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<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:x="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> <head> <title>Bilingual Aquinas</title> <style> h2, h3, h4 {margin-bottom: 0px; clear: both} .bilingual {clear: both; margin-top: .5em} div.eng {width: 45%; float: left} div.lat {width: 45%; float: right} @page { size: A4 portrait; margin: 1cm; orphans: 2; widows: 2; } @media print {div.div3 {page-break-before: always}} </style> </head> <body style="font-family: Bitstream Vera Serif"><div id="FS.iv" class="div2"> <h2 id="FS.iv-p0.1">TREATISE ON HABITS (QQ[49]-54)</h2><div class="toc"><a href="#FS_Q49">Q. 49. OF HABITS IN GENERAL, AS TO THEIR SUBSTANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q50">Q. 50. OF THE SUBJECT OF HABITS (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q51">Q. 51. OF THE CAUSE OF HABITS, AS TO THEIR FORMATION (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q52">Q. 52. OF THE INCREASE OF HABITS (THREE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q53">Q. 53. HOW HABITS ARE CORRUPTED OR DIMINISHED (THREE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q54">Q. 54. OF THE DISTINCTION OF HABITS (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/></div> <div id="FS_Q49" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q49-p0.1">Q. 49. OF HABITS IN GENERAL, AS TO THEIR SUBSTANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q49-p2"> After treating of human acts and passions, we now pass on to the consideration of the principles of human acts, and firstly of intrinsic principles, secondly of extrinsic principles. The intrinsic principle is power and habit; but as we have treated of powers in the FP, Q[77], seqq., it remains for us to consider them in general: in the second place we shall consider virtues and vices and other like habits, which are the principles of human acts. </p><p id="FS_Q49-p3"> Concerning habits in general there are four points to consider: First, the substance of habits; second, their subject; third, the cause of their generation, increase, and corruption; fourth, how they are distinguished from one another. </p><p id="FS_Q49-p4"> Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q49-p5"><a href="#FS_Q49_A1"> (1) Whether habit is a quality?</a></p><p id="FS_Q49-p6"><a href="#FS_Q49_A2"> (2) Whether it is a distinct species of quality?</a></p><p id="FS_Q49-p7"><a href="#FS_Q49_A3"> (3) Whether habit implies an order to an act?</a></p><p id="FS_Q49-p8"><a href="#FS_Q49_A4"> (4) Of the necessity of habit.</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 pr."><a name="35593" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35593] Iª-IIae q. 49 pr.</span></a> Post actus et passiones, considerandum est de principiis humanorum actuum. Et primo, de principiis intrinsecis; secundo, de principiis extrinsecis. Principium autem intrinsecum est potentia et habitus; sed quia de potentiis in prima parte dictum est, nunc restat de habitibus considerandum. Et primo quidem, in generali; secundo vero, de virtutibus et vitiis, et aliis huiusmodi habitibus, qui sunt humanorum actuum principia. Circa ipsos autem habitus in generali, quatuor consideranda sunt, primo quidem, de ipsa substantia habituum, secundo, de subiecto eorum; tertio, de causa generationis, augmenti et corruptionis ipsorum; quarto, de distinctione ipsorum. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum habitus sit qualitas. Secundo, utrum sit determinata species qualitatis. Tertio, utrum habitus importet ordinem ad actum. Quarto, de necessitate habitus.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q49_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q49_A1-p0.1">Q. 49. A. 1. Whether habit is a quality?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habit is not a quality. For Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 73): "this word 'habit' is derived from the verb 'to have.'" But "to have" belongs not only to quality, but also to the other categories: for we speak of ourselves as "having" quantity and money and other like things. Therefore habit is not a quality. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35594" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35594] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus non sit qualitas. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod <i>hoc nomen habitus dictum est ab hoc verbo quod est habere</i>. Sed habere non solum pertinet ad qualitatem, sed ad alia genera, dicimur enim habere etiam quantitatem, et pecuniam, et alia huiusmodi. Ergo habitus non est qualitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habit is reckoned as one of the predicaments; as may be clearly seen in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi). But one predicament is not contained under another. Therefore habit is not a quality. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35595" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35595] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, habitus ponitur unum praedicamentum; ut patet in libro praedicamentorum. Sed unum praedicamentum non continetur sub alio. Ergo habitus non est qualitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "every habit is a disposition," as is stated in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi). Now disposition is "the order of that which has parts," as stated in Metaph. v, text. 24. But this belongs to the predicament Position. Therefore habit is not a quality. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35596" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35596] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> <i>Praeterea, omnis habitus est dispositio</i>, ut dicitur in praedicamentis. Sed dispositio est ordo habentis partes, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. Hoc autem pertinet ad praedicamentum situs. Ergo habitus non est qualitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says in the Book of Predicaments (Categor. vi) that "habit is a quality which is difficult to change." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35597" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35597] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in praedicamentis, quod habitus est qualitas de difficili mobilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q49_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> This word "habitus" [habit] is derived from "habere" [to have]. Now habit is taken from this word in two ways; in one way, inasmuch as man, or any other thing, is said to "have" something; in another way, inasmuch as a particular thing has a relation [se habet] either in regard to itself, or in regard to something else. </p><p id="FS_Q49_A1-p7"> Concerning the first, we must observe that "to have," as said in regard to anything that is "had," is common to the various predicaments. And so the Philosopher puts "to have" among the "post-predicaments," so called because they result from the various predicaments; as, for instance, opposition, priority, posterity, and such like. Now among things which are had, there seems to be this distinction, that there are some in which there is no medium between the "haver" and that which is had: as, for instance, there is no medium between the subject and quality or quantity. Then there are some in which there is a medium, but only a relation: as, for instance, a man is said to have a companion or a friend. And, further, there are some in which there is a medium, not indeed an action or passion, but something after the manner of action or passion: thus, for instance, something adorns or covers, and something else is adorned or covered: wherefore the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "a habit is said to be, as it were, an action or a passion of the haver and that which is had"; as is the case in those things which we have about ourselves. And therefore these constitute a special genus of things, which are comprised under the predicament of "habit": of which the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "there is a habit between clothing and the man who is clothed." </p><p id="FS_Q49_A1-p8"> But if "to have" be taken according as a thing has a relation in regard to itself or to something else; in that case habit is a quality; since this mode of having is in respect of some quality: and of this the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "habit is a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill, and this, either in regard to itself or in regard to another: thus health is a habit." And in this sense we speak of habit now. Wherefore we must say that habit is a quality. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 1 co."><a name="35598" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35598] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod hoc nomen habitus ab habendo est sumptum. A quo quidem nomen habitus dupliciter derivatur, uno quidem modo, secundum quod homo, vel quaecumque alia res, dicitur aliquid habere; alio modo, secundum quod aliqua res aliquo modo se habet in seipsa vel ad aliquid aliud. Circa primum autem, considerandum est quod habere, secundum quod dicitur respectu cuiuscumque quod habetur, commune est ad diversa genera. Unde philosophus inter post praedicamenta habere ponit, quae scilicet diversa rerum genera consequuntur; sicut sunt opposita, et prius et posterius, et alia huiusmodi. Sed inter ea quae habentur, talis videtur esse distinctio, quod quaedam sunt in quibus nihil est medium inter habens et id quod habetur, sicut inter subiectum et qualitatem vel quantitatem nihil est medium. Quaedam vero sunt in quibus est aliquid medium inter utrumque, sed sola relatio, sicut dicitur aliquis habere socium vel amicum. Quaedam vero sunt inter quae est aliquid medium, non quidem actio vel passio, sed aliquid per modum actionis vel passionis, prout scilicet unum est ornans vel tegens, et aliud ornatum aut tectum, unde philosophus dicit, in V Metaphys., quod <i>habitus dicitur tanquam actio quaedam habentis et habiti</i>, sicut est in illis quae circa nos habemus. Et ideo in his constituitur unum speciale genus rerum, quod dicitur praedicamentum habitus, de quo dicit philosophus, in V Metaphys., quod <i>inter habentem indumentum, et indumentum quod habetur, est habitus medius</i>. Si autem sumatur habere prout res aliqua dicitur quodam modo se habere in seipsa vel ad aliud; cum iste modus se habendi sit secundum aliquam qualitatem, hoc modo habitus quaedam qualitas est, de quo philosophus, in V Metaphys., dicit quod habitus dicitur dispositio secundum quam bene vel male disponitur dispositum, et aut secundum se aut ad aliud, ut sanitas habitus quidam est. Et sic loquimur nunc de habitu. Unde dicendum est quod habitus est qualitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument takes "to have" in the general sense: for thus it is common to many predicaments, as we have said. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35599" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35599] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de habere communiter sumpto, sic enim est commune ad multa genera, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument takes habit in the sense in which we understand it to be a medium between the haver, and that which is had: and in this sense it is a predicament, as we have said. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35600" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35600] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de habitu secundum quod intelligitur aliquid medium inter habens et id quod habetur, sic enim est quoddam praedicamentum, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A1-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Disposition does always, indeed, imply an order of that which has parts: but this happens in three ways, as the Philosopher goes on at once to says (Metaph. v, text. 25): namely, "either as to place, or as to power, or as to species." "In saying this," as Simplicius observes in his Commentary on the Predicaments, "he includes all dispositions: bodily dispositions, when he says 'as to place,'" and this belongs to the predicament "Position," which is the order of parts in a place: "when he says 'as to power,' he includes all those dispositions which are in course of formation and not yet arrived at perfect usefulness," such as inchoate science and virtue: "and when he says, 'as to species,' he includes perfect dispositions, which are called habits," such as perfected science and virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35601" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35601] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod dispositio quidem semper importat ordinem alicuius habentis partes, sed hoc contingit tripliciter, ut statim ibidem philosophus subdit, scilicet aut secundum locum, aut secundum potentiam, aut secundum speciem. In quo, ut Simplicius dicit in commento praedicamentorum, comprehendit omnes dispositiones. Corporales quidem, in eo quod dicit secundum locum, et hoc pertinet ad praedicamentum situs, qui est ordo partium in loco. Quod autem dicit secundum potentiam, includit illas dispositiones quae sunt in praeparatione et idoneitate nondum perfecte, sicut scientia et virtus inchoata. Quod autem dicit secundum speciem, includit perfectas dispositiones, quae dicuntur habitus, sicut scientia et virtus complete.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q49_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q49_A2-p0.1">Q. 49. A. 2. Whether habit is a distinct species of quality?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habit is not a distinct species of quality. Because, as we have said <a href="#FS_Q49_A1" id="FS_Q49_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, habit, in so far as it is a quality, is "a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill." But this happens in regard to any quality: for a thing happens to be well or ill disposed in regard also to shape, and in like manner, in regard to heat and cold, and in regard to all such things. Therefore habit is not a distinct species of quality. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35602" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35602] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus non sit determinata species qualitatis. Quia, ut dictum est, habitus, secundum quod est qualitas, dicitur dispositio secundum quam bene aut male disponitur dispositum. Sed hoc contingit secundum quamlibet qualitatem, nam et secundum figuram contingit aliquid bene vel male esse dispositum, et similiter secundum calorem et frigus, et secundum omnia huiusmodi. Ergo habitus non est determinata species qualitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi), that heat and cold are dispositions or habits, just as sickness and health. Therefore habit or disposition is not distinct from the other species of quality. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35603" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35603] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, philosophus, in praedicamentis, caliditatem et frigiditatem dicit esse dispositiones vel habitus, sicut aegritudinem et sanitatem. Sed calor et frigus sunt in tertia specie qualitatis. Ergo habitus vel dispositio non distinguuntur ab aliis speciebus qualitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "difficult to change" is not a difference belonging to the predicament of quality, but rather to movement or passion. Now, no genus should be contracted to a species by a difference of another genus; but "differences should be proper to a genus," as the Philosopher says in Metaph. vii, text. 42. Therefore, since habit is "a quality difficult to change," it seems not to be a distinct species of quality. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35604" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35604] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, difficile mobile non est differentia pertinens ad genus qualitatis, sed magis pertinet ad motum vel passionem. Nullum autem genus determinatur ad speciem per differentiam alterius generis; sed oportet differentias per se advenire generi, ut philosophus dicit, in VII Metaphys. Ergo, cum habitus dicatur esse qualitas difficile mobilis, videtur quod non sit determinata species qualitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi) that "one species of quality is habit and disposition." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35605" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35605] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in praedicamentis, quod <i>una species qualitatis est habitus et dispositio</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q49_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The Philosopher in the Book of Predicaments (Categor. vi) reckons disposition and habit as the first species of quality. Now Simplicius, in his Commentary on the Predicaments, explains the difference of these species as follows. He says "that some qualities are natural, and are in their subject in virtue of its nature, and are always there: but some are adventitious, being caused from without, and these can be lost. Now the latter," i.e. those which are adventitious, "are habits and dispositions, differing in the point of being easily or difficultly lost. As to natural qualities, some regard a thing in the point of its being in a state of potentiality; and thus we have the second species of quality: while others regard a thing which is in act; and this either deeply rooted therein or only on its surface. If deeply rooted, we have the third species of quality: if on the surface, we have the fourth species of quality, as shape, and form which is the shape of an animated being." But this distinction of the species of quality seems unsuitable. For there are many shapes, and passion-like qualities, which are not natural but adventitious: and there are also many dispositions which are not adventitious but natural, as health, beauty, and the like. Moreover, it does not suit the order of the species, since that which is the more natural is always first. </p><p id="FS_Q49_A2-p7"> Therefore we must explain otherwise the distinction of dispositions and habits from other qualities. For quality, properly speaking, implies a certain mode of substance. Now mode, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3), "is that which a measure determines": wherefore it implies a certain determination according to a certain measure. Therefore, just as that in accordance with which the material potentiality [potentia materiae] is determined to its substantial being, is called quality, which is a difference affecting the substance, so that, in accordance with the potentiality of the subject is determined to its accidental being, is called an accidental quality, which is also a kind of difference, as is clear from the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text. 19). </p><p id="FS_Q49_A2-p8"> Now the mode of determination of the subject to accidental being may be taken in regard to the very nature of the subject, or in regard to action, and passion resulting from its natural principles, which are matter and form; or again in regard to quantity. If we take the mode or determination of the subject in regard to quantity, we shall then have the fourth species of quality. And because quantity, considered in itself, is devoid of movement, and does not imply the notion of good or evil, so it does not concern the fourth species of quality whether a thing be well or ill disposed, nor quickly or slowly transitory. </p><p id="FS_Q49_A2-p9"> But the mode of determination of the subject, in regard to action or passion, is considered in the second and third species of quality. And therefore in both, we take into account whether a thing be done with ease or difficulty; whether it be transitory or lasting. But in them, we do not consider anything pertaining to the notion of good or evil: because movements and passions have not the aspect of an end, whereas good and evil are said in respect of an end. </p><p id="FS_Q49_A2-p10"> On the other hand, the mode or determination of the subject, in regard to the nature of the thing, belongs to the first species of quality, which is habit and disposition: for the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17), when speaking of habits of the soul and of the body, that they are "dispositions of the perfect to the best; and by perfect I mean that which is disposed in accordance with its nature." And since the form itself and the nature of a thing is the end and the cause why a thing is made (Phys. ii, text. 25), therefore in the first species we consider both evil and good, and also changeableness, whether easy or difficult; inasmuch as a certain nature is the end of generation and movement. And so the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text. 25) defines habit, a "disposition whereby someone is disposed, well or ill"; and in Ethic. ii, 4, he says that by "habits we are directed well or ill in reference to the passions." For when the mode is suitable to the thing's nature, it has the aspect of good: and when it is unsuitable, it has the aspect of evil. And since nature is the first object of consideration in anything, for this reason habit is reckoned as the first species of quality. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 2 co."><a name="35606" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35606] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod philosophus, in praedicamentis, ponit inter quatuor species qualitatis primam, dispositionem et habitum. Quarum quidem specierum differentias sic assignat Simplicius, in commento praedicamentorum, dicens quod <i>qualitatum quaedam sunt naturales, quae secundum naturam insunt, et semper, quaedam autem sunt adventitiae, quae ab extrinseco efficiuntur, et possunt amitti. Et haec quidem</i>, quae sunt adventitiae, <i>sunt habitus et dispositiones, secundum facile et difficile amissibile differentes. Naturalium autem qualitatum quaedam sunt secundum id quod aliquid est in potentia, et sic est secunda species qualitatis. Quaedam vero secundum quod aliquid est in actu, et hoc vel in profundum, vel secundum superficiem. Si in profundum quidem, sic est tertia species qualitatis, secundum vero superficiem, est quarta species qualitatis, sicut figura et forma, quae est figura animati</i>. Sed ista distinctio specierum qualitatis inconveniens videtur. Sunt enim multae figurae et qualitates passibiles non naturales, sed adventitiae, et multae dispositiones non adventitiae, sed naturales, sicut sanitas et pulchritudo et huiusmodi. Et praeterea hoc non convenit ordini specierum, semper enim quod naturalius est, prius est. Et ideo aliter accipienda est distinctio dispositionum et habituum ab aliis qualitatibus. Proprie enim qualitas importat quendam modum substantiae. Modus autem est, ut dicit Augustinus, super Gen. ad litteram, quem mensura praefigit, unde importat quandam determinationem secundum aliquam mensuram. Et ideo sicut id secundum quod determinatur potentia materiae secundum esse substantiale dicitur qualitas quae est differentia substantiae; ita id secundum quod determinatur potentia subiecti secundum esse accidentale, dicitur qualitas accidentalis, quae est etiam quaedam differentia, ut patet per philosophum in V Metaphys. Modus autem sive determinatio subiecti secundum esse accidentale, potest accipi vel in ordine ad ipsam naturam subiecti; vel secundum actionem et passionem quae consequuntur principia naturae, quae sunt materia et forma; vel secundum quantitatem. Si autem accipiatur modus vel determinatio subiecti secundum quantitatem, sic est quarta species qualitatis. Et quia quantitas, secundum sui rationem, est sine motu, et sine ratione boni et mali; ideo ad quartam speciem qualitatis non pertinet quod aliquid sit bene vel male, cito vel tarde transiens. Modus autem sive determinatio subiecti secundum actionem et passionem, attenditur in secunda et tertia specie qualitatis. Et ideo in utraque consideratur quod aliquid facile vel difficile fiat, vel quod sit cito transiens aut diuturnum. Non autem consideratur in his aliquid pertinens ad rationem boni vel mali, quia motus et passiones non habent rationem finis, bonum autem et malum dicitur per respectum ad finem. Sed modus et determinatio subiecti in ordine ad naturam rei, pertinet ad primam speciem qualitatis, quae est habitus et dispositio, dicit enim philosophus, in VII Physic., loquens de habitibus animae et corporis, quod sunt <i>dispositiones quaedam perfecti ad optimum; dico autem perfecti, quod est dispositum secundum naturam. Et quia ipsa forma et natura rei est finis et cuius causa fit aliquid</i>, ut dicitur in II Physic. ideo in prima specie consideratur et bonum et malum; et etiam facile et difficile mobile, secundum quod aliqua natura est finis generationis et motus. Unde in V Metaphys. philosophus definit habitum, quod est dispositio secundum quam aliquis disponitur bene vel male. Et in II Ethic. dicit quod <i>habitus sunt secundum quos ad passiones nos habemus bene vel male</i>. Quando enim est modus conveniens naturae rei, tunc habet rationem boni, quando autem non convenit, tunc habet rationem mali. Et quia natura est id quod primum consideratur in re, ideo habitus ponitur prima species qualitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A2-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Disposition implies a certain order, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). Wherefore a man is not said to be disposed by some quality except in relation to something else. And if we add "well or ill," which belongs to the essential notion of habit, we must consider the quality's relation to the nature, which is the end. So in regard to shape, or heat, or cold, a man is not said to be well or ill disposed, except by reason of a relation to the nature of a thing, with regard to its suitability or unsuitability. Consequently even shapes and passion-like qualities, in so far as they are considered to be suitable or unsuitable to the nature of a thing, belong to habits or dispositions: for shape and color, according to their suitability to the nature of thing, concern beauty; while heat and cold, according to their suitability to the nature of a thing, concern health. And in this way heat and cold are put, by the Philosopher, in the first species of quality. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35607" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35607] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dispositio ordinem quendam importat, ut dictum est. Unde non dicitur aliquis disponi per qualitatem, nisi in ordine ad aliquid. Et si addatur bene vel male, quod pertinet ad rationem habitus, oportet quod attendatur ordo ad naturam, quae est finis. Unde secundum figuram, vel secundum calorem vel frigus, non dicitur aliquis disponi bene vel male, nisi secundum ordinem ad naturam rei, secundum quod est conveniens vel non conveniens. Unde et ipsae figurae et passibiles qualitates, secundum quod considerantur ut convenientes vel non convenientes naturae rei, pertinent ad habitus vel dispositiones, nam figura, prout convenit naturae rei, et color, pertinent ad pulchritudinem; calor autem et frigus, secundum quod conveniunt naturae rei, pertinent ad sanitatem. Et hoc modo caliditas et frigiditas ponuntur a philosopho in prima specie qualitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A2-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Wherefore it is clear how to answer the second objection: though some give another solution, as Simplicius says in his Commentary on the Predicaments. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35608" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35608] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Unde patet solutio ad secundum. Licet a quibusdam aliter solvatur, ut Simplicius dicit, in commento praedicamentorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q49_A2-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This difference, "difficult to change," does not distinguish habit from the other species of quality, but from disposition. Now disposition may be taken in two ways; in one way, as the genus of habit, for disposition is included in the definition of habit (Metaph. v, text. 25): in another way, according as it is divided against habit. Again, disposition, properly so called, can be divided against habit in two ways: first, as perfect and imperfect within the same species; and thus we call it a disposition, retaining the name of the genus, when it is had imperfectly, so as to be easily lost: whereas we call it a habit, when it is had perfectly, so as not to be lost easily. And thus a disposition becomes a habit, just as a boy becomes a man. Secondly, they may be distinguished as diverse species of the one subaltern genus: so that we call dispositions, those qualities of the first species, which by reason of their very nature are easily lost, because they have changeable causes; e.g. sickness and health: whereas we call habits those qualities which, by reason of their very nature, are not easily changed, in that they have unchangeable causes, e.g. sciences and virtues. And in this sense, disposition does not become habit. The latter explanation seems more in keeping with the intention of Aristotle: for in order to confirm this distinction he adduces the common mode of speaking, according to which, when a quality is, by reason of its nature, easily changeable, and, through some accident, becomes difficultly changeable, then it is called a habit: while the contrary happens in regard to qualities, by reason of their nature, difficultly changeable: for supposing a man to have a science imperfectly, so as to be liable to lose it easily, we say that he is disposed to that science, rather than that he has the science. From this it is clear that the word "habit" implies a certain lastingness: while the word "disposition" does not. </p><p id="FS_Q49_A2-p14"> Nor does it matter that thus to be easy and difficult to change are specific differences (of a quality), although they belong to passion and movement, and not the genus of quality. For these differences, though apparently accidental to quality, nevertheless designate differences which are proper and essential to quality. In the same way, in the genus of substance we often take accidental instead of substantial differences, in so far as by the former, essential principles are designated. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35609" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35609] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod ista differentia, difficile mobile, non diversificat habitum ab aliis speciebus qualitatis, sed a dispositione. Dispositio autem dupliciter accipitur, uno modo, secundum quod est genus habitus, nam in V Metaphys. dispositio ponitur in definitione habitus; alio modo, secundum quod est aliquid contra habitum divisum. Et potest intelligi dispositio proprie dicta condividi contra habitum, dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut perfectum et imperfectum in eadem specie, ut scilicet dispositio dicatur, retinens nomen commune, quando imperfecte inest, ita quod de facile amittitur; habitus autem, quando perfecte inest, ut non de facili amittatur. Et sic dispositio fit habitus, sicut puer fit vir. Alio modo possunt distingui sicut diversae species unius generis subalterni, ut dicantur dispositiones illae qualitates primae speciei, quibus convenit secundum propriam rationem ut de facili amittantur, quia habent causas transmutabiles, ut aegritudo et sanitas; habitus vero dicuntur illae qualitates quae secundum suam rationem habent quod non de facili transmutentur, quia habent causas immobiles, sicut scientiae et virtutes. Et secundum hoc dispositio non fit habitus. Et hoc videtur magis consonum intentioni Aristotelis. Unde ad huius distinctionis probationem inducit communem loquendi consuetudinem, secundum quam qualitates quae secundum rationem suam sunt facile mobiles, si ex aliquo accidenti difficile mobiles reddantur, habitus dicuntur, et e converso est de qualitatibus quae secundum suam rationem sunt difficile mobiles; nam si aliquis imperfecte habeat scientiam, ut de facili possit ipsam amittere, magis dicitur disponi ad scientiam quam scientiam habere. Ex quo patet quod nomen habitus diuturnitatem quandam importat; non autem nomen dispositionis. Nec impeditur quin secundum hoc facile et difficile mobile sint specificae differentiae, propter hoc quod ista pertinent ad passionem et motum, et non ad genus qualitatis. Nam istae differentiae, quamvis per accidens videantur se habere ad qualitatem, designant tamen proprias et per se differentias qualitatum. Sicut etiam in genere substantiae frequenter accipiuntur differentiae accidentales loco substantialium, inquantum per eas designantur principia essentialia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q49_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q49_A3-p0.1">Q. 49. A. 3. Whether habit implies order to an act?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habit does not imply order to an act. For everything acts according as it is in act. But the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text 8), that "when one is become knowing by habit, one is still in a state of potentiality, but otherwise than before learning." Therefore habit does not imply the relation of a principle to an act. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35610" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35610] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus non importet ordinem ad actum. Unumquodque enim agit secundum quod est actu. Sed philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod <i>cum aliquis fit sciens secundum habitum, est etiam tunc in potentia, aliter tamen quam ante addiscere</i>. Ergo habitus non importat habitudinem principii ad actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is put in the definition of a thing, belongs to it essentially. But to be a principle of action, is put in the definition of power, as we read in Metaph. v, text. 17. Therefore to be the principle of an act belongs to power essentially. Now that which is essential is first in every genus. If therefore, habit also is a principle of act, it follows that it is posterior to power. And so habit and disposition will not be the first species of quality. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35611" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35611] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, illud quod ponitur in definitione alicuius, per se convenit illi. Sed esse principium actionis ponitur in definitione potentiae; ut patet in V Metaphys. Ergo esse principium actus per se convenit potentiae. Quod autem est per se, est primum in unoquoque genere. Si ergo etiam habitus sit principium actus, sequitur quod sit posterior quam potentia. Et sic non erit prima species qualitatis habitus vel dispositio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, health is sometimes a habit, and so are leanness and beauty. But these do not indicate relation to an act. Therefore it is not essential to habit to be a principle of act. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35612" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35612] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sanitas quandoque est habitus, et similiter macies et pulchritudo. Sed ista non dicuntur per ordinem ad actum. Non ergo est de ratione habitus quod sit principium actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that "habit is that whereby something is done when necessary." And the Commentator says (De Anima iii) that "habit is that whereby we act when we will." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35613" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35613] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de bono coniugali, quod <i>habitus est quo aliquid agitur cum opus est</i>. Et Commentator dicit, in III de anima, quod <i>habitus est quo quis agit cum voluerit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q49_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> To have relation to an act may belong to habit, both in regard to the nature of habit, and in regard to the subject in which the habit is. In regard to the nature of habit, it belongs to every habit to have relation to an act. For it is essential to habit to imply some relation to a thing's nature, in so far as it is suitable or unsuitable thereto. But a thing's nature, which is the end of generation, is further ordained to another end, which is either an operation, or the product of an operation, to which one attains by means of operation. Wherefore habit implies relation not only to the very nature of a thing, but also, consequently, to operation, inasmuch as this is the end of nature, or conducive to the end. Whence also it is stated (Metaph. v, text. 25) in the definition of habit, that it is a disposition whereby that which is disposed, is well or ill disposed either in regard to itself, that is to its nature, or in regard to something else, that is to the end. </p><p id="FS_Q49_A3-p7"> But there are some habits, which even on the part of the subject in which they are, imply primarily and principally relation to an act. For, as we have said, habit primarily and of itself implies a relation to the thing's nature. If therefore the nature of a thing, in which the habit is, consists in this very relation to an act, it follows that the habit principally implies relation to an act. Now it is clear that the nature and the notion of power is that it should be a principle of act. Wherefore every habit is subjected in a power, implies principally relation to an act. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 3 co."><a name="35614" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35614] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod habere ordinem ad actum potest competere habitui et secundum rationem habitus; et secundum rationem subiecti in quo est habitus. Secundum quidem rationem habitus, convenit omni habitui aliquo modo habere ordinem ad actum. Est enim de ratione habitus ut importet habitudinem quandam in ordine ad naturam rei, secundum quod convenit vel non convenit. Sed natura rei, quae est finis generationis, ulterius etiam ordinatur ad alium finem, qui vel est operatio, vel aliquod operatum, ad quod quis pervenit per operationem. Unde habitus non solum importat ordinem ad ipsam naturam rei, sed etiam consequenter ad operationem, inquantum est finis naturae, vel perducens ad finem. Unde et in V Metaphys. dicitur in definitione habitus, quod est dispositio secundum quam bene vel male disponitur dispositum aut secundum se, idest secundum suam naturam, aut ad aliud, idest in ordine ad finem. Sed sunt quidam habitus qui etiam ex parte subiecti in quo sunt, primo et principaliter important ordinem ad actum. Quia ut dictum est, habitus primo et per se importat habitudinem ad naturam rei. Si igitur natura rei in qua est habitus, consistat in ipso ordine ad actum, sequitur quod habitus principaliter importet ordinem ad actum. Manifestum est autem quod natura et ratio potentiae est ut sit principium actus. Unde omnis habitus qui est alicuius potentiae ut subiecti, principaliter importat ordinem ad actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Habit is an act, in so far as it is a quality: and in this respect it can be a principle of operation. It is, however, in a state of potentiality in respect to operation. Wherefore habit is called first act, and operation, second act; as it is explained in De Anima ii, text. 5. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35615" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35615] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod habitus est actus quidam, inquantum est qualitas, et secundum hoc potest esse principium operationis. Sed est in potentia per respectum ad operationem. Unde habitus dicitur actus primus, et operatio actus secundus; ut patet in II de anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not the essence of habit to be related to power, but to be related to nature. And as nature precedes action, to which power is related, therefore habit is put before power as a species of quality. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35616" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35616] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod non est de ratione habitus quod respiciat potentiam, sed quod respiciat naturam. Et quia natura praecedit actionem, quam respicit potentia; ideo prior species qualitatis ponitur habitus quam potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A3-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Health is said to be a habit, or a habitual disposition, in relation to nature, as stated above. But in so far as nature is a principle of act, it consequently implies a relation to act. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Hist. Animal. x, 1), that man, or one of his members, is called healthy, "when he can perform the operation of a healthy man." And the same applies to other habits. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35617" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35617] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod sanitas dicitur habitus, vel habitualis dispositio, in ordine ad naturam, sicut dictum est. Inquantum tamen natura est principium actus, ex consequenti importat ordinem ad actum. Unde philosophus dicit, in X de historia Animal., quod homo dicitur sanus, vel membrum aliquod, quando potest facere operationem sani. Et est simile in aliis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q49_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q49_A4-p0.1">Q. 49. A. 4. Whether habits are necessary?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habits are not necessary. For by habits we are well or ill disposed in respect of something, as stated above. But a thing is well or ill disposed by its form: for in respect of its form a thing is good, even as it is a being. Therefore there is no necessity for habits. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35618" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35618] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit necessarium esse habitus. Habitus enim sunt quibus aliquid disponitur bene vel male ad aliquid, sicut dictum est. Sed per suam formam aliquid bene vel male disponitur, nam secundum formam aliquid est bonum, sicut et ens. Ergo nulla necessitas est habituum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habit implies relation to an act. But power implies sufficiently a principle of act: for even the natural powers, without any habits, are principles of acts. Therefore there was no necessity for habits. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35619" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35619] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, habitus importat ordinem ad actum. Sed potentia importat principium actus sufficienter, nam et potentiae naturales absque habitibus sunt principia actuum. Ergo non fuit necessarium habitus esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as power is related to good and evil, so also is habit: and as power does not always act, so neither does habit. Given, therefore, the powers, habits become superfluous. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35620" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35620] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut potentia se habet ad bonum et malum, ita et habitus, et sicut potentia non semper agit, ita nec habitus. Existentibus igitur potentiis, superfluum fuit habitum esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Habits are perfections (Phys. vii, text. 17). But perfection is of the greatest necessity to a thing: since it is in the nature of an end. Therefore it is necessary that there should be habits. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35621" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35621] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod habitus sunt perfectiones quaedam, ut dicitur in VII Physic. Sed perfectio est maxime necessaria rei, cum habeat rationem finis. Ergo necessarium fuit habitus esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q49_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said above ( <a href="#FS_Q49_A2" id="FS_Q49_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,3), habit implies a disposition in relation to a thing's nature, and to its operation or end, by reason of which disposition a thing is well or ill disposed thereto. Now for a thing to need to be disposed to something else, three conditions are necessary. The first condition is that which is disposed should be distinct from that to which it is disposed; and so, that it should be related to it as potentiality is to act. Whence, if there is a being whose nature is not composed of potentiality and act, and whose substance is its own operation, which itself is for itself, there we can find no room for habit and disposition, as is clearly the case in God. </p><p id="FS_Q49_A4-p7"> The second condition is, that that which is in a state of potentiality in regard to something else, be capable of determination in several ways and to various things. Whence if something be in a state of potentiality in regard to something else, but in regard to that only, there we find no room for disposition and habit: for such a subject from its own nature has the due relation to such an act. Wherefore if a heavenly body be composed of matter and form, since that matter is not in a state of potentiality to another form, as we said in the <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q56_A2" id="FS_Q49_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[56], A[2]</a>, there is no need for disposition or habit in respect of the form, or even in respect of operation, since the nature of the heavenly body is not in a state of potentiality to more than one fixed movement. </p><p id="FS_Q49_A4-p8"> The third condition is that in disposing the subject to one of those things to which it is in potentiality, several things should occur, capable of being adjusted in various ways: so as to dispose the subject well or ill to its form or to its operation. Wherefore the simple qualities of the elements which suit the natures of the elements in one single fixed way, are not called dispositions or habits, but "simple qualities": but we call dispositions or habits, such things as health, beauty, and so forth, which imply the adjustment of several things which may vary in their relative adjustability. For this reason the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 24,25) that "habit is a disposition": and disposition is "the order of that which has parts either as to place, or as to potentiality, or as to species," as we have said above (A[1], ad 3). Wherefore, since there are many things for whose natures and operations several things must concur which may vary in their relative adjustability, it follows that habit is necessary. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 4 co."><a name="35622" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35622] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus importat dispositionem quandam in ordine ad naturam rei, et ad operationem vel finem eius, secundum quam bene vel male aliquid ad hoc disponitur. Ad hoc autem quod aliquid indigeat disponi ad alterum, tria requiruntur. Primo quidem, ut id quod disponitur, sit alterum ab eo ad quod disponitur; et sic se habeat ad ipsum ut potentia ad actum. Unde si aliquid sit cuius natura non sit composita ex potentia et actu, et cuius substantia sit sua operatio, et ipsum sit propter seipsum; ibi habitus vel dispositio locum non habet, sicut patet in Deo. Secundo requiritur quod id quod est in potentia ad alterum, possit pluribus modis determinari, et ad diversa. Unde si aliquid sit in potentia ad alterum, ita tamen quod non sit in potentia nisi ad ipsum, ibi dispositio et habitus locum non habet, quia tale subiectum ex sua natura habet debitam habitudinem ad talem actum. Unde si corpus caeleste sit compositum ex materia et forma, cum illa materia non sit in potentia ad aliam formam, ut in primo dictum est, non habet ibi locum dispositio vel habitus ad formam; aut etiam ad operationem, quia natura caelestis corporis non est in potentia nisi ad unum motum determinatum. Tertio requiritur quod plura concurrant ad disponendum subiectum ad unum eorum ad quae est in potentia, quae diversis modis commensurari possunt, ut sic disponatur bene vel male ad formam vel ad operationem. Unde qualitates simplices elementorum, quae secundum unum modum determinatum naturis elementorum conveniunt, non dicimus dispositiones vel habitus, sed simplices qualitates, dicimus autem dispositiones vel habitus sanitatem, pulchritudinem et alia huiusmodi, quae important quandam commensurationem plurium quae diversis modis commensurari possunt. Propter quod philosophus dicit, in V Metaphys., quod <i>habitus est dispositio, et dispositio est ordo habentis partes vel secundum locum, vel secundum potentiam, vel secundum speciem</i>; ut supra dictum est. Quia igitur multa sunt entium ad quorum naturas et operationes necesse est plura concurrere quae diversis modis commensurari possunt, ideo necesse est habitus esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By the form the nature of a thing is perfected: yet the subject needs to be disposed in regard to the form by some disposition. But the form itself is further ordained to operation, which is either the end, or the means to the end. And if the form is limited to one fixed operation, no further disposition, besides the form itself, is needed for the operation. But if the form be such that it can operate in diverse ways, as the soul; it needs to be disposed to its operations by means of habits. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35623" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35623] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod per formam perficitur natura rei, sed oportet quod in ordine ad ipsam formam disponatur subiectum aliqua dispositione. Ipsa tamen forma ordinatur ulterius ad operationem, quae vel est finis, vel via in finem. Et si quidem habeat forma determinate unam tantum operationem determinatam, nulla alia dispositio requiritur ad operationem praeter ipsam formam. Si autem sit talis forma quae possit diversimode operari, sicut est anima; oportet quod disponatur ad suas operationes per aliquos habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A4-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Power sometimes has a relation to many things: and then it needs to be determined by something else. But if a power has not a relation to many things, it does not need a habit to determine it, as we have said. For this reason the natural forces do not perform their operations by means of habits: because they are of themselves determined to one mode of operation. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35624" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35624] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod potentia quandoque se habet ad multa, et ideo oportet quod aliquo alio determinetur. Si vero sit aliqua potentia quae non se habeat ad multa, non indiget habitu determinante, ut dictum est. Et propter hoc vires naturales non agunt operationes suas mediantibus aliquibus habitibus, quia secundum seipsas sunt determinatae ad unum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A4-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same habit has not a relation to good and evil, as will be made clear further on ( <a href="#FS_Q54_A3" id="FS_Q49_A4-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[54], A[3]</a>): whereas the same power has a relation to good and evil. And, therefore, habits are necessary that the powers be determined to good. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35625" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35625] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod non idem habitus se habet ad bonum et malum, sicut infra patebit. Eadem autem potentia se habet ad bonum et malum. Et ideo necessarii sunt habitus ut potentiae determinentur ad bonum.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q50" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q50-p0.1">Q. 50. OF THE SUBJECT OF HABITS (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q50-p2"> We consider next the subject of habits: and under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q50-p3"><a href="#FS_Q50_A1"> (1) Whether there is a habit in the body?</a></p><p id="FS_Q50-p4"><a href="#FS_Q50_A2"> (2) Whether the soul is a subject of habit, in respect of its essence or in respect of its power?</a></p><p id="FS_Q50-p5"><a href="#FS_Q50_A3"> (3) Whether in the powers of the sensitive part there can be a habit?</a></p><p id="FS_Q50-p6"><a href="#FS_Q50_A4"> (4) Whether there is a habit in the intellect?</a></p><p id="FS_Q50-p7"><a href="#FS_Q50_A5"> (5) Whether there is a habit in the will?</a></p><p id="FS_Q50-p8"><a href="#FS_Q50_A6"> (6) Whether there is a habit in separate substances?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 pr."><a name="35626" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35626] Iª-IIae q. 50 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de subiecto habituum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum in corpore sit aliquis habitus. Secundo, utrum anima sit subiectum habitus secundum suam essentiam, vel secundum suam potentiam. Tertio, utrum in potentiis sensitivae partis possit esse aliquis habitus. Quarto, utrum in ipso intellectu sit aliquis habitus. Quinto, utrum in voluntate sit aliquis habitus. Sexto, utrum in substantiis separatis.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q50_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q50_A1-p0.1">Q. 50. A. 1. Whether there is a habit in the body?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is not a habit in the body. For, as the Commentator says (De Anima iii), "a habit is that whereby we act when we will." But bodily actions are not subject to the will, since they are natural. Therefore there can be no habit in the body. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35627" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35627] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in corpore non sit aliquis habitus. Ut enim Commentator dicit, in III de anima, <i>habitus est quo quis agit cum voluerit</i>. Sed actiones corporales non subiacent voluntati, cum sint naturales. Ergo in corpore non potest esse aliquis habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all bodily dispositions are easy to change. But habit is a quality, difficult to change. Therefore no bodily disposition can be a habit. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35628" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35628] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnes dispositiones corporales sunt facile mobiles. Sed habitus est qualitas difficile mobilis. Ergo nulla dispositio corporalis potest esse habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all bodily dispositions are subject to change. But change can only be in the third species of quality, which is divided against habit. Therefore there is no habit in the body. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35629" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35629] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omnes dispositiones corporales subiacent alterationi. Sed alteratio non est nisi in tertia specie qualitatis, quae dividitur contra habitum. Ergo nullus habitus est in corpore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says in the Book of Predicaments (De Categor. vi) that health of the body and incurable disease are called habits. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35630" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35630] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus, in praedicamentis, sanitatem corporis, vel infirmitatem insanabilem, habitum nominari dicit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q50_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said above ( <a href="#FS_Q49_A2" id="FS_Q50_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[49], AA[2]</a> seqq.), habit is a disposition of a subject which is in a state of potentiality either to form or to operation. Therefore in so far as habit implies disposition to operation, no habit is principally in the body as its subject. For every operation of the body proceeds either from a natural quality of the body or from the soul moving the body. Consequently, as to those operations which proceed from its nature, the body is not disposed by a habit: because the natural forces are determined to one mode of operation; and we have already said ( <a href="#FS_Q49_A4" id="FS_Q50_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[49], A[4]</a>) that it is when the subject is in potentiality to many things that a habitual disposition is required. As to the operations which proceed from the soul through the body, they belong principally to the soul, and secondarily to the body. Now habits are in proportion to their operations: whence "by like acts like habits are formed" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). And therefore the dispositions to such operations are principally in the soul. But they can be secondarily in the body: to wit, in so far as the body is disposed and enabled with promptitude to help in the operations of the soul. </p><p id="FS_Q50_A1-p7"> If, however, we speak of the disposition of the subject to form, thus a habitual disposition can be in the body, which is related to the soul as a subject is to its form. And in this way health and beauty and such like are called habitual dispositions. Yet they have not the nature of habit perfectly: because their causes, of their very nature, are easily changeable. </p><p id="FS_Q50_A1-p8"> On the other hand, as Simplicius reports in his Commentary on the Predicaments, Alexander denied absolutely that habits or dispositions of the first species are in the body: and held that the first species of quality belonged to the soul alone. And he held that Aristotle mentions health and sickness in the Book on the Predicaments not as though they belonged to the first species of quality, but by way of example: so that he would mean that just as health and sickness may be easy or difficult to change, so also are all the qualities of the first species, which are called habits and dispositions. But this is clearly contrary to the intention of Aristotle: both because he speaks in the same way of health and sickness as examples, as of virtue and science; and because in Phys. vii, text. 17, he expressly mentions beauty and health among habits. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 1 co."><a name="35631" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35631] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus est quaedam dispositio alicuius subiecti existentis in potentia vel ad formam, vel ad operationem. Secundum ergo quod habitus importat dispositionem ad operationem, nullus habitus est principaliter in corpore sicut in subiecto. Omnis enim operatio corporis est aut a naturali qualitate corporis; aut est ab anima movente corpus. Quantum igitur ad illas operationes quae sunt a natura, non disponitur corpus per aliquem habitum, quia virtutes naturales sunt determinatae ad unum; dictum est autem quod habitualis dispositio requiritur ubi subiectum est in potentia ad multa. Operationes vero quae sunt ab anima per corpus, principaliter quidem sunt ipsius animae, secundario vero ipsius corporis. Habitus autem proportionantur operationibus, unde ex similibus actibus similes habitus causantur, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Et ideo dispositiones ad tales operationes principaliter sunt in anima. In corpore vero possunt esse secundario, inquantum scilicet corpus disponitur et habilitatur ad prompte deserviendum operationibus animae. Si vero loquamur de dispositione subiecti ad formam, sic habitualis dispositio potest esse in corpore, quod comparatur ad animam sicut subiectum ad formam. Et hoc modo sanitas et pulchritudo, et huiusmodi, habituales dispositiones dicuntur. Non tamen perfecte habent rationem habituum, quia causae eorum ex sua natura de facili transmutabiles sunt. Alexander vero posuit nullo modo habitum vel dispositionem primae speciei esse in corpore, ut Simplicius refert in commento Praedicament., sed dicebat primam speciem qualitatis pertinere tantum ad animam. Et quod Aristoteles inducit in praedicamentis de sanitate et aegritudine, non inducit quasi haec pertineant ad primam speciem qualitatis, sed per modum exempli, ut sit sensus quod sicut aegritudo et sanitas possunt esse facile vel difficile mobiles, ita etiam qualitates primae speciei, quae dicuntur habitus et dispositio. Sed patet hoc esse contra intentionem Aristotelis. Tum quia eodem modo loquendi utitur exemplificando de sanitate et aegritudine, et de virtute et de scientia. Tum quia in VII Physic. expresse ponit inter habitus pulchritudinem et sanitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection runs in the sense of habit as a disposition to operation, and of those actions of the body which are from nature: but not in the sense of those actions which proceed from the soul, and the principle of which is the will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35632" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35632] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de habitu secundum quod est dispositio ad operationem, et de actibus corporis qui sunt a natura, non autem de his qui sunt ab anima, quorum principium est voluntas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Bodily dispositions are not simply difficult to change on account of the changeableness of their bodily causes. But they may be difficult to change by comparison to such a subject, because, to wit, as long as such a subject endures, they cannot be removed; or because they are difficult to change, by comparison to other dispositions. But qualities of the soul are simply difficult to change, on account of the unchangeableness of the subject. And therefore he does not say that health which is difficult to change is a habit simply: but that it is "as a habit," as we read in the Greek [*{isos hexin} (Categor. viii)]. On the other hand, the qualities of the soul are called habits simply. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35633" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35633] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod dispositiones corporales non sunt simpliciter difficile mobiles, propter mutabilitatem corporalium causarum. Possunt tamen esse difficile mobiles per comparationem ad tale subiectum, quia scilicet, tali subiecto durante, amoveri non possunt, vel quia sunt difficile mobiles per comparationem ad alias dispositiones. Sed qualitates animae sunt simpliciter difficile mobiles, propter immobilitatem subiecti. Et ideo non dicit quod sanitas difficile mobilis simpliciter sit habitus, sed quod est ut habitus, sicut in Graeco habetur. Qualitates autem animae dicuntur simpliciter habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q50_A1-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Bodily dispositions which are in the first species of quality, as some maintained, differ from qualities of the third species, in this, that the qualities of the third species consist in some "becoming" and movement, as it were, wherefore they are called passions or passible qualities. But when they have attained to perfection (specific perfection, so to speak), they have then passed into the first species of quality. But Simplicius in his Commentary disapproves of this; for in this way heating would be in the third species, and heat in the first species of quality; whereas Aristotle puts heat in the third. </p><p id="FS_Q50_A1-p12"> Wherefore Porphyrius, as Simplicius reports (Commentary), says that passion or passion-like quality, disposition and habit, differ in bodies by way of intensity and remissness. For when a thing receives heat in this only that it is being heated, and not so as to be able to give heat, then we have passion, if it is transitory; or passion-like quality if it is permanent. But when it has been brought to the point that it is able to heat something else, then it is a disposition; and if it goes so far as to be firmly fixed and to become difficult to change, then it will be a habit: so that disposition would be a certain intensity of passion or passion-like quality, and habit an intensity or disposition. But Simplicius disapproves of this, for such intensity and remissness do not imply diversity on the part of the form itself, but on the part of the diverse participation thereof by the subject; so that there would be no diversity among the species of quality. And therefore we must say otherwise that, as was explained above ( <a href="#FS_Q49_A2" id="FS_Q50_A1-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[2]</a>, ad 1), the adjustment of the passion-like qualities themselves, according to their suitability to nature, implies the notion of disposition: and so, when a change takes place in these same passion-like qualities, which are heat and cold, moisture and dryness, there results a change as to sickness and health. But change does not occur in regard to like habits and dispositions, primarily and of themselves. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35634" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35634] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod dispositiones corporales quae sunt in prima specie qualitatis, ut quidam posuerunt, differunt a qualitatibus tertiae speciei in hoc, quod qualitates tertiae speciei sunt ut in fieri et ut in motu, unde dicuntur passiones vel passibiles qualitates. Quando autem iam pervenerint ad perfectum, quasi ad speciem, tunc iam sunt in prima specie qualitatis. Sed hoc improbat Simplicius, in commento praedicamentorum, quia secundum hoc calefactio esset in tertia specie qualitatis, calor autem in prima, Aristoteles autem ponit calorem in tertia. Unde Porphyrius dicit, sicut idem Simplicius refert, quod passio vel passibilis qualitas, et dispositio et habitus, differunt in corporibus secundum intensionem et remissionem. Quando enim aliquid recipit caliditatem secundum calefieri tantum, non autem ut calefacere possit; tunc est passio, si sit cito transiens, vel passibilis qualitas, si sit manens. Quando autem iam ad hoc perducitur quod potest etiam alterum calefacere, tunc est dispositio, si autem ulterius intantum confirmetur quod sit difficile mobilis, tunc erit habitus, ut sic dispositio sit quaedam intensio seu perfectio passionis vel passibilis qualitatis, habitus autem dispositionis. Sed hoc improbat Simplicius, quia talis intensio et remissio non important diversitatem ex parte ipsius formae, sed ex diversa participatione subiecti. Et ita non diversificarentur per hoc species qualitatis. Et ideo aliter dicendum est quod, sicut supra dictum est, commensuratio ipsarum qualitatum passibilium secundum convenientiam ad naturam, habet rationem dispositionis, et ideo, facta alteratione circa ipsas qualitates passibiles, quae sunt calidum et frigidum, humidum et siccum, fit ex consequenti alteratio secundum aegritudinem et sanitatem. Primo autem et per se non est alteratio secundum huiusmodi habitus et dispositiones.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q50_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q50_A2-p0.1">Q. 50. A. 2. Whether the soul is the subject of habit in respect of its essence or in respect of its power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habit is in the soul in respect of its essence rather than in respect of its powers. For we speak of dispositions and habits in relation to nature, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q49_A2" id="FS_Q50_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[2]</a>). But nature regards the essence of the soul rather than the powers; because it is in respect of its essence that the soul is the nature of such a body and the form thereof. Therefore habits are in the soul in respect of its essence and not in respect of its powers. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35635" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35635] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus sint in anima magis secundum essentiam quam secundum potentiam. Dispositiones enim et habitus dicuntur in ordine ad naturam, ut dictum est. Sed natura magis attenditur secundum essentiam animae quam secundum potentias, quia anima secundum suam essentiam est natura corporis talis, et forma eius. Ergo habitus sunt in anima secundum eius essentiam et non secundum potentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, accident is not the subject of accident. Now habit is an accident. But the powers of the soul are in the genus of accident, as we have said in the <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q77_A1" id="FS_Q50_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[77], A[1]</a>, ad 5. Therefore habit is not in the soul in respect of its powers. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35636" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35636] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, accidentis non est accidens. Habitus autem est quoddam accidens. Sed potentiae animae sunt de genere accidentium, ut in primo dictum est. Ergo habitus non est in anima ratione suae potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the subject is prior to that which is in the subject. But since habit belongs to the first species of quality, it is prior to power, which belongs to the second species. Therefore habit is not in a power of the soul as its subject. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35637" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35637] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, subiectum est prius eo quod est in subiecto. Sed habitus, cum pertineat ad primam speciem qualitatis, est prior quam potentia, quae pertinet ad secundam speciem. Ergo habitus non est in potentia animae sicut in subiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) puts various habits in the various powers of the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35638" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35638] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus, in I Ethic., ponit diversos habitus in diversis partibus animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q50_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said above ( <a href="#FS_Q49_A2" id="FS_Q50_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[49], AA[2]</a>,3), habit implies a certain disposition in relation to nature or to operation. If therefore we take habit as having a relation to nature, it cannot be in the soul---that is, if we speak of human nature: for the soul itself is the form completing the human nature; so that, regarded in this way, habit or disposition is rather to be found in the body by reason of its relation to the soul, than in the soul by reason of its relation to the body. But if we speak of a higher nature, of which man may become a partaker, according to 2 Pet. 1, "that we may be partakers of the Divine Nature": thus nothing hinders some habit, namely, grace, from being in the soul in respect of its essence, as we shall state later on ( <a href="FS_vii.html#FS_Q110_A4" id="FS_Q50_A2-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[110], A[4]</a>). </p><p id="FS_Q50_A2-p7"> On the other hand, if we take habit in its relation to operation, it is chiefly thus that habits are found in the soul: in so far as the soul is not determined to one operation, but is indifferent to many, which is a condition for a habit, as we have said above ( <a href="#FS_Q49_A4" id="FS_Q50_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[4]</a>). And since the soul is the principle of operation through its powers, therefore, regarded in this sense, habits are in the soul in respect of its powers. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 2 co."><a name="35639" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35639] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus importat dispositionem quandam in ordine ad naturam, vel ad operationem. Si ergo accipiatur habitus secundum quod habet ordinem ad naturam, sic non potest esse in anima, si tamen de natura humana loquamur, quia ipsa anima est forma completiva humanae naturae; unde secundum hoc, magis potest esse aliquis habitus vel dispositio in corpore per ordinem ad animam, quam in anima per ordinem ad corpus. Sed si loquamur de aliqua superiori natura, cuius homo potest esse particeps, secundum illud II Petr. I, <i>ut simus consortes naturae divinae</i>, sic nihil prohibet in anima secundum suam essentiam esse aliquem habitum, scilicet gratiam, ut infra dicetur. Si vero accipiatur habitus in ordine ad operationem, sic maxime habitus inveniuntur in anima, inquantum anima non determinatur ad unam operationem, sed se habet ad multas, quod requiritur ad habitum, ut supra dictum est. Et quia anima est principium operationum per suas potentias, ideo secundum hoc, habitus sunt in anima secundum suas potentias.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The essence of the soul belongs to human nature, not as a subject requiring to be disposed to something further, but as a form and nature to which someone is disposed. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35640" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35640] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod essentia animae pertinet ad naturam humanam, non sicut subiectum disponendum ad aliquid aliud, sed sicut forma et natura ad quam aliquis disponitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Accident is not of itself the subject of accident. But since among accidents themselves there is a certain order, the subject, according as it is under one accident, is conceived as the subject of a further accident. In this way we say that one accident is the subject of another; as superficies is the subject of color, in which sense power is the subject of habit. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35641" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35641] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod accidens per se non potest esse subiectum accidentis. Sed quia etiam in ipsis accidentibus est ordo quidam, subiectum secundum quod est sub uno accidente, intelligitur esse subiectum alterius. Et sic dicitur unum accidens esse subiectum alterius, ut superficies coloris. Et hoc modo potest potentia esse subiectum habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A2-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Habit takes precedence of power, according as it implies a disposition to nature: whereas power always implies a relation to operation, which is posterior, since nature is the principle of operation. But the habit whose subject is a power, does not imply relation to nature, but to operation. Wherefore it is posterior to power. Or, we may say that habit takes precedence of power, as the complete takes precedence of the incomplete, and as act takes precedence of potentiality. For act is naturally prior to potentiality, though potentiality is prior in order of generation and time, as stated in Metaph. vii, text. 17; ix, text. 13. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35642" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35642] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod habitus praemittitur potentiae, secundum quod importat dispositionem ad naturam, potentia autem semper importat ordinem ad operationem, quae est posterior, cum natura sit operationis principium. Sed habitus cuius potentia est subiectum, non importat ordinem ad naturam, sed ad operationem. Unde est posterior potentia. Vel potest dici quod habitus praeponitur potentiae sicut completum incompleto, et actus potentiae. Actus enim naturaliter est prior; quamvis potentia sit prior ordine generationis et temporis, ut dicitur in VII et IX Metaphys.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q50_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q50_A3-p0.1">Q. 50. A. 3. Whether there can be any habits in the powers of the sensitive parts?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be any habits in the powers of the sensitive part. For as the nutritive power is an irrational part, so is the sensitive power. But there can be no habits in the powers of the nutritive part. Therefore we ought not to put any habit in the powers of the sensitive part. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35643" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35643] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod in potentiis sensitivae partis non possit esse aliquis habitus. Sicut enim potentia nutritiva pars est irrationalis, ita et sensitiva. Sed in potentiis nutritivae partis non ponitur aliquis habitus. Ergo nec in potentiis sensitivae partis aliquis habitus debet poni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sensitive parts are common to us and the brutes. But there are not any habits in brutes: for in them there is no will, which is put in the definition of habit, as we have said above ( <a href="#FS_Q49_A3" id="FS_Q50_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[3]</a>). Therefore there are no habits in the sensitive powers. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35644" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35644] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sensitivae partes sunt communes nobis et brutis. Sed in brutis non sunt aliqui habitus, quia non est in eis voluntas, quae in definitione habitus ponitur, ut supra dictum est. Ergo in potentiis sensitivis non sunt aliqui habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the habits of the soul are sciences and virtues: and just as science is related to the apprehensive power, so it virtue related to the appetitive power. But in the sensitive powers there are no sciences: since science is of universals, which the sensitive powers cannot apprehend. Therefore, neither can there be habits of virtue in the sensitive part. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35645" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35645] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, habitus animae sunt scientiae et virtutes, et sicut scientia refertur ad vim apprehensivam, ita virtus ad vim appetitivam. Sed in potentiis sensitivis non sunt aliquae scientiae, cum scientia sit universalium, quae vires sensitivae apprehendere non possunt. Ergo etiam nec habitus virtutum in partibus sensitivis esse possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "some virtues," namely, temperance and fortitude, "belong to the irrational part." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35646" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35646] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod aliquae virtutes, scilicet temperantia et fortitudo, sunt irrationabilium partium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The sensitive powers can be considered in two ways: first, according as they act from natural instinct: secondly, according as they act at the command of reason. According as they act from natural instinct, they are ordained to one thing, even as nature is; but according as they act at the command of reason, they can be ordained to various things. And thus there can be habits in them, by which they are well or ill disposed in regard to something. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 3 co."><a name="35647" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35647] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod vires sensitivae dupliciter possunt considerari, uno modo, secundum quod operantur ex instinctu naturae; alio modo, secundum quod operantur ex imperio rationis. Secundum igitur quod operantur ex instinctu naturae, sic ordinantur ad unum, sicut et natura. Et ideo sicut in potentiis naturalibus non sunt aliqui habitus, ita etiam nec in potentiis sensitivis, secundum quod ex instinctu naturae operantur. Secundum vero quod operantur ex imperio rationis, sic ad diversa ordinari possunt. Et sic possunt in eis esse aliqui habitus, quibus bene aut male ad aliquid disponuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A3-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The powers of the nutritive part have not an inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason, and therefore there are no habits in them. But the sensitive powers have an inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason; and therefore habits can be in them: for in so far as they obey reason, in a certain sense they are said to be rational, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35648" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35648] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod vires nutritivae partis non sunt natae obedire imperio rationis, et ideo non sunt in eis aliqui habitus. Sed vires sensitivae natae sunt obedire imperio rationis, et ideo in eis esse possunt aliqui habitus; nam secundum quod obediunt rationi, quodammodo rationales dicuntur, ut in I Ethic. dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The sensitive powers of dumb animals do not act at the command of reason; but if they are left to themselves, such animals act from natural instinct: and so in them there are no habits ordained to operations. There are in them, however, certain dispositions in relation to nature, as health and beauty. But whereas by man's reason brutes are disposed by a sort of custom to do things in this or that way, so in this sense, to a certain extent, we can admit the existence of habits in dumb animals: wherefore Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 36): "We find the most untamed beasts, deterred by fear of pain, from that wherein they took the keenest pleasure; and when this has become a custom in them, we say that they are tame and gentle." But the habit is incomplete, as to the use of the will, for they have not that power of using or of refraining, which seems to belong to the notion of habit: and therefore, properly speaking, there can be no habits in them. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35649" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35649] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod vires sensitivae in brutis animalibus non operantur ex imperio rationis; sed si sibi relinquantur bruta animalia, operantur ex instinctu naturae. Et sic in brutis animalibus non sunt aliqui habitus ordinati ad operationes. Sunt tamen in eis aliquae dispositiones in ordine ad naturam, ut sanitas et pulchritudo. Sed quia bruta animalia a ratione hominis per quandam consuetudinem disponuntur ad aliquid operandum sic vel aliter, hoc modo in brutis animalibus habitus quodammodo poni possunt, unde Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod <i>videmus immanissimas bestias a maximis voluptatibus absterreri dolorum metu, quod cum in earum consuetudinem verterit, domitae et mansuetae vocantur</i>. Deficit tamen ratio habitus quantum ad usum voluntatis, quia non habent dominium utendi vel non utendi, quod videtur ad rationem habitus pertinere. Et ideo, proprie loquendo, in eis habitus esse non possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q50_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sensitive appetite has an inborn aptitude to be moved by the rational appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 57: but the rational powers of apprehension have an inborn aptitude to receive from the sensitive powers. And therefore it is more suitable that habits should be in the powers of sensitive appetite than in the powers of sensitive apprehension, since in the powers of sensitive appetite habits do not exist except according as they act at the command of the reason. And yet even in the interior powers of sensitive apprehension, we may admit of certain habits whereby man has a facility of memory, thought or imagination: wherefore also the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. ii) that "custom conduces much to a good memory": the reason of which is that these powers also are moved to act at the command of the reason. </p><p id="FS_Q50_A3-p10"> On the other hand the exterior apprehensive powers, as sight, hearing and the like, are not susceptible of habits, but are ordained to their fixed acts, according to the disposition of their nature, just as the members of the body, for there are no habits in them, but rather in the powers which command their movements. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35650" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35650] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod appetitus sensitivus natus est moveri ab appetitu rationali, ut dicitur in III de anima, sed vires rationales apprehensivae natae sunt accipere a viribus sensitivis. Et ideo magis convenit quod habitus sint in viribus sensitivis appetitivis quam in viribus sensitivis apprehensivis, cum in viribus sensitivis appetitivis non sint habitus nisi secundum quod operantur ex imperio rationis. Quamvis etiam in ipsis interioribus viribus sensitivis apprehensivis possint poni aliqui habitus, secundum quos homo fit bene memorativus vel cogitativus vel imaginativus, unde etiam philosophus dicit, in cap. de memoria, quod <i>consuetudo multum operatur ad bene memorandum</i>, quia etiam istae vires moventur ad operandum ex imperio rationis. Vires autem apprehensivae exteriores, ut visus et auditus et huiusmodi, non sunt susceptivae aliquorum habituum, sed secundum dispositionem suae naturae ordinantur ad suos actus determinatos; sicut et membra corporis, in quibus non sunt habitus, sed magis in viribus imperantibus motum ipsorum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q50_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q50_A4-p0.1">Q. 50. A. 4. Whether there is any habit in the intellect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are no habits in the intellect. For habits are in conformity with operations, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q50_A1" id="FS_Q50_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But the operations of man are common to soul and body, as stated in De Anima i, text. 64. Therefore also are habits. But the intellect is not an act of the body (De Anima iii, text. 6). Therefore the intellect is not the subject of a habit. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35651" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35651] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in intellectu non sint aliqui habitus. Habitus enim operationibus conformantur, ut dictum est. Sed operationes hominis sunt communes animae et corpori, ut dicitur in I de anima. Ergo et habitus. Sed intellectus non est actus corporis, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo intellectus non est subiectum alicuius habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is in a thing, is there according to the mode of that in which it is. But that which is form without matter, is act only: whereas what is composed of form and matter, has potentiality and act at the same time. Therefore nothing at the same time potential and actual can be in that which is form only, but only in that which is composed of matter and form. Now the intellect is form without matter. Therefore habit, which has potentiality at the same time as act, being a sort of medium between the two, cannot be in the intellect; but only in the "conjunction," which is composed of soul and body. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35652" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35652] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne quod est in aliquo, est in eo per modum eius in quo est. Sed id quod est forma sine materia, est actus tantum, quod autem est compositum ex forma et materia, habet potentiam et actum simul. Ergo in eo quod est forma tantum, non potest esse aliquid quod sit simul in potentia et actu, sed solum in eo quod est compositum ex materia et forma. Sed intellectus est forma sine materia. Ergo habitus, qui habet potentiam simul cum actu, quasi medium inter utrumque existens, non potest esse in intellectu; sed solum in coniuncto, quod est compositum ex anima et corpore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, habit is a disposition whereby we are well or ill disposed in regard to something, as is said (Metaph. v, text. 25). But that anyone should be well or ill disposed to an act of the intellect is due to some disposition of the body: wherefore also it is stated (De Anima ii, text. 94) that "we observe men with soft flesh to be quick witted." Therefore the habits of knowledge are not in the intellect, which is separate, but in some power which is the act of some part of the body. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35653" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35653] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, habitus est dispositio secundum quam aliquis bene vel male disponitur ad aliquid, ut dicitur in V Metaph. Sed quod aliquis bene vel male sit dispositus ad actum intellectus, provenit ex aliqua corporis dispositione, unde etiam in II de anima dicitur quod <i>molles carne bene aptos mente videmus</i>. Ergo habitus cognoscitivi non sunt in intellectu, qui est separatus; sed in aliqua potentia quae est actus alicuius partis corporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2,3,10) puts science, wisdom and understanding, which is the habit of first principles, in the intellective part of the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35654" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35654] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus, in VI Ethic., ponit scientiam et sapientiam et intellectum, qui est habitus principiorum, in ipsa intellectiva parte animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q50_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> concerning intellective habits there have been various opinions. Some, supposing that there was only one "possible" [* <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q79_A2" id="FS_Q50_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[79], A[2]</a>, ad 2] intellect for all men, were bound to hold that habits of knowledge are not in the intellect itself, but in the interior sensitive powers. For it is manifest that men differ in habits; and so it was impossible to put the habits of knowledge directly in that, which, being only one, would be common to all men. Wherefore if there were but one single "possible" intellect of all men, the habits of science, in which men differ from one another, could not be in the "possible" intellect as their subject, but would be in the interior sensitive powers, which differ in various men. </p><p id="FS_Q50_A4-p7"> Now, in the first place, this supposition is contrary to the mind of Aristotle. For it is manifest that the sensitive powers are rational, not by their essence, but only by participation (Ethic. i, 13). Now the Philosopher puts the intellectual virtues, which are wisdom, science and understanding, in that which is rational by its essence. Wherefore they are not in the sensitive powers, but in the intellect itself. Moreover he says expressly (De Anima iii, text. 8,18) that when the "possible" intellect "is thus identified with each thing," that is, when it is reduced to act in respect of singulars by the intelligible species, "then it is said to be in act, as the knower is said to be in act; and this happens when the intellect can act of itself," i.e. by considering: "and even then it is in potentiality in a sense; but not in the same way as before learning and discovering." Therefore the "possible" intellect itself is the subject of the habit of science, by which the intellect, even though it be not actually considering, is able to consider. In the second place, this supposition is contrary to the truth. For as to whom belongs the operation, belongs also the power to operate, belongs also the habit. But to understand and to consider is the proper act of the intellect. Therefore also the habit whereby one considers is properly in the intellect itself. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 4 co."><a name="35655" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35655] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod circa habitus cognoscitivos diversimode sunt aliqui opinati. Quidam enim, ponentes intellectum possibilem esse unum in omnibus hominibus, coacti sunt ponere quod habitus cognoscitivi non sunt in ipso intellectu, sed in viribus interioribus sensitivis. Manifestum est enim quod homines in habitibus diversificantur, unde non possunt habitus cognoscitivi directe poni in eo quod, unum numero existens, est omnibus hominibus commune. Unde si intellectus possibilis sit unus numero omnium hominum, habitus scientiarum, secundum quos homines diversificantur, non poterunt esse in intellectu possibili sicut in subiecto, sed erunt in viribus interioribus sensitivis, quae sunt diversae in diversis. Sed ista positio, primo quidem, est contra intentionem Aristotelis. Manifestum est enim quod vires sensitivae non sunt rationales per essentiam, sed solum per participationem, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Philosophus autem ponit intellectuales virtutes, quae sunt sapientia, scientia et intellectus, in eo quod est rationale per essentiam. Unde non sunt in viribus sensitivis, sed in ipso intellectu. Expresse etiam dicit, in III de anima, quod intellectus possibilis, cum sic fiat singula, idest cum reducatur in actum singulorum per species intelligibiles, tunc fit secundum actum eo modo quo sciens dicitur esse in actu, quod quidem accidit cum aliquis possit operari per seipsum, scilicet considerando. Est quidem igitur et tunc potentia quodammodo; non tamen similiter ut ante addiscere aut invenire. Ipse ergo intellectus possibilis est in quo est habitus scientiae quo potest considerare etiam cum non considerat. Secundo etiam, haec positio est contra rei veritatem. Sicut enim eius est potentia cuius est operatio, ita etiam eius est habitus cuius est operatio. Intelligere autem et considerare est proprius actus intellectus. Ergo et habitus quo consideratur, est proprie in ipso intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q50_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some said, as Simplicius reports in his Commentary on the Predicaments, that, since every operation of man is to a certain extent an operation of the "conjunctum," as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, text. 64); therefore no habit is in the soul only, but in the "conjunctum." And from this it follows that no habit is in the intellect, for the intellect is separate, as ran the argument, given above. But the argument is no cogent. For habit is not a disposition of the object to the power, but rather a disposition of the power to the object: wherefore the habit needs to be in that power which is principle of the act, and not in that which is compared to the power as its object. </p><p id="FS_Q50_A4-p9"> Now the act of understanding is not said to be common to soul and body, except in respect of the phantasm, as is stated in De Anima, text. 66. But it is clear that the phantasm is compared as object to the passive intellect (De Anima iii, text. 3,39). Whence it follows that the intellective habit is chiefly on the part of the intellect itself; and not on the part of the phantasm, which is common to soul and body. And therefore we must say that the "possible" intellect is the subject of habit, which is in potentiality to many: and this belongs, above all, to the "possible" intellect. Wherefore the "possible" intellect is the subject of intellectual habits. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35656" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35656] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quidam dixerunt, ut Simplicius refert in commento praedicamentorum, quod quia omnis operatio hominis est quodammodo coniuncti, ut philosophus dicit in I de anima; ideo nullus habitus est animae tantum, sed coniuncti. Et per hoc sequitur quod nullus habitus sit in intellectu, cum intellectus sit separatus, ut ratio proposita procedebat. Sed ista ratio non cogit. Habitus enim non est dispositio obiecti ad potentiam, sed magis dispositio potentiae ad obiectum, unde habitus oportet quod sit in ipsa potentia quae est principium actus, non autem in eo quod comparatur ad potentiam sicut obiectum. Ipsum autem intelligere non dicitur commune esse animae et corpori, nisi ratione phantasmatis, ut dicitur in I de anima. Patet autem quod phantasma comparatur ad intellectum possibilem ut obiectum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Unde relinquitur quod habitus intellectivus sit principaliter ex parte ipsius intellectus, non autem ex parte phantasmatis, quod est commune animae et corpori. Et ideo dicendum est quod intellectus possibilis est subiectum habitus, illi enim competit esse subiectum habitus, quod est in potentia ad multa; et hoc maxime competit intellectui possibili. Unde intellectus possibilis est subiectum habituum intellectualium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A4-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As potentiality to sensible being belongs to corporeal matter, so potentiality to intellectual being belongs to the "possible" intellect. Wherefore nothing forbids habit to be in the "possible" intellect, for it is midway between pure potentiality and perfect act. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35657" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35657] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut potentia ad esse sensibile convenit materiae corporali, ita potentia ad esse intelligibile convenit intellectui possibili. Unde nihil prohibet in intellectu possibili esse habitum, qui est medius inter puram potentiam et actum perfectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A4-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Because the apprehensive powers inwardly prepare their proper objects for the "possible intellect," therefore it is by the good disposition of these powers, to which the good disposition of the body cooperates, that man is rendered apt to understand. And so in a secondary way the intellective habit can be in these powers. But principally it is in the "possible" intellect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35658" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35658] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, quia vires apprehensivae interius praeparant intellectui possibili proprium obiectum; ideo ex bona dispositione harum virium, ad quam cooperatur bona dispositio corporis, redditur homo habilis ad intelligendum. Et sic habitus intellectivus secundario potest esse in istis viribus. Principaliter autem est in intellectu possibili.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q50_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q50_A5-p0.1">Q. 50. A. 5. Whether any habit is in the will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A5-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is not a habit in the will. For the habit which is in the intellect is the intelligible species, by means of which the intellect actually understands. But the will does not act by means of species. Therefore the will is not the subject of habit. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="35659" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35659] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in voluntate non sit aliquis habitus. Habitus enim qui in intellectu est, sunt species intelligibiles, quibus intelligit actu. Sed voluntas non operatur per aliquas species. Ergo voluntas non est subiectum alicuius habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A5-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no habit is allotted to the active intellect, as there is to the "possible" intellect, because the former is an active power. But the will is above all an active power, because it moves all the powers to their acts, as stated above ( <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q50_A5-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Therefore there is no habit in the will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="35660" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35660] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in intellectu agente non ponitur aliquis habitus, sicut in intellectu possibili, quia est potentia activa. Sed voluntas est maxime potentia activa, quia movet omnes potentias ad suos actus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo in ipsa non est aliquis habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A5-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the natural powers there is no habit, because, by reason of their nature, they are determinate to one thing. But the will, by reason of its nature, is ordained to tend to the good which reason directs. Therefore there is no habit in the will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="35661" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35661] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in potentiis naturalibus non est aliquis habitus, quia ex sua natura sunt ad aliquid determinatae. Sed voluntas ex sua natura ordinatur ad hoc quod tendat in bonum ordinatum ratione. Ergo in voluntate non est aliquis habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A5-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Justice is a habit. But justice is in the will; for it is "a habit whereby men will and do that which is just" (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore the will is the subject of a habit. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 5 s. c."><a name="35662" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35662] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod iustitia est habitus quidam. Sed iustitia est in voluntate, est enim iustitia <i>habitus secundum quem aliqui volunt et operantur iusta</i>, ut dicitur in V Ethic. Ergo voluntas est subiectum alicuius habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A5-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Every power which may be variously directed to act, needs a habit whereby it is well disposed to its act. Now since the will is a rational power, it may be variously directed to act. And therefore in the will we must admit the presence of a habit whereby it is well disposed to its act. Moreover, from the very nature of habit, it is clear that it is principally related to the will; inasmuch as habit "is that which one uses when one wills," as stated above <a href="#FS_Q50_A1" id="FS_Q50_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 5 co."><a name="35663" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35663] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod omnis potentia quae diversimode potest ordinari ad agendum, indiget habitu quo bene disponatur ad suum actum. Voluntas autem, cum sit potentia rationalis, diversimode potest ad agendum ordinari. Et ideo oportet in voluntate aliquem habitum ponere, quo bene disponatur ad suum actum. Ex ipsa etiam ratione habitus apparet quod habet quendam principalem ordinem ad voluntatem, prout habitus est quo quis utitur cum voluerit, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A5-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even as in the intellect there is a species which is the likeness of the object; so in the will, and in every appetitive power there must be something by which the power is inclined to its object; for the act of the appetitive power is nothing but a certain inclination, as we have said above ( <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q6_A4" id="FS_Q50_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[6], A[4]</a>; <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q22_A2" id="FS_Q50_A5-p7.2" shape="rect"> Q[22], A[2]</a>). And therefore in respect of those things to which it is inclined sufficiently by the nature of the power itself, the power needs no quality to incline it. But since it is necessary, for the end of human life, that the appetitive power be inclined to something fixed, to which it is not inclined by the nature of the power, which has a relation to many and various things, therefore it is necessary that, in the will and in the other appetitive powers, there be certain qualities to incline them, and these are called habits. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="35664" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35664] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut in intellectu est aliqua species quae est similitudo obiecti, ita oportet in voluntate, et in qualibet vi appetitiva, esse aliquid quo inclinetur in suum obiectum, cum nihil aliud sit actus appetitivae virtutis quam inclinatio quaedam, ut supra dictum est. Ad ea ergo ad quae sufficienter inclinatur per naturam ipsius potentiae, non indiget aliqua qualitate inclinante. Sed quia necessarium est ad finem humanae vitae, quod vis appetitiva inclinetur in aliquid determinatum, ad quod non inclinatur ex natura potentiae, quae se habet ad multa et diversa; ideo necesse est quod in voluntate, et in aliis viribus appetitivis, sint quaedam qualitates inclinantes, quae dicuntur habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A5-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The active intellect is active only, and in no way passive. But the will, and every appetitive power, is both mover and moved (De Anima iii, text. 54). And therefore the comparison between them does not hold; for to be susceptible of habit belongs to that which is somehow in potentiality. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="35665" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35665] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectus agens est agens tantum, et nullo modo patiens. Sed voluntas, et quaelibet vis appetitiva, est movens motum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Et ideo non est similis ratio de utroque, nam esse susceptivum habitus convenit ei quod est quodammodo in potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A5-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will from the very nature of the power inclined to the good of the reason. But because this good is varied in many ways, the will needs to be inclined, by means of a habit, to some fixed good of the reason, in order that action may follow more promptly. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="35666" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35666] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod voluntas ex ipsa natura potentiae inclinatur in bonum rationis. Sed quia hoc bonum multipliciter diversificatur, necessarium est ut ad aliquod determinatum bonum rationis voluntas per aliquem habitum inclinetur, ad hoc quod sequatur promptior operatio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q50_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q50_A6-p0.1">Q. 50. A. 6. Whether there are habits in the angels?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A6-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are no habits in the angels. For Maximus, commentator of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), says: "It is not proper to suppose that there are intellectual (i.e. spiritual) powers in the divine intelligences (i.e. in the angels) after the manner of accidents, as in us: as though one were in the other as in a subject: for accident of any kind is foreign to them." But every habit is an accident. Therefore there are no habits in the angels. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="35667" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35667] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Angelis non sint habitus. Dicit enim maximus, Commentator Dionysii, in VII cap. de Cael. Hier., non convenit arbitrari virtutes intellectuales, idest spirituales, more accidentium, quemadmodum et in nobis sunt, in divinis intellectibus, scilicet Angelis, esse, ut aliud in alio sit sicut in subiecto, accidens enim omne illinc repulsum est. Sed omnis habitus est accidens. Ergo in Angelis non sunt habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A6-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "The holy dispositions of the heavenly essences participate, above all other things, in God's goodness." But that which is of itself [per se] is prior to and more power than that which is by another [per aliud]. Therefore the angelic essences are perfected of themselves unto conformity with God, and therefore not by means of habits. And this seems to have been the reasoning of Maximus, who in the same passage adds: "For if this were the case, surely their essence would not remain in itself, nor could it have been as far as possible deified of itself." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="35668" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35668] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Cael. Hier., <i>sanctae caelestium essentiarum dispositiones super omnia alia Dei bonitatem participant</i>. Sed semper quod est per se, est prius et potius eo quod est per aliud. Ergo Angelorum essentiae per seipsas perficiuntur ad conformitatem Dei. Non ergo per aliquos habitus. Et haec videtur esse ratio maximi, qui ibidem subdit, <i>si enim hoc esset, non utique maneret in semetipsa harum essentia, nec deificari per se, quantum foret possibile, valuisset</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A6-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, habit is a disposition (Metaph. v, text. 25). But disposition, as is said in the same book, is "the order of that which has parts." Since, therefore, angels are simple substances, it seems that there are no dispositions and habits in them. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="35669" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35669] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, habitus est dispositio quaedam, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. Sed dispositio, ut ibidem dicitur, est ordo habentis partes. Cum ergo Angeli sint simplices substantiae, videtur quod in eis non sint dispositiones et habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A6-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that the angels are of the first hierarchy are called: "Fire-bearers and Thrones and Outpouring of Wisdom, by which is indicated the godlike nature of their habits." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 6 s. c."><a name="35670" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35670] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, VII cap. Cael. Hier., quod <i>Angeli primae hierarchiae nominantur calefacientes et throni et effusio sapientiae, manifestatio deiformis ipsorum habituum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q50_A6-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Some have thought that there are no habits in the angels, and that whatever is said of them, is said essentially. Whence Maximus, after the words which we have quoted, says: "Their dispositions, and the powers which are in them, are essential, through the absence of matter in them." And Simplicius says the same in his Commentary on the Predicaments: "Wisdom which is in the soul is its habit: but that which is in the intellect, is its substance. For everything divine is sufficient of itself, and exists in itself." </p><p id="FS_Q50_A6-p7"> Now this opinion contains some truth, and some error. For it is manifest from what we have said ( <a href="#FS_Q49_A4" id="FS_Q50_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[4]</a>) that only a being in potentiality is the subject of habit. So the above-mentioned commentators considered that angels are immaterial substances, and that there is no material potentiality in them, and on that account, excluded from them habit and any kind of accident. Yet since though there is no material potentiality in angels, there is still some potentiality in them (for to be pure act belongs to God alone), therefore, as far as potentiality is found to be in them, so far may habits be found in them. But because the potentiality of matter and the potentiality of intellectual substance are not of the same kind. Whence, Simplicius says in his Commentary on the Predicaments that: "The habits of the intellectual substance are not like the habits here below, but rather are they like simple and immaterial images which it contains in itself." </p><p id="FS_Q50_A6-p8"> However, the angelic intellect and the human intellect differ with regard to this habit. For the human intellect, being the lowest in the intellectual order, is in potentiality as regards all intelligible things, just as primal matter is in respect of all sensible forms; and therefore for the understanding of all things, it needs some habit. But the angelic intellect is not as a pure potentiality in the order of intelligible things, but as an act; not indeed as pure act (for this belongs to God alone), but with an admixture of some potentiality: and the higher it is, the less potentiality it has. And therefore, as we said in the <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q55_A1" id="FS_Q50_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[55], A[1]</a>, so far as it is in potentiality, so far is it in need of habitual perfection by means of intelligible species in regard to its proper operation: but so far as it is in act, through its own essence it can understand some things, at least itself, and other things according to the mode of its substance, as stated in De Causis: and the more perfect it is, the more perfectly will it understand. </p><p id="FS_Q50_A6-p9"> But since no angel attains to the perfection of God, but all are infinitely distant therefrom; for this reason, in order to attain to God Himself, through intellect and will, the angels need some habits, being as it were in potentiality in regard to that Pure Act. Wherefore Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that their habits are "godlike," that is to say, that by them they are made like to God. </p><p id="FS_Q50_A6-p10"> But those habits that are dispositions to the natural being are not in angels, since they are immaterial.</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 6 co."><a name="35671" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35671] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod quidam posuerunt in Angelis non esse habitus; sed quaecumque dicuntur de eis, essentialiter dicuntur. Unde maximus, post praedicta verba quae induximus, dicit, <i>habitudines earum, atque virtutes quae in eis sunt, essentiales sunt, propter immaterialitatem</i>. Et hoc etiam Simplicius dicit, in commento praedicamentorum, <i>sapientia quae est in anima, habitus est, quae autem in intellectu, substantia. Omnia enim quae sunt divina, et per se sufficientia sunt, et in seipsis existentia</i>. Quae quidem positio partim habet veritatem, et partim continet falsitatem. Manifestum est enim ex praemissis quod subiectum habitus non est nisi ens in potentia. Considerantes igitur praedicti commentatores quod Angeli sunt substantiae immateriales, et quod non est in illis potentia materiae; secundum hoc, ab eis habitum excluserunt, et omne accidens. Sed quia, licet in Angelis non sit potentia materiae, est tamen in eis aliqua potentia (esse enim actum purum est proprium Dei); ideo inquantum invenitur in eis de potentia, intantum in eis possunt habitus inveniri. Sed quia potentia materiae et potentia intellectualis substantiae non est unius rationis, ideo per consequens nec habitus unius rationis est utrobique. Unde Simplicius dicit, in commento praedicamentorum, quod <i>habitus intellectualis substantiae non sunt similes his qui sunt hic habitibus; sed magis sunt similes simplicibus et immaterialibus speciebus quas continet in seipsa</i>. Circa huiusmodi tamen habitum aliter se habet intellectus angelicus, et aliter intellectus humanus. Intellectus enim humanus, cum sit infimus in ordine intellectuum, est in potentia respectu omnium intelligibilium, sicut materia prima respectu omnium formarum sensibilium, et ideo ad omnia intelligenda indiget aliquo habitu. Sed intellectus angelicus non se habet sicut pura potentia in genere intelligibilium, sed sicut actus quidam, non autem sicut actus purus (hoc enim solius Dei est), sed cum permixtione alicuius potentiae, et tanto minus habet de potentialitate, quanto est superior. Et ideo, ut in primo dictum est, inquantum est in potentia, indiget perfici habitualiter per aliquas species intelligibiles ad operationem propriam, sed inquantum est actu, per essentiam suam potest aliqua intelligere, ad minus seipsum, et alia secundum modum suae substantiae, ut dicitur in Lib. de causis, et tanto perfectius, quanto est perfectior. Sed quia nullus Angelus pertingit ad perfectionem Dei, sed in infinitum distat; propter hoc, ad attingendum ad ipsum Deum per intellectum et voluntatem, indigent aliquibus habitibus, tanquam in potentia existentes respectu illius puri actus. Unde Dionysius dicit habitus eorum esse deiformes, quibus scilicet Deo conformantur. Habitus autem qui sunt dispositiones ad esse naturale, non sunt in Angelis, cum sint immateriales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A6-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This saying of Maximus must be understood of material habits and accidents. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="35672" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35672] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum maximi intelligendum est de habitibus et accidentibus materialibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A6-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As to that which belongs to angels by their essence, they do not need a habit. But as they are not so far beings of themselves, as not to partake of Divine wisdom and goodness, therefore, so far as they need to partake of something from without, so far do they need to have habits. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="35673" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35673] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod quantum ad hoc quod convenit Angelis per suam essentiam, non indigent habitu. Sed quia non ita sunt per seipsos entes, quin participent sapientiam et bonitatem divinam; ideo inquantum indigent participare aliquid ab exteriori, intantum necesse est in eis ponere habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A6-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In angels there are no essential parts: but there are potential parts, in so far as their intellect is perfected by several species, and in so far as their will has a relation to several things. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="35674" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35674] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod in Angelis non sunt partes essentiae, sed sunt partes secundum potentiam, inquantum intellectus eorum per plures species perficitur, et voluntas eorum se habet ad plura.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q51" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q51-p0.1">Q. 51. OF THE CAUSE OF HABITS, AS TO THEIR FORMATION (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q51-p2"> We must next consider the cause of habits: and firstly, as to their formation; secondly, as to their increase; thirdly, as to their diminution and corruption. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: </p><p id="FS_Q51-p3"><a href="#FS_Q51_A1"> (1) Whether any habit is from nature?</a></p><p id="FS_Q51-p4"><a href="#FS_Q51_A2"> (2) Whether any habit is caused by acts?</a></p><p id="FS_Q51-p5"><a href="#FS_Q51_A3"> (3) Whether any habit can be caused by one act?</a></p><p id="FS_Q51-p6"><a href="#FS_Q51_A4"> (4) Whether any habits are infused in man by God?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 pr."><a name="35675" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35675] Iª-IIae q. 51 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causa habituum. Et primo, quantum ad generationem ipsorum; secundo, quantum ad augmentum; tertio, quantum ad diminutionem et corruptionem. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum aliquis habitus sit a natura. Secundo, utrum aliquis habitus ex actibus causetur. Tertio, utrum per unum actum possit generari habitus. Quarto, utrum aliqui habitus sint in hominibus infusi a Deo.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q51_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q51_A1-p0.1">Q. 51. A. 1. Whether any habit is from nature?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no habit is from nature. For the use of those things which are from nature does not depend on the will. But habit "is that which we use when we will," as the Commentator says on De Anima iii. Therefore habit is not from nature. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35676" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35676] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullus habitus sit a natura. Eorum enim quae sunt a natura, usus non subiacet voluntati. Sed habitus est quo quis utitur cum voluerit, ut dicit Commentator, in III de anima. Ergo habitus non est a natura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nature does not employ two where one is sufficient. But the powers of the soul are from nature. If therefore the habits of the powers were from nature, habit and power would be one. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35677" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35677] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, natura non facit per duo quod per unum potest facere. Sed potentiae animae sunt a natura. Si igitur habitus potentiarum a natura essent, habitus et potentia essent unum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nature does not fail in necessaries. But habits are necessary in order to act well, as we have stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q49_A4" id="FS_Q51_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[4]</a>). If therefore any habits were from nature, it seems that nature would not fail to cause all necessary habits: but this is clearly false. Therefore habits are not from nature. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35678" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35678] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, natura non deficit in necessariis. Sed habitus sunt necessarii ad bene operandum, ut supra dictum est. Si igitur habitus aliqui essent a natura, videtur quod natura non deficeret quin omnes habitus necessarios causaret. Patet autem hoc esse falsum. Ergo habitus non sunt a natura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> In Ethic. vi, 6, among other habits, place is given to understanding of first principles, which habit is from nature: wherefore also first principles are said to be known naturally. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35679" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35679] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod in VI Ethic., inter alios habitus ponitur intellectus principiorum, qui est a natura, unde et principia prima dicuntur naturaliter cognita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q51_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> One thing can be natural to another in two ways. First in respect of the specific nature, as the faculty of laughing is natural to man, and it is natural to fire to have an upward tendency. Secondly, in respect of the individual nature, as it is natural to Socrates or Plato to be prone to sickness or inclined to health, in accordance with their respective temperaments. Again, in respect of both natures, something may be called natural in two ways: first, because it entirely is from the nature; secondly, because it is partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic principle. For instance, when a man is healed by himself, his health is entirely from nature; but when a man is healed by means of medicine, health is partly from nature, partly from an extrinsic principle. </p><p id="FS_Q51_A1-p7"> Thus, then, if we speak of habit as a disposition of the subject in relation to form or nature, it may be natural in either of the foregoing ways. For there is a certain natural disposition demanded by the human species, so that no man can be without it. And this disposition is natural in respect of the specific nature. But since such a disposition has a certain latitude, it happens that different grades of this disposition are becoming to different men in respect of the individual nature. And this disposition may be either entirely from nature, or partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic principle, as we have said of those who are healed by means of art. </p><p id="FS_Q51_A1-p8"> But the habit which is a disposition to operation, and whose subject is a power of the soul, as stated above (Q[50], A[2]), may be natural whether in respect of the specific nature or in respect of the individual nature: in respect of the specific nature, on the part of the soul itself, which, since it is the form of the body, is the specific principle; but in respect of the individual nature, on the part of the body, which is the material principle. Yet in neither way does it happen that there are natural habits in man, so that they be entirely from nature. In the angels, indeed, this does happen, since they have intelligible species naturally impressed on them, which cannot be said of the human soul, as we have said in the <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q55_A2" id="FS_Q51_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[55], A[2]</a>; <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q84_A3" id="FS_Q51_A1-p8.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[84], A[3]</a>. </p><p id="FS_Q51_A1-p9"> There are, therefore, in man certain natural habits, owing their existence, partly to nature, and partly to some extrinsic principle: in one way, indeed, in the apprehensive powers; in another way, in the appetitive powers. For in the apprehensive powers there may be a natural habit by way of a beginning, both in respect of the specific nature, and in respect of the individual nature. This happens with regard to the specific nature, on the part of the soul itself: thus the understanding of first principles is called a natural habit. For it is owing to the very nature of the intellectual soul that man, having once grasped what is a whole and what is a part, should at once perceive that every whole is larger than its part: and in like manner with regard to other such principles. Yet what is a whole, and what is a part---this he cannot know except through the intelligible species which he has received from phantasms: and for this reason, the Philosopher at the end of the Posterior Analytics shows that knowledge of principles comes to us from the senses. </p><p id="FS_Q51_A1-p10"> But in respect of the individual nature, a habit of knowledge is natural as to its beginning, in so far as one man, from the disposition of his organs of sense, is more apt than another to understand well, since we need the sensitive powers for the operation of the intellect. </p><p id="FS_Q51_A1-p11"> In the appetitive powers, however, no habit is natural in its beginning, on the part of the soul itself, as to the substance of the habit; but only as to certain principles thereof, as, for instance, the principles of common law are called the "nurseries of virtue." The reason of this is because the inclination to its proper objects, which seems to be the beginning of a habit, does not belong to the habit, but rather to the very nature of the powers. </p><p id="FS_Q51_A1-p12"> But on the part of the body, in respect of the individual nature, there are some appetitive habits by way of natural beginnings. For some are disposed from their own bodily temperament to chastity or meekness or such like. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 1 co."><a name="35680" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35680] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid potest esse naturale alicui dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum naturam speciei, sicut naturale est homini esse risibile, et igni ferri sursum. Alio modo, secundum naturam individui, sicut naturale est Socrati vel Platoni esse aegrotativum vel sanativum, secundum propriam complexionem. Rursus, secundum utramque naturam potest dici aliquid naturale dupliciter, uno modo, quia totum est a natura; alio modo, quia secundum aliquid est a natura, et secundum aliquid est ab exteriori principio. Sicut cum aliquis sanatur per seipsum, tota sanitas est a natura, cum autem aliquis sanatur auxilio medicinae, sanitas partim est a natura, partim ab exteriori principio. Sic igitur si loquamur de habitu secundum quod est dispositio subiecti in ordine ad formam vel naturam, quolibet praedictorum modorum contingit habitum esse naturalem. Est enim aliqua dispositio naturalis quae debetur humanae speciei, extra quam nullus homo invenitur. Et haec est naturalis secundum naturam speciei. Sed quia talis dispositio quandam latitudinem habet, contingit diversos gradus huiusmodi dispositionis convenire diversis hominibus secundum naturam individui. Et huiusmodi dispositio potest esse vel totaliter a natura, vel partim a natura et partim ab exteriori principio, sicut dictum est de his qui sanantur per artem. Sed habitus qui est dispositio ad operationem, cuius subiectum est potentia animae, ut dictum est, potest quidem esse naturalis et secundum naturam speciei, et secundum naturam individui. Secundum quidem naturam speciei, secundum quod se tenet ex parte ipsius animae, quae, cum sit forma corporis, est principium specificum. Secundum autem naturam individui, ex parte corporis, quod est materiale principium. Sed tamen neutro modo contingit in hominibus esse habitus naturales ita quod sint totaliter a natura. In Angelis siquidem contingit, eo quod habent species intelligibiles naturaliter inditas, quod non competit animae humanae, ut in primo dictum est. Sunt ergo in hominibus aliqui habitus naturales, tanquam partim a natura existentes et partim ab exteriori principio; aliter quidem in apprehensivis potentiis, et aliter in appetitivis. In apprehensivis enim potentiis potest esse habitus naturalis secundum inchoationem, et secundum naturam speciei, et secundum naturam individui. Secundum quidem naturam speciei, ex parte ipsius animae, sicut intellectus principiorum dicitur esse habitus naturalis. Ex ipsa enim natura animae intellectualis, convenit homini quod statim, cognito quid est totum et quid est pars, cognoscat quod omne totum est maius sua parte, et simile est in ceteris. Sed quid sit totum, et quid sit pars, cognoscere non potest nisi per species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus acceptas. Et propter hoc philosophus, in fine posteriorum, ostendit quod cognitio principiorum provenit nobis ex sensu. Secundum vero naturam individui, est aliquis habitus cognoscitivus secundum inchoationem naturalis, inquantum unus homo, ex dispositione organorum, est magis aptus ad bene intelligendum quam alius, inquantum ad operationem intellectus indigemus virtutibus sensitivis. In appetitivis autem potentiis non est aliquis habitus naturalis secundum inchoationem, ex parte ipsius animae, quantum ad ipsam substantiam habitus, sed solum quantum ad principia quaedam ipsius, sicut principia iuris communis dicuntur esse seminalia virtutum. Et hoc ideo, quia inclinatio ad obiecta propria, quae videtur esse inchoatio habitus, non pertinet ad habitum, sed magis pertinet ad ipsam rationem potentiarum. Sed ex parte corporis, secundum naturam individui, sunt aliqui habitus appetitivi secundum inchoationes naturales. Sunt enim quidam dispositi ex propria corporis complexione ad castitatem vel mansuetudinem, vel ad aliquid huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A1-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection takes nature as divided against reason and will; whereas reason itself and will belong to the nature of man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35681" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35681] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de natura secundum quod dividitur contra rationem et voluntatem, cum tamen ipsa ratio et voluntas ad naturam hominis pertineant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A1-p14"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Something may be added even naturally to the nature of a power, while it cannot belong to the power itself. For instance, with regard to the angels, it cannot belong to the intellective power itself capable of knowing all things: for thus it would have to be the act of all things, which belongs to God alone. Because that by which something is known, must needs be the actual likeness of the thing known: whence it would follow, if the power of the angel knew all things by itself, that it was the likeness and act of all things. Wherefore there must needs be added to the angels' intellective power, some intelligible species, which are likenesses of things understood: for it is by participation of the Divine wisdom and not by their own essence, that their intellect can be actually those things which they understand. And so it is clear that not everything belonging to a natural habit can belong to the power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35682" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35682] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod aliquid etiam naturaliter potest superaddi potentiae, quod tamen ad ipsam potentiam pertinere non potest. Sicut in Angelis non potest pertinere ad ipsam potentiam intellectivam quod sit per se cognoscitiva omnium, quia oporteret quod esset actus omnium, quod solius Dei est. Id enim quo aliquid cognoscitur, oportet esse actualem similitudinem eius quod cognoscitur, unde sequeretur, si potentia Angeli per seipsam cognosceret omnia, quod esset similitudo et actus omnium. Unde oportet quod superaddantur potentiae intellectivae ipsius aliquae species intelligibiles, quae sunt similitudines rerum intellectarum, quia per participationem divinae sapientiae, et non per essentiam propriam, possunt intellectus eorum esse actu ea quae intelligunt. Et sic patet quod non omne id quod pertinet ad habitum naturalem, potest ad potentiam pertinere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A1-p15"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Nature is not equally inclined to cause all the various kinds of habits: since some can be caused by nature, and some not, as we have said above. And so it does not follow that because some habits are natural, therefore all are natural. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35683" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35683] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod natura non aequaliter se habet ad causandas omnes diversitates habituum, quia quidam possunt causari a natura, quidam non, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo non sequitur, si aliqui habitus sint naturales, quod omnes sint naturales.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q51_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q51_A2-p0.1">Q. 51. A. 2. Whether any habit is caused by acts?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no habit is caused by acts. For habit is a quality, as we have said above ( <a href="#FS_Q49_A1" id="FS_Q51_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[1]</a>). Now every quality is caused in a subject, according to the latter's receptivity. Since then the agent, inasmuch as it acts, does not receive but rather gives: it seems impossible for a habit to be caused in an agent by its own acts. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35684" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35684] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullus habitus possit ex actu causari. Habitus enim est qualitas quaedam, ut supra dictum est. Omnis autem qualitas causatur in aliquo subiecto, inquantum est alicuius receptivum. Cum igitur agens ex hoc quod agit, non recipiat aliquid, sed magis ex se emittat; videtur quod non possit aliquis habitus in agente ex propriis actibus generari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the thing wherein a quality is caused is moved to that quality, as may be clearly seen in that which is heated or cooled: whereas that which produces the act that causes the quality, moves, as may be seen in that which heats or cools. If therefore habits were caused in anything by its own act, it would follow that the same would be mover and moved, active and passive: which is impossible, as stated in Physics iii, 8. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35685" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35685] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, illud in quo causatur aliqua qualitas, movetur ad qualitatem illam, sicut patet in re calefacta vel infrigidata, quod autem producit actum causantem qualitatem, movet, ut patet de calefaciente vel infrigidante. Si igitur in aliquo causaretur habitus per actum sui ipsius, sequeretur quod idem esset movens et motum, agens et patiens. Quod est impossibile, ut dicitur in VII Physic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the effect cannot be more noble than its cause. But habit is more noble than the act which precedes the habit; as is clear from the fact that the latter produces more noble acts. Therefore habit cannot be caused by an act which precedes the habit. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35686" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35686] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, effectus non potest esse nobilior sua causa. Sed habitus est nobilior quam actus praecedens habitum, quod patet ex hoc, quod nobiliores actus reddit. Ergo habitus non potest causari ab actu praecedente habitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1,2) teaches that habits of virtue and vice are caused by acts. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35687" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35687] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus, in II Ethic., docet habitus virtutum et vitiorum ex actibus causari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> In the agent there is sometimes only the active principle of its act: for instance in fire there is only the active principle of heating. And in such an agent a habit cannot be caused by its own act: for which reason natural things cannot become accustomed or unaccustomed, as is stated in Ethic. ii, 1. But a certain agent is to be found, in which there is both the active and the passive principle of its act, as we see in human acts. For the acts of the appetitive power proceed from that same power according as it is moved by the apprehensive power presenting the object: and further, the intellective power, according as it reasons about conclusions, has, as it were, an active principle in a self-evident proposition. Wherefore by such acts habits can be caused in their agents; not indeed with regard to the first active principle, but with regard to that principle of the act, which principle is a mover moved. For everything that is passive and moved by another, is disposed by the action of the agent; wherefore if the acts be multiplied a certain quality is formed in the power which is passive and moved, which quality is called a habit: just as the habits of moral virtue are caused in the appetitive powers, according as they are moved by the reason, and as the habits of science are caused in the intellect, according as it is moved by first propositions. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 2 co."><a name="35688" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35688] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod in agente quandoque est solum activum principium sui actus, sicut in igne est solum principium activum calefaciendi. Et in tali agente non potest aliquis habitus causari ex proprio actu, et inde est quod res naturales non possunt aliquid consuescere vel dissuescere, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Invenitur autem aliquod agens in quo est principium activum et passivum sui actus, sicut patet in actibus humanis. Nam actus appetitivae virtutis procedunt a vi appetitiva secundum quod movetur a vi apprehensiva repraesentante obiectum, et ulterius vis intellectiva, secundum quod ratiocinatur de conclusionibus, habet sicut principium activum propositionem per se notam. Unde ex talibus actibus possunt in agentibus aliqui habitus causari, non quidem quantum ad primum activum principium, sed quantum ad principium actus quod movet motum. Nam omne quod patitur et movetur ab alio, disponitur per actum agentis, unde ex multiplicatis actibus generatur quaedam qualitas in potentia passiva et mota, quae nominatur habitus. Sicut habitus virtutum moralium causantur in appetitivis potentiis, secundum quod moventur a ratione, et habitus scientiarum causantur in intellectu, secundum quod movetur a primis propositionibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A2-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The agent, as agent, does not receive anything. But in so far as it moves through being moved by another, it receives something from that which moves it: and thus is a habit caused. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35689" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35689] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod agens, inquantum est agens, non recipit aliquid. Sed inquantum agit motum ab alio, sic recipit aliquid a movente, et sic causatur habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same thing, and in the same respect, cannot be mover and moved; but nothing prevents a thing from being moved by itself as to different respects, as is proved in Physics viii, text. 28,29. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35690" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35690] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod idem, secundum idem, non potest esse movens et motum. Nihil autem prohibet idem a seipso moveri secundum diversa, ut in VIII Physic. probatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The act which precedes the habit, in so far as it comes from an active principle, proceeds from a more excellent principle than is the habit caused thereby: just as the reason is a more excellent principle than the habit of moral virtue produced in the appetitive power by repeated acts, and as the understanding of first principles is a more excellent principle than the science of conclusions. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35691" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35691] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod actus praecedens habitum inquantum procedit a principio activo, procedit a nobiliori principio quam sit habitus generatus, sicut ipsa ratio est nobilius principium quam sit habitus virtutis moralis in vi appetitiva per actuum consuetudines generatus; et intellectus principiorum est nobilius principium quam scientia conclusionum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q51_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q51_A3-p0.1">Q. 51. A. 3. Whether a habit can be caused by one act?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a habit can be caused by one act. For demonstration is an act of reason. But science, which is the habit of one conclusion, is caused by one demonstration. Therefore habit can be caused by one act. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35692" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35692] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod per unum actum possit habitus generari. Demonstratio enim actus rationis est. Sed per unam demonstrationem causatur scientia quae est habitus conclusionis unius. Ergo habitus potest causari ex uno actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as acts happen to increase by multiplication so do they happen to increase by intensity. But a habit is caused by multiplication of acts. Therefore also if an act be very intense, it can be the generating cause of a habit. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35693" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35693] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut contingit actus crescere per multiplicationem, ita contingit actum crescere per intensionem. Sed multiplicatis actibus, generatur habitus. Ergo etiam si multum intendatur unus actus, poterit esse causa generativa habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, health and sickness are habits. But it happens that a man is healed or becomes ill, by one act. Therefore one act can cause a habit. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35694" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35694] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sanitas et aegritudo sunt habitus quidam. Sed ex uno actu contingit hominem vel sanari vel infirmari. Ergo unus actus potest habitum causare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7): "As neither does one swallow nor one day make spring: so neither does one day nor a short time make a man blessed and happy." But "happiness is an operation in respect of a habit of perfect virtue" (Ethic. i, 7,10,13). Therefore a habit of virtue, and for the same reason, other habits, is not caused by one act. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35695" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35695] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod <i>una hirundo ver non facit, nec una dies, ita utique nec beatum nec felicem una dies, nec paucum tempus. Sed beatitudo est operatio secundum habitum perfectae virtutis</i>, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Ergo habitus virtutis, et eadem ratione alius habitus, non causatur per unum actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said already <a href="#FS_Q51_A2" id="FS_Q51_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, habit is caused by act, because a passive power is moved by an active principle. But in order that some quality be caused in that which is passive the active principle must entirely overcome the passive. Whence we see that because fire cannot at once overcome the combustible, it does not enkindle at once; but it gradually expels contrary dispositions, so that by overcoming it entirely, it may impress its likeness on it. Now it is clear that the active principle which is reason, cannot entirely overcome the appetitive power in one act: because the appetitive power is inclined variously, and to many things; while the reason judges in a single act, what should be willed in regard to various aspects and circumstances. Wherefore the appetitive power is not thereby entirely overcome, so as to be inclined like nature to the same thing, in the majority of cases; which inclination belongs to the habit of virtue. Therefore a habit of virtue cannot be caused by one act, but only by many. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 3 co."><a name="35696" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35696] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, habitus per actum generatur inquantum potentia passiva movetur ab aliquo principio activo. Ad hoc autem quod aliqua qualitas causetur in passivo, oportet quod activum totaliter vincat passivum. Unde videmus quod, quia ignis non potest statim vincere suum combustibile, non statim inflammat ipsum, sed paulatim abiicit contrarias dispositiones, ut sic totaliter vincens ipsum, similitudinem suam ipsi imprimat. Manifestum est autem quod principium activum quod est ratio, non totaliter potest supervincere appetitivam potentiam in uno actu, eo quod appetitiva potentia se habet diversimode et ad multa; iudicatur autem per rationem, in uno actu, aliquid appetendum secundum determinatas rationes et circumstantias. Unde ex hoc non totaliter vincitur appetitiva potentia, ut feratur in idem ut in pluribus, per modum naturae, quod pertinet ad habitum virtutis. Et ideo habitus virtutis non potest causari per unum actum, sed per multos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A3-p7"> But in the apprehensive powers, we must observe that there are two passive principles: one is the "possible" [*See <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q79_A2" id="FS_Q51_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[79], A[2]</a> ad 2] intellect itself; the other is the intellect which Aristotle (De Anima iii, text. 20) calls "passive," and is the "particular reason," that is the cogitative power, with memory and imagination. With regard then to the former passive principle, it is possible for a certain active principle to entirely overcome, by one act, the power of its passive principle: thus one self-evident proposition convinces the intellect, so that it gives a firm assent to the conclusion, but a probable proposition cannot do this. Wherefore a habit of opinion needs to be caused by many acts of the reason, even on the part of the "possible" intellect: whereas a habit of science can be caused by a single act of the reason, so far as the "possible" intellect is concerned. But with regard to the lower apprehensive powers, the same acts need to be repeated many times for anything to be firmly impressed on the memory. And so the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. 1) that "meditation strengthens memory." Bodily habits, however, can be caused by one act, if the active principle is of great power: sometimes, for instance, a strong dose of medicine restores health at once. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin"> In apprehensivis autem potentiis considerandum est quod duplex est passivum, unum quidem ipse intellectus possibilis; aliud autem intellectus quem vocat Aristoteles passivum, qui est ratio particularis, idest vis cogitativa cum memorativa et imaginativa. Respectu igitur primi passivi, potest esse aliquod activum quod uno actu totaliter vincit potentiam sui passivi, sicut una propositio per se nota convincit intellectum ad assentiendum firmiter conclusioni; quod quidem non facit propositio probabilis. Unde ex multis actibus rationis oportet causari habitum opinativum, etiam ex parte intellectus possibilis, habitum autem scientiae possibile est causari ex uno rationis actu, quantum ad intellectum possibilem. Sed quantum ad inferiores vires apprehensivas, necessarium est eosdem actus pluries reiterari, ut aliquid firmiter memoriae imprimatur. Unde philosophus, in libro de memoria et reminiscentia, dicit quod <i>meditatio confirmat memoriam</i>. Habitus autem corporales possibile est causari ex uno actu, si activum fuerit magnae virtutis, sicut quandoque medicina fortis statim inducit sanitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A3-p8"> Hence the solutions to the objections are clear.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 3 ad arg."><a name="35697" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35697] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 3 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q51_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q51_A4-p0.1">Q. 51. A. 4. Whether any habits are infused in man by God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no habit is infused in man by God. For God treats all equally. If therefore He infuses habits into some, He would infuse them into all: which is clearly untrue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35698" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35698] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullus habitus hominibus infundatur a Deo. Deus enim aequaliter se habet ad omnes. Si igitur quibusdam infundit habitus aliquos, omnibus eos infunderet. Quod patet esse falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God works in all things according to the mode which is suitable to their nature: for "it belongs to Divine providence to preserve nature," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But habits are naturally caused in man by acts, as we have said above <a href="#FS_Q51_A2" id="FS_Q51_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore God does not cause habits to be in man except by acts. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35699" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35699] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus operatur in omnibus secundum modum qui convenit naturae ipsorum, quia divinae providentiae est naturam salvare, ut dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed habitus in homine naturaliter causantur ex actibus, ut dictum est. Non ergo causat Deus in hominibus aliquos habitus absque actibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if any habit be infused into man by God, man can by that habit perform many acts. But "from those acts a like habit is caused" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Consequently there will be two habits of the same species in the same man, one acquired, the other infused. Now this seems impossible: for the two forms of the same species cannot be in the same subject. Therefore a habit is not infused into man by God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35700" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35700] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si aliquis habitus a Deo infunditur, per illum habitum homo potest multos actus producere. Sed ex illis actibus causatur similis habitus, ut in II Ethic. dicitur. Sequitur ergo duos habitus eiusdem speciei esse in eodem, unum acquisitum, et alterum infusum. Quod videtur esse impossibile, non enim duae formae unius speciei possunt esse in eodem subiecto. Non ergo habitus aliquis infunditur homini a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q51_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.15.5" target="asv">Ecclus. 15:5</a>): "God filled him with the spirit of wisdom and understanding." Now wisdom and understanding are habits. Therefore some habits are infused into man by God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35701" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35701] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli. XV, <i>implevit eum dominus spiritu sapientiae et intellectus</i>. Sed sapientia et intellectus quidam habitus sunt. Ergo aliqui habitus homini a Deo infunduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q51_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Some habits are infused by God into man, for two reasons. </p><p id="FS_Q51_A4-p7"> The first reason is because there are some habits by which man is disposed to an end which exceeds the proportion of human nature, namely, the ultimate and perfect happiness of man, as stated above ( <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q5_A5" id="FS_Q51_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[5], A[5]</a>). And since habits need to be in proportion with that to which man is disposed by them, therefore is it necessary that those habits, which dispose to this end, exceed the proportion of human nature. Wherefore such habits can never be in man except by Divine infusion, as is the case with all gratuitous virtues. </p><p id="FS_Q51_A4-p8"> The other reason is, because God can produce the effects of second causes, without these second causes, as we have said in the <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q105_A6" id="FS_Q51_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[105], A[6]</a>. Just as, therefore, sometimes, in order to show His power, He causes health, without its natural cause, but which nature could have caused, so also, at times, for the manifestation of His power, He infuses into man even those habits which can be caused by a natural power. Thus He gave to the apostles the science of the Scriptures and of all tongues, which men can acquire by study or by custom, but not so perfectly. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 4 co."><a name="35702" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35702] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod duplici ratione aliqui habitus homini a Deo infunduntur. Prima ratio est, quia aliqui habitus sunt quibus homo bene disponitur ad finem excedentem facultatem humanae naturae, qui est ultima et perfecta hominis beatitudo, ut supra dictum est. Et quia habitus oportet esse proportionatos ei ad quod homo disponitur secundum ipsos, ideo necesse est quod etiam habitus ad huiusmodi finem disponentes, excedant facultatem humanae naturae. Unde tales habitus nunquam possunt homini inesse nisi ex infusione divina, sicut est de omnibus gratuitis virtutibus. Alia ratio est, quia Deus potest producere effectus causarum secundarum absque ipsis causis secundis, ut in primo dictum est. Sicut igitur quandoque, ad ostensionem suae virtutis, producit sanitatem absque naturali causa, quae tamen per naturam posset causari; ita etiam quandoque, ad ostendendam suam virtutem, infundit homini illos etiam habitus qui naturali virtute possunt causari. Sicut apostolis dedit scientiam Scripturarum et omnium linguarum, quam homines per studium vel consuetudinem acquirere possunt, licet non ita perfecte.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God, in respect of His Nature, is the same to all, but in respect of the order of His Wisdom, for some fixed motive, gives certain things to some, which He does not give to others. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35703" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35703] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus, quantum ad suam naturam, aequaliter se habet ad omnes, sed secundum ordinem suae sapientiae certa ratione quaedam tribuit aliquibus, quae non tribuit aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A4-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That God works in all according to their mode, does not hinder God from doing what nature cannot do: but it follows from this that He does nothing contrary to that which is suitable to nature. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35704" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35704] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc quod Deus in omnibus operatur secundum modum eorum, non excludit quin Deus quaedam operetur quae natura operari non potest, sed ex hoc sequitur quod nihil operatur contra id quod naturae convenit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A4-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Acts produced by an infused habit, do not cause a habit, but strengthen the already existing habit; just as the remedies of medicine given to a man who is naturally health, do not cause a kind of health, but give new strength to the health he had before. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35705" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35705] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod actus qui producuntur ex habitu infuso, non causant aliquem habitum, sed confirmant habitum praeexistentem, sicut medicinalia remedia adhibita homini sano per naturam, non causant aliquam sanitatem, sed sanitatem prius habitam corroborant.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q52" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q52-p0.1">Q. 52. OF THE INCREASE OF HABITS (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q52-p2"> We have now to consider the increase of habits; under which head there are three points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q52-p3"><a href="#FS_Q52_A1"> (1) Whether habits increase?</a></p><p id="FS_Q52-p4"><a href="#FS_Q52_A2"> (2) Whether they increase by addition?</a></p><p id="FS_Q52-p5"><a href="#FS_Q52_A3"> (3) Whether each act increases the habit?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 pr."><a name="35706" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35706] Iª-IIae q. 52 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de augmento habituum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo, utrum habitus augeantur. Secundo, utrum augeantur per additionem. Tertio, utrum quilibet actus augeat habitum.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q52_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q52_A1-p0.1">Q. 52. A. 1. Whether habits increase?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habits cannot increase. For increase concerns quantity (Phys. v, text. 18). But habits are not in the genus quantity, but in that of quality. Therefore there can be no increase of habits. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35707" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35707] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus augeri non possint. Augmentum enim est circa quantitatem, ut dicitur in V Physic. Sed habitus non sunt in genere quantitatis, sed in genere qualitatis. Ergo circa eos augmentum esse non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habit is a perfection (Phys. vii, text. 17,18). But since perfection conveys a notion of end and term, it seems that it cannot be more or less. Therefore a habit cannot increase. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35708" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35708] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, habitus est perfectio quaedam, ut dicitur in VII Physic. Sed perfectio, cum importet finem et terminum, non videtur posse recipere magis et minus. Ergo habitus augeri non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, those things which can be more or less are subject to alteration: for that which from being less hot becomes more hot, is said to be altered. But in habits there is no alteration, as is proved in Phys. vii, text. 15,17. Therefore habits cannot increase. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35709" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35709] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in his quae recipiunt magis et minus, contingit esse alterationem, alterari enim dicitur quod de minus calido fit magis calidum. Sed in habitibus non est alteratio, ut probatur in VII Physic. Ergo habitus augeri non possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Faith is a habit, and yet it increases: wherefore the disciples said to our Lord ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q52_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.17.5" target="asv">Lk. 17:5</a>): "Lord, increase our faith." Therefore habits increase. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35710" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35710] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod fides est quidam habitus, et tamen augetur, unde discipuli domino dicunt, domine, adauge nobis fidem, ut habetur Luc. XVII. Ergo habitus augentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Increase, like other things pertaining to quantity, is transferred from bodily quantities to intelligible spiritual things, on account of the natural connection of the intellect with corporeal things, which come under the imagination. Now in corporeal quantities, a thing is said to be great, according as it reaches the perfection of quantity due to it; wherefore a certain quantity is reputed great in man, which is not reputed great in an elephant. And so also in forms, we say a thing is great because it is perfect. And since good has the nature of perfection, therefore "in things which are great, but not in quantity, to be greater is the same as to be better," as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 8). </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p7"> Now the perfection of a form may be considered in two ways: first, in respect of the form itself: secondly, in respect of the participation of the form by its subject. In so far as we consider the perfections of a form in respect of the form itself, thus the form is said to be "little" or "great": for instance great or little health or science. But in so far as we consider the perfection of a form in respect of the participation thereof by the subject, it is said to be "more" or "less": for instance more or less white or healthy. Now this distinction is not to be understood as implying that the form has a being outside its matter or subject, but that it is one thing to consider the form according to its specific nature, and another to consider it in respect of its participation by a subject. </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p8"> In this way, then, there were four opinions among philosophers concerning intensity and remission of habits and forms, as Simplicius relates in his Commentary on the Predicaments. For Plotinus and the other Platonists held that qualities and habits themselves were susceptible of more or less, for the reason that they were material and so had a certain want of definiteness, on account of the infinity of matter. Others, on the contrary, held that qualities and habits of themselves were not susceptible of more or less; but that the things affected by them [qualia] are said to be more or less, in respect of the participation of the subject: that, for instance, justice is not more or less, but the just thing. Aristotle alludes to this opinion in the Predicaments (Categor. vi). The third opinion was that of the Stoics, and lies between the two preceding opinions. For they held that some habits are of themselves susceptible of more and less, for instance, the arts; and that some are not, as the virtues. The fourth opinion was held by some who said that qualities and immaterial forms are not susceptible of more or less, but that material forms are. </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p9"> In order that the truth in this matter be made clear, we must observe that, in respect of which a thing receives its species, must be something fixed and stationary, and as it were indivisible: for whatever attains to that thing, is contained under the species, and whatever recedes from it more or less, belongs to another species, more or less perfect. Wherefore, the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text. 10) that species of things are like numbers, in which addition or subtraction changes the species. If, therefore, a form, or anything at all, receives its specific nature in respect of itself, or in respect of something belonging to it, it is necessary that, considered in itself, it be something of a definite nature, which can be neither more nor less. Such are heat, whiteness or other like qualities which are not denominated from a relation to something else: and much more so, substance, which is "per se" being. But those things which receive their species from something to which they are related, can be diversified, in respect of themselves, according to more or less: and nonetheless they remain in the same species, on account of the oneness of that to which they are related, and from which they receive their species. For example, movement is in itself more intense or more remiss: and yet it remains in the same species, on account of the oneness of the term by which it is specified. We may observe the same thing in health; for a body attains to the nature of health, according as it has a disposition suitable to an animal's nature, to which various dispositions may be suitable; which disposition is therefore variable as regards more or less, and withal the nature of health remains. Whence the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 2,3): "Health itself may be more or less: for the measure is not the same in all, nor is it always the same in one individual; but down to a certain point it may decrease and still remain health." </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p10"> Now these various dispositions and measures of health are by way of excess and defect: wherefore if the name of health were given to the most perfect measure, then we should not speak of health as greater or less. Thus therefore it is clear how a quality or form may increase or decrease of itself, and how it cannot. </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p11"> But if we consider a quality or form in respect of its participation by the subject, thus again we find that some qualities and forms are susceptible of more or less, and some not. Now Simplicius assigns the cause of this diversity to the fact that substance in itself cannot be susceptible of more or less, because it is "per se" being. And therefore every form which is participated substantially by its subject, cannot vary in intensity and remission: wherefore in the genus of substance nothing is said to be more or less. And because quantity is nigh to substance, and because shape follows on quantity, therefore is it that neither in these can there be such a thing as more or less. Whence the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 15) that when a thing receives form and shape, it is not said to be altered, but to be made. But other qualities which are further removed from quantity, and are connected with passions and actions, are susceptible of more or less, in respect of their participation by the subject. </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p12"> Now it is possible to explain yet further the reason of this diversity. For, as we have said, that from which a thing receives its species must remain indivisibly fixed and constant in something indivisible. Wherefore in two ways it may happen that a form cannot be participated more or less. First because the participator has its species in respect of that form. And for this reason no substantial form is participated more or less. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text. 10) that, "as a number cannot be more or less, so neither can that which is in the species of substance," that is, in respect of its participation of the specific form: "but in so far as substance may be with matter," i.e. in respect of material dispositions, "more or less are found in substance." </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p13"> Secondly this may happen from the fact that the form is essentially indivisible: wherefore if anything participate that form, it must needs participate it in respect of its indivisibility. For this reason we do not speak of the species of number as varying in respect of more or less; because each species thereof is constituted by an indivisible unity. The same is to be said of the species of continuous quantity, which are denominated from numbers, as two-cubits-long, three-cubits-long, and of relations of quantity, as double and treble, and of figures of quantity, as triangle and tetragon. </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p14"> This same explanation is given by Aristotle in the Predicaments (Categor. vi), where in explaining why figures are not susceptible of more or less, he says: "Things which are given the nature of a triangle or a circle, are accordingly triangles and circles": to wit, because indivisibility is essential to the motion of such, wherefore whatever participates their nature must participate it in its indivisibility. </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p15"> It is clear, therefore, since we speak of habits and dispositions in respect of a relation to something (Phys. vii, text. 17), that in two ways intensity and remission may be observed in habits and dispositions. First, in respect of the habit itself: thus, for instance, we speak of greater or less health; greater or less science, which extends to more or fewer things. Secondly, in respect of participation by the subject: in so far as equal science or health is participated more in one than in another, according to a diverse aptitude arising either from nature, or from custom. For habit and disposition do not give species to the subject: nor again do they essentially imply indivisibility. </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p16"> We shall say further on ( <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q66_A1" id="FS_Q52_A1-p16.1" shape="rect">Q[66], A[1]</a>) how it is with the virtues. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 1 co."><a name="35711" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35711] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod augmentum, sicut et alia ad quantitatem pertinentia, a quantitatibus corporalibus ad res spirituales intelligibiles transfertur; propter connaturalitatem intellectus nostri ad res corporeas, quae sub imaginatione cadunt. Dicitur autem in quantitatibus corporeis aliquid magnum, secundum quod ad debitam perfectionem quantitatis perducitur, unde aliqua quantitas reputatur magna in homine, quae non reputatur magna in elephante. Unde et in formis dicimus aliquid magnum, ex hoc quod est perfectum. Et quia bonum habet rationem perfecti, propter hoc <i>in his quae non mole magna sunt, idem est esse maius quod melius</i>, ut Augustinus dicit, in VI de Trin. Perfectio autem formae dupliciter potest considerari, uno modo, secundum ipsam formam; alio modo, secundum quod subiectum participat formam. Inquantum igitur attenditur perfectio formae secundum ipsam formam, sic dicitur ipsa esse parva vel magna; puta magna vel parva sanitas vel scientia. Inquantum vero attenditur perfectio formae secundum participationem subiecti, dicitur magis et minus; puta magis vel minus album vel sanum. Non autem ista distinctio procedit secundum hoc, quod forma habeat esse praeter materiam aut subiectum, sed quia alia est consideratio eius secundum rationem speciei suae, et alia secundum quod participatur in subiecto. Secundum hoc igitur, circa intensionem et remissionem habituum et formarum, fuerunt quatuor opiniones apud philosophos, ut Simplicius narrat in commento praedicamentorum. Plotinus enim et alii Platonici ponebant ipsas qualitates et habitus suscipere magis et minus, propter hoc quod materiales erant, et ex hoc habebant indeterminationem quandam, propter materiae infinitatem. Alii vero in contrarium ponebant quod ipsae qualitates et habitus secundum se non recipiebant magis et minus; sed qualia dicuntur magis et minus, secundum diversam participationem; puta quod iustitia non dicatur magis et minus, sed iustum. Et hanc opinionem tangit Aristoteles in praedicamentis. Tertia fuit opinio Stoicorum, media inter has. Posuerunt enim quod aliqui habitus secundum se recipiunt magis et minus, sicuti artes; quidam autem non, sicut virtutes. Quarta opinio fuit quorundam dicentium quod qualitates et formae immateriales non recipiunt magis et minus, materiales autem recipiunt. Ut igitur huius rei veritas manifestetur, considerandum est quod illud secundum quod sortitur aliquid speciem, oportet esse fixum et stans, et quasi indivisibile, quaecumque enim ad illud attingunt, sub specie continentur; quaecumque autem recedunt ab illo, vel in plus vel in minus, pertinent ad aliam speciem, vel perfectiorem vel imperfectiorem. Unde philosophus dicit, in VIII Metaphys., quod species rerum sunt sicut numeri, in quibus additio vel diminutio variat speciem. Si igitur aliqua forma, vel quaecumque res, secundum seipsam vel secundum aliquid sui, sortiatur rationem speciei; necesse est quod, secundum se considerata, habeat determinatam rationem, quae neque in plus excedere, neque in minus deficere possit. Et huiusmodi sunt calor et albedo, et aliae huiusmodi qualitates quae non dicuntur in ordine ad aliud, et multo magis substantia, quae est per se ens. Illa vero quae recipiunt speciem ex aliquo ad quod ordinantur, possunt secundum seipsa diversificari in plus vel in minus, et nihilominus sunt eadem specie, propter unitatem eius ad quod ordinantur, ex quo recipiunt speciem. Sicut motus secundum se est intensior et remissior, et tamen remanet eadem species, propter unitatem termini, ex quo specificatur. Et idem potest considerari in sanitate, nam corpus pertingit ad rationem sanitatis, secundum quod habet dispositionem convenientem naturae animalis, cui possunt dispositiones diversae convenientes esse; unde potest variari dispositio in plus vel in minus, et tamen semper remanet ratio sanitatis. Unde philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., quod <i>sanitas ipsa recipit magis et minus, non enim eadem est commensuratio in omnibus, neque in uno et eodem semper; sed remissa permanet sanitas usque ad aliquid</i>. Huiusmodi autem diversae dispositiones vel commensurationes sanitatis se habent secundum excedens et excessum, unde si nomen sanitatis esset impositum soli perfectissimae commensurationi, tunc ipsa sanitas non diceretur maior vel minor. Sic igitur patet qualiter aliqua qualitas vel forma possit secundum seipsam augeri vel minui, et qualiter non. Si vero consideremus qualitatem vel formam secundum participationem subiecti, sic etiam inveniuntur quaedam qualitates et formae recipere magis et minus, et quaedam non. Huiusmodi autem diversitatis causam Simplicius assignat ex hoc, quod substantia secundum seipsam non potest recipere magis et minus, quia est ens per se. Et ideo omnis forma quae substantialiter participatur in subiecto, caret intensione et remissione, unde in genere substantiae nihil dicitur secundum magis et minus. Et quia quantitas propinqua est substantiae, et figura etiam consequitur quantitatem; inde est quod neque etiam in istis dicitur aliquid secundum magis aut minus. Unde philosophus dicit, in VII Physic., quod cum aliquid accipit formam et figuram, non dicitur alterari, sed magis fieri. Aliae vero qualitates, quae sunt magis distantes a substantia, et coniunguntur passionibus et actionibus, recipiunt magis et minus secundum participationem subiecti. Potest autem et magis explicari huiusmodi diversitatis ratio. Ut enim dictum est, id a quo aliquid habet speciem, oportet manere fixum et stans in indivisibili. Duobus igitur modis potest contingere quod forma non participatur secundum magis et minus. Uno modo, quia participans habet speciem secundum ipsam. Et inde est quod nulla forma substantialis participatur secundum magis et minus. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit, in VIII Metaphys., quod, sicut numerus non habet magis neque minus, sic neque substantia quae est secundum speciem, idest quantum ad participationem formae specificae; sed si quidem quae cum materia, idest, secundum materiales dispositiones invenitur magis et minus in substantia. Alio modo potest contingere ex hoc quod ipsa indivisibilitas est de ratione formae, unde oportet quod, si aliquid participet formam illam, quod participet illam secundum rationem indivisibilitatis. Et inde est quod species numeri non dicuntur secundum magis et minus, quia unaquaeque species in eis constituitur per indivisibilem unitatem. Et eadem ratio est de speciebus quantitatis continuae quae secundum numeros accipiuntur ut bicubitum et tricubitum; et de relationibus, ut duplum et triplum; et de figuris, ut trigonum et tetragonum. Et hanc rationem ponit Aristoteles in praedicamentis, ubi, assignans rationem quare figurae non recipiunt magis et minus, dicit, <i>quae quidem enim recipiunt trigoni rationem et circuli, similiter trigona vel circuli sunt</i>, quia scilicet indivisibilitas est de ipsa eorum ratione, unde quaecumque participant rationem eorum, oportet quod indivisibiliter participent. Sic igitur patet quod, cum habitus et dispositiones dicantur secundum ordinem ad aliquid, ut dicitur in VII Physic., dupliciter potest intensio et remissio in habitibus et dispositionibus considerari. Uno modo, secundum se, prout dicitur maior vel minor sanitas; vel maior vel minor scientia, quae ad plura vel pauciora se extendit. Alio modo, secundum participationem subiecti, prout scilicet aequalis scientia vel sanitas magis recipitur in uno quam in alio, secundum diversam aptitudinem vel ex natura vel ex consuetudine. Non enim habitus et dispositio dat speciem subiecto, neque iterum in sui ratione includit indivisibilitatem. Quomodo autem circa virtutes se habeat, infra dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A1-p17"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the word "great" is taken from corporeal quantities and applied to the intelligible perfections of forms; so also is the word "growth," the term of which is something great. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35712" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35712] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut nomen magnitudinis derivatur a quantitatibus corporalibus ad intelligibiles perfectiones formarum; ita etiam et nomen augmenti, cuius terminus est magnum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A1-p18"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Habit is indeed a perfection, but not a perfection which is the term of its subject; for instance, a term giving the subject its specific being. Nor again does the nature of a habit include the notion of term, as do the species of numbers. Wherefore there is nothing to hinder it from being susceptible of more or less. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35713" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35713] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod habitus quidem perfectio est, non tamen talis perfectio quae sit terminus sui subiecti, puta dans ei esse specificum. Neque etiam in sui ratione terminum includit, sicut species numerorum. Unde nihil prohibet quin recipiat magis et minus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A1-p19"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Alteration is primarily indeed in the qualities of the third species; but secondarily it may be in the qualities of the first species: for, supposing an alteration as to hot and cold, there follows in an animal an alteration as to health and sickness. In like manner, if an alteration take place in the passions of the sensitive appetite, or the sensitive powers of apprehension, an alteration follows as to science and virtue (Phys. viii, text. 20). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35714" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35714] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod alteratio primo quidem est in qualitatibus tertiae speciei. In qualitatibus vero primae speciei potest esse alteratio per posterius, facta enim alteratione secundum calidum et frigidum, sequitur animal alterari secundum sanum et aegrum. Et similiter, facta alteratione secundum passiones appetitus sensitivi, vel secundum vires sensitivas apprehensivas, sequitur alteratio secundum scientias et virtutes, ut dicitur in VII Physic.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q52_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q52_A2-p0.1">Q. 52. A. 2. Whether habits increases by addition?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the increase of habits is by way of addition. For the word "increase," as we have said, is transferred to forms, from corporeal quantities. But in corporeal quantities there is no increase without addition: wherefore (De Gener. i, text. 31) it is said that "increase is an addition to a magnitude already existing." Therefore in habits also there is no increase without addition. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35715" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35715] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod augmentum habituum fiat per additionem. Nomen enim augmenti, ut dictum est, a quantitatibus corporalibus transfertur ad formas. Sed in quantitatibus corporalibus non fit augmentum sine additione, unde in I de Generat. dicitur quod <i>augmentum est praeexistenti magnitudini additamentum</i>. Ergo et in habitibus non fit augmentum nisi per additionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habit is not increased except by means of some agent. But every agent does something in the passive subject: for instance, that which heats, causes heat in that which is heated. Therefore there is no increase without addition. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35716" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35716] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, habitus non augetur nisi aliquo agente. Sed omne agens aliquid facit in subiecto patiente, sicut calefaciens facit calorem in ipso calefacto. Ergo non potest esse augmentum nisi aliqua fiat additio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as that which is not white, is in potentiality to be white: so that which is less white, is in potentiality to be more white. But that which is not white, is not made white except by the addition of whiteness. Therefore that which is less white, is not made more white, except by an added whiteness. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35717" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35717] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut id quod non est album, est in potentia ad album; ita id quod est minus album, est in potentia ad magis album. Sed id quod non est album, non fit album nisi per adventum albedinis. Ergo id quod est minus album, non fit magis album nisi per aliquam aliam albedinem supervenientem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text. 84): "That which is hot is made hotter, without making, in the matter, something hot, that was not hot, when the thing was less hot." Therefore, in like manner, neither is any addition made in other forms when they increase. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35718" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35718] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in IV Physic., <i>ex calido fit magis calidum, nullo facto in materia calido, quod non esset calidum quando erat minus calidum</i>. Ergo, pari ratione, nec in aliis formis quae augentur, est aliqua additio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q52_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The solution of this question depends on what we have said above <a href="#FS_Q52_A1" id="FS_Q52_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. For we said that increase and decrease in forms which are capable of intensity and remissness, happen in one way not on the part of the very form considered in itself, through the diverse participation thereof by the subject. Wherefore such increase of habits and other forms, is not caused by an addition of form to form; but by the subject participating more or less perfectly, one and the same form. And just as, by an agent which is in act, something is made actually hot, beginning, as it were, to participate a form, not as though the form itself were made, as is proved in Metaph. vii, text. 32, so, by an intense action of the agent, something is made more hot, as it were participating the form more perfectly, not as though something were added to the form. </p><p id="FS_Q52_A2-p7"> For if this increase in forms were understood to be by way of addition, this could only be either in the form itself or in the subject. If it be understood of the form itself, it has already been stated <a href="#FS_Q52_A1" id="FS_Q52_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that such an addition or subtraction would change the species; even as the species of color is changed when a thing from being pale becomes white. If, on the other hand, this addition be understood as applying to the subject, this could only be either because one part of the subject receives a form which it had not previously (thus we may say cold increases in a man who, after being cold in one part of his body, is cold in several parts), or because some other subject is added sharing in the same form (as when a hot thing is added to another, or one white thing to another). But in either of these two ways we have not a more white or a more hot thing, but a greater white or hot thing. </p><p id="FS_Q52_A2-p8"> Since, however, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q52_A1" id="FS_Q52_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, certain accidents are of themselves susceptible of more or less, in some of these we may find increase by addition. For movement increases by an addition either to the time it lasts, or to the course it follows: and yet the species remains the same on account of the oneness of the term. Yet movement increases the intensity as to participation in its subject: i.e. in so far as the same movement can be executed more or less speedily or readily. In like manner, science can increase in itself by addition; thus when anyone learns several conclusions of geometry, the same specific habit of science increases in that man. Yet a man's science increases, as to the subject's participation thereof, in intensity, in so far as one man is quicker and readier than another in considering the same conclusions. </p><p id="FS_Q52_A2-p9"> As to bodily habits, it does not seem very probable that they receive increase by way of addition. For an animal is not said to be simply healthy or beautiful, unless it be such in all its parts. And if it be brought to a more perfect measure, this is the result of a change in the simple qualities, which are not susceptible of increase save in intensity on the part of the subject partaking of them. </p><p id="FS_Q52_A2-p10"> How this question affects virtues we shall state further on ( <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q66_A1" id="FS_Q52_A2-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[66], A[1]</a> ). </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 2 co."><a name="35719" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35719] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod huius quaestionis solutio dependet ex praemissa. Dictum est enim supra quod augmentum et diminutio in formis quae intenduntur et remittuntur, accidit uno modo non ex parte ipsius formae secundum se consideratae, sed ex diversa participatione subiecti. Et ideo huiusmodi augmentum habituum et aliarum formarum, non fit per additionem formae ad formam; sed fit per hoc quod subiectum magis vel minus perfecte participat unam et eandem formam. Et sicut per agens quod est actu, fit aliquid actu calidum, quasi de novo incipiens participare formam, non quod fiat ipsa forma, ut probatur VII Metaphys.; ita per actionem intensam ipsius agentis efficitur magis calidum, tanquam perfectius participans formam, non tanquam formae aliquid addatur. Si enim per additionem intelligeretur huiusmodi augmentum in formis, hoc non posset esse nisi vel ex parte ipsius formae, vel ex parte subiecti. Si autem ex parte ipsius formae, iam dictum est quod talis additio vel subtractio speciem variaret; sicut variatur species coloris, quando de pallido fit album. Si vero huiusmodi additio intelligatur ex parte subiecti, hoc non posset esse nisi vel quia aliqua pars subiecti recipit formam quam prius non habebat, ut si dicatur frigus crescere in homine qui prius frigebat in una parte, quando iam in pluribus partibus friget, vel quia aliquod aliud subiectum additur participans eandem formam, sicut si calidum adiungatur calido, vel album albo. Sed secundum utrumque istorum duorum modorum, non dicitur aliquid magis album vel calidum, sed maius. Sed quia quaedam accidentia augentur secundum seipsa, ut supra dictum est, in quibusdam eorum fieri potest augmentum per additionem. Augetur enim motus per hoc quod ei aliquid additur vel secundum tempus in quo est, vel secundum viam per quam est, et tamen manet eadem species, propter unitatem termini. Augetur etiam nihilominus motus per intensionem, secundum participationem subiecti, inquantum scilicet idem motus potest vel magis vel minus expedite aut prompte fieri. Similiter etiam et scientia potest augeri secundum seipsam per additionem, sicut cum aliquis plures conclusiones geometriae addiscit, augetur in eo habitus eiusdem scientiae secundum speciem. Augetur nihilominus scientia in aliquo, secundum participationem subiecti, per intensionem, prout scilicet expeditius et clarius unus homo se habet alio in eisdem conclusionibus considerandis. In habitibus autem corporalibus non multum videtur fieri augmentum per additionem. Quia non dicitur animal sanum simpliciter, aut pulchrum, nisi secundum omnes partes suas sit tale. Quod autem ad perfectiorem commensurationem perducatur, hoc contingit secundum transmutationem simplicium qualitatum; quae non augentur nisi secundum intensionem, ex parte subiecti participantis. Quomodo autem se habeat circa virtutes, infra dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A2-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even in bodily bulk increase is twofold. First, by addition of one subject to another; such is the increase of living things. Secondly, by mere intensity, without any addition at all; such is the case with things subject to rarefaction, as is stated in Phys. iv, text. 63. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35720" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35720] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod etiam in magnitudine corporali contingit dupliciter esse augmentum. Uno modo, per additionem subiecti ad subiectum; sicut est in augmento viventium. Alio modo, per solam intensionem, absque omni additione; sicut est in his quae rarefiunt, ut dicitur in IV Physic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A2-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The cause that increases a habit, always effects something in the subject, but not a new form. But it causes the subject to partake more perfectly of a pre-existing form, or it makes the form to extend further. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35721" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35721] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod causa augens habitum, facit quidem semper aliquid in subiecto, non autem novam formam. Sed facit quod subiectum perfectius participet formam praeexistentem, aut quod amplius se extendat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A2-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> What is not already white, is potentially white, as not yet possessing the form of whiteness: hence the agent causes a new form in the subject. But that which is less hot or white, is not in potentiality to those forms, since it has them already actually: but it is in potentiality to a perfect mode of participation; and this it receives through the agent's action. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35722" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35722] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod id quod nondum est album, est in potentia ad formam ipsam, tanquam nondum habens formam, et ideo agens causat novam formam in subiecto. Sed id quod est minus calidum aut album, non est in potentia ad formam, cum iam actu formam habeat, sed est in potentia ad perfectum participationis modum. Et hoc consequitur per actionem agentis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q52_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q52_A3-p0.1">Q. 52. A. 3. Whether every act increases its habit?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every act increases its habit. For when the cause is increased the effect is increased. Now acts are causes of habits, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q51_A2" id="FS_Q52_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[51], A[2]</a>). Therefore a habit increases when its acts are multiplied. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35723" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35723] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod quilibet actus augeat habitum. Multiplicata enim causa, multiplicatur effectus. Sed actus sunt causa habituum aliquorum, ut supra dictum est. Ergo habitus augetur, multiplicatis actibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, of like things a like judgment should be formed. But all the acts proceeding from one and the same habit are alike (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Therefore if some acts increase a habit, every act should increase it. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35724" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35724] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, de similibus idem est iudicium. Sed omnes actus ab eodem habitu procedentes sunt similes, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Ergo, si aliqui actus augeant habitum, quilibet actus augebit ipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, like is increased by like. But any act is like the habit whence it proceeds. Therefore every act increases the habit. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35725" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35725] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, simile augetur suo simili. Sed quilibet actus est similis habitui a quo procedit. Ergo quilibet actus auget habitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Opposite effects do not result from the same cause. But according to Ethic. ii, 2, some acts lessen the habit whence they proceed, for instance if they be done carelessly. Therefore it is not every act that increases a habit. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35726" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35726] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, idem non est contrariorum causa. Sed, sicut dicitur in II Ethic., aliqui actus ab habitu procedentes diminuunt ipsum; utpote cum negligenter fiunt. Ergo non omnis actus habitum auget.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> "Like acts cause like habits" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Now things are like or unlike not only in respect of their qualities being the same or various, but also in respect of the same or a different mode of participation. For it is not only black that is unlike white, but also less white is unlike more white, since there is movement from less white to more white, even as from one opposite to another, as stated in Phys. v, text. 52. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 3 co."><a name="35727" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35727] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod similes actus similes habitus causant, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Similitudo autem et dissimilitudo non solum attenditur secundum qualitatem eandem vel diversam; sed etiam secundum eundem vel diversum participationis modum. Est enim dissimile non solum nigrum albo, sed etiam minus album magis albo, nam etiam motus fit a minus albo in magis album, tanquam ex opposito in oppositum, ut dicitur in V Physic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A3-p7"> But since use of habits depends on the will, as was shown above ( <a href="#FS_Q50_A5" id="FS_Q52_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[50], A[5]</a>); just as one who has a habit may fail to use it or may act contrary to it; so may he happen to use the habit by performing an act that is not in proportion to the intensity of the habit. Accordingly, if the intensity of the act correspond in proportion to the intensity of the habit, or even surpass it, every such act either increases the habit or disposes to an increase thereof, if we may speak of the increase of habits as we do of the increase of an animal. For not every morsel of food actually increases the animal's size as neither does every drop of water hollow out the stone: but the multiplication of food results at last in an increase of the body. So, too, repeated acts cause a habit to grow. If, however, the act falls short of the intensity of the habit, such an act does not dispose to an increase of that habit, but rather to a lessening thereof. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Quia vero usus habituum in voluntate hominis consistit, ut ex supradictis patet; sicut contingit quod aliquis habens habitum non utitur illo, vel etiam agit actum contrarium; ita etiam potest contingere quod utitur habitu secundum actum non respondentem proportionaliter intensioni habitus. Si igitur intensio actus proportionaliter aequetur intensioni habitus, vel etiam superexcedat; quilibet actus vel auget habitum, vel disponit ad augmentum ipsius; ut loquamur de augmento habituum ad similitudinem augmenti animalis. Non enim quodlibet alimentum assumptum actu auget animal, sicut nec quaelibet gutta cavat lapidem, sed, multiplicato alimento, tandem fit augmentum. Ita etiam, multiplicatis actibus, crescit habitus. Si vero intensio actus proportionaliter deficiat ab intensione habitus, talis actus non disponit ad augmentum habitus, sed magis ad diminutionem ipsius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A3-p8"> From this it is clear how to solve the objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 3 ad arg."><a name="35728" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35728] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q53" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q53-p0.1">Q. 53. HOW HABITS ARE CORRUPTED OR DIMINISHED (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q53-p2"> We must now consider how habits are lost or weakened; and under this head there are three points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q53-p3"><a href="#FS_Q53_A1"> (1) Whether a habit can be corrupted?</a></p><p id="FS_Q53-p4"><a href="#FS_Q53_A2"> (2) Whether it can be diminished?</a></p><p id="FS_Q53-p5"><a href="#FS_Q53_A3"> (3) How are habits corrupted or diminished?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 pr."><a name="35729" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35729] Iª-IIae q. 53 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de corruptione et diminutione habituum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo, utrum habitus corrumpi possit. Secundo, utrum possit diminui. Tertio, de modo corruptionis et diminutionis.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q53_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q53_A1-p0.1">Q. 53. A. 1. Whether a habit can be corrupted?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a habit cannot be corrupted. For habit is within its subject like a second nature; wherefore it is pleasant to act from habit. Now so long as a thing is, its nature is not corrupted. Therefore neither can a habit be corrupted so long as its subject remains. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35730" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35730] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus corrumpi non possit. Habitus enim inest sicut natura quaedam, unde operationes secundum habitum sunt delectabiles. Sed natura non corrumpitur, manente eo cuius est natura. Ergo neque habitus corrumpi potest, manente subiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whenever a form is corrupted, this is due either to corruption of its subject, or to its contrary: thus sickness ceases through corruption of the animal, or through the advent of health. Now science, which is a habit, cannot be lost through corruption of its subject: since "the intellect," which is its subject, "is a substance that is incorruptible" (De Anima i, text. 65). In like manner, neither can it be lost through the action of its contrary: since intelligible species are not contrary to one another (Metaph. vii, text. 52). Therefore the habit of science can nowise be lost. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35731" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35731] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnis corruptio formae vel est per corruptionem subiecti, vel est a contrario, sicut aegritudo corrumpitur corrupto animali, vel etiam superveniente sanitate. Sed scientia, quae est quidam habitus, non potest corrumpi per corruptionem subiecti, quia intellectus, qui est subiectum eius, est substantia quaedam, et non corrumpitur, ut dicitur in I de anima. Similiter etiam non potest corrumpi a contrario, nam species intelligibiles non sunt ad invicem contrariae, ut dicitur in VII Metaphys. Ergo habitus scientiae nullo modo corrumpi potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all corruption results from some movement. But the habit of science, which is in the soul, cannot be corrupted by a direct movement of the soul itself, since the soul is not moved directly. It is, however, moved indirectly through the movement of the body: and yet no bodily change seems capable of corrupting the intelligible species residing in the intellect: since the intellect independently of the body is the proper abode of the species; for which reason it is held that habits are not lost either through old age or through death. Therefore science cannot be corrupted. For the same reason neither can habits of virtue be corrupted, since they also are in the rational soul, and, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 10), "virtue is more lasting than learning." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35732" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35732] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omnis corruptio est per aliquem motum. Sed habitus scientiae, qui est in anima, non potest corrumpi per motum per se ipsius animae, quia anima per se non movetur. Movetur autem per accidens per motum corporis. Nulla autem transmutatio corporalis videtur posse corrumpere species intelligibiles existentes in intellectu, cum intellectus sit per se locus specierum, sine corpore, unde ponitur quod nec per senium nec per mortem corrumpuntur habitus. Ergo scientia corrumpi non potest. Et per consequens, nec habitus virtutis, qui etiam est in anima rationali, et, sicut philosophus dicit in I Ethic., <i>virtutes sunt permanentiores disciplinis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) that "forgetfulness and deception are the corruption of science." Moreover, by sinning a man loses a habit of virtue: and again, virtues are engendered and corrupted by contrary acts (Ethic. ii, 2). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35733" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35733] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in libro de longitudine et brevitate vitae, quod scientiae corruptio est oblivio et deceptio. Peccando etiam aliquis habitum virtutis amittit. Et ex contrariis actibus virtutes generantur et corrumpuntur, ut dicitur II Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q53_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> A form is said to be corrupted directly by its contrary; indirectly, through its subject being corrupted. When therefore a habit has a corruptible subject, and a cause that has a contrary, it can be corrupted both ways. This is clearly the case with bodily habits---for instance, health and sickness. But those habits that have an incorruptible subject, cannot be corrupted indirectly. There are, however, some habits which, while residing chiefly in an incorruptible subject, reside nevertheless secondarily in a corruptible subject; such is the habit of science which is chiefly indeed in the "possible" intellect, but secondarily in the sensitive powers of apprehension, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q50_A3" id="FS_Q53_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[50], A[3]</a>, ad 3). Consequently the habit of science cannot be corrupted indirectly, on the part of the "possible" intellect, but only on the part of the lower sensitive powers. </p><p id="FS_Q53_A1-p7"> We must therefore inquire whether habits of this kind can be corrupted directly. If then there be a habit having a contrary, either on the part of itself or on the part of its cause, it can be corrupted directly: but if it has no contrary, it cannot be corrupted directly. Now it is evident that an intelligible species residing in the "possible" intellect, has no contrary; nor can the active intellect, which is the cause of that species, have a contrary. Wherefore if in the "possible" intellect there be a habit caused immediately by the active intellect, such a habit is incorruptible both directly and indirectly. Such are the habits of the first principles, both speculative and practical, which cannot be corrupted by any forgetfulness or deception whatever: even as the Philosopher says about prudence (Ethic. vi, 5) that "it cannot be lost by being forgotten." There is, however, in the "possible" intellect a habit caused by the reason, to wit, the habit of conclusions, which is called science, to the cause of which something may be contrary in two ways. First, on the part of those very propositions which are the starting point of the reason: for the assertion "Good is not good" is contrary to the assertion "Good is good" (Peri Herm. ii). Secondly, on the part of the process of reasoning; forasmuch as a sophistical syllogism is contrary to a dialectic or demonstrative syllogism. Wherefore it is clear that a false reason can corrupt the habit of a true opinion or even of science. Hence the Philosopher, as stated above, says that "deception is the corruption of science." As to virtues, some of them are intellectual, residing in reason itself, as stated in Ethic. vi, 1: and to these applies what we have said of science and opinion. Some, however, viz. the moral virtues, are in the appetitive part of the soul; and the same may be said of the contrary vices. Now the habits of the appetitive part are caused therein because it is natural to it to be moved by the reason. Therefore a habit either of virtue or of vice, may be corrupted by a judgment of reason, whenever its motion is contrary to such vice or virtue, whether through ignorance, passion or deliberate choice. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 1 co."><a name="35734" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35734] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod secundum se dicitur aliqua forma corrumpi per contrarium suum, per accidens autem, per corruptionem sui subiecti. Si igitur fuerit aliquis habitus cuius subiectum est corruptibile, et cuius causa habet contrarium, utroque modo corrumpi poterit, sicut patet de habitibus corporalibus, scilicet sanitate et aegritudine. Illi vero habitus quorum subiectum est incorruptibile, non possunt corrumpi per accidens. Sunt tamen habitus quidam qui, etsi principaliter sint in subiecto incorruptibili, secundario tamen sunt in subiecto corruptibili, sicut habitus scientiae, qui principaliter est quidem in intellectu possibili, secundario autem in viribus apprehensivis sensitivis, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo ex parte intellectus possibilis, habitus scientiae non potest corrumpi per accidens; sed solum ex parte inferiorum virium sensitivarum. Est igitur considerandum si possunt huiusmodi habitus per se corrumpi. Si igitur fuerit aliquis habitus qui habeat aliquod contrarium, vel ex parte sua vel ex parte suae causae, poterit per se corrumpi, si vero non habet contrarium, non poterit per se corrumpi. Manifestum est autem quod species intelligibilis in intellectu possibili existens, non habet aliquid contrarium. Neque iterum intellectui agenti, qui est causa eius, potest aliquid esse contrarium. Unde si aliquis habitus sit in intellectu possibili immediate ab intellectu agente causatus, talis habitus est incorruptibilis et per se et per accidens. Huiusmodi autem sunt habitus primorum principiorum, tam speculabilium quam practicorum, qui nulla oblivione vel deceptione corrumpi possunt, sicut philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., de prudentia, quod non perditur per oblivionem. Aliquis vero habitus est in intellectu possibili ex ratione causatus, scilicet habitus conclusionum, qui dicitur scientia, cuius causae dupliciter potest aliquid contrarium esse. Uno modo, ex parte ipsarum propositionum ex quibus ratio procedit, etenim enuntiationi quae est, bonum est bonum, contraria est ea quae est, bonum non est bonum, secundum philosophum, in II Periherm. Alio modo, quantum ad ipsum processum rationis; prout syllogismus sophisticus opponitur syllogismo dialectico vel demonstrativo. Sic igitur patet quod per falsam rationem potest corrumpi habitus verae opinionis, aut etiam scientiae. Unde philosophus dicit quod deceptio est corruptio scientiae, sicut supra dictum est. Virtutum vero quaedam sunt intellectuales, quae sunt in ipsa ratione, ut dicitur in VI Ethic., de quibus est eadem ratio quae est de scientia vel opinione. Quaedam vero sunt in parte animae appetitiva, quae sunt virtutes morales, et eadem ratio est de vitiis oppositis. Habitus autem appetitivae partis causantur per hoc quod ratio nata est appetitivam partem movere. Unde per iudicium rationis in contrarium moventis quocumque modo, scilicet sive ex ignorantia, sive ex passione, vel etiam ex electione, corrumpitur habitus virtutis vel vitii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A1-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated in Ethic. vii, 10, a habit is like a second nature, and yet it falls short of it. And so it is that while the nature of a thing cannot in any way be taken away from a thing, a habit is removed, though with difficulty. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35735" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35735] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in VII Ethic., habitus similitudinem habet naturae, deficit tamen ab ipsa. Et ideo, cum natura rei nullo modo removeatur ab ipsa, habitus difficile removetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although there is no contrary to intelligible species, yet there can be a contrary to assertions and to the process of reason, as stated above. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35736" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35736] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod, etsi speciebus intelligibilibus non sit aliquid contrarium, enuntiationibus tamen et processui rationis potest aliquid esse contrarium, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Science is not taken away by movement of the body, if we consider the root itself of the habit, but only as it may prove an obstacle to the act of science; in so far as the intellect, in its act, has need of the sensitive powers, which are impeded by corporal transmutation. But the intellectual movement of the reason can corrupt the habit of science, even as regards the very root of the habit. In like manner a habit of virtue can be corrupted. Nevertheless when it is said that "virtue is more lasting than learning," this must be understood in respect, not of the subject or cause, but of the act: because the use of virtue continues through the whole of life, whereas the use of learning does not. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35737" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35737] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod scientia non removetur per motum corporalem quantum ad ipsam radicem habitus, sed solum quantum ad impedimentum actus; inquantum intellectus indiget in suo actu viribus sensitivis, quibus impedimentum affertur per corporalem transmutationem. Sed per intelligibilem motum rationis potest corrumpi habitus scientiae, etiam quantum ad ipsam radicem habitus. Et similiter etiam potest corrumpi habitus virtutis. Tamen quod dicitur, virtutes esse permanentiores disciplinis, intelligendum est non ex parte subiecti vel causae, sed ex parte actus, nam virtutum usus est continuus per totam vitam, non autem usus disciplinarum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q53_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q53_A2-p0.1">Q. 53. A. 2. Whether a habit can diminish?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a habit cannot diminish. Because a habit is a simple quality and form. Now a simple thing is possessed either wholly or not at all. Therefore although a habit can be lost it cannot diminish. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35738" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35738] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus diminui non possit. Habitus enim est quaedam qualitas et forma simplex. Simplex autem aut totum habetur, aut totum amittitur. Ergo habitus, etsi corrumpi possit, diminui non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if a thing is befitting an accident, this is by reason either of the accident or of its subject. Now a habit does not become more or less intense by reason of itself; else it would follow that a species might be predicated of its individuals more or less. And if it can become less intense as to its participation by its subject, it would follow that something is accidental to a habit, proper thereto and not common to the habit and its subject. Now whenever a form has something proper to it besides its subject, that form can be separate, as stated in De Anima i, text. 13. Hence it follows that a habit is a separable form; which is impossible. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35739" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35739] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne quod convenit accidenti, convenit eidem secundum se, vel ratione sui subiecti. Habitus autem secundum seipsum non intenditur et remittitur, alioquin sequeretur quod aliqua species de suis individuis praedicaretur secundum magis et minus. Si igitur secundum participationem subiecti diminui possit, sequeretur quod aliquid accidat habitui proprium, quod non sit commune ei et subiecto. Cuicumque autem formae convenit aliquid proprium praeter suum subiectum, illa forma est separabilis, ut dicitur in I de anima. Sequitur ergo quod habitus sit forma separabilis, quod est impossibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the very notion and nature of a habit as of any accident, is inherence in a subject: wherefore any accident is defined with reference to its subject. Therefore if a habit does not become more or less intense in itself, neither can it in its inherence in its subject: and consequently it will be nowise less intense. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35740" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35740] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ratio et natura habitus, sicut et cuiuslibet accidentis, consistit in concretione ad subiectum, unde et quodlibet accidens definitur per suum subiectum. Si igitur habitus secundum seipsum non intenditur neque remittitur, neque etiam secundum concretionem sui ad subiectum diminui poterit. Et ita nullo modo diminuetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is natural for contraries to be applicable to the same thing. Now increase and decrease are contraries. Since therefore a habit can increase, it seems that it can also diminish. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35741" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35741] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod contraria nata sunt fieri circa idem. Augmentum autem et diminutio sunt contraria. Cum igitur habitus possit augeri, videtur quod etiam possit diminui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Habits diminish, just as they increase, in two ways, as we have already explained ( <a href="#FS_Q52_A1" id="FS_Q53_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[52], A[1]</a>). And since they increase through the same cause as that which engenders them, so too they diminish by the same cause as that which corrupts them: since the diminishing of a habit is the road which leads to its corruption, even as, on the other hand, the engendering of a habit is a foundation of its increase. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 2 co."><a name="35742" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35742] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod habitus dupliciter diminuuntur, sicut et augentur, ut ex supradictis patet. Et sicut ex eadem causa augentur ex qua generantur, ita ex eadem causa diminuuntur ex qua corrumpuntur, nam diminutio habitus est quaedam via ad corruptionem, sicut e converso generatio habitus est quoddam fundamentum augmenti ipsius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A2-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A habit, considered in itself, is a simple form. It is not thus that it is subject to decrease; but according to the different ways in which its subject participates in it. This is due to the fact that the subject's potentiality is indeterminate, through its being able to participate a form in various ways, or to extend to a greater or a smaller number of things. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35743" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35743] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod habitus secundum se consideratus, est forma simplex, et secundum hoc non accidit ei diminutio, sed secundum diversum modum participandi, qui provenit ex indeterminatione potentiae ipsius participantis, quae scilicet diversimode potest unam formam participare, vel quae potest ad plura vel ad pauciora extendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument would hold, if the essence itself of a habit were nowise subject to decrease. This we do not say; but that a certain decrease in the essence of a habit has its origin, not in the habit, but in its subject. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35744" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35744] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si ipsa essentia habitus nullo modo diminueretur. Hoc autem non ponimus, sed quod quaedam diminutio essentiae habitus non habet principium ab habitu, sed a participante.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> No matter how we take an accident, its very notion implies dependence on a subject, but in different ways. For if we take an accident in the abstract, it implies relation to a subject, which relation begins in the accident and terminates in the subject: for "whiteness is that whereby a thing is white." Accordingly in defining an accident in the abstract, we do not put the subject as though it were the first part of the definition, viz. the genus; but we give it the second place, which is that of the difference; thus we say that "simitas" is "a curvature of the nose." But if we take accidents in the concrete, the relation begins in the subject and terminates in the concrete, the relation begins in the subject and terminates at the accident: for "a white thing" is "something that has whiteness." Accordingly in defining this kind of accident, we place the subject as the genus, which is the first part of a definition; for we say that a "simum" is a "snub-nose." Accordingly whatever is befitting an accident on the part of the subject, but is not of the very essence of the accident, is ascribed to that accident, not in the abstract, but in the concrete. Such are increase and decrease in certain accidents: wherefore to be more or less white is not ascribed to whiteness but to a white thing. The same applies to habits and other qualities; save that certain habits and other qualities; save that certain habits increase or diminish by a kind of addition, as we have already clearly explained ( <a href="#FS_Q52_A2" id="FS_Q53_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[52], A[2]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35745" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35745] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, quocumque modo significetur accidens, habet dependentiam ad subiectum secundum suam rationem, aliter tamen et aliter. Nam accidens significatum in abstracto, importat habitudinem ad subiectum quae incipit ab accidente, et terminatur ad subiectum, nam albedo dicitur qua aliquid est album. Et ideo in definitione accidentis abstracti non ponitur subiectum quasi prima pars definitionis, quae est genus; sed quasi secunda, quae est differentia; dicimus enim quod simitas est curvitas nasi. Sed in concretis incipit habitudo a subiecto, et terminatur ad accidens, dicitur enim album quod habet albedinem. Propter quod in definitione huiusmodi accidentis ponitur subiectum tanquam genus, quod est prima pars definitionis, dicimus enim quod simum est nasus curvus. Sic igitur id quod convenit accidentibus ex parte subiecti, non autem ex ipsa ratione accidentis, non attribuitur accidenti in abstracto, sed in concreto. Et huiusmodi est intensio et remissio in quibusdam accidentibus, unde albedo non dicitur magis et minus, sed album. Et eadem ratio est in habitibus et aliis qualitatibus, nisi quod quidam habitus augentur vel diminuuntur per quandam additionem, ut ex supradictis patet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q53_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q53_A3-p0.1">Q. 53. A. 3. Whether a habit is corrupted or diminished through mere cessation from act?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a habit is not corrupted or diminished through mere cessation from act. For habits are more lasting than passion-like qualities, as we have explained above ( <a href="#FS_Q49_A2" id="FS_Q53_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[2]</a>, ad 3; <a href="#FS_Q50_A1" id="FS_Q53_A3-p2.2" shape="rect"> Q[50], A[1]</a>). But passion-like qualities are neither corrupted nor diminished by cessation from act: for whiteness is not lessened through not affecting the sight, nor heat through ceasing to make something hot. Therefore neither are habits diminished or corrupted through cessation from act. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35746" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35746] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus non corrumpatur aut diminuatur per solam cessationem ab opere. Habitus enim permanentiores sunt quam passibiles qualitates, ut ex supradictis apparet. Sed passibiles qualitates non corrumpuntur neque diminuuntur per cessationem ab actu, non enim albedo diminuitur si visum non immutet, neque calor si non calefaciat. Ergo neque habitus diminuuntur vel corrumpuntur per cessationem ab actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, corruption and diminution are changes. Now nothing is changed without a moving cause. Since therefore cessation from act does not imply a moving cause, it does not appear how a habit can be diminished or corrupted through cessation from act. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35747" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35747] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, corruptio et diminutio sunt quaedam mutationes. Sed nihil mutatur absque aliqua causa movente. Cum igitur cessatio ab actu non importet aliquam causam moventem, non videtur quod per cessationem ab actu possit esse diminutio vel corruptio habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the habits of science and virtue are in the intellectual soul which is above time. Now those things that are above time are neither destroyed nor diminished by length of time. Neither, therefore, are such habits destroyed or diminished through length of time, if one fails for long to exercise them. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35748" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35748] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, habitus scientiae et virtutis sunt in anima intellectiva, quae est supra tempus. Ea vero quae sunt supra tempus, non corrumpuntur neque diminuuntur per temporis diuturnitatem. Ergo neque huiusmodi habitus corrumpuntur vel diminuuntur per temporis diuturnitatem, si diu aliquis absque exercitio permaneat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) that not only "deception," but also "forgetfulness, is the corruption of science." Moreover he says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "want of intercourse has dissolved many a friendship." In like manner other habits of virtue are diminished or destroyed through cessation from act. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35749" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35749] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus, in libro de Longit. et Brevit. vitae, dicit quod corruptio scientiae non solum est deceptio, sed etiam oblivio. Et in VIII Ethic. dicitur quod multas amicitias inappellatio dissolvit. Et eadem ratione, alii habitus virtutum per cessationem ab actu diminuuntur vel tolluntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in Phys. vii, text. 27, a thing is a cause of movement in two ways. First, directly; and such a thing causes movement by reason of its proper form; thus fire causes heat. Secondly, indirectly; for instance, that which removes an obstacle. It is in this latter way that the destruction or diminution of a habit results through cessation from act, in so far, to wit, as we cease from exercising an act which overcame the causes that destroyed or weakened that habit. For it has been stated <a href="#FS_Q53_A1" id="FS_Q53_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that habits are destroyed or diminished directly through some contrary agency. Consequently all habits that are gradually undermined by contrary agencies which need to be counteracted by acts proceeding from those habits, are diminished or even destroyed altogether by long cessation from act, as is clearly seen in the case both of science and of virtue. For it is evident that a habit of moral virtue makes a man ready to choose the mean in deeds and passions. And when a man fails to make use of his virtuous habit in order to moderate his own passions or deeds, the necessary result is that many passions and deeds fail to observe the mode of virtue, by reason of the inclination of the sensitive appetite and of other external agencies. Wherefore virtue is destroyed or lessened through cessation from act. The same applies to the intellectual habits, which render man ready to judge aright of those things that are pictured by his imagination. Hence when man ceases to make use of his intellectual habits, strange fancies, sometimes in opposition to them, arise in his imagination; so that unless those fancies be, as it were, cut off or kept back by frequent use of his intellectual habits, man becomes less fit to judge aright, and sometimes is even wholly disposed to the contrary, and thus the intellectual habit is diminished or even wholly destroyed by cessation from act. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 3 co."><a name="35750" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35750] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in VIII Physic., aliquid potest esse movens dupliciter, uno modo, per se, quod scilicet movet secundum rationem propriae formae, sicut ignis calefacit; alio modo, per accidens, sicut id quod removet prohibens. Et hoc modo cessatio ab actu causat corruptionem vel diminutionem habituum, inquantum scilicet removetur actus qui prohibebat causas corrumpentes vel diminuentes habitum. Dictum est enim quod habitus per se corrumpuntur vel diminuuntur ex contrario agente. Unde quorumcumque habituum contraria subcrescunt per temporis tractum, quae oportet subtrahi per actum ab habitu procedentem; huiusmodi habitus diminuuntur, vel etiam tolluntur totaliter, per diuturnam cessationem ab actu; ut patet et in scientia et in virtute. Manifestum est enim quod habitus virtutis moralis facit hominem promptum ad eligendum medium in operationibus et passionibus. Cum autem aliquis non utitur habitu virtutis ad moderandas passiones vel operationes proprias, necesse est quod proveniant multae passiones et operationes praeter modum virtutis, ex inclinatione appetitus sensitivi, et aliorum quae exterius movent. Unde corrumpitur virtus, vel diminuitur, per cessationem ab actu. Similiter etiam est ex parte habituum intellectualium, secundum quos est homo promptus ad recte iudicandum de imaginatis. Cum igitur homo cessat ab usu intellectualis habitus, insurgunt imaginationes extraneae, et quandoque ad contrarium ducentes; ita quod, nisi per frequentem usum intellectualis habitus, quodammodo succidantur vel comprimantur, redditur homo minus aptus ad recte iudicandum, et quandoque totaliter disponitur ad contrarium. Et sic per cessationem ab actu diminuitur, vel etiam corrumpitur intellectualis habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A3-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even heat would be destroyed through ceasing to give heat, if, for this same reason, cold which is destructive of heat were to increase. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35751" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35751] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ita etiam calor per cessationem a calefaciendo corrumperetur, si per hoc incresceret frigidum, quod est calidi corruptivum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Cessation from act is a moving cause, conducive of corruption or diminution, by removing the obstacles, thereto, as explained above. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35752" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35752] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod cessatio ab actu est movens ad corruptionem vel diminutionem, sicut removens prohibens, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellectual part of the soul, considered in itself, is above time, but the sensitive part is subject to time, and therefore in course of time it undergoes change as to the passions of the sensitive part, and also as to the powers of apprehension. Hence the Philosopher says (Phys. iv. text. 117) that time makes us forget. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35753" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35753] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod pars intellectiva animae secundum se est supra tempus, sed pars sensitiva subiacet tempori. Et ideo per temporis cursum, transmutatur quantum ad passiones appetitivae partis et etiam quantum ad vires apprehensivas. Unde philosophus dicit, in IV Physic., quod tempus est causa oblivionis.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q54" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q54-p0.1">Q. 54. OF THE DISTINCTION OF HABITS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q54-p2"> We have now to consider the distinction of habits; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q54-p3"><a href="#FS_Q54_A1"> (1) Whether many habits can be in one power?</a></p><p id="FS_Q54-p4"><a href="#FS_Q54_A2"> (2) Whether habits are distinguished by their objects?</a></p><p id="FS_Q54-p5"><a href="#FS_Q54_A3"> (3) Whether habits are divided into good and bad?</a></p><p id="FS_Q54-p6"><a href="#FS_Q54_A4"> (4) Whether one habit may be made up of many habits?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 pr."><a name="35754" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35754] Iª-IIae q. 54 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de distinctione habituum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum multi habitus possint esse in una potentia. Secundo, utrum habitus distinguantur secundum obiecta. Tertio, utrum habitus distinguantur secundum bonum et malum. Quarto, utrum unus habitus ex multis habitibus constituatur.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q54_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q54_A1-p0.1">Q. 54. A. 1. Whether many habits can be in one power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be many habits in one power. For when several things are distinguished in respect of the same thing, if one of them be multiplied, the others are too. Now habits and powers are distinguished in respect of the same thing, viz. their acts and objects. Therefore they are multiplied in like manner. Therefore there cannot be many habits in one power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35755" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35755] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non possint esse multi habitus in una potentia. Eorum enim quae secundum idem distinguuntur multiplicato uno, multiplicatur et aliud. Sed secundum idem potentiae et habitus distinguuntur, scilicet secundum actus et obiecta. Similiter ergo multiplicantur. Non ergo possunt esse multi habitus in una potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a power is a simple force. Now in one simple subject there cannot be diversity of accidents; for the subject is the cause of its accidents; and it does not appear how diverse effects can proceed from one simple cause. Therefore there cannot be many habits in one power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35756" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35756] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, potentia est virtus quaedam simplex. Sed in uno subiecto simplici non potest esse diversitas accidentium, quia subiectum est causa accidentis; ab uno autem simplici non videtur procedere nisi unum. Ergo in una potentia non possunt esse multi habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as the body is informed by its shape, so is a power informed by a habit. But one body cannot be informed at the same time by various shapes. Therefore neither can a power be informed at the same time by many habits. Therefore several habits cannot be at the same time in one power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35757" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35757] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut corpus formatur per figuram, ita potentia formatur per habitum. Sed unum corpus non potest simul formari diversis figuris. Ergo neque una potentia potest simul formari diversis habitibus. Non ergo plures habitus possunt simul esse in una potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The intellect is one power; wherein, nevertheless, are the habits of various sciences. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35758" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35758] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod intellectus est una potentia, in qua tamen sunt diversarum scientiarum habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q54_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q49_A4" id="FS_Q54_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[4]</a>), habits are dispositions of a thing that is in potentiality to something, either to nature, or to operation, which is the end of nature. As to those habits which are dispositions to nature, it is clear that several can be in one same subject: since in one subject we may take parts in various ways, according to the various dispositions of which parts there are various habits. Thus, if we take the humors as being parts of the human body, according to their disposition in respect of human nature, we have the habit or disposition of health: while, if we take like parts, such as nerves, bones, and flesh, the disposition of these in respect of nature is strength or weakness; whereas, if we take the limbs, i.e. the hands, feet, and so on, the disposition of these in proportion to nature, is beauty: and thus there are several habits or dispositions in the same subject. </p><p id="FS_Q54_A1-p7"> If, however, we speak of those habits that are dispositions to operation, and belong properly to the powers; thus, again, there may be several habits in one power. The reason for this is that the subject of a habit is a passive power, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q51_A2" id="FS_Q54_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[51], A[2]</a>): for it is only an active power that cannot be the subject of a habit, as was clearly shown above ( <a href="#FS_Q51_A2" id="FS_Q54_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[51], A[2]</a>). Now a passive power is compared to the determinate act of any species, as matter to form: because, just as matter is determinate to one form by one agent, so, too, is a passive power determined by the nature of one active object to an act specifically one. Wherefore, just as several objects can move one passive power, so can one passive power be the subject of several acts or perfections specifically diverse. Now habits are qualities or forms adhering to a power, and inclining that power to acts of a determinate species. Consequently several habits, even as several specifically different acts, can belong to one power. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 1 co."><a name="35759" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35759] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus sunt dispositiones quaedam alicuius in potentia existentis ad aliquid, sive ad naturam, sive ad operationem vel finem naturae. Et de illis quidem habitibus qui sunt dispositiones ad naturam, manifestum est quod possunt plures esse in uno subiecto, eo quod unius subiecti possunt diversimode partes accipi, secundum quarum dispositionem habitus dicuntur. Sicut, si accipiantur humani corporis partes humores, prout disponuntur secundum naturam humanam, est habitus vel dispositio sanitatis, si vero accipiantur partes similes ut nervi et ossa et carnes, earum dispositio in ordine ad naturam, est fortitudo aut macies, si vero accipiantur membra, ut manus et pes et huiusmodi, earum dispositio naturae conveniens, est pulchritudo. Et sic sunt plures habitus vel dispositiones in eodem. Si vero loquamur de habitibus qui sunt dispositiones ad opera, qui proprie pertinent ad potentias; sic etiam contingit unius potentiae esse habitus plures. Cuius ratio est, quia subiectum habitus est potentia passiva, ut supra dictum est, potentia enim activa tantum non est alicuius habitus subiectum, ut ex supradictis patet. Potentia autem passiva comparatur ad actum determinatum unius speciei, sicut materia ad formam, eo quod, sicut materia determinatur ad unam formam per unum agens, ita etiam potentia passiva a ratione unius obiecti activi determinatur ad unum actum secundum speciem. Unde sicut plura obiecta possunt movere unam potentiam passivam, ita una potentia passiva potest esse subiectum diversorum actuum vel perfectionum secundum speciem. Habitus autem sunt quaedam qualitates aut formae inhaerentes potentiae, quibus inclinatur potentia ad determinatos actus secundum speciem. Unde ad unam potentiam possunt plures habitus pertinere, sicut et plures actus specie differentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A1-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even as in natural things, diversity of species is according to the form, and diversity of genus, according to matter, as stated in Metaph. v, text. 33 (since things that differ in matter belong to different genera): so, too, generic diversity of objects entails a difference of powers (wherefore the Philosopher says in Ethic. vi, 1, that "those objects that differ generically belong to different departments of the soul"); while specific difference of objects entails a specific difference of acts, and consequently of habits also. Now things that differ in genus differ in species, but not vice versa. Wherefore the acts and habits of different powers differ in species: but it does not follow that different habits are in different powers, for several can be in one power. And even as several genera may be included in one genus, and several species be contained in one species; so does it happen that there are several species of habits and powers. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35760" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35760] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut in rebus naturalibus diversitas specierum est secundum formam, diversitas autem generum est secundum materiam, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. (ea enim sunt diversa genere, quorum est materia diversa), ita etiam diversitas obiectorum secundum genus, facit distinctionem potentiarum (unde philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod <i>ad ea quae sunt genere altera, sunt etiam animae particulae aliae</i>); diversitas vero obiectorum secundum speciem, facit diversitatem actuum secundum speciem, et per consequens habituum. Quaecumque autem sunt diversa genere, sunt etiam specie diversa, sed non convertitur. Et ideo diversarum potentiarum sunt diversi actus specie, et diversi habitus, non autem oportet quod diversi habitus sint diversarum potentiarum, sed possunt esse plures unius. Et sicut sunt genera generum, et species specierum; ita etiam contingit esse diversas species habituum et potentiarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although a power is simple as to its essence, it is multiple virtually, inasmuch as it extends to many specifically different acts. Consequently there is nothing to prevent many superficially different habits from being in one power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35761" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35761] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod potentia, etsi sit quidem simplex secundum essentiam, est tamen multiplex virtute, secundum quod ad multos actus specie differentes se extendit. Et ideo nihil prohibet in una potentia esse multos habitus specie differentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A body is informed by its shape as by its own terminal boundaries: whereas a habit is not the terminal boundary of a power, but the disposition of a power to an act as to its ultimate term. Consequently one same power cannot have several acts at the same time, except in so far as perchance one act is comprised in another; just as neither can a body have several shapes, save in so far as one shape enters into another, as a three-sided in a four-sided figure. For the intellect cannot understand several things at the same time "actually"; and yet it can know several things at the same time "habitually." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35762" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35762] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod corpus formatur per figuram sicut per propriam terminationem, habitus autem non est terminatio potentiae, sed est dispositio ad actum sicut ad ultimum terminum. Et ideo non possunt esse unius potentiae simul plures actus, nisi forte secundum quod unus comprehenditur sub alio, sicut nec unius corporis plures figurae, nisi secundum quod una est in alia, sicut trigonum in tetragono. Non enim potest intellectus simul multa actu intelligere. Potest tamen simul habitu multa scire.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q54_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q54_A2-p0.1">Q. 54. A. 2. Whether habits are distinguished by their objects?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habits are not distinguished by their objects. For contraries differ in species. Now the same habit of science regards contraries: thus medicine regards the healthy and the unhealthy. Therefore habits are not distinguished by objects specifically distinct. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35763" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35763] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus non distinguantur secundum obiecta. Contraria enim sunt specie differentia. Sed idem habitus scientiae est contrariorum, sicut medicina sani et aegri. Non ergo secundum obiecta specie differentia, habitus distinguuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, different sciences are different habits. But the same scientific truth belongs to different sciences: thus both the physicist and the astronomer prove the earth to be round, as stated in Phys. ii, text. 17. Therefore habits are not distinguished by their objects. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35764" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35764] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, diversae scientiae sunt diversi habitus. Sed idem scibile pertinet ad diversas scientias, sicut terram esse rotundam demonstrat et naturalis et astrologus, ut dicitur in II Physic. Ergo habitus non distinguuntur secundum obiecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, wherever the act is the same, the object is the same. But the same act can belong to different habits of virtue, if it be directed to different ends; thus to give money to anyone, if it be done for God's sake, is an act of charity; while, if it be done in order to pay a debt, it is an act of justice. Therefore the same object can also belong to different habits. Therefore diversity of habits does not follow diversity of objects. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35765" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35765] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, eiusdem actus est idem obiectum. Sed idem actus potest pertinere ad diversos habitus virtutum, si ad diversos fines referatur, sicut dare pecuniam alicui, si sit propter Deum, pertinet ad caritatem; si vero sit propter debitum solvendum, pertinet ad iustitiam. Ergo etiam idem obiectum potest ad diversos habitus pertinere. Non ergo est diversitas habituum secundum diversitatem obiectorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Acts differ in species according to the diversity of their objects, as stated above ( <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A5" id="FS_Q54_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[5]</a>). But habits are dispositions to acts. Therefore habits also are distinguished according to the diversity of objects. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35766" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35766] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, actus differunt specie secundum diversitatem obiectorum, ut supra dictum est. Sed habitus sunt dispositiones quaedam ad actus. Ergo etiam habitus distinguuntur secundum diversa obiecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q54_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> A habit is both a form and a habit. Hence the specific distinction of habits may be taken in the ordinary way in which forms differ specifically; or according to that mode of distinction which is proper to habits. Accordingly forms are distinguished from one another in reference to the diversity of their active principles, since every agent produces its like in species. Habits, however, imply order to something: and all things that imply order to something, are distinguished according to the distinction of the things to which they are ordained. Now a habit is a disposition implying a twofold order: viz. to nature and to an operation consequent to nature. </p><p id="FS_Q54_A2-p7"> Accordingly habits are specifically distinct in respect of three things. First, in respect of the active principles of such dispositions; secondly, in respect of nature; thirdly, in respect of specifically different objects, as will appear from what follows. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 2 co."><a name="35767" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35767] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod habitus et est forma quaedam, et est habitus. Potest ergo distinctio habituum secundum speciem attendi aut secundum communem modum quo formae specie distinguuntur; aut secundum proprium modum distinctionis habituum. Distinguuntur siquidem formae ad invicem secundum diversa principia activa, eo quod omne agens facit simile secundum speciem. Habitus autem importat ordinem ad aliquid. Omnia autem quae dicuntur secundum ordinem ad aliquid, distinguuntur secundum distinctionem eorum ad quae dicuntur. Est autem habitus dispositio quaedam ad duo ordinata, scilicet ad naturam, et ad operationem consequentem naturam. Sic igitur secundum tria, habitus specie distinguuntur. Uno quidem modo, secundum principia activa talium dispositionum; alio vero modo, secundum naturam; tertio vero modo, secundum obiecta specie differentia; ut per sequentia explicabitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In distinguishing powers, or also habits, we must consider the object not in its material but in its formal aspect, which may differ in species or even in genus. And though the distinction between specific contraries is a real distinction yet they are both known under one aspect, since one is known through the other. And consequently in so far as they concur in the one aspect of cognoscibility, they belong to one cognitive habit. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35768" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35768] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in distinctione potentiarum, vel etiam habituum, non est considerandum ipsum obiectum materialiter; sed ratio obiecti differens specie, vel etiam genere. Quamvis autem contraria specie differant diversitate rerum, tamen eadem ratio est cognoscendi utrumque, quia unum per aliud cognoscitur. Et ideo inquantum conveniunt in una ratione cognoscibilis, pertinent ad unum habitum cognoscitivum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The physicist proves the earth to be round by one means, the astronomer by another: for the latter proves this by means of mathematics, e.g. by the shapes of eclipses, or something of the sort; while the former proves it by means of physics, e.g. by the movement of heavy bodies towards the center, and so forth. Now the whole force of a demonstration, which is "a syllogism producing science," as stated in Poster. i, text. 5, depends on the mean. And consequently various means are as so many active principles, in respect of which the habits of science are distinguished. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35769" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35769] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod terram esse rotundam per aliud medium demonstrat naturalis, et per aliud astrologus, astrologus enim hoc demonstrat per media mathematica, sicut per figuras eclipsium, vel per aliud huiusmodi; naturalis vero hoc demonstrat per medium naturale, sicut per motum gravium ad medium, vel per aliud huiusmodi. Tota autem virtus demonstrationis, quae est syllogismus faciens scire, ut dicitur in I Poster., dependet ex medio. Et ideo diversa media sunt sicut diversa principia activa, secundum quae habitus scientiarum diversificantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A2-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, text. 89; Ethic. vii, 8), the end is, in practical matters, what the principle is in speculative matters. Consequently diversity of ends demands a diversity of virtues, even as diversity of active principles does. Moreover the ends are objects of the internal acts, with which, above all, the virtues are concerned, as is evident from what has been said ( <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A6" id="FS_Q54_A2-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[6]</a>; <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q19_A2" id="FS_Q54_A2-p10.2" shape="rect"> Q[19], A[2] </a>, ad 1; <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q34_A4" id="FS_Q54_A2-p10.3" shape="rect"> Q[34], A[4]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35770" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35770] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in II Physic. et in VII Ethic., ita se habet finis in operabilibus, sicut principium in demonstrativis. Et ideo diversitas finium diversificat virtutes sicut et diversitas activorum principiorum. Sunt etiam ipsi fines obiecta actuum interiorum, qui maxime pertinent ad virtutes, ut ex supradictis patet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q54_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q54_A3-p0.1">Q. 54. A. 3. Whether habits are divided into good and bad?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habits are not divided into good and bad. For good and bad are contraries. Now the same habit regards contraries, as was stated above (A[2], OBJ[1]). Therefore habits are not divided into good and bad. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35771" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35771] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus non distinguantur secundum bonum et malum. Bonum enim et malum sunt contraria. Sed idem habitus est contrariorum, ut supra habitum est. Ergo habitus non distinguuntur secundum bonum et malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, good is convertible with being; so that, since it is common to all, it cannot be accounted a specific difference, as the Philosopher declares (Topic. iv). Again, evil, since it is a privation and a non-being, cannot differentiate any being. Therefore habits cannot be specifically divided into good and evil. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35772" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35772] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, bonum convertitur cum ente, et sic, cum sit commune omnibus, non potest sumi ut differentia alicuius speciei; ut patet per philosophum in IV Topic. Similiter etiam malum, cum sit privatio et non ens, non potest esse alicuius entis differentia. Non ergo secundum bonum et malum possunt habitus specie distingui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there can be different evil habits about one same object; for instance, intemperance and insensibility about matters of concupiscence: and in like manner there can be several good habits; for instance, human virtue and heroic or godlike virtue, as the Philosopher clearly states (Ethic. vii, 1). Therefore, habits are not divided into good and bad. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35773" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35773] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, circa idem obiectum contingit esse diversos habitus malos, sicut circa concupiscentias intemperantiam et insensibilitatem, et similiter etiam plures habitus bonos, scilicet virtutem humanam et virtutem heroicam sive divinam, ut patet per philosophum in VII Ethic. Non ergo distinguuntur habitus secundum bonum et malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> A good habit is contrary to a bad habit, as virtue to vice. Now contraries are divided specifically into good and bad habits. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35774" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35774] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod habitus bonus contrariatur habitui malo, sicut virtus vitio. Sed contraria sunt diversa secundum speciem. Ergo habitus differunt specie secundum differentiam boni et mali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q54_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above <a href="#FS_Q54_A2" id="FS_Q54_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, habits are specifically distinct not only in respect of their objects and active principles, but also in their relation to nature. Now, this happens in two ways. First, by reason of their suitableness or unsuitableness to nature. In this way a good habit is specifically distinct from a bad habit: since a good habit is one which disposes to an act suitable to the agent's nature, while an evil habit is one which disposes to an act unsuitable to nature. Thus, acts of virtue are suitable to human nature, since they are according to reason, whereas acts of vice are discordant from human nature, since they are against reason. Hence it is clear that habits are distinguished specifically by the difference of good and bad. </p><p id="FS_Q54_A3-p7"> Secondly, habits are distinguished in relation to nature, from the fact that one habit disposes to an act that is suitable to a lower nature, while another habit disposes to an act befitting a higher nature. And thus human virtue, which disposes to an act befitting human nature, is distinct from godlike or heroic virtue, which disposes to an act befitting some higher nature. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 3 co."><a name="35775" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35775] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, habitus specie distinguuntur non solum secundum obiecta et principia activa, sed etiam in ordine ad naturam. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum convenientiam ad naturam, vel etiam secundum disconvenientiam ab ipsa. Et hoc modo distinguuntur specie habitus bonus et malus, nam habitus bonus dicitur qui disponit ad actum convenientem naturae agentis; habitus autem malus dicitur qui disponit ad actum non convenientem naturae. Sicut actus virtutum naturae humanae conveniunt, eo quod sunt secundum rationem, actus vero vitiorum, cum sint contra rationem, a natura humana discordant. Et sic manifestum est quod secundum differentiam boni et mali, habitus specie distinguuntur. Alio modo secundum naturam habitus distinguuntur, ex eo quod habitus unus disponit ad actum convenientem naturae inferiori; alius autem habitus disponit ad actum convenientem naturae superiori. Et sic virtus humana, quae disponit ad actum convenientem naturae humanae, distinguitur a divina virtute vel heroica, quae disponit ad actum convenientem cuidam superiori naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The same habit may be about contraries in so far as contraries agree in one common aspect. Never, however, does it happen that contrary habits are in one species: since contrariety of habits follows contrariety of aspect. Accordingly habits are divided into good and bad, namely, inasmuch as one habit is good, and another bad; but not by reason of one habit being something good, and another about something bad. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35776" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35776] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod contrariorum potest esse unus habitus, secundum quod contraria conveniunt in una ratione. Nunquam tamen contingit quod habitus contrarii sint unius speciei, contrarietas enim habituum est secundum contrarias rationes. Et ita secundum bonum et malum habitus distinguuntur, scilicet inquantum unus habitus est bonus et alius malus, non autem ex hoc quod unus est boni et alius mali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not the good which is common to every being, that is a difference constituting the species of a habit; but some determinate good by reason of suitability to some determinate, viz. the human, nature. In like manner the evil that constitutes a difference of habits is not a pure privation, but something determinate repugnant to a determinate nature. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35777" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35777] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum commune omni enti non est differentia constituens speciem alicuius habitus, sed quoddam bonum determinatum, quod est secundum convenientiam ad determinatam naturam, scilicet humanam. Similiter etiam malum quod est differentia constitutiva habitus, non est privatio pura, sed est aliquid determinatum repugnans determinatae naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A3-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Several good habits about one same specific thing are distinct in reference to their suitability to various natures, as stated above. But several bad habits in respect of one action are distinct in reference to their diverse repugnance to that which is in keeping with nature: thus, various vices about one same matter are contrary to one virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35778" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35778] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod plures habitus boni circa idem specie, distinguuntur secundum convenientiam ad diversas naturas, ut dictum est. Plures vero habitus mali distinguuntur circa idem agendum secundum diversas repugnantias ad id quod est secundum naturam, sicut uni virtuti contrariantur diversa vitia circa eandem materiam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q54_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q54_A4-p0.1">Q. 54. A. 4. Whether one habit is made up of many habits?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one habit is made up of many habits. For whatever is engendered, not at once, but little by little, seems to be made up of several parts. But a habit is engendered, not at once, but little by little out of several acts, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q51_A3" id="FS_Q54_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[51], A[3]</a>). Therefore one habit is made up of several. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35779" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35779] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unus habitus ex pluribus habitibus constituatur. Illud enim cuius generatio non simul perficitur, sed successive, videtur constitui ex pluribus partibus. Sed generatio habitus non est simul, sed successive ex pluribus actibus, ut supra habitum est. Ergo unus habitus constituitur ex pluribus habitibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a whole is made up of its parts. Now many parts are assigned to one habit: thus Tully assigns many parts of fortitude, temperance, and other virtues. Therefore one habit is made up of many. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35780" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35780] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ex partibus constituitur totum. Sed uni habitui assignantur multae partes, sicut Tullius ponit multas partes fortitudinis, temperantiae et aliarum virtutum. Ergo unus habitus constituitur ex pluribus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one conclusion suffices both for an act and for a habit of scientific knowledge. But many conclusions belong to but one science, to geometry, for instance, or to arithmetic. Therefore one habit is made up of many. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35781" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35781] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, de una sola conclusione potest scientia haberi et actu et habitu. Sed multae conclusiones pertinent ad unam scientiam totam, sicut ad geometriam vel arithmeticam. Ergo unus habitus constituitur ex multis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> A habit, since it is a quality, is a simple form. But nothing simple is made up of many. Therefore one habit is not made up of many. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35782" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35782] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, habitus, cum sit qualitas quaedam, est forma simplex. Sed nullum simplex constituitur ex pluribus. Ergo unus habitus non constituitur ex pluribus habitibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q54_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> A habit directed to operation, such as we are chiefly concerned with at present, is a perfection of a power. Now every perfection should be in proportion with that which it perfects. Hence, just as a power, while it is one, extends to many things, in so far as they have something in common, i.e. some general objective aspect, so also a habit extends to many things, in so far as they are related to one, for instance, to some specific objective aspect, or to one nature, or to one principle, as was clearly stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q54_A2" id="FS_Q54_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,3). </p><p id="FS_Q54_A4-p7"> If then we consider a habit as to the extent of its object, we shall find a certain multiplicity therein. But since this multiplicity is directed to one thing, on which the habit is chiefly intent, hence it is that a habit is a simple quality, not composed to several habits, even though it extend to many things. For a habit does not extend to many things save in relation to one, whence it derives its unity. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 4 co."><a name="35783" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35783] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod habitus ad operationem ordinatus, de quo nunc principaliter intendimus, est perfectio quaedam potentiae. Omnis autem perfectio proportionatur suo perfectibili. Unde sicut potentia, cum sit una, ad multa se extendit secundum quod conveniunt in aliquo uno, idest in generali quadam ratione obiecti; ita etiam habitus ad multa se extendit secundum quod habent ordinem ad aliquod unum, puta ad unam specialem rationem obiecti, vel unam naturam, vel unum principium, ut ex supradictis patet. Si igitur consideremus habitum secundum ea ad quae se extendit, sic inveniemus in eo quandam multiplicitatem. Sed quia illa multiplicitas est ordinata ad aliquid unum, ad quod principaliter respicit habitus, inde est quod habitus est qualitas simplex, non constituta ex pluribus habitibus, etiam si ad multa se extendat. Non enim unus habitus se extendit ad multa, nisi in ordine ad unum, ex quo habet unitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That a habit is engendered little by little, is due, not to one part being engendered after another, but to the fact that the subject does not acquire all at once a firm and difficultly changeable disposition; and also to the fact that it begins by being imperfectly in the subject, and is gradually perfected. The same applies to other qualities. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35784" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35784] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod successio in generatione habitus non contingit ex hoc quod pars eius generetur post partem, sed ex eo quod subiectum non statim consequitur dispositionem firmam et difficile mobilem; et ex eo quod primo imperfecte incipit esse in subiecto, et paulatim perficitur. Sicut etiam est de aliis qualitatibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The parts which are assigned to each cardinal virtue, are not integral parts that combine to form a whole; but subjective or potential parts, as we shall explain further on (Q[57], A[6], ad 4; <a href="SS_ii.html#SS_Q48" id="FS_Q54_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[48])</a>. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35785" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35785] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod partes quae singulis virtutibus cardinalibus assignantur, non sunt partes integrales, ex quibus constituatur totum sed partes subiectivae sive potentiales, ut infra patebit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A4-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In any science, he who acquires, by demonstration, scientific knowledge of one conclusion, has the habit indeed, yet imperfectly. And when he obtains, by demonstration, the scientific knowledge of another conclusion, no additional habit is engendered in him: but the habit which was in him previously is perfected, forasmuch as it has increased in extent; because the conclusions and demonstrations of one science are coordinate, and one flows from another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35786" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35786] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod ille qui in aliqua scientia acquirit per demonstrationem scientiam conclusionis unius, habet quidem habitum, sed imperfecte. Cum vero acquirit per aliquam demonstrationem scientiam conclusionis alterius, non aggeneratur in eo alius habitus; sed habitus qui prius inerat fit perfectior, utpote ad plura se extendens; eo quod conclusiones et demonstrationes unius scientiae ordinatae sunt, et una derivatur ex alia.</p></div></div></div></div> ` </div> </body> </html>