Mercurial > hg > Aquinas
changeset 111:076728bd4fc1
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| author | ht |
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| date | Sat, 30 Jun 2018 14:13:54 +0000 |
| parents | 8c90b527af0e |
| children | 5cef55a2686a |
| files | summa/bilingual/FS_iii.html summa/bilingual/FS_iii.pdf |
| diffstat | 2 files changed, 12820 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) [+] |
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--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/summa/bilingual/FS_iii.html Sat Jun 30 14:13:54 2018 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,12820 @@ + + <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:x="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + <head> + <title>Bilingual Aquinas</title> + <style> + h2, h3, h4 {margin-bottom: 0px; clear: both} + .bilingual {clear: both; margin-top: .5em} + div.eng {width: 45%; float: left} + div.lat {width: 45%; float: right} + @page { size: A4 portrait; margin: 1cm; + orphans: 2; widows: 2; + } + @media print {div.div3 {page-break-before: always}} + </style> + </head> + <body style="font-family: Bitstream Vera Serif"><div id="FS.iii" class="div2"> + + + <h2 id="FS.iii-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE PASSIONS (QQ[22]-48)</h2><div class="toc"><a href="#FS_Q22">Q. 22. OF THE SUBJECT OF THE SOUL'S PASSIONS (THREE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q23">Q. 23. HOW THE PASSIONS DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q24">Q. 24. OF GOOD AND EVIL IN THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q25">Q. 25. OF THE ORDER OF THE PASSIONS TO ONE ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q26">Q. 26. OF THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL IN PARTICULAR: AND FIRST, OF LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q27">Q. 27. OF THE CAUSE OF LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q28">Q. 28. OF THE EFFECTS OF LOVE (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q29">Q. 29. OF HATRED (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q30">Q. 30. OF CONCUPISCENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q31">Q. 31. OF DELIGHT CONSIDERED IN ITSELF [*Or, Pleasure] (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q32">Q. 32. OF THE CAUSE OF PLEASURE (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q33">Q. 33. OF THE EFFECTS OF PLEASURE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q34">Q. 34. OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF PLEASURES (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q35">Q. 35. OF PAIN OR SORROW, IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q36">Q. 36. OF THE CAUSES OF SORROW OR PAIN (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q37">Q. 37. OF THE EFFECTS OF PAIN OR SORROW (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q38">Q. 38. OF THE REMEDIES OF SORROW OR PAIN (FIVE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q39">Q. 39. OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF SORROW OR PAIN (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q40">Q. 40. OF THE IRASCIBLE PASSIONS, AND FIRST, OF HOPE AND DESPAIR (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q41">Q. 41. OF FEAR, IN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q42">Q. 42. OF THE OBJECT OF FEAR (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q43">Q. 43. OF THE CAUSE OF FEAR (TWO ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q44">Q. 44. OF THE EFFECTS OF FEAR (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q45">Q. 45. OF DARING (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q46">Q. 46. OF ANGER, IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q47">Q. 47. OF THE CAUSE THAT PROVOKES ANGER, AND OF THE REMEDIES OF ANGER (FOUR ARTICLES) [*There is no further mention of these remedies + in the text, except in A[4].] + </a><br/><a href="#FS_Q48">Q. 48. OF THE EFFECTS OF ANGER (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/></div> + <div id="FS_Q22" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q22-p0.1">Q. 22. OF THE SUBJECT OF THE SOUL'S PASSIONS (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q22-p2"> We must now consider the passions of the soul: first, in general; secondly, in particular. Taking them in general, there + are four things to be considered: (1) Their subject: (2) The difference between them: (3) Their mutual relationship: (4) Their + malice and goodness. + </p><p id="FS_Q22-p3"> Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q22-p4"><a href="#FS_Q22_A1"> (1) Whether there is any passion in the soul?</a></p><p id="FS_Q22-p5"><a href="#FS_Q22_A2"> (2) Whether passion is in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part?</a></p><p id="FS_Q22-p6"><a href="#FS_Q22_A3"> (3) Whether passion is in the sensitive appetite rather than in the intellectual appetite, which is called the will?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 pr."><a name="34515" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34515] +Iª-IIae q. 22 pr.</span></a> Post hoc considerandum est de +passionibus animae, et primo, in generali; secundo, in speciali. In +generali autem, quatuor occurrunt circa eas consideranda, primo +quidem, de subiecto earum; secundo, de differentia earum; tertio, +de comparatione earum ad invicem; quarto, de malitia et bonitate +ipsarum. Circa primum quaeruntur tria. Primo, utrum aliqua passio +sit in anima. Secundo, utrum magis in parte appetitiva quam in +apprehensiva. Tertio, utrum magis sit in appetitu sensitivo quam +intellectivo, qui dicitur voluntas.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q22_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q22_A1-p0.1">Q. 22. A. 1. Whether any passion is in the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no passion in the soul. Because passivity belongs to matter. But the soul is not composed of + matter and form, as stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q75_A5" id="FS_Q22_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[75], A[5]</a>. Therefore there is no passion in the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34516" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34516] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod nulla passio sit in anima. Pati enim +est proprium materiae. Sed anima non est composita ex materia et +forma, ut in primo habitum est. Ergo nulla passio est in anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, passion is movement, as is stated in Phys. iii, 3. But the soul is not moved, as is proved in De Anima i, 3. Therefore + passion is not in the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34517" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34517] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +passio est motus, ut dicitur in III Physic. Sed anima non movetur, +ut probatur in I de anima. Ergo passio non est in anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, passion is the road to corruption; since "every passion, when increased, alters the substance," as is stated in + Topic. vi, 6. But the soul is incorruptible. Therefore no passion is in the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34518" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34518] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +passio est via in corruptionem, nam omnis passio, magis facta, +abiicit a substantia, ut dicitur in libro topicorum. Sed anima est +incorruptibilis. Ergo nulla passio est in anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q22_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.5" target="asv">Rom. 7:5</a>): "When we were in the flesh, the passions of sins which were by the law, did the work in our members." Now sins are, properly + speaking, in the soul. Therefore passions also, which are described as being "of sins," are in the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34519" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34519] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Rom. VII, <i>cum essemus in carne, +passiones peccatorum, quae per legem erant, operabantur in membris +nostris</i>. Peccata autem sunt proprie in anima. Ergo et +passiones, quae dicuntur peccatorum, sunt in anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The word "passive" is used in three ways. First, in a general way, according as whatever receives something is passive, although + nothing is taken from it: thus we may say that the air is passive when it is lit up. But this is to be perfected rather than + to be passive. Secondly, the word "passive" is employed in its proper sense, when something is received, while something else + is taken away: and this happens in two ways. For sometimes that which is lost is + unsuitable to the thing: thus when an animal's body is healed, and loses sickness. At other times the contrary occurs: thus + to ail is to be passive; because the ailment is received and health is lost. And here we have passion in its most proper acceptation. + For a thing is said to be passive from its being drawn to the agent: and when a thing recedes from what is suitable to it, + then especially does it appear to be drawn to something else. Moreover in De Generat. i, 3 it is stated that when a + more excellent thing is generated from a less excellent, we have generation simply, and corruption in a particular respect: + whereas the reverse is the case, when from a more excellent thing, a less excellent is generated. In these three ways it happens + that passions are in the soul. For in the sense of mere reception, we speak of "feeling and understanding as being a kind + of passion" (De Anima i, 5). But passion, accompanied by the loss of something, is only in respect of a bodily + transmutation; wherefore passion properly so called cannot be in the soul, save accidentally, in so far, to wit, as the "composite" + is passive. But here again we find a difference; because when this transmutation is for the worse, it has more of the nature + of a passion, than when it is for the better: hence sorrow is more properly a passion than joy. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 1 co."><a name="34520" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34520] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod pati dicitur tripliciter. Uno modo, communiter, +secundum quod omne recipere est pati, etiam si nihil abiiciatur a +re, sicut si dicatur aerem pati, quando illuminatur. Hoc autem +magis proprie est perfici, quam pati. Alio modo dicitur pati +proprie, quando aliquid recipitur cum alterius abiectione. Sed hoc +contingit dupliciter. Quandoque enim abiicitur id quod non est +conveniens rei, sicut cum corpus animalis sanatur, dicitur pati, +quia recipit sanitatem, aegritudine abiecta. Alio modo, quando e +converso contingit, sicut aegrotare dicitur pati, quia recipitur +infirmitas, sanitate abiecta. Et hic est propriissimus modus +passionis. Nam pati dicitur ex eo quod aliquid trahitur ad agentem, +quod autem recedit ab eo quod est sibi conveniens, maxime videtur +ad aliud trahi. Et similiter in I de Generat. dicitur quod, quando +ex ignobiliori generatur nobilius, est generatio simpliciter, et +corruptio secundum quid, e converso autem quando ex nobiliori +ignobilius generatur. Et his tribus modis contingit esse in anima +passionem. Nam secundum receptionem tantum dicitur quod sentire et +intelligere est quoddam pati. Passio autem cum abiectione non est +nisi secundum transmutationem corporalem, unde passio proprie dicta +non potest competere animae nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet +compositum patitur. Sed et in hoc est diversitas, nam quando +huiusmodi transmutatio fit in deterius, magis proprie habet +rationem passionis, quam quando fit in melius. Unde tristitia magis +proprie est passio quam laetitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It belongs to matter to be passive in such a way as to lose something and to be transmuted: hence this happens only in those + things that are composed of matter and form. But passivity, as implying mere reception, need not be in matter, but can be + in anything that is in potentiality. Now, though the soul is not composed of matter and form, yet it has something of potentiality, + in respect of which it is competent to receive or to be passive, according + as the act of understanding is a kind of passion, as stated in De Anima iii, 4. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34521" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34521] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +igitur dicendum quod pati, secundum quod est cum abiectione et +transmutatione, proprium est materiae, unde non invenitur nisi in +compositis ex materia et forma. Sed pati prout importat receptionem +solam, non est necessarium quod sit materiae, sed potest esse +cuiuscumque existentis in potentia. Anima autem, etsi non sit +composita ex materia et forma, habet tamen aliquid potentialitatis, +secundum quam convenit sibi recipere et pati, secundum quod +intelligere pati est, ut dicitur in III de anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although it does not belong to the soul in itself to be passive and to be moved, yet it belongs accidentally as stated in + De Anima i, 3. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34522" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34522] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod pati et moveri, etsi non conveniat animae per se, +convenit tamen ei per accidens, ut in I de anima dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument is true of passion accompanied by transmutation to something worse. And passion, in this sense, is not found + in the soul, except accidentally: but the composite, which is corruptible, admits of it by reason of its own nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34523" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34523] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de passione quae est cum +transmutatione ad deterius. Et huiusmodi passio animae convenire +non potest nisi per accidens, per se autem convenit composito, quod +est corruptibile.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q22_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q22_A2-p0.1">Q. 22. A. 2. Whether passion is in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that passion is in the apprehensive part of the soul rather than in the appetitive. Because that which is first + in any genus, seems to rank first among all things that are in that genus, and to be their cause, as is stated in Metaph. + ii, 1. Now passion is found to be in the apprehensive, before being in the appetitive part: for the appetitive part is not + affected unless there be a previous passion in the apprehensive part. Therefore passion is in + the apprehensive part more than in the appetitive. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34524" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34524] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod passio magis sit in parte animae +apprehensiva quam in parte appetitiva. Quod enim est primum in +quolibet genere videtur esse maximum eorum quae sunt in genere +illo, et causa aliorum, ut dicitur in II Metaphys. Sed passio prius +invenitur in parte apprehensiva quam in parte appetitiva, non enim +patitur pars appetitiva, nisi passione praecedente in parte +apprehensiva. Ergo passio est magis in parte apprehensiva quam in +parte appetitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is more active is less passive; for action is contrary to passion. Now the appetitive part is more active than + the apprehensive part. Therefore it seems that passion is more in the apprehensive part. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34525" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34525] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quod est magis activum, videtur esse minus passivum, actio enim +passioni opponitur. Sed pars appetitiva est magis activa quam pars +apprehensiva. Ergo videtur quod in parte apprehensiva magis sit +passio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as the sensitive appetite is the power of a corporeal organ, so is the power of sensitive apprehension. But + passion in the soul occurs, properly speaking, in respect of a bodily transmutation. Therefore passion is not more in the + sensitive appetitive than in the sensitive apprehensive part. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34526" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34526] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut appetitus sensitivus est virtus in organo corporali, ita et +vis apprehensiva sensitiva. Sed passio animae fit, proprie +loquendo, secundum transmutationem corporalem. Ergo non magis est +passio in parte appetitiva sensitiva quam in apprehensiva +sensitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that "the movement of the soul, which the Greeks called {pathe}, are styled by some of + our writers, Cicero [*Those things which the Greeks call {pathe}, we prefer to call disturbances rather than diseases (Tusc. + iv. 5)] for instance, disturbances; by some, affections or emotions; while others rendering the Greek more accurately, call + them passions." From this it is evident that the passions of the soul are the same as + affections. But affections manifestly belong to the appetitive, and not to the apprehensive part. Therefore the passions are + in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34527" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34527] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in IX de Civ. Dei, quod <i>motus animi, +quos Graeci pathe, nostri autem quidam, sicut Cicero, +perturbationes, quidam affectiones vel affectus, quidam vero, sicut +in Graeco habetur, expressius passiones vocant</i>. Ex quo patet +quod passiones animae sunt idem quod affectiones. Sed affectiones +manifeste pertinent ad partem appetitivam, et non ad apprehensivam. +Ergo et passiones magis sunt in appetitiva quam in +apprehensiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As we have already stated + <a href="#FS_Q22_A1" id="FS_Q22_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> the word "passion" implies that the patient is drawn to that which belongs to the agent. Now the soul is drawn to a thing + by the appetitive power rather than by the apprehensive power: because the soul has, through its appetitive power, an order + to things as they are in themselves: hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, 4) that "good and evil," i.e. the objects of + the appetitive power, "are in things + themselves." On the other hand the apprehensive power is not drawn to a thing, as it is in itself; but knows it by reason + of an "intention" of the thing, which "intention" it has in itself, or receives in its own way. Hence we find it stated (Metaph. + vi, 4) that "the true and the false," which pertain to knowledge, "are not in things, but in the mind." Consequently it is + evident that the nature of passion is consistent with the appetitive, rather than with the apprehensive part. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 2 co."><a name="34528" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34528] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, in nomine passionis importatur +quod patiens trahatur ad id quod est agentis. Magis autem trahitur +anima ad rem per vim appetitivam quam per vim apprehensivam. Nam +per vim appetitivam anima habet ordinem ad ipsas res, prout in +seipsis sunt, unde philosophus dicit, in VI Metaphys., quod bonum +et malum, quae sunt obiecta appetitivae potentiae, sunt in ipsis +rebus. Vis autem apprehensiva non trahitur ad rem, secundum quod in +seipsa est; sed cognoscit eam secundum intentionem rei, quam in se +habet vel recipit secundum proprium modum. Unde et ibidem dicitur +quod verum et falsum, quae ad cognitionem pertinent, non sunt in +rebus, sed in mente. Unde patet quod ratio passionis magis +invenitur in parte appetitiva quam in parte apprehensiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In things relating to perfection the case is the opposite, in comparison to things that pertain to defect. Because in things + relating to perfection, intensity is in proportion to the approach to one first principle; to which the nearer a thing approaches, + the more intense it is. Thus the intensity of a thing possessed of light depends on its approach to something endowed with + light in a supreme degree, to which the nearer a thing approaches the more + light it possesses. But in things that relate to defect, intensity depends, not on approach to something supreme, but in receding + from that which is perfect; because therein consists the very notion of privation and defect. Wherefore the less a thing recedes + from that which stands first, the less intense it is: and the result is that at first we always find some small defect, which + afterwards increases as it goes on. Now passion pertains to defect, because it belongs to a thing according as it + is in potentiality. Wherefore in those things that approach to the Supreme Perfection, i.e. to God, there is but little potentiality + and passion: while in other things, consequently, there is more. Hence also, in the supreme, i.e. the apprehensive, power + of the soul, passion is found less than in the other powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34529" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34529] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod e contrario se habet in his quae pertinent ad +perfectionem, et in his quae pertinent ad defectum. Nam in his quae +ad perfectionem pertinent, attenditur intensio per accessum ad unum +primum principium, cui quanto est aliquid propinquius, tanto est +magis intensum, sicut intensio lucidi attenditur per accessum ad +aliquid summe lucidum, cui quanto aliquid magis appropinquat, tanto +est magis lucidum. Sed in his quae ad defectum pertinent, +attenditur intensio non per accessum ad aliquod summum, sed per +recessum a perfecto, quia in hoc ratio privationis et defectus +consistit. Et ideo quanto minus recedit a primo, tanto est minus +intensum, et propter hoc, in principio semper invenitur parvus +defectus, qui postea procedendo magis multiplicatur. Passio autem +ad defectum pertinet, quia est alicuius secundum quod est in +potentia. Unde in his quae appropinquant primo perfecto, scilicet +Deo, invenitur parum de ratione potentiae et passionis, in aliis +autem consequenter, plus. Et sic etiam in priori vi animae, +scilicet apprehensiva, invenitur minus de ratione passionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The appetitive power is said to be more active, because it is, more than the apprehensive power, the principle of the exterior + action: and this for the same reason that it is more passive, namely, its being related to things as existing in themselves: + since it is through the external action that we come into contact with things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34530" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34530] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod vis appetitiva dicitur esse magis activa, quia est +magis principium exterioris actus. Et hoc habet ex hoc ipso ex quo +habet quod sit magis passiva, scilicet ex hoc quod habet ordinem ad +rem ut est in seipsa, per actionem enim exteriorem pervenimus ad +consequendas res.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q78_A3" id="FS_Q22_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[78], A[3]</a> the organs of the soul can be changed in two ways. First, by a spiritual change, in respect of which the organ receives an + "intention" of the object. And this is essential to the act of the sensitive apprehension: thus is the eye changed by the + object visible, not by being colored, but by receiving an intention of color. But the organs are receptive of another and + natural change, which affects + their natural disposition; for instance, when they become hot or cold, or undergo some similar change. And whereas this kind + of change is accidental to the act of the sensitive apprehension; for instance, if the eye be wearied through gazing intently + at something or be overcome by the intensity of the object: on the other hand, it is essential to the act of the sensitive + appetite; wherefore the material element in the definitions of the movements of the appetitive part, is the natural change + of + the organ; for instance, "anger is" said to be "a kindling of the blood about the heart." Hence it is evident that the notion + of passion is more consistent with the act of the sensitive appetite, than with that of the sensitive apprehension, although + both are actions of a corporeal organ. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34531" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34531] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut in primo dictum est, dupliciter organum animae +potest transmutari. Uno modo, transmutatione spirituali, secundum +quod recipit intentionem rei. Et hoc per se invenitur in actu +apprehensivae virtutis sensitivae, sicut oculus immutatur a +visibili, non ita quod coloretur, sed ita quod recipiat intentionem +coloris. Est autem alia naturalis transmutatio organi, prout +organum transmutatur quantum ad suam naturalem dispositionem, puta +quod calefit aut infrigidatur, vel alio simili modo transmutatur. +Et huiusmodi transmutatio per accidens se habet ad actum +apprehensivae virtutis sensitivae, puta cum oculus fatigatur ex +forti intuitu, vel dissolvitur ex vehementia visibilis. Sed ad +actum appetitus sensitivi per se ordinatur huiusmodi transmutatio, +unde in definitione motuum appetitivae partis, materialiter ponitur +aliqua naturalis transmutatio organi; sicut dicitur quod ira est +accensio sanguinis circa cor. Unde patet quod ratio passionis magis +invenitur in actu sensitivae virtutis appetitivae, quam in actu +sensitivae virtutis apprehensivae, licet utraque sit actus organi +corporalis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q22_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q22_A3-p0.1">Q. 22. A. 3. Whether passion is in the sensitive appetite rather than in the intellectual appetite, which is called the will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that passion is not more in the sensitive than in the intellectual appetite. For Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. + ii) Hierotheus "to be taught by a kind of yet more Godlike instruction; not only by learning Divine things, but also by suffering + [patiens] them." But the sensitive appetite cannot "suffer" Divine things, since its object is the sensible good. Therefore + passion is in the intellectual appetite, just as it is also in the sensitive + appetite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34532" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34532] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod passio non magis sit in appetitu +sensitivo quam in appetitu intellectivo. Dicit enim Dionysius, II +cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>Hierotheus ex quadam est doctus +diviniore inspiratione, non solum discens, sed etiam patiens +divina</i>. Sed passio divinorum non potest pertinere ad appetitum +sensitivum, cuius obiectum est bonum sensibile. Ergo passio est in +appetitu intellectivo, sicut et in sensitivo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the more powerful the active force, the more intense the passion. But the object of the intellectual appetite, which + is the universal good, is a more powerful active force than the object of the sensitive appetite, which is a particular good. + Therefore passion is more consistent with the intellectual than with the sensitive appetite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34533" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34533] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quanto activum est potentius, tanto passio est fortior. Sed +obiectum appetitus intellectivi, quod est bonum universale, est +potentius activum quam obiectum appetitus sensitivi, quod est bonum +particulare. Ergo ratio passionis magis invenitur in appetitu +intellectivo quam in appetitu sensitivo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, joy and love are said to be passions. But these are to be found in the intellectual and not only in the sensitive + appetite: else they would not be ascribed by the Scriptures to God and the angels. Therefore the passions are not more in + the sensitive than in the intellectual appetite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34534" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34534] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +gaudium et amor passiones quaedam esse dicuntur. Sed haec +inveniuntur in appetitu intellectivo, et non solum in sensitivo, +alioquin non attribuerentur in Scripturis Deo et Angelis. Ergo +passiones non magis sunt in appetitu sensitivo quam in +intellectivo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22), while describing the animal passions: "Passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite + when we imagine good or evil: in other words, passion is a movement of the irrational soul, when we think of good or evil." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34535" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34535] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicit Damascenus, in II libro, describens animales +passiones, <i>passio est motus appetitivae virtutis sensibilis in +imaginatione boni vel mali. Et aliter, passio est motus +irrationalis animae per suspicionem boni vel mali</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q22_A1" id="FS_Q22_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> passion is properly to be found where there is corporeal transmutation. This corporeal transmutation is found in the act + of the sensitive appetite, and is not only spiritual, as in the sensitive apprehension, but also natural. Now there is no + need for corporeal transmutation in the act of the intellectual appetite: because this appetite is not exercised by means + of a corporeal organ. It is therefore evident + that passion is more properly in the act of the sensitive appetite, than in that of the intellectual appetite; and this is + again evident from the definitions of Damascene quoted above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 3 co."><a name="34536" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34536] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, passio proprie invenitur ubi +est transmutatio corporalis. Quae quidem invenitur in actibus +appetitus sensitivi; et non solum spiritualis, sicut est in +apprehensione sensitiva, sed etiam naturalis. In actu autem +appetitus intellectivi non requiritur aliqua transmutatio +corporalis, quia huiusmodi appetitus non est virtus alicuius +organi. Unde patet quod ratio passionis magis proprie invenitur in +actu appetitus sensitivi quam intellectivi; ut etiam patet per +definitiones Damasceni inductas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By "suffering" Divine things is meant being well affected towards them, and united to them by love: and this takes place + without any alteration in the body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34537" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34537] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod passio divinorum ibi dicitur affectio ad divina, +et coniunctio ad ipsa per amorem, quod tamen fit sine +transmutatione corporali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Intensity of passion depends not only on the power of the agent, but also on the passibility of the patient: because things + that are disposed to passion, suffer much even from petty agents. Therefore although the object of the intellectual appetite + has greater activity than the object of the sensitive appetite, yet the sensitive appetite is more passive. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34538" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34538] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod magnitudo passionis non solum dependet ex virtute +agentis, sed etiam ex passibilitate patientis, quia quae sunt bene +passibilia, multum patiuntur etiam a parvis activis. Licet ergo +obiectum appetitus intellectivi sit magis activum quam obiectum +appetitus sensitivi, tamen appetitus sensitivus est magis +passivus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When love and joy and the like are ascribed to God or the angels, or to man in respect of his intellectual appetite, they + signify simple acts of the will having like effects, but without passion. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5): "The holy + angels feel no anger while they punish . . . no fellow-feeling with misery while they relieve the unhappy: and yet ordinary + human speech is wont to ascribe to them also these passions by name, because, + although they have none of our weakness, their acts bear a certain resemblance to ours." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34539" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34539] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod amor et gaudium et alia huiusmodi, cum attribuuntur +Deo vel Angelis, aut hominibus secundum appetitum intellectivum, +significant simplicem actum voluntatis cum similitudine effectus, +absque passione. Unde dicit Augustinus, IX de Civ. Dei, <i>sancti +Angeli et sine ira puniunt et sine miseriae compassione subveniunt. +Et tamen, istarum nomina passionum, consuetudine locutionis +humanae, etiam in eos usurpantur, propter quandam operum +similitudinem, non propter affectionum infirmitatem</i>.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q23" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q23-p0.1">Q. 23. HOW THE PASSIONS DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q23-p2"> We must now consider how the passions differ from one another: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q23-p3"><a href="#FS_Q23_A1"> (1) Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from those of the irascible part?</a></p><p id="FS_Q23-p4"><a href="#FS_Q23_A2"> (2) Whether the contrariety of passions in the irascible part is based on the contrariety of good and evil?</a></p><p id="FS_Q23-p5"><a href="#FS_Q23_A3"> (3) Whether there is any passion that has no contrary?</a></p><p id="FS_Q23-p6"><a href="#FS_Q23_A4"> (4) Whether, in the same power, there are any passions, differing in species, but not contrary to one another?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 pr."><a name="34540" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34540] +Iª-IIae q. 23 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +passionum differentia ad invicem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. +Primo, utrum passiones quae sunt in concupiscibili, sint diversae +ab his quae sunt in irascibili. Secundo, utrum contrarietas +passionum irascibili sit secundum contrarietatem boni et mali. +Tertio, utrum sit aliqua passio non habens contrarium. Quarto, +utrum sint aliquae passiones differentes specie, in eadem potentia, +non contrariae ad invicem.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q23_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q23_A1-p0.1">Q. 23. A. 1. Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from those of the irascible part?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the same passions are in the irascible and concupiscible parts. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) + that the passions of the soul are those emotions "which are followed by joy or sorrow." But joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible + part. Therefore all the passions are in the concupiscible part, and not some in the irascible, others in the concupiscible + part. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34541" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34541] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod passiones eaedem sint in irascibili et +in concupiscibili. Dicit enim philosophus, in II Ethic., quod +passiones animae sunt quas sequitur gaudium et tristitia. Sed +gaudium et tristitia sunt in concupiscibili. Ergo omnes passiones +sunt in concupiscibili. Non ergo sunt aliae in irascibili, et aliae +in concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, on the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q23_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.13.33" target="asv"> Mat. 13:33, </a> "The kingdom of heaven is like to leaven," etc., Jerome's gloss says: "We should have prudence in the reason; hatred of vice + in the irascible faculty; desire of virtue, in the concupiscible part." But hatred is in the concupiscible faculty, as also + is love, of which it is the contrary, as is stated in Topic. ii, 7. Therefore the same passion is in the concupiscible and + irascible faculties. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34542" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34542] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Matth. XIII, super illud, <i>simile est regnum caelorum +fermento</i> etc., dicit Glossa Hieronymi, <i>in ratione +possideamus prudentiam, in irascibili odium vitiorum, in +concupiscibili desiderium virtutum</i>. Sed odium est in +concupiscibili, sicut et amor, cui contrariatur, ut dicitur in II +Topic. Ergo eadem passio est in concupiscibili et irascibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, passions and actions differ specifically according to their objects. But the objects of the irascible and concupiscible + passions are the same, viz. good and evil. Therefore the same passions are in the irascible and concupiscible faculties. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34543" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34543] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +passiones et actus differunt specie secundum obiecta. Sed passionum +irascibilis et concupiscibilis eadem obiecta sunt, scilicet bonum +et malum. Ergo eaedem sunt passiones irascibilis et +concupiscibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The acts of the different powers differ in species; for instance, to see, and to hear. But the irascible and the concupiscible + are two powers into which the sensitive appetite is divided, as stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q81_A2" id="FS_Q23_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[81], A[2]</a>. Therefore, since the passions are movements of the sensitive appetite, as stated above (Q[22], A[3]), the passions of the + irascible faculty are specifically distinct from those of the concupiscible part. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34544" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34544] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +diversarum potentiarum actus sunt specie diversi, sicut videre et +audire. Sed irascibilis et concupiscibilis sunt duae potentiae +dividentes appetitum sensitivum, ut in primo dictum est. Ergo, cum +passiones sint motus appetitus sensitivi, ut supra dictum est, +passiones quae sunt in irascibili, erunt aliae secundum speciem a +passionibus quae sunt in concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q23_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The passions of the irascible part differ in species from those of the concupiscible faculty. For since different powers + have different objects, as stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q77_A3" id="FS_Q23_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[77], A[3]</a>, the passions of different powers must of necessity be referred to different objects. Much more, therefore, do the passions + of different faculties differ in species; since a greater difference in the object is required to diversify the species of + the powers, + than to diversify the species of passions or actions. For just as in the physical order, diversity of genus arises from diversity + in the potentiality of matter, while diversity of species arises from diversity of form in the same matter; so in the acts + of the soul, those that belong to different powers, differ not only in species but also in genus, while acts and passions + regarding different specific objects, included under the one common object of a single power, differ as the species of that + genus. + </p><p id="FS_Q23_A1-p7"> In order, therefore, to discern which passions are in the irascible, and which in the concupiscible, we must take the object + of each of these powers. For we have stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q81_A2" id="FS_Q23_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[81], A[2]</a>, that the object of the concupiscible power is sensible good or evil, simply apprehended as such, which causes pleasure or + pain. But, since the soul must, of necessity, experience difficulty or struggle at times, in acquiring some such good, or + in avoiding some such + evil, in so far as such good or evil is more than our animal nature can easily acquire or avoid; therefore this very good + or evil, inasmuch as it is of an arduous or difficult nature, is the object of the irascible faculty. Therefore whatever passions + regard good or evil absolutely, belong to the concupiscible power; for instance, joy, sorrow, love, hatred, and such like: + whereas those passions which regard good or bad as arduous, through being difficult to obtain or avoid, belong to the + irascible faculty; such are daring, fear, hope and the like. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 1 co."><a name="34545" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34545] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod passiones quae sunt in irascibili et in +concupiscibili, differunt specie. Cum enim diversae potentiae +habeant diversa obiecta, ut in primo dictum est, necesse est quod +passiones diversarum potentiarum ad diversa obiecta referantur. +Unde multo magis passiones diversarum potentiarum specie differunt, +maior enim differentia obiecti requiritur ad diversificandam +speciem potentiarum, quam ad diversificandam speciem passionum vel +actuum. Sicut enim in naturalibus diversitas generis consequitur +diversitatem potentiae materiae, diversitas autem speciei +diversitatem formae in eadem materia; ita in actibus animae, actus +ad diversas potentias pertinentes, sunt non solum specie, sed etiam +genere diversi; actus autem vel passiones respicientes diversa +obiecta specialia comprehensa sub uno communi obiecto unius +potentiae, differunt sicut species illius generis. Ad cognoscendum +ergo quae passiones sint in irascibili, et quae in concupiscibili, +oportet assumere obiectum utriusque potentiae. Dictum est autem in +primo quod obiectum potentiae concupiscibilis est bonum vel malum +sensibile simpliciter acceptum, quod est delectabile vel dolorosum. +Sed quia necesse est quod interdum anima difficultatem vel pugnam +patiatur in adipiscendo aliquod huiusmodi bonum, vel fugiendo +aliquod huiusmodi malum, inquantum hoc est quodammodo elevatum +supra facilem potestatem animalis; ideo ipsum bonum vel malum, +secundum quod habet rationem ardui vel difficilis, est obiectum +irascibilis. Quaecumque ergo passiones respiciunt absolute bonum +vel malum, pertinent ad concupiscibilem; ut gaudium, tristitia, +amor, odium, et similia. Quaecumque vero passiones respiciunt bonum +vel malum sub ratione ardui, prout est aliquid adipiscibile vel +fugibile cum aliqua difficultate, pertinent ad irascibilem; ut +audacia, timor, spes, et huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q81_A2" id="FS_Q23_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[81], A[2]</a>, the irascible faculty is bestowed on animals, in order to remove the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible power from + tending towards its object, either by making some good difficult to obtain, or by making some evil hard to avoid. The result + is that all the irascible passions terminate in the concupiscible passions: and thus it is that even the passions which are + in the irascible faculty + are followed by joy and sadness which are in the concupiscible faculty. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34546" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34546] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut in primo dictum est, ad hoc vis +irascibilis data est animalibus, ut tollantur impedimenta quibus +concupiscibilis in suum obiectum tendere prohibetur, vel propter +difficultatem boni adipiscendi, vel propter difficultatem mali +superandi. Et ideo passiones irascibilis omnes terminantur ad +passiones concupiscibilis. Et secundum hoc, etiam passiones quae +sunt in irascibili, consequitur gaudium et tristitia, quae sunt in +concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Jerome ascribes hatred of vice to the irascible faculty, not by reason of hatred, which is properly a concupiscible passion; + but on account of the struggle, which belongs to the irascible power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34547" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34547] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod odium vitiorum attribuit Hieronymus irascibili, non +propter rationem odii, quae proprie competit concupiscibili; sed +propter impugnationem, quae pertinet ad irascibilem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Good, inasmuch as it is delightful, moves the concupiscible power. But if it prove difficult to obtain, from this very fact + it has a certain contrariety to the concupiscible power: and hence the need of another power tending to that good. The same + applies to evil. And this power is the irascible faculty. Consequently the concupiscible passions are specifically different + from the irascible passions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34548" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34548] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod bonum inquantum est delectabile, movet +concupiscibilem. Sed si bonum habeat quandam difficultatem ad +adipiscendum, ex hoc ipso habet aliquid repugnans concupiscibili. +Et ideo necessarium fuit esse aliam potentiam quae in id tenderet. +Et eadem ratio est de malis. Et haec potentia est irascibilis. Unde +ex consequenti passiones concupiscibilis et irascibilis specie +differunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q23_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q23_A2-p0.1">Q. 23. A. 2. Whether the contrariety of the irascible passions is based on the contrariety of good and evil?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the contrariety of the irascible passions is based on no other contrariety than that of good and evil. + For the irascible passions are ordained to the concupiscible passions, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). But the contrariety of + the concupiscible passions is no other than that of good and evil; take, for instance, love and hatred, joy and sorrow. Therefore + the same applies to the irascible passions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34549" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34549] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod contrarietas passionum irascibilis non +sit nisi secundum contrarietatem boni et mali. Passiones enim +irascibilis ordinantur ad passiones concupiscibilis, ut dictum est. +Sed passiones concupiscibilis non contrariantur nisi secundum +contrarietatem boni et mali; sicut amor et odium, gaudium et +tristitia. Ergo nec passiones irascibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, passions differ according to their objects; just as movements differ according to their termini. But there is no + other contrariety of movements, except that of the termini, as is stated in Phys. v, 3. Therefore there is no other contrariety + of passions, save that of the objects. Now the object of the appetite is good or evil. Therefore in no appetitive power can + there be contrariety of passions other than that of good and evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34550" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34550] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +passiones differunt secundum obiecta; sicut et motus secundum +terminos. Sed contrarietas non est in motibus nisi secundum +contrarietatem terminorum, ut patet in V Physic. Ergo neque in +passionibus est contrarietas nisi secundum contrarietatem +obiectorum. Obiectum autem appetitus est bonum vel malum. Ergo in +nulla potentia appetitiva potest esse contrarietas passionum nisi +secundum contrarietatem boni et mali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "every passion of the soul is by way of approach and withdrawal," as Avicenna declares in his sixth book of Physics. + Now approach results from the apprehension of good; withdrawal, from the apprehension of evil: since just as "good is what + all desire" (Ethic. i, 1), so evil is what all shun. Therefore, in the passions of the soul, there can be no other contrariety + than that of good and evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34551" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34551] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> +<i>Praeterea, omnis passio animae attenditur secundum accessum et +recessum</i>, ut Avicenna dicit, in sexto de naturalibus. Sed +accessus causatur ex ratione boni, recessus autem ex ratione mali, +quia sicut bonum est quod omnia appetunt, ut dicitur in I Ethic., +ita malum est quod omnia fugiunt. Ergo contrarietas in passionibus +animae non potest esse nisi secundum bonum et malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Fear and daring are contrary to one another, as stated in Ethic. iii, 7. But fear and daring do not differ in respect of + good and evil: because each regards some kind of evil. Therefore not every contrariety of the irascible passions is that of + good and evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34552" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34552] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +timor et audacia sunt contraria, ut patet in III Ethic. sed timor +et audacia non differunt secundum bonum et malum, quia utrumque est +respectu aliquorum malorum. Ergo non omnis contrarietas passionum +irascibilis est secundum contrarietatem boni et mali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q23_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Passion is a kind of movement, as stated in Phys. iii, 3. Therefore contrariety of passions is based on contrariety of movements + or changes. Now there is a twofold contrariety in changes and movements, as stated in Phys. v, 5. One is according to approach + and withdrawal in respect of the same term: and this contrariety belongs properly to changes, i.e. to generation, which is + a change "to being," and to corruption, which is a change "from being." The other + contrariety is according to opposition of termini, and belongs properly to movements: thus whitening, which is movement from + black to white, is contrary to blackening, which is movement from white to black. + </p><p id="FS_Q23_A2-p7"> Accordingly there is a twofold contrariety in the passions of the soul: one, according to contrariety of objects, i.e. of + good and evil; the other, according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same term. In the concupiscible passions + the former contrariety alone is to be found; viz. that which is based on the objects: whereas in the irascible passions, we + find both forms of contrariety. The reason of this is that the object of the concupiscible faculty, as stated above + + <a href="#FS_Q23_A1" id="FS_Q23_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, is sensible good or evil considered absolutely. Now good, as such, cannot be a term wherefrom, but only a term whereto, + since nothing shuns good as such; on the contrary, all things desire it. In like manner, nothing desires evil, as such; but + all things shun it: wherefore evil cannot have the aspect of a term whereto, but only of a term wherefrom. Accordingly every + concupiscible passion in respect of good, tends to it, as love, desire and joy; while every + concupiscible passion in respect of evil, tends from it, as hatred, avoidance or dislike, and sorrow. Wherefore, in the concupiscible + passions, there can be no contrariety of approach and withdrawal in respect of the same object. + </p><p id="FS_Q23_A2-p8"> On the other hand, the object of the irascible faculty is sensible good or evil, considered not absolutely, but under the + aspect of difficulty or arduousness. Now the good which is difficult or arduous, considered as good, is of such a nature as + to produce in us a tendency to it, which tendency pertains to the passion of "hope"; whereas, considered as arduous or difficult, + it makes us turn from it; and this pertains to the passion of "despair." In like manner the arduous evil, + considered as an evil, has the aspect of something to be shunned; and this belongs to the passion of "fear": but it also contains + a reason for tending to it, as attempting something arduous, whereby to escape being subject to evil; and this tendency is + called "daring." Consequently, in the irascible passions we find contrariety in respect of good and evil (as between hope + and fear): and also contrariety according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same term (as between daring and + fear). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 2 co."><a name="34553" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34553] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod passio quidam motus est, ut dicitur in III Physic. +Unde oportet contrarietatem passionum accipere secundum +contrarietatem motuum vel mutationum. Est autem duplex contrarietas +in mutationibus vel motibus, ut dicitur in V Physic. Una quidem +secundum accessum et recessum ab eodem termino, quae quidem +contrarietas est proprie mutationum, idest generationis, quae est +mutatio ad esse, et corruptionis, quae est mutatio ab esse. Alia +autem secundum contrarietatem terminorum, quae proprie est +contrarietas motuum, sicut dealbatio, quae est motus a nigro in +album, opponitur denigrationi, quae est motus ab albo in nigrum. +Sic igitur in passionibus animae duplex contrarietas invenitur, una +quidem secundum contrarietatem obiectorum, scilicet boni et mali; +alia vero secundum accessum et recessum ab eodem termino. In +passionibus quidem concupiscibilis invenitur prima contrarietas +tantum, quae scilicet est secundum obiecta, in passionibus autem +irascibilis invenitur utraque. Cuius ratio est quia obiectum +concupiscibilis, ut supra dictum est, est bonum vel malum sensibile +absolute. Bonum autem, inquantum bonum, non potest esse terminus ut +a quo, sed solum ut ad quem, quia nihil refugit bonum inquantum +bonum, sed omnia appetunt ipsum. Similiter nihil appetit malum +inquantum huiusmodi, sed omnia fugiunt ipsum, et propter hoc, malum +non habet rationem termini ad quem, sed solum termini a quo. Sic +igitur omnis passio concupiscibilis respectu boni, est ut in ipsum, +sicut amor, desiderium et gaudium, omnis vero passio eius respectu +mali, est ut ab ipso, sicut odium, fuga seu abominatio, et +tristitia. Unde in passionibus concupiscibilis non potest esse +contrarietas secundum accessum et recessum ab eodem obiecto. Sed +obiectum irascibilis est sensibile bonum vel malum, non quidem +absolute, sed sub ratione difficultatis vel arduitatis, ut supra +dictum est. Bonum autem arduum sive difficile habet rationem ut in +ipsum tendatur, inquantum est bonum, quod pertinet ad passionem +spei; et ut ab ipso recedatur, inquantum est arduum vel difficile, +quod pertinet ad passionem desperationis. Similiter malum arduum +habet rationem ut vitetur, inquantum est malum, et hoc pertinet ad +passionem timoris, habet etiam rationem ut in ipsum tendatur, sicut +in quoddam arduum, per quod scilicet aliquid evadit subiectionem +mali, et sic tendit in ipsum audacia. Invenitur ergo in passionibus +irascibilis contrarietas secundum contrarietatem boni et mali, +sicut inter spem et timorem, et iterum secundum accessum et +recessum ab eodem termino, sicut inter audaciam et timorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objections:</b> From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 2 ad arg."><a name="34554" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34554] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 2 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc +patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q23_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q23_A3-p0.1">Q. 23. A. 3. Whether any passion of the soul has no contrariety?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every passion of the soul has a contrary. For every passion of the soul is either in the irascible or + in the concupiscible faculty, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q23_A1" id="FS_Q23_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But both kinds of passion have their respective modes of contrariety. Therefore every passion of the soul has its contrary. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34555" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34555] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis passio animae habeat aliquid +contrarium. Omnis enim passio animae vel est in irascibili vel in +concupiscibili, sicut supra dictum est. Sed utraeque passiones +habent contrarietatem suo modo. Ergo omnis passio animae habet +contrarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every passion of the soul has either good or evil for its object; for these are the common objects of the appetitive + part. But a passion having good for its object, is contrary to a passion having evil for its object. Therefore every passion + has a contrary. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34556" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34556] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +omnis passio animae habet vel bonum vel malum pro obiecto, quae +sunt obiecta universaliter appetitivae partis. Sed passioni cuius +obiectum est bonum, opponitur passio cuius obiectum est malum. Ergo +omnis passio habet contrarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every passion of the soul is in respect of approach or withdrawal, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q23_A2" id="FS_Q23_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. But every approach has a corresponding contrary withdrawal, and vice versa. Therefore every passion of the soul has a contrary. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34557" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34557] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +omnis passio animae est secundum accessum vel secundum recessum, ut +dictum est. Sed cuilibet accessui contrariatur recessus, et e +converso. Ergo omnis passio animae habet contrarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Anger is a passion of the soul. But no passion is set down as being contrary to anger, as stated in Ethic. iv, 5. Therefore + not every passion has a contrary. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34558" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34558] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +ira est quaedam passio animae. Sed nulla passio ponitur contraria +irae, ut patet in IV Ethic. Ergo non omnis passio habet +contrarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q23_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The passion of anger is peculiar in this, that it cannot have a contrary, either according to approach and withdrawal, or + according to the contrariety of good and evil. For anger is caused by a difficult evil already present: and when such an evil + is present, the appetite must needs either succumb, so that it does not go beyond the limits of "sadness," which is a concupiscible + passion; or else it has a movement of attack on the hurtful evil, which movement + is that of "anger." But it cannot have a movement of withdrawal: because the evil is supposed to be already present or past. + Thus no passion is contrary to anger according to contrariety of approach and withdrawal. + </p><p id="FS_Q23_A3-p7"> In like manner neither can there be according to contrariety of good and evil. Because the opposite of present evil is good + obtained, which can be no longer have the aspect of arduousness or difficulty. Nor, when once good is obtained, does there + remain any other movement, except the appetite's repose in the good obtained; which repose belongs to joy, which is a passion + of the concupiscible faculty. + </p><p id="FS_Q23_A3-p8"> Accordingly no movement of the soul can be contrary to the movement of anger, and nothing else than cessation from its movement + is contrary thereto; thus the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "calm is contrary to anger," by opposition not of contrariety + but of negation or privation. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 3 co."><a name="34559" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34559] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod singulare est in passione irae, quod non potest +habere contrarium, neque secundum accessum et recessum, neque +secundum contrarietatem boni et mali. Causatur enim ira ex malo +difficili iam iniacente. Ad cuius praesentiam, necesse est quod aut +appetitus succumbat, et sic non exit terminos tristitiae, quae est +passio concupiscibilis, aut habet motum ad invadendum malum +laesivum, quod pertinet ad iram. Motum autem ad fugiendum habere +non potest, quia iam malum ponitur praesens vel praeteritum. Et sic +motui irae non contrariatur aliqua passio secundum contrarietatem +accessus et recessus. Similiter etiam nec secundum contrarietatem +boni et mali. Quia malo iam iniacenti opponitur bonum iam adeptum, +quod iam non potest habere rationem ardui vel difficilis. Nec post +adeptionem boni remanet alius motus, nisi quietatio appetitus in +bono adepto, quae pertinet ad gaudium, quod est passio +concupiscibilis. Unde motus irae non potest habere aliquem motum +animae contrarium, sed solummodo opponitur ei cessatio a motu, +sicut philosophus dicit, in sua rhetorica, quod <i>mitescere +opponitur ei quod est irasci</i>, quod non est oppositum contrarie, +sed negative vel privative.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objections:</b> From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 3 ad arg."><a name="34560" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34560] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 3 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc +patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q23_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q23_A4-p0.1">Q. 23. A. 4. Whether in the same power, there are any passions, specifically different, but not contrary to one another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be, in the same power, specifically different passions that are not contrary to one another. + For the passions of the soul differ according to their objects. Now the objects of the soul's passions are good and evil; + and on this distinction is based the contrariety of the passions. Therefore no passions of the same power, that are not contrary + to one another, differ specifically. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34561" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34561] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non possint in aliqua potentia esse +passiones specie differentes, et non contrariae ad invicem. +Passiones enim animae differunt secundum obiecta. Obiecta autem +passionum animae sunt bonum et malum, secundum quorum differentiam +passiones habent contrarietatem. Ergo nullae passiones eiusdem +potentiae, non habentes contrarietatem ad invicem, differunt +specie.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, difference of species implies a difference of form. But every difference of form is in respect of some contrariety, + as stated in Metaph. x, 8. Therefore passions of the same power, that are not contrary to one another, do not differ specifically. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34562" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34562] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +differentia speciei est differentia secundum formam. Sed omnis +differentia secundum formam, est secundum aliquam contrarietatem, +ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Ergo passiones eiusdem potentiae quae non +sunt contrariae, non differunt specie.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since every passion of the soul consists in approach or withdrawal in respect of good or evil, it seems that every + difference in the passions of the soul must needs arise from the difference of good and evil; or from the difference of approach + and withdrawal; or from degrees in approach or withdrawal. Now the first two differences cause contrariety in the passions + of the soul, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q23_A2" id="FS_Q23_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>: whereas the third + difference does not diversify the species; else the species of the soul's passions would be infinite. Therefore it is not + possible for passions of the same power to differ in species, without being contrary to one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34563" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34563] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +cum omnis passio animae consistat in accessu vel recessu ad bonum +vel ad malum, necesse videtur quod omnis differentia passionum +animae sit vel secundum differentiam boni et mali; vel secundum +differentiam accessus et recessus; vel secundum maiorem vel minorem +accessum aut recessum. Sed primae duae differentiae inducunt +contrarietatem in passionibus animae, ut dictum est. Tertia autem +differentia non diversificat speciem, quia sic essent infinitae +species passionum animae. Ergo non potest esse quod passiones +eiusdem potentiae animae differant specie, et non sint +contrariae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Love and joy differ in species, and are in the concupiscible power; and yet they are not contrary to one another; rather, + in fact, one causes the other. Therefore in the same power there are passions that differ in species without being contrary + to one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34564" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34564] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +amor et gaudium differunt specie, et sunt in concupiscibili. Nec +tamen contrariantur ad invicem, quin potius unum est causa +alterius. Ergo sunt aliquae passiones eiusdem potentiae quae +differunt specie, nec sunt contrariae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q23_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Passions differ in accordance with their active causes, which, in the case of the passions of the soul, are their objects. + Now, the difference in active causes may be considered in two ways: first, from the point of view of their species or nature, + as fire differs from water; secondly, from the point of view of the difference in their active power. In the passions of the + soul we can treat the difference of their active or motive causes in respect of their + motive power, as if they were natural agents. For every mover, in a fashion, either draws the patient to itself, or repels + it from itself. Now in drawing it to itself, it does three things in the patient. Because, in the first place, it gives the + patient an inclination or aptitude to tend to the mover: thus a light body, which is above, bestows lightness on the body + generated, so that it has an inclination or aptitude to be above. Secondly, if the generated body be outside its proper place, + the + mover gives it movement towards that place. Thirdly, it makes it to rest, when it shall have come to its proper place: since + to the same cause are due, both rest in a place, and the movement to that place. The same applies to the cause of repulsion. + </p><p id="FS_Q23_A4-p7"> Now, in the movements of the appetitive faculty, good has, as it were, a force of attraction, while evil has a force of repulsion. + In the first place, therefore, good causes, in the appetitive power, a certain inclination, aptitude or connaturalness in + respect of good: and this belongs to the passion of "love": the corresponding contrary of which is "hatred" in respect of + evil. Secondly, if the good be not yet possessed, it causes in the appetite a movement towards the + attainment of the good beloved: and this belongs to the passion of "desire" or "concupiscence": and contrary to it, in respect + of evil, is the passion of "aversion" or "dislike." Thirdly, when the good is obtained, it causes the appetite to rest, as + it were, in the good obtained: and this belongs to the passion of "delight" or "joy"; the contrary of which, in respect of + evil, is "sorrow" or "sadness." + </p><p id="FS_Q23_A4-p8"> On the other hand, in the irascible passions, the aptitude, or inclination to seek good, or to shun evil, is presupposed + as arising from the concupiscible faculty, which regards good or evil absolutely. And in respect of good not yet obtained, + we have "hope" and "despair." In respect of evil not yet present we have "fear" and "daring." But in respect of good obtained + there is no irascible passion: because it is no longer considered in the light of something arduous, as stated + above + <a href="#FS_Q23_A3" id="FS_Q23_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. But evil already present gives rise to the passion of "anger." + </p><p id="FS_Q23_A4-p9"> Accordingly it is clear that in the concupiscible faculty there are three couples of passions; viz. love and hatred, desire + and aversion, joy and sadness. In like manner there are three groups in the irascible faculty; viz. hope and despair, fear + and daring, and anger which has not contrary passion. + </p><p id="FS_Q23_A4-p10"> Consequently there are altogether eleven passions differing specifically; six in the concupiscible faculty, and five in the + irascible; and under these all the passions of the soul are contained. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 4 co."><a name="34565" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34565] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod passiones differunt secundum activa, quae sunt +obiecta passionum animae. Differentia autem activorum potest +attendi dupliciter, uno modo, secundum speciem vel naturam ipsorum +activorum, sicut ignis differt ab aqua; alio modo, secundum +diversam virtutem activam. Diversitas autem activi vel motivi +quantum ad virtutem movendi, potest accipi in passionibus animae +secundum similitudinem agentium naturalium. Omne enim movens trahit +quodammodo ad se patiens, vel a se repellit. Trahendo quidem ad se, +tria facit in ipso. Nam primo quidem, dat ei inclinationem vel +aptitudinem ut in ipsum tendat, sicut cum corpus leve, quod est +sursum, dat levitatem corpori generato, per quam habet +inclinationem vel aptitudinem ad hoc quod sit sursum. Secundo, si +corpus generatum est extra locum proprium, dat ei moveri ad locum. +Tertio, dat ei quiescere, in locum cum pervenerit, quia ex eadem +causa aliquid quiescit in loco, per quam movebatur ad locum. Et +similiter intelligendum est de causa repulsionis. In motibus autem +appetitivae partis, bonum habet quasi virtutem attractivam, malum +autem virtutem repulsivam. Bonum ergo primo quidem in potentia +appetitiva causat quandam inclinationem, seu aptitudinem, seu +connaturalitatem ad bonum, quod pertinet ad passionem amoris. Cui +per contrarium respondet odium, ex parte mali. Secundo, si bonum +sit nondum habitum, dat ei motum ad assequendum bonum amatum, et +hoc pertinet ad passionem desiderii vel concupiscentiae. Et ex +opposito, ex parte mali, est fuga vel abominatio. Tertio, cum +adeptum fuerit bonum, dat appetitus quietationem quandam in ipso +bono adepto, et hoc pertinet ad delectationem vel gaudium. Cui +opponitur ex parte mali dolor vel tristitia. In passionibus autem +irascibilis, praesupponitur quidem aptitudo vel inclinatio ad +prosequendum bonum vel fugiendum malum, ex concupiscibili, quae +absolute respicit bonum vel malum. Et respectu boni nondum adepti, +est spes et desperatio. Respectu autem mali nondum iniacentis, est +timor et audacia. Respectu autem boni adepti, non est aliqua passio +in irascibili, quia iam non habet rationem ardui, ut supra dictum +est. Sed ex malo iam iniacenti, sequitur passio irae. Sic igitur +patet quod in concupiscibili sunt tres coniugationes passionum, +scilicet amor et odium, desiderium et fuga gaudium et tristitia. +Similiter in irascibili sunt tres, scilicet spes et desperatio, +timor et audacia, et ira, cui nulla passio opponitur. Sunt ergo +omnes passiones specie differentes undecim, sex quidem in +concupiscibili, et quinque in irascibili; sub quibus omnes animae +passiones continentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A4-p11"> <b>Reply to Objections:</b> From this the replies to the objections are evident.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 4 ad arg."><a name="34566" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34566] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 4 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc +patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q24" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q24-p0.1">Q. 24. OF GOOD AND EVIL IN THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q24-p2"> We must now consider good and evil in the passions of the soul: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q24-p3"><a href="#FS_Q24_A1"> (1) Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul?</a></p><p id="FS_Q24-p4"><a href="#FS_Q24_A2"> (2) Whether every passion of the soul is morally evil?</a></p><p id="FS_Q24-p5"><a href="#FS_Q24_A3"> (3) Whether every passion increases or decreases the goodness of malice of an act?</a></p><p id="FS_Q24-p6"><a href="#FS_Q24_A4"> (4) Whether any passion is good or evil specifically?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 pr."><a name="34567" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34567] +Iª-IIae q. 24 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de bono +et malo circa passiones animae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. +Primo, utrum bonum et malum morale possit in passionibus animae +inveniri. Secundo, utrum omnis passio animae sit mala moraliter. +Tertio, utrum omnis passio addat, vel diminuat, ad bonitatem vel +malitiam actus. Quarto, utrum aliqua passio sit bona vel mala ex +sua specie.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q24_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q24_A1-p0.1">Q. 24. A. 1. Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no passion of the soul is morally good or evil. For moral good and evil are proper to man: since "morals + are properly predicated of man," as Ambrose says (Super Luc. Prolog.). But passions are not proper to man, for he has them + in common with other animals. Therefore no passion of the soul is morally good or evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34568" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34568] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod nulla passio animae sit bona vel mala +moraliter. Bonum enim et malum morale est proprium hominis, mores +enim proprie dicuntur humani, ut Ambrosius dicit, super Lucam. Sed +passiones non sunt propriae hominum, sed sunt etiam aliis +animalibus communes. Ergo nulla passio animae est bona vel mala +moraliter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the good or evil of man consists in "being in accord, or in disaccord with reason," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. + iv). Now the passions of the soul are not in the reason, but in the sensitive appetite, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q22_A3" id="FS_Q24_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[3]</a>). Therefore they have no connection with human, i.e. moral, good or evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34569" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34569] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +bonum vel malum hominis est secundum rationem esse, vel praeter +rationem esse, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed +passiones animae non sunt in ratione, sed in appetitu sensitivo, ut +supra dictum est. Ergo non pertinent ad bonum vel malum hominis, +quod est bonum morale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that "we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions." But we are praised + and blamed for moral good and evil. Therefore the passions are not morally good or evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34570" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34570] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod <i>passionibus neque laudamur +neque vituperamur</i>. Sed secundum bona et mala moralia, laudamur +et vituperamur. Ergo passiones non sunt bonae vel malae +moraliter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) while speaking of the passions of the soul: "They are evil if our love is evil; good + if our love is good." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34571" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34571] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, de passionibus +animae loquens <i>mala sunt ista, si malus est amor; bona, si +bonus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We may consider the passions of the soul in two ways: first, in themselves; secondly, as being subject to the command of + the reason and will. If then the passions be considered in themselves, to wit, as movements of the irrational appetite, thus + there is no moral good or evil in them, since this depends on the reason, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A5" id="FS_Q24_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[18] , A[5]</a>). If, however, they be considered as subject to the command of the reason and will, + then moral good and evil are in them. Because the sensitive appetite is nearer than the outward members to the reason and + will; and yet the movements and actions of the outward members are morally good or evil, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Much + more, therefore, may the passions, in so far as they are voluntary, be called morally good or evil. And they are said to be + voluntary, either from being commanded by the will, or from not being checked by the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 1 co."><a name="34572" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34572] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod passiones animae dupliciter possunt considerari, uno +modo, secundum se; alio modo, secundum quod subiacent imperio +rationis et voluntatis. Si igitur secundum se considerentur, prout +scilicet sunt motus quidam irrationalis appetitus, sic non est in +eis bonum vel malum morale, quod dependet a ratione, ut supra +dictum est. Si autem considerentur secundum quod subiacent imperio +rationis et voluntatis, sic est in eis bonum et malum morale. +Propinquior enim est appetitus sensitivus ipsi rationi et +voluntati, quam membra exteriora; quorum tamen motus et actus sunt +boni vel mali moraliter, secundum quod sunt voluntarii. Unde multo +magis et ipsae passiones, secundum quod sunt voluntariae, possunt +dici bonae vel malae moraliter. Dicuntur autem voluntariae vel ex +eo quod a voluntate imperantur, vel ex eo quod a voluntate non +prohibentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These passions, considered in themselves, are common to man and other animals: but, as commanded by the reason, they are + proper to man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34573" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34573] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod istae passiones secundum se consideratae, sunt +communes hominibus et aliis animalibus, sed secundum quod a ratione +imperantur, sunt propriae hominum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even the lower appetitive powers are called rational, in so far as "they partake of reason in some sort" (Ethic. i, 13). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34574" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34574] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod etiam inferiores vires appetitivae dicuntur +rationales, secundum quod participant aliqualiter rationem, ut +dicitur in I Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Philosopher says that we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions considered absolutely; but he does not exclude + their becoming worthy of praise or blame, in so far as they are subordinate to reason. Hence he continues: "For the man who + fears or is angry, is not praised . . . or blamed, but the man who is angry in a certain way, i.e. according to, or against + reason." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34575" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34575] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod philosophus dicit quod non laudamur aut vituperamur +secundum passiones absolute consideratas, sed non removet quin +possint fieri laudabiles vel vituperabiles secundum quod a ratione +ordinantur. Unde subdit, <i>non enim laudatur aut vituperatur qui +timet aut irascitur, sed qui aliqualiter</i>, idest secundum +rationem vel praeter rationem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q24_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q24_A2-p0.1">Q. 24. A. 2. Whether every passion of the soul is evil morally?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the passions of the soul are morally evil. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that "some call + the soul's passions diseases or disturbances of the soul" [*Those things which the Greeks call {pathe}, we prefer to call + disturbances rather than diseases (Tusc. iv. 5)]. But every disease or disturbance of the soul is morally evil. Therefore + every passion of the soul is evil morally. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34576" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34576] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnes passiones animae sint malae +moraliter. Dicit enim Augustinus, IX de Civ. Dei, quod <i>passiones +animae quidam vocant morbos vel perturbationes animae</i>. Sed +omnis morbus vel perturbatio animae est aliquid malum moraliter. +Ergo omnis passio animae moraliter mala est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "movement in accord with nature is an action, but movement contrary to + nature is passion." But in movements of the soul, what is against nature is sinful and morally evil: hence he says elsewhere + (De Fide Orth. ii, 4) that "the devil turned from that which is in accord with nature to that which is against nature." Therefore + these passions are morally evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34577" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34577] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Damascenus dicit quod <i>operatio quidem qui secundum naturam motus +est, passio vero qui praeter naturam</i>. Sed quod est praeter +naturam in motibus animae, habet rationem peccati et mali moralis, +unde ipse alibi dicit quod <i>Diabolus versus est ex eo quod est +secundum naturam, in id quod est praeter naturam</i>. Ergo +huiusmodi passiones sunt malae moraliter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever leads to sin, has an aspect of evil. But these passions lead to sin: wherefore they are called "the passions + of sins" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q24_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.5" target="asv">Rom. 7:5</a>). Therefore it seems that they are morally evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34578" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34578] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +omne quod inducit ad peccatum, habet rationem mali. Sed huiusmodi +passiones inducunt ad peccatum, unde Rom. VII dicuntur passiones +peccatorum. Ergo videtur quod sint malae moraliter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that "all these emotions are right in those whose love is rightly placed . . . For they + fear to sin, they desire to persevere; they grieve for sin, they rejoice in good works." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34579" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34579] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quod <i>rectus amor +omnes istas affectiones rectas habet. Metuunt enim peccare, cupiunt +perseverare, dolent in peccatis, gaudent in operibus bonis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q24_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> On this question the opinion of the Stoics differed from that of the Peripatetics: for the Stoics held that all passions + are evil, while the Peripatetics maintained that moderate passions are good. This difference, although it appears great in + words, is nevertheless, in reality, none at all, or but little, if we consider the intent of either school. For the Stoics + did not discern between sense and intellect; and consequently neither between the intellectual + and sensitive appetite. Hence they did not discriminate the passions of the soul from the movements of the will, in so far + as the passions of the soul are in the sensitive appetite, while the simple movements of the will are in the intellectual + appetite: but every rational movement of the appetitive part they call will, while they called passion, a movement that exceeds + the limits of reason. Wherefore Cicero, following their opinion (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) calls all passions "diseases of + the + soul": whence he argues that "those who are diseased are unsound; and those who are unsound are wanting in sense." Hence we + speak of those who are wanting in sense of being "unsound." + </p><p id="FS_Q24_A2-p7"> On the other hand, the Peripatetics give the name of "passions" to all the movements of the sensitive appetite. Wherefore + they esteem them good, when they are controlled by reason; and evil when they are not controlled by reason. Hence it is evident + that Cicero was wrong in disapproving (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) of the Peripatetic theory of a mean in the passions, when + he says that "every evil, though moderate, should be shunned; for, just as a body, though it be moderately + ailing, is not sound; so, this mean in the diseases or passions of the soul, is not sound." For passions are not called "diseases" + or "disturbances" of the soul, save when they are not controlled by reason. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 2 co."><a name="34580" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34580] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod circa hanc quaestionem diversa fuit sententia +Stoicorum et Peripateticorum, nam Stoici dixerunt omnes passiones +esse malas; Peripatetici vero dixerunt passiones moderatas esse +bonas. Quae quidem differentia, licet magna videatur secundum +vocem, tamen secundum rem vel nulla est, vel parva, si quis +utrorumque intentiones consideret. Stoici enim non discernebant +inter sensum et intellectum; et per consequens nec inter +intellectivum appetitum et sensitivum. Unde non discernebant +passiones animae a motibus voluntatis secundum hoc quod passiones +animae sunt in appetitu sensitivo, simplices autem motus voluntatis +sunt in intellectivo; sed omnem rationabilem motum appetitivae +partis vocabant voluntatem, passionem autem dicebant motum +progredientem extra limites rationis. Et ideo, eorum sententiam +sequens, Tullius, in III libro de Tusculanis quaestionibus, omnes +passiones vocat animae morbos. Ex quo argumentatur quod qui +<i>morbosi sunt, sani non sunt; et qui sani non sunt, insipientes +sunt</i>. Unde et insipientes insanos dicimus. Peripatetici vero +omnes motus appetitus sensitivi passiones vocant. Unde eas bonas +aestimant, cum sunt a ratione moderatae; malas autem, cum sunt +praeter moderationem rationis. Ex quo patet quod Tullius, in eodem +libro, Peripateticorum sententiam, qui approbabant mediocritatem +passionum, inconvenienter improbat, dicens quod <i>omne malum, +etiam mediocre, vitandum est, nam sicut corpus, etiamsi mediocriter +aegrum est, sanum non est; sic ista mediocritas morborum vel +passionum animae, sana non est</i>. Non enim passiones dicuntur +morbi vel perturbationes animae, nisi cum carent moderatione +rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1</b> Hence the reply to the First Objection is evident.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34581" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34581] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Unde patet +responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In every passion there is an increase or decrease in the natural movement of the heart, according as the heart is moved more + or less intensely by contraction and dilatation; and hence it derives the character of passion. But there is no need for passion + to deviate always from the order of natural reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34582" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34582] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod in omni passione animae additur aliquid, vel +diminuitur a naturali motu cordis, inquantum cor intensius vel +remissius movetur, secundum systolen aut diastolen, et secundum hoc +habet passionis rationem. Non tamen oportet quod passio semper +declinet ab ordine naturalis rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The passions of the soul, in so far as they are contrary to the order of reason, incline us to sin: but in so far as they + are controlled by reason, they pertain to virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34583" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34583] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod passiones animae, inquantum sunt praeter ordinem +rationis, inclinant ad peccatum, inquantum autem sunt ordinatae a +ratione, pertinent ad virtutem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q24_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q24_A3-p0.1">Q. 24. A. 3. Whether passion increases or decreases the goodness or malice of an act?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every passion decreases the goodness of a moral action. For anything that hinders the judgment of reason, + on which depends the goodness of a moral act, consequently decreases the goodness of the moral act. But every passion hinders + the judgment of reason: for Sallust says (Catilin.): "All those that take counsel about matters of doubt, should be free from + hatred, anger, friendship and pity." Therefore passion decreases the goodness of a + moral act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34584" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34584] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod passio quaecumque semper diminuat de +bonitate actus moralis. Omne enim quod impedit iudicium rationis, +ex quo dependet bonitas actus moralis, diminuit per consequens +bonitatem actus moralis. Sed omnis passio impedit iudicium +rationis, dicit enim Sallustius, in Catilinario, <i>omnes homines +qui de rebus dubiis consultant, ab odio, ira, amicitia atque +misericordia vacuos esse decet</i>. Ergo omnis passio diminuit +bonitatem moralis actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the more a man's action is like to God, the better it is: hence the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q24_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.1" target="asv">Eph. 5:1</a>): "Be ye followers of God, as most dear children." But "God and the holy angels feel no anger when they punish . . . no fellow-feeling + with misery when they relieve the unhappy," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5). Therefore it is better to do such like + deeds without than with a passion of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34585" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34585] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +actus hominis, quanto est Deo similior, tanto est melior, unde +dicit apostolus, Ephes. V, <i>estote imitatores Dei, sicut filii +carissimi. Sed Deus et sancti Angeli sine ira puniunt, sine +miseriae compassione subveniunt</i> ut Augustinus dicit, in IX de +Civ. Dei. Ergo est melius huiusmodi opera bona agere sine passione +animae, quam cum passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as moral evil depends on its relation to reason, so also does moral good. But moral evil is lessened by passion: + for he sins less, who sins from passion, than he who sins deliberately. Therefore he does a better deed, who does well without + passion, than he who does with passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34586" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34586] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut malum morale attenditur per ordinem ad rationem, ita et bonum +morale. Sed malum morale diminuitur per passionem, minus enim +peccat qui peccat ex passione, quam qui peccat ex industria. Ergo +maius bonum operatur qui operatur bonum sine passione, quam qui +operatur cum passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "the passion of pity is obedient to reason, when pity is bestowed without violating + right, as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent forgiven." But nothing that is obedient to reason lessens the moral + good. Therefore a passion of the soul does not lessen moral good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34587" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34587] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, IX de Civ. Dei, quod <i>passio +misericordiae rationi deservit, quando ita praebetur misericordia, +ut iustitia conservetur, sive cum indigenti tribuitur, sive cum +ignoscitur poenitenti</i>. Sed nihil quod deservit rationi, +diminuit bonum morale. Ergo passio animae non diminuit bonum +moris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q24_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As the Stoics held that every passion of the soul is evil, they consequently held that every passion of the soul lessens + the goodness of an act; since the admixture of evil either destroys good altogether, or makes it to be less good. And this + is true indeed, if by passions we understand none but the inordinate movements of the sensitive appetite, considered as disturbances + or ailments. But if we give the name of passions to all the movements of the + sensitive appetite, then it belongs to the perfection of man's good that his passions be moderated by reason. For since man's + good is founded on reason as its root, that good will be all the more perfect, according as it extends to more things pertaining + to man. Wherefore no one questions the fact that it belongs to the perfection of moral good, that the actions of the outward + members be controlled by the law of reason. Hence, since the sensitive appetite can obey reason, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q17_A7" id="FS_Q24_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[17], A[7]</a>), it belongs to the perfection of moral or human good, that the passions themselves also should be controlled by reason. + </p><p id="FS_Q24_A3-p7"> Accordingly just as it is better that man should both will good and do it in his external act; so also does it belong to + the perfection of moral good, that man should be moved unto good, not only in respect of his will, but also in respect of + his sensitive appetite; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q24_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.83.3" target="asv"> Ps. 83:3</a>: "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God": where by "heart" we are to understand the intellectual appetite, + and by "flesh" the sensitive appetite. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 3 co."><a name="34588" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34588] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod Stoici, sicut ponebant omnem passionem animae esse +malam, ita ponebant consequenter omnem passionem animae diminuere +actus bonitatem, omne enim bonum ex permixtione mali vel totaliter +tollitur, vel fit minus bonum. Et hoc quidem verum est, si dicamus +passiones animae solum inordinatos motus sensitivi appetitus, prout +sunt perturbationes seu aegritudines. Sed si passiones simpliciter +nominemus omnes motus appetitus sensitivi, sic ad perfectionem +humani boni pertinet quod etiam ipsae passiones sint moderatae per +rationem. Cum enim bonum hominis consistat in ratione sicut in +radice, tanto istud bonum erit perfectius, quanto ad plura quae +homini conveniunt, derivari potest. Unde nullus dubitat quin ad +perfectionem moralis boni pertineat quod actus exteriorum membrorum +per rationis regulam dirigantur. Unde, cum appetitus sensitivus +possit obedire rationi, ut supra dictum est, ad perfectionem +moralis sive humani boni pertinet quod etiam ipsae passiones animae +sint regulatae per rationem. Sicut igitur melius est quod homo et +velit bonum, et faciat exteriori actu; ita etiam ad perfectionem +boni moralis pertinet quod homo ad bonum moveatur non solum +secundum voluntatem, sed etiam secundum appetitum sensitivum; +secundum illud quod in Psalmo LXXXIII, dicitur, <i>cor meum et caro +mea exultaverunt in Deum vivum</i>, ut cor accipiamus pro appetitu +intellectivo, carnem autem pro appetitu sensitivo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passions of the soul may stand in a twofold relation to the judgment of reason. First, antecedently: and thus, since + they obscure the judgment of reason, on which the goodness of the moral act depends, they diminish the goodness of the act; + for it is more praiseworthy to do a work of charity from the judgment of reason than from the mere passion of pity. In the + second place, consequently: and this in two ways. First, by way of redundance: because, + to wit, when the higher part of the soul is intensely moved to anything, the lower part also follows that movement: and thus + the passion that results in consequence, in the sensitive appetite, is a sign of the intensity of the will, and so indicates + greater moral goodness. Secondly, by way of choice; when, to wit, a man, by the judgment of his reason, chooses to be affected + by a passion in order to work more promptly with the co-operation of the sensitive appetite. And thus a passion of the + soul increases the goodness of an action. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34589" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34589] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod passiones animae dupliciter se possunt habere ad +iudicium rationis. Uno modo, antecedenter. Et sic, cum obnubilent +iudicium rationis, ex quo dependet bonitas moralis actus, diminuunt +actus bonitatem, laudabilius enim est quod ex iudicio rationis +aliquis faciat opus caritatis, quam ex sola passione misericordiae. +Alio modo se habent consequenter. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo, per +modum redundantiae, quia scilicet, cum superior pars animae intense +movetur in aliquid, sequitur motum eius etiam pars inferior. Et sic +passio existens consequenter in appetitu sensitivo, est signum +intensionis voluntatis. Et sic indicat bonitatem moralem maiorem. +Alio modo, per modum electionis, quando scilicet homo ex iudicio +rationis eligit affici aliqua passione, ut promptius operetur, +cooperante appetitu sensitivo. Et sic passio animae addit ad +bonitatem actionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In God and the angels there is no sensitive appetite, nor again bodily members: and so in them good does not depend on the + right ordering of passions or of bodily actions, as it does in us. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34590" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34590] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod in Deo et in Angelis non est appetitus sensitivus, +neque etiam membra corporea, et ideo bonum in eis non attenditur +secundum ordinationem passionum aut corporeorum actuum, sicut in +nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A passion that tends to evil, and precedes the judgment of reason, diminishes sin; but if it be consequent in either of the + ways mentioned above (Reply OBJ 1), it aggravates the sin, or else it is a sign of its being more grievous. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34591" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34591] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod passio tendens in malum, praecedens iudicium +rationis, diminuit peccatum, sed consequens aliquo praedictorum +modorum, auget ipsum, vel significat augmentum eius.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q24_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q24_A4-p0.1">Q. 24. A. 4. Whether any passion is good or evil in its species?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no passion of the soul is good or evil morally according to its species. Because moral good and evil depend + on reason. But the passions are in the sensitive appetite; so that accordance with reason is accidental to them. Since, therefore, + nothing accidental belongs to a thing's species, it seems that no passion is good or evil according to its species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34592" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34592] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod nulla passio animae, secundum speciem +suam, sit bona vel mala moraliter. Bonum enim et malum morale +attenditur secundum rationem. Sed passiones sunt in appetitu +sensitivo, et ita id quod est secundum rationem, accidit eis. Cum +ergo nihil quod est per accidens, pertineat ad speciem rei; videtur +quod nulla passio secundum suam speciem sit bona vel mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, acts and passions take their species from their object. If, therefore, any passion were good or evil, according + to its species, it would follow that those passions the object of which is good, are specifically good, such as love, desire + and joy: and that those passions, the object of which is evil, are specifically evil, as hatred, fear and sadness. But this + is clearly false. Therefore no passion is good or evil according to its species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34593" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34593] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +actus et passiones habent speciem ex obiecto. Si ergo aliqua passio +secundum suam speciem esset bona vel mala, oporteret quod passiones +quarum obiectum est bonum, bonae essent secundum suam speciem, ut +amor, desiderium et gaudium; et passiones quarum obiectum est malum +essent malae secundum suam speciem, ut odium, timor et tristitia. +Sed hoc patet esse falsum. Non ergo aliqua passio est bona vel mala +ex sua specie.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there is no species of passion that is not to be found in other animals. But moral good is in man alone. Therefore + no passion of the soul is good or evil according to its species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34594" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34594] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +nulla species passionum est quae non inveniatur in aliis +animalibus. Sed bonum morale non invenitur nisi in homine. Ergo +nulla passio animae bona est vel mala ex sua specie.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "pity is a kind of virtue." Moreover, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that modesty + is a praiseworthy passion. Therefore some passions are good or evil according to their species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34595" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34595] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, IX de Civ. Dei, quod <i>misericordia +pertinet ad virtutem</i>. Philosophus etiam dicit, in II Ethic., +quod verecundia est passio laudabilis. Ergo aliquae passiones sunt +bonae vel malae secundum suam speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We ought, seemingly, to apply to passions what has been said in regard to acts ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A5" id="FS_Q24_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[18], AA[5]</a>,6; + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q20_A1" id="FS_Q24_A4-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[20], A[1]</a>)---viz. that the species of a passion, as the species of an act, can be considered from two points of view. First, according + to its natural genus; and thus moral good and evil have no connection with the species of an act or passion. Secondly, according + to its moral genus, inasmuch as it is voluntary + and controlled by reason. In this way moral good and evil can belong to the species of a passion, in so far as the object + to which a passion tends, is, of itself, in harmony or in discord with reason: as is clear in the case of "shame" which is + base fear; and of "envy" which is sorrow for another's good: for thus passions belong to the same species as the external + act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 4 co."><a name="34596" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34596] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod sicut de actibus dictum est, ita et de passionibus +dicendum videtur, quod scilicet species actus vel passionis +dupliciter considerari potest. Uno modo, secundum quod est in +genere naturae, et sic bonum vel malum morale non pertinet ad +speciem actus vel passionis. Alio modo, secundum quod pertinent ad +genus moris, prout scilicet participant aliquid de voluntario et de +iudicio rationis. Et hoc modo bonum et malum morale possunt +pertinere ad speciem passionis, secundum quod accipitur ut obiectum +passionis aliquid de se conveniens rationi, vel dissonum a ratione, +sicut patet de verecundia, quae est timor turpis; et de invidia, +quae est tristitia de bono alterius. Sic enim pertinent ad speciem +exterioris actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers the passions in their natural species, in so far as the sensitive appetite is considered in itself. + But in so far as the sensitive appetite obeys reason, good and evil of reason are no longer accidentally in the passions of + the appetite, but essentially. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34597" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34597] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de passionibus secundum quod +pertinent ad speciem naturae, prout scilicet appetitus sensitivus +in se consideratur. Secundum vero quod appetitus sensitivus obedit +rationi, iam bonum et malum rationis non est in passionibus eius +per accidens, sed per se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Passions having a tendency to good, are themselves good, if they tend to that which is truly good, and in like manner, if + they turn away from that which is truly evil. On the other hand, those passions which consist in aversion from good, and a + tendency to evil, are themselves evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34598" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34598] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod passiones quae in bonum tendunt, si sit verum bonum, +sunt bonae, et similiter quae a vero malo recedunt. E converso vero +passiones quae sunt per recessum a bono, et per accessum ad malum, +sunt malae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In irrational animals the sensitive appetite does not obey reason. Nevertheless, in so far as they are led by a kind of estimative + power, which is subject to a higher, i.e. the Divine reason, there is a certain likeness of moral good in them, in regard + to the soul's passions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34599" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34599] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in brutis animalibus appetitus sensitivus non obedit +rationi. Et tamen inquantum ducitur quadam aestimativa naturali, +quae subiicitur rationi superiori, scilicet divinae, est in eis +quaedam similitudo moralis boni, quantum ad animae passiones.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q25" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q25-p0.1">Q. 25. OF THE ORDER OF THE PASSIONS TO ONE ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q25-p2"> We must now consider the order of the passions to one another: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q25-p3"><a href="#FS_Q25_A1"> (1) The relation of the irascible passions to the concupiscible passions;</a></p><p id="FS_Q25-p4"><a href="#FS_Q25_A2"> (2) The relation of the concupiscible passions to one another;</a></p><p id="FS_Q25-p5"><a href="#FS_Q25_A3"> (3) The relation of the irascible passions to one another;</a></p><p id="FS_Q25-p6"><a href="#FS_Q25_A4"> (4) The four principal passions.</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 pr."><a name="34600" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34600] +Iª-IIae q. 25 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +ordine passionum ad invicem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. +Primo, de ordine passionum irascibilis ad passiones +concupiscibilis. Secundo, de ordine passionum concupiscibilis ad +invicem. Tertio, de ordine passionum irascibilis ad invicem. +Quarto, de quatuor principalibus passionibus.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q25_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q25_A1-p0.1">Q. 25. A. 1. Whether the irascible passions precede the concupiscible passions, or vice versa?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the irascible passions precede the concupiscible passions. For the order of the passions is that of their + objects. But the object of the irascible faculty is the difficult good, which seems to be the highest good. Therefore the + irascible passions seem to precede the concupiscible passions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34601" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34601] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod passiones irascibilis sint priores +passionibus concupiscibilis. Ordo enim passionum est secundum +ordinem obiectorum. Sed obiectum irascibilis est bonum arduum, quod +videtur esse supremum inter alia bona. Ergo passiones irascibilis +videntur praeesse passionibus concupiscibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the mover precedes that which is moved. But the irascible faculty is compared to the concupiscible, as mover to + that which is moved: since it is given to animals, for the purposed of removing the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible + faculty from enjoying its object, as stated above (Q[23], A[1], ad 1; + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q81_A2" id="FS_Q25_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[81], A[2]</a> ). Now "that which removes an obstacle, is a kind of mover" (Phys. viii, 4). Therefore the irascible + passions precede the concupiscible passions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34602" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34602] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +movens est prius moto. Sed irascibilis comparatur ad +concupiscibilem sicut movens ad motum, ad hoc enim datur +animalibus, ut tollantur impedimenta quibus concupiscibilis +prohibetur frui suo obiecto, ut supra dictum est; removens autem +prohibens habet rationem moventis, ut dicitur in VIII Physic. Ergo +passiones irascibilis sunt priores passionibus concupiscibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, joy and sadness are concupiscible passions. But joy and sadness succeed to the irascible passions: for the Philosopher + says (Ethic. iv, 5) that"retaliation causes anger to cease, because it produces pleasure instead of the previous pain." Therefore + the concupiscible passions follow the irascible passions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34603" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34603] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +gaudium et tristitia sunt passiones concupiscibilis. Sed gaudium et +tristitia consequuntur ad passiones irascibilis, dicit enim +philosophus, in IV Ethic., quod <i>punitio quietat impetum irae, +delectationem loco tristitiae faciens</i>. Ergo passiones +concupiscibilis sunt posteriores passionibus irascibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The concupiscible passions regard the absolute good, while the irascible passions regard a restricted, viz. the difficult, + good. Since, therefore, the absolute good precedes the restricted good, it seems that the concupiscible passions precede the + irascible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34604" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34604] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +passiones concupiscibilis respiciunt bonum absolutum, passiones +autem irascibilis respiciunt bonum contractum, scilicet arduum. Cum +igitur bonum simpliciter sit prius quam bonum contractum, videtur +quod passiones concupiscibilis sint priores passionibus +irascibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q25_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In the concupiscible passions there is more diversity than in the passions of the irascible faculty. For in the former we + find something relating to movement---e.g. desire; and something belonging to repose, e.g. joy and sadness. But in the irascible + passions there is nothing pertaining to repose, and only that which belongs to movement. The reason of this is that when we + find rest in a thing, we no longer look upon it as something difficult or arduous; + whereas such is the object of the irascible faculty. + </p><p id="FS_Q25_A1-p7"> Now since rest is the end of movement, it is first in the order of intention, but last in the order of execution. If, therefore, + we compare the passions of the irascible faculty with those concupiscible passions that denote rest in good, it is evident + that in the order of execution, the irascible passions take precedence of such like passions of the concupiscible faculty: + thus hope precedes joy, and hence causes it, according to the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q25_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.12" target="asv">Rom. 12:12</a>): + "Rejoicing in hope." But the concupiscible passion which denotes rest in evil, viz. sadness, comes between two irascible passions: + because it follows fear; since we become sad when we are confronted by the evil that we feared: while it precedes the movement + of anger; since the movement of self-vindication, that results from sadness, is the movement of anger. And because it is looked + upon as a good thing to pay back the evil done to us; when the angry man has achieved this he rejoices. Thus it + is evident that every passion of the irascible faculty terminates in a concupiscible passion denoting rest, viz. either in + joy or in sadness. + </p><p id="FS_Q25_A1-p8"> But if we compare the irascible passions to those concupiscible passions that denote movement, then it is clear that the + latter take precedence: because the passions of the irascible faculty add something to those of the concupiscible faculty; + just as the object of the irascible adds the aspect of arduousness or difficulty to the object of the concupiscible faculty. + Thus hope adds to desire a certain effort, and a certain raising of the spirits to the realization of the arduous + good. In like manner fear adds to aversion or detestation a certain lowness of spirits, on account of difficulty in shunning + the evil. + </p><p id="FS_Q25_A1-p9"> Accordingly the passions of the irascible faculty stand between those concupiscible passions that denote movement towards + good or evil, and those concupiscible passions that denote rest in good or evil. And it is therefore evident that the irascible + passions both arise from and terminate in the passions of the concupiscible faculty. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 1 co."><a name="34605" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34605] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod passiones concupiscibilis ad plura se habent quam +passiones irascibilis. Nam in passionibus concupiscibilis invenitur +aliquid pertinens ad motum, sicut desiderium; et aliquid pertinens +ad quietem, sicut gaudium et tristitia. Sed in passionibus +irascibilis non invenitur aliquid pertinens ad quietem, sed solum +pertinens ad motum. Cuius ratio est quia id in quo iam quiescitur, +non habet rationem difficilis seu ardui, quod est obiectum +irascibilis. Quies autem, cum sit finis motus, est prior in +intentione, sed posterior in executione. Si ergo comparentur +passiones irascibilis ad passiones concupiscibilis quae significant +quietem in bono; manifeste passiones irascibilis praecedunt, ordine +executionis, huiusmodi passiones concupiscibilis, sicut spes +praecedit gaudium, unde et causat ipsum, secundum illud apostoli, +Rom. XII, <i>spe gaudentes</i>. Sed passio concupiscibilis +importans quietem in malo, scilicet tristitia, media est inter duas +passiones irascibilis. Sequitur enim timorem, cum enim occurrerit +malum quod timebatur, causatur tristitia. Praecedit autem motum +irae, quia cum ex tristitia praecedente aliquis insurgit in +vindictam, hoc pertinet ad motum irae. Et quia rependere vicem +malis, apprehenditur ut bonum; cum iratus hoc consecutus fuerit, +gaudet. Et sic manifestum est quod omnis passio irascibilis +terminatur ad passionem concupiscibilis pertinentem ad quietem, +scilicet vel ad gaudium vel ad tristitiam. Sed si comparentur +passiones irascibilis ad passiones concupiscibilis quae important +motum, sic manifeste passiones concupiscibilis sunt priores, eo +quod passiones irascibilis addunt supra passiones concupiscibilis; +sicut et obiectum irascibilis addit supra obiectum concupiscibilis +arduitatem sive difficultatem. Spes enim supra desiderium addit +quendam conatum, et quandam elevationem animi ad consequendum bonum +arduum. Et similiter timor addit supra fugam seu abominationem, +quandam depressionem animi, propter difficultatem mali. Sic ergo +passiones irascibilis mediae sunt inter passiones concupiscibilis +quae important motum in bonum vel in malum; et inter passiones +concupiscibilis quae important quietem in bono vel in malo. Et sic +patet quod passiones irascibilis et principium habent a passionibus +concupiscibilis, et in passiones concupiscibilis terminantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument would prove, if the formal object of the concupiscible faculty were something contrary to the arduous, just + as the formal object of the irascible faculty is that which is arduous. But because the object of the concupiscible faculty + is good absolutely, it naturally precedes the object of the irascible, as the common precedes the proper. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34606" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34606] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod illa ratio procederet, si de ratione obiecti +concupiscibilis esset aliquid oppositum arduo, sicut de ratione +obiecti irascibilis est quod sit arduum. Sed quia obiectum +concupiscibilis est bonum absolute, prius naturaliter est quam +obiectum irascibilis, sicut commune proprio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The remover of an obstacle is not a direct but an accidental mover: and here we are speaking of passions as directly related + to one another. Moreover, the irascible passion removes the obstacle that hinders the concupiscible from resting in its object. + Wherefore it only follows that the irascible passions precede those concupiscible passions that connote rest. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34607" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34607] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod removens prohibens non est movens per se, sed per +accidens. Nunc autem loquimur de ordine passionum per se. Et +praeterea irascibilis removet prohibens quietem concupiscibilis in +suo obiecto. Unde ex hoc non sequitur nisi quod passiones +irascibilis praecedunt passiones concupiscibilis ad quietem +pertinentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A1-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b>The third object + leads to the same conclusion.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34608" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34608] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> De quibus +etiam tertia ratio procedit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q25_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q25_A2-p0.1">Q. 25. A. 2. Whether love is the first of the concupiscible passions?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that love is not the first of the concupiscible passions. For the concupiscible faculty is so called from concupiscence, + which is the same passion as desire. But "things are named from their chief characteristic" (De Anima ii, 4). Therefore desire + takes precedence of love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34609" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34609] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non sit prima passionum +concupiscibilis. Vis enim concupiscibilis a concupiscentia +denominatur, quae est eadem passio cum desiderio. Sed denominatio +fit a potiori, ut dicitur in II de anima. Ergo concupiscentia est +potior amore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, love implies a certain union; since it is a "uniting and binding force," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But concupiscence + or desire is a movement towards union with the thing coveted or desired. Therefore desire precedes love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34610" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34610] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +amor unionem quandam importat, est enim vis unitiva et concretiva, +ut Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed concupiscentia vel +desiderium est motus ad unionem rei concupitae vel desideratae. +Ergo concupiscentia est prior amore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the cause precedes its effect. But pleasure is sometimes the cause of love: since some love on account of pleasure + (Ethic. viii, 3,4). Therefore pleasure precedes love; and consequently love is not the first of the concupiscible passions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34611" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34611] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +causa est prior effectu. Sed delectatio est quandoque causa amoris, +quidam enim propter delectationem amant, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic. +Ergo delectatio est prior amore. Non ergo prima inter passiones +concupiscibilis est amor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9) that all the passions are caused by love: since "love yearning for the beloved object, + is desire; and, having and enjoying it, is joy." Therefore love is the first of the concupiscible passions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34612" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34612] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quod omnes passiones +ex amore causantur, <i>amor enim inhians habere quod amatur, +cupiditas est; id autem habens, eoque fruens, laetitia est</i>. +Amor ergo est prima passionum concupiscibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q25_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Good and evil are the object of the concupiscible faculty. Now good naturally precedes evil; since evil is privation of good. + Wherefore all the passions, the object of which is good, are naturally before those, the object of which is evil---that is + to say, each precedes its contrary passion: because the quest of a good is the reason for shunning the opposite evil. + </p><p id="FS_Q25_A2-p7"> Now good has the aspect of an end, and the end is indeed first in the order of intention, but last in the order of execution. + Consequently the order of the concupiscible passions can be considered either in the order of intention or in the order of + execution. In the order of execution, the first place belongs to that which takes place first in the thing that tends to the + end. Now it is evident that whatever tends to an end, has, in the first place, an aptitude or proportion to + that end, for nothing tends to a disproportionate end; secondly, it is moved to that end; thirdly, it rests in the end, after + having attained it. And this very aptitude or proportion of the appetite to good is love, which is complacency in good; while + movement towards good is desire or concupiscence; and rest in good is joy or pleasure. Accordingly in this order, love precedes + desire, and desire precedes pleasure. But in the order of intention, it is the reverse: because the pleasure intended + causes desire and love. For pleasure is the enjoyment of the good, which enjoyment is, in a way, the end, just as the good + itself is, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q11_A3" id="FS_Q25_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[11], A[3]</a>, ad 3). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 2 co."><a name="34613" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34613] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod obiectum concupiscibilis sunt bonum et malum. +Naturaliter autem est prius bonum malo, eo quod malum est privatio +boni. Unde et omnes passiones quarum obiectum est bonum, +naturaliter sunt priores passionibus quarum obiectum est malum, +unaquaeque scilicet sua opposita, quia enim bonum quaeritur, ideo +refutatur oppositum malum. Bonum autem habet rationem finis, qui +quidem est prior in intentione, sed est posterior in consecutione. +Potest ergo ordo passionum concupiscibilis attendi vel secundum +intentionem, vel secundum consecutionem. Secundum quidem +consecutionem, illud est prius quod primo fit in eo quod tendit ad +finem. Manifestum est autem quod omne quod tendit ad finem aliquem, +primo quidem habet aptitudinem seu proportionem ad finem, nihil +enim tendit in finem non proportionatum; secundo, movetur ad finem; +tertio, quiescit in fine post eius consecutionem. Ipsa autem +aptitudo sive proportio appetitus ad bonum est amor, qui nihil +aliud est quam complacentia boni; motus autem ad bonum est +desiderium vel concupiscentia; quies autem in bono est gaudium vel +delectatio. Et ideo secundum hunc ordinem, amor praecedit +desiderium, et desiderium praecedit delectationem. Sed secundum +ordinem intentionis, est e converso, nam delectatio intenta causat +desiderium et amorem. Delectatio enim est fruitio boni, quae +quodammodo est finis sicut et ipsum bonum, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We name a thing as we understand it, for "words are signs of thoughts," as the Philosopher states (Peri Herm. i, 1). Now + in most cases we know a cause by its effect. But the effect of love, when the beloved object is possessed, is pleasure: when + it is not possessed, it is desire or concupiscence: and, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), "we are more sensible to love, + when we lack that which we love." Consequently of all the concupiscible passions, + concupiscence is felt most; and for this reason the power is named after it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34614" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34614] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod hoc modo nominatur aliquid, secundum quod nobis +innotescit, voces enim sunt signa intellectuum, secundum +philosophum. Nos autem, ut plurimum, per effectum cognoscimus +causam. Effectus autem amoris, quando quidem habetur ipsum amatum, +est delectatio, quando vero non habetur, est desiderium vel +concupiscentia. Ut autem Augustinus dicit, in X de Trin., <i>amor +magis sentitur, cum eum prodit indigentia</i>. Unde inter omnes +passiones concupiscibilis, magis sensibilis est concupiscentia. Et +propter hoc, ab ea denominatur potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The union of lover and beloved is twofold. There is real union, consisting in the conjunction of one with the other. This + union belongs to joy or pleasure, which follows desire. There is also an affective union, consisting in an aptitude or proportion, + in so far as one thing, from the very fact of its having an aptitude for and an inclination to another, partakes of it: and + love betokens such a union. This union precedes the movement of desire. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34615" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34615] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod duplex est unio amati ad amantem. Una quidem realis, +secundum scilicet coniunctionem ad rem ipsam. Et talis unio +pertinet ad gaudium vel delectationem, quae sequitur desiderium. +Alia autem est unio affectiva, quae est secundum aptitudinem vel +proportionem, prout scilicet ex hoc quod aliquid habet aptitudinem +ad alterum et inclinationem, iam participat aliquid eius. Et sic +amor unionem importat. Quae quidem unio praecedit motum +desiderii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Pleasure causes love, in so far as it precedes love in the order of intention. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34616" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34616] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod delectatio causat amorem, secundum quod est prior in +intentione.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q25_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q25_A3-p0.1">Q. 25. A. 3. Whether hope is the first of the irascible passions?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hope is not the first of the irascible passions. Because the irascible faculty is denominated from anger. + Since, therefore, "things are names from their chief characteristic" (cf. A[2], OBJ[1]), it seems that anger precedes and + surpasses hope. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34617" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34617] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod spes non sit prima inter passiones +irascibilis. Vis enim irascibilis ab ira denominatur. Cum ergo +denominatio fiat a potiori, videtur quod ira sit potior et prior +quam spes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object of the irascible faculty is something arduous. Now it seems more arduous to strive to overcome a contrary + evil that threatens soon to overtake us, which pertains to daring; or an evil actually present, which pertains to anger; than + to strive simply to obtain some good. Again, it seems more arduous to strive to overcome a present evil, than a future evil. + Therefore anger seems to be a stronger passion than daring, and daring, than hope. And + consequently it seems that hope does not precede them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34618" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34618] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +arduum est obiectum irascibilis. Sed magis videtur esse arduum quod +aliquis conetur superare malum contrarium quod imminet ut futurum, +quod pertinet ad audaciam; vel quod iniacet iam ut praesens, quod +pertinet ad iram; quam quod conetur acquirere simpliciter aliquod +bonum. Et similiter magis videtur esse arduum quod conetur vincere +malum praesens, quam malum futurum. Ergo ira videtur esse potior +passio quam audacia, et audacia quam spes. Et sic spes non videtur +esse prior.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, when a thing is moved towards an end, the movement of withdrawal precedes the movement of approach. But fear and + despair imply withdrawal from something; while daring and hope imply approach towards something. Therefore fear and despair + precede hope and daring. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34619" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34619] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +prius occurrit, in motu ad finem, recessus a termino, quam accessus +ad terminum. Sed timor et desperatio important recessum ab aliquo, +audacia autem et spes important accessum ad aliquid. Ergo timor et +desperatio praecedunt spem et audaciam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The nearer a thing is to the first, the more it precedes others. But hope is nearer to love, which is the first of the passions. + Therefore hope is the first of the passions in the irascible faculty. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34620" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34620] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +quanto aliquid est propinquius primo, tanto est prius. Sed spes est +propinquior amori, qui est prima passionum. Ergo spes est prior +inter omnes passiones irascibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q25_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q25_A1" id="FS_Q25_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> all irascible passions imply movement towards something. Now this movement of the irascible faculty towards something may + be due to two causes: one is the mere aptitude or proportion to the end; and this pertains to love or hatred, those whose + object is good, or evil; and this belongs to sadness or joy. As a matter of fact, the presence of good produces no passion + in the irascible, as stated above (Q[23], + AA[3],4); but the presence of evil gives rise to the passion of anger. + </p><p id="FS_Q25_A3-p7"> Since then in order of generation or execution, proportion or aptitude to the end precedes the achievement of the end; it + follows that, of all the irascible passions, anger is the last in the order of generation. And among the other passions of + the irascible faculty, which imply a movement arising from love of good or hatred of evil, those whose object is good, viz. + hope and despair, must naturally precede those whose object is evil, viz. daring and fear: yet so that hope + precedes despair; since hope is a movement towards good as such, which is essentially attractive, so that hope tends to good + directly; whereas despair is a movement away from good, a movement which is consistent with good, not as such, but in respect + of something else, wherefore its tendency from good is accidental, as it were. In like manner fear, through being a movement + from evil, precedes daring. And that hope and despair naturally precede fear and daring is evident from this---that as the + desire of good is the reason for avoiding evil, so hope and despair are the reason for fear and daring: because daring arises + from the hope of victory, and fear arises from the despair of overcoming. Lastly, anger arises from daring: for no one is + angry while seeking vengeance, unless he dare to avenge himself, as Avicenna observes in the sixth book of his Physics. Accordingly, + it is evident that hope is the first of all the irascible passions. + </p><p id="FS_Q25_A3-p8"> And if we wish to know the order of all the passions in the way of generation, love and hatred are first; desire and aversion, + second; hope and despair, third; fear and daring, fourth; anger, fifth; sixth and last, joy and sadness, which follow from + all the passions, as stated in Ethic. ii, 5: yet so that love precedes hatred; desire precedes aversion; hope precedes despair; + fear precedes daring; and joy precedes sadness, as may be gathered from what has been stated above. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 3 co."><a name="34621" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34621] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, omnes passiones irascibilis +important motum in aliquid. Motus autem ad aliquid in irascibili +potest causari ex duobus, uno modo, ex sola aptitudine seu +proportione ad finem, quae pertinet ad amorem vel odium; alio modo, +ex praesentia ipsius boni vel mali, quae pertinet ad tristitiam vel +gaudium. Et quidem ex praesentia boni non causatur aliqua passio in +irascibili, ut dictum est, sed ex praesentia mali causatur passio +irae. Quia igitur in via generationis seu consecutionis, proportio +vel aptitudo ad finem praecedit consecutionem finis; inde est quod +ira, inter omnes passiones irascibilis, est ultima, ordine +generationis. Inter alias autem passiones irascibilis, quae +important motum consequentem amorem vel odium boni vel mali, +oportet quod passiones quarum obiectum est bonum, scilicet spes et +desperatio, sint naturaliter priores passionibus quarum obiectum +est malum, scilicet audacia et timore. Ita tamen quod spes est +prior desperatione, quia spes est motus in bonum secundum rationem +boni quod de sua ratione est attractivum, et ideo est motus in +bonum per se; desperatio autem est recessus a bono, qui non +competit bono secundum quod est bonum, sed secundum aliquid aliud, +unde est quasi per accidens. Et eadem ratione, timor, cum sit +recessus a malo, est prior quam audacia. Quod autem spes et +desperatio sint naturaliter priores quam timor et audacia, ex hoc +manifestum est, quod, sicut appetitus boni est ratio quare vitetur +malum, ita etiam spes et desperatio sunt ratio timoris et audaciae, +nam audacia consequitur spem victoriae, et timor consequitur +desperationem vincendi. Ira autem consequitur audaciam, nullus enim +irascitur vindictam appetens, nisi audeat vindicare, secundum quod +Avicenna dicit, in sexto de naturalibus. Sic ergo patet quod spes +est prima inter omnes passiones irascibilis. Et si ordinem omnium +passionum secundum viam generationis, scire velimus, primo +occurrunt amor et odium; secundo, desiderium et fuga; tertio, spes +et desperatio; quarto, timor et audacia; quinto, ira; sexto et +ultimo, gaudium et tristitia, quae consequuntur ad omnes passiones, +ut dicitur in II Ethic. Ita tamen quod amor est prior odio, et +desiderium fuga, et spes desperatione, et timor audacia, et gaudium +quam tristitia, ut ex praedictis colligi potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Because anger arises from the other passions, as an effect from the causes that precede it, it is from anger, as being more + manifest than the other passions, that the power takes its name. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34622" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34622] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, quia ira causatur ex aliis passionibus sicut +effectus a causis praecedentibus, ideo ab ea, tanquam a +manifestiori, denominatur potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not the arduousness but the good that is the reason for approach or desire. Consequently hope, which regards good more + directly, takes precedence: although at times daring or even anger regards something more arduous. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34623" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34623] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod arduum non est ratio accedendi vel appetendi, sed +potius bonum. Et ideo spes, quae directius respicit bonum, est +prior, quamvis audacia aliquando sit in magis arduum, vel etiam +ira.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The movement of the appetite is essentially and directly towards the good as towards its proper object; its movement from + evil results from this. For the movement of the appetitive part is in proportion, not to natural movement, but to the intention + of nature, which intends the end before intending the removal of a contrary, which removal is desired only for the sake of + obtaining the end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34624" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34624] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod appetitus primo et per se movetur in bonum, sicut in +proprium obiectum; et ex hoc causatur quod recedat a malo. +Proportionatur enim motus appetitivae partis, non quidem motui +naturali, sed intentioni naturae; quae per prius intendit finem +quam remotionem contrarii, quae non quaeritur nisi propter +adeptionem finis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q25_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q25_A4-p0.1">Q. 25. A. 4. Whether these are the four principal passions: joy, sadness, hope and fear?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that joy, sadness, hope and fear are not the four principal passions. For Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3,[7] + sqq.) omits hope and puts desire in its place. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34625" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34625] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sint istae quatuor principales +passiones, gaudium et tristitia, spes et timor. Augustinus enim, in +XIV de Civ. Dei, non ponit spem, sed cupiditatem loco eius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is a twofold order in the passions of the soul: the order of intention, and the order of execution or generation. + The principal passions should therefore be taken, either in the order of intention; and thus joy and sadness, which are the + final passions, will be the principal passions; or in the order of execution or generation, and thus love will be the principal + passion. Therefore joy and sadness, hope and fear should in no way be called the + four principal passions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34626" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34626] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +in passionibus animae est duplex ordo, scilicet intentionis, et +consecutionis seu generationis. Aut ergo principales passiones +accipiuntur secundum ordinem intentionis, et sic tantum gaudium et +tristitia, quae sunt finales, erunt principales passiones. Aut +secundum ordinem consecutionis seu generationis, et sic amor erit +principalis passio. Nullo ergo modo debent dici quatuor principales +passiones istae quatuor, gaudium et tristitia, spes et timor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as daring is caused by hope, so fear is caused by despair. Either, therefore, hope and despair should be reckoned + as principal passions, since they cause others: or hope and daring, from being akin to one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34627" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34627] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut audacia causatur ex spe, ita timor ex desperatione. Aut ergo +spes et desperatio debent poni principales passiones, tanquam +causae, aut spes et audacia, tanquam sibi ipsis affines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q25_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius (De Consol. i) in enumerating the four principal passions, says: + </p><p id="FS_Q25_A4-p6"> "Banish joys: banish fears:</p><p id="FS_Q25_A4-p7"> Away with hope: away with tears."</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34628" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34628] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est illud quod Boetius, in libro de Consol., enumerans quatuor +principales passiones, dicit, <i>gaudia pelle, pelle timorem, +spemque fugato, nec dolor adsit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q25_A4-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> These four are commonly called the principal passions. Two of them, viz. joy and sadness, are said to be principal because + in them all the other passions have their completion and end; wherefore they arise from all the other passions, as is stated + in Ethic. ii, 5. Fear and hope are principal passions, not because they complete the others simply, but because they complete + them as regards the movement of the appetite towards something: for in respect of good, + movement begins in love, goes forward to desire, and ends in hope; while in respect of evil, it begins in hatred, goes on + to aversion, and ends in fear. Hence it is customary to distinguish these four passions in relation to the present and the + future: for movement regards the future, while rest is in something present: so that joy relates to present good, sadness + relates to present evil; hope regards future good, and fear, future evil. + </p><p id="FS_Q25_A4-p9"> As to the other passions that regard good or evil, present or future, they all culminate in these four. For this reason some + have said that these four are the principal passions, because they are general passions; and this is true, provided that by + hope and fear we understand the appetite's common tendency to desire or shun something. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 4 co."><a name="34629" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34629] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod hae quatuor passiones communiter principales esse +dicuntur. Quarum duae, scilicet gaudium et tristitia, principales +dicuntur, quia sunt completivae et finales simpliciter respectu +omnium passionum, unde ad omnes passiones consequuntur, ut dicitur +in II Ethic. Timor autem et spes sunt principales, non quidem quasi +completivae simpliciter, sed quia sunt completivae in genere motus +appetitivi ad aliquid, nam respectu boni, incipit motus in amore, +et procedit in desiderium, et terminatur in spe; respectu vero +mali, incipit in odio, et procedit ad fugam, et terminatur in +timore. Et ideo solet harum quatuor passionum numerus accipi +secundum differentiam praesentis et futuri, motus enim respicit +futurum, sed quies est in aliquo praesenti. De bono igitur +praesenti est gaudium; de malo praesenti est tristitia; de bono +vero futuro est spes; de malo futuro est timor. Omnes autem aliae +passiones, quae sunt de bono vel de malo praesenti vel futuro, ad +has completive reducuntur. Unde etiam a quibusdam dicuntur +principales hae praedictae quatuor passiones, quia sunt generales. +Quod quidem verum est, si spes et timor designant motum appetitus +communiter tendentem in aliquid appetendum vel fugiendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine puts desire or covetousness in place of hope, in so far as they seem to regard the same object, viz. some future + good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34630" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34630] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Augustinus ponit desiderium vel cupiditatem loco +spei, inquantum ad idem pertinere videntur, scilicet ad bonum +futurum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> These are called principal passions, in the order of intention and completion. And though fear and hope are not the last + passions simply, yet they are the last of those passions that tend towards something as future. Nor can the argument be pressed + any further except in the case of anger: yet neither can anger be reckoned a principal passion, because it is an effect of + daring, which cannot be a principal passion, as we shall state further on (Reply + OBJ 3). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34631" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34631] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod passiones istae dicuntur principales, secundum +ordinem intentionis et complementi. Et quamvis timor et spes non +sint ultimae passiones simpliciter, tamen sunt ultimae in genere +passionum tendentium in aliud quasi in futurum. Nec potest esse +instantia nisi de ira. Quae tamen non potest poni principalis +passio, quia est quidam effectus audaciae, quae non potest esse +passio principalis, ut infra dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Despair implies movement away from good; and this is, as it were, accidental: and daring implies movement towards evil; and + this too is accidental. Consequently these cannot be principal passions; because that which is accidental cannot be said to + be principal. And so neither can anger be called a principal passion, because it arises from daring. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34632" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34632] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod desperatio importat recessum a bono, quod est quasi +per accidens, et audacia importat accessum ad malum, quod etiam est +per accidens. Et ideo hae passiones non possunt esse principales, +quia quod est per accidens, non potest dici principale. Et sic +etiam nec ira potest dici passio principalis, quae consequitur +audaciam.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q26" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q26-p0.1">Q. 26. OF THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL IN PARTICULAR: AND FIRST, OF LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q26-p2"> We have now to consider the soul's passions in particular, and (1) the passions of the concupiscible faculty; (2) the passions + of the irascible faculty. + </p><p id="FS_Q26-p3"> The first of these considerations will be threefold: since we shall consider (1) Love and hatred; (2) Desire and aversion; + (3) Pleasure and sadness. + </p><p id="FS_Q26-p4"> Concerning love, three points must be considered: (1) Love itself; (2) The cause of love; (3) The effects of love. Under + the first head there are four points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FS_Q26-p5"><a href="#FS_Q26_A1"> (1) Whether love is in the concupiscible power?</a></p><p id="FS_Q26-p6"><a href="#FS_Q26_A2"> (2) Whether love is a passion?</a></p><p id="FS_Q26-p7"><a href="#FS_Q26_A3"> (3) Whether love is the same as dilection?</a></p><p id="FS_Q26-p8"><a href="#FS_Q26_A4"> (4) Whether love is properly divided into love of friendship, and love of concupiscence?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 pr."><a name="34633" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34633] +Iª-IIae q. 26 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de +passionibus animae in speciali. Et primo, de passionibus +concupiscibilis; secundo, de passionibus irascibilis. Prima +consideratio erit tripartita, nam primo considerabimus de amore et +odio; secundo, de concupiscentia et fuga tertio, de delectatione et +tristitia. Circa amorem consideranda sunt tria, primo, de ipso +amore; secundo, de causa amoris; tertio, de effectibus eius. Circa +primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum amor sit in concupiscibili. +Secundo, utrum amor sit passio. Tertio, utrum amor sit idem quod +dilectio. Quarto, utrum amor convenienter dividatur in amorem +amicitiae et amorem concupiscentiae.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q26_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q26_A1-p0.1">Q. 26. A. 1. Whether love is in the concupiscible power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that love is not in the concupiscible power. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q26_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.2" target="asv">Wis. 8:2</a>): "Her," namely wisdom, "have I loved, and have sought her out from my youth." But the concupiscible power, being a part + of the sensitive appetite, cannot tend to wisdom, which is not apprehended by the senses. Therefore love is not in the concupiscible + power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34634" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34634] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non sit in concupiscibili. +Dicitur enim Sap. VIII, hanc, scilicet sapientiam, amavi et +exquisivi a iuventute mea. Sed concupiscibilis, cum sit pars +appetitus sensitivi, non potest tendere in sapientiam, quae non +comprehenditur sensu. Ergo amor non est in concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, love seems to be identified with every passion: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7): "Love, yearning for the + object beloved, is desire; having and enjoying it, is joy; fleeing what is contrary to it, is fear; and feeling what is contrary + to it, is sadness." But not every passion is in the concupiscible power; indeed, fear, which is mentioned in this passage, + is in the irascible power. Therefore we must not say absolutely that love is in the + concupiscible power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34635" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34635] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +amor videtur esse idem cuilibet passioni, dicit enim Augustinus, in +XIV de Civ. Dei, <i>amor inhians habere quod amatur, cupiditas est; +id autem habens, eoque fruens, laetitia; fugiens quod ei +adversatur, timor est; idque si acciderit sentiens, tristitia +est</i>. Sed non omnis passio est in concupiscibili; sed timor, +etiam hic enumeratus, est in irascibili. Ergo non est simpliciter +dicendum quod amor sit in concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) mentions a "natural love." But natural love seems to pertain rather to the natural powers, + which belong to the vegetal soul. Therefore love is not simply in the concupiscible power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34636" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34636] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Dionysius, in IV cap. de Div. Nom., ponit quendam amorem naturalem. +Sed amor naturalis magis videtur pertinere ad vires naturales, quae +sunt animae vegetabilis. Ergo amor non simpliciter est in +concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7) that "love is in the concupiscible power." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34637" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34637] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Topic., quod amor est in +concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q26_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Love is something pertaining to the appetite; since good is the object of both. Wherefore love differs according to the difference + of appetites. For there is an appetite which arises from an apprehension existing, not in the subject of the appetite, but + in some other: and this is called the "natural appetite." Because natural things seek what is suitable to them according to + their nature, by reason of an apprehension which is not in them, but in the Author + of their nature, as stated in the + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q6_A1" id="FS_Q26_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[6], A[1]</a>, ad 2; + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q103_A1" id="FS_Q26_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[103], A[1]</a>, ad 1,3. And there is another appetite arising from an apprehension in the subject of the appetite, but from necessity and + not from free-will. Such is, in irrational animals, the "sensitive appetite," which, however, in man, has a certain share + of liberty, in so far as it obeys reason. Again, there is another appetite following freely from an apprehension in the subject + of + the appetite. And this is the rational or intellectual appetite, which is called the "will." + </p><p id="FS_Q26_A1-p7"> Now in each of these appetites, the name "love" is given to the principle movement towards the end loved. In the natural + appetite the principle of this movement is the appetitive subject's connaturalness with the thing to which it tends, and may + be called "natural love": thus the connaturalness of a heavy body for the centre, is by reason of its weight and may be called + "natural love." In like manner the aptitude of the sensitive appetite or of the will to some good, that is to + say, its very complacency in good is called "sensitive love," or "intellectual" or "rational love." So that sensitive love + is in the sensitive appetite, just as intellectual love is in the intellectual appetite. And it belongs to the concupiscible + power, because it regards good absolutely, and not under the aspect of difficulty, which is the object of the irascible faculty. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 1 co."><a name="34638" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34638] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod amor est aliquid ad appetitum pertinens, cum +utriusque obiectum sit bonum. Unde secundum differentiam appetitus +est differentia amoris. Est enim quidam appetitus non consequens +apprehensionem ipsius appetentis, sed alterius, et huiusmodi +dicitur appetitus naturalis. Res enim naturales appetunt quod eis +convenit secundum suam naturam, non per apprehensionem propriam, +sed per apprehensionem instituentis naturam, ut in I libro dictum +est. Alius autem est appetitus consequens apprehensionem ipsius +appetentis, sed ex necessitate, non ex iudicio libero. Et talis est +appetitus sensitivus in brutis, qui tamen in hominibus aliquid +libertatis participat, inquantum obedit rationi. Alius autem est +appetitus consequens apprehensionem appetentis secundum liberum +iudicium. Et talis est appetitus rationalis sive intellectivus, qui +dicitur voluntas. In unoquoque autem horum appetituum, amor dicitur +illud quod est principium motus tendentis in finem amatum. In +appetitu autem naturali, principium huiusmodi motus est +connaturalitas appetentis ad id in quod tendit, quae dici potest +amor naturalis, sicut ipsa connaturalitas corporis gravis ad locum +medium est per gravitatem, et potest dici amor naturalis. Et +similiter coaptatio appetitus sensitivi, vel voluntatis, ad aliquod +bonum, idest ipsa complacentia boni, dicitur amor sensitivus, vel +intellectivus seu rationalis. Amor igitur sensitivus est in +appetitu sensitivo, sicut amor intellectivus in appetitu +intellectivo. Et pertinet ad concupiscibilem, quia dicitur per +respectum ad bonum absolute, non per respectum ad arduum, quod est +obiectum irascibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words quoted refer to intellectual or rational love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34639" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34639] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod auctoritas illa loquitur de amore intellectivo +vel rationali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Love is spoken of as being fear, joy, desire and sadness, not essentially but causally. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34640" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34640] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod amor dicitur esse timor, gaudium, cupiditas et +tristitia, non quidem essentialiter, sed causaliter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Natural love is not only in the powers of the vegetal soul, but in all the soul's powers, and also in all the parts of the + body, and universally in all things: because, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "Beauty and goodness are beloved by all things"; + since each single thing has a connaturalness with that which is naturally suitable to it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34641" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34641] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod amor naturalis non solum est in viribus animae +vegetativae, sed in omnibus potentiis animae, et etiam in omnibus +partibus corporis, et universaliter in omnibus rebus, quia, ut +Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., <i>omnibus est pulchrum et +bonum amabile</i>; cum unaquaeque res habeat connaturalitatem ad id +quod est sibi conveniens secundum suam naturam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q26_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q26_A2-p0.1">Q. 26. A. 2. Whether love is a passion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that love is not a passion. For no power is a passion. But every love is a power, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. + iv). Therefore love is not a passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34642" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34642] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non sit passio. Nulla enim virtus +passio est. Sed omnis amor est virtus quaedam, ut dicit Dionysius, +IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo amor non est passio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, love is a kind of union or bond, as Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 10). But a union or bond is not a passion, but + rather a relation. Therefore love is not a passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34643" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34643] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +amor est unio quaedam vel nexus, secundum Augustinum, in libro de +Trin. Sed unio vel nexus non est passio, sed magis relatio. Ergo +amor non est passio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that passion is a movement. But love does not imply the movement of the appetite; + for this is desire, of which movement love is the principle. Therefore love is not a passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34644" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34644] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Damascenus dicit, in II libro, quod passio est motus quidam. Amor +autem non importat motum appetitus, qui est desiderium; sed +principium huiusmodi motus. Ergo amor non est passio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "love is a passion." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34645" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34645] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic., quod amor est +passio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Passion is the effect of the agent on the patient. Now a natural agent produces a twofold effect on the patient: for in the + first place it gives it the form; and secondly it gives it the movement that results from the form. Thus the generator gives + the generated body both weight and the movement resulting from weight: so that weight, from being the principle of movement + to the place, which is connatural to that body by reason of its weight, can, in a way, be + called "natural love." In the same way the appetible object gives the appetite, first, a certain adaptation to itself, which + consists in complacency in that object; and from this follows movement towards the appetible object. For "the appetitive movement + is circular," as stated in De Anima iii, 10; because the appetible object moves the appetite, introducing itself, as it were, + into its intention; while the appetite moves towards the realization of the appetible object, so that the movement + ends where it began. Accordingly, the first change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object is called "love," and is + nothing else than complacency in that object; and from this complacency results a movement towards that same object, and this + movement is "desire"; and lastly, there is rest which is "joy." Since, therefore, love consists in a change wrought in the + appetite by the appetible object, it is evident that love is a passion: properly so called, according as it is in the + concupiscible faculty; in a wider and extended sense, according as it is in the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 2 co."><a name="34646" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34646] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod passio est effectus agentis in patiente. Agens autem +naturale duplicem effectum inducit in patiens, nam primo quidem dat +formam, secundo autem dat motum consequentem formam; sicut generans +dat corpori gravitatem, et motum consequentem ipsam. Et ipsa +gravitas, quae est principium motus ad locum connaturalem propter +gravitatem, potest quodammodo dici amor naturalis. Sic etiam ipsum +appetibile dat appetitui, primo quidem, quandam coaptationem ad +ipsum, quae est complacentia appetibilis; ex qua sequitur motus ad +appetibile. Nam appetitivus motus circulo agitur, ut dicitur in III +de anima, appetibile enim movet appetitum, faciens se quodammodo in +eius intentione; et appetitus tendit in appetibile realiter +consequendum, ut sit ibi finis motus, ubi fuit principium. Prima +ergo immutatio appetitus ab appetibili vocatur amor, qui nihil est +aliud quam complacentia appetibilis; et ex hac complacentia +sequitur motus in appetibile, qui est desiderium; et ultimo quies, +quae est gaudium. Sic ergo, cum amor consistat in quadam +immutatione appetitus ab appetibili, manifestum est quod amor et +passio, proprie quidem, secundum quod est in concupiscibili; +communiter autem, et extenso nomine, secundum quod est in +voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since power denotes a principle of movement or action, Dionysius calls love a power, in so far as it is a principle of movement + in the appetite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34647" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34647] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, quia virtus significat principium motus vel +actionis, ideo amor, inquantum est principium appetitivi motus, a +Dionysio vocatur virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Union belongs to love in so far as by reason of the complacency of the appetite, the lover stands in relation to that which + he loves, as though it were himself or part of himself. Hence it is clear that love is not the very relation of union, but + that union is a result of love. Hence, too, Dionysius says that "love is a unitive force" (Div. Nom. iv), and the Philosopher + says (Polit. ii, 1) that union is the work of love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34648" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34648] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod unio pertinet ad amorem, inquantum per complacentiam +appetitus amans se habet ad id quod amat, sicut ad seipsum, vel ad +aliquid sui. Et sic patet quod amor non est ipsa relatio unionis, +sed unio est consequens amorem. Unde et Dionysius dicit quod amor +est virtus unitiva, et philosophus dicit, in II Polit., quod unio +est opus amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although love does not denote the movement of the appetite in tending towards the appetible object, yet it denotes that movement + whereby the appetite is changed by the appetible object, so as to have complacency therein. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34649" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34649] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod amor, etsi non nominet motum appetitus tendentem in +appetibile, nominat tamen motum appetitus quo immutatur ab +appetibili, ut ei appetibile complaceat.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q26_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q26_A3-p0.1">Q. 26. A. 3. Whether love is the same as dilection?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that love is the same as dilection. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that love is to dilection, "as four is + to twice two, and as a rectilinear figure is to one composed of straight lines." But these have the same meaning. Therefore + love and dilection denote the same thing. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34650" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34650] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor sit idem quod dilectio. Dionysius +enim, IV cap. de Div. Nom., dicit quod hoc modo se habent amor et +dilectio, <i>sicut quatuor et bis duo, rectilineum et habens rectas +lineas</i>. Sed ista significant idem. Ergo amor et dilectio +significant idem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the movements of the appetite differ by reason of their objects. But the objects of dilection and love are the same. + Therefore these are the same. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34651" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34651] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +appetitivi motus secundum obiecta differunt. Sed idem est obiectum +dilectionis et amoris. Ergo sunt idem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if dilection and love differ, it seems that it is chiefly in the fact that "dilection refers to good things, love + to evil things, as some have maintained," according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7). But they do not differ thus; because + as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) the holy Scripture uses both words in reference to either good or bad things. Therefore + love and dilection do not differ: thus indeed Augustine concludes (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) + that "it is not one thing to speak of love, and another to speak of dilection." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34652" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34652] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +si dilectio et amor in aliquo differunt, maxime in hoc differre +videntur, quod dilectio sit in bono accipienda, amor autem in malo, +ut quidam dixerunt, secundum quod Augustinus narrat, in XIV de Civ. +Dei. Sed hoc modo non differunt, quia, ut ibidem Augustinus dicit, +in sacris Scripturis utrumque accipitur in bono et in malo. Ergo +amor et dilectio non differunt; sicut ipse Augustinus ibidem +concludit quod <i>non est aliud amorem dicere, et aliud dilectionem +dicere</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "some holy men have held that love means something more Godlike than dilection does." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34653" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34653] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>quibusdam +sanctorum visum est divinius esse nomen amoris quam nomen +dilectionis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q26_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We find four words referring in a way, to the same thing: viz. love, dilection, charity and friendship. They differ, however, + in this, that "friendship," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5), "is like a habit," whereas "love" and "dilection" + are expressed by way of act or passion; and "charity" can be taken either way. + </p><p id="FS_Q26_A3-p7"> Moreover these three express act in different ways. For love has a wider signification than the others, since every dilection + or charity is love, but not vice versa. Because dilection implies, in addition to love, a choice [electionem] made beforehand, + as the very word denotes: and therefore dilection is not in the concupiscible power, but only in the will, and only in the + rational nature. Charity denotes, in addition to love, a certain perfection of love, in so far as that + which is loved is held to be of great price, as the word itself implies [*Referring to the Latin "carus" (dear)]. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 3 co."><a name="34654" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34654] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod quatuor nomina inveniuntur ad idem quodammodo +pertinentia, scilicet amor, dilectio, caritas et amicitia. +Differunt tamen in hoc, quod amicitia, secundum philosophum in VIII +Ethic., est quasi habitus; amor autem et dilectio significantur per +modum actus vel passionis; caritas autem utroque modo accipi +potest. Differenter tamen significatur actus per ista tria. Nam +amor communius est inter ea, omnis enim dilectio vel caritas est +amor, sed non e converso. Addit enim dilectio supra amorem, +electionem praecedentem, ut ipsum nomen sonat. Unde dilectio non +est in concupiscibili, sed in voluntate tantum, et est in sola +rationali natura. Caritas autem addit supra amorem, perfectionem +quandam amoris, inquantum id quod amatur magni pretii aestimatur, +ut ipsum nomen designat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius is speaking of love and dilection, in so far as they are in the intellectual appetite; for thus love is the same + as dilection. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34655" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34655] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Dionysius loquitur de amore et dilectione, +secundum quod sunt in appetitu intellectivo, sic enim amor idem est +quod dilectio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The object of love is more general than the object of dilection: because love extends to more than dilection does, as stated + above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34656" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34656] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod obiectum amoris est communius quam obiectum +dilectionis, quia ad plura se extendit amor quam dilectio, sicut +dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Love and dilection differ, not in respect of good and evil, but as stated. Yet in the intellectual faculty love is the same + as dilection. And it is in this sense that Augustine speaks of love in the passage quoted: hence a little further on he adds + that "a right will is well-directed love, and a wrong will is ill-directed love." However, the fact that love, which is concupiscible + passion, inclines many to evil, is the reason why some assigned the + difference spoken of. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34657" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34657] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod non differunt amor et dilectio secundum differentiam +boni et mali, sed sicut dictum est. In parte tamen intellectiva +idem est amor et dilectio. Et sic loquitur ibi Augustinus de amore, +unde parum post subdit quod <i>recta voluntas est bonus amor, et +perversa voluntas est malus amor</i>. Quia tamen amor, qui est +passio concupiscibilis, plurimos inclinat ad malum, inde habuerunt +occasionem qui praedictam differentiam assignaverunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The reason why some held that, even when applied to the will itself, the word "love" signifies something more Godlike than + "dilection," was because love denotes a passion, especially in so far as it is in the sensitive appetite; whereas dilection + presupposes the judgment of reason. But it is possible for man to tend to God by love, being as it were passively drawn by + Him, more than he can possibly be drawn thereto by his reason, which pertains to the + nature of dilection, as stated above. And consequently love is more Godlike than dilection. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="34658" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34658] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod ideo aliqui posuerunt, etiam in ipsa voluntate, nomen +amoris esse divinius nomine dilectionis, quia amor importat quandam +passionem, praecipue secundum quod est in appetitu sensitivo; +dilectio autem praesupponit iudicium rationis. Magis autem homo in +Deum tendere potest per amorem, passive quodammodo ab ipso Deo +attractus, quam ad hoc eum propria ratio ducere possit, quod +pertinet ad rationem dilectionis, ut dictum est. Et propter hoc, +divinius est amor quam dilectio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q26_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q26_A4-p0.1">Q. 26. A. 4. Whether love is properly divided into love of friendship and love of concupiscence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that love is not properly divided into love of friendship and love of concupiscence. For "love is a passion, + while friendship is a habit," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5). But habit cannot be the member of a division + of passions. Therefore love is not properly divided into love of concupiscence and love of friendship. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34659" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34659] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor inconvenienter dividatur in +amorem amicitiae et concupiscentiae. Amor enim est passio, amicitia +vero est habitus, ut dicit philosophus, in VIII Ethic. Sed habitus +non potest esse pars divisiva passionis. Ergo amor non convenienter +dividitur per amorem concupiscentiae et amorem amicitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing cannot be divided by another member of the same division; for man is not a member of the same division as + "animal." But concupiscence is a member of the same division as love, as a passion distinct from love. Therefore concupiscence + is not a division of love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34660" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34660] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +nihil dividitur per id quod ei connumeratur, non enim homo +connumeratur animali. Sed concupiscentia connumeratur amori, sicut +alia passio ab amore. Ergo amor non potest dividi per +concupiscentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) friendship is threefold, that which is founded on "usefulness," that + which is founded on "pleasure," and that which is founded on "goodness." But useful and pleasant friendship are not without + concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence should not be contrasted with friendship. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34661" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34661] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +secundum philosophum, in VIII Ethic., triplex est amicitia, utilis, +delectabilis et honesta. Sed amicitia utilis et delectabilis habet +concupiscentiam. Ergo concupiscentia non debet dividi contra +amicitiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> We are said to love certain things, because we desire them: thus "a man is said to love wine, on account of its sweetness + which he desires"; as stated in Topic. ii, 3. But we have no friendship for wine and suchlike things, as stated in Ethic. + viii, 2. Therefore love of concupiscence is distinct from love of friendship. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34662" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34662] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +quaedam dicimur amare quia ea concupiscimus, sicut <i>dicitur +aliquis amare vinum propter dulce quod in eo concupiscit</i>, ut +dicitur in II Topic. Sed ad vinum, et ad huiusmodi, non habemus +amicitiam, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic. Ergo alius est amor +concupiscentiae, et alius est amor amicitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q26_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4), "to love is to wish good to someone." Hence the movement of love has a twofold tendency: + towards the good which a man wishes to someone (to himself or to another) and towards that to which he wishes some good. Accordingly, + man has love of concupiscence towards the good that he wishes to another, and love of friendship towards him to whom he wishes + good. + </p><p id="FS_Q26_A4-p7"> Now the members of this division are related as primary and secondary: since that which is loved with the love of friendship + is loved simply and for itself; whereas that which is loved with the love of concupiscence, is loved, not simply and for itself, + but for something else. For just as that which has existence, is a being simply, while that which exists in another is a relative + being; so, because good is convertible with being, the good, which itself has goodness, is good + simply; but that which is another's good, is a relative good. Consequently the love with which a thing is loved, that it may + have some good, is love simply; while the love, with which a thing is loved, that it may be another's good, is relative love. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 4 co."><a name="34663" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34663] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in II Rhetoric., amare est +velle alicui bonum. Sic ergo motus amoris in duo tendit, scilicet +in bonum quod quis vult alicui, vel sibi vel alii; et in illud cui +vult bonum. Ad illud ergo bonum quod quis vult alteri, habetur amor +concupiscentiae, ad illud autem cui aliquis vult bonum, habetur +amor amicitiae. Haec autem divisio est secundum prius et posterius. +Nam id quod amatur amore amicitiae, simpliciter et per se amatur, +quod autem amatur amore concupiscentiae, non simpliciter et +secundum se amatur, sed amatur alteri. Sicut enim ens simpliciter +est quod habet esse, ens autem secundum quid quod est in alio; ita +bonum, quod convertitur cum ente, simpliciter quidem est quod ipsum +habet bonitatem; quod autem est bonum alterius, est bonum secundum +quid. Et per consequens amor quo amatur aliquid ut ei sit bonum, +est amor simpliciter, amor autem quo amatur aliquid ut sit bonum +alterius, est amor secundum quid.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Love is not divided into friendship and concupiscence, but into love of friendship, and love of concupiscence. For a friend + is, properly speaking, one to whom we wish good: while we are said to desire, what we wish for ourselves. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34664" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34664] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod amor non dividitur per amicitiam et +concupiscentiam, sed per amorem amicitiae et concupiscentiae. Nam +ille proprie dicitur amicus, cui aliquod bonum volumus, illud autem +dicimur concupiscere, quod volumus nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Hence the Reply to the Second Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34665" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34665] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc +patet solutio ad secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When friendship is based on usefulness or pleasure, a man does indeed wish his friend some good: and in this respect the + character of friendship is preserved. But since he refers this good further to his own pleasure or use, the result is that + friendship of the useful or pleasant, in so far as it is connected with love of concupiscence, loses the character to true + friendship. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34666" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34666] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in amicitia utilis et delectabilis, vult quidem +aliquis aliquod bonum amico, et quantum ad hoc salvatur ibi ratio +amicitiae. Sed quia illud bonum refert ulterius ad suam +delectationem vel utilitatem, inde est quod amicitia utilis et +delectabilis, inquantum trahitur ad amorem concupiscentiae, deficit +a ratione verae amicitiae.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q27" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q27-p0.1">Q. 27. OF THE CAUSE OF LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q27-p2"> We must now consider the cause of love: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q27-p3"><a href="#FS_Q27_A1"> (1) Whether good is the only cause of love?</a></p><p id="FS_Q27-p4"><a href="#FS_Q27_A2"> (2) Whether knowledge is a cause of love?</a></p><p id="FS_Q27-p5"><a href="#FS_Q27_A3"> (3) Whether likeness is a cause of love?</a></p><p id="FS_Q27-p6"><a href="#FS_Q27_A4"> (4) Whether any other passion of the soul is a cause of love?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 pr."><a name="34667" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34667] +Iª-IIae q. 27 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causa +amoris. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum bonum sit +sola causa amoris. Secundo, utrum cognitio sit causa amoris. +Tertio, utrum similitudo. Quarto, utrum aliqua alia animae +passionum.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q27_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q27_A1-p0.1">Q. 27. A. 1. Whether good is the only cause of love?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that good is not the only cause of love. For good does not cause love, except because it is loved. But it happens + that evil also is loved, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q27_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.10.6" target="asv"> Ps. 10:6</a>: "He that loveth iniquity, hateth his own soul": else, every love would be good. Therefore good is not the only cause of + love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34668" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34668] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non solum bonum sit causa amoris. +Bonum enim non est causa amoris, nisi quia amatur. Sed contingit +etiam malum amari, secundum illud Psalmi X, <i>qui diligit +iniquitatem, odit animam suam</i>, alioquin omnis amor esset bonus. +Ergo non solum bonum est causa amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "we love those who acknowledge their evils." Therefore it seems that evil + is the cause of love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34669" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34669] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>eos qui mala sua +dicunt, amamus</i>. Ergo videtur quod malum sit causa amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that not "the good" only but also "the beautiful is beloved by all." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34670" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34670] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod non solum bonum, sed +etiam pulchrum est omnibus amabile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 3): "Assuredly the good alone is beloved." Therefore good alone is the cause of love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34671" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34671] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, VIII de Trin., <i>non amatur certe nisi +bonum</i>. Solum igitur bonum est causa amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q26_A1" id="FS_Q27_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[26], A[1]</a>), Love belongs to the appetitive power which is a passive faculty. Wherefore its object stands in relation to it as the cause + of its movement or act. Therefore the cause of love must needs be love's object. Now the proper object of love is the good; + because, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q26_A1" id="FS_Q27_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[26], AA[1]</a>,2), love implies a certain connaturalness or complacency of the lover for the thing beloved, + and to everything, that thing is a good, which is akin and proportionate to it. It follows, therefore, that good is the proper + cause of love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 1 co."><a name="34672" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34672] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, amor ad appetitivam +potentiam pertinet, quae est vis passiva. Unde obiectum eius +comparatur ad ipsam sicut causa motus vel actus ipsius. Oportet +igitur ut illud sit proprie causa amoris quod est amoris obiectum. +Amoris autem proprium obiectum est bonum, quia, ut dictum est, amor +importat quandam connaturalitatem vel complacentiam amantis ad +amatum; unicuique autem est bonum id quod est sibi connaturale et +proportionatum. Unde relinquitur quod bonum sit propria causa +amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Evil is never loved except under the aspect of good, that is to say, in so far as it is good in some respect, and is considered + as being good simply. And thus a certain love is evil, in so far as it tends to that which is not simply a true good. It is + in this way that man "loves iniquity," inasmuch as, by means of iniquity, some good is gained; pleasure, for instance, or + money, or such like. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34673" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34673] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod malum nunquam amatur nisi sub ratione boni, +scilicet inquantum est secundum quid bonum, et apprehenditur ut +simpliciter bonum. Et sic aliquis amor est malus, inquantum tendit +in id quod non est simpliciter verum bonum. Et per hunc modum homo +diligit iniquitatem, inquantum per iniquitatem adipiscitur aliquod +bonum, puta delectationem vel pecuniam vel aliquid huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those who acknowledge their evils, are beloved, not for their evils, but because they acknowledge them, for it is a good + thing to acknowledge one's faults, in so far as it excludes insincerity or hypocrisy. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34674" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34674] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod illi qui mala sua dicunt, non propter mala amantur, +sed propter hoc quod dicunt mala, hoc enim quod est dicere mala +sua, habet rationem boni, inquantum excludit fictionem seu +simulationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The beautiful is the same as the good, and they differ in aspect only. For since good is what all seek, the notion of good + is that which calms the desire; while the notion of the beautiful is that which calms the desire, by being seen or known. + Consequently those senses chiefly regard the beautiful, which are the most cognitive, viz. sight and hearing, as ministering + to reason; for we speak of beautiful sights and beautiful sounds. But in reference to + the other objects of the other senses, we do not use the expression "beautiful," for we do not speak of beautiful tastes, + and beautiful odors. Thus it is evident that beauty adds to goodness a relation to the cognitive faculty: so that "good" means + that which simply pleases the appetite; while the "beautiful" is something pleasant to apprehend. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34675" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34675] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod pulchrum est idem bono, sola ratione differens. Cum +enim bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, de ratione boni est quod in eo +quietetur appetitus, sed ad rationem pulchri pertinet quod in eius +aspectu seu cognitione quietetur appetitus. Unde et illi sensus +praecipue respiciunt pulchrum, qui maxime cognoscitivi sunt, +scilicet visus et auditus rationi deservientes, dicimus enim +pulchra visibilia et pulchros sonos. In sensibilibus autem aliorum +sensuum, non utimur nomine pulchritudinis, non enim dicimus +pulchros sapores aut odores. Et sic patet quod pulchrum addit supra +bonum, quendam ordinem ad vim cognoscitivam, ita quod bonum dicatur +id quod simpliciter complacet appetitui; pulchrum autem dicatur id +cuius ipsa apprehensio placet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q27_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q27_A2-p0.1">Q. 27. A. 2. Whether knowledge is a cause of love?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that knowledge is not a cause of love. For it is due to love that a thing is sought. But some things are sought + without being known, for instance, the sciences; for since "to have them is the same as to know them," as Augustine says (QQ[83], + qu. 35), if we knew them we should have them, and should not seek them. Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34676" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34676] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod cognitio non sit causa amoris. Quod +enim aliquid quaeratur, hoc contingit ex amore. Sed aliqua +quaeruntur quae nesciuntur, sicut scientiae, cum enim in his idem +sit eas habere quod eas nosse, ut Augustinus dicit in libro +octoginta trium quaest., si cognoscerentur, haberentur, et non +quaererentur. Ergo cognitio non est causa amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to love what we know not seems like loving something more than we know it. But some things are loved more than they + are known: thus in this life God can be loved in Himself, but cannot be known in Himself. Therefore knowledge is not the cause + of love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34677" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34677] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +eiusdem rationis videtur esse quod aliquid incognitum ametur, et +quod aliquid ametur plus quam cognoscatur. Sed aliqua amantur plus +quam cognoscantur, sicut Deus, qui in hac vita potest per seipsum +amari, non autem per seipsum cognosci. Ergo cognitio non est causa +amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if knowledge were the cause of love, there would be no love, where there is no knowledge. But in all things there + is love, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv); whereas there is not knowledge in all things. Therefore knowledge is not the cause + of love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34678" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34678] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +si cognitio esset causa amoris, non posset inveniri amor ubi non +est cognitio. Sed in omnibus rebus invenitur amor, ut dicit +Dionysius in IV cap. de Div. Nom., non autem in omnibus invenitur +cognitio. Ergo cognitio non est causa amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine proves (De Trin. x, 1,2) that "none can love what he does not know." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34679" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34679] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus probat, in X de Trin., quod <i>nullus potest +amare aliquid incognitum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q27_A1" id="FS_Q27_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, good is the cause of love, as being its object. But good is not the object of the appetite, except as apprehended. And therefore + love demands some apprehension of the good that is loved. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 5,12) says that bodily + sight is the beginning of sensitive love: and in like manner the contemplation of spiritual beauty or goodness is the beginning + of spiritual love. Accordingly + knowledge is the cause of love for the same reason as good is, which can be loved only if known. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 2 co."><a name="34680" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34680] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, bonum est causa amoris per modum +obiecti. Bonum autem non est obiectum appetitus, nisi prout est +apprehensum. Et ideo amor requirit aliquam apprehensionem boni quod +amatur. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit, IX Ethic., quod visio +corporalis est principium amoris sensitivi. Et similiter +contemplatio spiritualis pulchritudinis vel bonitatis, est +principium amoris spiritualis. Sic igitur cognitio est causa +amoris, ea ratione qua et bonum, quod non potest amari nisi +cognitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> He who seeks science, is not entirely without knowledge thereof: but knows something about it already in some respect, either + in a general way, or in some one of its effects, or from having heard it commended, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1,2). But + to have it is not to know it thus, but to know it perfectly. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34681" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34681] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ille qui quaerit scientiam, non omnino ignorat +eam, sed secundum aliquid eam praecognoscit, vel in universali, vel +in aliquo eius effectu, vel per hoc quod audit eam laudari, ut +Augustinus dicit, X de Trin. Sic autem eam cognoscere non est eam +habere; sed cognoscere eam perfecte.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Something is required for the perfection of knowledge, that is not requisite for the perfection of love. For knowledge belongs + to the reason, whose function it is to distinguish things which in reality are united, and to unite together, after a fashion, + things that are distinct, by comparing one with another. Consequently the perfection of knowledge requires that man should + know distinctly all that is in a thing, such as its parts, powers, and + properties. On the other hand, love is in the appetitive power, which regards a thing as it is in itself: wherefore it suffices, + for the perfection of love, that a thing be loved according as it is known in itself. Hence it is, therefore, that a thing + is loved more than it is known; since it can be loved perfectly, even without being perfectly known. This is most evident + in regard to the sciences, which some love through having a certain general knowledge of them: for instance, they know that + rhetoric is a science that enables man to persuade others; and this is what they love in rhetoric. The same applies to the + love of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34682" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34682] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod aliquid requiritur ad perfectionem cognitionis, quod +non requiritur ad perfectionem amoris. Cognitio enim ad rationem +pertinet, cuius est distinguere inter ea quae secundum rem sunt +coniuncta, et componere quodammodo ea quae sunt diversa, unum +alteri comparando. Et ideo ad perfectionem cognitionis requiritur +quod homo cognoscat singillatim quidquid est in re, sicut partes et +virtutes et proprietates. Sed amor est in vi appetitiva, quae +respicit rem secundum quod in se est. Unde ad perfectionem amoris +sufficit quod res prout in se apprehenditur, ametur. Ob hoc ergo +contingit quod aliquid plus amatur quam cognoscatur, quia potest +perfecte amari, etiam si non perfecte cognoscatur. Sicut maxime +patet in scientiis, quas aliqui amant propter aliquam summariam +cognitionem quam de eis habent, puta quod sciunt rhetoricam esse +scientiam per quam homo potest persuadere, et hoc in rhetorica +amant. Et similiter est dicendum circa amorem Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even natural love, which is in all things, is caused by a kind of knowledge, not indeed existing in natural things themselves, + but in Him Who created their nature, as stated above (Q[26], A[1]; cf. + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q6_A1" id="FS_Q27_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[6], A[1]</a>, ad 2). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34683" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34683] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod etiam amor naturalis, qui est in omnibus rebus, +causatur ex aliqua cognitione, non quidem in ipsis rebus +naturalibus existente, sed in eo qui naturam instituit, ut supra +dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q27_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q27_A3-p0.1">Q. 27. A. 3. Whether likeness is a cause of love?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that likeness is not a cause of love. For the same thing is not the cause of contraries. But likeness is the + cause of hatred; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q27_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.13.10" target="asv">Prov. 13:10</a>) that "among the proud there are always contentions"; and the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 1) that "potters quarrel with + one another." Therefore likeness is not a cause of love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34684" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34684] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod similitudo non sit causa amoris. Idem +enim non est causa contrariorum. Sed similitudo est causa odii, +dicitur enim Prov. XIII, quod <i>inter superbos semper sunt +iurgia</i>; et philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic., quod figuli +corrixantur ad invicem. Ergo similitudo non est causa amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 14) that "a man loves in another that which he would not be himself: thus he loves + an actor, but would not himself be an actor." But it would not be so, if likeness were the proper cause of love; for in that + case a man would love in another, that which he possesses himself, or would like to possess. Therefore likeness is not a cause + of love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34685" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34685] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in IV Confess., quod <i>aliquis amat in alio quod +esse non vellet, sicut homo amat histrionem, qui non vellet esse +histrio</i>. Hoc autem non contingeret, si similitudo esset propria +causa amoris, sic enim homo amaret in altero quod ipse haberet, vel +vellet habere. Ergo similitudo non est causa amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everyone loves that which he needs, even if he have it not: thus a sick man loves health, and a poor man loves riches. + But in so far as he needs them and lacks them, he is unlike them. Therefore not only likeness but also unlikeness is a cause + of love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34686" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34686] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quilibet homo amat id quo indiget, etiam si illud non habeat, sicut +infirmus amat sanitatem, et pauper amat divitias. Sed inquantum +indiget et caret eis, habet dissimilitudinem ad ipsa. Ergo non +solum similitudo, sed etiam dissimilitudo est causa amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "we love those who bestow money and health on us; and also those who retain + their friendship for the dead." But all are not such. Therefore likeness is not a cause of love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="34687" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34687] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>beneficos in pecunias +et salutem amamus, et similiter eos qui circa mortuos servant +amicitiam, omnes diligunt</i>. Non autem omnes sunt tales. Ergo +similitudo non est causa amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q27_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.13.19" target="asv">Ecclus. 13:19</a>): "Every beast loveth its like." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34688" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34688] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Eccli. XIII, <i>omne animal diligit simile +sibi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q27_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Likeness, properly speaking, is a cause of love. But it must be observed that likeness between things is twofold. One kind + of likeness arises from each thing having the same quality actually: for example, two things possessing the quality of whiteness + are said to be alike. Another kind of likeness arises from one thing having potentially and by way of inclination, a quality + which the other has actually: thus we may say that a heavy body existing outside its + proper place is like another heavy body that exists in its proper place: or again, according as potentiality bears a resemblance + to its act; since act is contained, in a manner, in the potentiality itself. + </p><p id="FS_Q27_A3-p8"> Accordingly the first kind of likeness causes love of friendship or well-being. For the very fact that two men are alike, + having, as it were, one form, makes them to be, in a manner, one in that form: thus two men are one thing in the species of + humanity, and two white men are one thing in whiteness. Hence the affections of one tend to the other, as being one with him; + and he wishes good to him as to himself. But the second kind of likeness causes love of concupiscence, or + friendship founded on usefulness or pleasure: because whatever is in potentiality, as such, has the desire for its act; and + it takes pleasure in its realization, if it be a sentient and cognitive being. + </p><p id="FS_Q27_A3-p9"> Now it has been stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q26_A4" id="FS_Q27_A3-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[26], A[4]</a>), that in the love of concupiscence, the lover, properly speaking, loves himself, in willing the good that he desires. But + a man loves himself more than another: because he is one with himself substantially, whereas with another he is one only in + the likeness of some form. Consequently, if this other's likeness to him arising from the participation of a form, hinders + him from gaining the good that he loves, he + becomes hateful to him, not for being like him, but for hindering him from gaining his own good. This is why "potters quarrel + among themselves," because they hinder one another's gain: and why "there are contentions among the proud," because they hinder + one another in attaining the position they covet. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 3 co."><a name="34689" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34689] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod similitudo, proprie loquendo, est causa amoris. Sed +considerandum est quod similitudo inter aliqua potest attendi +dupliciter. Uno modo, ex hoc quod utrumque habet idem in actu, +sicut duo habentes albedinem, dicuntur similes. Alio modo, ex hoc +quod unum habet in potentia et in quadam inclinatione, illud quod +aliud habet in actu, sicut si dicamus quod corpus grave existens +extra suum locum, habet similitudinem cum corpore gravi in suo loco +existenti. Vel etiam secundum quod potentia habet similitudinem ad +actum ipsum, nam in ipsa potentia quodammodo est actus. Primus ergo +similitudinis modus causat amorem amicitiae, seu benevolentiae. Ex +hoc enim quod aliqui duo sunt similes, quasi habentes unam formam, +sunt quodammodo unum in forma illa, sicut duo homines sunt unum in +specie humanitatis, et duo albi in albedine. Et ideo affectus unius +tendit in alterum, sicut in unum sibi; et vult ei bonum sicut et +sibi. Sed secundus modus similitudinis causat amorem +concupiscentiae, vel amicitiam utilis seu delectabilis. Quia +unicuique existenti in potentia, inquantum huiusmodi, inest +appetitus sui actus, et in eius consecutione delectatur, si sit +sentiens et cognoscens. Dictum est autem supra quod in amore +concupiscentiae amans proprie amat seipsum, cum vult illud bonum +quod concupiscit. Magis autem unusquisque seipsum amat quam alium, +quia sibi unus est in substantia, alteri vero in similitudine +alicuius formae. Et ideo si ex eo quod est sibi similis in +participatione formae, impediatur ipsemet a consecutione boni quod +amat; efficitur ei odiosus, non inquantum est similis, sed +inquantum est proprii boni impeditivus. Et propter hoc figuli +corrixantur ad invicem, quia se invicem impediunt in proprio lucro, +et inter superbos sunt iurgia, quia se invicem impediunt in propria +excellentia, quam concupiscunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A3-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Hence the Reply to the First Objection is evident.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34690" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34690] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc +patet responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even when a man loves in another what he loves not in himself, there is a certain likeness of proportion: because as the + latter is to that which is loved in him, so is the former to that which he loves in himself: for instance, if a good singer + love a good writer, we can see a likeness of proportion, inasmuch as each one has that which is becoming to him in respect + of his art. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34691" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34691] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod in hoc etiam quod aliquis in altero amat quod in se +non amat, invenitur ratio similitudinis secundum +proportionalitatem, nam sicut se habet alius ad hoc quod in eo +amatur, ita ipse se habet ad hoc quod in se amat. Puta si bonus +cantor bonum amet scriptorem, attenditur ibi similitudo +proportionis, secundum quod uterque habet quod convenit ei secundum +suam artem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He that loves what he needs, bears a likeness to what he loves, as potentiality bears a likeness to its act, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34692" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34692] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ille qui amat hoc quo indiget, habet similitudinem ad +id quod amat sicut quod est potentia ad actum, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> According to the same likeness of potentiality to its act, the illiberal man loves the man who is liberal, in so far as he + expects from him something which he desires. The same applies to the man who is constant in his friendship as compared to + one who is inconstant. For in either case friendship seems to be based on usefulness. We might also say that although not + all men have these virtues in the complete habit, yet they have them according to + certain seminal principles in the reason, in force of which principles the man who is not virtuous loves the virtuous man, + as being in conformity with his own natural reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="34693" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34693] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod secundum eandem similitudinem potentiae ad actum, +ille qui non est liberalis, amat eum qui est liberalis, inquantum +expectat ab eo aliquid quod desiderat. Et eadem ratio est de +perseverante in amicitia ad eum qui non perseverat. Utrobique enim +videtur esse amicitia propter utilitatem. Vel dicendum quod, licet +non omnes homines habeant huiusmodi virtutes secundum habitum +completum, habent tamen ea secundum quaedam seminalia rationis, +secundum quae, qui non habet virtutem, diligit virtuosum, tanquam +suae naturali rationi conformem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q27_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q27_A4-p0.1">Q. 27. A. 4. Whether any other passion of the soul is a cause of love?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that some other passion can be the cause of love. For the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) says that some are loved + for the sake of the pleasure they give. But pleasure is a passion. Therefore another passion is a cause of love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34694" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34694] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliqua alia passio possit esse causa +amoris. Dicit enim philosophus, in VIII Ethic., quod aliqui amantur +propter delectationem. Sed delectatio est passio quaedam. Ergo +aliqua alia passio est causa amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, desire is a passion. But we love some because we desire to receive something from them: as happens in every friendship + based on usefulness. Therefore another passion is a cause of love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34695" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34695] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +desiderium quaedam passio est. Sed aliquos amamus propter +desiderium alicuius quod ab eis expectamus, sicut apparet in omni +amicitia quae est propter utilitatem. Ergo aliqua alia passio est +causa amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1): "When we have no hope of getting a thing, we love it but half-heartedly or not at + all, even if we see how beautiful it is." Therefore hope too is a cause of love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34696" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34696] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in X de Trin., <i>cuius rei adipiscendae spem +quisque non gerit, aut tepide amat, aut omnino non amat, quamvis +quam pulchra sit videat</i>. Ergo spes etiam est causa amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> All the other emotions of the soul are caused by love, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34697" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34697] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod omnes aliae affectiones animi ex amore causantur, ut +Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There is no other passion of the soul that does not presuppose love of some kind. The reason is that every other passion + of the soul implies either movement towards something, or rest in something. Now every movement towards something, or rest + in something, arises from some kinship or aptness to that thing; and in this does love consist. Therefore it is not possible + for any other passion of the soul to be universally the cause of every love. But it may + happen that some other passion is the cause of some particular love: just as one good is the cause of another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 4 co."><a name="34698" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34698] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod nulla alia passio animae est quae non praesupponat +aliquem amorem. Cuius ratio est quia omnis alia passio animae vel +importat motum ad aliquid, vel quietem in aliquo. Omnis autem motus +in aliquid, vel quies in aliquo, ex aliqua connaturalitate vel +coaptatione procedit, quae pertinet ad rationem amoris. Unde +impossibile est quod aliqua alia passio animae sit causa +universaliter omnis amoris. Contingit tamen aliquam aliam passionem +esse causam amoris alicuius, sicut etiam unum bonum est causa +alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When a man loves a thing for the pleasure it affords, his love is indeed caused by pleasure; but that very pleasure is caused, + in its turn, by another preceding love; for none takes pleasure save in that which is loved in some way. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34699" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34699] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, cum aliquis amat aliquid propter delectationem, +amor quidem ille causatur ex delectatione, sed delectatio illa +iterum causatur ex alio amore praecedente; nullus enim delectatur +nisi in re aliquo modo amata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Desire for a thing always presupposes love for that thing. But desire of one thing can be the cause of another thing's being + loved; thus he that desires money, for this reason loves him from whom he receives it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34700" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34700] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod desiderium rei alicuius semper praesupponit amorem +illius rei. Sed desiderium alicuius rei potest esse causa ut res +alia ametur, sicut qui desiderat pecuniam, amat propter hoc eum a +quo pecuniam recipit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hope causes or increases love; both by reason of pleasure, because it causes pleasure; and by reason of desire, because hope + strengthens desire, since we do not desire so intensely that which we have no hope of receiving. Nevertheless hope itself + is of a good that is loved. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34701" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34701] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod spes causat vel auget amorem, et ratione +delectationis, quia delectationem causat, et etiam ratione +desiderii, quia spes desiderium fortificat, non enim ita intense +desideramus quae non speramus. Sed tamen et ipsa spes est alicuius +boni amati.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q28" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q28-p0.1">Q. 28. OF THE EFFECTS OF LOVE (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q28-p2"> We now have to consider the effects of love: under which head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q28-p3"><a href="#FS_Q28_A1"> (1) Whether union is an effect of love?</a></p><p id="FS_Q28-p4"><a href="#FS_Q28_A2"> (2) Whether mutual indwelling is an effect of love?</a></p><p id="FS_Q28-p5"><a href="#FS_Q28_A3"> (3) Whether ecstasy is an effect of love?</a></p><p id="FS_Q28-p6"><a href="#FS_Q28_A4"> (4) Whether zeal is an effect of love?</a></p><p id="FS_Q28-p7"><a href="#FS_Q28_A5"> (5) Whether love is a passion that is hurtful to the lover?</a></p><p id="FS_Q28-p8"><a href="#FS_Q28_A6"> (6) Whether love is cause of all that the lover does?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 pr."><a name="34702" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34702] +Iª-IIae q. 28 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +effectibus amoris. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum unio +sit effectus amoris. Secundo, utrum mutua inhaesio. Tertio, utrum +extasis sit effectus amoris. Quarto, utrum zelus. Quinto, utrum +amor sit passio laesiva amantis. Sexto, utrum amor sit causa omnium +quae amans agit.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q28_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q28_A1-p0.1">Q. 28. A. 1. Whether union is an effect of love?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that union is not an effect of love. For absence is incompatible with union. But love is compatible with absence; + for the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.4.18" target="asv">Gal. 4:18</a>): "Be zealous for that which is good in a good thing always" (speaking of himself, according to a gloss), "and not only when + I am present with you." Therefore union is not an effect of love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34703" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34703] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod unio non sit effectus amoris. Absentia +enim unioni repugnat. Sed amor compatitur secum absentiam, dicit +enim apostolus, ad Galat. IV, <i>bonum aemulamini in bono +semper</i> (loquens de seipso, ut Glossa dicit), <i>et non tantum +cum praesens sum apud vos</i>. Ergo unio non est effectus +amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every union is either according to essence, thus form is united to matter, accident to subject, and a part to the + whole, or to another part in order to make up the whole: or according to likeness, in genus, species, or accident. But love + does not cause union of essence; else love could not be between things essentially distinct. On the other hand, love does + not cause union of likeness, but rather is caused by it, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q27_A3" id="FS_Q28_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[27], A[3]</a>). Therefore union is not an effect of love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34704" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34704] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +omnis unio aut est per essentiam, sicut forma unitur materiae, et +accidens subiecto, et pars toti vel alteri parti ad constitutionem +totius, aut est per similitudinem vel generis, vel speciei, vel +accidentis. Sed amor non causat unionem essentiae, alioquin nunquam +haberetur amor ad ea quae sunt per essentiam divisa. Unionem autem +quae est per similitudinem, amor non causat, sed magis ab ea +causatur. Ut dictum est. Ergo unio non est effectus amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the sense in act is the sensible in act, and the intellect in act is the thing actually understood. But the lover + in act is not the beloved in act. Therefore union is the effect of knowledge rather than of love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34705" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34705] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sensus in actu fit sensibile in actu, et intellectus in actu fit +intellectum in actu. Non autem amans in actu fit amatum in actu. +Ergo unio magis est effectus cognitionis quam amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that every love is a "unitive love." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34706" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34706] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod amor quilibet +est virtus unitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q28_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The union of lover and beloved is twofold. The first is real union; for instance, when the beloved is present with the lover. + The second is union of affection: and this union must be considered in relation to the preceding apprehension; since movement + of the appetite follows apprehension. Now love being twofold, viz. love of concupiscence and love of friendship; each of these + arises from a kind of apprehension of the oneness of the thing loved with the + lover. For when we love a thing, by desiring it, we apprehend it as belonging to our well-being. In like manner when a man + loves another with the love of friendship, he wills good to him, just as he wills good to himself: wherefore he apprehends + him as his other self, in so far, to wit, as he wills good to him as to himself. Hence a friend is called a man's "other self" + (Ethic. ix, 4), and Augustine says (Confess. iv, 6), "Well did one say to his friend: Thou half of my soul." + </p><p id="FS_Q28_A1-p7"> The first of these unions is caused "effectively" by love; because love moves man to desire and seek the presence of the + beloved, as of something suitable and belonging to him. The second union is caused "formally" by love; because love itself + is this union or bond. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 10) that "love is a vital principle uniting, or seeking + to unite two together, the lover, to wit, and the beloved." For in describing it as "uniting" he refers to the + union of affection, without which there is no love: and in saying that "it seeks to unite," he refers to real union. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 1 co."><a name="34707" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34707] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod duplex est unio amantis ad amatum. Una quidem +secundum rem, puta cum amatum praesentialiter adest amanti. Alia +vero secundum affectum. Quae quidem unio consideranda est ex +apprehensione praecedente, nam motus appetitivus sequitur +apprehensionem. Cum autem sit duplex amor, scilicet concupiscentiae +et amicitiae, uterque procedit ex quadam apprehensione unitatis +amati ad amantem. Cum enim aliquis amat aliquid quasi concupiscens +illud, apprehendit illud quasi pertinens ad suum bene esse. +Similiter cum aliquis amat aliquem amore amicitiae, vult ei bonum +sicut et sibi vult bonum, unde apprehendit eum ut alterum se, +inquantum scilicet vult ei bonum sicut et sibi ipsi. Et inde est +quod amicus dicitur esse alter ipse, et Augustinus dicit, in IV +Confess., <i>bene quidam dixit de amico suo, dimidium animae +suae</i>. Primam ergo unionem amor facit effective, quia movet ad +desiderandum et quaerendum praesentiam amati, quasi sibi +convenientis et ad se pertinentis. Secundam autem unionem facit +formaliter, quia ipse amor est talis unio vel nexus. Unde +Augustinus dicit, in VIII de Trin., quod <i>amor est quasi vita +quaedam duo aliqua copulans, vel copulare appetens, amantem +scilicet et quod amatur</i>. Quod enim dicit copulans, refertur ad +unionem affectus, sine qua non est amor, quod vero dicit copulare +intendens, pertinet ad unionem realem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument is true of real union. That is necessary to pleasure as being its cause; desire implies the real absence of + the beloved: but love remains whether the beloved be absent or present. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34708" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34708] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de unione reali. Quam +quidem requirit delectatio sicut causam, desiderium vero est in +reali absentia amati, amor vero et in absentia et in +praesentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Union has a threefold relation to love. There is union which causes love; and this is substantial union, as regards the love + with which one loves oneself; while as regards the love wherewith one loves other things, it is the union of likeness, as + stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q27_A3" id="FS_Q28_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[27], A[3]</a>). There is also a union which is essentially love itself. This union is according to a bond of affection, and is likened + to substantial union, inasmuch as + the lover stands to the object of his love, as to himself, if it be love of friendship; as to something belonging to himself, + if it be love of concupiscence. Again there is a union, which is the effect of love. This is real union, which the lover seeks + with the object of his love. Moreover this union is in keeping with the demands of love: for as the Philosopher relates (Polit. + ii, 1), "Aristophanes stated that lovers would wish to be united both into one," but since "this would result in + either one or both being destroyed," they seek a suitable and becoming union---to live together, speak together, and be united + together in other like things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34709" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34709] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod unio tripliciter se habet ad amorem. Quaedam enim +unio est causa amoris. Et haec quidem est unio substantialis, +quantum ad amorem quo quis amat seipsum, quantum vero ad amorem quo +quis amat alia, est unio similitudinis, ut dictum est. Quaedam vero +unio est essentialiter ipse amor. Et haec est unio secundum +coaptationem affectus. Quae quidem assimilatur unioni substantiali, +inquantum amans se habet ad amatum, in amore quidem amicitiae, ut +ad seipsum; in amore autem concupiscentiae, ut ad aliquid sui. +Quaedam vero unio est effectus amoris. Et haec est unio realis, +quam amans quaerit de re amata. Et haec quidem unio est secundum +convenientiam amoris, ut enim philosophus refert, II Politic., +<i>Aristophanes dixit quod amantes desiderarent ex ambobus fieri +unum, sed quia ex hoc accideret aut ambos aut alterum corrumpi</i>, +quaerunt unionem quae convenit et decet; ut scilicet simul +conversentur, et simul colloquantur, et in aliis huiusmodi +coniungantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Knowledge is perfected by the thing known being united, through its likeness, to the knower. But the effect of love is that + the thing itself which is loved, is, in a way, united to the lover, as stated above. Consequently the union caused by love + is closer than that which is caused by knowledge. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34710" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34710] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod cognitio perficitur per hoc quod cognitum unitur +cognoscenti secundum suam similitudinem. Sed amor facit quod ipsa +res quae amatur, amanti aliquo modo uniatur, ut dictum est. Unde +amor est magis unitivus quam cognitio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q28_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q28_A2-p0.1">Q. 28. A. 2. Whether mutual indwelling is an effect of love?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that love does not cause mutual indwelling, so that the lover be in the beloved and vice versa. For that which + is in another is contained in it. But the same cannot be container and contents. Therefore love cannot cause mutual indwelling, + so that the lover be in the beloved and vice versa. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34711" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34711] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non causet mutuam inhaesionem, ut +scilicet amans sit in amato, et e converso. Quod enim est in +altero, continetur in eo. Sed non potest idem esse continens et +contentum. Ergo per amorem non potest causari mutua inhaesio, ut +amatum sit in amante et e converso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing can penetrate within a whole, except by means of a division of the whole. But it is the function of the + reason, not of the appetite where love resides, to divide things that are really united. Therefore mutual indwelling is not + an effect of love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34712" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34712] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +nihil potest penetrare in interiora alicuius integri, nisi per +aliquam divisionem. Sed dividere quae sunt secundum rem coniuncta, +non pertinet ad appetitum, in quo est amor, sed ad rationem. Ergo +mutua inhaesio non est effectus amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if love involves the lover being in the beloved and vice versa, it follows that the beloved is united to the lover, + in the same way as the lover is united to the beloved. But the union itself is love, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q28_A1" id="FS_Q28_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore it follows that the lover is always loved by the object of his love; which is evidently false. Therefore mutual + indwelling is not an effect of love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34713" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34713] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +si per amorem amans est in amato et e converso, sequetur quod hoc +modo amatum uniatur amanti, sicut amans amato. Sed ipsa unio est +amor, ut dictum est. Ergo sequitur quod semper amans ametur ab +amato, quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo mutua inhaesio est effectus +amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:16</a>): "He that abideth in charity abideth in God, and God in him." Now charity is the love of God. Therefore, for the same reason, + every love makes the beloved to be in the lover, and vice versa. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34714" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34714] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur I Ioan. IV, <i>qui manet in caritate, in Deo +manet, et Deus in eo</i>. Caritas autem est amor Dei. Ergo, eadem +ratione, quilibet amor facit amatum esse in amante, et e +converso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q28_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> This effect of mutual indwelling may be understood as referring both to the apprehensive and to the appetitive power. Because, + as to the apprehensive power, the beloved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as the beloved abides in the apprehension of + the lover, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.1.7" target="asv"> Phil. 1:7, </a> "For that I have you in my heart": while the lover is said to be in the beloved, according to apprehension, inasmuch as the + lover is not satisfied with a + superficial apprehension of the beloved, but strives to gain an intimate knowledge of everything pertaining to the beloved, + so as to penetrate into his very soul. Thus it is written concerning the Holy Ghost, Who is God's Love, that He "searcheth + all things, yea the deep things of God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:10</a>). + </p><p id="FS_Q28_A2-p7"> As the appetitive power, the object loved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as it is in his affections, by a kind of complacency: + causing him either to take pleasure in it, or in its good, when present; or, in the absence of the object loved, by his longing, + to tend towards it with the love of concupiscence, or towards the good that he wills to the beloved, with the love of friendship: + not indeed from any extrinsic cause (as when we desire one thing on account of another, or + wish good to another on account of something else), but because the complacency in the beloved is rooted in the lover's heart. + For this reason we speak of love as being "intimate"; and "of the bowels of charity." On the other hand, the lover is in the + beloved, by the love of concupiscence and by the love of friendship, but not in the same way. For the love of concupiscence + is not satisfied with any external or superficial possession or enjoyment of the beloved; but seeks to possess the beloved + perfectly, by penetrating into his heart, as it were. Whereas, in the love of friendship, the lover is in the beloved, inasmuch + as he reckons what is good or evil to his friend, as being so to himself; and his friend's will as his own, so that it seems + as though he felt the good or suffered the evil in the person of his friend. Hence it is proper to friends "to desire the + same things, and to grieve and rejoice at the same," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 3 and Rhet. ii, 4). Consequently + in + so far as he reckons what affects his friend as affecting himself, the lover seems to be in the beloved, as though he were + become one with him: but in so far as, on the other hand, he wills and acts for his friend's sake as for his own sake, looking + on his friend as identified with himself, thus the beloved is in the lover. + </p><p id="FS_Q28_A2-p8"> In yet a third way, mutual indwelling in the love of friendship can be understood in regard to reciprocal love: inasmuch + as friends return love for love, and both desire and do good things for one another. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 2 co."><a name="34715" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34715] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod iste effectus mutuae inhaesionis potest intelligi et +quantum ad vim apprehensivam, et quantum ad vim appetitivam. Nam +quantum ad vim apprehensivam amatum dicitur esse in amante, +inquantum amatum immoratur in apprehensione amantis; secundum illud +Philipp. I, <i>eo quod habeam vos in corde</i>. Amans vero dicitur +esse in amato secundum apprehensionem inquantum amans non est +contentus superficiali apprehensione amati, sed nititur singula +quae ad amatum pertinent intrinsecus disquirere, et sic ad +interiora eius ingreditur. Sicut de spiritu sancto, qui est amor +Dei, dicitur, I ad Cor. II, quod <i>scrutatur etiam profunda +Dei</i>. Sed quantum ad vim appetitivam, amatum dicitur esse in +amante, prout est per quandam complacentiam in eius affectu, ut vel +delectetur in eo, aut in bonis eius, apud praesentiam; vel in +absentia, per desiderium tendat in ipsum amatum per amorem +concupiscentiae; vel in bona quae vult amato, per amorem amicitiae; +non quidem ex aliqua extrinseca causa, sicut cum aliquis desiderat +aliquid propter alterum, vel cum aliquis vult bonum alteri propter +aliquid aliud; sed propter complacentiam amati interius radicatam. +Unde et amor dicitur intimus; et dicuntur viscera caritatis. E +converso autem amans est in amato aliter quidem per amorem +concupiscentiae, aliter per amorem amicitiae. Amor namque +concupiscentiae non requiescit in quacumque extrinseca aut +superficiali adeptione vel fruitione amati, sed quaerit amatum +perfecte habere, quasi ad intima illius perveniens. In amore vero +amicitiae, amans est in amato, inquantum reputat bona vel mala +amici sicut sua, et voluntatem amici sicut suam, ut quasi ipse in +suo amico videatur bona vel mala pati, et affici. Et propter hoc, +proprium est amicorum eadem velle, et in eodem tristari et gaudere +secundum philosophum, in IX Ethic. et in II Rhetoric. Ut sic, +inquantum quae sunt amici aestimat sua, amans videatur esse in +amato, quasi idem factus amato. Inquantum autem e converso vult et +agit propter amicum sicut propter seipsum, quasi reputans amicum +idem sibi, sic amatum est in amante. Potest autem et tertio modo +mutua inhaesio intelligi in amore amicitiae, secundum viam +redamationis, inquantum mutuo se amant amici, et sibi invicem bona +volunt et operantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The beloved is contained in the lover, by being impressed on his heart and thus becoming the object of his complacency. On + the other hand, the lover is contained in the beloved, inasmuch as the lover penetrates, so to speak, into the beloved. For + nothing hinders a thing from being both container and contents in different ways: just as a genus is contained in its species, + and vice versa. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34716" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34716] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod amatum continetur in amante, inquantum est +impressum in affectu eius per quandam complacentiam. E converso +vero amans continetur in amato, inquantum amans sequitur aliquo +modo illud quod est intimum amati. Nihil enim prohibet diverso modo +esse aliquid continens et contentum, sicut genus continetur in +specie et e converso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The apprehension of the reason precedes the movement of love. Consequently, just as the reason divides, so does the movement + of love penetrate into the beloved, as was explained above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34717" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34717] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod rationis apprehensio praecedit affectum amoris. Et +ideo, sicut ratio disquirit, ita affectus amoris subintrat in +amatum, ut ex dictis patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument is true of the third kind of mutual indwelling, which is not to be found in every kind of love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34718" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34718] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod illa ratio procedit de tertio modo mutuae +inhaesionis, qui non invenitur in quolibet amore.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q28_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q28_A3-p0.1">Q. 28. A. 3. Whether ecstasy is an effect of love?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that ecstasy is not an effect of love. For ecstasy seems to imply loss of reason. But love does not always + result in loss of reason: for lovers are masters of themselves at times. Therefore love does not cause ecstasy. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34719" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34719] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod extasis non sit effectus amoris. +Extasis enim quandam alienationem importare videtur. Sed amor non +semper facit alienationem, sunt enim amantes interdum sui compotes. +Ergo amor non facit extasim.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the lover desires the beloved to be united to him. Therefore he draws the beloved to himself, rather than betakes + himself into the beloved, going forth out from himself as it were. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34720" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34720] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +amans desiderat amatum sibi uniri. Magis ergo amatum trahit ad se, +quam etiam pergat in amatum, extra se exiens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, love unites the beloved to the lover, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q28_A1" id="FS_Q28_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. If, therefore, the lover goes out from himself, in order to betake himself into the beloved, it follows that the lover always + loves the beloved more than himself: which is evidently false. Therefore ecstasy is not an effect of love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34721" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34721] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +amor unit amatum amanti, sicut dictum est. Si ergo amans extra se +tendit, ut in amatum pergat, sequitur quod semper plus diligat +amatum quam seipsum. Quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo extasis est +effectus amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the Divine love produces ecstasy," and that "God Himself suffered ecstasy through love." + Since therefore according to the same author (Div. Nom. iv), every love is a participated likeness of the Divine Love, it + seems that every love causes ecstasy. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34722" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34722] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>divinus +amor extasim facit, et quod ipse Deus propter amorem est extasim +passus</i>. Cum ergo quilibet amor sit quaedam similitudo +participata divini amoris, ut ibidem dicitur, videtur quod quilibet +amor causet extasim.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q28_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> To suffer ecstasy means to be placed outside oneself. This happens as to the apprehensive power and as to the appetitive + power. As to the apprehensive power, a man is said to be placed outside himself, when he is placed outside the knowledge proper + to him. This may be due to his being raised to a higher knowledge; thus, a man is said to suffer ecstasy, inasmuch as he is + placed outside the connatural apprehension of his sense and reason, when he is raised up + so as to comprehend things that surpass sense and reason: or it may be due to his being cast down into a state of debasement; + thus a man may be said to suffer ecstasy, when he is overcome by violent passion or madness. As to the appetitive power, a + man is said to suffer ecstasy, when that power is borne towards something else, so that it goes forth out from itself, as + it were. + </p><p id="FS_Q28_A3-p7"> The first of these ecstasies is caused by love dispositively in so far, namely, as love makes the lover dwell on the beloved, + as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q28_A2" id="FS_Q28_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, and to dwell intently on one thing draws the mind from other things. The second ecstasy is caused by love directly; by love + of friendship, simply; by love of concupiscence not simply but in a restricted sense. Because in love of concupiscence, the + lover is carried out of himself, in a certain sense; in so + far, namely, as not being satisfied with enjoying the good that he has, he seeks to enjoy something outside himself. But since + he seeks to have this extrinsic good for himself, he does not go out from himself simply, and this movement remains finally + within him. On the other hand, in the love of friendship, a man's affection goes out from itself simply; because he wishes + and does good to his friend, by caring and providing for him, for his sake. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 3 co."><a name="34723" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34723] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod extasim pati aliquis dicitur, cum extra se ponitur. +Quod quidem contingit et secundum vim apprehensivam, et secundum +vim appetitivam. Secundum quidem vim apprehensivam aliquis dicitur +extra se poni, quando ponitur extra cognitionem sibi propriam, vel +quia ad superiorem sublimatur, sicut homo, dum elevatur ad +comprehendenda aliqua quae sunt supra sensum et rationem, dicitur +extasim pati, inquantum ponitur extra connaturalem apprehensionem +rationis et sensus; vel quia ad inferiora deprimitur; puta, cum +aliquis in furiam vel amentiam cadit, dicitur extasim passus. +Secundum appetitivam vero partem dicitur aliquis extasim pati, +quando appetitus alicuius in alterum fertur, exiens quodammodo +extra seipsum. Primam quidem extasim facit amor dispositive, +inquantum scilicet facit meditari de amato, ut dictum est, intensa +autem meditatio unius abstrahit ab aliis. Sed secundam extasim +facit amor directe, simpliciter quidem amor amicitiae; amor autem +concupiscentiae non simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Nam in amore +concupiscentiae, quodammodo fertur amans extra seipsum, inquantum +scilicet, non contentus gaudere de bono quod habet, quaerit frui +aliquo extra se. Sed quia illud extrinsecum bonum quaerit sibi +habere, non exit simpliciter extra se, sed talis affectio in fine +infra ipsum concluditur. Sed in amore amicitiae, affectus alicuius +simpliciter exit extra se, quia vult amico bonum, et operatur, +quasi gerens curam et providentiam ipsius, propter ipsum +amicum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument is true of the first kind of ecstasy. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34724" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34724] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod illa ratio procedit de prima extasi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument applies to love of concupiscence, which, as stated above, does not cause ecstasy simply. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34725" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34725] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod illa ratio procedit de amore concupiscentiae, qui non +facit simpliciter extasim, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He who loves, goes out from himself, in so far as he wills the good of his friend and works for it. Yet he does not will + the good of his friend more than his own good: and so it does not follow that he loves another more than himself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34726" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34726] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ille qui amat, intantum extra se exit, inquantum vult +bona amici et operatur. Non tamen vult bona amici magis quam sua. +Unde non sequitur quod alterum plus quam se diligat.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q28_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q28_A4-p0.1">Q. 28. A. 4. Whether zeal is an effect of love?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that zeal is not an effect of love. For zeal is a beginning of contention; wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.3" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:3</a>): "Whereas there is among you zeal [Douay: 'envying'] and contention," etc. But contention is incompatible with love. Therefore + zeal is not an effect of love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34727" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34727] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod zelus non sit effectus amoris. Zelus +enim est contentionis principium, unde dicitur I ad Cor. III, +<i>cum sit inter vos zelus et contentio,</i> et cetera. Sed +contentio repugnat amori. Ergo zelus non est effectus amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object of love is the good, which communicates itself to others. But zeal is opposed to communication; since + it seems an effect of zeal, that a man refuses to share the object of his love with another: thus husbands are said to be + jealous of [zelare] their wives, because they will not share them with others. Therefore zeal is not an effect of love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34728" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34728] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea +obiectum amoris est bonum, quod est communicativum sui. Sed zelus +repugnat communicationi, ad zelum enim pertinere videtur quod +aliquis non patiatur consortium in amato; sicut viri dicuntur +zelare uxores, quas nolunt habere communes cum ceteris. Ergo zelus +non est effectus amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there is no zeal without hatred, as neither is there without love: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.72.3" target="asv">Ps. 72:3</a>): "I had a zeal on occasion of the wicked." Therefore it should not be set down as an effect of love any more than of hatred. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34729" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34729] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +zelus non est sine odio, sicut nec sine amore, dicitur enim in +Psalmo LXXII, <i>zelavi super iniquos</i>. Non ergo debet dici +magis effectus amoris quam odii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "God is said to be a zealot, on account of his great love for all things." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34730" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34730] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>Deus +appellatur Zelotes propter multum amorem quem habet ad +existentia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q28_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Zeal, whatever way we take it, arises from the intensity of love. For it is evident that the more intensely a power tends + to anything, the more vigorously it withstands opposition or resistance. Since therefore love is "a movement towards the object + loved," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 35), an intense love seeks to remove everything that opposes it. + </p><p id="FS_Q28_A4-p7"> But this happens in different ways according to love of concupiscence, and love of friendship. For in love of concupiscence + he who desires something intensely, is moved against all that hinders his gaining or quietly enjoying the object of his love. + It is thus that husbands are said to be jealous of their wives, lest association with others prove a hindrance to their exclusive + individual rights. In like manner those who seek to excel, are moved against those who seem to excel, + as though these were a hindrance to their excelling. And this is the zeal of envy, of which it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.36.1" target="asv">Ps. 36:1</a>): "Be not emulous of evil doers, nor envy [zelaveris] them that work iniquity." + </p><p id="FS_Q28_A4-p8"> On the other hand, love of friendship seeks the friend's good: wherefore, when it is intense, it causes a man to be moved + against everything that opposes the friend's good. In this respect, a man is said to be zealous on behalf of his friend, when + he makes a point of repelling whatever may be said or done against the friend's good. In this way, too, a man is said to be + zealous on God's behalf, when he endeavors, to the best of his means, to repel whatever is contrary to the + honor or will of God; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 19:14</a>: "With zeal I have been zealous for the Lord of hosts." Again on the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A4-p8.2" href="./asv.html#John.2.17" target="asv"> Jn. 2:17</a>: "The zeal of Thy house hath eaten me up," a gloss says that "a man is eaten up with a good zeal, who strives to remedy whatever + evil he perceives; and if he cannot, bears with it and laments it." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 4 co."><a name="34731" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34731] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod zelus, quocumque modo sumatur, ex intensione amoris +provenit. Manifestum est enim quod quanto aliqua virtus intensius +tendit in aliquid, fortius etiam repellit omne contrarium vel +repugnans. Cum igitur amor sit quidam motus in amatum, ut +Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest., intensus amor +quaerit excludere omne quod sibi repugnat. Aliter tamen hoc +contingit in amore concupiscentiae, et aliter in amore amicitiae. +Nam in amore concupiscentiae, qui intense aliquid concupiscit, +movetur contra omne illud quod repugnat consecutioni vel fruitioni +quietae eius quod amatur. Et hoc modo viri dicuntur zelare uxores, +ne per consortium aliorum impediatur singularitas quam in uxore +quaerunt. Similiter etiam qui quaerunt excellentiam, moventur +contra eos qui excellere videntur, quasi impedientes excellentiam +eorum. Et iste est zelus invidiae, de quo dicitur in Psalmo XXXVI, +<i>noli aemulari in malignantibus, neque zelaveris facientes +iniquitatem</i>. Amor autem amicitiae quaerit bonum amici, unde +quando est intensus, facit hominem moveri contra omne illud quod +repugnat bono amici. Et secundum hoc, aliquis dicitur zelare pro +amico, quando, si qua dicuntur vel fiunt contra bonum amici, homo +repellere studet. Et per hunc etiam modum aliquis dicitur zelare +pro Deo, quando ea quae sunt contra honorem vel voluntatem Dei, +repellere secundum posse conatur; secundum illud III Reg. XIX, +<i>zelo zelatus sum pro domino exercituum</i>. Et Ioan. II, super +illud, <i>zelus domus tuae comedit me</i>, dicit Glossa quod +<i>bono zelo comeditur, qui quaelibet prava quae viderit, corrigere +satagit; si nequit, tolerat et gemit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle is speaking in this passage of the zeal of envy; which is indeed the cause of contention, not against the object + of love, but for it, and against that which is opposed to it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34732" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34732] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod apostolus ibi loquitur de zelo invidiae; qui +quidem est causa contentionis, non contra rem amatam, sed pro re +amata contra impedimenta ipsius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Good is loved inasmuch as it can be communicated to the lover. Consequently whatever hinders the perfection of this communication, + becomes hateful. Thus zeal arises from love of good. But through defect of goodness, it happens that certain small goods cannot, + in their entirety, be possessed by many at the same time: and from the love of such things arises the zeal of envy. But it + does not arise, properly speaking, in the case of those things which, in + their entirety, can be possessed by many: for no one envies another the knowledge of truth, which can be known entirely by + many; except perhaps one may envy another his superiority in the knowledge of it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34733" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34733] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod bonum amatur inquantum est communicabile amanti. Unde +omne illud quod perfectionem huius communicationis impedit, +efficitur odiosum. Et sic ex amore boni zelus causatur. Ex defectu +autem bonitatis contingit quod quaedam parva bona non possunt +integre simul possideri a multis. Et ex amore talium causatur zelus +invidiae. Non autem proprie ex his quae integre possunt a multis +possideri, nullus enim invidet alteri de cognitione veritatis, quae +a multis integre cognosci potest; sed forte de excellentia circa +cognitionem huius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The very fact that a man hates whatever is opposed to the object of his love, is the effect of love. Hence zeal is set down + as an effect of love rather than of hatred. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34734" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34734] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod aliquis odio habet ea quae repugnant +amato, ex amore procedit. Unde zelus proprie ponitur effectus +amoris magis quam odii.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q28_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q28_A5-p0.1">Q. 28. A. 5. Whether love is a passion that wounds the lover?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that love wounds the lover. For languor denotes a hurt in the one that languishes. But love causes languor: + for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Song.2.5" target="asv">Cant 2:5</a>): "Stay me up with flowers, compass me about with apples; because I languish with love." Therefore love is a wounding passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="34735" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34735] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor sit passio laesiva. Languor enim +significat laesionem quandam languentis. Sed amor causat languorem, +dicitur enim Cant. II, <i>fulcite me floribus, stipate me malis, +quia amore langueo</i>. Ergo amor est passio laesiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, melting is a kind of dissolution. But love melts that in which it is: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Song.5.6" target="asv">Cant 5:6</a>): "My soul melted when my beloved spoke." Therefore love is a dissolvent: therefore it is a corruptive and a wounding passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="34736" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34736] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +liquefactio est quaedam resolutio. Sed amor est liquefactivus, +dicitur enim Cant. V, <i>anima mea liquefacta est, ut dilectus meus +locutus est</i>. Ergo amor est resolutivus. Est ergo corruptivus et +laesivus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fervor denotes a certain excess of heat; which excess has a corruptive effect. But love causes fervor: for Dionysius + (Coel. Hier. vii) in reckoning the properties belonging to the Seraphim's love, includes "hot" and "piercing" and "most fervent." + Moreover it is said of love ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Song.8.6" target="asv">Cant 8:6</a>) that "its lamps are fire and flames." Therefore love is a wounding and corruptive passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="34737" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34737] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +fervor designat quendam excessum in caliditate, qui quidem excessus +corruptivus est. Sed fervor causatur ex amore, Dionysius enim, VII +cap. Cael. Hier., inter ceteras proprietates ad amorem Seraphim +pertinentes, ponit calidum et acutum et superfervens. Et Cant. +VIII, dicitur de amore quod <i>lampades eius sunt lampades ignis +atque flammarum</i>. Ergo amor est passio laesiva et +corruptiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "everything loves itself with a love that holds it together," i.e. that preserves it. + Therefore love is not a wounding passion, but rather one that preserves and perfects. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 5 s. c."><a name="34738" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34738] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod singula seipsa +amant contentive, idest conservative. Ergo amor non est passio +laesiva, sed magis conservativa et perfectiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q28_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q26_A1" id="FS_Q28_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[26], AA[1]</a>,2; + <a href="#FS_Q27_A1" id="FS_Q28_A5-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[27], A[1]</a>), love denotes a certain adapting of the appetitive power to some good. Now nothing is hurt by being adapted to that which + is suitable to it; rather, if possible, it is perfected and bettered. But if a thing be adapted to that which is not suitable + to it, it is hurt and made worse thereby. Consequently love of a suitable good perfects and betters the lover; but + love of a good which is unsuitable to the lover, wounds and worsens him. Wherefore man is perfected and bettered chiefly by + the love of God: but is wounded and worsened by the love of sin, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A5-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Hos.9.10" target="asv"> Osee 9:10</a>: "They became abominable, as those things which they loved." + </p><p id="FS_Q28_A5-p7"> And let this be understood as applying to love in respect of its formal element, i.e. in regard to the appetite. But in respect + of the material element in the passion of love, i.e. a certain bodily change, it happens that love is hurtful, by reason of + this change being excessive: just as it happens in the senses, and in every act of a power of the soul that is exercised through + the change of some bodily organ. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 5 co."><a name="34739" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34739] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, amor significat coaptationem +quandam appetitivae virtutis ad aliquod bonum. Nihil autem quod +coaptatur ad aliquid quod est sibi conveniens, ex hoc ipso +laeditur, sed magis, si sit possibile, proficit et melioratur. Quod +vero coaptatur ad aliquid quod non est sibi conveniens, ex hoc ipso +laeditur et deterioratur. Amor ergo boni convenientis est +perfectivus et meliorativus amantis, amor autem boni quod non est +conveniens amanti, est laesivus et deteriorativus amantis. Unde +maxime homo perficitur et melioratur per amorem Dei, laeditur autem +et deterioratur per amorem peccati, secundum illud Osee IX, +<i>facti sunt abominabiles, sicut ea quae dilexerunt</i>. Et hoc +quidem dictum sit de amore, quantum ad id quod est formale in ipso, +quod est scilicet ex parte appetitus. Quantum vero ad id quod est +materiale in passione amoris, quod est immutatio aliqua corporalis, +accidit quod amor sit laesivus propter excessum immutationis, sicut +accidit in sensu, et in omni actu virtutis animae qui exercetur per +aliquam immutationem organi corporalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A5-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In reply to the objections, it is to be observed that four proximate effects may be ascribed to love: viz. melting, enjoyment, + languor, and fervor. Of these the first is "melting," which is opposed to freezing. For things that are frozen, are closely + bound together, so as to be hard to pierce. But it belongs to love that the appetite is fitted to receive the good which is + loved, inasmuch as the object loved is in the lover, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q28_A2" id="FS_Q28_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. + Consequently the freezing or hardening of the heart is a disposition incompatible with love: while melting denotes a softening + of the heart, whereby the heart shows itself to be ready for the entrance of the beloved. If, then, the beloved is present + and possessed, pleasure or enjoyment ensues. But if the beloved be absent, two passions arise; viz. sadness at its absence, + which is denoted by "languor" (hence Cicero in De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 11 applies the term "ailment" chiefly to sadness); and + an intense desire to possess the beloved, which is signified by "fervor." And these are the effects of love considered formally, + according to the relation of the appetitive power to its object. But in the passion of love, other effects ensue, proportionate + to the above, in respect of a change in the organ. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="34740" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34740] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad ea vero +quae in contrarium obiiciuntur, dicendum quod amori attribui +possunt quatuor effectus proximi, scilicet liquefactio, fruitio, +languor et fervor. Inter quae primum est liquefactio, quae +opponitur congelationi. Ea enim quae sunt congelata, in seipsis +constricta sunt, ut non possint de facili subintrationem alterius +pati. Ad amorem autem pertinet quod appetitus coaptetur ad quandam +receptionem boni amati, prout amatum est in amante, sicut iam supra +dictum est. Unde cordis congelatio vel duritia est dispositio +repugnans amori. Sed liquefactio importat quandam mollificationem +cordis, qua exhibet se cor habile ut amatum in ipsum subintret. Si +ergo amatum fuerit praesens et habitum, causatur delectatio sive +fruitio. Si autem fuerit absens, consequuntur duae passiones, +scilicet tristitia de absentia, quae significatur per languorem +(unde et Tullius, in III de Tusculanis quaest., maxime tristitiam +aegritudinem nominat); et intensum desiderium de consecutione +amati, quod significatur per fervorem. Et isti quidem sunt effectus +amoris formaliter accepti, secundum habitudinem appetitivae +virtutis ad obiectum. Sed in passione amoris, consequuntur aliqui +effectus his proportionati, secundum immutationem organi.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q28_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q28_A6-p0.1">Q. 28. A. 6. Whether love is cause of all that the lover does?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the lover does not do everything from love. For love is a passion, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q26_A2" id="FS_Q28_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[26], A[2]</a>). But man does not do everything from passion: but some things he does from choice, and some things from ignorance, as stated + in Ethic. v, 8. Therefore not everything that a man does, is done from love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="34741" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34741] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod amans non agat omnia ex amore. Amor +enim quaedam passio est, ut supra dictum est. Sed non omnia quae +agit homo, agit ex passione, sed quaedam agit ex electione, et +quaedam ex ignorantia, ut dicitur in V Ethic. Ergo non omnia quae +homo agit, agit ex amore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the appetite is a principle of movement and action in all animals, as stated in De Anima iii, 10. If, therefore, + whatever a man does is done from love, the other passions of the appetitive faculty are superfluous. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="34742" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34742] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +appetitus est principium motus et actionis in omnibus animalibus, +ut patet in III de anima. Si igitur omnia quae quis agit, agit ex +amore, aliae passiones appetitivae partis erunt superfluae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing is produced at one and the same time by contrary causes. But some things are done from hatred. Therefore + all things are not done from love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="34743" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34743] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +nihil causatur simul a contrariis causis. Sed quaedam fiunt ex +odio. Non ergo omnia sunt ex amore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "all things, whatever they do, they do for the love of good." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 6 s. c."><a name="34744" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34744] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>propter +amorem boni omnia agunt quaecumque agunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Every agent acts for an end, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A2" id="FS_Q28_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[2]</a> ). Now the end is the good desired and loved by each one. Wherefore it is evident that every agent, whatever it be, does + every action from love of some kind. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 6 co."><a name="34745" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34745] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod omne agens agit propter finem aliquem, ut supra +dictum est. Finis autem est bonum desideratum et amatum unicuique. +Unde manifestum est quod omne agens, quodcumque sit, agit +quamcumque actionem ex aliquo amore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection takes love as a passion existing in the sensitive appetite. But here we are speaking of love in a general + sense, inasmuch as it includes intellectual, rational, animal, and natural love: for it is in this sense that Dionysius speaks + of love in chapter iv of De Divinis Nominibus. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="34746" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34746] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de amore qui est passio +in appetitu sensitivo existens. Nos autem loquimur nunc de amore +communiter accepto, prout comprehendit sub se amorem +intellectualem, rationalem, animalem, naturalem, sic enim Dionysius +loquitur de amore in IV cap. de Div. Nom.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q28_A5" id="FS_Q28_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[5];</a> Q[27], A[4]) desire, sadness and pleasure, and consequently all the other passions of the soul, result from love. Wherefore + every act proceeds from any passion, proceeds also from love as from a first cause: and so the other passions, which are proximate + causes, are not superfluous. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="34747" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34747] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ex amore, sicut iam dictum est, causantur et +desiderium et tristitia et delectatio, et per consequens omnes +aliae passiones. Unde omnis actio quae procedit ex quacumque +passione, procedit etiam ex amore, sicut ex prima causa. Unde non +superfluunt aliae passiones, quae sunt causae proximae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hatred also is a result of love, as we shall state further on ( + <a href="#FS_Q29_A2" id="FS_Q28_A6-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[29], A[2]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="34748" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34748] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod odium etiam ex amore causatur, sicut infra +dicetur.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q29" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q29-p0.1">Q. 29. OF HATRED (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q29-p2"> We must now consider hatred: concerning which there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q29-p3"><a href="#FS_Q29_A1"> (1) Whether evil is the cause and the object of hatred?</a></p><p id="FS_Q29-p4"><a href="#FS_Q29_A2"> (2) Whether love is the cause of hatred?</a></p><p id="FS_Q29-p5"><a href="#FS_Q29_A3"> (3) Whether hatred is stronger than love?</a></p><p id="FS_Q29-p6"><a href="#FS_Q29_A4"> (4) Whether a man can hate himself?</a></p><p id="FS_Q29-p7"><a href="#FS_Q29_A5"> (5) Whether a man can hate the truth?</a></p><p id="FS_Q29-p8"><a href="#FS_Q29_A6"> (6) Whether a thing can be the object of universal hatred?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 pr."><a name="34749" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34749] +Iª-IIae q. 29 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de odio. +Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum causa et obiectum odii +sit malum. Secundo, utrum odium causetur ex amore. Tertio, utrum +odium sit fortius quam amor. Quarto, utrum aliquis possit habere +odio seipsum. Quinto, utrum aliquis possit habere odio veritatem. +Sexto, utrum aliquid possit haberi odio in universali.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q29_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q29_A1-p0.1">Q. 29. A. 1. Whether evil is the cause and object of hatred?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that evil is not the object and cause of hatred. For everything that exists, as such, is good. If therefore + evil be the object of hatred, it follows that nothing but the lack of something can be the object of hatred: which is clearly + untrue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34750" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34750] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod obiectum et causa odii non sit malum. +Omne enim quod est, inquantum huiusmodi bonum est. Si igitur +obiectum odii sit malum, sequitur quod nulla res odio habeatur, sed +solum defectus alicuius rei. Quod patet esse falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, hatred of evil is praise-worthy; hence ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q29_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiMacc.3.1" target="asv">2 Macc 3:1</a>) some are praised for that "the laws were very well kept, because of the godliness of Onias the high-priest, and the hatred + of their souls [Douay: 'his soul'] had no evil." If, therefore, nothing but evil be the object of hatred, it would follow + that all hatred is commendable: and this is clearly false. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34751" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34751] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +odire malum est laudabile, unde in laudem quorundam dicitur II +Machab. III, quod <i>leges optime custodiebantur, propter Oniae +pontificis pietatem, et animos odio habentes mala</i>. Si igitur +nihil oditur nisi malum, sequitur quod omne odium sit laudabile. +Quod patet esse falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same thing is not at the same time both good and evil. But the same thing is lovable and hateful to different + subjects. Therefore hatred is not only of evil, but also of good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34752" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34752] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +idem non est simul bonum et malum. Sed idem diversis est odibile et +amabile. Ergo odium non solum est mali, sed etiam boni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Hatred is the opposite of love. But the object of love is good, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q26_A1" id="FS_Q29_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[26], A[1]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q27_A1" id="FS_Q29_A1-p5.2" shape="rect"> Q[27], A[1]</a>). Therefore the object of hatred is evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34753" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34753] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +odium contrariatur amori. Sed obiectum amoris est bonum, ut supra +dictum est. Ergo obiectum odii est malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since the natural appetite is the result of apprehension (though this apprehension is not in the same subject as the natural + appetite), it seems that what applies to the inclination of the natural appetite, applies also to the animal appetite, which + does result from an apprehension in the same subject, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q26_A1" id="FS_Q29_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[26], A[1]</a>). Now, with regard to the natural appetite, it is evident, that just as each thing is naturally attuned + and adapted to that which is suitable to it, wherein consists natural love; so has it a natural dissonance from that which + opposes and destroys it; and this is natural hatred. So, therefore, in the animal appetite, or in the intellectual appetite, + love is a certain harmony of the appetite with that which is apprehended as suitable; while hatred is dissonance of the appetite + from that which is apprehended as repugnant and hurtful. Now, just as whatever is suitable, as such, bears the aspect of + good; so whatever is repugnant, as such, bears the aspect of evil. And therefore, just as good is the object of love, so evil + is the object of hatred. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 1 co."><a name="34754" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34754] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, cum appetitus naturalis derivetur ab aliqua +apprehensione, licet non coniuncta; eadem ratio videtur esse de +inclinatione appetitus naturalis, et appetitus animalis, qui +sequitur apprehensionem coniunctam, sicut supra dictum est. In +appetitu autem naturali hoc manifeste apparet, quod sicut +unumquodque habet naturalem consonantiam vel aptitudinem ad id quod +sibi convenit, quae est amor naturalis; ita ad id quod est ei +repugnans et corruptivum, habet dissonantiam naturalem, quae est +odium naturale. Sic igitur et in appetitu animali, seu in +intellectivo, amor est consonantia quaedam appetitus ad id quod +apprehenditur ut conveniens, odium vero est dissonantia quaedam +appetitus ad id quod apprehenditur ut repugnans et nocivum. Sicut +autem omne conveniens, inquantum huiusmodi, habet rationem boni; +ita omne repugnans, inquantum huiusmodi, habet rationem mali. Et +ideo, sicut bonum est obiectum amoris, ita malum est obiectum +odii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Being, as such, has not the aspect of repugnance but only of fittingness; because being is common to all things. But being, + inasmuch as it is this determinate being, has an aspect of repugnance to some determinate being. And in this way, one being + is hateful to another, and is evil; though not in itself, but by comparison with something else. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34755" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34755] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ens, inquantum ens, non habet rationem +repugnantis, sed magis convenientis, quia omnia conveniunt in ente. +Sed ens inquantum est hoc ens determinatum, habet rationem +repugnantis ad aliquod ens determinatum. Et secundum hoc, unum ens +est odibile alteri, et est malum, etsi non in se, tamen per +comparationem ad alterum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as a thing may be apprehended as good, when it is not truly good; so a thing may be apprehended as evil, whereas it + is not truly evil. Hence it happens sometimes that neither hatred of evil nor love of good is good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34756" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34756] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut aliquid apprehenditur ut bonum, quod non est +vere bonum; ita aliquid apprehenditur ut malum, quod non est vere +malum. Unde contingit quandoque nec odium mali, nec amorem boni +esse bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To different things the same thing may be lovable or hateful: in respect of the natural appetite, owing to one and the same + thing being naturally suitable to one thing, and naturally unsuitable to another: thus heat is becoming to fire and unbecoming + to water: and in respect of the animal appetite, owing to one and the same thing being apprehended by one as good, by another + as bad. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34757" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34757] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod contingit idem esse amabile et odibile diversis, +secundum appetitum quidem naturalem, ex hoc quod unum et idem est +conveniens uni secundum suam naturam, et repugnans alteri, sicut +calor convenit igni, et repugnat aquae. Secundum appetitum vero +animalem, ex hoc quod unum et idem apprehenditur ab uno sub ratione +boni, et ab alio sub ratione mali.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q29_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q29_A2-p0.1">Q. 29. A. 2. Whether love is a cause of hatred?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that love is not a cause of hatred. For "the opposite members of a division are naturally simultaneous" (Praedic. + x). But love and hatred are opposite members of a division, since they are contrary to one another. Therefore they are naturally + simultaneous. Therefore love is not the cause of hatred. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34758" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34758] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non sit causa odii. <i>Ea enim +quae ex opposito dividuntur, naturaliter sunt simul</i>, ut dicitur +in praedicamentis. Sed amor et odium, cum sint contraria, ex +opposito dividuntur. Ergo naturaliter sunt simul. Non ergo amor est +causa odii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, of two contraries, one is not the cause of the other. But love and hatred are contraries. Therefore love is not + the cause of hatred. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34759" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34759] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +unum contrariorum non est causa alterius. Sed amor et odium sunt +contraria. Ergo amor non est causa odii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which follows is not the cause of that which precedes. But hatred precedes love, seemingly: since hatred implies + a turning away from evil, whereas love implies a turning towards good. Therefore love is not the cause of hatred. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34760" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34760] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +posterius non est causa prioris. Sed odium est prius amore, ut +videtur, nam odium importat recessum a malo, amor vero accessum ad +bonum. Ergo amor non est causa odii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9) that all emotions are caused by love. Therefore hatred also, since it is an emotion + of the soul, is caused by love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34761" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34761] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicit Augustinus, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod omnes affectiones +causantur ex amore. Ergo et odium, cum sit quaedam affectio animae, +causatur ex amore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q29_A1" id="FS_Q29_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, love consists in a certain agreement of the lover with the object loved, while hatred consists in a certain disagreement + or dissonance. Now we should consider in each thing, what agrees with it, before that which disagrees: since a thing disagrees + with another, through destroying or hindering that which agrees with it. Consequently love must needs precede hatred; and + nothing is hated, save through being + contrary to a suitable thing which is loved. And hence it is that every hatred is caused by love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 2 co."><a name="34762" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34762] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, amor consistit in quadam +convenientia amantis ad amatum, odium vero consistit in quadam +repugnantia vel dissonantia. Oportet autem in quolibet prius +considerare quid ei conveniat, quam quid ei repugnet, per hoc enim +aliquid est repugnans alteri, quia est corruptivum vel impeditivum +eius quod est conveniens. Unde necesse est quod amor sit prior +odio; et quod nihil odio habeatur, nisi per hoc quod contrariatur +convenienti quod amatur. Et secundum hoc, omne odium ex amore +causatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The opposite members of a division are sometimes naturally simultaneous, both really and logically; e.g. two species of animal, + or two species of color. Sometimes they are simultaneous logically, while, in reality, one precedes, and causes the other; + e.g. the species of numbers, figures and movements. Sometimes they are not simultaneous either really or logically; e.g. substance + and accident; for substance is in reality the cause of accident; and + being is predicated of substance before it is predicated of accident, by a priority of reason, because it is not predicated + of accident except inasmuch as the latter is in substance. Now love and hatred are naturally simultaneous, logically but not + really. Wherefore nothing hinders love from being the cause of hatred. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34763" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34763] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod in his quae ex opposito dividuntur, quaedam +inveniuntur quae sunt naturaliter simul et secundum rem, et +secundum rationem, sicut duae species animalis, vel duae species +coloris. Quaedam vero sunt simul secundum rationem, sed unum +realiter est prius altero et causa eius, sicut patet in speciebus +numerorum, figurarum et motuum. Quaedam vero non sunt simul nec +secundum rem, nec secundum rationem, sicut substantia et accidens, +nam substantia realiter est causa accidentis; et ens secundum +rationem prius attribuitur substantiae quam accidenti, quia +accidenti non attribuitur nisi inquantum est in substantia. Amor +autem et odium naturaliter quidem sunt simul secundum rationem, sed +non realiter. Unde nihil prohibet amorem esse causam odii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Love and hatred are contraries if considered in respect of the same thing. But if taken in respect of contraries, they are + not themselves contrary, but consequent to one another: for it amounts to the same that one love a certain thing, or that + one hate its contrary. Thus love of one thing is the cause of one's hating its contrary. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34764" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34764] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod amor et odium sunt contraria, quando accipiuntur +circa idem. Sed quando sunt de contrariis, non sunt contraria, sed +se invicem consequentia, eiusdem enim rationis est quod ametur +aliquid, et odiatur eius contrarium. Et sic amor unius rei est +causa quod eius contrarium odiatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the order of execution, the turning away from one term precedes the turning towards the other. But the reverse is the + case in the order of intention: since approach to one term is the reason for turning away from the other. Now the appetitive + movement belongs rather to the order of intention than to that of execution. Wherefore love precedes hatred: because each + is an appetitive movement. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34765" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34765] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in executione prius est recedere ab uno termino, quam +accedere ad alterum terminum. Sed in intentione est e converso, +propter hoc enim receditur ab uno termino, ut accedatur ad alterum. +Motus autem appetitivus magis pertinet ad intentionem quam ad +executionem. Et ideo amor est prior odio, cum utrumque sit motus +appetitivus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q29_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q29_A3-p0.1">Q. 29. A. 3. Whether hatred is stronger than love?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hatred is stronger than love. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 36): "There is no one who does not flee + from pain, more than he desires pleasure." But flight from pain pertains to hatred; while desire for pleasure belongs to love. + Therefore hatred is stronger than love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34766" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34766] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod odium sit fortius amore. Dicit enim +Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>nemo est qui non +magis dolorem fugiat, quam appetat voluptatem</i>. Sed fugere +dolorem pertinet ad odium, appetitus autem voluptatis pertinet ad +amorem. Ergo odium est fortius amore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the weaker is overcome by the stronger. But love is overcome by hatred: when, that is to say, love is turned into + hatred. Therefore hatred is stronger than love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34767" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34767] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +debilius vincitur a fortiori. Sed amor vincitur ab odio, quando +scilicet amor convertitur in odium. Ergo odium est fortius +amore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the emotions of the soul are shown by their effects. But man insists more on repelling what is hateful, than on + seeking what is pleasant: thus also irrational animals refrain from pleasure for fear of the whip, as Augustine instances + (QQ. 83, qu. 36). Therefore hatred is stronger than love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34768" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34768] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +affectio animae per effectum manifestatur. Sed fortius insistit +homo ad repellendum odiosum, quam ad prosequendum amatum, sicut +etiam bestiae abstinent a delectabilibus propter verbera, ut +Augustinus introducit in libro octoginta trium quaest. Ergo odium +est fortius amore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Good is stronger than evil; because "evil does nothing except in virtue of good," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But hatred + and love differ according to the difference of good and evil. Therefore love is stronger than hatred. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34769" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34769] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +bonum est fortius quam malum, quia malum non agit nisi virtute +boni, ut Dionysius dicit, cap. IV de Div. Nom. Sed odium et amor +differunt secundum differentiam boni et mali. Ergo amor est fortior +odio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for an effect to be stronger than its cause. Now every hatred arises from some love as its cause, as above + stated + <a href="#FS_Q29_A2" id="FS_Q29_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore it is impossible for hatred to be stronger than love absolutely. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 3 co."><a name="34770" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34770] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod impossibile est effectum sua causa esse fortiorem. +Omne autem odium procedit ex aliquo amore sicut ex causa, ut supra +dictum est. Unde impossibile est quod odium sit fortius amore +simpliciter. Sed oportet ulterius quod amor, simpliciter loquendo, +sit odio fortior. Fortius enim movetur aliquid in finem, quam in ea +quae sunt ad finem. Recessus autem a malo ordinatur ad +consecutionem boni, sicut ad finem. Unde, simpliciter loquendo, +fortior est motus animae in bonum quam in malum. Sed tamen +aliquando videtur odium fortius amore, propter duo. Primo quidem, +quia odium est magis sensibile quam amor. Cum enim sensus perceptio +sit in quadam immutatione, ex quo aliquid iam immutatum est, non +ita sentitur sicut quando est in ipso immutari. Unde calor febris +hecticae, quamvis sit maior, non tamen ita sentitur sicut calor +tertianae, quia calor hecticae iam versus est quasi in habitum et +naturam. Propter hoc etiam, amor magis sentitur in absentia amati, +sicut Augustinus dicit, in X de Trin., quod <i>amor non ita +sentitur, cum non prodit eum indigentia</i>. Et propter hoc etiam, +repugnantia eius quod oditur, sensibilius percipitur quam +convenientia eius quod amatur. Secundo, quia non comparatur odium +ad amorem sibi correspondentem. Secundum enim diversitatem bonorum, +est diversitas amorum in magnitudine et parvitate, quibus +proportionantur opposita odia. Unde odium quod correspondet maiori +amori, magis movet quam minor amor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A3-p7"> But furthermore, love must needs be, absolutely speaking, stronger than hatred. Because a thing is moved to the end more + strongly than to the means. Now turning away from evil is directed as a means to the gaining of good. Wherefore, absolutely + speaking, the soul's movement in respect of good is stronger than its movement in respect of evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34771" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34771] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc +patet responsio ad primum. Nam amor voluptatis est minor quam amor +conservationis sui ipsius, cui respondet fuga doloris. Et ideo +magis fugitur dolor, quam ametur voluptas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A3-p8"> Nevertheless hatred sometimes seems to be stronger than love, for two reasons. First, because hatred is more keenly felt + than love. For, since the sensitive perception is accompanied by a certain impression; when once the impression has been received + it is not felt so keenly as in the moment of receiving it. Hence the heat of a hectic fever, though greater, is nevertheless + not felt so much as the heat of tertian fever; because the heat of the hectic fever is habitual and like a + second nature. For this reason, love is felt more keenly in the absence of the object loved; thus Augustine says (De Trin. + x, 12) that "love is felt more keenly when we lack what we love." And for the same reason, the unbecomingness of that which + is hated is felt more keenly than the becomingness of that which is loved. Secondly, because comparison is made between a + hatred and a love which are not mutually corresponding. Because, according to different degrees of good there are different + degrees of love to which correspond different degrees of hatred. Wherefore a hatred that corresponds to a greater love, moves + us more than a lesser love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34772" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34772] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod odium nunquam vinceret amorem, nisi propter maiorem +amorem cui odium correspondet. Sicut homo magis diligit se quam +amicum, et propter hoc quod diligit se, habet odio etiam amicum, si +sibi contrarietur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A3-p9"> Hence it is clear how to reply to the First Objection. For the love of pleasure is less than the love of self-preservation, + to which corresponds flight from pain. Wherefore we flee from pain more than we love pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34773" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34773] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ideo intensius aliquid operatur ad repellendum +odiosa, quia odium est magis sensibile.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q29_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q29_A4-p0.1">Q. 29. A. 4. Whether a man can hate himself?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man can hate himself. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q29_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.10.6" target="asv">Ps. 10:6</a>): "He that loveth iniquity, hateth his own soul." But many love iniquity. Therefore many hate themselves. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34774" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34774] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis possit seipsum odio habere. +Dicitur enim in Psalmo X, <i>qui diligit iniquitatem, odit animam +suam</i>. Sed multi diligunt iniquitatem. Ergo multi odiunt +seipsos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, him we hate, to whom we wish and work evil. But sometimes a man wishes and works evil to himself, e.g. a man who + kills himself. Therefore some men hate themselves. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34775" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34775] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +illum odimus, cui volumus et operamur malum. Sed quandoque aliquis +vult et operatur sibi ipsi malum, puta qui interimunt seipsos. Ergo +aliqui seipsos habent odio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Consol. ii) that "avarice makes a man hateful"; whence we may conclude that everyone hates a miser. + But some men are misers. Therefore they hate themselves. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34776" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34776] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Boetius dicit, in II de Consol., quod <i>avaritia facit homines +odiosos</i>, ex quo potest accipi quod omnis homo odit avarum. Sed +aliqui sunt avari. Ergo illi odiunt seipsos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q29_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.29" target="asv">Eph. 5:29</a>) that "no man ever hated his own flesh." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34777" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34777] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. V, quod <i>nemo unquam carnem +suam odio habuit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q29_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Properly speaking, it is impossible for a man to hate himself. For everything naturally desires good, nor can anyone desire + anything for himself, save under the aspect of good: for "evil is outside the scope of the will," as Dionysius says (Div. + Nom. iv). Now to love a man is to will good to him, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q26_A4" id="FS_Q29_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[26], A[4]</a>). Consequently, a man must, of necessity, love himself; and it is impossible for a man to hate himself, + properly speaking. + </p><p id="FS_Q29_A4-p7"> But accidentally it happens that a man hates himself: and this in two ways. First, on the part of the good which a man wills + to himself. For it happens sometimes that what is desired as good in some particular respect, is simply evil; and in this + way, a man accidentally wills evil to himself; and thus hates himself. Secondly, in regard to himself, to whom he wills good. + For each thing is that which is predominant in it; wherefore the state is said to do what the king does, as if + the king were the whole state. Now it is clear that man is principally the mind of man. And it happens that some men account + themselves as being principally that which they are in their material and sensitive nature. Wherefore they love themselves + according to what they take themselves to be, while they hate that which they really are, by desiring what is contrary to + reason. And in both these ways, "he that loveth iniquity hateth" not only "his own soul," but also himself. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 4 co."><a name="34778" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34778] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod impossibile est quod aliquis, per se loquendo, odiat +seipsum. Naturaliter enim unumquodque appetit bonum, nec potest +aliquis aliquid sibi appetere nisi sub ratione boni, nam malum est +praeter voluntatem, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Amare +autem aliquem est velle ei bonum, ut supra dictum est. Unde necesse +est quod aliquis amet seipsum; et impossibile est quod aliquis +odiat seipsum, per se loquendo. Per accidens tamen contingit quod +aliquis seipsum odio habeat. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo, ex parte +boni quod sibi aliquis vult. Accidit enim quandoque illud quod +appetitur ut secundum quid bonum, esse simpliciter malum, et +secundum hoc, aliquis per accidens vult sibi malum, quod est odire. +Alio modo, ex parte sui ipsius, cui vult bonum. Unumquodque enim +maxime est id quod est principalius in ipso, unde civitas dicitur +facere quod rex facit, quasi rex sit tota civitas. Manifestum est +ergo quod homo maxime est mens hominis. Contingit autem quod aliqui +aestimant se esse maxime illud quod sunt secundum naturam +corporalem et sensitivam. Unde amant se secundum id quod aestimant +se esse, sed odiunt id quod vere sunt, dum volunt contraria +rationi. Et utroque modo, ille qui diligit iniquitatem, odit non +solum animam suam, sed etiam seipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A4-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Wherefore the reply to the First Objection is evident.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34779" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34779] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc +patet responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> No man wills and works evil to himself, except he apprehend it under the aspect of good. For even they who kill themselves, + apprehend death itself as a good, considered as putting an end to some unhappiness or pain. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34780" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34780] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod nullus sibi vult et facit malum, nisi inquantum +apprehendit illud sub ratione boni. Nam et illi qui interimunt +seipsos, hoc ipsum quod est mori, apprehendunt sub ratione boni, +inquantum est terminativum alicuius miseriae vel doloris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The miser hates something accidental to himself, but not for that reason does he hate himself: thus a sick man hates his + sickness for the very reason that he loves himself. Or we may say that avarice makes man hateful to others, but not to himself. + In fact, it is caused by inordinate self-love, in respect of which, man desires temporal goods for himself more than he should. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34781" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34781] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod avarus odit aliquod accidens suum, non tamen propter +hoc odit seipsum, sicut aeger odit suam aegritudinem, ex hoc ipso +quod se amat. Vel dicendum quod avaritia odiosos facit aliis, non +autem sibi ipsi. Quinimmo causatur ex inordinato sui amore, +secundum quem de bonis temporalibus plus sibi aliquis vult quam +debeat.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q29_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q29_A5-p0.1">Q. 29. A. 5. Whether a man can hate the truth?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man cannot hate the truth. For good, true, and being are convertible. But a man cannot hate good. Neither, + therefore, can he hate the truth. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="34782" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34782] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis non possit habere odio +veritatem. Bonum enim et ens et verum convertuntur. Sed aliquis non +potest habere odio bonitatem. Ergo nec veritatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "All men have a natural desire for knowledge," as stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics i, 1. But knowledge + is only of truth. Therefore truth is naturally desired and loved. But that which is in a thing naturally, is always in it. + Therefore no man can hate the truth. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="34783" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34783] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +omnes homines naturaliter scire desiderant, ut dicitur in principio +Metaphys. Sed scientia non est nisi verorum. Ergo veritas +naturaliter desideratur et amatur. Sed quod naturaliter inest, +semper inest. Nullus ergo potest habere odio veritatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "men love those who are straightforward." But there can be no other motive + for this save truth. Therefore man loves the truth naturally. Therefore he cannot hate it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="34784" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34784] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>homines amant non +fictos</i>. Sed non nisi propter veritatem. Ergo homo naturaliter +amat veritatem. Non potest ergo eam odio habere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q29_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.4.16" target="asv">Gal. 4:16</a>): "Am I become your enemy because I tell you the truth?" [*St. Thomas quotes the passage, probably from memory, as though + it were an assertion: "I am become," etc.] + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 5 s. c."><a name="34785" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34785] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Galat. IV, <i>factus sum vobis +inimicus, verum dicens vobis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Good, true and being are the same in reality, but differ as considered by reason. For good is considered in the light of + something desirable, while being and true are not so considered: because good is "what all things seek." Wherefore good, as + such, cannot be the object of hatred, neither in general nor in particular. Being and truth in general cannot be the object + of hatred: because disagreement is the cause of hatred, and agreement is the cause of love; + while being and truth are common to all things. But nothing hinders some particular being or some particular truth being an + object of hatred, in so far as it is considered as hurtful and repugnant; since hurtfulness and repugnance are not incompatible + with the notion of being and truth, as they are with the notion of good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 5 co."><a name="34786" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34786] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod bonum et verum et ens sunt idem secundum rem, sed +differunt ratione. Bonum enim habet rationem appetibilis, non autem +ens vel verum, quia bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Et ideo bonum, +sub ratione boni, non potest odio haberi, nec in universali nec in +particulari. Ens autem et verum in universali quidem odio haberi +non possunt, quia dissonantia est causa odii, et convenientia causa +amoris; ens autem et verum sunt communia omnibus. Sed in +particulari nihil prohibet quoddam ens et quoddam verum odio +haberi, inquantum habet rationem contrarii et repugnantis, +contrarietas enim et repugnantia non adversatur rationi entis et +veri, sicut adversatur rationi boni. Contingit autem verum aliquod +particulare tripliciter repugnare vel contrariari bono amato. Uno +modo, secundum quod veritas est causaliter et originaliter in ipsis +rebus. Et sic homo quandoque odit aliquam veritatem, dum vellet non +esse verum quod est verum. Alio modo, secundum quod veritas est in +cognitione ipsius hominis, quae impedit ipsum a prosecutione amati. +Sicut si aliqui vellent non cognoscere veritatem fidei, ut libere +peccarent, ex quorum persona dicitur Iob XXI, <i>scientiam viarum +tuarum nolumus</i>. Tertio modo habetur odio veritas particularis, +tanquam repugnans, prout est in intellectu alterius. Puta, cum +aliquis vult latere in peccato, odit quod aliquis veritatem circa +peccatum suum cognoscat. Et secundum hoc dicit Augustinus, in X +Confess., quod <i>homines amant veritatem lucentem, oderunt eam +redarguentem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A5-p7"> Now it may happen in three ways that some particular truth is repugnant or hurtful to the good we love. First, according + as truth is in things as in its cause and origin. And thus man sometimes hates a particular truth, when he wishes that what + is true were not true. Secondly, according as truth is in man's knowledge, which hinders him from gaining the object loved: + such is the case of those who wish not to know the truth of faith, that they may sin freely; in whose person it is + said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q29_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Job.21.14" target="asv">Job 21:14</a>): "We desire not the knowledge of Thy ways." Thirdly, a particular truth is hated, as being repugnant, inasmuch as it is + in the intellect of another man: as, for instance, when a man wishes to remain hidden in his sin, he hates that anyone should + know the truth about his sin. In this respect, Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that men "love truth when it enlightens, they + hate it when it reproves." This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="34787" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34787] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc +patet responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The knowledge of truth is lovable in itself: hence Augustine says that men love it when it enlightens. But accidentally, + the knowledge of truth may become hateful, in so far as it hinders one from accomplishing one's desire. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="34788" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34788] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod cognoscere veritatem secundum se est amabile, propter +quod dicit Augustinus quod amant eam lucentem. Sed per accidens +cognitio veritatis potest esse odibilis, inquantum impedit ab +aliquo desiderato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason why we love those who are straightforward is that they make known the truth, and the knowledge of the truth, considered + in itself, is a desirable thing. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="34789" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34789] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ex hoc procedit quod non ficti amantur, quod homo +amat secundum se cognoscere veritatem, quam homines non ficti +manifestant.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q29_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q29_A6-p0.1">Q. 29. A. 6. Whether anything can be an object of universal hatred?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a thing cannot be an object of universal hatred. Because hatred is a passion of the sensitive appetite, + which is moved by an apprehension in the senses. But the senses cannot apprehend the universal. Therefore a thing cannot be + an object of universal hatred. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="34790" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34790] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod odium non possit esse alicuius in +universali. Odium enim est passio appetitus sensitivi, qui movetur +ex sensibili apprehensione. Sed sensus non potest apprehendere +universale. Ergo odium non potest esse alicuius in universali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, hatred is caused by disagreement; and where there is disagreement, there is nothing in common. But the notion of + universality implies something in common. Therefore nothing can be the object of universal hatred. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="34791" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34791] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +odium causatur ex aliqua dissonantia; quae communitati repugnat. +Sed communitas est de ratione universalis. Ergo odium non potest +esse alicuius in universali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the object of hatred is evil. But "evil is in things, and not in the mind" (Metaph. vi, 4). Since therefore the + universal is in the mind only, which abstracts the universal from the particular, it would seem that hatred cannot have a + universal object. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="34792" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34792] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +obiectum odii est malum. Malum autem est in rebus, et non in mente, +ut dicitur in VI Metaphys. Cum ergo universale sit solum in mente, +quae abstrahit universale a particulari, videtur quod odium non +possit esse alicuius universalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is directed to something singular, whereas hatred is also directed to a thing + in general; for everybody hates the thief and the backbiter." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 6 s. c."><a name="34793" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34793] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>ira semper fit +inter singularia odium autem etiam ad genera, furem enim odit et +calumniatorem unusquisque</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q29_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There are two ways of speaking of the universal: first, as considered under the aspect of universality; secondly, as considered + in the nature to which it is ascribed: for it is one thing to consider the universal man, and another to consider a man as + man. If, therefore, we take the universal, in the first way, no sensitive power, whether of apprehension or of appetite, can + attain the universal: because the universal is obtained by abstraction from individual + matter, on which every sensitive power is based. + </p><p id="FS_Q29_A6-p7"> Nevertheless the sensitive powers, both of apprehension and of appetite, can tend to something universally. Thus we say that + the object of sight is color considered generically; not that the sight is cognizant of universal color, but because the fact + that color is cognizant by the sight, is attributed to color, not as being this particular color, but simply because it is + color. Accordingly hatred in the sensitive faculty can regard something universally: because this thing, by + reason of its common nature, and not merely as an individual, is hostile to the animal---for instance, a wolf in regard to + a sheep. Hence a sheep hates the wolf universally. On the other hand, anger is always caused by something in particular: because + it is caused by some action of the one that hurts us; and actions proceed from individuals. For this reason the Philosopher + says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is always directed to something singular, whereas hatred can be directed to a thing in + general." + </p><p id="FS_Q29_A6-p8"> But according as hatred is in the intellectual part, since it arises from the universal apprehension of the intellect, it + can regard the universal in both ways. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 6 co."><a name="34794" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34794] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod de universali dupliciter contingit loqui, uno modo, +secundum quod subest intentioni universalitatis; alio autem modo, +de natura cui talis intentio attribuitur, alia est enim +consideratio hominis universalis, et alia hominis in eo quod homo. +Si igitur universale accipiatur primo modo, sic nulla potentia +sensitivae partis, neque apprehensiva neque appetitiva, ferri +potest in universale, quia universale fit per abstractionem a +materia individuali, in qua radicatur omnis virtus sensitiva. +Potest tamen aliqua potentia sensitiva, et apprehensiva et +appetitiva, ferri in aliquid universaliter. Sicut dicimus quod +obiectum visus est color secundum genus, non quia visus cognoscat +colorem universalem; sed quia quod color sit cognoscibilis a visu, +non convenit colori inquantum est hic color, sed inquantum est +color simpliciter. Sic ergo odium etiam sensitivae partis, potest +respicere aliquid in universali, quia ex natura communi aliquid +adversatur animali, et non solum ex eo quod est particularis, sicut +lupus ovi. Unde ovis odit lupum generaliter. Sed ira semper +causatur ex aliquo particulari, quia ex aliquo actu laedentis; +actus autem particularium sunt. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit +quod <i>ira semper est ad aliquid singulare; odium vero potest esse +ad aliquid in genere</i>. Sed odium secundum quod est in parte +intellectiva, cum consequatur apprehensionem universalem +intellectus, potest utroque modo esse respectu universalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The senses do not apprehend the universal, as such: but they apprehend something to which the character of universality is + given by abstraction. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="34795" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34795] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod sensus non apprehendit universale, prout est +universale, apprehendit tamen aliquid cui per abstractionem accidit +universalitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That which is common to all cannot be a reason of hatred. But nothing hinders a thing from being common to many, and at variance + with others, so as to be hateful to them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="34796" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34796] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod id quod commune est omnibus, non potest esse ratio +odii. Sed nihil prohibet aliquid esse commune multis, quod tamen +dissonat ab aliis, et sic est eis odiosum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers the universal under the aspect of universality: and thus it does not come under the sensitive apprehension + or appetite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="34797" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34797] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod illa obiectio procedit de universali secundum quod +substat intentioni universalitatis, sic enim non cadit sub +apprehensione vel appetitu sensitivo.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q30" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q30-p0.1">Q. 30. OF CONCUPISCENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q30-p2"> We have now to consider concupiscence: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q30-p3"><a href="#FS_Q30_A1"> (1) Whether concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite only?</a></p><p id="FS_Q30-p4"><a href="#FS_Q30_A2"> (2) Whether concupiscence is a specific passion?</a></p><p id="FS_Q30-p5"><a href="#FS_Q30_A3"> (3) Whether some concupiscences are natural, and some not natural?</a></p><p id="FS_Q30-p6"><a href="#FS_Q30_A4"> (4) Whether concupiscence is infinite?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 pr."><a name="34798" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34798] +Iª-IIae q. 30 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +concupiscentia. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum +concupiscentia sit in appetitu sensitivo tantum. Secundo, utrum +concupiscentia sit passio specialis. Tertio, utrum sint aliquae +concupiscentiae naturales, et aliquae non naturales. Quarto, utrum +concupiscentia sit infinita.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q30_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q30_A1-p0.1">Q. 30. A. 1. Whether concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite only?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that concupiscence is not only in the sensitive appetite. For there is a concupiscence of wisdom, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q30_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.6.21" target="asv"> Wis. 6:21</a>: "The concupiscence [Douay: 'desire'] of wisdom bringeth to the everlasting kingdom." But the sensitive appetite can have + no tendency to wisdom. Therefore concupiscence is not only in the sensitive appetite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34799" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34799] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod concupiscentia non solum sit in +appetitu sensitivo. Est enim quaedam concupiscentia sapientiae, ut +dicitur Sap. VI, <i>concupiscentia sapientiae deducit ad regnum +perpetuum</i>. Sed appetitus sensitivus non potest ferri in +sapientiam. Ergo concupiscentia non est in solo appetitu +sensitivo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the desire for the commandments of God is not in the sensitive appetite: in fact the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q30_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.18" target="asv">Rom. 7:18</a>): "There dwelleth not in me, that is to say, in my flesh, that which is good." But desire for God's commandments is an act + of concupiscence, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q30_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.20" target="asv"> Ps. 118:20</a>: "My soul hath coveted [concupivit] to long for thy justifications." Therefore concupiscence is not only in the sensitive + appetite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34800" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34800] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +desiderium mandatorum Dei non est in appetitu sensitivo, immo +apostolus dicit, Rom. VII, <i>non habitat in me, hoc est in carne +mea, bonum</i>. Sed desiderium mandatorum Dei sub concupiscentia +cadit, secundum illud Psalmi CXVIII, <i>concupivit anima mea +desiderare iustificationes tuas</i>. Ergo concupiscentia non est +solum in appetitu sensitivo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to each power, its proper good is a matter of concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence is in each power of the soul, + and not only in the sensitive appetite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34801" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34801] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +cuilibet potentiae est concupiscibile proprium bonum. Ergo +concupiscentia est in qualibet potentiae animae, et non solum in +appetitu sensitivo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "the irrational part which is subject and amenable to reason, is divided into + the faculties of concupiscence and anger. This is the irrational part of the soul, passive and appetitive." Therefore concupiscence + is in the sensitive appetite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34802" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34802] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Damascenus dicit, quod <i>irrationale obediens et +persuasibile rationi, dividitur in concupiscentiam et iram. Haec +autem est irrationalis pars animae, passiva et appetitiva</i>. Ergo +concupiscentia est in appetitu sensitivo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11), "concupiscence is a craving for that which is pleasant." Now pleasure is twofold, + as we shall state later on ( + <a href="#FS_Q31_A3" id="FS_Q30_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[31], AA[3]</a>,4): one is in the intelligible good, which is the good of reason; the other is in good perceptible to the senses. The former + pleasure seems to belong to soul alone: whereas the latter belongs to both soul and body: because the sense is a power seated + in a bodily organ: + wherefore sensible good is the good of the whole composite. Now concupiscence seems to be the craving for this latter pleasure, + since it belongs to the united soul and body, as is implied by the Latin word "concupiscentia." Therefore, properly speaking, + concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite, and in the concupiscible faculty, which takes its name from it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 1 co."><a name="34803" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34803] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in I Rhetoric., +<i>concupiscentia est appetitus delectabilis</i>. Est autem duplex +delectatio, ut infra dicetur, una quae est in bono intelligibili, +quod est bonum rationis; alia quae est in bono secundum sensum. +Prima quidem delectatio videtur esse animae tantum. Secunda autem +est animae et corporis, quia sensus est virtus in organo corporeo; +unde et bonum secundum sensum est bonum totius coniuncti. Talis +autem delectationis appetitus videtur esse concupiscentia, quae +simul pertineat et ad animam et ad corpus, ut ipsum nomen +concupiscentiae sonat. Unde concupiscentia, proprie loquendo, est +in appetitu sensitivo; et in vi concupiscibili, quae ab ea +denominatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The craving for wisdom, or other spiritual goods, is sometimes called concupiscence; either by reason of a certain likeness; + or on account of the craving in the higher part of the soul being so vehement that it overflows into the lower appetite, so + that the latter also, in its own way, tends to the spiritual good, following the lead of the higher appetite, the result being + that the body itself renders its service in spiritual matters, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q30_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.83.3" target="asv"> Ps. 83:3</a>: "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34804" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34804] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod appetitus sapientiae, vel aliorum spiritualium +bonorum, interdum concupiscentia nominatur, vel propter +similitudinem quandam, vel propter intensionem appetitus superioris +partis, ex quo fit redundantia in inferiorem appetitum, ut simul +etiam ipse inferior appetitus suo modo tendat in spirituale bonum +consequens appetitum superiorem, et etiam ipsum corpus +spiritualibus deserviat; sicut in Psalmo LXXXIII, dicitur, <i>cor +meum et caro mea exultaverunt in Deum vivum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Properly speaking, desire may be not only in the lower, but also in the higher appetite. For it does not imply fellowship + in craving, as concupiscence does; but simply movement towards the thing desired. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34805" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34805] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod desiderium magis pertinere potest, proprie loquendo, +non solum ad inferiorem appetitum, sed etiam ad superiorem. Non +enim importat aliquam consociationem in cupiendo, sicut +concupiscentia; sed simplicem motum in rem desideratam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It belongs to each power of the soul to seek its proper good by the natural appetite, which does not arise from apprehension. + But the craving for good, by the animal appetite, which arises from apprehension, belongs to the appetitive power alone. And + to crave a thing under the aspect of something delightful to the senses, wherein concupiscence properly consists, belongs + to the concupiscible power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34806" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34806] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod unicuique potentiae animae competit appetere proprium +bonum appetitu naturali, qui non sequitur apprehensionem. Sed +appetere bonum appetitu animali, qui sequitur apprehensionem, +pertinet solum ad vim appetitivam. Appetere autem aliquid sub +ratione boni delectabilis secundum sensum, quod proprie est +concupiscere, pertinet ad vim concupiscibilem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q30_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q30_A2-p0.1">Q. 30. A. 2. Whether concupiscence is a specific passion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that concupiscence is not a specific passion of the concupiscible power. For passions are distinguished by + their objects. But the object of the concupiscible power is something delightful to the senses; and this is also the object + of concupiscence, as the Philosopher declares (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore concupiscence is not a specific passion of the concupiscible + faculty. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34807" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34807] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod concupiscentia non sit passio +specialis potentiae concupiscibilis. Passiones enim distinguuntur +secundum obiecta. Sed obiectum concupiscibilis est delectabile +secundum sensum; quod etiam est obiectum concupiscentiae, secundum +philosophum, in I Rhetoric. Ergo concupiscentia non est passio +specialis in concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33) that "covetousness is the love of transitory things": so that it is not distinct + from love. But all specific passions are distinct from one another. Therefore concupiscence is not a specific passion in the + concupiscible faculty. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34808" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34808] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod +<i>cupiditas est amor rerum transeuntium</i>, et sic ab amore non +distinguitur. Omnes autem passiones speciales ab invicem +distinguuntur. Ergo concupiscentia non est passio specialis in +concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to each passion of the concupiscible faculty there is a specific contrary passion in that faculty, as stated above + ( + <a href="#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q30_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a>). But no specific passion of the concupiscible faculty is contrary to concupiscence. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, + 12) that "good when desired gives rise to concupiscence; when present, it gives joy: in like manner, the evil we apprehend + makes us fear, the evil that is present makes us sad": + from which we gather that as sadness is contrary to joy, so is fear contrary to concupiscence. But fear is not in the concupiscible, + but in the irascible part. Therefore concupiscence is not a specific passion of the concupiscible faculty. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34809" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34809] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +cuilibet passioni concupiscibilis opponitur aliqua passio specialis +in concupiscibili, ut supra dictum est. Sed concupiscentiae non +opponitur aliqua passio specialis in concupiscibili. Dicit enim +Damascenus quod <i>expectatum bonum concupiscentiam constituit, +praesens vero laetitiam, similiter expectatum malum timorem, +praesens vero tristitiam</i>, ex quo videtur quod, sicut tristitia +contrariatur laetitiae, ita timor contrariatur concupiscentiae. +Timor autem non est in concupiscibili, sed in irascibili. Non ergo +concupiscentia est specialis passio in concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Concupiscence is caused by love, and tends to pleasure, both of which are passions of the concupiscible faculty. Hence it + is distinguished from the other concupiscible passions, as a specific passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34810" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34810] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod concupiscentia causatur ab amore, et tendit in +delectationem, quae sunt passiones concupiscibilis. Et sic +distinguitur ab aliis passionibus concupiscibilis, tanquam passio +specialis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q30_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q30_A1" id="FS_Q30_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1];</a> Q[23], A[1]), the good which gives pleasure to the senses is the common object of the concupiscible faculty. Hence the various + concupiscible passions are distinguished according to the differences of that good. Now the diversity of this object can arise + from the very nature of the object, or from a diversity in its active power. The diversity, derived from the nature of the + active object, causes a material + difference of passions: while the difference in regard to its active power causes a formal diversity of passions, in respect + of which the passions differ specifically. + </p><p id="FS_Q30_A2-p7"> Now the nature of the motive power of the end or of the good, differs according as it is really present, or absent: because, + according as it is present, it causes the faculty to find rest in it; whereas, according as it is absent, it causes the faculty + to be moved towards it. Wherefore the object of sensible pleasure causes love, inasmuch as, so to speak, it attunes and conforms + the appetite to itself; it causes concupiscence, inasmuch as, when absent, it draws the faculty to + itself; and it causes pleasure, inasmuch as, when present, it makes the faculty to find rest in itself. Accordingly, concupiscence + is a passion differing "in species" from both love and pleasure. But concupiscences of this or that pleasurable object differ + "in number." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 2 co."><a name="34811" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34811] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, bonum delectabile secundum sensum +est communiter obiectum concupiscibilis. Unde secundum eius +differentias, diversae passiones concupiscibilis distinguuntur. +Diversitas autem obiecti potest attendi vel secundum naturam ipsius +obiecti, vel secundum diversitatem in virtute agendi. Diversitas +quidem obiecti activi quae est secundum rei naturam, facit +materialem differentiam passionum. Sed diversitas quae est secundum +virtutem activam, facit formalem differentiam passionum, secundum +quam passiones specie differunt. Est autem alia ratio virtutis +motivae ipsius finis vel boni, secundum quod est realiter praesens, +et secundum quod est absens, nam secundum quod est praesens, facit +in seipso quiescere; secundum autem quod est absens, facit ad +seipsum moveri. Unde ipsum delectabile secundum sensum, inquantum +appetitum sibi adaptat quodammodo et conformat, causat amorem; +inquantum vero absens attrahit ad seipsum, causat concupiscentiam; +inquantum vero praesens quietat in seipso, causat delectationem. +Sic ergo concupiscentia est passio differens specie et ab amore et +a delectatione. Sed concupiscere hoc delectabile vel illud, facit +concupiscentias diversas numero.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Pleasurable good is the object of concupiscence, not absolutely, but considered as absent: just as the sensible, considered + as past, is the object of memory. For these particular conditions diversify the species of passions, and even of the powers + of the sensitive part, which regards particular things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34812" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34812] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod bonum delectabile non est absolute obiectum +concupiscentiae, sed sub ratione absentis, sicut et sensibile sub +ratione praeteriti, est obiectum memoriae. Huiusmodi enim +particulares conditiones diversificant speciem passionum, vel etiam +potentiarum sensitivae partis, quae respicit particularia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the passage quoted we have causal, not essential predication: for covetousness is not essentially love, but an effect + of love. We may also say that Augustine is taking covetousness in a wide sense, for any movement of the appetite in respect + of good to come: so that it includes both love and hope. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34813" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34813] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod illa praedicatio est per causam, non per essentiam, +non enim cupiditas est per se amor, sed amoris effectus, vel aliter +dicendum, quod Augustinus accipit cupiditatem large pro quolibet +motu appetitus qui potest esse respectu boni futuri. Unde +comprehendit sub se et amorem et spem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The passion which is directly contrary to concupiscence has no name, and stands in relation to evil, as concupiscence in + regard to good. But since, like fear, it regards the absent evil; sometimes it goes by the name of fear, just as hope is sometimes + called covetousness. For a small good or evil is reckoned as though it were nothing: and consequently every movement of the + appetite in future good or evil is called hope or fear, which regard good and + evil as arduous. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34814" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34814] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod passio quae directe opponitur concupiscentiae, +innominata est, quae ita se habet ad malum, sicut concupiscentia ad +bonum. Sed quia est mali absentis sicut et timor, quandoque loco +eius ponitur timor, sicut et quandoque cupiditas loco spei. Quod +enim est parvum bonum vel malum, quasi non reputatur, et ideo pro +omni motu appetitus in bonum vel in malum futurum, ponitur spes et +timor, quae respiciunt bonum vel malum arduum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q30_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q30_A3-p0.1">Q. 30. A. 3. Whether some concupiscences are natural, and some not natural?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that concupiscences are not divided into those which are natural and those which are not. For concupiscence + belongs to the animal appetite, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). But the natural appetite is contrasted with the animal appetite. + Therefore no concupiscence is natural. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34815" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34815] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod concupiscentiarum non sint quaedam +naturales, et quaedam non naturales. Concupiscentia enim pertinet +ad appetitum animalem, ut dictum est. Sed appetitus naturalis +dividitur contra animalem. Ergo nulla concupiscentia est +naturalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, material differences makes no difference of species, but only numerical difference; a difference which is outside + the purview of science. But if some concupiscences are natural, and some not, they differ only in respect of their objects; + which amounts to a material difference, which is one of number only. Therefore concupiscences should not be divided into those + that are natural and those that are not. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34816" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34816] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +diversitas materialis non facit diversitatem secundum speciem, sed +solum secundum numerum, quae quidem diversitas sub arte non cadit. +Sed si quae sint concupiscentiae naturales et non naturales, non +differunt nisi secundum diversa concupiscibilia, quod facit +materialem differentiam, et secundum numerum tantum. Non ergo +dividendae sunt concupiscentiae per naturales et non naturales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, reason is contrasted with nature, as stated in Phys. ii, 5. If therefore in man there is a concupiscence which is + not natural, it must needs be rational. But this is impossible: because, since concupiscence is a passion, it belongs to the + sensitive appetite, and not to the will, which is the rational appetite. Therefore there are no concupiscences which are not + natural. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34817" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34817] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +ratio contra naturam dividitur, ut patet in II Physic. Si igitur in +homine est aliqua concupiscentia non naturalis, oportet quod sit +rationalis. Sed hoc esse non potest, quia concupiscentia cum sit +passio quaedam, pertinet ad appetitum sensitivum, non autem ad +voluntatem, quae est appetitus rationis. Non ergo sunt +concupiscentiae aliquae non naturales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11 and Rhetor. i, 11) distinguishes natural concupiscences from those that are not natural. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34818" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34818] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus, in III Ethic. et in I Rhetoric., ponit +quasdam concupiscentias naturales, et quasdam non naturales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q30_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q30_A1" id="FS_Q30_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, concupiscence is the craving for pleasurable good. Now a thing is pleasurable in two ways. First, because it is suitable + to the nature of the animal; for example, food, drink, and the like: and concupiscence of such pleasurable things is said + to be natural. Secondly, a thing is pleasurable because it is apprehended as suitable to the animal: as when one apprehends + something as good and suitable, and + consequently takes pleasure in it: and concupiscence of such pleasurable things is said to be not natural, and is more wont + to be called "cupidity." + </p><p id="FS_Q30_A3-p7"> Accordingly concupiscences of the first kind, or natural concupiscences, are common to men and other animals: because to + both is there something suitable and pleasurable according to nature: and in these all men agree; wherefore the Philosopher + (Ethic. iii, 11) calls them "common" and "necessary." But concupiscences of the second kind are proper to men, to whom it + is proper to devise something as good and suitable, beyond that which nature requires. Hence the Philosopher says + (Rhet. i, 11) that the former concupiscences are "irrational," but the latter, "rational." And because different men reason + differently, therefore the latter are also called (Ethic. iii, 11) "peculiar and acquired," i.e. in addition to those that + are natural. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 3 co."><a name="34819" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34819] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, concupiscentia est appetitus boni +delectabilis. Dupliciter autem aliquid est delectabile. Uno modo, +quia est conveniens naturae animalis, sicut cibus, potus, et alia +huiusmodi. Et huiusmodi concupiscentia delectabilis dicitur +naturalis. Alio modo aliquid est delectabile, quia est conveniens +animali secundum apprehensionem, sicut cum aliquis apprehendit +aliquid ut bonum et conveniens, et per consequens delectatur in +ipso. Et huiusmodi delectabilis concupiscentia dicitur non +naturalis, et solet magis dici cupiditas. Primae ergo +concupiscentiae, naturales, communes sunt et hominibus et aliis +animalibus, quia utrisque est aliquid conveniens et delectabile +secundum naturam. Et in his etiam omnes homines conveniunt, unde et +philosophus, in III Ethic., vocat eas communes et necessarias. Sed +secundae concupiscentiae sunt propriae hominum, quorum proprium est +excogitare aliquid ut bonum et conveniens, praeter id quod natura +requirit. Unde et in I Rhetoric., philosophus dicit primas +concupiscentias esse irrationales, secundas vero cum ratione. Et +quia diversi diversimode ratiocinantur, ideo etiam secundae +dicuntur, in III Ethic., propriae et appositae, scilicet supra +naturales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The same thing that is the object of the natural appetite, may be the object of the animal appetite, once it is apprehended. + And in this way there may be an animal concupiscence of food, drink, and the like, which are objects of the natural appetite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34820" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34820] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod illud idem quod appetitur appetitu naturali, +potest appeti appetitu animali cum fuerit apprehensum. Et secundum +hoc cibi et potus et huiusmodi, quae appetuntur naturaliter, potest +esse concupiscentia naturalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The difference between those concupiscences that are natural and those that are not, is not merely a material difference; + it is also, in a way, formal, in so far as it arises from a difference in the active object. Now the object of the appetite + is the apprehended good. Hence diversity of the active object follows from diversity of apprehension: according as a thing + is apprehended as suitable, either by absolute apprehension, whence arise natural + concupiscences, which the Philosopher calls "irrational" (Rhet. i, 11); or by apprehension together with deliberation, whence + arise those concupiscences that are not natural, and which for this very reason the Philosopher calls "rational" (Rhet. i, + 11). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34821" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34821] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod diversitas concupiscentiarum naturalium a non +naturalibus, non est materialis tantum; sed etiam quodammodo +formalis, inquantum procedit ex diversitate obiecti activi. +Obiectum autem appetitus est bonum apprehensum. Unde ad +diversitatem activi pertinet diversitas apprehensionis, prout +scilicet apprehenditur aliquid ut conveniens absoluta +apprehensione, ex qua causantur concupiscentiae naturales, quas +philosophus in Rhetoric. vocat irrationales; et prout apprehenditur +aliquid cum deliberatione, ex quo causantur concupiscentiae non +naturales, quae propter hoc in Rhetoric. dicuntur cum ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man has not only universal reason, pertaining to the intellectual faculty; but also particular reason pertaining to the sensitive + faculty, as stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q78_A4" id="FS_Q30_A3-p10.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[78], A[4]</a>; + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q81_A3" id="FS_Q30_A3-p10.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[81], A[3]</a>: so that even rational concupiscence may pertain to the sensitive appetite. Moreover the sensitive appetite can be moved + by the universal reason also, through the medium of the particular imagination. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34822" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34822] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in homine non solum est ratio universalis, quae +pertinet ad partem intellectivam; sed etiam ratio particularis, +quae pertinet ad partem sensitivam, ut in primo libro dictum est. +Et secundum hoc, etiam concupiscentia quae est cum ratione, potest +ad appetitum sensitivum pertinere. Et praeterea appetitus +sensitivus potest etiam a ratione universali moveri, mediante +imaginatione particulari.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q30_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q30_A4-p0.1">Q. 30. A. 4. Whether concupiscence is infinite?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that concupiscence is not infinite. For the object of concupiscence is good, which has the aspect of an end. + But where there is infinity there is no end (Metaph. ii, 2). Therefore concupiscence cannot be infinite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34823" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34823] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod concupiscentia non sit infinita. +Obiectum enim concupiscentiae est bonum; quod habet rationem finis. +Qui autem ponit infinitum, excludit finem, ut dicitur in II +Metaphys. Concupiscentia ergo non potest esse infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, concupiscence is of the fitting good, since it proceeds from love. But the infinite is without proportion, and therefore + unfitting. Therefore concupiscence cannot be infinite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34824" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34824] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +concupiscentia est boni convenientis, cum procedat ex amore. Sed +infinitum, cum sit improportionatum, non potest esse conveniens. +Ergo concupiscentia non potest esse infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there is no passing through infinite things: and thus there is no reaching an ultimate term in them. But the subject + of concupiscence is not delighted until he attain the ultimate term. Therefore, if concupiscence were infinite, no delight + would ever ensue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34825" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34825] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +infinita non est transire, et sic in eis non est pervenire ad +ultimum. Sed concupiscenti fit delectatio per hoc quod attingit ad +ultimum. Ergo si concupiscentia esset infinita, sequeretur quod +nunquam fieret delectatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "since concupiscence is infinite, men desire an infinite number of things." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34826" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34826] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in I Polit., quod, in infinitum +concupiscentia existente homines infinita desiderant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q30_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q30_A3" id="FS_Q30_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, concupiscence is twofold; one is natural, the other is not natural. Natural concupiscence cannot be actually infinite: because + it is of that which nature requires; and nature ever tends to something finite and fixed. Hence man never desires infinite + meat, or infinite drink. But just as in nature there is potential successive infinity, so can this kind of concupiscence be + infinite successively; so that, for + instance, after getting food, a man may desire food yet again; and so of anything else that nature requires: because these + bodily goods, when obtained, do not last for ever, but fail. Hence Our Lord said to the woman of Samaria ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q30_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#John.4.13" target="asv">Jn. 4:13</a>): "Whosever drinketh of this water, shall thirst again." + </p><p id="FS_Q30_A4-p7"> But non-natural concupiscence is altogether infinite. Because, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q30_A3" id="FS_Q30_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, it follows from the reason, and it belongs to the reason to proceed to infinity. Hence he that desires riches, may desire + to be rich, not up to a certain limit, but to be simply as rich as possible. + </p><p id="FS_Q30_A4-p8"> Another reason may be assigned, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 3), why a certain concupiscence is finite, and another + infinite. Because concupiscence of the end is always infinite: since the end is desired for its own sake, e.g. health: and + thus greater health is more desired, and so on to infinity; just as, if a white thing of itself dilates the sight, that which + is more white dilates yet more. On the other hand, concupiscence of the means is not infinite, because the + concupiscence of the means is in suitable proportion to the end. Consequently those who place their end in riches have an + infinite concupiscence of riches; whereas those who desire riches, on account of the necessities of life, desire a finite + measure of riches, sufficient for the necessities of life, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3). The same applies to the + concupiscence of any other things. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 4 co."><a name="34827" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34827] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, duplex est concupiscentia, una +naturalis, et alia non naturalis. Naturalis quidem igitur +concupiscentia non potest esse infinita in actu. Est enim eius quod +natura requirit, natura vero semper intendit in aliquid finitum et +certum. Unde nunquam homo concupiscit infinitum cibum, vel +infinitum potum. Sed sicut in natura contingit esse infinitum in +potentia per successionem, ita huiusmodi concupiscentiam contingit +infinitam esse per successionem; ut scilicet, post adeptum cibum +iterum alia vice desideret cibum, vel quodcumque aliud quod natura +requirit, quia huiusmodi corporalia bona, cum adveniunt, non +perpetuo manent, sed deficiunt. Unde dixit dominus Samaritanae, +Ioan. IV, <i>qui biberit ex hac aqua, sitiet iterum</i>. Sed +concupiscentia non naturalis omnino est infinita. Sequitur enim +rationem, ut dictum est, rationi autem competit in infinitum +procedere. Unde qui concupiscit divitias, potest eas concupiscere, +non ad aliquem certum terminum, sed simpliciter se divitem esse, +quantumcumque potest. Potest et alia ratio assignari, secundum +philosophum in I Polit., quare quaedam concupiscentia sit finita, +et quaedam infinita. Semper enim concupiscentia finis est infinita, +finis enim per se concupiscitur, ut sanitas; unde maior sanitas +magis concupiscitur, et sic in infinitum; sicut, si album per se +disgregat, magis album magis disgregat. Concupiscentia vero eius +quod est ad finem, non est infinita, sed secundum illam mensuram +appetitur qua convenit fini. Unde qui finem ponunt in divitiis, +habent concupiscentiam divitiarum in infinitum, qui autem divitias +appetunt propter necessitatem vitae, concupiscunt divitias finitas, +sufficientes ad necessitatem vitae, ut philosophus dicit ibidem. Et +eadem est ratio de concupiscentia, quarumcumque aliarum rerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Every object of concupiscence is taken as something finite: either because it is finite in reality, as being once actually + desired; or because it is finite as apprehended. For it cannot be apprehended as infinite, since the infinite is that "from + which, however much we may take, there always remains something to be taken" (Phys. iii, 6). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34828" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34828] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod omne quod concupiscitur, accipitur ut quoddam +finitum, vel quia est finitum secundum rem, prout semel +concupiscitur in actu; vel quia est finitum secundum quod cadit sub +apprehensione. Non enim potest sub ratione infiniti apprehendi, +<i>quia infinitum est, cuius quantitatem accipientibus, semper est +aliquid extra sumere</i>, ut dicitur in III Physic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reason is possessed of infinite power, in a certain sense, in so far as it can consider a thing infinitely, as appears + in the addition of numbers and lines. Consequently, the infinite, taken in a certain way, is proportionate to reason. In fact + the universal which the reason apprehends, is infinite in a sense, inasmuch as it contains potentially an infinite number + of singulars. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34829" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34829] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio quodammodo est virtutis infinitae inquantum +potest in infinitum aliquid considerare, ut apparet in additione +numerorum et linearum. Unde infinitum aliquo modo sumptum, est +proportionatum rationi. Nam et universale, quod ratio apprehendit, +est quodammodo infinitum, inquantum in potentia continet infinita +singularia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In order that a man be delighted, there is no need for him to realize all that he desires: for he delights in the realization + of each object of his concupiscence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34830" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34830] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ad hoc quod aliquis delectetur, non requiritur quod +omnia consequatur quae concupiscit, sed in quolibet concupito quod +consequitur, delectatur.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q31" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q31-p0.1">Q. 31. OF DELIGHT CONSIDERED IN ITSELF [*Or, Pleasure] (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q31-p2"> We must now consider delight and sadness. Concerning delight four things must be considered: (1) Delight in itself; (2) The + causes of delight; (3) Its effects; (4) Its goodness and malice. + </p><p id="FS_Q31-p3"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q31-p4"><a href="#FS_Q31_A1"> (1) Whether delight is a passion?</a></p><p id="FS_Q31-p5"><a href="#FS_Q31_A2"> (2) Whether delight is subject to time?</a></p><p id="FS_Q31-p6"><a href="#FS_Q31_A3"> (3) Whether it differs from joy?</a></p><p id="FS_Q31-p7"><a href="#FS_Q31_A4"> (4) Whether it is in the intellectual appetite?</a></p><p id="FS_Q31-p8"><a href="#FS_Q31_A5"> (5) Of the delights of the higher appetite compared with the delight of the lower;</a></p><p id="FS_Q31-p9"><a href="#FS_Q31_A6"> (6) Of sensible delights compared with one another;</a></p><p id="FS_Q31-p10"><a href="#FS_Q31_A7"> (7) Whether any delight is non-natural?</a></p><p id="FS_Q31-p11"><a href="#FS_Q31_A8"> (8) Whether one delight can be contrary to another?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 pr."><a name="34831" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34831] +Iª-IIae q. 31 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +delectatione et tristitia. Circa delectationem vero consideranda +sunt quatuor, primo, de ipsa delectatione secundum se; secundo, de +causis delectationis; tertio, de effectibus eius; quarto, de +bonitate et malitia ipsius. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, +utrum delectatio sit passio. Secundo, utrum sit in tempore. Tertio, +utrum differat a gaudio. Quarto, utrum sit in appetitu +intellectivo. Quinto, de comparatione delectationum superioris +appetitus, ad delectationem inferioris. Sexto, de comparatione +delectationum sensitivarum ad invicem. Septimo, utrum sit aliqua +delectatio non naturalis. Octavo, utrum delectatio possit esse +contraria delectationi.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q31_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q31_A1-p0.1">Q. 31. A. 1. Whether delight is a passion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that delight is not a passion. For Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) distinguishes operation from passion, and + says that "operation is a movement in accord with nature, while passion is a movement contrary to nature." But delight is + an operation, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 12; x, 5). Therefore delight is not a passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34832" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34832] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non sit passio. Damascenus +enim, in II libro, distinguit operationem a passione, dicens quod +<i>operatio est motus qui est secundum naturam, passio vero est +motus contra naturam</i>. Sed delectatio est operatio, ut +philosophus dicit, in VII et X Ethic. Ergo delectatio non est +passio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "To be passive is to be moved," as stated in Phys. iii, 3. But delight does not consist in being moved, but in having + been moved; for it arises from good already gained. Therefore delight is not a passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34833" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34833] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +pati est moveri, ut dicitur in III Physic. Sed delectatio non +consistit in moveri, sed in motum esse, causatur enim delectatio ex +bono iam adepto. Ergo delectatio non est passio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, delight is a kind of a perfection of the one who is delighted; since it "perfects operation," as stated in Ethic. + x, 4,5. But to be perfected does not consist in being passive or in being altered, as stated in Phys. vii, 3 and De Anima + ii, 5. Therefore delight is not a passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34834" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34834] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +delectatio consistit in quadam perfectione delectati, perficit enim +operationem, ut dicitur in X Ethic. Sed perfici non est pati vel +alterari, ut dicitur in VII Physic. et in II de anima. Ergo +delectatio non est passio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 2; xiv, 5 seqq) reckons delight, joy, or gladness among the other passions of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34835" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34835] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus, in IX et XIV de Civ. Dei, ponit delectationem, +sive gaudium vel laetitiam, inter alias passiones animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q31_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The movements of the sensitive appetite, are properly called passions, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q22_A3" id="FS_Q31_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[3]</a>). Now every emotion arising from a sensitive apprehension, is a movement of the sensitive appetite: and this must needs be + said of delight, since, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 11) "delight is a certain movement of the soul and a sensible + establishing thereof all at once, in keeping with the nature of the thing." + </p><p id="FS_Q31_A1-p7"> In order to understand this, we must observe that just as in natural things some happen to attain to their natural perfections, + so does this happen in animals. And though movement towards perfection does not occur all at once, yet the attainment of natural + perfection does occur all at once. Now there is this difference between animals and other natural things, that when these + latter are established in the state becoming their nature, they do not perceive it, whereas animals do. + And from this perception there arises a certain movement of the soul in the sensitive appetite; which movement is called delight. + Accordingly by saying that delight is "a movement of the soul," we designate its genus. By saying that it is "an establishing + in keeping with the thing's nature," i.e. with that which exists in the thing, we assign the cause of delight, viz. the presence + of a becoming good. By saying that this establishing is "all at once," we mean that this establishing is to be + understood not as in the process of establishment, but as in the fact of complete establishment, in the term of the movement, + as it were: for delight is not a "becoming" as Plato [*Phileb. 32,33] maintained, but a "complete fact," as stated in Ethic. + vii, 12. Lastly, by saying that this establishing is "sensible," we exclude the perfections of insensible things wherein there + is no delight. It is therefore evident that, since delight is a movement of the animal appetite arising from an + apprehension of sense, it is a passion of the soul. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 1 co."><a name="34836" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34836] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod motus appetitus sensitivi proprie passio nominatur, +sicut supra dictum est. Affectio autem quaecumque ex apprehensione +sensitiva procedens, est motus appetitus sensitivi. Hoc autem +necesse est competere delectationi. Nam, sicut philosophus dicit in +I Rhetoric., <i>delectatio est quidam motus animae, et constitutio +simul tota et sensibilis in naturam existentem</i>. Ad cuius +intellectum, considerandum est quod, sicut contingit in rebus +naturalibus aliqua consequi suas perfectiones naturales, ita hoc +contingit in animalibus. Et quamvis moveri ad perfectionem non sit +totum simul, tamen consequi naturalem perfectionem est totum simul. +Haec autem est differentia inter animalia et alias res naturales, +quod aliae res naturales, quando constituuntur in id quod convenit +eis secundum naturam, hoc non sentiunt, sed animalia hoc sentiunt. +Et ex isto sensu causatur quidam motus animae in appetitu +sensitivo, et iste motus est delectatio. Per hoc ergo quod dicitur +quod delectatio est motus animae, ponitur in genere. Per hoc autem +quod dicitur constitutio in existentem naturam, idest in id quod +existit in natura rei, ponitur causa delectationis, scilicet +praesentia connaturalis boni. Per hoc autem quod dicitur simul +tota, ostendit quod constitutio non debet accipi prout est in +constitui, sed prout est in constitutum esse, quasi in termino +motus, non enim delectatio est generatio, ut Plato posuit, sed +magis consistit in factum esse, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Per hoc +autem quod dicitur sensibilis, excluduntur perfectiones rerum +insensibilium, in quibus non est delectatio. Sic ergo patet quod, +cum delectatio sit motus in appetitu animali consequens +apprehensionem sensus, delectatio est passio animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Connatural operation, which is unhindered, is a second perfection, as stated in De Anima ii, 1: and therefore when a thing + is established in its proper connatural and unhindered operation, delight follows, which consists in a state of completion, + as observed above. Accordingly when we say that delight is an operation, we designate, not its essence, but its cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34837" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34837] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod operatio connaturalis non impedita, est +perfectio secunda, ut habetur in II de anima. Et ideo, quando +constituitur res in propria operatione connaturali et non impedita, +sequitur delectatio, quae consistit in perfectum esse, ut dictum +est. Sic ergo cum dicitur quod delectatio est operatio, non est +praedicatio per essentiam, sed per causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A twofold movement is to be observed in an animal: one, according to the intention of the end, and this belongs to the appetite; + the other, according to the execution, and this belongs to the external operation. And so, although in him who has already + gained the good in which he delights, the movement of execution ceases, by which the tends to the end; yet the movement of + the appetitive faculty does not cease, since, just as before it desired that + which it had not, so afterwards does it delight in that which is possesses. For though delight is a certain repose of the + appetite, if we consider the presence of the pleasurable good that satisfies the appetite, nevertheless there remains the + impression made on the appetite by its object, by reason of which delight is a kind of movement. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34838" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34838] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod in animali duplex motus considerari potest, unus +secundum intentionem finis, qui pertinet ad appetitum, alius +secundum executionem, qui pertinet ad exteriorem operationem licet +ergo in eo qui iam consecutus est bonum in quo delectatur, cesset +motus executionis, quo tenditur ad finem; non tamen cessat motus +appetitivae partis, quae, sicut prius desiderabat non habitum, ita +postea delectatur in habito. Licet enim delectatio sit quies +quaedam appetitus, considerata praesentia boni delectantis, quod +appetitui satisfacit; tamen adhuc remanet immutatio appetitus ab +appetibili, ratione cuius delectatio motus quidam est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the name of passion is more appropriate to those passions which have a corruptive and evil tendency, such as bodily + ailments, as also sadness and fear in the soul; yet some passions have a tendency to something good, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q23_A1" id="FS_Q31_A1-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[23], AA[1]</a>,4): and in this sense delight is called a passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34839" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34839] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, quamvis nomen passionis magis proprie conveniat +passionibus corruptivis et in malum tendentibus, sicut sunt +aegritudines corporales, et tristitia et timor in anima; tamen +etiam in bonum ordinantur aliquae passiones, ut supra dictum est. +Et secundum hoc delectatio dicitur passio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q31_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q31_A2-p0.1">Q. 31. A. 2. Whether delight is in time?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that delight is in time. For "delight is a kind of movement," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But all + movement is in time. Therefore delight is in time. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34840" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34840] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio sit in tempore. Delectatio +enim est motus quidam, ut in I Rhetoric. philosophus dicit. Sed +motus omnis est in tempore. Ergo delectatio est in tempore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing is said to last long and to be morose in respect of time. But some pleasures are called morose. Therefore + pleasure is in time. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34841" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34841] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +diuturnum, vel morosum, dicitur aliquid secundum tempus. Sed +aliquae delectationes dicuntur morosae. Ergo delectatio est in +tempore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the passions of the soul are of one same genus. But some passions of the soul are in time. Therefore delight is + too. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34842" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34842] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +passiones animae sunt unius generis. Sed aliquae passiones animae +sunt in tempore. Ergo et delectatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "no one takes pleasure according to time." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34843" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34843] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., quod <i>secundum nullum +tempus accipiet quis delectationem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q31_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A thing may be in time in two ways: first, by itself; secondly, by reason of something else, and accidentally as it were. + For since time is the measure of successive things, those things are of themselves said to be in time, to which succession + or something pertaining to succession is essential: such are movement, repose, speech and such like. On the other hand, those + things are said to be in time, by reason of something else and not of themselves, to which + succession is not essential, but which are subject to something successive. Thus the fact of being a man is not essentially + something successive; since it is not a movement, but the term of a movement or change, viz. of this being begotten: yet, + because human being is subject to changeable causes, in this respect, to be a man is in time. + </p><p id="FS_Q31_A2-p7"> Accordingly, we must say that delight, of itself indeed, is not in time: for it regards good already gained, which is, as + it were, the term of the movement. But if this good gained be subject to change, the delight therein will be in time accidentally: + whereas if it be altogether unchangeable, the delight therein will not be in time, either by reason of itself or accidentally. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 2 co."><a name="34844" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34844] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod aliquid contingit esse in tempore dupliciter, uno +modo, secundum se; alio modo, per aliud, et quasi per accidens. +Quia enim tempus est numerus successivorum, illa secundum se +dicuntur esse in tempore, de quorum ratione est successio, vel +aliquid ad successionem pertinens, sicut motus, quies, locutio, et +alia huiusmodi. Secundum aliud vero, et non per se, dicuntur esse +in tempore illa de quorum ratione non est aliqua successio, sed +tamen alicui successivo subiacent. Sicut esse hominem de sui +ratione non habet successionem, non enim est motus, sed terminus +motus vel mutationis, scilicet generationis ipsius, sed quia +humanum esse subiacet causis transmutabilibus, secundum hoc esse +hominem est in tempore. Sic igitur dicendum est quod delectatio +secundum se quidem non est in tempore, est enim delectatio in bono +iam adepto, quod est quasi terminus motus. Sed si illud bonum +adeptum transmutationi subiaceat, erit delectatio per accidens in +tempore. Si autem sit omnino intransmutabile, delectatio non erit +in tempore nec per se, nec per accidens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated in De Anima iii, 7, movement is twofold. One is "the act of something imperfect, i.e. of something existing in + potentiality, as such": this movement is successive and is in time. Another movement is "the act of something perfect, i.e. + of something existing in act," e.g. to understand, to feel, and to will and such like, also to have delight. This movement + is not successive, nor is it of itself in time. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34845" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34845] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in III de anima, motus dupliciter +dicitur. Uno modo, qui est actus imperfecti, scilicet existentis in +potentia, inquantum huiusmodi, et talis motus est successivus, et +in tempore. Alius autem motus est actus perfecti, idest existentis +in actu; sicut intelligere, sentire et velle et huiusmodi, et etiam +delectari. Et huiusmodi motus non est successivus, nec per se in +tempore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Delight is said to be long lasting or morose, according as it is accidentally in time. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34846" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34846] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod delectatio dicitur diuturna vel morosa, secundum quod +per accidens est in tempore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Other passions have not for their object a good obtained, as delight has. Wherefore there is more of the movement of the + imperfect in them than in delight. And consequently it belongs more to delight not to be in time. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34847" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34847] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod aliae passiones non habent pro obiecto bonum adeptum, +sicut delectatio. Unde plus habent de ratione motus imperfecti, +quam delectatio. Et per consequens magis delectationi convenit non +esse in tempore.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q31_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q31_A3-p0.1">Q. 31. A. 3. Whether delight differs from joy?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that delight is altogether the same as joy. Because the passions of the soul differ according to their objects. + But delight and joy have the same object, namely, a good obtained. Therefore joy is altogether the same as delight. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34848" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34848] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod gaudium sit omnino idem quod +delectatio. Passiones enim animae differunt secundum obiecta. Sed +idem est obiectum gaudii et delectationis, scilicet bonum adeptum. +Ergo gaudium est omnino idem quod delectatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one movement does not end in two terms. But one and the same movement, that of desire, ends in joy and delight. + Therefore delight and joy are altogether the same. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34849" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34849] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +unus motus non terminatur ad duos terminos. Sed idem est motus qui +terminatur ad gaudium et delectationem, scilicet concupiscentia. +Ergo delectatio et gaudium sunt omnino idem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if joy differs from delight, it seems that there is equal reason for distinguishing gladness, exultation, and cheerfulness + from delight, so that they would all be various passions of the soul. But this seems to be untrue. Therefore joy does not + differ from delight. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34850" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34850] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +si gaudium est aliud a delectatione, videtur quod, pari ratione, et +laetitia et exultatio et iucunditas significent aliquid aliud a +delectatione, et sic erunt omnes diversae passiones. Quod videtur +esse falsum. Non ergo gaudium differt a delectatione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> We do not speak of joy in irrational animals; whereas we do speak of delight in them. Therefore joy is not the same as delight. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34851" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34851] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod in brutis animalibus non dicimus gaudium. Sed in eis +dicimus delectationem. Non ergo est idem gaudium et delectatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q31_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Joy, as Avicenna states (De Anima iv), is a kind of delight. For we must observe that, just as some concupiscences are natural, + and some not natural, but consequent to reason, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q30_A3" id="FS_Q31_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[30], A[3]</a>), so also some delights are natural, and some are not natural but rational. Or, as Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 13) and Gregory + of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii.] put it, "some delights are of the body, some are of the soul"; + which amounts to the same. For we take delight both in those things which we desire naturally, when we get them, and in those + things which we desire as a result of reason. But we do not speak of joy except when delight follows reason; and so we do + not ascribe joy to irrational animals, but only delight. + </p><p id="FS_Q31_A3-p7"> Now whatever we desire naturally, can also be the object of reasoned desire and delight, but not vice versa. Consequently + whatever can be the object of delight, can also be the object of joy in rational beings. And yet everything is not always + the object of joy; since sometimes one feels a certain delight in the body, without rejoicing thereat according to reason. + And accordingly delight extends to more things than does joy. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 3 co."><a name="34852" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34852] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod gaudium, ut Avicenna dicit in libro suo de anima, est +quaedam species delectationis. Est enim considerandum quod, sicut +sunt quaedam concupiscentiae naturales, quaedam autem non +naturales, sed consequuntur rationem, ut supra dictum est; ita +etiam delectationum quaedam sunt naturales, et quaedam non +naturales, quae sunt cum ratione. Vel, sicut Damascenus et +Gregorius Nyssenus dicunt, quaedam sunt corporales, quaedam +animales, quod in idem redit. Delectamur enim et in his quae +naturaliter concupiscimus, ea adipiscentes; et in his quae +concupiscimus secundum rationem. Sed nomen gaudii non habet locum +nisi in delectatione quae consequitur rationem, unde gaudium non +attribuimus brutis animalibus, sed solum nomen delectationis. Omne +autem quod concupiscimus secundum naturam, possumus etiam cum +delectatione rationis concupiscere, sed non e converso. Unde de +omnibus de quibus est delectatio, potest etiam esse gaudium in +habentibus rationem. Quamvis non semper de omnibus sit gaudium, +quandoque enim aliquis sentit aliquam delectationem secundum +corpus, de qua tamen non gaudet secundum rationem. Et secundum hoc, +patet quod delectatio est in plus quam gaudium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since the object of the appetite of the soul is an apprehended good, diversity of apprehension pertains, in a way, to diversity + of the object. And so delights of the soul, which are also called joys, are distinct from bodily delights, which are not called + otherwise than delights: as we have observed above in regard to concupiscences ( + <a href="#FS_Q30_A3" id="FS_Q31_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[30], A[3]</a>, ad 2). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34853" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34853] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, cum obiectum appetitus animalis sit bonum +apprehensum, diversitas apprehensionis pertinet quodammodo ad +diversitatem obiecti. Et sic delectationes animales, quae dicuntur +etiam gaudia, distinguuntur a delectationibus corporalibus, quae +dicuntur solum delectationes, sicut et de concupiscentiis supra +dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A like difference is to be observed in concupiscences also: so that delight corresponds to concupiscence, while joy corresponds + to desire, which seems to pertain more to concupiscence of the soul. Hence there is a difference of repose corresponding to + the difference of movement. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34854" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34854] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod similis differentia invenitur etiam in +concupiscentiis, ita quod delectatio respondeat concupiscentiae, et +gaudium respondeat desiderio, quod magis videtur pertinere ad +concupiscentiam animalem. Et sic secundum differentiam motus, est +etiam differentia quietis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These other names pertaining to delight are derived from the effects of delight; for "laetitia" [gladness] is derived from + the "dilation" of the heart, as if one were to say "latitia"; "exultation" is derived from the exterior signs of inward delight, + which appear outwardly in so far as the inward joy breaks forth from its bounds; and "cheerfulness" is so called from certain + special signs and effects of gladness. Yet all these names seem to belong to + joy; for we do not employ them save in speaking of rational beings. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34855" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34855] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod alia nomina ad delectationem pertinentia, sunt +imposita ab effectibus delectationis, nam laetitia imponitur a +dilatatione cordis, ac si diceretur latitia; exultatio vero dicitur +ab exterioribus signis delectationis interioris, quae apparent +exterius, inquantum scilicet interius gaudium prosilit ad +exteriora; iucunditas vero dicitur a quibusdam specialibus +laetitiae signis vel effectibus. Et tamen omnia ista nomina +videntur pertinere ad gaudium, non enim utimur eis nisi in naturis +rationalibus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q31_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q31_A4-p0.1">Q. 31. A. 4. Whether delight is in the intellectual appetite?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that delight is not in the intellectual appetite. Because the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that "delight + is a sensible movement." But sensible movement is not in an intellectual power. Therefore delight is not in the intellectual + appetite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34856" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34856] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non sit in appetitu +intellectivo. Dicit enim philosophus, in I Rhetoric., quod +<i>delectatio est motus quidam sensibilis</i>. Sed motus sensibilis +non est in parte intellectiva. Ergo delectatio non est in parte +intellectiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, delight is a passion. But every passion is in the sensitive appetite. Therefore delight is only in the sensitive + appetite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34857" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34857] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +delectatio est passio quaedam. Sed omnis passio est in appetitu +sensitivo. Ergo delectatio non est nisi in appetitu sensitivo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, delight is common to us and to the irrational animals. Therefore it is not elsewhere than in that power which we + have in common with irrational animals. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34858" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34858] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +delectatio est communis nobis et brutis. Ergo non est nisi in parte +quae nobis et brutis communis est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q31_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.36.4" target="asv">Ps. 36:4</a>): "Delight in the Lord." But the sensitive appetite cannot reach to God; only the intellectual appetite can. Therefore delight + can be in the intellectual appetite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34859" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34859] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod in Psalmo XXXVI, dicitur, <i>delectare in domino</i>. Sed +ad Deum non potest extendi appetitus sensitivus, sed solum +intellectivus. Ergo delectatio potest esse in appetitu +intellectivo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q31_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q31_A3" id="FS_Q31_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, a certain delight arises from the apprehension of the reason. Now on the reason apprehending something, not only the sensitive + appetite is moved, as regards its application to some particular thing, but also the intellectual appetite, which is called + the will. And accordingly in the intellectual appetite or will there is that delight which is called joy, but not bodily delight. + </p><p id="FS_Q31_A4-p7"> However, there is this difference of delight in either power, that delight of the sensitive appetite is accompanied by a + bodily transmutation, whereas delight of the intellectual appetite is nothing but the mere movement of the will. Hence Augustine + says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6) that "desire and joy are nothing else but a volition of consent to the things we wish." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 4 co."><a name="34860" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34860] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, delectatio quaedam sequitur +apprehensionem rationis. Ad apprehensionem autem rationis, non +solum commovetur appetitus sensitivus, per applicationem ad aliquid +particulare; sed etiam appetitus intellectivus, qui dicitur +voluntas. Et secundum hoc, in appetitu intellectivo, sive in +voluntate, est delectatio quae dicitur gaudium, non autem +delectatio corporalis. Hoc tamen interest inter delectationem +utriusque appetitus, quod delectatio appetitus sensibilis est cum +aliqua transmutatione corporali, delectatio autem appetitus +intellectivi nihil aliud est quam simplex motus voluntatis. Et +secundum hoc Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quod +<i>cupiditas et laetitia non est aliud quam voluntas in eorum +consensione quae volumus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In this definition of the Philosopher, he uses the word "sensible" in its wide acceptation for any kind of perception. For + he says (Ethic. x, 4) that "delight is attendant upon every sense, as it is also upon every act of the intellect and contemplation." + Or we may say that he is defining delight of the sensitive appetite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34861" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34861] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod in illa definitione philosophi, sensibile +ponitur communiter pro quacumque apprehensione. Dicit enim +philosophus in X Ethic., quod <i>secundum omnem sensum est +delectatio; similiter autem et secundum intellectum et +speculationem</i>. Vel potest dici quod ipse definit delectationem +appetitus sensitivi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Delight has the character of passion, properly speaking, when accompanied by bodily transmutation. It is not thus in the + intellectual appetite, but according to simple movement: for thus it is also in God and the angels. Hence the Philosopher + says (Ethic. vii, 14) that "God rejoices by one simple act": and Dionysius says at the end of De Coel. Hier., that "the angels + are not susceptible to our passible delight, but rejoice together with God with the + gladness of incorruption." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34862" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34862] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod delectatio habet rationem passionis, proprie +loquendo, inquantum est cum aliqua transmutatione corporali. Et sic +non est in appetitu intellectivo, sed secundum simplicem motum, sic +enim etiam est in Deo et in Angelis. Unde dicit philosophus, in VII +Ethic., quod Deus una simplici operatione gaudet. Et Dionysius +dicit, in fine Cael. Hier., quod <i>Angeli non sunt susceptibiles +nostrae passibilis delectationis, sed congaudent Deo secundum +incorruptionis laetitiam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In us there is delight, not only in common with dumb animals, but also in common with angels. Wherefore Dionysius says (De + Coel. Hier.) that "holy men often take part in the angelic delights." Accordingly we have delight, not only in the sensitive + appetite, which we have in common with dumb animals, but also in the intellectual appetite, which we have in common with the + angels. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34863" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34863] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in nobis non solum est delectatio in qua communicamus +cum brutis, sed etiam in qua communicamus cum Angelis. Unde ibidem +Dionysius dicit quod <i>sancti homines multoties fiunt in +participatione delectationum angelicarum</i>. Et ita in nobis est +delectatio non solum in appetitu sensitivo, in quo communicamus cum +brutis; sed etiam in appetitu intellectivo, in quo communicamus cum +Angelis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q31_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q31_A5-p0.1">Q. 31. A. 5. Whether bodily and sensible pleasures are greater than spiritual and intellectual pleasures?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that bodily and sensible pleasures are greater than spiritual and intelligible pleasures. For all men seek + some pleasure, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 2,4). But more seek sensible pleasures, than intelligible spiritual + pleasures. Therefore bodily pleasures are greater. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="34864" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34864] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectationes corporales et sensibiles +sint maiores delectationibus spiritualibus intelligibilibus. Omnes +enim aliquam delectationem sequuntur, secundum philosophum, in X +Ethic. Sed plures sequuntur delectationes sensibiles, quam +delectationes spirituales intelligibiles. Ergo delectationes +corporales sunt maiores.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the greatness of a cause is known by its effect. But bodily pleasures have greater effects; since "they alter the + state of the body, and in some they cause madness" (Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore bodily pleasures are greater. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="34865" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34865] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +magnitudo causae ex effectu cognoscitur. Sed delectationes +corporales habent fortiores effectus, <i>transmutant enim corpus, +et quibusdam insanias faciunt</i>, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Ergo +delectationes corporales sunt fortiores.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, bodily pleasures need to be tempered and checked, by reason of their vehemence: whereas there is no need to check + spiritual pleasures. Therefore bodily pleasures are greater. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="34866" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34866] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +delectationes corporales oportet temperare et refraenare, propter +earum vehementiam. Sed delectationes spirituales non oportet +refraenare. Ergo delectationes corporales sunt maiores.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q31_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.103" target="asv">Ps. 118:103</a>): "How sweet are Thy words to my palate; more than honey to my mouth!" And the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 7) that "the greatest + pleasure is derived from the operation of wisdom." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 5 s. c."><a name="34867" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34867] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur in Psalmo CXVIII, <i>quam dulcia faucibus meis +eloquia tua, super mel ori meo</i>. Et philosophus dicit, in X +Ethic., quod <i>maxima delectatio est quae est secundum operationem +sapientiae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q31_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q31_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, pleasure arises from union with a suitable object perceived or known. Now, in the operations of the soul, especially of + the sensitive and intellectual soul, it must be noted that, since they do not pass into outward matter, they are acts or perfections + of the agent, e.g. to understand, to feel, to will and the like: because actions which pass into outward matter, are actions + and perfections rather of the + matter transformed; for "movement is the act produced by the mover in the thing moved" (Phys. iii, 3). Accordingly the aforesaid + actions of the sensitive and intellectual soul, are themselves a certain good of the agent, and are known by sense and intellect. + Wherefore from them also does pleasure arise, and not only from their objects. + </p><p id="FS_Q31_A5-p7"> If therefore we compare intellectual pleasures with sensible pleasures, according as we delight in the very actions, for + instance in sensitive and in intellectual knowledge; without doubt intellectual pleasures are much greater than sensible pleasures. + For man takes much more delight in knowing something, by understanding it, than in knowing something by perceiving it with + his sense. Because intellectual knowledge is more perfect; and because it is better known, since the + intellect reflects on its own act more than sense does. Moreover intellectual knowledge is more beloved: for there is no one + who would not forfeit his bodily sight rather than his intellectual vision, as beasts or fools are deprived thereof, as Augustine + says in De Civ. Dei (De Trin. xiv, 14). + </p><p id="FS_Q31_A5-p8"> If, however, intellectual spiritual pleasures be compared with sensible bodily pleasures, then, in themselves and absolutely + speaking, spiritual pleasures are greater. And this appears from the consideration of the three things needed for pleasure, + viz. the good which is brought into conjunction, that to which it is conjoined, and the conjunction itself. For spiritual + good is both greater and more beloved than bodily good: a sign whereof is that men abstain from even the + greatest bodily pleasures, rather than suffer loss of honor which is an intellectual good. Likewise the intellectual faculty + is much more noble and more knowing than the sensitive faculty. Also the conjunction is more intimate, more perfect and more + firm. More intimate, because the senses stop at the outward accidents of a thing, whereas the intellect penetrates to the + essence; for the object of the intellect is "what a thing is." More perfect, because the conjunction of the sensible to the + sense implies movement, which is an imperfect act: wherefore sensible pleasures are not perceived all at once, but some part + of them is passing away, while some other part is looked forward to as yet to be realized, as is manifest in pleasures of + the table and in sexual pleasures: whereas intelligible things are without movement: hence pleasures of this kind are realized + all at once. More firm; because the objects of bodily pleasure are corruptible, and soon pass away; whereas spiritual goods + are incorruptible. + </p><p id="FS_Q31_A5-p9"> On the other hand, in relation to us, bodily pleasures are more vehement, for three reasons. First, because sensible things + are more known to us, than intelligible things. Secondly, because sensible pleasures, through being passions of the sensitive + appetite, are accompanied by some alteration in the body: whereas this does not occur in spiritual pleasures, save by reason + of a certain reaction of the superior appetite on the lower. Thirdly, because bodily pleasures are sought as + remedies for bodily defects or troubles, whence various griefs arise. Wherefore bodily pleasures, by reason of their succeeding + griefs of this kind, are felt the more, and consequently are welcomed more than spiritual pleasures, which have no contrary + griefs, as we shall state farther on ( + <a href="#FS_Q35_A5" id="FS_Q31_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[35], A[5]</a>). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 5 co."><a name="34868" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34868] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, delectatio provenit ex +coniunctione convenientis quae sentitur vel cognoscitur. In +operibus autem animae, praecipue sensitivae et intellectivae, est +hoc considerandum, quod, cum non transeant in materiam exteriorem, +sunt actus vel perfectiones operantis, scilicet intelligere, +sentire, velle, et huiusmodi, nam actiones quae transeunt in +exteriorem materiam, magis sunt actiones et perfectiones materiae +transmutatae; motus enim est actus mobilis a movente. Sic igitur +praedictae actiones animae sensitivae et intellectivae, et ipsae +sunt quoddam bonum operantis, et sunt etiam cognitae per sensum vel +intellectum. Unde etiam ex ipsis consurgit delectatio, et non solum +ex eorum obiectis. Si igitur comparentur delectationes +intelligibiles delectationibus sensibilibus, secundum quod +delectamur in ipsis actionibus, puta in cognitione sensus et in +cognitione intellectus; non est dubium quod multo sunt maiores +delectationes intelligibiles quam sensibiles. Multo enim magis +delectatur homo de hoc quod cognoscit aliquid intelligendo, quam de +hoc quod cognoscit aliquid sentiendo. Quia intellectualis cognitio +et perfectior est, et etiam magis cognoscitur, quia intellectus +magis reflectitur supra actum suum quam sensus. Est etiam cognitio +intellectiva magis dilecta, nullus enim est qui non magis vellet +carere visu corporali quam visu intellectuali, eo modo quo bestiae +vel stulti carent, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Civ. Dei. +Sed si comparentur delectationes intelligibiles spirituales +delectationibus sensibilibus corporalibus, sic, secundum se et +simpliciter loquendo, delectationes spirituales sunt maiores. Et +hoc apparet secundum tria quae requiruntur ad delectationem, +scilicet bonum coniunctum, et id cui coniungitur, et ipsa +coniunctio. Nam ipsum bonum spirituale et est maius quam corporale +bonum; et est magis dilectum. Cuius signum est quod homines etiam a +maximis corporalibus voluptatibus abstinent, ut non perdant +honorem, qui est bonum intelligibile. Similiter etiam ipsa pars +intellectiva est multo nobilior, et magis cognoscitiva, quam pars +sensitiva. Coniunctio etiam utriusque est magis intima, et magis +perfecta, et magis firma. Intimior quidem est, quia sensus sistit +circa exteriora accidentia rei, intellectus vero penetrat usque ad +rei essentiam; obiectum enim intellectus est quod quid est. +Perfectior autem est, quia coniunctioni sensibilis ad sensum +adiungitur motus, qui est actus imperfectus, unde et delectationes +sensibiles non sunt totae simul, sed in eis aliquid pertransit, et +aliquid expectatur consummandum, ut patet in delectatione ciborum +et venereorum. Sed intelligibilia sunt absque motu, unde +delectationes tales sunt totae simul. Est etiam firmior, quia +delectabilia corporalia sunt corruptibilia, et cito deficiunt; bona +vero spiritualia sunt incorruptibilia. Sed quoad nos, delectationes +corporales sunt magis vehementes, propter tria. Primo, quia +sensibilia sunt magis nota, quoad nos, quam intelligibilia. Secundo +etiam, quia delectationes sensibiles, cum sint passiones sensitivi +appetitus, sunt cum aliqua transmutatione corporali. Quod non +contingit in delectationibus spiritualibus, nisi per quandam +redundantiam a superiori appetitu in inferiorem. Tertio, quia +delectationes corporales appetuntur ut medicinae quaedam contra +corporales defectus vel molestias, ex quibus tristitiae quaedam +consequuntur. Unde delectationes corporales, tristitiis huiusmodi +supervenientes, magis sentiuntur, et per consequens magis +acceptantur, quam delectationes spirituales quae non habent +tristitias contrarias, ut infra dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The reason why more seek bodily pleasures is because sensible goods are known better and more generally: and, again, because + men need pleasures as remedies for many kinds of sorrow and sadness: and since the majority cannot attain spiritual pleasures, + which are proper to the virtuous, hence it is that they turn aside to seek those of the body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="34869" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34869] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ideo plures sequuntur delectationes corporales, +quia bona sensibilia sunt magis et pluribus nota. Et etiam quia +homines indigent delectationibus ut medicinis contra multiplices +dolores et tristitias, et cum plures hominum non possint attingere +ad delectationes spirituales, quae sunt propriae virtuosorum, +consequens et quod declinent ad corporales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Bodily transmutation arises more from bodily pleasures, inasmuch as they are passions of the sensitive appetite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="34870" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34870] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod transmutatio corporis magis contingit ex +delectationibus corporalibus, inquantum sunt passiones appetitus +sensitivi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Bodily pleasures are realized in the sensitive faculty which is governed by reason: wherefore they need to be tempered and + checked by reason. But spiritual pleasures are in the mind, which is itself the rule: wherefore they are in themselves both + sober and moderate. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="34871" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34871] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod delectationes corporales sunt secundum partem +sensitivam, quae regulatur ratione, et ideo indigent temperari et +refraenari per rationem. Sed delectationes spirituales sunt +secundum mentem, quae est ipsa regula, unde sunt secundum seipsas +sobriae et moderatae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q31_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q31_A6-p0.1">Q. 31. A. 6. Whether the pleasures of touch are greater than the pleasures afforded by the other senses?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the pleasures of touch are not greater than the pleasures afforded by the other senses. Because the greatest + pleasure seems to be that without which all joy is at an end. But such is the pleasure afforded by the sight, according to + the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q31_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Tob.5.12" target="asv"> Tob. 5:12</a>: "What manner of joy shall be to me, who sit in darkness, and see not the light of heaven?" Therefore the pleasure afforded + by the sight is the greatest of sensible + pleasures. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="34872" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34872] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectationes quae sunt secundum +tactum, non sint maiores delectationibus quae sunt secundum alios +sensus. Illa enim delectatio videtur esse maxima, qua exclusa, omne +gaudium cessat. Sed talis est delectatio quae est secundum visum, +dicitur enim Tobiae V, <i>quale gaudium erit mihi, qui in tenebris +sedeo, et lumen caeli non video?</i> Ergo delectatio quae est per +visum, est maxima inter sensibiles delectationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "every one finds treasure in what he loves," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But "of all the senses the sight + is loved most" [*Metaph. i, 1]. Therefore the greatest pleasure seems to be afforded by sight. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="34873" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34873] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> +<i>Praeterea, unicuique fit delectabile illud quod amat</i>, ut +philosophus dicit, in I Rhetoric. Sed inter alios sensus maxime +diligitur visus. Ergo delectatio quae est secundum visum, est +maxima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the beginning of friendship which is for the sake of the pleasant is principally sight. But pleasure is the cause + of such friendship. Therefore the greatest pleasure seems to be afforded by sight. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="34874" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34874] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +principium amicitiae delectabilis maxime est visio. Sed causa talis +amicitiae est delectatio. Ergo secundum visum videtur esse maxime +delectatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), that the greatest pleasures are those which are afforded by the touch. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 6 s. c."><a name="34875" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34875] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod maximae +delectationes sunt secundum tactum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q31_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q25_A2" id="FS_Q31_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[25], A[2]</a>, ad 1; + <a href="#FS_Q27_A4" id="FS_Q31_A6-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[27], A[4]</a>, ad 1), everything gives pleasure according as it is loved. Now, as stated in Metaph. i, 1, the senses are loved for two + reasons: for the purpose of knowledge, and on account of their usefulness. Wherefore the senses afford pleasure in both these + ways. But because it is proper to man to apprehend knowledge itself as something good, it follows that the former + pleasures of the senses, i.e. those which arise from knowledge, are proper to man: whereas pleasures of the senses, as loved + for their usefulness, are common to all animals. + </p><p id="FS_Q31_A6-p7"> If therefore we speak of that sensible pleasure by which reason of knowledge, it is evident that the sight affords greater + pleasure than any other sense. On the other hand, if we speak of that sensible pleasure which is by reason of usefulness, + then the greatest pleasure is afforded by the touch. For the usefulness of sensible things is gauged by their relation to + the preservation of the animal's nature. Now the sensible objects of touch bear the closest relation to this + usefulness: for the touch takes cognizance of those things which are vital to an animal, namely, of things hot and cold and + the like. Wherefore in this respect, the pleasures of touch are greater as being more closely related to the end. For this + reason, too, other animals which do not experience sensible pleasure save by reason of usefulness, derive no pleasure from + the other senses except as subordinated to the sensible objects of the touch: "for dogs do not take delight in the smell of + hares, but in eating them; . . . nor does the lion feel pleasure in the lowing of an ox, but in devouring it" (Ethic. iii, + 10). + </p><p id="FS_Q31_A6-p8"> Since then the pleasure afforded by touch is the greatest in respect of usefulness, and the pleasure afforded by sight the + greatest in respect of knowledge; if anyone wish to compare these two, he will find that the pleasure of touch is, absolutely + speaking, greater than the pleasure of sight, so far as the latter remains within the limits of sensible pleasure. Because + it is evident that in everything, that which is natural is most powerful: and it is to these pleasures of the + touch that the natural concupiscences, such as those of food, sexual union, and the like, are ordained. If, however, we consider + the pleasures of sight, inasmuch sight is the handmaid of the mind, then the pleasures of sight are greater, forasmuch as + intellectual pleasures are greater than sensible. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 6 co."><a name="34876" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34876] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, unumquodque, inquantum amatur, +efficitur delectabile. Sensus autem, ut dicitur in principio +Metaphys., propter duo diliguntur, scilicet propter cognitionem, et +propter utilitatem. Unde et utroque modo contingit esse +delectationem secundum sensum. Sed quia apprehendere ipsam +cognitionem tanquam bonum quoddam, proprium est hominis; ideo +primae delectationes sensuum, quae scilicet sunt secundum +cognitionem, sunt propriae hominum, delectationes autem sensuum +inquantum diliguntur propter utilitatem, sunt communes omnibus +animalibus. Si igitur loquamur de delectatione sensus quae est +ratione cognitionis, manifestum est quod secundum visum est maior +delectatio quam secundum aliquem alium sensum. Si autem loquamur de +delectatione sensus quae est ratione utilitatis, sic maxima +delectatio est secundum tactum. Utilitas enim sensibilium +attenditur secundum ordinem ad conservationem naturae animalis. Ad +hanc autem utilitatem propinquius se habent sensibilia tactus, est +enim tactus cognoscitivus eorum ex quibus consistit animal, +scilicet calidi et frigidi, et huiusmodi. Unde secundum hoc, +delectationes quae sunt secundum tactum, sunt maiores, quasi fini +propinquiores. Et propter hoc etiam, alia animalia, quae non habent +delectationem secundum sensum nisi ratione utilitatis, non +delectantur secundum alios sensus, nisi in ordine ad sensibilia +tactus, <i>neque enim odoribus leporum canes gaudent, sed +cibatione; neque leo voce bovis, sed comestione</i>, ut dicitur in +III Ethic. Cum igitur delectatio tactus sit maxima ratione +utilitatis, delectatio autem visus ratione cognitionis; si quis +utramque comparare velit, inveniet simpliciter delectationem tactus +esse maiorem delectatione visus, secundum quod sistit infra limites +sensibilis delectationis. Quia manifestum est quod id quod est +naturale in unoquoque, est potentissimum. Huiusmodi autem +delectationes tactus sunt ad quas ordinantur concupiscentiae +naturales, sicut cibi, et venerea, et huiusmodi. Sed si +consideremus delectationes visus, secundum quod visus deservit +intellectui; sic delectationes visus erunt potiores, ea ratione qua +et intelligibiles delectationes sunt potiores sensibilibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Joy, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q31_A3" id="FS_Q31_A6-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, denotes pleasure of the soul; and this belongs principally to the sight. But natural pleasure belongs principally to the + touch. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="34877" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34877] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod gaudium, sicut supra dictum est, significat +animalem delectationem, et haec maxime pertinet ad visum. Sed +delectatio naturalis maxime pertinet ad tactum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The sight is loved most, "on account of knowledge, because it helps us to distinguish many things," as is stated in the same + passage (Metaph. i, 1). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="34878" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34878] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod visus maxime diligitur propter cognitionem, eo quod +multas rerum differentias nobis ostendit, ut ibidem dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Pleasure causes carnal love in one way; the sight, in another. For pleasure, especially that which is afforded by the touch, + is the final cause of the friendship which is for the sake of the pleasant: whereas the sight is a cause like that from which + a movement has its beginning, inasmuch as the beholder on seeing the lovable object receives an impression of its image, which + entices him to love it and to seek its delight. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="34879" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34879] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod alio modo delectatio est causa amoris carnalis, et +alio modo visio. Nam delectatio, et maxime quae est secundum +tactum, est causa amicitiae delectabilis per modum finis, visio +autem est causa sicut unde est principium motus, inquantum per +visum amabilis imprimitur species rei, quae allicit ad amandum et +ad concupiscendum eius delectationem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q31_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q31_A7-p0.1">Q. 31. A. 7. Whether any pleasure is not natural?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no pleasure is not natural. For pleasure is to the emotions of the soul what repose is to bodies. But + the appetite of a natural body does not repose save in a connatural place. Neither, therefore, can the repose of the animal + appetite, which is pleasure, be elsewhere than in something connatural. Therefore no pleasure is non-natural. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="34880" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34880] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod nulla delectatio sit innaturalis. +Delectatio enim in affectibus animae proportionatur quieti in +corporibus. Sed appetitus corporis naturalis non quiescit nisi in +loco connaturali. Ergo nec quies appetitus animalis, quae est +delectatio, potest esse nisi in aliquo connaturali. Nulla ergo +delectatio est non naturalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is against nature is violent. But "whatever is violent causes grief" (Metaph. v, 5). Therefore nothing which + is unnatural can give pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="34881" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34881] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +illud quod est contra naturam, est violentum. Sed omne violentum +est contristans, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. Ergo nihil quod est +contra naturam, potest esse delectabile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the fact of being established in one's own nature, if perceived, gives rise to pleasure, as is evident from the + Philosopher's definition quoted above + <a href="#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q31_A7-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But it is natural to every thing to be established in its nature; because natural movement tends to a natural end. Therefore + every pleasure is natural. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="34882" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34882] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +constitui in propriam naturam, cum sentitur, causat delectationem; +ut patet ex definitione philosophi supra posita. Sed constitui in +naturam, unicuique est naturale, quia motus naturalis est qui est +ad terminum naturalem. Ergo omnis delectatio est naturalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5,6) that some things are pleasant "not from nature but from disease." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 7 s. c."><a name="34883" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34883] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod quaedam +delectationes sunt aegritudinales et contra naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We speak of that as being natural, which is in accord with nature, as stated in Phys. ii, 1. Now, in man, nature can be taken + in two ways. First, inasmuch as intellect and reason is the principal part of man's nature, since in respect thereof he has + his own specific nature. And in this sense, those pleasures may be called natural to man, which are derived from things pertaining + to man in respect of his reason: for instance, it is natural to man to take + pleasure in contemplating the truth and in doing works of virtue. Secondly, nature in man may be taken as contrasted with + reason, and as denoting that which is common to man and other animals, especially that part of man which does not obey reason. + And in this sense, that which pertains to the preservation of the body, either as regards the individual, as food, drink, + sleep, and the like, or as regards the species, as sexual intercourse, are said to afford man natural pleasure. Under each + kind + of pleasures, we find some that are "not natural" speaking absolutely, and yet "connatural" in some respect. For it happens + in an individual that some one of the natural principles of the species is corrupted, so that something which is contrary + to the specific nature, becomes accidentally natural to this individual: thus it is natural to this hot water to give heat. + Consequently it happens that something which is not natural to man, either in regard to reason, or in regard to the preservation + of the body, becomes connatural to this individual man, on account of there being some corruption of nature in him. And this + corruption may be either on the part of the body---from some ailment; thus to a man suffering from fever, sweet things seem + bitter, and vice versa---or from an evil temperament; thus some take pleasure in eating earth and coals and the like; or on + the part of the soul; thus from custom some take pleasure in cannibalism or in the unnatural intercourse of man and beast, + or + other such things, which are not in accord with human nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 7 co."><a name="34884" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34884] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod naturale dicitur quod est secundum naturam, ut +dicitur in II Physic. Natura autem in homine dupliciter sumi +potest. Uno modo, prout intellectus et ratio est potissime hominis +natura, quia secundum eam homo in specie constituitur. Et secundum +hoc, naturales delectationes hominum dici possunt quae sunt in eo +quod convenit homini secundum rationem, sicut delectari in +contemplatione veritatis, et in actibus virtutum, est naturale +homini. Alio modo potest sumi natura in homine secundum quod +condividitur rationi, id scilicet quod est commune homini et aliis, +praecipue quod rationi non obedit. Et secundum hoc, ea quae +pertinent ad conservationem corporis, vel secundum individuum, ut +cibus, potus, lectus, et huiusmodi, vel secundum speciem, sicut +venereorum usus, dicuntur homini delectabilia naturaliter. Secundum +utrasque autem delectationes, contingit aliquas esse innaturales, +simpliciter loquendo, sed connaturales secundum quid. Contingit +enim in aliquo individuo corrumpi aliquod principiorum naturalium +speciei; et sic id quod est contra naturam speciei, fieri per +accidens naturale huic individuo; sicut huic aquae calefactae est +naturale quod calefaciat. Ita igitur contingit quod id quod est +contra naturam hominis, vel quantum ad rationem, vel quantum ad +corporis conservationem, fiat huic homini connaturale, propter +aliquam corruptionem naturae in eo existentem. Quae quidem +corruptio potest esse vel ex parte corporis, sive ex aegritudine, +sicut febricitantibus dulcia videntur amara et e converso; sive +propter malam complexionem, sicut aliqui delectantur in comestione +terrae vel carbonum, vel aliquorum huiusmodi, vel etiam ex parte +animae, sicut propter consuetudinem aliqui, delectantur in +comedendo homines, vel in coitu bestiarum aut masculorum, aut +aliorum huiusmodi, quae non sunt secundum naturam humanam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A7-p7"> This suffices for the answers to the objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 7 ad arg."><a name="34885" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34885] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 7 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc +patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q31_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q31_A8-p0.1">Q. 31. A. 8. Whether one pleasure can be contrary to another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one pleasure cannot be contrary to another. Because the passions of the soul derive their species and + contrariety from their objects. Now the object of pleasure is the good. Since therefore good is not contrary to good, but + "good is contrary to evil, and evil to good," as stated in Praedic. viii; it seems that one pleasure is not contrary to another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="34886" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34886] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectationi non sit delectatio +contraria. Passiones enim animae speciem et contrarietatem +recipiunt secundum obiecta. Obiectum autem delectationis est bonum. +Cum igitur bonum non sit contrarium bono, sed bonum malo +contrarietur, et malum malo, ut dicitur in praedicamentis; videtur +quod delectatio non sit contraria delectationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to one thing there is one contrary, as is proved in Metaph. x, 4. But sadness is contrary to pleasure. Therefore + pleasure is not contrary to pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="34887" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34887] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +uni unum est contrarium, ut probatur in X Metaphys. Sed +delectationi contraria est tristitia. Non ergo delectationi +contraria est delectatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if one pleasure is contrary to another, this is only on account of the contrariety of the things which give pleasure. + But this difference is material: whereas contrariety is a difference of form, as stated in Metaph. x, 4. Therefore there is + no contrariety between one pleasure and another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="34888" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34888] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +si delectationi contraria est delectatio hoc non est nisi propter +contrarietatem eorum in quibus aliquis delectatur. Sed haec +differentia est materialis, contrarietas autem est differentia +secundum formam, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Ergo contrarietas non +est delectationis ad delectationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Things of the same genus that impede one another are contraries, as the Philosopher states (Phys. viii, 8). But some pleasures + impede one another, as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore some pleasures are contrary to one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 8 s. c."><a name="34889" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34889] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +ea quae se impediunt, in eodem genere existentia, secundum +philosophum, sunt contraria. Sed quaedam delectationes se invicem +impediunt ut dicitur in X Ethic. Ergo aliquae delectationes sunt +contrariae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is likened to repose in natural bodies, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q31_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a>). Now one repose is said to be contrary to another when they are in contrary termini; thus, "repose in a high place is contrary + to repose in a low place" (Phys. v, 6). Wherefore it happens in the emotions of the soul that one pleasure is contrary to + another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 8 co."><a name="34890" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34890] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod delectatio in affectionibus animae, sicut dictum est, +proportionatur quieti in corporibus naturalibus. Dicuntur autem +duae quietes esse contrariae, quae sunt in contrariis terminis; +sicut quies quae est sursum, ei quae est deorsum, ut dicitur V +Physic. Unde et contingit in affectibus animae duas delectationes +esse contrarias.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A8-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This saying of the Philosopher is to be understood of good and evil as applied to virtues and vices: because one vice may + be contrary to another vice, whereas no virtue can be contrary to another virtue. But in other things nothing prevents one + good from being contrary to another, such as hot and cold, of which the former is good in relation to fire, the latter, in + relation to water. And in this way one pleasure can be contrary to another. That this + is impossible with regard to the good of virtue, is due to the fact that virtue's good depends on fittingness in relation + to some one thing---i.e. the reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="34891" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34891] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod verbum illud philosophi est intelligendum +secundum quod bonum et malum accipitur in virtutibus et vitiis, nam +inveniuntur duo contraria vitia, non autem invenitur virtus +contraria virtuti. In aliis autem nil prohibet duo bona esse ad +invicem contraria, sicut calidum et frigidum, quorum unum est bonum +igni, alterum aquae. Et per hunc modum delectatio potest esse +delectationi contraria. Sed hoc in bono virtutis esse non potest, +quia bonum virtutis non accipitur nisi per convenientiam ad aliquid +unum, scilicet rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is likened to natural repose in bodies: because its object is something suitable and + connatural, so to speak. But sadness is like a violent repose; because its object is disagreeable to the animal appetite, + just as the place of violent repose is disagreeable to the natural appetite. Now natural repose is contrary both to violent + repose of the same body, and to the natural repose of another, as stated in Phys. v, + 6. Wherefore pleasure is contrary to both to another pleasure and to sadness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="34892" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34892] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod delectatio se habet in affectibus animae, sicut quies +naturalis in corporibus, est enim in aliquo convenienti et quasi +connaturali. Tristitia autem se habet sicut quies violenta, +tristabile enim repugnat appetitui animali, sicut locus quietis +violentae appetitui naturali. Quieti autem naturali opponitur et +quies violenta eiusdem corporis, et quies naturalis alterius, ut +dicitur in V Physic. Unde delectationi opponitur et delectatio et +tristitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The things in which we take pleasure, since they are the objects of pleasure, cause not only a material, but also a formal + difference, if the formality of pleasurableness be different. Because difference in the formal object causes a specific difference + in acts and passions, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q23_A1" id="FS_Q31_A8-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[23], AA[1]</a>,4; + <a href="#FS_Q30_A2" id="FS_Q31_A8-p9.2" shape="rect"> Q[30], A[2]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="34893" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34893] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ea in quibus delectamur, cum sint obiecta +delectationis, non solum faciunt differentiam materialem, sed etiam +formalem, si sit diversa ratio delectabilitatis. Diversa enim ratio +obiecti diversificat speciem actus vel passionis, ut ex supradictis +patet.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q32" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q32-p0.1">Q. 32. OF THE CAUSE OF PLEASURE (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q32-p2"> We must now consider the causes of pleasure: and under this head there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q32-p3"><a href="#FS_Q32_A1"> (1) Whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure?</a></p><p id="FS_Q32-p4"><a href="#FS_Q32_A2"> (2) Whether movement is a cause of pleasure?</a></p><p id="FS_Q32-p5"><a href="#FS_Q32_A3"> (3) Whether hope and memory cause pleasure?</a></p><p id="FS_Q32-p6"><a href="#FS_Q32_A4"> (4) Whether sadness causes pleasure?</a></p><p id="FS_Q32-p7"><a href="#FS_Q32_A5"> (5) Whether the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us?</a></p><p id="FS_Q32-p8"><a href="#FS_Q32_A6"> (6) Whether doing good to another is a cause of pleasure?</a></p><p id="FS_Q32-p9"><a href="#FS_Q32_A7"> (7) Whether likeness is a cause of pleasure?</a></p><p id="FS_Q32-p10"><a href="#FS_Q32_A8"> (8) Whether wonder is a cause of pleasure?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 pr."><a name="34894" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34894] +Iª-IIae q. 32 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +causis delectationis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum +operatio sit causa propria delectationis. Secundo, utrum motus sit +causa delectationis. Tertio, utrum spes et memoria. Quarto, utrum +tristitia. Quinto, utrum actiones aliorum sint nobis delectationis +causa. Sexto, utrum benefacere alteri sit causa delectationis. +Septimo, utrum similitudo sit causa delectationis. Octavo, utrum +admiratio sit causa delectationis.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q32_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q32_A1-p0.1">Q. 32. A. 1. Whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that operation is not the proper and first cause of pleasure. For, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11), "pleasure + consists in a perception of the senses," since knowledge is requisite for pleasure, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q32_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[31], A[1]</a>). But the objects of operations are knowable before the operations themselves. Therefore operation is not the proper cause + of pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34895" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34895] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod operatio non sit propria et prima +causa delectationis. Ut enim philosophus dicit, in I Rhetoric., +<i>delectari consistit in hoc quod sensus aliquid patiatur</i>, +requiritur enim ad delectationem cognitio, sicut dictum est. Sed +per prius sunt cognoscibilia obiecta operationum quam ipsae +operationes. Ergo operatio non est propria causa delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, pleasure consists especially in an end gained: since it is this that is chiefly desired. But the end is not always + an operation, but is sometimes the effect of the operation. Therefore operation is not the proper and direct cause of pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34896" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34896] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +delectatio potissime consistit in fine adepto, hoc enim est quod +praecipue concupiscitur. Sed non semper operatio est finis, sed +quandoque ipsum operatum. Non ergo operatio est propria et per se +causa delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, leisure and rest consist in cessation from work: and they are objects of pleasure (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore operation + is not the proper cause of pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34897" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34897] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +otium et requies dicuntur per cessationem operationis. Haec autem +sunt delectabilia, ut dicitur in I Rhetoric. Non ergo operatio est +propria causa delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12,13; x, 4) that "pleasure is a connatural and uninterrupted operation." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34898" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34898] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, VII et X Ethic., quod <i>delectatio est +operatio connaturalis non impedita</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q32_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[31], A[1]</a>), two things are requisite for pleasure: namely, the attainment of the suitable good, and knowledge of this attainment. Now + each of these consists in a kind of operation: because actual knowledge is an operation; and the attainment of the suitable + good is by means of an operation. Moreover, the proper operation itself is a suitable good. Wherefore every pleasure must + needs be the result of some + operation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 1 co."><a name="34899" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34899] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad delectationem duo +requiruntur, scilicet consecutio boni convenientis, et cognitio +huiusmodi adeptionis. Utrumque autem horum in quadam operatione +consistit, nam actualis cognitio operatio quaedam est; similiter +bonum conveniens adipiscimur aliqua operatione. Ipsa etiam operatio +propria est quoddam bonum conveniens. Unde oportet quod omnis +delectatio aliquam operationem consequatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The objects of operations are not pleasurable save inasmuch as they are united to us; either by knowledge alone, as when + we take pleasure in thinking of or looking at certain things; or in some other way in addition to knowledge; as when a man + takes pleasure in knowing that he has something good--riches, honor, or the like; which would not be pleasurable unless they + were apprehended as possessed. For as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii, 2) "we take + great pleasure in looking upon a thing as our own, by reason of the natural love we have for ourselves." Now to have such + like things is nothing else but to use them or to be able to use them: and this is through some operation. Wherefore it is + evident that every pleasure is traced to some operation as its cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34900" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34900] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ipsa obiecta operationum non sunt delectabilia, +nisi inquantum coniunguntur nobis, vel per cognitionem solam, sicut +cum delectamur in consideratione vel inspectione aliquorum; vel +quocumque alio modo simul cum cognitione, sicut cum aliquis +delectatur in hoc quod cognoscit se habere quodcumque bonum, puta +divitias vel honorem vel aliquid huiusmodi; quae quidem non essent +delectabilia, nisi inquantum apprehenduntur ut habita. Ut enim +philosophus dicit, in II Polit., <i>magnam delectationem habet +putare aliquid sibi proprium; quae procedit ex naturali amore +alicuius ad seipsum</i>. Habere autem huiusmodi nihil est aliud +quam uti eis, vel posse uti. Et hoc est per aliquam operationem. +Unde manifestum est quod omnis delectatio in operationem reducitur +sicut in causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even when it is not an operation, but the effect of an operation, that is the end, this effect is pleasant in so far as possessed + or effected: and this implies use or operation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34901" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34901] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod etiam in illis in quibus operationes non sunt fines, +sed operata, ipsa operata sunt delectabilia inquantum sunt habita +vel facta. Quod refertur ad aliquem usum vel operationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Operations are pleasant, in so far as they are proportionate and connatural to the agent. Now, since human power is finite, + operation is proportionate thereto according to a certain measure. Wherefore if it exceed that measure, it will be no longer + proportionate or pleasant, but, on the contrary, painful and irksome. And in this sense, leisure and play and other things + pertaining to repose, are pleasant, inasmuch as they banish sadness which results + from labor. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34902" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34902] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod operationes sunt delectabiles, inquantum sunt +proportionatae et connaturales operanti. Cum autem virtus humana +sit finita, secundum aliquam mensuram operatio est sibi +proportionata. Unde si excedat illam mensuram, iam non erit sibi +proportionata, nec delectabilis, sed magis laboriosa et attaedians. +Et secundum hoc, otium et ludus et alia quae ad requiem pertinent, +delectabilia sunt, inquantum auferunt tristitiam quae est ex +labore.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q32_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q32_A2-p0.1">Q. 32. A. 2. Whether movement is a cause of pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that movement is not a cause of pleasure. Because, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q32_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[31], A[1]</a>), the good which is obtained and is actually possessed, is the cause of pleasure: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. + vii, 12) that pleasure is not compared with generation, but with the operation of a thing already in existence. Now that which + is being moved towards something has it not as yet; but, so to speak, is being generated in its + regard, forasmuch as generation or corruption are united to every movement, as stated in Phys. viii, 3. Therefore movement + is not a cause of pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34903" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34903] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod motus non sit causa delectationis. +Quia, sicut supra dictum est, bonum praesentialiter adeptum est +causa delectationis, unde philosophus, in VII Ethic., dicit quod +delectatio non comparatur generationi, sed operationi rei iam +existentis. Id autem quod movetur ad aliquid, nondum habet illud; +sed quodammodo est in via generationis respectu illius, secundum +quod omni motui adiungitur generatio et corruptio, ut dicitur in +VIII Physic. Ergo motus non est causa delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, movement is the chief cause of toil and fatigue in our works. But operations through being toilsome and fatiguing + are not pleasant but disagreeable. Therefore movement is not a cause of pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34904" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34904] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +motus praecipue laborem et lassitudinem inducit in operibus. Sed +operationes, ex hoc quod sunt laboriosae et lassantes, non sunt +delectabiles, sed magis afflictivae. Ergo motus non est causa +delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, movement implies a certain innovation, which is the opposite of custom. But things "which we are accustomed to, + are pleasant," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore movement is not a cause of pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34905" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34905] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +motus importat innovationem quandam, quae opponitur consuetudini. +Sed ea quae sunt consueta, sunt nobis delectabilia, ut philosophus +dicit, in I Rhetoric. Ergo motus non est causa delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. viii, 3): "What means this, O Lord my God, whereas Thou art everlasting joy to Thyself, and some + things around Thee evermore rejoice in Thee? What means this, that this portion of things ebbs and flows alternately displeased + and reconciled?" From these words we gather that man rejoices and takes pleasure in some kind of alterations: and therefore + movement seems to cause pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34906" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34906] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in VIII Confess., <i>quid est hoc, +domine Deus meus, cum tu aeternum tibi tu ipse sis gaudium; et +quaedam de te circa te semper gaudeant; quod haec rerum pars +alterno defectu et profectu, offensionibus et conciliationibus +gaudet?</i> Ex quo accipitur quod homines gaudent et delectantur in +quibusdam alternationibus. Et sic motus videtur esse causa +delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q32_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Three things are requisite for pleasure; two, i.e. the one that is pleased and the pleasurable object conjoined to him; and + a third, which is knowledge of this conjunction: and in respect of these three, movement is pleasant, as the Philosopher says + (Ethic. vii, 14 and Rhetor. i, 11). For as far as we who feel pleasure are concerned, change is pleasant to us because our + nature is changeable: for which reason that which is suitable to us at one time is not + suitable at another; thus to warm himself at a fire is suitable to man in winter but not in summer. Again, on the part of + the pleasing good which is united to us, change is pleasant. Because the continued action of an agent increases its effect: + thus the longer a person remains near the fire, the more he is warmed and dried. Now the natural mode of being consists in + a certain measure; and therefore when the continued presence of a pleasant object exceeds the measure of one's natural mode + of + being, the removal of that object becomes pleasant. On the part of the knowledge itself (change becomes pleasant), because + man desires to know something whole and perfect: when therefore a thing cannot be apprehended all at once as a whole, change + in such a thing is pleasant, so that one part may pass and another succeed, and thus the whole be perceived. Hence Augustine + says (Confess. iv, 11): "Thou wouldst not have the syllables stay, but fly away, that others may come, and thou hear the + whole. And so whenever any one thing is made up of many, all of which do not exist together, all would please collectively + more than they do severally, if all could be perceived collectively." + </p><p id="FS_Q32_A2-p7"> If therefore there be any thing, whose nature is unchangeable; the natural mode of whose being cannot be exceeded by the + continuation of any pleasing object; and which can behold the whole object of its delight at once---to such a one change will + afford no delight. And the more any pleasures approach to this, the more are they capable of being continual. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 2 co."><a name="34907" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34907] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod ad delectationem tria requiruntur, scilicet duo +quorum est coniunctio delectabilis; et tertium, quod est cognitio +huius coniunctionis. Et secundum haec tria motus efficitur +delectabilis, ut philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic. et in I Rhetoric. +Nam ex parte nostra qui delectamur, transmutatio efficitur nobis +delectabilis propter hoc, quod natura nostra transmutabilis est; et +propter hoc, quod est nobis conveniens nunc, non erit nobis +conveniens postea; sicut calefieri ad ignem est conveniens homini +in hieme, non autem in aestate. Ex parte vero boni delectantis quod +nobis coniungitur, fit etiam transmutatio delectabilis. Quia actio +continuata alicuius agentis auget effectum, sicut quanto aliquis +diutius appropinquat igni, magis calefit et desiccatur. Naturalis +autem habitudo in quadam mensura consistit. Et ideo quando +continuata praesentia delectabilis superexcedit mensuram naturalis +habitudinis, efficitur remotio eius delectabilis. Ex parte vero +ipsius cognitionis, quia homo desiderat cognoscere aliquod totum et +perfectum. Cum ergo aliqua non poterunt apprehendi tota simul, +delectat in his transmutatio, ut unum transeat et alterum succedat, +et sic totum sentiatur. Unde Augustinus dicit, in IV Confess., +<i>non vis utique stare syllabam, sed transvolare, ut aliae +veniant, et totum audias. Ita semper omnia ex quibus unum aliquid +constat, et non sunt omnia simul, plus delectant omnia quam +singula, si possint sentiri omnia</i>. Si ergo sit aliqua res cuius +natura sit intransmutabilis; et non possit in ea fieri excessus +naturalis habitudinis per continuationem delectabilis; et quae +possit totum suum delectabile simul intueri, non erit ei +transmutatio delectabilis. Et quanto aliquae delectationes plus ad +hoc accedunt, tanto plus continuari possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the subject of movement has not yet perfectly that to which it is moved, nevertheless it is beginning to have something + thereof: and in this respect movement itself has something of pleasure. But it falls short of the perfection of pleasure; + because the more perfect pleasures regard things that are unchangeable. Moreover movement becomes the cause of pleasure, in + so far as thereby something which previously was unsuitable, becomes suitable or + ceases to be, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34908" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34908] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod id quod movetur, etsi nondum habeat perfecte id +ad quod movetur, incipit tamen iam aliquid habere eius ad quod +movetur, et secundum hoc, ipse motus habet aliquid delectationis. +Deficit tamen a delectationis perfectione, nam perfectiores +delectationes sunt in rebus immobilibus. Motus etiam efficitur +delectabilis, inquantum per ipsum fit aliquid conveniens quod prius +conveniens non erat, vel desinit esse, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Movement causes toil and fatigue, when it exceeds our natural aptitude. It is not thus that it causes pleasure, but by removing + the obstacles to our natural aptitude. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34909" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34909] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod motus laborem et lassitudinem inducit, secundum quod +transcendit habitudinem naturalem. Sic autem motus non est +delectabilis, sed secundum quod removentur contraria habitudinis +naturalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> What is customary becomes pleasant, in so far as it becomes natural: because custom is like a second nature. But the movement + which gives pleasure is not that which departs from custom, but rather that which prevents the corruption of the natural mode + of being, that might result from continued operation. And thus from the same cause of connaturalness, both custom and movement + become pleasant. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34910" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34910] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod id quod est consuetum, efficitur delectabile, +inquantum efficitur naturale, nam consuetudo est quasi altera +natura. Motus autem est delectabilis, non quidem quo receditur a +consuetudine, sed magis secundum quod per ipsum impeditur corruptio +naturalis habitudinis, quae posset provenire ex assiduitate +alicuius operationis. Et sic ex eadem causa connaturalitatis +efficitur consuetudo delectabilis, et motus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q32_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q32_A3-p0.1">Q. 32. A. 3. Whether hope and memory causes pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that memory and hope do not cause pleasure. Because pleasure is caused by present good, as Damascene says (De + Fide Orth. ii, 12). But hope and memory regard what is absent: since memory is of the past, and hope of the future. Therefore + memory and hope do not cause pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34911" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34911] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod memoria et spes non sint causae +delectationis. Delectatio enim est de bono praesenti, ut Damascenus +dicit. Sed memoria et spes sunt de absenti, est enim memoria +praeteritorum, spes vero futurorum. Ergo memoria et spes non sunt +causa delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the same thing is not the cause of contraries. But hope causes affliction, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q32_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.13.12" target="asv"> Prov. 13:12</a>: "Hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul." Therefore hope does not cause pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34912" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34912] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +idem non est causa contrariorum. Sed spes est causa afflictionis, +dicitur enim Prov. XIII, <i>spes quae differtur, affligit +animam</i>. Ergo spes non est causa delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as hope agrees with pleasure in regarding good, so also do desire and love. Therefore hope should not be assigned + as a cause of pleasure, any more than desire or love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34913" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34913] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut spes convenit cum delectatione in eo quod est de bono, ita +etiam concupiscentia et amor. Non ergo magis debet assignari spes +causa delectationis, quam concupiscentia vel amor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q32_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.12" target="asv">Rom. 12:12</a>): "Rejoicing in hope"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q32_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.76.4" target="asv">Ps. 76:4</a>): "I remembered God, and was delighted." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34914" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34914] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Rom. XII, <i>spe gaudentes</i>; et in Psalmo +LXXVI, <i>memor fui Dei, et delectatus sum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Pleasure is caused by the presence of suitable good, in so far as it is felt, or perceived in any way. Now a thing is present + to us in two ways. First, in knowledge---i.e. according as the thing known is in the knower by its likeness; secondly, in + reality---i.e. according as one thing is in real conjunction of any kind with another, either actually or potentially. And + since real conjunction is greater than conjunction by likeness, which is the conjunction of + knowledge; and again, since actual is greater than potential conjunction: therefore the greatest pleasure is that which arises + from sensation which requires the presence of the sensible object. The second place belongs to the pleasure of hope, wherein + there is pleasurable conjunction, not only in respect of apprehension, but also in respect of the faculty or power of obtaining + the pleasurable object. The third place belongs to the pleasure of memory, which has only the conjunction of + apprehension. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 3 co."><a name="34915" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34915] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod delectatio causatur ex praesentia boni convenientis, +secundum quod sentitur, vel qualitercumque percipitur. Est autem +aliquid praesens nobis dupliciter, uno modo, secundum cognitionem, +prout scilicet cognitum est in cognoscente secundum suam +similitudinem; alio modo, secundum rem, prout scilicet unum alteri +realiter coniungitur, vel actu vel potentia, secundum quemcumque +coniunctionis modum. Et quia maior est coniunctio secundum rem quam +secundum similitudinem, quae est coniunctio cognitionis; itemque +maior est coniunctio rei in actu quam in potentia, ideo maxima est +delectatio quae fit per sensum, qui requirit praesentiam rei +sensibilis. Secundum autem gradum tenet delectatio spei, in qua non +solum est delectabilis coniunctio secundum apprehensionem, sed +etiam secundum facultatem vel potestatem adipiscendi bonum quod +delectat. Tertium autem gradum tenet delectatio memoriae, quae +habet solam coniunctionem apprehensionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Hope and memory are indeed of things which, absolutely speaking, are absent: and yet those are, after a fashion, present, + i.e. either according to apprehension only; or according to apprehension and possibility, at least supposed, of attainment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34916" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34916] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod spes et memoria sunt quidem eorum quae sunt +simpliciter absentia, quae tamen secundum quid sunt praesentia, +scilicet vel secundum apprehensionem solam; vel secundum +apprehensionem et facultatem, ad minus aestimatam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Nothing prevents the same thing, in different ways, being the cause of contraries. And so hope, inasmuch as it implies a + present appraising of a future good, causes pleasure; whereas, inasmuch as it implies absence of that good, it causes affliction. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34917" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34917] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod nihil prohibet idem, secundum diversa, esse causam +contrariorum. Sic igitur spes, inquantum habet praesentem +aestimationem boni futuri, delectationem causat, inquantum autem +caret praesentia eius, causat afflictionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Love and concupiscence also cause pleasure. For everything that is loved becomes pleasing to the lover, since love is a kind + of union or connaturalness of lover and beloved. In like manner every object of desire is pleasing to the one that desires, + since desire is chiefly a craving for pleasure. However hope, as implying a certainty of the real presence of the pleasing + good, that is not implied either by love or by concupiscence, is reckoned in + preference to them as causing pleasure; and also in preference to memory, which is of that which has already passed away. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34918" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34918] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod etiam amor et concupiscentia delectationem causant. +Omne enim amatum fit delectabile amanti, eo quod amor est quaedam +unio vel connaturalitas amantis ad amatum. Similiter etiam omne +concupitum est delectabile concupiscenti, cum concupiscentia sit +praecipue appetitus delectationis. Sed tamen spes, inquantum +importat quandam certitudinem realis praesentiae boni delectantis, +quam non importat nec amor nec concupiscentia, magis ponitur causa +delectationis quam illa. Et similiter magis quam memoria, quae est +de eo quod iam transiit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q32_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q32_A4-p0.1">Q. 32. A. 4. Whether sadness causes pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sadness does not cause pleasure. For nothing causes its own contrary. But sadness is contrary to pleasure. + Therefore it does not cause it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34919" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34919] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod tristitia non sit causa delectationis. +Contrarium enim non est causa contrarii. Sed tristitia contrariatur +delectationi. Ergo non est causa delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, contraries have contrary effects. But pleasures, when called to mind, cause pleasure. Therefore sad things, when + remembered, cause sorrow and not pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34920" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34920] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +contrariorum contrarii sunt effectus. Sed delectabilia memorata +sunt causa delectationis. Ergo tristia memorata sunt causa doloris, +et non delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as sadness is to pleasure, so is hatred to love. But hatred does not cause love, but rather the other way about, + as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q29_A2" id="FS_Q32_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[29], A[2]</a>). Therefore sadness does not cause pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34921" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34921] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut se habet tristitia ad delectationem, ita odium ad amorem. Sed +odium non est causa amoris, sed magis e converso, ut supra dictum +est. Ergo tristitia non est causa delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q32_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.41.4" target="asv">Ps. 41:4</a>): "My tears have been my bread day and night": where bread denotes the refreshment of pleasure. Therefore tears, which arise + from sadness, can give pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34922" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34922] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod in Psalmo XLI, dicitur, <i>fuerunt mihi lacrimae meae +panes die ac nocte</i>. Per panem autem refectio delectationis +intelligitur. Ergo lacrimae, quae ex tristitia oriuntur, possunt +esse delectabiles.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Sadness may be considered in two ways: as existing actually, and as existing in the memory: and in both ways sadness can + cause pleasure. Because sadness, as actually existing, causes pleasure, inasmuch as it brings to mind that which is loved, + the absence of which causes sadness; and yet the mere thought of it gives pleasure. The recollection of sadness becomes a + cause of pleasure, on account of the deliverance which ensued: because absence of evil is looked + upon as something good; wherefore so far as a man thinks that he has been delivered from that which caused him sorrow and + pain, so much reason has he to rejoice. Hence Augustine says in De Civ. Dei xxii, 31 [*Gregory, Moral. iv.] that "oftentimes + in joy we call to mind sad things . . . and in the season of health we recall past pains without feeling pain . . . and in + proportion are the more filled with joy and gladness": and again (Confess. viii, 3) he says that "the more peril there was + in the + battle, so much the more joy will there be in the triumph." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 4 co."><a name="34923" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34923] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod tristitia potest dupliciter considerari, uno modo, +secundum quod est in actu; alio modo, secundum quod est in memoria. +Et utroque modo tristitia potest esse delectationis causa. +Tristitia siquidem in actu existens est causa delectationis, +inquantum facit memoriam rei dilectae, de cuius absentia aliquis +tristatur, et tamen de sola eius apprehensione delectatur. Memoria +autem tristitiae fit causa delectationis, propter subsequentem +evasionem. Nam carere malo accipitur in ratione boni, unde secundum +quod homo apprehendit se evasisse ab aliquibus tristibus et +dolorosis, accrescit ei gaudii materia; secundum quod Augustinus +dicit, XXII de Civ. Dei, quod <i>saepe laeti tristium meminimus, et +sani dolorum sine dolore, et inde amplius laeti et grati sumus</i>. +Et in VIII Confess. dicit quod <i>quanto maius fuit periculum in +proelio, tanto maius erit gaudium in triumpho</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sometimes accidentally a thing is the cause of its contrary: thus "that which is cold sometimes causes heat," as stated in + Phys. viii, 1. In like manner sadness is the accidental cause of pleasure, in so far as it gives rise to the apprehension + of something pleasant. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34924" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34924] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod contrarium quandoque per accidens est causa +contrarii, sicut frigidum quandoque calefacit, ut dicitur in VIII +Physic. Et similiter tristitia per accidens est delectationis +causa, inquantum fit per eam apprehensio alicuius delectabilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sad things, called to mind, cause pleasure, not in so far as they are sad and contrary to pleasant things; but in so far + as man is delivered from them. In like manner the recollection of pleasant things, by reason of these being lost, may cause + sadness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34925" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34925] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod tristia memorata, inquantum sunt tristia et +delectabilibus contraria, non causant delectationem, sed inquantum +ab eis homo liberatur. Et similiter memoria delectabilium, ex eo +quod sunt amissa, potest causare tristitiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hatred also can be the accidental cause of love: i.e. so far as some love one another, inasmuch as they agree in hating one + and the same thing. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34926" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34926] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod odium etiam per accidens potest esse causa amoris, +prout scilicet aliqui diligunt se, inquantum conveniunt in odio +unius et eiusdem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q32_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q32_A5-p0.1">Q. 32. A. 5. Whether the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the actions of others are not a cause of pleasure to us. Because the cause of pleasure is our own good + when conjoined to us. But the actions of others are not conjoined to us. Therefore they are not a cause of pleasure to us. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="34927" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34927] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod actiones aliorum non sint nobis +delectationis causa. Causa enim delectationis est proprium bonum +coniunctum. Sed aliorum operationes non sunt nobis coniunctae. Ergo +non sunt nobis causa delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the action is the agent's own good. If, therefore, the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us, for the + same reason all goods belonging to others will be pleasing to us: which is evidently untrue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="34928" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34928] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +operatio est proprium bonum operantis. Si igitur operationes +aliorum sint nobis causa delectationis, pari ratione omnia alia +bona aliorum erunt nobis delectationis causa. Quod patet esse +falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, action is pleasant through proceeding from an innate habit; hence it is stated in Ethic. ii, 3 that "we must reckon + the pleasure which follows after action, as being the sign of a habit existing in us." But the actions of others do not proceed + from habits existing in us, but, sometimes, from habits existing in the agents. Therefore the actions of others are not pleasing + to us, but to the agents themselves. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="34929" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34929] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +operatio est delectabilis, inquantum procedit ex habitu nobis +innato, unde dicitur in II Ethic., quod <i>signum generati habitus +oportet accipere fientem in opere delectationem</i>. Sed +operationes aliorum non procedunt ex habitibus qui in nobis sunt, +sed interdum ex habitibus qui sunt in operantibus. Non ergo +operationes aliorum sunt nobis delectabiles, sed ipsis +operantibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written in the second canonical epistle of John (verse 4): "I was exceeding glad that I found thy children walking + in truth." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 5 s. c."><a name="34930" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34930] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur in secunda canonica Ioannis, <i>gavisus sum valde, +quoniam inveni de filiis tuis ambulantes in veritate</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q32_A1" id="FS_Q32_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1];</a> Q[31], A[1]), two things are requisite for pleasure, namely, the attainment of one's proper good, and the knowledge of having + obtained it. Wherefore the action of another may cause pleasure to us in three ways. First, from the fact that we obtain some + good through the action of another. And in this way, the actions of those who do some good to us, are pleasing to us: since + it is pleasant to be benefited by + another. Secondly, from the fact that another's action makes us to know or appreciate our own good: and for this reason men + take pleasure in being praised or honored by others, because, to wit, they thus become aware of some good existing in themselves. + And since this appreciation receives greater weight from the testimony of good and wise men, hence men take greater pleasure + in being praised and honored by them. And because a flatterer appears to praise, therefore flattery is pleasing to some. + And as love is for something good, while admiration is for something great, so it is pleasant to be loved and admired by others, + inasmuch as a man thus becomes aware of his own goodness or greatness, through their giving pleasure to others. Thirdly, from + the fact that another's actions, if they be good, are reckoned as one's own good, by reason of the power of love, which makes + a man to regard his friend as one with himself. And on account of hatred, which makes one to reckon another's good as + being in opposition to oneself, the evil action of an enemy becomes an object of pleasure: whence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q32_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.6" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:6</a>) that charity "rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 5 co."><a name="34931" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34931] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, ad delectationem duo +requiruntur, scilicet consecutio proprii boni, et cognitio proprii +boni consecuti. Tripliciter ergo operatio alterius potest esse +delectationis causa. Uno modo, inquantum per operationem alicuius +consequimur aliquod bonum. Et secundum hoc, operationes illorum qui +nobis aliquod bonum faciunt, sunt nobis delectabiles, quia bene +pati ab alio est delectabile. Alio modo, secundum quod per +operationes aliorum efficitur nobis aliqua cognitio vel aestimatio +proprii boni. Et propter hoc homines delectantur in hoc quod +laudantur vel honorantur ab aliis, quia scilicet per hoc accipiunt +aestimationem in seipsis aliquod bonum esse. Et quia ista +aestimatio fortius generatur ex testimonio bonorum et sapientum, +ideo in horum laudibus et honoribus homines magis delectantur. Et +quia adulator est apparens laudator, propter hoc etiam adulationes +quibusdam sunt delectabiles. Et quia amor est alicuius boni, et +admiratio est alicuius magni, idcirco amari ab aliis, et in +admiratione haberi, est delectabile; inquantum per hoc fit homini +aestimatio propriae bonitatis vel magnitudinis, in quibus aliquis +delectatur. Tertio modo, inquantum ipsae operationes aliorum, si +sint bonae, aestimantur ut bonum proprium, propter vim amoris, qui +facit aestimare amicum quasi eundem sibi. Et propter odium, quod +facit aestimare bonum alterius esse sibi contrarium, efficitur mala +operatio inimici delectabilis. Unde dicitur I ad Cor. XIII, quod +<i>caritas non gaudet super iniquitate, congaudet autem +veritati</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Another's action may be conjoined to me, either by its effect, as in the first way, or by knowledge, as in the second way; + or by affection, as in the third way. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="34932" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34932] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod operatio alterius potest esse mihi coniuncta vel +per effectum, sicut in primo modo; vel per apprehensionem, sicut in +secundo modo; vel per affectionem, sicut in tertio modo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument avails for the third mode, but not for the first two. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="34933" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34933] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit quantum ad tertium modum, non +autem quantum ad duos primos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the actions of another do not proceed from habits that are in me, yet they either produce in me something that gives + pleasure; or they make me appreciate or know a habit of mind; or they proceed from the habit of one who is united to me by + love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="34934" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34934] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod operationes aliorum etsi non procedant ex habitibus +qui in me sunt, causant tamen in me aliquid delectabile; vel +faciunt mihi aestimationem sive apprehensionem proprii habitus; vel +procedunt ex habitu illius qui est unum mecum per amorem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q32_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q32_A6-p0.1">Q. 32. A. 6. Whether doing good to another is a cause of pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that doing good to another is not a cause of pleasure. Because pleasure is caused by one's obtaining one's + proper good, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q32_A1" id="FS_Q32_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,5; Q[31], A[1]). But doing good pertains not to the obtaining but to the spending of one's proper good. Therefore it seems + to be the cause of sadness rather than of pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="34935" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34935] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod benefacere alteri non sit +delectationis causa. Delectatio enim causatur ex consecutione +proprii boni, sicut supra dictum est. Sed benefacere non pertinet +ad consecutionem proprii boni, sed magis ad emissionem. Ergo magis +videtur esse causa tristitiae quam delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "illiberality is more connatural to man than prodigality." Now it is a + mark of prodigality to do good to others; while it is a mark of illiberality to desist from doing good. Since therefore everyone + takes pleasure in a connatural operation, as stated in Ethic. vii, 14 and x, 4, it seems that doing good to others is not + a cause of pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="34936" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34936] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod <i>illiberalitas +connaturalior est hominibus quam prodigalitas</i>. Sed ad +prodigalitatem pertinet benefacere aliis, ad illiberalitatem autem +pertinet desistere a benefaciendo. Cum ergo operatio connaturalis +sit delectabilis unicuique, ut dicitur in VII et X Ethic., videtur +quod benefacere aliis non sit causa delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, contrary effects proceed from contrary causes. But man takes a natural pleasure in certain kinds of ill-doing, such + as overcoming, contradicting or scolding others, or, if he be angry, in punishing them, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, + 11). Therefore doing good to others is a cause of sadness rather than pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="34937" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34937] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +contrarii effectus ex contrariis causis procedunt. Sed quaedam quae +pertinent ad malefacere, sunt naturaliter homini delectabilia, +sicut vincere, redarguere vel increpare alios, et etiam punire, +quantum ad iratos, ut dicit philosophus in I Rhetoric. Ergo +benefacere magis est causa tristitiae quam delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 2) that "it is most pleasant to give presents or assistance to friends and strangers." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 6 s. c."><a name="34938" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34938] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Polit., quod <i>largiri et +auxiliari amicis aut extraneis, est delectabilissimum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Doing good to another may give pleasure in three ways. First, in consideration of the effect, which is the good conferred + on another. In this respect, inasmuch as through being united to others by love, we look upon their good as being our own, + we take pleasure in the good we do to others, especially to our friends, as in our own good. Secondly, in consideration of + the end; as when a man, from doing good to another, hopes to get some good for himself, either + from God or from man: for hope is a cause of pleasure. Thirdly, in consideration of the principle: and thus, doing good to + another, can give pleasure in respect of a threefold principle. One is the faculty of doing good: and in this regard, doing + good to another becomes pleasant, in so far as it arouses in man an imagination of abundant good existing in him, whereof + he is able to give others a share. Wherefore men take pleasure in their children, and in their own works, as being things + on which + they bestow a share of their own good. Another principle is man's habitual inclination to do good, by reason of which doing + good becomes connatural to him: for which reason the liberal man takes pleasure in giving to others. The third principle is + the motive: for instance when a man is moved by one whom he loves, to do good to someone: for whatever we do or suffer for + a friend is pleasant, because love is the principal cause of pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 6 co."><a name="34939" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34939] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod est benefacere alteri, potest +tripliciter esse delectationis causa. Uno modo, per comparationem +ad effectum, quod est bonum in altero constitutum. Et secundum hoc, +inquantum bonum alterius reputamus quasi nostrum bonum, propter +unionem amoris, delectamur in bono quod per nos fit aliis, +praecipue amicis, sicut in bono proprio. Alio modo, per +comparationem ad finem, sicut cum aliquis, per hoc quod alteri +benefacit, sperat consequi aliquod bonum sibi ipsi, vel a Deo vel +ab homine. Spes autem delectationis est causa. Tertio modo, per +comparationem ad principium. Et sic hoc quod est benefacere alteri, +potest esse delectabile per comparationem ad triplex principium. +Quorum unum est facultas benefaciendi, et secundum hoc, benefacere +alteri fit delectabile, inquantum per hoc fit homini quaedam +imaginatio abundantis boni in seipso existentis, ex quo possit +aliis communicare. Et ideo homines delectantur in filiis et in +propriis operibus, sicut quibus communicant proprium bonum. Aliud +principium est habitus inclinans, secundum quem benefacere fit +alicui connaturale. Unde liberales delectabiliter dant aliis. +Tertium principium est motivum, puta cum aliquis movetur ab aliquo +quem diligit, ad benefaciendum alicui, omnia enim quae facimus vel +patimur propter amicum, delectabilia sunt, quia amor praecipua +causa delectationis est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Spending gives pleasure as showing forth one's good. But in so far as it empties us of our own good it may be a cause of + sadness; for instance when it is excessive. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="34940" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34940] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod emissio, inquantum est indicativa proprii boni, +est delectabilis. Sed inquantum evacuat proprium bonum potest esse +contristans; sicut quando est immoderata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Prodigality is an excessive spending, which is unnatural: wherefore prodigality is said to be contrary to nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="34941" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34941] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod prodigalitas habet immoderatam emissionem, quae +repugnat naturae. Et ideo prodigalitas dicitur esse contra +naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To overcome, to contradict, and to punish, give pleasure, not as tending to another's ill, but as pertaining to one's own + good, which man loves more than he hates another's ill. For it is naturally pleasant to overcome, inasmuch as it makes a man + to appreciate his own superiority. Wherefore all those games in which there is a striving for the mastery, and a possibility + of winning it, afford the greatest pleasure: and speaking generally all contests, + in so far as they admit hope of victory. To contradict and to scold can give pleasure in two ways. First, as making man imagine + himself to be wise and excellent; since it belongs to wise men and elders to reprove and to scold. Secondly, in so far as + by scolding and reproving, one does good to another: for this gives one pleasure, as stated above. It is pleasant to an angry + man to punish, in so far as he thinks himself to be removing an apparent slight, which seems to be due to a previous hurt: + for when a man is hurt by another, he seems to be slighted thereby; and therefore he wishes to be quit of this slight by paying + back the hurt. And thus it is clear that doing good to another may be of itself pleasant: whereas doing evil to another is + not pleasant, except in so far as it seems to affect one's own good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="34942" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34942] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod vincere, redarguere et punire, non est delectabile +inquantum est in malum alterius, sed inquantum pertinet ad proprium +bonum, quod plus homo amat quam odiat malum alterius. Vincere enim +est delectabile naturaliter, inquantum per hoc homini fit +aestimatio propriae excellentiae. Et propter hoc, omnes ludi in +quibus est concertatio, et in quibus potest esse victoria, sunt +maxime delectabiles, et universaliter omnes concertationes, +secundum quod habent spem victoriae. Redarguere autem et increpare +potest esse dupliciter delectationis causa. Uno modo, inquantum +facit homini imaginationem propriae sapientiae et excellentiae, +increpare enim et corripere est sapientum et maiorum alio modo, +secundum quod aliquis, increpando et reprehendendo, alteri +benefacit, quod est delectabile, ut dictum est. Irato autem est +delectabile punire, inquantum videtur removere apparentem +minorationem, quae videtur esse ex praecedenti laesione. Cum enim +aliquis est ab aliquo laesus, videtur per hoc ab illo minoratus +esse, et ideo appetit ab hac minoratione liberari per retributionem +laesionis. Et sic patet quod benefacere alteri per se potest esse +delectabile, sed malefacere alteri non est delectabile, nisi +inquantum videtur pertinere ad proprium bonum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q32_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q32_A7-p0.1">Q. 32. A. 7. Whether likeness is a cause of pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that likeness is not a cause of pleasure. Because ruling and presiding seem to imply a certain unlikeness. + But "it is natural to take pleasure in ruling and presiding," as stated in Rhetor. i, 11. Therefore unlikeness, rather than + likeness, is a cause of pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="34943" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34943] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod similitudo non sit causa +delectationis. Principari enim et praeesse quandam dissimilitudinem +importat. Sed principari et praeesse naturaliter est delectabile, +ut dicitur in I Rhetoric. Ergo dissimilitudo magis est causa +delectationis quam similitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing is more unlike pleasure than sorrow. But those who are burdened by sorrow are most inclined to seek pleasures, + as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14). Therefore unlikeness, rather than likeness, is a cause of pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="34944" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34944] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +nihil magis est dissimile delectationi quam tristitia. Sed illi qui +patiuntur tristitias, maxime sequuntur delectationes, ut dicitur in +VII Ethic. Ergo dissimilitudo est magis causa delectationis quam +similitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, those who are satiated with certain delights, derive not pleasure but disgust from them; as when one is satiated + with food. Therefore likeness is not a cause of pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="34945" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34945] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +illi qui sunt repleti aliquibus delectabilibus, non delectantur in +eis, sed magis fastidiunt ea, sicut patet in repletione ciborum. +Non ergo similitudo est delectationis causa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Likeness is a cause of love, as above stated ( + <a href="#FS_Q27_A3" id="FS_Q32_A7-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[27], A[3]</a>): and love is the cause of pleasure. Therefore likeness is a cause of pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 7 s. c."><a name="34946" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34946] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod similitudo est causa amoris, ut dictum est supra. Amor +autem est causa delectationis. Ergo similitudo est causa +delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q32_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Likeness is a kind of unity; hence that which is like us, as being one with us, causes pleasure; just at it causes love, + as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q27_A3" id="FS_Q32_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[27], A[3]</a>). And if that which is like us does not hurt our own good, but increase it, it is pleasurable simply; for instance one man + in respect of another, one youth in relation to another. But if it be hurtful to our own good, thus accidentally it causes + disgust or sadness, not as being like and + one with us, but as hurtful to that which is yet more one with us. + </p><p id="FS_Q32_A7-p7"> Now it happens in two ways that something like is hurtful to our own good. First, by destroying the measure of our own good, + by a kind of excess; because good, especially bodily good, as health, is conditioned by a certain measure: wherefore superfluous + good or any bodily pleasure, causes disgust. Secondly, by being directly contrary to one's own good: thus a potter dislikes + other potters, not because they are potters, but because they deprive him of his own excellence or + profits, which he seeks as his own good. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 7 co."><a name="34947" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34947] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod similitudo est quaedam unitas, unde id quod est +simile, inquantum est unum, est delectabile, sicut et amabile, ut +supra dictum est. Et si quidem id quod est simile, proprium bonum +non corrumpat, sed augeat, est simpliciter delectabile, puta homo +homini, et iuvenis iuveni. Si vero sit corruptivum proprii boni, +sic per accidens efficitur fastidiosum vel contristans; non quidem +inquantum est simile et unum, sed inquantum corrumpit id quod est +magis unum. Quod autem aliquid simile corrumpat proprium bonum, +contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, quia corrumpit mensuram proprii +boni per quendam excessum, bonum enim, praecipue corporale, ut +sanitas, in quadam commensuratione consistit. Et propter hoc, +superabundantes cibi, vel quaelibet delectationes corporales, +fastidiuntur. Alio modo, per directam contrarietatem ad proprium +bonum, sicut figuli abominantur alios figulos, non inquantum sunt +figuli, sed inquantum per eos amittunt excellentiam propriam, sive +proprium lucrum, quae appetunt sicut proprium bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since ruler and subject are in communion with one another, there is a certain likeness between them: but this likeness is + conditioned by a certain superiority, since ruling and presiding pertain to the excellence of a man's own good: because they + belong to men who are wise and better than others; the result being that they give man an idea of his own excellence. Another + reason is that by ruling and presiding, a man does good to others, which is + pleasant. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="34948" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34948] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, cum sit quaedam communicatio principantis ad +subiectum, est ibi quaedam similitudo. Tamen secundum quandam +excellentiam, eo quod principari et praeesse pertinent ad +excellentiam proprii boni, sapientum enim et meliorum est +principari et praeesse. Unde per hoc fit homini propriae bonitatis +imaginatio. Vel quia per hoc quod homo principatur et praeest, +aliis benefacit, quod est delectabile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That which gives pleasure to the sorrowful man, though it be unlike sorrow, bears some likeness to the man that is sorrowful: + because sorrows are contrary to his own good. Wherefore the sorrowful man seeks pleasure as making for his own good, in so + far as it is a remedy for its contrary. And this is why bodily pleasures, which are contrary to certain sorrows, are more + sought than intellectual pleasures, which have no contrary sorrow, as we shall state + later on ( + <a href="#FS_Q35_A5" id="FS_Q32_A7-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[35], A[5]</a>). And this explains why all animals naturally desire pleasure: because animals ever work through sense and movement. For + this reason also young people are most inclined to seek pleasures; on account of the many changes to which they are subject, + while yet growing. Moreover this is why the melancholic has a strong desire for pleasures, in order to drive away sorrow: + because his "body is corroded by a base humor," as stated in Ethic. vii, 14. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="34949" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34949] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod id in quo delectatur tristatus, etsi non sit simile +tristitiae, est tamen simile homini contristato. Quia tristitiae +contrariantur proprio bono eius qui tristatur. Et ideo appetitur +delectatio ab his qui in tristitia sunt, ut conferens ad proprium +bonum, inquantum est medicativa contrarii. Et ista est causa quare +delectationes corporales, quibus sunt contrariae quaedam +tristitiae, magis appetuntur, quam delectationes intellectuales, +quae non habent contrarietatem tristitiae, ut infra dicetur. Exinde +etiam est quod omnia animalia naturaliter appetunt delectationem, +quia semper animal laborat per sensum et motum. Et propter hoc +etiam iuvenes maxime delectationes appetunt; propter multas +transmutationes in eis existentes, dum sunt in statu augmenti. Et +etiam melancholici vehementer appetunt delectationes, ad +expellendum tristitiam, quia corpus eorum quasi pravo humore +corroditur, ut dicitur in VII Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Bodily goods are conditioned by a certain fixed measure: wherefore surfeit of such things destroys the proper good, and consequently + gives rise to disgust and sorrow, through being contrary to the proper good of man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="34950" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34950] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod bona corporalia in quadam mensura consistunt, et ideo +superexcessus similium corrumpit proprium bonum. Et propter hoc +efficitur fastidiosum et contristans, inquantum contrariatur bono +proprio hominis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q32_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q32_A8-p0.1">Q. 32. A. 8. Whether wonder is a cause of pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that wonder is not a cause of pleasure. Because wonder is the act of one who is ignorant of the nature of something, + as Damascene says. But knowledge, rather than ignorance, is a cause of pleasure. Therefore wonder is not a cause of pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="34951" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34951] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod admiratio non sit causa delectationis. +Admirari enim est ignorantis naturae, ut Damascenus dicit. Sed +ignorantia non est delectabilis, sed magis scientia. Ergo admiratio +non est causa delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, wonder is the beginning of wisdom, being as it were, the road to the search of truth, as stated in the beginning + of Metaph. i, 2. But "it is more pleasant to think of what we know, than to seek what we know not," as the Philosopher says + (Ethic. x, 7): since in the latter case we encounter difficulties and hindrances, in the former not; while pleasure arises + from an operation which is unhindered, as stated in Ethic. vii, 12,13. Therefore wonder hinders + rather than causes pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="34952" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34952] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +admiratio est principium sapientiae, quasi via ad inquirendum +veritatem, ut dicitur in principio Metaphys. <i>Sed delectabilius +est contemplari iam cognita, quam inquirere ignota</i>, ut +philosophus dicit in X Ethic., cum hoc habeat difficultatem et +impedimentum, illud autem non habeat; delectatio autem causatur ex +operatione non impedita, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Ergo admiratio +non est causa delectationis, sed magis delectationem impedit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everyone takes pleasure in what he is accustomed to: wherefore the actions of habits acquired by custom, are pleasant. + But "we wonder at what is unwonted," as Augustine says (Tract. xxiv in Joan.). Therefore wonder is contrary to the cause of + pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="34953" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34953] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +unusquisque in consuetis delectatur, unde operationes habituum per +consuetudinem acquisitorum, sunt delectabiles. Sed consueta non +sunt admirabilia, ut dicit Augustinus, super Ioan. Ergo admiratio +contrariatur causae delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that wonder is the cause of pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 8 s. c."><a name="34954" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34954] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in I Rhetoric., quod admiratio est +delectationis causa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is pleasant to get what one desires, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q32_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a>): and therefore the greater the desire for the thing loved, the greater the pleasure when it is attained: indeed the very + increase of desire brings with it an increase of pleasure, according as it gives rise to the hope of obtaining that which + is loved, since it was stated above (A[3], ad 3) that desire resulting from hope is a cause of pleasure. Now wonder is a + kind of desire for knowledge; a desire which comes to man when he sees an effect of which the cause either is unknown to him, + or surpasses his knowledge or faculty of understanding. Consequently wonder is a cause of pleasure, in so far as it includes + a hope of getting the knowledge which one desires to have. For this reason whatever is wonderful is pleasing, for instance + things that are scarce. Also, representations of things, even of those which are not pleasant in themselves, give rise to + pleasure; for the soul rejoices in comparing one thing with another, because comparison of one thing with another is the proper + and connatural act of the reason, as the Philosopher says (Poet. iv). This again is why "it is more delightful to be delivered + from great danger, because it is something wonderful," as stated in Rhetor. i, 11. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 8 co."><a name="34955" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34955] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod adipisci desiderata est delectabile, ut supra dictum +est. Et ideo quanto alicuius rei amatae magis crescit desiderium, +tanto magis per adeptionem crescit delectatio. Et etiam in ipso +augmento desiderii fit augmentum delectationis, secundum quod fit +etiam spes rei amatae; sicut supra dictum est quod ipsum desiderium +ex spe est delectabile. Est autem admiratio desiderium quoddam +sciendi, quod in homine contingit ex hoc quod videt effectum et +ignorat causam, vel ex hoc quod causa talis effectus excedit +cognitionem aut facultatem ipsius. Et ideo admiratio est causa +delectationis inquantum habet adiunctam spem consequendi +cognitionem eius quod scire desiderat. Et propter hoc omnia +mirabilia sunt delectabilia, sicut quae sunt rara, et omnes +repraesentationes rerum, etiam quae in se non sunt delectabiles; +gaudet enim anima in collatione unius ad alterum, quia conferre +unum alteri est proprius et connaturalis actus rationis, ut +philosophus dicit in sua poetica. Et propter hoc etiam <i>liberari +a magnis periculis magis est delectabile, quia est admirabile</i>, +ut dicitur in I Rhetoric.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A8-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Wonder gives pleasure, not because it implies ignorance, but in so far as it includes the desire of learning the cause, and + in so far as the wonderer learns something new, i.e. that the cause is other than he had thought it to be. [*According to + another reading:---that he is other than he thought himself to be.] + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="34956" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34956] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod admiratio non est delectabilis inquantum habet +ignorantiam, sed inquantum habet desiderium addiscendi causam; et +inquantum admirans aliquid novum addiscit, scilicet talem esse quem +non aestimabat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Pleasure includes two things; rest in the good, and perception of this rest. As to the former therefore, since it is more + perfect to contemplate the known truth, than to seek for the unknown, the contemplation of what we know, is in itself more + pleasing than the research of what we do not know. Nevertheless, as to the second, it happens that research is sometimes more + pleasing accidentally, in so far as it proceeds from a greater desire: for greater + desire is awakened when we are conscious of our ignorance. This is why man takes the greatest pleasure in finding or learning + things for the first time. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="34957" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34957] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod delectatio duo habet, scilicet quietem in bono, et +huiusmodi quietis perceptionem. Quantum igitur ad primum, cum sit +perfectius contemplari veritatem cognitam quam inquirere ignotam, +contemplationes rerum scitarum, per se loquendo, sunt magis +delectabiles quam inquisitiones rerum ignotarum. Tamen per +accidens, quantum ad secundum, contingit quod inquisitiones sunt +quandoque delectabiliores, secundum quod ex maiori desiderio +procedunt, desiderium autem maius excitatur ex perceptione +ignorantiae. Unde maxime homo delectatur in his quae de novo +invenit aut addiscit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is pleasant to do what we are wont to do, inasmuch as this is connatural to us, as it were. And yet things that are of + rare occurrence can be pleasant, either as regards knowledge, from the fact that we desire to know something about them, in + so far as they are wonderful; or as regards action, from the fact that "the mind is more inclined by desire to act intensely + in things that are new," as stated in Ethic. x, 4, since more perfect operation + causes more perfect pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="34958" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34958] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ea quae sunt consueta, sunt delectabilia ad +operandum, inquantum sunt quasi connaturalia. Sed tamen ea quae +sunt rara, possunt esse delectabilia, vel ratione cognitionis, quia +desideratur eorum scientia, inquantum sunt mira; vel ratione +operationis, <i>quia ex desiderio magis inclinatur mens ad hoc quod +intense in novitate operetur</i>, ut dicitur in X Ethic.; +perfectior enim operatio causat perfectiorem delectationem.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q33" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q33-p0.1">Q. 33. OF THE EFFECTS OF PLEASURE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q33-p2"> We must now consider the effects of pleasure; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q33-p3"><a href="#FS_Q33_A1"> (1) Whether expansion is an effect of pleasure?</a></p><p id="FS_Q33-p4"><a href="#FS_Q33_A2"> (2) Whether pleasure causes thirst or desire for itself?</a></p><p id="FS_Q33-p5"><a href="#FS_Q33_A3"> (3) Whether pleasure hinders the use of reason?</a></p><p id="FS_Q33-p6"><a href="#FS_Q33_A4"> (4) Whether pleasure perfects operation?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 pr."><a name="34959" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34959] +Iª-IIae q. 33 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +effectibus delectationis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, +utrum delectationis sit dilatare. Secundo, utrum delectatio causet +sui sitim, vel desiderium. Tertio, utrum delectatio impediat usum +rationis. Quarto, utrum delectatio perficiat operationem.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q33_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q33_A1-p0.1">Q. 33. A. 1. Whether expansion is an effect of pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that expansion is not an effect of pleasure. For expansion seems to pertain more to love, according to the + Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q33_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.6.11" target="asv">2 Cor. 6:11</a>): "Our heart is enlarged." Wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q33_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.96" target="asv">Ps. 118:96</a>) concerning the precept of charity: "Thy commandment is exceeding broad." But pleasure is a distinct passion from love. Therefore + expansion is not an effect of pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34960" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34960] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod dilatatio non sit effectus +delectationis. Dilatatio enim videtur ad amorem magis pertinere, +secundum quod dicit apostolus, II ad Cor. VI, <i>cor nostrum +dilatatum est</i>. Unde et de praecepto caritatis in Psalmo CXVIII, +dicitur, <i>latum mandatum tuum nimis</i>. Sed delectatio est alia +passio ab amore. Ergo dilatatio non est effectus delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, when a thing expands it is enabled to receive more. But receiving pertains to desire, which is for something not + yet possessed. Therefore expansion seems to belong to desire rather than to pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34961" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34961] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ex hoc quod aliquid dilatatur, efficitur capacius ad recipiendum. +Sed receptio pertinet ad desiderium, quod est rei nondum habitae. +Ergo dilatatio magis videtur pertinere ad desiderium quam ad +delectationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, contraction is contrary to expansion. But contraction seems to belong to pleasure, for the hand closes on that which + we wish to grasp firmly: and such is the affection of appetite in regard to that which pleases it. Therefore expansion does + not pertain to pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34962" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34962] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +constrictio dilatationi opponitur. Sed constrictio videtur ad +delectationem pertinere, nam illud constringimus quod firmiter +volumus retinere; et talis est affectio appetitus circa rem +delectantem. Ergo dilatatio ad delectationem non pertinet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> In order to express joy, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q33_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.60.5" target="asv">Is. 60:5</a>): "Thou shall see and abound, thy heart shall wonder and be enlarged." Moreover pleasure is called by the name of "laetitia" + as being derived from "dilatatio" [expansion], as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q31_A3" id="FS_Q33_A1-p5.2" shape="rect">Q[31], A[3]</a>, ad 3). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34963" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34963] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod, ad expressionem gaudii, dicitur Isaiae LX, <i>videbis, et +affluens, et mirabitur et dilatabitur cor tuum</i>. Ipsa etiam +delectatio ex dilatatione nomen accepit ut laetitia nominetur sicut +supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Breadth [latitudo] is a dimension of bodily magnitude: hence it is not applied to the emotions of the soul, save metaphorically. + Now expansion denotes a kind of movement towards breadth; and it belongs to pleasure in respect of the two things requisite + for pleasure. One of these is on the part of the apprehensive power, which is cognizant of the conjunction with some suitable + good. As a result of this apprehension, man perceives that he has attained a + certain perfection, which is a magnitude of the spiritual order: and in this respect man's mind is said to be magnified or + expanded by pleasure. The other requisite for pleasure is on the part of the appetitive power, which acquiesces in the pleasurable + object, and rests therein, offering, as it were, to enfold it within itself. And thus man's affection is expanded by pleasure, + as though it surrendered itself to hold within itself the object of its pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 1 co."><a name="34964" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34964] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod latitudo est quaedam dimensio magnitudinis +corporalis, unde in affectionibus animae non nisi secundum +metaphoram dicitur. Dilatatio autem dicitur quasi motus ad +latitudinem. Et competit delectationi secundum duo quae ad +delectationem requiruntur. Quorum unum est ex parte apprehensivae +virtutis, quae apprehendit coniunctionem alicuius boni +convenientis. Ex hac autem apprehensione apprehendit se homo +perfectionem quandam adeptum, quae est spiritualis magnitudo, et +secundum hoc, animus hominis dicitur per delectationem magnificari, +seu dilatari. Aliud autem est ex parte appetitivae virtutis, quae +assentit rei delectabili, et in ea quiescit, quodammodo se praebens +ei ad eam interius capiendam. Et sic dilatatur affectus hominis per +delectationem, quasi se tradens ad continendum interius rem +delectantem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In metaphorical expressions nothing hinders one and the same thing from being attributed to different things according to + different likenesses. And in this way expansion pertains to love by reason of a certain spreading out, in so far as the affection + of the lover spreads out to others, so as to care, not only for his own interests, but also for what concerns others. On the + other hand expansion pertains to pleasure, in so far as a thing becomes more + ample in itself so as to become more capacious. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34965" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34965] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet in his quae dicuntur metaphorice, +idem diversis attribui secundum diversas similitudines. Et secundum +hoc, dilatatio pertinet ad amorem ratione cuiusdam extensionis, +inquantum affectus amantis ad alios extenditur, ut curet non solum +quae sua sunt, sed quae aliorum. Ad delectationem vero pertinet +dilatatio, inquantum aliquid in seipso ampliatur, ut quasi capacius +reddatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Desire includes a certain expansion arising from the imagination of the thing desired; but this expansion increases at the + presence of the pleasurable object: because the mind surrenders itself more to that object when it is already taking pleasure + in it, than when it desires it before possessing it; since pleasure is the end of desire. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34966" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34966] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod desiderium habet quidem aliquam ampliationem ex +imaginatione rei desideratae, sed multo magis ex praesentia rei iam +delectantis. Quia magis praebet se animus rei iam delectanti, quam +rei non habitae desideratae, cum delectatio sit finis +desiderii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He that takes pleasure in a thing holds it fast, by clinging to it with all his might: but he opens his heart to it that + he may enjoy it perfectly. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34967" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34967] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ille qui delectatur, constringit quidem rem +delectantem, dum ei fortiter inhaeret, sed cor suum ampliat, ut +perfecte delectabili fruatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q33_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q33_A2-p0.1">Q. 33. A. 2. Whether pleasure causes thirst or desire for itself?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pleasure does not cause desire for itself. Because all movement ceases when repose is reached. But pleasure + is, as it were, a certain repose of the movement of desire, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q33_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q25_A2" id="FS_Q33_A2-p2.2" shape="rect"> Q[25], A[2]</a>). Therefore the movement of desire ceases when pleasure is reached. Therefore pleasure does not cause desire. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34968" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34968] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non causet desiderium sui +ipsius. Omnis enim motus cessat, cum pervenerit ad quietem. Sed +delectatio est quasi quaedam quies motus desiderii, ut supra dictum +est. Cessat ergo motus desiderii, cum ad delectationem pervenerit. +Non ergo delectatio causat desiderium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing does not cause its contrary. But pleasure is, in a way, contrary to desire, on the part of the object: since + desire regards a good which is not yet possessed, whereas pleasure regards the good that is possessed. Therefore pleasure + does not cause desire for itself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34969" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34969] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +oppositum non est causa sui oppositi. Sed delectatio quodammodo +desiderio opponitur, ex parte obiecti, nam desiderium est boni non +habiti, delectatio vero boni iam habiti. Ergo delectatio non causat +desiderium sui ipsius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, distaste is incompatible with desire. But pleasure often causes distaste. Therefore it does not cause desire. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34970" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34970] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +fastidium desiderio repugnat. Sed delectatio plerumque causat +fastidium. Non ergo facit sui desiderium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q33_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.13" target="asv">Jn. 4:13</a>): "Whosoever drinketh of this water, shall thirst again": where, according to Augustine (Tract. xv in Joan.), water denotes + pleasures of the body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34971" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34971] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dominus dicit, Ioan. IV, <i>qui biberit ex hac aqua, +sitiet iterum</i>, per aquam autem significatur, secundum +Augustinum, delectatio corporalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q33_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Pleasure can be considered in two ways; first, as existing in reality; secondly, as existing in the memory. Again thirst, + or desire, can be taken in two ways; first, properly, as denoting a craving for something not possessed; secondly, in general, + as excluding distaste. + </p><p id="FS_Q33_A2-p7"> Considered as existing in reality, pleasure does not of itself cause thirst or desire for itself, but only accidentally; + provided we take thirst or desire as denoting a craving for some thing not possessed: because pleasure is an emotion of the + appetite in respect of something actually present. But it may happen that what is actually present is not perfectly possessed: + and this may be on the part of the thing possessed, or on the part of the possessor. On the part of the thing + possessed, this happens through the thing possessed not being a simultaneous whole; wherefore one obtains possession of it + successively, and while taking pleasure in what one has, one desires to possess the remainder: thus if a man is pleased with + the first part of a verse, he desires to hear the second part, as Augustine says (Confess. iv, 11). In this way nearly all + bodily pleasures cause thirst for themselves, until they are fully realized, because pleasures of this kind arise from some + movement: as is evident in pleasures of the table. On the part of the possessor, this happens when a man possesses a thing + which is perfect in itself, yet does not possess it perfectly, but obtains possession of it little by little. Thus in this + life, a faint perception of Divine knowledge affords us delight, and delight sets up a thirst or desire for perfect knowledge; + in which sense we may understand the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q33_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.24.29" target="asv"> Ecclus. 24:29</a>: "They that drink me shall yet thirst." + </p><p id="FS_Q33_A2-p8"> On the other hand, if by thirst or desire we understand the mere intensity of the emotion, that excludes distaste, thus more + than all others spiritual pleasures cause thirst or desire for themselves. Because bodily pleasures become distasteful by + reason of their causing an excess in the natural mode of being, when they are increased or even when they are protracted; + as is evident in the case of pleasures of the table. This is why, when a man arrives at the point of perfection in + bodily pleasures, he wearies of them, and sometimes desires another kind. Spiritual pleasures, on the contrary, do not exceed + the natural mode of being, but perfect nature. Hence when their point of perfection is reached, then do they afford the greatest + delight: except, perchance, accidentally, in so far as the work of contemplation is accompanied by some operation of the bodily + powers, which tire from protracted activity. And in this sense also we may understand those words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q33_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.24.29" target="asv"> + Ecclus. 24:29 + </a>: "They that drink me shall yet thirst": for, even of the angels, who know God perfectly, and delight in Him, it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q33_A2-p8.2" href="./asv.html#iPet.1.12" target="asv">1 Pet. 1:12</a>) that they "desire to look at Him." + </p><p id="FS_Q33_A2-p9"> Lastly, if we consider pleasure, not as existing in reality, but as existing in the memory, thus it has of itself a natural + tendency to cause thirst and desire for itself: when, to wit, man returns to that disposition, in which he was when he experienced + the pleasure that is past. But if he be changed from that disposition, the memory of that pleasure does not give him pleasure, + but distaste: for instance, the memory of food in respect of a man who has eaten to repletion. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 2 co."><a name="34972" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34972] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod delectatio dupliciter potest considerari, uno modo, +secundum quod est in actu; alio modo, secundum quod est in memoria. +Item sitis, vel desiderium, potest dupliciter accipi, uno modo, +proprie, secundum quod importat appetitum rei non habitae; alio +modo, communiter, secundum quod importat exclusionem fastidii. +Secundum quidem igitur quod est in actu, delectatio non causat +sitim vel desiderium sui ipsius, per se loquendo, sed solum per +accidens, si tamen sitis vel desiderium dicatur rei non habitae +appetitus, nam delectatio est affectio appetitus circa rem +praesentem. Sed contingit rem praesentem non perfecte haberi. Et +hoc potest esse vel ex parte rei habitae, vel ex parte habentis. Ex +parte quidem rei habitae, eo quod res habita non est tota simul, +unde successive recipitur, et dum aliquis delectatur in eo quod +habet, desiderat potiri eo quod restat; sicut qui audit primam +partem versus, et in hoc delectatur, desiderat alteram partem +versus audire, ut Augustinus dicit, IV Confess. Et hoc modo omnes +fere delectationes corporales faciunt sui ipsarum sitim, quousque +consummentur, eo quod tales delectationes consequuntur aliquem +motum, sicut patet in delectationibus ciborum. Ex parte autem +ipsius habentis, sicut cum aliquis aliquam rem in se perfectam +existentem, non statim perfecte habet, sed paulatim acquirit. Sicut +in mundo isto, percipientes aliquid imperfecte de divina +cognitione, delectamur; et ipsa delectatio excitat sitim vel +desiderium perfectae cognitionis; secundum quod potest intelligi +quod habetur Eccli. XXIV, <i>qui bibunt me, adhuc sitient</i>. Si +vero per sitim vel desiderium intelligatur sola intensio affectus +tollens fastidium, sic delectationes spirituales maxime faciunt +sitim vel desiderium sui ipsarum. Delectationes enim corporales, +quia augmentatae, vel etiam continuatae, faciunt superexcrescentiam +naturalis habitudinis, efficiuntur fastidiosae; ut patet in +delectatione ciborum. Et propter hoc, quando aliquis iam pervenit +ad perfectum in delectationibus corporalibus, fastidit eas, et +quandoque appetit aliquas alias. Sed delectationes spirituales non +superexcrescunt naturalem habitudinem, sed perficiunt naturam. Unde +cum pervenitur ad consummationem in ipsis, tunc sunt magis +delectabiles, nisi forte per accidens, inquantum operationi +contemplativae adiunguntur aliquae operationes virtutum +corporalium, quae per assiduitatem operandi lassantur. Et per hunc +etiam modum potest intelligi quod dicitur Eccli. XXIV <i>qui bibit +me, adhuc sitiet</i>. Quia etiam de Angelis, qui perfecte Deum +cognoscunt, et delectantur in ipso, dicitur I Petri I, quod +<i>desiderant in eum conspicere</i>. Si vero consideretur +delectatio prout est in memoria et non in actu, sic per se nata est +causare sui ipsius sitim et desiderium, quando scilicet homo redit +ad illam dispositionem in qua erat sibi delectabile quod +praeteriit. Si vero immutatus sit ab illa dispositione, memoria +delectationis non causat in eo delectationem, sed fastidium, sicut +pleno existenti memoria cibi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When pleasure is perfect, then it includes complete rest; and the movement of desire, tending to what was not possessed, + ceases. But when it is imperfect, then the desire, tending to what was not possessed, does not cease altogether. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34973" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34973] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, quando delectatio est perfecta, tunc habet +omnimodam quietem, et cessat motus desiderii tendentis in non +habitum. Sed quando imperfecte habetur, tunc non omnino cessat +motus desiderii tendentis in non habitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That which is possessed imperfectly, is possessed in one respect, and in another respect is not possessed. Consequently it + may be the object of desire and pleasure at the same time. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34974" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34974] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod id quod imperfecte habetur, secundum quid habetur, et +secundum quid non habetur. Et ideo simul de eo potest esse et +desiderium et delectatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Pleasures cause distaste in one way, desire in another, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34975" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34975] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod delectationes alio modo causant fastidium, et alio +modo desiderium, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q33_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q33_A3-p0.1">Q. 33. A. 3. Whether pleasure hinders the use of reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pleasure does not hinder the use of reason. Because repose facilitates very much the due use of reason: + wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, 3) that "while we sit and rest, the soul is inclined to knowledge and prudence"; + and it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q33_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.16" target="asv">Wis. 8:16</a>): "When I go into my house, I shall repose myself with her," i.e. wisdom. But pleasure is a kind of repose. Therefore it + helps rather than hinders the use of + reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34976" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34976] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non impediat usum rationis. +Quies enim maxime confert ad debitum rationis usum, unde dicitur in +VII Physic., quod in sedendo et quiescendo fit anima sciens et +prudens; et Sap. VIII, <i>intrans in domum meam, conquiescam cum +illa</i>, scilicet sapientia. Sed delectatio est quaedam quies. +Ergo non impedit, sed magis iuvat rationis usum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, things which are not in the same subject though they be contraries, do not hinder one another. But pleasure is in + the appetitive faculty, while the use of reason is in the apprehensive power. Therefore pleasure does not hinder the use of + reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34977" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34977] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ea quae non sunt in eodem, etiam si sint contraria, non se +impediunt. Sed delectatio est in parte appetitiva, usus autem +rationis in parte apprehensiva. Ergo delectatio non impedit +rationis usum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is hindered by another, seems to be moved, as it were, thereby. But the use of an apprehensive power + moves pleasure rather than is moved by it: because it is the cause of pleasure. Therefore pleasure does not hinder the use + of reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34978" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34978] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quod impeditur ab alio, videtur quodammodo transmutari ab ipso. Sed +usus apprehensivae virtutis magis movet delectationem quam a +delectatione moveatur, est enim causa delectationis. Ergo +delectatio non impedit usum rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5), that "pleasure destroys the estimate of prudence." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34979" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34979] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod <i>delectatio +corrumpit existimationem prudentiae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q33_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As is stated in Ethic. x, 5, "appropriate pleasures increase activity . . . whereas pleasures arising from other sources + are impediments to activity." Accordingly there is a certain pleasure that is taken in the very act of reason, as when one + takes pleasure in contemplating or in reasoning: and such pleasure does not hinder the act of reason, but helps it; because + we are more attentive in doing that which gives us pleasure, and attention fosters + activity. + </p><p id="FS_Q33_A3-p7"> On the other hand bodily pleasures hinder the use of reason in three ways. First, by distracting the reason. Because, as + we have just observed, we attend much to that which pleases us. Now when the attention is firmly fixed on one thing, it is + either weakened in respect of other things, or it is entirely withdrawn from them; and thus if the bodily pleasure be great, + either it entirely hinders the use of reason, by concentrating the mind's attention on itself; or else it hinders + it considerably. Secondly, by being contrary to reason. Because some pleasures, especially those that are in excess, are contrary + to the order of reason: and in this sense the Philosopher says that "bodily pleasures destroy the estimate of prudence, but + not the speculative estimate," to which they are not opposed, "for instance that the three angles of a triangle are together + equal to two right angles." In the first sense, however, they hinder both estimates. Thirdly, by fettering the reason: + in so far as bodily pleasure is followed by a certain alteration in the body, greater even than in the other passions, in + proportion as the appetite is more vehemently affected towards a present than towards an absent thing. Now such bodily disturbances + hinder the use of reason; as may be seen in the case of drunkards, in whom the use of reason is fettered or hindered. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 3 co."><a name="34980" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34980] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in X Ethic., delectationes propriae +adaugent operationes, extraneae vero impediunt. Est ergo quaedam +delectatio quae habetur de ipso actu rationis, sicut cum aliquis +delectatur in contemplando vel ratiocinando. Et talis delectatio +non impedit usum rationis, sed ipsum adiuvat, quia illud attentius +operamur in quo delectamur; attentio autem adiuvat operationem. Sed +delectationes corporales impediunt usum rationis triplici ratione. +Primo quidem, ratione distractionis. Quia, sicut iam dictum est, ad +ea in quibus delectamur, multum attendimus, cum autem attentio +fortiter inhaeserit alicui rei, debilitatur circa alias res, vel +totaliter ab eis revocatur. Et secundum hoc, si delectatio +corporalis fuerit magna, vel totaliter impediet usum rationis, ad +se intentionem animi attrahendo; vel multum impediet. Secundo, +ratione contrarietatis. Quaedam enim delectationes, maxime +superexcedentes, sunt contra ordinem rationis. Et per hunc modum +philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod <i>delectationes corporales +corrumpunt existimationem prudentiae, non autem existimationem +speculativam</i>, cui non contrariantur, <i>puta quod triangulus +habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis</i>. Secundum autem +primum modum, utramque impedit. Tertio modo, secundum quandam +ligationem, inquantum scilicet ad delectationem corporalem sequitur +quaedam transmutatio corporalis, maior etiam quam in aliis +passionibus, quanto vehementius afficitur appetitus ad rem +praesentem quam ad rem absentem. Huiusmodi autem corporales +perturbationes impediunt usum rationis, sicut patet in vinolentis, +qui habent usum rationis ligatum vel impeditum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Bodily pleasure implies indeed repose of the appetite in the object of pleasure; which repose is sometimes contrary to reason; + but on the part of the body it always implies alteration. And in respect of both points, it hinders the use of reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34981" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34981] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod delectatio corporalis habet quidem quietem +appetitus in delectabili, quae quies interdum contrariatur rationi; +sed ex parte corporis, semper habet transmutationem. Et quantum ad +utrumque, impedit rationis usum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The powers of the appetite and of apprehension are indeed distinct parts, but belonging to the one soul. Consequently when + the soul is very intent on the action of one part, it is hindered from attending to a contrary act of the other part. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34982" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34982] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod vis appetitiva et apprehensiva sunt quidem diversae +partes, sed unius animae. Et ideo cum intentio animae vehementer +applicatur ad actum unius, impeditur ab actu contrario +alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The use of reason requires the due use of the imagination and of the other sensitive powers, which are exercised through + a bodily organ. Consequently alteration in the body hinders the use of reason, because it hinders the act of the imagination + and of the other sensitive powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34983" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34983] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod usus rationis requirit debitum usum imaginationis et +aliarum virium sensitivarum, quae utuntur organo corporali. Et ideo +ex transmutatione corporali usus rationis impeditur, impedito actu +virtutis imaginativae et aliarum sensitivarum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q33_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q33_A4-p0.1">Q. 33. A. 4. Whether pleasure perfects operation?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pleasure does not perfect operation. For every human operation depends on the use of reason. But pleasure + hinders the use of reason, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q33_A3" id="FS_Q33_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. Therefore pleasure does not perfect, but weakens human operation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34984" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34984] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non perficiat operationem. +Omnis enim humana operatio ab usu rationis dependet. Sed delectatio +impedit usum rationis, ut dictum est. Ergo delectatio non perficit, +sed debilitat operationem humanam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing perfects itself or its cause. But pleasure is an operation (Ethic. vii, 12; x, 4), i.e. either in its essence + or in its cause. Therefore pleasure does not perfect operation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34985" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34985] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +nihil est perfectivum sui ipsius, vel suae causae. Sed delectatio +est operatio, ut dicitur in VII et X Ethic., quod oportet ut +intelligatur vel essentialiter, vel causaliter. Ergo delectatio non +perficit operationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if pleasure perfects operation, it does so either as end, or as form, or as agent. But not as end; because operation + is not sought for the sake of pleasure, but rather the reverse, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q4_A2" id="FS_Q33_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[2]</a>): nor as agent, because rather is it the operation that causes pleasure: nor again as form, because, according to the Philosopher + (Ethic. x, 4), "pleasure does not perfect operation, as a habit does." Therefore pleasure + does not perfect operation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34986" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34986] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +si delectatio perficit operationem, aut perficit ipsam sicut finis, +aut sicut forma, aut sicut agens. Sed non sicut finis, quia +operationes non quaeruntur propter delectationem, sed magis e +converso, ut supra dictum est. Nec iterum per modum efficientis, +quia magis operatio est causa efficiens delectationis. Nec iterum +sicut forma, non enim perficit delectatio operationem ut habitus +quidam, secundum philosophum, in X Ethic. Delectatio ergo non +perficit operationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects operation." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34987" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34987] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur ibidem, quod delectatio operationem perficit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Pleasure perfects operation in two ways. First, as an end: not indeed according as an end is that on "account of which a + thing is"; but according as every good which is added to a thing and completes it, can be called its end. And in this sense + the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects operation . . . as some end added to it": that is to say, inasmuch + as to this good, which is operation, there is added another good, which is pleasure, + denoting the repose of the appetite in a good that is presupposed. Secondly, as agent; not indeed directly, for the Philosopher + says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects operation, not as a physician makes a man healthy, but as health does": but it + does so indirectly; inasmuch as the agent, through taking pleasure in his action, is more eagerly intent on it, and carries + it out with greater care. And in this sense it is said in Ethic. x, 5 that "pleasures increase their appropriate activities, + and hinder those that are not appropriate." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 4 co."><a name="34988" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34988] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod delectatio dupliciter operationem perficit. Uno modo, +per modum finis, non quidem secundum quod finis dicitur id propter +quod aliquid est; sed secundum quod omne bonum completive +superveniens, potest dici finis. Et secundum hoc dicit philosophus, +in X Ethic., quod <i>delectatio perficit operationem sicut quidam +superveniens finis</i>, inquantum scilicet super hoc bonum quod est +operatio, supervenit aliud bonum quod est delectatio, quae importat +quietationem appetitus in bono praesupposito. Secundo modo, ex +parte causae agentis. Non quidem directe, quia philosophus dicit, +in X Ethic., quod <i>perficit delectatio operationem, non sicut +medicus sanum, sed sicut sanitas</i>. Indirecte autem, inquantum +scilicet agens, quia delectatur in sua actione, vehementius +attendit ad ipsam, et diligentius eam operatur. Et secundum hoc +dicitur in X Ethic., quod <i>delectationes adaugent proprias +operationes, et impediunt extraneas</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is not every pleasure that hinders the act of reason, but only bodily pleasure; for this arises, not from the act of reason, + but from the act of the concupiscible faculty, which act is intensified by pleasure. On the contrary, pleasure that arises + from the act of reason, strengthens the use of reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34989" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34989] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod non omnis delectatio impedit actum rationis, sed +delectatio corporalis; quae non consequitur actum rationis, sed +actum concupiscibilis, qui per delectationem augetur. Delectatio +autem quae consequitur actum rationis, fortificat rationis +usum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated in Phys. ii, 3 two things may be causes of one another, if one be the efficient, the other the final cause. And + in this way, operation is the efficient cause of pleasure, while pleasure perfects operation by way of final cause, as stated + above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34990" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34990] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in II Physic., contingit quod duo sibi +invicem sunt causa, ita quod unum sit causa efficiens, et aliud +causa finalis alterius. Et per hunc modum, operatio causat +delectationem sicut causa efficiens; delectatio autem perficit +operationem per modum finis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A4-p9"> The Reply to the Third Objection is evident for what has been said.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34991" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34991] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +patet responsio ex dictis.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q34" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q34-p0.1">Q. 34. OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF PLEASURES (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q34-p2"> We must now consider the goodness and malice of pleasures: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q34-p3"><a href="#FS_Q34_A1"> (1) Whether every pleasure is evil?</a></p><p id="FS_Q34-p4"><a href="#FS_Q34_A2"> (2) If not, whether every pleasure is good?</a></p><p id="FS_Q34-p5"><a href="#FS_Q34_A3"> (3) Whether any pleasure is the greatest good?</a></p><p id="FS_Q34-p6"><a href="#FS_Q34_A4"> (4) Whether pleasure is the measure or rule by which to judge of moral good and evil?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 pr."><a name="34992" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34992] +Iª-IIae q. 34 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +bonitate et malitia delectationum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. +Primo, utrum omnis delectatio sit mala. Secundo, dato quod non, +utrum omnis delectatio sit bona. Tertio, utrum aliqua delectatio +sit optimum. Quarto, utrum delectatio sit mensura vel regula +secundum quam iudicetur bonum vel malum in moralibus.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q34_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q34_A1-p0.1">Q. 34. A. 1. Whether every pleasure is evil?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every pleasure is evil. For that which destroys prudence and hinders the use of reason, seems to be evil + in itself: since man's good is to be "in accord with reason," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But pleasure destroys prudence + and hinders the use of reason; and so much the more, as the pleasure is greater: wherefore "in sexual pleasures," which are + the greatest of all, "it is impossible to understand anything," as stated in Ethic. vii, + 11. Moreover, Jerome says in his commentary on Matthew [*Origen, Hom. vi in Num.] that "at the time of conjugal intercourse, + the presence of the Holy Ghost is not vouchsafed, even if it be a prophet that fulfils the conjugal duty." Therefore pleasure + is evil in itself; and consequently every pleasure is evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34993" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34993] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis delectatio sit mala. Illud enim +quod corrumpit prudentiam, et impedit rationis usum, videtur esse +secundum se malum, quia bonum hominis est secundum rationem esse, +ut Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed delectatio +corrumpit prudentiam, et impedit rationis usum, et tanto magis, +quanto delectationes sunt maiores. Unde in delectationibus +venereis, quae sunt maximae, impossibile est aliquid intelligere, +ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Et Hieronymus etiam dicit, super Matth., +quod <i>illo tempore quo coniugales actus geruntur, praesentia +sancti spiritus non dabitur, etiam si propheta esse videatur qui +officio generationis obsequitur</i>. Ergo delectatio est secundum +se malum. Ergo omnis delectatio mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which the virtuous man shuns, and the man lacking in virtue seeks, seems to be evil in itself, and should be + avoided; because, as stated in Ethic. x, 5 "the virtuous man is a kind of measure and rule of human actions"; and the Apostle + says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q34_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:15</a>): "The spiritual man judgeth all things." But children and dumb animals, in whom there is no virtue, seek pleasure: whereas + the man who is master of himself does not. Therefore + pleasures are evil in themselves and should be avoided. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34994" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34994] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +illud quod fugit virtuosus, et prosequitur deficiens a virtute, +videtur esse secundum se malum, et fugiendum, quia, ut dicitur in X +Ethic., <i>virtuosus est quasi mensura et regula humanorum +actuum</i>; et apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. II, <i>spiritualis +iudicat omnia</i>. Sed pueri et bestiae, in quibus non est virtus, +prosequuntur delectationes, fugit autem eas temperatus. Ergo +delectationes secundum se sunt malae, et fugiendae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "virtue and art are concerned about the difficult and the good" (Ethic. ii, 3). But no art is ordained to pleasure. + Therefore pleasure is not something good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34995" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34995] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> +<i>Praeterea, virtus et ars sunt circa difficile et bonum</i>, ut +dicitur in II Ethic. Sed nulla ars ordinata est ad delectationem. +Ergo delectatio non est aliquid bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q34_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.36.4" target="asv">Ps. 36:4</a>): "Delight in the Lord." Since, therefore, Divine authority leads to no evil, it seems that not every pleasure is evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34996" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34996] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod in Psalmo XXXVI, dicitur, <i>delectare in domino</i>. Cum +igitur ad nihil mali auctoritas divina inducat, videtur quod non +omnis delectatio sit mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q34_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in Ethic. x, 2,[3] some have maintained that all pleasure is evil. The reason seems to have been that they took + account only of sensible and bodily pleasures which are more manifest; since, also in other respects, the ancient philosophers + did not discriminate between the intelligible and the sensible, nor between intellect and sense (De Anima iii, 3). And they + held that all bodily pleasures should be reckoned as bad, and thus that man, being prone + to immoderate pleasures, arrives at the mean of virtue by abstaining from pleasure. But they were wrong in holding this opinion. + Because, since none can live without some sensible and bodily pleasure, if they who teach that all pleasures are evil, are + found in the act of taking pleasure; men will be more inclined to pleasure by following the example of their works instead + of listening to the doctrine of their words: since, in human actions and passions, wherein experience is of great weight, + example moves more than words. + </p><p id="FS_Q34_A1-p7"> We must therefore say that some pleasures are good, and that some are evil. For pleasure is a repose of the appetitive power + in some loved good, and resulting from some operation; wherefore we assign a twofold reason for this assertion. The first + is in respect of the good in which a man reposes with pleasure. For good and evil in the moral order depend on agreement or + disagreement with reason, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A5" id="FS_Q34_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[5]</a>): just as in the order of + nature, a thing is said to be natural, if it agrees with nature, and unnatural, if it disagrees. Accordingly, just as in the + natural order there is a certain natural repose, whereby a thing rests in that which agrees with its nature, for instance, + when a heavy body rests down below; and again an unnatural repose, whereby a thing rests in that which disagrees with its + nature, as when a heavy body rests up aloft: so, in the moral order, there is a good pleasure, whereby the higher or lower + appetite rests in that which is in accord with reason; and an evil pleasure, whereby the appetite rests in that which is discordant + from reason and the law of God. + </p><p id="FS_Q34_A1-p8"> The second reason can be found by considering the actions, some of which are good, some evil. Now pleasures which are conjoined + to actions are more akin to those actions, than desires, which precede them in point of time. Wherefore, since the desires + of good actions are good, and of evil actions, evil; much more are the pleasures of good actions good, and those of evil actions + evil. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 1 co."><a name="34997" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34997] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in X Ethic., aliqui posuerunt omnes +delectationes esse malas. Cuius ratio videtur fuisse, quia +intentionem suam referebant ad solas delectationes sensibiles et +corporales, quae sunt magis manifestae, nam et in ceteris +intelligibilia a sensibilibus antiqui philosophi non distinguebant, +nec intellectum a sensu, ut dicitur in libro de anima. +Delectationes autem corporales ut dicitur in libro de anima. +Delectationes autem corporales arbitrabantur dicendum omnes esse +malas, ut sic homines, qui ad delectationes immoderatas sunt proni, +a delectationibus se retrahentes, ad medium virtutis perveniant. +Sed haec existimatio non fuit conveniens. Cum enim nullus possit +vivere sine aliqua sensibili et corporali delectatione, si illi qui +docent omnes delectationes esse malas, deprehendantur aliquas +delectationes suscipere; magis homines ad delectationes erunt +proclives exemplo operum, verborum doctrina praetermissa. In +operationibus enim et passionibus humanis, in quibus experientia +plurimum valet, magis movent exempla quam verba. Dicendum est ergo +aliquas delectationes esse bonas, et aliquas esse malas. Est enim +delectatio quies appetitivae virtutis in aliquo bono amato, et +consequens aliquam operationem. Unde huius ratio duplex accipi +potest. Una quidem ex parte boni in quo aliquis quiescens +delectatur. Bonum enim et malum in moralibus dicitur secundum quod +convenit rationi vel discordat ab ea, ut supra dictum est, sicut in +rebus naturalibus aliquid dicitur naturale ex eo quod naturae +convenit, innaturale vero ex eo quod est a natura discordans. Sicut +igitur in naturalibus est quaedam quies naturalis, quae scilicet +est in eo quod convenit naturae, ut cum grave quiescit deorsum; et +quaedam innaturalis, quae est in eo quod repugnat naturae, sicut +cum grave quiescit sursum, ita et in moralibus est quaedam +delectatio bona, secundum quod appetitus superior aut inferior +requiescit in eo quod convenit rationi; et quaedam mala, ex eo quod +quiescit in eo quod a ratione discordat, et a lege Dei. Alia ratio +accipi potest ex parte operationum, quarum quaedam sunt bonae, et +quaedam malae. Operationibus autem magis sunt affines +delectationes, quae sunt eis coniunctae, quam concupiscentiae, quae +tempore eas praecedunt. Unde, cum concupiscentiae bonarum +operationum sint bonae, malarum vero malae; multo magis +delectationes bonarum operationum sunt bonae, malarum vero +malae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (Q[33], A[3]), it is not the pleasures which result from an act of reason, that hinder the reason or destroy + prudence, but extraneous pleasures, such as the pleasures of the body. These indeed hinder the use of reason, as stated above + (Q[33], A[3]), either by contrariety of the appetite that rests in something repugnant to reason, which makes the pleasure + morally bad; or by fettering the reason: thus in conjugal intercourse, though the + pleasure be in accord with reason, yet it hinders the use of reason, on account of the accompanying bodily change. But in + this case the pleasure is not morally evil; as neither is sleep, whereby the reason is fettered, morally evil, if it be taken + according to reason: for reason itself demands that the use of reason be interrupted at times. We must add, however, that + although this fettering of the reason through the pleasure of conjugal intercourse has no moral malice, since it is neither + a + mortal nor a venial sin; yet it proceeds from a kind of moral malice, namely, from the sin of our first parent; because, as + stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q98_A2" id="FS_Q34_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[98], A[2]</a> the case was different in the state of innocence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34998" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34998] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, delectationes quae sunt +de actu rationis, non impediunt rationem, neque corrumpunt +prudentiam; sed delectationes extraneae, cuiusmodi sunt +delectationes corporales. Quae quidem rationis usum impediunt, +sicut supra dictum est, et per contrarietatem appetitus, qui +quiescit in eo quod repugnat rationi, et ex hoc habet delectatio +quod sit moraliter mala, vel secundum quandam ligationem rationis, +sicut in concubitu coniugali delectatio, quamvis sit in eo quod +convenit rationi, tamen impedit rationis usum, propter corporalem +transmutationem adiunctam. Sed ex hoc non consequitur malitiam +moralem, sicut nec somnus quo ligatur usus rationis, moraliter est +malus, si sit secundum rationem receptus, nam et ipsa ratio hoc +habet, ut quandoque rationis usus intercipiatur. Dicimus tamen quod +huiusmodi ligamentum rationis ex delectatione in actu coniugali, +etsi non habeat malitiam moralem, quia non est peccatum mortale nec +veniale; provenit tamen ex quadam morali malitia, scilicet ex +peccato primi parentis, nam hoc in statu innocentiae non erat, ut +patet ex his quae in primo dicta sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The temperate man does not shun all pleasures, but those that are immoderate, and contrary to reason. The fact that children + and dumb animals seek pleasures, does not prove that all pleasures are evil: because they have from God their natural appetite, + which is moved to that which is naturally suitable to them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34999" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34999] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod temperatus non fugit omnes delectationes, sed +immoderatas, et rationi non convenientes. Quod autem pueri et +bestiae delectationes prosequantur, non ostendit eas universaliter +esse malas, quia in eis est naturalis appetitus a Deo, qui movetur +in id quod est eis conveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Art is not concerned with all kinds of good, but with the making of external things, as we shall state further on ( + <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q57_A3" id="FS_Q34_A1-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[57], A[3]</a>). But actions and passions, which are within us, are more the concern of prudence and virtue than of art. Nevertheless there + is an art of making pleasure, namely, "the art of cookery and the art of making arguments," as stated in Ethic. vii, 12. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35000" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35000] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod non omnis boni est ars, sed exteriorum factibilium, +ut infra dicetur. Circa operationes autem et passiones quae sunt in +nobis, magis est prudentia et virtus quam ars. Et tamen aliqua ars +est factiva delectationis; scilicet pulmentaria et pigmentaria, ut +dicitur in VII Ethic.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q34_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q34_A2-p0.1">Q. 34. A. 2. Whether every pleasure is good?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every pleasure is good. Because as stated in the + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q5_A6" id="FS_Q34_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[5], A[6]</a> there are three kinds of good: the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant. But everything virtuous is good; and in like manner + everything useful is good. Therefore also every pleasure is good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35001" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35001] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis delectatio sit bona. Sicut enim +in primo dictum est, bonum in tria dividitur, scilicet honestum, +utile et delectabile. Sed honestum omne est bonum; et similiter +omne utile. Ergo et omnis delectatio est bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is not sought for the sake of something else, is good in itself, as stated in Ethic. i, 6,7. But pleasure + is not sought for the sake of something else; for it seems absurd to ask anyone why he seeks to be pleased. Therefore pleasure + is good in itself. Now that which is predicated to a thing considered in itself, is predicated thereof universally. Therefore + every pleasure is good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35002" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35002] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +illud est per se bonum, quod non quaeritur propter aliud, ut +dicitur in I Ethic. Sed delectatio non quaeritur propter aliud, +ridiculum enim videtur ab aliquo quaerere quare vult delectari. +Ergo delectatio est per se bonum. Sed quod per se praedicatur de +aliquo, universaliter praedicatur de eo. Ergo omnis delectatio est +bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is desired by all, seems to be good of itself: because good is "what all things seek," as stated in Ethic. + i, 1. But everyone seeks some kind of pleasure, even children and dumb animals. Therefore pleasure is good in itself: and + consequently all pleasure is good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35003" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35003] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +id quod ab omnibus desideratur, videtur esse per se bonum, nam +bonum est quod omnia appetunt, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Sed omnes +appetunt aliquam delectationem, etiam pueri et bestiae. Ergo +delectatio est secundum se bonum. Omnis ergo delectatio est +bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q34_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.2.14" target="asv">Prov. 2:14</a>): "Who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35004" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35004] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Prov. II, <i>qui laetantur cum malefecerint, et +exultant in rebus pessimis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> While some of the Stoics maintained that all pleasures are evil, the Epicureans held that pleasure is good in itself, and + that consequently all pleasures are good. They seem to have thus erred through not discriminating between that which is good + simply, and that which is good in respect of a particular individual. That which is good simply, is good in itself. Now that + which is not good in itself, may be good in respect of some individual in two ways. In one + way, because it is suitable to him by reason of a disposition in which he is now, which disposition, however, is not natural: + thus it is sometimes good for a leper to eat things that are poisonous, which are not suitable simply to the human temperament. + In another way, through something unsuitable being esteemed suitable. And since pleasure is the repose of the appetite in + some good, if the appetite reposes in that which is good simply, the pleasure will be pleasure simply, and good simply. But + if a man's appetite repose in that which is good, not simply, but in respect of that particular man, then his pleasure will + not be pleasure simply, but a pleasure to him; neither will it be good simply, but in a certain respect, or an apparent good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 2 co."><a name="35005" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35005] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut aliqui Stoicorum posuerunt omnes delectationes +esse malas, ita Epicurei posuerunt delectationem secundum se esse +bonum, et per consequens delectationes omnes esse bonas. Qui ex hoc +decepti esse videntur, quod non distinguebant inter id quod est +bonum simpliciter, et id quod est bonum quoad hunc. Simpliciter +quidem bonum est quod secundum se bonum est. Contingit autem quod +non est secundum se bonum, esse huic bonum, dupliciter. Uno modo, +quia est ei conveniens secundum dispositionem in qua nunc est, quae +tamen non est naturalis, sicut leproso bonum est quandoque comedere +aliqua venenosa, quae non sunt simpliciter convenientia complexioni +humanae. Alio modo, quia id quod non est conveniens, aestimatur ut +conveniens. Et quia delectatio est quies appetitus in bono, si sit +bonum simpliciter illud in quo quiescit appetitus, erit simpliciter +delectatio, et simpliciter bona. Si autem non sit bonum +simpliciter, sed quoad hunc, tunc nec delectatio est simpliciter, +sed huic, nec simpliciter est bona, sed bona secundum quid, vel +apparens bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The virtuous and the useful depend on accordance with reason, and consequently nothing is virtuous or useful, without being + good. But the pleasant depends on agreement with the appetite, which tends sometimes to that which is discordant from reason. + Consequently not every object of pleasure is good in the moral order which depends on the order of reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35006" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35006] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod honestum et utile dicuntur secundum rationem, et +ideo nihil est honestum vel utile, quod non sit bonum. Delectabile +autem dicitur secundum appetitum, qui quandoque in illud tendit +quod non est conveniens rationi. Et ideo non omne delectabile est +bonum bonitate morali, quae attenditur secundum rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reason why pleasure is not sought for the sake of something else is because it is repose in the end. Now the end may + be either good or evil; although nothing can be an end except in so far as it is good in respect of such and such a man: and + so too with regard to pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35007" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35007] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ideo delectatio non quaeritur propter aliud, quia est +quies in fine. Finem autem contingit esse bonum et malum quamvis +nunquam sit finis nisi secundum quod est bonum quoad hunc. Ita +etiam est de delectatione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All things seek pleasure in the same way as they seek good: since pleasure is the repose of the appetite in good. But, just + as it happens that not every good which is desired, is of itself and verily good; so not every pleasure is of itself and verily + good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35008" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35008] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod hoc modo omnia appetunt delectationem, sicut et +bonum, cum delectatio sit quies appetitus in bono. Sed sicut +contingit non omne bonum quod appetitur, esse per se et vere bonum; +ita non omnis delectatio est per se et vere bona.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q34_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q34_A3-p0.1">Q. 34. A. 3. Whether any pleasure is the greatest good?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no pleasure is the greatest good. Because nothing generated is the greatest good: since generation cannot + be the last end. But pleasure is a consequence of generation: for the fact that a thing takes pleasure is due to its being + established in its own nature, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q34_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[31], A[1]</a>). Therefore no pleasure is the greatest good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35009" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35009] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod nulla delectatio sit optimum. Nulla +enim generatio est optimum, nam generatio non potest esse ultimus +finis. Sed delectatio consequitur generationem, nam ex eo quod +aliquid constituitur in suam naturam, delectatur, ut supra dictum +est. Ergo nulla delectatio potest esse optimum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is the greatest good cannot be made better by addition. But pleasure is made better by addition; since + pleasure together with virtue is better than pleasure without virtue. Therefore pleasure is not the greatest good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35010" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35010] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +illud quod est optimum, nullo addito potest fieri melius. Sed +delectatio aliquo addito fit melior, est enim melior delectatio cum +virtute quam sine virtute. Ergo delectatio non est optimum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is the greatest good is universally good, as being good of itself: since that which is such of itself + is prior to and greater than that which is such accidentally. But pleasure is not universally good, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q34_A2" id="FS_Q34_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore pleasure is not the greatest good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35011" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35011] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +id quod est optimum, est universaliter bonum, sicut per se bonum +existens, nam quod est per se, est prius et potius eo quod est per +accidens. Sed delectatio non est universaliter bonum, ut dictum +est. Ergo delectatio non est optimum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Happiness is the greatest good: since it is the end of man's life. But Happiness is not without pleasure: for it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q34_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.15.11" target="asv">Ps. 15:11</a>): "Thou shalt fill me with joy with Thy countenance; at Thy right hand are delights even to the end." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35012" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35012] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +beatitudo est optimum, cum sit finis humanae vitae. Sed beatitudo +non est sine delectatione, dicitur enim in Psalmo XV, <i>adimplebis +me laetitia cum vultu tuo; delectationes in dextera tua usque in +finem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q34_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Plato held neither with the Stoics, who asserted that all pleasures are evil, nor with the Epicureans, who maintained that + all pleasures are good; but he said that some are good, and some evil; yet, so that no pleasure be the sovereign or greatest + good. But, judging from his arguments, he fails in two points. First, because, from observing that sensible and bodily pleasure + consists in a certain movement and "becoming," as is evident in satiety from eating + and the like; he concluded that all pleasure arises from some "becoming" and movement: and from this, since "becoming" and + movement are the acts of something imperfect, it would follow that pleasure is not of the nature of ultimate perfection. But + this is seen to be evidently false as regards intellectual pleasures: because one takes pleasure, not only in the "becoming" + of knowledge, for instance, when one learns or wonders, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q32_A8" id="FS_Q34_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[32], A[8]</a>, ad 2); but also + in the act of contemplation, by making use of knowledge already acquired. + </p><p id="FS_Q34_A3-p7"> Secondly, because by greatest good he understood that which is the supreme good simply, i.e. the good as existing apart from, + and unparticipated by, all else, in which sense God is the Supreme Good; whereas we are speaking of the greatest good in human + things. Now the greatest good of everything is its last end. And the end, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A8" id="FS_Q34_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[8]</a>; + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q2_A7" id="FS_Q34_A3-p7.2" shape="rect"> Q[2], A[7]</a>) is twofold; namely, the thing itself, and the use of that thing; + thus the miser's end is either money or the possession of money. Accordingly, man's last end may be said to be either God + Who is the Supreme Good simply; or the enjoyment of God, which implies a certain pleasure in the last end. And in this sense + a certain pleasure of man may be said to be the greatest among human goods. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 3 co."><a name="35013" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35013] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod Plato non posuit omnes delectationes esse malas, +sicut Stoici; neque omnes esse bonas, sicut Epicurei; sed quasdam +esse bonas, et quasdam esse malas; ita tamen quod nulla sit summum +bonum, vel optimum. Sed quantum ex eius rationibus datur intelligi, +in duobus deficit. In uno quidem quia, cum videret delectationes +sensibiles et corporales in quodam motu et generatione consistere, +sicut patet in repletione ciborum et huiusmodi; aestimavit omnes +delectationes consequi generationem et motum. Unde, cum generatio +et motus sint actus imperfecti, sequeretur quod delectatio non +haberet rationem ultimae perfectionis. Sed hoc manifeste apparet +falsum in delectationibus intellectualibus. Aliquis enim non solum +delectatur in generatione scientiae, puta cum addiscit aut miratur, +sicut supra dictum est; sed etiam in contemplando secundum +scientiam iam acquisitam. Alio vero modo, quia dicebat optimum +illud quod est simpliciter summum bonum, quod scilicet est ipsum +bonum quasi abstractum et non participatum, sicut ipse Deus est +summum bonum. Nos autem loquimur de optimo in rebus humanis. +Optimum autem in unaquaque re est ultimus finis. Finis autem, ut +supra dictum est, dupliciter dicitur, scilicet ipsa res, et usus +rei; sicut finis avari est vel pecunia, vel possessio pecuniae. Et +secundum hoc, ultimus finis hominis dici potest vel ipse Deus, qui +est summum bonum simpliciter; vel fruitio ipsius, quae importat +delectationem quandam in ultimo fine. Et per hunc modum aliqua +delectatio hominis potest dici optimum inter bona humana.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every pleasure arises from a "becoming"; for some pleasures result from perfect operations, as stated above. Accordingly + nothing prevents some pleasure being the greatest good, although every pleasure is not such. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35014" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35014] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod non omnis delectatio consequitur generationem; +sed aliquae delectationes consequuntur operationes perfectas, ut +dictum est. Et ideo nihil prohibet aliquam delectationem esse +optimum, etsi non omnis sit talis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument is true of the greatest good simply, by participation of which all things are good; wherefore no addition can + make it better: whereas in regard to other goods, it is universally true that any good becomes better by the addition of another + good. Moreover it might be said that pleasure is not something extraneous to the operation of virtue, but that it accompanies + it, as stated in Ethic. i, 8. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35015" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35015] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de optimo simpliciter, per cuius +participationem omnia sunt bona, unde ex nullius additione fit +melius. Sed in aliis bonis universaliter verum est quod quodlibet +bonum ex additione alterius fit melius. Quamvis posset dici quod +delectatio non est aliquid extraneum ab operatione virtutis, sed +concomitans ipsam, ut in I Ethic. dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That pleasure is the greatest good is due not to the mere fact that it is pleasure, but to the fact that it is perfect repose + in the perfect good. Hence it does not follow that every pleasure is supremely good, or even good at all. Thus a certain science + is supremely good, but not every science is. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35016" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35016] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod delectatio non habet quod sit optimum ex hoc quod est +delectatio, sed ex hoc quod est perfecta quies in optimo. Unde non +oportet quod omnis delectatio sit optima, aut etiam bona. Sicut +aliqua scientia est optima, non tamen omnis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q34_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q34_A4-p0.1">Q. 34. A. 4. Whether pleasure is the measure or rule by which to judge of moral good or evil?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pleasure is not the measure or rule of moral good and evil. Because "that which is first in a genus is + the measure of all the rest" (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasure is not the first thing in the moral genus, for it is preceded by + love and desire. Therefore it is not the rule of goodness and malice in moral matters. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35017" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35017] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non sit mensura vel regula +boni et mali moralis. <i>Omnia enim mensurantur primo sui +generis</i>, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed delectatio non est +primum in genere moralium, sed praecedunt ipsam amor et desiderium. +Non ergo est regula bonitatis et malitiae in moralibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a measure or rule should be uniform; hence that movement which is the most uniform, is the measure and rule of all + movements (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasures are various and multiform: since some of them are good, and some evil. Therefore pleasure + is not the measure and rule of morals. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35018" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35018] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +mensuram et regulam oportet esse uniformem, et ideo motus qui est +maxime uniformis, est mensura et regula omnium motuum, ut dicitur +in X Metaphys. Sed delectatio est varia et multiformis, cum quaedam +earum sint bonae, et quaedam malae. Ergo delectatio non est mensura +et regula moralium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, judgment of the effect from its cause is more certain than judgment of cause from effect. Now goodness or malice + of operation is the cause of goodness or malice of pleasure: because "those pleasures are good which result from good operations, + and those are evil which arise from evil operations," as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore pleasures are not the rule and measure + of moral goodness and malice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35019" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35019] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +certius iudicium sumitur de effectu per causam, quam e converso. +Sed bonitas vel malitia operationis est causa bonitatis vel +malitiae delectationis, quia bonae delectationes sunt quae +consequuntur bonas operationes, malae autem quae malas, ut dicitur +in X Ethic. Ergo delectationes non sunt regula et mensura bonitatis +et malitiae in moralibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine, commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q34_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.7.10" target="asv"> Ps. 7:10 </a>"The searcher of hearts and reins is God," says: "The end of care and thought is the pleasure which each one aims at achieving." + And the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11) that "pleasure is the architect," i.e. the principal, "end [*St. Thomas took "finis" + as being the nominative, whereas it is the genitive---{tou telous}; and the Greek reads "He" (i.e. the political philosopher), + "is the architect of + the end."], in regard to which, we say absolutely that this is evil, and that, good." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35020" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35020] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, super illud Psalmi VII, <i>scrutans +corda et renes Deus, finis curae et cogitationis est delectatio ad +quam quis nititur pervenire</i>. Et philosophus dicit, in VII +Ethic., quod <i>delectatio est finis architecton</i>, idest +principalis, <i>ad quem respicientes, unumquodque hoc quidem malum, +hoc autem bonum simpliciter dicimus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q34_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Moral goodness or malice depends chiefly on the will, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q20_A1" id="FS_Q34_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[20], A[1]</a>); and it is chiefly from the end that we discern whether the will is good or evil. Now the end is taken to be that in which + the will reposes: and the repose of the will and of every appetite in the good is pleasure. And therefore man is reckoned + to be good or bad chiefly according to the pleasure of the human will; since that man is good and virtuous, + who takes pleasure in the works of virtue; and that man evil, who takes pleasure in evil works. + </p><p id="FS_Q34_A4-p7"> On the other hand, pleasures of the sensitive appetite are not the rule of moral goodness and malice; since food is universally + pleasurable to the sensitive appetite both of good and of evil men. But the will of the good man takes pleasure in them in + accordance with reason, to which the will of the evil man gives no heed. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 4 co."><a name="35021" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35021] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod bonitas vel malitia moralis principaliter in +voluntate consistit, ut supra dictum est. Utrum autem voluntas sit +bona vel mala, praecipue ex fine cognoscitur. Id autem habetur pro +fine, in quo voluntas quiescit. Quies autem voluntatis, et +cuiuslibet appetitus, in bono, est delectatio. Et ideo secundum +delectationem voluntatis humanae, praecipue iudicatur homo bonus +vel malus; est enim bonus et virtuosus qui gaudet in operibus +virtutum; malus autem qui in operibus malis. Delectationes autem +appetitus sensitivi non sunt regula bonitatis vel malitiae moralis, +nam cibus communiter delectabilis est secundum appetitum +sensitivum, bonis et malis. Sed voluntas bonorum delectatur in eis +secundum convenientiam rationis, quam non curat voluntas +malorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Love and desire precede pleasure in the order of generation. But pleasure precedes them in the order of the end, which serves + a principle in actions; and it is by the principle, which is the rule and measure of such matters, that we form our judgment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35022" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35022] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod amor et desiderium sunt priora delectatione in +via generationis. Sed delectatio est prior secundum rationem finis, +qui in operabilibus habet rationem principii, a quo maxime sumitur +iudicium, sicut a regula vel mensura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All pleasures are uniform in the point of their being the repose of the appetite in something good: and in this respect pleasure + can be a rule or measure. Because that man is good, whose will rests in the true good: and that man evil, whose will rests + in evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35023" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35023] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod omnis delectatio in hoc est uniformis, quod est quies +in aliquo bono, et secundum hoc potest esse regula vel mensura. Nam +ille bonus est cuius voluntas quiescit in vero bono; malus autem, +cuius voluntas quiescit in malo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since pleasure perfects operation as its end, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q33_A4" id="FS_Q34_A4-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[33], A[4]</a>); an operation cannot be perfectly good, unless there be also pleasure in good: because the goodness of a thing depends on + its end. And thus, in a way, the goodness of the pleasure is the cause of goodness in the operation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35024" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35024] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, cum delectatio perficiat operationem per modum +finis, ut supra dictum est; non potest esse operatio perfecte bona, +nisi etiam adsit delectatio in bono, nam bonitas rei dependet ex +fine. Et sic quodammodo bonitas delectationis est causa bonitas in +operatione.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q35" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q35-p0.1">Q. 35. OF PAIN OR SORROW, IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q35-p2"> We have now to consider pain and sorrow: concerning which we must consider: (1) Sorrow or pain in itself; (2) Its cause; + (3) Its effects; (4) Its remedies; (5) Its goodness or malice. + </p><p id="FS_Q35-p3"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q35-p4"><a href="#FS_Q35_A1"> (1) Whether pain is a passion of the soul?</a></p><p id="FS_Q35-p5"><a href="#FS_Q35_A2"> (2) Whether sorrow is the same as pain?</a></p><p id="FS_Q35-p6"><a href="#FS_Q35_A3"> (3) Whether sorrow or pain is contrary in pleasure?</a></p><p id="FS_Q35-p7"><a href="#FS_Q35_A4"> (4) Whether all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure?</a></p><p id="FS_Q35-p8"><a href="#FS_Q35_A5"> (5) Whether there is a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation?</a></p><p id="FS_Q35-p9"><a href="#FS_Q35_A6"> (6) Whether sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought?</a></p><p id="FS_Q35-p10"><a href="#FS_Q35_A7"> (7) Whether exterior pain is greater than interior?</a></p><p id="FS_Q35-p11"><a href="#FS_Q35_A8"> (8) Of the species of sorrow.</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 pr."><a name="35025" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35025] +Iª-IIae q. 35 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +dolore et tristitia. Et circa hoc, primo considerandum est de +tristitia, seu dolore, secundum se; secundo, de causis eius; +tertio, de effectibus ipsius; quarto, de remediis eius; quinto, de +bonitate vel malitia eius. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, +utrum dolor sit passio animae. Secundo, utrum tristitia sit idem +quod dolor. Tertio, utrum tristitia, seu dolor, sit contraria +delectationi. Quarto, utrum omnis tristitia omni delectationi +contrarietur. Quinto, utrum delectationi contemplationis sit aliqua +tristitia contraria. Sexto, utrum magis fugienda sit tristitia, +quam delectatio appetenda. Septimo, utrum dolor exterior sit maior +quam dolor interior. Octavo, de speciebus tristitiae.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q35_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q35_A1-p0.1">Q. 35. A. 1. Whether pain is a passion of the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pain is not a passion of the soul. Because no passion of the soul is in the body. But pain can be in the + body, since Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xii), that "bodily pain is a sudden corruption of the well-being of that thing + which the soul, by making evil use of it, made subject to corruption." Therefore pain is not a passion of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35026" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35026] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod dolor non sit passio animae. Nulla +enim passio animae est in corpore. Sed dolor potest esse in +corpore, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de vera Relig., quod +<i>dolor qui dicitur corporis, est corruptio repentina salutis eius +rei, quam, male utendo, anima corruptioni obnoxiavit</i>. Ergo +dolor non est passio animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every passion of the soul belongs to the appetitive faculty. But pain does not belong to the appetitive, but rather + to the apprehensive part: for Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx) that "bodily pain is caused by the sense resisting a more powerful + body." Therefore pain is not a passion of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35027" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35027] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +omnis passio animae pertinet ad vim appetitivam. Sed dolor non +pertinet ad vim appetitivam, sed magis ad apprehensivam, dicit enim +Augustinus, in libro de natura boni, quod <i>dolorem in corpore +facit sensus resistens corpori potentiori</i>. Ergo dolor non est +passio animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every passion of the soul belongs to the animal appetite. But pain does not belong to the animal appetite, but rather + to the natural appetite; for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 14): "Had not some good remained in nature, we should feel + no pain in being punished by the loss of good." Therefore pain is not a passion of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35028" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35028] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +omnis passio animae pertinet ad appetitum animalem. Sed dolor non +pertinet ad appetitum animalem, sed magis ad appetitum naturalem, +dicit enim Augustinus, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., <i>nisi aliquod +bonum remansisset in natura, nullius boni amissi esset dolor in +poena</i>. Ergo dolor non est passio animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8) reckons pain among the passions of the soul; quoting Virgil (Aeneid, vi, 733): "hence wild + desires and grovelling fears/And human laughter, human tears." [Translation: Conington.] + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35029" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35029] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus, XIV de Civ. Dei, ponit dolorem inter passiones +animae, inducens illud Virgilii, <i>hinc metuunt, cupiunt, +gaudentque dolentque</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q35_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Just as two things are requisite for pleasure; namely, conjunction with good and perception of this conjunction; so also + two things are requisite for pain: namely, conjunction with some evil (which is in so far evil as it deprives one of some + good), and perception of this conjunction. Now whatever is conjoined, if it have not the aspect of good or evil in regard + to the being to which it is conjoined, cannot cause pleasure or pain. Whence it is evident that + something under the aspect of good or evil is the object of the pleasure or pain. But good and evil, as such, are objects + of the appetite. Consequently it is clear that pleasure and pain belong to the appetite. + </p><p id="FS_Q35_A1-p7"> Now every appetitive movement or inclination consequent to apprehension, belongs to the intellective or sensitive appetite: + since the inclination of the natural appetite is not consequent to an apprehension of the subject of that appetite, but to + the apprehension of another, as stated in the + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q103_A1" id="FS_Q35_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[103], AA[1]</a>,3. Since then pleasure and pain presuppose some sense or apprehension in the same subject, it is evident that pain, like + pleasure, is in the + intellective or sensitive appetite. + </p><p id="FS_Q35_A1-p8"> Again every movement of the sensitive appetite is called a passion, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q22_A1" id="FS_Q35_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[22], AA[1]</a>,3): and especially those which tend to some defect. Consequently pain, according as it is in the sensitive appetite, is most + properly called a passion of the soul: just as bodily ailments are properly called passions of the body. Hence Augustine (De + Civ. Dei xiv, 7,[8] [*Quoting Cicero]) reckons pain especially as being a kind of ailment. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 1 co."><a name="35030" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35030] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ad delectationem duo requiruntur, scilicet +coniunctio boni, et perceptio huiusmodi coniunctionis; ita etiam ad +dolorem duo requiruntur, scilicet coniunctio alicuius mali (quod ea +ratione est malum, quia privat aliquod bonum); et perceptio +huiusmodi coniunctionis. Quidquid autem coniungitur, si non habeat, +respectu eius cui coniungitur, rationem boni vel mali, non potest +causare delectationem vel dolorem. Ex quo patet quod aliquid sub +ratione boni vel mali, est obiectum delectationis et doloris. Bonum +autem et malum, inquantum huiusmodi, sunt obiecta appetitus. Unde +patet quod delectatio et dolor ad appetitum pertinent. Omnis autem +motus appetitivus, seu inclinatio consequens apprehensionem, +pertinet ad appetitum intellectivum vel sensitivum, nam inclinatio +appetitus naturalis non consequitur apprehensionem ipsius +appetentis, sed alterius, ut in primo dictum est. Cum igitur +delectatio et dolor praesupponant in eodem subiecto sensum vel +apprehensionem aliquam, manifestum est quod dolor, sicut et +delectatio, est in appetitu intellectivo vel sensitivo. Omnis autem +motus appetitus sensitivi dicitur passio, ut supra dictum est. Et +praecipue illi qui in defectum sonant. Unde dolor, secundum quod +est in appetitu sensitivo, propriissime dicitur passio animae, +sicut molestiae corporales proprie passiones corporis dicuntur. +Unde et Augustinus, XIV de Civ. Dei, dolorem specialiter +aegritudinem nominat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We speak of the body, because the cause of pain is in the body: as when we suffer something hurtful to the body. But the + movement of pain is always in the soul; since "the body cannot feel pain unless the soul feel it," as Augustine says (Super + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q35_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.87.4" target="asv"> Psalm 87:4</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35031" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35031] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod dolor dicitur esse corporis, quia causa doloris +est in corpore, puta cum patimur aliquod nocivum corpori. Sed motus +doloris semper est in anima, nam corpus non potest dolere nisi +dolente anima, ut Augustinus dicit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> We speak of pain of the senses, not as though it were an act of the sensitive power; but because the senses are required + for bodily pain, in the same way as for bodily pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35032" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35032] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod dolor dicitur esse sensus, non quia sit actus +sensitivae virtutis, sed quia requiritur ad dolorem corporalem, +sicut ad delectationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Pain at the loss of good proves the goodness of the nature, not because pain is an act of the natural appetite, but because + nature desires something as good, the removal of which being perceived, there results the passion of pain in the sensitive + appetite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35033" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35033] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod dolor de amissione boni demonstrat bonitatem naturae, +non quia dolor sit actus naturalis appetitus, sed quia natura +aliquid appetit ut bonum, quod cum removeri sentitur, sequitur +doloris passio in appetitu sensitivo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q35_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q35_A2-p0.1">Q. 35. A. 2. Whether sorrow is the same as pain?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow is not pain. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) that "pain is used to express bodily suffering." + But sorrow is used more in reference to the soul. Therefore sorrow is not pain. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35034" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35034] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod tristitia non sit dolor. Dicit enim +Augustinus, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod <i>dolor in corporibus +dicitur</i>. Tristitia autem dicitur magis in anima. Ergo tristitia +non est dolor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, pain is only in respect of present evil. But sorrow can refer to both past and future evil: thus repentance is sorrow + for the past, and anxiety for the future. Therefore sorrow is quite different from pain. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35035" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35035] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +dolor non est nisi de praesenti malo. Sed tristitia potest esse de +praeterito et de futuro, sicut poenitentia est tristitia de +praeterito, et anxietas de futuro. Ergo tristitia omnino a dolore +differt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, pain seems not to follow save from the sense of touch. But sorrow can arise from all the senses. Therefore sorrow + is not pain, and extends to more objects. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35036" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35036] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +dolor non videtur consequi nisi sensum tactus. Sed tristitia potest +consequi ex omnibus sensibus. Ergo tristitia non est dolor, sed se +habet in pluribus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q35_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.2" target="asv">Rom. 9:2</a>): "I have great sorrow [Douay: 'sadness'] and continual pain [Douay: 'sorrow'] in my heart," thus denoting the same thing + by sorrow and pain. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35037" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35037] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Rom. IX, <i>tristitia est mihi magna, +et continuus dolor cordi meo</i>, pro eodem utens tristitia et +dolore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Pleasure and pain can arise from a twofold apprehension, namely, from the apprehension of an exterior sense; and from the + interior apprehension of the intellect or of the imagination. Now the interior apprehension extends to more objects than the + exterior apprehension: because whatever things come under the exterior apprehension, come under the interior, but not conversely. + Consequently that pleasure alone which is caused by an interior apprehension is + called joy, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q31_A3" id="FS_Q35_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[31], A[3]</a>): and in like manner that pain alone which is caused by an interior apprehension, is called sorrow. And just as that pleasure + which is caused by an exterior apprehension, is called pleasure but not joy; so too that pain which is caused by an exterior + apprehension, is called pain indeed but not sorrow. Accordingly sorrow is a species of pain, as joy is a species of pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 2 co."><a name="35038" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35038] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod delectatio et dolor ex duplici apprehensione causari +possunt, scilicet ex apprehensione exterioris sensus, et ex +apprehensione interiori sive intellectus sive imaginationis. +Interior autem apprehensio ad plura se extendit quam exterior, eo +quod quaecumque cadunt sub exteriori apprehensione, cadunt sub +interiori, sed non e converso. Sola igitur illa delectatio quae ex +interiori apprehensione causatur, gaudium nominatur, ut supra +dictum est. Et similiter ille solus dolor qui ex apprehensione +interiori causatur, nominatur tristitia. Et sicut illa delectatio +quae ex exteriori apprehensione causatur, delectatio quidem +nominatur, non autem gaudium; ita ille dolor qui ex exteriori +apprehensione causatur, nominatur quidem dolor, non autem +tristitia. Sic igitur tristitia est quaedam species doloris, sicut +gaudium delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking there of the use of the word: because "pain" is more generally used in reference to bodily pains, which + are better known, than in reference to spiritual pains. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35039" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35039] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur ibi quantum ad usum +vocabuli, quia dolor magis usitatur in corporalibus doloribus, qui +sunt magis noti, quam in doloribus spiritualibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> External sense perceives only what is present; but the interior cognitive power can perceive the present, past and future. + Consequently sorrow can regard present, past and future: whereas bodily pain, which follows apprehension of the external sense, + can only regard something present. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35040" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35040] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod sensus exterior non percipit nisi praesens, vis autem +cognitiva interior potest percipere praesens, praeteritum et +futurum. Et ideo tristitia potest esse de praesenti, praeterito et +futuro, dolor autem corporalis, qui sequitur apprehensionem sensus +exterioris, non potest esse nisi de praesenti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sensibles of touch are painful, not only in so far as they are disproportionate to the apprehensive power, but also in + so far as they are contrary to nature: whereas the objects of the other senses can indeed be disproportionate to the apprehensive + power, but they are not contrary to nature, save as they are subordinate to the sensibles of touch. Consequently man alone, + who is a perfectly cognizant animal, takes pleasure in the objects of the + other senses for their own sake; whereas other animals take no pleasure in them save as referable to the sensibles of touch, + as stated in Ethic. iii, 10. Accordingly, in referring to the objects of the other senses, we do not speak of pain in so far + as it is contrary to natural pleasure: but rather of sorrow, which is contrary to joy. So then if pain be taken as denoting + bodily pain, which is its more usual meaning, then it is contrasted with sorrow, according to the distinction of interior + and + exterior apprehension; although, on the part of the objects, pleasure extends further than does bodily pain. But if pain be + taken in a wide sense, then it is the genus of sorrow, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35041" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35041] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod sensibilia tactus sunt dolorosa, non solum inquantum +sunt improportionata virtuti apprehensivae, sed etiam inquantum +contrariantur naturae. Aliorum vero sensuum sensibilia possunt +quidem esse improportionata virtuti apprehensivae, non tamen +contrariantur naturae, nisi in ordine ad sensibilia tactus. Unde +solus homo, qui est animal perfectum in cognitione, delectatur in +sensibilibus aliorum sensuum secundum se ipsa, alia vero animalia +non delectantur in eis nisi secundum quod referuntur ad sensibilia +tactus, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Et ideo de sensibilibus aliorum +sensuum non dicitur esse dolor, secundum quod contrariatur +delectationi naturali, sed magis tristitia, quae contrariatur +gaudio animali. Sic igitur si dolor accipiatur pro corporali +dolore, quod usitatius est, dolor ex opposito dividitur contra +tristitiam, secundum distinctionem apprehensionis interioris et +exterioris; licet, quantum ad obiecta, delectatio ad plura se +extendat quam dolor corporalis. Si vero dolor accipiatur +communiter, sic dolor est genus tristitiae, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q35_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q35_A3-p0.1">Q. 35. A. 3. Whether sorrow or pain is contrary to pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow is not contrary to pleasure. For one of two contraries is not the cause of the other. But sorrow + can be the cause of pleasure; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q35_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.5" target="asv">Mat. 5:5</a>): "Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted." Therefore they are not contrary to one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35042" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35042] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod dolor delectationi non contrarietur. +Unum enim contrariorum non est causa alterius. Sed tristitia potest +esse causa delectationis, dicitur enim Matth. V, <i>beati qui +lugent, quoniam ipsi consolabuntur</i>. Ergo non sunt +contraria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one contrary does not denominate the other. But to some, pain or sorrow gives pleasure: thus Augustine says (Confess. + iii, 2) that in stage-plays sorrow itself gives pleasure: and (Confess. iv, 5) that "weeping is a bitter thing, and yet it + sometimes pleases us." Therefore pain is not contrary to pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35043" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35043] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +unum contrariorum non denominat aliud. Sed in quibusdam ipse dolor +vel tristitia est delectabilis, sicut Augustinus dicit, in III +Confess., quod dolor in spectaculis delectat. Et IV Confess., dicit +quod <i>fletus amara res est, et tamen quandoque delectat</i>. Ergo +dolor non contrariatur delectationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one contrary is not the matter of the other; because contraries cannot co-exist together. But sorrow can be the + matter of pleasure; for Augustine says (De Poenit. xiii): "The penitent should ever sorrow, and rejoice in his sorrow." The + Philosopher too says (Ethic. ix, 4) that, on the other hand, "the evil man feels pain at having been pleased." Therefore pleasure + and pain are not contrary to one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35044" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35044] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +unum contrariorum non est materia alterius, quia contraria simul +esse non possunt. Sed dolor potest esse materia delectationis, +dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de poenitentia, <i>semper poenitens +doleat, et de dolore gaudeat</i>. Et philosophus dicit, in IX +Ethic., quod e converso <i>malus dolet de eo quod delectatus +est</i>. Ergo delectatio et dolor non sunt contraria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6) that "joy is the volition of consent to the things we wish: and that sorrow is the volition + of dissent from the things we do not wish." But consent and dissent are contraries. Therefore pleasure and sorrow are contrary + to one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35045" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35045] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod <i>laetitia est +voluntas in eorum consensione quae volumus, tristitia autem est +voluntas in dissensione ab his quae nolumus</i>. Sed consentire et +dissentire sunt contraria. Ergo laetitia et tristitia sunt +contraria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, 4), contrariety is a difference in respect of a form. Now the form or species of a passion + or movement is taken from the object or term. Consequently, since the objects of pleasure and sorrow or pain, viz. present + good and present evil, are contrary to one another, it follows that pain and pleasure are contrary to one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 3 co."><a name="35046" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35046] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit X Metaphys., contrarietas +est differentia secundum formam. Forma autem, seu species, +passionis et motus sumitur ex obiecto vel termino. Unde, cum +obiecta delectationis et tristitiae, seu doloris, sint contraria, +scilicet bonum praesens et malum praesens, sequitur quod dolor et +delectatio sint contraria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nothing hinders one contrary causing the other accidentally: and thus sorrow can be the cause of pleasure. In one way, in + so far as from sorrow at the absence of something, or at the presence of its contrary, one seeks the more eagerly for something + pleasant: thus a thirsty man seeks more eagerly the pleasure of a drink, as a remedy for the pain he suffers. In another way, + in so far as, from a strong desire for a certain pleasure, one does not shrink + from undergoing pain, so as to obtain that pleasure. In each of these ways, the sorrows of the present life lead us to the + comfort of the future life. Because by the mere fact that man mourns for his sins, or for the delay of glory, he merits the + consolation of eternity. In like manner a man merits it when he shrinks not from hardships and straits in order to obtain + it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35047" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35047] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet unum contrariorum esse causam +alterius per accidens. Sic autem tristitia potest esse causa +delectationis. Uno quidem modo, inquantum tristitia de absentia +alicuius rei, vel de praesentia contrarii, vehementius quaerit id +in quo delectetur, sicut sitiens vehementius quaerit delectationem +potus, ut remedium contra tristitiam quam patitur. Alio modo, +inquantum ex magno desiderio delectationis alicuius, non recusat +aliquis tristitias perferre, ut ad illam delectationem perveniat. +Et utroque modo luctus praesens ad consolationem futurae vitae +perducit. Quia ex hoc ipso quod homo luget pro peccatis, vel pro +dilatione gloriae, meretur consolationem aeternam. Similiter etiam +meretur eam aliquis ex hoc quod, ad ipsam consequendam, non refugit +labores et angustias propter ipsam sustinere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Pain itself can be pleasurable accidentally in so far as it is accompanied by wonder, as in stage-plays; or in so far as + it recalls a beloved object to one's memory, and makes one feel one's love for the thing, whose absence gives us pain. Consequently, + since love is pleasant, both pain and whatever else results from love, forasmuch as they remind us of our love, are pleasant. + And, for this reason, we derive pleasure even from pains depicted on the + stage: in so far as, in witnessing them, we perceive ourselves to conceive a certain love for those who are there represented. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35048" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35048] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod dolor ipse potest esse delectabilis per accidens, +inquantum scilicet habet adiunctam admirationem, ut in spectaculis; +vel inquantum facit recordationem rei amatae, et facit percipere +amorem eius, de cuius absentia doletur. Unde, cum amor sit +delectabilis, et dolor et omnia quae ex amore consequuntur, +inquantum in eis sentitur amor, sunt delectabilia. Et propter hoc +etiam dolores in spectaculis possunt esse delectabiles, inquantum +in eis sentitur aliquis amor conceptus ad illos qui in spectaculis +commemorantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will and the reason reflect on their own acts, inasmuch as the acts themselves of the will and reason are considered + under the aspect of good or evil. In this way sorrow can be the matter of pleasure, or vice versa, not essentially but accidentally: + that is, in so far as either of them is considered under the aspect of good or evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35049" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35049] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod voluntas et ratio supra suos actus reflectuntur, +inquantum ipsi actus voluntatis et rationis accipiuntur sub ratione +boni vel mali. Et hoc modo tristitia potest esse materia +delectationis, vel e converso, non per se, sed per accidens, +inquantum scilicet utrumque accipitur in ratione boni vel mali.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q35_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q35_A4-p0.1">Q. 35. A. 4. Whether all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure. Because, just as whiteness and blackness are contrary species + of color, so pleasure and sorrow are contrary species of the soul's passions. But whiteness and blackness are universally + contrary to one another. Therefore pleasure and sorrow are so too. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35050" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35050] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis tristitia omni delectationi +contrarietur. Sicut enim albedo et nigredo sunt contrariae species +coloris, ita delectatio et tristitia sunt contrariae species animae +passionum. Sed albedo et nigredo universaliter sibi opponuntur. +Ergo etiam delectatio et tristitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, remedies are made of things contrary (to the evil). But every pleasure is a remedy for all manner of sorrow, as + the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vii, 14). Therefore every pleasure is contrary to every sorrow. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35051" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35051] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +medicinae per contraria fiunt. Sed quaelibet delectatio est +medicina contra quamlibet tristitiam, ut patet per philosophum, in +VII Ethic. Ergo quaelibet delectatio cuilibet tristitiae +contrariatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, contraries are hindrances to one another. But every sorrow hinders any kind of pleasure: as is evident from Ethic. + x, 5. Therefore every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35052" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35052] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +contraria sunt quae se invicem impediunt. Sed quaelibet tristitia +impedit quamlibet delectationem, ut patet per illud quod dicitur X +Ethic. Ergo quaelibet tristitia cuilibet delectationi +contrariatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The same thing is not the cause of contraries. But joy for one thing, and sorrow for the opposite thing, proceed from the + same habit: thus from charity it happens that we "rejoice with them that rejoice," and "weep with them that weep" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q35_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.15" target="asv">Rom. 12:15</a>). Therefore not every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35053" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35053] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +contrariorum non est eadem causa. Sed ab eodem habitu procedit quod +aliquis gaudeat de uno, et tristetur de opposito, <i>ex caritate +enim contingit gaudere cum gaudentibus, et flere cum flentibus</i>, +ut dicitur Rom. XII. Ergo non omnis tristitia omni delectationi +contrariatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q35_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in Metaph. x, 4 contrariety is a difference in respect of a form. Now a form may be generic or specific. Consequently + things may be contraries in respect of a generic form, as virtue and vice; or in respect of a specific form, as justice and + injustice. + </p><p id="FS_Q35_A4-p7"> Now we must observe that some things are specified by absolute forms, e.g. substances and qualities; whereas other things + are specified in relation to something extrinsic, e.g. passions and movements, which derive their species from their terms + or objects. Accordingly in those things that are specified by absolute forms, it happens that species contained under contrary + genera are not contrary as to their specific nature: but it does not happen for them to have any affinity or + fittingness to one another. For intemperance and justice, which are in the contrary genera of virtue and vice, are not contrary + to one another in respect of their specific nature; and yet they have no affinity or fittingness to one another. On the other + hand, in those things that are specified in relation to something extrinsic, it happens that species belonging to contrary + genera, are not only not contrary to one another, but also that they have a certain mutual affinity or fittingness. The + reason of this is that where there is one same relation to two contraries, there is contrariety; e.g. to approach to a white + thing, and to approach to a black thing, are contraries; whereas contrary relations to contrary things, implies a certain + likeness, e.g. to recede from something white, and to approach to something black. This is most evident in the case of contradiction, + which is the principle of opposition: because opposition consists in affirming and denying the same thing, e.g. + "white" and "non-white"; while there is fittingness and likeness in the affirmation of one contrary and the denial of the + other, as, if I were to say "black" and "not white." + </p><p id="FS_Q35_A4-p8"> Now sorrow and pleasure, being passions, are specified by their objects. According to their respective genera, they are contrary + to one another: since one is a kind of "pursuit," the other a kind of "avoidance," which "are to the appetite, what affirmation + and denial are to the intellect" (Ethic. vi, 2). Consequently sorrow and pleasure in respect of the same object, are specifically + contrary to one another: whereas sorrow and pleasure in respect of objects that are not contrary + but disparate, are not specifically contrary to one another, but are also disparate; for instance, sorrow at the death of + a friend, and pleasure in contemplation. If, however, those diverse objects be contrary to one another, then pleasure and + sorrow are not only specifically contrary, but they also have a certain mutual fittingness and affinity: for instance to rejoice + in good and to sorrow for evil. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 4 co."><a name="35054" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35054] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in X Metaphys., contrarietas est +differentia secundum formam. Forma autem est et generalis, et +specialis. Unde contingit esse aliqua contraria secundum formam +generis, sicut virtus et vitium; et secundum formam speciei, sicut +iustitia et iniustitia. Est autem considerandum quod quaedam +specificantur secundum formas absolutas, sicut substantiae et +qualitates, quaedam vero specificantur per comparationem ad aliquid +extra, sicut passiones et motus recipiunt speciem ex terminis sive +ex obiectis. In his ergo quorum species considerantur secundum +formas absolutas, contingit quidem species quae continentur sub +contrariis generibus, non esse contrarias secundum rationem +speciei, non tamen contingit quod habeant aliquam affinitatem vel +convenientiam ad invicem. Intemperantia enim et iustitia, quae sunt +in contrariis generibus, virtute scilicet et vitio, non +contrariantur ad invicem secundum rationem propriae speciei, nec +tamen habent aliquam affinitatem vel convenientiam ad invicem. Sed +in illis quorum species sumuntur secundum habitudinem ad aliquid +extrinsecum, contingit quod species contrariorum generum non solum +non sunt contrariae ad invicem, sed etiam habent quandam +convenientiam et affinitatem ad invicem, eo quod eodem modo se +habere ad contraria, contrarietatem inducit, sicut accedere ad +album et accedere ad nigrum habent rationem contrarietatis; sed +contrario modo se habere ad contraria, habet rationem +similitudinis, sicut recedere ab albo et accedere ad nigrum. Et hoc +maxime apparet in contradictione, quae est principium oppositionis, +nam in affirmatione et negatione eiusdem consistit oppositio, sicut +album et non album; in affirmatione autem unius oppositorum et +negatione alterius, attenditur convenientia et similitudo, ut si +dicam nigrum et non album. Tristitia autem et delectatio, cum sint +passiones, specificantur ex obiectis. Et quidem secundum genus +suum, contrarietatem habent, nam unum pertinet ad prosecutionem, +aliud vero ad fugam, <i>quae se habent in appetitu sicut affirmatio +et negatio in ratione</i>, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Et ideo tristia +et delectatio quae sunt de eodem, habent oppositionem ad invicem +secundum speciem. Tristitia vero et delectatio de diversis, si +quidem illa diversa non sint opposita, sed disparata, non habent +oppositionem ad invicem secundum rationem speciei, sed sunt etiam +disparatae, sicut tristari de morte amici, et delectari in +contemplatione. Si vero illa diversa sint contraria, tunc +delectatio et tristitia non solum non habent contrarietatem +secundum rationem speciei, sed etiam habent convenientiam et +affinitatem, sicut gaudere de bono, et tristari de malo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Whiteness and blackness do not take their species from their relationship to something extrinsic, as pleasure and sorrow + do: wherefore the comparison does not hold. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35055" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35055] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod albedo et nigredo non habent speciem ex +habitudine ad aliquid exterius, sicut delectatio et tristitia. Unde +non est eadem ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Genus is taken from matter, as is stated in Metaph. viii, 2; and in accidents the subject takes the place of matter. Now + it has been said above that pleasure and sorrow are generically contrary to one another. Consequently in every sorrow the + subject has a disposition contrary to the disposition of the subject of pleasure: because in every pleasure the appetite is + viewed as accepting what it possesses, and in every sorrow, as avoiding it. And + therefore on the part of the subject every pleasure is a remedy for any kind of sorrow, and every sorrow is a hindrance of + all manner of pleasure: but chiefly when pleasure is opposed to sorrow specifically. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35056" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35056] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod genus sumitur ex materia, ut patet in VIII Metaphys. +In accidentibus autem loco materiae est subiectum. Dictum est autem +quod delectatio et tristitia contrariantur secundum genus. Et ideo +in qualibet tristitia est contraria dispositio subiecti +dispositioni quae est in qualibet delectatione, nam in qualibet +delectatione appetitus se habet ut acceptans id quod habet; in +qualibet autem tristitia se habet ut fugiens. Et ideo ex parte +subiecti quaelibet delectatio est medicina contra quamlibet +tristitiam, et quaelibet tristitia est impeditiva cuiuslibet +delectationis, praecipue tamen quando delectatio tristitiae +contrariatur etiam secundum speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A4-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is evident. Or we may say that, although not every sorrow is specifically contrary + to every pleasure, yet they are contrary to one another in regard to their effects: since one has the effect of strengthening + the animal nature, while the other results in a kind of discomfort. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35057" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35057] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Unde patet +solutio ad tertium. Vel aliter dicendum quod, etsi non omnis +tristitia contrarietur omni delectationi secundum speciem, tamen +quantum ad effectum contrariantur, nam ex uno confortatur natura +animalis, ex alio vero quodammodo molestatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q35_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q35_A5-p0.1">Q. 35. A. 5. Whether there is any sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is a sorrow that is contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q35_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.7.10" target="asv">2 Cor. 7:10</a>): "The sorrow that is according to God, worketh penance steadfast unto salvation." Now to look at God belongs to the higher + reason, whose act is to give itself to contemplation, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 3,4). Therefore there is a sorrow + contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="35058" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35058] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectationi contemplationis sit +aliqua tristitia contraria. Dicit enim apostolus, II ad Cor. VII, +<i>quae secundum Deum est tristitia, poenitentiam in salutem +stabilem operatur</i>. Sed respicere ad Deum pertinet ad superiorem +rationem, cuius est contemplationi vacare, secundum Augustinum, in +XII de Trin. Ergo delectationi contemplationis opponitur +tristitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, contrary things have contrary effects. If therefore the contemplation of one contrary gives pleasure, the other + contrary will give sorrow: and so there will be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="35059" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35059] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +contrariorum contrarii sunt effectus. Si ergo unum contrariorum +contemplatum est causa delectationis, aliud erit causa tristitiae. +Et sic delectationi contemplationis erit tristitia contraria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the object of pleasure is good, so the object of sorrow is evil. But contemplation can be an evil: since the + Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, 9) that "it is unfitting to think of certain things." Therefore sorrow can be contrary to the + pleasure of contemplation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="35060" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35060] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut obiectum delectationis est bonum, ita obiectum tristitiae est +malum. Sed contemplatio potest habere mali rationem, dicit enim +philosophus, in XII Metaphys., quod quaedam inconveniens est +meditari. Ergo contemplationis delectationi potest esse contraria +tristitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, any work, so far as it is unhindered, can be a cause of pleasure, as stated in Ethic. vii, 12,13; x, 4. But the + work of contemplation can be hindered in many ways, either so as to destroy it altogether, or as to make it difficult. Therefore + in contemplation there can be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="35061" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35061] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +operatio quaelibet, secundum quod non est impedita, est causa +delectationis, ut dicitur in VII et X Ethic. Sed operatio +contemplationis potest multipliciter impediri, vel ut totaliter non +sit, vel ut cum difficultate sit. Ergo in contemplatione potest +esse tristitia delectationi contraria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A5-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, affliction of the flesh is a cause of sorrow. But, as it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q35_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.12.12" target="asv">Eccles. 12:12</a>) "much study is an affliction of the flesh." Therefore contemplation admits of sorrow contrary to its pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 5 arg. 5"><a name="35062" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35062] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +carnis afflictio est causa tristitiae. Sed sicut dicitur Eccle. +ult., <i>frequens meditatio carnis est afflictio</i>. Ergo +contemplatio habet tristitiam delectationi contrariam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A5-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q35_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.16" target="asv">Wis. 8:16</a>): "Her," i.e. wisdom's, "conversation hath no bitterness nor her company any tediousness; but joy and gladness." Now the + conversation and company of wisdom are found in contemplation. Therefore there is no sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 5 s. c."><a name="35063" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35063] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Sap. VIII, <i>non habet amaritudinem conversatio +illius</i> scilicet sapientiae, <i>nec taedium convictus eius; sed +laetitiam et gaudium</i>. Conversatio autem et convictus sapientiae +est per contemplationem. Ergo nulla tristitia est quae sit +contraria delectationi contemplationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q35_A5-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The pleasure of contemplation can be understood in two ways. In one way, so that contemplation is the cause, but not the + object of pleasure: and then pleasure is taken not in contemplating but in the thing contemplated. Now it is possible to contemplate + something harmful and sorrowful, just as to contemplate something suitable and pleasant. Consequently if the pleasure of contemplation + be taken in this way, nothing hinders some sorrow being contrary to the + pleasure of contemplation. + </p><p id="FS_Q35_A5-p9"> In another way, the pleasure of contemplation is understood, so that contemplation is its object and cause; as when one takes + pleasure in the very act of contemplating. And thus, according to Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii.], "no sorrow + is contrary to that pleasure which is about contemplation": and the Philosopher says the same (Topic. i, 13; Ethic. x, 3). + This, however, is to be understood as being the case properly speaking. The reason is because sorrow is of + itself contrary to pleasure in a contrary object: thus pleasure in heat is contrary to sorrow caused by cold. But there is + no contrary to the object of contemplation: because contraries, as apprehended by the mind, are not contrary, but one is the + means of knowing the other. Wherefore, properly speaking, there cannot be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. + Nor has it any sorrow annexed to it, as bodily pleasures have, which are like remedies against certain annoyances; thus a + man + takes pleasure in drinking through being troubled with thirst, but when the thirst is quite driven out, the pleasure of drinking + ceases also. Because the pleasure of contemplation is not caused by one's being quit of an annoyance, but by the fact that + contemplation is pleasant in itself: for pleasure is not a "becoming" but a perfect operation, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q35_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[31], A[1]</a>). + </p><p id="FS_Q35_A5-p10"> Accidentally, however, sorrow is mingled with the pleasure of contemplation; and this in two ways: first, on the part of + an organ, secondly, through some impediment in the apprehension. On the part of an organ, sorrow or pain is mingled with apprehension, + directly, as regards the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part, which have a bodily organ; either from the sensible object + disagreeing with the normal condition of the organ, as the taste of something bitter, and the smell + of something foul; or from the sensible object, though agreeable, being so continuous in its action on the sense, that it + exceeds the normal condition of the organ, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q33_A2" id="FS_Q35_A5-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[33], A[2]</a>), the result being that an apprehension which at first was pleasant becomes tedious. But these two things cannot occur directly + in the contemplation of the mind; because the mind has no corporeal organ: wherefore it was said in the authority quoted above + that intellectual + contemplation has neither "bitterness," nor "tediousness." Since, however, the human mind, in contemplation, makes use of + the sensitive powers of apprehension, to whose acts weariness is incidental; therefore some affliction or pain is indirectly + mingled with contemplation. + </p><p id="FS_Q35_A5-p11"> Nevertheless, in neither of these ways, is the pain thus accidentally mingled with contemplation, contrary to the pleasure + thereof. Because pain caused by a hindrance to contemplation, is not contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, but rather + is in affinity and in harmony with it, as is evident from what has been said above + <a href="#FS_Q35_A4" id="FS_Q35_A5-p11.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>: while pain or sorrow caused by bodily weariness, does not belong to the same genus, wherefore it is altogether disparate. + Accordingly it is evident that no sorrow is contrary to pleasure taken in the very act of contemplation; nor is any sorrow + connected with it save accidentally. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 5 co."><a name="35064" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35064] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod delectatio contemplationis potest intelligi +dupliciter. Uno modo, ita quod contemplatio sit delectationis +causa, et non obiectum. Et tunc delectatio non est de ipsa +contemplatione, sed de re contemplata. Contingit autem contemplari +aliquid nocivum et contristans, sicut et aliquid conveniens et +delectans. Unde si sic delectatio contemplationis accipiatur, nihil +prohibet delectationi contemplationis esse tristitiam contrariam. +Alio modo potest dici delectatio contemplationis, quia contemplatio +est eius obiectum et causa, puta cum aliquis delectatur de hoc ipso +quod contemplatur. Et sic, ut dicit Gregorius Nyssenus, <i>ei +delectationi quae est secundum contemplationem, non opponitur +aliqua tristitia</i>. Et hoc idem philosophus dicit, in I Topic. et +in X Ethic. Sed hoc est intelligendum, per se loquendo. Cuius ratio +est, quia tristitia per se contrariatur delectationi quae est de +contrario obiecto, sicut delectationi quae est de calore, +contrariatur tristitia quae est de frigore. Obiecto autem +contemplationis nihil est contrarium, contrariorum enim rationes, +secundum quod sunt apprehensae, non sunt contrariae, sed unum +contrarium est ratio cognoscendi aliud. Unde delectationi quae est +in contemplando, non potest, per se loquendo, esse aliqua tristitia +contraria. Sed nec etiam habet tristitiam annexam, sicut corporales +delectationes, quae sunt ut medicinae quaedam contra aliquas +molestias, sicut aliquis delectatur in potu ex hoc quod anxiatur +siti, quando autem iam tota sitis est repulsa, etiam cessat +delectatio potus. Delectatio enim contemplationis non causatur ex +hoc quod excluditur aliqua molestia, sed ex hoc quod est secundum +seipsam delectabilis, non est enim generatio, sed operatio quaedam +perfecta, ut dictum est. Per accidens autem admiscetur tristitia +delectationi apprehensionis. Et hoc dupliciter, uno modo, ex parte +organi; alio modo, ex impedimento apprehensionis. Ex parte quidem +organi, admiscetur tristitia vel dolor apprehensioni, directe +quidem in viribus apprehensivis sensitivae partis, quae habent +organum corporale, vel ex sensibili, quod est contrarium debitae +complexioni organi, sicut gustus rei amarae et olfactus rei +foetidae; vel ex continuitate sensibilis convenientis, quod per +assiduitatem facit superexcrescentiam naturalis habitus, ut supra +dictum est, et sic redditur apprehensio sensibilis quae prius erat +delectabilis, taediosa. Sed haec duo directe in contemplatione +mentis locum non habent, quia mens non habet organum corporale. +Unde dictum est in auctoritate inducta, quod non habet contemplatio +mentis nec amaritudinem nec taedium. Sed quia mens humana utitur in +contemplando viribus apprehensivis sensitivis, in quarum actibus +accidit lassitudo; ideo indirecte admiscetur aliqua afflictio vel +dolor contemplationi. Sed neutro modo tristitia contemplationi per +accidens adiuncta, contrariatur delectationi eius. Nam tristitia +quae est de impedimento contemplationis, non contrariatur +delectationi contemplationis, sed magis habet affinitatem et +convenientiam cum ipsa, ut ex supradictis patet. Tristitia vero vel +afflictio quae est de lassitudine corporali, non ad idem genus +refertur, unde est penitus disparata. Et sic manifestum est quod +delectationi quae est de ipsa contemplatione, nulla tristitia +contrariatur; nec adiungitur ei aliqua tristitia nisi per +accidens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The "sorrow which is according to God," is not caused by the very act of intellectual contemplation, but by something which + the mind contemplates: viz. by sin, which the mind considers as contrary to the love of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="35065" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35065] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod illa tristitia quae est secundum Deum, non est +de ipsa contemplatione mentis, sed est de aliquo quod mens +contemplatur, scilicet de peccato, quod mens considerat ut +contrarium dilectioni divinae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A5-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Things which are contrary according to nature are not contrary according as they exist in the mind: for things that are contrary + in reality are not contrary in the order of thought; indeed rather is one contrary the reason for knowing the other. Hence + one and the same science considers contraries. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="35066" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35066] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ea quae sunt contraria in rerum natura, secundum quod +sunt in mente, non habent contrarietatem. Non enim rationes +contrariorum sunt contrariae, sed magis unum contrarium est ratio +cognoscendi aliud. Propter quod est una scientia contrariorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A5-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Contemplation, in itself, is never evil, since it is nothing else than the consideration of truth, which is the good of the + intellect: it can, however, be evil accidentally, i.e. in so far as the contemplation of a less noble object hinders the contemplation + of a more noble object; or on the part of the object contemplated, to which the appetite is inordinately attached. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="35067" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35067] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod contemplatio, secundum se, nunquam habet rationem +mali, cum contemplatio nihil aliud sit quam consideratio veri, quod +est bonum intellectus, sed per accidens tantum, inquantum scilicet +contemplatio vilioris impedit contemplationem melioris; vel ex +parte rei contemplatae, ad quam inordinatae appetitus +afficitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A5-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Sorrow caused by a hindrance to contemplation, is not contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, but is in harmony with it, + as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="35068" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35068] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod tristitia quae est de impedimento contemplationis, +non contrariatur delectationi contemplationis, sed est ei affinis, +ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A5-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Affliction of the flesh affects contemplation accidentally and indirectly, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 5 ad 5"><a name="35069" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35069] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod afflictio carnis per accidens et indirecte se habet +ad contemplationem mentis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q35_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q35_A6-p0.1">Q. 35. A. 6. Whether sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 63): "There + is nobody that does not shun sorrow more than he seeks pleasure." Now that which all agree in doing, seems to be natural. + Therefore it is natural and right for sorrow to be shunned more than pleasure is sought. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="35070" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35070] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod magis sit fugienda tristitia, quam +delectatio appetenda. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta +trium quaest., <i>nemo est qui non magis dolorem fugiat, quam +appetat voluptatem</i>. Illud autem in quo communiter omnia +consentiunt, videtur esse naturale. Ergo naturale est et conveniens +quod plus tristitia fugiatur, quam delectatio appetatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the action of a contrary conduces to rapidity and intensity of movement: for "hot water freezes quicker and harder," + as the Philosopher says (Meteor. i, 12). But the shunning of sorrow is due to the contrariety of the cause of sorrow; whereas + the desire for pleasure does not arise from any contrariety, but rather from the suitableness of the pleasant object. Therefore + sorrow is shunned more eagerly than pleasure is sought. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="35071" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35071] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +actio contrarii facit ad velocitatem et intensionem motus, aqua +enim calida citius et fortius congelatur, ut dicit philosophus, in +libro Meteor. Sed fuga tristitiae est ex contrarietate +contristantis, appetitus autem delectationis non est ex aliqua +contrarietate, sed magis procedit ex convenientia delectantis. Ergo +maior est fuga tristitiae quam appetitus delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the stronger the passion which a man resists according to reason, the more worthy is he of praise, and the more + virtuous: since "virtue is concerned with the difficult and the good" (Ethic. ii, 3). But the brave man who resists the movement + of shunning sorrow, is more virtuous than the temperate man, who resists the movement of desire for pleasure: since the Philosopher + says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "the brave and the just are chiefly praised." Therefore + the movement of shunning sorrow is more eager than the movement of seeking pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="35072" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35072] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quanto aliquis secundum rationem fortiori passioni repugnat, tanto +laudabilior est et virtuosior, quia virtus est circa difficile et +bonum, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed fortis, qui resistit motui quo +fugitur dolor, est virtuosior quam temperatus, qui resistit motui +quo appetitur delectatio, dicit enim philosophus, in II Rhetoric., +quod fortes et iusti maxime honorantur. Ergo vehementior est motus +quo fugitur tristitia, quam motus quo appetitur delectatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Good is stronger than evil, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). But pleasure is desirable for the sake of the good which + is its object; whereas the shunning of sorrow is on account of evil. Therefore the desire for pleasure is more eager than + the shunning of sorrow. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 6 s. c."><a name="35073" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35073] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +bonum est fortius quam malum, ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap. de +Div. Nom. Sed delectatio est appetibilis propter bonum, quod est +eius obiectum, fuga autem tristitiae est propter malum. Ergo +fortior est appetitus delectationis quam fuga tristitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q35_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The desire for pleasure is of itself more eager than the shunning of sorrow. The reason of this is that the cause of pleasure + is a suitable good; while the cause of pain or sorrow is an unsuitable evil. Now it happens that a certain good is suitable + without any repugnance at all: but it is not possible for any evil to be so unsuitable as not to be suitable in some way. + Wherefore pleasure can be entire and perfect: whereas sorrow is always partial. Therefore + desire for pleasure is naturally greater than the shunning of sorrow. Another reason is because the good, which is the object + of pleasure, is sought for its own sake: whereas the evil, which is the object of sorrow, is to be shunned as being a privation + of good: and that which is by reason of itself is stronger than that which is by reason of something else. Moreover we find + a confirmation of this in natural movements. For every natural movement is more intense in the end, when a thing + approaches the term that is suitable to its nature, than at the beginning, when it leaves the term that is unsuitable to its + nature: as though nature were more eager in tending to what is suitable to it, than in shunning what is unsuitable. Therefore + the inclination of the appetitive power is, of itself, more eager in tending to pleasure than in shunning sorrow. + </p><p id="FS_Q35_A6-p7"> But it happens accidentally that a man shuns sorrow more eagerly than he seeks pleasure: and this for three reasons. First, + on the part of the apprehension. Because, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), "love is felt more keenly, when we lack that + which we love." Now from the lack of what we love, sorrow results, which is caused either by the loss of some loved good, + or by the presence of some contrary evil. But pleasure suffers no lack of the good loved, for it rests in + possession of it. Since then love is the cause of pleasure and sorrow, the latter is more the shunned, according as love is + the more keenly felt on account of that which is contrary to it. Secondly, on the part of the cause of sorrow or pain, which + cause is repugnant to a good that is more loved than the good in which we take pleasure. For we love the natural well-being + of the body more than the pleasure of eating: and consequently we would leave the pleasure of eating and the like, from fear + of the pain occasioned by blows or other such causes, which are contrary to the well-being of the body. Thirdly, on the part + of the effect: namely, in so far as sorrow hinders not only one pleasure, but all. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 6 co."><a name="35074" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35074] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, per se loquendo, appetitus delectationis est fortior +quam fuga tristitiae. Cuius ratio est, quia causa delectationis est +bonum conveniens, causa autem doloris sive tristitiae est aliquod +malum repugnans. Contingit autem aliquod bonum esse conveniens +absque omni dissonantia, non autem potest esse aliquod malum +totaliter, absque omni convenientia, repugnans. Unde delectatio +potest esse integra et perfecta, tristitia autem est semper +secundum partem. Unde naturaliter maior est appetitus delectationis +quam fuga tristitiae. Alia vero ratio est, quia bonum, quod est +obiectum delectationis, propter seipsum appetitur, malum autem, +quod est obiectum tristitiae, est fugiendum inquantum est privatio +boni. Quod autem est per se, potius est illo quod est per aliud. +Cuius etiam signum apparet in motibus naturalibus. Nam omnis motus +naturalis intensior est in fine, cum appropinquat ad terminum suae +naturae convenientem, quam in principio, cum recedit a termino suae +naturae non convenienti, quasi natura magis tendat in id quod est +sibi conveniens, quam fugiat id quod est sibi repugnans. Unde et +inclinatio appetitivae virtutis, per se loquendo, vehementius +tendit in delectationem quam fugiat tristitiam. Sed per accidens +contingit quod tristitiam aliquis magis fugit, quam delectationem +appetat. Et hoc tripliciter. Primo quidem, ex parte apprehensionis. +Quia, ut Augustinus dicit, X de Trin., <i>amor magis sentitur, cum +eum prodit indigentia</i>. Ex indigentia autem amati procedit +tristitia, quae est ex amissione alicuius boni amati, vel ex +incursu alicuius mali contrarii. Delectatio autem non habet +indigentiam boni amati, sed quiescit in eo iam adepto. Cum igitur +amor sit causa delectationis et tristitiae, tanto magis fugitur +tristitia, quanto magis sentitur amor ex eo quod contrariatur +amori. Secundo, ex parte causae contristantis, vel dolorem +inferentis, quae repugnat bono magis amato quam sit bonum illud in +quo delectamur. Magis enim amamus consistentiam corporis naturalem, +quam delectationem cibi. Et ideo timore doloris qui provenit ex +flagellis vel aliis huiusmodi, quae contrariantur bonae +consistentiae corporis, dimittimus delectationem ciborum vel +aliorum huiusmodi. Tertio, ex parte effectus, inquantum scilicet +tristitia impedit non unam tantum delectationem, sed omnes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saying of Augustine that "sorrow is shunned more than pleasure is sought" is true accidentally but not simply. And this + is clear from what he says after: "Since we see that the most savage animals are deterred from the greatest pleasures by fear + of pain," which pain is contrary to life which is loved above all. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="35075" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35075] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod illud quod Augustinus dicit, quod <i>dolor magis +fugitur quam voluptas appetatur</i>, est verum per accidens, et non +per se. Et hoc patet ex eo quod subdit, <i>quandoquidem videmus +etiam immanissimas bestias a maximis voluptatibus absterreri +dolorum metu</i>, qui contrariatur vitae, quae maxime amatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not the same with movement from within and movement from without. For movement from within tends to what is suitable + more than it recedes from that which is unsuitable; as we remarked above in regard to natural movement. But movement from + without is intensified by the very opposition: because each thing strives in its own way to resist anything contrary to it, + as aiming at its own preservation. Hence violent movement is intense at first, and + slackens towards the end. Now the movement of the appetitive faculty is from within: since it tends from the soul to the object. + Consequently pleasure is, of itself, more to be sought than sorrow is to be shunned. But the movement of the sensitive faculty + is from without, as it were from the object of the soul. Consequently the more contrary a thing is the more it is felt. And + then too, accidentally, in so far as the senses are requisite for pleasure and pain, pain is shunned more than pleasure + is sought. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="35076" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35076] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod aliter est in motu qui est ab interiori, et aliter in +motu qui est ab exteriori. Motus enim qui est ab interiori, magis +tendit in id quod est conveniens, quam recedat a contrario, sicut +supra dictum est de motu naturali. Sed motus qui est ab extrinseco, +intenditur ex ipsa contrarietate, quia unumquodque suo modo nititur +ad resistendum contrario, sicut ad conservationem sui ipsius. Unde +motus violentus intenditur in principio, et remittitur in fine. +Motus autem appetitivae partis est ab intrinseco, cum sit ab anima +ad res. Et ideo, per se loquendo, magis appetitur delectatio quam +fugiatur tristitia. Sed motus sensitivae partis est ab exteriori, +quasi a rebus ad animam. Unde magis sentitur quod est magis +contrarium. Et sic etiam per accidens, inquantum sensus requiritur +ad delectationem et tristitiam, magis fugitur tristitia quam +delectatio appetatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A brave man is not praised because, in accordance with reason, he is not overcome by any kind of sorrow or pain whatever, + but because he is not overcome by that which is concerned with the dangers of death. And this kind of sorrow is more shunned, + than pleasures of the table or of sexual intercourse are sought, which latter pleasures are the object of temperance: thus + life is loved more than food and sexual pleasure. But the temperate man is praised + for refraining from pleasures of touch, more than for not shunning the pains which are contrary to them, as is stated in Ethic. + iii, 11. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="35077" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35077] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod fortis non laudatur ex eo quod secundum rationem non +vincitur a dolore vel tristitia quacumque, sed ea quae consistit in +periculis mortis. Quae quidem tristitia magis fugitur quam +appetatur delectatio ciborum vel venereorum, circa quam est +temperantia, sicut vita magis amatur quam cibus vel coitus. Sed +temperatus magis laudatur ex hoc quod non prosequitur delectationes +tactus, quam ex hoc quod non fugit tristitias contrarias, ut patet +in III Ethic.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q35_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q35_A7-p0.1">Q. 35. A. 7. Whether outward pain is greater than interior sorrow?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that outward pain is greater than interior sorrow of the heart. Because outward pain arises from a cause repugnant + to the well-being of the body in which is life: whereas interior sorrow is caused by some evil in the imagination. Since, + therefore, life is loved more than an imagined good, it seems that, according to what has been said above + <a href="#FS_Q35_A6" id="FS_Q35_A7-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[6])</a>, outward pain is greater than interior sorrow. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="35078" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35078] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod dolor exterior sit maior quam dolor +cordis interior. Dolor enim exterior causatur ex causa repugnante +bonae consistentiae corporis, in quo est vita, dolor autem interior +causatur ex aliqua imaginatione mali. Cum ergo vita magis ametur +quam imaginatum bonum, videtur, secundum praedicta, quod dolor +exterior sit maior quam dolor interior.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the reality moves more than its likeness does. But outward pain arises from the real conjunction of some contrary; + whereas inward sorrow arises from the apprehended likeness of a contrary. Therefore outward pain is greater than inward sorrow. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="35079" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35079] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +res magis movet quam rei similitudo. Sed dolor exterior provenit ex +reali coniunctione alicuius contrarii, dolor autem interior ex +similitudine contrarii apprehensa. Ergo maior est dolor exterior +quam dolor interior.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a cause is known by its effect. But outward pain has more striking effects: since man dies sooner of outward pain + than of interior sorrow. Therefore outward pain is greater and is shunned more than interior sorrow. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="35080" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35080] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +causa ex effectu cognoscitur. Sed dolor exterior habet fortiores +effectus, facilius enim homo moritur propter dolores exteriores +quam propter dolorem interiorem. Ergo exterior dolor est maior, et +magis fugitur, quam dolor interior.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q35_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.25.17" target="asv">Ecclus. 25:17</a>): "The sadness of the heart is every wound [Douay: 'plague'], and the wickedness of a woman is all evil." Therefore, just + as the wickedness of a woman surpasses all other wickedness, as the text implies; so sadness of the heart surpasses every + outward wound. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 7 s. c."><a name="35081" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35081] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Eccli. XXV, <i>omnis plaga tristitia cordis est, +et omnis malitia nequitia mulieris</i>. Ergo, sicut nequitia +mulieris alias nequitias superat, ut ibi intenditur; ita tristitia +cordis omnem plagam exteriorem excedit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q35_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Interior and exterior pain agree in one point and differ in two. They agree in this, that each is a movement of the appetitive + power, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q35_A1" id="FS_Q35_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But they differ in respect of those two things which are requisite for pain and pleasure; namely, in respect of the cause, + which is a conjoined good or evil; and in respect of the apprehension. For the cause of outward pain is a conjoined evil repugnant + to the body; while the + cause of inward pain is a conjoined evil repugnant to the appetite. Again, outward pain arises from an apprehension of sense, + chiefly of touch; while inward pain arises from an interior apprehension, of the imagination or of the reason. + </p><p id="FS_Q35_A7-p7"> If then we compare the cause of inward pain to the cause of outward pain, the former belongs, of itself, to the appetite + to which both these pains belong: while the latter belongs to the appetite directly. Because inward pain arises from something + being repugnant to the appetite itself, while outward pain arises from something being repugnant to the appetite, through + being repugnant to the body. Now, that which is of itself is always prior to that which is by reason of another. + Wherefore, from this point of view, inward pain surpasses outward pain. In like manner also on the part of apprehension: because + the apprehension of reason and imagination is of a higher order than the apprehension of the sense of touch. Consequently + inward pain is, simply and of itself, more keen than outward pain: a sign whereof is that one willingly undergoes outward + pain in order to avoid inward pain: and in so far as outward pain is not repugnant to the interior appetite, it becomes in + a + manner pleasant and agreeable by way of inward joy. Sometimes, however, outward pain is accompanied by inward pain, and then + the pain is increased. Because inward pain is not only greater than outward pain, it is also more universal: since whatever + is repugnant to the body, can be repugnant to the interior appetite; and whatever is apprehended by sense may be apprehended + by imagination and reason, but not conversely. Hence in the passage quoted above it is said expressively: "Sadness of the + heart is every wound," because even the pains of outward wounds are comprised in the interior sorrows of the heart. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 7 co."><a name="35082" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35082] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod dolor interior et exterior in uno conveniunt, et in +duobus differunt. Conveniunt quidem in hoc, quod uterque est motus +appetitivae virtutis, ut supra dictum est. Differunt autem secundum +illa duo quae ad tristitiam et delectationem requiruntur, scilicet +secundum causam, quae est bonum vel malum coniunctum; et secundum +apprehensionem. Causa enim doloris exterioris est malum coniunctum +quod repugnat corpori, causa autem interioris doloris est malum +coniunctum quod repugnat appetitui. Dolor etiam exterior sequitur +apprehensionem sensus, et specialiter tactus, dolor autem interior +sequitur apprehensionem interiorem, imaginationis scilicet vel +etiam rationis. Si ergo comparatur causa interioris doloris ad +causam exterioris, una per se pertinet ad appetitum, cuius est +uterque dolor, alia vero per aliud. Nam dolor interior est ex hoc +quod aliquid repugnat ipsi appetitui, exterior autem dolor, ex hoc +quod repugnat appetitui quia repugnat corpori. Semper autem quod +est per se, prius est eo quod est per aliud. Unde ex parte ista, +dolor interior praeeminet dolori exteriori. Similiter etiam ex +parte apprehensionis. Nam apprehensio rationis et imaginationis +altior est quam apprehensio sensu tactus. Unde simpliciter et per +se loquendo, dolor interior potior est quam dolor exterior. Cuius +signum est, quod etiam dolores exteriores aliquis voluntarie +suscipit, ut evitet interiorem dolorem. Et inquantum non repugnat +dolor exterior interiori appetitui, fit quodammodo delectabilis et +iucundus interiori gaudio. Quandoque tamen dolor exterior est cum +interiori dolore, et tunc dolor augetur. Non solum enim interior +dolor est maior quam exterior, sed etiam universalior. Quidquid +enim est repugnans corpori, potest esse repugnans interiori +appetitui; et quidquid apprehenditur sensu, potest apprehendi +imaginatione et ratione; sed non convertitur. Et ideo signanter in +auctoritate adducta dicitur, omnis plaga tristitia cordis est, quia +etiam dolores exteriorum plagarum sub interiori cordis tristitia +comprehenduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Inward pain can also arise from things that are destructive of life. And then the comparison of inward to outward pain must + not be taken in reference to the various evils that cause pain; but in regard to the various ways in which this cause of pain + is compared to the appetite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="35083" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35083] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod dolor interior potest etiam esse de his quae +contrariantur vitae. Et sic comparatio doloris interioris ad +exteriorem non est accipienda secundum diversa mala quae sunt causa +doloris, sed secundum diversam comparationem huius causae doloris +ad appetitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Inward pain is not caused by the apprehended likeness of a thing: for a man is not inwardly pained by the apprehended likeness + itself, but by the thing which the likeness represents. And this thing is all the more perfectly apprehended by means of its + likeness, as this likeness is more immaterial and abstract. Consequently inward pain is, of itself, greater, as being caused + by a greater evil, forasmuch as evil is better known by an inward + apprehension. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="35084" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35084] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod tristitia interior non procedit ex similitudine rei +apprehensa, sicut ex causa, non enim homo tristatur interius de +ipsa similitudine apprehensa, sed de re cuius est similitudo. Quae +quidem res tanto perfectius apprehenditur per aliquam +similitudinem, quanto similitudo est magis immaterialis et +abstracta. Et ideo dolor interior, per se loquendo, est maior, +tanquam de maiori malo existens; propter hoc quod interiori +apprehensione magis cognoscitur malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Bodily changes are more liable to be caused by outward pain, both from the fact that outward pain is caused by a corruptive + conjoined corporally, which is a necessary condition of the sense of touch; and from the fact that the outward sense is more + material than the inward sense, just as the sensitive appetite is more material than the intellective. For this reason, as + stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q22_A3" id="FS_Q35_A7-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[3]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q31_A5" id="FS_Q35_A7-p10.2" shape="rect"> Q[31], + A[5] + </a> ), the body undergoes a greater change from the movement of the sensitive appetite: and, in like manner, from outward than + from inward pain. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="35085" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35085] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod immutationes corporales magis causantur ex dolore +exteriori, tum quia causa doloris exterioris est corrumpens +coniunctum corporaliter, quod exigit apprehensio tactus. Tum etiam +quia sensus exterior est magis corporalis quam sensus interior, +sicut et appetitus sensitivus quam intellectivus. Et propter hoc, +ut supra dictum est, ex motu appetitus sensitivi magis corpus +immutatur. Et similiter ex dolore exteriori, magis quam ex dolore +interiori.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q35_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q35_A8-p0.1">Q. 35. A. 8. Whether there are only four species of sorrow?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Damascene's (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) division of sorrow into four species is incorrect; viz. into "torpor, + distress," which Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] calls "anxiety,"---"pity," and "envy." For sorrow is contrary + to pleasure. But there are not several species of pleasure. Therefore it is incorrect to assign different species of sorrow. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="35086" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35086] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod Damascenus inconvenienter quatuor +tristitiae species assignet, quae sunt acedia, achthos (vel +anxietas secundum Gregorium Nyssenum), misericordia et invidia. +Tristitia enim delectationi opponitur. Sed delectationis non +assignantur aliquae species. Ergo nec tristitiae species debent +assignari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Repentance" is a species of sorrow; and so are "indignation" and "jealousy," as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, + 9,11). But these are not included in the above species. Therefore this division is insufficient. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="35087" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35087] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +poenitentia est quaedam species tristitiae. Similiter etiam Nemesis +et zelus, ut dicit philosophus, II Rhetoric. Quae quidem sub his +speciebus non comprehenduntur. Ergo insufficiens est eius praedicta +divisio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the members of a division should be things that are opposed to one another. But these species are not opposed to + one another. For according to Gregory [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] "torpor is sorrow depriving of speech; anxiety is the + sorrow that weighs down; envy is sorrow for another's good; pity is sorrow for another's wrongs." But it is possible for one + to sorrow for another's wrongs, and for another's good, and at the same time to be weighed + down inwardly, and outwardly to be speechless. Therefore this division is correct. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="35088" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35088] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +omnis divisio debet esse per opposita. Sed praedicta non habent +oppositionem ad invicem. Nam secundum Gregorium <i>acedia est +tristitia vocem amputans; anxietas vero est tristitia aggravans; +invidia vero est tristitia in alienis bonis; misericordia autem est +tristitia in alienis malis</i>. Contingit autem aliquem tristari et +de alienis malis, et de alienis bonis et simul cum hoc interius +aggravari, et exterius vocem amittere. Ergo praedicta divisio non +est conveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the twofold authority of Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius] and of Damascene. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 8 s. c."><a name="35089" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35089] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est auctoritas utriusque, scilicet Gregorii Nysseni et +Damasceni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q35_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It belongs to the notion of a species that it is something added to the genus. But a thing can be added to a genus in two + ways. First, as something belonging of itself to the genus, and virtually contained therein: thus "rational" is added to "animal." + Such an addition makes true species of a genus: as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vii, 12; viii, 2,3). But, secondly, a thing + may be added to a genus, that is, as it were, foreign to the notion conveyed by that + genus: thus "white" or something of the kind may be added to "animal." Such an addition does not make true species of the + genus, according to the usual sense in which we speak of genera and species. But sometimes a thing is said to be a species + of a certain genus, through having something foreign to that genus indeed, but to which the notion of that genus is applicable: + thus a live coal or a flame is said to be a species of fire, because in each of them the nature of fire is applied to a + foreign matter. In like manner we speak of astronomy and perspective as being species of mathematics, inasmuch as the principles + of mathematics are applied to natural matter. + </p><p id="FS_Q35_A8-p7"> In accordance with this manner of speaking, the species of sorrow are reckoned by an application of the notion of sorrow + to something foreign to it. This foreign matter may be taken on the part of the cause or the object, or of the effect. For + the proper object of sorrow is "one's own evil." Hence sorrow may be concerned for an object foreign to it either through + one's being sorry for an evil that is not one's own; and thus we have "pity" which is sorrow for another's evil, + considered, however, as one's own: or through one's being sorry for something that is neither evil nor one's own, but another's + good, considered, however, as one's own evil: and thus we have "envy." The proper effect of sorrow consists in a certain "flight + of the appetite." Wherefore the foreign element in the effect of sorrow, may be taken so as to affect the first part only, + by excluding flight: and thus we have "anxiety" which weighs on the mind, so as to make escape seem impossible: hence + it is also called "perplexity." If, however, the mind be weighed down so much, that even the limbs become motionless, which + belongs to "torpor," then we have the foreign element affecting both, since there is neither flight, nor is the effect in + the appetite. And the reason why torpor especially is said to deprive one of speech is because of all the external movements + the voice is the best expression of the inward thought and desire, not only in men, but also in other animals, as is stated + in + Polit. i, 1. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 8 co."><a name="35090" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35090] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod ad rationem speciei pertinet quod se habeat ex +additione ad genus. Sed generi potest aliquid addi dupliciter. Uno +modo, quod per se ad ipsum pertinet, et virtute continetur in ipso, +sicut rationale additur animali. Et talis additio facit veras +species alicuius generis, ut per philosophum patet, in VII et VIII +Metaphys. Aliquid vero additur generi quasi aliquid extraneum a +ratione ipsius, sicut si album animali addatur, vel aliquid +huiusmodi. Et talis additio non facit veras species generis, +secundum quod communiter loquimur de genere et speciebus. Interdum +tamen dicitur aliquid esse species alicuius generis propter hoc +quod habet aliquid extraneum ad quod applicatur generis ratio, +sicut carbo et flamma dicuntur esse species ignis, propter +applicationem naturae ignis ad materiam alienam. Et simili modo +loquendi dicuntur astrologia et perspectiva species mathematicae, +inquantum principia mathematica applicantur ad materiam naturalem. +Et hoc modo loquendi assignantur hic species tristitiae, per +applicationem rationis tristitiae ad aliquid extraneum. Quod quidem +extraneum accipi potest vel ex parte causae, obiecti; vel ex parte +effectus. Proprium enim obiectum tristitiae est proprium malum. +Unde extraneum obiectum tristitiae accipi potest vel secundum +alterum tantum, quia scilicet est malum, sed non proprium, et sic +est misericordia, quae est tristitia de alieno malo, inquantum +tamen aestimatur ut proprium. Vel quantum ad utrumque, quia neque +est de proprio, neque de malo, sed de bono alieno, inquantum tamen +bonum alienum aestimatur ut proprium malum, et sic est invidia. +Proprius autem effectus tristitiae consistit in quadam fuga +appetitus. Unde extraneum circa effectum tristitiae, potest accipi +quantum ad alterum tantum, quia scilicet tollitur fuga, et sic est +anxietas quae sic aggravat animum, ut non appareat aliquod +refugium, unde alio nomine dicitur angustia. Si vero intantum +procedat talis aggravatio, ut etiam exteriora membra immobilitet ab +opere, quod pertinet ad acediam; sic erit extraneum quantum ad +utrumque, quia nec est fuga, nec est in appetitu. Ideo autem +specialiter acedia dicitur vocem amputare, quia vox inter omnes +exteriores motus magis exprimit interiorem conceptum et affectum, +non solum in hominibus, sed etiam in aliis animalibus, ut dicitur +in I Polit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Pleasure is caused by good, which has only one meaning: and so pleasure is not divided into several species as sorrow is; + for the latter is caused by evil, which "happens in many ways," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="35091" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35091] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod delectatio causatur ex bono, quod uno modo +dicitur. Et ideo delectationis non assignantur tot species sicut +tristitiae, quae causatur ex malo, quod multifariam contingit, ut +dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Repentance is for one's own evil, which is the proper object of sorrow: wherefore it does not belong to these species. Jealousy + and indignation are included in envy, as we shall explain later ( + <a href="SS_i.html#SS_Q36_A2" id="FS_Q35_A8-p9.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[36], A[2]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="35092" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35092] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod poenitentia est de malo proprio, quod per se est +obiectum tristitiae. Unde non pertinet ad has species. Zelus vero +et Nemesis sub invidia continentur, ut infra patebit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This division is not according to opposite species; but according to the diversity of foreign matter to which the notion + of sorrow is applied, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="35093" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35093] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod divisio ista non sumitur secundum oppositiones +specierum, sed secundum diversitatem extraneorum ad quae trahitur +ratio tristitiae, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q36" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q36-p0.1">Q. 36. OF THE CAUSES OF SORROW OR PAIN (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q36-p2"> We must now consider the causes of sorrow: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q36-p3"><a href="#FS_Q36_A1"> (1) Whether sorrow is caused by the loss of a good or rather by the presence of an evil?</a></p><p id="FS_Q36-p4"><a href="#FS_Q36_A2"> (2) Whether desire is a cause of sorrow?</a></p><p id="FS_Q36-p5"><a href="#FS_Q36_A3"> (3) Whether the craving for unity is a cause of sorrow?</a></p><p id="FS_Q36-p6"><a href="#FS_Q36_A4"> (4) Whether an irresistible power is a cause of sorrow?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 pr."><a name="35094" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35094] +Iª-IIae q. 36 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +causis tristitiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum +causa doloris sit bonum amissum, vel magis malum coniunctum. +Secundo, utrum concupiscentia sit causa doloris. Tertio, utrum +appetitus unitatis sit causa doloris. Quarto, utrum potestas cui +resisti non potest, sit causa doloris.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q36_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q36_A1-p0.1">Q. 36. A. 1. Whether sorrow is caused by the loss of good or by the presence of evil?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow is caused by the loss of a good rather than by the presence of an evil. For Augustine says (De + viii QQ. Dulcit. qu. 1) that sorrow is caused by the loss of temporal goods. Therefore, in like manner, every sorrow is caused + by the loss of some good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35095" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35095] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonum amissum sit magis causa doloris +quam malum coniunctum. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de octo +quaestionibus Dulcitii, dolorem esse de amissione bonorum +temporalium. Eadem ergo ratione, quilibet dolor ex amissione +alicuius boni contingit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it was said above ( + <a href="#FS_Q35_A4" id="FS_Q36_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[35], A[4]</a>) that the sorrow which is contrary to a pleasure, has the same object as that pleasure. But the object of pleasure is good, + as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q36_A1-p3.2" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q36_A1-p3.3" shape="rect"> Q[31], A[1]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q35_A3" id="FS_Q36_A1-p3.4" shape="rect"> Q[35], A[3]</a>). Therefore sorrow is caused chiefly by the loss of good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35096" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35096] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +supra dictum est quod dolor qui delectationi contrariatur, est de +eodem de quo est delectatio. Sed delectatio est de bono, sicut +supra dictum est. Ergo dolor est principaliter de amissione +boni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), love is the cause of sorrow, as of the other emotions of the soul. + But the object of love is good. Therefore pain or sorrow is felt for the loss of good rather than for an evil that is present. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35097" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35097] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +secundum Augustinum, XIV de Civ. Dei, amor est causa tristitiae, +sicut et aliarum affectionum animae. Sed obiectum amoris est bonum. +Ergo dolor vel tristitia magis respicit bonum amissum quam malum +coniunctum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "the dreaded evil gives rise to fear, the present evil is the cause of sorrow." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35098" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35098] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Damascenus dicit, in II libro, quod <i>expectatum malum +timorem constituit, praesens vero tristitiam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q36_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> If privations, as considered by the mind, were what they are in reality, this question would seem to be of no importance. + For, as stated in the + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q14_A10" id="FS_Q36_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[14], A[10]</a> and + <a href="FP_vi.html#FP_Q48_A3" id="FS_Q36_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[48], A[3]</a>, evil is the privation of good: and privation is in reality nothing else than the lack of the contrary habit; so that, in + this respect, to sorrow for the loss of good, would be the same as to sorrow for the presence of evil. But + sorrow is a movement of the appetite in consequence of an apprehension: and even a privation, as apprehended, has the aspect + of a being, wherefore it is called "a being of reason." And in this way evil, being a privation, is regarded as a "contrary." + Accordingly, so far as the movement of the appetite is concerned, it makes a difference which of the two it regards chiefly, + the present evil or the good which is lost. + </p><p id="FS_Q36_A1-p7"> Again, since the movement of the animal appetite holds the same place in the actions of the soul, as natural movement in + natural things; the truth of the matter is to be found by considering natural movements. For if, in natural movements, we + observe those of approach and withdrawal, approach is of itself directed to something suitable to nature; while withdrawal + is of itself directed to something contrary to nature; thus a heavy body, of itself, withdraws from a higher place, + and approaches naturally to a lower place. But if we consider the cause of both these movements, viz. gravity, then gravity + itself inclines towards the lower place more than it withdraws from the higher place, since withdrawal from the latter is + the reason for its downward tendency. + </p><p id="FS_Q36_A1-p8"> Accordingly, since, in the movements of the appetite, sorrow is a kind of flight or withdrawal, while pleasure is a kind + of pursuit or approach; just as pleasure regards first the good possessed, as its proper object, so sorrow regards the evil + that is present. On the other hand love, which is the cause of pleasure and sorrow, regards good rather than evil: and therefore, + forasmuch as the object is the cause of a passion, the present evil is more properly the cause of sorrow or + pain, than the good which is lost. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 1 co."><a name="35099" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35099] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, si hoc modo se haberent privationes in apprehensione +animae, sicut se habent in ipsis rebus, ista quaestio nullius +momenti esse videretur. Malum enim, ut in primo libro habitum est, +est privatio boni, privatio autem, in rerum natura, nihil est aliud +quam carentia oppositi habitus, secundum hoc ergo, idem esset +tristari de bono amisso, et de malo habito. Sed tristitia est motus +appetitus apprehensionem sequentis. In apprehensione autem ipsa +privatio habet rationem cuiusdam entis, unde dicitur ens rationis. +Et sic malum, cum sit privatio, se habet per modum contrarii. Et +ideo, quantum ad motum appetitivum, differt utrum respiciat +principalius malum coniunctum, vel bonum amissum. Et quia motus +appetitus animalis hoc modo se habet in operibus animae, sicut +motus naturalis in rebus naturalibus; ex consideratione naturalium +motuum veritas accipi potest. Si enim accipiamus in motibus +naturalibus accessum et recessum, accessus per se respicit id quod +est conveniens naturae; recessus autem per se respicit id quod est +contrarium; sicut grave per se recedit a loco superiori, accedit +autem naturaliter ad locum inferiorem. Sed si accipiamus causam +utriusque motus, scilicet gravitatem, ipsa gravitas per prius +inclinat ad locum deorsum, quam retrahat a loco sursum, a quo +recedit ut deorsum tendat. Sic igitur, cum tristitia in motibus +appetitivis se habeat per modum fugae vel recessus, delectatio +autem per modum prosecutionis vel accessus; sicut delectatio per +prius respicit bonum adeptum, quasi proprium obiectum, ita +tristitia respicit malum coniunctum. Sed causa delectationis et +tristitiae, scilicet amor, per prius respicit bonum quam malum. Sic +ergo eo modo quo obiectum est causa passionis, magis proprie est +causa tristitiae vel doloris malum coniunctum, quam bonum +amissum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The loss itself of good is apprehended as an evil, just as the loss of evil is apprehended as a good: and in this sense Augustine + says that pain results from the loss of temporal goods. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35100" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35100] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ipsa amissio boni apprehenditur sub ratione +mali, sicut et amissio mali apprehenditur sub ratione boni. Et ideo +Augustinus dicit dolorem provenire ex amissione temporalium +bonorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Pleasure and its contrary pain have the same object, but under contrary aspects: because if the presence of a particular + thin be the object of pleasure, the absence of that same thing is the object of sorrow. Now one contrary includes the privation + of the other, as stated in Metaph. x, 4: and consequently sorrow in respect of one contrary is, in a way, directed to the + same thing under a contrary aspect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35101" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35101] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod delectatio et dolor ei contrarius respiciunt idem, +sed sub contraria ratione, nam si delectatio est de praesentia +alicuius, tristitia est de absentia eiusdem. In uno autem +contrariorum includitur privatio alterius, ut patet in X Metaphys. +Et inde est quod tristitia quae est de contrario, est quodammodo de +eodem sub contraria ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When many movements arise from one cause, it does not follow that they all regard chiefly that which the cause regards chiefly, + but only the first of them. And each of the others regards chiefly that which is suitable to it according to its own nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35102" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35102] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, quando ex una causa proveniunt multi motus, non +oportet quod omnes principalius respiciant illud quod principalius +respicit causa, sed primus tantum. Unusquisque autem aliorum +principalius respicit illud quod est ei conveniens secundum +propriam rationem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q36_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q36_A2-p0.1">Q. 36. A. 2. Whether desire is a cause of sorrow?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that desire is not a cause of pain or sorrow. Because sorrow of itself regards evil, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q36_A1" id="FS_Q36_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>: whereas desire is a movement of the appetite towards good. Now movement towards one contrary is not a cause of movement + towards the other contrary. Therefore desire is not a cause of pain. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35103" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35103] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod concupiscentia non sit causa doloris +seu tristitiae. Tristitia enim per se respicit malum, ut dictum +est. Concupiscentia autem est motus quidam appetitus in bonum. +Motus autem qui est in unum contrarium, non est causa motus qui +respicit aliud contrarium. Ergo concupiscentia non est causa +doloris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, pain, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12), is caused by something present; whereas the object of desire + is something future. Therefore desire is not a cause of pain. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35104" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35104] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +dolor, secundum Damascenum, est de praesenti, concupiscentia autem +est de futuro. Ergo concupiscentia non est causa doloris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is pleasant in itself is not a cause of pain. But desire is pleasant in itself, as the Philosopher says + (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore desire is not a cause of pain or sorrow. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35105" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35105] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +id quod est per se delectabile, non est causa doloris. Sed +concupiscentia est secundum seipsam delectabilis, ut philosophus +dicit, in I Rhetoric. Ergo concupiscentia non est causa doloris seu +tristitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Enchiridion xxiv): "When ignorance of things necessary to be done, and desire of things hurtful, found their + way in: error and pain stole an entrance in their company." But ignorance is the cause of error. Therefore desire is a cause + of sorrow. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35106" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35106] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., <i>subintrantibus +ignorantia agendarum rerum, et concupiscentia noxiarum, comites +subinferuntur error et dolor</i>. Sed ignorantia est causa erroris. +Ergo concupiscentia est causa doloris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q36_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Sorrow is a movement of the animal appetite. Now, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q36_A1" id="FS_Q36_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the appetitive movement is likened to the natural appetite; a likeness, that may be assigned to a twofold cause; one, on + the part of the end, the other, on the part of the principle of movement. Thus, on the part of the end, the cause of a heavy + body's downward movement is the lower place; while the principle of that movement is a natural inclination resulting + from gravity. + </p><p id="FS_Q36_A2-p7"> Now the cause of the appetitive movement, on the part of the end, is the object of that movement. And thus, it has been said + above + <a href="#FS_Q36_A1" id="FS_Q36_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that the cause of pain or sorrow is a present evil. On the other hand, the cause, by way or principle, of that movement, + is the inward inclination of the appetite; which inclination regards, first of all, the good, and in consequence, the rejection + of a contrary evil. Hence the first principle of this appetitive + movement is love, which is the first inclination of the appetite towards the possession of good: while the second principle + is hatred, which is the first inclination of the appetite towards the avoidance of evil. But since concupiscence or desire + is the first effect of love, which gives rise to the greatest pleasure, as stated above (Q[32], A[6]); hence it is that Augustine + often speaks of desire or concupiscence in the sense of love, as was also stated (Q[30], A[2], ad 2): and in this sense he + says that desire is the universal cause of sorrow. Sometimes, however, desire taken in its proper sense, is the cause of sorrow. + Because whatever hinders a movement from reaching its end is contrary to that movement. Now that which is contrary to the + movement of the appetite, is a cause of sorrow. Consequently, desire becomes a cause of sorrow, in so far as we sorrow for + the delay of a desired good, or for its entire removal. But it cannot be a universal cause of sorrow: since we sorrow more + for the loss of present good, in which we have already taken pleasure, than for the withdrawal of future good which we desire + to have. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 2 co."><a name="35107" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35107] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod tristitia est motus quidam appetitus animalis. Motus +autem appetitivus habet, sicut dictum est, similitudinem appetitus +naturalis. Cuius duplex causa assignari potest, una per modum +finis; alia sicut unde est principium motus. Sicut descensionis +corporis gravis causa sicut finis, est locus deorsum, principium +autem motus est inclinatio naturalis, quae est ex gravitate. Causa +autem motus appetitivi per modum finis, est eius obiectum. Et sic +supra dictum est quod causa doloris seu tristitiae est malum +coniunctum. Causa autem sicut unde est principium talis motus, est +interior inclinatio appetitus. Qui quidem per prius inclinatur ad +bonum; et ex consequenti ad repudiandum malum contrarium. Et ideo +huiusmodi motus appetitivi primum principium est amor, qui est +prima inclinatio appetitus ad bonum consequendum, secundum autem +principium est odium, quod est inclinatio prima appetitus ad malum +fugiendum. Sed quia concupiscentia vel cupiditas est primus +effectus amoris, quo maxime delectamur, ut supra dictum est; ideo +frequenter Augustinus cupiditatem vel concupiscentiam pro amore +ponit, ut etiam supra dictum est. Et hoc modo concupiscentiam dicit +esse universalem causam doloris. Sed ipsa concupiscentia, secundum +propriam rationem considerata, est interdum causa doloris. Omne +enim quod impedit motum ne perveniat ad terminum, est contrarium +motui. Illud autem quod est contrarium motui appetitus, est +contristans. Et sic per consequens concupiscentia fit causa +tristitiae, inquantum de retardatione boni concupiti, vel totali +ablatione, tristamur. Universalis autem causa doloris esse non +potest, quia magis dolemus de subtractione bonorum praesentium, in +quibus iam delectamur, quam futurorum, quae concupiscimus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The inclination of the appetite to the possession of good causes the inclination of the appetite to fly from evil, as stated + above. And hence it is that the appetitive movements that regard good, are reckoned as causing the appetitive movements that + regard evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35108" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35108] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod inclinatio appetitus ad bonum consequendum, est +causa inclinationis appetitus ad malum fugiendum, sicut dictum est. +Et ex hoc contingit quod motus appetitivi qui respiciunt bonum, +ponuntur causa motuum appetitus qui respiciunt malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That which is desired, though really future, is, nevertheless, in a way, present, inasmuch as it is hoped for. Or we may + say that although the desired good itself is future, yet the hindrance is reckoned as present, and so gives rise to sorrow. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35109" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35109] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod illud quod concupiscitur, etsi realiter sit futurum, +est tamen quodammodo praesens, inquantum speratur. Vel potest dici +quod, licet ipsum bonum concupitum sit futurum, tamen impedimentum +praesentialiter apponitur, quod dolorem causat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Desire gives pleasure, so long as there is hope of obtaining that which is desired. But, when hope is removed through the + presence of an obstacle, desire causes sorrow. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35110" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35110] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod concupiscentia est delectabilis, quandiu manet spes +adipiscendi quod concupiscitur. Sed, subtracta spe per impedimentum +appositum, concupiscentia dolorem causat.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q36_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q36_A3-p0.1">Q. 36. A. 3. Whether the craving for unity is a cause of sorrow?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the craving for unity is not a cause of sorrow. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 3) that "this opinion," + which held repletion to be the cause of pleasure, and division [*Aristotle wrote {endeian}, 'want'; St. Thomas, in the Latin + version, read 'incisionem'; should he have read 'indigentiam'?], the cause of sorrow, "seems to have originated in pains and + pleasures connected with food." But not every pleasure or sorrow is of this kind. + Therefore the craving for unity is not the universal cause of sorrow; since repletion pertains to unity, and division is the + cause of multitude. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35111" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35111] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod appetitus unitatis non sit causa +doloris. Dicit enim philosophus, in X Ethic., quod haec opinio, +quae posuit repletionem esse causam delectationis, et incisionem +causam tristitiae, videtur esse facta ex delectationibus et +tristitiis quae sunt circa cibum. Sed non omnis delectatio vel +tristitia est huiusmodi. Ergo appetitus unitatis non est causa +universalis doloris, cum repletio ad unitatem pertineat, incisio +vero multitudinem inducat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every separation is opposed to unity. If therefore sorrow were caused by a craving for unity, no separation would + be pleasant: and this is clearly untrue as regards the separation of whatever is superfluous. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35112" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35112] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quaelibet separatio unitati opponitur. Si ergo dolor causaretur ex +appetitu unitatis, nulla separatio esset delectabilis. Quod patet +esse falsum in separatione omnium superfluorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, for the same reason we desire the conjunction of good and the removal of evil. But as conjunction regards unity, + since it is a kind of union; so separation is contrary to unity. Therefore the craving for unity should not be reckoned, rather + than the craving for separation, as causing sorrow. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35113" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35113] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +eadem ratione appetimus coniunctionem boni, et remotionem mali. Sed +sicut coniunctio pertinet ad unitatem, cum sit unio quaedam; ita +separatio est contrarium unitati. Ergo appetitus unitatis non magis +debet poni causa doloris quam appetitus separationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 23), that "from the pain that dumb animals feel, it is quite evident how their souls desire + unity, in ruling and quickening their bodies. For what else is pain but a feeling of impatience of division or corruption?" + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35114" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35114] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in III de libero arbitrio, <i>quod ex +dolore quem bestiae sentiunt, satis apparet in regendis +animandisque suis corporibus, quam sint animae appetentes unitatis. +Quid enim est aliud dolor, nisi quidam sensus divisionis vel +corruptionis impatiens?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Forasmuch as the desire or craving for good is reckoned as a cause of sorrow, so must a craving for unity, and love, be accounted + as causing sorrow. Because the good of each thing consists in a certain unity, inasmuch as each thing has, united in itself, + the elements of which its perfection consists: wherefore the Platonists held that "one" is a principle, just as "good" is. + Hence everything naturally desires unity, just as it desires goodness: and + therefore, just as love or desire for good is a cause of sorrow, so also is the love or craving for unity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 3 co."><a name="35115" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35115] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod eo modo quo concupiscentia vel cupiditas boni est +causa doloris, etiam appetitus unitatis, vel amor, causa doloris +ponendus est. Bonum enim uniuscuiusque rei in quadam unitate +consistit, prout scilicet unaquaeque res habet in se unita illa ex +quibus consistit eius perfectio, unde et Platonici posuerunt unum +esse principium, sicut et bonum. Unde naturaliter unumquodque +appetit unitatem, sicut et bonitatem. Et propter hoc, sicut amor +vel appetitus boni est causa doloris, ita etiam amor vel appetitus +unitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every kind of union causes perfect goodness, but only that on which the perfect being of a thing depends. Hence neither + does the desire of any kind of unity cause pain or sorrow, as some have maintained: whose opinion is refuted by the Philosopher + from the fact that repletion is not always pleasant; for instance, when a man has eaten to repletion, he takes no further + pleasure in eating; because repletion or union of this kind, is repugnant rather + than conducive to perfect being. Consequently sorrow is caused by the craving, not for any kind of unity, but for that unity + in which the perfection of nature consists. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35116" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35116] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod non omnis unio perficit rationem boni, sed solum +illa a qua dependet esse perfectum rei. Et propter hoc etiam, non +cuiuslibet appetitus unitatis est causa doloris vel tristitiae, ut +quidam opinabantur. Quorum opinionem ibi philosophus excludit per +hoc, quod quaedam repletiones non sunt delectabiles, sicut repleti +cibis non delectantur in ciborum sumptione. Talis enim repletio, +sive unio, magis repugnaret ad perfectum esse, quam ipsum +constitueret. Unde dolor non causatur ex appetitu cuiuslibet +unitatis, sed eius in qua consistit perfectio naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Separation can be pleasant, either because it removes something contrary to a thing's perfection, or because it has some + union connected with it, such as union of the sense to its object. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35117" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35117] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod separatio potest esse delectabilis, vel inquantum +removetur illud quod est contrarium perfectioni rei, vel inquantum +separatio habet aliquam unionem adiunctam, puta sensibilis ad +sensum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Separation from things hurtful and corruptive is desired, in so far as they destroy the unity which is due. Wherefore the + desire for such like separation is not the first cause of sorrow, whereas the craving for unity is. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35118" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35118] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod separatio nocivorum et corrumpentium appetitur, +inquantum tollunt debitam unitatem. Unde appetitus huiusmodi +separationis non est prima causa doloris, sed magis appetitus +unitatis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q36_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q36_A4-p0.1">Q. 36. A. 4. Whether an irresistible power is a cause of sorrow?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a greater power should not be reckoned a cause of sorrow. For that which is in the power of the agent + is not present but future. But sorrow is for present evil. Therefore a greater power is not a cause of sorrow. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35119" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35119] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod potestas maior non debeat poni causa +doloris. Quod enim est in potestate agentis, nondum est praesens, +sed futurum. Dolor autem est de malo praesenti. Ergo potestas maior +non est causa doloris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, hurt inflicted is the cause of sorrow. But hurt can be inflicted even by a lesser power. Therefore a greater power + should not be reckoned as a cause of sorrow. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35120" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35120] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +nocumentum illatum est causa doloris. Sed nocumentum potest inferri +etiam a potestate minore. Ergo potestas maior non debet poni causa +doloris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the interior inclinations of the soul are the causes of the movements of appetite. But a greater power is something + external. Therefore it should not be reckoned as a cause of sorrow. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35121" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35121] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +causae appetitivorum motuum sunt interiores inclinationes animae. +Potestas autem maior est aliquid exterius. Ergo non debet poni +causa doloris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx): "Sorrow in the soul is caused by the will resisting a stronger power: while pain in the + body is caused by sense resisting a stronger body." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35122" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35122] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de natura boni, <i>in animo +dolorem facit voluntas resistens potestati maiori; in corpore +dolorem facit sensus resistens corpori potentiori</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q36_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q36_A1" id="FS_Q36_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, a present evil, is cause of sorrow or pain, by way of object. Therefore that which is the cause of the evil being present, + should be reckoned as causing pain or sorrow. Now it is evident that it is contrary to the inclination of the appetite to + be united with a present evil: and whatever is contrary to a thing's inclination does not happen to it save by the action + of something stronger. Wherefore Augustine + reckons a greater power as being the cause of sorrow. + </p><p id="FS_Q36_A4-p7"> But it must be noted that if the stronger power goes so far as to transform the contrary inclination into its own inclination + there will be no longer repugnance or violence: thus if a stronger agent, by its action on a heavy body, deprives it of its + downward tendency, its consequent upward tendency is not violent but natural to it. + </p><p id="FS_Q36_A4-p8"> Accordingly if some greater power prevail so far as to take away from the will or the sensitive appetite, their respective + inclinations, pain or sorrow will not result therefrom; such is the result only when the contrary inclination of the appetite + remains. And hence Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx) that sorrow is caused by the will "resisting a stronger power": for were + it not to resist, but to yield by consenting, the result would be not sorrow but pleasure. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 4 co."><a name="35123" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35123] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, malum coniunctum est causa +doloris vel tristitiae per modum obiecti. Id ergo quod est causa +coniunctionis mali, debet poni causa doloris vel tristitiae. +Manifestum est autem hoc esse contra inclinationem appetitus, ut +malo praesentialiter inhaereat. Quod autem est contra inclinationem +alicuius, nunquam advenit ei nisi per actionem alicuius fortioris. +Et ideo potestas maior ponitur esse causa doloris ab Augustino. Sed +sciendum est quod, si potestas fortior intantum invalescat quod +mutet contrariam inclinationem in inclinationem propriam, iam non +erit aliqua repugnantia vel violentia, sicut quando agens fortius, +corrumpendo corpus grave, aufert ei inclinationem qua tendit +deorsum; et tunc ferri sursum non est ei violentum, sed naturale. +Sic igitur si aliqua potestas maior intantum invalescat quod +auferat inclinationem voluntatis vel appetitus sensitivi, ex ea non +sequitur dolor vel tristitia, sed tunc solum sequitur, quando +remanet inclinatio appetitus in contrarium. Et inde est quod +Augustinus dicit quod voluntas resistens potestati fortiori, causat +dolorem, si enim non resisteret, sed cederet consentiendo, non +sequeretur dolor, sed delectatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A greater power causes sorrow, as acting not potentially but actually, i.e. by causing the actual presence of the corruptive + evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35124" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35124] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod maior potestas dolorem causat, non secundum quod +est agens in potentia, sed secundum quod est agens actu, dum +scilicet facit coniunctionem mali corruptivi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Nothing hinders a power which is not simply greater, from being greater in some respect: and accordingly it is able to inflict + some harm. But if it be nowise stronger, it can do no harm at all: wherefore it cannot bring about that which causes sorrow. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35125" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35125] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquam potestatem quae non est maior +simpliciter, esse maiorem quantum ad aliquid. Et secundum hoc, +aliquod nocumentum inferre potest. Si autem nullo modo maior esset, +nullo modo posset nocere. Unde non posset causam doloris +inferre.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> External agents can be the causes of appetitive movements, in so far as they cause the presence of the object: and it is + thus that a greater power is reckoned to be the cause of sorrow. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35126" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35126] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod exteriora agentia possunt esse causa motuum +appetitivorum, inquantum causant praesentiam obiecti. Et hoc modo +potestas maior ponitur causa doloris.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q37" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q37-p0.1">Q. 37. OF THE EFFECTS OF PAIN OR SORROW (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q37-p2"> We must now consider the effects of pain or of sorrow: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q37-p3"><a href="#FS_Q37_A1"> (1) Whether pain deprives one of the power to learn?</a></p><p id="FS_Q37-p4"><a href="#FS_Q37_A2"> (2) Whether the effect of sorrow or pain is to burden the soul?</a></p><p id="FS_Q37-p5"><a href="#FS_Q37_A3"> (3) Whether sorrow or pain weakens all activity?</a></p><p id="FS_Q37-p6"><a href="#FS_Q37_A4"> (4) Whether sorrow is more harmful to the body than all the other passions of the soul?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 pr."><a name="35127" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35127] +Iª-IIae q. 37 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +effectibus doloris vel tristitiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. +Primo, utrum dolor auferat facultatem addiscendi. Secundo, utrum +aggravatio animi sit effectus tristitiae vel doloris. Tertio, utrum +tristitia vel dolor debilitet omnem operationem. Quarto, utrum +tristitia noceat corpori magis quam aliae passiones animae.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q37_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q37_A1-p0.1">Q. 37. A. 1. Whether pain deprives one of the power to learn?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pain does not deprive one of the power to learn. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.26.9" target="asv">Is. 26:9</a>): "When Thou shalt do Thy judgments on the earth, the inhabitants of the world shall learn justice": and further on (verse + 16): "In the tribulation of murmuring Thy instruction was with them." But the judgments of God and tribulation cause sorrow + in men's hearts. Therefore pain or sorrow, far from destroying, increases the power of learning. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35128" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35128] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod dolor non auferat facultatem +addiscendi. Dicitur enim Isaiae XXVI, <i>cum feceris iudicia tua in +terra, iustitiam discent omnes habitatores orbis</i>. Et infra, +<i>in tribulatione murmuris doctrina tua eis</i>, sed ex iudiciis +Dei, et tribulatione, sequitur dolor seu tristitia in cordibus +hominum. Ergo dolor vel tristitia non tollit, sed magis auget +facultatem addiscendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.28.9" target="asv">Is. 28:9</a>): "Whom shall He teach knowledge? And whom shall He make to understand the hearing? Them that are weaned from the milk, that + are drawn away from the breasts," i.e. from pleasures. But pain and sorrow are most destructive of pleasure; since sorrow + hinders all pleasure, as stated in Ethic. vii, 14: and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.11.29" target="asv">Ecclus. 11:29</a>) it is stated that "the affliction of an hour maketh one forget great + delights." Therefore pain, instead of taking away, increases the faculty of learning. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35129" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35129] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Isaiae XXVIII, dicitur, <i>quem docebit scientiam? Et quem +intelligere faciet auditum? Ablactatos a lacte, avulsos ab +uberibus</i> idest a delectationibus. Sed dolor et tristitia maxime +tollunt delectationes, impedit enim tristitia omnem delectationem, +ut dicitur in VII Ethic.; et Eccli. XI dicitur quod <i>malitia +unius horae oblivionem facit luxuriae maximae</i>. Ergo dolor non +tollit, sed magis praebet facultatem addiscendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, inward sorrow surpasses outward pain, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q35_A7" id="FS_Q37_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[35], A[7]</a>). But man can learn while sorrowful. Much more, therefore, can he learn while in bodily pain. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35130" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35130] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +tristitia interior praeeminet dolori exteriori, ut supra dictum +est. Sed simul cum tristitia potest homo addiscere. Ergo multo +magis simul cum dolore corporali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): "Although during those days I was tormented with a violent tooth-ache, I was not able to + turn over in my mind other things than those I had already learnt; and as to learning anything, I was quite unequal to it, + because it required undivided attention." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35131" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35131] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in I Soliloq., <i>quanquam acerrimo +dolore dentium his diebus torquerer, non quidem sinebar animo +volvere nisi ea quae iam forte didiceram. A discendo autem penitus +impediebar, ad quod mihi tota intentione animi opus erat</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q37_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since all the powers of the soul are rooted in the one essence of the soul, it must needs happen, when the intention of the + soul is strongly drawn towards the action of one power, that it is withdrawn from the action of another power: because the + soul, being one, can only have one intention. The result is that if one thing draws upon itself the entire intention of the + soul, or a great portion thereof, anything else requiring considerable attention is + incompatible therewith. + </p><p id="FS_Q37_A1-p7"> Now it is evident that sensible pain above all draws the soul's attention to itself; because it is natural for each thing + to tend wholly to repel whatever is contrary to it, as may be observed even in natural things. It is likewise evident that + in order to learn anything new, we require study and effort with a strong intention, as is clearly stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.2.4" target="asv"> Prov. 2:4,5</a>: "If thou shalt seek wisdom as money, and shall dig for her as for a treasure, then shalt thou + understand learning" [Vulg: 'the fear of the Lord']. Consequently if the pain be acute, man is prevented at the time from + learning anything: indeed it can be so acute, that, as long as it lasts, a man is unable to give his attention even to that + which he knew already. However a difference is to be observed according to the difference of love that a man has for learning + or for considering: because the greater his love, the more will he retain the intention of his mind so as to prevent it from + turning entirely to the pain. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 1 co."><a name="35132" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35132] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, quia omnes potentiae animae in una essentia animae +radicantur, necesse est quod, quando intentio animae vehementer +trahitur ad operationem unius potentiae, retrahatur ab operatione +alterius, unius enim animae non potest esse nisi una intentio. Et +propter hoc, si aliquid ad se trahat totam intentionem animae, vel +magnam partem ipsius, non compatitur secum aliquid aliud quod +magnam attentionem requirat. Manifestum est autem quod dolor +sensibilis maxime trahit ad se intentionem animae, quia naturaliter +unumquodque tota intentione tendit ad repellendum contrarium, sicut +etiam in rebus naturalibus apparet. Similiter etiam manifestum est +quod ad addiscendum aliquid de novo, requiritur studium et conatus +cum magna intentione, ut patet per illud quod dicitur Prov. II, +<i>si quaesieris sapientiam quasi pecuniam, et sicut thesauros +effoderis eam, tunc intelliges disciplinam</i>. Et ideo si sit +dolor intensus, impeditur homo ne tunc aliquid addiscere possit. Et +tantum potest intendi, quod nec etiam, instante dolore, potest homo +aliquid considerare etiam quod prius scivit. In hoc tamen +attenditur diversitas secundum diversitatem amoris quem homo habet +ad addiscendum vel considerandum, qui quanto maior fuerit, magis +retinet intentionem animi, ne omnino feratur ad dolorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Moderate sorrow, that does not cause the mind to wander, can conduce to the acquisition of learning especially in regard + to those things by which a man hopes to be freed from sorrow. And thus, "in the tribulation of murmuring," men are more apt + to be taught by God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35133" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35133] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod tristitia moderata, quae excludit evagationem +animi, potest conferre ad disciplinam suscipiendam, et praecipue +eorum per quae homo sperat se posse a tristitia liberari. Et hoc +modo in tribulatione murmuris homines doctrinam Dei magis +recipiunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Both pleasure and pain, in so far as they draw upon themselves the soul's intention, hinder the reason from the act of consideration, + wherefore it is stated in Ethic. vii, 11 that "in the moment of sexual pleasure, a man cannot understand anything." Nevertheless + pain attracts the soul's intention more than pleasure does: thus we observe in natural things that the action of a natural + body is more intense in regard to its contrary; for instance, hot + water is more accessible to the action of cold, and in consequence freezes harder. If therefore pain or sorrow be moderate, + it can conduce accidentally to the facility of learning, in so far as it takes away an excess of pleasure. But, of itself, + it is a hindrance; and if it be intense, it prevents it altogether. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35134" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35134] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod tam delectatio quam dolor, inquantum ad se trahunt +animae intentionem, impediunt considerationem rationis, unde in VII +Ethic. dicitur quod <i>impossibile est in ipsa delectatione +venereorum, aliquid intelligere</i>. Sed tamen dolor magis trahit +ad se intentionem animae quam delectatio, sicut etiam videmus in +rebus naturalibus, quod actio corporis naturalis magis intenditur +in contrarium; sicut aqua calefacta magis patitur a frigido, ut +fortius congeletur. Si ergo dolor seu tristitia fuerit moderata, +per accidens potest conferre ad addiscendum, inquantum aufert +superabundantiam delectationum. Sed per se impedit, et si +intendatur, totaliter aufert.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> External pain arises from hurt done to the body, so that it involves bodily transmutation more than inward sorrow does: and + yet the latter is greater in regard to the formal element of pain, which belongs to the soul. Consequently bodily pain is + a greater hindrance to contemplation which requires complete repose, than inward sorrow is. Nevertheless if inward sorrow + be very intense, it attracts the intention, so that man is unable to learn anything for + the first time: wherefore on account of sorrow Gregory interrupted his commentary on Ezechiel (Hom. xxii in Ezechiel). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35135" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35135] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod dolor exterior accidit ex laesione corporali, et ita +magis habet transmutationem corporalem adiunctam quam dolor +interior, qui tamen est maior secundum illud quod est formale in +dolore, quod est ex parte animae. Et ideo dolor corporalis magis +impedit contemplationem, quae requirit omnimodam quietem, quam +dolor interior. Et tamen etiam dolor interior, si multum +intendatur, ita trahit intentionem, ut non possit homo de novo +aliquid addiscere. Unde et Gregorius propter tristitiam intermisit +Ezechielis expositionem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q37_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q37_A2-p0.1">Q. 37. A. 2. Whether the effect of sorrow or pain is to burden the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not an effect of sorrow to burden the soul. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.7.11" target="asv">2 Cor. 7:11</a>): "Behold this self-same thing, that you were made sorrowful according to God, how great carefulness it worketh in you: yea, + defence, yea indignation," etc. Now carefulness and indignation imply that the soul is uplifted, which is contrary to being + depressed. Therefore depression is not an effect of sorrow. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35136" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35136] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod aggravatio animi non sit effectus +tristitiae. Dicit enim apostolus, II ad Cor. VII, <i>ecce hoc +ipsum, contristari vos secundum Deum, quantam in vobis operatur +sollicitudinem, sed defensionem, sed indignationem,</i> et cetera. +Sed sollicitudo et indignatio ad quandam erectionem animi +pertinent, quae aggravationi opponitur. Non ergo aggravatio est +effectus tristitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sorrow is contrary to pleasure. But the effect of pleasure is expansion: the opposite of which is not depression + but contraction. Therefore depression should not be reckoned as an effect of sorrow. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35137" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35137] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +tristitia delectationi opponitur. Sed effectus delectationis est +dilatatio, cui non opponitur aggravatio, sed constrictio. Ergo +effectus tristitiae non debet poni aggravatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sorrow consumes those who are inflicted therewith, as may be gathered from the words of the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.2.7" target="asv">2 Cor. 2:7</a>): "Lest perhaps such an one be swallowed up with overmuch sorrow." But that which is depressed is not consumed; nay, it is + weighed down by something heavy, whereas that which is consumed enters within the consumer. Therefore depression should not + be reckoned an effect of sorrow. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35138" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35138] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +ad tristitiam pertinet absorbere, ut patet per illud quod apostolus +dicit, II ad Cor. II, <i>ne forte abundantiori tristitia +absorbeatur qui est eiusmodi</i>. Sed quod aggravatur, non +absorbetur, quinimmo sub aliquo ponderoso deprimitur; quod autem +absorbetur, intra absorbens includitur. Ergo aggravatio non debet +poni effectus tristitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) speak of "depressing sorrow." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35139" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35139] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Gregorius Nyssenus et Damascenus ponunt tristitiam +aggravantem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The effects of the soul's passions are sometimes named metaphorically, from a likeness to sensible bodies: for the reason + that the movements of the animal appetite are like the inclinations of the natural appetite. And in this way fervor is ascribed + to love, expansion to pleasure, and depression to sorrow. For a man is said to be depressed, through being hindered in his + own movement by some weight. Now it is evident from what has been said above ( + <a href="#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q37_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q25_A4" id="FS_Q37_A2-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[25], A[4]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q36_A1" id="FS_Q37_A2-p6.3" shape="rect"> Q[36], A[1]</a>) that sorrow is caused by a present evil: and this evil, from the very fact that it is repugnant to the movement of the will, + depresses the soul, inasmuch as it hinders it from enjoying that which it wishes to enjoy. And if the evil which is the cause + of sorrow be not so strong as to deprive one of the hope of avoiding it, although the soul be depressed in so far as, for + the present, it + fails to grasp that which it craves for; yet it retains the movement whereby to repulse that evil. If, on the other hand, + the strength of the evil be such as to exclude the hope of evasion, then even the interior movement of the afflicted soul + is absolutely hindered, so that it cannot turn aside either this way or that. Sometimes even the external movement of the + body is paralyzed, so that a man becomes completely stupefied. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 2 co."><a name="35140" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35140] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod effectus passionum animae quandoque metaphorice +nominantur, secundum similitudinem sensibilium corporum, eo quod +motus appetitus animalis sunt similes inclinationibus appetitus +naturalis. Et per hunc modum fervor attribuitur amori, dilatatio +delectationi, et aggravatio tristitiae. Dicitur enim homo +aggravari, ex eo quod aliquo pondere impeditur a proprio motu. +Manifestum est autem ex praedictis quod tristitia contingit ex +aliquo malo praesenti. Quod quidem, ex hoc ipso quod repugnat motui +voluntatis, aggravat animum, inquantum impedit ipsum ne fruatur eo +quod vult. Et si quidem non sit tanta vis mali contristantis ut +auferat spem evadendi, licet animus aggravetur quantum ad hoc, quod +in praesenti non potitur eo quod vult; remanet tamen motus ad +repellendum nocivum contristans. Si vero superexcrescat vis mali +intantum ut spem evasionis excludat, tunc simpliciter impeditur +etiam interior motus animi angustiati, ut neque hac neque illac +divertere valeat. Et quandoque etiam impeditur exterior motus +corporis, ita quod remaneat homo stupidus in seipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That uplifting of the soul ensues from the sorrow which is according to God, because it brings with it the hope of the forgiveness + of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35141" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35141] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod illa erectio animi provenit ex tristitia quae +est secundum Deum, propter spem adiunctam de remissione +peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As far as the movement of the appetite is concerned, contraction and depression amount to the same: because the soul, through + being depressed so as to be unable to attend freely to outward things, withdraws to itself, closing itself up as it were. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35142" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35142] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, quantum ad motum appetitivum pertinet, ad idem +refertur constrictio et aggravatio. Ex hoc enim quod aggravatur +animus, ut ad exteriora libere progredi non possit, ad seipsum +retrahitur, quasi in seipso constrictus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sorrow is said to consume man, when the force of the afflicting evil is such as to shut out all hope of evasion: and thus + also it both depresses and consumes at the same time. For certain things, taken metaphorically, imply one another, which taken + literally, appear to exclude one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35143" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35143] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod tristitia absorbere hominem dicitur, quando sic +totaliter vis contristantis mali afficit animam, ut omnem spem +evasionis excludat. Et sic etiam eodem modo aggravat et absorbet. +Quaedam enim se consequuntur in his quae metaphorice dicuntur, quae +sibi repugnare videntur, si secundum proprietatem accipiantur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q37_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q37_A3-p0.1">Q. 37. A. 3. Whether sorrow or pain weakens all activity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow does not weaken all activity. Because carefulness is caused by sorrow, as is clear from the passage + of the Apostle quoted above (A[2], OBJ[1]). But carefulness conduces to good work: wherefore the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.15" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:15</a>): "Carefully study to present thyself . . . a workman that needeth not to be ashamed." Therefore sorrow is not a hindrance + to work, but helps one to work well. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35144" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35144] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod tristitia non impediat omnem +operationem. Sollicitudo enim ex tristitia causatur, ut patet per +auctoritatem apostoli inductam. Sed sollicitudo adiuvat ad bene +operandum, unde apostolus dicit, II ad Tim. II, <i>sollicite cura +teipsum exhibere operarium inconfusibilem</i>. Ergo tristitia non +impedit operationem, sed magis adiuvat ad bene operandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sorrow causes desire in many cases, as stated in Ethic. vii, 14. But desire causes intensity of action. Therefore + sorrow does too. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35145" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35145] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +tristitia causat in multis concupiscentiam, ut dicitur in VII +Ethic. Sed concupiscentia facit ad intensionem operationis. Ergo et +tristitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as some actions are proper to the joyful, so are others proper to the sorrowful; for instance, to mourn. Now a thing + is improved by that which is suitable to it. Therefore certain actions are not hindered but improved by reason of sorrow. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35146" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35146] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut quaedam operationes propriae sunt gaudentium, ita etiam +quaedam operationes his qui tristantur, sicut lugere. Sed +unumquodque augetur ex sibi convenienti. Ergo aliquae operationes +non impediuntur, sed meliorantur propter tristitiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects action," whereas on the other hand, "sorrow hinders it" (Ethic. + x, 5). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35147" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35147] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., quod delectatio perficit +operationem, sed e contrario tristitia impedit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q37_A2" id="FS_Q37_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, sorrow at times does not depress or consume the soul, so as to shut out all movement, internal or external; but certain + movements are sometimes caused by sorrow itself. Accordingly action stands in a twofold relation to sorrow. First, as being + the object of sorrow: and thus sorrow hinders any action: for we never do that which we do with sorrow, so well as that which + we do with pleasure, or without sorrow. The + reason for this is that the will is the cause of human actions: and consequently when we do something that gives pain, the + action must of necessity be weakened in consequence. Secondly, action stands in relation to sorrow, as to its principle and + cause: and such action must needs be improved by sorrow: thus the more one sorrows on account of a certain thing, the more + one strives to shake off sorrow, provided there is a hope of shaking it off: otherwise no movement or action would result + from + that sorrow. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 3 co."><a name="35148" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35148] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, tristitia quandoque non ita +aggravat vel absorbet animum, ut omnem motum interiorem et +exteriorem excludat; sed aliqui motus quandoque ex ipsa tristitia +causantur. Sic ergo operatio ad tristitiam dupliciter potest +comparari. Uno modo, sicut ad id de quo est tristitia. Et sic +tristitia quamlibet operationem impedit, nunquam enim illud quod +cum tristitia facimus, ita bene facimus sicut illud quod facimus +cum delectatione, vel sine tristitia. Cuius ratio est, quia +voluntas est causa operationis humanae, unde quando operatio est de +qua aliquis contristatur, necesse est quod actio debilitetur. Alio +modo comparatur operatio ad tristitiam sicut ad principium et +causam. Et sic necesse est quod operatio talis ex tristitia +augeatur, sicut quanto aliquis magis tristatur de re aliqua, tanto +magis conatur ad expellendam tristitiam, dummodo remaneat spes +expellendi, alioquin nullus motus vel operatio ex tristitia +causaretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A3-p7"> From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 3 ad arg."><a name="35149" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35149] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 3 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc +patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q37_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q37_A4-p0.1">Q. 37. A. 4. Whether sorrow is more harmful to the body than the other passions of the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow is not most harmful to the body. For sorrow has a spiritual existence in the soul. But those things + which have only a spiritual existence do not cause a transmutation in the body: as is evident with regard to the images of + colors, which images are in the air and do not give color to bodies. Therefore sorrow is not harmful to the body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35150" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35150] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod tristitia non inferat maxime corpori +nocumentum. Tristitia enim habet esse spirituale in anima. Sed ea +quae habent tantum esse spirituale, non causant transmutationem +corporalem, sicut patet de intentionibus colorum quae sunt in aere, +a quibus nullum corpus coloratur. Ergo tristitia non facit aliquod +corporale nocumentum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further if it be harmful to the body, this can only be due to its having a bodily transmutation in conjunction with it. But + bodily transmutation takes place in all the passions of the soul, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q22_A1" id="FS_Q37_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[22], AA[1]</a>,3). Therefore sorrow is not more harmful to the body than the other passions of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35151" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35151] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +si facit aliquod corporale nocumentum, hoc non est nisi inquantum +habet corporalem transmutationem adiunctam. Sed corporalis +transmutatio invenitur in omnibus animae passionibus, ut supra +dictum est. Ergo non magis tristitia quam aliae animae passiones, +corpori nocet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that "anger and desire drive some to madness": which seems to be a very great + harm, since reason is the most excellent thing in man. Moreover, despair seems to be more harmful than sorrow; for it is the + cause of sorrow. Therefore sorrow is not more harmful to the body than the other passions of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35152" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35152] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod <i>irae et concupiscentiae +quibusdam insanias faciunt</i>, quod videtur esse maximum +nocumentum, cum ratio sit excellentissimum eorum quae sunt in +homine. Desperatio etiam videtur esse magis nociva quam tristitia, +cum sit causa tristitiae. Ergo tristitia non magis nocet corpori +quam aliae animae passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.17.22" target="asv">Prov. 17:22</a>): "A joyful mind maketh age flourishing: a sorrowful spirit drieth up the bones": and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.25.20" target="asv">Prov. 25:20</a>): "As a moth doth by a garment, and a worm by the wood: so the sadness of a man consumeth the heart": and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A4-p5.3" href="./asv.html#Sir.38.19" target="asv">Ecclus. 38:19</a>): "Of sadness cometh death." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35153" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35153] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Prov. XVII, <i>animus gaudens aetatem floridam +facit, spiritus tristis exsiccat ossa</i>. Et Prov. XXV, <i>sicut +tinea vestimento, et vermis ligno, ita tristitia viri nocet +cordi</i>. Et Eccli. XXXVIII, <i>a tristitia festinat mors</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q37_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Of all the soul's passions, sorrow is most harmful to the body. The reason of this is because sorrow is repugnant to man's + life in respect of the species of its movement, and not merely in respect of its measure or quantity, as is the case with + the other passions of the soul. For man's life consists in a certain movement, which flows from the heart to the other parts + of the body: and this movement is befitting to human nature according to a certain fixed + measure. Consequently if this movement goes beyond the right measure, it will be repugnant to man's life in respect of the + measure of quantity; but not in respect of its specific character: whereas if this movement be hindered in its progress, it + will be repugnant to life in respect of its species. + </p><p id="FS_Q37_A4-p7"> Now it must be noted that, in all the passions of the soul, the bodily transmutation which is their material element, is + in conformity with and in proportion to the appetitive movement, which is the formal element: just as in everything matter + is proportionate to form. Consequently those passions that imply a movement of the appetite in pursuit of something, are not + repugnant to the vital movement as regards its species, but they may be repugnant thereto as regards its measure: + such are love, joy, desire and the like; wherefore these passions conduce to the well-being of the body; though, if they be + excessive, they may be harmful to it. On the other hand, those passions which denote in the appetite a movement of flight + or contraction, are repugnant to the vital movement, not only as regards its measure, but also as regards its species; wherefore + they are simply harmful: such are fear and despair, and above all sorrow which depresses the soul by reason of a present + evil, which makes a stronger impression than future evil. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 4 co."><a name="35154" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35154] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod tristitia, inter omnes animae passiones, magis +corpori nocet. Cuius ratio est, quia tristitia repugnat humanae +vitae quantum ad speciem sui motus; et non solum quantum ad +mensuram seu quantitatem, sicut aliae animae passiones. Consistit +enim humana vita in quadam motione, quae a corde in cetera membra +diffunditur, quae quidem motio convenit naturae humanae secundum +aliquam determinatam mensuram. Si ergo ista motio procedat ultra +mensuram debitam, repugnabit humanae vitae secundum quantitatis +mensuram; non autem secundum similitudinem speciei. Si autem +impediatur processus huius motionis, repugnabit vitae secundum suam +speciem. Est autem attendendum in omnibus animae passionibus, quod +transmutatio corporalis, quae est in eis materialis, est conformis +et proportionata motui appetitus, qui est formalis, sicut in +omnibus materia proportionatur formae. Illae ergo animae passiones +quae important motum appetitus ad prosequendum aliquid, non +repugnant vitali motioni secundum speciem, sed possunt repugnare +secundum quantitatem, ut amor, gaudium, desiderium, et huiusmodi. +Et ideo ista secundum speciem suam iuvant naturam corporis, sed +propter excessum possunt nocere. Passiones autem quae important +motum appetitus cum fuga vel retractione quadam, repugnant vitali +motioni non solum secundum quantitatem, sed etiam secundum speciem +motus, et ideo simpliciter nocent, sicut timor et desperatio, et +prae omnibus tristitia, quae aggravat animum ex malo praesenti, +cuius est fortior impressio quam futuri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since the soul naturally moves the body, the spiritual movement of the soul is naturally the cause of bodily transmutation. + Nor is there any parallel with spiritual images, because they are not naturally ordained to move such other bodies as are + not naturally moved by the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35155" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35155] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, quia anima naturaliter movet corpus, +spiritualis motus animae naturaliter est causa transmutationis +corporalis. Nec est simile de spiritualibus intentionibus, quae non +habent naturaliter ordinem movendi alia corpora, quae non sunt nata +moveri ab anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Other passions imply a bodily transmutation which is specifically in conformity with the vital movement: whereas sorrow implies + a transmutation that is repugnant thereto, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35156" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35156] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod aliae passiones habent transmutationem corporalem +conformem, secundum suam speciem, motioni vitali, sed tristitia +contrariam, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A lesser cause suffices to hinder the use of reason, than to destroy life: since we observe that many ailments deprive one + of the use of reason, before depriving one of life. Nevertheless fear and anger cause very great harm to the body, by reason + of the sorrow which they imply, and which arises from the absence of the thing desired. Moreover sorrow too sometimes deprives + man of the use of reason: as may be seen in those who through sorrow become a + prey to melancholy or madness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35157" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35157] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ex leviori causa impeditur usus rationis quam +corrumpatur vita, cum videamus multas aegritudines usum rationis +tollere, quae nondum adimunt vitam. Et tamen timor et ira maxime +nocumentum corporale afferunt ex permixtione tristitiae, propter +absentiam eius quod cupitur. Ipsa etiam tristitia quandoque +rationem aufert, sicut patet in his qui propter dolorem in +melancholiam vel in maniam incidunt.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q38" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q38-p0.1">Q. 38. OF THE REMEDIES OF SORROW OR PAIN (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q38-p2"> We must now consider the remedies of pain or sorrow: under which head there are five points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q38-p3"><a href="#FS_Q38_A1"> (1) Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by every pleasure?</a></p><p id="FS_Q38-p4"><a href="#FS_Q38_A2"> (2) Whether it is assuaged by weeping?</a></p><p id="FS_Q38-p5"><a href="#FS_Q38_A3"> (3) Whether it is assuaged by the sympathy of friends?</a></p><p id="FS_Q38-p6"><a href="#FS_Q38_A4"> (4) Whether it is assuaged by contemplating the truth?</a></p><p id="FS_Q38-p7"><a href="#FS_Q38_A5"> (5) Whether it is assuaged by sleep and baths?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 pr."><a name="35158" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35158] +Iª-IIae q. 38 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +remediis doloris seu tristitiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. +Primo, utrum dolor vel tristitia mitigetur per quamlibet +delectationem. Secundo, utrum mitigetur per fletum. Tertio, utrum +per compassionem amicorum. Quarto, utrum per contemplationem +veritatis. Quinto, utrum per somnum et balnea.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q38_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q38_A1-p0.1">Q. 38. A. 1. Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by every pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not every pleasure assuages every pain or sorrow. For pleasure does not assuage sorrow, save in so far + as it is contrary to it: for "remedies work by contraries" (Ethic. ii, 3). But not every pleasure is contrary to every sorrow; + as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q35_A4" id="FS_Q38_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[35], A[4]</a> ). Therefore not every pleasure assuages every sorrow. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35159" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35159] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non quaelibet delectatio mitiget +quemlibet dolorem seu tristitiam. Non enim delectatio tristitiam +mitigat, nisi inquantum ei contrariatur, medicinae enim fiunt per +contraria, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed non quaelibet delectatio +contrariatur cuilibet tristitiae, ut supra dictum est. Ergo non +quaelibet delectatio mitigat quamlibet tristitiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which causes sorrow does not assuage it. But some pleasures cause sorrow; since, as stated in Ethic. ix, 4, + "the wicked man feels pain at having been pleased." Therefore not every pleasure assuages sorrow. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35160" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35160] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +illud quod causat tristitiam, non mitigat tristitiam. Sed aliquae +delectationes causant tristitiam, quia, ut dicitur in IX Ethic., +<i>malus tristatur quoniam delectatus est</i>. Non ergo omnis +delectatio mitigat tristitiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 7) that he fled from his country, where he had been wont to associate with his friend, + now dead: "for so should his eyes look for him less, where they were not wont to see him." Hence we may gather that those + things which united us to our dead or absent friends, become burdensome to us when we mourn their death or absence. But nothing + united us more than the pleasures we enjoyed in common. Therefore these very pleasures + become burdensome to us when we mourn. Therefore not every pleasure assuages every sorrow. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35161" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35161] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in IV Confess., quod ipse fugit de patria, in qua +conversari solitus erat cum amico suo iam mortuo, <i>minus enim +quaerebant eum oculi eius, ubi videre non solebant</i>. Ex quo +accipi potest quod illa in quibus nobis amici mortui vel absentes +communicaverunt, efficiuntur nobis, de eorum morte vel absentia +dolentibus, onerosa. Sed maxime communicaverunt nobis in +delectationibus. Ergo ipsae delectationes efficiuntur nobis +dolentibus onerosae. Non ergo quaelibet delectatio mitigat +quamlibet tristitiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14) that "sorrow is driven forth by pleasure, both by a contrary pleasure and by any other, + provided it be intense." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35162" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35162] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod <i>expellit +delectatio tristitiam, et quae contraria, et quae contingens, si +sit fortis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As is evident from what has been said above ( + <a href="#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q38_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a> ), pleasure is a kind of repose of the appetite in a suitable good; while sorrow arises from something unsuited to the appetite. + Consequently in movements of the appetite pleasure is to sorrow, what, in bodies, repose is to weariness, which is due to + a non-natural transmutation; for sorrow itself implies a certain weariness or ailing of the appetitive faculty. Therefore + just as + all repose of the body brings relief to any kind of weariness, ensuing from any non-natural cause; so every pleasure brings + relief by assuaging any kind of sorrow, due to any cause whatever. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 1 co."><a name="35163" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35163] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ex praedictis patet, delectatio est quaedam +quies appetitus in bono convenienti; tristitia autem est ex eo quod +repugnat appetitui. Unde sic se habet delectatio ad tristitiam in +motibus appetitivis, sicut se habet in corporibus quies ad +fatigationem, quae accidit ex aliqua transmutatione innaturali, nam +et ipsa tristitia fatigationem quandam, seu aegritudinem +appetitivae virtutis importat. Sicut igitur quaelibet quies +corporis remedium affert contra quamlibet fatigationem, ex +quacumque causa innaturali provenientem; ita quaelibet delectatio +remedium affert ad mitigandam quamlibet tristitiam, ex quocumque +procedat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although not every pleasure is specifically contrary to every sorrow, yet it is generically, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q35_A4" id="FS_Q38_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[35], A[4]</a>). And consequently, on the part of the disposition of the subject, any sorrow can be assuaged by any pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35164" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35164] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, licet non omnis delectatio contrarietur omni +tristitiae secundum speciem, contrariatur tamen secundum genus, ut +supra dictum est. Et ideo ex parte dispositionis subiecti, +quaelibet tristitia per quamlibet delectationem mitigari +potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The pleasures of wicked men are not a cause of sorrow while they are enjoyed, but afterwards: that is to say, in so far as + wicked men repent of those things in which they took pleasure. This sorrow is healed by contrary pleasures. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35165" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35165] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod delectationes malorum non causant tristitiam in +praesenti, sed in futuro, inquantum scilicet mali poenitent de +malis de quibus laetitiam habuerunt. Et huic tristitiae subvenitur +per contrarias delectationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When there are two causes inclining to contrary movements, each hinders the other; yet the one which is stronger and more + persistent, prevails in the end. Now when a man is made sorrowful by those things in which he took pleasure in common with + a deceased or absent friend, there are two causes producing contrary movements. For the thought of the friend's death or absence, + inclines him to sorrow: whereas the present good inclines him to pleasure. + Consequently each is modified by the other. And yet, since the perception of the present moves more strongly than the memory + of the past, and since love of self is more persistent than love of another; hence it is that, in the end, the pleasure drives + out the sorrow. Wherefore a little further on (Confess. iv, 8) Augustine says that his "sorrow gave way to his former pleasures." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35166" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35166] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, quando sunt duae causae ad contrarios motus +inclinantes, utraque alteram impedit, et tamen illa finaliter +vincit, quae fortior est et diuturnior. In eo autem qui tristatur +de his in quibus simul cum amico mortuo vel absente delectari +consuevit, duae causae in contrarium moventes inveniuntur. Nam mors +vel absentia amici recogitata, inclinat ad dolorem, bonum autem +praesens inclinat ad delectationem. Unde utrumque per alterum +minuitur. Sed tamen, quia fortius movet sensus praesentis quam +memoria praeteriti, et amor sui ipsius quam amor alterius +diuturnius manet; inde est quod finaliter delectatio tristitiam +expellit. Unde post pauca subdit ibidem Augustinus quod +<i>pristinis generibus delectationum cedebat dolor eius</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q38_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q38_A2-p0.1">Q. 38. A. 2. Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by tears?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that tears do not assuage sorrow. Because no effect diminishes its cause. But tears or groans are an effect + of sorrow. Therefore they do not diminish sorrow. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35167" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35167] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod fletus non mitiget tristitiam. Nullus +enim effectus diminuit suam causam. Sed fletus, vel gemitus, est +effectus tristitiae. Ergo non minuit tristitiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as tears or groans are an effect of sorrow, so laughter is an effect of joy. But laughter does not lessen joy. + Therefore tears do not lessen sorrow. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35168" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35168] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut fletus vel gemitus est effectus tristitiae, ita risus est +effectus laetitiae. Sed risus non minuit laetitiam. Ergo fletus non +mitigat tristitiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, when we weep, the evil that saddens us is present to the imagination. But the image of that which saddens us increases + sorrow, just as the image of a pleasant thing adds to joy. Therefore it seems that tears do not assuage sorrow. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35169" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35169] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +in fletu repraesentatur nobis malum contristans. Sed imaginatio rei +contristantis auget tristitiam, sicut imaginatio rei delectantis +auget laetitiam. Ergo videtur quod fletus non mitiget +tristitiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. iv, 7) that when he mourned the death of his friend, "in groans and in tears alone did he find some + little refreshment." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35170" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35170] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in IV Confess., quod quando dolebat de +morte amici, <i>in solis gemitibus et lacrimis erat ei aliquantula +requies</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Tears and groans naturally assuage sorrow: and this for two reasons. First, because a hurtful thing hurts yet more if we + keep it shut up, because the soul is more intent on it: whereas if it be allowed to escape, the soul's intention is dispersed + as it were on outward things, so that the inward sorrow is lessened. This is why men, burdened with sorrow, make outward show + of their sorrow, by tears or groans or even by words, their sorrow is assuaged. Secondly, + because an action, that befits a man according to his actual disposition, is always pleasant to him. Now tears and groans + are actions befitting a man who is in sorrow or pain; and consequently they become pleasant to him. Since then, as stated + above + <a href="#FS_Q38_A1" id="FS_Q38_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, every pleasure assuages sorrow or pain somewhat, it follows that sorrow is assuaged by weeping and groans. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 2 co."><a name="35171" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35171] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod lacrimae et gemitus naturaliter mitigant tristitiam. +Et hoc duplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia omne nocivum interius +clausum magis affligit, quia magis multiplicatur intentio animae +circa ipsum, sed quando ad exteriora diffunditur, tunc animae +intentio ad exteriora quodammodo disgregatur, et sic interior dolor +minuitur. Et propter hoc, quando homines qui sunt in tristitiis, +exterius suam tristitiam manifestant vel fletu aut gemitu, vel +etiam verbo, mitigatur tristitia. Secundo, quia semper operatio +conveniens homini secundum dispositionem in qua est, sibi est +delectabilis. Fletus autem et gemitus sunt quaedam operationes +convenientes tristato vel dolenti. Et ideo efficiuntur ei +delectabiles. Cum igitur omnis delectatio aliqualiter mitiget +tristitiam vel dolorem, ut dictum est, sequitur quod per planctum +et gemitum tristitia mitigetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This relation of the cause to effect is opposed to the relation existing between the cause of sorrow and the sorrowing man. + For every effect is suited to its cause, and consequently is pleasant to it; but the cause of sorrow is disagreeable to him + that sorrows. Hence the effect of sorrow is not related to him that sorrows in the same way as the cause of sorrow is. For + this reason sorrow is assuaged by its effect, on account of the aforesaid + contrariety. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35172" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35172] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ipsa habitudo causae ad effectum contrariatur +habitudini contristantis ad contristatum, nam omnis effectus est +conveniens suae causae, et per consequens est ei delectabilis; +contristans autem contrariatur contristato. Et ideo effectus +tristitiae habet contrariam habitudinem ad contristatum, quam +contristans ad ipsum. Et propter hoc, mitigatur tristitia per +effectum tristitiae, ratione contrarietatis praedictae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The relation of effect to cause is like the relation of the object of pleasure to him that takes pleasure in it: because + in each case the one agrees with the other. Now every like thing increases its like. Therefore joy is increased by laughter + and the other effects of joy: except they be excessive, in which case, accidentally, they lessen it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35173" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35173] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod habitudo effectus ad causam est similis habitudini +delectantis ad delectatum, quia utrobique convenientia invenitur. +Omne autem simile auget suum simile. Et ideo per risum et alios +effectus laetitiae augetur laetitia, nisi forte per accidens, +propter excessum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The image of that which saddens us, considered in itself, has a natural tendency to increase sorrow: yet from the very fact + that a man imagines himself to be doing that which is fitting according to his actual state, he feels a certain amount of + pleasure. For the same reason if laughter escapes a man when he is so disposed that he thinks he ought to weep, he is sorry + for it, as having done something unbecoming to him, as Cicero says (De Tusc. Quaest. + iii, 27). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35174" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35174] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod imaginatio rei contristantis, quantum est de se, nata +est augere tristitiam, sed ex hoc ipso quod homo imaginatur quod +facit illud quod convenit sibi secundum talem statum, consurgit +inde quaedam delectatio. Et eadem ratione, si alicui subrepat risus +in statu in quo videtur sibi esse lugendum, ex hoc ipso dolet, +tanquam faciat id quod non convenit, ut Tullius dicit, in III de +Tuscul. quaestionibus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q38_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q38_A3-p0.1">Q. 38. A. 3. Whether pain or sorrow are assuaged by the sympathy of friends?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sorrow of sympathizing friends does not assuage our own sorrow. For contraries have contrary effects. + Now as Augustine says (Confess. viii, 4), "when many rejoice together, each one has more exuberant joy, for they are kindled + and inflamed one by the other." Therefore, in like manner, when many are sorrowful, it seems that their sorrow is greater. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35175" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35175] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod dolor amici compatientis non mitiget +tristitiam. Contrariorum enim contrarii sunt effectus. Sed sicut +Augustinus dicit, VIII Confess., <i>quando cum multis gaudetur, in +singulis uberius est gaudium, quia fervere faciunt se, et +inflammantur ex alterutro</i>. Ergo, pari ratione, quando multi +simul tristantur, videtur quod sit maior tristitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, friendship demands mutual love, as Augustine declares (Confess. iv, 9). But a sympathizing friend is pained at the + sorrow of his friend with whom he sympathizes. Consequently the pain of a sympathizing friend becomes, to the friend in sorrow, + a further cause of sorrow: so that, his pain being doubled his sorrow seems to increase. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35176" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35176] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +hoc requirit amicitia, ut amoris vicem quis rependat, ut Augustinus +dicit, IV Confess. Sed amicus condolens dolet de dolore amici +dolentis. Ergo ipse dolor amici condolentis est causa amico prius +dolenti de proprio malo, alterius doloris. Et sic, duplicato +dolore, videtur tristitia crescere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sorrow arises from every evil affecting a friend, as though it affected oneself: since "a friend is one's other + self" (Ethic. ix, 4,9). But sorrow is an evil. Therefore the sorrow of the sympathizing friend increases the sorrow of the + friend with whom he sympathizes. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35177" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35177] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +omne malum amici est contristans, sicut et malum proprium, nam +amicus est alter ipse. Sed dolor est quoddam malum. Ergo dolor +amici condolentis auget tristitiam amico cui condoletur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 11) that those who are in pain are consoled when their friends sympathize with them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35178" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35178] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in IX Ethic., quod in tristitiis amicus +condolens consolatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> When one is in pain, it is natural that the sympathy of a friend should afford consolation: whereof the Philosopher indicates + a twofold reason (Ethic. ix, 11). The first is because, since sorrow has a depressing effect, it is like a weight whereof + we strive to unburden ourselves: so that when a man sees others saddened by his own sorrow, it seems as though others were + bearing the burden with him, striving, as it were, to lessen its weight; wherefore the load + of sorrow becomes lighter for him: something like what occurs in the carrying of bodily burdens. The second and better reason + is because when a man's friends condole with him, he sees that he is loved by them, and this affords him pleasure, as stated + above (Q[32], A[5]). Consequently, since every pleasure assuages sorrow, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q38_A1" id="FS_Q38_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, it follows that sorrow is mitigated by a sympathizing friend. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 3 co."><a name="35179" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35179] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod naturaliter amicus condolens in tristitiis, est +consolativus. Cuius duplicem rationem tangit philosophus in IX +Ethic. Quarum prima est quia, cum ad tristitiam pertineat +aggravare, habet rationem cuiusdam oneris, a quo aliquis aggravatus +alleviari conatur. Cum ergo aliquis videt de sua tristitia alios +contristatos, fit ei quasi quaedam imaginatio quod illud onus alii +cum ipso ferant, quasi conantes ad ipsum ab onere alleviandum et +ideo levius fert tristitiae onus, sicut etiam in portandis oneribus +corporalibus contingit. Secunda ratio, et melior, est quia per hoc +quod amici contristantur ei, percipit se ab eis amari; quod est +delectabile, ut supra dictum est. Unde, cum omnis delectatio +mitiget tristitiam, sicut supra dictum est, sequitur quod amicus +condolens tristitiam mitiget.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In either case there is a proof of friendship, viz. when a man rejoices with the joyful, and when he sorrows with the sorrowful. + Consequently each becomes an object of pleasure by reason of its cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35180" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35180] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod in utroque amicitia manifestatur, scilicet et +quod congaudet gaudenti, et quod condolet dolenti. Et ideo utrumque +ratione causae redditur delectabile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The friend's sorrow itself would be a cause of sorrow: but consideration of its cause, viz. his love, gives rise rather to + pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35181" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35181] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ipse dolor amici secundum se contristaret. Sed +consideratio causae eius, quae est amor, magis delectat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A3-p9"> And this suffices for the reply to the Third Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35182" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35182] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Et per hoc +patet responsio ad tertium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q38_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q38_A4-p0.1">Q. 38. A. 4. Whether pain and sorrow are assuaged by the contemplation of truth?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the contemplation of truth does not assuage sorrow. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q38_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.1.18" target="asv">Eccles. 1:18</a>): "He that addeth knowledge addeth also sorrow" [Vulg.: 'labor']. But knowledge pertains to the contemplation of truth. Therefore + the contemplation of truth does not assuage sorrow. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35183" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35183] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod contemplatio veritatis non mitiget +dolorem. Dicitur enim Eccle. I, <i>qui addit scientiam, addit et +dolorem</i>. Sed scientia ad contemplationem veritatis pertinet. +Non ergo contemplatio veritatis mitigat dolorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the contemplation of truth belongs to the speculative intellect. But "the speculative intellect is not a principle + of movement"; as stated in De Anima iii, 11. Therefore, since joy and sorrow are movements of the soul, it seems that the + contemplation of truth does not help to assuage sorrow. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35184" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35184] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +contemplatio veritatis ad intellectum speculativum pertinet. Sed +intellectus speculativus non movet, ut dicitur in III de anima. Cum +igitur gaudium et dolor sint quidam motus animi, videtur quod +contemplatio veritatis nihil faciat ad mitigationem doloris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the remedy for an ailment should be applied to the part which ails. But contemplation of truth is in the intellect. + Therefore it does not assuage bodily pain, which is in the senses. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35185" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35185] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +remedium aegritudinis apponendum est ubi est aegritudo. Sed +contemplatio veritatis est in intellectu. Non ergo mitigat dolorem +corporalem, qui est in sensu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): "It seemed to me that if the light of that truth were to dawn on our minds, either I should + not feel that pain, or at least that pain would seem nothing to me." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35186" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35186] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in I Soliloq., <i>videbatur mihi, si se +ille mentibus nostris veritatis fulgor aperiret, aut non me +sensurum fuisse illum dolorem, aut certe pro nihilo +toleraturum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[3], A[5]), the greatest of all pleasures consists in the contemplation of truth. Now every pleasure assuages + pain as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q38_A1" id="FS_Q38_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>: hence the contemplation of truth assuages pain or sorrow, and the more so, the more perfectly one is a lover of wisdom. + And therefore in the midst of tribulations men rejoice in the contemplation of Divine things and of future Happiness, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q38_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.2" target="asv"> James + 1:2 + </a>: "My brethren, count it all joy, when you shall fall into divers temptations": and, what is more, even in the midst of bodily + tortures this joy is found; as the "martyr Tiburtius, when he was walking barefoot on the burning coals, said: Methinks, I + walk on roses, in the name of Jesus Christ." [*Cf. Dominican Breviary, August 11th, commemoration of St. Tiburtius.] + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 4 co."><a name="35187" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35187] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in contemplatione veritatis +maxima delectatio consistit. Omnis autem delectatio dolorem +mitigat, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo contemplatio veritatis +mitigat tristitiam vel dolorem, et tanto magis, quanto perfectius +aliquis est amator sapientiae. Et ideo homines ex contemplatione +divina et futurae beatitudinis, in tribulationibus gaudent; +secundum illud Iacobi I, <i>omne gaudium existimate, fratres mei, +cum in tentationes varias incideritis</i>. Et quod est amplius, +etiam inter corporis cruciatus huiusmodi gaudium invenitur, +<i>sicut Tiburtius martyr, cum nudatis plantis super ardentes +prunas incederet, dixit, videtur mihi quod super roseos flores +incedam, in nomine Iesu Christi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "He that addeth knowledge, addeth sorrow," either on account of the difficulty and disappointment in the search for truth; + or because knowledge makes man acquainted with many things that are contrary to his will. Accordingly, on the part of the + things known, knowledge causes sorrow: but on the part of the contemplation of truth, it causes pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35188" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35188] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod qui addit scientiam, addit dolorem, vel propter +difficultatem et defectum inveniendae veritatis, vel propter hoc, +quod per scientiam homo cognoscit multa quae voluntati +contrariantur. Et sic ex parte rerum cognitarum, scientia dolorem +causat, ex parte autem contemplationis veritatis, +delectationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The speculative intellect does not move the mind on the part of the thing contemplated: but on the part of contemplation + itself, which is man's good and naturally pleasant to him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35189" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35189] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod intellectus speculativus non movet animum ex parte +rei speculatae, movet tamen animum ex parte ipsius speculationis, +quae est quoddam bonum hominis, et naturaliter delectabilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the powers of the soul there is an overflow from the higher to the lower powers: and accordingly, the pleasure of contemplation, + which is in the higher part, overflows so as to mitigate even that pain which is in the senses. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35190" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35190] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in viribus animae fit redundantia a superiori ad +inferius. Et secundum hoc, delectatio contemplationis, quae est in +superiori parte, redundat ad mitigandum etiam dolorem qui est in +sensu.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q38_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q38_A5-p0.1">Q. 38. A. 5. Whether pain and sorrow are assuaged by sleep and baths?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sleep and baths do not assuage sorrow. For sorrow is in the soul: whereas sleep and baths regard the body. + Therefore they do not conduce to the assuaging of sorrow. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="35191" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35191] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod somnus et balneum non mitigent +tristitiam. Tristitia enim in anima consistit. Sed somnus et +balneum ad corpus pertinent. Non ergo aliquid faciunt ad +mitigationem tristitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the same effect does not seem to ensue from contrary causes. But these, being bodily things, are incompatible with + the contemplation of truth which is a cause of the assuaging of sorrow, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q38_A4" id="FS_Q38_A5-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. Therefore sorrow is not mitigated by the like. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="35192" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35192] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +idem effectus non videtur causari ex contrariis causis. Sed +huiusmodi, cum sint corporalia, repugnant contemplationi veritatis, +quae est causa mitigationis tristitiae, ut dictum est. Non ergo per +huiusmodi tristitia mitigatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sorrow and pain, in so far as they affect the body, denote a certain transmutation of the heart. But such remedies + as these seem to pertain to the outward senses and limbs, rather than to the interior disposition of the heart. Therefore + they do not assuage sorrow. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="35193" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35193] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +tristitia et dolor, secundum quod pertinent ad corpus, in quadam +transmutatione cordis consistunt. Sed huiusmodi remedia magis +videntur pertinere ad exteriores sensus et membra, quam ad +interiorem cordis dispositionem. Non ergo per huiusmodi tristitia +mitigatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. ix, 12): "I had heard that the bath had its name [*Balneum, from the Greek {balaneion}] . . . from + the fact of its driving sadness from the mind." And further on, he says: "I slept, and woke up again, and found my grief not + a little assuaged": and quotes the words from the hymn of Ambrose [*Cf. Sarum Breviary: First Sunday after the octave of the + Epiphany, Hymn for first Vespers], in which it is said that "Sleep restores the tired + limbs to labor, refreshes the weary mind, and banishes sorrow." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 5 s. c."><a name="35194" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35194] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, IX Confess., <i>audieram balnei nomen +inde dictum, quod anxietatem pellat ex animo</i> et infra, +<i>dormivi, et evigilavi, et non parva ex parte mitigatum inveni +dolorem meum</i>. Et inducit quod in hymno Ambrosii dicitur, quod +<i>quies artus solutos reddit laboris usui, mentesque fessas +allevat, luctusque solvit anxios</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q37_A4" id="FS_Q38_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[37], A[4]</a>), sorrow, by reason of its specific nature, is repugnant to the vital movement of the body; and consequently whatever restores + the bodily nature to its due state of vital movement, is opposed to sorrow and assuages it. Moreover such remedies, from the + very fact that they bring nature back to its normal state, are causes of pleasure; for this is precisely in what pleasure + consists, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q38_A5-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[31], A[1]</a>). Therefore, since every + pleasure assuages sorrow, sorrow is assuaged by such like bodily remedies. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 5 co."><a name="35195" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35195] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, tristitia secundum suam +speciem repugnat vitali motioni corporis. Et ideo illa quae +reformant naturam corporalem in debitum statum vitalis motionis, +repugnant tristitiae, et ipsam mitigant. Per hoc etiam quod +huiusmodi remediis reducitur natura ad debitum statum, causatur ex +his delectatio, hoc enim est quod delectationem facit, ut supra +dictum est. Unde, cum omnis delectatio tristitiam mitiget, per +huiusmodi remedia corporalia tristitia mitigatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The normal disposition of the body, so far as it is felt, is itself a cause of pleasure, and consequently assuages sorrow. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="35196" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35196] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ipsa debita corporis dispositio, inquantum +sentitur, delectationem causat, et per consequens tristitiam +mitigat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q31_A8" id="FS_Q38_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[31], A[8]</a>), one pleasure hinders another; and yet every pleasure assuages sorrow. Consequently it is not unreasonable that sorrow should + be assuaged by causes which hinder one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="35197" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35197] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod delectationum una aliam impedit, ut supra dictum est, +et tamen omnis delectatio tristitiam mitigat. Unde non est +inconveniens quod ex causis se invicem impedientibus tristitia +mitigetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every good disposition of the body reacts somewhat on the heart, which is the beginning and end of bodily movements, as stated + in De Causa Mot. Animal. xi. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="35198" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35198] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod omnis bona dispositio corporis redundat quodammodo ad +cor, sicut ad principium et finem corporalium motionum, ut dicitur +in libro de causa motus animalium.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q39" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q39-p0.1">Q. 39. OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF SORROW OR PAIN (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q39-p2"> We must now consider the goodness and malice of pain or sorrow: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q39-p3"><a href="#FS_Q39_A1"> (1) Whether all sorrow is evil?</a></p><p id="FS_Q39-p4"><a href="#FS_Q39_A2"> (2) Whether sorrow can be a virtuous good?</a></p><p id="FS_Q39-p5"><a href="#FS_Q39_A3"> (3) Whether it can be a useful good?</a></p><p id="FS_Q39-p6"><a href="#FS_Q39_A4"> (4) Whether bodily pain is the greatest evil?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 pr."><a name="35199" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35199] +Iª-IIae q. 39 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +bonitate et malitia doloris vel tristitiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur +quatuor. Primo, utrum omnis tristitia sit malum. Secundo, utrum +possit esse bonum honestum. Tertio, utrum possit esse bonum utile. +Quarto, utrum dolor corporis sit summum malum.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q39_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q39_A1-p0.1">Q. 39. A. 1. Whether all sorrow is evil?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all sorrow is evil. For Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] says: "All sorrow is evil, from + its very nature." Now what is naturally evil, is evil always and everywhere. Therefore, all sorrow is evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35200" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35200] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis tristitia sit mala. Dicit enim +Gregorius Nyssenus, <i>omnis tristitia malum est, sui ipsius +natura</i>. Sed quod naturaliter est malum, semper et ubique est +malum. Ergo omnis tristitia est mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which all, even the virtuous, avoid, is evil. But all avoid sorrow, even the virtuous, since as stated in Ethic. + vii, 11, "though the prudent man does not aim at pleasure, yet he aims at avoiding sorrow." Therefore sorrow is evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35201" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35201] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +illud quod omnes fugiunt, etiam virtuosi, est malum. Sed tristitiam +omnes fugiunt, etiam virtuosi, quia, ut dicitur in VII Ethic., +<i>etsi prudens non intendat delectari, tamen intendit non +tristari</i>. Ergo tristitia est malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as bodily evil is the object and cause of bodily pain, so spiritual evil is the object and cause of sorrow + in the soul. But every bodily pain is a bodily evil. Therefore every spiritual sorrow is an evil of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35202" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35202] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut malum corporale est obiectum et causa doloris corporalis, ita +malum spirituale est obiectum et causa tristitiae spiritualis. Sed +omnis dolor corporalis est malum corporis. Ergo omnis tristitia +spiritualis est malum animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Sorrow for evil is contrary to pleasure in evil. But pleasure in evil is evil: wherefore in condemnation of certain men, + it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q39_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.2.14" target="asv">Prov. 2:14</a>), that "they were glad when they had done evil." Therefore sorrow for evil is good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35203" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35203] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +tristitia de malo contrariatur delectationi de malo. Sed delectatio +de malo est mala, unde in detestationem quorundam dicitur Prov. II, +quod <i>laetantur cum malefecerint</i>. Ergo tristitia de malo est +bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A thing may be good or evil in two ways: first considered simply and in itself; and thus all sorrow is an evil, because the + mere fact of a man's appetite being uneasy about a present evil, is itself an evil, because it hinders the response of the + appetite in good. Secondly, a thing is said to be good or evil, on the supposition of something else: thus shame is said to + be good, on the supposition of a shameful deed done, as stated in Ethic. iv, 9. + Accordingly, supposing the presence of something saddening or painful, it is a sign of goodness if a man is in sorrow or pain + on account of this present evil. For if he were not to be in sorrow or pain, this could only be either because he feels it + not, or because he does not reckon it as something unbecoming, both of which are manifest evils. Consequently it is a condition + of goodness, that, supposing an evil to be present, sorrow or pain should ensue. Wherefore Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. + viii, 14): "It is also a good thing that he sorrows for the good he has lost: for had not some good remained in his nature, + he could not be punished by the loss of good." Because, however, in the science of Morals, we consider things individually---for + actions are concerned about individuals---that which is good on some supposition, should be considered as good: just as that + which is voluntary on some supposition, is judged to be voluntary, as stated in Ethic. iii, 1, and likewise above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q6_A6" id="FS_Q39_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[6], A[6]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 1 co."><a name="35204" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35204] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod aliquid esse bonum vel malum, potest dici dupliciter. +Uno modo, simpliciter et secundum se. Et sic omnis tristitia est +quoddam malum, hoc enim ipsum quod est appetitum hominis anxiari de +malo praesenti, rationem mali habet; impeditur enim per hoc quies +appetitus in bono. Alio modo dicitur aliquid bonum vel malum, ex +suppositione alterius, sicut verecundia dicitur esse bonum, ex +suppositione alicuius turpis commissi, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Sic +igitur, supposito aliquo contristabili vel doloroso, ad bonitatem +pertinet quod aliquis de malo praesenti tristetur vel doleat. Quod +enim non tristaretur vel non doleret, non posset esse nisi quia vel +non sentiret, vel quia non reputaret sibi repugnans, et utrumque +istorum est malum manifeste. Et ideo ad bonitatem pertinet ut, +supposita praesentia mali, sequatur tristitia vel dolor. Et hoc est +quod Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., <i>adhuc est bonum +quod dolet amissum bonum, nam nisi aliquod bonum remansisset in +natura, nullius boni amissi dolor esset in poena</i>. Sed quia +sermones morales sunt in singularibus, quorum sunt operationes, +illud quod est ex suppositione bonum, debet bonum iudicari, sicut +quod est ex suppositione voluntarium, iudicatur voluntarium, ut +dicitur in III Ethic., et supra habitum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius] is speaking of sorrow on the part of the evil that causes it, but not on the part of the subject + that feels and rejects the evil. And from this point of view, all shun sorrow, inasmuch as they shun evil: but they do not + shun the perception and rejection of evil. The same also applies to bodily pain: because the perception and rejection of bodily + evil is the proof of the goodness of nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35205" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35205] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Gregorius Nyssenus loquitur de tristitia ex +parte mali tristantis, non autem ex parte sentientis et repudiantis +malum. Et ex hac etiam parte omnes fugiunt tristitiam, inquantum +fugiunt malum, sed sensum et refutationem mali non fugiunt. Et sic +etiam dicendum est de dolore corporali, nam sensus et recusatio +mali corporalis attestatur naturae bonae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A1-p8"> This suffices for the Replies to the Second and Third Objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35206" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35206] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Unde patet +responsio ad secundum et tertium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q39_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q39_A2-p0.1">Q. 39. A. 2. Whether sorrow can be a virtuous good?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow is not a virtuous good. For that which leads to hell is not a virtuous good. But, as Augustine + says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 33), "Jacob seems to have feared lest he should be troubled overmuch by sorrow, and so, instead of + entering into the rest of the blessed, be consigned to the hell of sinners." Therefore sorrow is not a virtuous good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35207" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35207] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod tristitia non habeat rationem boni +honesti. Quod enim ad Inferos deducit, contrariatur honesto. Sed +sicut dicit Augustinus, XII super Gen. ad Litt., <i>Iacob hoc +timuisse videtur, ne nimia tristitia sic perturbaretur, ut non ad +requiem beatorum iret, sed ad Inferos peccatorum</i>. Ergo +tristitia non habet rationem boni honesti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the virtuous good is praiseworthy and meritorious. But sorrow lessens praise or merit: for the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q39_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.9.7" target="asv">2 Cor. 9:7</a>): "Everyone, as he hath determined in his heart, not with sadness, or of necessity." Therefore sorrow is not a virtuous good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35208" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35208] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +bonum honestum habet rationem laudabilis et meritorii. Sed +tristitia diminuit rationem laudis et meriti, dicit enim apostolus, +II ad Cor. IX, <i>unusquisque prout destinavit in corde suo, non ex +tristitia aut ex necessitate</i>. Ergo tristitia non est bonum +honestum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15), "sorrow is concerned about those things which happen against our will." + But not to will those things which are actually taking place, is to have a will opposed to the decree of God, to Whose providence + whatever is done is subject. Since, then, conformity of the human to the Divine will is a condition of the rectitude of the + will, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q19_A9" id="FS_Q39_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[9]</a>), it seems that sorrow is + incompatible with rectitude of the will, and that consequently it is not virtuous. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35209" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35209] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, <i>tristitia est de his +quae, nobis nolentibus, accidunt</i>. Sed non velle ea quae +praesentialiter fiunt, est habere voluntatem repugnantem +ordinationi divinae, cuius providentiae subiacent omnia quae +aguntur. Ergo, cum conformitas humanae voluntatis ad divinam +pertineat ad rectitudinem voluntatis, ut supra dictum est; videtur +quod tristitia contrarietur rectitudini voluntatis. Et sic non +habet rationem honesti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever merits the reward of eternal life is virtuous. But such is sorrow; as is evident from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q39_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.5" target="asv"> Mat. 5:5</a>: "Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted." Therefore sorrow is a virtuous good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35210" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35210] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +omne quod meretur praemium vitae aeternae, habet rationem honesti. +Sed tristitia est huiusmodi, ut patet per id quod dicitur Matth. V, +<i>beati qui lugent, quoniam ipsi consolabuntur</i>. Ergo tristitia +est bonum honestum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In so far as sorrow is good, it can be a virtuous good. For it has been said above + <a href="#FS_Q39_A1" id="FS_Q39_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that sorrow is a good inasmuch as it denotes perception and rejection of evil. These two things, as regards bodily pain, + are a proof of the goodness of nature, to which it is due that the senses perceive, and that nature shuns, the harmful thing + that causes pain. As regards interior sorrow, perception of the evil is sometimes due to a right + judgment of reason; while the rejection of the evil is the act of the will, well disposed and detesting that evil. Now every + virtuous good results from these two things, the rectitude of the reason and the will. Wherefore it is evident that sorrow + may be a virtuous good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 2 co."><a name="35211" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35211] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, secundum illam rationem qua tristitia est bonum, +potest esse bonum honestum. Dictum est enim quod tristitia est +bonum secundum cognitionem et recusationem mali. Quae quidem duo in +dolore corporali, attestantur bonitati naturae, ex qua provenit +quod sensus sentit, et natura refugit laesivum, quod causat +dolorem. In interiori vero tristitia, cognitio mali quandoque +quidem est per rectum iudicium rationis; et recusatio mali est per +voluntatem bene dispositam detestantem malum. Omne autem bonum +honestum ex his duobus procedit, scilicet ex rectitudine rationis +et voluntatis. Unde manifestum est quod tristitia potest habere +rationem boni honesti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All the passions of the soul should be regulated according to the rule of reason, which is the root of the virtuous good; + but excessive sorrow, of which Augustine is speaking, oversteps this rule, and therefore it fails to be a virtuous good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35212" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35212] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod omnes passiones animae regulari debent secundum +regulam rationis, quae est radix boni honesti. Quam transcendit +immoderata tristitia, de qua loquitur Augustinus. Et ideo recedit a +ratione boni honesti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as sorrow for an evil arises from a right will and reason, which detest the evil, so sorrow for a good is due to a perverse + reason and will, which detest the good. Consequently such sorrow is an obstacle to the praise and merit of the virtuous good; + for instance, when a man gives an alms sorrowfully. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35213" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35213] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut tristitia de malo procedit ex voluntate et +ratione recta, quae detestatur malum; ita tristitia de bono +procedit ex ratione et voluntate perversa, quae detestatur bonum. +Et ideo talis tristitia impedit laudem vel meritum boni honesti, +sicut cum quis facit cum tristitia eleemosynam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some things do actually happen, not because God wills, but because He permits them to happen---such as sins. Consequently + a will that is opposed to sin, whether in oneself or in another, is not discordant from the Divine will. Penal evils happen + actually, even by God's will. But it is not necessary for the rectitude of his will, that man should will them in themselves: + but only that he should not revolt against the order of Divine justice, as stated + above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q19_A10" id="FS_Q39_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[10]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35214" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35214] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod aliqua praesentialiter eveniunt, quae non fiunt Deo +volente, sed Deo permittente, sicut peccata. Unde voluntas +repugnans peccato existenti vel in se vel in alio, non discordat a +voluntate Dei. Mala vero poenalia praesentialiter contingunt, etiam +Deo volente. Non tamen exigitur ad rectitudinem voluntatis, quod ea +secundum se homo velit, sed solum quod non contranitatur ordini +divinae iustitiae, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q39_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q39_A3-p0.1">Q. 39. A. 3. Whether sorrow can be a useful good?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow cannot be a useful good. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q39_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.30.25" target="asv">Ecclus. 30:25</a>): "Sadness hath killed many, and there is no profit in it." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35215" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35215] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod tristitia non possit esse bonum utile. +Dicitur enim Eccli. XXX, <i>multos occidit tristitia, et non est +utilitas in illa</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, choice is of that which is useful to an end. But sorrow is not an object of choice; in fact, "a thing without sorrow + is to be chosen rather than the same thing with sorrow" (Topic. iii, 2). Therefore sorrow is not a useful good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35216" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35216] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +electio est de eo quod est utile ad finem aliquem. Sed tristitia +non est eligibilis, quinimmo <i>idem sine tristitia, quam cum +tristitia, est magis eligendum</i>, ut dicitur in III Topic. Ergo +tristitia non est bonum utile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "Everything is for the sake of its own operation," as stated in De Coel. ii, 3. But "sorrow hinders operation," + as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore sorrow is not a useful good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35217" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35217] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> +<i>Praeterea, omnis res est propter suam operationem</i>, ut +dicitur in II de coelo. Sed tristitia impedit operationem, ut +dicitur in X Ethic. Ergo tristitia non habet rationem boni +utilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The wise man seeks only that which is useful. But according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q39_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.7.5" target="asv"> Eccles. 7:5, </a> "the heart of the wise is where there is mourning, and the heart of fools where there is mirth." Therefore sorrow is useful. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35218" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35218] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +sapiens non quaerit nisi utilia. Sed sicut dicitur Eccle. VII, +<i>cor sapientum ubi tristitia, et cor stultorum ubi laetitia</i>. +Ergo tristitia est utilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q39_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A twofold movement of the appetite ensues from a present evil. One is that whereby the appetite is opposed to the present + evil; and, in this respect, sorrow is of no use; because that which is present, cannot be not present. The other movement + arises in the appetite to the effect of avoiding or expelling the saddening evil: and, in this respect, sorrow is of use, + if it be for something which ought to be avoided. Because there are two reasons for which it may + be right to avoid a thing. First, because it should be avoided in itself, on account of its being contrary to good; for instance, + sin. Wherefore sorrow for sin is useful as inducing a man to avoid sin: hence the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q39_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.7.9" target="asv">2 Cor. 7:9</a>): "I am glad: not because you were made sorrowful, but because you were made sorrowful unto penance." Secondly, a thing is + to be avoided, not as though it were evil in itself, but because it is an occasion of evil; either through one's being + attached to it, and loving it too much, or through one's being thrown headlong thereby into an evil, as is evident in the + case of temporal goods. And, in this respect, sorrow for temporal goods may be useful; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q39_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Eccl.7.3" target="asv"> Eccles. 7:3</a>: "It is better to go to the house of mourning, than to the house of feasting: for in that we are put in mind of the end of + all." + </p><p id="FS_Q39_A3-p7"> Moreover, sorrow for that which ought to be avoided is always useful, since it adds another motive for avoiding it. Because + the very evil is in itself a thing to be avoided: while everyone avoids sorrow for its own sake, just as everyone seeks the + good, and pleasure in the good. Therefore just as pleasure in the good makes one seek the good more earnestly, so sorrow for + evil makes one avoid evil more eagerly. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 3 co."><a name="35219" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35219] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod ex malo praesenti insurgit duplex appetitivus motus. +Unus quidem est quo appetitus contrariatur malo praesenti. Et ex +ista parte tristitia non habet utilitatem, quia id quod est +praesens, non potest non esse praesens. Secundus motus consurgit in +appetitu ad fugiendum vel repellendum malum contristans. Et quantum +ad hoc, tristitia habet utilitatem, si sit de aliquo quod est +fugiendum. Est enim aliquid fugiendum dupliciter. Uno modo, propter +seipsum, ex contrarietate quam habet ad bonum; sicut peccatum. Et +ideo tristitia de peccato utilis est ad hoc quod homo fugiat +peccatum, sicut apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. VII, <i>gaudeo, non +quia contristati estis, sed quia contristati estis ad +poenitentiam</i>. Alio modo est aliquid fugiendum, non quia sit +secundum se malum, sed quia est occasio mali; dum vel homo nimis +inhaeret ei per amorem, vel etiam ex hoc praecipitatur in aliquod +malum, sicut patet in bonis temporalibus. Et secundum hoc, +tristitia de bonis temporalibus potest esse utilis, sicut dicitur +Eccle. VII, <i>melius est ire ad domum luctus quam ad domum +convivii, in illa enim finis cunctorum admonetur hominum</i>. Ideo +autem tristitia in omni fugiendo est utilis, quia geminatur +fugiendi causa. Nam ipsum malum secundum se fugiendum est, ipsam +autem tristitiam secundum se omnes fugiunt, sicut etiam bonum omnes +appetunt, et delectationem de bono. Sicut ergo delectatio de bono +facit ut bonum avidius quaeratur, ita tristitia de malo facit ut +malum vehementius fugiatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This passage is to be taken as referring to excessive sorrow, which consumes the soul: for such sorrow paralyzes the soul, + and hinders it from shunning evil, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q37_A2" id="FS_Q39_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[37], A[2]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35220" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35220] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod auctoritas illa intelligitur de immoderata +tristitia, quae animum absorbet. Huiusmodi enim tristitia +immobilitat animum, et impedit fugam mali, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as any object of choice becomes less eligible by reason of sorrow, so that which ought to be shunned is still more to + be shunned by reason of sorrow: and, in this respect, sorrow is useful. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35221" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35221] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut quodlibet eligibile fit minus eligibile +propter tristitiam, ita quodlibet fugiendum redditur magis +fugiendum propter tristitiam. Et quantum ad hoc, tristitia est +utilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sorrow caused by an action hinders that action: but sorrow for the cessation of an action, makes one do it more earnestly. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35222" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35222] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod tristitia de operatione aliqua, impedit operationem, +sed tristitia de cessatione operationis, facit avidius operari.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q39_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q39_A4-p0.1">Q. 39. A. 4. Whether bodily pain is the greatest evil?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pain is the greatest evil. Because "the worst is contrary to the best" (Ethic. viii, 10). But a certain + pleasure is the greatest good, viz. the pleasure of bliss. Therefore a certain pain is the greatest evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35223" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35223] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod tristitia sit summum malum. Optimo +enim opponitur pessimum, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic. Sed quaedam +delectatio est optimum, quae scilicet pertinet ad felicitatem. Ergo +aliqua tristitia est summum malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is man's greatest good, because it is his last end. But man's Happiness consists in his "having whatever + he will, and in willing naught amiss," as stated above ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q3_A4" id="FS_Q39_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[4]</a>, OBJ[5]; + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q5_A8" id="FS_Q39_A4-p3.2" shape="rect"> Q[5], A[8]</a>, OBJ[3]). Therefore man's greatest good consists in the fulfilment of his will. Now pain consists in something happening + contrary to the will, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6,15). Therefore pain + is man's greatest evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35224" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35224] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +beatitudo est summum bonum hominis, quia est ultimus hominis finis. +Sed beatitudo consistit in hoc quod homo habeat quidquid velit, et +nihil mali velit, ut supra dictum est. Ergo summum bonum hominis +est impletio voluntatis ipsius. Sed tristitia consistit in hoc quod +accidit aliquid contra voluntatem, ut patet per Augustinum, XIV de +Civ. Dei. Ergo tristitia est summum malum hominis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine argues thus (Soliloq. i, 12): "We are composed of two parts, i.e. of a soul and a body, whereof the body + is the inferior. Now the sovereign good is the greatest good of the better part: while the supreme evil is the greatest evil + of the inferior part. But wisdom is the greatest good of the soul; while the worst thing in the body is pain. Therefore man's + greatest good is to be wise: while his greatest evil is to suffer pain." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35225" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35225] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus sic argumentatur in Soliloq., <i>ex duabus partibus +compositi sumus, ex anima scilicet et corpore, quarum pars deterior +corpus est. Summum autem bonum est melioris partis optimum, summum +autem malum, pessimum deterioris. Est autem optimum in animo +sapientia, in corpore pessimum dolor. Summum igitur bonum hominis +est sapere, summum malum dolere</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Guilt is a greater evil than punishment, as was stated in the + <a href="FP_vi.html#FP_Q48_A6" id="FS_Q39_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[48], A[6]</a>. But sorrow or pain belongs to the punishment of sin, just as the enjoyment of changeable things is an evil of guilt. For + Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xii): "What is pain of the soul, except for the soul to be deprived of that which it was wont + to enjoy, or had hoped to enjoy? And this is all that is called evil, i.e. sin, and the punishment of sin." + Therefore sorrow or pain is not man's greatest evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35226" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35226] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +culpa est magis malum quam poena, ut in primo habitum est. Sed +tristitia seu dolor pertinet ad poenam peccati; sicut frui rebus +mutabilibus est malum culpae. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de +vera religione, <i>quis est dolor qui dicitur animi, nisi carere +mutabilibus rebus quibus fruebatur, aut frui se posse speraverat? +Et hoc est totum quod dicitur malum, idest peccatum, et poena +peccati</i>. Ergo tristitia seu dolor non est summum malum +hominis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for any sorrow or pain to be man's greatest evil. For all sorrow or pain is either for something that is + truly evil, or for something that is apparently evil, but good in reality. Now pain or sorrow for that which is truly evil + cannot be the greatest evil: for there is something worse, namely, either not to reckon as evil that which is really evil, + or not to reject it. Again, sorrow or pain, for that which is apparently evil, but really + good, cannot be the greatest evil, for it would be worse to be altogether separated from that which is truly good. Hence it + is impossible for any sorrow or pain to be man's greatest evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 4 co."><a name="35227" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35227] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod impossibile est aliquam tristitiam seu dolorem esse +summum hominis malum. Omnis enim tristitia seu dolor aut est de hoc +quod est vere malum, aut est de aliquo apparenti malo, quod est +vere bonum. Dolor autem seu tristitia quae est de vere malo, non +potest esse summum malum, est enim aliquid eo peius, scilicet vel +non iudicare esse malum illud quod vere est malum, vel etiam non +refutare illud. Tristitia autem vel dolor qui est de apparenti +malo, quod est vere bonum, non potest esse summum malum, quia peius +esset omnino alienari a vero bono. Unde impossibile est quod aliqua +tristitia vel dolor sit summum hominis malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Pleasure and sorrow have two good points in common: namely, a true judgment concerning good and evil; and the right order + of the will in approving of good and rejecting evil. Thus it is clear that in pain or sorrow there is a good, by the removal + of which they become worse: and yet there is not an evil in every pleasure, by the removal of which the pleasure is better. + Consequently, a pleasure can be man's highest good, in the way above stated ( + <a href="#FS_Q34_A3" id="FS_Q39_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[34], + A[3] + </a>): whereas sorrow cannot be man's greatest evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35228" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35228] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod duo bona sunt communia et delectationi et +tristitiae, scilicet iudicium verum de bono et malo; et ordo +debitus voluntatis approbantis bonum et recusantis malum. Et sic +patet quod in dolore vel tristitia est aliquod bonum per cuius +privationem potest fieri deterius. Sed non in omni delectatione est +aliquod malum, per cuius remotionem possit fieri melius. Unde +delectatio aliqua potest esse summum hominis bonum, eo modo quo +supra dictum est, tristitia autem non potest esse summum hominis +malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The very fact of the will being opposed to evil is a good. And for this reason, sorrow or pain cannot be the greatest evil; + because it has an admixture of good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35229" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35229] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod est voluntatem repugnare malo, est +quoddam bonum. Et propter hoc, tristitia vel dolor non potest esse +summum malum, quia habet aliquam permixtionem boni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which harms the better thing is worse than that which harms the worse. Now a thing is called evil "because it harms," + as Augustine says (Enchiridion xii). Therefore that which is an evil to the soul is a greater evil than that which is an evil + to the body. Therefore this argument does not prove: nor does Augustine give it as his own, but as taken from another [*Cornelius + Celsus]. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35230" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35230] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod peius est quod nocet meliori, quam quod nocet peiori. +Malum autem dicitur quia nocet, ut dicit Augustinus in Enchirid. +Unde maius malum est quod est malum animae, quam quod est malum +corporis. Unde non est efficax, ratio, quam Augustinus inducit non +ex sensu suo sed ex sensu alterius.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q40" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q40-p0.1">Q. 40. OF THE IRASCIBLE PASSIONS, AND FIRST, OF HOPE AND DESPAIR (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q40-p2"> We must now consider the irascible passions: (1) Hope and despair; (2) Fear and daring; (3) Anger. Under first head there + are eight points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FS_Q40-p3"><a href="#FS_Q40_A1"> (1) Whether hope is the same as desire or cupidity?</a></p><p id="FS_Q40-p4"><a href="#FS_Q40_A2"> (2) Whether hope is in the apprehensive, or in the appetitive faculty?</a></p><p id="FS_Q40-p5"><a href="#FS_Q40_A3"> (3) Whether hope is in dumb animals?</a></p><p id="FS_Q40-p6"><a href="#FS_Q40_A4"> (4) Whether despair is contrary to hope?</a></p><p id="FS_Q40-p7"><a href="#FS_Q40_A5"> (5) Whether experience is a cause of hope?</a></p><p id="FS_Q40-p8"><a href="#FS_Q40_A6"> (6) Whether hope abounds in young men and drunkards?</a></p><p id="FS_Q40-p9"><a href="#FS_Q40_A7"> (7) Concerning the order of hope to love;</a></p><p id="FS_Q40-p10"><a href="#FS_Q40_A8"> (8) Whether love conduces to action?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 pr."><a name="35231" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35231] +Iª-IIae q. 40 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de +passionibus irascibilis, et primo, de spe et desperatione; secundo, +de timore et audacia; tertio, de ira. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. +Primo, utrum spes sit idem quod desiderium vel cupiditas. Secundo, +utrum spes sit in vi apprehensiva, vel in vi appetitiva. Tertio, +utrum spes sit in brutis animalibus. Quarto, utrum spei +contrarietur desperatio. Quinto, utrum causa spei sit experientia. +Sexto, utrum in iuvenibus et ebriosis spes abundet. Septimo, de +ordine spei ad amorem. Octavo, utrum spes conferat ad +operationem.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q40_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q40_A1-p0.1">Q. 40. A. 1. Whether hope is the same as desire of cupidity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hope is the same as desire or cupidity. Because hope is reckoned as one of the four principal passions. + But Augustine in setting down the four principal passions puts cupidity in the place of hope (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3,7). Therefore + hope is the same as cupidity or desire. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35232" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35232] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod spes sit idem quod desiderium sive +cupiditas. Spes enim ponitur una quatuor principalium passionum. +Sed Augustinus, enumerans quatuor principales passiones, ponit +cupiditatem loco spei, ut patet in XIV de Civ. Dei. Ergo spes est +idem quod cupiditas sive desiderium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, passions differ according to their objects. But the object of hope is the same as the object of cupidity or desire, + viz. the future good. Therefore hope is the same as cupidity or desire. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35233" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35233] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +passiones differunt secundum obiecta. Sed idem est obiectum spei, +et cupiditatis sive desiderii, scilicet bonum futurum. Ergo spes +est idem quod cupiditas sive desiderium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> If it be said that hope, in addition to desire, denotes the possibility of obtaining the future good; on the contrary, whatever + is accidental to the object does not make a different species of passion. But possibility of acquisition is accidental to + a future good, which is the object of cupidity or desire, and of hope. Therefore hope does not differ specifically from desire + or cupidity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35234" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35234] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Si dicatur +quod spes addit supra desiderium possibilitatem adipiscendi bonum +futurum, contra, id quod per accidens se habet ad obiectum, non +variat speciem passionis. Sed possibile se habet per accidens ad +bonum futurum, quod est obiectum cupiditatis vel desiderii, et +spei. Ergo spes non est passio specie differens a desiderio vel +cupiditate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> To different powers belong different species of passions. But hope is in the irascible power; whereas desire or cupidity + is in the concupiscible. Therefore hope differs specifically from desire or cupidity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35235" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35235] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +diversarum potentiarum sunt diversae passiones specie differentes. +Sed spes est in irascibili; desiderium autem et cupiditas in +concupiscibili. Ergo spes differt specie a desiderio seu +cupiditate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The species of a passion is taken from the object. Now, in the object of hope, we may note four conditions. First, that it + is something good; since, properly speaking, hope regards only the good; in this respect, hope differs from fear, which regards + evil. Secondly, that it is future; for hope does not regard that which is present and already possessed: in this respect, + hope differs from joy which regards a present good. Thirdly, that it must be something + arduous and difficult to obtain, for we do not speak of any one hoping for trifles, which are in one's power to have at any + time: in this respect, hope differs from desire or cupidity, which regards the future good absolutely: wherefore it belongs + to the concupiscible, while hope belongs to the irascible faculty. Fourthly, that this difficult thing is something possible + to obtain: for one does not hope for that which one cannot get at all: and, in this respect, hope differs from despair. It + is + therefore evident that hope differs from desire, as the irascible passions differ from the concupiscible. For this reason, + moreover, hope presupposes desire: just as all irascible passions presuppose the passions of the concupiscible faculty, as + stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q25_A1" id="FS_Q40_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[25], A[1]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 1 co."><a name="35236" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35236] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod species passionis ex obiecto consideratur circa +obiectum autem spei quatuor conditiones attenduntur. Primo quidem, +quod sit bonum, non enim, proprie loquendo, est spes nisi de bono. +Et per hoc differt spes a timore, qui est de malo. Secundo, ut sit +futurum, non enim spes est de praesenti iam habito. Et per hoc +differt spes a gaudio, quod est de bono praesenti. Tertio, +requiritur quod sit aliquid arduum cum difficultate adipiscibile, +non enim aliquis dicitur aliquid sperare minimum, quod statim est +in sua potestate ut habeat. Et per hoc differt spes a desiderio vel +cupiditate, quae est de bono futuro absolute, unde pertinet ad +concupiscibilem, spes autem ad irascibilem. Quarto, quod illud +arduum sit possibile adipisci, non enim aliquis sperat id quod +omnino adipisci non potest. Et secundum hoc differt spes a +desperatione. Sic ergo patet quod spes differt a desiderio, sicut +differunt passiones irascibilis a passionibus concupiscibilis. Et +propter hoc, spes praesupponit desiderium, sicut et omnes passiones +irascibilis praesupponunt passiones concupiscibilis, ut supra +dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine mentions desire instead of hope, because each regards future good; and because the good which is not arduous is + reckoned as nothing: thus implying that desire seems to tend chiefly to the arduous good, to which hope tends likewise. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35237" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35237] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Augustinus ponit cupiditatem loco spei, propter +hoc quod utrumque respicit bonum futurum, et quia bonum quod non +est arduum, quasi nihil reputatur; ut sic cupiditas maxime videatur +tendere in bonum arduum, in quod etiam tendit spes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The object of hope is the future good considered, not absolutely, but as arduous and difficult of attainment, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35238" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35238] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod obiectum spei non est bonum futurum absolute, sed cum +arduitate et difficultate adipiscendi, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The object of hope adds not only possibility to the object of desire, but also difficulty: and this makes hope belong to + another power, viz. the irascible, which regards something difficult, as stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q81_A2" id="FS_Q40_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[81], A[2]</a>. Moreover, possibility and impossibility are not altogether accidental to the object of the appetitive power: because the + appetite is a principle of movement; and nothing is moved to anything except under + the aspect of being possible; for no one is moved to that which he reckons impossible to get. Consequently hope differs from + despair according to the difference of possible and impossible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35239" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35239] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod obiectum spei non tantum addit possibilitatem super +obiectum desiderii, sed etiam arduitatem, quae ad aliam potentiam +facit spem pertinere, scilicet ad irascibilem, quae respicit +arduum, ut in primo dictum est. Possibile autem et impossibile non +omnino per accidens se habent ad obiectum appetitivae virtutis. Nam +appetitus est principium motionis, nihil autem movetur ad aliquid +nisi sub ratione possibilis; nullus enim movetur ad id quod +existimat impossibile adipisci. Et propter hoc, spes differt a +desperatione secundum differentiam possibilis et impossibilis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q40_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q40_A2-p0.1">Q. 40. A. 2. Whether hope is in the apprehensive or in the appetitive power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hope belongs to the cognitive power. Because hope, seemingly, is a kind of awaiting; for the Apostle says + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q40_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.25" target="asv">Rom. 8:25</a>): "If we hope for that which we see not; we wait for it with patience." But awaiting seems to belong to the cognitive power, + which we exercise by "looking out." Therefore hope belongs to the cognitive power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35240" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35240] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod spes pertineat ad vim cognitivam. Spes +enim videtur esse expectatio quaedam, dicit enim apostolus, Rom. +VIII, <i>si autem quod non videmus speramus, per patientiam +expectamus</i>. Sed expectatio videtur ad vim cognitivam pertinere, +cuius est exspectare. Ergo spes ad cognitivam pertinet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, apparently hope is the same as confidence; hence when a man hopes he is said to be confident, as though to hope + and to be confident were the same thing. But confidence, like faith, seems to belong to the cognitive power. Therefore hope + does too. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35241" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35241] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +idem est, ut videtur, spes quod fiducia, unde et sperantes +confidentes vocamus, quasi pro eodem utentes eo quod est confidere +et sperare. Sed fiducia, sicut et fides, videtur ad vim cognitivam +pertinere. Ergo et spes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, certainty is a property of the cognitive power. But certainty is ascribed to hope. Therefore hope belongs to the + cognitive power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35242" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35242] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +certitudo est proprietas cognitivae virtutis. Sed certitudo +attribuitur spei. Ergo spes ad vim cognitivam pertinet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Hope regards good, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q40_A1" id="FS_Q40_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Now good, as such, is not the object of the cognitive, but of the appetitive power. Therefore hope belongs, not to the cognitive, + but to the appetitive power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35243" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35243] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +spes est de bono, sicut dictum est. Bonum autem, inquantum +huiusmodi, non est obiectum cognitivae, sed appetitivae virtutis. +Ergo spes non pertinet ad cognitivam, sed ad appetitivam +virtutem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since hope denotes a certain stretching out of the appetite towards good, it evidently belongs to the appetitive power; since + movement towards things belongs properly to the appetite: whereas the action of the cognitive power is accomplished not by + the movement of the knower towards things, but rather according as the things known are in the knower. But since the cognitive + power moves the appetite, by presenting its object to it; there arise in the appetite + various movements according to various aspects of the apprehended object. For the apprehension of good gives rise to one kind + of movement in the appetite, while the apprehension of evil gives rise to another: in like manner various movements arise + from the apprehension of something present and of something future; of something considered absolutely, and of something considered + as arduous; of something possible, and of something impossible. And accordingly hope is a movement of the appetitive + power ensuing from the apprehension of a future good, difficult but possible to obtain; namely, a stretching forth of the + appetite to such a good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 2 co."><a name="35244" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35244] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, cum spes importet extensionem quandam appetitus in +bonum, manifeste pertinet ad appetitivam virtutem, motus enim ad +res pertinet proprie ad appetitum. Actio vero virtutis cognitivae +perficitur non secundum motum cognoscentis ad res, sed potius +secundum quod res cognitae sunt in cognoscente. Sed quia vis +cognitiva movet appetitivam, repraesentando ei suum obiectum; +secundum diversas rationes obiecti apprehensi, subsequuntur diversi +motus in vi appetitiva. Alius enim motus sequitur in appetitu ex +apprehensione boni, et alius ex apprehensione mali, et similiter +alius motus ex apprehensione praesentis et futuri, absoluti et +ardui, possibilis et impossibilis. Et secundum hoc, spes est motus +appetitivae virtutis consequens apprehensionem boni futuri ardui +possibilis adipisci, scilicet extensio appetitus in huiusmodi +obiectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since hope regards a possible good, there arises in man a twofold movement of hope; for a thing may be possible to him in + two ways, viz. by his own power, or by another's. Accordingly when a man hopes to obtain something by his own power, he is + not said to wait for it, but simply to hope for it. But, properly speaking, he is said to await that which he hopes to get + by another's help as though to await [exspectare] implied keeping one's eyes on another + [ex alio spectare], in so far as the apprehensive power, by going ahead, not only keeps its eye on the good which man intends + to get, but also on the thing by whose power he hopes to get it; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q40_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.51.10" target="asv"> Ecclus. 51:10, </a> "I looked for the succor of men." Wherefore the movement of hope is sometimes called expectation, on account of the preceding + inspection of the cognitive power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35245" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35245] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, quia spes respicit ad bonum possibile, insurgit +dupliciter homini motus spei, sicut dupliciter est ei aliquid +possibile, scilicet secundum propriam virtutem, et secundum +virtutem alterius. Quod ergo aliquis sperat per propriam virtutem +adipisci, non dicitur expectare, sed sperare tantum. Sed proprie +dicitur expectare quod sperat ex auxilio virtutis alienae, ut +dicatur exspectare quasi ex alio spectare, inquantum scilicet vis +apprehensiva praecedens non solum respicit ad bonum quod intendit +adipisci, sed etiam ad illud cuius virtute adipisci sperat; +secundum illud Eccli. li, <i>respiciens eram ad adiutorium +hominum</i>. Motus ergo spei quandoque dicitur expectatio, propter +inspectionem virtutis cognitivae praecedentem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When a man desires a thing and reckons that he can get it, he believes that he can get it, he believes that he will get it; + and from this belief which precedes in the cognitive power, the ensuing movement in the appetite is called confidence. Because + the movement of the appetite takes its name from the knowledge that precedes it, as an effect from a cause which is better + known; for the apprehensive power knows its own act better than that of the + appetite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35246" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35246] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod illud quod homo desiderat, et aestimat se posse +adipisci, credit se adepturum, et ex tali fide in cognitiva +praecedente, motus sequens in appetitu fiducia nominatur. +Denominatur enim motus appetitivus a cognitione praecedente, sicut +effectus ex causa magis nota, magis enim cognoscit vis apprehensiva +suum actum quam actum appetitivae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Certainty is ascribed to the movement, not only of the sensitive, but also of the natural appetite; thus we say that a stone + is certain to tend downwards. This is owing to the inerrancy which the movement of the sensitive or even natural appetite + derives from the certainty of the knowledge that precedes it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35247" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35247] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod certitudo attribuitur motui non solum appetitus +sensitivi, sed etiam appetitus naturalis, sicut dicitur quod lapis +certitudinaliter tendit deorsum. Et hoc propter infallibilitatem +quam habet ex certitudine cognitionis quae praecedit motum +appetitus sensitivi, vel etiam naturalis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q40_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q40_A3-p0.1">Q. 40. A. 3. Whether hope is in dumb animals?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no hope in dumb animals. Because hope is for some future good, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. + ii, 12). But knowledge of the future is not in the competency of dumb animals, whose knowledge is confined to the senses and + does not extend to the future. Therefore there is no hope in dumb animals. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35248" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35248] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod in brutis animalibus non sit spes. +Spes enim est de futuro bono, ut Damascenus dicit. Sed cognoscere +futurum non pertinet ad animalia bruta, quae habent solum +cognitionem sensitivam, quae non est futurorum. Ergo spes non est +in brutis animalibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object of hope is a future good, possible of attainment. But possible and impossible are differences of the + true and the false, which are only in the mind, as the Philosopher states (Metaph. vi, 4). Therefore there is no hope in dumb + animals, since they have no mind. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35249" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35249] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +obiectum spei est bonum possibile adipisci. Sed possibile et +impossibile sunt quaedam differentiae veri et falsi, quae solum +sunt in mente, ut philosophus dicit in VI Metaphys. Ergo spes non +est in brutis animalibus, in quibus non est mens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14) that "animals are moved by the things that they see." But hope is of things + unseen: "for what a man seeth, why doth he hope for?" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q40_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.24" target="asv">Rom. 8:24</a>). Therefore there is no hope in dumb animals. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35250" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35250] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, super Gen. ad Litt., quod animalia moventur +visis. Sed spes non est de eo quod videtur, <i>nam quod videt quis, +quid sperat?</i> Ut dicitur Rom. VIII. Ergo spes non est in brutis +animalibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Hope is an irascible passion. But the irascible faculty is in dumb animals. Therefore hope is also. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35251" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35251] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +spes est passio irascibilis. Sed in brutis animalibus est +irascibilis. Ergo et spes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The internal passions of animals can be gathered from their outward movements: from which it is clear that hope is in dumb + animals. For if a dog see a hare, or a hawk see a bird, too far off, it makes no movement towards it, as having no hope to + catch it: whereas, if it be near, it makes a movement towards it, as being in hopes of catching it. Because as stated above + ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A2" id="FS_Q40_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[2]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q26_A1" id="FS_Q40_A3-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[26], A[1]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q35_A1" id="FS_Q40_A3-p6.3" shape="rect"> Q[35], A[1]</a>), the sensitive appetite of dumb animals, and likewise the natural appetite of insensible things, result from the apprehension + of an intellect, just as the appetite of the intellectual nature, which is called the will. But there is a difference, in + that the will is moved by an apprehension of the intellect in the same subject; whereas the movement of the natural appetite + results from the apprehension of the separate Intellect, Who is the Author of nature; as + does also the sensitive appetite of dumb animals, who act from a certain natural instinct. Consequently, in the actions of + irrational animals and of other natural things, we observe a procedure which is similar to that which we observe in the actions + of art: and in this way hope and despair are in dumb animals. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 3 co."><a name="35252" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35252] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod interiores passiones animalium ex exterioribus +motibus deprehendi possunt. Ex quibus apparet quod in animalibus +brutis est spes. Si enim canis videat leporem, aut accipiter avem, +nimis distantem, non movetur ad ipsam, quasi non sperans se eam +posse adipisci, si autem sit in propinquo, movetur, quasi sub spe +adipiscendi. Ut enim supra dictum est, appetitus sensitivus +brutorum animalium, et etiam appetitus naturalis rerum +insensibilium, sequuntur apprehensionem alicuius intellectus, sicut +et appetitus naturae intellectivae, qui dicitur voluntas. Sed in +hoc est differentia, quod voluntas movetur ex apprehensione +intellectus coniuncti, sed motus appetitus naturalis sequitur +apprehensionem intellectus separati, qui naturam instituit; et +similiter appetitus sensitivus brutorum animalium, quae etiam +quodam instinctu naturali agunt. Unde in operibus brutorum +animalium, et aliarum rerum naturalium, apparet similis processus +sicut et in operibus artis. Et per hunc modum in animalibus brutis +est spes et desperatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although dumb animals do not know the future, yet an animal is moved by its natural instinct to something future, as though + it foresaw the future. Because this instinct is planted in them by the Divine Intellect that foresees the future. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35253" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35253] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, quamvis bruta animalia non cognoscant futurum, +tamen ex instinctu naturali movetur animal ad aliquid in futurum, +ac si futurum praevideret. Huiusmodi enim instinctus est eis +inditus ab intellectu divino praevidente futura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The object of hope is not the possible as differentiating the true, for thus the possible ensues from the relation of a predicate + to a subject. The object of hope is the possible as compared to a power. For such is the division of the possible given in + Metaph. v, 12, i.e. into the two kinds we have just mentioned. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35254" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35254] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod obiectum spei non est possibile, prout est quaedam +differentia veri, sic enim consequitur habitudinem praedicati ad +subiectum. Sed obiectum spei est possibile quod dicitur secundum +aliquam potentiam. Sic enim distinguitur possibile in V Metaphys., +scilicet in duo possibilia praedicta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the thing which is future does not come under the object of sight; nevertheless through seeing something present, + an animal's appetite is moved to seek or avoid something future. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35255" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35255] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, licet id quod est futurum, non cadat sub visu; tamen +ex his quae videt animal in praesenti, movetur eius appetitus in +aliquod futurum vel prosequendum vel vitandum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q40_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q40_A4-p0.1">Q. 40. A. 4. Whether despair is contrary to hope?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that despair is not contrary to hope. Because "to one thing there is one contrary" (Metaph. x, 5). But fear + is contrary to hope. Therefore despair is not contrary to hope. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35256" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35256] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod desperatio non sit contraria spei. Uni +enim unum est contrarium, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed spei +contrariatur timor. Non ergo contrariatur ei desperatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, contraries seem to bear on the same thing. But hope and despair do not bear on the same thing: since hope regards + the good, whereas despair arises from some evil that is in the way of obtaining good. Therefore hope is not contrary to despair. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35257" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35257] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +contraria videntur esse circa idem. Sed spes et desperatio non sunt +circa idem, nam spes respicit bonum, desperatio autem est propter +aliquod malum impeditivum adeptionis boni. Ergo spes non +contrariatur desperationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, movement is contrary to movement: while repose is in opposition to movement as a privation thereof. But despair + seems to imply immobility rather than movement. Therefore it is not contrary to hope, which implies movement of stretching + out towards the hoped-for good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35258" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35258] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +motui contrariatur motus, quies vero opponitur motui ut privatio. +Sed desperatio magis videtur importare immobilitatem quam motum. +Ergo non contrariatur spei, quae importat motum extensionis in +bonum speratum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The very name of despair [desperatio] implies that it is contrary to hope [spes]. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35259" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35259] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod desperatio nominatur per contrarium spei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q23_A2" id="FS_Q40_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[2]</a>), there is a twofold contrariety of movements. One is in respect of approach to contrary terms: and this contrariety alone + is to be found in the concupiscible passions, for instance between love and hatred. The other is according to approach and + withdrawal with regard to the same term; and is to be found in the irascible passions, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q23_A2" id="FS_Q40_A4-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[23], A[2]</a>). Now the object of + hope, which is the arduous good, has the character of a principle of attraction, if it be considered in the light of something + attainable; and thus hope tends thereto, for it denotes a kind of approach. But in so far as it is considered as unobtainable, + it has the character of a principle of repulsion, because, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3, "when men come to an impossibility + they disperse." And this is how despair stands in regard to this object, wherefore it implies a movement of withdrawal: and + consequently it is contrary to hope, as withdrawal is to approach. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 4 co."><a name="35260" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35260] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in mutationibus invenitur +duplex contrarietas. Una secundum accessum ad contrarios terminos, +et talis contrarietas sola invenitur in passionibus +concupiscibilis, sicut amor et odium contrariantur. Alio modo, per +accessum et per recessum respectu eiusdem termini, et talis +contrarietas invenitur in passionibus irascibilis, sicut supra +dictum est. Obiectum autem spei, quod est bonum arduum, habet +quidem rationem attractivi, prout consideratur cum possibilitate +adipiscendi, et sic tendit in ipsum spes, quae importat quendam +accessum. Sed secundum quod consideratur cum impossibilitate +obtinendi, habet rationem repulsivi, quia, ut dicitur in III +Ethic., <i>cum ventum fuerit ad aliquid impossibile, tunc homines +discedunt</i>. Et sic respicit hoc obiectum desperatio. Unde +importat motum cuiusdam recessus. Et propter hoc, contrariatur spei +sicut recessus accessui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Fear is contrary to hope, because their objects, i.e. good and evil, are contrary: for this contrariety is found in the irascible + passions, according as they ensue from the passions of the concupiscible. But despair is contrary to hope, only by contrariety + of approach and withdrawal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35261" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35261] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod timor contrariatur spei secundum contrarietatem +obiectorum, scilicet boni et mali, haec enim contrarietas invenitur +in passionibus irascibilis, secundum quod derivantur a passionibus +concupiscibilis. Sed desperatio contrariatur ei solum secundum +contrarietatem accessus et recessus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Despair does not regard evil as such; sometimes however it regards evil accidentally, as making the difficult good impossible + to obtain. But it can arise from the mere excess of good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35262" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35262] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod desperatio non respicit malum sub ratione mali, sed +per accidens quandoque respicit malum, inquantum facit +impossibilitatem adipiscendi. Potest autem esse desperatio ex solo +superexcessu boni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Despair implies not only privation of hope, but also a recoil from the thing desired, by reason of its being esteemed impossible + to get. Hence despair, like hope, presupposes desire; because we neither hope for nor despair of that which we do not desire + to have. For this reason, too, each of them regards the good, which is the object of desire. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35263" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35263] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod desperatio non importat solam privationem spei; sed +importat quendam recessum a re desiderata, propter aestimatam +impossibilitatem adipiscendi. Unde desperatio praesupponit +desiderium, sicut et spes, de eo enim quod sub desiderio nostro non +cadit, neque spem neque desperationem habemus. Et propter hoc +etiam, utrumque eorum est de bono, quod sub desiderio cadit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q40_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q40_A5-p0.1">Q. 40. A. 5. Whether experience is a cause of hope?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that experience is not a cause of hope. Because experience belongs to the cognitive power; wherefore the Philosopher + says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "intellectual virtue needs experience and time." But hope is not in the cognitive power, but in the + appetite, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q40_A2" id="FS_Q40_A5-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore experience is not a cause of hope. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="35264" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35264] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod experientia non sit causa spei. +Experientia enim ad vim cognitivam pertinet, unde philosophus +dicit, in II Ethic., quod <i>virtus intellectualis indiget +experimento et tempore</i>. Spes autem non est in vi cognitiva, sed +in appetitiva, ut dictum est. Ergo experientia non est causa +spei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 13) that "the old are slow to hope, on account of their experience"; whence it seems + to follow that experience causes want of hope. But the same cause is not productive of opposites. Therefore experience is + not a cause of hope. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="35265" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35265] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>senes sunt difficilis +spei, propter experientiam</i>, ex quo videtur quod experientia sit +causa defectus spei. Sed non est idem causa oppositorum. Ergo +experientia non est causa spei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Coel. ii, 5) that "to have something to say about everything, without leaving anything + out, is sometimes a proof of folly." But to attempt everything seems to point to great hopes; while folly arises from inexperience. + Therefore inexperience, rather than experience, seems to be a cause of hope. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="35266" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35266] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in II de caelo, quod <i>de omnibus enuntiare +aliquid, et nihil praetermittere, quandoque est signum +stultitiae</i>. Sed quod homo tentet omnia, ad magnitudinem spei +pertinere videtur, stultitia autem provenit ex inexperientia. Ergo +inexperientia videtur esse magis causa spei quam experientia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) "some are hopeful, through having been victorious often and over many opponents": which + seems to pertain to experience. Therefore experience is a cause of hope. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 5 s. c."><a name="35267" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35267] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod <i>aliqui sunt +bonae spei, propter multoties et multos vicisse</i>, quod ad +experientiam pertinet. Ergo experientia est causa spei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q40_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q40_A1" id="FS_Q40_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the object of hope is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain. Consequently a thing may be a cause of hope, either + because it makes something possible to a man: or because it makes him think something possible. In the first way hope is caused + by everything that increases a man's power; e.g. riches, strength, and, among others, experience: since by experience man + acquires the faculty of doing something + easily, and the result of this is hope. Wherefore Vegetius says (De Re Milit. i): "No one fears to do that which he is sure + of having learned well." + </p><p id="FS_Q40_A5-p7"> In the second way, hope is caused by everything that makes man think that he can obtain something: and thus both teaching + and persuasion may be a cause of hope. And then again experience is a cause of hope, in so far as it makes him reckon something + possible, which before his experience he looked upon as impossible. However, in this way, experience can cause a lack of hope: + because just as it makes a man think possible what he had previously thought impossible; so, conversely, + experience makes a man consider as impossible that which hitherto he had thought possible. Accordingly experience causes hope + in two ways, despair in one way: and for this reason we may say rather that it causes hope. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 5 co."><a name="35268" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35268] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, spei obiectum est bonum +futurum arduum possibile adipisci. Potest ergo aliquid esse causa +spei, vel quia facit homini aliquid esse possibile, vel quia facit +eum existimare aliquid esse possibile. Primo modo est causa spei +omne illud quod auget potestatem hominis, sicut divitiae, +fortitudo, et, inter cetera, etiam experientia, nam per +experientiam homo acquirit facultatem aliquid de facili faciendi, +et ex hoc sequitur spes. Unde Vegetius dicit, in libro de re +militari, <i>nemo facere metuit quod se bene didicisse +confidit</i>. Alio modo est causa spei omne illud quod facit alicui +existimationem quod aliquid sit sibi possibile. Et hoc modo et +doctrina, et persuasio quaelibet potest esse causa spei. Et sic +etiam experientia est causa spei, inquantum scilicet per +experientiam fit homini existimatio quod aliquid sit sibi +possibile, quod impossibile ante experientiam reputabat. Sed per +hunc modum experientia potest etiam esse causa defectus spei. Quia +sicut per experientiam fit homini existimatio quod aliquid sibi sit +possibile, quod reputabat impossibile; ita e converso per +experientiam fit homini existimatio quod aliquid non sit sibi +possibile, quod possibile existimabat. Sic ergo experientia est +causa spei duobus modis, causa autem defectus spei, uno modo. Et +propter hoc, magis dicere possumus eam esse causam spei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Experience in matters pertaining to action not only produces knowledge; it also causes a certain habit, by reason of custom, + which renders the action easier. Moreover, the intellectual virtue itself adds to the power of acting with ease: because it + shows something to be possible; and thus is a cause of hope. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="35269" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35269] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod experientia in operabilibus non solum causat +scientiam; sed etiam causat quendam habitum, propter consuetudinem, +qui facit operationem faciliorem. Sed et ipsa virtus intellectualis +facit ad potestatem facile operandi, demonstrat enim aliquid esse +possibile. Et sic causat spem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The old are wanting in hope because of their experience, in so far as experience makes them think something impossible. Hence + he adds (Rhet. ii, 13) that "many evils have befallen them." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="35270" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35270] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod in senibus est defectus spei propter experientiam, +inquantum experientia facit existimationem impossibilis. Unde +ibidem subditur quod eis multa evenerunt in deterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Folly and inexperience can be a cause of hope accidentally as it were, by removing the knowledge which would help one to + judge truly a thing to be impossible. Wherefore inexperience is a cause of hope, for the same reason as experience causes + lack of hope. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="35271" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35271] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod stultitia et inexperientia possunt esse causa spei +quasi per accidens, removendo scilicet scientiam per quam vere +existimatur aliquid esse non possibile. Unde ea ratione +inexperientia est causa spei, qua experientia est causa defectus +spei.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q40_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q40_A6-p0.1">Q. 40. A. 6. Whether hope abounds in young men and drunkards?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that youth and drunkenness are not causes of hope. Because hope implies certainty and steadiness; so much so + that it is compared to an anchor ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q40_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.6.19" target="asv">Heb. 6:19</a>). But young men and drunkards are wanting in steadiness; since their minds are easily changed. Therefore youth and drunkenness + are not causes of hope. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="35272" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35272] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod iuventus et ebrietas non sint causa +spei. Spes enim importat quandam certitudinem et firmitatem, unde +ad Heb. VI, spes comparatur ancorae. Sed iuvenes et ebrii deficiunt +a firmitate, habent enim animum de facili mutabilem. Ergo iuventus +et ebrietas non est causa spei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q40_A5" id="FS_Q40_A6-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>, the cause of hope is chiefly whatever increases one's power. But youth and drunkenness are united to weakness. Therefore + they are not causes of hope. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="35273" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35273] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ea quae augent potestatem, maxime sunt causa spei, ut supra dictum +est. Sed iuventus et ebrietas quandam infirmitatem habent +adiunctam. Ergo non sunt causa spei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, experience is a cause of hope, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q40_A5" id="FS_Q40_A6-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. But youth lacks experience. Therefore it is not a cause of hope. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="35274" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35274] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +experientia est causa spei, ut dictum est. Sed iuvenibus +experientia deficit. Ergo iuventus non est causa spei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "drunken men are hopeful": and (Rhet. ii, 12) that "the young are full of hope." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 6 s. c."><a name="35275" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35275] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod <i>inebriati sunt +bene sperantes</i>. Et in II Rhetoric. dicitur quod <i>iuvenes sunt +bonae spei</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Youth is a cause of hope for three reasons, as the Philosopher states in Rhet. ii, 12: and these three reasons may be gathered + from the three conditions of the good which is the object of hope---namely, that it is future, arduous and possible, as stated + above + <a href="#FS_Q40_A1" id="FS_Q40_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. For youth has much of the future before it, and little of the past: and therefore since memory is of the past, and hope + of the future, it has little to remember and + lives very much in hope. Again, youths, on account of the heat of their nature, are full of spirit; so that their heart expands: + and it is owing to the heart being expanded that one tends to that which is arduous; wherefore youths are spirited and hopeful. + Likewise they who have not suffered defeat, nor had experience of obstacles to their efforts, are prone to count a thing possible + to them. Wherefore youths, through inexperience of obstacles and of their own shortcomings, easily count a thing + possible; and consequently are of good hope. Two of these causes are also in those who are in drink---viz. heat and high spirits, + on account of wine, and heedlessness of dangers and shortcomings. For the same reason all foolish and thoughtless persons + attempt everything and are full of hope. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 6 co."><a name="35276" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35276] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod iuventus est causa spei propter tria, ut philosophus +dicit in II Rhetoric. Et haec tria possunt accipi secundum tres +conditiones boni quod est obiectum spei, quod est futurum, et +arduum, et possibile, ut dictum est. Iuvenes enim multum habent de +futuro, et parum de praeterito. Et ideo, quia memoria est +praeteriti, spes autem futuri; parum habent de memoria, sed multum +vivunt in spe. Iuvenes etiam, propter caliditatem naturae, habent +multos spiritus, et ita in eis cor ampliatur. Ex amplitudine autem +cordis est quod aliquis ad ardua tendat. Et ideo iuvenes sunt +animosi et bonae spei. Similiter etiam illi qui non sunt passi +repulsam, nec experti impedimenta in suis conatibus, de facili +reputant aliquid sibi possibile. Unde et iuvenes, propter +inexperientiam impedimentorum et defectuum, de facili reputant +aliquid sibi possibile. Et ideo sunt bonae spei. Duo etiam istorum +sunt in ebriis, scilicet caliditas et multiplicatio spirituum, +propter vinum; et iterum inconsideratio periculorum vel defectuum. +Et propter eandem rationem etiam omnes stulti, et deliberatione non +utentes, omnia tentant, et sunt bonae spei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although youths and men in drink lack steadiness in reality, yet they are steady in their own estimation, for they think + that they will steadily obtain that which they hope for. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="35277" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35277] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod in iuvenibus et in ebriis licet non sit firmitas +secundum rei veritatem, est tamen in eis secundum eorum +aestimationem, reputant enim se firmiter assecuturos illud quod +sperant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A6-p8"> In like manner, in reply to the Second Objection, we must observe that young people and men in drink are indeed unsteady + in reality: but, in their own estimation, they are capable, for they know not their shortcomings. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="35278" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35278] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Et similiter +dicendum ad secundum, quod iuvenes et ebrii habent quidem +infirmitatem secundum rei veritatem, sed secundum eorum +existimationem, habent potestatem; quia suos defectus non +cognoscunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not only experience, but also lack of experience, is, in some way, a cause of hope, as explained above (A[5], ad 3). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="35279" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35279] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod non solum experientia, sed etiam inexperientia est +quodammodo causa spei, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q40_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q40_A7-p0.1">Q. 40. A. 7. Whether hope is a cause of love?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hope is not a cause of love. Because, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), love is the first + of the soul's emotions. But hope is an emotion of the soul. Therefore love precedes hope, and consequently hope does not cause + love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="35280" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35280] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod spes non sit causa amoris. Quia +secundum Augustinum, XIV de Civ. Dei, prima affectionum animae est +amor. Sed spes est quaedam affectio animae. Amor ergo praecedit +spem. Non ergo spes causat amorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, desire precedes hope. But desire is caused by love, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q25_A2" id="FS_Q40_A7-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[25], A[2]</a>). Therefore hope, too, follows love, and consequently is not its cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="35281" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35281] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +desiderium praecedit spem. Sed desiderium causatur ex amore, ut +dictum est. Ergo etiam spes sequitur amorem. Non ergo causat +ipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, hope causes pleasure, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q32_A3" id="FS_Q40_A7-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[32], A[3]</a>). But pleasure is only of the good that is loved. Therefore love precedes hope. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="35282" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35282] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +spes causat delectationem, ut supra dictum est. Sed delectatio non +est nisi de bono amato. Ergo amor praecedit spem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The gloss commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q40_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.1.2" target="asv"> Mat. 1:2, </a> "Abraham begot Isaac, and Isaac begot Jacob," says, i.e. "faith begets hope, and hope begets charity." But charity is love. + Therefore love is caused by hope. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 7 s. c."><a name="35283" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35283] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Matth. I, super illud, Abraham genuit Isaac, Isaac autem +genuit Iacob, dicit Glossa, <i>idest, fides spem, spes +caritatem</i>. Caritas autem est amor. Ergo amor causatur a +spe.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Hope can regard two things. For it regards as its object, the good which one hopes for. But since the good we hope for is + something difficult but possible to obtain; and since it happens sometimes that what is difficult becomes possible to us, + not through ourselves but through others; hence it is that hope regards also that by which something becomes possible to us. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 7 co."><a name="35284" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35284] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod spes duo respicere potest. Respicit enim sicut +obiectum, bonum speratum. Sed quia bonum speratum est arduum +possibile; aliquando autem fit aliquod arduum possibile nobis, non +per nos, sed per alios; ideo spes etiam respicit illud per quod fit +nobis aliquid possibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A7-p7"> In so far, then, as hope regards the good we hope to get, it is caused by love: since we do not hope save for that which + we desire and love. But in so far as hope regards one through whom something becomes possible to us, love is caused by hope, + and not vice versa. Because by the very fact that we hope that good will accrue to us through someone, we are moved towards + him as to our own good; and thus we begin to love him. Whereas from the fact that we love someone we do not hope + in him, except accidentally, that is, in so far as we think that he returns our love. Wherefore the fact of being loved by + another makes us hope in him; but our love for him is caused by the hope we have in him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Inquantum igitur spes respicit bonum +speratum, spes ex amore causatur, non enim est spes nisi de bono +desiderato et amato. Inquantum vero spes respicit illum per quem +fit aliquid nobis possibile, sic amor causatur ex spe, et non e +converso. Ex hoc enim quod per aliquem speramus nobis posse +provenire bona, movemur in ipsum sicut in bonum nostrum, et sic +incipimus ipsum amare. Ex hoc autem quod amamus aliquem, non +speramus de eo, nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet credimus nos +redamari ab ipso. Unde amari ab aliquo facit nos sperare de eo, sed +amor eius causatur ex spe quam de eo habemus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A7-p8"> Wherefore the Replies to the Objections are evident.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 7 ad arg."><a name="35285" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35285] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 7 ad arg.</span></a> Et per +haec patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q40_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q40_A8-p0.1">Q. 40. A. 8. Whether hope is a help or a hindrance to action?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hope is not a help but a hindrance to action. Because hope implies security. But security begets negligence + which hinders action. Therefore hope is a hindrance to action. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="35286" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35286] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod spes non adiuvet operationem, sed +magis impediat. Ad spem enim securitas pertinet. Sed securitas +parit negligentiam, quae impedit operationem. Ergo spes impedit +operationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sorrow hinders action, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q37_A3" id="FS_Q40_A8-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[37], A[3]</a>). But hope sometimes causes sorrow: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q40_A8-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.13.12" target="asv">Prov. 13:12</a>): "Hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul." Therefore hope hinders action. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="35287" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35287] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +tristitia impedit operationem, ut supra dictum est. Sed spes +quandoque causat tristitiam, dicitur enim Prov. XIII, <i>spes quae +differtur, affligit animam</i>. Ergo spes impedit operationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, despair is contrary to hope, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q40_A4" id="FS_Q40_A8-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. But despair, especially in matters of war, conduces to action; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q40_A8-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iiKgdms.2.26" target="asv">2 Kings 2:26</a>), that "it is dangerous to drive people to despair." Therefore hope has a contrary effect, namely, by hindering action. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="35288" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35288] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +desperatio contrariatur spei, ut dictum est. Sed desperatio, maxime +in rebus bellicis, adiuvat operationem, dicitur enim II Reg. II, +quod <i>periculosa res est desperatio</i>. Ergo spes facit +contrarium effectum, impediendo scilicet operationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q40_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:10</a>) that "he that plougheth should plough in hope . . . to receive fruit": and the same applies to all other actions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 8 s. c."><a name="35289" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35289] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur I ad Cor. IX, quod <i>qui arat, debet arare in spe +fructus percipiendi</i>. Et eadem ratio est in omnibus aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Hope of its very nature is a help to action by making it more intense: and this for two reasons. First, by reason of its + object, which is a good, difficult but possible. For the thought of its being difficult arouses our attention; while the thought + that it is possible is no drag on our effort. Hence it follows that by reason of hope man is intent on his action. Secondly, + on account of its effect. Because hope, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q32_A3" id="FS_Q40_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[32], + A[3] + </a>), causes pleasure; which is a help to action, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q33_A4" id="FS_Q40_A8-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[33], A[4]</a>). Therefore hope is conducive to action. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 8 co."><a name="35290" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35290] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod spes per se habet quod adiuvet operationem, +intendendo ipsam. Et hoc ex duobus. Primo quidem, ex ratione sui +obiecti, quod est bonum arduum possibile. Existimatio enim ardui +excitat attentionem, existimatio vero possibilis non retardat +conatum. Unde sequitur quod homo intente operetur propter spem. +Secundo vero, ex ratione sui effectus. Spes enim, ut supra dictum +est, causat delectationem, quae adiuvat operationem, ut supra +dictum est. Unde spes operationem adiuvat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A8-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Hope regards a good to be obtained; security regards an evil to be avoided. Wherefore security seems to be contrary to fear + rather than to belong to hope. Yet security does not beget negligence, save in so far as it lessens the idea of difficulty: + whereby it also lessens the character of hope: for the things in which a man fears no hindrance, are no longer looked upon + as difficult. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="35291" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35291] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod spes respicit bonum consequendum, securitas +autem respicit malum vitandum. Unde securitas magis videtur opponi +timori, quam ad spem pertinere. Et tamen securitas non causat +negligentiam, nisi inquantum diminuit existimationem ardui, in quo +etiam diminuitur ratio spei. Illa enim in quibus homo nullum +impedimentum timet, quasi iam non reputantur ardua.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Hope of itself causes pleasure; it is by accident that it causes sorrow, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q32_A3" id="FS_Q40_A8-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[32], A[3]</a>, ad 2). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="35292" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35292] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod spes per se causat delectationem, sed per accidens +est ut causet tristitiam, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Despair threatens danger in war, on account of a certain hope that attaches to it. For they who despair of flight, strive + less to fly, but hope to avenge their death: and therefore in this hope they fight the more bravely, and consequently prove + dangerous to the foe. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="35293" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35293] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod desperatio in bello fit periculosa, propter aliquam +spem adiunctam. Illi enim qui desperant de fuga, debilitantur in +fugiendo, sed sperant mortem suam vindicare. Et ideo ex hac spe +acrius pugnant, unde periculosi hostibus fiunt.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q41" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q41-p0.1">Q. 41. OF FEAR, IN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q41-p2"> We must now consider, in the first place, fear; and, secondly, daring. With regard to fear, four things must be considered: + (1) Fear, in itself; (2) Its object; (3) Its cause; (4) Its effect. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FS_Q41-p3"><a href="#FS_Q41_A1"> (1) Whether fear is a passion of the soul?</a></p><p id="FS_Q41-p4"><a href="#FS_Q41_A2"> (2) Whether fear is a special passion?</a></p><p id="FS_Q41-p5"><a href="#FS_Q41_A3"> (3) Whether there is a natural fear?</a></p><p id="FS_Q41-p6"><a href="#FS_Q41_A4"> (4) Of the species of fear.</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 pr."><a name="35294" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35294] +Iª-IIae q. 41 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est, +primo, de timore; et secundo, de audacia. Circa timorem +consideranda sunt quatuor, primo, de ipso timore; secundo, de +obiecto eius; tertio, de causa ipsius; quarto, de effectu. Circa +primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum timor sit passio animae. +Secundo, utrum sit specialis passio. Tertio, utrum sit aliquis +timor naturalis. Quarto, de speciebus timoris.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q41_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q41_A1-p0.1">Q. 41. A. 1. Whether fear is a passion of the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fear is not a passion of the soul. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that "fear is a power, by + way of {systole}"---i.e. of contraction---"desirous of vindicating nature." But no virtue is a passion, as is proved in Ethic. + ii, 5. Therefore fear is not a passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35295" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35295] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor non sit passio animae. Dicit +enim Damascenus, in libro III, quod timor est virtus secundum +systolen idest contractionem, essentiae desiderativa. Sed nulla +virtus est passio, ut probatur in II Ethic. Ergo timor non est +passio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every passion is an effect due to the presence of an agent. But fear is not of something present, but of something + future, as Damascene declares (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). Therefore fear is not a passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35296" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35296] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +omnis passio est effectus ex praesentia agentis proveniens. Sed +timor non est de aliquo praesenti, sed de futuro, ut Damascenus +dicit in II libro. Ergo timor non est passio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every passion of the soul is a movement of the sensitive appetite, in consequence of an apprehension of the senses. + But sense apprehends, not the future but the present. Since, then, fear is of future evil, it seems that it is not a passion + of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35297" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35297] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +omnis passio animae est motus appetitus sensitivi, qui sequitur +apprehensionem sensus. Sensus autem non est apprehensivus futuri, +sed praesentis. Cum ergo timor sit de malo futuro, videtur quod non +sit passio animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 5, seqq.) reckons fear among the other passions of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35298" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35298] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus, in XIV de Civ. Dei, enumerat timorem inter +alias animae passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Among the other passions of the soul, after sorrow, fear chiefly has the character of passion. For as we have stated above + (Q[22] ), the notion of passion implies first of all a movement of a passive power---i.e. of a power whose object is compared + to it as its active principle: since passion is the effect of an agent. In this way, both "to feel" and "to understand" are + passions. Secondly, more properly speaking, passion is a movement of the appetitive + power; and more properly still, it is a movement of an appetitive power that has a bodily organ, such movement being accompanied + by a bodily transmutation. And, again, most properly those movements are called passions, which imply some deterioration. + Now it is evident that fear, since it regards evil, belongs to the appetitive power, which of itself regards good and evil. + Moreover, it belongs to the sensitive appetite: for it is accompanied by a certain transmutation---i.e. contraction---as + Damascene says (Cf. OBJ 1). Again, it implies relation to evil as overcoming, so to speak, some particular good. Wherefore + it has most properly the character of passion; less, however, than sorrow, which regards the present evil: because fear regards + future evil, which is not so strong a motive as present evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 1 co."><a name="35299" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35299] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, inter ceteros animae motus, post tristitiam, timor +magis rationem obtinet passionis. Ut enim supra dictum est, ad +rationem passionis primo quidem pertinet quod sit motus passivae +virtutis, ad quam scilicet comparetur suum obiectum per modum +activi moventis, eo quod passio est effectus agentis. Et per hunc +modum, etiam sentire et intelligere dicuntur pati. Secundo, magis +proprie dicitur passio motus appetitivae virtutis. Et adhuc magis +proprie, motus appetitivae virtutis habentis organum corporale, qui +fit cum aliqua transmutatione corporali. Et adhuc propriissime illi +motus passiones dicuntur, qui important aliquod nocumentum. +Manifestum est autem quod timor, cum sit de malo, ad appetitivam +potentiam pertinet, quae per se respicit bonum et malum. Pertinet +autem ad appetitum sensitivum, fit enim cum quadam transmutatione, +scilicet cum contractione, ut Damascenus dicit. Et importat etiam +habitudinem ad malum, secundum quod malum habet quodammodo +victoriam super aliquod bonum. Unde verissime sibi competit ratio +passionis. Tamen post tristitiam, quae est de malo praesenti, nam +timor est de malo futuro, quod non ita movet sicut praesens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue denotes a principle of action: wherefore, in so far as the interior movements of the appetitive faculty are principles + of external action, they are called virtues. But the Philosopher denies that passion is a virtue by way of habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35300" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35300] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod virtus nominat quoddam principium actionis, et +ideo, inquantum interiores motus appetitivae virtutis sunt +principia exteriorum actuum, dicuntur virtutes. Philosophus autem +negat passionem esse virtutem quae est habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as the passion of a natural body is due to the bodily presence of an agent, so is the passion of the soul due to the + agent being present to the soul, although neither corporally nor really present: that is to say, in so far as the evil which + is really future, is present in the apprehension of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35301" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35301] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut passio corporis naturalis provenit ex +corporali praesentia agentis, ita passio animae provenit ex animali +praesentia agentis, absque praesentia corporali vel reali, +inquantum scilicet malum quod est futurum realiter, est praesens +secundum apprehensionem animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The senses do not apprehend the future: but from apprehending the present, an animal is moved by natural instinct to hope + for a future good, or to fear a future evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35302" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35302] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod sensus non apprehendit futurum, sed ex eo quod +apprehendit praesens, animal naturali instinctu movetur ad +sperandum futurum bonum, vel timendum futurum malum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q41_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q41_A2-p0.1">Q. 41. A. 2. Whether fear is a special passion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fear is not a special passion. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33) that "the man who is not distraught + by fear, is neither harassed by desire, nor wounded by sickness"---i.e. sorrow---"nor tossed about in transports of empty + joys." Wherefore it seems that, if fear be set aside, all the other passions are removed. Therefore fear is not a special + but a general passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35303" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35303] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor non sit specialis passio. Dicit +enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod <i>quem non +exanimat metus, nec cupiditas eum vastat, nec aegritudo</i>, idest +tristitia, <i>macerat, nec ventilat gestiens et vana laetitia</i>. +Ex quo videtur quod, remoto timore, omnes aliae passiones +removentur. Non ergo passio est specialis, sed generalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that "pursuit and avoidance in the appetite are what affirmation and denial + are in the intellect." But denial is nothing special in the intellect, as neither is affirmation, but something common to + many. Therefore neither is avoidance anything special in the appetite. But fear is nothing but a kind of avoidance of evil. + Therefore it is not a special passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35304" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35304] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod <i>ita se habet in appetitu +prosecutio et fuga, sicut in intellectu affirmatio et negatio</i>. +Sed negatio non est aliquid speciale in intellectu, sicut nec +affirmatio, sed aliquid commune ad multa. Ergo nec fuga in +appetitu. Sed nihil est aliud timor quam fuga quaedam mali. Ergo +timor non est passio specialis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if fear were a special passion, it would be chiefly in the irascible part. But fear is also in the concupiscible: + since the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear is a kind of sorrow"; and Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that + fear is "a power of desire": and both sorrow and desire are in the concupiscible faculty, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q41_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a>). Therefore fear is not a special passion, since it belongs to different + powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35305" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35305] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +si timor esset passio specialis, praecipue in irascibili esset. Est +autem timor etiam in concupiscibili. Dicit enim philosophus, in II +Rhetoric., quod timor est tristitia quaedam, et Damascenus dicit +quod timor est virtus desiderativa, tristitia autem et desiderium +sunt in concupiscibili, ut supra dictum est. Non est ergo passio +specialis, cum pertineat ad diversas potentias.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Fear is condivided with the other passions of the soul, as is clear from Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12,15). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35306" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35306] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod condividitur aliis passionibus animae; ut patet per +Damascenum, in II libro.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The passions of the soul derive their species from their objects: hence that is a special passion, which has a special object. + Now fear has a special object, as hope has. For just as the object of hope is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain; + so the object of fear is a future evil, difficult and irresistible. Consequently fear is a special passion of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 2 co."><a name="35307" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35307] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod passiones animae recipiunt speciem ex obiectis. Unde +specialis passio est quae habet speciale obiectum. Timor autem +habet speciale obiectum, sicut et spes. Sicut enim obiectum spei +est bonum futurum arduum possibile adipisci; ita obiectum timoris +est malum futurum difficile cui resisti non potest. Unde timor est +specialis passio animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All the passions of the soul arise from one source, viz. love, wherein they are connected with one another. By reason of + this connection, when fear is put aside, the other passions of the soul are dispersed; not, however, as though it were a general + passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35308" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35308] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod omnes passiones animae derivantur ex uno +principio, scilicet ex amore, in quo habent ad invicem connexionem. +Et ratione huius connexionis, remoto timore, removentur aliae +passiones animae, non ideo quia sit passio generalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not every avoidance in the appetite is fear, but avoidance of a special object, as stated. Wherefore, though avoidance be + something common, yet fear is a special passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35309" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35309] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod non omnis fuga appetitus est timor, sed fuga ab +aliquo speciali obiecto, ut dictum est. Et ideo, licet fuga sit +quoddam generale, tamen timor est passio specialis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Fear is nowise in the concupiscible: for it regards evil, not absolutely, but as difficult or arduous, so as to be almost + unavoidable. But since the irascible passions arise from the passions of the concupiscible faculty, and terminate therein, + as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q25_A1" id="FS_Q41_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[25], A[1]</a>); hence it is that what belongs to the concupiscible is ascribed to fear. For fear is called sorrow, in so far as the object + of fear causes sorrow when + present: wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that fear arises "from the representation of a future evil which is + either corruptive or painful." In like manner desire is ascribed by Damascene to fear, because just as hope arises from the + desire of good, so fear arises from avoidance of evil; while avoidance of evil arises from the desire of good, as is evident + from what has been said above ( + <a href="#FS_Q25_A2" id="FS_Q41_A2-p9.2" shape="rect">Q[25], A[2]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q29_A2" id="FS_Q41_A2-p9.3" shape="rect"> Q[29], A[2]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q36_A2" id="FS_Q41_A2-p9.4" shape="rect"> + Q[36], A[2] + </a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35310" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35310] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod timor nullo modo est in concupiscibili, non enim +respicit malum absolute, sed cum quadam difficultate vel arduitate, +ut ei resisti vix possit. Sed quia passiones irascibilis derivantur +a passionibus concupiscibilis et ad eas terminantur, ut supra +dictum est; ideo timori attribuuntur ea quae sunt concupiscibilis. +Dicitur enim timor esse tristitia, inquantum obiectum, timoris est +contristans, si praesens fuerit, unde et philosophus dicit ibidem +quod timor procedit ex phantasia futuri mali corruptivi vel +contristativi. Similiter et desiderium attribuitur a Damasceno +timori, quia, sicut spes oritur a desiderio boni ita timor ex fuga +mali; fuga autem mali oritur ex desiderio boni, ut ex supra dictis +patet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q41_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q41_A3-p0.1">Q. 41. A. 3. Whether there is a natural fear?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is a natural fear. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that "there is a natural fear, through + the soul refusing to be severed from the body." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35311" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35311] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor aliquis sit naturalis. Dicit +enim Damascenus, in III libro, quod <i>est quidam timor naturalis, +nolente anima dividi a corpore</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fear arises from love, as stated above (A[2], ad 1). But there is a natural love, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). + Therefore there is also a natural fear. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35312" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35312] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +timor ex amore oritur, ut dictum est. Sed est aliquis amor +naturalis, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo etiam est +aliquis timor naturalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fear is opposed to hope, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q40_A4" id="FS_Q41_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[40], A[4]</a>, ad 1). But there is a hope of nature, as is evident from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q41_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.4.18" target="asv"> Rom. 4:18, </a> where it is said of Abraham that "against hope" of nature, "he believed in hope" of grace. Therefore there is also a fear + of nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35313" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35313] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +timor opponitur spei, ut supra dictum est. Sed est aliqua spes +naturae, ut patet per id quod dicitur Rom. IV, de Abraham, quod +contra spem naturae, in spem gratiae credidit. Ergo etiam est +aliquis timor naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> That which is natural is common to things animate and inanimate. But fear is not in things inanimate. Therefore there is + no natural fear. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35314" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35314] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +ea quae sunt naturalia, communiter inveniuntur in rebus animatis et +inanimatis. Sed timor non invenitur in rebus inanimatis. Ergo timor +non est naturalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A movement is said to be natural, because nature inclines thereto. Now this happens in two ways. First, so that it is entirely + accomplished by nature, without any operation of the apprehensive faculty: thus to have an upward movement is natural to fire, + and to grow is the natural movement of animals and plants. Secondly, a movement is said to be natural, if nature inclines + thereto, though it be accomplished by the apprehensive faculty alone: since, as stated + above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q10_A1" id="FS_Q41_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[10], A[1]</a>), the movements of the cognitive and appetitive faculties are reducible to nature as to their first principle. In this way, + even the acts of the apprehensive power, such as understanding, feeling, and remembering, as well as the movements of the + animal appetite, are sometimes said to be natural. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 3 co."><a name="35315" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35315] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod aliquis motus dicitur naturalis, quia ad ipsum +inclinat natura. Sed hoc contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, quod totum +perficitur a natura, absque aliqua operatione apprehensivae +virtutis, sicut moveri sursum est motus naturalis ignis, et augeri +est motus naturalis animalium et plantarum. Alio modo dicitur motus +naturalis, ad quem natura inclinat, licet non perficiatur nisi per +apprehensionem, quia, sicut supra dictum est, motus cognitivae et +appetitivae virtutis reducuntur in naturam, sicut in principium +primum. Et per hunc modum, etiam ipsi actus apprehensivae virtutis, +ut intelligere, sentire et memorari, et etiam motus appetitus +animalis, quandoque dicuntur naturales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A3-p7"> And in this sense we may say that there is a natural fear; and it is distinguished from non-natural fear, by reason of the + diversity of its object. For, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), there is a fear of "corruptive evil," which nature shrinks + from on account of its natural desire to exist; and such fear is said to be natural. Again, there is a fear of "painful evil," + which is repugnant not to nature, but to the desire of the appetite; and such fear is not natural. In + this sense we have stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q26_A1" id="FS_Q41_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[26], A[1]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q30_A3" id="FS_Q41_A3-p7.2" shape="rect"> Q[30], A[3]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q31_A7" id="FS_Q41_A3-p7.3" shape="rect"> Q[31], A[7]</a>) that love, desire, and pleasure are divisible into natural and non-natural. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin"> Et per hunc modum potest +dici timor naturalis. Et distinguitur a timore non naturali, +secundum diversitatem obiecti. Est enim, ut philosophus dicit in II +Rhetoric., timor de malo corruptivo, quod natura refugit propter +naturale desiderium essendi, et talis timor dicitur naturalis. Est +iterum de malo contristativo, quod non repugnat naturae, sed +desiderio appetitus, et talis timor non est naturalis. Sicut etiam +supra amor, concupiscentia et delectatio distincta sunt per +naturale et non naturale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A3-p8"> But in the first sense of the word "natural," we must observe that certain passions of the soul are sometimes said to be + natural, as love, desire, and hope; whereas the others cannot be called natural. The reason of this is because love and hatred, + desire and avoidance, imply a certain inclination to pursue what is good or to avoid what is evil; which inclination is to + be found in the natural appetite also. Consequently there is a natural love; while we may also speak of desire + and hope as being even in natural things devoid of knowledge. On the other hand the other passions of the soul denote certain + movements, whereto the natural inclination is nowise sufficient. This is due either to the fact that perception or knowledge + is essential to these passions (thus we have said + <a href="#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q41_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">, Q[31], AA[1]</a>,3; + <a href="#FS_Q35_A1" id="FS_Q41_A3-p8.2" shape="rect"> Q[35], A[1]</a>, that apprehension is a necessary condition of pleasure and sorrow), wherefore things devoid of knowledge cannot be + said to take pleasure or to be sorrowful: or else it is because such like movements are contrary to the very nature of natural + inclination: for instance, despair flies from good on account of some difficulty; and fear shrinks from repelling a contrary + evil; both of which are contrary to the inclination of nature. Wherefore such like passions are in no way ascribed to inanimate + beings. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin"> Sed secundum primam acceptionem +naturalis, sciendum est quod quaedam de passionibus animae +quandoque dicuntur naturales, ut amor, desiderium et spes, aliae +vero naturales dici non possunt. Et hoc ideo, quia amor et odium, +desiderium et fuga, important inclinationem quandam ad prosequendum +bonum et fugiendum malum; quae quidem inclinatio pertinet etiam ad +appetitum naturalem. Et ideo est amor quidam naturalis, et +desiderium vel spes potest quodammodo dici etiam in rebus +naturalibus cognitione carentibus. Sed aliae passiones animae +important quosdam motus ad quos nullo modo sufficit inclinatio +naturalis. Vel quia de ratione harum passionum est sensus seu +cognitio, sicut dictum est quod apprehensio requiritur ad rationem +delectationis et doloris, unde quae carent cognitione, non possunt +dici delectari vel dolere. Aut quia huiusmodi motus sunt contra +rationem inclinationis naturalis, puta quod desperatio refugit +bonum propter aliquam difficultatem; et timor refugit impugnationem +mali contrarii, ad quod est inclinatio naturalis. Et ideo huiusmodi +passiones nullo modo attribuuntur rebus inanimatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A3-p9"><b>Reply to the Objections</b> are evident.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 3 ad arg."><a name="35316" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35316] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 3 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc +patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q41_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q41_A4-p0.1">Q. 41. A. 4. Whether the species of fear is suitably assigned?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that six species of fear are unsuitably assigned by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15); namely, "laziness, shamefacedness, + shame, amazement, stupor, and anxiety." Because, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear regards a saddening evil." Therefore + the species of fear should correspond to the species of sorrow. Now there are four species of sorrow, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q35_A8" id="FS_Q41_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[35], A[8]</a>). Therefore there should only be four + species of fear corresponding to them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35317" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35317] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter Damascenus assignet sex +species timoris, scilicet <i>segnitiem, erubescentiam, verecundiam, +admirationem, stuporem, agoniam</i>. Ut enim philosophus dicit, in +II Rhetoric., <i>timor est de malo contristativo</i>. Ergo species +timoris debent respondere speciebus tristitiae. Sunt autem quatuor +species tristitiae, ut supra dictum est. Ergo solum debent esse +quatuor species timoris, eis correspondentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which consists in an action of our own is in our power. But fear regards an evil that surpasses our power, + as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q41_A2" id="FS_Q41_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore laziness, shamefacedness, and shame, which regard our own actions, should not be reckoned as species of fear. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35318" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35318] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +illud quod in actu nostro consistit, nostrae potestati subiicitur. +Sed timor est de malo quod excedit potestatem nostram, ut dictum +est. Non ergo segnities et erubescentia et verecundia, quae +respiciunt operationem nostram, debent poni species timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fear is of the future, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q41_A1" id="FS_Q41_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>, 2). But "shame regards a disgraceful deed already done," as Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xx.] says. Therefore + shame is not a species of fear. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35319" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35319] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +timor est de futuro, ut dictum est. Sed verecundia est de turpi +actu iam commisso, ut Gregorius Nyssenus dicit. Ergo verecundia non +est species timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, fear is only of evil. But amazement and stupor regard great and unwonted things, whether good or evil. Therefore + amazement and stupor are not species of fear. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="35320" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35320] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +timor non est nisi de malo. Sed admiratio et stupor sunt de magno +et insolito, sive bono sive malo. Ergo admiratio et stupor non sunt +species timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, Philosophers have been led by amazement to seek the truth, as stated in the beginning of Metaphysics. But fear leads + to flight rather than to search. Therefore amazement is not a species of fear. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="35321" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35321] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophi ex admiratione sunt moti ad inquirendum veritatem, ut +dicitur in principio Metaphys. Timor autem non movet ad +inquirendum, sed magis ad fugiendum. Ergo admiratio non est species +timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A4-p7"><b>On the contrary,</b> suffices the authority of Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius] (Cf. OBJ 1,3).</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35322" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35322] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed in +contrarium sufficiat auctoritas Damasceni et Gregorii Nysseni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q41_A4-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q41_A2" id="FS_Q41_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, fear regards a future evil which surpasses the power of him that fears, so that it is irresistible. Now man's evil, like + his good, may be considered either in his action or in external things. In his action he has a twofold evil to fear. First, + there is the toil that burdens his nature: and hence arises "laziness," as when a man shrinks from work for fear of too much + toil. Secondly, there is the disgrace which + damages him in the opinion of others. And thus, if disgrace is feared in a deed that is yet to be done, there is "shamefacedness"; + if, however, it be a deed already done, there is "shame." + </p><p id="FS_Q41_A4-p9"> On the other hand, the evil that consists in external things may surpass man's faculty of resistance in three ways. First + by reason of its magnitude; when, that is to say, a man considers some great evil the outcome of which he is unable to gauge: + and then there is "amazement." Secondly, by reason of its being unwonted; because, to wit, some unwonted evil arises before + us, and on that account is great in our estimation: and then there is "stupor," which is caused by the + representation of something unwonted. Thirdly, by reason of its being unforeseen: thus future misfortunes are feared, and + fear of this kind is called "anxiety." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 4 co."><a name="35323" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35323] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, timor est de futuro malo quod +excedit potestatem timentis, ut scilicet ei resisti non possit. +Sicut autem bonum hominis, ita et malum, potest considerari vel in +operatione ipsius, vel in exterioribus rebus. In operatione autem +ipsius hominis, potest duplex malum timeri. Primo quidem, labor +gravans naturam. Et sic causatur segnities, cum scilicet aliquis +refugit operari, propter timorem excedentis laboris. Secundo, +turpitudo laedens opinionem. Et sic, si turpitudo timeatur in actu +committendo, est erubescentia, si autem sit de turpi iam facto, est +verecundia. Malum autem quod in exterioribus rebus consistit, +triplici ratione potest excedere hominis facultatem ad resistendum. +Primo quidem, ratione suae magnitudinis, cum scilicet aliquis +considerat aliquod magnum malum, cuius exitum considerare non +sufficit. Et sic est admiratio. Secundo, ratione dissuetudinis, +quia scilicet aliquod malum inconsuetum nostrae considerationi +offertur, et sic est magnum nostra reputatione. Et hoc modo est +stupor, qui causatur ex insolita imaginatione. Tertio modo, ratione +improvisionis, quia scilicet provideri non potest, sicut futura +infortunia timentur. Et talis timor dicitur agonia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those species of sorrow given above are not derived from the diversity of objects, but from the diversity of effects, and + for certain special reasons. Consequently there is no need for those species of sorrow to correspond with these species of + fear, which are derived from the proper division of the object of fear itself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35324" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35324] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod illae species tristitiae quae supra positae +sunt, non accipiuntur secundum diversitatem obiecti, sed secundum +effectus, et secundum quasdam speciales rationes. Et ideo non +oportet quod illae species tristitiae respondeant istis speciebus +timoris, quae accipiuntur secundum divisionem propriam obiecti +ipsius timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A deed considered as being actually done, is in the power of the doer. But it is possible to take into consideration something + connected with the deed, and surpassing the faculty of the doer, for which reason he shrinks from the deed. It is in this + sense that laziness, shamefacedness, and shame are reckoned as species of fear. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35325" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35325] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod operatio secundum quod iam fit, subditur potestati +operantis. Sed aliquid circa operationem considerari potest +facultatem operantis excedens, propter quod aliquis refugit +actionem. Et secundum hoc, segnities, erubescentia et verecundia +ponuntur species timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The past deed may be the occasion of fear of future reproach or disgrace: and in this sense shame is a species of fear. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35326" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35326] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod de actu praeterito potest timeri convitium vel +opprobrium futurum. Et secundum hoc, verecundia est species +timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Not every amazement and stupor are species of fear, but that amazement which is caused by a great evil, and that stupor which + arises from an unwonted evil. Or else we may say that, just as laziness shrinks from the toil of external work, so amazement + and stupor shrink from the difficulty of considering a great and unwonted thing, whether good or evil: so that amazement and + stupor stand in relation to the act of the intellect, as laziness does to + external work. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="35327" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35327] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod non quaelibet admiratio et stupor sunt species +timoris, sed admiratio quae est de magno malo, et stupor qui est de +malo insolito. Vel potest dici quod, sicut segnities refugit +laborem exterioris operationis, ita admiratio et stupor refugiunt +difficultatem considerationis rei magnae et insolitae, sive sit +bona sive mala, ut hoc modo se habeat admiratio et stupor ad actum +intellectus, sicut segnities ad exteriorem actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A4-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> He who is amazed shrinks at present from forming a judgment of that which amazes him, fearing to fall short of the truth, + but inquires afterwards: whereas he who is overcome by stupor fears both to judge at present, and to inquire afterwards. Wherefore + amazement is a beginning of philosophical research: whereas stupor is a hindrance thereto. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="35328" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35328] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod admirans refugit in praesenti dare iudicium de eo +quod miratur, timens defectum, sed in futurum inquirit. Stupens +autem timet et in praesenti iudicare, et in futuro inquirere. Unde +admiratio est principium philosophandi, sed stupor est +philosophicae considerationis impedimentum.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q42" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q42-p0.1">Q. 42. OF THE OBJECT OF FEAR (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q42-p2"> We must now consider the object of fear: under which head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q42-p3"><a href="#FS_Q42_A1"> (1) Whether good or evil is the object of fear?</a></p><p id="FS_Q42-p4"><a href="#FS_Q42_A2"> (2) Whether evil of nature is the object of fear?</a></p><p id="FS_Q42-p5"><a href="#FS_Q42_A3"> (3) Whether the evil of sin is an object of fear?</a></p><p id="FS_Q42-p6"><a href="#FS_Q42_A4"> (4) Whether fear itself can be feared?</a></p><p id="FS_Q42-p7"><a href="#FS_Q42_A5"> (5) Whether sudden things are especially feared?</a></p><p id="FS_Q42-p8"><a href="#FS_Q42_A6"> (6) Whether those things are more feared against which there is no remedy?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 pr."><a name="35329" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35329] +Iª-IIae q. 42 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +obiecto timoris. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum bonum +sit obiectum timoris, vel malum. Secundo, utrum malum naturae sit +obiectum timoris. Tertio, utrum timor sit de malo culpae. Quarto, +utrum ipse timor timeri possit. Quinto, utrum repentina magis +timeantur. Sexto, utrum ea contra quae non est remedium, magis +timeantur.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q42_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q42_A1-p0.1">Q. 42. A. 1. Whether the object of fear is good or evil?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that good is the object of fear. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 83) that "we fear nothing save to lose what + we love and possess, or not to obtain that which we hope for." But that which we love is good. Therefore fear regards good + as its proper object. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35330" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35330] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonum sit obiectum timoris. Dicit enim +Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod <i>nihil +timemus, nisi ne id quod amamus, aut adeptum amittamus, aut non +adipiscamur speratum</i>. Sed id quod amamus est bonum. Ergo timor +respicit bonum sicut proprium obiectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "power and to be above another is a thing to be feared." But this is a good + thing. Therefore good is the object of fear. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35331" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35331] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>potestas, et super +alium ipsum esse, est terribile</i>. Sed huiusmodi est quoddam +bonum. Ergo bonum est obiectum timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there can be no evil in God. But we are commanded to fear God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q42_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.33.10" target="asv"> Ps. 33:10</a>: "Fear the Lord, all ye saints." Therefore even the good is an object of fear. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35332" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35332] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +in Deo nihil malum esse potest. Sed mandatur nobis ut Deum +timeamus; secundum illud Psalmi XXXIII, <i>timete dominum, omnes +sancti eius</i>. Ergo etiam timor est de bono.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that fear is of future evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35333" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35333] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Damascenus dicit, in II libro, quod timor est de malo +futuro.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q42_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Fear is a movement of the appetitive power. Now it belongs to the appetitive power to pursue and to avoid, as stated in Ethic. + vi, 2: and pursuit is of good, while avoidance is of evil. Consequently whatever movement of the appetitive power implies + pursuit, has some good for its object: and whatever movement implies avoidance, has an evil for its object. Wherefore, since + fear implies an avoidance, in the first place and of its very nature it regards evil as + its proper object. + </p><p id="FS_Q42_A1-p7"> It can, however, regard good also, in so far as referable to evil. This can be in two ways. In one way, inasmuch as an evil + causes privation of good. Now a thing is evil from the very fact that it is a privation of some good. Wherefore, since evil + is shunned because it is evil, it follows that it is shunned because it deprives one of the good that one pursues through + love thereof. And in this sense Augustine says that there is no cause for fear, save loss of the good we + love. + </p><p id="FS_Q42_A1-p8"> In another way, good stands related to evil as its cause: in so far as some good can by its power bring harm to the good + we love: and so, just as hope, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q40_A7" id="FS_Q42_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[40], A[7]</a>), regards two things, namely, the good to which it tends, and the thing through which there is a hope of obtaining the desired + good; so also does fear regard two things, namely, the evil from which it shrinks, and that good which, by its power, can + inflict that evil. In this + way God is feared by man, inasmuch as He can inflict punishment, spiritual or corporal. In this way, too, we fear the power + of man; especially when it has been thwarted, or when it is unjust, because then it is more likely to do us a harm. + </p><p id="FS_Q42_A1-p9"> In like manner one fears "to be over another," i.e. to lean on another, so that it is in his power to do us a harm: thus + a man fears another, who knows him to be guilty of a crime lest he reveal it to others. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 1 co."><a name="35334" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35334] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod timor est quidam motus appetitivae virtutis. Ad +virtutem autem appetitivam pertinet prosecutio et fuga, ut dicitur +in VI Ethic. Est autem prosecutio boni. Fuga autem mali. Unde +quicumque motus appetitivae virtutis importat prosecutionem, habet +aliquod bonum pro obiecto, quicumque autem importat fugam, habet +malum pro obiecto. Unde, cum timor fugam quandam importet, primo et +per se respicit malum sicut proprium obiectum. Potest autem +respicere etiam bonum, secundum quod habet habitudinem ad malum. +Quod quidem potest esse dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, inquantum per +malum privatur bonum. Ex hoc autem ipso est aliquid malum, quod est +privativum boni. Unde, cum fugiatur malum quia malum est, sequitur +ut fugiatur quia privat bonum quod quis amando prosequitur. Et +secundum hoc dicit Augustinus quod nulla est causa timendi, nisi ne +amittatur bonum amatum. Alio modo comparatur bonum ad malum, ut +causa ipsius, inquantum scilicet aliquod bonum sua virtute potest +inducere aliquod nocumentum in bono amato. Et ideo, sicut spes, ut +supra dictum est, ad duo respicit, scilicet ad bonum in quod +tendit, et ad id per quod sperat se bonum concupitum adipisci; ita +etiam timor ad duo respicit, scilicet ad malum quod refugit, et ad +illud bonum quod sua virtute potest infligere malum. Et per hunc +modum Deus timetur ab homine, inquantum potest infligere poenam, +vel spiritualem vel corporalem. Per hunc etiam modum timetur +potestas alicuius hominis, maxime quando est laesa, vel quando est +iniusta, quia sic in promptu habet nocumentum inferre. Ita etiam +timetur super alium esse, idest inniti alii, ut scilicet in eius +potestate sic constitutum nobis nocumentum inferre, sicut ille qui +est conscius criminis, timetur, ne crimen revelet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to objections</b> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 1 ad arg."><a name="35335" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35335] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 1 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc +patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q42_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q42_A2-p0.1">Q. 42. A. 2. Whether evil of nature is an object of fear?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that evil of nature is not an object of fear. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear makes us take + counsel." But we do not take counsel about things which happen naturally, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Therefore evil of nature + is not an object of fear. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35336" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35336] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor non sit de malo naturae. Dicit +enim philosophus, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>timor consiliativos +facit</i>. Non autem consiliamur de his quae a natura eveniunt, ut +dicitur in III Ethic. Ergo timor non est de malo naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, natural defects such as death and the like are always threatening man. If therefore such like evils were an object + of fear, man would needs be always in fear. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35337" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35337] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +defectus naturales semper homini imminent, ut mors et alia +huiusmodi. Si igitur de huiusmodi malis esset timor, oporteret quod +homo semper esset in timore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nature does not move to contraries. But evil of nature is an effect of nature. Therefore if a man shrinks from such + like evils through fear thereof, this is not an effect of nature. Therefore natural fear is not of the evil of nature; and + yet it seems that it should be. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35338" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35338] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +natura non movet ad contraria. Sed malum naturae provenit ex +natura. Ergo quod timendo aliquis refugiat huiusmodi malum, non est +a natura. Timor ergo naturalis non est de malo naturae; ad quem +tamen hoc malum pertinere videtur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 6) that "the most terrible of all things is death," which is an evil of nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35339" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35339] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod inter omnia +terribilissimum est mors, quae est malum naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q42_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), fear is caused by the "imagination of a future evil which is either corruptive or + painful." Now just as a painful evil is that which is contrary to the will, so a corruptive evil is that which is contrary + to nature: and this is the evil of nature. Consequently evil of nature can be the object of fear. + </p><p id="FS_Q42_A2-p7"> But it must be observed that evil of nature sometimes arises from a natural cause; and then it is called evil of nature, + not merely from being a privation of the good of nature, but also from being an effect of nature; such are natural death and + other like defects. But sometimes evil of nature arises from a non-natural cause; such as violent death inflicted by an assailant. + In either case evil of nature is feared to a certain extent, and to a certain extent not. For since fear + arises "from the imagination of future evil," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), whatever removes the imagination of the + future evil, removes fear also. Now it may happen in two ways that an evil may not appear as about to be. First, through being + remote and far off: for, on account of the distance, such a thing is considered as though it were not to be. Hence we either + do not fear it, or fear it but little; for, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "we do not fear things that are very + far off; since all know that they shall die, but as death is not near, they heed it not." Secondly, a future evil is considered + as though it were not to be, on account of its being inevitable, wherefore we look upon it as already present. Hence the Philosopher + says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those who are already on the scaffold, are not afraid," seeing that they are on the very point of + a death from which there is no escape; "but in order that a man be afraid, there must be some hope of escape for + him." + </p><p id="FS_Q42_A2-p8"> Consequently evil of nature is not feared if it be not apprehended as future: but if evil of nature, that is corruptive, + be apprehended as near at hand, and yet with some hope of escape, then it will be feared. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 2 co."><a name="35340" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35340] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in II Rhetoric., timor +provenit <i>ex phantasia futuri mali corruptivi vel +contristativi</i>. Sicut autem contristativum malum est quod +contrariatur voluntati; ita corruptivum malum est quod contrariatur +naturae. Et hoc est malum naturae. Unde de malo naturae potest esse +timor. Sed considerandum est quod malum naturae quandoque est a +causa naturali, et tunc dicitur malum naturae, non solum quia +privat naturae bonum, sed etiam quia est effectus naturae; sicut +mors naturalis, et alii huiusmodi defectus. Aliquando vero malum +naturae provenit ex causa non naturali, sicut mors quae violenter +infertur a persecutore. Et utroque modo malum naturae quodammodo +timetur, et quodammodo non timetur. Cum enim timor proveniat ex +phantasia futuri mali, ut dicit philosophus; illud quod removet +futuri mali phantasiam, excludit etiam timorem. Quod autem non +appareat aliquod malum ut futurum, potest ex duobus contingere. Uno +quidem modo, ex hoc quod est remotum et distans, hoc enim, propter +distantiam, imaginamur ut non futurum. Et ideo vel non timemus, vel +parum timemus. Ut enim philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., <i>quae +valde longe sunt non timentur, sciunt enim omnes, quod morientur; +sed quia non prope est, nihil curant</i>. Alio modo aestimatur +aliquod malum quod est futurum, ut non futurum, propter +necessitatem, quae facit ipsum aestimare ut praesens. Unde +philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>illi qui iam +decapitantur non timent</i>, videntes sibi necessitatem mortis +imminere; sed <i>ad hoc quod aliquis timeat, oportet adesse aliquam +spem salutis</i>. Sic igitur malum naturae non timetur, quia non +apprehenditur ut futurum. Si vero malum naturae, quod est +corruptivum, apprehendatur ut propinquum, et tamen cum aliqua spe +evasionis, tunc timebitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The evil of nature sometimes is not an effect of nature, as stated above. But in so far as it is an effect of nature, although + it may be impossible to avoid it entirely, yet it may be possible to delay it. And with this hope one may take counsel about + avoiding it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35341" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35341] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod malum naturae quandoque non provenit a natura, +ut dictum est. Secundum tamen quod a natura provenit, etsi non ex +toto vitari possit, potest tamen differri. Et sub hac spe, potest +esse consilium de vitatione ipsius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although evil of nature ever threatens, yet it does not always threaten from near at hand: and consequently it is not always + feared. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35342" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35342] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod malum naturae, etsi semper immineat, non tamen semper +imminet de propinquo. Et ideo non semper timetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Death and other defects of nature are the effects of the common nature; and yet the individual nature rebels against them + as far as it can. Accordingly, from the inclination of the individual nature arise pain and sorrow for such like evils, when + present; fear when threatening in the future. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35343" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35343] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod mors et alii defectus naturae proveniunt a natura +universali, quibus tamen repugnat natura particularis quantum +potest. Et sic ex inclinatione particularis naturae, est dolor et +tristitia de huiusmodi malis, cum sunt praesentia; et timor, si +immineant in futurum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q42_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q42_A3-p0.1">Q. 42. A. 3. Whether the evil of sin is an object of fear?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the evil of sin can be an object of fear. For Augustine says on the canonical Epistle of John (Tract. + ix), that "by chaste fear man fears to be severed from God." Now nothing but sin severs us from God; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q42_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.59.2" target="asv"> Is. 59:2</a>: "Your iniquities have divided between you and your God." Therefore the evil of sin can be an object of fear. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35344" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35344] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor possit esse de malo culpae. +Dicit enim Augustinus, super canonicam Ioan., quod <i>timore casto +timet homo separationem a Deo</i>. Sed nihil separat nos a Deo nisi +culpa; secundum illud Isaiae LIX. <i>Peccata vestra diviserunt +inter vos et Deum vestrum</i>. Ergo timor potest esse de malo +culpae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. iv, 4,6) that "we fear when they are yet to come, those things which give us pain when + they are present." But it is possible for one to be pained or sorrowful on account of the evil of sin. Therefore one can also + fear the evil of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35345" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35345] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Tullius dicit, in IV de Tusculanis quaest., quod <i>de illis +timemus, cum futura sunt, de quorum praesentia tristamur</i>. Sed +de malo culpae potest aliquis dolere vel tristari. Ergo etiam malum +culpae aliquis potest timere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, hope is contrary to fear. But the good of virtue can be the object of hope, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. + ix, 4): and the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q42_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.10" target="asv">Gal. 5:10</a>): "I have confidence in you in the Lord, that you will not be of another mind." Therefore fear can regard evil of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35346" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35346] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +spes timori opponitur. Sed spes potest esse de bono virtutis, ut +patet per philosophum in IX Ethic. Et apostolus dicit, ad Gal. V, +<i>confido de vobis in domino, quod nihil aliud sapietis</i>. Ergo +etiam timor potest esse de malo culpae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, shame is a kind of fear, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q41_A4" id="FS_Q42_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[41], A[4]</a>). But shame regards a disgraceful deed, which is an evil of sin. Therefore fear does so likewise. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="35347" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35347] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +verecundia est quaedam species timoris, ut supra dictum est. Sed +verecundia est de turpi facto. Quod est malum culpae. Ergo et +timor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "not all evils are feared, for instance that someone be unjust or slow." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35348" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35348] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>non omnia mala +timentur, puta si aliquis erit iniustus, aut tardus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q42_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q40_A1" id="FS_Q42_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[40], A[1]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q41_A2" id="FS_Q42_A3-p7.2" shape="rect"> Q[41], A[2]</a>), as the object of hope is a future good difficult but possible to obtain, so the object of fear is a future evil, arduous + and not to be easily avoided. From this we may gather that whatever is entirely subject to our power and will, is not an object + of fear; and that nothing gives rise to fear save what is due to an external cause. Now human will is the proper cause + of the evil of sin: and consequently evil of sin, properly speaking, is not an object of fear. + </p><p id="FS_Q42_A3-p8"> But since the human will may be inclined to sin by an extrinsic cause; if this cause have a strong power of inclination, + in that respect a man may fear the evil of sin, in so far as it arises from that extrinsic cause: as when he fears to dwell + in the company of wicked men, lest he be led by them to sin. But, properly speaking, a man thus disposed, fears the being + led astray rather than the sin considered in its proper nature, i.e. as a voluntary act; for considered in this + light it is not an object of fear to him. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 3 co."><a name="35349" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35349] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, sicut obiectum spei est +bonum futurum arduum quod quis potest adipisci; ita timor est de +malo futuro arduo quod non potest de facili vitari. Ex quo potest +accipi quod id quod omnino subiacet potestati et voluntati nostrae, +non habet rationem terribilis, sed illud solum est terribile, quod +habet causam extrinsecam. Malum autem culpae propriam causam habet +voluntatem humanam. Et ideo proprie non habet rationem terribilis. +Sed quia voluntas humana ab aliquo exteriori potest inclinari ad +peccandum; si illud inclinans habeat magnam vim ad inclinandum, +secundum hoc poterit esse timor de malo culpae, inquantum est ab +exteriori causa, puta cum aliquis timet commorari in societate +malorum, ne ab eis ad peccandum inducatur. Sed proprie loquendo, in +tali dispositione magis timet homo seductionem quam culpam secundum +propriam rationem, idest inquantum est voluntaria, sic enim non +habet ut timeatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Separation from God is a punishment resulting from sin: and every punishment is, in some way, due to an extrinsic cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35350" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35350] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod separatio a Deo est quaedam poena consequens +peccatum, et omnis poena aliquo modo est ab exteriori causa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sorrow and fear agree in one point, since each regards evil: they differ, however, in two points. First, because sorrow is + about present evil, whereas fear is future evil. Secondly, because sorrow, being in the concupiscible faculty, regards evil + absolutely; wherefore it can be about any evil, great or small; whereas fear, being in the irascible part, regards evil with + the addition of a certain arduousness or difficulty; which difficulty ceases in so + far as a thing is subject to the will. Consequently not all things that give us pain when they are present, make us fear when + they are yet to come, but only some things, namely, those that are difficult. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35351" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35351] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod tristitia et timor in uno conveniunt, quia utrumque +est de malo, differunt autem in duobus. In uno quidem, quia +tristitia est de malo praesenti, timor de malo futuro. In alio +vero, quia tristitia, cum sit in concupiscibili, respicit malum +absolute, unde potest esse de quocumque malo, sive parvo sive +magno. Timor vero, cum sit in irascibili, respicit malum cum quadam +arduitate seu difficultate, quae tollitur, inquantum aliquid +subiacet voluntati. Et ideo non omnia timemus quae sunt futura, de +quibus tristamur cum sunt praesentia, sed aliqua, quae scilicet +sunt ardua.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hope is of good that is obtainable. Now one may obtain a good either of oneself, or through another: and so, hope may be + of an act of virtue, which lies within our own power. On the other hand, fear is of an evil that does not lie in our own power: + and consequently the evil which is feared is always from an extrinsic cause; while the good that is hoped for may be both + from an intrinsic and from an extrinsic cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35352" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35352] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod spes est de bono quod quis potest adipisci. Potest +autem aliquis adipisci bonum vel per se, vel per alium, et ideo +spes potest esse de actu virtutis, qui est in potestate nostra +constitutus. Sed timor est de malo quod non subiacet nostrae +potestati, et ideo semper malum quod timetur, est a causa +extrinseca. Bonum autem quod speratur, potest esse et a causa +intrinseca, et a causa extrinseca.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q41_A4" id="FS_Q42_A3-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[41], A[4]</a>, ad 2,3), shame is not fear of the very act of sin, but of the disgrace or ignominy which arises therefrom, and which is + due to an extrinsic cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="35353" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35353] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, verecundia non est timor de +actu ipso peccati, sed de turpitudine vel ignominia quae +consequitur ipsum, quae est a causa extrinseca.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q42_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q42_A4-p0.1">Q. 42. A. 4. Whether fear itself can be feared?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fear cannot be feared. For whatever is feared, is prevented from being lost, through fear thereof: thus + a man who fears to lose his health, keeps it, through fearing its loss. If therefore a man be afraid of fear, he will keep + himself from fear by being afraid: which seems absurd. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35354" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35354] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor timeri non possit. Omne enim +quod timetur, timendo custoditur, ne amittatur, sicut ille qui +timet amittere sanitatem timendo custodit eam. Si igitur timor +timeatur, timendo se custodiet homo ne timeat. Quod videtur esse +inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fear is a kind of flight. But nothing flies from itself. Therefore fear cannot be the object of fear. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35355" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35355] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +timor est quaedam fuga. Sed nihil fugit seipsum. Ergo timor non +timet timorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fear is about the future. But fear is present to him that fears. Therefore it cannot be the object of his fear. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35356" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35356] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +timor est de futuro. Sed ille qui timet, iam habet timorem. Non +ergo potest timere timorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A man can love his own love, and can grieve at his own sorrow. Therefore, in like manner, he can fear his own fear. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35357" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35357] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod homo potest amare amorem, et dolere de dolore. Ergo etiam, +pari ratione, potest timere timorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q42_A3" id="FS_Q42_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, nothing can be an object of fear, save what is due to an extrinsic cause; but not that which ensues from our own will. Now + fear partly arises from an extrinsic cause, and is partly subject to the will. It is due to an extrinsic cause, in so far + as it is a passion resulting from the imagination of an imminent evil. In this sense it is possible for fear to be the object + of fear, i.e. a man may fear lest he + should be threatened by the necessity of fearing, through being assailed by some great evil. It is subject to the will, in + so far as the lower appetite obeys reason; wherefore man is able to drive fear away. In this sense fear cannot be the object + of fear, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33). Lest, however, anyone make use of his arguments, in order to prove that fear + cannot be at all be the object of fear, we must add a solution to the same. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 4 co."><a name="35358" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35358] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, illud solum habet rationem +terribilis, quod ex causa extrinseca provenit, non autem quod +provenit ex voluntate nostra. Timor autem partim provenit ex causa +extrinseca, et partim subiacet voluntati. Provenit quidem ex causa +extrinseca, inquantum est passio quaedam consequens phantasiam +imminentis mali. Et secundum hoc, potest aliquis timere timorem, ne +scilicet immineat ei necessitas timendi, propter ingruentiam +alicuius excellentis mali. Subiacet autem voluntati, inquantum +appetitus inferior obedit rationi, unde homo potest timorem +repellere. Et secundum hoc, timor non potest timeri, ut dicit +Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest. Sed quia rationibus +quas inducit, aliquis posset uti ad ostendendum quod timor nullo +modo timeatur, ideo ad eas respondendum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every fear is identically the same; there are various fears according to the various objects of fear. Nothing, then, + prevents a man from keeping himself from fearing one thing, by fearing another, so that the fear which he has preserves him + from the fear which he has not. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35359" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35359] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, non omnis timor est unus timor, sed secundum +diversa quae timentur, sunt diversi timores. Nihil ergo prohibet +quin uno timore aliquis praeservet se ab alio timore, et sic +custodiat se non timentem illo timore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since fear of an imminent evil is not identical with the fear of the fear of imminent evil; it does not follow that a thing + flies from itself, or that it is the same flight in both cases. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35360" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35360] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, cum sit alius timor quo timetur malum imminens, et +alius timor quo timetur ipse timor mali imminentis; non sequitur +quod idem fugiat seipsum, vel quod sit idem fuga sui ipsius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> On account of the various kinds of fear already alluded to (ad 2) a man's present fear may have a future fear for its object. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35361" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35361] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod propter diversitatem timorum iam dictam, timore +praesenti potest homo timere futurum timorem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q42_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q42_A5-p0.1">Q. 42. A. 5. Whether sudden things are especially feared?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that unwonted and sudden things are not especially feared. Because, as hope is about good things, so fear is + about evil things. But experience conduces to the increase of hope in good things. Therefore it also adds to fear in evil + things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="35362" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35362] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod insolita et repentina non sint magis +terribilia. Sicut enim spes est de bono, ita timor est de malo. Sed +experientia facit ad augmentum spei in bonis. Ergo etiam facit ad +augmentum timoris in malis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those are feared most, not who are quick-tempered, but who are gentle and + cunning." Now it is clear that those who are quick-tempered are more subject to sudden emotions. Therefore sudden things are + less to be feared. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="35363" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35363] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod magis timentur non qui +acutae sunt irae, sed mites et astuti. Constat autem quod illi qui +acutae irae sunt, magis habent subitos motus. Ergo ea quae sunt +subita, sunt minus terribilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we think less about things that happen suddenly. But the more we think about a thing, the more we fear it; hence + the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "some appear to be courageous through ignorance, but as soon as they discover that + the case is different from what they expected, they run away." Therefore sudden things are feared less. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="35364" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35364] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quae sunt subita, minus considerari possunt. Sed tanto aliqua magis +timentur, quanto magis considerantur, unde philosophus dicit, in +III Ethic., quod <i>aliqui videntur fortes propter ignorantiam, +qui, si cognoverint quod aliud sit quam suspicantur, fugiunt</i>. +Ergo repentina minus timentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6): "Fear is startled at things unwonted and sudden, which endanger things beloved, and takes + forethought for their safety." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 5 s. c."><a name="35365" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35365] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in II Confess., <i>timor insolita et +repentina exhorrescit, rebus quae amantur adversantia, dum +praecavet securitati</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated about + <a href="#FS_Q42_A3" id="FS_Q42_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3];</a> Q[41], A[2]), the object of fear is an imminent evil, which can be repelled, but with difficulty. Now this is due to one + of two causes: to the greatness of the evil, or to the weakness of him that fears; while unwontedness and suddenness conduce + to both of these causes. First, it helps an imminent evil to seem greater. Because all material things, whether good or evil, + the more we consider them, the smaller + they seem. Consequently, just as sorrow for a present evil is mitigated in course of time, as Cicero states (De Quaest. Tusc. + iii, 30); so, too, fear of a future evil is diminished by thinking about it beforehand. Secondly, unwontedness and suddenness + increase the weakness of him that fears, in so far as they deprive him of the remedies with which he might otherwise provide + himself to forestall the coming evil, were it not for the evil taking him by surprise. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 5 co."><a name="35366" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35366] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, obiectum timoris est malum +imminens quod non de facili repelli potest. Hoc autem ex duobus +contingit, scilicet ex magnitudine mali, et ex debilitate timentis. +Ad utrumque autem horum operatur quod aliquid sit insolitum et +repentinum. Primo quidem, facit ad hoc quod malum imminens maius +appareat. Omnia enim corporalia, et bona et mala, quanto magis +considerantur, minora apparent. Et ideo, sicut propter +diuturnitatem dolor praesentis mali mitigatur, ut patet per Tullium +in III de Tusculanis quaest.; ita etiam ex praemeditatione minuitur +timor futuri mali. Secundo, aliquid esse insolitum et repentinum +facit ad debilitatem timentis, inquantum subtrahit remedia quae +homo potest praeparare ad repellendum futurum malum, quae esse non +possunt quando ex improviso malum occurrit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The object of hope is a good that is possible to obtain. Consequently whatever increases a man's power, is of a nature to + increase hope, and, for the same reason, to diminish fear, since fear is about an evil which cannot be easily repelled. Since, + therefore, experience increases a man's power of action, therefore, as it increases hope, so does it diminish fear. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="35367" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35367] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod obiectum spei est bonum quod quis potest +adipisci. Et ideo ea quae augmentant potestatem hominis, nata sunt +augere spem, et eadem ratione, diminuere timorem, quia timor est de +malo cui non de facili potest resisti. Quia igitur experientia +facit hominem magis potentem ad operandum, ideo, sicut auget spem, +ita diminuit timorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those who are quick-tempered do not hide their anger; wherefore the harm they do others is not so sudden, as not to be foreseen. + On the other hand, those who are gentle or cunning hide their anger; wherefore the harm which may be impending from them, + cannot be foreseen, but takes one by surprise. For this reason the Philosopher says that such men are feared more than others. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="35368" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35368] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod illi qui habent iram acutam, non occultant eam, et +ideo nocumenta ab eis illata non ita sunt repentina, quin +praevideantur. Sed homines mites et astuti occultant iram, et ideo +nocumentum quod ab eis imminet, non potest praevideri, sed ex +improviso advenit. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit quod tales +magis timentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Bodily good or evil, considered in itself, seems greater at first. The reason for this is that a thing is more obvious when + seen in juxtaposition with its contrary. Hence, when a man passes unexpectedly from penury to wealth, he thinks more of his + wealth on account of his previous poverty: while, on the other hand, the rich man who suddenly becomes poor, finds poverty + all the more disagreeable. For this reason sudden evil is feared more, because it + seems more to be evil. However, it may happen through some accident that the greatness of some evil is hidden; for instance + if the foe hides himself in ambush: and then it is true that evil inspires greater fear through being much thought about. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="35369" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35369] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, per se loquendo, bona vel mala corporalia in +principio maiora apparent. Cuius ratio est, quia unumquodque magis +apparet, contrario iuxta se posito. Unde cum aliquis statim a +paupertate ad divitias transit, propter paupertatem praeexistentem +divitias magis aestimat, et e contrario divites statim ad +paupertatem devenientes, eam magis horrent. Et propter hoc, malum +repentinum magis timetur, quia magis videtur esse malum. Sed potest +propter aliquod accidens contingere quod magnitudo alicuius mali +lateat, puta cum hostes se insidiose occultant. Et tunc verum est +quod malum ex diligenti consideratione fit terribilius.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q42_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q42_A6-p0.1">Q. 42. A. 6. Whether those things are more feared, for which there is no remedy?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that those things are not more to be feared, for which there is no remedy. Because it is a condition of fear, + that there be some hope of safety, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q42_A2" id="FS_Q42_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. But an evil that cannot be remedied leaves no hope of escape. Therefore such things are not feared at all. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="35370" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35370] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ea quae non habent remedium, non sint +magis timenda. Ad timorem enim requiritur quod remaneat aliqua spes +salutis, ut supra dictum est. Sed in malis quae non habent +remedium, nulla remanet spes salutis. Ergo talia mala nullo modo +timentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no remedy for the evil of death: since, in the natural course of things, there is no return from death + to life. And yet death is not the most feared of all things, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore those things + are not feared most, for which there is no remedy. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="35371" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35371] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +malo mortis nullum remedium adhiberi potest, non enim, secundum +naturam, potest esse reditus a morte ad vitam. Non tamen mors +maxime timetur, ut dicit philosophus, in II Rhetoric. Non ergo ea +magis timentur quae remedium non habent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 6) that "a thing which lasts long is no better than that which lasts but one day: + nor is that which lasts for ever any better than that which is not everlasting": and the same applies to evil. But things + that cannot be remedied seem to differ from other things, merely in the point of their lasting long or for ever. Consequently + they are not therefore any worse or more to be feared. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="35372" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35372] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod <i>non est magis bonum quod +est diuturnius, eo quod est unius diei, neque quod est perpetuum, +eo quod non est perpetuum</i>. Ergo, eadem ratione, neque maius +malum. Sed ea quae non habent remedium, non videntur differre ab +aliis nisi propter diuturnitatem vel perpetuitatem. Ergo propter +hoc non sunt peiora, vel magis timenda.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those things are most to be feared which when done wrong cannot be put right . . + . or for which there is no help, or which are not easy." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 6 s. c."><a name="35373" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35373] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>omnia timenda +sunt terribiliora quaecumque, si peccaverint, corrigi non +contingit; aut quorum auxilia non sunt; aut non facilia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The object of fear is evil: consequently whatever tends to increase evil, conduces to the increase of fear. Now evil is increased + not only in its species of evil, but also in respect of circumstances, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A3" id="FS_Q42_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[3]</a>). And of all the circumstances, longlastingness, or even everlastingness, seems to have the greatest bearing on the increase + of evil. Because things that exist in time are measured, in a way, according to + the duration of time: wherefore if it be an evil to suffer something for a certain length of time, we should reckon the evil + doubled, if it be suffered for twice that length of time. And accordingly, to suffer the same thing for an infinite length + of time, i.e. for ever, implies, so to speak, an infinite increase. Now those evils which, after they have come, cannot be + remedied at all, or at least not easily, are considered as lasting for ever or for a long time: for which reason they inspire + the greatest fear. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 6 co."><a name="35374" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35374] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod obiectum timoris est malum, unde illud quod facit ad +augmentum mali, facit ad augmentum timoris. Malum autem augetur non +solum secundum speciem ipsius mali, sed etiam secundum +circumstantias, ut ex supra dictis apparet. Inter ceteras autem +circumstantias, diuturnitas, vel etiam perpetuitas, magis videtur +facere ad augmentum mali. Ea enim quae sunt in tempore, secundum +durationem temporis quodammodo mensurantur, unde si pati aliquid in +tanto tempore est malum, pati idem in duplo tempore apprehenditur +ut duplatum. Et secundum hanc rationem, pati idem in infinito +tempore, quod est perpetuo pati, habet quodammodo infinitum +augmentum. Mala autem quae, postquam advenerint, non possunt habere +remedium, vel non de facili, accipiuntur ut perpetua vel diuturna. +Et ideo maxime redduntur timenda.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Remedy for an evil is twofold. One, by which a future evil is warded off from coming. If such a remedy be removed, there + is an end to hope and consequently to fear; wherefore we do not speak now of remedies of that kind. The other remedy is one + by which an already present evil is removed: and of such a remedy we speak now. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="35375" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35375] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod remedium mali est duplex. Unum, per quod +impeditur futurum malum, ne adveniat. Et tali remedio sublato, +aufertur spes, et per consequens timor. Unde de tali remedio nunc +non loquimur. Aliud remedium mali est, quo malum iam praesens +removetur. Et de tali remedio nunc loquimur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although death be an evil without remedy, yet, since it threatens not from near, it is not feared, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q42_A2" id="FS_Q42_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="35376" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35376] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, licet mors sit irremediabile malum, tamen, quia non +imminet de prope, non timetur, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Philosopher is speaking there of things that are good in themselves, i.e. good specifically. And such like good is no + better for lasting long or for ever: its goodness depends on its very nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="35377" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35377] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod philosophus ibi loquitur de per se bono, quod est +bonum secundum speciem suam. Sic autem non fit aliquid magis bonum +propter diuturnitatem vel perpetuitatem, sed propter naturam ipsius +boni.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q43" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q43-p0.1">Q. 43. OF THE CAUSE OF FEAR (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q43-p2"> We must now consider the cause of fear: under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q43-p3"><a href="#FS_Q43_A1"> (1) Whether love is the cause of fear?</a></p><p id="FS_Q43-p4"><a href="#FS_Q43_A2"> (2) Whether defect is the cause of fear?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 pr."><a name="35378" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35378] +Iª-IIae q. 43 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causa +timoris. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum causa timoris +sit amor. Secundo, utrum causa timoris sit defectus.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q43_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q43_A1-p0.1">Q. 43. A. 1. Whether love is the cause of fear?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that love is not the cause of fear. For that which leads to a thing is its cause. But "fear leads to the love + of charity" as Augustine says on the canonical epistle of John (Tract. ix). Therefore fear is the cause of love, and not conversely. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35379" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35379] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non sit causa timoris. Illud enim +quod introducit aliquid, est causa eius. Sed timor introducit +amorem caritatis, ut Augustinus dicit, super canonicam Ioan. Ergo +timor est causa amoris, et non e converso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those are feared most from whom we dread the advent of some evil." But + the dread of evil being caused by someone, makes us hate rather than love him. Therefore fear is caused by hate rather than + by love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35380" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35380] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>illi maxime timentur, a +quibus expectamus imminere nobis aliqua mala</i>. Sed per hoc quod +ab aliquo expectamus malum, magis provocamur ad odium eius quam ad +amorem. Ergo timor magis causatur ab odio quam ab amore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it has been stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q42_A3" id="FS_Q43_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[42], A[3]</a>) that those things which occur by our own doing are not fearful. But that which we do from love, is done from our inmost + heart. Therefore fear is not caused by love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35381" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35381] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +supra dictum est quod ea quae sunt a nobis ipsis, non habent +rationem terribilium. Sed ea quae sunt ex amore, maxime proveniunt +ex intimo cordis. Ergo timor ex amore non causatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33): "There can be no doubt that there is no cause for fear save the loss of what we love, when + we possess it, or the failure to obtain what we hope for." Therefore all fear is caused by our loving something: and consequently + love is the cause of fear. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35382" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35382] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., +<i>nulli dubium est non aliam esse metuendi causam, nisi ne id quod +amamus, aut adeptum amittamus, aut non adipiscamur speratum</i>. +Omnis ergo timor causatur ex hoc quod aliquid amamus. Amor igitur +est causa timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q43_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The objects of the soul's passions stand in relation thereto as the forms to things natural or artificial: because the passions + of the soul take their species from their objects, as the aforesaid things do from their forms. Therefore, just as whatever + is a cause of the form, is a cause of the thing constituted by that form, so whatever is a cause, in any way whatever, of + the object, is a cause of the passion. Now a thing may be a cause of the object, either + by way of efficient cause, or by way of material disposition. Thus the object of pleasure is good apprehended as suitable + and conjoined: and its efficient cause is that which causes the conjunction, or the suitableness, or goodness, or apprehension + of that good thing; while its cause by way of material disposition, is a habit or any sort of disposition by reason of which + this conjoined good becomes suitable or is apprehended as such. + </p><p id="FS_Q43_A1-p7"> Accordingly, as to the matter in question, the object of fear is something reckoned as an evil to come, near at hand and + difficult to avoid. Therefore that which can inflict such an evil, is the efficient cause of the object of fear, and, consequently, + of fear itself. While that which renders a man so disposed that thing is such an evil to him, is a cause of fear and of its + object, by way of material disposition. And thus it is that love causes fear: since it is through his + loving a certain good, that whatever deprives a man of that good is an evil to him, and that consequently he fears it as an + evil. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 1 co."><a name="35383" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35383] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod obiecta passionum animae se habent ad eas tanquam +formae ad res naturales vel artificiales, quia passiones animae +speciem recipiunt ab obiectis, sicut res praedictae a suis formis. +Sicut igitur quidquid est causa formae, est causa rei constitutae +per ipsam; ita etiam quidquid, et quocumque modo, est causa +obiecti, est causa passionis. Contingit autem aliquid esse causam +obiecti vel per modum causae efficientis, vel per modum +dispositionis materialis. Sicut obiectum delectationis est bonum +apparens conveniens coniunctum, cuius causa efficiens est illud +quod facit coniunctionem, vel quod facit convenientiam vel +bonitatem, vel apparentiam huiusmodi boni; causa autem per modum +dispositionis materialis, est habitus, vel quaecumque dispositio +secundum quam fit alicui conveniens aut apparens illud bonum quod +est ei coniunctum. Sic igitur, in proposito, obiectum timoris est +aestimatum malum futurum propinquum cui resisti de facili non +potest. Et ideo illud quod potest inferre tale malum, est causa +effectiva obiecti timoris, et per consequens ipsius timoris. Illud +autem per quod aliquis ita disponitur ut aliquid sit ei tale, est +causa timoris, et obiecti eius, per modum dispositionis materialis. +Et hoc modo amor est causa timoris, ex hoc enim quod aliquis amat +aliquod bonum, sequitur quod privativum talis boni sit ei malum, et +per consequens quod timeat ipsum tanquam malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q42_A1" id="FS_Q43_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[42], A[1]</a>), fear, of itself and in the first place, regards the evil from which it recoils as being contrary to some loved good: and + thus fear, of itself, is born of love. But, in the second place, it regards the cause from which that evil ensues: so that + sometimes, accidentally, fear gives rise to love; in so far as, for instance, through fear of God's punishments, man keeps + His commandments, and thus + begins to hope, while hope leads to love, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q40_A7" id="FS_Q43_A1-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[40] , A[7]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35384" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35384] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, timor per se et primo +respicit ad malum, quod refugit, quod opponitur alicui bono amato. +Et sic per se timor nascitur ex amore. Secundario vero respicit ad +id per quod provenit tale malum. Et sic per accidens quandoque +timor inducit amorem, inquantum scilicet homo qui timet puniri a +Deo, servat mandata eius, et sic incipit sperare, et spes +introducit amorem, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> He, from whom evil is expected, is indeed hated at first; but afterwards, when once we begin to hope for good from him, we + begin to love him. But the good, the contrary evil of which is feared, was loved from the beginning. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35385" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35385] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ille a quo expectantur mala, primo quidem odio +habetur, sed postquam ab ipso iam incipiunt sperari bona, tunc +incipit amari. Bonum autem cui contrariatur malum quod timetur, a +principio amabatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument is true of that which is the efficient cause of the evil to be feared: whereas love causes fear by way of material + disposition, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35386" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35386] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de eo quod est causa mali +terribilis per modum efficientis. Amor autem est causa eius per +modum materialis dispositionis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q43_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q43_A2-p0.1">Q. 43. A. 2. Whether defect is the cause of fear?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that defect is not a cause of fear. Because those who are in power are very much feared. But defect is contrary + to power. Therefore defect is not a cause of fear. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35387" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35387] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod defectus non sit causa timoris. Illi +enim qui potentiam habent, maxime timentur. Sed defectus +contrariatur potentiae. Ergo defectus non est causa timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the defect of those who are already being executed is extreme. But such like do not fear as stated in Rhet. ii, + 5. Therefore defect is not a cause of fear. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35388" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35388] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +illi qui iam decapitantur, maxime sunt in defectu. Sed tales non +timent. Ut dicitur in II Rhetoric. Ergo defectus non est causa +timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, contests arise from strength not from defect. But "those who contend fear those who contend with them" (Rhet. ii, + 5). Therefore defect is not a cause of fear. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35389" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35389] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +decertare ex fortitudine provenit, non ex defectu. <i>Sed +decertantes timent eos qui pro eisdem decertant</i>, ut dicitur in +II Rhetoric. Ergo defectus non est causa timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Contraries ensue from contrary causes. But "wealth, strength, a multitude of friends, and power drive fear away" (Rhet. ii, + 5). Therefore fear is caused by lack of these. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35390" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35390] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +contrariorum contrariae sunt causae. Sed <i>divitiae, et robur, et +multitudo amicorum, et potestas, excludunt timorem</i>, ut dicitur +in II Rhetoric. Ergo ex defectu horum timor causatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q43_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q43_A1" id="FS_Q43_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, fear may be set down to a twofold cause: one is by way of a material disposition, on the part of him that fears; the other + is by way of efficient cause, on the part of the person feared. As to the first then, some defect is, of itself, the cause + of fear: for it is owing to some lack of power that one is unable easily to repulse a threatening evil. And yet, in order + to cause fear, this defect must be according + to a measure. For the defect which causes fear of a future evil, is less than the defect caused by evil present, which is + the object of sorrow. And still greater would be the defect, if perception of the evil, or love of the good whose contrary + is feared, were entirely absent. + </p><p id="FS_Q43_A2-p7"> But as to the second, power and strength are, of themselves, the cause of fear: because it is owing to the fact that the + cause apprehended as harmful is powerful, that its effect cannot be repulsed. It may happen, however, in this respect, that + some defect causes fear accidentally, in so far as owing to some defect someone wishes to hurt another; for instance, by reason + of injustice, either because that other has already done him a harm, or because he fears to be harmed by + him. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 2 co."><a name="35391" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35391] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, duplex causa timoris accipi +potest, una quidem per modum materialis dispositionis, ex parte +eius qui timet; alia per modum causae efficientis, ex parte eius +qui timetur. Quantum igitur ad primum, defectus, per se loquendo, +est causa timoris, ex aliquo enim defectu virtutis contingit quod +non possit aliquis de facili repellere imminens malum. Sed tamen ad +causandum timorem requiritur defectus cum aliqua mensura. Minor +enim est defectus qui causat timorem futuri mali, quam defectus +consequens malum praesens, de quo est tristitia. Et adhuc esset +maior defectus, si totaliter sensus mali auferretur, vel amor boni +cuius contrarium timetur. Quantum vero ad secundum, virtus et +robur, per se loquendo, est causa timoris, ex hoc enim quod aliquid +quod apprehenditur ut nocivum, est virtuosum, contingit quod eius +effectus repelli non potest. Contingit tamen per accidens quod +aliquis defectus ex ista parte causat timorem, inquantum ex aliquo +defectu contingit quod aliquis velit nocumentum inferre, puta +propter iniustitiam, vel quia ante laesus fuit, vel quia timet +laedi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument is true of the cause of fear, on the part of the efficient cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35392" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35392] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de causa timoris ex parte +causae efficientis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those who are already being executed, are actually suffering from a present evil; wherefore their defect exceeds the measure + of fear. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35393" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35393] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod illi qui iam decapitantur, sunt in passione +praesentis mali. Et ideo iste defectus excedit mensuram +timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those who contend with one another are afraid, not on account of the power which enables them to contend: but on account + of the lack of power, owing to which they are not confident of victory. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35394" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35394] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod decertantes timent non propter potentiam, qua +decertare possunt, sed propter defectum potentiae, ex quo contingit +quod se superaturos non confidunt.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q44" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q44-p0.1">Q. 44. OF THE EFFECTS OF FEAR (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q44-p2"> We must now consider the effects of fear: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q44-p3"><a href="#FS_Q44_A1"> (1) Whether fear causes contraction?</a></p><p id="FS_Q44-p4"><a href="#FS_Q44_A2"> (2) Whether it makes men suitable for counsel?</a></p><p id="FS_Q44-p5"><a href="#FS_Q44_A3"> (3) Whether it makes one tremble?</a></p><p id="FS_Q44-p6"><a href="#FS_Q44_A4"> (4) Whether it hinders action?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 pr."><a name="35395" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35395] +Iª-IIae q. 44 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +effectibus timoris. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum +timor faciat contractionem. Secundo, utrum faciat consiliativos. +Tertio, utrum faciat tremorem. Quarto, utrum impediat +operationem.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q44_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q44_A1-p0.1">Q. 44. A. 1. Whether fear causes contraction?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fear does not cause contraction. For when contraction takes place, the heat and vital spirits are withdrawn + inwardly. But accumulation of heat and vital spirits in the interior parts of the body, dilates the heart unto endeavors of + daring, as may be seen in those who are angered: while the contrary happens in those who are afraid. Therefore fear does not + cause contraction. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35396" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35396] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor non faciat contractionem. +Contractione enim facta, calor et spiritus ad interiora revocantur. +Sed ex multitudine caloris et spirituum in interioribus, +magnificatur cor ad audacter aliquid aggrediendum, ut patet in +iratis, cuius contrarium in timore accidit. Non ergo timor facit +contractionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, when, as a result of contraction, the vital spirits and heat are accumulated in the interior parts, man cries out, + as may be seen in those who are in pain. But those who fear utter nothing: on the contrary they lose their speech. Therefore + fear does not cause contraction. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35397" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35397] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +multiplicatis spiritibus et calore in interioribus per +contractionem, sequitur quod homo in vocem prorumpat, ut patet in +dolentibus. Sed timentes non emittunt vocem, sed magis redduntur +taciturni. Ergo timor non facit contractionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, shame is a kind of fear, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q41_A4" id="FS_Q44_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[41], A[4]</a>). But "those who are ashamed blush," as Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8), and the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 9) observe. But + blushing is an indication, not of contraction, but of the reverse. Therefore contraction is not an effect of fear. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35398" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35398] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +verecundia est quaedam species timoris, ut supra dictum est. Sed +verecundati rubescunt, ut dicit Tullius, IV de Tusculanis quaest., +et philosophus in IV Ethic. Rubor autem faciei non attestatur +contractioni, sed contrario. Non ergo contractio est effectus +timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 23) that "fear is a power according to {systole}," i.e. contraction. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35399" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35399] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, quod timor est virtus +secundum systolen, idest secundum contractionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q28_A5" id="FS_Q44_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[28], A[5]</a>), in the passions of the soul, the formal element is the movement of the appetitive power, while the bodily transmutation + is the material element. Both of these are mutually proportionate; and consequently the bodily transmutation assumes a resemblance + to and the very nature of the appetitive movement. Now, as to the appetitive movement of the soul, fear implies a certain + contraction: the reason of which + is that fear arises from the imagination of some threatening evil which is difficult to repel, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q41_A2" id="FS_Q44_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[41], A[2]</a>). But that a thing be difficult to repel is due to lack of power, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q43_A2" id="FS_Q44_A1-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[43], A[2]</a>): and the weaker a power is, the fewer the things to which it extends. Wherefore from the very imagination that causes fear + there ensues a certain contraction in the appetite. Thus we observe in one who is dying that nature + withdraws inwardly, on account of the lack of power: and again we see the inhabitants of a city, when seized with fear, leave + the outskirts, and, as far as possible, make for the inner quarters. It is in resemblance to this contraction, which pertains + to the appetite of the soul, that in fear a similar contraction of heat and vital spirits towards the inner parts takes place + in regard to the body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 1 co."><a name="35400" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35400] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in passionibus animae est +sicut formale ipse motus appetitivae potentiae, sicut autem +materiale transmutatio corporalis, quorum unum alteri +proportionatur. Unde secundum similitudinem et rationem appetitivi +motus, sequitur corporalis transmutatio. Quantum autem ad animalem +motum appetitus, timor contractionem quandam importat. Cuius ratio +est, quia timor provenit ex phantasia alicuius mali imminentis quod +difficile repelli potest, ut supra dictum est. Quod autem aliquid +difficile possit repelli, provenit ex debilitate virtutis, ut supra +dictum est. Virtus autem, quanto est debilior, tanto ad pauciora se +potest extendere. Et ideo ex ipsa imaginatione quae causat timorem, +sequitur quaedam contractio in appetitu. Sicut etiam videmus in +morientibus quod natura retrahitur ad interiora, propter +debilitatem virtutis, et videmus etiam in civitatibus quod, quando +cives timent, retrahunt se ab exterioribus, et recurrunt, quantum +possunt, ad interiora. Et secundum similitudinem huius +contractionis, quae pertinet ad appetitum animalem, sequitur etiam +in timore ex parte corporis, contractio caloris et spirituum ad +interiora.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 3), although in those who fear, the vital spirits recede from outer to the inner + parts of the body, yet the movement of vital spirits is not the same in those who are angry and those who are afraid. For + in those who are angry, by reason of the heat and subtlety of the vital spirits, which result from the craving for vengeance, + the inward movement has an upward direction: wherefore the vital spirits and heat + concentrate around the heart: the result being that an angry man is quick and brave in attacking. But in those who are afraid, + on account of the condensation caused by cold, the vital spirits have a downward movement; the said cold being due to the + imagined lack of power. Consequently the heat and vital spirits abandon the heart instead of concentrating around it: the + result being that a man who is afraid is not quick to attack, but is more inclined to run away. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35401" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35401] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in libro de +problematibus, licet in timentibus retrahantur spiritus ab +exterioribus ad interiora, non tamen est idem motus spirituum in +iratis et timentibus. Nam in iratis, propter calorem et +subtilitatem spirituum, quae proveniunt ex appetitu vindictae, +interius fit spirituum motus ab inferioribus ad superiora, et ideo +congregantur spiritus et calor circa cor. Ex quo sequitur quod +irati redduntur prompti et audaces ad invadendum. Sed in +timentibus, propter frigiditatem ingrossantem, spiritus moventur a +superioribus ad inferiora, quae quidem frigiditas contingit ex +imaginatione defectus virtutis. Et ideo non multiplicantur calor et +spiritus circa cor, sed magis a corde refugiunt. Et propter hoc, +timentes non prompte invadunt, sed magis refugiunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To everyone that is in pain, whether man or animal, it is natural to use all possible means of repelling the harmful thing + that causes pain but its presence: thus we observe that animals, when in pain, attack with their jaws or with their horns. + Now the greatest help for all purposes, in animals, is heat and vital spirits: wherefore when they are in pain, their nature + stores up the heat and vital spirits within them, in order to make use thereof in + repelling the harmful object. Hence the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 9) when the vital spirits and heat are concentrated + together within, they require to find a vent in the voice: for which reason those who are in pain can scarcely refrain from + crying aloud. On the other hand, in those who are afraid, the internal heat and vital spirits move from the heart downwards, + as stated above (ad 1): wherefore fear hinders speech which ensues from the emission of the vital spirits in an upward + direction through the mouth: the result being that fear makes its subject speechless. For this reason, too, fear "makes its + subject tremble," as the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 1,6,7). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35402" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35402] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod naturale est cuilibet dolenti, sive homini sive +animali, quod utatur quocumque auxilio potest, ad repellendum +nocivum praesens quod infert dolorem, unde videmus quod animalia +dolentia percutiunt vel faucibus vel cornibus. Maximum autem +auxilium ad omnia in animalibus est calor et spiritus. Et ideo in +dolore natura conservat calorem et spiritum interius, ut hoc utatur +ad repellendum nocivum. Et ideo philosophus dicit, in libro de +problematibus, quod multiplicatis introrsum spiritibus et calore, +necesse est quod emittantur per vocem. Et propter hoc, dolentes vix +se possunt continere quin clament. Sed in timentibus fit motus +interioris caloris et spirituum a corde ad inferiora, ut dictum +est. Et ideo timor contrariatur formationi vocis, quae fit per +emissionem spirituum ad superiora per os. Et propter hoc, timor +tacentes facit. Et inde est etiam quod timor trementes facit, ut +dicit philosophus, in libro de problematibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Mortal perils are contrary not only to the appetite of the soul, but also to nature. Consequently in such like fear, there + is contraction not only in the appetite, but also in the corporeal nature: for when an animal is moved by the imagination + of death, it experiences a contraction of heat towards the inner parts of the body, as though it were threatened by a natural + death. Hence it is that "those who are in fear of death turn pale" (Ethic. iv, 9). + But the evil that shame fears, is contrary, not to nature, but only to the appetite of the soul. Consequently there results + a contraction in this appetite, but not in the corporeal nature; in fact, the soul, as though contracted in itself, is free + to set the vital spirits and heat in movement, so that they spread to the outward parts of the body: the result being that + those who are ashamed blush. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35403" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35403] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod pericula mortis non solum contrariantur appetitui +animali, sed etiam contrariantur naturae. Et propter hoc, in +huiusmodi timore non solum fit contractio ex parte appetitus, sed +etiam ex parte naturae corporalis, sic enim disponitur animal ex +imaginatione mortis contrahens calorem ad interiora, sicut quando +naturaliter mors imminet. Et inde est quod timentes mortem +pallescunt, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Sed malum quod timet +verecundia, non opponitur naturae, sed solum appetitui animali. Et +ideo fit quidem contractio secundum appetitum animalem, non autem +secundum naturam corporalem, sed magis anima, quasi in se +contracta, vacat ad motionem spirituum et caloris, unde fit eorum +diffusio ad exteriora. Et propter hoc, verecundati rubescunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q44_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q44_A2-p0.1">Q. 44. A. 2. Whether fear makes one suitable for counsel? </h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fear does not make one suitable for counsel. For the same thing cannot be conducive to counsel, and a + hindrance thereto. But fear hinders counsel: because every passion disturbs repose, which is requisite for the good use of + reason. Therefore fear does not make a man suitable for counsel. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35404" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35404] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor non faciat consiliativos. Non +enim est eiusdem consiliativos facere, et consilium impedire. Sed +timor consilium impedit, omnis enim passio perturbat quietem, quae +requiritur ad bonum usum rationis. Ergo timor non facit +consiliativos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, counsel is an act of reason, in thinking and deliberating about the future. But a certain fear "drives away all + thought, and dislocates the mind," as Cicero observes (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8). Therefore fear does not conduce to counsel, + but hinders it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35405" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35405] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +consilium est actus rationis de futuris cogitantis et deliberantis. +Sed aliquis timor est <i>excutiens cogitata, et mentem a suo loco +removet</i>, ut Tullius dicit, in IV de Tusculanis quaest. Ergo +timor non facit consiliativos, sed magis impedit consilium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as we have recourse to counsel in order to avoid evil, so do we, in order to attain good things. But whereas + fear is of evil to be avoided, so is hope of good things to be obtained. Therefore fear is not more conducive to counsel, + than hope is. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35406" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35406] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut consilium adhibetur ad vitanda mala, ita etiam adhibetur ad +consequenda bona. Sed sicut timor est de malis vitandis, ita spes +est de bonis consequendis. Ergo timor non facit magis consiliativos +quam spes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear makes men of counsel." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35407" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35407] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod timor +consiliativos facit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q44_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A man of counsel may be taken in two ways. First, from his being willing or anxious to take counsel. And thus fear makes + men of counsel. Because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3), "we take counsel on great matters, because therein we distrust + ourselves." Now things which make us afraid, are not simply evil, but have a certain magnitude, both because they seem difficult + to repel, and because they are apprehended as near to us, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q42_A2" id="FS_Q44_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[42], A[2]</a>). Wherefore men seek for counsel especially when they are afraid. + </p><p id="FS_Q44_A2-p7"> Secondly, a man of counsel means one who is apt for giving good counsel: and in this sense, neither fear nor any passion + makes men of counsel. Because when a man is affected by a passion, things seem to him greater or smaller than they really + are: thus to a lover, what he loves seems better; to him that fears, what he fears seems more dreadful. Consequently owing + to the want of right judgment, every passion, considered in itself, hinders the faculty of giving good counsel. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 2 co."><a name="35408" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35408] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod aliquis potest dici consiliativus dupliciter. Uno +modo, a voluntate seu sollicitudine consiliandi. Et sic timor +consiliativos facit. Quia, ut philosophus in III Ethic. dicit, +<i>consiliamur de magnis, in quibus quasi nobis ipsis +discredimus</i>. Ea autem quae timorem incutiunt, non sunt +simpliciter mala, sed habent quandam magnitudinem, tum ex eo quod +apprehenduntur ut quae difficiliter repelli possunt; tum etiam quia +apprehenduntur ut de prope existentia, sicut iam dictum est. Unde +homines maxime in timoribus quaerunt consiliari. Alio modo dicitur +aliquis consiliativus, a facultate bene consiliandi. Et sic nec +timor, nec aliqua passio consiliativos facit. Quia homini affecto +secundum aliquam passionem, videtur aliquid vel maius vel minus +quam sit secundum rei veritatem, sicut amanti videntur ea quae +amat, meliora; et timenti, ea quae timet, terribiliora. Et sic ex +defectu rectitudinis iudicii, quaelibet passio, quantum est de se, +impedit facultatem bene consiliandi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to objections</b> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35409" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35409] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc +patet responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The stronger a passion is, the greater the hindrance is it to the man who is swayed by it. Consequently, when fear is intense, + man does indeed wish to take counsel, but his thoughts are so disturbed, that he can find no counsel. If, however, the fear + be slight, so as to make a man wish to take counsel, without gravely disturbing the reason; it may even make it easier for + him to take good counsel, by reason of his ensuing carefulness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35410" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35410] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod quanto aliqua passio est fortior, tanto magis homo +secundum ipsam affectus, impeditur. Et ideo quando timor fuerit +fortis, vult quidem homo consiliari, sed adeo perturbatur in suis +cogitationibus, quod consilium adinvenire non potest. Si autem sit +parvus timor, qui sollicitudinem consiliandi inducat, nec multum +rationem conturbet; potest etiam conferre ad facultatem bene +consiliandi, ratione sollicitudinis consequentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hope also makes man a good counsellor: because, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "no man takes counsel in matters he + despairs of," nor about impossible things, as he says in Ethic. iii, 3. But fear incites to counsel more than hope does. Because + hope is of good things, as being possible of attainment; whereas fear is of evil things, as being difficult to repel, so that + fear regards the aspect of difficulty more than hope does. And it is in + matters of difficulty, especially when we distrust ourselves, that we take counsel, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35411" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35411] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod etiam spes facit consiliativos, quia, ut in II +Rhetoric. philosophus dicit, <i>nullus consiliatur de his de quibus +desperat</i>; sicut nec de impossibilibus, ut dicitur in III Ethic. +Timor tamen facit magis consiliativos quam spes. Quia spes est de +bono, prout possumus ipsum consequi, timor autem de malo, prout vix +repelli potest, et ita magis respicit rationem difficilis timor +quam spes. In difficilibus autem, maxime in quibus nobis non +confidimus, consiliamur, sicut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q44_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q44_A3-p0.1">Q. 44. A. 3. Whether fear makes one tremble?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that trembling is not an effect of fear. Because trembling is occasioned by cold; thus we observe that a cold + person trembles. Now fear does not seem to make one cold, but rather to cause a parching heat: a sign whereof is that those + who fear are thirsty, especially if their fear be very great, as in the case of those who are being led to execution. Therefore + fear does not cause trembling. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35412" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35412] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod tremor non sit effectus timoris. +Tremor enim ex frigore accidit, videmus enim infrigidatos tremere. +Timor autem non videtur causare frigus, sed magis calorem +desiccantem, cuius signum est quod timentes sitiunt, et praecipue +in maximis timoribus, sicut patet in illis qui ad mortem ducuntur. +Ergo timor non causat tremorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, faecal evacuation is occasioned by heat; hence laxative medicines are generally warm. But these evacuations are + often caused by fear. Therefore fear apparently causes heat; and consequently does not cause trembling. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35413" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35413] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +emissio superfluitatum ex calore accidit, unde, ut plurimum, +medicinae laxativae sunt calidae. Sed huiusmodi emissiones +superfluitatum ex timore frequenter contingunt. Ergo timor videtur +causare calorem. Et sic non causat tremorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in fear, the heat is withdrawn from the outer to the inner parts of the body. If, therefore, man trembles in his + outward parts, through the heat being withdrawn thus; it seems that fear should cause this trembling in all the external members. + But such is not the case. Therefore trembling of the body is not caused by fear. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35414" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35414] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +in timore calor ab exterioribus ad interiora revocatur. Si igitur +propter huiusmodi revocationem caloris, in exterioribus homo +tremit; videtur quod similiter in omnibus exterioribus membris +deberet causari tremor ex timore. Hoc autem non videtur. Non ergo +tremor corporis est effectus timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8) that "fear is followed by trembling, pallor and chattering of the teeth." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35415" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35415] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Tullius dicit, in IV de Tusculanis quaest., quod +<i>terrorem sequitur tremor, et pallor, et dentium +crepitus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q44_A1" id="FS_Q44_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, in fear there takes place a certain contraction from the outward to the inner parts of the body, the result being that the + outer parts become cold; and for this reason trembling is occasioned in these parts, being caused by a lack of power in controlling + the members: which lack of power is due to the want of heat, which is the instrument whereby the soul moves those members, + as stated in De Anima ii, 4. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 3 co."><a name="35416" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35416] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in timore fit quaedam +contractio ab exterioribus ad interiora, et ideo exteriora frigida +remanent. Et propter hoc in eis accidit tremor, qui causatur ex +debilitate virtutis continentis membra, ad huiusmodi autem +debilitatem maxime facit defectus caloris, qui est instrumentum quo +anima movet, ut dicitur in II de anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When the heat withdraws from the outer to the inner parts, the inward heat increases, especially in the inferior or nutritive + parts. Consequently the humid element being spent, thirst ensues; sometimes indeed the result is a loosening of the bowels, + and urinary or even seminal evacuation. Or else such like evacuations are due to contraction of the abdomen and testicles, + as the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxii, 11). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35417" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35417] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, calore ab exterioribus ad interiora revocato, +multiplicatur calor interius, et maxime versus inferiora, idest +circa nutritivam. Et ideo, consumpto humido, consequitur sitis, et +etiam interdum solutio ventris, et urinae emissio, et quandoque +etiam seminis. Vel huiusmodi emissio superfluitatum accidit propter +contractionem ventris et testiculorum, ut philosophus dicit, in +libro de problematibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35418" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35418] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Unde patet +solutio ad secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In fear, heat abandons the heart, with a downward movement: hence in those who are afraid the heart especially trembles, + as also those members which are connected with the breast where the heart resides. Hence those who fear tremble especially + in their speech, on account of the tracheal artery being near the heart. The lower lip, too, and the lower jaw tremble, through + their connection with the heart; which explains the chattering of the teeth. For + the same reason the arms and hands tremble. Or else because the aforesaid members are more mobile. For which reason the knees + tremble in those who are afraid, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q44_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.35.3" target="asv">Is. 35:3</a>: "Strengthen ye the feeble hands, and confirm the trembling [Vulg.: 'weak'] knees." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35419" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35419] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, quia in timore calor deserit cor, a superioribus ad +inferiora tendens, ideo timentibus maxime tremit cor, et membra +quae habent aliquam connexionem ad pectus, ubi est cor. Unde +timentes maxime tremunt in voce, propter vicinitatem vocalis +arteriae ad cor. Tremit etiam labium inferius, et tota inferior +mandibula, propter continuationem ad cor, unde et crepitus dentium +sequitur. Et eadem ratione brachia et manus tremunt. Vel etiam quia +huiusmodi membra sunt magis mobilia. Propter quod et genua tremunt +timentibus; secundum illud Isaiae XXXV, <i>confortate manus +dissolutas, et genua trementia roborate</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q44_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q44_A4-p0.1">Q. 44. A. 4. Whether fear hinders action?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fear hinders action. For action is hindered chiefly by a disturbance in the reason, which directs action. + But fear disturbs reason, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q44_A2" id="FS_Q44_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore fear hinders action. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35420" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35420] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor impediat operationem. Operatio +enim maxime impeditur ex perturbatione rationis, quae dirigit in +opere. Sed timor perturbat rationem, ut dictum est. Ergo timor +impedit operationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those who fear while doing anything, are more apt to fail: thus a man who walks on a plank placed aloft, easily + falls through fear; whereas, if he were to walk on the same plank down below, he would not fall, through not being afraid. + Therefore fear hinders action. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35421" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35421] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +illi qui faciunt aliquid cum timore, facilius in operando +deficiunt, sicut si aliquis incedat super trabem in alto positam, +propter timorem de facili cadit; non autem caderet, si incederet +super eandem trabem in imo positam, propter defectum timoris. Ergo +timor impedit operationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, laziness or sloth is a kind of fear. But laziness hinders action. Therefore fear does too. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35422" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35422] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +pigritia, sive segnities, est quaedam species timoris. Sed pigritia +impedit operationem. Ergo et timor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q44_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.12" target="asv">Phil. 2:12</a>): "With fear and trembling work out your salvation": and he would not say this if fear were a hindrance to a good work. Therefore + fear does not hinder a good action. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35423" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35423] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Philipp. II, <i>cum metu et tremore +vestram salutem operamini</i>, quod non diceret, si timor bonam +operationem impediret. Timor ergo non impedit bonam +operationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Man's exterior actions are caused by the soul as first mover, but by the bodily members as instruments. Now action may be + hindered both by defect of the instrument, and by defect of the principal mover. On the part of the bodily instruments, fear, + considered in itself, is always apt to hinder exterior action, on account of the outward members being deprived, through fear, + of their heat. But on the part of the soul, if the fear be moderate, without much + disturbance of the reason, it conduces to working well, in so far as it causes a certain solicitude, and makes a man take + counsel and work with greater attention. If, however, fear increases so much as to disturb the reason, it hinders action even + on the part of the soul. But of such a fear the Apostle does not speak. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 4 co."><a name="35424" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35424] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod operatio hominis exterior causatur quidem ab anima +sicut a primo movente, sed a membris corporeis sicut ab +instrumentis. Contingit autem operationem impediri et propter +defectum instrumenti, et propter defectum principalis moventis. Ex +parte igitur instrumentorum corporalium, timor, quantum est de se, +semper natus est impedire exteriorem operationem, propter defectum +caloris qui ex timore accidit in exterioribus membris. Sed ex parte +animae, si sit timor moderatus, non multum rationem perturbans; +confert ad bene operandum, inquantum causat quandam sollicitudinem, +et facit hominem attentius consiliari et operari. Si vero timor +tantum increscat quod rationem perturbet, impedit operationem etiam +ex parte animae. Sed de tali timore apostolus non loquitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A4-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35425" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35425] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Et per haec +patet responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> He that falls from a plank placed aloft, suffers a disturbance of his imagination, through fear of the fall that is pictured + to his imagination. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35426" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35426] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod illi qui cadunt de trabe in alto posita, patiuntur +perturbationem imaginationis, propter timorem casus imaginati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Everyone in fear shuns that which he fears: and therefore, since laziness is a fear of work itself as being toilsome, it + hinders work by withdrawing the will from it. But fear of other things conduces to action, in so far as it inclines the will + to do that whereby a man escapes from what he fears. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35427" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35427] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod omnis timens refugit id quod timet, et ideo, cum +pigritia sit timor de ipsa operatione, inquantum est laboriosa, +impedit operationem, quia retrahit voluntatem ab ipsa. Sed timor +qui est de aliis rebus, intantum adiuvat operationem, inquantum +inclinat voluntatem ad operandum ea per quae homo effugit id quod +timet.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q45" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q45-p0.1">Q. 45. OF DARING (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q45-p2"> We must now consider daring: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q45-p3"><a href="#FS_Q45_A1"> (1) Whether daring is contrary to fear?</a></p><p id="FS_Q45-p4"><a href="#FS_Q45_A2"> (2) How is daring related to hope?</a></p><p id="FS_Q45-p5"><a href="#FS_Q45_A3"> (3) Of the cause of daring;</a></p><p id="FS_Q45-p6"><a href="#FS_Q45_A4"> (4) Of its effect.</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 pr."><a name="35428" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35428] +Iª-IIae q. 45 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +audacia. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum audacia sit +contraria timori. Secundo, quomodo audacia se habeat ad spem. +Tertio, de causa audaciae. Quarto, de effectus ipsius.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q45_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q45_A1-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 1. Whether daring is contrary to fear?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that daring is not contrary to fear. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 31) that "daring is a vice." Now vice + is contrary to virtue. Since, therefore, fear is not a virtue but a passion, it seems that daring is not contrary to fear. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35429" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35429] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod audacia non contrarietur timori. Dicit +enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod audacia +vitium est. Vitium autem virtuti contrariatur. Cum ergo timor non +sit virtus, sed passio, videtur quod timori non contrarietur +audacia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to one thing there is one contrary. But hope is contrary to fear. Therefore daring is not contrary to fear. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35430" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35430] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +uni unum est contrarium. Sed timori contrariatur spes. Non ergo +contrariatur ei audacia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every passion excludes its opposite. But fear excludes safety; for Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "fear takes + forethought for safety." Therefore safety is contrary to fear. Therefore daring is not contrary to fear. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35431" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35431] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +unaquaeque passio excludit passionem oppositam. Sed id quod +excluditur per timorem, est securitas, dicit enim Augustinus, II +Confess., quod timor securitati praecavet ergo securitas +contrariatur timori. Non ergo audacia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "daring is contrary to fear." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35432" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35432] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>audacia est +timori contraria</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is of the essence of contraries to be "farthest removed from one another," as stated in Metaph. x, 4. Now that which is + farthest removed from fear, is daring: since fear turns away from the future hurt, on account of its victory over him that + fears it; whereas daring turns on threatened danger because of its own victory over that same danger. Consequently it is evident + that daring is contrary to fear. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 1 co."><a name="35433" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35433] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod de ratione contrariorum est quod maxime a se distent, +ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Illud autem quod maxime distat a timore, +est audacia, timor enim refugit nocumentum futurum, propter eius +victoriam super ipsum timentem; sed audacia aggreditur periculum +imminens, propter victoriam sui supra ipsum periculum. Unde +manifeste timori contrariatur audacia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Anger, daring and all the names of the passions can be taken in two ways. First, as denoting absolutely movements of the + sensitive appetite in respect of some object, good or bad: and thus they are names of passions. Secondly, as denoting besides + this movement, a straying from the order of reason: and thus they are names of vices. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks + of daring: but we are speaking of it in the first sense. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35434" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35434] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ira et audacia, et omnium passionum nomina, +dupliciter accipi possunt. Uno modo, secundum quod important +absolute motus appetitus sensitivi in aliquod obiectum bonum vel +malum, et sic sunt nomina passionum. Alio modo, secundum quod simul +cum huiusmodi motu important recessum ab ordine rationis, et sic +sunt nomina vitiorum. Et hoc modo loquitur Augustinus de audacia, +sed nos loquimur nunc de audacia secundum primum modum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To one thing, in the same respect, there are not several contraries; but in different respects nothing prevents one thing + having several contraries. Accordingly it has been said above ( + <a href="#FS_Q23_A2" id="FS_Q45_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[2]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q40_A4" id="FS_Q45_A1-p8.2" shape="rect"> Q[40], A[4]</a>) that the irascible passions admit of a twofold contrariety: one, according to the opposition of good and evil, and thus + fear is contrary to hope: the other, according to the opposition of + approach and withdrawal, and thus daring is contrary to fear, and despair contrary to hope. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35435" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35435] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod uni secundum idem, non sunt plura contraria, sed +secundum diversa, nihil prohibet uni plura contrariari. Et sic +dictum est supra quod passiones irascibilis habent duplicem +contrarietatem, unam secundum oppositionem boni et mali, et sic +timor contrariatur spei; aliam secundum oppositionem accessus et +recessus, et sic timori contrariatur audacia, spei vero +desperatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Safety does not denote something contrary to fear, but merely the exclusion of fear: for he is said to be safe, who fears + not. Wherefore safety is opposed to fear, as a privation: while daring is opposed thereto as a contrary. And as contrariety + implies privation, so daring implies safety. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35436" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35436] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod securitas non significat aliquid contrarium timori, +sed solam timoris exclusionem, ille enim dicitur esse securus, qui +non timet. Unde securitas opponitur timori sicut privatio, audacia +autem sicut contrarium. Et sicut contrarium includit in se +privationem, ita audacia securitatem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q45_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q45_A2-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 2. Whether daring ensues from hope?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that daring does not ensue from hope. Because daring regards evil and fearful things, as stated in Ethic. iii, + 7. But hope regards good things, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q40_A1" id="FS_Q45_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[40], A[1]</a>). Therefore they have different objects and are not in the same order. Therefore daring does not ensue from hope. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35437" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35437] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod audacia non consequatur spem. Audacia +enim est respectu malorum et terribilium, ut dicitur in III Ethic. +Spes autem respicit bonum. Ut supra dictum est. Ergo habent diversa +obiecta, et non sunt unius ordinis. Non ergo audacia consequitur +spem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as daring is contrary to fear, so is despair contrary to hope. But fear does not ensue from despair: in fact, + despair excludes fear, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore daring does not result from hope. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35438" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35438] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut audacia contrariatur timori, ita desperatio spei. Sed timor +non sequitur desperationem, quinimmo desperatio excludit timorem. +Ut philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric. Ergo audacia non consequitur +spem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, daring is intent on something good, viz. victory. But it belongs to hope to tend to that which is good and difficult. + Therefore daring is the same as hope; and consequently does not result from it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35439" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35439] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +audacia intendit quoddam bonum, scilicet victoriam. Sed tendere in +bonum arduum pertinet ad spem. Ergo audacia est idem spei. Non ergo +consequitur ad spem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "those are hopeful are full of daring." Therefore it seems that daring ensues from + hope. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35440" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35440] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod <i>illi qui sunt +bonae spei, sunt audaces</i>. Videtur ergo audacia consequi +spem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As we have often stated ( + <a href="#FS_Q22_A2" id="FS_Q45_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[2]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q35_A1" id="FS_Q45_A2-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[35], A[1]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q41_A1" id="FS_Q45_A2-p6.3" shape="rect"> Q[41], A[1]</a>), all these passions belong to the appetitive power. Now every movement of the appetitive power is reducible to one either + of pursuit or of avoidance. Again, pursuit or avoidance is of something either by reason of itself or by reason of something + else. By reason of itself, good is the object of pursuit, and evil, the + object of avoidance: but by reason of something else, evil can be the object of pursuit, through some good attaching to it; + and good can be the object of avoidance, through some evil attaching to it. Now that which is by reason of something else, + follows that which is by reason of itself. Consequently pursuit of evil follows pursuit of good; and avoidance of good follows + avoidance of evil. Now these four things belong to four passions, since pursuit of good belongs to hope, avoidance of evil + to + fear, the pursuit of the fearful evil belongs to daring, and the avoidance of good to despair. It follows, therefore, that + daring results from hope; since it is in the hope of overcoming the threatening object of fear, that one attacks it boldly. + But despair results from fear: since the reason why a man despairs is because he fears the difficulty attaching to the good + he should hope for. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 2 co."><a name="35441" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35441] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam pluries dictum est, omnes huiusmodi +passiones animae ad appetitivam potentiam pertinent. Omnis autem +motus appetitivae potentiae reducitur ad prosecutionem vel fugam. +Prosecutio autem vel fuga est alicuius et per se, et per accidens, +per se quidem est prosecutio boni, fuga vero mali; per accidens +autem potest prosecutio esse mali, propter aliquod bonum adiunctum, +et fuga boni, propter aliquod malum adiunctum. Quod autem est per +accidens, sequitur ad id quod est per se. Et ideo prosecutio mali, +sequitur prosecutionem boni, sicut et fuga boni sequitur fugam +mali. Haec autem quatuor pertinent ad quatuor passiones, nam +prosecutio boni pertinet ad spem, fuga mali ad timorem, insecutio +mali terribilis pertinet ad audaciam, fuga vero boni pertinet ad +desperationem. Unde sequitur quod audacia consequitur ad spem, ex +hoc enim quod aliquis sperat superare terribile imminens, ex hoc +audacter insequitur ipsum. Ad timorem vero sequitur desperatio, +ideo enim aliquis desperat, quia timet difficultatem quae est circa +bonum sperandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument would hold, if good and evil were not co-ordinate objects. But because evil has a certain relation to good, + since it comes after good, as privation comes after habit; consequently daring which pursues evil, comes after hope which + pursues good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35442" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35442] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ratio sequeretur, si bonum et malum essent +obiecta non habentia ordinem ad invicem. Sed quia malum habet +aliquem ordinem ad bonum, est enim posterius bono, sicut privatio +habitu; ideo audacia, quae insequitur malum, est post spem, quae +insequitur bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although good, absolutely speaking, is prior to evil, yet avoidance of evil precedes avoidance of good; just as the pursuit + of good precedes the pursuit of evil. Consequently just as hope precedes daring, so fear precedes despair. And just as fear + does not always lead to despair, but only when it is intense; so hope does not always lead to daring, save only when it is + strong. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35443" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35443] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, etsi bonum simpliciter sit prius quam malum, tamen +fuga per prius debetur malo quam bono, sicut insecutio per prius +debetur bono quam malo. Et ideo sicut spes est prior quam audacia, +ita timor est prior quam desperatio. Et sicut ex timore non semper +sequitur desperatio, sed quando fuerit intensus; ita ex spe non +semper sequitur audacia, sed quando fuerit vehemens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the object of daring is an evil to which, in the estimation of the daring man, the good of victory is conjoined; + yet daring regards the evil, and hope regards the conjoined good. In like manner despair regards directly the good which it + turns away from, while fear regards the conjoined evil. Hence, properly speaking, daring is not a part of hope, but its effect: + just as despair is an effect, not a part, of fear. For this reason, too, daring + cannot be a principal passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35444" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35444] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod audacia, licet sit circa malum cui coniunctum est +bonum victoriae secundum aestimationem audacis, tamen respicit +malum, bonum vero adiunctum respicit spes. Et similiter desperatio +respicit bonum directe, quod refugit, malum vero adiunctum respicit +timor. Unde, proprie loquendo, audacia non est pars spei, sed eius +effectus, sicut nec desperatio est pars timoris, sed eius effectus. +Et propter hoc etiam audacia principalis passio esse non +potest.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q45_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q45_A3-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 3. Whether some defect is a cause of daring?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that some defect is a cause of daring. For the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 4) that "lovers of wine + are strong and daring." But from wine ensues the effect of drunkenness. Therefore daring is caused by a defect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35445" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35445] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod defectus aliquis sit causa audaciae. +Dicit enim philosophus, in libro de problematibus, quod <i>amatores +vini sunt fortes et audaces</i>. Sed ex vino sequitur defectus +ebrietatis. Ergo audacia causatur ex aliquo defectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those who have no experience of danger are bold." But want of experience + is a defect. Therefore daring is caused by a defect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35446" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35446] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>inexperti periculorum +sunt audaces</i>. Sed inexperientia defectus quidam est. Ergo +audacia ex defectu causatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, those who have suffered wrongs are wont to be daring; "like the beasts when beaten," as stated in Ethic. iii, 5. + But the suffering of wrongs pertains to defect. Therefore daring is caused by a defect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35447" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35447] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +iniusta passi audaciores esse solent; sicut etiam bestiae cum +percutiuntur, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Sed iniustum pati ad +defectum pertinet. Ergo audacia ex aliquo defectu causatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that the cause of daring "is the presence in the imagination of the hope that the means + of safety are nigh, and that the things to be feared are either non-existent or far off." But anything pertaining to defect + implies either the removal of the means of safety, or the proximity of something to be feared. Therefore nothing pertaining + to defect is a cause of daring. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35448" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35448] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod causa audaciae +est, <i>cum in phantasia spes fuerit salutarium ut prope +existentium, timendorum autem aut non entium, aut longe entium</i>. +Sed id quod pertinet ad defectum, vel pertinet ad salutarium +remotionem, vel ad terribilium propinquitatem. Ergo nihil quod ad +defectum pertinet, est causa audaciae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q45_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q45_A1" id="FS_Q45_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2) daring results from hope and is contrary to fear: wherefore whatever is naturally apt to cause hope or banish fear, is + a cause of daring. Since, however, fear and hope, and also daring, being passions, consist in a movement of the appetite, + and in a certain bodily transmutation; a thing may be considered as the cause of daring in two ways, whether by raising hope, + or by banishing fear; in one way, in the + part of the appetitive movement; in another way, on the part of the bodily transmutation. + </p><p id="FS_Q45_A3-p7"> On the part of the appetitive movement which follows apprehension, hope that leads to daring is roused by those things that + make us reckon victory as possible. Such things regard either our own power, as bodily strength, experience of dangers, abundance + of wealth, and the like; or they regard the powers of others, such as having a great number of friends or any other means + of help, especially if a man trust in the Divine assistance: wherefore "those are more daring, with whom it + is well in regard to godlike things," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Fear is banished, in this way, by the removal + of threatening causes of fear; for instance, by the fact that a man has not enemies, through having harmed nobody, so that + he is not aware of any imminent danger; since those especially appear to be threatened by danger, who have harmed others. + </p><p id="FS_Q45_A3-p8"> On the part of the bodily transmutation, daring is caused through the incitement of hope and the banishment of fear, by those + things which raise the temperature about the heart. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Part. Animal. iii, 4) that "those whose + heart is small in size, are more daring; while animals whose heart is large are timid; because the natural heat is unable + to give the same degree of temperature to a large as to a small heart; just as a fire does not heat a large + house as well as it does a small house." He says also (De Problem. xxvii, 4), that "those whose lungs contain much blood, + are more daring, through the heat in the heart that results therefrom." He says also in the same passage that "lovers of wine + are more daring, on account of the heat of the wine": hence it has been said above ( + <a href="#FS_Q40_A6" id="FS_Q45_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[40], A[6]</a>) that drunkenness conduces to hope, since the heat in the heart banishes fear and raises hope, by reason of the dilatation + and + enlargement of the heart. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 3 co."><a name="35449" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35449] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, audacia consequitur spem, et +contrariatur timori, unde quaecumque nata sunt causare spem, vel +excludere timorem, sunt causa audaciae. Quia vero timor et spes, et +etiam audacia, cum sint passiones quaedam, consistunt in motu +appetitus et in quadam transmutatione corporali; dupliciter potest +accipi causa audaciae, sive quantum ad provocationem spei, sive +quantum ad exclusionem timoris, uno modo quidem, ex parte +appetitivi motus; alio vero modo, ex parte transmutationis +corporalis. Ex parte quidem appetitivi motus, qui sequitur +apprehensionem, provocatur spes causans audaciam, per ea quae +faciunt nos aestimare quod possibile sit adipisci victoriam; vel +secundum propriam potentiam, sicut fortitudo corporis, experientia +in periculis, multitudo pecuniarum, et alia huiusmodi; sive per +potentiam aliorum, sicut multitudo amicorum vel quorumcumque +auxiliantium, et praecipue si homo confidat de auxilio divino; +<i>unde illi qui se bene habent ad divina, audaciores sunt</i>, ut +etiam philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric. Timor autem excluditur, +secundum istum modum, per remotionem terribilium appropinquantium, +puta quia homo non habet inimicos, quia nulli nocuit, quia non +videt aliquod periculum imminere; illis enim videntur maxime +pericula imminere, qui aliis nocuerunt. Ex parte vero +transmutationis corporalis, causatur audacia per provocationem spei +et exclusionem timoris, ex his quae faciunt caliditatem circa cor. +Unde philosophus dicit, in libro de partibus animalium, quod +<i>illi qui habent parvum cor secundum quantitatem, sunt magis +audaces; et animalia habentia magnum cor secundum quantitatem, sunt +timida, quia calor naturalis non tantum potest calefacere magnum +cor; sicut parvum, sicut ignis non tantum potest calefacere magnam +domum, sicut parvam</i>. Et in libro de problematibus dicit quod +<i>habentes pulmonem sanguineum, sunt audaciores, propter +caliditatem cordis exinde consequentem</i>. Et ibidem dicit quod +<i>vini amatores sunt magis audaces, propter caliditatem vini</i>, +unde et supra dictum est quod ebrietas facit ad bonitatem spei, +caliditas enim cordis repellit timorem, et causat spem, propter +cordis extensionem et amplificationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Drunkenness causes daring, not through being a defect, but through dilating the heart: and again through making a man think + greatly of himself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35450" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35450] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ebrietas causat audaciam, non inquantum est +defectus, sed inquantum facit cordis dilatationem, et inquantum +etiam facit aestimationem cuiusdam magnitudinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those who have no experience of dangers are more daring, not on account of a defect, but accidentally, i.e. in so far as + through being inexperienced they do not know their own failings, nor the dangers that threaten. Hence it is that the removal + of the cause of fear gives rise to daring. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35451" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35451] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod illi qui sunt inexperti periculorum, sunt audaciores, +non propter defectum, sed per accidens, inquantum scilicet, propter +inexperientiam, neque debilitatem suam cognoscunt, neque +praesentiam periculorum. Et ita, per subtractionem causae timoris, +sequitur audacia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q45_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) "those who have been wronged are courageous, because they think that God comes to the + assistance of those who suffer unjustly." + </p><p id="FS_Q45_A3-p12"> Hence it is evident that no defect causes daring except accidentally, i.e. in so far as some excellence attaches thereto, + real or imaginary, either in oneself or in another. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35452" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35452] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in II Rhetoric., <i>iniustum +passi redduntur audaciores, quia aestimant quod Deus iniustum +passis auxilium ferat</i>. Et sic patet quod nullus defectus causat +audaciam nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet habet adiunctam +aliquam excellentiam, vel veram vel aestimatam, vel ex parte sui +vel ex parte alterius.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q45_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q45_A4-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 4. Whether the brave are more eager at first than in the midst of danger?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the daring are not more eager at first than in the midst of danger. Because trembling is caused by fear, + which is contrary to daring, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q45_A1" id="FS_Q45_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1];</a> Q[44], A[3]). But the daring sometimes tremble at first, as the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 3). Therefore they are + not more eager at first than in the midst of danger. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35453" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35453] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod audaces non sint promptiores in +principio quam in ipsis periculis. Tremor enim ex timore causatur, +qui contrariatur audaciae, ut ex dictis patet. Sed audaces +quandoque in principio tremunt, ut philosophus dicit, in libro de +problematibus. Ergo non sunt promptiores in principio quam in ipsis +periculis existentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, passion is intensified by an increase in its object: thus since a good is lovable, what is better is yet more lovable. + But the object of daring is something difficult. Therefore the greater the difficulty, the greater the daring. But danger + is more arduous and difficult when present. It is then therefore that daring is greatest. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35454" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35454] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +per augmentum obiecti augetur passio, sicut si bonum est amabile, +et magis bonum est magis amabile. Sed arduum est obiectum audaciae. +Augmentato ergo arduo, augmentatur audacia. Sed magis fit arduum et +difficile periculum, quando est praesens. Ergo debet tunc magis +crescere audacia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, anger is provoked by the infliction of wounds. But anger causes daring; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that + "anger makes man bold." Therefore when man is in the midst of danger and when he is being beaten, then is he most daring. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35455" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35455] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +ex vulneribus inflictis provocatur ira. Sed ira causat audaciam, +dicit enim philosophus, in II Rhetoric., quod ira est ausivum. Ergo +quando iam sunt in ipsis periculis, et percutiuntur, videtur quod +magis audaces reddantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in Ethic. iii, 7 that "the daring are precipitate and full of eagerness before the danger, yet in the midst of + dangers they stand aloof." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35456" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35456] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur in III Ethic., quod <i>audaces praevolantes sunt +et volentes ante pericula, in ipsis autem discedunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q45_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Daring, being a movement of the sensitive appetite, follows an apprehension of the sensitive faculty. But the sensitive faculty + cannot make comparisons, nor can it inquire into circumstances; its judgment is instantaneous. Now it happens sometimes that + it is impossible for a man to take note in an instant of all the difficulties of a certain situation: hence there arises the + movement of daring to face the danger; so that when he comes to experience the + danger, he feels the difficulty to be greater than he expected, and so gives way. + </p><p id="FS_Q45_A4-p7"> On the other hand, reason discusses all the difficulties of a situation. Consequently men of fortitude who face danger according + to the judgment of reason, at first seem slack, because they face the danger not from passion but with due deliberation. Yet + when they are in the midst of danger, they experience nothing unforeseen, but sometimes the difficulty turns out to be less + than they anticipated; wherefore they are more persevering. Moreover, it may be because they face the + danger on account of the good of virtue which is the abiding object of their will, however great the danger may prove: whereas + men of daring face the danger on account of a mere thought giving rise to hope and banishing fear, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q45_A3" id="FS_Q45_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 4 co."><a name="35457" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35457] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod audacia, cum sit quidam motus appetitus sensitivi, +sequitur apprehensionem sensitivae virtutis. Virtus autem sensitiva +non est collativa nec inquisitiva singulorum quae circumstant rem, +sed subitum habet iudicium. Contingit autem quandoque quod secundum +subitam apprehensionem non possunt cognosci omnia quae +difficultatem in aliquo negotio afferunt, unde surgit audaciae +motus ad aggrediendum periculum. Unde quando iam experiuntur ipsum +periculum, sentiunt maiorem difficultatem quam aestimaverunt. Et +ideo deficiunt. Sed ratio est discussiva omnium quae afferunt +difficultatem negotio. Et ideo fortes, qui ex iudicio rationis +aggrediuntur pericula, in principio videntur remissi, quia non +passi, sed cum deliberatione debita aggrediuntur. Quando autem sunt +in ipsis periculis, non experiuntur aliquid improvisum; sed +quandoque minora illis quae praecogitaverunt. Et ideo magis +persistunt. Vel etiam quia propter bonum virtutis pericula +aggrediuntur, cuius boni voluntas in eis perseverat, quantacumque +sint pericula. Audaces autem, propter solam aestimationem facientem +spem et excludentem timorem, sicut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Trembling does occur in men of daring, on account of the heat being withdrawn from the outer to the inner parts of the body, + as occurs also in those who are afraid. But in men of daring the heat withdraws to the heart; whereas in those who are afraid, + it withdraws to the inferior parts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35458" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35458] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod etiam in audacibus accidit tremor, propter +revocationem caloris ab exterioribus ad interiora, sicut etiam in +timentibus. Sed in audacibus revocatur calor ad cor, in timentibus +autem, ad inferiora.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The object of love is good simply, wherefore if it be increased, love is increased simply. But the object of daring is a + compound of good and evil; and the movement of daring towards evil presupposes the movement of hope towards good. If, therefore, + so much difficulty be added to the danger that it overcomes hope, the movement of daring does not ensue, but fails. But if + the movement of daring does ensue, the greater the danger, the greater is the + daring considered to be. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35459" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35459] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod obiectum amoris est simpliciter bonum, unde +augmentatum simpliciter augmentat amorem. Sed obiectum audaciae est +compositum ex bono et malo; et motus audaciae in malum, +praesupponit motum spei in bonum. Et ideo si tantum addatur de +arduitate ad periculum quod excedat spem, non sequetur motus +audaciae, sed diminuetur. Si tamen sit motus audaciae, quanto maius +est periculum, tanto maior audacia reputatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hurt does not give rise to anger unless there be some kind of hope, as we shall see later on ( + <a href="#FS_Q46_A1" id="FS_Q45_A4-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[46], A[1]</a>). Consequently if the danger be so great as to banish all hope of victory, anger does not ensue. It is true, however, that + if anger does ensue, there will be greater daring. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35460" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35460] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ex laesione non causatur ira, nisi supposita aliqua +spe, ut infra dicetur. Et ideo si fuerit tantum periculum quod +excedat spem victoriae, non sequetur ira. Sed verum est quod, si +ira sequatur, audacia augebitur.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q46" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q46-p0.1">Q. 46. OF ANGER, IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q46-p2"> We must now consider anger: and (1) anger in itself; (2) the cause of anger and its remedy; (3) the effect of anger.</p><p id="FS_Q46-p3"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q46-p4"><a href="#FS_Q46_A1"> (1) Whether anger is a special passion?</a></p><p id="FS_Q46-p5"><a href="#FS_Q46_A2"> (2) Whether the object of anger is good or evil?</a></p><p id="FS_Q46-p6"><a href="#FS_Q46_A3"> (3) Whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty?</a></p><p id="FS_Q46-p7"><a href="#FS_Q46_A4"> (4) Whether anger is accompanied by an act of reason?</a></p><p id="FS_Q46-p8"><a href="#FS_Q46_A5"> (5) Whether anger is more natural than desire?</a></p><p id="FS_Q46-p9"><a href="#FS_Q46_A6"> (6) Whether anger is more grievous than hatred?</a></p><p id="FS_Q46-p10"><a href="#FS_Q46_A7"> (7) Whether anger is only towards those with whom we have a relation of justice?</a></p><p id="FS_Q46-p11"><a href="#FS_Q46_A8"> (8) Of the species of anger.</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 pr."><a name="35461" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35461] +Iª-IIae q. 46 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de ira. +Et primo, de ira secundum se; secundo, de causa factiva irae, et +remedio eius; tertio, de effectu eius. Circa primum quaeruntur +octo. Primo, utrum ira sit passio specialis. Secundo, utrum +obiectum irae sit bonum, an malum. Tertio, utrum ira sit in +concupiscibili. Quarto, utrum ira sit cum ratione. Quinto, utrum +ira sit naturalior quam concupiscentia. Sexto, utrum ira sit +gravior quam odium. Septimo, utrum ira solum sit ad illos ad quos +est iustitia. Octavo, de speciebus irae.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q46_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q46_A1-p0.1">Q. 46. A. 1. Whether anger is a special passion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger is not a special passion. For the irascible power takes its name from anger [ira]. But there are + several passions in this power, not only one. Therefore anger is not one special passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35462" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35462] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non sit passio specialis. Ab ira +enim denominatur potentia irascibilis. Sed huius potentiae non est +una tantum passio, sed multae. Ergo ira non est una passio +specialis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to every special passion there is a contrary passion; as is evident by going through them one by one. But no passion + is contrary to anger, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q23_A3" id="FS_Q46_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[3]</a>). Therefore anger is not a special passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35463" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35463] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +cuilibet passioni speciali est aliquid contrarium; ut patet +inducenti per singula. Sed irae non est aliqua passio contraria, ut +supra dictum est. Ergo ira non est passio specialis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one special passion does not include another. But anger includes several passions: since it accompanies sorrow, + pleasure, and hope, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2). Therefore anger is not a special passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35464" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35464] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +una specialis passio non includit aliam. Sed ira includit multas +passiones, est enim cum tristitia, et cum delectatione, et cum spe, +ut patet per philosophum, in II Rhetoric. Ergo ira non est passio +specialis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) calls anger a special passion: and so does Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 7). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35465" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35465] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Damascenus ponit iram specialem passionem. Et similiter +Tullius, IV de Tusculanis quaest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q46_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A thing is said to be general in two ways. First, by predication; thus "animal" is general in respect of all animals. Secondly, + by causality; thus the sun is the general cause of all things generated here below, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). + Because just as a genus contains potentially many differences, according to a likeness of matter; so an efficient cause contains + many effects according to its active power. Now it happens that an effect is + produced by the concurrence of various causes; and since every cause remains somewhat in its effect, we may say that, in yet + a third way, an effect which is due to the concurrence of several causes, has a certain generality, inasmuch as several causes + are, in a fashion, actually existing therein. + </p><p id="FS_Q46_A1-p7"> Accordingly in the first way, anger is not a general passion but is condivided with the other passions, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q46_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a>). In like manner, neither is it in the second way: since it is not a cause of the other passions. But in this way, love may + be called a general passion, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), because love is the primary root of all the other + passions, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q27_A4" id="FS_Q46_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[27], A[4]</a> ). But, in a + third way, anger may be called a general passion, inasmuch as it is caused by a concurrence of several passions. Because the + movement of anger does not arise save on account of some pain inflicted, and unless there be desire and hope of revenge: for, + as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2), "the angry man hopes to punish; since he craves for revenge as being possible." Consequently + if the person, who inflicted the injury, excel very much, anger does not ensue, but only sorrow, as Avicenna states + (De Anima iv, 6). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 1 co."><a name="35466" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35466] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod aliquid dicitur generale dupliciter. Uno modo, per +praedicationem, sicut animal est generale ad omnia animalia. Alio +modo, per causam, sicut sol est causa generalis omnium quae +generantur in his inferioribus, secundum Dionysium, in IV cap. de +Div. Nom. Sicut enim genus continet multas differentias potestate, +secundum similitudinem materiae; ita causa agens continet multos +effectus secundum virtutem activam. Contingit autem aliquem +effectum ex concursu diversarum causarum produci, et quia omnis +causa aliquo modo in effectu manet, potest etiam dici, tertio modo, +quod effectus ex congregatione multarum causarum productus, habet +quandam generalitatem, inquantum continet multas causas quodammodo +in actu. Primo ergo modo, ira non est passio generalis, sed +condivisa aliis passionibus, ut supra dictum est. Similiter autem +nec secundo modo. Non est enim causa aliarum passionum, sed per +hunc modum potest dici generalis passio amor, ut patet per +Augustinum, in XIV libro de Civ. Dei; amor enim est prima radix +omnium passionum, ut supra dictum est. Sed tertio modo potest ira +dici passio generalis, inquantum ex concursu multarum passionum +causatur. Non enim insurgit motus irae nisi propter aliquam +tristitiam illatam et nisi adsit desiderium et spes ulciscendi, +quia, ut philosophus dicit in II Rhetoric., <i>iratus habet spem +puniendi; appetit enim vindictam ut sibi possibilem</i>. Unde si +fuerit multum excellens persona quae nocumentum intulit, non +sequitur ira, sed solum tristitia, ut Avicenna dicit, in libro de +anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The irascible power takes its name from "ira" [anger], not because every movement of that power is one of anger; but because + all its movements terminate in anger; and because, of all these movements, anger is the most patent. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35467" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35467] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, vis irascibilis denominatur ab ira, non quia +omnis motus huius potentiae sit ira, sed quia ad iram terminantur +omnes motus huius potentiae; et inter alios eius motus, iste est +manifestior.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the very fact that anger is caused by contrary passions, i.e. by hope, which is of good, and by sorrow, which is of + evil, it includes in itself contrariety: and consequently it has no contrary outside itself. Thus also in mixed colors there + is no contrariety, except that of the simple colors from which they are made. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35468" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35468] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ex hoc ipso quod ira causatur ex contrariis +passionibus, scilicet a spe, quae est boni, et a tristitia, quae +est mali, includit in seipsa contrarietatem, et ideo non habet +contrarium extra se. Sicut etiam in mediis coloribus non invenitur +contrarietas, nisi quae est simplicium colorum, ex quibus +causantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Anger includes several passions, not indeed as a genus includes several species; but rather according to the inclusion of + cause and effect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35469" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35469] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ira includit multas passiones, non quidem sicut genus +species, sed magis secundum continentiam causae et effectus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q46_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q46_A2-p0.1">Q. 46. A. 2. Whether the object of anger is good or evil?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the object of anger is evil. For Gregory of Nyssa says [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.] that anger is "the + sword-bearer of desire," inasmuch, to wit, as it assails whatever obstacle stands in the way of desire. But an obstacle has + the character of evil. Therefore anger regards evil as its object. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35470" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35470] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod obiectum irae sit malum. Dicit enim +Gregorius Nyssenus quod ira est quasi armigera concupiscentiae, +inquantum scilicet impugnat id quod concupiscentiam impedit. Sed +omne impedimentum habet rationem mali. Ergo ira respicit malum +tanquam obiectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, anger and hatred agree in their effect, since each seeks to inflict harm on another. But hatred regards evil as + its object, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q29_A1" id="FS_Q46_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[29], A[1]</a>). Therefore anger does also. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35471" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35471] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ira et odium conveniunt in effectu, utriusque enim est inferre +nocumentum alteri. Sed odium respicit malum tanquam obiectum, ut +supra dictum est. Ergo etiam et ira.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, anger arises from sorrow; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 6) that "anger acts with sorrow." But evil + is the object of sorrow. Therefore it is also the object of anger. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35472" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35472] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +ira causatur ex tristitia, unde philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., +quod ira operatur cum tristitia. Sed tristitiae obiectum est malum. +Ergo et irae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q46_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "anger craves for revenge." But the desire for revenge is a desire for something good: + since revenge belongs to justice. Therefore the object of anger is good. + </p><p id="FS_Q46_A2-p6"> Moreover, anger is always accompanied by hope, wherefore it causes pleasure, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2). But the + object of hope and of pleasure is good. Therefore good is also the object of anger. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><div class="latin"><p title="I-II q. 46 a. 2 s. c. 1"><a name="35473" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35473] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 2 s. c. 1</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in II Confess., quod ira appetit +vindictam. Sed appetitus vindictae est appetitus boni, cum vindicta +ad iustitiam pertineat. Ergo obiectum irae est bonum.</p><p title="I-II q. 46 a. 2 s. c. 2"><a name="35474" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35474] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 2 s. c. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ira semper est cum spe, unde et delectationem causat, ut dicit +philosophus, in II Rhetoric. Sed spei et delectationis obiectum est +bonum. Ergo et irae.</p></div></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q46_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The movement of the appetitive power follows an act of the apprehensive power. Now the apprehensive power apprehends a thing + in two ways. First, by way of an incomplex object, as when we understand what a man is; secondly, by way of a complex object, + as when we understand that whiteness is in a man. Consequently in each of these ways the appetitive power can tend to both + good and evil: by way of a simple and incomplex object, when the appetite simply follows + and adheres to good, or recoils from evil: and such movements are desire, hope, pleasure, sorrow, and so forth: by way of + a complex object, as when the appetite is concerned with some good or evil being in, or being done to, another, either seeking + this or recoiling from it. This is evident in the case of love and hatred: for we love someone, in so far as we wish some + good to be in him; and we hate someone, in so far as we wish some evil to be in him. It is the same with anger; for when a + man + is angry, he wishes to be avenged on someone. Hence the movement of anger has a twofold tendency: viz. to vengeance itself, + which it desires and hopes for as being a good, wherefore it takes pleasure in it; and to the person on whom it seeks vengeance, + as to something contrary and hurtful, which bears the character of evil. + </p><p id="FS_Q46_A2-p8"> We must, however, observe a twofold difference in this respect, between anger on the one side, and hatred and love on the + other. The first difference is that anger always regards two objects: whereas love and hatred sometimes regard but one object, + as when a man is said to love wine or something of the kind, or to hate it. The second difference is, that both the objects + of love are good: since the lover wishes good to someone, as to something agreeable to himself: while both the + objects of hatred bear the character of evil: for the man who hates, wishes evil to someone, as to something disagreeable + to him. Whereas anger regards one object under the aspect of evil, viz. the noxious person, on whom it seeks to be avenged. + Consequently it is a passion somewhat made up of contrary passions. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 2 co."><a name="35475" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35475] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod motus appetitivae virtutis sequitur actum virtutis +apprehensivae. Vis autem apprehensiva dupliciter aliquid +apprehendit, uno modo, per modum incomplexi, sicut cum intelligimus +quid est homo; alio modo, per modum complexi, sicut cum +intelligimus album inesse homini. Unde utroque modo vis appetitiva +potest tendere in bonum et malum. Per modum quidem simplicis et +incomplexi, cum appetitus simpliciter sequitur vel inhaeret bono, +vel refugit malum. Et tales motus sunt desiderium et spes, +delectatio et tristitia, et alia huiusmodi. Per modum autem +complexi, sicut cum appetitus fertur in hoc quod aliquod bonum vel +malum insit vel fiat circa alterum, vel tendendo in hoc, vel +refugiendo ab hoc. Sicut manifeste apparet in amore et odio, amamus +enim aliquem, inquantum volumus ei inesse aliquod bonum; odimus +autem aliquem, inquantum volumus ei inesse aliquod malum. Et +similiter est in ira, quicumque enim irascitur, quaerit vindicari +de aliquo. Et sic motus irae tendit in duo, scilicet in ipsam +vindictam, quam appetit et sperat sicut quoddam bonum, unde et de +ipsa delectatur, tendit etiam in illum de quo quaerit vindictam, +sicut in contrarium et nocivum, quod pertinet ad rationem mali. Est +tamen duplex differentia attendenda circa hoc, irae ad odium et ad +amorem. Quarum prima est, quod ira semper respicit duo obiecta, +amor vero et odium quandoque respiciunt unum obiectum tantum, sicut +cum dicitur aliquis amare vinum vel aliquid huiusmodi, aut etiam +odire. Secunda est, quia utrumque obiectorum quod respicit amor, +est bonum, vult enim amans bonum alicui, tanquam sibi convenienti. +Utrumque vero eorum quae respicit odium, habet rationem mali, vult +enim odiens malum alicui, tamquam cuidam inconvenienti. Sed ira +respicit unum obiectum secundum rationem boni, scilicet vindictam, +quam appetit, et aliud secundum rationem mali, scilicet hominem +nocivum, de quo vult vindicari. Et ideo est passio quodammodo +composita ex contrariis passionibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to objections:</b> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 2 ad arg."><a name="35476" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35476] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 2 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc +patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q46_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q46_A3-p0.1">Q. 46. A. 3. Whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger is in the concupiscible faculty. For Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that anger is a kind of + "desire." But desire is in the concupiscible faculty. Therefore anger is too. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35477" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35477] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira sit in concupiscibili. Dicit enim +Tullius, in IV de Tusculanis quaest., quod ira est libido quaedam. +Sed libido est in concupiscibili. Ergo et ira.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says in his Rule, that "anger grows into hatred": and Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that "hatred + is inveterate anger." But hatred, like love, is a concupiscible passion. Therefore anger is in the concupiscible faculty. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35478" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35478] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in regula, quod ira crescit in odium. Et Tullius +dicit, in eodem libro, quod odium est ira inveterata. Sed odium est +in concupiscibili, sicut amor. Ergo ira est in concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.] say that "anger is made up + of sorrow and desire." Both of these are in the concupiscible faculty. Therefore anger is a concupiscible passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35479" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35479] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Damascenus et Gregorius Nyssenus dicunt quod ira componitur ex +tristitia et desiderio. Sed utrumque horum est in concupiscibili. +Ergo ira est in concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The concupiscible is distinct from the irascible faculty. If, therefore, anger were in the concupiscible power, the irascible + would not take its name from it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35480" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35480] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +vis concupiscibilis est alia ab irascibili. Si igitur ira esset in +concupiscibili, non denominaretur ab ea vis irascibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[23], A[1]), the passions of the irascible part differ from the passions of the concupiscible faculty, + in that the objects of the concupiscible passions are good and evil absolutely considered, whereas the objects of the irascible + passions are good and evil in a certain elevation or arduousness. Now it has been stated + <a href="#FS_Q46_A2" id="FS_Q46_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a> that anger regards two objects: viz. the vengeance that it seeks; and the person on whom it + seeks vengeance; and in respect of both, anger requires a certain arduousness: for the movement of anger does not arise, unless + there be some magnitude about both these objects; since "we make no ado about things that are naught or very minute," as the + Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 2). It is therefore evident that anger is not in the concupiscible, but in the irascible faculty. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 3 co."><a name="35481" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35481] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, passiones irascibilis in hoc +differunt a passionibus concupiscibilis, quod obiecta passionum +concupiscibilis sunt bonum et malum absolute; obiecta autem +passionum irascibilis sunt bonum et malum cum quadam elevatione vel +arduitate. Dictum est autem quod ira respicit duo obiecta, scilicet +vindictam, quam appetit; et eum de quo vindictam quaerit. Et circa +utrumque quandam arduitatem ira requirit, non enim insurgit motus +irae, nisi aliqua magnitudine circa utrumque existente; +<i>quaecumque enim nihil sunt, aut modica valde nullo digna +aestimamus</i>, ut dicit philosophus, in II Rhetoric. Unde +manifestum est quod ira non est in concupiscibili, sed in +irascibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Cicero gives the name of desire to any kind of craving for a future good, without discriminating between that which is arduous + and that which is not. Accordingly he reckons anger as a kind of desire, inasmuch as it is a desire of vengeance. In this + sense, however, desire is common to the irascible and concupiscible faculties. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35482" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35482] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Tullius libidinem nominat appetitum cuiuscumque +boni futuri non habita discretione ardui vel non ardui. Et secundum +hoc, ponit iram sub libidine, inquantum est appetitus vindictae. +Sic autem libido communis est ad irascibilem et +concupiscibilem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Anger is said to grow into hatred, not as though the same passion which at first was anger, afterwards becomes hatred by + becoming inveterate; but by a process of causality. For anger when it lasts a long time engenders hatred. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35483" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35483] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ira dicitur crescere in odium, non quod eadem numero +passio quae prius fuit ira, postmodum fiat odium per quandam +inveterationem, sed per quandam causalitatem. Ira enim, per +diuturnitatem, causat odium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Anger is said to be composed of sorrow and desire, not as though they were its parts, but because they are its causes: and + it has been said above ( + <a href="#FS_Q25_A2" id="FS_Q46_A3-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[25], A[2]</a>) that the concupiscible passions are the causes of the irascible passions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35484" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35484] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ira dicitur componi ex tristitia et desiderio, non +sicut ex partibus, sed sicut ex causis. Dictum est autem supra quod +passiones concupiscibilis sunt causae passionum irascibilis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q46_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q46_A4-p0.1">Q. 46. A. 4. Whether anger requires an act of reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger does not require an act of reason. For, since anger is a passion, it is in the sensitive appetite. + But the sensitive appetite follows an apprehension, not of reason, but of the sensitive faculty. Therefore anger does not + require an act of reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35485" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35485] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non sit cum ratione. Ira enim, cum +sit passio quaedam, est in appetitu sensitivo. Sed appetitus +sensitivus non sequitur rationis apprehensionem, sed sensitivae +partis. Ergo ira non est cum ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, dumb animals are devoid of reason: and yet they are seen to be angry. Therefore anger does not require an act of + reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35486" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35486] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +animalia bruta carent ratione. Et tamen in eis invenitur ira. Ergo +ira non est cum ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, drunkenness fetters the reason; whereas it is conducive to anger. Therefore anger does not require an act of reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35487" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35487] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +ebrietas ligat rationem. Adiuvat autem ad iram. Ergo ira non est +cum ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger listens to reason somewhat." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35488" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35488] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod <i>ira consequitur +rationem aliqualiter</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q46_A2" id="FS_Q46_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, anger is a desire for vengeance. Now vengeance implies a comparison between the punishment to be inflicted and the hurt + done; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger, as if it had drawn the inference that it ought to quarrel + with such a person, is therefore immediately exasperated." Now to compare and to draw an inference is an act of reason. Therefore + anger, in a fashion, requires an act of + reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 4 co."><a name="35489" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35489] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ira est appetitus vindictae. +Haec autem collationem importat poenae infligendae ad nocumentum +sibi illatum, unde, in VII Ethic., dicit philosophus quod +<i>syllogizans quoniam oportet talem oppugnare, irascitur +confestim</i>. Conferre autem et syllogizare est rationis. Et ideo +ira est quodammodo cum ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The movement of the appetitive power may follow an act of reason in two ways. In the first way, it follows the reason in + so far as the reason commands: and thus the will follows reason, wherefore it is called the rational appetite. In another + way, it follows reason in so far as the reason denounces, and thus anger follows reason. For the Philosopher says (De Problem. + xxviii, 3) that "anger follows reason, not in obedience to reason's command, but as a + result of reason's denouncing the injury." Because the sensitive appetite is subject to the reason, not immediately but through + the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35490" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35490] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod motus appetitivae virtutis potest esse cum +ratione dupliciter. Uno modo, cum ratione praecipiente, et sic +voluntas est cum ratione; unde et dicitur appetitus rationalis. +Alio modo, cum ratione denuntiante, et sic ira est cum ratione. +Dicit enim philosophus, in libro de Problemat., quod ira est cum +ratione, <i>non sicut praecipiente ratione, sed ut manifestante +iniuriam</i>. Appetitus enim sensitivus immediate rationi non +obedit, sed mediante voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Dumb animals have a natural instinct imparted to them by the Divine Reason, in virtue of which they are gifted with movements, + both internal and external, like unto rational movements, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q40_A3" id="FS_Q46_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[40], A[3]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35491" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35491] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod bruta animalia habent instinctum naturalem ex divina +ratione eis inditum, per quem habent motus interiores et exteriores +similes motibus rationis, sicut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated in Ethic. vii, 6, "anger listens somewhat to reason" in so far as reason denounces the injury inflicted, "but listens + not perfectly," because it does not observe the rule of reason as to the measure of vengeance. Anger, therefore, requires + an act of reason; and yet proves a hindrance to reason. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Problem. iii, 2,27) that whose + who are very drunk, so as to be incapable of the use of reason, do not get angry: + but those who are slightly drunk, do get angry, through being still able, though hampered, to form a judgment of reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35492" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35492] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in VII Ethic., ira audit aliqualiter +rationem, sicut nuntiantem quod iniuriatum est ei, sed non perfecte +audit, quia non observat regulam rationis in rependendo vindictam. +Ad iram ergo requiritur aliquis actus rationis; et additur +impedimentum rationis. Unde philosophus dicit, in libro de +Problemat., quod illi qui sunt multum ebrii, tanquam nihil habentes +de iudicio rationis, non irascuntur, sed quando sunt parum ebrii, +irascuntur, tanquam habentes iudicium rationis, sed impeditum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q46_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q46_A5-p0.1">Q. 46. A. 5. Whether anger is more natural than desire?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger is not more natural than desire. Because it is proper to man to be by nature a gentle animal. But + "gentleness is contrary to anger," as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 3). Therefore anger is no more natural than desire, + in fact it seems to be altogether unnatural to man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="35493" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35493] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non sit naturalior quam +concupiscentia. Proprium enim hominis dicitur quod sit animal +mansuetum natura. Sed mansuetudo opponitur irae, ut dicit +philosophus, in II Rhetoric. Ergo ira non est naturalior quam +concupiscentia, sed omnino videtur esse contra hominis naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, reason is contrasted with nature: since those things that act according to reason, are not said to act according + to nature. Now "anger requires an act of reason, but desire does not," as stated in Ethic. vii, 6. Therefore desire is more + natural than anger. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="35494" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35494] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ratio contra naturam dividitur, ea enim quae secundum rationem +agunt, non dicimus secundum naturam agere. Sed ira est cum ratione, +concupiscentia autem sine ratione, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Ergo +concupiscentia est naturalior quam ira.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, anger is a craving for vengeance: while desire is a craving for those things especially which are pleasant to the + touch, viz. for pleasures of the table and for sexual pleasures. But these things are more natural to man than vengeance. + Therefore desire is more natural than anger. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="35495" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35495] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +ira est appetitus vindictae, concupiscentia autem maxime est +appetitus delectabilium secundum tactum, scilicet ciborum et +venereorum. Haec autem sunt magis naturalia homini quam vindicta. +Ergo concupiscentia est naturalior quam ira.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger is more natural than desire." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 5 s. c."><a name="35496" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35496] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod <i>ira est +naturalior quam concupiscentia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q46_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> By "natural" we mean that which is caused by nature, as stated in Phys. ii, 1. Consequently the question as to whether a + particular passion is more or less natural cannot be decided without reference to the cause of that passion. Now the cause + of a passion, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q36_A2" id="FS_Q46_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[36], A[2]</a>), may be considered in two ways: first, on the part of the object; secondly, on the part of the subject. If then we consider + the cause of anger and of + desire, on the part of the object, thus desire, especially of pleasures of the table, and of sexual pleasures, is more natural + than anger; in so far as these pleasures are more natural to man than vengeance. + </p><p id="FS_Q46_A5-p7"> If, however, we consider the cause of anger on the part of the subject, thus anger, in a manner, is more natural; and, in + a manner, desire is more natural. Because the nature of an individual man may be considered either as to the generic, or as + to the specific nature, or again as to the particular temperament of the individual. If then we consider the generic nature, + i.e. the nature of this man considered as an animal; thus desire is more natural than anger; because it is from + this very generic nature that man is inclined to desire those things which tend to preserve in him the life both of the species + and of the individual. If, however, we consider the specific nature, i.e. the nature of this man as a rational being; then + anger is more natural to man than desire, in so far as anger follows reason more than desire does. Wherefore the Philosopher + says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "revenge" which pertains to anger "is more natural to man than meekness": for it is natural to + everything to rise up against things contrary and hurtful. And if we consider the nature of the individual, in respect of + his particular temperament, thus anger is more natural than desire; for the reason that anger is prone to ensue from the natural + tendency to anger, more than desire, or any other passion, is to ensue from a natural tendency to desire, which tendencies + result from a man's individual temperament. Because disposition to anger is due to a bilious temperament; and of all the + humors, the bile moves quickest; for it is like fire. Consequently he that is temperamentally disposed to anger is sooner + incensed with anger, than he that is temperamentally disposed to desire, is inflamed with desire: and for this reason the + Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that a disposition to anger is more liable to be transmitted from parent to child, than a + disposition to desire. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 5 co."><a name="35497" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35497] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod naturale dicitur illud quod causatur a natura, ut +patet in II Physic. Unde utrum aliqua passio sit magis vel minus +naturalis, considerari non potest nisi ex causa sua. Causa autem +passionis, ut supra dictum est, dupliciter accipi potest, uno modo, +ex parte obiecti; alio modo, ex parte subiecti. Si ergo +consideretur causa irae et concupiscentiae ex parte obiecti, sic +concupiscentia, et maxime ciborum et venereorum, naturalior est +quam ira, inquantum ista sunt magis naturalia quam vindicta. Si +autem consideretur causa irae ex parte subiecti, sic quodammodo ira +est naturalior, et quodammodo concupiscentia. Potest enim natura +alicuius hominis considerari vel secundum naturam generis, vel +secundum naturam speciei, vel secundum complexionem propriam +individui. Si igitur consideretur natura generis, quae est natura +huius hominis inquantum est animal; sic naturalior est +concupiscentia quam ira, quia ex ipsa natura communi habet homo +quandam inclinationem ad appetendum ea quae sunt conservativa +vitae, vel secundum speciem vel secundum individuum. Si autem +consideremus naturam hominis ex parte speciei, scilicet inquantum +est rationalis; sic ira est magis naturalis homini quam +concupiscentia, inquantum ira est cum ratione magis quam +concupiscentia. Unde philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod humanius +est punire, quod pertinet ad iram, quam mansuetum esse, unumquodque +enim naturaliter insurgit contra contraria et nociva. Si vero +consideretur natura huius individui secundum propriam complexionem, +sic ira naturalior est quam concupiscentia, quia scilicet +habitudinem naturalem ad irascendum, quae est ex complexione, magis +de facili sequitur ira, quam concupiscentia vel aliqua alia passio. +Est enim homo dispositus ad irascendum, secundum quod habet +cholericam complexionem, cholera autem, inter alios humores, citius +movetur; assimilatur enim igni. Et ideo magis est in promptu ut +ille qui est dispositus secundum naturalem complexionem ad iram, +irascatur; quam de eo qui est dispositus ad concupiscendum, quod +concupiscat. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod +ira magis traducitur a parentibus in filios, quam +concupiscentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We may consider in man both the natural temperament on the part of the body, and the reason. On the part of the bodily temperament, + a man, considered specifically, does not naturally excel others either in anger or in any other passion, on account of the + moderation of his temperament. But other animals, for as much as their temperament recedes from this moderation and approaches + to an extreme disposition, are naturally disposed to some excess of + passion, such as the lion in daring, the hound in anger, the hare in fear, and so forth. On the part of reason, however, it + is natural to man, both to be angry and to be gentle: in so far as reason somewhat causes anger, by denouncing the injury + which causes anger; and somewhat appeases anger, in so far as the angry man "does not listen perfectly to the command of reason," + as stated above (A[4], ad 3). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="35498" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35498] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod in homine considerari potest et naturalis +complexio ex parte corporis, quae est temperata; et ipsa ratio. Ex +parte igitur complexionis corporalis, naturaliter homo, secundum +suam speciem, est non habens superexcellentiam neque irae neque +alicuius alterius passionis, propter temperamentum suae +complexionis. Alia vero animalia, secundum quod recedunt ab hac +qualitate complexionis ad dispositionem alicuius complexionis +extremae, secundum hoc etiam naturaliter disponuntur ad excessum +alicuius passionis, ut leo ad audaciam, canis ad iram, lepus ad +timorem, et sic de aliis. Ex parte vero rationis, est naturale +homini et irasci et mansuetum esse, secundum quod ratio quodammodo +causat iram, inquantum nuntiat causam irae; et quodammodo sedat +iram, inquantum iratus non totaliter audit imperium rationis, ut +supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Reason itself belongs to the nature of man: wherefore from the very fact that anger requires an act of reason, it follows + that it is, in a manner, natural to man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="35499" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35499] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ipsa ratio pertinet ad naturam hominis. Unde ex hoc +ipso quod ira est cum ratione, sequitur quod secundum aliquem modum +sit homini naturalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument regards anger and desire on the part of the object. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="35500" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35500] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de ira et concupiscentia, ex +parte obiecti.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q46_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q46_A6-p0.1">Q. 46. A. 6. Whether anger is more grievous than hatred?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger is more grievous than hatred. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q46_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.27.4" target="asv">Prov. 27:4</a>) that "anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth." But hatred sometimes has mercy. Therefore anger is more grievous + than hatred. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="35501" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35501] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira sit gravior quam odium. Dicitur +enim Prov. XXVII, quod <i>ira non habet misericordiam, nec erumpens +furor</i>. Odium autem quandoque habet misericordiam. Ergo ira est +gravior quam odium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is worse to suffer evil and to grieve for it, than merely to suffer it. But when a man hates, he is contented + if the object of his hatred suffer evil: whereas the angry man is not satisfied unless the object of his anger know it and + be aggrieved thereby, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4). Therefore, anger is more grievous than hatred. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="35502" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35502] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +maius est pati malum et de malo dolere, quam simpliciter pati. Sed +illi qui habet aliquem odio, sufficit quod ille quem odit, patiatur +malum, irato autem non sufficit, sed quaerit quod cognoscat illud +et de illo doleat, ut dicit philosophus, in II Rhetoric. Ergo ira +est gravior quam odium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a thing seems to be so much the more firm according as more things concur to set it up: thus a habit is all the + more settled through being caused by several acts. But anger is caused by the concurrence of several passions, as stated above + + <a href="#FS_Q46_A1" id="FS_Q46_A6-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>: whereas hatred is not. Therefore anger is more settled and more grievous than hatred. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="35503" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35503] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quanto ad constitutionem alicuius plura concurrunt, tanto videtur +esse stabilius, sicut habitus permanentior est qui ex pluribus +actibus causatur. Sed ira causatur ex concursu plurium passionum, +ut supra dictum est, non autem odium. Ergo ira est stabilior et +gravior quam odium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine, in his Rule, compares hatred to "a beam," but anger to "a mote." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 6 s. c."><a name="35504" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35504] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus, in regula, odium comparat trabi, iram vero +festucae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The species and nature of a passion are taken from its object. Now the object of anger is the same in substance as the object + of hatred; since, just as the hater wishes evil to him whom he hates, so does the angry man wish evil to him with whom he + is angry. But there is a difference of aspect: for the hater wishes evil to his enemy, as evil, whereas the angry man wishes + evil to him with whom he is angry, not as evil but in so far as it has an aspect of good, + that is, in so far as he reckons it as just, since it is a means of vengeance. Wherefore also it has been said above + <a href="#FS_Q46_A2" id="FS_Q46_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a> that hatred implies application of evil to evil, whereas anger denotes application of good to evil. Now it is evident that + to seek evil under the aspect of justice, is a lesser evil, than simply to seek evil to someone. Because to wish evil to someone + under the aspect of justice, may be according to the virtue of justice, if it be in conformity + with the order of reason; and anger fails only in this, that it does not obey the precept of reason in taking vengeance. Consequently + it is evident that hatred is far worse and graver than anger. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 6 co."><a name="35505" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35505] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod species passionis, et ratio ipsius, ex obiecto +pensatur. Est autem obiectum irae et odii idem subiecto, nam sicut +odiens appetit malum ei quem odit, ita iratus ei contra quem +irascitur. Sed non eadem ratione, sed odiens appetit malum inimici, +inquantum est malum; iratus autem appetit malum eius contra quem +irascitur, non inquantum est malum, sed inquantum habet quandam +rationem boni, scilicet prout aestimat illud esse iustum, inquantum +est vindicativum. Unde etiam supra dictum est quod odium est per +applicationem mali ad malum; ira autem per applicationem boni ad +malum. Manifestum est autem quod appetere malum sub ratione iusti, +minus habet de ratione mali quam velle malum alicuius simpliciter. +Velle enim malum alicuius sub ratione iusti, potest esse etiam +secundum virtutem iustitiae, si praecepto rationis obtemperetur, +sed ira in hoc solum deficit, quod non obedit rationis praecepto in +ulciscendo. Unde manifestum est quod odium est multo deterius et +gravius quam ira.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q46_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In anger and hatred two points may be considered: namely, the thing desired, and the intensity of the desire. As to the thing + desired, anger has more mercy than hatred has. For since hatred desires another's evil for evil's sake, it is satisfied with + no particular measure of evil: because those things that are desired for their own sake, are desired without measure, as the + Philosopher states (Polit. i, 3), instancing a miser with regard to riches. + Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q46_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.12.16" target="asv">Ecclus. 12:16</a>): "An enemy . . . if he find an opportunity, will not be satisfied with blood." Anger, on the other hand, seeks evil only + under the aspect of a just means of vengeance. Consequently when the evil inflicted goes beyond the measure of justice according + to the estimate of the angry man, then he has mercy. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "the angry man is appeased + if many evils befall, whereas the hater is never + appeased." + </p><p id="FS_Q46_A6-p8"> As to the intensity of the desire, anger excludes mercy more than hatred does; because the movement of anger is more impetuous, + through the heating of the bile. Hence the passage quoted continues: "Who can bear the violence of one provoked?" + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="35506" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35506] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod in ira et odio duo possunt considerari, scilicet +ipsum quod desideratur, et intensio desiderii. Quantum igitur ad id +quod desideratur, ira habet magis misericordiam quam odium. Quia +enim odium appetit malum alterius secundum se, nulla mensura mali +satiatur, ea enim quae secundum se appetuntur, sine mensura +appetuntur, ut philosophus dicit I Politic., sicut avarus divitias. +Unde dicitur Eccli. XII, <i>inimicus si invenerit tempus, non +satiabitur sanguine</i>. Sed ira non appetit malum nisi sub ratione +iusti vindicativi. Unde quando malum illatum excedit mensuram +iustitiae, secundum aestimationem irascentis, tunc miseretur. Unde +philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>iratus, si fiant multa, +miserebitur, odiens autem pro nullo</i>. Quantum vero ad +intensionem desiderii, ira magis excludit misericordiam quam odium, +quia motus irae est impetuosior, propter cholerae inflammationem. +Unde statim subditur, <i>impetum concitati spiritus ferre quis +poterit?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above, an angry man wishes evil to someone, in so far as this evil is a means of just vengeance. Now vengeance + is wrought by the infliction of a punishment: and the nature of punishment consists in being contrary to the will, painful, + and inflicted for some fault. Consequently an angry man desires this, that the person whom he is hurting, may feel it and + be in pain, and know that this has befallen him on account of the harm he has done the + other. The hater, on the other hand, cares not for all this, since he desires another's evil as such. It is not true, however, + that an evil is worse through giving pain: because "injustice and imprudence, although evil," yet, being voluntary, "do not + grieve those in whom they are," as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 4). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="35507" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35507] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, iratus appetit malum alicuius, +inquantum habet rationem iusti vindicativi. Vindicta autem fit per +illationem poenae. Est autem de ratione poenae quod sit contraria +voluntati, et quod sit afflictiva, et quod pro aliqua culpa +inferatur. Et ideo iratus hoc appetit, ut ille cui nocumentum +infert, percipiat, et doleat, et quod cognoscat propter iniuriam +illatam sibi hoc provenire. Sed odiens de hoc nihil curat, quia +appetit malum alterius inquantum huiusmodi. Non est autem verum +quod id de quo quis tristatur, sit peius, iniustitia enim et +imprudentia, cum sint mala, quia tamen sunt voluntaria, non +contristant eos quibus insunt, ut dicit philosophus, in II +Rhetoric.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which proceeds from several causes, is more settled when these causes are of one kind: but it may be that one cause + prevails over many others. Now hatred ensues from a more lasting cause than anger does. Because anger arises from an emotion + of the soul due to the wrong inflicted; whereas hatred ensues from a disposition in a man, by reason of which he considers + that which he hates to be contrary and hurtful to him. Consequently, as passion is + more transitory than disposition or habit, so anger is less lasting than hatred; although hatred itself is a passion ensuing + from this disposition. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "hatred is more incurable than anger." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="35508" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35508] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod id quod ex pluribus causis causatur, tunc est +stabilius, quando causae accipiuntur unius rationis, sed una causa +potest praevalere multis aliis. Odium autem provenit ex +permanentiori causa quam ira. Nam ira provenit ex aliqua commotione +animi propter laesionem illatam, sed odium procedit ex aliqua +dispositione hominis, secundum quam reputat sibi contrarium et +nocivum id quod odit. Et ideo sicut passio citius transit quam +dispositio vel habitus, ita ira citius transit quam odium; quamvis +etiam odium sit passio ex tali dispositione proveniens. Et propter +hoc philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>odium est magis +insanabile quam ira</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q46_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q46_A7-p0.1">Q. 46. A. 7. Whether anger is only towards those to whom one has an obligation of justice?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger is not only towards those to whom one has an obligation of justice. For there is no justice between + man and irrational beings. And yet sometimes one is angry with irrational beings; thus, out of anger, a writer throws away + his pen, or a rider strikes his horse. Therefore anger is not only towards those to whom one has an obligation of justice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="35509" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35509] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non solum sit ad illos ad quos est +iustitia. Non enim est iustitia hominis ad res irrationales. Sed +tamen homo quandoque irascitur rebus irrationalibus, puta cum +scriptor ex ira proiicit pennam, vel eques percutit equum. Ergo ira +non solum est ad illos ad quos est iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "there is no justice towards oneself . . . nor is there justice towards one's own" (Ethic. v, 6). But sometimes + a man is angry with himself; for instance, a penitent, on account of his sin; hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q46_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.4.5" target="asv">Ps. 4:5</a>): "Be ye angry and sin not." Therefore anger is not only towards those with whom one has a relation of justice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="35510" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35510] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> +<i>Praeterea, non est iustitia hominis ad seipsum, nec ad ea quae +sui ipsius sunt</i>, ut dicitur in V Ethic. Sed homo quandoque sibi +ipsi irascitur, sicut poenitens propter peccatum, unde dicitur in +Psalmo IV, <i>irascimini, et nolite peccare</i>. Ergo ira non solum +est ad quos est iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, justice and injustice can be of one man towards an entire class, or a whole community: for instance, when the state + injures an individual. But anger is not towards a class but only towards an individual, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, + 4). Therefore properly speaking, anger is not towards those with whom one is in relation of justice or injustice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="35511" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35511] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +iustitia et iniustitia potest esse alicuius ad totum aliquod genus, +vel ad totam aliquam communitatem, puta cum civitas aliquem laesit. +Sed ira non est ad aliquod genus, sed solum ad aliquod singularium, +ut dicit philosophus, in II Rhetoric. Ergo ira non proprie est ad +quos est iustitia et iniustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A7-p5"> The contrary, however, may be gathered from the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 2,3).</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 7 s. c."><a name="35512" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35512] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed +contrarium accipi potest a philosopho in II Rhetoric.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q46_A6" id="FS_Q46_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[6])</a>, anger desires evil as being a means of just vengeance. Consequently, anger is towards those to whom we are just or unjust: + since vengeance is an act of justice, and wrong-doing is an act of injustice. Therefore both on the part of the cause, viz. + the harm done by another, and on the part of the vengeance sought by the angry man, it is evident that anger concerns those + to whom one is just or unjust. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 7 co."><a name="35513" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35513] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ira appetit malum, inquantum +habet rationem iusti vindicativi. Et ideo ad eosdem est ira, ad +quos est iustitia et iniustitia. Nam inferre vindictam ad iustitiam +pertinet, laedere autem aliquem pertinet ad iniustitiam. Unde tam +ex parte causae, quae est laesio illata ab altero; quam etiam ex +parte vindictae, quam appetit iratus; manifestum est quod ad eosdem +pertinet ira, ad quos iustitia et iniustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (A[4], ad 2), anger, though it follows an act of reason, can nevertheless be in dumb animals that are devoid + of reason, in so far as through their natural instinct they are moved by their imagination to something like rational action. + Since then in man there is both reason and imagination, the movement of anger can be aroused in man in two ways. First, when + only his imagination denounces the injury: and, in this way, man is aroused to + a movement of anger even against irrational and inanimate beings, which movement is like that which occurs in animals against + anything that injures them. Secondly, by the reason denouncing the injury: and thus, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, + 3), "it is impossible to be angry with insensible things, or with the dead": both because they feel no pain, which is, above + all, what the angry man seeks in those with whom he is angry: and because there is no question of vengeance on them, since + they can do us no harm. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="35514" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35514] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ira, quamvis sit cum +ratione, potest tamen etiam esse in brutis animalibus, quae ratione +carent, inquantum naturali instinctu per imaginationem moventur ad +aliquid simile operibus rationis. Sic igitur, cum in homine sit et +ratio et imaginatio, dupliciter in homine potest motus irae +insurgere. Uno modo, ex sola imaginatione nuntiante laesionem. Et +sic insurgit aliquis motus irae etiam ad res irrationales et +inanimatas, secundum similitudinem illius motus qui est in +animalibus contra quodlibet nocivum. Alio modo, ex ratione +nuntiante laesionem. Et sic, ut philosophus dicit II Rhetoric., +<i>nullo modo potest esse ira ad res insensibiles, neque ad +mortuos</i>. Tum quia non dolent, quod maxime quaerunt irati in eis +quibus irascuntur. Tum etiam quia non est ad eos vindicta, cum +eorum non sit iniuriam facere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 11), "metaphorically speaking there is a certain justice and injustice between a man and + himself," in so far as the reason rules the irascible and concupiscible parts of the soul. And in this sense a man is said + to be avenged on himself, and consequently, to be angry with himself. But properly, and in accordance with the nature of things, + a man is never angry with himself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="35515" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35515] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in V Ethic., <i>quaedam +metaphorica iustitia et iniustitia est hominis ad seipsum</i>, +inquantum scilicet ratio regit irascibilem et concupiscibilem. Et +secundum hoc etiam homo dicitur de seipso vindictam facere, et per +consequens sibi ipsi irasci. Proprie autem et per se, non contingit +aliquem sibi ipsi irasci.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 4) assigns as one difference between hatred and anger, that "hatred may be felt towards a class, + as we hate the entire class of thieves; whereas anger is directed only towards an individual." The reason is that hatred arises + from our considering a quality as disagreeing with our disposition; and this may refer to a thing in general or in particular. + Anger, on the other hand, ensues from someone having injured us by his + action. Now all actions are the deeds of individuals: and consequently anger is always pointed at an individual. When the + whole state hurts us, the whole state is reckoned as one individual [*Cf. + <a href="#FS_Q29_A6" id="FS_Q46_A7-p9.1" shape="rect"> Q[29], A[6]</a>]. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="35516" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35516] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod philosophus, in II Rhetoric., assignat unam +differentiam inter odium et iram, quod <i>odium potest esse ad +aliquod genus, sicut habemus odio omne latronum genus, sed ira non +est nisi ad aliquod singulare</i>. Cuius ratio est, quia odium +causatur ex hoc quod qualitas alicuius rei apprehenditur ut +dissonans nostrae dispositioni, et hoc potest esse vel in +universali, vel in particulari. Sed ira causatur ex hoc quod +aliquis nos laesit per suum actum. Actus autem omnes sunt +singularium. Et ideo ira semper est circa aliquod singulare. Cum +autem tota civitas nos laeserit, tota civitas computatur sicut unum +singulare.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q46_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q46_A8-p0.1">Q. 46. A. 8. Whether the species of anger are suitably assigned?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) unsuitably assigns three species of anger---"wrath," "ill-will" and "rancor." + For no genus derives its specific differences from accidents. But these three are diversified in respect of an accident: because + "the beginning of the movement of anger is called wrath {cholos}, if anger continue it is called ill-will {menis}; while rancor + {kotos} is anger waiting for an opportunity of vengeance." Therefore these + are not different species of anger. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="35517" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35517] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod Damascenus inconvenienter assignet +tres species irae, scilicet fel, maniam et furorem. Nullius enim +generis species diversificantur secundum aliquod accidens. Sed ista +tria diversificantur secundum aliquod accidens, <i>principium enim +motus irae fel vocatur; ira autem permanens dicitur mania; furor +autem est ira observans tempus in vindictam</i>. Ergo non sunt +diversae species irae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that "excandescentia [irascibility] is what the Greeks call {thymosis}, and + is a kind of anger that arises and subsides intermittently"; while according to Damascene {thymosis}, is the same as the Greek + {kotos} [rancor]. Therefore {kotos} does not bide its time for taking vengeance, but in course of time spends itself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="35518" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35518] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Tullius, in IV de Tusculanis quaest., dicit quod <i>excandescentia +Graece dicitur thymosis; et est ira modo nascens et modo +desistens</i>. Thymosis autem secundum Damascenum, est idem quod +furor. Non ergo furor tempus quaerit ad vindictam, sed tempore +deficit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory (Moral. xxi, 4) gives three degrees of anger, namely, "anger without utterance, anger with utterance, and + anger with perfection of speech," corresponding to the three degrees mentioned by Our Lord ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q46_A8-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.22" target="asv">Mat. 5:22</a>): "Whosoever is angry with his brother" [thus implying "anger without utterance"], and then, "whosoever shall say to his + brother, 'Raca'" [implying "anger with utterance yet without full expression"], and lastly, + "whosoever shall say 'Thou fool'" [where we have "perfection of speech"]. Therefore Damascene's division is imperfect, since + it takes no account of utterance. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="35519" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35519] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Gregorius, XXI Moral., ponit tres gradus irae, scilicet <i>iram +sine voce, et iram cum voce, et iram cum verbo expresso</i>, +secundum illa tria quae dominus ponit Matth. V, qui irascitur +fratri suo, ubi tangitur ira sine voce; et postea subdit, qui +dixerit fratri suo, raca, ubi tangitur ira cum voce, sed necdum +pleno verbo formata; et postea dicit, qui autem dixerit fratri suo, +fatue, ubi expletur vox perfectione sermonis. Ergo insufficienter +divisit Damascenus iram, nihil ponens ex parte vocis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.]. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 8 s. c."><a name="35520" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35520] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est auctoritas Damasceni et Gregorii Nysseni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The species of anger given by Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa are taken from those things which give increase to anger. This + happens in three ways. First from facility of the movement itself, and he calls this kind of anger {cholos} [bile] because + it quickly aroused. Secondly, on the part of the grief that causes anger, and which dwells some time in the memory; this belongs + to {menis} [ill-will] which is derived from {menein} [to dwell]. Thirdly, on the part + of that which the angry man seeks, viz. vengeance; and this pertains to {kotos} [rancor] which never rests until it is avenged + [* + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q46_A8-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.31" target="asv">Eph. 4:31</a>: "Let all bitterness and anger and indignation . . . be put away from you."]. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) calls + some angry persons {akrocholoi} [choleric], because they are easily angered; some he calls {pikroi} [bitter], because they + retain their anger for a long time; and some he calls {chalepoi} [ill-tempered], because they + never rest until they have retaliated [*Cf. + <a href="SS_iii.html#SS_Q158_A5" id="FS_Q46_A8-p6.2" shape="rect">SS, Q[158], A[5]</a>]. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 8 co."><a name="35521" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35521] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod tres species irae quas Damascenus ponit, et etiam +Gregorius Nyssenus, sumuntur secundum ea quae dant irae aliquod +augmentum. Quod quidem contingit tripliciter. Uno modo, ex +facilitate ipsius motus, et talem iram vocat fel, quia cito +accenditur. Alio modo, ex parte tristitiae causantis iram, quae diu +in memoria manet, et haec pertinet ad maniam, quae a manendo +dicitur. Tertio, ex parte eius quod iratus appetit, scilicet +vindictae, et haec pertinet ad furorem, qui nunquam quiescit donec +puniat. Unde philosophus, in IV Ethic., quosdam irascentium vocat +acutos, quia cito irascuntur; quosdam amaros, quia diu retinent +iram; quosdam difficiles, quia nunquam quiescunt nisi puniant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A8-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All those things which give anger some kind of perfection are not altogether accidental to anger; and consequently nothing + prevents them from causing a certain specific difference thereof. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="35522" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35522] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod omnia illa per quae ira recipit aliquam +perfectionem, non omnino per accidens se habent ad iram. Et ideo +nihil prohibet secundum ea species irae assignari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Irascibility, which Cicero mentions, seems to pertain to the first species of anger, which consists in a certain quickness + of temper, rather than to rancor [furor]. And there is no reason why the Greek {thymosis}, which is denoted by the Latin "furor," + should not signify both quickness to anger, and firmness of purpose in being avenged. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="35523" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35523] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod excandescentia, quam Tullius ponit, magis videtur +pertinere ad primam speciem irae, quae perficitur secundum +velocitatem irae, quam ad furorem. Nihil autem prohibet ut thymosis +Graece, quod Latine furor dicitur, utrumque importet, et +velocitatem ad irascendum et firmitatem propositi ad puniendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These degrees are distinguished according to various effects of anger; and not according to degrees of perfection in the + very movement of anger. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="35524" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35524] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod gradus illi irae distinguuntur secundum effectum +irae, non autem secundum diversam perfectionem ipsius motus +irae.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q47" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q47-p0.1">Q. 47. OF THE CAUSE THAT PROVOKES ANGER, AND OF THE REMEDIES OF ANGER (FOUR ARTICLES) [*There is no further mention of these remedies + in the text, except in A[4].] + </h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q47-p2"> We must now consider the cause that provokes anger, and its remedies. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q47-p3"><a href="#FS_Q47_A1"> (1) Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the one who is angry?</a></p><p id="FS_Q47-p4"><a href="#FS_Q47_A2"> (2) Whether slight or contempt is the sole motive of anger?</a></p><p id="FS_Q47-p5"><a href="#FS_Q47_A3"> (3) Of the cause of anger on the part of the angry person;</a></p><p id="FS_Q47-p6"><a href="#FS_Q47_A4"> (4) Of the cause of anger on the part of the person with whom one is angry.</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 pr."><a name="35525" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35525] +Iª-IIae q. 47 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causa +effectiva irae, et de remediis eius. Et circa hoc quaeruntur +quatuor. Primo, utrum semper motivum irae sit aliquid factum contra +eum qui irascitur. Secundo, utrum sola parvipensio vel despectio +sit motivum irae. Tertio, de causa irae ex parte irascentis. +Quarto, de causa irae ex parte eius contra quem aliquis +irascitur.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q47_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q47_A1-p0.1">Q. 47. A. 1. Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the one who is angry?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the motive of anger is not always something done against the one who is angry. Because man, by sinning, + can do nothing against God; since it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q47_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.35.6" target="asv">Job 35:6</a>): "If thy iniquities be multiplied, what shalt thou do against Him?" And yet God is spoken of as being angry with man on + account of sin, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q47_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.105.40" target="asv"> Ps. 105:40</a>: "The Lord was exceedingly angry with His people." Therefore it is not always on + account of something done against him, that a man is angry. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35526" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35526] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non semper aliquis irascatur propter +aliquid contra se factum. Homo enim, peccando, nihil contra Deum +facere potest, dicitur enim Iob XXXV, <i>si multiplicatae fuerint +iniquitates tuae, quid facies contra illum?</i> Dicitur tamen Deus +irasci contra homines propter peccata; secundum illud Psalmi CV, +<i>iratus est furore dominus in populum suum</i>. Ergo non semper +aliquis irascitur propter aliquid contra se factum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, anger is a desire for vengeance. But one may desire vengeance for things done against others. Therefore we are not + always angry on account of something done against us. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35527" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35527] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ira est appetitus vindictae. Sed aliquis appetit vindictam facere +etiam de his quae contra alios fiunt. Ergo non semper motivum irae +est aliquid contra nos factum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) man is angry especially with those "who despise what he takes a great interest + in; thus men who study philosophy are angry with those who despise philosophy," and so forth. But contempt of philosophy does + not harm the philosopher. Therefore it is not always a harm done to us that makes us angry. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35528" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35528] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., homines irascuntur +praecipue contra eos qui despiciunt <i>ea circa quae ipsi maxime +student, sicut qui student in philosophia, irascuntur contra eos +qui philosophiam despiciunt</i>, et simile est in aliis. Sed +despicere philosophiam non est nocere ipsi studenti. Non ergo +semper irascimur propter id quod contra nos fit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, he that holds his tongue when another insults him, provokes him to greater anger, as Chrysostom observes (Hom. xxii, + in Ep. ad Rom.). But by holding his tongue he does the other no harm. Therefore a man is not always provoked to anger by something + done against him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="35529" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35529] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +ille qui tacet contra contumeliantem, magis ipsum ad iram provocat, +ut dicit Chrysostomus. Sed in hoc contra ipsum nihil agit, quod +tacet. Ergo non semper ira alicuius provocatur propter aliquid quod +contra ipsum fit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is always due to something done to oneself: whereas hatred may arise without + anything being done to us, for we hate a man simply because we think him such." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35530" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35530] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>ira fit semper +ex his quae ad seipsum. Inimicitia autem et sine his quae ad ipsum, +si enim putemus talem esse odimus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q46_A6" id="FS_Q47_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[46], A[6]</a>), anger is the desire to hurt another for the purpose of just vengeance. Now unless some injury has been done, there is no + question of vengeance: nor does any injury provoke one to vengeance, but only that which is done to the person who seeks vengeance: + for just as everything naturally seeks its own good, so does it naturally repel its own evil. But injury done by anyone does + not affect a man unless in + some way it be something done against him. Consequently the motive of a man's anger is always something done against him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 1 co."><a name="35531" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35531] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ira est appetitus nocendi +alteri sub ratione iusti vindicativi. Vindicta autem locum non +habet nisi ubi praecessit iniuria. Nec iniuria omnis ad vindictam +provocat, sed illa sola quae ad eum pertinet qui appetit vindictam, +sicut enim unumquodque naturaliter appetit proprium bonum, ita +etiam naturaliter repellit proprium malum. Iniuria autem ab aliquo +facta non pertinet ad aliquem, nisi aliquid fecerit quod aliquo +modo sit contra ipsum. Unde sequitur quod motivum irae alicuius +semper sit aliquid contra ipsum factum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We speak of anger in God, not as of a passion of the soul but as of judgment of justice, inasmuch as He wills to take vengeance + on sin. Because the sinner, by sinning, cannot do God any actual harm: but so far as he himself is concerned, he acts against + God in two ways. First, in so far as he despises God in His commandments. Secondly, in so far as he harms himself or another; + which injury redounds to God, inasmuch as the person injured is an object + of God's providence and protection. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35532" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35532] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ira non dicitur in Deo secundum passionem animi, +sed secundum iudicium iustitiae, prout vult vindictam facere de +peccato. Peccator enim, peccando, Deo nihil nocere effective +potest, tamen ex parte sua dupliciter contra Deum agit. Primo +quidem, inquantum eum in suis mandatis contemnit. Secundo, +inquantum nocumentum aliquod infert alicui, vel sibi vel alteri, +quod ad Deum pertinet, prout ille cui nocumentum infertur, sub Dei +providentia et tutela continetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If we are angry with those who harm others, and seek to be avenged on them, it is because those who are injured belong in + some way to us: either by some kinship or friendship, or at least because of the nature we have in common. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35533" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35533] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod irascimur contra illos qui aliis nocent et vindictam +appetimus, inquantum illi quibus nocetur, aliquo modo ad nos +pertinent, vel per aliquam affinitatem, vel per amicitiam, vel +saltem per communionem naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When we take a very great interest in a thing, we look upon it as our own good; so that if anyone despise it, it seems as + though we ourselves were despised and injured. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35534" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35534] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod id in quo maxime studemus, reputamus esse bonum +nostrum. Et ideo, cum illud despicitur, reputamus nos quoque +despici, et arbitramur nos laesos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Silence provokes the insulter to anger when he thinks it is due to contempt, as though his anger were slighted: and a slight + is an action. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="35535" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35535] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod tunc aliquis tacens ad iram provocat iniuriantem, +quando videtur ex contemptu tacere, quasi parvipendat alterius +iram. Ipsa autem parvipensio quidam actus est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q47_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q47_A2-p0.1">Q. 47. A. 2. Whether the sole motive of anger is slight or contempt?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that slight or contempt is not the sole motive of anger. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that we + are angry "when we suffer, or think that we are suffering, an injury." But one may suffer an injury without being despised + or slighted. Therefore a slight is not the only motive of anger. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35536" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35536] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sola parvipensio vel despectio sit +motivum irae. Dicit enim Damascenus quod <i>iniuriam passi, vel +aestimantes pati, irascimur</i>. Sed homo potest iniuriam pati +etiam absque despectu vel parvipensione. Ergo non sola parvipensio +est irae motivum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, desire for honor and grief for a slight belong to the same subject. But dumb animals do not desire honor. Therefore + they are not grieved by being slighted. And yet "they are roused to anger, when wounded," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. + iii, 8). Therefore a slight is not the sole motive of anger. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35537" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35537] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +eiusdem est appetere honorem, et contristari de parvipensione. Sed +bruta animalia non appetunt honorem. Ergo non contristantur de +parvipensione. Et tamen in eis provocatur ira propter hoc quod +vulnerantur, ut dicit philosophus, in III Ethic. Ergo non sola +parvipensio videtur esse motivum irae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 2) gives many other causes of anger, for instance, "being forgotten by others; that others + should rejoice in our misfortunes; that they should make known our evils; being hindered from doing as we like." Therefore + being slighted is not the only motive for being angry. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35538" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35538] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus, in II Rhetoric., ponit multas alias causas irae, puta +<i>oblivionem, et exultationem in infortuniis, denuntiationem +malorum, impedimentum consequendae propriae voluntatis</i>. Non +ergo sola parvipensio est provocativum irae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that anger is "a desire, with sorrow, for vengeance, on account of a seeming slight done + unbecomingly." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35539" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35539] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>ira est +appetitus cum tristitia punitionis, propter apparentem +parvipensionem non convenienter factam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q47_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> All the causes of anger are reduced to slight. For slight is of three kinds, as stated in Rhet. ii, 2, viz. "contempt," "despiteful + treatment," i.e. hindering one from doing one's will, and "insolence": and all motives of anger are reduced to these three. + Two reasons may be assigned for this. First, because anger seeks another's hurt as being a means of just vengeance: wherefore + it seeks vengeance in so far as it seems just. Now just vengeance is taken only + for that which is done unjustly; hence that which provokes anger is always something considered in the light of an injustice. + Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "men are not angry---if they think they have wronged some one and are suffering + justly on that account; because there is no anger at what is just." Now injury is done to another in three ways: namely, through + ignorance, through passion, and through choice. Then, most of all, a man does an injustice, when he does an injury + from choice, on purpose, or from deliberate malice, as stated in Ethic. v, 8. Wherefore we are most of all angry with those + who, in our opinion, have hurt us on purpose. For if we think that some one has done us an injury through ignorance or through + passion, either we are not angry with them at all, or very much less: since to do anything through ignorance or through passion + takes away from the notion of injury, and to a certain extent calls for mercy and forgiveness. Those, on the other hand, + who do an injury on purpose, seem to sin from contempt; wherefore we are angry with them most of all. Hence the Philosopher + says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "we are either not angry at all, or not very angry with those who have acted through anger, because + they do not seem to have acted slightingly." + </p><p id="FS_Q47_A2-p7"> The second reason is because a slight is opposed to a man's excellence: because "men think little of things that are not + worth much ado" (Rhet. ii, 2). Now we seek for some kind of excellence from all our goods. Consequently whatever injury is + inflicted on us, in so far as it is derogatory to our excellence, seems to savor of a slight. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 2 co."><a name="35540" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35540] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod omnes causae irae reducuntur ad parvipensionem. Sunt +enim tres species parvipensionis, ut dicitur in II Rhetoric., +scilicet despectus, epereasmus, idest impedimentum voluntatis +implendae, et contumeliatio, et ad haec tria omnia motiva irae +reducuntur. Cuius ratio potest accipi duplex. Prima est, quia ira +appetit nocumentum alterius, inquantum habet rationem iusti +vindicativi, et ideo intantum quaerit vindictam, inquantum videtur +esse iusta. Iusta autem vindicta non fit nisi de eo quod est +iniuste factum, et ideo provocativum ad iram semper est aliquid sub +ratione iniusti. Unde dicit philosophus, in II Rhetoric., quod +<i>si homines putaverint eos qui laeserunt, esse iuste passos, non +irascuntur, non enim fit ira ad iustum</i>. Contingit autem +tripliciter nocumentum alicui inferri, scilicet ex ignorantia, ex +passione, et ex electione. Tunc autem aliquis maxime iniustum +facit, quando ex electione vel industria, vel ex certa malitia +nocumentum infert, ut dicitur in V Ethic. Et ideo maxime irascimur +contra illos quos putamus ex industria nobis nocuisse. Si enim +putemus aliquos vel per ignorantiam, vel ex passione nobis +intulisse iniuriam, vel non irascimur contra eos, vel multo minus, +agere enim aliquid ex ignorantia vel ex passione, diminuit rationem +iniuriae, et est quodammodo provocativum misericordiae et veniae. +Illi autem qui ex industria nocumentum inferunt, ex contemptu +peccare videntur, et ideo contra eos maxime irascimur. Unde +philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>his qui propter iram +aliquid fecerunt, aut non irascimur, aut minus irascimur, non enim +propter parvipensionem videntur egisse</i>. Secunda ratio est, quia +parvipensio excellentiae hominis opponitur, quae enim homines +putant nullo digna esse, parvipendunt, ut dicitur in II Rhetoric. +Ex omnibus autem bonis nostris aliquam excellentiam quaerimus. Et +ideo quodcumque nocumentum nobis inferatur, inquantum excellentiae +derogat, videtur ad parvipensionem pertinere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Any other cause, besides contempt, through which a man suffers an injury, takes away from the notion of injury: contempt + or slight alone adds to the motive of anger, and consequently is of itself the cause of anger. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35541" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35541] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ex quacumque alia causa aliquis iniuriam +patiatur quam ex contemptu, illa causa minuit rationem iniuriae. +Sed solus contemptus, vel parvipensio, rationem irae auget. Et ideo +est per se causa irascendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although a dumb animal does not seek honor as such, yet it naturally seeks a certain superiority, and is angry with anything + derogatory thereto. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35542" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35542] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, licet animal brutum non appetat honorem sub ratione +honoris, appetit tamen naturaliter quandam excellentiam, et +irascitur contra ea quae illi excellentiae derogant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Each of those causes amounts to some kind of slight. Thus forgetfulness is a clear sign of slight esteem, for the more we + think of a thing the more is it fixed in our memory. Again if a man does not hesitate by his remarks to give pain to another, + this seems to show that he thinks little of him: and those too who show signs of hilarity when another is in misfortune, seem + to care little about his good or evil. Again he that hinders another from + carrying out his will, without deriving thereby any profit to himself, seems not to care much for his friendship. Consequently + all those things, in so far as they are signs of contempt, provoke anger. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35543" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35543] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod omnes illae causae ad quandam parvipensionem +reducuntur. Oblivio enim parvipensionis est evidens signum, ea enim +quae magna aestimamus, magis memoriae infigimus. Similiter ex +quadam parvipensione est quod aliquis non vereatur contristare +aliquem, denuntiando sibi aliqua tristia. Qui etiam in infortuniis +alicuius hilaritatis signa ostendit, videtur parum curare de bono +vel malo eius. Similiter etiam qui impedit aliquem a sui propositi +assecutione, non propter aliquam utilitatem sibi inde provenientem, +non videtur multum curare de amicitia eius. Et ideo omnia talia, +inquantum sunt signa contemptus, sunt provocativa irae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q47_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q47_A3-p0.1">Q. 47. A. 3. Whether a man's excellence is the cause of his being angry?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man's excellence is not the cause of his being more easily angry. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, + 2) that "some are angry especially when they are grieved, for instance, the sick, the poor, and those who are disappointed." + But these things seem to pertain to defect. Therefore defect rather than excellence makes one prone to anger. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35544" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35544] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod excellentia alicuius non sit causa +quod facilius irascatur. Dicit enim philosophus, in II Rhetoric., +quod <i>maxime aliqui irascuntur cum tristantur, ut infirmi, et +egentes, et qui non habent id quod concupiscunt</i>. Sed omnia ista +ad defectum pertinere videntur. Ergo magis facit pronum ad iram +defectus quam excellentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "some are very much inclined to be angry when they are despised for some + failing or weakness of the existence of which there are grounds for suspicion; but if they think they excel in those points, + they do not trouble." But a suspicion of this kind is due to some defect. Therefore defect rather than excellence is a cause + of a man being angry. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35545" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35545] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit ibidem quod <i>tunc aliqui maxime irascuntur, +quando in eis despicitur id de quo potest esse suspicio quod vel +non insit eis, vel quod insit eis debiliter, sed cum putant se +multum excellere in illis in quibus despiciuntur, non curant</i>. +Sed praedicta suspicio ex defectu provenit. Ergo defectus est magis +causa quod aliquis irascatur, quam excellentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever savors of excellence makes a man agreeable and hopeful. But the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "men + are not angry when they play, make jokes, or take part in a feast, nor when they are prosperous or successful, nor in moderate + pleasures and well-founded hope." Therefore excellence is not a cause of anger. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35546" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35546] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +ea quae ad excellentiam pertinent, maxime faciunt homines iucundos +et bonae spei esse. Sed philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod +<i>in ludo, in risu, in festo, in prosperitate, in consummatione +operum, in delectatione non turpi, et in spe optima, homines non +irascuntur</i>. Ergo excellentia non est causa irae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9) that excellence makes men prone to anger. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35547" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35547] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus, in eodem libro, dicit quod homines propter +excellentiam indignantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q47_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The cause of anger, in the man who is angry, may be taken in two ways. First in respect of the motive of anger: and thus + excellence is the cause of a man being easily angered. Because the motive of anger is an unjust slight, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q47_A2" id="FS_Q47_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Now it is evident that the more excellent a man is, the more unjust is a slight offered him in the matter in which he excels. + Consequently those who excel in any matter, are most of all + angry, if they be slighted in that matter; for instance, a wealthy man in his riches, or an orator in his eloquence, and so + forth. + </p><p id="FS_Q47_A3-p7"> Secondly, the cause of anger, in the man who is angry, may be considered on the part of the disposition produced in him by + the motive aforesaid. Now it is evident that nothing moves a man to anger except a hurt that grieves him: while whatever savors + of defect is above all a cause of grief; since men who suffer from some defect are more easily hurt. And this is why men who + are weak, or subject to some other defect, are more easily angered, since they are more easily grieved. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 3 co."><a name="35548" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35548] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod causa irae in eo qui irascitur, dupliciter accipi +potest. Uno modo, secundum habitudinem ad motivum irae. Et sic +excellentia est causa ut aliquis de facili irascatur. Est enim +motivum irae iniusta parvipensio, ut dictum est. Constat autem quod +quanto aliquis est excellentior, iniustius parvipenditur in hoc in +quo excellit. Et ideo illi qui sunt in aliqua excellentia, maxime +irascuntur, si parvipendantur, puta si dives parvipenditur in +pecunia, et rhetor in loquendo, et sic de aliis. Alio modo potest +considerari causa irae in eo qui irascitur, ex parte dispositionis +quae in eo relinquitur ex tali motivo. Manifestum est autem quod +nihil movet ad iram, nisi nocumentum quod contristat. Ea autem quae +ad defectum pertinent, maxime sunt contristantia, quia homines +defectibus subiacentes facilius laeduntur. Et ista est causa quare +homines qui sunt infirmi, vel in aliis defectibus, facilius +irascuntur, quia facilius contristantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35549" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35549] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc +patet responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If a man be despised in a matter in which he evidently excels greatly, he does not consider himself the loser thereby, and + therefore is not grieved: and in this respect he is less angered. But in another respect, in so far as he is more undeservedly + despised, he has more reason for being angry: unless perhaps he thinks that he is envied or insulted not through contempt + but through ignorance, or some other like cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35550" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35550] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ille qui despicitur in eo in quo manifeste multum +excellit, non reputat se aliquam iacturam pati, et ideo non +contristatur, et ex hac parte minus irascitur. Sed ex alia parte, +inquantum indignius despicitur, habet maiorem rationem irascendi. +Nisi forte reputet se non invideri vel subsannari propter +despectum; sed propter ignorantiam, vel propter aliud +huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All these things hinder anger in so far as they hinder sorrow. But in another respect they are naturally apt to provoke anger, + because they make it more unseemly to insult anyone. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35551" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35551] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod omnia illa impediunt iram, inquantum impediunt +tristitiam. Sed ex alia parte, nata sunt provocare iram, secundum +quod faciunt hominem inconvenientius despici.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q47_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q47_A4-p0.1">Q. 47. A. 4. Whether a person's defect is a reason for being more easily angry with him?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a person's defect is not a reason for being more easily angry with him. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. + ii, 3) that "we are not angry with those who confess and repent and humble themselves; on the contrary, we are gentle with + them. Wherefore dogs bite not those who sit down." But these things savor of littleness and defect. Therefore littleness of + a person is a reason for being less angry with him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35552" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35552] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod defectus alicuius non sit causa ut +contra ipsum facilius irascamur. Dicit enim philosophus, in II +Rhetoric., quod <i>his qui confitentur et poenitent et humiliantur, +non irascimur, sed magis ad eos mitescimus. Unde et canes non +mordent eos qui resident</i>. Sed haec pertinent ad parvitatem et +defectum. Ergo parvitas alicuius est causa ut ei minus +irascamur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no greater defect than death. But anger ceases at the sight of death. Therefore defect of a person does + not provoke anger against him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35553" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35553] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +nullus est maior defectus quam mortis. Sed ad mortuos desinit ira. +Ergo defectus alicuius non est causa provocativa irae contra +ipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one thinks little of a man through his being friendly towards him. But we are more angry with friends, if they + offend us or refuse to help us; hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q47_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.54.13" target="asv">Ps. 54:13</a>): "If my enemy had reviled me I would verily have borne with it." Therefore a person's defect is not a reason for being more + easily angry with him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35554" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35554] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +nullus aestimat aliquem parvum ex hoc quod est sibi amicus. Sed ad +amicos, si nos offenderint, vel si non iuverint, magis offendimur, +unde dicitur in Psalmo LIV, <i>si inimicus meus maledixisset mihi, +sustinuissem utique</i>. Ergo defectus alicuius non est causa ut +contra ipsum facilius irascamur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "the rich man is angry with the poor man, if the latter despise him; and in like + manner the prince is angry with his subject." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35555" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35555] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>dives +irascitur contra pauperem, si eum despiciat; et principans contra +subiectum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q47_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q47_A2" id="FS_Q47_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,3) unmerited contempt more than anything else is a provocative of anger. Consequently deficiency or littleness in the person + with whom we are angry, tends to increase our anger, in so far as it adds to the unmeritedness of being despised. For just + as the higher a man's position is, the more undeservedly he is despised; so the lower it is, the less reason he has for despising. + Thus a nobleman is angry if he be + insulted by a peasant; a wise man, if by a fool; a master, if by a servant. + </p><p id="FS_Q47_A4-p7"> If, however, the littleness or deficiency lessens the unmerited contempt, then it does not increase but lessens anger. In + this way those who repent of their ill-deeds, and confess that they have done wrong, who humble themselves and ask pardon, + mitigate anger, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q47_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.15.1" target="asv">Prov. 15:1</a>: "A mild answer breaketh wrath": because, to wit, they seem not to despise, but rather to think much of those before whom + they humble themselves. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 4 co."><a name="35556" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35556] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, indigna despectio est maxime +provocativa irae. Defectus igitur vel parvitas eius contra quem +irascimur, facit ad augmentum irae, inquantum auget indignam +despectionem. Sicut enim quanto aliquis est maior, tanto indignius +despicitur; ita quanto aliquis est minor, tanto indignius despicit. +Et ideo nobiles irascuntur si despiciantur a rusticis, vel +sapientes ab insipientibus, vel domini a servis. Si vero parvitas +vel defectus diminuat despectionem indignam, talis parvitas non +auget, sed diminuit iram. Et hoc modo illi qui poenitent de +iniuriis factis, et confitentur se male fecisse, et humiliantur et +veniam petunt, mitigant iram, secundum illud Prov. XV, <i>responsio +mollis frangit iram</i>, inquantum scilicet tales videntur non +despicere, sed magis magnipendere eos quibus se humiliant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35557" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35557] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc +patet responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There are two reasons why anger ceases at the sight of death. One is because the dead are incapable of sorrow and sensation; + and this is chiefly what the angry seek in those with whom they are angered. Another reason is because the dead seem to have + attained to the limit of evils. Hence anger ceases in regard to all who are grievously hurt, in so far as this hurt surpasses + the measure of just retaliation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35558" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35558] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod duplex est causa quare ad mortuos cessat ira. Una, +quia non possunt dolere et sentire, quod maxime quaerunt irati in +his quibus irascuntur. Alio modo, quia iam videntur ad ultimum +malorum pervenisse. Unde etiam ad quoscumque graviter laesos cessat +ira, inquantum eorum malum excedit mensuram iustae +retributionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To be despised by one's friends seems also a greater indignity. Consequently if they despise us by hurting or by failing + to help, we are angry with them for the same reason for which we are angry with those who are beneath us. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35559" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35559] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod etiam despectio quae est ab amicis, videtur esse +magis indigna. Et ideo ex simili causa magis irascimur contra eos, +si despiciant, vel nocendo vel non iuvando, sicut et contra +minores.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q48" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q48-p0.1">Q. 48. OF THE EFFECTS OF ANGER (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q48-p2"> We must now consider the effects of anger: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q48-p3"><a href="#FS_Q48_A1"> (1) Whether anger causes pleasure?</a></p><p id="FS_Q48-p4"><a href="#FS_Q48_A2"> (2) Whether above all it causes heat in the heart?</a></p><p id="FS_Q48-p5"><a href="#FS_Q48_A3"> (3) Whether above all it hinders the use of reason?</a></p><p id="FS_Q48-p6"><a href="#FS_Q48_A4"> (4) Whether it causes taciturnity?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 pr."><a name="35560" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35560] +Iª-IIae q. 48 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +effectibus irae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum ira +causet delectationem. Secundo, utrum maxime causet fervorem in +corde. Tertio, utrum maxime impediat rationis usum. Quarto, utrum +causet taciturnitatem.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q48_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q48_A1-p0.1">Q. 48. A. 1. Whether anger causes pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger does not cause pleasure. Because sorrow excludes pleasure. But anger is never without sorrow, since, + as stated in Ethic. vii, 6, "everyone that acts from anger, acts with pain." Therefore anger does not cause pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35561" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35561] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non causet delectationem. +Tristitia enim delectationem excludit. Sed ira est semper cum +tristitia, quia, ut dicitur in VII Ethic., <i>omnis qui facit +aliquid per iram, facit tristatus</i>. Ergo ira non causat +delectationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "vengeance makes anger to cease, because it substitutes pleasure for pain": + whence we may gather that the angry man derives pleasure from vengeance, and that vengeance quells his anger. Therefore on + the advent of pleasure, anger departs: and consequently anger is not an effect united with pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35562" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35562] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod <i>punitio quietat impetum +irae, delectationem pro tristitia faciens</i>, ex quo potest accipi +quod delectatio irato provenit ex punitione, punitio autem excludit +iram. Ergo, adveniente delectatione, ira tollitur. Non est ergo +effectus delectationi coniunctus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no effect hinders its cause, since it is conformed to its cause. But pleasure hinders anger as stated in Rhet. ii, + 3. Therefore pleasure is not an effect of anger. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35563" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35563] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +nullus effectus impedit causam suam, cum sit suae causae conformis. +Sed delectationes impediunt iram, ut dicitur in II Rhetoric. Ergo +delectatio non est effectus irae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) quotes the saying that anger is "Sweet to the soul as honey to the taste" (Iliad, xviii, 109 + [trl. Pope]). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35564" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35564] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus, in eodem libro, inducit proverbium, quod +<i>ira multo dulcior melle distillante in pectoribus virorum +crescit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14), pleasures, chiefly sensible and bodily pleasures, are remedies against sorrow: + and therefore the greater the sorrow or anxiety, the more sensible are we to the pleasure which heals it, as is evident in + the case of thirst which increases the pleasure of drink. Now it is clear from what has been said ( + <a href="#FS_Q47_A1" id="FS_Q48_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[47], AA[1]</a>,3), that the movement of anger arises from a wrong done that causes sorrow, for + which sorrow vengeance is sought as a remedy. Consequently as soon as vengeance is present, pleasure ensues, and so much the + greater according as the sorrow was greater. Therefore if vengeance be really present, perfect pleasure ensues, entirely excluding + sorrow, so that the movement of anger ceases. But before vengeance is really present, it becomes present to the angry man + in two ways: in one way, by hope; because none is angry except he hopes for vengeance, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q46_A1" id="FS_Q48_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[46], A[1]</a>); in another way, by thinking of it continually, for to everyone that desires a thing it is pleasant to dwell on the thought + of what he desires; wherefore the imaginings of dreams are pleasant. Accordingly an angry man takes pleasure in thinking much + about vengeance. This pleasure, however, is not perfect, so as to banish sorrow and consequently anger. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 1 co."><a name="35565" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35565] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in VII Ethic., +delectationes, maxime sensibiles et corporales, sunt medicinae +quaedam contra tristitiam, et ideo quanto per delectationem contra +maiorem tristitiam vel anxietatem remedium praestatur, tanto +delectatio magis percipitur; sicut patet quod quando aliquis sitit, +delectabilior fit ei potus. Manifestum est autem ex praedictis quod +motus irae insurgit ex aliqua illata iniuria contristante; cui +quidem tristitiae remedium adhibetur per vindictam. Et ideo ad +praesentiam vindictae delectatio sequitur, et tanto maior, quanto +maior fuit tristitia. Si igitur vindicta fuerit praesens realiter, +fit perfecta delectatio, quae totaliter excludit tristitiam, et per +hoc quietat motum irae. Sed antequam vindicta sit praesens +realiter, fit irascenti praesens dupliciter. Uno modo, per spem, +quia nullus irascitur nisi sperans vindictam, ut supra dictum est. +Alio modo, secundum continuam cogitationem. Unicuique enim +concupiscenti est delectabile immorari in cogitatione eorum quae +concupiscit, propter quod etiam imaginationes somniorum sunt +delectabiles. Et ideo, cum iratus multum in animo suo cogitet de +vindicta, ex hoc delectatur. Tamen delectatio non est perfecta, +quae tollat tristitiam, et per consequens iram.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The angry man does not grieve and rejoice at the same thing; he grieves for the wrong done, while he takes pleasure in the + thought and hope of vengeance. Consequently sorrow is to anger as its beginning; while pleasure is the effect or terminus + of anger. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35566" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35566] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod non de eodem iratus tristatur et gaudet, sed +tristatur de illata iniuria, delectatur autem de vindicta cogitata +et sperata. Unde tristitia se habet ad iram sicut principium, sed +delectatio sicut effectus vel terminus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument holds in regard to pleasure caused by the real presence of vengeance, which banishes anger altogether. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35567" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35567] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de delectatione quae causatur +ex reali praesentia vindictae, quae totaliter tollit iram.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Pleasure that precedes hinders sorrow from ensuing, and consequently is a hindrance to anger. But pleasure felt in taking + vengeance follows from anger. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35568" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35568] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod delectationes praecedentes impediunt ne sequatur +tristitia; et per consequens impediunt iram. Sed delectatio de +vindicta consequitur ipsam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q48_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q48_A2-p0.1">Q. 48. A. 2. Whether anger above all causes fervor in the heart?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that heat is not above all the effect of anger. For fervor, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q28_A5" id="FS_Q48_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[28], A[5]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q37_A2" id="FS_Q48_A2-p2.2" shape="rect"> Q[37], A[2]</a>), belongs to love. But love, as above stated, is the beginning and cause of all the passions. Since then the cause is more + powerful than its effect, it seems that anger is not the chief cause of fervor. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35569" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35569] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod fervor non sit maxime effectus irae. +Fervor enim, sicut supra dictum est, pertinet ad amorem. Sed amor, +sicut supra dictum est, principium est et causa omnium passionum. +Cum ergo causa sit potior effectu, videtur quod ira non faciat +maxime fervorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those things which, of themselves, arouse fervor, increase as time goes on; thus love grows stronger the longer + it lasts. But in course of time anger grows weaker; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "time puts an end to anger." + Therefore fervor is not the proper effect of anger. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35570" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35570] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +illa quae de se excitant fervorem, per temporis assiduitatem magis +augentur, sicut amor diuturnitate convalescit. Sed ira per tractum +temporis debilitatur, dicit enim philosophus, in II Rhetoric., quod +tempus quietat iram. Ergo ira non proprie causat fervorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fervor added to fervor produces greater fervor. But "the addition of a greater anger banishes already existing anger," + as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3). Therefore anger does not cause fervor. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35571" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35571] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +fervor additus fervori, augmentat fervorem. <i>Sed maior ira +superveniens facit iram mitescere</i>, ut philosophus dicit, in II +Rhetoric. Ergo ira non causat fervorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that "anger is fervor of the blood around the heart, resulting from an exhalation of + the bile." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35572" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35572] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Damascenus dicit, quod <i>ira est fervor eius qui circa +cor est sanguinis, ex evaporatione fellis fiens</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q44_A1" id="FS_Q48_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[44], A[1]</a>), the bodily transmutation that occurs in the passions of the soul is proportionate to the movement of the appetite. Now + it is evident that every appetite, even the natural appetite, tends with greater force to repel that which is contrary to + it, if it be present: hence we see that hot water freezes harder, as though the cold acted with greater force on the hot object. + Since then the appetitive movement + of anger is caused by some injury inflicted, as by a contrary that is present; it follows that the appetite tends with great + force to repel the injury by the desire of vengeance; and hence ensues great vehemence and impetuosity in the movement of + anger. And because the movement of anger is not one of recoil, which corresponds to the action of cold, but one of prosecution, + which corresponds to the action of heat, the result is that the movement of anger produces fervor of the blood and vital + spirits around the heart, which is the instrument of the soul's passions. And hence it is that, on account of the heart being + so disturbed by anger, those chiefly who are angry betray signs thereof in their outer members. For, as Gregory says (Moral. + v, 30) "the heart that is inflamed with the stings of its own anger beats quick, the body trembles, the tongue stammers, the + countenance takes fire, the eyes grow fierce, they that are well known are not recognized. With the mouth indeed he shapes + a sound, but the understanding knows not what it says." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 2 co."><a name="35573" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35573] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, corporalis transmutatio quae est +in passionibus animae, proportionatur motui appetitus. Manifestum +est autem quod quilibet appetitus, etiam naturalis, fortius tendit +in id quod est sibi contrarium, si fuerit praesens, unde videmus +quod aqua calefacta magis congelatur, quasi frigido vehementius in +calidum agente. Motus autem appetitivus irae causatur ex aliqua +iniuria illata, sicut ex quodam contrario iniacente. Et ideo +appetitus potissime tendit ad repellendum iniuriam per appetitum +vindictae, et ex hoc sequitur magna vehementia et impetuositas in +motu irae. Et quia motus irae non est per modum retractionis, cui +proportionatur frigus; sed magis per modum insecutionis, cui +proportionatur calor; consequenter fit motus irae causativus +cuiusdam fervoris sanguinis et spirituum circa cor, quod est +instrumentum passionum animae. Et exinde est quod, propter magnam +perturbationem cordis quae est in ira, maxime apparent in iratis +indicia quaedam in exterioribus membris. Ut enim Gregorius dicit, +in V Moral., <i>irae suae stimulis accensum cor palpitat, corpus +tremit, lingua se praepedit, facies ignescit, exasperantur oculi, +et nequaquam recognoscuntur noti, ore quidem clamorem format, sed +sensus quid loquatur, ignorat</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q48_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Love itself is not felt so keenly as in the absence of the beloved," as Augustine observes (De Trin. x, 12). Consequently + when a man suffers from a hurt done to the excellence that he loves, he feels his love thereof the more: the result being + that his heart is moved with greater heat to remove the hindrance to the object of his love; so that anger increases the fervor + of love and makes it to be felt more. + </p><p id="FS_Q48_A2-p8"> Nevertheless, the fervor arising from heat differs according as it is to be referred to love or to anger. Because the fervor + of love has a certain sweetness and gentleness; for it tends to the good that one loves: whence it is likened to the warmth + of the air and of the blood. For this reason sanguine temperaments are more inclined to love; and hence the saying that "love + springs from the liver," because of the blood being formed there. On the other hand, the fervor of anger has + a certain bitterness with a tendency to destroy, for it seeks to be avenged on the contrary evil: whence it is likened to + the heat of fire and of the bile, and for this reason Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that it "results from an exhalation + of the bile whence it takes its name {chole}." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35574" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35574] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod <i>amor ipse non ita sentitur, nisi cum eum +prodit indigentia</i>, ut Augustinus dicit, in X de Trin. Et ideo +quando homo patitur detrimentum amatae excellentiae propter +iniuriam illatam, magis sentitur amor; et ideo ferventius cor +mutatur ad removendum impedimentum rei amatae; ut sic fervor ipse +amoris per iram crescat, et magis sentiatur. Et tamen fervor qui +consequitur calorem, alia ratione pertinet ad amorem, et ad iram. +Nam fervor amoris est cum quadam dulcedine et lenitate, est enim in +bonum amatum. Et ideo assimilatur calori aeris et sanguinis, +propter quod, sanguinei sunt magis amativi; et dicitur quod cogit +amare iecur, in quo fit quaedam generatio sanguinis. Fervor autem +irae est cum amaritudine, ad consumendum, quia tendit ad punitionem +contrarii. Unde assimilatur calori ignis et cholerae, et propter +hoc Damascenus dicit quod <i>procedit ex evaporatione fellis, et +fellea nominatur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q48_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Time, of necessity, weakens all those things, the causes of which are impaired by time. Now it is evident that memory is + weakened by time; for things which happened long ago easily slip from our memory. But anger is caused by the memory of a wrong + done. Consequently the cause of anger is impaired little by little as time goes on, until at length it vanishes altogether. + Moreover a wrong seems greater when it is first felt; and our estimate thereof is + gradually lessened the further the sense of present wrong recedes into the past. The same applies to love, so long as the + cause of love is in the memory alone; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "if a friend's absence lasts long, + it seems to make men forget their friendship." But in the presence of a friend, the cause of friendship is continually being + multiplied by time: wherefore the friendship increases: and the same would apply to anger, were its cause continually + multiplied. + </p><p id="FS_Q48_A2-p10"> Nevertheless the very fact that anger soon spends itself proves the strength of its fervor: for as a great fire is soon spent + having burnt up all the fuel; so too anger, by reason of its vehemence, soon dies away. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35575" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35575] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod omne illud cuius causa per tempus diminuitur, necesse +est quod tempore debilitetur. Manifestum est autem quod memoria +tempore diminuitur, quae enim antiqua sunt, a memoria de facili +excidunt. Ira autem causatur ex memoria iniuriae illatae. Et ideo +causa irae per tempus paulatim diminuitur, quousque totaliter +tollatur. Maior etiam videtur iniuria quando primo sentitur; et +paulatim diminuitur eius aestimatio, secundum quod magis receditur +a praesenti sensu iniuriae. Et similiter etiam est de amore, si +amoris causa remaneat in sola memoria, unde philosophus dicit, in +VIII Ethic., quod si <i>diuturna fiat amici absentia, videtur +amicitiae oblivionem facere</i>. Sed in praesentia amici, semper +per tempus multiplicatur causa amicitiae, et ideo amicitia crescit. +Et similiter esset de ira, si continue multiplicaretur causa +ipsius. Tamen hoc ipsum quod ira cito consumitur, attestatur +vehementi fervori ipsius. Sicut enim ignis magnus cito extinguitur, +consumpta materia; ita etiam ira, propter suam vehementiam, cito +deficit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every power that is divided in itself is weakened. Consequently if a man being already angry with one, becomes angry with + another, by this very fact his anger with the former is weakened. Especially is this so if his anger in the second case be + greater: because the wrong done which aroused his former anger, will, in comparison with the second wrong, which is reckoned + greater, seem to be of little or no account. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35576" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35576] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod omnis virtus divisa in plures partes, diminuitur. Et +ideo quando aliquis iratus alicui, irascitur postmodum alteri, ex +hoc ipso diminuitur ira ad primum. Et praecipue si ad secundum +fuerit maior ira, nam iniuria quae excitavit iram ad primum, +videbitur, comparatione secundae iniuriae, quae aestimatur maior, +esse parva vel nulla.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q48_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q48_A3-p0.1">Q. 48. A. 3. Whether anger above all hinders the use of reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger does not hinder the use of reason. Because that which presupposes an act of reason, does not seem + to hinder the use of reason. But "anger listens to reason," as stated in Ethic. vii, 6. Therefore anger does not hinder reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35577" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35577] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non impediat rationem. Illud enim +quod est cum ratione, non videtur esse rationis impedimentum. Sed +ira est cum ratione, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Ergo ira non impedit +rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the more the reason is hindered, the less does a man show his thoughts. But the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) + that "an angry man is not cunning but is open." Therefore anger does not seem to hinder the use of reason, as desire does; + for desire is cunning, as he also states (Ethic. vii, 6.). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35578" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35578] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quanto magis impeditur ratio, tanto diminuitur manifestatio. Sed +philosophus dicit in VII Ethic., quod <i>iracundus non est +insidiator, sed manifestus</i>. Ergo ira non videtur impedire usum +rationis, sicut concupiscentia; quae est insidiosa, ut ibidem +dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the judgment of reason becomes more evident by juxtaposition of the contrary: because contraries stand out more + clearly when placed beside one another. But this also increases anger: for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "men are + more angry if they receive unwonted treatment; for instance, honorable men, if they be dishonored": and so forth. Therefore + the same cause increases anger, and facilitates the judgment of reason. Therefore anger does + not hinder the judgment of reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35579" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35579] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +iudicium rationis evidentius fit ex adiunctione contrarii, quia +contraria iuxta se posita magis elucescunt. Sed ex hoc etiam +crescit ira, dicit enim philosophus, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>magis +homines irascuntur, si contraria praeexistunt, sicut honorati si +dehonorentur</i>; et sic de aliis. Ergo ex eodem et ira crescit, et +iudicium rationis adiuvatur. Non ergo ira impedit iudicium +rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) that anger "withdraws the light of understanding, while by agitating it troubles the mind." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35580" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35580] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Gregorius dicit, in V Moral., quod <i>ira intelligentiae +lucem subtrahit, cum mentem permovendo confundit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Although the mind or reason makes no use of a bodily organ in its proper act, yet, since it needs certain sensitive powers + for the execution of its act, the acts of which powers are hindered when the body is disturbed, it follows of necessity that + any disturbance in the body hinders even the judgment of reason; as is clear in the case of drunkenness or sleep. Now it has + been stated + <a href="#FS_Q48_A2" id="FS_Q48_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a> that anger, above all, causes a bodily + disturbance in the region of the heart, so much as to effect even the outward members. Consequently, of all the passions, + anger is the most manifest obstacle to the judgment of reason, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q48_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.30.10" target="asv"> Ps. 30:10</a>: "My eye is troubled with wrath." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 3 co."><a name="35581" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35581] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod mens vel ratio quamvis non utatur organo corporali in +suo proprio actu; tamen, quia indiget ad sui actum quibusdam +viribus sensitivis, quorum actus impediuntur corpore perturbato; +necesse est quod perturbationes corporales etiam iudicium rationis +impediant, sicut patet in ebrietate et somno. Dictum est autem quod +ira maxime facit perturbationem corporalem circa cor, ita ut etiam +usque ad exteriora membra derivetur. Unde ira, inter ceteras +passiones, manifestius impedit iudicium rationis; secundum illud +Psalmi XXX, <i>conturbatus est in ira oculus meus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The beginning of anger is in the reason, as regards the appetitive movement, which is the formal element of anger. But the + passion of anger forestalls the perfect judgment of reason, as though it listened but imperfectly to reason, on account of + the commotion of the heat urging to instant action, which commotion is the material element of anger. In this respect it hinders + the judgment of reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35582" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35582] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod a ratione est principium irae, quantum ad motum +appetitivum, qui est formalis in ira. Sed perfectum iudicium +rationis passio irae praeoccupat quasi non perfecte rationem +audiens, propter commotionem caloris velociter impellentis, quae +est materialis in ira. Et quantum ad hoc, impedit iudicium +rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An angry man is said to be open, not because it is clear to him what he ought to do, but because he acts openly, without + thought of hiding himself. This is due partly to the reason being hindered, so as not to discern what should be hidden and + what done openly, nor to devise the means of hiding; and partly to the dilatation of the heart which pertains to magnanimity + which is an effect of anger: wherefore the Philosopher says of the magnanimous man + (Ethic. iv, 3) that "he is open in his hatreds and his friendships . . . and speaks and acts openly." Desire, on the other + hand, is said to lie low and to be cunning, because, in many cases, the pleasurable things that are desired, savor of shame + and voluptuousness, wherein man wishes not to be seen. But in those things that savor of manliness and excellence, such as + matters of vengeance, man seeks to be in the open. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35583" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35583] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod iracundus dicitur esse manifestus, non quia +manifestum sit sibi quid facere debeat, sed quia manifeste +operatur, non quaerens aliquam occultationem. Quod partim contingit +propter impedimentum rationis, quae non potest discernere quid sit +occultandum et quid manifestandum, nec etiam excogitare occultandi +vias. Partim vero est ex ampliatione cordis, quae pertinet ad +magnanimitatem, quam facit ira, unde et de magnanimo philosophus +dicit, in IV Ethic., quod <i>est manifestus oditor et amator et +manifeste dicit et operatur</i>. Concupiscentia autem dicitur esse +latens et insidiosa, quia, ut plurimum, delectabilia quae +concupiscuntur, habent turpitudinem quandam et mollitiem, in quibus +homo vult latere. In his autem quae sunt virilitatis et +excellentiae, cuiusmodi sunt vindictae, quaerit homo manifestus +esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (ad 1), the movement of anger begins in the reason, wherefore the juxtaposition of one contrary with another + facilitates the judgment of reason, on the same grounds as it increases anger. For when a man who is possessed of honor or + wealth, suffers a loss therein, the loss seems all the greater, both on account of the contrast, and because it was unforeseen. + Consequently it causes greater grief: just as a great good, through being + received unexpectedly, causes greater delight. And in proportion to the increase of the grief that precedes, anger is increased + also. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35584" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35584] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, motus irae a ratione incipit, et +ideo secundum idem appositio contrarii ad contrarium adiuvat +iudicium rationis, et auget iram. Cum enim aliquis habet honorem +vel divitias, et postea incurrit alicuius detrimentum, illud +detrimentum apparet maius, tum propter vicinitatem contrarii; tum +quia erat inopinatum. Et ideo causat maiorem tristitiam, sicut +etiam magna bona ex inopinato venientia, causant maiorem +delectationem. Et secundum augmentum tristitiae praecedentis, +consequenter augetur et ira.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q48_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q48_A4-p0.1">Q. 48. A. 4. Whether anger above all causes taciturnity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger does not cause taciturnity. Because taciturnity is opposed to speech. But increase in anger conduces + to speech; as is evident from the degrees of anger laid down by Our Lord ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q48_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.22" target="asv">Mat. 5:22</a>): where He says: "Whosoever is angry with his brother"; and " . . . whosoever shall say to his brother, 'Raca'"; and " . + . . whosoever shall say to his brother, 'Thou fool.'" Therefore anger does not cause taciturnity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35585" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35585] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non causet taciturnitatem. +Taciturnitas enim locutioni opponitur. Sed per crementum irae usque +ad locutionem pervenitur, ut patet per gradus irae quos dominus +assignat, Matth. V, dicens, <i>qui irascitur fratri suo; et, qui +dixerit fratri suo, raca; et, qui dixerit fratri suo, fatue</i>. +Ergo ira non causat taciturnitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, through failing to obey reason, man sometimes breaks out into unbecoming words: hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q48_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.25.28" target="asv">Prov. 25:28</a>): "As a city that lieth open and is not compassed with walls, so is a man that cannot refrain his own spirit in speaking." + But anger, above all, hinders the judgment of reason, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q48_A3" id="FS_Q48_A4-p3.2" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. Consequently above all it makes one break out into unbecoming words. Therefore it does not + cause taciturnity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35586" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35586] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ex hoc quod custodia rationis deficit, contingit quod homo +prorumpat ad verba inordinata, unde dicitur Prov. XXV, <i>sicut +urbs patens et absque murorum ambitu, ita vir qui non potest +cohibere in loquendo spiritum suum</i>. Sed ira maxime impedit +iudicium rationis, ut dictum est. Ergo facit maxime profluere in +verba inordinata. Non ergo causat taciturnitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q48_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.34" target="asv">Mat. 12:34</a>): "Out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh." But anger, above all, causes a disturbance in the heart, as stated + above + <a href="#FS_Q48_A2" id="FS_Q48_A4-p4.2" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore above all it conduces to speech. Therefore it does not cause taciturnity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35587" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35587] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Matth. XII dicitur, ex abundantia cordis os loquitur. Sed per iram +cor maxime perturbatur, ut dictum est. Ergo maxime causat +locutionem. Non ergo causat taciturnitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) that "when anger does not vent itself outwardly by the lips, inwardly it burns the more fiercely." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35588" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35588] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Gregorius dicit, in V Moral., quod <i>ira per silentium +clausa, intra mentem vehementius aestuat</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q48_A3" id="FS_Q48_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3];</a> Q[46], A[4]), anger both follows an act of reason, and hinders the reason: and in both respects it may cause taciturnity. + On the part of the reason, when the judgment of reason prevails so far, that although it does not curb the appetite in its + inordinate desire for vengeance, yet it curbs the tongue from unbridled speech. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v, 30): "Sometimes + when the mind is disturbed, anger, as + if in judgment, commands silence." On the part of the impediment to reason because, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q48_A2" id="FS_Q48_A4-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, the disturbance of anger reaches to the outward members, and chiefly to those members which reflect more distinctly the + emotions of the heart, such as the eyes, face and tongue; wherefore, as observed above + <a href="#FS_Q48_A2" id="FS_Q48_A4-p6.3" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, "the tongue stammers, the countenance takes fire, the eyes grow fierce." Consequently anger may cause such a disturbance, + that + the tongue is altogether deprived of speech; and taciturnity is the result. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 4 co."><a name="35589" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35589] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod ira, sicut iam dictum est, et cum ratione est, et +impedit rationem. Et ex utraque parte, potest taciturnitatem +causare. Ex parte quidem rationis, quando iudicium rationis +intantum viget quod, etsi non cohibeat affectum ab inordinato +appetitu vindictae, cohibet tamen linguam ab inordinata locutione. +Unde Gregorius, in V Moral., dicit, <i>aliquando ira perturbato +animo, quasi ex iudicio, silentium indicit</i>. Ex parte vero +impedimenti rationis, quia, sicut dictum est, perturbatio irae +usque ad exteriora membra perducitur; et maxime ad illa membra in +quibus expressius relucet vestigium cordis, sicut in oculis et in +facie et in lingua; unde, sicut dictum est, <i>lingua se praepedit, +facies ignescit, exasperantur oculi</i>. Potest ergo esse tanta +perturbatio irae, quod omnino impediatur lingua ab usu loquendi. Et +tunc sequitur taciturnitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Anger sometimes goes so far as to hinder the reason from curbing the tongue: but sometimes it goes yet farther, so as to + paralyze the tongue and other outward members. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35590" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35590] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod augmentum irae quandoque est usque ad +impediendum rationem a cohibitione linguae. Quandoque autem ultra +procedit, usque ad impediendum motum linguae, et aliorum membrorum +exteriorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> And this suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35591" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35591] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc +etiam patet solutio ad secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The disturbance of the heart may sometimes superabound to the extend that the movements of the outward members are hindered + by the inordinate movement of the heart. Thence ensue taciturnity and immobility of the outward members; and sometimes even + death. If, however, the disturbance be not so great, then "out of the abundance of the heart" thus disturbed, the mouth proceeds + to speak. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35592" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35592] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod perturbatio cordis quandoque potest superabundare +usque ad hoc, quod per inordinatum motum cordis impediatur motus +exteriorum membrorum. Et tunc causatur taciturnitas, et immobilitas +exteriorum membrorum, et quandoque etiam mors. Si autem non fuerit +tanta perturbatio, tunc ex abundantia perturbationis cordis, +sequitur oris locutio.</p></div></div></div></div> + + + ` + </div> + </body> + </html>