria voluntate agunt. Secus autem est de appetitu +naturalis boni qui est in eis, ut in primo dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Man does indeed agree with the angels in the mind or intellect, but he differs in his mode of understanding, as stated above. +
[37406] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod homo convenit quidem cum Angelis in mente, sive +in intellectu; sed differt in modo intelligendi, ut dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 2: An angel could not love a creature less than God, without, at the same time, either referring it to God, as the last end, + or to some inordinate end, for the reason given above. +
[37407] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod Angelus non potuit minus diligere creaturam quam +Deum, nisi simul referens eam in Deum, sicut in ultimum finem, vel +aliquem finem inordinatum, ratione iam dicta.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The demons incite man to all such things which seem venial, that he may become used to them, so as to lead him on to mortal + sin. Consequently in all such things they sin mortally, on account of the end they have in view. +
[37408] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod omnia illa quae videntur esse venialia, Daemones +procurant ut homines ad sui familiaritatem attrahant, et sic +deducant eos in peccatum mortale. Unde in omnibus talibus +mortaliter peccant, propter intentionem finis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the first movements of the sensuality in unbelievers are mortal sins. For the Apostle says ( + Rom. 8:1) that "there is . . . no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus, who walk not according to the flesh": and he is speaking + there of the concupiscence of the sensuality, as appears from the context ( + Rom. 7). Therefore the reason why concupiscence is not a matter of condemnation to those who walk not according to the + flesh, i.e. by consenting to concupiscence, is because they are in Christ Jesus. But unbelievers are not in Christ Jesus. + Therefore in unbelievers this is a matter of condemnation. Therefore the first movements of unbelievers are mortal sins. +
[37409] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod primi motus sensualitatis in +infidelibus sint peccata mortalia. Dicit enim apostolus, ad Rom. +VIII, quod nihil est damnationis his qui sunt in Christo Iesu, +qui non secundum carnem ambulant, et loquitur ibi de +concupiscentia sensualitatis, ut ex praemissis apparet. Haec ergo +causa est quare concupiscere non sit damnabile his qui non secundum +carnem ambulant, consentiendo scilicet concupiscentiae, quia sunt +in Christo Iesu. Sed infideles non sunt in Christo Iesu. Ergo in +infidelibus est damnabile. Primi igitur motus infidelium sunt +peccata mortalia.
+ Objection 2: Further Anselm says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. vii): "Those who are not in Christ, when they feel the sting of the flesh, follow + the road of damnation, even if they walk not according to the flesh." But damnation is not due save to mortal sin. Therefore, + since man feels the sting of the flesh in the first movements of the concupiscence, it seems that the first movements of concupiscence + in unbelievers are mortal sins. +
[37410] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Anselmus dicit, in libro de gratia et Lib. Arb., qui non sunt in +Christo, sentientes carnem, sequuntur damnationem, etiam si non +secundum carnem ambulant. Sed damnatio non debetur nisi peccato +mortali. Ergo, cum homo sentiat carnem secundum primum motum +concupiscentiae, videtur quod primus motus concupiscentiae in +infidelibus sit peccatum mortale.
+ Objection 3: Further, Anselm says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. vii): "Man was so made that he was not liable to feel concupiscence." Now this + liability seems to be remitted to man by the grace of Baptism, which the unbeliever has not. Therefore every act of concupiscence + in an unbeliever, even without his consent, is a mortal sin, because he acts against his duty. +
[37411] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +Anselmus dicit, in eodem libro, sic factus est homo, ut +concupiscentiam sentire non deberet. Hoc autem debitum videtur +homini remissum per gratiam baptismalem, quam infideles non habent. +Ergo quandocumque infidelis concupiscit, etiam si non consentiat, +peccat mortaliter, contra debitum faciens.
+ On the contrary, It is stated in + Acts 10:34 that "God is not a respecter of persons." Therefore he does not impute to one unto condemnation, what He does not impute to + another. But he does not impute first movements to believers, unto condemnation. Neither therefore does He impute them to + unbelievers. +
[37412] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Act. X, non est personarum acceptor Deus. +Quod ergo uni non imputat ad damnationem, nec alteri. Sed primos +motus fidelibus non imputat ad damnationem. Ergo etiam nec +infidelibus.
+ I answer that, It is unreasonable to say that the first movements of unbelievers are mortal sins, when they do not consent to them. This + is evident for two reasons. First, because the sensuality itself could not be the subject of mortal sin, as stated above ( + Q[79], A[4]). Now the sensuality has the same nature in unbelievers as in believers. Therefore it is not possible for the mere movements + of the sensuality in unbelievers, to be mortal sins. + Secondly, from the state of the sinner. Because excellence of the person of the person never diminishes sin, but, on the contrary, + increases it, as stated above ( + Q[73], A[10]). Therefore a sin is not less grievous in a believer than in an unbeliever, but much more so. For the sins of an unbeliever + are more deserving of forgiveness, on account of their ignorance, according to + 1 Tim. 1:13: "I obtained the mercy of God, because I did it ignorantly in + my unbelief": whereas the sins of believers are more grievous on account of the sacraments of grace, according to + Heb. 10:29: "How much more, do you think, he deserveth worse punishments . . . who hath esteemed the blood of the testament unclean, + by which he was sanctified?" +
[37413] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod irrationabiliter dicitur quod primi motus infidelium +sint peccata mortalia, si eis non consentiatur. Et hoc patet +dupliciter. Primo quidem, quia ipsa sensualitas non potest esse +subiectum peccati mortalis, ut supra habitum est. Est autem eadem +natura sensualitatis in infidelibus et fidelibus. Unde non potest +esse quod solus motus sensualitatis in infidelibus sit peccatum +mortale. Alio modo, ex statu ipsius peccantis. Nunquam enim +dignitas personae diminuit peccatum, sed magis auget, ut ex supra +dictis patet. Unde nec peccatum est minus in fideli quam in +infideli, sed multo maius. Nam et infidelium peccata magis merentur +veniam, propter ignorantiam, secundum illud I ad Tim. I, +misericordiam Dei consecutus sum, quia ignorans feci in +incredulitate mea; et peccata fidelium aggravantur propter +gratiae sacramenta, secundum illud Heb. X, quanto magis putatis +deteriora mereri supplicia, qui sanguinem testamenti, in quo +sanctificatus est, pollutum duxerit?
+ Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle is speaking of the condemnation due to original sin, which condemnation is remitted by the grace of Jesus Christ, + although the "fomes" of concupiscence remain. Wherefore the fact that believers are subject to concupiscence is not in them + a sign of the condemnation due to original sin, as it is in unbelievers. +
[37414] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod apostolus loquitur de damnatione debita peccato +originali, quae aufertur per gratiam Iesu Christi, quamvis maneat +concupiscentiae fomes. Unde hoc quod fideles concupiscunt, non est +in eis signum damnationis originalis peccati, sicut est in +infidelibus.
In this way also is to be understood the saying of Anselm, wherefore the Reply to the Second Objection is evident.
[37415] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 ad 2 Et hoc etiam +modo intelligendum est dictum Anselmi. Unde patet solutio ad +secundum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: This freedom from liability to concupiscence was a result of original justice. Wherefore that which is opposed to such liability + pertains, not to actual but to original sin. +
[37416] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod illud debitum non concupiscendi erat per originalem +iustitiam. Unde id quod opponitur tali debito, non pertinet ad +peccatum actuale, sed ad peccatum originale.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin can be in a man with original sin alone. For disposition precedes habit. Now venial sin is + a disposition to mortal sin, as stated above ( + Q[88], A[3]). Therefore in an unbeliever, in whom original sin is not remitted, venial sin exists before mortal sin: and so sometimes + unbelievers have venial together with original sin, and without mortal sins. +
[37417] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum veniale possit esse in aliquo +cum solo originali. Dispositio enim praecedit habitum. Sed veniale +est dispositio ad mortale, ut supra dictum est. Ergo veniale in +infideli, cui non remittitur originale, invenitur ante mortale. Et +sic quandoque infideles habent peccata venialia cum originali, sine +mortalibus.
+ Objection 2: Further, venial sin has less in common, and less connection with mortal sin, than one mortal sin has with another. But an + unbeliever in the state of original sin, can commit one mortal sin without committing another. Therefore he can also commit + a venial sin without committing a mortal sin. +
[37418] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, +minus habet de connexione et convenientia veniale cum mortali, quam +mortale peccatum cum mortali. Sed infidelis subiectus originali +peccato, potest committere unum peccatum mortale et non aliud. Ergo +etiam potest committere peccatum veniale, et non mortale.
+ Objection 3: Further, it is possible to fix the time at which a child is first able to commit an actual sin: and when the child comes + to that time, it can stay a short time at least, without committing a mortal sin, because this happens in the worst criminals. + Now it is possible for the child to sin venially during that space of time, however short it may be. Therefore venial sin + can be in anyone with original sin alone and without mortal sin. +
[37419] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, +determinari potest tempus in quo puer primo potest esse actor +peccati actualis. Ad quod tempus cum pervenerit, potest ad minus +per aliquod breve spatium stare, quin peccet mortaliter, quia hoc +etiam in maximis sceleratis contingit. In illo autem spatio, +quantumcumque brevi, potest peccare venialiter. Ergo peccatum +veniale potest esse in aliquo cum originali peccato, absque +mortali.
+ On the contrary, Man is punished for original sin in the children's limbo, where there is no pain of sense as we shall state further on ( + SS, Q[69], A[6]): whereas men are punished in hell for no other than mortal sin. Therefore there will be no place where a man can be punished + for venial sin with no other than original sin. +
[37420] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra +est quia pro peccato originali puniuntur homines in Limbo puerorum, +ubi non est poena sensus, ut infra dicetur. In Inferno autem +detruduntur homines propter solum peccatum mortale. Ergo non erit +locus in quo possit puniri ille qui habet peccatum veniale cum +originali solo.
+ I answer that, It is impossible for venial sin to be in anyone with original sin alone, and without mortal sin. The reason for this is because + before a man comes to the age of discretion, the lack of years hinders the use of reason and excuses him from mortal sin, + wherefore, much more does it excuse him from venial sin, if he does anything which is such generically. But when he begins + to have the use of reason, he is not entirely excused from the guilt of venial or mortal + sin. Now the first thing that occurs to a man to think about then, is to deliberate about himself. And if he then direct himself + to the due end, he will, by means of grace, receive the remission of original sin: whereas if he does not then direct himself + to the due end, and as far as he is capable of discretion at that particular age, he will sin mortally, for through not doing + that which is in his power to do. Accordingly thenceforward there cannot be venial sin in him without mortal, until + afterwards all sin shall have been remitted to him through grace. +
[37421] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod impossibile est quod peccatum veniale sit in aliquo +cum originali peccato, absque mortali. Cuius ratio est quia +antequam ad annos discretionis perveniat, defectus aetatis, +prohibens usum rationis, excusat eum a peccato mortali, unde multo +magis excusat eum a peccato veniali, si committat aliquid quod sit +ex genere suo tale. Cum vero usum rationis habere inceperit, non +omnino excusatur a culpa venialis et mortalis peccati. Sed primum +quod tunc homini cogitandum occurrit, est deliberare de seipso. Et +si quidem seipsum ordinaverit ad debitum finem, per gratiam +consequetur remissionem originalis peccati. Si vero non ordinet +seipsum ad debitum finem, secundum quod in illa aetate est capax +discretionis, peccabit mortaliter, non faciens quod in se est. Et +ex tunc non erit in eo peccatum veniale sine mortali, nisi postquam +totum fuerit sibi per gratiam remissum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Venial sin always precedes mortal sin not as a necessary, but as a contingent disposition, just as work sometimes disposes + to fever, but not as heat disposes to the form of fire. +
[37422] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod veniale non est dispositio ex necessitate +praecedens mortale, sed contingenter, sicut labor disponit +quandoque ad febrem, non autem sicut calor disponit ad formam +ignis.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Venial sin is prevented from being with original sin alone, not on account of its want of connection or likeness, but on + account of the lack of use of reason, as stated above. +
[37423] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod non impeditur peccatum veniale esse simul cum solo +originali propter distantiam eius vel convenientiam; sed propter +defectum usus rationis, ut dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The child that is beginning to have the use of reason can refrain from other mortal sins for a time, but it is not free from + the aforesaid sin of omission, unless it turns to God as soon as possible. For the first thing that occurs to a man who has + discretion, is to think of himself, and to direct other things to himself as to their end, since the end is the first thing + in the intention. Therefore this is the time when man is bound by God's + affirmative precept, which the Lord expressed by saying ( + Zech. 1:3): "Turn ye to Me . . . and I will turn to you." +
[37424] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ab aliis peccatis mortalibus potest puer incipiens +habere usum rationis, per aliquod tempus abstinere, sed a peccato +omissionis praedictae non liberatur, nisi quam cito potest, se +convertat ad Deum. Primum enim quod occurrit homini discretionem +habenti est quod de seipso cogitet, ad quem alia ordinet sicut ad +finem, finis enim est prior in intentione. Et ideo hoc est tempus +pro quo obligatur ex Dei praecepto affirmativo, quo dominus dicit, +convertimini ad me, et ego convertar ad vos, Zachariae +I.
We have now to consider the extrinsic principles of acts. Now the extrinsic principle inclining to evil is the devil, of + whose temptations we have spoken in the + FP, Q[114]. But the extrinsic principle moving to good is God, Who both instructs us by means of His Law, and assists us by His Grace: + wherefore in the first place we must speak of law; in the second place, of grace. +
Concerning law, we must consider: (1) Law itself in general; (2) its parts. Concerning law in general three points offer + themselves for our consideration: (1) Its essence; (2) The different kinds of law; (3) The effects of law. +
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether law is something pertaining to reason?
+[37425] +Iª-IIae q. 90 pr. Consequenter considerandum est de +principiis exterioribus actuum. Principium autem exterius ad malum +inclinans est Diabolus, de cuius tentatione in primo dictum est. +Principium autem exterius movens ad bonum est Deus, qui et nos +instruit per legem, et iuvat per gratiam. Unde primo, de lege; +secundo, de gratia dicendum est. Circa legem autem, primo oportet +considerare de ipsa lege in communi; secundo, de partibus eius. +Circa legem autem in communi tria occurrunt consideranda, primo +quidem, de essentia ipsius; secundo, de differentia legum; tertio, +de effectibus legis. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum +lex sit aliquid rationis. Secundo, de fine legis. Tertio, de causa +eius. Quarto, de promulgatione ipsius.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that law is not something pertaining to reason. For the Apostle says ( + Rom. 7:23): "I see another law in my members," etc. But nothing pertaining to reason is in the members; since the reason does not make + use of a bodily organ. Therefore law is not something pertaining to reason. +
[37426] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex non sit aliquid rationis. Dicit +enim apostolus, ad Rom. VII, video aliam legem in membris +meis, et cetera. Sed nihil quod est rationis, est in membris, +quia ratio non utitur organo corporali. Ergo lex non est aliquid +rationis.
+ Objection 2: Further, in the reason there is nothing else but power, habit, and act. But law is not the power itself of reason. In like + manner, neither is it a habit of reason: because the habits of reason are the intellectual virtues of which we have spoken + above ( + Q[57]). Nor again is it an act of reason: because then law would cease, when the act of reason ceases, for instance, while we are + asleep. Therefore law is nothing pertaining to reason. +
[37427] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +in ratione non est nisi potentia, habitus et actus. Sed lex non est +ipsa potentia rationis. Similiter etiam non est aliquis habitus +rationis, quia habitus rationis sunt virtutes intellectuales, de +quibus supra dictum est. Nec etiam est actus rationis, quia +cessante rationis actu, lex cessaret, puta in dormientibus. Ergo +lex non est aliquid rationis.
+ Objection 3: Further, the law moves those who are subject to it to act aright. But it belongs properly to the will to move to act, as + is evident from what has been said above ( + Q[9], A[1]). Therefore law pertains, not to the reason, but to the will; according to the words of the Jurist (Lib. i, ff., De Const. + Prin. leg. i): "Whatsoever pleaseth the sovereign, has force of law." +
[37428] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +lex movet eos qui subiiciuntur legi, ad recte agendum. Sed movere +ad agendum proprie pertinet ad voluntatem, ut patet ex praemissis. +Ergo lex non pertinet ad rationem, sed magis ad voluntatem, +secundum quod etiam iurisperitus dicit, quod placuit principi, +legis habet vigorem.
+ On the contrary, It belongs to the law to command and to forbid. But it belongs to reason to command, as stated above ( + Q[17], A[1]). Therefore law is something pertaining to reason. +
[37429] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod ad legem pertinet praecipere et prohibere. Sed imperare +est rationis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo lex est aliquid +rationis.
+ I answer that, Law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is induced to act or is restrained from acting: for "lex" [law] is derived + from "ligare" [to bind], because it binds one to act. Now the rule and measure of human acts is the reason, which is the first + principle of human acts, as is evident from what has been stated above ( + Q[1], A[1], ad 3); since it belongs to the reason to direct to the end, which is the first principle in all matters + of action, according to the Philosopher (Phys. ii). Now that which is the principle in any genus, is the rule and measure + of that genus: for instance, unity in the genus of numbers, and the first movement in the genus of movements. Consequently + it follows that law is something pertaining to reason. +
[37430] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod lex quaedam regula est et mensura actuum, secundum +quam inducitur aliquis ad agendum, vel ab agendo retrahitur, +dicitur enim lex a ligando, quia obligat ad agendum. Regula autem +et mensura humanorum actuum est ratio, quae est primum principium +actuum humanorum, ut ex praedictis patet, rationis enim est +ordinare ad finem, qui est primum principium in agendis, secundum +philosophum. In unoquoque autem genere id quod est principium, est +mensura et regula illius generis, sicut unitas in genere numeri, et +motus primus in genere motuum. Unde relinquitur quod lex sit +aliquid pertinens ad rationem.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Since law is a kind of rule and measure, it may be in something in two ways. First, as in that which measures and rules: + and since this is proper to reason, it follows that, in this way, law is in the reason alone. Secondly, as in that which is + measured and ruled. In this way, law is in all those things that are inclined to something by reason of some law: so that + any inclination arising from a law, may be called a law, not essentially but by + participation as it were. And thus the inclination of the members to concupiscence is called "the law of the members." +
[37431] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, cum lex sit regula quaedam et mensura, dicitur +dupliciter esse in aliquo. Uno modo, sicut in mensurante et +regulante. Et quia hoc est proprium rationis, ideo per hunc modum +lex est in ratione sola. Alio modo, sicut in regulato et mensurato. +Et sic lex est in omnibus quae inclinantur in aliquid ex aliqua +lege, ita quod quaelibet inclinatio proveniens ex aliqua lege, +potest dici lex, non essentialiter, sed quasi participative. Et hoc +modo inclinatio ipsa membrorum ad concupiscendum lex membrorum +vocatur.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Just as, in external action, we may consider the work and the work done, for instance the work of building and the house + built; so in the acts of reason, we may consider the act itself of reason, i.e. to understand and to reason, and something + produced by this act. With regard to the speculative reason, this is first of all the definition; secondly, the proposition; + thirdly, the syllogism or argument. And since also the practical reason makes use of a + syllogism in respect of the work to be done, as stated above ( + Q[13], A[3]; + Q[76], A[1]) and since as the Philosopher teaches (Ethic. vii, 3); hence we find in the practical reason something that holds the same + position in regard to operations, as, in the speculative intellect, the proposition holds in regard to conclusions. Such like + universal propositions of the practical intellect that are directed to actions have the nature of law. And these + propositions are sometimes under our actual consideration, while sometimes they are retained in the reason by means of a habit. +
[37432] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut in actibus exterioribus est considerare +operationem et operatum, puta aedificationem et aedificatum; ita in +operibus rationis est considerare ipsum actum rationis, qui est +intelligere et ratiocinari, et aliquid per huiusmodi actum +constitutum. Quod quidem in speculativa ratione primo quidem est +definitio; secundo, enunciatio; tertio vero, syllogismus vel +argumentatio. Et quia ratio etiam practica utitur quodam syllogismo +in operabilibus, ut supra habitum est, secundum quod philosophus +docet in VII Ethic.; ideo est invenire aliquid in ratione practica +quod ita se habeat ad operationes, sicut se habet propositio in +ratione speculativa ad conclusiones. Et huiusmodi propositiones +universales rationis practicae ordinatae ad actiones, habent +rationem legis. Quae quidem propositiones aliquando actualiter +considerantur, aliquando vero habitualiter a ratione tenentur.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Reason has its power of moving from the will, as stated above ( + Q[17], A[1]): for it is due to the fact that one wills the end, that the reason issues its commands as regards things ordained to the + end. But in order that the volition of what is commanded may have the nature of law, it needs to be in accord with some rule + of reason. And in this sense is to be understood the saying that the will of the sovereign has the force of + law; otherwise the sovereign's will would savor of lawlessness rather than of law. +
[37433] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio habet vim movendi a voluntate, ut supra dictum +est, ex hoc enim quod aliquis vult finem, ratio imperat de his quae +sunt ad finem. Sed voluntas de his quae imperantur, ad hoc quod +legis rationem habeat, oportet quod sit aliqua ratione regulata. Et +hoc modo intelligitur quod voluntas principis habet vigorem legis, +alioquin voluntas principis magis esset iniquitas quam lex.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the law is not always directed to the common good as to its end. For it belongs to law to command and + to forbid. But commands are directed to certain individual goods. Therefore the end of the law is not always the common good. +
[37434] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex non ordinetur semper ad bonum +commune sicut ad finem. Ad legem enim pertinet praecipere et +prohibere. Sed praecepta ordinantur ad quaedam singularia bona. Non +ergo semper finis legis est bonum commune.
+ Objection 2: Further, the law directs man in his actions. But human actions are concerned with particular matters. Therefore the law is + directed to some particular good. +
[37435] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +lex dirigit hominem ad agendum. Sed actus humani sunt in +particularibus. Ergo et lex ad aliquod particulare bonum +ordinatur.
+ Objection 3: Further, Isidore says (Etym. v, 3): "If the law is based on reason, whatever is based on reason will be a law." But reason + is the foundation not only of what is ordained to the common good, but also of that which is directed private good. Therefore + the law is not only directed to the good of all, but also to the private good of an individual. +
[37436] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., si ratione lex constat, lex +erit omne quod ratione constiterit. Sed ratione consistit non +solum quod ordinatur ad bonum commune, sed etiam quod ordinatur ad +bonum privatum. Ergo lex non ordinatur solum ad bonum commune, sed +etiam ad bonum privatum unius.
+ On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 21) that "laws are enacted for no private profit, but for the common benefit of the citizens." +
[37437] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Isidorus dicit, in V Etymol., quod lex est nullo +privato commodo, sed pro communi utilitate civium +conscripta.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[1]), the law belongs to that which is a principle of human acts, because it is their rule and measure. Now as reason is a principle + of human acts, so in reason itself there is something which is the principle in respect of all the rest: wherefore to this + principle chiefly and mainly law must needs be referred. Now the first principle in practical matters, which are the object + of the practical reason, is the last + end: and the last end of human life is bliss or happiness, as stated above (Q[2], A[7]; Q[3], A[1]). Consequently the law + must needs regard principally the relationship to happiness. Moreover, since every part is ordained to the whole, as imperfect + to perfect; and since one man is a part of the perfect community, the law must needs regard properly the relationship to universal + happiness. Wherefore the Philosopher, in the above definition of legal matters mentions both happiness and the body + politic: for he says (Ethic. v, 1) that we call those legal matters "just, which are adapted to produce and preserve happiness + and its parts for the body politic": since the state is a perfect community, as he says in Polit. i, 1. +
Now in every genus, that which belongs to it chiefly is the principle of the others, and the others belong to that genus + in subordination to that thing: thus fire, which is chief among hot things, is the cause of heat in mixed bodies, and these + are said to be hot in so far as they have a share of fire. Consequently, since the law is chiefly ordained to the common good, + any other precept in regard to some individual work, must needs be devoid of the nature of a law, save in so + far as it regards the common good. Therefore every law is ordained to the common good. +
[37438] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, lex pertinet ad id quod est +principium humanorum actuum, ex eo quod est regula et mensura. +Sicut autem ratio est principium humanorum actuum, ita etiam in +ipsa ratione est aliquid quod est principium respectu omnium +aliorum. Unde ad hoc oportet quod principaliter et maxime pertineat +lex. Primum autem principium in operativis, quorum est ratio +practica, est finis ultimus. Est autem ultimus finis humanae vitae +felicitas vel beatitudo, ut supra habitum est. Unde oportet quod +lex maxime respiciat ordinem qui est in beatitudinem. Rursus, cum +omnis pars ordinetur ad totum sicut imperfectum ad perfectum; unus +autem homo est pars communitatis perfectae, necesse est quod lex +proprie respiciat ordinem ad felicitatem communem. Unde et +philosophus, in praemissa definitione legalium, mentionem facit et +de felicitate et communione politica. Dicit enim, in V Ethic., quod +legalia iusta dicimus factiva et conservativa felicitatis et +particularum ipsius, politica communicatione, perfecta enim +communitas civitas est, ut dicitur in I Polit. In quolibet autem +genere id quod maxime dicitur, est principium aliorum, et alia +dicuntur secundum ordinem ad ipsum, sicut ignis, qui est maxime +calidus, est causa caliditatis in corporibus mixtis, quae intantum +dicuntur calida, inquantum participant de igne. Unde oportet quod, +cum lex maxime dicatur secundum ordinem ad bonum commune, +quodcumque aliud praeceptum de particulari opere non habeat +rationem legis nisi secundum ordinem ad bonum commune. Et ideo +omnis lex ad bonum commune ordinatur.
+ Reply to Objection 1: A command denotes an application of a law to matters regulated by the law. Now the order to the common good, at which the + law aims, is applicable to particular ends. And in this way commands are given even concerning particular matters. +
[37439] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod praeceptum importat applicationem legis ad ea +quae ex lege regulantur. Ordo autem ad bonum commune, qui pertinet +ad legem, est applicabilis ad singulares fines. Et secundum hoc, +etiam de particularibus quibusdam praecepta dantur.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Actions are indeed concerned with particular matters: but those particular matters are referable to the common good, not + as to a common genus or species, but as to a common final cause, according as the common good is said to be the common end. +
[37440] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod operationes quidem sunt in particularibus, sed illa +particularia referri possunt ad bonum commune, non quidem +communitate generis vel speciei, sed communitate causae finalis, +secundum quod bonum commune dicitur finis communis.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Just as nothing stands firm with regard to the speculative reason except that which is traced back to the first indemonstrable + principles, so nothing stands firm with regard to the practical reason, unless it be directed to the last end which is the + common good: and whatever stands to reason in this sense, has the nature of a law. +
[37441] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut nihil constat firmiter secundum rationem +speculativam nisi per resolutionem ad prima principia +indemonstrabilia, ita firmiter nihil constat per rationem practicam +nisi per ordinationem ad ultimum finem, qui est bonum commune. Quod +autem hoc modo ratione constat, legis rationem habet.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the reason of any man is competent to make laws. For the Apostle says ( + Rom. 2:14) that "when the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law . . . they are a law to themselves." + Now he says this of all in general. Therefore anyone can make a law for himself. +
[37442] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod cuiuslibet ratio sit factiva legis. +Dicit enim apostolus, ad Rom. II, quod cum gentes, quae legem +non habent, naturaliter ea quae legis sunt faciunt, ipsi sibi sunt +lex. Hoc autem communiter de omnibus dicit. Ergo quilibet +potest facere sibi legem.
+ Objection 2: Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1), "the intention of the lawgiver is to lead men to virtue." But every man + can lead another to virtue. Therefore the reason of any man is competent to make laws. +
[37443] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +sicut philosophus dicit, in libro II Ethic., intentio +legislatoris est ut inducat hominem ad virtutem. Sed quilibet +homo potest alium inducere ad virtutem. Ergo cuiuslibet hominis +ratio est factiva legis.
+ Objection 3: Further, just as the sovereign of a state governs the state, so every father of a family governs his household. But the sovereign + of a state can make laws for the state. Therefore every father of a family can make laws for his household. +
[37444] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sicut princeps civitatis est civitatis gubernator, ita quilibet +paterfamilias est gubernator domus. Sed princeps civitatis potest +legem in civitate facere. Ergo quilibet paterfamilias potest in sua +domo facere legem.
+ On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 10): "A law is an ordinance of the people, whereby something is sanctioned by the Elders together + with the Commonalty." +
[37445] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., et habetur in decretis, +dist. II, lex est constitutio populi, secundum quam maiores natu +simul cum plebibus aliquid sanxerunt. Non est ergo cuiuslibet +facere legem.
+ I answer that, A law, properly speaking, regards first and foremost the order to the common good. Now to order anything to the common good, + belongs either to the whole people, or to someone who is the viceregent of the whole people. And therefore the making of a + law belongs either to the whole people or to a public personage who has care of the whole people: since in all other matters + the directing of anything to the end concerns him to whom the end belongs. +
[37446] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod lex proprie, primo et principaliter respicit ordinem +ad bonum commune. Ordinare autem aliquid in bonum commune est vel +totius multitudinis, vel alicuius gerentis vicem totius +multitudinis. Et ideo condere legem vel pertinet ad totam +multitudinem, vel pertinet ad personam publicam quae totius +multitudinis curam habet. Quia et in omnibus aliis ordinare in +finem est eius cuius est proprius ille finis.
+ Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[1], ad 1), a law is in a person not only as in one that rules, but also by participation as in one that + is ruled. In the latter way each one is a law to himself, in so far as he shares the direction that he receives from one who + rules him. Hence the same text goes on: "Who show the work of the law written in their hearts." +
[37447] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, lex est in aliquo non +solum sicut in regulante, sed etiam participative sicut in +regulato. Et hoc modo unusquisque sibi est lex, inquantum +participat ordinem alicuius regulantis. Unde et ibidem subditur, +qui ostendunt opus legis scriptum in cordibus suis.
+ Reply to Objection 2: A private person cannot lead another to virtue efficaciously: for he can only advise, and if his advice be not taken, it + has no coercive power, such as the law should have, in order to prove an efficacious inducement to virtue, as the Philosopher + says (Ethic. x, 9). But this coercive power is vested in the whole people or in some public personage, to whom it belongs + to inflict penalties, as we shall state further on (Q[92], A[2], ad 3; + + SS, Q[64], A[3]). Wherefore the framing of laws belongs to him alone. +
[37448] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod persona privata non potest inducere efficaciter ad +virtutem. Potest enim solum monere, sed si sua monitio non +recipiatur, non habet vim coactivam; quam debet habere lex, ad hoc +quod efficaciter inducat ad virtutem, ut philosophus dicit, in X +Ethic. Hanc autem virtutem coactivam habet multitudo vel persona +publica, ad quam pertinet poenas infligere, ut infra dicetur. Et +ideo solius eius est leges facere.
+ Reply to Objection 3: As one man is a part of the household, so a household is a part of the state: and the state is a perfect community, according + to Polit. i, 1. And therefore, as the good of one man is not the last end, but is ordained to the common good; so too the + good of one household is ordained to the good of a single state, which is a perfect community. Consequently he that governs + a family, can indeed make certain commands or ordinances, but not such as to have + properly the force of law. +
[37449] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut homo est pars domus, ita domus est pars +civitatis, civitas autem est communitas perfecta, ut dicitur in I +Politic. Et ideo sicut bonum unius hominis non est ultimus finis, +sed ordinatur ad commune bonum; ita etiam et bonum unius domus +ordinatur ad bonum unius civitatis, quae est communitas perfecta. +Unde ille qui gubernat aliquam familiam, potest quidem facere +aliqua praecepta vel statuta; non tamen quae proprie habeant +rationem legis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that promulgation is not essential to a law. For the natural law above all has the character of law. But the + natural law needs no promulgation. Therefore it is not essential to a law that it be promulgated. +
[37450] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod promulgatio non sit de ratione legis. +Lex enim naturalis maxime habet rationem legis. Sed lex naturalis +non indiget promulgatione. Ergo non est de ratione legis quod +promulgetur.
+ Objection 2: Further, it belongs properly to a law to bind one to do or not to do something. But the obligation of fulfilling a law touches + not only those in whose presence it is promulgated, but also others. Therefore promulgation is not essential to a law. +
[37451] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +ad legem pertinet proprie obligare ad aliquid faciendum vel non +faciendum. Sed non solum obligantur ad implendam legem illi coram +quibus promulgatur lex, sed etiam alii. Ergo promulgatio non est de +ratione legis.
+ Objection 3: Further, the binding force of a law extends even to the future, since "laws are binding in matters of the future," as the + jurists say (Cod. 1, tit. De lege et constit. leg. vii). But promulgation concerns those who are present. Therefore it is + not essential to a law. +
[37452] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +obligatio legis extenditur etiam in futurum, quia leges futuris +negotiis necessitatem imponunt, ut iura dicunt. Sed promulgatio fit +ad praesentes. Ergo promulgatio non est de necessitate legis.
+ On the contrary, It is laid down in the Decretals, dist. 4, that "laws are established when they are promulgated." +
[37453] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur in decretis, IV dist., quod leges instituuntur +cum promulgantur.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[1]), a law is imposed on others by way of a rule and measure. Now a rule or measure is imposed by being applied to those who + are to be ruled and measured by it. Wherefore, in order that a law obtain the binding force which is proper to a law, it must + needs be applied to the men who have to be ruled by it. Such application is made by its being notified to them by promulgation. + Wherefore promulgation is necessary for + the law to obtain its force. +
Thus from the four preceding articles, the definition of law may be gathered; and it is nothing else than an ordinance of + reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated. +
[37454] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, lex imponitur aliis per modum +regulae et mensurae. Regula autem et mensura imponitur per hoc quod +applicatur his quae regulantur et mensurantur. Unde ad hoc quod lex +virtutem obligandi obtineat, quod est proprium legis, oportet quod +applicetur hominibus qui secundum eam regulari debent. Talis autem +applicatio fit per hoc quod in notitiam eorum deducitur ex ipsa +promulgatione. Unde promulgatio necessaria est ad hoc quod lex +habeat suam virtutem. Et sic ex quatuor praedictis potest colligi +definitio legis, quae nihil est aliud quam quaedam rationis +ordinatio ad bonum commune, ab eo qui curam communitatis habet, +promulgata.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The natural law is promulgated by the very fact that God instilled it into man's mind so as to be known by him naturally. +
[37455] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod promulgatio legis naturae est ex hoc ipso quod +Deus eam mentibus hominum inseruit naturaliter cognoscendam.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Those who are not present when a law is promulgated, are bound to observe the law, in so far as it is notified or can be + notified to them by others, after it has been promulgated. +
[37456] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod illi coram quibus lex non promulgatur, obligantur ad +legem servandam, inquantum in eorum notitiam devenit per alios, vel +devenire potest, promulgatione facta.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The promulgation that takes place now, extends to future time by reason of the durability of written characters, by which + means it is continually promulgated. Hence Isidore says (Etym. v, 3; ii, 10) that "lex [law] is derived from legere [to read] + because it is written." +
[37457] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod promulgatio praesens in futurum extenditur per +firmitatem Scripturae, quae quodammodo semper eam promulgat. Unde +Isidorus dicit, in II Etymol., quod lex a legendo vocata est, +quia scripta est.
We must now consider the various kinds of law: under which head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is an eternal law?
(2) Whether there is a natural law?
(3) Whether there is a human law?
(4) Whether there is a Divine law?
+[37458] +Iª-IIae q. 91 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +diversitate legum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum sit +aliqua lex aeterna. Secundo, utrum sit aliqua lex naturalis. +Tertio, utrum sit aliqua lex humana. Quarto, utrum sit aliqua lex +divina. Quinto, utrum sit una tantum, vel plures. Sexto, utrum sit +aliqua lex peccati.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that there is no eternal law. Because every law is imposed on someone. But there was not someone from eternity + on whom a law could be imposed: since God alone was from eternity. Therefore no law is eternal. +
[37459] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit aliqua lex aeterna. Omnis enim +lex aliquibus imponitur. Sed non fuit ab aeterno aliquis cui lex +posset imponi, solus enim Deus fuit ab aeterno. Ergo nulla lex est +aeterna.
+ Objection 2: Further, promulgation is essential to law. But promulgation could not be from eternity: because there was no one to whom + it could be promulgated from eternity. Therefore no law can be eternal. +
[37460] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +promulgatio est de ratione legis. Sed promulgatio non potuit esse +ab aeterno, quia non erat ab aeterno cui promulgaretur. Ergo nulla +lex potest esse aeterna.
+ Objection 3: Further, a law implies order to an end. But nothing ordained to an end is eternal: for the last end alone is eternal. Therefore + no law is eternal. +
[37461] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +lex importat ordinem ad finem. Sed nihil est aeternum quod +ordinetur ad finem, solus enim ultimus finis est aeternus. Ergo +nulla lex est aeterna.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): "That Law which is the Supreme Reason cannot be understood to be otherwise than unchangeable + and eternal." +
[37462] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib. Arb., lex quae summa +ratio nominatur, non potest cuipiam intelligenti non incommutabilis +aeternaque videri.
+ I answer that, As stated above (Q[90], A[1], ad 2; + AA[3],4), a law is nothing else but a dictate of practical reason emanating from the ruler who governs a perfect community. Now + it is evident, granted that the world is ruled by Divine Providence, as was stated in the + FP, Q[22], AA[1],2, that the whole community of the universe is governed by Divine Reason. Wherefore the very Idea of the government of things + in God the + Ruler of the universe, has the nature of a law. And since the Divine Reason's conception of things is not subject to time + but is eternal, according to + Prov. 8:23, therefore it is that this kind of law must be called eternal. +
[37463] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, nihil est aliud lex quam +quoddam dictamen practicae rationis in principe qui gubernat +aliquam communitatem perfectam. Manifestum est autem, supposito +quod mundus divina providentia regatur, ut in primo habitum est, +quod tota communitas universi gubernatur ratione divina. Et ideo +ipsa ratio gubernationis rerum in Deo sicut in principe +universitatis existens, legis habet rationem. Et quia divina ratio +nihil concipit ex tempore, sed habet aeternum conceptum, ut dicitur +Prov. VIII; inde est quod huiusmodi legem oportet dicere +aeternam.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Those things that are not in themselves, exist with God, inasmuch as they are foreknown and preordained by Him, according + to + Rom. 4:17: "Who calls those things that are not, as those that are." Accordingly the eternal concept of the Divine law bears the character + of an eternal law, in so far as it is ordained by God to the government of things foreknown by Him. +
[37464] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ea quae in seipsis non sunt, apud Deum existunt, +inquantum sunt ab ipso praecognita et praeordinata; secundum illud +Rom. IV, qui vocat ea quae non sunt, tanquam ea quae sunt. +Sic igitur aeternus divinae legis conceptus habet rationem legis +aeternae, secundum quod a Deo ordinatur ad gubernationem rerum ab +ipso praecognitarum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Promulgation is made by word of mouth or in writing; and in both ways the eternal law is promulgated: because both the Divine + Word and the writing of the Book of Life are eternal. But the promulgation cannot be from eternity on the part of the creature + that hears or reads. +
[37465] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod promulgatio fit et verbo et scripto; et utroque modo +lex aeterna habet promulgationem ex parte Dei promulgantis, quia et +verbum divinum est aeternum, et Scriptura libri vitae est aeterna. +Sed ex parte creaturae audientis aut inspicientis, non potest esse +promulgatio aeterna.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The law implies order to the end actively, in so far as it directs certain things to the end; but not passively---that is + to say, the law itself is not ordained to the end---except accidentally, in a governor whose end is extrinsic to him, and + to which end his law must needs be ordained. But the end of the Divine government is God Himself, and His law is not distinct + from Himself. Wherefore the eternal law is not ordained to another end. +
[37466] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod lex importat ordinem ad finem active, inquantum +scilicet per eam ordinantur aliqua in finem, non autem passive, +idest quod ipsa lex ordinetur ad finem, nisi per accidens in +gubernante cuius finis est extra ipsum, ad quem etiam necesse est +ut lex eius ordinetur. Sed finis divinae gubernationis est ipse +Deus, nec eius lex est aliud ab ipso. Unde lex aeterna non +ordinatur in alium finem.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that there is no natural law in us. Because man is governed sufficiently by the eternal law: for Augustine + says (De Lib. Arb. i) that "the eternal law is that by which it is right that all things should be most orderly." But nature + does not abound in superfluities as neither does she fail in necessaries. Therefore no law is natural to man. +
[37467] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit in nobis aliqua lex naturalis. +Sufficienter enim homo gubernatur per legem aeternam, dicit enim +Augustinus, in I de Lib. Arb., quod lex aeterna est qua iustum +est ut omnia sint ordinatissima. Sed natura non abundat in +superfluis, sicut nec deficit in necessariis. Ergo non est aliqua +lex homini naturalis.
+ Objection 2: Further, by the law man is directed, in his acts, to the end, as stated above ( + Q[90], A[2]). But the directing of human acts to their end is not a function of nature, as is the case in irrational creatures, which + act for an end solely by their natural appetite; whereas man acts for an end by his reason and will. Therefore no law is natural + to man. +
[37468] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +per legem ordinatur homo in suis actibus ad finem, ut supra habitum +est. Sed ordinatio humanorum actuum ad finem non est per naturam, +sicut accidit in creaturis irrationabilibus, quae solo appetitu +naturali agunt propter finem, sed agit homo propter finem per +rationem et voluntatem. Ergo non est aliqua lex homini +naturalis.
+ Objection 3: Further, the more a man is free, the less is he under the law. But man is freer than all the animals, on account of his free-will, + with which he is endowed above all other animals. Since therefore other animals are not subject to a natural law, neither + is man subject to a natural law. +
[37469] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +quanto aliquis est liberior, tanto minus est sub lege. Sed homo est +liberior omnibus animalibus, propter liberum arbitrium, quod prae +aliis animalibus habet. Cum igitur alia animalia non subdantur legi +naturali, nec homo alicui legi naturali subditur.
+ On the contrary, A gloss on + Rom. 2:14: "When the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law," comments as follows: "Although + they have no written law, yet they have the natural law, whereby each one knows, and is conscious of, what is good and what + is evil." +
[37470] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod, Rom. II, super illud, cum gentes, quae legem non +habent, naturaliter ea quae legis sunt faciunt, dicit Glossa, +etsi non habent legem scriptam, habent tamen legem naturalem, +qua quilibet intelligit et sibi conscius est quid sit bonum et quid +malum.
+ I answer that, As stated above (Q[90], A[1], ad 1), law, being a rule and measure, can be in a person in two ways: in one way, as in him + that rules and measures; in another way, as in that which is ruled and measured, since a thing is ruled and measured, in so + far as it partakes of the rule or measure. Wherefore, since all things subject to Divine providence are ruled and measured + by the eternal law, as was stated above + (A[1]); it is evident that + all things partake somewhat of the eternal law, in so far as, namely, from its being imprinted on them, they derive their + respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends. Now among all others, the rational creature is subject to Divine providence + in the most excellent way, in so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by being provident both for itself and for others. + Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end: and + this participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law. Hence the Psalmist after saying + ( + Ps. 4:6): "Offer up the sacrifice of justice," as though someone asked what the works of justice are, adds: "Many say, Who showeth + us good things?" in answer to which question he says: "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us": thus implying + that the light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is evil, which is the function of the + natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the Divine light. It is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing + else than the rational creature's participation of the eternal law. +
[37471] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, lex, cum sit regula et +mensura, dupliciter potest esse in aliquo, uno modo, sicut in +regulante et mensurante; alio modo, sicut in regulato et mensurato, +quia inquantum participat aliquid de regula vel mensura, sic +regulatur vel mensuratur. Unde cum omnia quae divinae providentiae +subduntur, a lege aeterna regulentur et mensurentur, ut ex dictis +patet; manifestum est quod omnia participant aliqualiter legem +aeternam, inquantum scilicet ex impressione eius habent +inclinationes in proprios actus et fines. Inter cetera autem +rationalis creatura excellentiori quodam modo divinae providentiae +subiacet, inquantum et ipsa fit providentiae particeps, sibi ipsi +et aliis providens. Unde et in ipsa participatur ratio aeterna, per +quam habet naturalem inclinationem ad debitum actum et finem. Et +talis participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura lex +naturalis dicitur. Unde cum Psalmista dixisset, sacrificate +sacrificium iustitiae, quasi quibusdam quaerentibus quae sunt +iustitiae opera, subiungit, multi dicunt, quis ostendit nobis bona? +Cui quaestioni respondens, dicit, signatum est super nos lumen +vultus tui, domine, quasi lumen rationis naturalis, quo discernimus +quid sit bonum et malum, quod pertinet ad naturalem legem, nihil +aliud sit quam impressio divini luminis in nobis. Unde patet quod +lex naturalis nihil aliud est quam participatio legis aeternae in +rationali creatura.
+ Reply to Objection 1: This argument would hold, if the natural law were something different from the eternal law: whereas it is nothing but a participation + thereof, as stated above. +
[37472] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si lex naturalis esset +aliquid diversum a lege aeterna. Non autem est nisi quaedam +participatio eius, ut dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Every act of reason and will in us is based on that which is according to nature, as stated above ( + Q[10], A[1]): for every act of reasoning is based on principles that are known naturally, and every act of appetite in respect of the + means is derived from the natural appetite in respect of the last end. Accordingly the first direction of our acts to their + end must needs be in virtue of the natural law. +
[37473] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod omnis operatio, rationis et voluntatis derivatur in +nobis ab eo quod est secundum naturam, ut supra habitum est, nam +omnis ratiocinatio derivatur a principiis naturaliter notis, et +omnis appetitus eorum quae sunt ad finem, derivatur a naturali +appetitu ultimi finis. Et sic etiam oportet quod prima directio +actuum nostrorum ad finem, fiat per legem naturalem.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Even irrational animals partake in their own way of the Eternal Reason, just as the rational creature does. But because the + rational creature partakes thereof in an intellectual and rational manner, therefore the participation of the eternal law + in the rational creature is properly called a law, since a law is something pertaining to reason, as stated above ( + Q[90], A[1]). Irrational creatures, however, do not partake thereof + in a rational manner, wherefore there is no participation of the eternal law in them, except by way of similitude. +
[37474] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod etiam animalia irrationalia participant rationem +aeternam suo modo, sicut et rationalis creatura. Sed quia +rationalis creatura participat eam intellectualiter et +rationaliter, ideo participatio legis aeternae in creatura +rationali proprie lex vocatur, nam lex est aliquid rationis, ut +supra dictum est. In creatura autem irrationali non participatur +rationaliter, unde non potest dici lex nisi per similitudinem.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a human law. For the natural law is a participation of the eternal law, as stated above + (A[2]). Now through the eternal law "all things are most orderly," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. i, 6). Therefore the natural + law suffices for the ordering of all human affairs. Consequently there is no need for a human law. +
[37475] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit aliqua lex humana. Lex enim +naturalis est participatio legis aeternae, ut dictum est. Sed per +legem aeternam omnia sunt ordinatissima, ut Augustinus dicit, in I +de Lib. Arb. Ergo lex naturalis sufficit ad omnia humana ordinanda. +Non est ergo necessarium quod sit aliqua lex humana.
+ Objection 2: Further, a law bears the character of a measure, as stated above ( + Q[90], A[1]). But human reason is not a measure of things, but vice versa, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 5. Therefore no law can emanate + from human reason. +
[37476] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +lex habet rationem mensurae, ut dictum est. Sed ratio humana non +est mensura rerum, sed potius e converso, ut in X Metaphys. +dicitur. Ergo ex ratione humana nulla lex procedere potest.
+ Objection 3: Further, a measure should be most certain, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 3. But the dictates of human reason in matters of + conduct are uncertain, according to + Wis. 9:14: "The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain." Therefore no law can emanate from human reason. +
[37477] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +mensura debet esse certissima, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed +dictamen humanae rationis de rebus gerendis est incertum; secundum +illud Sap. IX, cogitationes mortalium timidae, et incertae +providentiae nostrae. Ergo ex ratione humana nulla lex +procedere potest.
+ On the contrary, Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) distinguishes two kinds of law, the one eternal, the other temporal, which he calls human. +
[37478] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus, in I de Lib. Arb., ponit duas leges, unam +aeternam et aliam temporalem, quam dicit esse humanam.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + Q[90], A[1], ad 2), a law is a dictate of the practical reason. Now it is to be observed that the same procedure takes place in the practical + and in the speculative reason: for each proceeds from principles to conclusions, as stated above (De Lib. Arb. i, 6). Accordingly + we conclude that just as, in the speculative reason, from naturally known indemonstrable principles, we draw the conclusions + of the various + sciences, the knowledge of which is not imparted to us by nature, but acquired by the efforts of reason, so too it is from + the precepts of the natural law, as from general and indemonstrable principles, that the human reason needs to proceed to + the more particular determination of certain matters. These particular determinations, devised by human reason, are called + human laws, provided the other essential conditions of law be observed, as stated above ( + Q[90], + AA[2] + ,3,4). Wherefore Tully says in his Rhetoric (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "justice has its source in nature; thence certain things + came into custom by reason of their utility; afterwards these things which emanated from nature and were approved by custom, + were sanctioned by fear and reverence for the law." +
[37479] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, lex est quoddam dictamen +practicae rationis. Similis autem processus esse invenitur rationis +practicae et speculativae, utraque enim ex quibusdam principiis ad +quasdam conclusiones procedit, ut superius habitum est. Secundum +hoc ergo dicendum est quod, sicut in ratione speculativa ex +principiis indemonstrabilibus naturaliter cognitis producuntur +conclusiones diversarum scientiarum, quarum cognitio non est nobis +naturaliter indita, sed per industriam rationis inventa; ita etiam +ex praeceptis legis naturalis, quasi ex quibusdam principiis +communibus et indemonstrabilibus, necesse est quod ratio humana +procedat ad aliqua magis particulariter disponenda. Et istae +particulares dispositiones adinventae secundum rationem humanam, +dicuntur leges humanae, servatis aliis conditionibus quae pertinent +ad rationem legis, ut supra dictum est. Unde et Tullius dicit, in +sua Rhetor., quod initium iuris est a natura profectum; deinde +quaedam in consuetudinem ex utilitate rationis venerunt; postea res +et a natura profectas et a consuetudine probatas legum metus et +religio sanxit.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The human reason cannot have a full participation of the dictate of the Divine Reason, but according to its own mode, and + imperfectly. Consequently, as on the part of the speculative reason, by a natural participation of Divine Wisdom, there is + in us the knowledge of certain general principles, but not proper knowledge of each single truth, such as that contained in + the Divine Wisdom; so too, on the part of the practical reason, man has a natural + participation of the eternal law, according to certain general principles, but not as regards the particular determinations + of individual cases, which are, however, contained in the eternal law. Hence the need for human reason to proceed further + to sanction them by law. +
[37480] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ratio humana non potest participare ad plenum +dictamen rationis divinae, sed suo modo et imperfecte. Et ideo +sicut ex parte rationis speculativae, per naturalem participationem +divinae sapientiae, inest nobis cognitio quorundam communium +principiorum, non autem cuiuslibet veritatis propria cognitio, +sicut in divina sapientia continetur; ita etiam ex parte rationis +practicae naturaliter homo participat legem aeternam secundum +quaedam communia principia, non autem secundum particulares +directiones singulorum, quae tamen in aeterna lege continentur. Et +ideo necesse est ulterius quod ratio humana procedat ad +particulares quasdam legum sanctiones.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Human reason is not, of itself, the rule of things: but the principles impressed on it by nature, are general rules and measures + of all things relating to human conduct, whereof the natural reason is the rule and measure, although it is not the measure + of things that are from nature. +
[37481] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio humana secundum se non est regula rerum, sed +principia ei naturaliter indita, sunt quaedam regulae generales et +mensurae omnium eorum quae sunt per hominem agenda, quorum ratio +naturalis est regula et mensura, licet non sit mensura eorum quae +sunt a natura.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The practical reason is concerned with practical matters, which are singular and contingent: but not with necessary things, + with which the speculative reason is concerned. Wherefore human laws cannot have that inerrancy that belongs to the demonstrated + conclusions of sciences. Nor is it necessary for every measure to be altogether unerring and certain, but according as it + is possible in its own particular genus. +
[37482] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio practica est circa operabilia, quae sunt +singularia et contingentia, non autem circa necessaria, sicut ratio +speculativa. Et ideo leges humanae non possunt illam +infallibilitatem habere quam habent conclusiones demonstrativae +scientiarum. Nec oportet quod omnis mensura sit omni modo +infallibilis et certa, sed secundum quod est possibile in genere +suo.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that there was no need for a Divine law. Because, as stated above + (A[2]), the natural law is a participation in us of the eternal law. But the eternal law is a Divine law, as stated above + (A[1]). Therefore there was no need for a Divine law in addition to the natural law, and human laws derived therefrom. +
[37483] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit necessarium esse aliquam +legem divinam. Quia, ut dictum est, lex naturalis est quaedam +participatio legis aeternae in nobis. Sed lex aeterna est lex +divina, ut dictum est. Ergo non oportet quod praeter legem +naturalem, et leges humanas ab ea derivatas, sit aliqua alia lex +divina.
+ Objection 2: Further, it is written ( + Ecclus. 15:14) that "God left man in the hand of his own counsel." Now counsel is an act of reason, as stated above (Q[14], A[1]). Therefore + man was left to the direction of his reason. But a dictate of human reason is a human law as stated above + (A[3]). Therefore there is no need for man to be governed also by a Divine law. +
[37484] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Eccli. XV dicitur quod Deus dimisit hominem in manu consilii +sui. Consilium autem est actus rationis, ut supra habitum est. +Ergo homo dimissus est gubernationi suae rationis. Sed dictamen +rationis humanae est lex humana, ut dictum est. Ergo non oportet +quod homo alia lege divina gubernetur.
+ Objection 3: Further, human nature is more self-sufficing than irrational creatures. But irrational creatures have no Divine law besides + the natural inclination impressed on them. Much less, therefore, should the rational creature have a Divine law in addition + to the natural law. +
[37485] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +natura humana est sufficientior irrationalibus creaturis. Sed +irrationales creaturae non habent aliquam legem divinam praeter +inclinationem naturalem eis inditam. Ergo multo minus creatura +rationalis debet habere aliquam legem divinam praeter naturalem +legem.
+ On the contrary, David prayed God to set His law before him, saying ( + Ps. 118:33): "Set before me for a law the way of Thy justifications, O Lord." +
[37486] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod David expetit legem a Deo sibi poni, dicens, legem pone +mihi, domine, in via iustificationum tuarum.
+ I answer that, Besides the natural and the human law it was necessary for the directing of human conduct to have a Divine law. And this + for four reasons. First, because it is by law that man is directed how to perform his proper acts in view of his last end. + And indeed if man were ordained to no other end than that which is proportionate to his natural faculty, there would be no + need for man to have any further direction of the part of his reason, besides the natural law + and human law which is derived from it. But since man is ordained to an end of eternal happiness which is inproportionate + to man's natural faculty, as stated above ( + Q[5], A[5]), therefore it was necessary that, besides the natural and the human law, man should be directed to his end by a law given + by God. +
Secondly, because, on account of the uncertainty of human judgment, especially on contingent and particular matters, different + people form different judgments on human acts; whence also different and contrary laws result. In order, therefore, that man + may know without any doubt what he ought to do and what he ought to avoid, it was necessary for man to be directed in his + proper acts by a law given by God, for it is certain that such a law cannot err. +
Thirdly, because man can make laws in those matters of which he is competent to judge. But man is not competent to judge + of interior movements, that are hidden, but only of exterior acts which appear: and yet for the perfection of virtue it is + necessary for man to conduct himself aright in both kinds of acts. Consequently human law could not sufficiently curb and + direct interior acts; and it was necessary for this purpose that a Divine law should supervene. +
Fourthly, because, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5,6), human law cannot punish or forbid all evil deeds: since while + aiming at doing away with all evils, it would do away with many good things, and would hinder the advance of the common good, + which is necessary for human intercourse. In order, therefore, that no evil might remain unforbidden and unpunished, it was + necessary for the Divine law to supervene, whereby all sins are forbidden. +
And these four causes are touched upon in + Ps. 118:8, where it is said: "The law of the Lord is unspotted," i.e. allowing no foulness of sin; "converting souls," because it directs + not only exterior, but also interior acts; "the testimony of the Lord is faithful," because of the certainty of what is true + and right; "giving wisdom to little ones," by directing man to an end supernatural and Divine. +
[37487] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod praeter legem naturalem et legem humanam, necessarium +fuit ad directionem humanae vitae habere legem divinam. Et hoc +propter quatuor rationes. Primo quidem, quia per legem dirigitur +homo ad actus proprios in ordine ad ultimum finem. Et si quidem +homo ordinaretur tantum ad finem qui non excederet proportionem +naturalis facultatis hominis, non oporteret quod homo haberet +aliquid directivum ex parte rationis, supra legem naturalem et +legem humanitus positam, quae ab ea derivatur. Sed quia homo +ordinatur ad finem beatitudinis aeternae, quae excedit proportionem +naturalis facultatis humanae, ut supra habitum est; ideo +necessarium fuit ut supra legem naturalem et humanam, dirigeretur +etiam ad suum finem lege divinitus data. Secundo, quia propter +incertitudinem humani iudicii, praecipue de rebus contingentibus et +particularibus, contingit de actibus humanis diversorum esse +diversa iudicia, ex quibus etiam diversae et contrariae leges +procedunt. Ut ergo homo absque omni dubitatione scire possit quid +ei sit agendum et quid vitandum, necessarium fuit ut in actibus +propriis dirigeretur per legem divinitus datam, de qua constat quod +non potest errare. Tertio, quia de his potest homo legem ferre, de +quibus potest iudicare. Iudicium autem hominis esse non potest de +interioribus motibus, qui latent, sed solum de exterioribus +actibus, qui apparent. Et tamen ad perfectionem virtutis requiritur +quod in utrisque actibus homo rectus existat. Et ideo lex humana +non potuit cohibere et ordinare sufficienter interiores actus, sed +necessarium fuit quod ad hoc superveniret lex divina. Quarto quia, +sicut Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib. Arb., lex humana non potest +omnia quae male fiunt, punire vel prohibere, quia dum auferre +vellet omnia mala, sequeretur quod etiam multa bona tollerentur, et +impediretur utilitas boni communis, quod est necessarium ad +conversationem humanam. Ut ergo nullum malum improhibitum et +impunitum remaneat, necessarium fuit supervenire legem divinam, per +quam omnia peccata prohibentur. Et istae quatuor causae tanguntur +in Psalmo XVIII, ubi dicitur, lex domini immaculata, idest nullam +peccati turpitudinem permittens; convertens animas, quia non solum +exteriores actus, sed etiam interiores dirigit; testimonium domini +fidele, propter certitudinem veritatis et rectitudinis; sapientiam +praestans parvulis, inquantum ordinat hominem ad supernaturalem +finem et divinum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: By the natural law the eternal law is participated proportionately to the capacity of human nature. But to his supernatural + end man needs to be directed in a yet higher way. Hence the additional law given by God, whereby man shares more perfectly + in the eternal law. +
[37488] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod per naturalem legem participatur lex aeterna +secundum proportionem capacitatis humanae naturae. Sed oportet ut +altiori modo dirigatur homo in ultimum finem supernaturalem. Et +ideo superadditur lex divinitus data, per quam lex aeterna +participatur altiori modo.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Counsel is a kind of inquiry: hence it must proceed from some principles. Nor is it enough for it to proceed from principles + imparted by nature, which are the precepts of the natural law, for the reasons given above: but there is need for certain + additional principles, namely, the precepts of the Divine law. +
[37489] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod consilium est inquisitio quaedam, unde oportet quod +procedat ex aliquibus principiis. Nec sufficit quod procedat ex +principiis naturaliter inditis, quae sunt praecepta legis naturae, +propter praedicta, sed oportet quod superaddantur quaedam alia +principia, scilicet praecepta legis divinae.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Irrational creatures are not ordained to an end higher than that which is proportionate to their natural powers: consequently + the comparison fails. +
[37490] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod creaturae irrationales non ordinantur ad altiorem +finem quam sit finis qui est proportionatus naturali virtuti +ipsarum. Et ideo non est similis ratio.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that there is but one Divine law. Because, where there is one king in one kingdom there is but one law. Now + the whole of mankind is compared to God as to one king, according to + Ps. 46:8: "God is the King of all the earth." Therefore there is but one Divine law. +
[37491] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex divina sit una tantum. Unius enim +regis in uno regno est una lex. Sed totum humanum genus comparatur +ad Deum sicut ad unum regem; secundum illud Psalmi XLVI, rex +omnis terrae Deus. Ergo est una tantum lex divina.
+ Objection 2: Further, every law is directed to the end which the lawgiver intends for those for whom he makes the law. But God intends + one and the same thing for all men; since according to + 1 Tim. 2:4: "He will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth." Therefore there is but one Divine law. +
[37492] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +omnis lex ordinatur ad finem quem legislator intendit in eis quibus +legem fert. Sed unum et idem est quod Deus intendit in omnibus +hominibus; secundum illud I ad Tim. II, vult omnes homines +salvos fieri, et ad agnitionem veritatis venire. Ergo una +tantum est lex divina.
+ Objection 3: Further, the Divine law seems to be more akin to the eternal law, which is one, than the natural law, according as the revelation + of grace is of a higher order than natural knowledge. Therefore much more is the Divine law but one. +
[37493] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +lex divina propinquior esse videtur legi aeternae, quae est una, +quam lex naturalis, quanto altior est revelatio gratiae quam +cognitio naturae. Sed lex naturalis est una omnium hominum. Ergo +multo magis lex divina.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle says ( + Heb. 7:12): "The priesthood being translated, it is necessary that a translation also be made of the law." But the priesthood is twofold, + as stated in the same passage, viz. the levitical priesthood, and the priesthood of Christ. Therefore the Divine law is twofold, + namely the Old Law and the New Law. +
[37494] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Heb. VII, translato sacerdotio, +necesse est ut legis translatio fiat. Sed sacerdotium est +duplex, ut ibidem dicitur, scilicet sacerdotium leviticum, et +sacerdotium Christi. Ergo etiam duplex est lex divina, scilicet lex +vetus, et lex nova.
+ I answer that, As stated in the + FP, Q[30], A[3], distinction is the cause of number. Now things may be distinguished in two ways. First, as those things that are altogether + specifically different, e.g. a horse and an ox. Secondly, as perfect and imperfect in the same species, e.g. a boy and a man: + and in this way the Divine law is divided into Old and New. Hence the Apostle ( + Gal. 3:24,25) compares the state of man under the Old + Law to that of a child "under a pedagogue"; but the state under the New Law, to that of a full grown man, who is "no longer + under a pedagogue." +
Now the perfection and imperfection of these two laws is to be taken in connection with the three conditions pertaining to + law, as stated above. For, in the first place, it belongs to law to be directed to the common good as to its end, as stated + above ( + Q[90], A[2]). This good may be twofold. It may be a sensible and earthly good; and to this, man was directly ordained by the Old Law: + wherefore, at the very outset of the law, the people were invited to + the earthly kingdom of the Chananaeans ( + Ex. 3:8, + 17). Again it may be an intelligible and heavenly good: and to this, man is ordained by the New Law. Wherefore, at the very + beginning of His preaching, Christ invited men to the kingdom of heaven, saying ( + Mat. 4:17): "Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand." Hence Augustine says (Contra Faust. iv) that "promises of temporal + goods are contained in the Old Testament, for which reason it is called old; but the promise of + eternal life belongs to the New Testament." +
Secondly, it belongs to the law to direct human acts according to the order of righteousness + (A[4]): wherein also the New Law surpasses the Old Law, since it directs our internal acts, according to + Mat. 5:20: "Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven." + Hence the saying that "the Old Law restrains the hand, but the New Law controls the mind" ( Sentent. iii, + D, xl). +
Thirdly, it belongs to the law to induce men to observe its commandments. This the Old Law did by the fear of punishment: + but the New Law, by love, which is poured into our hearts by the grace of Christ, bestowed in the New Law, but foreshadowed + in the Old. Hence Augustine says (Contra Adimant. Manich. discip. xvii) that "there is little difference [*The 'little difference' + refers to the Latin words 'timor' and 'amor'---'fear' and 'love.'] between the Law and the Gospel---fear + and love." +
[37495] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut in primo dictum est, distinctio est causa +numeri. Dupliciter autem inveniuntur aliqua distingui. Uno modo, +sicut ea quae sunt omnino specie diversa, ut equus et bos. Alio +modo, sicut perfectum et imperfectum in eadem specie, sicut puer et +vir. Et hoc modo lex divina distinguitur in legem veterem et legem +novam. Unde apostolus, ad Gal. III, comparat statum veteris legis +statui puerili existenti sub paedagogo, statum autem novae legis +comparat statui viri perfecti, qui iam non est sub paedagogo. +Attenditur autem perfectio et imperfectio utriusque legis secundum +tria quae ad legem pertinent, ut supra dictum est. Primo enim ad +legem pertinet ut ordinetur ad bonum commune sicut ad finem, ut +supra dictum est. Quod quidem potest esse duplex. Scilicet bonum +sensibile et terrenum, et ad tale bonum ordinabat directe lex +vetus; unde statim, Exodi III, in principio legis, invitatur +populus ad regnum terrenum Chananaeorum. Et iterum bonum +intelligibile et caeleste, et ad hoc ordinat lex nova. Unde statim +Christus ad regnum caelorum in suae praedicationis principio +invitavit, dicens, poenitentiam agite, appropinquavit enim +regnum caelorum, Matth. IV. Et ideo Augustinus dicit, in IV +contra Faustum, quod temporalium rerum promissiones testamento +veteri continentur, et ideo vetus appellatur, sed aeternae vitae +promissio ad novum pertinet testamentum. Secundo ad legem +pertinet dirigere humanos actus secundum ordinem iustitiae. In quo +etiam superabundat lex nova legi veteri, interiores actus animi +ordinando; secundum illud Matth. V, nisi abundaverit iustitia +vestra plus quam Scribarum et Pharisaeorum, non intrabitis in +regnum caelorum. Et ideo dicitur quod lex vetus cohibet +manum, lex nova animum. Tertio ad legem pertinet inducere +homines ad observantias mandatorum. Et hoc quidem lex vetus +faciebat timore poenarum, lex autem nova facit hoc per amorem, qui +in cordibus nostris infunditur per gratiam Christi, quae in lege +nova confertur, sed in lege veteri figurabatur. Et ideo dicit +Augustinus, contra Adimantum Manichaei discipulum, quod brevis +differentia est legis et Evangelii, timor et amor.
+ Reply to Objection 1: As the father of a family issues different commands to the children and to the adults, so also the one King, God, in His + one kingdom, gave one law to men, while they were yet imperfect, and another more perfect law, when, by the preceding law, + they had been led to a greater capacity for Divine things. +
[37496] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut paterfamilias in domo alia mandata +proponit pueris et adultis, ita etiam unus rex Deus, in uno suo +regno, aliam legem dedit hominibus adhuc imperfectis existentibus; +et aliam perfectiorem iam manuductis per priorem legem ad maiorem +capacitatem divinorum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The salvation of man could not be achieved otherwise than through Christ, according to + Acts 4:12: "There is no other name . . . given to men, whereby we must be saved." Consequently the law that brings all to salvation + could not be given until after the coming of Christ. But before His coming it was necessary to give to the people, of whom + Christ was to be born, a law containing certain rudiments of righteousness unto salvation, + in order to prepare them to receive Him. +
[37497] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod salus hominum non poterat esse nisi per Christum; +secundum illud Act. IV, non est aliud nomen datum hominibus, in +quo oporteat nos salvos fieri. Et ideo lex perfecte ad salutem +omnes inducens, dari non potuit nisi post Christi adventum. Antea +vero dari oportuit populo ex quo Christus erat nasciturus, legem +praeparatoriam ad Christi susceptionem, in qua quaedam rudimenta +salutaris iustitiae continerentur.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The natural law directs man by way of certain general precepts, common to both the perfect and the imperfect: wherefore it + is one and the same for all. But the Divine law directs man also in certain particular matters, to which the perfect and imperfect + do not stand in the same relation. Hence the necessity for the Divine law to be twofold, as already explained. +
[37498] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod lex naturalis dirigit hominem secundum quaedam +praecepta communia, in quibus conveniunt tam perfecti quam +imperfecti, et ideo est una omnium. Sed lex divina dirigit hominem +etiam in quibusdam particularibus, ad quae non similiter se habent +perfecti et imperfecti. Et ideo oportuit legem divinam esse +duplicem, sicut iam dictum est.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that there is no law of the "fomes" of sin. For Isidore says (Etym. v) that the "law is based on reason." But + the "fomes" of sin is not based on reason, but deviates from it. Therefore the "fomes" has not the nature of a law. +
[37499] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit aliqua lex fomitis. Dicit enim +Isidorus, in V Etymol., quod lex ratione consistit. Fomes +autem non consistit ratione, sed magis a ratione deviat. Ergo fomes +non habet rationem legis.
+ Objection 2: Further, every law is binding, so that those who do not obey it are called transgressors. But man is not called a transgressor, + from not following the instigations of the "fomes"; but rather from his following them. Therefore the "fomes" has not the + nature of a law. +
[37500] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, +omnis lex obligatoria est, ita quod qui ipsam non servant, +transgressores dicuntur. Sed fomes non constituit aliquem +transgressorem ex hoc quod ipsum non sequitur, sed magis +transgressor redditur si quis ipsum sequatur. Ergo fomes non habet +rationem legis.
+ Objection 3: Further, the law is ordained to the common good, as stated above ( + Q[90], A[2]). But the "fomes" inclines us, not to the common, but to our own private good. Therefore the "fomes" has not the nature of + sin. +
[37501] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, +lex ordinatur ad bonum commune, ut supra habitum est. Sed fomes non +inclinat ad bonum commune, sed magis ad bonum privatum. Ergo fomes +non habet rationem legis.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle says ( + Rom. 7:23): "I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind." +
[37502] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. VII, video aliam legem in membris +meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[2]; Q[90], A[1], ad 1), the law, as to its essence, resides in him that rules and measures; but, by way of participation, in + that which is ruled and measured; so that every inclination or ordination which may be found in things subject to the law, + is called a law by participation, as stated above + (A[2]; Q[90], A[1] , ad 1). Now those who are subject to a law may receive a twofold + inclination from the lawgiver. First, in so far as he directly inclines his subjects to something; sometimes indeed different + subjects to different acts; in this way we may say that there is a military law and a mercantile law. Secondly, indirectly; + thus by the very fact that a lawgiver deprives a subject of some dignity, the latter passes into another order, so as to be + under another law, as it were: thus if a soldier be turned out of the army, he becomes a subject of rural or of mercantile + legislation. +
Accordingly under the Divine Lawgiver various creatures have various natural inclinations, so that what is, as it were, a + law for one, is against the law for another: thus I might say that fierceness is, in a way, the law of a dog, but against + the law of a sheep or another meek animal. And so the law of man, which, by the Divine ordinance, is allotted to him, according + to his proper natural condition, is that he should act in accordance with reason: and this law was so effective + in the primitive state, that nothing either beside or against reason could take man unawares. But when man turned his back + on God, he fell under the influence of his sensual impulses: in fact this happens to each one individually, the more he deviates + from the path of reason, so that, after a fashion, he is likened to the beasts that are led by the impulse of sensuality, + according to + Ps. 48:21: "Man, when he was in honor, did not understand: he hath been compared to + senseless beasts, and made like to them." +
So, then, this very inclination of sensuality which is called the "fomes," in other animals has simply the nature of a law + (yet only in so far as a law may be said to be in such things), by reason of a direct inclination. But in man, it has not + the nature of law in this way, rather is it a deviation from the law of reason. But since, by the just sentence of God, man + is destitute of original justice, and his reason bereft of its vigor, this impulse of sensuality, whereby he is + led, in so far as it is a penalty following from the Divine law depriving man of his proper dignity, has the nature of a law. +
[37503] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 6 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, lex essentialiter invenitur +in regulante et mensurante, participative autem in eo quod +mensuratur et regulatur; ita quod omnis inclinatio vel ordinatio +quae invenitur in his quae subiecta sunt legi, participative +dicitur lex, ut ex supradictis patet. Potest autem in his quae +subduntur legi, aliqua inclinatio inveniri dupliciter a +legislatore. Uno modo, inquantum directe inclinat suos subditos ad +aliquid; et diversos interdum ad diversos actus; secundum quem +modum potest dici quod alia est lex militum, et alia est lex +mercatorum. Alio modo, indirecte, inquantum scilicet per hoc quod +legislator destituit aliquem sibi subditum aliqua dignitate, +sequitur quod transeat in alium ordinem et quasi in aliam legem, +puta si miles ex militia destituatur, transibit in legem rusticorum +vel mercatorum. Sic igitur sub Deo legislatore diversae creaturae +diversas habent naturales inclinationes, ita ut quod uni est +quodammodo lex, alteri sit contra legem, ut si dicam quod +furibundum esse est quodammodo lex canis, est autem contra legem +ovis vel alterius mansueti animalis. Est ergo hominis lex, quam +sortitur ex ordinatione divina secundum propriam conditionem, ut +secundum rationem operetur. Quae quidem lex fuit tam valida in +primo statu, ut nihil vel praeter rationem vel contra rationem +posset subrepere homini. Sed dum homo a Deo recessit, incurrit in +hoc quod feratur secundum impetum sensualitatis, et unicuique etiam +particulariter hoc contingit, quanto magis a ratione recesserit, ut +sic quodammodo bestiis assimiletur, quae sensualitatis impetu +feruntur; secundum illud Psalmi XLVIII, homo, cum in honore +esset, non intellexit, comparatus est iumentis insipientibus, et +similis factus est illis. Sic igitur ipsa sensualitatis +inclinatio, quae fomes dicitur, in aliis quidem animalibus +simpliciter habet rationem legis, illo tamen modo quo in talibus +lex dici potest, secundum directam inclinationem. In hominibus +autem secundum hoc non habet rationem legis, sed magis est deviatio +a lege rationis. Sed inquantum per divinam iustitiam homo +destituitur originali iustitia et vigore rationis, ipse impetus +sensualitatis qui eum ducit, habet rationem legis, inquantum est +poenalis et ex lege divina consequens, hominem destituente propria +dignitate.
+ Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the "fomes" in itself, as an incentive to evil. It is not thus that it has the nature of a law, as + stated above, but according as it results from the justice of the Divine law: it is as though we were to say that the law + allows a nobleman to be condemned to hard labor for some misdeed. +
[37504] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de fomite secundum se +considerato, prout inclinat ad malum. Sic enim non habet rationem +legis, ut dictum est, sed secundum quod sequitur ex divinae legis +iustitia, tanquam si diceretur lex esse quod aliquis nobilis, +propter suam culpam, ad servilia opera induci permitteretur.
+ Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers law in the light of a rule or measure: for it is in this sense that those who deviate from the law + become transgressors. But the "fomes" is not a law in this respect, but by a kind of participation, as stated above. +
[37505] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de eo quod est lex quasi +regula et mensura, sic enim deviantes a lege transgressores +constituuntur. Sic autem fomes non est lex, sed per quandam +participationem, ut supra dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the "fomes" as to its proper inclination, and not as to its origin. And yet if the inclination of + sensuality be considered as it is in other animals, thus it is ordained to the common good, namely, to the preservation of + nature in the species or in the individual. And this is in man also, in so far as sensuality is subject to reason. But it + is called "fomes" in so far as it strays from the order of reason. +
[37506] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de fomite quantum ad +inclinationem propriam, non autem quantum ad suam originem. Et +tamen si consideretur inclinatio sensualitatis prout est in aliis +animalibus, sic ordinatur ad bonum commune, idest ad conservationem +naturae in specie vel in individuo. Et hoc est etiam in homine, +prout sensualitas subditur rationi. Sed fomes dicitur secundum quod +exit rationis ordinem.
We must now consider the effects of law; under which head there are two points of inquiry:
+[37507] +Iª-IIae q. 92 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +effectibus legis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum +effectus legis sit homines facere bonos. Secundo, utrum effectus +legis sint imperare, vetare, permittere et punire, sicut +legisperitus dicit.
+ Objection 1: It seems that it is not an effect of law to make men good. For men are good through virtue, since virtue, as stated in Ethic. + ii, 6 is "that which makes its subject good." But virtue is in man from God alone, because He it is Who "works it in us without + us," as we stated above ( + Q[55], A[4]) in giving the definition of virtue. Therefore the law does not make men good. +
[37508] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod legis non sit facere homines bonos. +Homines enim sunt boni per virtutem, virtus enim est quae bonum +facit habentem, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed virtus est homini a +solo Deo, ipse enim eam facit in nobis sine nobis, ut supra dictum +est in definitione virtutis. Ergo legis non est facere homines +bonos.
+ Objection 2: Further, Law does not profit a man unless he obeys it. But the very fact that a man obeys a law is due to his being good. + Therefore in man goodness is presupposed to the law. Therefore the law does not make men good. +
[37509] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +lex non prodest homini nisi legi obediat. Sed hoc ipsum quod homo +obedit legi, est ex bonitate. Ergo bonitas praeexigitur in homine +ad legem. Non igitur lex facit homines bonos.
+ Objection 3: Further, Law is ordained to the common good, as stated above ( + Q[90], A[2]). But some behave well in things regarding the community, who behave ill in things regarding themselves. Therefore it is + not the business of the law to make men good. +
[37510] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +lex ordinatur ad bonum commune, ut supra dictum est. Sed quidam +bene se habent in his quae ad commune pertinent, qui tamen in +propriis non bene se habent. Non ergo ad legem pertinet quod faciat +homines bonos.
+ Objection 4: Further, some laws are tyrannical, as the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 6). But a tyrant does not intend the good of his + subjects, but considers only his own profit. Therefore law does not make men good. +
[37511] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, +quaedam leges sunt tyrannicae, ut philosophus dicit, in sua +politica. Sed tyrannus non intendit ad bonitatem subditorum, sed +solum ad propriam utilitatem. Non ergo legis est facere homines +bonos.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that the "intention of every lawgiver is to make good citizens." +
[37512] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod voluntas +cuiuslibet legislatoris haec est, ut faciat cives bonos.
+ I answer that, as stated above (Q[90], A[1], ad 2; + AA[3],4), a law is nothing else than a dictate of reason in the ruler by whom his subjects are governed. Now the virtue of any + subordinate thing consists in its being well subordinated to that by which it is regulated: thus we see that the virtue of + the irascible and concupiscible faculties consists in their being obedient to reason; and accordingly "the virtue of every + subject consists in his + being well subjected to his ruler," as the Philosopher says (Polit. i). But every law aims at being obeyed by those who are + subject to it. Consequently it is evident that the proper effect of law is to lead its subjects to their proper virtue: and + since virtue is "that which makes its subject good," it follows that the proper effect of law is to make those to whom it + is given, good, either simply or in some particular respect. For if the intention of the lawgiver is fixed on true good, which + is + the common good regulated according to Divine justice, it follows that the effect of the law is to make men good simply. If, + however, the intention of the lawgiver is fixed on that which is not simply good, but useful or pleasurable to himself, or + in opposition to Divine justice; then the law does not make men good simply, but in respect to that particular government. + In this way good is found even in things that are bad of themselves: thus a man is called a good robber, because he works + in a + way that is adapted to his end. +
[37513] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, lex nihil aliud est quam +dictamen rationis in praesidente, quo subditi gubernantur. +Cuiuslibet autem subditi virtus est ut bene subdatur ei a quo +gubernatur, sicut videmus quod virtus irascibilis et +concupiscibilis in hoc consistit quod sint bene obedientes rationi. +Et per hunc modum virtus cuiuslibet subiecti est ut bene +subiiciatur principanti, ut philosophus dicit, in I Polit. Ad +hoc autem ordinatur unaquaeque lex, ut obediatur ei a subditis. +Unde manifestum est quod hoc sit proprium legis, inducere subiectos +ad propriam ipsorum virtutem. Cum igitur virtus sit quae bonum +facit habentem, sequitur quod proprius effectus legis sit bonos +facere eos quibus datur, vel simpliciter vel secundum quid. Si enim +intentio ferentis legem tendat in verum bonum, quod est bonum +commune secundum iustitiam divinam regulatum, sequitur quod per +legem homines fiant boni simpliciter. Si vero intentio legislatoris +feratur ad id quod non est bonum simpliciter, sed utile vel +delectabile sibi, vel repugnans iustitiae divinae; tunc lex non +facit homines bonos simpliciter, sed secundum quid, scilicet in +ordine ad tale regimen. Sic autem bonum invenitur etiam in per se +malis, sicut aliquis dicitur bonus latro, quia operatur accommode +ad finem.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Virtue is twofold, as explained above ( + Q[63], A[2]), viz. acquired and infused. Now the fact of being accustomed to an action contributes to both, but in different ways; for + it causes the acquired virtue; while it disposes to infused virtue, and preserves and fosters it when it already exists. And + since law is given for the purpose of directing human acts; as far as human acts conduce to virtue, so far does law make men + good. + Wherefore the Philosopher says in the second book of the Politics (Ethic. ii) that "lawgivers make men good by habituating + them to good works." +
[37514] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod duplex est virtus, ut ex supradictis patet, +scilicet acquisita, et infusa. Ad utramque autem aliquid operatur +operum assuetudo, sed diversimode, nam virtutem quidem acquisitam +causat; ad virtutem autem infusam disponit, et eam iam habitam +conservat et promovet. Et quia lex ad hoc datur ut dirigat actus +humanos, inquantum actus humani operantur ad virtutem, intantum lex +facit homines bonos. Unde et philosophus dicit, II Polit., quod +legislatores assuefacientes faciunt bonos.
+ Reply to Objection 2: It is not always through perfect goodness of virtue that one obeys the law, but sometimes it is through fear of punishment, + and sometimes from the mere dictates of reason, which is a beginning of virtue, as stated above ( + Q[63], A[1]). +
[37515] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod non semper aliquis obedit legi ex bonitate perfecta +virtutis, sed quandoque quidem ex timore poenae; quandoque autem ex +solo dictamine rationis, quod est quoddam principium virtutis, ut +supra habitum est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The goodness of any part is considered in comparison with the whole; hence Augustine says (Confess. iii) that "unseemly is + the part that harmonizes not with the whole." Since then every man is a part of the state, it is impossible that a man be + good, unless he be well proportionate to the common good: nor can the whole be well consistent unless its parts be proportionate + to it. Consequently the common good of the state cannot flourish, unless the + citizens be virtuous, at least those whose business it is to govern. But it is enough for the good of the community, that + the other citizens be so far virtuous that they obey the commands of their rulers. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, + 2) that "the virtue of a sovereign is the same as that of a good man, but the virtue of any common citizen is not the same + as that of a good man." +
[37516] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod bonitas cuiuslibet partis consideratur in proportione +ad suum totum, unde et Augustinus dicit, in III Confess., quod +turpis omnis pars est quae suo toti non congruit. Cum igitur +quilibet homo sit pars civitatis, impossibile est quod aliquis homo +sit bonus, nisi sit bene proportionatus bono communi, nec totum +potest bene consistere nisi ex partibus sibi proportionatis. Unde +impossibile est quod bonum commune civitatis bene se habeat, nisi +cives sint virtuosi, ad minus illi quibus convenit principari. +Sufficit autem, quantum ad bonum communitatis, quod alii intantum +sint virtuosi quod principum mandatis obediant. Et ideo philosophus +dicit, in III Polit., quod eadem est virtus principis et boni +viri; non autem eadem est virtus cuiuscumque civis et boni +viri.
+ Reply to Objection 4: A tyrannical law, through not being according to reason, is not a law, absolutely speaking, but rather a perversion of law; + and yet in so far as it is something in the nature of a law, it aims at the citizens' being good. For all it has in the nature + of a law consists in its being an ordinance made by a superior to his subjects, and aims at being obeyed by them, which is + to make them good, not simply, but with respect to that particular + government. +
[37517] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod lex tyrannica, cum non sit secundum rationem, non est +simpliciter lex, sed magis est quaedam perversitas legis. Et tamen +inquantum habet aliquid de ratione legis, intendit ad hoc quod +cives sint boni. Non enim habet de ratione legis nisi secundum hoc +quod est dictamen alicuius praesidentis in subditis, et ad hoc +tendit ut subditi legi sint bene obedientes; quod est eos esse +bonos, non simpliciter, sed in ordine ad tale regimen.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the acts of law are not suitably assigned as consisting in "command," "prohibition," "permission" and + "punishment." For "every law is a general precept," as the jurist states. But command and precept are the same. Therefore + the other three are superfluous. +
[37518] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod legis actus non sint convenienter +assignati in hoc quod dicitur quod legis actus est imperare, +vetare, permittere et punire. Lex enim omnis praeceptum commune +est, ut legisconsultus dicit. Sed idem est imperare quod +praecipere. Ergo alia tria superfluunt.
+ Objection 2: Further, the effect of a law is to induce its subjects to be good, as stated above + (A[1]). But counsel aims at a higher good than a command does. Therefore it belongs to law to counsel rather than to command. +
[37519] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +effectus legis est ut inducat subditos ad bonum, sicut supra dictum +est. Sed consilium est de meliori bono quam praeceptum. Ergo magis +pertinet ad legem consulere quam praecipere.
+ Objection 3: Further, just as punishment stirs a man to good deeds, so does reward. Therefore if to punish is reckoned an effect of law, + so also is to reward. +
[37520] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sicut homo aliquis incitatur ad bonum per poenas, ita etiam et per +praemia. Ergo sicut punire ponitur effectus legis, ita etiam et +praemiare.
+ Objection 4: Further, the intention of a lawgiver is to make men good, as stated above + (A[1]). But he that obeys the law, merely through fear of being punished, is not good: because "although a good deed may be done + through servile fear, i.e. fear of punishment, it is not done well," as Augustine says (Contra duas Epist. Pelag. ii). Therefore + punishment is not a proper effect of law. +
[37521] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, +intentio legislatoris est ut homines faciat bonos, sicut supra +dictum est. Sed ille qui solo metu poenarum obedit legi, non est +bonus, nam timore servili, qui est timor poenarum, etsi bonum +aliquis faciat, non tamen bene aliquid fit, ut Augustinus +dicit. Non ergo videtur esse proprium legis quod puniat.
+ On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 19): "Every law either permits something, as: 'A brave man may demand his reward'": or forbids something, + as: "No man may ask a consecrated virgin in marriage": or punishes, as: "Let him that commits a murder be put to death." +
[37522] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Isidorus dicit, in V Etymol., omnis lex aut permittit +aliquid, ut, vir fortis praemium petat. Aut vetat, ut, sacrarum +virginum nuptias nulli liceat petere. Aut punit, ut, qui caedem +fecerit, capite plectatur.
+ I answer that, Just as an assertion is a dictate of reason asserting something, so is a law a dictate of reason, commanding something. Now + it is proper to reason to lead from one thing to another. Wherefore just as, in demonstrative sciences, the reason leads us + from certain principles to assent to the conclusion, so it induces us by some means to assent to the precept of the law. +
Now the precepts of law are concerned with human acts, in which the law directs, as stated above ( + Q[90], AA[1],2; + Q[91], A[4]). Again there are three kinds of human acts: for, as stated above ( + Q[18], A[8]), some acts are good generically, viz. acts of virtue; and in respect of these the act of the law is a precept or command, + for "the law commands all acts of virtue" (Ethic. v, 1). Some acts are evil + generically, viz. acts of vice, and in respect of these the law forbids. Some acts are generically indifferent, and in respect + of these the law permits; and all acts that are either not distinctly good or not distinctly bad may be called indifferent. + And it is the fear of punishment that law makes use of in order to ensure obedience: in which respect punishment is an effect + of law. +
[37523] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut enuntiatio est rationis dictamen per modum +enuntiandi, ita etiam lex per modum praecipiendi. Rationis autem +proprium est ut ex aliquo ad aliquid inducat. Unde sicut in +demonstrativis scientiis ratio inducit ut assentiatur conclusioni +per quaedam principia, ita etiam inducit ut assentiatur legis +praecepto per aliquid. Praecepta autem legis sunt de actibus +humanis, in quibus lex dirigit, ut supra dictum est. Sunt autem +tres differentiae humanorum actuum. Nam sicut supra dictum est, +quidam actus sunt boni ex genere, qui sunt actus virtutum, et +respectu horum, ponitur legis actus praecipere vel imperare; +praecipit enim lex omnes actus virtutum, ut dicitur in V Ethic. +Quidam vero sunt actus mali ex genere, sicut actus vitiosi, et +respectu horum, lex habet prohibere. Quidam vero ex genere suo sunt +actus indifferentes, et respectu horum, lex habet permittere. Et +possunt etiam indifferentes dici omnes illi actus qui sunt vel +parum boni vel parum mali. Id autem per quod inducit lex ad hoc +quod sibi obediatur, est timor poenae, et quantum ad hoc, ponitur +legis effectus punire.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Just as to cease from evil is a kind of good, so a prohibition is a kind of precept: and accordingly, taking precept in a + wide sense, every law is a kind of precept. +
[37524] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut cessare a malo habet quandam rationem +boni, ita etiam prohibitio habet quandam rationem praecepti. Et +secundum hoc, large accipiendo praeceptum, universaliter lex +praeceptum dicitur.
+ Reply to Objection 2: To advise is not a proper act of law, but may be within the competency even of a private person, who cannot make a law. Wherefore + too the Apostle, after giving a certain counsel ( + 1 Cor. 7:12) says: "I speak, not the Lord." Consequently it is not reckoned as an effect of law. +
[37525] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod consulere non est proprius actus legis, sed potest +pertinere etiam ad personam privatam, cuius non est condere legem. +Unde etiam apostolus, I ad Cor. VII, cum consilium quoddam daret, +dixit, ego dico, non dominus. Et ideo non ponitur inter effectus +legis.
+ Reply to Objection 3: To reward may also pertain to anyone: but to punish pertains to none but the framer of the law, by whose authority the pain + is inflicted. Wherefore to reward is not reckoned an effect of law, but only to punish. +
[37526] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod etiam praemiare potest ad quemlibet pertinere, sed +punire non pertinet nisi ad ministrum legis, cuius auctoritate +poena infertur. Et ideo praemiare non ponitur actus legis, sed +solum punire.
+ Reply to Objection 4: From becoming accustomed to avoid evil and fulfill what is good, through fear of punishment, one is sometimes led on to do + so likewise, with delight and of one's own accord. Accordingly, law, even by punishing, leads men on to being good. +
[37527] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod per hoc quod aliquis incipit assuefieri ad vitandum +mala et ad implendum bona propter metum poenae, perducitur +quandoque ad hoc quod delectabiliter et ex propria voluntate hoc +faciat. Et secundum hoc, lex etiam puniendo perducit ad hoc quod +homines sint boni.
We must now consider each law by itself; and (1) The eternal law; (2) The natural law; (3) The human law; (4) The old law; + (5) The new law, which is the law of the Gospel. Of the sixth law which is the law of the "fomes," suffice what we have said + when treating of original sin. +
Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry:
(2) Whether it is known to all?
(3) Whether every law is derived from it?
(4) Whether necessary things are subject to the eternal law?
(5) Whether natural contingencies are subject to the eternal law?
+[37528] +Iª-IIae q. 93 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +singulis legibus. Et primo, de lege aeterna; secundo, de lege +naturali; tertio, de lege humana; quarto, de lege veteri; quinto, +de lege nova, quae est lex Evangelii. De sexta autem lege, quae est +lex fomitis, sufficiat quod dictum est cum de peccato originali +ageretur. Circa primum quaeruntur sex. Primo, quid sit lex aeterna. +Secundo, utrum sit omnibus nota. Tertio, utrum omnis lex ab ea +derivetur. Quarto, utrum necessaria subiiciantur legi aeternae. +Quinto, utrum contingentia naturalia subiiciantur legi aeternae. +Sexto, utrum omnes res humanae ei subiiciantur.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the eternal law is not a sovereign type existing in God. For there is only one eternal law. But there + are many types of things in the Divine mind; for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 46) that God "made each thing according + to its type." Therefore the eternal law does not seem to be a type existing in the Divine mind. +
[37529] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex aeterna non sit ratio summa in Deo +existens. Lex enim aeterna est una tantum. Sed rationes rerum in +mente divina sunt plures, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta +trium quaest., quod Deus singula fecit propriis rationibus. +Ergo lex aeterna non videtur esse idem quod ratio in mente divina +existens.
+ Objection 2: Further, it is essential to a law that it be promulgated by word, as stated above (Q[90], A[4]). But Word is a Personal name + in God, as stated in the + FP, Q[34], A[1]: whereas type refers to the Essence. Therefore the eternal law is not the same as a Divine type. +
[37530] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +de ratione legis est quod verbo promulgetur, ut supra dictum est. +Sed verbum in divinis dicitur personaliter, ut in primo habitum +est, ratio autem dicitur essentialiter. Non igitur idem est lex +aeterna quod ratio divina.
+ Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxx): "We see a law above our minds, which is called truth." But the law which is + above our minds is the eternal law. Therefore truth is the eternal law. But the idea of truth is not the same as the idea + of a type. Therefore the eternal law is not the same as the sovereign type. +
[37531] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in libro de vera Relig., apparet supra mentem +nostram legem esse, quae veritas dicitur. Lex autem supra +mentem nostram existens est lex aeterna. Ergo veritas est lex +aeterna. Sed non est eadem ratio veritatis et rationis. Ergo lex +aeterna non est idem quod ratio summa.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "the eternal law is the sovereign type, to which we must always conform." +
[37532] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib. Arb., quod lex aeterna +est summa ratio, cui semper obtemperandum est.
+ I answer that, Just as in every artificer there pre-exists a type of the things that are made by his art, so too in every governor there + must pre-exist the type of the order of those things that are to be done by those who are subject to his government. And just + as the type of the things yet to be made by an art is called the art or exemplar of the products of that art, so too the type + in him who governs the acts of his subjects, bears the character of a law, provided the + other conditions be present which we have mentioned above (Q[90]). Now God, by His wisdom, is the Creator of all things in + relation to which He stands as the artificer to the products of his art, as stated in the + FP, Q[14], A[8]. Moreover He governs all the acts and movements that are to be found in each single creature, as was also stated in the + FP, Q[103], A[5]. Wherefore as the type of the Divine Wisdom, inasmuch as by It all things are + created, has the character of art, exemplar or idea; so the type of Divine Wisdom, as moving all things to their due end, + bears the character of law. Accordingly the eternal law is nothing else than the type of Divine Wisdom, as directing all actions + and movements. +
[37533] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut in quolibet artifice praeexistit ratio eorum +quae constituuntur per artem, ita etiam in quolibet gubernante +oportet quod praeexistat ratio ordinis eorum quae agenda sunt per +eos qui gubernationi subduntur. Et sicut ratio rerum fiendarum per +artem vocatur ars vel exemplar rerum artificiatarum, ita etiam +ratio gubernantis actus subditorum, rationem legis obtinet, +servatis aliis quae supra esse diximus de legis ratione. Deus autem +per suam sapientiam conditor est universarum rerum, ad quas +comparatur sicut artifex ad artificiata, ut in primo habitum est. +Est etiam gubernator omnium actuum et motionum quae inveniuntur in +singulis creaturis, ut etiam in primo habitum est. Unde sicut ratio +divinae sapientiae inquantum per eam cuncta sunt creata, rationem +habet artis vel exemplaris vel ideae; ita ratio divinae sapientiae +moventis omnia ad debitum finem, obtinet rationem legis. Et +secundum hoc, lex aeterna nihil aliud est quam ratio divinae +sapientiae, secundum quod est directiva omnium actuum et +motionum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking in that passage of the ideal types which regard the proper nature of each single thing; and consequently + in them there is a certain distinction and plurality, according to their different relations to things, as stated in the + FP, Q[15], A[2]. But law is said to direct human acts by ordaining them to the common good, as stated above (Q[90], A[2]). And things, which + are in themselves different, may be + considered as one, according as they are ordained to one common thing. Wherefore the eternal law is one since it is the type + of this order. +
[37534] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur ibi de rationibus idealibus, +quae respiciunt proprias naturas singularum rerum, et ideo in eis +invenitur quaedam distinctio et pluralitas, secundum diversos +respectus ad res, ut in primo habitum est. Sed lex dicitur +directiva actuum in ordine ad bonum commune, ut supra dictum est. +Ea autem quae sunt in seipsis diversa, considerantur ut unum, +secundum quod ordinantur ad aliquod commune. Et ideo lex aeterna +est una, quae est ratio huius ordinis.
+ Reply to Objection 2: With regard to any sort of word, two points may be considered: viz. the word itself, and that which is expressed by the word. + For the spoken word is something uttered by the mouth of man, and expresses that which is signified by the human word. The + same applies to the human mental word, which is nothing else that something conceived by the mind, by which man expresses + his thoughts mentally. So then in God the Word conceived by the intellect of the + Father is the name of a Person: but all things that are in the Father's knowledge, whether they refer to the Essence or to + the Persons, or to the works of God, are expressed by this Word, as Augustine declares (De Trin. xv, 14). And among other + things expressed by this Word, the eternal law itself is expressed thereby. Nor does it follow that the eternal law is a Personal + name in God: yet it is appropriated to the Son, on account of the kinship between type and word. +
[37535] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod circa verbum quodcumque duo possunt considerari, +scilicet ipsum verbum, et ea quae verbo exprimuntur. Verbum enim +vocale est quiddam ab ore hominis prolatum; sed hoc verbo +exprimuntur quae verbis humanis significantur. Et eadem ratio est +de verbo hominis mentali, quod nihil est aliud quam quiddam mente +conceptum, quo homo exprimit mentaliter ea de quibus cogitat. Sic +igitur in divinis ipsum verbum, quod est conceptio paterni +intellectus, personaliter dicitur, sed omnia quaecumque sunt in +scientia patris, sive essentialia sive personalia, sive etiam Dei +opera exprimuntur hoc verbo, ut patet per Augustinum, in XV de +Trin. Et inter cetera quae hoc verbo exprimuntur, etiam ipsa lex +aeterna verbo ipso exprimitur. Nec tamen propter hoc sequitur quod +lex aeterna personaliter in divinis dicatur. Appropriatur tamen +filio, propter convenientiam quam habet ratio ad verbum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The types of the Divine intellect do not stand in the same relation to things, as the types of the human intellect. For the + human intellect is measured by things, so that a human concept is not true by reason of itself, but by reason of its being + consonant with things, since "an opinion is true or false according as it answers to the reality." But the Divine intellect + is the measure of things: since each thing has so far truth in it, as it represents + the Divine intellect, as was stated in the + FP, Q[16], A[1]. Consequently the Divine intellect is true in itself; and its type is truth itself. +
[37536] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio intellectus divini aliter se habet ad res quam +ratio intellectus humani. Intellectus enim humanus est mensuratus a +rebus, ut scilicet conceptus hominis non sit verus propter seipsum, +sed dicitur verus ex hoc quod consonat rebus, ex hoc enim quod res +est vel non est, opinio vera vel falsa est. Intellectus vero +divinus est mensura rerum, quia unaquaeque res intantum habet de +veritate, inquantum imitatur intellectum divinum, ut in primo +dictum est. Et ideo intellectus divinus est verus secundum se. Unde +ratio eius est ipsa veritas.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the eternal law is not known to all. Because, as the Apostle says ( + 1 Cor. 2:11), "the things that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God." But the eternal law is a type existing in the Divine + mind. Therefore it is unknown to all save God alone. +
[37537] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex aeterna non sit omnibus nota. Quia +ut dicit apostolus, I ad Cor., quae sunt Dei, nemo novit nisi +spiritus Dei. Sed lex aeterna est quaedam ratio in mente divina +existens. Ergo omnibus est ignota nisi soli Deo.
+ Objection 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) "the eternal law is that by which it is right that all things should be most + orderly." But all do not know how all things are most orderly. Therefore all do not know the eternal law. +
[37538] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Lib. Arb., lex aeterna est +qua iustum est ut omnia sint ordinatissima. Sed non omnes +cognoscunt qualiter omnia sint ordinatissima. Non ergo omnes +cognoscunt legem aeternam.
+ Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi) that "the eternal law is not subject to the judgment of man." But according + to Ethic. i, "any man can judge well of what he knows." Therefore the eternal law is not known to us. +
[37539] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in libro de vera Relig., quod lex aeterna est +de qua homines iudicare non possunt. Sed sicut in I Ethic. +dicitur, unusquisque bene iudicat quae cognoscit. Ergo lex +aeterna non est nobis nota.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "knowledge of the eternal law is imprinted on us." +
[37540] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Lib. Arb., quod aeternae +legis notio nobis impressa est.
+ I answer that, A thing may be known in two ways: first, in itself; secondly, in its effect, wherein some likeness of that thing is found: + thus someone not seeing the sun in its substance, may know it by its rays. So then no one can know the eternal law, as it + is in itself, except the blessed who see God in His Essence. But every rational creature knows it in its reflection, greater + or less. For every knowledge of truth is a kind of reflection and participation of the + eternal law, which is the unchangeable truth, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi). Now all men know the truth to a certain + extent, at least as to the common principles of the natural law: and as to the others, they partake of the knowledge of truth, + some more, some less; and in this respect are more or less cognizant of the eternal law. +
[37541] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod dupliciter aliquid cognosci potest, uno modo, in +seipso; alio modo, in suo effectu, in quo aliqua similitudo eius +invenitur; sicut aliquis non videns solem in sua substantia, +cognoscit ipsum in sua irradiatione. Sic igitur dicendum est quod +legem aeternam nullus potest cognoscere secundum quod in seipsa +est, nisi solum beati, qui Deum per essentiam vident. Sed omnis +creatura rationalis ipsam cognoscit secundum aliquam eius +irradiationem, vel maiorem vel minorem. Omnis enim cognitio +veritatis est quaedam irradiatio et participatio legis aeternae, +quae est veritas incommutabilis, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de +vera Relig. Veritatem autem omnes aliqualiter cognoscunt, ad minus +quantum ad principia communia legis naturalis. In aliis vero quidam +plus et quidam minus participant de cognitione veritatis; et +secundum hoc etiam plus vel minus cognoscunt legem aeternam.
+ Reply to Objection 1: We cannot know the things that are of God, as they are in themselves; but they are made known to us in their effects, according + to + Rom. 1:20: "The invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." +
[37542] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ea quae sunt Dei, in seipsis quidem cognosci a +nobis non possunt, sed tamen in effectibus suis nobis +manifestantur, secundum illud Rom. I, invisibilia Dei per ea +quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Although each one knows the eternal law according to his own capacity, in the way explained above, yet none can comprehend + it: for it cannot be made perfectly known by its effects. Therefore it does not follow that anyone who knows the eternal law + in the way aforesaid, knows also the whole order of things, whereby they are most orderly. +
[37543] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod legem aeternam etsi unusquisque cognoscat pro sua +capacitate, secundum modum praedictum, nullus tamen eam +comprehendere potest, non enim totaliter manifestari potest per +suos effectus. Et ideo non oportet quod quicumque cognoscit legem +aeternam secundum modum praedictum, cognoscat totum ordinem rerum, +quo omnia sunt ordinatissima.
+ Reply to Objection 3: To judge a thing may be understood in two ways. First, as when a cognitive power judges of its proper object, according to + + Job 12:11: "Doth not the ear discern words, and the palate of him that eateth, the taste?" It is to this kind of judgment that the + Philosopher alludes when he says that "anyone can judge well of what he knows," by judging, namely, whether what is put forward + is true. In another way we speak of a superior judging of a subordinate + by a kind of practical judgment, as to whether he should be such and such or not. And thus none can judge of the eternal law. +
[37544] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod iudicare de aliquo potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno +modo, sicut vis cognitiva diiudicat de proprio obiecto; secundum +illud Iob XII, nonne auris verba diiudicat, et fauces comedentis +saporem? Et secundum istum modum iudicii, philosophus dicit +quod unusquisque bene iudicat quae cognoscit, iudicando scilicet an +sit verum quod proponitur. Alio modo, secundum quod superior +iudicat de inferiori quodam practico iudicio, an scilicet ita +debeat esse vel non ita. Et sic nullus potest iudicare de lege +aeterna.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that not every law is derived from the eternal law. For there is a law of the "fomes," as stated above ( + Q[91], A[6]), which is not derived from that Divine law which is the eternal law, since thereunto pertains the "prudence of the flesh," + of which the Apostle says ( + Rom. 8:7), that "it cannot be subject to the law of God." Therefore not every law is derived from the eternal law. +
[37545] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnis lex a lege aeterna +derivetur. Est enim quaedam lex fomitis, ut supra dictum est. Ipsa +autem non derivatur a lege divina, quae est lex aeterna, ad ipsam +enim pertinet prudentia carnis, de qua apostolus dicit, ad Rom. +VIII, quod legi Dei non potest esse subiecta. Ergo non omnis +lex procedit a lege aeterna.
+ Objection 2: Further, nothing unjust can be derived from the eternal law, because, as stated above (A[2], OBJ[2]), "the eternal law is + that, according to which it is right that all things should be most orderly." But some laws are unjust, according to + Is. 10:1: "Woe to them that make wicked laws." Therefore not every law is derived from the eternal law. +
[37546] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +a lege aeterna nihil iniquum procedere potest, quia sicut dictum +est, lex aeterna est secundum quam iustum est ut omnia sint +ordinatissima. Sed quaedam leges sunt iniquae; secundum illud +Isaiae X, vae qui condunt leges iniquas. Ergo non omnis lex +procedit a lege aeterna.
+ Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) that "the law which is framed for ruling the people, rightly permits many things + which are punished by Divine providence." But the type of Divine providence is the eternal law, as stated above + (A[1]). Therefore not even every good law is derived from the eternal law. +
[37547] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib. Arbit., quod lex quae populo +regendo scribitur, recte multa permittit quae per divinam +providentiam vindicantur. Sed ratio divinae providentiae est +lex aeterna, ut dictum est. Ergo nec etiam omnis lex recta procedit +a lege aeterna.
+ On the contrary, Divine Wisdom says ( + Prov. 8:15): "By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things." But the type of Divine Wisdom is the eternal law, as stated above + + (A[1]). Therefore all laws proceed from the eternal law. +
[37548] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod, Prov. VIII, divina sapientia dicit, per me reges +regnant, et legum conditores iusta decernunt. Ratio autem +divinae sapientiae est lex aeterna, ut supra dictum est. Ergo omnes +leges a lege aeterna procedunt.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + Q[90], AA[1],2), the law denotes a kind of plan directing acts towards an end. Now wherever there are movers ordained to one another, + the power of the second mover must needs be derived from the power of the first mover; since the second mover does not move + except in so far as it is moved by the first. Wherefore we observe the same in all those who govern, so that the plan of government + is derived by secondary + governors from the governor in chief; thus the plan of what is to be done in a state flows from the king's command to his + inferior administrators: and again in things of art the plan of whatever is to be done by art flows from the chief craftsman + to the under-crafts-men, who work with their hands. Since then the eternal law is the plan of government in the Chief Governor, + all the plans of government in the inferior governors must be derived from the eternal law. But these plans of inferior + governors are all other laws besides the eternal law. Therefore all laws, in so far as they partake of right reason, are derived + from the eternal law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "in temporal law there is nothing just and lawful, but + what man has drawn from the eternal law." +
[37549] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, lex importat rationem +quandam directivam actuum ad finem. In omnibus autem moventibus +ordinatis oportet quod virtus secundi moventis derivetur a virtute +moventis primi, quia movens secundum non movet nisi inquantum +movetur a primo. Unde et in omnibus gubernantibus idem videmus, +quod ratio gubernationis a primo gubernante ad secundos derivatur, +sicut ratio eorum quae sunt agenda in civitate, derivatur a rege +per praeceptum in inferiores administratores. Et in artificialibus +etiam ratio artificialium actuum derivatur ab architectore ad +inferiores artifices, qui manu operantur. Cum ergo lex aeterna sit +ratio gubernationis in supremo gubernante, necesse est quod omnes +rationes gubernationis quae sunt in inferioribus gubernantibus, a +lege aeterna deriventur. Huiusmodi autem rationes inferiorum +gubernantium sunt quaecumque aliae leges praeter legem aeternam. +Unde omnes leges, inquantum participant de ratione recta, intantum +derivantur a lege aeterna. Et propter hoc Augustinus dicit, in I de +Lib. Arb., quod in temporali lege nihil est iustum ac legitimum, +quod non ex lege aeterna homines sibi derivaverunt.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The "fomes" has the nature of law in man, in so far as it is a punishment resulting from Divine justice; and in this respect + it is evident that it is derived from the eternal law. But in so far as it denotes a proneness to sin, it is contrary to the + Divine law, and has not the nature of law, as stated above ( + Q[91], A[6]). +
[37550] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod fomes habet rationem legis in homine, inquantum +est poena consequens divinam iustitiam, et secundum hoc manifestum +est quod derivatur a lege aeterna. Inquantum vero inclinat ad +peccatum, sic contrariatur legi Dei, et non habet rationem legis, +ut ex supradictis patet.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Human law has the nature of law in so far as it partakes of right reason; and it is clear that, in this respect, it is derived + from the eternal law. But in so far as it deviates from reason, it is called an unjust law, and has the nature, not of law + but of violence. Nevertheless even an unjust law, in so far as it retains some appearance of law, though being framed by one + who is in power, is derived from the eternal law; since all power is from the + Lord God, according to + Rom. 13:1. +
[37551] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod lex humana intantum habet rationem legis, inquantum +est secundum rationem rectam, et secundum hoc manifestum est quod a +lege aeterna derivatur. Inquantum vero a ratione recedit, sic +dicitur lex iniqua, et sic non habet rationem legis, sed magis +violentiae cuiusdam. Et tamen in ipsa lege iniqua inquantum +servatur aliquid de similitudine legis propter ordinem potestatis +eius qui legem fert, secundum hoc etiam derivatur a lege aeterna, +omnis enim potestas a domino Deo est, ut dicitur Rom. XIII.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Human law is said to permit certain things, not as approving them, but as being unable to direct them. And many things are + directed by the Divine law, which human law is unable to direct, because more things are subject to a higher than to a lower + cause. Hence the very fact that human law does not meddle with matters it cannot direct, comes under the ordination of the + eternal law. It would be different, were human law to sanction what the eternal law + condemns. Consequently it does not follow that human law is not derived from the eternal law, but that it is not on a perfect + equality with it. +
[37552] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod lex humana dicitur aliqua permittere, non quasi ea +approbans, sed quasi ea dirigere non potens. Multa autem diriguntur +lege divina quae dirigi non possunt lege humana, plura enim +subduntur causae superiori quam inferiori. Unde hoc ipsum quod lex +humana non se intromittat de his quae dirigere non potest, ex +ordine legis aeternae provenit. Secus autem esset si approbaret ea +quae lex aeterna reprobat. Unde ex hoc non habetur quod lex humana +non derivetur a lege aeterna, sed quod non perfecte eam assequi +possit.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that necessary and eternal things are subject to the eternal law. For whatever is reasonable is subject to + reason. But the Divine will is reasonable, for it is just. Therefore it is subject to (the Divine) reason. But the eternal + law is the Divine reason. Therefore God's will is subject to the eternal law. But God's will is eternal. Therefore eternal + and necessary things are subject to the eternal law. +
[37553] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod necessaria et aeterna subiiciantur +legi aeternae. Omne enim quod rationabile est, rationi subditur. +Sed voluntas divina est rationabilis, cum sit iusta. Ergo rationi +subditur. Sed lex aeterna est ratio divina. Ergo voluntas Dei +subditur legi aeternae. Voluntas autem Dei est aliquod aeternum. +Ergo etiam aeterna et necessaria legi aeternae subduntur.
+ Objection 2: Further, whatever is subject to the King, is subject to the King's law. Now the Son, according to + 1 Cor. 15:28,24, "shall be subject . . . to God and the Father . . . when He shall have delivered up the Kingdom to Him." Therefore the Son, + Who is eternal, is subject to the eternal law. +
[37554] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +quidquid subiicitur regi, subiicitur legi regis. Filius +autem, ut dicitur I ad Cor. XV, subiectus erit Deo et patri, +cum tradiderit ei regnum. Ergo filius, qui est aeternus, +subiicitur legi aeternae.
+ Objection 3: Further, the eternal law is Divine providence as a type. But many necessary things are subject to Divine providence: for + instance, the stability of incorporeal substances and of the heavenly bodies. Therefore even necessary things are subject + to the eternal law. +
[37555] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +lex aeterna est ratio divinae providentiae. Sed multa necessaria +subduntur divinae providentiae, sicut permanentia substantiarum +incorporalium et corporum caelestium. Ergo legi aeternae subduntur +etiam necessaria.
+ On the contrary, Things that are necessary cannot be otherwise, and consequently need no restraining. But laws are imposed on men, in order + to restrain them from evil, as explained above ( + Q[92], A[2]). Therefore necessary things are not subject to the eternal law. +
[37556] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra, +ea quae sunt necessaria, impossibile est aliter se habere, unde +cohibitione non indigent. Sed imponitur hominibus lex ut +cohibeantur a malis, ut ex supradictis patet. Ergo ea quae sunt +necessaria, legi non subduntur.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[1]), the eternal law is the type of the Divine government. Consequently whatever is subject to the Divine government, is subject + to the eternal law: while if anything is not subject to the Divine government, neither is it subject to the eternal law. The + application of this distinction may be gathered by looking around us. For those things are subject to human government, which + can be done by man; but what pertains + to the nature of man is not subject to human government; for instance, that he should have a soul, hands, or feet. Accordingly + all that is in things created by God, whether it be contingent or necessary, is subject to the eternal law: while things pertaining + to the Divine Nature or Essence are not subject to the eternal law, but are the eternal law itself. +
[37557] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, lex aeterna est ratio +divinae gubernationis. Quaecumque ergo divinae gubernationi +subduntur, subiiciuntur etiam legi aeternae, quae vero gubernationi +aeternae non subduntur, neque legi aeternae subduntur. Horum autem +distinctio attendi potest ex his quae circa nos sunt. Humanae enim +gubernationi subduntur ea quae per homines fieri possunt, quae vero +ad naturam hominis pertinent, non subduntur gubernationi humanae, +scilicet quod homo habeat animam, vel manus aut pedes. Sic igitur +legi aeternae subduntur omnia quae sunt in rebus a Deo creatis, +sive sint contingentia sive sint necessaria, ea vero quae pertinent +ad naturam vel essentiam divinam, legi aeternae non subduntur, sed +sunt realiter ipsa lex aeterna.
+ Reply to Objection 1: We may speak of God's will in two ways. First, as to the will itself: and thus, since God's will is His very Essence, it + is subject neither to the Divine government, nor to the eternal law, but is the same thing as the eternal law. Secondly, we + may speak of God's will, as to the things themselves that God wills about creatures; which things are subject to the eternal + law, in so far as they are planned by Divine Wisdom. In reference to these things + God's will is said to be reasonable [rationalis]: though regarded in itself it should rather be called their type [ratio]. +
[37558] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod de voluntate Dei dupliciter possumus loqui. Uno +modo, quantum ad ipsam voluntatem, et sic, cum voluntas Dei sit +ipsa eius essentia, non subditur gubernationi divinae neque legi +aeternae, sed est idem quod lex aeterna. Alio modo possumus loqui +de voluntate divina quantum ad ipsa quae Deus vult circa creaturas, +quae quidem subiecta sunt legi aeternae, inquantum horum ratio est +in divina sapientia. Et ratione horum, voluntas Dei dicitur +rationabilis. Alioquin, ratione sui ipsius, magis est dicenda ipsa +ratio.
+ Reply to Objection 2: God the Son was not made by God, but was naturally born of God. Consequently He is not subject to Divine providence or to + the eternal law: but rather is Himself the eternal law by a kind of appropriation, as Augustine explains (De Vera Relig. xxxi). + But He is said to be subject to the Father by reason of His human nature, in respect of which also the Father is said to be + greater than He. +
[37559] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod filius Dei non est a Deo factus, sed naturaliter ab +ipso genitus. Et ideo non subditur divinae providentiae aut legi +aeternae, sed magis ipse est lex aeterna per quandam +appropriationem, ut patet per Augustinum, in libro de vera Relig. +Dicitur autem esse subiectus patri ratione humanae naturae, +secundum quam etiam pater dicitur esse maior eo.
The third objection we grant, because it deals with those necessary things that are created.
[37560] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 4 ad 3 Tertium +concedimus, quia procedit de necessariis creatis.
+ Reply to Objection 4: As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 6), some necessary things have a cause of their necessity: and thus they derive + from something else the fact that they cannot be otherwise. And this is in itself a most effective restraint; for whatever + is restrained, is said to be restrained in so far as it cannot do otherwise than it is allowed to. +
[37561] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 4 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in V Metaphys., quaedam +necessaria habent causam suae necessitatis, et sic hoc ipsum quod +impossibile est ea aliter esse, habent ab alio. Et hoc ipsum est +cohibitio quaedam efficacissima, nam quaecumque cohibentur, +intantum cohiberi dicuntur, inquantum non possunt aliter facere +quam de eis disponatur.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that natural contingents are not subject to the eternal law. Because promulgation is essential to law, as stated + above ( + Q[90], A[4]). But a law cannot be promulgated except to rational creatures, to whom it is possible to make an announcement. Therefore + none but rational creatures are subject to the eternal law; and consequently natural contingents are not. +
[37562] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod naturalia contingentia non subsint +legi aeternae. Promulgatio enim est de ratione legis, ut supra +dictum est. Sed promulgatio non potest fieri nisi ad creaturas +rationales, quibus potest aliquid denuntiari. Ergo solae creaturae +rationales subsunt legi aeternae. Non ergo naturalia +contingentia.
+ Objection 2: Further, "Whatever obeys reason partakes somewhat of reason," as stated in Ethic. i. But the eternal law, is the supreme + type, as stated above + (A[1]). Since then natural contingents do not partake of reason in any way, but are altogether void of reason, it seems that they + are not subject to the eternal law. +
[37563] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +ea quae obediunt rationi, participant aliqualiter ratione, ut +dicitur in I Ethic. Lex autem aeterna est ratio summa, ut supra +dictum est. Cum igitur naturalia contingentia non participent +aliqualiter ratione, sed penitus sint irrationabilia, videtur quod +non subsint legi aeternae.
+ Objection 3: Further, the eternal law is most efficient. But in natural contingents defects occur. Therefore they are not subject to the + eternal law. +
[37564] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +lex aeterna est efficacissima. Sed in naturalibus contingentibus +accidit defectus. Non ergo subsunt legi aeternae.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Prov. 8:29): "When He compassed the sea with its bounds, and set a law to the waters, that they should not pass their limits." +
[37565] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Prov. VIII, quando circumdabat mari terminum +suum, et legem ponebat aquis ne transirent fines suos.
+ I answer that, We must speak otherwise of the law of man, than of the eternal law which is the law of God. For the law of man extends only + to rational creatures subject to man. The reason of this is because law directs the actions of those that are subject to the + government of someone: wherefore, properly speaking, none imposes a law on his own actions. Now whatever is done regarding + the use of irrational things subject to man, is done by the act of man himself moving + those things, for these irrational creatures do not move themselves, but are moved by others, as stated above ( + Q[1], A[2]). Consequently man cannot impose laws on irrational beings, however much they may be subject to him. But he can impose laws + on rational beings subject to him, in so far as by his command or pronouncement of any kind, he imprints on their minds a + rule which is a principle of action. +
Now just as man, by such pronouncement, impresses a kind of inward principle of action on the man that is subject to him, + so God imprints on the whole of nature the principles of its proper actions. And so, in this way, God is said to command the + whole of nature, according to + Ps. 148:6: "He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away." And thus all actions and movements of the whole of nature are subject + to the eternal law. Consequently irrational + creatures are subject to the eternal law, through being moved by Divine providence; but not, as rational creatures are, through + understanding the Divine commandment. +
[37566] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod aliter dicendum est de lege hominis, et aliter de +lege aeterna, quae est lex Dei. Lex enim hominis non se extendit +nisi ad creaturas rationales quae homini subiiciuntur. Cuius ratio +est quia lex est directiva actuum qui conveniunt subiectis +gubernationi alicuius, unde nullus, proprie loquendo, suis actibus +legem imponit. Quaecumque autem aguntur circa usum rerum +irrationalium homini subditarum, aguntur per actum ipsius hominis +moventis huiusmodi res, nam huiusmodi irrationales creaturae non +agunt seipsas, sed ab aliis aguntur, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo +rebus irrationalibus homo legem imponere non potest, quantumcumque +ei subiiciantur. Rebus autem rationalibus sibi subiectis potest +imponere legem, inquantum suo praecepto, vel denuntiatione +quacumque, imprimit menti earum quandam regulam quae est principium +agendi. Sicut autem homo imprimit, denuntiando, quoddam interius +principium actuum homini sibi subiecto, ita etiam Deus imprimit +toti naturae principia propriorum actuum. Et ideo per hunc modum +dicitur Deus praecipere toti naturae; secundum illud Psalmi +CXLVIII, praeceptum posuit, et non praeteribit. Et per hanc +etiam rationem omnes motus et actiones totius naturae legi aeternae +subduntur. Unde alio modo creaturae irrationales subduntur legi +aeternae, inquantum moventur a divina providentia, non autem per +intellectum divini praecepti, sicut creaturae rationales.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The impression of an inward active principle is to natural things, what the promulgation of law is to men: because law, by + being promulgated, imprints on man a directive principle of human actions, as stated above. +
[37567] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod hoc modo se habet impressio activi principii +intrinseci, quantum ad res naturales, sicut se habet promulgatio +legis quantum ad homines, quia per legis promulgationem imprimitur +hominibus quoddam directivum principium humanorum actuum, ut dictum +est.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Irrational creatures neither partake of nor are obedient to human reason: whereas they do partake of the Divine Reason by + obeying it; because the power of Divine Reason extends over more things than human reason does. And as the members of the + human body are moved at the command of reason, and yet do not partake of reason, since they have no apprehension subordinate + to reason; so too irrational creatures are moved by God, without, on that account, + being rational. +
[37568] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod creaturae irrationales non participant ratione +humana, nec ei obediunt, participant tamen, per modum obedientiae, +ratione divina. Ad plura enim se extendit virtus rationis divinae +quam virtus rationis humanae. Et sicut membra corporis humani +moventur ad imperium rationis, non tamen participant ratione, quia +non habent aliquam apprehensionem ordinatam ad rationem; ita etiam +creaturae irrationales moventur a Deo, nec tamen propter hoc sunt +rationales.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Although the defects which occur in natural things are outside the order of particular causes, they are not outside the order + of universal causes, especially of the First Cause, i.e. God, from Whose providence nothing can escape, as stated in the + FP, Q[22], A[2]. And since the eternal law is the type of Divine providence, as stated above + (A[1]), hence the defects of natural things are subject to the + eternal law. +
[37569] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod defectus qui accidunt in rebus naturalibus, quamvis +sint praeter ordinem causarum particularium, non tamen sunt praeter +ordinem causarum universalium; et praecipue causae primae, quae +Deus est, cuius providentiam nihil subterfugere potest, ut in primo +dictum est. Et quia lex aeterna est ratio divinae providentiae, ut +dictum est, ideo defectus rerum naturalium legi aeternae +subduntur.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that not all human affairs are subject to the eternal law. For the Apostle says ( + Gal. 5:18): "If you are led by the spirit you are not under the law." But the righteous who are the sons of God by adoption, are led + by the spirit of God, according to + Rom. 8:14: "Whosoever are led by the spirit of God, they are the sons of God." Therefore not all men are under the eternal law. +
[37570] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnes res humanae subiiciantur +legi aeternae. Dicit enim apostolus, ad Gal. V, si spiritu +ducimini, non estis sub lege. Sed viri iusti, qui sunt filii +Dei per adoptionem, spiritu Dei aguntur; secundum illud Rom. VIII, +qui spiritu Dei aguntur, hi filii Dei sunt. Ergo non omnes +homines sunt sub lege aeterna.
+ Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says ( + Rom. 8:7): "The prudence [Vulg.: 'wisdom'] of the flesh is an enemy to God: for it is not subject to the law of God." But many are + those in whom the prudence of the flesh dominates. Therefore all men are not subject to the eternal law which is the law of + God. +
[37571] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, +apostolus dicit, ad Rom. VIII, prudentia carnis inimica est Deo, +legi enim Dei subiecta non est. Sed multi homines sunt in +quibus prudentia carnis dominatur. Ergo legi aeternae, quae est lex +Dei, non subiiciuntur omnes homines.
+ Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "the eternal law is that by which the wicked deserve misery, the good, a + life of blessedness." But those who are already blessed, and those who are already lost, are not in the state of merit. Therefore + they are not under the eternal law. +
[37572] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib. Arb., quod lex aeterna est qua +mali miseriam, boni vitam beatam merentur. Sed homines iam +beati, vel iam damnati, non sunt in statu merendi. Ergo non subsunt +legi aeternae.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 12): "Nothing evades the laws of the most high Creator and Governor, for by Him the peace + of the universe is administered." +
[37573] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, nullo modo aliquid +legibus summi creatoris ordinatorisque subtrahitur, a quo pax +universitatis administratur.
+ I answer that, There are two ways in which a thing is subject to the eternal law, as explained above + (A[5]): first, by partaking of the eternal law by way of knowledge; secondly, by way of action and passion, i.e. by partaking of + the eternal law by way of an inward motive principle: and in this second way, irrational creatures are subject to the eternal + law, as stated above + (A[5]). But since the rational nature, together + with that which it has in common with all creatures, has something proper to itself inasmuch as it is rational, consequently + it is subject to the eternal law in both ways; because while each rational creature has some knowledge of the eternal law, + as stated above + (A[2]), it also has a natural inclination to that which is in harmony with the eternal law; for "we are naturally adapted to the + recipients of virtue" (Ethic. ii, 1). +
Both ways, however, are imperfect, and to a certain extent destroyed, in the wicked; because in them the natural inclination + to virtue is corrupted by vicious habits, and, moreover, the natural knowledge of good is darkened by passions and habits + of sin. But in the good both ways are found more perfect: because in them, besides the natural knowledge of good, there is + the added knowledge of faith and wisdom; and again, besides the natural inclination to good, there is the added + motive of grace and virtue. +
Accordingly, the good are perfectly subject to the eternal law, as always acting according to it: whereas the wicked are + subject to the eternal law, imperfectly as to their actions, indeed, since both their knowledge of good, and their inclination + thereto, are imperfect; but this imperfection on the part of action is supplied on the part of passion, in so far as they + suffer what the eternal law decrees concerning them, according as they fail to act in harmony with that law. + Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 15): "I esteem that the righteous act according to the eternal law; and (De Catech. + Rud. xviii): Out of the just misery of the souls which deserted Him, God knew how to furnish the inferior parts of His creation + with most suitable laws." +
[37574] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 6 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod duplex est modus quo aliquid subditur legi aeternae, +ut ex supradictis patet, uno modo, inquantum participatur lex +aeterna per modum cognitionis; alio modo, per modum actionis et +passionis, inquantum participatur per modum principii motivi. Et +hoc secundo modo subduntur legi aeternae irrationales creaturae, ut +dictum est. Sed quia rationalis natura, cum eo quod est commune +omnibus creaturis, habet aliquid sibi proprium inquantum est +rationalis, ideo secundum utrumque modum legi aeternae subditur, +quia et notionem legis aeternae aliquo modo habet, ut supra dictum +est; et iterum unicuique rationali creaturae inest naturalis +inclinatio ad id quod est consonum legi aeternae; sumus enim innati +ad habendum virtutes, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Uterque tamen modus +imperfectus quidem est, et quodammodo corruptus, in malis; in +quibus et inclinatio naturalis ad virtutem depravatur per habitum +vitiosum; et iterum ipsa naturalis cognitio boni in eis +obtenebratur per passiones et habitus peccatorum. In bonis autem +uterque modus invenitur perfectior, quia et supra cognitionem +naturalem boni, superadditur eis cognitio fidei et sapientiae; et +supra naturalem inclinationem ad bonum, superadditur eis interius +motivum gratiae et virtutis. Sic igitur boni perfecte subsunt legi +aeternae, tanquam semper secundum eam agentes. Mali autem subsunt +quidem legi aeternae, imperfecte quidem quantum ad actiones +ipsorum, prout imperfecte cognoscunt et imperfecte inclinantur ad +bonum, sed quantum deficit ex parte actionis, suppletur ex parte +passionis, prout scilicet intantum patiuntur quod lex aeterna +dictat de eis, inquantum deficiunt facere quod legi aeternae +convenit. Unde Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib. Arb., iustos sub +aeterna lege agere existimo. Et in libro de catechizandis +rudibus, dicit quod Deus ex iusta miseria animarum se +deserentium, convenientissimis legibus inferiores partes creaturae +suae novit ornare.
+ Reply to Objection 1: This saying of the Apostle may be understood in two ways. First, so that a man is said to be under the law, through being + pinned down thereby, against his will, as by a load. Hence, on the same passage a gloss says that "he is under the law, who + refrains from evil deeds, through fear of punishment threatened by the law, and not from love of virtue." In this way the + spiritual man is not under the law, because he fulfils the law willingly, through + charity which is poured into his heart by the Holy Ghost. Secondly, it can be understood as meaning that the works of a man, + who is led by the Holy Ghost, are the works of the Holy Ghost rather than his own. Therefore, since the Holy Ghost is not + under the law, as neither is the Son, as stated above (A[4], ad 2); it follows that such works, in so far as they are of the + Holy Ghost, are not under the law. The Apostle witnesses to this when he says ( + 2 Cor. 3:17): "Where the + Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty." +
[37575] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod illud verbum apostoli potest intelligi +dupliciter. Uno modo, ut esse sub lege intelligatur ille qui nolens +obligationi legis subditur, quasi cuidam ponderi. Unde Glossa +ibidem dicit quod sub lege est qui timore supplicii quod lex +minatur, non amore iustitiae, a malo opere abstinet. Et hoc +modo spirituales viri non sunt sub lege, quia per caritatem, quam +spiritus sanctus cordibus eorum infundit, voluntarie id quod legis +est, implent. Alio modo potest etiam intelligi inquantum hominis +opera qui spiritu sancto agitur, magis dicuntur esse opera spiritus +sancti quam ipsius hominis. Unde cum spiritus sanctus non sit sub +lege, sicut nec filius, ut supra dictum est; sequitur quod +huiusmodi opera, inquantum sunt spiritus sancti, non sint sub lege. +Et huic attestatur quod apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. III, ubi +spiritus domini, ibi libertas.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The prudence of the flesh cannot be subject to the law of God as regards action; since it inclines to actions contrary to + the Divine law: yet it is subject to the law of God, as regards passion; since it deserves to suffer punishment according + to the law of Divine justice. Nevertheless in no man does the prudence of the flesh dominate so far as to destroy the whole + good of his nature: and consequently there remains in man the inclination to act in + accordance with the eternal law. For we have seen above ( + Q[85], A[2]) that sin does not destroy entirely the good of nature. +
[37576] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod prudentia carnis non potest subiici legi Dei ex parte +actionis, quia inclinat ad actiones contrarias legi Dei. Subiicitur +tamen legi Dei ex parte passionis, quia meretur pati poenam +secundum legem divinae iustitiae. Nihilominus tamen in nullo homine +ita prudentia carnis dominatur, quod totum bonum naturae +corrumpatur. Et ideo remanet in homine inclinatio ad agendum ea +quae sunt legis aeternae. Habitum est enim supra quod peccatum non +tollit totum bonum naturae.
+ Reply to Objection 3: A thing is maintained in the end and moved towards the end by one and the same cause: thus gravity which makes a heavy body + rest in the lower place is also the cause of its being moved thither. We therefore reply that as it is according to the eternal + law that some deserve happiness, others unhappiness, so is it by the eternal law that some are maintained in a happy state, + others in an unhappy state. Accordingly both the blessed and the damned are + under the eternal law. +
[37577] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod idem est per quod aliquid conservatur in fine, et per +quod movetur ad finem, sicut corpus grave gravitate quiescit in +loco inferiori, per quam etiam ad locum ipsum movetur. Et sic +dicendum est quod, sicut secundum legem aeternam aliqui merentur +beatitudinem vel miseriam, ita per eandem legem in beatitudine vel +miseria conservantur. Et secundum hoc, et beati et damnati subsunt +legi aeternae.
We must now consider the natural law; concerning which there are six points of inquiry:
(2) What are the precepts of the natural law?
(3) Whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law?
+[37578] +Iª-IIae q. 94 pr. Deinde considerandum est de lege +naturali. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, quid sit lex +naturalis. Secundo, quae sint praecepta legis naturalis. Tertio, +utrum omnes actus virtutum sint de lege naturali. Quarto, utrum lex +naturalis sit una apud omnes. Quinto, utrum sit mutabilis. Sexto, +utrum possit a mente hominis deleri.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law is a habit. Because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5), "there are three things in + the soul: power, habit, and passion." But the natural law is not one of the soul's powers: nor is it one of the passions; + as we may see by going through them one by one. Therefore the natural law is a habit. +
[37579] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex naturalis sit habitus. Quia ut +philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., tria sunt in anima, potentia, +habitus et passio. Sed naturalis lex non est aliqua potentiarum +animae, nec aliqua passionum, ut patet enumerando per singula. Ergo +lex naturalis est habitus.
+ Objection 2: Further, Basil [*Damascene, De Fide Orth. iv, 22] says that the conscience or "synderesis is the law of our mind"; which + can only apply to the natural law. But the "synderesis" is a habit, as was shown in the + FP, Q[79], A[12]. Therefore the natural law is a habit. +
[37580] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Basilius dicit quod conscientia, sive synderesis, est lex +intellectus nostri, quod non potest intelligi nisi de lege +naturali. Sed synderesis est habitus quidam, ut in primo habitum +est. Ergo lex naturalis est habitus.
+ Objection 3: Further, the natural law abides in man always, as will be shown further on + (A[6]). But man's reason, which the law regards, does not always think about the natural law. Therefore the natural law is not an + act, but a habit. +
[37581] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +lex naturalis semper in homine manet, ut infra patebit. Sed non +semper ratio hominis, ad quam lex pertinet, cogitat de lege +naturali. Ergo lex naturalis non est actus, sed habitus.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that "a habit is that whereby something is done when necessary." But such is not the + natural law: since it is in infants and in the damned who cannot act by it. Therefore the natural law is not a habit. +
[37582] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de bono coniugali, quod +habitus est quo aliquid agitur cum opus est. Sed naturalis +lex non est huiusmodi, est enim in parvulis et damnatis, qui per +eam agere non possunt. Ergo lex naturalis non est habitus.
+ I answer that, A thing may be called a habit in two ways. First, properly and essentially: and thus the natural law is not a habit. For + it has been stated above ( + Q[90], A[1], ad 2) that the natural law is something appointed by reason, just as a proposition is a work of reason. Now that which a + man does is not the same as that whereby he does it: for he makes a becoming speech by the habit of grammar. Since then a + habit is that by which we act, a + law cannot be a habit properly and essentially. +
Secondly, the term habit may be applied to that which we hold by a habit: thus faith may mean that which we hold by faith. + And accordingly, since the precepts of the natural law are sometimes considered by reason actually, while sometimes they are + in the reason only habitually, in this way the natural law may be called a habit. Thus, in speculative matters, the indemonstrable + principles are not the habit itself whereby we hold those principles, but are the principles the habit + of which we possess. +
[37583] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod aliquid potest dici esse habitus dupliciter. Uno +modo, proprie et essentialiter, et sic lex naturalis non est +habitus. Dictum est enim supra quod lex naturalis est aliquid per +rationem constitutum, sicut etiam propositio est quoddam opus +rationis. Non est autem idem quod quis agit, et quo quis agit, +aliquis enim per habitum grammaticae agit orationem congruam. Cum +igitur habitus sit quo quis agit, non potest esse quod lex aliqua +sit habitus proprie et essentialiter. Alio modo potest dici habitus +id quod habitu tenetur, sicut dicitur fides id quod fide tenetur. +Et hoc modo, quia praecepta legis naturalis quandoque considerantur +in actu a ratione, quandoque autem sunt in ea habitualiter tantum, +secundum hunc modum potest dici quod lex naturalis sit habitus. +Sicut etiam principia indemonstrabilia in speculativis non sunt +ipse habitus principiorum, sed sunt principia quorum est +habitus.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher proposes there to discover the genus of virtue; and since it is evident that virtue is a principle of action, + he mentions only those things which are principles of human acts, viz. powers, habits and passions. But there are other things + in the soul besides these three: there are acts; thus "to will" is in the one that wills; again, things known are in the knower; + moreover its own natural properties are in the soul, such as immortality + and the like. +
[37584] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod philosophus intendit ibi investigare genus +virtutis, et cum manifestum sit quod virtus sit quoddam principium +actus, illa tantum ponit quae sunt principia humanorum actuum, +scilicet potentias, habitus et passiones. Praeter haec autem tria +sunt quaedam alia in anima, sicut quidam actus, ut velle est in +volente; et etiam cognita sunt in cognoscente; et proprietates +naturales animae insunt ei, ut immortalitas et alia huiusmodi.
+ Reply to Objection 2: "Synderesis" is said to be the law of our mind, because it is a habit containing the precepts of the natural law, which are + the first principles of human actions. +
[37585] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod synderesis dicitur lex intellectus nostri, inquantum +est habitus continens praecepta legis naturalis, quae sunt prima +principia operum humanorum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: This argument proves that the natural law is held habitually; and this is granted. +
[37586] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa concludit quod lex naturalis habitualiter +tenetur. Et hoc concedimus.
+ Reply to Objection 4: To the argument advanced in the contrary sense we reply that sometimes a man is unable to make use of that which is in him + habitually, on account of some impediment: thus, on account of sleep, a man is unable to use the habit of science. In like + manner, through the deficiency of his age, a child cannot use the habit of understanding of principles, or the natural law, + which is in him habitually. +
[37587] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 1 ad 4 Ad id vero +quod in contrarium obiicitur, dicendum quod eo quod habitualiter +inest, quandoque aliquis uti non potest propter aliquod +impedimentum, sicut homo non potest uti habitu scientiae propter +somnum. Et similiter puer non potest uti habitu intellectus +principiorum, vel etiam lege naturali, quae ei habitualiter inest, +propter defectum aetatis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law contains, not several precepts, but one only. For law is a kind of precept, as stated + above ( + Q[92], A[2]). If therefore there were many precepts of the natural law, it would follow that there are also many natural laws. +
[37588] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex naturalis non contineat plura +praecepta, sed unum tantum. Lex enim continetur in genere +praecepti, ut supra habitum est. Si igitur essent multa praecepta +legis naturalis, sequeretur quod etiam essent multae leges +naturales.
+ Objection 2: Further, the natural law is consequent to human nature. But human nature, as a whole, is one; though, as to its parts, it + is manifold. Therefore, either there is but one precept of the law of nature, on account of the unity of nature as a whole; + or there are many, by reason of the number of parts of human nature. The result would be that even things relating to the + inclination of the concupiscible faculty belong to the natural law. +
[37589] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +lex naturalis consequitur hominis naturam. Sed humana natura est +una secundum totum, licet sit multiplex secundum partes. Aut ergo +est unum praeceptum tantum legis naturae, propter unitatem totius, +aut sunt multa, secundum multitudinem partium humanae naturae. Et +sic oportebit quod etiam ea quae sunt de inclinatione +concupiscibilis, pertineant ad legem naturalem.
+ Objection 3: Further, law is something pertaining to reason, as stated above ( + Q[90], A[1]). Now reason is but one in man. Therefore there is only one precept of the natural law. +
[37590] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +lex est aliquid ad rationem pertinens, ut supra dictum est. Sed +ratio in homine est una tantum. Ergo solum unum praeceptum est +legis naturalis.
+ On the contrary, The precepts of the natural law in man stand in relation to practical matters, as the first principles to matters of demonstration. + But there are several first indemonstrable principles. Therefore there are also several precepts of the natural law. +
[37591] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quia sic se habent praecepta legis naturalis in homine quantum +ad operabilia, sicut se habent prima principia in demonstrativis. +Sed prima principia indemonstrabilia sunt plura. Ergo etiam +praecepta legis naturae sunt plura.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + Q[91], A[3]), the precepts of the natural law are to the practical reason, what the first principles of demonstrations are to the speculative + reason; because both are self-evident principles. Now a thing is said to be self-evident in two ways: first, in itself; secondly, + in relation to us. Any proposition is said to be self-evident in itself, if its predicate is contained in the notion of the + subject: although, to + one who knows not the definition of the subject, it happens that such a proposition is not self-evident. For instance, this + proposition, "Man is a rational being," is, in its very nature, self-evident, since who says "man," says "a rational being": + and yet to one who knows not what a man is, this proposition is not self-evident. Hence it is that, as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), + certain axioms or propositions are universally self-evident to all; and such are those propositions whose terms are + known to all, as, "Every whole is greater than its part," and, "Things equal to one and the same are equal to one another." + But some propositions are self-evident only to the wise, who understand the meaning of the terms of such propositions: thus + to one who understands that an angel is not a body, it is self-evident that an angel is not circumscriptively in a place: + but this is not evident to the unlearned, for they cannot grasp it. +
Now a certain order is to be found in those things that are apprehended universally. For that which, before aught else, falls + under apprehension, is "being," the notion of which is included in all things whatsoever a man apprehends. Wherefore the first + indemonstrable principle is that "the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time," which is based on the notion + of "being" and "not-being": and on this principle all others are based, as is stated in Metaph. iv, + text. 9. Now as "being" is the first thing that falls under the apprehension simply, so "good" is the first thing that falls + under the apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed to action: since every agent acts for an end under the aspect + of good. Consequently the first principle of practical reason is one founded on the notion of good, viz. that "good is that + which all things seek after." Hence this is the first precept of law, that "good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to + be avoided." All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends + as man's good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided. +
Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a contrary, hence it is that all those things to which + man has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and consequently as objects of pursuit, + and their contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations, is the order + of the precepts of the natural law. Because in man there is first of all an inclination to good in + accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substances: inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation + of its own being, according to its nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of preserving human life, + and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law. Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that pertain + to him more specially, according to that nature which he has in common with other animals: and in virtue of this inclination, + those things are said to belong to the natural law, "which nature has taught to all animals" [*Pandect. Just. I, tit. i], + such as sexual intercourse, education of offspring and so forth. Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to good, according + to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him: thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, + and to live in society: and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance, + to + shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination. +
[37592] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, praecepta legis naturae hoc +modo se habent ad rationem practicam, sicut principia prima +demonstrationum se habent ad rationem speculativam, utraque enim +sunt quaedam principia per se nota. Dicitur autem aliquid per se +notum dupliciter, uno modo, secundum se; alio modo, quoad nos. +Secundum se quidem quaelibet propositio dicitur per se nota, cuius +praedicatum est de ratione subiecti, contingit tamen quod ignoranti +definitionem subiecti, talis propositio non erit per se nota. Sicut +ista propositio, homo est rationale, est per se nota secundum sui +naturam, quia qui dicit hominem, dicit rationale, et tamen +ignoranti quid sit homo, haec propositio non est per se nota. Et +inde est quod, sicut dicit Boetius, in libro de Hebdomad., quaedam +sunt dignitates vel propositiones per se notae communiter omnibus, +et huiusmodi sunt illae propositiones quarum termini sunt omnibus +noti, ut, omne totum est maius sua parte, et, quae uni et eidem +sunt aequalia, sibi invicem sunt aequalia. Quaedam vero +propositiones sunt per se notae solis sapientibus, qui terminos +propositionum intelligunt quid significent, sicut intelligenti quod +Angelus non est corpus, per se notum est quod non est +circumscriptive in loco, quod non est manifestum rudibus, qui hoc +non capiunt. In his autem quae in apprehensione omnium cadunt, +quidam ordo invenitur. Nam illud quod primo cadit in apprehensione, +est ens, cuius intellectus includitur in omnibus quaecumque quis +apprehendit. Et ideo primum principium indemonstrabile est quod non +est simul affirmare et negare, quod fundatur supra rationem entis +et non entis, et super hoc principio omnia alia fundantur, ut +dicitur in IV Metaphys. Sicut autem ens est primum quod cadit in +apprehensione simpliciter, ita bonum est primum quod cadit in +apprehensione practicae rationis, quae ordinatur ad opus, omne enim +agens agit propter finem, qui habet rationem boni. Et ideo primum +principium in ratione practica est quod fundatur supra rationem +boni, quae est, bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Hoc est ergo primum +praeceptum legis, quod bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et +malum vitandum. Et super hoc fundantur omnia alia praecepta legis +naturae, ut scilicet omnia illa facienda vel vitanda pertineant ad +praecepta legis naturae, quae ratio practica naturaliter +apprehendit esse bona humana. Quia vero bonum habet rationem finis, +malum autem rationem contrarii, inde est quod omnia illa ad quae +homo habet naturalem inclinationem, ratio naturaliter apprehendit +ut bona, et per consequens ut opere prosequenda, et contraria eorum +ut mala et vitanda. Secundum igitur ordinem inclinationum +naturalium, est ordo praeceptorum legis naturae. Inest enim primo +inclinatio homini ad bonum secundum naturam in qua communicat cum +omnibus substantiis, prout scilicet quaelibet substantia appetit +conservationem sui esse secundum suam naturam. Et secundum hanc +inclinationem, pertinent ad legem naturalem ea per quae vita +hominis conservatur, et contrarium impeditur. Secundo inest homini +inclinatio ad aliqua magis specialia, secundum naturam in qua +communicat cum ceteris animalibus. Et secundum hoc, dicuntur ea +esse de lege naturali quae natura omnia animalia docuit, ut est +coniunctio maris et feminae, et educatio liberorum, et similia. +Tertio modo inest homini inclinatio ad bonum secundum naturam +rationis, quae est sibi propria, sicut homo habet naturalem +inclinationem ad hoc quod veritatem cognoscat de Deo, et ad hoc +quod in societate vivat. Et secundum hoc, ad legem naturalem +pertinent ea quae ad huiusmodi inclinationem spectant, utpote quod +homo ignorantiam vitet, quod alios non offendat cum quibus debet +conversari, et cetera huiusmodi quae ad hoc spectant.
+ Reply to Objection 1: All these precepts of the law of nature have the character of one natural law, inasmuch as they flow from one first precept. +
[37593] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod omnia ista praecepta legis naturae, inquantum +referuntur ad unum primum praeceptum, habent rationem unius legis +naturalis.
+ Reply to Objection 2: All the inclinations of any parts whatsoever of human nature, e.g. of the concupiscible and irascible parts, in so far as + they are ruled by reason, belong to the natural law, and are reduced to one first precept, as stated above: so that the precepts + of the natural law are many in themselves, but are based on one common foundation. +
[37594] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod omnes inclinationes quarumcumque partium humanae +naturae, puta concupiscibilis et irascibilis, secundum quod +regulantur ratione, pertinent ad legem naturalem, et reducuntur ad +unum primum praeceptum, ut dictum est. Et secundum hoc, sunt multa +praecepta legis naturae in seipsis, quae tamen communicant in una +radice.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Although reason is one in itself, yet it directs all things regarding man; so that whatever can be ruled by reason, is contained + under the law of reason. +
[37595] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio, etsi in se una sit, tamen est ordinativa +omnium quae ad homines spectant. Et secundum hoc, sub lege rationis +continentur omnia ea quae ratione regulari possunt.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that not all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law. Because, as stated above ( + Q[90], A[2]) it is essential to a law that it be ordained to the common good. But some acts of virtue are ordained to the private good + of the individual, as is evident especially in regards to acts of temperance. Therefore not all acts of virtue are the subject + of natural law. +
[37596] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnes actus virtutum sint de lege +naturae. Quia, ut supra dictum est, de ratione legis est ut +ordinetur ad bonum commune. Sed quidam virtutum actus ordinantur ad +bonum privatum alicuius, ut patet praecipue in actibus +temperantiae. Non ergo omnes actus virtutum legi subduntur +naturali.
+ Objection 2: Further, every sin is opposed to some virtuous act. If therefore all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law, it + seems to follow that all sins are against nature: whereas this applies to certain special sins. +
[37597] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +omnia peccata aliquibus virtuosis actibus opponuntur. Si igitur +omnes actus virtutum sint de lege naturae, videtur ex consequenti +quod omnia peccata sint contra naturam. Quod tamen specialiter de +quibusdam peccatis dicitur.
+ Objection 3: Further, those things which are according to nature are common to all. But acts of virtue are not common to all: since a + thing is virtuous in one, and vicious in another. Therefore not all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law. +
[37598] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +in his quae sunt secundum naturam, omnes conveniunt. Sed in actibus +virtutum non omnes conveniunt, aliquid enim est virtuosum uni, quod +est alteri vitiosum. Ergo non omnes actus virtutum sunt de lege +naturae.
+ On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4) that "virtues are natural." Therefore virtuous acts also are a subject of the natural + law. +
[37599] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, quod virtutes sunt +naturales. Ergo et actus virtuosi subiacent legi naturae.
+ I answer that, We may speak of virtuous acts in two ways: first, under the aspect of virtuous; secondly, as such and such acts considered + in their proper species. If then we speak of acts of virtue, considered as virtuous, thus all virtuous acts belong to the + natural law. For it has been stated + (A[2]) that to the natural law belongs everything to which a man is inclined according to his nature. Now each thing is inclined + naturally to an operation + that is suitable to it according to its form: thus fire is inclined to give heat. Wherefore, since the rational soul is the + proper form of man, there is in every man a natural inclination to act according to reason: and this is to act according to + virtue. Consequently, considered thus, all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law: since each one's reason naturally + dictates to him to act virtuously. But if we speak of virtuous acts, considered in themselves, i.e. in their proper species, + thus not all virtuous acts are prescribed by the natural law: for many things are done virtuously, to which nature does not + incline at first; but which, through the inquiry of reason, have been found by men to be conducive to well-living. +
[37600] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod de actibus virtuosis dupliciter loqui possumus, uno +modo, inquantum sunt virtuosi; alio modo, inquantum sunt tales +actus in propriis speciebus considerati. Si igitur loquamur de +actibus virtutum inquantum sunt virtuosi, sic omnes actus virtuosi +pertinent ad legem naturae. Dictum est enim quod ad legem naturae +pertinet omne illud ad quod homo inclinatur secundum suam naturam. +Inclinatur autem unumquodque naturaliter ad operationem sibi +convenientem secundum suam formam, sicut ignis ad calefaciendum. +Unde cum anima rationalis sit propria forma hominis, naturalis +inclinatio inest cuilibet homini ad hoc quod agat secundum +rationem. Et hoc est agere secundum virtutem. Unde secundum hoc, +omnes actus virtutum sunt de lege naturali, dictat enim hoc +naturaliter unicuique propria ratio, ut virtuose agat. Sed si +loquamur de actibus virtuosis secundum seipsos, prout scilicet in +propriis speciebus considerantur, sic non omnes actus virtuosi sunt +de lege naturae. Multa enim secundum virtutem fiunt, ad quae natura +non primo inclinat; sed per rationis inquisitionem ea homines +adinvenerunt, quasi utilia ad bene vivendum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Temperance is about the natural concupiscences of food, drink and sexual matters, which are indeed ordained to the natural + common good, just as other matters of law are ordained to the moral common good. +
[37601] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod temperantia est circa concupiscentias naturales +cibi et potus et venereorum, quae quidem ordinantur ad bonum +commune naturae, sicut et alia legalia ordinantur ad bonum commune +morale.
+ Reply to Objection 2: By human nature we may mean either that which is proper to man---and in this sense all sins, as being against reason, are + also against nature, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): or we may mean that nature which is common to man and other + animals; and in this sense, certain special sins are said to be against nature; thus contrary to sexual intercourse, which + is natural to all animals, is unisexual lust, which has received the special name of + the unnatural crime. +
[37602] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod natura hominis potest dici vel illa quae est propria +homini, et secundum hoc, omnia peccata, inquantum sunt contra +rationem, sunt etiam contra naturam, ut patet per Damascenum, in II +libro. Vel illa quae est communis homini et aliis animalibus, et +secundum hoc, quaedam specialia peccata dicuntur esse contra +naturam; sicut contra commixtionem maris et feminae, quae est +naturalis omnibus animalibus, est concubitus masculorum, quod +specialiter dicitur vitium contra naturam.
+ Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers acts in themselves. For it is owing to the various conditions of men, that certain acts are virtuous + for some, as being proportionate and becoming to them, while they are vicious for others, as being out of proportion to them. +
[37603] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de actibus secundum seipsos +consideratis. Sic enim, propter diversas hominum conditiones, +contingit quod aliqui actus sunt aliquibus virtuosi, tanquam eis +proportionati et convenientes, qui tamen sunt aliis vitiosi, +tanquam eis non proportionati.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law is not the same in all. For it is stated in the Decretals (Dist. i) that "the natural + law is that which is contained in the Law and the Gospel." But this is not common to all men; because, as it is written ( + Rom. 10:16), "all do not obey the gospel." Therefore the natural law is not the same in all men. +
[37604] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex naturae non sit una apud omnes. +Dicitur enim in decretis, dist. I, quod ius naturale est quod in +lege et in Evangelio continetur. Sed hoc non est commune +omnibus, quia, ut dicitur Rom. X, non omnes obediunt +Evangelio. Ergo lex naturalis non est una apud omnes.
+ Objection 2: Further, "Things which are according to the law are said to be just," as stated in Ethic. v. But it is stated in the same + book that nothing is so universally just as not to be subject to change in regard to some men. Therefore even the natural + law is not the same in all men. +
[37605] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +ea quae sunt secundum legem, iusta esse dicuntur, ut dicitur in V +Ethic. Sed in eodem libro dicitur quod nihil est ita iustum apud +omnes, quin apud aliquos diversificetur. Ergo lex etiam naturalis +non est apud omnes eadem.
+ Objection 3: Further, as stated above ( + AA[2],3), to the natural law belongs everything to which a man is inclined according to his nature. Now different men are naturally + inclined to different things; some to the desire of pleasures, others to the desire of honors, and other men to other things. + Therefore there is not one natural law for all. +
[37606] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +ad legem naturae pertinet id ad quod homo secundum naturam suam +inclinatur, ut supra dictum est. Sed diversi homines naturaliter ad +diversa inclinantur, alii quidem ad concupiscentiam voluptatum, +alii ad desideria honorum, alii ad alia. Ergo non est una lex +naturalis apud omnes.
+ On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 4): "The natural law is common to all nations." +
[37607] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., ius naturale est +commune omnium nationum.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + AA[2],3), to the natural law belongs those things to which a man is inclined naturally: and among these it is proper to man to + be inclined to act according to reason. Now the process of reason is from the common to the proper, as stated in Phys. i. + The speculative reason, however, is differently situated in this matter, from the practical reason. For, since the speculative + reason is busied chiefly with the necessary + things, which cannot be otherwise than they are, its proper conclusions, like the universal principles, contain the truth + without fail. The practical reason, on the other hand, is busied with contingent matters, about which human actions are concerned: + and consequently, although there is necessity in the general principles, the more we descend to matters of detail, the more + frequently we encounter defects. Accordingly then in speculative matters truth is the same in all men, both as to + principles and as to conclusions: although the truth is not known to all as regards the conclusions, but only as regards the + principles which are called common notions. But in matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all, + as to matters of detail, but only as to the general principles: and where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail, + it is not equally known to all. +
It is therefore evident that, as regards the general principles whether of speculative or of practical reason, truth or rectitude + is the same for all, and is equally known by all. As to the proper conclusions of the speculative reason, the truth is the + same for all, but is not equally known to all: thus it is true for all that the three angles of a triangle are together equal + to two right angles, although it is not known to all. But as to the proper conclusions of the practical + reason, neither is the truth or rectitude the same for all, nor, where it is the same, is it equally known by all. Thus it + is right and true for all to act according to reason: and from this principle it follows as a proper conclusion, that goods + entrusted to another should be restored to their owner. Now this is true for the majority of cases: but it may happen in a + particular case that it would be injurious, and therefore unreasonable, to restore goods held in trust; for instance, if they + are + claimed for the purpose of fighting against one's country. And this principle will be found to fail the more, according as + we descend further into detail, e.g. if one were to say that goods held in trust should be restored with such and such a guarantee, + or in such and such a way; because the greater the number of conditions added, the greater the number of ways in which the + principle may fail, so that it be not right to restore or not to restore. +
Consequently we must say that the natural law, as to general principles, is the same for all, both as to rectitude and as + to knowledge. But as to certain matters of detail, which are conclusions, as it were, of those general principles, it is the + same for all in the majority of cases, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge; and yet in some few cases it may fail, both + as to rectitude, by reason of certain obstacles (just as natures subject to generation and corruption fail in + some few cases on account of some obstacle), and as to knowledge, since in some the reason is perverted by passion, or evil + habit, or an evil disposition of nature; thus formerly, theft, although it is expressly contrary to the natural law, was not + considered wrong among the Germans, as Julius Caesar relates (De Bello Gall. vi). +
[37608] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad legem naturae pertinent +ea ad quae homo naturaliter inclinatur; inter quae homini proprium +est ut inclinetur ad agendum secundum rationem. Ad rationem autem +pertinet ex communibus ad propria procedere, ut patet ex I Physic. +Aliter tamen circa hoc se habet ratio speculativa, et aliter ratio +practica. Quia enim ratio speculativa praecipue negotiatur circa +necessaria, quae impossibile est aliter se habere, absque aliquo +defectu invenitur veritas in conclusionibus propriis, sicut et in +principiis communibus. Sed ratio practica negotiatur circa +contingentia, in quibus sunt operationes humanae, et ideo, etsi in +communibus sit aliqua necessitas, quanto magis ad propria +descenditur, tanto magis invenitur defectus. Sic igitur in +speculativis est eadem veritas apud omnes tam in principiis quam in +conclusionibus, licet veritas non apud omnes cognoscatur in +conclusionibus, sed solum in principiis, quae dicuntur communes +conceptiones. In operativis autem non est eadem veritas vel +rectitudo practica apud omnes quantum ad propria, sed solum quantum +ad communia, et apud illos apud quos est eadem rectitudo in +propriis, non est aequaliter omnibus nota. Sic igitur patet quod, +quantum ad communia principia rationis sive speculativae sive +practicae, est eadem veritas seu rectitudo apud omnes, et +aequaliter nota. Quantum vero ad proprias conclusiones rationis +speculativae, est eadem veritas apud omnes, non tamen aequaliter +omnibus nota, apud omnes enim verum est quod triangulus habet tres +angulos aequales duobus rectis, quamvis hoc non sit omnibus notum. +Sed quantum ad proprias conclusiones rationis practicae, nec est +eadem veritas seu rectitudo apud omnes; nec etiam apud quos est +eadem, est aequaliter nota. Apud omnes enim hoc rectum est et +verum, ut secundum rationem agatur. Ex hoc autem principio sequitur +quasi conclusio propria, quod deposita sint reddenda. Et hoc quidem +ut in pluribus verum est, sed potest in aliquo casu contingere quod +sit damnosum, et per consequens irrationabile, si deposita +reddantur; puta si aliquis petat ad impugnandam patriam. Et hoc +tanto magis invenitur deficere, quanto magis ad particularia +descenditur, puta si dicatur quod deposita sunt reddenda cum tali +cautione, vel tali modo, quanto enim plures conditiones +particulares apponuntur, tanto pluribus modis poterit deficere, ut +non sit rectum vel in reddendo vel in non reddendo. Sic igitur +dicendum est quod lex naturae, quantum ad prima principia communia, +est eadem apud omnes et secundum rectitudinem, et secundum +notitiam. Sed quantum ad quaedam propria, quae sunt quasi +conclusiones principiorum communium, est eadem apud omnes ut in +pluribus et secundum rectitudinem et secundum notitiam, sed ut in +paucioribus potest deficere et quantum ad rectitudinem, propter +aliqua particularia impedimenta (sicut etiam naturae generabiles et +corruptibiles deficiunt ut in paucioribus, propter impedimenta), et +etiam quantum ad notitiam; et hoc propter hoc quod aliqui habent +depravatam rationem ex passione, seu ex mala consuetudine, seu ex +mala habitudine naturae; sicut apud germanos olim latrocinium non +reputabatur iniquum, cum tamen sit expresse contra legem naturae, +ut refert Iulius Caesar, in libro de bello Gallico.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The meaning of the sentence quoted is not that whatever is contained in the Law and the Gospel belongs to the natural law, + since they contain many things that are above nature; but that whatever belongs to the natural law is fully contained in them. + Wherefore Gratian, after saying that "the natural law is what is contained in the Law and the Gospel," adds at once, by way + of example, "by which everyone is commanded to do to others as he would be done + by." +
[37609] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod verbum illud non est sic intelligendum quasi +omnia quae in lege et in Evangelio continentur, sint de lege +naturae, cum multa tradantur ibi supra naturam, sed quia ea quae +sunt de lege naturae, plenarie ibi traduntur. Unde cum dixisset +Gratianus quod ius naturale est quod in lege et in Evangelio +continetur, statim, exemplificando, subiunxit, quo quisque +iubetur alii facere quod sibi vult fieri.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The saying of the Philosopher is to be understood of things that are naturally just, not as general principles, but as conclusions + drawn from them, having rectitude in the majority of cases, but failing in a few. +
[37610] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod verbum philosophi est intelligendum de his quae sunt +naturaliter iusta non sicut principia communia, sed sicut quaedam +conclusiones ex his derivatae; quae ut in pluribus rectitudinem +habent, et ut in paucioribus deficiunt.
+ Reply to Objection 3: As, in man, reason rules and commands the other powers, so all the natural inclinations belonging to the other powers must + needs be directed according to reason. Wherefore it is universally right for all men, that all their inclinations should be + directed according to reason. +
[37611] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut ratio in homine dominatur et imperat aliis +potentiis, ita oportet quod omnes inclinationes naturales ad alias +potentias pertinentes ordinentur secundum rationem. Unde hoc est +apud omnes communiter rectum, ut secundum rationem dirigantur omnes +hominum inclinationes.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law can be changed. Because on + Ecclus. 17:9, "He gave them instructions, and the law of life," the gloss says: "He wished the law of the letter to be written, in order + to correct the law of nature." But that which is corrected is changed. Therefore the natural law can be changed. +
[37612] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex naturae mutari possit. Quia super +illud Eccli. XVII, addidit eis disciplinam et legem vitae, +dicit Glossa, legem litterae, quantum ad correctionem legis +naturalis, scribi voluit. Sed illud quod corrigitur, mutatur. +Ergo lex naturalis potest mutari.
+ Objection 2: Further, the slaying of the innocent, adultery, and theft are against the natural law. But we find these things changed by + God: as when God commanded Abraham to slay his innocent son ( + Gn. 22:2); and when he ordered the Jews to borrow and purloin the vessels of the Egyptians ( + Ex. 12:35); and when He commanded Osee to take to himself "a wife of fornications" ( + Osee 1:2). Therefore the natural law can be changed. +
[37613] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +contra legem naturalem est occisio innocentis, et etiam adulterium +et furtum. Sed ista inveniuntur esse mutata a Deo, puta cum Deus +praecepit Abrahae quod occideret filium innocentem, ut habetur Gen. +XXII; et cum praecepit Iudaeis ut mutuata Aegyptiorum vasa +subriperent, ut habetur Exod. XII; et cum praecepit Osee ut uxorem +fornicariam acciperet, ut habetur Osee I. Ergo lex naturalis potest +mutari.
+ Objection 3: Further, Isidore says (Etym. 5:4) that "the + possession of all things in common, and universal freedom, are matters of natural law." But these things are seen to be changed + by human laws. Therefore it seems that the natural law is subject to change. +
[37614] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., quod communis omnium +possessio, et una libertas, est de iure naturali. Sed haec +videmus esse commutata per leges humanas. Ergo videtur quod lex +naturalis sit mutabilis.
+ On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (Dist. v): "The natural law dates from the creation of the rational creature. It does not vary + according to time, but remains unchangeable." +
[37615] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur in decretis, dist. V, naturale ius ab exordio +rationalis creaturae. Nec variatur tempore, sed immutabile +permanet.
+ I answer that, A change in the natural law may be understood in two ways. First, by way of addition. In this sense nothing hinders the natural + law from being changed: since many things for the benefit of human life have been added over and above the natural law, both + by the Divine law and by human laws. +
Secondly, a change in the natural law may be understood by way of subtraction, so that what previously was according to the + natural law, ceases to be so. In this sense, the natural law is altogether unchangeable in its first principles: but in its + secondary principles, which, as we have said + (A[4]), are certain detailed proximate conclusions drawn from the first principles, the natural law is not changed so that what + it prescribes be not right in most + cases. But it may be changed in some particular cases of rare occurrence, through some special causes hindering the observance + of such precepts, as stated above + (A[4]). +
[37616] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod lex naturalis potest intelligi mutari dupliciter. Uno +modo, per hoc quod aliquid ei addatur. Et sic nihil prohibet legem +naturalem mutari, multa enim supra legem naturalem superaddita +sunt, ad humanam vitam utilia, tam per legem divinam, quam etiam +per leges humanas. Alio modo intelligitur mutatio legis naturalis +per modum subtractionis, ut scilicet aliquid desinat esse de lege +naturali, quod prius fuit secundum legem naturalem. Et sic quantum +ad prima principia legis naturae, lex naturae est omnino +immutabilis. Quantum autem ad secunda praecepta, quae diximus esse +quasi quasdam proprias conclusiones propinquas primis principiis, +sic lex naturalis non immutatur quin ut in pluribus rectum sit +semper quod lex naturalis habet. Potest tamen immutari in aliquo +particulari, et in paucioribus, propter aliquas speciales causas +impedientes observantiam talium praeceptorum, ut supra dictum +est.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The written law is said to be given for the correction of the natural law, either because it supplies what was wanting to + the natural law; or because the natural law was perverted in the hearts of some men, as to certain matters, so that they esteemed + those things good which are naturally evil; which perversion stood in need of correction. +
[37617] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod lex scripta dicitur esse data ad correctionem +legis naturae, vel quia per legem scriptam suppletum est quod legi +naturae deerat, vel quia lex naturae in aliquorum cordibus, quantum +ad aliqua, corrupta erat intantum ut existimarent esse bona quae +naturaliter sunt mala; et talis corruptio correctione +indigebat.
+ Reply to Objection 2: All men alike, both guilty and innocent, die the death of nature: which death of nature is inflicted by the power of God + on account of original sin, according to + 1 Kings 2:6: "The Lord killeth and maketh alive." Consequently, by the command of God, death can be inflicted on any man, guilty or innocent, + without any injustice whatever. In like manner adultery is intercourse with another's wife; who is allotted to him by the + law + emanating from God. Consequently intercourse with any woman, by the command of God, is neither adultery nor fornication. The + same applies to theft, which is the taking of another's property. For whatever is taken by the command of God, to Whom all + things belong, is not taken against the will of its owner, whereas it is in this that theft consists. Nor is it only in human + things, that whatever is commanded by God is right; but also in natural things, whatever is done by God, is, in some way, + natural, as stated in the + FP, Q[105], A[6], ad 1. +
[37618] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod naturali morte moriuntur omnes communiter, tam +nocentes quam innocentes. Quae quidem naturalis mors divina +potestate inducitur propter peccatum originale; secundum illud I +Reg. II, dominus mortificat et vivificat. Et ideo absque +aliqua iniustitia, secundum mandatum Dei, potest infligi mors +cuicumque homini, vel nocenti vel innocenti. Similiter etiam +adulterium est concubitus cum uxore aliena, quae quidem est ei +deputata secundum legem divinitus traditam. Unde ad quamcumque +mulierem aliquis accedat ex mandato divino, non est adulterium nec +fornicatio. Et eadem ratio est de furto, quod est acceptio rei +alienae. Quidquid enim accipit aliquis ex mandato Dei, qui est +dominus universorum, non accipit absque voluntate domini, quod est +furari. Nec solum in rebus humanis quidquid a Deo mandatur, hoc +ipso est debitum, sed etiam in rebus naturalibus quidquid a Deo +fit, est quodammodo naturale, ut in primo dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: A thing is said to belong to the natural law in two ways. First, because nature inclines thereto: e.g. that one should not + do harm to another. Secondly, because nature did not bring in the contrary: thus we might say that for man to be naked is + of the natural law, because nature did not give him clothes, but art invented them. In this sense, "the possession of all + things in common and universal freedom" are said to be of the natural law, because, to + wit, the distinction of possessions and slavery were not brought in by nature, but devised by human reason for the benefit + of human life. Accordingly the law of nature was not changed in this respect, except by addition. +
[37619] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod aliquid dicitur esse de iure naturali dupliciter. Uno +modo, quia ad hoc natura inclinat, sicut non esse iniuriam alteri +faciendam. Alio modo, quia natura non induxit contrarium, sicut +possemus dicere quod hominem esse nudum est de iure naturali, quia +natura non dedit ei vestitum, sed ars adinvenit. Et hoc modo +communis omnium possessio, et omnium una libertas, dicitur esse de +iure naturali, quia scilicet distinctio possessionum et servitus +non sunt inductae a natura, sed per hominum rationem, ad utilitatem +humanae vitae. Et sic in hoc lex naturae non est mutata nisi per +additionem.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law can be abolished from the heart of man. Because on + Rom. 2:14, "When the Gentiles who have not the law," etc. a gloss says that "the law of righteousness, which sin had blotted out, is + graven on the heart of man when he is restored by grace." But the law of righteousness is the law of nature. Therefore the + law of nature can be blotted out. +
[37620] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex naturae possit a corde hominis +aboleri. Quia Rom. II, super illud, cum gentes, quae legem non +habent, etc., dicit Glossa quod in interiori homine per +gratiam innovato, lex iustitiae inscribitur, quam deleverat +culpa. Sed lex iustitiae est lex naturae. Ergo lex naturae +potest deleri.
+ Objection 2: Further, the law of grace is more efficacious than the law of nature. But the law of grace is blotted out by sin. Much more + therefore can the law of nature be blotted out. +
[37621] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, +lex gratiae est efficacior quam lex naturae. Sed lex gratiae +deletur per culpam. Ergo multo magis lex naturae potest deleri.
+ Objection 3: Further, that which is established by law is made just. But many things are enacted by men, which are contrary to the law + of nature. Therefore the law of nature can be abolished from the heart of man. +
[37622] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, +illud quod lege statuitur, inducitur quasi iustum. Sed multa sunt +ab hominibus statuta contra legem naturae. Ergo lex naturae potest +a cordibus hominum aboleri.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ii): "Thy law is written in the hearts of men, which iniquity itself effaces not." But the law which + is written in men's hearts is the natural law. Therefore the natural law cannot be blotted out. +
[37623] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in II Confess., lex tua scripta est +in cordibus hominum, quam nec ulla quidem delet iniquitas. Sed +lex scripta in cordibus hominum est lex naturalis. Ergo lex +naturalis deleri non potest.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + AA[4],5), there belong to the natural law, first, certain most general precepts, that are known to all; and secondly, certain secondary + and more detailed precepts, which are, as it were, conclusions following closely from first principles. As to those general + principles, the natural law, in the abstract, can nowise be blotted out from men's hearts. But it is blotted out in the case + of a particular action, in so far + as reason is hindered from applying the general principle to a particular point of practice, on account of concupiscence or + some other passion, as stated above (Q[77], A[2]). But as to the other, i.e. the secondary precepts, the natural law can be + blotted out from the human heart, either by evil persuasions, just as in speculative matters errors occur in respect of necessary + conclusions; or by vicious customs and corrupt habits, as among some men, theft, and even unnatural vices, as the Apostle + states (Rom. i), were not esteemed sinful. +
[37624] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 6 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad legem naturalem pertinent +primo quidem quaedam praecepta communissima, quae sunt omnibus +nota, quaedam autem secundaria praecepta magis propria, quae sunt +quasi conclusiones propinquae principiis. Quantum ergo ad illa +principia communia, lex naturalis nullo modo potest a cordibus +hominum deleri in universali. Deletur tamen in particulari +operabili, secundum quod ratio impeditur applicare commune +principium ad particulare operabile, propter concupiscentiam vel +aliquam aliam passionem, ut supra dictum est. Quantum vero ad alia +praecepta secundaria, potest lex naturalis deleri de cordibus +hominum, vel propter malas persuasiones, eo modo quo etiam in +speculativis errores contingunt circa conclusiones necessarias; vel +etiam propter pravas consuetudines et habitus corruptos; sicut apud +quosdam non reputabantur latrocinia peccata, vel etiam vitia contra +naturam, ut etiam apostolus dicit, ad Rom. I.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Sin blots out the law of nature in particular cases, not universally, except perchance in regard to the secondary precepts + of the natural law, in the way stated above. +
[37625] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod culpa delet legem naturae in particulari, non +autem in universali, nisi forte quantum ad secunda praecepta legis +naturae, eo modo quo dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Although grace is more efficacious than nature, yet nature is more essential to man, and therefore more enduring. +
[37626] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod gratia etsi sit efficacior quam natura, tamen natura +essentialior est homini, et ideo magis permanens.
+ Reply to Objection 3: This argument is true of the secondary precepts of the natural law, against which some legislators have framed certain enactments + which are unjust. +
[37627] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de secundis praeceptis legis +naturae, contra quae aliqui legislatores statuta aliqua fecerunt, +quae sunt iniqua.
We must now consider human law; and (1) this law considered in itself; (2) its power; (3) its mutability. Under the first + head there are four points of inquiry: +
+[37628] +Iª-IIae q. 95 pr. Deinde considerandum est de lege +humana. Et primo quidem, de ipsa lege secundum se; secundo, de +potestate eius; tertio, de eius mutabilitate. Circa primum +quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, de utilitate ipsius. Secundo, de origine +eius. Tertio, de qualitate ipsius. Quarto, de divisione +eiusdem.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that it was not useful for laws to be framed by men. Because the purpose of every law is that man be made good + thereby, as stated above ( + Q[92], A[1]). But men are more to be induced to be good willingly by means of admonitions, than against their will, by means of laws. + Therefore there was no need to frame laws. +
[37629] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit utile aliquas leges poni ab +hominibus. Intentio enim cuiuslibet legis est ut per eam homines +fiant boni, sicut supra dictum est. Sed homines magis inducuntur ad +bonum voluntarii per monitiones, quam coacti per leges. Ergo non +fuit necessarium leges ponere.
+ Objection 2: Further, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4), "men have recourse to a judge as to animate justice." But animate justice + is better than inanimate justice, which contained in laws. Therefore it would have been better for the execution of justice + to be entrusted to the decision of judges, than to frame laws in addition. +
[37630] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +sicut dicit philosophus, in V Ethic., ad iudicem confugiunt +homines sicut ad iustum animatum. Sed iustitia animata est +melior quam inanimata, quae legibus continetur. Ergo melius fuisset +ut executio iustitiae committeretur arbitrio iudicum, quam quod +super hoc lex aliqua ederetur.
+ Objection 3: Further, every law is framed for the direction of human actions, as is evident from what has been stated above ( + Q[90], AA[1],2). But since human actions are about singulars, which are infinite in number, matter pertaining to the direction of human + actions cannot be taken into sufficient consideration except by a wise man, who looks into each one of them. Therefore it + would have been better for human acts to be directed by the judgment + of wise men, than by the framing of laws. Therefore there was no need of human laws. +
[37631] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +lex omnis directiva est actuum humanorum, ut ex supradictis patet. +Sed cum humani actus consistant in singularibus, quae sunt +infinita, non possunt ea quae ad directionem humanorum actuum +pertinent, sufficienter considerari, nisi ab aliquo sapiente, qui +inspiciat singula. Ergo melius fuisset arbitrio sapientum dirigi +actus humanos, quam aliqua lege posita. Ergo non fuit necessarium +leges humanas ponere.
+ On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 20): "Laws were made that in fear thereof human audacity might be held in check, that innocence might + be safeguarded in the midst of wickedness, and that the dread of punishment might prevent the wicked from doing harm." But + these things are most necessary to mankind. Therefore it was necessary that human laws should be made. +
[37632] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., factae sunt leges ut +earum metu humana coerceretur audacia, tutaque sit inter improbos +innocentia, et in ipsis improbis formidato supplicio refrenetur +nocendi facultas. Sed haec sunt maxime necessaria humano +generi. Ergo necessarium fuit ponere leges humanas.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + Q[63], A[1]; + Q[94], A[3]), man has a natural aptitude for virtue; but the perfection of virtue must be acquired by man by means of some kind of training. + Thus we observe that man is helped by industry in his necessities, for instance, in food and clothing. Certain beginnings + of these he has from nature, viz. his reason and his hands; but he has not the full complement, as other animals have, + to whom nature has given sufficiency of clothing and food. Now it is difficult to see how man could suffice for himself in + the matter of this training: since the perfection of virtue consists chiefly in withdrawing man from undue pleasures, to which + above all man is inclined, and especially the young, who are more capable of being trained. Consequently a man needs to receive + this training from another, whereby to arrive at the perfection of virtue. And as to those young people who are inclined + to acts of virtue, by their good natural disposition, or by custom, or rather by the gift of God, paternal training suffices, + which is by admonitions. But since some are found to be depraved, and prone to vice, and not easily amenable to words, it + was necessary for such to be restrained from evil by force and fear, in order that, at least, they might desist from evil-doing, + and leave others in peace, and that they themselves, by being habituated in this way, might be brought to do willingly + what hitherto they did from fear, and thus become virtuous. Now this kind of training, which compels through fear of punishment, + is the discipline of laws. Therefore in order that man might have peace and virtue, it was necessary for laws to be framed: + for, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2), "as man is the most noble of animals if he be perfect in virtue, so is he the + lowest of all, if he be severed from law and righteousness"; because man can use his reason to devise means of satisfying + his lusts and evil passions, which other animals are unable to do. +
[37633] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ex supradictis patet, homini naturaliter inest +quaedam aptitudo ad virtutem; sed ipsa virtutis perfectio necesse +est quod homini adveniat per aliquam disciplinam. Sicut etiam +videmus quod per aliquam industriam subvenitur homini in suis +necessitatibus, puta in cibo et vestitu, quorum initia quaedam +habet a natura, scilicet rationem et manus, non autem ipsum +complementum, sicut cetera animalia, quibus natura dedit +sufficienter tegumentum et cibum. Ad hanc autem disciplinam non de +facili invenitur homo sibi sufficiens. Quia perfectio virtutis +praecipue consistit in retrahendo hominem ab indebitis +delectationibus, ad quas praecipue homines sunt proni, et maxime +iuvenes, circa quos efficacior est disciplina. Et ideo oportet quod +huiusmodi disciplinam, per quam ad virtutem perveniatur, homines ab +alio sortiantur. Et quidem quantum ad illos iuvenes qui sunt proni +ad actus virtutum, ex bona dispositione naturae, vel consuetudine, +vel magis divino munere, sufficit disciplina paterna, quae est per +monitiones. Sed quia inveniuntur quidam protervi et ad vitia proni, +qui verbis de facili moveri non possunt; necessarium fuit ut per +vim et metum cohiberentur a malo, ut saltem sic male facere +desistentes, et aliis quietam vitam redderent, et ipsi tandem per +huiusmodi assuetudinem ad hoc perducerentur quod voluntarie +facerent quae prius metu implebant, et sic fierent virtuosi. +Huiusmodi autem disciplina cogens metu poenae, est disciplina +legum. Unde necessarium fuit ad pacem hominum et virtutem, ut leges +ponerentur, quia sicut philosophus dicit, in I Polit., sicut +homo, si sit perfectus virtute, est optimum animalium; sic, si sit +separatus a lege et iustitia, est pessimum omnium; quia homo +habet arma rationis ad explendas concupiscentias et saevitias, quae +non habent alia animalia.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Men who are well disposed are led willingly to virtue by being admonished better than by coercion: but men who are evilly + disposed are not led to virtue unless they are compelled. +
[37634] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod homines bene dispositi melius inducuntur ad +virtutem monitionibus voluntariis quam coactione, sed quidam male +dispositi non ducuntur ad virtutem nisi cogantur.
+ Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 1), "it is better that all things be regulated by law, than left to be decided by judges": + and this for three reasons. First, because it is easier to find a few wise men competent to frame right laws, than to find + the many who would be necessary to judge aright of each single case. Secondly, because those who make laws consider long beforehand + what laws to make; whereas judgment on each single case has to be + pronounced as soon as it arises: and it is easier for man to see what is right, by taking many instances into consideration, + than by considering one solitary fact. Thirdly, because lawgivers judge in the abstract and of future events; whereas those + who sit in judgment of things present, towards which they are affected by love, hatred, or some kind of cupidity; wherefore + their judgment is perverted. +
Since then the animated justice of the judge is not found in every man, and since it can be deflected, therefore it was necessary, + whenever possible, for the law to determine how to judge, and for very few matters to be left to the decision of men. +
[37635] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, I Rhetor., melius est +omnia ordinari lege, quam dimittere iudicum arbitrio. Et hoc +propter tria. Primo quidem, quia facilius est invenire paucos +sapientes, qui sufficiant ad rectas leges ponendas, quam multos, +qui requirerentur ad recte iudicandum de singulis. Secundo, quia +illi qui leges ponunt, ex multo tempore considerant quid lege +ferendum sit, sed iudicia de singularibus factis fiunt ex casibus +subito exortis. Facilius autem ex multis consideratis potest homo +videre quid rectum sit, quam solum ex aliquo uno facto. Tertio, +quia legislatores iudicant in universali, et de futuris, sed +homines iudiciis praesidentes iudicant de praesentibus, ad quae +afficiuntur amore vel odio, aut aliqua cupiditate; et sic eorum +depravatur iudicium. Quia ergo iustitia animata iudicis non +invenitur in multis; et quia flexibilis est; ideo necessarium fuit, +in quibuscumque est possibile, legem determinare quid iudicandum +sit, et paucissima arbitrio hominum committere.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Certain individual facts which cannot be covered by the law "have necessarily to be committed to judges," as the Philosopher + says in the same passage: for instance, "concerning something that has happened or not happened," and the like. +
[37636] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod quaedam singularia, quae non possunt lege +comprehendi, necesse est committere iudicibus, ut ibidem +philosophus dicit, puta de eo quod est factum esse vel non esse, et +de aliis huiusmodi.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that not every human law is derived from the natural law. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "the + legal just is that which originally was a matter of indifference." But those things which arise from the natural law are not + matters of indifference. Therefore the enactments of human laws are not derived from the natural law. +
[37637] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnis lex humanitus posita a lege +naturali derivetur. Dicit enim philosophus, in V Ethic., quod +iustum legale est quod ex principio quidem nihil differt utrum +sic vel aliter fiat. Sed in his quae oriuntur ex lege naturali, +differt utrum sic vel aliter fiat. Ergo ea quae sunt legibus +humanis statuta, non omnia derivantur a lege naturae.
+ Objection 2: Further, positive law is contrasted with natural law, as stated by Isidore (Etym. v, 4) and the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7). + But those things which flow as conclusions from the general principles of the natural law belong to the natural law, as stated + above ( + Q[94], A[4]). Therefore that which is established by human law does not belong to the natural law. +
[37638] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +ius positivum dividitur contra ius naturale, ut patet per Isidorum, +in libro Etymol., et per philosophum, in V Ethic. Sed ea quae +derivantur a principiis communibus legis naturae sicut +conclusiones, pertinent ad legem naturae, ut supra dictum est. Ergo +ea quae sunt de lege humana, non derivantur a lege naturae.
+ Objection 3: Further, the law of nature is the same for all; since the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "the natural just is that which + is equally valid everywhere." If therefore human laws were derived from the natural law, it would follow that they too are + the same for all: which is clearly false. +
[37639] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +lex naturae est eadem apud omnes, dicit enim philosophus, in V +Ethic., quod naturale iustum est quod ubique habet eandem +potentiam. Si igitur leges humanae a naturali lege +derivarentur, sequeretur quod etiam ipsae essent eaedem apud omnes. +Quod patet esse falsum.
+ Objection 4: Further, it is possible to give a reason for things which are derived from the natural law. But "it is not possible to give + the reason for all the legal enactments of the lawgivers," as the jurist says [*Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff, tit. iii, v; + De Leg. et Senat.]. Therefore not all human laws are derived from the natural law. +
[37640] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, +eorum quae a lege naturali derivantur, potest aliqua ratio +assignari. Sed non omnium quae a maioribus lege statuta sunt, ratio +reddi potest, ut iurisperitus dicit. Ergo non omnes leges humanae +derivantur a lege naturali.
+ On the contrary, Tully says (Rhet. ii): "Things which emanated from nature and were approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and reverence + for the laws." +
[37641] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Tullius dicit, in sua Rhetor., res a natura profectas, +et a consuetudine probatas, legum metus et religio sanxit.
+ I answer that, As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) "that which is not just seems to be no law at all": wherefore the force of a law depends + on the extent of its justice. Now in human affairs a thing is said to be just, from being right, according to the rule of + reason. But the first rule of reason is the law of nature, as is clear from what has been stated above ( + Q[91], A[2], ad 2). Consequently every human law has just so much of the nature of + law, as it is derived from the law of nature. But if in any point it deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law + but a perversion of law. +
But it must be noted that something may be derived from the natural law in two ways: first, as a conclusion from premises, + secondly, by way of determination of certain generalities. The first way is like to that by which, in sciences, demonstrated + conclusions are drawn from the principles: while the second mode is likened to that whereby, in the arts, general forms are + particularized as to details: thus the craftsman needs to determine the general form of a house to some + particular shape. Some things are therefore derived from the general principles of the natural law, by way of conclusions; + e.g. that "one must not kill" may be derived as a conclusion from the principle that "one should do harm to no man": while + some are derived therefrom by way of determination; e.g. the law of nature has it that the evil-doer should be punished; but + that he be punished in this or that way, is a determination of the law of nature. +
Accordingly both modes of derivation are found in the human law. But those things which are derived in the first way, are + contained in human law not as emanating therefrom exclusively, but have some force from the natural law also. But those things + which are derived in the second way, have no other force than that of human law. +
[37642] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib. Arb., non +videtur esse lex, quae iusta non fuerit. Unde inquantum habet +de iustitia, intantum habet de virtute legis. In rebus autem +humanis dicitur esse aliquid iustum ex eo quod est rectum secundum +regulam rationis. Rationis autem prima regula est lex naturae, ut +ex supradictis patet. Unde omnis lex humanitus posita intantum +habet de ratione legis, inquantum a lege naturae derivatur. Si vero +in aliquo, a lege naturali discordet, iam non erit lex sed legis +corruptio. Sed sciendum est quod a lege naturali dupliciter potest +aliquid derivari, uno modo, sicut conclusiones ex principiis; alio +modo, sicut determinationes quaedam aliquorum communium. Primus +quidem modus est similis ei quo in scientiis ex principiis +conclusiones demonstrativae producuntur. Secundo vero modo simile +est quod in artibus formae communes determinantur ad aliquid +speciale, sicut artifex formam communem domus necesse est quod +determinet ad hanc vel illam domus figuram. Derivantur ergo quaedam +a principiis communibus legis naturae per modum conclusionum, sicut +hoc quod est non esse occidendum, ut conclusio quaedam derivari +potest ab eo quod est nulli esse malum faciendum. Quaedam vero per +modum determinationis, sicut lex naturae habet quod ille qui +peccat, puniatur; sed quod tali poena puniatur, hoc est quaedam +determinatio legis naturae. Utraque igitur inveniuntur in lege +humana posita. Sed ea quae sunt primi modi, continentur lege humana +non tanquam sint solum lege posita, sed habent etiam aliquid +vigoris ex lege naturali. Sed ea quae sunt secundi modi, ex sola +lege humana vigorem habent.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of those enactments which are by way of determination or specification of the precepts of the + natural law. +
[37643] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de illis quae sunt lege +posita per determinationem vel specificationem quandam praeceptorum +legis naturae.
+ Reply to Objection 2: This argument avails for those things that are derived from the natural law, by way of conclusions. +
[37644] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de his quae derivantur a lege +naturae tanquam conclusiones.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The general principles of the natural law cannot be applied to all men in the same way on account of the great variety of + human affairs: and hence arises the diversity of positive laws among various people. +
[37645] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod principia communia legis naturae non possunt eodem +modo applicari omnibus, propter multam varietatem rerum humanarum. +Et exinde provenit diversitas legis positivae apud diversos.
+ Reply to Objection 4: These words of the Jurist are to be understood as referring to decisions of rulers in determining particular points of the + natural law: on which determinations the judgment of expert and prudent men is based as on its principles; in so far, to wit, + as they see at once what is the best thing to decide. +
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11) that in such matters, "we ought to pay as much attention to the undemonstrated + sayings and opinions of persons who surpass us in experience, age and prudence, as to their demonstrations." +
[37646] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod verbum illud iurisperiti intelligendum est in his +quae sunt introducta a maioribus circa particulares determinationes +legis naturalis; ad quas quidem determinationes se habet expertorum +et prudentum iudicium sicut ad quaedam principia; inquantum +scilicet statim vident quid congruentius sit particulariter +determinari. Unde philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod in +talibus oportet attendere expertorum et seniorum vel prudentum +indemonstrabilibus enuntiationibus et opinionibus, non minus quam +demonstrationibus.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that Isidore's description of the quality of positive law is not appropriate, when he says (Etym. v, 21): "Law + shall be virtuous, just, possible to nature, according to the custom of the country, suitable to place and time, necessary, + useful; clearly expressed, lest by its obscurity it lead to misunderstanding; framed for no private benefit, but for the common + good." Because he had previously expressed the quality of law in three conditions, + saying that "law is anything founded on reason, provided that it foster religion, be helpful to discipline, and further the + common weal." Therefore it was needless to add any further conditions to these. +
[37647] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod Isidorus inconvenienter qualitatem +legis positivae describat, dicens, erit lex honesta, iusta, +possibilis secundum naturam, secundum consuetudinem patriae, loco +temporique conveniens, necessaria, utilis; manifesta quoque, ne +aliquid per obscuritatem in captionem contineat; nullo privato +commodo, sed pro communi utilitate civium scripta. Supra enim +in tribus conditionibus qualitatem legis explicaverat, dicens, +lex erit omne quod ratione constiterit, dumtaxat quod religioni +congruat, quod disciplinae conveniat, quod saluti proficiat. +Ergo superflue postmodum conditiones legis multiplicat.
+ Objection 2: Further, Justice is included in honesty, as Tully says (De Offic. vii). Therefore after saying "honest" it was superfluous + to add "just." +
[37648] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +iustitia pars est honestatis; ut Tullius dicit, in I de Offic. Ergo +postquam dixerat honesta, superflue additur iusta.
+ Objection 3: Further, written law is condivided with custom, according to Isidore (Etym. ii, 10). Therefore it should not be stated in + the definition of law that it is "according to the custom of the country." +
[37649] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +lex scripta, secundum Isidorum, contra consuetudinem dividitur. Non +ergo debuit in definitione legis poni quod esset secundum +consuetudinem patriae.
+ Objection 4: Further, a thing may be necessary in two ways. It may be necessary simply, because it cannot be otherwise: and that which + is necessary in this way, is not subject to human judgment, wherefore human law is not concerned with necessity of this kind. + Again a thing may be necessary for an end: and this necessity is the same as usefulness. Therefore it is superfluous to say + both "necessary" and "useful." +
[37650] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 3 arg. 4 Praeterea, +necessarium dupliciter dicitur. Scilicet id quod est necessarium +simpliciter, quod impossibile est aliter se habere, et huiusmodi +necessarium non subiacet humano iudicio, unde talis necessitas ad +legem humanam non pertinet. Est etiam aliquid necessarium propter +finem, et talis necessitas idem est quod utilitas. Ergo superflue +utrumque ponitur, necessaria et utilis.
+ On the contrary, stands the authority of Isidore. +
[37651] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est auctoritas ipsius Isidori.
+ I answer that, Whenever a thing is for an end, its form must be determined proportionately to that end; as the form of a saw is such as + to be suitable for cutting (Phys. ii, text. 88). Again, everything that is ruled and measured must have a form proportionate + to its rule and measure. Now both these conditions are verified of human law: since it is both something ordained to an end; + and is a rule or measure ruled or measured by a higher measure. And this higher measure is + twofold, viz. the Divine law and the natural law, as explained above + (A[2]; Q[93], A[3] ). Now the end of human law is to be useful to man, as the jurist states [*Pandect. Justin. lib. xxv, ff., tit. + iii; De Leg. et Senat.]. Wherefore Isidore in determining the nature of law, lays down, at first, three conditions; viz. that + it "foster religion," inasmuch as it is proportionate to the Divine law; that it be "helpful to discipline," inasmuch as it + is proportionate to the + nature law; and that it "further the common weal," inasmuch as it is proportionate to the utility of mankind. +
All the other conditions mentioned by him are reduced to these three. For it is called virtuous because it fosters religion. + And when he goes on to say that it should be "just, possible to nature, according to the customs of the country, adapted to + place and time," he implies that it should be helpful to discipline. For human discipline depends on first on the order of + reason, to which he refers by saying "just": secondly, it depends on the ability of the agent; because + discipline should be adapted to each one according to his ability, taking also into account the ability of nature (for the + same burdens should be not laid on children as adults); and should be according to human customs; since man cannot live alone + in society, paying no heed to others: thirdly, it depends on certain circumstances, in respect of which he says, "adapted + to place and time." The remaining words, "necessary, useful," etc. mean that law should further the common weal: so that + "necessity" refers to the removal of evils; "usefulness" to the attainment of good; "clearness of expression," to the need + of preventing any harm ensuing from the law itself. And since, as stated above ( + Q[90], A[2]), law is ordained to the common good, this is expressed in the last part of the description. +
[37652] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod uniuscuiusque rei quae est propter finem, necesse est +quod forma determinetur secundum proportionem ad finem; sicut forma +serrae talis est qualis convenit sectioni; ut patet in II Physic. +Quaelibet etiam res recta et mensurata oportet quod habeat formam +proportionalem suae regulae et mensurae. Lex autem humana utrumque +habet, quia et est aliquid ordinatum ad finem; et est quaedam +regula vel mensura regulata vel mensurata quadam superiori mensura; +quae quidem est duplex, scilicet lex divina et lex naturae, ut ex +supradictis patet. Finis autem humanae legis est utilitas hominum; +sicut etiam iurisperitus dicit. Et ideo Isidorus in conditione +legis, primo quidem tria posuit, scilicet quod religioni congruat, +inquantum scilicet est proportionata legi divinae; quod disciplinae +conveniat, inquantum est proportionata legi naturae; quod saluti +proficiat, inquantum est proportionata utilitati humanae. Et ad +haec tria omnes aliae conditiones quas postea ponit, reducuntur. +Nam quod dicitur honesta, refertur ad hoc quod religioni congruat. +Quod autem subditur, iusta, possibilis secundum naturam, +secundum consuetudinem patriae, loco temporique conveniens, +additur ad hoc quod conveniat disciplinae. Attenditur enim humana +disciplina primum quidem quantum ad ordinem rationis, qui +importatur in hoc quod dicitur iusta. Secundo, quantum ad +facultatem agentium. Debet enim esse disciplina conveniens +unicuique secundum suam possibilitatem, observata etiam +possibilitate naturae (non enim eadem sunt imponenda pueris, quae +imponuntur viris perfectis); et secundum humanam consuetudinem; non +enim potest homo solus in societate vivere, aliis morem non gerens. +Tertio, quantum ad debitas circumstantias, dicit, loco temporique +conveniens. Quod vero subditur, necessaria, utilis, etc., refertur +ad hoc quod expediat saluti, ut necessitas referatur ad remotionem +malorum; utilitas, ad consecutionem bonorum; manifestatio vero, ad +cavendum nocumentum quod ex ipsa lege posset provenire. Et quia, +sicut supra dictum est, lex ordinatur ad bonum commune, hoc ipsum +in ultima parte determinationis ostenditur.
+ Reply to Objections: This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
[37653] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 3 ad arg. Et per hoc +patet responsio ad obiecta.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that Isidore wrongly divided human statutes or human law (Etym. v, 4, seqq.). For under this law he includes + the "law of nations," so called, because, as he says, "nearly all nations use it." But as he says, "natural law is that which + is common to all nations." Therefore the law of nations is not contained under positive human law, but rather under natural + law. +
[37654] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter Isidorus divisionem +legum humanarum ponat, sive iuris humani. Sub hoc enim iure +comprehendit ius gentium, quod ideo sic nominatur, ut ipse dicit, +quia eo omnes fere gentes utuntur. Sed sicut ipse dicit, ius +naturale est quod est commune omnium nationum. Ergo ius gentium +non continetur sub iure positivo humano, sed magis sub iure +naturali.
+ Objection 2: Further, those laws which have the same force, seem to differ not formally but only materially. But "statutes, decrees of + the commonalty, senatorial decrees," and the like which he mentions (Etym. v, 9), all have the same force. Therefore they + do not differ, except materially. But art takes no notice of such a distinction: since it may go on to infinity. Therefore + this division of human laws is not appropriate. +
[37655] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +ea quae habent eandem vim, non videntur formaliter differre, sed +solum materialiter. Sed leges, plebiscita, senatusconsulta, et alia +huiusmodi quae ponit, omnia habent eandem vim. Ergo videtur quod +non differant nisi materialiter. Sed talis distinctio in arte non +est curanda, cum possit esse in infinitum. Ergo inconvenienter +huiusmodi divisio humanarum legum introducitur.
+ Objection 3: Further, just as, in the state, there are princes, priests and soldiers, so are there other human offices. Therefore it seems + that, as this division includes "military law," and "public law," referring to priests and magistrates; so also it should + include other laws pertaining to other offices of the state. +
[37656] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sicut in civitate sunt principes et sacerdotes et milites, ita +etiam sunt et alia hominum officia. Ergo videtur quod, sicut +ponitur quoddam ius militare, et ius publicum, quod consistit in +sacerdotibus et magistratibus; ita etiam debeant poni alia iura, ad +alia officia civitatis pertinentia.
+ Objection 4: Further, those things that are accidental should be passed over. But it is accidental to law that it be framed by this or + that man. Therefore it is unreasonable to divide laws according to the names of lawgivers, so that one be called the "Cornelian" + law, another the "Falcidian" law, etc. +
[37657] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 4 arg. 4 Praeterea, +ea quae sunt per accidens, sunt praetermittenda. Sed accidit legi +ut ab hoc vel illo homine feratur. Ergo inconvenienter ponitur +divisio legum humanarum ex nominibus legislatorum, ut scilicet +quaedam dicatur Cornelia, quaedam Falcidia, et cetera.
+ On the contrary, The authority of Isidore (OBJ[1]) suffices. +
[37658] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 4 s. c. In +contrarium auctoritas Isidori sufficiat.
+ I answer that, A thing can of itself be divided in respect of something contained in the notion of that thing. Thus a soul either rational + or irrational is contained in the notion of animal: and therefore animal is divided properly and of itself in respect of its + being rational or irrational; but not in the point of its being white or black, which are entirely beside the notion of animal. + Now, in the notion of human law, many things are contained, in respect of any of + which human law can be divided properly and of itself. For in the first place it belongs to the notion of human law, to be + derived from the law of nature, as explained above + (A[2]). In this respect positive law is divided into the "law of nations" and "civil law," according to the two ways in which something + may be derived from the law of nature, as stated above + (A[2]). Because, to the law of nations belong those things which are derived from + the law of nature, as conclusions from premises, e.g. just buyings and sellings, and the like, without which men cannot live + together, which is a point of the law of nature, since man is by nature a social animal, as is proved in Polit. i, 2. But + those things which are derived from the law of nature by way of particular determination, belong to the civil law, according + as each state decides on what is best for itself. +
Secondly, it belongs to the notion of human law, to be ordained to the common good of the state. In this respect human law + may be divided according to the different kinds of men who work in a special way for the common good: e.g. priests, by praying + to God for the people; princes, by governing the people; soldiers, by fighting for the safety of the people. Wherefore certain + special kinds of law are adapted to these men. +
Thirdly, it belongs to the notion of human law, to be framed by that one who governs the community of the state, as shown + above ( + Q[90], A[3]). In this respect, there are various human laws according to the various forms of government. Of these, according to the + Philosopher (Polit. iii, 10) one is "monarchy," i.e. when the state is governed by one; and then we have "Royal Ordinances." + Another form is "aristocracy," i.e. government by the best men or men + of highest rank; and then we have the "Authoritative legal opinions" [Responsa Prudentum] and "Decrees of the Senate" [Senatus + consulta]. Another form is "oligarchy," i.e. government by a few rich and powerful men; and then we have "Praetorian," also + called "Honorary," law. Another form of government is that of the people, which is called "democracy," and there we have "Decrees + of the commonalty" [Plebiscita]. There is also tyrannical government, which is altogether corrupt, which, therefore, + has no corresponding law. Finally, there is a form of government made up of all these, and which is the best: and in this + respect we have law sanctioned by the "Lords and Commons," as stated by Isidore (Etym. v, 4, seqq.). +
Fourthly, it belongs to the notion of human law to direct human actions. In this respect, according to the various matters + of which the law treats, there are various kinds of laws, which are sometimes named after their authors: thus we have the + "Lex Julia" about adultery, the "Lex Cornelia" concerning assassins, and so on, differentiated in this way, not on account + of the authors, but on account of the matters to which they refer. +
[37659] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod unumquodque potest per se dividi secundum id quod in +eius ratione continetur. Sicut in ratione animalis continetur +anima, quae est rationalis vel irrationalis, et ideo animal proprie +et per se dividitur secundum rationale et irrationale; non autem +secundum album et nigrum, quae sunt omnino praeter rationem eius. +Sunt autem multa de ratione legis humanae, secundum quorum +quodlibet lex humana proprie et per se dividi potest. Est enim +primo de ratione legis humanae quod sit derivata a lege naturae, ut +ex dictis patet. Et secundum hoc dividitur ius positivum in ius +gentium et ius civile, secundum duos modos quibus aliquid derivatur +a lege naturae, ut supra dictum est. Nam ad ius gentium pertinent +ea quae derivantur ex lege naturae sicut conclusiones ex +principiis, ut iustae emptiones, venditiones, et alia huiusmodi, +sine quibus homines ad invicem convivere non possent; quod est de +lege naturae, quia homo est naturaliter animal sociale, ut probatur +in I Polit. Quae vero derivantur a lege naturae per modum +particularis determinationis, pertinent ad ius civile, secundum +quod quaelibet civitas aliquid sibi accommodum determinat. Secundo +est de ratione legis humanae quod ordinetur ad bonum commune +civitatis. Et secundum hoc lex humana dividi potest secundum +diversitatem eorum qui specialiter dant operam ad bonum commune, +sicut sacerdotes, pro populo Deum orantes; principes, populum +gubernantes; et milites, pro salute populi pugnantes. Et ideo istis +hominibus specialia quaedam iura aptantur. Tertio est de ratione +legis humanae ut instituatur a gubernante communitatem civitatis, +sicut supra dictum est. Et secundum hoc distinguuntur leges humanae +secundum diversa regimina civitatum. Quorum unum, secundum +philosophum, in III Polit., est regnum, quando scilicet civitas +gubernatur ab uno, et secundum hoc accipiuntur constitutiones +principum. Aliud vero regimen est aristocratia, idest principatus +optimorum, vel optimatum, et secundum hoc sumuntur responsa +prudentum, et etiam senatusconsulta. Aliud regimen est oligarchia, +idest principatus paucorum divitum et potentum, et secundum hoc +sumitur ius praetorium, quod etiam honorarium dicitur. Aliud autem +regimen est populi, quod nominatur democratia, et secundum hoc +sumuntur plebiscita. Aliud autem est tyrannicum, quod est omnino +corruptum, unde ex hoc non sumitur aliqua lex. Est etiam aliquod +regimen ex istis commixtum, quod est optimum, et secundum hoc +sumitur lex, quam maiores natu simul cum plebibus sanxerunt, +ut Isidorus dicit. Quarto vero de ratione legis humanae est quod +sit directiva humanorum actuum. Et secundum hoc, secundum diversa +de quibus leges feruntur, distinguuntur leges, quae interdum ab +auctoribus nominantur, sicut distinguitur lex Iulia de adulteriis, +lex Cornelia de sicariis, et sic de aliis, non propter auctores, +sed propter res de quibus sunt.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The law of nations is indeed, in some way, natural to man, in so far as he is a reasonable being, because it is derived from + the natural law by way of a conclusion that is not very remote from its premises. Wherefore men easily agreed thereto. Nevertheless + it is distinct from the natural law, especially it is distinct from the natural law which is common to all animals. +
[37660] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ius gentium est quidem aliquo modo naturale +homini, secundum quod est rationalis, inquantum derivatur a lege +naturali per modum conclusionis quae non est multum remota a +principiis. Unde de facili in huiusmodi homines consenserunt. +Distinguitur tamen a lege naturali, maxime ab eo quod est omnibus +animalibus communis.
+ Reply to Objections 2--4: The Replies to the other Objections are evident from what has been said.
[37661] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 4 ad 2 Ad alia patet +responsio ex his quae dicta sunt.
We must now consider the power of human law. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether human law should be framed for the community?
(2) Whether human law should repress all vices?
(3) Whether human law is competent to direct all acts of virtue?
(4) Whether it binds man in conscience?
(5) Whether all men are subject to human law?
(6) Whether those who are under the law may act beside the letter of the law?
+[37662] +Iª-IIae q. 96 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +potestate legis humanae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum +lex humana debeat poni in communi. Secundo, utrum lex humana debeat +omnia vitia cohibere. Tertio, utrum omnium virtutum actus habeat +ordinare. Quarto, utrum imponat homini necessitatem quantum ad +forum conscientiae. Quinto, utrum omnes homines legi humanae +subdantur. Sexto, utrum his qui sunt sub lege, liceat agere praeter +verba legis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that human law should be framed not for the community, but rather for the individual. For the Philosopher says + (Ethic. v, 7) that "the legal just . . . includes all particular acts of legislation . . . and all those matters which are + the subject of decrees," which are also individual matters, since decrees are framed about individual actions. Therefore law + is framed not only for the community, but also for the individual. +
[37663] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex humana non debeat poni in communi, +sed magis in particulari. Dicit enim philosophus, in V Ethic., quod +legalia sunt quaecumque in singularibus lege ponunt; et etiam +sententialia, quae sunt etiam singularia, quia de singularibus +actibus sententiae feruntur. Ergo lex non solum ponitur in communi, +sed etiam in singulari.
+ Objection 2: Further, law is the director of human acts, as stated above ( + Q[90], AA[1],2). But human acts are about individual matters. Therefore human laws should be framed, not for the community, but rather + for the individual. +
[37664] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +lex est directiva humanorum actuum, ut supra dictum est. Sed humani +actus in singularibus consistunt. Ergo leges humanae non debent in +universali ferri, sed magis in singulari.
+ Objection 3: Further, law is a rule and measure of human acts, as stated above ( + Q[90], AA[1],2). But a measure should be most certain, as stated in Metaph. x. Since therefore in human acts no general proposition can + be so certain as not to fail in some individual cases, it seems that laws should be framed not in general but for individual + cases. +
[37665] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +lex est regula et mensura humanorum actuum, ut supra dictum est. +Sed mensura debet esse certissima, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Cum +ergo in actibus humanis non possit esse aliquod universale certum, +quin in particularibus deficiat; videtur quod necesse sit leges non +in universali, sed in singulari poni.
+ On the contrary, The jurist says (Pandect. Justin. lib. i, tit. iii, art. ii; De legibus, etc.) that "laws should be made to suit the majority + of instances; and they are not framed according to what may possibly happen in an individual case." +
[37666] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod iurisperitus dicit, quod iura constitui oportet in his +quae saepius accidunt, ex his autem quae forte uno casu accidere +possunt, iura non constituuntur.
+ I answer that, Whatever is for an end should be proportionate to that end. Now the end of law is the common good; because, as Isidore says + (Etym. v, 21) that "law should be framed, not for any private benefit, but for the common good of all the citizens." Hence + human laws should be proportionate to the common good. Now the common good comprises many things. Wherefore law should take + account of many things, as to persons, as to matters, and as to times. Because the + community of the state is composed of many persons; and its good is procured by many actions; nor is it established to endure + for only a short time, but to last for all time by the citizens succeeding one another, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, + 21; xxii, 6). +
[37667] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod unumquodque quod est propter finem, necesse est quod +sit fini proportionatum. Finis autem legis est bonum commune, quia, +ut Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., nullo privato commodo, sed +pro communi utilitate civium lex debet esse conscripta. Unde +oportet leges humanas esse proportionatas ad bonum commune. Bonum +autem commune constat ex multis. Et ideo oportet quod lex ad multa +respiciat, et secundum personas, et secundum negotia, et secundum +tempora. Constituitur enim communitas civitatis ex multis personis; +et eius bonum per multiplices actiones procuratur; nec ad hoc solum +instituitur quod aliquo modico tempore duret, sed quod omni tempore +perseveret per civium successionem, ut Augustinus dicit, in XXII de +Civ. Dei.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7) divides the legal just, i.e. positive law, into three parts. For some things are laid down + simply in a general way: and these are the general laws. Of these he says that "the legal is that which originally was a matter + of indifference, but which, when enacted, is so no longer": as the fixing of the ransom of a captive. Some things affect the + community in one respect, and individuals in another. These are called + "privileges," i.e. "private laws," as it were, because they regard private persons, although their power extends to many matters; + and in regard to these, he adds, "and further, all particular acts of legislation." Other matters are legal, not through being + laws, but through being applications of general laws to particular cases: such are decrees which have the force of law; and + in regard to these, he adds "all matters subject to decrees." +
[37668] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod philosophus in V Ethic. ponit tres partes iusti +legalis, quod est ius positivum. Sunt enim quaedam quae simpliciter +in communi ponuntur. Et haec sunt leges communes. Et quantum ad +huiusmodi, dicit quod legale est quod ex principio quidem nihil +differt sic vel aliter, quando autem ponitur, differt, puta +quod captivi statuto pretio redimantur. Quaedam vero sunt quae sunt +communia quantum ad aliquid, et singularia quantum ad aliquid. Et +huiusmodi dicuntur privilegia, quasi leges privatae, quia +respiciunt singulares personas, et tamen potestas eorum extenditur +ad multa negotia. Et quantum ad hoc, subdit, adhuc quaecumque in +singularibus lege ponunt. Dicuntur etiam quaedam legalia, non +quia sint leges, sed propter applicationem legum communium ad +aliqua particularia facta; sicut sunt sententiae, quae pro iure +habentur. Et quantum ad hoc, subdit, et sententialia.
+ Reply to Objection 2: A principle of direction should be applicable to many; wherefore (Metaph. x, text. 4) the Philosopher says that all things + belonging to one genus, are measured by one, which is the principle in that genus. For if there were as many rules or measures + as there are things measured or ruled, they would cease to be of use, since their use consists in being applicable to many + things. Hence law would be of no use, if it did not extend further than to one + single act. Because the decrees than to one single act. Because the decrees of prudent men are made for the purpose of directing + individual actions; whereas law is a general precept, as stated above ( + Q[92], A[2], OBJ[2]). +
[37669] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod illud quod est directivum, oportet esse plurium +directivum, unde in X Metaphys., philosophus dicit quod omnia quae +sunt unius generis, mensurantur aliquo uno, quod est primum in +genere illo. Si enim essent tot regulae vel mensurae quot sunt +mensurata vel regulata, cessaret utilitas regulae vel mensurae, +quae est ut ex uno multa possint cognosci. Et ita nulla esset +utilitas legis, si non se extenderet nisi ad unum singularem actum. +Ad singulares enim actus dirigendos dantur singularia praecepta +prudentium, sed lex est praeceptum commune, ut supra dictum +est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: "We must not seek the same degree of certainty in all things" (Ethic. i, 3). Consequently in contingent matters, such as + natural and human things, it is enough for a thing to be certain, as being true in the greater number of instances, though + at times and less frequently it fail. +
[37670] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod non est eadem certitudo quaerenda in omnibus, ut in I +Ethic. dicitur. Unde in rebus contingentibus, sicut sunt naturalia +et res humanae, sufficit talis certitudo ut aliquid sit verum ut in +pluribus, licet interdum deficiat in paucioribus.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that it belongs to human law to repress all vices. For Isidore says (Etym. v, 20) that "laws were made in order + that, in fear thereof, man's audacity might be held in check." But it would not be held in check sufficiently, unless all + evils were repressed by law. Therefore human laws should repress all evils. +
[37671] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad legem humanam pertineat omnia vitia +cohibere. Dicit enim Isidorus, in libro Etymol., quod leges sunt +factae ut earum metu coerceatur audacia. Non autem sufficienter +coerceretur, nisi quaelibet mala cohiberentur per legem. Ergo lex +humana debet quaelibet mala cohibere.
+ Objection 2: Further, the intention of the lawgiver is to make the citizens virtuous. But a man cannot be virtuous unless he forbear from + all kinds of vice. Therefore it belongs to human law to repress all vices. +
[37672] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +intentio legislatoris est cives facere virtuosos. Sed non potest +esse aliquis virtuosus, nisi ab omnibus vitiis compescatur. Ergo ad +legem humanam pertinet omnia vitia compescere.
+ Objection 3: Further, human law is derived from the natural law, as stated above ( + Q[95], A[2]). But all vices are contrary to the law of nature. Therefore human law should repress all vices. +
[37673] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +lex humana a lege naturali derivatur, ut supra dictum est. Sed +omnia vitia repugnant legi naturae. Ergo lex humana omnia vitia +debet cohibere.
+ On the contrary, We read in De Lib. Arb. i, 5: "It seems to me that the law which is written for the governing of the people rightly permits + these things, and that Divine providence punishes them." But Divine providence punishes nothing but vices. Therefore human + law rightly allows some vices, by not repressing them. +
[37674] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur in I de Lib. Arb., videtur mihi legem istam +quae populo regendo scribitur, recte ista permittere, et divinam +providentiam vindicare. Sed divina providentia non vindicat +nisi vitia. Ergo recte lex humana permittit aliqua vitia, non +cohibendo ipsa.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + Q[90], AA[1],2), law is framed as a rule or measure of human acts. Now a measure should be homogeneous with that which it measures, as + stated in Metaph. x, text. 3,4, since different things are measured by different measures. Wherefore laws imposed on men should + also be in keeping with their condition, for, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 21), law should be "possible both according to nature, + and according to the customs + of the country." Now possibility or faculty of action is due to an interior habit or disposition: since the same thing is + not possible to one who has not a virtuous habit, as is possible to one who has. Thus the same is not possible to a child + as to a full-grown man: for which reason the law for children is not the same as for adults, since many things are permitted + to children, which in an adult are punished by law or at any rate are open to blame. In like manner many things are permissible + to + men not perfect in virtue, which would be intolerable in a virtuous man. +
Now human law is framed for a number of human beings, the majority of whom are not perfect in virtue. Wherefore human laws + do not forbid all vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but only the more grievous vices, from which it is possible for + the majority to abstain; and chiefly those that are to the hurt of others, without the prohibition of which human society + could not be maintained: thus human law prohibits murder, theft and such like. +
[37675] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, lex ponitur ut quaedam regula +vel mensura humanorum actuum. Mensura autem debet esse homogenea +mensurato, ut dicitur in X Metaphys., diversa enim diversis +mensuris mensurantur. Unde oportet quod etiam leges imponantur +hominibus secundum eorum conditionem, quia, ut Isidorus dicit. +Lex debet esse possibilis et secundum naturam, et secundum +consuetudinem patriae. Potestas autem sive facultas operandi ex +interiori habitu seu dispositione procedit, non enim idem est +possibile ei qui non habet habitum virtutis, et virtuoso; sicut +etiam non est idem possibile puero et viro perfecto. Et propter hoc +non ponitur eadem lex pueris quae ponitur adultis, multa enim +pueris permittuntur quae in adultis lege puniuntur, vel etiam +vituperantur. Et similiter multa sunt permittenda hominibus non +perfectis virtute, quae non essent toleranda in hominibus +virtuosis. Lex autem humana ponitur multitudini hominum, in qua +maior pars est hominum non perfectorum virtute. Et ideo lege humana +non prohibentur omnia vitia, a quibus virtuosi abstinent; sed solum +graviora, a quibus possibile est maiorem partem multitudinis +abstinere; et praecipue quae sunt in nocumentum aliorum, sine +quorum prohibitione societas humana conservari non posset, sicut +prohibentur lege humana homicidia et furta et huiusmodi.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Audacity seems to refer to the assailing of others. Consequently it belongs to those sins chiefly whereby one's neighbor + is injured: and these sins are forbidden by human law, as stated. +
[37676] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod audacia pertinere videtur ad invasionem aliorum. +Unde praecipue pertinet ad illa peccata quibus iniuria proximis +irrogatur; quae lege humana prohibentur, ut dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The purpose of human law is to lead men to virtue, not suddenly, but gradually. Wherefore it does not lay upon the multitude + of imperfect men the burdens of those who are already virtuous, viz. that they should abstain from all evil. Otherwise these + imperfect ones, being unable to bear such precepts, would break out into yet greater evils: thus it is written ( + Ps. 30:33): "He that violently bloweth his nose, bringeth out blood"; + and ( + Mat. 9:17) that if "new wine," i.e. precepts of a perfect life, "is put into old bottles," i.e. into imperfect men, "the bottles break, + and the wine runneth out," i.e. the precepts are despised, and those men, from contempt, break into evils worse still. +
[37677] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod lex humana intendit homines inducere ad virtutem, non +subito, sed gradatim. Et ideo non statim multitudini imperfectorum +imponit ea quae sunt iam virtuosorum, ut scilicet ab omnibus malis +abstineant. Alioquin imperfecti, huiusmodi praecepta ferre non +valentes, in deteriora mala prorumperent, sicut dicitur Prov. XXX, +qui nimis emungit, elicit sanguinem; et Matth. IX dicitur +quod, si vinum novum, idest praecepta perfectae vitae, mittatur in +utres veteres, idest in homines imperfectos, utres rumpuntur, et +vinum effunditur, idest, praecepta contemnuntur, et homines ex +contemptu ad peiora mala prorumpunt.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The natural law is a participation in us of the eternal law: while human law falls short of the eternal law. Now Augustine + says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): "The law which is framed for the government of states, allows and leaves unpunished many things + that are punished by Divine providence. Nor, if this law does not attempt to do everything, is this a reason why it should + be blamed for what it does." Wherefore, too, human law does not prohibit everything + that is forbidden by the natural law. +
[37678] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod lex naturalis est quaedam participatio legis aeternae +in nobis, lex autem humana deficit a lege aeterna. Dicit enim +Augustinus, in I de Lib. Arb., lex ista quae regendis +civitatibus fertur, multa concedit atque impunita relinquit, quae +per divinam providentiam vindicantur. Neque enim quia non omnia +facit, ideo quae facit, improbanda sunt. Unde etiam lex humana +non omnia potest prohibere quae prohibet lex naturae.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that human law does not prescribe acts of all the virtues. For vicious acts are contrary to acts of virtue. + But human law does not prohibit all vices, as stated above + (A[2]). Therefore neither does it prescribe all acts of virtue. +
[37679] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex humana non praecipiat actus omnium +virtutum. Actibus enim virtutum opponuntur actus vitiosi. Sed lex +humana non prohibet omnia vitia, ut dictum est. Ergo etiam non +praecipit actus omnium virtutum.
+ Objection 2: Further, a virtuous act proceeds from a virtue. But virtue is the end of law; so that whatever is from a virtue, cannot come + under a precept of law. Therefore human law does not prescribe all acts of virtue. +
[37680] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +actus virtutis a virtute procedit. Sed virtus est finis legis, et +ita quod est ex virtute, sub praecepto legis cadere non potest. +Ergo lex humana non praecipit actus omnium virtutum.
+ Objection 3: Further, law is ordained to the common good, as stated above ( + Q[90], A[2]). But some acts of virtue are ordained, not to the common good, but to private good. Therefore the law does not prescribe + all acts of virtue. +
[37681] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +lex ordinatur ad bonum commune, ut dictum est. Sed quidam actus +virtutum non ordinantur ad bonum commune, sed ad bonum privatum. +Ergo lex non praecipit actus omnium virtutum.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that the law "prescribes the performance of the acts of a brave man . . . and the acts + of the temperate man . . . and the acts of the meek man: and in like manner as regards the other virtues and vices, prescribing + the former, forbidding the latter." +
[37682] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., quod praecipit lex +fortis opera facere, et quae temperati, et quae mansueti; similiter +autem secundum alias virtutes et malitias, haec quidem iubens, haec +autem prohibens.
+ I answer that, The species of virtues are distinguished by their objects, as explained above ( + Q[54], A[2]; + Q[60], A[1]; + Q[62], A[2]). Now all the objects of virtues can be referred either to the private good of an individual, or to the common good of the + multitude: thus matters of fortitude may be achieved either for the safety of the state, or for upholding the rights of a + friend, and in like + manner with the other virtues. But law, as stated above ( + Q[90], A[2]) is ordained to the common good. Wherefore there is no virtue whose acts cannot be prescribed by the law. Nevertheless human + law does not prescribe concerning all the acts of every virtue: but only in regard to those that are ordainable to the common + good---either immediately, as when certain things are done directly for the common good---or mediately, as when a lawgiver + prescribes certain things + pertaining to good order, whereby the citizens are directed in the upholding of the common good of justice and peace. +
[37683] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod species virtutum distinguuntur secundum obiecta, ut +ex supradictis patet. Omnia autem obiecta virtutum referri possunt +vel ad bonum privatum alicuius personae, vel ad bonum commune +multitudinis, sicut ea quae sunt fortitudinis potest aliquis exequi +vel propter conservationem civitatis, vel ad conservandum ius amici +sui; et simile est in aliis. Lex autem, ut dictum est, ordinatur ad +bonum commune. Et ideo nulla virtus est de cuius actibus lex +praecipere non possit. Non tamen de omnibus actibus omnium virtutum +lex humana praecipit, sed solum de illis qui sunt ordinabiles ad +bonum commune, vel immediate, sicut cum aliqua directe propter +bonum commune fiunt; vel mediate, sicut cum aliqua ordinantur a +legislatore pertinentia ad bonam disciplinam, per quam cives +informantur ut commune bonum iustitiae et pacis conservent.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Human law does not forbid all vicious acts, by the obligation of a precept, as neither does it prescribe all acts of virtue. + But it forbids certain acts of each vice, just as it prescribes some acts of each virtue. +
[37684] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod lex humana non prohibet omnes actus vitiosos, +secundum obligationem praecepti, sicut nec praecipit omnes actus +virtuosos. Prohibet tamen aliquos actus singulorum vitiorum, sicut +etiam praecipit quosdam actus singularum virtutum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: An act is said to be an act of virtue in two ways. First, from the fact that a man does something virtuous; thus the act + of justice is to do what is right, and an act of fortitude is to do brave things: and in this way law prescribes certain acts + of virtue. Secondly an act of virtue is when a man does a virtuous thing in a way in which a virtuous man does it. Such an + act always proceeds from virtue: and it does not come under a precept of law, but is + the end at which every lawgiver aims. +
[37685] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod aliquis actus dicitur esse virtutis dupliciter. Uno +modo, ex eo quod homo operatur virtuosa, sicut actus iustitiae est +facere recta, et actus fortitudinis facere fortia. Et sic lex +praecipit aliquos actus virtutum. Alio modo dicitur actus virtutis, +quia aliquis operatur virtuosa eo modo quo virtuosus operatur. Et +talis actus semper procedit a virtute, nec cadit sub praecepto +legis, sed est finis ad quem legislator ducere intendit.
+ Reply to Objection 3: There is no virtue whose act is not ordainable to the common good, as stated above, either mediately or immediately. +
[37686] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod non est aliqua virtus cuius actus non sint +ordinabiles ad bonum commune, ut dictum est, vel mediate vel +immediate.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that human law does not bind man in conscience. For an inferior power has no jurisdiction in a court of higher + power. But the power of man, which frames human law, is beneath the Divine power. Therefore human law cannot impose its precept + in a Divine court, such as is the court of conscience. +
[37687] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex humana non imponat homini +necessitatem in foro conscientiae. Inferior enim potestas non +potest imponere legem in iudicio superioris potestatis. Sed +potestas hominis, quae fert legem humanam, est infra potestatem +divinam. Ergo lex humana non potest imponere legem quantum ad +iudicium divinum, quod est iudicium conscientiae.
+ Objection 2: Further, the judgment of conscience depends chiefly on the commandments of God. But sometimes God's commandments are made + void by human laws, according to + Mat. 15:6: "You have made void the commandment of God for your tradition." Therefore human law does not bind a man in conscience. +
[37688] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +iudicium conscientiae maxime dependet ex divinis mandatis. Sed +quandoque divina mandata evacuantur per leges humanas; secundum +illud Matth. XV, irritum fecistis mandatum Dei propter +traditiones vestras. Ergo lex humana non imponit necessitatem +homini quantum ad conscientiam.
+ Objection 3: Further, human laws often bring loss of character and injury on man, according to + Is. 10:1 et seqq.: "Woe to them that make wicked laws, and when they write, write injustice; to oppress the poor in judgment, and do + violence to the cause of the humble of My people." But it is lawful for anyone to avoid oppression and violence. Therefore + human laws do not bind man in conscience. +
[37689] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +leges humanae frequenter ingerunt calumniam et iniuriam hominibus; +secundum illud Isaiae X, vae qui condunt leges iniquas, et +scribentes iniustitias scripserunt, ut opprimerent in iudicio +pauperes, et vim facerent causae humilium populi mei. Sed +licitum est unicuique oppressionem et violentiam evitare. Ergo +leges humanae non imponunt necessitatem homini quantum ad +conscientiam.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + 1 Pet. + 2:19 + ): "This is thankworthy, if for conscience . . . a man endure sorrows, suffering wrongfully." +
[37690] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur I Petr. II, haec est gratia, si propter +conscientiam sustineat quis tristitias, patiens iniuste.
+ I answer that, Laws framed by man are either just or unjust. If they be just, they have the power of binding in conscience, from the eternal + law whence they are derived, according to + Prov. 8:15: "By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things." Now laws are said to be just, both from the end, when, to wit, they + are ordained to the common good---and from their author, that is to say, when the law that is made does not exceed the power + of the + lawgiver---and from their form, when, to wit, burdens are laid on the subjects, according to an equality of proportion and + with a view to the common good. For, since one man is a part of the community, each man in all that he is and has, belongs + to the community; just as a part, in all that it is, belongs to the whole; wherefore nature inflicts a loss on the part, in + order to save the whole: so that on this account, such laws as these, which impose proportionate burdens, are just and binding + in + conscience, and are legal laws. +
On the other hand laws may be unjust in two ways: first, by being contrary to human good, through being opposed to the things + mentioned above---either in respect of the end, as when an authority imposes on his subjects burdensome laws, conducive, not + to the common good, but rather to his own cupidity or vainglory---or in respect of the author, as when a man makes a law that + goes beyond the power committed to him---or in respect of the form, as when burdens are imposed unequally + on the community, although with a view to the common good. The like are acts of violence rather than laws; because, as Augustine + says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5), "a law that is not just, seems to be no law at all." Wherefore such laws do not bind in conscience, + except perhaps in order to avoid scandal or disturbance, for which cause a man should even yield his right, according to + Mat. 5:40,41: "If a man . . . take away thy coat, let go thy cloak also unto him; and whosoever will + force thee one mile, go with him other two." +
Secondly, laws may be unjust through being opposed to the Divine good: such are the laws of tyrants inducing to idolatry, + or to anything else contrary to the Divine law: and laws of this kind must nowise be observed, because, as stated in + Acts 5:29, "we ought to obey God rather than man." +
[37691] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod leges positae humanitus vel sunt iustae, vel +iniustae. Si quidem iustae sint, habent vim obligandi in foro +conscientiae a lege aeterna, a qua derivantur; secundum illud Prov. +VIII, per me reges regnant, et legum conditores iusta +decernunt. Dicuntur autem leges iustae et ex fine, quando +scilicet ordinantur ad bonum commune; et ex auctore, quando +scilicet lex lata non excedit potestatem ferentis; et ex forma, +quando scilicet secundum aequalitatem proportionis imponuntur +subditis onera in ordine ad bonum commune. Cum enim unus homo sit +pars multitudinis, quilibet homo hoc ipsum quod est et quod habet, +est multitudinis, sicut et quaelibet pars id quod est, est totius. +Unde et natura aliquod detrimentum infert parti, ut salvet totum. +Et secundum hoc, leges huiusmodi, onera proportionabiliter +inferentes, iustae sunt, et obligant in foro conscientiae, et sunt +leges legales. Iniustae autem sunt leges dupliciter. Uno modo, per +contrarietatem ad bonum humanum, e contrario praedictis, vel ex +fine, sicut cum aliquis praesidens leges imponit onerosas subditis +non pertinentes ad utilitatem communem, sed magis ad propriam +cupiditatem vel gloriam; vel etiam ex auctore, sicut cum aliquis +legem fert ultra sibi commissam potestatem; vel etiam ex forma, +puta cum inaequaliter onera multitudini dispensantur, etiam si +ordinentur ad bonum commune. Et huiusmodi magis sunt violentiae +quam leges, quia, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Lib. Arb., +lex esse non videtur, quae iusta non fuerit. Unde tales +leges non obligant in foro conscientiae, nisi forte propter +vitandum scandalum vel turbationem, propter quod etiam homo iuri +suo debet cedere, secundum illud Matth. V, qui angariaverit te +mille passus, vade cum eo alia duo; et qui abstulerit tibi tunicam, +da ei et pallium. Alio modo leges possunt esse iniustae per +contrarietatem ad bonum divinum, sicut leges tyrannorum inducentes +ad idololatriam, vel ad quodcumque aliud quod sit contra legem +divinam. Et tales leges nullo modo licet observare, quia sicut +dicitur Act. V, obedire oportet Deo magis quam +hominibus.
+ Reply to Objection 1: As the Apostle says ( + Rom. 13:1,2), all human power is from God . . . "therefore he that resisteth the power," in matters that are within its scope, "resisteth + the ordinance of God"; so that he becomes guilty according to his conscience. +
[37692] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut apostolus dicit, ad Rom. XIII, omnis +potestas humana a Deo est, et ideo qui potestati resistit, in +his quae ad ordinem potestatis pertinent, Dei ordinationi resistit. +Et secundum hoc efficitur reus quantum ad conscientiam.
+ Reply to Objection 2: This argument is true of laws that are contrary to the commandments of God, which is beyond the scope of (human) power. Wherefore + in such matters human law should not be obeyed. +
[37693] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de legibus humanis quae +ordinantur contra Dei mandatum. Et ad hoc ordo potestatis non se +extendit. Unde in talibus legi humanae non est parendum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: This argument is true of a law that inflicts unjust hurt on its subjects. The power that man holds from God does not extend + to this: wherefore neither in such matters is man bound to obey the law, provided he avoid giving scandal or inflicting a + more grievous hurt. +
[37694] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de lege quae infert gravamen +iniustum subditis, ad quod etiam ordo potestatis divinitus +concessus non se extendit. Unde nec in talibus homo obligatur ut +obediat legi, si sine scandalo vel maiori detrimento resistere +possit.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that not all are subject to the law. For those alone are subject to a law for whom a law is made. But the Apostle + says ( + 1 Tim. 1:9): "The law is not made for the just man." Therefore the just are not subject to the law. +
[37695] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnes legi subiiciantur. Illi enim +soli subiiciuntur legi, quibus lex ponitur. Sed apostolus dicit, I +ad Tim. I, quod iusto non est lex posita. Ergo iusti non +subiiciuntur legi humanae.
+ Objection 2: Further, Pope Urban says [*Decretals. caus. xix, qu. 2]: "He that is guided by a private law need not for any reason be bound + by the public law." Now all spiritual men are led by the private law of the Holy Ghost, for they are the sons of God, of whom + it is said ( + Rom. 8:14): "Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God." Therefore not all men are subject to human law. +
[37696] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Urbanus Papa dicit, et habetur in decretis, XIX qu. II, qui lege +privata ducitur, nulla ratio exigit ut publica constringatur. +Lege autem privata spiritus sancti ducuntur omnes viri spirituales, +qui sunt filii Dei; secundum illud Rom. VIII, qui spiritu Dei +aguntur, hi filii Dei sunt. Ergo non omnes homines legi humanae +subiiciuntur.
+ Objection 3: Further, the jurist says [*Pandect. Justin. i, ff., tit. 3, De Leg. et Senat.] that "the sovereign is exempt from the laws." + But he that is exempt from the law is not bound thereby. Therefore not all are subject to the law. +
[37697] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +iurisperitus dicit quod princeps legibus solutus est. Qui autem est +solutus a lege, non subditur legi. Ergo non omnes subiecti sunt +legi.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle says ( + Rom. 13:1): "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers." But subjection to a power seems to imply subjection to the laws framed + by that power. Therefore all men should be subject to human law. +
[37698] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. XIII, omnis anima potestatibus +sublimioribus subdita sit. Sed non videtur esse subditus +potestati, qui non subiicitur legi quam fert potestas. Ergo omnes +homines debent esse legi humanae subiecti.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + Q[90], AA[1],2; A[3], ad 2), the notion of law contains two things: first, that it is a rule of human acts; secondly, that it has coercive + power. Wherefore a man may be subject to law in two ways. First, as the regulated is subject to the regulator: and, in this + way, whoever is subject to a power, is subject to the law framed by that power. But it may happen in two ways that one is + not subject to a power. In one way, + by being altogether free from its authority: hence the subjects of one city or kingdom are not bound by the laws of the sovereign + of another city or kingdom, since they are not subject to his authority. In another way, by being under a yet higher law; + thus the subject of a proconsul should be ruled by his command, but not in those matters in which the subject receives his + orders from the emperor: for in these matters, he is not bound by the mandate of the lower authority, since he is directed + by that of a higher. In this way, one who is simply subject to a law, may not be a subject thereto in certain matters, in + respect of which he is ruled by a higher law. +
Secondly, a man is said to be subject to a law as the coerced is subject to the coercer. In this way the virtuous and righteous + are not subject to the law, but only the wicked. Because coercion and violence are contrary to the will: but the will of the + good is in harmony with the law, whereas the will of the wicked is discordant from it. Wherefore in this sense the good are + not subject to the law, but only the wicked. +
[37699] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ex supradictis patet, lex de sui ratione duo +habet, primo quidem, quod est regula humanorum actuum; secundo, +quod habet vim coactivam. Dupliciter ergo aliquis homo potest esse +legi subiectus. Uno modo, sicut regulatum regulae. Et hoc modo +omnes illi qui subduntur potestati, subduntur legi quam fert +potestas. Quod autem aliquis potestati non subdatur, potest +contingere dupliciter. Uno modo, quia est simpliciter absolutus ab +eius subiectione. Unde illi qui sunt de una civitate vel regno, non +subduntur legibus principis alterius civitatis vel regni, sicut nec +eius dominio. Alio modo, secundum quod regitur superiori lege. Puta +si aliquis subiectus sit proconsuli, regulari debet eius mandato, +non tamen in his quae dispensantur ei ab imperatore, quantum enim +ad illa, non adstringitur mandato inferioris, cum superiori mandato +dirigatur. Et secundum hoc contingit quod aliquis simpliciter +subiectus legi, secundum aliqua legi non adstringitur, secundum +quae regitur superiori lege. Alio vero modo dicitur aliquis subdi +legi sicut coactum cogenti. Et hoc modo homines virtuosi et iusti +non subduntur legi, sed soli mali. Quod enim est coactum et +violentum, est contrarium voluntati. Voluntas autem bonorum +consonat legi, a qua malorum voluntas discordat. Et ideo secundum +hoc boni non sunt sub lege, sed solum mali.
+ Reply to Objection 1: This argument is true of subjection by way of coercion: for, in this way, "the law is not made for the just men": because + "they are a law to themselves," since they "show the work of the law written in their hearts," as the Apostle says ( + Rom. 2:14,15). Consequently the law does not enforce itself upon them as it does on the wicked. +
[37700] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de subiectione quae est per +modum coactionis. Sic enim iusto non est lex posita, quia ipsi sibi +sunt lex, dum ostendunt opus legis scriptum in cordibus suis, sicut +apostolus, ad Rom. II, dicit. Unde in eos non habet lex vim +coactivam, sicut habet in iniustos.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The law of the Holy Ghost is above all law framed by man: and therefore spiritual men, in so far as they are led by the law + of the Holy Ghost, are not subject to the law in those matters that are inconsistent with the guidance of the Holy Ghost. + Nevertheless the very fact that spiritual men are subject to law, is due to the leading of the Holy Ghost, according to + 1 Pet. 2:13: "Be ye subject . . . to every human creature for God's + sake." +
[37701] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod lex spiritus sancti est superior omni lege humanitus +posita. Et ideo viri spirituales, secundum hoc quod lege spiritus +sancti ducuntur, non subduntur legi, quantum ad ea quae repugnant +ductioni spiritus sancti. Sed tamen hoc ipsum est de ductu spiritus +sancti, quod homines spirituales legibus humanis subdantur; +secundum illud I Petr. II, subiecti estote omni humanae +creaturae, propter Deum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The sovereign is said to be "exempt from the law," as to its coercive power; since, properly speaking, no man is coerced + by himself, and law has no coercive power save from the authority of the sovereign. Thus then is the sovereign said to be + exempt from the law, because none is competent to pass sentence on him, if he acts against the law. Wherefore on + Ps. 50:6: "To Thee only have I sinned," a gloss says that "there is no man who + can judge the deeds of a king." But as to the directive force of law, the sovereign is subject to the law by his own will, + according to the statement (Extra, De Constit. cap. Cum omnes) that "whatever law a man makes for another, he should keep + himself. And a wise authority [*Dionysius Cato, Dist. de Moribus] says: 'Obey the law that thou makest thyself.'" Moreover + the Lord reproaches those who "say and do not"; and who "bind heavy burdens and lay them on men's shoulders, but with a finger + of + their own they will not move them" ( + Mat. 23:3,4). Hence, in the judgment of God, the sovereign is not exempt from the law, as to its directive force; but he should fulfil + it to his own free-will and not of constraint. Again the sovereign is above the law, in so far as, when it is expedient, he + can change the law, and dispense in it according to time and place. +
[37702] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod princeps dicitur esse solutus a lege, quantum ad vim +coactivam legis, nullus enim proprie cogitur a seipso; lex autem +non habet vim coactivam nisi ex principis potestate. Sic igitur +princeps dicitur esse solutus a lege, quia nullus in ipsum potest +iudicium condemnationis ferre, si contra legem agat. Unde super +illud Psalmi l, tibi soli peccavi etc., dicit Glossa quod +lex non habet hominem qui sua facta diiudicet. Sed quantum +ad vim directivam legis, princeps subditur legi propria voluntate; +secundum quod dicitur extra, de constitutionibus, cap. cum omnes, +quod quisque iuris in alterum statuit, ipse eodem iure uti +debet. Et sapientis dicit auctoritas, patere legem quam ipse +tuleris. Improperatur etiam his a domino qui dicunt et non +faciunt; et qui aliis onera gravia imponunt, et ipsi nec digito +volunt ea movere; ut habetur Matth. XXIII. Unde quantum ad Dei +iudicium, princeps non est solutus a lege, quantum ad vim +directivam eius; sed debet voluntarius, non coactus, legem implere. +Est etiam princeps supra legem, inquantum, si expediens fuerit, +potest legem mutare, et in ea dispensare, pro loco et tempore.
+ Objection 1: It seems that he who is subject to a law may not act beside the letter of the law. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 31): + "Although men judge about temporal laws when they make them, yet when once they are made they must pass judgment not on them, + but according to them." But if anyone disregard the letter of the law, saying that he observes the intention of the lawgiver, + he seems to pass judgment on the law. Therefore it is not right for one who is under the + law to disregard the letter of the law, in order to observe the intention of the lawgiver. +
[37703] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non liceat ei qui subditur legi, +praeter verba legis agere. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de vera +Relig., in temporalibus legibus, quamvis homines iudicent de his +cum eas instituunt, tamen quando fuerint institutae et firmatae, +non licebit de ipsis iudicare, sed secundum ipsas. Sed si +aliquis praetermittat verba legis, dicens se intentionem +legislatoris servare, videtur iudicare de lege. Ergo non licet ei +qui subditur legi, ut praetermittat verba legis, ut intentionem +legislatoris servet.
+ Objection 2: Further, he alone is competent to interpret the law who can make the law. But those who are subject to the law cannot make + the law. Therefore they have no right to interpret the intention of the lawgiver, but should always act according to the letter + of the law. +
[37704] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, +ad eum solum pertinet leges interpretari, cuius est condere leges. +Sed hominum subditorum legi non est leges condere. Ergo eorum non +est interpretari legislatoris intentionem, sed semper secundum +verba legis agere debent.
+ Objection 3: Further, every wise man knows how to explain his intention by words. But those who framed the laws should be reckoned wise: + for Wisdom says ( + Prov. 8:15): "By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things." Therefore we should not judge of the intention of the lawgiver otherwise + than by the words of the law. +
[37705] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, +omnis sapiens intentionem suam verbis novit explicare. Sed illi qui +leges condiderunt, reputari debent sapientes, dicit enim sapientia, +Prov. VIII, per me reges regnant, et legum conditores iusta +decernunt. Ergo de intentione legislatoris non est iudicandum +nisi per verba legis.
+ On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "The meaning of what is said is according to the motive for saying it: because things are not + subject to speech, but speech to things." Therefore we should take account of the motive of the lawgiver, rather than of his + very words. +
[37706] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Hilarius dicit, in IV de Trin., intelligentia dictorum +ex causis est assumenda dicendi, quia non sermoni res, sed rei +debet esse sermo subiectus. Ergo magis est attendendum ad +causam quae movit legislatorem, quam ad ipsa verba legis.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[4]), every law is directed to the common weal of men, and derives the force and nature of law accordingly. Hence the jurist says + [*Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff., tit. 3, De Leg. et Senat.]: "By no reason of law, or favor of equity, is it allowable for + us to interpret harshly, and render burdensome, those useful measures which have been enacted for the welfare of man." Now + it happens often that the observance of some + point of law conduces to the common weal in the majority of instances, and yet, in some cases, is very hurtful. Since then + the lawgiver cannot have in view every single case, he shapes the law according to what happens most frequently, by directing + his attention to the common good. Wherefore if a case arise wherein the observance of that law would be hurtful to the general + welfare, it should not be observed. For instance, suppose that in a besieged city it be an established law that the gates + of the city are to be kept closed, this is good for public welfare as a general rule: but, it were to happen that the enemy + are in pursuit of certain citizens, who are defenders of the city, it would be a great loss to the city, if the gates were + not opened to them: and so in that case the gates ought to be opened, contrary to the letter of the law, in order to maintain + the common weal, which the lawgiver had in view. +
Nevertheless it must be noted, that if the observance of the law according to the letter does not involve any sudden risk + needing instant remedy, it is not competent for everyone to expound what is useful and what is not useful to the state: those + alone can do this who are in authority, and who, on account of such like cases, have the power to dispense from the laws. + If, however, the peril be so sudden as not to allow of the delay involved by referring the matter to authority, + the mere necessity brings with it a dispensation, since necessity knows no law. +
[37707] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 6 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, omnis lex ordinatur ad +communem hominum salutem, et intantum obtinet vim et rationem +legis; secundum vero quod ab hoc deficit, virtutem obligandi non +habet. Unde iurisperitus dicit quod nulla iuris ratio aut +aequitatis benignitas patitur ut quae salubriter pro utilitate +hominum introducuntur, ea nos duriori interpretatione, contra +ipsorum commodum, perducamus ad severitatem. Contingit autem +multoties quod aliquid observari communi saluti est utile ut in +pluribus, quod tamen in aliquibus casibus est maxime nocivum. Quia +igitur legislator non potest omnes singulares casus intueri, +proponit legem secundum ea quae in pluribus accidunt, ferens +intentionem suam ad communem utilitatem. Unde si emergat casus in +quo observatio talis legis sit damnosa communi saluti, non est +observanda. Sicut si in civitate obsessa statuatur lex quod portae +civitatis maneant clausae, hoc est utile communi saluti ut in +pluribus, si tamen contingat casus quod hostes insequantur aliquos +cives, per quos civitas conservatur, damnosissimum esset civitati +nisi eis portae aperirentur, et ideo in tali casu essent portae +aperiendae, contra verba legis, ut servaretur utilitas communis, +quam legislator intendit. Sed tamen hoc est considerandum, quod si +observatio legis secundum verba non habeat subitum periculum, cui +oportet statim occurri, non pertinet ad quemlibet ut interpretetur +quid sit utile civitati et quid inutile, sed hoc solum pertinet ad +principes, qui propter huiusmodi casus habent auctoritatem in +legibus dispensandi. Si vero sit subitum periculum, non patiens +tantam moram ut ad superiorem recurri possit, ipsa necessitas +dispensationem habet annexam, quia necessitas non subditur +legi.
+ Reply to Objection 1: He who in a case of necessity acts beside the letter of the law, does not judge the law; but of a particular case in which + he sees that the letter of the law is not to be observed. +
[37708] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ille qui in casu necessitatis agit praeter verba +legis, non iudicat de ipsa lege, sed iudicat de casu singulari, in +quo videt verba legis observanda non esse.
+ Reply to Objection 2: He who follows the intention of the lawgiver, does not interpret the law simply; but in a case in which it is evident, by + reason of the manifest harm, that the lawgiver intended otherwise. For if it be a matter of doubt, he must either act according + to the letter of the law, or consult those in power. +
[37709] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod ille qui sequitur intentionem legislatoris, non +interpretatur legem simpliciter; sed in casu in quo manifestum est +per evidentiam nocumenti, legislatorem aliud intendisse. Si enim +dubium sit, debet vel secundum verba legis agere, vel superiores +consulere.
+ Reply to Objection 3: No man is so wise as to be able to take account of every single case; wherefore he is not able sufficiently to express in + words all those things that are suitable for the end he has in view. And even if a lawgiver were able to take all the cases + into consideration, he ought not to mention them all, in order to avoid confusion: but should frame the law according to that + which is of most common occurrence. +
[37710] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod nullius hominis sapientia tanta est ut possit omnes +singulares casus excogitare, et ideo non potest sufficienter per +verba sua exprimere ea quae conveniunt ad finem intentum. Et si +posset legislator omnes casus considerare, non oporteret ut omnes +exprimeret, propter confusionem vitandam, sed legem ferre deberet +secundum ea quae in pluribus accidunt.
We must now consider change in laws: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether human law is changeable?
(2) Whether it should be always changed, whenever anything better occurs?
(3) Whether it is abolished by custom, and whether custom obtains the force of law?
(4) Whether the application of human law should be changed by dispensation of those in authority?
+[37711] +Iª-IIae q. 97 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +mutatione legum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum lex +humana sit mutabilis. Secundo, utrum semper debeat mutari, quando +aliquid melius occurrerit. Tertio, utrum per consuetudinem +aboleatur; et utrum consuetudo obtineat vim legis. Quarto, utrum +usus legis humanae per dispensationem rectorum immutari debeat.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that human law should not be changed in any way at all. Because human law is derived from the natural law, + as stated above ( + Q[95], A[2]). But the natural law endures unchangeably. Therefore human law should also remain without any change. +
[37712] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex humana nullo modo debeat mutari. +Lex enim humana derivatur a lege naturali, ut supra dictum est. Sed +lex naturalis immobilis perseverat. Ergo et lex humana debet +immobilis permanere.
+ Objection 2: Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5), a measure should be absolutely stable. But human law is the measure of human + acts, as stated above ( + Q[90], AA[1],2). Therefore it should remain without change. +
[37713] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +sicut philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., mensura maxime debet esse +permanens. Sed lex humana est mensura humanorum actuum, ut supra +dictum est. Ergo debet immobiliter permanere.
+ Objection 3: Further, it is of the essence of law to be just and right, as stated above ( + Q[95], A[2]). But that which is right once is right always. Therefore that which is law once, should be always law. +
[37714] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +de ratione legis est quod sit iusta et recta, ut supra dictum est. +Sed illud quod semel est rectum, semper est rectum. Ergo illud quod +semel est lex, semper debet esse lex.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): "A temporal law, however just, may be justly changed in course of time." +
[37715] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib. Arb., lex temporalis +quamvis iusta sit, commutari tamen per tempora iuste +potest.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + Q[91], A[3]), human law is a dictate of reason, whereby human acts are directed. Thus there may be two causes for the just change of + human law: one on the part of reason; the other on the part of man whose acts are regulated by law. The cause on the part + of reason is that it seems natural to human reason to advance gradually from the imperfect to the perfect. Hence, in speculative + sciences, we see that the teaching + of the early philosophers was imperfect, and that it was afterwards perfected by those who succeeded them. So also in practical + matters: for those who first endeavored to discover something useful for the human community, not being able by themselves + to take everything into consideration, set up certain institutions which were deficient in many ways; and these were changed + by subsequent lawgivers who made institutions that might prove less frequently deficient in respect of the common weal. +
On the part of man, whose acts are regulated by law, the law can be rightly changed on account of the changed condition of + man, to whom different things are expedient according to the difference of his condition. An example is proposed by Augustine + (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): "If the people have a sense of moderation and responsibility, and are most careful guardians of the common + weal, it is right to enact a law allowing such a people to choose their own magistrates for the government + of the commonwealth. But if, as time goes on, the same people become so corrupt as to sell their votes, and entrust the government + to scoundrels and criminals; then the right of appointing their public officials is rightly forfeit to such a people, and + the choice devolves to a few good men." +
[37716] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod sicut supra dictum est, lex humana est quoddam +dictamen rationis, quo diriguntur humani actus. Et secundum hoc +duplex causa potest esse quod lex humana iuste mutetur, una quidem +ex parte rationis; alia vero ex parte hominum, quorum actus lege +regulantur. Ex parte quidem rationis, quia humanae rationi naturale +esse videtur ut gradatim ab imperfecto ad perfectum perveniat. Unde +videmus in scientiis speculativis quod qui primo philosophati sunt, +quaedam imperfecta tradiderunt, quae postmodum per posteriores sunt +magis perfecta. Ita etiam est in operabilibus. Nam primi qui +intenderunt invenire aliquid utile communitati hominum, non +valentes omnia ex seipsis considerare, instituerunt quaedam +imperfecta in multis deficientia quae posteriores mutaverunt, +instituentes aliqua quae in paucioribus deficere possent a communi +utilitate. Ex parte vero hominum, quorum actus lege regulantur, lex +recte mutari potest propter mutationem conditionum hominum, quibus +secundum diversas eorum conditiones diversa expediunt. Sicut +Augustinus ponit exemplum, in I de Lib. Arb., quod si populus +sit bene moderatus et gravis, communisque utilitatis +diligentissimus custos, recte lex fertur qua tali populo liceat +creare sibi magistratus, per quos respublica administretur. Porro +si paulatim idem populus depravatus habeat venale suffragium, et +regimen flagitiosis sceleratisque committat; recte adimitur tali +populo potestas dandi honores, et ad paucorum bonorum redit +arbitrium.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The natural law is a participation of the eternal law, as stated above ( + Q[91], A[2]), and therefore endures without change, owing to the unchangeableness and perfection of the Divine Reason, the Author of + nature. But the reason of man is changeable and imperfect: wherefore his law is subject to change. Moreover the natural law + contains certain universal precepts, which are everlasting: whereas human law contains certain + particular precepts, according to various emergencies. +
[37717] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod naturalis lex est participatio quaedam legis +aeternae, ut supra dictum est, et ideo immobilis perseverat, quod +habet ex immobilitate et perfectione divinae rationis instituentis +naturam. Sed ratio humana mutabilis est et imperfecta. Et ideo eius +lex mutabilis est. Et praeterea lex naturalis continet quaedam +universalia praecepta, quae semper manent, lex vero posita ab +homine continet praecepta quaedam particularia, secundum diversos +casus qui emergunt.
+ Reply to Objection 2: A measure should be as enduring as possible. But nothing can be absolutely unchangeable in things that are subject to change. + And therefore human law cannot be altogether unchangeable. +
[37718] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod mensura debet esse permanens quantum est possibile. +Sed in rebus mutabilibus non potest esse aliquid omnino +immutabiliter permanens. Et ideo lex humana non potest esse omnino +immutabilis.
+ Reply to Objection 3: In corporal things, right is predicated absolutely: and therefore, as far as itself is concerned, always remains right. But + right is predicated of law with reference to the common weal, to which one and the same thing is not always adapted, as stated + above: wherefore rectitude of this kind is subject to change. +
[37719] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod rectum in rebus corporalibus dicitur absolute, et +ideo semper, quantum est de se, manet rectum. Sed rectitudo legis +dicitur in ordine ad utilitatem communem, cui non semper +proportionatur una eademque res, sicut supra dictum est. Et ideo +talis rectitudo mutatur.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that human law should be changed, whenever something better occurs. Because human laws are devised by human + reason, like other arts. But in the other arts, the tenets of former times give place to others, if something better occurs. + Therefore the same should apply to human laws. +
[37720] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod semper lex humana, quando aliquid +melius occurrit, sit mutanda. Leges enim humanae sunt adinventae +per rationem humanam, sicut etiam aliae artes. Sed in aliis artibus +mutatur id quod prius tenebatur, si aliquid melius occurrat. Ergo +idem est etiam faciendum in legibus humanis.
+ Objection 2: Further, by taking note of the past we can provide for the future. Now unless human laws had been changed when it was found + possible to improve them, considerable inconvenience would have ensued; because the laws of old were crude in many points. + Therefore it seems that laws should be changed, whenever anything better occurs to be enacted. +
[37721] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +ex his quae praeterita sunt, providere possumus de futuris. Sed +nisi leges humanae mutatae fuissent supervenientibus melioribus +adinventionibus, multa inconvenientia sequerentur, eo quod leges +antiquae inveniuntur multas ruditates continere. Ergo videtur quod +leges sint mutandae, quotiescumque aliquid melius occurrit +statuendum.
+ Objection 3: Further, human laws are enacted about single acts of man. But we cannot acquire perfect knowledge in singular matters, except + by experience, which "requires time," as stated in Ethic. ii. Therefore it seems that as time goes on it is possible for something + better to occur for legislation. +
[37722] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +leges humanae circa singulares actus hominum statuuntur. In +singularibus autem perfectam cognitionem adipisci non possumus nisi +per experientiam, quae tempore indiget, ut dicitur in II Ethic. +Ergo videtur quod per successionem temporis possit aliquid melius +occurrere statuendum.
+ On the contrary, It is stated in the Decretals (Dist. xii, 5): "It is absurd, and a detestable shame, that we should suffer those traditions + to be changed which we have received from the fathers of old." +
[37723] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur in decretis, dist. XII, ridiculum est et satis +abominabile dedecus, ut traditiones quas antiquitus a patribus +suscepimus, infringi patiamur.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[1]), human law is rightly changed, in so far as such change is conducive to the common weal. But, to a certain extent, the mere + change of law is of itself prejudicial to the common good: because custom avails much for the observance of laws, seeing that + what is done contrary to general custom, even in slight matters, is looked upon as grave. Consequently, when a law is changed, + the binding power of the law is + diminished, in so far as custom is abolished. Wherefore human law should never be changed, unless, in some way or other, the + common weal be compensated according to the extent of the harm done in this respect. Such compensation may arise either from + some very great and every evident benefit conferred by the new enactment; or from the extreme urgency of the case, due to + the fact that either the existing law is clearly unjust, or its observance extremely harmful. Wherefore the jurist says + [*Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff., tit. 4, De Constit. Princip.] that "in establishing new laws, there should be evidence of + the benefit to be derived, before departing from a law which has long been considered just." +
[37724] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, lex humana intantum recte mutatur, +inquantum per eius mutationem communi utilitati providetur. Habet +autem ipsa legis mutatio, quantum in se est, detrimentum quoddam +communis salutis. Quia ad observantiam legum plurimum valet +consuetudo, intantum quod ea quae contra communem consuetudinem +fiunt, etiam si sint leviora de se, graviora videantur. Unde quando +mutatur lex, diminuitur vis constrictiva legis, inquantum tollitur +consuetudo. Et ideo nunquam debet mutari lex humana, nisi ex aliqua +parte tantum recompensetur communi saluti, quantum ex ista parte +derogatur. Quod quidem contingit vel ex hoc quod aliqua maxima et +evidentissima utilitas ex novo statuto provenit, vel ex eo quod est +maxima necessitas, ex eo quod lex consueta aut manifestam +iniquitatem continet, aut eius observatio est plurimum nociva. Unde +dicitur a iurisperito quod in rebus novis constituendis, evidens +debet esse utilitas, ut recedatur ab eo iure quod diu aequum visum +est.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Rules of art derive their force from reason alone: and therefore whenever something better occurs, the rule followed hitherto + should be changed. But "laws derive very great force from custom," as the Philosopher states (Polit. ii, 5): consequently + they should not be quickly changed. +
[37725] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ea quae sunt artis, habent efficaciam ex sola +ratione, et ideo ubicumque melior ratio occurrat, est mutandum quod +prius tenebatur. Sed leges habent maximam virtutem ex +consuetudine, ut philosophus dicit, in II Polit. Et inde non +sunt de facili mutandae.
+ Reply to Objection 2: This argument proves that laws ought to be changed: not in view of any improvement, but for the sake of a great benefit or + in a case of great urgency, as stated above. +
[37726] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa concludit quod leges sunt mutandae, non +tamen pro quacumque melioratione, sed pro magna utilitate vel +necessitate, ut dictum est.
Reply to Objection 3: This answer applies also to the Third Objection.
[37727] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 2 ad 3 Et similiter +dicendum est ad tertium.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that custom cannot obtain force of law, nor abolish a law. Because human law is derived from the natural law + and from the Divine law, as stated above ( + Q[93], A[3]; + Q[95], A[2]). But human custom cannot change either the law of nature or the Divine law. Therefore neither can it change human law. +
[37728] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod consuetudo non possit obtinere vim +legis, nec legem amovere. Lex enim humana derivatur a lege naturae +et a lege divina, ut ex supradictis patet. Sed consuetudo hominum +non potest immutare legem naturae, nec legem divinam. Ergo etiam +nec legem humanam immutare potest.
+ Objection 2: Further, many evils cannot make one good. But he who first acted against the law, did evil. Therefore by multiplying such + acts, nothing good is the result. Now a law is something good; since it is a rule of human acts. Therefore law is not abolished + by custom, so that the mere custom should obtain force of law. +
[37729] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +ex multis malis non potest fieri unum bonum. Sed ille qui incipit +primo contra legem agere, male facit. Ergo, multiplicatis similibus +actibus, non efficietur aliquod bonum. Lex autem est quoddam bonum, +cum sit regula humanorum actuum. Ergo per consuetudinem non potest +removeri lex, ut ipsa consuetudo vim legis obtineat.
+ Objection 3: Further, the framing of laws belongs to those public men whose business it is to govern the community; wherefore private + individuals cannot make laws. But custom grows by the acts of private individuals. Therefore custom cannot obtain force of + law, so as to abolish the law. +
[37730] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +ferre legem pertinet ad publicas personas, ad quas pertinet regere +communitatem, unde privatae personae legem facere non possunt. Sed +consuetudo invalescit per actus privatarum personarum. Ergo +consuetudo non potest obtinere vim legis, per quam lex +removeatur.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. ad Casulan. xxxvi): "The customs of God's people and the institutions of our ancestors are to be considered + as laws. And those who throw contempt on the customs of the Church ought to be punished as those who disobey the law of God." +
[37731] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in Epist. ad Casulan., mos populi Dei +et instituta maiorum pro lege sunt tenenda. Et sicut +praevaricatores legum divinarum, ita et contemptores consuetudinum +ecclesiasticarum coercendi sunt.
+ I answer that, All law proceeds from the reason and will of the lawgiver; the Divine and natural laws from the reasonable will of God; the + human law from the will of man, regulated by reason. Now just as human reason and will, in practical matters, may be made + manifest by speech, so may they be made known by deeds: since seemingly a man chooses as good that which he carries into execution. + But it is evident that by human speech, law can be both changed and expounded, in so + far as it manifests the interior movement and thought of human reason. Wherefore by actions also, especially if they be repeated, + so as to make a custom, law can be changed and expounded; and also something can be established which obtains force of law, + in so far as by repeated external actions, the inward movement of the will, and concepts of reason are most effectually declared; + for when a thing is done again and again, it seems to proceed from a deliberate judgment of reason. Accordingly, + custom has the force of a law, abolishes law, and is the interpreter of law. +
[37732] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod omnis lex proficiscitur a ratione et voluntate +legislatoris, lex quidem divina et naturalis a rationabili Dei +voluntate; lex autem humana a voluntate hominis ratione regulata. +Sicut autem ratio et voluntas hominis manifestantur verbo in rebus +agendis, ita etiam manifestantur facto, hoc enim unusquisque +eligere videtur ut bonum, quod opere implet. Manifestum est autem +quod verbo humano potest et mutari lex, et etiam exponi, inquantum +manifestat interiorem motum et conceptum rationis humanae. Unde +etiam et per actus, maxime multiplicatos, qui consuetudinem +efficiunt, mutari potest lex, et exponi, et etiam aliquid causari +quod legis virtutem obtineat, inquantum scilicet per exteriores +actus multiplicatos interior voluntatis motus, et rationis +conceptus, efficacissime declaratur; cum enim aliquid multoties +fit, videtur ex deliberato rationis iudicio provenire. Et secundum +hoc, consuetudo et habet vim legis, et legem abolet, et est legum +interpretatrix.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The natural and Divine laws proceed from the Divine will, as stated above. Wherefore they cannot be changed by a custom proceeding + from the will of man, but only by Divine authority. Hence it is that no custom can prevail over the Divine or natural laws: + for Isidore says (Synon. ii, 16): "Let custom yield to authority: evil customs should be eradicated by law and reason." +
[37733] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod lex naturalis et divina procedit a voluntate +divina, ut dictum est. Unde non potest mutari per consuetudinem +procedentem a voluntate hominis, sed solum per auctoritatem divinam +mutari posset. Et inde est quod nulla consuetudo vim obtinere +potest contra legem divinam vel legem naturalem, dicit enim +Isidorus, in Synonym., usus auctoritati cedat, pravum usum lex +et ratio vincat.
+ Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ( + Q[96], A[6]), human laws fail in some cases: wherefore it is possible sometimes to act beside the law; namely, in a case where the law + fails; yet the act will not be evil. And when such cases are multiplied, by reason of some change in man, then custom shows + that the law is no longer useful: just as it might be declared by the verbal promulgation of a law to the contrary. If, however, + the same reason remains, + for which the law was useful hitherto, then it is not the custom that prevails against the law, but the law that overcomes + the custom: unless perhaps the sole reason for the law seeming useless, be that it is not "possible according to the custom + of the country" [* + Q[95], A[3]], which has been stated to be one of the conditions of law. For it is not easy to set aside the custom of a whole people. +
[37734] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, leges humanae in aliquibus +casibus deficiunt, unde possibile est quandoque praeter legem +agere, in casu scilicet in quo deficit lex, et tamen actus non erit +malus. Et cum tales casus multiplicantur, propter aliquam +mutationem hominum, tunc manifestatur per consuetudinem quod lex +ulterius utilis non est, sicut etiam manifestaretur si lex +contraria verbo promulgaretur. Si autem adhuc maneat ratio eadem +propter quam prima lex utilis erat, non consuetudo legem, sed lex +consuetudinem vincit, nisi forte propter hoc solum inutilis lex +videatur, quia non est possibilis secundum consuetudinem patriae, +quae erat una de conditionibus legis. Difficile enim est +consuetudinem multitudinis removere.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The people among whom a custom is introduced may be of two conditions. For if they are free, and able to make their own laws, + the consent of the whole people expressed by a custom counts far more in favor of a particular observance, that does the authority + of the sovereign, who has not the power to frame laws, except as representing the people. Wherefore although each individual + cannot make laws, yet the whole people can. If however the people have + not the free power to make their own laws, or to abolish a law made by a higher authority; nevertheless with such a people + a prevailing custom obtains force of law, in so far as it is tolerated by those to whom it belongs to make laws for that people: + because by the very fact that they tolerate it they seem to approve of that which is introduced by custom. +
[37735] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod multitudo in qua consuetudo introducitur duplicis +conditionis esse potest. Si enim sit libera multitudo, quae possit +sibi legem facere, plus est consensus totius multitudinis ad +aliquid observandum, quem consuetudo manifestat, quam auctoritas +principis, qui non habet potestatem condendi legem, nisi inquantum +gerit personam multitudinis. Unde licet singulae personae non +possint condere legem, tamen totus populus legem condere potest. Si +vero multitudo non habeat liberam potestatem condendi sibi legem, +vel legem a superiori potestate positam removendi; tamen ipsa +consuetudo in tali multitudine praevalens obtinet vim legis, +inquantum per eos toleratur ad quos pertinet multitudini legem +imponere, ex hoc enim ipso videntur approbare quod consuetudo +induxit.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the rulers of the people cannot dispense from human laws. For the law is established for the "common weal," + as Isidore says (Etym. v, 21). But the common good should not be set aside for the private convenience of an individual: because, + as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 2), "the good of the nation is more godlike than the good of one man." Therefore it seems + that a man should not be dispensed from acting in compliance with the general + law. +
[37736] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod rectores multitudinis non possint in +legibus humanis dispensare. Lex enim statuta est pro communi +utilitate, ut Isidorus dicit. Sed bonum commune non debet +intermitti pro privato commodo alicuius personae, quia, ut dicit +philosophus, in I Ethic., bonum gentis divinius est quam bonum +unius hominis. Ergo videtur quod non debeat dispensari cum +aliquo ut contra legem communem agat.
+ Objection 2: Further, those who are placed over others are commanded as follows ( + Dt. 1:17): "You shall hear the little as well as the great; neither shall you respect any man's person, because it is the judgment + of God." But to allow one man to do that which is equally forbidden to all, seems to be respect of persons. Therefore the + rulers of a community cannot grant such dispensations, since this is against a precept of the Divine law. +
[37737] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +illis qui super alios constituuntur, praecipitur Deut. I, ita +parvum audietis ut magnum, nec accipietis cuiusquam personam, quia +Dei iudicium est. Sed concedere alicui quod communiter +denegatur omnibus, videtur esse acceptio personarum. Ergo huiusmodi +dispensationes facere rectores multitudinis non possunt, cum hoc +sit contra praeceptum legis divinae.
+ Objection 3: Further, human law, in order to be just, should accord with the natural and Divine laws: else it would not "foster religion," + nor be "helpful to discipline," which is requisite to the nature of law, as laid down by Isidore (Etym. v, 3). But no man + can dispense from the Divine and natural laws. Neither, therefore, can he dispense from the human law. +
[37738] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +lex humana, si sit recta, oportet quod consonet legi naturali et +legi divinae, aliter enim non congrueret religioni, nec conveniret +disciplinae, quod requiritur ad legem, ut Isidorus dicit. Sed in +lege divina et naturali nullus homo potest dispensare. Ergo nec +etiam in lege humana.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle says ( + 1 Cor. 9:17): "A dispensation is committed to me." +
[37739] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicit apostolus, I ad Cor. IX, dispensatio mihi credita +est.
+ I answer that, Dispensation, properly speaking, denotes a measuring out to individuals of some common goods: thus the head of a household + is called a dispenser, because to each member of the household he distributes work and necessaries of life in due weight and + measure. Accordingly in every community a man is said to dispense, from the very fact that he directs how some general precept + is to be fulfilled by each individual. Now it happens at times that a precept, which is + conducive to the common weal as a general rule, is not good for a particular individual, or in some particular case, either + because it would hinder some greater good, or because it would be the occasion of some evil, as explained above ( + Q[96], A[6]). But it would be dangerous to leave this to the discretion of each individual, except perhaps by reason of an evident and + sudden emergency, as stated above ( + Q[96], A[6]). Consequently he who is + placed over a community is empowered to dispense in a human law that rests upon his authority, so that, when the law fails + in its application to persons or circumstances, he may allow the precept of the law not to be observed. If however he grant + this permission without any such reason, and of his mere will, he will be an unfaithful or an imprudent dispenser: unfaithful, + if he has not the common good in view; imprudent, if he ignores the reasons for granting dispensations. Hence Our Lord says + ( + Lk. 12:42): "Who, thinkest thou, is the faithful and wise dispenser [Douay: steward], whom his lord setteth over his family?" +
[37740] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod dispensatio proprie importat commensurationem +alicuius communis ad singula, unde etiam gubernator familiae +dicitur dispensator, inquantum unicuique de familia cum pondere et +mensura distribuit et operationes et necessaria vitae. Sic igitur +et in quacumque multitudine ex eo dicitur aliquis dispensare, quod +ordinat qualiter aliquod commune praeceptum sit a singulis +adimplendum. Contingit autem quandoque quod aliquod praeceptum quod +est ad commodum multitudinis ut in pluribus, non est conveniens +huic personae, vel in hoc casu, quia vel per hoc impediretur +aliquid melius, vel etiam induceretur aliquod malum, sicut ex +supradictis patet. Periculosum autem esset ut hoc iudicio +cuiuslibet committeretur, nisi forte propter evidens et subitum +periculum, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo ille qui habet regere +multitudinem, habet potestatem dispensandi in lege humana quae suae +auctoritati innititur, ut scilicet in personis vel casibus in +quibus lex deficit, licentiam tribuat ut praeceptum legis non +servetur. Si autem absque hac ratione, pro sola voluntate, +licentiam tribuat, non erit fidelis in dispensatione, aut erit +imprudens, infidelis quidem, si non habeat intentionem ad bonum +commune; imprudens autem, si rationem dispensandi ignoret. Propter +quod dominus dicit, Lucae XII, quis, putas, est fidelis +dispensator et prudens, quem constituit dominus super familiam +suam?
+ Reply to Objection 1: When a person is dispensed from observing the general law, this should not be done to the prejudice of, but with the intention + of benefiting, the common good. +
[37741] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, quando cum aliquo dispensatur ut legem communem +non servet, non debet fieri in praeiudicium boni communis; sed ea +intentione ut ad bonum commune proficiat.
+ Reply to Objection 2: It is not respect of persons if unequal measures are served out to those who are themselves unequal. Wherefore when the condition + of any person requires that he should reasonably receive special treatment, it is not respect of persons if he be the object + of special favor. +
[37742] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod non est acceptio personarum si non serventur aequalia +in personis inaequalibus. Unde quando conditio alicuius personae +requirit ut rationabiliter in ea aliquid specialiter observetur, +non est personarum acceptio si sibi aliqua specialis gratia +fiat.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Natural law, so far as it contains general precepts, which never fail, does not allow of dispensations. In other precepts, + however, which are as conclusions of the general precepts, man sometimes grants a dispensation: for instance, that a loan + should not be paid back to the betrayer of his country, or something similar. But to the Divine law each man stands as a private + person to the public law to which he is subject. Wherefore just as none can + dispense from public human law, except the man from whom the law derives its authority, or his delegate; so, in the precepts + of the Divine law, which are from God, none can dispense but God, or the man to whom He may give special power for that purpose. +
[37743] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod lex naturalis inquantum continet praecepta communia, +quae nunquam fallunt, dispensationem recipere non potest. In aliis +vero praeceptis, quae sunt quasi conclusiones praeceptorum +communium, quandoque per hominem dispensatur, puta quod mutuum non +reddatur proditori patriae, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Ad legem autem +divinam ita se habet quilibet homo, sicut persona privata ad legem +publicam cui subiicitur. Unde sicut in lege humana publica non +potest dispensare nisi ille a quo lex auctoritatem habet, vel is +cui ipse commiserit; ita in praeceptis iuris divini, quae sunt a +Deo, nullus potest dispensare nisi Deus, vel si cui ipse +specialiter committeret.
In due sequence we must now consider the Old Law; and (1) The Law itself; (2) Its precepts. Under the first head there are + six points of inquiry: +
(1) Whether the Old Law was good?
(3) Whether it came from Him through the angels?
(4) Whether it was given to all?
+[37744] +Iª-IIae q. 98 pr. Consequenter considerandum est de +lege veteri. Et primo, de ipsa lege; secundo, de praeceptis eius. +Circa primum quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum lex vetus sit bona. +Secundo, utrum sit a Deo. Tertio, utrum sit ab eo mediantibus +Angelis. Quarto, utrum data sit omnibus. Quinto, utrum omnes +obliget. Sexto, utrum congruo tempore fuerit data.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law was not good. For it is written ( + Ezech. 20:25): "I gave them statutes that were not good, and judgments in which they shall not live." But a law is not said to be good + except on account of the goodness of the precepts that it contains. Therefore the Old Law was not good. +
[37745] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex vetus non fuerit bona. Dicitur +enim Ezech. XX dedi eis praecepta non bona, et iudicia in quibus +non vivent. Sed lex non dicitur bona nisi propter bonitatem +praeceptorum quae continet. Ergo lex vetus non fuit bona.
+ Objection 2: Further, it belongs to the goodness of a law that it conduce to the common welfare, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 3). But the + Old Law was not salutary; rather was it deadly and hurtful. For the Apostle says ( + Rom. 7:8, seqq.): "Without the law sin was dead. And I lived some time without the law. But when the commandment came sin revived; + and I died." Again he says ( + Rom. 5:20): "Law entered in that sin might abound." Therefore the Old Law was not + good. +
[37746] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +ad bonitatem legis pertinet ut communi saluti proficiat sicut +Isidorus dicit. Sed lex vetus non fuit salutifera, sed magis +mortifera et nociva. Dicit enim apostolus, Rom. VII, sine lege +peccatum mortuum erat. Ego autem vivebam sine lege aliquando, sed +cum venisset mandatum, peccatum revixit, ego autem mortuus sum; +et Rom. V, lex subintravit ut abundaret delictum. Ergo lex +vetus non fuit bona.
+ Objection 3: Further, it belongs to the goodness of the law that it should be possible to obey it, both according to nature, and according + to human custom. But such the Old Law was not: since Peter said ( + Acts 15:10): "Why tempt you (God) to put a yoke on the necks of the disciples, which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear?" + Therefore it seems that the Old Law was not good. +
[37747] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +ad bonitatem legis pertinet quod sit possibilis ad observandum et +secundum naturam, et secundum humanam consuetudinem. Sed hoc non +habuit lex vetus, dicit enim Petrus, Act. XV, quid tentatis +imponere iugum super cervicem discipulorum, quod neque nos, neque +patres nostri, portare potuimus? Ergo videtur quod lex vetus +non fuerit bona.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle says ( + Rom. 7:12): "Wherefore the law indeed is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good." +
[37748] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. VII, itaque lex quidem sancta +est, et mandatum sanctum et iustum et bonum.
+ I answer that, Without any doubt, the Old Law was good. For just as a doctrine is shown to be good by the fact that it accords with right + reason, so is a law proved to be good if it accords with reason. Now the Old Law was in accordance with reason. Because it + repressed concupiscence which is in conflict with reason, as evidenced by the commandment, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's + goods" ( + Ex. 20:17). Moreover the same law forbade all kinds of sin; + and these too are contrary to reason. Consequently it is evident that it was a good law. The Apostle argues in the same way + ( + Rom. 7): "I am delighted," says he (verse 22), "with the law of God, according to the inward man": and again (verse 16): "I consent + to the law, that is good." +
But it must be noted that the good has various degrees, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv): for there is a perfect good, + and an imperfect good. In things ordained to an end, there is perfect goodness when a thing is such that it is sufficient + in itself to conduce to the end: while there is imperfect goodness when a thing is of some assistance in attaining the end, + but is not sufficient for the realization thereof. Thus a medicine is perfectly good, if it gives health to a man; + but it is imperfect, if it helps to cure him, without being able to bring him back to health. Again it must be observed that + the end of human law is different from the end of Divine law. For the end of human law is the temporal tranquillity of the + state, which end law effects by directing external actions, as regards those evils which might disturb the peaceful condition + of the state. On the other hand, the end of the Divine law is to bring man to that end which is everlasting happiness; which + end is hindered by any sin, not only of external, but also of internal action. Consequently that which suffices for the perfection + of human law, viz. the prohibition and punishment of sin, does not suffice for the perfection of the Divine law: but it is + requisite that it should make man altogether fit to partake of everlasting happiness. Now this cannot be done save by the + grace of the Holy Ghost, whereby "charity" which fulfilleth the law . . . "is spread abroad in our hearts" ( + Rom. + 5:5 + ): since "the grace of God is life everlasting" ( + Rom. 6:23). But the Old Law could not confer this grace, for this was reserved to Christ; because, as it is written ( + Jn. 1:17), the law was given "by Moses, grace and truth came by Jesus Christ." Consequently the Old Law was good indeed, but imperfect, + according to + Heb. 7:19: "The law brought nothing to perfection." +
[37749] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod absque omni dubio lex vetus bona fuit. Sicut enim +doctrina ostenditur esse vera ex hoc quod consonat rationi rectae, +ita etiam lex aliqua ostenditur esse bona ex eo quod consonat +rationi. Lex autem vetus rationi consonabat. Quia concupiscentiam +reprimebat, quae rationi adversatur; ut patet in illo mandato, non +concupisces rem proximi tui, quod ponitur Exod. XX. Ipsa etiam +omnia peccata prohibebat, quae sunt contra rationem. Unde +manifestum est quod bona erat. Et haec est ratio apostoli, Rom. +VII, condelector, inquit, legi Dei secundum interiorem hominem; et +iterum, consentio legi, quoniam bona est. Sed notandum est quod +bonum diversos gradus habet, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. +Nom., est enim aliquod bonum perfectum, et aliquod bonum +imperfectum. Perfecta quidem bonitas est, in his quae ad finem +ordinantur, quando aliquid est tale quod per se sufficiens est +inducere ad finem, imperfectum autem bonum est quod operatur +aliquid ad hoc quod perveniatur ad finem, non tamen sufficit ad hoc +quod ad finem perducat. Sicut medicina perfecte bona est quae +hominem sanat, imperfecta autem est quae hominem adiuvat, sed tamen +sanare non potest. Est autem sciendum quod est alius finis legis +humanae, et alius legis divinae. Legis enim humanae finis est +temporalis tranquillitas civitatis, ad quem finem pervenit lex +cohibendo exteriores actus, quantum ad illa mala quae possunt +perturbare pacificum statum civitatis. Finis autem legis divinae +est perducere hominem ad finem felicitatis aeternae; qui quidem +finis impeditur per quodcumque peccatum, et non solum per actus +exteriores, sed etiam per interiores. Et ideo illud quod sufficit +ad perfectionem legis humanae, ut scilicet peccata prohibeat et +poenam apponat, non sufficit ad perfectionem legis divinae, sed +oportet quod hominem totaliter faciat idoneum ad participationem +felicitatis aeternae. Quod quidem fieri non potest nisi per gratiam +spiritus sancti, per quam diffunditur caritas in cordibus nostris, +quae legem adimplet, gratia enim Dei vita aeterna, ut dicitur Rom. +VI. Hanc autem gratiam lex vetus conferre non potuit, reservabatur +enim hoc Christo, quia, ut dicitur Ioan. I, lex per Moysen data +est; gratia et veritas per Iesum Christum facta est. Et inde +est quod lex vetus bona quidem est, sed imperfecta; secundum illud +Heb. VII, nihil ad perfectum adduxit lex.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The Lord refers there to the ceremonial precepts; which are said not to be good, because they did not confer grace unto the + remission of sins, although by fulfilling these precepts man confessed himself a sinner. Hence it is said pointedly, "and + judgments in which they shall not live"; i.e. whereby they are unable to obtain life; and so the text goes on: "And I polluted + them," i.e. showed them to be polluted, "in their own gifts, when they offered all + that opened the womb, for their offenses." +
[37750] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod dominus loquitur ibi de praeceptis +caeremonialibus; quae quidem dicuntur non bona, quia gratiam non +conferebant, per quam homines a peccato mundarentur, cum tamen per +huiusmodi se peccatores ostenderent. Unde signanter dicitur, et +iudicia in quibus non vivent, idest per quae vitam gratiae obtinere +non possunt; et postea subditur, et pollui eos in muneribus suis, +idest pollutos ostendi, cum offerrent omne quod aperit vulvam, +propter delicta sua.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The law is said to have been deadly, as being not the cause, but the occasion of death, on account of its imperfection: in + so far as it did not confer grace enabling man to fulfil what is prescribed, and to avoid what it forbade. Hence this occasion + was not given to men, but taken by them. Wherefore the Apostle says ( + Rom. 5:11): "Sin, taking occasion by the commandment, seduced me, and by it killed me." In the same sense when it is + said that "the law entered in that sin might abound," the conjunction "that" must be taken as consecutive and not final: in + so far as men, taking occasion from the law, sinned all the more, both because a sin became more grievous after law had forbidden + it, and because concupiscence increased, since we desire a thing the more from its being forbidden. +
[37751] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod lex dicitur occidisse, non quidem effective, sed +occasionaliter, ex sua imperfectione, inquantum scilicet gratiam +non conferebat, per quam homines implere possent quod mandabat, vel +vitare quod vetabat. Et sic occasio ista non erat data, sed sumpta +ab hominibus. Unde et apostolus ibidem dicit, occasione accepta +peccatum per mandatum seduxit me, et per illud occidit. Et ex +hac etiam ratione dicitur quod lex subintravit ut abundaret +delictum, ut ly ut teneatur consecutive, non causaliter, inquantum +scilicet homines, accipientes occasionem a lege, abundantius +peccaverunt; tum quia gravius fuit peccatum post legis +prohibitionem; tum etiam quia concupiscentia crevit, magis enim +concupiscimus quod nobis prohibetur.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The yoke of the law could not be borne without the help of grace, which the law did not confer: for it is written ( + Rom. 9:16): "It is not him that willeth, nor of him that runneth," viz. that he wills and runs in the commandments of God, "but of + God that showeth mercy." Wherefore it is written ( + Ps. 118:32): "I have run the way of Thy commandments, when Thou didst enlarge my heart," i.e. by giving me grace and + charity. +
[37752] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod iugum legis servari non poterat sine gratia +adiuvante, quam lex non dabat, dicitur enim Rom. IX, non est +volentis neque currentis, scilicet velle et currere in +praeceptis Dei, sed miserentis Dei. Unde et in Psalmo CXVIII +dicitur, viam mandatorum tuorum cucurri, cum dilatasti cor +meum, scilicet per donum gratiae et caritatis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law was not from God. For it is written ( + Dt. 32:4): "The works of God are perfect." But the Law was imperfect, as stated above + (A[1]). Therefore the Old Law was not from God. +
[37753] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex vetus non fuerit a Deo. Dicitur +enim Deut. XXXII, Dei perfecta sunt opera. Sed lex fuit +imperfecta, ut supra dictum est. Ergo lex vetus non fuit a Deo.
+ Objection 2: Further, it is written ( + Eccles. 3:14): "I have learned that all the works which God hath made continue for ever." But the Old Law does not continue for ever: + since the Apostle says ( + Heb. 7:18): "There is indeed a setting aside of the former commandment, because of the weakness and unprofitableness thereof." Therefore + the Old Law was not from God. +
[37754] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Eccle. III dicitur, didici quod omnia opera quae fecit Deus, +perseverent in aeternum. Sed lex vetus non perseverat in +aeternum, dicit enim apostolus, ad Heb. VII, reprobatio fit +quidem praecedentis mandati, propter infirmitatem eius et +inutilitatem. Ergo lex vetus non fuit a Deo.
+ Objection 3: Further, a wise lawgiver should remove, not only evil, but also the occasions of evil. But the Old Law was an occasion of + sin, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). Therefore the giving of such a law does not pertain to God, to Whom "none is like among + the lawgivers" ( + Job 36:22). +
[37755] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +ad sapientem legislatorem pertinet non solum mala auferre, sed +etiam occasiones malorum. Sed vetus lex fuit occasio peccati, ut +supra dictum est. Ergo ad Deum, cui nullus est similis in +legislatoribus, ut dicitur Iob XXXVI, non pertinebat legem talem +dare.
+ Objection 4: Further, it is written ( + 1 Tim. 2:4) that God "will have all men to be saved." But the Old Law did not suffice to save man, as stated above + (A[1]). Therefore the giving of such a law did not appertain to God. Therefore the Old Law was not from God. +
[37756] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, +I ad Tim. II, dicitur quod Deus vult omnes homines salvos +fieri. Sed lex vetus non sufficiebat ad salutem hominum, ut +supra dictum est. Ergo ad Deum non pertinebat talem legem dare. Lex +ergo vetus non est a Deo.
+ On the contrary, Our Lord said ( + Mat. 15:6) while speaking to the Jews, to whom the Law was given: "You have made void the commandment of God for your tradition." And + shortly before (verse 4) He had said: "Honor thy father and mother," which is contained expressly in the Old Law ( + Ex. 20:12; + Dt. 5:16). Therefore the Old Law was from God. +
[37757] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dominus dicit, Matth. XV, loquens Iudaeis, quibus erat lex +vetus data, irritum fecistis mandatum Dei propter traditiones +vestras. Et paulo ante praemittitur, honora patrem tuum et +matrem tuam, quod manifeste in lege veteri continetur. Ergo lex +vetus est a Deo.
+ I answer that, The Old Law was given by the good God, Who is the Father of Our Lord Jesus Christ. For the Old Law ordained men to Christ + in two ways. First by bearing witness to Christ; wherefore He Himself says ( + Lk. 24:44): "All things must needs be fulfilled, which are written in the law . . . and in the prophets, and in the psalms, concerning + Me": and ( + Jn. 5:46): "If you did believe Moses, you would perhaps believe Me also; for he wrote of Me." Secondly, as a kind of + disposition, since by withdrawing men from idolatrous worship, it enclosed [concludebat] them in the worship of one God, by + Whom the human race was to be saved through Christ. Wherefore the Apostle says ( + Gal. 3:23): "Before the faith came, we were kept under the law shut up [conclusi], unto that faith which was to be revealed." Now it + is evident that the same thing it is, which gives a disposition to the end, and which brings to the end; and when I say "the + same," I mean + that it does so either by itself or through its subjects. For the devil would not make a law whereby men would be led to Christ, + Who was to cast him out, according to + Mat. 12:26: "If Satan cast out Satan, his kingdom is divided" [Vulg.: 'he is divided against himself']. Therefore the Old Law was given + by the same God, from Whom came salvation to man, through the grace of Christ. +
[37758] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod lex vetus a bono Deo data est, qui est pater domini +nostri Iesu Christi. Lex enim vetus homines ordinabat ad Christum +dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, testimonium Christo perhibendo, unde +ipse dicit, Lucae ult., oportet impleri omnia quae scripta sunt +in lege et Psalmis et prophetis de me; et Ioan. V, si +crederetis Moysi, crederetis forsitan et mihi, de me enim ille +scripsit. Alio modo, per modum cuiusdam dispositionis, dum, +retrahens homines a cultu idololatriae, concludebat eos sub cultu +unius Dei, a quo salvandum erat humanum genus per Christum, unde +apostolus dicit, ad Gal. III, priusquam veniret fides, sub lege +custodiebamur conclusi in eam fidem quae revelanda erat. +Manifestum est autem quod eiusdem est disponere ad finem et ad +finem perducere, et dico eiusdem per se vel per suos subiectos. Non +enim Diabolus legem tulisset per quam homines adducerentur ad +Christum, per quem erat eiiciendus; secundum illud Matth. XII, +si Satanas Satanam eiicit, divisum est regnum eius. Et ideo +ab eodem Deo a quo facta est salus hominum per gratiam Christi, lex +vetus data est.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Nothing prevents a thing being not perfect simply, and yet perfect in respect of time: thus a boy is said to be perfect, + not simply, but with regard to the condition of time. So, too, precepts that are given to children are perfect in comparison + with the condition of those to whom they are given, although they are not perfect simply. Hence the Apostle says ( + Gal. 3:24): "The law was our pedagogue in Christ." +
[37759] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquid non esse perfectum +simpliciter, quod tamen est perfectum secundum tempus, sicut +dicitur aliquis puer perfectus non simpliciter, sed secundum +temporis conditionem. Ita etiam praecepta quae pueris dantur, sunt +quidem perfecta secundum conditionem eorum quibus dantur, etsi non +sint perfecta simpliciter. Et talia fuerunt praecepta legis. Unde +apostolus dicit, ad Gal. III, lex paedagogus noster fuit in +Christo.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Those works of God endure for ever which God so made that they would endure for ever; and these are His perfect works. But + the Old Law was set aside when there came the perfection of grace; not as though it were evil, but as being weak and useless + for this time; because, as the Apostle goes on to say, "the law brought nothing to perfection": hence he says ( + Gal. 3:25): "After the faith is come, we are no longer under a + pedagogue." +
[37760] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod opera Dei perseverant in aeternum, quae sic Deus +fecit ut in aeternum perseverent, et haec sunt ea quae sunt +perfecta. Lex autem vetus reprobatur tempore perfectionis gratiae, +non tanquam mala, sed tanquam infirma et inutilis pro isto tempore, +quia, ut subditur, nihil ad perfectum adduxit lex. Unde ad Gal. +III, dicit apostolus, ubi venit fides, iam non sumus sub +paedagogo.
+ Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ( + Q[79], A[4]), God sometimes permits certain ones to fall into sin, that they may thereby be humbled. So also did He wish to give such + a law as men by their own forces could not fulfill, so that, while presuming on their own powers, they might find themselves + to be sinners, and being humbled might have recourse to the help of grace. +
[37761] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, Deus aliquando permittit +aliquos cadere in peccatum, ut exinde humilientur. Ita etiam voluit +talem legem dare quam suis viribus homines implere non possent, ut +sic dum homines de se praesumentes peccatores se invenirent, +humiliati recurrerent ad auxilium gratiae.
+ Reply to Objection 4: Although the Old Law did not suffice to save man, yet another help from God besides the Law was available for man, viz. faith + in the Mediator, by which the fathers of old were justified even as we were. Accordingly God did not fail man by giving him + insufficient aids to salvation. +
[37762] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod, quamvis lex vetus non sufficeret ad salvandum +hominem, tamen aderat aliud auxilium a Deo hominibus simul cum +lege, per quod salvari poterant, scilicet fides mediatoris, per +quam iustificati sunt antiqui patres, sicut etiam nos iustificamur. +Et sic Deus non deficiebat hominibus quin daret eis salutis +auxilia.
+ Objection 1: It seems that the Old Law was not given through the angels, but immediately by God. For an angel means a "messenger"; so + that the word "angel" denotes ministry, not lordship, according to + Ps. 102:20,21: "Bless the Lord, all ye His Angels . . . you ministers of His." But the Old Law is related to have been given by the Lord: + for it is written ( + Ex. 20:1): "And the Lord spoke . . . these words," and further on: "I am the Lord Thy God." + Moreover the same expression is often repeated in Exodus, and the later books of the Law. Therefore the Law was given by God + immediately. +
[37763] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex vetus non fuerit data per Angelos, +sed immediate a Deo. Angelus enim nuntius dicitur, et sic nomen +Angeli ministerium importat, non dominium; secundum illud Psalmi +CII, benedicite domino, omnes Angeli eius, ministri eius. +Sed vetus lex a domino tradita esse perhibetur, dicitur enim Exod. +XX, locutusque est dominus sermones hos, et postea subditur, +ego enim sum dominus Deus tuus. Et idem modus loquendi +frequenter repetitur in Exodo, et in libris consequentibus legis. +Ergo lex est immediate data a Deo.
+ Objection 2: Further, according to + Jn. 1:17, "the Law was given by Moses." But Moses received it from God immediately: for it is written ( + Ex. 33:11): "The Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a man is wont to speak to his friend." Therefore the Old Law was given by God + immediately. +
[37764] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +sicut dicitur Ioan. I, lex per Moysen data est. Sed Moyses +immediate accepit a Deo, dicitur enim Exod. XXXIII, loquebatur +dominus ad Moysen facie ad faciem, sicut loqui solet homo ad amicum +suum. Ergo lex vetus immediate data est a Deo.
+ Objection 3: Further, it belongs to the sovereign alone to make a law, as stated above ( + Q[90], A[3]). But God alone is Sovereign as regards the salvation of souls: while the angels are the "ministering spirits," as stated + in + Heb. 1:14. Therefore it was not meet for the Law to be given through the angels, since it is ordained to the salvation of souls. +
[37765] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +ad solum principem pertinet legem ferre, ut supra dictum est. Sed +solus Deus est princeps salutis animarum, Angeli vero sunt +administratorii spiritus, ut dicitur ad Heb. I. Ergo lex vetus +per Angelos dari non debuit, cum ordinaretur ad animarum +salutem.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle said ( + Gal. 3:19) that the Law was "given [Vulg.: 'ordained'] by angels in the hand of a Mediator." And Stephen said ( + Acts 7:53): "(Who) have received the Law by the disposition of angels." +
[37766] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicit apostolus, ad Gal. III, lex data est per Angelos +in manu mediatoris. Et Act. VII, dicit Stephanus, accepistis +legem in dispositione Angelorum.
+ I answer that, The Law was given by God through the angels. And besides the general reason given by Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv), viz. that + "the gifts of God should be brought to men by means of the angels," there is a special reason why the Old Law should have + been given through them. For it has been stated ( + AA[1],2) that the Old Law was imperfect, and yet disposed man to that perfect salvation of the human race, which was to come through + Christ. + Now it is to be observed that wherever there is an order of powers or arts, he that holds the highest place, himself exercises + the principal and perfect acts; while those things which dispose to the ultimate perfection are effected by him through his + subordinates: thus the ship-builder himself rivets the planks together, but prepares the material by means of the workmen + who assist him under his direction. Consequently it was fitting that the perfect law of the New Testament should be given + by + the incarnate God immediately; but that the Old Law should be given to men by the ministers of God, i.e. by the angels. It + is thus that the Apostle at the beginning of his epistle to the Hebrews (1:2) proves the excellence of the New Law over the + Old; because in the New Testament "God . . . hath spoken to us by His Son," whereas in the Old Testament "the word was spoken + by angels" ( + Heb. 2:2). +
[37767] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod lex data est a Deo per Angelos. Et praeter generalem +rationem, quam Dionysius assignat, in IV cap. Cael. Hier., quod +divina debent deferri ad homines mediantibus Angelis, +specialis ratio est quare legem veterem per Angelos dari oportuit. +Dictum est enim quod lex vetus imperfecta erat, sed disponebat ad +salutem perfectam generis humani, quae futura erat per Christum. +Sic autem videtur in omnibus potestatibus et artibus ordinatis, +quod ille qui est superior, principalem et perfectum actum operatur +per seipsum; ea vero quae disponunt ad perfectionem ultimam, +operatur per suos ministros; sicut navifactor compaginat navem per +seipsum, sed praeparat materiam per artifices subministrantes. Et +ideo conveniens fuit ut lex perfecta novi testamenti daretur +immediate per ipsum Deum hominem factum; lex autem vetus per +ministros Dei, scilicet per Angelos, daretur hominibus. Et per hunc +modum apostolus, in principio ad Heb., probat eminentiam novae +legis ad veterem, quia in novo testamento locutus est nobis Deus in +filio suo, in veteri autem testamento est sermo factus per +Angelos.
+ Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory says at the beginning of his Morals (Praef. chap. i), "the angel who is described to have appeared to Moses, is + sometimes mentioned as an angel, sometimes as the Lord: an angel, in truth, in respect of that which was subservient to the + external delivery; and the Lord, because He was the Director within, Who supported the effectual power of speaking." Hence + also it is that the angel spoke as personating the Lord. +
[37768] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut Gregorius dicit, in principio Moral., +Angelus qui Moysi apparuisse describitur, modo Angelus, modo +dominus memoratur. Angelus videlicet, propter hoc quod exterius +loquendo serviebat; dominus autem dicitur, quia interius praesidens +loquendi efficaciam ministrabat. Et inde est etiam quod quasi +ex persona domini Angelus loquebatur.
+ Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27), it is stated in Exodus that "the Lord spoke to Moses face to face"; and shortly + afterwards we read, "Show me Thy glory. Therefore He perceived what he saw and he desired what he saw not." Hence he did not + see the very Essence of God; and consequently he was not taught by Him immediately. Accordingly when Scripture states that + "He spoke to him face to face," this is to be understood as expressing the opinion of + the people, who thought that Moses was speaking with God mouth to mouth, when God spoke and appeared to him, by means of a + subordinate creature, i.e. an angel and a cloud. Again we may say that this vision "face to face" means some kind of sublime + and familiar contemplation, inferior to the vision of the Divine Essence. +
[37769] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., in +Exodo dicitur, locutus est dominus Moysi facie ad faciem; et +paulo post subditur, ostende mihi gloriam tuam. Sentiebat ergo +quid videbat; et quod non videbat, desiderabat. Non ergo +videbat ipsam Dei essentiam, et ita non immediate ab eo +instruebatur. Quod ergo dicitur quod loquebatur ei facie ad faciem, +secundum opinionem populi loquitur Scriptura, qui putabat Moysen +ore ad os loqui cum Deo, cum per subiectam creaturam, idest per +Angelum et nubem, ei loqueretur et appareret. Vel per visionem +faciei intelligitur quaedam eminens contemplatio et familiaris, +infra essentiae divinae visionem.
+ Reply to Objection 3: It is for the sovereign alone to make a law by his own authority; but sometimes after making a law, he promulgates it through + others. Thus God made the Law by His own authority, but He promulgated it through the angels. +
[37770] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod solius principis est sua auctoritate legem +instituere, sed quandoque legem institutam per alios promulgat. Et +ita Deus sua auctoritate instituit legem, sed per Angelos +promulgavit.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law should not have been given to the Jews alone. For the Old Law disposed men for the salvation + which was to come through Christ, as stated above ( + AA[2],3). But that salvation was to come not to the Jews alone but to all nations, according to + Is. 49:6: "It is a small thing that thou shouldst be my servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to convert the dregs of Israel. + Behold I have + given thee to be the light of the Gentiles, that thou mayest be My salvation, even to the farthest part of the earth." Therefore + the Old Law should have been given to all nations, and not to one people only. +
[37771] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex vetus non debuerit dari soli +populo Iudaeorum. Lex enim vetus disponebat ad salutem quae futura +erat per Christum, ut dictum est. Sed salus illa non erat futura +solum in Iudaeis, sed in omnibus gentibus; secundum illud Isaiae +XLIX, parum est ut sis mihi servus ad suscitandas tribus Iacob +et faeces Israel convertendas, dedi te in lucem gentium, ut sis +salus mea usque ad extremum terrae. Ergo lex vetus dari debuit +omnibus gentibus, et non uni populo tantum.
+ Objection 2: Further, according to + Acts 10:34,35, "God is not a respecter of persons: but in every nation, he that feareth Him, and worketh justice, is acceptable to Him." + Therefore the way of salvation should not have been opened to one people more than to another. +
[37772] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +sicut dicitur Act. X, non est personarum acceptor Deus, sed in +omni gente qui timet Deum et facit iustitiam, acceptus est +illi. Non ergo magis uni populo quam aliis viam salutis debuit +aperire.
+ Objection 3: Further, the law was given through the angels, as stated above + (A[3]). But God always vouchsafed the ministrations of the angels not to the Jews alone, but to all nations: for it is written ( + Ecclus. 17:14): "Over every nation He set a ruler." Also on all nations He bestows temporal goods, which are of less account with God than + spiritual goods. Therefore He should have given the Law also to all peoples. +
[37773] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +lex data est per Angelos, sicut iam dictum est. Sed ministeria +Angelorum Deus non solum Iudaeis, sed omnibus gentibus semper +exhibuit, dicitur enim Eccli. XVII, in unamquamque gentem +praeposuit rectorem. Omnibus etiam gentibus temporalia bona +largitur, quae minus sunt curae Deo quam spiritualia bona. Ergo +etiam legem omnibus populis dare debuit.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Rom. 3:1,2): "What advantage then hath the Jew? . . . Much every way. First indeed, because the words of God were committed to them": + and ( + Ps. 147:9): "He hath not done in like manner to every nation: and His judgments He hath not made manifest unto them." +
[37774] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Rom. III, quid ergo amplius est Iudaeo? Multum +quidem per omnem modum. Primum quidem, quia credita sunt illis +eloquia Dei. Et in Psalmo CXLVII dicitur, non fecit taliter +omni nationi, et iudicia sua non manifestavit eis.
+ I answer that, It might be assigned as a reason for the Law being given to the Jews rather than to other peoples, that the Jewish people + alone remained faithful to the worship of one God, while the others turned away to idolatry; wherefore the latter were unworthy + to receive the Law, lest a holy thing should be given to dogs. +
But this reason does not seem fitting: because that people turned to idolatry, even after the Law had been made, which was + more grievous, as is clear from + Ex. 32 and from + Amos 5:25,26: "Did you offer victims and sacrifices to Me in the desert for forty years, O house of Israel? But you carried a tabernacle + for your Moloch, and the image of your idols, the star of your god, which you made to yourselves." Moreover it is stated expressly + ( + Dt. + 9:6 + ): "Know therefore that the Lord thy God giveth thee not this excellent land in possession for thy justices, for thou art + a very stiff-necked people": but the real reason is given in the preceding verse: "That the Lord might accomplish His word, + which He promised by oath to thy fathers Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob." +
What this promise was is shown by the Apostle, who says ( + Gal. 3:16) that "to Abraham were the promises made and to his seed. He saith not, 'And to his seeds,' as of many: but as of one, 'And + to thy seed,' which is Christ." And so God vouchsafed both the Law and other special boons to that people, on account of the + promised made to their fathers that Christ should be born of them. For it was fitting that the people, of whom Christ was + to be born, should be + signalized by a special sanctification, according to the words of + Lev. 19:2: "Be ye holy, because I . . . am holy." Nor again was it on account of the merit of Abraham himself that this promise was + made to him, viz. that Christ should be born of his seed: but of gratuitous election and vocation. Hence it is written ( + Is. 41:2): "Who hath raised up the just one form the east, hath called him to follow him?" +
It is therefore evident that it was merely from gratuitous election that the patriarchs received the promise, and that the + people sprung from them received the law; according to + Dt. 4:36, 37: "Ye did [Vulg.: 'Thou didst'] hear His words out of the midst of the fire, because He loved thy fathers, and chose their + seed after them." And if again it asked why He chose this people, and not another, that Christ might be born thereof; a fitting + answer is given by + Augustine (Tract. super Joan. xxvi): "Why He draweth one and draweth not another, seek not thou to judge, if thou wish not + to err." +
[37775] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod posset una ratio assignari quare potius populo +Iudaeorum data sit lex quam aliis populis, quia, aliis ad +idololatriam declinantibus, solus populus Iudaeorum in cultu unius +Dei remansit; et ideo alii populi indigni erant legem recipere, ne +sanctum canibus daretur. Sed ista ratio conveniens non videtur, +quia populus ille etiam post legem latam, ad idololatriam +declinavit, quod gravius fuit, ut patet Exod. XXXII; et Amos V, +numquid hostias et sacrificium obtulistis mihi in deserto +quadraginta annis, domus Israel? Et portastis tabernaculum Moloch +vestro, et imaginem idolorum vestrorum, sidus Dei vestri, quae +fecistis vobis. Expresse etiam dicitur Deut. IX, scito quod +non propter iustitias tuas dominus Deus tuus dedit tibi terram hanc +in possessionem, cum durissimae cervici sis populus. Sed ratio +ibi praemittitur, ut compleret verbum suum dominus, quod sub +iuramento pollicitus est patribus tuis, Abraham, Isaac et +Iacob. Quae autem promissio eis sit facta, ostendit apostolus, +ad Galat. III, dicens, Abrahae dictae sunt promissiones, et +semini eius. Non dicit, seminibus, quasi in multis, sed quasi in +uno, et semini tuo, qui est Christus. Deus igitur et legem et +alia beneficia specialia illi populo exhibuit propter promissionem +eorum patribus factam ut ex eis Christus nasceretur. Decebat enim +ut ille populus ex quo Christus nasciturus erat, quadam speciali +sanctificatione polleret; secundum illud quod dicitur Levit. XIX, +sancti eritis, quia ego sanctus sum. Nec etiam fuit propter +meritum ipsius Abrahae ut talis promissio ei fieret, ut scilicet +Christus ex eius semine nasceretur, sed ex gratuita electione et +vocatione. Unde dicitur Isaiae XLI, quis suscitavit ab oriente +iustum, vocavit eum ut sequeretur se? Sic ergo patet quod ex +sola gratuita electione patres promissionem acceperunt, et populus +ex eis progenitus legem accepit; secundum illud Deut. IV, +audistis verba illius de medio ignis, quia dilexit patres, et +elegit semen eorum post illos. Si autem rursus quaeratur quare +hunc populum elegit ut ex eo Christus nasceretur, et non alium, +conveniet responsio Augustini, quam dicit super Ioan., quare +hunc trahat et illum non trahat, noli velle diiudicare, si non vis +errare.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Although the salvation, which was to come through Christ, was prepared for all nations, yet it was necessary that Christ + should be born of one people, which, for this reason, was privileged above other peoples; according to + Rom. 9:4: "To whom," namely the Jews, "belongeth the adoption as of children (of God) . . . and the testament, and the giving of the + Law . . . whose are the fathers, and of whom is Christ according to the + flesh." +
[37776] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, quamvis salus futura per Christum, esset +omnibus gentibus praeparata; tamen oportebat ex uno populo Christum +nasci, qui propter hoc prae aliis praerogativas habuit; secundum +illud Rom. IX, quorum, scilicet Iudaeorum, est adoptio filiorum +Dei, et testamentum et legislatio; quorum patres; ex quibus +Christus est secundum carnem.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Respect of persons takes place in those things which are given according to due; but it has no place in those things which + are bestowed gratuitously. Because he who, out of generosity, gives of his own to one and not to another, is not a respecter + of persons: but if he were a dispenser of goods held in common, and were not to distribute them according to personal merits, + he would be a respecter of persons. Now God bestows the benefits of salvation on + the human race gratuitously: wherefore He is not a respecter of persons, if He gives them to some rather than to others. Hence + Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. viii): "All whom God teaches, he teaches out of pity; but whom He teaches not, out of + justice He teaches not": for this is due to the condemnation of the human race for the sin of the first parent. +
[37777] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod acceptio personarum locum habet in his quae ex debito +dantur, in his vero quae ex gratuita voluntate conferuntur, +acceptio personarum locum non habet. Non enim est personarum +acceptor qui ex liberalitate de suo dat uni et non alteri, sed si +esset dispensator bonorum communium, et non distribueret aequaliter +secundum merita personarum, esset personarum acceptor. Salutaria +autem beneficia Deus humano generi confert ex sua gratia. Unde non +est personarum acceptor si quibusdam prae aliis conferat. Unde +Augustinus dicit, in libro de Praedest. Sanct., omnes quos Deus +docet, misericordia docet, quos autem non docet, iudicio non +docet. Hoc enim venit ex damnatione humani generis pro peccato +primi parentis.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The benefits of grace are forfeited by man on account of sin: but not the benefits of nature. Among the latter are the ministries + of the angels, which the very order of various natures demands, viz. that the lowest beings be governed through the intermediate + beings: and also bodily aids, which God vouchsafes not only to men, but also to beasts, according to + Ps. 35:7: "Men and beasts Thou wilt preserve, O Lord." +
[37778] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod beneficia gratiae subtrahuntur homini propter culpam, +sed beneficia naturalia non subtrahuntur. Inter quae sunt +ministeria Angelorum, quae ipse naturarum ordo requirit, ut +scilicet per media gubernentur infima; et etiam corporalia +subsidia, quae non solum hominibus, sed etiam iumentis Deus +administrat, secundum illud Psalmi XXXV, homines et iumenta +salvabis, domine.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that all men were bound to observe the Old Law. Because whoever is subject to the king, must needs be subject + to his law. But the Old Law was given by God, Who is "King of all the earth" ( + Ps. 46:8). Therefore all the inhabitants of the earth were bound to observe the Law. +
[37779] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnes homines obligarentur ad +observandam veterem legem. Quicumque enim subditur regi, oportet +quod subdatur legi ipsius. Sed vetus lex est data a Deo, qui est +rex omnis terrae, ut in Psalmo XLVI dicitur. Ergo omnes habitantes +terram tenebantur ad observantiam legis.
+ Objection 2: Further, the Jews could not be saved without observing the Old Law: for it is written ( + Dt. 27:26): "Cursed be he that abideth not in the words of this law, and fulfilleth them not in work." If therefore other men could + be saved without the observance of the Old Law, the Jews would be in a worse plight than other men. +
[37780] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Iudaei salvari non poterant nisi legem veterem observarent, dicitur +enim Deut. XXVII, maledictus qui non permanet in sermonibus +legis huius, nec eos opere perficit. Si igitur alii homines +sine observantia legis veteris potuissent salvari, peior fuisset +conditio Iudaeorum quam aliorum hominum.
+ Objection 3: Further, the Gentiles were admitted to the Jewish ritual and to the observances of the Law: for it is written ( + Ex. 12:48): "If any stranger be willing to dwell among you, and to keep the Phase of the Lord, all his males shall first be circumcised, + and then shall he celebrate it according to the manner; and he shall be as he that is born in the land." But it would have + been useless to admit strangers to the legal observances according to + Divine ordinance, if they could have been saved without the observance of the Law. Therefore none could be saved without observing + the Law. +
[37781] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +gentiles ad ritum Iudaicum et ad observantias legis admittebantur, +dicitur enim Exod. XII, si quis peregrinorum in vestram voluerit +transire coloniam, et facere phase domini, circumcidetur prius omne +masculinum eius, et tunc rite celebrabit, eritque simul sicut +indigena terrae. Frustra autem ad observantias legales fuissent +extranei admissi ex ordinatione divina, si absque legalibus +observantiis salvari potuissent. Ergo nullus salvari poterat nisi +legem observaret.
+ On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix) that many of the Gentiles were brought back to God by the angels. But it is clear that the + Gentiles did not observe the Law. Therefore some could be saved without observing the Law. +
[37782] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Dionysius dicit, IX cap. Cael. Hier., quod multi gentilium +per Angelos sunt reducti in Deum. Sed constat quod gentiles legem +non observabant. Ergo absque observantia legis poterant aliqui +salvari.
+ I answer that, The Old Law showed forth the precepts of the natural law, and added certain precepts of its own. Accordingly, as to those + precepts of the natural law contained in the Old Law, all were bound to observe the Old Law; not because they belonged to + the Old Law, but because they belonged to the natural law. But as to those precepts which were added by the Old Law, they + were not binding on save the Jewish people alone. +
The reason of this is because the Old Law, as stated above + (A[4]), was given to the Jewish people, that it might receive a prerogative of holiness, in reverence for Christ Who was to be born + of that people. Now whatever laws are enacted for the special sanctification of certain ones, are binding on them alone: thus + clerics who are set aside for the service of God are bound to certain obligations to which the laity are not bound; likewise + religious are + bound by their profession to certain works of perfection, to which people living in the world are not bound. In like manner + this people was bound to certain special observances, to which other peoples were not bound. Wherefore it is written ( + Dt. 18:13): "Thou shalt be perfect and without spot before the Lord thy God": and for this reason they used a kind of form of profession, + as appears from + Dt. 26:3: "I profess this day before the Lord thy God," + etc. +
[37783] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod lex vetus manifestabat praecepta legis naturae, et +superaddebat quaedam propria praecepta. Quantum igitur ad illa quae +lex vetus continebat de lege naturae, omnes tenebantur ad +observantiam veteris legis, non quia erant de veteri lege, sed quia +erant de lege naturae. Sed quantum ad illa quae lex vetus +superaddebat, non tenebantur aliqui ad observantiam veteris legis +nisi solus populus Iudaeorum. Cuius ratio est quia lex vetus, sicut +dictum est, data est populo Iudaeorum ut quandam praerogativam +sanctitatis obtineret, propter reverentiam Christi, qui ex illo +populo nasciturus erat. Quaecumque autem statuuntur ad specialem +aliquorum sanctificationem, non obligant nisi illos, sicut ad +quaedam obligantur clerici, qui mancipantur divino ministerio, ad +quae laici non obligantur; similiter et religiosi ad quaedam +perfectionis opera obligantur ex sua professione, ad quae +saeculares non obligantur. Et similiter ad quaedam specialia +obligabatur populus ille, ad quae alii populi non obligabantur. +Unde dicitur Deut. XVIII, perfectus eris, et absque macula, cum +domino Deo tuo. Et propter hoc etiam quadam professione +utebantur; ut patet Deut. XXVI, profiteor hodie coram domino Deo +tuo et cetera.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Whoever are subject to a king, are bound to observe his law which he makes for all in general. But if he orders certain things + to be observed by the servants of his household, others are not bound thereto. +
[37784] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod quicumque subduntur regi, obligantur ad legem +eius observandam quam omnibus communiter proponit. Sed si instituat +aliqua observanda a suis familiaribus ministris, ad haec ceteri non +obligantur.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The more a man is united to God, the better his state becomes: wherefore the more the Jewish people were bound to the worship + of God, the greater their excellence over other peoples. Hence it is written ( + Dt. 4:8): "What other nation is there so renowned that hath ceremonies and just judgments, and all the law?" In like manner, from + this point of view, the state of clerics is better than that of the laity, and the state of + religious than that of folk living in the world. +
[37785] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod homo quanto Deo magis coniungitur, tanto efficitur +melioris conditionis. Et ideo quanto populus Iudaeorum erat +adstrictus magis ad divinum cultum, dignior aliis populis erat. +Unde dicitur Deut. IV, quae est alia gens sic inclyta, ut habeat +caeremonias, iustaque iudicia, et universam legem? Et similiter +etiam quantum ad hoc sunt melioris conditionis clerici quam laici, +et religiosi quam saeculares.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The Gentiles obtained salvation more perfectly and more securely under the observances of the Law than under the mere natural + law: and for this reason they were admitted to them. So too the laity are now admitted to the ranks of the clergy, and secular + persons to those of the religious, although they can be saved without this. +
[37786] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod gentiles perfectius et securius salutem +consequebantur sub observantiis legis quam sub sola lege naturali, +et ideo ad eas admittebantur. Sicut etiam nunc laici transeunt ad +clericatum, et saeculares ad religionem, quamvis absque hoc possint +salvari.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law was not suitably given at the time of Moses. Because the Old Law disposed man for the salvation + which was to come through Christ, as stated above ( + AA[2],3). But man needed this salutary remedy immediately after he had sinned. Therefore the Law should have been given immediately + after sin. +
[37787] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex vetus non convenienter fuerit data +tempore Moysi. Lex enim vetus disponebat ad salutem quae erat +futura per Christum, sicut dictum est. Sed statim homo post +peccatum indiguit huiusmodi salutis remedio. Ergo statim post +peccatum lex vetus debuit dari.
+ Objection 2: Further, the Old Law was given for the sanctification of those from whom Christ was to be born. Now the promise concerning + the "seed, which is Christ" ( + Gal. 3:16) was first made to Abraham, as related in + Gn. 12:7. Therefore the Law should have been given at once at the time of Abraham. +
[37788] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, +lex vetus data est propter sanctificationem eorum ex quibus +Christus nasciturus erat. Sed Abrahae incoepit fieri promissio de +semine, quod est Christus, ut habetur Gen. XII. Ergo statim tempore +Abrahae debuit lex dari.
+ Objection 3: Further, as Christ was born of those alone who descended from Noe through Abraham, to whom the promise was made; so was He + born of no other of the descendants of Abraham but David, to whom the promise was renewed, according to + 2 Kings 23:1: "The man to whom it was appointed concerning the Christ of the God of Jacob . . . said." Therefore the Old Law should have + been given after David, just as it was given after Abraham. +
[37789] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sicut Christus non est natus ex aliis descendentibus ex Noe nisi ex +Abraham, cui facta est promissio; ita etiam non est natus ex aliis +filiis Abrahae nisi ex David, cui est promissio renovata, secundum +illud II Reg. XXIII, dixit vir cui constitutum est de Christo +Dei Iacob. Ergo lex vetus debuit dari post David, sicut data +est post Abraham.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle says ( + Gal. 3:19) that the Law "was set because of transgressions, until the seed should come, to whom He made the promise, being ordained + by angels in the hand of a Mediator": ordained, i.e. "given in orderly fashion," as the gloss explains. Therefore it was fitting + that the Old Law should be given in this order of time. +
[37790] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Gal. III, quod lex propter +transgressionem posita est, donec veniret semen cui promiserat, +ordinata per Angelos in manu mediatoris, idest ordinabiliter +data, ut Glossa dicit. Ergo congruum fuit ut lex vetus illo +temporis ordine traderetur.
+ I answer that, It was most fitting for the Law to be given at the time of Moses. The reason for this may be taken from two things in respect + of which every law is imposed on two kinds of men. Because it is imposed on some men who are hard-hearted and proud, whom + the law restrains and tames: and it is imposed on good men, who, through being instructed by the law, are helped to fulfil + what they desire to do. Hence it was fitting that the Law should be given at such a time as + would be appropriate for the overcoming of man's pride. For man was proud of two things, viz. of knowledge and of power. He + was proud of his knowledge, as though his natural reason could suffice him for salvation: and accordingly, in order that his + pride might be overcome in this matter, man was left to the guidance of his reason without the help of a written law: and + man was able to learn from experience that his reason was deficient, since about the time of Abraham man had fallen headlong + into idolatry and the most shameful vices. Wherefore, after those times, it was necessary for a written law to be given as + a remedy for human ignorance: because "by the Law is the knowledge of sin" ( + Rom. 3:20). But, after man had been instructed by the Law, his pride was convinced of his weakness, through his being unable to fulfil + what he knew. Hence, as the Apostle concludes ( + Rom. 8:3,4), "what the Law could not do in that it was weak through the flesh, + God sent [Vulg.: 'sending'] His own Son . . . that the justification of the Law might be fulfilled in us." +
With regard to good men, the Law was given to them as a help; which was most needed by the people, at the time when the natural + law began to be obscured on account of the exuberance of sin: for it was fitting that this help should be bestowed on men + in an orderly manner, so that they might be led from imperfection to perfection; wherefore it was becoming that the Old Law + should be given between the law of nature and the law of grace. +
[37791] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 6 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod convenientissime lex vetus data fuit tempore Moysi. +Cuius ratio potest accipi ex duobus, secundum quod quaelibet lex +duobus generibus hominum imponitur. Imponitur enim quibusdam duris +et superbis, qui per legem compescuntur et domantur, imponitur +etiam bonis, qui, per legem instructi, adiuvantur ad implendum quod +intendunt. Conveniens igitur fuit tali tempore legem veterem dari, +ad superbiam hominum convincendam. De duobus enim homo superbiebat, +scilicet de scientia, et de potentia. De scientia quidem, quasi +ratio naturalis ei posset sufficere ad salutem. Et ideo ut de hoc +eius superbia convinceretur permissus est homo regimini suae +rationis absque adminiculo legis scriptae, et experimento homo +discere potuit quod patiebatur rationis defectum, per hoc quod +homines usque ad idololatriam et turpissima vitia circa tempora +Abrahae sunt prolapsi. Et ideo post haec tempora fuit necessarium +legem scriptam dari in remedium humanae ignorantiae, quia per legem +est cognitio peccati, ut dicitur Rom. III. Sed postquam homo est +instructus per legem, convicta est eius superbia de infirmitate, +dum implere non poterat quod cognoscebat. Et ideo, sicut apostolus +concludit, ad Rom. VIII, quod impossibile erat legi, in qua +infirmabatur per carnem, misit Deus filium suum, ut iustificatio +legis impleretur in nobis. Ex parte vero bonorum, lex data est +in auxilium. Quod quidem tunc maxime populo necessarium fuit, +quando lex naturalis obscurari incipiebat propter exuberantiam +peccatorum. Oportebat autem huiusmodi auxilium quodam ordine dari, +ut per imperfecta ad perfectionem manuducerentur. Et ideo inter +legem naturae et legem gratiae, oportuit legem veterem dari.
+ Reply to Objection 1: It was not fitting for the Old Law to be given at once after the sin of the first man: both because man was so confident + in his own reason, that he did not acknowledge his need of the Old Law; because as yet the dictate of the natural law was + not darkened by habitual sinning. +
[37792] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod statim post peccatum primi hominis non +competebat legem veterem dari, tum quia nondum homo recognoscebat +se ea indigere, de sua ratione confisus. Tum quia adhuc dictamen +legis naturae nondum erat obtenebratum per consuetudinem +peccandi.
+ Reply to Objection 2: A law should not be given save to the people, since it is a general precept, as stated above ( + Q[90], AA[2],3); wherefore at the time of Abraham God gave men certain familiar, and, as it were, household precepts: but when Abraham's + descendants had multiplied, so as to form a people, and when they had been freed from slavery, it was fitting that they should + be given a law; for "slaves are not that part of the people or state to + which it is fitting for the law to be directed," as the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2,4,5). +
[37793] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod lex non debet dari nisi populo, est enim praeceptum +commune, ut dictum est. Et ideo tempore Abrahae data sunt quaedam +familiaria praecepta, et quasi domestica, Dei ad homines. Sed +postmodum, multiplicatis eius posteris intantum quod populus esset, +et liberatis eis a servitute, lex convenienter potuit dari, nam +servi non sunt pars populi vel civitatis, cui legem dari competit, +ut philosophus dicit, in III Polit.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Since the Law had to be given to the people, not only those, of whom Christ was born, received the Law, but the whole people, + who were marked with the seal of circumcision, which was the sign of the promise made to Abraham, and in which he believed, + according to + Rom. 4:11: hence even before David, the Law had to be given to that people as soon as they were collected together. +
[37794] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, quia legem oportebat alicui populo dari, non solum +illi ex quibus Christus natus est, legem acceperunt; sed totus +populus consignatus signaculo circumcisionis, quae fuit signum +promissionis Abrahae factae et ab eo creditae, ut dicit apostolus, +Rom. IV. Et ideo etiam ante David oportuit legem dari tali populo +iam collecto.
We must now consider the precepts of the Old Law; and (1) how they are distinguished from one another; (2) each kind of precept. + Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: +
(1) Whether the Old Law contains several precepts or only one?
(2) Whether the Old Law contains any moral precepts?
(3) Whether it contains ceremonial precepts in addition to the moral precepts?
(4) Whether besides these it contains judicial precepts?
+[37795] +Iª-IIae q. 99 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +praeceptis veteris legis. Et primo, de distinctione ipsorum; +secundo, de singulis generibus distinctis. Circa primum quaeruntur +sex. Primo, utrum legis veteris sint plura praecepta, vel unum +tantum. Secundo, utrum lex vetus contineat aliqua praecepta +moralia. Tertio, utrum praeter moralia contineat caeremonialia. +Quarto, utrum contineat, praeter haec, iudicialia. Quinto, utrum +praeter ista tria contineat aliqua alia. Sexto, de modo quo lex +inducebat ad observantiam praedictorum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law contains but one precept. Because a law is nothing else than a precept, as stated above ( + Q[90], AA[2],3). Now there is but one Old Law. Therefore it contains but one precept. +
[37796] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod in lege veteri non contineatur nisi +unum praeceptum. Lex enim est nihil aliud quam praeceptum, ut supra +habitum est. Sed lex vetus est una. Ergo non continet nisi unum +praeceptum.
+ Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says ( + Rom. 13:9): "If there be any other commandment, it is comprised in this word: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." But this is + only one commandment. Therefore the Old Law contained but one commandment. +
[37797] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +apostolus dicit, Rom. XIII, si quod est aliud mandatum, in hoc +verbo instauratur, diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum. Sed +istud mandatum est unum. Ergo lex vetus non continet nisi unum +mandatum.
+ Objection 3: Further, it is written ( + Mat. 7:12): "All things . . . whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them. For this is the Law and the prophets." + But the whole of the Old Law is comprised in the Law and the prophets. Therefore the whole of the Old Law contains but one + commandment. +
[37798] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +Matth. VII, dicitur, omnia quaecumque vultis ut faciant vobis +homines, et vos facite illis, haec est enim lex et prophetae. +Sed tota lex vetus continetur in lege et prophetis. Ergo tota lex +vetus non habet nisi unum praeceptum.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle says ( + Eph. 2:15): "Making void the Law of commandments contained in decrees": where he is referring to the Old Law, as the gloss comments, + on the passage. Therefore the Old Law comprises many commandments. +
[37799] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. II, legem mandatorum +decretis evacuans. Et loquitur de lege veteri, ut patet per +Glossam ibidem. Ergo lex vetus continet in se multa mandata.
+ I answer that, Since a precept of law is binding, it is about something which must be done: and, that a thing must be done, arises from + the necessity of some end. Hence it is evident that a precept implies, in its very idea, relation to an end, in so far as + a thing is commanded as being necessary or expedient to an end. Now many things may happen to be necessary or expedient to + an end; and, accordingly, precepts may be given about various things as being ordained to one + end. Consequently we must say that all the precepts of the Old Law are one in respect of their relation to one end: and yet + they are many in respect of the diversity of those things that are ordained to that end. +
[37800] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod praeceptum legis, cum sit obligatorium, est de aliquo +quod fieri debet. Quod autem aliquid debeat fieri, hoc provenit ex +necessitate alicuius finis. Unde manifestum est quod de ratione +praecepti est quod importet ordinem ad finem, inquantum scilicet +illud praecipitur quod est necessarium vel expediens ad finem. +Contingit autem ad unum finem multa esse necessaria vel +expedientia. Et secundum hoc possunt de diversis rebus dari +praecepta inquantum ordinantur ad unum finem. Unde dicendum est +quod omnia praecepta legis veteris sunt unum secundum ordinem ad +unum finem, sunt tamen multa secundum diversitatem eorum quae +ordinantur ad finem illum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The Old Law is said to be one as being ordained to one end: yet it comprises various precepts, according to the diversity + of the things which it directs to the end. Thus also the art of building is one according to the unity of its end, because + it aims at the building of a house: and yet it contains various rules, according to the variety of acts ordained thereto. +
[37801] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod lex vetus dicitur esse una secundum ordinem ad +finem unum, et tamen continet diversa praecepta, secundum +distinctionem eorum quae ordinat ad finem. Sicut etiam ars +aedificativa est una secundum unitatem finis, quia tendit ad +aedificationem domus, tamen continet diversa praecepta, secundum +diversos actus ad hoc ordinatos.
+ Reply to Objection 2: As the Apostle says ( + 1 Tim. 1:5), "the end of the commandment is charity"; since every law aims at establishing friendship, either between man and man, or + between man and God. Wherefore the whole Law is comprised in this one commandment, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," + as expressing the end of all commandments: because love of one's neighbor includes love of God, when we love our neighbor + for God's sake. Hence the + Apostle put this commandment in place of the two which are about the love of God and of one's neighbor, and of which Our Lord + said ( + Mat. 22:40): "On these two commandments dependeth the whole Law and the prophets." +
[37802] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut apostolus dicit, I ad Tim. I, finis +praecepti caritas est, ad hoc enim omnis lex tendit, ut +amicitiam constituat vel hominum ad invicem, vel hominis ad Deum. +Et ideo tota lex impletur in hoc uno mandato, diliges proximum +tuum sicut teipsum, sicut in quodam fine mandatorum omnium, in +dilectione enim proximi includitur etiam Dei dilectio, quando +proximus diligitur propter Deum. Unde apostolus hoc unum praeceptum +posuit pro duobus quae sunt de dilectione Dei et proximi, de quibus +dicit dominus, Matth. XXII, in his duobus mandatis pendet omnis +lex et prophetae.
+ Reply to Objection 3: As stated in Ethic. ix, 8, "friendship towards another arises from friendship towards oneself," in so far as man looks on + another as on himself. Hence when it is said, "All things whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them," + this is an explanation of the rule of neighborly love contained implicitly in the words, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as + thyself": so that it is an explanation of this commandment. +
[37803] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in IX Ethic., amicabilia quae sunt +ad alterum, venerunt ex amicabilibus quae sunt homini ad +seipsum, dum scilicet homo ita se habet ad alterum sicut ad se. +Et ideo in hoc quod dicitur, omnia quaecumque vultis ut faciant +vobis homines, et vos facite illis, explicatur quaedam regula +dilectionis proximi, quae etiam implicite continetur in hoc quod +dicitur, diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum. Unde est +quaedam explicatio istius mandati.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law contains no moral precepts. For the Old Law is distinct from the law of nature, as stated + above ( + Q[91], AA[4],5; + Q[98], A[5]). But the moral precepts belong to the law of nature. Therefore they do not belong to the Old Law. +
[37804] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex vetus non contineat praecepta +moralia. Lex enim vetus distinguitur a lege naturae, ut supra +habitum est. Sed praecepta moralia pertinent ad legem naturae. Ergo +non pertinent ad legem veterem.
+ Objection 2: Further, the Divine Law should have come to man's assistance where human reason fails him: as is evident in regard to things + that are of faith, which are above reason. But man's reason seems to suffice for the moral precepts. Therefore the moral precepts + do not belong to the Old Law, which is a Divine law. +
[37805] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +ibi subvenire debuit homini lex divina, ubi deficit ratio humana, +sicut patet in his quae ad fidem pertinent, quae sunt supra +rationem. Sed ad praecepta moralia ratio hominis sufficere videtur. +Ergo praecepta moralia non sunt de lege veteri, quae est lex +divina.
+ Objection 3: Further, the Old Law is said to be "the letter that killeth" ( + 2 Cor. 3:6). But the moral precepts do not kill, but quicken, according to + Ps. 118:93: "Thy justifications I will never forget, for by them Thou hast given me life." Therefore the moral precepts do not belong + to the Old Law. +
[37806] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +lex vetus dicitur littera occidens, ut patet II ad Cor. III. Sed +praecepta moralia non occidunt, sed vivificant; secundum illud +Psalmi CXVIII, in aeternum non obliviscar iustificationes tuas, +quia in ipsis vivificasti me. Ergo praecepta moralia non +pertinent ad veterem legem.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Ecclus. 17:9): "Moreover, He gave them discipline [Douay: 'instructions'] and the law of life for an inheritance." Now discipline belongs + to morals; for this gloss on + Heb. 12:11: "Now all chastisement [disciplina]," etc., says: "Discipline is an exercise in morals by means of difficulties." Therefore + the Law which was given by God comprised moral precepts. +
[37807] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Eccli. XVII, addidit illis disciplinam, et +legem vitae haereditavit eos. Disciplina autem pertinet ad +mores, dicit enim Glossa ad Heb. XII, super illud, omnis disciplina +etc., disciplina est eruditio morum per difficilia. Ergo lex +a Deo data, praecepta moralia continebat.
+ I answer that, The Old Law contained some moral precepts; as is evident from + Ex. 20:13, + 15: "Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal." This was reasonable: because, just as the principal intention of human law + is to created friendship between man and man; so the chief intention of the Divine law is to establish man in friendship with + God. Now since likeness is the reason of love, according to + Ecclus. 13:19: "Every beast loveth its + like"; there cannot possibly be any friendship of man to God, Who is supremely good, unless man become good: wherefore it + is written ( + Lev. 19:2; 11:45): "You shall be holy, for I am holy." But the goodness of man is virtue, which "makes its possessor good" (Ethic. + ii, 6). Therefore it was necessary for the Old Law to include precepts about acts of virtue: and these are the moral precepts + of the Law. +
[37808] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod lex vetus continebat praecepta quaedam moralia, ut +patet Exod. XX, non occides, non furtum facies. Et hoc +rationabiliter. Nam sicut intentio principalis legis humanae est ut +faciat amicitiam hominum ad invicem; ita intentio legis divinae est +ut constituat principaliter amicitiam hominis ad Deum. Cum autem +similitudo sit ratio amoris, secundum illud Eccli. XIII, omne +animal diligit simile sibi; impossibile est esse amicitiam +hominis ad Deum, qui est optimus, nisi homines boni efficiantur, +unde dicitur Levit. XIX, sancti eritis, quoniam ego sanctus +sum. Bonitas autem hominis est virtus, quae facit bonum +habentem. Et ideo oportuit praecepta legis veteris etiam de actibus +virtutum dari. Et haec sunt moralia legis praecepta.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The Old Law is distinct from the natural law, not as being altogether different from it, but as something added thereto. + For just as grace presupposes nature, so must the Divine law presuppose the natural law. +
[37809] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod lex vetus distinguitur a lege naturae non +tanquam ab ea omnino aliena, sed tanquam aliquid ei superaddens. +Sicut enim gratia praesupponit naturam, ita oportet quod lex divina +praesupponat legem naturalem.
+ Reply to Objection 2: It was fitting that the Divine law should come to man's assistance not only in those things for which reason is insufficient, + but also in those things in which human reason may happen to be impeded. Now human reason could not go astray in the abstract, + as to the universal principles of the natural law; but through being habituated to sin, it became obscured in the point of + things to be done in detail. But with regard to the other moral precepts, which + are like conclusions drawn from the universal principles of the natural law, the reason of many men went astray, to the extend + of judging to be lawful, things that are evil in themselves. Hence there was need for the authority of the Divine law to rescue + man from both these defects. Thus among the articles of faith not only are those things set forth to which reason cannot reach, + such as the Trinity of the Godhead; but also those to which right reason can attain, such as the Unity of the + Godhead; in order to remove the manifold errors to which reason is liable. +
[37810] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod legi divinae conveniens erat ut non solum provideret +homini in his ad quae ratio non potest, sed etiam in his circa quae +contingit rationem hominis impediri. Ratio autem hominis circa +praecepta moralia, quantum ad ipsa communissima praecepta legis +naturae, non poterat errare in universali, sed tamen, propter +consuetudinem peccandi, obscurabatur in particularibus agendis. +Circa alia vero praecepta moralia, quae sunt quasi conclusiones +deductae ex communibus principiis legis naturae, multorum ratio +oberrabat, ita ut quaedam quae secundum se sunt mala, ratio +multorum licita iudicaret. Unde oportuit contra utrumque defectum +homini subveniri per auctoritatem legis divinae. Sicut etiam inter +credenda nobis proponuntur non solum ea ad quae ratio attingere non +potest, ut Deum esse trinum; sed etiam ea ad quae ratio recta +pertingere potest, ut Deum esse unum; ad excludendum rationis +humanae errorem, qui accidebat in multis.
+ Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine proves (De Spiritu et Litera xiv), even the letter of the law is said to be the occasion of death, as to the + moral precepts; in so far as, to wit, it prescribes what is good, without furnishing the aid of grace for its fulfilment. +
[37811] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus probat in libro de spiritu et +littera, etiam littera legis quantum ad praecepta moralia, occidere +dicitur occasionaliter, inquantum scilicet praecipit quod bonum +est, non praebens auxilium gratiae ad implendum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law does not comprise ceremonial, besides moral, precepts. For every law that is given to man + is for the purpose of directing human actions. Now human actions are called moral, as stated above ( + Q[1], A[3]). Therefore it seems that the Old Law given to men should not comprise other than moral precepts. +
[37812] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex vetus non contineat praecepta +caeremonialia, praeter moralia. Omnis enim lex quae hominibus +datur, est directiva humanorum actuum. Actus autem humani morales +dicuntur, ut supra dictum est. Ergo videtur quod in lege veteri +hominibus data, non debeant contineri nisi praecepta moralia.
+ Objection 2: Further, those precepts that are styled ceremonial seem to refer to the Divine worship. But Divine worship is the act of + a virtue, viz. religion, which, as Tully says (De Invent. ii) "offers worship and ceremony to the Godhead." Since, then, the + moral precepts are about acts of virtue, as stated above + (A[2]), it seems that the ceremonial precepts should not be distinct from the moral. +
[37813] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +praecepta quae dicuntur caeremonialia, videntur ad divinum cultum +pertinere. Sed divinus cultus est actus virtutis, scilicet +religionis, quae, ut Tullius dicit in sua Rhetoric., divinae +naturae cultum caeremoniamque affert. Cum igitur praecepta +moralia sint de actibus virtutum, ut dictum est, videtur quod +praecepta caeremonialia non sint distinguenda a moralibus.
+ Objection 3: Further, the ceremonial precepts seem to be those which signify something figuratively. But, as Augustine observes (De Doctr. + Christ. ii, 3,4), "of all signs employed by men words hold the first place." Therefore there is no need for the Law to contain + ceremonial precepts about certain figurative actions. +
[37814] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +praecepta caeremonialia esse videntur quae figurative aliquid +significant. Sed sicut Augustinus dicit, in II de Doctr. Christ., +verba inter homines obtinuerunt principatum significandi. +Ergo nulla necessitas fuit ut in lege continerentur praecepta +caeremonialia de aliquibus actibus figurativis.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Dt. 4:13,14): "Ten words . . . He wrote in two tables of stone; and He commanded me at that time that I should teach you the ceremonies + and judgments which you shall do." But the ten commandments of the Law are moral precepts. Therefore besides the moral precepts + there are others which are ceremonial. +
[37815] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Deut. IV, decem verba scripsit in duabus +tabulis lapideis, mihique mandavit in illo tempore ut docerem vos +caeremonias et iudicia quae facere deberetis. Sed decem +praecepta legis sunt moralia. Ergo praeter praecepta moralia sunt +etiam alia praecepta caeremonialia.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[2]), the Divine law is instituted chiefly in order to direct men to God; while human law is instituted chiefly in order to direct + men in relation to one another. Hence human laws have not concerned themselves with the institution of anything relating to + Divine worship except as affecting the common good of mankind: and for this reason they have devised many institutions relating + to Divine matters, according as it + seemed expedient for the formation of human morals; as may be seen in the rites of the Gentiles. On the other hand the Divine + law directed men to one another according to the demands of that order whereby man is directed to God, which order was the + chief aim of that law. Now man is directed to God not only by the interior acts of the mind, which are faith, hope, and love, + but also by certain external works, whereby man makes profession of his subjection to God: and it is these works that are + said to belong to the Divine worship. This worship is called "ceremony" [the munia, i.e. gifts] of Ceres (who was the goddess + of fruits), as some say: because, at first, offerings were made to God from the fruits: or because, as Valerius Maximus states + [*Fact. et Dict. Memor. i, 1], the word "ceremony" was introduced among the Latins, to signify the Divine worship, being derived + from a town near Rome called "Caere": since, when Rome was taken by the Gauls, the sacred chattels of the Romans were + taken thither and most carefully preserved. Accordingly those precepts of the Law which refer to the Divine worship are specially + called ceremonial. +
[37816] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, lex divina principaliter +instituitur ad ordinandum homines ad Deum; lex autem humana +principaliter ad ordinandum homines ad invicem. Et ideo leges +humanae non curaverunt aliquid instituere de cultu divino nisi in +ordine ad bonum commune hominum, et propter hoc etiam multa +confinxerunt circa res divinas, secundum quod videbatur eis +expediens ad informandos mores hominum; sicut patet in ritu +gentilium. Sed lex divina e converso homines ad invicem ordinavit +secundum quod conveniebat ordini qui est in Deum, quem +principaliter intendebat. Ordinatur autem homo in Deum non solum +per interiores actus mentis, qui sunt credere, sperare et amare; +sed etiam per quaedam exteriora opera, quibus homo divinam +servitutem profitetur. Et ista opera dicuntur ad cultum Dei +pertinere. Qui quidem cultus caeremonia vocatur, quasi munia, idest +dona, Caereris, quae dicebatur dea frugum, ut quidam dicunt, eo +quod primo ex frugibus oblationes Deo offerebantur. Sive, ut +maximus Valerius refert, nomen caeremoniae introductum est ad +significandum cultum divinum apud Latinos, a quodam oppido iuxta +Romam, quod Caere vocabatur, eo quod, Roma capta a gallis, illuc +sacra Romanorum ablata sunt, et reverentissime habita. Sic igitur +illa praecepta quae in lege pertinent ad cultum Dei, specialiter +caeremonialia dicuntur.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Human acts extend also to the Divine worship: and therefore the Old Law given to man contains precepts about these matters + also. +
[37817] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod humani actus se extendunt etiam ad cultum +divinum. Et ideo etiam de his continet praecepta lex vetus +hominibus data.
+ Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ( + Q[91], A[3]), the precepts of the natural law are general, and require to be determined: and they are determined both by human law and + by Divine law. And just as these very determinations which are made by human law are said to be, not of natural, but of positive + law; so the determinations of the precepts of the natural law, effected by the Divine law, are distinct from the moral precepts + which belong to the + natural law. Wherefore to worship God, since it is an act of virtue, belongs to a moral precept; but the determination of + this precept, namely that He is to be worshipped by such and such sacrifices, and such and such offerings, belongs to the + ceremonial precepts. Consequently the ceremonial precepts are distinct from the moral precepts. +
[37818] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, praecepta legis naturae +communia sunt, et indigent determinatione. Determinantur autem et +per legem humanam, et per legem divinam. Et sicut ipsae +determinationes quae fiunt per legem humanam, non dicuntur esse de +lege naturae, sed de iure positivo; ita ipsae determinationes +praeceptorum legis naturae quae fiunt per legem divinam, +distinguuntur a praeceptis moralibus, quae pertinent ad legem +naturae. Colere ergo Deum, cum sit actus virtutis, pertinet ad +praeceptum morale, sed determinatio huius praecepti, ut scilicet +colatur talibus hostiis et talibus muneribus, hoc pertinet ad +praecepta caeremonialia. Et ideo praecepta caeremonialia +distinguuntur a praeceptis moralibus.
+ Reply to Objection 3: As Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i), the things of God cannot be manifested to men except by means of sensible similitudes. + Now these similitudes move the soul more when they are not only expressed in words, but also offered to the senses. Wherefore + the things of God are set forth in the Scriptures not only by similitudes expressed in words, as in the case of metaphorical + expressions; but also by similitudes of things set before the eyes, which pertains + to the ceremonial precepts. +
[37819] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut Dionysius dicit, I cap. Cael. Hier., divina +hominibus manifestari non possunt nisi sub aliquibus +similitudinibus sensibilibus. Ipsae autem similitudines magis +movent animum quando non solum verbo exprimuntur, sed etiam sensui +offeruntur. Et ideo divina traduntur in Scripturis non solum per +similitudines verbo expressas, sicut patet in metaphoricis +locutionibus; sed etiam per similitudines rerum quae visui +proponuntur, quod pertinet ad praecepta caeremonialia.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that there are no judicial precepts in addition to the moral and ceremonial precepts in the Old Law. For Augustine + says (Contra Faust. vi, 2) that in the Old Law there are "precepts concerning the life we have to lead, and precepts regarding + the life that is foreshadowed." Now the precepts of the life we have to lead are moral precepts; and the precepts of the life + that is foreshadowed are ceremonial. Therefore besides these two kinds of precepts + we should not put any judicial precepts in the Law. +
[37820] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod praeter praecepta moralia et +caeremonialia, non sint aliqua praecepta iudicialia in veteri lege. +Dicit enim Augustinus, contra Faustum, quod in lege veteri sunt +praecepta vitae agendae, et praecepta vitae significandae. Sed +praecepta vitae agendae sunt moralia; praecepta autem vitae +significandae sunt caeremonialia. Ergo praeter haec duo genera +praeceptorum, non sunt ponenda in lege alia praecepta +iudicialia.
+ Objection 2: Further, a gloss on + Ps. 118:102, "I have not declined from Thy judgments," says, i.e. "from the rule of life Thou hast set for me." But a rule of life belongs + to the moral precepts. Therefore the judicial precepts should not be considered as distinct from the moral precepts. +
[37821] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +super illud Psalmi CXVIII, a iudiciis tuis non declinavi, +dicit Glossa, idest ab his quae constituisti regulam +vivendi. Sed regula vivendi pertinet ad praecepta moralia. Ergo +praecepta iudicialia non sunt distinguenda a moralibus.
+ Objection 3: Further, judgment seems to be an act of justice, according to + Ps. 93:15: "Until justice be turned into judgment." But acts of justice, like the acts of other virtues, belong to the moral precepts. + Therefore the moral precepts include the judicial precepts, and consequently should not be held as distinct from them. +
[37822] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +iudicium videtur esse actus iustitiae; secundum illud Psalmi XCIII, +quoadusque iustitia convertatur in iudicium. Sed actus +iustitiae, sicut et actus ceterarum virtutum, pertinet ad praecepta +moralia. Ergo praecepta moralia includunt in se iudicialia, et sic +non debent ab eis distingui.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Dt. 6:1): "These are the precepts and ceremonies, and judgments": where "precepts" stands for "moral precepts" antonomastically. + Therefore there are judicial precepts besides moral and ceremonial precepts. +
[37823] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Deut. VI, haec sunt praecepta et caeremoniae +atque iudicia. Praecepta autem antonomastice dicuntur moralia. +Ergo praeter praecepta moralia et caeremonialia, sunt etiam +iudicialia.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + AA[2],3), it belongs to the Divine law to direct men to one another and to God. Now each of these belongs in the abstract to the + dictates of the natural law, to which dictates the moral precepts are to be referred: yet each of them has to be determined + by Divine or human law, because naturally known principles are universal, both in speculative and in practical matters. Accordingly + just as the determination of the + universal principle about Divine worship is effected by the ceremonial precepts, so the determination of the general precepts + of that justice which is to be observed among men is effected by the judicial precepts. +
We must therefore distinguish three kinds of precept in the Old Law; viz. "moral" precepts, which are dictated by the natural + law; "ceremonial" precepts, which are determinations of the Divine worship; and "judicial" precepts, which are determinations + of the justice to be maintained among men. Wherefore the Apostle ( + Rom. 7:12) after saying that the "Law is holy," adds that "the commandment is just, and holy, and good": "just," in respect of the + judicial + precepts; "holy," with regard to the ceremonial precepts (since the word "sanctus"---"holy"---is applied to that which is + consecrated to God); and "good," i.e. conducive to virtue, as to the moral precepts. +
[37824] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ad legem divinam pertinet ut +ordinet homines ad invicem et ad Deum. Utrumque autem horum in +communi quidem pertinet ad dictamen legis naturae, ad quod +referuntur moralia praecepta, sed oportet quod determinetur +utrumque per legem divinam vel humanam, quia principia naturaliter +nota sunt communia tam in speculativis quam in activis. Sicut +igitur determinatio communis praecepti de cultu divino fit per +praecepta caeremonialia, sic et determinatio communis praecepti de +iustitia observanda inter homines, determinatur per praecepta +iudicialia. Et secundum hoc, oportet tria praecepta legis veteris +ponere; scilicet moralia, quae sunt de dictamine legis naturae; +caeremonialia, quae sunt determinationes cultus divini; et +iudicialia, quae sunt determinationes iustitiae inter homines +observandae. Unde cum apostolus, Rom. VII, dixisset quod lex est +sancta, subiungit quod mandatum est iustum et sanctum et bonum, +iustum quidem, quantum ad iudicialia; sanctum, quantum ad +caeremonialia (nam sanctum dicitur quod est Deo dicatum); bonum, +idest honestum, quantum ad moralia.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Both the moral and the judicial precepts aim at the ordering of human life: and consequently they are both comprised under + one of the heads mentioned by Augustine, viz. under the precepts of the life we have to lead. +
[37825] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod tam praecepta moralia, quam etiam iudicialia, +pertinent ad directionem vitae humanae. Et ideo utraque continentur +sub uno membro illorum quae ponit Augustinus, scilicet sub +praeceptis vitae agendae.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Judgment denotes execution of justice, by an application of the reason to individual cases in a determinate way. Hence the + judicial precepts have something in common with the moral precepts, in that they are derived from reason; and something in + common with the ceremonial precepts, in that they are determinations of general precepts. This explains why sometimes "judgments" + comprise both judicial and moral precepts, as in + Dt. 5:1: + "Hear, O Israel, the ceremonies and judgments"; and sometimes judicial and ceremonial precepts, as in + Lev. 18:4: "You shall do My judgments, and shall observe My precepts," where "precepts" denotes moral precepts, while "judgments" refers + to judicial and ceremonial precepts. +
[37826] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod iudicium significat executionem iustitiae, quae +quidem est secundum applicationem rationis ad aliqua particularia +determinate. Unde praecepta iudicialia communicant in aliquo cum +moralibus, inquantum scilicet a ratione derivantur; et in aliquo +cum caeremonialibus, inquantum scilicet sunt quaedam +determinationes communium praeceptorum. Et ideo quandoque sub +iudiciis comprehenduntur praecepta iudicialia et moralia, sicut +Deut. V, audi, Israel, caeremonias atque iudicia; quandoque vero +iudicialia et caeremonialia, sicut Levit. XVIII, facietis iudicia +mea, et praecepta mea servabitis, ubi praecepta ad moralia +referuntur, iudicia vero ad iudicialia et caeremonialia.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The act of justice, in general, belongs to the moral precepts; but its determination to some special kind of act belongs + to the judicial precepts. +
[37827] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod actus iustitiae in generali pertinet ad praecepta +moralia, sed determinatio eius in speciali pertinet ad praecepta +iudicialia.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law contains others besides the moral, judicial, and ceremonial precepts. Because the judicial + precepts belong to the act of justice, which is between man and man; while the ceremonial precepts belong to the act of religion, + whereby God is worshipped. Now besides these there are many other virtues, viz. temperance, fortitude, liberality, and several + others, as stated above ( + Q[60], A[5]). Therefore besides the + aforesaid precepts, the Old Law should comprise others. +
[37828] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliqua alia praecepta contineantur in +lege veteri praeter moralia, iudicialia et caeremonialia. +Iudicialia enim praecepta pertinent ad actum iustitiae, quae est +hominis ad hominem; caeremonialia vero pertinent ad actum +religionis, qua Deus colitur. Sed praeter has sunt multae aliae +virtutes, scilicet temperantia, fortitudo, liberalitas, et aliae +plures, ut supra dictum est. Ergo praeter praedicta oportet plura +alia in lege veteri contineri.
+ Objection 2: Further, it is written ( + Dt. 11:1): "Love the Lord thy God, and observe His precepts and ceremonies, His judgments and commandments." Now precepts concern + moral matters, as stated above + (A[4]). Therefore besides the moral, judicial and ceremonial precepts, the Law contains others which are called "commandments." + [*The "commandments" (mandata) spoken of here and in the body of this article are not to be confused with + the Commandments (praecepta) in the ordinary acceptance of the word.] +
[37829] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Deut. XI dicitur, ama dominum Deum tuum, et observa eius +praecepta et caeremonias et iudicia atque mandata. Sed +praecepta pertinent ad moralia, ut dictum est. Ergo praeter +moralia, iudicialia et caeremonialia, adhuc alia continentur in +lege, quae dicuntur mandata.
+ Objection 3: Further, it is written ( + Dt. 6:17): "Keep the precepts of the Lord thy God, and the testimonies and ceremonies which I have [Vulg.: 'He hath'] commanded thee." + Therefore in addition to the above, the Law comprises "testimonies." +
[37830] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +Deut. VI dicitur, custodi praecepta domini Dei tui, ac +testimonia et caeremonias quas tibi praecepi. Ergo praeter +omnia praedicta adhuc in lege testimonia continentur.
+ Objection 4: Further, it is written ( + Ps. 118:93): "Thy justifications (i.e. "Thy Law," according to a gloss) I will never forget." Therefore in the Old Law there are not + only moral, ceremonial and judicial precepts, but also others, called "justifications." +
[37831] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 5 arg. 4 Praeterea, +in Psalmo CXVIII dicitur, in aeternum non obliviscar +iustificationes tuas, Glossa, idest legem. Ergo +praecepta legis veteris non solum sunt moralia, caeremonialia et +iudicialia, sed etiam iustificationes.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Dt. 6:1): "These are the precepts and ceremonies and judgments which the Lord your God commanded . . . you." And these words are + placed at the beginning of the Law. Therefore all the precepts of the Law are included under them. +
[37832] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Deut. VI, haec sunt praecepta et caeremoniae +atque iudicia quae mandavit dominus Deus vobis. Et haec +ponuntur in principio legis. Ergo omnia praecepta legis sub his +comprehenduntur.
+ I answer that, Some things are included in the Law by way of precept; other things, as being ordained to the fulfilment of the precepts. + Now the precepts refer to things which have to be done: and to their fulfilment man is induced by two considerations, viz. + the authority of the lawgiver, and the benefit derived from the fulfilment, which benefit consists in the attainment of some + good, useful, pleasurable or virtuous, or in the avoidance of some contrary evil. Hence it + was necessary that in the Old Law certain things should be set forth to indicate the authority of God the lawgiver: e.g. + Dt. 6:4: "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord"; and + Gn. 1:1: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth": and these are called "testimonies." Again it was necessary that in the + Law certain rewards should be appointed for those who observe the Law, and punishments for those who transgress; as it may + be seen in + Dt. 28: "If + thou wilt hear the voice of the Lord thy God . . . He will make thee higher than all the nations," etc.: and these are called + "justifications," according as God punishes or rewards certain ones justly. +
The things that have to be done do not come under the precept except in so far as they have the character of a duty. Now + a duty is twofold: one according to the rule of reason; the other according to the rule of a law which prescribes that duty: + thus the Philosopher distinguishes a twofold just---moral and legal (Ethic. v, 7). +
Moral duty is twofold: because reason dictates that something must be done, either as being so necessary that without it + the order of virtue would be destroyed; or as being useful for the better maintaining of the order of virtue. And in this + sense some of the moral precepts are expressed by way of absolute command or prohibition, as "Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt + not steal": and these are properly called "precepts." Other things are prescribed or forbidden, not as an absolute + duty, but as something better to be done. These may be called "commandments"; because they are expressed by way of inducement + and persuasion: an example whereof is seen in + Ex. 22:26: "If thou take of thy neighbor a garment in pledge, thou shalt give it him again before sunset"; and in other like cases. + Wherefore Jerome (Praefat. in Comment. super Marc.) says that "justice is in the precepts, charity in the commandments." Duty + as fixed by the Law, belongs to the judicial + precepts, as regards human affairs; to the "ceremonial" precepts, as regards Divine matters. +
Nevertheless those ordinances also which refer to punishments and rewards may be called "testimonies," in so far as they + testify to the Divine justice. Again all the precepts of the Law may be styled "justifications," as being executions of legal + justice. Furthermore the commandments may be distinguished from the precepts, so that those things be called "precepts" which + God Himself prescribed; and those things "commandments" which He enjoined [mandavit] through others, as the + very word seems to denote. +
From this it is clear that all the precepts of the Law are either moral, ceremonial, or judicial; and that other ordinances + have not the character of a precept, but are directed to the observance of the precepts, as stated above. +
[37833] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod in lege ponuntur aliqua tanquam praecepta; aliqua +vero tanquam ad praeceptorum adimpletionem ordinata. Praecepta +quidem sunt de his quae sunt agenda. Ad quorum impletionem ex +duobus homo inducitur, scilicet ex auctoritate praecipientis; et ex +utilitate impletionis, quae quidem est consecutio alicuius boni +utilis, delectabilis vel honesti, aut fuga alicuius mali contrarii. +Oportuit igitur in veteri lege proponi quaedam quae auctoritatem +Dei praecipientis indicarent, sicut illud Deut. VI, audi, +Israel, dominus Deus tuus Deus unus est; et illud Gen. I, in +principio creavit Deus caelum et terram. Et huiusmodi dicuntur +testimonia. Oportuit etiam quod in lege proponerentur quaedam +praemia observantium legem, et poenae transgredientium, ut patet +Deut. XXVIII, si audieris vocem domini Dei tui, faciet te +excelsiorem cunctis gentibus, et cetera. Et huiusmodi dicuntur +iustificationes, secundum quod Deus aliquos iuste punit vel +praemiat. Ipsa autem agenda sub praecepto non cadunt nisi inquantum +habent aliquam debiti rationem. Est autem duplex debitum, unum +quidem secundum regulam rationis, aliud autem secundum regulam +legis determinantis; sicut philosophus, in V Ethic., distinguit +duplex iustum, scilicet morale et legale. Debitum autem morale est +duplex, dictat enim ratio aliquid faciendum vel tanquam +necessarium, sine quo non potest esse ordo virtutis; vel tanquam +utile ad hoc quod ordo virtutis melius conservetur. Et secundum +hoc, quaedam moralium praecise praecipiuntur vel prohibentur in +lege, sicut, non occides, non furtum facies. Et haec proprie +dicuntur praecepta. Quaedam vero praecipiuntur vel prohibentur, non +quasi praecise debita, sed propter melius. Et ista possunt dici +mandata, quia quandam inductionem habent et persuasionem. Sicut +illud Exod. XXII, si pignus acceperis vestimentum a proximo tuo, +ante solis occasum reddas ei; et aliqua similia. Unde +Hieronymus dicit quod in praeceptis est iustitia, in mandatis +vero caritas. Debitum autem ex determinatione legis, in rebus +quidem humanis pertinet ad iudicialia; in rebus autem divinis, ad +caeremonialia. Quamvis etiam ea quae pertinent ad poenam vel +praemia, dici possint testimonia, inquantum sunt protestationes +quaedam divinae iustitiae. Omnia vero praecepta legis possunt dici +iustificationes, inquantum sunt quaedam executiones legalis +iustitiae. Possunt etiam aliter mandata a praeceptis distingui, ut +praecepta dicantur quae Deus per seipsum iussit; mandata autem, +quae per alios mandavit, ut ipsum nomen sonare videtur. Ex quibus +omnibus apparet quod omnia legis praecepta continentur sub +moralibus, caeremonialibus et iudicialibus, alia vero non habent +rationem praeceptorum, sed ordinantur ad praeceptorum +observationem, ut dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Justice alone, of all the virtues, implies the notion of duty. Consequently moral matters are determinable by law in so far + as they belong to justice: of which virtue religion is a part, as Tully says (De Invent. ii). Wherefore the legal just cannot + be anything foreign to the ceremonial and judicial precepts. +
[37834] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod sola iustitia, inter alias virtutes, importat +rationem debiti. Et ideo moralia intantum sunt lege determinabilia, +inquantum pertinent ad iustitiam, cuius etiam quaedam pars est +religio, ut Tullius dicit. Unde iustum legale non potest esse +aliquod praeter caeremonialia et iudicialia praecepta.
Reply to Objections 2--4: The Replies to the other Objections are clear from what has been said.
[37835] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 5 ad 2 Ad alia patet +responsio per ea quae dicta sunt.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law should not have induced men to the observance of its precepts, by means of temporal promises + and threats. For the purpose of the Divine law is to subject man to God by fear and love: hence it is written ( + Dt. 10:12): "And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God, and walk in His ways, + and love Him?" But the desire for temporal goods leads man away from God: + for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36), that "covetousness is the bane of charity." Therefore temporal promises and threats + seem to be contrary to the intention of a lawgiver: and this makes a law worthy of rejection, as the Philosopher declares + (Polit. ii, 6). +
[37836] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex vetus non debuerit inducere ad +observantiam praeceptorum per temporales promissiones et +comminationes. Intentio enim legis divinae est ut homines Deo +subdat per timorem et amorem, unde dicitur Deut. X, et nunc, +Israel, quid dominus Deus tuus petit a te, nisi ut timeas dominum +Deum tuum, et ambules in viis eius, et diligas eum? Sed +cupiditas rerum temporalium abducit a Deo, dicit enim Augustinus, +in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod venenum caritatis est +cupiditas. Ergo promissiones et comminationes temporales +videntur contrariari intentioni legislatoris, quod facit legem +reprobabilem, ut patet per philosophum, in II Polit.
+ Objection 2: Further, the Divine law is more excellent than human law. Now, in sciences, we notice that the loftier the science, the higher + the means of persuasion that it employs. Therefore, since human law employs temporal threats and promises, as means of persuading + man, the Divine law should have used, not these, but more lofty means. +
[37837] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, +lex divina est excellentior quam lex humana. Videmus autem in +scientiis quod quanto aliqua est altior, tanto per altiora media +procedit. Ergo cum lex humana procedat ad inducendum homines per +temporales comminationes et promissiones, lex divina non debuit ex +his procedere, sed per aliqua maiora.
+ Objection 3: Further, the reward of righteousness and the punishment of guilt cannot be that which befalls equally the good and the wicked. + But as stated in + Eccles. 9:2, "all" temporal "things equally happen to the just and to the wicked, to the good and the evil, to the clean and to the unclean, + to him that offereth victims, and to him that despiseth sacrifices." Therefore temporal goods or evils are not suitably set + forth as punishments or rewards of + the commandments of the Divine law. +
[37838] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, +illud non potest esse praemium iustitiae vel poena culpae, quod +aequaliter evenit et bonis et malis. Sed sicut dicitur Eccle. IX, +universa, temporalia, aeque eveniunt iusto et impio, bono et +malo, mundo et immundo, immolanti victimas et sacrificia +contemnenti. Ergo temporalia bona vel mala non convenienter +ponuntur ut poenae vel praemia mandatorum legis divinae.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Is. 1:19,20): "If you be willing, and will hearken to Me, you shall eat the good things of the land. But if you will not, and will provoke + Me to wrath: the sword shall devour you." +
[37839] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Isaiae I, si volueritis, et audieritis me, bona +terrae comedetis. Quod si nolueritis, et me ad iracundiam +provocaveritis, gladius devorabit vos.
+ I answer that, As in speculative sciences men are persuaded to assent to the conclusions by means of syllogistic arguments, so too in every + law, men are persuaded to observe its precepts by means of punishments and rewards. Now it is to be observed that, in speculative + sciences, the means of persuasion are adapted to the conditions of the pupil: wherefore the process of argument in sciences + should be ordered becomingly, so that the instruction is based on principles more + generally known. And thus also he who would persuade a man to the observance of any precepts, needs to move him at first by + things for which he has an affection; just as children are induced to do something, by means of little childish gifts. Now + it has been said above ( + Q[98], AA[1],2,3) that the Old Law disposed men to (the coming of) Christ, as the imperfect in comparison disposes to the perfect, wherefore + it was given to a people as yet imperfect in comparison to the + perfection which was to result from Christ's coming: and for this reason, that people is compared to a child that is still + under a pedagogue ( + Gal. 3:24). But the perfection of man consists in his despising temporal things and cleaving to things spiritual, as is clear from + the words of the Apostle ( + Phil. 3:13, + 15): "Forgetting the things that are behind, I stretch [Vulg.: 'and stretching'] forth myself to those that are before . . . + Let us therefore, as + many as are perfect, be thus minded." Those who are yet imperfect desire temporal goods, albeit in subordination to God: whereas + the perverse place their end in temporalities. It was therefore fitting that the Old Law should conduct men to God by means + of temporal goods for which the imperfect have an affection. +
[37840] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 6 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut in scientiis speculativis inducuntur homines +ad assentiendum conclusionibus per media syllogistica, ita etiam in +quibuslibet legibus homines inducuntur ad observantias praeceptorum +per poenas et praemia. Videmus autem in scientiis speculativis quod +media proponuntur auditori secundum eius conditionem, unde oportet +ordinate in scientiis procedere, ut ex notioribus disciplina +incipiat. Ita etiam oportet eum qui vult inducere hominem ad +observantiam praeceptorum, ut ex illis eum movere incipiat quae +sunt in eius affectu, sicut pueri provocantur ad aliquid faciendum +aliquibus puerilibus munusculis. Dictum est autem supra quod lex +vetus disponebat ad Christum sicut imperfectum ad perfectum, unde +dabatur populo adhuc imperfecto in comparatione ad perfectionem +quae erat futura per Christum, et ideo populus ille comparatur +puero sub paedagogo existenti, ut patet Galat. III. Perfectio autem +hominis est ut, contemptis temporalibus, spiritualibus inhaereat, +ut patet per illud quod apostolus dicit, Philipp. III, quae +quidem retro sunt obliviscens, ad ea quae priora sunt me extendo. +Quicumque ergo perfecti sumus, hoc sentiamus. Imperfectorum +autem est quod temporalia bona desiderent, in ordine tamen ad Deum. +Perversorum autem est quod in temporalibus bonis finem constituant. +Unde legi veteri conveniebat ut per temporalia, quae erant in +affectu hominum imperfectorum, manuduceret homines ad Deum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Covetousness whereby man places his end in temporalities, is the bane of charity. But the attainment of temporal goods which + man desires in subordination to God is a road leading the imperfect to the love of God, according to + Ps. 48:19: "He will praise Thee, when Thou shalt do well to him." +
[37841] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod cupiditas, qua homo constituit finem in +temporalibus bonis, est caritatis venenum. Sed consecutio +temporalium bonorum quae homo desiderat in ordine ad Deum, est +quaedam via inducens imperfectos ad Dei amorem; secundum illud +Psalmi XLVIII, confitebitur tibi cum benefeceris illi.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Human law persuades men by means of temporal rewards or punishments to be inflicted by men: whereas the Divine law persuades + men by meas of rewards or punishments to be received from God. In this respect it employs higher means. +
[37842] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod lex humana inducit homines ex temporalibus praemiis +vel poenis per homines inducendis, lex vero divina ex praemiis vel +poenis exhibendis per Deum. Et in hoc procedit per media +altiora.
+ Reply to Objection 3: As any one can see, who reads carefully the story of the Old Testament, the common weal of the people prospered under the + Law as long as they obeyed it; and as soon as they departed from the precepts of the Law they were overtaken by many calamities. + But certain individuals, although they observed the justice of the Law, met with misfortunes---either because they had already + become spiritual (so that misfortune might withdraw them all the more from + attachment to temporal things, and that their virtue might be tried)---or because, while outwardly fulfilling the works of + the Law, their heart was altogether fixed on temporal goods, and far removed from God, according to + Is. 29:13 ( + Mat. 15:8): "This people honoreth Me with their lips; but their hearts is far from Me." +
[37843] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut patet historias veteris testamenti revolventi, +communis status populi semper sub lege in prosperitate fuit, +quandiu legem observabant; et statim declinantes a praeceptis +legis, in multas adversitates incidebant. Sed aliquae personae +particulares etiam iustitiam legis observantes, in aliquas +adversitates incidebant, vel quia iam erant spirituales effecti, ut +per hoc magis ab affectu temporalium abstraherentur, et eorum +virtus probata redderetur; aut quia, opera legis exterius +implentes, cor totum habebant in temporalibus defixum et a Deo +elongatum, secundum quod dicitur Isaiae XXIX, populus hic labiis +me honorat, cor autem eorum longe est a me.
We must now consider each kind of precept of the Old Law: and (1) the moral precepts, (2) the ceremonial precepts, (3) the + judicial precepts. Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry: +
(1) Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law belong to the law of nature?
(2) Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law are about the acts of all the virtues?
(4) How the precepts of the decalogue are distinguished from one another?
(7) The manner in which they were given;
(8) Whether they are dispensable?
(9) Whether the mode of observing a virtue comes under the precept of the Law?
(10) Whether the mode of charity comes under the precept?
(11) The distinction of other moral precepts;
(12) Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law justified man?
+[37844] Iª-IIae q. 100 pr. Deinde +considerandum est de singulis generibus praeceptorum veteris legis. +Et primo, de praeceptis moralibus; secundo, de caeremonialibus; +tertio, de iudicialibus. Circa primum quaeruntur duodecim. Primo, +utrum omnia praecepta moralia veteris legis sint de lege naturae. +Secundo, utrum praecepta moralia veteris legis sint de actibus +omnium virtutum. Tertio, utrum omnia praecepta moralia veteris +legis reducantur ad decem praecepta Decalogi. Quarto, de +distinctione praeceptorum Decalogi. Quinto, de numero eorum. Sexto, +de ordine. Septimo, de modo tradendi ipsa. Octavo, utrum sint +dispensabilia. Nono, utrum modus observandi virtutem cadat sub +praecepto. Decimo, utrum modus caritatis cadat sub praecepto. +Undecimo, de distinctione aliorum praeceptorum moralium. Duodecimo, +utrum praecepta moralia veteris legis iustificent.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that not all the moral precepts belong to the law of nature. For it is written ( + Ecclus. 17:9): "Moreover He gave them instructions, and the law of life for an inheritance." But instruction is in contradistinction to + the law of nature; since the law of nature is not learnt, but instilled by natural instinct. Therefore not all the moral precepts + belong to the natural law. +
[37845] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnia praecepta moralia pertineant +ad legem naturae. Dicitur enim Eccli. XVII, addidit illis +disciplinam, et legem vitae haereditavit illos. Sed disciplina +dividitur contra legem naturae, eo quod lex naturalis non +addiscitur, sed ex naturali instinctu habetur. Ergo non omnia +praecepta moralia sunt de lege naturae.
+ Objection 2: Further, the Divine law is more perfect than human law. But human law adds certain things concerning good morals, to those + that belong to the law of nature: as is evidenced by the fact that the natural law is the same in all men, while these moral + institutions are various for various people. Much more reason therefore was there why the Divine law should add to the law + of nature, ordinances pertaining to good morals. +
[37846] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +lex divina perfectior est quam lex humana. Sed lex humana +superaddit aliqua ad bonos mores pertinentia his quae sunt de lege +naturae, quod patet ex hoc quod lex naturae est eadem apud omnes, +huiusmodi autem morum instituta sunt diversa apud diversos. Ergo +multo fortius divina lex aliqua ad bonos mores pertinentia debuit +addere supra legem naturae.
+ Objection 3: Further, just as natural reason leads to good morals in certain matters, so does faith: hence it is written ( + Gal. 5:6) that faith "worketh by charity." But faith is not included in the law of nature; since that which is of faith is above nature. + Therefore not all the moral precepts of the Divine law belong to the law of nature. +
[37847] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sicut ratio naturalis inducit ad aliquos bonos mores, ita et fides, +unde etiam dicitur ad Galat. V, quod fides per dilectionem +operatur. Sed fides non continetur sub lege naturae, quia ea quae +sunt fidei, sunt supra rationem naturalem. Ergo non omnia praecepta +moralia legis divinae pertinent ad legem naturae.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle says ( + Rom. 2:14) that "the Gentiles, who have not the Law, do by nature those things that are of the Law": which must be understood of things + pertaining to good morals. Therefore all the moral precepts of the Law belong to the law of nature. +
[37848] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicit apostolus, Rom. II, quod gentes, quae legem non +habent, naturaliter ea quae legis sunt, faciunt, quod oportet +intelligi de his quae pertinent ad bonos mores. Ergo omnia moralia +praecepta legis sunt de lege naturae.
+ I answer that, The moral precepts, distinct from the ceremonial and judicial precepts, are about things pertaining of their very nature + to good morals. Now since human morals depend on their relation to reason, which is the proper principle of human acts, those + morals are called good which accord with reason, and those are called bad which are discordant from reason. And as every judgment + of speculative reason proceeds from the natural knowledge of first principles, so + every judgment of practical reason proceeds from principles known naturally, as stated above ( + Q[94], AA[2],4): from which principles one may proceed in various ways to judge of various matters. For some matters connected with human + actions are so evident, that after very little consideration one is able at once to approve or disapprove of them by means + of these general first principles: while some matters cannot be the subject of judgment without much consideration of + the various circumstances, which all are not competent to do carefully, but only those who are wise: just as it is not possible + for all to consider the particular conclusions of sciences, but only for those who are versed in philosophy: and lastly there + are some matters of which man cannot judge unless he be helped by Divine instruction; such as the articles of faith. +
It is therefore evident that since the moral precepts are about matters which concern good morals; and since good morals + are those which are in accord with reason; and since also every judgment of human reason must needs by derived in some way + from natural reason; it follows, of necessity, that all the moral precepts belong to the law of nature; but not all in the + same way. For there are certain things which the natural reason of every man, of its own accord and at once, judges + to be done or not to be done: e.g. "Honor thy father and thy mother," and "Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal": and + these belong to the law of nature absolutely. And there are certain things which, after a more careful consideration, wise + men deem obligatory. Such belong to the law of nature, yet so that they need to be inculcated, the wiser teaching the less + wise: e.g. "Rise up before the hoary head, and honor the person of the aged man," and the like. And there are some things, + to + judge of which, human reason needs Divine instruction, whereby we are taught about the things of God: e.g. "Thou shalt not + make to thyself a graven thing, nor the likeness of anything; Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain." +
[37849] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod praecepta moralia, a caeremonialibus et iudicialibus +distincta, sunt de illis quae secundum se ad bonos mores pertinent. +Cum autem humani mores dicantur in ordine ad rationem, quae est +proprium principium humanorum actuum, illi mores dicuntur boni qui +rationi congruunt, mali autem qui a ratione discordant. Sicut autem +omne iudicium rationis speculativae procedit a naturali cognitione +primorum principiorum, ita etiam omne iudicium rationis practicae +procedit ex quibusdam principiis naturaliter cognitis, ut supra +dictum est. Ex quibus diversimode procedi potest ad iudicandum de +diversis. Quaedam enim sunt in humanis actibus adeo explicita quod +statim, cum modica consideratione, possunt approbari vel reprobari +per illa communia et prima principia. Quaedam vero sunt ad quorum +iudicium requiritur multa consideratio diversarum circumstantiarum, +quas considerare diligenter non est cuiuslibet, sed sapientum, +sicut considerare particulares conclusiones scientiarum non +pertinet ad omnes, sed ad solos philosophos. Quaedam vero sunt ad +quae diiudicanda indiget homo adiuvari per instructionem divinam, +sicut est circa credenda. Sic igitur patet quod, cum moralia +praecepta sint de his quae pertinent ad bonos mores; haec autem +sunt quae rationi congruunt; omne autem rationis humanae iudicium +aliqualiter a naturali ratione derivatur, necesse est quod omnia +praecepta moralia pertineant ad legem naturae, sed diversimode. +Quaedam enim sunt quae statim per se ratio naturalis cuiuslibet +hominis diiudicat esse facienda vel non facienda, sicut honora +patrem tuum et matrem tuam, et, non occides, non furtum facies. +Et huiusmodi sunt absolute de lege naturae. Quaedam vero sunt quae +subtiliori consideratione rationis a sapientibus iudicantur esse +observanda. Et ista sic sunt de lege naturae, ut tamen indigeant +disciplina, qua minores a sapientioribus instruantur, sicut illud, +coram cano capite consurge, et honora personam senis, et +alia huiusmodi. Quaedam vero sunt ad quae iudicanda ratio humana +indiget instructione divina, per quam erudimur de divinis, sicut +est illud, non facies tibi sculptile neque omnem similitudinem; +non assumes nomen Dei tui in vanum.
Reply to Objections This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
[37850] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 1 ad arg. Et per +hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the moral precepts of the Law are not about all the acts of virtue. For observance of the precepts of + the Old Law is called justification, according to + Ps. 118:8: "I will keep Thy justifications." But justification is the execution of justice. Therefore the moral precepts are only about + acts of justice. +
[37851] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad +secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praecepta moralia legis non +sint de omnibus actibus virtutum. Observatio enim praeceptorum +veteris legis iustificatio nominatur, secundum illud Psalmi CXVIII, +iustificationes tuas custodiam. Sed iustificatio est +executio iustitiae. Ergo praecepta moralia non sunt nisi de actibus +iustitiae.
+ Objection 2: Further, that which comes under a precept has the character of a duty. But the character of duty belongs to justice alone + and to none of the other virtues, for the proper act of justice consists in rendering to each one his due. Therefore the precepts + of the moral law are not about the acts of the other virtues, but only about the acts of justice. +
[37852] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +id quod cadit sub praecepto, habet rationem debiti. Sed ratio +debiti non pertinet ad alias virtutes nisi ad solam iustitiam, +cuius proprius actus est reddere unicuique debitum. Ergo praecepta +legis moralia non sunt de actibus aliarum virtutum, sed solum de +actibus iustitiae.
+ Objection 3: Further, every law is made for the common good, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 21). But of all the virtues justice alone regards + the common good, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore the moral precepts are only about the acts of justice. +
[37853] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +omnis lex ponitur propter bonum commune, ut dicit Isidorus. Sed +inter virtutes sola iustitia respicit bonum commune, ut philosophus +dicit, in V Ethic. Ergo praecepta moralia sunt solum de actibus +iustitiae.
+ On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Paradiso viii) that "a sin is a transgression of the Divine law, and a disobedience to the commandments + of heaven." But there are sins contrary to all the acts of virtue. Therefore it belongs to Divine law to direct all the acts + of virtue. +
[37854] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Ambrosius dicit, quod peccatum est transgressio legis +divinae, et caelestium inobedientia mandatorum. Sed peccata +contrariantur omnibus actibus virtutum. Ergo lex divina habet +ordinare de actibus omnium virtutum.
+ I answer that, Since the precepts of the Law are ordained to the common good, as stated above ( + Q[90], A[2]), the precepts of the Law must needs be diversified according to the various kinds of community: hence the Philosopher (Polit. + iv, 1) teaches that the laws which are made in a state which is ruled by a king must be different from the laws of a state + which is ruled by the people, or by a few powerful men in the state. Now human law is ordained + for one kind of community, and the Divine law for another kind. Because human law is ordained for the civil community, implying + mutual duties of man and his fellows: and men are ordained to one another by outward acts, whereby men live in communion with + one another. This life in common of man with man pertains to justice, whose proper function consists in directing the human + community. Wherefore human law makes precepts only about acts of justice; and if it commands acts of other virtues, this + is only in so far as they assume the nature of justice, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. v, 1). +
But the community for which the Divine law is ordained, is that of men in relation to God, either in this life or in the + life to come. And therefore the Divine law proposes precepts about all those matters whereby men are well ordered in their + relations to God. Now man is united to God by his reason or mind, in which is God's image. Wherefore the Divine law proposes + precepts about all those matters whereby human reason is well ordered. But this is effected by the acts of all the + virtues: since the intellectual virtues set in good order the acts of the reason in themselves: while the moral virtues set + in good order the acts of the reason in reference to the interior passions and exterior actions. It is therefore evident that + the Divine law fittingly proposes precepts about the acts of all the virtues: yet so that certain matters, without which the + order of virtue, which is the order of reason, cannot even exist, come under an obligation of precept; while other matters, + which pertain to the well-being of perfect virtue, come under an admonition of counsel. +
[37855] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, cum praecepta legis ordinentur ad bonum commune, +sicut supra habitum est, necesse est quod praecepta legis +diversificentur secundum diversos modos communitatum, unde et +philosophus, in sua politica, docet quod alias leges oportet +statuere in civitate quae regitur rege, et alias in ea quae regitur +per populum, vel per aliquos potentes de civitate. Est autem alius +modus communitatis ad quam ordinatur lex humana, et ad quam +ordinatur lex divina. Lex enim humana ordinatur ad communitatem +civilem, quae est hominum ad invicem. Homines autem ordinantur ad +invicem per exteriores actus, quibus homines sibi invicem +communicant. Huiusmodi autem communicatio pertinet ad rationem +iustitiae, quae est proprie directiva communitatis humanae. Et ideo +lex humana non proponit praecepta nisi de actibus iustitiae; et si +praecipiat actus aliarum virtutum, hoc non est nisi inquantum +assumunt rationem iustitiae; ut patet per philosophum, in V Ethic. +Sed communitas ad quam ordinat lex divina, est hominum ad Deum, vel +in praesenti vel in futura vita. Et ideo lex divina praecepta +proponit de omnibus illis per quae homines bene ordinentur ad +communicationem cum Deo. Homo autem Deo coniungitur ratione, sive +mente, in qua est Dei imago. Et ideo lex divina praecepta proponit +de omnibus illis per quae ratio hominis est bene ordinata. Hoc +autem contingit per actus omnium virtutum, nam virtutes +intellectuales ordinant bene actus rationis in seipsis; virtutes +autem morales ordinant bene actus rationis circa interiores +passiones et exteriores operationes. Et ideo manifestum est quod +lex divina convenienter proponit praecepta de actibus omnium +virtutum, ita tamen quod quaedam, sine quibus ordo virtutis, qui +est ordo rationis, observari non potest, cadunt sub obligatione +praecepti; quaedam vero, quae pertinent ad bene esse virtutis +perfectae, cadunt sub admonitione consilii.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The fulfilment of the commandments of the Law, even of those which are about the acts of the other virtues, has the character + of justification, inasmuch as it is just that man should obey God: or again, inasmuch as it is just that all that belongs + to man should be subject to reason. +
[37856] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod adimpletio mandatorum legis etiam quae sunt de +actibus aliarum virtutum, habet rationem iustificationis, inquantum +iustum est ut homo obediat Deo. Vel etiam inquantum iustum est quod +omnia quae sunt hominis, rationi subdantur.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Justice properly so called regards the duty of one man to another: but all the other virtues regard the duty of the lower + powers to reason. It is in relation to this latter duty that the Philosopher speaks (Ethic. v, 11) of a kind of metaphorical + justice. +
[37857] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod iustitia proprie dicta attendit debitum unius hominis +ad alium, sed in omnibus aliis virtutibus attenditur debitum +inferiorum virium ad rationem. Et secundum rationem huius debiti, +philosophus assignat, in V Ethic., quandam iustitiam +metaphoricam.
Reply to Objection 3The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said about the different kinds of community.
[37858] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +patet responsio per ea quae dicta sunt de diversitate +communitatis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that not all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reducible to the ten precepts of the decalogue. For the + first and principal precepts of the Law are, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God," and "Thou shalt love thy neighbor," as stated + in + Mat. 22:37,39. But these two are not contained in the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore not all the moral precepts are contained in the + precepts of the decalogue. +
[37859] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnia praecepta moralia veteris +legis reducantur ad decem praecepta Decalogi. Prima enim et +principalia legis praecepta sunt, diliges dominum Deum tuum, et, +diliges proximum tuum, ut habetur Matth. XXII. Sed ista duo non +continentur in praeceptis Decalogi. Ergo non omnia praecepta +moralia continentur in praeceptis Decalogi.
+ Objection 2: Further, the moral precepts are not reducible to the ceremonial precepts, but rather vice versa. But among the precepts of + the decalogue, one is ceremonial, viz. "Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath-day." Therefore the moral precepts are not + reducible to all the precepts of the decalogue. +
[37860] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +praecepta moralia non reducuntur ad praecepta caeremonialia, sed +potius e converso. Sed inter praecepta Decalogi est unum +caeremoniale, scilicet, memento ut diem sabbati sanctifices. +Ergo praecepta moralia non reducuntur ad omnia praecepta +Decalogi.
+ Objection 3: Further, the moral precepts are about all the acts of virtue. But among the precepts of the decalogue are only such as regard + acts of justice; as may be seen by going through them all. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue do not include all the + moral precepts. +
[37861] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +praecepta moralia sunt de omnibus actibus virtutum. Sed inter +praecepta Decalogi ponuntur sola praecepta pertinentia ad actus +iustitiae; ut patet discurrenti per singula. Ergo praecepta +Decalogi non continent omnia praecepta moralia.
+ On the contrary, The gloss on + Mat. 5:11: "Blessed are ye when they shall revile you," etc. says that "Moses, after propounding the ten precepts, set them out in + detail." Therefore all the precepts of the Law are so many parts of the precepts of the decalogue. +
[37862] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod, Matth. V, super illud, beati estis cum +maledixerint etc., dicit Glossa quod Moyses, decem praecepta +proponens, postea per partes explicat. Ergo omnia praecepta +legis sunt quaedam partes praeceptorum Decalogi.
+ I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue differ from the other precepts of the Law, in the fact that God Himself is said to have given + the precepts of the decalogue; whereas He gave the other precepts to the people through Moses. Wherefore the decalogue includes + those precepts the knowledge of which man has immediately from God. Such are those which with but slight reflection can be + gathered at once from the first general principles: and those also which become known + to man immediately through divinely infused faith. Consequently two kinds of precepts are not reckoned among the precepts + of the decalogue: viz. first general principles, for they need no further promulgation after being once imprinted on the natural + reason to which they are self-evident; as, for instance, that one should do evil to no man, and other similar principles: + and again those which the careful reflection of wise men shows to be in accord with reason; since the people receive these + principles from God, through being taught by wise men. Nevertheless both kinds of precepts are contained in the precepts of + the decalogue; yet in different ways. For the first general principles are contained in them, as principles in their proximate + conclusions; while those which are known through wise men are contained, conversely, as conclusions in their principles. +
[37863] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod praecepta Decalogi ab aliis praeceptis legis +differunt in hoc, quod praecepta Decalogi per seipsum Deus dicitur +populo proposuisse; alia vero praecepta proposuit populo per +Moysen. Illa ergo praecepta ad Decalogum pertinent, quorum notitiam +homo habet per seipsum a Deo. Huiusmodi vero sunt illa quae statim +ex principiis communibus primis cognosci possunt modica +consideratione, et iterum illa quae statim ex fide divinitus infusa +innotescunt. Inter praecepta ergo Decalogi non computantur duo +genera praeceptorum, illa scilicet quae sunt prima et communia, +quorum non oportet aliam editionem esse nisi quod sunt scripta in +ratione naturali quasi per se nota, sicut quod nulli debet homo +malefacere, et alia huiusmodi; et iterum illa quae per diligentem +inquisitionem sapientum inveniuntur rationi convenire, haec enim +proveniunt a Deo ad populum mediante disciplina sapientum. Utraque +tamen horum praeceptorum continentur in praeceptis Decalogi, sed +diversimode. Nam illa quae sunt prima et communia, continentur in +eis sicut principia in conclusionibus proximis, illa vero quae per +sapientes cognoscuntur, continentur in eis, e converso, sicut +conclusiones in principiis.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Those two principles are the first general principles of the natural law, and are self-evident to human reason, either through + nature or through faith. Wherefore all the precepts of the decalogue are referred to these, as conclusions to general principles. +
[37864] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod illa duo praecepta sunt prima et communia +praecepta legis naturae, quae sunt per se nota rationi humanae, vel +per naturam vel per fidem. Et ideo omnia praecepta Decalogi ad illa +duo referuntur sicut conclusiones ad principia communia.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The precept of the Sabbath observance is moral in one respect, in so far as it commands man to give some time to the things + of God, according to + Ps. 45:11: "Be still and see that I am God." In this respect it is placed among the precepts of the decalogue: but not as to the fixing + of the time, in which respect it is a ceremonial precept. +
[37865] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod praeceptum de observatione sabbati est secundum +aliquid morale, inquantum scilicet per hoc praecipitur quod homo +aliquo tempore vacet rebus divinis; secundum illud Psalmi XLV, +vacate, et videte quoniam ego sum Deus. Et secundum hoc, +inter praecepta Decalogi computatur. Non autem quantum ad +taxationem temporis, quia secundum hoc est caeremoniale.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The notion of duty is not so patent in the other virtues as it is in justice. Hence the precepts about the acts of the other + virtues are not so well known to the people as are the precepts about acts of justice. Wherefore the acts of justice especially + come under the precepts of the decalogue, which are the primary elements of the Law. +
[37866] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio debiti in aliis virtutibus est magis latens +quam in iustitia. Et ideo praecepta de actibus aliarum virtutum non +sunt ita nota populo sicut praecepta de actibus iustitiae. Et +propter hoc actus iustitiae specialiter cadunt sub praeceptis +Decalogi, quae sunt prima legis elementa.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably distinguished from one another. For worship is a virtue distinct + from faith. Now the precepts are about acts of virtue. But that which is said at the beginning of the decalogue, "Thou shalt + not have strange gods before Me," belongs to faith: and that which is added, "Thou shalt not make . . . any graven thing," + etc. belongs to worship. Therefore these are not one precept, as Augustine asserts (Qq. + in Exod. qu. lxxi), but two. +
[37867] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter praecepta Decalogi +distinguantur. Latria enim est alia virtus a fide. Sed praecepta +dantur de actibus virtutum. Sed hoc quod dicitur in principio +Decalogi, non habebis deos alienos coram me, pertinet ad fidem, +quod autem subditur, non facies sculptile etc., pertinet ad +latriam. Ergo sunt duo praecepta, et non unum, sicut Augustinus +dicit.
+ Objection 2: Further, the affirmative precepts in the Law are distinct from the negative precepts; e.g. "Honor thy father and thy mother," + and, "Thou shalt not kill." But this, "I am the Lord thy God," is affirmative: and that which follows, "Thou shalt not have + strange gods before Me," is negative. Therefore these are two precepts, and do not, as Augustine says (Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi), + make one. +
[37868] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +praecepta affirmativa in lege distinguuntur a negativis, sicut, +honora patrem et matrem, et, non occides. Sed hoc quod dicitur, ego +sum dominus Deus tuus, est affirmativum, quod autem subditur, non +habebis deos alienos coram me, est negativum. Ergo sunt duo +praecepta, et non continentur sub uno, ut Augustinus ponit.
+ Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says ( + Rom. 7:7): "I had not known concupiscence, if the Law did not say: 'Thou shalt not covet.'" Hence it seems that this precept, "Thou + shalt not covet," is one precept; and, therefore, should not be divided into two. +
[37869] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +apostolus, ad Rom. VII, dicit, concupiscentiam nesciebam, nisi +lex diceret, non concupisces. Et sic videtur quod hoc +praeceptum, non concupisces, sit unum praeceptum. Non ergo debet +distingui in duo.
+ On the contrary, stands the authority of Augustine who, in commenting on Exodus (Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi) distinguishes three precepts as referring + to God, and seven as referring to our neighbor. +
[37870] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est auctoritas Augustini, in Glossa super Exod., ubi ponit tria +praecepta pertinentia ad Deum, et septem ad proximum.
+ I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue are differently divided by different authorities. For Hesychius commenting on + Lev. 26:26, "Ten women shall bake your bread in one oven," says that the precept of the Sabbath-day observance is not one of the ten + precepts, because its observance, in the letter, is not binding for all time. But he distinguishes four precepts pertaining + to God, the first being, "I am the Lord thy God"; the second, "Thou shalt + not have strange gods before Me," (thus also Jerome distinguishes these two precepts, in his commentary on + Osee 10:10, "On thy" [Vulg.: "their"] "two iniquities"); the third precept according to him is, "Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven + thing"; and the fourth, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain." He states that there are six precepts + pertaining to our neighbor; the first, "Honor thy father and thy mother"; the second, "Thou shalt not kill"; + the third, "Thou shalt not commit adultery"; the fourth, "Thou shalt not steal"; the fifth, "Thou shalt not bear false witness"; + the sixth, "Thou shalt not covet." +
But, in the first place, it seems unbecoming for the precept of the Sabbath-day observance to be put among the precepts of + the decalogue, if it nowise belonged to the decalogue. Secondly, because, since it is written ( + Mat. 6:24), "No man can serve two masters," the two statements, "I am the Lord thy God," and, "Thou shalt not have strange gods before + Me" seem to be of the same nature and to form one precept. Hence Origen (Hom. viii in Exod.) who also + distinguishes four precepts as referring to God, unites these two under one precept; and reckons in the second place, "Thou + shalt not make . . . any graven thing"; as third, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain"; and as fourth, + "Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath-day." The other six he reckons in the same way as Hesychius. +
Since, however, the making of graven things or the likeness of anything is not forbidden except as to the point of their + being worshipped as gods---for God commanded an image of the Seraphim [Vulg.: Cherubim] to be made and placed in the tabernacle, + as related in + Ex. 25:18---Augustine more fittingly unites these two, "Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me," and, "Thou shalt not make . . + . any graven thing," into one precept. Likewise to covet another's + wife, for the purpose of carnal knowledge, belongs to the concupiscence of the flesh; whereas, to covet other things, which + are desired for the purpose of possession, belongs to the concupiscence of the eyes; wherefore Augustine reckons as distinct + precepts, that which forbids the coveting of another's goods, and that which prohibits the coveting of another's wife. Thus + he distinguishes three precepts as referring to God, and seven as referring to our neighbor. And this is better. +
[37871] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod praecepta Decalogi diversimode a diversis +distinguuntur. Hesychius enim, Levit. XXVI, super illud, decem +mulieres in uno clibano coquunt panes, dicit praeceptum de +observatione sabbati non esse de decem praeceptis, quia non est +observandum, secundum litteram, secundum omne tempus. Distinguit +tamen quatuor praecepta pertinentia ad Deum, ut primum sit, ego sum +dominus Deus tuus; secundum sit, non habebis deos alienos coram me +(et sic etiam distinguit haec duo Hieronymus, Osee X, super illud, +propter duas iniquitates tuas); tertium vero praeceptum esse dicit, +non facies tibi sculptile; quartum vero, non assumes nomen Dei tui +in vanum. Pertinentia vero ad proximum dicit esse sex, ut primum +sit, honora patrem tuum et matrem tuam; secundum, non occides; +tertium, non moechaberis; quartum, non furtum facies; quintum, non +falsum testimonium dices; sextum, non concupisces. Sed primo hoc +videtur inconveniens, quod praeceptum de observatione sabbati +praeceptis Decalogi interponatur, si nullo modo ad Decalogum +pertineat. Secundo quia, cum scriptum sit Matth. VI, nemo potest +duobus dominis servire, eiusdem rationis esse videtur, et sub eodem +praecepto cadere, ego sum dominus Deus tuus, et, non habebis deos +alienos. Unde Origenes, distinguens etiam quatuor praecepta +ordinantia ad Deum, ponit ista duo pro uno praecepto; secundum vero +ponit, non facies sculptile; tertium, non assumes nomen Dei tui in +vanum; quartum, memento ut diem sabbati sanctifices. Alia vero sex +ponit sicut Hesychius. Sed quia facere sculptile vel similitudinem +non est prohibitum nisi secundum hoc, ut non colantur pro diis (nam +et in tabernaculo Deus praecepit fieri imaginem Seraphim, ut +habetur Exod. XXV); convenientius Augustinus ponit sub uno +praecepto, non habebis deos alienos, et, non facies sculptile. +Similiter etiam concupiscentia uxoris alienae ad commixtionem, +pertinet ad concupiscentiam carnis; concupiscentiae autem aliarum +rerum, quae desiderantur ad possidendum, pertinent ad +concupiscentiam oculorum; unde etiam Augustinus ponit duo praecepta +de non concupiscendo rem alienam, et uxorem alienam. Et sic ponit +tria praecepta in ordine ad Deum, et septem in ordine ad proximum. +Et hoc melius est.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Worship is merely a declaration of faith: wherefore the precepts about worship should not be reckoned as distinct from those + about faith. Nevertheless precepts should be given about worship rather than about faith, because the precept about faith + is presupposed to the precepts of the decalogue, as is also the precept of charity. For just as the first general principles + of the natural law are self-evident to a subject having natural reason, and need no + promulgation; so also to believe in God is a first and self-evident principle to a subject possessed of faith: "for he that + cometh to God, must believe that He is" ( + Heb. 11:6). Hence it needs no other promulgation that the infusion of faith. +
[37872] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod latria non est nisi quaedam protestatio fidei, +unde non sunt alia praecepta danda de latria, et alia de fide. +Potius tamen sunt danda de latria quam de fide, quia praeceptum +fidei praesupponitur ad praecepta Decalogi, sicut praeceptum +dilectionis. Sicut enim prima praecepta communia legis naturae sunt +per se nota habenti rationem naturalem, et promulgatione non +indigent; ita etiam et hoc quod est credere in Deum, est primum et +per se notum ei qui habet fidem, accedentem enim ad Deum oportet +credere quia est, ut dicitur ad Heb. XI. Et ideo non indiget alia +promulgatione nisi infusione fidei.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The affirmative precepts are distinct from the negative, when one is not comprised in the other: thus that man should honor + his parents does not include that he should not kill another man; nor does the latter include the former. But when an affirmative + precept is included in a negative, or vice versa, we do not find that two distinct precepts are given: thus there is not one + precept saying that "Thou shalt not steal," and another binding one to keep + another's property intact, or to give it back to its owner. In the same way there are not different precepts about believing + in God, and about not believing in strange gods. +
[37873] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod praecepta affirmativa distinguuntur a negativis, +quando unum non comprehenditur in alio, sicut in honoratione +parentum non includitur quod nullus homo occidatur, nec e converso. +Sed quando affirmativum comprehenditur in negativo vel e converso, +non dantur super hoc diversa praecepta, sicut non datur aliud +praeceptum de hoc quod est, non furtum facies, et de hoc quod est +conservare rem alienam, vel restituere eam. Et eadem ratione non +sunt diversa praecepta de credendo in Deum, et de hoc quod non +credatur in alienos deos.
+ Reply to Objection 3: All covetousness has one common ratio: and therefore the Apostle speaks of the commandment about covetousness as though it + were one. But because there are various special kinds of covetousness, therefore Augustine distinguishes different prohibitions + against coveting: for covetousness differs specifically in respect of the diversity of actions or things coveted, as the Philosopher + says (Ethic. x, 5). +
[37874] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod omnis concupiscentia convenit in una communi ratione, +et ideo apostolus singulariter de mandato concupiscendi loquitur. +Quia tamen in speciali diversae sunt rationes concupiscendi, ideo +Augustinus distinguit diversa praecepta de non concupiscendo, +differunt enim specie concupiscentiae secundum diversitatem +actionum vel concupiscibilium, ut philosophus dicit, in X +Ethic.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably set forth. Because sin, as stated by Ambrose (De Paradiso + viii), is "a transgression of the Divine law and a disobedience to the commandments of heaven." But sins are distinguished + according as man sins against God, or his neighbor, or himself. Since, then, the decalogue does not include any precepts directing + man in his relations to himself, but only such as direct him in his relations to God and + himself, it seems that the precepts of the decalogue are insufficiently enumerated. +
[37875] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter praecepta Decalogi +enumerentur. Peccatum enim, ut Ambrosius dicit, est transgressio +legis divinae, et caelestium inobedientia mandatorum. Sed +peccata distinguuntur per hoc quod homo peccat vel in Deum, vel in +proximum, vel in seipsum. Cum igitur in praeceptis Decalogi non +ponantur aliqua praecepta ordinantia hominem ad seipsum, sed solum +ordinantia ipsum ad Deum et proximum; videtur quod insufficiens sit +enumeratio praeceptorum Decalogi.
+ Objection 2: Further, just as the Sabbath-day observance pertained to the worship of God, so also did the observance of other solemnities, + and the offering of sacrifices. But the decalogue contains a precept about the Sabbath-day observance. Therefore it should + contain others also, pertaining to the other solemnities, and to the sacrificial rite. +
[37876] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +sicut ad cultum Dei pertinebat observatio sabbati, ita etiam +observatio aliarum solemnitatum, et immolatio sacrificiorum. Sed +inter praecepta Decalogi est unum pertinens ad observantiam +sabbati. Ergo etiam debent esse aliqua pertinentia ad alias +solemnitates, et ad ritum sacrificiorum.
+ Objection 3: Further, as sins against God include the sin of perjury, so also do they include blasphemy, or other ways of lying against + the teaching of God. But there is a precept forbidding perjury, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain." + Therefore there should be also a precept of the decalogue forbidding blasphemy and false doctrine. +
[37877] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sicut contra Deum peccare contingit periurando, ita etiam +blasphemando, vel alias contra doctrinam divinam mentiendo. Sed +ponitur unum praeceptum prohibens periurium, cum dicitur, non +assumes nomen Dei tui in vanum. Ergo peccatum blasphemiae, et +falsae doctrinae, debent aliquo praecepto Decalogi prohiberi.
+ Objection 4: Further, just as man has a natural affection for his parents, so has he also for his children. Moreover the commandment of + charity extends to all our neighbors. Now the precepts of the decalogue are ordained unto charity, according to + 1 Tim. 1:5: "The end of the commandment is charity." Therefore as there is a precept referring to parents, so should there have been + some precepts referring to children and other neighbors. +
[37878] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 arg. 4 Praeterea, +sicut homo naturalem dilectionem habet ad parentes, ita etiam ad +filios. Mandatum etiam caritatis ad omnes proximos extenditur. Sed +praecepta Decalogi ordinantur ad caritatem; secundum illud I Tim. +I, finis praecepti caritas est. Ergo sicut ponitur quoddam +praeceptum pertinens ad parentes, ita etiam debuerunt poni aliqua +praecepta pertinentia ad filios et ad alios proximos.
+ Objection 5: Further, in every kind of sin, it is possible to sin in thought or in deed. But in some kinds of sin, namely in theft and + adultery, the prohibition of sins of deed, when it is said, "Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not steal," is distinct + from the prohibition of the sin of thought, when it is said, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods," and, "Thou shalt + not covet thy neighbor's wife." Therefore the same should have been done in regard to the + sins of homicide and false witness. +
[37879] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 arg. 5 Praeterea, +in quolibet genere peccati contingit peccare corde et opere. Sed in +quibusdam generibus peccatorum, scilicet in furto et adulterio, +seorsum prohibetur peccatum operis, cum dicitur, non moechaberis, +non furtum facies; et seorsum peccatum cordis, cum dicitur, non +concupisces rem proximi tui, et, non concupisces uxorem proximi +tui. Ergo etiam idem debuit poni in peccato homicidii et falsi +testimonii.
+ Objection 6: Further, just as sin happens through disorder of the concupiscible faculty, so does it arise through disorder of the irascible + part. But some precepts forbid inordinate concupiscence, when it is said, "Thou shalt not covet." Therefore the decalogue + should have included some precepts forbidding the disorders of the irascible faculty. Therefore it seems that the ten precepts + of the decalogue are unfittingly enumerated. +
[37880] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 arg. 6 Praeterea, +sicut contingit peccatum provenire ex inordinatione +concupiscibilis, ita etiam ex inordinatione irascibilis. Sed +quibusdam praeceptis prohibetur inordinata concupiscentia, cum +dicitur, non concupisces. Ergo etiam aliqua praecepta in Decalogo +debuerunt poni per quae prohiberetur inordinatio irascibilis. Non +ergo videtur quod convenienter decem praecepta Decalogi +enumerentur.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Dt. 4:13): "He shewed you His covenant, which He commanded you to do, and the ten words that He wrote in two tablets of stone." +
[37881] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Deut. IV, ostendit vobis pactum suum, quod +praecepit ut faceretis; et decem verba quae scripsit in duabus +tabulis lapideis.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[2]), just as the precepts of human law direct man in his relations to the human community, so the precepts of the Divine law + direct man in his relations to a community or commonwealth of men under God. Now in order that any man may dwell aright in + a community, two things are required: the first is that he behave well to the head of the community; the other is that he + behave well to those who are his fellows and + partners in the community. It is therefore necessary that the Divine law should contain in the first place precepts ordering + man in his relations to God; and in the second place, other precepts ordering man in his relations to other men who are his + neighbors and live with him under God. +
Now man owes three things to the head of the community: first, fidelity; secondly, reverence; thirdly, service. Fidelity + to his master consists in his not giving sovereign honor to another: and this is the sense of the first commandment, in the + words "Thou shalt not have strange gods." Reverence to his master requires that he should do nothing injurious to him: and + this is conveyed by the second commandment, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain." Service is + due to the master in return for the benefits which his subjects receive from him: and to this belongs the third commandment + of the sanctification of the Sabbath in memory of the creation of all things. +
To his neighbors a man behaves himself well both in particular and in general. In particular, as to those to whom he is indebted, + by paying his debts: and in this sense is to be taken the commandment about honoring one's parents. In general, as to all + men, by doing harm to none, either by deed, or by word, or by thought. By deed, harm is done to one's neighbor---sometimes + in his person, i.e. as to his personal existence; and this is forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt not kill": + sometimes in a person united to him, as to the propagation of offspring; and this is prohibited by the words, "Thou shalt + not commit adultery": sometimes in his possessions, which are directed to both the aforesaid; and with this regard to this + it is said, "Thou shalt not steal." Harm done by word is forbidden when it is said, "Thou shalt not bear false witness against + thy neighbor": harm done by thought is forbidden in the words, "Thou shalt not covet." +
The three precepts that direct man in his behavior towards God may also be differentiated in this same way. For the first + refers to deeds; wherefore it is said, "Thou shalt not make . . . a graven thing": the second, to words; wherefore it is said, + "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain": the third, to thoughts; because the sanctification of the Sabbath, + as the subject of a moral precept, requires repose of the heart in God. Or, according to Augustine (In + Ps. + 32 + : Conc. 1), by the first commandment we reverence the unity of the First Principle; by the second, the Divine truth; by the + third, His goodness whereby we are sanctified, and wherein we rest as in our last end. +
[37882] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, sicut praecepta legis +humanae ordinant hominem ad communitatem humanam, ita praecepta +legis divinae ordinant hominem ad quandam communitatem seu +rempublicam hominum sub Deo. Ad hoc autem quod aliquis in aliqua +communitate bene commoretur, duo requiruntur, quorum primum est ut +bene se habeat ad eum qui praeest communitati; aliud autem est ut +homo bene se habeat ad alios communitatis consocios et +comparticipes. Oportet igitur quod in lege divina primo ferantur +quaedam praecepta ordinantia hominem ad Deum; et deinde alia +praecepta ordinantia hominem ad alios proximos simul conviventes +sub Deo. Principi autem communitatis tria debet homo, primo quidem, +fidelitatem; secundo, reverentiam; tertio, famulatum. Fidelitas +quidem ad dominum in hoc consistit, ut honorem principatus ad alium +non deferat. Et quantum ad hoc accipitur primum praeceptum, cum +dicitur, non habebis deos alienos. Reverentia autem ad dominum +requiritur ut nihil iniuriosum in eum committatur. Et quantum ad +hoc accipitur secundum praeceptum, quod est, non assumes nomen +domini Dei tui in vanum. Famulatus autem debetur domino in +recompensationem beneficiorum quae ab ipso percipiunt subditi. Et +ad hoc pertinet tertium praeceptum, de sanctificatione sabbati in +memoriam creationis rerum. Ad proximos autem aliquis bene se habet +et specialiter, et generaliter. Specialiter quidem, quantum ad +illos quorum est debitor, ut eis debitum reddat. Et quantum ad hoc +accipitur praeceptum de honoratione parentum. Generaliter autem, +quantum ad omnes, ut nulli nocumentum inferatur, neque opere neque +ore neque corde. Opere quidem infertur nocumentum proximo, +quandoque quidem in personam propriam, quantum ad consistentiam +scilicet personae. Et hoc prohibetur per hoc quod dicitur, non +occides. Quandoque autem in personam coniunctam quantum ad +propagationem prolis. Et hoc prohibetur cum dicitur, non +moechaberis. Quandoque autem in rem possessam, quae ordinatur ad +utrumque. Et quantum ad hoc dicitur, non furtum facies. Nocumentum +autem oris prohibetur cum dicitur, non loqueris contra proximum +tuum falsum testimonium. Nocumentum autem cordis prohibetur cum +dicitur, non concupisces. Et secundum hanc etiam differentiam +possent distingui tria praecepta ordinantia in Deum. Quorum primum +pertinet ad opus, unde ibi dicitur, non facies sculptile. Secundum +ad os, unde dicitur, non assumes nomen Dei tui in vanum. Tertium +pertinet ad cor, quia in sanctificatione sabbati, secundum quod est +morale praeceptum, praecipitur quies cordis in Deum. Vel, secundum +Augustinum, per primum praeceptum reveremur unitatem primi +principii; per secundum, veritatem divinam; per tertium, eius +bonitatem, qua sanctificamur, et in qua quiescimus sicut in +fine.
+ Reply to Objection 1: This objection may be answered in two ways. First, because the precepts of the decalogue can be reduced to the precepts of + charity. Now there was need for man to receive a precept about loving God and his neighbor, because in this respect the natural + law had become obscured on account of sin: but not about the duty of loving oneself, because in this respect the natural law + retained its vigor: or again, because love of oneself is contained in the love + of God and of one's neighbor: since true self-love consists in directing oneself to God. And for this reason the decalogue + includes those precepts only which refer to our neighbor and to God. +
Secondly, it may be answered that the precepts of the decalogue are those which the people received from God immediately; + wherefore it is written ( + Dt. 10:4): "He wrote in the tables, according as He had written before, the ten words, which the Lord spoke to you." Hence the precepts + of the decalogue need to be such as the people can understand at once. Now a precept implies the notion of duty. But it is + easy for a man, especially for a believer, to understand + that, of necessity, he owes certain duties to God and to his neighbor. But that, in matters which regard himself and not another, + man has, of necessity, certain duties to himself, is not so evident: for, at the first glance, it seems that everyone is free + in matters that concern himself. And therefore the precepts which prohibit disorders of a man with regard to himself, reach + the people through the instruction of men who are versed through the instruction of men who are versed in such matters; + and, consequently, they are not contained in the decalogue. +
[37883] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo potest responderi dupliciter. Primo quidem, quia praecepta +Decalogi referuntur ad praecepta dilectionis. Fuit autem dandum +praeceptum homini de dilectione Dei et proximi, quia quantum ad hoc +lex naturalis obscurata erat propter peccatum, non autem quantum ad +dilectionem sui ipsius, quia quantum ad hoc lex naturalis vigebat. +Vel quia etiam dilectio sui ipsius includitur in dilectione Dei et +proximi, in hoc enim homo vere se diligit, quod se ordinat in Deum. +Et ideo etiam in praeceptis Decalogi ponuntur solum praecepta +pertinentia ad proximum et ad Deum. Aliter potest dici quod +praecepta Decalogi sunt illa quae immediate populus recepit a Deo, +unde dicitur Deut. X, scripsit in tabulis, iuxta id quod prius +scripserat, verba decem, quae locutus est ad vos dominus. Unde +oportet praecepta Decalogi talia esse quae statim in mente populi +cadere possunt. Praeceptum autem habet rationem debiti. Quod autem +homo ex necessitate debeat aliquid Deo vel proximo, hoc de facili +cadit in conceptione hominis, et praecipue fidelis. Sed quod +aliquid ex necessitate sit debitum homini de his quae pertinent ad +seipsum et non ad alium, hoc non ita in promptu apparet, videtur +enim primo aspectu quod quilibet sit liber in his quae ad ipsum +pertinent. Et ideo praecepta quibus prohibentur inordinationes +hominis ad seipsum, perveniunt ad populum mediante instructione +sapientum. Unde non pertinent ad Decalogum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: All the solemnities of the Old Law were instituted in celebration of some Divine favor, either in memory of past favors, + or in sign of some favor to come: in like manner all the sacrifices were offered up with the same purpose. Now of all the + Divine favors to be commemorated the chief was that of the Creation, which was called to mind by the sanctification of the + Sabbath; wherefore the reason for this precept is given in + Ex. + 20:11 + : "In six days the Lord made heaven and earth," etc. And of all future blessings, the chief and final was the repose of the + mind in God, either, in the present life, by grace, or, in the future life, by glory; which repose was also foreshadowed in + the Sabbath-day observance: wherefore it is written ( + Is. 58:13): "If thou turn away thy foot from the Sabbath, from doing thy own will in My holy day, and call the Sabbath delightful, + and the holy of the Lord + glorious." Because these favors first and chiefly are borne in mind by men, especially by the faithful. But other solemnities + were celebrated on account of certain particular favors temporal and transitory, such as the celebration of the Passover in + memory of the past favor of the delivery from Egypt, and as a sign of the future Passion of Christ, which though temporal + and transitory, brought us to the repose of the spiritual Sabbath. Consequently, the Sabbath alone, and none of the other + solemnities and sacrifices, is mentioned in the precepts of the decalogue. +
[37884] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod omnes solemnitates legis veteris sunt institutae in +commemorationem alicuius divini beneficii vel praeteriti +commemorati, vel futuri praefigurati. Et similiter propter hoc +omnia sacrificia offerebantur. Inter omnia autem beneficia Dei +commemoranda, primum et praecipuum erat beneficium creationis, quod +commemoratur in sanctificatione sabbati, unde Exod. XX pro ratione +huius praecepti ponitur, sex enim diebus fecit Deus caelum et +terram et cetera. Inter omnia autem futura beneficia, quae +erant praefiguranda, praecipuum et finale erat quies mentis in Deo, +vel in praesenti per gratiam, vel in futuro per gloriam, quae etiam +figurabatur per observantiam sabbati; unde dicitur Isaiae LVIII, +si averteris a sabbato pedem tuum, facere voluntatem tuam in die +sancto meo, et vocaveris sabbatum delicatum, et sanctum domini +gloriosum. Haec enim beneficia primo et principaliter sunt in +mente hominum, maxime fidelium. Aliae vero solemnitates celebrantur +propter aliqua particularia beneficia temporaliter transeuntia, +sicut celebratio phase propter beneficium praeteritae liberationis +ex Aegypto, et propter futuram passionem Christi, quae temporaliter +transivit, inducens nos in quietem sabbati spiritualis. Et ideo, +praetermissis omnibus aliis solemnitatibus et sacrificiis, de solo +sabbato fiebat mentio inter praecepta Decalogi.
+ Reply to Objection 3: As the Apostle says ( + Heb. 6:16), "men swear by one greater than themselves; and an oath for confirmation is the end of all their controversy." Hence, since + oaths are common to all, inordinate swearing is the matter of a special prohibition by a precept of the decalogue. According + to one interpretation, however, the words, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain," are a prohibition of + false doctrine, for one gloss + expounds them thus: "Thou shalt not say that Christ is a creature." +
[37885] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut apostolus dicit, ad Heb. VI, homines per +maiorem sui iurant, et omnis controversiae eorum finis ad +confirmationem est iuramentum. Et ideo, quia iuramentum est +omnibus commune, propter hoc prohibitio inordinationis circa +iuramentum, specialiter praecepto Decalogi prohibetur. Peccatum +vero falsae doctrinae non pertinet nisi ad paucos, unde non +oportebat ut de hoc fieret mentio inter praecepta Decalogi. Quamvis +etiam, quantum ad aliquem intellectum, in hoc quod dicitur, non +assumes nomen Dei tui in vanum, prohibeatur falsitas doctrinae, una +enim Glossa exponit, non dices Christum esse creaturam.
+ Reply to Objection 4: That a man should not do harm to anyone is an immediate dictate of his natural reason: and therefore the precepts that forbid + the doing of harm are binding on all men. But it is not an immediate dictate of natural reason that a man should do one thing + in return for another, unless he happen to be indebted to someone. Now a son's debt to his father is so evident that one cannot + get away from it by denying it: since the father is the principle of + generation and being, and also of upbringing and teaching. Wherefore the decalogue does not prescribe deeds of kindness or + service to be done to anyone except to one's parents. On the other hand parents do not seem to be indebted to their children + for any favors received, but rather the reverse is the case. Again, a child is a part of his father; and "parents love their + children as being a part of themselves," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 12). Hence, just as the decalogue contains + no + ordinance as to man's behavior towards himself, so, for the same reason, it includes no precept about loving one's children. +
[37886] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod statim ratio naturalis homini dictat quod nulli +iniuriam faciat, et ideo praecepta prohibentia nocumentum, +extendunt se ad omnes. Sed ratio naturalis non statim dictat quod +aliquid sit pro alio faciendum, nisi cui homo aliquid debet. +Debitum autem filii ad patrem adeo est manifestum quod nulla +tergiversatione potest negari, eo quod pater est principium +generationis et esse, et insuper educationis et doctrinae. Et ideo +non ponitur sub praecepto Decalogi ut aliquod beneficium vel +obsequium alicui impendatur nisi parentibus. Parentes autem non +videntur esse debitores filiis propter aliqua beneficia suscepta, +sed potius e converso. Filius etiam est aliquid patris; et patres +amant filios ut aliquid ipsorum, sicut dicit philosophus, in VIII +Ethic. Unde eisdem rationibus non ponuntur aliqua praecepta +Decalogi pertinentia ad amorem filiorum, sicut neque etiam aliqua +ordinantia hominem ad seipsum.
+ Reply to Objection 5: The pleasure of adultery and the usefulness of wealth, in so far as they have the character of pleasurable or useful good, + are of themselves, objects of appetite: and for this reason they needed to be forbidden not only in the deed but also in the + desire. But murder and falsehood are, of themselves, objects of repulsion (since it is natural for man to love his neighbor + and the truth): and are desired only for the sake of something else. Consequently + with regard to sins of murder and false witness, it was necessary to proscribe, not sins of thought, but only sins of deed. +
[37887] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 ad 5 Ad quintum +dicendum quod delectatio adulterii, et utilitas divitiarum, sunt +propter seipsa appetibilia, inquantum habent rationem boni +delectabilis vel utilis. Et propter hoc oportuit in eis prohiberi +non solum opus, sed etiam concupiscentiam. Sed homicidium et +falsitas sunt secundum seipsa horribilia, quia proximus et veritas +naturaliter amantur, et non desiderantur nisi propter aliud. Et +ideo non oportuit circa peccatum homicidii et falsi testimonii +prohibere peccatum cordis, sed solum operis.
+ Reply to Objection 6: As stated above ( + Q[25], A[1]), all the passions of the irascible faculty arise from the passions of the concupiscible part. Hence, as the precepts of + the decalogue are, as it were, the first elements of the Law, there was no need for mention of the irascible passions, but + only of the concupiscible passions. +
[37888] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 ad 6 Ad sextum +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, omnes passiones irascibilis +derivantur a passionibus concupiscibilis. Et ideo in praeceptis +Decalogi, quae sunt quasi prima elementa legis, non erat mentio +facienda de passionibus irascibilis, sed solum de passionibus +concupiscibilis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the ten precepts of the decalogue are not set in proper order. Because love of one's neighbor is seemingly + previous to love of God, since our neighbor is better known to us than God is; according to + 1 Jn. 4:20: "He that loveth not his brother, whom he seeth, how can he love God, Whom he seeth not?" But the first three precepts belong + to the love of God, while the other seven pertain to the love of our neighbor. Therefore + the precepts of the decalogue are not set in proper order. +
[37889] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter ordinentur decem +praecepta Decalogi. Dilectio enim proximi videtur esse praevia ad +dilectionem Dei, quia proximus est nobis magis notus quam Deus; +secundum illud I Ioan. IV, qui fratrem suum, quem videt, non +diligit, Deum, quem non videt, quomodo potest diligere? Sed +tria prima praecepta pertinent ad dilectionem Dei, septem vero alia +ad dilectionem proximi. Ergo inconvenienter praecepta Decalogi +ordinantur.
+ Objection 2: Further, the acts of virtue are prescribed by the affirmative precepts, and acts of vice are forbidden by the negative precepts. + But according to Boethius in his commentary on the Categories [*Lib. iv, cap. De Oppos.], vices should be uprooted before + virtues are sown. Therefore among the precepts concerning our neighbor, the negative precepts should have preceded the affirmative. +
[37890] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, +per praecepta affirmativa imperantur actus virtutum, per praecepta +vero negativa prohibentur actus vitiorum. Sed secundum Boetium, in +commento praedicamentorum, prius sunt extirpanda vitia quam +inserantur virtutes. Ergo inter praecepta pertinentia ad proximum, +primo ponenda fuerunt praecepta negativa quam affirmativa.
+ Objection 3: Further, the precepts of the Law are about men's actions. But actions of thought precede actions of word or outward deed. + Therefore the precepts about not coveting, which regard our thoughts, are unsuitably placed last in order. +
[37891] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, +praecepta legis dantur de actibus hominum. Sed prior est actus +cordis quam oris vel exterioris operis. Ergo inconvenienti ordine +praecepta de non concupiscendo, quae pertinent ad cor, ultimo +ponuntur.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle says ( + Rom. 13:1): "The things that are of God, are well ordered" [Vulg.: 'Those that are, are ordained of God']. But the precepts of the + decalogue were given immediately by God, as stated above + (A[3]). Therefore they are arranged in becoming order. +
[37892] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. XIII, quae a Deo sunt, ordinata +sunt. Sed praecepta Decalogi sunt immediate data a Deo, ut +dictum est. Ergo convenientem ordinem habent.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + AA[3],5, ad 1), the precepts of the decalogue are such as the mind of man is ready to grasp at once. Now it is evident that a thing + is so much the more easily grasped by the reason, as its contrary is more grievous and repugnant to reason. Moreover, it is + clear, since the order of reason begins with the end, that, for a man to be inordinately disposed towards his end, is supremely + contrary to reason. Now the end of + human life and society is God. Consequently it was necessary for the precepts of the decalogue, first of all, to direct man + to God; since the contrary to this is most grievous. Thus also, in an army, which is ordained to the commander as to its end, + it is requisite first that the soldier should be subject to the commander, and the opposite of this is most grievous; and + secondly it is requisite that he should be in coordination with the other soldiers. +
Now among those things whereby we are ordained to God, the first is that man should be subjected to Him faithfully, by having + nothing in common with His enemies. The second is that he should show Him reverence: the third that he should offer Him service. + Thus, in an army, it is a greater sin for a soldier to act treacherously and make a compact with the foe, than to be insolent + to his commander: and this last is more grievous than if he be found wanting in some point of service + to him. +
As to the precepts that direct man in his behavior towards his neighbor, it is evident that it is more repugnant to reason, + and a more grievous sin, if man does not observe the due order as to those persons to whom he is most indebted. Consequently, + among those precepts that direct man in his relations to his neighbor, the first place is given to that one which regards + his parents. Among the other precepts we again find the order to be according to the gravity of sin. For it is + more grave and more repugnant to reason, to sin by deed than by word; and by word than by thought. And among sins of deed, + murder which destroys life in one already living is more grievous than adultery, which imperils the life of the unborn child; + and adultery is more grave than theft, which regards external goods. +
[37893] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 6 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, praecepta Decalogi dantur de his +quae statim in promptu mens hominis suscipit. Manifestum est autem +quod tanto aliquid magis a ratione suscipitur, quanto contrarium +est gravius et magis rationi repugnans. Manifestum est autem quod, +cum rationis ordo a fine incipiat, maxime est contra rationem ut +homo inordinate se habeat circa finem. Finis autem humanae vitae et +societatis est Deus. Et ideo primo oportuit per praecepta Decalogi +hominem ordinare ad Deum, cum eius contrarium sit gravissimum. +Sicut etiam in exercitu, qui ordinatur ad ducem sicut ad finem, +primum est quod miles subdatur duci, et huius contrarium est +gravissimum; secundum vero est ut aliis coordinetur. Inter ipsa +autem per quae ordinamur in Deum, primum occurrit quod homo +fideliter ei subdatur, nullam participationem cum inimicis habens. +Secundum autem est quod ei reverentiam exhibeat. Tertium autem est +quod etiam famulatum impendat. Maiusque peccatum est in exercitu si +miles, infideliter agens, cum hoste pactum habeat, quam si aliquam +irreverentiam faciat duci, et hoc est etiam gravius quam si in +aliquo obsequio ducis deficiens inveniatur. In praeceptis autem +ordinantibus ad proximum, manifestum est quod magis repugnat +rationi, et gravius peccatum est, si homo non servet ordinem +debitum ad personas quibus magis est debitor. Et ideo inter +praecepta ordinantia ad proximum, primo ponitur praeceptum +pertinens ad parentes. Inter alia vero praecepta etiam apparet ordo +secundum ordinem gravitatis peccatorum. Gravius est enim, et magis +rationi repugnans, peccare opere quam ore, et ore quam corde. Et +inter peccata operis, gravius est homicidium, per quod tollitur +vita hominis iam existentis, quam adulterium, per quod impeditur +certitudo prolis nasciturae; et adulterium gravius quam furtum, +quod pertinet ad bona exteriora.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Although our neighbor is better known than God by the way of the senses, nevertheless the love of God is the reason for the + love of our neighbor, as shall be declared later on ( + SS, Q[25], A[1]; + SS, Q[26], A[2]). Hence the precepts ordaining man to God demanded precedence of the others. +
[37894] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, quamvis secundum viam sensus proximus sit magis +notus quam Deus, tamen dilectio Dei est ratio dilectionis proximi, +ut infra patebit. Et ideo praecepta ordinantia ad Deum, fuerunt +praeordinanda.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Just as God is the universal principle of being in respect of all things, so is a father a principle of being in respect + of his son. Therefore the precept regarding parents was fittingly placed after the precepts regarding God. This argument holds + in respect of affirmative and negative precepts about the same kind of deed: although even then it is not altogether cogent. + For although in the order of execution, vices should be uprooted before virtues + are sown, according to + Ps. 33:15: "Turn away from evil, and do good," and + Is. 1:16,17: "Cease to do perversely; learn to do well"; yet, in the order of knowledge, virtue precedes vice, because "the crooked line + is known by the straight" (De Anima i): and "by the law is the knowledge of sin" ( + Rom. 3:20). Wherefore the affirmation precept demanded the first place. However, this is not the reason for the order, but that which + is given + above. Because in the precepts regarding God, which belongs to the first table, an affirmative precept is placed last, since + its transgression implies a less grievous sin. +
[37895] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut Deus est universale principium essendi +omnibus, ita etiam pater est principium quoddam essendi filio. Et +ideo convenienter post praecepta pertinentia ad Deum, ponitur +praeceptum pertinens ad parentes. Ratio autem procedit quando +affirmativa et negativa pertinent ad idem genus operis. Quamvis +etiam et in hoc non habeat omnimodam efficaciam. Etsi enim in +executione operis, prius extirpanda sint vitia quam inserendae +virtutes, secundum illud Psalmi XXXIII, declina a malo, et fac +bonum, et Isaiae I, quiescite agere perverse, discite +benefacere; tamen in cognitione prior est virtus quam peccatum, +quia per rectum cognoscitur obliquum, ut dicitur in I de anima. Per +legem autem cognitio peccati, ut Rom. III dicitur. Et secundum hoc, +praeceptum affirmativum debuisset primo poni. Sed non est ista +ratio ordinis, sed quae supra posita est. Quia in praeceptis +pertinentibus ad Deum, quae sunt primae tabulae, ultimo ponitur +praeceptum affirmativum, quia eius transgressio minorem reatum +inducit.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Although sin of thought stands first in the order of execution, yet its prohibition holds a later position in the order of + reason. +
[37896] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod peccatum cordis etsi sit prius in executione, tamen +eius prohibitio posterius cadit in ratione.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably formulated. Because the affirmative precepts direct man to + acts of virtue, while the negative precepts withdraw him from acts of vice. But in every matter there are virtues and vices + opposed to one another. Therefore in whatever matter there is an ordinance of a precept of the decalogue, there should have + been an affirmative and a negative precept. Therefore it was unfitting that affirmative + precepts should be framed in some matters, and negative precepts in others. +
[37897] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad +septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praecepta Decalogi +inconvenienter tradantur. Praecepta enim affirmativa ordinant ad +actus virtutum, praecepta autem negativa abstrahunt ab actibus +vitiorum. Sed circa quamlibet materiam opponuntur sibi virtutes et +vitia. Ergo in qualibet materia de qua ordinat praeceptum Decalogi, +debuit poni praeceptum affirmativum et negativum. Inconvenienter +igitur ponuntur quaedam affirmativa et quaedam negativa.
+ Objection 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. ii, 10) that every law is based on reason. But all the precepts of the decalogue belong to the + Divine law. Therefore the reason should have been pointed out in each precept, and not only in the first and third. +
[37898] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Isidorus dicit quod omnis lex ratione constat. Sed omnia praecepta +Decalogi pertinent ad legem divinam. Ergo in omnibus debuit ratio +assignari, et non solum in primo et tertio praecepto.
+ Objection 3: Further, by observing the precepts man deserves to be rewarded by God. But the Divine promises concern the rewards of the + precepts. Therefore the promise should have been included in each precept, and not only in the second and fourth. +
[37899] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, +per observantiam praeceptorum meretur aliquis praemia a Deo. Sed +divinae promissiones sunt de praemiis praeceptorum. Ergo promissio +debuit poni in omnibus praeceptis, et non solum in primo et +quarto.
+ Objection 4: Further, the Old Law is called "the law of fear," in so far as it induced men to observe the precepts, by means of the threat + of punishments. But all the precepts of the decalogue belong to the Old Law. Therefore a threat of punishment should have + been included in each, and not only in the first and second. +
[37900] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 7 arg. 4 Praeterea, +lex vetus dicitur lex timoris, inquantum per comminationes poenarum +inducebat ad observationes praeceptorum. Sed omnia praecepta +Decalogi pertinent ad legem veterem. Ergo in omnibus debuit poni +comminatio poenae, et non solum in primo et secundo.
+ Objection 5: Further, all the commandments of God should be retained in the memory: for it is written ( + Prov. 3:3): "Write them in the tables of thy heart." Therefore it was not fitting that mention of the memory should be made in the + third commandment only. Consequently it seems that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably formulated. +
[37901] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 7 arg. 5 Praeterea, +omnia praecepta Dei sunt in memoria retinenda, dicitur enim Prov. +III, describe ea in tabulis cordis tui. Inconvenienter ergo +in solo tertio praecepto fit mentio de memoria. Et ita videntur +praecepta Decalogi inconvenienter tradita esse.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Wis. 11:21) that "God made all things, in measure, number and weight." Much more therefore did He observe a suitable manner in formulating + His Law. +
[37902] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Sap. XI, quod Deus omnia fecit in numero, +pondere et mensura. Multo magis ergo in praeceptis suae legis +congruum modum tradendi servavit.
+ I answer that, The highest wisdom is contained in the precepts of the Divine law: wherefore it is written ( + Dt. 4:6): "This is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of nations." Now it belongs to wisdom to arrange all things in due + manner and order. Therefore it must be evident that the precepts of the Law are suitably set forth. +
[37903] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 7 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod in praeceptis divinae legis maxima sapientia +continetur, unde dicitur Deut. IV, haec est vestra sapientia et +intellectus coram populis. Sapientis autem est omnia debito +modo et ordine disponere. Et ideo manifestum esse debet quod +praecepta legis convenienti modo sunt tradita.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Affirmation of one thing always leads to the denial of its opposite: but the denial of one opposite does not always lead + to the affirmation of the other. For it follows that if a thing is white, it is not black: but it does not follow that if + it is not black, it is white: because negation extends further than affirmation. And hence too, that one ought not to do harm + to another, which pertains to the negative precepts, extends to more persons, as a + primary dictate of reason, than that one ought to do someone a service or kindness. Nevertheless it is a primary dictate of + reason that man is a debtor in the point of rendering a service or kindness to those from whom he has received kindness, if + he has not yet repaid the debt. Now there are two whose favors no man can sufficiently repay, viz. God and man's father, as + stated in Ethic. viii, 14. Therefore it is that there are only two affirmative precepts; one about the honor due to parents, + the other about the celebration of the Sabbath in memory of the Divine favor. +
[37904] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod semper ad affirmationem sequitur negatio +oppositi, non autem semper ad negationem unius oppositi sequitur +affirmatio alterius. Sequitur enim, si est album, non est nigrum, +non tamen sequitur, si non est nigrum, ergo est album, quia ad +plura sese extendit negatio quam affirmatio. Et inde est etiam quod +non esse faciendum iniuriam, quod pertinet ad praecepta negativa, +ad plures personas se extendit, secundum primum dictamen rationis, +quam esse debitum ut alicui obsequium vel beneficium impendatur. +Inest autem primo dictamen rationis quod homo debitor est beneficii +vel obsequii exhibendi illis a quibus beneficia accepit, si nondum +recompensavit. Duo autem sunt quorum beneficiis sufficienter nullus +recompensare potest, scilicet Deus et pater, ut dicitur in VIII +Ethic. Et ideo sola duo praecepta affirmativa ponuntur, unum de +honoratione parentum; aliud de celebratione sabbati in +commemorationem divini beneficii.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The reasons for the purely moral precepts are manifest; hence there was no need to add the reason. But some of the precepts + include ceremonial matter, or a determination of a general moral precept; thus the first precept includes the determination, + "Thou shalt not make a graven thing"; and in the third precept the Sabbath-day is fixed. Consequently there was need to state + the reason in each case. +
[37905] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod illa praecepta quae sunt pure moralia, habent +manifestam rationem, unde non oportuit quod in eis aliqua ratio +adderetur. Sed quibusdam praeceptis additur caeremoniale, vel +determinativum praecepti moralis communis, sicut in primo +praecepto, non facies sculptile; et in tertio praecepto +determinatur dies sabbati. Et ideo utrobique oportuit rationem +assignari.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Generally speaking, men direct their actions to some point of utility. Consequently in those precepts in which it seemed + that there would be no useful result, or that some utility might be hindered, it was necessary to add a promise of reward. + And since parents are already on the way to depart from us, no benefit is expected from them: wherefore a promise of reward + is added to the precept about honoring one's parents. The same applies to the precept + forbidding idolatry: since thereby it seemed that men were hindered from receiving the apparent benefit which they think they + can get by entering into a compact with the demons. +
[37906] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod homines ut plurimum actus suos ad aliquam utilitatem +ordinant. Et ideo in illis praeceptis necesse fuit promissionem +praemii apponere, ex quibus videbatur nulla utilitas sequi, vel +aliqua utilitas impediri. Quia vero parentes sunt iam in recedendo, +ab eis non expectatur utilitas. Et ideo praecepto de honore +parentum additur promissio. Similiter etiam praecepto de +prohibitione idololatriae, quia per hoc videbatur impediri apparens +utilitas quam homines credunt se posse consequi per pactum cum +Daemonibus initum.
+ Reply to Objection 4: Punishments are necessary against those who are prone to evil, as stated in Ethic. x, 9. Wherefore a threat of punishment + is only affixed to those precepts of the law which forbade evils to which men were prone. Now men were prone to idolatry by + reason of the general custom of the nations. Likewise men are prone to perjury on account of the frequent use of oaths. Hence + it is that a threat is affixed to the first two precepts. +
[37907] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 7 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod poenae praecipue necessariae sunt contra illos qui +sunt proni ad malum, ut dicitur in X Ethic. Et ideo illis solis +praeceptis legis additur comminatio poenarum, in quibus erat +pronitas ad malum. Erant autem homines proni ad idololatriam, +propter generalem consuetudinem gentium. Et similiter sunt etiam +homines proni ad periurium, propter frequentiam iuramenti. Et ideo +primis duobus praeceptis adiungitur comminatio.
+ Reply to Objection 5: The commandment about the Sabbath was made in memory of a past blessing. Wherefore special mention of the memory is made + therein. Or again, the commandment about the Sabbath has a determination affixed to it that does not belong to the natural + law, wherefore this precept needed a special admonition. +
[37908] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 7 ad 5 Ad quintum +dicendum quod praeceptum de sabbato ponitur ut commemorativum +beneficii praeteriti. Et ideo specialiter in eo fit mentio de +memoria. Vel quia praeceptum de sabbato habet determinationem +adiunctam quae non est de lege naturae; et ideo hoc praeceptum +speciali admonitione indiguit.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable. For the precepts of the decalogue belong to the natural + law. But the natural law fails in some cases and is changeable, like human nature, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7). + Now the failure of law to apply in certain particular cases is a reason for dispensation, as stated above ( + Q[96], A[6]; + Q[97], A[4]). Therefore a dispensation can be + granted in the precepts of the decalogue. +
[37909] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod praecepta Decalogi sint dispensabilia. +Praecepta enim Decalogi sunt de iure naturali. Sed iustum naturale +in aliquibus deficit, et mutabile est, sicut et natura humana, ut +philosophus dicit, in V Ethic. Defectus autem legis in aliquibus +particularibus casibus est ratio dispensandi, ut supra dictum est. +Ergo in praeceptis Decalogi potest fieri dispensatio.
+ Objection 2: Further, man stands in the same relation to human law as God does to Divine law. But man can dispense with the precepts of + a law made by man. Therefore, since the precepts of the decalogue are ordained by God, it seems that God can dispense with + them. Now our superiors are God's viceregents on earth; for the Apostle says ( + 2 Cor. 2:10): "For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your sakes have I done it in the person of + Christ." Therefore superiors can dispense with the precepts of the decalogue. +
[37910] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, +sicut se habet homo ad legem humanam, ita se habet Deus ad legem +datam divinitus. Sed homo potest dispensare in praeceptis legis +quae homo statuit. Ergo, cum praecepta Decalogi sint instituta a +Deo, videtur quod Deus in eis possit dispensare. Sed praelati vice +Dei funguntur in terris, dicit enim apostolus, II ad Cor. II, +nam et ego, si quid donavi, propter vos donavi in persona +Christi. Ergo etiam praelati possunt in praeceptis Decalogi +dispensare.
+ Objection 3: Further, among the precepts of the decalogue is one forbidding murder. But it seems that a dispensation is given by men in + this precept: for instance, when according to the prescription of human law, such as evil-doers or enemies are lawfully slain. + Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable. +
[37911] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, +inter praecepta Decalogi continetur prohibitio homicidii. Sed in +isto praecepto videtur dispensari per homines, puta cum, secundum +praeceptum legis humanae, homines licite occiduntur, puta +malefactores vel hostes. Ergo praecepta Decalogi sunt +dispensabilia.
+ Objection 4: Further, the observance of the Sabbath is ordained by a precept of the decalogue. But a dispensation was granted in this + precept; for it is written ( + 1 Macc. 2:4): "And they determined in that day, saying: Whosoever shall come up to fight against us on the Sabbath-day, we will fight + against him." Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable. +
[37912] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 8 arg. 4 Praeterea, +observatio sabbati continetur inter praecepta Decalogi. Sed in hoc +praecepto fuit dispensatum, dicitur enim I Machab. II, et +cogitaverunt in die illa dicentes, omnis homo quicumque venerit ad +nos in bello die sabbatorum, pugnemus adversus eum. Ergo +praecepta Decalogi sunt dispensabilia.
+ On the contrary, are the words of + Is. 24:5, where some are reproved for that "they have changed the ordinance, they have broken the everlasting covenant"; which, seemingly, + apply principally to the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue cannot be changed by dispensation. +
[37913] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Isaiae XXIV, quidam reprehenduntur de hoc quod +mutaverunt ius, dissipaverunt foedus sempiternum, quod maxime +videtur intelligendum de praeceptis Decalogi. Ergo praecepta +Decalogi mutari per dispensationem non possunt.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + Q[96], A[6]; + Q[97], A[4]), precepts admit of dispensation, when there occurs a particular case in which, if the letter of the law be observed, the + intention of the lawgiver is frustrated. Now the intention of every lawgiver is directed first and chiefly to the common good; + secondly, to the order of justice and virtue, whereby the common good is preserved and attained. If therefore there by + any precepts which contain the very preservation of the common good, or the very order of justice and virtue, such precepts + contain the intention of the lawgiver, and therefore are indispensable. For instance, if in some community a law were enacted, + such as this---that no man should work for the destruction of the commonwealth, or betray the state to its enemies, or that + no man should do anything unjust or evil, such precepts would not admit of dispensation. But if other precepts were enacted, + subordinate to the above, and determining certain special modes of procedure, these latter precepts would admit of dispensation, + in so far as the omission of these precepts in certain cases would not be prejudicial to the former precepts which contain + the intention of the lawgiver. For instance if, for the safeguarding of the commonwealth, it were enacted in some city that + from each ward some men should keep watch as sentries in case of siege, some might be dispensed from this on account of + some greater utility. +
Now the precepts of the decalogue contain the very intention of the lawgiver, who is God. For the precepts of the first table, + which direct us to God, contain the very order to the common and final good, which is God; while the precepts of the second + table contain the order of justice to be observed among men, that nothing undue be done to anyone, and that each one be given + his due; for it is in this sense that we are to take the precepts of the decalogue. Consequently the + precepts of the decalogue admit of no dispensation whatever. +
[37914] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 8 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, tunc in praeceptis debet +fieri dispensatio, quando occurrit aliquis particularis casus in +quo, si verbum legis observetur, contrariatur intentioni +legislatoris. Intentio autem legislatoris cuiuslibet ordinatur +primo quidem et principaliter ad bonum commune; secundo autem, ad +ordinem iustitiae et virtutis, secundum quem bonum commune +conservatur, et ad ipsum pervenitur. Si qua ergo praecepta dentur +quae contineant ipsam conservationem boni communis, vel ipsum +ordinem iustitiae et virtutis; huiusmodi praecepta continent +intentionem legislatoris, et ideo indispensabilia sunt. Puta si +poneretur hoc praeceptum in aliqua communitate, quod nullus +destrueret rempublicam, neque proderet civitatem hostibus, sive +quod nullus faceret aliquid iniuste vel male; huiusmodi praecepta +essent indispensabilia. Sed si aliqua alia praecepta traderentur +ordinata ad ista praecepta, quibus determinantur aliqui speciales +modi, in talibus praeceptis dispensatio posset fieri; inquantum per +omissionem huiusmodi praeceptorum in aliquibus casibus, non fieret +praeiudicium primis praeceptis, quae continent intentionem +legislatoris. Puta si, ad conservationem reipublicae, statueretur +in aliqua civitate quod de singulis vicis aliqui vigilarent ad +custodiam civitatis obsessae; posset cum aliquibus dispensari +propter aliquam maiorem utilitatem. Praecepta autem Decalogi +continent ipsam intentionem legislatoris, scilicet Dei. Nam +praecepta primae tabulae, quae ordinant ad Deum, continent ipsum +ordinem ad bonum commune et finale, quod Deus est; praecepta autem +secundae tabulae continent ipsum ordinem iustitiae inter homines +observandae, ut scilicet nulli fiat indebitum, et cuilibet reddatur +debitum; secundum hanc enim rationem sunt intelligenda praecepta +Decalogi. Et ideo praecepta Decalogi sunt omnino +indispensabilia.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is not speaking of the natural law which contains the very order of justice: for it is a never-failing principle + that "justice should be preserved." But he is speaking in reference to certain fixed modes of observing justice, which fail + to apply in certain cases. +
[37915] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod philosophus non loquitur de iusto naturali quod +continet ipsum ordinem iustitiae, hoc enim nunquam deficit, +iustitiam esse servandam. Sed loquitur quantum ad determinatos +modos observationis iustitiae, qui in aliquibus fallunt.
+ Reply to Objection 2: As the Apostle says ( + 2 Tim. 2:13), "God continueth faithful, He cannot deny Himself." But He would deny Himself if He were to do away with the very order + of His own justice, since He is justice itself. Wherefore God cannot dispense a man so that it be lawful for him not to direct + himself to God, or not to be subject to His justice, even in those matters in which men are directed to one another. +
[37916] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut apostolus dicit, II ad Tim. II, Deus +fidelis permanet, negare seipsum non potest. Negaret autem +seipsum, si ipsum ordinem suae iustitiae auferret, cum ipse sit +ipsa iustitia. Et ideo in hoc Deus dispensare non potest, ut homini +liceat non ordinate se habere ad Deum, vel non subdi ordini +iustitiae eius, etiam in his secundum quae homines ad invicem +ordinantur.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The slaying of a man is forbidden in the decalogue, in so far as it bears the character of something undue: for in this sense + the precept contains the very essence of justice. Human law cannot make it lawful for a man to be slain unduly. But it is + not undue for evil-doers or foes of the common weal to be slain: hence this is not contrary to the precept of the decalogue; + and such a killing is no murder as forbidden by that precept, as Augustine + observes (De Lib. Arb. i, 4). In like manner when a man's property is taken from him, if it be due that he should lose it, + this is not theft or robbery as forbidden by the decalogue. +
Consequently when the children of Israel, by God's command, took away the spoils of the Egyptians, this was not theft; since + it was due to them by the sentence of God. Likewise when Abraham consented to slay his son, he did not consent to murder, + because his son was due to be slain by the command of God, Who is Lord of life and death: for He it is Who inflicts the punishment + of death on all men, both godly and ungodly, on account of the sin of our first parent, and if a man be + the executor of that sentence by Divine authority, he will be no murderer any more than God would be. Again Osee, by taking + unto himself a wife of fornications, or an adulterous woman, was not guilty either of adultery or of fornication: because + he took unto himself one who was his by command of God, Who is the Author of the institution of marriage. +
Accordingly, therefore, the precepts of the decalogue, as to the essence of justice which they contain, are unchangeable: + but as to any determination by application to individual actions---for instance, that this or that be murder, theft or adultery, + or not---in this point they admit of change; sometimes by Divine authority alone, namely, in such matters as are exclusively + of Divine institution, as marriage and the like; sometimes also by human authority, namely in such matters + as are subject to human jurisdiction: for in this respect men stand in the place of God: and yet not in all respects. +
[37917] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod occisio hominis prohibetur in Decalogo secundum quod +habet rationem indebiti, sic enim praeceptum continet ipsam +rationem iustitiae. Lex autem humana hoc concedere non potest, quod +licite homo indebite occidatur. Sed malefactores occidi, vel hostes +reipublicae, hoc non est indebitum. Unde hoc non contrariatur +praecepto Decalogi, nec talis occisio est homicidium, quod +praecepto Decalogi prohibetur, ut Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib. +Arb. Et similiter si alicui auferatur quod suum erat, si debitum +est quod ipsum amittat, hoc non est furtum vel rapina, quae +praecepto Decalogi prohibentur. Et ideo quando filii Israel +praecepto Dei tulerunt Aegyptiorum spolia, non fuit furtum, quia +hoc eis debebatur ex sententia Dei. Similiter etiam Abraham, cum +consensit occidere filium, non consensit in homicidium, quia +debitum erat eum occidi per mandatum Dei, qui est dominus vitae et +mortis. Ipse enim est qui poenam mortis infligit omnibus hominibus, +iustis et iniustis, pro peccato primi parentis, cuius sententiae si +homo sit executor auctoritate divina, non erit homicida, sicut nec +Deus. Et similiter etiam Osee, accedens ad uxorem fornicariam, vel +ad mulierem adulteram, non est moechatus nec fornicatus, quia +accessit ad eam quae sua erat secundum mandatum divinum, qui est +auctor institutionis matrimonii. Sic igitur praecepta ipsa +Decalogi, quantum ad rationem iustitiae quam continent, immutabilia +sunt. Sed quantum ad aliquam determinationem per applicationem ad +singulares actus, ut scilicet hoc vel illud sit homicidium, furtum +vel adulterium, aut non, hoc quidem est mutabile, quandoque sola +auctoritate divina, in his scilicet quae a solo Deo sunt instituta, +sicut in matrimonio, et in aliis huiusmodi; quandoque etiam +auctoritate humana, sicut in his quae sunt commissa hominum +iurisdictioni. Quantum enim ad hoc, homines gerunt vicem Dei, non +autem quantum ad omnia.
+ Reply to Objection 4: This determination was an interpretation rather than a dispensation. For a man is not taken to break the Sabbath, if he does + something necessary for human welfare; as Our Lord proves ( + Mat. 12:3, seqq.). +
[37918] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 8 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod illa excogitatio magis fuit interpretatio praecepti +quam dispensatio. Non enim intelligitur violare sabbatum qui facit +opus quod est necessarium ad salutem humanam; sicut dominus probat, +Matth. XII.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the mode of virtue falls under the precept of the law. For the mode of virtue is that deeds of justice + should be done justly, that deeds of fortitude should be done bravely, and in like manner as to the other virtues. But it + is commanded ( + Dt. 26:20) that "thou shalt follow justly after that which is just." Therefore the mode of virtue falls under the precept. +
[37919] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 9 arg. 1 Ad nonum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod modus virtutis cadat sub praecepto +legis. Est enim modus virtutis ut aliquis iuste operetur iusta, et +fortiter fortia, et similiter de aliis virtutibus. Sed Deut. XVI +praecipitur, iuste quod iustum est exequeris. Ergo modus +virtutis cadit sub praecepto.
+ Objection 2: Further, that which belongs to the intention of the lawgiver comes chiefly under the precept. But the intention of the lawgiver + is directed chiefly to make men virtuous, as stated in Ethic. ii: and it belongs to a virtuous man to act virtuously. Therefore + the mode of virtue falls under the precept. +
[37920] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 9 arg. 2 Praeterea, +illud maxime cadit sub praecepto quod est de intentione +legislatoris. Sed intentio legislatoris ad hoc principaliter fertur +ut homines faciat virtuosos, sicut dicitur in II Ethic. Virtuosi +autem est virtuose agere. Ergo modus virtutis cadit sub +praecepto.
+ Objection 3: Further, the mode of virtue seems to consist properly in working willingly and with pleasure. But this falls under a precept + of the Divine law, for it is written ( + Ps. 99:2): "Serve ye the Lord with gladness"; and ( + 2 Cor. 9:7): "Not with sadness or necessity: for God loveth a cheerful giver"; whereupon the gloss says: "Whatever ye do, do gladly; + and then you will do it well; whereas if you do it sorrowfully, it is done + in thee, not by thee." Therefore the mode of virtue falls under the precept of the law. +
[37921] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 9 arg. 3 Praeterea, +modus virtutis proprie esse videtur ut aliquis voluntarie et +delectabiliter operetur. Sed hoc cadit sub praecepto legis divinae, +dicitur enim in Psalmo XCIX, servite domino in laetitia; et +II ad Cor. IX, non ex tristitia aut ex necessitate, hilarem enim +datorem diligit Deus; ubi Glossa dicit, quidquid boni facis, +cum hilaritate fac, et tunc bene facis, si autem cum tristitia +facis, fit de te, non tu facis. Ergo modus virtutis cadit sub +praecepto legis.
+ On the contrary, No man can act as a virtuous man acts unless he has the habit of virtue, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. ii, 4; v, 8). + Now whoever transgresses a precept of the law, deserves to be punished. Hence it would follow that a man who has not the habit + of virtue, would deserve to be punished, whatever he does. But this is contrary to the intention of the law, which aims at + leading man to virtue, by habituating him to good works. Therefore the mode of virtue + does not fall under the precept. +
[37922] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 9 s. c. Sed contra, +nullus potest operari eo modo quo operatur virtuosus, nisi habeat +habitum virtutis; ut patet per philosophum, in II et V Ethic. +Quicumque autem transgreditur praeceptum legis, meretur poenam. +Sequeretur ergo quod ille qui non habet habitum virtutis, quidquid +faceret, mereretur poenam. Hoc autem est contra intentionem legis, +quae intendit hominem, assuefaciendo ad bona opera, inducere ad +virtutem. Non ergo modus virtutis cadit sub praecepto.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + Q[90], A[3], ad 2), a precept of law has compulsory power. Hence that on which the compulsion of the law is brought to bear, falls directly + under the precept of the law. Now the law compels through fear of punishment, as stated in Ethic. x, 9, because that properly + falls under the precept of the law, for which the penalty of the law is inflicted. But Divine law and human law are differently + situated as to the + appointment of penalties; since the penalty of the law is inflicted only for those things which come under the judgment of + the lawgiver; for the law punishes in accordance with the verdict given. Now man, the framer of human law, is competent to + judge only of outward acts; because "man seeth those things that appear," according to + 1 Kings 16:7: while God alone, the framer of the Divine law, is competent to judge of the inward movements of wills, according to + Ps. + 7:10 + : "The searcher of hearts and reins is God." +
Accordingly, therefore, we must say that the mode of virtue is in some sort regarded both by human and by Divine law; in + some respect it is regarded by the Divine, but not by the human law; and in another way, it is regarded neither by the human + nor by the Divine law. Now the mode of virtue consists in three things, as the Philosopher states in Ethic. ii. The first + is that man should act "knowingly": and this is subject to the judgment of both Divine and human law; because what + a man does in ignorance, he does accidentally. Hence according to both human and Divine law, certain things are judged in + respect of ignorance to be punishable or pardonable. +
The second point is that a man should act "deliberately," i.e. "from choice, choosing that particular action for its own + sake"; wherein a twofold internal movement is implied, of volition and of intention, about which we have spoken above (QQ[8], + 12): and concerning these two, Divine law alone, and not human law, is competent to judge. For human law does not punish the + man who wishes to slay, and slays not: whereas the Divine law does, according to + Mat. 5:22: + "Whosoever is angry with his brother, shall be in danger of the judgment." +
The third point is that he should "act from a firm and immovable principle": which firmness belongs properly to a habit, + and implies that the action proceeds from a rooted habit. In this respect, the mode of virtue does not fall under the precept + either of Divine or of human law, since neither by man nor by God is he punished as breaking the law, who gives due honor + to his parents and yet has not the habit of filial piety. +
[37923] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 9 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, praeceptum legis habet vim +coactivam. Illud ergo directe cadit sub praecepto legis, ad quod +lex cogit. Coactio autem legis est per metum poenae, ut dicitur X +Ethic., nam illud proprie cadit sub praecepto legis, pro quo poena +legis infligitur. Ad instituendam autem poenam aliter se habet lex +divina, et lex humana. Non enim poena legis infligitur nisi pro +illis de quibus legislator habet iudicare, quia ex iudicio lex +punit. Homo autem, qui est legis lator humanae, non habet iudicare +nisi de exterioribus actibus, quia homines vident ea quae +parent, ut dicitur I Reg. XVI. Sed solius Dei, qui est lator +legis divinae est iudicare de interioribus motibus voluntatum; +secundum illud Psalmi VII, scrutans corda et renes Deus. +Secundum hoc igitur dicendum est quod modus virtutis quantum ad +aliquid respicitur a lege humana et divina; quantum ad aliquid +autem, a lege divina sed non a lege humana; quantum ad aliquid +vero, nec a lege humana nec a lege divina. Modus autem virtutis in +tribus consistit, secundum philosophum, in II Ethic. Quorum primum +est, si aliquis operetur sciens. Hoc autem diiudicatur et a lege +divina et a lege humana. Quod enim aliquis facit ignorans, per +accidens facit. Unde secundum ignorantiam aliqua diiudicantur ad +poenam vel ad veniam, tam secundum legem humanam quam secundum +legem divinam. Secundum autem est ut aliquis operetur volens, vel +eligens et propter hoc eligens; in quo importatur duplex motus +interior, scilicet voluntatis et intentionis, de quibus supra +dictum est. Et ista duo non diiudicat lex humana, sed solum lex +divina. Lex enim humana non punit eum qui vult occidere et non +occidit, punit autem eum lex divina, secundum illud Matth. V, +qui irascitur fratri suo, reus erit iudicio. Tertium autem +est ut firme et immobiliter habeat et operetur. Et ista firmitas +proprie pertinet ad habitum, ut scilicet aliquis ex habitu radicato +operetur. Et quantum ad hoc, modus virtutis non cadit sub praecepto +neque legis divinae neque legis humanae, neque enim ab homine neque +a Deo punitur tanquam praecepti transgressor, qui debitum honorem +impendit parentibus, quamvis non habeat habitum pietatis.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The mode of doing acts of justice, which falls under the precept, is that they be done in accordance with right; but not + that they be done from the habit of justice. +
[37924] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 9 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod modus faciendi actum iustitiae qui cadit sub +praecepto, est ut fiat aliquid secundum ordinem iuris, non autem +quod fiat ex habitu iustitiae.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The intention of the lawgiver is twofold. His aim, in the first place, is to lead men to something by the precepts of the + law: and this is virtue. Secondly, his intention is brought to bear on the matter itself of the precept: and this is something + leading or disposing to virtue, viz. an act of virtue. For the end of the precept and the matter of the precept are not the + same: just as neither in other things is the end the same as that which conduces + to the end. +
[37925] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 9 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod intentio legislatoris est de duobus. De uno quidem, +ad quod intendit per praecepta legis inducere, et hoc est virtus. +Aliud autem est de quo intendit praeceptum ferre, et hoc est id +quod ducit vel disponit ad virtutem, scilicet actus virtutis. Non +enim idem est finis praecepti et id de quo praeceptum datur, sicut +neque in aliis rebus idem est finis et quod est ad finem.
+ Reply to Objection 3: That works of virtue should be done without sadness, falls under the precept of the Divine law; for whoever works with sadness + works unwillingly. But to work with pleasure, i.e. joyfully or cheerfully, in one respect falls under the precept, viz. in + so far as pleasure ensues from the love of God and one's neighbor (which love falls under the precept), and love causes pleasure: + and in another respect does not fall under the precept, in so far as + pleasure ensues from a habit; for "pleasure taken in a work proves the existence of a habit," as stated in Ethic. ii, 3. For + an act may give pleasure either on account of its end, or through its proceeding from a becoming habit. +
[37926] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 9 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod operari sine tristitia opus virtutis, cadit sub +praecepto legis divinae, quia quicumque cum tristitia operatur, non +volens operatur. Sed delectabiliter operari, sive cum laetitia vel +hilaritate, quodammodo cadit sub praecepto, scilicet secundum quod +sequitur delectatio ex dilectione Dei et proximi, quae cadit sub +praecepto, cum amor sit causa delectationis, et quodammodo non, +secundum quod delectatio consequitur habitum; delectatio enim +operis est signum habitus generati, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Potest +enim aliquis actus esse delectabilis vel propter finem, vel propter +convenientiam habitus.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the mode of charity falls under the precept of the Divine law. For it is written ( + Mat. 19:17): "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments": whence it seems to follow that the observance of the commandments + suffices for entrance into life. But good works do not suffice for entrance into life, except they be done from charity: for + it is written ( + 1 Cor. 13:3): "If I should distribute all my + goods to feed the poor, and if I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing." Therefore + the mode of charity is included in the commandment. +
[37927] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 10 arg. 1 Ad +decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod modus caritatis cadat sub +praecepto divinae legis. Dicitur enim Matth. XIX, si vis ad +vitam ingredi, serva mandata, ex quo videtur quod observatio +mandatorum sufficiat ad introducendum in vitam. Sed opera bona non +sufficiunt ad introducendum in vitam, nisi ex caritate fiant, +dicitur enim I ad Cor. XIII, si distribuero in cibos pauperum +omnes facultates meas, et si tradidero corpus meum ita ut ardeam, +caritatem autem non habuero, nihil mihi prodest. Ergo modus +caritatis est in praecepto.
+ Objection 2: Further, the mode of charity consists properly speaking in doing all things for God. But this falls under the precept; for + the Apostle says ( + 1 Cor. 10:31): "Do all to the glory of God." Therefore the mode of charity falls under the precept. +
[37928] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 10 arg. 2 +Praeterea, ad modum caritatis proprie pertinet ut omnia fiant +propter Deum. Sed istud cadit sub praecepto, dicit enim apostolus, +I ad Cor. X, omnia in gloriam Dei facite. Ergo modus +caritatis cadit sub praecepto.
+ Objection 3: Further, if the mode of charity does not fall under the precept, it follows that one can fulfil the precepts of the law without + having charity. Now what can be done without charity can be done without grace, which is always united to charity. Therefore + one can fulfil the precepts of the law without grace. But this is the error of Pelagius, as Augustine declares (De Haeres. + lxxxviii). Therefore the mode of charity is included in the commandment. +
[37929] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 10 arg. 3 +Praeterea, si modus caritatis non cadit sub praecepto, ergo aliquis +potest implere praecepta legis non habens caritatem. Sed quod +potest fieri sine caritate, potest fieri sine gratia, quae semper +adiuncta est caritati. Ergo aliquis potest implere praecepta legis +sine gratia. Hoc autem est Pelagiani erroris; ut patet per +Augustinum, in libro de haeresibus. Ergo modus caritatis est in +praecepto.
+ On the contrary, Whoever breaks a commandment sins mortally. If therefore the mode of charity falls under the precept, it follows that whoever + acts otherwise than from charity sins mortally. But whoever has not charity, acts otherwise than from charity. Therefore it + follows that whoever has not charity, sins mortally in whatever he does, however good this may be in itself: which is absurd. +
[37930] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 10 s. c. Sed contra +est quia quicumque non servat praeceptum, peccat mortaliter. Si +igitur modus caritatis cadat sub praecepto, sequitur quod quicumque +operatur aliquid et non ex caritate, peccet mortaliter. Sed +quicumque non habet caritatem, operatur non ex caritate. Ergo +sequitur quod quicumque non habet caritatem, peccet mortaliter in +omni opere quod facit, quantumcumque sit de genere bonorum. Quod +est inconveniens.
+ I answer that, Opinions have been contrary on this question. For some have said absolutely that the mode of charity comes under the precept; + and yet that it is possible for one not having charity to fulfil this precept: because he can dispose himself to receive charity + from God. Nor (say they) does it follow that a man not having charity sins mortally whenever he does something good of its + kind: because it is an affirmative precept that binds one to act from charity, and + is binding not for all time, but only for such time as one is in a state of charity. On the other hand, some have said that + the mode of charity is altogether outside the precept. +
Both these opinions are true up to a certain point. Because the act of charity can be considered in two ways. First, as an + act by itself: and thus it falls under the precept of the law which specially prescribes it, viz. "Thou shalt love the Lord + thy God," and "Thou shalt love thy neighbor." In this sense, the first opinion is true. Because it is not impossible to observe + this precept which regards the act of charity; since man can dispose himself to possess charity, and when he + possesses it, he can use it. Secondly, the act of charity can be considered as being the mode of the acts of the other virtues, + i.e. inasmuch as the acts of the other virtues are ordained to charity, which is "the end of the commandment," as stated in + 1 Tim. i, 5: for it has been said above ( + Q[12], A[4]) that the intention of the end is a formal mode of the act ordained to that end. In this sense the second opinion is true + in saying that the mode of charity does not + fall under the precept, that is to say that this commandment, "Honor thy father," does not mean that a man must honor his + father from charity, but merely that he must honor him. Wherefore he that honors his father, yet has not charity, does not + break this precept: although he does break the precept concerning the act of charity, for which reason he deserves to be punished. +
[37931] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 10 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod circa hoc fuerunt contrariae opiniones. Quidam enim +dixerunt absolute modum caritatis esse sub praecepto. Nec est +impossibile observare hoc praeceptum caritatem non habenti, quia +potest se disponere ad hoc quod caritas ei infundatur a Deo. Nec +quandocumque aliquis non habens caritatem facit aliquid de genere +bonorum, peccat mortaliter, quia hoc est praeceptum affirmativum, +ut ex caritate operetur, et non obligat ad semper, sed pro tempore +illo quo aliquis habet caritatem. Alii vero dixerunt quod omnino +modus caritatis non cadit sub praecepto. Utrique autem quantum ad +aliquid, verum dixerunt. Actus enim caritatis dupliciter +considerari potest. Uno modo, secundum quod est quidam actus per +se. Et hoc modo cadit sub praecepto legis quod de hoc specialiter +datur, scilicet, diliges dominum Deum tuum, et, diliges proximum +tuum. Et quantum ad hoc, primi verum dixerunt. Non enim est +impossibile hoc praeceptum observare, quod est de actu caritatis, +quia homo potest se disponere ad caritatem habendam, et quando +habuerit eam, potest ea uti. Alio modo potest considerari actus +caritatis secundum quod est modus actuum aliarum virtutum, hoc est +secundum quod actus aliarum virtutum ordinantur ad caritatem, quae +est finis praecepti, ut dicitur I ad Tim. I, dictum est enim supra +quod intentio finis est quidam modus formalis actus ordinati in +finem. Et hoc modo verum est quod secundi dixerunt, quod modus +caritatis non cadit sub praecepto, hoc est dictu, quod in hoc +praecepto, honora patrem, non includitur quod honoretur pater ex +caritate, sed solum quod honoretur pater. Unde qui honorat patrem, +licet non habens caritatem, non efficitur transgressor huius +praecepti, etsi sit transgressor praecepti quod est de actu +caritatis, propter quam transgressionem meretur poenam.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord did not say, "If thou wilt enter into life, keep one commandment"; but "keep" all "the commandments": among which + is included the commandment concerning the love of God and our neighbor. +
[37932] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 10 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod dominus non dixit, si vis ad vitam ingredi, +serva unum mandatum, sed, serva omnia mandata. Inter quae etiam +continetur mandatum de dilectione Dei et proximi.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The precept of charity contains the injunction that God should be loved from our whole heart, which means that all things + would be referred to God. Consequently man cannot fulfil the precept of charity, unless he also refer all things to God. Wherefore + he that honors his father and mother, is bound to honor them from charity, not in virtue of the precept, "Honor thy father + and mother," but in virtue of the precept, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God + with thy whole heart." And since these are two affirmative precepts, not binding for all times, they can be binding, each + one at a different time: so that it may happen that a man fulfils the precept of honoring his father and mother, without at + the same time breaking the precept concerning the omission of the mode of charity. +
[37933] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 10 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod sub mandato caritatis continetur ut diligatur Deus ex +toto corde, ad quod pertinet ut omnia referantur in Deum. Et ideo +praeceptum caritatis implere homo non potest, nisi etiam omnia +referantur in Deum. Sic ergo qui honorat parentes, tenetur ex +caritate honorare, non ex vi huius praecepti quod est, honora +parentes, sed ex vi huius praecepti, diliges dominum Deum tuum ex +toto corde tuo. Et cum ista sint duo praecepta affirmativa non +obligantia ad semper, possunt pro diversis temporibus obligare. Et +ita potest contingere quod aliquis implens praeceptum de +honoratione parentum, non tunc transgrediatur praeceptum de +omissione modi caritatis.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Man cannot fulfil all the precepts of the law, unless he fulfil the precept of charity, which is impossible without charity. + Consequently it is not possible, as Pelagius maintained, for man to fulfil the law without grace. +
[37934] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 10 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod observare omnia praecepta legis homo non potest, nisi +impleat praeceptum caritatis, quod non fit sine gratia. Et ideo +impossibile est quod Pelagius dixit, hominem implere legem sine +gratia.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that it is wrong to distinguish other moral precepts of the law besides the decalogue. Because, as Our Lord + declared ( + Mat. 22:40), "on these two commandments" of charity "dependeth the whole law and the prophets." But these two commandments are explained + by the ten commandments of the decalogue. Therefore there is no need for other moral precepts. +
[37935] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 11 arg. 1 Ad +undecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter distinguantur +alia moralia praecepta legis praeter Decalogum. Quia ut dominus +dicit, Matth. XXII, in duobus praeceptis caritatis pendet omnis +lex et prophetae. Sed haec duo praecepta explicantur per decem +praecepta Decalogi. Ergo non oportet alia praecepta moralia +esse.
+ Objection 2: Further, the moral precepts are distinct from the judicial and ceremonial precepts, as stated above (Q[99], AA[3],4). But + the determinations of the general moral precepts belong to the judicial and ceremonial precepts: and the general moral precepts + are contained in the decalogue, or are even presupposed to the decalogue, as stated above + (A[3]). Therefore it was unsuitable to lay down other moral precepts besides the decalogue. +
[37936] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 11 arg. 2 +Praeterea, praecepta moralia a iudicialibus et caeremonialibus +distinguuntur, ut dictum est. Sed determinationes communium +praeceptorum moralium pertinent ad iudicialia et caeremonialia +praecepta, communia autem praecepta moralia sub Decalogo +continentur, vel etiam Decalogo praesupponuntur, ut dictum est. +Ergo inconvenienter traduntur alia praecepta moralia praeter +Decalogum.
+ Objection 3: Further, the moral precepts are about the acts of all the virtues, as stated above + (A[2]). Therefore, as the Law contains, besides the decalogue, moral precepts pertaining to religion, liberality, mercy, and chastity; + so there should have been added some precepts pertaining to the other virtues, for instance, fortitude, sobriety, and so forth. + And yet such is not the case. It is therefore unbecoming to distinguish other moral precepts + in the Law besides those of the decalogue. +
[37937] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 11 arg. 3 +Praeterea, praecepta moralia sunt de actibus omnium virtutum, ut +supra dictum est. Sicut igitur in lege ponuntur praecepta moralia +praeter Decalogum pertinentia ad latriam, liberalitatem et +misericordiam, et castitatem; ita etiam deberent poni aliqua +praecepta pertinentia ad alias virtutes, puta ad fortitudinem, +sobrietatem, et alia huiusmodi. Quod tamen non invenitur. Non ergo +convenienter distinguuntur in lege alia praecepta moralia quae sunt +praeter Decalogum.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Ps. 18:8): "The law of the Lord is unspotted, converting souls." But man is preserved from the stain of sin, and his soul is converted + to God by other moral precepts besides those of the decalogue. Therefore it was right for the Law to include other moral precepts. +
[37938] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 11 s. c. Sed contra +est quod in Psalmo XVIII dicitur, lex domini immaculata, +convertens animas. Sed per alia etiam moralia quae Decalogo +superadduntur, homo conservatur absque macula peccati, et anima +eius ad Deum convertitur. Ergo ad legem pertinebat etiam alia +praecepta moralia tradere.
+ I answer that, As is evident from what has been stated (Q[99], AA[3],4), the judicial and ceremonial precepts derive their force from their + institution alone: since before they were instituted, it seemed of no consequence whether things were done in this or that + way. But the moral precepts derive their efficacy from the very dictate of natural reason, even if they were never included + in the Law. Now of these there are three grades: for some are most certain, and so evident + as to need no promulgation; such as the commandments of the love of God and our neighbor, and others like these, as stated + above + (A[3]), which are, as it were, the ends of the commandments; wherefore no man can have an erroneous judgment about them. Some precepts + are more detailed, the reason of which even an uneducated man can easily grasp; and yet they need to be promulgated, because + human judgment, in a few instances, happens to be led astray concerning them: these + are the precepts of the decalogue. Again, there are some precepts the reason of which is not so evident to everyone, but only + the wise; these are moral precepts added to the decalogue, and given to the people by God through Moses and Aaron. +
But since the things that are evident are the principles whereby we know those that are not evident, these other moral precepts + added to the decalogue are reducible to the precepts of the decalogue, as so many corollaries. Thus the first commandment + of the decalogue forbids the worship of strange gods: and to this are added other precepts forbidding things relating to worship + of idols: thus it is written ( + Dt. 18:10,11): "Neither let there be found among you + anyone that shall expiate his son or daughter, making them to pass through the fire: . . . neither let there by any wizard + nor charmer, nor anyone that consulteth pythonic spirits, or fortune-tellers, or that seeketh the truth from the dead." The + second commandment forbids perjury. To this is added the prohibition of blasphemy ( + Lev. 24:15, seqq) and the prohibition of false doctrine ( + Dt. 13). To the third commandment are added all the ceremonial precepts. To the fourth + commandment prescribing the honor due to parents, is added the precept about honoring the aged, according to + Lev. 19:32: "Rise up before the hoary head, and honor the person of the aged man"; and likewise all the precepts prescribing the reverence + to be observed towards our betters, or kindliness towards our equals or inferiors. To the fifth commandment, which forbids + murder, is added the prohibition of hatred and of any kind of violence inflicted on our neighbor, according + to + Lev. 19:16: "Thou shalt not stand against the blood of thy neighbor": likewise the prohibition against hating one's brother ( + Lev. 19:17): "Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart." To the sixth commandment which forbids adultery, is added the prohibition + about whoredom, according to + Dt. 23:17: "There shall be no whore among the daughters of Israel, nor whoremonger among the sons of Israel"; and the prohibition against + unnatural sins, according to + Lev. 28:22,23: "Thou shalt not lie with mankind . . . thou shalt not copulate with any beast." To the seventh commandment which prohibits + theft, is added the precept forbidding usury, according to + Dt. 23:19: "Thou shalt not lend to thy brother money to usury"; and the prohibition against fraud, according to + Dt. 25:13: "Thou shalt not have divers weights in thy bag"; and universally all prohibitions + relating to peculations and larceny. To the eighth commandment, forbidding false testimony, is added the prohibition against + false judgment, according to + Ex. 23:2: "Neither shalt thou yield in judgment, to the opinion of the most part, to stray from the truth"; and the prohibition against + lying ( + Ex. 23:7): "Thou shalt fly lying," and the prohibition against detraction, according to + Lev. 19:16: "Thou shalt not be a detractor, nor a + whisperer among the people." To the other two commandments no further precepts are added, because thereby are forbidden all + kinds of evil desires. +
[37939] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 11 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ex dictis patet, praecepta iudicialia et +caeremonialia ex sola institutione vim habent, quia antequam +instituerentur, non videbatur differre utrum sic vel aliter fieret. +Sed praecepta moralia ex ipso dictamine naturalis rationis +efficaciam habent, etiam si nunquam in lege statuantur. Horum autem +triplex est gradus. Nam quaedam sunt certissima, et adeo manifesta +quod editione non indigent; sicut mandata de dilectione Dei et +proximi, et alia huiusmodi, ut supra dictum est, quae sunt quasi +fines praeceptorum, unde in eis nullus potest errare secundum +iudicium rationis. Quaedam vero sunt magis determinata, quorum +rationem statim quilibet, etiam popularis, potest de facili videre; +et tamen quia in paucioribus circa huiusmodi contingit iudicium +humanum perverti, huiusmodi editione indigent, et haec sunt +praecepta Decalogi. Quaedam vero sunt quorum ratio non est adeo +cuilibet manifesta, sed solum sapientibus, et ista sunt praecepta +moralia superaddita Decalogo, tradita a Deo populo per Moysen et +Aaron. Sed quia ea quae sunt manifesta, sunt principia cognoscendi +eorum quae non sunt manifesta; alia praecepta moralia superaddita +Decalogo reducuntur ad praecepta Decalogi, per modum cuiusdam +additionis ad ipsa. Nam in primo praecepto Decalogi prohibetur +cultus alienorum deorum, cui superadduntur alia praecepta +prohibitiva eorum quae ordinantur in cultum idolorum; sicut habetur +Deut. XVIII, non inveniatur in te qui lustret filium suum aut +filiam, ducens per ignem, nec sit maleficus atque incantator, nec +Pythones consulat neque divinos, et quaerat a mortuis +veritatem. Secundum autem praeceptum prohibet periurium. +Superadditur autem ei prohibitio blasphemiae, Levit. XXIV; et +prohibitio falsae doctrinae, Deut. XIII. Tertio vero praecepto +superadduntur omnia caeremonialia. Quarto autem praecepto, de +honore parentum, superadditur praeceptum de honoratione senum, +secundum illud Levit. XIX, coram cano capite consurge, et honora +personam senis; et universaliter omnia praecepta inducentia ad +reverentiam exhibendam maioribus, vel ad beneficia exhibenda vel +aequalibus vel minoribus. Quinto autem praecepto, quod est de +prohibitione homicidii, additur prohibitio odii et cuiuslibet +violationis contra proximum, sicut illud Levit. XIX, non stabis +contra sanguinem proximi tui; et etiam prohibitio odii fratris, +secundum illud, ne oderis fratrem tuum in corde tuo. +Praecepto autem sexto, quod est de prohibitione adulterii, +superadditur praeceptum de prohibitione meretricii, secundum illud +Deut. XXIII, non erit meretrix de filiabus Israel, neque +fornicator de filiis Israel; et iterum prohibitio vitii contra +naturam, secundum illud Levit. XVIII, cum masculo non +commisceberis, cum omni pecore non coibis. Septimo autem +praecepto, de prohibitione furti adiungitur praeceptum de +prohibitione usurae, secundum illud Deut. XXIII, non foenerabis +fratri tuo ad usuram; et prohibitio fraudis, secundum illud +Deut. XXV, non habebis in sacculo diversa pondera; et +universaliter omnia quae ad prohibitionem calumniae et rapinae +pertinent. Octavo vero praecepto, quod est de prohibitione falsi +testimonii, additur prohibitio falsi iudicii, secundum illud Exod. +XXIII, nec in iudicio plurimorum acquiesces sententiae, ut a +veritate devies; et prohibitio mendacii, sicut ibi subditur, +mendacium fugies; et prohibitio detractionis, secundum illud +Levit. XIX, non eris criminator et susurro in populis. Aliis +autem duobus praeceptis nulla alia adiunguntur, quia per ea +universaliter omnis mala concupiscentia prohibetur.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The precepts of the decalogue are ordained to the love of God and our neighbor as pertaining evidently to our duty towards + them; but the other precepts are so ordained as pertaining thereto less evidently. +
[37940] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 11 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ad dilectionem Dei et proximi ordinantur quidem +praecepta Decalogi secundum manifestam rationem debiti, alia vero +secundum rationem magis occultam.
+ Reply to Objection 2: It is in virtue of their institution that the ceremonial and judicial precepts "are determinations of the precepts of the + decalogue," not by reason of a natural instinct, as in the case of the superadded moral precepts. +
[37941] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 11 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod praecepta caeremonialia et iudicialia sunt +determinativa praeceptorum Decalogi ex vi institutionis, non autem +ex vi naturalis instinctus, sicut praecepta moralia +superaddita.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The precepts of a law are ordained for the common good, as stated above ( + Q[90], A[2]). And since those virtues which direct our conduct towards others pertain directly to the common good, as also does the virtue + of chastity, in so far as the generative act conduces to the common good of the species; hence precepts bearing directly on + these virtues are given, both in the decalogue and in addition thereto. As to the act of + fortitude there are the order to be given by the commanders in the war, which is undertaken for the common good: as is clear + from + Dt. 20:3, where the priest is commanded (to speak thus): "Be not afraid, do not give back." In like manner the prohibition of acts + of gluttony is left to paternal admonition, since it is contrary to the good of the household; hence it is said ( + Dt. 21:20) in the person of parents: "He slighteth hearing our admonitions, he giveth himself to + revelling, and to debauchery and banquetings." +
[37942] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 11 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod praecepta legis ordinantur ad bonum commune, ut supra +dictum est. Et quia virtutes ordinantes ad alium directe pertinent +ad bonum commune; et similiter virtus castitatis, inquantum actus +generationis deservit bono communi speciei; ideo de istis +virtutibus directe dantur praecepta et Decalogi et superaddita. De +actu autem fortitudinis datur praeceptum proponendum per duces +exhortantes in bello, quod pro bono communi suscipitur, ut patet +Deut. XX, ubi mandatur sacerdoti, nolite metuere, nolite +cedere. Similiter etiam actus gulae prohibendus committitur +monitioni paternae, quia contrariatur bono domestico, unde dicitur +Deut. XXI, ex persona parentum, monita nostra audire contemnit, +comessationibus vacat et luxuriae atque conviviis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the moral precepts of the Old Law justified man. Because the Apostle says ( + Rom. 2:13): "For not the hearers of the Law are justified before God, but the doers of the Law shall be justified." But the doers of + the Law are those who fulfil the precepts of the Law. Therefore the fulfilling of the precepts of the Law was a cause of justification. +
[37943] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 12 arg. 1 Ad +duodecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praecepta moralia veteris +legis iustificarent. Dicit enim apostolus, Rom. II, non enim +auditores legis iusti sunt apud Deum, sed factores legis +iustificabuntur. Sed factores legis dicuntur qui implent +praecepta legis. Ergo praecepta legis adimpleta iustificabant.
+ Objection 2: Further, it is written ( + Lev. 18:5): "Keep My laws and My judgments, which if a man do, he shall live in them." But the spiritual life of man is through justice. + Therefore the fulfilling of the precepts of the Law was a cause of justification. +
[37944] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 12 arg. 2 +Praeterea, Levit. XVIII dicitur, custodite leges meas atque +iudicia, quae faciens homo vivet in eis. Sed vita spiritualis +hominis est per iustitiam. Ergo praecepta legis adimpleta +iustificabant.
+ Objection 3: Further, the Divine law is more efficacious than human law. But human law justifies man; since there is a kind of justice + consisting in fulfilling the precepts of law. Therefore the precepts of the Law justified man. +
[37945] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 12 arg. 3 +Praeterea, lex divina efficacior est quam lex humana. Sed lex +humana iustificat, est enim quaedam iustitia in hoc quod praecepta +legis adimplentur. Ergo praecepta legis iustificabant.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle says ( + 2 Cor. 3:6): "The letter killeth": which, according to Augustine (De Spir. et Lit. xiv), refers even to the moral precepts. Therefore + the moral precepts did not cause justice. +
[37946] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 12 s. c. Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. III, littera occidit. Quod +secundum Augustinum, in libro de spiritu et littera, intelligitur +etiam de praeceptis moralibus. Ergo praecepta moralia non +iustificabant.
+ I answer that, Just as "healthy" is said properly and first of that which is possessed of health, and secondarily of that which is a sign + or a safeguard of health; so justification means first and properly the causing of justice; while secondarily and improperly, + as it were, it may denote a sign of justice or a disposition thereto. If justice be taken in the last two ways, it is evident + that it was conferred by the precepts of the Law; in so far, to wit, as they disposed + men to the justifying grace of Christ, which they also signified, because as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 24), "even + the life of that people foretold and foreshadowed Christ." +
But if we speak of justification properly so called, then we must notice that it can be considered as in the habit or as + in the act: so that accordingly justification may be taken in two ways. First, according as man is made just, by becoming + possessed of the habit of justice: secondly, according as he does works of justice, so that in this sense justification is + nothing else than the execution of justice. Now justice, like the other virtues, may denote either the acquired or + the infused virtue, as is clear from what has been stated ( + Q[63], A[4]). The acquired virtue is caused by works; but the infused virtue is caused by God Himself through His grace. The latter is + true justice, of which we are speaking now, and in this respect of which a man is said to be just before God, according to + Rom. 4:2: "If Abraham were justified by works, he hath whereof to glory, but not before God." Hence this justice could not be caused + by + moral precepts, which are about human actions: wherefore the moral precepts could not justify man by causing justice. +
If, on the other hand, by justification we understand the execution of justice, thus all the precepts of the Law justified + man, but in various ways. Because the ceremonial precepts taken as a whole contained something just in itself, in so far as + they aimed at offering worship to God; whereas taken individually they contained that which is just, not in itself, but by + being a determination of the Divine law. Hence it is said of these precepts that they did not justify man save + through the devotion and obedience of those who complied with them. On the other hand the moral and judicial precepts, either + in general or also in particular, contained that which is just in itself: but the moral precepts contained that which is just + in itself according to that "general justice" which is "every virtue" according to Ethic. v, 1: whereas the judicial precepts + belonged to "special justice," which is about contracts connected with the human mode of life, between one man and + another. +
[37947] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 12 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut sanum proprie et primo dicitur quod habet +sanitatem, per posterius autem quod significat sanitatem, vel quod +conservat sanitatem; ita iustificatio primo et proprie dicitur ipsa +factio iustitiae; secundario vero, et quasi improprie, potest dici +iustificatio significatio iustitiae, vel dispositio ad iustitiam. +Quibus duobus modis manifestum est quod praecepta legis +iustificabant, inquantum scilicet disponebant homines ad gratiam +Christi iustificantem, quam etiam significabant; quia sicut dicit +Augustinus, contra Faustum, etiam vita illius populi prophetica +erat, et Christi figurativa. Sed si loquamur de iustificatione +proprie dicta, sic considerandum est quod iustitia potest accipi +prout est in habitu, vel prout est in actu, et secundum hoc, +iustificatio dupliciter dicitur. Uno quidem modo, secundum quod +homo fit iustus adipiscens habitum iustitiae. Alio vero modo, +secundum quod opera iustitiae operatur, ut secundum hoc +iustificatio nihil aliud sit quam iustitiae executio. Iustitia +autem, sicut et aliae virtutes potest accipi et acquisita et +infusa, ut ex supradictis patet. Acquisita quidem causatur ex +operibus, sed infusa causatur ab ipso Deo per eius gratiam. Et haec +est vera iustitia, de qua nunc loquimur, secundum quam aliquis +dicitur iustus apud Deum; secundum illud Rom. IV, si Abraham ex +operibus legis iustificatus est, habet gloriam, sed non apud +Deum. Haec igitur iustitia causari non poterat per praecepta +moralia, quae sunt de actibus humanis. Et secundum hoc, praecepta +moralia iustificare non poterant iustitiam causando. Si vero +accipiatur iustificatio pro executione iustitiae, sic omnia +praecepta legis iustificabant, aliter tamen et aliter. Nam +praecepta caeremonialia continebant quidem iustitiam secundum se in +generali, prout scilicet exhibebantur in cultum Dei, in speciali +vero non continebant secundum se iustitiam, nisi ex sola +determinatione legis divinae. Et ideo de huiusmodi praeceptis +dicitur quod non iustificabant nisi ex devotione et obedientia +facientium. Praecepta vero moralia et iudicialia continebant id +quod erat secundum se iustum vel in generali, vel etiam in +speciali. Sed moralia praecepta continebant id quod est secundum se +iustum secundum iustitiam generalem quae est omnis virtus, ut +dicitur in V Ethic. Praecepta vero iudicialia pertinebant ad +iustitiam specialem, quae consistit circa contractus humanae vitae, +qui sunt inter homines ad invicem.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle takes justification for the execution of justice. +
[37948] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 12 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod apostolus accipit ibi iustificationem pro +executione iustitiae.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The man who fulfilled the precepts of the Law is said to live in them, because he did not incur the penalty of death, which + the Law inflicted on its transgressors: in this sense the Apostle quotes this passage ( + Gal. 3:12). +
[37949] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 12 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod homo faciens praecepta legis dicitur vivere in eis, +quia non incurrebat poenam mortis, quam lex transgressoribus +infligebat. In quo sensu inducit hoc apostolus, Gal. III.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The precepts of human law justify man by acquired justice: it is not about this that we are inquiring now, but only about + that justice which is before God. +
[37950] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 12 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod praecepta legis humanae iustificant iustitia +acquisita, de qua non quaeritur ad praesens, sed solum de iustitia +quae est apud Deum.
We must now consider the ceremonial precepts: and first we must consider them in themselves; secondly, their cause; thirdly, + their duration. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: +
(1) The nature of the ceremonial precepts;
(2) Whether they are figurative?
+[37951] Iª-IIae q. 101 pr. Consequenter +considerandum est de praeceptis caeremonialibus. Et primo, de ipsis +secundum se; secundo, de causa eorum; tertio, de duratione ipsorum. +Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, quae sit ratio praeceptorum +caeremonialium. Secundo, utrum sint figuralia. Tertio, utrum +debuerint esse multa. Quarto, de distinctione ipsorum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the nature of the ceremonial precepts does not consist in their pertaining to the worship of God. Because, + in the Old Law, the Jews were given certain precepts about abstinence from food ( + Lev. 11); and about refraining from certain kinds of clothes, e.g. ( + Lev. 19:19): "Thou shalt not wear a garment that is woven of two sorts"; and again ( + Num. 15:38): "To make to themselves fringes in the corners of their garments." But + these are not moral precepts; since they do not remain in the New Law. Nor are they judicial precepts; since they do not pertain + to the pronouncing of judgment between man and man. Therefore they are ceremonial precepts. Yet they seem in no way to pertain + to the worship of God. Therefore the nature of the ceremonial precepts does not consist in their pertaining to Divine worship. +
[37952] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ratio praeceptorum caeremonialium non +in hoc consistat quod pertinent ad cultum Dei. In lege enim veteri +dantur Iudaeis quaedam praecepta de abstinentia ciborum, ut patet +Levit. XI; et etiam de abstinendo ab aliquibus vestimentis, sicut +illud Levit. XIX, vestem quae ex duobus texta est, non +indueris; et iterum quod praecipitur Num. XV, ut faciant +sibi fimbrias per angulos palliorum. Sed huiusmodi non sunt +praecepta moralia, quia non manent in nova lege. Nec etiam +iudicialia, quia non pertinent ad iudicium faciendum inter homines. +Ergo sunt caeremonialia. Sed in nullo pertinere videntur ad cultum +Dei. Ergo non est ratio caeremonialium praeceptorum quod pertineant +ad cultum Dei.
+ Objection 2: Further, some state that the ceremonial precepts are those which pertain to solemnities; as though they were so called from + the "cerei" [candles] which are lit up on those occasions. But many other things besides solemnities pertain to the worship + of God. Therefore it does not seem that the ceremonial precepts are so called from their pertaining to the Divine worship. +
[37953] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +dicunt quidam quod praecepta caeremonialia dicuntur illa quae +pertinent ad solemnitates, quasi dicerentur a cereis, qui in +solemnitatibus accenduntur. Sed multa alia sunt pertinentia ad +cultum Dei praeter solemnitates. Ergo non videtur quod praecepta +caeremonialia ea ratione dicantur, quia pertinent ad cultum +Dei.
+ Objection 3: Further, some say that the ceremonial precepts are patterns, i.e. rules, of salvation: because the Greek {chaire} is the + same as the Latin "salve." But all the precepts of the Law are rules of salvation, and not only those that pertain to the + worship of God. Therefore not only those precepts which pertain to Divine worship are called ceremonial. +
[37954] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +secundum quosdam praecepta caeremonialia dicuntur quasi normae, +idest regulae, salutis, nam chaire in Graeco idem est quod salve. +Sed omnia praecepta legis sunt regulae salutis, et non solum illa +quae pertinent ad Dei cultum. Ergo non solum illa praecepta +dicuntur caeremonialia quae pertinent ad cultum Dei.
+ Objection 4: Further, Rabbi Moses says (Doct. Perplex. iii) that the ceremonial precepts are those for which there is no evident reason. + But there is evident reason for many things pertaining to the worship of God; such as the observance of the Sabbath, the feasts + of the Passover and of the Tabernacles, and many other things, the reason for which is set down in the Law. Therefore the + ceremonial precepts are not those which pertain to the worship of God. +
[37955] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, +Rabbi Moyses dicit quod praecepta caeremonialia dicuntur quorum +ratio non est manifesta. Sed multa pertinentia ad cultum Dei habent +rationem manifestam, sicut observatio sabbati, et celebratio phase +et Scenopegiae, et multorum aliorum, quorum ratio assignatur in +lege. Ergo caeremonialia non sunt quae pertinent ad cultum Dei.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Ex. 18:19,20): "Be thou to the people in those things that pertain to God . . . and . . . shew the people the ceremonies and the manner + of worshipping." +
[37956] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Exod. XVIII, esto populo in his quae ad Deum +pertinent, ostendasque populo caeremonias et ritum colendi.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + Q[99], A[4]), the ceremonial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts whereby man is directed to God, just as the judicial precepts + are determinations of the moral precepts whereby he is directed to his neighbor. Now man is directed to God by the worship + due to Him. Wherefore those precepts are properly called ceremonial, which pertain to the Divine worship. The reason for their + being so called was given + above ( + Q[99], A[3]), when we established the distinction between the ceremonial and the other precepts. +
[37957] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, caeremonialia praecepta +determinant praecepta moralia in ordine ad Deum, sicut iudicialia +determinant praecepta moralia in ordine ad proximum. Homo autem +ordinatur ad Deum per debitum cultum. Et ideo caeremonialia proprie +dicuntur quae ad cultum Dei pertinent. Ratio autem huius nominis +posita est supra, ubi praecepta caeremonialia ab aliis sunt +distincta.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The Divine worship includes not only sacrifices and the like, which seem to be directed to God immediately, but also those + things whereby His worshippers are duly prepared to worship Him: thus too in other matters, whatever is preparatory to the + end comes under the science whose object is the end. Accordingly those precepts of the Law which regard the clothing and food + of God's worshippers, and other such matters, pertain to a certain preparation of + the ministers, with the view of fitting them for the Divine worship: just as those who administer to a king make use of certain + special observances. Consequently such are contained under the ceremonial precepts. +
[37958] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ad cultum Dei pertinent non solum sacrificia et +alia huiusmodi, quae immediate ad Deum ordinari videntur, sed etiam +debita praeparatio colentium Deum ad cultum ipsius, sicut etiam in +aliis quaecumque sunt praeparatoria ad finem, cadunt sub scientia +quae est de fine. Huiusmodi autem praecepta quae dantur in lege de +vestibus et cibis colentium Deum, et aliis huiusmodi, pertinent ad +quandam praeparationem ipsorum ministrantium, ut sint idonei ad +cultum Dei, sicut etiam specialibus observantiis aliqui utuntur qui +sunt in ministerio regis. Unde etiam sub praeceptis caeremonialibus +continentur.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The alleged explanation of the name does not seem very probable: especially as the Law does not contain many instances of + the lighting of candles in solemnities; since, even the lamps of the Candlestick were furnished with "oil of olives," as stated + in + Lev. 24:2. Nevertheless we may say that all things pertaining to the Divine worship were more carefully observed on solemn festivals: + so that all ceremonial precepts may be included + under the observance of solemnities. +
[37959] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod illa expositio nominis non videtur esse multum +conveniens, praesertim cum non multum inveniatur in lege quod in +solemnitatibus cerei accenderentur, sed in ipso etiam candelabro +lucernae cum oleo olivarum praeparabantur, ut patet Lev. XXIV. +Nihilominus tamen potest dici quod in solemnitatibus omnia illa +quae pertinebant ad cultum Dei, diligentius observabantur, et +secundum hoc, in observatione solemnitatum omnia caeremonialia +includuntur.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Neither does this explanation of the name appear to be very much to the point, since the word "ceremony" is not Greek but + Latin. We may say, however, that, since man's salvation is from God, those precepts above all seem to be rules of salvation, + which direct man to God: and accordingly those which refer to Divine worship are called ceremonial precepts. +
[37960] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod nec illa expositio nominis videtur esse multum +conveniens, nomen enim caeremoniae non est Graecum, sed Latinum. +Potest tamen dici quod, cum salus hominis sit a Deo, praecipue illa +praecepta videntur esse salutis regulae, quae hominem ordinant ad +Deum. Et sic caeremonialia dicuntur quae ad cultum Dei +pertinent.
+ Reply to Objection 4: This explanation of the ceremonial precepts has a certain amount of probability: not that they are called ceremonial precisely + because there is no evident reason for them; this is a kind of consequence. For, since the precepts referring to the Divine + worship must needs be figurative, as we shall state further on + (A[2]), the consequence is that the reason for them is not so very evident. +
[37961] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod illa ratio caeremonialium est quodammodo probabilis, +non quod ex eo dicuntur caeremonialia quia eorum ratio non est +manifesta; sed hoc est quoddam consequens. Quia enim praecepta ad +cultum Dei pertinentia oportet esse figuralia, ut infra dicetur, +inde est quod eorum ratio non est adeo manifesta.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the ceremonial precepts are not figurative. For it is the duty of every teacher to express himself in + such a way as to be easily understood, as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. iv, 4,10) and this seems very necessary in the + framing of a law: because precepts of law are proposed to the populace; for which reason a law should be manifest, as Isidore + declares (Etym. v, 21). If therefore the precepts of the Law were given as figures of + something, it seems unbecoming that Moses should have delivered these precepts without explaining what they signified. +
[37962] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad +secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praecepta caeremonialia non +sint figuralia. Pertinet enim ad officium cuiuslibet doctoris ut +sic pronunciet ut de facili intelligi possit, sicut Augustinus +dicit, in IV de Doctr. Christ. Et hoc maxime videtur esse +necessarium in legis latione, quia praecepta legis populo +proponuntur. Unde lex debet esse manifesta, ut Isidorus dicit. Si +igitur praecepta caeremonialia data sunt in alicuius rei figuram, +videtur inconvenienter tradidisse huiusmodi praecepta Moyses, non +exponens quid figurarent.
+ Objection 2: Further, whatever is done for the worship of God, should be entirely free from unfittingness. But the performance of actions + in representation of others, seems to savor of the theatre or of the drama: because formerly the actions performed in theatres + were done to represent the actions of others. Therefore it seems that such things should not be done for the worship of God. + But the ceremonial precepts are ordained to the Divine worship, as stated above + + (A[1]). Therefore they should not be figurative. +
[37963] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +ea quae in cultum Dei aguntur, maxime debent honestatem habere. Sed +facere aliqua facta ad alia repraesentanda, videtur esse +theatricum, sive poeticum, in theatris enim repraesentabantur olim +per aliqua quae ibi gerebantur, quaedam aliorum facta. Ergo videtur +quod huiusmodi non debeant fieri ad cultum Dei. Sed caeremonialia +ordinantur ad cultum Dei, ut dictum est. Ergo caeremonialia non +debent esse figuralia.
+ Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion iii, iv) that "God is worshipped chiefly by faith, hope, and charity." But the precepts + of faith, hope, and charity are not figurative. Therefore the ceremonial precepts should not be figurative. +
[37964] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., quod Deus maxime colitur fide, +spe et caritate. Sed praecepta quae dantur de fide, spe et +caritate, non sunt figuralia. Ergo praecepta caeremonialia non +debent esse figuralia.
+ Objection 4: Further, Our Lord said ( + Jn. 4:24): "God is a spirit, and they that adore Him, must adore Him in spirit and in truth." But a figure is not the very truth: + in fact one is condivided with the other. Therefore the ceremonial precepts, which refer to the Divine worship, should not + be figurative. +
[37965] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, +dominus dicit, Ioan. IV, spiritus est Deus, et eos qui adorant +eum, in spiritu et veritate adorare oportet. Sed figura non est +ipsa veritas, immo contra se invicem dividuntur. Ergo +caeremonialia, quae pertinent ad cultum Dei, non debent esse +figuralia.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle says ( + Col. 2:16,17): "Let no man . . . judge you in meat or in drink, or in respect of a festival day, or of the new moon, or of the sabbaths, + which are a shadow of things to come." +
[37966] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Colos. II, nemo vos iudicet in cibo +aut in potu, aut in parte diei festi aut Neomeniae aut sabbatorum, +quae sunt umbra futurorum.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[1]; Q[99], AA[3],4), the ceremonial precepts are those which refer to the worship of God. Now the Divine worship is twofold: + internal, and external. For since man is composed of soul and body, each of these should be applied to the worship of God; + the soul by an interior worship; the body by an outward worship: hence it is written ( + Ps. 83:3): "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living + God." And as the body is ordained to God through the soul, so the outward worship is ordained to the internal worship. Now + interior worship consists in the soul being united to God by the intellect and affections. Wherefore according to the various + ways in which the intellect and affections of the man who worships God are rightly united to God, his external actions are + applied in various ways to the Divine worship. +
For in the state of future bliss, the human intellect will gaze on the Divine Truth in Itself. Wherefore the external worship + will not consist in anything figurative, but solely in the praise of God, proceeding from the inward knowledge and affection, + according to + Is. 51:3: "Joy and gladness shall be found therein, thanksgiving and the voice of praise." +
But in the present state of life, we are unable to gaze on the Divine Truth in Itself, and we need the ray of Divine light + to shine upon us under the form of certain sensible figures, as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. i); in various ways, however, + according to the various states of human knowledge. For under the Old Law, neither was the Divine Truth manifest in Itself, + nor was the way leading to that manifestation as yet opened out, as the Apostle declares ( + Heb. + 9:8 + ). Hence the external worship of the Old Law needed to be figurative not only of the future truth to be manifested in our + heavenly country, but also of Christ, Who is the way leading to that heavenly manifestation. But under the New Law this way + is already revealed: and therefore it needs no longer to be foreshadowed as something future, but to be brought to our minds + as something past or present: and the truth of the glory to come, which is not yet revealed, alone needs to be + foreshadowed. This is what the Apostle says ( + Heb. 11:1): "The Law has [Vulg.: 'having'] a shadow of the good things to come, not the very image of the things": for a shadow is + less than an image; so that the image belongs to the New Law, but the shadow to the Old. +
[37967] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, praecepta caeremonialia +dicuntur quae ordinantur ad cultum Dei. Est autem duplex cultus +Dei, interior, et exterior. Cum enim homo sit compositus ex anima +et corpore, utrumque debet applicari ad colendum Deum, ut scilicet +anima colat interiori cultu, et corpus exteriori, unde dicitur in +Psalmo LXXXIII, cor meum et caro mea exultaverunt in Deum +vivum. Et sicut corpus ordinatur in Deum per animam, ita cultus +exterior ordinatur ad interiorem cultum. Consistit autem interior +cultus in hoc quod anima coniungatur Deo per intellectum et +affectum. Et ideo secundum quod diversimode intellectus et affectus +colentis Deum Deo recte coniungitur, secundum hoc diversimode +exteriores actus hominis ad cultum Dei applicantur. In statu enim +futurae beatitudinis, intellectus humanus ipsam divinam veritatem +in seipsa intuebitur. Et ideo exterior cultus non consistet in +aliqua figura, sed solum in laude Dei, quae procedit ex interiori +cognitione et affectione; secundum illud Isaiae li, gaudium et +laetitia invenietur in ea, gratiarum actio et vox laudis. In +statu autem praesentis vitae, non possumus divinam veritatem in +seipsa intueri, sed oportet quod radius divinae veritatis nobis +illucescat sub aliquibus sensibilibus figuris, sicut Dionysius +dicit, I cap. Cael. Hier., diversimode tamen, secundum diversum +statum cognitionis humanae. In veteri enim lege neque ipsa divina +veritas in seipsa manifesta erat, neque etiam adhuc propalata erat +via ad hoc perveniendi, sicut apostolus dicit, ad Heb. IX. Et ideo +oportebat exteriorem cultum veteris legis non solum esse +figurativum futurae veritatis manifestandae in patria; sed etiam +esse figurativum Christi, qui est via ducens ad illam patriae +veritatem. Sed in statu novae legis, haec via iam est revelata. +Unde hanc praefigurari non oportet sicut futuram, sed commemorari +oportet per modum praeteriti vel praesentis, sed solum oportet +praefigurari futuram veritatem gloriae nondum revelatam. Et hoc est +quod apostolus dicit, ad Heb. X, umbram habet lex futurorum +bonorum, non ipsam imaginem rerum, umbra enim minus est quam +imago; tanquam imago pertineat ad novam legem, umbra vero ad +veterem.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The things of God are not to be revealed to man except in proportion to his capacity: else he would be in danger of downfall, + were he to despise what he cannot grasp. Hence it was more beneficial that the Divine mysteries should be revealed to uncultured + people under a veil of figures, that thus they might know them at least implicitly by using those figures to the honor of + God. +
[37968] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod divina non sunt revelanda hominibus nisi +secundum eorum capacitatem, alioquin daretur eis praecipitii +materia, dum contemnerent quae capere non possent. Et ideo utilius +fuit ut sub quodam figurarum velamine divina mysteria rudi populo +traderentur, ut sic saltem ea implicite cognoscerent, dum illis +figuris deservirent ad honorem Dei.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Just as human reason fails to grasp poetical expressions on account of their being lacking in truth, so does it fail to grasp + Divine things perfectly, on account of the sublimity of the truth they contain: and therefore in both cases there is need + of signs by means of sensible figures. +
[37969] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut poetica non capiuntur a ratione humana propter +defectum veritatis qui est in eis, ita etiam ratio humana perfecte +capere non potest divina propter excedentem ipsorum veritatem. Et +ideo utrobique opus est repraesentatione per sensibiles +figuras.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Augustine is speaking there of internal worship; to which, however, external worship should be ordained, as stated above. +
[37970] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur de cultu interiore; ad quem +tamen ordinari oportet exteriorem cultum, ut dictum est.
Reply to Objection 4 The same answer applies to the Fourth Objection: because men were taught by Him to practice more perfectly the spiritual + worship of God. +
[37971] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 2 ad 4 Et similiter +dicendum est ad quartum, quia per Christum homines plenius ad +spiritualem Dei cultum sunt introducti.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that there should not have been many ceremonial precepts. For those things which conduce to an end should be + proportionate to that end. But the ceremonial precepts, as stated above ( + AA[1],2), are ordained to the worship of God, and to the foreshadowing of Christ. Now "there is but one God, of Whom are all things + . . . and one Lord Jesus Christ, by Whom are all things" ( + 1 Cor. 8:6). Therefore there + should not have been many ceremonial precepts. +
[37972] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non debuerint esse multa caeremonialia +praecepta. Ea enim quae sunt ad finem, debent esse fini +proportionata. Sed caeremonialia praecepta, sicut dictum est, +ordinantur ad cultum Dei et in figuram Christi. Est autem unus +Deus, a quo omnia; et unus dominus Iesus Christus, per quem +omnia, ut dicitur I ad Cor. VIII. Ergo caeremonialia non +debuerunt multiplicari.
+ Objection 2: Further, the great number of the ceremonial precepts was an occasion of transgression, according to the words of Peter ( + Acts 15:10): "Why tempt you God, to put a yoke upon the necks of the disciples, which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear?" + Now the transgression of the Divine precepts is an obstacle to man's salvation. Since, therefore, every law should conduce + to man's salvation, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 3), it seems + that the ceremonial precepts should not have been given in great number. +
[37973] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +multitudo caeremonialium praeceptorum transgressionis erat occasio; +secundum illud quod dicit Petrus, Act. XV, quid tentatis Deum, +imponere iugum super cervicem discipulorum, quod neque nos, neque +patres nostri, portare potuimus? Sed transgressio divinorum +praeceptorum contrariatur humanae saluti. Cum igitur lex omnis +debeat saluti congruere hominum, ut Isidorus dicit, videtur quod +non debuerint multa praecepta caeremonialia dari.
+ Objection 3: Further, the ceremonial precepts referred to the outward and bodily worship of God, as stated above + (A[2]). But the Law should have lessened this bodily worship: since it directed men to Christ, Who taught them to worship God "in + spirit and in truth," as stated in + Jn. 4:23. Therefore there should not have been many ceremonial precepts. +
[37974] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +praecepta caeremonialia pertinebant ad cultum Dei exteriorem et +corporalem, ut dictum est. Sed huiusmodi cultum corporalem lex +debebat diminuere, quia ordinabat ad Christum, qui docuit homines +Deum colere in spiritu et veritate, ut habetur Ioan. IV. Non ergo +debuerunt multa praecepta caeremonialia dari.
+ On the contrary, ( + Osee 8:12): "I shall write to them [Vulg.: 'him'] My manifold laws"; and ( + Job 11:6): "That He might show thee the secrets of His wisdom, and that His Law is manifold." +
[37975] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Osee VIII, scribam eis multiplices leges +intus; et Iob XI, ut ostenderet tibi secreta sapientiae, +quod multiplex sit lex eius.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + Q[96], A[1]), every law is given to a people. Now a people contains two kinds of men: some, prone to evil, who have to be coerced by + the precepts of the law, as stated above ( + Q[95], A[1]); some, inclined to good, either from nature or from custom, or rather from grace; and the like have to be taught and improved + by means of the precepts of the law. Accordingly, with regard to both kinds of + the law. Accordingly, with regard to both kinds of men it was expedient that the Old Law should contain many ceremonial precepts. + For in that people there were many prone to idolatry; wherefore it was necessary to recall them by means of ceremonial precepts + from the worship of idols to the worship of God. And since men served idols in many ways, it was necessary on the other hand + to devise many means of repressing every single one: and again, to lay many obligations on such like men, in order + that being burdened, as it were, by their duties to the Divine worship, they might have no time for the service of idols. + As to those who were inclined to good, it was again necessary that there should be many ceremonial precepts; both because + thus their mind turned to God in many ways, and more continually; and because the mystery of Christ, which was foreshadowed + by these ceremonial precepts, brought many boons to the world, and afforded men many considerations, which needed to be signified + by various ceremonies. +
[37976] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, omnis lex alicui populo +datur. In populo autem duo genera hominum continentur, quidam proni +ad malum, qui sunt per praecepta legis coercendi, ut supra dictum +est; quidam habentes inclinationem ad bonum, vel ex natura vel ex +consuetudine, vel magis ex gratia; et tales sunt per legis +praeceptum instruendi et in melius promovendi. Quantum igitur ad +utrumque genus hominum, expediebat praecepta caeremonialia in +veteri lege multiplicari. Erant enim in illo populo aliqui ad +idololatriam proni, et ideo necesse erat ut ab idololatriae cultu +per praecepta caeremonialia revocarentur ad cultum Dei. Et quia +multipliciter homines idololatriae deserviebant, oportebat e +contrario multa institui ad singula reprimenda, et iterum multa +talibus imponi, ut, quasi oneratis ex his quae ad cultum Dei +impenderent, non vacaret idololatriae deservire. Ex parte vero +eorum qui erant prompti ad bonum, etiam necessaria fuit +multiplicatio caeremonialium praeceptorum. Tum quia per hoc +diversimode mens eorum referebatur in Deum, et magis assidue. Tum +etiam quia mysterium Christi, quod per huiusmodi caeremonialia +figurabatur, multiplices utilitates attulit mundo, et multa circa +ipsum consideranda erant, quae oportuit per diversa caeremonialia +figurari.
+ Reply to Objection 1: When that which conduces to an end is sufficient to conduce thereto, then one such thing suffices for one end: thus one remedy, + if it be efficacious, suffices sometimes to restore men to health, and then the remedy needs not to be repeated. But when + that which conduces to an end is weak and imperfect, it needs to be multiplied: thus many remedies are given to a sick man, + when one is not enough to heal him. Now the ceremonies of the Old Law were weak + and imperfect, both for representing the mystery of Christ, on account of its surpassing excellence; and for subjugating men's + minds to God. Hence the Apostle says ( + Heb. 7:18,19): "There is a setting aside of the former commandment because of the weakness and unprofitableness thereof, for the law brought + nothing to perfection." Consequently these ceremonies needed to be in great number. +
[37977] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, quando id quod ordinatur ad finem, est +sufficiens ad ducendum in finem, tunc sufficit unum ad unum finem, +sicut una medicina, si sit efficax, sufficit quandoque ad sanitatem +inducendam, et tunc non oportet multiplicari medicinam. Sed propter +debilitatem et imperfectionem eius quod est ad finem, oportet eam +multiplicari, sicut multa remedia adhibentur infirmo, quando unum +non sufficit ad sanandum. Caeremoniae autem veteris legis invalidae +et imperfectae erant et ad repraesentandum Christi mysterium, quod +est superexcellens; et ad subiugandum mentes hominum Deo. Unde +apostolus dicit, ad Heb. VII, reprobatio fit praecedentis +mandati, propter infirmitatem et inutilitatem, nihil enim ad +perfectum adduxit lex. Et ideo oportuit huiusmodi caeremonias +multiplicari.
+ Reply to Objection 2: A wise lawgiver should suffer lesser transgressions, that the greater may be avoided. And therefore, in order to avoid the + sin of idolatry, and the pride which would arise in the hearts of the Jews, were they to fulfil all the precepts of the Law, + the fact that they would in consequence find many occasions of disobedience did not prevent God from giving them many ceremonial + precepts. +
[37978] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod sapientis legislatoris est minores transgressiones +permittere, ut maiores caveantur. Et ideo, ut caveretur +transgressio idololatriae, et superbiae quae in Iudaeorum cordibus +nasceretur si omnia praecepta legis implerent, non propter hoc +praetermisit Deus multa caeremonialia praecepta tradere, quia de +facili sumebant ex hoc transgrediendi occasionem.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The Old Law lessened bodily worship in many ways. Thus it forbade sacrifices to be offered in every place and by any person. + Many such like things did it enact for the lessening of bodily worship; as Rabbi Moses, the Egyptian testifies (Doct. Perplex. + iii). Nevertheless it behooved not to attenuate the bodily worship of God so much as to allow men to fall away into the worship + of idols. +
[37979] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod vetus lex in multis diminuit corporalem cultum. +Propter quod statuit quod non in omni loco sacrificia offerrentur, +neque a quibuslibet. Et multa huiusmodi statuit ad diminutionem +exterioris cultus; sicut etiam Rabbi Moyses Aegyptius dicit. +Oportebat tamen non ita attenuare corporalem cultum Dei, ut homines +ad cultum Daemonum declinarent.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the ceremonies of the Old Law are unsuitably divided into "sacrifices, sacred things, sacraments, and + observances." For the ceremonies of the Old Law foreshadowed Christ. But this was done only by the sacrifices, which foreshadowed + the sacrifice in which Christ "delivered Himself an oblation and a sacrifice to God" ( + Eph. 5:2). Therefore none but the sacrifices were ceremonies. +
[37980] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod caeremoniae veteris legis +inconvenienter dividantur in sacrificia, sacra, sacramenta et +observantias. Caeremoniae enim veteris legis figurabant Christum. +Sed hoc solum fiebat per sacrificia, per quae figurabatur +sacrificium quo Christus se obtulit oblationem et hostiam Deo, ut +dicitur ad Ephes. V. Ergo sola sacrificia erant caeremonialia.
+ Objection 2: Further, the Old Law was ordained to the New. But in the New Law the sacrifice is the Sacrament of the Altar. Therefore in + the Old Law there should be no distinction between "sacrifices" and "sacraments." +
[37981] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +vetus lex ordinabatur ad novam. Sed in nova lege ipsum sacrificium +est sacramentum altaris. Ergo in veteri lege non debuerunt +distingui sacramenta contra sacrificia.
+ Objection 3: Further, a "sacred thing" is something dedicated to God: in which sense the tabernacle and its vessels were said to be consecrated. + But all the ceremonial precepts were ordained to the worship of God, as stated above + (A[1]). Therefore all ceremonies were sacred things. Therefore "sacred things" should not be taken as a part of the ceremonies. +
[37982] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sacrum dicitur quod est Deo dicatum, secundum quem modum +tabernaculum et vasa eius sacrificari dicebantur. Sed omnia +caeremonialia erant ordinata ad cultum Dei, ut dictum est. Ergo +caeremonialia omnia sacra erant. Non ergo una pars caeremonialium +debet sacra nominari.
+ Objection 4: Further, "observances" are so called from having to be observed. But all the precepts of the Law had to be observed: for + it is written ( + Dt. 8:11): "Observe [Douay: 'Take heed'] and beware lest at any time thou forget the Lord thy God, and neglect His commandments and + judgments and ceremonies." Therefore the "observances" should not be considered as a part of the ceremonies. +
[37983] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 4 arg. 4 Praeterea, +observantiae ab observando dicuntur. Sed omnia praecepta legis +observari debebant, dicitur enim Deut. VIII, observa et cave ne +quando obliviscaris domini Dei tui, et negligas mandata eius atque +iudicia et caeremonias. Non ergo observantiae debent poni una +pars caeremonialium.
+ Objection 5: Further, the solemn festivals are reckoned as part of the ceremonial: since they were a shadow of things to come ( + Col. 2:16,17): and the same may be said of the oblations and gifts, as appears from the words of the Apostle ( + Heb. 9:9): and yet these do not seem to be inclined in any of those mentioned above. Therefore the above division of ceremonies is + unsuitable. +
[37984] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 4 arg. 5 Praeterea, +solemnitates inter caeremonialia computantur, cum sint in umbram +futuri, ut patet ad Colos. II. Similiter etiam oblationes et +munera; ut patet per apostolum, ad Heb. IX. Quae tamen sub nullo +horum contineri videntur. Ergo inconveniens est praedicta +distinctio caeremonialium.
+ On the contrary, In the Old Law each of the above is called a ceremony. For the sacrifices are called ceremonies ( + Num. 15:24): "They shall offer a calf . . . and the sacrifices and libations thereof, as the ceremonies require." Of the sacrament of + Order it is written ( + Lev. 7:35): "This is the anointing of Aaron and his sons in the ceremonies." Of sacred things also it is written ( + Ex. 38:21): "These are the + instruments of the tabernacle of the testimony . . . in the ceremonies of the Levites." And again of the observances it is + written ( + 3 Kings 9:6): "If you . . . shall turn away from following Me, and will not observe [Douay: 'keep'] My . . . ceremonies which I have + set before you." +
[37985] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod in veteri lege singula praedicta caeremoniae vocantur. +Sacrificia enim dicuntur caeremoniae Num. XV, offerat vitulum et +sacrificia eius ac libamenta, ut caeremoniae eius postulant. De +sacramento etiam ordinis dicitur Levit. VII, haec est unctio +Aaron et filiorum eius in caeremoniis. De sacris etiam dicitur +Exod. XXXVIII, haec sunt instrumenta tabernaculi testimonii in +caeremoniis Levitarum. De observantiis etiam dicitur III Reg. +IX, si aversi fueritis, non sequentes me, nec observantes +caeremonias quas proposui vobis.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + AA[1],2), the ceremonial precepts are ordained to the Divine worship. Now in this worship we may consider the worship itself, the + worshippers, and the instruments of worship. The worship consists specially in "sacrifices," which are offered up in honor + of God. The instruments of worship refer to the "sacred things," such as the tabernacle, the vessels and so forth. With regard + to the worshippers two points may be + considered. The first point is their preparation for Divine worship, which is effected by a sort of consecration either of + the people or of the ministers; and to this the "sacraments" refer. The second point is their particular mode of life, whereby + they are distinguished from those who do not worship God: and to this pertain the "observances," for instance, in matters + of food, clothing, and so forth. +
[37986] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, caeremonialia praecepta +ordinantur ad cultum Dei. In quo quidem cultu considerari possunt +et ipse cultus, et colentes, et instrumenta colendi. Ipse autem +cultus specialiter consistit in sacrificiis, quae in Dei +reverentiam offeruntur. Instrumenta autem colendi pertinent ad +sacra, sicut est tabernaculum, et vasa, et alia huiusmodi. Ex parte +autem colentium duo possunt considerari. Scilicet et eorum +institutio ad cultum divinum, quod fit per quandam consecrationem +vel populi, vel ministrorum, et ad hoc pertinent sacramenta. Et +iterum eorum singularis conversatio, per quam distinguuntur ab his +qui Deum non colunt, et ad hoc pertinent observantiae, puta in +cibis et vestimentis et aliis huiusmodi.
+ Reply to Objection 1: It was necessary for the sacrifices to be offered both in some certain place and by some certain men: and all this pertained + to the worship of God. Wherefore just as their sacrifices signified Christ the victim, so too their sacraments and sacred + things of the New Law; while their observances foreshadowed the mode of life of the people under the New Law: all of which + things pertain to Christ. +
[37987] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod sacrificia oportebat offerri et in aliquibus +locis, et per aliquos homines, et totum hoc ad cultum Dei pertinet. +Unde sicut per sacrificia significatur Christus immolatus, ita +etiam per sacramenta et sacra illorum figurabantur sacramenta et +sacra novae legis; et per eorum observantias figurabatur +conversatio populi novae legis. Quae omnia ad Christum +pertinent.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The sacrifice of the New Law, viz. the Eucharist, contains Christ Himself, the Author of our Sanctification: for He sanctified + "the people by His own blood" ( + Heb. 13:12). Hence this Sacrifice is also a sacrament. But the sacrifices of the Old Law did not contain Christ, but foreshadowed Him; + hence they are not called sacraments. In order to signify this there were certain sacraments apart from the sacrifices of + the Old Law, which + sacraments were figures of the sanctification to come. Nevertheless to certain consecrations certain sacrifices were united. +
[37988] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod sacrificium novae legis, idest Eucharistia, continet +ipsum Christum, qui est sanctificationis auctor, sanctificavit enim +per suum sanguinem populum, ut dicitur ad Heb. ult. Et ideo hoc +sacrificium etiam est sacramentum. Sed sacrificia veteris legis non +continebant Christum, sed ipsum figurabant, et ideo non dicuntur +sacramenta. Sed ad hoc designandum seorsum erant quaedam sacramenta +in veteri lege, quae erant figurae futurae consecrationis. Quamvis +etiam quibusdam consecrationibus quaedam sacrificia +adiungerentur.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The sacrifices and sacraments were of course sacred things. But certain things were sacred, through being dedicated to the + Divine worship, and yet were not sacrifices or sacraments: wherefore they retained the common designation of sacred things. +
[37989] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod etiam sacrificia et sacramenta erant sacra. Sed +quaedam erant quae erant sacra, utpote ad cultum Dei dicata, nec +tamen erant sacrificia nec sacramenta, et ideo retinebant sibi +commune nomen sacrorum.
+ Reply to Objection 4: Those things which pertained to the mode of life of the people who worshipped God, retained the common designation of observances, + in so far as they fell short of the above. For they were not called sacred things, because they had no immediate connection + with the worship of God, such as the tabernacle and its vessels had. But by a sort of consequence they were matters of ceremony, + in so far as they affected the fitness of the people who worshipped + God. +
[37990] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 4 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod ea quae pertinebant ad conversationem populi colentis +Deum, retinebant sibi commune nomen observantiarum, inquantum a +praemissis deficiebant. Non enim dicebantur sacra, quia non +habebant immediatum respectum ad cultum Dei, sicut tabernaculum et +vasa eius. Sed per quandam consequentiam erant caeremonialia, +inquantum pertinebant ad quandam idoneitatem populi colentis +Deum.
+ Reply to Objection 5: Just as the sacrifices were offered in a fixed place, so were they offered at fixed times: for which reason the solemn festivals + seem to be reckoned among the sacred things. The oblations and gifts are counted together with the sacrifices; hence the Apostle + says ( + Heb. 5:1): "Every high-priest taken from among men, is ordained for men in things that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts + and sacrifices." +
[37991] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 4 ad 5 Ad quintum +dicendum quod, sicut sacrificia offerebantur in determinato loco +ita etiam offerebantur in determinatis temporibus, unde etiam +solemnitates inter sacra computari videntur. Oblationes autem et +munera computantur cum sacrificiis, quia Deo offerebantur, unde +apostolus dicit, ad Heb. V, omnis pontifex ex hominibus +assumptus, pro hominibus constituitur in his quae sunt ad Deum, ut +offerat dona et sacrificia.
We must now consider the causes of the ceremonial precepts: under which head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there was any cause for the ceremonial precepts?
(2) Whether the cause of the ceremonial precepts was literal or figurative?
(3) The causes of the sacrifices;
(4) The causes of the sacrifices;
+[37992] Iª-IIae q. 102 pr. Deinde +considerandum est de causis caeremonialium praeceptorum. Et circa +hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum praecepta caeremonialia habeant +causam. Secundo, utrum habeant causam litteralem, vel solum +figuralem. Tertio, de causis sacrificiorum. Quarto, de causis +sacramentorum. Quinto, de causis sacrorum. Sexto, de causis +observantiarum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that there was no cause for the ceremonial precepts. Because on + Eph. 2:15, "Making void the law of the commandments," the gloss says, (i.e.) "making void the Old Law as to the carnal observances, + by substituting decrees, i.e. evangelical precepts, which are based on reason." But if the observances of the Old Law were + based on reason, it would have been useless to void them by the reasonable decrees of the New Law. Therefore + there was no reason for the ceremonial observances of the Old Law. +
[37993] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod caeremonialia praecepta non habeant +causam. Quia super illud Ephes. II, legem mandatorum decretis +evacuans, dicit Glossa, idest, evacuans legem veterem quantum ad +carnales observantias, decretis, idest praeceptis evangelicis, quae +ex ratione sunt. Sed si observantiae veteris legis ex ratione +erant, frustra evacuarentur per rationabilia decreta novae legis. +Non ergo caeremoniales observantiae veteris legis habebant aliquam +rationem.
+ Objection 2: Further, the Old Law succeeded the law of nature. But in the law of nature there was a precept for which there was no reason + save that man's obedience might be tested; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 6,13), concerning the prohibition about the + tree of life. Therefore in the Old Law there should have been some precepts for the purpose of testing man's obedience, having + no reason in themselves. +
[37994] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +vetus lex successit legi naturae. Sed in lege naturae fuit aliquod +praeceptum quod nullam rationem habebat nisi ut hominis obedientia +probaretur; sicut Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., de +prohibitione ligni vitae. Ergo etiam in veteri lege aliqua +praecepta danda erant in quibus hominis obedientia probaretur, quae +de se nullam rationem haberent.
+ Objection 3: Further, man's works are called moral according as they proceed from reason. If therefore there is any reason for the ceremonial + precepts, they would not differ from the moral precepts. It seems therefore that there was no cause for the ceremonial precepts: + for the reason of a precept is taken from some cause. +
[37995] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +opera hominis dicuntur moralia secundum quod sunt a ratione. Si +igitur caeremonialium praeceptorum sit aliqua ratio, non different +a moralibus praeceptis. Videtur ergo quod caeremonialia praecepta +non habeant aliquam causam, ratio enim praecepti ex aliqua causa +sumitur.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Ps. 18:9): "The commandment of the Lord is lightsome, enlightening the eyes." But the ceremonial precepts are commandments of God. + Therefore they are lightsome: and yet they would not be so, if they had no reasonable cause. Therefore the ceremonial precepts + have a reasonable cause. +
[37996] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur in Psalmo XVIII, praeceptum domini lucidum, +illuminans oculos. Sed caeremonialia sunt praecepta Dei. Ergo +sunt lucida. Quod non esset nisi haberent rationabilem causam. Ergo +praecepta caeremonialia habent rationabilem causam.
+ I answer that, Since, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 2), it is the function of a "wise man to do everything in order," those things + which proceed from the Divine wisdom must needs be well ordered, as the Apostle states ( + Rom. 13:1). Now there are two conditions required for things to be well ordered. First, that they be ordained to their due end, which + is the principle of the whole order in matters of action: since those things that happen by + chance outside the intention of the end, or which are not done seriously but for fun, are said to be inordinate. Secondly, + that which is done in view of the end should be proportionate to the end. From this it follows that the reason for whatever + conduces to the end is taken from the end: thus the reason for the disposition of a saw is taken from cutting, which is its + end, as stated in Phys. ii, 9. Now it is evident that the ceremonial precepts, like all the other precepts of the Law, were + institutions of Divine wisdom: hence it is written ( + Dt. 4:6): "This is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of nations." Consequently we must needs say that the ceremonial precepts + were ordained to a certain end, wherefrom their reasonable causes can be gathered. +
[37997] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, cum sapientis sit ordinare, secundum philosophum, in +I Metaphys., ea quae ex divina sapientia procedunt, oportet esse +ordinata, ut apostolus dicit, ad Rom. XIII. Ad hoc autem quod +aliqua sint ordinata, duo requiruntur. Primo quidem, quod aliqua +ordinentur ad debitum finem, qui est principium totius ordinis in +rebus agendis, ea enim quae casu eveniunt praeter intentionem +finis, vel quae non serio fiunt sed ludo, dicimus esse inordinata. +Secundo oportet quod id quod est ad finem, sit proportionatum fini. +Et ex hoc sequitur quod ratio eorum quae sunt ad finem, sumitur ex +fine, sicut ratio dispositionis serrae sumitur ex sectione, quae +est finis eius, ut dicitur in II Physic. Manifestum est autem quod +praecepta caeremonialia, sicut et omnia alia praecepta legis, sunt +ex divina sapientia instituta, unde dicitur Deut. IV, haec est +sapientia vestra et intellectus coram populis. Unde necesse est +dicere quod praecepta caeremonialia sint ordinata ad aliquem finem, +ex quo eorum rationabiles causae assignari possunt.
+ Reply to Objection 1: It may be said there was no reason for the observances of the Old Law, in the sense that there was no reason in the very + nature of the thing done: for instance that a garment should not be made of wool and linen. But there could be a reason for + them in relation to something else: namely, in so far as something was signified or excluded thereby. On the other hand, the + decrees of the New Law, which refer chiefly to faith and the love of God, are + reasonable from the very nature of the act. +
[37998] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod observantiae veteris legis possunt dici sine +ratione quantum ad hoc, quod ipsa facta in sui natura rationem non +habebant, puta quod vestis non conficeretur ex lana et lino. +Poterant tamen habere rationem ex ordine ad aliud, inquantum +scilicet vel aliquid per hoc figurabatur, vel aliquid excludebatur. +Sed decreta novae legis, quae praecipue consistunt in fide et +dilectione Dei, ex ipsa natura actus rationabilia sunt.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The reason for the prohibition concerning the tree of knowledge of good and evil was not that this tree was naturally evil: + and yet this prohibition was reasonable in its relation to something else, in as much as it signified something. And so also + the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law were reasonable on account of their relation to something else. +
[37999] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod prohibitio ligni scientiae boni et mali non fuit +propter hoc quod illud lignum esset naturaliter malum, sed tamen +ipsa prohibitio habuit aliquam rationem ex ordine ad aliud, +inquantum scilicet per hoc aliquid figurabatur. Et sic etiam +caeremonialia praecepta veteris legis habent rationem in ordine ad +aliud.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The moral precepts in their very nature have reasonable causes: as for instance, "Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal." + But the ceremonial precepts have a reasonable cause in their relation to something else, as stated above. +
[38000] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod praecepta moralia secundum suam naturam habent +rationabiles causas, sicut, non occides, non furtum facies. Sed +praecepta caeremonialia habent rationabiles causas ex ordine ad +aliud, ut dictum est.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the ceremonial precepts have not a literal, but merely a figurative cause. For among the ceremonial precepts, + the chief was circumcision and the sacrifice of the paschal lamb. But neither of these had any but a figurative cause: because + each was given as a sign. For it is written ( + Gn. 17:11): "You shall circumcise the flesh of your foreskin, that it may be a sign of the covenant between Me and you": and of the + celebration of the Passover it is written ( + Ex. 13:9): "It shall be as a sign in thy hand, and as a memorial before thy eyes." Therefore much more did the other ceremonial precepts + have none but a figurative reason. +
[38001] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad +secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praecepta caeremonialia non +habeant causam litteralem, sed figuralem tantum. Inter praecepta +enim caeremonialia praecipua erant circumcisio, et immolatio agni +paschalis. Sed utrumque istorum non habebat nisi causam figuralem, +quia utrumque istorum datum est in signum. Dicitur enim Gen. XVII, +circumcidetis carnem praeputii vestri, ut sit in signum foederis +inter me et vos. Et de celebratione phase dicitur Exod. XIII, +erit quasi signum in manu tua, et quasi monumentum ante oculos +tuos. Ergo multo magis alia caeremonialia non habent nisi +causam figuralem.
+ Objection 2: Further, an effect is proportionate to its cause. But all the ceremonial precepts are figurative, as stated above ( + Q[101], A[2]). Therefore they have no other than a figurative cause. +
[38002] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +effectus proportionatur suae causae. Sed omnia caeremonialia sunt +figuralia, ut supra dictum est. Ergo non habent nisi causam +figuralem.
+ Objection 3: Further, if it be a matter of indifference whether a certain thing, considered in itself, be done in a particular way or + not, it seems that it has not a literal cause. Now there are certain points in the ceremonial precepts, which appear to be + a matter of indifference, as to whether they be done in one way or in another: for instance, the number of animals to be offered, + and other such particular circumstances. Therefore there is no literal cause for the + precepts of the Old Law. +
[38003] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +illud quod de se est indifferens utrum sic vel non sic fiat, non +videtur habere aliquam litteralem causam. Sed quaedam sunt in +praeceptis caeremonialibus quae non videntur differre utrum sic vel +sic fiant, sicut est de numero animalium offerendorum, et aliis +huiusmodi particularibus circumstantiis. Ergo praecepta veteris +legis non habent rationem litteralem.
+ On the contrary, Just as the ceremonial precepts foreshadowed Christ, so did the stories of the Old Testament: for it is written ( + 1 Cor. 10:11) that "all (these things) happened to them in figure." Now in the stories of the Old Testament, besides the mystical or figurative, + there is the literal sense. Therefore the ceremonial precepts had also literal, besides their figurative causes. +
[38004] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra, +sicut praecepta caeremonialia figurabant Christum, ita etiam +historiae veteris testamenti, dicitur enim I ad Cor. X, quod omnia +in figuram contingebant illis. Sed in historiis veteris testamenti, +praeter intellectum mysticum seu figuralem, est etiam intellectus +litteralis. Ergo etiam praecepta caeremonialia, praeter causas +figurales, habebant etiam causas litterales.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[1]), the reason for whatever conduces to an end must be taken from that end. Now the end of the ceremonial precepts was twofold: + for they were ordained to the Divine worship, for that particular time, and to the foreshadowing of Christ; just as the words + of the prophets regarded the time being in such a way as to be utterances figurative of the time to come, as Jerome says on + Osee 1:3. + Accordingly the reasons for the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law can be taken in two ways. First, in respect of the Divine + worship which was to be observed for that particular time: and these reasons are literal: whether they refer to the shunning + of idolatry; or recall certain Divine benefits; or remind men of the Divine excellence; or point out the disposition of mind + which was then required in those who worshipped God. Secondly, their reasons can be gathered from the point of view of their + being ordained to foreshadow Christ: and thus their reasons are figurative and mystical: whether they be taken from Christ + Himself and the Church, which pertains to the allegorical sense; or to the morals of the Christian people, which pertains + to the moral sense; or to the state of future glory, in as much as we are brought thereto by Christ, which refers to the anagogical + sense. +
[38005] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ratio eorum quae sunt ad +finem, oportet quod a fine sumatur. Finis autem praeceptorum +caeremonialium est duplex, ordinabatur enim ad cultum Dei pro +tempore illo, et ad figurandum Christum; sicut etiam verba +prophetarum sic respiciebant praesens tempus, quod etiam in figuram +futuri dicebantur, ut Hieronymus dicit, super Osee. Sic igitur +rationes praeceptorum caeremonialium veteris legis dupliciter +accipi possunt. Uno modo, ex ratione cultus divini qui erat pro +tempore illo observandus. Et rationes istae sunt litterales, sive +pertineant ad vitandum idololatriae cultum; sive ad rememoranda +aliqua Dei beneficia; sive ad insinuandam excellentiam divinam; vel +etiam ad designandam dispositionem mentis quae tunc requirebatur in +colentibus Deum. Alio modo possunt eorum rationes assignari +secundum quod ordinantur ad figurandum Christum. Et sic habent +rationes figurales et mysticas, sive accipiantur ex ipso Christo et +Ecclesia, quod pertinet ad allegoriam; sive ad mores populi +Christiani, quod pertinet ad moralitatem; sive ad statum futurae +gloriae, prout in eam introducimur per Christum, quod pertinet ad +anagogiam.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Just as the use of metaphorical expressions in Scripture belongs to the literal sense, because the words are employed in + order to convey that particular meaning; so also the meaning of those legal ceremonies which commemorated certain Divine benefits, + on account of which they were instituted, and of others similar which belonged to that time, does not go beyond the order + of literal causes. Consequently when we assert that the cause of the celebration + of the Passover was its signification of the delivery from Egypt, or that circumcision was a sign of God's covenant with Abraham, + we assign the literal cause. +
[38006] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut intellectus metaphoricae locutionis in +Scripturis est litteralis, quia verba ad hoc proferuntur ut hoc +significent; ita etiam significationes caeremoniarum legis quae +sunt commemorativae beneficiorum Dei propter quae instituta sunt, +vel aliorum huiusmodi quae ad illum statum pertinebant, non +transcendunt ordinem litteralium causarum. Unde quod assignetur +causa celebrationis phase quia est signum liberationis ex Aegypto, +et quod circumcisio est signum pacti quod Deus habuit cum Abraham, +pertinet ad causam litteralem.
+ Reply to Objection 2: This argument would avail if the ceremonial precepts had been given merely as figures of things to come, and not for the + purpose of worshipping God then and there. +
[38007] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si caeremonialia praecepta +essent data solum ad figurandum futurum, non autem ad +praesentialiter Deum colendum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: As we have stated when speaking of human laws ( + Q[96], AA[1] ,6), there is a reason for them in the abstract, but not in regard to particular conditions, which depend on the judgment + of those who frame them; so also many particular determinations in the ceremonies of the Old Law have no literal cause, but + only a figurative cause; whereas in the abstract they have a literal cause. +
[38008] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut in legibus humanis dictum est quod in +universali habent rationem, non autem quantum ad particulares +conditiones, sed haec sunt ex arbitrio instituentium; ita etiam +multae particulares determinationes in caeremoniis veteris legis +non habent aliquam causam litteralem, sed solam figuralem; in +communi vero habent etiam causam litteralem.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that no suitable cause can be assigned for the ceremonies pertaining to sacrifices. For those things which + were offered in sacrifice, are those which are necessary for sustaining human life: such as certain animals and certain loaves. + But God needs no such sustenance; according to + Ps. 49:13: "Shall I eat the flesh of bullocks? Or shall I drink the blood of goats?" Therefore such sacrifices were unfittingly offered + to God. +
[38009] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non possit conveniens ratio assignari +caeremoniarum quae ad sacrificia pertinent. Ea enim quae in +sacrificium offerebantur, sunt illa quae sunt necessaria ad +sustentandam humanam vitam, sicut animalia quaedam, et panes +quidam. Sed tali sustentamento Deus non indiget; secundum illud +Psalmi XLIX, numquid manducabo carnes taurorum, aut sanguinem +hircorum potabo? Ergo inconvenienter huiusmodi sacrificia Deo +offerebantur.
+ Objection 2: Further, only three kinds of quadrupeds were offered in sacrifice to God, viz. oxen, sheep and goats; of birds, generally + the turtledove and the dove; but specially, in the cleansing of a leper, an offering was made of sparrows. Now many other + animals are more noble than these. Since therefore whatever is best should be offered to God, it seems that not only of these + three should sacrifices have been offered to Him. +
[38010] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +in sacrificium divinum non offerebantur nisi de tribus generibus +animalium quadrupedum, scilicet de genere bovum, ovium et caprarum; +et de avibus, communiter quidem turtur et columba; specialiter +autem in emundatione leprosi fiebat sacrificium de passeribus. +Multa autem alia animalia sunt eis nobiliora. Cum igitur omne quod +est optimum Deo sit exhibendum, videtur quod non solum de istis +rebus fuerint Deo sacrificia offerenda.
+ Objection 3: Further, just as man has received from God the dominion over birds and beasts, so also has he received dominion over fishes. + Consequently it was unfitting for fishes to be excluded from the divine sacrifices. +
[38011] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sicut homo a Deo habet dominium volatilium et bestiarum, ita etiam +piscium. Inconvenienter igitur pisces a divino sacrificio +excludebantur.
+ Objection 4: Further, turtledoves and doves indifferently are commanded to be offered up. Since then the young of the dove are commanded + to be offered, so also should the young of the turtledove. +
[38012] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 4 Praeterea, +indifferenter offerri mandantur turtures et columbae. Sicut igitur +mandantur offerri pulli columbarum, ita etiam pulli turturum.
+ Objection 5: Further, God is the Author of life, not only of men, but also of animals, as is clear from + Gn. 1:20, seqq. Now death is opposed to life. Therefore it was fitting that living animals rather than slain animals should be offered + to God, especially as the Apostle admonishes us ( + Rom. 12:1), to present our bodies "a living sacrifice, holy, pleasing unto God." +
[38013] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 5 Praeterea, +Deus est auctor vitae non solum hominum, sed etiam animalium; ut +patet per id quod dicitur Gen. I. Mors autem opponitur vitae. Non +ergo debuerunt Deo offerri animalia occisa, sed magis animalia +viventia. Praecipue quia etiam apostolus monet, Rom. XII, ut +exhibeamus nostra corpora hostiam viventem, sanctam, Deo +placentem.
+ Objection 6: Further, if none but slain animals were offered in sacrifice to God, it seems that it mattered not how they were slain. Therefore + it was unfitting that the manner of immolation should be determined, especially as regards birds ( + Lev. 1:15, seqq.). +
[38014] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 6 Praeterea, +si animalia Deo in sacrificium non offerebantur nisi occisa, nulla +videtur esse differentia qualiter occidantur. Inconvenienter igitur +determinatur modus immolationis, praecipue in avibus, ut patet +Levit. I.
+ Objection 7: Further, every defect in an animal is a step towards corruption and death. If therefore slain animals were offered to God, + it was unreasonable to forbid the offering of an imperfect animal, e.g. a lame, or a blind, or otherwise defective animal. +
[38015] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 7 Praeterea, +omnis defectus animalis via est ad corruptionem et mortem. Si +igitur animalia occisa Deo offerebantur, inconveniens fuit +prohibere oblationem animalis imperfecti, puta claudi aut caeci, +aut aliter maculosi.
+ Objection 8: Further, those who offer victims to God should partake thereof, according to the words of the Apostle ( + 1 Cor. 10:18): "Are not they that eat of the sacrifices partakers of the altar?" It was therefore unbecoming for the offerers to be denied + certain parts of the victims, namely, the blood, the fat, the breastbone and the right shoulder. +
[38016] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 8 Praeterea, +illi qui offerunt hostias Deo, debent de his participare; secundum +illud apostoli, I Cor. X, nonne qui edunt hostias, participes +sunt altaris? Inconvenienter igitur quaedam partes hostiarum +offerentibus subtrahebantur, scilicet sanguis et adeps, et +pectusculum et armus dexter.
+ Objection 9: Further, just as holocausts were offered up in honor of God, so also were the peace-offerings and sin-offerings. But no female + animals was offered up to God as a holocaust, although holocausts were offered of both quadrupeds and birds. Therefore it + was inconsistent that female animals should be offered up in peace-offerings and sin-offerings, and that nevertheless birds + should not be offered up in peace-offerings. +
[38017] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 9 Praeterea, +sicut holocausta offerebantur in honorem Dei, ita etiam hostiae +pacificae et hostiae pro peccato. Sed nullum animal feminini sexus +offerebatur Deo in holocaustum, fiebant tamen holocausta tam de +quadrupedibus quam de avibus. Ergo inconvenienter in hostiis +pacificis et pro peccato offerebantur animalia feminini sexus; et +tamen in hostiis pacificis non offerebantur aves.
+ Objection 10: Further, all the peace-offerings seem to be of one kind. Therefore it was unfitting to make a distinction among them, so + that it was forbidden to eat the flesh of certain peace-offerings on the following day, while it was allowed to eat the flesh + of other peace-offerings, as laid down in + Lev. 7:15, seqq. +
[38018] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 10 +Praeterea, omnes hostiae pacificae unius generis esse videntur. Non +ergo debuit poni ista differentia, quod quorundam pacificorum +carnes non possent vesci in crastino, quorundam autem possent, ut +mandatur Levit. VII.
+ Objection 11: Further, all sins agree in turning us from God. Therefore, in order to reconcile us to God, one kind of sacrifice should + have been offered up for all sins. +
[38019] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 11 +Praeterea, omnia peccata in hoc conveniunt quod a Deo avertunt. +Ergo pro omnibus peccatis, in Dei reconciliationem, unum genus +sacrificii debuit offerri.
+ Objection 12: Further, all animals that were offered up in sacrifice, were offered up in one way, viz. slain. Therefore it does not seem + to be suitable that products of the soil should be offered up in various ways; for sometimes an offering was made of ears + of corn, sometimes of flour, sometimes of bread, this being baked sometimes in an oven, sometimes in a pan, sometimes on a + gridiron. +
[38020] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 12 +Praeterea, omnia animalia quae offerebantur in sacrificium, uno +modo offerebantur, scilicet occisa. Non videtur ergo conveniens +quod de terrae nascentibus diversimode fiebat oblatio, nunc enim +offerebantur spicae, nunc simila, nunc panis, quandoque quidem +coctus in clibano, quandoque in sartagine, quandoque in +craticula.
+ Objection 13: Further, whatever things are serviceable to us should be recognized as coming from God. It was therefore unbecoming that + besides animals, nothing but bread, wine, oil, incense, and salt should be offered to God. +
[38021] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 13 +Praeterea, omnia quae in usum nostrum veniunt, a Deo recognoscere +debemus. Inconvenienter ergo praeter animalia, solum haec Deo +offerebantur, panis, vinum, oleum, thus et sal.
+ Objection 14: Further, bodily sacrifices denote the inward sacrifice of the heart, whereby man offers his soul to God. But in the inward + sacrifice, the sweetness, which is denoted by honey, surpasses the pungency which salt represents; for it is written ( + Ecclus. 24:27): "My spirit is sweet above honey." Therefore it was unbecoming that the use of honey, and of leaven which makes bread savory, + should be forbidden in a sacrifice; while the use was + prescribed, of salt which is pungent, and of incense which has a bitter taste. Consequently it seems that things pertaining + to the ceremonies of the sacrifices have no reasonable cause. +
[38022] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 14 +Praeterea, sacrificia corporalia exprimunt interius sacrificium +cordis, quo homo spiritum suum offert Deo. Sed in interiori +sacrificio plus est de dulcedine, quam repraesentat mel, quam de +mordacitate, quam repraesentat sal, dicitur enim Eccli. XXIV, +spiritus meus super mel dulcis. Ergo inconvenienter +prohibebatur in sacrificio apponi mel et fermentum, quod etiam +facit panem sapidum; et praecipiebatur ibi apponi sal, quod est +mordicativum, et thus, quod habet saporem amarum. Videtur ergo quod +ea quae pertinent ad caeremonias sacrificiorum, non habeant +rationabilem causam.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Lev. 1:13): "The priest shall offer it all and burn it all upon the altar, for a holocaust, and most sweet savor to the Lord." Now + according to + Wis. 7:28, "God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom": whence it seems to follow that whatever is acceptable to God is wisely + done. Therefore these ceremonies of the sacrifices were wisely done, as having reasonable causes. +
[38023] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Levit. I, oblata omnia adolebit sacerdos super +altare in holocaustum et odorem suavissimum domino. Sed sicut +dicitur Sap. VII, neminem diligit Deus nisi qui cum sapientia +inhabitat, ex quo potest accipi quod quidquid est Deo acceptum, +est cum sapientia. Ergo illae caeremoniae sacrificiorum cum +sapientia erant, velut habentes rationabiles causas.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[2]), the ceremonies of the Old Law had a twofold cause, viz. a literal cause, according as they were intended for Divine worship; + and a figurative or mystical cause, according as they were intended to foreshadow Christ: and on either hand the ceremonies + pertaining to the sacrifices can be assigned to a fitting cause. +
For, according as the ceremonies of the sacrifices were intended for the divine worship, the causes of the sacrifices can + be taken in two ways. First, in so far as the sacrifice represented the directing of the mind to God, to which the offerer + of the sacrifice was stimulated. Now in order to direct his mind to God aright, man must recognize that whatever he has is + from God as from its first principle, and direct it to God as its last end. This was denoted in the offerings and + sacrifices, by the fact that man offered some of his own belongings in honor of God, as though in recognition of his having + received them from God, according to the saying of David (1 Paral. xxix, 14): "All things are Thine: and we have given Thee + what we received of Thy hand." Wherefore in offering up sacrifices man made protestation that God is the first principle of + the creation of all things, and their last end, to which all things must be directed. And since, for the human mind to be + directed to God aright, it must recognize no first author of things other than God, nor place its end in any other; for this + reason it was forbidden in the Law to offer sacrifice to any other but God, according to + Ex. 22:20: "He that sacrificeth to gods, shall be put to death, save only to the Lord." Wherefore another reasonable cause may be assigned + to the ceremonies of the sacrifices, from the fact that thereby men were withdrawn from offering sacrifices to idols. Hence + too it is that the precepts about the sacrifices were not given to the Jewish people until after they had fallen into idolatry, + by worshipping the molten calf: as though those sacrifices were instituted, that the people, being ready to offer sacrifices, + might offer those sacrifices to God rather than to idols. Thus it is written ( + Jer. 7:22): "I spake not to your fathers and I commanded them not, in the day that I brought them out of the land of Egypt, concerning + the matter + of burnt-offerings and sacrifices." +
Now of all the gifts which God vouchsafed to mankind after they had fallen away by sin, the chief is that He gave His Son; + wherefore it is written ( + Jn. 3:16): "God so loved the world, as to give His only-begotten Son; that whosoever believeth in Him, may not perish, but may have + life everlasting." Consequently the chief sacrifice is that whereby Christ Himself "delivered Himself . . . to God for an + odor of sweetness" ( + Eph. 5:2). And for this reason all the + other sacrifices of the Old Law were offered up in order to foreshadow this one individual and paramount sacrifice---the imperfect + forecasting the perfect. Hence the Apostle says ( + Heb. 10:11) that the priest of the Old Law "often" offered "the same sacrifices, which can never take away sins: but" Christ offered + "one sacrifice for sins, for ever." And since the reason of the figure is taken from that which the figure represents, therefore + the reasons of the figurative + sacrifices of the Old Law should be taken from the true sacrifice of Christ. +
[38024] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, caeremoniae veteris legis +duplicem causam habebant, unam scilicet litteralem, secundum quod +ordinabantur ad cultum Dei; aliam vero figuralem, sive mysticam, +secundum quod ordinabantur ad figurandum Christum. Et ex utraque +parte potest convenienter assignari causa caeremoniarum quae ad +sacrificia pertinebant. Secundum enim quod sacrificia ordinabantur +ad cultum Dei, causa sacrificiorum dupliciter accipi potest. Uno +modo, secundum quod per sacrificia repraesentabatur ordinatio +mentis in Deum, ad quam excitabatur sacrificium offerens. Ad rectam +autem ordinationem mentis in Deum pertinet quod omnia quae homo +habet, recognoscat a Deo tanquam a primo principio, et ordinet in +Deum tanquam in ultimum finem. Et hoc repraesentabatur in +oblationibus et sacrificiis, secundum quod homo ex rebus suis, +quasi in recognitionem quod haberet ea a Deo, in honorem Dei ea +offerebat; secundum quod dixit David, I Paral. XXIX, tua sunt +omnia; et quae de manu tua accepimus, dedimus tibi. Et ideo in +oblatione sacrificiorum protestabatur homo quod Deus esset primum +principium creationis rerum et ultimus finis, ad quem essent omnia +referenda. Et quia pertinet ad rectam ordinationem mentis in Deum +ut mens humana non recognoscat alium primum auctorem rerum nisi +solum Deum, neque in aliquo alio finem suum constituat; propter hoc +prohibebatur in lege offerre sacrificium alicui alteri nisi Deo, +secundum illud Exod. XXII, qui immolat diis, occidetur, praeter +domino soli. Et ideo de causa caeremoniarum circa sacrificia +potest assignari ratio alio modo, ex hoc quod per huiusmodi homines +retrahebantur a sacrificiis idolorum. Unde etiam praecepta de +sacrificiis non fuerunt data populo Iudaeorum nisi postquam +declinavit ad idololatriam, adorando vitulum conflatilem, quasi +huiusmodi sacrificia sint instituta ut populus ad sacrificandum +promptus, huiusmodi sacrificia magis Deo quam idolis offerret. Unde +dicitur Ierem. VII, non sum locutus cum patribus vestris, et non +praecepi eis, in die qua eduxi eos de terra Aegypti, de verbo +holocautomatum et victimarum. Inter omnia autem dona quae Deus +humano generi iam per peccatum lapso dedit, praecipuum est quod +dedit filium suum, unde dicitur Ioan. III, sic Deus dilexit +mundum ut filium suum unigenitum daret, ut omnis qui credit in +ipsum non pereat, sed habeat vitam aeternam. Et ideo potissimum +sacrificium est quo ipse Christus seipsum obtulit Deo in odorem +suavitatis, ut dicitur ad Ephes. V. Et propter hoc omnia alia +sacrificia offerebantur in veteri lege ut hoc unum singulare et +praecipuum sacrificium figuraretur, tanquam perfectum per +imperfecta. Unde apostolus dicit, ad Heb. X, quod sacerdos +veteris legis easdem saepe offerebat hostias, quae nunquam possunt +auferre peccata, Christus autem pro peccatis obtulit unam in +sempiternum. Et quia ex figurato sumitur ratio figurae, ideo +rationes sacrificiorum figuralium veteris legis sunt sumendae ex +vero sacrificio Christi.
+ Reply to Objection 1: God did not wish these sacrifices to be offered to Him on account of the things themselves that were offered, as though He + stood in need of them: wherefore it is written ( + Is. 1:11): "I desire not holocausts of rams, and fat of fatlings, and blood of calves and lambs and buckgoats." But, as stated above, + He wished them to be offered to Him, in order to prevent idolatry; in order to signify the right ordering of man's mind to + God; + and in order to represent the mystery of the Redemption of man by Christ. +
[38025] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Deus non volebat huiusmodi sacrificia sibi +offerri propter ipsas res quae offerebantur, quasi eis indigeret, +unde dicitur Isaiae I, holocausta arietum, et adipem pinguium, +et sanguinem vitulorum et hircorum et agnorum, nolui. Sed +volebat ea sibi offerri, ut supra dictum est, tum ad excludendam +idololatriam; tum ad significandum debitum ordinem mentis humanae +in Deum; tum etiam ad figurandum mysterium redemptionis humanae +factae per Christum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: In all the respects mentioned above (ad 1), there was a suitable reason for these animals, rather than others, being offered + in sacrifice to God. First, in order to prevent idolatry. Because idolaters offered all other animals to their gods, or made + use of them in their sorceries: while the Egyptians (among whom the people had been dwelling) considered it abominable to + slay these animals, wherefore they used not to offer them in sacrifice to their + gods. Hence it is written ( + Ex. 8:26): "We shall sacrifice the abominations of the Egyptians to the Lord our God." For they worshipped the sheep; they reverenced + the ram (because demons appeared under the form thereof); while they employed oxen for agriculture, which was reckoned by + them as something sacred. +
Secondly, this was suitable for the aforesaid right ordering of man's mind to God: and in two ways. First, because it is + chiefly by means of these animals that human life is sustained: and moreover they are most clean, and partake of a most clean + food: whereas other animals are either wild, and not deputed to ordinary use among men: or, if they be tame, they have unclean + food, as pigs and geese: and nothing but what is clean should be offered to God. These birds especially were + offered in sacrifice because there were plenty of them in the land of promise. Secondly, because the sacrificing of these + animals represented purity of heart. Because as the gloss says on + Lev. 1, "We offer a calf, when we overcome the pride of the flesh; a lamb, when we restrain our unreasonable motions; a goat, when + we conquer wantonness; a turtledove, when we keep chaste; unleavened bread, when we feast on the unleavened bread of sincerity." + And it is evident that the dove denotes charity and + simplicity of heart. +
Thirdly, it was fitting that these animals should be offered, that they might foreshadow Christ. Because, as the gloss observes, + "Christ is offered in the calf, to denote the strength of the cross; in the lamb, to signify His innocence; in the ram, to + foreshadow His headship; and in the goat, to signify the likeness of 'sinful flesh' [*An allusion to + Col. 2:11 (Textus Receptus)]. The turtledove and dove denoted the union of the two natures"; or else the turtledove signified + chastity; while the dove was a figure of charity. "The wheat-flour foreshadowed the sprinkling of believers with the water + of Baptism." +
[38026] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod quantum ad omnia praedicta, conveniens ratio fuit +quare ista animalia offerebantur Deo in sacrificium, et non alia. +Primo quidem, ad excludendum idololatriam. Quia omnia alia animalia +offerebant idololatrae diis suis, vel eis ad maleficia utebantur, +ista autem animalia apud Aegyptios, cum quibus conversati erant, +abominabilia erant ad occidendum, unde ea non offerebant in +sacrificium diis suis; unde dicitur Exod. VIII, abominationes +Aegyptiorum immolabimus domino Deo nostro. Oves enim colebant; +hircos venerabantur, quia in eorum figura Daemones apparebant; +bobus autem utebantur ad agriculturam, quam inter res sacras +habebant. Secundo, hoc conveniens erat ad praedictam ordinationem +mentis in Deum. Et hoc dupliciter. Primo quidem, quia huiusmodi +animalia maxime sunt per quae sustentatur humana vita, et cum hoc +mundissima sunt, et mundissimum habent nutrimentum. Alia vero +animalia vel sunt silvestria, et non sunt communiter hominum usui +deputata, vel, si sunt domestica, immundum habent nutrimentum, ut +porcus et gallina; solum autem id quod est purum, Deo est +attribuendum. Huiusmodi autem aves specialiter offerebantur, quia +habentur in copia in terra promissionis. Secundo, quia per +immolationem huiusmodi animalium puritas mentis designatur. Quia, +ut dicitur in Glossa Levit. I, vitulum offerimus, cum carnis +superbiam vincimus; agnum, cum irrationales motus corrigimus; +haedum, cum lasciviam superamus; turturem, dum castitatem servamus; +panes azymos, cum in azymis sinceritatis epulamur. In columba +vero manifestum est quod significatur caritas et simplicitas +mentis. Tertio vero, conveniens fuit haec animalia offerri in +figuram Christi. Quia, ut in eadem Glossa dicitur, Christus in +vitulo offertur, propter virtutem crucis; in agno, propter +innocentiam; in ariete, propter principatum; in hirco, propter +similitudinem carnis peccati. In turture et columba duarum +naturarum coniunctio monstrabatur, vel in turture castitas, in +columba caritas significatur. In similagine aspersio credentium +per aquam Baptismi figurabatur.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Fish through living in water are further removed from man than other animals, which, like man, live in the air. Again, fish + die as soon as they are taken out of water; hence they could not be offered in the temple like other animals. +
[38027] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod pisces, quia in aquis vivunt, magis sunt alieni ab +homine quam alia animalia, quae vivunt in aere, sicut et homo. Et +iterum pisces, ex aqua extracti, statim moriuntur, unde non +poterant in templo offerri, sicut alia animalia.
+ Reply to Objection 4: Among turtledoves the older ones are better than the young; while with doves the case is the reverse. Wherefore, as Rabbi + Moses observes (Doct. Perplex. iii), turtledoves and young doves are commanded to be offered, because nothing should be offered + to God but what is best. +
[38028] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod in turturibus meliores sunt maiores quam pulli; in +columbis autem e converso. Et ideo, ut Rabbi Moyses dicit, +mandantur offerri turtures et pulli columbarum, quia omne quod est +optimum, Deo est attribuendum.
+ Reply to Objection 5: The animals which were offered in sacrifice were slain, because it is by being killed that they become useful to man, forasmuch + as God gave them to man for food. Wherefore also they were burnt with fire: because it is by being cooked that they are made + fit for human consumption. Moreover the slaying of the animals signified the destruction of sins: and also that man deserved + death on account of his sins; as though those animals were slain in man's + stead, in order to betoken the expiation of sins. Again the slaying of these animals signified the slaying of Christ. +
[38029] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 5 Ad quintum +dicendum quod animalia in sacrificium oblata occidebantur, quia +veniunt in usum hominis occisa, secundum quod a Deo dantur homini +ad esum. Et ideo etiam igni cremabantur, quia per ignem decocta +fiunt apta humano usui. Similiter etiam per occisionem animalium +significatur destructio peccatorum. Et quod homines erant digni +occisione pro peccatis suis, ac si illa animalia loco eorum +occiderentur, ad significandum expiationem peccatorum. Per +occisionem etiam huiusmodi animalium significabatur occisio +Christi.
+ Reply to Objection 6: The Law fixed the special manner of slaying the sacrificial animals in order to exclude other ways of killing, whereby idolaters + sacrificed animals to idols. Or again, as Rabbi Moses says (Doct. Perplex. iii), "the Law chose that manner of slaying which + was least painful to the slain animal." This excluded cruelty on the part of the offerers, and any mangling of the animals + slain. +
[38030] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 6 Ad sextum +dicendum quod specialis modus occidendi animalia immolata +determinabatur in lege ad excludendum alios modos, quibus +idololatrae animalia idolis immolabant. Vel etiam, ut Rabbi Moyses +dicit, lex elegit genus occisionis quo animalia minus +affligebantur occisa. Per quod excludebatur etiam +immisericordia offerentium, et deterioratio animalium +occisorum.
+ Reply to Objection 7: It is because unclean animals are wont to be held in contempt among men, that it was forbidden to offer them in sacrifice + to God: and for this reason too they were forbidden ( + Dt. 23:18) to offer "the hire of a strumpet or the price of a dog in the house of . . . God." For the same reason they did not offer + animals before the seventh day, because such were abortive as it were, the flesh being not yet firm on account of its + exceeding softness. +
[38031] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 7 Ad septimum +dicendum quod, quia animalia maculosa solent haberi contemptui +etiam apud homines, ideo prohibitum est ne Deo in sacrificium +offerrentur, propter quod etiam prohibitum erat ne mercedem +prostibuli, aut pretium canis, in domum Dei offerrent. Et eadem +etiam ratione non offerebant animalia ante septimum diem, quia +talia animalia erant quasi abortiva, nondum plene consistentia, +propter teneritudinem.
+ Reply to Objection 8: There were three kinds of sacrifices. There was one in which the victim was entirely consumed by fire: this was called "a + holocaust, i.e. all burnt." For this kind of sacrifice was offered to God specially to show reverence to His majesty, and + love of His goodness: and typified the state of perfection as regards the fulfilment of the counsels. Wherefore the whole + was burnt up: so that as the whole animal by being dissolved into vapor soared aloft, so + it might denote that the whole man, and whatever belongs to him, are subject to the authority of God, and should be offered + to Him. +
Another sacrifice was the "sin-offering," which was offered to God on account of man's need for the forgiveness of sin: and + this typifies the state of penitents in satisfying for sins. It was divided into two parts: for one part was burnt; while + the other was granted to the use of the priests to signify that remission of sins is granted by God through the ministry of + His priests. When, however, this sacrifice was offered for the sins of the whole people, or specially for the sin + of the priest, the whole victim was burnt up. For it was not fitting that the priests should have the use of that which was + offered for their own sins, to signify that nothing sinful should remain in them. Moreover, this would not be satisfaction + for sin: for if the offering were granted to the use of those for whose sins it was offered, it would seem to be the same + as if it had not been offered. +
The third kind of sacrifice was called the "peace-offering," which was offered to God, either in thanksgiving, or for the + welfare and prosperity of the offerers, in acknowledgment of benefits already received or yet to be received: and this typifies + the state of those who are proficient in the observance of the commandments. These sacrifices were divided into three parts: + for one part was burnt in honor of God; another part was allotted to the use of the priests; and the third + part to the use of the offerers; in order to signify that man's salvation is from God, by the direction of God's ministers, + and through the cooperation of those who are saved. +
But it was the universal rule that the blood and fat were not allotted to the use either of the priests or of the offerers: + the blood being poured out at the foot of the altar, in honor of God, while the fat was burnt upon the altar ( + Lev. 9:9,10). The reason for this was, first, in order to prevent idolatry: because idolaters used to drink the blood and eat the fat + of the victims, according to + Dt. 32:38: "Of whose victims they eat the + fat, and drank the wine of their drink-offerings." Secondly, in order to form them to a right way of living. For they were + forbidden the use of the blood that they might abhor the shedding of human blood; wherefore it is written ( + Gn. 9:4,5): "Flesh with blood you shall not eat: for I will require the blood of your lives": and they were forbidden to eat the fat, + in order to withdraw them from lasciviousness; hence it is written ( + Ezech. 34:3): "You have + killed that which was fat." Thirdly, on account of the reverence due to God: because blood is most necessary for life, for + which reason "life" is said to be "in the blood" ( + Lev. 17:11, + 14): while fat is a sign of abundant nourishment. Wherefore, in order to show that to God we owe both life and a sufficiency + of all good things, the blood was poured out, and the fat burnt up in His honor. Fourthly, in order to foreshadow the shedding + of Christ's blood, and the abundance of His charity, whereby He + offered Himself to God for us. +
In the peace-offerings, the breast-bone and the right shoulder were allotted to the use of the priest, in order to prevent + a certain kind of divination which is known as "spatulamantia," so called because it was customary in divining to use the + shoulder-blade [spatula], and the breast-bone of the animals offered in sacrifice; wherefore these things were taken away + from the offerers. This is also denoted the priest's need of wisdom in the heart, to instruct the people---this was + signified by the breast-bone, which covers the heart; and his need of fortitude, in order to bear with human frailty---and + this was signified by the right shoulder. +
[38032] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 8 Ad octavum +dicendum quod triplex erat sacrificiorum genus. Quoddam erat quod +totum comburebatur, et hoc dicebatur holocaustum, quasi totum +incensum. Huiusmodi enim sacrificium offerebatur Deo specialiter ad +reverentiam maiestatis ipsius, et amorem bonitatis eius, et +conveniebat perfectionis statui in impletione consiliorum. Et ideo +totum comburebatur, ut sicut totum animal, resolutum in vaporem, +sursum ascendebat, ita etiam significaretur totum hominem, et omnia +quae ipsius sunt, Dei dominio esse subiecta, et ei esse offerenda. +Aliud autem erat sacrificium pro peccato, quod offerebatur Deo ex +necessitate remissionis peccati, et conveniebat statui poenitentium +in satisfactione peccatorum. Quod dividebatur in duas partes, nam +una pars eius comburebatur, alia vero cedebat in usum sacerdotum; +ad significandum quod expiatio peccatorum fit a Deo per ministerium +sacerdotum. Nisi quando offerebatur sacrificium pro peccato totius +populi, vel specialiter pro peccato sacerdotis, tunc enim totum +comburebatur. Non enim debebant in usum sacerdotum venire ea quae +pro peccato eorum offerebantur, ut nihil peccati in eis remaneret. +Et quia hoc non esset satisfactio pro peccato, si enim cederet in +usum eorum pro quorum peccatis offerebatur, idem esse videretur ac +si non offerrent. Tertium vero sacrificium vocabatur hostia +pacifica, quae offerebatur Deo vel pro gratiarum actione, vel pro +salute et prosperitate offerentium, ex debito beneficii vel accepti +vel accipiendi, et convenit statui proficientium in impletione +mandatorum. Et ista dividebantur in tres partes, nam una pars +incendebatur ad honorem Dei, alia pars cedebat in usum sacerdotum, +tertia vero pars in usum offerentium; ad significandum quod salus +hominis procedit a Deo, dirigentibus ministris Dei, et +cooperantibus ipsis hominibus qui salvantur. Hoc autem generaliter +observabatur, quod sanguis et adeps non veniebant neque in usum +sacerdotum, neque in usum offerentium, sed sanguis effundebatur ad +crepidinem altaris, in honorem Dei; adeps vero adurebatur in igne. +Cuius ratio una quidem fuit ad excludendam idololatriam. +Idololatrae enim bibebant de sanguine victimarum, et comedebant +adipes; secundum illud Deut. XXXII, de quorum victimis +comedebant adipes, et bibebant vinum libaminum. Secunda ratio +est ad informationem humanae vitae. Prohibebatur enim eis usus +sanguinis, ad hoc quod horrerent humani sanguinis effusionem, unde +dicitur Gen. IX, carnem cum sanguine non comedetis, sanguinem +enim animarum vestrarum requiram. Esus vero adipum prohibebatur +eis ad vitandam lasciviam, unde dicitur Ezech. XXXIV, quod +crassum erat, occidebatis. Tertia ratio est propter reverentiam +divinam. Quia sanguis est maxime necessarius ad vitam, ratione +cuius dicitur anima esse in sanguine, adeps autem abundantiam +nutrimenti demonstrat. Et ideo ut ostenderetur quod a Deo nobis est +et vita et omnis bonorum sufficientia, ad honorem Dei effundebatur +sanguis, et adurebatur adeps. Quarta ratio est quia per hoc +figurabatur effusio sanguinis Christi, et pinguedo caritatis eius, +per quam se obtulit Deo pro nobis. De hostiis autem pacificis in +usum sacerdotis cedebat pectusculum et armus dexter, ad excludendum +quandam divinationis speciem quae vocatur spatulamantia, quia +scilicet in spatulis animalium immolatorum divinabant, et similiter +in osse pectoris. Et ideo ista offerentibus subtrahebantur. Per hoc +etiam significabatur quod sacerdoti erat necessaria sapientia +cordis ad instruendum populum, quod significabatur per pectus, quod +est tegumentum cordis; et etiam fortitudo ad sustentandum defectus, +quae significatur per armum dextrum.
+ Reply to Objection 9: Because the holocaust was the most perfect kind of sacrifice, therefore none but a male was offered for a holocaust: because + the female is an imperfect animal. The offering of turtledoves and doves was on account of the poverty of the offerers, who + were unable to offer bigger animals. And since peace-victims were offered freely, and no one was bound to offer them against + his will, hence these birds were offered not among the peace-victims, but among + the holocausts and victims for sin, which man was obliged to offer at times. Moreover these birds, on account of their lofty + flight, while befitting the perfection of the holocausts: and were suitable for sin-offerings because their song is doleful. +
[38033] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 9 Ad nonum +dicendum quod, quia holocaustum erat perfectissimum inter +sacrificia, ideo non offerebatur in holocaustum nisi masculus, nam +femina est animal imperfectum. Oblatio autem turturum et columbarum +erat propter paupertatem offerentium, qui maiora animalia offerre +non poterant. Et quia hostiae pacificae gratis offerebantur, et +nullus eas offerre cogebatur nisi spontaneus; ideo huiusmodi aves +non offerebantur inter hostias pacificas, sed inter holocausta et +hostias pro peccato, quas quandoque oportebat offerre. Aves etiam +huiusmodi, propter altitudinem volatus, congruunt perfectioni +holocaustorum, et etiam hostiis pro peccato, quia habent gemitum +pro cantu.
+ Reply to Objection 10: The holocaust was the chief of all the sacrifices: because all were burnt in honor of God, and nothing of it was eaten. The + second place in holiness, belongs to the sacrifice for sins, which was eaten in the court only, and on the very day of the + sacrifice ( + Lev. 7:6, + 15). The third place must be given to the peace-offerings of thanksgiving, which were eaten on the same day, but anywhere in + Jerusalem. Fourth in order were the + "ex-voto" peace-offerings, the flesh of which could be eaten even on the morrow. The reason for this order is that man is + bound to God, chiefly on account of His majesty; secondly, on account of the sins he has committed; thirdly, because of the + benefits he has already received from Him; fourthly, by reason of the benefits he hopes to receive from Him. +
[38034] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 10 Ad decimum +dicendum quod inter omnia sacrificia holocaustum erat praecipuum, +quia totum comburebatur in honorem Dei, et nihil ex eo comedebatur. +Secundum vero locum in sanctitate tenebat hostia pro peccato, quae +comedebatur solum in atrio a sacerdotibus, et in ipsa die +sacrificii. Tertium vero gradum tenebant hostiae pacificae pro +gratiarum actione, quae comedebantur ipso die, sed ubique in +Ierusalem. Quartum vero locum tenebant hostiae pacificae ex voto, +quarum carnes poterant etiam in crastino comedi. Et est ratio huius +ordinis quia maxime obligatur homo Deo propter eius maiestatem, +secundo, propter offensam commissam; tertio, propter beneficia iam +suscepta; quarto, propter beneficia sperata.
+ Reply to Objection 11: Sins are more grievous by reason of the state of the sinner, as stated above ( + Q[73], A[10]): wherefore different victims are commanded to be offered for the sin of a priest, or of a prince, or of some other private + individual. "But," as Rabbi Moses says (Doct. Perplex. iii), "we must take note that the more grievous the sin, the lower + the species of animals offered for it. Wherefore the goat, which is a very base animal, was + offered for idolatry; while a calf was offered for a priest's ignorance, and a ram for the negligence of a prince." +
[38035] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 11 Ad +undecimum dicendum quod peccata aggravantur ex statu peccantis, ut +supra dictum est. Et ideo alia hostia mandatur offerri pro peccato +sacerdotis et principis, vel alterius privatae personae. Est autem +attendendum, ut Rabbi Moyses dicit, quod quanto gravius erat +peccatum, tanto vilior species animalis offerebatur pro eo. Unde +capra, quod est vilissimum animal, offerebatur pro idololatria, +quod est gravissimum peccatum; pro ignorantia vero sacerdotis +offerebatur vitulus; pro negligentia autem principis, +hircus.
+ Reply to Objection 12: In the matter of sacrifices the Law had in view the poverty of the offerers; so that those who could not have a four-footed + animal at their disposal, might at least offer a bird; and that he who could not have a bird might at least offer bread; and + that if a man had not even bread he might offer flour or ears of corn. +
The figurative cause is that the bread signifies Christ Who is the "living bread" ( + Jn. 6:41, + 51). He was indeed an ear of corn, as it were, during the state of the law of nature, in the faith of the patriarchs; He was + like flour in the doctrine of the Law of the prophets; and He was like perfect bread after He had taken human nature; baked + in the fire, i.e. formed by the Holy Ghost in the oven of the virginal womb; baked again in a pan by the toils which He + suffered in the world; and consumed by fire on the cross as on a gridiron. +
[38036] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 12 Ad +duodecimum dicendum quod lex in sacrificiis providere voluit +paupertati offerentium, ut qui non posset habere animal quadrupes, +saltem offerret avem; quam qui habere non posset, saltem offerret +panem; et si hunc habere non posset, saltem offerret farinam vel +spicas. Causa vero figuralis est quia panis significat Christum, +qui est panis vivus, ut dicitur Ioan. VI. Qui quidem erat sicut in +spica, pro statu legis naturae, in fide patrum; erat autem sicut +simila in doctrina legis prophetarum; erat autem sicut panis +formatus post humanitatem assumptam; coctus igne, idest formatus +spiritu sancto in clibano uteri virginalis; qui etiam fuit coctus +in sartagine, per labores quos in mundo sustinebat; in cruce vero +quasi in craticula adustus.
+ Reply to Objection 13: The products of the soil are useful to man, either as food, and of these bread was offered; or as drink, and of these wine + was offered; or as seasoning, and of these oil and salt were offered; or as healing, and of these they offered incense, which + both smells sweetly and binds easily together. +
Now the bread foreshadowed the flesh of Christ; and the wine, His blood, whereby we were redeemed; oil betokens the grace + of Christ; salt, His knowledge; incense, His prayer. +
[38037] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 13 Ad +decimumtertium dicendum quod ea quae in usum hominis veniunt de +terrae nascentibus, vel sunt in cibum, et de eis offerebatur panis. +Vel sunt in potum, et de his offerebatur vinum. Vel sunt in +condimentum, et de his offerebatur oleum et sal. Vel sunt in +medicamentum, et de his offerebatur thus, quod est aromaticum et +consolidativum. Per panem autem figuratur caro Christi; per vinum +autem sanguis eius, per quem redempti sumus; oleum figurat gratiam +Christi; sal scientiam; thus orationem.
+ Reply to Objection 14: Honey was not offered in the sacrifices to God, both because it was wont to be offered in the sacrifices to idols; and in + order to denote the absence of all carnal sweetness and pleasure from those who intend to sacrifice to God. Leaven was not + offered, to denote the exclusion of corruption. Perhaps too, it was wont to be offered in the sacrifices to idols. +
Salt, however, was offered, because it wards off the corruption of putrefaction: for sacrifices offered to God should be + incorrupt. Moreover, salt signifies the discretion of wisdom, or again, mortification of the flesh. +
Incense was offered to denote devotion of the heart, which is necessary in the offerer; and again, to signify the odor of + a good name: for incense is composed of matter, both rich and fragrant. And since the sacrifice "of jealousy" did not proceed + from devotion, but rather from suspicion, therefore incense was not offered therein ( + Num. 5:15). +
[38038] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 14 Ad +decimumquartum dicendum quod mel non offerebatur in sacrificiis +Dei, tum quia consueverat offerri in sacrificiis idolorum. Tum +etiam ad excludendam omnem carnalem dulcedinem et voluptatem ab his +qui Deo sacrificare intendunt. Fermentum vero non offerebatur, ad +excludendam corruptionem. Et forte etiam in sacrificiis idolorum +solitum erat offerri. Sal autem offerebatur, quia impedit +corruptionem putredinis, sacrificia autem Dei debent esse +incorrupta. Et etiam quia in sale significatur discretio +sapientiae; vel etiam mortificatio carnis. Thus autem offerebatur +ad designandam devotionem mentis, quae est necessaria offerentibus; +et etiam ad designandum odorem bonae famae, nam thus et pingue est, +et odoriferum. Et quia sacrificium zelotypiae non procedebat ex +devotione, sed magis ex suspicione, ideo in eo non offerebatur +thus.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that no sufficient reason can be assigned for the ceremonies of the Old Law that pertain to holy things. For + Paul said ( + Acts 17:24): "God Who made the world and all things therein; He being Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in temples made by hands." + It was therefore unfitting that in the Old Law a tabernacle or temple should be set up for the worship of God. +
[38039] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod caeremoniarum veteris legis quae ad +sacra pertinent sufficiens ratio assignari non possit. Dicit enim +Paulus, Act. XVII, Deus, qui fecit mundum et omnia quae in eo +sunt, hic, caeli et terrae cum sit dominus, non in manufactis +templis habitat. Inconvenienter igitur ad cultum Dei +tabernaculum, vel templum, in lege veteri est institutum.
+ Objection 2: Further, the state of the Old Law was not changed except by Christ. But the tabernacle denoted the state of the Old Law. + Therefore it should not have been changed by the building of a temple. +
[38040] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +status veteris legis non fuit immutatus nisi per Christum. Sed +tabernaculum designabat statum veteris legis. Non ergo debuit +mutari per aedificationem alicuius templi.
+ Objection 3: Further, the Divine Law, more than any other indeed, should lead man to the worship of God. But an increase of divine worship + requires multiplication of altars and temples; as is evident in regard to the New Law. Therefore it seems that also under + the Old Law there should have been not only one tabernacle or temple, but many. +
[38041] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +divina lex praecipue etiam debet homines inducere ad divinum +cultum. Sed ad augmentum divini cultus pertinet quod fiant multa +altaria et multa templa, sicut patet in nova lege. Ergo videtur +quod etiam in veteri lege non debuit esse solum unum templum aut +unum tabernaculum sed multa.
+ Objection 4: Further, the tabernacle or temple was ordained to the worship of God. But in God we should worship above all His unity and + simplicity. Therefore it seems unbecoming for the tabernacle or temple to be divided by means of veils. +
[38042] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 arg. 4 Praeterea, +tabernaculum, seu templum, ad cultum Dei ordinabatur. Sed in Deo +praecipue oportet venerari unitatem et simplicitatem. Non videtur +igitur fuisse conveniens ut tabernaculum, seu templum, per quaedam +vela distingueretur.
+ Objection 5: Further, the power of the First Mover, i.e. God, appears first of all in the east, for it is in that quarter that the first + movement begins. But the tabernacle was set up for the worship of God. Therefore it should have been built so as to point + to the east rather than the west. +
[38043] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 arg. 5 Praeterea, +virtus primi moventis, qui est Deus, primo apparet in parte +orientis, a qua parte incipit primus motus. Sed tabernaculum fuit +institutum ad Dei adorationem. Ergo debebat esse dispositum magis +versus orientem quam versus occidentem.
+ Objection 6: Further, the Lord commanded ( + Ex. 20:4) that they should "not make . . . a graven thing, nor the likeness of anything." It was therefore unfitting for graven images + of the cherubim to be set up in the tabernacle or temple. In like manner, the ark, the propitiatory, the candlestick, the + table, the two altars, seem to have been placed there without reasonable cause. +
[38044] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 arg. 6 Praeterea, +Exod. XX, dominus praecepit ut non facerent sculptile, neque +aliquam similitudinem. Inconvenienter igitur in tabernaculo, +vel in templo, fuerunt sculptae imagines Cherubim. Similiter etiam +et arca, et propitiatorium, et candelabrum, et mensa, et duplex +altare, sine rationabili causa ibi fuisse videntur.
+ Objection 7: Further, the Lord commanded ( + Ex. 20:24): "You shall make an altar of earth unto Me": and again ( + Ex. 20:26): "Thou shalt not go up by steps unto My altar." It was therefore unfitting that subsequently they should be commanded to + make an altar of wood laid over with gold or brass; and of such a height that it was impossible to go up to it except by steps. + For it is written ( + Ex. 27:1,2): "Thou shalt + make also an altar of setim wood, which shall be five cubits long, and as many broad . . . and three cubits high . . . and + thou shalt cover it with brass": and ( + Ex. 30:1, + 3): "Thou shalt make . . . an altar to burn incense, of setim wood . . . and thou shalt overlay it with the purest gold." +
[38045] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 arg. 7 Praeterea, +dominus praecepit, Exod. XX, altare de terra facietis mihi. Et +iterum, non ascendes ad altare meum per gradus. Inconvenienter +igitur mandatur postmodum altare fieri de lignis auro vel aere +contextis; et tantae altitudinis ut ad illud nisi per gradus +ascendi non posset. Dicitur enim Exod. XXVII, facies et altare +de lignis setim, quod habebit quinque cubitos in longitudine, et +totidem in latitudine, et tres cubitos in altitudine; et operies +illud aere. Et Exod. XXX dicitur, facies altare ad adolendum +thymiamata, de lignis setim, vestiesque illud auro +purissimo.
+ Objection 8: Further, in God's works nothing should be superfluous; for not even in the works of nature is anything superfluous to be + found. But one cover suffices for one tabernacle or house. Therefore it was unbecoming to furnish the tabernacle with many + coverings, viz. curtains, curtains of goats' hair, rams' skins dyed red, and violet-colored skins ( + Ex. 26). +
[38046] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 arg. 8 Praeterea, +in operibus Dei nihil debet esse superfluum, quia nec in operibus +naturae aliquid superfluum invenitur. Sed uni tabernaculo, vel +domui, sufficit unum operimentum. Inconvenienter igitur tabernaculo +fuerunt apposita multa tegumenta, scilicet cortinae, saga cilicina, +pelles arietum rubricatae, et pelles hyacintinae.
+ Objection 9: Further, exterior consecration signifies interior holiness, the subject of which is the soul. It was therefore unsuitable + for the tabernacle and its vessels to be consecrated, since they were inanimate things. +
[38047] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 arg. 9 Praeterea, +consecratio exterior interiorem sanctitatem significat, cuius +subiectum est anima. Inconvenienter igitur tabernaculum et eius +vasa consecrabantur, cum essent quaedam corpora inanimata.
+ Objection 10: Further, it is written ( + Ps. 33:2): "I will bless the Lord at all times, His praise shall always be in my mouth." But the solemn festivals were instituted + for the praise of God. Therefore it was not fitting that certain days should be fixed for keeping solemn festivals; so that + it seems that there was no suitable cause for the ceremonies relating to holy things. +
[38048] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 arg. 10 +Praeterea, in Psalmo XXXIII dicitur, benedicam dominum in omni +tempore, semper laus eius in ore meo. Sed solemnitates +instituuntur ad laudandum Deum. Non ergo fuit conveniens ut aliqui +certi dies statuerentur ad solemnitates peragendas. Sic igitur +videtur quod caeremoniae sacrorum convenientes causas non +haberent.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle says ( + Heb. 8:4) that those who "offer gifts according to the law . . . serve unto the example and shadow of heavenly things. As it was answered + to Moses, when he was to finish the tabernacle: See, says He, that thou make all things according to the pattern which was + shown thee on the mount." But that is most reasonable, which presents a likeness to heavenly things. Therefore the ceremonies + relating to holy things had a + reasonable cause. +
[38049] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Heb. VIII, quod illi qui offerunt +secundum legem munera, exemplari et umbrae deserviunt caelestium, +sicut responsum est Moysi, cum consummaret tabernaculum, vide, +inquit, omnia facito secundum exemplar quod tibi in monte +monstratum est. Sed valde rationabile est quod imaginem +caelestium repraesentat. Ergo caeremoniae sacrorum rationabilem +causam habebant.
+ I answer that, The chief purpose of the whole external worship is that man may give worship to God. Now man's tendency is to reverence less + those things which are common, and indistinct from other things; whereas he admires and reveres those things which are distinct + from others in some point of excellence. Hence too it is customary among men for kings and princes, who ought to be reverenced + by their subjects, to be clothed in more precious garments, and to possess vaster + and more beautiful abodes. And for this reason it behooved special times, a special abode, special vessels, and special ministers + to be appointed for the divine worship, so that thereby the soul of man might be brought to greater reverence for God. +
In like manner the state of the Old Law, as observed above + (A[2]; Q[100] , A[12]; Q[101], A[2]), was instituted that it might foreshadow the mystery of Christ. Now that which foreshadows + something should be determinate, so that it may present some likeness thereto. Consequently, certain special points had to + be observed in matters pertaining to the worship of God. +
[38050] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod totus exterior cultus Dei ad hoc praecipue ordinatur +ut homines Deum in reverentia habeant. Habet autem hoc humanus +affectus, ut ea quae communia sunt, et non distincta ab aliis, +minus revereatur; ea vero quae habent aliquam excellentiae +discretionem ab aliis, magis admiretur et revereatur. Et inde etiam +hominum consuetudo inolevit ut reges et principes, quos oportet in +reverentia haberi a subditis, et pretiosioribus vestibus ornentur, +et etiam ampliores et pulchriores habitationes possideant. Et +propter hoc oportuit ut aliqua specialia tempora, et speciale +habitaculum, et specialia vasa, et speciales ministri ad cultum Dei +ordinarentur, ut per hoc animi hominum ad maiorem Dei reverentiam +adducerentur. Similiter etiam status veteris legis, sicut dictum +est, institutus erat ad figurandum mysterium Christi. Oportet autem +esse aliquid determinatum id per quod aliud figurari debet, ut +scilicet eius aliquam similitudinem repraesentet. Et ideo etiam +oportuit aliqua specialia observari in his quae pertinent ad cultum +Dei.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The divine worship regards two things: namely, God Who is worshipped; and men, who worship Him. Accordingly God, Who is worshipped, + is confined to no bodily place: wherefore there was no need, on His part, for a tabernacle or temple to be set up. But men, + who worship Him, are corporeal beings: and for their sake there was need for a special tabernacle or temple to be set up for + the worship of God, for two reasons. First, that through coming together + with the thought that the place was set aside for the worship of God, they might approach thither with greater reverence. + Secondly, that certain things relating to the excellence of Christ's Divine or human nature might be signified by the arrangement + of various details in such temple or tabernacle. +
To this Solomon refers ( + 3 Kings 8:27) when he says: "If heaven and the heavens of heavens cannot contain Thee, how much less this house which I have built" for + Thee? And further on ( + 3 Kings 8:29, + 20) he adds: "That Thy eyes may be open upon this house . . . of which Thou hast said: My name shall be there; . . . that Thou + mayest hearken to the supplication of Thy servant and of Thy people Israel." From this it is evident that the house of + the sanctuary was set up, not in order to contain God, as abiding therein locally, but that God might be made known there + by means of things done and said there; and that those who prayed there might, through reverence for the place, pray more + devoutly, so as to be heard more readily. +
[38051] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod cultus Dei duo respicit, scilicet Deum, qui +colitur; et homines colentes. Ipse igitur Deus, qui colitur, nullo +corporali loco clauditur, unde propter ipsum non oportuit +tabernaculum fieri, aut templum. Sed homines ipsum colentes +corporales sunt, et propter eos oportuit speciale tabernaculum, vel +templum, institui ad cultum Dei, propter duo. Primo quidem, ut ad +huiusmodi locum convenientes cum hac cogitatione quod deputaretur +ad colendum Deum, cum maiori reverentia accederent. Secundo, ut per +dispositionem talis templi, vel tabernaculi, significarentur aliqua +pertinentia ad excellentiam divinitatis vel humanitatis Christi. Et +hoc est quod Salomon dicit, III Reg. VIII, si caelum et caeli +caelorum te capere non possunt, quanto magis domus haec, quam +aedificavi tibi? Et postea subdit, sint oculi tui aperti +super domum hanc, de qua dixisti, erit nomen meum ibi; ut exaudias +deprecationem servi tui et populi tui Israel. Ex quo patet quod +domus sanctuarii non est instituta ad hoc quod Deum capiat, quasi +localiter inhabitantem; sed ad hoc quod nomen Dei habitet ibi, +idest ut notitia Dei ibi manifestetur per aliqua quae ibi fiebant +vel dicebantur; et quod, propter reverentiam loci, orationes +fierent ibi magis exaudibiles ex devotione orantium.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Before the coming of Christ, the state of the Old Law was not changed as regards the fulfilment of the Law, which was effected + in Christ alone: but it was changed as regards the condition of the people that were under the Law. Because, at first, the + people were in the desert, having no fixed abode: afterwards they were engaged in various wars with the neighboring nations; + and lastly, at the time of David and Solomon, the state of that people was one + of great peace. And then for the first time the temple was built in the place which Abraham, instructed by God, had chosen + for the purpose of sacrifice. For it is written ( + Gn. 22:2) that the Lord commanded Abraham to "offer" his son "for a holocaust upon one of the mountains which I will show thee": and + it is related further on ( + Gn. 22:14) that "he calleth the name of that place, The Lord seeth," as though, according to the Divine prevision, that place + were chosen for the worship of God. Hence it is written ( + Dt. 12:5,6): "You shall come to the place which the Lord your God shall choose . . . and you shall offer . . . your holocausts and victims." +
Now it was not meet for that place to be pointed out by the building of the temple before the aforesaid time; for three reasons + assigned by Rabbi Moses. First, lest the Gentiles might seize hold of that place. Secondly, lest the Gentiles might destroy + it. The third reason is lest each tribe might wish that place to fall to their lot, and strifes and quarrels be the result. + Hence the temple was not built until they had a king who would be able to quell such quarrels. Until that + time a portable tabernacle was employed for divine worship, no place being as yet fixed for the worship of God. This is the + literal reason for the distinction between the tabernacle and the temple. +
The figurative reason may be assigned to the fact that they signify a twofold state. For the tabernacle, which was changeable, + signifies the state of the present changeable life: whereas the temple, which was fixed and stable, signifies the state of + future life which is altogether unchangeable. For this reason it is said that in the building of the temple no sound was heard + of hammer or saw, to signify that all movements of disturbance will be far removed from the future state. + Or else the tabernacle signifies the state of the Old Law; while the temple built by Solomon betokens the state of the New + Law. Hence the Jews alone worked at the building of the tabernacle; whereas the temple was built with the cooperation of the + Gentiles, viz. the Tyrians and Sidonians. +
[38052] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod status veteris legis non fuit immutatus ante Christum +quantum ad impletionem legis, quae facta est solum per Christum, +est tamen immutatus quantum ad conditionem populi qui erat sub +lege. Nam primo populus fuit in deserto, non habens certam +mansionem; postmodum autem habuerunt varia bella cum finitimis +gentibus; ultimo autem, tempore David et Salomonis, populus ille +habuit quietissimum statum. Et tunc primo aedificatum fuit templum, +in loco quem designaverat Abraham, ex divina demonstratione, ad +immolandum. Dicitur enim Gen. XXII, quod dominus mandavit Abrahae +ut offerret filium suum in holocaustum super unum montium quem +monstravero tibi. Et postea dicit quod appellavit nomen illius +loci, dominus videt, quasi secundum Dei praevisionem esset +locus ille electus ad cultum divinum. Propter quod dicitur Deut. +XII, ad locum quem elegerit dominus Deus vester, venietis, et +offeretis holocausta et victimas vestras. Locus autem ille +designari non debuit per aedificationem templi ante tempus +praedictum, propter tres rationes, quas Rabbi Moyses assignat. +Prima est ne gentes appropriarent sibi locum illum. Secunda est ne +gentes ipsum destruerent. Tertia vero ratio est ne quaelibet tribus +vellet habere locum illum in sorte sua, et propter hoc orirentur +lites et iurgia. Et ideo non fuit aedificatum templum donec +haberent regem, per quem posset huiusmodi iurgium compesci. Antea +vero ad cultum Dei erat ordinatum tabernaculum portatile per +diversa loca, quasi nondum existente determinato loco divini +cultus. Et haec est ratio litteralis diversitatis tabernaculi et +templi. Ratio autem figuralis esse potest quia per haec duo +significatur duplex status. Per tabernaculum enim, quod est +mutabile, significatur status praesentis vitae mutabilis. Per +templum vero, quod erat fixum et stans, significatur status futurae +vitae, quae omnino invariabilis est. Et propter hoc in +aedificatione templi dicitur quod non est auditus sonitus mallei +vel securis, ad significandum quod omnis perturbationis tumultus +longe erit a statu futuro. Vel per tabernaculum significatur status +veteris legis, per templum autem a Salomone constructum, status +novae legis. Unde ad constructionem tabernaculi soli Iudaei sunt +operati, ad aedificationem vero templi cooperati sunt etiam +gentiles, scilicet Tyrii et Sidonii.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The reason for the unity of the temple or tabernacle may be either literal or figurative. The literal reason was the exclusion + of idolatry. For the Gentiles put up various times to various gods: and so, to strengthen in the minds of men their belief + in the unity of the Godhead, God wished sacrifices to be offered to Him in one place only. Another reason was in order to + show that bodily worship is not acceptable of itself: and so they restrained from + offering sacrifices anywhere and everywhere. But the worship of the New Law, in the sacrifice whereof spiritual grace is contained, + is of itself acceptable to God; and consequently the multiplication of altars and temples is permitted in the New Law. +
As to those matters that regarded the spiritual worship of God, consisting in the teaching of the Law and the Prophets, there + were, even under the Old Law, various places, called synagogues, appointed for the people to gather together for the praise + of God; just as now there are places called churches in which the Christian people gather together for the divine worship. + Thus our church takes the place of both temple and synagogue: since the very sacrifice of the Church is + spiritual; wherefore with us the place of sacrifice is not distinct from the place of teaching. The figurative reason may + be that hereby is signified the unity of the Church, whether militant or triumphant. +
[38053] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio unitatis templi, vel tabernaculi, potest esse +et litteralis, et figuralis. Litteralis quidem est ratio ad +exclusionem idololatriae. Quia gentiles diversis diis diversa +templa constituebant, et ideo, ut firmaretur in animis hominum +fides unitatis divinae, voluit Deus ut in uno loco tantum sibi +sacrificium offerretur. Et iterum ut per hoc ostenderet quod +corporalis cultus non propter se erat ei acceptus. Et ideo +compescebantur ne passim et ubique sacrificia offerrent. Sed cultus +novae legis, in cuius sacrificio spiritualis gratia continetur, est +secundum se Deo acceptus. Et ideo multiplicatio altarium et +templorum acceptatur in nova lege. Quantum vero ad ea quae +pertinebant ad spiritualem cultum Dei, qui consistit in doctrina +legis et prophetarum, erant etiam in veteri lege diversa loca +deputata in quibus conveniebant ad laudem Dei, quae dicebantur +synagogae, sicut et nunc dicuntur Ecclesiae, in quibus populus +Christianus ad laudem Dei congregatur. Et sic Ecclesia nostra +succedit in locum et templi et synagogae, quia ipsum sacrificium +Ecclesiae spirituale est; unde non distinguitur apud nos locus +sacrificii a loco doctrinae. Ratio autem figuralis esse potest quia +per hoc significatur unitas Ecclesiae, vel militantis vel +triumphantis.
+ Reply to Objection 4: Just as the unity of the temple or tabernacle betokened the unity of God, or the unity of the Church, so also the division + of the tabernacle or temple signified the distinction of those things that are subject to God, and from which we arise to + the worship of God. Now the tabernacle was divided into two parts: one was called the "Holy of Holies," and was placed to + the west; the other was called the "Holy Place" [*Or 'Sanctuary'. The Douay version uses + both expressions], which was situated to the east. Moreover there was a court facing the tabernacle. Accordingly there are + two reasons for this distinction. One is in respect of the tabernacle being ordained to the worship of God. Because the different + parts of the world are thus betokened by the division of the tabernacle. For that part which was called the Holy of Holies + signified the higher world, which is that of spiritual substances: while that part which is called the Holy Place signified + the corporeal world. Hence the Holy Place was separated from the Holy of Holies by a veil, which was of four different colors + (denoting the four elements), viz. of linen, signifying earth, because linen, i.e. flax, grows out of the earth; purple, signifying + water, because the purple tint was made from certain shells found in the sea; violet, signifying air, because it has the color + of the air; and scarlet twice dyed, signifying fire: and this because matter composed of the four elements is a + veil between us and incorporeal substances. Hence the high-priest alone, and that once a year, entered into the inner tabernacle, + i.e. the Holy of Holies: whereby we are taught that man's final perfection consists in his entering into that (higher) world: + whereas into the outward tabernacle, i.e. the Holy Place, the priests entered every day: whereas the people were only admitted + to the court; because the people were able to perceived material things, the inner nature of which only wise men by + dint of study are able to discover. +
But regard to the figurative reason, the outward tabernacle, which was called the Holy Place, betokened the state of the + Old Law, as the Apostle says ( + Heb. 9:6, seqq.): because into that tabernacle "the priests always entered accomplishing the offices of sacrifices." But the inner + tabernacle, which was called the Holy of Holies, signified either the glory of heaven or the spiritual state of the New Law + to come. To the latter state Christ brought us; and this + was signified by the high-priest entering alone, once a year, into the Holy of Holies. The veil betokened the concealing of + the spiritual sacrifices under the sacrifices of old. This veil was adorned with four colors: viz. that of linen, to designate + purity of the flesh; purple, to denote the sufferings which the saints underwent for God; scarlet twice dyed, signifying the + twofold love of God and our neighbor; and violet, in token of heavenly contemplation. With regard to the state of the Old + Law the people and the priests were situated differently from one another. For the people saw the mere corporeal sacrifices + which were offered in the court: whereas the priests were intent on the inner meaning of the sacrifices, because their faith + in the mysteries of Christ was more explicit. Hence they entered into the outer tabernacle. This outer tabernacle was divided + from the court by a veil; because some matters relating to the mystery of Christ were hidden from the people, while they + were known to the priests: though they were not fully revealed to them, as they were subsequently in the New Testament (cf. + Eph. 3:5). +
[38054] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod, sicut in unitate templi, vel tabernaculi, +repraesentabatur unitas Dei, vel unitas Ecclesiae; ita etiam in +distinctione tabernaculi, vel templi, repraesentabatur distinctio +eorum quae Deo sunt subiecta, ex quibus in Dei venerationem +consurgimus. Distinguebatur autem tabernaculum in duas partes, in +unam quae vocabatur sancta sanctorum, quae erat Occidentalis; et +aliam quae vocabatur sancta, quae erat ad orientem. Et iterum ante +tabernaculum erat atrium. Haec igitur distinctio duplicem habet +rationem. Unam quidem, secundum quod tabernaculum ordinatur ad +cultum Dei. Sic enim diversae partes mundi in distinctione +tabernaculi figurantur. Nam pars illa quae sancta sanctorum +dicitur, figurabat saeculum altius, quod est spiritualium +substantiarum, pars vero illa quae dicitur sancta, exprimebat +mundum corporalem. Et ideo sancta a sanctis sanctorum +distinguebantur quodam velo, quod quatuor coloribus erat +distinctum, per quos quatuor elementa designantur, scilicet bysso, +per quod designatur terra, quia byssus, idest linum, de terra +nascitur; purpura, per quam significatur aqua, fiebat enim +purpureus color ex quibusdam conchis quae inveniuntur in mari; +hyacintho, per quem significatur aer, quia habet aereum colorem; et +cocco bis tincto, per quem designatur ignis. Et hoc ideo quia +materia quatuor elementorum est impedimentum per quod velantur +nobis incorporales substantiae. Et ideo in interius tabernaculum, +idest in sancta sanctorum, solus summus sacerdos, et semel in anno, +introibat, ut designaretur quod haec est finalis perfectio hominis, +ut ad illud saeculum introducatur. In tabernaculum vero exterius, +idest in sancta, introibant sacerdotes quotidie, non autem populus, +qui solum ad atrium accedebat, quia ipsa corpora populus percipere +potest; ad interiores autem eorum rationes soli sapientes per +considerationem attingere possunt. Secundum vero rationem +figuralem, per exterius tabernaculum, quod dicitur sancta, +significatur status veteris legis, ut apostolus dicit, ad Heb. IX, +quia ad illud tabernaculum semper introibant sacerdotes +sacrificiorum officia consummantes. Per interius vero +tabernaculum, quod dicitur sancta sanctorum, significatur vel +caelestis gloria, vel etiam status spiritualis novae legis, qui est +quaedam inchoatio futurae gloriae. In quem statum nos Christus +introduxit, quod figurabatur per hoc quod summus sacerdos, semel in +anno, solus in sancta sanctorum intrabat. Velum autem figurabat +spiritualium occultationem sacrificiorum in veteribus sacrificiis. +Quod velum quatuor coloribus erat ornatum, bysso quidem, ad +designandam carnis puritatem; purpura autem, ad figurandum +passiones quas sancti sustinuerunt pro Deo; cocco bis tincto, ad +significandum caritatem geminam Dei et proximi; hyacintho autem +significabatur caelestis meditatio. Ad statum autem veteris legis +aliter se habebat populus, et aliter sacerdotes. Nam populus ipsa +corporalia sacrificia considerabat, quae in atrio offerebantur. +Sacerdotes vero rationem sacrificiorum considerabant, habentes +fidem magis explicitam de mysteriis Christi. Et ideo intrabant in +exterius tabernaculum. Quod etiam quodam velo distinguebatur ab +atrio, quia quaedam erant velata populo circa mysterium Christi, +quae sacerdotibus erant nota. Non tamen erant eis plene revelata, +sicut postea in novo testamento, ut habetur Ephes. III.
+ Reply to Objection 5: Worship towards the west was introduced in the Law to the exclusion of idolatry: because all the Gentiles, in reverence to + the sun, worshipped towards the east; hence it is written ( + Ezech. 8:16) that certain men "had their backs towards the temple of the Lord, and their faces to the east, and they adored towards the + rising of the sun." Accordingly, in order to prevent this, the tabernacle had the Holy of Holies to westward, that + they might adore toward the west. A figurative reason may also be found in the fact that the whole state of the first tabernacle + was ordained to foreshadow the death of Christ, which is signified by the west, according to + Ps. 67:5: "Who ascendeth unto the west; the Lord is His name." +
[38055] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 ad 5 Ad quintum +dicendum quod adoratio ad occidentem fuit introducta in lege ad +excludendam idololatriam, nam omnes gentiles, in reverentiam solis, +adorabant ad orientem; unde dicitur Ezech. VIII, quod quidam +habebant dorsa contra templum domini et facies ad orientem, et +adorabant ad ortum solis. Unde ad hoc excludendum, tabernaculum +habebat sancta sanctorum ad occidentem, ut versus occidentem +adorarent. Ratio etiam figuralis esse potest quia totus status +prioris tabernaculi ordinabatur ad figurandum mortem Christi, quae +significatur per occasum; secundum illud Psalmi LXVII, qui +ascendit super occasum, dominus nomen illi.
+ Reply to Objection 6: Both literal and figurative reasons may be assigned for the things contained in the tabernacle. The literal reason is in + connection with the divine worship. And because, as already observed (ad 4), the inner tabernacle, called the Holy of Holies, + signified the higher world of spiritual substances, hence that tabernacle contained three things, viz. "the ark of the testament + in which was a golden pot that had manna, and the rod of Aaron that had + blossomed, and the tables" ( + Heb. 9:4) on which were written the ten commandments of the Law. Now the ark stood between two "cherubim" that looked one towards + the other: and over the ark was a table, called the "propitiatory," raised above the wings of the cherubim, as though it were + held up by them; and appearing, to the imagination, to be the very seat of God. For this reason it was called the "propitiatory," + as though the people received propitiation thence at the prayers + of the high-priest. And so it was held up, so to speak, by the cherubim, in obedience, as it were, to God: while the ark of + the testament was like the foot-stool to Him that sat on the propitiatory. These three things denote three things in that + higher world: namely, God Who is above all, and incomprehensible to any creature. Hence no likeness of Him was set up; to + denote His invisibility. But there was something to represent his seat; since, to wit, the creature, which is beneath God, + as the + seat under the sitter, is comprehensible. Again in that higher world there are spiritual substances called angels. These are + signified by the two cherubim, looking one towards the other, to show that they are at peace with one another, according to + Job 25:2: "Who maketh peace in . . . high places." For this reason, too, there was more than one cherub, to betoken the multitude + of heavenly spirits, and to prevent their receiving worship from those who had been commanded to + worship but one God. Moreover there are, enclosed as it were in that spiritual world, the intelligible types of whatsoever + takes place in this world, just as in every cause are enclosed the types of its effects, and in the craftsman the types of + the works of his craft. This was betokened by the ark, which represented, by means of the three things it contained, the three + things of greatest import in human affairs. These are wisdom, signified by the tables of the testament; the power of + governing, betokened by the rod of Aaron; and life, betokened by the manna which was the means of sustenance. Or else these + three things signified the three Divine attributes, viz. wisdom, in the tables; power, in the rod; goodness, in the manna---both + by reason of its sweetness, and because it was through the goodness of God that it was granted to man, wherefore it was preserved + as a memorial of the Divine mercy. Again, these three things were represented in Isaias' vision. For he "saw the + Lord sitting upon a throne high and elevated"; and the seraphim standing by; and that the house was filled with the glory + of the Lord; wherefrom the seraphim cried out: "All the earth is full of His glory" ( + Is. 6:1, + 3). And so the images of the seraphim were set up, not to be worshipped, for this was forbidden by the first commandment; but + as a sign of their function, as stated above. +
The outer tabernacle, which denotes this present world, also contained three things, viz. the "altar of incense," which was + directly opposite the ark; the "table of proposition," with the twelve loaves of proposition on it, which stood on the northern + side; and the "candlestick," which was placed towards the south. These three things seem to correspond to the three which + were enclosed in the ark; and they represented the same things as the latter, but more clearly: because, in + order that wise men, denoted by the priests entering the temple, might grasp the meaning of these types, it was necessary + to express them more manifestly than they are in the Divine or angelic mind. Accordingly the candlestick betokened, as a sensible + sign thereof, the wisdom which was expressed on the tables (of the Law) in intelligible words. The altar of incense signified + the office of the priest, whose duty it was to bring the people to God: and this was signified also by the rod: because + on that altar the sweet-smelling incense was burnt, signifying the holiness of the people acceptable to God: for it is written + ( + Apoc. 8:3) that the smoke of the sweet-smelling spices signifies the "justifications of the saints" (cf. + Apoc. 19:8). Moreover it was fitting that the dignity of the priesthood should be denoted, in the ark, by the rod, and, in the outer + tabernacle, by the altar of incense: because the priest is the mediator between God and the + people, governing the people by Divine power, denoted by the rod; and offering to God the fruit of His government, i.e. the + holiness of the people, on the altar of incense, so to speak. The table signified the sustenance of life, just as the manna + did: but the former, a more general and a coarser kind of nourishment; the latter, a sweeter and more delicate. Again, the + candlestick was fittingly placed on the southern side, while the table was placed to the north: because the south is the + right-hand side of the world, while the north is the left-hand side, as stated in De Coelo et Mundo ii; and wisdom, like other + spiritual goods, belongs to the right hand, while temporal nourishment belongs on the left, according to + Prov. 3:16: "In her left hand (are) riches and glory." And the priestly power is midway between temporal goods and spiritual wisdom; + because thereby both spiritual wisdom and temporal goods are dispensed. +
Another literal signification may be assigned. For the ark contained the tables of the Law, in order to prevent forgetfulness + of the Law, wherefore it is written ( + Ex. 24:12): "I will give thee two tables of stone, and the Law, and the commandments which I have written: that thou mayest teach them" + to the children of Israel. The rod of Aaron was placed there to restrain the people from insubordination to the priesthood + of Aaron; wherefore it is written + ( + Num. 17:10): "Carry back the rod of Aaron into the tabernacle of the testimony, that it may be kept there for a token of the rebellious + children of Israel." The manna was kept in the ark to remind them of the benefit conferred by God on the children of Israel + in the desert; wherefore it is written ( + Ex. 16:32): "Fill a gomor of it, and let it be kept unto generations to come hereafter, that they may know the bread wherewith I fed + you in the wilderness." + The candlestick was set up to enhance the beauty of the temple, for the magnificence of a house depends on its being well + lighted. Now the candlestick had seven branches, as Josephus observes (Antiquit. iii, 7,8), to signify the seven planets, + wherewith the whole world is illuminated. Hence the candlestick was placed towards the south; because for us the course of + the planets is from that quarter. The altar of incense was instituted that there might always be in the tabernacle a sweet-smelling + smoke; both through respect for the tabernacle, and as a remedy for the stenches arising from the shedding of blood and the + slaying of animals. For men despise evil-smelling things as being vile, whereas sweet-smelling things are much appreciated. + The table was place there to signify that the priests who served the temple should take their food in the temple: wherefore, + as stated in + Mat. 12:4, it was lawful for none but the priests to eat the twelve loaves which were put on + the table in memory of the twelve tribes. And the table was not placed in the middle directly in front of the propitiatory, + in order to exclude an idolatrous rite: for the Gentiles, on the feasts of the moon, set up a table in front of the idol of + the moon, wherefore it is written ( + Jer. 7:18): "The women knead the dough, to make cakes to the queen of heaven." +
In the court outside the tabernacle was the altar of holocausts, on which sacrifices of those things which the people possessed + were offered to God: and consequently the people who offered these sacrifices to God by the hands of the priest could be present + in the court. But the priests alone, whose function it was to offer the people to God, could approach the inner altar, whereon + the very devotion and holiness of the people was offered to God. And this altar was put up outside + the tabernacle and in the court, to the exclusion of idolatrous worship: for the Gentiles placed altars inside the temples + to offer up sacrifices thereon to idols. +
The figurative reason for all these things may be taken from the relation of the tabernacle to Christ, who was foreshadowed + therein. Now it must be observed that to show the imperfection of the figures of the Law, various figures were instituted + in the temple to betoken Christ. For He was foreshadowed by the "propitiatory," since He is "a propitiation for our sins" + ( + 1 Jn. 2:2). This propitiatory was fittingly carried by cherubim, since of Him it is written + ( + Heb. 1:6): "Let all the angels of God adore Him." He is also signified by the ark: because just as the ark was made of setim-wood, + so was Christ's body composed of most pure members. More over it was gilded: for Christ was full of wisdom and charity, which + are betokened by gold. And in the ark was a golden pot, i.e. His holy soul, having manna, i.e. "all the fulness of the Godhead" + ( + Col. 2:9). Also there was a rod in the ark, i.e. His priestly power: + for "He was made a . . . priest for ever" ( + Heb. 6:20). And therein were the tables of the Testament, to denote that Christ Himself is a lawgiver. Again, Christ was signified + by the candlestick, for He said Himself ( + Jn. 8:12): "I am the Light of the world"; while the seven lamps denoted the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost. He is also betokened in + the table, because He is our spiritual food, according to + Jn. 6:41, + 51: "I am the living bread": and the twelve + loaves signified the twelve apostles, or their teaching. Or again, the candlestick and table may signify the Church's teaching, + and faith, which also enlightens and refreshes. Again, Christ is signified by the two altars of holocausts and incense. Because + all works of virtue must be offered to us to God through Him; both those whereby we afflict the body, which are offered, as + it were, on the altar of holocausts; and those which, with greater perfection of mind, are offered to God in Christ, by + the spiritual desires of the perfect, on the altar of incense, as it were, according to + Heb. 13:15: "By Him therefore let us offer the sacrifice of praise always to God." +
[38056] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 ad 6 Ad sextum +dicendum quod eorum quae in tabernaculo continebantur, ratio reddi +potest et litteralis et figuralis. Litteralis quidem, per +relationem ad cultum divinum. Et quia dictum est quod per +tabernaculum interius, quod dicebatur sancta sanctorum, +significabatur saeculum altius spiritualium substantiarum, ideo in +illo tabernaculo tria continebantur. Scilicet arca testamenti, in +qua erat urna aurea habens manna, et virga Aaron quae fronduerat, +et tabulae in quibus erant scripta decem praecepta legis. Haec +autem arca sita erat inter duos Cherubim, qui se mutuis vultibus +respiciebant. Et super arcam erat quaedam tabula, quae dicebatur +propitiatorium, super alas Cherubim, quasi ab ipsis Cherubim +portaretur, ac si imaginaretur quod illa tabula esset sedes Dei. +Unde et propitiatorium dicebatur, quasi exinde populo +propitiaretur, ad preces summi sacerdotis. Et ideo quasi portabatur +a Cherubim, quasi Deo obsequentibus, arca vero testamenti erat +quasi scabellum sedentis supra propitiatorium. Per haec autem tria +designantur tria quae sunt in illo altiori saeculo. Scilicet Deus, +qui super omnia est, et incomprehensibilis omni creaturae. Et +propter hoc nulla similitudo eius ponebatur, ad repraesentandam +eius invisibilitatem. Sed ponebatur quaedam figura sedis eius, quia +scilicet creatura comprehensibilis est, quae est subiecta Deo, +sicut sedes sedenti. Sunt etiam in illo altiori saeculo spirituales +substantiae, quae Angeli dicuntur. Et hi significantur per duos +Cherubim; mutuo se respicientes, ad designandam concordiam eorum ad +invicem, secundum illud Iob XXV, qui facit concordiam in +sublimibus. Et propter hoc etiam non fuit unus tantum Cherubim, ut +designaretur multitudo caelestium spirituum, et excluderetur cultus +eorum ab his quibus praeceptum erat ut solum unum Deum colerent. +Sunt etiam in illo intelligibili saeculo rationes omnium eorum quae +in hoc saeculo perficiuntur quodammodo clausae, sicut rationes +effectuum clauduntur in suis causis, et rationes artificiatorum in +artifice. Et hoc significabatur per arcam, in qua +repraesentabantur, per tria ibi contenta, tria quae sunt potissima +in rebus humanis, scilicet sapientia, quae repraesentabatur per +tabulas testamenti; potestas regiminis, quae repraesentabatur per +virgam Aaron; vita, quae repraesentabatur per manna, quod fuit +sustentamentum vitae. Vel per haec tria significabantur tria Dei +attributa, scilicet sapientia, in tabulis; potentia, in virga; +bonitas, in manna, tum propter dulcedinem, tum quia ex Dei +misericordia est populo datum, et ideo in memoriam divinae +misericordiae conservabatur. Et haec tria etiam figurata sunt in +visione Isaiae. Vidit enim dominum sedentem super solium excelsum +et elevatum; et Seraphim assistentes; et domum impleri a gloria +Dei. Unde et Seraphim dicebant, plena est omnis terra gloria eius. +Et sic similitudines Seraphim non ponebantur ad cultum, quod +prohibebatur primo legis praecepto, sed in signum ministerii, ut +dictum est. In exteriori vero tabernaculo, quod significat praesens +saeculum, continebantur etiam tria, scilicet altare thymiamatis, +quod erat directe contra arcam; mensa propositionis, super quam +duodecim panes apponebantur, erat posita ex parte aquilonari; +candelabrum vero ex parte Australi. Quae tria videntur respondere +tribus quae erant in arca clausa, sed magis manifeste eadem +repraesentabant, oportet enim rationes rerum ad manifestiorem +demonstrationem perduci quam sint in mente divina et Angelorum, ad +hoc quod homines sapientes eas cognoscere possint qui significantur +per sacerdotes ingredientes tabernaculum. In candelabro igitur +designabatur, sicut in signo sensibili, sapientia quae +intelligibilibus verbis exprimebatur in tabulis. Per altare vero +thymiamatis significabatur officium sacerdotum, quorum erat populum +ad Deum reducere, et hoc etiam significabatur per virgam. Nam in +illo altari incedebatur thymiama boni odoris, per quod +significabatur sanctitas populi acceptabilis Deo, dicitur enim +Apoc. VIII, quod per fumum aromatum significantur iustificationes +sanctorum. Convenienter autem sacerdotalis dignitas in arca +significabatur per virgam, in exteriori vero tabernaculo per altare +thymiamatis, quia sacerdos mediator est inter Deum et populum, +regens populum per potestatem divinam, quam virga significat; et +fructum sui regiminis, scilicet sanctitatem populi, Deo offert, +quasi in altari thymiamatis. Per mensam autem significatur +nutrimentum vitae, sicut et per manna. Sed hoc est communius et +grossius nutrimentum, illud autem suavius et subtilius. +Convenienter autem candelabrum ponebatur ex parte Australi, mensa +autem ex parte aquilonari, quia Australis pars est dextera pars +mundi, aquilonaris autem sinistra, ut dicitur in II de caelo et +mundo; sapientia autem pertinet ad dextram, sicut et cetera +spiritualia bona; temporale autem nutrimentum ad sinistram, +secundum illud Prov. III, in sinistra illius divitiae et gloria. +Potestas autem sacerdotalis media est inter temporalia et +spiritualem sapientiam, quia per eam et spiritualis sapientia et +temporalia dispensantur. Potest autem et horum alia ratio assignari +magis litteralis. In arca enim continebantur tabulae legis, ad +tollendam legis oblivionem, unde dicitur Exod. XXIV, dabo tibi +duas tabulas lapideas et legem ac mandata quae scripsi, ut doceas +filios Israel. Virga vero Aaron ponebatur ibi ad comprimendam +dissensionem populi de sacerdotio Aaron, unde dicitur Num. XVII, +refer virgam Aaron in tabernaculum testimonii, ut servetur in +signum rebellium filiorum Israel. Manna autem conservabatur in +arca, ad commemorandum beneficium quod dominus praestitit filiis +Israel in deserto, unde dicitur Exod. XVI, imple gomor ex eo, et +custodiatur in futuras retro generationes, ut noverint panes de +quibus alui vos in solitudine. Candelabrum vero erat institutum +ad honorificentiam tabernaculi, pertinet enim ad magnificentiam +domus quod sit bene luminosa. Habebat autem candelabrum septem +calamos, ut Iosephus dicit, ad significandum septem planetas, +quibus totus mundus illuminatur. Et ideo ponebatur candelabrum ex +parte Australi, quia ex illa parte est nobis planetarum cursus. +Altare vero thymiamatis erat institutum ut iugiter in tabernaculo +esset fumus boni odoris, tum propter venerationem tabernaculi; tum +etiam in remedium fetoris quem oportebat accidere ex effusione +sanguinis et occisione animalium. Ea enim quae sunt fetida, +despiciuntur quasi vilia, quae vero sunt boni odoris, homines magis +appretiant. Mensa autem apponebatur ad significandum quod +sacerdotes templo servientes, in templo victum habere debebant, +unde duodecim panes superpositos mensae, in memoriam duodecim +tribuum, solis sacerdotibus edere licitum erat, ut habetur Matth. +XII. Mensa autem non ponebatur directe in medio ante +propitiatorium, ad excludendum ritum idololatriae, nam gentiles in +sacris lunae proponebant mensam coram idolo lunae; unde dicitur +Ierem. VII, mulieres conspergunt adipem ut faciant placentas +reginae caeli. In atrio vero extra tabernaculum continebatur +altare holocaustorum, in quo offerebantur Deo sacrificia de his +quae erant a populo possessa. Et ideo in atrio poterat esse +populus, qui huiusmodi Deo offerebat per manus sacerdotum. Sed ad +altare interius, in quo ipsa devotio et sanctitas populi Deo +offerebatur, non poterant accedere nisi sacerdotes, quorum erat Deo +offerre populum. Est autem hoc altare extra tabernaculum in atrio +constitutum, ad removendum cultum idololatriae, nam gentiles infra +templa altaria constituebant ad immolandum idolis. Figuralis vero +ratio omnium horum assignari potest ex relatione tabernaculi ad +Christum, qui figurabatur. Est autem considerandum quod ad +designandum imperfectionem legalium figurarum, diversae figurae +fuerunt institutae in templo ad significandum Christum. Ipse enim +significatur per propitiatorium, quia ipse est propitiatio pro +peccatis nostris, ut dicitur I Ioan. II. Et convenienter hoc +propitiatorium a Cherubim portatur, quia de eo scriptum est, +adorent eum omnes Angeli Dei, ut habetur Heb. I. Ipse etiam +significatur per arcam, quia sicut arca erat constructa de lignis +setim, ita corpus Christi de membris purissimis constabat. Erat +autem deaurata, quia Christus fuit plenus sapientia et caritate, +quae per aurum significantur. Intra arcam autem erat urna aurea, +idest sancta anima; habens manna, idest omnem plenitudinem +divinitatis. Erat etiam in arca virga, idest potestas sacerdotalis, +quia ipse est factus sacerdos in aeternum. Erant etiam ibi tabulae +testamenti, ad designandum quod ipse Christus est legis dator. Ipse +etiam Christus significatur per candelabrum, quia ipse dicit, ego +sum lux mundi, per septem lucernas, septem dona spiritus sancti. +Ipse est spiritualis cibus, secundum illud Ioan. VI, ego sum panis +vivus, duodecim autem panes significant duodecim apostolos, vel +doctrinam eorum. Sive per candelabrum et mensam potest significari +doctrina et fides Ecclesiae, quae etiam illuminat et spiritualiter +reficit. Ipse etiam Christus significatur per duplex altare +holocaustorum et thymiamatis. Quia per ipsum oportet nos Deo +offerre omnia virtutum opera, sive illa quibus carnem affligimus, +quae offeruntur quasi in altari holocaustorum; sive illa quae, +maiore mentis perfectione, per spiritualia perfectorum desideria, +Deo offeruntur in Christo, quasi in altari thymiamatis, secundum +illud ad Heb. ult., per ipsum ergo offeramus hostiam laudis +semper Deo.
+ Reply to Objection 7: The Lord commanded an altar to be made for the offering of sacrifices and gifts, in honor of God, and for the upkeep of the + ministers who served the tabernacle. Now concerning the construction of the altar the Lord issued a twofold precept. One was + at the beginning of the Law ( + Ex. 20:24, seqq.) when the Lord commanded them to make "an altar of earth," or at least "not of hewn stones"; and again, not to make + the altar high, so as + to make it necessary to "go up" to it "by steps." This was in detestation of idolatrous worship: for the Gentiles made their + altars ornate and high, thinking that there was something holy and divine in such things. For this reason, too, the Lord commanded + ( + Dt. 16:21): "Thou shalt plant no grove, nor any tree near the altar of the Lord thy God": since idolaters were wont to offer sacrifices + beneath trees, on account of the pleasantness and shade afforded by them. There was + also a figurative reason for these precepts. Because we must confess that in Christ, Who is our altar, there is the true nature + of flesh, as regards His humanity---and this is to make an altar of earth; and again, in regard to His Godhead, we must confess + His equality with the Father---and this is "not to go up" to the altar by steps. Moreover we should not couple the doctrine + of Christ to that of the Gentiles, which provokes men to lewdness. +
But when once the tabernacle had been constructed to the honor of God, there was no longer reason to fear these occasions + of idolatry. Wherefore the Lord commanded the altar of holocausts to be made of brass, and to be conspicuous to all the people; + and the altar of incense, which was visible to none but the priests. Nor was brass so precious as to give the people an occasion + for idolatry. +
Since, however, the reason for the precept, "Thou shalt not go up by steps unto My altar" ( + Ex. 20:26) is stated to have been "lest thy nakedness be discovered," it should be observed that this too was instituted with the purpose + of preventing idolatry, for in the feasts of Priapus the Gentiles uncovered their nakedness before the people. But later on + the priests were prescribed the use of loin-cloths for the sake of decency: so that without any danger the + altar could be placed so high that the priests when offering sacrifices would go up by steps of wood, not fixed but movable. +
[38057] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 ad 7 Ad septimum +dicendum quod dominus praecepit altare construi ad sacrificia et +munera offerenda, in honorem Dei et sustentationem ministrorum qui +tabernaculo deserviebant. De constructione autem altaris datur a +domino duplex praeceptum. Unum quidem in principio legis, Exod. XX, +ubi dominus mandavit quod facerent altare de terra, vel saltem de +lapidibus non sectis; et iterum quod non facerent altare excelsum, +ad quod oporteret per gradus ascendere. Et hoc, ad detestandum +idololatriae cultum, gentiles enim idolis construebant altaria +ornata et sublimia, in quibus credebant aliquid sanctitatis et +numinis esse. Propter quod etiam dominus mandavit, Deut. XVI, +non plantabis lucum, et omnem arborem, iuxta altare domini Dei +tui, idololatrae enim consueverunt sub arboribus sacrificare, +propter amoenitatem et umbrositatem. Quorum etiam praeceptorum +ratio figuralis fuit. Quia in Christo, qui est nostrum altare, +debemus confiteri veram carnis naturam, quantum ad humanitatem, +quod est altare de terra facere, et quantum ad divinitatem, debemus +in eo confiteri patris aequalitatem, quod est non ascendere per +gradus ad altare. Nec etiam iuxta Christum debemus admittere +doctrinam gentilium, ad lasciviam provocantem. Sed facto +tabernaculo ad honorem Dei, non erant timendae huiusmodi occasiones +idololatriae. Et ideo dominus mandavit quod fieret altare +holocaustorum de aere, quod esset omni populo conspicuum; et altare +thymiamatis de auro, quod soli sacerdotes videbant. Nec erat tanta +pretiositas aeris ut per hoc populus ad aliquam idololatriam +provocaretur. Sed quia Exod. XX ponitur pro ratione huius +praecepti, non ascendes per gradus ad altare meum, id quod +subditur, ne reveletur turpitudo tua; considerandum est quod hoc +etiam fuit institutum ad excludendam idololatriam, nam in sacris +Priapi sua pudenda gentiles populo denudabant. Postmodum autem +indictus est sacerdotibus feminalium usus ad tegimen pudendorum. Et +ideo sine periculo institui potuit tanta altaris altitudo ut per +aliquos gradus ligneos, non stantes sed portatiles, in hora +sacrificii, sacerdotes ad altare ascenderent sacrificia +offerentes.
+ Reply to Objection 8: The body of the tabernacle consisted of boards placed on end, and covered on the inside with curtains of four different colors, + viz. twisted linen, violet, purple, and scarlet twice dyed. These curtains, however, covered the sides only of the tabernacle; + and the roof of the tabernacle was covered with violet-colored skins; and over this there was another covering of rams' skins + dyed red; and over this there was a third curtain made of goats' hair, + which covered not only the roof of the tabernacle, but also reached to the ground and covered the boards of the tabernacle + on the outside. The literal reason of these coverings taken altogether was the adornment and protection of the tabernacle, + that it might be an object of respect. Taken singly, according to some, the curtains denoted the starry heaven, which is adorned + with various stars; the curtain (of goats' skin) signified the waters which are above the firmament; the skins dyed red + denoted the empyrean heaven, where the angels are; the violet skins, the heaven of the Blessed Trinity. +
The figurative meaning of these things is that the boards of which the tabernacle was constructed signify the faithful of + Christ, who compose the Church. The boards were covered on the inner side by curtains of four colors: because the faithful + are inwardly adorned with the four virtues: for "the twisted linen," as the gloss observes, "signifies the flesh refulgent + with purity; violet signifies the mind desirous of heavenly things; purple denotes the flesh subject to passions; + the twice dyed scarlet betokens the mind in the midst of the passions enlightened by the love of God and our neighbor." The + coverings of the building designate prelates and doctors, who ought to be conspicuous for their heavenly manner of life, signified + by the violet colored skins: and who should also be ready to suffer martyrdom, denoted by the skins dyed red; and austere + of life and patient in adversity, betokened by the curtains of goats' hair, which were exposed to wind and rain, as the + gloss observes. +
[38058] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 ad 8 Ad octavum +dicendum quod corpus tabernaculi constabat ex quibusdam tabulis in +longitudinem erectis, quae quidem interius tegebantur quibusdam +cortinis ex quatuor coloribus variatis, scilicet de bysso retorta, +et hyacintho, ac purpura, coccoque bis tincto. Sed huiusmodi +cortinae tegebant solum latera tabernaculi, in tecto autem +tabernaculi erat operimentum unum de pellibus hyacinthinis; et +super hoc aliud de pellibus arietum rubricatis; et desuper tertium +de quibusdam sagis cilicinis, quae non tantum operiebant tectum +tabernaculi, sed etiam descendebant usque terram, et tegebant +tabulas tabernaculi exterius. Horum autem operimentorum ratio +litteralis in communi erat ornatus et protectio tabernaculi, ut in +reverentia haberetur. In speciali vero, secundum quosdam, per +cortinas designabatur caelum sydereum, quod est diversis stellis +variatum; per saga, aquae quae sunt supra firmamentum; per pelles +rubricatas, caelum Empyreum, in quo sunt Angeli; per pelles +hyacinthinas, caelum sanctae Trinitatis. Figuralis autem ratio +horum est quia per tabulas ex quibus construebatur tabernaculum, +significantur Christi fideles, ex quibus construitur Ecclesia. +Tegebantur autem interius tabulae cortinis quadricoloribus, quia +fideles interius ornantur quatuor virtutibus; nam in bysso +retorta, ut Glossa dicit, significatur caro castitate +renitens; in hyacintho, mens superna cupiens; in purpura, caro +passionibus subiacens; in cocco bis tincto, mens inter passiones +Dei et proximi dilectione praefulgens. Per operimenta vero +tecti designantur praelati et doctores, in quibus debet renitere +caelestis conversatio, quod significatur per pelles hyacinthinas; +promptitudo ad martyrium, quod significant pelles rubricatae; +austeritas vitae et tolerantia adversorum, quae significantur per +saga cilicina, quae erant exposita ventis et pluviis, ut Glossa +dicit.
+ Reply to Objection 9: The literal reason for the sanctification of the tabernacle and vessels was that they might be treated with greater reverence, + being deputed, as it were, to the divine worship by this consecration. The figurative reason is that this sanctification signified + the sanctification of the living tabernacle, i.e. the faithful of whom the Church of Christ is composed. +
[38059] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 ad 9 Ad nonum +dicendum quod sanctificatio tabernaculi et vasorum eius habebat +causam litteralem ut in maiori reverentia haberetur, quasi per +huiusmodi consecrationem divino cultui deputatum. Figuralis autem +ratio est quia per huiusmodi sanctificationem significatur +spiritualis sanctificatio viventis tabernaculi, scilicet fidelium, +ex quibus constituitur Ecclesia Christi.
+ Reply to Objection 10: Under the Old Law there were seven temporal solemnities, and one continual solemnity, as may be gathered from + Num. 28, + 29. There was a continual feast, since the lamb was sacrificed every day, morning and evening: and this continual feast of an + abiding sacrifice signified the perpetuity of Divine bliss. Of the temporal feasts the first was that which was repeated every + week. This was the solemnity of the "Sabbath," celebrated in memory of the work of + the creation of the universe. Another solemnity, viz. the "New Moon," was repeated every month, and was observed in memory + of the work of the Divine government. For the things of this lower world owe their variety chiefly to the movement of the + moon; wherefore this feast was kept at the new moon: and not at the full moon, to avoid the worship of idolaters who used + to offer sacrifices to the moon at that particular time. And these two blessings are bestowed in common on the whole human + race; and + hence they were repeated more frequently. +
The other five feasts were celebrated once a year: and they commemorated the benefits which had been conferred especially + on that people. For there was the feast of the "Passover" in the first month to commemorate the blessing of being delivered + out of Egypt. The feast of "Pentecost" was celebrated fifty days later, to recall the blessing of the giving of the Law. The + other three feasts were kept in the seventh month, nearly the whole of which was solemnized by them, just as the + seventh day. For on the first of the seventh month was the feast of "Trumpets," in memory of the delivery of Isaac, when Abraham + found the ram caught by its horns, which they represented by the horns which they blew. The feast of Trumpets was a kind of + invitation whereby they prepared themselves to keep the following feast which was kept on the tenth day. This was the feast + of "Expiation," in memory of the blessing whereby, at the prayer of Moses, God forgave the people's sin of worshipping the + calf. After this was the feast of "Scenopegia" or of "Tents," which was kept for seven days, to commemorate the blessing of + being protected and led by God through the desert, where they lived in tents. Hence during this feast they had to take "the + fruits of the fairest tree," i.e. the citron, "and the trees of dense foliage" [*Douay and A. V. and R. V. read: 'Boughs of + thick trees'], i.e. the myrtle, which is fragrant, "and the branches of palm-trees, and willows of the brook," which retain + their greenness a long time; and these are to be found in the Land of promise; to signify that God had brought them through + the arid land of the wilderness to a land of delights. On the eighth day another feast was observed, of "Assembly and Congregation," + on which the people collected the expenses necessary for the divine worship: and it signified the uniting of the people and + the peace granted to them in the Land of promise. +
The figurative reason for these feasts was that the continual sacrifice of the lamb foreshadowed the perpetuity of Christ, + Who is the "Lamb of God," according to + Heb. 13:8: "Jesus Christ yesterday and today, and the same for ever." The Sabbath signified the spiritual rest bestowed by Christ, + as stated in + Heb. 4. The Neomenia, which is the beginning of the new moon, signified the enlightening of the primitive Church by Christ's preaching + and miracles. The + feast of Pentecost signified the Descent of the Holy Ghost on the apostles. The feast of Trumpets signified the preaching + of the apostles. The feast of Expiation signified the cleansing of the Christian people from sins: and the feast of Tabernacles + signified their pilgrimage in this world, wherein they walk by advancing in virtue. The feast of Assembly or Congregation + foreshadowed the assembly of the faithful in the kingdom of heaven: wherefore this feast is described as "most holy" + ( + Lev. 23:36). These three feasts followed immediately on one another, because those who expiate their vices should advance in virtue, + until they come to see God, as stated in + Ps. 83:8. +
[38060] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 ad 10 Ad decimum +dicendum quod in veteri lege erant septem solemnitates temporales, +et una continua, ut potest colligi Num. XXVIII et XXIX. Erat enim +quasi continuum festum, quia quotidie mane et vespere immolabatur +agnus. Et per illud continuum festum iugis sacrificii +repraesentabatur perpetuitas divinae beatitudinis. Festorum autem +temporalium primum erat quod iterabatur qualibet septimana. Et haec +erat solemnitas sabbati, quod celebrabatur in memoriam creationis +rerum, ut supra dictum est. Alia autem solemnitas iterabatur +quolibet mense, scilicet festum Neomeniae, quod celebrabatur ad +commemorandum opus divinae gubernationis. Nam haec inferiora +praecipue variantur secundum motum lunae, et ideo celebrabatur hoc +festum in novitate lunae. Non autem in eius plenitudine, ad +evitandum idololatrarum cultum, qui in tali tempore lunae +sacrificabant. Haec autem duo beneficia sunt communia toti humano +generi, et ideo frequentius iterabantur. Alia vero quinque festa +celebrabantur semel in anno, et recolebantur in eis beneficia +specialiter illi populo exhibita. Celebrabatur enim festum phase +primo mense, ad commemorandum beneficium liberationis ex Aegypto. +Celebrabatur autem festum Pentecostes post quinquaginta dies, ad +recolendum beneficium legis datae. Alia vero tria festa +celebrabantur in mense septimo, qui quasi totus apud eos erat +solemnis, sicut et septimus dies. In prima enim die mensis septimi +erat festum tubarum, in memoriam liberationis Isaac, quando Abraham +invenit arietem haerentem cornibus, quem repraesentabant per cornua +quibus buccinabant. Erat autem festum tubarum quasi quaedam +invitatio ut praepararent se ad sequens festum, quod celebrabatur +decimo die. Et hoc erat festum expiationis, in memoriam illius +beneficii quo Deus propitiatus est peccato populi de adoratione +vituli, ad preces Moysi. Post hoc autem celebrabatur festum +Scenopegiae, idest tabernaculorum, septem diebus, ad commemorandum +beneficium divinae protectionis et deductionis per desertum, ubi in +tabernaculis habitaverunt. Unde in hoc festo debebant habere +fructum arboris pulcherrimae, idest citrum, et lignum densarum +frondium, idest myrtum, quae sunt odorifera; et spatulas palmarum, +et salices de torrente, quae diu retinent suum virorem; et haec +inveniuntur in terra promissionis; ad significandum quod per aridam +terram deserti eos duxerat Deus ad terram deliciosam. Octavo autem +die celebrabatur aliud festum, scilicet coetus atque collectae, in +quo colligebantur a populo ea quae erant necessaria ad expensas +cultus divini. Et significabatur adunatio populi et pax praestita +in terra promissionis. Figuralis autem ratio horum festorum est +quia per iuge sacrificium agni figuratur perpetuitas Christi, qui +est agnus Dei; secundum illud Heb. ult., Iesus Christus heri et +hodie, ipse et in saecula. Per sabbatum autem significatur +spiritualis requies nobis data per Christum, ut habetur ad Heb. IV. +Per Neomeniam autem, quae est incoeptio novae lunae, significatur +illuminatio primitivae Ecclesiae per Christum, eo praedicante et +miracula faciente. Per festum autem Pentecostes significatur +descensus spiritus sancti in apostolos. Per festum autem tubarum +significatur praedicatio apostolorum. Per festum autem expiationis +significatur emundatio a peccatis populi Christiani. Per festum +autem tabernaculorum, peregrinatio eorum in hoc mundo, in quo +ambulant in virtutibus proficiendo. Per festum autem coetus atque +collectae significatur congregatio fidelium in regno caelorum, et +ideo istud festum dicebatur sanctissimum esse. Et haec tria festa +erant continua ad invicem, quia oportet expiatos a vitiis proficere +in virtute, quousque perveniant ad Dei visionem, ut dicitur in +Psalmo LXXXIII.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that there can be no suitable cause for the sacraments of the Old Law. Because those things that are done for + the purpose of divine worship should not be like the observances of idolaters: since it is written ( + Dt. 12:31): "Thou shalt not do in like manner to the Lord thy God: for they have done to their gods all the abominations which the + Lord abhorreth." Now worshippers of idols used to knive themselves to the shedding of + blood: for it is related ( + 3 Kings 18:28) that they "cut themselves after their manner with knives and lancets, till they were all covered with blood." For this reason + the Lord commanded ( + Dt. 14:1): "You shall not cut yourselves nor make any baldness for the dead." Therefore it was unfitting for circumcision to be prescribed + by the Law ( + Lev. 12:3). +
[38061] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod sacramentorum veteris legis conveniens +causa esse non possit. Ea enim quae ad cultum divinum fiunt, non +debent esse similia his quae idololatrae observabant, dicitur enim +Deut. XII, non facies similiter domino Deo tuo, omnes enim +abominationes quas aversatur dominus, fecerunt diis suis. Sed +cultores idolorum in eorum cultu se incidebant usque ad effusionem +sanguinis, dicitur enim III Reg. XVIII, quod incidebant se, +iuxta ritum suum, cultris et lanceolis, donec perfunderentur +sanguine. Propter quod dominus mandavit, Deut. XIV, non vos +incidetis, nec facietis calvitium super mortuo. Inconvenienter +igitur circumcisio erat instituta in lege.
+ Objection 2: Further, those things which are done for the worship of God should be marked with decorum and gravity; according to + Ps. 34:18: "I will praise Thee in a grave [Douay: 'strong'] people." But it seems to savor of levity for a man to eat with haste. Therefore + it was unfittingly commanded ( + Ex. 12:11) that they should eat the Paschal lamb "in haste." Other things too relative to the eating of the lamb were prescribed, which + seem altogether unreasonable. +
[38062] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +ea quae in cultum divinum fiunt, debent honestatem et gravitatem +habere; secundum illud Psalmi XXXIV, in populo gravi laudabo +te. Sed ad levitatem quandam pertinere videtur ut homines +festinanter comedant. Inconvenienter igitur praeceptum est, Exod. +XII, ut comederent festinanter agnum paschalem. Et alia etiam circa +eius comestionem sunt instituta, quae videntur omnino +irrationabilia esse.
+ Objection 3: Further, the sacraments of the Old Law were figures of the sacraments of the New Law. Now the Paschal lamb signified the + sacrament of the Eucharist, according to + 1 Cor. 5:7: "Christ our Pasch is sacrificed." Therefore there should also have been some sacraments of the Old Law to foreshadow the + other sacraments of the New Law, such as Confirmation, Extreme Unction, and Matrimony, and so forth. +
[38063] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sacramenta veteris legis figurae fuerunt sacramentorum novae legis. +Sed per agnum paschalem significatur sacramentum Eucharistiae; +secundum illud I ad Cor. V, Pascha nostrum immolatus est +Christus. Ergo etiam debuerunt esse aliqua sacramenta in lege +quae praefigurarent alia sacramenta novae legis, sicut +confirmationem et extremam unctionem et matrimonium, et alia +sacramenta.
+ Objection 4: Further, purification can scarcely be done except by removing something impure. But as far as God is concerned, no bodily + thing is reputed impure, because all bodies are God's creatures; and "every creature of God is good, and nothing to be rejected + that is received with thanksgiving" ( + 1 Tim. 4:4). It was therefore unfitting for them to be purified after contact with a corpse, or any similar corporeal infection. +
[38064] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 arg. 4 Praeterea, +purificatio non potest convenienter fieri nisi ab aliquibus +immunditiis. Sed quantum ad Deum, nullum corporale reputatur +immundum, quia omne corpus creatura Dei est; et omnis creatura +Dei bona, et nihil reiiciendum quod cum gratiarum actione +percipitur, ut dicitur I ad Tim. IV. Inconvenienter igitur +purificabantur propter contactum hominis mortui, vel alicuius +huiusmodi corporalis infectionis.
+ Objection 5: Further, it is written ( + Ecclus. 34:4): "What can be made clean by the unclean?" But the ashes of the red heifer [*Cf. + Heb. 9:13] which was burnt, were unclean, since they made a man unclean: for it is stated ( + Num. 19:7, seqq.) that the priest who immolated her was rendered unclean "until the evening"; likewise he that burnt her; and he that + gathered up her ashes. Therefore it was unfittingly + prescribed there that the unclean should be purified by being sprinkled with those cinders. +
[38065] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 arg. 5 Praeterea, +Eccli. XXXIV dicitur, ab immundo quid mundabitur? Sed cinis +vitulae rufae quae comburebatur, immundus erat, quia immundum +reddebat, dicitur enim Num. XIX, quod sacerdos qui immolabat eam, +commaculatus erat usque ad vesperum; similiter et ille qui eam +comburebat; et etiam ille qui eius cineres colligebat. Ergo +inconvenienter praeceptum ibi fuit ut per huiusmodi cinerem +aspersum immundi purificarentur.
+ Objection 6: Further, sins are not something corporeal that can be carried from one place to another: nor can man be cleansed from sin + by means of something unclean. It was therefore unfitting for the purpose of expiating the sins of the people that the priest + should confess the sins of the children of Israel on one of the buck-goats, that it might carry them away into the wilderness: + while they were rendered unclean by the other, which they used for the purpose of + purification, by burning it together with the calf outside the camp; so that they had to wash their clothes and their bodies + with water ( + Lev. 16). +
[38066] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 arg. 6 Praeterea, +peccata non sunt aliquid corporale, quod possit deferri de loco ad +locum, neque etiam per aliquid immundum potest homo a peccato +mundari. Inconvenienter igitur ad expiationem peccatorum populi, +sacerdos super unum hircorum confitebatur peccata filiorum Israel, +ut portaret ea in desertum, per alium autem, quo utebantur ad +purificationes, simul cum vitulo comburentes extra castra, immundi +reddebantur, ita quod oportebat eos lavare vestimenta et carnem +aqua.
+ Objection 7: Further, what is already cleansed should not be cleansed again. It was therefore unfitting to apply a second purification + to a man cleansed from leprosy, or to a house; as laid down in + Lev. 14. +
[38067] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 arg. 7 Praeterea, +illud quod iam est mundatum, non oportet iterum mundari. +Inconvenienter igitur, mundata lepra hominis, vel etiam domus, alia +purificatio adhibebatur; ut habetur Levit. XIV.
+ Objection 8: Further, spiritual uncleanness cannot be cleansed by material water or by shaving the hair. Therefore it seems unreasonable + that the Lord ordered ( + Ex. 30:18, seqq.) the making of a brazen laver with its foot, that the priests might wash their hands and feet before entering the temple; + and that He commanded ( + Num. 8:7) the Levites to be sprinkled with the water of purification, and to shave all the hairs of their + flesh. +
[38068] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 arg. 8 Praeterea, +spiritualis immunditia non potest per corporalem aquam, vel pilorum +rasuram, emundari. Irrationabile igitur videtur quod dominus +praecepit Exod. XXX, ut fieret labium aeneum cum basi sua ad +lavandum manus et pedes sacerdotum qui ingressuri erant +tabernaculum; et quod praecipitur Num. VIII, quod Levitae +abstergerentur aqua lustrationis, et raderent omnes pilos carnis +suae.
+ Objection 9: Further, that which is greater cannot be cleansed by that which is less. Therefore it was unfitting that, in the Law, the + higher and lower priests, as stated in + Lev. 8 [*Cf. + Ex. 29], and the Levites, according to + Num. 8, should be consecrated with any bodily anointing, bodily sacrifices, and bodily oblations. +
[38069] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 arg. 9 Praeterea, +quod maius est, non potest sanctificari per illud quod minus est. +Inconvenienter igitur per quandam unctionem corporalem, et +corporalia sacrificia, et oblationes corporales, fiebat in lege +consecratio maiorum et minorum sacerdotum, ut habetur Levit. VIII; +et Levitarum, ut habetur Num. VIII.
+ Objection 10: Further, as stated in + 1 Kings 16:7, "Man seeth those things that appear, but the Lord beholdeth the heart." But those things that appear outwardly in man are + the dispositions of his body and his clothes. Therefore it was unfitting for certain special garments to be appointed to the + higher and lower priests, as related in + Ex. 28 [*Cf. + Lev. 8:7, seqq.]. It seems, moreover, unreasonable that anyone should be debarred from + the priesthood on account of defects in the body, as stated in + Lev. 21:17, seqq.: "Whosoever of thy seed throughout their families, hath a blemish, he shall not offer bread to his God . . . if he + be blind, if he be lame," etc. It seems, therefore, that the sacraments of the Old Law were unreasonable. +
[38070] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 arg. 10 +Praeterea, sicut dicitur I Reg. XVI, homines vident ea quae +parent, Deus autem intuetur cor. Sed ea quae exterius parent in +homine, est corporalis dispositio, et etiam indumenta. +Inconvenienter igitur sacerdotibus maioribus et minoribus quaedam +specialia vestimenta deputabantur, de quibus habetur Exod. XXVIII. +Et sine ratione videtur quod prohiberetur aliquis a sacerdotio +propter corporales defectus, secundum quod dicitur Levit. XXI, +homo de semine tuo per familias qui habuerit maculam, non +offeret panes Deo suo, si caecus fuerit, vel claudus, et +cetera. Sic igitur videtur quod sacramenta veteris legis +irrationabilia fuerint.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Lev. 20:8): "I am the Lord that sanctify you." But nothing unreasonable is done by God, for it is written ( + Ps. 103:24): "Thou hast made all things in wisdom." Therefore there was nothing without a reasonable cause in the sacraments of the + Old Law, which were ordained to the sanctification of man. +
[38071] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Levit. XX, ego sum dominus, qui sanctifico +vos. Sed a Deo nihil sine ratione fit, dicitur enim in Psalmo +CIII, omnia in sapientia fecisti. Ergo in sacramentis +veteris legis, quae ordinabantur ad hominum sanctificationem, nihil +erat sine rationabili causa.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + Q[101], A[4]), the sacraments are, properly speaking, things applied to the worshippers of God for their consecration so as, in some way, + to depute them to the worship of God. Now the worship of God belonged in a general way to the whole people; but in a special + way, it belonged to the priests and Levites, who were the ministers of divine worship. Consequently, in these sacraments of + the Old Law, certain things + concerned the whole people in general; while others belonged to the ministers. +
In regard to both, three things were necessary. The first was to be established in the state of worshipping God: and this + institution was brought about---for all in general, by circumcision, without which no one was admitted to any of the legal + observances---and for the priests, by their consecration. The second thing required was the use of those things that pertain + to divine worship. And thus, as to the people, there was the partaking of the paschal banquet, to which no + uncircumcised man was admitted, as is clear from + Ex. 12:43, seqq.: and, as to the priests, the offering of the victims, and the eating of the loaves of proposition and of other things + that were allotted to the use of the priests. The third thing required was the removal of all impediments to divine worship, + viz. of uncleannesses. And then, as to the people, certain purifications were instituted for the removal of certain external + uncleannesses; and also expiations from + sins; while, as to the priests and Levites, the washing of hands and feet and the shaving of the hair were instituted. +
And all these things had reasonable causes, both literal, in so far as they were ordained to the worship of God for the time + being, and figurative, in so far as they were ordained to foreshadow Christ: as we shall see by taking them one by one. +
[38072] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, sacramenta proprie dicuntur +illa quae adhibebantur Dei cultoribus ad quandam consecrationem, +per quam scilicet deputabantur quodammodo ad cultum Dei. Cultus +autem Dei generali quidem modo pertinebat ad totum populum; sed +speciali modo pertinebat ad sacerdotes et Levitas, qui erant +ministri cultus divini. Et ideo in istis sacramentis veteris legis +quaedam pertinebant communiter ad totum populum; quaedam autem +specialiter ad ministros. Et circa utrosque tria erant necessaria. +Quorum primum est institutio in statu colendi Deum. Et haec quidem +institutio communiter quantum ad omnes, fiebat per circumcisionem, +sine qua nullus admittebatur ad aliquid legalium, quantum vero ad +sacerdotes, per sacerdotum consecrationem. Secundo requirebatur +usus eorum quae pertinent ad divinum cultum. Et sic quantum ad +populum, erat esus paschalis convivii, ad quem nullus incircumcisus +admittebatur, ut patet Exod. XII, et quantum ad sacerdotes, oblatio +victimarum, et esus panum propositionis et aliorum quae erant +sacerdotum usibus deputata. Tertio requirebatur remotio eorum per +quae aliqui impediebantur a cultu divino, scilicet immunditiarum. +Et sic quantum ad populum, erant institutae quaedam purificationes +a quibusdam exterioribus immunditiis, et etiam expiationes a +peccatis, quantum vero ad sacerdotes et Levitas, erat instituta +ablutio manuum et pedum, et rasio pilorum. Et haec omnia habebant +rationabiles causas et litterales, secundum quod ordinabantur ad +cultum Dei pro tempore illo; et figurales, secundum quod +ordinabantur ad figurandum Christum; ut patebit per singula.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The chief literal reason for circumcision was in order that man might profess his belief in one God. And because Abraham + was the first to sever himself from the infidels, by going out from his house and kindred, for this reason he was the first + to receive circumcision. This reason is set forth by the Apostle ( + Rom. 4:9, seqq.) thus: "He received the sign of circumcision, a seal of the justice of the faith which he had, being + uncircumcised"; because, to wit, we are told that "unto Abraham faith was reputed to justice," for the reason that "against + hope he believed in hope," i.e. against the hope that is of nature he believed in the hope that is of grace, "that he might + be made the father of many nations," when he was an old man, and his wife an old and barren woman. And in order that this + declaration, and imitation of Abraham's faith, might be fixed firmly in the hearts of the Jews, they received in their flesh + such + a sign as they could not forget, wherefore it is written ( + Gn. 17:13): "My covenant shall be in your flesh for a perpetual covenant." This was done on the eighth day, because until then a child + is very tender, and so might be seriously injured; and is considered as something not yet consolidated: wherefore neither + are animals offered before the eighth day. And it was not delayed after that time, lest some might refuse the sign of circumcision + on account of the pain: and also lest the parents, + whose love for their children increases as they become used to their presence and as they grow older, should withdraw their + children from circumcision. A second reason may have been the weakening of concupiscence in that member. A third motive may + have been to revile the worship of Venus and Priapus, which gave honor to that part of the body. The Lord's prohibition extended + only to the cutting of oneself in honor of idols: and such was not the circumcision of which we have been speaking. +
The figurative reason for circumcision was that it foreshadowed the removal of corruption, which was to be brought about + by Christ, and will be perfectly fulfilled in the eighth age, which is the age of those who rise from the dead. And since + all corruption of guilt and punishment comes to us through our carnal origin, from the sin of our first parent, therefore + circumcision was applied to the generative member. Hence the Apostle says ( + Col. 2:11): "You are + circumcised" in Christ "with circumcision not made by hand in despoiling of the body of the flesh, but in the circumcision + of" Our Lord Jesus "Christ." +
[38073] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod litteralis ratio circumcisionis principalis +quidem fuit ad protestationem fidei unius Dei. Et quia Abraham fuit +primus qui se ab infidelibus separavit, exiens de domo sua et de +cognatione sua, ideo ipse primus circumcisionem accepit. Et hanc +causam assignat apostolus, ad Rom. IV, signum accepit +circumcisionis, signaculum iustitiae fidei quae est in +praeputio, quia scilicet in hoc legitur Abrahae fides reputata +ad iustitiam, quod contra spem in spem credidit, scilicet contra +spem naturae in spem gratiae, ut fieret pater multarum gentium, cum +ipse esset senex, et uxor sua esset anus et sterilis. Et ut haec +protestatio, et imitatio fidei Abrahae, firmaretur in cordibus +Iudaeorum, acceperunt signum in carne sua, cuius oblivisci non +possent, unde dicitur Gen. XVII, erit pactum meum in carne +vestra in foedus aeternum. Ideo autem fiebat octava die, quia +antea puer est valde tenellus, et posset ex hoc graviter laedi, et +reputatur adhuc quasi quiddam non solidatum, unde etiam nec +animalia offerebantur ante octavum diem. Ideo vero non magis +tardabatur, ne propter dolorem aliqui signum circumcisionis +refugerent, et ne parentes etiam, quorum amor increscit ad filios +post frequentem conversationem et eorum augmentum, eos +circumcisioni subtraherent. Secunda ratio esse potuit ad +debilitationem concupiscentiae in membro illo. Tertia ratio, in +sugillationem sacrorum Veneris et Priapi, in quibus illa pars +corporis honorabatur. Dominus autem non prohibuit nisi incisionem +quae in cultum idolorum fiebat, cui non erat similis praedicta +circumcisio. Figuralis vero ratio circumcisionis erat quia +figurabatur ablatio corruptionis fienda per Christum, quae perfecte +complebitur in octava aetate, quae est aetas resurgentium. Et quia +omnis corruptio culpae et poenae provenit in nos per carnalem +originem ex peccato primi parentis, ideo talis circumcisio fiebat +in membro generationis. Unde apostolus dicit, ad Colos. II, +circumcisi estis in Christo circumcisione non manu facta in +expoliatione corporis carnis, sed in circumcisione domini nostri +Iesu Christi.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The literal reason of the paschal banquet was to commemorate the blessing of being led by God out of Egypt. Hence by celebrating + this banquet they declared that they belonged to that people which God had taken to Himself out of Egypt. For when they were + delivered from Egypt, they were commanded to sprinkle the lamb's blood on the transoms of their house doors, as though declaring + that they were averse to the rites of the Egyptians who worshipped the + ram. Wherefore they were delivered by the sprinkling or rubbing of the blood of the lamb on the door-posts, from the danger + of extermination which threatened the Egyptians. +
Now two things are to be observed in their departure from Egypt: namely, their haste in going, for the Egyptians pressed + them to go forth speedily, as related in + Ex. 12:33; and there was danger that anyone who did not hasten to go with the crowd might be slain by the Egyptians. Their haste was + shown in two ways. First by what they ate. For they were commanded to eat unleavened bread, as a sign "that it could not be + leavened, the Egyptians pressing them to + depart"; and to eat roast meat, for this took less time to prepare; and that they should not break a bone thereof, because + in their haste there was no time to break bones. Secondly, as to the manner of eating. For it is written: "You shall gird + your reins, and you shall have shoes on your feet, holding staves in your hands, and you shall eat in haste": which clearly + designates men at the point of starting on a journey. To this also is to be referred the command: "In one house shall it be + eaten, + neither shall you carry forth of the flesh thereof out of the house": because, to wit, on account of their haste, they could + not send any gifts of it. +
The stress they suffered while in Egypt was denoted by the wild lettuces. The figurative reason is evident, because the sacrifice + of the paschal lamb signified the sacrifice of Christ according to + 1 Cor. 5:7: "Christ our pasch is sacrificed." The blood of the lamb, which ensured deliverance from the destroyer, by being sprinkled + on the transoms, signified faith in Christ's Passion, in the hearts and on the lips of the faithful, by which same Passion + we are + delivered from sin and death, according to + 1 Pet. 1:18: "You were . . . redeemed . . . with the precious blood . . . of a lamb unspotted." The partaking of its flesh signified + the eating of Christ's body in the Sacrament; and the flesh was roasted at the fire to signify Christ's Passion or charity. + And it was eaten with unleavened bread to signify the blameless life of the faithful who partake of Christ's body, according + to + 1 Cor. 5:8: "Let us feast . . + . with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth." The wild lettuces were added to denote repentance for sins, which is + required of those who receive the body of Christ. Their loins were girt in sign of chastity: and the shoes of their feet are + the examples of our dead ancestors. The staves they were to hold in their hands denoted pastoral authority: and it was commanded + that the paschal lamb should be eaten in one house, i.e. in a catholic church, and not in the conventicles of heretics. +
[38074] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod litteralis ratio paschalis convivii fuit in +commemorationem beneficii quo Deus eduxit eos de Aegypto. Unde per +huiusmodi convivii celebrationem profitebantur se ad illum populum +pertinere quem Deus sibi assumpserat ex Aegypto. Quando enim sunt +ex Aegypto liberati, praeceptum est eis ut sanguine agni linirent +superliminaria domorum, quasi protestantes se recedere a ritibus +Aegyptiorum, qui arietem colebant. Unde et liberati sunt per +sanguinis agni aspersionem vel linitionem in postibus domorum, a +periculo exterminii quod imminebat Aegyptiis. In illo autem exitu +eorum de Aegypto duo fuerunt, scilicet festinantia ad egrediendum, +impellebant enim eos Aegyptii ut exirent velociter, ut habetur +Exod. XII; imminebatque periculum ei qui non festinaret exire cum +multitudine, ne remanens occideretur ab Aegyptiis. Festinantia +autem designabatur dupliciter. Uno quidem modo per ea quae +comedebant. Praeceptum enim erat eis quod comederent panes azymos, +in huius signum, quod non poterant fermentari, cogentibus exire +Aegyptiis; et quod comederent assum igni, sic enim velocius +praeparabatur; et quod os non comminuerent ex eo, quia in +festinantia non vacat ossa frangere. Alio modo, quantum ad modum +comedendi. Dicitur enim, renes vestros accingetis, calceamenta +habebitis in pedibus, tenentes baculos in manibus, et comedetis +festinanter, quod manifeste designat homines existentes in +promptu itineris. Ad idem etiam pertinet quod eis praecipitur, +in una domo comedetis, neque feretis de carnibus eius foras, +quia scilicet, propter festinantiam, non vacabat invicem mittere +exennia. Amaritudo autem quam passi fuerant in Aegypto, +significabatur per lactucas agrestes. Figuralis autem ratio patet. +Quia per immolationem agni paschalis significabatur immolatio +Christi; secundum illud I ad Cor. V, Pascha nostrum immolatus +est Christus. Sanguis vero agni liberans ab exterminatore, +linitis superliminaribus domorum, significat fidem passionis +Christi in corde et ore fidelium, per quam liberamur a peccato et a +morte; secundum illud I Petr. I, redempti estis pretioso +sanguine agni immaculati. Comedebantur autem carnes illae, ad +significandum esum corporis Christi in sacramento. Erant autem +assae igni, ad significandum passionem, vel caritatem Christi. +Comedebantur autem cum azymis panibus, ad significandam puram +conversationem fidelium sumentium corpus Christi, secundum illud I +ad Cor. V, epulemur in azymis sinceritatis et veritatis. +Lactucae autem agrestes addebantur, in signum poenitentiae +peccatorum, quae necessaria est sumentibus corpus Christi. Renes +autem accingendi sunt cingulo castitatis. Calceamenta autem pedum +sunt exempla mortuorum patrum. Baculi autem habendi in manibus, +significant pastoralem custodiam. Praecipitur autem quod in una +domo agnus paschalis comedatur, idest in Ecclesia Catholicorum, non +in conventiculis haereticorum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Some of the sacraments of the New Law had corresponding figurative sacraments in the Old Law. For Baptism, which is the sacrament + of Faith, corresponds to circumcision. Hence it is written ( + Col. 2:11,12): "You are circumcised . . . in the circumcision of" Our Lord Jesus "Christ: buried with Him in Baptism." In the New Law + the sacrament of the Eucharist corresponds to the banquet of the paschal lamb. The sacrament of Penance in the New Law corresponds + to all the purifications of the Old Law. The sacrament of Orders corresponds to the consecration of the pontiff and of the + priests. To the sacrament of Confirmation, which is the sacrament of the fulness of grace, there would be no corresponding + sacrament of the Old Law, because the time of fulness had not yet come, since "the Law brought no man [Vulg.: 'nothing'] to + perfection" ( + Heb. 7:19). The same applies to the sacrament of Extreme Unction, which is an immediate + preparation for entrance into glory, to which the way was not yet opened out in the Old Law, since the price had not yet been + paid. Matrimony did indeed exist under the Old Law, as a function of nature, but not as the sacrament of the union of Christ + with the Church, for that union was not as yet brought about. Hence under the Old Law it was allowable to give a bill of divorce, + which is contrary to the nature of the sacrament. +
[38075] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod quaedam sacramenta novae legis habuerunt in veteri +lege sacramenta figuralia sibi correspondentia. Nam circumcisioni +respondet Baptismus, qui est fidei sacramentum, unde dicitur ad +Col. II, circumcisi estis in circumcisione domini nostri Iesu +Christi, consepulti ei in Baptismo. Convivio vero agni +paschalis respondet in nova lege sacramentum Eucharistiae. Omnibus +autem purificationibus veteris legis respondet in nova lege +sacramentum poenitentiae. Consecrationi autem pontificum et +sacerdotum respondet sacramentum ordinis. Sacramento autem +confirmationis, quod est sacramentum plenitudinis gratiae, non +potest respondere in veteri lege aliquod sacramentum, quia nondum +advenerat tempus plenitudinis, eo quod neminem ad perfectum adduxit +lex. Similiter autem et sacramento extremae unctionis, quod est +quaedam immediata praeparatio ad introitum gloriae, cuius aditus +nondum patebat in veteri lege, pretio nondum soluto. Matrimonium +autem fuit quidem in veteri lege prout erat in officium naturae; +non autem prout est sacramentum coniunctionis Christi et Ecclesiae, +quae nondum erat facta. Unde et in veteri lege dabatur libellus +repudii, quod est contra sacramenti rationem.
+ Reply to Objection 4: As already stated, the purifications of the Old Law were ordained for the removal of impediments to the divine worship: which + worship is twofold; viz. spiritual, consisting in devotion of the mind to God; and corporal, consisting in sacrifices, oblations, + and so forth. Now men are hindered in the spiritual worship by sins, whereby men were said to be polluted, for instance, by + idolatry, murder, adultery, or incest. From such pollutions men were + purified by certain sacrifices, offered either for the whole community in general, or also for the sins of individuals; not + that those carnal sacrifices had of themselves the power of expiating sin; but that they signified that expiation of sins + which was to be effected by Christ, and of which those of old became partakers by protesting their faith in the Redeemer, + while taking part in the figurative sacrifices. +
The impediments to external worship consisted in certain bodily uncleannesses; which were considered in the first place as + existing in man, and consequently in other animals also, and in man's clothes, dwelling-place, and vessels. In man himself + uncleanness was considered as arising partly from himself and partly from contact with unclean things. Anything proceeding + from man was reputed unclean that was already subject to corruption, or exposed thereto: and consequently since + death is a kind of corruption, the human corpse was considered unclean. In like manner, since leprosy arises from corruption + of the humors, which break out externally and infect other persons, therefore were lepers also considered unclean; and, again, + women suffering from a flow of blood, whether from weakness, or from nature (either at the monthly course or at the time of + conception); and, for the same reason, men were reputed unclean if they suffered from a flow of seed, whether due to + weakness, to nocturnal pollution, or to sexual intercourse. Because every humor issuing from man in the aforesaid ways involves + some unclean infection. Again, man contracted uncleanness by touching any unclean thing whatever. +
Now there was both a literal and a figurative reason for these uncleannesses. The literal reason was taken from the reverence + due to those things that belong to the divine worship: both because men are not wont, when unclean, to touch precious things: + and in order that by rarely approaching sacred things they might have greater respect for them. For since man could seldom + avoid all the aforesaid uncleannesses, the result was that men could seldom approach to touch things + belonging to the worship of God, so that when they did approach, they did so with greater reverence and humility. Moreover, + in some of these the literal reason was that men should not be kept away from worshipping God through fear of coming in contact + with lepers and others similarly afflicted with loathsome and contagious diseases. In others, again, the reason was to avoid + idolatrous worship: because in their sacrificial rites the Gentiles sometimes employed human blood and seed. All these + bodily uncleannesses were purified either by the mere sprinkling of water, or, in the case of those which were more grievous, + by some sacrifice of expiation for the sin which was the occasion of the uncleanness in question. +
The figurative reason for these uncleannesses was that they were figures of various sins. For the uncleanness of any corpse + signifies the uncleanness of sin, which is the death of the soul. The uncleanness of leprosy betokened the uncleanness of + heretical doctrine: both because heretical doctrine is contagious just as leprosy is, and because no doctrine is so false + as not to have some truth mingled with error, just as on the surface of a leprous body one may distinguish the + healthy parts from those that are infected. The uncleanness of a woman suffering from a flow of blood denotes the uncleanness + of idolatry, on account of the blood which is offered up. The uncleanness of the man who has suffered seminal loss signifies + the uncleanness of empty words, for "the seed is the word of God." The uncleanness of sexual intercourse and of the woman + in child-birth signifies the uncleanness of original sin. The uncleanness of the woman in her periods signifies the + uncleanness of a mind that is sensualized by pleasure. Speaking generally, the uncleanness contracted by touching an unclean + thing denotes the uncleanness arising from consent in another's sin, according to + 2 Cor. 6:17: "Go out from among them, and be ye separate . . . and touch not the unclean thing." +
Moreover, this uncleanness arising from the touch was contracted even by inanimate objects; for whatever was touched in any + way by an unclean man, became itself unclean. Wherein the Law attenuated the superstition of the Gentiles, who held that uncleanness + was contracted not only by touch, but also by speech or looks, as Rabbi Moses states (Doct. Perplex. iii) of a woman in her + periods. The mystical sense of this was that "to God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful alike" + ( + Wis. 14:9). +
There was also an uncleanness of inanimate things considered in themselves, such as the uncleanness of leprosy in a house + or in clothes. For just as leprosy occurs in men through a corrupt humor causing putrefaction and corruption in the flesh; + so, too, through some corruption and excess of humidity or dryness, there arises sometimes a kind of corruption in the stones + with which a house is built, or in clothes. Hence the Law called this corruption by the name of leprosy, whereby + a house or a garment was deemed to be unclean: both because all corruption savored of uncleanness, as stated above, and because + the Gentiles worshipped their household gods as a preservative against this corruption. Hence the Law prescribed such houses, + where this kind of corruption was of a lasting nature, to be destroyed; and such garments to be burnt, in order to avoid all + occasion of idolatry. There was also an uncleanness of vessels, of which it is written ( + Num. + 19:15 + ): "The vessel that hath no cover, and binding over it, shall be unclean." The cause of this uncleanness was that anything + unclean might easily drop into such vessels, so as to render them unclean. Moreover, this command aimed at the prevention + of idolatry. For idolaters believed that if mice, lizards, or the like, which they used to sacrifice to the idols, fell into + the vessels or into the water, these became more pleasing to the gods. Even now some women let down uncovered + vessels in honor of the nocturnal deities which they call "Janae." +
The figurative reason of these uncleannesses is that the leprosy of a house signified the uncleanness of the assembly of + heretics; the leprosy of a linen garment signified an evil life arising from bitterness of mind; the leprosy of a woolen garment + denoted the wickedness of flatterers; leprosy in the warp signified the vices of the soul; leprosy on the woof denoted sins + of the flesh, for as the warp is in the woof, so is the soul in the body. The vessel that has neither cover + nor binding, betokens a man who lacks the veil of taciturnity, and who is unrestrained by any severity of discipline. +
[38076] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, purificationes veteris legis +ordinabantur ad removendum impedimenta cultus divini. Qui quidem +est duplex, scilicet spiritualis, qui consistit in devotione mentis +ad Deum; et corporalis, qui consistit in sacrificiis et +oblationibus et aliis huiusmodi. A cultu autem spirituali +impediuntur homines per peccata, quibus homines pollui dicebantur, +sicut per idololatriam et homicidium, per adulteria et incestus. Et +ab istis pollutionibus purificabantur homines per aliqua sacrificia +vel communiter oblata pro tota multitudine, vel etiam pro peccatis +singulorum. Non quod sacrificia illa carnalia haberent ex seipsis +virtutem expiandi peccatum, sed quia significabant expiationem +peccatorum futuram per Christum, cuius participes erant etiam +antiqui, protestantes fidem redemptoris in figuris sacrificiorum. A +cultu vero exteriori impediebantur homines per quasdam immunditias +corporales, quae quidem primo considerabantur in hominibus; +consequenter etiam in aliis animalibus, et in vestimentis et +domibus et vasis. In hominibus quidem immunditia reputabatur partim +quidem ex ipsis hominibus; partim autem ex contactu rerum +immundarum. Ex ipsis autem hominibus immundum reputabatur omne +illud quod corruptionem aliquam iam habebat, vel erat corruptioni +expositum. Et ideo, quia mors est corruptio quaedam, cadaver +hominis reputabatur immundum. Similiter etiam, quia lepra ex +corruptione humorum contingit, qui etiam exterius erumpunt et alios +inficiunt, leprosi etiam reputabantur immundi. Similiter etiam +mulieres patientes sanguinis fluxum, sive per infirmitatem, sive +etiam per naturam vel temporibus menstruis vel etiam tempore +conceptionis. Et eadem ratione viri reputabantur immundi fluxum +seminis patientes, vel per infirmitatem, vel per pollutionem +nocturnam, vel etiam per coitum. Nam omnis humiditas praedictis +modis ab homine egrediens, quandam immundam infectionem habet. +Inerat etiam hominibus immunditia quaedam ex contactu quarumcumque +rerum immundarum. Istarum autem immunditiarum ratio erat et +litteralis, et figuralis. Litteralis quidem, propter reverentiam +eorum quae ad divinum cultum pertinent. Tum quia homines pretiosas +res contingere non solent cum fuerint immundi. Tum etiam ut ex raro +accessu ad sacra, ea magis venerarentur. Cum enim omnes huiusmodi +immunditias raro aliquis cavere possit, contingebat quod raro +poterant homines accedere ad attingendum ea quae pertinebant ad +divinum cultum, et sic quando accedebant, cum maiori reverentia et +humilitate mentis accedebant. Erat autem in quibusdam horum ratio +litteralis ut homines non reformidarent accedere ad divinum cultum, +quasi refugientes consortium leprosorum et similium infirmorum, +quorum morbus abominabilis erat et contagiosus. In quibusdam etiam +ratio erat ad vitandum idololatriae cultum, quia gentiles in ritu +suorum sacrificiorum utebantur quandoque humano sanguine et semine. +Omnes autem huiusmodi immunditiae corporales purificabantur vel per +solam aspersionem aquae, vel quae maiores erant, per aliquod +sacrificium ad expiandum peccatum, ex quo tales infirmitates +contingebant. Ratio autem figuralis harum immunditiarum fuit quia +per huiusmodi exteriores immunditias figurabantur diversa peccata. +Nam immunditia cadaveris cuiuscumque significat immunditiam +peccati, quod est mors animae. Immunditia autem leprae significat +immunditiam haereticae doctrinae, tum quia haeretica doctrina +contagiosa est, sicut et lepra; tum etiam quia nulla falsa doctrina +est quae vera falsis non admisceat, sicut etiam in superficie +corporis leprosi apparet quaedam distinctio quarundam macularum ab +alia carne integra. Per immunditiam vero mulieris sanguinifluae, +designatur immunditia idololatriae, propter immolatitium cruorem. +Per immunditiam vero viri seminiflui, designatur immunditia vanae +locutionis, eo quod semen est verbum Dei. Per immunditiam vero +coitus, et mulieris parientis, designatur immunditia peccati +originalis. Per immunditiam vero mulieris menstruatae, designatur +immunditia mentis per voluptates emollitae. Universaliter vero per +immunditiam contactus rei immundae designatur immunditia consensus +in peccatum alterius; secundum illud II ad Cor. VI, exite de +medio eorum et separamini, et immundum ne tetigeritis. +Huiusmodi autem immunditia contactus derivabatur etiam ad res +inanimatas, quidquid enim quocumque modo tangebat immundus, +immundum erat. In quo lex attenuavit superstitionem gentilium, qui +non solum per contactum immundi dicebant immunditiam contrahi, sed +etiam per collocutionem aut per aspectum, ut Rabbi Moyses dicit de +muliere menstruata. Per hoc autem mystice significabatur id quod +dicitur Sap. XIV, similiter odio sunt Deo impius et impietas +eius. Erat autem et immunditia quaedam ipsarum rerum +inanimatarum secundum se, sicut erat immunditia leprae in domo et +in vestimentis. Sicut enim morbus leprae accidit in hominibus ex +humore corrupto putrefaciente carnem et corrumpente, ita etiam +propter aliquam corruptionem et excessum humiditatis vel +siccitatis, fit quandoque aliqua corrosio in lapidibus domus, vel +etiam in vestimento. Et ideo hanc corruptionem vocabat lex lepram, +ex qua domus vel vestis immunda iudicaretur. Tum quia omnis +corruptio ad immunditiam pertinebat, ut dictum est. Tum etiam quia +contra huiusmodi corruptionem gentiles deos Penates colebant, et +ideo lex praecepit huiusmodi domus, in quibus fuerit talis +corruptio perseverans, destrui, et vestes comburi, ad tollendam +idololatriae occasionem. Erat etiam et quaedam immunditia vasorum, +de qua dicitur Num. XIX, vas quod non habuerit cooperculum et +ligaturam desuper, immundum erit. Cuius immunditiae causa est +quia in talia vasa de facili poterat aliquid immundum cadere, unde +poterant immundari. Erat etiam hoc praeceptum ad declinandam +idololatriam, credebant enim idololatrae quod, si mures aut +lacertae, vel aliquid huiusmodi, quae immolabant idolis, cito +caderent in vasa vel in aquas, quod essent diis gratiosa. Adhuc +etiam aliquae mulierculae vasa dimittunt discooperta in obsequium +nocturnorum numinum, quae ianas vocant. Harum autem immunditiarum +ratio est figuralis quia per lepram domus significatur immunditia +congregationis haereticorum. Per lepram vero in veste linea +significatur perversitas morum ex amaritudine mentis. Per lepram +vero vestis laneae significatur perversitas adulatorum. Per lepram +in stamine significantur vitia animae, per lepram vero in +subtegmine significantur peccata carnalia, sicut enim stamen est in +subtegmine, ita anima in corpore. Per vas autem quod non habet +operculum nec ligaturam, significatur homo qui non habet aliquod +velamen taciturnitatis, et qui non constringitur aliqua censura +disciplinae.
+ Reply to Objection 5: As stated above (ad 4), there was a twofold uncleanness in the Law; one by way of corruption in the mind or in the body; + and this was the graver uncleanness; the other was by mere contact with an unclean thing, and this was less grave, and was + more easily expiated. Because the former uncleanness was expiated by sacrifices for sins, since all corruption is due to sin, + and signifies sin: whereas the latter uncleanness was expiated by the mere sprinkling + of a certain water, of which water we read in + Num. 19. For there God commanded them to take a red cow in memory of the sin they had committed in worshipping a calf. And a cow + is mentioned rather than a calf, because it was thus that the Lord was wont to designate the synagogue, according to + Osee 4:16: "Israel hath gone astray like a wanton heifer": and this was, perhaps, because they worshipped heifers after the custom + of Egypt, according to + Osee 10:5: "(They) have + worshipped the kine of Bethaven." And in detestation of the sin of idolatry it was sacrificed outside the camp; in fact, whenever + sacrifice was offered up in expiation of the multitude of sins, it was all burnt outside the camp. Moreover, in order to show + that this sacrifice cleansed the people from all their sins, "the priest" dipped "his finger in her blood," and sprinkled + "it over against the door of the tabernacle seven times"; for the number seven signified universality. Further, the very + sprinkling of blood pertained to the detestation of idolatry, in which the blood that was offered up was not poured out, but + was collected together, and men gathered round it to eat in honor of the idols. Likewise it was burnt by fire, either because + God appeared to Moses in a fire, and the Law was given from the midst of fire; or to denote that idolatry, together with all + that was connected therewith, was to be extirpated altogether; just as the cow was burnt "with her skin and her flesh, her + blood and dung being delivered to the flames." To this burning were added "cedar-wood, and hyssop, and scarlet twice dyed," + to signify that just as cedar-wood is not liable to putrefaction, and scarlet twice dyed does not easily lose its color, and + hyssop retains its odor after it has been dried; so also was this sacrifice for the preservation of the whole people, and + for their good behavior and devotion. Hence it is said of the ashes of the cow: "That they may be reserved for the multitude + of + the children of Israel." Or, according to Josephus (Antiq. iii, 8,9,10), the four elements are indicated here: for "cedar-wood" + was added to the fire, to signify the earth, on account of its earthiness; "hyssop," to signify the air, on account of its + smell; "scarlet twice dyed," to signify water, for the same reason as purple, on account of the dyes which are taken out of + the water: thus denoting the fact that this sacrifice was offered to the Creator of the four elements. And since this + sacrifice was offered for the sin of idolatry, both "he that burned her," and "he that gathered up the ashes," and "he that + sprinkled the water" in which the ashes were placed, were deemed unclean in detestation of that sin, in order to show that + whatever was in any way connected with idolatry should be cast aside as being unclean. From this uncleanness they were purified + by the mere washing of their clothes; nor did they need to be sprinkled with the water on account of this kind of + uncleanness, because otherwise the process would have been unending, since he that sprinkled the water became unclean, so + that if he were to sprinkle himself he would remain unclean; and if another were to sprinkle him, that one would have become + unclean, and in like manner, whoever might sprinkle him, and so on indefinitely. +
The figurative reason of this sacrifice was that the red cow signified Christ in respect his assumed weakness, denoted by + the female sex; while the color of the cow designated the blood of His Passion. And the "red cow was of full age," because + all Christ's works are perfect, "in which there" was "no blemish"; "and which" had "not carried the yoke," because Christ + was innocent, nor did He carry the yoke of sin. It was commanded to be taken to Moses, because they blamed Him for + transgressing the law of Moses by breaking the Sabbath. And it was commanded to be delivered "to Eleazar the priest," because + Christ was delivered into the hands of the priests to be slain. It was immolated "without the camp," because Christ "suffered + outside the gate" ( + Heb. 13:12). And the priest dipped "his finger in her blood," because the mystery of Christ's Passion should be considered and imitated. +
It was sprinkled "over against . . . the tabernacle," which denotes the synagogue, to signify either the condemnation of + the unbelieving Jews, or the purification of believers; and this "seven times," in token either of the seven gifts of the + Holy Ghost, or of the seven days wherein all time is comprised. Again, all things that pertain to the Incarnation of Christ + should be burnt with fire, i.e. they should be understood spiritually; for the "skin" and "flesh" signified Christ's + outward works; the "blood" denoted the subtle inward force which quickened His external deeds; the "dung" betokened His weariness, + His thirst, and all such like things pertaining to His weakness. Three things were added, viz. "cedar-wood," which denotes + the height of hope or contemplation; "hyssop," in token of humility or faith; "scarlet twice dyed," which denotes twofold + charity; for it is by these three that we should cling to Christ suffering. The ashes of this burning were gathered by "a + man that is clean," because the relics of the Passion came into the possession of the Gentiles, who were not guilty of Christ's + death. The ashes were put into water for the purpose of expiation, because Baptism receives from Christ's Passion the power + of washing away sins. The priest who immolated and burned the cow, and he who burned, and he who gathered together the ashes, + were unclean, as also he that sprinkled the water: either because the Jews became unclean through putting Christ to + death, whereby our sins are expiated; and this, until the evening, i.e. until the end of the world, when the remnants of Israel + will be converted; or else because they who handle sacred things with a view to the cleansing of others contract certain uncleannesses, + as Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 5); and this until the evening, i.e. until the end of this life. +
[38077] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 ad 5 Ad quintum +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, duplex erat immunditia in lege. +Una quidem per aliquam corruptionem mentis vel corporis, et haec +immunditia maior erat. Alia vero erat immunditia ex solo contactu +rei immundae, et haec minor erat, et faciliori ritu expiabatur. Nam +immunditia prima expiabatur sacrificio pro peccato, quia omnis +corruptio ex peccato procedit et peccatum significat, sed secunda +immunditia expiabatur per solam aspersionem aquae cuiusdam, de qua +quidem aqua expiationis habetur Num. XIX. Mandatur enim ibi a +domino quod accipiant vaccam rufam, in memoriam peccati quod +commiserunt in adoratione vituli. Et dicitur vacca magis quam +vitulus, quia sic dominus synagogam vocare consuevit; secundum +illud Osee IV, sicut vacca lasciviens declinavit Israel. Et hoc +forte ideo quia vaccas in morem Aegyptii, coluerunt; secundum illud +Osee X, vaccas Bethaven coluerunt. Et in detestationem peccati +idololatriae, immolabatur extra castra. Et ubicumque sacrificium +fiebat pro expiatione multitudinis peccatorum, cremabatur extra +castra totum. Et ut significaretur per hoc sacrificium emundari +populus ab universitate peccatorum, intingebat sacerdos digitum in +sanguine eius, et aspergebat contra fores sanctuarii septem +vicibus, quia septenarius universitatem significat. Et ipsa etiam +aspersio sanguinis pertinebat ad detestationem idololatriae, in qua +sanguis immolatitius non effundebatur, sed congregabatur, et circa +ipsum homines comedebant in honorem idolorum. Comburebatur autem in +igne. Vel quia Deus Moysi in igne apparuit, et in igne data est +lex. Vel quia per hoc significabatur quod idololatria totaliter +erat extirpanda, et omne quod ad idololatriam pertinebat, sicut +vacca cremabatur, tam pelle et carnibus, quam sanguine et fimo, +flammae traditis. Adiungebatur etiam in combustione lignum +cedrinum, hyssopus, coccusque bis tinctus, ad significandum quod, +sicut ligna cedrina non de facili putrescunt, et coccus bis tinctus +non amittit colorem, et hyssopus retinet odorem etiam postquam +fuerit desiccatus; ita etiam hoc sacrificium erat in conservationem +ipsius populi, et honestatis et devotionis ipsius. Unde dicitur de +cineribus vaccae, ut sint multitudini filiorum Israel in +custodiam. Vel, secundum Iosephum, quatuor elementa significata +sunt, igni enim apponebatur cedrus, significans terram, propter sui +terrestreitatem; hyssopus, significans aerem, propter odorem; +coccus, significans aquam, eadem ratione qua et purpura, propter +tincturas, quae ex aquis sumuntur, ut per hoc exprimeretur quod +illud sacrificium offerebatur creatori quatuor elementorum. Et quia +huiusmodi sacrificium offerebatur pro peccato idololatriae, in eius +detestationem et comburens, et cineres colligens, et ille qui +aspergit aquas in quibus cinis ponebatur, immundi reputabantur, ut +per hoc ostenderetur quod quidquid quocumque modo ad idololatriam +pertinet, quasi immundum est abiiciendum. Ab hac autem immunditia +purificabantur per solam ablutionem vestimentorum, nec indigebant +aqua aspergi propter huiusmodi immunditiam, quia sic esset +processus in infinitum. Ille enim qui aspergebat aquam, immundus +fiebat, et sic si ipse seipsum aspergeret, immundus remaneret; si +autem alius eum aspergeret, ille immundus esset; et similiter ille +qui illum aspergeret, et sic in infinitum. Figuralis autem ratio +huius sacrificii est quia per vaccam rufam significatur Christus +secundum infirmitatem assumptam, quam femininus sexus designat. +Sanguinem passionis eius designat vaccae color. Erat autem vacca +rufa aetatis integrae, quia omnis operatio Christi est perfecta. In +qua nulla erat macula, nec portavit iugum, quia non portavit iugum +peccati. Praecipitur autem adduci ad Moysen, quia imputabant ei +transgressionem Mosaicae legis in violatione sabbati. Praecipitur +etiam tradi Eleazaro sacerdoti, quia Christus occidendus in manus +sacerdotum traditus est. Immolatur autem extra castra, quia extra +portam Christus passus est. Intingit autem sacerdos digitum in +sanguine eius, quia per discretionem, quam digitus significat, +mysterium passionis Christi est considerandum et imitandum. +Aspergitur autem contra tabernaculum, per quod synagoga designatur, +vel ad condemnationem Iudaeorum non credentium; vel ad +purificationem credentium. Et hoc septem vicibus, vel propter +septem dona spiritus sancti; vel propter septem dies, in quibus +omne tempus intelligitur. Sunt autem omnia quae ad Christi +incarnationem pertinent, igne cremanda, idest spiritualiter +intelligenda, nam per pellem et carnem exterior Christi operatio +significatur; per sanguinem, subtilis et interna virtus exteriora +vivificans; per fimum, lassitudo, sitis, et omnia huiusmodi ad +infirmitatem pertinentia. Adduntur autem tria, cedrus, quod +significat altitudinem spei, vel contemplationis; hyssopus, quod +significat humilitatem, vel fidem; coccus bis tinctus, quod +significat geminam caritatem; per haec enim debemus Christo passo +adhaerere. Iste autem cinis combustionis colligitur a viro mundo, +quia reliquiae passionis pervenerunt ad gentiles, qui non fuerunt +culpabiles in Christi morte. Apponuntur autem cineres in aqua ad +expiandum, quia ex passione Christi Baptismus sortitur virtutem +emundandi peccata. Sacerdos autem qui immolabat et comburebat +vaccam, et ille qui comburebat, et qui colligebat cineres, immundus +erat, et etiam qui aspergebat aquam, vel quia Iudaei facti sunt +immundi ex occisione Christi, per quam nostra peccata expiantur; et +hoc usque ad vesperum, idest usque ad finem mundi, quando reliquiae +Israel convertentur. Vel quia illi qui tractant sancta intendentes +ad emundationem aliorum, ipsi etiam aliquas immunditias contrahunt, +ut Gregorius dicit, in pastorali; et hoc usque ad vesperum, idest +usque ad finem praesentis vitae.
+ Reply to Objection 6: As stated above (ad 5), an uncleanness which was caused by corruption either of mind or of body was expiated by sin-offerings. + Now special sacrifices were wont to be offered for the sins of individuals: but since some were neglectful about expiating + such sins and uncleannesses; or, through ignorance, failed to offer this expiation; it was laid down that once a year, on + the tenth day of the seventh month, a sacrifice of expiation should be offered for + the whole people. And because, as the Apostle says ( + Heb. 7:28), "the Law maketh men priests, who have infirmity," it behooved the priest first of all to offer a calf for his own sins, + in memory of Aaron's sin in fashioning the molten calf; and besides, to offer a ram for a holocaust, which signified that + the priestly sovereignty denoted by the ram, who is the head of the flock, was to be ordained to the glory of God. Then he + offered two he-goats for the people: one of which + was offered in expiation of the sins of the multitude. For the he-goat is an evil-smelling animal; and from its skin clothes + are made having a pungent odor; to signify the stench, uncleanness and the sting of sin. After this he-goat had been immolated, + its blood was taken, together with the blood of the calf, into the Holy of Holies, and the entire sanctuary was sprinkled + with it; to signify that the tabernacle was cleansed from the uncleanness of the children of Israel. But the corpses of the + he-goat and calf which had been offered up for sin had to be burnt, to denote the destruction of sins. They were not, however, + burnt on the altar: since none but holocausts were burnt thereon; but it was prescribed that they should be burnt without + the camp, in detestation of sin: for this was done whenever sacrifice was offered for a grievous sin, or for the multitude + of sins. The other goat was let loose into the wilderness: not indeed to offer it to the demons, whom the Gentiles worshipped + in desert places, because it was unlawful to offer aught to them; but in order to point out the effect of the sacrifice which + had been offered up. Hence the priest put his hand on its head, while confessing the sins of the children of Israel: as though + that goat were to carry them away into the wilderness, where it would be devoured by wild beasts, because it bore the punishment + of the people's sins. And it was said to bear the sins of the people, either because the forgiveness of the people's + sins was signified by its being let loose, or because on its head written lists of sins were fastened. +
The figurative reason of these things was that Christ was foreshadowed both by the calf, on account of His power; and by + the ram, because He is the Head of the faithful; and by the he-goat, on account of "the likeness of sinful flesh" ( + Rom. 8:3). Moreover, Christ was sacrificed for the sins of both priests and people: since both those of high and those of low degree + are cleansed from sin by His Passion. The blood of the calf and of the goat was brought into + the Holies by the priest, because the entrance to the kingdom of heaven was opened to us by the blood of Christ's Passion. + Their bodies were burnt without the camp, because "Christ suffered without the gate," as the Apostle declares ( + Heb. 13:12). The scape-goat may denote either Christ's Godhead Which went away into solitude when the Man Christ suffered, not by going + to another place, but by restraining His power: or it may signify the base concupiscence which we ought to + cast away from ourselves, while we offer up to Our Lord acts of virtue. +
With regard to the uncleanness contracted by those who burnt these sacrifices, the reason is the same as that which we assigned + (ad 5) to the sacrifice of the red heifer. +
[38078] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 ad 6 Ad sextum +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, immunditia quae ex corruptione +proveniebat vel mentis vel corporis, expiabatur per sacrificia pro +peccato. Offerebantur autem specialia sacrificia pro peccatis +singulorum, sed quia aliqui negligentes erant circa expiationem +huiusmodi peccatorum et immunditiarum; vel etiam propter +ignorantiam ab expiatione huiusmodi desistebant; institutum fuit ut +semel in anno, decima die septimi mensis, fieret sacrificium +expiationis pro toto populo. Et quia, sicut apostolus dicit, ad +Heb. VII, lex constituit homines sacerdotes infirmitatem +habentes, oportebat quod sacerdos prius offerret pro seipso +vitulum pro peccato, in commemorationem peccati quod Aaron fecerat +in conflatione vituli aurei; et arietem in holocaustum, per quod +significabatur quod sacerdotis praelatio, quam aries designat, qui +est dux gregis, erat ordinanda ad honorem Dei. Deinde autem +offerebat pro populo duos hircos. Quorum unus immolabatur, ad +expiandum peccatum multitudinis. Hircus enim animal fetidum est, et +de pilis eius fiunt vestimenta pungentia, ut per hoc significaretur +fetor et immunditia et aculei peccatorum. Huius autem hirci +immolati sanguis inferebatur, simul etiam cum sanguine vituli, in +sancta sanctorum, et aspergebatur ex eo totum sanctuarium, ad +significandum quod tabernaculum emundabatur ab immunditiis filiorum +Israel. Corpus vero hirci et vituli quae immolata sunt pro peccato, +oportebat comburi, ad ostendendum consumptionem peccatorum. Non +autem in altari, quia ibi non comburebantur totaliter nisi +holocausta. Unde mandatum erat ut comburerentur extra castra, in +detestationem peccati, hoc enim fiebat quandocumque immolabatur +sacrificium pro aliquo gravi peccato, vel pro multitudine +peccatorum. Alter vero hircus emittebatur in desertum, non quidem +ut offerretur Daemonibus, quos colebant gentiles in desertis, quia +eis nihil licebat immolari; sed ad designandum effectum illius +sacrificii immolati. Et ideo sacerdos imponebat manum super caput +eius, confitens peccata filiorum Israel, ac si ille hircus +deportaret ea in desertum, ubi a bestiis comederetur, quasi portans +poenam pro peccatis populi. Dicebatur autem portare peccata populi, +vel quia in eius emissione significabatur remissio peccatorum +populi, vel quia colligabatur super caput eius aliqua schedula ubi +erant scripta peccata. Ratio autem figuralis horum erat quia +Christus significatur et per vitulum, propter virtutem; et per +arietem, quia ipse est dux fidelium; et per hircum, propter +similitudinem carnis peccati. Et ipse Christus est immolatus pro +peccatis et sacerdotum et populi, quia per eius passionem et +maiores et minores a peccato mundantur. Sanguis autem vituli et +hirci infertur in sancta per pontificem, quia per sanguinem +passionis Christi patet nobis introitus in regnum caelorum. +Comburuntur autem eorum corpora extra castra, quia extra portam +Christus passus est, ut apostolus dicit, ad Heb. ult. Per hircum +autem qui emittebatur, potest significari vel ipsa divinitas +Christi, quae in solitudinem abiit, homine Christo patiente, non +quidem locum mutans, sed virtutem cohibens, vel significatur +concupiscentia mala, quam debemus a nobis abiicere, virtuosos autem +motus domino immolare. De immunditia vero eorum qui huiusmodi +sacrificia comburebant, eadem ratio est quae in sacrificio vitulae +rufae dicta est.
+ Reply to Objection 7: The legal rite did not cleanse the leper of his deformity, but declared him to be cleansed. This is shown by the words of + Lev. 14:3, seqq., where it was said that the priest, "when he shall find that the leprosy is cleansed," shall command "him that is to + be purified": consequently, the leper was already healed: but he was said to be purified in so far as the verdict of the priest + restored him to the society of men and to the + worship of God. It happened sometimes, however, that bodily leprosy was miraculously cured by the legal rite, when the priest + erred in his judgment. +
Now this purification of a leper was twofold: for, in the first place, he was declared to be clean; and, secondly, he was + restored, as clean, to the society of men and to the worship of God, to wit, after seven days. At the first purification the + leper who sought to be cleansed offered for himself "two living sparrows . . . cedar-wood, and scarlet, and hyssop," in such + wise that a sparrow and the hyssop should be tied to the cedar-wood with a scarlet thread, so that the + cedar-wood was like the handle of an aspersory: while the hyssop and sparrow were that part of the aspersory which was dipped + into the blood of the other sparrow which was "immolated . . . over living waters." These things he offered as an antidote + to the four defects of leprosy: for cedar-wood, which is not subject to putrefaction, was offered against the putrefaction; + hyssop, which is a sweet-smelling herb, was offered up against the stench; a living sparrow was offered up against numbness; + and scarlet, which has a vivid color, was offered up against the repulsive color of leprosy. The living sparrow was let loose + to fly away into the plain, because the leper was restored to his former liberty. +
On the eighth day he was admitted to divine worship, and was restored to the society of men; but only after having shaved + all the hair of his body, and washed his clothes, because leprosy rots the hair, infects the clothes, and gives them an evil + smell. Afterwards a sacrifice was offered for his sin, since leprosy was frequently a result of sin: and some of the blood + of the sacrifice was put on the tip of the ear of the man that was to be cleansed, "and on the thumb of his right + hand, and the great toe of his right foot"; because it is in these parts that leprosy is first diagnosed and felt. In this + rite, moreover, three liquids were employed: viz. blood, against the corruption of the blood; oil, to denote the healing of + the disease; and living waters, to wash away the filth. +
The figurative reason was that the Divine and human natures in Christ were denoted by the two sparrows, one of which, in + likeness of His human nature, was offered up in an earthen vessel over living waters, because the waters of Baptism are sanctified + by Christ's Passion. The other sparrow, in token of His impassible Godhead, remained living, because the Godhead cannot die: + hence it flew away, for the Godhead could not be encompassed by the Passion. Now this living sparrow, + together with the cedar-wood and scarlet or cochineal, and hyssop, i.e. faith, hope and charity, as stated above (ad 5), was + put into the water for the purpose of sprinkling, because we are baptized in the faith of the God-Man. By the waters of Baptism + or of his tears man washes his clothes, i.e. his works, and all his hair, i.e. his thoughts. The tip of the right ear of the + man to be cleansed is moistened with some the blood and oil, in order to strengthen his hearing against harmful words; + and the thumb and toe of his right hand and foot are moistened that his deeds may be holy. Other matters pertaining to this + purification, or to that also of any other uncleannesses, call for no special remark, beyond what applies to other sacrifices, + whether for sins or for trespasses. +
[38079] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 ad 7 Ad septimum +dicendum quod per ritum legis leprosus non emundabatur a macula +leprae, sed emundatus ostendebatur. Et hoc significatur Lev. XIV, +cum dicitur de sacerdote, cum invenerit lepram esse emundatam, +praecipiet ei qui purificatur. Iam ergo lepra mundata erat, sed +purificari dicebatur, inquantum iudicio sacerdotis restituebatur +consortio hominum et cultui divino. Contingebat tamen quandoque ut +divino miraculo per ritum legis corporalis mundaretur lepra, quando +sacerdos decipiebatur in iudicio. Huiusmodi autem purificatio +leprosi dupliciter fiebat, nam primo, iudicabatur esse mundus; +secundo autem, restituebatur tanquam mundus consortio hominum et +cultui divino, scilicet post septem dies. In prima autem +purificatione offerebat pro se leprosus mundandus duos passeres +vivos, et lignum cedrinum, et vermiculum, et hyssopum; hoc modo ut +filo coccineo ligarentur passer et hyssopus simul cum ligno +cedrino, ita scilicet quod lignum cedrinum esset quasi manubrium +aspersorii. Hyssopus vero et passer erant id quod de aspersorio +tingebatur in sanguine alterius passeris immolati in aquis vivis. +Haec autem quatuor offerebat contra quatuor defectus leprae, nam +contra putredinem, offerebatur cedrus, quae est arbor imputribilis; +contra fetorem, hyssopus, quae est herba odorifera; contra +insensibilitatem, passer vivus; contra turpitudinem coloris, +vermiculus, qui habet vivum colorem. Passer vero vivus avolare +dimittebatur in agrum, quia leprosus restituebatur pristinae +libertati. In octavo vero die admittebatur ad cultum divinum, et +restituebatur consortio hominum. Primo tamen rasis pilis totius +corporis et vestimentis, eo quod lepra pilos corrodit, et +vestimenta inquinat et fetida reddit. Et postmodum sacrificium +offerebatur pro delicto eius, quia lepra plerumque inducitur pro +peccato. De sanguine autem sacrificii tingebatur extremum auriculae +eius qui erat mundandus, et pollices manus dextrae et pedis, quia +in istis partibus primum lepra dignoscitur et sentitur. +Adhibebantur etiam huic ritui tres liquores, scilicet sanguis, +contra sanguinis corruptionem; oleum, ad designandam sanationem +morbi; aqua viva, ad emundandum spurcitiem. Figuralis autem ratio +erat quia per duos passeres significantur divinitas et humanitas +Christi. Quorum unus, scilicet humanitas, immolatur in vase fictili +super aquas viventes, quia per passionem Christi aquae Baptismi +consecrantur. Alius autem, scilicet impassibilis divinitas, vivus +remanebat, quia divinitas mori non potest. Unde et avolabat, quia +passione astringi non poterat. Hic autem passer vivus, simul cum +ligno cedrino et cocco, vel vermiculo, et hyssopo, idest fide, spe +et caritate, ut supra dictum est, mittitur in aquam ad aspergendum, +quia in fide Dei et hominis baptizamur. Lavat autem homo, per aquam +Baptismi vel lacrymarum, vestimenta sua, idest opera, et omnes +pilos, idest cogitationes. Tingitur autem extremum auriculae +dextrae eius qui mundatur, de sanguine et de oleo, ut eius auditum +muniat contra corrumpentia verba, pollices autem manus dextrae et +pedis tinguntur, ut sit eius actio sancta. Alia vero quae ad hanc +purificationem pertinent, vel etiam aliarum immunditiarum, non +habent aliquid speciale praeter alia sacrificia pro peccatis vel +pro delictis.
Reply to Objections 8&9 Just as the people were initiated by circumcision to the divine worship, so were the ministers by some + special purification or consecration: wherefore they are commanded to be separated from other men, as being specially deputed, + rather than others, to the ministry of the divine worship. And all that was done touching them in their consecration or institution, + was with a view to show that they were in possession of a prerogative of purity, power and dignity. + Hence three things were done in the institution of ministers: for first, they were purified; secondly, they were adorned [*'Ornabantur.' + Some editions have 'ordinabantur'---'were ordained': the former reading is a reference to + Lev. 8:7-9] and consecrated; thirdly, they were employed in the ministry. All in general used to be purified by washing in water, and + by certain sacrifices; but the Levites in particular shaved all the hair of their bodies, as stated in + Lev. 8 (cf. + + Num. 8). +
With regard to the high-priests and priests the consecration was performed as follows. First, when they had been washed, + they were clothed with certain special garments in designation of their dignity. In particular, the high-priest was anointed + on the head with the oil of unction: to denote that the power of consecration was poured forth by him on to others, just as + oil flows from the head on to the lower parts of the body; according to + Ps. 132:2: "Like the + precious ointment on the head that ran down upon the beard, the beard of Aaron." But the Levites received no other consecration + besides being offered to the Lord by the children of Israel through the hands of the high-priest, who prayed for them. The + lesser priests were consecrated on the hands only, which were to be employed in the sacrifices. The tip of their right ear + and the thumb of their right hand, and the great toe of their right foot were tinged with the blood of the sacrificial + animal, to denote that they should be obedient to God's law in offering the sacrifices (this is denoted by touching their + right ear); and that they should be careful and ready in performing the sacrifices (this is signified by the moistening of + the right foot and hand). They themselves and their garments were sprinkled with the blood of the animal that had been sacrificed, + in memory of the blood of the lamb by which they had been delivered in Egypt. At their consecration the following + sacrifices were offered: a calf, for sin, in memory of Aaron's sin in fashioning the molten calf; a ram, for a holocaust, + in memory of the sacrifice of Abraham, whose obedience it behooved the high-priest to imitate; again, a ram of consecration, + which was a peace-offering, in memory of the delivery form Egypt through the blood of the lamb; and a basket of bread, in + memory of the manna vouchsafed to the people. +
In reference to their being destined to the ministry, the fat of the ram, one roll of bread, and the right shoulder were + placed on their hands, to show that they received the power of offering these things to the Lord: while the Levites were initiated + to the ministry by being brought into the tabernacle of the covenant, as being destined to the ministry touching the vessels + of the sanctuary. +
The figurative reason of these things was that those who are to be consecrated to the spiritual ministry of Christ, should + be first of all purified by the waters of Baptism, and by the waters of tears, in their faith in Christ's Passion, which is + a sacrifice both of expiation and of purification. They have also to shave all the hair of their body, i.e. all evil thoughts. + They should, moreover, be decked with virtues, and be consecrated with the oil of the Holy Ghost, and with + the sprinkling of Christ's blood. And thus they should be intent on the fulfilment of their spiritual ministry. +
[38080] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 ad 8 Ad octavum +et nonum dicendum quod, sicut populus instituebatur ad cultum Dei +per circumcisionem, ita ministri per aliquam specialem +purificationem vel consecrationem, unde et separari ab aliis +praecipiuntur, quasi specialiter ad ministerium cultus divini prae +aliis deputati. Et totum quod circa eos fiebat in eorum +consecratione vel institutione ad hoc pertinebat ut ostenderetur +eos habere quandam praerogativam puritatis et virtutis et +dignitatis. Et ideo in institutione ministrorum tria fiebant, primo +enim, purificabantur; secundo, ornabantur et consecrabantur; +tertio, applicabantur ad usum ministerii. Purificabantur quidem +communiter omnes per ablutionem aquae, et per quaedam sacrificia; +specialiter autem Levitae radebant omnes pilos carnis suae; ut +habetur Lev. VIII. Consecratio vero circa pontifices et sacerdotes +hoc ordine fiebat. Primo enim, postquam abluti erant, induebantur +quibusdam vestimentis specialibus pertinentibus ad designandum +dignitatem ipsorum. Specialiter autem pontifex oleo unctionis in +capite ungebatur, ut designaretur quod ab ipso diffundebatur +potestas consecrandi ad alios, sicut oleum a capite derivatur ad +inferiora; ut habetur in Psalmo CXXXII, sicut unguentum in +capite, quod descendit in barbam, barbam Aaron. Levitae vero +non habebant aliam consecrationem, nisi quod offerebantur domino a +filiis Israel per manus pontificis, qui orabat pro eis. Minorum +vero sacerdotum solae manus consecrabantur, quae erant applicandae +ad sacrificia. Et de sanguine animalis immolatitii tingebatur +extremum auriculae dextrae ipsorum, et pollices pedis ac manus +dextrae, ut scilicet essent obedientes legi Dei in oblatione +sacrificiorum, quod significatur in intinctione auris dextrae; et +quod essent solliciti et prompti in executione sacrificiorum, quod +significatur in intinctione pedis et manus dextrae. Aspergebantur +etiam ipsi, et vestimenta eorum, sanguine animalis immolati, in +memoriam sanguinis agni per quem fuerunt liberati in Aegypto. +Offerebantur autem in eorum consecratione huiusmodi sacrificia, +vitulus pro peccato, in memoriam remissionis peccati Aaron circa +conflationem vituli; aries in holocaustum, in memoriam oblationis +Abrahae, cuius obedientiam pontifex imitari debebat; aries etiam +consecrationis, qui erat quasi hostia pacifica, in memoriam +liberationis de Aegypto per sanguinem agni; canistrum panum, in +memoriam mannae praestiti populo. Pertinebat autem ad applicationem +ministerii quod imponebantur super manus eorum adeps arietis, et +torta panis unius, et armus dexter, ut ostenderetur quod +accipiebant potestatem huiusmodi offerendi domino. Levitae vero +applicabantur ad ministerium per hoc quod intromittebantur in +tabernaculum foederis, quasi ad ministrandum circa vasa sanctuarii. +Figuralis vero horum ratio erat quia illi qui sunt consecrandi ad +spirituale ministerium Christi, debent primo purificari per aquam +Baptismi et lacrymarum in fide passionis Christi, quod est +expiativum et purgativum sacrificium. Et debent radere omnes pilos +carnis, idest omnes pravas cogitationes. Debent etiam ornari +virtutibus; et consecrari oleo spiritus sancti; et aspersione +sanguinis Christi. Et sic debent esse intenti ad exequenda +spiritualia ministeria.
+ Reply to Objection 10: As already stated + (A[4]), the purpose of the Law was to induce men to have reverence for the divine worship: and this in two ways; first, by excluding + from the worship of God whatever might be an object of contempt; secondly, by introducing into the divine worship all that + seemed to savor of reverence. And, indeed, if this was observed in regard to the tabernacle and its vessels, and in the animals + to be sacrificed, much + more was it to be observed in the very ministers. Wherefore, in order to obviate contempt for the ministers, it was prescribed + that they should have no bodily stain or defect: since men so deformed are wont to be despised by others. For the same reason + it was also commanded that the choice of those who were to be destined to the service of God was not to be made in a broadcast + manner from any family, but according to their descent from one particular stock, thus giving them distinction and + nobility. +
In order that they might be revered, special ornate vestments were appointed for their use, and a special form of consecration. + This indeed is the general reason of ornate garments. But the high-priest in particular had eight vestments. First, he had + a linen tunic. Secondly, he had a purple tunic; round the bottom of which were placed "little bells" and "pomegranates of + violet, and purple, and scarlet twice dyed." Thirdly, he had the ephod, which covered his shoulders and his + breast down to the girdle; and it was made of gold, and violet and purple, and scarlet twice dyed and twisted linen: and on + his shoulders he bore two onyx stones, on which were graven the names of the children of Israel. Fourthly, he had the rational, + made of the same material; it was square in shape, and was worn on the breast, and was fastened to the ephod. On this rational + there were twelve precious stones set in four rows, on which also were graven the names of the children of Israel, in + token that the priest bore the burden of the whole people, since he bore their names on his shoulders; and that it was his + duty ever to think of their welfare, since he wore them on his breast, bearing them in his heart, so to speak. And the Lord + commanded the "Doctrine and Truth" to be put in the rational: for certain matters regarding moral and dogmatic truth were + written on it. The Jews indeed pretend that on the rational was placed a stone which changed color according to the various + things + which were about to happen to the children of Israel: and this they call the "Truth and Doctrine." Fifthly, he wore a belt + or girdle made of the four colors mentioned above. Sixthly, there was the tiara or mitre which was made of linen. Seventhly, + there was the golden plate which hung over his forehead; on it was inscribed the Lord's name. Eighthly, there were "the linen + breeches to cover the flesh of their nakedness," when they went up to the sanctuary or altar. Of these eight vestments the + lesser priests had four, viz. the linen tunic and breeches, the belt and the tiara. +
According to some, the literal reason for these vestments was that they denoted the disposition of the terrestrial globe; + as though the high-priest confessed himself to be the minister of the Creator of the world, wherefore it is written ( + Wis. 18:24): "In the robe" of Aaron "was the whole world" described. For the linen breeches signified the earth out of which the flax + grows. The surrounding belt signified the ocean which surrounds the earth. The violet + tunic denoted the air by its color: its little bells betoken the thunder; the pomegranates, the lightning. The ephod, by its + many colors, signified the starry heaven; the two onyx stones denoted the two hemispheres, or the sun and moon. The twelve + precious stones on the breast are the twelve signs of the zodiac: and they are said to have been placed on the rational because + in heaven, are the types [rationes] of earthly things, according to + Job 38:33: "Dost thou know the + order of heaven, and canst thou set down the reason [rationem] thereof on the earth?" The turban or tiara signified the empyrean: + the golden plate was a token of God, the governor of the universe. +
The figurative reason is evident. Because bodily stains or defects wherefrom the priests had to be immune, signify the various + vices and sins from which they should be free. Thus it is forbidden that he should be blind, i.e. he ought not to be ignorant: + he must not be lame, i.e. vacillating and uncertain of purpose: that he must have "a little, or a great, or a crooked nose," + i.e. that he should not, from lack of discretion, exceed in one direction or in another, or even + exercise some base occupation: for the nose signifies discretion, because it discerns odors. It is forbidden that he should + have "a broken foot" or "hand," i.e. he should not lose the power of doing good works or of advancing in virtue. He is rejected, + too, if he have a swelling either in front or behind [Vulg.: 'if he be crook-backed']: by which is signified too much love + of earthly things: if he be blear-eyed, i.e. if his mind is darkened by carnal affections: for running of the eyes is + caused by a flow of matter. He is also rejected if he had "a pearl in his eye," i.e. if he presumes in his own estimation + that he is clothed in the white robe of righteousness. Again, he is rejected "if he have a continued scab," i.e. lustfulness + of the flesh: also, if he have "a dry scurf," which covers the body without giving pain, and is a blemish on the comeliness + of the members; which denotes avarice. Lastly, he is rejected "if he have a rupture" or hernia; through baseness rending his + heart, though it appear not in his deeds. +
The vestments denote the virtues of God's ministers. Now there are four things that are necessary to all His ministers, viz. + chastity denoted by the breeches; a pure life, signified by the linen tunic; the moderation of discretion, betokened by the + girdle; and rectitude of purpose, denoted by the mitre covering the head. But the high-priests needed four other things in + addition to these. First, a continual recollection of God in their thoughts; and this was signified by the + golden plate worn over the forehead, with the name of God engraved thereon. Secondly, they had to bear with the shortcomings + of the people: this was denoted by the ephod which they bore on their shoulders. Thirdly, they had to carry the people in + their mind and heart by the solicitude of charity, in token of which they wore the rational. Fourthly, they had to lead a + godly life by performing works of perfection; and this was signified by the violet tunic. Hence little golden bells were fixed + to + the bottom of the violet tunic, which bells signified the teaching of divine things united in the high-priest to his godly + mode of life. In addition to these were the pomegranates, signifying unity of faith and concord in good morals: because his + doctrine should hold together in such a way that it should not rend asunder the unity of faith and peace. +
[38081] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 ad 10 Ad decimum +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, intentio legis erat inducere +ad reverentiam divini cultus. Et hoc dupliciter, uno modo, +excludendo a cultu divino omne id quod poterat esse contemptibile; +alio modo, apponendo ad cultum divinum omne illud quod videbatur ad +honorificentiam pertinere. Et si hoc quidem observabatur in +tabernaculo et vasis eius, et animalibus immolandis, multo magis +hoc observandum erat in ipsis ministris. Et ideo ad removendum +contemptum ministrorum, praeceptum fuit ut non haberent maculam vel +defectum corporalem, quia huiusmodi homines solent apud alios in +contemptu haberi. Propter quod etiam institutum fuit ut non sparsim +ex quolibet genere ad Dei ministerium applicarentur, sed ex certa +prosapia secundum generis successionem, ut ex hoc clariores et +nobiliores haberentur. Ad hoc autem quod in reverentia haberentur, +adhibebatur eis specialis ornatus vestium, et specialis +consecratio. Et haec est in communi causa ornatus vestium. In +speciali autem sciendum est quod pontifex habebat octo ornamenta. +Primo enim, habebat vestem lineam. Secundo, habebat tunicam +hyacinthinam; in cuius extremitate versus pedes, ponebantur per +circuitum tintinabula quaedam, et mala Punica facta ex hyacintho et +purpura coccoque bis tincto. Tertio, habebat superhumerale, quod +tegebat humeros et anteriorem partem usque ad cingulum; quod erat +ex auro et hyacintho et purpura, coccoque bis tincto, et bysso +retorta. Et super humeros habebat duos onychinos, in quibus erant +sculpta nomina filiorum Israel. Quartum erat rationale, ex eadem +materia factum; quod erat quadratum, et ponebatur in pectore, et +coniungebatur superhumerali. Et in hoc rationali erant duodecim +lapides pretiosi distincti per quatuor ordines, in quibus etiam +sculpta erant nomina filiorum Israel, quasi ad designandum quod +ferret onus totius populi, per hoc quod habebat nomina eorum in +humeris; et quod iugiter debebat de eorum salute cogitare, per hoc +quod portabat eos in pectore, quasi in corde habens. In quo etiam +rationali mandavit dominus poni doctrinam et veritatem, quia +quaedam pertinentia ad veritatem iustitiae et doctrinae, +scribebantur in illo rationali. Iudaei tamen fabulantur quod in +rationali erat lapis qui secundum diversos colores mutabatur, +secundum diversa quae debebant accidere filiis Israel, et hoc +vocant veritatem et doctrinam. Quintum erat balteus, idest cingulus +quidam, factus ex praedictis quatuor coloribus. Sextum erat tiara, +idest mitra quaedam, de bysso. Septimum autem erat lamina aurea, +pendens in fronte eius, in qua erat nomen domini. Octavum autem +erant femoralia linea, ut operirent carnem turpitudinis suae, +quando accederent ad sanctuarium vel ad altare. Ex istis autem octo +ornamentis minores sacerdotes habebant quatuor, scilicet tunicam +lineam, femoralia, balteum et tiaram. Horum autem ornamentorum +quidam rationem litteralem assignant, dicentes quod in istis +ornamentis designatur dispositio orbis terrarum, quasi pontifex +protestaretur se esse ministrum creatoris mundi, unde etiam Sap. +XVIII dicitur quod in veste Aaron erat descriptus orbis terrarum. +Nam femoralia linea figurabant terram, ex qua linum nascitur. +Baltei circumvolutio significabat Oceanum, qui circumcingit terram. +Tunica hyacinthina suo colore significabat aerem, per cuius +tintinabula significabantur tonitrua; per mala granata, +coruscationes. Superhumerale vero significabat sua varietate caelum +sidereum, duo onychini, duo hemisphaeria, vel solem et lunam. +Duodecim gemmae in pectore, duodecim signa in zodiaco, quae +dicebantur posita in rationali, quia in caelestibus sunt rationes +terrenorum, secundum illud Iob XXXVIII, numquid nosti ordinem +caeli, et ponis rationem eius in terra? Cidaris autem, vel +tiara, significabat caelum Empyreum. Lamina aurea, Deum omnibus +praesidentem. Figuralis vero ratio manifesta est. Nam maculae vel +defectus corporales a quibus debebant sacerdotes esse immunes, +significant diversa vitia et peccata quibus debent carere. +Prohibetur enim esse caecus, idest, ne sit ignorans. Ne sit +claudus, idest instabilis, et ad diversa se inclinans. Ne sit +parvo, vel grandi, vel torto naso, idest ne per defectum +discretionis, vel in plus vel in minus excedat, aut etiam aliqua +prava exerceat; per nasum enim discretio designatur, quia est +discretivus odoris. Ne sit fracto pede vel manus, idest ne amittat +virtutem bene operandi, vel procedendi in virtutem. Repudiatur +etiam si habeat gibbum vel ante vel retro, per quem significatur +superfluus amor terrenorum. Si est lippus, idest per carnalem +affectum eius ingenium obscuratur, contingit enim lippitudo ex +fluxu humoris. Repudiatur etiam si habeat albuginem in oculo, idest +praesumptionem candoris iustitiae in sua cogitatione. Repudiatur +etiam si habuerit iugem scabiem, idest petulantiam carnis. Et si +habuerit impetiginem, quae sine dolore corpus occupat, et membrorum +decorem foedat, per quam avaritia designatur. Et etiam si sit +herniosus vel ponderosus, qui scilicet gestat pondus turpitudinis +in corde, licet non exerceat in opere. Per ornamenta vero +designantur virtutes ministrorum Dei. Sunt autem quatuor quae sunt +necessariae omnibus ministris, scilicet castitas, quae significatur +per femoralia; puritas vero vitae, quae significatur per lineam +tunicam; moderatio discretionis quae significatur per cingulum; +rectitudo intentionis, quae significatur per tiaram protegentem +caput. Sed prae his pontifices debent quatuor habere. Primo quidem, +iugem Dei memoriam in contemplatione, et hoc significat lamina +aurea habens nomen Dei, in fronte. Secundo, quod supportent +infirmitates populi, quod significat superhumerale. Tertio, quod +habeant populum in corde et in visceribus per sollicitudinem +caritatis, quod significatur per rationale. Quarto, quod habeant +conversationem caelestem per opera perfectionis, quod significatur +per tunicam hyacinthinam. Unde et tunicae hyacinthinae adiunguntur +in extremitate tintinabula aurea, per quae significatur doctrina +divinorum, quae debet coniungi caelesti conversationi pontificis. +Adiunguntur autem mala Punica, per quae significatur unitas fidei +et concordia in bonis moribus, quia sic coniuncta debet esse eius +doctrina, ut per eam fidei et pacis unitas non rumpatur.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that there was no reasonable cause for the ceremonial observances. Because, as the Apostle says ( + 1 Tim. 4:4), "every creature of God is good, and nothing to be rejected that is received with thanksgiving." It was therefore unfitting + that they should be forbidden to eat certain foods, as being unclean according to + Lev. 11 [*Cf. + Dt. 14]. +
[38082] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod observantiarum caeremonialium nulla +fuerit rationabilis causa. Quia ut apostolus dicit, I ad Tim. IV, +omnis creatura Dei est bona, et nihil reiiciendum quod cum +gratiarum actione percipitur. Inconvenienter igitur prohibiti +sunt ab esu quorundam ciborum tanquam immundorum, ut patet Lev. +XI.
+ Objection 2: Further, just as animals are given to man for food, so also are herbs: wherefore it is written ( + Gn. 9:3): "As the green herbs have I delivered all" flesh "to you." But the Law did not distinguish any herbs from the rest as being + unclean, although some are most harmful, for instance, those that are poisonous. Therefore it seems that neither should any + animals have been prohibited as being unclean. +
[38083] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, +sicut animalia dantur in cibum hominis, ita etiam et herbae, unde +dicitur Gen. IX, quasi olera virentia dedi vobis omnem +carnem. Sed in herbis lex non distinxit aliquas immundas, cum +tamen aliquae illarum sint maxime nocivae, ut puta venenosae. Ergo +videtur quod nec de animalibus aliqua debuerint prohiberi tanquam +immunda.
+ Objection 3: Further, if the matter from which a thing is generated be unclean, it seems that likewise the thing generated therefrom is + unclean. But flesh is generated from blood. Since therefore all flesh was not prohibited as unclean, it seems that in like + manner neither should blood have been forbidden as unclean; nor the fat which is engendered from blood. +
[38084] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, +si materia est immunda ex qua aliquid generatur, pari ratione +videtur quod id quod generatur ex ea, sit immundum. Sed ex sanguine +generatur caro. Cum igitur non omnes carnes prohiberentur tanquam +immundae, pari ratione nec sanguis debuit prohiberi quasi immundus; +aut adeps, qui ex sanguine generatur.
+ Objection 4: Further, Our Lord said ( + Mat. 10:28; cf. + Lk. 12:4), that those should not be feared "that kill the body," since after death they "have no more that they can do": which would + not be true if after death harm might come to man through anything done with his body. Much less therefore does it matter + to an animal already dead how its flesh be cooked. Consequently there seems to be no reason in what is said, + Ex. 23:19: "Thou + shalt not boil a kid in the milk of its dam." +
[38085] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 arg. 4 Praeterea, +dominus dicit, Matth. X, eos non esse timendos qui occidunt corpus, +quia post mortem non habent quid faciant, quod non esset verum, si +in nocumentum homini cederet quid ex eo fieret. Multo igitur minus +pertinet ad animal iam occisum qualiter eius carnes decoquantur. +Irrationabile igitur videtur esse quod dicitur Exod. XXIII, non +coques haedum in lacte matris suae.
+ Objection 5: Further, all that is first brought forth of man and beast, as being most perfect, is commanded to be offered to the Lord + ( + Ex. 13). Therefore it is an unfitting command that is set forth in + Lev. 19:23: "when you shall be come into the land, and shall have planted in it fruit trees, you shall take away the uncircumcision + [*'Praeputia,' which Douay version renders 'first fruits'] of them," i.e. the first crops, and they "shall be unclean to + you, neither shall you eat of them." +
[38086] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 arg. 5 Praeterea, +ea quae sunt primitiva in hominibus et animalibus, tanquam +perfectiora, praecipiuntur domino offerri. Inconvenienter igitur +praecipitur Lev. XIX, quando ingressi fueritis terram, et +plantaveritis in ea ligna pomifera, auferetis praeputia eorum, +idest prima germina, et immunda erunt vobis, nec edetis ex eis.
+ Objection 6: Further, clothing is something extraneous to man's body. Therefore certain kinds of garments should not have been forbidden + to the Jews: for instance ( + Lev. 19:19): "Thou shalt not wear a garment that is woven of two sorts": and ( + Dt. 22:5): "A woman shall not be clothed with man's apparel, neither shall a man use woman's apparel": and further on ( + Dt. 22:11): "Thou shalt not wear a garment that is + woven of woolen and linen together." +
[38087] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 arg. 6 Praeterea, +vestimentum extra corpus hominis est. Non igitur debuerunt quaedam +specialia vestimenta Iudaeis interdici, puta quod dicitur Lev. XIX, +vestem quae ex duobus texta est, non indueris; et Deut. +XXII, non induetur mulier veste virili, et vir non induetur +veste feminea; et infra, non indueris vestimento quod ex +lana linoque contextum est.
+ Objection 7: Further, to be mindful of God's commandments concerns not the body but the heart. Therefore it is unsuitably prescribed ( + Dt. 6:8, seqq.) that they should "bind" the commandments of God "as a sign" on their hands; and that they should "write them in the + entry"; and ( + Num. 15:38, seqq.) that they should "make to themselves fringes in the corners of their garments, putting in them ribands of blue . + . . they may remember . . . the commandments + of the Lord." +
[38088] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 arg. 7 Praeterea, +memoria mandatorum Dei non pertinet ad corpus, sed ad cor. +Inconvenienter igitur praecipitur Deut. VI, quod ligarent +praecepta Dei quasi signum in manu sua, et quod scriberentur in +limine ostiorum; et quod per angulos palliorum facerent fimbrias, +in quibus ponerent vittas hyacinthinas, in memoriam mandatorum +Dei, ut habetur Num. XV.
+ Objection 8: Further, the Apostle says ( + 1 Cor. 9:9) that God does not "take care for oxen," and, therefore, neither of other irrational animals. Therefore without reason is + it commanded ( + Dt. 22:6): "If thou find, as thou walkest by the way, a bird's nest in a tree . . . thou shalt not take the dam with her young"; and + ( + Dt. 25:4): "Thou shalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out thy corn"; and ( + Lev. + 19:19 + ): "Thou shalt not make thy cattle to gender with beasts of any other kind." +
[38089] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 arg. 8 Praeterea, +apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. IX, quod non est cura Deo de bobus, et +per consequens neque de aliis animalibus irrationalibus. +Inconvenienter igitur praecipitur Deut. XXII, si ambulaveris per +viam, et inveneris nidum avis, non tenebis matrem cum filiis; +et Deut. XXV, non alligabis os bovis triturantis; et Lev. +XIX, iumenta tua non facies coire cum alterius generis +animantibus.
+ Objection 9: Further, no distinction was made between clean and unclean plants. Much less therefore should any distinction have been made + about the cultivation of plants. Therefore it was unfittingly prescribed ( + Lev. 19:19): "Thou shalt not sow thy field with different seeds"; and ( + Dt. 22:9, seqq.): "Thou shalt sow thy vineyard with divers seeds"; and: "Thou shalt not plough with an ox and an ass together." +
[38090] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 arg. 9 Praeterea, +inter plantas non fiebat discretio mundorum ab immundis. Ergo multo +minus circa culturam plantarum debuit aliqua discretio adhiberi. +Ergo inconvenienter praecipitur Lev. XIX, agrum non seres +diverso semine; et Deut. XXII, non seres vineam tuam altero +semine; et, non arabis in bove simul et asino.
+ Objection 10: Further, it is apparent that inanimate things are most of all subject to the power of man. Therefore it was unfitting to + debar man from taking silver and gold of which idols were made, or anything they found in the houses of idols, as expressed + in the commandment of the Law ( + Dt. 7:25, seqq.). It also seems an absurd commandment set forth in + Dt. 23:13, that they should "dig round about and . . . cover with earth that which they were eased + of." +
[38091] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 arg. 10 +Praeterea, ea quae sunt inanimata, maxime videmus hominum potestati +esse subiecta. Inconvenienter igitur arcetur homo ab argento et +auro ex quibus fabricata sunt idola, et ab aliis quae in idolorum +domibus inveniuntur, praecepto legis quod habetur Deut. VII. +Ridiculum etiam videtur esse praeceptum quod habetur Deut. XXIII, +ut egestiones humo operirent, fodientes in terra.
+ Objection 11: Further, piety is required especially in priests. But it seems to be an act of piety to assist at the burial of one's friends: + wherefore Tobias is commended for so doing ( + Tob. 1:20, seqq.). In like manner it is sometimes an act of piety to marry a loose woman, because she is thereby delivered from sin + and infamy. Therefore it seems inconsistent for these things to be forbidden to priests ( + Lev. 21). +
[38092] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 arg. 11 +Praeterea, pietas maxime in sacerdotibus requiritur. Sed ad +pietatem pertinere videtur quod aliquis funeribus amicorum +intersit, unde etiam de hac Tobias laudatur, ut habetur Tob. I. +Similiter etiam quandoque ad pietatem pertinet quod aliquis in +uxorem accipiat meretricem, quia per hoc eam a peccato et infamia +liberat. Ergo videtur quod haec inconvenienter prohibeantur +sacerdotibus, Lev. XXI.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Dt. 18:14): "But thou art otherwise instructed by the Lord thy God": from which words we may gather that these observances were instituted + by God to be a special prerogative of that people. Therefore they are not without reason or cause. +
[38093] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Deut. XVIII, tu autem a domino Deo tuo aliter +institutus es, ex quo potest accipi quod huiusmodi observantiae +sunt institutae a Deo ad quandam specialem illius populi +praerogativam. Non ergo sunt irrationabiles, aut sine causa.
+ I answer that, The Jewish people, as stated above + (A[5]), were specially chosen for the worship of God, and among them the priests themselves were specially set apart for that purpose. + And just as other things that are applied to the divine worship, need to be marked in some particular way so that they be + worthy of the worship of God; so too in that people's, and especially the priests', mode of life, there needed to be certain + special things + befitting the divine worship, whether spiritual or corporal. Now the worship prescribed by the Law foreshadowed the mystery + of Christ: so that whatever they did was a figure of things pertaining to Christ, according to + 1 Cor. 10:11: "All these things happened to them in figures." Consequently the reasons for these observances may be taken in two ways, + first according to their fittingness to the worship of God; secondly, according as they foreshadow something touching the + Christian mode of life. +
[38094] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod populus Iudaeorum, ut supra dictum est, specialiter +erat deputatus ad cultum divinum; et inter eos, specialiter +sacerdotes. Et sicut aliae res quae applicantur ad cultum divinum, +aliquam specialitatem debent habere, quod pertinet ad +honorificentiam divini cultus; ita etiam et in conversatione illius +populi, et praecipue sacerdotum, debuerunt esse aliqua specialia +congruentia ad cultum divinum, vel spiritualem vel corporalem. +Cultus autem legis figurabat mysterium Christi, unde omnia eorum +gesta figurabant ea quae ad Christum pertinent; secundum illud I +Cor. X, omnia in figuram contingebant illis. Et ideo +rationes harum observantiarum dupliciter assignari possunt, uno +modo, secundum congruentiam ad divinum cultum; alio modo, secundum +quod figurant aliquid circa Christianorum vitam.
+ Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[5], ad 4,5), the Law distinguished a twofold pollution or uncleanness; one, that of sin, whereby the soul + was defiled; and another consisting in some kind of corruption, whereby the body was in some way infected. Speaking then of + the first-mentioned uncleanness, no kind of food is unclean, or can defile a man, by reason of its nature; wherefore we read + ( + Mat. 15:11): "Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a + man; but what cometh out of the mouth, this defileth a man": which words are explained ( + Mat. 15:17) as referring to sins. Yet certain foods can defile the soul accidentally; in so far as man partakes of them against obedience + or a vow, or from excessive concupiscence; or through their being an incentive to lust, for which reason some refrain from + wine and flesh-meat. +
If, however, we speak of bodily uncleanness, consisting in some kind of corruption, the flesh of certain animals is unclean, + either because like the pig they feed on unclean things; or because their life is among unclean surroundings: thus certain + animals, like moles and mice and such like, live underground, whence they contract a certain unpleasant smell; or because + their flesh, through being too moist or too dry, engenders corrupt humors in the human body. Hence they were + forbidden to eat the flesh of flat-footed animals, i.e. animals having an uncloven hoof, on account of their earthiness; and + in like manner they were forbidden to eat the flesh of animals that have many clefts in their feet, because such are very + fierce and their flesh is very dry, such as the flesh of lions and the like. For the same reason they were forbidden to eat + certain birds of prey the flesh of which is very dry, and certain water-fowl on account of their exceeding humidity. In like + manner certain fish lacking fins and scales were prohibited on account of their excessive moisture; such as eels and the like. + They were, however, allowed to eat ruminants and animals with a divided hoof, because in such animals the humors are well + absorbed, and their nature well balanced: for neither are they too moist, as is indicated by the hoof; nor are they too earthly, + which is shown by their having not a flat but a cloven hoof. Of fishes they were allowed to partake of the drier kinds, + of which the fins and scales are an indication, because thereby the moist nature of the fish is tempered. Of birds they were + allowed to eat the tamer kinds, such as hens, partridges, and the like. Another reason was detestation of idolatry: because + the Gentiles, and especially the Egyptians, among whom they had grown up, offered up these forbidden animals to their idols, + or employed them for the purpose of sorcery: whereas they did not eat those animals which the Jews were allowed to eat, but + worshipped them as gods, or abstained, for some other motive, from eating them, as stated above (A[3], ad 2). The third reason + was to prevent excessive care about food: wherefore they were allowed to eat those animals which could be procured easily + and promptly. +
With regard to blood and fat, they were forbidden to partake of those of any animals whatever without exception. Blood was + forbidden, both in order to avoid cruelty, that they might abhor the shedding of human blood, as stated above (A[3], ad 8); + and in order to shun idolatrous rite whereby it was customary for men to collect the blood and to gather together around it + for a banquet in honor of the idols, to whom they held the blood to be most acceptable. Hence the Lord commanded + the blood to be poured out and to be covered with earth ( + Lev. 17:13). For the same reason they were forbidden to eat animals that had been suffocated or strangled: because the blood of these + animals would not be separated from the body: or because this form of death is very painful to the victim; and the Lord wished + to withdraw them from cruelty even in regard to irrational animals, so as to be less inclined to be cruel to other men, through + being used to be kind to beasts. + They were forbidden to eat the fat: both because idolaters ate it in honor of their gods; and because it used to be burnt + in honor of God; and, again, because blood and fat are not nutritious, which is the cause assigned by Rabbi Moses (Doct. Perplex. + iii). The reason why they were forbidden to eat the sinews is given in + Gn. 32:32, where it is stated that "the children of Israel . . . eat not the sinew . . . because he touched the sinew of" Jacob's "thing + and it shrank." +
The figurative reason for these things is that all these animals signified certain sins, in token of which those animals + were prohibited. Hence Augustine says (Contra Faustum iv, 7): "If the swine and lamb be called in question, both are clean + by nature, because all God's creatures are good: yet the lamb is clean, and the pig is unclean in a certain signification. + Thus if you speak of a foolish, and of a wise man, each of these expressions is clean considered in the nature of + the sound, letters and syllables of which it is composed: but in signification, the one is clean, the other unclean." The + animal that chews the cud and has a divided hoof, is clean in signification. Because division of the hoof is a figure of the + two Testaments: or of the Father and Son: or of the two natures in Christ: of the distinction of good and evil. While chewing + the cud signifies meditation on the Scriptures and a sound understanding thereof; and whoever lacks either of these is + spiritually unclean. In like manner those fish that have scales and fins are clean in signification. Because fins signify + the heavenly or contemplative life; while scales signify a life of trials, each of which is required for spiritual cleanness. + Of birds certain kinds were forbidden. In the eagle which flies at a great height, pride is forbidden: in the griffon which + is hostile to horses and men, cruelty of powerful men is prohibited. The osprey, which feeds on very small birds, signifies + those who oppress the poor. The kite, which is full of cunning, denotes those who are fraudulent in their dealings. The vulture, + which follows an army, expecting to feed on the carcases of the slain, signifies those who like others to die or to fight + among themselves that they may gain thereby. Birds of the raven kind signify those who are blackened by their lusts; or those + who lack kindly feelings, for the raven did not return when once it had been let loose from the ark. The ostrich which, + though a bird, cannot fly, and is always on the ground, signifies those who fight God's cause, and at the same time are taken + up with worldly business. The owl, which sees clearly at night, but cannot see in the daytime, denotes those who are clever + in temporal affairs, but dull in spiritual matters. The gull, which flies both in the air and swims in the water, signifies + those who are partial both to Circumcision and to Baptism: or else it denotes those who would fly by contemplation, yet dwell + in the waters of sensual delights. The hawk, which helps men to seize the prey, is a figure of those who assist the strong + to prey on the poor. The screech-owl, which seeks its food by night but hides by day, signifies the lustful man who seeks + to lie hidden in his deeds of darkness. The cormorant, so constituted that it can stay a long time under water, denotes the + glutton who plunges into the waters of pleasure. The ibis is an African bird with a long beak, and feeds on snakes; and perhaps + it + is the same as the stork: it signifies the envious man, who refreshes himself with the ills of others, as with snakes. The + swan is bright in color, and by the aid of its long neck extracts its food from deep places on land or water: it may denote + those who seek earthly profit though an external brightness of virtue. The bittern is a bird of the East: it has a long beak, + and its jaws are furnished with follicules, wherein it stores its food at first, after a time proceeding to digest it: it + is a + figure of the miser, who is excessively careful in hoarding up the necessaries of life. The coot [*Douay: 'porphyrion.' St. + Thomas' description tallies with the coot or moorhen: though of course he is mistaken about the feet differing from one another.] + has this peculiarity apart from other birds, that it has a webbed foot for swimming, and a cloven foot for walking: for it + swims like a duck in the water, and walks like a partridge on land: it drinks only when it bites, since it dips all its + food in water: it is a figure of a man who will not take advice, and does nothing but what is soaked in the water of his own + will. The heron [*Vulg.: 'herodionem'], commonly called a falcon, signifies those whose "feet are swift to shed blood" ( + Ps. 13:3). The plover [*Here, again, the Douay translators transcribed from the Vulgate: 'charadrion'; 'charadrius' is the generic + name for all plovers.], which is a garrulous bird, signifies the gossip. The hoopoe, which builds its + nest on dung, feeds on foetid ordure, and whose song is like a groan, denotes worldly grief which works death in those who + are unclean. The bat, which flies near the ground, signifies those who being gifted with worldly knowledge, seek none but + earthly things. Of fowls and quadrupeds those alone were permitted which have the hind-legs longer than the forelegs, so that + they can leap: whereas those were forbidden which cling rather to the earth: because those who abuse the doctrine of the four + Evangelists, so that they are not lifted up thereby, are reputed unclean. By the prohibition of blood, fat and nerves, we + are to understand the forbidding of cruelty, lust, and bravery in committing sin. +
[38095] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, duplex pollutio, vel +immunditia, observabatur in lege, una quidem culpae, per quam +polluebatur anima; alia autem corruptionis cuiusdam, per quam +quodammodo inquinatur corpus. Loquendo igitur de prima immunditia, +nulla genera ciborum immunda sunt, vel hominem inquinare possunt, +secundum suam naturam, unde dicitur Matth. XV, non quod intrat +in os, coinquinat hominem; sed quae procedunt de ore, haec +coinquinant hominem; et exponitur hoc de peccatis. Possunt +tamen aliqui cibi per accidens inquinare animam, inquantum scilicet +contra obedientiam vel votum, vel nimia concupiscentia comeduntur; +vel inquantum praebent fomentum luxuriae, propter quod aliqui a +vino et carnibus abstinent. Secundum autem corporalem immunditiam, +quae est corruptionis cuiusdam, aliquae animalium carnes +immunditiam habent, vel quia ex rebus immundis nutriuntur, sicut +porcus; aut immunde conversantur, sicut quaedam animalia sub terra +habitantia, sicut talpae et mures et alia huiusmodi, unde etiam +quendam fetorem contrahunt; vel quia eorum carnes, propter +superfluam umiditatem vel siccitatem, corruptos humores in +corporibus humanis generant. Et ideo prohibitae sunt eis carnes +animalium habentium soleas, idest ungulam unam non fissam, propter +eorum terrestreitatem. Et similiter sunt eis prohibitae carnes +animalium habentium multas fissuras in pedibus, quia sunt nimis +cholerica et adusta, sicut carnes leonis et huiusmodi. Et eadem +ratione prohibitae sunt eis aves quaedam rapaces, quae sunt nimiae +siccitatis; et quaedam aves aquaticae, propter excessum +humiditatis. Similiter etiam quidam pisces non habentes pinnulas et +squamas, ut anguillae et huiusmodi, propter excessum humiditatis. +Sunt autem eis concessa ad esum animalia ruminantia et findentia +ungulam, quia habent humores bene digestos, et sunt medie +complexionata, quia nec sunt nimis humida, quod significant +ungulae; neque sunt nimis terrestria, cum non habeant ungulam +continuam, sed fissam. In piscibus etiam concessi sunt eis pisces +sicciores, quod significatur per hoc quod habent squamas et +pinnulas, per hoc enim efficitur temperata complexio humida +piscium. In avibus etiam sunt eis concessae magis temperatae, sicut +gallinae, perdices, et aliae huiusmodi. Alia ratio fuit in +detestationem idololatriae. Nam gentiles, et praecipue Aegyptii, +inter quos erant nutriti, huiusmodi animalia prohibita idolis +immolabant, vel eis ad maleficia utebantur. Animalia vero quae +Iudaeis sunt concessa ad esum non comedebant, sed ea tanquam deos +colebant; vel propter aliam causam ab eis abstinebant, ut supra +dictum est. Tertia ratio est ad tollendam nimiam diligentiam circa +cibaria. Et ideo conceduntur illa animalia quae de facili et in +promptu haberi possunt. Generaliter tamen prohibitus est eis esus +sanguinis et adipis cuiuslibet animalis. Sanguinis quidem tum ad +vitandam crudelitatem, ut detestarentur humanum sanguinem +effundere, sicut supra dictum est. Tum etiam ad vitandum +idololatriae ritum, quia eorum consuetudo erat ut circa sanguinem +congregatum adunarentur ad comedendum in honorem idolorum, quibus +reputabant sanguinem acceptissimum esse. Et ideo dominus mandavit +quod sanguis effunderetur, et quod pulvere operiretur. Et propter +hoc etiam prohibitum est eis comedere animalia suffocata vel +strangulata, quia sanguis eorum non separaretur a carne. Vel quia +in tali morte animalia multum affliguntur; et dominus voluit eos a +crudelitate prohibere etiam circa animalia bruta, ut per hoc magis +recederent a crudelitate hominis, habentes exercitium pietatis +etiam circa bestias. Adipis etiam esus prohibitus est eis, tum quia +idololatrae comedebant illum in honorem deorum suorum. Tum etiam +quia cremabatur in honorem Dei. Tum etiam quia sanguis et adeps non +generant bonum nutrimentum, quod pro causa inducit Rabbi Moyses. +Causa autem prohibitionis esus nervorum exprimitur Gen. XXXII, ubi +dicitur quod non comedunt filii Israel nervum, eo quod tetigerit +nervum femoris Iacob, et obstupuerit. Figuralis autem ratio +horum est quia per omnia huiusmodi animalia prohibita designantur +aliqua peccata, in quorum figuram illa animalia prohibentur. Unde +dicit Augustinus, in libro contra Faustum, si de porco et agno +requiratur, utrumque natura mundum est, quia omnis creatura Dei +bona est, quadam vero significatione, agnus mundus, porcus immundus +est. Tanquam, si stultum et sapientem diceres, utrumque hoc verbum +natura vocis et litterarum et syllabarum ex quibus constat, mundum +est, significatione autem unum est mundum, et aliud immundum. +Animal enim quod ruminat et ungulam findit, mundum est +significatione. Quia fissio ungulae significat distinctionem duorum +testamentorum; vel patris et filii; vel duarum naturarum in +Christo; vel discretionem boni et mali. Ruminatio autem significat +meditationem Scripturarum, et sanum intellectum earum. Cuicumque +autem horum alterum deest, spiritualiter immundus est. Similiter +etiam in piscibus illi qui habent squamas et pinnulas, +significatione mundi sunt. Quia per pinnulas significatur vita +sublimis, vel contemplatio; per squamas autem significatur aspera +vita; quorum utrumque necessarium est ad munditiam spiritualem. In +avibus autem specialia quaedam genera prohibentur. In aquila enim, +quae alte volat, prohibetur superbia. In gryphe autem, qui equis et +hominibus infestus est, crudelitas potentum prohibetur. In +haliaeeto autem, qui pascitur minutis avibus, significantur illi +qui sunt pauperibus molesti. In milvo autem, qui maxime insidiis +utitur, designantur fraudulenti. In vulture autem, qui sequitur +exercitum expectans comedere cadavera mortuorum, significantur illi +qui mortes et seditiones hominum affectant ut inde lucrentur. Per +animalia corvini generis significantur illi qui sunt voluptatibus +denigrati, vel qui sunt expertes bonae affectionis, quia corvus, +semel emissus ab arca, non est reversus. Per struthionem, qui, cum +sit avis, volare non potest, sed semper est circa terram, +significantur Deo militantes et se negotiis saecularibus +implicantes. Nycticorax, quae in nocte acuti est visus, in die +autem non videt, significat eos qui in temporalibus sunt astuti, in +spiritualibus hebetes. Larus autem, qui et volat in aere et natat +in aqua, significat eos qui et circumcisionem et Baptismum +venerantur, vel significat eos qui per contemplationem volare +volunt, et tamen vivunt in aquis voluptatum. Accipiter vero, qui +deservit hominibus ad praedam, significat eos qui ministrant +potentibus ad depraedandum pauperes. Per bubonem, qui in nocte +pastum quaerit, de die autem latet, significantur luxuriosi, qui +occultari quaerunt in nocturnis operibus quae agunt. Mergulus +autem, cuius natura est ut sub undis diutius immoretur, significat +gulosos, qui aquis deliciarum se immergunt. Ibis vero avis est in +Africa habens longum rostrum, quae serpentibus pascitur, et forte +est idem quod ciconia, et significat invidos, qui de malis aliorum, +quasi de serpentibus, reficiuntur. Cygnus autem est coloris +candidi, et longo collo quod habet, ex profunditate terrae vel +aquae cibum trahit, et potest significare homines qui per +exteriorem iustitiae candorem lucra terrena quaerunt. Onocrotalus +autem avis est in partibus orientis, longo rostro, quae in faucibus +habet quosdam folliculos, in quibus primo cibum reponit, et post +horam in ventrem mittit, et significat avaros, qui immoderata +sollicitudine vitae necessaria congregant. Porphyrio autem, praeter +modum aliarum avium, habet unum pedem latum ad natandum, alium +fissum ad ambulandum, quia et in aqua natat ut anates, et in terra +ambulat ut perdices, solo morsu bibit, omnem cibum aqua tingens, et +significat eos qui nihil ad alterius arbitrium facere volunt, sed +solum quod fuerit tinctum aqua propriae voluntatis. Per Herodionem +qui vulgariter falco dicitur, significantur illi quorum pedes sunt +veloces ad effundendum sanguinem. Charadrius autem, quae est avis +garrula, significat loquaces. Upupa autem, quae nidificat in +stercoribus et fetenti pascitur fimo, et gemitum in cantu simulat, +significat tristitiam saeculi, quae in hominibus immundis mortem +operatur. Per vespertilionem autem, quae circa terram volitat, +significantur illi qui, saeculari scientia praediti, sola terrena +sapiunt. Circa volatilia autem et quadrupedia, illa sola +conceduntur eis quae posteriora crura habent longiora, ut salire +possint. Alia vero, quae terrae magis adhaerent, prohibentur, quia +illi qui abutuntur doctrina quatuor Evangelistarum, ut per eam in +altum non subleventur, immundi reputantur. In sanguine vero et +adipe et nervo, intelligitur prohiberi crudelitas, et voluptas, et +fortitudo ad peccandum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Men were wont to eat plants and other products of the soil even before the deluge: but the eating of flesh seems to have + been introduced after the deluge; for it is written ( + Gn. 9:3): "Even as the green herbs have I delivered . . . all" flesh "to you." The reason for this was that the eating of the products + of the soil savors rather of a simple life; whereas the eating of flesh savors of delicate and over-careful living. For the + soil gives birth to the herb of its own accord; and such like products of the earth may be had in great quantities with very + little effort: whereas no small trouble is necessary either to rear or to catch an animal. Consequently God being wishful + to bring His people back to a more simple way of living, forbade them to eat many kinds of animals, but not those things that + are produced by the soil. Another reason may be that animals were offered to idols, while the products of the soil were + not. +
The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said (ad 1).
[38096] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod esus plantarum et aliorum terrae nascentium adfuit +apud homines etiam ante diluvium, sed esus carnium videtur esse +post diluvium introductus; dicitur enim Gen. IX, quasi olera +virentia dedi vobis omnem carnem. Et hoc ideo, quia esus terrae +nascentium magis pertinet ad quandam simplicitatem vitae; esus +autem carnium ad quasdam delicias et curiositatem vivendi. Sponte +enim terra herbam germinat, vel cum modico studio huiusmodi terrae +nascentia in magna copia procurantur, oportet autem cum magno +studio animalia vel nutrire, vel etiam capere. Et ideo volens +dominus populum suum reducere ad simpliciorem victum, multa in +genere animalium eis prohibuit, non autem in genere terrae +nascentium. Vel etiam quia animalia immolabantur idolis, non autem +terrae nascentia.
+ Reply to Objection 4: Although the kid that is slain has no perception of the manner in which its flesh is cooked, yet it would seem to savor of + heartlessness if the dam's milk, which was intended for the nourishment of her offspring, were served up on the same dish. + It might also be said that the Gentiles in celebrating the feasts of their idols prepared the flesh of kids in this manner, + for the purpose of sacrifice or banquet: hence ( + Ex. 23) after the solemnities to be + celebrated under the Law had been foretold, it is added: "Thou shalt not boil a kid in the milk of its dam." The figurative + reason for this prohibition is this: the kid, signifying Christ, on account of "the likeness of sinful flesh" ( + Rom. 8:3), was not to be seethed, i.e. slain, by the Jews, "in the milk of its dam," i.e. during His infancy. Or else it signifies + that the kid, i.e. the sinner, should not be boiled in the milk of its dam, i.e. should not be cajoled by flattery. +
[38097] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium +patet responsio ex dictis.
+ Reply to Objection 5: The Gentiles offered their gods the first-fruits, which they held to bring them good luck: or they burnt them for the purpose + of secrecy. Consequently (the Israelites) were commanded to look upon the fruits of the first three years as unclean: for + in that country nearly all the trees bear fruit in three years' time; those trees, to wit, that are cultivated either from + seed, or from a graft, or from a cutting: but it seldom happens that the + fruit-stones or seeds encased in a pod are sown: since it would take a longer time for these to bear fruit: and the Law considered + what happened most frequently. The fruits, however, of the fourth year, as being the firstlings of clean fruits, were offered + to God: and from the fifth year onward they were eaten. +
The figurative reason was that this foreshadowed the fact that after the three states of the Law (the first lasting from + Abraham to David, the second, until they were carried away to Babylon, the third until the time of Christ), the Fruit of the + Law, i.e. Christ, was to be offered to God. Or again, that we must mistrust our first efforts, on account of their imperfection. +
[38098] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod, etsi haedus occisus non sentiat qualiter carnes eius +coquantur, tamen in animo decoquentis ad quandam crudelitatem +pertinere videtur si lac matris, quod datum est ei pro nutrimento, +adhibeatur ad consumptionem carnium ipsius. Vel potest dici quod +gentiles in solemnitatibus idolorum taliter carnes haedi coquebant, +ad immolandum vel ad comedendum. Et ideo Exod. XXIII, postquam +praedictum fuerat de solemnitatibus celebrandis in lege, subditur, +non coques haedum in lacte matris suae. Figuralis autem +ratio huius prohibitionis est quia praefigurabatur quod Christus, +qui est haedus propter similitudinem carnis peccati, non erat a +Iudaeis coquendus, idest occidendus, in lacte matris, idest tempore +infantiae. Vel significatur quod haedus idest peccator, non est +coquendus in lacte matris, idest non est blanditiis +deliniendus.
+ Reply to Objection 6: It is said of a man in + Ecclus. 19:27, that "the attire of the body . . . " shows "what he is." Hence the Lord wished His people to be distinguished from other + nations, not only by the sign of the circumcision, which was in the flesh, but also by a certain difference of attire. Wherefore + they were forbidden to wear garments woven of woolen and linen together, and for a woman to be clothed with man's apparel, + or vice versa, for two + reasons. First, to avoid idolatrous worship. Because the Gentiles, in their religious rites, used garments of this sort, made + of various materials. Moreover in the worship of Mars, women put on men's armor; while, conversely, in the worship of Venus + men donned women's attire. The second reason was to preserve them from lust: because the employment of various materials in + the making of garments signified inordinate union of sexes, while the use of male attire by a woman, or vice versa, has an + incentive to evil desires, and offers an occasion of lust. The figurative reason is that the prohibition of wearing a garment + woven of woolen and linen signified that it was forbidden to unite the simplicity of innocence, denoted by wool, with the + duplicity of malice, betokened by linen. It also signifies that woman is forbidden to presume to teach, or perform other duties + of men: or that man should not adopt the effeminate manners of a woman. +
[38099] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 ad 5 Ad quintum +dicendum quod gentiles fructus primitivos, quos fortunatos +aestimabant, diis suis offerebant, vel etiam comburebant eos ad +quaedam magica facienda. Et ideo praeceptum est eis ut fructus +trium primorum annorum immundos reputarent. In tribus enim annis +fere omnes arbores terrae illius fructum producunt, quae scilicet +vel seminando, vel inserendo, vel plantando coluntur. Raro autem +contingit quod ossa fructuum arboris, vel semina latentia, +seminentur, haec enim tardius facerent fructum, sed lex respexit ad +id quod frequentius fit. Poma autem quarti anni, tanquam primitiae +mundorum fructuum, Deo offerebantur, a quinto autem anno, et +deinceps, comedebantur. Figuralis autem ratio est quia per hoc +praefiguratur quod post tres status legis, quorum unus est ab +Abraham usque ad David, secundus usque ad transmigrationem +Babylonis, tertius usque ad Christum, erat Christus Deo offerendus, +qui est fructus legis. Vel quia primordia nostrorum operum debent +esse nobis suspecta, propter imperfectionem.
+ Reply to Objection 7: As Jerome says on + Mat. 23:6, "the Lord commanded them to make violet-colored fringes in the four corners of their garments, so that the Israelites might + be distinguished from other nations." Hence, in this way, they professed to be Jews: and consequently the very sight of this + sign reminded them of their law. +
When we read: "Thou shalt bind them on thy hand, and they shall be ever before thy eyes [Vulg.: 'they shall be and shall + move between thy eyes'], the Pharisees gave a false interpretation to these words, and wrote the decalogue of Moses on a parchment, + and tied it on their foreheads like a wreath, so that it moved in front of their eyes": whereas the intention of the Lord + in giving this commandment was that they should be bound in their hands, i.e. in their works; and that they + should be before their eyes, i.e. in their thoughts. The violet-colored fillets which were inserted in their cloaks signify + the godly intention which should accompany our every deed. It may, however, be said that, because they were a carnal-minded + and stiff-necked people, it was necessary for them to be stirred by these sensible things to the observance of the Law. +
[38100] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 ad 6 Ad sextum +dicendum quod sicut dicitur Eccli. XIX, amictus corporis +enuntiat de homine. Et ideo voluit dominus ut populus eius +distingueretur ab aliis populis non solum signo circumcisionis, +quod erat in carne, sed etiam certa habitus distinctione. Et ideo +prohibitum fuit eis ne induerentur vestimento ex lana et lino +contexto, et ne mulier indueretur veste virili, aut e converso, +propter duo. Primo quidem, ad vitandum idololatriae cultum. +Huiusmodi enim variis vestibus ex diversis confectis gentiles in +cultu suorum deorum utebantur. Et etiam in cultu Martis mulieres +utebantur armis virorum; in cultu autem Veneris e converso viri +utebantur vestibus mulierum. Alia ratio est ad declinandam +luxuriam. Nam per commixtiones varias in vestimentis omnis +inordinata commixtio coitus excluditur. Quod autem mulier induatur +veste virili, aut e converso, incentivum est concupiscentiae, et +occasionem libidini praestat. Figuralis autem ratio est quia in +vestimento contexto ex lana et lino interdicitur coniunctio +simplicitatis innocentiae, quae figuratur per lanam, et +subtilitatis malitiae, quae figuratur per linum. Prohibetur etiam +quod mulier non usurpet sibi doctrinam, vel alia virorum officia; +vel vir declinet ad mollities mulierum.
+ Reply to Objection 8: Affection in man is twofold: it may be an affection of reason, or it may be an affection of passion. If a man's affection + be one of reason, it matters not how man behaves to animals, because God has subjected all things to man's power, according + to + Ps. 8:8: "Thou hast subjected all things under his feet": and it is in this sense that the Apostle says that "God has no care for + oxen"; because God does not ask of man what he does + with oxen or other animals. +
But if man's affection be one of passion, then it is moved also in regard to other animals: for since the passion of pity + is caused by the afflictions of others; and since it happens that even irrational animals are sensible to pain, it is possible + for the affection of pity to arise in a man with regard to the sufferings of animals. Now it is evident that if a man practice + a pitiful affection for animals, he is all the more disposed to take pity on his fellow-men: wherefore it + is written ( + Prov. 11:10): "The just regardeth the lives of his beasts: but the bowels of the wicked are cruel." Consequently the Lord, in order to + inculcate pity to the Jewish people, who were prone to cruelty, wished them to practice pity even with regard to dumb animals, + and forbade them to do certain things savoring of cruelty to animals. Hence He prohibited them to "boil a kid in the milk + of its dam"; and to "muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn"; and to slay "the dam with her young." + It may, nevertheless, be also said that these prohibitions were made in hatred of idolatry. For the Egyptians held it to be + wicked to allow the ox to eat of the grain while threshing the corn. Moreover certain sorcerers were wont to ensnare the mother + bird with her young during incubation, and to employ them for the purpose of securing fruitfulness and good luck in bringing + up children: also because it was held to be a good omen to find the mother sitting on her young. +
As to the mingling of animals of divers species, the literal reason may have been threefold. The first was to show detestation + for the idolatry of the Egyptians, who employed various mixtures in worshipping the planets, which produce various effects, + and on various kinds of things according to their various conjunctions. The second reason was in condemnation of unnatural + sins. The third reason was the entire removal of all occasions of concupiscence. Because animals of different + species do not easily breed, unless this be brought about by man; and movements of lust are aroused by seeing such things. + Wherefore in the Jewish traditions we find it prescribed as stated by Rabbi Moses that men shall turn away their eyes from + such sights. +
The figurative reason for these things is that the necessities of life should not be withdrawn from the ox that treadeth + the corn, i.e. from the preacher bearing the sheaves of doctrine, as the Apostle states ( + 1 Cor. 9:4, seqq.). Again, we should not take the dam with her young: because in certain things we have to keep the spiritual senses, + i.e. the offspring, and set aside the observance of the letter, i.e. the mother, for instance, in all the ceremonies of the + Law. It is also + forbidden that beast of burden, i.e. any of the common people, should be allowed to engender, i.e. to have any connection, + with animals of another kind, i.e. with Gentiles or Jews. +
[38101] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 ad 7 Ad septimum +dicendum quod, sicut Hieronymus dicit, super Matth., dominus +iussit ut in quatuor angulis palliorum hyacinthinas fimbrias +facerent, ad populum Israel dignoscendum ab aliis populis. Unde +per hoc se esse Iudaeos profitebantur, et ideo per aspectum huius +signi inducebantur in memoriam suae legis. Quod autem dicitur, +ligabis ea in manu tua, et erunt semper ante oculos tuos, +Pharisaei male interpretabantur, scribentes in membranis Decalogum +Moysi, et ligabant in fronte, quasi coronam, ut ante oculos +moverentur, cum tamen intentio domini mandantis fuerit ut +ligarentur in manu, idest in operatione; et essent ante oculos, +idest in meditatione. In hyacinthinis etiam vittis, quae palliis +inserebantur, significatur caelestis intentio, quae omnibus +operibus nostris debet adiungi. Potest tamen dici quod, quia +populus ille carnalis erat et durae cervicis, oportuit etiam per +huiusmodi sensibilia eos ad legis observantiam excitari.
+ Reply to Objection 9: All these minglings were forbidden in agriculture; literally, in detestation of idolatry. For the Egyptians in worshipping + the stars employed various combinations of seeds, animals and garments, in order to represent the various connections of the + stars. Or else all these minglings were forbidden in detestation of the unnatural vice. +
They have, however, a figurative reason. For the prohibition: "Thou shalt not sow thy field with different seeds," is to + be understood, in the spiritual sense, of the prohibition to sow strange doctrine in the Church, which is a spiritual vineyard. + Likewise "the field," i.e. the Church, must not be sown "with different seeds," i.e. with Catholic and heretical doctrines. + Neither is it allowed to plough "with an ox and an ass together"; thus a fool should not accompany a wise man + in preaching, for one would hinder the other. +
[38102] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 ad 8 Ad octavum +dicendum quod affectus hominis est duplex, unus quidem secundum +rationem; alius vero secundum passionem. Secundum igitur affectum +rationis, non refert quid homo circa bruta animalia agat, quia +omnia sunt subiecta eius potestati a Deo, secundum illud Psalmi +VIII, omnia subiecisti sub pedibus eius. Et secundum hoc +apostolus dicit quod non est cura Deo de bobus, quia Deus non +requirit ab homine quid circa boves agat, vel circa alia animalia. +Quantum vero ad affectum passionis, movetur affectus hominis etiam +circa alia animalia, quia enim passio misericordiae consurgit ex +afflictionibus aliorum, contingit autem etiam bruta animalia poenas +sentire, potest in homine consurgere misericordiae affectus etiam +circa afflictiones animalium. Proximum autem est ut qui exercetur +in affectu misericordiae circa animalia, magis ex hoc disponatur ad +affectum misericordiae circa homines, unde dicitur Prov. XII, +novit iustus animas iumentorum suorum; viscera autem impiorum +crudelia. Et ideo ut dominus populum Iudaicum, ad crudelitatem +pronum, ad misericordiam revocaret, voluit eos exerceri ad +misericordiam etiam circa bruta animalia, prohibens quaedam circa +animalia fieri quae ad crudelitatem quandam pertinere videntur. Et +ideo prohibuit ne coqueretur haedus in lacte matris; et quod non +alligaretur os bovi trituranti; et quod non occideretur mater cum +filiis. Quamvis etiam dici possit quod haec prohibita sunt eis in +detestationem idololatriae. Nam Aegyptii nefarium reputabant ut +boves triturantes de frugibus comederent. Aliqui etiam malefici +utebantur matre avis incubante et pullis eius simul captis, ad +fecunditatem et fortunam circa nutritionem filiorum. Et etiam quia +in auguriis reputabatur hoc esse fortunatum, quod inveniretur mater +incubans filiis. Circa commixtionem vero animalium diversae +speciei, ratio litteralis potuit esse triplex. Una quidem, ad +detestationem idololatriae Aegyptiorum, qui diversis commixtionibus +utebantur in servitium planetarum, qui secundum diversas +coniunctiones habent diversos effectus, et super diversas species +rerum. Alia ratio est ad excludendum concubitus contra naturam. +Tertia ratio est ad tollendam universaliter occasionem +concupiscentiae. Animalia enim diversarum specierum non +commiscentur de facili ad invicem, nisi hoc per homines procuretur; +et in aspectu coitus animalium excitatur homini concupiscentiae +motus. Unde etiam in traditionibus Iudaeorum praeceptum invenitur, +ut Rabbi Moyses dicit, ut homines avertant oculos ab animalibus +coeuntibus. Figuralis autem horum ratio est quia bovi trituranti, +idest praedicatori deferenti segetes doctrinae, non sunt necessaria +victus subtrahenda; ut apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. IX. Matrem etiam +non simul debemus tenere cum filiis, quia in quibusdam retinendi +sunt spirituales sensus, quasi filii, et dimittenda est litteralis +observantia, quasi mater; sicut in omnibus caeremoniis legis. +Prohibetur etiam quod iumenta, idest populares homines, non +faciamus coire, idest coniunctionem habere, cum alterius generis +animantibus, idest cum gentilibus vel Iudaeis.
+ Reply to Objection 10: [*The Reply to the Tenth Objection is lacking in the codices. The solution given here is found in some editions, and was + supplied by Nicolai.] Silver and gold were reasonably forbidden ( + Dt. 7) not as though they were not subject to the power of man, but because, like the idols themselves, all materials out of which + idols were made, were anathematized as hateful in God's sight. This is clear from the same chapter, where we read further + on + ( + Dt. 7:26): "Neither shalt thou bring anything of the idol into thy house, lest thou become an anathema like it." Another reason was + lest, by taking silver and gold, they should be led by avarice into idolatry to which the Jews were inclined. The other precept + ( + Dt. 23) about covering up excretions, was just and becoming, both for the sake of bodily cleanliness; and in order to keep the air + wholesome; and by reason of the respect due to the tabernacle of the covenant which + stood in the midst of the camp, wherein the Lord was said to dwell; as is clearly set forth in the same passage, where after + expressing the command, the reason thereof is at once added, to wit: "For the Lord thy God walketh in the midst of thy camp, + to deliver thee, and to give up thy enemies to thee, and let thy camp be holy [i.e. clean], and let no uncleanness appear + therein." The figurative reason for this precept, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi), is that sins which are the fetid + excretions of the mind should be covered over by repentance, that we may become acceptable to God, according to + Ps. 31:1: "Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered." Or else according to a gloss, that we should + recognize the unhappy condition of human nature, and humbly cover and purify the stains of a puffed-up and proud spirit in + the deep furrow of self-examination. +
[38103] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 ad 9 Ad nonum +dicendum quod omnes illae commixtiones in agricultura sunt +prohibitae, ad litteram, in detestationem idololatriae. Quia +Aegyptii, in venerationem stellarum, diversas commixtiones +faciebant et in seminibus et in animalibus et in vestibus, +repraesentantes diversas coniunctiones stellarum. Vel omnes +huiusmodi commixtiones variae prohibentur ad detestationem coitus +contra naturam. Habent tamen figuralem rationem. Quia quod dicitur, +non seres vineam tuam altero semine, est spiritualiter +intelligendum, quod in Ecclesia, quae est spiritualis vinea, non +est seminanda aliena doctrina. Et similiter ager, idest Ecclesia, +non est seminandus diverso semine, idest Catholica doctrina et +haeretica. Non est etiam simul arandum in bove et asino, quia +fatuus sapienti in praedicatione non est sociandus, quia unus +impedit alium.
+ Reply to Objection 11: Sorcerers and idolatrous priests made use, in their rites, of the bones and flesh of dead men. Wherefore, in order to extirpate + the customs of idolatrous worship, the Lord commanded that the priests of inferior degree, who at fixed times served in the + temple, should not "incur an uncleanness at the death" of anyone except of those who were closely related to them, viz. their + father or mother, and others thus near of kin to them. But the high-priest + had always to be ready for the service of the sanctuary; wherefore he was absolutely forbidden to approach the dead, however + nearly related to him. They were also forbidden to marry a "harlot" or "one that has been put away," or any other than a virgin: + both on account of the reverence due to the priesthood, the honor of which would seem to be tarnished by such a marriage: + and for the sake of the children who would be disgraced by the mother's shame: which was most of all to be avoided when the + priestly dignity was passed on from father to son. Again, they were commanded to shave neither head nor beard, and not to + make incisions in their flesh, in order to exclude the rites of idolatry. For the priests of the Gentiles shaved both head + and beard, wherefore it is written ( + Bar 6:30): "Priests sit in their temples having their garments rent, and their heads and beards shaven." Moreover, in worshipping + their idols "they cut themselves with knives and lancets" + ( + 3 Kings 18:28). For this reason the priests of the Old Law were commanded to do the contrary. +
The spiritual reason for these things is that priests should be entirely free from dead works, i.e. sins. And they should + not shave their heads, i.e. set wisdom aside; nor should they shave their beards, i.e. set aside the perfection of wisdom; + nor rend their garments or cut their flesh, i.e. they should not incur the sin of schism. +
[38104] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 ad 11 Ad +undecimum dicendum quod malefici et sacerdotes idolorum utebantur +in suis ritibus ossibus vel carnibus hominum mortuorum. Et ideo, ad +extirpandum idololatriae cultum, praecepit dominus ut sacerdotes +minores, qui per tempora certa ministrabant in sanctuario, non +inquinarentur in mortibus nisi valde propinquorum, scilicet patris +et matris et huiusmodi coniunctarum personarum. Pontifex autem +semper debebat esse paratus ad ministerium sanctuarii, et ideo +totaliter prohibitus erat ei accessus ad mortuos, quantumcumque +propinquos. Praeceptum etiam est eis ne ducerent uxorem meretricem +ac repudiatam, sed virginem. Tum propter reverentiam sacerdotum, +quorum dignitas quodammodo ex tali coniugio diminui videretur. Tum +etiam propter filios, quibus esset ad ignominiam turpitudo matris, +quod maxime tunc erat vitandum, quando sacerdotii dignitas secundum +successionem generis conferebatur. Praeceptum etiam erat eis ut non +raderent caput nec barbam, nec in carnibus suis facerent incisuram, +ad removendum idololatriae ritum. Nam sacerdotes gentilium radebant +caput et barbam, unde dicitur Baruch VI, sacerdotes sedent +habentes tunicas scissas, et capita et barbam rasam. Et etiam +in cultu idolorum incidebant se cultris et lanceolis, ut dicitur +III regum XVIII. Unde contraria praecepta sunt sacerdotibus veteris +legis. Spiritualis autem ratio horum est quia sacerdotes omnino +debent esse immunes ab operibus mortuis, quae sunt opera peccati. +Et etiam non debent radere caput, idest deponere sapientiam; neque +deponere barbam, idest sapientiae perfectionem; neque etiam +scindere vestimenta aut incidere carnes, ut scilicet vitium +schismatis non incurrant.
We must now consider the duration of the ceremonial precepts: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the ceremonial precepts were in existence before the Law?
(2) Whether at the time of the Law the ceremonies of the Old Law had any power of justification?
(3) Whether they ceased at the coming of Christ?
(4) Whether it is a mortal sin to observe them after the coming of Christ?
+[38105] Iª-IIae q. 103 pr. Deinde +considerandum est de duratione caeremonialium praeceptorum. Et +circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum praecepta caeremonialia +fuerint ante legem. Secundo, utrum in lege aliquam virtutem +habuerint iustificandi. Tertio, utrum cessaverint Christo veniente. +Quarto, utrum sit peccatum mortale observare ea post Christum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the ceremonies of the Law were in existence before the Law. For sacrifices and holocausts were ceremonies + of the Old Law, as stated above ( + Q[101], A[4]). But sacrifices and holocausts preceded the Law: for it is written ( + Gn. 4:3,4) that "Cain offered, of the fruits of the earth, gifts to the Lord," and that "Abel offered of the firstlings of his flock, + and of their fat." Noe also "offered + holocausts" to the Lord ( + Gn. 18:20), and Abraham did in like manner ( + Gn. 22:13). Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law preceded the Law. +
[38106] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod caeremoniae legis fuerint ante legem. +Sacrificia enim et holocausta pertinent ad caeremonias veteris +legis, ut supra dictum est. Sed sacrificia et holocausta fuerunt +ante legem. Dicitur enim Gen. IV, quod Cain obtulit de fructibus +terrae munera domino; Abel autem obtulit de primogenitis gregis +sui, et de adipibus eorum. Noe etiam obtulit holocausta domino, +ut dicitur Gen. VIII; et Abraham similiter, ut dicitur Gen. XXII. +Ergo caeremoniae veteris legis fuerunt ante legem.
+ Objection 2: Further, the erecting and consecrating of the altar were part of the ceremonies relating to holy things. But these preceded + the Law. For we read ( + Gn. 13:18) that "Abraham . . . built . . . an altar to the Lord"; and ( + Gn. 28:18) that "Jacob . . . took the stone . . . and set it up for a title, pouring oil upon the top of it." Therefore the legal ceremonies + preceded the Law. +
[38107] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +ad caeremonias sacrorum pertinet constructio altaris, et eius +inunctio. Sed ista fuerunt ante legem. Legitur enim Gen. XIII, quod +Abraham aedificavit altare domino; et de Iacob dicitur Gen. XXVIII, +quod tulit lapidem et erexit in titulum fundens oleum +desuper. Ergo caeremoniae legales fuerunt ante legem.
+ Objection 3: Further, the first of the legal sacraments seems to have been circumcision. But circumcision preceded the Law, as appears + from + Gn. 17. In like manner the priesthood preceded the Law; for it is written ( + Gn. 14:18) that "Melchisedech . . . was the priest of the most high God." Therefore the sacramental ceremonies preceded the Law. +
[38108] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +inter sacramenta legalia primum videtur fuisse circumcisio. Sed +circumcisio fuit ante legem, ut patet Gen. XVII. Similiter etiam +sacerdotium fuit ante legem, dicitur enim Gen. XIV, quod +Melchisedech erat sacerdos Dei summi. Ergo caeremoniae +sacramentorum fuerunt ante legem.
+ Objection 4: Further, the distinction of clean from unclean animals belongs to the ceremonies of observances, as stated above (Q[100], + 2, A[6], ad 1). But this distinction preceded the Law; for it is written ( + Gn. 7:2,3): "Of all clean beasts take seven and seven . . . but of the beasts that are unclean, two and two." Therefore the legal ceremonies + preceded the Law. +
[38109] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, +discretio mundorum animalium ab immundis pertinet ad caeremonias +observantiarum, ut supra dictum est. Sed talis discretio fuit ante +legem, dicitur enim Gen. VII, ex omnibus mundis animalibus tolle +septena et septena; de animantibus vero immundis, duo et duo. +Ergo caeremoniae legales fuerunt ante legem.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Dt. 6:1): "These are the precepts and ceremonies . . . which the Lord your God commanded that I should teach you." But they would + not have needed to be taught about these things, if the aforesaid ceremonies had been already in existence. Therefore the + legal ceremonies did not precede the Law. +
[38110] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Deut. VI, haec sunt praecepta et caeremoniae +quae mandavit dominus Deus vester ut docerem vos. Non autem +indiguissent super his doceri, si prius praedictae caeremoniae +fuissent. Ergo caeremoniae legis non fuerunt ante legem.
+ I answer that, As is clear from what has been said ( + Q[101], A[2]; + Q[102] , A[2]), the legal ceremonies were ordained for a double purpose; the worship of God, and the foreshadowing of Christ. Now whoever + worships God must needs worship Him by means of certain fixed things pertaining to external worship. But the fixing of the + divine worship belongs to the ceremonies; just as the determining of our relations with our + neighbor is a matter determined by the judicial precepts, as stated above ( + Q[99], A[4]). Consequently, as among men in general there were certain judicial precepts, not indeed established by Divine authority, + but ordained by human reason; so also there were some ceremonies fixed, not by the authority of any law, but according to + the will and devotion of those that worship God. Since, however, even before the Law some of the leading men were gifted with + the spirit of + prophecy, it is to be believed that a heavenly instinct, like a private law, prompted them to worship God in a certain definite + way, which would be both in keeping with the interior worship, and a suitable token of Christ's mysteries, which were foreshadowed + also by other things that they did, according to + 1 Cor. 10:11: "All . . . things happened to them in figure." Therefore there were some ceremonies before the Law, but they were not legal + ceremonies, because they were not as yet established + by legislation. +
[38111] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ex dictis patet, caeremoniae legis ad duo +ordinabantur, scilicet ad cultum Dei, et ad figurandum Christum. +Quicumque autem colit Deum, oportet quod per aliqua determinata eum +colat, quae ad exteriorem cultum pertinent. Determinatio autem +divini cultus ad caeremonias pertinet; sicut etiam determinatio +eorum per quae ordinamur ad proximum, pertinet ad praecepta +iudicialia; ut supra dictum est. Et ideo sicut inter homines +communiter erant aliqua iudicialia, non tamen ex auctoritate legis +divinae instituta, sed ratione hominum ordinata; ita etiam erant +quaedam caeremoniae, non quidem ex auctoritate alicuius legis +determinatae, sed solum secundum voluntatem et devotionem hominum +Deum colentium. Sed quia etiam ante legem fuerunt quidam viri +praecipui prophetico spiritu pollentes, credendum est quod ex +instinctu divino, quasi ex quadam privata lege, inducerentur ad +aliquem certum modum colendi Deum, qui et conveniens esset +interiori cultui, et etiam congrueret ad significandum Christi +mysteria, quae figurabantur etiam per alia eorum gesta, secundum +illud I ad Cor. X, omnia in figuram contingebant illis. +Fuerunt igitur ante legem quaedam caeremoniae, non tamen +caeremoniae legis, quia non erant per aliquam legislationem +institutae.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The patriarchs offered up these oblations, sacrifices and holocausts previously to the Law, out of a certain devotion of + their own will, according as it seemed proper to them to offer up in honor of God those things which they had received from + Him, and thus to testify that they worshipped God Who is the beginning and end of all. +
[38112] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod huiusmodi oblationes et sacrificia et holocausta +offerebant antiqui ante legem ex quadam devotione propriae +voluntatis, secundum quod eis videbatur conveniens ut in rebus quas +a Deo acceperant, quas in reverentiam divinam offerrent, +protestarentur se colere Deum, qui est omnium principium et +finis.
+ Reply to Objection 2: They also established certain sacred things, because they thought that the honor due to God demanded that certain places + should be set apart from others for the purpose of divine worship. +
[38113] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod etiam sacra quaedam instituerunt, quia videbatur eis +conveniens ut in reverentiam divinam essent aliqua loca ab aliis +discreta, divino cultui mancipata.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The sacrament of circumcision was established by command of God before the Law. Hence it cannot be called a sacrament of + the Law as though it were an institution of the Law, but only as an observance included in the Law. Hence Our Lord said ( + Jn. 7:20) that circumcision was "not of Moses, but of his fathers." Again, among those who worshipped God, the priesthood was in existence + before the Law by human appointment, for the Law + allotted the priestly dignity to the firstborn. +
[38114] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod sacramentum circumcisionis praecepto divino fuit +statutum ante legem. Unde non potest dici sacramentum legis quasi +in lege institutum, sed solum quasi in lege observatum. Et hoc est +quod dominus dicit, Ioan. VII, circumcisio non ex Moyse est, sed +ex patribus eius. Sacerdotium etiam erat ante legem apud +colentes Deum, secundum humanam determinationem, quia hanc +dignitatem primogenitis attribuebant.
+ Reply to Objection 4: The distinction of clean from unclean animals was in vogue before the Law, not with regard to eating them, since it is written + ( + Gn. 9:3): "Everything that moveth and liveth shall be meat for you": but only as to the offering of sacrifices because they used + only certain animals for that purpose. If, however, they did make any distinction in regard to eating; it was not that it + was considered illegal to eat such animals, since this was not forbidden by + any law, but from dislike or custom: thus even now we see that certain foods are looked upon with disgust in some countries, + while people partake of them in others. +
[38115] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod distinctio mundorum animalium et immundorum non fuit +ante legem quantum ad esum, cum dictum sit Gen. IX, omne quod +movetur et vivit, erit vobis in cibum, sed solum quantum ad +sacrificiorum oblationem, quia de quibusdam determinatis animalibus +sacrificia offerebant. Si tamen quantum ad esum erat aliqua +discretio animalium, hoc non erat quia esus illorum reputaretur +illicitus, cum nulla lege esset prohibitus, sed propter +abominationem vel consuetudinem, sicut et nunc videmus quod aliqua +cibaria sunt in aliquibus terris abominabilia, quae in aliis +comeduntur.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the ceremonies of the Old Law had the power of justification at the time of the Law. Because expiation + from sin and consecration pertains to justification. But it is written ( + Ex. 39:21) that the priests and their apparel were consecrated by the sprinkling of blood and the anointing of oil; and ( + Lev. 16:16) that, by sprinkling the blood of the calf, the priest expiated "the sanctuary from the + uncleanness of the children of Israel, and from their transgressions and . . . their sins." Therefore the ceremonies of the + Old Law had the power of justification. +
[38116] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad +secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod caeremoniae veteris legis +habuerint virtutem iustificandi tempore legis. Expiatio enim a +peccato, et consecratio hominis, ad iustificationem pertinent, sed +Exod. XXIX, dicitur quod per aspersionem sanguinis et inunctionem +olei consecrabantur sacerdotes et vestes eorum; et Levit. XVI, +dicitur quod sacerdos per aspersionem sanguinis vituli expiabat +sanctuarium ab immunditiis filiorum Israel, et a praevaricationibus +eorum atque peccatis. Ergo caeremoniae veteris legis habebant +virtutem iustificandi.
+ Objection 2: Further, that by which man pleases God pertains to justification, according to + Ps. 10:8: "The Lord is just and hath loved justice." But some pleased God by means of ceremonies, according to + Lev. 10:19: "How could I . . . please the Lord in the ceremonies, having a sorrowful heart?" Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law + had the power of justification. +
[38117] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +id per quod homo placet Deo, ad iustitiam pertinet; secundum illud +Psalmi X, iustus dominus, et iustitias dilexit, sed per +caeremonias aliqui Deo placebant, secundum illud Levit. X, +quomodo potui placere domino in caeremoniis mente lugubri? +Ergo caeremoniae veteris legis habebant virtutem iustificandi.
+ Objection 3: Further, things relating to the divine worship regard the soul rather than the body, according to + Ps. 18:8: "The Law of the Lord is unspotted, converting souls." But the leper was cleansed by means of the ceremonies of the Old Law, + as stated in + Lev. 14. Much more therefore could the ceremonies of the Old Law cleanse the soul by justifying it. +
[38118] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +ea quae sunt divini cultus magis pertinent ad animam quam ad +corpus; secundum illud Psalmi XVIII, lex domini immaculata, +convertens animas. Sed per caeremonias veteris legis mundabatur +leprosus, ut dicitur Levit. XIV. Ergo multo magis caeremoniae +veteris legis poterant mundare animam, iustificando.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle says ( + Gal. 2) [*The first words of the quotation are from 3:21: St. Thomas probably quoting from memory, substituted them for 2:21, which + runs thus: 'If justice be by the Law, then Christ died in vain.']: "If there had been a law given which could justify [Vulg.: + 'give life'], Christ died in vain," i.e. without cause. But this is inadmissible. Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law + did not confer justice. +
[38119] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, Galat. II, si data esset lex quae +posset iustificare, Christus gratis mortuus esset, idest sine +causa. Sed hoc est inconveniens. Ergo caeremoniae veteris legis non +iustificabant.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + Q[102], A[5], ad 4), a twofold uncleanness was distinguished in the Old Law. One was spiritual and is the uncleanness of sin. The other + was corporal, which rendered a man unfit for divine worship; thus a leper, or anyone that touched carrion, was said to be + unclean: and thus uncleanness was nothing but a kind of irregularity. From this uncleanness, then, the ceremonies of the Old + Law had the power to cleanse: + because they were ordered by the Law to be employed as remedies for the removal of the aforesaid uncleannesses which were + contracted in consequence of the prescription of the Law. Hence the Apostle says ( + Heb. 9:13) that "the blood of goats and of oxen, and the ashes of a heifer, being sprinkled, sanctify such as are defiled, to the cleansing + of the flesh." And just as this uncleanness which was washed away by such like ceremonies, affected the flesh rather than + the soul, so + also the ceremonies themselves are called by the Apostle shortly before ( + Heb. 9:10) justices of the flesh: "justices of the flesh," says he, "being laid on them until the time of correction." +
On the other hand, they had no power of cleansing from uncleanness of the soul, i.e. from the uncleanness of sin. The reason + of this was that at no time could there be expiation from sin, except through Christ, "Who taketh away the sins [Vulg.: 'sin'] + of the world" ( + Jn. 1:29). And since the mystery of Christ's Incarnation and Passion had not yet really taken place, those ceremonies of the Old Law + could not really contain in themselves a power flowing from + Christ already incarnate and crucified, such as the sacraments of the New Law contain. Consequently they could not cleanse + from sin: thus the Apostle says ( + Heb. 10:4) that "it is impossible that with the blood of oxen and goats sin should be taken away"; and for this reason he calls them + ( + Gal. 4:9) "weak and needy elements": weak indeed, because they cannot take away sin; but this weakness results from their being needy, + i.e. from the fact that they do + not contain grace within themselves. +
However, it was possible at the time of the Law, for the minds of the faithful, to be united by faith to Christ incarnate + and crucified; so that they were justified by faith in Christ: of which faith the observance of these ceremonies was a sort + of profession, inasmuch as they foreshadowed Christ. Hence in the Old Law certain sacrifices were offered up for sins, not + as though the sacrifices themselves washed sins away, but because they were professions of faith which cleansed + from sin. In fact, the Law itself implies this in the terms employed: for it is written ( + Lev. 4:26; 5:16) that in offering the sacrifice for sin "the priest shall pray for him . . . and it shall be forgiven him," as though + the sin were forgiven, not in virtue of the sacrifices, but through the faith and devotion of those who offered them. It must + be observed, however, that the very fact that the ceremonies of the Old Law washed away uncleanness of the body, was a figure + of + that expiation from sins which was effected by Christ. +
It is therefore evident that under the state of the Old Law the ceremonies had no power of justification.
[38120] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in veteri lege duplex +immunditia observabatur. Una quidem spiritualis, quae est +immunditia culpae. Alia vero corporalis, quae tollebat idoneitatem +ad cultum divinum, sicut leprosus dicebatur immundus, vel ille qui +tangebat aliquod morticinum, et sic immunditia nihil aliud erat +quam irregularitas quaedam. Ab hac igitur immunditia caeremoniae +veteris legis habebant virtutem emundandi, quia huiusmodi +caeremoniae erant quaedam remedia adhibita ex ordinatione legis ad +tollendas praedictas immunditias ex statuto legis inductas. Et ideo +apostolus dicit, ad Heb. IX, quod sanguis hircorum et taurorum, +et cinis vitulae aspersus, inquinatos sanctificat ad emundationem +carnis. Et sicut ista immunditia quae per huiusmodi caeremonias +emundabatur, erat magis carnis quam mentis; ita etiam ipsae +caeremoniae iustitiae carnis dicuntur ab ipso apostolo, parum +supra, iustitiis, inquit, carnis usque ad tempus correctionis +impositis. Ab immunditia vero mentis, quae est immunditia +culpae, non habebant virtutem expiandi. Et hoc ideo quia expiatio a +peccatis nunquam fieri potuit nisi per Christum, qui tollit peccata +mundi, ut dicitur Ioan. I, et quia mysterium incarnationis et +passionis Christi nondum erat realiter peractum, illae veteris +legis caeremoniae non poterant in se continere realiter virtutem +profluentem a Christo incarnato et passo, sicut continent +sacramenta novae legis. Et ideo non poterant a peccato mundare, +sicut apostolus dicit, ad Heb. X, quod impossibile est sanguine +taurorum aut hircorum auferri peccata. Et hoc est quod, Gal. +IV, apostolus vocat ea egena et infirma elementa, infirma quidem, +quia non possunt a peccato mundare; sed haec infirmitas provenit ex +eo quod sunt egena, idest eo quod non continent in se gratiam. +Poterat autem mens fidelium, tempore legis, per fidem coniungi +Christo incarnato et passo, et ita ex fide Christi iustificabantur. +Cuius fidei quaedam protestatio erat huiusmodi caeremoniarum +observatio, inquantum erant figura Christi. Et ideo pro peccatis +offerebantur sacrificia quaedam in veteri lege, non quia ipsa +sacrificia a peccato emundarent, sed quia erant quaedam +protestationes fidei, quae a peccato mundabat. Et hoc etiam ipsa +lex innuit ex modo loquendi, dicitur enim Levit. IV et V, quod in +oblatione hostiarum pro peccato orabit pro eo sacerdos, et +dimittetur ei; quasi peccatum dimittatur non ex vi sacrificiorum, +sed ex fide et devotione offerentium. Sciendum est tamen quod hoc +ipsum quod veteris legis caeremoniae a corporalibus immunditiis +expiabant, erat in figura expiationis a peccatis quae fit per +Christum. Sic igitur patet quod caeremoniae in statu veteris legis +non habebant virtutem iustificandi.
+ Reply to Objection 1: That sanctification of priests and their sons, and of their apparel or of anything else belonging to them, by sprinkling + them with blood, had no other effect but to appoint them to the divine worship, and to remove impediments from them, "to the + cleansing of the flesh," as the Apostle states ( + Heb. 9:13) in token of that sanctification whereby "Jesus" sanctified "the people by His own blood" ( + Heb. 13:12). + Moreover, the expiation must be understood as referring to the removal of these bodily uncleannesses, not to the forgiveness + of sin. Hence even the sanctuary which could not be the subject of sin is stated to be expiated. +
[38121] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod illa sanctificatio sacerdotum et filiorum eius, +et vestium ipsorum, vel quorumcumque aliorum, per aspersionem +sanguinis, nihil aliud erat quam deputatio ad divinum cultum, et +remotio impedimentorum ad emundationem carnis, ut apostolus dicit; +in praefigurationem illius sanctificationis qua Iesus per suum +sanguinem sanctificavit populum. Expiatio etiam ad remotionem +huiusmodi corporalium immunditiarum referenda est, non ad +remotionem culpae. Unde etiam sanctuarium expiari dicitur, quod +culpae subiectum esse non poterat.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The priests pleased God in the ceremonies by their obedience and devotion, and by their faith in the reality foreshadowed; + not by reason of the things considered in themselves. +
[38122] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod sacerdotes placebant Deo in caeremoniis propter +obedientiam et devotionem et fidem rei praefiguratae, non autem +propter ipsas res secundum se consideratas.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Those ceremonies which were prescribed in the cleansing of a leper, were not ordained for the purpose of taking away the + defilement of leprosy. This is clear from the fact that these ceremonies were not applied to a man until he was already healed: + hence it is written ( + Lev. 14:3,4) that the priest, "going out of the camp, when he shall find that the leprosy is cleansed, shall command him that is to be + purified to offer," etc.; whence it is evident + that the priest was appointed the judge of leprosy, not before, but after cleansing. But these ceremonies were employed for + the purpose of taking away the uncleanness of irregularity. They do say, however, that if a priest were to err in his judgment, + the leper would be cleansed miraculously by the power of God, but not in virtue of the sacrifice. Thus also it was by miracle + that the thigh of the adulterous woman rotted, when she had drunk the water "on which" the priest had "heaped curses," as + stated in + Num. 5:19-27. +
[38123] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod caeremoniae illae quae erant institutae in +emundatione leprosi, non ordinabantur ad tollendam immunditiam +infirmitatis leprae. Quod patet ex hoc quod non adhibebantur +huiusmodi caeremoniae nisi iam emundato, unde dicitur Levit. XIV, +quod sacerdos, egressus de castris, cum invenerit lepram esse +mundatam, praecipiet ei qui purificatur ut offerat, etc.; ex +quo patet quod sacerdos constituebatur iudex leprae emundatae, non +autem emundandae. Adhibebantur autem huiusmodi caeremoniae ad +tollendam immunditiam irregularitatis. Dicunt tamen quod quandoque, +si contingeret sacerdotem errare in iudicando, miraculose leprosus +mundabatur a Deo virtute divina, non autem virtute sacrificiorum. +Sicut etiam miraculose mulieris adulterae computrescebat femur, +bibitis aquis in quibus sacerdos maledicta congesserat, ut habetur +Num. V.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the ceremonies of the Old Law did not cease at the coming of Christ. For it is written ( + Bar 4:1): "This is the book of the commandments of God, and the law that is for ever." But the legal ceremonies were part of the + Law. Therefore the legal ceremonies were to last for ever. +
[38124] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod caeremoniae veteris legis non +cessaverint in Christi adventu. Dicitur enim Baruch IV, hic est +liber mandatorum Dei, et lex quae est in aeternum. Sed ad legem +pertinebant legis caeremoniae. Ergo legis caeremoniae in aeternum +duraturae erant.
+ Objection 2: Further, the offering made by a leper after being cleansed was a ceremony of the Law. But the Gospel commands the leper, + who has been cleansed, to make this offering ( + Mat. 8:4). Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law did not cease at Christ's coming. +
[38125] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +oblatio leprosi mundati ad legis caeremonias pertinebat. Sed etiam +in Evangelio praecipitur leproso emundato ut huiusmodi oblationes +offerat. Ergo caeremoniae veteris legis non cessaverunt Christo +veniente.
+ Objection 3: Further, as long as the cause remains, the effect remains. But the ceremonies of the Old Law had certain reasonable causes, + inasmuch as they were ordained to the worship of God, besides the fact that they were intended to be figures of Christ. Therefore + the ceremonies of the Old Law should not have ceased. +
[38126] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +manente causa, manet effectus. Sed caeremoniae veteris legis +habebant quasdam rationabiles causas, inquantum ordinabantur ad +divinum cultum; etiam praeter hoc quod ordinabantur in figuram +Christi. Ergo caeremoniae veteris legis cessare non debuerunt.
+ Objection 4: Further, circumcision was instituted as a sign of Abraham's faith: the observance of the sabbath, to recall the blessing + of creation: and other solemnities, in memory of other Divine favors, as state above ( + Q[102], A[4], ad 10; A[5], ad 1). But Abraham's faith is ever to be imitated even by us: and the blessing of creation and other Divine + favors should never be forgotten. Therefore at least circumcision and the other legal + solemnities should not have ceased. +
[38127] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 3 arg. 4 Praeterea, +circumcisio erat instituta in signum fidei Abrahae; observatio +autem sabbati ad recolendum beneficium creationis; et aliae +solemnitates legis ad recolendum alia beneficia Dei; ut supra +dictum est. Sed fides Abrahae est semper imitanda etiam a nobis; et +beneficium creationis, et alia Dei beneficia, semper sunt +recolenda. Ergo ad minus circumcisio et solemnitates legis cessare +non debuerunt.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle says ( + Col. 2:16,17): "Let no man . . . judge you in meat or in drink, or in respect of a festival day, or of the new moon, or of the sabbaths, + which are a shadow of things to come": and ( + Heb. 8:13): "In saying a new (testament), he hath made the former old: and that which decayeth and groweth old, is near its end." +
[38128] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Coloss. II, nemo vos iudicet in +cibo aut in potu, aut in parte diei festi aut Neomeniae aut +sabbatorum, quae sunt umbra futurorum. Et ad Heb. VIII dicitur +quod, dicendo novum testamentum, veteravit prius, quod autem +antiquatur et senescit, prope interitum est.
+ I answer that, All the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law were ordained to the worship of God as stated above ( + Q[101], AA[1],2). Now external worship should be in proportion to the internal worship, which consists in faith, hope and charity. Consequently + exterior worship had to be subject to variations according to the variations in the internal worship, in which a threefold + state may be distinguished. One state was in respect of faith and hope, + both in heavenly goods, and in the means of obtaining them---in both of these considered as things to come. Such was the state + of faith and hope in the Old Law. Another state of interior worship is that in which we have faith and hope in heavenly goods + as things to come; but in the means of obtaining heavenly goods, as in things present or past. Such is the state of the New + Law. The third state is that in which both are possessed as present; wherein nothing is believed in as lacking, nothing + hoped for as being yet to come. Such is the state of the Blessed. +
In this state of the Blessed, then, nothing in regard to worship of God will be figurative; there will be naught but "thanksgiving + and voice of praise" ( + Is. 51:3). Hence it is written concerning the city of the Blessed ( + Apoc. 21:22): "I saw no temple therein: for the Lord God Almighty is the temple thereof, and the Lamb." Proportionately, therefore, the + ceremonies of the first-mentioned state which foreshadowed the second and third + states, had need to cease at the advent of the second state; and other ceremonies had to be introduced which would be in keeping + with the state of divine worship for that particular time, wherein heavenly goods are a thing of the future, but the Divine + favors whereby we obtain the heavenly boons are a thing of the present. +
[38129] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod omnia praecepta caeremonialia veteris legis ad cultum +Dei sunt ordinata, ut supra dictum est. Exterior autem cultus +proportionari debet interiori cultui, qui consistit in fide, spe et +caritate. Unde secundum diversitatem interioris cultus, debuit +diversificari cultus exterior. Potest autem triplex status +distingui interioris cultus. Unus quidem secundum quem habetur +fides et spes et de bonis caelestibus, et de his per quae in +caelestia introducimur, de utrisque quidem sicut de quibusdam +futuris. Et talis fuit status fidei et spei in veteri lege. Alius +autem est status interioris cultus in quo habetur fides et spes de +caelestibus bonis sicut de quibusdam futuris, sed de his per quae +introducimur in caelestia, sicut de praesentibus vel praeteritis. +Et iste est status novae legis. Tertius autem status est in quo +utraque habentur ut praesentia, et nihil creditur ut absens, neque +speratur ut futurum. Et iste est status beatorum. In illo ergo +statu beatorum nihil erit figurale ad divinum cultum pertinens, sed +solum gratiarum actio et vox laudis. Et ideo dicitur Apoc. XXI, de +civitate beatorum, templum non vidi in ea, dominus enim Deus +omnipotens templum illius est, et agnus. Pari igitur ratione, +caeremoniae primi status, per quas figurabatur et secundus et +tertius, veniente secundo statu, cessare debuerunt; et aliae +caeremoniae induci, quae convenirent statui cultus divini pro +tempore illo, in quo bona caelestia sunt futura, beneficia autem +Dei per quae ad caelestia introducimur, sunt praesentia.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The Old Law is said to be "for ever" simply and absolutely, as regards its moral precepts; but as regards the ceremonial + precepts it lasts for even in respect of the reality which those ceremonies foreshadowed. +
[38130] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod lex vetus dicitur esse in aeternum, secundum +moralia quidem, simpliciter et absolute, secundum caeremonialia +vero, quantum ad veritatem per ea figuratam.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The mystery of the redemption of the human race was fulfilled in Christ's Passion: hence Our Lord said then: "It is consummated" + ( + Jn. 19:30). Consequently the prescriptions of the Law must have ceased then altogether through their reality being fulfilled. As a + sign of this, we read that at the Passion of Christ "the veil of the temple was rent" ( + Mat. 27:51). Hence, before Christ's Passion, while Christ was + preaching and working miracles, the Law and the Gospel were concurrent, since the mystery of Christ had already begun, but + was not as yet consummated. And for this reason Our Lord, before His Passion, commanded the leper to observe the legal ceremonies. +
[38131] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod mysterium redemptionis humani generis completum fuit +in passione Christi, unde tunc dominus dixit, consummatum +est, ut habetur Ioan. XIX. Et ideo tunc totaliter debuerunt +cessare legalia, quasi iam veritate eorum consummata. In cuius +signum, in passione Christi velum templi legitur esse scissum, +Matth. XXVII. Et ideo ante passionem Christi, Christo praedicante +et miracula faciente, currebant simul lex et Evangelium, quia iam +mysterium Christi erat inchoatum, sed nondum consummatum. Et +propter hoc mandavit dominus, ante passionem suam, leproso, ut +legales caeremonias observaret.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The literal reasons already given ( + Q[102]) for the ceremonies refer to the divine worship, which was founded on faith in that which was to come. Hence, at the advent + of Him Who was to come, both that worship ceased, and all the reasons referring thereto. +
[38132] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod rationes litterales caeremoniarum supra assignatae +referuntur ad divinum cultum, qui quidem cultus erat in fide +venturi. Et ideo, iam veniente eo qui venturus erat, et cultus ille +cessat, et omnes rationes ad hunc cultum ordinatae.
+ Reply to Objection 4: The faith of Abraham was commended in that he believed in God's promise concerning his seed to come, in which all nations + were to blessed. Wherefore, as long as this seed was yet to come, it was necessary to make profession of Abraham's faith by + means of circumcision. But now that it is consummated, the same thing needs to be declared by means of another sign, viz. + Baptism, which, in this respect, took the place of circumcision, according to the + saying of the Apostle ( + Col. 2:11, 12): "You are circumcised with circumcision not made by hand, in despoiling of the body of the flesh, but in the circumcision + of Christ, buried with Him in Baptism." +
As to the sabbath, which was a sign recalling the first creation, its place is taken by the "Lord's Day," which recalls the + beginning of the new creature in the Resurrection of Christ. In like manner other solemnities of the Old Law are supplanted + by new solemnities: because the blessings vouchsafed to that people, foreshadowed the favors granted us by Christ. Hence the + feast of the Passover gave place to the feast of Christ's Passion and Resurrection: the feast of Pentecost + when the Old Law was given, to the feast of Pentecost on which was given the Law of the living spirit: the feast of the New + Moon, to Lady Day, when appeared the first rays of the sun, i.e. Christ, by the fulness of grace: the feast of Trumpets, to + the feasts of the Apostles: the feast of Expiation, to the feasts of Martyrs and Confessors: the feast of Tabernacles, to + the feast of the Church Dedication: the feast of the Assembly and Collection, to feast of the Angels, or else to the feast + of All + Hallows. +
[38133] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod fides Abrahae fuit commendata in hoc quod credidit +divinae promissioni de futuro semine, in quo benedicerentur omnes +gentes. Et ideo quandiu hoc erat futurum, oportebat protestari +fidem Abrahae in circumcisione. Sed postquam iam hoc est perfectum, +oportet idem alio signo declarari, scilicet Baptismo, qui in hoc +circumcisioni succedit; secundum illud apostoli, ad Coloss. II, +circumcisi estis circumcisione non manu facta in expoliatione +corporis carnis, sed in circumcisione domini nostri Iesu Christi, +consepulti ei in Baptismo. Sabbatum autem, quod significabat +primam creationem, mutatur in diem dominicum, in quo commemoratur +nova creatura inchoata in resurrectione Christi. Et similiter aliis +solemnitatibus veteris legis novae solemnitates succedunt, quia +beneficia illi populo exhibita, significant beneficia nobis +concessa per Christum. Unde festo phase succedit festum passionis +Christi et resurrectionis. Festo Pentecostes, in quo fuit data lex +vetus, succedit festum Pentecostes in quo fuit data lex spiritus +vitae. Festo Neomeniae succedit festum beatae virginis, in qua +primo apparuit illuminatio solis, idest Christi, per copiam +gratiae. Festo tubarum succedunt festa apostolorum. Festo +expiationis succedunt festa martyrum et confessorum. Festo +tabernaculorum succedit festum consecrationis Ecclesiae. Festo +coetus atque collectae succedit festum Angelorum; vel etiam festum +omnium sanctorum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that since Christ's Passion the legal ceremonies can be observed without committing mortal sin. For we must + not believe that the apostles committed mortal sin after receiving the Holy Ghost: since by His fulness they were "endued + with power from on high" ( + Lk. 24:49). But the apostles observed the legal ceremonies after the coming of the Holy Ghost: for it is stated ( + Acts 16:3) that Paul circumcised Timothy: and + ( + Acts 21:26) that Paul, at the advice of James, "took the men, and . . . being purified with them, entered into the temple, giving notice + of the accomplishment of the days of purification, until an oblation should be offered for every one of them." Therefore the + legal ceremonies can be observed since the Passion of Christ without mortal sin. +
[38134] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod post passionem Christi legalia possint +sine peccato mortali observari. Non est enim credendum quod +apostoli, post acceptum spiritum sanctum, mortaliter peccaverint, +eius enim plenitudine sunt induti virtute ex alto, ut dicitur Lucae +ult. Sed apostoli post adventum spiritus sancti legalia +observaverunt, dicitur enim Act. XVI, quod Paulus circumcidit +Timotheum; et Act. XXI, dicitur quod Paulus, secundum consilium +Iacobi, assumptis viris, purificatus cum eis intravit in +templum, annuntians expletionem dierum purificationis, donec +offerretur pro unoquoque eorum oblatio. Ergo sine peccato +mortali possunt post Christi passionem legalia observari.
+ Objection 2: Further, one of the legal ceremonies consisted in shunning the fellowship of Gentiles. But the first Pastor of the Church + complied with this observance; for it is stated ( + Gal. 2:12) that, "when" certain men "had come" to Antioch, Peter "withdrew and separated himself" from the Gentiles. Therefore the + legal ceremonies can be observed since Christ's Passion without committing mortal sin. +
[38135] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +vitare consortia gentilium ad caeremonias legis pertinebat. Sed hoc +observavit primus pastor Ecclesiae, dicitur enim ad Gal. II, quod, +cum venissent quidam Antiochiam, subtrahebat et segregabat se +Petrus a gentilibus. Ergo absque peccato post passionem Christi +legis caeremoniae observari possunt.
+ Objection 3: Further, the commands of the apostles did not lead men into sin. But it was commanded by apostolic decree that the Gentiles + should observe certain ceremonies of the Law: for it is written ( + Acts 15:28,29): "It hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us, to lay no further burden upon you than these necessary things: that you + abstain from things sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled, and from fornication." Therefore + the legal ceremonies can be observed since Christ's Passion without committing mortal sin. +
[38136] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +praecepta apostolorum non induxerunt homines ad peccatum. Sed ex +decreto apostolorum statutum fuit quod gentiles quaedam de +caeremoniis legis observarent, dicitur enim Act. XV, visum est +spiritui sancto et nobis nihil ultra imponere oneris vobis quam +haec necessaria, ut abstineatis vos ab immolatis simulacrorum, et +sanguine, et suffocato, et fornicatione. Ergo absque peccato +caeremoniae legales possunt post Christi passionem observari.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle says ( + Gal. 5:2): "If you be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing." But nothing save mortal sin hinders us from receiving Christ's + fruit. Therefore since Christ's Passion it is a mortal sin to be circumcised, or to observe the other legal ceremonies. +
[38137] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Gal. V, si circumcidimini, Christus +nihil vobis proderit. Sed nihil excludit fructum Christi nisi +peccatum mortale. Ergo circumcidi, et alias caeremonias observare, +post passionem Christi est peccatum mortale.
+ I answer that, All ceremonies are professions of faith, in which the interior worship of God consists. Now man can make profession of his + inward faith, by deeds as well as by words: and in either profession, if he make a false declaration, he sins mortally. Now, + though our faith in Christ is the same as that of the fathers of old; yet, since they came before Christ, whereas we come + after Him, the same faith is expressed in different words, by us and by them. For by them + was it said: "Behold a virgin shall conceive and bear a son," where the verbs are in the future tense: whereas we express + the same by means of verbs in the past tense, and say that she "conceived and bore." In like manner the ceremonies of the + Old Law betokened Christ as having yet to be born and to suffer: whereas our sacraments signify Him as already born and having + suffered. Consequently, just as it would be a mortal sin now for anyone, in making a profession of faith, to say that Christ + is + yet to be born, which the fathers of old said devoutly and truthfully; so too it would be a mortal sin now to observe those + ceremonies which the fathers of old fulfilled with devotion and fidelity. Such is the teaching Augustine (Contra Faust. xix, + 16), who says: "It is no longer promised that He shall be born, shall suffer and rise again, truths of which their sacraments + were a kind of image: but it is declared that He is already born, has suffered and risen again; of which our sacraments, in + which Christians share, are the actual representation." +
[38138] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod omnes caeremoniae sunt quaedam protestationes fidei, +in qua consistit interior Dei cultus. Sic autem fidem interiorem +potest homo protestari factis, sicut et verbis, et in utraque +protestatione, si aliquid homo falsum protestatur, peccat +mortaliter. Quamvis autem sit eadem fides quam habemus de Christo, +et quam antiqui patres habuerunt; tamen quia ipsi praecesserunt +Christum, nos autem sequimur, eadem fides diversis verbis +significatur a nobis et ab eis. Nam ab eis dicebatur, ecce virgo +concipiet et pariet filium, quae sunt verba futuri temporis, nos +autem idem repraesentamus per verba praeteriti temporis, dicentes +quod concepit et peperit. Et similiter caeremoniae veteris legis +significabant Christum ut nasciturum et passurum, nostra autem +sacramenta significant ipsum ut natum et passum. Sicut igitur +peccaret mortaliter qui nunc, suam fidem protestando, diceret +Christum nasciturum, quod antiqui pie et veraciter dicebant; ita +etiam peccaret mortaliter, si quis nunc caeremonias observaret, +quas antiqui pie et fideliter observabant. Et hoc est quod +Augustinus dicit, contra Faustum, iam non promittitur +nasciturus, passurus, resurrecturus, quod illa sacramenta +quodammodo personabant, sed annuntiatur quod natus sit, passus sit, +resurrexerit; quod haec sacramenta quae a Christianis aguntur, iam +personant.
+ Reply to Objection 1: On this point there seems to have been a difference of opinion between Jerome and Augustine. For Jerome (Super Galat. ii, + 11, seqq.) distinguished two periods of time. One was the time previous to Christ's Passion, during which the legal ceremonies + were neither dead, since they were obligatory, and did expiate in their own fashion; nor deadly, because it was not sinful + to observe them. But immediately after Christ's Passion they began to be not only + dead, so as no longer to be either effectual or binding; but also deadly, so that whoever observed them was guilty of mortal + sin. Hence he maintained that after the Passion the apostles never observed the legal ceremonies in real earnest; but only + by a kind of pious pretense, lest, to wit, they should scandalize the Jews and hinder their conversion. This pretense, however, + is to be understood, not as though they did not in reality perform those actions, but in the sense that they performed them + without the mind to observe the ceremonies of the Law: thus a man might cut away his foreskin for health's sake, not with + the intention of observing legal circumcision. +
But since it seems unbecoming that the apostles, in order to avoid scandal, should have hidden things pertaining to the truth + of life and doctrine, and that they should have made use of pretense, in things pertaining to the salvation of the faithful; + therefore Augustine (Epist. lxxxii) more fittingly distinguished three periods of time. One was the time that preceded the + Passion of Christ, during which the legal ceremonies were neither deadly nor dead: another period was after + the publication of the Gospel, during which the legal ceremonies are both dead and deadly. The third is a middle period, viz. + from the Passion of Christ until the publication of the Gospel, during which the legal ceremonies were dead indeed, because + they had neither effect nor binding force; but were not deadly, because it was lawful for the Jewish converts to Christianity + to observe them, provided they did not put their trust in them so as to hold them to be necessary unto salvation, as though + faith in Christ could not justify without the legal observances. On the other hand, there was no reason why those who were + converted from heathendom to Christianity should observe them. Hence Paul circumcised Timothy, who was born of a Jewish mother; + but was unwilling to circumcise Titus, who was of heathen nationality. +
The reason why the Holy Ghost did not wish the converted Jews to be debarred at once from observing the legal ceremonies, + while converted heathens were forbidden to observe the rites of heathendom, was in order to show that there is a difference + between these rites. For heathenish ceremonial was rejected as absolutely unlawful, and as prohibited by God for all time; + whereas the legal ceremonial ceased as being fulfilled through Christ's Passion, being instituted by God as a + figure of Christ. +
[38139] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod circa hoc diversimode sensisse videntur +Hieronymus et Augustinus. Hieronymus enim distinxit duo tempora. +Unum tempus ante passionem Christi, in quo legalia nec erant +mortua, quasi non habentia vim obligatoriam, aut expiativam pro suo +modo; nec etiam mortifera, quia non peccabant ea observantes. +Statim autem post passionem Christi incoeperunt esse non solum +mortua, idest non habentia virtutem et obligationem; sed etiam +mortifera, ita scilicet quod peccabant mortaliter quicumque ea +observabant. Unde dicebat quod apostoli nunquam legalia +observaverunt post passionem secundum veritatem; sed solum quadam +pia simulatione, ne scilicet scandalizarent Iudaeos et eorum +conversionem impedirent. Quae quidem simulatio sic intelligenda +est, non quidem ita quod illos actus secundum rei veritatem non +facerent, sed quia non faciebant tanquam legis caeremonias +observantes; sicut si quis pelliculam virilis membri abscinderet +propter sanitatem, non causa legalis circumcisionis observandae. +Sed quia indecens videtur quod apostoli ea occultarent propter +scandalum quae pertinent ad veritatem vitae et doctrinae, et quod +simulatione uterentur in his quae pertinent ad salutem fidelium; +ideo convenientius Augustinus distinxit tria tempora. Unum quidem +ante Christi passionem, in quo legalia non erant neque mortifera +neque mortua. Aliud autem post tempus Evangelii divulgati, in quo +legalia sunt et mortua et mortifera. Tertium autem est tempus +medium, scilicet a passione Christi usque ad divulgationem +Evangelii, in quo legalia fuerunt quidem mortua, quia neque vim +aliquam habebant, neque aliquis ea observare tenebatur; non tamen +fuerunt mortifera, quia illi qui conversi erant ad Christum ex +Iudaeis, poterant illa legalia licite observare, dummodo non sic +ponerent spem in eis quod ea reputarent sibi necessaria ad salutem, +quasi sine legalibus fides Christi iustificare non posset. His +autem qui convertebantur ex gentilitate ad Christum, non inerat +causa ut ea observarent. Et ideo Paulus circumcidit Timotheum, qui +ex matre Iudaea genitus erat; Titum autem, qui ex gentilibus natus +erat, circumcidere noluit. Ideo autem noluit spiritus sanctus ut +statim inhiberetur his qui ex Iudaeis convertebantur observatio +legalium, sicut inhibebatur his qui ex gentilibus convertebantur +gentilitatis ritus, ut quaedam differentia inter hos ritus +ostenderetur. Nam gentilitatis ritus repudiabatur tanquam omnino +illicitus, et a Deo semper prohibitus, ritus autem legis cessabat +tanquam impletus per Christi passionem, utpote a Deo in figuram +Christi institutus.
+ Reply to Objection 2: According to Jerome, Peter withdrew himself from the Gentiles by pretense, in order to avoid giving scandal to the Jews, + of whom he was the Apostle. Hence he did not sin at all in acting thus. On the other hand, Paul in like manner made a pretense + of blaming him, in order to avoid scandalizing the Gentiles, whose Apostle he was. But Augustine disapproves of this solution: + because in the canonical Scripture (viz. + Gal. 2:11), + wherein we must not hold anything to be false, Paul says that Peter "was to be blamed." Consequently it is true that Peter + was at fault: and Paul blamed him in very truth and not with pretense. Peter, however, did not sin, by observing the legal + ceremonial for the time being; because this was lawful for him who was a converted Jew. But he did sin by excessive minuteness + in the observance of the legal rites lest he should scandalize the Jews, the result being that he gave scandal to the + Gentiles. +
[38140] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, secundum Hieronymum, Petrus simulatorie se a +gentilibus subtrahebat, ut vitaret Iudaeorum scandalum, quorum erat +apostolus. Unde in hoc nullo modo peccavit, sed Paulus eum +similiter simulatorie reprehendit, ut vitaret scandalum gentilium, +quorum erat apostolus. Sed Augustinus hoc improbat, quia Paulus in +canonica Scriptura, scilicet Gal. II, in qua nefas est credere +aliquid esse falsum, dicit quod Petrus reprehensibilis erat. Unde +verum est quod Petrus peccavit, et Paulus vere eum, non +simulatorie, reprehendit. Non autem peccavit Petrus in hoc quod ad +tempus legalia observabat, quia hoc sibi licebat, tanquam ex +Iudaeis converso. Sed peccabat in hoc quod circa legalium +observantiam nimiam diligentiam adhibebat ne scandalizaret Iudaeos, +ita quod ex hoc sequebatur gentilium scandalum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Some have held that this prohibition of the apostles is not to be taken literally, but spiritually: namely, that the prohibition + of blood signifies the prohibition of murder; the prohibition of things strangled, that of violence and rapine; the prohibition + of things offered to idols, that of idolatry; while fornication is forbidden as being evil in itself: which opinion they gathered + from certain glosses, which expound these prohibitions in a mystical + sense. Since, however, murder and rapine were held to be unlawful even by the Gentiles, there would have been no need to give + this special commandment to those who were converted to Christ from heathendom. Hence others maintain that those foods were + forbidden literally, not to prevent the observance of legal ceremonies, but in order to prevent gluttony. Thus Jerome says + on Ezech. 44:31 ("The priest shall not eat of anything that is dead"): "He condemns those priests who from gluttony did not + keep these precepts." +
But since certain foods are more delicate than these and more conducive to gluttony, there seems no reason why these should + have been forbidden more than the others. +
We must therefore follow the third opinion, and hold that these foods were forbidden literally, not with the purpose of enforcing + compliance with the legal ceremonies, but in order to further the union of Gentiles and Jews living side by side. Because + blood and things strangled were loathsome to the Jews by ancient custom; while the Jews might have suspected the Gentiles + of relapse into idolatry if the latter had partaken of things offered to idols. Hence these things were + prohibited for the time being, during which the Gentiles and Jews were to become united together. But as time went on, with + the lapse of the cause, the effect lapsed also, when the truth of the Gospel teaching was divulged, wherein Our Lord taught + that "not that which entereth into the mouth defileth a man" ( + Mat. 15:11); and that "nothing is to be rejected that is received with thanksgiving" ( + 1 Tim. 4:4). With regard to fornication a special prohibition + was made, because the Gentiles did not hold it to be sinful. +
[38141] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod illa prohibitio apostolorum non +est intelligenda ad litteram, sed secundum spiritualem intellectum, +ut scilicet in prohibitione sanguinis, intelligatur prohibitio +homicidii; in prohibitione suffocati, intelligatur prohibitio +violentiae et rapinae; in prohibitione immolatorum, intelligatur +prohibitio idololatriae; fornicatio autem prohibetur tanquam per se +malum. Et hanc opinionem accipiunt ex quibusdam Glossis, quae +huiusmodi praecepta mystice exponunt. Sed quia homicidium et rapina +etiam apud gentiles reputabantur illicita, non oportuisset super +hoc speciale mandatum dari his qui erant ex gentilitate conversi ad +Christum. Unde alii dicunt quod ad litteram illa comestibilia +fuerunt prohibita, non propter observantiam legalium, sed propter +gulam comprimendam. Unde dicit Hieronymus, super illud Ezech. XLIV, +omne morticinum etc., condemnat sacerdotes qui in turdis et +ceteris huiusmodi, haec, cupiditate gulae, non custodiunt. Sed +quia sunt quaedam cibaria magis delicata et gulam provocantia, non +videtur ratio quare fuerunt haec magis quam alia prohibita. Et ideo +dicendum, secundum tertiam opinionem, quod ad litteram ista sunt +prohibita, non ad observandum caeremonias legis, sed ad hoc quod +posset coalescere unio gentilium et Iudaeorum insimul habitantium. +Iudaeis enim, propter antiquam consuetudinem, sanguis et suffocatum +erant abominabilia, comestio autem immolatorum simulacris, poterat +in Iudaeis aggenerare circa gentiles suspicionem reditus ad +idololatriam. Et ideo ista fuerunt prohibita pro tempore illo, in +quo de novo oportebat convenire in unum gentiles et Iudaeos. +Procedente autem tempore, cessante causa, cessat effectus; +manifestata evangelicae doctrinae veritate, in qua dominus docet +quod nihil quod per os intrat, coinquinat hominem, ut dicitur +Matth. XV; et quod nihil est reiiciendum quod cum gratiarum +actione percipitur, ut I ad Tim. IV dicitur. Fornicatio autem +prohibetur specialiter, quia gentiles eam non reputabant esse +peccatum.
We must now consider the judicial precepts: and first of all we shall consider them in general; in the second place we shall + consider their reasons. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: +
(1) What is meant by the judicial precepts?
+[38142] Iª-IIae q. 104 pr. Consequenter +considerandum est de praeceptis iudicialibus. Et primo, +considerandum est de ipsis in communi; secundo, de rationibus +eorum. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, quae sint iudicialia +praecepta. Secundo, utrum sint figuralia. Tertio, de duratione +eorum. Quarto, de distinctione eorum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts were not those which directed man in his relations to his neighbor. For judicial + precepts take their name from "judgment." But there are many things that direct man as to his neighbor, which are not subordinate + to judgment. Therefore the judicial precepts were not those which directed man in his relations to his neighbor. +
[38143] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ratio praeceptorum iudicialium non +consistat in hoc quod sunt ordinantia ad proximum. Iudicialia enim +praecepta a iudicio dicuntur. Sed multa sunt alia quibus homo ad +proximum ordinatur, quae non pertinent ad ordinem iudiciorum. Non +ergo praecepta iudicialia dicuntur quibus homo ordinatur ad +proximum.
+ Objection 2: Further, the judicial precepts are distinct from the moral precepts, as stated above ( + Q[99], A[4]). But there are many moral precepts which direct man as to his neighbor: as is evidently the case with the seven precepts + of the second table. Therefore the judicial precepts are not so called from directing man as to his neighbor. +
[38144] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +praecepta iudicialia a moralibus distinguuntur, ut supra dictum +est. Sed multa praecepta moralia sunt quibus homo ordinatur ad +proximum, sicut patet in septem praeceptis secundae tabulae. Non +ergo praecepta iudicialia dicuntur ex hoc quod ad proximum +ordinant.
+ Objection 3: Further, as the ceremonial precepts relate to God, so do the judicial precepts relate to one's neighbor, as stated above + ( + Q[99], A[4]; + Q[101], A[1]). But among the ceremonial precepts there are some which concern man himself, such as observances in matter of food and apparel, + of which we have already spoken ( + Q[102], A[6], ad 1,6). Therefore the judicial precepts are not so called from + directing man as to his neighbor. +
[38145] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sicut se habent praecepta caeremonialia ad Deum, ita se habent +iudicialia praecepta ad proximum, ut supra dictum est. Sed inter +praecepta caeremonialia sunt quaedam quae pertinent ad seipsum, +sicut observantiae ciborum et vestimentorum, de quibus supra dictum +est. Ergo praecepta iudicialia non ex hoc dicuntur quod ordinent +hominem ad proximum.
+ On the contrary, It is reckoned ( + Ezech. 18:8) among other works of a good and just man, that "he hath executed true judgment between man and man." But judicial precepts + are so called from "judgment." Therefore it seems that the judicial precepts were those which directed the relations between + man and man. +
[38146] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Ezech. XVIII, inter cetera bona opera viri iusti, +si iudicium verum fecerit inter virum et virum. Sed +iudicialia praecepta a iudicio dicuntur. Ergo praecepta iudicialia +videntur dici illa quae pertinent ad ordinationem hominum ad +invicem.
+ I answer that, As is evident from what we have stated above ( + Q[95], A[2] ; + Q[99], A[4]), in every law, some precepts derive their binding force from the dictate of reason itself, because natural reason dictates + that something ought to be done or to be avoided. These are called "moral" precepts: since human morals are based on reason. + At the same time there are other precepts which derive their binding force, not from the + very dictate of reason (because, considered in themselves, they do not imply an obligation of something due or undue); but + from some institution, Divine or human: and such are certain determinations of the moral precepts. When therefore the moral + precepts are fixed by Divine institution in matters relating to man's subordination to God, they are called "ceremonial" precepts: + but when they refer to man's relations to other men, they are called "judicial" precepts. Hence there are two conditions + attached to the judicial precepts: viz. first, that they refer to man's relations to other men; secondly, that they derive + their binding force not from reason alone, but in virtue of their institution. +
[38147] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ex supradictis patet, praeceptorum cuiuscumque +legis quaedam habent vim obligandi ex ipso dictamine rationis, quia +naturalis ratio dictat hoc esse debitum fieri vel vitari. Et +huiusmodi praecepta dicuntur moralia, eo quod a ratione dicuntur +mores humani. Alia vero praecepta sunt quae non habent vim +obligandi ex ipso dictamine rationis, quia scilicet in se +considerata non habent absolute rationem debiti vel indebiti; sed +habent vim obligandi ex aliqua institutione divina vel humana. Et +huiusmodi sunt determinationes quaedam moralium praeceptorum. Si +igitur determinentur moralia praecepta per institutionem divinam in +his per quae ordinatur homo ad Deum, talia dicentur praecepta +caeremonialia. Si autem in his quae pertinent ad ordinationem +hominum ad invicem, talia dicentur praecepta iudicialia. In duobus +ergo consistit ratio iudicialium praeceptorum, scilicet ut +pertineant ad ordinationem hominum ad invicem; et ut non habeant +vim obligandi ex sola ratione, sed ex institutione.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Judgments emanate through the official pronouncement of certain men who are at the head of affairs, and in whom the judicial + power is vested. Now it belongs to those who are at the head of affairs to regulate not only litigious matters, but also voluntary + contracts which are concluded between man and man, and whatever matters concern the community at large and the government + thereof. Consequently the judicial precepts are not only those which concern + actions at law; but also all those that are directed to the ordering of one man in relation to another, which ordering is + subject to the direction of the sovereign as supreme judge. +
[38148] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod iudicia exercentur officio aliquorum principum, +qui habent potestatem iudicandi. Ad principem autem pertinet non +solum ordinare de his quae veniunt in litigium, sed etiam de +voluntariis contractibus qui inter homines fiunt, et de omnibus +pertinentibus ad populi communitatem et regimen. Unde praecepta +iudicialia non solum sunt illa quae pertinent ad lites iudiciorum; +sed etiam quaecumque pertinent ad ordinationem hominum ad invicem, +quae subest ordinationi principis tanquam supremi iudicis.
+ Reply to Objection 2: This argument holds in respect of those precepts which direct man in his relations to his neighbor, and derive their binding + force from the mere dictate of reason. +
[38149] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de illis praeceptis ordinantibus +ad proximum, quae habent vim obligandi ex solo dictamine +rationis.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Even in those precepts which direct us to God, some are moral precepts, which the reason itself dictates when it is quickened + by faith; such as that God is to be loved and worshipped. There are also ceremonial precepts, which have no binding force + except in virtue of their Divine institution. Now God is concerned not only with the sacrifices that are offered to Him, but + also with whatever relates to the fitness of those who offer sacrifices to Him and + worship Him. Because men are ordained to God as to their end; wherefore it concerns God and, consequently, is a matter of + ceremonial precept, that man should show some fitness for the divine worship. On the other hand, man is not ordained to his + neighbor as to his end, so as to need to be disposed in himself with regard to his neighbor, for such is the relationship + of a slave to his master, since a slave "is his master's in all that he is," as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2). Hence + there are + no judicial precepts ordaining man in himself; all such precepts are moral: because the reason, which is the principal in + moral matters, holds the same position, in man, with regard to things that concern him, as a prince or judge holds in the + state. Nevertheless we must take note that, since the relations of man to his neighbor are more subject to reason than the + relations of man to God, there are more precepts whereby man is directed in his relations to his neighbor, than whereby he + is + directed to God. For the same reason there had to be more ceremonial than judicial precepts in the Law. +
[38150] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod etiam in his quae ordinant ad Deum, quaedam sunt +moralia, quae ipsa ratio fide informata dictat, sicut Deum esse +amandum et colendum. Quaedam vero sunt caeremonialia, quae non +habent vim obligationis nisi ex institutione divina. Ad Deum autem +pertinent non solum sacrificia oblata Deo, sed etiam quaecumque +pertinent ad idoneitatem offerentium et Deum colentium. Homines +enim ordinantur in Deum sicut in finem, et ideo ad cultum Dei +pertinet, et per consequens ad caeremonialia praecepta, quod homo +habeat quandam idoneitatem respectu cultus divini. Sed homo non +ordinatur ad proximum sicut in finem, ut oporteat eum disponi in +seipso in ordine ad proximum, haec enim est comparatio servorum ad +dominos, qui id quod sunt, dominorum sunt, secundum +philosophum, in I Polit. Et ideo non sunt aliqua praecepta +iudicialia ordinantia hominem in seipso, sed omnia talia sunt +moralia, quia ratio, quae est principium moralium, se habet in +homine respectu eorum quae ad ipsum pertinent, sicut princeps vel +iudex in civitate. Sciendum tamen quod, quia ordo hominis ad +proximum magis subiacet rationi quam ordo hominis ad Deum, plura +praecepta moralia inveniuntur per quae ordinatur homo ad proximum, +quam per quae ordinatur ad Deum. Et propter hoc etiam oportuit +plura esse caeremonialia in lege quam iudicialia.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts were not figurative. Because it seems proper to the ceremonial precepts to be instituted + as figures of something else. Therefore, if the judicial precepts are figurative, there will be no difference between the + judicial and ceremonial precepts. +
[38151] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad +secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praecepta iudicialia non +figurent aliquid. Hoc enim videtur esse proprium caeremonialium +praeceptorum, quod sint in figuram alicuius rei instituta. Si +igitur etiam praecepta iudicialia aliquid figurent, non erit +differentia inter iudicialia et caeremonialia praecepta.
+ Objection 2: Further, just as certain judicial precepts were given to the Jewish people, so also were some given to other heathen peoples. + But the judicial precepts given to other peoples were not figurative, but stated what had to be done. Therefore it seems that + neither were the judicial precepts of the Old Law figures of anything. +
[38152] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +sicuti illi populo Iudaeorum data sunt quaedam iudicialia +praecepta, ita etiam aliis populis gentilium. Sed iudicialia +praecepta aliorum populorum non figurant aliquid, sed ordinant quid +fieri debeat. Ergo videtur quod neque praecepta iudicialia veteris +legis aliquid figurarent.
+ Objection 3: Further, those things which relate to the divine worship had to be taught under certain figures, because the things of God + are above our reason, as stated above ( + Q[101], A[2], ad 2). But things concerning our neighbor are not above our reason. Therefore the judicial precepts which direct us in relation + to our neighbor should not have been figurative. +
[38153] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +ea quae ad cultum divinum pertinent, figuris quibusdam tradi +oportuit, quia ea quae Dei sunt, supra nostram rationem sunt, ut +supra dictum est. Sed ea quae sunt proximorum, non excedunt nostram +rationem. Ergo per iudicialia, quae ad proximum nos ordinant, non +oportuit aliquid figurari.
+ On the contrary, The judicial precepts are expounded both in the allegorical and in the moral sense ( + Ex. 21). +
[38154] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Exod. XXI iudicialia praecepta allegorice et moraliter +exponuntur.
+ I answer that, A precept may be figurative in two ways. First, primarily and in itself: because, to wit, it is instituted principally that + it may be the figure of something. In this way the ceremonial precepts are figurative; since they were instituted for the + very purpose that they might foreshadow something relating to the worship of God and the mystery of Christ. But some precepts + are figurative, not primarily and in themselves, but consequently. In this way the + judicial precepts of the Old Law are figurative. For they were not instituted for the purpose of being figurative, but in + order that they might regulate the state of that people according to justice and equity. Nevertheless they did foreshadow + something consequently: since, to wit, the entire state of that people, who were directed by these precepts, was figurative, + according to + 1 Cor. 10:11: "All . . . things happened to them in figure." +
[38155] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod dupliciter contingit aliquod praeceptum esse +figurale. Uno modo, primo et per se, quia scilicet principaliter +est institutum ad aliquid figurandum. Et hoc modo praecepta +caeremonialia sunt figuralia, ad hoc enim sunt instituta, ut +aliquid figurent pertinens ad cultum Dei et ad mysterium Christi. +Quaedam vero praecepta sunt figuralia non primo et per se, sed ex +consequenti. Et hoc modo praecepta iudicialia veteris legis sunt +figuralia. Non enim sunt instituta ad aliquid figurandum; sed ad +ordinandum statum illius populi secundum iustitiam et aequitatem. +Sed ex consequenti aliquid figurabant, inquantum scilicet totus +status illius populi, qui per huiusmodi praecepta disponebatur, +figuralis erat; secundum illud I ad Cor. X, omnia in figuram +contingebant illis.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The ceremonial precepts are not figurative in the same way as the judicial precepts, as explained above. +
[38156] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod praecepta caeremonialia alio modo sunt figuralia +quam iudicialia, ut dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The Jewish people were chosen by God that Christ might be born of them. Consequently the entire state of that people had + to be prophetic and figurative, as Augustine states (Contra Faust. xxii, 24). For this reason even the judicial precepts that + were given to this people were more figurative that those which were given to other nations. Thus, too, the wars and deeds + of this people are expounded in the mystical sense: but not the wars and deeds of the + Assyrians or Romans, although the latter are more famous in the eyes of men. +
[38157] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod populus Iudaeorum ad hoc electus erat a Deo, quod ex +eo Christus nasceretur. Et ideo oportuit totum illius populi statum +esse propheticum et figuralem, ut Augustinus dicit, contra Faustum. +Et propter hoc etiam iudicialia illi populo tradita, magis sunt +figuralia quam iudicialia aliis populis tradita. Sicut etiam bella +et gesta illius populi exponuntur mystice; non autem bella vel +gesta Assyriorum vel Romanorum, quamvis longe clariora secundum +homines.
+ Reply to Objection 3: In this people the direction of man in regard to his neighbor, considered in itself, was subject to reason. But in so far + as it was referred to the worship of God, it was above reason: and in this respect it was figurative. +
[38158] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ordo ad proximum in populo illo, secundum se +consideratus, pervius erat rationi. Sed secundum quod referebatur +ad cultum Dei, superabat rationem. Et ex hac parte erat +figuralis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts of the Old Law bind for ever. Because the judicial precepts relate to the virtue + of justice: since a judgment is an execution of the virtue of justice. Now "justice is perpetual and immortal" ( + Wis. 1:15). Therefore the judicial precepts bind for ever. +
[38159] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod praecepta iudicialia veteris legis +perpetuam obligationem habeant. Praecepta enim iudicialia pertinent +ad virtutem iustitiae, nam iudicium dicitur iustitiae executio. +Iustitia autem est perpetua et immortalis, ut dicitur Sap. I. Ergo +obligatio praeceptorum iudicialium est perpetua.
+ Objection 2: Further, Divine institutions are more enduring than human institutions. But the judicial precepts of human laws bind for + ever. Therefore much more do the judicial precepts of the Divine Law. +
[38160] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +institutio divina est stabilior quam institutio humana. Sed +praecepta iudicialia humanarum legum habent perpetuam obligationem. +Ergo multo magis praecepta iudicialia legis divinae.
+ Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says ( + Heb. 7:18) that "there is a setting aside of the former commandment, because of the weakness and unprofitableness thereof." Now this + is true of the ceremonial precept, which "could [Vulg.: 'can'] not, as to the conscience, make him perfect that serveth only + in meats and in drinks, and divers washings and justices of the flesh," as the Apostle declares ( + Heb. 9:9,10). On the other hand, the + judicial precepts were useful and efficacious in respect of the purpose for which they were instituted, viz. to establish + justice and equity among men. Therefore the judicial precepts of the Old Law are not set aside, but still retain their efficacy. +
[38161] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +apostolus dicit, ad Heb. VII, quod reprobatio fit praecedentis +mandati propter infirmitatem ipsius et inutilitatem. Quod +quidem verum est de mandato caeremoniali quod non poterat facere +perfectum iuxta conscientiam servientem solummodo in cibis et in +potibus et variis Baptismatibus et iustitiis carnis, ut +apostolus dicit, ad Heb. IX. Sed praecepta iudicialia utilia erant +et efficacia ad id ad quod ordinabantur, scilicet ad iustitiam et +aequitatem inter homines constituendam. Ergo praecepta iudicialia +veteris legis non reprobantur, sed adhuc efficaciam habent.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle says ( + Heb. 7:12) that "the priesthood being translated it is necessary that a translation also be made of the Law." But the priesthood was + transferred from Aaron to Christ. Therefore the entire Law was also transferred. Therefore the judicial precepts are no longer + in force. +
[38162] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Heb. VII, quod translato +sacerdotio, necesse est ut legis translatio fiat. Sed +sacerdotium est translatum ab Aaron ad Christum. Ergo etiam et tota +lex est translata. Non ergo iudicialia praecepta adhuc obligationem +habent.
+ I answer that, The judicial precepts did not bind for ever, but were annulled by the coming of Christ: yet not in the same way as the ceremonial + precepts. For the ceremonial precepts were annulled so far as to be not only "dead," but also deadly to those who observe + them since the coming of Christ, especially since the promulgation of the Gospel. On the other hand, the judicial precepts + are dead indeed, because they have no binding force: but they are not deadly. For if a + sovereign were to order these judicial precepts to be observed in his kingdom, he would not sin: unless perchance they were + observed, or ordered to be observed, as though they derived their binding force through being institutions of the Old Law: + for it would be a deadly sin to intend to observe them thus. +
The reason for this difference may be gathered from what has been said above + (A[2]). For it has been stated that the ceremonial precepts are figurative primarily and in themselves, as being instituted chiefly + for the purpose of foreshadowing the mysteries of Christ to come. On the other hand, the judicial precepts were not instituted + that they might be figures, but that they might shape the state of that people who were directed to Christ. Consequently, + when the state of that people changed with the coming of Christ, the judicial precepts lost their binding force: for the Law + was a pedagogue, leading men to Christ, as stated in + Gal. 3:24. Since, however, these judicial precepts are instituted, not for the purpose of being figures, but for the performance of + certain deeds, the observance thereof is not prejudicial to the truth of faith. But the intention of observing them, as though + one were bound by the Law, is + prejudicial to the truth of faith: because it would follow that the former state of the people still lasts, and that Christ + has not yet come. +
[38163] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod iudicialia praecepta non habuerunt perpetuam +obligationem, sed sunt evacuata per adventum Christi, aliter tamen +quam caeremonialia. Nam caeremonialia adeo sunt evacuata ut non +solum sint mortua, sed etiam mortifera observantibus post Christum, +maxime post Evangelium divulgatum. Praecepta autem iudicialia sunt +quidem mortua, quia non habent vim obligandi, non tamen sunt +mortifera. Quia si quis princeps ordinaret in regno suo illa +iudicialia observari, non peccaret, nisi forte hoc modo +observarentur, vel observari mandarentur, tanquam habentia vim +obligandi ex veteris legis institutione. Talis enim intentio +observandi esset mortifera. Et huius differentiae ratio potest +accipi ex praemissis. Dictum est enim quod praecepta caeremonialia +sunt figuralia primo et per se, tanquam instituta principaliter ad +figurandum Christi mysteria ut futura. Et ideo ipsa observatio +eorum praeiudicat fidei veritati, secundum quam confitemur illa +mysteria iam esse completa. Praecepta autem iudicialia non sunt +instituta ad figurandum, sed ad disponendum statum illius populi, +qui ordinabatur ad Christum. Et ideo, mutato statu illius populi, +Christo iam veniente, iudicialia praecepta obligationem amiserunt, +lex enim fuit paedagogus ducens ad Christum, ut dicitur ad Gal. +III. Quia tamen huiusmodi iudicialia praecepta non ordinantur ad +figurandum, sed ad aliquid fiendum, ipsa eorum observatio absolute +non praeiudicat fidei veritati. Sed intentio observandi tanquam ex +obligatione legis, praeiudicat veritati fidei, quia per hoc +haberetur quod status prioris populi adhuc duraret, et quod +Christus nondum venisset.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The obligation of observing justice is indeed perpetual. But the determination of those things that are just, according to + human or Divine institution, must needs be different, according to the different states of mankind. +
[38164] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod iustitia quidem perpetuo est observanda. Sed +determinatio eorum quae sunt iusta secundum institutionem humanam +vel divinam, oportet quod varietur secundum diversum hominum +statum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The judicial precepts established by men retain their binding force for ever, so long as the state of government remains + the same. But if the state or nation pass to another form of government, the laws must needs be changed. For democracy, which + is government by the people, demands different laws from those of oligarchy, which is government by the rich, as the Philosopher + shows (Polit. iv, 1). Consequently when the state of that people changed, the + judicial precepts had to be changed also. +
[38165] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod praecepta iudicialia ab hominibus instituta habent +perpetuam obligationem, manente illo statu regiminis. Sed si +civitas vel gens ad aliud regimen deveniat, oportet leges mutari. +Non enim eaedem leges conveniunt in democratia, quae est potestas +populi, et in oligarchia, quae est potestas divitum; ut patet per +philosophum, in sua politica. Et ideo etiam, mutato statu illius +populi, oportuit praecepta iudicialia mutari.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Those judicial precepts directed the people to justice and equity, in keeping with the demands of that state. But after the + coming of Christ, there had to be a change in the state of that people, so that in Christ there was no distinction between + Gentile and Jew, as there had been before. For this reason the judicial precepts needed to be changed also. +
[38166] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod illa praecepta iudicialia disponebant populum ad +iustitiam et aequitatem secundum quod conveniebat illi statui. Sed +post Christum, statum illius populi oportuit mutari, ut iam in +Christo non esset discretio gentilis et Iudaei, sicut antea erat. +Et propter hoc oportuit etiam praecepta iudicialia mutari.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that it is impossible to assign a distinct division of the judicial precepts. Because the judicial precepts + direct men in their relations to one another. But those things which need to be directed, as pertaining to the relationship + between man and man, and which are made use of by men, are not subject to division, since they are infinite in number. Therefore + it is not possible to assign a distinct division of the judicial precepts. +
[38167] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod praecepta iudicialia non possint +habere aliquam certam divisionem. Praecepta enim iudicialia +ordinant homines ad invicem. Sed ea quae inter homines ordinari +oportet, in usum eorum venientia, non cadunt sub certa +distinctione, cum sint infinita. Ergo praecepta iudicialia non +possunt habere certam distinctionem.
+ Objection 2: Further, the judicial precepts are decisions on moral matters. But moral precepts do not seem to be capable of division, + except in so far as they are reducible to the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore there is no distinct division of the judicial + precepts. +
[38168] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +praecepta iudicialia sunt determinationes moralium. Sed moralia +praecepta non videntur habere aliquam distinctionem, nisi secundum +quod reducuntur ad praecepta Decalogi. Ergo praecepta iudicialia +non habent aliquam certam distinctionem.
+ Objection 3: Further, because there is a distinct division of the ceremonial precepts, the Law alludes to this division, by describing + some as "sacrifices," others as "observances." But the Law contains no allusion to a division of the judicial precepts. Therefore + it seems that they have no distinct division. +
[38169] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +praecepta caeremonialia quia certam distinctionem habent, eorum +distinctio in lege innuitur, dum quaedam vocantur sacrificia, +quaedam observantiae. Sed nulla distinctio innuitur in lege +praeceptorum iudicialium. Ergo videtur quod non habeant certam +distinctionem.
+ On the contrary, Wherever there is order there must needs be division. But the notion of order is chiefly applicable to the judicial precepts, + since thereby that people was ordained. Therefore it is most necessary that they should have a distinct division. +
[38170] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra, +ubi est ordo, oportet quod sit distinctio. Sed ratio ordinis maxime +pertinet ad praecepta iudicialia, per quae populus ille +ordinabatur. Ergo maxime debent habere distinctionem certam.
+ I answer that, Since law is the art, as it were, of directing or ordering the life of man, as in every art there is a distinct division + in the rules of art, so, in every law, there must be a distinct division of precepts: else the law would be rendered useless + by confusion. We must therefore say that the judicial precepts of the Old Law, whereby men were directed in their relations + to one another, are subject to division according to the divers ways in which man is + directed. +
Now in every people a fourfold order is to be found: one, of the people's sovereign to his subjects; a second of the subjects + among themselves; a third, of the citizens to foreigners; a fourth, of members of the same household, such as the order of + the father to his son; of the wife to her husband; of the master to his servant: and according to these four orders we may + distinguish different kinds of judicial precepts in the Old Law. For certain precepts are laid down concerning + the institution of the sovereign and relating to his office, and about the respect due to him: this is one part of the judicial + precepts. Again, certain precepts are given in respect of a man to his fellow citizens: for instance, about buying and selling, + judgments and penalties: this is the second part of the judicial precepts. Again, certain precepts are enjoined with regard + to foreigners: for instance, about wars waged against their foes, and about the way to receive travelers and strangers: + this is the third part of the judicial precepts. Lastly, certain precepts are given relating to home life: for instance, about + servants, wives and children: this is the fourth part of the judicial precepts. +
[38171] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, cum lex sit quasi quaedam ars humanae vitae +instituendae vel ordinandae, sicut in unaquaque arte est certa +distinctio regularum artis, ita oportet in qualibet lege esse +certam distinctionem praeceptorum, aliter enim ipsa confusio +utilitatem legis auferret. Et ideo dicendum est quod praecepta +iudicialia veteris legis, per quae homines ad invicem ordinabantur, +distinctionem habent secundum distinctionem ordinationis humanae. +Quadruplex autem ordo in aliquo populo inveniri potest, unus +quidem, principum populi ad subditos; alius autem, subditorum ad +invicem; tertius autem, eorum qui sunt de populo ad extraneos; +quartus autem, ad domesticos, sicut patris ad filium, uxoris ad +virum, et domini ad servum. Et secundum istos quatuor ordines +distingui possunt praecepta iudicialia veteris legis. Dantur enim +quaedam praecepta de institutione principum et officio eorum, et de +reverentia eis exhibenda, et haec est una pars iudicialium +praeceptorum. Dantur etiam quaedam praecepta pertinentia ad +concives ad invicem, puta circa emptiones et venditiones, et +iudicia et poenas. Et haec est secunda pars iudicialium +praeceptorum. Dantur etiam quaedam praecepta pertinentia ad +extraneos, puta de bellis contra hostes, et de susceptione +peregrinorum et advenarum. Et haec est tertia pars iudicialium +praeceptorum. Dantur etiam in lege quaedam praecepta pertinentia ad +domesticam conversationem, sicut de servis, et uxoribus, et filiis. +Et haec est quarta pars iudicialium praeceptorum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Things pertaining to the ordering of relations between one man and another are indeed infinite in number: yet they are reducible + to certain distinct heads, according to the different relations in which one man stands to another, as stated above. +
[38172] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ea quae pertinent ad ordinationem hominum ad +invicem, sunt quidem numero infinita; sed tamen reduci possunt ad +aliqua certa, secundum differentiam ordinationis humanae, ut dictum +est.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The precepts of the decalogue held the first place in the moral order, as stated above ( + Q[100], A[3]): and consequently it is fitting that other moral precepts should be distinguished in relation to them. But the judicial + and ceremonial precepts have a different binding force, derived, not from natural reason, but from their institution alone. + Hence there is a distinct reason for distinguishing them. +
[38173] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod praecepta Decalogi sunt prima in genere moralium, ut +supra dictum est, et ideo convenienter alia praecepta moralia +secundum ea distinguuntur. Sed praecepta iudicialia et +caeremonialia habent aliam rationem obligationis non quidem ex +ratione naturali sed ex sola institutione. Et ideo distinctionis +eorum est alia ratio.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The Law alludes to the division of the judicial precepts in the very things themselves which are prescribed by the judicial + precepts of the Law. +
[38174] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ex ipsis rebus quae per praecepta iudicialia +ordinantur in lege, innuit lex distinctionem iudicialium +praeceptorum.
We must now consider the reason for the judicial precepts: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Concerning the reason for the judicial precepts relating to the rulers;
(2) Concerning the fellowship of one man with another;
+[38175] Iª-IIae q. 105 pr. Deinde +considerandum est de ratione iudicialium praeceptorum. Et circa hoc +quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, de ratione praeceptorum iudicialium quae +pertinent ad principes. Secundo, de his quae pertinent ad convictum +hominum ad invicem. Tertio, de his quae pertinent ad extraneos. +Quarto, de his quae pertinent ad domesticam conversationem.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law made unfitting precepts concerning rulers. Because, as the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 4), + "the ordering of the people depends mostly on the chief ruler." But the Law contains no precept relating to the institution + of the chief ruler; and yet we find therein prescriptions concerning the inferior rulers: firstly ( + Ex. 18:21): "Provide out of all the people wise [Vulg.: 'able'] men," etc.; again ( + Num. 11:16): + "Gather unto Me seventy men of the ancients of Israel"; and again ( + Dt. 1:13): "Let Me have from among you wise and understanding men," etc. Therefore the Law provided insufficiently in regard to the + rulers of the people. +
[38176] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter lex vetus de +principibus ordinaverit. Quia, ut philosophus dicit, in III Polit., +ordinatio populi praecipue dependet ex maximo principatu. +Sed in lege non invenitur qualiter debeat institui supremus +princeps. Invenitur autem de inferioribus principibus, primo +quidem, Exod. XVIII, provide de omni plebe viros sapientes, etc.; +et Num. XI, congrega mihi septuaginta viros de senioribus Israel; +et Deut. I, date ex vobis viros sapientes et gnaros, et cetera. +Ergo insufficienter lex vetus principes populi ordinavit.
+ Objection 2: Further, "The best gives of the best," as Plato states (Tim. ii). Now the best ordering of a state or of any nation is to + be ruled by a king: because this kind of government approaches nearest in resemblance to the Divine government, whereby God + rules the world from the beginning. Therefore the Law should have set a king over the people, and they should not have been + allowed a choice in the matter, as indeed they were allowed ( + Dt. + 17:14,15 + ): "When thou . . . shalt say: I will set a king over me . . . thou shalt set him," etc. +
[38177] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +optimi est optima adducere, ut Plato dicit. Sed optima ordinatio +civitatis vel populi cuiuscumque est ut gubernetur per regem, quia +huiusmodi regimen maxime repraesentat divinum regimen, quo unus +Deus mundum gubernat. A principio igitur lex debuit regem populo +instituere; et non permittere hoc eorum arbitrio, sicut permittitur +Deut. XVII, cum dixeris, constituam super me regem, eum +constitues, et cetera.
+ Objection 3: Further, according to + Mat. 12:25: "Every kingdom divided against itself shall be made desolate": a saying which was verified in the Jewish people, whose destruction + was brought about by the division of the kingdom. But the Law should aim chiefly at things pertaining to the general well-being + of the people. Therefore it should have forbidden the kingdom to be divided under two kings: nor should this have been introduced + even by Divine + authority; as we read of its being introduced by the authority of the prophet Ahias the Silonite ( + 3 Kings 11:29, seqq.). +
[38178] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sicut dicitur Matth. XII, omne regnum in se divisum desolabitur, +quod etiam experimento patuit in populo Iudaeorum, in quo divisio +regni fuit destructionis causa. Sed lex praecipue debet intendere +ea quae pertinent ad communem salutem populi. Ergo debuit in lege +prohiberi divisio regni in duos reges. Nec etiam debuit hoc +auctoritate divina introduci; sicut legitur introductum auctoritate +domini per Ahiam Silonitem prophetam, III Reg. XI.
+ Objection 4: Further, just as priests are instituted for the benefit of the people in things concerning God, as stated in + Heb. 5:1; so are rulers set up for the benefit of the people in human affairs. But certain things were allotted as a means of livelihood + for the priests and Levites of the Law: such as the tithes and first-fruits, and many like things. Therefore in like manner + certain things should have been determined for the livelihood of the + rulers of the people: the more that they were forbidden to accept presents, as is clearly stated in + Ex. 23:8: "You shall not [Vulg.: 'Neither shalt thou'] take bribes, which even blind the wise, and pervert the words of the just." +
[38179] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, +sicut sacerdotes instituuntur ad utilitatem populi in his quae ad +Deum pertinent, ut patet Heb. V; ita etiam principes instituuntur +ad utilitatem populi in rebus humanis. Sed sacerdotibus et Levitis +qui sunt in lege, deputantur aliqua ex quibus vivere debeant, sicut +decimae et primitiae, et multa alia huiusmodi. Ergo similiter +principibus populi debuerunt aliqua ordinari unde sustentarentur, +et praecipue cum inhibita sit eis munerum acceptio, ut patet Exod. +XXIII, non accipietis munera, quae excaecant etiam prudentes, et +subvertunt verba iustorum.
+ Objection 5: Further, as a kingdom is the best form of government, so is tyranny the most corrupt. But when the Lord appointed the king, + He established a tyrannical law; for it is written ( + 1 Kings 8:11): "This will be the right of the king, that shall reign over you: He will take your sons," etc. Therefore the Law made unfitting + provision with regard to the institution of rulers. +
[38180] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 1 arg. 5 Praeterea, +sicut regnum est optimum regimen, ita tyrannis est pessima +corruptio regiminis. Sed dominus regi instituendo instituit ius +tyrannicum, dicitur enim I Reg. VIII, hoc erit ius regis qui +imperaturus est vobis, filios vestros tollet, et cetera. Ergo +inconvenienter fuit provisum per legem circa principum +ordinationem.
+ On the contrary, The people of Israel is commended for the beauty of its order ( + Num. 24:5): "How beautiful are thy tabernacles, O Jacob, and thy tents." But the beautiful ordering of a people depends on the right + establishment of its rulers. Therefore the Law made right provision for the people with regard to its rulers. +
[38181] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod populus Israel de pulchritudine ordinationis commendatur, +Num. XXIV, quam pulchra tabernacula tua, Iacob; et tentoria tua, +Israel. Sed pulchritudo ordinationis populi dependet ex +principibus bene institutis. Ergo per legem populus fuit circa +principes bene institutus.
+ I answer that, Two points are to be observed concerning the right ordering of rulers in a state or nation. One is that all should take some + share in the government: for this form of constitution ensures peace among the people, commends itself to all, and is most + enduring, as stated in Polit. ii, 6. The other point is to be observed in respect of the kinds of government, or the different + ways in which the constitutions are established. For whereas these differ in kind, as + the Philosopher states (Polit. iii, 5), nevertheless the first place is held by the "kingdom," where the power of government + is vested in one; and "aristocracy," which signifies government by the best, where the power of government is vested in a + few. Accordingly, the best form of government is in a state or kingdom, where one is given the power to preside over all; + while under him are others having governing powers: and yet a government of this kind is shared by all, both because all are + eligible to govern, and because the rules are chosen by all. For this is the best form of polity, being partly kingdom, since + there is one at the head of all; partly aristocracy, in so far as a number of persons are set in authority; partly democracy, + i.e. government by the people, in so far as the rulers can be chosen from the people, and the people have the right to choose + their rulers. +
Such was the form of government established by the Divine Law. For Moses and his successors governed the people in such a + way that each of them was ruler over all; so that there was a kind of kingdom. Moreover, seventy-two men were chosen, who + were elders in virtue: for it is written ( + Dt. 1:15): "I took out of your tribes wise and honorable, and appointed them rulers": so that there was an element of aristocracy. + But it was a democratical government in so + far as the rulers were chosen from all the people; for it is written ( + Ex. 18:21): "Provide out of all the people wise [Vulg.: 'able'] men," etc.; and, again, in so far as they were chosen by the people; + wherefore it is written ( + Dt. 1:13): "Let me have from among you wise [Vulg.: 'able'] men," etc. Consequently it is evident that the ordering of the rulers + was well provided for by the Law. +
[38182] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod circa bonam ordinationem principum in aliqua civitate +vel gente, duo sunt attendenda. Quorum unum est ut omnes aliquam +partem habeant in principatu, per hoc enim conservatur pax populi, +et omnes talem ordinationem amant et custodiunt, ut dicitur in II +Polit. Aliud est quod attenditur secundum speciem regiminis, vel +ordinationis principatuum. Cuius cum sint diversae species, ut +philosophus tradit, in III Polit., praecipuae tamen sunt regnum, in +quo unus principatur secundum virtutem; et aristocratia, idest +potestas optimorum, in qua aliqui pauci principantur secundum +virtutem. Unde optima ordinatio principum est in aliqua civitate +vel regno, in qua unus praeficitur secundum virtutem qui omnibus +praesit; et sub ipso sunt aliqui principantes secundum virtutem; et +tamen talis principatus ad omnes pertinet, tum quia ex omnibus +eligi possunt, tum quia etiam ab omnibus eliguntur. Talis enim est +optima politia, bene commixta ex regno, inquantum unus praeest; et +aristocratia, inquantum multi principantur secundum virtutem; et ex +democratia, idest potestate populi, inquantum ex popularibus +possunt eligi principes, et ad populum pertinet electio principum. +Et hoc fuit institutum secundum legem divinam. Nam Moyses et eius +successores gubernabant populum quasi singulariter omnibus +principantes, quod est quaedam species regni. Eligebantur autem +septuaginta duo seniores secundum virtutem, dicitur enim Deut. I, +tuli de vestris tribubus viros sapientes et nobiles, et +constitui eos principes, et hoc erat aristocraticum. Sed +democraticum erat quod isti de omni populo eligebantur; dicitur +enim Exod. XVIII, provide de omni plebe viros sapientes, +etc., et etiam quod populus eos eligebat; unde dicitur Deut. I, +date ex vobis viros sapientes, et cetera. Unde patet quod optima +fuit ordinatio principum quam lex instituit.
+ Reply to Objection 1: This people was governed under the special care of God: wherefore it is written ( + Dt. 7:6): "The Lord thy God hath chosen thee to be His peculiar people": and this is why the Lord reserved to Himself the institution + of the chief ruler. For this too did Moses pray ( + Num. 27:16): "May the Lord the God of the spirits of all the flesh provide a man, that may be over this multitude." Thus by God's orders + Josue was + set at the head in place of Moses; and we read about each of the judges who succeeded Josue that God "raised . . . up a saviour" + for the people, and that "the spirit of the Lord was" in them ( + Judges 3:9, + 10, + 15). Hence the Lord did not leave the choice of a king to the people; but reserved this to Himself, as appears from + Dt. 17:15: "Thou shalt set him whom the Lord thy God shall choose." +
[38183] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod populus ille sub speciali cura Dei regebatur, +unde dicitur Deut. VII, te elegit dominus Deus tuus ut sis ei +populus peculiaris. Et ideo institutionem summi principis +dominus sibi reservavit. Et hoc est quod Moyses petivit, Num. +XXVII, provideat dominus Deus spirituum omnis carnis, hominem +qui sit super multitudinem hanc. Et sic ex Dei ordinatione +institutus est Iosue in principatu post Moysen, et de singulis +iudicibus qui post Iosue fuerunt, legitur quod Deus suscitavit +populo salvatorem, et quod spiritus domini fuit in eis, ut patet +Iudic. III. Et ideo etiam electionem regis non commisit dominus +populo, sed sibi reservavit; ut patet Deut. XVII, eum constitues +regem, quem dominus Deus tuus elegerit.
+ Reply to Objection 2: A kingdom is the best form of government of the people, so long as it is not corrupt. But since the power granted to a king + is so great, it easily degenerates into tyranny, unless he to whom this power is given be a very virtuous man: for it is only + the virtuous man that conducts himself well in the midst of prosperity, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 3). Now perfect + virtue is to be found in few: and especially were the Jews inclined to + cruelty and avarice, which vices above all turn men into tyrants. Hence from the very first the Lord did not set up the kingly + authority with full power, but gave them judges and governors to rule them. But afterwards when the people asked Him to do + so, being indignant with them, so to speak, He granted them a king, as is clear from His words to Samuel ( + 1 Kings 8:7): "They have not rejected thee, but Me, that I should not reign over them." +
Nevertheless, as regards the appointment of a king, He did establish the manner of election from the very beginning ( + Dt. 17:14, seqq.): and then He determined two points: first, that in choosing a king they should wait for the Lord's decision; and that + they should not make a man of another nation king, because such kings are wont to take little interest in the people they + are set over, and consequently to have no care for their welfare: secondly, He + prescribed how the king after his appointment should behave, in regard to himself; namely, that he should not accumulate chariots + and horses, nor wives, nor immense wealth: because through craving for such things princes become tyrants and forsake justice. + He also appointed the manner in which they were to conduct themselves towards God: namely, that they should continually read + and ponder on God's Law, and should ever fear and obey God. Moreover, He decided how they should behave towards their + subjects: namely, that they should not proudly despise them, or ill-treat them, and that they should not depart from the paths + of justice. +
[38184] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod regnum est optimum regimen populi, si non +corrumpatur. Sed propter magnam potestatem quae regi conceditur, de +facili regnum degenerat in tyrannidem, nisi sit perfecta virtus +eius cui talis potestas conceditur, quia non est nisi virtuosi bene +ferre bonas fortunas, ut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic. Perfecta +autem virtus in paucis invenitur, et praecipue Iudaei crudeles +erant et ad avaritiam proni, per quae vitia maxime homines in +tyrannidem decidunt. Et ideo dominus a principio eis regem non +instituit cum plena potestate, sed iudicem et gubernatorem in eorum +custodiam. Sed postea regem ad petitionem populi, quasi indignatus, +concessit, ut patet per hoc quod dixit ad Samuelem, I Reg. VIII, +non te abiecerunt, sed me, ne regnem super eos. Instituit +tamen a principio circa regem instituendum, primo quidem, modum +eligendi. In quo duo determinavit, ut scilicet in eius electione +expectarent iudicium domini; et ut non facerent regem alterius +gentis, quia tales reges solent parum affici ad gentem cui +praeficiuntur, et per consequens non curare de eis. Secundo, +ordinavit circa reges institutos qualiter deberent se habere +quantum ad seipsos, ut scilicet non multiplicarent currus et equos, +neque uxores, neque etiam immensas divitias; quia ex cupiditate +horum principes ad tyrannidem declinant, et iustitiam derelinquunt. +Instituit etiam qualiter se deberent habere ad Deum, ut scilicet +semper legerent et cogitarent de lege Dei, et semper essent in Dei +timore et obedientia. Instituit etiam qualiter se haberent ad +subditos suos, ut scilicet non superbe eos contemnerent, aut +opprimerent, neque etiam a iustitia declinarent.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The division of the kingdom, and a number of kings, was rather a punishment inflicted on that people for their many dissensions, + specially against the just rule of David, than a benefit conferred on them for their profit. Hence it is written ( + Osee 13:11): "I will give thee a king in My wrath"; and ( + Osee 8:4): "They have reigned, but not by Me: they have been princes, and I knew not." +
[38185] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod divisio regni, et multitudo regum, magis est populo +illi data in poenam pro multis dissensionibus eorum, quas maxime +contra regnum David iustum moverant, quam ad eorum profectum. Unde +dicitur Osee XIII, dabo tibi regem in furore meo; et Osee +VIII, ipsi regnaverunt, et non ex me, principes extiterunt, et +non cognovi.
+ Reply to Objection 4: The priestly office was bequeathed by succession from father to son: and this, in order that it might be held in greater + respect, if not any man from the people could become a priest: since honor was given to them out of reverence for the divine + worship. Hence it was necessary to put aside certain things for them both as to tithes and as to first-fruits, and, again, + as to oblations and sacrifices, that they might be afforded a means of livelihood. On + the other hand, the rulers, as stated above, were chosen from the whole people; wherefore they had their own possessions, + from which to derive a living: and so much the more, since the Lord forbade even a king to have superabundant wealth to make + too much show of magnificence: both because he could scarcely avoid the excesses of pride and tyranny, arising from such things, + and because, if the rulers were not very rich, and if their office involved much work and anxiety, it would not tempt the + ambition of the common people; and would not become an occasion of sedition. +
[38186] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod sacerdotes per successionem originis sacris +deputabantur. Et hoc ideo ut in maiori reverentia haberentur, si +non quilibet ex populo posset sacerdos fieri, quorum honor cedebat +in reverentiam divini cultus. Et ideo oportuit ut eis specialia +quaedam deputarentur, tam in decimis quam in primitiis, quam etiam +in oblationibus et sacrificiis, ex quibus viverent. Sed principes, +sicut dictum est, assumebantur ex toto populo, et ideo habebant +certas possessiones proprias, ex quibus vivere poterant. Et +praecipue cum dominus prohiberet etiam in rege ne superabundaret +divitiis aut magnifico apparatu, tum quia non erat facile quin ex +his in superbiam et tyrannidem erigeretur; tum etiam quia, si +principes non erant multum divites, et erat laboriosus principatus +et sollicitudine plenus, non multum affectabatur a popularibus, et +sic tollebatur seditionis materia.
+ Reply to Objection 5: That right was not given to the king by Divine institution: rather was it foretold that kings would usurp that right, by + framing unjust laws, and by degenerating into tyrants who preyed on their subjects. This is clear from the context that follows: + "And you shall be his slaves [Douay: 'servants']": which is significative of tyranny, since a tyrant rules is subjects as + though they were his slaves. Hence Samuel spoke these words to deter them from + asking for a king; since the narrative continues: "But the people would not hear the voice of Samuel." It may happen, however, + that even a good king, without being a tyrant, may take away the sons, and make them tribunes and centurions; and may take + many things from his subjects in order to secure the common weal. +
[38187] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 1 ad 5 Ad quintum +dicendum quod illud ius non dabatur regi ex institutione divina; +sed magis praenuntiatur usurpatio regum, qui sibi ius iniquum +constituunt in tyrannidem degenerantes, et subditos depraedantes. +Et hoc patet per hoc quod in fine subdit, vosque eritis ei +servi, quod proprie pertinet ad tyrannidem, quia tyranni suis +subditis principantur ut servis. Unde hoc dicebat Samuel ad +deterrendum eos ne regem peterent, sequitur enim, noluit autem +audire populus vocem Samuelis. Potest tamen contingere quod +etiam bonus rex, absque tyrannide, filios tollat, et constituat +tribunos et centuriones, et multa accipiat a subditis, propter +commune bonum procurandum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts were not suitably framed as regards the relations of one man with another. Because + men cannot live together in peace, if one man takes what belongs to another. But this seems to have been approved by the Law: + since it is written ( + Dt. 23:24): "Going into thy neighbor's vineyard, thou mayest eat as many grapes as thou pleasest." Therefore the Old Law did not make + suitable provisions for man's + peace. +
[38188] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad +secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter fuerint +tradita praecepta iudicialia quantum ad popularium convictum. Non +enim possunt homines pacifice vivere ad invicem, si unus accipiat +ea quae sunt alterius. Sed hoc videtur esse inductum in lege, +dicitur enim Deut. XXIII, ingressus vineam proximi tui, comede +uvas quantum tibi placuerit. Ergo lex vetus non convenienter +providebat hominum paci.
+ Objection 2: Further, one of the chief causes of the downfall of states has been the holding of property by women, as the Philosopher + says (Polit. ii, 6). But this was introduced by the Old Law; for it is written ( + Num. 27:8): "When a man dieth without a son, his inheritance shall pass to his daughter." Therefore the Law made unsuitable provision + for the welfare of the people. +
[38189] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +ex hoc maxime multae civitates et regna destruuntur, quod +possessiones ad mulieres perveniunt, ut philosophus dicit, in II +Polit. Sed hoc fuit introductum in veteri lege, dicitur enim Num. +XXVII, homo cum mortuus fuerit absque filio, ad filiam eius +transibit hereditas. Ergo non convenienter providit lex saluti +populi.
+ Objection 3: Further, it is most conducive to the preservation of human society that men may provide themselves with necessaries by buying + and selling, as stated in Polit. i. But the Old Law took away the force of sales; since it prescribes that in the 50th year + of the jubilee all that is sold shall return to the vendor ( + Lev. 25:28). Therefore in this matter the Law gave the people an unfitting command. +
[38190] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +societas hominum maxime per hoc conservatur, quod homines emendo et +vendendo sibi invicem res suas commutant quibus indigent, ut +dicitur in I Polit. Sed lex vetus abstulit virtutem venditionis, +mandavit enim quod possessio vendita reverteretur ad venditorem in +quinquagesimo anno iubilaei, ut patet Levit. XXV. Inconvenienter +igitur lex populum illum circa hoc instituit.
+ Objection 4: Further, man's needs require that men should be ready to lend: which readiness ceases if the creditors do not return the + pledges: hence it is written ( + Ecclus. 29:10): "Many have refused to lend, not out of wickedness, but they were afraid to be defrauded without cause." And yet this was + encouraged by the Law. First, because it prescribed ( + Dt. 15:2): "He to whom any thing is owing from his friend or neighbor or brother, + cannot demand it again, because it is the year of remission of the Lord"; and ( + Ex. 22:15) it is stated that if a borrowed animal should die while the owner is present, the borrower is not bound to make restitution. + Secondly, because the security acquired through the pledge is lost: for it is written ( + Dt. 24:10): "When thou shalt demand of thy neighbor any thing that he oweth thee, thou shalt not go into his house to take away a pledge"; + and again + ( + Dt. 24:12,13): "The pledge shall not lodge with thee that night, but thou shalt restore it to him presently." Therefore the Law made insufficient + provision in the matter of loans. +
[38191] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, +necessitatibus hominum maxime expedit ut homines sint prompti ad +mutuum concedendum. Quae quidem promptitudo tollitur per hoc quod +creditores accepta non reddunt, unde dicitur Eccli. XXIX, multi +non causa nequitiae non faenerati sunt, sed fraudari gratis +timuerunt. Hoc autem induxit lex. Primo quidem, quia mandavit +Deut. XV, cui debetur aliquid ab amico vel proximo ac fratre +suo, repetere non poterit, quia annus remissionis est domini; +et Exod. XXII dicitur quod si praesente domino animal mutuatum +mortuum fuerit, reddere non tenetur. Secundo, quia aufertur ei +securitas quae habetur per pignus, dicitur enim Deut. XXIV, cum +repetes a proximo tuo rem aliquam quam debet tibi, non ingredieris +domum eius ut pignus auferas; et iterum, non pernoctabit +apud te pignus, sed statim reddes ei. Ergo insufficienter fuit +ordinatum in lege de mutuis.
+ Objection 5: Further, considerable risk attaches to goods deposited with a fraudulent depositary: wherefore great caution should be observed + in such matters: hence it is stated in + 2 Mac. 3:15 that "the priests . . . called upon Him from heaven, Who made the law concerning things given to be kept, that He would preserve + them safe, for them that had deposited them." But the precepts of the Old Law observed little caution in regard to deposits: + since it + is prescribed ( + Ex. 22:10,11) that when goods deposited are lost, the owner is to stand by the oath of the depositary. Therefore the Law made unsuitable + provision in this matter. +
[38192] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 arg. 5 Praeterea, +ex defraudatione depositi maximum periculum imminet, et ideo est +maxima cautela adhibenda, unde etiam dicitur II Mach. III, quod +sacerdotes invocabant de caelo eum qui de depositis legem +posuit, ut his qui deposuerant ea, salva custodiret. Sed in +praeceptis veteris legis parva cautela circa deposita adhibetur, +dicitur enim Exod. XXII quod in amissione depositi statur iuramento +eius apud quem fuit depositum. Ergo non fuit circa hoc legis +ordinatio conveniens.
+ Objection 6: Further, just as a workman offers his work for hire, so do men let houses and so forth. But there is no need for the tenant + to pay his rent as soon as he takes a house. Therefore it seems an unnecessarily hard prescription ( + Lev. 19:13) that "the wages of him that hath been hired by thee shall not abide with thee until morning." +
[38193] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 arg. 6 Praeterea, +sicut aliquis mercenarius locat operas suas, ita etiam aliqui +locant domum, vel quaecumque alia huiusmodi. Sed non est +necessarium ut statim pretium locatae domus conductor exhibeat. +Ergo etiam nimis durum fuit quod praecipitur Levit. XIX, non +morabitur opus mercenarii tui apud te usque mane.
+ Objection 7: Further, since there is often pressing need for a judge, it should be easy to gain access to one. It was therefore unfitting + that the Law ( + Dt. 17:8,9) should command them to go to a fixed place to ask for judgment on doubtful matters. +
[38194] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 arg. 7 Praeterea, +cum frequenter immineat iudiciorum necessitas, facilis debet esse +accessus ad iudicem. Inconvenienter igitur statuit lex, Deut. XVII, +ut irent ad unum locum expetituri iudicium de suis dubiis.
+ Objection 8: Further, it is possible that not only two, but three or more, should agree to tell a lie. Therefore it is unreasonably stated + ( + Dt. 19:15) that "in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word shall stand." +
[38195] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 arg. 8 Praeterea, +possibile est non solum duos, sed etiam tres vel plures concordare +ad mentiendum. Inconvenienter igitur dicitur Deut. XIX, in ore +duorum vel trium testium stabit omne verbum.
+ Objection 9: Further, punishment should be fixed according to the gravity of the fault: for which reason also it is written ( + Dt. 25:2): "According to the measure of the sin, shall the measure also of the stripes be." Yet the Law fixed unequal punishments + for certain faults: for it is written ( + Ex. 22:1) that the thief "shall restore five oxen for one ox, and four sheep for one sheep." Moreover, certain slight offenses are + severely + punished: thus ( + Num. 15:32, seqq.) a man is stoned for gathering sticks on the sabbath day: and ( + Dt. 21:18, seqq.) the unruly son is commanded to be stoned on account of certain small transgressions, viz. because "he gave himself + to revelling . . . and banquetings." Therefore the Law prescribed punishments in an unreasonable manner. +
[38196] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 arg. 9 Praeterea, +poena debet taxari secundum quantitatem culpae, unde dicitur etiam +Deut. XXV, pro mensura peccati erit et plagarum modus. Sed +quibusdam aequalibus culpis lex statuit inaequales poenas, dicitur +enim Exod. XXII, quod restituet fur quinque boves pro uno bove, et +quatuor oves pro una ove. Quaedam etiam non multum gravia peccata +gravi poena puniuntur, sicut Num. XV, lapidatus est qui collegerat +ligna in sabbato. Filius etiam protervus propter parva delicta, +quia scilicet comessationibus vacabat et conviviis, mandatur +lapidari, Deut. XXI. Igitur inconvenienter in lege sunt institutae +poenae.
+ Objection 10: Further, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11), "Tully writes that the laws recognize eight forms of punishment, indemnity, + prison, stripes, retaliation, public disgrace, exile, death, slavery." Now some of these were prescribed by the Law. "Indemnity," + as when a thief was condemned to make restitution fivefold or fourfold. "Prison," as when ( + Num. 15:34) a certain man is ordered to be imprisoned. "Stripes"; thus ( + Dt. + 25:2 + ), "if they see that the offender be worthy of stripes; they shall lay him down, and shall cause him to be beaten before them." + "Public disgrace" was brought on to him who refused to take to himself the wife of his deceased brother, for she took "off + his shoe from his foot, and" did "spit in his face" ( + Dt. 25:9). It prescribed the "death" penalty, as is clear from ( + Lev. 20:9): "He that curseth his father, or mother, dying let him die." + The Law also recognized the "lex talionis," by prescribing ( + Ex. 21:24): "Eye for eye, tooth for tooth." Therefore it seems unreasonable that the Law should not have inflicted the two other punishments, + viz. "exile" and "slavery." +
[38197] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 arg. 10 +Praeterea, sicut Augustinus dicit, XXI de Civ. Dei, octo genera +poenarum in legibus esse scribit Tullius, damnum, vincula, verbera, +talionem, ignominiam, exilium, mortem, servitutem. Ex quibus +aliqua sunt in lege statuta. Damnum quidem, sicut cum fur +condemnabatur ad quintuplum vel quadruplum. Vincula vero, sicut +Num. XV, mandatur de quodam quod in carcerem includatur. Verbera +vero, sicut Deut. XXV, si eum qui peccavit dignum viderint +plagis, prosternent, et coram se facient verberari. Ignominiam +etiam inferebat illi qui nolebat accipere uxorem fratris sui +defuncti, quae tollebat calceamentum illius, et spuebat in faciem +illius. Mortem etiam inferebat, ut patet Levit. XX, qui +maledixerit patri suo aut matri, morte moriatur. Poenam etiam +talionis lex induxit, dicens Exod. XXI, oculum pro oculo, dentem +pro dente. Inconveniens igitur videtur quod alias duas poenas, +scilicet exilium et servitutem, lex vetus non inflixit.
+ Objection 11: Further, no punishment is due except for a fault. But dumb animals cannot commit a fault. Therefore the Law is unreasonable + in punishing them ( + Ex. 21:29): "If the ox . . . shall kill a man or a woman," it "shall be stoned": and ( + Lev. 20:16): "The woman that shall lie under any beast, shall be killed together with the same." Therefore it seems that matters pertaining + to the relations of one man with another were + unsuitably regulated by the Law. +
[38198] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 arg. 11 +Praeterea, poena non debetur nisi culpae. Sed bruta animalia non +possunt habere culpam. Ergo inconvenienter eis infligitur poena, +Exod. XXI, bos lapidibus obruetur qui occiderit virum aut +mulierem. Et Levit. XX dicitur, mulier quae succubuerit +cuilibet iumento, simul interficiatur cum eo. Sic igitur +videtur quod inconvenienter ea quae pertinent ad convictum hominum +ad invicem, fuerint in lege veteri ordinata.
+ Objection 12: Further, the Lord commanded ( + Ex. 21:12) a murderer to be punished with death. But the death of a dumb animal is reckoned of much less account than the slaying of + a man. Hence murder cannot be sufficiently punished by the slaying of a dumb animal. Therefore it is unfittingly prescribed + ( + Dt. 21:1, + 4) that "when there shall be found . . . the corpse of a man slain, and it is not known who is guilty of the murder . . . the + ancients" of the nearest city "shall take a heifer of the herd, that hath not drawn in the yoke, nor ploughed the ground, + and they shall bring her into a rough and stony valley, that never was ploughed, nor sown; and there they shall strike off + the head of the heifer." +
[38199] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 arg. 12 +Praeterea, dominus mandavit Exod. XXI, quod homicidium morte +hominis puniretur. Sed mors bruti animalis multo minus reputatur +quam occisio hominis. Ergo non potest sufficienter recompensari +poena homicidii per occisionem bruti animalis. Inconvenienter +igitur mandatur Deut. XXI quod quando inventum fuerit cadaver +occisi hominis, et ignorabitur caedis reus, seniores propinquioris +civitatis tollant vitulam de armento quae non traxit iugum nec +terram scidit vomere, et ducent eam ad vallem asperam atque saxosam +quae numquam arata est nec sementa recepit, et caedent in ea +cervices vitulae.
+ On the contrary, It is recalled as a special blessing ( + Ps. 147:20) that "He hath not done in like manner to every nation; and His judgments He hath not made manifest to them." +
[38200] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod pro speciali beneficio commemoratur in Psalmo CXLVII, +non fecit taliter omni nationi, et iudicia sua non manifestavit +eis.
+ I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21), quoting Tully, "a nation is a body of men united together by consent to the law and + by community of welfare." Consequently it is of the essence of a nation that the mutual relations of the citizens be ordered + by just laws. Now the relations of one man with another are twofold: some are effected under the guidance of those in authority: + others are effected by the will of private individuals. And since whatever is + subject to the power of an individual can be disposed of according to his will, hence it is that the decision of matters between + one man and another, and the punishment of evildoers, depend on the direction of those in authority, to whom men are subject. + On the other hand, the power of private persons is exercised over the things they possess: and consequently their dealings + with one another, as regards such things, depend on their own will, for instance in buying, selling, giving, and so + forth. Now the Law provided sufficiently in respect of each of these relations between one man and another. For it established + judges, as is clearly indicated in + Dt. 16:18: "Thou shalt appoint judges and magistrates in all its [Vulg.: 'thy'] gates . . . that they may judge the people with just + judgment." It is also directed the manner of pronouncing just judgments, according to + Dt. 1:16,17: "Judge that which is just, whether he be one of your own country or a stranger: + there shall be no difference of persons." It also removed an occasion of pronouncing unjust judgment, by forbidding judges + to accept bribes ( + Ex. 23:8; + Dt. 16:19). It prescribed the number of witnesses, viz. two or three: and it appointed certain punishments to certain crimes, as we + shall state farther on (ad 10). +
But with regard to possessions, it is a very good thing, says the Philosopher (Polit. ii, 2) that the things possessed should + be distinct, and the use thereof should be partly common, and partly granted to others by the will of the possessors. These + three points were provided for by the Law. Because, in the first place, the possessions themselves were divided among individuals: + for it is written ( + Num. 33:53,54): "I have given you" the land "for a possession: + and you shall divide it among you by lot." And since many states have been ruined through want of regulations in the matter + of possessions, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii, 6); therefore the Law provided a threefold remedy against the regularity + of possessions. The first was that they should be divided equally, wherefore it is written ( + Num. 33:54): "To the more you shall give a larger part, and to the fewer, a lesser." A second remedy was that possessions could not + be alienated for ever, but after a certain lapse of time should return to their former owner, so as to avoid confusion of + possessions (cf. ad 3). The third remedy aimed at the removal of this confusion, and provided that the dead should be succeeded + by their next of kin: in the first place, the son; secondly, the daughter; thirdly, the brother; fourthly, the father's brother; + fifthly, any other next of kin. Furthermore, in order to preserve the distinction of property, the Law enacted that + heiresses should marry within their own tribe, as recorded in + Num. 36:6. +
Secondly, the Law commanded that, in some respects, the use of things should belong to all in common. Firstly, as regards + the care of them; for it was prescribed ( + Dt. 22:1-4): "Thou shalt not pass by, if thou seest thy brother's ox or his sheep go astray; but thou shalt bring them back to thy brother," + and in like manner as to other things. Secondly, as regards fruits. For all alike were allowed on entering a friend's vineyard + to eat of the fruit, but not to + take any away. And, specially, with respect to the poor, it was prescribed that the forgotten sheaves, and the bunches of + grapes and fruit, should be left behind for them ( + Lev. 19:9; + Dt. 24:19). Moreover, whatever grew in the seventh year was common property, as stated in + Ex. 23:11 and + Lev. 25:4. +
Thirdly, the law recognized the transference of goods by the owner. There was a purely gratuitous transfer: thus it is written + ( + Dt. 14:28,29): "The third day thou shalt separate another tithe . . . and the Levite . . . and the stranger, and the fatherless, and the + widow . . . shall come and shall eat and be filled." And there was a transfer for a consideration, for instance, by selling + and buying, by letting out and hiring, by loan and also by deposit, concerning all of which we + find that the Law made ample provision. Consequently it is clear that the Old Law provided sufficiently concerning the mutual + relations of one man with another. +
[38201] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus in II de Civ. Dei introducit a +Tullio dictum, populus est coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et +utilitatis communione sociatus. Unde ad rationem populi +pertinet ut communicatio hominum ad invicem iustis praeceptis legis +ordinetur. Est autem duplex communicatio hominum ad invicem, una +quidem quae fit auctoritate principum; alia autem fit propria +voluntate privatarum personarum. Et quia voluntate uniuscuiusque +disponi potest quod eius subditur potestati, ideo auctoritate +principum, quibus subiecti sunt homines, oportet quod iudicia inter +homines exerceantur, et poenae malefactoribus inferantur. Potestati +vero privatarum personarum subduntur res possessae, et ideo propria +voluntate in his possunt sibi invicem communicare, puta emendo, +vendendo, donando, et aliis huiusmodi modis. Circa utramque autem +communicationem lex sufficienter ordinavit. Statuit enim iudices, +ut patet Deut. XVI, iudices et magistros constitues in omnibus +portis eius, ut iudicent populum iusto iudicio. Instituit etiam +iustum iudicii ordinem, ut dicitur Deut. I, quod iustum est +iudicate, sive civis ille sit sive peregrinus, nulla erit +personarum distantia. Sustulit etiam occasionem iniusti +iudicii, acceptionem munerum iudicibus prohibendo; ut patet Exod. +XXIII, et Deut. XVI. Instituit etiam numerum testium duorum vel +trium; ut patet Deut. XVII, et XIX. Instituit etiam certas poenas +pro diversis delictis, ut post dicetur. Sed circa res possessas +optimum est, sicut dicit philosophus, in II Polit., quod +possessiones sint distinctae, et usus sit partim communis, partim +autem per voluntatem possessorum communicetur. Et haec tria fuerunt +in lege statuta. Primo enim, ipsae possessiones divisae erant in +singulos, dicitur enim Num. XXXIII, ego dedi vobis terram in +possessionem, quam sorte dividetis vobis. Et quia per +possessionum irregularitatem plures civitates destruuntur, ut +philosophus dicit, in II Polit.; ideo circa possessiones regulandas +triplex remedium lex adhibuit. Unum quidem, ut secundum numerum +hominum aequaliter dividerentur, unde dicitur Num. XXXIII, +pluribus dabitis latiorem, et paucioribus angustiorem. Aliud +remedium est ut possessiones non in perpetuum alienentur, sed certo +tempore ad suos possessores revertantur, ut non confundantur sortes +possessionum. Tertium remedium est ad huiusmodi confusionem +tollendam, ut proximi succedant morientibus, primo quidem gradu, +filius; secundo autem, filia; tertio, fratres; quarto, patrui; +quinto, quicumque propinqui. Et ad distinctionem sortium +conservandam, ulterius lex statuit ut mulieres quae sunt haeredes, +nuberent suae tribus hominibus, ut habetur Num. XXXVI. Secundo +vero, instituit lex ut quantum ad aliqua usus rerum esset communis. +Et primo, quantum ad curam, praeceptum est enim Deut. XXII, non +videbis bovem et ovem fratris tui errantem, et praeteribis, sed +reduces fratri tuo; et similiter de aliis. Secundo, quantum ad +fructum. Concedebatur enim communiter quantum ad omnes, ut +ingressus in vineam amici posset licite comedere, dum tamen extra +non auferret. Quantum ad pauperes vero specialiter, ut eis +relinquerentur manipuli obliti, et fructus et racemi remanentes, ut +habetur Lev. XIX, et Deut. XXIV. Et etiam communicabantur ea quae +nascebantur in septimo anno; ut habetur Exod. XXIII, et Lev. XXV. +Tertio vero, statuit lex communicationem factam per eos qui sunt +domini rerum. Unam pure gratuitam, unde dicitur Deut. XIV, anno +tertio separabis aliam decimam, venientque Levites et peregrinus et +pupillus et vidua, et comedent et saturabuntur. Aliam vero cum +recompensatione utilitatis, sicut per venditionem et emptionem, et +locationem et conductionem, et per mutuum, et iterum per depositum, +de quibus omnibus inveniuntur ordinationes certae in lege. Unde +patet quod lex vetus sufficienter ordinavit convictum illius +populi.
+ Reply to Objection 1: As the Apostle says ( + Rom. 13:8), "he that loveth his neighbor hath fulfilled the Law": because, to wit, all the precepts of the Law, chiefly those concerning + our neighbor, seem to aim at the end that men should love one another. Now it is an effect of love that men give their own + goods to others: because, as stated in + 1 Jn. 3:17: "He that . . . shall see his brother in need, and shall shut up his bowels from + him: how doth the charity of God abide in him?" Hence the purpose of the Law was to accustom men to give of their own to others + readily: thus the Apostle ( + 1 Tim. 6:18) commands the rich "to give easily and to communicate to others." Now a man does not give easily to others if he will not + suffer another man to take some little thing from him without any great injury to him. And so the Law laid down that it should + be lawful for a man, on entering his neighbor's vineyard, to + eat of the fruit there: but not to carry any away, lest this should lead to the infliction of a grievous harm, and cause a + disturbance of the peace: for among well-behaved people, the taking of a little does not disturb the peace; in fact, it rather + strengthens friendship and accustoms men to give things to one another. +
[38202] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut apostolus dicit, Rom. XIII, qui +diligit proximum, legem implevit, quia scilicet omnia praecepta +legis, praecipue ordinata ad proximum, ad hunc finem ordinari +videntur, ut homines se invicem diligant. Ex dilectione autem +procedit quod homines sibi invicem bona sua communicent, quia ut +dicitur I Ioan. III, qui viderit fratrem suum necessitatem +patientem, et clauserit viscera sua ab eo, quomodo caritas Dei +manet in illo? Et ideo intendebat lex homines assuefacere ut +facile sibi invicem sua communicarent, sicut et apostolus, I ad +Tim. VI, divitibus mandat facile tribuere et communicare. Non autem +facile communicativus est qui non sustinet quod proximus aliquid +modicum de suo accipiat, absque magno sui detrimento. Et ideo lex +ordinavit ut liceret intrantem in vineam proximi, racemos ibi +comedere, non autem extra deferre, ne ex hoc daretur occasio gravis +damni inferendi, ex quo pax perturbaretur. Quae inter disciplinatos +non perturbatur ex modicorum acceptione, sed magis amicitia +confirmatur, et assuefiunt homines ad facile communicandum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The Law did not prescribe that women should succeed to their father's estate except in default of male issue: failing which + it was necessary that succession should be granted to the female line in order to comfort the father, who would have been + sad to think that his estate would pass to strangers. Nevertheless the Law observed due caution in the matter, by providing + that those women who succeeded to their father's estate, should marry within their + own tribe, in order to avoid confusion of tribal possessions, as stated in + Num. 36:7,8. +
[38203] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod lex non statuit quod mulieres succederent in bonis +paternis, nisi in defectu filiorum masculorum. Tunc autem +necessarium erat ut successio mulieribus concederetur in +consolationem patris, cui grave fuisset si eius hereditas omnino ad +extraneos transiret. Adhibuit tamen circa hoc lex cautelam debitam, +praecipiens ut mulieres succedentes in haereditate paterna, +nuberent suae tribus hominibus, ad hoc quod sortes tribuum non +confunderentur, ut habetur Num. ult.
+ Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 4), the regulation of possessions conduces much to the preservation of a state or nation. + Consequently, as he himself observes, it was forbidden by the law in some of the heathen states, "that anyone should sell + his possessions, except to avoid a manifest loss." For if possessions were to be sold indiscriminately, they might happen + to come into the hands of a few: so that it might become necessary for a state or + country to become void of inhabitants. Hence the Old Law, in order to remove this danger, ordered things in such a way that + while provision was made for men's needs, by allowing the sale of possessions to avail for a certain period, at the same time + the said danger was removed, by prescribing the return of those possessions after that period had elapsed. The reason for + this law was to prevent confusion of possessions, and to ensure the continuance of a definite distinction among the tribes. +
But as the town houses were not allotted to distinct estates, therefore the Law allowed them to be sold in perpetuity, like + movable goods. Because the number of houses in a town was not fixed, whereas there was a fixed limit to the amount of estates, + which could not be exceeded, while the number of houses in a town could be increased. On the other hand, houses situated not + in a town, but "in a village that hath no walls," could not be sold in perpetuity: because such houses are + built merely with a view to the cultivation and care of possessions; wherefore the Law rightly made the same prescription + in regard to both ( + Lev. 25). +
[38204] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in II Polit., regulatio +possessionum multum confert ad conservationem civitatis vel gentis. +Unde, sicut ipse dicit, apud quasdam gentilium civitates statutum +fuit ut nullus possessionem vendere posset, nisi pro manifesto +detrimento. Si enim passim possessiones vendantur, potest +contingere quod omnes possessiones ad paucos deveniant, et ita +necesse erit civitatem vel regionem habitatoribus evacuari. Et ideo +lex vetus, ad huiusmodi periculum amovendum, sic ordinavit quod et +necessitatibus hominum subveniretur, concedens possessionum +venditionem usque ad certum tempus; et tamen periculum removit, +praecipiens ut certo tempore possessio vendita ad vendentem +rediret. Et hoc instituit ut sortes non confunderentur, sed semper +remaneret eadem distinctio determinata in tribubus. Quia vero domus +urbanae non erant sorte distinctae, ideo concessit quod in +perpetuum vendi possent, sicut et mobilia bona. Non enim erat +statutus numerus domorum civitatis, sicut erat certa mensura +possessionis, ad quam non addebatur, poterat autem aliquid addi ad +numerum domorum civitatis. Domus vero quae non erant in urbe, sed +in villa muros non habente, in perpetuum vendi non poterant, quia +huiusmodi domus non construuntur nisi ad cultum et ad custodiam +possessionum; et ideo lex congrue statuit idem ius circa +utrumque.
+ Reply to Objection 4: As stated above (ad 1), the purpose of the Law was to accustom men to its precepts, so as to be ready to come to one another's + assistance: because this is a very great incentive to friendship. The Law granted these facilities for helping others in the + matter not only of gratuitous and absolute donations, but also of mutual transfers: because the latter kind of succor is more + frequent and benefits the greater number: and it granted facilities for this + purpose in many ways. First of all by prescribing that men should be ready to lend, and that they should not be less inclined + to do so as the year of remission drew nigh, as stated in + Dt. 15:7, seqq. Secondly, by forbidding them to burden a man to whom they might grant a loan, either by exacting usury, or by accepting + necessities of life in security; and by prescribing that when this had been done they should be restored at once. For it is + written ( + Dt. + 23:19 + ): "Thou shalt not lend to thy brother money to usury": and ( + Dt. 24:6): "Thou shalt not take the nether nor the upper millstone to pledge; for he hath pledged his life to thee": and ( + Ex. 22:26): "If thou take of thy neighbor a garment in pledge, thou shalt give it him again before sunset." Thirdly, by forbidding + them to be importunate in exacting payment. Hence it is written ( + Ex. 22:25): "If thou lend money to any of + my people that is poor that dwelleth with thee, thou shalt not be hard upon them as an extortioner." For this reason, too, + it is enacted ( + Dt. 24:10,11): "When thou shalt demand of thy neighbor anything that he oweth thee, thou shalt not go into his house to take away a pledge, + but thou shalt stand without, and he shall bring out to thee what he hath": both because a man's house is his surest refuge, + wherefore it is offensive to a man to be set upon in his own house; and because the Law does not + allow the creditor to take away whatever he likes in security, but rather permits the debtor to give what he needs least. + Fourthly, the Law prescribed that debts should cease together after the lapse of seven years. For it was probable that those + who could conveniently pay their debts, would do so before the seventh year, and would not defraud the lender without cause. + But if they were altogether insolvent, there was the same reason for remitting the debt from love for them, as there was for + renewing the loan on account of their need. +
As regards animals granted in loan, the Law enacted that if, through the neglect of the person to whom they were lent, they + perished or deteriorated in his absence, he was bound to make restitution. But if they perished or deteriorated while he was + present and taking proper care of them, he was not bound to make restitution, especially if they were hired for a consideration: + because they might have died or deteriorated in the same way if they had remained in possession of the + lender, so that if the animal had been saved through being lent, the lender would have gained something by the loan which + would no longer have been gratuitous. And especially was this to be observed when animals were hired for a consideration: + because then the owner received a certain price for the use of the animals; wherefore he had no right to any profit, by receiving + indemnity for the animal, unless the person who had charge of it were negligent. In the case, however, of animals not hired + for a consideration, equity demanded that he should receive something by way of restitution at least to the value of the hire + of the animal that had perished or deteriorated. +
[38205] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, intentio legis erat assuefacere +homines suis praeceptis ad hoc quod sibi invicem de facili in +necessitatibus subvenirent, quia hoc maxime est amicitiae fomentum. +Et hanc quidem facilitatem subveniendi non solum statuit in his +quae gratis et absolute donantur, sed etiam in his quae mutuo +conceduntur, quia huiusmodi subventio frequentior est, et pluribus +necessaria. Huiusmodi autem subventionis facilitatem multipliciter +instituit. Primo quidem, ut faciles se praeberent ad mutuum +exhibendum, nec ab hoc retraherentur anno remissionis +appropinquante, ut habetur Deut. XV. Secundo, ne eum cui mutuum +concederent, gravarent vel usuris, vel etiam aliqua pignora omnino +vitae necessaria accipiendo, et si accepta fuerint, quod statim +restituerentur. Dicitur enim Deut. XXIII, non faeneraberis +fratri tuo ad usuram; et XXIV, non accipies loco pignoris +inferiorem et superiorem molam, quia animam suam apposuit tibi; +et Exod. XXII dicitur, si pignus a proximo tuo acceperis +vestimentum, ante solis occasum reddes ei. Tertio, ut non +importune exigerent. Unde dicitur Exod. XXII, si pecuniam mutuam +dederis populo meo pauperi qui habitat tecum, non urgebis eum quasi +exactor. Et propter hoc etiam mandatur Deut. XXIV, cum +repetes a proximo tuo rem aliquam quam debet tibi, non ingredieris +in domum eius ut pignus auferas; sed stabis foris, et ille tibi +proferet quod habuerit, tum quia domus est tutissimum +uniuscuiusque receptaculum, unde molestum homini est ut in domo sua +invadatur; tum etiam quia non concedit creditori ut accipiat pignus +quod voluerit, sed magis debitori ut det quo minus indiguerit. +Quarto, instituit quod in septimo anno debita penitus +remitterentur. Probabile enim erat ut illi qui commode reddere +possent, ante septimum annum redderent, et gratis mutuantem non +defraudarent. Si autem omnino impotentes essent, eadem ratione eis +erat debitum remittendum ex dilectione, qua etiam erat eis de novo +dandum propter indigentiam. Circa animalia vero mutuata haec lex +statuit, ut propter negligentiam eius cui mutuata sunt, si in +ipsius absentia moriantur vel debilitentur, reddere ea compellatur. +Si vero eo praesente et diligenter custodiente, mortua fuerint vel +debilitata, non cogebatur restituere, et maxime si erant mercede +conducta, quia ita etiam potuissent mori et debilitari apud +mutuantem; et ita, si conservationem animalis consequeretur, iam +aliquod lucrum reportaret ex mutuo, et non esset gratuitum mutuum. +Et maxime hoc observandum erat quando animalia erant mercede +conducta, quia tunc habebat certum pretium pro usu animalium; unde +nihil accrescere debebat per restitutionem animalium, nisi propter +negligentiam custodientis. Si autem non essent mercede conducta, +potuisset habere aliquam aequitatem ut saltem tantum restitueret +quantum usus animalis mortui vel debilitati conduci potuisset.
+ Reply to Objection 5: The difference between a loan and a deposit is that a loan is in respect of goods transferred for the use of the person to + whom they are transferred, whereas a deposit is for the benefit of the depositor. Hence in certain cases there was a stricter + obligation of returning a loan than of restoring goods held in deposit. Because the latter might be lost in two ways. First, + unavoidably: i.e. either through a natural cause, for instance if an animal held + in deposit were to die or depreciate in value; or through an extrinsic cause, for instance, if it were taken by an enemy, + or devoured by a beast (in which case, however, a man was bound to restore to the owner what was left of the animal thus slain): + whereas in the other cases mentioned above, he was not bound to make restitution; but only to take an oath in order to clear + himself of suspicion. Secondly, the goods deposited might be lost through an avoidable cause, for instance by theft: and + then the depositary was bound to restitution on account of his neglect. But, as stated above (ad 4), he who held an animal + on loan, was bound to restitution, even if he were absent when it depreciated or died: because he was held responsible for + less negligence than a depositary, who was only held responsible in case of theft. +
[38206] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 ad 5 Ad quintum +dicendum quod haec differentia est inter mutuum et depositum, quia +mutuum traditur in utilitatem eius cui traditur; sed depositum +traditur in utilitatem deponentis. Et ideo magis arctabatur aliquis +in aliquibus casibus ad restituendum mutuum, quam ad restituendum +depositum. Depositum enim perdi poterat dupliciter. Uno modo, ex +causa inevitabili, vel naturali, puta si esset mortuum vel +debilitatum animal depositum; vel extrinseca, puta si esset captum +ab hostibus, vel si esset comestum a bestia; in quo tamen casu +tenebatur deferre ad dominum animalis id quod de animali occiso +supererat. In aliis autem praedictis casibus nihil reddere +tenebatur, sed solum, ad expurgandam suspicionem fraudis, tenebatur +iuramentum praestare. Alio modo poterat perdi ex causa evitabili, +puta per furtum. Et tunc, propter negligentiam custodis, reddere +tenebatur. Sed, sicut dictum est, ille qui mutuo accipiebat animal, +tenebatur reddere, etiam si debilitatum aut mortuum fuisset in eius +absentia. De minori enim negligentia tenebatur quam depositarius, +qui non tenebatur nisi de furto.
+ Reply to Objection 6: Workmen who offer their labor for hire, are poor men who toil for their daily bread: and therefore the Law commanded wisely + that they should be paid at once, lest they should lack food. But they who offer other commodities for hire, are wont to be + rich: nor are they in such need of their price in order to gain a livelihood: and consequently the comparison does not hold. +
[38207] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 ad 6 Ad sextum +dicendum quod mercenarii qui locant operas suas, pauperes sunt, de +laboribus suis victum quaerentes quotidianum, et ideo lex provide +ordinavit ut statim eis merces solveretur, ne victus eis deficeret. +Sed illi qui locant alias res, divites esse consueverunt, nec ita +indigent locationis pretio ad suum victum quotidianum. Et ideo non +est eadem ratio in utroque.
+ Reply to Objection 7: The purpose for which judges are appointed among men, is that they may decide doubtful points in matters of justice. Now + a matter may be doubtful in two ways. First, among simple-minded people: and in order to remove doubts of this kind, it was + prescribed ( + Dt. 16:18) that "judges and magistrates" should be appointed in each tribe, "to judge the people with just judgment." Secondly, a matter + may be doubtful even among experts: and + therefore, in order to remove doubts of this kind, the Law prescribed that all should foregather in some chief place chosen + by God, where there would be both the high-priest, who would decide doubtful matters relating to the ceremonies of divine + worship; and the chief judge of the people, who would decide matters relating to the judgments of men: just as even now cases + are taken from a lower to a higher court either by appeal or by consultation. Hence it is written ( + Dt. + 17:8,9 + ): "If thou perceive that there be among you a hard and doubtful matter in judgment . . . and thou see that the words of the + judges within thy gates do vary; arise and go up to the place, which the Lord thy God shall choose; and thou shalt come to + the priests of the Levitical race, and to the judge that shall be at that time." But such like doubtful matters did not often + occur for judgment: wherefore the people were not burdened on this account. +
[38208] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 ad 7 Ad septimum +dicendum quod iudices ad hoc inter homines constituuntur, quod +determinent quod ambiguum inter homines circa iustitiam esse +potest. Dupliciter autem aliquid potest esse ambiguum. Uno modo, +apud simplices. Et ad hoc dubium tollendum, mandatur Deut. XVI, ut +iudices et magistri constituerentur per singulas tribus, ut +iudicarent populum iusto iudicio. Alio modo contingit aliquid +esse dubium etiam apud peritos. Et ideo ad hoc dubium tollendum, +constituit lex ut omnes recurrerent ad locum principalem a Deo +electum, in quo et summus sacerdos esset, qui determinaret dubia +circa caeremonias divini cultus; et summus iudex populi, qui +determinaret quae pertinent ad iudicia hominum, sicut etiam nunc +per appellationem, vel per consultationem, causae ab inferioribus +iudicibus ad superiores deferuntur. Unde dicitur Deut. XVII, si +difficile et ambiguum apud te iudicium perspexeris, et iudicum +intra portas tuas videris verba variari; ascende ad locum quem +elegerit dominus, veniesque ad sacerdotes levitici generis, et ad +iudicem qui fuerit illo tempore. Huiusmodi autem ambigua +iudicia non frequenter emergebant. Unde ex hoc populus non +gravabatur.
+ Reply to Objection 8: In the business affairs of men, there is no such thing as demonstrative and infallible proof, and we must be content with + a certain conjectural probability, such as that which an orator employs to persuade. Consequently, although it is quite possible + for two or three witnesses to agree to a falsehood, yet it is neither easy nor probable that they succeed in so doing: wherefore + their testimony is taken as being true, especially if they do not waver in + giving it, or are not otherwise suspect. Moreover, in order that witnesses might not easily depart from the truth, the Law + commanded that they should be most carefully examined, and that those who were found untruthful should be severely punished, + as stated in + Dt. 19:16, seqq. +
There was, however, a reason for fixing on this particular number, in token of the unerring truth of the Divine Persons, + Who are sometimes mentioned as two, because the Holy Ghost is the bond of the other two Persons; and sometimes as three: as + Augustine observes on + Jn. 8:17: "In your law it is written that the testimony of two men is true." +
[38209] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 ad 8 Ad octavum +dicendum quod in negotiis humanis non potest haberi probatio +demonstrativa et infallibilis, sed sufficit aliqua coniecturalis +probabilitas, secundum quam rhetor persuadet. Et ideo, licet sit +possibile duos aut tres testes in mendacium convenire, non tamen +est facile nec probabile quod conveniant; et ideo accipitur eorum +testimonium tanquam verum; et praecipue si in suo testimonio non +vacillent, vel alias suspecti non fuerint. Et ad hoc etiam quod non +de facili a veritate testes declinarent, instituit lex ut testes +diligentissime examinarentur, et graviter punirentur qui +invenirentur mendaces, ut habetur Deut. XIX. Fuit tamen aliqua +ratio huiusmodi numeri determinandi, ad significandam infallibilem +veritatem personarum divinarum, quae quandoque numerantur duae, +quia spiritus sanctus est nexus duorum, quandoque exprimuntur tres; +ut Augustinus dicit, super illud Ioan. VIII, in lege vestra +scriptum est quia duorum hominum testimonium verum est.
+ Reply to Objection 9: A severe punishment is inflicted not only on account of the gravity of a fault, but also for other reasons. First, on account + of the greatness of the sin, because a greater sin, other things being equal, deserves a greater punishment. Secondly, on + account of a habitual sin, since men are not easily cured of habitual sin except by severe punishments. Thirdly, on account + of a great desire for or a great pleasure in the sin: for men are not easily + deterred from such sins unless they be severely punished. Fourthly, on account of the facility of committing a sin and of + concealing it: for such like sins, when discovered, should be more severely punished in order to deter others from committing + them. +
Again, with regard to the greatness of a sin, four degrees may be observed, even in respect of one single deed. The first + is when a sin is committed unwillingly; because then, if the sin be altogether involuntary, man is altogether excused from + punishment; for it is written ( + Dt. 22:25, seqq.) that a damsel who suffers violence in a field is not guilty of death, because "she cried, and there was no man to + help her." But if a man sinned in any way voluntarily, + and yet through weakness, as for instance when a man sins from passion, the sin is diminished: and the punishment, according + to true judgment, should be diminished also; unless perchance the common weal requires that the sin be severely punished in + order to deter others from committing such sins, as stated above. The second degree is when a man sins through ignorance: + and then he was held to be guilty to a certain extent, on account of his negligence in acquiring knowledge: yet he was not + punished by the judges but expiated his sin by sacrifices. Hence it is written ( + Lev. 4:2): "The soul that sinneth through ignorance," etc. This is, however, to be taken as applying to ignorance of fact; and not + to ignorance of the Divine precept, which all were bound to know. The third degree was when a man sinned from pride, i.e. + through deliberate choice or malice: and then he was punished according to the greatness of the sin [*Cf. + Dt. 25:2]. The + fourth degree was when a man sinned from stubbornness or obstinacy: and then he was to be utterly cut off as a rebel and a + destroyer of the commandment of the Law [*Cf. + Num. 15:30,31]. +
Accordingly we must say that, in appointing the punishment for theft, the Law considered what would be likely to happen most + frequently ( + Ex. 22:1-9): wherefore, as regards theft of other things which can easily be safeguarded from a thief, the thief restored only twice + their value. But sheep cannot be easily safeguarded from a thief, because they graze in the fields: wherefore it happened + more frequently that sheep were stolen in the fields. Consequently the Law inflicted a + heavier penalty, by ordering four sheep to be restored for the theft of one. As to cattle, they were yet more difficult to + safeguard, because they are kept in the fields, and do not graze in flocks as sheep do; wherefore a yet more heavy penalty + was inflicted in their regard, so that five oxen were to be restored for one ox. And this I say, unless perchance the animal + itself were discovered in the thief's possession: because in that case he had to restore only twice the number, as in the + case + of other thefts: for there was reason to presume that he intended to restore the animal, since he kept it alive. Again, we + might say, according to a gloss, that "a cow is useful in five ways: it may be used for sacrifice, for ploughing, for food, + for milk, and its hide is employed for various purposes": and therefore for one cow five had to be restored. But the sheep + was useful in four ways: "for sacrifice, for meat, for milk, and for its wool." The unruly son was slain, not because he ate + and + drank: but on account of his stubbornness and rebellion, which was always punished by death, as stated above. As to the man + who gathered sticks on the sabbath, he was stoned as a breaker of the Law, which commanded the sabbath to be observed, to + testify the belief in the newness of the world, as stated above ( + Q[100], A[5]): wherefore he was slain as an unbeliever. +
[38210] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 ad 9 Ad nonum +dicendum quod non solum propter gravitatem culpae, sed etiam +propter alias causas gravis poena infligitur. Primo quidem, propter +quantitatem peccati, quia maiori peccato, ceteris paribus, gravior +poena debetur. Secundo, propter peccati consuetudinem, quia a +peccatis consuetis non faciliter homines abstrahuntur nisi per +graves poenas. Tertio, propter multam concupiscentiam vel +delectationem in peccato, ab his enim non de facili homines +abstrahuntur nisi per graves poenas. Quarto, propter facilitatem +committendi peccatum, et latendi in ipso, huiusmodi enim peccata, +quando manifestantur, sunt magis punienda, ad terrorem aliorum. +Circa ipsam etiam quantitatem peccati quadruplex gradus est +attendendus, etiam circa unum et idem factum. Quorum primus est +quando involuntarius peccatum committit. Tunc enim, si omnino est +involuntarius, totaliter excusatur a poena, dicitur enim Deut. +XXII, quod puella quae opprimitur in agro, non est rea mortis, +quia clamavit, et nullus affuit qui liberaret eam. Si vero +aliquo modo fuerit voluntarius, sed tamen ex infirmitate peccat, +puta cum quis peccat ex passione, minuitur peccatum, et poena, +secundum veritatem iudicii, diminui debet; nisi forte, propter +communem utilitatem, poena aggravetur, ad abstrahendum homines ab +huiusmodi peccatis, sicut dictum est. Secundus gradus est quando +quis per ignorantiam peccavit. Et tunc aliquo modo reus +reputabatur, propter negligentiam addiscendi; sed tamen non +puniebatur per iudices, sed expiabat peccatum suum per sacrificia. +Unde dicitur Levit. IV, anima quae peccaverit per +ignorantiam, et cetera. Sed hoc intelligendum est de ignorantia +facti, non autem de ignorantia praecepti divini, quod omnes scire +tenebantur. Tertius gradus est quando aliquis ex superbia peccabat, +idest ex certa electione vel ex certa malitia. Et tunc puniebatur +secundum quantitatem delicti. Quartus autem gradus est quando +peccabat per proterviam et pertinaciam. Et tunc, quasi rebellis et +destructor ordinationis legis, omnino occidendus erat. Secundum +hoc, dicendum est quod in poena furti considerabatur secundum legem +id quod frequenter accidere poterat. Et ideo pro furto aliarum +rerum, quae de facili custodiri possunt a furibus, non reddebat fur +nisi duplum. Oves autem non de facili possunt custodiri a furto, +quia pascuntur in agris, et ideo frequentius contingebat quod oves +furto subtraherentur. Unde lex maiorem poenam apposuit, ut scilicet +quatuor oves pro una ove redderentur. Adhuc autem boves difficilius +custodiuntur, quia habentur in agris, et non ita pascuntur gregatim +sicut oves. Et ideo adhuc hic maiorem poenam apposuit, ut scilicet +quinque boves pro uno bove redderentur. Et hoc dico, nisi forte +idem animal inventum fuerit vivens apud eum, quia tunc solum duplum +restituebat, sicut et in ceteris furtis; poterat enim haberi +praesumptio quod cogitaret restituere, ex quo vivum servasset. Vel +potest dici, secundum Glossam, quod bos habet quinque +utilitates, quia immolatur, arat, pascit carnibus, lactat, et +corium etiam diversis usibus ministrat, et ideo pro uno bove +quinque boves reddebantur. Ovis autem habet quatuor utilitates, +quia immolatur, pascit, lac dat, et lanam ministrat. Filius autem +contumax, non quia comedebat et bibebat, occidebatur, sed propter +contumaciam et rebellionem, quae semper morte puniebatur, ut dictum +est. Ille vero qui colligebat ligna in sabbato, lapidatus fuit +tanquam legis violator, quae sabbatum observari praecipiebat in +commemorationem fidei novitatis mundi, sicut supra dictum est. Unde +occisus fuit tanquam infidelis.
+ Reply to Objection 10: The Old Law inflicted the death penalty for the more grievous crimes, viz. for those which are committed against God, and + for murder, for stealing a man, irreverence towards one's parents, adultery and incest. In the case of thief of other things + it inflicted punishment by indemnification: while in the case of blows and mutilation it authorized punishment by retaliation; + and likewise for the sin of bearing false witness. In other faults of less + degree it prescribed the punishment of stripes or of public disgrace. +
The punishment of slavery was prescribed by the Law in two cases. First, in the case of a slave who was unwilling to avail + himself of the privilege granted by the Law, whereby he was free to depart in the seventh year of remission: wherefore he + was punished by remaining a slave for ever. Secondly, in the case of a thief, who had not wherewith to make restitution, as + stated in + Ex. 22:3. +
The punishment of absolute exile was not prescribed by the Law: because God was worshipped by that people alone, whereas + all other nations were given to idolatry: wherefore if any man were exiled from that people absolutely, he would be in danger + of falling into idolatry. For this reason it is related ( + 1 Kings 26:19) that David said to Saul: "They are cursed in the sight of the Lord, who have case me out this day, that I should not dwell + in the inheritance of + the Lord, saying: Go, serve strange gods." There was, however, a restricted sort of exile: for it is written in + Dt. 19:4 [*Cf. + Num. 35:25] that "he that striketh [Vulg.: 'killeth'] his neighbor ignorantly, and is proved to have had no hatred against him, shall + flee to one of the cities" of refuge and "abide there until the death of the high-priest." For then it became lawful for him + to return home, because when the whole people thus suffered a loss they + forgot their private quarrels, so that the next of kin of the slain were not so eager to kill the slayer. +
[38211] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 ad 10 Ad decimum +dicendum quod lex vetus poenam mortis inflixit in gravioribus +criminibus, scilicet in his quae contra Deum peccantur, et in +homicidio, et in furto hominum, et in irreverentia ad parentes, et +in adulterio, et in incestibus. In furto autem aliarum rerum +adhibuit poenam damni. In percussuris autem et mutilationibus +induxit poenam talionis; et similiter in peccato falsi testimonii. +In aliis autem minoribus culpis induxit poenam flagellationis vel +ignominiae. Poenam autem servitutis induxit in duobus casibus. In +uno quidem, quando, septimo anno remissionis, ille qui erat servus, +nolebat beneficio legis uti ut liber exiret. Unde pro poena ei +infligebatur ut in perpetuum servus remaneret. Secundo, +infligebatur furi, quando non habebat quod posset restituere, sicut +habetur Exod. XXII. Poenam autem exilii universaliter lex non +statuit. Quia in solo populo illo Deus colebatur, omnibus aliis +populis per idololatriam corruptis, unde si quis a populo illo +universaliter exclusus esset, daretur ei occasio idololatriae. Et +ideo I Reg. XXVI dicitur quod David dixit ad Saul, maledicti +sunt qui eiecerunt me hodie, ut non habitem in hereditate domini, +dicentes, vade, servi diis alienis. Erat tamen aliquod +particulare exilium. Dicitur enim Deut. XIX quod qui percusserit +proximum suum nesciens, et qui nullum contra ipsum habuisse odium +comprobatur, ad unam urbium refugii confugiebat, et ibi manebat +usque ad mortem summi sacerdotis. Tunc enim licebat ei redire ad +domum suam, quia in universali damno populi consueverunt +particulares irae sedari, et ita proximi defuncti non sic proni +erant ad eius occisionem.
+ Reply to Objection 11: Dumb animals were ordered to be slain, not on account of any fault of theirs; but as a punishment to their owners, who had + not safeguarded their beasts from these offenses. Hence the owner was more severely punished if his ox had butted anyone "yesterday + or the day before" (in which case steps might have been taken to butting suddenly). Or again, the animal was slain in detestation + of the sin; and lest men should be horrified at the sight + thereof. +
[38212] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 ad 11 Ad +undecimum dicendum quod animalia bruta mandabantur occidi, non +propter aliquam ipsorum culpam; sed in poenam dominorum, qui talia +animalia non custodierant ab huiusmodi peccatis. Et ideo magis +puniebatur dominus si bos cornupeta fuerat ab heri et +nudiustertius, in quo casu poterat occurri periculo; quam si subito +cornupeta efficeretur. Vel occidebantur animalia in detestationem +peccati; et ne ex eorum aspectu aliquis horror hominibus +incuteretur.
+ Reply to Objection 12: The literal reason for this commandment, as Rabbi Moses declares (Doct. Perplex. iii), was because the slayer was frequently + from the nearest city: wherefore the slaying of the calf was a means of investigating the hidden murder. This was brought + about in three ways. In the first place the elders of the city swore that they had taken every measure for safeguarding the + roads. Secondly, the owner of the heifer was indemnified for the slaying of his + beast, and if the murder was previously discovered, the beast was not slain. Thirdly, the place, where the heifer was slain, + remained uncultivated. Wherefore, in order to avoid this twofold loss, the men of the city would readily make known the murderer, + if they knew who he was: and it would seldom happen but that some word or sign would escape about the matter. Or again, this + was done in order to frighten people, in detestation of murder. Because the slaying of a heifer, which is a useful + animal and full of strength, especially before it has been put under the yoke, signified that whoever committed murder, however + useful and strong he might be, was to forfeit his life; and that, by a cruel death, which was implied by the striking off + of its head; and that the murderer, as vile and abject, was to be cut off from the fellowship of men, which was betokened + by the fact that the heifer after being slain was left to rot in a rough and uncultivated place. +
Mystically, the heifer taken from the herd signifies the flesh of Christ; which had not drawn a yoke, since it had done no + sin; nor did it plough the ground, i.e. it never knew the stain of revolt. The fact of the heifer being killed in an uncultivated + valley signified the despised death of Christ, whereby all sins are washed away, and the devil is shown to be the arch-murderer. +
[38213] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 ad 12 Ad +duodecimum dicendum quod ratio litteralis illius mandati fuit, ut +Rabbi Moyses dicit, quia frequenter interfector est de civitate +propinquiori. Unde occisio vitulae fiebat ad explorandum homicidium +occultum. Quod quidem fiebat per tria. Quorum unum est quod +seniores civitatis iurabant nihil se praetermisisse in custodia +viarum. Aliud est quia ille cuius erat vitula damnificabatur in +occisione animalis, et si prius manifestaretur homicidium, animal +non occideretur. Tertium est quia locus in quo occidebatur vitula, +remanebat incultus. Et ideo, ad evitandum utrumque damnum, homines +civitatis de facili manifestarent homicidam, si scirent, et raro +poterat esse quin aliqua verba vel iudicia super hoc facta essent. +Vel hoc fiebat ad terrorem, in detestationem homicidii. Per +occisionem enim vitulae, quae est animal utile et fortitudine +plenum, praecipue antequam laboret sub iugo, significabatur quod +quicumque homicidium fecisset, quamvis esset utilis et fortis, +occidendus erat; et morte crudeli, quod cervicis concisio +significabat; et quod tanquam vilis et abiectus a consortio hominum +excludendus erat, quod significabatur per hoc quod vitula occisa in +loco aspero et inculto relinquebatur, in putredinem convertenda. +Mystice autem per vitulam de armento significatur caro Christi; +quae non traxit iugum, quia non fecit peccatum; nec terram scidit +vomere, idest seditionis maculam non admisit. Per hoc autem quod in +valle inculta occidebatur, significabatur despecta mors Christi; +per quam purgantur omnia peccata, et Diabolus esse homicidii auctor +ostenditur.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts regarding foreigners were not suitably framed. For Peter said ( + Acts 10:34,35): "In very deed I perceive that God is not a respecter of persons, but in every nation, he that feareth Him and worketh justice + is acceptable to Him." But those who are acceptable to God should not be excluded from the Church of God. Therefore it is + unsuitably commanded ( + Dt. 23:3) that "the Ammonite and + the Moabite, even after the tenth generation, shall not enter into the church of the Lord for ever": whereas, on the other + hand, it is prescribed ( + Dt. 23:7) to be observed with regard to certain other nations: "Thou shalt not abhor the Edomite, because he is thy brother; nor the + Egyptian because thou wast a stranger in his land." +
[38214] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod iudicialia praecepta non sint +convenienter tradita quantum ad extraneos. Dicit enim Petrus, Act. +X, in veritate comperi quoniam non est acceptor personarum Deus; +sed in omni gente qui timet Deum et operatur iustitiam, acceptus +est illi. Sed illi qui sunt Deo accepti, non sunt ab Ecclesia +Dei excludendi. Inconvenienter igitur mandatur Deut. XXIII, quod +Ammonites et Moabites, etiam post decimam generationem, non +intrabunt Ecclesiam domini in aeternum; e contrario autem +ibidem praecipitur de quibusdam gentibus, non abominaberis +Idumaeum, quia frater tuus est; nec Aegyptium, quia advena fuisti +in terra eius.
+ Objection 2: Further, we do not deserve to be punished for those things which are not in our power. But it is not in man's power to be + an eunuch, or born of a prostitute. Therefore it is unsuitably commanded ( + Dt. 23:1,2) that "an eunuch and one born of a prostitute shalt not enter into the church of the Lord." +
[38215] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +ea quae non sunt in potestate nostra, non merentur aliquam poenam. +Sed quod homo sit eunuchus, vel ex scorto natus, non est in +potestate eius. Ergo inconvenienter mandatur Deut. XXIII, quod +eunuchus, et ex scorto natus, non ingrediatur Ecclesiam +domini.
+ Objection 3: Further, the Old Law mercifully forbade strangers to be molested: for it is written ( + Ex. 22:21): "Thou shalt not molest a stranger, nor afflict him; for yourselves also were strangers in the land of Egypt": and ( + Ex. 23:9): "Thou shalt not molest a stranger, for you know the hearts of strangers, for you also were strangers in the land of Egypt." + But it is an affliction to be burdened with usury. Therefore the Law + unsuitably permitted them ( + Dt. 23:19,20) to lend money to the stranger for usury. +
[38216] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +lex vetus misericorditer mandavit ut advenae non affligantur, +dicitur enim Exod. XXII, advenam non contristabis, neque +affliges eum, advenae enim et ipsi fuistis in terra Aegypti; et +XXIII, peregrino molestus non eris, scitis enim advenarum +animas, quia et ipsi peregrini fuistis in terra Aegypti. Sed ad +afflictionem alicuius pertinet quod usuris opprimatur. +Inconvenienter igitur lex permisit, Deut. XXIII, ut alienis ad +usuram pecuniam mutuarent.
+ Objection 4: Further, men are much more akin to us than trees. But we should show greater care and love for these things that are nearest + to us, according to + Ecclus. 13:19: "Every beast loveth its like: so also every man him that is nearest to himself." Therefore the Lord unsuitably commanded + ( + Dt. 20:13-19) that all the inhabitants of a captured hostile city were to be slain, but that the fruit-trees should not be cut down. +
[38217] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 arg. 4 Praeterea, +multo magis appropinquant nobis homines quam arbores. Sed his quae +sunt nobis magis propinqua, magis debemus affectum et effectum +dilectionis impendere; secundum illud Eccli. XIII, omne animal +diligit simile sibi, sic et omnis homo proximum sibi. +Inconvenienter igitur dominus, Deut. XX, mandavit quod de +civitatibus hostium captis omnes interficerent, et tamen arbores +fructiferas non succiderent.
+ Objection 5: Further, every one should prefer the common good of virtue to the good of the individual. But the common good is sought in + a war which men fight against their enemies. Therefore it is unsuitably commanded ( + Dt. 20:5-7) that certain men should be sent home, for instance a man that had built a new house, or who had planted a vineyard, or who + had married a wife. +
[38218] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 arg. 5 Praeterea, +bonum commune secundum virtutem est bono privato praeferendum ab +unoquoque. Sed in bello quod committitur contra hostes, quaeritur +bonum commune. Inconvenienter igitur mandatur Deut. XX, quod, +imminente proelio, aliqui domum remittantur, puta qui aedificavit +domum novam, qui plantavit vineam, vel qui despondit uxorem.
+ Objection 6: Further, no man should profit by his own fault. But it is a man's fault if he be timid or faint-hearted: since this is contrary + to the virtue of fortitude. Therefore the timid and faint-hearted are unfittingly excused from the toil of battle ( + Dt. 20:8). +
[38219] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 arg. 6 Praeterea, +ex culpa non debet quis commodum reportare. Sed quod homo sit +formidolosus et corde pavido, culpabile est, contrariatur enim +virtuti fortitudinis. Inconvenienter igitur a labore proelii +excusabantur formidolosi et pavidum cor habentes.
+ On the contrary, Divine Wisdom declares ( + Prov. 8:8): "All my words are just, there is nothing wicked nor perverse in them." +
[38220] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod sapientia divina dicit, Prov. VIII, recti sunt omnes +sermones mei, non est in eis pravum quid neque perversum.
+ I answer that, Man's relations with foreigners are twofold: peaceful, and hostile: and in directing both kinds of relation the Law contained + suitable precepts. For the Jews were offered three opportunities of peaceful relations with foreigners. First, when foreigners + passed through their land as travelers. Secondly, when they came to dwell in their land as newcomers. And in both these respects + the Law made kind provision in its precepts: for it is written ( + Ex. + 22:21 + ): "Thou shalt not molest a stranger [advenam]"; and again ( + Ex. 22:9): "Thou shalt not molest a stranger [peregrino]." Thirdly, when any foreigners wished to be admitted entirely to their fellowship + and mode of worship. With regard to these a certain order was observed. For they were not at once admitted to citizenship: + just as it was law with some nations that no one was deemed a citizen except after two or three generations, as the Philosopher + says (Polit. + iii, 1). The reason for this was that if foreigners were allowed to meddle with the affairs of a nation as soon as they settled + down in its midst, many dangers might occur, since the foreigners not yet having the common good firmly at heart might attempt + something hurtful to the people. Hence it was that the Law prescribed in respect of certain nations that had close relations + with the Jews (viz., the Egyptians among whom they were born and educated, and the Idumeans, the children of Esau, + Jacob's brother), that they should be admitted to the fellowship of the people after the third generation; whereas others + (with whom their relations had been hostile, such as the Ammonites and Moabites) were never to be admitted to citizenship; + while the Amalekites, who were yet more hostile to them, and had no fellowship of kindred with them, were to be held as foes + in perpetuity: for it is written ( + Ex. 17:16): "The war of the Lord shall be against Amalec from generation + to generation." +
In like manner with regard to hostile relations with foreigners, the Law contained suitable precepts. For, in the first place, + it commanded that war should be declared for a just cause: thus it is commanded ( + Dt. 20:10) that when they advanced to besiege a city, they should at first make an offer of peace. Secondly, it enjoined that when + once they had entered on a war they should undauntedly persevere in it, putting their trust in God. And in order that they + might be the more heedful of this command, it ordered that on the approach of battle the priest should hearten them by promising + them God's aid. Thirdly, it prescribed the removal of whatever might prove an obstacle to the fight, and that certain men, + who might be in the way, should be sent home. Fourthly, it enjoined that they should use moderation in pursuing the advantage + of victory, by sparing women and children, and by not cutting down fruit-trees of that country. +
[38221] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod cum extraneis potest esse hominum conversatio +dupliciter, uno modo, pacifice; alio modo, hostiliter. Et quantum +ad utrumque modum ordinandum, lex convenientia praecepta +continebat. Tripliciter enim offerebatur Iudaeis occasio ut cum +extraneis pacifice communicarent. Primo quidem, quando extranei per +terram eorum transitum faciebant quasi peregrini. Alio modo, quando +in terram eorum adveniebant ad inhabitandum sicut advenae. Et +quantum ad utrumque, lex misericordiae praecepta proposuit, nam +Exod. XXII dicitur, advenam non contristabis; et XXIII +dicitur, peregrino molestus non eris. Tertio vero, quando +aliqui extranei totaliter in eorum consortium et ritum admitti +volebant. Et in his quidam ordo attendebatur. Non enim statim +recipiebantur quasi cives, sicut etiam apud quosdam gentilium +statutum erat ut non reputarentur cives nisi qui ex avo, vel abavo, +cives existerent, ut philosophus dicit, in III Polit. Et hoc ideo +quia, si statim extranei advenientes reciperentur ad tractandum ea +quae sunt populi, possent multa pericula contingere; dum extranei, +non habentes adhuc amorem firmatum ad bonum publicum, aliqua contra +populum attentarent. Et ideo lex statuit ut de quibusdam gentibus +habentibus aliquam affinitatem ad Iudaeos, scilicet de Aegyptiis, +apud quos nati fuerant et nutriti, et de Idumaeis, filiis Esau +fratris Iacob, in tertia generatione reciperentur in consortium +populi; quidam vero, quia hostiliter se ad eos habuerant, sicut +Ammonitae et Moabitae, nunquam in consortium populi admitterentur; +Amalecitae autem, qui magis eis fuerant adversati, et cum eis +nullum cognationis habebant consortium, quasi hostes perpetui +haberentur; dicitur enim Exod. XVII, bellum Dei erit contra +Amalec a generatione in generationem. Similiter etiam quantum +ad hostilem communicationem cum extraneis, lex convenientia +praecepta tradidit. Nam primo quidem, instituit ut bellum iuste +iniretur, mandatur enim Deut. XX, quod quando accederent ad +expugnandum civitatem, offerrent ei primum pacem. Secundo, +instituit ut fortiter bellum susceptum exequerentur, habentes de +Deo fiduciam. Et ad hoc melius observandum, instituit quod, +imminente proelio, sacerdos eos confortaret, promittendo auxilium +Dei. Tertio, mandavit ut impedimenta proelii removerentur, +remittendo quosdam ad domum, qui possent impedimenta praestare. +Quarto, instituit ut victoria moderate uterentur, parcendo +mulieribus et parvulis, et etiam ligna fructifera regionis non +incidendo.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The Law excluded the men of no nation from the worship of God and from things pertaining to the welfare of the soul: for + it is written ( + Ex. 12:48): "If any stranger be willing to dwell among you, and to keep the Phase of the Lord; all his males shall first be circumcised, + and then shall he celebrate it according to the manner, and he shall be as that which is born in the land." But in temporal + matters concerning the public life of + the people, admission was not granted to everyone at once, for the reason given above: but to some, i.e. the Egyptians and + Idumeans, in the third generation; while others were excluded in perpetuity, in detestation of their past offense, i.e. the + peoples of Moab, Ammon, and Amalec. For just as one man is punished for a sin committed by him, in order that others seeing + this may be deterred and refrain from sinning; so too may one nation or city be punished for a crime, that others may refrain + from similar crimes. +
Nevertheless it was possible by dispensation for a man to be admitted to citizenship on account of some act of virtue: thus + it is related ( + Judith 14:6) that Achior, the captain of the children of Ammon, "was joined to the people of Israel, with all the succession of his kindred." + The same applies to Ruth the Moabite who was "a virtuous woman" ( + Ruth 3:11): although it may be said that this prohibition regarded men and not women, who are not competent to be + citizens absolutely speaking. +
[38222] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod homines nullius gentis exclusit lex a cultu Dei +et ab his quae pertinent ad animae salutem, dicitur enim Exod. XII, +si quis peregrinorum in vestram voluerit transire coloniam, et +facere phase domini; circumcidetur prius omne masculinum eius, et +tunc rite celebrabit, eritque simul sicut indigena terrae. Sed +in temporalibus, quantum ad ea quae pertinebant ad communitatem +populi, non statim quilibet admittebatur, ratione supra dicta, sed +quidam in tertia generatione, scilicet Aegyptii et Idumaei; alii +vero perpetuo excludebantur, in detestationem culpae praeteritae, +sicut Moabitae et Ammonitae et Amalecitae. Sicut enim punitur unus +homo propter peccatum quod commisit, ut alii videntes timeant et +peccare desistant; ita etiam propter aliquod peccatum gens vel +civitas potest puniri, ut alii a simili peccato abstineant. Poterat +tamen dispensative aliquis in collegium populi admitti propter +aliquem virtutis actum, sicut Iudith XIV dicitur quod Achior, dux +filiorum Ammon, appositus est ad populum Israel, et omnis +successio generis eius. Et similiter Ruth Moabitis, quae mulier +virtutis erat. Licet possit dici quod illa prohibitio extendebatur +ad viros, non ad mulieres, quibus non competit simpliciter esse +cives.
+ Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 3), a man is said to be a citizen in two ways: first, simply; secondly, in a restricted + sense. A man is a citizen simply if he has all the rights of citizenship, for instance, the right of debating or voting in + the popular assembly. On the other hand, any man may be called citizen, only in a restricted sense, if he dwells within the + state, even common people or children or old men, who are not fit to enjoy power in + matters pertaining to the common weal. For this reason bastards, by reason of their base origin, were excluded from the "ecclesia," + i.e. from the popular assembly, down to the tenth generation. The same applies to eunuchs, who were not competent to receive + the honor due to a father, especially among the Jews, where the divine worship was continued through carnal generation: for + even among the heathens, those who had many children were marked with special honor, as the Philosopher remarks + (Polit. ii, 6). Nevertheless, in matters pertaining to the grace of God, eunuchs were not discriminated from others, as neither + were strangers, as already stated: for it is written ( + Isa. 56:3): "Let not the son of the stranger that adhereth to the Lord speak, saying: The Lord will divide and separate me from His + people. And let not the eunuch say: Behold I am a dry tree." +
[38223] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in III Polit., dupliciter +aliquis dicitur esse civis, uno modo, simpliciter; et alio modo, +secundum quid. Simpliciter quidem civis est qui potest agere ea +quae sunt civium, puta dare consilium vel iudicium in populo. +Secundum quid autem civis dici potest quicumque civitatem +inhabitat, etiam viles personae et pueri et senes, qui non sunt +idonei ad hoc quod habeant potestatem in his quae pertinent ad +commune. Ideo ergo spurii, propter vilitatem originis, +excludebantur ab Ecclesia, idest a collegio populi, usque ad +decimam generationem. Et similiter eunuchi, quibus non poterat +competere honor qui patribus debebatur, et praecipue in populo +Iudaeorum, in quo Dei cultus conservabatur per carnis generationem, +nam etiam apud gentiles, qui multos filios genuerant, aliquo +insigni honore donabantur, sicut philosophus dicit, in II Polit. +Tamen quantum ad ea quae ad gratiam Dei pertinent, eunuchi ab aliis +non separabantur, sicut nec advenae, ut dictum est, dicitur enim +Isaiae LVI, non dicat filius advenae qui adhaeret domino, +dicens, separatione dividet me dominus a populo suo. Et non dicat +eunuchus, ecce ego lignum aridum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: It was not the intention of the Law to sanction the acceptance of usury from strangers, but only to tolerate it on account + of the proneness of the Jews to avarice; and in order to promote an amicable feeling towards those out of whom they made a + profit. +
[38224] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod accipere usuras ab alienis non erat secundum +intentionem legis, sed ex quadam permissione, propter pronitatem +Iudaeorum ad avaritiam; et ut magis pacifice se haberent ad +extraneos, a quibus lucrabantur.
+ Reply to Objection 4: A distinction was observed with regard to hostile cities. For some of them were far distant, and were not among those which + had been promised to them. When they had taken these cities, they killed all the men who had fought against God's people; + whereas the women and children were spared. But in the neighboring cities which had been promised to them, all were ordered + to be slain, on account of their former crimes, to punish which God sent the + Israelites as executor of Divine justice: for it is written ( + Dt. 9:5) "because they have done wickedly, they are destroyed at thy coming in." The fruit-trees were commanded to be left untouched, + for the use of the people themselves, to whom the city with its territory was destined to be subjected. +
[38225] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod circa civitates hostium quaedam distinctio +adhibebatur. Quaedam enim erant remotae, non de numero illarum +urbium quae eis erant repromissae, et in talibus urbibus expugnatis +occidebantur masculi, qui pugnaverant contra populum Dei; +mulieribus autem et infantibus parcebatur. Sed in civitatibus +vicinis, quae erant eis repromissae omnes mandabantur interfici, +propter iniquitates eorum priores, ad quas puniendas dominus +populum Israel quasi divinae iustitiae executorem mittebat, dicitur +enim Deut. IX, quia illae egerunt impie, introeunte te deletae +sunt. Ligna autem fructifera mandabantur reservari propter +utilitatem ipsius populi, cuius ditioni civitas et eius territorium +erat subiiciendum.
+ Reply to Objection 5: The builder of a new house, the planter of a vineyard, the newly married husband, were excluded from fighting, for two reasons. + First, because man is wont to give all his affection to those things which he has lately acquired, or is on the point of having, + and consequently he is apt to dread the loss of these above other things. Wherefore it was likely enough that on account of + this affection they would fear death all the more, and be so much the less + brave in battle. Secondly, because, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 5), "it is a misfortune for a man if he is prevented + from obtaining something good when it is within his grasp." And so lest the surviving relations should be the more grieved + at the death of these men who had not entered into the possession of the good things prepared for them; and also lest the + people should be horror-stricken at the sight of their misfortune: these men were taken away from the danger of death by being + removed from the battle. +
[38226] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 ad 5 Ad quintum +dicendum quod novus aedificator domus, aut plantator vineae, vel +desponsator uxoris, excludebatur a proelio propter duo. Primo +quidem, quia ea quae homo de novo habet, vel statim paratus est ad +habendum, magis solet amare, et per consequens eorum amissionem +timere. Unde probabile erat quod ex tali amore magis mortem +timerent, et sic minus fortes essent ad pugnandum. Secundo quia, +sicut philosophus dicit, in II Physic., infortunium videtur +quando aliquis appropinquat ad aliquod bonum habendum, si postea +impediatur ab illo. Et ideo ne propinqui remanentes magis +contristarentur de morte talium, qui bonis sibi paratis potiti non +fuerunt; et etiam populus, considerans hoc, horreret; huiusmodi +homines a mortis periculo sunt sequestrati per subtractionem a +proelio.
+ Reply to Objection 6: The timid were sent back home, not that they might be the gainers thereby; but lest the people might be the losers by their + presence, since their timidity and flight might cause others to be afraid and run away. +
[38227] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 ad 6 Ad sextum +dicendum quod timidi remittebantur ad domum, non ut ipsi ex hoc +commodum consequerentur; sed ne populus ex eorum praesentia +incommodum consequeretur, dum per eorum timorem et fugam etiam alii +ad timendum et fugiendum provocarentur.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law set forth unsuitable precepts about the members of the household. For a slave "is in every + respect his master's property," as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 2). But that which is a man's property should be his + always. Therefore it was unfitting for the Law to command ( + Ex. 21:2) that slaves should "go out free" in the seventh year. +
[38228] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter lex vetus praecepta +ediderit circa personas domesticas. Servus enim id quod est, domini +est, ut philosophus dicit, in I Polit. Sed id quod est alicuius, +perpetuo eius esse debet. Ergo inconvenienter lex mandavit Exod. +XXI, quod servi septimo anno liberi abscederent.
+ Objection 2: Further, a slave is his master's property, just as an animal, e.g. an ass or an ox. But it is commanded ( + Dt. 22:1-3) with regard to animals, that they should be brought back to the owner if they be found going astray. Therefore it was unsuitably + commanded ( + Dt. 23:15): "Thou shalt not deliver to his master the servant that is fled to thee." +
[38229] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +sicut animal aliquod, ut asinus aut bos, est possessio domini, ita +etiam servus. Sed de animalibus praecipitur Deut. XXII, quod +restituantur dominis suis, si errare inveniantur. Inconvenienter +ergo mandatur Deut. XXIII, non tradas servum domino suo, qui ad +te confugerit.
+ Objection 3: Further, the Divine Law should encourage mercy more even than the human law. But according to human laws those who ill-treat + their servants and maidservants are severely punished: and the worse treatment of all seems to be that which results in death. + Therefore it is unfittingly commanded ( + Ex. 21:20,21) that "he that striketh his bondman or bondwoman with a rod, and they die under his hands . . . if the party remain alive + a day . . . he + shall not be subject to the punishment, because it is his money." +
[38230] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +lex divina debet magis ad misericordiam provocare quam etiam lex +humana. Sed secundum leges humanas graviter puniuntur qui nimis +aspere affligunt servos aut ancillas. Asperrima autem videtur esse +afflictio ex qua sequitur mors. Inconvenienter igitur statuitur +Exod. XXI, quod qui percusserit servum suum vel ancillam virga, +si uno die supervixerit, non subiacebit poenae, quia pecunia illius +est.
+ Objection 4: Further, the dominion of a master over his slave differs from that of the father over his son (Polit. i, 3). But the dominion + of master over slave gives the former the right to sell his servant or maidservant. Therefore it was unfitting for the Law + to allow a man to sell his daughter to be a servant or handmaid ( + Ex. 21:7). +
[38231] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 arg. 4 Praeterea, +alius est principatus domini ad servum, et patris ad filium, ut +dicitur in I et III Polit. Sed hoc ad principatum domini ad servum +pertinet, ut aliquis servum vel ancillam vendere possit. +Inconvenienter igitur lex permisit quod aliquis venderet filiam +suam in famulam vel ancillam.
+ Objection 5: Further, a father has power over his son. But he who has power over the sinner has the right to punish him for his offenses. + Therefore it is unfittingly commanded ( + Dt. 21:18, seqq.) that a father should bring his son to the ancients of the city for punishment. +
[38232] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 arg. 5 Praeterea, +pater habet sui filii potestatem. Sed eius est punire excessus, qui +habet potestatem super peccantem. Inconvenienter igitur mandatur +Deut. XXI, quod pater ducat filium ad seniores civitatis +puniendum.
+ Objection 6: Further, the Lord forbade them ( + Dt. 7:3, seqq.) to make marriages with strange nations; and commanded the dissolution of such as had been contracted ( + 1 Esdras 10). Therefore it was unfitting to allow them to marry captive women from strange nations ( + Dt. 21:10, seqq.). +
[38233] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 arg. 6 Praeterea, +dominus prohibuit, Deut. VII, ut cum alienigenis non sociarent +coniugia; et coniuncta etiam separarentur, ut patet I Esdrae X. +Inconvenienter igitur Deut. XXI conceditur eis ut captivas +alienigenarum ducere possint uxores.
+ Objection 7: Further, the Lord forbade them to marry within certain degrees of consanguinity and affinity, according to + Lev. 18. Therefore it was unsuitably commanded ( + Dt. 25:5) that if any man died without issue, his brother should marry his wife. +
[38234] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 arg. 7 Praeterea, +dominus in uxoribus ducendis quosdam consanguinitatis et +affinitatis gradus praecepit esse vitandos, ut patet Lev. XVIII. +Inconvenienter igitur mandatur Deut. XXV, quod si aliquis esset +mortuus absque liberis, uxorem ipsius frater eius acciperet.
+ Objection 8: Further, as there is the greatest familiarity between man and wife, so should there be the staunchest fidelity. But this + is impossible if the marriage bond can be sundered. Therefore it was unfitting for the Lord to allow ( + Dt. 24:1-4) a man to put his wife away, by writing a bill of divorce; and besides, that he could not take her again to wife. +
[38235] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 arg. 8 Praeterea, +inter virum et uxorem, sicut est maxima familiaritas, ita debet +esse firmissima fides. Sed hoc non potest esse, si matrimonium +dissolubile fuerit. Inconvenienter igitur dominus permisit, Deut. +XXIV, quod aliquis posset uxorem dimittere, scripto libello +repudii; et quod etiam ulterius eam recuperare non posset.
+ Objection 9: Further, just as a wife can be faithless to her husband, so can a slave be to his master, and a son to his father. But the + Law did not command any sacrifice to be offered in order to investigate the injury done by a servant to his master, or by + a son to his father. Therefore it seems to have been superfluous for the Law to prescribe the "sacrifice of jealousy" in order + to investigate a wife's adultery ( + Num. 5:12, seqq.). Consequently it + seems that the Law put forth unsuitable judicial precepts about the members of the household. +
[38236] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 arg. 9 Praeterea, +sicut uxor potest frangere fidem marito, ita etiam servus domino, +et filius patri. Sed ad investigandam iniuriam servi in dominum, +vel filii in patrem, non est institutum in lege aliquod +sacrificium. Superflue igitur videtur institui sacrificium +zelotypiae ad investigandum uxoris adulterium, Num. V. Sic igitur +inconvenienter videntur esse tradita in lege praecepta iudicialia +circa personas domesticas.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Ps. 18:10): "The judgments of the Lord are true, justified in themselves." +
[38237] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur in Psalmo XVIII, iudicia domini vera, +iustificata in semetipsa.
+ I answer that, The mutual relations of the members of a household regard everyday actions directed to the necessities of life, as the Philosopher + states (Polit. i, 1). Now the preservation of man's life may be considered from two points of view. First, from the point + of view of the individual, i.e. in so far as man preserves his individuality: and for the purpose of the preservation of life, + considered from this standpoint, man has at his service external goods, by means + of which he provides himself with food and clothing and other such necessaries of life: in the handling of which he has need + of servants. Secondly man's life is preserved from the point of view of the species, by means of generation, for which purpose + man needs a wife, that she may bear him children. Accordingly the mutual relations of the members of a household admit of + a threefold combination: viz. those of master and servant, those of husband and wife, and those of father and son: and in + respect of all these relationships the Old Law contained fitting precepts. Thus, with regard to servants, it commanded them + to be treated with moderation---both as to their work, lest, to wit, they should be burdened with excessive labor, wherefore + the Lord commanded ( + Dt. 5:14) that on the Sabbath day "thy manservant and thy maidservant" should "rest even as thyself"---and also as to the infliction + of punishment, for it ordered those who maimed their servants, to set them + free ( + Ex. 21:26,27). Similar provision was made in favor of a maidservant when married to anyone ( + Ex. 21:7, seqq.). Moreover, with regard to those servants in particular who were taken from among the people, the Law prescribed that + they should go out free in the seventh year taking whatever they brought with them, even their clothes ( + Ex. 21:2, seqq.): and furthermore it was commanded ( + Dt. 15:13) that they should + be given provision for the journey. +
With regard to wives the Law made certain prescriptions as to those who were to be taken in marriage: for instance, that + they should marry a wife from their own tribe ( + Num. 36:6): and this lest confusion should ensue in the property of various tribes. Also that a man should marry the wife of his deceased + brother when the latter died without issue, as prescribed in + Dt. 25:5,6: and this in order that he who could not have successors + according to carnal origin, might at least have them by a kind of adoption, and that thus the deceased might not be entirely + forgotten. It also forbade them to marry certain women; to wit, women of strange nations, through fear of their losing their + faith; and those of their near kindred, on account of the natural respect due to them. Furthermore it prescribed in what way + wives were to be treated after marriage. To wit, that they should not be slandered without grave reason: wherefore it + ordered punishment to be inflicted on the man who falsely accused his wife of a crime ( + Dt. 22:13, seqq.). Also that a man's hatred of his wife should not be detrimental to his son ( + Dt. 21:15, seqq.). Again, that a man should not ill-use his wife through hatred of her, but rather that he should write a bill of divorce + and send her away ( + Dt. 24:1). Furthermore, in order to foster conjugal love from the very outset, it was prescribed + that no public duties should be laid on a recently married man, so that he might be free to rejoice with his wife. +
With regard to children, the Law commanded parents to educate them by instructing them in the faith: hence it is written + ( + Ex. 12:26, seqq.): "When your children shall say to you: What is the meaning of this service? You shall say to them: It is the victim + of the passage of the Lord." Moreover, they are commanded to teach them the rules of right conduct: wherefore it is written + ( + Dt. 21:20) that the parents had to say: "He slighteth + hearing our admonitions, he giveth himself to revelling and to debauchery." +
[38238] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod communio domesticarum personarum ad invicem, ut +philosophus dicit, in I Polit., est secundum quotidianos actus qui +ordinantur ad necessitatem vitae. Vita autem hominis conservatur +dupliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad individuum, prout scilicet homo +idem numero vivit, et ad talem vitae conservationem opitulantur +homini exteriora bona, ex quibus homo habet victum et vestitum et +alia huiusmodi necessaria vitae; in quibus administrandis indiget +homo servis. Alio modo conservatur vita hominis secundum speciem +per generationem, ad quam indiget homo uxore, ut ex ea generet +filium. Sic igitur in domestica communione sunt tres combinationes, +scilicet domini ad servum, viri ad uxorem, patris ad filium. Et +quantum ad omnia ista lex vetus convenientia praecepta tradidit. +Nam quantum ad servos, instituit ut modeste tractarentur et quantum +ad labores, ne scilicet immoderatis laboribus affligerentur, unde +Deut. V, dominus mandavit ut in die sabbati requiesceret servus et +ancilla tua sicut et tu, et iterum quantum ad poenas infligendas, +imposuit enim poenam mutilatoribus servorum ut dimitterent eos +liberos, sicut habetur Exod. XXI. Et simile etiam statuit in +ancilla quam in uxorem aliquis duxerit. Statuit etiam specialiter +circa servos qui erant ex populo, ut septimo anno liberi +egrederentur cum omnibus quae apportaverant, etiam vestimentis, ut +habetur Exod. XXI. Mandatur etiam insuper Deut. XV, ut ei detur +viaticum. Circa uxores vero, statuitur in lege quantum ad uxores +ducendas. Ut scilicet ducant uxores suae tribus, sicut habetur Num. +ult., et hoc ideo, ne sortes tribuum confundantur. Et quod aliquis +in uxorem ducat uxorem fratris defuncti sine liberis, ut habetur +Deut. XXV, et hoc ideo, ut ille qui non potuit habere successores +secundum carnis originem, saltem habeat per quandam adoptionem, et +sic non totaliter memoria defuncti deleretur. Prohibuit etiam +quasdam personas ne in coniugium ducerentur, scilicet alienigenas, +propter periculum seductionis; et propinquas, propter reverentiam +naturalem quae eis debetur. Statuit etiam qualiter uxores iam +ductae tractari deberent. Ut scilicet non leviter infamarentur, +unde mandatur puniri ille qui falso crimen imponit uxori, ut +habetur Deut. XXII. Et quod etiam propter uxoris odium filius +detrimentum non pateretur, ut habetur Deut. XXI. Et etiam quod, +propter odium uxorem non affligeret, sed potius, scripto libello, +eam dimitteret, ut patet Deut. XXIV. Et ut etiam maior dilectio +inter coniuges a principio contrahatur, praecipitur quod, cum +aliquis nuper uxorem acceperit, nihil ei publicae necessitatis +iniungatur, ut libere possit laetari cum uxore sua. Circa filios +autem, instituit ut patres eis disciplinam adhiberent, instruendo +eos in fide, unde habetur Exod. XII, cum dixerint vobis filii +vestri, quae est ista religio? Dicetis eis, victima transitus +domini est. Et quod etiam instruerent eos in moribus, unde +dicitur Deut. XXI, quod patres dicere debent, monita nostra +audire contemnit, commessationibus vacat et luxuriae atque +conviviis.
+ Reply to Objection 1: As the children of Israel had been delivered by the Lord from slavery, and for this reason were bound to the service of God, + He did not wish them to be slaves in perpetuity. Hence it is written ( + Lev. 25:39, seqq.): "If thy brother, constrained by poverty, sell himself to thee, thou shalt not oppress him with the service of bondservants: + but he shall be as a hireling and a sojourner . . . for they are My servants, and I brought them out of the land of + Egypt: let them not be sold as bondmen": and consequently, since they were slaves, not absolutely but in a restricted sense, + after a lapse of time they were set free. +
[38239] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, quia filii Israel erant a domino de servitute +liberati, et per hoc divinae servituti addicti, noluit dominus ut +in perpetuum servi essent. Unde dicitur Lev. XXV, si paupertate +compulsus vendiderit se tibi frater tuus, non eum opprimes +servitute famulorum, sed quasi mercenarius et colonus erit. Mei +enim sunt servi, et ego eduxi eos de terra Aegypti, non veneant +conditione servorum. Et ideo, quia simpliciter servi non erant, +sed secundum quid, finito tempore, dimittebantur liberi.
+ Reply to Objection 2: This commandment is to be understood as referring to a servant whom his master seeks to kill, or to help him in committing + some sin. +
[38240] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod mandatum illud intelligitur de servo qui a domino +quaeritur ad occidendum, vel ad aliquod peccati ministerium.
+ Reply to Objection 3: With regard to the ill-treatment of servants, the Law seems to have taken into consideration whether it was certain or not: + since if it were certain, the Law fixed a penalty: for maiming, the penalty was forfeiture of the servant, who was ordered + to be given his liberty: while for slaying, the punishment was that of a murderer, when the slave died under the blow of his + master. If, however, the hurt was not certain, but only probable, the Law did not + impose any penalty as regards a man's own servant: for instance if the servant did not die at once after being struck, but + after some days: for it would be uncertain whether he died as a result of the blows he received. For when a man struck a free + man, yet so that he did not die at once, but "walked abroad again upon his staff," he that struck him was quit of murder, + even though afterwards he died. Nevertheless he was bound to pay the doctor's fees incurred by the victim of his assault. + But + this was not the case if a man killed his own servant: because whatever the servant had, even his very person, was the property + of his master. Hence the reason for his not being subject to a pecuniary penalty is set down as being "because it is his money." +
[38241] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod circa laesiones servis illatas, lex considerasse +videtur utrum sit certa vel incerta. Si enim laesio certa esset, +lex poenam adhibuit, pro mutilatione quidem, amissionem servi qui +mandabatur libertati donandus; pro morte autem, homicidii poenam, +cum servus in manu domini verberantis moreretur. Si vero laesio non +esset certa, sed aliquam apparentiam haberet, lex nullam poenam +infligebat in proprio servo, puta cum percussus servus non statim +moriebatur, sed post aliquos dies. Incertum enim erat utrum ex +percussione mortuus esset. Quia si percussisset liberum hominem, +ita tamen quod statim non moreretur, sed super baculum suum +ambularet, non erat homicidii reus qui percusserat, etiam si postea +moreretur. Tenebatur tamen ad impensas solvendas quas percussus in +medicos fecerat. Sed hoc in servo proprio locum non habebat, quia +quidquid servus habebat, et etiam ipsa persona servi, erat quaedam +possessio domini. Et ideo pro causa assignatur quare non subiaceat +poenae pecuniariae, quia pecunia illius est.
+ Reply to Objection 4: As stated above (ad 1), no Jew could own a Jew as a slave absolutely: but only in a restricted sense, as a hireling for a + fixed time. And in this way the Law permitted that through stress of poverty a man might sell his son or daughter. This is + shown by the very words of the Law, where we read: "If any man sell his daughter to be a servant, she shall not go out as + bondwomen are wont to go out." Moreover, in this way a man might sell not only his son, + but even himself, rather as a hireling than as a slave, according to + Lev. 25:39,40: "If thy brother, constrained by poverty, sell himself to thee, thou shalt not oppress him with the service of bondservants: + but he shall be as a hireling and a sojourner." +
[38242] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, nullus Iudaeus poterat possidere +Iudaeum quasi simpliciter servum; sed erat servus secundum quid, +quasi mercenarius, usque ad tempus. Et per hunc modum permittebat +lex quod, paupertate cogente, aliquis filium aut filiam venderet. +Et hoc etiam verba ipsius legis ostendunt, dicit enim, si quis +vendiderit filiam suam in famulam, non egredietur sicut ancillae +exire consueverunt. Per hunc etiam modum non solum filium, sed +etiam seipsum aliquis vendere poterat, magis quasi mercenarium quam +quasi servum; secundum illud Levit. XXV, si paupertate compulsus +vendiderit se tibi frater tuus, non eum opprimes servitute +famulorum, sed quasi mercenarius et colonus erit.
+ Reply to Objection 5: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 9), the paternal authority has the power only of admonition; but not that of coercion, + whereby rebellious and headstrong persons can be compelled. Hence in this case the Lord commanded the stubborn son to be punished + by the rulers of the city. +
[38243] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 ad 5 Ad quintum +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., principatus +paternus habet solam admonendi potestatem; non autem habet vim +coactivam, per quam rebelles et contumaces comprimi possunt. Et +ideo in hoc casu lex mandabat ut filius contumax a principibus +civitatis puniretur.
+ Reply to Objection 6: The Lord forbade them to marry strange women on account of the danger of seduction, lest they should be led astray into idolatry. + And specially did this prohibition apply with respect to those nations who dwelt near them, because it was more probable that + they would adopt their religious practices. When, however, the woman was willing to renounce idolatry, and become an adherent + of the Law, it was lawful to take her in marriage: as was the case with + Ruth whom Booz married. Wherefore she said to her mother-in-law ( + Ruth 1:16): "Thy people shall be my people, and thy God my God." Accordingly it was not permitted to marry a captive woman unless she + first shaved her hair, and pared her nails, and put off the raiment wherein she was taken, and mourned for her father and + mother, in token that she renounced idolatry for ever. +
[38244] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 ad 6 Ad sextum +dicendum quod dominus alienigenas prohibuit in matrimonium duci +propter periculum seductionis, ne inducerentur in idololatriam. Et +specialiter hoc prohibuit de illis gentibus quae in vicino +habitabant, de quibus erat magis probabile quod suos ritus +retinerent. Si qua vero idololatriae cultum dimittere vellet, et ad +legis cultum se transferre, poterat in matrimonium duci, sicut +patet de Ruth, quam duxit Booz in uxorem. Unde ipsa dixerat socrui +suae, populus tuus populus meus, Deus tuus Deus meus, ut +habetur Ruth I. Et ideo captiva non aliter permittebatur in uxorem +duci nisi prius rasa caesarie, et circumcisis unguibus, et deposita +veste in qua capta est, et fleret patrem et matrem, per quae +significatur idololatriae perpetua abiectio.
+ Reply to Objection 7: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xlviii super Matth.), "because death was an unmitigated evil for the Jews, who did everything with + a view to the present life, it was ordained that children should be born to the dead man through his brother: thus affording + a certain mitigation to his death. It was not, however, ordained that any other than his brother or one next of kin should + marry the wife of the deceased, because" the offspring of this union "would not be + looked upon as that of the deceased: and moreover, a stranger would not be under the obligation to support the household of + the deceased, as his brother would be bound to do from motives of justice on account of his relationship." Hence it is evident + that in marrying the wife of his dead brother, he took his dead brother's place. +
[38245] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 ad 7 Ad septimum +dicendum quod, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., quia +immitigabile malum mors erat apud Iudaeos, qui omnia pro praesenti +vita faciebant, statutum fuit ut defuncto filius nasceretur ex +fratre, quod erat quaedam mortis mitigatio. Non autem alius quam +frater vel propinquus iubebatur accipere uxorem defuncti, quia non +ita crederetur (qui ex tali coniunctione erat nasciturus) +esse filius eius qui obiit; et iterum extraneus non ita haberet +necessitatem statuere domum eius qui obierat, sicut frater, cui +etiam ex cognatione hoc facere iustum erat. Ex quo patet quod +frater in accipiendo uxorem fratris sui, persona fratris defuncti +fungebatur.
+ Reply to Objection 8: The Law permitted a wife to be divorced, not as though it were just absolutely speaking, but on account of the Jews' hardness + of heart, as Our Lord declared ( + Mat. 19:8). Of this, however, we must speak more fully in the treatise on Matrimony ( + SP, Q[67]). +
[38246] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 ad 8 Ad octavum +dicendum quod lex permisit repudium uxoris, non quia simpliciter +iustum esset, sed propter duritiam Iudaeorum; ut dominus dicit, +Matth. XIX. Sed de hoc oportet plenius tractari cum de matrimonio +agetur.
+ Reply to Objection 9: Wives break their conjugal faith by adultery, both easily, for motives of pleasure, and hiddenly, since "the eye of the adulterer + observeth darkness" ( + Job 24:15). But this does not apply to a son in respect of his father, or to a servant in respect of his master: because the latter + infidelity is not the result of the lust of pleasure, but rather of malice: nor can it remain hidden like the infidelity of + an adulterous woman. +
[38247] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 ad 9 Ad nonum +dicendum quod uxores fidem matrimonii frangunt per adulterium et de +facili, propter delectationem; et latenter, quia oculus adulteri +observat caliginem, ut dicitur Iob XXIV. Non autem est similis +ratio de filio ad patrem, vel de servo ad dominum, quia talis +infidelitas non procedit ex concupiscentia delectationis, sed magis +ex malitia; nec potest ita latere sicut infidelitas mulieris +adulterae.
In proper sequence we have to consider now the Law of the Gospel which is called the New Law: and in the first place we must + consider it in itself; secondly, in comparison with the Old Law; thirdly, we shall treat of those things that are contained + in the New Law. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: +
(1) What kind of law is it? i.e. Is it a written law or is it instilled in the heart?
(2) Of its efficacy, i.e. does it justify?
(3) Of its beginning: should it have been given at the beginning of the world?
(4) Of its end: i.e. whether it will last until the end, or will another law take its place?
+[38248] Iª-IIae q. 106 pr. Consequenter +considerandum est de lege Evangelii, quod dicitur lex nova. Et +primo, de ipsa secundum se; secundo, de ipsa per comparationem ad +legem veterem; tertio, de his quae in lege nova continentur. Circa +primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, qualis sit, utrum scilicet +scripta vel indita. Secundo, de virtute eius, utrum iustificet. +Tertio, de principio eius, utrum debuerit dari a principio mundi. +Quarto, de termino eius utrum scilicet sit duratura usque ad finem, +an debeat ei alia lex succedere.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law is a written law. For the New Law is just the same as the Gospel. But the Gospel is set forth + in writing, according to + Jn. 20:31: "But these are written that you may believe." Therefore the New Law is a written law. +
[38249] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex nova sit lex scripta. Lex enim +nova est ipsum Evangelium. Sed Evangelium est descriptum, Ioan. XX, +haec autem scripta sunt ut credatis. Ergo lex nova est lex +scripta.
+ Objection 2: Further, the law that is instilled in the heart is the natural law, according to + Rom. 2:14,15: "(The Gentiles) do by nature those things that are of the law . . . who have [Vulg.: 'show'] the work of the law written + in their hearts." If therefore the law of the Gospel were instilled in our hearts, it would not be distinct from the law of + nature. +
[38250] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +lex indita est lex naturae; secundum illud Rom. II, naturaliter +ea quae legis sunt faciunt, qui habent opus legis scriptum in +cordibus suis. Si igitur lex Evangelii esset lex indita, non +differret a lege naturae.
+ Objection 3: Further, the law of the Gospel is proper to those who are in the state of the New Testament. But the law that is instilled + in the heart is common to those who are in the New Testament and to those who are in the Old Testament: for it is written + ( + Wis. 7:27) that Divine Wisdom "through nations conveyeth herself into holy souls, she maketh the friends of God and prophets." Therefore + the New Law is not instilled in our hearts. +
[38251] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +lex Evangelii propria est eorum qui sunt in statu novi testamenti. +Sed lex indita communis est et eis qui sunt in novo testamento, et +eis qui sunt in veteri testamento, dicitur enim Sap. VII, quod +divina sapientia per nationes in animas sanctas se transfert, +amicos Dei et prophetas constituit. Ergo lex nova non est lex +indita.
+ On the contrary, The New Law is the law of the New Testament. But the law of the New Testament is instilled in our hearts. For the Apostle, + quoting the authority of + Jeremiah 31:31, + 33: "Behold the days shall come, saith the Lord; and I will perfect unto the house of Israel, and unto the house of Judah, a + new testament," says, explaining what this statement is ( + Heb. 8:8, + 10): "For this is the testament which I will make to the house + of Israel . . . by giving [Vulg.: 'I will give'] My laws into their mind, and in their heart will I write them." Therefore + the New Law is instilled in our hearts. +
[38252] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod lex nova est lex novi testamenti. Sed lex novi testamenti +est indita in corde. Apostolus enim, ad Heb. VIII, dicit, inducens +auctoritatem quae habetur Ierem. XXXI, ecce dies venient, dicit +dominus, et consummabo super domum Israel et super domum Iuda +testamentum novum, et exponens quid sit hoc testamentum, dicit, +quia hoc est testamentum quod disponam domui Israel, dando leges +meas in mentem eorum, et in corde eorum superscribam eas. Ergo +lex nova est lex indita.
+ I answer that, "Each thing appears to be that which preponderates in it," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 8). Now that which is preponderant + in the law of the New Testament, and whereon all its efficacy is based, is the grace of the Holy Ghost, which is given through + faith in Christ. Consequently the New Law is chiefly the grace itself of the Holy Ghost, which is given to those who believe + in Christ. This is manifestly stated by the Apostle who says ( + Rom. + 3:27 + ): "Where is . . . thy boasting? It is excluded. By what law? Of works? No, but by the law of faith": for he calls the grace + itself of faith "a law." And still more clearly it is written ( + Rom. 8:2): "The law of the spirit of life, in Christ Jesus, hath delivered me from the law of sin and of death." Hence Augustine says + (De Spir. et Lit. xxiv) that "as the law of deeds was written on tables of stone, so is the law of faith inscribed on the + hearts of the + faithful": and elsewhere, in the same book (xxi): "What else are the Divine laws written by God Himself on our hearts, but + the very presence of His Holy Spirit?" +
Nevertheless the New Law contains certain things that dispose us to receive the grace of the Holy Ghost, and pertaining to + the use of that grace: such things are of secondary importance, so to speak, in the New Law; and the faithful need to be instructed + concerning them, both by word and writing, both as to what they should believe and as to what they should do. Consequently + we must say that the New Law is in the first place a law that is inscribed on our hearts, but that + secondarily it is a written law. +
[38253] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod unaquaeque res illud videtur esse quod in ea est +potissimum, ut philosophus dicit, in IX Ethic. Id autem quod +est potissimum in lege novi testamenti, et in quo tota virtus eius +consistit, est gratia spiritus sancti, quae datur per fidem +Christi. Et ideo principaliter lex nova est ipsa gratia spiritus +sancti, quae datur Christi fidelibus. Et hoc manifeste apparet per +apostolum, qui, ad Rom. III, dicit, ubi est ergo gloriatio tua? +Exclusa est. Per quam legem? Factorum? Non, sed per legem +fidei, ipsam enim fidei gratiam legem appellat. Et expressius +ad Rom. VIII dicitur, lex spiritus vitae in Christo Iesu +liberavit me a lege peccati et mortis. Unde et Augustinus +dicit, in libro de spiritu et littera, quod sicut lex factorum +scripta fuit in tabulis lapideis, ita lex fidei scripta est in +cordibus fidelium. Et alibi dicit in eodem libro, quae sunt +leges Dei ab ipso Deo scriptae in cordibus, nisi ipsa praesentia +spiritus sancti? Habet tamen lex nova quaedam sicut dispositiva +ad gratiam spiritus sancti, et ad usum huius gratiae pertinentia, +quae sunt quasi secundaria in lege nova, de quibus oportuit instrui +fideles Christi et verbis et scriptis, tam circa credenda quam +circa agenda. Et ideo dicendum est quod principaliter nova lex est +lex indita, secundario autem est lex scripta.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The Gospel writings contain only such things as pertain to the grace of the Holy Ghost, either by disposing us thereto, or + by directing us to the use thereof. Thus with regard to the intellect, the Gospel contains certain matters pertaining to the + manifestation of Christ's Godhead or humanity, which dispose us by means of faith through which we receive the grace of the + Holy Ghost: and with regard to the affections, it contains matters touching the + contempt of the world, whereby man is rendered fit to receive the grace of the Holy Ghost: for "the world," i.e. worldly men, + "cannot receive" the Holy Ghost ( + Jn. 14:17). As to the use of spiritual grace, this consists in works of virtue to which the writings of the New Testament exhort men + in divers ways. +
[38254] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod in Scriptura Evangelii non continentur nisi ea +quae pertinent ad gratiam spiritus sancti vel sicut dispositiva, +vel sicut ordinativa ad usum huius gratiae. Sicut dispositiva +quidem quantum ad intellectum per fidem, per quam datur spiritus +sancti gratia, continentur in Evangelio ea quae pertinent ad +manifestandam divinitatem vel humanitatem Christi. Secundum +affectum vero, continentur in Evangelio ea quae pertinent ad +contemptum mundi, per quem homo fit capax gratiae spiritus sancti, +mundus enim, idest amatores mundi, non potest capere spiritum +sanctum, ut habetur Ioan. XIV. Usus vero spiritualis gratiae est in +operibus virtutum, ad quae multipliciter Scriptura novi testamenti +homines exhortatur.
+ Reply to Objection 2: There are two ways in which a thing may be instilled into man. First, through being part of his nature, and thus the natural + law is instilled into man. Secondly, a thing is instilled into man by being, as it were, added on to his nature by a gift + of grace. In this way the New Law is instilled into man, not only by indicating to him what he should do, but also by helping + him to accomplish it. +
[38255] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod dupliciter est aliquid inditum homini. Uno modo, +pertinens ad naturam humanam, et sic lex naturalis est lex indita +homini. Alio modo est aliquid inditum homini quasi naturae +superadditum per gratiae donum. Et hoc modo lex nova est indita +homini, non solum indicans quid sit faciendum, sed etiam adiuvans +ad implendum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: No man ever had the grace of the Holy Ghost except through faith in Christ either explicit or implicit: and by faith in Christ + man belongs to the New Testament. Consequently whoever had the law of grace instilled into them belonged to the New Testament. +
[38256] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod nullus unquam habuit gratiam spiritus sancti nisi per +fidem Christi explicitam vel implicitam. Per fidem autem Christi +pertinet homo ad novum testamentum. Unde quibuscumque fuit lex +gratiae indita, secundum hoc ad novum testamentum pertinebant.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law does not justify. For no man is justified unless he obeys God's law, according to + Heb. 5:9: "He," i.e. Christ, "became to all that obey Him the cause of eternal salvation." But the Gospel does not always cause men + to believe in it: for it is written ( + Rom. 10:16): "All do not obey the Gospel." Therefore the New Law does not justify. +
[38257] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad +secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex nova non iustificet. +Nullus enim iustificatur nisi legi Dei obediat; secundum illud ad +Heb. V, factus est, scilicet Christus, omnibus +obtemperantibus sibi causa salutis aeternae. Sed Evangelium non +semper hoc operatur quod homines ei obediant, dicitur enim Rom. X, +non omnes obediunt Evangelio. Ergo lex nova non iustificat.
+ Objection 2: Further, the Apostle proves in his epistle to the Romans that the Old Law did not justify, because transgression increased + at its advent: for it is stated ( + Rom. 4:15): "The Law worketh wrath: for where there is no law, neither is there transgression." But much more did the New Law increase + transgression: since he who sins after the giving of the New Law deserves greater punishment, according to + Heb. 10:28,29: "A man + making void the Law of Moses dieth without any mercy under two or three witnesses. How much more, do you think, he deserveth + worse punishments, who hath trodden underfoot the Son of God," etc.? Therefore the New Law, like the Old Law, does not justify. +
[38258] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +apostolus probat, ad Rom., quod lex vetus non iustificabat, quia ea +adveniente praevaricatio crevit, habetur enim ad Rom. IV, lex +iram operatur, ubi enim non est lex, nec praevaricatio. Sed +multo magis lex nova praevaricationem addidit, maiori enim poena +est dignus qui post legem novam datam adhuc peccat; secundum illud +Heb. X, irritam quis faciens legem Moysi, sine ulla miseratione, +duobus vel tribus testibus, moritur. Quanto magis putatis deteriora +mereri supplicia, qui filium Dei conculcaverit, et cetera? Ergo +lex nova non iustificat, sicut nec vetus.
+ Objection 3: Further, justification is an effect proper to God, according to + Rom. 8:33: "God that justifieth." But the Old Law was from God just as the New Law. Therefore the New Law does not justify any more + than the Old Law. +
[38259] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +iustificare est proprius effectus Dei; secundum illud ad Rom. VIII, +Deus qui iustificat. Sed lex vetus fuit a Deo, sicut et lex nova. +Ergo lex nova non magis iustificat quam lex vetus.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle says ( + Rom. 1:16): "I am not ashamed of the Gospel: for it is in the power of God unto salvation to everyone that believeth." But there is + no salvation but to those who are justified. Therefore the Law of the Gospel justifies. +
[38260] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Rom. I, non erubesco Evangelium, +virtus enim Dei est in salutem omni credenti. Non autem est +salus nisi iustificatis. Ergo lex Evangelii iustificat.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[1]), there is a twofold element in the Law of the Gospel. There is the chief element, viz. the grace of the Holy Ghost bestowed + inwardly. And as to this, the New Law justifies. Hence Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xvii): "There," i.e. in the Old Testament, + "the Law was set forth in an outward fashion, that the ungodly might be afraid"; "here," i.e. in the New Testament, "it is + given in an inward manner, that + they may be justified." The other element of the Evangelical Law is secondary: namely, the teachings of faith, and those commandments + which direct human affections and human actions. And as to this, the New Law does not justify. Hence the Apostle says ( + 2 Cor. 3:6) "The letter killeth, but the spirit quickeneth": and Augustine explains this (De Spir. et Lit. xiv, xvii) by saying that + the letter denotes any writing external to man, even that of the moral precepts such as are + contained in the Gospel. Wherefore the letter, even of the Gospel would kill, unless there were the inward presence of the + healing grace of faith. +
[38261] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ad legem Evangelii duo pertinent. +Unum quidem principaliter, scilicet ipsa gratia spiritus sancti +interius data. Et quantum ad hoc, nova lex iustificat. Unde +Augustinus dicit, in libro de spiritu et littera, ibi, scilicet in +veteri testamento, lex extrinsecus posita est, qua iniusti +terrerentur, hic, scilicet in novo testamento, intrinsecus data +est, qua iustificarentur. Aliud pertinet ad legem Evangelii +secundario, scilicet documenta fidei, et praecepta ordinantia +affectum humanum et humanos actus. Et quantum ad hoc, lex nova non +iustificat. Unde apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. III, littera +occidit, spiritus autem vivificat. Et Augustinus exponit, in +libro de spiritu et littera, quod per litteram intelligitur +quaelibet Scriptura extra homines existens, etiam moralium +praeceptorum qualia continentur in Evangelio. Unde etiam littera +Evangelii occideret, nisi adesset interius gratia fidei sanans.
+ Reply to Objection 1: This argument holds true of the New Law, not as to its principal, but as to its secondary element: i.e. as to the dogmas + and precepts outwardly put before man either in words or in writing. +
[38262] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod illa obiectio procedit de lege nova non quantum +ad id quod est principale in ipsa, sed quantum ad id quod est +secundarium in ipsa, scilicet quantum ad documenta et praecepta +exterius homini proposita vel verbo vel scripto.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Although the grace of the New Testament helps man to avoid sin, yet it does not so confirm man in good that he cannot sin: + for this belongs to the state of glory. Hence if a man sin after receiving the grace of the New Testament, he deserves greater + punishment, as being ungrateful for greater benefits, and as not using the help given to him. And this is why the New Law + is not said to "work wrath": because as far as it is concerned it gives man + sufficient help to avoid sin. +
[38263] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod gratia novi testamenti, etsi adiuvet hominem ad non +peccandum, non tamen ita confirmat in bono ut homo peccare non +possit, hoc enim pertinet ad statum gloriae. Et ideo si quis post +acceptam gratiam novi testamenti peccaverit, maiori poena est +dignus, tanquam maioribus beneficiis ingratus, et auxilio sibi dato +non utens. Nec tamen propter hoc dicitur quod lex nova iram +operatur, quia quantum est de se, sufficiens auxilium dat ad non +peccandum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The same God gave both the New and the Old Law, but in different ways. For He gave the Old Law written on tables of stone: + whereas He gave the New Law written "in the fleshly tables of the heart," as the Apostle expresses it ( + 2 Cor. 3:3). Wherefore, as Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xviii), "the Apostle calls this letter which is written outside man, a ministration + of death and a ministration of condemnation: whereas he calls + the other letter, i.e. the Law of the New Testament, the ministration of the spirit and the ministration of justice: because + through the gift of the Spirit we work justice, and are delivered from the condemnation due to transgression." +
[38264] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod legem novam et veterem unus Deus dedit, sed aliter et +aliter. Nam legem veterem dedit scriptam in tabulis lapideis, legem +autem novam dedit scriptam in tabulis cordis carnalibus, ut +apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. III. Proinde sicut Augustinus dicit, in +libro de spiritu et littera, litteram istam extra hominem +scriptam, et ministrationem mortis et ministrationem damnationis +apostolus appellat. Hanc autem, scilicet novi testamenti legem, +ministrationem spiritus et ministrationem iustitiae dicit, quia per +donum spiritus operamur iustitiam, et a praevaricationis damnatione +liberamur.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law should have been given from the beginning of the world. "For there is no respect of persons + with God" ( + Rom. 2:11). But "all" men "have sinned and do need the glory of God" ( + Rom. 3:23). Therefore the Law of the Gospel should have been given from the beginning of the world, in order that it might bring succor + to all. +
[38265] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex nova debuerit dari a principio +mundi. Non enim est personarum acceptio apud Deum, ut dicitur ad +Rom. II. Sed omnes homines peccaverunt, et egent gloria Dei, ut +dicitur ad Rom. III. Ergo a principio mundi lex Evangelii dari +debuit, ut omnibus per eam subveniretur.
+ Objection 2: Further, as men dwell in various places, so do they live in various times. But God, "Who will have all men to be saved" ( + 1 Tim. 2:4), commanded the Gospel to be preached in all places, as may be seen in the last chapters of Matthew and Mark. Therefore the + Law of the Gospel should have been at hand for all times, so as to be given from the beginning of the world. +
[38266] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +sicut in diversis locis sunt diversi homines, ita etiam in diversis +temporibus. Sed Deus, qui vult omnes homines salvos fieri, +ut dicitur I ad Tim. II, mandavit Evangelium praedicari in omnibus +locis; ut patet Matth. ult., et Marc. ult. Ergo omnibus temporibus +debuit adesse lex Evangelii, ita quod a principio mundi +daretur.
+ Objection 3: Further, man needs to save his soul, which is for all eternity, more than to save his body, which is a temporal matter. But + God provided man from the beginning of the world with things that are necessary for the health of his body, by subjecting + to his power whatever was created for the sake of man ( + Gn. 1:26-29). Therefore the New Law also, which is very necessary for the health of the soul, should have been given to man from the + beginning + of the world. +
[38267] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +magis est necessaria homini salus spiritualis, quae est aeterna, +quam salus corporalis, quae est temporalis. Sed Deus ab initio +mundi providit homini ea quae sunt necessaria ad salutem +corporalem, tradens eius potestati omnia quae erant propter hominem +creata, ut patet Gen. I. Ergo etiam lex nova, quae maxime est +necessaria ad salutem spiritualem, debuit hominibus a principio +mundi dari.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle says ( + 1 Cor. 15:46): "That was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural." But the New Law is highly spiritual. Therefore it was + not fitting for it to be given from the beginning of the world. +
[38268] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XV, non prius quod +spirituale est, sed quod animale. Sed lex nova est maxime +spiritualis. Ergo lex nova non debuit dari a principio mundi.
+ I answer that, Three reasons may be assigned why it was not fitting for the New Law to be given from the beginning of the world. The first + is because the New Law, as stated above + (A[1]), consists chiefly in the grace of the Holy Ghost: which it behoved not to be given abundantly until sin, which is an obstacle + to grace, had been cast out of man through the accomplishment of his redemption by Christ: wherefore it is written ( + Jn. + 7:39 + ): "As yet the Spirit was not given, because Jesus was not yet glorified." This reason the Apostle states clearly ( + Rom. 8:2, seqq.) where, after speaking of "the Law of the Spirit of life," he adds: "God sending His own Son, in the likeness of sinful + flesh, of sin* hath condemned sin in the flesh, that the justification of the Law might be fulfilled in us." [*St. Thomas, + quoting perhaps from memory, omits the "et" (and), after "sinful flesh." The text quoted + should read thus: "in the likeness of sinful flesh, and a sin offering ({peri hamartias}), hath," etc.] +
A second reason may be taken from the perfection of the New Law. Because a thing is not brought to perfection at once from + the outset, but through an orderly succession of time; thus one is at first a boy, and then a man. And this reason is stated + by the Apostle ( + Gal. 3:24,25): "The Law was our pedagogue in Christ that we might be justified by faith. But after the faith is come, we are no longer + under a pedagogue." +
The third reason is found in the fact that the New Law is the law of grace: wherefore it behoved man first of all to be left + to himself under the state of the Old Law, so that through falling into sin, he might realize his weakness, and acknowledge + his need of grace. This reason is set down by the Apostle ( + Rom. 5:20): "The Law entered in, that sin might abound: and when sin abounded grace did more abound." +
[38269] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod triplex ratio potest assignari quare lex nova non +debuit dari a principio mundi. Quarum prima est quia lex nova, +sicut dictum est, principaliter est gratia spiritus sancti; quae +abundanter dari non debuit antequam impedimentum peccati ab humano +genere tolleretur, consummata redemptione per Christum; unde +dicitur Ioan. VII, nondum erat spiritus datus, quia Iesus nondum +erat glorificatus. Et hanc rationem manifeste assignat +apostolus ad Rom. VIII, ubi, postquam praemiserat de lege spiritus +vitae, subiungit, Deus, filium suum mittens in similitudinem +carnis peccati, de peccato damnavit peccatum in carne, ut +iustificatio legis impleretur in nobis. Secunda ratio potest +assignari ex perfectione legis novae. Non enim aliquid ad perfectum +adducitur statim a principio, sed quodam temporali successionis +ordine, sicut aliquis prius fit puer, et postmodum vir. Et hanc +rationem assignat apostolus ad Gal. III, lex paedagogus noster +fuit in Christo, ut ex fide iustificemur. At ubi venit fides, iam +non sumus sub paedagogo. Tertia ratio sumitur ex hoc quod lex +nova est lex gratiae, et ideo primo oportuit quod homo +relinqueretur sibi in statu veteris legis, ut, in peccatum cadendo, +suam infirmitatem cognoscens, recognosceret se gratia indigere. Et +hanc rationem assignat apostolus ad Rom. V, dicens, lex +subintravit ut abundaret delictum, ubi autem abundavit delictum, +superabundavit et gratia.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Mankind on account of the sin of our first parents deserved to be deprived of the aid of grace: and so "from whom it is withheld + it is justly withheld, and to whom it is given, it is mercifully given," as Augustine states (De Perfect. Justit. iv) [*Cf. + Ep. ccvii; De Pecc. Mer. et Rem. ii, 19]. Consequently it does not follow that there is respect of persons with God, from + the fact that He did not offer the Law of grace to all from the beginning of the + world, which Law was to be published in due course of time, as stated above. +
[38270] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod humanum genus propter peccatum primi parentis +meruit privari auxilio gratiae. Et ideo quibuscumque non datur, +hoc est ex iustitia, quibuscumque autem datur, hoc est ex +gratia, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Perfect. Iustit. Unde +non est acceptio personarum apud Deum ex hoc quod non omnibus a +principio mundi legem gratiae proposuit, quae erat debito ordine +proponenda, ut dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The state of mankind does not vary according to diversity of place, but according to succession of time. Hence the New Law + avails for all places, but not for all times: although at all times there have been some persons belonging to the New Testament, + as stated above (A[1], ad 3). +
[38271] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod diversitas locorum non variat diversum statum humani +generis, qui variatur per temporis successionem. Et ideo omnibus +locis proponitur lex nova, non autem omnibus temporibus, licet omni +tempore fuerint aliqui ad novum testamentum pertinentes, ut supra +dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Things pertaining to the health of the body are of service to man as regards his nature, which sin does not destroy: whereas + things pertaining to the health of the soul are ordained to grace, which is forfeit through sin. Consequently the comparison + will not hold. +
[38272] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ea quae pertinent ad salutem corporalem, deserviunt +homini quantum ad naturam, quae non tollitur per peccatum. Sed ea +quae pertinent ad spiritualem salutem, ordinantur ad gratiam, quae +amittitur per peccatum. Et ideo non est similis ratio de +utrisque.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law will not last until the end of the world. Because, as the Apostle says ( + 1 Cor. 13:10), "when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away." But the New Law is "in part," since the + Apostle says ( + 1 Cor. 13:9): "We know in part and we prophesy in part." Therefore the New Law is to be done away, and will be succeeded by a more perfect + state. +
[38273] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex nova non sit duratura usque ad +finem mundi. Quia ut apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XIII, cum +venerit quod perfectum est, evacuabitur quod ex parte est. Sed +lex nova ex parte est, dicit enim apostolus ibidem, ex parte +cognoscimus, et ex parte prophetamus. Ergo lex nova evacuanda +est, alio perfectiori statu succedente.
+ Objection 2: Further, Our Lord ( + Jn. 16:13) promised His disciples the knowledge of all truth when the Holy Ghost, the Comforter, should come. But the Church knows + not yet all truth in the state of the New Testament. Therefore we must look forward to another state, wherein all truth will + be revealed by the Holy Ghost. +
[38274] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +dominus, Ioan. XVI, promisit discipulis suis in adventu spiritus +sancti Paracleti cognitionem omnis veritatis. Sed nondum Ecclesia +omnem veritatem cognoscit, in statu novi testamenti. Ergo +expectandus est alius status, in quo per spiritum sanctum omnis +veritas manifestetur.
+ Objection 3: Further, just as the Father is distinct from the Son and the Son from the Father, so is the Holy Ghost distinct from the + Father and the Son. But there was a state corresponding with the Person of the Father, viz. the state of the Old Law, wherein + men were intent on begetting children: and likewise there is a state corresponding to the Person of the Son: viz. the state + of the New Law, wherein the clergy who are intent on wisdom (which is appropriated to the + Son) hold a prominent place. Therefore there will be a third state corresponding to the Holy Ghost, wherein spiritual men + will hold the first place. +
[38275] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sicut pater est alius a filio et filius a patre, ita spiritus +sanctus a patre et filio. Sed fuit quidam status conveniens +personae patris, scilicet status veteris legis, in quo homines +generationi intendebant. Similiter etiam est alius status +conveniens personae filii, scilicet status novae legis, in quo +clerici, intendentes sapientiae, quae appropriatur filio, +principantur. Ergo erit status tertius spiritus sancti, in quo +spirituales viri principabuntur.
+ Objection 4: Further, Our Lord said ( + Mat. 24:14): "This Gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in the whole world . . . and then shall the consummation come." But the Gospel + of Christ is already preached throughout the whole world: and yet the consummation has not yet come. Therefore the Gospel + of Christ is not the Gospel of the kingdom, but another Gospel, that of the Holy Ghost, is to come yet, like unto another + Law. +
[38276] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 4 arg. 4 Praeterea, +dominus dicit, Matth. XXIV, praedicabitur hoc Evangelium regni +in universo orbe, et tunc veniet consummatio. Sed Evangelium +Christi iamdiu est praedicatum in universo orbe; nec tamen adhuc +venit consummatio. Ergo Evangelium Christi non est Evangelium +regni, sed futurum est aliud Evangelium spiritus sancti, quasi alia +lex.
+ On the contrary, Our Lord said ( + Mat. 24:34): "I say to you that this generation shall not pass till all (these) things be done": which passage Chrysostom (Hom. lxxvii) + explains as referring to "the generation of those that believe in Christ." Therefore the state of those who believe in Christ + will last until the consummation of the world. +
[38277] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dominus dicit, Matth. XXIV, dico vobis quia non +praeteribit generatio haec donec omnia fiant, quod Chrysostomus +exponit de generatione fidelium Christi. Ergo status fidelium +Christi manebit usque ad consummationem saeculi.
+ I answer that, The state of the world may change in two ways. In one way, according to a change of law: and thus no other state will succeed + this state of the New Law. Because the state of the New Law succeeded the state of the Old Law, as a more perfect law a less + perfect one. Now no state of the present life can be more perfect that the state of the New Law: since nothing can approach + nearer to the last end than that which is the immediate cause of our being brought to + the last end. But the New Law does this: wherefore the Apostle says ( + Heb. 10:19-22): "Having therefore, brethren, a confidence in the entering into the Holies by the blood of Christ, a new . . . way which + He hath dedicated for us . . . let us draw near." Therefore no state of the present life can be more perfect than that of + the New Law, since the nearer a thing is to the last end the more perfect it is. +
In another way the state of mankind may change according as man stands in relation to one and the same law more or less perfectly. + And thus the state of the Old Law underwent frequent changes, since at times the laws were very well kept, and at other times + were altogether unheeded. Thus, too, the state of the New Law is subject to change with regard to various places, times, and + persons, according as the grace of the Holy Ghost dwells in man more or less perfectly. Nevertheless + we are not to look forward to a state wherein man is to possess the grace of the Holy Ghost more perfectly than he has possessed + it hitherto, especially the apostles who "received the firstfruits of the Spirit, i.e. sooner and more abundantly than others," + as a gloss expounds on + Rom. 8:23. +
[38278] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod status mundi variari potest dupliciter. Uno modo, +secundum diversitatem legis. Et sic huic statui novae legis nullus +alius status succedet. Successit enim status novae legis statui +veteris legis tanquam perfectior imperfectiori. Nullus autem status +praesentis vitae potest esse perfectior quam status novae legis. +Nihil enim potest esse propinquius fini ultimo quam quod immediate +in finem ultimum introducit. Hoc autem facit nova lex, unde +apostolus dicit, ad Heb. X, habentes itaque, fratres, fiduciam +in introitu sanctorum in sanguine Christi, quam initiavit nobis +viam novam, accedamus ad eum. Unde non potest esse aliquis +perfectior status praesentis vitae quam status novae legis, quia +tanto est unumquodque perfectius, quanto ultimo fini propinquius. +Alio modo status hominum variari potest secundum quod homines +diversimode se habent ad eandem legem, vel perfectius vel minus +perfecte. Et sic status veteris legis frequenter fuit mutatus, cum +quandoque leges optime custodirentur, quandoque omnino +praetermitterentur. Sic etiam status novae legis diversificatur, +secundum diversa loca et tempora et personas, inquantum gratia +spiritus sancti perfectius vel minus perfecte ab aliquibus habetur. +Non est tamen expectandum quod sit aliquis status futurus in quo +perfectius gratia spiritus sancti habeatur quam hactenus habita +fuerit, maxime ab apostolis, qui primitias spiritus acceperunt, +idest et tempore prius et ceteris abundantius, ut Glossa +dicit Rom. VIII.
+ Reply to Objection 1: As Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v), there is a threefold state of mankind; the first was under the Old Law; the second is + that of the New Law; the third will take place not in this life, but in heaven. But as the first state is figurative and imperfect + in comparison with the state of the Gospel; so is the present state figurative and imperfect in comparison with the heavenly + state, with the advent of which the present state will be done away as + expressed in that very passage ( + 1 Cor. 13:12): "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face." +
[38279] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut Dionysius dicit, in Eccl. Hier., triplex +est hominum status, primus quidem veteris legis; secundus novae +legis; tertius status succedit non in hac vita, sed in patria. Sed +sicut primus status est figuralis et imperfectus respectu status +evangelici, ita hic status est figuralis et imperfectus respectu +status patriae; quo veniente, iste status evacuatur, sicut ibi +dicitur, videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem +facie ad faciem.
+ Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix, 31), Montanus and Priscilla pretended that Our Lord's promise to give the Holy Ghost + was fulfilled, not in the apostles, but in themselves. In like manner the Manicheans maintained that it was fulfilled in Manes + whom they held to be the Paraclete. Hence none of the above received the Acts of the Apostles, where it is clearly shown that + the aforesaid promise was fulfilled in the apostles: just as Our Lord promised + them a second time ( + Acts 1:5): "You shall be baptized with the Holy Ghost, not many days hence": which we read as having been fulfilled in + Acts 2. However, these foolish notions are refuted by the statement ( + Jn. 7:39) that "as yet the Spirit was not given, because Jesus was not yet glorified"; from which we gather that the Holy Ghost was + given as soon as Christ was glorified in His Resurrection and Ascension. Moreover, this puts out of court the + senseless idea that the Holy Ghost is to be expected to come at some other time. +
Now the Holy Ghost taught the apostles all truth in respect of matters necessary for salvation; those things, to wit, that + we are bound to believe and to do. But He did not teach them about all future events: for this did not regard them according + to + Acts 1:7: "It is not for you to know the times or moments which the Father hath put in His own power." +
[38280] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro contra Faustum, +Montanus et Priscilla posuerunt quod promissio domini de spiritu +sancto dando non fuit completa in apostolis, sed in eis. Et +similiter Manichaei posuerunt quod fuit completa in Manichaeo, quem +dicebant esse spiritum Paracletum. Et ideo utrique non recipiebant +actus apostolorum, in quibus manifeste ostenditur quod illa +promissio fuit in apostolis completa, sicut dominus iterato eis +promisit, Act. I, baptizamini in spiritu sancto non post multos +hos dies; quod impletum legitur Act. II. Sed istae vanitates +excluduntur per hoc quod dicitur Ioan. VII, nondum erat spiritus +datus, quia Iesus nondum erat glorificatus, ex quo datur +intelligi quod statim glorificato Christo in resurrectione et +ascensione, fuit spiritus sanctus datus. Et per hoc etiam +excluditur quorumcumque vanitas qui dicerent esse expectandum aliud +tempus spiritus sancti. Docuit autem spiritus sanctus apostolos +omnem veritatem de his quae pertinent ad necessitatem salutis, +scilicet de credendis et agendis. Non tamen docuit eos de omnibus +futuris eventibus, hoc enim ad eos non pertinebat, secundum illud +Act. I, non est vestrum nosse tempora vel momenta, quae pater +posuit in sua potestate.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The Old Law corresponded not only to the Father, but also to the Son: because Christ was foreshadowed in the Old Law. Hence + Our Lord said ( + Jn. 5:46): "If you did believe Moses, you would perhaps believe me also; for he wrote of Me." In like manner the New Law corresponds + not only to Christ, but also to the Holy Ghost; according to + Rom. 8:2: "The Law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus," etc. Hence we are not + to look forward to another law corresponding to the Holy Ghost. +
[38281] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod lex vetus non solum fuit patris, sed etiam filii, +quia Christus in veteri lege figurabatur. Unde dominus dicit, Ioan. +V, si crederetis Moysi, crederetis forsitan et mihi, de me enim +ille scripsit. Similiter etiam lex nova non solum est Christi, +sed etiam spiritus sancti; secundum illud Rom. VIII, lex +spiritus vitae in Christo Iesu, et cetera. Unde non est +expectanda alia lex, quae sit spiritus sancti.
+ Reply to Objection 4: Since Christ said at the very outset of the preaching of the Gospel: "The kingdom of heaven is at hand" ( + Mat. 4:17), it is most absurd to say that the Gospel of Christ is not the Gospel of the kingdom. But the preaching of the Gospel of + Christ may be understood in two ways. First, as denoting the spreading abroad of the knowledge of Christ: and thus the Gospel + was preached throughout the world even at the time of the apostles, as + Chrysostom states (Hom. lxxv in Matth.). And in this sense the words that follow---"and then shall the consummation come," + refer to the destruction of Jerusalem, of which He was speaking literally. Secondly, the preaching of the Gospel may be understood + as extending throughout the world and producing its full effect, so that, to wit, the Church would be founded in every nation. + And in these sense, as Augustine writes to Hesychius (Epist. cxcix), the Gospel is not preached to the whole world + yet, but, when it is, the consummation of the world will come. +
[38282] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 4 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod, cum Christus statim in principio evangelicae +praedicationis dixerit, appropinquavit regnum caelorum, +stultissimum est dicere quod Evangelium Christi non sit Evangelium +regni. Sed praedicatio Evangelii Christi potest intelligi +dupliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad divulgationem notitiae Christi, et +sic praedicatum fuit Evangelium in universo orbe etiam tempore +apostolorum, ut Chrysostomus dicit. Et secundum hoc, quod additur, +et tunc erit consummatio, intelligitur de destructione Ierusalem, +de qua tunc ad litteram loquebatur. Alio modo potest intelligi +praedicatio Evangelii in universo orbe cum pleno effectu, ita +scilicet quod in qualibet gente fundetur Ecclesia. Et ita, sicut +dicit Augustinus, in epistola ad Hesych., nondum est praedicatum +Evangelium in universo orbe, sed, hoc facto, veniet consummatio +mundi.
We must now consider the New Law as compared with the Old: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the New Law is distinct from the Old Law?
(2) Whether the New Law fulfils the Old?
+[38283] Iª-IIae q. 107 pr. Deinde +considerandum est de comparatione legis novae ad legem veterem. Et +circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum lex nova sit alia lex a +lege veteri. Secundo, utrum lex nova impleat veterem. Tertio, utrum +lex nova contineatur in veteri. Quarto, quae sit gravior, utrum lex +nova vel vetus.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law is not distinct from the Old. Because both these laws were given to those who believe in God: + since "without faith it is impossible to please God," according to + Heb. 11:6. But the faith of olden times and of nowadays is the same, as the gloss says on + Mat. 21:9. Therefore the law is the same also. +
[38284] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex nova non sit alia a lege veteri. +Utraque enim lex datur fidem Dei habentibus, quia sine fide +impossibile est placere Deo, ut dicitur Heb. XI. Sed eadem +fides est antiquorum et modernorum, ut dicitur in Glossa Matth. +XXI. Ergo etiam est eadem lex.
+ Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Contra Adamant. Manich. discip. xvii) that "there is little difference between the Law and Gospel" + [*The 'little difference' refers to the Latin words 'timor' and 'amor']---"fear and love." But the New and Old Laws cannot + be differentiated in respect of these two things: since even the Old Law comprised precepts of charity: "Thou shalt love thy + neighbor" ( + Lev. 19:18), and: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God" + ( + Dt. 6:5). In like manner neither can they differ according to the other difference which Augustine assigns (Contra Faust. iv, 2), + viz. that "the Old Testament contained temporal promises, whereas the New Testament contains spiritual and eternal promises": + since even the New Testament contains temporal promises, according to + Mk. 10:30: He shall receive "a hundred times as much . . . in this time, houses and brethren," etc.: while in the Old Testament + they hoped in promises spiritual and eternal, according to + Heb. 11:16: "But now they desire a better, that is to say, a heavenly country," which is said of the patriarchs. Therefore it seems + that the New Law is not distinct from the Old. +
[38285] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in libro contra Adamantum Manich. Discip., quod +brevis differentia legis et Evangelii est timor et amor. Sed +secundum haec duo nova lex et vetus diversificari non possunt, quia +etiam in veteri lege proponuntur praecepta caritatis; Lev. XIX, +diliges proximum tuum; et Deut. VI, diliges dominum Deum +tuum. Similiter etiam diversificari non possunt per aliam +differentiam quam Augustinus assignat, contra Faustum, quod +vetus testamentum habuit promissa temporalia, novum testamentum +habet promissa spiritualia et aeterna. Quia etiam in novo +testamento promittuntur aliqua promissa temporalia; secundum illud +Marc. X, accipiet centies tantum in tempore hoc, domos et +fratres, et cetera. Et in veteri testamento sperabantur +promissa spiritualia et aeterna; secundum illud ad Heb. XI, nunc +autem meliorem patriam appetunt, idest caelestem, quod dicitur +de antiquis patribus. Ergo videtur quod nova lex non sit alia a +veteri.
+ Objection 3: Further, the Apostle seems to distinguish both laws by calling the Old Law "a law of works," and the New Law "a law of faith" + ( + Rom. 3:27). But the Old Law was also a law of faith, according to + Heb. 11:39: "All were [Vulg.: 'All these being'] approved by the testimony of faith," which he says of the fathers of the Old Testament. + In like manner the New Law is a law of works: since it is written ( + Mat. 5:44): "Do good to + them that hate you"; and ( + Lk. 22:19): "Do this for a commemoration of Me." Therefore the New Law is not distinct from the Old. +
[38286] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +apostolus videtur distinguere utramque legem, ad Rom. III, veterem +legem appellans legem factorum, legem vero novam appellans legem +fidei. Sed lex vetus fuit etiam fidei; secundum illud Heb. XI, +omnes testimonio fidei probati sunt, quod dicit de patribus +veteris testamenti. Similiter etiam lex nova est lex factorum, +dicitur enim Matth. V, benefacite his qui oderunt vos; et +Luc. XXII, hoc facite in meam commemorationem. Ergo lex nova +non est alia a lege veteri.
+ On the contrary, the Apostle says ( + Heb. 7:12): "The priesthood being translated it is necessary that a translation also be made of the Law." But the priesthood of the + New Testament is distinct from that of the Old, as the Apostle shows in the same place. Therefore the Law is also distinct. +
[38287] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Heb. VII, translato sacerdotio, +necesse est ut legis translatio fiat. Sed aliud est sacerdotium +novi et veteris testamenti, ut ibidem apostolus probat. Ergo est +etiam alia lex.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + Q[90], A[2]; + Q[91], A[4]), every law ordains human conduct to some end. Now things ordained to an end may be divided in two ways, considered from + the point of view of the end. First, through being ordained to different ends: and this difference will be specific, especially + if such ends are proximate. Secondly, by reason of being closely or remotely connected with the end. Thus it is clear + that movements differ in species through being directed to different terms: while according as one part of a movement is nearer + to the term than another part, the difference of perfect and imperfect movement is assessed. +
Accordingly then two laws may be distinguished from one another in two ways. First, through being altogether diverse, from + the fact that they are ordained to diverse ends: thus a state-law ordained to democratic government, would differ specifically + from a law ordained to government by the aristocracy. Secondly, two laws may be distinguished from one another, through one + of them being more closely connected with the end, and the other more remotely: thus in one and the same + state there is one law enjoined on men of mature age, who can forthwith accomplish that which pertains to the common good; + and another law regulating the education of children who need to be taught how they are to achieve manly deeds later on. +
We must therefore say that, according to the first way, the New Law is not distinct from the Old Law: because they both have + the same end, namely, man's subjection to God; and there is but one God of the New and of the Old Testament, according to + Rom. 3:30: "It is one God that justifieth circumcision by faith, and uncircumcision through faith." According to the second way, the + New Law is distinct from the Old Law: because the Old Law is like a pedagogue of + children, as the Apostle says ( + Gal. 3:24), whereas the New Law is the law of perfection, since it is the law of charity, of which the Apostle says ( + Col. 3:14) that it is "the bond of perfection." +
[38288] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, omnis lex ordinat +conversationem humanam in ordine ad aliquem finem. Ea autem quae +ordinantur ad finem, secundum rationem finis dupliciter +diversificari possunt. Uno modo, quia ordinantur ad diversos fines, +et haec est diversitas speciei, maxime si sit finis proximus. Alio +modo, secundum propinquitatem ad finem vel distantiam ab ipso. +Sicut patet quod motus differunt specie secundum quod ordinantur ad +diversos terminos, secundum vero quod una pars motus est +propinquior termino quam alia, attenditur differentia in motu +secundum perfectum et imperfectum. Sic ergo duae leges distingui +possunt dupliciter. Uno modo, quasi omnino diversae, utpote +ordinatae ad diversos fines, sicut lex civitatis quae esset +ordinata ad hoc quod populus dominaretur, esset specie differens ab +illa lege quae esset ad hoc ordinata quod optimates civitatis +dominarentur. Alio modo duae leges distingui possunt secundum quod +una propinquius ordinat ad finem, alia vero remotius. Puta in una +et eadem civitate dicitur alia lex quae imponitur viris perfectis, +qui statim possunt exequi ea quae pertinent ad bonum commune; et +alia lex de disciplina puerorum, qui sunt instruendi qualiter +postmodum opera virorum exequantur. Dicendum est ergo quod secundum +primum modum, lex nova non est alia a lege veteri, quia utriusque +est unus finis, scilicet ut homines subdantur Deo; est autem unus +Deus et novi et veteris testamenti, secundum illud Rom. III, +unus Deus est qui iustificat circumcisionem ex fide, et +praeputium per fidem. Alio modo, lex nova est alia a veteri. +Quia lex vetus est quasi paedagogus puerorum, ut apostolus dicit, +ad Gal. III, lex autem nova est lex perfectionis, quia est lex +caritatis, de qua apostolus dicit, ad Colos. III, quod est vinculum +perfectionis.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The unity of faith under both Testaments witnesses to the unity of end: for it has been stated above ( + Q[62], A[2]) that the object of the theological virtues, among which is faith, is the last end. Yet faith had a different state in the + Old and in the New Law: since what they believed as future, we believe as fact. +
[38289] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod unitas fidei utriusque testamenti attestatur +unitati finis, dictum est enim supra quod obiectum theologicarum +virtutum, inter quas est fides, est finis ultimus. Sed tamen fides +habuit alium statum in veteri et in nova lege, nam quod illi +credebant futurum, nos credimus factum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: All the differences assigned between the Old and New Laws are gathered from their relative perfection and imperfection. For + the precepts of every law prescribe acts of virtue. Now the imperfect, who as yet are not possessed of a virtuous habit, are + directed in one way to perform virtuous acts, while those who are perfected by the possession of virtuous habits are directed + in another way. For those who as yet are not endowed with virtuous habits, are + directed to the performance of virtuous acts by reason of some outward cause: for instance, by the threat of punishment, or + the promise of some extrinsic rewards, such as honor, riches, or the like. Hence the Old Law, which was given to men who were + imperfect, that is, who had not yet received spiritual grace, was called the "law of fear," inasmuch as it induced men to + observe its commandments by threatening them with penalties; and is spoken of as containing temporal promises. On the other + hand, those who are possessed of virtue, are inclined to do virtuous deeds through love of virtue, not on account of some + extrinsic punishment or reward. Hence the New Law which derives its pre-eminence from the spiritual grace instilled into our + hearts, is called the "Law of love": and it is described as containing spiritual and eternal promises, which are objects of + the virtues, chiefly of charity. Accordingly such persons are inclined of themselves to those objects, not as to something + foreign but as to something of their own. For this reason, too, the Old Law is described as "restraining the hand, not the + will" [*Peter Lombard, Sent. iii, D, 40]; since when a man refrains from some sins through fear of being punished, his will + does not shrink simply from sin, as does the will of a man who refrains from sin through love of righteousness: and hence + the New Law, which is the Law of love, is said to restrain the will. +
Nevertheless there were some in the state of the Old Testament who, having charity and the grace of the Holy Ghost, looked + chiefly to spiritual and eternal promises: and in this respect they belonged to the New Law. In like manner in the New Testament + there are some carnal men who have not yet attained to the perfection of the New Law; and these it was necessary, even under + the New Testament, to lead to virtuous action by the fear of punishment and by temporal promises. +
But although the Old Law contained precepts of charity, nevertheless it did not confer the Holy Ghost by Whom "charity . + . . is spread abroad in our hearts" ( + Rom. 5:5). +
[38290] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod omnes differentiae quae assignantur inter novam legem +et veterem, accipiuntur secundum perfectum et imperfectum. +Praecepta enim legis cuiuslibet dantur de actibus virtutum. Ad +operanda autem virtutum opera aliter inclinantur imperfecti, qui +nondum habent virtutis habitum; et aliter illi qui sunt per habitum +virtutis perfecti. Illi enim qui nondum habent habitum virtutis, +inclinantur ad agendum virtutis opera ex aliqua causa extrinseca, +puta ex comminatione poenarum, vel ex promissione aliquarum +extrinsecarum remunerationum, puta honoris vel divitiarum vel +alicuius huiusmodi. Et ideo lex vetus, quae dabatur imperfectis, +idest nondum consecutis gratiam spiritualem, dicebatur lex timoris, +inquantum inducebat ad observantiam praeceptorum per comminationem +quarundam poenarum. Et dicitur habere temporalia quaedam promissa. +Illi autem qui habent virtutem, inclinantur ad virtutis opera +agenda propter amorem virtutis, non propter aliquam poenam aut +remunerationem extrinsecam. Et ideo lex nova, cuius principalitas +consistit in ipsa spirituali gratia indita cordibus, dicitur lex +amoris. Et dicitur habere promissa spiritualia et aeterna, quae +sunt obiecta virtutis, praecipue caritatis. Et ita per se in ea +inclinantur, non quasi in extranea, sed quasi in propria. Et +propter hoc etiam lex vetus dicitur cohibere manum, non animum, +quia qui timore poenae ab aliquo peccato abstinet, non simpliciter +eius voluntas a peccato recedit, sicut recedit voluntas eius qui +amore iustitiae abstinet a peccato. Et propter hoc lex nova, quae +est lex amoris, dicitur animum cohibere. Fuerunt tamen aliqui in +statu veteris testamenti habentes caritatem et gratiam spiritus +sancti, qui principaliter expectabant promissiones spirituales et +aeternas. Et secundum hoc pertinebant ad legem novam. Similiter +etiam in novo testamento sunt aliqui carnales nondum pertingentes +ad perfectionem novae legis, quos oportuit etiam in novo testamento +induci ad virtutis opera per timorem poenarum, et per aliqua +temporalia promissa. Lex autem vetus etsi praecepta caritatis +daret, non tamen per eam dabatur spiritus sanctus, per quem +diffunditur caritas in cordibus nostris, ut dicitur Rom. V.
+ Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ( + Q[106], AA[1],2), the New Law is called the law of faith, in so far as its pre-eminence is derived from that very grace which is given + inwardly to believers, and for this reason is called the grace of faith. Nevertheless it consists secondarily in certain deeds, + moral and sacramental: but the New Law does not consist chiefly in these latter things, as did the Old Law. As to those under + the Old Testament who + through faith were acceptable to God, in this respect they belonged to the New Testament: for they were not justified except + through faith in Christ, Who is the Author of the New Testament. Hence of Moses the Apostle says ( + Heb. 11:26) that he esteemed "the reproach of Christ greater riches than the treasure of the Egyptians." +
[38291] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, lex nova dicitur lex fidei, +inquantum eius principalitas consistit in ipsa gratia quae interius +datur credentibus, unde dicitur gratia fidei. Habet autem +secundario aliqua facta et moralia et sacramentalia, sed in his non +consistit principalitas legis novae, sicut principalitas veteris +legis in eis consistebat. Illi autem qui in veteri testamento Deo +fuerunt accepti per fidem, secundum hoc ad novum testamentum +pertinebant, non enim iustificabantur nisi per fidem Christi, qui +est auctor novi testamenti. Unde et de Moyse dicit apostolus, ad +Heb. XI, quod maiores divitias aestimabat thesauro Aegyptiorum, +improperium Christi.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law does not fulfil the Old. Because to fulfil and to void are contrary. But the New Law voids + or excludes the observances of the Old Law: for the Apostle says ( + Gal. 5:2): "If you be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing." Therefore the New Law is not a fulfilment of the Old. +
[38292] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad +secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex nova legem veterem non +impleat. Impletio enim contrariatur evacuationi. Sed lex nova +evacuat, vel excludit observantias legis veteris, dicit enim +apostolus, ad Gal. V, si circumcidimini, Christus nihil vobis +proderit. Ergo lex nova non est impletiva veteris legis.
+ Objection 2: Further, one contrary is not the fulfilment of another. But Our Lord propounded in the New Law precepts that were contrary + to precepts of the Old Law. For we read ( + Mat. 5:27-32): You have heard that it was said to them of old: . . . "Whosoever shall put away his wife, let him give her a bill of divorce. + But I say to you that whosoever shall put away his wife . . . maketh her to commit adultery." Furthermore, the same evidently + applies to + the prohibition against swearing, against retaliation, and against hating one's enemies. In like manner Our Lord seems to + have done away with the precepts of the Old Law relating to the different kinds of foods ( + Mat. 15:11): "Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth the man: but what cometh out of the mouth, this defileth a man." Therefore + the New Law is not a fulfilment of the Old. +
[38293] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +contrarium non est impletivum sui contrarii. Sed dominus in lege +nova proposuit quaedam praecepta contraria praeceptis veteris +legis. Dicitur enim Matth. V, audistis quia dictum est antiquis, +quicumque dimiserit uxorem suam, det ei libellum repudii. Ego autem +dico vobis, quicumque dimiserit uxorem suam, facit eam +moechari. Et idem consequenter patet in prohibitione iuramenti, +et etiam in prohibitione talionis, et in odio inimicorum. Similiter +etiam videtur dominus exclusisse praecepta veteris legis de +discretione ciborum, Matth. XV, non quod intrat in os, +coinquinat hominem. Ergo lex nova non est impletiva +veteris.
+ Objection 3: Further, whoever acts against a law does not fulfil the law. But Christ in certain cases acted against the Law. For He touched + the leper ( + Mat. 8:3), which was contrary to the Law. Likewise He seems to have frequently broken the sabbath; since the Jews used to say of Him + ( + Jn. 9:16): "This man is not of God, who keepeth not the sabbath." Therefore Christ did not fulfil the Law: and so the New Law given + by Christ is not a fulfilment of the + Old. +
[38294] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +quicumque contra legem agit, non implet legem. Sed Christus in +aliquibus contra legem fecit. Tetigit enim leprosum, ut dicitur +Matth. VIII, quod erat contra legem. Similiter etiam videtur +sabbatum pluries violasse, unde de eo dicebant Iudaei, Ioan. IX, +non est hic homo a Deo, qui sabbatum non custodit. Ergo +Christus non implevit legem. Et ita lex nova data a Christo, non +est veteris impletiva.
+ Objection 4: Further, the Old Law contained precepts, moral, ceremonial, and judicial, as stated above ( + Q[99], A[4]). But Our Lord ( + Mat. 5) fulfilled the Law in some respects, but without mentioning the judicial and ceremonial precepts. Therefore it seems that + the New Law is not a complete fulfilment of the Old. +
[38295] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, +in veteri lege continebantur praecepta moralia, caeremonialia et +iudicialia, ut supra dictum est. Sed dominus, Matth. V, ubi quantum +ad aliqua legem implevit, nullam mentionem videtur facere de +iudicialibus et caeremonialibus. Ergo videtur quod lex nova non sit +totaliter veteris impletiva.
+ On the contrary, Our Lord said ( + Mat. 5:17): "I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil": and went on to say ( + Mat. 5:18): "One jot or one tittle shall not pass of the Law till all be fulfilled." +
[38296] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dominus dicit, Matth. V, non veni solvere legem, sed +adimplere. Et postea, subdit, iota unum, aut unus apex, non +praeteribit a lege, donec omnia fiant.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[1]), the New Law is compared to the Old as the perfect to the imperfect. Now everything perfect fulfils that which is lacking + in the imperfect. And accordingly the New Law fulfils the Old by supplying that which was lacking in the Old Law. +
Now two things of every law is to make men righteous and virtuous, as was stated above ( + Q[92], A[1]): and consequently the end of the Old Law was the justification of men. The Law, however, could not accomplish this: but + foreshadowed it by certain ceremonial actions, and promised it in words. And in this respect, the New Law fulfils the Old + by justifying men through the power of Christ's Passion. This is what the Apostle says ( + Rom. + 8:3,4 + ): "What the Law could not do . . . God sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh . . . hath condemned sin in the + flesh, that the justification of the Law might be fulfilled in us." And in this respect, the New Law gives what the Old Law + promised, according to + 2 Cor. 1:20: "Whatever are the promises of God, in Him," i.e. in Christ, "they are 'Yea'." [*The Douay version reads thus: "All the promises + of God are in Him, 'It is'."] Again, in this respect, it also fulfils + what the Old Law foreshadowed. Hence it is written ( + Col. 2:17) concerning the ceremonial precepts that they were "a shadow of things to come, but the body is of Christ"; in other words, + the reality is found in Christ. Wherefore the New Law is called the law of reality; whereas the Old Law is called the law + of shadow or of figure. +
Now Christ fulfilled the precepts of the Old Law both in His works and in His doctrine. In His works, because He was willing + to be circumcised and to fulfil the other legal observances, which were binding for the time being; according to + Gal. 4:4: "Made under the Law." In His doctrine He fulfilled the precepts of the Law in three ways. First, by explaining the true + sense of the Law. This is clear in the case of murder and adultery, the prohibition of which + the Scribes and Pharisees thought to refer only to the exterior act: wherefore Our Lord fulfilled the Law by showing that + the prohibition extended also to the interior acts of sins. Secondly, Our Lord fulfilled the precepts of the Law by prescribing + the safest way of complying with the statutes of the Old Law. Thus the Old Law forbade perjury: and this is more safely avoided, + by abstaining altogether from swearing, save in cases of urgency. Thirdly, Our Lord fulfilled the precepts of the Law, + by adding some counsels of perfection: this is clearly seen in + Mat. 19:21, where Our Lord said to the man who affirmed that he had kept all the precepts of the Old Law: "One thing is wanting to thee: + If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell whatsoever thou hast," etc. [*St. Thomas combines + Mat. 19:21 with + Mk. 10:21]. +
[38297] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, lex nova comparatur ad veterem +sicut perfectum ad imperfectum. Omne autem perfectum adimplet id +quod imperfecto deest. Et secundum hoc lex nova adimplet veterem +legem, inquantum supplet illud quod veteri legi deerat. In veteri +autem lege duo possunt considerari, scilicet finis; et praecepta +contenta in lege. Finis vero cuiuslibet legis est ut homines +efficiantur iusti et virtuosi, ut supra dictum est. Unde et finis +veteris legis erat iustificatio hominum. Quam quidem lex efficere +non poterat, sed figurabat quibusdam caeremonialibus factis, et +promittebat verbis. Et quantum ad hoc, lex nova implet veterem +legem iustificando virtute passionis Christi. Et hoc est quod +apostolus dicit, ad Rom. VIII, quod impossibile erat legi, Deus, +filium suum mittens in similitudinem carnis peccati, damnavit +peccatum in carne, ut iustificatio legis impleretur in nobis. +Et quantum ad hoc, lex nova exhibet quod lex vetus promittebat; +secundum illud II ad Cor. I, quotquot promissiones Dei sunt, in +illo est, idest in Christo. Et iterum quantum ad hoc etiam complet +quod vetus lex figurabat. Unde ad Colos. II dicitur de +caeremonialibus quod erant umbra futurorum, corpus autem Christi, +idest, veritas pertinet ad Christum. Unde lex nova dicitur lex +veritatis, lex autem vetus umbrae vel figurae. Praecepta vero +veteris legis adimplevit Christus et opere, et doctrina. Opere +quidem, quia circumcidi voluit, et alia legalia observare, quae +erant illo tempore observanda; secundum illud Gal. IV, factum +sub lege. Sua autem doctrina adimplevit praecepta legis +tripliciter. Primo quidem, verum intellectum legis exprimendo. +Sicut patet in homicidio et adulterio, in quorum prohibitione +Scribae et Pharisaei non intelligebant nisi exteriorem actum +prohibitum, unde dominus legem adimplevit, ostendendo etiam +interiores actus peccatorum cadere sub prohibitione. Secundo, +adimplevit dominus praecepta legis, ordinando quomodo tutius +observaretur quod lex vetus statuerat. Sicut lex vetus statuerat ut +homo non peiuraret, et hoc tutius observatur si omnino a iuramento +abstineat, nisi in casu necessitatis. Tertio, adimplevit dominus +praecepta legis, superaddendo quaedam perfectionis consilia, ut +patet Matth. XIX, ubi dominus dicenti se observasse praecepta +veteris legis, dicit, unum tibi deest. Si vis perfectus esse, +vade et vende omnia quae habes, et cetera.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The New Law does not void observance of the Old Law except in the point of ceremonial precepts, as stated above ( + Q[103], AA[3],4). Now the latter were figurative of something to come. Wherefore from the very fact that the ceremonial precepts were fulfilled + when those things were accomplished which they foreshadowed, it follows that they are no longer to be observed: for it they + were to be observed, this would mean that + something is still to be accomplished and is not yet fulfilled. Thus the promise of a future gift holds no longer when it + has been fulfilled by the presentation of the gift. In this way the legal ceremonies are abolished by being fulfilled. +
[38298] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod lex nova non evacuat observantiam veteris legis +nisi quantum ad caeremonialia, ut supra habitum est. Haec autem +erant in figuram futuri. Unde ex hoc ipso quod caeremonialia +praecepta sunt impleta, perfectis his quae figurabantur, non sunt +ulterius observanda, quia si observarentur, adhuc significaretur +aliquid ut futurum et non impletum. Sicut etiam promissio futuri +doni locum iam non habet, promissione iam impleta per doni +exhibitionem et per hunc modum, caeremoniae legis tolluntur cum +implentur.
+ Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix, 26), those precepts of Our Lord are not contrary to the precepts of the Old Law. For + what Our Lord commanded about a man not putting away his wife, is not contrary to what the Law prescribed. "For the Law did + not say: 'Let him that wills, put his wife away': the contrary of which would be not to put her away. On the contrary, the + Law was unwilling that a man should put away his wife, since it prescribed a delay, + so that excessive eagerness for divorce might cease through being weakened during the writing of the bill. Hence Our Lord, + in order to impress the fact that a wife ought not easily to be put away, allowed no exception save in the case of fornication." + The same applies to the prohibition about swearing, as stated above. The same is also clear with respect to the prohibition + of retaliation. For the Law fixed a limit to revenge, by forbidding men to seek vengeance unreasonably: whereas Our Lord + deprived them of vengeance more completely by commanding them to abstain from it altogether. With regard to the hatred of + one's enemies, He dispelled the false interpretation of the Pharisees, by admonishing us to hate, not the person, but his + sin. As to discriminating between various foods, which was a ceremonial matter, Our Lord did not forbid this to be observed: + but He showed that no foods are naturally unclean, but only in token of something else, as stated above ( + Q[102], A[6], ad 1). +
[38299] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, contra Faustum, praecepta +illa domini non sunt contraria praeceptis veteris legis quod +enim dominus praecepit de uxore non dimittenda, non est contrarium +ei quod lex praecepit. Neque enim ait lex, qui voluerit, dimittat +uxorem; cui esset contrarium non dimittere. Sed utique nolebat +dimitti uxorem a viro, qui hanc interposuit moram, ut in dissidium +animus praeceps libelli conscriptione refractus absisteret. Unde +dominus, ad hoc confirmandum ut non facile uxor dimittatur, solam +causam fornicationis excepit. Et idem etiam dicendum est in +prohibitione iuramenti, sicut dictum est. Et idem etiam patet in +prohibitione talionis. Taxavit enim modum vindictae lex, ut non +procederetur ad immoderatam vindictam, a qua dominus perfectius +removit eum quem monuit omnino a vindicta abstinere. Circa odium +vero inimicorum, removit falsum Pharisaeorum intellectum, nos +monens ut persona odio non haberetur, sed culpa. Circa discretionem +vero ciborum, quae caeremonialis erat, dominus non mandavit ut tunc +non observaretur, sed ostendit quod nulli cibi secundum suam +naturam erant immundi, sed solum secundum figuram, ut supra dictum +est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: It was forbidden by the Law to touch a leper; because by doing so, man incurred a certain uncleanness of irregularity, as + also by touching the dead, as stated above ( + Q[102], A[5], ad 4). But Our Lord, Who healed the leper, could not contract an uncleanness. By those things which He did on the sabbath, + He did not break the sabbath in reality, as the Master Himself shows in the Gospel: both because He worked miracles by His + Divine power, which is ever active among things; and because He worked miracles by His Divine power, which is ever active + among things; and because His works were concerned with the salvation of man, while the Pharisees were concerned for the well-being + of animals even on the sabbath; and again because on account of urgency He excused His disciples for gathering the ears of + corn on the sabbath. But He did seem to break the sabbath according to the superstitious interpretation of the Pharisees, + who thought that man ought to abstain from doing even works of kindness on the sabbath; which was contrary to the intention + of the Law. +
[38300] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod tactus leprosi erat prohibitus in lege, quia ex hoc +incurrebat homo quandam irregularitatis immunditiam, sicut et ex +tactu mortui, ut supra dictum est. Sed dominus, qui erat mundator +leprosi, immunditiam incurrere non poterat. Per ea autem quae fecit +in sabbato, sabbatum non solvit secundum rei veritatem, sicut ipse +magister in Evangelio ostendit, tum quia operabatur miracula +virtute divina, quae semper operatur in rebus; tum quia salutis +humanae opera faciebat, cum Pharisaei etiam saluti animalium in die +sabbati providerent; tum quia etiam ratione necessitatis discipulos +excusavit in sabbato spicas colligentes. Sed videbatur solvere +secundum superstitiosum intellectum Pharisaeorum, qui credebant +etiam a salubribus operibus esse in die sabbati abstinendum, quod +erat contra intentionem legis.
+ Reply to Objection 4: The reason why the ceremonial precepts of the Law are not mentioned in + Mat. 5 is because, as stated above (ad 1), their observance was abolished by their fulfilment. But of the judicial precepts He mentioned + that of retaliation: so that what He said about it should refer to all the others. With regard to this precept, He taught + that the intention of the Law was that retaliation should be sought out of love of justice, and not as a punishment out of + revengeful spite, which He forbade, admonishing man to be ready to suffer yet greater insults; and this remains still in the + New Law. +
[38301] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod caeremonialia praecepta legis non commemorantur +Matth. V, quia eorum observantia totaliter excluditur per +impletionem, ut dictum est. De iudicialibus vero praeceptis +commemoravit praeceptum talionis, ut quod de hoc diceretur, de +omnibus aliis esset intelligendum. In quo quidem praecepto docuit +legis intentionem non esse ad hoc quod poena talionis quaereretur +propter livorem vindictae, quem ipse excludit, monens quod homo +debet esse paratus etiam maiores iniurias sufferre, sed solum +propter amorem iustitiae. Quod adhuc in nova lege remanet.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law is not contained in the Old. Because the New Law consists chiefly in faith: wherefore it is + called the "law of faith" ( + Rom. 3:27). But many points of faith are set forth in the New Law, which are not contained in the Old. Therefore the New Law is not + contained in the Old. +
[38302] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex nova in lege veteri non +contineatur. Lex enim nova praecipue in fide consistit, unde +dicitur lex fidei, ut patet Rom. III. Sed multa credenda traduntur +in nova lege quae in veteri non continentur. Ergo lex nova non +continetur in veteri.
+ Objection 2: Further, a gloss says on + Mat. 5:19, "He that shall break one of these least commandments," that the lesser commandments are those of the Law, and the greater + commandments, those contained in the Gospel. Now the greater cannot be contained in the lesser. Therefore the New Law is not + contained in the Old. +
[38303] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +quaedam Glossa dicit, Matth. V, super illud, qui solverit unum de +mandatis istis minimis, quod mandata legis sunt minora, in +Evangelio vero sunt mandata maiora. Maius autem non potest +contineri in minori. Ergo lex nova non continetur in veteri.
+ Objection 3: Further, who holds the container holds the contents. If, therefore, the New Law is contained in the Old, it follows that + whoever had the Old Law had the New: so that it was superfluous to give men a New Law when once they had the Old. Therefore + the New Law is not contained in the Old. +
[38304] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +quod continetur in altero, simul habetur habito illo. Si igitur lex +nova contineretur in veteri, sequeretur quod, habita veteri lege, +habeatur et nova. Superfluum igitur fuit, habita veteri lege, +iterum dari novam. Non ergo nova lex continetur in veteri.
+ On the contrary, As expressed in + Ezech. 1:16, there was "a wheel in the midst of a wheel," i.e. "the New Testament within the Old," according to Gregory's exposition. +
[38305] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod, sicut dicitur Ezech. I, rota erat in rota, idest +novum testamentum in veteri, ut Gregorius exponit.
+ I answer that, One thing may be contained in another in two ways. First, actually; as a located thing is in a place. Secondly, virtually; + as an effect in its cause, or as the complement in that which is incomplete; thus a genus contains its species, and a seed + contains the whole tree, virtually. It is in this way that the New Law is contained in the Old: for it has been stated + (A[1]) that the New Law is compared to the Old as perfect to imperfect. + Hence Chrysostom, expounding + Mk. 4:28, "The earth of itself bringeth forth fruit, first the blade, then the ear, afterwards the full corn in the ear," expresses + himself as follows: "He brought forth first the blade, i.e. the Law of Nature; then the ear, i.e. the Law of Moses; lastly, + the full corn, i.e. the Law of the Gospel." Hence then the New Law is in the Old as the corn in the ear. +
[38306] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod aliquid continetur in alio dupliciter. Uno modo, in +actu, sicut locatum in loco. Alio modo, virtute, sicut effectus in +causa, vel complementum in incompleto, sicut genus continet species +potestate, et sicut tota arbor continetur in semine. Et per hunc +modum nova lex continetur in veteri, dictum est enim quod nova lex +comparatur ad veterem sicut perfectum ad imperfectum. Unde +Chrysostomus exponens illud quod habetur Marc. IV, ultro terra +fructificat primum herbam, deinde spicam, deinde plenum frumentum +in spica, sic dicit, primo herbam fructificat in lege +naturae; postmodum spicas in lege Moysi; postea plenum frumentum, +in Evangelio. Sic igitur est lex nova in veteri sicut fructus +in spica.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Whatsoever is set down in the New Testament explicitly and openly as a point of faith, is contained in the Old Testament + as a matter of belief, but implicitly, under a figure. And accordingly, even as to those things which we are bound to believe, + the New Law is contained in the Old. +
[38307] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod omnia quae credenda traduntur in novo testamento +explicite et aperte, traduntur credenda in veteri testamento, sed +implicite sub figura. Et secundum hoc etiam quantum ad credenda lex +nova continetur in veteri.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The precepts of the New Law are said to be greater than those of the Old Law, in the point of their being set forth explicitly. + But as to the substance itself of the precepts of the New Testament, they are all contained in the Old. Hence Augustine says + (Contra Faust. xix, 23,28) that "nearly all Our Lord's admonitions or precepts, where He expressed Himself by saying: 'But + I say unto you,' are to be found also in those ancient books. Yet, since they + thought that murder was only the slaying of the human body, Our Lord declared to them that every wicked impulse to hurt our + brother is to be looked on as a kind of murder." And it is in the point of declarations of this kind that the precepts of + the New Law are said to be greater than those of the Old. Nothing, however, prevents the greater from being contained in the + lesser virtually; just as a tree is contained in the seed. +
[38308] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod praecepta novae legis dicuntur esse maiora quam +praecepta veteris legis, quantum ad explicitam manifestationem. Sed +quantum ad ipsam substantiam praeceptorum novi testamenti, omnia +continentur in veteri testamento. Unde Augustinus dicit, contra +Faustum, quod pene omnia quae monuit vel praecepit dominus, ubi +adiungebat, ego autem dico vobis, inveniuntur etiam in illis +veteribus libris. Sed quia non intelligebant homicidium nisi +peremptionem corporis humani, aperuit dominus omnem iniquum motum +ad nocendum fratri, in homicidii genere deputari. Et quantum ad +huiusmodi manifestationes, praecepta novae legis dicuntur maiora +praeceptis veteris legis. Nihil tamen prohibet maius in minori +virtute contineri, sicut arbor continetur in semine.
+ Reply to Objection 3: What is set forth implicitly needs to be declared explicitly. Hence after the publishing of the Old Law, a New Law also had + to be given. +
[38309] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod illud quod implicite datum est, oportet explicari. Et +ideo post veterem legem latam, oportuit etiam novam legem dari.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law is more burdensome than the Old. For Chrysostom (Opus Imp. in Matth., Hom. x [*The work of + an unknown author]) say: "The commandments given to Moses are easy to obey: Thou shalt not kill; Thou shalt not commit adultery: + but the commandments of Christ are difficult to accomplish, for instance: Thou shalt not give way to anger, or to lust." Therefore + the New Law is more burdensome than the Old. +
[38310] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex nova sit gravior quam lex vetus. +Matth. enim V, super illud, qui solverit unum de mandatis his +minimis, dicit Chrysostomus, mandata Moysi in actu facilia sunt, +non occides, non adulterabis. Mandata autem Christi, idest, non +irascaris, non concupiscas, in actu difficilia sunt. Ergo lex +nova est gravior quam vetus.
+ Objection 2: Further, it is easier to make use of earthly prosperity than to suffer tribulations. But in the Old Testament observance + of the Law was followed by temporal prosperity, as may be gathered from + Dt. 28:1-14; whereas many kinds of trouble ensue to those who observe the New Law, as stated in + 2 Cor. 6:4-10: "Let us exhibit ourselves as the ministers of God, in much patience, in tribulation, in necessities, in distresses," + etc. Therefore the New Law is more burdensome than the Old. +
[38311] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +facilius est terrena prosperitate uti quam tribulationes perpeti. +Sed in veteri testamento observationem veteris legis consequebatur +prosperitas temporalis, ut patet Deut. XXVIII. Observatores autem +novae legis consequitur multiplex adversitas, prout dicitur II ad +Cor. VI, exhibeamus nosmetipsos sicut Dei ministros in multa +patientia, in tribulationibus, in necessitatibus, in angustiis, +et cetera. Ergo lex nova est gravior quam lex vetus.
+ Objection 3: The more one has to do, the more difficult it is. But the New Law is something added to the Old. For the Old Law forbade + perjury, while the New Law proscribed even swearing: the Old Law forbade a man to cast off his wife without a bill of divorce, + while the New Law forbade divorce altogether; as is clearly stated in + Mat. 5:31, seqq., according to Augustine's expounding. Therefore the New Law is more burdensome than the Old. +
[38312] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +quod se habet ex additione ad alterum, videtur esse difficilius. +Sed lex nova se habet ex additione ad veterem. Nam lex vetus +prohibuit periurium, lex nova etiam iuramentum, lex vetus prohibuit +discidium uxoris sine libello repudii, lex autem nova omnino +discidium prohibuit, ut patet Matth. V, secundum expositionem +Augustini. Ergo lex nova est gravior quam vetus.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Mat. 11:28): "Come to Me, all you that labor and are burdened": which words are expounded by Hilary thus: "He calls to Himself all those + that labor under the difficulty of observing the Law, and are burdened with the sins of this world." And further on He says + of the yoke of the Gospel: "For My yoke is sweet and My burden light." Therefore the New Law is a lighter burden than the + Old. +
[38313] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Matth. XI, venite ad me omnes qui laboratis et +onerati estis. Quod exponens Hilarius dicit, legis +difficultatibus laborantes, et peccatis saeculi oneratos, ad se +advocat. Et postmodum de iugo Evangelii subdit, iugum enim +meum suave est, et onus meum leve. Ergo lex nova est levior +quam vetus.
+ I answer that, A twofold difficult may attach to works of virtue with which the precepts of the Law are concerned. One is on the part of + the outward works, which of themselves are, in a way, difficult and burdensome. And in this respect the Old Law is a much + heavier burden than the New: since the Old Law by its numerous ceremonies prescribed many more outward acts than the New Law, + which, in the teaching of Christ and the apostles, added very few precepts to those of the + natural law; although afterwards some were added, through being instituted by the holy Fathers. Even in these Augustine says + that moderation should be observed, lest good conduct should become a burden to the faithful. For he says in reply to the + queries of Januarius (Ep. lv) that, "whereas God in His mercy wished religion to be a free service rendered by the public + solemnization of a small number of most manifest sacraments, certain persons make it a slave's burden; so much so that the + state + of the Jews who were subject to the sacraments of the Law, and not to the presumptuous devices of man, was more tolerable." +
The other difficulty attaches to works of virtue as to interior acts: for instance, that a virtuous deed be done with promptitude + and pleasure. It is this difficulty that virtue solves: because to act thus is difficult for a man without virtue: but through + virtue it becomes easy for him. In this respect the precepts of the New Law are more burdensome than those of the Old; because + the New Law prohibits certain interior movements of the soul, which were not expressly forbidden in + the Old Law in all cases, although they were forbidden in some, without, however, any punishment being attached to the prohibition. + Now this is very difficult to a man without virtue: thus even the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 9) that it is easy to do what + a righteous man does; but that to do it in the same way, viz. with pleasure and promptitude, is difficult to a man who is + not righteous. Accordingly we read also ( + 1 Jn. 5:3) that "His commandments are not heavy": which + words Augustine expounds by saying that "they are not heavy to the man that loveth; whereas they are a burden to him that + loveth not." +
[38314] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod circa opera virtutis, de quibus praecepta legis +dantur, duplex difficultas attendi potest. Una quidem ex parte +exteriorum operum, quae ex seipsis quandam difficultatem habent et +gravitatem. Et quantum ad hoc, lex vetus est multo gravior quam +nova, quia ad plures actus exteriores obligabat lex vetus in +multiplicibus caeremoniis, quam lex nova, quae praeter praecepta +legis naturae, paucissima superaddidit in doctrina Christi et +apostolorum; licet aliqua sint postmodum superaddita ex +institutione sanctorum patrum. In quibus etiam Augustinus dicit +esse moderationem attendendam, ne conversatio fidelium onerosa +reddatur. Dicit enim, ad inquisitiones Ianuarii, de quibusdam, quod +ipsam religionem nostram, quam in manifestissimis et paucissimis +celebrationum sacramentis Dei misericordia voluit esse liberam, +servilibus premunt oneribus, adeo ut tolerabilior sit conditio +Iudaeorum, qui legalibus sacramentis, non humanis praesumptionibus +subiiciuntur. Alia autem difficultas est circa opera virtutum +in interioribus actibus, puta quod aliquis opus virtutis exerceat +prompte et delectabiliter. Et circa hoc difficile est virtus, hoc +enim non habenti virtutem est valde difficile; sed per virtutem +redditur facile. Et quantum ad hoc, praecepta novae legis sunt +graviora praeceptis veteris legis, quia in nova lege prohibentur +interiores motus animi, qui expresse in veteri lege non +prohibebantur in omnibus, etsi in aliquibus prohiberentur; in +quibus tamen prohibendis poena non apponebatur. Hoc autem est +difficillimum non habenti virtutem, sicut etiam philosophus dicit, +in V Ethic., quod operari ea quae iustus operatur, facile est; sed +operari ea eo modo quo iustus operatur, scilicet delectabiliter et +prompte, est difficile non habenti iustitiam. Et sic etiam dicitur +I Ioan. V, quod mandata eius gravia non sunt, quod exponens +Augustinus dicit quod non sunt gravia amanti, sed non amanti +sunt gravia.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted speaks expressly of the difficulty of the New Law as to the deliberate curbing of interior movements. +
[38315] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod auctoritas illa expresse loquitur de +difficultate novae legis quantum ad expressam cohibitionem +interiorum motuum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The tribulations suffered by those who observe the New Law are not imposed by the Law itself. Moreover they are easily borne, + on account of the love in which the same Law consists: since, as Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxx), "love makes light + and nothing of things that seem arduous and beyond our power." +
[38316] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod adversitates quas patiuntur observatores novae legis, +non sunt ab ipsa lege impositae. Sed tamen propter amorem, in quo +ipsa lex consistit, faciliter tollerantur, quia sicut Augustinus +dicit, in libro de verbis domini, omnia saeva et immania facilia +et prope nulla efficit amor.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The object of these additions to the precepts of the Old Law was to render it easier to do what it prescribed, as Augustine + states [*De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 17,21; xix, 23,26]. Accordingly this does not prove that the New Law is more burdensome, + but rather that it is a lighter burden. +
[38317] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod illae additiones ad praecepta veteris legis, ad hoc +ordinantur ut facilius impleatur quod vetus lex mandabat, sicut +Augustinus dicit. Et ideo per hoc non ostenditur quod lex nova sit +gravior, sed magis quod sit facilior.
We must now consider those things that are contained in the New Law: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the New Law ought to prescribe or to forbid any outward works?
(2) Whether the New Law makes sufficient provision in prescribing and forbidding external acts?
(3) Whether in the matter of internal acts it directs man sufficiently?
+[38318] Iª-IIae q. 108 pr. Deinde +considerandum est de his quae continentur in lege nova. Et circa +hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum lex nova debeat aliqua opera +exteriora praecipere vel prohibere. Secundo, utrum sufficienter se +habeat in exterioribus actibus praecipiendis vel prohibendis. +Tertio, utrum convenienter instituat homines quantum ad actus +interiores. Quarto, utrum convenienter superaddat consilia +praeceptis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law should not prescribe or prohibit any external acts. For the New Law is the Gospel of the kingdom, + according to + Mat. 24:14: "This Gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in the whole world." But the kingdom of God consists not in exterior, but + only in interior acts, according to + Lk. 17:21: "The kingdom of God is within you"; and + Rom. 14:17: "The kingdom of God is not + meat and drink; but justice and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost." Therefore the New Law should not prescribe or forbid any + external acts. +
[38319] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex nova nullos exteriores actus +debeat praecipere vel prohibere. Lex enim nova est Evangelium +regni; secundum illud Matth. XXIV, praedicabitur hoc Evangelium +regni in universo orbe. Sed regnum Dei non consistit in +exterioribus actibus, sed solum in interioribus; secundum illud +Luc. XVII, regnum Dei intra vos est; et Rom. XIV, non est +regnum Dei esca et potus, sed iustitia et pax et gaudium in spiritu +sancto. Ergo lex nova non debet praecipere vel prohibere +aliquos exteriores actus.
+ Objection 2: Further, the New Law is "the law of the Spirit" ( + Rom. 8:2). But "where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty" ( + 2 Cor. 3:17). Now there is no liberty when man is bound to do or avoid certain external acts. Therefore the New Law does not prescribe + or forbid any external acts. +
[38320] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +lex nova est lex spiritus, ut dicitur Rom. VIII. Sed ubi spiritus +domini, ibi libertas, ut dicitur II ad Cor. III. Non est autem +libertas ubi homo obligatur ad aliqua exteriora opera facienda vel +vitanda. Ergo lex nova non continet aliqua praecepta vel +prohibitiones exteriorum actuum.
+ Objection 3: Further, all external acts are understood as referable to the hand, just as interior acts belong to the mind. But this is + assigned as the difference between the New and Old Laws that the "Old Law restrains the hand, whereas the New Law curbs the + will" [*Peter Lombard, Sent. iii, D, 40]. Therefore the New Law should not contain prohibitions and commands about exterior + deeds, but only about interior acts. +
[38321] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +omnes exteriores actus pertinere intelliguntur ad manum, sicut +interiores actus pertinent ad animum. Sed haec ponitur differentia +inter novam legem et veterem, quod vetus lex cohibet manum, sed +lex nova cohibet animum. Ergo in lege nova non debent poni +prohibitiones et praecepta exteriorum actuum, sed solum +interiorum.
+ On the contrary, Through the New Law, men are made "children of light": wherefore it is written ( + Jn. 12:36): "Believe in the light that you may be the children of light." Now it is becoming that children of the light should do deeds + of light and cast aside deeds of darkness, according to + Eph. 5:8: "You were heretofore darkness, but now light in the Lord. Walk . . . as children of the light." Therefore the New Law had + to forbid + certain external acts and prescribe others. +
[38322] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod per legem novam efficiuntur homines filii lucis, unde +dicitur Ioan. XII, credite in lucem, ut filii lucis sitis. +Sed filios lucis decet opera lucis facere, et opera tenebrarum +abiicere; secundum illud Ephes. V, eratis aliquando tenebrae, +nunc autem lux in domino. Ut filii lucis ambulate. Ergo lex +nova quaedam exteriora opera debuit prohibere, et quaedam +praecipere.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + Q[106], AA[1],2), the New Law consists chiefly in the grace of the Holy Ghost, which is shown forth by faith that worketh through love. + Now men become receivers of this grace through God's Son made man, Whose humanity grace filled first, and thence flowed forth + to us. Hence it is written ( + Jn. 1:14): "The Word was made flesh," and afterwards: "full of grace and truth"; and further on: "Of His + fulness we all have received, and grace for grace." Hence it is added that "grace and truth came by Jesus Christ." Consequently + it was becoming that the grace flows from the incarnate Word should be given to us by means of certain external sensible objects; + and that from this inward grace, whereby the flesh is subjected to the Spirit, certain external works should ensue. +
Accordingly external acts may have a twofold connection with grace. In the first place, as leading in some way to grace. + Such are the sacramental acts which are instituted in the New Law, e.g. Baptism, the Eucharist, and the like. +
In the second place there are those external acts which ensue from the promptings of grace: and herein we must observe a + difference. For there are some which are necessarily in keeping with, or in opposition to inward grace consisting in faith + that worketh through love. Such external works are prescribed or forbidden in the New Law; thus confession of faith is prescribed, + and denial of faith is forbidden; for it is written ( + Mat. 10:32,33) "(Every one) that + shall confess Me before men, I will also confess him before My Father . . . But he that shall deny Me before men, I will also + deny him before My Father." On the other hand, there are works which are not necessarily opposed to, or in keeping with faith + that worketh through love. Such works are not prescribed or forbidden in the New Law, by virtue of its primitive institution; + but have been left by the Lawgiver, i.e. Christ, to the discretion of each individual. And so to each one it is free to + decide what he should do or avoid; and to each superior, to direct his subjects in such matters as regards what they must + do or avoid. Wherefore also in this respect the Gospel is called the "law of liberty" [*Cf. Reply OBJ[2]]: since the Old Law + decided many points and left few to man to decide as he chose. +
[38323] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, principalitas legis novae est +gratia spiritus sancti, quae manifestatur in fide per dilectionem +operante. Hanc autem gratiam consequuntur homines per Dei filium +hominem factum, cuius humanitatem primo replevit gratia, et exinde +est ad nos derivata. Unde dicitur Ioan. I, verbum caro factum +est; et postea subditur, plenum gratiae et veritatis; et +infra, de plenitudine eius nos omnes accepimus, et gratiam pro +gratia. Unde subditur quod gratia et veritas per Iesum Christum +facta est. Et ideo convenit ut per aliqua exteriora sensibilia +gratia a verbo incarnato profluens in nos deducatur; et ex hac +interiori gratia, per quam caro spiritui subditur, exteriora +quaedam opera sensibilia producantur. Sic igitur exteriora opera +dupliciter ad gratiam pertinere possunt. Uno modo, sicut inducentia +aliqualiter ad gratiam. Et talia sunt opera sacramentorum quae in +lege nova sunt instituta, sicut Baptismus, Eucharistia, et alia +huiusmodi. Alia vero sunt opera exteriora quae ex instinctu gratiae +producuntur. Et in his est quaedam differentia attendenda. Quaedam +enim habent necessariam convenientiam vel contrarietatem ad +interiorem gratiam, quae in fide per dilectionem operante +consistit. Et huiusmodi exteriora opera sunt praecepta vel +prohibita in lege nova, sicut praecepta est confessio fidei, et +prohibita negatio; dicitur enim Matth. X, qui confitebitur me +coram hominibus, confitebor et ego eum coram patre meo. Qui autem +negaverit me coram hominibus, negabo et ego eum coram patre +meo. Alia vero sunt opera quae non habent necessariam +contrarietatem vel convenientiam ad fidem per dilectionem +operantem. Et talia opera non sunt in nova lege praecepta vel +prohibita ex ipsa prima legis institutione; sed relicta sunt a +legislatore, scilicet Christo, unicuique, secundum quod aliquis +curam gerere debet. Et sic unicuique liberum est circa talia +determinare quid sibi expediat facere vel vitare; et cuicumque +praesidenti, circa talia ordinare suis subditis quid sit in talibus +faciendum vel vitandum. Unde etiam quantum ad hoc dicitur lex +Evangelii lex libertatis, nam lex vetus multa determinabat, et +pauca relinquebat hominum libertati determinanda.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The kingdom of God consists chiefly in internal acts: but as a consequence all things that are essential to internal acts + belong also to the kingdom of God. Thus if the kingdom of God is internal righteousness, peace, and spiritual joy, all external + acts that are incompatible with righteousness, peace, and spiritual joy, are in opposition to the kingdom of God; and consequently + should be forbidden in the Gospel of the kingdom. On the other hand, those + things that are indifferent as regards the aforesaid, for instance, to eat of this or that food, are not part of the kingdom + of God; wherefore the Apostle says before the words quoted: "The kingdom of God is not meat and drink." +
[38324] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod regnum Dei in interioribus actibus principaliter +consistit, sed ex consequenti etiam ad regnum Dei pertinent omnia +illa sine quibus interiores actus esse non possunt. Sicut si regnum +Dei est interior iustitia et pax et gaudium spirituale, necesse est +quod omnes exteriores actus qui repugnant iustitiae aut paci aut +gaudio spirituali, repugnent regno Dei, et ideo sunt in Evangelio +regni prohibendi. Illa vero quae indifferenter se habent respectu +horum, puta comedere hos vel illos cibos, in his non est regnum +Dei, unde apostolus praemittit, non est regnum Dei esca et +potus.
+ Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 2), what is "free is cause of itself." Therefore he acts freely, who acts of his + own accord. Now man does of his own accord that which he does from a habit that is suitable to his nature: since a habit inclines + one as a second nature. If, however, a habit be in opposition to nature, man would not act according to his nature, but according + to some corruption affecting that nature. Since then the grace of the + Holy Ghost is like an interior habit bestowed on us and inclining us to act aright, it makes us do freely those things that + are becoming to grace, and shun what is opposed to it. +
Accordingly the New Law is called the law of liberty in two respects. First, because it does not bind us to do or avoid certain + things, except such as are of themselves necessary or opposed to salvation, and come under the prescription or prohibition + of the law. Secondly, because it also makes us comply freely with these precepts and prohibitions, inasmuch as we do so through + the promptings of grace. It is for these two reasons that the New Law is called "the law of perfect + liberty" ( + James 1:25). +
[38325] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, in I Metaphys., liber est +qui sui causa est. Ille ergo libere aliquid agit qui ex seipso +agit. Quod autem homo agit ex habitu suae naturae convenienti, ex +seipso agit, quia habitus inclinat in modum naturae. Si vero +habitus esset naturae repugnans, homo non ageret secundum quod est +ipse, sed secundum aliquam corruptionem sibi supervenientem. Quia +igitur gratia spiritus sancti est sicut interior habitus nobis +infusus inclinans nos ad recte operandum, facit nos libere operari +ea quae conveniunt gratiae, et vitare ea quae gratiae repugnant. +Sic igitur lex nova dicitur lex libertatis dupliciter. Uno modo, +quia non arctat nos ad facienda vel vitanda aliqua, nisi quae de se +sunt vel necessaria vel repugnantia saluti, quae cadunt sub +praecepto vel prohibitione legis. Secundo, quia huiusmodi etiam +praecepta vel prohibitiones facit nos libere implere, inquantum ex +interiori instinctu gratiae ea implemus. Et propter haec duo lex +nova dicitur lex perfectae libertatis, Iac. I.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The New Law, by restraining the mind from inordinate movements, must needs also restrain the hand from inordinate acts, which + ensue from inward movements. +
[38326] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod lex nova, cohibendo animum ab inordinatis motibus, +oportet quod etiam cohibeat manum ab inordinatis actibus, qui sunt +effectus interiorum motuum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law made insufficient ordinations about external acts. Because faith that worketh through charity + seems chiefly to belong to the New Law, according to + Gal. 5:6: "In Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision: but faith that worketh through charity." But + the New Law declared explicitly certain points of faith which were not set forth explicitly in the Old Law; for instance, + belief in + the Trinity. Therefore it should also have added certain outward moral deeds, which were not fixed in the Old Law. +
[38327] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad +secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex nova insufficienter +exteriores actus ordinaverit. Ad legem enim novam praecipue +pertinere videtur fides per dilectionem operans; secundum illud ad +Gal. V, in Christo Iesu neque circumcisio aliquid valet neque +praeputium, sed fides quae per dilectionem operatur. Sed lex +nova explicavit quaedam credenda quae non erant in veteri lege +explicita, sicut de fide Trinitatis. Ergo etiam debuit superaddere +aliqua exteriora opera moralia, quae non erant in veteri lege +determinata.
+ Objection 2: Further, in the Old Law not only were sacraments instituted, but also certain sacred things, as stated above ( + Q[101], A[4]; + Q[102], A[4]). But in the New Law, although certain sacraments are instituted by Our Lord; for instance, pertaining either to the sanctification + of a temple or of the vessels, or to the celebration of some particular feast. Therefore the New Law made insufficient ordinations + about + external matters. +
[38328] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +in veteri lege non solum instituta sunt sacramenta, sed etiam +aliqua sacra, ut supra dictum est. Sed in nova lege, etsi sint +instituta aliqua sacramenta, nulla tamen sacra instituta a domino +videntur, puta quae pertineant vel ad sanctificationem alicuius +templi aut vasorum, vel etiam ad aliquam solemnitatem celebrandam. +Ergo lex nova insufficienter exteriora ordinavit.
+ Objection 3: Further, in the Old Law, just as there were certain observances pertaining to God's ministers, so also were there certain + observances pertaining to the people: as was stated above when we were treating of the ceremonial of the Old Law ( + Q[101], A[4]; + Q[102], A[6]). Now in the New Law certain observances seem to have been prescribed to the ministers of God; as may be gathered from + Mat. 10:9: + "Do not possess gold, nor silver, nor money in your purses," nor other things which are mentioned here and + Lk. 9, + 10. Therefore certain observances pertaining to the faithful should also have been instituted in the New Law. +
[38329] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +in veteri lege, sicut erant quaedam observantiae pertinentes ad Dei +ministros, ita etiam erant quaedam observantiae pertinentes ad +populum; ut supra dictum est, cum de caeremonialibus veteris legis +ageretur. Sed in nova lege videntur aliquae observantiae esse datae +ministris Dei, ut patet Matth. X, nolite possidere aurum neque +argentum, neque pecuniam in zonis vestris, et cetera quae ibi +sequuntur, et quae dicuntur Luc. IX et X. Ergo etiam debuerunt +aliquae observantiae institui in nova lege ad populum fidelem +pertinentes.
+ Objection 4: Further, in the Old Law, besides moral and ceremonial precepts, there were certain judicial precepts. But in the New Law + there are no judicial precepts. Therefore the New Law made insufficient ordinations about external works. +
[38330] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, +in veteri lege, praeter moralia et caeremonialia, fuerunt quaedam +iudicialia praecepta. Sed in lege nova non traduntur aliqua +iudicialia praecepta. Ergo lex nova insufficienter exteriora opera +ordinavit.
+ On the contrary, Our Lord said ( + Mat. 7:24): "Every one . . . that heareth these My words, and doth them, shall be likened to a wise man that built his house upon a + rock." But a wise builder leaves out nothing that is necessary to the building. Therefore Christ's words contain all things + necessary for man's salvation. +
[38331] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dominus dicit, Matth. VII, omnis qui audit verba mea +haec et facit ea, assimilabitur viro sapienti qui aedificavit domum +suam supra petram. Sed sapiens aedificator nihil omittit eorum +quae sunt necessaria ad aedificium. Ergo in verbis Christi +sufficienter sunt omnia posita quae pertinent ad salutem +humanam.
+ I answer that, as stated above + (A[1]), the New Law had to make such prescriptions or prohibitions alone as are essential for the reception or right use of grace. + And since we cannot of ourselves obtain grace, but through Christ alone, hence Christ of Himself instituted the sacraments + whereby we obtain grace: viz. Baptism, Eucharist, Orders of the ministers of the New Law, by the institution of the apostles + and seventy-two disciples, Penance, and + indissoluble Matrimony. He promised Confirmation through the sending of the Holy Ghost: and we read that by His institution + the apostles healed the sick by anointing them with oil ( + Mk. 6:13). These are the sacraments of the New Law. +
The right use of grace is by means of works of charity. These, in so far as they are essential to virtue, pertain to the + moral precepts, which also formed part of the Old Law. Hence, in this respect, the New Law had nothing to add as regards external + action. The determination of these works in their relation to the divine worship, belongs to the ceremonial precepts of the + Law; and, in relation to our neighbor, to the judicial precepts, as stated above ( + Q[99], A[4]). And therefore, since these determinations are not in themselves necessarily connected with inward grace wherein the Law + consists, they do not come under a precept of the New Law, but are left to the decision of man; some relating to inferiors---as + when a precept is given to an individual; others, relating to superiors, temporal or spiritual, referring, namely, to the + common good. +
Accordingly the New Law had no other external works to determine, by prescribing or forbidding, except the sacraments, and + those moral precepts which have a necessary connection with virtue, for instance, that one must not kill, or steal, and so + forth. +
[38332] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, lex nova in exterioribus illa +solum praecipere debuit vel prohibere, per quae in gratiam +introducimur, vel quae pertinent ad rectum gratiae usum ex +necessitate. Et quia gratiam ex nobis consequi non possumus, sed +per Christum solum, ideo sacramenta, per quae gratiam consequimur, +ipse dominus instituit per seipsum, scilicet Baptismum, +Eucharistiam, ordinem ministrorum novae legis, instituendo +apostolos et septuaginta duos discipulos, et poenitentiam, et +matrimonium indivisibile. Confirmationem etiam promisit per +spiritus sancti missionem. Ex eius etiam institutione apostoli +leguntur oleo infirmos ungendo sanasse, ut habetur Marc. VI. Quae +sunt novae legis sacramenta. Rectus autem gratiae usus est per +opera caritatis. Quae quidem secundum quod sunt de necessitate +virtutis, pertinent ad praecepta moralia, quae etiam in veteri lege +tradebantur. Unde quantum ad hoc, lex nova super veterem addere non +debuit circa exteriora agenda. Determinatio autem praedictorum +operum in ordine ad cultum Dei, pertinet ad praecepta caeremonialia +legis; in ordine vero ad proximum, ad iudicialia; ut supra dictum +est. Et ideo, quia istae determinationes non sunt secundum se de +necessitate interioris gratiae, in qua lex consistit; idcirco non +cadunt sub praecepto novae legis, sed relinquuntur humano arbitrio; +quaedam quidem quantum ad subditos, quae scilicet pertinent +singillatim ad unumquemque; quaedam vero ad praelatos temporales +vel spirituales, quae scilicet pertinent ad utilitatem communem. +Sic igitur lex nova nulla alia exteriora opera determinare debuit +praecipiendo vel prohibendo, nisi sacramenta, et moralia praecepta +quae de se pertinent ad rationem virtutis, puta non esse +occidendum, non esse furandum, et alia huiusmodi.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Matters of faith are above human reason, and so we cannot attain to them except through grace. Consequently, when grace came + to be bestowed more abundantly, the result was an increase in the number of explicit points of faith. On the other hand, it + is through human reason that we are directed to works of virtue, for it is the rule of human action, as stated above ( + Q[19], A[3]; + Q[63], A[2]). Wherefore + in such matters as these there was no need for any precepts to be given besides the moral precepts of the Law, which proceed + from the dictate of reason. +
[38333] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ea quae sunt fidei, sunt supra rationem humanam, +unde in ea non possumus pervenire nisi per gratiam. Et ideo, +abundantiori gratia superveniente, oportuit plura credenda +explicari. Sed ad opera virtutum dirigimur per rationem naturalem, +quae est regula quaedam operationis humanae, ut supra dictum est. +Et ideo in his non oportuit aliqua praecepta dari ultra moralia +legis praecepta, quae sunt de dictamine rationis.
+ Reply to Objection 2: In the sacraments of the New Law grace is bestowed, which cannot be received except through Christ: consequently they had + to be instituted by Him. But in the sacred things no grace is given: for instance, in the consecration of a temple, an altar + or the like, or, again, in the celebration of feasts. Wherefore Our Lord left the institution of such things to the discretion + of the faithful, since they have not of themselves any necessary connection with + inward grace. +
[38334] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod in sacramentis novae legis datur gratia, quae non est +nisi a Christo, et ideo oportuit quod ab ipso institutionem +haberent. Sed in sacris non datur aliqua gratia, puta in +consecratione templi vel altaris vel aliorum huiusmodi, aut etiam +in ipsa celebritate solemnitatum. Et ideo talia, quia secundum +seipsa non pertinent ad necessitatem interioris gratiae, dominus +fidelibus instituenda reliquit pro suo arbitrio.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Our Lord gave the apostles those precepts not as ceremonial observances, but as moral statutes: and they can be understood + in two ways. First, following Augustine (De Consensu Evang. 30), as being not commands but permissions. For He permitted them + to set forth to preach without scrip or stick, and so on, since they were empowered to accept their livelihood from those + to whom they preached: wherefore He goes on to say: "For the laborer is worthy of + his hire." Nor is it a sin, but a work of supererogation for a preacher to take means of livelihood with him, without accepting + supplies from those to whom he preaches; as Paul did ( + 1 Cor. 9:4, seqq.). +
Secondly, according to the explanation of other holy men, they may be considered as temporal commands laid upon the apostles + for the time during which they were sent to preach in Judea before Christ's Passion. For the disciples, being yet as little + children under Christ's care, needed to receive some special commands from Christ, such as all subjects receive from their + superiors: and especially so, since they were to be accustomed little by little to renounce the care of + temporalities, so as to become fitted for the preaching of the Gospel throughout the whole world. Nor must we wonder if He + established certain fixed modes of life, as long as the state of the Old Law endured and the people had not as yet achieved + the perfect liberty of the Spirit. These statutes He abolished shortly before His Passion, as though the disciples had by + their means become sufficiently practiced. Hence He said ( + Lk. 22:35,36) "When I sent you without purse and + scrip and shoes, did you want anything? But they said: Nothing. Then said He unto them: But now, he that hath a purse, let + him take it, and likewise a scrip." Because the time of perfect liberty was already at hand, when they would be left entirely + to their own judgment in matters not necessarily connected with virtue. +
[38335] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod illa praecepta dominus dedit apostolis non tanquam +caeremoniales observantias, sed tanquam moralia instituta. Et +possunt intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum Augustinum, in +libro de consensu Evangelist., ut non sint praecepta, sed +concessiones. Concessit enim eis ut possent pergere ad +praedicationis officium sine pera et baculo et aliis huiusmodi, +tanquam habentes potestatem necessaria vitae accipiendi ab illis +quibus praedicabant, unde subdit, dignus enim est operarius cibo +suo. Non autem peccat, sed supererogat, qui sua portat, ex quibus +vivat in praedicationis officio, non accipiens sumptum ab his +quibus Evangelium praedicat, sicut Paulus fecit. Alio modo possunt +intelligi, secundum aliorum sanctorum expositionem, ut sint quaedam +statuta temporalia apostolis data pro illo tempore quo mittebantur +ad praedicandum in Iudaea ante Christi passionem. Indigebant enim +discipuli, quasi adhuc parvuli sub Christi cura existentes, +accipere aliqua specialia instituta a Christo, sicut et quilibet +subditi a suis praelatis, et praecipue quia erant paulatim +exercitandi ut temporalium sollicitudinem abdicarent, per quod +reddebantur idonei ad hoc quod Evangelium per universum orbem +praedicarent. Nec est mirum si, adhuc durante statu veteris legis, +et nondum perfectam libertatem spiritus consecutis, quosdam +determinatos modos vivendi instituit. Quae quidem statuta, +imminente passione, removit, tanquam discipulis iam per ea +sufficienter exercitatis. Unde Luc. XXII, dixit, quando misi vos +sine sacculo et pera et calceamentis, numquid aliquid defuit vobis? +At illi dixerunt, nihil. Dixit ergo eis, sed nunc qui habet +sacculum, tollat; similiter et peram. Iam enim imminebat tempus +perfectae libertatis, ut totaliter suo dimitterentur arbitrio in +his quae secundum se non pertinent ad necessitatem virtutis.
+ Reply to Objection 4: Judicial precepts also, are not essential to virtue in respect of any particular determination, but only in regard to the + common notion of justice. Consequently Our Lord left the judicial precepts to the discretion of those who were to have spiritual + or temporal charge of others. But as regards the judicial precepts of the Old Law, some of them He explained, because they + were misunderstood by the Pharisees, as we shall state later on (A[3], ad 2). +
[38336] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod iudicialia etiam, secundum se considerata, non sunt +de necessitate virtutis quantum ad talem determinationem sed solum +quantum ad communem rationem iustitiae. Et ideo iudicialia +praecepta reliquit dominus disponenda his qui curam aliorum erant +habituri vel spiritualem vel temporalem. Sed circa iudicialia +praecepta veteris legis quaedam explanavit, propter malum +intellectum Pharisaeorum, ut infra dicetur.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law directed man insufficiently as regards interior actions. For there are ten commandments of + the decalogue directing man to God and his neighbor. But Our Lord partly fulfilled only three of them: as regards, namely, + the prohibition of murder, of adultery, and of perjury. Therefore it seems that, by omitting to fulfil the other precepts, + He directed man insufficiently. +
[38337] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod circa interiores actus lex nova +insufficienter hominem ordinaverit. Sunt enim decem praecepta +Decalogi ordinantia hominem ad Deum et proximum. Sed dominus solum +circa tria illorum aliquid adimplevit, scilicet circa prohibitionem +homicidii, et circa prohibitionem adulterii, et circa prohibitionem +periurii. Ergo videtur quod insufficienter hominem ordinaverit, +adimpletionem aliorum praeceptorum praetermittens.
+ Objection 2: Further, as regards the judicial precepts, Our Lord ordained nothing in the Gospel, except in the matter of divorcing of + wife, of punishment by retaliation, and of persecuting one's enemies. But there are many other judicial precepts of the Old + Law, as stated above ( + Q[104], A[4]; + Q[105]). Therefore, in this respect, He directed human life insufficiently. +
[38338] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +dominus nihil ordinavit in Evangelio de iudicialibus praeceptis +nisi circa repudium uxoris, et circa poenam talionis, et circa +persecutionem inimicorum. Sed multa sunt alia iudicialia praecepta +veteris legis, ut supra dictum est. Ergo quantum ad hoc, +insufficienter vitam hominum ordinavit.
+ Objection 3: Further, in the Old Law, besides moral and judicial, there were ceremonial precepts about which Our Lord made no ordination. + Therefore it seems that He ordained insufficiently. +
[38339] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +in veteri lege, praeter praecepta moralia et iudicialia, erant +quaedam caeremonialia. Circa quae dominus nihil ordinavit. Ergo +videtur insufficienter ordinasse.
+ Objection 4: Further, in order that the mind be inwardly well disposed, man should do no good deed for any temporal whatever. But there + are many other temporal goods besides the favor of man: and there are many other good works besides fasting, alms-deeds, and + prayer. Therefore Our Lord unbecomingly taught that only in respect of these three works, and of no other earthly goods ought + we to shun the glory of human favor. +
[38340] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 arg. 4 Praeterea, +ad interiorem bonam mentis dispositionem pertinet ut nullum bonum +opus homo faciat propter quemcumque temporalem finem. Sed multa +sunt alia temporalia bona quam favor humanus, multa etiam alia sunt +bona opera quam ieiunium, eleemosyna et oratio. Ergo inconveniens +fuit quod dominus docuit solum circa haec tria opera gloriam +favoris humani vitari, et nihil aliud terrenorum bonorum.
+ Objection 5: Further, solicitude for the necessary means of livelihood is by nature instilled into man, and this solicitude even other + animals share with man: wherefore it is written ( + Prov. 6:6, + 8): "Go to the ant, O sluggard, and consider her ways . . . she provideth her meat for herself in the summer, and gathereth + her food in the harvest." But every command issued against the inclination of nature is an unjust command, forasmuch as it + is contrary to + the law of nature. Therefore it seems that Our Lord unbecomingly forbade solicitude about food and raiment. +
[38341] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 arg. 5 Praeterea, +naturaliter homini inditum est ut sollicitetur circa ea quae sunt +sibi necessaria ad vivendum, in qua etiam sollicitudine alia +animalia cum homine conveniunt, unde dicitur Prov. VI, vade ad +formicam, o piger, et considera vias eius. Parat in aestate cibum +sibi, et congregat in messe quod comedat. Sed omne praeceptum +quod datur contra inclinationem naturae, est iniquum, utpote contra +legem naturalem existens. Ergo inconvenienter videtur dominus +prohibuisse sollicitudinem victus et vestitus.
+ Objection 6: Further, no act of virtue should be the subject of a prohibition. Now judgment is an act of justice, according to + Ps. 18:15: "Until justice be turned into judgment." Therefore it seems that Our Lord unbecomingly forbade judgment: and consequently + that the New Law directed man insufficiently in the matter of interior acts. +
[38342] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 arg. 6 Praeterea, +nullus actus virtutis est prohibendus. Sed iudicium est actus +iustitiae; secundum illud Psalmi XCIII, quousque iustitia +convertatur in iudicium. Ergo inconvenienter videtur dominus +iudicium prohibuisse. Et ita videtur lex nova insufficienter +hominem ordinasse circa interiores actus.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 1): We should take note that, when He said: "'He that heareth these My words,' + He indicates clearly that this sermon of the Lord is replete with all the precepts whereby a Christian's life is formed." +
[38343] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, +considerandum est quia, cum dixit, qui audit verba mea haec, +satis significat sermonem istum domini omnibus praeceptis quibus +Christiana vita formatur, esse perfectum.
+ I answer that, As is evident from Augustine's words just quoted, the sermon, contains the whole process of forming the life of a Christian. + Therein man's interior movements are ordered. Because after declaring that his end is Beatitude; and after commending the + authority of the apostles, through whom the teaching of the Gospel was to be promulgated, He orders man's interior movements, + first in regard to man himself, secondly in regard to his neighbor. +
This he does in regard to man himself, in two ways, corresponding to man's two interior movements in respect of any prospective + action, viz. volition of what has to be done, and intention of the end. Wherefore, in the first place, He directs man's will + in respect of the various precepts of the Law: by prescribing that man should refrain not merely from those external works + that are evil in themselves, but also from internal acts, and from the occasions of evil deeds. In the + second place He directs man's intention, by teaching that in our good works, we should seek neither human praise, nor worldly + riches, which is to lay up treasures on earth. +
Afterwards He directs man's interior movement in respect of his neighbor, by forbidding us, on the one hand, to judge him + rashly, unjustly, or presumptuously; and, on the other, to entrust him too readily with sacred things if he be unworthy. +
Lastly, He teaches us how to fulfil the teaching of the Gospel; viz. by imploring the help of God; by striving to enter by + the narrow door of perfect virtue; and by being wary lest we be led astray by evil influences. Moreover, He declares that + we must observe His commandments, and that it is not enough to make profession of faith, or to work miracles, or merely to + hear His words. +
[38344] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ex inducta auctoritate Augustini apparet, +sermo quem dominus in monte proposuit, totam informationem +Christianae vitae continet. In quo perfecte interiores motus +hominis ordinantur. Nam post declaratum beatitudinis finem; et +commendata apostolica dignitate, per quos erat doctrina evangelica +promulganda; ordinat interiores hominis motus, primo quidem quantum +ad seipsum; et deinde quantum ad proximum. Quantum autem ad +seipsum, dupliciter; secundum duos interiores hominis motus circa +agenda, qui sunt voluntas de agendis, et intentio de fine. Unde +primo ordinat hominis voluntatem secundum diversa legis praecepta, +ut scilicet abstineat aliquis non solum ab exterioribus operibus +quae sunt secundum se mala, sed etiam ab interioribus, et ab +occasionibus malorum. Deinde ordinat intentionem hominis, docens +quod in bonis quae agimus, neque quaeramus humanam gloriam, neque +mundanas divitias, quod est thesaurizare in terra. Consequenter +autem ordinat interiorem hominis motum quoad proximum, ut scilicet +eum non temerarie aut iniuste iudicemus, aut praesumptuose; neque +tamen sic simus apud proximum remissi, ut eis sacra committamus, si +sint indigni. Ultimo autem docet modum adimplendi evangelicam +doctrinam, scilicet implorando divinum auxilium; et conatum +apponendo ad ingrediendum per angustam portam perfectae virtutis; +et cautelam adhibendo ne a seductoribus corrumpamur. Et quod +observatio mandatorum eius est necessaria ad virtutem, non autem +sufficit sola confessio fidei, vel miraculorum operatio, vel solus +auditus.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord explained the manner of fulfilling those precepts which the Scribes and Pharisees did not rightly understand: and + this affected chiefly those precepts of the decalogue. For they thought that the prohibition of adultery and murder covered + the external act only, and not the internal desire. And they held this opinion about murder and adultery rather than about + theft and false witness, because the movement of anger tending to murder, and the + movement of desire tending to adultery, seem to be in us from nature somewhat, but not the desire of stealing or bearing false + witness. They held a false opinion about perjury, for they thought that perjury indeed was a sin; but that oaths were of themselves + to be desired and to be taken frequently, since they seem to proceed from reverence to God. Hence Our Lord shows that an oath + is not desirable as a good thing; and that it is better to speak without oaths, unless necessity forces us to have + recourse to them. +
[38345] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod dominus circa illa legis praecepta adimpletionem +apposuit, in quibus Scribae et Pharisaei non rectum intellectum +habebant. Et hoc contingebat praecipue circa tria praecepta +Decalogi. Nam circa prohibitionem adulterii et homicidii, +aestimabant solum exteriorem actum prohiberi, non autem interiorem +appetitum. Quod magis credebant circa homicidium et adulterium quam +circa furtum vel falsum testimonium, quia motus irae in homicidium +tendens, et concupiscentiae motus tendens in adulterium, videntur +aliqualiter nobis a natura inesse; non autem appetitus furandi, vel +falsum testimonium dicendi. Circa periurium vero habebant falsum +intellectum, credentes periurium quidem esse peccatum; iuramentum +autem per se esse appetendum et frequentandum, quia videtur ad Dei +reverentiam pertinere. Et ideo dominus ostendit iuramentum non esse +appetendum tanquam bonum; sed melius esse absque iuramento loqui, +nisi necessitas cogat.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The Scribes and Pharisees erred about the judicial precepts in two ways. First, because they considered certain matters contained + in the Law of Moses by way of permission, to be right in themselves: namely, divorce of a wife, and the taking of usury from + strangers. Wherefore Our Lord forbade a man to divorce his wife ( + Mat. 5:32); and to receive usury ( + Lk. 6:35), when He said: "Lend, hoping for nothing + thereby." +
In another way they erred by thinking that certain things which the Old Law commanded to be done for justice's sake, should + be done out of desire for revenge, or out of lust for temporal goods, or out of hatred of one's enemies; and this in respect + of three precepts. For they thought that desire for revenge was lawful, on account of the precept concerning punishment by + retaliation: whereas this precept was given that justice might be safeguarded, not that man might seek revenge. + Wherefore, in order to do away with this, Our Lord teaches that man should be prepared in his mind to suffer yet more if necessary. + They thought that movements of covetousness were lawful on account of those judicial precepts which prescribed restitution + of what had been purloined, together with something added thereto, as stated above ( + Q[105], A[2], ad 9); whereas the Law commanded this to be done in order to safeguard justice, not to encourage covetousness. Wherefore + Our Lord teaches that we should not demand our goods from motives of cupidity, and that we should be ready to give yet more + if necessary. They thought that the movement of hatred was lawful, on account of the commandments of the Law about the slaying + of one's enemies: whereas the Law ordered this for the fulfilment of justice, as stated above ( + Q[105], A[3], ad 4), not to satisfy hatred. Wherefore Our Lord teaches us that we ought to love our enemies, and to be ready to + do good to them if necessary. For these precepts are to be taken as binding "the mind to be prepared to fulfil them," as Augustine + says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19). +
[38346] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod circa iudicialia praecepta dupliciter Scribae et +Pharisaei errabant. Primo quidem, quia quaedam quae in lege Moysi +erant tradita tanquam permissiones, aestimabant esse per se iusta, +scilicet repudium uxoris, et usuras accipere ab extraneis. Et ideo +dominus prohibuit uxoris repudium, Matth. V; et usurarum +acceptionem, Luc. VI, dicens, date mutuum nihil inde +sperantes. Alio modo errabant credentes quaedam quae lex vetus +instituerat facienda propter iustitiam, esse exequenda ex appetitu +vindictae; vel ex cupiditate temporalium rerum; vel ex odio +inimicorum. Et hoc in tribus praeceptis. Appetitum enim vindictae +credebant esse licitum, propter praeceptum datum de poena talionis. +Quod quidem fuit datum ut iustitia servaretur, non ut homo +vindictam quaereret. Et ideo dominus, ad hoc removendum, docet +animum hominis sic debere esse praeparatum ut, si necesse sit, +etiam paratus sit plura sustinere. Motum autem cupiditatis +aestimabant esse licitum, propter praecepta iudicialia in quibus +mandabatur restitutio rei ablatae fieri etiam cum aliqua additione, +ut supra dictum est. Et hoc quidem lex mandavit propter iustitiam +observandam, non ut daret cupiditati locum. Et ideo dominus docet +ut ex cupiditate nostra non repetamus, sed simus parati, si necesse +fuerit, etiam ampliora dare. Motum vero odii credebant esse +licitum, propter praecepta legis data de hostium interfectione. +Quod quidem lex statuit propter iustitiam implendam, ut supra +dictum est, non propter odia exsaturanda. Et ideo dominus docet ut +ad inimicos dilectionem habeamus, et parati simus, si opus fuerit, +etiam benefacere. Haec enim praecepta secundum praeparationem animi +sunt accipienda, ut Augustinus exponit.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The moral precepts necessarily retained their force under the New Law, because they are of themselves essential to virtue: + whereas the judicial precepts did not necessarily continue to bind in exactly the same way as had been fixed by the Law: this + was left to man to decide in one way or another. Hence Our Lord directed us becomingly with regard to these two kinds of precepts. + On the other hand, the observance of the ceremonial precepts was totally + abolished by the advent of the reality; wherefore in regard to these precepts He commanded nothing on this occasion when He + was giving the general points of His doctrine. Elsewhere, however, He makes it clear that the entire bodily worship which + was fixed by the Law, was to be changed into spiritual worship: as is evident from + Jn. 4:21,23, where He says: "The hour cometh when you shall neither on this mountain, nor in Jerusalem adore the Father . . . but . . + . the true + adorers shall adore the Father in spirit and in truth." +
[38347] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod praecepta moralia omnino in nova lege remanere +debebant, quia secundum se pertinent ad rationem virtutis. +Praecepta autem iudicialia non remanebant ex necessitate secundum +modum quem lex determinavit; sed relinquebatur arbitrio hominum +utrum sic vel aliter esset determinandum. Et ideo convenienter +dominus circa haec duo genera praeceptorum nos ordinavit. +Praeceptorum autem caeremonialium observatio totaliter per rei +impletionem tollebatur. Et ideo circa huiusmodi praecepta, in illa +communi doctrina, nihil ordinavit. Ostendit tamen alibi quod totus +corporalis cultus qui erat determinatus in lege, erat in +spiritualem commutandus; ut patet Ioan. IV, ubi dixit, venit +hora quando neque in monte hoc neque in Ierosolymis adorabitis +patrem; sed veri adoratores adorabunt patrem in spiritu et +veritate.
+ Reply to Objection 4: All worldly goods may be reduced to three---honors, riches, and pleasures; according to + 1 Jn. 2:16: "All that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh," which refers to pleasures of the flesh, "and the concupiscence + of the eyes," which refers to riches, "and the pride of life," which refers to ambition for renown and honor. Now the Law + did not promise an abundance of carnal pleasures; on the contrary, it forbade them. But + it did promise exalted honors and abundant riches; for it is written in reference to the former ( + Dt. 28:1): "If thou wilt hear the voice of the Lord thy God . . . He will make thee higher than all the nations"; and in reference + to the latter, we read a little further on ( + Dt. 28:11): "He will make thee abound with all goods." But the Jews so distorted the true meaning of these promises, as to think that + we ought to serve God, with these things as the end + in view. Wherefore Our Lord set this aside by teaching, first of all, that works of virtue should not be done for human glory. + And He mentions three works, to which all others may be reduced: since whatever a man does in order to curb his desires, comes + under the head of fasting; and whatever a man does for the love of his neighbor, comes under the head of alms-deeds; and whatever + a man does for the worship of God, comes under the head of prayer. And He mentions these three specifically, as + they hold the principal place, and are most often used by men in order to gain glory. In the second place He taught us that + we must not place our end in riches, when He said: "Lay not up to yourselves treasures on earth" ( + Mat. 6:19). +
[38348] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod omnes res mundanae ad tria reducuntur, scilicet ad +honores, divitias et delicias; secundum illud I Ioan. II, omne quod +est in mundo, concupiscentia carnis est, quod pertinet ad delicias +carnis; et concupiscentia oculorum, quod pertinet ad divitias; et +superbia vitae, quod pertinet ad ambitum gloriae et honoris. +Superfluas autem carnis delicias lex non repromisit, sed magis +prohibuit. Repromisit autem celsitudinem honoris, et abundantiam +divitiarum, dicitur enim Deut. XXVIII, si audieris vocem domini +Dei tui, faciet te excelsiorem cunctis gentibus, quantum ad +primum; et post pauca subdit, abundare te faciet omnibus +bonis, quantum ad secundum. Quae quidem promissa sic prave +intelligebant Iudaei, ut propter ea esset Deo serviendum, sicut +propter finem. Et ideo dominus hoc removit, docens primo, quod +opera virtutis non sunt facienda propter humanam gloriam. Et ponit +tria opera, ad quae omnia alia reducuntur, nam omnia quae aliquis +facit ad refrenandum seipsum in suis concupiscentiis, reducuntur ad +ieiunium; quaecumque vero fiunt propter dilectionem proximi, +reducuntur ad eleemosynam; quaecumque vero propter cultum Dei +fiunt, reducuntur ad orationem. Ponit autem haec tria specialiter +quasi praecipua, et per quae homines maxime solent gloriam venari. +Secundo, docuit quod non debemus finem constituere in divitiis, cum +dixit, nolite thesaurizare vobis thesauros in terra.
+ Reply to Objection 5: Our Lord forbade, not necessary, but inordinate solicitude. Now there is a fourfold solicitude to be avoided in temporal + matters. First, we must not place our end in them, nor serve God for the sake of the necessities of food and raiment. Wherefore + He says: "Lay not up for yourselves," etc. Secondly, we must not be so anxious about temporal things, as to despair of God's + help: wherefore Our Lord says ( + Mat. 6:32): "Your Father + knoweth that you have need of all these things." Thirdly, we must not add presumption to our solicitude; in other words, we + must not be confident of getting the necessaries of life by our own efforts without God's help: such solicitude Our Lord sets + aside by saying that a man cannot add anything to his stature ( + Mat. 6:27). We must not anticipate the time for anxiety; namely, by being solicitous now, for the needs, not of the present, but of + a future time: wherefore He says + ( + Mat. 6:34): "Be not . . . solicitous for tomorrow." +
[38349] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 ad 5 Ad quintum +dicendum quod dominus sollicitudinem necessariam non prohibuit, sed +sollicitudinem inordinatam. Est autem quadruplex inordinatio +sollicitudinis vitanda circa temporalia. Primo quidem, ut in eis +finem non constituamus, neque Deo serviamus propter necessaria +victus et vestitus. Unde dicit, nolite thesaurizare vobis et +cetera. Secundo, ut non sic sollicitemur de temporalibus, cum +desperatione divini auxilii. Unde dominus dicit, scit pater +vester quia his omnibus indigetis. Tertio, ne sit sollicitudo +praesumptuosa, ut scilicet homo confidat se necessaria vitae per +suam sollicitudinem posse procurare, absque divino auxilio. Quod +dominus removet per hoc quod homo non potest aliquid adiicere ad +staturam suam. Quarto, per hoc quod homo sollicitudinis tempus +praeoccupat, quia scilicet de hoc sollicitus est nunc, quod non +pertinet ad curam praesentis temporis, sed ad curam futuri. Unde +dicit, nolite solliciti esse in crastinum.
+ Reply to Objection 6: Our Lord did not forbid the judgment of justice, without which holy things could not be withdrawn from the unworthy. But + he forbade inordinate judgment, as stated above. +
[38350] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 ad 6 Ad sextum +dicendum quod dominus non prohibet iudicium iustitiae, sine quo non +possent sancta subtrahi ab indignis. Sed prohibet iudicium +inordinatum, ut dictum est.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that certain definite counsels are not fittingly proposed in the New Law. For counsels are given about that + which is expedient for an end, as we stated above, when treating of counsel ( + Q[14] , A[2]). But the same things are not expedient for all. Therefore certain definite counsels should not be proposed to all. +
[38351] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter in lege nova consilia +quaedam determinata sint proposita. Consilia enim dantur de rebus +expedientibus ad finem; ut supra dictum est, cum de consilio +ageretur. Sed non eadem omnibus expediunt. Ergo non sunt aliqua +consilia determinata omnibus proponenda.
+ Objection 2: Further, counsels regard a greater good. But there are no definite degrees to the greater good. Therefore definite counsels + should not be given. +
[38352] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +consilia dantur de meliori bono. Sed non sunt determinati gradus +melioris boni. Ergo non debent aliqua determinata consilia +dari.
+ Objection 3: Further, counsels pertain to the life of perfection. But obedience pertains to the life of perfection. Therefore it was unfitting + that no counsel of obedience should be contained in the Gospel. +
[38353] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +consilia pertinent ad perfectionem vitae. Sed obedientia pertinet +ad perfectionem vitae. Ergo inconvenienter de ea consilium non +datur in Evangelio.
+ Objection 4: Further, many matters pertaining to the life of perfection are found among the commandments, as, for instance, "Love your + enemies" ( + Mat. 5:44), and those precepts which Our Lord gave His apostles ( + Mat. 10). Therefore the counsels are unfittingly given in the New Law: both because they are not all mentioned; and because they + are not distinguished from the commandments. +
[38354] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 4 arg. 4 Praeterea, +multa ad perfectionem vitae pertinentia inter praecepta ponuntur, +sicut hoc quod dicitur, diligite inimicos vestros; et praecepta +etiam quae dedit dominus apostolis, Matth. X. Ergo inconvenienter +traduntur consilia in nova lege, tum quia non omnia ponuntur; tum +etiam quia a praeceptis non distinguuntur.
+ On the contrary, The counsels of a wise friend are of great use, according to Prov. (27:9): "Ointment and perfumes rejoice the heart: and + the good counsels of a friend rejoice the soul." But Christ is our wisest and greatest friend. Therefore His counsels are + supremely useful and becoming. +
[38355] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra, +consilia sapientis amici magnam utilitatem afferunt; secundum illud +Prov. XXVII, unguento et variis odoribus delectatur cor, et +bonis amici consiliis anima dulcoratur. Sed Christus maxime est +sapiens et amicus. Ergo eius consilia maximam utilitatem continent, +et convenientia sunt.
+ I answer that, The difference between a counsel and a commandment is that a commandment implies obligation, whereas a counsel is left to + the option of the one to whom it is given. Consequently in the New Law, which is the law of liberty, counsels are added to + the commandments, and not in the Old Law, which is the law of bondage. We must therefore understand the commandments of the + New Law to have been given about matters that are necessary to gain the end of eternal bliss, + to which end the New Law brings us forthwith: but that the counsels are about matters that render the gaining of this end + more assured and expeditious. +
Now man is placed between the things of this world, and spiritual goods wherein eternal happiness consists: so that the more + he cleaves to the one, the more he withdraws from the other, and conversely. Wherefore he that cleaves wholly to the things + of this world, so as to make them his end, and to look upon them as the reason and rule of all he does, falls away altogether + from spiritual goods. Hence this disorder is removed by the commandments. Nevertheless, for man to gain the + end aforesaid, he does not need to renounce the things of the world altogether: since he can, while using the things of this + world, attain to eternal happiness, provided he does not place his end in them: but he will attain more speedily thereto by + giving up the goods of this world entirely: wherefore the evangelical counsels are given for this purpose. +
Now the goods of this world which come into use in human life, consist in three things: viz. in external wealth pertaining + to the "concupiscence of the eyes"; carnal pleasures pertaining to the "concupiscence of the flesh"; and honors, which pertain + to the "pride of life," according to + 1 Jn. 2:16: and it is in renouncing these altogether, as far as possible, that the evangelical counsels consist. Moreover, every form + of the religious life that professes the + state of perfection is based on these three: since riches are renounced by poverty; carnal pleasures by perpetual chastity; + and the pride of life by the bondage of obedience. +
Now if a man observe these absolutely, this is in accordance with the counsels as they stand. But if a man observe any one + of them in a particular case, this is taking that counsel in a restricted sense, namely, as applying to that particular case. + For instance, when anyone gives an alms to a poor man, not being bound so to do, he follows the counsels in that particular + case. In like manner, when a man for some fixed time refrains from carnal pleasures that he may give himself + to prayer, he follows the counsel for that particular time. And again, when a man follows not his will as to some deed which + he might do lawfully, he follows the counsel in that particular case: for instance, if he do good to his enemies when he is + not bound to, or if he forgive an injury of which he might justly seek to be avenged. In this way, too, all particular counsels + may be reduced to these three general and perfect counsels. +
[38356] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod haec est differentia inter consilium et praeceptum, +quod praeceptum importat necessitatem, consilium autem in optione +ponitur eius cui datur. Et ideo convenienter in lege nova, quae est +lex libertatis, supra praecepta sunt addita consilia, non autem in +veteri lege, quae erat lex servitutis. Oportet igitur quod +praecepta novae legis intelligantur esse data de his quae sunt +necessaria ad consequendum finem aeternae beatitudinis, in quem lex +nova immediate introducit. Consilia vero oportet esse de illis per +quae melius et expeditius potest homo consequi finem praedictum. +Est autem homo constitutus inter res mundi huius et spiritualia +bona, in quibus beatitudo aeterna consistit, ita quod quanto plus +inhaeret uni eorum, tanto plus recedit ab altero, et e converso. +Qui ergo totaliter inhaeret rebus huius mundi, ut in eis finem +constituat, habens eas quasi rationes et regulas suorum operum, +totaliter excidit a spiritualibus bonis. Et ideo huiusmodi +inordinatio tollitur per praecepta. Sed quod homo totaliter ea quae +sunt mundi abiiciat, non est necessarium ad perveniendum in finem +praedictum, quia potest homo utens rebus huius mundi, dummodo in +eis finem non constituat, ad beatitudinem aeternam pervenire. Sed +expeditius perveniet totaliter bona huius mundi abdicando. Et ideo +de hoc dantur consilia Evangelii. Bona autem huius mundi, quae +pertinent ad usum humanae vitae, in tribus consistunt, scilicet in +divitiis exteriorum bonorum, quae pertinent ad concupiscentiam +oculorum; in deliciis carnis, quae pertinent ad concupiscentiam +carnis; et in honoribus, quae pertinent ad superbiam vitae; sicut +patet I Ioan. II. Haec autem tria totaliter derelinquere, secundum +quod possibile est, pertinet ad consilia evangelica. In quibus +etiam tribus fundatur omnis religio, quae statum perfectionis +profitetur, nam divitiae abdicantur per paupertatem; deliciae +carnis per perpetuam castitatem; superbia vitae per obedientiae +servitutem. Haec autem simpliciter observata pertinent ad consilia +simpliciter proposita. Sed observatio uniuscuiusque eorum in aliquo +speciali casu, pertinet ad consilium secundum quid, scilicet in +casu illo. Puta cum homo dat aliquam eleemosynam pauperi quam dare +non tenetur, consilium sequitur quantum ad factum illud. Similiter +etiam quando aliquo tempore determinato a delectationibus carnis +abstinet ut orationibus vacet, consilium sequitur pro tempore illo. +Similiter etiam quando aliquis non sequitur voluntatem suam in +aliquo facto quod licite posset facere, consilium sequitur in casu +illo, puta si benefaciat inimicis quando non tenetur, vel si +offensam remittat cuius iuste posset exigere vindictam. Et sic +etiam omnia consilia particularia ad illa tria generalia et +perfecta reducuntur.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The aforesaid counsels, considered in themselves, are expedient to all; but owing to some people being ill-disposed, it happens + that some of them are inexpedient, because their disposition is not inclined to such things. Hence Our Lord, in proposing + the evangelical counsels, always makes mention of man's fitness for observing the counsels. For in giving the counsel of perpetual + poverty ( + Mat. 19:21), He begins with the words: "If + thou wilt be perfect," and then He adds: "Go, sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast." In like manner when He gave the counsel + of perpetual chastity, saying ( + Mat. 19:12): "There are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven," He adds straightway: "He that can take, + let him take it." And again, the Apostle ( + 1 Cor. 7:35), after giving the counsel of virginity, says: "And this I speak for your profit; not to cast a snare upon you." +
[38357] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod praedicta consilia, quantum est de se sunt +omnibus expedientia, sed ex indispositione aliquorum contingit quod +alicui expedientia non sunt, quia eorum affectus ad haec non +inclinatur. Et ideo dominus, consilia evangelica proponens, semper +facit mentionem de idoneitate hominum ad observantiam consiliorum. +Dans enim consilium perpetuae paupertatis, Matth. XIX, praemittit, +si vis perfectus esse; et postea subdit, vade et vende +omnia quae habes. Similiter, dans consilium perpetuae +castitatis, cum dixit, sunt eunuchi qui castraverunt seipsos +propter regnum caelorum, statim subdit, qui potest capere, +capiat. Et similiter apostolus, I ad Cor. VII, praemisso +consilio virginitatis, dicit, porro hoc ad utilitatem vestram +dico, non ut laqueum vobis iniiciam.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The greater goods are not definitely fixed in the individual; but those which are simply and absolutely the greater good + in general are fixed: and to these all the above particular goods may be reduced, as stated above. +
[38358] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod meliora bona particulariter in singulis sunt +indeterminata. Sed illa quae sunt simpliciter et absolute meliora +bona in universali, sunt determinata. Ad quae etiam omnia illa +particularia reducuntur, ut dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Even the counsel of obedience is understood to have been given by Our Lord in the words: "And [let him] follow Me." For we + follow Him not only by imitating His works, but also by obeying His commandments, according to + Jn. 10:27: "My sheep hear My voice . . . and they follow Me." +
[38359] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod etiam consilium obedientiae dominus intelligitur +dedisse in hoc quod dixit, et sequatur me; quem sequimur non solum +imitando opera, sed etiam obediendo mandatis ipsius; secundum illud +Ioan. X. Oves meae vocem meam audiunt, et sequuntur me.
+ Reply to Objection 4: Those things which Our Lord prescribed about the true love of our enemies, and other similar sayings ( + Mat. 5; + Lk. 6), may be referred to the preparation of the mind, and then they are necessary for salvation; for instance, that man be prepared + to do good to his enemies, and other similar actions, when there is need. Hence these things are placed among the precepts. + But that anyone should actually and promptly behave thus towards an enemy when there is + no special need, is to be referred to the particular counsels, as stated above. As to those matters which are set down in + + Mat. 10 and + Lk. 9 and 10, they were either disciplinary commands for that particular time, or concessions, as stated above (A[2], ad 3). Hence + they are not set down among the counsels. +
[38360] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 4 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod ea quae de vera dilectione inimicorum, et similibus, +dominus dicit Matth. V et Luc. VI, si referantur ad praeparationem +animi, sunt de necessitate salutis, ut scilicet homo sit paratus +benefacere inimicis, et alia huiusmodi facere, cum necessitas hoc +requirat. Et ideo inter praecepta ponuntur. Sed ut aliquis hoc +inimicis exhibeat prompte in actu, ubi specialis necessitas non +occurrit, pertinet ad consilia particularia, ut dictum est. Illa +autem quae ponuntur Matth. X, et Luc. IX, et X, fuerunt quaedam +praecepta disciplinae pro tempore illo, vel concessiones quaedam, +ut supra dictum est. Et ideo non inducuntur tanquam consilia.