We must now consider the passions of the soul: first, in general; secondly, in particular. Taking them in general, there + are four things to be considered: (1) Their subject: (2) The difference between them: (3) Their mutual relationship: (4) Their + malice and goodness. +
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is any passion in the soul?
(2) Whether passion is in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part?
+[34515] +Iª-IIae q. 22 pr. Post hoc considerandum est de +passionibus animae, et primo, in generali; secundo, in speciali. In +generali autem, quatuor occurrunt circa eas consideranda, primo +quidem, de subiecto earum; secundo, de differentia earum; tertio, +de comparatione earum ad invicem; quarto, de malitia et bonitate +ipsarum. Circa primum quaeruntur tria. Primo, utrum aliqua passio +sit in anima. Secundo, utrum magis in parte appetitiva quam in +apprehensiva. Tertio, utrum magis sit in appetitu sensitivo quam +intellectivo, qui dicitur voluntas.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that there is no passion in the soul. Because passivity belongs to matter. But the soul is not composed of + matter and form, as stated in the + FP, Q[75], A[5]. Therefore there is no passion in the soul. +
[34516] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod nulla passio sit in anima. Pati enim +est proprium materiae. Sed anima non est composita ex materia et +forma, ut in primo habitum est. Ergo nulla passio est in anima.
+ Objection 2: Further, passion is movement, as is stated in Phys. iii, 3. But the soul is not moved, as is proved in De Anima i, 3. Therefore + passion is not in the soul. +
[34517] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +passio est motus, ut dicitur in III Physic. Sed anima non movetur, +ut probatur in I de anima. Ergo passio non est in anima.
+ Objection 3: Further, passion is the road to corruption; since "every passion, when increased, alters the substance," as is stated in + Topic. vi, 6. But the soul is incorruptible. Therefore no passion is in the soul. +
[34518] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +passio est via in corruptionem, nam omnis passio, magis facta, +abiicit a substantia, ut dicitur in libro topicorum. Sed anima est +incorruptibilis. Ergo nulla passio est in anima.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle says ( + Rom. 7:5): "When we were in the flesh, the passions of sins which were by the law, did the work in our members." Now sins are, properly + speaking, in the soul. Therefore passions also, which are described as being "of sins," are in the soul. +
[34519] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Rom. VII, cum essemus in carne, +passiones peccatorum, quae per legem erant, operabantur in membris +nostris. Peccata autem sunt proprie in anima. Ergo et +passiones, quae dicuntur peccatorum, sunt in anima.
+ I answer that, The word "passive" is used in three ways. First, in a general way, according as whatever receives something is passive, although + nothing is taken from it: thus we may say that the air is passive when it is lit up. But this is to be perfected rather than + to be passive. Secondly, the word "passive" is employed in its proper sense, when something is received, while something else + is taken away: and this happens in two ways. For sometimes that which is lost is + unsuitable to the thing: thus when an animal's body is healed, and loses sickness. At other times the contrary occurs: thus + to ail is to be passive; because the ailment is received and health is lost. And here we have passion in its most proper acceptation. + For a thing is said to be passive from its being drawn to the agent: and when a thing recedes from what is suitable to it, + then especially does it appear to be drawn to something else. Moreover in De Generat. i, 3 it is stated that when a + more excellent thing is generated from a less excellent, we have generation simply, and corruption in a particular respect: + whereas the reverse is the case, when from a more excellent thing, a less excellent is generated. In these three ways it happens + that passions are in the soul. For in the sense of mere reception, we speak of "feeling and understanding as being a kind + of passion" (De Anima i, 5). But passion, accompanied by the loss of something, is only in respect of a bodily + transmutation; wherefore passion properly so called cannot be in the soul, save accidentally, in so far, to wit, as the "composite" + is passive. But here again we find a difference; because when this transmutation is for the worse, it has more of the nature + of a passion, than when it is for the better: hence sorrow is more properly a passion than joy. +
[34520] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod pati dicitur tripliciter. Uno modo, communiter, +secundum quod omne recipere est pati, etiam si nihil abiiciatur a +re, sicut si dicatur aerem pati, quando illuminatur. Hoc autem +magis proprie est perfici, quam pati. Alio modo dicitur pati +proprie, quando aliquid recipitur cum alterius abiectione. Sed hoc +contingit dupliciter. Quandoque enim abiicitur id quod non est +conveniens rei, sicut cum corpus animalis sanatur, dicitur pati, +quia recipit sanitatem, aegritudine abiecta. Alio modo, quando e +converso contingit, sicut aegrotare dicitur pati, quia recipitur +infirmitas, sanitate abiecta. Et hic est propriissimus modus +passionis. Nam pati dicitur ex eo quod aliquid trahitur ad agentem, +quod autem recedit ab eo quod est sibi conveniens, maxime videtur +ad aliud trahi. Et similiter in I de Generat. dicitur quod, quando +ex ignobiliori generatur nobilius, est generatio simpliciter, et +corruptio secundum quid, e converso autem quando ex nobiliori +ignobilius generatur. Et his tribus modis contingit esse in anima +passionem. Nam secundum receptionem tantum dicitur quod sentire et +intelligere est quoddam pati. Passio autem cum abiectione non est +nisi secundum transmutationem corporalem, unde passio proprie dicta +non potest competere animae nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet +compositum patitur. Sed et in hoc est diversitas, nam quando +huiusmodi transmutatio fit in deterius, magis proprie habet +rationem passionis, quam quando fit in melius. Unde tristitia magis +proprie est passio quam laetitia.
+ Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to matter to be passive in such a way as to lose something and to be transmuted: hence this happens only in those + things that are composed of matter and form. But passivity, as implying mere reception, need not be in matter, but can be + in anything that is in potentiality. Now, though the soul is not composed of matter and form, yet it has something of potentiality, + in respect of which it is competent to receive or to be passive, according + as the act of understanding is a kind of passion, as stated in De Anima iii, 4. +
[34521] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +igitur dicendum quod pati, secundum quod est cum abiectione et +transmutatione, proprium est materiae, unde non invenitur nisi in +compositis ex materia et forma. Sed pati prout importat receptionem +solam, non est necessarium quod sit materiae, sed potest esse +cuiuscumque existentis in potentia. Anima autem, etsi non sit +composita ex materia et forma, habet tamen aliquid potentialitatis, +secundum quam convenit sibi recipere et pati, secundum quod +intelligere pati est, ut dicitur in III de anima.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Although it does not belong to the soul in itself to be passive and to be moved, yet it belongs accidentally as stated in + De Anima i, 3. +
[34522] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod pati et moveri, etsi non conveniat animae per se, +convenit tamen ei per accidens, ut in I de anima dicitur.
+ Reply to Objection 3: This argument is true of passion accompanied by transmutation to something worse. And passion, in this sense, is not found + in the soul, except accidentally: but the composite, which is corruptible, admits of it by reason of its own nature. +
[34523] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de passione quae est cum +transmutatione ad deterius. Et huiusmodi passio animae convenire +non potest nisi per accidens, per se autem convenit composito, quod +est corruptibile.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that passion is in the apprehensive part of the soul rather than in the appetitive. Because that which is first + in any genus, seems to rank first among all things that are in that genus, and to be their cause, as is stated in Metaph. + ii, 1. Now passion is found to be in the apprehensive, before being in the appetitive part: for the appetitive part is not + affected unless there be a previous passion in the apprehensive part. Therefore passion is in + the apprehensive part more than in the appetitive. +
[34524] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod passio magis sit in parte animae +apprehensiva quam in parte appetitiva. Quod enim est primum in +quolibet genere videtur esse maximum eorum quae sunt in genere +illo, et causa aliorum, ut dicitur in II Metaphys. Sed passio prius +invenitur in parte apprehensiva quam in parte appetitiva, non enim +patitur pars appetitiva, nisi passione praecedente in parte +apprehensiva. Ergo passio est magis in parte apprehensiva quam in +parte appetitiva.
+ Objection 2: Further, what is more active is less passive; for action is contrary to passion. Now the appetitive part is more active than + the apprehensive part. Therefore it seems that passion is more in the apprehensive part. +
[34525] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +quod est magis activum, videtur esse minus passivum, actio enim +passioni opponitur. Sed pars appetitiva est magis activa quam pars +apprehensiva. Ergo videtur quod in parte apprehensiva magis sit +passio.
+ Objection 3: Further, just as the sensitive appetite is the power of a corporeal organ, so is the power of sensitive apprehension. But + passion in the soul occurs, properly speaking, in respect of a bodily transmutation. Therefore passion is not more in the + sensitive appetitive than in the sensitive apprehensive part. +
[34526] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sicut appetitus sensitivus est virtus in organo corporali, ita et +vis apprehensiva sensitiva. Sed passio animae fit, proprie +loquendo, secundum transmutationem corporalem. Ergo non magis est +passio in parte appetitiva sensitiva quam in apprehensiva +sensitiva.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that "the movement of the soul, which the Greeks called {pathe}, are styled by some of + our writers, Cicero [*Those things which the Greeks call {pathe}, we prefer to call disturbances rather than diseases (Tusc. + iv. 5)] for instance, disturbances; by some, affections or emotions; while others rendering the Greek more accurately, call + them passions." From this it is evident that the passions of the soul are the same as + affections. But affections manifestly belong to the appetitive, and not to the apprehensive part. Therefore the passions are + in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part. +
[34527] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in IX de Civ. Dei, quod motus animi, +quos Graeci pathe, nostri autem quidam, sicut Cicero, +perturbationes, quidam affectiones vel affectus, quidam vero, sicut +in Graeco habetur, expressius passiones vocant. Ex quo patet +quod passiones animae sunt idem quod affectiones. Sed affectiones +manifeste pertinent ad partem appetitivam, et non ad apprehensivam. +Ergo et passiones magis sunt in appetitiva quam in +apprehensiva.
+ I answer that, As we have already stated + (A[1]) the word "passion" implies that the patient is drawn to that which belongs to the agent. Now the soul is drawn to a thing + by the appetitive power rather than by the apprehensive power: because the soul has, through its appetitive power, an order + to things as they are in themselves: hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, 4) that "good and evil," i.e. the objects of + the appetitive power, "are in things + themselves." On the other hand the apprehensive power is not drawn to a thing, as it is in itself; but knows it by reason + of an "intention" of the thing, which "intention" it has in itself, or receives in its own way. Hence we find it stated (Metaph. + vi, 4) that "the true and the false," which pertain to knowledge, "are not in things, but in the mind." Consequently it is + evident that the nature of passion is consistent with the appetitive, rather than with the apprehensive part. +
[34528] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, in nomine passionis importatur +quod patiens trahatur ad id quod est agentis. Magis autem trahitur +anima ad rem per vim appetitivam quam per vim apprehensivam. Nam +per vim appetitivam anima habet ordinem ad ipsas res, prout in +seipsis sunt, unde philosophus dicit, in VI Metaphys., quod bonum +et malum, quae sunt obiecta appetitivae potentiae, sunt in ipsis +rebus. Vis autem apprehensiva non trahitur ad rem, secundum quod in +seipsa est; sed cognoscit eam secundum intentionem rei, quam in se +habet vel recipit secundum proprium modum. Unde et ibidem dicitur +quod verum et falsum, quae ad cognitionem pertinent, non sunt in +rebus, sed in mente. Unde patet quod ratio passionis magis +invenitur in parte appetitiva quam in parte apprehensiva.
+ Reply to Objection 1: In things relating to perfection the case is the opposite, in comparison to things that pertain to defect. Because in things + relating to perfection, intensity is in proportion to the approach to one first principle; to which the nearer a thing approaches, + the more intense it is. Thus the intensity of a thing possessed of light depends on its approach to something endowed with + light in a supreme degree, to which the nearer a thing approaches the more + light it possesses. But in things that relate to defect, intensity depends, not on approach to something supreme, but in receding + from that which is perfect; because therein consists the very notion of privation and defect. Wherefore the less a thing recedes + from that which stands first, the less intense it is: and the result is that at first we always find some small defect, which + afterwards increases as it goes on. Now passion pertains to defect, because it belongs to a thing according as it + is in potentiality. Wherefore in those things that approach to the Supreme Perfection, i.e. to God, there is but little potentiality + and passion: while in other things, consequently, there is more. Hence also, in the supreme, i.e. the apprehensive, power + of the soul, passion is found less than in the other powers. +
[34529] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod e contrario se habet in his quae pertinent ad +perfectionem, et in his quae pertinent ad defectum. Nam in his quae +ad perfectionem pertinent, attenditur intensio per accessum ad unum +primum principium, cui quanto est aliquid propinquius, tanto est +magis intensum, sicut intensio lucidi attenditur per accessum ad +aliquid summe lucidum, cui quanto aliquid magis appropinquat, tanto +est magis lucidum. Sed in his quae ad defectum pertinent, +attenditur intensio non per accessum ad aliquod summum, sed per +recessum a perfecto, quia in hoc ratio privationis et defectus +consistit. Et ideo quanto minus recedit a primo, tanto est minus +intensum, et propter hoc, in principio semper invenitur parvus +defectus, qui postea procedendo magis multiplicatur. Passio autem +ad defectum pertinet, quia est alicuius secundum quod est in +potentia. Unde in his quae appropinquant primo perfecto, scilicet +Deo, invenitur parum de ratione potentiae et passionis, in aliis +autem consequenter, plus. Et sic etiam in priori vi animae, +scilicet apprehensiva, invenitur minus de ratione passionis.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The appetitive power is said to be more active, because it is, more than the apprehensive power, the principle of the exterior + action: and this for the same reason that it is more passive, namely, its being related to things as existing in themselves: + since it is through the external action that we come into contact with things. +
[34530] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod vis appetitiva dicitur esse magis activa, quia est +magis principium exterioris actus. Et hoc habet ex hoc ipso ex quo +habet quod sit magis passiva, scilicet ex hoc quod habet ordinem ad +rem ut est in seipsa, per actionem enim exteriorem pervenimus ad +consequendas res.
+ Reply to Objection 3: As stated in the + FP, Q[78], A[3] the organs of the soul can be changed in two ways. First, by a spiritual change, in respect of which the organ receives an + "intention" of the object. And this is essential to the act of the sensitive apprehension: thus is the eye changed by the + object visible, not by being colored, but by receiving an intention of color. But the organs are receptive of another and + natural change, which affects + their natural disposition; for instance, when they become hot or cold, or undergo some similar change. And whereas this kind + of change is accidental to the act of the sensitive apprehension; for instance, if the eye be wearied through gazing intently + at something or be overcome by the intensity of the object: on the other hand, it is essential to the act of the sensitive + appetite; wherefore the material element in the definitions of the movements of the appetitive part, is the natural change + of + the organ; for instance, "anger is" said to be "a kindling of the blood about the heart." Hence it is evident that the notion + of passion is more consistent with the act of the sensitive appetite, than with that of the sensitive apprehension, although + both are actions of a corporeal organ. +
[34531] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut in primo dictum est, dupliciter organum animae +potest transmutari. Uno modo, transmutatione spirituali, secundum +quod recipit intentionem rei. Et hoc per se invenitur in actu +apprehensivae virtutis sensitivae, sicut oculus immutatur a +visibili, non ita quod coloretur, sed ita quod recipiat intentionem +coloris. Est autem alia naturalis transmutatio organi, prout +organum transmutatur quantum ad suam naturalem dispositionem, puta +quod calefit aut infrigidatur, vel alio simili modo transmutatur. +Et huiusmodi transmutatio per accidens se habet ad actum +apprehensivae virtutis sensitivae, puta cum oculus fatigatur ex +forti intuitu, vel dissolvitur ex vehementia visibilis. Sed ad +actum appetitus sensitivi per se ordinatur huiusmodi transmutatio, +unde in definitione motuum appetitivae partis, materialiter ponitur +aliqua naturalis transmutatio organi; sicut dicitur quod ira est +accensio sanguinis circa cor. Unde patet quod ratio passionis magis +invenitur in actu sensitivae virtutis appetitivae, quam in actu +sensitivae virtutis apprehensivae, licet utraque sit actus organi +corporalis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that passion is not more in the sensitive than in the intellectual appetite. For Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. + ii) Hierotheus "to be taught by a kind of yet more Godlike instruction; not only by learning Divine things, but also by suffering + [patiens] them." But the sensitive appetite cannot "suffer" Divine things, since its object is the sensible good. Therefore + passion is in the intellectual appetite, just as it is also in the sensitive + appetite. +
[34532] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod passio non magis sit in appetitu +sensitivo quam in appetitu intellectivo. Dicit enim Dionysius, II +cap. de Div. Nom., quod Hierotheus ex quadam est doctus +diviniore inspiratione, non solum discens, sed etiam patiens +divina. Sed passio divinorum non potest pertinere ad appetitum +sensitivum, cuius obiectum est bonum sensibile. Ergo passio est in +appetitu intellectivo, sicut et in sensitivo.
+ Objection 2: Further, the more powerful the active force, the more intense the passion. But the object of the intellectual appetite, which + is the universal good, is a more powerful active force than the object of the sensitive appetite, which is a particular good. + Therefore passion is more consistent with the intellectual than with the sensitive appetite. +
[34533] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +quanto activum est potentius, tanto passio est fortior. Sed +obiectum appetitus intellectivi, quod est bonum universale, est +potentius activum quam obiectum appetitus sensitivi, quod est bonum +particulare. Ergo ratio passionis magis invenitur in appetitu +intellectivo quam in appetitu sensitivo.
+ Objection 3: Further, joy and love are said to be passions. But these are to be found in the intellectual and not only in the sensitive + appetite: else they would not be ascribed by the Scriptures to God and the angels. Therefore the passions are not more in + the sensitive than in the intellectual appetite. +
[34534] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +gaudium et amor passiones quaedam esse dicuntur. Sed haec +inveniuntur in appetitu intellectivo, et non solum in sensitivo, +alioquin non attribuerentur in Scripturis Deo et Angelis. Ergo +passiones non magis sunt in appetitu sensitivo quam in +intellectivo.
+ On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22), while describing the animal passions: "Passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite + when we imagine good or evil: in other words, passion is a movement of the irrational soul, when we think of good or evil." +
[34535] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicit Damascenus, in II libro, describens animales +passiones, passio est motus appetitivae virtutis sensibilis in +imaginatione boni vel mali. Et aliter, passio est motus +irrationalis animae per suspicionem boni vel mali.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[1]) passion is properly to be found where there is corporeal transmutation. This corporeal transmutation is found in the act + of the sensitive appetite, and is not only spiritual, as in the sensitive apprehension, but also natural. Now there is no + need for corporeal transmutation in the act of the intellectual appetite: because this appetite is not exercised by means + of a corporeal organ. It is therefore evident + that passion is more properly in the act of the sensitive appetite, than in that of the intellectual appetite; and this is + again evident from the definitions of Damascene quoted above. +
[34536] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, passio proprie invenitur ubi +est transmutatio corporalis. Quae quidem invenitur in actibus +appetitus sensitivi; et non solum spiritualis, sicut est in +apprehensione sensitiva, sed etiam naturalis. In actu autem +appetitus intellectivi non requiritur aliqua transmutatio +corporalis, quia huiusmodi appetitus non est virtus alicuius +organi. Unde patet quod ratio passionis magis proprie invenitur in +actu appetitus sensitivi quam intellectivi; ut etiam patet per +definitiones Damasceni inductas.
+ Reply to Objection 1: By "suffering" Divine things is meant being well affected towards them, and united to them by love: and this takes place + without any alteration in the body. +
[34537] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod passio divinorum ibi dicitur affectio ad divina, +et coniunctio ad ipsa per amorem, quod tamen fit sine +transmutatione corporali.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Intensity of passion depends not only on the power of the agent, but also on the passibility of the patient: because things + that are disposed to passion, suffer much even from petty agents. Therefore although the object of the intellectual appetite + has greater activity than the object of the sensitive appetite, yet the sensitive appetite is more passive. +
[34538] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod magnitudo passionis non solum dependet ex virtute +agentis, sed etiam ex passibilitate patientis, quia quae sunt bene +passibilia, multum patiuntur etiam a parvis activis. Licet ergo +obiectum appetitus intellectivi sit magis activum quam obiectum +appetitus sensitivi, tamen appetitus sensitivus est magis +passivus.
+ Reply to Objection 3: When love and joy and the like are ascribed to God or the angels, or to man in respect of his intellectual appetite, they + signify simple acts of the will having like effects, but without passion. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5): "The holy + angels feel no anger while they punish . . . no fellow-feeling with misery while they relieve the unhappy: and yet ordinary + human speech is wont to ascribe to them also these passions by name, because, + although they have none of our weakness, their acts bear a certain resemblance to ours." +
[34539] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod amor et gaudium et alia huiusmodi, cum attribuuntur +Deo vel Angelis, aut hominibus secundum appetitum intellectivum, +significant simplicem actum voluntatis cum similitudine effectus, +absque passione. Unde dicit Augustinus, IX de Civ. Dei, sancti +Angeli et sine ira puniunt et sine miseriae compassione subveniunt. +Et tamen, istarum nomina passionum, consuetudine locutionis +humanae, etiam in eos usurpantur, propter quandam operum +similitudinem, non propter affectionum infirmitatem.
We must now consider how the passions differ from one another: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from those of the irascible part?
+[34540] +Iª-IIae q. 23 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +passionum differentia ad invicem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. +Primo, utrum passiones quae sunt in concupiscibili, sint diversae +ab his quae sunt in irascibili. Secundo, utrum contrarietas +passionum irascibili sit secundum contrarietatem boni et mali. +Tertio, utrum sit aliqua passio non habens contrarium. Quarto, +utrum sint aliquae passiones differentes specie, in eadem potentia, +non contrariae ad invicem.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the same passions are in the irascible and concupiscible parts. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) + that the passions of the soul are those emotions "which are followed by joy or sorrow." But joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible + part. Therefore all the passions are in the concupiscible part, and not some in the irascible, others in the concupiscible + part. +
[34541] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod passiones eaedem sint in irascibili et +in concupiscibili. Dicit enim philosophus, in II Ethic., quod +passiones animae sunt quas sequitur gaudium et tristitia. Sed +gaudium et tristitia sunt in concupiscibili. Ergo omnes passiones +sunt in concupiscibili. Non ergo sunt aliae in irascibili, et aliae +in concupiscibili.
+ Objection 2: Further, on the words of + Mat. 13:33, "The kingdom of heaven is like to leaven," etc., Jerome's gloss says: "We should have prudence in the reason; hatred of vice + in the irascible faculty; desire of virtue, in the concupiscible part." But hatred is in the concupiscible faculty, as also + is love, of which it is the contrary, as is stated in Topic. ii, 7. Therefore the same passion is in the concupiscible and + irascible faculties. +
[34542] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Matth. XIII, super illud, simile est regnum caelorum +fermento etc., dicit Glossa Hieronymi, in ratione +possideamus prudentiam, in irascibili odium vitiorum, in +concupiscibili desiderium virtutum. Sed odium est in +concupiscibili, sicut et amor, cui contrariatur, ut dicitur in II +Topic. Ergo eadem passio est in concupiscibili et irascibili.
+ Objection 3: Further, passions and actions differ specifically according to their objects. But the objects of the irascible and concupiscible + passions are the same, viz. good and evil. Therefore the same passions are in the irascible and concupiscible faculties. +
[34543] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +passiones et actus differunt specie secundum obiecta. Sed passionum +irascibilis et concupiscibilis eadem obiecta sunt, scilicet bonum +et malum. Ergo eaedem sunt passiones irascibilis et +concupiscibilis.
+ On the contrary, The acts of the different powers differ in species; for instance, to see, and to hear. But the irascible and the concupiscible + are two powers into which the sensitive appetite is divided, as stated in the + FP, Q[81], A[2]. Therefore, since the passions are movements of the sensitive appetite, as stated above (Q[22], A[3]), the passions of the + irascible faculty are specifically distinct from those of the concupiscible part. +
[34544] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra, +diversarum potentiarum actus sunt specie diversi, sicut videre et +audire. Sed irascibilis et concupiscibilis sunt duae potentiae +dividentes appetitum sensitivum, ut in primo dictum est. Ergo, cum +passiones sint motus appetitus sensitivi, ut supra dictum est, +passiones quae sunt in irascibili, erunt aliae secundum speciem a +passionibus quae sunt in concupiscibili.
+ I answer that, The passions of the irascible part differ in species from those of the concupiscible faculty. For since different powers + have different objects, as stated in the + FP, Q[77], A[3], the passions of different powers must of necessity be referred to different objects. Much more, therefore, do the passions + of different faculties differ in species; since a greater difference in the object is required to diversify the species of + the powers, + than to diversify the species of passions or actions. For just as in the physical order, diversity of genus arises from diversity + in the potentiality of matter, while diversity of species arises from diversity of form in the same matter; so in the acts + of the soul, those that belong to different powers, differ not only in species but also in genus, while acts and passions + regarding different specific objects, included under the one common object of a single power, differ as the species of that + genus. +
In order, therefore, to discern which passions are in the irascible, and which in the concupiscible, we must take the object + of each of these powers. For we have stated in the + FP, Q[81], A[2], that the object of the concupiscible power is sensible good or evil, simply apprehended as such, which causes pleasure or + pain. But, since the soul must, of necessity, experience difficulty or struggle at times, in acquiring some such good, or + in avoiding some such + evil, in so far as such good or evil is more than our animal nature can easily acquire or avoid; therefore this very good + or evil, inasmuch as it is of an arduous or difficult nature, is the object of the irascible faculty. Therefore whatever passions + regard good or evil absolutely, belong to the concupiscible power; for instance, joy, sorrow, love, hatred, and such like: + whereas those passions which regard good or bad as arduous, through being difficult to obtain or avoid, belong to the + irascible faculty; such are daring, fear, hope and the like. +
[34545] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod passiones quae sunt in irascibili et in +concupiscibili, differunt specie. Cum enim diversae potentiae +habeant diversa obiecta, ut in primo dictum est, necesse est quod +passiones diversarum potentiarum ad diversa obiecta referantur. +Unde multo magis passiones diversarum potentiarum specie differunt, +maior enim differentia obiecti requiritur ad diversificandam +speciem potentiarum, quam ad diversificandam speciem passionum vel +actuum. Sicut enim in naturalibus diversitas generis consequitur +diversitatem potentiae materiae, diversitas autem speciei +diversitatem formae in eadem materia; ita in actibus animae, actus +ad diversas potentias pertinentes, sunt non solum specie, sed etiam +genere diversi; actus autem vel passiones respicientes diversa +obiecta specialia comprehensa sub uno communi obiecto unius +potentiae, differunt sicut species illius generis. Ad cognoscendum +ergo quae passiones sint in irascibili, et quae in concupiscibili, +oportet assumere obiectum utriusque potentiae. Dictum est autem in +primo quod obiectum potentiae concupiscibilis est bonum vel malum +sensibile simpliciter acceptum, quod est delectabile vel dolorosum. +Sed quia necesse est quod interdum anima difficultatem vel pugnam +patiatur in adipiscendo aliquod huiusmodi bonum, vel fugiendo +aliquod huiusmodi malum, inquantum hoc est quodammodo elevatum +supra facilem potestatem animalis; ideo ipsum bonum vel malum, +secundum quod habet rationem ardui vel difficilis, est obiectum +irascibilis. Quaecumque ergo passiones respiciunt absolute bonum +vel malum, pertinent ad concupiscibilem; ut gaudium, tristitia, +amor, odium, et similia. Quaecumque vero passiones respiciunt bonum +vel malum sub ratione ardui, prout est aliquid adipiscibile vel +fugibile cum aliqua difficultate, pertinent ad irascibilem; ut +audacia, timor, spes, et huiusmodi.
+ Reply to Objection 1: As stated in the + FP, Q[81], A[2], the irascible faculty is bestowed on animals, in order to remove the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible power from + tending towards its object, either by making some good difficult to obtain, or by making some evil hard to avoid. The result + is that all the irascible passions terminate in the concupiscible passions: and thus it is that even the passions which are + in the irascible faculty + are followed by joy and sadness which are in the concupiscible faculty. +
[34546] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut in primo dictum est, ad hoc vis +irascibilis data est animalibus, ut tollantur impedimenta quibus +concupiscibilis in suum obiectum tendere prohibetur, vel propter +difficultatem boni adipiscendi, vel propter difficultatem mali +superandi. Et ideo passiones irascibilis omnes terminantur ad +passiones concupiscibilis. Et secundum hoc, etiam passiones quae +sunt in irascibili, consequitur gaudium et tristitia, quae sunt in +concupiscibili.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Jerome ascribes hatred of vice to the irascible faculty, not by reason of hatred, which is properly a concupiscible passion; + but on account of the struggle, which belongs to the irascible power. +
[34547] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod odium vitiorum attribuit Hieronymus irascibili, non +propter rationem odii, quae proprie competit concupiscibili; sed +propter impugnationem, quae pertinet ad irascibilem.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Good, inasmuch as it is delightful, moves the concupiscible power. But if it prove difficult to obtain, from this very fact + it has a certain contrariety to the concupiscible power: and hence the need of another power tending to that good. The same + applies to evil. And this power is the irascible faculty. Consequently the concupiscible passions are specifically different + from the irascible passions. +
[34548] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod bonum inquantum est delectabile, movet +concupiscibilem. Sed si bonum habeat quandam difficultatem ad +adipiscendum, ex hoc ipso habet aliquid repugnans concupiscibili. +Et ideo necessarium fuit esse aliam potentiam quae in id tenderet. +Et eadem ratio est de malis. Et haec potentia est irascibilis. Unde +ex consequenti passiones concupiscibilis et irascibilis specie +differunt.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the contrariety of the irascible passions is based on no other contrariety than that of good and evil. + For the irascible passions are ordained to the concupiscible passions, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). But the contrariety of + the concupiscible passions is no other than that of good and evil; take, for instance, love and hatred, joy and sorrow. Therefore + the same applies to the irascible passions. +
[34549] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod contrarietas passionum irascibilis non +sit nisi secundum contrarietatem boni et mali. Passiones enim +irascibilis ordinantur ad passiones concupiscibilis, ut dictum est. +Sed passiones concupiscibilis non contrariantur nisi secundum +contrarietatem boni et mali; sicut amor et odium, gaudium et +tristitia. Ergo nec passiones irascibilis.
+ Objection 2: Further, passions differ according to their objects; just as movements differ according to their termini. But there is no + other contrariety of movements, except that of the termini, as is stated in Phys. v, 3. Therefore there is no other contrariety + of passions, save that of the objects. Now the object of the appetite is good or evil. Therefore in no appetitive power can + there be contrariety of passions other than that of good and evil. +
[34550] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +passiones differunt secundum obiecta; sicut et motus secundum +terminos. Sed contrarietas non est in motibus nisi secundum +contrarietatem terminorum, ut patet in V Physic. Ergo neque in +passionibus est contrarietas nisi secundum contrarietatem +obiectorum. Obiectum autem appetitus est bonum vel malum. Ergo in +nulla potentia appetitiva potest esse contrarietas passionum nisi +secundum contrarietatem boni et mali.
+ Objection 3: Further, "every passion of the soul is by way of approach and withdrawal," as Avicenna declares in his sixth book of Physics. + Now approach results from the apprehension of good; withdrawal, from the apprehension of evil: since just as "good is what + all desire" (Ethic. i, 1), so evil is what all shun. Therefore, in the passions of the soul, there can be no other contrariety + than that of good and evil. +
[34551] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 2 arg. 3 +Praeterea, omnis passio animae attenditur secundum accessum et +recessum, ut Avicenna dicit, in sexto de naturalibus. Sed +accessus causatur ex ratione boni, recessus autem ex ratione mali, +quia sicut bonum est quod omnia appetunt, ut dicitur in I Ethic., +ita malum est quod omnia fugiunt. Ergo contrarietas in passionibus +animae non potest esse nisi secundum bonum et malum.
+ On the contrary, Fear and daring are contrary to one another, as stated in Ethic. iii, 7. But fear and daring do not differ in respect of + good and evil: because each regards some kind of evil. Therefore not every contrariety of the irascible passions is that of + good and evil. +
[34552] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra, +timor et audacia sunt contraria, ut patet in III Ethic. sed timor +et audacia non differunt secundum bonum et malum, quia utrumque est +respectu aliquorum malorum. Ergo non omnis contrarietas passionum +irascibilis est secundum contrarietatem boni et mali.
+ I answer that, Passion is a kind of movement, as stated in Phys. iii, 3. Therefore contrariety of passions is based on contrariety of movements + or changes. Now there is a twofold contrariety in changes and movements, as stated in Phys. v, 5. One is according to approach + and withdrawal in respect of the same term: and this contrariety belongs properly to changes, i.e. to generation, which is + a change "to being," and to corruption, which is a change "from being." The other + contrariety is according to opposition of termini, and belongs properly to movements: thus whitening, which is movement from + black to white, is contrary to blackening, which is movement from white to black. +
Accordingly there is a twofold contrariety in the passions of the soul: one, according to contrariety of objects, i.e. of + good and evil; the other, according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same term. In the concupiscible passions + the former contrariety alone is to be found; viz. that which is based on the objects: whereas in the irascible passions, we + find both forms of contrariety. The reason of this is that the object of the concupiscible faculty, as stated above + + (A[1]), is sensible good or evil considered absolutely. Now good, as such, cannot be a term wherefrom, but only a term whereto, + since nothing shuns good as such; on the contrary, all things desire it. In like manner, nothing desires evil, as such; but + all things shun it: wherefore evil cannot have the aspect of a term whereto, but only of a term wherefrom. Accordingly every + concupiscible passion in respect of good, tends to it, as love, desire and joy; while every + concupiscible passion in respect of evil, tends from it, as hatred, avoidance or dislike, and sorrow. Wherefore, in the concupiscible + passions, there can be no contrariety of approach and withdrawal in respect of the same object. +
On the other hand, the object of the irascible faculty is sensible good or evil, considered not absolutely, but under the + aspect of difficulty or arduousness. Now the good which is difficult or arduous, considered as good, is of such a nature as + to produce in us a tendency to it, which tendency pertains to the passion of "hope"; whereas, considered as arduous or difficult, + it makes us turn from it; and this pertains to the passion of "despair." In like manner the arduous evil, + considered as an evil, has the aspect of something to be shunned; and this belongs to the passion of "fear": but it also contains + a reason for tending to it, as attempting something arduous, whereby to escape being subject to evil; and this tendency is + called "daring." Consequently, in the irascible passions we find contrariety in respect of good and evil (as between hope + and fear): and also contrariety according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same term (as between daring and + fear). +
[34553] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod passio quidam motus est, ut dicitur in III Physic. +Unde oportet contrarietatem passionum accipere secundum +contrarietatem motuum vel mutationum. Est autem duplex contrarietas +in mutationibus vel motibus, ut dicitur in V Physic. Una quidem +secundum accessum et recessum ab eodem termino, quae quidem +contrarietas est proprie mutationum, idest generationis, quae est +mutatio ad esse, et corruptionis, quae est mutatio ab esse. Alia +autem secundum contrarietatem terminorum, quae proprie est +contrarietas motuum, sicut dealbatio, quae est motus a nigro in +album, opponitur denigrationi, quae est motus ab albo in nigrum. +Sic igitur in passionibus animae duplex contrarietas invenitur, una +quidem secundum contrarietatem obiectorum, scilicet boni et mali; +alia vero secundum accessum et recessum ab eodem termino. In +passionibus quidem concupiscibilis invenitur prima contrarietas +tantum, quae scilicet est secundum obiecta, in passionibus autem +irascibilis invenitur utraque. Cuius ratio est quia obiectum +concupiscibilis, ut supra dictum est, est bonum vel malum sensibile +absolute. Bonum autem, inquantum bonum, non potest esse terminus ut +a quo, sed solum ut ad quem, quia nihil refugit bonum inquantum +bonum, sed omnia appetunt ipsum. Similiter nihil appetit malum +inquantum huiusmodi, sed omnia fugiunt ipsum, et propter hoc, malum +non habet rationem termini ad quem, sed solum termini a quo. Sic +igitur omnis passio concupiscibilis respectu boni, est ut in ipsum, +sicut amor, desiderium et gaudium, omnis vero passio eius respectu +mali, est ut ab ipso, sicut odium, fuga seu abominatio, et +tristitia. Unde in passionibus concupiscibilis non potest esse +contrarietas secundum accessum et recessum ab eodem obiecto. Sed +obiectum irascibilis est sensibile bonum vel malum, non quidem +absolute, sed sub ratione difficultatis vel arduitatis, ut supra +dictum est. Bonum autem arduum sive difficile habet rationem ut in +ipsum tendatur, inquantum est bonum, quod pertinet ad passionem +spei; et ut ab ipso recedatur, inquantum est arduum vel difficile, +quod pertinet ad passionem desperationis. Similiter malum arduum +habet rationem ut vitetur, inquantum est malum, et hoc pertinet ad +passionem timoris, habet etiam rationem ut in ipsum tendatur, sicut +in quoddam arduum, per quod scilicet aliquid evadit subiectionem +mali, et sic tendit in ipsum audacia. Invenitur ergo in passionibus +irascibilis contrarietas secundum contrarietatem boni et mali, +sicut inter spem et timorem, et iterum secundum accessum et +recessum ab eodem termino, sicut inter audaciam et timorem.
Reply to Objections: From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.
[34554] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 2 ad arg. Et per hoc +patet responsio ad obiecta.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that every passion of the soul has a contrary. For every passion of the soul is either in the irascible or + in the concupiscible faculty, as stated above + (A[1]). But both kinds of passion have their respective modes of contrariety. Therefore every passion of the soul has its contrary. +
[34555] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis passio animae habeat aliquid +contrarium. Omnis enim passio animae vel est in irascibili vel in +concupiscibili, sicut supra dictum est. Sed utraeque passiones +habent contrarietatem suo modo. Ergo omnis passio animae habet +contrarium.
+ Objection 2: Further, every passion of the soul has either good or evil for its object; for these are the common objects of the appetitive + part. But a passion having good for its object, is contrary to a passion having evil for its object. Therefore every passion + has a contrary. +
[34556] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +omnis passio animae habet vel bonum vel malum pro obiecto, quae +sunt obiecta universaliter appetitivae partis. Sed passioni cuius +obiectum est bonum, opponitur passio cuius obiectum est malum. Ergo +omnis passio habet contrarium.
+ Objection 3: Further, every passion of the soul is in respect of approach or withdrawal, as stated above + (A[2]). But every approach has a corresponding contrary withdrawal, and vice versa. Therefore every passion of the soul has a contrary. +
[34557] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +omnis passio animae est secundum accessum vel secundum recessum, ut +dictum est. Sed cuilibet accessui contrariatur recessus, et e +converso. Ergo omnis passio animae habet contrarium.
+ On the contrary, Anger is a passion of the soul. But no passion is set down as being contrary to anger, as stated in Ethic. iv, 5. Therefore + not every passion has a contrary. +
[34558] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra, +ira est quaedam passio animae. Sed nulla passio ponitur contraria +irae, ut patet in IV Ethic. Ergo non omnis passio habet +contrarium.
+ I answer that, The passion of anger is peculiar in this, that it cannot have a contrary, either according to approach and withdrawal, or + according to the contrariety of good and evil. For anger is caused by a difficult evil already present: and when such an evil + is present, the appetite must needs either succumb, so that it does not go beyond the limits of "sadness," which is a concupiscible + passion; or else it has a movement of attack on the hurtful evil, which movement + is that of "anger." But it cannot have a movement of withdrawal: because the evil is supposed to be already present or past. + Thus no passion is contrary to anger according to contrariety of approach and withdrawal. +
In like manner neither can there be according to contrariety of good and evil. Because the opposite of present evil is good + obtained, which can be no longer have the aspect of arduousness or difficulty. Nor, when once good is obtained, does there + remain any other movement, except the appetite's repose in the good obtained; which repose belongs to joy, which is a passion + of the concupiscible faculty. +
Accordingly no movement of the soul can be contrary to the movement of anger, and nothing else than cessation from its movement + is contrary thereto; thus the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "calm is contrary to anger," by opposition not of contrariety + but of negation or privation. +
[34559] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod singulare est in passione irae, quod non potest +habere contrarium, neque secundum accessum et recessum, neque +secundum contrarietatem boni et mali. Causatur enim ira ex malo +difficili iam iniacente. Ad cuius praesentiam, necesse est quod aut +appetitus succumbat, et sic non exit terminos tristitiae, quae est +passio concupiscibilis, aut habet motum ad invadendum malum +laesivum, quod pertinet ad iram. Motum autem ad fugiendum habere +non potest, quia iam malum ponitur praesens vel praeteritum. Et sic +motui irae non contrariatur aliqua passio secundum contrarietatem +accessus et recessus. Similiter etiam nec secundum contrarietatem +boni et mali. Quia malo iam iniacenti opponitur bonum iam adeptum, +quod iam non potest habere rationem ardui vel difficilis. Nec post +adeptionem boni remanet alius motus, nisi quietatio appetitus in +bono adepto, quae pertinet ad gaudium, quod est passio +concupiscibilis. Unde motus irae non potest habere aliquem motum +animae contrarium, sed solummodo opponitur ei cessatio a motu, +sicut philosophus dicit, in sua rhetorica, quod mitescere +opponitur ei quod est irasci, quod non est oppositum contrarie, +sed negative vel privative.
Reply to Objections: From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.
[34560] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 3 ad arg. Et per hoc +patet responsio ad obiecta.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be, in the same power, specifically different passions that are not contrary to one another. + For the passions of the soul differ according to their objects. Now the objects of the soul's passions are good and evil; + and on this distinction is based the contrariety of the passions. Therefore no passions of the same power, that are not contrary + to one another, differ specifically. +
[34561] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non possint in aliqua potentia esse +passiones specie differentes, et non contrariae ad invicem. +Passiones enim animae differunt secundum obiecta. Obiecta autem +passionum animae sunt bonum et malum, secundum quorum differentiam +passiones habent contrarietatem. Ergo nullae passiones eiusdem +potentiae, non habentes contrarietatem ad invicem, differunt +specie.
+ Objection 2: Further, difference of species implies a difference of form. But every difference of form is in respect of some contrariety, + as stated in Metaph. x, 8. Therefore passions of the same power, that are not contrary to one another, do not differ specifically. +
[34562] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +differentia speciei est differentia secundum formam. Sed omnis +differentia secundum formam, est secundum aliquam contrarietatem, +ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Ergo passiones eiusdem potentiae quae non +sunt contrariae, non differunt specie.
+ Objection 3: Further, since every passion of the soul consists in approach or withdrawal in respect of good or evil, it seems that every + difference in the passions of the soul must needs arise from the difference of good and evil; or from the difference of approach + and withdrawal; or from degrees in approach or withdrawal. Now the first two differences cause contrariety in the passions + of the soul, as stated above + (A[2]): whereas the third + difference does not diversify the species; else the species of the soul's passions would be infinite. Therefore it is not + possible for passions of the same power to differ in species, without being contrary to one another. +
[34563] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +cum omnis passio animae consistat in accessu vel recessu ad bonum +vel ad malum, necesse videtur quod omnis differentia passionum +animae sit vel secundum differentiam boni et mali; vel secundum +differentiam accessus et recessus; vel secundum maiorem vel minorem +accessum aut recessum. Sed primae duae differentiae inducunt +contrarietatem in passionibus animae, ut dictum est. Tertia autem +differentia non diversificat speciem, quia sic essent infinitae +species passionum animae. Ergo non potest esse quod passiones +eiusdem potentiae animae differant specie, et non sint +contrariae.
+ On the contrary, Love and joy differ in species, and are in the concupiscible power; and yet they are not contrary to one another; rather, + in fact, one causes the other. Therefore in the same power there are passions that differ in species without being contrary + to one another. +
[34564] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra, +amor et gaudium differunt specie, et sunt in concupiscibili. Nec +tamen contrariantur ad invicem, quin potius unum est causa +alterius. Ergo sunt aliquae passiones eiusdem potentiae quae +differunt specie, nec sunt contrariae.
+ I answer that, Passions differ in accordance with their active causes, which, in the case of the passions of the soul, are their objects. + Now, the difference in active causes may be considered in two ways: first, from the point of view of their species or nature, + as fire differs from water; secondly, from the point of view of the difference in their active power. In the passions of the + soul we can treat the difference of their active or motive causes in respect of their + motive power, as if they were natural agents. For every mover, in a fashion, either draws the patient to itself, or repels + it from itself. Now in drawing it to itself, it does three things in the patient. Because, in the first place, it gives the + patient an inclination or aptitude to tend to the mover: thus a light body, which is above, bestows lightness on the body + generated, so that it has an inclination or aptitude to be above. Secondly, if the generated body be outside its proper place, + the + mover gives it movement towards that place. Thirdly, it makes it to rest, when it shall have come to its proper place: since + to the same cause are due, both rest in a place, and the movement to that place. The same applies to the cause of repulsion. +
Now, in the movements of the appetitive faculty, good has, as it were, a force of attraction, while evil has a force of repulsion. + In the first place, therefore, good causes, in the appetitive power, a certain inclination, aptitude or connaturalness in + respect of good: and this belongs to the passion of "love": the corresponding contrary of which is "hatred" in respect of + evil. Secondly, if the good be not yet possessed, it causes in the appetite a movement towards the + attainment of the good beloved: and this belongs to the passion of "desire" or "concupiscence": and contrary to it, in respect + of evil, is the passion of "aversion" or "dislike." Thirdly, when the good is obtained, it causes the appetite to rest, as + it were, in the good obtained: and this belongs to the passion of "delight" or "joy"; the contrary of which, in respect of + evil, is "sorrow" or "sadness." +
On the other hand, in the irascible passions, the aptitude, or inclination to seek good, or to shun evil, is presupposed + as arising from the concupiscible faculty, which regards good or evil absolutely. And in respect of good not yet obtained, + we have "hope" and "despair." In respect of evil not yet present we have "fear" and "daring." But in respect of good obtained + there is no irascible passion: because it is no longer considered in the light of something arduous, as stated + above + (A[3]). But evil already present gives rise to the passion of "anger." +
Accordingly it is clear that in the concupiscible faculty there are three couples of passions; viz. love and hatred, desire + and aversion, joy and sadness. In like manner there are three groups in the irascible faculty; viz. hope and despair, fear + and daring, and anger which has not contrary passion. +
Consequently there are altogether eleven passions differing specifically; six in the concupiscible faculty, and five in the + irascible; and under these all the passions of the soul are contained. +
[34565] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod passiones differunt secundum activa, quae sunt +obiecta passionum animae. Differentia autem activorum potest +attendi dupliciter, uno modo, secundum speciem vel naturam ipsorum +activorum, sicut ignis differt ab aqua; alio modo, secundum +diversam virtutem activam. Diversitas autem activi vel motivi +quantum ad virtutem movendi, potest accipi in passionibus animae +secundum similitudinem agentium naturalium. Omne enim movens trahit +quodammodo ad se patiens, vel a se repellit. Trahendo quidem ad se, +tria facit in ipso. Nam primo quidem, dat ei inclinationem vel +aptitudinem ut in ipsum tendat, sicut cum corpus leve, quod est +sursum, dat levitatem corpori generato, per quam habet +inclinationem vel aptitudinem ad hoc quod sit sursum. Secundo, si +corpus generatum est extra locum proprium, dat ei moveri ad locum. +Tertio, dat ei quiescere, in locum cum pervenerit, quia ex eadem +causa aliquid quiescit in loco, per quam movebatur ad locum. Et +similiter intelligendum est de causa repulsionis. In motibus autem +appetitivae partis, bonum habet quasi virtutem attractivam, malum +autem virtutem repulsivam. Bonum ergo primo quidem in potentia +appetitiva causat quandam inclinationem, seu aptitudinem, seu +connaturalitatem ad bonum, quod pertinet ad passionem amoris. Cui +per contrarium respondet odium, ex parte mali. Secundo, si bonum +sit nondum habitum, dat ei motum ad assequendum bonum amatum, et +hoc pertinet ad passionem desiderii vel concupiscentiae. Et ex +opposito, ex parte mali, est fuga vel abominatio. Tertio, cum +adeptum fuerit bonum, dat appetitus quietationem quandam in ipso +bono adepto, et hoc pertinet ad delectationem vel gaudium. Cui +opponitur ex parte mali dolor vel tristitia. In passionibus autem +irascibilis, praesupponitur quidem aptitudo vel inclinatio ad +prosequendum bonum vel fugiendum malum, ex concupiscibili, quae +absolute respicit bonum vel malum. Et respectu boni nondum adepti, +est spes et desperatio. Respectu autem mali nondum iniacentis, est +timor et audacia. Respectu autem boni adepti, non est aliqua passio +in irascibili, quia iam non habet rationem ardui, ut supra dictum +est. Sed ex malo iam iniacenti, sequitur passio irae. Sic igitur +patet quod in concupiscibili sunt tres coniugationes passionum, +scilicet amor et odium, desiderium et fuga gaudium et tristitia. +Similiter in irascibili sunt tres, scilicet spes et desperatio, +timor et audacia, et ira, cui nulla passio opponitur. Sunt ergo +omnes passiones specie differentes undecim, sex quidem in +concupiscibili, et quinque in irascibili; sub quibus omnes animae +passiones continentur.
Reply to Objections: From this the replies to the objections are evident.
[34566] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 4 ad arg. Et per hoc +patet responsio ad obiecta.
We must now consider good and evil in the passions of the soul: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul?
(2) Whether every passion of the soul is morally evil?
(3) Whether every passion increases or decreases the goodness of malice of an act?
+[34567] +Iª-IIae q. 24 pr. Deinde considerandum est de bono +et malo circa passiones animae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. +Primo, utrum bonum et malum morale possit in passionibus animae +inveniri. Secundo, utrum omnis passio animae sit mala moraliter. +Tertio, utrum omnis passio addat, vel diminuat, ad bonitatem vel +malitiam actus. Quarto, utrum aliqua passio sit bona vel mala ex +sua specie.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that no passion of the soul is morally good or evil. For moral good and evil are proper to man: since "morals + are properly predicated of man," as Ambrose says (Super Luc. Prolog.). But passions are not proper to man, for he has them + in common with other animals. Therefore no passion of the soul is morally good or evil. +
[34568] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod nulla passio animae sit bona vel mala +moraliter. Bonum enim et malum morale est proprium hominis, mores +enim proprie dicuntur humani, ut Ambrosius dicit, super Lucam. Sed +passiones non sunt propriae hominum, sed sunt etiam aliis +animalibus communes. Ergo nulla passio animae est bona vel mala +moraliter.
+ Objection 2: Further, the good or evil of man consists in "being in accord, or in disaccord with reason," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. + iv). Now the passions of the soul are not in the reason, but in the sensitive appetite, as stated above ( + Q[22], A[3]). Therefore they have no connection with human, i.e. moral, good or evil. +
[34569] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +bonum vel malum hominis est secundum rationem esse, vel praeter +rationem esse, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed +passiones animae non sunt in ratione, sed in appetitu sensitivo, ut +supra dictum est. Ergo non pertinent ad bonum vel malum hominis, +quod est bonum morale.
+ Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that "we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions." But we are praised + and blamed for moral good and evil. Therefore the passions are not morally good or evil. +
[34570] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod passionibus neque laudamur +neque vituperamur. Sed secundum bona et mala moralia, laudamur +et vituperamur. Ergo passiones non sunt bonae vel malae +moraliter.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) while speaking of the passions of the soul: "They are evil if our love is evil; good + if our love is good." +
[34571] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, de passionibus +animae loquens mala sunt ista, si malus est amor; bona, si +bonus.
+ I answer that, We may consider the passions of the soul in two ways: first, in themselves; secondly, as being subject to the command of + the reason and will. If then the passions be considered in themselves, to wit, as movements of the irrational appetite, thus + there is no moral good or evil in them, since this depends on the reason, as stated above ( + Q[18] , A[5]). If, however, they be considered as subject to the command of the reason and will, + then moral good and evil are in them. Because the sensitive appetite is nearer than the outward members to the reason and + will; and yet the movements and actions of the outward members are morally good or evil, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Much + more, therefore, may the passions, in so far as they are voluntary, be called morally good or evil. And they are said to be + voluntary, either from being commanded by the will, or from not being checked by the will. +
[34572] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod passiones animae dupliciter possunt considerari, uno +modo, secundum se; alio modo, secundum quod subiacent imperio +rationis et voluntatis. Si igitur secundum se considerentur, prout +scilicet sunt motus quidam irrationalis appetitus, sic non est in +eis bonum vel malum morale, quod dependet a ratione, ut supra +dictum est. Si autem considerentur secundum quod subiacent imperio +rationis et voluntatis, sic est in eis bonum et malum morale. +Propinquior enim est appetitus sensitivus ipsi rationi et +voluntati, quam membra exteriora; quorum tamen motus et actus sunt +boni vel mali moraliter, secundum quod sunt voluntarii. Unde multo +magis et ipsae passiones, secundum quod sunt voluntariae, possunt +dici bonae vel malae moraliter. Dicuntur autem voluntariae vel ex +eo quod a voluntate imperantur, vel ex eo quod a voluntate non +prohibentur.
+ Reply to Objection 1: These passions, considered in themselves, are common to man and other animals: but, as commanded by the reason, they are + proper to man. +
[34573] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod istae passiones secundum se consideratae, sunt +communes hominibus et aliis animalibus, sed secundum quod a ratione +imperantur, sunt propriae hominum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Even the lower appetitive powers are called rational, in so far as "they partake of reason in some sort" (Ethic. i, 13). +
[34574] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod etiam inferiores vires appetitivae dicuntur +rationales, secundum quod participant aliqualiter rationem, ut +dicitur in I Ethic.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher says that we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions considered absolutely; but he does not exclude + their becoming worthy of praise or blame, in so far as they are subordinate to reason. Hence he continues: "For the man who + fears or is angry, is not praised . . . or blamed, but the man who is angry in a certain way, i.e. according to, or against + reason." +
[34575] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod philosophus dicit quod non laudamur aut vituperamur +secundum passiones absolute consideratas, sed non removet quin +possint fieri laudabiles vel vituperabiles secundum quod a ratione +ordinantur. Unde subdit, non enim laudatur aut vituperatur qui +timet aut irascitur, sed qui aliqualiter, idest secundum +rationem vel praeter rationem.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that all the passions of the soul are morally evil. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that "some call + the soul's passions diseases or disturbances of the soul" [*Those things which the Greeks call {pathe}, we prefer to call + disturbances rather than diseases (Tusc. iv. 5)]. But every disease or disturbance of the soul is morally evil. Therefore + every passion of the soul is evil morally. +
[34576] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnes passiones animae sint malae +moraliter. Dicit enim Augustinus, IX de Civ. Dei, quod passiones +animae quidam vocant morbos vel perturbationes animae. Sed +omnis morbus vel perturbatio animae est aliquid malum moraliter. +Ergo omnis passio animae moraliter mala est.
+ Objection 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "movement in accord with nature is an action, but movement contrary to + nature is passion." But in movements of the soul, what is against nature is sinful and morally evil: hence he says elsewhere + (De Fide Orth. ii, 4) that "the devil turned from that which is in accord with nature to that which is against nature." Therefore + these passions are morally evil. +
[34577] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Damascenus dicit quod operatio quidem qui secundum naturam motus +est, passio vero qui praeter naturam. Sed quod est praeter +naturam in motibus animae, habet rationem peccati et mali moralis, +unde ipse alibi dicit quod Diabolus versus est ex eo quod est +secundum naturam, in id quod est praeter naturam. Ergo +huiusmodi passiones sunt malae moraliter.
+ Objection 3: Further, whatever leads to sin, has an aspect of evil. But these passions lead to sin: wherefore they are called "the passions + of sins" ( + Rom. 7:5). Therefore it seems that they are morally evil. +
[34578] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +omne quod inducit ad peccatum, habet rationem mali. Sed huiusmodi +passiones inducunt ad peccatum, unde Rom. VII dicuntur passiones +peccatorum. Ergo videtur quod sint malae moraliter.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that "all these emotions are right in those whose love is rightly placed . . . For they + fear to sin, they desire to persevere; they grieve for sin, they rejoice in good works." +
[34579] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quod rectus amor +omnes istas affectiones rectas habet. Metuunt enim peccare, cupiunt +perseverare, dolent in peccatis, gaudent in operibus bonis.
+ I answer that, On this question the opinion of the Stoics differed from that of the Peripatetics: for the Stoics held that all passions + are evil, while the Peripatetics maintained that moderate passions are good. This difference, although it appears great in + words, is nevertheless, in reality, none at all, or but little, if we consider the intent of either school. For the Stoics + did not discern between sense and intellect; and consequently neither between the intellectual + and sensitive appetite. Hence they did not discriminate the passions of the soul from the movements of the will, in so far + as the passions of the soul are in the sensitive appetite, while the simple movements of the will are in the intellectual + appetite: but every rational movement of the appetitive part they call will, while they called passion, a movement that exceeds + the limits of reason. Wherefore Cicero, following their opinion (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) calls all passions "diseases of + the + soul": whence he argues that "those who are diseased are unsound; and those who are unsound are wanting in sense." Hence we + speak of those who are wanting in sense of being "unsound." +
On the other hand, the Peripatetics give the name of "passions" to all the movements of the sensitive appetite. Wherefore + they esteem them good, when they are controlled by reason; and evil when they are not controlled by reason. Hence it is evident + that Cicero was wrong in disapproving (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) of the Peripatetic theory of a mean in the passions, when + he says that "every evil, though moderate, should be shunned; for, just as a body, though it be moderately + ailing, is not sound; so, this mean in the diseases or passions of the soul, is not sound." For passions are not called "diseases" + or "disturbances" of the soul, save when they are not controlled by reason. +
[34580] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod circa hanc quaestionem diversa fuit sententia +Stoicorum et Peripateticorum, nam Stoici dixerunt omnes passiones +esse malas; Peripatetici vero dixerunt passiones moderatas esse +bonas. Quae quidem differentia, licet magna videatur secundum +vocem, tamen secundum rem vel nulla est, vel parva, si quis +utrorumque intentiones consideret. Stoici enim non discernebant +inter sensum et intellectum; et per consequens nec inter +intellectivum appetitum et sensitivum. Unde non discernebant +passiones animae a motibus voluntatis secundum hoc quod passiones +animae sunt in appetitu sensitivo, simplices autem motus voluntatis +sunt in intellectivo; sed omnem rationabilem motum appetitivae +partis vocabant voluntatem, passionem autem dicebant motum +progredientem extra limites rationis. Et ideo, eorum sententiam +sequens, Tullius, in III libro de Tusculanis quaestionibus, omnes +passiones vocat animae morbos. Ex quo argumentatur quod qui +morbosi sunt, sani non sunt; et qui sani non sunt, insipientes +sunt. Unde et insipientes insanos dicimus. Peripatetici vero +omnes motus appetitus sensitivi passiones vocant. Unde eas bonas +aestimant, cum sunt a ratione moderatae; malas autem, cum sunt +praeter moderationem rationis. Ex quo patet quod Tullius, in eodem +libro, Peripateticorum sententiam, qui approbabant mediocritatem +passionum, inconvenienter improbat, dicens quod omne malum, +etiam mediocre, vitandum est, nam sicut corpus, etiamsi mediocriter +aegrum est, sanum non est; sic ista mediocritas morborum vel +passionum animae, sana non est. Non enim passiones dicuntur +morbi vel perturbationes animae, nisi cum carent moderatione +rationis.
Reply to Objection 1 Hence the reply to the First Objection is evident.
[34581] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 ad 1 Unde patet +responsio ad primum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: In every passion there is an increase or decrease in the natural movement of the heart, according as the heart is moved more + or less intensely by contraction and dilatation; and hence it derives the character of passion. But there is no need for passion + to deviate always from the order of natural reason. +
[34582] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod in omni passione animae additur aliquid, vel +diminuitur a naturali motu cordis, inquantum cor intensius vel +remissius movetur, secundum systolen aut diastolen, et secundum hoc +habet passionis rationem. Non tamen oportet quod passio semper +declinet ab ordine naturalis rationis.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The passions of the soul, in so far as they are contrary to the order of reason, incline us to sin: but in so far as they + are controlled by reason, they pertain to virtue. +
[34583] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod passiones animae, inquantum sunt praeter ordinem +rationis, inclinant ad peccatum, inquantum autem sunt ordinatae a +ratione, pertinent ad virtutem.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that every passion decreases the goodness of a moral action. For anything that hinders the judgment of reason, + on which depends the goodness of a moral act, consequently decreases the goodness of the moral act. But every passion hinders + the judgment of reason: for Sallust says (Catilin.): "All those that take counsel about matters of doubt, should be free from + hatred, anger, friendship and pity." Therefore passion decreases the goodness of a + moral act. +
[34584] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod passio quaecumque semper diminuat de +bonitate actus moralis. Omne enim quod impedit iudicium rationis, +ex quo dependet bonitas actus moralis, diminuit per consequens +bonitatem actus moralis. Sed omnis passio impedit iudicium +rationis, dicit enim Sallustius, in Catilinario, omnes homines +qui de rebus dubiis consultant, ab odio, ira, amicitia atque +misericordia vacuos esse decet. Ergo omnis passio diminuit +bonitatem moralis actus.
+ Objection 2: Further, the more a man's action is like to God, the better it is: hence the Apostle says ( + Eph. 5:1): "Be ye followers of God, as most dear children." But "God and the holy angels feel no anger when they punish . . . no fellow-feeling + with misery when they relieve the unhappy," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5). Therefore it is better to do such like + deeds without than with a passion of the soul. +
[34585] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +actus hominis, quanto est Deo similior, tanto est melior, unde +dicit apostolus, Ephes. V, estote imitatores Dei, sicut filii +carissimi. Sed Deus et sancti Angeli sine ira puniunt, sine +miseriae compassione subveniunt ut Augustinus dicit, in IX de +Civ. Dei. Ergo est melius huiusmodi opera bona agere sine passione +animae, quam cum passione.
+ Objection 3: Further, just as moral evil depends on its relation to reason, so also does moral good. But moral evil is lessened by passion: + for he sins less, who sins from passion, than he who sins deliberately. Therefore he does a better deed, who does well without + passion, than he who does with passion. +
[34586] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sicut malum morale attenditur per ordinem ad rationem, ita et bonum +morale. Sed malum morale diminuitur per passionem, minus enim +peccat qui peccat ex passione, quam qui peccat ex industria. Ergo +maius bonum operatur qui operatur bonum sine passione, quam qui +operatur cum passione.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "the passion of pity is obedient to reason, when pity is bestowed without violating + right, as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent forgiven." But nothing that is obedient to reason lessens the moral + good. Therefore a passion of the soul does not lessen moral good. +
[34587] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, IX de Civ. Dei, quod passio +misericordiae rationi deservit, quando ita praebetur misericordia, +ut iustitia conservetur, sive cum indigenti tribuitur, sive cum +ignoscitur poenitenti. Sed nihil quod deservit rationi, +diminuit bonum morale. Ergo passio animae non diminuit bonum +moris.
+ I answer that, As the Stoics held that every passion of the soul is evil, they consequently held that every passion of the soul lessens + the goodness of an act; since the admixture of evil either destroys good altogether, or makes it to be less good. And this + is true indeed, if by passions we understand none but the inordinate movements of the sensitive appetite, considered as disturbances + or ailments. But if we give the name of passions to all the movements of the + sensitive appetite, then it belongs to the perfection of man's good that his passions be moderated by reason. For since man's + good is founded on reason as its root, that good will be all the more perfect, according as it extends to more things pertaining + to man. Wherefore no one questions the fact that it belongs to the perfection of moral good, that the actions of the outward + members be controlled by the law of reason. Hence, since the sensitive appetite can obey reason, as stated above ( + Q[17], A[7]), it belongs to the perfection of moral or human good, that the passions themselves also should be controlled by reason. +
Accordingly just as it is better that man should both will good and do it in his external act; so also does it belong to + the perfection of moral good, that man should be moved unto good, not only in respect of his will, but also in respect of + his sensitive appetite; according to + Ps. 83:3: "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God": where by "heart" we are to understand the intellectual appetite, + and by "flesh" the sensitive appetite. +
[34588] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod Stoici, sicut ponebant omnem passionem animae esse +malam, ita ponebant consequenter omnem passionem animae diminuere +actus bonitatem, omne enim bonum ex permixtione mali vel totaliter +tollitur, vel fit minus bonum. Et hoc quidem verum est, si dicamus +passiones animae solum inordinatos motus sensitivi appetitus, prout +sunt perturbationes seu aegritudines. Sed si passiones simpliciter +nominemus omnes motus appetitus sensitivi, sic ad perfectionem +humani boni pertinet quod etiam ipsae passiones sint moderatae per +rationem. Cum enim bonum hominis consistat in ratione sicut in +radice, tanto istud bonum erit perfectius, quanto ad plura quae +homini conveniunt, derivari potest. Unde nullus dubitat quin ad +perfectionem moralis boni pertineat quod actus exteriorum membrorum +per rationis regulam dirigantur. Unde, cum appetitus sensitivus +possit obedire rationi, ut supra dictum est, ad perfectionem +moralis sive humani boni pertinet quod etiam ipsae passiones animae +sint regulatae per rationem. Sicut igitur melius est quod homo et +velit bonum, et faciat exteriori actu; ita etiam ad perfectionem +boni moralis pertinet quod homo ad bonum moveatur non solum +secundum voluntatem, sed etiam secundum appetitum sensitivum; +secundum illud quod in Psalmo LXXXIII, dicitur, cor meum et caro +mea exultaverunt in Deum vivum, ut cor accipiamus pro appetitu +intellectivo, carnem autem pro appetitu sensitivo.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The passions of the soul may stand in a twofold relation to the judgment of reason. First, antecedently: and thus, since + they obscure the judgment of reason, on which the goodness of the moral act depends, they diminish the goodness of the act; + for it is more praiseworthy to do a work of charity from the judgment of reason than from the mere passion of pity. In the + second place, consequently: and this in two ways. First, by way of redundance: because, + to wit, when the higher part of the soul is intensely moved to anything, the lower part also follows that movement: and thus + the passion that results in consequence, in the sensitive appetite, is a sign of the intensity of the will, and so indicates + greater moral goodness. Secondly, by way of choice; when, to wit, a man, by the judgment of his reason, chooses to be affected + by a passion in order to work more promptly with the co-operation of the sensitive appetite. And thus a passion of the + soul increases the goodness of an action. +
[34589] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod passiones animae dupliciter se possunt habere ad +iudicium rationis. Uno modo, antecedenter. Et sic, cum obnubilent +iudicium rationis, ex quo dependet bonitas moralis actus, diminuunt +actus bonitatem, laudabilius enim est quod ex iudicio rationis +aliquis faciat opus caritatis, quam ex sola passione misericordiae. +Alio modo se habent consequenter. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo, per +modum redundantiae, quia scilicet, cum superior pars animae intense +movetur in aliquid, sequitur motum eius etiam pars inferior. Et sic +passio existens consequenter in appetitu sensitivo, est signum +intensionis voluntatis. Et sic indicat bonitatem moralem maiorem. +Alio modo, per modum electionis, quando scilicet homo ex iudicio +rationis eligit affici aliqua passione, ut promptius operetur, +cooperante appetitu sensitivo. Et sic passio animae addit ad +bonitatem actionis.
+ Reply to Objection 2: In God and the angels there is no sensitive appetite, nor again bodily members: and so in them good does not depend on the + right ordering of passions or of bodily actions, as it does in us. +
[34590] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod in Deo et in Angelis non est appetitus sensitivus, +neque etiam membra corporea, et ideo bonum in eis non attenditur +secundum ordinationem passionum aut corporeorum actuum, sicut in +nobis.
+ Reply to Objection 3: A passion that tends to evil, and precedes the judgment of reason, diminishes sin; but if it be consequent in either of the + ways mentioned above (Reply OBJ 1), it aggravates the sin, or else it is a sign of its being more grievous. +
[34591] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod passio tendens in malum, praecedens iudicium +rationis, diminuit peccatum, sed consequens aliquo praedictorum +modorum, auget ipsum, vel significat augmentum eius.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that no passion of the soul is good or evil morally according to its species. Because moral good and evil depend + on reason. But the passions are in the sensitive appetite; so that accordance with reason is accidental to them. Since, therefore, + nothing accidental belongs to a thing's species, it seems that no passion is good or evil according to its species. +
[34592] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod nulla passio animae, secundum speciem +suam, sit bona vel mala moraliter. Bonum enim et malum morale +attenditur secundum rationem. Sed passiones sunt in appetitu +sensitivo, et ita id quod est secundum rationem, accidit eis. Cum +ergo nihil quod est per accidens, pertineat ad speciem rei; videtur +quod nulla passio secundum suam speciem sit bona vel mala.
+ Objection 2: Further, acts and passions take their species from their object. If, therefore, any passion were good or evil, according + to its species, it would follow that those passions the object of which is good, are specifically good, such as love, desire + and joy: and that those passions, the object of which is evil, are specifically evil, as hatred, fear and sadness. But this + is clearly false. Therefore no passion is good or evil according to its species. +
[34593] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +actus et passiones habent speciem ex obiecto. Si ergo aliqua passio +secundum suam speciem esset bona vel mala, oporteret quod passiones +quarum obiectum est bonum, bonae essent secundum suam speciem, ut +amor, desiderium et gaudium; et passiones quarum obiectum est malum +essent malae secundum suam speciem, ut odium, timor et tristitia. +Sed hoc patet esse falsum. Non ergo aliqua passio est bona vel mala +ex sua specie.
+ Objection 3: Further, there is no species of passion that is not to be found in other animals. But moral good is in man alone. Therefore + no passion of the soul is good or evil according to its species. +
[34594] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +nulla species passionum est quae non inveniatur in aliis +animalibus. Sed bonum morale non invenitur nisi in homine. Ergo +nulla passio animae bona est vel mala ex sua specie.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "pity is a kind of virtue." Moreover, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that modesty + is a praiseworthy passion. Therefore some passions are good or evil according to their species. +
[34595] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, IX de Civ. Dei, quod misericordia +pertinet ad virtutem. Philosophus etiam dicit, in II Ethic., +quod verecundia est passio laudabilis. Ergo aliquae passiones sunt +bonae vel malae secundum suam speciem.
+ I answer that, We ought, seemingly, to apply to passions what has been said in regard to acts ( + Q[18], AA[5],6; + Q[20], A[1])---viz. that the species of a passion, as the species of an act, can be considered from two points of view. First, according + to its natural genus; and thus moral good and evil have no connection with the species of an act or passion. Secondly, according + to its moral genus, inasmuch as it is voluntary + and controlled by reason. In this way moral good and evil can belong to the species of a passion, in so far as the object + to which a passion tends, is, of itself, in harmony or in discord with reason: as is clear in the case of "shame" which is + base fear; and of "envy" which is sorrow for another's good: for thus passions belong to the same species as the external + act. +
[34596] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod sicut de actibus dictum est, ita et de passionibus +dicendum videtur, quod scilicet species actus vel passionis +dupliciter considerari potest. Uno modo, secundum quod est in +genere naturae, et sic bonum vel malum morale non pertinet ad +speciem actus vel passionis. Alio modo, secundum quod pertinent ad +genus moris, prout scilicet participant aliquid de voluntario et de +iudicio rationis. Et hoc modo bonum et malum morale possunt +pertinere ad speciem passionis, secundum quod accipitur ut obiectum +passionis aliquid de se conveniens rationi, vel dissonum a ratione, +sicut patet de verecundia, quae est timor turpis; et de invidia, +quae est tristitia de bono alterius. Sic enim pertinent ad speciem +exterioris actus.
+ Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the passions in their natural species, in so far as the sensitive appetite is considered in itself. + But in so far as the sensitive appetite obeys reason, good and evil of reason are no longer accidentally in the passions of + the appetite, but essentially. +
[34597] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de passionibus secundum quod +pertinent ad speciem naturae, prout scilicet appetitus sensitivus +in se consideratur. Secundum vero quod appetitus sensitivus obedit +rationi, iam bonum et malum rationis non est in passionibus eius +per accidens, sed per se.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Passions having a tendency to good, are themselves good, if they tend to that which is truly good, and in like manner, if + they turn away from that which is truly evil. On the other hand, those passions which consist in aversion from good, and a + tendency to evil, are themselves evil. +
[34598] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod passiones quae in bonum tendunt, si sit verum bonum, +sunt bonae, et similiter quae a vero malo recedunt. E converso vero +passiones quae sunt per recessum a bono, et per accessum ad malum, +sunt malae.
+ Reply to Objection 3: In irrational animals the sensitive appetite does not obey reason. Nevertheless, in so far as they are led by a kind of estimative + power, which is subject to a higher, i.e. the Divine reason, there is a certain likeness of moral good in them, in regard + to the soul's passions. +
[34599] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod in brutis animalibus appetitus sensitivus non obedit +rationi. Et tamen inquantum ducitur quadam aestimativa naturali, +quae subiicitur rationi superiori, scilicet divinae, est in eis +quaedam similitudo moralis boni, quantum ad animae passiones.
We must now consider the order of the passions to one another: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) The relation of the irascible passions to the concupiscible passions;
(2) The relation of the concupiscible passions to one another;
+[34600] +Iª-IIae q. 25 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +ordine passionum ad invicem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. +Primo, de ordine passionum irascibilis ad passiones +concupiscibilis. Secundo, de ordine passionum concupiscibilis ad +invicem. Tertio, de ordine passionum irascibilis ad invicem. +Quarto, de quatuor principalibus passionibus.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the irascible passions precede the concupiscible passions. For the order of the passions is that of their + objects. But the object of the irascible faculty is the difficult good, which seems to be the highest good. Therefore the + irascible passions seem to precede the concupiscible passions. +
[34601] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod passiones irascibilis sint priores +passionibus concupiscibilis. Ordo enim passionum est secundum +ordinem obiectorum. Sed obiectum irascibilis est bonum arduum, quod +videtur esse supremum inter alia bona. Ergo passiones irascibilis +videntur praeesse passionibus concupiscibilis.
+ Objection 2: Further, the mover precedes that which is moved. But the irascible faculty is compared to the concupiscible, as mover to + that which is moved: since it is given to animals, for the purposed of removing the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible + faculty from enjoying its object, as stated above (Q[23], A[1], ad 1; + FP, Q[81], A[2] ). Now "that which removes an obstacle, is a kind of mover" (Phys. viii, 4). Therefore the irascible + passions precede the concupiscible passions. +
[34602] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +movens est prius moto. Sed irascibilis comparatur ad +concupiscibilem sicut movens ad motum, ad hoc enim datur +animalibus, ut tollantur impedimenta quibus concupiscibilis +prohibetur frui suo obiecto, ut supra dictum est; removens autem +prohibens habet rationem moventis, ut dicitur in VIII Physic. Ergo +passiones irascibilis sunt priores passionibus concupiscibilis.
+ Objection 3: Further, joy and sadness are concupiscible passions. But joy and sadness succeed to the irascible passions: for the Philosopher + says (Ethic. iv, 5) that"retaliation causes anger to cease, because it produces pleasure instead of the previous pain." Therefore + the concupiscible passions follow the irascible passions. +
[34603] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +gaudium et tristitia sunt passiones concupiscibilis. Sed gaudium et +tristitia consequuntur ad passiones irascibilis, dicit enim +philosophus, in IV Ethic., quod punitio quietat impetum irae, +delectationem loco tristitiae faciens. Ergo passiones +concupiscibilis sunt posteriores passionibus irascibilis.
+ On the contrary, The concupiscible passions regard the absolute good, while the irascible passions regard a restricted, viz. the difficult, + good. Since, therefore, the absolute good precedes the restricted good, it seems that the concupiscible passions precede the + irascible. +
[34604] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra, +passiones concupiscibilis respiciunt bonum absolutum, passiones +autem irascibilis respiciunt bonum contractum, scilicet arduum. Cum +igitur bonum simpliciter sit prius quam bonum contractum, videtur +quod passiones concupiscibilis sint priores passionibus +irascibilis.
+ I answer that, In the concupiscible passions there is more diversity than in the passions of the irascible faculty. For in the former we + find something relating to movement---e.g. desire; and something belonging to repose, e.g. joy and sadness. But in the irascible + passions there is nothing pertaining to repose, and only that which belongs to movement. The reason of this is that when we + find rest in a thing, we no longer look upon it as something difficult or arduous; + whereas such is the object of the irascible faculty. +
Now since rest is the end of movement, it is first in the order of intention, but last in the order of execution. If, therefore, + we compare the passions of the irascible faculty with those concupiscible passions that denote rest in good, it is evident + that in the order of execution, the irascible passions take precedence of such like passions of the concupiscible faculty: + thus hope precedes joy, and hence causes it, according to the Apostle ( + Rom. 12:12): + "Rejoicing in hope." But the concupiscible passion which denotes rest in evil, viz. sadness, comes between two irascible passions: + because it follows fear; since we become sad when we are confronted by the evil that we feared: while it precedes the movement + of anger; since the movement of self-vindication, that results from sadness, is the movement of anger. And because it is looked + upon as a good thing to pay back the evil done to us; when the angry man has achieved this he rejoices. Thus it + is evident that every passion of the irascible faculty terminates in a concupiscible passion denoting rest, viz. either in + joy or in sadness. +
But if we compare the irascible passions to those concupiscible passions that denote movement, then it is clear that the + latter take precedence: because the passions of the irascible faculty add something to those of the concupiscible faculty; + just as the object of the irascible adds the aspect of arduousness or difficulty to the object of the concupiscible faculty. + Thus hope adds to desire a certain effort, and a certain raising of the spirits to the realization of the arduous + good. In like manner fear adds to aversion or detestation a certain lowness of spirits, on account of difficulty in shunning + the evil. +
Accordingly the passions of the irascible faculty stand between those concupiscible passions that denote movement towards + good or evil, and those concupiscible passions that denote rest in good or evil. And it is therefore evident that the irascible + passions both arise from and terminate in the passions of the concupiscible faculty. +
[34605] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod passiones concupiscibilis ad plura se habent quam +passiones irascibilis. Nam in passionibus concupiscibilis invenitur +aliquid pertinens ad motum, sicut desiderium; et aliquid pertinens +ad quietem, sicut gaudium et tristitia. Sed in passionibus +irascibilis non invenitur aliquid pertinens ad quietem, sed solum +pertinens ad motum. Cuius ratio est quia id in quo iam quiescitur, +non habet rationem difficilis seu ardui, quod est obiectum +irascibilis. Quies autem, cum sit finis motus, est prior in +intentione, sed posterior in executione. Si ergo comparentur +passiones irascibilis ad passiones concupiscibilis quae significant +quietem in bono; manifeste passiones irascibilis praecedunt, ordine +executionis, huiusmodi passiones concupiscibilis, sicut spes +praecedit gaudium, unde et causat ipsum, secundum illud apostoli, +Rom. XII, spe gaudentes. Sed passio concupiscibilis +importans quietem in malo, scilicet tristitia, media est inter duas +passiones irascibilis. Sequitur enim timorem, cum enim occurrerit +malum quod timebatur, causatur tristitia. Praecedit autem motum +irae, quia cum ex tristitia praecedente aliquis insurgit in +vindictam, hoc pertinet ad motum irae. Et quia rependere vicem +malis, apprehenditur ut bonum; cum iratus hoc consecutus fuerit, +gaudet. Et sic manifestum est quod omnis passio irascibilis +terminatur ad passionem concupiscibilis pertinentem ad quietem, +scilicet vel ad gaudium vel ad tristitiam. Sed si comparentur +passiones irascibilis ad passiones concupiscibilis quae important +motum, sic manifeste passiones concupiscibilis sunt priores, eo +quod passiones irascibilis addunt supra passiones concupiscibilis; +sicut et obiectum irascibilis addit supra obiectum concupiscibilis +arduitatem sive difficultatem. Spes enim supra desiderium addit +quendam conatum, et quandam elevationem animi ad consequendum bonum +arduum. Et similiter timor addit supra fugam seu abominationem, +quandam depressionem animi, propter difficultatem mali. Sic ergo +passiones irascibilis mediae sunt inter passiones concupiscibilis +quae important motum in bonum vel in malum; et inter passiones +concupiscibilis quae important quietem in bono vel in malo. Et sic +patet quod passiones irascibilis et principium habent a passionibus +concupiscibilis, et in passiones concupiscibilis terminantur.
+ Reply to Objection 1: This argument would prove, if the formal object of the concupiscible faculty were something contrary to the arduous, just + as the formal object of the irascible faculty is that which is arduous. But because the object of the concupiscible faculty + is good absolutely, it naturally precedes the object of the irascible, as the common precedes the proper. +
[34606] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod illa ratio procederet, si de ratione obiecti +concupiscibilis esset aliquid oppositum arduo, sicut de ratione +obiecti irascibilis est quod sit arduum. Sed quia obiectum +concupiscibilis est bonum absolute, prius naturaliter est quam +obiectum irascibilis, sicut commune proprio.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The remover of an obstacle is not a direct but an accidental mover: and here we are speaking of passions as directly related + to one another. Moreover, the irascible passion removes the obstacle that hinders the concupiscible from resting in its object. + Wherefore it only follows that the irascible passions precede those concupiscible passions that connote rest. +
[34607] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod removens prohibens non est movens per se, sed per +accidens. Nunc autem loquimur de ordine passionum per se. Et +praeterea irascibilis removet prohibens quietem concupiscibilis in +suo obiecto. Unde ex hoc non sequitur nisi quod passiones +irascibilis praecedunt passiones concupiscibilis ad quietem +pertinentes.
Reply to Objection 3:The third object + leads to the same conclusion.
[34608] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 ad 3 De quibus +etiam tertia ratio procedit.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that love is not the first of the concupiscible passions. For the concupiscible faculty is so called from concupiscence, + which is the same passion as desire. But "things are named from their chief characteristic" (De Anima ii, 4). Therefore desire + takes precedence of love. +
[34609] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non sit prima passionum +concupiscibilis. Vis enim concupiscibilis a concupiscentia +denominatur, quae est eadem passio cum desiderio. Sed denominatio +fit a potiori, ut dicitur in II de anima. Ergo concupiscentia est +potior amore.
+ Objection 2: Further, love implies a certain union; since it is a "uniting and binding force," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But concupiscence + or desire is a movement towards union with the thing coveted or desired. Therefore desire precedes love. +
[34610] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +amor unionem quandam importat, est enim vis unitiva et concretiva, +ut Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed concupiscentia vel +desiderium est motus ad unionem rei concupitae vel desideratae. +Ergo concupiscentia est prior amore.
+ Objection 3: Further, the cause precedes its effect. But pleasure is sometimes the cause of love: since some love on account of pleasure + (Ethic. viii, 3,4). Therefore pleasure precedes love; and consequently love is not the first of the concupiscible passions. +
[34611] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +causa est prior effectu. Sed delectatio est quandoque causa amoris, +quidam enim propter delectationem amant, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic. +Ergo delectatio est prior amore. Non ergo prima inter passiones +concupiscibilis est amor.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9) that all the passions are caused by love: since "love yearning for the beloved object, + is desire; and, having and enjoying it, is joy." Therefore love is the first of the concupiscible passions. +
[34612] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quod omnes passiones +ex amore causantur, amor enim inhians habere quod amatur, +cupiditas est; id autem habens, eoque fruens, laetitia est. +Amor ergo est prima passionum concupiscibilis.
+ I answer that, Good and evil are the object of the concupiscible faculty. Now good naturally precedes evil; since evil is privation of good. + Wherefore all the passions, the object of which is good, are naturally before those, the object of which is evil---that is + to say, each precedes its contrary passion: because the quest of a good is the reason for shunning the opposite evil. +
Now good has the aspect of an end, and the end is indeed first in the order of intention, but last in the order of execution. + Consequently the order of the concupiscible passions can be considered either in the order of intention or in the order of + execution. In the order of execution, the first place belongs to that which takes place first in the thing that tends to the + end. Now it is evident that whatever tends to an end, has, in the first place, an aptitude or proportion to + that end, for nothing tends to a disproportionate end; secondly, it is moved to that end; thirdly, it rests in the end, after + having attained it. And this very aptitude or proportion of the appetite to good is love, which is complacency in good; while + movement towards good is desire or concupiscence; and rest in good is joy or pleasure. Accordingly in this order, love precedes + desire, and desire precedes pleasure. But in the order of intention, it is the reverse: because the pleasure intended + causes desire and love. For pleasure is the enjoyment of the good, which enjoyment is, in a way, the end, just as the good + itself is, as stated above ( + Q[11], A[3], ad 3). +
[34613] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod obiectum concupiscibilis sunt bonum et malum. +Naturaliter autem est prius bonum malo, eo quod malum est privatio +boni. Unde et omnes passiones quarum obiectum est bonum, +naturaliter sunt priores passionibus quarum obiectum est malum, +unaquaeque scilicet sua opposita, quia enim bonum quaeritur, ideo +refutatur oppositum malum. Bonum autem habet rationem finis, qui +quidem est prior in intentione, sed est posterior in consecutione. +Potest ergo ordo passionum concupiscibilis attendi vel secundum +intentionem, vel secundum consecutionem. Secundum quidem +consecutionem, illud est prius quod primo fit in eo quod tendit ad +finem. Manifestum est autem quod omne quod tendit ad finem aliquem, +primo quidem habet aptitudinem seu proportionem ad finem, nihil +enim tendit in finem non proportionatum; secundo, movetur ad finem; +tertio, quiescit in fine post eius consecutionem. Ipsa autem +aptitudo sive proportio appetitus ad bonum est amor, qui nihil +aliud est quam complacentia boni; motus autem ad bonum est +desiderium vel concupiscentia; quies autem in bono est gaudium vel +delectatio. Et ideo secundum hunc ordinem, amor praecedit +desiderium, et desiderium praecedit delectationem. Sed secundum +ordinem intentionis, est e converso, nam delectatio intenta causat +desiderium et amorem. Delectatio enim est fruitio boni, quae +quodammodo est finis sicut et ipsum bonum, ut supra dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 1: We name a thing as we understand it, for "words are signs of thoughts," as the Philosopher states (Peri Herm. i, 1). Now + in most cases we know a cause by its effect. But the effect of love, when the beloved object is possessed, is pleasure: when + it is not possessed, it is desire or concupiscence: and, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), "we are more sensible to love, + when we lack that which we love." Consequently of all the concupiscible passions, + concupiscence is felt most; and for this reason the power is named after it. +
[34614] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod hoc modo nominatur aliquid, secundum quod nobis +innotescit, voces enim sunt signa intellectuum, secundum +philosophum. Nos autem, ut plurimum, per effectum cognoscimus +causam. Effectus autem amoris, quando quidem habetur ipsum amatum, +est delectatio, quando vero non habetur, est desiderium vel +concupiscentia. Ut autem Augustinus dicit, in X de Trin., amor +magis sentitur, cum eum prodit indigentia. Unde inter omnes +passiones concupiscibilis, magis sensibilis est concupiscentia. Et +propter hoc, ab ea denominatur potentia.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The union of lover and beloved is twofold. There is real union, consisting in the conjunction of one with the other. This + union belongs to joy or pleasure, which follows desire. There is also an affective union, consisting in an aptitude or proportion, + in so far as one thing, from the very fact of its having an aptitude for and an inclination to another, partakes of it: and + love betokens such a union. This union precedes the movement of desire. +
[34615] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod duplex est unio amati ad amantem. Una quidem realis, +secundum scilicet coniunctionem ad rem ipsam. Et talis unio +pertinet ad gaudium vel delectationem, quae sequitur desiderium. +Alia autem est unio affectiva, quae est secundum aptitudinem vel +proportionem, prout scilicet ex hoc quod aliquid habet aptitudinem +ad alterum et inclinationem, iam participat aliquid eius. Et sic +amor unionem importat. Quae quidem unio praecedit motum +desiderii.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Pleasure causes love, in so far as it precedes love in the order of intention. +
[34616] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod delectatio causat amorem, secundum quod est prior in +intentione.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not the first of the irascible passions. Because the irascible faculty is denominated from anger. + Since, therefore, "things are names from their chief characteristic" (cf. A[2], OBJ[1]), it seems that anger precedes and + surpasses hope. +
[34617] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod spes non sit prima inter passiones +irascibilis. Vis enim irascibilis ab ira denominatur. Cum ergo +denominatio fiat a potiori, videtur quod ira sit potior et prior +quam spes.
+ Objection 2: Further, the object of the irascible faculty is something arduous. Now it seems more arduous to strive to overcome a contrary + evil that threatens soon to overtake us, which pertains to daring; or an evil actually present, which pertains to anger; than + to strive simply to obtain some good. Again, it seems more arduous to strive to overcome a present evil, than a future evil. + Therefore anger seems to be a stronger passion than daring, and daring, than hope. And + consequently it seems that hope does not precede them. +
[34618] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +arduum est obiectum irascibilis. Sed magis videtur esse arduum quod +aliquis conetur superare malum contrarium quod imminet ut futurum, +quod pertinet ad audaciam; vel quod iniacet iam ut praesens, quod +pertinet ad iram; quam quod conetur acquirere simpliciter aliquod +bonum. Et similiter magis videtur esse arduum quod conetur vincere +malum praesens, quam malum futurum. Ergo ira videtur esse potior +passio quam audacia, et audacia quam spes. Et sic spes non videtur +esse prior.
+ Objection 3: Further, when a thing is moved towards an end, the movement of withdrawal precedes the movement of approach. But fear and + despair imply withdrawal from something; while daring and hope imply approach towards something. Therefore fear and despair + precede hope and daring. +
[34619] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +prius occurrit, in motu ad finem, recessus a termino, quam accessus +ad terminum. Sed timor et desperatio important recessum ab aliquo, +audacia autem et spes important accessum ad aliquid. Ergo timor et +desperatio praecedunt spem et audaciam.
+ On the contrary, The nearer a thing is to the first, the more it precedes others. But hope is nearer to love, which is the first of the passions. + Therefore hope is the first of the passions in the irascible faculty. +
[34620] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra, +quanto aliquid est propinquius primo, tanto est prius. Sed spes est +propinquior amori, qui est prima passionum. Ergo spes est prior +inter omnes passiones irascibilis.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[1]) all irascible passions imply movement towards something. Now this movement of the irascible faculty towards something may + be due to two causes: one is the mere aptitude or proportion to the end; and this pertains to love or hatred, those whose + object is good, or evil; and this belongs to sadness or joy. As a matter of fact, the presence of good produces no passion + in the irascible, as stated above (Q[23], + AA[3],4); but the presence of evil gives rise to the passion of anger. +
Since then in order of generation or execution, proportion or aptitude to the end precedes the achievement of the end; it + follows that, of all the irascible passions, anger is the last in the order of generation. And among the other passions of + the irascible faculty, which imply a movement arising from love of good or hatred of evil, those whose object is good, viz. + hope and despair, must naturally precede those whose object is evil, viz. daring and fear: yet so that hope + precedes despair; since hope is a movement towards good as such, which is essentially attractive, so that hope tends to good + directly; whereas despair is a movement away from good, a movement which is consistent with good, not as such, but in respect + of something else, wherefore its tendency from good is accidental, as it were. In like manner fear, through being a movement + from evil, precedes daring. And that hope and despair naturally precede fear and daring is evident from this---that as the + desire of good is the reason for avoiding evil, so hope and despair are the reason for fear and daring: because daring arises + from the hope of victory, and fear arises from the despair of overcoming. Lastly, anger arises from daring: for no one is + angry while seeking vengeance, unless he dare to avenge himself, as Avicenna observes in the sixth book of his Physics. Accordingly, + it is evident that hope is the first of all the irascible passions. +
And if we wish to know the order of all the passions in the way of generation, love and hatred are first; desire and aversion, + second; hope and despair, third; fear and daring, fourth; anger, fifth; sixth and last, joy and sadness, which follow from + all the passions, as stated in Ethic. ii, 5: yet so that love precedes hatred; desire precedes aversion; hope precedes despair; + fear precedes daring; and joy precedes sadness, as may be gathered from what has been stated above. +
[34621] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, omnes passiones irascibilis +important motum in aliquid. Motus autem ad aliquid in irascibili +potest causari ex duobus, uno modo, ex sola aptitudine seu +proportione ad finem, quae pertinet ad amorem vel odium; alio modo, +ex praesentia ipsius boni vel mali, quae pertinet ad tristitiam vel +gaudium. Et quidem ex praesentia boni non causatur aliqua passio in +irascibili, ut dictum est, sed ex praesentia mali causatur passio +irae. Quia igitur in via generationis seu consecutionis, proportio +vel aptitudo ad finem praecedit consecutionem finis; inde est quod +ira, inter omnes passiones irascibilis, est ultima, ordine +generationis. Inter alias autem passiones irascibilis, quae +important motum consequentem amorem vel odium boni vel mali, +oportet quod passiones quarum obiectum est bonum, scilicet spes et +desperatio, sint naturaliter priores passionibus quarum obiectum +est malum, scilicet audacia et timore. Ita tamen quod spes est +prior desperatione, quia spes est motus in bonum secundum rationem +boni quod de sua ratione est attractivum, et ideo est motus in +bonum per se; desperatio autem est recessus a bono, qui non +competit bono secundum quod est bonum, sed secundum aliquid aliud, +unde est quasi per accidens. Et eadem ratione, timor, cum sit +recessus a malo, est prior quam audacia. Quod autem spes et +desperatio sint naturaliter priores quam timor et audacia, ex hoc +manifestum est, quod, sicut appetitus boni est ratio quare vitetur +malum, ita etiam spes et desperatio sunt ratio timoris et audaciae, +nam audacia consequitur spem victoriae, et timor consequitur +desperationem vincendi. Ira autem consequitur audaciam, nullus enim +irascitur vindictam appetens, nisi audeat vindicare, secundum quod +Avicenna dicit, in sexto de naturalibus. Sic ergo patet quod spes +est prima inter omnes passiones irascibilis. Et si ordinem omnium +passionum secundum viam generationis, scire velimus, primo +occurrunt amor et odium; secundo, desiderium et fuga; tertio, spes +et desperatio; quarto, timor et audacia; quinto, ira; sexto et +ultimo, gaudium et tristitia, quae consequuntur ad omnes passiones, +ut dicitur in II Ethic. Ita tamen quod amor est prior odio, et +desiderium fuga, et spes desperatione, et timor audacia, et gaudium +quam tristitia, ut ex praedictis colligi potest.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Because anger arises from the other passions, as an effect from the causes that precede it, it is from anger, as being more + manifest than the other passions, that the power takes its name. +
[34622] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, quia ira causatur ex aliis passionibus sicut +effectus a causis praecedentibus, ideo ab ea, tanquam a +manifestiori, denominatur potentia.
+ Reply to Objection 2: It is not the arduousness but the good that is the reason for approach or desire. Consequently hope, which regards good more + directly, takes precedence: although at times daring or even anger regards something more arduous. +
[34623] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod arduum non est ratio accedendi vel appetendi, sed +potius bonum. Et ideo spes, quae directius respicit bonum, est +prior, quamvis audacia aliquando sit in magis arduum, vel etiam +ira.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The movement of the appetite is essentially and directly towards the good as towards its proper object; its movement from + evil results from this. For the movement of the appetitive part is in proportion, not to natural movement, but to the intention + of nature, which intends the end before intending the removal of a contrary, which removal is desired only for the sake of + obtaining the end. +
[34624] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod appetitus primo et per se movetur in bonum, sicut in +proprium obiectum; et ex hoc causatur quod recedat a malo. +Proportionatur enim motus appetitivae partis, non quidem motui +naturali, sed intentioni naturae; quae per prius intendit finem +quam remotionem contrarii, quae non quaeritur nisi propter +adeptionem finis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that joy, sadness, hope and fear are not the four principal passions. For Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3,[7] + sqq.) omits hope and puts desire in its place. +
[34625] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sint istae quatuor principales +passiones, gaudium et tristitia, spes et timor. Augustinus enim, in +XIV de Civ. Dei, non ponit spem, sed cupiditatem loco eius.
+ Objection 2: Further, there is a twofold order in the passions of the soul: the order of intention, and the order of execution or generation. + The principal passions should therefore be taken, either in the order of intention; and thus joy and sadness, which are the + final passions, will be the principal passions; or in the order of execution or generation, and thus love will be the principal + passion. Therefore joy and sadness, hope and fear should in no way be called the + four principal passions. +
[34626] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +in passionibus animae est duplex ordo, scilicet intentionis, et +consecutionis seu generationis. Aut ergo principales passiones +accipiuntur secundum ordinem intentionis, et sic tantum gaudium et +tristitia, quae sunt finales, erunt principales passiones. Aut +secundum ordinem consecutionis seu generationis, et sic amor erit +principalis passio. Nullo ergo modo debent dici quatuor principales +passiones istae quatuor, gaudium et tristitia, spes et timor.
+ Objection 3: Further, just as daring is caused by hope, so fear is caused by despair. Either, therefore, hope and despair should be reckoned + as principal passions, since they cause others: or hope and daring, from being akin to one another. +
[34627] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sicut audacia causatur ex spe, ita timor ex desperatione. Aut ergo +spes et desperatio debent poni principales passiones, tanquam +causae, aut spes et audacia, tanquam sibi ipsis affines.
+ On the contrary, Boethius (De Consol. i) in enumerating the four principal passions, says: +
"Banish joys: banish fears:
Away with hope: away with tears."
[34628] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est illud quod Boetius, in libro de Consol., enumerans quatuor +principales passiones, dicit, gaudia pelle, pelle timorem, +spemque fugato, nec dolor adsit.
+ I answer that, These four are commonly called the principal passions. Two of them, viz. joy and sadness, are said to be principal because + in them all the other passions have their completion and end; wherefore they arise from all the other passions, as is stated + in Ethic. ii, 5. Fear and hope are principal passions, not because they complete the others simply, but because they complete + them as regards the movement of the appetite towards something: for in respect of good, + movement begins in love, goes forward to desire, and ends in hope; while in respect of evil, it begins in hatred, goes on + to aversion, and ends in fear. Hence it is customary to distinguish these four passions in relation to the present and the + future: for movement regards the future, while rest is in something present: so that joy relates to present good, sadness + relates to present evil; hope regards future good, and fear, future evil. +
As to the other passions that regard good or evil, present or future, they all culminate in these four. For this reason some + have said that these four are the principal passions, because they are general passions; and this is true, provided that by + hope and fear we understand the appetite's common tendency to desire or shun something. +
[34629] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod hae quatuor passiones communiter principales esse +dicuntur. Quarum duae, scilicet gaudium et tristitia, principales +dicuntur, quia sunt completivae et finales simpliciter respectu +omnium passionum, unde ad omnes passiones consequuntur, ut dicitur +in II Ethic. Timor autem et spes sunt principales, non quidem quasi +completivae simpliciter, sed quia sunt completivae in genere motus +appetitivi ad aliquid, nam respectu boni, incipit motus in amore, +et procedit in desiderium, et terminatur in spe; respectu vero +mali, incipit in odio, et procedit ad fugam, et terminatur in +timore. Et ideo solet harum quatuor passionum numerus accipi +secundum differentiam praesentis et futuri, motus enim respicit +futurum, sed quies est in aliquo praesenti. De bono igitur +praesenti est gaudium; de malo praesenti est tristitia; de bono +vero futuro est spes; de malo futuro est timor. Omnes autem aliae +passiones, quae sunt de bono vel de malo praesenti vel futuro, ad +has completive reducuntur. Unde etiam a quibusdam dicuntur +principales hae praedictae quatuor passiones, quia sunt generales. +Quod quidem verum est, si spes et timor designant motum appetitus +communiter tendentem in aliquid appetendum vel fugiendum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Augustine puts desire or covetousness in place of hope, in so far as they seem to regard the same object, viz. some future + good. +
[34630] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Augustinus ponit desiderium vel cupiditatem loco +spei, inquantum ad idem pertinere videntur, scilicet ad bonum +futurum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: These are called principal passions, in the order of intention and completion. And though fear and hope are not the last + passions simply, yet they are the last of those passions that tend towards something as future. Nor can the argument be pressed + any further except in the case of anger: yet neither can anger be reckoned a principal passion, because it is an effect of + daring, which cannot be a principal passion, as we shall state further on (Reply + OBJ 3). +
[34631] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod passiones istae dicuntur principales, secundum +ordinem intentionis et complementi. Et quamvis timor et spes non +sint ultimae passiones simpliciter, tamen sunt ultimae in genere +passionum tendentium in aliud quasi in futurum. Nec potest esse +instantia nisi de ira. Quae tamen non potest poni principalis +passio, quia est quidam effectus audaciae, quae non potest esse +passio principalis, ut infra dicetur.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Despair implies movement away from good; and this is, as it were, accidental: and daring implies movement towards evil; and + this too is accidental. Consequently these cannot be principal passions; because that which is accidental cannot be said to + be principal. And so neither can anger be called a principal passion, because it arises from daring. +
[34632] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod desperatio importat recessum a bono, quod est quasi +per accidens, et audacia importat accessum ad malum, quod etiam est +per accidens. Et ideo hae passiones non possunt esse principales, +quia quod est per accidens, non potest dici principale. Et sic +etiam nec ira potest dici passio principalis, quae consequitur +audaciam.
We have now to consider the soul's passions in particular, and (1) the passions of the concupiscible faculty; (2) the passions + of the irascible faculty. +
The first of these considerations will be threefold: since we shall consider (1) Love and hatred; (2) Desire and aversion; + (3) Pleasure and sadness. +
Concerning love, three points must be considered: (1) Love itself; (2) The cause of love; (3) The effects of love. Under + the first head there are four points of inquiry: +
(1) Whether love is in the concupiscible power?
(2) Whether love is a passion?
(3) Whether love is the same as dilection?
(4) Whether love is properly divided into love of friendship, and love of concupiscence?
+[34633] +Iª-IIae q. 26 pr. Consequenter considerandum est de +passionibus animae in speciali. Et primo, de passionibus +concupiscibilis; secundo, de passionibus irascibilis. Prima +consideratio erit tripartita, nam primo considerabimus de amore et +odio; secundo, de concupiscentia et fuga tertio, de delectatione et +tristitia. Circa amorem consideranda sunt tria, primo, de ipso +amore; secundo, de causa amoris; tertio, de effectibus eius. Circa +primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum amor sit in concupiscibili. +Secundo, utrum amor sit passio. Tertio, utrum amor sit idem quod +dilectio. Quarto, utrum amor convenienter dividatur in amorem +amicitiae et amorem concupiscentiae.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that love is not in the concupiscible power. For it is written ( + Wis. 8:2): "Her," namely wisdom, "have I loved, and have sought her out from my youth." But the concupiscible power, being a part + of the sensitive appetite, cannot tend to wisdom, which is not apprehended by the senses. Therefore love is not in the concupiscible + power. +
[34634] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non sit in concupiscibili. +Dicitur enim Sap. VIII, hanc, scilicet sapientiam, amavi et +exquisivi a iuventute mea. Sed concupiscibilis, cum sit pars +appetitus sensitivi, non potest tendere in sapientiam, quae non +comprehenditur sensu. Ergo amor non est in concupiscibili.
+ Objection 2: Further, love seems to be identified with every passion: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7): "Love, yearning for the + object beloved, is desire; having and enjoying it, is joy; fleeing what is contrary to it, is fear; and feeling what is contrary + to it, is sadness." But not every passion is in the concupiscible power; indeed, fear, which is mentioned in this passage, + is in the irascible power. Therefore we must not say absolutely that love is in the + concupiscible power. +
[34635] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +amor videtur esse idem cuilibet passioni, dicit enim Augustinus, in +XIV de Civ. Dei, amor inhians habere quod amatur, cupiditas est; +id autem habens, eoque fruens, laetitia; fugiens quod ei +adversatur, timor est; idque si acciderit sentiens, tristitia +est. Sed non omnis passio est in concupiscibili; sed timor, +etiam hic enumeratus, est in irascibili. Ergo non est simpliciter +dicendum quod amor sit in concupiscibili.
+ Objection 3: Further, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) mentions a "natural love." But natural love seems to pertain rather to the natural powers, + which belong to the vegetal soul. Therefore love is not simply in the concupiscible power. +
[34636] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +Dionysius, in IV cap. de Div. Nom., ponit quendam amorem naturalem. +Sed amor naturalis magis videtur pertinere ad vires naturales, quae +sunt animae vegetabilis. Ergo amor non simpliciter est in +concupiscibili.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7) that "love is in the concupiscible power." +
[34637] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Topic., quod amor est in +concupiscibili.
+ I answer that, Love is something pertaining to the appetite; since good is the object of both. Wherefore love differs according to the difference + of appetites. For there is an appetite which arises from an apprehension existing, not in the subject of the appetite, but + in some other: and this is called the "natural appetite." Because natural things seek what is suitable to them according to + their nature, by reason of an apprehension which is not in them, but in the Author + of their nature, as stated in the + FP, Q[6], A[1], ad 2; + FP, Q[103], A[1], ad 1,3. And there is another appetite arising from an apprehension in the subject of the appetite, but from necessity and + not from free-will. Such is, in irrational animals, the "sensitive appetite," which, however, in man, has a certain share + of liberty, in so far as it obeys reason. Again, there is another appetite following freely from an apprehension in the subject + of + the appetite. And this is the rational or intellectual appetite, which is called the "will." +
Now in each of these appetites, the name "love" is given to the principle movement towards the end loved. In the natural + appetite the principle of this movement is the appetitive subject's connaturalness with the thing to which it tends, and may + be called "natural love": thus the connaturalness of a heavy body for the centre, is by reason of its weight and may be called + "natural love." In like manner the aptitude of the sensitive appetite or of the will to some good, that is to + say, its very complacency in good is called "sensitive love," or "intellectual" or "rational love." So that sensitive love + is in the sensitive appetite, just as intellectual love is in the intellectual appetite. And it belongs to the concupiscible + power, because it regards good absolutely, and not under the aspect of difficulty, which is the object of the irascible faculty. +
[34638] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod amor est aliquid ad appetitum pertinens, cum +utriusque obiectum sit bonum. Unde secundum differentiam appetitus +est differentia amoris. Est enim quidam appetitus non consequens +apprehensionem ipsius appetentis, sed alterius, et huiusmodi +dicitur appetitus naturalis. Res enim naturales appetunt quod eis +convenit secundum suam naturam, non per apprehensionem propriam, +sed per apprehensionem instituentis naturam, ut in I libro dictum +est. Alius autem est appetitus consequens apprehensionem ipsius +appetentis, sed ex necessitate, non ex iudicio libero. Et talis est +appetitus sensitivus in brutis, qui tamen in hominibus aliquid +libertatis participat, inquantum obedit rationi. Alius autem est +appetitus consequens apprehensionem appetentis secundum liberum +iudicium. Et talis est appetitus rationalis sive intellectivus, qui +dicitur voluntas. In unoquoque autem horum appetituum, amor dicitur +illud quod est principium motus tendentis in finem amatum. In +appetitu autem naturali, principium huiusmodi motus est +connaturalitas appetentis ad id in quod tendit, quae dici potest +amor naturalis, sicut ipsa connaturalitas corporis gravis ad locum +medium est per gravitatem, et potest dici amor naturalis. Et +similiter coaptatio appetitus sensitivi, vel voluntatis, ad aliquod +bonum, idest ipsa complacentia boni, dicitur amor sensitivus, vel +intellectivus seu rationalis. Amor igitur sensitivus est in +appetitu sensitivo, sicut amor intellectivus in appetitu +intellectivo. Et pertinet ad concupiscibilem, quia dicitur per +respectum ad bonum absolute, non per respectum ad arduum, quod est +obiectum irascibilis.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted refer to intellectual or rational love. +
[34639] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod auctoritas illa loquitur de amore intellectivo +vel rationali.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Love is spoken of as being fear, joy, desire and sadness, not essentially but causally. +
[34640] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod amor dicitur esse timor, gaudium, cupiditas et +tristitia, non quidem essentialiter, sed causaliter.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Natural love is not only in the powers of the vegetal soul, but in all the soul's powers, and also in all the parts of the + body, and universally in all things: because, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "Beauty and goodness are beloved by all things"; + since each single thing has a connaturalness with that which is naturally suitable to it. +
[34641] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod amor naturalis non solum est in viribus animae +vegetativae, sed in omnibus potentiis animae, et etiam in omnibus +partibus corporis, et universaliter in omnibus rebus, quia, ut +Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., omnibus est pulchrum et +bonum amabile; cum unaquaeque res habeat connaturalitatem ad id +quod est sibi conveniens secundum suam naturam.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that love is not a passion. For no power is a passion. But every love is a power, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. + iv). Therefore love is not a passion. +
[34642] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non sit passio. Nulla enim virtus +passio est. Sed omnis amor est virtus quaedam, ut dicit Dionysius, +IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo amor non est passio.
+ Objection 2: Further, love is a kind of union or bond, as Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 10). But a union or bond is not a passion, but + rather a relation. Therefore love is not a passion. +
[34643] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +amor est unio quaedam vel nexus, secundum Augustinum, in libro de +Trin. Sed unio vel nexus non est passio, sed magis relatio. Ergo +amor non est passio.
+ Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that passion is a movement. But love does not imply the movement of the appetite; + for this is desire, of which movement love is the principle. Therefore love is not a passion. +
[34644] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +Damascenus dicit, in II libro, quod passio est motus quidam. Amor +autem non importat motum appetitus, qui est desiderium; sed +principium huiusmodi motus. Ergo amor non est passio.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "love is a passion." +
[34645] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic., quod amor est +passio.
+ I answer that, Passion is the effect of the agent on the patient. Now a natural agent produces a twofold effect on the patient: for in the + first place it gives it the form; and secondly it gives it the movement that results from the form. Thus the generator gives + the generated body both weight and the movement resulting from weight: so that weight, from being the principle of movement + to the place, which is connatural to that body by reason of its weight, can, in a way, be + called "natural love." In the same way the appetible object gives the appetite, first, a certain adaptation to itself, which + consists in complacency in that object; and from this follows movement towards the appetible object. For "the appetitive movement + is circular," as stated in De Anima iii, 10; because the appetible object moves the appetite, introducing itself, as it were, + into its intention; while the appetite moves towards the realization of the appetible object, so that the movement + ends where it began. Accordingly, the first change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object is called "love," and is + nothing else than complacency in that object; and from this complacency results a movement towards that same object, and this + movement is "desire"; and lastly, there is rest which is "joy." Since, therefore, love consists in a change wrought in the + appetite by the appetible object, it is evident that love is a passion: properly so called, according as it is in the + concupiscible faculty; in a wider and extended sense, according as it is in the will. +
[34646] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod passio est effectus agentis in patiente. Agens autem +naturale duplicem effectum inducit in patiens, nam primo quidem dat +formam, secundo autem dat motum consequentem formam; sicut generans +dat corpori gravitatem, et motum consequentem ipsam. Et ipsa +gravitas, quae est principium motus ad locum connaturalem propter +gravitatem, potest quodammodo dici amor naturalis. Sic etiam ipsum +appetibile dat appetitui, primo quidem, quandam coaptationem ad +ipsum, quae est complacentia appetibilis; ex qua sequitur motus ad +appetibile. Nam appetitivus motus circulo agitur, ut dicitur in III +de anima, appetibile enim movet appetitum, faciens se quodammodo in +eius intentione; et appetitus tendit in appetibile realiter +consequendum, ut sit ibi finis motus, ubi fuit principium. Prima +ergo immutatio appetitus ab appetibili vocatur amor, qui nihil est +aliud quam complacentia appetibilis; et ex hac complacentia +sequitur motus in appetibile, qui est desiderium; et ultimo quies, +quae est gaudium. Sic ergo, cum amor consistat in quadam +immutatione appetitus ab appetibili, manifestum est quod amor et +passio, proprie quidem, secundum quod est in concupiscibili; +communiter autem, et extenso nomine, secundum quod est in +voluntate.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Since power denotes a principle of movement or action, Dionysius calls love a power, in so far as it is a principle of movement + in the appetite. +
[34647] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, quia virtus significat principium motus vel +actionis, ideo amor, inquantum est principium appetitivi motus, a +Dionysio vocatur virtus.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Union belongs to love in so far as by reason of the complacency of the appetite, the lover stands in relation to that which + he loves, as though it were himself or part of himself. Hence it is clear that love is not the very relation of union, but + that union is a result of love. Hence, too, Dionysius says that "love is a unitive force" (Div. Nom. iv), and the Philosopher + says (Polit. ii, 1) that union is the work of love. +
[34648] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod unio pertinet ad amorem, inquantum per complacentiam +appetitus amans se habet ad id quod amat, sicut ad seipsum, vel ad +aliquid sui. Et sic patet quod amor non est ipsa relatio unionis, +sed unio est consequens amorem. Unde et Dionysius dicit quod amor +est virtus unitiva, et philosophus dicit, in II Polit., quod unio +est opus amoris.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Although love does not denote the movement of the appetite in tending towards the appetible object, yet it denotes that movement + whereby the appetite is changed by the appetible object, so as to have complacency therein. +
[34649] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod amor, etsi non nominet motum appetitus tendentem in +appetibile, nominat tamen motum appetitus quo immutatur ab +appetibili, ut ei appetibile complaceat.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that love is the same as dilection. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that love is to dilection, "as four is + to twice two, and as a rectilinear figure is to one composed of straight lines." But these have the same meaning. Therefore + love and dilection denote the same thing. +
[34650] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor sit idem quod dilectio. Dionysius +enim, IV cap. de Div. Nom., dicit quod hoc modo se habent amor et +dilectio, sicut quatuor et bis duo, rectilineum et habens rectas +lineas. Sed ista significant idem. Ergo amor et dilectio +significant idem.
+ Objection 2: Further, the movements of the appetite differ by reason of their objects. But the objects of dilection and love are the same. + Therefore these are the same. +
[34651] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +appetitivi motus secundum obiecta differunt. Sed idem est obiectum +dilectionis et amoris. Ergo sunt idem.
+ Objection 3: Further, if dilection and love differ, it seems that it is chiefly in the fact that "dilection refers to good things, love + to evil things, as some have maintained," according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7). But they do not differ thus; because + as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) the holy Scripture uses both words in reference to either good or bad things. Therefore + love and dilection do not differ: thus indeed Augustine concludes (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) + that "it is not one thing to speak of love, and another to speak of dilection." +
[34652] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +si dilectio et amor in aliquo differunt, maxime in hoc differre +videntur, quod dilectio sit in bono accipienda, amor autem in malo, +ut quidam dixerunt, secundum quod Augustinus narrat, in XIV de Civ. +Dei. Sed hoc modo non differunt, quia, ut ibidem Augustinus dicit, +in sacris Scripturis utrumque accipitur in bono et in malo. Ergo +amor et dilectio non differunt; sicut ipse Augustinus ibidem +concludit quod non est aliud amorem dicere, et aliud dilectionem +dicere.
+ On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "some holy men have held that love means something more Godlike than dilection does." +
[34653] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod quibusdam +sanctorum visum est divinius esse nomen amoris quam nomen +dilectionis.
+ I answer that, We find four words referring in a way, to the same thing: viz. love, dilection, charity and friendship. They differ, however, + in this, that "friendship," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5), "is like a habit," whereas "love" and "dilection" + are expressed by way of act or passion; and "charity" can be taken either way. +
Moreover these three express act in different ways. For love has a wider signification than the others, since every dilection + or charity is love, but not vice versa. Because dilection implies, in addition to love, a choice [electionem] made beforehand, + as the very word denotes: and therefore dilection is not in the concupiscible power, but only in the will, and only in the + rational nature. Charity denotes, in addition to love, a certain perfection of love, in so far as that + which is loved is held to be of great price, as the word itself implies [*Referring to the Latin "carus" (dear)]. +
[34654] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod quatuor nomina inveniuntur ad idem quodammodo +pertinentia, scilicet amor, dilectio, caritas et amicitia. +Differunt tamen in hoc, quod amicitia, secundum philosophum in VIII +Ethic., est quasi habitus; amor autem et dilectio significantur per +modum actus vel passionis; caritas autem utroque modo accipi +potest. Differenter tamen significatur actus per ista tria. Nam +amor communius est inter ea, omnis enim dilectio vel caritas est +amor, sed non e converso. Addit enim dilectio supra amorem, +electionem praecedentem, ut ipsum nomen sonat. Unde dilectio non +est in concupiscibili, sed in voluntate tantum, et est in sola +rationali natura. Caritas autem addit supra amorem, perfectionem +quandam amoris, inquantum id quod amatur magni pretii aestimatur, +ut ipsum nomen designat.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius is speaking of love and dilection, in so far as they are in the intellectual appetite; for thus love is the same + as dilection. +
[34655] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Dionysius loquitur de amore et dilectione, +secundum quod sunt in appetitu intellectivo, sic enim amor idem est +quod dilectio.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The object of love is more general than the object of dilection: because love extends to more than dilection does, as stated + above. +
[34656] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod obiectum amoris est communius quam obiectum +dilectionis, quia ad plura se extendit amor quam dilectio, sicut +dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Love and dilection differ, not in respect of good and evil, but as stated. Yet in the intellectual faculty love is the same + as dilection. And it is in this sense that Augustine speaks of love in the passage quoted: hence a little further on he adds + that "a right will is well-directed love, and a wrong will is ill-directed love." However, the fact that love, which is concupiscible + passion, inclines many to evil, is the reason why some assigned the + difference spoken of. +
[34657] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod non differunt amor et dilectio secundum differentiam +boni et mali, sed sicut dictum est. In parte tamen intellectiva +idem est amor et dilectio. Et sic loquitur ibi Augustinus de amore, +unde parum post subdit quod recta voluntas est bonus amor, et +perversa voluntas est malus amor. Quia tamen amor, qui est +passio concupiscibilis, plurimos inclinat ad malum, inde habuerunt +occasionem qui praedictam differentiam assignaverunt.
+ Reply to Objection 4: The reason why some held that, even when applied to the will itself, the word "love" signifies something more Godlike than + "dilection," was because love denotes a passion, especially in so far as it is in the sensitive appetite; whereas dilection + presupposes the judgment of reason. But it is possible for man to tend to God by love, being as it were passively drawn by + Him, more than he can possibly be drawn thereto by his reason, which pertains to the + nature of dilection, as stated above. And consequently love is more Godlike than dilection. +
[34658] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod ideo aliqui posuerunt, etiam in ipsa voluntate, nomen +amoris esse divinius nomine dilectionis, quia amor importat quandam +passionem, praecipue secundum quod est in appetitu sensitivo; +dilectio autem praesupponit iudicium rationis. Magis autem homo in +Deum tendere potest per amorem, passive quodammodo ab ipso Deo +attractus, quam ad hoc eum propria ratio ducere possit, quod +pertinet ad rationem dilectionis, ut dictum est. Et propter hoc, +divinius est amor quam dilectio.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that love is not properly divided into love of friendship and love of concupiscence. For "love is a passion, + while friendship is a habit," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5). But habit cannot be the member of a division + of passions. Therefore love is not properly divided into love of concupiscence and love of friendship. +
[34659] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor inconvenienter dividatur in +amorem amicitiae et concupiscentiae. Amor enim est passio, amicitia +vero est habitus, ut dicit philosophus, in VIII Ethic. Sed habitus +non potest esse pars divisiva passionis. Ergo amor non convenienter +dividitur per amorem concupiscentiae et amorem amicitiae.
+ Objection 2: Further, a thing cannot be divided by another member of the same division; for man is not a member of the same division as + "animal." But concupiscence is a member of the same division as love, as a passion distinct from love. Therefore concupiscence + is not a division of love. +
[34660] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +nihil dividitur per id quod ei connumeratur, non enim homo +connumeratur animali. Sed concupiscentia connumeratur amori, sicut +alia passio ab amore. Ergo amor non potest dividi per +concupiscentiam.
+ Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) friendship is threefold, that which is founded on "usefulness," that + which is founded on "pleasure," and that which is founded on "goodness." But useful and pleasant friendship are not without + concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence should not be contrasted with friendship. +
[34661] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +secundum philosophum, in VIII Ethic., triplex est amicitia, utilis, +delectabilis et honesta. Sed amicitia utilis et delectabilis habet +concupiscentiam. Ergo concupiscentia non debet dividi contra +amicitiam.
+ On the contrary, We are said to love certain things, because we desire them: thus "a man is said to love wine, on account of its sweetness + which he desires"; as stated in Topic. ii, 3. But we have no friendship for wine and suchlike things, as stated in Ethic. + viii, 2. Therefore love of concupiscence is distinct from love of friendship. +
[34662] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra, +quaedam dicimur amare quia ea concupiscimus, sicut dicitur +aliquis amare vinum propter dulce quod in eo concupiscit, ut +dicitur in II Topic. Sed ad vinum, et ad huiusmodi, non habemus +amicitiam, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic. Ergo alius est amor +concupiscentiae, et alius est amor amicitiae.
+ I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4), "to love is to wish good to someone." Hence the movement of love has a twofold tendency: + towards the good which a man wishes to someone (to himself or to another) and towards that to which he wishes some good. Accordingly, + man has love of concupiscence towards the good that he wishes to another, and love of friendship towards him to whom he wishes + good. +
Now the members of this division are related as primary and secondary: since that which is loved with the love of friendship + is loved simply and for itself; whereas that which is loved with the love of concupiscence, is loved, not simply and for itself, + but for something else. For just as that which has existence, is a being simply, while that which exists in another is a relative + being; so, because good is convertible with being, the good, which itself has goodness, is good + simply; but that which is another's good, is a relative good. Consequently the love with which a thing is loved, that it may + have some good, is love simply; while the love, with which a thing is loved, that it may be another's good, is relative love. +
[34663] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in II Rhetoric., amare est +velle alicui bonum. Sic ergo motus amoris in duo tendit, scilicet +in bonum quod quis vult alicui, vel sibi vel alii; et in illud cui +vult bonum. Ad illud ergo bonum quod quis vult alteri, habetur amor +concupiscentiae, ad illud autem cui aliquis vult bonum, habetur +amor amicitiae. Haec autem divisio est secundum prius et posterius. +Nam id quod amatur amore amicitiae, simpliciter et per se amatur, +quod autem amatur amore concupiscentiae, non simpliciter et +secundum se amatur, sed amatur alteri. Sicut enim ens simpliciter +est quod habet esse, ens autem secundum quid quod est in alio; ita +bonum, quod convertitur cum ente, simpliciter quidem est quod ipsum +habet bonitatem; quod autem est bonum alterius, est bonum secundum +quid. Et per consequens amor quo amatur aliquid ut ei sit bonum, +est amor simpliciter, amor autem quo amatur aliquid ut sit bonum +alterius, est amor secundum quid.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Love is not divided into friendship and concupiscence, but into love of friendship, and love of concupiscence. For a friend + is, properly speaking, one to whom we wish good: while we are said to desire, what we wish for ourselves. +
[34664] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod amor non dividitur per amicitiam et +concupiscentiam, sed per amorem amicitiae et concupiscentiae. Nam +ille proprie dicitur amicus, cui aliquod bonum volumus, illud autem +dicimur concupiscere, quod volumus nobis.
Reply to Objection 2: Hence the Reply to the Second Objection.
[34665] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 ad 2 Et per hoc +patet solutio ad secundum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: When friendship is based on usefulness or pleasure, a man does indeed wish his friend some good: and in this respect the + character of friendship is preserved. But since he refers this good further to his own pleasure or use, the result is that + friendship of the useful or pleasant, in so far as it is connected with love of concupiscence, loses the character to true + friendship. +
[34666] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod in amicitia utilis et delectabilis, vult quidem +aliquis aliquod bonum amico, et quantum ad hoc salvatur ibi ratio +amicitiae. Sed quia illud bonum refert ulterius ad suam +delectationem vel utilitatem, inde est quod amicitia utilis et +delectabilis, inquantum trahitur ad amorem concupiscentiae, deficit +a ratione verae amicitiae.
We must now consider the cause of love: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether good is the only cause of love?
(2) Whether knowledge is a cause of love?
(3) Whether likeness is a cause of love?
(4) Whether any other passion of the soul is a cause of love?
+[34667] +Iª-IIae q. 27 pr. Deinde considerandum est de causa +amoris. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum bonum sit +sola causa amoris. Secundo, utrum cognitio sit causa amoris. +Tertio, utrum similitudo. Quarto, utrum aliqua alia animae +passionum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that good is not the only cause of love. For good does not cause love, except because it is loved. But it happens + that evil also is loved, according to + Ps. 10:6: "He that loveth iniquity, hateth his own soul": else, every love would be good. Therefore good is not the only cause of + love. +
[34668] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non solum bonum sit causa amoris. +Bonum enim non est causa amoris, nisi quia amatur. Sed contingit +etiam malum amari, secundum illud Psalmi X, qui diligit +iniquitatem, odit animam suam, alioquin omnis amor esset bonus. +Ergo non solum bonum est causa amoris.
+ Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "we love those who acknowledge their evils." Therefore it seems that evil + is the cause of love. +
[34669] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod eos qui mala sua +dicunt, amamus. Ergo videtur quod malum sit causa amoris.
+ Objection 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that not "the good" only but also "the beautiful is beloved by all." +
[34670] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod non solum bonum, sed +etiam pulchrum est omnibus amabile.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 3): "Assuredly the good alone is beloved." Therefore good alone is the cause of love. +
[34671] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, VIII de Trin., non amatur certe nisi +bonum. Solum igitur bonum est causa amoris.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + Q[26], A[1]), Love belongs to the appetitive power which is a passive faculty. Wherefore its object stands in relation to it as the cause + of its movement or act. Therefore the cause of love must needs be love's object. Now the proper object of love is the good; + because, as stated above ( + Q[26], AA[1],2), love implies a certain connaturalness or complacency of the lover for the thing beloved, + and to everything, that thing is a good, which is akin and proportionate to it. It follows, therefore, that good is the proper + cause of love. +
[34672] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, amor ad appetitivam +potentiam pertinet, quae est vis passiva. Unde obiectum eius +comparatur ad ipsam sicut causa motus vel actus ipsius. Oportet +igitur ut illud sit proprie causa amoris quod est amoris obiectum. +Amoris autem proprium obiectum est bonum, quia, ut dictum est, amor +importat quandam connaturalitatem vel complacentiam amantis ad +amatum; unicuique autem est bonum id quod est sibi connaturale et +proportionatum. Unde relinquitur quod bonum sit propria causa +amoris.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Evil is never loved except under the aspect of good, that is to say, in so far as it is good in some respect, and is considered + as being good simply. And thus a certain love is evil, in so far as it tends to that which is not simply a true good. It is + in this way that man "loves iniquity," inasmuch as, by means of iniquity, some good is gained; pleasure, for instance, or + money, or such like. +
[34673] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod malum nunquam amatur nisi sub ratione boni, +scilicet inquantum est secundum quid bonum, et apprehenditur ut +simpliciter bonum. Et sic aliquis amor est malus, inquantum tendit +in id quod non est simpliciter verum bonum. Et per hunc modum homo +diligit iniquitatem, inquantum per iniquitatem adipiscitur aliquod +bonum, puta delectationem vel pecuniam vel aliquid huiusmodi.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Those who acknowledge their evils, are beloved, not for their evils, but because they acknowledge them, for it is a good + thing to acknowledge one's faults, in so far as it excludes insincerity or hypocrisy. +
[34674] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod illi qui mala sua dicunt, non propter mala amantur, +sed propter hoc quod dicunt mala, hoc enim quod est dicere mala +sua, habet rationem boni, inquantum excludit fictionem seu +simulationem.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The beautiful is the same as the good, and they differ in aspect only. For since good is what all seek, the notion of good + is that which calms the desire; while the notion of the beautiful is that which calms the desire, by being seen or known. + Consequently those senses chiefly regard the beautiful, which are the most cognitive, viz. sight and hearing, as ministering + to reason; for we speak of beautiful sights and beautiful sounds. But in reference to + the other objects of the other senses, we do not use the expression "beautiful," for we do not speak of beautiful tastes, + and beautiful odors. Thus it is evident that beauty adds to goodness a relation to the cognitive faculty: so that "good" means + that which simply pleases the appetite; while the "beautiful" is something pleasant to apprehend. +
[34675] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod pulchrum est idem bono, sola ratione differens. Cum +enim bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, de ratione boni est quod in eo +quietetur appetitus, sed ad rationem pulchri pertinet quod in eius +aspectu seu cognitione quietetur appetitus. Unde et illi sensus +praecipue respiciunt pulchrum, qui maxime cognoscitivi sunt, +scilicet visus et auditus rationi deservientes, dicimus enim +pulchra visibilia et pulchros sonos. In sensibilibus autem aliorum +sensuum, non utimur nomine pulchritudinis, non enim dicimus +pulchros sapores aut odores. Et sic patet quod pulchrum addit supra +bonum, quendam ordinem ad vim cognoscitivam, ita quod bonum dicatur +id quod simpliciter complacet appetitui; pulchrum autem dicatur id +cuius ipsa apprehensio placet.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that knowledge is not a cause of love. For it is due to love that a thing is sought. But some things are sought + without being known, for instance, the sciences; for since "to have them is the same as to know them," as Augustine says (QQ[83], + qu. 35), if we knew them we should have them, and should not seek them. Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love. +
[34676] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod cognitio non sit causa amoris. Quod +enim aliquid quaeratur, hoc contingit ex amore. Sed aliqua +quaeruntur quae nesciuntur, sicut scientiae, cum enim in his idem +sit eas habere quod eas nosse, ut Augustinus dicit in libro +octoginta trium quaest., si cognoscerentur, haberentur, et non +quaererentur. Ergo cognitio non est causa amoris.
+ Objection 2: Further, to love what we know not seems like loving something more than we know it. But some things are loved more than they + are known: thus in this life God can be loved in Himself, but cannot be known in Himself. Therefore knowledge is not the cause + of love. +
[34677] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +eiusdem rationis videtur esse quod aliquid incognitum ametur, et +quod aliquid ametur plus quam cognoscatur. Sed aliqua amantur plus +quam cognoscantur, sicut Deus, qui in hac vita potest per seipsum +amari, non autem per seipsum cognosci. Ergo cognitio non est causa +amoris.
+ Objection 3: Further, if knowledge were the cause of love, there would be no love, where there is no knowledge. But in all things there + is love, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv); whereas there is not knowledge in all things. Therefore knowledge is not the cause + of love. +
[34678] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +si cognitio esset causa amoris, non posset inveniri amor ubi non +est cognitio. Sed in omnibus rebus invenitur amor, ut dicit +Dionysius in IV cap. de Div. Nom., non autem in omnibus invenitur +cognitio. Ergo cognitio non est causa amoris.
+ On the contrary, Augustine proves (De Trin. x, 1,2) that "none can love what he does not know." +
[34679] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus probat, in X de Trin., quod nullus potest +amare aliquid incognitum.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[1]), good is the cause of love, as being its object. But good is not the object of the appetite, except as apprehended. And therefore + love demands some apprehension of the good that is loved. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 5,12) says that bodily + sight is the beginning of sensitive love: and in like manner the contemplation of spiritual beauty or goodness is the beginning + of spiritual love. Accordingly + knowledge is the cause of love for the same reason as good is, which can be loved only if known. +
[34680] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, bonum est causa amoris per modum +obiecti. Bonum autem non est obiectum appetitus, nisi prout est +apprehensum. Et ideo amor requirit aliquam apprehensionem boni quod +amatur. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit, IX Ethic., quod visio +corporalis est principium amoris sensitivi. Et similiter +contemplatio spiritualis pulchritudinis vel bonitatis, est +principium amoris spiritualis. Sic igitur cognitio est causa +amoris, ea ratione qua et bonum, quod non potest amari nisi +cognitum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: He who seeks science, is not entirely without knowledge thereof: but knows something about it already in some respect, either + in a general way, or in some one of its effects, or from having heard it commended, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1,2). But + to have it is not to know it thus, but to know it perfectly. +
[34681] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ille qui quaerit scientiam, non omnino ignorat +eam, sed secundum aliquid eam praecognoscit, vel in universali, vel +in aliquo eius effectu, vel per hoc quod audit eam laudari, ut +Augustinus dicit, X de Trin. Sic autem eam cognoscere non est eam +habere; sed cognoscere eam perfecte.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Something is required for the perfection of knowledge, that is not requisite for the perfection of love. For knowledge belongs + to the reason, whose function it is to distinguish things which in reality are united, and to unite together, after a fashion, + things that are distinct, by comparing one with another. Consequently the perfection of knowledge requires that man should + know distinctly all that is in a thing, such as its parts, powers, and + properties. On the other hand, love is in the appetitive power, which regards a thing as it is in itself: wherefore it suffices, + for the perfection of love, that a thing be loved according as it is known in itself. Hence it is, therefore, that a thing + is loved more than it is known; since it can be loved perfectly, even without being perfectly known. This is most evident + in regard to the sciences, which some love through having a certain general knowledge of them: for instance, they know that + rhetoric is a science that enables man to persuade others; and this is what they love in rhetoric. The same applies to the + love of God. +
[34682] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod aliquid requiritur ad perfectionem cognitionis, quod +non requiritur ad perfectionem amoris. Cognitio enim ad rationem +pertinet, cuius est distinguere inter ea quae secundum rem sunt +coniuncta, et componere quodammodo ea quae sunt diversa, unum +alteri comparando. Et ideo ad perfectionem cognitionis requiritur +quod homo cognoscat singillatim quidquid est in re, sicut partes et +virtutes et proprietates. Sed amor est in vi appetitiva, quae +respicit rem secundum quod in se est. Unde ad perfectionem amoris +sufficit quod res prout in se apprehenditur, ametur. Ob hoc ergo +contingit quod aliquid plus amatur quam cognoscatur, quia potest +perfecte amari, etiam si non perfecte cognoscatur. Sicut maxime +patet in scientiis, quas aliqui amant propter aliquam summariam +cognitionem quam de eis habent, puta quod sciunt rhetoricam esse +scientiam per quam homo potest persuadere, et hoc in rhetorica +amant. Et similiter est dicendum circa amorem Dei.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Even natural love, which is in all things, is caused by a kind of knowledge, not indeed existing in natural things themselves, + but in Him Who created their nature, as stated above (Q[26], A[1]; cf. + FP, Q[6], A[1], ad 2). +
[34683] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod etiam amor naturalis, qui est in omnibus rebus, +causatur ex aliqua cognitione, non quidem in ipsis rebus +naturalibus existente, sed in eo qui naturam instituit, ut supra +dictum est.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that likeness is not a cause of love. For the same thing is not the cause of contraries. But likeness is the + cause of hatred; for it is written ( + Prov. 13:10) that "among the proud there are always contentions"; and the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 1) that "potters quarrel with + one another." Therefore likeness is not a cause of love. +
[34684] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod similitudo non sit causa amoris. Idem +enim non est causa contrariorum. Sed similitudo est causa odii, +dicitur enim Prov. XIII, quod inter superbos semper sunt +iurgia; et philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic., quod figuli +corrixantur ad invicem. Ergo similitudo non est causa amoris.
+ Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 14) that "a man loves in another that which he would not be himself: thus he loves + an actor, but would not himself be an actor." But it would not be so, if likeness were the proper cause of love; for in that + case a man would love in another, that which he possesses himself, or would like to possess. Therefore likeness is not a cause + of love. +
[34685] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in IV Confess., quod aliquis amat in alio quod +esse non vellet, sicut homo amat histrionem, qui non vellet esse +histrio. Hoc autem non contingeret, si similitudo esset propria +causa amoris, sic enim homo amaret in altero quod ipse haberet, vel +vellet habere. Ergo similitudo non est causa amoris.
+ Objection 3: Further, everyone loves that which he needs, even if he have it not: thus a sick man loves health, and a poor man loves riches. + But in so far as he needs them and lacks them, he is unlike them. Therefore not only likeness but also unlikeness is a cause + of love. +
[34686] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +quilibet homo amat id quo indiget, etiam si illud non habeat, sicut +infirmus amat sanitatem, et pauper amat divitias. Sed inquantum +indiget et caret eis, habet dissimilitudinem ad ipsa. Ergo non +solum similitudo, sed etiam dissimilitudo est causa amoris.
+ Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "we love those who bestow money and health on us; and also those who retain + their friendship for the dead." But all are not such. Therefore likeness is not a cause of love. +
[34687] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 arg. 4 Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod beneficos in pecunias +et salutem amamus, et similiter eos qui circa mortuos servant +amicitiam, omnes diligunt. Non autem omnes sunt tales. Ergo +similitudo non est causa amoris.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Ecclus. 13:19): "Every beast loveth its like." +
[34688] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Eccli. XIII, omne animal diligit simile +sibi.
+ I answer that, Likeness, properly speaking, is a cause of love. But it must be observed that likeness between things is twofold. One kind + of likeness arises from each thing having the same quality actually: for example, two things possessing the quality of whiteness + are said to be alike. Another kind of likeness arises from one thing having potentially and by way of inclination, a quality + which the other has actually: thus we may say that a heavy body existing outside its + proper place is like another heavy body that exists in its proper place: or again, according as potentiality bears a resemblance + to its act; since act is contained, in a manner, in the potentiality itself. +
Accordingly the first kind of likeness causes love of friendship or well-being. For the very fact that two men are alike, + having, as it were, one form, makes them to be, in a manner, one in that form: thus two men are one thing in the species of + humanity, and two white men are one thing in whiteness. Hence the affections of one tend to the other, as being one with him; + and he wishes good to him as to himself. But the second kind of likeness causes love of concupiscence, or + friendship founded on usefulness or pleasure: because whatever is in potentiality, as such, has the desire for its act; and + it takes pleasure in its realization, if it be a sentient and cognitive being. +
Now it has been stated above ( + Q[26], A[4]), that in the love of concupiscence, the lover, properly speaking, loves himself, in willing the good that he desires. But + a man loves himself more than another: because he is one with himself substantially, whereas with another he is one only in + the likeness of some form. Consequently, if this other's likeness to him arising from the participation of a form, hinders + him from gaining the good that he loves, he + becomes hateful to him, not for being like him, but for hindering him from gaining his own good. This is why "potters quarrel + among themselves," because they hinder one another's gain: and why "there are contentions among the proud," because they hinder + one another in attaining the position they covet. +
[34689] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod similitudo, proprie loquendo, est causa amoris. Sed +considerandum est quod similitudo inter aliqua potest attendi +dupliciter. Uno modo, ex hoc quod utrumque habet idem in actu, +sicut duo habentes albedinem, dicuntur similes. Alio modo, ex hoc +quod unum habet in potentia et in quadam inclinatione, illud quod +aliud habet in actu, sicut si dicamus quod corpus grave existens +extra suum locum, habet similitudinem cum corpore gravi in suo loco +existenti. Vel etiam secundum quod potentia habet similitudinem ad +actum ipsum, nam in ipsa potentia quodammodo est actus. Primus ergo +similitudinis modus causat amorem amicitiae, seu benevolentiae. Ex +hoc enim quod aliqui duo sunt similes, quasi habentes unam formam, +sunt quodammodo unum in forma illa, sicut duo homines sunt unum in +specie humanitatis, et duo albi in albedine. Et ideo affectus unius +tendit in alterum, sicut in unum sibi; et vult ei bonum sicut et +sibi. Sed secundus modus similitudinis causat amorem +concupiscentiae, vel amicitiam utilis seu delectabilis. Quia +unicuique existenti in potentia, inquantum huiusmodi, inest +appetitus sui actus, et in eius consecutione delectatur, si sit +sentiens et cognoscens. Dictum est autem supra quod in amore +concupiscentiae amans proprie amat seipsum, cum vult illud bonum +quod concupiscit. Magis autem unusquisque seipsum amat quam alium, +quia sibi unus est in substantia, alteri vero in similitudine +alicuius formae. Et ideo si ex eo quod est sibi similis in +participatione formae, impediatur ipsemet a consecutione boni quod +amat; efficitur ei odiosus, non inquantum est similis, sed +inquantum est proprii boni impeditivus. Et propter hoc figuli +corrixantur ad invicem, quia se invicem impediunt in proprio lucro, +et inter superbos sunt iurgia, quia se invicem impediunt in propria +excellentia, quam concupiscunt.
Reply to Objection 1: Hence the Reply to the First Objection is evident.
[34690] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 ad 1 Et per hoc +patet responsio ad primum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Even when a man loves in another what he loves not in himself, there is a certain likeness of proportion: because as the + latter is to that which is loved in him, so is the former to that which he loves in himself: for instance, if a good singer + love a good writer, we can see a likeness of proportion, inasmuch as each one has that which is becoming to him in respect + of his art. +
[34691] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod in hoc etiam quod aliquis in altero amat quod in se +non amat, invenitur ratio similitudinis secundum +proportionalitatem, nam sicut se habet alius ad hoc quod in eo +amatur, ita ipse se habet ad hoc quod in se amat. Puta si bonus +cantor bonum amet scriptorem, attenditur ibi similitudo +proportionis, secundum quod uterque habet quod convenit ei secundum +suam artem.
+ Reply to Objection 3: He that loves what he needs, bears a likeness to what he loves, as potentiality bears a likeness to its act, as stated above. +
[34692] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ille qui amat hoc quo indiget, habet similitudinem ad +id quod amat sicut quod est potentia ad actum, ut dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 4: According to the same likeness of potentiality to its act, the illiberal man loves the man who is liberal, in so far as he + expects from him something which he desires. The same applies to the man who is constant in his friendship as compared to + one who is inconstant. For in either case friendship seems to be based on usefulness. We might also say that although not + all men have these virtues in the complete habit, yet they have them according to + certain seminal principles in the reason, in force of which principles the man who is not virtuous loves the virtuous man, + as being in conformity with his own natural reason. +
[34693] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod secundum eandem similitudinem potentiae ad actum, +ille qui non est liberalis, amat eum qui est liberalis, inquantum +expectat ab eo aliquid quod desiderat. Et eadem ratio est de +perseverante in amicitia ad eum qui non perseverat. Utrobique enim +videtur esse amicitia propter utilitatem. Vel dicendum quod, licet +non omnes homines habeant huiusmodi virtutes secundum habitum +completum, habent tamen ea secundum quaedam seminalia rationis, +secundum quae, qui non habet virtutem, diligit virtuosum, tanquam +suae naturali rationi conformem.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that some other passion can be the cause of love. For the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) says that some are loved + for the sake of the pleasure they give. But pleasure is a passion. Therefore another passion is a cause of love. +
[34694] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliqua alia passio possit esse causa +amoris. Dicit enim philosophus, in VIII Ethic., quod aliqui amantur +propter delectationem. Sed delectatio est passio quaedam. Ergo +aliqua alia passio est causa amoris.
+ Objection 2: Further, desire is a passion. But we love some because we desire to receive something from them: as happens in every friendship + based on usefulness. Therefore another passion is a cause of love. +
[34695] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +desiderium quaedam passio est. Sed aliquos amamus propter +desiderium alicuius quod ab eis expectamus, sicut apparet in omni +amicitia quae est propter utilitatem. Ergo aliqua alia passio est +causa amoris.
+ Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1): "When we have no hope of getting a thing, we love it but half-heartedly or not at + all, even if we see how beautiful it is." Therefore hope too is a cause of love. +
[34696] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in X de Trin., cuius rei adipiscendae spem +quisque non gerit, aut tepide amat, aut omnino non amat, quamvis +quam pulchra sit videat. Ergo spes etiam est causa amoris.
+ On the contrary, All the other emotions of the soul are caused by love, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9). +
[34697] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod omnes aliae affectiones animi ex amore causantur, ut +Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei.
+ I answer that, There is no other passion of the soul that does not presuppose love of some kind. The reason is that every other passion + of the soul implies either movement towards something, or rest in something. Now every movement towards something, or rest + in something, arises from some kinship or aptness to that thing; and in this does love consist. Therefore it is not possible + for any other passion of the soul to be universally the cause of every love. But it may + happen that some other passion is the cause of some particular love: just as one good is the cause of another. +
[34698] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod nulla alia passio animae est quae non praesupponat +aliquem amorem. Cuius ratio est quia omnis alia passio animae vel +importat motum ad aliquid, vel quietem in aliquo. Omnis autem motus +in aliquid, vel quies in aliquo, ex aliqua connaturalitate vel +coaptatione procedit, quae pertinet ad rationem amoris. Unde +impossibile est quod aliqua alia passio animae sit causa +universaliter omnis amoris. Contingit tamen aliquam aliam passionem +esse causam amoris alicuius, sicut etiam unum bonum est causa +alterius.
+ Reply to Objection 1: When a man loves a thing for the pleasure it affords, his love is indeed caused by pleasure; but that very pleasure is caused, + in its turn, by another preceding love; for none takes pleasure save in that which is loved in some way. +
[34699] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, cum aliquis amat aliquid propter delectationem, +amor quidem ille causatur ex delectatione, sed delectatio illa +iterum causatur ex alio amore praecedente; nullus enim delectatur +nisi in re aliquo modo amata.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Desire for a thing always presupposes love for that thing. But desire of one thing can be the cause of another thing's being + loved; thus he that desires money, for this reason loves him from whom he receives it. +
[34700] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod desiderium rei alicuius semper praesupponit amorem +illius rei. Sed desiderium alicuius rei potest esse causa ut res +alia ametur, sicut qui desiderat pecuniam, amat propter hoc eum a +quo pecuniam recipit.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Hope causes or increases love; both by reason of pleasure, because it causes pleasure; and by reason of desire, because hope + strengthens desire, since we do not desire so intensely that which we have no hope of receiving. Nevertheless hope itself + is of a good that is loved. +
[34701] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod spes causat vel auget amorem, et ratione +delectationis, quia delectationem causat, et etiam ratione +desiderii, quia spes desiderium fortificat, non enim ita intense +desideramus quae non speramus. Sed tamen et ipsa spes est alicuius +boni amati.
We now have to consider the effects of love: under which head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether union is an effect of love?
(2) Whether mutual indwelling is an effect of love?
(3) Whether ecstasy is an effect of love?
(4) Whether zeal is an effect of love?
+[34702] +Iª-IIae q. 28 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +effectibus amoris. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum unio +sit effectus amoris. Secundo, utrum mutua inhaesio. Tertio, utrum +extasis sit effectus amoris. Quarto, utrum zelus. Quinto, utrum +amor sit passio laesiva amantis. Sexto, utrum amor sit causa omnium +quae amans agit.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that union is not an effect of love. For absence is incompatible with union. But love is compatible with absence; + for the Apostle says ( + Gal. 4:18): "Be zealous for that which is good in a good thing always" (speaking of himself, according to a gloss), "and not only when + I am present with you." Therefore union is not an effect of love. +
[34703] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod unio non sit effectus amoris. Absentia +enim unioni repugnat. Sed amor compatitur secum absentiam, dicit +enim apostolus, ad Galat. IV, bonum aemulamini in bono +semper (loquens de seipso, ut Glossa dicit), et non tantum +cum praesens sum apud vos. Ergo unio non est effectus +amoris.
+ Objection 2: Further, every union is either according to essence, thus form is united to matter, accident to subject, and a part to the + whole, or to another part in order to make up the whole: or according to likeness, in genus, species, or accident. But love + does not cause union of essence; else love could not be between things essentially distinct. On the other hand, love does + not cause union of likeness, but rather is caused by it, as stated above ( + Q[27], A[3]). Therefore union is not an effect of love. +
[34704] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +omnis unio aut est per essentiam, sicut forma unitur materiae, et +accidens subiecto, et pars toti vel alteri parti ad constitutionem +totius, aut est per similitudinem vel generis, vel speciei, vel +accidentis. Sed amor non causat unionem essentiae, alioquin nunquam +haberetur amor ad ea quae sunt per essentiam divisa. Unionem autem +quae est per similitudinem, amor non causat, sed magis ab ea +causatur. Ut dictum est. Ergo unio non est effectus amoris.
+ Objection 3: Further, the sense in act is the sensible in act, and the intellect in act is the thing actually understood. But the lover + in act is not the beloved in act. Therefore union is the effect of knowledge rather than of love. +
[34705] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sensus in actu fit sensibile in actu, et intellectus in actu fit +intellectum in actu. Non autem amans in actu fit amatum in actu. +Ergo unio magis est effectus cognitionis quam amoris.
+ On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that every love is a "unitive love." +
[34706] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod amor quilibet +est virtus unitiva.
+ I answer that, The union of lover and beloved is twofold. The first is real union; for instance, when the beloved is present with the lover. + The second is union of affection: and this union must be considered in relation to the preceding apprehension; since movement + of the appetite follows apprehension. Now love being twofold, viz. love of concupiscence and love of friendship; each of these + arises from a kind of apprehension of the oneness of the thing loved with the + lover. For when we love a thing, by desiring it, we apprehend it as belonging to our well-being. In like manner when a man + loves another with the love of friendship, he wills good to him, just as he wills good to himself: wherefore he apprehends + him as his other self, in so far, to wit, as he wills good to him as to himself. Hence a friend is called a man's "other self" + (Ethic. ix, 4), and Augustine says (Confess. iv, 6), "Well did one say to his friend: Thou half of my soul." +
The first of these unions is caused "effectively" by love; because love moves man to desire and seek the presence of the + beloved, as of something suitable and belonging to him. The second union is caused "formally" by love; because love itself + is this union or bond. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 10) that "love is a vital principle uniting, or seeking + to unite two together, the lover, to wit, and the beloved." For in describing it as "uniting" he refers to the + union of affection, without which there is no love: and in saying that "it seeks to unite," he refers to real union. +
[34707] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod duplex est unio amantis ad amatum. Una quidem +secundum rem, puta cum amatum praesentialiter adest amanti. Alia +vero secundum affectum. Quae quidem unio consideranda est ex +apprehensione praecedente, nam motus appetitivus sequitur +apprehensionem. Cum autem sit duplex amor, scilicet concupiscentiae +et amicitiae, uterque procedit ex quadam apprehensione unitatis +amati ad amantem. Cum enim aliquis amat aliquid quasi concupiscens +illud, apprehendit illud quasi pertinens ad suum bene esse. +Similiter cum aliquis amat aliquem amore amicitiae, vult ei bonum +sicut et sibi vult bonum, unde apprehendit eum ut alterum se, +inquantum scilicet vult ei bonum sicut et sibi ipsi. Et inde est +quod amicus dicitur esse alter ipse, et Augustinus dicit, in IV +Confess., bene quidam dixit de amico suo, dimidium animae +suae. Primam ergo unionem amor facit effective, quia movet ad +desiderandum et quaerendum praesentiam amati, quasi sibi +convenientis et ad se pertinentis. Secundam autem unionem facit +formaliter, quia ipse amor est talis unio vel nexus. Unde +Augustinus dicit, in VIII de Trin., quod amor est quasi vita +quaedam duo aliqua copulans, vel copulare appetens, amantem +scilicet et quod amatur. Quod enim dicit copulans, refertur ad +unionem affectus, sine qua non est amor, quod vero dicit copulare +intendens, pertinet ad unionem realem.
+ Reply to Objection 1: This argument is true of real union. That is necessary to pleasure as being its cause; desire implies the real absence of + the beloved: but love remains whether the beloved be absent or present. +
[34708] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de unione reali. Quam +quidem requirit delectatio sicut causam, desiderium vero est in +reali absentia amati, amor vero et in absentia et in +praesentia.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Union has a threefold relation to love. There is union which causes love; and this is substantial union, as regards the love + with which one loves oneself; while as regards the love wherewith one loves other things, it is the union of likeness, as + stated above ( + Q[27], A[3]). There is also a union which is essentially love itself. This union is according to a bond of affection, and is likened + to substantial union, inasmuch as + the lover stands to the object of his love, as to himself, if it be love of friendship; as to something belonging to himself, + if it be love of concupiscence. Again there is a union, which is the effect of love. This is real union, which the lover seeks + with the object of his love. Moreover this union is in keeping with the demands of love: for as the Philosopher relates (Polit. + ii, 1), "Aristophanes stated that lovers would wish to be united both into one," but since "this would result in + either one or both being destroyed," they seek a suitable and becoming union---to live together, speak together, and be united + together in other like things. +
[34709] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod unio tripliciter se habet ad amorem. Quaedam enim +unio est causa amoris. Et haec quidem est unio substantialis, +quantum ad amorem quo quis amat seipsum, quantum vero ad amorem quo +quis amat alia, est unio similitudinis, ut dictum est. Quaedam vero +unio est essentialiter ipse amor. Et haec est unio secundum +coaptationem affectus. Quae quidem assimilatur unioni substantiali, +inquantum amans se habet ad amatum, in amore quidem amicitiae, ut +ad seipsum; in amore autem concupiscentiae, ut ad aliquid sui. +Quaedam vero unio est effectus amoris. Et haec est unio realis, +quam amans quaerit de re amata. Et haec quidem unio est secundum +convenientiam amoris, ut enim philosophus refert, II Politic., +Aristophanes dixit quod amantes desiderarent ex ambobus fieri +unum, sed quia ex hoc accideret aut ambos aut alterum corrumpi, +quaerunt unionem quae convenit et decet; ut scilicet simul +conversentur, et simul colloquantur, et in aliis huiusmodi +coniungantur.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Knowledge is perfected by the thing known being united, through its likeness, to the knower. But the effect of love is that + the thing itself which is loved, is, in a way, united to the lover, as stated above. Consequently the union caused by love + is closer than that which is caused by knowledge. +
[34710] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod cognitio perficitur per hoc quod cognitum unitur +cognoscenti secundum suam similitudinem. Sed amor facit quod ipsa +res quae amatur, amanti aliquo modo uniatur, ut dictum est. Unde +amor est magis unitivus quam cognitio.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that love does not cause mutual indwelling, so that the lover be in the beloved and vice versa. For that which + is in another is contained in it. But the same cannot be container and contents. Therefore love cannot cause mutual indwelling, + so that the lover be in the beloved and vice versa. +
[34711] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non causet mutuam inhaesionem, ut +scilicet amans sit in amato, et e converso. Quod enim est in +altero, continetur in eo. Sed non potest idem esse continens et +contentum. Ergo per amorem non potest causari mutua inhaesio, ut +amatum sit in amante et e converso.
+ Objection 2: Further, nothing can penetrate within a whole, except by means of a division of the whole. But it is the function of the + reason, not of the appetite where love resides, to divide things that are really united. Therefore mutual indwelling is not + an effect of love. +
[34712] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +nihil potest penetrare in interiora alicuius integri, nisi per +aliquam divisionem. Sed dividere quae sunt secundum rem coniuncta, +non pertinet ad appetitum, in quo est amor, sed ad rationem. Ergo +mutua inhaesio non est effectus amoris.
+ Objection 3: Further, if love involves the lover being in the beloved and vice versa, it follows that the beloved is united to the lover, + in the same way as the lover is united to the beloved. But the union itself is love, as stated above + (A[1]). Therefore it follows that the lover is always loved by the object of his love; which is evidently false. Therefore mutual + indwelling is not an effect of love. +
[34713] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +si per amorem amans est in amato et e converso, sequetur quod hoc +modo amatum uniatur amanti, sicut amans amato. Sed ipsa unio est +amor, ut dictum est. Ergo sequitur quod semper amans ametur ab +amato, quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo mutua inhaesio est effectus +amoris.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + 1 Jn. 4:16): "He that abideth in charity abideth in God, and God in him." Now charity is the love of God. Therefore, for the same reason, + every love makes the beloved to be in the lover, and vice versa. +
[34714] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur I Ioan. IV, qui manet in caritate, in Deo +manet, et Deus in eo. Caritas autem est amor Dei. Ergo, eadem +ratione, quilibet amor facit amatum esse in amante, et e +converso.
+ I answer that, This effect of mutual indwelling may be understood as referring both to the apprehensive and to the appetitive power. Because, + as to the apprehensive power, the beloved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as the beloved abides in the apprehension of + the lover, according to + Phil. 1:7, "For that I have you in my heart": while the lover is said to be in the beloved, according to apprehension, inasmuch as the + lover is not satisfied with a + superficial apprehension of the beloved, but strives to gain an intimate knowledge of everything pertaining to the beloved, + so as to penetrate into his very soul. Thus it is written concerning the Holy Ghost, Who is God's Love, that He "searcheth + all things, yea the deep things of God" ( + 1 Cor. 2:10). +
As the appetitive power, the object loved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as it is in his affections, by a kind of complacency: + causing him either to take pleasure in it, or in its good, when present; or, in the absence of the object loved, by his longing, + to tend towards it with the love of concupiscence, or towards the good that he wills to the beloved, with the love of friendship: + not indeed from any extrinsic cause (as when we desire one thing on account of another, or + wish good to another on account of something else), but because the complacency in the beloved is rooted in the lover's heart. + For this reason we speak of love as being "intimate"; and "of the bowels of charity." On the other hand, the lover is in the + beloved, by the love of concupiscence and by the love of friendship, but not in the same way. For the love of concupiscence + is not satisfied with any external or superficial possession or enjoyment of the beloved; but seeks to possess the beloved + perfectly, by penetrating into his heart, as it were. Whereas, in the love of friendship, the lover is in the beloved, inasmuch + as he reckons what is good or evil to his friend, as being so to himself; and his friend's will as his own, so that it seems + as though he felt the good or suffered the evil in the person of his friend. Hence it is proper to friends "to desire the + same things, and to grieve and rejoice at the same," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 3 and Rhet. ii, 4). Consequently + in + so far as he reckons what affects his friend as affecting himself, the lover seems to be in the beloved, as though he were + become one with him: but in so far as, on the other hand, he wills and acts for his friend's sake as for his own sake, looking + on his friend as identified with himself, thus the beloved is in the lover. +
In yet a third way, mutual indwelling in the love of friendship can be understood in regard to reciprocal love: inasmuch + as friends return love for love, and both desire and do good things for one another. +
[34715] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod iste effectus mutuae inhaesionis potest intelligi et +quantum ad vim apprehensivam, et quantum ad vim appetitivam. Nam +quantum ad vim apprehensivam amatum dicitur esse in amante, +inquantum amatum immoratur in apprehensione amantis; secundum illud +Philipp. I, eo quod habeam vos in corde. Amans vero dicitur +esse in amato secundum apprehensionem inquantum amans non est +contentus superficiali apprehensione amati, sed nititur singula +quae ad amatum pertinent intrinsecus disquirere, et sic ad +interiora eius ingreditur. Sicut de spiritu sancto, qui est amor +Dei, dicitur, I ad Cor. II, quod scrutatur etiam profunda +Dei. Sed quantum ad vim appetitivam, amatum dicitur esse in +amante, prout est per quandam complacentiam in eius affectu, ut vel +delectetur in eo, aut in bonis eius, apud praesentiam; vel in +absentia, per desiderium tendat in ipsum amatum per amorem +concupiscentiae; vel in bona quae vult amato, per amorem amicitiae; +non quidem ex aliqua extrinseca causa, sicut cum aliquis desiderat +aliquid propter alterum, vel cum aliquis vult bonum alteri propter +aliquid aliud; sed propter complacentiam amati interius radicatam. +Unde et amor dicitur intimus; et dicuntur viscera caritatis. E +converso autem amans est in amato aliter quidem per amorem +concupiscentiae, aliter per amorem amicitiae. Amor namque +concupiscentiae non requiescit in quacumque extrinseca aut +superficiali adeptione vel fruitione amati, sed quaerit amatum +perfecte habere, quasi ad intima illius perveniens. In amore vero +amicitiae, amans est in amato, inquantum reputat bona vel mala +amici sicut sua, et voluntatem amici sicut suam, ut quasi ipse in +suo amico videatur bona vel mala pati, et affici. Et propter hoc, +proprium est amicorum eadem velle, et in eodem tristari et gaudere +secundum philosophum, in IX Ethic. et in II Rhetoric. Ut sic, +inquantum quae sunt amici aestimat sua, amans videatur esse in +amato, quasi idem factus amato. Inquantum autem e converso vult et +agit propter amicum sicut propter seipsum, quasi reputans amicum +idem sibi, sic amatum est in amante. Potest autem et tertio modo +mutua inhaesio intelligi in amore amicitiae, secundum viam +redamationis, inquantum mutuo se amant amici, et sibi invicem bona +volunt et operantur.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The beloved is contained in the lover, by being impressed on his heart and thus becoming the object of his complacency. On + the other hand, the lover is contained in the beloved, inasmuch as the lover penetrates, so to speak, into the beloved. For + nothing hinders a thing from being both container and contents in different ways: just as a genus is contained in its species, + and vice versa. +
[34716] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod amatum continetur in amante, inquantum est +impressum in affectu eius per quandam complacentiam. E converso +vero amans continetur in amato, inquantum amans sequitur aliquo +modo illud quod est intimum amati. Nihil enim prohibet diverso modo +esse aliquid continens et contentum, sicut genus continetur in +specie et e converso.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The apprehension of the reason precedes the movement of love. Consequently, just as the reason divides, so does the movement + of love penetrate into the beloved, as was explained above. +
[34717] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod rationis apprehensio praecedit affectum amoris. Et +ideo, sicut ratio disquirit, ita affectus amoris subintrat in +amatum, ut ex dictis patet.
+ Reply to Objection 3: This argument is true of the third kind of mutual indwelling, which is not to be found in every kind of love. +
[34718] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod illa ratio procedit de tertio modo mutuae +inhaesionis, qui non invenitur in quolibet amore.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that ecstasy is not an effect of love. For ecstasy seems to imply loss of reason. But love does not always + result in loss of reason: for lovers are masters of themselves at times. Therefore love does not cause ecstasy. +
[34719] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod extasis non sit effectus amoris. +Extasis enim quandam alienationem importare videtur. Sed amor non +semper facit alienationem, sunt enim amantes interdum sui compotes. +Ergo amor non facit extasim.
+ Objection 2: Further, the lover desires the beloved to be united to him. Therefore he draws the beloved to himself, rather than betakes + himself into the beloved, going forth out from himself as it were. +
[34720] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +amans desiderat amatum sibi uniri. Magis ergo amatum trahit ad se, +quam etiam pergat in amatum, extra se exiens.
+ Objection 3: Further, love unites the beloved to the lover, as stated above + (A[1]). If, therefore, the lover goes out from himself, in order to betake himself into the beloved, it follows that the lover always + loves the beloved more than himself: which is evidently false. Therefore ecstasy is not an effect of love. +
[34721] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +amor unit amatum amanti, sicut dictum est. Si ergo amans extra se +tendit, ut in amatum pergat, sequitur quod semper plus diligat +amatum quam seipsum. Quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo extasis est +effectus amoris.
+ On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the Divine love produces ecstasy," and that "God Himself suffered ecstasy through love." + Since therefore according to the same author (Div. Nom. iv), every love is a participated likeness of the Divine Love, it + seems that every love causes ecstasy. +
[34722] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod divinus +amor extasim facit, et quod ipse Deus propter amorem est extasim +passus. Cum ergo quilibet amor sit quaedam similitudo +participata divini amoris, ut ibidem dicitur, videtur quod quilibet +amor causet extasim.
+ I answer that, To suffer ecstasy means to be placed outside oneself. This happens as to the apprehensive power and as to the appetitive + power. As to the apprehensive power, a man is said to be placed outside himself, when he is placed outside the knowledge proper + to him. This may be due to his being raised to a higher knowledge; thus, a man is said to suffer ecstasy, inasmuch as he is + placed outside the connatural apprehension of his sense and reason, when he is raised up + so as to comprehend things that surpass sense and reason: or it may be due to his being cast down into a state of debasement; + thus a man may be said to suffer ecstasy, when he is overcome by violent passion or madness. As to the appetitive power, a + man is said to suffer ecstasy, when that power is borne towards something else, so that it goes forth out from itself, as + it were. +
The first of these ecstasies is caused by love dispositively in so far, namely, as love makes the lover dwell on the beloved, + as stated above + (A[2]), and to dwell intently on one thing draws the mind from other things. The second ecstasy is caused by love directly; by love + of friendship, simply; by love of concupiscence not simply but in a restricted sense. Because in love of concupiscence, the + lover is carried out of himself, in a certain sense; in so + far, namely, as not being satisfied with enjoying the good that he has, he seeks to enjoy something outside himself. But since + he seeks to have this extrinsic good for himself, he does not go out from himself simply, and this movement remains finally + within him. On the other hand, in the love of friendship, a man's affection goes out from itself simply; because he wishes + and does good to his friend, by caring and providing for him, for his sake. +
[34723] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod extasim pati aliquis dicitur, cum extra se ponitur. +Quod quidem contingit et secundum vim apprehensivam, et secundum +vim appetitivam. Secundum quidem vim apprehensivam aliquis dicitur +extra se poni, quando ponitur extra cognitionem sibi propriam, vel +quia ad superiorem sublimatur, sicut homo, dum elevatur ad +comprehendenda aliqua quae sunt supra sensum et rationem, dicitur +extasim pati, inquantum ponitur extra connaturalem apprehensionem +rationis et sensus; vel quia ad inferiora deprimitur; puta, cum +aliquis in furiam vel amentiam cadit, dicitur extasim passus. +Secundum appetitivam vero partem dicitur aliquis extasim pati, +quando appetitus alicuius in alterum fertur, exiens quodammodo +extra seipsum. Primam quidem extasim facit amor dispositive, +inquantum scilicet facit meditari de amato, ut dictum est, intensa +autem meditatio unius abstrahit ab aliis. Sed secundam extasim +facit amor directe, simpliciter quidem amor amicitiae; amor autem +concupiscentiae non simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Nam in amore +concupiscentiae, quodammodo fertur amans extra seipsum, inquantum +scilicet, non contentus gaudere de bono quod habet, quaerit frui +aliquo extra se. Sed quia illud extrinsecum bonum quaerit sibi +habere, non exit simpliciter extra se, sed talis affectio in fine +infra ipsum concluditur. Sed in amore amicitiae, affectus alicuius +simpliciter exit extra se, quia vult amico bonum, et operatur, +quasi gerens curam et providentiam ipsius, propter ipsum +amicum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: This argument is true of the first kind of ecstasy. +
[34724] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod illa ratio procedit de prima extasi.
+ Reply to Objection 2: This argument applies to love of concupiscence, which, as stated above, does not cause ecstasy simply. +
[34725] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod illa ratio procedit de amore concupiscentiae, qui non +facit simpliciter extasim, ut dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: He who loves, goes out from himself, in so far as he wills the good of his friend and works for it. Yet he does not will + the good of his friend more than his own good: and so it does not follow that he loves another more than himself. +
[34726] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ille qui amat, intantum extra se exit, inquantum vult +bona amici et operatur. Non tamen vult bona amici magis quam sua. +Unde non sequitur quod alterum plus quam se diligat.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that zeal is not an effect of love. For zeal is a beginning of contention; wherefore it is written ( + 1 Cor. 3:3): "Whereas there is among you zeal [Douay: 'envying'] and contention," etc. But contention is incompatible with love. Therefore + zeal is not an effect of love. +
[34727] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod zelus non sit effectus amoris. Zelus +enim est contentionis principium, unde dicitur I ad Cor. III, +cum sit inter vos zelus et contentio, et cetera. Sed +contentio repugnat amori. Ergo zelus non est effectus amoris.
+ Objection 2: Further, the object of love is the good, which communicates itself to others. But zeal is opposed to communication; since + it seems an effect of zeal, that a man refuses to share the object of his love with another: thus husbands are said to be + jealous of [zelare] their wives, because they will not share them with others. Therefore zeal is not an effect of love. +
[34728] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea +obiectum amoris est bonum, quod est communicativum sui. Sed zelus +repugnat communicationi, ad zelum enim pertinere videtur quod +aliquis non patiatur consortium in amato; sicut viri dicuntur +zelare uxores, quas nolunt habere communes cum ceteris. Ergo zelus +non est effectus amoris.
+ Objection 3: Further, there is no zeal without hatred, as neither is there without love: for it is written ( + Ps. 72:3): "I had a zeal on occasion of the wicked." Therefore it should not be set down as an effect of love any more than of hatred. +
[34729] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +zelus non est sine odio, sicut nec sine amore, dicitur enim in +Psalmo LXXII, zelavi super iniquos. Non ergo debet dici +magis effectus amoris quam odii.
+ On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "God is said to be a zealot, on account of his great love for all things." +
[34730] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod Deus +appellatur Zelotes propter multum amorem quem habet ad +existentia.
+ I answer that, Zeal, whatever way we take it, arises from the intensity of love. For it is evident that the more intensely a power tends + to anything, the more vigorously it withstands opposition or resistance. Since therefore love is "a movement towards the object + loved," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 35), an intense love seeks to remove everything that opposes it. +
But this happens in different ways according to love of concupiscence, and love of friendship. For in love of concupiscence + he who desires something intensely, is moved against all that hinders his gaining or quietly enjoying the object of his love. + It is thus that husbands are said to be jealous of their wives, lest association with others prove a hindrance to their exclusive + individual rights. In like manner those who seek to excel, are moved against those who seem to excel, + as though these were a hindrance to their excelling. And this is the zeal of envy, of which it is written ( + Ps. 36:1): "Be not emulous of evil doers, nor envy [zelaveris] them that work iniquity." +
On the other hand, love of friendship seeks the friend's good: wherefore, when it is intense, it causes a man to be moved + against everything that opposes the friend's good. In this respect, a man is said to be zealous on behalf of his friend, when + he makes a point of repelling whatever may be said or done against the friend's good. In this way, too, a man is said to be + zealous on God's behalf, when he endeavors, to the best of his means, to repel whatever is contrary to the + honor or will of God; according to + 3 Kings 19:14: "With zeal I have been zealous for the Lord of hosts." Again on the words of + Jn. 2:17: "The zeal of Thy house hath eaten me up," a gloss says that "a man is eaten up with a good zeal, who strives to remedy whatever + evil he perceives; and if he cannot, bears with it and laments it." +
[34731] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod zelus, quocumque modo sumatur, ex intensione amoris +provenit. Manifestum est enim quod quanto aliqua virtus intensius +tendit in aliquid, fortius etiam repellit omne contrarium vel +repugnans. Cum igitur amor sit quidam motus in amatum, ut +Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest., intensus amor +quaerit excludere omne quod sibi repugnat. Aliter tamen hoc +contingit in amore concupiscentiae, et aliter in amore amicitiae. +Nam in amore concupiscentiae, qui intense aliquid concupiscit, +movetur contra omne illud quod repugnat consecutioni vel fruitioni +quietae eius quod amatur. Et hoc modo viri dicuntur zelare uxores, +ne per consortium aliorum impediatur singularitas quam in uxore +quaerunt. Similiter etiam qui quaerunt excellentiam, moventur +contra eos qui excellere videntur, quasi impedientes excellentiam +eorum. Et iste est zelus invidiae, de quo dicitur in Psalmo XXXVI, +noli aemulari in malignantibus, neque zelaveris facientes +iniquitatem. Amor autem amicitiae quaerit bonum amici, unde +quando est intensus, facit hominem moveri contra omne illud quod +repugnat bono amici. Et secundum hoc, aliquis dicitur zelare pro +amico, quando, si qua dicuntur vel fiunt contra bonum amici, homo +repellere studet. Et per hunc etiam modum aliquis dicitur zelare +pro Deo, quando ea quae sunt contra honorem vel voluntatem Dei, +repellere secundum posse conatur; secundum illud III Reg. XIX, +zelo zelatus sum pro domino exercituum. Et Ioan. II, super +illud, zelus domus tuae comedit me, dicit Glossa quod +bono zelo comeditur, qui quaelibet prava quae viderit, corrigere +satagit; si nequit, tolerat et gemit.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle is speaking in this passage of the zeal of envy; which is indeed the cause of contention, not against the object + of love, but for it, and against that which is opposed to it. +
[34732] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod apostolus ibi loquitur de zelo invidiae; qui +quidem est causa contentionis, non contra rem amatam, sed pro re +amata contra impedimenta ipsius.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Good is loved inasmuch as it can be communicated to the lover. Consequently whatever hinders the perfection of this communication, + becomes hateful. Thus zeal arises from love of good. But through defect of goodness, it happens that certain small goods cannot, + in their entirety, be possessed by many at the same time: and from the love of such things arises the zeal of envy. But it + does not arise, properly speaking, in the case of those things which, in + their entirety, can be possessed by many: for no one envies another the knowledge of truth, which can be known entirely by + many; except perhaps one may envy another his superiority in the knowledge of it. +
[34733] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod bonum amatur inquantum est communicabile amanti. Unde +omne illud quod perfectionem huius communicationis impedit, +efficitur odiosum. Et sic ex amore boni zelus causatur. Ex defectu +autem bonitatis contingit quod quaedam parva bona non possunt +integre simul possideri a multis. Et ex amore talium causatur zelus +invidiae. Non autem proprie ex his quae integre possunt a multis +possideri, nullus enim invidet alteri de cognitione veritatis, quae +a multis integre cognosci potest; sed forte de excellentia circa +cognitionem huius.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The very fact that a man hates whatever is opposed to the object of his love, is the effect of love. Hence zeal is set down + as an effect of love rather than of hatred. +
[34734] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod aliquis odio habet ea quae repugnant +amato, ex amore procedit. Unde zelus proprie ponitur effectus +amoris magis quam odii.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that love wounds the lover. For languor denotes a hurt in the one that languishes. But love causes languor: + for it is written ( + Cant 2:5): "Stay me up with flowers, compass me about with apples; because I languish with love." Therefore love is a wounding passion. +
[34735] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor sit passio laesiva. Languor enim +significat laesionem quandam languentis. Sed amor causat languorem, +dicitur enim Cant. II, fulcite me floribus, stipate me malis, +quia amore langueo. Ergo amor est passio laesiva.
+ Objection 2: Further, melting is a kind of dissolution. But love melts that in which it is: for it is written ( + Cant 5:6): "My soul melted when my beloved spoke." Therefore love is a dissolvent: therefore it is a corruptive and a wounding passion. +
[34736] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +liquefactio est quaedam resolutio. Sed amor est liquefactivus, +dicitur enim Cant. V, anima mea liquefacta est, ut dilectus meus +locutus est. Ergo amor est resolutivus. Est ergo corruptivus et +laesivus.
+ Objection 3: Further, fervor denotes a certain excess of heat; which excess has a corruptive effect. But love causes fervor: for Dionysius + (Coel. Hier. vii) in reckoning the properties belonging to the Seraphim's love, includes "hot" and "piercing" and "most fervent." + Moreover it is said of love ( + Cant 8:6) that "its lamps are fire and flames." Therefore love is a wounding and corruptive passion. +
[34737] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +fervor designat quendam excessum in caliditate, qui quidem excessus +corruptivus est. Sed fervor causatur ex amore, Dionysius enim, VII +cap. Cael. Hier., inter ceteras proprietates ad amorem Seraphim +pertinentes, ponit calidum et acutum et superfervens. Et Cant. +VIII, dicitur de amore quod lampades eius sunt lampades ignis +atque flammarum. Ergo amor est passio laesiva et +corruptiva.
+ On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "everything loves itself with a love that holds it together," i.e. that preserves it. + Therefore love is not a wounding passion, but rather one that preserves and perfects. +
[34738] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod singula seipsa +amant contentive, idest conservative. Ergo amor non est passio +laesiva, sed magis conservativa et perfectiva.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + Q[26], AA[1],2; + Q[27], A[1]), love denotes a certain adapting of the appetitive power to some good. Now nothing is hurt by being adapted to that which + is suitable to it; rather, if possible, it is perfected and bettered. But if a thing be adapted to that which is not suitable + to it, it is hurt and made worse thereby. Consequently love of a suitable good perfects and betters the lover; but + love of a good which is unsuitable to the lover, wounds and worsens him. Wherefore man is perfected and bettered chiefly by + the love of God: but is wounded and worsened by the love of sin, according to + Osee 9:10: "They became abominable, as those things which they loved." +
And let this be understood as applying to love in respect of its formal element, i.e. in regard to the appetite. But in respect + of the material element in the passion of love, i.e. a certain bodily change, it happens that love is hurtful, by reason of + this change being excessive: just as it happens in the senses, and in every act of a power of the soul that is exercised through + the change of some bodily organ. +
[34739] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, amor significat coaptationem +quandam appetitivae virtutis ad aliquod bonum. Nihil autem quod +coaptatur ad aliquid quod est sibi conveniens, ex hoc ipso +laeditur, sed magis, si sit possibile, proficit et melioratur. Quod +vero coaptatur ad aliquid quod non est sibi conveniens, ex hoc ipso +laeditur et deterioratur. Amor ergo boni convenientis est +perfectivus et meliorativus amantis, amor autem boni quod non est +conveniens amanti, est laesivus et deteriorativus amantis. Unde +maxime homo perficitur et melioratur per amorem Dei, laeditur autem +et deterioratur per amorem peccati, secundum illud Osee IX, +facti sunt abominabiles, sicut ea quae dilexerunt. Et hoc +quidem dictum sit de amore, quantum ad id quod est formale in ipso, +quod est scilicet ex parte appetitus. Quantum vero ad id quod est +materiale in passione amoris, quod est immutatio aliqua corporalis, +accidit quod amor sit laesivus propter excessum immutationis, sicut +accidit in sensu, et in omni actu virtutis animae qui exercetur per +aliquam immutationem organi corporalis.
Reply to Objection 1: In reply to the objections, it is to be observed that four proximate effects may be ascribed to love: viz. melting, enjoyment, + languor, and fervor. Of these the first is "melting," which is opposed to freezing. For things that are frozen, are closely + bound together, so as to be hard to pierce. But it belongs to love that the appetite is fitted to receive the good which is + loved, inasmuch as the object loved is in the lover, as stated above + (A[2]). + Consequently the freezing or hardening of the heart is a disposition incompatible with love: while melting denotes a softening + of the heart, whereby the heart shows itself to be ready for the entrance of the beloved. If, then, the beloved is present + and possessed, pleasure or enjoyment ensues. But if the beloved be absent, two passions arise; viz. sadness at its absence, + which is denoted by "languor" (hence Cicero in De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 11 applies the term "ailment" chiefly to sadness); and + an intense desire to possess the beloved, which is signified by "fervor." And these are the effects of love considered formally, + according to the relation of the appetitive power to its object. But in the passion of love, other effects ensue, proportionate + to the above, in respect of a change in the organ. +
[34740] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 5 ad 1 Ad ea vero +quae in contrarium obiiciuntur, dicendum quod amori attribui +possunt quatuor effectus proximi, scilicet liquefactio, fruitio, +languor et fervor. Inter quae primum est liquefactio, quae +opponitur congelationi. Ea enim quae sunt congelata, in seipsis +constricta sunt, ut non possint de facili subintrationem alterius +pati. Ad amorem autem pertinet quod appetitus coaptetur ad quandam +receptionem boni amati, prout amatum est in amante, sicut iam supra +dictum est. Unde cordis congelatio vel duritia est dispositio +repugnans amori. Sed liquefactio importat quandam mollificationem +cordis, qua exhibet se cor habile ut amatum in ipsum subintret. Si +ergo amatum fuerit praesens et habitum, causatur delectatio sive +fruitio. Si autem fuerit absens, consequuntur duae passiones, +scilicet tristitia de absentia, quae significatur per languorem +(unde et Tullius, in III de Tusculanis quaest., maxime tristitiam +aegritudinem nominat); et intensum desiderium de consecutione +amati, quod significatur per fervorem. Et isti quidem sunt effectus +amoris formaliter accepti, secundum habitudinem appetitivae +virtutis ad obiectum. Sed in passione amoris, consequuntur aliqui +effectus his proportionati, secundum immutationem organi.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the lover does not do everything from love. For love is a passion, as stated above ( + Q[26], A[2]). But man does not do everything from passion: but some things he does from choice, and some things from ignorance, as stated + in Ethic. v, 8. Therefore not everything that a man does, is done from love. +
[34741] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod amans non agat omnia ex amore. Amor +enim quaedam passio est, ut supra dictum est. Sed non omnia quae +agit homo, agit ex passione, sed quaedam agit ex electione, et +quaedam ex ignorantia, ut dicitur in V Ethic. Ergo non omnia quae +homo agit, agit ex amore.
+ Objection 2: Further, the appetite is a principle of movement and action in all animals, as stated in De Anima iii, 10. If, therefore, + whatever a man does is done from love, the other passions of the appetitive faculty are superfluous. +
[34742] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, +appetitus est principium motus et actionis in omnibus animalibus, +ut patet in III de anima. Si igitur omnia quae quis agit, agit ex +amore, aliae passiones appetitivae partis erunt superfluae.
+ Objection 3: Further, nothing is produced at one and the same time by contrary causes. But some things are done from hatred. Therefore + all things are not done from love. +
[34743] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, +nihil causatur simul a contrariis causis. Sed quaedam fiunt ex +odio. Non ergo omnia sunt ex amore.
+ On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "all things, whatever they do, they do for the love of good." +
[34744] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod propter +amorem boni omnia agunt quaecumque agunt.
+ I answer that, Every agent acts for an end, as stated above ( + Q[1], A[2] ). Now the end is the good desired and loved by each one. Wherefore it is evident that every agent, whatever it be, does + every action from love of some kind. +
[34745] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod omne agens agit propter finem aliquem, ut supra +dictum est. Finis autem est bonum desideratum et amatum unicuique. +Unde manifestum est quod omne agens, quodcumque sit, agit +quamcumque actionem ex aliquo amore.
+ Reply to Objection 1: This objection takes love as a passion existing in the sensitive appetite. But here we are speaking of love in a general + sense, inasmuch as it includes intellectual, rational, animal, and natural love: for it is in this sense that Dionysius speaks + of love in chapter iv of De Divinis Nominibus. +
[34746] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de amore qui est passio +in appetitu sensitivo existens. Nos autem loquimur nunc de amore +communiter accepto, prout comprehendit sub se amorem +intellectualem, rationalem, animalem, naturalem, sic enim Dionysius +loquitur de amore in IV cap. de Div. Nom.
+ Reply to Objection 2: As stated above + (A[5]; Q[27], A[4]) desire, sadness and pleasure, and consequently all the other passions of the soul, result from love. Wherefore + every act proceeds from any passion, proceeds also from love as from a first cause: and so the other passions, which are proximate + causes, are not superfluous. +
[34747] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod ex amore, sicut iam dictum est, causantur et +desiderium et tristitia et delectatio, et per consequens omnes +aliae passiones. Unde omnis actio quae procedit ex quacumque +passione, procedit etiam ex amore, sicut ex prima causa. Unde non +superfluunt aliae passiones, quae sunt causae proximae.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Hatred also is a result of love, as we shall state further on ( + Q[29], A[2]). +
[34748] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod odium etiam ex amore causatur, sicut infra +dicetur.
We must now consider hatred: concerning which there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether evil is the cause and the object of hatred?
(2) Whether love is the cause of hatred?
(3) Whether hatred is stronger than love?
(4) Whether a man can hate himself?
+[34749] +Iª-IIae q. 29 pr. Deinde considerandum est de odio. +Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum causa et obiectum odii +sit malum. Secundo, utrum odium causetur ex amore. Tertio, utrum +odium sit fortius quam amor. Quarto, utrum aliquis possit habere +odio seipsum. Quinto, utrum aliquis possit habere odio veritatem. +Sexto, utrum aliquid possit haberi odio in universali.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that evil is not the object and cause of hatred. For everything that exists, as such, is good. If therefore + evil be the object of hatred, it follows that nothing but the lack of something can be the object of hatred: which is clearly + untrue. +
[34750] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod obiectum et causa odii non sit malum. +Omne enim quod est, inquantum huiusmodi bonum est. Si igitur +obiectum odii sit malum, sequitur quod nulla res odio habeatur, sed +solum defectus alicuius rei. Quod patet esse falsum.
+ Objection 2: Further, hatred of evil is praise-worthy; hence ( + 2 Macc 3:1) some are praised for that "the laws were very well kept, because of the godliness of Onias the high-priest, and the hatred + of their souls [Douay: 'his soul'] had no evil." If, therefore, nothing but evil be the object of hatred, it would follow + that all hatred is commendable: and this is clearly false. +
[34751] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +odire malum est laudabile, unde in laudem quorundam dicitur II +Machab. III, quod leges optime custodiebantur, propter Oniae +pontificis pietatem, et animos odio habentes mala. Si igitur +nihil oditur nisi malum, sequitur quod omne odium sit laudabile. +Quod patet esse falsum.
+ Objection 3: Further, the same thing is not at the same time both good and evil. But the same thing is lovable and hateful to different + subjects. Therefore hatred is not only of evil, but also of good. +
[34752] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +idem non est simul bonum et malum. Sed idem diversis est odibile et +amabile. Ergo odium non solum est mali, sed etiam boni.
+ On the contrary, Hatred is the opposite of love. But the object of love is good, as stated above ( + Q[26], A[1]; + Q[27], A[1]). Therefore the object of hatred is evil. +
[34753] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra, +odium contrariatur amori. Sed obiectum amoris est bonum, ut supra +dictum est. Ergo obiectum odii est malum.
+ I answer that, Since the natural appetite is the result of apprehension (though this apprehension is not in the same subject as the natural + appetite), it seems that what applies to the inclination of the natural appetite, applies also to the animal appetite, which + does result from an apprehension in the same subject, as stated above ( + Q[26], A[1]). Now, with regard to the natural appetite, it is evident, that just as each thing is naturally attuned + and adapted to that which is suitable to it, wherein consists natural love; so has it a natural dissonance from that which + opposes and destroys it; and this is natural hatred. So, therefore, in the animal appetite, or in the intellectual appetite, + love is a certain harmony of the appetite with that which is apprehended as suitable; while hatred is dissonance of the appetite + from that which is apprehended as repugnant and hurtful. Now, just as whatever is suitable, as such, bears the aspect of + good; so whatever is repugnant, as such, bears the aspect of evil. And therefore, just as good is the object of love, so evil + is the object of hatred. +
[34754] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, cum appetitus naturalis derivetur ab aliqua +apprehensione, licet non coniuncta; eadem ratio videtur esse de +inclinatione appetitus naturalis, et appetitus animalis, qui +sequitur apprehensionem coniunctam, sicut supra dictum est. In +appetitu autem naturali hoc manifeste apparet, quod sicut +unumquodque habet naturalem consonantiam vel aptitudinem ad id quod +sibi convenit, quae est amor naturalis; ita ad id quod est ei +repugnans et corruptivum, habet dissonantiam naturalem, quae est +odium naturale. Sic igitur et in appetitu animali, seu in +intellectivo, amor est consonantia quaedam appetitus ad id quod +apprehenditur ut conveniens, odium vero est dissonantia quaedam +appetitus ad id quod apprehenditur ut repugnans et nocivum. Sicut +autem omne conveniens, inquantum huiusmodi, habet rationem boni; +ita omne repugnans, inquantum huiusmodi, habet rationem mali. Et +ideo, sicut bonum est obiectum amoris, ita malum est obiectum +odii.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Being, as such, has not the aspect of repugnance but only of fittingness; because being is common to all things. But being, + inasmuch as it is this determinate being, has an aspect of repugnance to some determinate being. And in this way, one being + is hateful to another, and is evil; though not in itself, but by comparison with something else. +
[34755] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ens, inquantum ens, non habet rationem +repugnantis, sed magis convenientis, quia omnia conveniunt in ente. +Sed ens inquantum est hoc ens determinatum, habet rationem +repugnantis ad aliquod ens determinatum. Et secundum hoc, unum ens +est odibile alteri, et est malum, etsi non in se, tamen per +comparationem ad alterum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Just as a thing may be apprehended as good, when it is not truly good; so a thing may be apprehended as evil, whereas it + is not truly evil. Hence it happens sometimes that neither hatred of evil nor love of good is good. +
[34756] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut aliquid apprehenditur ut bonum, quod non est +vere bonum; ita aliquid apprehenditur ut malum, quod non est vere +malum. Unde contingit quandoque nec odium mali, nec amorem boni +esse bonum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: To different things the same thing may be lovable or hateful: in respect of the natural appetite, owing to one and the same + thing being naturally suitable to one thing, and naturally unsuitable to another: thus heat is becoming to fire and unbecoming + to water: and in respect of the animal appetite, owing to one and the same thing being apprehended by one as good, by another + as bad. +
[34757] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod contingit idem esse amabile et odibile diversis, +secundum appetitum quidem naturalem, ex hoc quod unum et idem est +conveniens uni secundum suam naturam, et repugnans alteri, sicut +calor convenit igni, et repugnat aquae. Secundum appetitum vero +animalem, ex hoc quod unum et idem apprehenditur ab uno sub ratione +boni, et ab alio sub ratione mali.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that love is not a cause of hatred. For "the opposite members of a division are naturally simultaneous" (Praedic. + x). But love and hatred are opposite members of a division, since they are contrary to one another. Therefore they are naturally + simultaneous. Therefore love is not the cause of hatred. +
[34758] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non sit causa odii. Ea enim +quae ex opposito dividuntur, naturaliter sunt simul, ut dicitur +in praedicamentis. Sed amor et odium, cum sint contraria, ex +opposito dividuntur. Ergo naturaliter sunt simul. Non ergo amor est +causa odii.
+ Objection 2: Further, of two contraries, one is not the cause of the other. But love and hatred are contraries. Therefore love is not + the cause of hatred. +
[34759] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +unum contrariorum non est causa alterius. Sed amor et odium sunt +contraria. Ergo amor non est causa odii.
+ Objection 3: Further, that which follows is not the cause of that which precedes. But hatred precedes love, seemingly: since hatred implies + a turning away from evil, whereas love implies a turning towards good. Therefore love is not the cause of hatred. +
[34760] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +posterius non est causa prioris. Sed odium est prius amore, ut +videtur, nam odium importat recessum a malo, amor vero accessum ad +bonum. Ergo amor non est causa odii.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9) that all emotions are caused by love. Therefore hatred also, since it is an emotion + of the soul, is caused by love. +
[34761] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicit Augustinus, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod omnes affectiones +causantur ex amore. Ergo et odium, cum sit quaedam affectio animae, +causatur ex amore.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[1]), love consists in a certain agreement of the lover with the object loved, while hatred consists in a certain disagreement + or dissonance. Now we should consider in each thing, what agrees with it, before that which disagrees: since a thing disagrees + with another, through destroying or hindering that which agrees with it. Consequently love must needs precede hatred; and + nothing is hated, save through being + contrary to a suitable thing which is loved. And hence it is that every hatred is caused by love. +
[34762] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, amor consistit in quadam +convenientia amantis ad amatum, odium vero consistit in quadam +repugnantia vel dissonantia. Oportet autem in quolibet prius +considerare quid ei conveniat, quam quid ei repugnet, per hoc enim +aliquid est repugnans alteri, quia est corruptivum vel impeditivum +eius quod est conveniens. Unde necesse est quod amor sit prior +odio; et quod nihil odio habeatur, nisi per hoc quod contrariatur +convenienti quod amatur. Et secundum hoc, omne odium ex amore +causatur.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The opposite members of a division are sometimes naturally simultaneous, both really and logically; e.g. two species of animal, + or two species of color. Sometimes they are simultaneous logically, while, in reality, one precedes, and causes the other; + e.g. the species of numbers, figures and movements. Sometimes they are not simultaneous either really or logically; e.g. substance + and accident; for substance is in reality the cause of accident; and + being is predicated of substance before it is predicated of accident, by a priority of reason, because it is not predicated + of accident except inasmuch as the latter is in substance. Now love and hatred are naturally simultaneous, logically but not + really. Wherefore nothing hinders love from being the cause of hatred. +
[34763] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod in his quae ex opposito dividuntur, quaedam +inveniuntur quae sunt naturaliter simul et secundum rem, et +secundum rationem, sicut duae species animalis, vel duae species +coloris. Quaedam vero sunt simul secundum rationem, sed unum +realiter est prius altero et causa eius, sicut patet in speciebus +numerorum, figurarum et motuum. Quaedam vero non sunt simul nec +secundum rem, nec secundum rationem, sicut substantia et accidens, +nam substantia realiter est causa accidentis; et ens secundum +rationem prius attribuitur substantiae quam accidenti, quia +accidenti non attribuitur nisi inquantum est in substantia. Amor +autem et odium naturaliter quidem sunt simul secundum rationem, sed +non realiter. Unde nihil prohibet amorem esse causam odii.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Love and hatred are contraries if considered in respect of the same thing. But if taken in respect of contraries, they are + not themselves contrary, but consequent to one another: for it amounts to the same that one love a certain thing, or that + one hate its contrary. Thus love of one thing is the cause of one's hating its contrary. +
[34764] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod amor et odium sunt contraria, quando accipiuntur +circa idem. Sed quando sunt de contrariis, non sunt contraria, sed +se invicem consequentia, eiusdem enim rationis est quod ametur +aliquid, et odiatur eius contrarium. Et sic amor unius rei est +causa quod eius contrarium odiatur.
+ Reply to Objection 3: In the order of execution, the turning away from one term precedes the turning towards the other. But the reverse is the + case in the order of intention: since approach to one term is the reason for turning away from the other. Now the appetitive + movement belongs rather to the order of intention than to that of execution. Wherefore love precedes hatred: because each + is an appetitive movement. +
[34765] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod in executione prius est recedere ab uno termino, quam +accedere ad alterum terminum. Sed in intentione est e converso, +propter hoc enim receditur ab uno termino, ut accedatur ad alterum. +Motus autem appetitivus magis pertinet ad intentionem quam ad +executionem. Et ideo amor est prior odio, cum utrumque sit motus +appetitivus.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that hatred is stronger than love. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 36): "There is no one who does not flee + from pain, more than he desires pleasure." But flight from pain pertains to hatred; while desire for pleasure belongs to love. + Therefore hatred is stronger than love. +
[34766] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod odium sit fortius amore. Dicit enim +Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., nemo est qui non +magis dolorem fugiat, quam appetat voluptatem. Sed fugere +dolorem pertinet ad odium, appetitus autem voluptatis pertinet ad +amorem. Ergo odium est fortius amore.
+ Objection 2: Further, the weaker is overcome by the stronger. But love is overcome by hatred: when, that is to say, love is turned into + hatred. Therefore hatred is stronger than love. +
[34767] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +debilius vincitur a fortiori. Sed amor vincitur ab odio, quando +scilicet amor convertitur in odium. Ergo odium est fortius +amore.
+ Objection 3: Further, the emotions of the soul are shown by their effects. But man insists more on repelling what is hateful, than on + seeking what is pleasant: thus also irrational animals refrain from pleasure for fear of the whip, as Augustine instances + (QQ. 83, qu. 36). Therefore hatred is stronger than love. +
[34768] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +affectio animae per effectum manifestatur. Sed fortius insistit +homo ad repellendum odiosum, quam ad prosequendum amatum, sicut +etiam bestiae abstinent a delectabilibus propter verbera, ut +Augustinus introducit in libro octoginta trium quaest. Ergo odium +est fortius amore.
+ On the contrary, Good is stronger than evil; because "evil does nothing except in virtue of good," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But hatred + and love differ according to the difference of good and evil. Therefore love is stronger than hatred. +
[34769] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra, +bonum est fortius quam malum, quia malum non agit nisi virtute +boni, ut Dionysius dicit, cap. IV de Div. Nom. Sed odium et amor +differunt secundum differentiam boni et mali. Ergo amor est fortior +odio.
+ I answer that, It is impossible for an effect to be stronger than its cause. Now every hatred arises from some love as its cause, as above + stated + (A[2]). Therefore it is impossible for hatred to be stronger than love absolutely. +
[34770] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod impossibile est effectum sua causa esse fortiorem. +Omne autem odium procedit ex aliquo amore sicut ex causa, ut supra +dictum est. Unde impossibile est quod odium sit fortius amore +simpliciter. Sed oportet ulterius quod amor, simpliciter loquendo, +sit odio fortior. Fortius enim movetur aliquid in finem, quam in ea +quae sunt ad finem. Recessus autem a malo ordinatur ad +consecutionem boni, sicut ad finem. Unde, simpliciter loquendo, +fortior est motus animae in bonum quam in malum. Sed tamen +aliquando videtur odium fortius amore, propter duo. Primo quidem, +quia odium est magis sensibile quam amor. Cum enim sensus perceptio +sit in quadam immutatione, ex quo aliquid iam immutatum est, non +ita sentitur sicut quando est in ipso immutari. Unde calor febris +hecticae, quamvis sit maior, non tamen ita sentitur sicut calor +tertianae, quia calor hecticae iam versus est quasi in habitum et +naturam. Propter hoc etiam, amor magis sentitur in absentia amati, +sicut Augustinus dicit, in X de Trin., quod amor non ita +sentitur, cum non prodit eum indigentia. Et propter hoc etiam, +repugnantia eius quod oditur, sensibilius percipitur quam +convenientia eius quod amatur. Secundo, quia non comparatur odium +ad amorem sibi correspondentem. Secundum enim diversitatem bonorum, +est diversitas amorum in magnitudine et parvitate, quibus +proportionantur opposita odia. Unde odium quod correspondet maiori +amori, magis movet quam minor amor.
But furthermore, love must needs be, absolutely speaking, stronger than hatred. Because a thing is moved to the end more + strongly than to the means. Now turning away from evil is directed as a means to the gaining of good. Wherefore, absolutely + speaking, the soul's movement in respect of good is stronger than its movement in respect of evil. +
[34771] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 3 ad 1 Et per hoc +patet responsio ad primum. Nam amor voluptatis est minor quam amor +conservationis sui ipsius, cui respondet fuga doloris. Et ideo +magis fugitur dolor, quam ametur voluptas.
Nevertheless hatred sometimes seems to be stronger than love, for two reasons. First, because hatred is more keenly felt + than love. For, since the sensitive perception is accompanied by a certain impression; when once the impression has been received + it is not felt so keenly as in the moment of receiving it. Hence the heat of a hectic fever, though greater, is nevertheless + not felt so much as the heat of tertian fever; because the heat of the hectic fever is habitual and like a + second nature. For this reason, love is felt more keenly in the absence of the object loved; thus Augustine says (De Trin. + x, 12) that "love is felt more keenly when we lack what we love." And for the same reason, the unbecomingness of that which + is hated is felt more keenly than the becomingness of that which is loved. Secondly, because comparison is made between a + hatred and a love which are not mutually corresponding. Because, according to different degrees of good there are different + degrees of love to which correspond different degrees of hatred. Wherefore a hatred that corresponds to a greater love, moves + us more than a lesser love. +
[34772] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod odium nunquam vinceret amorem, nisi propter maiorem +amorem cui odium correspondet. Sicut homo magis diligit se quam +amicum, et propter hoc quod diligit se, habet odio etiam amicum, si +sibi contrarietur.
Hence it is clear how to reply to the First Objection. For the love of pleasure is less than the love of self-preservation, + to which corresponds flight from pain. Wherefore we flee from pain more than we love pleasure. +
[34773] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ideo intensius aliquid operatur ad repellendum +odiosa, quia odium est magis sensibile.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that a man can hate himself. For it is written ( + Ps. 10:6): "He that loveth iniquity, hateth his own soul." But many love iniquity. Therefore many hate themselves. +
[34774] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis possit seipsum odio habere. +Dicitur enim in Psalmo X, qui diligit iniquitatem, odit animam +suam. Sed multi diligunt iniquitatem. Ergo multi odiunt +seipsos.
+ Objection 2: Further, him we hate, to whom we wish and work evil. But sometimes a man wishes and works evil to himself, e.g. a man who + kills himself. Therefore some men hate themselves. +
[34775] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +illum odimus, cui volumus et operamur malum. Sed quandoque aliquis +vult et operatur sibi ipsi malum, puta qui interimunt seipsos. Ergo +aliqui seipsos habent odio.
+ Objection 3: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. ii) that "avarice makes a man hateful"; whence we may conclude that everyone hates a miser. + But some men are misers. Therefore they hate themselves. +
[34776] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +Boetius dicit, in II de Consol., quod avaritia facit homines +odiosos, ex quo potest accipi quod omnis homo odit avarum. Sed +aliqui sunt avari. Ergo illi odiunt seipsos.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle says ( + Eph. 5:29) that "no man ever hated his own flesh." +
[34777] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. V, quod nemo unquam carnem +suam odio habuit.
+ I answer that, Properly speaking, it is impossible for a man to hate himself. For everything naturally desires good, nor can anyone desire + anything for himself, save under the aspect of good: for "evil is outside the scope of the will," as Dionysius says (Div. + Nom. iv). Now to love a man is to will good to him, as stated above ( + Q[26], A[4]). Consequently, a man must, of necessity, love himself; and it is impossible for a man to hate himself, + properly speaking. +
But accidentally it happens that a man hates himself: and this in two ways. First, on the part of the good which a man wills + to himself. For it happens sometimes that what is desired as good in some particular respect, is simply evil; and in this + way, a man accidentally wills evil to himself; and thus hates himself. Secondly, in regard to himself, to whom he wills good. + For each thing is that which is predominant in it; wherefore the state is said to do what the king does, as if + the king were the whole state. Now it is clear that man is principally the mind of man. And it happens that some men account + themselves as being principally that which they are in their material and sensitive nature. Wherefore they love themselves + according to what they take themselves to be, while they hate that which they really are, by desiring what is contrary to + reason. And in both these ways, "he that loveth iniquity hateth" not only "his own soul," but also himself. +
[34778] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod impossibile est quod aliquis, per se loquendo, odiat +seipsum. Naturaliter enim unumquodque appetit bonum, nec potest +aliquis aliquid sibi appetere nisi sub ratione boni, nam malum est +praeter voluntatem, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Amare +autem aliquem est velle ei bonum, ut supra dictum est. Unde necesse +est quod aliquis amet seipsum; et impossibile est quod aliquis +odiat seipsum, per se loquendo. Per accidens tamen contingit quod +aliquis seipsum odio habeat. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo, ex parte +boni quod sibi aliquis vult. Accidit enim quandoque illud quod +appetitur ut secundum quid bonum, esse simpliciter malum, et +secundum hoc, aliquis per accidens vult sibi malum, quod est odire. +Alio modo, ex parte sui ipsius, cui vult bonum. Unumquodque enim +maxime est id quod est principalius in ipso, unde civitas dicitur +facere quod rex facit, quasi rex sit tota civitas. Manifestum est +ergo quod homo maxime est mens hominis. Contingit autem quod aliqui +aestimant se esse maxime illud quod sunt secundum naturam +corporalem et sensitivam. Unde amant se secundum id quod aestimant +se esse, sed odiunt id quod vere sunt, dum volunt contraria +rationi. Et utroque modo, ille qui diligit iniquitatem, odit non +solum animam suam, sed etiam seipsum.
Reply to Objection 1: Wherefore the reply to the First Objection is evident.
[34779] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 4 ad 1 Et per hoc +patet responsio ad primum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: No man wills and works evil to himself, except he apprehend it under the aspect of good. For even they who kill themselves, + apprehend death itself as a good, considered as putting an end to some unhappiness or pain. +
[34780] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod nullus sibi vult et facit malum, nisi inquantum +apprehendit illud sub ratione boni. Nam et illi qui interimunt +seipsos, hoc ipsum quod est mori, apprehendunt sub ratione boni, +inquantum est terminativum alicuius miseriae vel doloris.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The miser hates something accidental to himself, but not for that reason does he hate himself: thus a sick man hates his + sickness for the very reason that he loves himself. Or we may say that avarice makes man hateful to others, but not to himself. + In fact, it is caused by inordinate self-love, in respect of which, man desires temporal goods for himself more than he should. +
[34781] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod avarus odit aliquod accidens suum, non tamen propter +hoc odit seipsum, sicut aeger odit suam aegritudinem, ex hoc ipso +quod se amat. Vel dicendum quod avaritia odiosos facit aliis, non +autem sibi ipsi. Quinimmo causatur ex inordinato sui amore, +secundum quem de bonis temporalibus plus sibi aliquis vult quam +debeat.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that a man cannot hate the truth. For good, true, and being are convertible. But a man cannot hate good. Neither, + therefore, can he hate the truth. +
[34782] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis non possit habere odio +veritatem. Bonum enim et ens et verum convertuntur. Sed aliquis non +potest habere odio bonitatem. Ergo nec veritatem.
+ Objection 2: Further, "All men have a natural desire for knowledge," as stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics i, 1. But knowledge + is only of truth. Therefore truth is naturally desired and loved. But that which is in a thing naturally, is always in it. + Therefore no man can hate the truth. +
[34783] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +omnes homines naturaliter scire desiderant, ut dicitur in principio +Metaphys. Sed scientia non est nisi verorum. Ergo veritas +naturaliter desideratur et amatur. Sed quod naturaliter inest, +semper inest. Nullus ergo potest habere odio veritatem.
+ Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "men love those who are straightforward." But there can be no other motive + for this save truth. Therefore man loves the truth naturally. Therefore he cannot hate it. +
[34784] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod homines amant non +fictos. Sed non nisi propter veritatem. Ergo homo naturaliter +amat veritatem. Non potest ergo eam odio habere.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle says ( + Gal. 4:16): "Am I become your enemy because I tell you the truth?" [*St. Thomas quotes the passage, probably from memory, as though + it were an assertion: "I am become," etc.] +
[34785] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Galat. IV, factus sum vobis +inimicus, verum dicens vobis.
+ I answer that, Good, true and being are the same in reality, but differ as considered by reason. For good is considered in the light of + something desirable, while being and true are not so considered: because good is "what all things seek." Wherefore good, as + such, cannot be the object of hatred, neither in general nor in particular. Being and truth in general cannot be the object + of hatred: because disagreement is the cause of hatred, and agreement is the cause of love; + while being and truth are common to all things. But nothing hinders some particular being or some particular truth being an + object of hatred, in so far as it is considered as hurtful and repugnant; since hurtfulness and repugnance are not incompatible + with the notion of being and truth, as they are with the notion of good. +
[34786] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod bonum et verum et ens sunt idem secundum rem, sed +differunt ratione. Bonum enim habet rationem appetibilis, non autem +ens vel verum, quia bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Et ideo bonum, +sub ratione boni, non potest odio haberi, nec in universali nec in +particulari. Ens autem et verum in universali quidem odio haberi +non possunt, quia dissonantia est causa odii, et convenientia causa +amoris; ens autem et verum sunt communia omnibus. Sed in +particulari nihil prohibet quoddam ens et quoddam verum odio +haberi, inquantum habet rationem contrarii et repugnantis, +contrarietas enim et repugnantia non adversatur rationi entis et +veri, sicut adversatur rationi boni. Contingit autem verum aliquod +particulare tripliciter repugnare vel contrariari bono amato. Uno +modo, secundum quod veritas est causaliter et originaliter in ipsis +rebus. Et sic homo quandoque odit aliquam veritatem, dum vellet non +esse verum quod est verum. Alio modo, secundum quod veritas est in +cognitione ipsius hominis, quae impedit ipsum a prosecutione amati. +Sicut si aliqui vellent non cognoscere veritatem fidei, ut libere +peccarent, ex quorum persona dicitur Iob XXI, scientiam viarum +tuarum nolumus. Tertio modo habetur odio veritas particularis, +tanquam repugnans, prout est in intellectu alterius. Puta, cum +aliquis vult latere in peccato, odit quod aliquis veritatem circa +peccatum suum cognoscat. Et secundum hoc dicit Augustinus, in X +Confess., quod homines amant veritatem lucentem, oderunt eam +redarguentem.
Now it may happen in three ways that some particular truth is repugnant or hurtful to the good we love. First, according + as truth is in things as in its cause and origin. And thus man sometimes hates a particular truth, when he wishes that what + is true were not true. Secondly, according as truth is in man's knowledge, which hinders him from gaining the object loved: + such is the case of those who wish not to know the truth of faith, that they may sin freely; in whose person it is + said ( + Job 21:14): "We desire not the knowledge of Thy ways." Thirdly, a particular truth is hated, as being repugnant, inasmuch as it is + in the intellect of another man: as, for instance, when a man wishes to remain hidden in his sin, he hates that anyone should + know the truth about his sin. In this respect, Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that men "love truth when it enlightens, they + hate it when it reproves." This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. +
[34787] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 5 ad 1 Et per hoc +patet responsio ad primum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The knowledge of truth is lovable in itself: hence Augustine says that men love it when it enlightens. But accidentally, + the knowledge of truth may become hateful, in so far as it hinders one from accomplishing one's desire. +
[34788] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod cognoscere veritatem secundum se est amabile, propter +quod dicit Augustinus quod amant eam lucentem. Sed per accidens +cognitio veritatis potest esse odibilis, inquantum impedit ab +aliquo desiderato.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The reason why we love those who are straightforward is that they make known the truth, and the knowledge of the truth, considered + in itself, is a desirable thing. +
[34789] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ex hoc procedit quod non ficti amantur, quod homo +amat secundum se cognoscere veritatem, quam homines non ficti +manifestant.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that a thing cannot be an object of universal hatred. Because hatred is a passion of the sensitive appetite, + which is moved by an apprehension in the senses. But the senses cannot apprehend the universal. Therefore a thing cannot be + an object of universal hatred. +
[34790] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod odium non possit esse alicuius in +universali. Odium enim est passio appetitus sensitivi, qui movetur +ex sensibili apprehensione. Sed sensus non potest apprehendere +universale. Ergo odium non potest esse alicuius in universali.
+ Objection 2: Further, hatred is caused by disagreement; and where there is disagreement, there is nothing in common. But the notion of + universality implies something in common. Therefore nothing can be the object of universal hatred. +
[34791] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, +odium causatur ex aliqua dissonantia; quae communitati repugnat. +Sed communitas est de ratione universalis. Ergo odium non potest +esse alicuius in universali.
+ Objection 3: Further, the object of hatred is evil. But "evil is in things, and not in the mind" (Metaph. vi, 4). Since therefore the + universal is in the mind only, which abstracts the universal from the particular, it would seem that hatred cannot have a + universal object. +
[34792] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, +obiectum odii est malum. Malum autem est in rebus, et non in mente, +ut dicitur in VI Metaphys. Cum ergo universale sit solum in mente, +quae abstrahit universale a particulari, videtur quod odium non +possit esse alicuius universalis.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is directed to something singular, whereas hatred is also directed to a thing + in general; for everybody hates the thief and the backbiter." +
[34793] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod ira semper fit +inter singularia odium autem etiam ad genera, furem enim odit et +calumniatorem unusquisque.
+ I answer that, There are two ways of speaking of the universal: first, as considered under the aspect of universality; secondly, as considered + in the nature to which it is ascribed: for it is one thing to consider the universal man, and another to consider a man as + man. If, therefore, we take the universal, in the first way, no sensitive power, whether of apprehension or of appetite, can + attain the universal: because the universal is obtained by abstraction from individual + matter, on which every sensitive power is based. +
Nevertheless the sensitive powers, both of apprehension and of appetite, can tend to something universally. Thus we say that + the object of sight is color considered generically; not that the sight is cognizant of universal color, but because the fact + that color is cognizant by the sight, is attributed to color, not as being this particular color, but simply because it is + color. Accordingly hatred in the sensitive faculty can regard something universally: because this thing, by + reason of its common nature, and not merely as an individual, is hostile to the animal---for instance, a wolf in regard to + a sheep. Hence a sheep hates the wolf universally. On the other hand, anger is always caused by something in particular: because + it is caused by some action of the one that hurts us; and actions proceed from individuals. For this reason the Philosopher + says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is always directed to something singular, whereas hatred can be directed to a thing in + general." +
But according as hatred is in the intellectual part, since it arises from the universal apprehension of the intellect, it + can regard the universal in both ways. +
[34794] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 6 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod de universali dupliciter contingit loqui, uno modo, +secundum quod subest intentioni universalitatis; alio autem modo, +de natura cui talis intentio attribuitur, alia est enim +consideratio hominis universalis, et alia hominis in eo quod homo. +Si igitur universale accipiatur primo modo, sic nulla potentia +sensitivae partis, neque apprehensiva neque appetitiva, ferri +potest in universale, quia universale fit per abstractionem a +materia individuali, in qua radicatur omnis virtus sensitiva. +Potest tamen aliqua potentia sensitiva, et apprehensiva et +appetitiva, ferri in aliquid universaliter. Sicut dicimus quod +obiectum visus est color secundum genus, non quia visus cognoscat +colorem universalem; sed quia quod color sit cognoscibilis a visu, +non convenit colori inquantum est hic color, sed inquantum est +color simpliciter. Sic ergo odium etiam sensitivae partis, potest +respicere aliquid in universali, quia ex natura communi aliquid +adversatur animali, et non solum ex eo quod est particularis, sicut +lupus ovi. Unde ovis odit lupum generaliter. Sed ira semper +causatur ex aliquo particulari, quia ex aliquo actu laedentis; +actus autem particularium sunt. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit +quod ira semper est ad aliquid singulare; odium vero potest esse +ad aliquid in genere. Sed odium secundum quod est in parte +intellectiva, cum consequatur apprehensionem universalem +intellectus, potest utroque modo esse respectu universalis.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The senses do not apprehend the universal, as such: but they apprehend something to which the character of universality is + given by abstraction. +
[34795] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod sensus non apprehendit universale, prout est +universale, apprehendit tamen aliquid cui per abstractionem accidit +universalitas.
+ Reply to Objection 2: That which is common to all cannot be a reason of hatred. But nothing hinders a thing from being common to many, and at variance + with others, so as to be hateful to them. +
[34796] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod id quod commune est omnibus, non potest esse ratio +odii. Sed nihil prohibet aliquid esse commune multis, quod tamen +dissonat ab aliis, et sic est eis odiosum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the universal under the aspect of universality: and thus it does not come under the sensitive apprehension + or appetite. +
[34797] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod illa obiectio procedit de universali secundum quod +substat intentioni universalitatis, sic enim non cadit sub +apprehensione vel appetitu sensitivo.
We have now to consider concupiscence: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite only?
(2) Whether concupiscence is a specific passion?
(3) Whether some concupiscences are natural, and some not natural?
+[34798] +Iª-IIae q. 30 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +concupiscentia. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum +concupiscentia sit in appetitu sensitivo tantum. Secundo, utrum +concupiscentia sit passio specialis. Tertio, utrum sint aliquae +concupiscentiae naturales, et aliquae non naturales. Quarto, utrum +concupiscentia sit infinita.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that concupiscence is not only in the sensitive appetite. For there is a concupiscence of wisdom, according + to + Wis. 6:21: "The concupiscence [Douay: 'desire'] of wisdom bringeth to the everlasting kingdom." But the sensitive appetite can have + no tendency to wisdom. Therefore concupiscence is not only in the sensitive appetite. +
[34799] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod concupiscentia non solum sit in +appetitu sensitivo. Est enim quaedam concupiscentia sapientiae, ut +dicitur Sap. VI, concupiscentia sapientiae deducit ad regnum +perpetuum. Sed appetitus sensitivus non potest ferri in +sapientiam. Ergo concupiscentia non est in solo appetitu +sensitivo.
+ Objection 2: Further, the desire for the commandments of God is not in the sensitive appetite: in fact the Apostle says ( + Rom. 7:18): "There dwelleth not in me, that is to say, in my flesh, that which is good." But desire for God's commandments is an act + of concupiscence, according to + Ps. 118:20: "My soul hath coveted [concupivit] to long for thy justifications." Therefore concupiscence is not only in the sensitive + appetite. +
[34800] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +desiderium mandatorum Dei non est in appetitu sensitivo, immo +apostolus dicit, Rom. VII, non habitat in me, hoc est in carne +mea, bonum. Sed desiderium mandatorum Dei sub concupiscentia +cadit, secundum illud Psalmi CXVIII, concupivit anima mea +desiderare iustificationes tuas. Ergo concupiscentia non est +solum in appetitu sensitivo.
+ Objection 3: Further, to each power, its proper good is a matter of concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence is in each power of the soul, + and not only in the sensitive appetite. +
[34801] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +cuilibet potentiae est concupiscibile proprium bonum. Ergo +concupiscentia est in qualibet potentiae animae, et non solum in +appetitu sensitivo.
+ On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "the irrational part which is subject and amenable to reason, is divided into + the faculties of concupiscence and anger. This is the irrational part of the soul, passive and appetitive." Therefore concupiscence + is in the sensitive appetite. +
[34802] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Damascenus dicit, quod irrationale obediens et +persuasibile rationi, dividitur in concupiscentiam et iram. Haec +autem est irrationalis pars animae, passiva et appetitiva. Ergo +concupiscentia est in appetitu sensitivo.
+ I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11), "concupiscence is a craving for that which is pleasant." Now pleasure is twofold, + as we shall state later on ( + Q[31], AA[3],4): one is in the intelligible good, which is the good of reason; the other is in good perceptible to the senses. The former + pleasure seems to belong to soul alone: whereas the latter belongs to both soul and body: because the sense is a power seated + in a bodily organ: + wherefore sensible good is the good of the whole composite. Now concupiscence seems to be the craving for this latter pleasure, + since it belongs to the united soul and body, as is implied by the Latin word "concupiscentia." Therefore, properly speaking, + concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite, and in the concupiscible faculty, which takes its name from it. +
[34803] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in I Rhetoric., +concupiscentia est appetitus delectabilis. Est autem duplex +delectatio, ut infra dicetur, una quae est in bono intelligibili, +quod est bonum rationis; alia quae est in bono secundum sensum. +Prima quidem delectatio videtur esse animae tantum. Secunda autem +est animae et corporis, quia sensus est virtus in organo corporeo; +unde et bonum secundum sensum est bonum totius coniuncti. Talis +autem delectationis appetitus videtur esse concupiscentia, quae +simul pertineat et ad animam et ad corpus, ut ipsum nomen +concupiscentiae sonat. Unde concupiscentia, proprie loquendo, est +in appetitu sensitivo; et in vi concupiscibili, quae ab ea +denominatur.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The craving for wisdom, or other spiritual goods, is sometimes called concupiscence; either by reason of a certain likeness; + or on account of the craving in the higher part of the soul being so vehement that it overflows into the lower appetite, so + that the latter also, in its own way, tends to the spiritual good, following the lead of the higher appetite, the result being + that the body itself renders its service in spiritual matters, according + to + Ps. 83:3: "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God." +
[34804] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod appetitus sapientiae, vel aliorum spiritualium +bonorum, interdum concupiscentia nominatur, vel propter +similitudinem quandam, vel propter intensionem appetitus superioris +partis, ex quo fit redundantia in inferiorem appetitum, ut simul +etiam ipse inferior appetitus suo modo tendat in spirituale bonum +consequens appetitum superiorem, et etiam ipsum corpus +spiritualibus deserviat; sicut in Psalmo LXXXIII, dicitur, cor +meum et caro mea exultaverunt in Deum vivum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Properly speaking, desire may be not only in the lower, but also in the higher appetite. For it does not imply fellowship + in craving, as concupiscence does; but simply movement towards the thing desired. +
[34805] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod desiderium magis pertinere potest, proprie loquendo, +non solum ad inferiorem appetitum, sed etiam ad superiorem. Non +enim importat aliquam consociationem in cupiendo, sicut +concupiscentia; sed simplicem motum in rem desideratam.
+ Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to each power of the soul to seek its proper good by the natural appetite, which does not arise from apprehension. + But the craving for good, by the animal appetite, which arises from apprehension, belongs to the appetitive power alone. And + to crave a thing under the aspect of something delightful to the senses, wherein concupiscence properly consists, belongs + to the concupiscible power. +
[34806] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod unicuique potentiae animae competit appetere proprium +bonum appetitu naturali, qui non sequitur apprehensionem. Sed +appetere bonum appetitu animali, qui sequitur apprehensionem, +pertinet solum ad vim appetitivam. Appetere autem aliquid sub +ratione boni delectabilis secundum sensum, quod proprie est +concupiscere, pertinet ad vim concupiscibilem.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that concupiscence is not a specific passion of the concupiscible power. For passions are distinguished by + their objects. But the object of the concupiscible power is something delightful to the senses; and this is also the object + of concupiscence, as the Philosopher declares (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore concupiscence is not a specific passion of the concupiscible + faculty. +
[34807] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod concupiscentia non sit passio +specialis potentiae concupiscibilis. Passiones enim distinguuntur +secundum obiecta. Sed obiectum concupiscibilis est delectabile +secundum sensum; quod etiam est obiectum concupiscentiae, secundum +philosophum, in I Rhetoric. Ergo concupiscentia non est passio +specialis in concupiscibili.
+ Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33) that "covetousness is the love of transitory things": so that it is not distinct + from love. But all specific passions are distinct from one another. Therefore concupiscence is not a specific passion in the + concupiscible faculty. +
[34808] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod +cupiditas est amor rerum transeuntium, et sic ab amore non +distinguitur. Omnes autem passiones speciales ab invicem +distinguuntur. Ergo concupiscentia non est passio specialis in +concupiscibili.
+ Objection 3: Further, to each passion of the concupiscible faculty there is a specific contrary passion in that faculty, as stated above + ( + Q[23], A[4]). But no specific passion of the concupiscible faculty is contrary to concupiscence. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, + 12) that "good when desired gives rise to concupiscence; when present, it gives joy: in like manner, the evil we apprehend + makes us fear, the evil that is present makes us sad": + from which we gather that as sadness is contrary to joy, so is fear contrary to concupiscence. But fear is not in the concupiscible, + but in the irascible part. Therefore concupiscence is not a specific passion of the concupiscible faculty. +
[34809] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +cuilibet passioni concupiscibilis opponitur aliqua passio specialis +in concupiscibili, ut supra dictum est. Sed concupiscentiae non +opponitur aliqua passio specialis in concupiscibili. Dicit enim +Damascenus quod expectatum bonum concupiscentiam constituit, +praesens vero laetitiam, similiter expectatum malum timorem, +praesens vero tristitiam, ex quo videtur quod, sicut tristitia +contrariatur laetitiae, ita timor contrariatur concupiscentiae. +Timor autem non est in concupiscibili, sed in irascibili. Non ergo +concupiscentia est specialis passio in concupiscibili.
+ On the contrary, Concupiscence is caused by love, and tends to pleasure, both of which are passions of the concupiscible faculty. Hence it + is distinguished from the other concupiscible passions, as a specific passion. +
[34810] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod concupiscentia causatur ab amore, et tendit in +delectationem, quae sunt passiones concupiscibilis. Et sic +distinguitur ab aliis passionibus concupiscibilis, tanquam passio +specialis.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[1]; Q[23], A[1]), the good which gives pleasure to the senses is the common object of the concupiscible faculty. Hence the various + concupiscible passions are distinguished according to the differences of that good. Now the diversity of this object can arise + from the very nature of the object, or from a diversity in its active power. The diversity, derived from the nature of the + active object, causes a material + difference of passions: while the difference in regard to its active power causes a formal diversity of passions, in respect + of which the passions differ specifically. +
Now the nature of the motive power of the end or of the good, differs according as it is really present, or absent: because, + according as it is present, it causes the faculty to find rest in it; whereas, according as it is absent, it causes the faculty + to be moved towards it. Wherefore the object of sensible pleasure causes love, inasmuch as, so to speak, it attunes and conforms + the appetite to itself; it causes concupiscence, inasmuch as, when absent, it draws the faculty to + itself; and it causes pleasure, inasmuch as, when present, it makes the faculty to find rest in itself. Accordingly, concupiscence + is a passion differing "in species" from both love and pleasure. But concupiscences of this or that pleasurable object differ + "in number." +
[34811] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, bonum delectabile secundum sensum +est communiter obiectum concupiscibilis. Unde secundum eius +differentias, diversae passiones concupiscibilis distinguuntur. +Diversitas autem obiecti potest attendi vel secundum naturam ipsius +obiecti, vel secundum diversitatem in virtute agendi. Diversitas +quidem obiecti activi quae est secundum rei naturam, facit +materialem differentiam passionum. Sed diversitas quae est secundum +virtutem activam, facit formalem differentiam passionum, secundum +quam passiones specie differunt. Est autem alia ratio virtutis +motivae ipsius finis vel boni, secundum quod est realiter praesens, +et secundum quod est absens, nam secundum quod est praesens, facit +in seipso quiescere; secundum autem quod est absens, facit ad +seipsum moveri. Unde ipsum delectabile secundum sensum, inquantum +appetitum sibi adaptat quodammodo et conformat, causat amorem; +inquantum vero absens attrahit ad seipsum, causat concupiscentiam; +inquantum vero praesens quietat in seipso, causat delectationem. +Sic ergo concupiscentia est passio differens specie et ab amore et +a delectatione. Sed concupiscere hoc delectabile vel illud, facit +concupiscentias diversas numero.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Pleasurable good is the object of concupiscence, not absolutely, but considered as absent: just as the sensible, considered + as past, is the object of memory. For these particular conditions diversify the species of passions, and even of the powers + of the sensitive part, which regards particular things. +
[34812] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod bonum delectabile non est absolute obiectum +concupiscentiae, sed sub ratione absentis, sicut et sensibile sub +ratione praeteriti, est obiectum memoriae. Huiusmodi enim +particulares conditiones diversificant speciem passionum, vel etiam +potentiarum sensitivae partis, quae respicit particularia.
+ Reply to Objection 2: In the passage quoted we have causal, not essential predication: for covetousness is not essentially love, but an effect + of love. We may also say that Augustine is taking covetousness in a wide sense, for any movement of the appetite in respect + of good to come: so that it includes both love and hope. +
[34813] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod illa praedicatio est per causam, non per essentiam, +non enim cupiditas est per se amor, sed amoris effectus, vel aliter +dicendum, quod Augustinus accipit cupiditatem large pro quolibet +motu appetitus qui potest esse respectu boni futuri. Unde +comprehendit sub se et amorem et spem.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The passion which is directly contrary to concupiscence has no name, and stands in relation to evil, as concupiscence in + regard to good. But since, like fear, it regards the absent evil; sometimes it goes by the name of fear, just as hope is sometimes + called covetousness. For a small good or evil is reckoned as though it were nothing: and consequently every movement of the + appetite in future good or evil is called hope or fear, which regard good and + evil as arduous. +
[34814] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod passio quae directe opponitur concupiscentiae, +innominata est, quae ita se habet ad malum, sicut concupiscentia ad +bonum. Sed quia est mali absentis sicut et timor, quandoque loco +eius ponitur timor, sicut et quandoque cupiditas loco spei. Quod +enim est parvum bonum vel malum, quasi non reputatur, et ideo pro +omni motu appetitus in bonum vel in malum futurum, ponitur spes et +timor, quae respiciunt bonum vel malum arduum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that concupiscences are not divided into those which are natural and those which are not. For concupiscence + belongs to the animal appetite, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). But the natural appetite is contrasted with the animal appetite. + Therefore no concupiscence is natural. +
[34815] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod concupiscentiarum non sint quaedam +naturales, et quaedam non naturales. Concupiscentia enim pertinet +ad appetitum animalem, ut dictum est. Sed appetitus naturalis +dividitur contra animalem. Ergo nulla concupiscentia est +naturalis.
+ Objection 2: Further, material differences makes no difference of species, but only numerical difference; a difference which is outside + the purview of science. But if some concupiscences are natural, and some not, they differ only in respect of their objects; + which amounts to a material difference, which is one of number only. Therefore concupiscences should not be divided into those + that are natural and those that are not. +
[34816] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +diversitas materialis non facit diversitatem secundum speciem, sed +solum secundum numerum, quae quidem diversitas sub arte non cadit. +Sed si quae sint concupiscentiae naturales et non naturales, non +differunt nisi secundum diversa concupiscibilia, quod facit +materialem differentiam, et secundum numerum tantum. Non ergo +dividendae sunt concupiscentiae per naturales et non naturales.
+ Objection 3: Further, reason is contrasted with nature, as stated in Phys. ii, 5. If therefore in man there is a concupiscence which is + not natural, it must needs be rational. But this is impossible: because, since concupiscence is a passion, it belongs to the + sensitive appetite, and not to the will, which is the rational appetite. Therefore there are no concupiscences which are not + natural. +
[34817] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +ratio contra naturam dividitur, ut patet in II Physic. Si igitur in +homine est aliqua concupiscentia non naturalis, oportet quod sit +rationalis. Sed hoc esse non potest, quia concupiscentia cum sit +passio quaedam, pertinet ad appetitum sensitivum, non autem ad +voluntatem, quae est appetitus rationis. Non ergo sunt +concupiscentiae aliquae non naturales.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11 and Rhetor. i, 11) distinguishes natural concupiscences from those that are not natural. +
[34818] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus, in III Ethic. et in I Rhetoric., ponit +quasdam concupiscentias naturales, et quasdam non naturales.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[1]), concupiscence is the craving for pleasurable good. Now a thing is pleasurable in two ways. First, because it is suitable + to the nature of the animal; for example, food, drink, and the like: and concupiscence of such pleasurable things is said + to be natural. Secondly, a thing is pleasurable because it is apprehended as suitable to the animal: as when one apprehends + something as good and suitable, and + consequently takes pleasure in it: and concupiscence of such pleasurable things is said to be not natural, and is more wont + to be called "cupidity." +
Accordingly concupiscences of the first kind, or natural concupiscences, are common to men and other animals: because to + both is there something suitable and pleasurable according to nature: and in these all men agree; wherefore the Philosopher + (Ethic. iii, 11) calls them "common" and "necessary." But concupiscences of the second kind are proper to men, to whom it + is proper to devise something as good and suitable, beyond that which nature requires. Hence the Philosopher says + (Rhet. i, 11) that the former concupiscences are "irrational," but the latter, "rational." And because different men reason + differently, therefore the latter are also called (Ethic. iii, 11) "peculiar and acquired," i.e. in addition to those that + are natural. +
[34819] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, concupiscentia est appetitus boni +delectabilis. Dupliciter autem aliquid est delectabile. Uno modo, +quia est conveniens naturae animalis, sicut cibus, potus, et alia +huiusmodi. Et huiusmodi concupiscentia delectabilis dicitur +naturalis. Alio modo aliquid est delectabile, quia est conveniens +animali secundum apprehensionem, sicut cum aliquis apprehendit +aliquid ut bonum et conveniens, et per consequens delectatur in +ipso. Et huiusmodi delectabilis concupiscentia dicitur non +naturalis, et solet magis dici cupiditas. Primae ergo +concupiscentiae, naturales, communes sunt et hominibus et aliis +animalibus, quia utrisque est aliquid conveniens et delectabile +secundum naturam. Et in his etiam omnes homines conveniunt, unde et +philosophus, in III Ethic., vocat eas communes et necessarias. Sed +secundae concupiscentiae sunt propriae hominum, quorum proprium est +excogitare aliquid ut bonum et conveniens, praeter id quod natura +requirit. Unde et in I Rhetoric., philosophus dicit primas +concupiscentias esse irrationales, secundas vero cum ratione. Et +quia diversi diversimode ratiocinantur, ideo etiam secundae +dicuntur, in III Ethic., propriae et appositae, scilicet supra +naturales.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The same thing that is the object of the natural appetite, may be the object of the animal appetite, once it is apprehended. + And in this way there may be an animal concupiscence of food, drink, and the like, which are objects of the natural appetite. +
[34820] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod illud idem quod appetitur appetitu naturali, +potest appeti appetitu animali cum fuerit apprehensum. Et secundum +hoc cibi et potus et huiusmodi, quae appetuntur naturaliter, potest +esse concupiscentia naturalis.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The difference between those concupiscences that are natural and those that are not, is not merely a material difference; + it is also, in a way, formal, in so far as it arises from a difference in the active object. Now the object of the appetite + is the apprehended good. Hence diversity of the active object follows from diversity of apprehension: according as a thing + is apprehended as suitable, either by absolute apprehension, whence arise natural + concupiscences, which the Philosopher calls "irrational" (Rhet. i, 11); or by apprehension together with deliberation, whence + arise those concupiscences that are not natural, and which for this very reason the Philosopher calls "rational" (Rhet. i, + 11). +
[34821] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod diversitas concupiscentiarum naturalium a non +naturalibus, non est materialis tantum; sed etiam quodammodo +formalis, inquantum procedit ex diversitate obiecti activi. +Obiectum autem appetitus est bonum apprehensum. Unde ad +diversitatem activi pertinet diversitas apprehensionis, prout +scilicet apprehenditur aliquid ut conveniens absoluta +apprehensione, ex qua causantur concupiscentiae naturales, quas +philosophus in Rhetoric. vocat irrationales; et prout apprehenditur +aliquid cum deliberatione, ex quo causantur concupiscentiae non +naturales, quae propter hoc in Rhetoric. dicuntur cum ratione.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Man has not only universal reason, pertaining to the intellectual faculty; but also particular reason pertaining to the sensitive + faculty, as stated in the + FP, Q[78], A[4]; + FP, Q[81], A[3]: so that even rational concupiscence may pertain to the sensitive appetite. Moreover the sensitive appetite can be moved + by the universal reason also, through the medium of the particular imagination. +
[34822] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod in homine non solum est ratio universalis, quae +pertinet ad partem intellectivam; sed etiam ratio particularis, +quae pertinet ad partem sensitivam, ut in primo libro dictum est. +Et secundum hoc, etiam concupiscentia quae est cum ratione, potest +ad appetitum sensitivum pertinere. Et praeterea appetitus +sensitivus potest etiam a ratione universali moveri, mediante +imaginatione particulari.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that concupiscence is not infinite. For the object of concupiscence is good, which has the aspect of an end. + But where there is infinity there is no end (Metaph. ii, 2). Therefore concupiscence cannot be infinite. +
[34823] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod concupiscentia non sit infinita. +Obiectum enim concupiscentiae est bonum; quod habet rationem finis. +Qui autem ponit infinitum, excludit finem, ut dicitur in II +Metaphys. Concupiscentia ergo non potest esse infinita.
+ Objection 2: Further, concupiscence is of the fitting good, since it proceeds from love. But the infinite is without proportion, and therefore + unfitting. Therefore concupiscence cannot be infinite. +
[34824] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +concupiscentia est boni convenientis, cum procedat ex amore. Sed +infinitum, cum sit improportionatum, non potest esse conveniens. +Ergo concupiscentia non potest esse infinita.
+ Objection 3: Further, there is no passing through infinite things: and thus there is no reaching an ultimate term in them. But the subject + of concupiscence is not delighted until he attain the ultimate term. Therefore, if concupiscence were infinite, no delight + would ever ensue. +
[34825] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +infinita non est transire, et sic in eis non est pervenire ad +ultimum. Sed concupiscenti fit delectatio per hoc quod attingit ad +ultimum. Ergo si concupiscentia esset infinita, sequeretur quod +nunquam fieret delectatio.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "since concupiscence is infinite, men desire an infinite number of things." +
[34826] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in I Polit., quod, in infinitum +concupiscentia existente homines infinita desiderant.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[3]), concupiscence is twofold; one is natural, the other is not natural. Natural concupiscence cannot be actually infinite: because + it is of that which nature requires; and nature ever tends to something finite and fixed. Hence man never desires infinite + meat, or infinite drink. But just as in nature there is potential successive infinity, so can this kind of concupiscence be + infinite successively; so that, for + instance, after getting food, a man may desire food yet again; and so of anything else that nature requires: because these + bodily goods, when obtained, do not last for ever, but fail. Hence Our Lord said to the woman of Samaria ( + Jn. 4:13): "Whosever drinketh of this water, shall thirst again." +
But non-natural concupiscence is altogether infinite. Because, as stated above + (A[3]), it follows from the reason, and it belongs to the reason to proceed to infinity. Hence he that desires riches, may desire + to be rich, not up to a certain limit, but to be simply as rich as possible. +
Another reason may be assigned, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 3), why a certain concupiscence is finite, and another + infinite. Because concupiscence of the end is always infinite: since the end is desired for its own sake, e.g. health: and + thus greater health is more desired, and so on to infinity; just as, if a white thing of itself dilates the sight, that which + is more white dilates yet more. On the other hand, concupiscence of the means is not infinite, because the + concupiscence of the means is in suitable proportion to the end. Consequently those who place their end in riches have an + infinite concupiscence of riches; whereas those who desire riches, on account of the necessities of life, desire a finite + measure of riches, sufficient for the necessities of life, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3). The same applies to the + concupiscence of any other things. +
[34827] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, duplex est concupiscentia, una +naturalis, et alia non naturalis. Naturalis quidem igitur +concupiscentia non potest esse infinita in actu. Est enim eius quod +natura requirit, natura vero semper intendit in aliquid finitum et +certum. Unde nunquam homo concupiscit infinitum cibum, vel +infinitum potum. Sed sicut in natura contingit esse infinitum in +potentia per successionem, ita huiusmodi concupiscentiam contingit +infinitam esse per successionem; ut scilicet, post adeptum cibum +iterum alia vice desideret cibum, vel quodcumque aliud quod natura +requirit, quia huiusmodi corporalia bona, cum adveniunt, non +perpetuo manent, sed deficiunt. Unde dixit dominus Samaritanae, +Ioan. IV, qui biberit ex hac aqua, sitiet iterum. Sed +concupiscentia non naturalis omnino est infinita. Sequitur enim +rationem, ut dictum est, rationi autem competit in infinitum +procedere. Unde qui concupiscit divitias, potest eas concupiscere, +non ad aliquem certum terminum, sed simpliciter se divitem esse, +quantumcumque potest. Potest et alia ratio assignari, secundum +philosophum in I Polit., quare quaedam concupiscentia sit finita, +et quaedam infinita. Semper enim concupiscentia finis est infinita, +finis enim per se concupiscitur, ut sanitas; unde maior sanitas +magis concupiscitur, et sic in infinitum; sicut, si album per se +disgregat, magis album magis disgregat. Concupiscentia vero eius +quod est ad finem, non est infinita, sed secundum illam mensuram +appetitur qua convenit fini. Unde qui finem ponunt in divitiis, +habent concupiscentiam divitiarum in infinitum, qui autem divitias +appetunt propter necessitatem vitae, concupiscunt divitias finitas, +sufficientes ad necessitatem vitae, ut philosophus dicit ibidem. Et +eadem est ratio de concupiscentia, quarumcumque aliarum rerum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Every object of concupiscence is taken as something finite: either because it is finite in reality, as being once actually + desired; or because it is finite as apprehended. For it cannot be apprehended as infinite, since the infinite is that "from + which, however much we may take, there always remains something to be taken" (Phys. iii, 6). +
[34828] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod omne quod concupiscitur, accipitur ut quoddam +finitum, vel quia est finitum secundum rem, prout semel +concupiscitur in actu; vel quia est finitum secundum quod cadit sub +apprehensione. Non enim potest sub ratione infiniti apprehendi, +quia infinitum est, cuius quantitatem accipientibus, semper est +aliquid extra sumere, ut dicitur in III Physic.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The reason is possessed of infinite power, in a certain sense, in so far as it can consider a thing infinitely, as appears + in the addition of numbers and lines. Consequently, the infinite, taken in a certain way, is proportionate to reason. In fact + the universal which the reason apprehends, is infinite in a sense, inasmuch as it contains potentially an infinite number + of singulars. +
[34829] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio quodammodo est virtutis infinitae inquantum +potest in infinitum aliquid considerare, ut apparet in additione +numerorum et linearum. Unde infinitum aliquo modo sumptum, est +proportionatum rationi. Nam et universale, quod ratio apprehendit, +est quodammodo infinitum, inquantum in potentia continet infinita +singularia.
+ Reply to Objection 3: In order that a man be delighted, there is no need for him to realize all that he desires: for he delights in the realization + of each object of his concupiscence. +
[34830] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ad hoc quod aliquis delectetur, non requiritur quod +omnia consequatur quae concupiscit, sed in quolibet concupito quod +consequitur, delectatur.
We must now consider delight and sadness. Concerning delight four things must be considered: (1) Delight in itself; (2) The + causes of delight; (3) Its effects; (4) Its goodness and malice. +
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether delight is a passion?
(2) Whether delight is subject to time?
(3) Whether it differs from joy?
(4) Whether it is in the intellectual appetite?
(5) Of the delights of the higher appetite compared with the delight of the lower;
(6) Of sensible delights compared with one another;
+[34831] +Iª-IIae q. 31 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +delectatione et tristitia. Circa delectationem vero consideranda +sunt quatuor, primo, de ipsa delectatione secundum se; secundo, de +causis delectationis; tertio, de effectibus eius; quarto, de +bonitate et malitia ipsius. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, +utrum delectatio sit passio. Secundo, utrum sit in tempore. Tertio, +utrum differat a gaudio. Quarto, utrum sit in appetitu +intellectivo. Quinto, de comparatione delectationum superioris +appetitus, ad delectationem inferioris. Sexto, de comparatione +delectationum sensitivarum ad invicem. Septimo, utrum sit aliqua +delectatio non naturalis. Octavo, utrum delectatio possit esse +contraria delectationi.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that delight is not a passion. For Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) distinguishes operation from passion, and + says that "operation is a movement in accord with nature, while passion is a movement contrary to nature." But delight is + an operation, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 12; x, 5). Therefore delight is not a passion. +
[34832] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non sit passio. Damascenus +enim, in II libro, distinguit operationem a passione, dicens quod +operatio est motus qui est secundum naturam, passio vero est +motus contra naturam. Sed delectatio est operatio, ut +philosophus dicit, in VII et X Ethic. Ergo delectatio non est +passio.
+ Objection 2: Further, "To be passive is to be moved," as stated in Phys. iii, 3. But delight does not consist in being moved, but in having + been moved; for it arises from good already gained. Therefore delight is not a passion. +
[34833] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +pati est moveri, ut dicitur in III Physic. Sed delectatio non +consistit in moveri, sed in motum esse, causatur enim delectatio ex +bono iam adepto. Ergo delectatio non est passio.
+ Objection 3: Further, delight is a kind of a perfection of the one who is delighted; since it "perfects operation," as stated in Ethic. + x, 4,5. But to be perfected does not consist in being passive or in being altered, as stated in Phys. vii, 3 and De Anima + ii, 5. Therefore delight is not a passion. +
[34834] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +delectatio consistit in quadam perfectione delectati, perficit enim +operationem, ut dicitur in X Ethic. Sed perfici non est pati vel +alterari, ut dicitur in VII Physic. et in II de anima. Ergo +delectatio non est passio.
+ On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 2; xiv, 5 seqq) reckons delight, joy, or gladness among the other passions of the soul. +
[34835] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus, in IX et XIV de Civ. Dei, ponit delectationem, +sive gaudium vel laetitiam, inter alias passiones animae.
+ I answer that, The movements of the sensitive appetite, are properly called passions, as stated above ( + Q[22], A[3]). Now every emotion arising from a sensitive apprehension, is a movement of the sensitive appetite: and this must needs be + said of delight, since, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 11) "delight is a certain movement of the soul and a sensible + establishing thereof all at once, in keeping with the nature of the thing." +
In order to understand this, we must observe that just as in natural things some happen to attain to their natural perfections, + so does this happen in animals. And though movement towards perfection does not occur all at once, yet the attainment of natural + perfection does occur all at once. Now there is this difference between animals and other natural things, that when these + latter are established in the state becoming their nature, they do not perceive it, whereas animals do. + And from this perception there arises a certain movement of the soul in the sensitive appetite; which movement is called delight. + Accordingly by saying that delight is "a movement of the soul," we designate its genus. By saying that it is "an establishing + in keeping with the thing's nature," i.e. with that which exists in the thing, we assign the cause of delight, viz. the presence + of a becoming good. By saying that this establishing is "all at once," we mean that this establishing is to be + understood not as in the process of establishment, but as in the fact of complete establishment, in the term of the movement, + as it were: for delight is not a "becoming" as Plato [*Phileb. 32,33] maintained, but a "complete fact," as stated in Ethic. + vii, 12. Lastly, by saying that this establishing is "sensible," we exclude the perfections of insensible things wherein there + is no delight. It is therefore evident that, since delight is a movement of the animal appetite arising from an + apprehension of sense, it is a passion of the soul. +
[34836] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod motus appetitus sensitivi proprie passio nominatur, +sicut supra dictum est. Affectio autem quaecumque ex apprehensione +sensitiva procedens, est motus appetitus sensitivi. Hoc autem +necesse est competere delectationi. Nam, sicut philosophus dicit in +I Rhetoric., delectatio est quidam motus animae, et constitutio +simul tota et sensibilis in naturam existentem. Ad cuius +intellectum, considerandum est quod, sicut contingit in rebus +naturalibus aliqua consequi suas perfectiones naturales, ita hoc +contingit in animalibus. Et quamvis moveri ad perfectionem non sit +totum simul, tamen consequi naturalem perfectionem est totum simul. +Haec autem est differentia inter animalia et alias res naturales, +quod aliae res naturales, quando constituuntur in id quod convenit +eis secundum naturam, hoc non sentiunt, sed animalia hoc sentiunt. +Et ex isto sensu causatur quidam motus animae in appetitu +sensitivo, et iste motus est delectatio. Per hoc ergo quod dicitur +quod delectatio est motus animae, ponitur in genere. Per hoc autem +quod dicitur constitutio in existentem naturam, idest in id quod +existit in natura rei, ponitur causa delectationis, scilicet +praesentia connaturalis boni. Per hoc autem quod dicitur simul +tota, ostendit quod constitutio non debet accipi prout est in +constitui, sed prout est in constitutum esse, quasi in termino +motus, non enim delectatio est generatio, ut Plato posuit, sed +magis consistit in factum esse, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Per hoc +autem quod dicitur sensibilis, excluduntur perfectiones rerum +insensibilium, in quibus non est delectatio. Sic ergo patet quod, +cum delectatio sit motus in appetitu animali consequens +apprehensionem sensus, delectatio est passio animae.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Connatural operation, which is unhindered, is a second perfection, as stated in De Anima ii, 1: and therefore when a thing + is established in its proper connatural and unhindered operation, delight follows, which consists in a state of completion, + as observed above. Accordingly when we say that delight is an operation, we designate, not its essence, but its cause. +
[34837] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod operatio connaturalis non impedita, est +perfectio secunda, ut habetur in II de anima. Et ideo, quando +constituitur res in propria operatione connaturali et non impedita, +sequitur delectatio, quae consistit in perfectum esse, ut dictum +est. Sic ergo cum dicitur quod delectatio est operatio, non est +praedicatio per essentiam, sed per causam.
+ Reply to Objection 2: A twofold movement is to be observed in an animal: one, according to the intention of the end, and this belongs to the appetite; + the other, according to the execution, and this belongs to the external operation. And so, although in him who has already + gained the good in which he delights, the movement of execution ceases, by which the tends to the end; yet the movement of + the appetitive faculty does not cease, since, just as before it desired that + which it had not, so afterwards does it delight in that which is possesses. For though delight is a certain repose of the + appetite, if we consider the presence of the pleasurable good that satisfies the appetite, nevertheless there remains the + impression made on the appetite by its object, by reason of which delight is a kind of movement. +
[34838] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod in animali duplex motus considerari potest, unus +secundum intentionem finis, qui pertinet ad appetitum, alius +secundum executionem, qui pertinet ad exteriorem operationem licet +ergo in eo qui iam consecutus est bonum in quo delectatur, cesset +motus executionis, quo tenditur ad finem; non tamen cessat motus +appetitivae partis, quae, sicut prius desiderabat non habitum, ita +postea delectatur in habito. Licet enim delectatio sit quies +quaedam appetitus, considerata praesentia boni delectantis, quod +appetitui satisfacit; tamen adhuc remanet immutatio appetitus ab +appetibili, ratione cuius delectatio motus quidam est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Although the name of passion is more appropriate to those passions which have a corruptive and evil tendency, such as bodily + ailments, as also sadness and fear in the soul; yet some passions have a tendency to something good, as stated above ( + Q[23], AA[1],4): and in this sense delight is called a passion. +
[34839] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, quamvis nomen passionis magis proprie conveniat +passionibus corruptivis et in malum tendentibus, sicut sunt +aegritudines corporales, et tristitia et timor in anima; tamen +etiam in bonum ordinantur aliquae passiones, ut supra dictum est. +Et secundum hoc delectatio dicitur passio.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that delight is in time. For "delight is a kind of movement," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But all + movement is in time. Therefore delight is in time. +
[34840] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio sit in tempore. Delectatio +enim est motus quidam, ut in I Rhetoric. philosophus dicit. Sed +motus omnis est in tempore. Ergo delectatio est in tempore.
+ Objection 2: Further, a thing is said to last long and to be morose in respect of time. But some pleasures are called morose. Therefore + pleasure is in time. +
[34841] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +diuturnum, vel morosum, dicitur aliquid secundum tempus. Sed +aliquae delectationes dicuntur morosae. Ergo delectatio est in +tempore.
+ Objection 3: Further, the passions of the soul are of one same genus. But some passions of the soul are in time. Therefore delight is + too. +
[34842] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +passiones animae sunt unius generis. Sed aliquae passiones animae +sunt in tempore. Ergo et delectatio.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "no one takes pleasure according to time." +
[34843] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., quod secundum nullum +tempus accipiet quis delectationem.
+ I answer that, A thing may be in time in two ways: first, by itself; secondly, by reason of something else, and accidentally as it were. + For since time is the measure of successive things, those things are of themselves said to be in time, to which succession + or something pertaining to succession is essential: such are movement, repose, speech and such like. On the other hand, those + things are said to be in time, by reason of something else and not of themselves, to which + succession is not essential, but which are subject to something successive. Thus the fact of being a man is not essentially + something successive; since it is not a movement, but the term of a movement or change, viz. of this being begotten: yet, + because human being is subject to changeable causes, in this respect, to be a man is in time. +
Accordingly, we must say that delight, of itself indeed, is not in time: for it regards good already gained, which is, as + it were, the term of the movement. But if this good gained be subject to change, the delight therein will be in time accidentally: + whereas if it be altogether unchangeable, the delight therein will not be in time, either by reason of itself or accidentally. +
[34844] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod aliquid contingit esse in tempore dupliciter, uno +modo, secundum se; alio modo, per aliud, et quasi per accidens. +Quia enim tempus est numerus successivorum, illa secundum se +dicuntur esse in tempore, de quorum ratione est successio, vel +aliquid ad successionem pertinens, sicut motus, quies, locutio, et +alia huiusmodi. Secundum aliud vero, et non per se, dicuntur esse +in tempore illa de quorum ratione non est aliqua successio, sed +tamen alicui successivo subiacent. Sicut esse hominem de sui +ratione non habet successionem, non enim est motus, sed terminus +motus vel mutationis, scilicet generationis ipsius, sed quia +humanum esse subiacet causis transmutabilibus, secundum hoc esse +hominem est in tempore. Sic igitur dicendum est quod delectatio +secundum se quidem non est in tempore, est enim delectatio in bono +iam adepto, quod est quasi terminus motus. Sed si illud bonum +adeptum transmutationi subiaceat, erit delectatio per accidens in +tempore. Si autem sit omnino intransmutabile, delectatio non erit +in tempore nec per se, nec per accidens.
+ Reply to Objection 1: As stated in De Anima iii, 7, movement is twofold. One is "the act of something imperfect, i.e. of something existing in + potentiality, as such": this movement is successive and is in time. Another movement is "the act of something perfect, i.e. + of something existing in act," e.g. to understand, to feel, and to will and such like, also to have delight. This movement + is not successive, nor is it of itself in time. +
[34845] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in III de anima, motus dupliciter +dicitur. Uno modo, qui est actus imperfecti, scilicet existentis in +potentia, inquantum huiusmodi, et talis motus est successivus, et +in tempore. Alius autem motus est actus perfecti, idest existentis +in actu; sicut intelligere, sentire et velle et huiusmodi, et etiam +delectari. Et huiusmodi motus non est successivus, nec per se in +tempore.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Delight is said to be long lasting or morose, according as it is accidentally in time. +
[34846] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod delectatio dicitur diuturna vel morosa, secundum quod +per accidens est in tempore.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Other passions have not for their object a good obtained, as delight has. Wherefore there is more of the movement of the + imperfect in them than in delight. And consequently it belongs more to delight not to be in time. +
[34847] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod aliae passiones non habent pro obiecto bonum adeptum, +sicut delectatio. Unde plus habent de ratione motus imperfecti, +quam delectatio. Et per consequens magis delectationi convenit non +esse in tempore.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that delight is altogether the same as joy. Because the passions of the soul differ according to their objects. + But delight and joy have the same object, namely, a good obtained. Therefore joy is altogether the same as delight. +
[34848] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod gaudium sit omnino idem quod +delectatio. Passiones enim animae differunt secundum obiecta. Sed +idem est obiectum gaudii et delectationis, scilicet bonum adeptum. +Ergo gaudium est omnino idem quod delectatio.
+ Objection 2: Further, one movement does not end in two terms. But one and the same movement, that of desire, ends in joy and delight. + Therefore delight and joy are altogether the same. +
[34849] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +unus motus non terminatur ad duos terminos. Sed idem est motus qui +terminatur ad gaudium et delectationem, scilicet concupiscentia. +Ergo delectatio et gaudium sunt omnino idem.
+ Objection 3: Further, if joy differs from delight, it seems that there is equal reason for distinguishing gladness, exultation, and cheerfulness + from delight, so that they would all be various passions of the soul. But this seems to be untrue. Therefore joy does not + differ from delight. +
[34850] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +si gaudium est aliud a delectatione, videtur quod, pari ratione, et +laetitia et exultatio et iucunditas significent aliquid aliud a +delectatione, et sic erunt omnes diversae passiones. Quod videtur +esse falsum. Non ergo gaudium differt a delectatione.
+ On the contrary, We do not speak of joy in irrational animals; whereas we do speak of delight in them. Therefore joy is not the same as delight. +
[34851] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod in brutis animalibus non dicimus gaudium. Sed in eis +dicimus delectationem. Non ergo est idem gaudium et delectatio.
+ I answer that, Joy, as Avicenna states (De Anima iv), is a kind of delight. For we must observe that, just as some concupiscences are natural, + and some not natural, but consequent to reason, as stated above ( + Q[30], A[3]), so also some delights are natural, and some are not natural but rational. Or, as Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 13) and Gregory + of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii.] put it, "some delights are of the body, some are of the soul"; + which amounts to the same. For we take delight both in those things which we desire naturally, when we get them, and in those + things which we desire as a result of reason. But we do not speak of joy except when delight follows reason; and so we do + not ascribe joy to irrational animals, but only delight. +
Now whatever we desire naturally, can also be the object of reasoned desire and delight, but not vice versa. Consequently + whatever can be the object of delight, can also be the object of joy in rational beings. And yet everything is not always + the object of joy; since sometimes one feels a certain delight in the body, without rejoicing thereat according to reason. + And accordingly delight extends to more things than does joy. +
[34852] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod gaudium, ut Avicenna dicit in libro suo de anima, est +quaedam species delectationis. Est enim considerandum quod, sicut +sunt quaedam concupiscentiae naturales, quaedam autem non +naturales, sed consequuntur rationem, ut supra dictum est; ita +etiam delectationum quaedam sunt naturales, et quaedam non +naturales, quae sunt cum ratione. Vel, sicut Damascenus et +Gregorius Nyssenus dicunt, quaedam sunt corporales, quaedam +animales, quod in idem redit. Delectamur enim et in his quae +naturaliter concupiscimus, ea adipiscentes; et in his quae +concupiscimus secundum rationem. Sed nomen gaudii non habet locum +nisi in delectatione quae consequitur rationem, unde gaudium non +attribuimus brutis animalibus, sed solum nomen delectationis. Omne +autem quod concupiscimus secundum naturam, possumus etiam cum +delectatione rationis concupiscere, sed non e converso. Unde de +omnibus de quibus est delectatio, potest etiam esse gaudium in +habentibus rationem. Quamvis non semper de omnibus sit gaudium, +quandoque enim aliquis sentit aliquam delectationem secundum +corpus, de qua tamen non gaudet secundum rationem. Et secundum hoc, +patet quod delectatio est in plus quam gaudium.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Since the object of the appetite of the soul is an apprehended good, diversity of apprehension pertains, in a way, to diversity + of the object. And so delights of the soul, which are also called joys, are distinct from bodily delights, which are not called + otherwise than delights: as we have observed above in regard to concupiscences ( + Q[30], A[3], ad 2). +
[34853] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, cum obiectum appetitus animalis sit bonum +apprehensum, diversitas apprehensionis pertinet quodammodo ad +diversitatem obiecti. Et sic delectationes animales, quae dicuntur +etiam gaudia, distinguuntur a delectationibus corporalibus, quae +dicuntur solum delectationes, sicut et de concupiscentiis supra +dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 2: A like difference is to be observed in concupiscences also: so that delight corresponds to concupiscence, while joy corresponds + to desire, which seems to pertain more to concupiscence of the soul. Hence there is a difference of repose corresponding to + the difference of movement. +
[34854] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod similis differentia invenitur etiam in +concupiscentiis, ita quod delectatio respondeat concupiscentiae, et +gaudium respondeat desiderio, quod magis videtur pertinere ad +concupiscentiam animalem. Et sic secundum differentiam motus, est +etiam differentia quietis.
+ Reply to Objection 3: These other names pertaining to delight are derived from the effects of delight; for "laetitia" [gladness] is derived from + the "dilation" of the heart, as if one were to say "latitia"; "exultation" is derived from the exterior signs of inward delight, + which appear outwardly in so far as the inward joy breaks forth from its bounds; and "cheerfulness" is so called from certain + special signs and effects of gladness. Yet all these names seem to belong to + joy; for we do not employ them save in speaking of rational beings. +
[34855] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod alia nomina ad delectationem pertinentia, sunt +imposita ab effectibus delectationis, nam laetitia imponitur a +dilatatione cordis, ac si diceretur latitia; exultatio vero dicitur +ab exterioribus signis delectationis interioris, quae apparent +exterius, inquantum scilicet interius gaudium prosilit ad +exteriora; iucunditas vero dicitur a quibusdam specialibus +laetitiae signis vel effectibus. Et tamen omnia ista nomina +videntur pertinere ad gaudium, non enim utimur eis nisi in naturis +rationalibus.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that delight is not in the intellectual appetite. Because the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that "delight + is a sensible movement." But sensible movement is not in an intellectual power. Therefore delight is not in the intellectual + appetite. +
[34856] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non sit in appetitu +intellectivo. Dicit enim philosophus, in I Rhetoric., quod +delectatio est motus quidam sensibilis. Sed motus sensibilis +non est in parte intellectiva. Ergo delectatio non est in parte +intellectiva.
+ Objection 2: Further, delight is a passion. But every passion is in the sensitive appetite. Therefore delight is only in the sensitive + appetite. +
[34857] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +delectatio est passio quaedam. Sed omnis passio est in appetitu +sensitivo. Ergo delectatio non est nisi in appetitu sensitivo.
+ Objection 3: Further, delight is common to us and to the irrational animals. Therefore it is not elsewhere than in that power which we + have in common with irrational animals. +
[34858] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +delectatio est communis nobis et brutis. Ergo non est nisi in parte +quae nobis et brutis communis est.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Ps. 36:4): "Delight in the Lord." But the sensitive appetite cannot reach to God; only the intellectual appetite can. Therefore delight + can be in the intellectual appetite. +
[34859] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod in Psalmo XXXVI, dicitur, delectare in domino. Sed +ad Deum non potest extendi appetitus sensitivus, sed solum +intellectivus. Ergo delectatio potest esse in appetitu +intellectivo.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[3]), a certain delight arises from the apprehension of the reason. Now on the reason apprehending something, not only the sensitive + appetite is moved, as regards its application to some particular thing, but also the intellectual appetite, which is called + the will. And accordingly in the intellectual appetite or will there is that delight which is called joy, but not bodily delight. +
However, there is this difference of delight in either power, that delight of the sensitive appetite is accompanied by a + bodily transmutation, whereas delight of the intellectual appetite is nothing but the mere movement of the will. Hence Augustine + says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6) that "desire and joy are nothing else but a volition of consent to the things we wish." +
[34860] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, delectatio quaedam sequitur +apprehensionem rationis. Ad apprehensionem autem rationis, non +solum commovetur appetitus sensitivus, per applicationem ad aliquid +particulare; sed etiam appetitus intellectivus, qui dicitur +voluntas. Et secundum hoc, in appetitu intellectivo, sive in +voluntate, est delectatio quae dicitur gaudium, non autem +delectatio corporalis. Hoc tamen interest inter delectationem +utriusque appetitus, quod delectatio appetitus sensibilis est cum +aliqua transmutatione corporali, delectatio autem appetitus +intellectivi nihil aliud est quam simplex motus voluntatis. Et +secundum hoc Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quod +cupiditas et laetitia non est aliud quam voluntas in eorum +consensione quae volumus.
+ Reply to Objection 1: In this definition of the Philosopher, he uses the word "sensible" in its wide acceptation for any kind of perception. For + he says (Ethic. x, 4) that "delight is attendant upon every sense, as it is also upon every act of the intellect and contemplation." + Or we may say that he is defining delight of the sensitive appetite. +
[34861] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod in illa definitione philosophi, sensibile +ponitur communiter pro quacumque apprehensione. Dicit enim +philosophus in X Ethic., quod secundum omnem sensum est +delectatio; similiter autem et secundum intellectum et +speculationem. Vel potest dici quod ipse definit delectationem +appetitus sensitivi.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Delight has the character of passion, properly speaking, when accompanied by bodily transmutation. It is not thus in the + intellectual appetite, but according to simple movement: for thus it is also in God and the angels. Hence the Philosopher + says (Ethic. vii, 14) that "God rejoices by one simple act": and Dionysius says at the end of De Coel. Hier., that "the angels + are not susceptible to our passible delight, but rejoice together with God with the + gladness of incorruption." +
[34862] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod delectatio habet rationem passionis, proprie +loquendo, inquantum est cum aliqua transmutatione corporali. Et sic +non est in appetitu intellectivo, sed secundum simplicem motum, sic +enim etiam est in Deo et in Angelis. Unde dicit philosophus, in VII +Ethic., quod Deus una simplici operatione gaudet. Et Dionysius +dicit, in fine Cael. Hier., quod Angeli non sunt susceptibiles +nostrae passibilis delectationis, sed congaudent Deo secundum +incorruptionis laetitiam.
+ Reply to Objection 3: In us there is delight, not only in common with dumb animals, but also in common with angels. Wherefore Dionysius says (De + Coel. Hier.) that "holy men often take part in the angelic delights." Accordingly we have delight, not only in the sensitive + appetite, which we have in common with dumb animals, but also in the intellectual appetite, which we have in common with the + angels. +
[34863] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod in nobis non solum est delectatio in qua communicamus +cum brutis, sed etiam in qua communicamus cum Angelis. Unde ibidem +Dionysius dicit quod sancti homines multoties fiunt in +participatione delectationum angelicarum. Et ita in nobis est +delectatio non solum in appetitu sensitivo, in quo communicamus cum +brutis; sed etiam in appetitu intellectivo, in quo communicamus cum +Angelis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that bodily and sensible pleasures are greater than spiritual and intelligible pleasures. For all men seek + some pleasure, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 2,4). But more seek sensible pleasures, than intelligible spiritual + pleasures. Therefore bodily pleasures are greater. +
[34864] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectationes corporales et sensibiles +sint maiores delectationibus spiritualibus intelligibilibus. Omnes +enim aliquam delectationem sequuntur, secundum philosophum, in X +Ethic. Sed plures sequuntur delectationes sensibiles, quam +delectationes spirituales intelligibiles. Ergo delectationes +corporales sunt maiores.
+ Objection 2: Further, the greatness of a cause is known by its effect. But bodily pleasures have greater effects; since "they alter the + state of the body, and in some they cause madness" (Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore bodily pleasures are greater. +
[34865] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +magnitudo causae ex effectu cognoscitur. Sed delectationes +corporales habent fortiores effectus, transmutant enim corpus, +et quibusdam insanias faciunt, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Ergo +delectationes corporales sunt fortiores.
+ Objection 3: Further, bodily pleasures need to be tempered and checked, by reason of their vehemence: whereas there is no need to check + spiritual pleasures. Therefore bodily pleasures are greater. +
[34866] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +delectationes corporales oportet temperare et refraenare, propter +earum vehementiam. Sed delectationes spirituales non oportet +refraenare. Ergo delectationes corporales sunt maiores.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Ps. 118:103): "How sweet are Thy words to my palate; more than honey to my mouth!" And the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 7) that "the greatest + pleasure is derived from the operation of wisdom." +
[34867] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur in Psalmo CXVIII, quam dulcia faucibus meis +eloquia tua, super mel ori meo. Et philosophus dicit, in X +Ethic., quod maxima delectatio est quae est secundum operationem +sapientiae.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[1]), pleasure arises from union with a suitable object perceived or known. Now, in the operations of the soul, especially of + the sensitive and intellectual soul, it must be noted that, since they do not pass into outward matter, they are acts or perfections + of the agent, e.g. to understand, to feel, to will and the like: because actions which pass into outward matter, are actions + and perfections rather of the + matter transformed; for "movement is the act produced by the mover in the thing moved" (Phys. iii, 3). Accordingly the aforesaid + actions of the sensitive and intellectual soul, are themselves a certain good of the agent, and are known by sense and intellect. + Wherefore from them also does pleasure arise, and not only from their objects. +
If therefore we compare intellectual pleasures with sensible pleasures, according as we delight in the very actions, for + instance in sensitive and in intellectual knowledge; without doubt intellectual pleasures are much greater than sensible pleasures. + For man takes much more delight in knowing something, by understanding it, than in knowing something by perceiving it with + his sense. Because intellectual knowledge is more perfect; and because it is better known, since the + intellect reflects on its own act more than sense does. Moreover intellectual knowledge is more beloved: for there is no one + who would not forfeit his bodily sight rather than his intellectual vision, as beasts or fools are deprived thereof, as Augustine + says in De Civ. Dei (De Trin. xiv, 14). +
If, however, intellectual spiritual pleasures be compared with sensible bodily pleasures, then, in themselves and absolutely + speaking, spiritual pleasures are greater. And this appears from the consideration of the three things needed for pleasure, + viz. the good which is brought into conjunction, that to which it is conjoined, and the conjunction itself. For spiritual + good is both greater and more beloved than bodily good: a sign whereof is that men abstain from even the + greatest bodily pleasures, rather than suffer loss of honor which is an intellectual good. Likewise the intellectual faculty + is much more noble and more knowing than the sensitive faculty. Also the conjunction is more intimate, more perfect and more + firm. More intimate, because the senses stop at the outward accidents of a thing, whereas the intellect penetrates to the + essence; for the object of the intellect is "what a thing is." More perfect, because the conjunction of the sensible to the + sense implies movement, which is an imperfect act: wherefore sensible pleasures are not perceived all at once, but some part + of them is passing away, while some other part is looked forward to as yet to be realized, as is manifest in pleasures of + the table and in sexual pleasures: whereas intelligible things are without movement: hence pleasures of this kind are realized + all at once. More firm; because the objects of bodily pleasure are corruptible, and soon pass away; whereas spiritual goods + are incorruptible. +
On the other hand, in relation to us, bodily pleasures are more vehement, for three reasons. First, because sensible things + are more known to us, than intelligible things. Secondly, because sensible pleasures, through being passions of the sensitive + appetite, are accompanied by some alteration in the body: whereas this does not occur in spiritual pleasures, save by reason + of a certain reaction of the superior appetite on the lower. Thirdly, because bodily pleasures are sought as + remedies for bodily defects or troubles, whence various griefs arise. Wherefore bodily pleasures, by reason of their succeeding + griefs of this kind, are felt the more, and consequently are welcomed more than spiritual pleasures, which have no contrary + griefs, as we shall state farther on ( + Q[35], A[5]). +
[34868] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, delectatio provenit ex +coniunctione convenientis quae sentitur vel cognoscitur. In +operibus autem animae, praecipue sensitivae et intellectivae, est +hoc considerandum, quod, cum non transeant in materiam exteriorem, +sunt actus vel perfectiones operantis, scilicet intelligere, +sentire, velle, et huiusmodi, nam actiones quae transeunt in +exteriorem materiam, magis sunt actiones et perfectiones materiae +transmutatae; motus enim est actus mobilis a movente. Sic igitur +praedictae actiones animae sensitivae et intellectivae, et ipsae +sunt quoddam bonum operantis, et sunt etiam cognitae per sensum vel +intellectum. Unde etiam ex ipsis consurgit delectatio, et non solum +ex eorum obiectis. Si igitur comparentur delectationes +intelligibiles delectationibus sensibilibus, secundum quod +delectamur in ipsis actionibus, puta in cognitione sensus et in +cognitione intellectus; non est dubium quod multo sunt maiores +delectationes intelligibiles quam sensibiles. Multo enim magis +delectatur homo de hoc quod cognoscit aliquid intelligendo, quam de +hoc quod cognoscit aliquid sentiendo. Quia intellectualis cognitio +et perfectior est, et etiam magis cognoscitur, quia intellectus +magis reflectitur supra actum suum quam sensus. Est etiam cognitio +intellectiva magis dilecta, nullus enim est qui non magis vellet +carere visu corporali quam visu intellectuali, eo modo quo bestiae +vel stulti carent, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Civ. Dei. +Sed si comparentur delectationes intelligibiles spirituales +delectationibus sensibilibus corporalibus, sic, secundum se et +simpliciter loquendo, delectationes spirituales sunt maiores. Et +hoc apparet secundum tria quae requiruntur ad delectationem, +scilicet bonum coniunctum, et id cui coniungitur, et ipsa +coniunctio. Nam ipsum bonum spirituale et est maius quam corporale +bonum; et est magis dilectum. Cuius signum est quod homines etiam a +maximis corporalibus voluptatibus abstinent, ut non perdant +honorem, qui est bonum intelligibile. Similiter etiam ipsa pars +intellectiva est multo nobilior, et magis cognoscitiva, quam pars +sensitiva. Coniunctio etiam utriusque est magis intima, et magis +perfecta, et magis firma. Intimior quidem est, quia sensus sistit +circa exteriora accidentia rei, intellectus vero penetrat usque ad +rei essentiam; obiectum enim intellectus est quod quid est. +Perfectior autem est, quia coniunctioni sensibilis ad sensum +adiungitur motus, qui est actus imperfectus, unde et delectationes +sensibiles non sunt totae simul, sed in eis aliquid pertransit, et +aliquid expectatur consummandum, ut patet in delectatione ciborum +et venereorum. Sed intelligibilia sunt absque motu, unde +delectationes tales sunt totae simul. Est etiam firmior, quia +delectabilia corporalia sunt corruptibilia, et cito deficiunt; bona +vero spiritualia sunt incorruptibilia. Sed quoad nos, delectationes +corporales sunt magis vehementes, propter tria. Primo, quia +sensibilia sunt magis nota, quoad nos, quam intelligibilia. Secundo +etiam, quia delectationes sensibiles, cum sint passiones sensitivi +appetitus, sunt cum aliqua transmutatione corporali. Quod non +contingit in delectationibus spiritualibus, nisi per quandam +redundantiam a superiori appetitu in inferiorem. Tertio, quia +delectationes corporales appetuntur ut medicinae quaedam contra +corporales defectus vel molestias, ex quibus tristitiae quaedam +consequuntur. Unde delectationes corporales, tristitiis huiusmodi +supervenientes, magis sentiuntur, et per consequens magis +acceptantur, quam delectationes spirituales quae non habent +tristitias contrarias, ut infra dicetur.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The reason why more seek bodily pleasures is because sensible goods are known better and more generally: and, again, because + men need pleasures as remedies for many kinds of sorrow and sadness: and since the majority cannot attain spiritual pleasures, + which are proper to the virtuous, hence it is that they turn aside to seek those of the body. +
[34869] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ideo plures sequuntur delectationes corporales, +quia bona sensibilia sunt magis et pluribus nota. Et etiam quia +homines indigent delectationibus ut medicinis contra multiplices +dolores et tristitias, et cum plures hominum non possint attingere +ad delectationes spirituales, quae sunt propriae virtuosorum, +consequens et quod declinent ad corporales.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Bodily transmutation arises more from bodily pleasures, inasmuch as they are passions of the sensitive appetite. +
[34870] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod transmutatio corporis magis contingit ex +delectationibus corporalibus, inquantum sunt passiones appetitus +sensitivi.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Bodily pleasures are realized in the sensitive faculty which is governed by reason: wherefore they need to be tempered and + checked by reason. But spiritual pleasures are in the mind, which is itself the rule: wherefore they are in themselves both + sober and moderate. +
[34871] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod delectationes corporales sunt secundum partem +sensitivam, quae regulatur ratione, et ideo indigent temperari et +refraenari per rationem. Sed delectationes spirituales sunt +secundum mentem, quae est ipsa regula, unde sunt secundum seipsas +sobriae et moderatae.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the pleasures of touch are not greater than the pleasures afforded by the other senses. Because the greatest + pleasure seems to be that without which all joy is at an end. But such is the pleasure afforded by the sight, according to + the words of + Tob. 5:12: "What manner of joy shall be to me, who sit in darkness, and see not the light of heaven?" Therefore the pleasure afforded + by the sight is the greatest of sensible + pleasures. +
[34872] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectationes quae sunt secundum +tactum, non sint maiores delectationibus quae sunt secundum alios +sensus. Illa enim delectatio videtur esse maxima, qua exclusa, omne +gaudium cessat. Sed talis est delectatio quae est secundum visum, +dicitur enim Tobiae V, quale gaudium erit mihi, qui in tenebris +sedeo, et lumen caeli non video? Ergo delectatio quae est per +visum, est maxima inter sensibiles delectationes.
+ Objection 2: Further, "every one finds treasure in what he loves," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But "of all the senses the sight + is loved most" [*Metaph. i, 1]. Therefore the greatest pleasure seems to be afforded by sight. +
[34873] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 arg. 2 +Praeterea, unicuique fit delectabile illud quod amat, ut +philosophus dicit, in I Rhetoric. Sed inter alios sensus maxime +diligitur visus. Ergo delectatio quae est secundum visum, est +maxima.
+ Objection 3: Further, the beginning of friendship which is for the sake of the pleasant is principally sight. But pleasure is the cause + of such friendship. Therefore the greatest pleasure seems to be afforded by sight. +
[34874] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, +principium amicitiae delectabilis maxime est visio. Sed causa talis +amicitiae est delectatio. Ergo secundum visum videtur esse maxime +delectatio.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), that the greatest pleasures are those which are afforded by the touch. +
[34875] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod maximae +delectationes sunt secundum tactum.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + Q[25], A[2], ad 1; + Q[27], A[4], ad 1), everything gives pleasure according as it is loved. Now, as stated in Metaph. i, 1, the senses are loved for two + reasons: for the purpose of knowledge, and on account of their usefulness. Wherefore the senses afford pleasure in both these + ways. But because it is proper to man to apprehend knowledge itself as something good, it follows that the former + pleasures of the senses, i.e. those which arise from knowledge, are proper to man: whereas pleasures of the senses, as loved + for their usefulness, are common to all animals. +
If therefore we speak of that sensible pleasure by which reason of knowledge, it is evident that the sight affords greater + pleasure than any other sense. On the other hand, if we speak of that sensible pleasure which is by reason of usefulness, + then the greatest pleasure is afforded by the touch. For the usefulness of sensible things is gauged by their relation to + the preservation of the animal's nature. Now the sensible objects of touch bear the closest relation to this + usefulness: for the touch takes cognizance of those things which are vital to an animal, namely, of things hot and cold and + the like. Wherefore in this respect, the pleasures of touch are greater as being more closely related to the end. For this + reason, too, other animals which do not experience sensible pleasure save by reason of usefulness, derive no pleasure from + the other senses except as subordinated to the sensible objects of the touch: "for dogs do not take delight in the smell of + hares, but in eating them; . . . nor does the lion feel pleasure in the lowing of an ox, but in devouring it" (Ethic. iii, + 10). +
Since then the pleasure afforded by touch is the greatest in respect of usefulness, and the pleasure afforded by sight the + greatest in respect of knowledge; if anyone wish to compare these two, he will find that the pleasure of touch is, absolutely + speaking, greater than the pleasure of sight, so far as the latter remains within the limits of sensible pleasure. Because + it is evident that in everything, that which is natural is most powerful: and it is to these pleasures of the + touch that the natural concupiscences, such as those of food, sexual union, and the like, are ordained. If, however, we consider + the pleasures of sight, inasmuch sight is the handmaid of the mind, then the pleasures of sight are greater, forasmuch as + intellectual pleasures are greater than sensible. +
[34876] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, unumquodque, inquantum amatur, +efficitur delectabile. Sensus autem, ut dicitur in principio +Metaphys., propter duo diliguntur, scilicet propter cognitionem, et +propter utilitatem. Unde et utroque modo contingit esse +delectationem secundum sensum. Sed quia apprehendere ipsam +cognitionem tanquam bonum quoddam, proprium est hominis; ideo +primae delectationes sensuum, quae scilicet sunt secundum +cognitionem, sunt propriae hominum, delectationes autem sensuum +inquantum diliguntur propter utilitatem, sunt communes omnibus +animalibus. Si igitur loquamur de delectatione sensus quae est +ratione cognitionis, manifestum est quod secundum visum est maior +delectatio quam secundum aliquem alium sensum. Si autem loquamur de +delectatione sensus quae est ratione utilitatis, sic maxima +delectatio est secundum tactum. Utilitas enim sensibilium +attenditur secundum ordinem ad conservationem naturae animalis. Ad +hanc autem utilitatem propinquius se habent sensibilia tactus, est +enim tactus cognoscitivus eorum ex quibus consistit animal, +scilicet calidi et frigidi, et huiusmodi. Unde secundum hoc, +delectationes quae sunt secundum tactum, sunt maiores, quasi fini +propinquiores. Et propter hoc etiam, alia animalia, quae non habent +delectationem secundum sensum nisi ratione utilitatis, non +delectantur secundum alios sensus, nisi in ordine ad sensibilia +tactus, neque enim odoribus leporum canes gaudent, sed +cibatione; neque leo voce bovis, sed comestione, ut dicitur in +III Ethic. Cum igitur delectatio tactus sit maxima ratione +utilitatis, delectatio autem visus ratione cognitionis; si quis +utramque comparare velit, inveniet simpliciter delectationem tactus +esse maiorem delectatione visus, secundum quod sistit infra limites +sensibilis delectationis. Quia manifestum est quod id quod est +naturale in unoquoque, est potentissimum. Huiusmodi autem +delectationes tactus sunt ad quas ordinantur concupiscentiae +naturales, sicut cibi, et venerea, et huiusmodi. Sed si +consideremus delectationes visus, secundum quod visus deservit +intellectui; sic delectationes visus erunt potiores, ea ratione qua +et intelligibiles delectationes sunt potiores sensibilibus.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Joy, as stated above + (A[3]), denotes pleasure of the soul; and this belongs principally to the sight. But natural pleasure belongs principally to the + touch. +
[34877] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod gaudium, sicut supra dictum est, significat +animalem delectationem, et haec maxime pertinet ad visum. Sed +delectatio naturalis maxime pertinet ad tactum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The sight is loved most, "on account of knowledge, because it helps us to distinguish many things," as is stated in the same + passage (Metaph. i, 1). +
[34878] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod visus maxime diligitur propter cognitionem, eo quod +multas rerum differentias nobis ostendit, ut ibidem dicitur.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Pleasure causes carnal love in one way; the sight, in another. For pleasure, especially that which is afforded by the touch, + is the final cause of the friendship which is for the sake of the pleasant: whereas the sight is a cause like that from which + a movement has its beginning, inasmuch as the beholder on seeing the lovable object receives an impression of its image, which + entices him to love it and to seek its delight. +
[34879] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod alio modo delectatio est causa amoris carnalis, et +alio modo visio. Nam delectatio, et maxime quae est secundum +tactum, est causa amicitiae delectabilis per modum finis, visio +autem est causa sicut unde est principium motus, inquantum per +visum amabilis imprimitur species rei, quae allicit ad amandum et +ad concupiscendum eius delectationem.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that no pleasure is not natural. For pleasure is to the emotions of the soul what repose is to bodies. But + the appetite of a natural body does not repose save in a connatural place. Neither, therefore, can the repose of the animal + appetite, which is pleasure, be elsewhere than in something connatural. Therefore no pleasure is non-natural. +
[34880] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod nulla delectatio sit innaturalis. +Delectatio enim in affectibus animae proportionatur quieti in +corporibus. Sed appetitus corporis naturalis non quiescit nisi in +loco connaturali. Ergo nec quies appetitus animalis, quae est +delectatio, potest esse nisi in aliquo connaturali. Nulla ergo +delectatio est non naturalis.
+ Objection 2: Further, what is against nature is violent. But "whatever is violent causes grief" (Metaph. v, 5). Therefore nothing which + is unnatural can give pleasure. +
[34881] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, +illud quod est contra naturam, est violentum. Sed omne violentum +est contristans, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. Ergo nihil quod est +contra naturam, potest esse delectabile.
+ Objection 3: Further, the fact of being established in one's own nature, if perceived, gives rise to pleasure, as is evident from the + Philosopher's definition quoted above + (A[1]). But it is natural to every thing to be established in its nature; because natural movement tends to a natural end. Therefore + every pleasure is natural. +
[34882] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, +constitui in propriam naturam, cum sentitur, causat delectationem; +ut patet ex definitione philosophi supra posita. Sed constitui in +naturam, unicuique est naturale, quia motus naturalis est qui est +ad terminum naturalem. Ergo omnis delectatio est naturalis.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5,6) that some things are pleasant "not from nature but from disease." +
[34883] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod quaedam +delectationes sunt aegritudinales et contra naturam.
+ I answer that, We speak of that as being natural, which is in accord with nature, as stated in Phys. ii, 1. Now, in man, nature can be taken + in two ways. First, inasmuch as intellect and reason is the principal part of man's nature, since in respect thereof he has + his own specific nature. And in this sense, those pleasures may be called natural to man, which are derived from things pertaining + to man in respect of his reason: for instance, it is natural to man to take + pleasure in contemplating the truth and in doing works of virtue. Secondly, nature in man may be taken as contrasted with + reason, and as denoting that which is common to man and other animals, especially that part of man which does not obey reason. + And in this sense, that which pertains to the preservation of the body, either as regards the individual, as food, drink, + sleep, and the like, or as regards the species, as sexual intercourse, are said to afford man natural pleasure. Under each + kind + of pleasures, we find some that are "not natural" speaking absolutely, and yet "connatural" in some respect. For it happens + in an individual that some one of the natural principles of the species is corrupted, so that something which is contrary + to the specific nature, becomes accidentally natural to this individual: thus it is natural to this hot water to give heat. + Consequently it happens that something which is not natural to man, either in regard to reason, or in regard to the preservation + of the body, becomes connatural to this individual man, on account of there being some corruption of nature in him. And this + corruption may be either on the part of the body---from some ailment; thus to a man suffering from fever, sweet things seem + bitter, and vice versa---or from an evil temperament; thus some take pleasure in eating earth and coals and the like; or on + the part of the soul; thus from custom some take pleasure in cannibalism or in the unnatural intercourse of man and beast, + or + other such things, which are not in accord with human nature. +
[34884] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 7 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod naturale dicitur quod est secundum naturam, ut +dicitur in II Physic. Natura autem in homine dupliciter sumi +potest. Uno modo, prout intellectus et ratio est potissime hominis +natura, quia secundum eam homo in specie constituitur. Et secundum +hoc, naturales delectationes hominum dici possunt quae sunt in eo +quod convenit homini secundum rationem, sicut delectari in +contemplatione veritatis, et in actibus virtutum, est naturale +homini. Alio modo potest sumi natura in homine secundum quod +condividitur rationi, id scilicet quod est commune homini et aliis, +praecipue quod rationi non obedit. Et secundum hoc, ea quae +pertinent ad conservationem corporis, vel secundum individuum, ut +cibus, potus, lectus, et huiusmodi, vel secundum speciem, sicut +venereorum usus, dicuntur homini delectabilia naturaliter. Secundum +utrasque autem delectationes, contingit aliquas esse innaturales, +simpliciter loquendo, sed connaturales secundum quid. Contingit +enim in aliquo individuo corrumpi aliquod principiorum naturalium +speciei; et sic id quod est contra naturam speciei, fieri per +accidens naturale huic individuo; sicut huic aquae calefactae est +naturale quod calefaciat. Ita igitur contingit quod id quod est +contra naturam hominis, vel quantum ad rationem, vel quantum ad +corporis conservationem, fiat huic homini connaturale, propter +aliquam corruptionem naturae in eo existentem. Quae quidem +corruptio potest esse vel ex parte corporis, sive ex aegritudine, +sicut febricitantibus dulcia videntur amara et e converso; sive +propter malam complexionem, sicut aliqui delectantur in comestione +terrae vel carbonum, vel aliquorum huiusmodi, vel etiam ex parte +animae, sicut propter consuetudinem aliqui, delectantur in +comedendo homines, vel in coitu bestiarum aut masculorum, aut +aliorum huiusmodi, quae non sunt secundum naturam humanam.
This suffices for the answers to the objections.
[34885] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 7 ad arg. Et per hoc +patet responsio ad obiecta.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that one pleasure cannot be contrary to another. Because the passions of the soul derive their species and + contrariety from their objects. Now the object of pleasure is the good. Since therefore good is not contrary to good, but + "good is contrary to evil, and evil to good," as stated in Praedic. viii; it seems that one pleasure is not contrary to another. +
[34886] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectationi non sit delectatio +contraria. Passiones enim animae speciem et contrarietatem +recipiunt secundum obiecta. Obiectum autem delectationis est bonum. +Cum igitur bonum non sit contrarium bono, sed bonum malo +contrarietur, et malum malo, ut dicitur in praedicamentis; videtur +quod delectatio non sit contraria delectationi.
+ Objection 2: Further, to one thing there is one contrary, as is proved in Metaph. x, 4. But sadness is contrary to pleasure. Therefore + pleasure is not contrary to pleasure. +
[34887] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, +uni unum est contrarium, ut probatur in X Metaphys. Sed +delectationi contraria est tristitia. Non ergo delectationi +contraria est delectatio.
+ Objection 3: Further, if one pleasure is contrary to another, this is only on account of the contrariety of the things which give pleasure. + But this difference is material: whereas contrariety is a difference of form, as stated in Metaph. x, 4. Therefore there is + no contrariety between one pleasure and another. +
[34888] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, +si delectationi contraria est delectatio hoc non est nisi propter +contrarietatem eorum in quibus aliquis delectatur. Sed haec +differentia est materialis, contrarietas autem est differentia +secundum formam, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Ergo contrarietas non +est delectationis ad delectationem.
+ On the contrary, Things of the same genus that impede one another are contraries, as the Philosopher states (Phys. viii, 8). But some pleasures + impede one another, as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore some pleasures are contrary to one another. +
[34889] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra, +ea quae se impediunt, in eodem genere existentia, secundum +philosophum, sunt contraria. Sed quaedam delectationes se invicem +impediunt ut dicitur in X Ethic. Ergo aliquae delectationes sunt +contrariae.
+ I answer that, Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is likened to repose in natural bodies, as stated above ( + Q[23], A[4]). Now one repose is said to be contrary to another when they are in contrary termini; thus, "repose in a high place is contrary + to repose in a low place" (Phys. v, 6). Wherefore it happens in the emotions of the soul that one pleasure is contrary to + another. +
[34890] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod delectatio in affectionibus animae, sicut dictum est, +proportionatur quieti in corporibus naturalibus. Dicuntur autem +duae quietes esse contrariae, quae sunt in contrariis terminis; +sicut quies quae est sursum, ei quae est deorsum, ut dicitur V +Physic. Unde et contingit in affectibus animae duas delectationes +esse contrarias.
+ Reply to Objection 1: This saying of the Philosopher is to be understood of good and evil as applied to virtues and vices: because one vice may + be contrary to another vice, whereas no virtue can be contrary to another virtue. But in other things nothing prevents one + good from being contrary to another, such as hot and cold, of which the former is good in relation to fire, the latter, in + relation to water. And in this way one pleasure can be contrary to another. That this + is impossible with regard to the good of virtue, is due to the fact that virtue's good depends on fittingness in relation + to some one thing---i.e. the reason. +
[34891] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod verbum illud philosophi est intelligendum +secundum quod bonum et malum accipitur in virtutibus et vitiis, nam +inveniuntur duo contraria vitia, non autem invenitur virtus +contraria virtuti. In aliis autem nil prohibet duo bona esse ad +invicem contraria, sicut calidum et frigidum, quorum unum est bonum +igni, alterum aquae. Et per hunc modum delectatio potest esse +delectationi contraria. Sed hoc in bono virtutis esse non potest, +quia bonum virtutis non accipitur nisi per convenientiam ad aliquid +unum, scilicet rationem.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is likened to natural repose in bodies: because its object is something suitable and + connatural, so to speak. But sadness is like a violent repose; because its object is disagreeable to the animal appetite, + just as the place of violent repose is disagreeable to the natural appetite. Now natural repose is contrary both to violent + repose of the same body, and to the natural repose of another, as stated in Phys. v, + 6. Wherefore pleasure is contrary to both to another pleasure and to sadness. +
[34892] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod delectatio se habet in affectibus animae, sicut quies +naturalis in corporibus, est enim in aliquo convenienti et quasi +connaturali. Tristitia autem se habet sicut quies violenta, +tristabile enim repugnat appetitui animali, sicut locus quietis +violentae appetitui naturali. Quieti autem naturali opponitur et +quies violenta eiusdem corporis, et quies naturalis alterius, ut +dicitur in V Physic. Unde delectationi opponitur et delectatio et +tristitia.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The things in which we take pleasure, since they are the objects of pleasure, cause not only a material, but also a formal + difference, if the formality of pleasurableness be different. Because difference in the formal object causes a specific difference + in acts and passions, as stated above ( + Q[23], AA[1],4; + Q[30], A[2]). +
[34893] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ea in quibus delectamur, cum sint obiecta +delectationis, non solum faciunt differentiam materialem, sed etiam +formalem, si sit diversa ratio delectabilitatis. Diversa enim ratio +obiecti diversificat speciem actus vel passionis, ut ex supradictis +patet.
We must now consider the causes of pleasure: and under this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure?
(2) Whether movement is a cause of pleasure?
(3) Whether hope and memory cause pleasure?
(4) Whether sadness causes pleasure?
(5) Whether the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us?
(6) Whether doing good to another is a cause of pleasure?
+[34894] +Iª-IIae q. 32 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +causis delectationis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum +operatio sit causa propria delectationis. Secundo, utrum motus sit +causa delectationis. Tertio, utrum spes et memoria. Quarto, utrum +tristitia. Quinto, utrum actiones aliorum sint nobis delectationis +causa. Sexto, utrum benefacere alteri sit causa delectationis. +Septimo, utrum similitudo sit causa delectationis. Octavo, utrum +admiratio sit causa delectationis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that operation is not the proper and first cause of pleasure. For, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11), "pleasure + consists in a perception of the senses," since knowledge is requisite for pleasure, as stated above ( + Q[31], A[1]). But the objects of operations are knowable before the operations themselves. Therefore operation is not the proper cause + of pleasure. +
[34895] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod operatio non sit propria et prima +causa delectationis. Ut enim philosophus dicit, in I Rhetoric., +delectari consistit in hoc quod sensus aliquid patiatur, +requiritur enim ad delectationem cognitio, sicut dictum est. Sed +per prius sunt cognoscibilia obiecta operationum quam ipsae +operationes. Ergo operatio non est propria causa delectationis.
+ Objection 2: Further, pleasure consists especially in an end gained: since it is this that is chiefly desired. But the end is not always + an operation, but is sometimes the effect of the operation. Therefore operation is not the proper and direct cause of pleasure. +
[34896] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +delectatio potissime consistit in fine adepto, hoc enim est quod +praecipue concupiscitur. Sed non semper operatio est finis, sed +quandoque ipsum operatum. Non ergo operatio est propria et per se +causa delectationis.
+ Objection 3: Further, leisure and rest consist in cessation from work: and they are objects of pleasure (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore operation + is not the proper cause of pleasure. +
[34897] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +otium et requies dicuntur per cessationem operationis. Haec autem +sunt delectabilia, ut dicitur in I Rhetoric. Non ergo operatio est +propria causa delectationis.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12,13; x, 4) that "pleasure is a connatural and uninterrupted operation." +
[34898] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, VII et X Ethic., quod delectatio est +operatio connaturalis non impedita.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + Q[31], A[1]), two things are requisite for pleasure: namely, the attainment of the suitable good, and knowledge of this attainment. Now + each of these consists in a kind of operation: because actual knowledge is an operation; and the attainment of the suitable + good is by means of an operation. Moreover, the proper operation itself is a suitable good. Wherefore every pleasure must + needs be the result of some + operation. +
[34899] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad delectationem duo +requiruntur, scilicet consecutio boni convenientis, et cognitio +huiusmodi adeptionis. Utrumque autem horum in quadam operatione +consistit, nam actualis cognitio operatio quaedam est; similiter +bonum conveniens adipiscimur aliqua operatione. Ipsa etiam operatio +propria est quoddam bonum conveniens. Unde oportet quod omnis +delectatio aliquam operationem consequatur.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The objects of operations are not pleasurable save inasmuch as they are united to us; either by knowledge alone, as when + we take pleasure in thinking of or looking at certain things; or in some other way in addition to knowledge; as when a man + takes pleasure in knowing that he has something good--riches, honor, or the like; which would not be pleasurable unless they + were apprehended as possessed. For as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii, 2) "we take + great pleasure in looking upon a thing as our own, by reason of the natural love we have for ourselves." Now to have such + like things is nothing else but to use them or to be able to use them: and this is through some operation. Wherefore it is + evident that every pleasure is traced to some operation as its cause. +
[34900] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ipsa obiecta operationum non sunt delectabilia, +nisi inquantum coniunguntur nobis, vel per cognitionem solam, sicut +cum delectamur in consideratione vel inspectione aliquorum; vel +quocumque alio modo simul cum cognitione, sicut cum aliquis +delectatur in hoc quod cognoscit se habere quodcumque bonum, puta +divitias vel honorem vel aliquid huiusmodi; quae quidem non essent +delectabilia, nisi inquantum apprehenduntur ut habita. Ut enim +philosophus dicit, in II Polit., magnam delectationem habet +putare aliquid sibi proprium; quae procedit ex naturali amore +alicuius ad seipsum. Habere autem huiusmodi nihil est aliud +quam uti eis, vel posse uti. Et hoc est per aliquam operationem. +Unde manifestum est quod omnis delectatio in operationem reducitur +sicut in causam.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Even when it is not an operation, but the effect of an operation, that is the end, this effect is pleasant in so far as possessed + or effected: and this implies use or operation. +
[34901] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod etiam in illis in quibus operationes non sunt fines, +sed operata, ipsa operata sunt delectabilia inquantum sunt habita +vel facta. Quod refertur ad aliquem usum vel operationem.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Operations are pleasant, in so far as they are proportionate and connatural to the agent. Now, since human power is finite, + operation is proportionate thereto according to a certain measure. Wherefore if it exceed that measure, it will be no longer + proportionate or pleasant, but, on the contrary, painful and irksome. And in this sense, leisure and play and other things + pertaining to repose, are pleasant, inasmuch as they banish sadness which results + from labor. +
[34902] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod operationes sunt delectabiles, inquantum sunt +proportionatae et connaturales operanti. Cum autem virtus humana +sit finita, secundum aliquam mensuram operatio est sibi +proportionata. Unde si excedat illam mensuram, iam non erit sibi +proportionata, nec delectabilis, sed magis laboriosa et attaedians. +Et secundum hoc, otium et ludus et alia quae ad requiem pertinent, +delectabilia sunt, inquantum auferunt tristitiam quae est ex +labore.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that movement is not a cause of pleasure. Because, as stated above ( + Q[31], A[1]), the good which is obtained and is actually possessed, is the cause of pleasure: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. + vii, 12) that pleasure is not compared with generation, but with the operation of a thing already in existence. Now that which + is being moved towards something has it not as yet; but, so to speak, is being generated in its + regard, forasmuch as generation or corruption are united to every movement, as stated in Phys. viii, 3. Therefore movement + is not a cause of pleasure. +
[34903] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod motus non sit causa delectationis. +Quia, sicut supra dictum est, bonum praesentialiter adeptum est +causa delectationis, unde philosophus, in VII Ethic., dicit quod +delectatio non comparatur generationi, sed operationi rei iam +existentis. Id autem quod movetur ad aliquid, nondum habet illud; +sed quodammodo est in via generationis respectu illius, secundum +quod omni motui adiungitur generatio et corruptio, ut dicitur in +VIII Physic. Ergo motus non est causa delectationis.
+ Objection 2: Further, movement is the chief cause of toil and fatigue in our works. But operations through being toilsome and fatiguing + are not pleasant but disagreeable. Therefore movement is not a cause of pleasure. +
[34904] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +motus praecipue laborem et lassitudinem inducit in operibus. Sed +operationes, ex hoc quod sunt laboriosae et lassantes, non sunt +delectabiles, sed magis afflictivae. Ergo motus non est causa +delectationis.
+ Objection 3: Further, movement implies a certain innovation, which is the opposite of custom. But things "which we are accustomed to, + are pleasant," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore movement is not a cause of pleasure. +
[34905] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +motus importat innovationem quandam, quae opponitur consuetudini. +Sed ea quae sunt consueta, sunt nobis delectabilia, ut philosophus +dicit, in I Rhetoric. Ergo motus non est causa delectationis.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. viii, 3): "What means this, O Lord my God, whereas Thou art everlasting joy to Thyself, and some + things around Thee evermore rejoice in Thee? What means this, that this portion of things ebbs and flows alternately displeased + and reconciled?" From these words we gather that man rejoices and takes pleasure in some kind of alterations: and therefore + movement seems to cause pleasure. +
[34906] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in VIII Confess., quid est hoc, +domine Deus meus, cum tu aeternum tibi tu ipse sis gaudium; et +quaedam de te circa te semper gaudeant; quod haec rerum pars +alterno defectu et profectu, offensionibus et conciliationibus +gaudet? Ex quo accipitur quod homines gaudent et delectantur in +quibusdam alternationibus. Et sic motus videtur esse causa +delectationis.
+ I answer that, Three things are requisite for pleasure; two, i.e. the one that is pleased and the pleasurable object conjoined to him; and + a third, which is knowledge of this conjunction: and in respect of these three, movement is pleasant, as the Philosopher says + (Ethic. vii, 14 and Rhetor. i, 11). For as far as we who feel pleasure are concerned, change is pleasant to us because our + nature is changeable: for which reason that which is suitable to us at one time is not + suitable at another; thus to warm himself at a fire is suitable to man in winter but not in summer. Again, on the part of + the pleasing good which is united to us, change is pleasant. Because the continued action of an agent increases its effect: + thus the longer a person remains near the fire, the more he is warmed and dried. Now the natural mode of being consists in + a certain measure; and therefore when the continued presence of a pleasant object exceeds the measure of one's natural mode + of + being, the removal of that object becomes pleasant. On the part of the knowledge itself (change becomes pleasant), because + man desires to know something whole and perfect: when therefore a thing cannot be apprehended all at once as a whole, change + in such a thing is pleasant, so that one part may pass and another succeed, and thus the whole be perceived. Hence Augustine + says (Confess. iv, 11): "Thou wouldst not have the syllables stay, but fly away, that others may come, and thou hear the + whole. And so whenever any one thing is made up of many, all of which do not exist together, all would please collectively + more than they do severally, if all could be perceived collectively." +
If therefore there be any thing, whose nature is unchangeable; the natural mode of whose being cannot be exceeded by the + continuation of any pleasing object; and which can behold the whole object of its delight at once---to such a one change will + afford no delight. And the more any pleasures approach to this, the more are they capable of being continual. +
[34907] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod ad delectationem tria requiruntur, scilicet duo +quorum est coniunctio delectabilis; et tertium, quod est cognitio +huius coniunctionis. Et secundum haec tria motus efficitur +delectabilis, ut philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic. et in I Rhetoric. +Nam ex parte nostra qui delectamur, transmutatio efficitur nobis +delectabilis propter hoc, quod natura nostra transmutabilis est; et +propter hoc, quod est nobis conveniens nunc, non erit nobis +conveniens postea; sicut calefieri ad ignem est conveniens homini +in hieme, non autem in aestate. Ex parte vero boni delectantis quod +nobis coniungitur, fit etiam transmutatio delectabilis. Quia actio +continuata alicuius agentis auget effectum, sicut quanto aliquis +diutius appropinquat igni, magis calefit et desiccatur. Naturalis +autem habitudo in quadam mensura consistit. Et ideo quando +continuata praesentia delectabilis superexcedit mensuram naturalis +habitudinis, efficitur remotio eius delectabilis. Ex parte vero +ipsius cognitionis, quia homo desiderat cognoscere aliquod totum et +perfectum. Cum ergo aliqua non poterunt apprehendi tota simul, +delectat in his transmutatio, ut unum transeat et alterum succedat, +et sic totum sentiatur. Unde Augustinus dicit, in IV Confess., +non vis utique stare syllabam, sed transvolare, ut aliae +veniant, et totum audias. Ita semper omnia ex quibus unum aliquid +constat, et non sunt omnia simul, plus delectant omnia quam +singula, si possint sentiri omnia. Si ergo sit aliqua res cuius +natura sit intransmutabilis; et non possit in ea fieri excessus +naturalis habitudinis per continuationem delectabilis; et quae +possit totum suum delectabile simul intueri, non erit ei +transmutatio delectabilis. Et quanto aliquae delectationes plus ad +hoc accedunt, tanto plus continuari possunt.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Although the subject of movement has not yet perfectly that to which it is moved, nevertheless it is beginning to have something + thereof: and in this respect movement itself has something of pleasure. But it falls short of the perfection of pleasure; + because the more perfect pleasures regard things that are unchangeable. Moreover movement becomes the cause of pleasure, in + so far as thereby something which previously was unsuitable, becomes suitable or + ceases to be, as stated above. +
[34908] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod id quod movetur, etsi nondum habeat perfecte id +ad quod movetur, incipit tamen iam aliquid habere eius ad quod +movetur, et secundum hoc, ipse motus habet aliquid delectationis. +Deficit tamen a delectationis perfectione, nam perfectiores +delectationes sunt in rebus immobilibus. Motus etiam efficitur +delectabilis, inquantum per ipsum fit aliquid conveniens quod prius +conveniens non erat, vel desinit esse, ut supra dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Movement causes toil and fatigue, when it exceeds our natural aptitude. It is not thus that it causes pleasure, but by removing + the obstacles to our natural aptitude. +
[34909] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod motus laborem et lassitudinem inducit, secundum quod +transcendit habitudinem naturalem. Sic autem motus non est +delectabilis, sed secundum quod removentur contraria habitudinis +naturalis.
+ Reply to Objection 3: What is customary becomes pleasant, in so far as it becomes natural: because custom is like a second nature. But the movement + which gives pleasure is not that which departs from custom, but rather that which prevents the corruption of the natural mode + of being, that might result from continued operation. And thus from the same cause of connaturalness, both custom and movement + become pleasant. +
[34910] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod id quod est consuetum, efficitur delectabile, +inquantum efficitur naturale, nam consuetudo est quasi altera +natura. Motus autem est delectabilis, non quidem quo receditur a +consuetudine, sed magis secundum quod per ipsum impeditur corruptio +naturalis habitudinis, quae posset provenire ex assiduitate +alicuius operationis. Et sic ex eadem causa connaturalitatis +efficitur consuetudo delectabilis, et motus.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that memory and hope do not cause pleasure. Because pleasure is caused by present good, as Damascene says (De + Fide Orth. ii, 12). But hope and memory regard what is absent: since memory is of the past, and hope of the future. Therefore + memory and hope do not cause pleasure. +
[34911] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod memoria et spes non sint causae +delectationis. Delectatio enim est de bono praesenti, ut Damascenus +dicit. Sed memoria et spes sunt de absenti, est enim memoria +praeteritorum, spes vero futurorum. Ergo memoria et spes non sunt +causa delectationis.
+ Objection 2: Further, the same thing is not the cause of contraries. But hope causes affliction, according to + Prov. 13:12: "Hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul." Therefore hope does not cause pleasure. +
[34912] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +idem non est causa contrariorum. Sed spes est causa afflictionis, +dicitur enim Prov. XIII, spes quae differtur, affligit +animam. Ergo spes non est causa delectationis.
+ Objection 3: Further, just as hope agrees with pleasure in regarding good, so also do desire and love. Therefore hope should not be assigned + as a cause of pleasure, any more than desire or love. +
[34913] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sicut spes convenit cum delectatione in eo quod est de bono, ita +etiam concupiscentia et amor. Non ergo magis debet assignari spes +causa delectationis, quam concupiscentia vel amor.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Rom. 12:12): "Rejoicing in hope"; and ( + Ps. 76:4): "I remembered God, and was delighted." +
[34914] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Rom. XII, spe gaudentes; et in Psalmo +LXXVI, memor fui Dei, et delectatus sum.
+ I answer that, Pleasure is caused by the presence of suitable good, in so far as it is felt, or perceived in any way. Now a thing is present + to us in two ways. First, in knowledge---i.e. according as the thing known is in the knower by its likeness; secondly, in + reality---i.e. according as one thing is in real conjunction of any kind with another, either actually or potentially. And + since real conjunction is greater than conjunction by likeness, which is the conjunction of + knowledge; and again, since actual is greater than potential conjunction: therefore the greatest pleasure is that which arises + from sensation which requires the presence of the sensible object. The second place belongs to the pleasure of hope, wherein + there is pleasurable conjunction, not only in respect of apprehension, but also in respect of the faculty or power of obtaining + the pleasurable object. The third place belongs to the pleasure of memory, which has only the conjunction of + apprehension. +
[34915] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod delectatio causatur ex praesentia boni convenientis, +secundum quod sentitur, vel qualitercumque percipitur. Est autem +aliquid praesens nobis dupliciter, uno modo, secundum cognitionem, +prout scilicet cognitum est in cognoscente secundum suam +similitudinem; alio modo, secundum rem, prout scilicet unum alteri +realiter coniungitur, vel actu vel potentia, secundum quemcumque +coniunctionis modum. Et quia maior est coniunctio secundum rem quam +secundum similitudinem, quae est coniunctio cognitionis; itemque +maior est coniunctio rei in actu quam in potentia, ideo maxima est +delectatio quae fit per sensum, qui requirit praesentiam rei +sensibilis. Secundum autem gradum tenet delectatio spei, in qua non +solum est delectabilis coniunctio secundum apprehensionem, sed +etiam secundum facultatem vel potestatem adipiscendi bonum quod +delectat. Tertium autem gradum tenet delectatio memoriae, quae +habet solam coniunctionem apprehensionis.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Hope and memory are indeed of things which, absolutely speaking, are absent: and yet those are, after a fashion, present, + i.e. either according to apprehension only; or according to apprehension and possibility, at least supposed, of attainment. +
[34916] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod spes et memoria sunt quidem eorum quae sunt +simpliciter absentia, quae tamen secundum quid sunt praesentia, +scilicet vel secundum apprehensionem solam; vel secundum +apprehensionem et facultatem, ad minus aestimatam.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Nothing prevents the same thing, in different ways, being the cause of contraries. And so hope, inasmuch as it implies a + present appraising of a future good, causes pleasure; whereas, inasmuch as it implies absence of that good, it causes affliction. +
[34917] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod nihil prohibet idem, secundum diversa, esse causam +contrariorum. Sic igitur spes, inquantum habet praesentem +aestimationem boni futuri, delectationem causat, inquantum autem +caret praesentia eius, causat afflictionem.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Love and concupiscence also cause pleasure. For everything that is loved becomes pleasing to the lover, since love is a kind + of union or connaturalness of lover and beloved. In like manner every object of desire is pleasing to the one that desires, + since desire is chiefly a craving for pleasure. However hope, as implying a certainty of the real presence of the pleasing + good, that is not implied either by love or by concupiscence, is reckoned in + preference to them as causing pleasure; and also in preference to memory, which is of that which has already passed away. +
[34918] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod etiam amor et concupiscentia delectationem causant. +Omne enim amatum fit delectabile amanti, eo quod amor est quaedam +unio vel connaturalitas amantis ad amatum. Similiter etiam omne +concupitum est delectabile concupiscenti, cum concupiscentia sit +praecipue appetitus delectationis. Sed tamen spes, inquantum +importat quandam certitudinem realis praesentiae boni delectantis, +quam non importat nec amor nec concupiscentia, magis ponitur causa +delectationis quam illa. Et similiter magis quam memoria, quae est +de eo quod iam transiit.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that sadness does not cause pleasure. For nothing causes its own contrary. But sadness is contrary to pleasure. + Therefore it does not cause it. +
[34919] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod tristitia non sit causa delectationis. +Contrarium enim non est causa contrarii. Sed tristitia contrariatur +delectationi. Ergo non est causa delectationis.
+ Objection 2: Further, contraries have contrary effects. But pleasures, when called to mind, cause pleasure. Therefore sad things, when + remembered, cause sorrow and not pleasure. +
[34920] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +contrariorum contrarii sunt effectus. Sed delectabilia memorata +sunt causa delectationis. Ergo tristia memorata sunt causa doloris, +et non delectationis.
+ Objection 3: Further, as sadness is to pleasure, so is hatred to love. But hatred does not cause love, but rather the other way about, + as stated above ( + Q[29], A[2]). Therefore sadness does not cause pleasure. +
[34921] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sicut se habet tristitia ad delectationem, ita odium ad amorem. Sed +odium non est causa amoris, sed magis e converso, ut supra dictum +est. Ergo tristitia non est causa delectationis.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Ps. 41:4): "My tears have been my bread day and night": where bread denotes the refreshment of pleasure. Therefore tears, which arise + from sadness, can give pleasure. +
[34922] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod in Psalmo XLI, dicitur, fuerunt mihi lacrimae meae +panes die ac nocte. Per panem autem refectio delectationis +intelligitur. Ergo lacrimae, quae ex tristitia oriuntur, possunt +esse delectabiles.
+ I answer that, Sadness may be considered in two ways: as existing actually, and as existing in the memory: and in both ways sadness can + cause pleasure. Because sadness, as actually existing, causes pleasure, inasmuch as it brings to mind that which is loved, + the absence of which causes sadness; and yet the mere thought of it gives pleasure. The recollection of sadness becomes a + cause of pleasure, on account of the deliverance which ensued: because absence of evil is looked + upon as something good; wherefore so far as a man thinks that he has been delivered from that which caused him sorrow and + pain, so much reason has he to rejoice. Hence Augustine says in De Civ. Dei xxii, 31 [*Gregory, Moral. iv.] that "oftentimes + in joy we call to mind sad things . . . and in the season of health we recall past pains without feeling pain . . . and in + proportion are the more filled with joy and gladness": and again (Confess. viii, 3) he says that "the more peril there was + in the + battle, so much the more joy will there be in the triumph." +
[34923] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod tristitia potest dupliciter considerari, uno modo, +secundum quod est in actu; alio modo, secundum quod est in memoria. +Et utroque modo tristitia potest esse delectationis causa. +Tristitia siquidem in actu existens est causa delectationis, +inquantum facit memoriam rei dilectae, de cuius absentia aliquis +tristatur, et tamen de sola eius apprehensione delectatur. Memoria +autem tristitiae fit causa delectationis, propter subsequentem +evasionem. Nam carere malo accipitur in ratione boni, unde secundum +quod homo apprehendit se evasisse ab aliquibus tristibus et +dolorosis, accrescit ei gaudii materia; secundum quod Augustinus +dicit, XXII de Civ. Dei, quod saepe laeti tristium meminimus, et +sani dolorum sine dolore, et inde amplius laeti et grati sumus. +Et in VIII Confess. dicit quod quanto maius fuit periculum in +proelio, tanto maius erit gaudium in triumpho.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes accidentally a thing is the cause of its contrary: thus "that which is cold sometimes causes heat," as stated in + Phys. viii, 1. In like manner sadness is the accidental cause of pleasure, in so far as it gives rise to the apprehension + of something pleasant. +
[34924] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod contrarium quandoque per accidens est causa +contrarii, sicut frigidum quandoque calefacit, ut dicitur in VIII +Physic. Et similiter tristitia per accidens est delectationis +causa, inquantum fit per eam apprehensio alicuius delectabilis.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Sad things, called to mind, cause pleasure, not in so far as they are sad and contrary to pleasant things; but in so far + as man is delivered from them. In like manner the recollection of pleasant things, by reason of these being lost, may cause + sadness. +
[34925] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod tristia memorata, inquantum sunt tristia et +delectabilibus contraria, non causant delectationem, sed inquantum +ab eis homo liberatur. Et similiter memoria delectabilium, ex eo +quod sunt amissa, potest causare tristitiam.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Hatred also can be the accidental cause of love: i.e. so far as some love one another, inasmuch as they agree in hating one + and the same thing. +
[34926] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod odium etiam per accidens potest esse causa amoris, +prout scilicet aliqui diligunt se, inquantum conveniunt in odio +unius et eiusdem.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the actions of others are not a cause of pleasure to us. Because the cause of pleasure is our own good + when conjoined to us. But the actions of others are not conjoined to us. Therefore they are not a cause of pleasure to us. +
[34927] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod actiones aliorum non sint nobis +delectationis causa. Causa enim delectationis est proprium bonum +coniunctum. Sed aliorum operationes non sunt nobis coniunctae. Ergo +non sunt nobis causa delectationis.
+ Objection 2: Further, the action is the agent's own good. If, therefore, the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us, for the + same reason all goods belonging to others will be pleasing to us: which is evidently untrue. +
[34928] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +operatio est proprium bonum operantis. Si igitur operationes +aliorum sint nobis causa delectationis, pari ratione omnia alia +bona aliorum erunt nobis delectationis causa. Quod patet esse +falsum.
+ Objection 3: Further, action is pleasant through proceeding from an innate habit; hence it is stated in Ethic. ii, 3 that "we must reckon + the pleasure which follows after action, as being the sign of a habit existing in us." But the actions of others do not proceed + from habits existing in us, but, sometimes, from habits existing in the agents. Therefore the actions of others are not pleasing + to us, but to the agents themselves. +
[34929] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +operatio est delectabilis, inquantum procedit ex habitu nobis +innato, unde dicitur in II Ethic., quod signum generati habitus +oportet accipere fientem in opere delectationem. Sed +operationes aliorum non procedunt ex habitibus qui in nobis sunt, +sed interdum ex habitibus qui sunt in operantibus. Non ergo +operationes aliorum sunt nobis delectabiles, sed ipsis +operantibus.
+ On the contrary, It is written in the second canonical epistle of John (verse 4): "I was exceeding glad that I found thy children walking + in truth." +
[34930] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur in secunda canonica Ioannis, gavisus sum valde, +quoniam inveni de filiis tuis ambulantes in veritate.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[1]; Q[31], A[1]), two things are requisite for pleasure, namely, the attainment of one's proper good, and the knowledge of having + obtained it. Wherefore the action of another may cause pleasure to us in three ways. First, from the fact that we obtain some + good through the action of another. And in this way, the actions of those who do some good to us, are pleasing to us: since + it is pleasant to be benefited by + another. Secondly, from the fact that another's action makes us to know or appreciate our own good: and for this reason men + take pleasure in being praised or honored by others, because, to wit, they thus become aware of some good existing in themselves. + And since this appreciation receives greater weight from the testimony of good and wise men, hence men take greater pleasure + in being praised and honored by them. And because a flatterer appears to praise, therefore flattery is pleasing to some. + And as love is for something good, while admiration is for something great, so it is pleasant to be loved and admired by others, + inasmuch as a man thus becomes aware of his own goodness or greatness, through their giving pleasure to others. Thirdly, from + the fact that another's actions, if they be good, are reckoned as one's own good, by reason of the power of love, which makes + a man to regard his friend as one with himself. And on account of hatred, which makes one to reckon another's good as + being in opposition to oneself, the evil action of an enemy becomes an object of pleasure: whence it is written ( + 1 Cor. 13:6) that charity "rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth." +
[34931] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, ad delectationem duo +requiruntur, scilicet consecutio proprii boni, et cognitio proprii +boni consecuti. Tripliciter ergo operatio alterius potest esse +delectationis causa. Uno modo, inquantum per operationem alicuius +consequimur aliquod bonum. Et secundum hoc, operationes illorum qui +nobis aliquod bonum faciunt, sunt nobis delectabiles, quia bene +pati ab alio est delectabile. Alio modo, secundum quod per +operationes aliorum efficitur nobis aliqua cognitio vel aestimatio +proprii boni. Et propter hoc homines delectantur in hoc quod +laudantur vel honorantur ab aliis, quia scilicet per hoc accipiunt +aestimationem in seipsis aliquod bonum esse. Et quia ista +aestimatio fortius generatur ex testimonio bonorum et sapientum, +ideo in horum laudibus et honoribus homines magis delectantur. Et +quia adulator est apparens laudator, propter hoc etiam adulationes +quibusdam sunt delectabiles. Et quia amor est alicuius boni, et +admiratio est alicuius magni, idcirco amari ab aliis, et in +admiratione haberi, est delectabile; inquantum per hoc fit homini +aestimatio propriae bonitatis vel magnitudinis, in quibus aliquis +delectatur. Tertio modo, inquantum ipsae operationes aliorum, si +sint bonae, aestimantur ut bonum proprium, propter vim amoris, qui +facit aestimare amicum quasi eundem sibi. Et propter odium, quod +facit aestimare bonum alterius esse sibi contrarium, efficitur mala +operatio inimici delectabilis. Unde dicitur I ad Cor. XIII, quod +caritas non gaudet super iniquitate, congaudet autem +veritati.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Another's action may be conjoined to me, either by its effect, as in the first way, or by knowledge, as in the second way; + or by affection, as in the third way. +
[34932] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod operatio alterius potest esse mihi coniuncta vel +per effectum, sicut in primo modo; vel per apprehensionem, sicut in +secundo modo; vel per affectionem, sicut in tertio modo.
+ Reply to Objection 2: This argument avails for the third mode, but not for the first two. +
[34933] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit quantum ad tertium modum, non +autem quantum ad duos primos.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Although the actions of another do not proceed from habits that are in me, yet they either produce in me something that gives + pleasure; or they make me appreciate or know a habit of mind; or they proceed from the habit of one who is united to me by + love. +
[34934] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod operationes aliorum etsi non procedant ex habitibus +qui in me sunt, causant tamen in me aliquid delectabile; vel +faciunt mihi aestimationem sive apprehensionem proprii habitus; vel +procedunt ex habitu illius qui est unum mecum per amorem.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that doing good to another is not a cause of pleasure. Because pleasure is caused by one's obtaining one's + proper good, as stated above ( + AA[1],5; Q[31], A[1]). But doing good pertains not to the obtaining but to the spending of one's proper good. Therefore it seems + to be the cause of sadness rather than of pleasure. +
[34935] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod benefacere alteri non sit +delectationis causa. Delectatio enim causatur ex consecutione +proprii boni, sicut supra dictum est. Sed benefacere non pertinet +ad consecutionem proprii boni, sed magis ad emissionem. Ergo magis +videtur esse causa tristitiae quam delectationis.
+ Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "illiberality is more connatural to man than prodigality." Now it is a + mark of prodigality to do good to others; while it is a mark of illiberality to desist from doing good. Since therefore everyone + takes pleasure in a connatural operation, as stated in Ethic. vii, 14 and x, 4, it seems that doing good to others is not + a cause of pleasure. +
[34936] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod illiberalitas +connaturalior est hominibus quam prodigalitas. Sed ad +prodigalitatem pertinet benefacere aliis, ad illiberalitatem autem +pertinet desistere a benefaciendo. Cum ergo operatio connaturalis +sit delectabilis unicuique, ut dicitur in VII et X Ethic., videtur +quod benefacere aliis non sit causa delectationis.
+ Objection 3: Further, contrary effects proceed from contrary causes. But man takes a natural pleasure in certain kinds of ill-doing, such + as overcoming, contradicting or scolding others, or, if he be angry, in punishing them, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, + 11). Therefore doing good to others is a cause of sadness rather than pleasure. +
[34937] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, +contrarii effectus ex contrariis causis procedunt. Sed quaedam quae +pertinent ad malefacere, sunt naturaliter homini delectabilia, +sicut vincere, redarguere vel increpare alios, et etiam punire, +quantum ad iratos, ut dicit philosophus in I Rhetoric. Ergo +benefacere magis est causa tristitiae quam delectationis.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 2) that "it is most pleasant to give presents or assistance to friends and strangers." +
[34938] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Polit., quod largiri et +auxiliari amicis aut extraneis, est delectabilissimum.
+ I answer that, Doing good to another may give pleasure in three ways. First, in consideration of the effect, which is the good conferred + on another. In this respect, inasmuch as through being united to others by love, we look upon their good as being our own, + we take pleasure in the good we do to others, especially to our friends, as in our own good. Secondly, in consideration of + the end; as when a man, from doing good to another, hopes to get some good for himself, either + from God or from man: for hope is a cause of pleasure. Thirdly, in consideration of the principle: and thus, doing good to + another, can give pleasure in respect of a threefold principle. One is the faculty of doing good: and in this regard, doing + good to another becomes pleasant, in so far as it arouses in man an imagination of abundant good existing in him, whereof + he is able to give others a share. Wherefore men take pleasure in their children, and in their own works, as being things + on which + they bestow a share of their own good. Another principle is man's habitual inclination to do good, by reason of which doing + good becomes connatural to him: for which reason the liberal man takes pleasure in giving to others. The third principle is + the motive: for instance when a man is moved by one whom he loves, to do good to someone: for whatever we do or suffer for + a friend is pleasant, because love is the principal cause of pleasure. +
[34939] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 6 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod est benefacere alteri, potest +tripliciter esse delectationis causa. Uno modo, per comparationem +ad effectum, quod est bonum in altero constitutum. Et secundum hoc, +inquantum bonum alterius reputamus quasi nostrum bonum, propter +unionem amoris, delectamur in bono quod per nos fit aliis, +praecipue amicis, sicut in bono proprio. Alio modo, per +comparationem ad finem, sicut cum aliquis, per hoc quod alteri +benefacit, sperat consequi aliquod bonum sibi ipsi, vel a Deo vel +ab homine. Spes autem delectationis est causa. Tertio modo, per +comparationem ad principium. Et sic hoc quod est benefacere alteri, +potest esse delectabile per comparationem ad triplex principium. +Quorum unum est facultas benefaciendi, et secundum hoc, benefacere +alteri fit delectabile, inquantum per hoc fit homini quaedam +imaginatio abundantis boni in seipso existentis, ex quo possit +aliis communicare. Et ideo homines delectantur in filiis et in +propriis operibus, sicut quibus communicant proprium bonum. Aliud +principium est habitus inclinans, secundum quem benefacere fit +alicui connaturale. Unde liberales delectabiliter dant aliis. +Tertium principium est motivum, puta cum aliquis movetur ab aliquo +quem diligit, ad benefaciendum alicui, omnia enim quae facimus vel +patimur propter amicum, delectabilia sunt, quia amor praecipua +causa delectationis est.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Spending gives pleasure as showing forth one's good. But in so far as it empties us of our own good it may be a cause of + sadness; for instance when it is excessive. +
[34940] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod emissio, inquantum est indicativa proprii boni, +est delectabilis. Sed inquantum evacuat proprium bonum potest esse +contristans; sicut quando est immoderata.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Prodigality is an excessive spending, which is unnatural: wherefore prodigality is said to be contrary to nature. +
[34941] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod prodigalitas habet immoderatam emissionem, quae +repugnat naturae. Et ideo prodigalitas dicitur esse contra +naturam.
+ Reply to Objection 3: To overcome, to contradict, and to punish, give pleasure, not as tending to another's ill, but as pertaining to one's own + good, which man loves more than he hates another's ill. For it is naturally pleasant to overcome, inasmuch as it makes a man + to appreciate his own superiority. Wherefore all those games in which there is a striving for the mastery, and a possibility + of winning it, afford the greatest pleasure: and speaking generally all contests, + in so far as they admit hope of victory. To contradict and to scold can give pleasure in two ways. First, as making man imagine + himself to be wise and excellent; since it belongs to wise men and elders to reprove and to scold. Secondly, in so far as + by scolding and reproving, one does good to another: for this gives one pleasure, as stated above. It is pleasant to an angry + man to punish, in so far as he thinks himself to be removing an apparent slight, which seems to be due to a previous hurt: + for when a man is hurt by another, he seems to be slighted thereby; and therefore he wishes to be quit of this slight by paying + back the hurt. And thus it is clear that doing good to another may be of itself pleasant: whereas doing evil to another is + not pleasant, except in so far as it seems to affect one's own good. +
[34942] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod vincere, redarguere et punire, non est delectabile +inquantum est in malum alterius, sed inquantum pertinet ad proprium +bonum, quod plus homo amat quam odiat malum alterius. Vincere enim +est delectabile naturaliter, inquantum per hoc homini fit +aestimatio propriae excellentiae. Et propter hoc, omnes ludi in +quibus est concertatio, et in quibus potest esse victoria, sunt +maxime delectabiles, et universaliter omnes concertationes, +secundum quod habent spem victoriae. Redarguere autem et increpare +potest esse dupliciter delectationis causa. Uno modo, inquantum +facit homini imaginationem propriae sapientiae et excellentiae, +increpare enim et corripere est sapientum et maiorum alio modo, +secundum quod aliquis, increpando et reprehendendo, alteri +benefacit, quod est delectabile, ut dictum est. Irato autem est +delectabile punire, inquantum videtur removere apparentem +minorationem, quae videtur esse ex praecedenti laesione. Cum enim +aliquis est ab aliquo laesus, videtur per hoc ab illo minoratus +esse, et ideo appetit ab hac minoratione liberari per retributionem +laesionis. Et sic patet quod benefacere alteri per se potest esse +delectabile, sed malefacere alteri non est delectabile, nisi +inquantum videtur pertinere ad proprium bonum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that likeness is not a cause of pleasure. Because ruling and presiding seem to imply a certain unlikeness. + But "it is natural to take pleasure in ruling and presiding," as stated in Rhetor. i, 11. Therefore unlikeness, rather than + likeness, is a cause of pleasure. +
[34943] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod similitudo non sit causa +delectationis. Principari enim et praeesse quandam dissimilitudinem +importat. Sed principari et praeesse naturaliter est delectabile, +ut dicitur in I Rhetoric. Ergo dissimilitudo magis est causa +delectationis quam similitudo.
+ Objection 2: Further, nothing is more unlike pleasure than sorrow. But those who are burdened by sorrow are most inclined to seek pleasures, + as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14). Therefore unlikeness, rather than likeness, is a cause of pleasure. +
[34944] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, +nihil magis est dissimile delectationi quam tristitia. Sed illi qui +patiuntur tristitias, maxime sequuntur delectationes, ut dicitur in +VII Ethic. Ergo dissimilitudo est magis causa delectationis quam +similitudo.
+ Objection 3: Further, those who are satiated with certain delights, derive not pleasure but disgust from them; as when one is satiated + with food. Therefore likeness is not a cause of pleasure. +
[34945] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, +illi qui sunt repleti aliquibus delectabilibus, non delectantur in +eis, sed magis fastidiunt ea, sicut patet in repletione ciborum. +Non ergo similitudo est delectationis causa.
+ On the contrary, Likeness is a cause of love, as above stated ( + Q[27], A[3]): and love is the cause of pleasure. Therefore likeness is a cause of pleasure. +
[34946] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra +est quod similitudo est causa amoris, ut dictum est supra. Amor +autem est causa delectationis. Ergo similitudo est causa +delectationis.
+ I answer that, Likeness is a kind of unity; hence that which is like us, as being one with us, causes pleasure; just at it causes love, + as stated above ( + Q[27], A[3]). And if that which is like us does not hurt our own good, but increase it, it is pleasurable simply; for instance one man + in respect of another, one youth in relation to another. But if it be hurtful to our own good, thus accidentally it causes + disgust or sadness, not as being like and + one with us, but as hurtful to that which is yet more one with us. +
Now it happens in two ways that something like is hurtful to our own good. First, by destroying the measure of our own good, + by a kind of excess; because good, especially bodily good, as health, is conditioned by a certain measure: wherefore superfluous + good or any bodily pleasure, causes disgust. Secondly, by being directly contrary to one's own good: thus a potter dislikes + other potters, not because they are potters, but because they deprive him of his own excellence or + profits, which he seeks as his own good. +
[34947] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 7 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod similitudo est quaedam unitas, unde id quod est +simile, inquantum est unum, est delectabile, sicut et amabile, ut +supra dictum est. Et si quidem id quod est simile, proprium bonum +non corrumpat, sed augeat, est simpliciter delectabile, puta homo +homini, et iuvenis iuveni. Si vero sit corruptivum proprii boni, +sic per accidens efficitur fastidiosum vel contristans; non quidem +inquantum est simile et unum, sed inquantum corrumpit id quod est +magis unum. Quod autem aliquid simile corrumpat proprium bonum, +contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, quia corrumpit mensuram proprii +boni per quendam excessum, bonum enim, praecipue corporale, ut +sanitas, in quadam commensuratione consistit. Et propter hoc, +superabundantes cibi, vel quaelibet delectationes corporales, +fastidiuntur. Alio modo, per directam contrarietatem ad proprium +bonum, sicut figuli abominantur alios figulos, non inquantum sunt +figuli, sed inquantum per eos amittunt excellentiam propriam, sive +proprium lucrum, quae appetunt sicut proprium bonum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Since ruler and subject are in communion with one another, there is a certain likeness between them: but this likeness is + conditioned by a certain superiority, since ruling and presiding pertain to the excellence of a man's own good: because they + belong to men who are wise and better than others; the result being that they give man an idea of his own excellence. Another + reason is that by ruling and presiding, a man does good to others, which is + pleasant. +
[34948] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, cum sit quaedam communicatio principantis ad +subiectum, est ibi quaedam similitudo. Tamen secundum quandam +excellentiam, eo quod principari et praeesse pertinent ad +excellentiam proprii boni, sapientum enim et meliorum est +principari et praeesse. Unde per hoc fit homini propriae bonitatis +imaginatio. Vel quia per hoc quod homo principatur et praeest, +aliis benefacit, quod est delectabile.
+ Reply to Objection 2: That which gives pleasure to the sorrowful man, though it be unlike sorrow, bears some likeness to the man that is sorrowful: + because sorrows are contrary to his own good. Wherefore the sorrowful man seeks pleasure as making for his own good, in so + far as it is a remedy for its contrary. And this is why bodily pleasures, which are contrary to certain sorrows, are more + sought than intellectual pleasures, which have no contrary sorrow, as we shall state + later on ( + Q[35], A[5]). And this explains why all animals naturally desire pleasure: because animals ever work through sense and movement. For + this reason also young people are most inclined to seek pleasures; on account of the many changes to which they are subject, + while yet growing. Moreover this is why the melancholic has a strong desire for pleasures, in order to drive away sorrow: + because his "body is corroded by a base humor," as stated in Ethic. vii, 14. +
[34949] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod id in quo delectatur tristatus, etsi non sit simile +tristitiae, est tamen simile homini contristato. Quia tristitiae +contrariantur proprio bono eius qui tristatur. Et ideo appetitur +delectatio ab his qui in tristitia sunt, ut conferens ad proprium +bonum, inquantum est medicativa contrarii. Et ista est causa quare +delectationes corporales, quibus sunt contrariae quaedam +tristitiae, magis appetuntur, quam delectationes intellectuales, +quae non habent contrarietatem tristitiae, ut infra dicetur. Exinde +etiam est quod omnia animalia naturaliter appetunt delectationem, +quia semper animal laborat per sensum et motum. Et propter hoc +etiam iuvenes maxime delectationes appetunt; propter multas +transmutationes in eis existentes, dum sunt in statu augmenti. Et +etiam melancholici vehementer appetunt delectationes, ad +expellendum tristitiam, quia corpus eorum quasi pravo humore +corroditur, ut dicitur in VII Ethic.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Bodily goods are conditioned by a certain fixed measure: wherefore surfeit of such things destroys the proper good, and consequently + gives rise to disgust and sorrow, through being contrary to the proper good of man. +
[34950] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod bona corporalia in quadam mensura consistunt, et ideo +superexcessus similium corrumpit proprium bonum. Et propter hoc +efficitur fastidiosum et contristans, inquantum contrariatur bono +proprio hominis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that wonder is not a cause of pleasure. Because wonder is the act of one who is ignorant of the nature of something, + as Damascene says. But knowledge, rather than ignorance, is a cause of pleasure. Therefore wonder is not a cause of pleasure. +
[34951] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod admiratio non sit causa delectationis. +Admirari enim est ignorantis naturae, ut Damascenus dicit. Sed +ignorantia non est delectabilis, sed magis scientia. Ergo admiratio +non est causa delectationis.
+ Objection 2: Further, wonder is the beginning of wisdom, being as it were, the road to the search of truth, as stated in the beginning + of Metaph. i, 2. But "it is more pleasant to think of what we know, than to seek what we know not," as the Philosopher says + (Ethic. x, 7): since in the latter case we encounter difficulties and hindrances, in the former not; while pleasure arises + from an operation which is unhindered, as stated in Ethic. vii, 12,13. Therefore wonder hinders + rather than causes pleasure. +
[34952] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, +admiratio est principium sapientiae, quasi via ad inquirendum +veritatem, ut dicitur in principio Metaphys. Sed delectabilius +est contemplari iam cognita, quam inquirere ignota, ut +philosophus dicit in X Ethic., cum hoc habeat difficultatem et +impedimentum, illud autem non habeat; delectatio autem causatur ex +operatione non impedita, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Ergo admiratio +non est causa delectationis, sed magis delectationem impedit.
+ Objection 3: Further, everyone takes pleasure in what he is accustomed to: wherefore the actions of habits acquired by custom, are pleasant. + But "we wonder at what is unwonted," as Augustine says (Tract. xxiv in Joan.). Therefore wonder is contrary to the cause of + pleasure. +
[34953] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, +unusquisque in consuetis delectatur, unde operationes habituum per +consuetudinem acquisitorum, sunt delectabiles. Sed consueta non +sunt admirabilia, ut dicit Augustinus, super Ioan. Ergo admiratio +contrariatur causae delectationis.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that wonder is the cause of pleasure. +
[34954] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in I Rhetoric., quod admiratio est +delectationis causa.
+ I answer that, It is pleasant to get what one desires, as stated above ( + Q[23], A[4]): and therefore the greater the desire for the thing loved, the greater the pleasure when it is attained: indeed the very + increase of desire brings with it an increase of pleasure, according as it gives rise to the hope of obtaining that which + is loved, since it was stated above (A[3], ad 3) that desire resulting from hope is a cause of pleasure. Now wonder is a + kind of desire for knowledge; a desire which comes to man when he sees an effect of which the cause either is unknown to him, + or surpasses his knowledge or faculty of understanding. Consequently wonder is a cause of pleasure, in so far as it includes + a hope of getting the knowledge which one desires to have. For this reason whatever is wonderful is pleasing, for instance + things that are scarce. Also, representations of things, even of those which are not pleasant in themselves, give rise to + pleasure; for the soul rejoices in comparing one thing with another, because comparison of one thing with another is the proper + and connatural act of the reason, as the Philosopher says (Poet. iv). This again is why "it is more delightful to be delivered + from great danger, because it is something wonderful," as stated in Rhetor. i, 11. +
[34955] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 8 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod adipisci desiderata est delectabile, ut supra dictum +est. Et ideo quanto alicuius rei amatae magis crescit desiderium, +tanto magis per adeptionem crescit delectatio. Et etiam in ipso +augmento desiderii fit augmentum delectationis, secundum quod fit +etiam spes rei amatae; sicut supra dictum est quod ipsum desiderium +ex spe est delectabile. Est autem admiratio desiderium quoddam +sciendi, quod in homine contingit ex hoc quod videt effectum et +ignorat causam, vel ex hoc quod causa talis effectus excedit +cognitionem aut facultatem ipsius. Et ideo admiratio est causa +delectationis inquantum habet adiunctam spem consequendi +cognitionem eius quod scire desiderat. Et propter hoc omnia +mirabilia sunt delectabilia, sicut quae sunt rara, et omnes +repraesentationes rerum, etiam quae in se non sunt delectabiles; +gaudet enim anima in collatione unius ad alterum, quia conferre +unum alteri est proprius et connaturalis actus rationis, ut +philosophus dicit in sua poetica. Et propter hoc etiam liberari +a magnis periculis magis est delectabile, quia est admirabile, +ut dicitur in I Rhetoric.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Wonder gives pleasure, not because it implies ignorance, but in so far as it includes the desire of learning the cause, and + in so far as the wonderer learns something new, i.e. that the cause is other than he had thought it to be. [*According to + another reading:---that he is other than he thought himself to be.] +
[34956] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod admiratio non est delectabilis inquantum habet +ignorantiam, sed inquantum habet desiderium addiscendi causam; et +inquantum admirans aliquid novum addiscit, scilicet talem esse quem +non aestimabat.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Pleasure includes two things; rest in the good, and perception of this rest. As to the former therefore, since it is more + perfect to contemplate the known truth, than to seek for the unknown, the contemplation of what we know, is in itself more + pleasing than the research of what we do not know. Nevertheless, as to the second, it happens that research is sometimes more + pleasing accidentally, in so far as it proceeds from a greater desire: for greater + desire is awakened when we are conscious of our ignorance. This is why man takes the greatest pleasure in finding or learning + things for the first time. +
[34957] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod delectatio duo habet, scilicet quietem in bono, et +huiusmodi quietis perceptionem. Quantum igitur ad primum, cum sit +perfectius contemplari veritatem cognitam quam inquirere ignotam, +contemplationes rerum scitarum, per se loquendo, sunt magis +delectabiles quam inquisitiones rerum ignotarum. Tamen per +accidens, quantum ad secundum, contingit quod inquisitiones sunt +quandoque delectabiliores, secundum quod ex maiori desiderio +procedunt, desiderium autem maius excitatur ex perceptione +ignorantiae. Unde maxime homo delectatur in his quae de novo +invenit aut addiscit.
+ Reply to Objection 3: It is pleasant to do what we are wont to do, inasmuch as this is connatural to us, as it were. And yet things that are of + rare occurrence can be pleasant, either as regards knowledge, from the fact that we desire to know something about them, in + so far as they are wonderful; or as regards action, from the fact that "the mind is more inclined by desire to act intensely + in things that are new," as stated in Ethic. x, 4, since more perfect operation + causes more perfect pleasure. +
[34958] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ea quae sunt consueta, sunt delectabilia ad +operandum, inquantum sunt quasi connaturalia. Sed tamen ea quae +sunt rara, possunt esse delectabilia, vel ratione cognitionis, quia +desideratur eorum scientia, inquantum sunt mira; vel ratione +operationis, quia ex desiderio magis inclinatur mens ad hoc quod +intense in novitate operetur, ut dicitur in X Ethic.; +perfectior enim operatio causat perfectiorem delectationem.
We must now consider the effects of pleasure; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether expansion is an effect of pleasure?
(2) Whether pleasure causes thirst or desire for itself?
+[34959] +Iª-IIae q. 33 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +effectibus delectationis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, +utrum delectationis sit dilatare. Secundo, utrum delectatio causet +sui sitim, vel desiderium. Tertio, utrum delectatio impediat usum +rationis. Quarto, utrum delectatio perficiat operationem.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that expansion is not an effect of pleasure. For expansion seems to pertain more to love, according to the + Apostle ( + 2 Cor. 6:11): "Our heart is enlarged." Wherefore it is written ( + Ps. 118:96) concerning the precept of charity: "Thy commandment is exceeding broad." But pleasure is a distinct passion from love. Therefore + expansion is not an effect of pleasure. +
[34960] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod dilatatio non sit effectus +delectationis. Dilatatio enim videtur ad amorem magis pertinere, +secundum quod dicit apostolus, II ad Cor. VI, cor nostrum +dilatatum est. Unde et de praecepto caritatis in Psalmo CXVIII, +dicitur, latum mandatum tuum nimis. Sed delectatio est alia +passio ab amore. Ergo dilatatio non est effectus delectationis.
+ Objection 2: Further, when a thing expands it is enabled to receive more. But receiving pertains to desire, which is for something not + yet possessed. Therefore expansion seems to belong to desire rather than to pleasure. +
[34961] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +ex hoc quod aliquid dilatatur, efficitur capacius ad recipiendum. +Sed receptio pertinet ad desiderium, quod est rei nondum habitae. +Ergo dilatatio magis videtur pertinere ad desiderium quam ad +delectationem.
+ Objection 3: Further, contraction is contrary to expansion. But contraction seems to belong to pleasure, for the hand closes on that which + we wish to grasp firmly: and such is the affection of appetite in regard to that which pleases it. Therefore expansion does + not pertain to pleasure. +
[34962] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +constrictio dilatationi opponitur. Sed constrictio videtur ad +delectationem pertinere, nam illud constringimus quod firmiter +volumus retinere; et talis est affectio appetitus circa rem +delectantem. Ergo dilatatio ad delectationem non pertinet.
+ On the contrary, In order to express joy, it is written ( + Is. 60:5): "Thou shall see and abound, thy heart shall wonder and be enlarged." Moreover pleasure is called by the name of "laetitia" + as being derived from "dilatatio" [expansion], as stated above ( + Q[31], A[3], ad 3). +
[34963] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod, ad expressionem gaudii, dicitur Isaiae LX, videbis, et +affluens, et mirabitur et dilatabitur cor tuum. Ipsa etiam +delectatio ex dilatatione nomen accepit ut laetitia nominetur sicut +supra dictum est.
+ I answer that, Breadth [latitudo] is a dimension of bodily magnitude: hence it is not applied to the emotions of the soul, save metaphorically. + Now expansion denotes a kind of movement towards breadth; and it belongs to pleasure in respect of the two things requisite + for pleasure. One of these is on the part of the apprehensive power, which is cognizant of the conjunction with some suitable + good. As a result of this apprehension, man perceives that he has attained a + certain perfection, which is a magnitude of the spiritual order: and in this respect man's mind is said to be magnified or + expanded by pleasure. The other requisite for pleasure is on the part of the appetitive power, which acquiesces in the pleasurable + object, and rests therein, offering, as it were, to enfold it within itself. And thus man's affection is expanded by pleasure, + as though it surrendered itself to hold within itself the object of its pleasure. +
[34964] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod latitudo est quaedam dimensio magnitudinis +corporalis, unde in affectionibus animae non nisi secundum +metaphoram dicitur. Dilatatio autem dicitur quasi motus ad +latitudinem. Et competit delectationi secundum duo quae ad +delectationem requiruntur. Quorum unum est ex parte apprehensivae +virtutis, quae apprehendit coniunctionem alicuius boni +convenientis. Ex hac autem apprehensione apprehendit se homo +perfectionem quandam adeptum, quae est spiritualis magnitudo, et +secundum hoc, animus hominis dicitur per delectationem magnificari, +seu dilatari. Aliud autem est ex parte appetitivae virtutis, quae +assentit rei delectabili, et in ea quiescit, quodammodo se praebens +ei ad eam interius capiendam. Et sic dilatatur affectus hominis per +delectationem, quasi se tradens ad continendum interius rem +delectantem.
+ Reply to Objection 1: In metaphorical expressions nothing hinders one and the same thing from being attributed to different things according to + different likenesses. And in this way expansion pertains to love by reason of a certain spreading out, in so far as the affection + of the lover spreads out to others, so as to care, not only for his own interests, but also for what concerns others. On the + other hand expansion pertains to pleasure, in so far as a thing becomes more + ample in itself so as to become more capacious. +
[34965] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet in his quae dicuntur metaphorice, +idem diversis attribui secundum diversas similitudines. Et secundum +hoc, dilatatio pertinet ad amorem ratione cuiusdam extensionis, +inquantum affectus amantis ad alios extenditur, ut curet non solum +quae sua sunt, sed quae aliorum. Ad delectationem vero pertinet +dilatatio, inquantum aliquid in seipso ampliatur, ut quasi capacius +reddatur.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Desire includes a certain expansion arising from the imagination of the thing desired; but this expansion increases at the + presence of the pleasurable object: because the mind surrenders itself more to that object when it is already taking pleasure + in it, than when it desires it before possessing it; since pleasure is the end of desire. +
[34966] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod desiderium habet quidem aliquam ampliationem ex +imaginatione rei desideratae, sed multo magis ex praesentia rei iam +delectantis. Quia magis praebet se animus rei iam delectanti, quam +rei non habitae desideratae, cum delectatio sit finis +desiderii.
+ Reply to Objection 3: He that takes pleasure in a thing holds it fast, by clinging to it with all his might: but he opens his heart to it that + he may enjoy it perfectly. +
[34967] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ille qui delectatur, constringit quidem rem +delectantem, dum ei fortiter inhaeret, sed cor suum ampliat, ut +perfecte delectabili fruatur.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that pleasure does not cause desire for itself. Because all movement ceases when repose is reached. But pleasure + is, as it were, a certain repose of the movement of desire, as stated above ( + Q[23], A[4]; + Q[25], A[2]). Therefore the movement of desire ceases when pleasure is reached. Therefore pleasure does not cause desire. +
[34968] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non causet desiderium sui +ipsius. Omnis enim motus cessat, cum pervenerit ad quietem. Sed +delectatio est quasi quaedam quies motus desiderii, ut supra dictum +est. Cessat ergo motus desiderii, cum ad delectationem pervenerit. +Non ergo delectatio causat desiderium.
+ Objection 2: Further, a thing does not cause its contrary. But pleasure is, in a way, contrary to desire, on the part of the object: since + desire regards a good which is not yet possessed, whereas pleasure regards the good that is possessed. Therefore pleasure + does not cause desire for itself. +
[34969] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +oppositum non est causa sui oppositi. Sed delectatio quodammodo +desiderio opponitur, ex parte obiecti, nam desiderium est boni non +habiti, delectatio vero boni iam habiti. Ergo delectatio non causat +desiderium sui ipsius.
+ Objection 3: Further, distaste is incompatible with desire. But pleasure often causes distaste. Therefore it does not cause desire. +
[34970] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +fastidium desiderio repugnat. Sed delectatio plerumque causat +fastidium. Non ergo facit sui desiderium.
+ On the contrary, Our Lord said ( + Jn. 4:13): "Whosoever drinketh of this water, shall thirst again": where, according to Augustine (Tract. xv in Joan.), water denotes + pleasures of the body. +
[34971] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dominus dicit, Ioan. IV, qui biberit ex hac aqua, +sitiet iterum, per aquam autem significatur, secundum +Augustinum, delectatio corporalis.
+ I answer that, Pleasure can be considered in two ways; first, as existing in reality; secondly, as existing in the memory. Again thirst, + or desire, can be taken in two ways; first, properly, as denoting a craving for something not possessed; secondly, in general, + as excluding distaste. +
Considered as existing in reality, pleasure does not of itself cause thirst or desire for itself, but only accidentally; + provided we take thirst or desire as denoting a craving for some thing not possessed: because pleasure is an emotion of the + appetite in respect of something actually present. But it may happen that what is actually present is not perfectly possessed: + and this may be on the part of the thing possessed, or on the part of the possessor. On the part of the thing + possessed, this happens through the thing possessed not being a simultaneous whole; wherefore one obtains possession of it + successively, and while taking pleasure in what one has, one desires to possess the remainder: thus if a man is pleased with + the first part of a verse, he desires to hear the second part, as Augustine says (Confess. iv, 11). In this way nearly all + bodily pleasures cause thirst for themselves, until they are fully realized, because pleasures of this kind arise from some + movement: as is evident in pleasures of the table. On the part of the possessor, this happens when a man possesses a thing + which is perfect in itself, yet does not possess it perfectly, but obtains possession of it little by little. Thus in this + life, a faint perception of Divine knowledge affords us delight, and delight sets up a thirst or desire for perfect knowledge; + in which sense we may understand the words of + Ecclus. 24:29: "They that drink me shall yet thirst." +
On the other hand, if by thirst or desire we understand the mere intensity of the emotion, that excludes distaste, thus more + than all others spiritual pleasures cause thirst or desire for themselves. Because bodily pleasures become distasteful by + reason of their causing an excess in the natural mode of being, when they are increased or even when they are protracted; + as is evident in the case of pleasures of the table. This is why, when a man arrives at the point of perfection in + bodily pleasures, he wearies of them, and sometimes desires another kind. Spiritual pleasures, on the contrary, do not exceed + the natural mode of being, but perfect nature. Hence when their point of perfection is reached, then do they afford the greatest + delight: except, perchance, accidentally, in so far as the work of contemplation is accompanied by some operation of the bodily + powers, which tire from protracted activity. And in this sense also we may understand those words of + + Ecclus. 24:29 + : "They that drink me shall yet thirst": for, even of the angels, who know God perfectly, and delight in Him, it is written + ( + 1 Pet. 1:12) that they "desire to look at Him." +
Lastly, if we consider pleasure, not as existing in reality, but as existing in the memory, thus it has of itself a natural + tendency to cause thirst and desire for itself: when, to wit, man returns to that disposition, in which he was when he experienced + the pleasure that is past. But if he be changed from that disposition, the memory of that pleasure does not give him pleasure, + but distaste: for instance, the memory of food in respect of a man who has eaten to repletion. +
[34972] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod delectatio dupliciter potest considerari, uno modo, +secundum quod est in actu; alio modo, secundum quod est in memoria. +Item sitis, vel desiderium, potest dupliciter accipi, uno modo, +proprie, secundum quod importat appetitum rei non habitae; alio +modo, communiter, secundum quod importat exclusionem fastidii. +Secundum quidem igitur quod est in actu, delectatio non causat +sitim vel desiderium sui ipsius, per se loquendo, sed solum per +accidens, si tamen sitis vel desiderium dicatur rei non habitae +appetitus, nam delectatio est affectio appetitus circa rem +praesentem. Sed contingit rem praesentem non perfecte haberi. Et +hoc potest esse vel ex parte rei habitae, vel ex parte habentis. Ex +parte quidem rei habitae, eo quod res habita non est tota simul, +unde successive recipitur, et dum aliquis delectatur in eo quod +habet, desiderat potiri eo quod restat; sicut qui audit primam +partem versus, et in hoc delectatur, desiderat alteram partem +versus audire, ut Augustinus dicit, IV Confess. Et hoc modo omnes +fere delectationes corporales faciunt sui ipsarum sitim, quousque +consummentur, eo quod tales delectationes consequuntur aliquem +motum, sicut patet in delectationibus ciborum. Ex parte autem +ipsius habentis, sicut cum aliquis aliquam rem in se perfectam +existentem, non statim perfecte habet, sed paulatim acquirit. Sicut +in mundo isto, percipientes aliquid imperfecte de divina +cognitione, delectamur; et ipsa delectatio excitat sitim vel +desiderium perfectae cognitionis; secundum quod potest intelligi +quod habetur Eccli. XXIV, qui bibunt me, adhuc sitient. Si +vero per sitim vel desiderium intelligatur sola intensio affectus +tollens fastidium, sic delectationes spirituales maxime faciunt +sitim vel desiderium sui ipsarum. Delectationes enim corporales, +quia augmentatae, vel etiam continuatae, faciunt superexcrescentiam +naturalis habitudinis, efficiuntur fastidiosae; ut patet in +delectatione ciborum. Et propter hoc, quando aliquis iam pervenit +ad perfectum in delectationibus corporalibus, fastidit eas, et +quandoque appetit aliquas alias. Sed delectationes spirituales non +superexcrescunt naturalem habitudinem, sed perficiunt naturam. Unde +cum pervenitur ad consummationem in ipsis, tunc sunt magis +delectabiles, nisi forte per accidens, inquantum operationi +contemplativae adiunguntur aliquae operationes virtutum +corporalium, quae per assiduitatem operandi lassantur. Et per hunc +etiam modum potest intelligi quod dicitur Eccli. XXIV qui bibit +me, adhuc sitiet. Quia etiam de Angelis, qui perfecte Deum +cognoscunt, et delectantur in ipso, dicitur I Petri I, quod +desiderant in eum conspicere. Si vero consideretur +delectatio prout est in memoria et non in actu, sic per se nata est +causare sui ipsius sitim et desiderium, quando scilicet homo redit +ad illam dispositionem in qua erat sibi delectabile quod +praeteriit. Si vero immutatus sit ab illa dispositione, memoria +delectationis non causat in eo delectationem, sed fastidium, sicut +pleno existenti memoria cibi.
+ Reply to Objection 1: When pleasure is perfect, then it includes complete rest; and the movement of desire, tending to what was not possessed, + ceases. But when it is imperfect, then the desire, tending to what was not possessed, does not cease altogether. +
[34973] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, quando delectatio est perfecta, tunc habet +omnimodam quietem, et cessat motus desiderii tendentis in non +habitum. Sed quando imperfecte habetur, tunc non omnino cessat +motus desiderii tendentis in non habitum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: That which is possessed imperfectly, is possessed in one respect, and in another respect is not possessed. Consequently it + may be the object of desire and pleasure at the same time. +
[34974] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod id quod imperfecte habetur, secundum quid habetur, et +secundum quid non habetur. Et ideo simul de eo potest esse et +desiderium et delectatio.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Pleasures cause distaste in one way, desire in another, as stated above. +
[34975] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod delectationes alio modo causant fastidium, et alio +modo desiderium, ut dictum est.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that pleasure does not hinder the use of reason. Because repose facilitates very much the due use of reason: + wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, 3) that "while we sit and rest, the soul is inclined to knowledge and prudence"; + and it is written ( + Wis. 8:16): "When I go into my house, I shall repose myself with her," i.e. wisdom. But pleasure is a kind of repose. Therefore it + helps rather than hinders the use of + reason. +
[34976] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non impediat usum rationis. +Quies enim maxime confert ad debitum rationis usum, unde dicitur in +VII Physic., quod in sedendo et quiescendo fit anima sciens et +prudens; et Sap. VIII, intrans in domum meam, conquiescam cum +illa, scilicet sapientia. Sed delectatio est quaedam quies. +Ergo non impedit, sed magis iuvat rationis usum.
+ Objection 2: Further, things which are not in the same subject though they be contraries, do not hinder one another. But pleasure is in + the appetitive faculty, while the use of reason is in the apprehensive power. Therefore pleasure does not hinder the use of + reason. +
[34977] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +ea quae non sunt in eodem, etiam si sint contraria, non se +impediunt. Sed delectatio est in parte appetitiva, usus autem +rationis in parte apprehensiva. Ergo delectatio non impedit +rationis usum.
+ Objection 3: Further, that which is hindered by another, seems to be moved, as it were, thereby. But the use of an apprehensive power + moves pleasure rather than is moved by it: because it is the cause of pleasure. Therefore pleasure does not hinder the use + of reason. +
[34978] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +quod impeditur ab alio, videtur quodammodo transmutari ab ipso. Sed +usus apprehensivae virtutis magis movet delectationem quam a +delectatione moveatur, est enim causa delectationis. Ergo +delectatio non impedit usum rationis.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5), that "pleasure destroys the estimate of prudence." +
[34979] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod delectatio +corrumpit existimationem prudentiae.
+ I answer that, As is stated in Ethic. x, 5, "appropriate pleasures increase activity . . . whereas pleasures arising from other sources + are impediments to activity." Accordingly there is a certain pleasure that is taken in the very act of reason, as when one + takes pleasure in contemplating or in reasoning: and such pleasure does not hinder the act of reason, but helps it; because + we are more attentive in doing that which gives us pleasure, and attention fosters + activity. +
On the other hand bodily pleasures hinder the use of reason in three ways. First, by distracting the reason. Because, as + we have just observed, we attend much to that which pleases us. Now when the attention is firmly fixed on one thing, it is + either weakened in respect of other things, or it is entirely withdrawn from them; and thus if the bodily pleasure be great, + either it entirely hinders the use of reason, by concentrating the mind's attention on itself; or else it hinders + it considerably. Secondly, by being contrary to reason. Because some pleasures, especially those that are in excess, are contrary + to the order of reason: and in this sense the Philosopher says that "bodily pleasures destroy the estimate of prudence, but + not the speculative estimate," to which they are not opposed, "for instance that the three angles of a triangle are together + equal to two right angles." In the first sense, however, they hinder both estimates. Thirdly, by fettering the reason: + in so far as bodily pleasure is followed by a certain alteration in the body, greater even than in the other passions, in + proportion as the appetite is more vehemently affected towards a present than towards an absent thing. Now such bodily disturbances + hinder the use of reason; as may be seen in the case of drunkards, in whom the use of reason is fettered or hindered. +
[34980] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in X Ethic., delectationes propriae +adaugent operationes, extraneae vero impediunt. Est ergo quaedam +delectatio quae habetur de ipso actu rationis, sicut cum aliquis +delectatur in contemplando vel ratiocinando. Et talis delectatio +non impedit usum rationis, sed ipsum adiuvat, quia illud attentius +operamur in quo delectamur; attentio autem adiuvat operationem. Sed +delectationes corporales impediunt usum rationis triplici ratione. +Primo quidem, ratione distractionis. Quia, sicut iam dictum est, ad +ea in quibus delectamur, multum attendimus, cum autem attentio +fortiter inhaeserit alicui rei, debilitatur circa alias res, vel +totaliter ab eis revocatur. Et secundum hoc, si delectatio +corporalis fuerit magna, vel totaliter impediet usum rationis, ad +se intentionem animi attrahendo; vel multum impediet. Secundo, +ratione contrarietatis. Quaedam enim delectationes, maxime +superexcedentes, sunt contra ordinem rationis. Et per hunc modum +philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod delectationes corporales +corrumpunt existimationem prudentiae, non autem existimationem +speculativam, cui non contrariantur, puta quod triangulus +habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis. Secundum autem +primum modum, utramque impedit. Tertio modo, secundum quandam +ligationem, inquantum scilicet ad delectationem corporalem sequitur +quaedam transmutatio corporalis, maior etiam quam in aliis +passionibus, quanto vehementius afficitur appetitus ad rem +praesentem quam ad rem absentem. Huiusmodi autem corporales +perturbationes impediunt usum rationis, sicut patet in vinolentis, +qui habent usum rationis ligatum vel impeditum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Bodily pleasure implies indeed repose of the appetite in the object of pleasure; which repose is sometimes contrary to reason; + but on the part of the body it always implies alteration. And in respect of both points, it hinders the use of reason. +
[34981] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod delectatio corporalis habet quidem quietem +appetitus in delectabili, quae quies interdum contrariatur rationi; +sed ex parte corporis, semper habet transmutationem. Et quantum ad +utrumque, impedit rationis usum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The powers of the appetite and of apprehension are indeed distinct parts, but belonging to the one soul. Consequently when + the soul is very intent on the action of one part, it is hindered from attending to a contrary act of the other part. +
[34982] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod vis appetitiva et apprehensiva sunt quidem diversae +partes, sed unius animae. Et ideo cum intentio animae vehementer +applicatur ad actum unius, impeditur ab actu contrario +alterius.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The use of reason requires the due use of the imagination and of the other sensitive powers, which are exercised through + a bodily organ. Consequently alteration in the body hinders the use of reason, because it hinders the act of the imagination + and of the other sensitive powers. +
[34983] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod usus rationis requirit debitum usum imaginationis et +aliarum virium sensitivarum, quae utuntur organo corporali. Et ideo +ex transmutatione corporali usus rationis impeditur, impedito actu +virtutis imaginativae et aliarum sensitivarum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that pleasure does not perfect operation. For every human operation depends on the use of reason. But pleasure + hinders the use of reason, as stated above + (A[3]). Therefore pleasure does not perfect, but weakens human operation. +
[34984] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non perficiat operationem. +Omnis enim humana operatio ab usu rationis dependet. Sed delectatio +impedit usum rationis, ut dictum est. Ergo delectatio non perficit, +sed debilitat operationem humanam.
+ Objection 2: Further, nothing perfects itself or its cause. But pleasure is an operation (Ethic. vii, 12; x, 4), i.e. either in its essence + or in its cause. Therefore pleasure does not perfect operation. +
[34985] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +nihil est perfectivum sui ipsius, vel suae causae. Sed delectatio +est operatio, ut dicitur in VII et X Ethic., quod oportet ut +intelligatur vel essentialiter, vel causaliter. Ergo delectatio non +perficit operationem.
+ Objection 3: Further, if pleasure perfects operation, it does so either as end, or as form, or as agent. But not as end; because operation + is not sought for the sake of pleasure, but rather the reverse, as stated above ( + Q[4], A[2]): nor as agent, because rather is it the operation that causes pleasure: nor again as form, because, according to the Philosopher + (Ethic. x, 4), "pleasure does not perfect operation, as a habit does." Therefore pleasure + does not perfect operation. +
[34986] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +si delectatio perficit operationem, aut perficit ipsam sicut finis, +aut sicut forma, aut sicut agens. Sed non sicut finis, quia +operationes non quaeruntur propter delectationem, sed magis e +converso, ut supra dictum est. Nec iterum per modum efficientis, +quia magis operatio est causa efficiens delectationis. Nec iterum +sicut forma, non enim perficit delectatio operationem ut habitus +quidam, secundum philosophum, in X Ethic. Delectatio ergo non +perficit operationem.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects operation." +
[34987] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur ibidem, quod delectatio operationem perficit.
+ I answer that, Pleasure perfects operation in two ways. First, as an end: not indeed according as an end is that on "account of which a + thing is"; but according as every good which is added to a thing and completes it, can be called its end. And in this sense + the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects operation . . . as some end added to it": that is to say, inasmuch + as to this good, which is operation, there is added another good, which is pleasure, + denoting the repose of the appetite in a good that is presupposed. Secondly, as agent; not indeed directly, for the Philosopher + says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects operation, not as a physician makes a man healthy, but as health does": but it + does so indirectly; inasmuch as the agent, through taking pleasure in his action, is more eagerly intent on it, and carries + it out with greater care. And in this sense it is said in Ethic. x, 5 that "pleasures increase their appropriate activities, + and hinder those that are not appropriate." +
[34988] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod delectatio dupliciter operationem perficit. Uno modo, +per modum finis, non quidem secundum quod finis dicitur id propter +quod aliquid est; sed secundum quod omne bonum completive +superveniens, potest dici finis. Et secundum hoc dicit philosophus, +in X Ethic., quod delectatio perficit operationem sicut quidam +superveniens finis, inquantum scilicet super hoc bonum quod est +operatio, supervenit aliud bonum quod est delectatio, quae importat +quietationem appetitus in bono praesupposito. Secundo modo, ex +parte causae agentis. Non quidem directe, quia philosophus dicit, +in X Ethic., quod perficit delectatio operationem, non sicut +medicus sanum, sed sicut sanitas. Indirecte autem, inquantum +scilicet agens, quia delectatur in sua actione, vehementius +attendit ad ipsam, et diligentius eam operatur. Et secundum hoc +dicitur in X Ethic., quod delectationes adaugent proprias +operationes, et impediunt extraneas.
+ Reply to Objection 1: It is not every pleasure that hinders the act of reason, but only bodily pleasure; for this arises, not from the act of reason, + but from the act of the concupiscible faculty, which act is intensified by pleasure. On the contrary, pleasure that arises + from the act of reason, strengthens the use of reason. +
[34989] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod non omnis delectatio impedit actum rationis, sed +delectatio corporalis; quae non consequitur actum rationis, sed +actum concupiscibilis, qui per delectationem augetur. Delectatio +autem quae consequitur actum rationis, fortificat rationis +usum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: As stated in Phys. ii, 3 two things may be causes of one another, if one be the efficient, the other the final cause. And + in this way, operation is the efficient cause of pleasure, while pleasure perfects operation by way of final cause, as stated + above. +
[34990] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in II Physic., contingit quod duo sibi +invicem sunt causa, ita quod unum sit causa efficiens, et aliud +causa finalis alterius. Et per hunc modum, operatio causat +delectationem sicut causa efficiens; delectatio autem perficit +operationem per modum finis, ut dictum est.
The Reply to the Third Objection is evident for what has been said.
[34991] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +patet responsio ex dictis.
We must now consider the goodness and malice of pleasures: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether every pleasure is evil?
(2) If not, whether every pleasure is good?
(3) Whether any pleasure is the greatest good?
(4) Whether pleasure is the measure or rule by which to judge of moral good and evil?
+[34992] +Iª-IIae q. 34 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +bonitate et malitia delectationum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. +Primo, utrum omnis delectatio sit mala. Secundo, dato quod non, +utrum omnis delectatio sit bona. Tertio, utrum aliqua delectatio +sit optimum. Quarto, utrum delectatio sit mensura vel regula +secundum quam iudicetur bonum vel malum in moralibus.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that every pleasure is evil. For that which destroys prudence and hinders the use of reason, seems to be evil + in itself: since man's good is to be "in accord with reason," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But pleasure destroys prudence + and hinders the use of reason; and so much the more, as the pleasure is greater: wherefore "in sexual pleasures," which are + the greatest of all, "it is impossible to understand anything," as stated in Ethic. vii, + 11. Moreover, Jerome says in his commentary on Matthew [*Origen, Hom. vi in Num.] that "at the time of conjugal intercourse, + the presence of the Holy Ghost is not vouchsafed, even if it be a prophet that fulfils the conjugal duty." Therefore pleasure + is evil in itself; and consequently every pleasure is evil. +
[34993] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis delectatio sit mala. Illud enim +quod corrumpit prudentiam, et impedit rationis usum, videtur esse +secundum se malum, quia bonum hominis est secundum rationem esse, +ut Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed delectatio +corrumpit prudentiam, et impedit rationis usum, et tanto magis, +quanto delectationes sunt maiores. Unde in delectationibus +venereis, quae sunt maximae, impossibile est aliquid intelligere, +ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Et Hieronymus etiam dicit, super Matth., +quod illo tempore quo coniugales actus geruntur, praesentia +sancti spiritus non dabitur, etiam si propheta esse videatur qui +officio generationis obsequitur. Ergo delectatio est secundum +se malum. Ergo omnis delectatio mala.
+ Objection 2: Further, that which the virtuous man shuns, and the man lacking in virtue seeks, seems to be evil in itself, and should be + avoided; because, as stated in Ethic. x, 5 "the virtuous man is a kind of measure and rule of human actions"; and the Apostle + says ( + 1 Cor. 2:15): "The spiritual man judgeth all things." But children and dumb animals, in whom there is no virtue, seek pleasure: whereas + the man who is master of himself does not. Therefore + pleasures are evil in themselves and should be avoided. +
[34994] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +illud quod fugit virtuosus, et prosequitur deficiens a virtute, +videtur esse secundum se malum, et fugiendum, quia, ut dicitur in X +Ethic., virtuosus est quasi mensura et regula humanorum +actuum; et apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. II, spiritualis +iudicat omnia. Sed pueri et bestiae, in quibus non est virtus, +prosequuntur delectationes, fugit autem eas temperatus. Ergo +delectationes secundum se sunt malae, et fugiendae.
+ Objection 3: Further, "virtue and art are concerned about the difficult and the good" (Ethic. ii, 3). But no art is ordained to pleasure. + Therefore pleasure is not something good. +
[34995] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 arg. 3 +Praeterea, virtus et ars sunt circa difficile et bonum, ut +dicitur in II Ethic. Sed nulla ars ordinata est ad delectationem. +Ergo delectatio non est aliquid bonum.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Ps. 36:4): "Delight in the Lord." Since, therefore, Divine authority leads to no evil, it seems that not every pleasure is evil. +
[34996] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod in Psalmo XXXVI, dicitur, delectare in domino. Cum +igitur ad nihil mali auctoritas divina inducat, videtur quod non +omnis delectatio sit mala.
+ I answer that, As stated in Ethic. x, 2,[3] some have maintained that all pleasure is evil. The reason seems to have been that they took + account only of sensible and bodily pleasures which are more manifest; since, also in other respects, the ancient philosophers + did not discriminate between the intelligible and the sensible, nor between intellect and sense (De Anima iii, 3). And they + held that all bodily pleasures should be reckoned as bad, and thus that man, being prone + to immoderate pleasures, arrives at the mean of virtue by abstaining from pleasure. But they were wrong in holding this opinion. + Because, since none can live without some sensible and bodily pleasure, if they who teach that all pleasures are evil, are + found in the act of taking pleasure; men will be more inclined to pleasure by following the example of their works instead + of listening to the doctrine of their words: since, in human actions and passions, wherein experience is of great weight, + example moves more than words. +
We must therefore say that some pleasures are good, and that some are evil. For pleasure is a repose of the appetitive power + in some loved good, and resulting from some operation; wherefore we assign a twofold reason for this assertion. The first + is in respect of the good in which a man reposes with pleasure. For good and evil in the moral order depend on agreement or + disagreement with reason, as stated above ( + Q[18], A[5]): just as in the order of + nature, a thing is said to be natural, if it agrees with nature, and unnatural, if it disagrees. Accordingly, just as in the + natural order there is a certain natural repose, whereby a thing rests in that which agrees with its nature, for instance, + when a heavy body rests down below; and again an unnatural repose, whereby a thing rests in that which disagrees with its + nature, as when a heavy body rests up aloft: so, in the moral order, there is a good pleasure, whereby the higher or lower + appetite rests in that which is in accord with reason; and an evil pleasure, whereby the appetite rests in that which is discordant + from reason and the law of God. +
The second reason can be found by considering the actions, some of which are good, some evil. Now pleasures which are conjoined + to actions are more akin to those actions, than desires, which precede them in point of time. Wherefore, since the desires + of good actions are good, and of evil actions, evil; much more are the pleasures of good actions good, and those of evil actions + evil. +
[34997] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in X Ethic., aliqui posuerunt omnes +delectationes esse malas. Cuius ratio videtur fuisse, quia +intentionem suam referebant ad solas delectationes sensibiles et +corporales, quae sunt magis manifestae, nam et in ceteris +intelligibilia a sensibilibus antiqui philosophi non distinguebant, +nec intellectum a sensu, ut dicitur in libro de anima. +Delectationes autem corporales ut dicitur in libro de anima. +Delectationes autem corporales arbitrabantur dicendum omnes esse +malas, ut sic homines, qui ad delectationes immoderatas sunt proni, +a delectationibus se retrahentes, ad medium virtutis perveniant. +Sed haec existimatio non fuit conveniens. Cum enim nullus possit +vivere sine aliqua sensibili et corporali delectatione, si illi qui +docent omnes delectationes esse malas, deprehendantur aliquas +delectationes suscipere; magis homines ad delectationes erunt +proclives exemplo operum, verborum doctrina praetermissa. In +operationibus enim et passionibus humanis, in quibus experientia +plurimum valet, magis movent exempla quam verba. Dicendum est ergo +aliquas delectationes esse bonas, et aliquas esse malas. Est enim +delectatio quies appetitivae virtutis in aliquo bono amato, et +consequens aliquam operationem. Unde huius ratio duplex accipi +potest. Una quidem ex parte boni in quo aliquis quiescens +delectatur. Bonum enim et malum in moralibus dicitur secundum quod +convenit rationi vel discordat ab ea, ut supra dictum est, sicut in +rebus naturalibus aliquid dicitur naturale ex eo quod naturae +convenit, innaturale vero ex eo quod est a natura discordans. Sicut +igitur in naturalibus est quaedam quies naturalis, quae scilicet +est in eo quod convenit naturae, ut cum grave quiescit deorsum; et +quaedam innaturalis, quae est in eo quod repugnat naturae, sicut +cum grave quiescit sursum, ita et in moralibus est quaedam +delectatio bona, secundum quod appetitus superior aut inferior +requiescit in eo quod convenit rationi; et quaedam mala, ex eo quod +quiescit in eo quod a ratione discordat, et a lege Dei. Alia ratio +accipi potest ex parte operationum, quarum quaedam sunt bonae, et +quaedam malae. Operationibus autem magis sunt affines +delectationes, quae sunt eis coniunctae, quam concupiscentiae, quae +tempore eas praecedunt. Unde, cum concupiscentiae bonarum +operationum sint bonae, malarum vero malae; multo magis +delectationes bonarum operationum sunt bonae, malarum vero +malae.
+ Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (Q[33], A[3]), it is not the pleasures which result from an act of reason, that hinder the reason or destroy + prudence, but extraneous pleasures, such as the pleasures of the body. These indeed hinder the use of reason, as stated above + (Q[33], A[3]), either by contrariety of the appetite that rests in something repugnant to reason, which makes the pleasure + morally bad; or by fettering the reason: thus in conjugal intercourse, though the + pleasure be in accord with reason, yet it hinders the use of reason, on account of the accompanying bodily change. But in + this case the pleasure is not morally evil; as neither is sleep, whereby the reason is fettered, morally evil, if it be taken + according to reason: for reason itself demands that the use of reason be interrupted at times. We must add, however, that + although this fettering of the reason through the pleasure of conjugal intercourse has no moral malice, since it is neither + a + mortal nor a venial sin; yet it proceeds from a kind of moral malice, namely, from the sin of our first parent; because, as + stated in the + FP, Q[98], A[2] the case was different in the state of innocence. +
[34998] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, delectationes quae sunt +de actu rationis, non impediunt rationem, neque corrumpunt +prudentiam; sed delectationes extraneae, cuiusmodi sunt +delectationes corporales. Quae quidem rationis usum impediunt, +sicut supra dictum est, et per contrarietatem appetitus, qui +quiescit in eo quod repugnat rationi, et ex hoc habet delectatio +quod sit moraliter mala, vel secundum quandam ligationem rationis, +sicut in concubitu coniugali delectatio, quamvis sit in eo quod +convenit rationi, tamen impedit rationis usum, propter corporalem +transmutationem adiunctam. Sed ex hoc non consequitur malitiam +moralem, sicut nec somnus quo ligatur usus rationis, moraliter est +malus, si sit secundum rationem receptus, nam et ipsa ratio hoc +habet, ut quandoque rationis usus intercipiatur. Dicimus tamen quod +huiusmodi ligamentum rationis ex delectatione in actu coniugali, +etsi non habeat malitiam moralem, quia non est peccatum mortale nec +veniale; provenit tamen ex quadam morali malitia, scilicet ex +peccato primi parentis, nam hoc in statu innocentiae non erat, ut +patet ex his quae in primo dicta sunt.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The temperate man does not shun all pleasures, but those that are immoderate, and contrary to reason. The fact that children + and dumb animals seek pleasures, does not prove that all pleasures are evil: because they have from God their natural appetite, + which is moved to that which is naturally suitable to them. +
[34999] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod temperatus non fugit omnes delectationes, sed +immoderatas, et rationi non convenientes. Quod autem pueri et +bestiae delectationes prosequantur, non ostendit eas universaliter +esse malas, quia in eis est naturalis appetitus a Deo, qui movetur +in id quod est eis conveniens.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Art is not concerned with all kinds of good, but with the making of external things, as we shall state further on ( + Q[57], A[3]). But actions and passions, which are within us, are more the concern of prudence and virtue than of art. Nevertheless there + is an art of making pleasure, namely, "the art of cookery and the art of making arguments," as stated in Ethic. vii, 12. +
[35000] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod non omnis boni est ars, sed exteriorum factibilium, +ut infra dicetur. Circa operationes autem et passiones quae sunt in +nobis, magis est prudentia et virtus quam ars. Et tamen aliqua ars +est factiva delectationis; scilicet pulmentaria et pigmentaria, ut +dicitur in VII Ethic.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that every pleasure is good. Because as stated in the + FP, Q[5], A[6] there are three kinds of good: the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant. But everything virtuous is good; and in like manner + everything useful is good. Therefore also every pleasure is good. +
[35001] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis delectatio sit bona. Sicut enim +in primo dictum est, bonum in tria dividitur, scilicet honestum, +utile et delectabile. Sed honestum omne est bonum; et similiter +omne utile. Ergo et omnis delectatio est bona.
+ Objection 2: Further, that which is not sought for the sake of something else, is good in itself, as stated in Ethic. i, 6,7. But pleasure + is not sought for the sake of something else; for it seems absurd to ask anyone why he seeks to be pleased. Therefore pleasure + is good in itself. Now that which is predicated to a thing considered in itself, is predicated thereof universally. Therefore + every pleasure is good. +
[35002] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +illud est per se bonum, quod non quaeritur propter aliud, ut +dicitur in I Ethic. Sed delectatio non quaeritur propter aliud, +ridiculum enim videtur ab aliquo quaerere quare vult delectari. +Ergo delectatio est per se bonum. Sed quod per se praedicatur de +aliquo, universaliter praedicatur de eo. Ergo omnis delectatio est +bona.
+ Objection 3: Further, that which is desired by all, seems to be good of itself: because good is "what all things seek," as stated in Ethic. + i, 1. But everyone seeks some kind of pleasure, even children and dumb animals. Therefore pleasure is good in itself: and + consequently all pleasure is good. +
[35003] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +id quod ab omnibus desideratur, videtur esse per se bonum, nam +bonum est quod omnia appetunt, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Sed omnes +appetunt aliquam delectationem, etiam pueri et bestiae. Ergo +delectatio est secundum se bonum. Omnis ergo delectatio est +bona.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Prov. 2:14): "Who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things." +
[35004] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Prov. II, qui laetantur cum malefecerint, et +exultant in rebus pessimis.
+ I answer that, While some of the Stoics maintained that all pleasures are evil, the Epicureans held that pleasure is good in itself, and + that consequently all pleasures are good. They seem to have thus erred through not discriminating between that which is good + simply, and that which is good in respect of a particular individual. That which is good simply, is good in itself. Now that + which is not good in itself, may be good in respect of some individual in two ways. In one + way, because it is suitable to him by reason of a disposition in which he is now, which disposition, however, is not natural: + thus it is sometimes good for a leper to eat things that are poisonous, which are not suitable simply to the human temperament. + In another way, through something unsuitable being esteemed suitable. And since pleasure is the repose of the appetite in + some good, if the appetite reposes in that which is good simply, the pleasure will be pleasure simply, and good simply. But + if a man's appetite repose in that which is good, not simply, but in respect of that particular man, then his pleasure will + not be pleasure simply, but a pleasure to him; neither will it be good simply, but in a certain respect, or an apparent good. +
[35005] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut aliqui Stoicorum posuerunt omnes delectationes +esse malas, ita Epicurei posuerunt delectationem secundum se esse +bonum, et per consequens delectationes omnes esse bonas. Qui ex hoc +decepti esse videntur, quod non distinguebant inter id quod est +bonum simpliciter, et id quod est bonum quoad hunc. Simpliciter +quidem bonum est quod secundum se bonum est. Contingit autem quod +non est secundum se bonum, esse huic bonum, dupliciter. Uno modo, +quia est ei conveniens secundum dispositionem in qua nunc est, quae +tamen non est naturalis, sicut leproso bonum est quandoque comedere +aliqua venenosa, quae non sunt simpliciter convenientia complexioni +humanae. Alio modo, quia id quod non est conveniens, aestimatur ut +conveniens. Et quia delectatio est quies appetitus in bono, si sit +bonum simpliciter illud in quo quiescit appetitus, erit simpliciter +delectatio, et simpliciter bona. Si autem non sit bonum +simpliciter, sed quoad hunc, tunc nec delectatio est simpliciter, +sed huic, nec simpliciter est bona, sed bona secundum quid, vel +apparens bona.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The virtuous and the useful depend on accordance with reason, and consequently nothing is virtuous or useful, without being + good. But the pleasant depends on agreement with the appetite, which tends sometimes to that which is discordant from reason. + Consequently not every object of pleasure is good in the moral order which depends on the order of reason. +
[35006] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod honestum et utile dicuntur secundum rationem, et +ideo nihil est honestum vel utile, quod non sit bonum. Delectabile +autem dicitur secundum appetitum, qui quandoque in illud tendit +quod non est conveniens rationi. Et ideo non omne delectabile est +bonum bonitate morali, quae attenditur secundum rationem.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The reason why pleasure is not sought for the sake of something else is because it is repose in the end. Now the end may + be either good or evil; although nothing can be an end except in so far as it is good in respect of such and such a man: and + so too with regard to pleasure. +
[35007] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod ideo delectatio non quaeritur propter aliud, quia est +quies in fine. Finem autem contingit esse bonum et malum quamvis +nunquam sit finis nisi secundum quod est bonum quoad hunc. Ita +etiam est de delectatione.
+ Reply to Objection 3: All things seek pleasure in the same way as they seek good: since pleasure is the repose of the appetite in good. But, just + as it happens that not every good which is desired, is of itself and verily good; so not every pleasure is of itself and verily + good. +
[35008] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod hoc modo omnia appetunt delectationem, sicut et +bonum, cum delectatio sit quies appetitus in bono. Sed sicut +contingit non omne bonum quod appetitur, esse per se et vere bonum; +ita non omnis delectatio est per se et vere bona.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that no pleasure is the greatest good. Because nothing generated is the greatest good: since generation cannot + be the last end. But pleasure is a consequence of generation: for the fact that a thing takes pleasure is due to its being + established in its own nature, as stated above ( + Q[31], A[1]). Therefore no pleasure is the greatest good. +
[35009] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod nulla delectatio sit optimum. Nulla +enim generatio est optimum, nam generatio non potest esse ultimus +finis. Sed delectatio consequitur generationem, nam ex eo quod +aliquid constituitur in suam naturam, delectatur, ut supra dictum +est. Ergo nulla delectatio potest esse optimum.
+ Objection 2: Further, that which is the greatest good cannot be made better by addition. But pleasure is made better by addition; since + pleasure together with virtue is better than pleasure without virtue. Therefore pleasure is not the greatest good. +
[35010] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +illud quod est optimum, nullo addito potest fieri melius. Sed +delectatio aliquo addito fit melior, est enim melior delectatio cum +virtute quam sine virtute. Ergo delectatio non est optimum.
+ Objection 3: Further, that which is the greatest good is universally good, as being good of itself: since that which is such of itself + is prior to and greater than that which is such accidentally. But pleasure is not universally good, as stated above + (A[2]). Therefore pleasure is not the greatest good. +
[35011] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +id quod est optimum, est universaliter bonum, sicut per se bonum +existens, nam quod est per se, est prius et potius eo quod est per +accidens. Sed delectatio non est universaliter bonum, ut dictum +est. Ergo delectatio non est optimum.
+ On the contrary, Happiness is the greatest good: since it is the end of man's life. But Happiness is not without pleasure: for it is written + ( + Ps. 15:11): "Thou shalt fill me with joy with Thy countenance; at Thy right hand are delights even to the end." +
[35012] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +beatitudo est optimum, cum sit finis humanae vitae. Sed beatitudo +non est sine delectatione, dicitur enim in Psalmo XV, adimplebis +me laetitia cum vultu tuo; delectationes in dextera tua usque in +finem.
+ I answer that, Plato held neither with the Stoics, who asserted that all pleasures are evil, nor with the Epicureans, who maintained that + all pleasures are good; but he said that some are good, and some evil; yet, so that no pleasure be the sovereign or greatest + good. But, judging from his arguments, he fails in two points. First, because, from observing that sensible and bodily pleasure + consists in a certain movement and "becoming," as is evident in satiety from eating + and the like; he concluded that all pleasure arises from some "becoming" and movement: and from this, since "becoming" and + movement are the acts of something imperfect, it would follow that pleasure is not of the nature of ultimate perfection. But + this is seen to be evidently false as regards intellectual pleasures: because one takes pleasure, not only in the "becoming" + of knowledge, for instance, when one learns or wonders, as stated above ( + Q[32], A[8], ad 2); but also + in the act of contemplation, by making use of knowledge already acquired. +
Secondly, because by greatest good he understood that which is the supreme good simply, i.e. the good as existing apart from, + and unparticipated by, all else, in which sense God is the Supreme Good; whereas we are speaking of the greatest good in human + things. Now the greatest good of everything is its last end. And the end, as stated above ( + Q[1], A[8]; + Q[2], A[7]) is twofold; namely, the thing itself, and the use of that thing; + thus the miser's end is either money or the possession of money. Accordingly, man's last end may be said to be either God + Who is the Supreme Good simply; or the enjoyment of God, which implies a certain pleasure in the last end. And in this sense + a certain pleasure of man may be said to be the greatest among human goods. +
[35013] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod Plato non posuit omnes delectationes esse malas, +sicut Stoici; neque omnes esse bonas, sicut Epicurei; sed quasdam +esse bonas, et quasdam esse malas; ita tamen quod nulla sit summum +bonum, vel optimum. Sed quantum ex eius rationibus datur intelligi, +in duobus deficit. In uno quidem quia, cum videret delectationes +sensibiles et corporales in quodam motu et generatione consistere, +sicut patet in repletione ciborum et huiusmodi; aestimavit omnes +delectationes consequi generationem et motum. Unde, cum generatio +et motus sint actus imperfecti, sequeretur quod delectatio non +haberet rationem ultimae perfectionis. Sed hoc manifeste apparet +falsum in delectationibus intellectualibus. Aliquis enim non solum +delectatur in generatione scientiae, puta cum addiscit aut miratur, +sicut supra dictum est; sed etiam in contemplando secundum +scientiam iam acquisitam. Alio vero modo, quia dicebat optimum +illud quod est simpliciter summum bonum, quod scilicet est ipsum +bonum quasi abstractum et non participatum, sicut ipse Deus est +summum bonum. Nos autem loquimur de optimo in rebus humanis. +Optimum autem in unaquaque re est ultimus finis. Finis autem, ut +supra dictum est, dupliciter dicitur, scilicet ipsa res, et usus +rei; sicut finis avari est vel pecunia, vel possessio pecuniae. Et +secundum hoc, ultimus finis hominis dici potest vel ipse Deus, qui +est summum bonum simpliciter; vel fruitio ipsius, quae importat +delectationem quandam in ultimo fine. Et per hunc modum aliqua +delectatio hominis potest dici optimum inter bona humana.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Not every pleasure arises from a "becoming"; for some pleasures result from perfect operations, as stated above. Accordingly + nothing prevents some pleasure being the greatest good, although every pleasure is not such. +
[35014] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod non omnis delectatio consequitur generationem; +sed aliquae delectationes consequuntur operationes perfectas, ut +dictum est. Et ideo nihil prohibet aliquam delectationem esse +optimum, etsi non omnis sit talis.
+ Reply to Objection 2: This argument is true of the greatest good simply, by participation of which all things are good; wherefore no addition can + make it better: whereas in regard to other goods, it is universally true that any good becomes better by the addition of another + good. Moreover it might be said that pleasure is not something extraneous to the operation of virtue, but that it accompanies + it, as stated in Ethic. i, 8. +
[35015] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de optimo simpliciter, per cuius +participationem omnia sunt bona, unde ex nullius additione fit +melius. Sed in aliis bonis universaliter verum est quod quodlibet +bonum ex additione alterius fit melius. Quamvis posset dici quod +delectatio non est aliquid extraneum ab operatione virtutis, sed +concomitans ipsam, ut in I Ethic. dicitur.
+ Reply to Objection 3: That pleasure is the greatest good is due not to the mere fact that it is pleasure, but to the fact that it is perfect repose + in the perfect good. Hence it does not follow that every pleasure is supremely good, or even good at all. Thus a certain science + is supremely good, but not every science is. +
[35016] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod delectatio non habet quod sit optimum ex hoc quod est +delectatio, sed ex hoc quod est perfecta quies in optimo. Unde non +oportet quod omnis delectatio sit optima, aut etiam bona. Sicut +aliqua scientia est optima, non tamen omnis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that pleasure is not the measure or rule of moral good and evil. Because "that which is first in a genus is + the measure of all the rest" (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasure is not the first thing in the moral genus, for it is preceded by + love and desire. Therefore it is not the rule of goodness and malice in moral matters. +
[35017] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non sit mensura vel regula +boni et mali moralis. Omnia enim mensurantur primo sui +generis, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed delectatio non est +primum in genere moralium, sed praecedunt ipsam amor et desiderium. +Non ergo est regula bonitatis et malitiae in moralibus.
+ Objection 2: Further, a measure or rule should be uniform; hence that movement which is the most uniform, is the measure and rule of all + movements (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasures are various and multiform: since some of them are good, and some evil. Therefore pleasure + is not the measure and rule of morals. +
[35018] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +mensuram et regulam oportet esse uniformem, et ideo motus qui est +maxime uniformis, est mensura et regula omnium motuum, ut dicitur +in X Metaphys. Sed delectatio est varia et multiformis, cum quaedam +earum sint bonae, et quaedam malae. Ergo delectatio non est mensura +et regula moralium.
+ Objection 3: Further, judgment of the effect from its cause is more certain than judgment of cause from effect. Now goodness or malice + of operation is the cause of goodness or malice of pleasure: because "those pleasures are good which result from good operations, + and those are evil which arise from evil operations," as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore pleasures are not the rule and measure + of moral goodness and malice. +
[35019] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +certius iudicium sumitur de effectu per causam, quam e converso. +Sed bonitas vel malitia operationis est causa bonitatis vel +malitiae delectationis, quia bonae delectationes sunt quae +consequuntur bonas operationes, malae autem quae malas, ut dicitur +in X Ethic. Ergo delectationes non sunt regula et mensura bonitatis +et malitiae in moralibus.
+ On the contrary, Augustine, commenting on + Ps. 7:10 "The searcher of hearts and reins is God," says: "The end of care and thought is the pleasure which each one aims at achieving." + And the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11) that "pleasure is the architect," i.e. the principal, "end [*St. Thomas took "finis" + as being the nominative, whereas it is the genitive---{tou telous}; and the Greek reads "He" (i.e. the political philosopher), + "is the architect of + the end."], in regard to which, we say absolutely that this is evil, and that, good." +
[35020] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, super illud Psalmi VII, scrutans +corda et renes Deus, finis curae et cogitationis est delectatio ad +quam quis nititur pervenire. Et philosophus dicit, in VII +Ethic., quod delectatio est finis architecton, idest +principalis, ad quem respicientes, unumquodque hoc quidem malum, +hoc autem bonum simpliciter dicimus.
+ I answer that, Moral goodness or malice depends chiefly on the will, as stated above ( + Q[20], A[1]); and it is chiefly from the end that we discern whether the will is good or evil. Now the end is taken to be that in which + the will reposes: and the repose of the will and of every appetite in the good is pleasure. And therefore man is reckoned + to be good or bad chiefly according to the pleasure of the human will; since that man is good and virtuous, + who takes pleasure in the works of virtue; and that man evil, who takes pleasure in evil works. +
On the other hand, pleasures of the sensitive appetite are not the rule of moral goodness and malice; since food is universally + pleasurable to the sensitive appetite both of good and of evil men. But the will of the good man takes pleasure in them in + accordance with reason, to which the will of the evil man gives no heed. +
[35021] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod bonitas vel malitia moralis principaliter in +voluntate consistit, ut supra dictum est. Utrum autem voluntas sit +bona vel mala, praecipue ex fine cognoscitur. Id autem habetur pro +fine, in quo voluntas quiescit. Quies autem voluntatis, et +cuiuslibet appetitus, in bono, est delectatio. Et ideo secundum +delectationem voluntatis humanae, praecipue iudicatur homo bonus +vel malus; est enim bonus et virtuosus qui gaudet in operibus +virtutum; malus autem qui in operibus malis. Delectationes autem +appetitus sensitivi non sunt regula bonitatis vel malitiae moralis, +nam cibus communiter delectabilis est secundum appetitum +sensitivum, bonis et malis. Sed voluntas bonorum delectatur in eis +secundum convenientiam rationis, quam non curat voluntas +malorum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Love and desire precede pleasure in the order of generation. But pleasure precedes them in the order of the end, which serves + a principle in actions; and it is by the principle, which is the rule and measure of such matters, that we form our judgment. +
[35022] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod amor et desiderium sunt priora delectatione in +via generationis. Sed delectatio est prior secundum rationem finis, +qui in operabilibus habet rationem principii, a quo maxime sumitur +iudicium, sicut a regula vel mensura.
+ Reply to Objection 2: All pleasures are uniform in the point of their being the repose of the appetite in something good: and in this respect pleasure + can be a rule or measure. Because that man is good, whose will rests in the true good: and that man evil, whose will rests + in evil. +
[35023] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod omnis delectatio in hoc est uniformis, quod est quies +in aliquo bono, et secundum hoc potest esse regula vel mensura. Nam +ille bonus est cuius voluntas quiescit in vero bono; malus autem, +cuius voluntas quiescit in malo.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Since pleasure perfects operation as its end, as stated above ( + Q[33], A[4]); an operation cannot be perfectly good, unless there be also pleasure in good: because the goodness of a thing depends on + its end. And thus, in a way, the goodness of the pleasure is the cause of goodness in the operation. +
[35024] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, cum delectatio perficiat operationem per modum +finis, ut supra dictum est; non potest esse operatio perfecte bona, +nisi etiam adsit delectatio in bono, nam bonitas rei dependet ex +fine. Et sic quodammodo bonitas delectationis est causa bonitas in +operatione.
We have now to consider pain and sorrow: concerning which we must consider: (1) Sorrow or pain in itself; (2) Its cause; + (3) Its effects; (4) Its remedies; (5) Its goodness or malice. +
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether pain is a passion of the soul?
(2) Whether sorrow is the same as pain?
(3) Whether sorrow or pain is contrary in pleasure?
(4) Whether all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure?
(5) Whether there is a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation?
(6) Whether sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought?
+[35025] +Iª-IIae q. 35 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +dolore et tristitia. Et circa hoc, primo considerandum est de +tristitia, seu dolore, secundum se; secundo, de causis eius; +tertio, de effectibus ipsius; quarto, de remediis eius; quinto, de +bonitate vel malitia eius. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, +utrum dolor sit passio animae. Secundo, utrum tristitia sit idem +quod dolor. Tertio, utrum tristitia, seu dolor, sit contraria +delectationi. Quarto, utrum omnis tristitia omni delectationi +contrarietur. Quinto, utrum delectationi contemplationis sit aliqua +tristitia contraria. Sexto, utrum magis fugienda sit tristitia, +quam delectatio appetenda. Septimo, utrum dolor exterior sit maior +quam dolor interior. Octavo, de speciebus tristitiae.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that pain is not a passion of the soul. Because no passion of the soul is in the body. But pain can be in the + body, since Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xii), that "bodily pain is a sudden corruption of the well-being of that thing + which the soul, by making evil use of it, made subject to corruption." Therefore pain is not a passion of the soul. +
[35026] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod dolor non sit passio animae. Nulla +enim passio animae est in corpore. Sed dolor potest esse in +corpore, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de vera Relig., quod +dolor qui dicitur corporis, est corruptio repentina salutis eius +rei, quam, male utendo, anima corruptioni obnoxiavit. Ergo +dolor non est passio animae.
+ Objection 2: Further, every passion of the soul belongs to the appetitive faculty. But pain does not belong to the appetitive, but rather + to the apprehensive part: for Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx) that "bodily pain is caused by the sense resisting a more powerful + body." Therefore pain is not a passion of the soul. +
[35027] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +omnis passio animae pertinet ad vim appetitivam. Sed dolor non +pertinet ad vim appetitivam, sed magis ad apprehensivam, dicit enim +Augustinus, in libro de natura boni, quod dolorem in corpore +facit sensus resistens corpori potentiori. Ergo dolor non est +passio animae.
+ Objection 3: Further, every passion of the soul belongs to the animal appetite. But pain does not belong to the animal appetite, but rather + to the natural appetite; for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 14): "Had not some good remained in nature, we should feel + no pain in being punished by the loss of good." Therefore pain is not a passion of the soul. +
[35028] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +omnis passio animae pertinet ad appetitum animalem. Sed dolor non +pertinet ad appetitum animalem, sed magis ad appetitum naturalem, +dicit enim Augustinus, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., nisi aliquod +bonum remansisset in natura, nullius boni amissi esset dolor in +poena. Ergo dolor non est passio animae.
+ On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8) reckons pain among the passions of the soul; quoting Virgil (Aeneid, vi, 733): "hence wild + desires and grovelling fears/And human laughter, human tears." [Translation: Conington.] +
[35029] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus, XIV de Civ. Dei, ponit dolorem inter passiones +animae, inducens illud Virgilii, hinc metuunt, cupiunt, +gaudentque dolentque.
+ I answer that, Just as two things are requisite for pleasure; namely, conjunction with good and perception of this conjunction; so also + two things are requisite for pain: namely, conjunction with some evil (which is in so far evil as it deprives one of some + good), and perception of this conjunction. Now whatever is conjoined, if it have not the aspect of good or evil in regard + to the being to which it is conjoined, cannot cause pleasure or pain. Whence it is evident that + something under the aspect of good or evil is the object of the pleasure or pain. But good and evil, as such, are objects + of the appetite. Consequently it is clear that pleasure and pain belong to the appetite. +
Now every appetitive movement or inclination consequent to apprehension, belongs to the intellective or sensitive appetite: + since the inclination of the natural appetite is not consequent to an apprehension of the subject of that appetite, but to + the apprehension of another, as stated in the + FP, Q[103], AA[1],3. Since then pleasure and pain presuppose some sense or apprehension in the same subject, it is evident that pain, like + pleasure, is in the + intellective or sensitive appetite. +
Again every movement of the sensitive appetite is called a passion, as stated above ( + Q[22], AA[1],3): and especially those which tend to some defect. Consequently pain, according as it is in the sensitive appetite, is most + properly called a passion of the soul: just as bodily ailments are properly called passions of the body. Hence Augustine (De + Civ. Dei xiv, 7,[8] [*Quoting Cicero]) reckons pain especially as being a kind of ailment. +
[35030] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ad delectationem duo requiruntur, scilicet +coniunctio boni, et perceptio huiusmodi coniunctionis; ita etiam ad +dolorem duo requiruntur, scilicet coniunctio alicuius mali (quod ea +ratione est malum, quia privat aliquod bonum); et perceptio +huiusmodi coniunctionis. Quidquid autem coniungitur, si non habeat, +respectu eius cui coniungitur, rationem boni vel mali, non potest +causare delectationem vel dolorem. Ex quo patet quod aliquid sub +ratione boni vel mali, est obiectum delectationis et doloris. Bonum +autem et malum, inquantum huiusmodi, sunt obiecta appetitus. Unde +patet quod delectatio et dolor ad appetitum pertinent. Omnis autem +motus appetitivus, seu inclinatio consequens apprehensionem, +pertinet ad appetitum intellectivum vel sensitivum, nam inclinatio +appetitus naturalis non consequitur apprehensionem ipsius +appetentis, sed alterius, ut in primo dictum est. Cum igitur +delectatio et dolor praesupponant in eodem subiecto sensum vel +apprehensionem aliquam, manifestum est quod dolor, sicut et +delectatio, est in appetitu intellectivo vel sensitivo. Omnis autem +motus appetitus sensitivi dicitur passio, ut supra dictum est. Et +praecipue illi qui in defectum sonant. Unde dolor, secundum quod +est in appetitu sensitivo, propriissime dicitur passio animae, +sicut molestiae corporales proprie passiones corporis dicuntur. +Unde et Augustinus, XIV de Civ. Dei, dolorem specialiter +aegritudinem nominat.
+ Reply to Objection 1: We speak of the body, because the cause of pain is in the body: as when we suffer something hurtful to the body. But the + movement of pain is always in the soul; since "the body cannot feel pain unless the soul feel it," as Augustine says (Super + Psalm 87:4). +
[35031] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod dolor dicitur esse corporis, quia causa doloris +est in corpore, puta cum patimur aliquod nocivum corpori. Sed motus +doloris semper est in anima, nam corpus non potest dolere nisi +dolente anima, ut Augustinus dicit.
+ Reply to Objection 2: We speak of pain of the senses, not as though it were an act of the sensitive power; but because the senses are required + for bodily pain, in the same way as for bodily pleasure. +
[35032] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod dolor dicitur esse sensus, non quia sit actus +sensitivae virtutis, sed quia requiritur ad dolorem corporalem, +sicut ad delectationem.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Pain at the loss of good proves the goodness of the nature, not because pain is an act of the natural appetite, but because + nature desires something as good, the removal of which being perceived, there results the passion of pain in the sensitive + appetite. +
[35033] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod dolor de amissione boni demonstrat bonitatem naturae, +non quia dolor sit actus naturalis appetitus, sed quia natura +aliquid appetit ut bonum, quod cum removeri sentitur, sequitur +doloris passio in appetitu sensitivo.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is not pain. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) that "pain is used to express bodily suffering." + But sorrow is used more in reference to the soul. Therefore sorrow is not pain. +
[35034] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod tristitia non sit dolor. Dicit enim +Augustinus, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod dolor in corporibus +dicitur. Tristitia autem dicitur magis in anima. Ergo tristitia +non est dolor.
+ Objection 2: Further, pain is only in respect of present evil. But sorrow can refer to both past and future evil: thus repentance is sorrow + for the past, and anxiety for the future. Therefore sorrow is quite different from pain. +
[35035] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +dolor non est nisi de praesenti malo. Sed tristitia potest esse de +praeterito et de futuro, sicut poenitentia est tristitia de +praeterito, et anxietas de futuro. Ergo tristitia omnino a dolore +differt.
+ Objection 3: Further, pain seems not to follow save from the sense of touch. But sorrow can arise from all the senses. Therefore sorrow + is not pain, and extends to more objects. +
[35036] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +dolor non videtur consequi nisi sensum tactus. Sed tristitia potest +consequi ex omnibus sensibus. Ergo tristitia non est dolor, sed se +habet in pluribus.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle says ( + Rom. 9:2): "I have great sorrow [Douay: 'sadness'] and continual pain [Douay: 'sorrow'] in my heart," thus denoting the same thing + by sorrow and pain. +
[35037] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Rom. IX, tristitia est mihi magna, +et continuus dolor cordi meo, pro eodem utens tristitia et +dolore.
+ I answer that, Pleasure and pain can arise from a twofold apprehension, namely, from the apprehension of an exterior sense; and from the + interior apprehension of the intellect or of the imagination. Now the interior apprehension extends to more objects than the + exterior apprehension: because whatever things come under the exterior apprehension, come under the interior, but not conversely. + Consequently that pleasure alone which is caused by an interior apprehension is + called joy, as stated above ( + Q[31], A[3]): and in like manner that pain alone which is caused by an interior apprehension, is called sorrow. And just as that pleasure + which is caused by an exterior apprehension, is called pleasure but not joy; so too that pain which is caused by an exterior + apprehension, is called pain indeed but not sorrow. Accordingly sorrow is a species of pain, as joy is a species of pleasure. +
[35038] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod delectatio et dolor ex duplici apprehensione causari +possunt, scilicet ex apprehensione exterioris sensus, et ex +apprehensione interiori sive intellectus sive imaginationis. +Interior autem apprehensio ad plura se extendit quam exterior, eo +quod quaecumque cadunt sub exteriori apprehensione, cadunt sub +interiori, sed non e converso. Sola igitur illa delectatio quae ex +interiori apprehensione causatur, gaudium nominatur, ut supra +dictum est. Et similiter ille solus dolor qui ex apprehensione +interiori causatur, nominatur tristitia. Et sicut illa delectatio +quae ex exteriori apprehensione causatur, delectatio quidem +nominatur, non autem gaudium; ita ille dolor qui ex exteriori +apprehensione causatur, nominatur quidem dolor, non autem +tristitia. Sic igitur tristitia est quaedam species doloris, sicut +gaudium delectationis.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking there of the use of the word: because "pain" is more generally used in reference to bodily pains, which + are better known, than in reference to spiritual pains. +
[35039] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur ibi quantum ad usum +vocabuli, quia dolor magis usitatur in corporalibus doloribus, qui +sunt magis noti, quam in doloribus spiritualibus.
+ Reply to Objection 2: External sense perceives only what is present; but the interior cognitive power can perceive the present, past and future. + Consequently sorrow can regard present, past and future: whereas bodily pain, which follows apprehension of the external sense, + can only regard something present. +
[35040] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod sensus exterior non percipit nisi praesens, vis autem +cognitiva interior potest percipere praesens, praeteritum et +futurum. Et ideo tristitia potest esse de praesenti, praeterito et +futuro, dolor autem corporalis, qui sequitur apprehensionem sensus +exterioris, non potest esse nisi de praesenti.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The sensibles of touch are painful, not only in so far as they are disproportionate to the apprehensive power, but also in + so far as they are contrary to nature: whereas the objects of the other senses can indeed be disproportionate to the apprehensive + power, but they are not contrary to nature, save as they are subordinate to the sensibles of touch. Consequently man alone, + who is a perfectly cognizant animal, takes pleasure in the objects of the + other senses for their own sake; whereas other animals take no pleasure in them save as referable to the sensibles of touch, + as stated in Ethic. iii, 10. Accordingly, in referring to the objects of the other senses, we do not speak of pain in so far + as it is contrary to natural pleasure: but rather of sorrow, which is contrary to joy. So then if pain be taken as denoting + bodily pain, which is its more usual meaning, then it is contrasted with sorrow, according to the distinction of interior + and + exterior apprehension; although, on the part of the objects, pleasure extends further than does bodily pain. But if pain be + taken in a wide sense, then it is the genus of sorrow, as stated above. +
[35041] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod sensibilia tactus sunt dolorosa, non solum inquantum +sunt improportionata virtuti apprehensivae, sed etiam inquantum +contrariantur naturae. Aliorum vero sensuum sensibilia possunt +quidem esse improportionata virtuti apprehensivae, non tamen +contrariantur naturae, nisi in ordine ad sensibilia tactus. Unde +solus homo, qui est animal perfectum in cognitione, delectatur in +sensibilibus aliorum sensuum secundum se ipsa, alia vero animalia +non delectantur in eis nisi secundum quod referuntur ad sensibilia +tactus, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Et ideo de sensibilibus aliorum +sensuum non dicitur esse dolor, secundum quod contrariatur +delectationi naturali, sed magis tristitia, quae contrariatur +gaudio animali. Sic igitur si dolor accipiatur pro corporali +dolore, quod usitatius est, dolor ex opposito dividitur contra +tristitiam, secundum distinctionem apprehensionis interioris et +exterioris; licet, quantum ad obiecta, delectatio ad plura se +extendat quam dolor corporalis. Si vero dolor accipiatur +communiter, sic dolor est genus tristitiae, ut dictum est.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is not contrary to pleasure. For one of two contraries is not the cause of the other. But sorrow + can be the cause of pleasure; for it is written ( + Mat. 5:5): "Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted." Therefore they are not contrary to one another. +
[35042] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod dolor delectationi non contrarietur. +Unum enim contrariorum non est causa alterius. Sed tristitia potest +esse causa delectationis, dicitur enim Matth. V, beati qui +lugent, quoniam ipsi consolabuntur. Ergo non sunt +contraria.
+ Objection 2: Further, one contrary does not denominate the other. But to some, pain or sorrow gives pleasure: thus Augustine says (Confess. + iii, 2) that in stage-plays sorrow itself gives pleasure: and (Confess. iv, 5) that "weeping is a bitter thing, and yet it + sometimes pleases us." Therefore pain is not contrary to pleasure. +
[35043] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +unum contrariorum non denominat aliud. Sed in quibusdam ipse dolor +vel tristitia est delectabilis, sicut Augustinus dicit, in III +Confess., quod dolor in spectaculis delectat. Et IV Confess., dicit +quod fletus amara res est, et tamen quandoque delectat. Ergo +dolor non contrariatur delectationi.
+ Objection 3: Further, one contrary is not the matter of the other; because contraries cannot co-exist together. But sorrow can be the + matter of pleasure; for Augustine says (De Poenit. xiii): "The penitent should ever sorrow, and rejoice in his sorrow." The + Philosopher too says (Ethic. ix, 4) that, on the other hand, "the evil man feels pain at having been pleased." Therefore pleasure + and pain are not contrary to one another. +
[35044] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +unum contrariorum non est materia alterius, quia contraria simul +esse non possunt. Sed dolor potest esse materia delectationis, +dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de poenitentia, semper poenitens +doleat, et de dolore gaudeat. Et philosophus dicit, in IX +Ethic., quod e converso malus dolet de eo quod delectatus +est. Ergo delectatio et dolor non sunt contraria.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6) that "joy is the volition of consent to the things we wish: and that sorrow is the volition + of dissent from the things we do not wish." But consent and dissent are contraries. Therefore pleasure and sorrow are contrary + to one another. +
[35045] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod laetitia est +voluntas in eorum consensione quae volumus, tristitia autem est +voluntas in dissensione ab his quae nolumus. Sed consentire et +dissentire sunt contraria. Ergo laetitia et tristitia sunt +contraria.
+ I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, 4), contrariety is a difference in respect of a form. Now the form or species of a passion + or movement is taken from the object or term. Consequently, since the objects of pleasure and sorrow or pain, viz. present + good and present evil, are contrary to one another, it follows that pain and pleasure are contrary to one another. +
[35046] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit X Metaphys., contrarietas +est differentia secundum formam. Forma autem, seu species, +passionis et motus sumitur ex obiecto vel termino. Unde, cum +obiecta delectationis et tristitiae, seu doloris, sint contraria, +scilicet bonum praesens et malum praesens, sequitur quod dolor et +delectatio sint contraria.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders one contrary causing the other accidentally: and thus sorrow can be the cause of pleasure. In one way, in + so far as from sorrow at the absence of something, or at the presence of its contrary, one seeks the more eagerly for something + pleasant: thus a thirsty man seeks more eagerly the pleasure of a drink, as a remedy for the pain he suffers. In another way, + in so far as, from a strong desire for a certain pleasure, one does not shrink + from undergoing pain, so as to obtain that pleasure. In each of these ways, the sorrows of the present life lead us to the + comfort of the future life. Because by the mere fact that man mourns for his sins, or for the delay of glory, he merits the + consolation of eternity. In like manner a man merits it when he shrinks not from hardships and straits in order to obtain + it. +
[35047] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet unum contrariorum esse causam +alterius per accidens. Sic autem tristitia potest esse causa +delectationis. Uno quidem modo, inquantum tristitia de absentia +alicuius rei, vel de praesentia contrarii, vehementius quaerit id +in quo delectetur, sicut sitiens vehementius quaerit delectationem +potus, ut remedium contra tristitiam quam patitur. Alio modo, +inquantum ex magno desiderio delectationis alicuius, non recusat +aliquis tristitias perferre, ut ad illam delectationem perveniat. +Et utroque modo luctus praesens ad consolationem futurae vitae +perducit. Quia ex hoc ipso quod homo luget pro peccatis, vel pro +dilatione gloriae, meretur consolationem aeternam. Similiter etiam +meretur eam aliquis ex hoc quod, ad ipsam consequendam, non refugit +labores et angustias propter ipsam sustinere.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Pain itself can be pleasurable accidentally in so far as it is accompanied by wonder, as in stage-plays; or in so far as + it recalls a beloved object to one's memory, and makes one feel one's love for the thing, whose absence gives us pain. Consequently, + since love is pleasant, both pain and whatever else results from love, forasmuch as they remind us of our love, are pleasant. + And, for this reason, we derive pleasure even from pains depicted on the + stage: in so far as, in witnessing them, we perceive ourselves to conceive a certain love for those who are there represented. +
[35048] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod dolor ipse potest esse delectabilis per accidens, +inquantum scilicet habet adiunctam admirationem, ut in spectaculis; +vel inquantum facit recordationem rei amatae, et facit percipere +amorem eius, de cuius absentia doletur. Unde, cum amor sit +delectabilis, et dolor et omnia quae ex amore consequuntur, +inquantum in eis sentitur amor, sunt delectabilia. Et propter hoc +etiam dolores in spectaculis possunt esse delectabiles, inquantum +in eis sentitur aliquis amor conceptus ad illos qui in spectaculis +commemorantur.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The will and the reason reflect on their own acts, inasmuch as the acts themselves of the will and reason are considered + under the aspect of good or evil. In this way sorrow can be the matter of pleasure, or vice versa, not essentially but accidentally: + that is, in so far as either of them is considered under the aspect of good or evil. +
[35049] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod voluntas et ratio supra suos actus reflectuntur, +inquantum ipsi actus voluntatis et rationis accipiuntur sub ratione +boni vel mali. Et hoc modo tristitia potest esse materia +delectationis, vel e converso, non per se, sed per accidens, +inquantum scilicet utrumque accipitur in ratione boni vel mali.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure. Because, just as whiteness and blackness are contrary species + of color, so pleasure and sorrow are contrary species of the soul's passions. But whiteness and blackness are universally + contrary to one another. Therefore pleasure and sorrow are so too. +
[35050] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis tristitia omni delectationi +contrarietur. Sicut enim albedo et nigredo sunt contrariae species +coloris, ita delectatio et tristitia sunt contrariae species animae +passionum. Sed albedo et nigredo universaliter sibi opponuntur. +Ergo etiam delectatio et tristitia.
+ Objection 2: Further, remedies are made of things contrary (to the evil). But every pleasure is a remedy for all manner of sorrow, as + the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vii, 14). Therefore every pleasure is contrary to every sorrow. +
[35051] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +medicinae per contraria fiunt. Sed quaelibet delectatio est +medicina contra quamlibet tristitiam, ut patet per philosophum, in +VII Ethic. Ergo quaelibet delectatio cuilibet tristitiae +contrariatur.
+ Objection 3: Further, contraries are hindrances to one another. But every sorrow hinders any kind of pleasure: as is evident from Ethic. + x, 5. Therefore every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure. +
[35052] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +contraria sunt quae se invicem impediunt. Sed quaelibet tristitia +impedit quamlibet delectationem, ut patet per illud quod dicitur X +Ethic. Ergo quaelibet tristitia cuilibet delectationi +contrariatur.
+ On the contrary, The same thing is not the cause of contraries. But joy for one thing, and sorrow for the opposite thing, proceed from the + same habit: thus from charity it happens that we "rejoice with them that rejoice," and "weep with them that weep" ( + Rom. 12:15). Therefore not every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure. +
[35053] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra, +contrariorum non est eadem causa. Sed ab eodem habitu procedit quod +aliquis gaudeat de uno, et tristetur de opposito, ex caritate +enim contingit gaudere cum gaudentibus, et flere cum flentibus, +ut dicitur Rom. XII. Ergo non omnis tristitia omni delectationi +contrariatur.
+ I answer that, As stated in Metaph. x, 4 contrariety is a difference in respect of a form. Now a form may be generic or specific. Consequently + things may be contraries in respect of a generic form, as virtue and vice; or in respect of a specific form, as justice and + injustice. +
Now we must observe that some things are specified by absolute forms, e.g. substances and qualities; whereas other things + are specified in relation to something extrinsic, e.g. passions and movements, which derive their species from their terms + or objects. Accordingly in those things that are specified by absolute forms, it happens that species contained under contrary + genera are not contrary as to their specific nature: but it does not happen for them to have any affinity or + fittingness to one another. For intemperance and justice, which are in the contrary genera of virtue and vice, are not contrary + to one another in respect of their specific nature; and yet they have no affinity or fittingness to one another. On the other + hand, in those things that are specified in relation to something extrinsic, it happens that species belonging to contrary + genera, are not only not contrary to one another, but also that they have a certain mutual affinity or fittingness. The + reason of this is that where there is one same relation to two contraries, there is contrariety; e.g. to approach to a white + thing, and to approach to a black thing, are contraries; whereas contrary relations to contrary things, implies a certain + likeness, e.g. to recede from something white, and to approach to something black. This is most evident in the case of contradiction, + which is the principle of opposition: because opposition consists in affirming and denying the same thing, e.g. + "white" and "non-white"; while there is fittingness and likeness in the affirmation of one contrary and the denial of the + other, as, if I were to say "black" and "not white." +
Now sorrow and pleasure, being passions, are specified by their objects. According to their respective genera, they are contrary + to one another: since one is a kind of "pursuit," the other a kind of "avoidance," which "are to the appetite, what affirmation + and denial are to the intellect" (Ethic. vi, 2). Consequently sorrow and pleasure in respect of the same object, are specifically + contrary to one another: whereas sorrow and pleasure in respect of objects that are not contrary + but disparate, are not specifically contrary to one another, but are also disparate; for instance, sorrow at the death of + a friend, and pleasure in contemplation. If, however, those diverse objects be contrary to one another, then pleasure and + sorrow are not only specifically contrary, but they also have a certain mutual fittingness and affinity: for instance to rejoice + in good and to sorrow for evil. +
[35054] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in X Metaphys., contrarietas est +differentia secundum formam. Forma autem est et generalis, et +specialis. Unde contingit esse aliqua contraria secundum formam +generis, sicut virtus et vitium; et secundum formam speciei, sicut +iustitia et iniustitia. Est autem considerandum quod quaedam +specificantur secundum formas absolutas, sicut substantiae et +qualitates, quaedam vero specificantur per comparationem ad aliquid +extra, sicut passiones et motus recipiunt speciem ex terminis sive +ex obiectis. In his ergo quorum species considerantur secundum +formas absolutas, contingit quidem species quae continentur sub +contrariis generibus, non esse contrarias secundum rationem +speciei, non tamen contingit quod habeant aliquam affinitatem vel +convenientiam ad invicem. Intemperantia enim et iustitia, quae sunt +in contrariis generibus, virtute scilicet et vitio, non +contrariantur ad invicem secundum rationem propriae speciei, nec +tamen habent aliquam affinitatem vel convenientiam ad invicem. Sed +in illis quorum species sumuntur secundum habitudinem ad aliquid +extrinsecum, contingit quod species contrariorum generum non solum +non sunt contrariae ad invicem, sed etiam habent quandam +convenientiam et affinitatem ad invicem, eo quod eodem modo se +habere ad contraria, contrarietatem inducit, sicut accedere ad +album et accedere ad nigrum habent rationem contrarietatis; sed +contrario modo se habere ad contraria, habet rationem +similitudinis, sicut recedere ab albo et accedere ad nigrum. Et hoc +maxime apparet in contradictione, quae est principium oppositionis, +nam in affirmatione et negatione eiusdem consistit oppositio, sicut +album et non album; in affirmatione autem unius oppositorum et +negatione alterius, attenditur convenientia et similitudo, ut si +dicam nigrum et non album. Tristitia autem et delectatio, cum sint +passiones, specificantur ex obiectis. Et quidem secundum genus +suum, contrarietatem habent, nam unum pertinet ad prosecutionem, +aliud vero ad fugam, quae se habent in appetitu sicut affirmatio +et negatio in ratione, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Et ideo tristia +et delectatio quae sunt de eodem, habent oppositionem ad invicem +secundum speciem. Tristitia vero et delectatio de diversis, si +quidem illa diversa non sint opposita, sed disparata, non habent +oppositionem ad invicem secundum rationem speciei, sed sunt etiam +disparatae, sicut tristari de morte amici, et delectari in +contemplatione. Si vero illa diversa sint contraria, tunc +delectatio et tristitia non solum non habent contrarietatem +secundum rationem speciei, sed etiam habent convenientiam et +affinitatem, sicut gaudere de bono, et tristari de malo.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Whiteness and blackness do not take their species from their relationship to something extrinsic, as pleasure and sorrow + do: wherefore the comparison does not hold. +
[35055] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod albedo et nigredo non habent speciem ex +habitudine ad aliquid exterius, sicut delectatio et tristitia. Unde +non est eadem ratio.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Genus is taken from matter, as is stated in Metaph. viii, 2; and in accidents the subject takes the place of matter. Now + it has been said above that pleasure and sorrow are generically contrary to one another. Consequently in every sorrow the + subject has a disposition contrary to the disposition of the subject of pleasure: because in every pleasure the appetite is + viewed as accepting what it possesses, and in every sorrow, as avoiding it. And + therefore on the part of the subject every pleasure is a remedy for any kind of sorrow, and every sorrow is a hindrance of + all manner of pleasure: but chiefly when pleasure is opposed to sorrow specifically. +
[35056] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod genus sumitur ex materia, ut patet in VIII Metaphys. +In accidentibus autem loco materiae est subiectum. Dictum est autem +quod delectatio et tristitia contrariantur secundum genus. Et ideo +in qualibet tristitia est contraria dispositio subiecti +dispositioni quae est in qualibet delectatione, nam in qualibet +delectatione appetitus se habet ut acceptans id quod habet; in +qualibet autem tristitia se habet ut fugiens. Et ideo ex parte +subiecti quaelibet delectatio est medicina contra quamlibet +tristitiam, et quaelibet tristitia est impeditiva cuiuslibet +delectationis, praecipue tamen quando delectatio tristitiae +contrariatur etiam secundum speciem.
Reply to Objection 3: Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is evident. Or we may say that, although not every sorrow is specifically contrary + to every pleasure, yet they are contrary to one another in regard to their effects: since one has the effect of strengthening + the animal nature, while the other results in a kind of discomfort. +
[35057] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 4 ad 3 Unde patet +solutio ad tertium. Vel aliter dicendum quod, etsi non omnis +tristitia contrarietur omni delectationi secundum speciem, tamen +quantum ad effectum contrariantur, nam ex uno confortatur natura +animalis, ex alio vero quodammodo molestatur.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that there is a sorrow that is contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. For the Apostle says ( + 2 Cor. 7:10): "The sorrow that is according to God, worketh penance steadfast unto salvation." Now to look at God belongs to the higher + reason, whose act is to give itself to contemplation, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 3,4). Therefore there is a sorrow + contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. +
[35058] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectationi contemplationis sit +aliqua tristitia contraria. Dicit enim apostolus, II ad Cor. VII, +quae secundum Deum est tristitia, poenitentiam in salutem +stabilem operatur. Sed respicere ad Deum pertinet ad superiorem +rationem, cuius est contemplationi vacare, secundum Augustinum, in +XII de Trin. Ergo delectationi contemplationis opponitur +tristitia.
+ Objection 2: Further, contrary things have contrary effects. If therefore the contemplation of one contrary gives pleasure, the other + contrary will give sorrow: and so there will be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. +
[35059] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +contrariorum contrarii sunt effectus. Si ergo unum contrariorum +contemplatum est causa delectationis, aliud erit causa tristitiae. +Et sic delectationi contemplationis erit tristitia contraria.
+ Objection 3: Further, as the object of pleasure is good, so the object of sorrow is evil. But contemplation can be an evil: since the + Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, 9) that "it is unfitting to think of certain things." Therefore sorrow can be contrary to the + pleasure of contemplation. +
[35060] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sicut obiectum delectationis est bonum, ita obiectum tristitiae est +malum. Sed contemplatio potest habere mali rationem, dicit enim +philosophus, in XII Metaphys., quod quaedam inconveniens est +meditari. Ergo contemplationis delectationi potest esse contraria +tristitia.
+ Objection 4: Further, any work, so far as it is unhindered, can be a cause of pleasure, as stated in Ethic. vii, 12,13; x, 4. But the + work of contemplation can be hindered in many ways, either so as to destroy it altogether, or as to make it difficult. Therefore + in contemplation there can be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure. +
[35061] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 arg. 4 Praeterea, +operatio quaelibet, secundum quod non est impedita, est causa +delectationis, ut dicitur in VII et X Ethic. Sed operatio +contemplationis potest multipliciter impediri, vel ut totaliter non +sit, vel ut cum difficultate sit. Ergo in contemplatione potest +esse tristitia delectationi contraria.
+ Objection 5: Further, affliction of the flesh is a cause of sorrow. But, as it is written ( + Eccles. 12:12) "much study is an affliction of the flesh." Therefore contemplation admits of sorrow contrary to its pleasure. +
[35062] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 arg. 5 Praeterea, +carnis afflictio est causa tristitiae. Sed sicut dicitur Eccle. +ult., frequens meditatio carnis est afflictio. Ergo +contemplatio habet tristitiam delectationi contrariam.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Wis. 8:16): "Her," i.e. wisdom's, "conversation hath no bitterness nor her company any tediousness; but joy and gladness." Now the + conversation and company of wisdom are found in contemplation. Therefore there is no sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. +
[35063] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Sap. VIII, non habet amaritudinem conversatio +illius scilicet sapientiae, nec taedium convictus eius; sed +laetitiam et gaudium. Conversatio autem et convictus sapientiae +est per contemplationem. Ergo nulla tristitia est quae sit +contraria delectationi contemplationis.
+ I answer that, The pleasure of contemplation can be understood in two ways. In one way, so that contemplation is the cause, but not the + object of pleasure: and then pleasure is taken not in contemplating but in the thing contemplated. Now it is possible to contemplate + something harmful and sorrowful, just as to contemplate something suitable and pleasant. Consequently if the pleasure of contemplation + be taken in this way, nothing hinders some sorrow being contrary to the + pleasure of contemplation. +
In another way, the pleasure of contemplation is understood, so that contemplation is its object and cause; as when one takes + pleasure in the very act of contemplating. And thus, according to Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii.], "no sorrow + is contrary to that pleasure which is about contemplation": and the Philosopher says the same (Topic. i, 13; Ethic. x, 3). + This, however, is to be understood as being the case properly speaking. The reason is because sorrow is of + itself contrary to pleasure in a contrary object: thus pleasure in heat is contrary to sorrow caused by cold. But there is + no contrary to the object of contemplation: because contraries, as apprehended by the mind, are not contrary, but one is the + means of knowing the other. Wherefore, properly speaking, there cannot be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. + Nor has it any sorrow annexed to it, as bodily pleasures have, which are like remedies against certain annoyances; thus a + man + takes pleasure in drinking through being troubled with thirst, but when the thirst is quite driven out, the pleasure of drinking + ceases also. Because the pleasure of contemplation is not caused by one's being quit of an annoyance, but by the fact that + contemplation is pleasant in itself: for pleasure is not a "becoming" but a perfect operation, as stated above ( + Q[31], A[1]). +
Accidentally, however, sorrow is mingled with the pleasure of contemplation; and this in two ways: first, on the part of + an organ, secondly, through some impediment in the apprehension. On the part of an organ, sorrow or pain is mingled with apprehension, + directly, as regards the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part, which have a bodily organ; either from the sensible object + disagreeing with the normal condition of the organ, as the taste of something bitter, and the smell + of something foul; or from the sensible object, though agreeable, being so continuous in its action on the sense, that it + exceeds the normal condition of the organ, as stated above ( + Q[33], A[2]), the result being that an apprehension which at first was pleasant becomes tedious. But these two things cannot occur directly + in the contemplation of the mind; because the mind has no corporeal organ: wherefore it was said in the authority quoted above + that intellectual + contemplation has neither "bitterness," nor "tediousness." Since, however, the human mind, in contemplation, makes use of + the sensitive powers of apprehension, to whose acts weariness is incidental; therefore some affliction or pain is indirectly + mingled with contemplation. +
Nevertheless, in neither of these ways, is the pain thus accidentally mingled with contemplation, contrary to the pleasure + thereof. Because pain caused by a hindrance to contemplation, is not contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, but rather + is in affinity and in harmony with it, as is evident from what has been said above + (A[4]): while pain or sorrow caused by bodily weariness, does not belong to the same genus, wherefore it is altogether disparate. + Accordingly it is evident that no sorrow is contrary to pleasure taken in the very act of contemplation; nor is any sorrow + connected with it save accidentally. +
[35064] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod delectatio contemplationis potest intelligi +dupliciter. Uno modo, ita quod contemplatio sit delectationis +causa, et non obiectum. Et tunc delectatio non est de ipsa +contemplatione, sed de re contemplata. Contingit autem contemplari +aliquid nocivum et contristans, sicut et aliquid conveniens et +delectans. Unde si sic delectatio contemplationis accipiatur, nihil +prohibet delectationi contemplationis esse tristitiam contrariam. +Alio modo potest dici delectatio contemplationis, quia contemplatio +est eius obiectum et causa, puta cum aliquis delectatur de hoc ipso +quod contemplatur. Et sic, ut dicit Gregorius Nyssenus, ei +delectationi quae est secundum contemplationem, non opponitur +aliqua tristitia. Et hoc idem philosophus dicit, in I Topic. et +in X Ethic. Sed hoc est intelligendum, per se loquendo. Cuius ratio +est, quia tristitia per se contrariatur delectationi quae est de +contrario obiecto, sicut delectationi quae est de calore, +contrariatur tristitia quae est de frigore. Obiecto autem +contemplationis nihil est contrarium, contrariorum enim rationes, +secundum quod sunt apprehensae, non sunt contrariae, sed unum +contrarium est ratio cognoscendi aliud. Unde delectationi quae est +in contemplando, non potest, per se loquendo, esse aliqua tristitia +contraria. Sed nec etiam habet tristitiam annexam, sicut corporales +delectationes, quae sunt ut medicinae quaedam contra aliquas +molestias, sicut aliquis delectatur in potu ex hoc quod anxiatur +siti, quando autem iam tota sitis est repulsa, etiam cessat +delectatio potus. Delectatio enim contemplationis non causatur ex +hoc quod excluditur aliqua molestia, sed ex hoc quod est secundum +seipsam delectabilis, non est enim generatio, sed operatio quaedam +perfecta, ut dictum est. Per accidens autem admiscetur tristitia +delectationi apprehensionis. Et hoc dupliciter, uno modo, ex parte +organi; alio modo, ex impedimento apprehensionis. Ex parte quidem +organi, admiscetur tristitia vel dolor apprehensioni, directe +quidem in viribus apprehensivis sensitivae partis, quae habent +organum corporale, vel ex sensibili, quod est contrarium debitae +complexioni organi, sicut gustus rei amarae et olfactus rei +foetidae; vel ex continuitate sensibilis convenientis, quod per +assiduitatem facit superexcrescentiam naturalis habitus, ut supra +dictum est, et sic redditur apprehensio sensibilis quae prius erat +delectabilis, taediosa. Sed haec duo directe in contemplatione +mentis locum non habent, quia mens non habet organum corporale. +Unde dictum est in auctoritate inducta, quod non habet contemplatio +mentis nec amaritudinem nec taedium. Sed quia mens humana utitur in +contemplando viribus apprehensivis sensitivis, in quarum actibus +accidit lassitudo; ideo indirecte admiscetur aliqua afflictio vel +dolor contemplationi. Sed neutro modo tristitia contemplationi per +accidens adiuncta, contrariatur delectationi eius. Nam tristitia +quae est de impedimento contemplationis, non contrariatur +delectationi contemplationis, sed magis habet affinitatem et +convenientiam cum ipsa, ut ex supradictis patet. Tristitia vero vel +afflictio quae est de lassitudine corporali, non ad idem genus +refertur, unde est penitus disparata. Et sic manifestum est quod +delectationi quae est de ipsa contemplatione, nulla tristitia +contrariatur; nec adiungitur ei aliqua tristitia nisi per +accidens.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The "sorrow which is according to God," is not caused by the very act of intellectual contemplation, but by something which + the mind contemplates: viz. by sin, which the mind considers as contrary to the love of God. +
[35065] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod illa tristitia quae est secundum Deum, non est +de ipsa contemplatione mentis, sed est de aliquo quod mens +contemplatur, scilicet de peccato, quod mens considerat ut +contrarium dilectioni divinae.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Things which are contrary according to nature are not contrary according as they exist in the mind: for things that are contrary + in reality are not contrary in the order of thought; indeed rather is one contrary the reason for knowing the other. Hence + one and the same science considers contraries. +
[35066] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod ea quae sunt contraria in rerum natura, secundum quod +sunt in mente, non habent contrarietatem. Non enim rationes +contrariorum sunt contrariae, sed magis unum contrarium est ratio +cognoscendi aliud. Propter quod est una scientia contrariorum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Contemplation, in itself, is never evil, since it is nothing else than the consideration of truth, which is the good of the + intellect: it can, however, be evil accidentally, i.e. in so far as the contemplation of a less noble object hinders the contemplation + of a more noble object; or on the part of the object contemplated, to which the appetite is inordinately attached. +
[35067] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod contemplatio, secundum se, nunquam habet rationem +mali, cum contemplatio nihil aliud sit quam consideratio veri, quod +est bonum intellectus, sed per accidens tantum, inquantum scilicet +contemplatio vilioris impedit contemplationem melioris; vel ex +parte rei contemplatae, ad quam inordinatae appetitus +afficitur.
+ Reply to Objection 4: Sorrow caused by a hindrance to contemplation, is not contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, but is in harmony with it, + as stated above. +
[35068] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod tristitia quae est de impedimento contemplationis, +non contrariatur delectationi contemplationis, sed est ei affinis, +ut dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 5: Affliction of the flesh affects contemplation accidentally and indirectly, as stated above. +
[35069] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 ad 5 Ad quintum +dicendum quod afflictio carnis per accidens et indirecte se habet +ad contemplationem mentis, ut dictum est.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 63): "There + is nobody that does not shun sorrow more than he seeks pleasure." Now that which all agree in doing, seems to be natural. + Therefore it is natural and right for sorrow to be shunned more than pleasure is sought. +
[35070] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod magis sit fugienda tristitia, quam +delectatio appetenda. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta +trium quaest., nemo est qui non magis dolorem fugiat, quam +appetat voluptatem. Illud autem in quo communiter omnia +consentiunt, videtur esse naturale. Ergo naturale est et conveniens +quod plus tristitia fugiatur, quam delectatio appetatur.
+ Objection 2: Further, the action of a contrary conduces to rapidity and intensity of movement: for "hot water freezes quicker and harder," + as the Philosopher says (Meteor. i, 12). But the shunning of sorrow is due to the contrariety of the cause of sorrow; whereas + the desire for pleasure does not arise from any contrariety, but rather from the suitableness of the pleasant object. Therefore + sorrow is shunned more eagerly than pleasure is sought. +
[35071] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, +actio contrarii facit ad velocitatem et intensionem motus, aqua +enim calida citius et fortius congelatur, ut dicit philosophus, in +libro Meteor. Sed fuga tristitiae est ex contrarietate +contristantis, appetitus autem delectationis non est ex aliqua +contrarietate, sed magis procedit ex convenientia delectantis. Ergo +maior est fuga tristitiae quam appetitus delectationis.
+ Objection 3: Further, the stronger the passion which a man resists according to reason, the more worthy is he of praise, and the more + virtuous: since "virtue is concerned with the difficult and the good" (Ethic. ii, 3). But the brave man who resists the movement + of shunning sorrow, is more virtuous than the temperate man, who resists the movement of desire for pleasure: since the Philosopher + says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "the brave and the just are chiefly praised." Therefore + the movement of shunning sorrow is more eager than the movement of seeking pleasure. +
[35072] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, +quanto aliquis secundum rationem fortiori passioni repugnat, tanto +laudabilior est et virtuosior, quia virtus est circa difficile et +bonum, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed fortis, qui resistit motui quo +fugitur dolor, est virtuosior quam temperatus, qui resistit motui +quo appetitur delectatio, dicit enim philosophus, in II Rhetoric., +quod fortes et iusti maxime honorantur. Ergo vehementior est motus +quo fugitur tristitia, quam motus quo appetitur delectatio.
+ On the contrary, Good is stronger than evil, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). But pleasure is desirable for the sake of the good which + is its object; whereas the shunning of sorrow is on account of evil. Therefore the desire for pleasure is more eager than + the shunning of sorrow. +
[35073] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra, +bonum est fortius quam malum, ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap. de +Div. Nom. Sed delectatio est appetibilis propter bonum, quod est +eius obiectum, fuga autem tristitiae est propter malum. Ergo +fortior est appetitus delectationis quam fuga tristitiae.
+ I answer that, The desire for pleasure is of itself more eager than the shunning of sorrow. The reason of this is that the cause of pleasure + is a suitable good; while the cause of pain or sorrow is an unsuitable evil. Now it happens that a certain good is suitable + without any repugnance at all: but it is not possible for any evil to be so unsuitable as not to be suitable in some way. + Wherefore pleasure can be entire and perfect: whereas sorrow is always partial. Therefore + desire for pleasure is naturally greater than the shunning of sorrow. Another reason is because the good, which is the object + of pleasure, is sought for its own sake: whereas the evil, which is the object of sorrow, is to be shunned as being a privation + of good: and that which is by reason of itself is stronger than that which is by reason of something else. Moreover we find + a confirmation of this in natural movements. For every natural movement is more intense in the end, when a thing + approaches the term that is suitable to its nature, than at the beginning, when it leaves the term that is unsuitable to its + nature: as though nature were more eager in tending to what is suitable to it, than in shunning what is unsuitable. Therefore + the inclination of the appetitive power is, of itself, more eager in tending to pleasure than in shunning sorrow. +
But it happens accidentally that a man shuns sorrow more eagerly than he seeks pleasure: and this for three reasons. First, + on the part of the apprehension. Because, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), "love is felt more keenly, when we lack that + which we love." Now from the lack of what we love, sorrow results, which is caused either by the loss of some loved good, + or by the presence of some contrary evil. But pleasure suffers no lack of the good loved, for it rests in + possession of it. Since then love is the cause of pleasure and sorrow, the latter is more the shunned, according as love is + the more keenly felt on account of that which is contrary to it. Secondly, on the part of the cause of sorrow or pain, which + cause is repugnant to a good that is more loved than the good in which we take pleasure. For we love the natural well-being + of the body more than the pleasure of eating: and consequently we would leave the pleasure of eating and the like, from fear + of the pain occasioned by blows or other such causes, which are contrary to the well-being of the body. Thirdly, on the part + of the effect: namely, in so far as sorrow hinders not only one pleasure, but all. +
[35074] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 6 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, per se loquendo, appetitus delectationis est fortior +quam fuga tristitiae. Cuius ratio est, quia causa delectationis est +bonum conveniens, causa autem doloris sive tristitiae est aliquod +malum repugnans. Contingit autem aliquod bonum esse conveniens +absque omni dissonantia, non autem potest esse aliquod malum +totaliter, absque omni convenientia, repugnans. Unde delectatio +potest esse integra et perfecta, tristitia autem est semper +secundum partem. Unde naturaliter maior est appetitus delectationis +quam fuga tristitiae. Alia vero ratio est, quia bonum, quod est +obiectum delectationis, propter seipsum appetitur, malum autem, +quod est obiectum tristitiae, est fugiendum inquantum est privatio +boni. Quod autem est per se, potius est illo quod est per aliud. +Cuius etiam signum apparet in motibus naturalibus. Nam omnis motus +naturalis intensior est in fine, cum appropinquat ad terminum suae +naturae convenientem, quam in principio, cum recedit a termino suae +naturae non convenienti, quasi natura magis tendat in id quod est +sibi conveniens, quam fugiat id quod est sibi repugnans. Unde et +inclinatio appetitivae virtutis, per se loquendo, vehementius +tendit in delectationem quam fugiat tristitiam. Sed per accidens +contingit quod tristitiam aliquis magis fugit, quam delectationem +appetat. Et hoc tripliciter. Primo quidem, ex parte apprehensionis. +Quia, ut Augustinus dicit, X de Trin., amor magis sentitur, cum +eum prodit indigentia. Ex indigentia autem amati procedit +tristitia, quae est ex amissione alicuius boni amati, vel ex +incursu alicuius mali contrarii. Delectatio autem non habet +indigentiam boni amati, sed quiescit in eo iam adepto. Cum igitur +amor sit causa delectationis et tristitiae, tanto magis fugitur +tristitia, quanto magis sentitur amor ex eo quod contrariatur +amori. Secundo, ex parte causae contristantis, vel dolorem +inferentis, quae repugnat bono magis amato quam sit bonum illud in +quo delectamur. Magis enim amamus consistentiam corporis naturalem, +quam delectationem cibi. Et ideo timore doloris qui provenit ex +flagellis vel aliis huiusmodi, quae contrariantur bonae +consistentiae corporis, dimittimus delectationem ciborum vel +aliorum huiusmodi. Tertio, ex parte effectus, inquantum scilicet +tristitia impedit non unam tantum delectationem, sed omnes.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The saying of Augustine that "sorrow is shunned more than pleasure is sought" is true accidentally but not simply. And this + is clear from what he says after: "Since we see that the most savage animals are deterred from the greatest pleasures by fear + of pain," which pain is contrary to life which is loved above all. +
[35075] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod illud quod Augustinus dicit, quod dolor magis +fugitur quam voluptas appetatur, est verum per accidens, et non +per se. Et hoc patet ex eo quod subdit, quandoquidem videmus +etiam immanissimas bestias a maximis voluptatibus absterreri +dolorum metu, qui contrariatur vitae, quae maxime amatur.
+ Reply to Objection 2: It is not the same with movement from within and movement from without. For movement from within tends to what is suitable + more than it recedes from that which is unsuitable; as we remarked above in regard to natural movement. But movement from + without is intensified by the very opposition: because each thing strives in its own way to resist anything contrary to it, + as aiming at its own preservation. Hence violent movement is intense at first, and + slackens towards the end. Now the movement of the appetitive faculty is from within: since it tends from the soul to the object. + Consequently pleasure is, of itself, more to be sought than sorrow is to be shunned. But the movement of the sensitive faculty + is from without, as it were from the object of the soul. Consequently the more contrary a thing is the more it is felt. And + then too, accidentally, in so far as the senses are requisite for pleasure and pain, pain is shunned more than pleasure + is sought. +
[35076] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod aliter est in motu qui est ab interiori, et aliter in +motu qui est ab exteriori. Motus enim qui est ab interiori, magis +tendit in id quod est conveniens, quam recedat a contrario, sicut +supra dictum est de motu naturali. Sed motus qui est ab extrinseco, +intenditur ex ipsa contrarietate, quia unumquodque suo modo nititur +ad resistendum contrario, sicut ad conservationem sui ipsius. Unde +motus violentus intenditur in principio, et remittitur in fine. +Motus autem appetitivae partis est ab intrinseco, cum sit ab anima +ad res. Et ideo, per se loquendo, magis appetitur delectatio quam +fugiatur tristitia. Sed motus sensitivae partis est ab exteriori, +quasi a rebus ad animam. Unde magis sentitur quod est magis +contrarium. Et sic etiam per accidens, inquantum sensus requiritur +ad delectationem et tristitiam, magis fugitur tristitia quam +delectatio appetatur.
+ Reply to Objection 3: A brave man is not praised because, in accordance with reason, he is not overcome by any kind of sorrow or pain whatever, + but because he is not overcome by that which is concerned with the dangers of death. And this kind of sorrow is more shunned, + than pleasures of the table or of sexual intercourse are sought, which latter pleasures are the object of temperance: thus + life is loved more than food and sexual pleasure. But the temperate man is praised + for refraining from pleasures of touch, more than for not shunning the pains which are contrary to them, as is stated in Ethic. + iii, 11. +
[35077] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod fortis non laudatur ex eo quod secundum rationem non +vincitur a dolore vel tristitia quacumque, sed ea quae consistit in +periculis mortis. Quae quidem tristitia magis fugitur quam +appetatur delectatio ciborum vel venereorum, circa quam est +temperantia, sicut vita magis amatur quam cibus vel coitus. Sed +temperatus magis laudatur ex hoc quod non prosequitur delectationes +tactus, quam ex hoc quod non fugit tristitias contrarias, ut patet +in III Ethic.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that outward pain is greater than interior sorrow of the heart. Because outward pain arises from a cause repugnant + to the well-being of the body in which is life: whereas interior sorrow is caused by some evil in the imagination. Since, + therefore, life is loved more than an imagined good, it seems that, according to what has been said above + (A[6]), outward pain is greater than interior sorrow. +
[35078] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod dolor exterior sit maior quam dolor +cordis interior. Dolor enim exterior causatur ex causa repugnante +bonae consistentiae corporis, in quo est vita, dolor autem interior +causatur ex aliqua imaginatione mali. Cum ergo vita magis ametur +quam imaginatum bonum, videtur, secundum praedicta, quod dolor +exterior sit maior quam dolor interior.
+ Objection 2: Further, the reality moves more than its likeness does. But outward pain arises from the real conjunction of some contrary; + whereas inward sorrow arises from the apprehended likeness of a contrary. Therefore outward pain is greater than inward sorrow. +
[35079] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, +res magis movet quam rei similitudo. Sed dolor exterior provenit ex +reali coniunctione alicuius contrarii, dolor autem interior ex +similitudine contrarii apprehensa. Ergo maior est dolor exterior +quam dolor interior.
+ Objection 3: Further, a cause is known by its effect. But outward pain has more striking effects: since man dies sooner of outward pain + than of interior sorrow. Therefore outward pain is greater and is shunned more than interior sorrow. +
[35080] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, +causa ex effectu cognoscitur. Sed dolor exterior habet fortiores +effectus, facilius enim homo moritur propter dolores exteriores +quam propter dolorem interiorem. Ergo exterior dolor est maior, et +magis fugitur, quam dolor interior.
+ On the contrary, it is written ( + Ecclus. 25:17): "The sadness of the heart is every wound [Douay: 'plague'], and the wickedness of a woman is all evil." Therefore, just + as the wickedness of a woman surpasses all other wickedness, as the text implies; so sadness of the heart surpasses every + outward wound. +
[35081] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Eccli. XXV, omnis plaga tristitia cordis est, +et omnis malitia nequitia mulieris. Ergo, sicut nequitia +mulieris alias nequitias superat, ut ibi intenditur; ita tristitia +cordis omnem plagam exteriorem excedit.
+ I answer that, Interior and exterior pain agree in one point and differ in two. They agree in this, that each is a movement of the appetitive + power, as stated above + (A[1]). But they differ in respect of those two things which are requisite for pain and pleasure; namely, in respect of the cause, + which is a conjoined good or evil; and in respect of the apprehension. For the cause of outward pain is a conjoined evil repugnant + to the body; while the + cause of inward pain is a conjoined evil repugnant to the appetite. Again, outward pain arises from an apprehension of sense, + chiefly of touch; while inward pain arises from an interior apprehension, of the imagination or of the reason. +
If then we compare the cause of inward pain to the cause of outward pain, the former belongs, of itself, to the appetite + to which both these pains belong: while the latter belongs to the appetite directly. Because inward pain arises from something + being repugnant to the appetite itself, while outward pain arises from something being repugnant to the appetite, through + being repugnant to the body. Now, that which is of itself is always prior to that which is by reason of another. + Wherefore, from this point of view, inward pain surpasses outward pain. In like manner also on the part of apprehension: because + the apprehension of reason and imagination is of a higher order than the apprehension of the sense of touch. Consequently + inward pain is, simply and of itself, more keen than outward pain: a sign whereof is that one willingly undergoes outward + pain in order to avoid inward pain: and in so far as outward pain is not repugnant to the interior appetite, it becomes in + a + manner pleasant and agreeable by way of inward joy. Sometimes, however, outward pain is accompanied by inward pain, and then + the pain is increased. Because inward pain is not only greater than outward pain, it is also more universal: since whatever + is repugnant to the body, can be repugnant to the interior appetite; and whatever is apprehended by sense may be apprehended + by imagination and reason, but not conversely. Hence in the passage quoted above it is said expressively: "Sadness of the + heart is every wound," because even the pains of outward wounds are comprised in the interior sorrows of the heart. +
[35082] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 7 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod dolor interior et exterior in uno conveniunt, et in +duobus differunt. Conveniunt quidem in hoc, quod uterque est motus +appetitivae virtutis, ut supra dictum est. Differunt autem secundum +illa duo quae ad tristitiam et delectationem requiruntur, scilicet +secundum causam, quae est bonum vel malum coniunctum; et secundum +apprehensionem. Causa enim doloris exterioris est malum coniunctum +quod repugnat corpori, causa autem interioris doloris est malum +coniunctum quod repugnat appetitui. Dolor etiam exterior sequitur +apprehensionem sensus, et specialiter tactus, dolor autem interior +sequitur apprehensionem interiorem, imaginationis scilicet vel +etiam rationis. Si ergo comparatur causa interioris doloris ad +causam exterioris, una per se pertinet ad appetitum, cuius est +uterque dolor, alia vero per aliud. Nam dolor interior est ex hoc +quod aliquid repugnat ipsi appetitui, exterior autem dolor, ex hoc +quod repugnat appetitui quia repugnat corpori. Semper autem quod +est per se, prius est eo quod est per aliud. Unde ex parte ista, +dolor interior praeeminet dolori exteriori. Similiter etiam ex +parte apprehensionis. Nam apprehensio rationis et imaginationis +altior est quam apprehensio sensu tactus. Unde simpliciter et per +se loquendo, dolor interior potior est quam dolor exterior. Cuius +signum est, quod etiam dolores exteriores aliquis voluntarie +suscipit, ut evitet interiorem dolorem. Et inquantum non repugnat +dolor exterior interiori appetitui, fit quodammodo delectabilis et +iucundus interiori gaudio. Quandoque tamen dolor exterior est cum +interiori dolore, et tunc dolor augetur. Non solum enim interior +dolor est maior quam exterior, sed etiam universalior. Quidquid +enim est repugnans corpori, potest esse repugnans interiori +appetitui; et quidquid apprehenditur sensu, potest apprehendi +imaginatione et ratione; sed non convertitur. Et ideo signanter in +auctoritate adducta dicitur, omnis plaga tristitia cordis est, quia +etiam dolores exteriorum plagarum sub interiori cordis tristitia +comprehenduntur.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Inward pain can also arise from things that are destructive of life. And then the comparison of inward to outward pain must + not be taken in reference to the various evils that cause pain; but in regard to the various ways in which this cause of pain + is compared to the appetite. +
[35083] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod dolor interior potest etiam esse de his quae +contrariantur vitae. Et sic comparatio doloris interioris ad +exteriorem non est accipienda secundum diversa mala quae sunt causa +doloris, sed secundum diversam comparationem huius causae doloris +ad appetitum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Inward pain is not caused by the apprehended likeness of a thing: for a man is not inwardly pained by the apprehended likeness + itself, but by the thing which the likeness represents. And this thing is all the more perfectly apprehended by means of its + likeness, as this likeness is more immaterial and abstract. Consequently inward pain is, of itself, greater, as being caused + by a greater evil, forasmuch as evil is better known by an inward + apprehension. +
[35084] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod tristitia interior non procedit ex similitudine rei +apprehensa, sicut ex causa, non enim homo tristatur interius de +ipsa similitudine apprehensa, sed de re cuius est similitudo. Quae +quidem res tanto perfectius apprehenditur per aliquam +similitudinem, quanto similitudo est magis immaterialis et +abstracta. Et ideo dolor interior, per se loquendo, est maior, +tanquam de maiori malo existens; propter hoc quod interiori +apprehensione magis cognoscitur malum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Bodily changes are more liable to be caused by outward pain, both from the fact that outward pain is caused by a corruptive + conjoined corporally, which is a necessary condition of the sense of touch; and from the fact that the outward sense is more + material than the inward sense, just as the sensitive appetite is more material than the intellective. For this reason, as + stated above ( + Q[22], A[3]; + Q[31], + A[5] + ), the body undergoes a greater change from the movement of the sensitive appetite: and, in like manner, from outward than + from inward pain. +
[35085] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod immutationes corporales magis causantur ex dolore +exteriori, tum quia causa doloris exterioris est corrumpens +coniunctum corporaliter, quod exigit apprehensio tactus. Tum etiam +quia sensus exterior est magis corporalis quam sensus interior, +sicut et appetitus sensitivus quam intellectivus. Et propter hoc, +ut supra dictum est, ex motu appetitus sensitivi magis corpus +immutatur. Et similiter ex dolore exteriori, magis quam ex dolore +interiori.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that Damascene's (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) division of sorrow into four species is incorrect; viz. into "torpor, + distress," which Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] calls "anxiety,"---"pity," and "envy." For sorrow is contrary + to pleasure. But there are not several species of pleasure. Therefore it is incorrect to assign different species of sorrow. +
[35086] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod Damascenus inconvenienter quatuor +tristitiae species assignet, quae sunt acedia, achthos (vel +anxietas secundum Gregorium Nyssenum), misericordia et invidia. +Tristitia enim delectationi opponitur. Sed delectationis non +assignantur aliquae species. Ergo nec tristitiae species debent +assignari.
+ Objection 2: Further, "Repentance" is a species of sorrow; and so are "indignation" and "jealousy," as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, + 9,11). But these are not included in the above species. Therefore this division is insufficient. +
[35087] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, +poenitentia est quaedam species tristitiae. Similiter etiam Nemesis +et zelus, ut dicit philosophus, II Rhetoric. Quae quidem sub his +speciebus non comprehenduntur. Ergo insufficiens est eius praedicta +divisio.
+ Objection 3: Further, the members of a division should be things that are opposed to one another. But these species are not opposed to + one another. For according to Gregory [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] "torpor is sorrow depriving of speech; anxiety is the + sorrow that weighs down; envy is sorrow for another's good; pity is sorrow for another's wrongs." But it is possible for one + to sorrow for another's wrongs, and for another's good, and at the same time to be weighed + down inwardly, and outwardly to be speechless. Therefore this division is correct. +
[35088] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, +omnis divisio debet esse per opposita. Sed praedicta non habent +oppositionem ad invicem. Nam secundum Gregorium acedia est +tristitia vocem amputans; anxietas vero est tristitia aggravans; +invidia vero est tristitia in alienis bonis; misericordia autem est +tristitia in alienis malis. Contingit autem aliquem tristari et +de alienis malis, et de alienis bonis et simul cum hoc interius +aggravari, et exterius vocem amittere. Ergo praedicta divisio non +est conveniens.
+ On the contrary, stands the twofold authority of Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius] and of Damascene. +
[35089] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra +est auctoritas utriusque, scilicet Gregorii Nysseni et +Damasceni.
+ I answer that, It belongs to the notion of a species that it is something added to the genus. But a thing can be added to a genus in two + ways. First, as something belonging of itself to the genus, and virtually contained therein: thus "rational" is added to "animal." + Such an addition makes true species of a genus: as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vii, 12; viii, 2,3). But, secondly, a thing + may be added to a genus, that is, as it were, foreign to the notion conveyed by that + genus: thus "white" or something of the kind may be added to "animal." Such an addition does not make true species of the + genus, according to the usual sense in which we speak of genera and species. But sometimes a thing is said to be a species + of a certain genus, through having something foreign to that genus indeed, but to which the notion of that genus is applicable: + thus a live coal or a flame is said to be a species of fire, because in each of them the nature of fire is applied to a + foreign matter. In like manner we speak of astronomy and perspective as being species of mathematics, inasmuch as the principles + of mathematics are applied to natural matter. +
In accordance with this manner of speaking, the species of sorrow are reckoned by an application of the notion of sorrow + to something foreign to it. This foreign matter may be taken on the part of the cause or the object, or of the effect. For + the proper object of sorrow is "one's own evil." Hence sorrow may be concerned for an object foreign to it either through + one's being sorry for an evil that is not one's own; and thus we have "pity" which is sorrow for another's evil, + considered, however, as one's own: or through one's being sorry for something that is neither evil nor one's own, but another's + good, considered, however, as one's own evil: and thus we have "envy." The proper effect of sorrow consists in a certain "flight + of the appetite." Wherefore the foreign element in the effect of sorrow, may be taken so as to affect the first part only, + by excluding flight: and thus we have "anxiety" which weighs on the mind, so as to make escape seem impossible: hence + it is also called "perplexity." If, however, the mind be weighed down so much, that even the limbs become motionless, which + belongs to "torpor," then we have the foreign element affecting both, since there is neither flight, nor is the effect in + the appetite. And the reason why torpor especially is said to deprive one of speech is because of all the external movements + the voice is the best expression of the inward thought and desire, not only in men, but also in other animals, as is stated + in + Polit. i, 1. +
[35090] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 8 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod ad rationem speciei pertinet quod se habeat ex +additione ad genus. Sed generi potest aliquid addi dupliciter. Uno +modo, quod per se ad ipsum pertinet, et virtute continetur in ipso, +sicut rationale additur animali. Et talis additio facit veras +species alicuius generis, ut per philosophum patet, in VII et VIII +Metaphys. Aliquid vero additur generi quasi aliquid extraneum a +ratione ipsius, sicut si album animali addatur, vel aliquid +huiusmodi. Et talis additio non facit veras species generis, +secundum quod communiter loquimur de genere et speciebus. Interdum +tamen dicitur aliquid esse species alicuius generis propter hoc +quod habet aliquid extraneum ad quod applicatur generis ratio, +sicut carbo et flamma dicuntur esse species ignis, propter +applicationem naturae ignis ad materiam alienam. Et simili modo +loquendi dicuntur astrologia et perspectiva species mathematicae, +inquantum principia mathematica applicantur ad materiam naturalem. +Et hoc modo loquendi assignantur hic species tristitiae, per +applicationem rationis tristitiae ad aliquid extraneum. Quod quidem +extraneum accipi potest vel ex parte causae, obiecti; vel ex parte +effectus. Proprium enim obiectum tristitiae est proprium malum. +Unde extraneum obiectum tristitiae accipi potest vel secundum +alterum tantum, quia scilicet est malum, sed non proprium, et sic +est misericordia, quae est tristitia de alieno malo, inquantum +tamen aestimatur ut proprium. Vel quantum ad utrumque, quia neque +est de proprio, neque de malo, sed de bono alieno, inquantum tamen +bonum alienum aestimatur ut proprium malum, et sic est invidia. +Proprius autem effectus tristitiae consistit in quadam fuga +appetitus. Unde extraneum circa effectum tristitiae, potest accipi +quantum ad alterum tantum, quia scilicet tollitur fuga, et sic est +anxietas quae sic aggravat animum, ut non appareat aliquod +refugium, unde alio nomine dicitur angustia. Si vero intantum +procedat talis aggravatio, ut etiam exteriora membra immobilitet ab +opere, quod pertinet ad acediam; sic erit extraneum quantum ad +utrumque, quia nec est fuga, nec est in appetitu. Ideo autem +specialiter acedia dicitur vocem amputare, quia vox inter omnes +exteriores motus magis exprimit interiorem conceptum et affectum, +non solum in hominibus, sed etiam in aliis animalibus, ut dicitur +in I Polit.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Pleasure is caused by good, which has only one meaning: and so pleasure is not divided into several species as sorrow is; + for the latter is caused by evil, which "happens in many ways," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). +
[35091] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod delectatio causatur ex bono, quod uno modo +dicitur. Et ideo delectationis non assignantur tot species sicut +tristitiae, quae causatur ex malo, quod multifariam contingit, ut +dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Repentance is for one's own evil, which is the proper object of sorrow: wherefore it does not belong to these species. Jealousy + and indignation are included in envy, as we shall explain later ( + SS, Q[36], A[2]). +
[35092] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod poenitentia est de malo proprio, quod per se est +obiectum tristitiae. Unde non pertinet ad has species. Zelus vero +et Nemesis sub invidia continentur, ut infra patebit.
+ Reply to Objection 3: This division is not according to opposite species; but according to the diversity of foreign matter to which the notion + of sorrow is applied, as stated above. +
[35093] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod divisio ista non sumitur secundum oppositiones +specierum, sed secundum diversitatem extraneorum ad quae trahitur +ratio tristitiae, ut dictum est.
We must now consider the causes of sorrow: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether sorrow is caused by the loss of a good or rather by the presence of an evil?
(2) Whether desire is a cause of sorrow?
+[35094] +Iª-IIae q. 36 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +causis tristitiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum +causa doloris sit bonum amissum, vel magis malum coniunctum. +Secundo, utrum concupiscentia sit causa doloris. Tertio, utrum +appetitus unitatis sit causa doloris. Quarto, utrum potestas cui +resisti non potest, sit causa doloris.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is caused by the loss of a good rather than by the presence of an evil. For Augustine says (De + viii QQ. Dulcit. qu. 1) that sorrow is caused by the loss of temporal goods. Therefore, in like manner, every sorrow is caused + by the loss of some good. +
[35095] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonum amissum sit magis causa doloris +quam malum coniunctum. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de octo +quaestionibus Dulcitii, dolorem esse de amissione bonorum +temporalium. Eadem ergo ratione, quilibet dolor ex amissione +alicuius boni contingit.
+ Objection 2: Further, it was said above ( + Q[35], A[4]) that the sorrow which is contrary to a pleasure, has the same object as that pleasure. But the object of pleasure is good, + as stated above ( + Q[23], A[4]; + Q[31], A[1]; + Q[35], A[3]). Therefore sorrow is caused chiefly by the loss of good. +
[35096] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +supra dictum est quod dolor qui delectationi contrariatur, est de +eodem de quo est delectatio. Sed delectatio est de bono, sicut +supra dictum est. Ergo dolor est principaliter de amissione +boni.
+ Objection 3: Further, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), love is the cause of sorrow, as of the other emotions of the soul. + But the object of love is good. Therefore pain or sorrow is felt for the loss of good rather than for an evil that is present. +
[35097] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +secundum Augustinum, XIV de Civ. Dei, amor est causa tristitiae, +sicut et aliarum affectionum animae. Sed obiectum amoris est bonum. +Ergo dolor vel tristitia magis respicit bonum amissum quam malum +coniunctum.
+ On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "the dreaded evil gives rise to fear, the present evil is the cause of sorrow." +
[35098] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Damascenus dicit, in II libro, quod expectatum malum +timorem constituit, praesens vero tristitiam.
+ I answer that, If privations, as considered by the mind, were what they are in reality, this question would seem to be of no importance. + For, as stated in the + FP, Q[14], A[10] and + FP, Q[48], A[3], evil is the privation of good: and privation is in reality nothing else than the lack of the contrary habit; so that, in + this respect, to sorrow for the loss of good, would be the same as to sorrow for the presence of evil. But + sorrow is a movement of the appetite in consequence of an apprehension: and even a privation, as apprehended, has the aspect + of a being, wherefore it is called "a being of reason." And in this way evil, being a privation, is regarded as a "contrary." + Accordingly, so far as the movement of the appetite is concerned, it makes a difference which of the two it regards chiefly, + the present evil or the good which is lost. +
Again, since the movement of the animal appetite holds the same place in the actions of the soul, as natural movement in + natural things; the truth of the matter is to be found by considering natural movements. For if, in natural movements, we + observe those of approach and withdrawal, approach is of itself directed to something suitable to nature; while withdrawal + is of itself directed to something contrary to nature; thus a heavy body, of itself, withdraws from a higher place, + and approaches naturally to a lower place. But if we consider the cause of both these movements, viz. gravity, then gravity + itself inclines towards the lower place more than it withdraws from the higher place, since withdrawal from the latter is + the reason for its downward tendency. +
Accordingly, since, in the movements of the appetite, sorrow is a kind of flight or withdrawal, while pleasure is a kind + of pursuit or approach; just as pleasure regards first the good possessed, as its proper object, so sorrow regards the evil + that is present. On the other hand love, which is the cause of pleasure and sorrow, regards good rather than evil: and therefore, + forasmuch as the object is the cause of a passion, the present evil is more properly the cause of sorrow or + pain, than the good which is lost. +
[35099] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, si hoc modo se haberent privationes in apprehensione +animae, sicut se habent in ipsis rebus, ista quaestio nullius +momenti esse videretur. Malum enim, ut in primo libro habitum est, +est privatio boni, privatio autem, in rerum natura, nihil est aliud +quam carentia oppositi habitus, secundum hoc ergo, idem esset +tristari de bono amisso, et de malo habito. Sed tristitia est motus +appetitus apprehensionem sequentis. In apprehensione autem ipsa +privatio habet rationem cuiusdam entis, unde dicitur ens rationis. +Et sic malum, cum sit privatio, se habet per modum contrarii. Et +ideo, quantum ad motum appetitivum, differt utrum respiciat +principalius malum coniunctum, vel bonum amissum. Et quia motus +appetitus animalis hoc modo se habet in operibus animae, sicut +motus naturalis in rebus naturalibus; ex consideratione naturalium +motuum veritas accipi potest. Si enim accipiamus in motibus +naturalibus accessum et recessum, accessus per se respicit id quod +est conveniens naturae; recessus autem per se respicit id quod est +contrarium; sicut grave per se recedit a loco superiori, accedit +autem naturaliter ad locum inferiorem. Sed si accipiamus causam +utriusque motus, scilicet gravitatem, ipsa gravitas per prius +inclinat ad locum deorsum, quam retrahat a loco sursum, a quo +recedit ut deorsum tendat. Sic igitur, cum tristitia in motibus +appetitivis se habeat per modum fugae vel recessus, delectatio +autem per modum prosecutionis vel accessus; sicut delectatio per +prius respicit bonum adeptum, quasi proprium obiectum, ita +tristitia respicit malum coniunctum. Sed causa delectationis et +tristitiae, scilicet amor, per prius respicit bonum quam malum. Sic +ergo eo modo quo obiectum est causa passionis, magis proprie est +causa tristitiae vel doloris malum coniunctum, quam bonum +amissum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The loss itself of good is apprehended as an evil, just as the loss of evil is apprehended as a good: and in this sense Augustine + says that pain results from the loss of temporal goods. +
[35100] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ipsa amissio boni apprehenditur sub ratione +mali, sicut et amissio mali apprehenditur sub ratione boni. Et ideo +Augustinus dicit dolorem provenire ex amissione temporalium +bonorum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Pleasure and its contrary pain have the same object, but under contrary aspects: because if the presence of a particular + thin be the object of pleasure, the absence of that same thing is the object of sorrow. Now one contrary includes the privation + of the other, as stated in Metaph. x, 4: and consequently sorrow in respect of one contrary is, in a way, directed to the + same thing under a contrary aspect. +
[35101] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod delectatio et dolor ei contrarius respiciunt idem, +sed sub contraria ratione, nam si delectatio est de praesentia +alicuius, tristitia est de absentia eiusdem. In uno autem +contrariorum includitur privatio alterius, ut patet in X Metaphys. +Et inde est quod tristitia quae est de contrario, est quodammodo de +eodem sub contraria ratione.
+ Reply to Objection 3: When many movements arise from one cause, it does not follow that they all regard chiefly that which the cause regards chiefly, + but only the first of them. And each of the others regards chiefly that which is suitable to it according to its own nature. +
[35102] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, quando ex una causa proveniunt multi motus, non +oportet quod omnes principalius respiciant illud quod principalius +respicit causa, sed primus tantum. Unusquisque autem aliorum +principalius respicit illud quod est ei conveniens secundum +propriam rationem.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that desire is not a cause of pain or sorrow. Because sorrow of itself regards evil, as stated above + (A[1]): whereas desire is a movement of the appetite towards good. Now movement towards one contrary is not a cause of movement + towards the other contrary. Therefore desire is not a cause of pain. +
[35103] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod concupiscentia non sit causa doloris +seu tristitiae. Tristitia enim per se respicit malum, ut dictum +est. Concupiscentia autem est motus quidam appetitus in bonum. +Motus autem qui est in unum contrarium, non est causa motus qui +respicit aliud contrarium. Ergo concupiscentia non est causa +doloris.
+ Objection 2: Further, pain, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12), is caused by something present; whereas the object of desire + is something future. Therefore desire is not a cause of pain. +
[35104] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +dolor, secundum Damascenum, est de praesenti, concupiscentia autem +est de futuro. Ergo concupiscentia non est causa doloris.
+ Objection 3: Further, that which is pleasant in itself is not a cause of pain. But desire is pleasant in itself, as the Philosopher says + (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore desire is not a cause of pain or sorrow. +
[35105] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +id quod est per se delectabile, non est causa doloris. Sed +concupiscentia est secundum seipsam delectabilis, ut philosophus +dicit, in I Rhetoric. Ergo concupiscentia non est causa doloris seu +tristitiae.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xxiv): "When ignorance of things necessary to be done, and desire of things hurtful, found their + way in: error and pain stole an entrance in their company." But ignorance is the cause of error. Therefore desire is a cause + of sorrow. +
[35106] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., subintrantibus +ignorantia agendarum rerum, et concupiscentia noxiarum, comites +subinferuntur error et dolor. Sed ignorantia est causa erroris. +Ergo concupiscentia est causa doloris.
+ I answer that, Sorrow is a movement of the animal appetite. Now, as stated above + (A[1]), the appetitive movement is likened to the natural appetite; a likeness, that may be assigned to a twofold cause; one, on + the part of the end, the other, on the part of the principle of movement. Thus, on the part of the end, the cause of a heavy + body's downward movement is the lower place; while the principle of that movement is a natural inclination resulting + from gravity. +
Now the cause of the appetitive movement, on the part of the end, is the object of that movement. And thus, it has been said + above + (A[1]) that the cause of pain or sorrow is a present evil. On the other hand, the cause, by way or principle, of that movement, + is the inward inclination of the appetite; which inclination regards, first of all, the good, and in consequence, the rejection + of a contrary evil. Hence the first principle of this appetitive + movement is love, which is the first inclination of the appetite towards the possession of good: while the second principle + is hatred, which is the first inclination of the appetite towards the avoidance of evil. But since concupiscence or desire + is the first effect of love, which gives rise to the greatest pleasure, as stated above (Q[32], A[6]); hence it is that Augustine + often speaks of desire or concupiscence in the sense of love, as was also stated (Q[30], A[2], ad 2): and in this sense he + says that desire is the universal cause of sorrow. Sometimes, however, desire taken in its proper sense, is the cause of sorrow. + Because whatever hinders a movement from reaching its end is contrary to that movement. Now that which is contrary to the + movement of the appetite, is a cause of sorrow. Consequently, desire becomes a cause of sorrow, in so far as we sorrow for + the delay of a desired good, or for its entire removal. But it cannot be a universal cause of sorrow: since we sorrow more + for the loss of present good, in which we have already taken pleasure, than for the withdrawal of future good which we desire + to have. +
[35107] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod tristitia est motus quidam appetitus animalis. Motus +autem appetitivus habet, sicut dictum est, similitudinem appetitus +naturalis. Cuius duplex causa assignari potest, una per modum +finis; alia sicut unde est principium motus. Sicut descensionis +corporis gravis causa sicut finis, est locus deorsum, principium +autem motus est inclinatio naturalis, quae est ex gravitate. Causa +autem motus appetitivi per modum finis, est eius obiectum. Et sic +supra dictum est quod causa doloris seu tristitiae est malum +coniunctum. Causa autem sicut unde est principium talis motus, est +interior inclinatio appetitus. Qui quidem per prius inclinatur ad +bonum; et ex consequenti ad repudiandum malum contrarium. Et ideo +huiusmodi motus appetitivi primum principium est amor, qui est +prima inclinatio appetitus ad bonum consequendum, secundum autem +principium est odium, quod est inclinatio prima appetitus ad malum +fugiendum. Sed quia concupiscentia vel cupiditas est primus +effectus amoris, quo maxime delectamur, ut supra dictum est; ideo +frequenter Augustinus cupiditatem vel concupiscentiam pro amore +ponit, ut etiam supra dictum est. Et hoc modo concupiscentiam dicit +esse universalem causam doloris. Sed ipsa concupiscentia, secundum +propriam rationem considerata, est interdum causa doloris. Omne +enim quod impedit motum ne perveniat ad terminum, est contrarium +motui. Illud autem quod est contrarium motui appetitus, est +contristans. Et sic per consequens concupiscentia fit causa +tristitiae, inquantum de retardatione boni concupiti, vel totali +ablatione, tristamur. Universalis autem causa doloris esse non +potest, quia magis dolemus de subtractione bonorum praesentium, in +quibus iam delectamur, quam futurorum, quae concupiscimus.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The inclination of the appetite to the possession of good causes the inclination of the appetite to fly from evil, as stated + above. And hence it is that the appetitive movements that regard good, are reckoned as causing the appetitive movements that + regard evil. +
[35108] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod inclinatio appetitus ad bonum consequendum, est +causa inclinationis appetitus ad malum fugiendum, sicut dictum est. +Et ex hoc contingit quod motus appetitivi qui respiciunt bonum, +ponuntur causa motuum appetitus qui respiciunt malum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: That which is desired, though really future, is, nevertheless, in a way, present, inasmuch as it is hoped for. Or we may + say that although the desired good itself is future, yet the hindrance is reckoned as present, and so gives rise to sorrow. +
[35109] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod illud quod concupiscitur, etsi realiter sit futurum, +est tamen quodammodo praesens, inquantum speratur. Vel potest dici +quod, licet ipsum bonum concupitum sit futurum, tamen impedimentum +praesentialiter apponitur, quod dolorem causat.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Desire gives pleasure, so long as there is hope of obtaining that which is desired. But, when hope is removed through the + presence of an obstacle, desire causes sorrow. +
[35110] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod concupiscentia est delectabilis, quandiu manet spes +adipiscendi quod concupiscitur. Sed, subtracta spe per impedimentum +appositum, concupiscentia dolorem causat.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the craving for unity is not a cause of sorrow. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 3) that "this opinion," + which held repletion to be the cause of pleasure, and division [*Aristotle wrote {endeian}, 'want'; St. Thomas, in the Latin + version, read 'incisionem'; should he have read 'indigentiam'?], the cause of sorrow, "seems to have originated in pains and + pleasures connected with food." But not every pleasure or sorrow is of this kind. + Therefore the craving for unity is not the universal cause of sorrow; since repletion pertains to unity, and division is the + cause of multitude. +
[35111] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod appetitus unitatis non sit causa +doloris. Dicit enim philosophus, in X Ethic., quod haec opinio, +quae posuit repletionem esse causam delectationis, et incisionem +causam tristitiae, videtur esse facta ex delectationibus et +tristitiis quae sunt circa cibum. Sed non omnis delectatio vel +tristitia est huiusmodi. Ergo appetitus unitatis non est causa +universalis doloris, cum repletio ad unitatem pertineat, incisio +vero multitudinem inducat.
+ Objection 2: Further, every separation is opposed to unity. If therefore sorrow were caused by a craving for unity, no separation would + be pleasant: and this is clearly untrue as regards the separation of whatever is superfluous. +
[35112] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +quaelibet separatio unitati opponitur. Si ergo dolor causaretur ex +appetitu unitatis, nulla separatio esset delectabilis. Quod patet +esse falsum in separatione omnium superfluorum.
+ Objection 3: Further, for the same reason we desire the conjunction of good and the removal of evil. But as conjunction regards unity, + since it is a kind of union; so separation is contrary to unity. Therefore the craving for unity should not be reckoned, rather + than the craving for separation, as causing sorrow. +
[35113] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +eadem ratione appetimus coniunctionem boni, et remotionem mali. Sed +sicut coniunctio pertinet ad unitatem, cum sit unio quaedam; ita +separatio est contrarium unitati. Ergo appetitus unitatis non magis +debet poni causa doloris quam appetitus separationis.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 23), that "from the pain that dumb animals feel, it is quite evident how their souls desire + unity, in ruling and quickening their bodies. For what else is pain but a feeling of impatience of division or corruption?" +
[35114] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in III de libero arbitrio, quod ex +dolore quem bestiae sentiunt, satis apparet in regendis +animandisque suis corporibus, quam sint animae appetentes unitatis. +Quid enim est aliud dolor, nisi quidam sensus divisionis vel +corruptionis impatiens?
+ I answer that, Forasmuch as the desire or craving for good is reckoned as a cause of sorrow, so must a craving for unity, and love, be accounted + as causing sorrow. Because the good of each thing consists in a certain unity, inasmuch as each thing has, united in itself, + the elements of which its perfection consists: wherefore the Platonists held that "one" is a principle, just as "good" is. + Hence everything naturally desires unity, just as it desires goodness: and + therefore, just as love or desire for good is a cause of sorrow, so also is the love or craving for unity. +
[35115] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod eo modo quo concupiscentia vel cupiditas boni est +causa doloris, etiam appetitus unitatis, vel amor, causa doloris +ponendus est. Bonum enim uniuscuiusque rei in quadam unitate +consistit, prout scilicet unaquaeque res habet in se unita illa ex +quibus consistit eius perfectio, unde et Platonici posuerunt unum +esse principium, sicut et bonum. Unde naturaliter unumquodque +appetit unitatem, sicut et bonitatem. Et propter hoc, sicut amor +vel appetitus boni est causa doloris, ita etiam amor vel appetitus +unitatis.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Not every kind of union causes perfect goodness, but only that on which the perfect being of a thing depends. Hence neither + does the desire of any kind of unity cause pain or sorrow, as some have maintained: whose opinion is refuted by the Philosopher + from the fact that repletion is not always pleasant; for instance, when a man has eaten to repletion, he takes no further + pleasure in eating; because repletion or union of this kind, is repugnant rather + than conducive to perfect being. Consequently sorrow is caused by the craving, not for any kind of unity, but for that unity + in which the perfection of nature consists. +
[35116] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod non omnis unio perficit rationem boni, sed solum +illa a qua dependet esse perfectum rei. Et propter hoc etiam, non +cuiuslibet appetitus unitatis est causa doloris vel tristitiae, ut +quidam opinabantur. Quorum opinionem ibi philosophus excludit per +hoc, quod quaedam repletiones non sunt delectabiles, sicut repleti +cibis non delectantur in ciborum sumptione. Talis enim repletio, +sive unio, magis repugnaret ad perfectum esse, quam ipsum +constitueret. Unde dolor non causatur ex appetitu cuiuslibet +unitatis, sed eius in qua consistit perfectio naturae.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Separation can be pleasant, either because it removes something contrary to a thing's perfection, or because it has some + union connected with it, such as union of the sense to its object. +
[35117] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod separatio potest esse delectabilis, vel inquantum +removetur illud quod est contrarium perfectioni rei, vel inquantum +separatio habet aliquam unionem adiunctam, puta sensibilis ad +sensum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Separation from things hurtful and corruptive is desired, in so far as they destroy the unity which is due. Wherefore the + desire for such like separation is not the first cause of sorrow, whereas the craving for unity is. +
[35118] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod separatio nocivorum et corrumpentium appetitur, +inquantum tollunt debitam unitatem. Unde appetitus huiusmodi +separationis non est prima causa doloris, sed magis appetitus +unitatis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that a greater power should not be reckoned a cause of sorrow. For that which is in the power of the agent + is not present but future. But sorrow is for present evil. Therefore a greater power is not a cause of sorrow. +
[35119] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod potestas maior non debeat poni causa +doloris. Quod enim est in potestate agentis, nondum est praesens, +sed futurum. Dolor autem est de malo praesenti. Ergo potestas maior +non est causa doloris.
+ Objection 2: Further, hurt inflicted is the cause of sorrow. But hurt can be inflicted even by a lesser power. Therefore a greater power + should not be reckoned as a cause of sorrow. +
[35120] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +nocumentum illatum est causa doloris. Sed nocumentum potest inferri +etiam a potestate minore. Ergo potestas maior non debet poni causa +doloris.
+ Objection 3: Further, the interior inclinations of the soul are the causes of the movements of appetite. But a greater power is something + external. Therefore it should not be reckoned as a cause of sorrow. +
[35121] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +causae appetitivorum motuum sunt interiores inclinationes animae. +Potestas autem maior est aliquid exterius. Ergo non debet poni +causa doloris.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx): "Sorrow in the soul is caused by the will resisting a stronger power: while pain in the + body is caused by sense resisting a stronger body." +
[35122] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de natura boni, in animo +dolorem facit voluntas resistens potestati maiori; in corpore +dolorem facit sensus resistens corpori potentiori.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[1]), a present evil, is cause of sorrow or pain, by way of object. Therefore that which is the cause of the evil being present, + should be reckoned as causing pain or sorrow. Now it is evident that it is contrary to the inclination of the appetite to + be united with a present evil: and whatever is contrary to a thing's inclination does not happen to it save by the action + of something stronger. Wherefore Augustine + reckons a greater power as being the cause of sorrow. +
But it must be noted that if the stronger power goes so far as to transform the contrary inclination into its own inclination + there will be no longer repugnance or violence: thus if a stronger agent, by its action on a heavy body, deprives it of its + downward tendency, its consequent upward tendency is not violent but natural to it. +
Accordingly if some greater power prevail so far as to take away from the will or the sensitive appetite, their respective + inclinations, pain or sorrow will not result therefrom; such is the result only when the contrary inclination of the appetite + remains. And hence Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx) that sorrow is caused by the will "resisting a stronger power": for were + it not to resist, but to yield by consenting, the result would be not sorrow but pleasure. +
[35123] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, malum coniunctum est causa +doloris vel tristitiae per modum obiecti. Id ergo quod est causa +coniunctionis mali, debet poni causa doloris vel tristitiae. +Manifestum est autem hoc esse contra inclinationem appetitus, ut +malo praesentialiter inhaereat. Quod autem est contra inclinationem +alicuius, nunquam advenit ei nisi per actionem alicuius fortioris. +Et ideo potestas maior ponitur esse causa doloris ab Augustino. Sed +sciendum est quod, si potestas fortior intantum invalescat quod +mutet contrariam inclinationem in inclinationem propriam, iam non +erit aliqua repugnantia vel violentia, sicut quando agens fortius, +corrumpendo corpus grave, aufert ei inclinationem qua tendit +deorsum; et tunc ferri sursum non est ei violentum, sed naturale. +Sic igitur si aliqua potestas maior intantum invalescat quod +auferat inclinationem voluntatis vel appetitus sensitivi, ex ea non +sequitur dolor vel tristitia, sed tunc solum sequitur, quando +remanet inclinatio appetitus in contrarium. Et inde est quod +Augustinus dicit quod voluntas resistens potestati fortiori, causat +dolorem, si enim non resisteret, sed cederet consentiendo, non +sequeretur dolor, sed delectatio.
+ Reply to Objection 1: A greater power causes sorrow, as acting not potentially but actually, i.e. by causing the actual presence of the corruptive + evil. +
[35124] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod maior potestas dolorem causat, non secundum quod +est agens in potentia, sed secundum quod est agens actu, dum +scilicet facit coniunctionem mali corruptivi.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Nothing hinders a power which is not simply greater, from being greater in some respect: and accordingly it is able to inflict + some harm. But if it be nowise stronger, it can do no harm at all: wherefore it cannot bring about that which causes sorrow. +
[35125] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquam potestatem quae non est maior +simpliciter, esse maiorem quantum ad aliquid. Et secundum hoc, +aliquod nocumentum inferre potest. Si autem nullo modo maior esset, +nullo modo posset nocere. Unde non posset causam doloris +inferre.
+ Reply to Objection 3: External agents can be the causes of appetitive movements, in so far as they cause the presence of the object: and it is + thus that a greater power is reckoned to be the cause of sorrow. +
[35126] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod exteriora agentia possunt esse causa motuum +appetitivorum, inquantum causant praesentiam obiecti. Et hoc modo +potestas maior ponitur causa doloris.
We must now consider the effects of pain or of sorrow: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether pain deprives one of the power to learn?
(2) Whether the effect of sorrow or pain is to burden the soul?
(3) Whether sorrow or pain weakens all activity?
(4) Whether sorrow is more harmful to the body than all the other passions of the soul?
+[35127] +Iª-IIae q. 37 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +effectibus doloris vel tristitiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. +Primo, utrum dolor auferat facultatem addiscendi. Secundo, utrum +aggravatio animi sit effectus tristitiae vel doloris. Tertio, utrum +tristitia vel dolor debilitet omnem operationem. Quarto, utrum +tristitia noceat corpori magis quam aliae passiones animae.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that pain does not deprive one of the power to learn. For it is written ( + Is. 26:9): "When Thou shalt do Thy judgments on the earth, the inhabitants of the world shall learn justice": and further on (verse + 16): "In the tribulation of murmuring Thy instruction was with them." But the judgments of God and tribulation cause sorrow + in men's hearts. Therefore pain or sorrow, far from destroying, increases the power of learning. +
[35128] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod dolor non auferat facultatem +addiscendi. Dicitur enim Isaiae XXVI, cum feceris iudicia tua in +terra, iustitiam discent omnes habitatores orbis. Et infra, +in tribulatione murmuris doctrina tua eis, sed ex iudiciis +Dei, et tribulatione, sequitur dolor seu tristitia in cordibus +hominum. Ergo dolor vel tristitia non tollit, sed magis auget +facultatem addiscendi.
+ Objection 2: Further, it is written ( + Is. 28:9): "Whom shall He teach knowledge? And whom shall He make to understand the hearing? Them that are weaned from the milk, that + are drawn away from the breasts," i.e. from pleasures. But pain and sorrow are most destructive of pleasure; since sorrow + hinders all pleasure, as stated in Ethic. vii, 14: and ( + Ecclus. 11:29) it is stated that "the affliction of an hour maketh one forget great + delights." Therefore pain, instead of taking away, increases the faculty of learning. +
[35129] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Isaiae XXVIII, dicitur, quem docebit scientiam? Et quem +intelligere faciet auditum? Ablactatos a lacte, avulsos ab +uberibus idest a delectationibus. Sed dolor et tristitia maxime +tollunt delectationes, impedit enim tristitia omnem delectationem, +ut dicitur in VII Ethic.; et Eccli. XI dicitur quod malitia +unius horae oblivionem facit luxuriae maximae. Ergo dolor non +tollit, sed magis praebet facultatem addiscendi.
+ Objection 3: Further, inward sorrow surpasses outward pain, as stated above ( + Q[35], A[7]). But man can learn while sorrowful. Much more, therefore, can he learn while in bodily pain. +
[35130] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +tristitia interior praeeminet dolori exteriori, ut supra dictum +est. Sed simul cum tristitia potest homo addiscere. Ergo multo +magis simul cum dolore corporali.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): "Although during those days I was tormented with a violent tooth-ache, I was not able to + turn over in my mind other things than those I had already learnt; and as to learning anything, I was quite unequal to it, + because it required undivided attention." +
[35131] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in I Soliloq., quanquam acerrimo +dolore dentium his diebus torquerer, non quidem sinebar animo +volvere nisi ea quae iam forte didiceram. A discendo autem penitus +impediebar, ad quod mihi tota intentione animi opus erat.
+ I answer that, Since all the powers of the soul are rooted in the one essence of the soul, it must needs happen, when the intention of the + soul is strongly drawn towards the action of one power, that it is withdrawn from the action of another power: because the + soul, being one, can only have one intention. The result is that if one thing draws upon itself the entire intention of the + soul, or a great portion thereof, anything else requiring considerable attention is + incompatible therewith. +
Now it is evident that sensible pain above all draws the soul's attention to itself; because it is natural for each thing + to tend wholly to repel whatever is contrary to it, as may be observed even in natural things. It is likewise evident that + in order to learn anything new, we require study and effort with a strong intention, as is clearly stated in + Prov. 2:4,5: "If thou shalt seek wisdom as money, and shall dig for her as for a treasure, then shalt thou + understand learning" [Vulg: 'the fear of the Lord']. Consequently if the pain be acute, man is prevented at the time from + learning anything: indeed it can be so acute, that, as long as it lasts, a man is unable to give his attention even to that + which he knew already. However a difference is to be observed according to the difference of love that a man has for learning + or for considering: because the greater his love, the more will he retain the intention of his mind so as to prevent it from + turning entirely to the pain. +
[35132] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, quia omnes potentiae animae in una essentia animae +radicantur, necesse est quod, quando intentio animae vehementer +trahitur ad operationem unius potentiae, retrahatur ab operatione +alterius, unius enim animae non potest esse nisi una intentio. Et +propter hoc, si aliquid ad se trahat totam intentionem animae, vel +magnam partem ipsius, non compatitur secum aliquid aliud quod +magnam attentionem requirat. Manifestum est autem quod dolor +sensibilis maxime trahit ad se intentionem animae, quia naturaliter +unumquodque tota intentione tendit ad repellendum contrarium, sicut +etiam in rebus naturalibus apparet. Similiter etiam manifestum est +quod ad addiscendum aliquid de novo, requiritur studium et conatus +cum magna intentione, ut patet per illud quod dicitur Prov. II, +si quaesieris sapientiam quasi pecuniam, et sicut thesauros +effoderis eam, tunc intelliges disciplinam. Et ideo si sit +dolor intensus, impeditur homo ne tunc aliquid addiscere possit. Et +tantum potest intendi, quod nec etiam, instante dolore, potest homo +aliquid considerare etiam quod prius scivit. In hoc tamen +attenditur diversitas secundum diversitatem amoris quem homo habet +ad addiscendum vel considerandum, qui quanto maior fuerit, magis +retinet intentionem animi, ne omnino feratur ad dolorem.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Moderate sorrow, that does not cause the mind to wander, can conduce to the acquisition of learning especially in regard + to those things by which a man hopes to be freed from sorrow. And thus, "in the tribulation of murmuring," men are more apt + to be taught by God. +
[35133] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod tristitia moderata, quae excludit evagationem +animi, potest conferre ad disciplinam suscipiendam, et praecipue +eorum per quae homo sperat se posse a tristitia liberari. Et hoc +modo in tribulatione murmuris homines doctrinam Dei magis +recipiunt.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Both pleasure and pain, in so far as they draw upon themselves the soul's intention, hinder the reason from the act of consideration, + wherefore it is stated in Ethic. vii, 11 that "in the moment of sexual pleasure, a man cannot understand anything." Nevertheless + pain attracts the soul's intention more than pleasure does: thus we observe in natural things that the action of a natural + body is more intense in regard to its contrary; for instance, hot + water is more accessible to the action of cold, and in consequence freezes harder. If therefore pain or sorrow be moderate, + it can conduce accidentally to the facility of learning, in so far as it takes away an excess of pleasure. But, of itself, + it is a hindrance; and if it be intense, it prevents it altogether. +
[35134] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod tam delectatio quam dolor, inquantum ad se trahunt +animae intentionem, impediunt considerationem rationis, unde in VII +Ethic. dicitur quod impossibile est in ipsa delectatione +venereorum, aliquid intelligere. Sed tamen dolor magis trahit +ad se intentionem animae quam delectatio, sicut etiam videmus in +rebus naturalibus, quod actio corporis naturalis magis intenditur +in contrarium; sicut aqua calefacta magis patitur a frigido, ut +fortius congeletur. Si ergo dolor seu tristitia fuerit moderata, +per accidens potest conferre ad addiscendum, inquantum aufert +superabundantiam delectationum. Sed per se impedit, et si +intendatur, totaliter aufert.
+ Reply to Objection 3: External pain arises from hurt done to the body, so that it involves bodily transmutation more than inward sorrow does: and + yet the latter is greater in regard to the formal element of pain, which belongs to the soul. Consequently bodily pain is + a greater hindrance to contemplation which requires complete repose, than inward sorrow is. Nevertheless if inward sorrow + be very intense, it attracts the intention, so that man is unable to learn anything for + the first time: wherefore on account of sorrow Gregory interrupted his commentary on Ezechiel (Hom. xxii in Ezechiel). +
[35135] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod dolor exterior accidit ex laesione corporali, et ita +magis habet transmutationem corporalem adiunctam quam dolor +interior, qui tamen est maior secundum illud quod est formale in +dolore, quod est ex parte animae. Et ideo dolor corporalis magis +impedit contemplationem, quae requirit omnimodam quietem, quam +dolor interior. Et tamen etiam dolor interior, si multum +intendatur, ita trahit intentionem, ut non possit homo de novo +aliquid addiscere. Unde et Gregorius propter tristitiam intermisit +Ezechielis expositionem.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that it is not an effect of sorrow to burden the soul. For the Apostle says ( + 2 Cor. 7:11): "Behold this self-same thing, that you were made sorrowful according to God, how great carefulness it worketh in you: yea, + defence, yea indignation," etc. Now carefulness and indignation imply that the soul is uplifted, which is contrary to being + depressed. Therefore depression is not an effect of sorrow. +
[35136] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod aggravatio animi non sit effectus +tristitiae. Dicit enim apostolus, II ad Cor. VII, ecce hoc +ipsum, contristari vos secundum Deum, quantam in vobis operatur +sollicitudinem, sed defensionem, sed indignationem, et cetera. +Sed sollicitudo et indignatio ad quandam erectionem animi +pertinent, quae aggravationi opponitur. Non ergo aggravatio est +effectus tristitiae.
+ Objection 2: Further, sorrow is contrary to pleasure. But the effect of pleasure is expansion: the opposite of which is not depression + but contraction. Therefore depression should not be reckoned as an effect of sorrow. +
[35137] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +tristitia delectationi opponitur. Sed effectus delectationis est +dilatatio, cui non opponitur aggravatio, sed constrictio. Ergo +effectus tristitiae non debet poni aggravatio.
+ Objection 3: Further, sorrow consumes those who are inflicted therewith, as may be gathered from the words of the Apostle ( + 2 Cor. 2:7): "Lest perhaps such an one be swallowed up with overmuch sorrow." But that which is depressed is not consumed; nay, it is + weighed down by something heavy, whereas that which is consumed enters within the consumer. Therefore depression should not + be reckoned an effect of sorrow. +
[35138] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +ad tristitiam pertinet absorbere, ut patet per illud quod apostolus +dicit, II ad Cor. II, ne forte abundantiori tristitia +absorbeatur qui est eiusmodi. Sed quod aggravatur, non +absorbetur, quinimmo sub aliquo ponderoso deprimitur; quod autem +absorbetur, intra absorbens includitur. Ergo aggravatio non debet +poni effectus tristitiae.
+ On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) speak of "depressing sorrow." +
[35139] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Gregorius Nyssenus et Damascenus ponunt tristitiam +aggravantem.
+ I answer that, The effects of the soul's passions are sometimes named metaphorically, from a likeness to sensible bodies: for the reason + that the movements of the animal appetite are like the inclinations of the natural appetite. And in this way fervor is ascribed + to love, expansion to pleasure, and depression to sorrow. For a man is said to be depressed, through being hindered in his + own movement by some weight. Now it is evident from what has been said above ( + Q[23], A[4]; + Q[25], A[4]; + Q[36], A[1]) that sorrow is caused by a present evil: and this evil, from the very fact that it is repugnant to the movement of the will, + depresses the soul, inasmuch as it hinders it from enjoying that which it wishes to enjoy. And if the evil which is the cause + of sorrow be not so strong as to deprive one of the hope of avoiding it, although the soul be depressed in so far as, for + the present, it + fails to grasp that which it craves for; yet it retains the movement whereby to repulse that evil. If, on the other hand, + the strength of the evil be such as to exclude the hope of evasion, then even the interior movement of the afflicted soul + is absolutely hindered, so that it cannot turn aside either this way or that. Sometimes even the external movement of the + body is paralyzed, so that a man becomes completely stupefied. +
[35140] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod effectus passionum animae quandoque metaphorice +nominantur, secundum similitudinem sensibilium corporum, eo quod +motus appetitus animalis sunt similes inclinationibus appetitus +naturalis. Et per hunc modum fervor attribuitur amori, dilatatio +delectationi, et aggravatio tristitiae. Dicitur enim homo +aggravari, ex eo quod aliquo pondere impeditur a proprio motu. +Manifestum est autem ex praedictis quod tristitia contingit ex +aliquo malo praesenti. Quod quidem, ex hoc ipso quod repugnat motui +voluntatis, aggravat animum, inquantum impedit ipsum ne fruatur eo +quod vult. Et si quidem non sit tanta vis mali contristantis ut +auferat spem evadendi, licet animus aggravetur quantum ad hoc, quod +in praesenti non potitur eo quod vult; remanet tamen motus ad +repellendum nocivum contristans. Si vero superexcrescat vis mali +intantum ut spem evasionis excludat, tunc simpliciter impeditur +etiam interior motus animi angustiati, ut neque hac neque illac +divertere valeat. Et quandoque etiam impeditur exterior motus +corporis, ita quod remaneat homo stupidus in seipso.
+ Reply to Objection 1: That uplifting of the soul ensues from the sorrow which is according to God, because it brings with it the hope of the forgiveness + of sin. +
[35141] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod illa erectio animi provenit ex tristitia quae +est secundum Deum, propter spem adiunctam de remissione +peccati.
+ Reply to Objection 2: As far as the movement of the appetite is concerned, contraction and depression amount to the same: because the soul, through + being depressed so as to be unable to attend freely to outward things, withdraws to itself, closing itself up as it were. +
[35142] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, quantum ad motum appetitivum pertinet, ad idem +refertur constrictio et aggravatio. Ex hoc enim quod aggravatur +animus, ut ad exteriora libere progredi non possit, ad seipsum +retrahitur, quasi in seipso constrictus.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Sorrow is said to consume man, when the force of the afflicting evil is such as to shut out all hope of evasion: and thus + also it both depresses and consumes at the same time. For certain things, taken metaphorically, imply one another, which taken + literally, appear to exclude one another. +
[35143] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod tristitia absorbere hominem dicitur, quando sic +totaliter vis contristantis mali afficit animam, ut omnem spem +evasionis excludat. Et sic etiam eodem modo aggravat et absorbet. +Quaedam enim se consequuntur in his quae metaphorice dicuntur, quae +sibi repugnare videntur, si secundum proprietatem accipiantur.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow does not weaken all activity. Because carefulness is caused by sorrow, as is clear from the passage + of the Apostle quoted above (A[2], OBJ[1]). But carefulness conduces to good work: wherefore the Apostle says ( + 2 Tim. 2:15): "Carefully study to present thyself . . . a workman that needeth not to be ashamed." Therefore sorrow is not a hindrance + to work, but helps one to work well. +
[35144] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod tristitia non impediat omnem +operationem. Sollicitudo enim ex tristitia causatur, ut patet per +auctoritatem apostoli inductam. Sed sollicitudo adiuvat ad bene +operandum, unde apostolus dicit, II ad Tim. II, sollicite cura +teipsum exhibere operarium inconfusibilem. Ergo tristitia non +impedit operationem, sed magis adiuvat ad bene operandum.
+ Objection 2: Further, sorrow causes desire in many cases, as stated in Ethic. vii, 14. But desire causes intensity of action. Therefore + sorrow does too. +
[35145] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +tristitia causat in multis concupiscentiam, ut dicitur in VII +Ethic. Sed concupiscentia facit ad intensionem operationis. Ergo et +tristitia.
+ Objection 3: Further, as some actions are proper to the joyful, so are others proper to the sorrowful; for instance, to mourn. Now a thing + is improved by that which is suitable to it. Therefore certain actions are not hindered but improved by reason of sorrow. +
[35146] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sicut quaedam operationes propriae sunt gaudentium, ita etiam +quaedam operationes his qui tristantur, sicut lugere. Sed +unumquodque augetur ex sibi convenienti. Ergo aliquae operationes +non impediuntur, sed meliorantur propter tristitiam.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects action," whereas on the other hand, "sorrow hinders it" (Ethic. + x, 5). +
[35147] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., quod delectatio perficit +operationem, sed e contrario tristitia impedit.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[2]), sorrow at times does not depress or consume the soul, so as to shut out all movement, internal or external; but certain + movements are sometimes caused by sorrow itself. Accordingly action stands in a twofold relation to sorrow. First, as being + the object of sorrow: and thus sorrow hinders any action: for we never do that which we do with sorrow, so well as that which + we do with pleasure, or without sorrow. The + reason for this is that the will is the cause of human actions: and consequently when we do something that gives pain, the + action must of necessity be weakened in consequence. Secondly, action stands in relation to sorrow, as to its principle and + cause: and such action must needs be improved by sorrow: thus the more one sorrows on account of a certain thing, the more + one strives to shake off sorrow, provided there is a hope of shaking it off: otherwise no movement or action would result + from + that sorrow. +
[35148] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, tristitia quandoque non ita +aggravat vel absorbet animum, ut omnem motum interiorem et +exteriorem excludat; sed aliqui motus quandoque ex ipsa tristitia +causantur. Sic ergo operatio ad tristitiam dupliciter potest +comparari. Uno modo, sicut ad id de quo est tristitia. Et sic +tristitia quamlibet operationem impedit, nunquam enim illud quod +cum tristitia facimus, ita bene facimus sicut illud quod facimus +cum delectatione, vel sine tristitia. Cuius ratio est, quia +voluntas est causa operationis humanae, unde quando operatio est de +qua aliquis contristatur, necesse est quod actio debilitetur. Alio +modo comparatur operatio ad tristitiam sicut ad principium et +causam. Et sic necesse est quod operatio talis ex tristitia +augeatur, sicut quanto aliquis magis tristatur de re aliqua, tanto +magis conatur ad expellendam tristitiam, dummodo remaneat spes +expellendi, alioquin nullus motus vel operatio ex tristitia +causaretur.
From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.
[35149] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 3 ad arg. Et per hoc +patet responsio ad obiecta.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is not most harmful to the body. For sorrow has a spiritual existence in the soul. But those things + which have only a spiritual existence do not cause a transmutation in the body: as is evident with regard to the images of + colors, which images are in the air and do not give color to bodies. Therefore sorrow is not harmful to the body. +
[35150] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod tristitia non inferat maxime corpori +nocumentum. Tristitia enim habet esse spirituale in anima. Sed ea +quae habent tantum esse spirituale, non causant transmutationem +corporalem, sicut patet de intentionibus colorum quae sunt in aere, +a quibus nullum corpus coloratur. Ergo tristitia non facit aliquod +corporale nocumentum.
+ Objection 2: Further if it be harmful to the body, this can only be due to its having a bodily transmutation in conjunction with it. But + bodily transmutation takes place in all the passions of the soul, as stated above ( + Q[22], AA[1],3). Therefore sorrow is not more harmful to the body than the other passions of the soul. +
[35151] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +si facit aliquod corporale nocumentum, hoc non est nisi inquantum +habet corporalem transmutationem adiunctam. Sed corporalis +transmutatio invenitur in omnibus animae passionibus, ut supra +dictum est. Ergo non magis tristitia quam aliae animae passiones, +corpori nocet.
+ Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that "anger and desire drive some to madness": which seems to be a very great + harm, since reason is the most excellent thing in man. Moreover, despair seems to be more harmful than sorrow; for it is the + cause of sorrow. Therefore sorrow is not more harmful to the body than the other passions of the soul. +
[35152] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod irae et concupiscentiae +quibusdam insanias faciunt, quod videtur esse maximum +nocumentum, cum ratio sit excellentissimum eorum quae sunt in +homine. Desperatio etiam videtur esse magis nociva quam tristitia, +cum sit causa tristitiae. Ergo tristitia non magis nocet corpori +quam aliae animae passiones.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Prov. 17:22): "A joyful mind maketh age flourishing: a sorrowful spirit drieth up the bones": and ( + Prov. 25:20): "As a moth doth by a garment, and a worm by the wood: so the sadness of a man consumeth the heart": and ( + Ecclus. 38:19): "Of sadness cometh death." +
[35153] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Prov. XVII, animus gaudens aetatem floridam +facit, spiritus tristis exsiccat ossa. Et Prov. XXV, sicut +tinea vestimento, et vermis ligno, ita tristitia viri nocet +cordi. Et Eccli. XXXVIII, a tristitia festinat mors.
+ I answer that, Of all the soul's passions, sorrow is most harmful to the body. The reason of this is because sorrow is repugnant to man's + life in respect of the species of its movement, and not merely in respect of its measure or quantity, as is the case with + the other passions of the soul. For man's life consists in a certain movement, which flows from the heart to the other parts + of the body: and this movement is befitting to human nature according to a certain fixed + measure. Consequently if this movement goes beyond the right measure, it will be repugnant to man's life in respect of the + measure of quantity; but not in respect of its specific character: whereas if this movement be hindered in its progress, it + will be repugnant to life in respect of its species. +
Now it must be noted that, in all the passions of the soul, the bodily transmutation which is their material element, is + in conformity with and in proportion to the appetitive movement, which is the formal element: just as in everything matter + is proportionate to form. Consequently those passions that imply a movement of the appetite in pursuit of something, are not + repugnant to the vital movement as regards its species, but they may be repugnant thereto as regards its measure: + such are love, joy, desire and the like; wherefore these passions conduce to the well-being of the body; though, if they be + excessive, they may be harmful to it. On the other hand, those passions which denote in the appetite a movement of flight + or contraction, are repugnant to the vital movement, not only as regards its measure, but also as regards its species; wherefore + they are simply harmful: such are fear and despair, and above all sorrow which depresses the soul by reason of a present + evil, which makes a stronger impression than future evil. +
[35154] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod tristitia, inter omnes animae passiones, magis +corpori nocet. Cuius ratio est, quia tristitia repugnat humanae +vitae quantum ad speciem sui motus; et non solum quantum ad +mensuram seu quantitatem, sicut aliae animae passiones. Consistit +enim humana vita in quadam motione, quae a corde in cetera membra +diffunditur, quae quidem motio convenit naturae humanae secundum +aliquam determinatam mensuram. Si ergo ista motio procedat ultra +mensuram debitam, repugnabit humanae vitae secundum quantitatis +mensuram; non autem secundum similitudinem speciei. Si autem +impediatur processus huius motionis, repugnabit vitae secundum suam +speciem. Est autem attendendum in omnibus animae passionibus, quod +transmutatio corporalis, quae est in eis materialis, est conformis +et proportionata motui appetitus, qui est formalis, sicut in +omnibus materia proportionatur formae. Illae ergo animae passiones +quae important motum appetitus ad prosequendum aliquid, non +repugnant vitali motioni secundum speciem, sed possunt repugnare +secundum quantitatem, ut amor, gaudium, desiderium, et huiusmodi. +Et ideo ista secundum speciem suam iuvant naturam corporis, sed +propter excessum possunt nocere. Passiones autem quae important +motum appetitus cum fuga vel retractione quadam, repugnant vitali +motioni non solum secundum quantitatem, sed etiam secundum speciem +motus, et ideo simpliciter nocent, sicut timor et desperatio, et +prae omnibus tristitia, quae aggravat animum ex malo praesenti, +cuius est fortior impressio quam futuri.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Since the soul naturally moves the body, the spiritual movement of the soul is naturally the cause of bodily transmutation. + Nor is there any parallel with spiritual images, because they are not naturally ordained to move such other bodies as are + not naturally moved by the soul. +
[35155] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, quia anima naturaliter movet corpus, +spiritualis motus animae naturaliter est causa transmutationis +corporalis. Nec est simile de spiritualibus intentionibus, quae non +habent naturaliter ordinem movendi alia corpora, quae non sunt nata +moveri ab anima.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Other passions imply a bodily transmutation which is specifically in conformity with the vital movement: whereas sorrow implies + a transmutation that is repugnant thereto, as stated above. +
[35156] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod aliae passiones habent transmutationem corporalem +conformem, secundum suam speciem, motioni vitali, sed tristitia +contrariam, ut supra dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: A lesser cause suffices to hinder the use of reason, than to destroy life: since we observe that many ailments deprive one + of the use of reason, before depriving one of life. Nevertheless fear and anger cause very great harm to the body, by reason + of the sorrow which they imply, and which arises from the absence of the thing desired. Moreover sorrow too sometimes deprives + man of the use of reason: as may be seen in those who through sorrow become a + prey to melancholy or madness. +
[35157] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ex leviori causa impeditur usus rationis quam +corrumpatur vita, cum videamus multas aegritudines usum rationis +tollere, quae nondum adimunt vitam. Et tamen timor et ira maxime +nocumentum corporale afferunt ex permixtione tristitiae, propter +absentiam eius quod cupitur. Ipsa etiam tristitia quandoque +rationem aufert, sicut patet in his qui propter dolorem in +melancholiam vel in maniam incidunt.
We must now consider the remedies of pain or sorrow: under which head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by every pleasure?
(2) Whether it is assuaged by weeping?
(3) Whether it is assuaged by the sympathy of friends?
+[35158] +Iª-IIae q. 38 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +remediis doloris seu tristitiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. +Primo, utrum dolor vel tristitia mitigetur per quamlibet +delectationem. Secundo, utrum mitigetur per fletum. Tertio, utrum +per compassionem amicorum. Quarto, utrum per contemplationem +veritatis. Quinto, utrum per somnum et balnea.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that not every pleasure assuages every pain or sorrow. For pleasure does not assuage sorrow, save in so far + as it is contrary to it: for "remedies work by contraries" (Ethic. ii, 3). But not every pleasure is contrary to every sorrow; + as stated above ( + Q[35], A[4] ). Therefore not every pleasure assuages every sorrow. +
[35159] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non quaelibet delectatio mitiget +quemlibet dolorem seu tristitiam. Non enim delectatio tristitiam +mitigat, nisi inquantum ei contrariatur, medicinae enim fiunt per +contraria, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed non quaelibet delectatio +contrariatur cuilibet tristitiae, ut supra dictum est. Ergo non +quaelibet delectatio mitigat quamlibet tristitiam.
+ Objection 2: Further, that which causes sorrow does not assuage it. But some pleasures cause sorrow; since, as stated in Ethic. ix, 4, + "the wicked man feels pain at having been pleased." Therefore not every pleasure assuages sorrow. +
[35160] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +illud quod causat tristitiam, non mitigat tristitiam. Sed aliquae +delectationes causant tristitiam, quia, ut dicitur in IX Ethic., +malus tristatur quoniam delectatus est. Non ergo omnis +delectatio mitigat tristitiam.
+ Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 7) that he fled from his country, where he had been wont to associate with his friend, + now dead: "for so should his eyes look for him less, where they were not wont to see him." Hence we may gather that those + things which united us to our dead or absent friends, become burdensome to us when we mourn their death or absence. But nothing + united us more than the pleasures we enjoyed in common. Therefore these very pleasures + become burdensome to us when we mourn. Therefore not every pleasure assuages every sorrow. +
[35161] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in IV Confess., quod ipse fugit de patria, in qua +conversari solitus erat cum amico suo iam mortuo, minus enim +quaerebant eum oculi eius, ubi videre non solebant. Ex quo +accipi potest quod illa in quibus nobis amici mortui vel absentes +communicaverunt, efficiuntur nobis, de eorum morte vel absentia +dolentibus, onerosa. Sed maxime communicaverunt nobis in +delectationibus. Ergo ipsae delectationes efficiuntur nobis +dolentibus onerosae. Non ergo quaelibet delectatio mitigat +quamlibet tristitiam.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14) that "sorrow is driven forth by pleasure, both by a contrary pleasure and by any other, + provided it be intense." +
[35162] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod expellit +delectatio tristitiam, et quae contraria, et quae contingens, si +sit fortis.
+ I answer that, As is evident from what has been said above ( + Q[23], A[4] ), pleasure is a kind of repose of the appetite in a suitable good; while sorrow arises from something unsuited to the appetite. + Consequently in movements of the appetite pleasure is to sorrow, what, in bodies, repose is to weariness, which is due to + a non-natural transmutation; for sorrow itself implies a certain weariness or ailing of the appetitive faculty. Therefore + just as + all repose of the body brings relief to any kind of weariness, ensuing from any non-natural cause; so every pleasure brings + relief by assuaging any kind of sorrow, due to any cause whatever. +
[35163] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ex praedictis patet, delectatio est quaedam +quies appetitus in bono convenienti; tristitia autem est ex eo quod +repugnat appetitui. Unde sic se habet delectatio ad tristitiam in +motibus appetitivis, sicut se habet in corporibus quies ad +fatigationem, quae accidit ex aliqua transmutatione innaturali, nam +et ipsa tristitia fatigationem quandam, seu aegritudinem +appetitivae virtutis importat. Sicut igitur quaelibet quies +corporis remedium affert contra quamlibet fatigationem, ex +quacumque causa innaturali provenientem; ita quaelibet delectatio +remedium affert ad mitigandam quamlibet tristitiam, ex quocumque +procedat.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Although not every pleasure is specifically contrary to every sorrow, yet it is generically, as stated above ( + Q[35], A[4]). And consequently, on the part of the disposition of the subject, any sorrow can be assuaged by any pleasure. +
[35164] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, licet non omnis delectatio contrarietur omni +tristitiae secundum speciem, contrariatur tamen secundum genus, ut +supra dictum est. Et ideo ex parte dispositionis subiecti, +quaelibet tristitia per quamlibet delectationem mitigari +potest.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The pleasures of wicked men are not a cause of sorrow while they are enjoyed, but afterwards: that is to say, in so far as + wicked men repent of those things in which they took pleasure. This sorrow is healed by contrary pleasures. +
[35165] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod delectationes malorum non causant tristitiam in +praesenti, sed in futuro, inquantum scilicet mali poenitent de +malis de quibus laetitiam habuerunt. Et huic tristitiae subvenitur +per contrarias delectationes.
+ Reply to Objection 3: When there are two causes inclining to contrary movements, each hinders the other; yet the one which is stronger and more + persistent, prevails in the end. Now when a man is made sorrowful by those things in which he took pleasure in common with + a deceased or absent friend, there are two causes producing contrary movements. For the thought of the friend's death or absence, + inclines him to sorrow: whereas the present good inclines him to pleasure. + Consequently each is modified by the other. And yet, since the perception of the present moves more strongly than the memory + of the past, and since love of self is more persistent than love of another; hence it is that, in the end, the pleasure drives + out the sorrow. Wherefore a little further on (Confess. iv, 8) Augustine says that his "sorrow gave way to his former pleasures." +
[35166] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, quando sunt duae causae ad contrarios motus +inclinantes, utraque alteram impedit, et tamen illa finaliter +vincit, quae fortior est et diuturnior. In eo autem qui tristatur +de his in quibus simul cum amico mortuo vel absente delectari +consuevit, duae causae in contrarium moventes inveniuntur. Nam mors +vel absentia amici recogitata, inclinat ad dolorem, bonum autem +praesens inclinat ad delectationem. Unde utrumque per alterum +minuitur. Sed tamen, quia fortius movet sensus praesentis quam +memoria praeteriti, et amor sui ipsius quam amor alterius +diuturnius manet; inde est quod finaliter delectatio tristitiam +expellit. Unde post pauca subdit ibidem Augustinus quod +pristinis generibus delectationum cedebat dolor eius.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that tears do not assuage sorrow. Because no effect diminishes its cause. But tears or groans are an effect + of sorrow. Therefore they do not diminish sorrow. +
[35167] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod fletus non mitiget tristitiam. Nullus +enim effectus diminuit suam causam. Sed fletus, vel gemitus, est +effectus tristitiae. Ergo non minuit tristitiam.
+ Objection 2: Further, just as tears or groans are an effect of sorrow, so laughter is an effect of joy. But laughter does not lessen joy. + Therefore tears do not lessen sorrow. +
[35168] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +sicut fletus vel gemitus est effectus tristitiae, ita risus est +effectus laetitiae. Sed risus non minuit laetitiam. Ergo fletus non +mitigat tristitiam.
+ Objection 3: Further, when we weep, the evil that saddens us is present to the imagination. But the image of that which saddens us increases + sorrow, just as the image of a pleasant thing adds to joy. Therefore it seems that tears do not assuage sorrow. +
[35169] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +in fletu repraesentatur nobis malum contristans. Sed imaginatio rei +contristantis auget tristitiam, sicut imaginatio rei delectantis +auget laetitiam. Ergo videtur quod fletus non mitiget +tristitiam.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 7) that when he mourned the death of his friend, "in groans and in tears alone did he find some + little refreshment." +
[35170] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in IV Confess., quod quando dolebat de +morte amici, in solis gemitibus et lacrimis erat ei aliquantula +requies.
+ I answer that, Tears and groans naturally assuage sorrow: and this for two reasons. First, because a hurtful thing hurts yet more if we + keep it shut up, because the soul is more intent on it: whereas if it be allowed to escape, the soul's intention is dispersed + as it were on outward things, so that the inward sorrow is lessened. This is why men, burdened with sorrow, make outward show + of their sorrow, by tears or groans or even by words, their sorrow is assuaged. Secondly, + because an action, that befits a man according to his actual disposition, is always pleasant to him. Now tears and groans + are actions befitting a man who is in sorrow or pain; and consequently they become pleasant to him. Since then, as stated + above + (A[1]), every pleasure assuages sorrow or pain somewhat, it follows that sorrow is assuaged by weeping and groans. +
[35171] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod lacrimae et gemitus naturaliter mitigant tristitiam. +Et hoc duplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia omne nocivum interius +clausum magis affligit, quia magis multiplicatur intentio animae +circa ipsum, sed quando ad exteriora diffunditur, tunc animae +intentio ad exteriora quodammodo disgregatur, et sic interior dolor +minuitur. Et propter hoc, quando homines qui sunt in tristitiis, +exterius suam tristitiam manifestant vel fletu aut gemitu, vel +etiam verbo, mitigatur tristitia. Secundo, quia semper operatio +conveniens homini secundum dispositionem in qua est, sibi est +delectabilis. Fletus autem et gemitus sunt quaedam operationes +convenientes tristato vel dolenti. Et ideo efficiuntur ei +delectabiles. Cum igitur omnis delectatio aliqualiter mitiget +tristitiam vel dolorem, ut dictum est, sequitur quod per planctum +et gemitum tristitia mitigetur.
+ Reply to Objection 1: This relation of the cause to effect is opposed to the relation existing between the cause of sorrow and the sorrowing man. + For every effect is suited to its cause, and consequently is pleasant to it; but the cause of sorrow is disagreeable to him + that sorrows. Hence the effect of sorrow is not related to him that sorrows in the same way as the cause of sorrow is. For + this reason sorrow is assuaged by its effect, on account of the aforesaid + contrariety. +
[35172] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ipsa habitudo causae ad effectum contrariatur +habitudini contristantis ad contristatum, nam omnis effectus est +conveniens suae causae, et per consequens est ei delectabilis; +contristans autem contrariatur contristato. Et ideo effectus +tristitiae habet contrariam habitudinem ad contristatum, quam +contristans ad ipsum. Et propter hoc, mitigatur tristitia per +effectum tristitiae, ratione contrarietatis praedictae.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The relation of effect to cause is like the relation of the object of pleasure to him that takes pleasure in it: because + in each case the one agrees with the other. Now every like thing increases its like. Therefore joy is increased by laughter + and the other effects of joy: except they be excessive, in which case, accidentally, they lessen it. +
[35173] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod habitudo effectus ad causam est similis habitudini +delectantis ad delectatum, quia utrobique convenientia invenitur. +Omne autem simile auget suum simile. Et ideo per risum et alios +effectus laetitiae augetur laetitia, nisi forte per accidens, +propter excessum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The image of that which saddens us, considered in itself, has a natural tendency to increase sorrow: yet from the very fact + that a man imagines himself to be doing that which is fitting according to his actual state, he feels a certain amount of + pleasure. For the same reason if laughter escapes a man when he is so disposed that he thinks he ought to weep, he is sorry + for it, as having done something unbecoming to him, as Cicero says (De Tusc. Quaest. + iii, 27). +
[35174] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod imaginatio rei contristantis, quantum est de se, nata +est augere tristitiam, sed ex hoc ipso quod homo imaginatur quod +facit illud quod convenit sibi secundum talem statum, consurgit +inde quaedam delectatio. Et eadem ratione, si alicui subrepat risus +in statu in quo videtur sibi esse lugendum, ex hoc ipso dolet, +tanquam faciat id quod non convenit, ut Tullius dicit, in III de +Tuscul. quaestionibus.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the sorrow of sympathizing friends does not assuage our own sorrow. For contraries have contrary effects. + Now as Augustine says (Confess. viii, 4), "when many rejoice together, each one has more exuberant joy, for they are kindled + and inflamed one by the other." Therefore, in like manner, when many are sorrowful, it seems that their sorrow is greater. +
[35175] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod dolor amici compatientis non mitiget +tristitiam. Contrariorum enim contrarii sunt effectus. Sed sicut +Augustinus dicit, VIII Confess., quando cum multis gaudetur, in +singulis uberius est gaudium, quia fervere faciunt se, et +inflammantur ex alterutro. Ergo, pari ratione, quando multi +simul tristantur, videtur quod sit maior tristitia.
+ Objection 2: Further, friendship demands mutual love, as Augustine declares (Confess. iv, 9). But a sympathizing friend is pained at the + sorrow of his friend with whom he sympathizes. Consequently the pain of a sympathizing friend becomes, to the friend in sorrow, + a further cause of sorrow: so that, his pain being doubled his sorrow seems to increase. +
[35176] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +hoc requirit amicitia, ut amoris vicem quis rependat, ut Augustinus +dicit, IV Confess. Sed amicus condolens dolet de dolore amici +dolentis. Ergo ipse dolor amici condolentis est causa amico prius +dolenti de proprio malo, alterius doloris. Et sic, duplicato +dolore, videtur tristitia crescere.
+ Objection 3: Further, sorrow arises from every evil affecting a friend, as though it affected oneself: since "a friend is one's other + self" (Ethic. ix, 4,9). But sorrow is an evil. Therefore the sorrow of the sympathizing friend increases the sorrow of the + friend with whom he sympathizes. +
[35177] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +omne malum amici est contristans, sicut et malum proprium, nam +amicus est alter ipse. Sed dolor est quoddam malum. Ergo dolor +amici condolentis auget tristitiam amico cui condoletur.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 11) that those who are in pain are consoled when their friends sympathize with them. +
[35178] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in IX Ethic., quod in tristitiis amicus +condolens consolatur.
+ I answer that, When one is in pain, it is natural that the sympathy of a friend should afford consolation: whereof the Philosopher indicates + a twofold reason (Ethic. ix, 11). The first is because, since sorrow has a depressing effect, it is like a weight whereof + we strive to unburden ourselves: so that when a man sees others saddened by his own sorrow, it seems as though others were + bearing the burden with him, striving, as it were, to lessen its weight; wherefore the load + of sorrow becomes lighter for him: something like what occurs in the carrying of bodily burdens. The second and better reason + is because when a man's friends condole with him, he sees that he is loved by them, and this affords him pleasure, as stated + above (Q[32], A[5]). Consequently, since every pleasure assuages sorrow, as stated above + (A[1]), it follows that sorrow is mitigated by a sympathizing friend. +
[35179] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod naturaliter amicus condolens in tristitiis, est +consolativus. Cuius duplicem rationem tangit philosophus in IX +Ethic. Quarum prima est quia, cum ad tristitiam pertineat +aggravare, habet rationem cuiusdam oneris, a quo aliquis aggravatus +alleviari conatur. Cum ergo aliquis videt de sua tristitia alios +contristatos, fit ei quasi quaedam imaginatio quod illud onus alii +cum ipso ferant, quasi conantes ad ipsum ab onere alleviandum et +ideo levius fert tristitiae onus, sicut etiam in portandis oneribus +corporalibus contingit. Secunda ratio, et melior, est quia per hoc +quod amici contristantur ei, percipit se ab eis amari; quod est +delectabile, ut supra dictum est. Unde, cum omnis delectatio +mitiget tristitiam, sicut supra dictum est, sequitur quod amicus +condolens tristitiam mitiget.
+ Reply to Objection 1: In either case there is a proof of friendship, viz. when a man rejoices with the joyful, and when he sorrows with the sorrowful. + Consequently each becomes an object of pleasure by reason of its cause. +
[35180] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod in utroque amicitia manifestatur, scilicet et +quod congaudet gaudenti, et quod condolet dolenti. Et ideo utrumque +ratione causae redditur delectabile.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The friend's sorrow itself would be a cause of sorrow: but consideration of its cause, viz. his love, gives rise rather to + pleasure. +
[35181] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod ipse dolor amici secundum se contristaret. Sed +consideratio causae eius, quae est amor, magis delectat.
And this suffices for the reply to the Third Objection.
[35182] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 3 ad 3 Et per hoc +patet responsio ad tertium.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplation of truth does not assuage sorrow. For it is written ( + Eccles. 1:18): "He that addeth knowledge addeth also sorrow" [Vulg.: 'labor']. But knowledge pertains to the contemplation of truth. Therefore + the contemplation of truth does not assuage sorrow. +
[35183] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod contemplatio veritatis non mitiget +dolorem. Dicitur enim Eccle. I, qui addit scientiam, addit et +dolorem. Sed scientia ad contemplationem veritatis pertinet. +Non ergo contemplatio veritatis mitigat dolorem.
+ Objection 2: Further, the contemplation of truth belongs to the speculative intellect. But "the speculative intellect is not a principle + of movement"; as stated in De Anima iii, 11. Therefore, since joy and sorrow are movements of the soul, it seems that the + contemplation of truth does not help to assuage sorrow. +
[35184] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +contemplatio veritatis ad intellectum speculativum pertinet. Sed +intellectus speculativus non movet, ut dicitur in III de anima. Cum +igitur gaudium et dolor sint quidam motus animi, videtur quod +contemplatio veritatis nihil faciat ad mitigationem doloris.
+ Objection 3: Further, the remedy for an ailment should be applied to the part which ails. But contemplation of truth is in the intellect. + Therefore it does not assuage bodily pain, which is in the senses. +
[35185] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +remedium aegritudinis apponendum est ubi est aegritudo. Sed +contemplatio veritatis est in intellectu. Non ergo mitigat dolorem +corporalem, qui est in sensu.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): "It seemed to me that if the light of that truth were to dawn on our minds, either I should + not feel that pain, or at least that pain would seem nothing to me." +
[35186] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in I Soliloq., videbatur mihi, si se +ille mentibus nostris veritatis fulgor aperiret, aut non me +sensurum fuisse illum dolorem, aut certe pro nihilo +toleraturum.
+ I answer that, As stated above (Q[3], A[5]), the greatest of all pleasures consists in the contemplation of truth. Now every pleasure assuages + pain as stated above + (A[1]): hence the contemplation of truth assuages pain or sorrow, and the more so, the more perfectly one is a lover of wisdom. + And therefore in the midst of tribulations men rejoice in the contemplation of Divine things and of future Happiness, according + to + James + 1:2 + : "My brethren, count it all joy, when you shall fall into divers temptations": and, what is more, even in the midst of bodily + tortures this joy is found; as the "martyr Tiburtius, when he was walking barefoot on the burning coals, said: Methinks, I + walk on roses, in the name of Jesus Christ." [*Cf. Dominican Breviary, August 11th, commemoration of St. Tiburtius.] +
[35187] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in contemplatione veritatis +maxima delectatio consistit. Omnis autem delectatio dolorem +mitigat, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo contemplatio veritatis +mitigat tristitiam vel dolorem, et tanto magis, quanto perfectius +aliquis est amator sapientiae. Et ideo homines ex contemplatione +divina et futurae beatitudinis, in tribulationibus gaudent; +secundum illud Iacobi I, omne gaudium existimate, fratres mei, +cum in tentationes varias incideritis. Et quod est amplius, +etiam inter corporis cruciatus huiusmodi gaudium invenitur, +sicut Tiburtius martyr, cum nudatis plantis super ardentes +prunas incederet, dixit, videtur mihi quod super roseos flores +incedam, in nomine Iesu Christi.
+ Reply to Objection 1: "He that addeth knowledge, addeth sorrow," either on account of the difficulty and disappointment in the search for truth; + or because knowledge makes man acquainted with many things that are contrary to his will. Accordingly, on the part of the + things known, knowledge causes sorrow: but on the part of the contemplation of truth, it causes pleasure. +
[35188] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod qui addit scientiam, addit dolorem, vel propter +difficultatem et defectum inveniendae veritatis, vel propter hoc, +quod per scientiam homo cognoscit multa quae voluntati +contrariantur. Et sic ex parte rerum cognitarum, scientia dolorem +causat, ex parte autem contemplationis veritatis, +delectationem.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The speculative intellect does not move the mind on the part of the thing contemplated: but on the part of contemplation + itself, which is man's good and naturally pleasant to him. +
[35189] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod intellectus speculativus non movet animum ex parte +rei speculatae, movet tamen animum ex parte ipsius speculationis, +quae est quoddam bonum hominis, et naturaliter delectabilis.
+ Reply to Objection 3: In the powers of the soul there is an overflow from the higher to the lower powers: and accordingly, the pleasure of contemplation, + which is in the higher part, overflows so as to mitigate even that pain which is in the senses. +
[35190] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod in viribus animae fit redundantia a superiori ad +inferius. Et secundum hoc, delectatio contemplationis, quae est in +superiori parte, redundat ad mitigandum etiam dolorem qui est in +sensu.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that sleep and baths do not assuage sorrow. For sorrow is in the soul: whereas sleep and baths regard the body. + Therefore they do not conduce to the assuaging of sorrow. +
[35191] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod somnus et balneum non mitigent +tristitiam. Tristitia enim in anima consistit. Sed somnus et +balneum ad corpus pertinent. Non ergo aliquid faciunt ad +mitigationem tristitiae.
+ Objection 2: Further, the same effect does not seem to ensue from contrary causes. But these, being bodily things, are incompatible with + the contemplation of truth which is a cause of the assuaging of sorrow, as stated above + (A[4]). Therefore sorrow is not mitigated by the like. +
[35192] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +idem effectus non videtur causari ex contrariis causis. Sed +huiusmodi, cum sint corporalia, repugnant contemplationi veritatis, +quae est causa mitigationis tristitiae, ut dictum est. Non ergo per +huiusmodi tristitia mitigatur.
+ Objection 3: Further, sorrow and pain, in so far as they affect the body, denote a certain transmutation of the heart. But such remedies + as these seem to pertain to the outward senses and limbs, rather than to the interior disposition of the heart. Therefore + they do not assuage sorrow. +
[35193] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +tristitia et dolor, secundum quod pertinent ad corpus, in quadam +transmutatione cordis consistunt. Sed huiusmodi remedia magis +videntur pertinere ad exteriores sensus et membra, quam ad +interiorem cordis dispositionem. Non ergo per huiusmodi tristitia +mitigatur.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ix, 12): "I had heard that the bath had its name [*Balneum, from the Greek {balaneion}] . . . from + the fact of its driving sadness from the mind." And further on, he says: "I slept, and woke up again, and found my grief not + a little assuaged": and quotes the words from the hymn of Ambrose [*Cf. Sarum Breviary: First Sunday after the octave of the + Epiphany, Hymn for first Vespers], in which it is said that "Sleep restores the tired + limbs to labor, refreshes the weary mind, and banishes sorrow." +
[35194] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, IX Confess., audieram balnei nomen +inde dictum, quod anxietatem pellat ex animo et infra, +dormivi, et evigilavi, et non parva ex parte mitigatum inveni +dolorem meum. Et inducit quod in hymno Ambrosii dicitur, quod +quies artus solutos reddit laboris usui, mentesque fessas +allevat, luctusque solvit anxios.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + Q[37], A[4]), sorrow, by reason of its specific nature, is repugnant to the vital movement of the body; and consequently whatever restores + the bodily nature to its due state of vital movement, is opposed to sorrow and assuages it. Moreover such remedies, from the + very fact that they bring nature back to its normal state, are causes of pleasure; for this is precisely in what pleasure + consists, as stated above ( + Q[31], A[1]). Therefore, since every + pleasure assuages sorrow, sorrow is assuaged by such like bodily remedies. +
[35195] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, tristitia secundum suam +speciem repugnat vitali motioni corporis. Et ideo illa quae +reformant naturam corporalem in debitum statum vitalis motionis, +repugnant tristitiae, et ipsam mitigant. Per hoc etiam quod +huiusmodi remediis reducitur natura ad debitum statum, causatur ex +his delectatio, hoc enim est quod delectationem facit, ut supra +dictum est. Unde, cum omnis delectatio tristitiam mitiget, per +huiusmodi remedia corporalia tristitia mitigatur.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The normal disposition of the body, so far as it is felt, is itself a cause of pleasure, and consequently assuages sorrow. +
[35196] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ipsa debita corporis dispositio, inquantum +sentitur, delectationem causat, et per consequens tristitiam +mitigat.
+ Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ( + Q[31], A[8]), one pleasure hinders another; and yet every pleasure assuages sorrow. Consequently it is not unreasonable that sorrow should + be assuaged by causes which hinder one another. +
[35197] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod delectationum una aliam impedit, ut supra dictum est, +et tamen omnis delectatio tristitiam mitigat. Unde non est +inconveniens quod ex causis se invicem impedientibus tristitia +mitigetur.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Every good disposition of the body reacts somewhat on the heart, which is the beginning and end of bodily movements, as stated + in De Causa Mot. Animal. xi. +
[35198] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod omnis bona dispositio corporis redundat quodammodo ad +cor, sicut ad principium et finem corporalium motionum, ut dicitur +in libro de causa motus animalium.
We must now consider the goodness and malice of pain or sorrow: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether all sorrow is evil?
(2) Whether sorrow can be a virtuous good?
+[35199] +Iª-IIae q. 39 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +bonitate et malitia doloris vel tristitiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur +quatuor. Primo, utrum omnis tristitia sit malum. Secundo, utrum +possit esse bonum honestum. Tertio, utrum possit esse bonum utile. +Quarto, utrum dolor corporis sit summum malum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that all sorrow is evil. For Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] says: "All sorrow is evil, from + its very nature." Now what is naturally evil, is evil always and everywhere. Therefore, all sorrow is evil. +
[35200] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis tristitia sit mala. Dicit enim +Gregorius Nyssenus, omnis tristitia malum est, sui ipsius +natura. Sed quod naturaliter est malum, semper et ubique est +malum. Ergo omnis tristitia est mala.
+ Objection 2: Further, that which all, even the virtuous, avoid, is evil. But all avoid sorrow, even the virtuous, since as stated in Ethic. + vii, 11, "though the prudent man does not aim at pleasure, yet he aims at avoiding sorrow." Therefore sorrow is evil. +
[35201] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +illud quod omnes fugiunt, etiam virtuosi, est malum. Sed tristitiam +omnes fugiunt, etiam virtuosi, quia, ut dicitur in VII Ethic., +etsi prudens non intendat delectari, tamen intendit non +tristari. Ergo tristitia est malum.
+ Objection 3: Further, just as bodily evil is the object and cause of bodily pain, so spiritual evil is the object and cause of sorrow + in the soul. But every bodily pain is a bodily evil. Therefore every spiritual sorrow is an evil of the soul. +
[35202] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sicut malum corporale est obiectum et causa doloris corporalis, ita +malum spirituale est obiectum et causa tristitiae spiritualis. Sed +omnis dolor corporalis est malum corporis. Ergo omnis tristitia +spiritualis est malum animae.
+ On the contrary, Sorrow for evil is contrary to pleasure in evil. But pleasure in evil is evil: wherefore in condemnation of certain men, + it is written ( + Prov. 2:14), that "they were glad when they had done evil." Therefore sorrow for evil is good. +
[35203] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra, +tristitia de malo contrariatur delectationi de malo. Sed delectatio +de malo est mala, unde in detestationem quorundam dicitur Prov. II, +quod laetantur cum malefecerint. Ergo tristitia de malo est +bona.
+ I answer that, A thing may be good or evil in two ways: first considered simply and in itself; and thus all sorrow is an evil, because the + mere fact of a man's appetite being uneasy about a present evil, is itself an evil, because it hinders the response of the + appetite in good. Secondly, a thing is said to be good or evil, on the supposition of something else: thus shame is said to + be good, on the supposition of a shameful deed done, as stated in Ethic. iv, 9. + Accordingly, supposing the presence of something saddening or painful, it is a sign of goodness if a man is in sorrow or pain + on account of this present evil. For if he were not to be in sorrow or pain, this could only be either because he feels it + not, or because he does not reckon it as something unbecoming, both of which are manifest evils. Consequently it is a condition + of goodness, that, supposing an evil to be present, sorrow or pain should ensue. Wherefore Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. + viii, 14): "It is also a good thing that he sorrows for the good he has lost: for had not some good remained in his nature, + he could not be punished by the loss of good." Because, however, in the science of Morals, we consider things individually---for + actions are concerned about individuals---that which is good on some supposition, should be considered as good: just as that + which is voluntary on some supposition, is judged to be voluntary, as stated in Ethic. iii, 1, and likewise above ( + Q[6], A[6]). +
[35204] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod aliquid esse bonum vel malum, potest dici dupliciter. +Uno modo, simpliciter et secundum se. Et sic omnis tristitia est +quoddam malum, hoc enim ipsum quod est appetitum hominis anxiari de +malo praesenti, rationem mali habet; impeditur enim per hoc quies +appetitus in bono. Alio modo dicitur aliquid bonum vel malum, ex +suppositione alterius, sicut verecundia dicitur esse bonum, ex +suppositione alicuius turpis commissi, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Sic +igitur, supposito aliquo contristabili vel doloroso, ad bonitatem +pertinet quod aliquis de malo praesenti tristetur vel doleat. Quod +enim non tristaretur vel non doleret, non posset esse nisi quia vel +non sentiret, vel quia non reputaret sibi repugnans, et utrumque +istorum est malum manifeste. Et ideo ad bonitatem pertinet ut, +supposita praesentia mali, sequatur tristitia vel dolor. Et hoc est +quod Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., adhuc est bonum +quod dolet amissum bonum, nam nisi aliquod bonum remansisset in +natura, nullius boni amissi dolor esset in poena. Sed quia +sermones morales sunt in singularibus, quorum sunt operationes, +illud quod est ex suppositione bonum, debet bonum iudicari, sicut +quod est ex suppositione voluntarium, iudicatur voluntarium, ut +dicitur in III Ethic., et supra habitum est.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius] is speaking of sorrow on the part of the evil that causes it, but not on the part of the subject + that feels and rejects the evil. And from this point of view, all shun sorrow, inasmuch as they shun evil: but they do not + shun the perception and rejection of evil. The same also applies to bodily pain: because the perception and rejection of bodily + evil is the proof of the goodness of nature. +
[35205] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Gregorius Nyssenus loquitur de tristitia ex +parte mali tristantis, non autem ex parte sentientis et repudiantis +malum. Et ex hac etiam parte omnes fugiunt tristitiam, inquantum +fugiunt malum, sed sensum et refutationem mali non fugiunt. Et sic +etiam dicendum est de dolore corporali, nam sensus et recusatio +mali corporalis attestatur naturae bonae.
This suffices for the Replies to the Second and Third Objections.
[35206] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 1 ad 2 Unde patet +responsio ad secundum et tertium.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is not a virtuous good. For that which leads to hell is not a virtuous good. But, as Augustine + says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 33), "Jacob seems to have feared lest he should be troubled overmuch by sorrow, and so, instead of + entering into the rest of the blessed, be consigned to the hell of sinners." Therefore sorrow is not a virtuous good. +
[35207] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod tristitia non habeat rationem boni +honesti. Quod enim ad Inferos deducit, contrariatur honesto. Sed +sicut dicit Augustinus, XII super Gen. ad Litt., Iacob hoc +timuisse videtur, ne nimia tristitia sic perturbaretur, ut non ad +requiem beatorum iret, sed ad Inferos peccatorum. Ergo +tristitia non habet rationem boni honesti.
+ Objection 2: Further, the virtuous good is praiseworthy and meritorious. But sorrow lessens praise or merit: for the Apostle says ( + 2 Cor. 9:7): "Everyone, as he hath determined in his heart, not with sadness, or of necessity." Therefore sorrow is not a virtuous good. +
[35208] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +bonum honestum habet rationem laudabilis et meritorii. Sed +tristitia diminuit rationem laudis et meriti, dicit enim apostolus, +II ad Cor. IX, unusquisque prout destinavit in corde suo, non ex +tristitia aut ex necessitate. Ergo tristitia non est bonum +honestum.
+ Objection 3: Further, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15), "sorrow is concerned about those things which happen against our will." + But not to will those things which are actually taking place, is to have a will opposed to the decree of God, to Whose providence + whatever is done is subject. Since, then, conformity of the human to the Divine will is a condition of the rectitude of the + will, as stated above ( + Q[19], A[9]), it seems that sorrow is + incompatible with rectitude of the will, and that consequently it is not virtuous. +
[35209] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sicut Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, tristitia est de his +quae, nobis nolentibus, accidunt. Sed non velle ea quae +praesentialiter fiunt, est habere voluntatem repugnantem +ordinationi divinae, cuius providentiae subiacent omnia quae +aguntur. Ergo, cum conformitas humanae voluntatis ad divinam +pertineat ad rectitudinem voluntatis, ut supra dictum est; videtur +quod tristitia contrarietur rectitudini voluntatis. Et sic non +habet rationem honesti.
+ On the contrary, Whatever merits the reward of eternal life is virtuous. But such is sorrow; as is evident from + Mat. 5:5: "Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted." Therefore sorrow is a virtuous good. +
[35210] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra, +omne quod meretur praemium vitae aeternae, habet rationem honesti. +Sed tristitia est huiusmodi, ut patet per id quod dicitur Matth. V, +beati qui lugent, quoniam ipsi consolabuntur. Ergo tristitia +est bonum honestum.
+ I answer that, In so far as sorrow is good, it can be a virtuous good. For it has been said above + (A[1]) that sorrow is a good inasmuch as it denotes perception and rejection of evil. These two things, as regards bodily pain, + are a proof of the goodness of nature, to which it is due that the senses perceive, and that nature shuns, the harmful thing + that causes pain. As regards interior sorrow, perception of the evil is sometimes due to a right + judgment of reason; while the rejection of the evil is the act of the will, well disposed and detesting that evil. Now every + virtuous good results from these two things, the rectitude of the reason and the will. Wherefore it is evident that sorrow + may be a virtuous good. +
[35211] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, secundum illam rationem qua tristitia est bonum, +potest esse bonum honestum. Dictum est enim quod tristitia est +bonum secundum cognitionem et recusationem mali. Quae quidem duo in +dolore corporali, attestantur bonitati naturae, ex qua provenit +quod sensus sentit, et natura refugit laesivum, quod causat +dolorem. In interiori vero tristitia, cognitio mali quandoque +quidem est per rectum iudicium rationis; et recusatio mali est per +voluntatem bene dispositam detestantem malum. Omne autem bonum +honestum ex his duobus procedit, scilicet ex rectitudine rationis +et voluntatis. Unde manifestum est quod tristitia potest habere +rationem boni honesti.
+ Reply to Objection 1: All the passions of the soul should be regulated according to the rule of reason, which is the root of the virtuous good; + but excessive sorrow, of which Augustine is speaking, oversteps this rule, and therefore it fails to be a virtuous good. +
[35212] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod omnes passiones animae regulari debent secundum +regulam rationis, quae est radix boni honesti. Quam transcendit +immoderata tristitia, de qua loquitur Augustinus. Et ideo recedit a +ratione boni honesti.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Just as sorrow for an evil arises from a right will and reason, which detest the evil, so sorrow for a good is due to a perverse + reason and will, which detest the good. Consequently such sorrow is an obstacle to the praise and merit of the virtuous good; + for instance, when a man gives an alms sorrowfully. +
[35213] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut tristitia de malo procedit ex voluntate et +ratione recta, quae detestatur malum; ita tristitia de bono +procedit ex ratione et voluntate perversa, quae detestatur bonum. +Et ideo talis tristitia impedit laudem vel meritum boni honesti, +sicut cum quis facit cum tristitia eleemosynam.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Some things do actually happen, not because God wills, but because He permits them to happen---such as sins. Consequently + a will that is opposed to sin, whether in oneself or in another, is not discordant from the Divine will. Penal evils happen + actually, even by God's will. But it is not necessary for the rectitude of his will, that man should will them in themselves: + but only that he should not revolt against the order of Divine justice, as stated + above ( + Q[19], A[10]). +
[35214] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod aliqua praesentialiter eveniunt, quae non fiunt Deo +volente, sed Deo permittente, sicut peccata. Unde voluntas +repugnans peccato existenti vel in se vel in alio, non discordat a +voluntate Dei. Mala vero poenalia praesentialiter contingunt, etiam +Deo volente. Non tamen exigitur ad rectitudinem voluntatis, quod ea +secundum se homo velit, sed solum quod non contranitatur ordini +divinae iustitiae, ut supra dictum est.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow cannot be a useful good. For it is written ( + Ecclus. 30:25): "Sadness hath killed many, and there is no profit in it." +
[35215] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod tristitia non possit esse bonum utile. +Dicitur enim Eccli. XXX, multos occidit tristitia, et non est +utilitas in illa.
+ Objection 2: Further, choice is of that which is useful to an end. But sorrow is not an object of choice; in fact, "a thing without sorrow + is to be chosen rather than the same thing with sorrow" (Topic. iii, 2). Therefore sorrow is not a useful good. +
[35216] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +electio est de eo quod est utile ad finem aliquem. Sed tristitia +non est eligibilis, quinimmo idem sine tristitia, quam cum +tristitia, est magis eligendum, ut dicitur in III Topic. Ergo +tristitia non est bonum utile.
+ Objection 3: Further, "Everything is for the sake of its own operation," as stated in De Coel. ii, 3. But "sorrow hinders operation," + as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore sorrow is not a useful good. +
[35217] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 arg. 3 +Praeterea, omnis res est propter suam operationem, ut +dicitur in II de coelo. Sed tristitia impedit operationem, ut +dicitur in X Ethic. Ergo tristitia non habet rationem boni +utilis.
+ On the contrary, The wise man seeks only that which is useful. But according to + Eccles. 7:5, "the heart of the wise is where there is mourning, and the heart of fools where there is mirth." Therefore sorrow is useful. +
[35218] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra, +sapiens non quaerit nisi utilia. Sed sicut dicitur Eccle. VII, +cor sapientum ubi tristitia, et cor stultorum ubi laetitia. +Ergo tristitia est utilis.
+ I answer that, A twofold movement of the appetite ensues from a present evil. One is that whereby the appetite is opposed to the present + evil; and, in this respect, sorrow is of no use; because that which is present, cannot be not present. The other movement + arises in the appetite to the effect of avoiding or expelling the saddening evil: and, in this respect, sorrow is of use, + if it be for something which ought to be avoided. Because there are two reasons for which it may + be right to avoid a thing. First, because it should be avoided in itself, on account of its being contrary to good; for instance, + sin. Wherefore sorrow for sin is useful as inducing a man to avoid sin: hence the Apostle says ( + 2 Cor. 7:9): "I am glad: not because you were made sorrowful, but because you were made sorrowful unto penance." Secondly, a thing is + to be avoided, not as though it were evil in itself, but because it is an occasion of evil; either through one's being + attached to it, and loving it too much, or through one's being thrown headlong thereby into an evil, as is evident in the + case of temporal goods. And, in this respect, sorrow for temporal goods may be useful; according to + Eccles. 7:3: "It is better to go to the house of mourning, than to the house of feasting: for in that we are put in mind of the end of + all." +
Moreover, sorrow for that which ought to be avoided is always useful, since it adds another motive for avoiding it. Because + the very evil is in itself a thing to be avoided: while everyone avoids sorrow for its own sake, just as everyone seeks the + good, and pleasure in the good. Therefore just as pleasure in the good makes one seek the good more earnestly, so sorrow for + evil makes one avoid evil more eagerly. +
[35219] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod ex malo praesenti insurgit duplex appetitivus motus. +Unus quidem est quo appetitus contrariatur malo praesenti. Et ex +ista parte tristitia non habet utilitatem, quia id quod est +praesens, non potest non esse praesens. Secundus motus consurgit in +appetitu ad fugiendum vel repellendum malum contristans. Et quantum +ad hoc, tristitia habet utilitatem, si sit de aliquo quod est +fugiendum. Est enim aliquid fugiendum dupliciter. Uno modo, propter +seipsum, ex contrarietate quam habet ad bonum; sicut peccatum. Et +ideo tristitia de peccato utilis est ad hoc quod homo fugiat +peccatum, sicut apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. VII, gaudeo, non +quia contristati estis, sed quia contristati estis ad +poenitentiam. Alio modo est aliquid fugiendum, non quia sit +secundum se malum, sed quia est occasio mali; dum vel homo nimis +inhaeret ei per amorem, vel etiam ex hoc praecipitatur in aliquod +malum, sicut patet in bonis temporalibus. Et secundum hoc, +tristitia de bonis temporalibus potest esse utilis, sicut dicitur +Eccle. VII, melius est ire ad domum luctus quam ad domum +convivii, in illa enim finis cunctorum admonetur hominum. Ideo +autem tristitia in omni fugiendo est utilis, quia geminatur +fugiendi causa. Nam ipsum malum secundum se fugiendum est, ipsam +autem tristitiam secundum se omnes fugiunt, sicut etiam bonum omnes +appetunt, et delectationem de bono. Sicut ergo delectatio de bono +facit ut bonum avidius quaeratur, ita tristitia de malo facit ut +malum vehementius fugiatur.
+ Reply to Objection 1: This passage is to be taken as referring to excessive sorrow, which consumes the soul: for such sorrow paralyzes the soul, + and hinders it from shunning evil, as stated above ( + Q[37], A[2]). +
[35220] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod auctoritas illa intelligitur de immoderata +tristitia, quae animum absorbet. Huiusmodi enim tristitia +immobilitat animum, et impedit fugam mali, ut supra dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Just as any object of choice becomes less eligible by reason of sorrow, so that which ought to be shunned is still more to + be shunned by reason of sorrow: and, in this respect, sorrow is useful. +
[35221] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut quodlibet eligibile fit minus eligibile +propter tristitiam, ita quodlibet fugiendum redditur magis +fugiendum propter tristitiam. Et quantum ad hoc, tristitia est +utilis.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Sorrow caused by an action hinders that action: but sorrow for the cessation of an action, makes one do it more earnestly. +
[35222] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod tristitia de operatione aliqua, impedit operationem, +sed tristitia de cessatione operationis, facit avidius operari.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that pain is the greatest evil. Because "the worst is contrary to the best" (Ethic. viii, 10). But a certain + pleasure is the greatest good, viz. the pleasure of bliss. Therefore a certain pain is the greatest evil. +
[35223] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod tristitia sit summum malum. Optimo +enim opponitur pessimum, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic. Sed quaedam +delectatio est optimum, quae scilicet pertinet ad felicitatem. Ergo +aliqua tristitia est summum malum.
+ Objection 2: Further, happiness is man's greatest good, because it is his last end. But man's Happiness consists in his "having whatever + he will, and in willing naught amiss," as stated above ( + Q[3], A[4], OBJ[5]; + Q[5], A[8], OBJ[3]). Therefore man's greatest good consists in the fulfilment of his will. Now pain consists in something happening + contrary to the will, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6,15). Therefore pain + is man's greatest evil. +
[35224] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +beatitudo est summum bonum hominis, quia est ultimus hominis finis. +Sed beatitudo consistit in hoc quod homo habeat quidquid velit, et +nihil mali velit, ut supra dictum est. Ergo summum bonum hominis +est impletio voluntatis ipsius. Sed tristitia consistit in hoc quod +accidit aliquid contra voluntatem, ut patet per Augustinum, XIV de +Civ. Dei. Ergo tristitia est summum malum hominis.
+ Objection 3: Further, Augustine argues thus (Soliloq. i, 12): "We are composed of two parts, i.e. of a soul and a body, whereof the body + is the inferior. Now the sovereign good is the greatest good of the better part: while the supreme evil is the greatest evil + of the inferior part. But wisdom is the greatest good of the soul; while the worst thing in the body is pain. Therefore man's + greatest good is to be wise: while his greatest evil is to suffer pain." +
[35225] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +Augustinus sic argumentatur in Soliloq., ex duabus partibus +compositi sumus, ex anima scilicet et corpore, quarum pars deterior +corpus est. Summum autem bonum est melioris partis optimum, summum +autem malum, pessimum deterioris. Est autem optimum in animo +sapientia, in corpore pessimum dolor. Summum igitur bonum hominis +est sapere, summum malum dolere.
+ On the contrary, Guilt is a greater evil than punishment, as was stated in the + FP, Q[48], A[6]. But sorrow or pain belongs to the punishment of sin, just as the enjoyment of changeable things is an evil of guilt. For + Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xii): "What is pain of the soul, except for the soul to be deprived of that which it was wont + to enjoy, or had hoped to enjoy? And this is all that is called evil, i.e. sin, and the punishment of sin." + Therefore sorrow or pain is not man's greatest evil. +
[35226] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra, +culpa est magis malum quam poena, ut in primo habitum est. Sed +tristitia seu dolor pertinet ad poenam peccati; sicut frui rebus +mutabilibus est malum culpae. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de +vera religione, quis est dolor qui dicitur animi, nisi carere +mutabilibus rebus quibus fruebatur, aut frui se posse speraverat? +Et hoc est totum quod dicitur malum, idest peccatum, et poena +peccati. Ergo tristitia seu dolor non est summum malum +hominis.
+ I answer that, It is impossible for any sorrow or pain to be man's greatest evil. For all sorrow or pain is either for something that is + truly evil, or for something that is apparently evil, but good in reality. Now pain or sorrow for that which is truly evil + cannot be the greatest evil: for there is something worse, namely, either not to reckon as evil that which is really evil, + or not to reject it. Again, sorrow or pain, for that which is apparently evil, but really + good, cannot be the greatest evil, for it would be worse to be altogether separated from that which is truly good. Hence it + is impossible for any sorrow or pain to be man's greatest evil. +
[35227] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod impossibile est aliquam tristitiam seu dolorem esse +summum hominis malum. Omnis enim tristitia seu dolor aut est de hoc +quod est vere malum, aut est de aliquo apparenti malo, quod est +vere bonum. Dolor autem seu tristitia quae est de vere malo, non +potest esse summum malum, est enim aliquid eo peius, scilicet vel +non iudicare esse malum illud quod vere est malum, vel etiam non +refutare illud. Tristitia autem vel dolor qui est de apparenti +malo, quod est vere bonum, non potest esse summum malum, quia peius +esset omnino alienari a vero bono. Unde impossibile est quod aliqua +tristitia vel dolor sit summum hominis malum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Pleasure and sorrow have two good points in common: namely, a true judgment concerning good and evil; and the right order + of the will in approving of good and rejecting evil. Thus it is clear that in pain or sorrow there is a good, by the removal + of which they become worse: and yet there is not an evil in every pleasure, by the removal of which the pleasure is better. + Consequently, a pleasure can be man's highest good, in the way above stated ( + Q[34], + A[3] + ): whereas sorrow cannot be man's greatest evil. +
[35228] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod duo bona sunt communia et delectationi et +tristitiae, scilicet iudicium verum de bono et malo; et ordo +debitus voluntatis approbantis bonum et recusantis malum. Et sic +patet quod in dolore vel tristitia est aliquod bonum per cuius +privationem potest fieri deterius. Sed non in omni delectatione est +aliquod malum, per cuius remotionem possit fieri melius. Unde +delectatio aliqua potest esse summum hominis bonum, eo modo quo +supra dictum est, tristitia autem non potest esse summum hominis +malum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The very fact of the will being opposed to evil is a good. And for this reason, sorrow or pain cannot be the greatest evil; + because it has an admixture of good. +
[35229] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod est voluntatem repugnare malo, est +quoddam bonum. Et propter hoc, tristitia vel dolor non potest esse +summum malum, quia habet aliquam permixtionem boni.
+ Reply to Objection 3: That which harms the better thing is worse than that which harms the worse. Now a thing is called evil "because it harms," + as Augustine says (Enchiridion xii). Therefore that which is an evil to the soul is a greater evil than that which is an evil + to the body. Therefore this argument does not prove: nor does Augustine give it as his own, but as taken from another [*Cornelius + Celsus]. +
[35230] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod peius est quod nocet meliori, quam quod nocet peiori. +Malum autem dicitur quia nocet, ut dicit Augustinus in Enchirid. +Unde maius malum est quod est malum animae, quam quod est malum +corporis. Unde non est efficax, ratio, quam Augustinus inducit non +ex sensu suo sed ex sensu alterius.
We must now consider the irascible passions: (1) Hope and despair; (2) Fear and daring; (3) Anger. Under first head there + are eight points of inquiry: +
(1) Whether hope is the same as desire or cupidity?
(2) Whether hope is in the apprehensive, or in the appetitive faculty?
(3) Whether hope is in dumb animals?
(4) Whether despair is contrary to hope?
(5) Whether experience is a cause of hope?
(6) Whether hope abounds in young men and drunkards?
+[35231] +Iª-IIae q. 40 pr. Consequenter considerandum est de +passionibus irascibilis, et primo, de spe et desperatione; secundo, +de timore et audacia; tertio, de ira. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. +Primo, utrum spes sit idem quod desiderium vel cupiditas. Secundo, +utrum spes sit in vi apprehensiva, vel in vi appetitiva. Tertio, +utrum spes sit in brutis animalibus. Quarto, utrum spei +contrarietur desperatio. Quinto, utrum causa spei sit experientia. +Sexto, utrum in iuvenibus et ebriosis spes abundet. Septimo, de +ordine spei ad amorem. Octavo, utrum spes conferat ad +operationem.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that hope is the same as desire or cupidity. Because hope is reckoned as one of the four principal passions. + But Augustine in setting down the four principal passions puts cupidity in the place of hope (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3,7). Therefore + hope is the same as cupidity or desire. +
[35232] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod spes sit idem quod desiderium sive +cupiditas. Spes enim ponitur una quatuor principalium passionum. +Sed Augustinus, enumerans quatuor principales passiones, ponit +cupiditatem loco spei, ut patet in XIV de Civ. Dei. Ergo spes est +idem quod cupiditas sive desiderium.
+ Objection 2: Further, passions differ according to their objects. But the object of hope is the same as the object of cupidity or desire, + viz. the future good. Therefore hope is the same as cupidity or desire. +
[35233] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +passiones differunt secundum obiecta. Sed idem est obiectum spei, +et cupiditatis sive desiderii, scilicet bonum futurum. Ergo spes +est idem quod cupiditas sive desiderium.
+ Objection 3: If it be said that hope, in addition to desire, denotes the possibility of obtaining the future good; on the contrary, whatever + is accidental to the object does not make a different species of passion. But possibility of acquisition is accidental to + a future good, which is the object of cupidity or desire, and of hope. Therefore hope does not differ specifically from desire + or cupidity. +
[35234] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 1 arg. 3 Si dicatur +quod spes addit supra desiderium possibilitatem adipiscendi bonum +futurum, contra, id quod per accidens se habet ad obiectum, non +variat speciem passionis. Sed possibile se habet per accidens ad +bonum futurum, quod est obiectum cupiditatis vel desiderii, et +spei. Ergo spes non est passio specie differens a desiderio vel +cupiditate.
+ On the contrary, To different powers belong different species of passions. But hope is in the irascible power; whereas desire or cupidity + is in the concupiscible. Therefore hope differs specifically from desire or cupidity. +
[35235] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra, +diversarum potentiarum sunt diversae passiones specie differentes. +Sed spes est in irascibili; desiderium autem et cupiditas in +concupiscibili. Ergo spes differt specie a desiderio seu +cupiditate.
+ I answer that, The species of a passion is taken from the object. Now, in the object of hope, we may note four conditions. First, that it + is something good; since, properly speaking, hope regards only the good; in this respect, hope differs from fear, which regards + evil. Secondly, that it is future; for hope does not regard that which is present and already possessed: in this respect, + hope differs from joy which regards a present good. Thirdly, that it must be something + arduous and difficult to obtain, for we do not speak of any one hoping for trifles, which are in one's power to have at any + time: in this respect, hope differs from desire or cupidity, which regards the future good absolutely: wherefore it belongs + to the concupiscible, while hope belongs to the irascible faculty. Fourthly, that this difficult thing is something possible + to obtain: for one does not hope for that which one cannot get at all: and, in this respect, hope differs from despair. It + is + therefore evident that hope differs from desire, as the irascible passions differ from the concupiscible. For this reason, + moreover, hope presupposes desire: just as all irascible passions presuppose the passions of the concupiscible faculty, as + stated above ( + Q[25], A[1]). +
[35236] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod species passionis ex obiecto consideratur circa +obiectum autem spei quatuor conditiones attenduntur. Primo quidem, +quod sit bonum, non enim, proprie loquendo, est spes nisi de bono. +Et per hoc differt spes a timore, qui est de malo. Secundo, ut sit +futurum, non enim spes est de praesenti iam habito. Et per hoc +differt spes a gaudio, quod est de bono praesenti. Tertio, +requiritur quod sit aliquid arduum cum difficultate adipiscibile, +non enim aliquis dicitur aliquid sperare minimum, quod statim est +in sua potestate ut habeat. Et per hoc differt spes a desiderio vel +cupiditate, quae est de bono futuro absolute, unde pertinet ad +concupiscibilem, spes autem ad irascibilem. Quarto, quod illud +arduum sit possibile adipisci, non enim aliquis sperat id quod +omnino adipisci non potest. Et secundum hoc differt spes a +desperatione. Sic ergo patet quod spes differt a desiderio, sicut +differunt passiones irascibilis a passionibus concupiscibilis. Et +propter hoc, spes praesupponit desiderium, sicut et omnes passiones +irascibilis praesupponunt passiones concupiscibilis, ut supra +dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Augustine mentions desire instead of hope, because each regards future good; and because the good which is not arduous is + reckoned as nothing: thus implying that desire seems to tend chiefly to the arduous good, to which hope tends likewise. +
[35237] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Augustinus ponit cupiditatem loco spei, propter +hoc quod utrumque respicit bonum futurum, et quia bonum quod non +est arduum, quasi nihil reputatur; ut sic cupiditas maxime videatur +tendere in bonum arduum, in quod etiam tendit spes.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The object of hope is the future good considered, not absolutely, but as arduous and difficult of attainment, as stated above. +
[35238] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod obiectum spei non est bonum futurum absolute, sed cum +arduitate et difficultate adipiscendi, ut dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The object of hope adds not only possibility to the object of desire, but also difficulty: and this makes hope belong to + another power, viz. the irascible, which regards something difficult, as stated in the + FP, Q[81], A[2]. Moreover, possibility and impossibility are not altogether accidental to the object of the appetitive power: because the + appetite is a principle of movement; and nothing is moved to anything except under + the aspect of being possible; for no one is moved to that which he reckons impossible to get. Consequently hope differs from + despair according to the difference of possible and impossible. +
[35239] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod obiectum spei non tantum addit possibilitatem super +obiectum desiderii, sed etiam arduitatem, quae ad aliam potentiam +facit spem pertinere, scilicet ad irascibilem, quae respicit +arduum, ut in primo dictum est. Possibile autem et impossibile non +omnino per accidens se habent ad obiectum appetitivae virtutis. Nam +appetitus est principium motionis, nihil autem movetur ad aliquid +nisi sub ratione possibilis; nullus enim movetur ad id quod +existimat impossibile adipisci. Et propter hoc, spes differt a +desperatione secundum differentiam possibilis et impossibilis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that hope belongs to the cognitive power. Because hope, seemingly, is a kind of awaiting; for the Apostle says + ( + Rom. 8:25): "If we hope for that which we see not; we wait for it with patience." But awaiting seems to belong to the cognitive power, + which we exercise by "looking out." Therefore hope belongs to the cognitive power. +
[35240] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod spes pertineat ad vim cognitivam. Spes +enim videtur esse expectatio quaedam, dicit enim apostolus, Rom. +VIII, si autem quod non videmus speramus, per patientiam +expectamus. Sed expectatio videtur ad vim cognitivam pertinere, +cuius est exspectare. Ergo spes ad cognitivam pertinet.
+ Objection 2: Further, apparently hope is the same as confidence; hence when a man hopes he is said to be confident, as though to hope + and to be confident were the same thing. But confidence, like faith, seems to belong to the cognitive power. Therefore hope + does too. +
[35241] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +idem est, ut videtur, spes quod fiducia, unde et sperantes +confidentes vocamus, quasi pro eodem utentes eo quod est confidere +et sperare. Sed fiducia, sicut et fides, videtur ad vim cognitivam +pertinere. Ergo et spes.
+ Objection 3: Further, certainty is a property of the cognitive power. But certainty is ascribed to hope. Therefore hope belongs to the + cognitive power. +
[35242] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +certitudo est proprietas cognitivae virtutis. Sed certitudo +attribuitur spei. Ergo spes ad vim cognitivam pertinet.
+ On the contrary, Hope regards good, as stated above + (A[1]). Now good, as such, is not the object of the cognitive, but of the appetitive power. Therefore hope belongs, not to the cognitive, + but to the appetitive power. +
[35243] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra, +spes est de bono, sicut dictum est. Bonum autem, inquantum +huiusmodi, non est obiectum cognitivae, sed appetitivae virtutis. +Ergo spes non pertinet ad cognitivam, sed ad appetitivam +virtutem.
+ I answer that, Since hope denotes a certain stretching out of the appetite towards good, it evidently belongs to the appetitive power; since + movement towards things belongs properly to the appetite: whereas the action of the cognitive power is accomplished not by + the movement of the knower towards things, but rather according as the things known are in the knower. But since the cognitive + power moves the appetite, by presenting its object to it; there arise in the appetite + various movements according to various aspects of the apprehended object. For the apprehension of good gives rise to one kind + of movement in the appetite, while the apprehension of evil gives rise to another: in like manner various movements arise + from the apprehension of something present and of something future; of something considered absolutely, and of something considered + as arduous; of something possible, and of something impossible. And accordingly hope is a movement of the appetitive + power ensuing from the apprehension of a future good, difficult but possible to obtain; namely, a stretching forth of the + appetite to such a good. +
[35244] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, cum spes importet extensionem quandam appetitus in +bonum, manifeste pertinet ad appetitivam virtutem, motus enim ad +res pertinet proprie ad appetitum. Actio vero virtutis cognitivae +perficitur non secundum motum cognoscentis ad res, sed potius +secundum quod res cognitae sunt in cognoscente. Sed quia vis +cognitiva movet appetitivam, repraesentando ei suum obiectum; +secundum diversas rationes obiecti apprehensi, subsequuntur diversi +motus in vi appetitiva. Alius enim motus sequitur in appetitu ex +apprehensione boni, et alius ex apprehensione mali, et similiter +alius motus ex apprehensione praesentis et futuri, absoluti et +ardui, possibilis et impossibilis. Et secundum hoc, spes est motus +appetitivae virtutis consequens apprehensionem boni futuri ardui +possibilis adipisci, scilicet extensio appetitus in huiusmodi +obiectum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Since hope regards a possible good, there arises in man a twofold movement of hope; for a thing may be possible to him in + two ways, viz. by his own power, or by another's. Accordingly when a man hopes to obtain something by his own power, he is + not said to wait for it, but simply to hope for it. But, properly speaking, he is said to await that which he hopes to get + by another's help as though to await [exspectare] implied keeping one's eyes on another + [ex alio spectare], in so far as the apprehensive power, by going ahead, not only keeps its eye on the good which man intends + to get, but also on the thing by whose power he hopes to get it; according to + Ecclus. 51:10, "I looked for the succor of men." Wherefore the movement of hope is sometimes called expectation, on account of the preceding + inspection of the cognitive power. +
[35245] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, quia spes respicit ad bonum possibile, insurgit +dupliciter homini motus spei, sicut dupliciter est ei aliquid +possibile, scilicet secundum propriam virtutem, et secundum +virtutem alterius. Quod ergo aliquis sperat per propriam virtutem +adipisci, non dicitur expectare, sed sperare tantum. Sed proprie +dicitur expectare quod sperat ex auxilio virtutis alienae, ut +dicatur exspectare quasi ex alio spectare, inquantum scilicet vis +apprehensiva praecedens non solum respicit ad bonum quod intendit +adipisci, sed etiam ad illud cuius virtute adipisci sperat; +secundum illud Eccli. li, respiciens eram ad adiutorium +hominum. Motus ergo spei quandoque dicitur expectatio, propter +inspectionem virtutis cognitivae praecedentem.
+ Reply to Objection 2: When a man desires a thing and reckons that he can get it, he believes that he can get it, he believes that he will get it; + and from this belief which precedes in the cognitive power, the ensuing movement in the appetite is called confidence. Because + the movement of the appetite takes its name from the knowledge that precedes it, as an effect from a cause which is better + known; for the apprehensive power knows its own act better than that of the + appetite. +
[35246] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod illud quod homo desiderat, et aestimat se posse +adipisci, credit se adepturum, et ex tali fide in cognitiva +praecedente, motus sequens in appetitu fiducia nominatur. +Denominatur enim motus appetitivus a cognitione praecedente, sicut +effectus ex causa magis nota, magis enim cognoscit vis apprehensiva +suum actum quam actum appetitivae.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Certainty is ascribed to the movement, not only of the sensitive, but also of the natural appetite; thus we say that a stone + is certain to tend downwards. This is owing to the inerrancy which the movement of the sensitive or even natural appetite + derives from the certainty of the knowledge that precedes it. +
[35247] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod certitudo attribuitur motui non solum appetitus +sensitivi, sed etiam appetitus naturalis, sicut dicitur quod lapis +certitudinaliter tendit deorsum. Et hoc propter infallibilitatem +quam habet ex certitudine cognitionis quae praecedit motum +appetitus sensitivi, vel etiam naturalis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that there is no hope in dumb animals. Because hope is for some future good, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. + ii, 12). But knowledge of the future is not in the competency of dumb animals, whose knowledge is confined to the senses and + does not extend to the future. Therefore there is no hope in dumb animals. +
[35248] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod in brutis animalibus non sit spes. +Spes enim est de futuro bono, ut Damascenus dicit. Sed cognoscere +futurum non pertinet ad animalia bruta, quae habent solum +cognitionem sensitivam, quae non est futurorum. Ergo spes non est +in brutis animalibus.
+ Objection 2: Further, the object of hope is a future good, possible of attainment. But possible and impossible are differences of the + true and the false, which are only in the mind, as the Philosopher states (Metaph. vi, 4). Therefore there is no hope in dumb + animals, since they have no mind. +
[35249] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +obiectum spei est bonum possibile adipisci. Sed possibile et +impossibile sunt quaedam differentiae veri et falsi, quae solum +sunt in mente, ut philosophus dicit in VI Metaphys. Ergo spes non +est in brutis animalibus, in quibus non est mens.
+ Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14) that "animals are moved by the things that they see." But hope is of things + unseen: "for what a man seeth, why doth he hope for?" ( + Rom. 8:24). Therefore there is no hope in dumb animals. +
[35250] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, super Gen. ad Litt., quod animalia moventur +visis. Sed spes non est de eo quod videtur, nam quod videt quis, +quid sperat? Ut dicitur Rom. VIII. Ergo spes non est in brutis +animalibus.
+ On the contrary, Hope is an irascible passion. But the irascible faculty is in dumb animals. Therefore hope is also. +
[35251] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra, +spes est passio irascibilis. Sed in brutis animalibus est +irascibilis. Ergo et spes.
+ I answer that, The internal passions of animals can be gathered from their outward movements: from which it is clear that hope is in dumb + animals. For if a dog see a hare, or a hawk see a bird, too far off, it makes no movement towards it, as having no hope to + catch it: whereas, if it be near, it makes a movement towards it, as being in hopes of catching it. Because as stated above + ( + Q[1], A[2]; + Q[26], A[1]; + Q[35], A[1]), the sensitive appetite of dumb animals, and likewise the natural appetite of insensible things, result from the apprehension + of an intellect, just as the appetite of the intellectual nature, which is called the will. But there is a difference, in + that the will is moved by an apprehension of the intellect in the same subject; whereas the movement of the natural appetite + results from the apprehension of the separate Intellect, Who is the Author of nature; as + does also the sensitive appetite of dumb animals, who act from a certain natural instinct. Consequently, in the actions of + irrational animals and of other natural things, we observe a procedure which is similar to that which we observe in the actions + of art: and in this way hope and despair are in dumb animals. +
[35252] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod interiores passiones animalium ex exterioribus +motibus deprehendi possunt. Ex quibus apparet quod in animalibus +brutis est spes. Si enim canis videat leporem, aut accipiter avem, +nimis distantem, non movetur ad ipsam, quasi non sperans se eam +posse adipisci, si autem sit in propinquo, movetur, quasi sub spe +adipiscendi. Ut enim supra dictum est, appetitus sensitivus +brutorum animalium, et etiam appetitus naturalis rerum +insensibilium, sequuntur apprehensionem alicuius intellectus, sicut +et appetitus naturae intellectivae, qui dicitur voluntas. Sed in +hoc est differentia, quod voluntas movetur ex apprehensione +intellectus coniuncti, sed motus appetitus naturalis sequitur +apprehensionem intellectus separati, qui naturam instituit; et +similiter appetitus sensitivus brutorum animalium, quae etiam +quodam instinctu naturali agunt. Unde in operibus brutorum +animalium, et aliarum rerum naturalium, apparet similis processus +sicut et in operibus artis. Et per hunc modum in animalibus brutis +est spes et desperatio.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Although dumb animals do not know the future, yet an animal is moved by its natural instinct to something future, as though + it foresaw the future. Because this instinct is planted in them by the Divine Intellect that foresees the future. +
[35253] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, quamvis bruta animalia non cognoscant futurum, +tamen ex instinctu naturali movetur animal ad aliquid in futurum, +ac si futurum praevideret. Huiusmodi enim instinctus est eis +inditus ab intellectu divino praevidente futura.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The object of hope is not the possible as differentiating the true, for thus the possible ensues from the relation of a predicate + to a subject. The object of hope is the possible as compared to a power. For such is the division of the possible given in + Metaph. v, 12, i.e. into the two kinds we have just mentioned. +
[35254] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod obiectum spei non est possibile, prout est quaedam +differentia veri, sic enim consequitur habitudinem praedicati ad +subiectum. Sed obiectum spei est possibile quod dicitur secundum +aliquam potentiam. Sic enim distinguitur possibile in V Metaphys., +scilicet in duo possibilia praedicta.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Although the thing which is future does not come under the object of sight; nevertheless through seeing something present, + an animal's appetite is moved to seek or avoid something future. +
[35255] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, licet id quod est futurum, non cadat sub visu; tamen +ex his quae videt animal in praesenti, movetur eius appetitus in +aliquod futurum vel prosequendum vel vitandum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that despair is not contrary to hope. Because "to one thing there is one contrary" (Metaph. x, 5). But fear + is contrary to hope. Therefore despair is not contrary to hope. +
[35256] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod desperatio non sit contraria spei. Uni +enim unum est contrarium, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed spei +contrariatur timor. Non ergo contrariatur ei desperatio.
+ Objection 2: Further, contraries seem to bear on the same thing. But hope and despair do not bear on the same thing: since hope regards + the good, whereas despair arises from some evil that is in the way of obtaining good. Therefore hope is not contrary to despair. +
[35257] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +contraria videntur esse circa idem. Sed spes et desperatio non sunt +circa idem, nam spes respicit bonum, desperatio autem est propter +aliquod malum impeditivum adeptionis boni. Ergo spes non +contrariatur desperationi.
+ Objection 3: Further, movement is contrary to movement: while repose is in opposition to movement as a privation thereof. But despair + seems to imply immobility rather than movement. Therefore it is not contrary to hope, which implies movement of stretching + out towards the hoped-for good. +
[35258] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +motui contrariatur motus, quies vero opponitur motui ut privatio. +Sed desperatio magis videtur importare immobilitatem quam motum. +Ergo non contrariatur spei, quae importat motum extensionis in +bonum speratum.
+ On the contrary, The very name of despair [desperatio] implies that it is contrary to hope [spes]. +
[35259] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod desperatio nominatur per contrarium spei.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + Q[23], A[2]), there is a twofold contrariety of movements. One is in respect of approach to contrary terms: and this contrariety alone + is to be found in the concupiscible passions, for instance between love and hatred. The other is according to approach and + withdrawal with regard to the same term; and is to be found in the irascible passions, as stated above ( + Q[23], A[2]). Now the object of + hope, which is the arduous good, has the character of a principle of attraction, if it be considered in the light of something + attainable; and thus hope tends thereto, for it denotes a kind of approach. But in so far as it is considered as unobtainable, + it has the character of a principle of repulsion, because, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3, "when men come to an impossibility + they disperse." And this is how despair stands in regard to this object, wherefore it implies a movement of withdrawal: and + consequently it is contrary to hope, as withdrawal is to approach. +
[35260] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in mutationibus invenitur +duplex contrarietas. Una secundum accessum ad contrarios terminos, +et talis contrarietas sola invenitur in passionibus +concupiscibilis, sicut amor et odium contrariantur. Alio modo, per +accessum et per recessum respectu eiusdem termini, et talis +contrarietas invenitur in passionibus irascibilis, sicut supra +dictum est. Obiectum autem spei, quod est bonum arduum, habet +quidem rationem attractivi, prout consideratur cum possibilitate +adipiscendi, et sic tendit in ipsum spes, quae importat quendam +accessum. Sed secundum quod consideratur cum impossibilitate +obtinendi, habet rationem repulsivi, quia, ut dicitur in III +Ethic., cum ventum fuerit ad aliquid impossibile, tunc homines +discedunt. Et sic respicit hoc obiectum desperatio. Unde +importat motum cuiusdam recessus. Et propter hoc, contrariatur spei +sicut recessus accessui.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Fear is contrary to hope, because their objects, i.e. good and evil, are contrary: for this contrariety is found in the irascible + passions, according as they ensue from the passions of the concupiscible. But despair is contrary to hope, only by contrariety + of approach and withdrawal. +
[35261] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod timor contrariatur spei secundum contrarietatem +obiectorum, scilicet boni et mali, haec enim contrarietas invenitur +in passionibus irascibilis, secundum quod derivantur a passionibus +concupiscibilis. Sed desperatio contrariatur ei solum secundum +contrarietatem accessus et recessus.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Despair does not regard evil as such; sometimes however it regards evil accidentally, as making the difficult good impossible + to obtain. But it can arise from the mere excess of good. +
[35262] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod desperatio non respicit malum sub ratione mali, sed +per accidens quandoque respicit malum, inquantum facit +impossibilitatem adipiscendi. Potest autem esse desperatio ex solo +superexcessu boni.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Despair implies not only privation of hope, but also a recoil from the thing desired, by reason of its being esteemed impossible + to get. Hence despair, like hope, presupposes desire; because we neither hope for nor despair of that which we do not desire + to have. For this reason, too, each of them regards the good, which is the object of desire. +
[35263] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod desperatio non importat solam privationem spei; sed +importat quendam recessum a re desiderata, propter aestimatam +impossibilitatem adipiscendi. Unde desperatio praesupponit +desiderium, sicut et spes, de eo enim quod sub desiderio nostro non +cadit, neque spem neque desperationem habemus. Et propter hoc +etiam, utrumque eorum est de bono, quod sub desiderio cadit.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that experience is not a cause of hope. Because experience belongs to the cognitive power; wherefore the Philosopher + says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "intellectual virtue needs experience and time." But hope is not in the cognitive power, but in the + appetite, as stated above + (A[2]). Therefore experience is not a cause of hope. +
[35264] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod experientia non sit causa spei. +Experientia enim ad vim cognitivam pertinet, unde philosophus +dicit, in II Ethic., quod virtus intellectualis indiget +experimento et tempore. Spes autem non est in vi cognitiva, sed +in appetitiva, ut dictum est. Ergo experientia non est causa +spei.
+ Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 13) that "the old are slow to hope, on account of their experience"; whence it seems + to follow that experience causes want of hope. But the same cause is not productive of opposites. Therefore experience is + not a cause of hope. +
[35265] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod senes sunt difficilis +spei, propter experientiam, ex quo videtur quod experientia sit +causa defectus spei. Sed non est idem causa oppositorum. Ergo +experientia non est causa spei.
+ Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Coel. ii, 5) that "to have something to say about everything, without leaving anything + out, is sometimes a proof of folly." But to attempt everything seems to point to great hopes; while folly arises from inexperience. + Therefore inexperience, rather than experience, seems to be a cause of hope. +
[35266] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in II de caelo, quod de omnibus enuntiare +aliquid, et nihil praetermittere, quandoque est signum +stultitiae. Sed quod homo tentet omnia, ad magnitudinem spei +pertinere videtur, stultitia autem provenit ex inexperientia. Ergo +inexperientia videtur esse magis causa spei quam experientia.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) "some are hopeful, through having been victorious often and over many opponents": which + seems to pertain to experience. Therefore experience is a cause of hope. +
[35267] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod aliqui sunt +bonae spei, propter multoties et multos vicisse, quod ad +experientiam pertinet. Ergo experientia est causa spei.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[1]), the object of hope is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain. Consequently a thing may be a cause of hope, either + because it makes something possible to a man: or because it makes him think something possible. In the first way hope is caused + by everything that increases a man's power; e.g. riches, strength, and, among others, experience: since by experience man + acquires the faculty of doing something + easily, and the result of this is hope. Wherefore Vegetius says (De Re Milit. i): "No one fears to do that which he is sure + of having learned well." +
In the second way, hope is caused by everything that makes man think that he can obtain something: and thus both teaching + and persuasion may be a cause of hope. And then again experience is a cause of hope, in so far as it makes him reckon something + possible, which before his experience he looked upon as impossible. However, in this way, experience can cause a lack of hope: + because just as it makes a man think possible what he had previously thought impossible; so, conversely, + experience makes a man consider as impossible that which hitherto he had thought possible. Accordingly experience causes hope + in two ways, despair in one way: and for this reason we may say rather that it causes hope. +
[35268] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, spei obiectum est bonum +futurum arduum possibile adipisci. Potest ergo aliquid esse causa +spei, vel quia facit homini aliquid esse possibile, vel quia facit +eum existimare aliquid esse possibile. Primo modo est causa spei +omne illud quod auget potestatem hominis, sicut divitiae, +fortitudo, et, inter cetera, etiam experientia, nam per +experientiam homo acquirit facultatem aliquid de facili faciendi, +et ex hoc sequitur spes. Unde Vegetius dicit, in libro de re +militari, nemo facere metuit quod se bene didicisse +confidit. Alio modo est causa spei omne illud quod facit alicui +existimationem quod aliquid sit sibi possibile. Et hoc modo et +doctrina, et persuasio quaelibet potest esse causa spei. Et sic +etiam experientia est causa spei, inquantum scilicet per +experientiam fit homini existimatio quod aliquid sit sibi +possibile, quod impossibile ante experientiam reputabat. Sed per +hunc modum experientia potest etiam esse causa defectus spei. Quia +sicut per experientiam fit homini existimatio quod aliquid sibi sit +possibile, quod reputabat impossibile; ita e converso per +experientiam fit homini existimatio quod aliquid non sit sibi +possibile, quod possibile existimabat. Sic ergo experientia est +causa spei duobus modis, causa autem defectus spei, uno modo. Et +propter hoc, magis dicere possumus eam esse causam spei.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Experience in matters pertaining to action not only produces knowledge; it also causes a certain habit, by reason of custom, + which renders the action easier. Moreover, the intellectual virtue itself adds to the power of acting with ease: because it + shows something to be possible; and thus is a cause of hope. +
[35269] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod experientia in operabilibus non solum causat +scientiam; sed etiam causat quendam habitum, propter consuetudinem, +qui facit operationem faciliorem. Sed et ipsa virtus intellectualis +facit ad potestatem facile operandi, demonstrat enim aliquid esse +possibile. Et sic causat spem.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The old are wanting in hope because of their experience, in so far as experience makes them think something impossible. Hence + he adds (Rhet. ii, 13) that "many evils have befallen them." +
[35270] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod in senibus est defectus spei propter experientiam, +inquantum experientia facit existimationem impossibilis. Unde +ibidem subditur quod eis multa evenerunt in deterius.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Folly and inexperience can be a cause of hope accidentally as it were, by removing the knowledge which would help one to + judge truly a thing to be impossible. Wherefore inexperience is a cause of hope, for the same reason as experience causes + lack of hope. +
[35271] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod stultitia et inexperientia possunt esse causa spei +quasi per accidens, removendo scilicet scientiam per quam vere +existimatur aliquid esse non possibile. Unde ea ratione +inexperientia est causa spei, qua experientia est causa defectus +spei.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that youth and drunkenness are not causes of hope. Because hope implies certainty and steadiness; so much so + that it is compared to an anchor ( + Heb. 6:19). But young men and drunkards are wanting in steadiness; since their minds are easily changed. Therefore youth and drunkenness + are not causes of hope. +
[35272] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod iuventus et ebrietas non sint causa +spei. Spes enim importat quandam certitudinem et firmitatem, unde +ad Heb. VI, spes comparatur ancorae. Sed iuvenes et ebrii deficiunt +a firmitate, habent enim animum de facili mutabilem. Ergo iuventus +et ebrietas non est causa spei.
+ Objection 2: Further, as stated above + (A[5]), the cause of hope is chiefly whatever increases one's power. But youth and drunkenness are united to weakness. Therefore + they are not causes of hope. +
[35273] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, +ea quae augent potestatem, maxime sunt causa spei, ut supra dictum +est. Sed iuventus et ebrietas quandam infirmitatem habent +adiunctam. Ergo non sunt causa spei.
+ Objection 3: Further, experience is a cause of hope, as stated above + (A[5]). But youth lacks experience. Therefore it is not a cause of hope. +
[35274] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, +experientia est causa spei, ut dictum est. Sed iuvenibus +experientia deficit. Ergo iuventus non est causa spei.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "drunken men are hopeful": and (Rhet. ii, 12) that "the young are full of hope." +
[35275] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod inebriati sunt +bene sperantes. Et in II Rhetoric. dicitur quod iuvenes sunt +bonae spei.
+ I answer that, Youth is a cause of hope for three reasons, as the Philosopher states in Rhet. ii, 12: and these three reasons may be gathered + from the three conditions of the good which is the object of hope---namely, that it is future, arduous and possible, as stated + above + (A[1]). For youth has much of the future before it, and little of the past: and therefore since memory is of the past, and hope + of the future, it has little to remember and + lives very much in hope. Again, youths, on account of the heat of their nature, are full of spirit; so that their heart expands: + and it is owing to the heart being expanded that one tends to that which is arduous; wherefore youths are spirited and hopeful. + Likewise they who have not suffered defeat, nor had experience of obstacles to their efforts, are prone to count a thing possible + to them. Wherefore youths, through inexperience of obstacles and of their own shortcomings, easily count a thing + possible; and consequently are of good hope. Two of these causes are also in those who are in drink---viz. heat and high spirits, + on account of wine, and heedlessness of dangers and shortcomings. For the same reason all foolish and thoughtless persons + attempt everything and are full of hope. +
[35276] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 6 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod iuventus est causa spei propter tria, ut philosophus +dicit in II Rhetoric. Et haec tria possunt accipi secundum tres +conditiones boni quod est obiectum spei, quod est futurum, et +arduum, et possibile, ut dictum est. Iuvenes enim multum habent de +futuro, et parum de praeterito. Et ideo, quia memoria est +praeteriti, spes autem futuri; parum habent de memoria, sed multum +vivunt in spe. Iuvenes etiam, propter caliditatem naturae, habent +multos spiritus, et ita in eis cor ampliatur. Ex amplitudine autem +cordis est quod aliquis ad ardua tendat. Et ideo iuvenes sunt +animosi et bonae spei. Similiter etiam illi qui non sunt passi +repulsam, nec experti impedimenta in suis conatibus, de facili +reputant aliquid sibi possibile. Unde et iuvenes, propter +inexperientiam impedimentorum et defectuum, de facili reputant +aliquid sibi possibile. Et ideo sunt bonae spei. Duo etiam istorum +sunt in ebriis, scilicet caliditas et multiplicatio spirituum, +propter vinum; et iterum inconsideratio periculorum vel defectuum. +Et propter eandem rationem etiam omnes stulti, et deliberatione non +utentes, omnia tentant, et sunt bonae spei.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Although youths and men in drink lack steadiness in reality, yet they are steady in their own estimation, for they think + that they will steadily obtain that which they hope for. +
[35277] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod in iuvenibus et in ebriis licet non sit firmitas +secundum rei veritatem, est tamen in eis secundum eorum +aestimationem, reputant enim se firmiter assecuturos illud quod +sperant.
In like manner, in reply to the Second Objection, we must observe that young people and men in drink are indeed unsteady + in reality: but, in their own estimation, they are capable, for they know not their shortcomings. +
[35278] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 6 ad 2 Et similiter +dicendum ad secundum, quod iuvenes et ebrii habent quidem +infirmitatem secundum rei veritatem, sed secundum eorum +existimationem, habent potestatem; quia suos defectus non +cognoscunt.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Not only experience, but also lack of experience, is, in some way, a cause of hope, as explained above (A[5], ad 3). +
[35279] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod non solum experientia, sed etiam inexperientia est +quodammodo causa spei, ut dictum est.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a cause of love. Because, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), love is the first + of the soul's emotions. But hope is an emotion of the soul. Therefore love precedes hope, and consequently hope does not cause + love. +
[35280] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod spes non sit causa amoris. Quia +secundum Augustinum, XIV de Civ. Dei, prima affectionum animae est +amor. Sed spes est quaedam affectio animae. Amor ergo praecedit +spem. Non ergo spes causat amorem.
+ Objection 2: Further, desire precedes hope. But desire is caused by love, as stated above ( + Q[25], A[2]). Therefore hope, too, follows love, and consequently is not its cause. +
[35281] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, +desiderium praecedit spem. Sed desiderium causatur ex amore, ut +dictum est. Ergo etiam spes sequitur amorem. Non ergo causat +ipsum.
+ Objection 3: Further, hope causes pleasure, as stated above ( + Q[32], A[3]). But pleasure is only of the good that is loved. Therefore love precedes hope. +
[35282] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, +spes causat delectationem, ut supra dictum est. Sed delectatio non +est nisi de bono amato. Ergo amor praecedit spem.
+ On the contrary, The gloss commenting on + Mat. 1:2, "Abraham begot Isaac, and Isaac begot Jacob," says, i.e. "faith begets hope, and hope begets charity." But charity is love. + Therefore love is caused by hope. +
[35283] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Matth. I, super illud, Abraham genuit Isaac, Isaac autem +genuit Iacob, dicit Glossa, idest, fides spem, spes +caritatem. Caritas autem est amor. Ergo amor causatur a +spe.
+ I answer that, Hope can regard two things. For it regards as its object, the good which one hopes for. But since the good we hope for is + something difficult but possible to obtain; and since it happens sometimes that what is difficult becomes possible to us, + not through ourselves but through others; hence it is that hope regards also that by which something becomes possible to us. +
[35284] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 7 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod spes duo respicere potest. Respicit enim sicut +obiectum, bonum speratum. Sed quia bonum speratum est arduum +possibile; aliquando autem fit aliquod arduum possibile nobis, non +per nos, sed per alios; ideo spes etiam respicit illud per quod fit +nobis aliquid possibile.
In so far, then, as hope regards the good we hope to get, it is caused by love: since we do not hope save for that which + we desire and love. But in so far as hope regards one through whom something becomes possible to us, love is caused by hope, + and not vice versa. Because by the very fact that we hope that good will accrue to us through someone, we are moved towards + him as to our own good; and thus we begin to love him. Whereas from the fact that we love someone we do not hope + in him, except accidentally, that is, in so far as we think that he returns our love. Wherefore the fact of being loved by + another makes us hope in him; but our love for him is caused by the hope we have in him. +
Inquantum igitur spes respicit bonum +speratum, spes ex amore causatur, non enim est spes nisi de bono +desiderato et amato. Inquantum vero spes respicit illum per quem +fit aliquid nobis possibile, sic amor causatur ex spe, et non e +converso. Ex hoc enim quod per aliquem speramus nobis posse +provenire bona, movemur in ipsum sicut in bonum nostrum, et sic +incipimus ipsum amare. Ex hoc autem quod amamus aliquem, non +speramus de eo, nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet credimus nos +redamari ab ipso. Unde amari ab aliquo facit nos sperare de eo, sed +amor eius causatur ex spe quam de eo habemus.
Wherefore the Replies to the Objections are evident.
[35285] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 7 ad arg. Et per +haec patet responsio ad obiecta.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a help but a hindrance to action. Because hope implies security. But security begets negligence + which hinders action. Therefore hope is a hindrance to action. +
[35286] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod spes non adiuvet operationem, sed +magis impediat. Ad spem enim securitas pertinet. Sed securitas +parit negligentiam, quae impedit operationem. Ergo spes impedit +operationem.
+ Objection 2: Further, sorrow hinders action, as stated above ( + Q[37], A[3]). But hope sometimes causes sorrow: for it is written ( + Prov. 13:12): "Hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul." Therefore hope hinders action. +
[35287] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, +tristitia impedit operationem, ut supra dictum est. Sed spes +quandoque causat tristitiam, dicitur enim Prov. XIII, spes quae +differtur, affligit animam. Ergo spes impedit operationem.
+ Objection 3: Further, despair is contrary to hope, as stated above + (A[4]). But despair, especially in matters of war, conduces to action; for it is written ( + 2 Kings 2:26), that "it is dangerous to drive people to despair." Therefore hope has a contrary effect, namely, by hindering action. +
[35288] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, +desperatio contrariatur spei, ut dictum est. Sed desperatio, maxime +in rebus bellicis, adiuvat operationem, dicitur enim II Reg. II, +quod periculosa res est desperatio. Ergo spes facit +contrarium effectum, impediendo scilicet operationem.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + 1 Cor. 9:10) that "he that plougheth should plough in hope . . . to receive fruit": and the same applies to all other actions. +
[35289] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur I ad Cor. IX, quod qui arat, debet arare in spe +fructus percipiendi. Et eadem ratio est in omnibus aliis.
+ I answer that, Hope of its very nature is a help to action by making it more intense: and this for two reasons. First, by reason of its + object, which is a good, difficult but possible. For the thought of its being difficult arouses our attention; while the thought + that it is possible is no drag on our effort. Hence it follows that by reason of hope man is intent on his action. Secondly, + on account of its effect. Because hope, as stated above ( + Q[32], + A[3] + ), causes pleasure; which is a help to action, as stated above ( + Q[33], A[4]). Therefore hope is conducive to action. +
[35290] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 8 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod spes per se habet quod adiuvet operationem, +intendendo ipsam. Et hoc ex duobus. Primo quidem, ex ratione sui +obiecti, quod est bonum arduum possibile. Existimatio enim ardui +excitat attentionem, existimatio vero possibilis non retardat +conatum. Unde sequitur quod homo intente operetur propter spem. +Secundo vero, ex ratione sui effectus. Spes enim, ut supra dictum +est, causat delectationem, quae adiuvat operationem, ut supra +dictum est. Unde spes operationem adiuvat.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Hope regards a good to be obtained; security regards an evil to be avoided. Wherefore security seems to be contrary to fear + rather than to belong to hope. Yet security does not beget negligence, save in so far as it lessens the idea of difficulty: + whereby it also lessens the character of hope: for the things in which a man fears no hindrance, are no longer looked upon + as difficult. +
[35291] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod spes respicit bonum consequendum, securitas +autem respicit malum vitandum. Unde securitas magis videtur opponi +timori, quam ad spem pertinere. Et tamen securitas non causat +negligentiam, nisi inquantum diminuit existimationem ardui, in quo +etiam diminuitur ratio spei. Illa enim in quibus homo nullum +impedimentum timet, quasi iam non reputantur ardua.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Hope of itself causes pleasure; it is by accident that it causes sorrow, as stated above ( + Q[32], A[3], ad 2). +
[35292] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod spes per se causat delectationem, sed per accidens +est ut causet tristitiam, ut supra dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Despair threatens danger in war, on account of a certain hope that attaches to it. For they who despair of flight, strive + less to fly, but hope to avenge their death: and therefore in this hope they fight the more bravely, and consequently prove + dangerous to the foe. +
[35293] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod desperatio in bello fit periculosa, propter aliquam +spem adiunctam. Illi enim qui desperant de fuga, debilitantur in +fugiendo, sed sperant mortem suam vindicare. Et ideo ex hac spe +acrius pugnant, unde periculosi hostibus fiunt.
We must now consider, in the first place, fear; and, secondly, daring. With regard to fear, four things must be considered: + (1) Fear, in itself; (2) Its object; (3) Its cause; (4) Its effect. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: +
(1) Whether fear is a passion of the soul?
(2) Whether fear is a special passion?
+[35294] +Iª-IIae q. 41 pr. Consequenter considerandum est, +primo, de timore; et secundo, de audacia. Circa timorem +consideranda sunt quatuor, primo, de ipso timore; secundo, de +obiecto eius; tertio, de causa ipsius; quarto, de effectu. Circa +primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum timor sit passio animae. +Secundo, utrum sit specialis passio. Tertio, utrum sit aliquis +timor naturalis. Quarto, de speciebus timoris.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not a passion of the soul. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that "fear is a power, by + way of {systole}"---i.e. of contraction---"desirous of vindicating nature." But no virtue is a passion, as is proved in Ethic. + ii, 5. Therefore fear is not a passion. +
[35295] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor non sit passio animae. Dicit +enim Damascenus, in libro III, quod timor est virtus secundum +systolen idest contractionem, essentiae desiderativa. Sed nulla +virtus est passio, ut probatur in II Ethic. Ergo timor non est +passio.
+ Objection 2: Further, every passion is an effect due to the presence of an agent. But fear is not of something present, but of something + future, as Damascene declares (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). Therefore fear is not a passion. +
[35296] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +omnis passio est effectus ex praesentia agentis proveniens. Sed +timor non est de aliquo praesenti, sed de futuro, ut Damascenus +dicit in II libro. Ergo timor non est passio.
+ Objection 3: Further, every passion of the soul is a movement of the sensitive appetite, in consequence of an apprehension of the senses. + But sense apprehends, not the future but the present. Since, then, fear is of future evil, it seems that it is not a passion + of the soul. +
[35297] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +omnis passio animae est motus appetitus sensitivi, qui sequitur +apprehensionem sensus. Sensus autem non est apprehensivus futuri, +sed praesentis. Cum ergo timor sit de malo futuro, videtur quod non +sit passio animae.
+ On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 5, seqq.) reckons fear among the other passions of the soul. +
[35298] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus, in XIV de Civ. Dei, enumerat timorem inter +alias animae passiones.
+ I answer that, Among the other passions of the soul, after sorrow, fear chiefly has the character of passion. For as we have stated above + (Q[22] ), the notion of passion implies first of all a movement of a passive power---i.e. of a power whose object is compared + to it as its active principle: since passion is the effect of an agent. In this way, both "to feel" and "to understand" are + passions. Secondly, more properly speaking, passion is a movement of the appetitive + power; and more properly still, it is a movement of an appetitive power that has a bodily organ, such movement being accompanied + by a bodily transmutation. And, again, most properly those movements are called passions, which imply some deterioration. + Now it is evident that fear, since it regards evil, belongs to the appetitive power, which of itself regards good and evil. + Moreover, it belongs to the sensitive appetite: for it is accompanied by a certain transmutation---i.e. contraction---as + Damascene says (Cf. OBJ 1). Again, it implies relation to evil as overcoming, so to speak, some particular good. Wherefore + it has most properly the character of passion; less, however, than sorrow, which regards the present evil: because fear regards + future evil, which is not so strong a motive as present evil. +
[35299] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, inter ceteros animae motus, post tristitiam, timor +magis rationem obtinet passionis. Ut enim supra dictum est, ad +rationem passionis primo quidem pertinet quod sit motus passivae +virtutis, ad quam scilicet comparetur suum obiectum per modum +activi moventis, eo quod passio est effectus agentis. Et per hunc +modum, etiam sentire et intelligere dicuntur pati. Secundo, magis +proprie dicitur passio motus appetitivae virtutis. Et adhuc magis +proprie, motus appetitivae virtutis habentis organum corporale, qui +fit cum aliqua transmutatione corporali. Et adhuc propriissime illi +motus passiones dicuntur, qui important aliquod nocumentum. +Manifestum est autem quod timor, cum sit de malo, ad appetitivam +potentiam pertinet, quae per se respicit bonum et malum. Pertinet +autem ad appetitum sensitivum, fit enim cum quadam transmutatione, +scilicet cum contractione, ut Damascenus dicit. Et importat etiam +habitudinem ad malum, secundum quod malum habet quodammodo +victoriam super aliquod bonum. Unde verissime sibi competit ratio +passionis. Tamen post tristitiam, quae est de malo praesenti, nam +timor est de malo futuro, quod non ita movet sicut praesens.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Virtue denotes a principle of action: wherefore, in so far as the interior movements of the appetitive faculty are principles + of external action, they are called virtues. But the Philosopher denies that passion is a virtue by way of habit. +
[35300] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod virtus nominat quoddam principium actionis, et +ideo, inquantum interiores motus appetitivae virtutis sunt +principia exteriorum actuum, dicuntur virtutes. Philosophus autem +negat passionem esse virtutem quae est habitus.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Just as the passion of a natural body is due to the bodily presence of an agent, so is the passion of the soul due to the + agent being present to the soul, although neither corporally nor really present: that is to say, in so far as the evil which + is really future, is present in the apprehension of the soul. +
[35301] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut passio corporis naturalis provenit ex +corporali praesentia agentis, ita passio animae provenit ex animali +praesentia agentis, absque praesentia corporali vel reali, +inquantum scilicet malum quod est futurum realiter, est praesens +secundum apprehensionem animae.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The senses do not apprehend the future: but from apprehending the present, an animal is moved by natural instinct to hope + for a future good, or to fear a future evil. +
[35302] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod sensus non apprehendit futurum, sed ex eo quod +apprehendit praesens, animal naturali instinctu movetur ad +sperandum futurum bonum, vel timendum futurum malum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not a special passion. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33) that "the man who is not distraught + by fear, is neither harassed by desire, nor wounded by sickness"---i.e. sorrow---"nor tossed about in transports of empty + joys." Wherefore it seems that, if fear be set aside, all the other passions are removed. Therefore fear is not a special + but a general passion. +
[35303] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor non sit specialis passio. Dicit +enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod quem non +exanimat metus, nec cupiditas eum vastat, nec aegritudo, idest +tristitia, macerat, nec ventilat gestiens et vana laetitia. +Ex quo videtur quod, remoto timore, omnes aliae passiones +removentur. Non ergo passio est specialis, sed generalis.
+ Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that "pursuit and avoidance in the appetite are what affirmation and denial + are in the intellect." But denial is nothing special in the intellect, as neither is affirmation, but something common to + many. Therefore neither is avoidance anything special in the appetite. But fear is nothing but a kind of avoidance of evil. + Therefore it is not a special passion. +
[35304] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod ita se habet in appetitu +prosecutio et fuga, sicut in intellectu affirmatio et negatio. +Sed negatio non est aliquid speciale in intellectu, sicut nec +affirmatio, sed aliquid commune ad multa. Ergo nec fuga in +appetitu. Sed nihil est aliud timor quam fuga quaedam mali. Ergo +timor non est passio specialis.
+ Objection 3: Further, if fear were a special passion, it would be chiefly in the irascible part. But fear is also in the concupiscible: + since the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear is a kind of sorrow"; and Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that + fear is "a power of desire": and both sorrow and desire are in the concupiscible faculty, as stated above ( + Q[23], A[4]). Therefore fear is not a special passion, since it belongs to different + powers. +
[35305] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +si timor esset passio specialis, praecipue in irascibili esset. Est +autem timor etiam in concupiscibili. Dicit enim philosophus, in II +Rhetoric., quod timor est tristitia quaedam, et Damascenus dicit +quod timor est virtus desiderativa, tristitia autem et desiderium +sunt in concupiscibili, ut supra dictum est. Non est ergo passio +specialis, cum pertineat ad diversas potentias.
+ On the contrary, Fear is condivided with the other passions of the soul, as is clear from Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12,15). +
[35306] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod condividitur aliis passionibus animae; ut patet per +Damascenum, in II libro.
+ I answer that, The passions of the soul derive their species from their objects: hence that is a special passion, which has a special object. + Now fear has a special object, as hope has. For just as the object of hope is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain; + so the object of fear is a future evil, difficult and irresistible. Consequently fear is a special passion of the soul. +
[35307] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod passiones animae recipiunt speciem ex obiectis. Unde +specialis passio est quae habet speciale obiectum. Timor autem +habet speciale obiectum, sicut et spes. Sicut enim obiectum spei +est bonum futurum arduum possibile adipisci; ita obiectum timoris +est malum futurum difficile cui resisti non potest. Unde timor est +specialis passio animae.
+ Reply to Objection 1: All the passions of the soul arise from one source, viz. love, wherein they are connected with one another. By reason of + this connection, when fear is put aside, the other passions of the soul are dispersed; not, however, as though it were a general + passion. +
[35308] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod omnes passiones animae derivantur ex uno +principio, scilicet ex amore, in quo habent ad invicem connexionem. +Et ratione huius connexionis, remoto timore, removentur aliae +passiones animae, non ideo quia sit passio generalis.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Not every avoidance in the appetite is fear, but avoidance of a special object, as stated. Wherefore, though avoidance be + something common, yet fear is a special passion. +
[35309] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod non omnis fuga appetitus est timor, sed fuga ab +aliquo speciali obiecto, ut dictum est. Et ideo, licet fuga sit +quoddam generale, tamen timor est passio specialis.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Fear is nowise in the concupiscible: for it regards evil, not absolutely, but as difficult or arduous, so as to be almost + unavoidable. But since the irascible passions arise from the passions of the concupiscible faculty, and terminate therein, + as stated above ( + Q[25], A[1]); hence it is that what belongs to the concupiscible is ascribed to fear. For fear is called sorrow, in so far as the object + of fear causes sorrow when + present: wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that fear arises "from the representation of a future evil which is + either corruptive or painful." In like manner desire is ascribed by Damascene to fear, because just as hope arises from the + desire of good, so fear arises from avoidance of evil; while avoidance of evil arises from the desire of good, as is evident + from what has been said above ( + Q[25], A[2]; + Q[29], A[2]; + + Q[36], A[2] + ). +
[35310] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod timor nullo modo est in concupiscibili, non enim +respicit malum absolute, sed cum quadam difficultate vel arduitate, +ut ei resisti vix possit. Sed quia passiones irascibilis derivantur +a passionibus concupiscibilis et ad eas terminantur, ut supra +dictum est; ideo timori attribuuntur ea quae sunt concupiscibilis. +Dicitur enim timor esse tristitia, inquantum obiectum, timoris est +contristans, si praesens fuerit, unde et philosophus dicit ibidem +quod timor procedit ex phantasia futuri mali corruptivi vel +contristativi. Similiter et desiderium attribuitur a Damasceno +timori, quia, sicut spes oritur a desiderio boni ita timor ex fuga +mali; fuga autem mali oritur ex desiderio boni, ut ex supra dictis +patet.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that there is a natural fear. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that "there is a natural fear, through + the soul refusing to be severed from the body." +
[35311] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor aliquis sit naturalis. Dicit +enim Damascenus, in III libro, quod est quidam timor naturalis, +nolente anima dividi a corpore.
+ Objection 2: Further, fear arises from love, as stated above (A[2], ad 1). But there is a natural love, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). + Therefore there is also a natural fear. +
[35312] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +timor ex amore oritur, ut dictum est. Sed est aliquis amor +naturalis, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo etiam est +aliquis timor naturalis.
+ Objection 3: Further, fear is opposed to hope, as stated above ( + Q[40], A[4], ad 1). But there is a hope of nature, as is evident from + Rom. 4:18, where it is said of Abraham that "against hope" of nature, "he believed in hope" of grace. Therefore there is also a fear + of nature. +
[35313] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +timor opponitur spei, ut supra dictum est. Sed est aliqua spes +naturae, ut patet per id quod dicitur Rom. IV, de Abraham, quod +contra spem naturae, in spem gratiae credidit. Ergo etiam est +aliquis timor naturae.
+ On the contrary, That which is natural is common to things animate and inanimate. But fear is not in things inanimate. Therefore there is + no natural fear. +
[35314] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra, +ea quae sunt naturalia, communiter inveniuntur in rebus animatis et +inanimatis. Sed timor non invenitur in rebus inanimatis. Ergo timor +non est naturalis.
+ I answer that, A movement is said to be natural, because nature inclines thereto. Now this happens in two ways. First, so that it is entirely + accomplished by nature, without any operation of the apprehensive faculty: thus to have an upward movement is natural to fire, + and to grow is the natural movement of animals and plants. Secondly, a movement is said to be natural, if nature inclines + thereto, though it be accomplished by the apprehensive faculty alone: since, as stated + above ( + Q[10], A[1]), the movements of the cognitive and appetitive faculties are reducible to nature as to their first principle. In this way, + even the acts of the apprehensive power, such as understanding, feeling, and remembering, as well as the movements of the + animal appetite, are sometimes said to be natural. +
[35315] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod aliquis motus dicitur naturalis, quia ad ipsum +inclinat natura. Sed hoc contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, quod totum +perficitur a natura, absque aliqua operatione apprehensivae +virtutis, sicut moveri sursum est motus naturalis ignis, et augeri +est motus naturalis animalium et plantarum. Alio modo dicitur motus +naturalis, ad quem natura inclinat, licet non perficiatur nisi per +apprehensionem, quia, sicut supra dictum est, motus cognitivae et +appetitivae virtutis reducuntur in naturam, sicut in principium +primum. Et per hunc modum, etiam ipsi actus apprehensivae virtutis, +ut intelligere, sentire et memorari, et etiam motus appetitus +animalis, quandoque dicuntur naturales.
And in this sense we may say that there is a natural fear; and it is distinguished from non-natural fear, by reason of the + diversity of its object. For, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), there is a fear of "corruptive evil," which nature shrinks + from on account of its natural desire to exist; and such fear is said to be natural. Again, there is a fear of "painful evil," + which is repugnant not to nature, but to the desire of the appetite; and such fear is not natural. In + this sense we have stated above ( + Q[26], A[1]; + Q[30], A[3]; + Q[31], A[7]) that love, desire, and pleasure are divisible into natural and non-natural. +
Et per hunc modum potest +dici timor naturalis. Et distinguitur a timore non naturali, +secundum diversitatem obiecti. Est enim, ut philosophus dicit in II +Rhetoric., timor de malo corruptivo, quod natura refugit propter +naturale desiderium essendi, et talis timor dicitur naturalis. Est +iterum de malo contristativo, quod non repugnat naturae, sed +desiderio appetitus, et talis timor non est naturalis. Sicut etiam +supra amor, concupiscentia et delectatio distincta sunt per +naturale et non naturale.
But in the first sense of the word "natural," we must observe that certain passions of the soul are sometimes said to be + natural, as love, desire, and hope; whereas the others cannot be called natural. The reason of this is because love and hatred, + desire and avoidance, imply a certain inclination to pursue what is good or to avoid what is evil; which inclination is to + be found in the natural appetite also. Consequently there is a natural love; while we may also speak of desire + and hope as being even in natural things devoid of knowledge. On the other hand the other passions of the soul denote certain + movements, whereto the natural inclination is nowise sufficient. This is due either to the fact that perception or knowledge + is essential to these passions (thus we have said + , Q[31], AA[1],3; + Q[35], A[1], that apprehension is a necessary condition of pleasure and sorrow), wherefore things devoid of knowledge cannot be + said to take pleasure or to be sorrowful: or else it is because such like movements are contrary to the very nature of natural + inclination: for instance, despair flies from good on account of some difficulty; and fear shrinks from repelling a contrary + evil; both of which are contrary to the inclination of nature. Wherefore such like passions are in no way ascribed to inanimate + beings. +
Sed secundum primam acceptionem +naturalis, sciendum est quod quaedam de passionibus animae +quandoque dicuntur naturales, ut amor, desiderium et spes, aliae +vero naturales dici non possunt. Et hoc ideo, quia amor et odium, +desiderium et fuga, important inclinationem quandam ad prosequendum +bonum et fugiendum malum; quae quidem inclinatio pertinet etiam ad +appetitum naturalem. Et ideo est amor quidam naturalis, et +desiderium vel spes potest quodammodo dici etiam in rebus +naturalibus cognitione carentibus. Sed aliae passiones animae +important quosdam motus ad quos nullo modo sufficit inclinatio +naturalis. Vel quia de ratione harum passionum est sensus seu +cognitio, sicut dictum est quod apprehensio requiritur ad rationem +delectationis et doloris, unde quae carent cognitione, non possunt +dici delectari vel dolere. Aut quia huiusmodi motus sunt contra +rationem inclinationis naturalis, puta quod desperatio refugit +bonum propter aliquam difficultatem; et timor refugit impugnationem +mali contrarii, ad quod est inclinatio naturalis. Et ideo huiusmodi +passiones nullo modo attribuuntur rebus inanimatis.
Reply to the Objections are evident.
[35316] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 3 ad arg. Et per hoc +patet responsio ad obiecta.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that six species of fear are unsuitably assigned by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15); namely, "laziness, shamefacedness, + shame, amazement, stupor, and anxiety." Because, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear regards a saddening evil." Therefore + the species of fear should correspond to the species of sorrow. Now there are four species of sorrow, as stated above ( + Q[35], A[8]). Therefore there should only be four + species of fear corresponding to them. +
[35317] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter Damascenus assignet sex +species timoris, scilicet segnitiem, erubescentiam, verecundiam, +admirationem, stuporem, agoniam. Ut enim philosophus dicit, in +II Rhetoric., timor est de malo contristativo. Ergo species +timoris debent respondere speciebus tristitiae. Sunt autem quatuor +species tristitiae, ut supra dictum est. Ergo solum debent esse +quatuor species timoris, eis correspondentes.
+ Objection 2: Further, that which consists in an action of our own is in our power. But fear regards an evil that surpasses our power, + as stated above + (A[2]). Therefore laziness, shamefacedness, and shame, which regard our own actions, should not be reckoned as species of fear. +
[35318] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +illud quod in actu nostro consistit, nostrae potestati subiicitur. +Sed timor est de malo quod excedit potestatem nostram, ut dictum +est. Non ergo segnities et erubescentia et verecundia, quae +respiciunt operationem nostram, debent poni species timoris.
+ Objection 3: Further, fear is of the future, as stated above ( + AA[1], 2). But "shame regards a disgraceful deed already done," as Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xx.] says. Therefore + shame is not a species of fear. +
[35319] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +timor est de futuro, ut dictum est. Sed verecundia est de turpi +actu iam commisso, ut Gregorius Nyssenus dicit. Ergo verecundia non +est species timoris.
+ Objection 4: Further, fear is only of evil. But amazement and stupor regard great and unwonted things, whether good or evil. Therefore + amazement and stupor are not species of fear. +
[35320] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 arg. 4 Praeterea, +timor non est nisi de malo. Sed admiratio et stupor sunt de magno +et insolito, sive bono sive malo. Ergo admiratio et stupor non sunt +species timoris.
+ Objection 5: Further, Philosophers have been led by amazement to seek the truth, as stated in the beginning of Metaphysics. But fear leads + to flight rather than to search. Therefore amazement is not a species of fear. +
[35321] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 arg. 5 Praeterea, +philosophi ex admiratione sunt moti ad inquirendum veritatem, ut +dicitur in principio Metaphys. Timor autem non movet ad +inquirendum, sed magis ad fugiendum. Ergo admiratio non est species +timoris.
On the contrary, suffices the authority of Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius] (Cf. OBJ 1,3).
[35322] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 s. c. Sed in +contrarium sufficiat auctoritas Damasceni et Gregorii Nysseni.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[2]), fear regards a future evil which surpasses the power of him that fears, so that it is irresistible. Now man's evil, like + his good, may be considered either in his action or in external things. In his action he has a twofold evil to fear. First, + there is the toil that burdens his nature: and hence arises "laziness," as when a man shrinks from work for fear of too much + toil. Secondly, there is the disgrace which + damages him in the opinion of others. And thus, if disgrace is feared in a deed that is yet to be done, there is "shamefacedness"; + if, however, it be a deed already done, there is "shame." +
On the other hand, the evil that consists in external things may surpass man's faculty of resistance in three ways. First + by reason of its magnitude; when, that is to say, a man considers some great evil the outcome of which he is unable to gauge: + and then there is "amazement." Secondly, by reason of its being unwonted; because, to wit, some unwonted evil arises before + us, and on that account is great in our estimation: and then there is "stupor," which is caused by the + representation of something unwonted. Thirdly, by reason of its being unforeseen: thus future misfortunes are feared, and + fear of this kind is called "anxiety." +
[35323] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, timor est de futuro malo quod +excedit potestatem timentis, ut scilicet ei resisti non possit. +Sicut autem bonum hominis, ita et malum, potest considerari vel in +operatione ipsius, vel in exterioribus rebus. In operatione autem +ipsius hominis, potest duplex malum timeri. Primo quidem, labor +gravans naturam. Et sic causatur segnities, cum scilicet aliquis +refugit operari, propter timorem excedentis laboris. Secundo, +turpitudo laedens opinionem. Et sic, si turpitudo timeatur in actu +committendo, est erubescentia, si autem sit de turpi iam facto, est +verecundia. Malum autem quod in exterioribus rebus consistit, +triplici ratione potest excedere hominis facultatem ad resistendum. +Primo quidem, ratione suae magnitudinis, cum scilicet aliquis +considerat aliquod magnum malum, cuius exitum considerare non +sufficit. Et sic est admiratio. Secundo, ratione dissuetudinis, +quia scilicet aliquod malum inconsuetum nostrae considerationi +offertur, et sic est magnum nostra reputatione. Et hoc modo est +stupor, qui causatur ex insolita imaginatione. Tertio modo, ratione +improvisionis, quia scilicet provideri non potest, sicut futura +infortunia timentur. Et talis timor dicitur agonia.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Those species of sorrow given above are not derived from the diversity of objects, but from the diversity of effects, and + for certain special reasons. Consequently there is no need for those species of sorrow to correspond with these species of + fear, which are derived from the proper division of the object of fear itself. +
[35324] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod illae species tristitiae quae supra positae +sunt, non accipiuntur secundum diversitatem obiecti, sed secundum +effectus, et secundum quasdam speciales rationes. Et ideo non +oportet quod illae species tristitiae respondeant istis speciebus +timoris, quae accipiuntur secundum divisionem propriam obiecti +ipsius timoris.
+ Reply to Objection 2: A deed considered as being actually done, is in the power of the doer. But it is possible to take into consideration something + connected with the deed, and surpassing the faculty of the doer, for which reason he shrinks from the deed. It is in this + sense that laziness, shamefacedness, and shame are reckoned as species of fear. +
[35325] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod operatio secundum quod iam fit, subditur potestati +operantis. Sed aliquid circa operationem considerari potest +facultatem operantis excedens, propter quod aliquis refugit +actionem. Et secundum hoc, segnities, erubescentia et verecundia +ponuntur species timoris.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The past deed may be the occasion of fear of future reproach or disgrace: and in this sense shame is a species of fear. +
[35326] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod de actu praeterito potest timeri convitium vel +opprobrium futurum. Et secundum hoc, verecundia est species +timoris.
+ Reply to Objection 4: Not every amazement and stupor are species of fear, but that amazement which is caused by a great evil, and that stupor which + arises from an unwonted evil. Or else we may say that, just as laziness shrinks from the toil of external work, so amazement + and stupor shrink from the difficulty of considering a great and unwonted thing, whether good or evil: so that amazement and + stupor stand in relation to the act of the intellect, as laziness does to + external work. +
[35327] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod non quaelibet admiratio et stupor sunt species +timoris, sed admiratio quae est de magno malo, et stupor qui est de +malo insolito. Vel potest dici quod, sicut segnities refugit +laborem exterioris operationis, ita admiratio et stupor refugiunt +difficultatem considerationis rei magnae et insolitae, sive sit +bona sive mala, ut hoc modo se habeat admiratio et stupor ad actum +intellectus, sicut segnities ad exteriorem actum.
+ Reply to Objection 5: He who is amazed shrinks at present from forming a judgment of that which amazes him, fearing to fall short of the truth, + but inquires afterwards: whereas he who is overcome by stupor fears both to judge at present, and to inquire afterwards. Wherefore + amazement is a beginning of philosophical research: whereas stupor is a hindrance thereto. +
[35328] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 ad 5 Ad quintum +dicendum quod admirans refugit in praesenti dare iudicium de eo +quod miratur, timens defectum, sed in futurum inquirit. Stupens +autem timet et in praesenti iudicare, et in futuro inquirere. Unde +admiratio est principium philosophandi, sed stupor est +philosophicae considerationis impedimentum.
We must now consider the object of fear: under which head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether good or evil is the object of fear?
(2) Whether evil of nature is the object of fear?
(3) Whether the evil of sin is an object of fear?
(4) Whether fear itself can be feared?
(5) Whether sudden things are especially feared?
(6) Whether those things are more feared against which there is no remedy?
+[35329] +Iª-IIae q. 42 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +obiecto timoris. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum bonum +sit obiectum timoris, vel malum. Secundo, utrum malum naturae sit +obiectum timoris. Tertio, utrum timor sit de malo culpae. Quarto, +utrum ipse timor timeri possit. Quinto, utrum repentina magis +timeantur. Sexto, utrum ea contra quae non est remedium, magis +timeantur.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that good is the object of fear. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 83) that "we fear nothing save to lose what + we love and possess, or not to obtain that which we hope for." But that which we love is good. Therefore fear regards good + as its proper object. +
[35330] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonum sit obiectum timoris. Dicit enim +Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod nihil +timemus, nisi ne id quod amamus, aut adeptum amittamus, aut non +adipiscamur speratum. Sed id quod amamus est bonum. Ergo timor +respicit bonum sicut proprium obiectum.
+ Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "power and to be above another is a thing to be feared." But this is a good + thing. Therefore good is the object of fear. +
[35331] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod potestas, et super +alium ipsum esse, est terribile. Sed huiusmodi est quoddam +bonum. Ergo bonum est obiectum timoris.
+ Objection 3: Further, there can be no evil in God. But we are commanded to fear God, according to + Ps. 33:10: "Fear the Lord, all ye saints." Therefore even the good is an object of fear. +
[35332] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +in Deo nihil malum esse potest. Sed mandatur nobis ut Deum +timeamus; secundum illud Psalmi XXXIII, timete dominum, omnes +sancti eius. Ergo etiam timor est de bono.
+ On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that fear is of future evil. +
[35333] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Damascenus dicit, in II libro, quod timor est de malo +futuro.
+ I answer that, Fear is a movement of the appetitive power. Now it belongs to the appetitive power to pursue and to avoid, as stated in Ethic. + vi, 2: and pursuit is of good, while avoidance is of evil. Consequently whatever movement of the appetitive power implies + pursuit, has some good for its object: and whatever movement implies avoidance, has an evil for its object. Wherefore, since + fear implies an avoidance, in the first place and of its very nature it regards evil as + its proper object. +
It can, however, regard good also, in so far as referable to evil. This can be in two ways. In one way, inasmuch as an evil + causes privation of good. Now a thing is evil from the very fact that it is a privation of some good. Wherefore, since evil + is shunned because it is evil, it follows that it is shunned because it deprives one of the good that one pursues through + love thereof. And in this sense Augustine says that there is no cause for fear, save loss of the good we + love. +
In another way, good stands related to evil as its cause: in so far as some good can by its power bring harm to the good + we love: and so, just as hope, as stated above ( + Q[40], A[7]), regards two things, namely, the good to which it tends, and the thing through which there is a hope of obtaining the desired + good; so also does fear regard two things, namely, the evil from which it shrinks, and that good which, by its power, can + inflict that evil. In this + way God is feared by man, inasmuch as He can inflict punishment, spiritual or corporal. In this way, too, we fear the power + of man; especially when it has been thwarted, or when it is unjust, because then it is more likely to do us a harm. +
In like manner one fears "to be over another," i.e. to lean on another, so that it is in his power to do us a harm: thus + a man fears another, who knows him to be guilty of a crime lest he reveal it to others. +
[35334] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod timor est quidam motus appetitivae virtutis. Ad +virtutem autem appetitivam pertinet prosecutio et fuga, ut dicitur +in VI Ethic. Est autem prosecutio boni. Fuga autem mali. Unde +quicumque motus appetitivae virtutis importat prosecutionem, habet +aliquod bonum pro obiecto, quicumque autem importat fugam, habet +malum pro obiecto. Unde, cum timor fugam quandam importet, primo et +per se respicit malum sicut proprium obiectum. Potest autem +respicere etiam bonum, secundum quod habet habitudinem ad malum. +Quod quidem potest esse dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, inquantum per +malum privatur bonum. Ex hoc autem ipso est aliquid malum, quod est +privativum boni. Unde, cum fugiatur malum quia malum est, sequitur +ut fugiatur quia privat bonum quod quis amando prosequitur. Et +secundum hoc dicit Augustinus quod nulla est causa timendi, nisi ne +amittatur bonum amatum. Alio modo comparatur bonum ad malum, ut +causa ipsius, inquantum scilicet aliquod bonum sua virtute potest +inducere aliquod nocumentum in bono amato. Et ideo, sicut spes, ut +supra dictum est, ad duo respicit, scilicet ad bonum in quod +tendit, et ad id per quod sperat se bonum concupitum adipisci; ita +etiam timor ad duo respicit, scilicet ad malum quod refugit, et ad +illud bonum quod sua virtute potest infligere malum. Et per hunc +modum Deus timetur ab homine, inquantum potest infligere poenam, +vel spiritualem vel corporalem. Per hunc etiam modum timetur +potestas alicuius hominis, maxime quando est laesa, vel quando est +iniusta, quia sic in promptu habet nocumentum inferre. Ita etiam +timetur super alium esse, idest inniti alii, ut scilicet in eius +potestate sic constitutum nobis nocumentum inferre, sicut ille qui +est conscius criminis, timetur, ne crimen revelet.
Reply to objections This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
[35335] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 1 ad arg. Et per hoc +patet responsio ad obiecta.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that evil of nature is not an object of fear. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear makes us take + counsel." But we do not take counsel about things which happen naturally, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Therefore evil of nature + is not an object of fear. +
[35336] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor non sit de malo naturae. Dicit +enim philosophus, in II Rhetoric., quod timor consiliativos +facit. Non autem consiliamur de his quae a natura eveniunt, ut +dicitur in III Ethic. Ergo timor non est de malo naturae.
+ Objection 2: Further, natural defects such as death and the like are always threatening man. If therefore such like evils were an object + of fear, man would needs be always in fear. +
[35337] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +defectus naturales semper homini imminent, ut mors et alia +huiusmodi. Si igitur de huiusmodi malis esset timor, oporteret quod +homo semper esset in timore.
+ Objection 3: Further, nature does not move to contraries. But evil of nature is an effect of nature. Therefore if a man shrinks from such + like evils through fear thereof, this is not an effect of nature. Therefore natural fear is not of the evil of nature; and + yet it seems that it should be. +
[35338] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +natura non movet ad contraria. Sed malum naturae provenit ex +natura. Ergo quod timendo aliquis refugiat huiusmodi malum, non est +a natura. Timor ergo naturalis non est de malo naturae; ad quem +tamen hoc malum pertinere videtur.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 6) that "the most terrible of all things is death," which is an evil of nature. +
[35339] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod inter omnia +terribilissimum est mors, quae est malum naturae.
+ I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), fear is caused by the "imagination of a future evil which is either corruptive or + painful." Now just as a painful evil is that which is contrary to the will, so a corruptive evil is that which is contrary + to nature: and this is the evil of nature. Consequently evil of nature can be the object of fear. +
But it must be observed that evil of nature sometimes arises from a natural cause; and then it is called evil of nature, + not merely from being a privation of the good of nature, but also from being an effect of nature; such are natural death and + other like defects. But sometimes evil of nature arises from a non-natural cause; such as violent death inflicted by an assailant. + In either case evil of nature is feared to a certain extent, and to a certain extent not. For since fear + arises "from the imagination of future evil," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), whatever removes the imagination of the + future evil, removes fear also. Now it may happen in two ways that an evil may not appear as about to be. First, through being + remote and far off: for, on account of the distance, such a thing is considered as though it were not to be. Hence we either + do not fear it, or fear it but little; for, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "we do not fear things that are very + far off; since all know that they shall die, but as death is not near, they heed it not." Secondly, a future evil is considered + as though it were not to be, on account of its being inevitable, wherefore we look upon it as already present. Hence the Philosopher + says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those who are already on the scaffold, are not afraid," seeing that they are on the very point of + a death from which there is no escape; "but in order that a man be afraid, there must be some hope of escape for + him." +
Consequently evil of nature is not feared if it be not apprehended as future: but if evil of nature, that is corruptive, + be apprehended as near at hand, and yet with some hope of escape, then it will be feared. +
[35340] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in II Rhetoric., timor +provenit ex phantasia futuri mali corruptivi vel +contristativi. Sicut autem contristativum malum est quod +contrariatur voluntati; ita corruptivum malum est quod contrariatur +naturae. Et hoc est malum naturae. Unde de malo naturae potest esse +timor. Sed considerandum est quod malum naturae quandoque est a +causa naturali, et tunc dicitur malum naturae, non solum quia +privat naturae bonum, sed etiam quia est effectus naturae; sicut +mors naturalis, et alii huiusmodi defectus. Aliquando vero malum +naturae provenit ex causa non naturali, sicut mors quae violenter +infertur a persecutore. Et utroque modo malum naturae quodammodo +timetur, et quodammodo non timetur. Cum enim timor proveniat ex +phantasia futuri mali, ut dicit philosophus; illud quod removet +futuri mali phantasiam, excludit etiam timorem. Quod autem non +appareat aliquod malum ut futurum, potest ex duobus contingere. Uno +quidem modo, ex hoc quod est remotum et distans, hoc enim, propter +distantiam, imaginamur ut non futurum. Et ideo vel non timemus, vel +parum timemus. Ut enim philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quae +valde longe sunt non timentur, sciunt enim omnes, quod morientur; +sed quia non prope est, nihil curant. Alio modo aestimatur +aliquod malum quod est futurum, ut non futurum, propter +necessitatem, quae facit ipsum aestimare ut praesens. Unde +philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod illi qui iam +decapitantur non timent, videntes sibi necessitatem mortis +imminere; sed ad hoc quod aliquis timeat, oportet adesse aliquam +spem salutis. Sic igitur malum naturae non timetur, quia non +apprehenditur ut futurum. Si vero malum naturae, quod est +corruptivum, apprehendatur ut propinquum, et tamen cum aliqua spe +evasionis, tunc timebitur.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The evil of nature sometimes is not an effect of nature, as stated above. But in so far as it is an effect of nature, although + it may be impossible to avoid it entirely, yet it may be possible to delay it. And with this hope one may take counsel about + avoiding it. +
[35341] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod malum naturae quandoque non provenit a natura, +ut dictum est. Secundum tamen quod a natura provenit, etsi non ex +toto vitari possit, potest tamen differri. Et sub hac spe, potest +esse consilium de vitatione ipsius.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Although evil of nature ever threatens, yet it does not always threaten from near at hand: and consequently it is not always + feared. +
[35342] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod malum naturae, etsi semper immineat, non tamen semper +imminet de propinquo. Et ideo non semper timetur.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Death and other defects of nature are the effects of the common nature; and yet the individual nature rebels against them + as far as it can. Accordingly, from the inclination of the individual nature arise pain and sorrow for such like evils, when + present; fear when threatening in the future. +
[35343] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod mors et alii defectus naturae proveniunt a natura +universali, quibus tamen repugnat natura particularis quantum +potest. Et sic ex inclinatione particularis naturae, est dolor et +tristitia de huiusmodi malis, cum sunt praesentia; et timor, si +immineant in futurum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the evil of sin can be an object of fear. For Augustine says on the canonical Epistle of John (Tract. + ix), that "by chaste fear man fears to be severed from God." Now nothing but sin severs us from God; according to + Is. 59:2: "Your iniquities have divided between you and your God." Therefore the evil of sin can be an object of fear. +
[35344] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor possit esse de malo culpae. +Dicit enim Augustinus, super canonicam Ioan., quod timore casto +timet homo separationem a Deo. Sed nihil separat nos a Deo nisi +culpa; secundum illud Isaiae LIX. Peccata vestra diviserunt +inter vos et Deum vestrum. Ergo timor potest esse de malo +culpae.
+ Objection 2: Further, Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. iv, 4,6) that "we fear when they are yet to come, those things which give us pain when + they are present." But it is possible for one to be pained or sorrowful on account of the evil of sin. Therefore one can also + fear the evil of sin. +
[35345] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Tullius dicit, in IV de Tusculanis quaest., quod de illis +timemus, cum futura sunt, de quorum praesentia tristamur. Sed +de malo culpae potest aliquis dolere vel tristari. Ergo etiam malum +culpae aliquis potest timere.
+ Objection 3: Further, hope is contrary to fear. But the good of virtue can be the object of hope, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. + ix, 4): and the Apostle says ( + Gal. 5:10): "I have confidence in you in the Lord, that you will not be of another mind." Therefore fear can regard evil of sin. +
[35346] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +spes timori opponitur. Sed spes potest esse de bono virtutis, ut +patet per philosophum in IX Ethic. Et apostolus dicit, ad Gal. V, +confido de vobis in domino, quod nihil aliud sapietis. Ergo +etiam timor potest esse de malo culpae.
+ Objection 4: Further, shame is a kind of fear, as stated above ( + Q[41], A[4]). But shame regards a disgraceful deed, which is an evil of sin. Therefore fear does so likewise. +
[35347] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 arg. 4 Praeterea, +verecundia est quaedam species timoris, ut supra dictum est. Sed +verecundia est de turpi facto. Quod est malum culpae. Ergo et +timor.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "not all evils are feared, for instance that someone be unjust or slow." +
[35348] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod non omnia mala +timentur, puta si aliquis erit iniustus, aut tardus.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + Q[40], A[1]; + Q[41], A[2]), as the object of hope is a future good difficult but possible to obtain, so the object of fear is a future evil, arduous + and not to be easily avoided. From this we may gather that whatever is entirely subject to our power and will, is not an object + of fear; and that nothing gives rise to fear save what is due to an external cause. Now human will is the proper cause + of the evil of sin: and consequently evil of sin, properly speaking, is not an object of fear. +
But since the human will may be inclined to sin by an extrinsic cause; if this cause have a strong power of inclination, + in that respect a man may fear the evil of sin, in so far as it arises from that extrinsic cause: as when he fears to dwell + in the company of wicked men, lest he be led by them to sin. But, properly speaking, a man thus disposed, fears the being + led astray rather than the sin considered in its proper nature, i.e. as a voluntary act; for considered in this + light it is not an object of fear to him. +
[35349] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, sicut obiectum spei est +bonum futurum arduum quod quis potest adipisci; ita timor est de +malo futuro arduo quod non potest de facili vitari. Ex quo potest +accipi quod id quod omnino subiacet potestati et voluntati nostrae, +non habet rationem terribilis, sed illud solum est terribile, quod +habet causam extrinsecam. Malum autem culpae propriam causam habet +voluntatem humanam. Et ideo proprie non habet rationem terribilis. +Sed quia voluntas humana ab aliquo exteriori potest inclinari ad +peccandum; si illud inclinans habeat magnam vim ad inclinandum, +secundum hoc poterit esse timor de malo culpae, inquantum est ab +exteriori causa, puta cum aliquis timet commorari in societate +malorum, ne ab eis ad peccandum inducatur. Sed proprie loquendo, in +tali dispositione magis timet homo seductionem quam culpam secundum +propriam rationem, idest inquantum est voluntaria, sic enim non +habet ut timeatur.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Separation from God is a punishment resulting from sin: and every punishment is, in some way, due to an extrinsic cause. +
[35350] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod separatio a Deo est quaedam poena consequens +peccatum, et omnis poena aliquo modo est ab exteriori causa.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Sorrow and fear agree in one point, since each regards evil: they differ, however, in two points. First, because sorrow is + about present evil, whereas fear is future evil. Secondly, because sorrow, being in the concupiscible faculty, regards evil + absolutely; wherefore it can be about any evil, great or small; whereas fear, being in the irascible part, regards evil with + the addition of a certain arduousness or difficulty; which difficulty ceases in so + far as a thing is subject to the will. Consequently not all things that give us pain when they are present, make us fear when + they are yet to come, but only some things, namely, those that are difficult. +
[35351] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod tristitia et timor in uno conveniunt, quia utrumque +est de malo, differunt autem in duobus. In uno quidem, quia +tristitia est de malo praesenti, timor de malo futuro. In alio +vero, quia tristitia, cum sit in concupiscibili, respicit malum +absolute, unde potest esse de quocumque malo, sive parvo sive +magno. Timor vero, cum sit in irascibili, respicit malum cum quadam +arduitate seu difficultate, quae tollitur, inquantum aliquid +subiacet voluntati. Et ideo non omnia timemus quae sunt futura, de +quibus tristamur cum sunt praesentia, sed aliqua, quae scilicet +sunt ardua.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Hope is of good that is obtainable. Now one may obtain a good either of oneself, or through another: and so, hope may be + of an act of virtue, which lies within our own power. On the other hand, fear is of an evil that does not lie in our own power: + and consequently the evil which is feared is always from an extrinsic cause; while the good that is hoped for may be both + from an intrinsic and from an extrinsic cause. +
[35352] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod spes est de bono quod quis potest adipisci. Potest +autem aliquis adipisci bonum vel per se, vel per alium, et ideo +spes potest esse de actu virtutis, qui est in potestate nostra +constitutus. Sed timor est de malo quod non subiacet nostrae +potestati, et ideo semper malum quod timetur, est a causa +extrinseca. Bonum autem quod speratur, potest esse et a causa +intrinseca, et a causa extrinseca.
+ Reply to Objection 4: As stated above ( + Q[41], A[4], ad 2,3), shame is not fear of the very act of sin, but of the disgrace or ignominy which arises therefrom, and which is + due to an extrinsic cause. +
[35353] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, verecundia non est timor de +actu ipso peccati, sed de turpitudine vel ignominia quae +consequitur ipsum, quae est a causa extrinseca.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that fear cannot be feared. For whatever is feared, is prevented from being lost, through fear thereof: thus + a man who fears to lose his health, keeps it, through fearing its loss. If therefore a man be afraid of fear, he will keep + himself from fear by being afraid: which seems absurd. +
[35354] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor timeri non possit. Omne enim +quod timetur, timendo custoditur, ne amittatur, sicut ille qui +timet amittere sanitatem timendo custodit eam. Si igitur timor +timeatur, timendo se custodiet homo ne timeat. Quod videtur esse +inconveniens.
+ Objection 2: Further, fear is a kind of flight. But nothing flies from itself. Therefore fear cannot be the object of fear. +
[35355] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +timor est quaedam fuga. Sed nihil fugit seipsum. Ergo timor non +timet timorem.
+ Objection 3: Further, fear is about the future. But fear is present to him that fears. Therefore it cannot be the object of his fear. +
[35356] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +timor est de futuro. Sed ille qui timet, iam habet timorem. Non +ergo potest timere timorem.
+ On the contrary, A man can love his own love, and can grieve at his own sorrow. Therefore, in like manner, he can fear his own fear. +
[35357] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod homo potest amare amorem, et dolere de dolore. Ergo etiam, +pari ratione, potest timere timorem.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[3]), nothing can be an object of fear, save what is due to an extrinsic cause; but not that which ensues from our own will. Now + fear partly arises from an extrinsic cause, and is partly subject to the will. It is due to an extrinsic cause, in so far + as it is a passion resulting from the imagination of an imminent evil. In this sense it is possible for fear to be the object + of fear, i.e. a man may fear lest he + should be threatened by the necessity of fearing, through being assailed by some great evil. It is subject to the will, in + so far as the lower appetite obeys reason; wherefore man is able to drive fear away. In this sense fear cannot be the object + of fear, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33). Lest, however, anyone make use of his arguments, in order to prove that fear + cannot be at all be the object of fear, we must add a solution to the same. +
[35358] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, illud solum habet rationem +terribilis, quod ex causa extrinseca provenit, non autem quod +provenit ex voluntate nostra. Timor autem partim provenit ex causa +extrinseca, et partim subiacet voluntati. Provenit quidem ex causa +extrinseca, inquantum est passio quaedam consequens phantasiam +imminentis mali. Et secundum hoc, potest aliquis timere timorem, ne +scilicet immineat ei necessitas timendi, propter ingruentiam +alicuius excellentis mali. Subiacet autem voluntati, inquantum +appetitus inferior obedit rationi, unde homo potest timorem +repellere. Et secundum hoc, timor non potest timeri, ut dicit +Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest. Sed quia rationibus +quas inducit, aliquis posset uti ad ostendendum quod timor nullo +modo timeatur, ideo ad eas respondendum est.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Not every fear is identically the same; there are various fears according to the various objects of fear. Nothing, then, + prevents a man from keeping himself from fearing one thing, by fearing another, so that the fear which he has preserves him + from the fear which he has not. +
[35359] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, non omnis timor est unus timor, sed secundum +diversa quae timentur, sunt diversi timores. Nihil ergo prohibet +quin uno timore aliquis praeservet se ab alio timore, et sic +custodiat se non timentem illo timore.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Since fear of an imminent evil is not identical with the fear of the fear of imminent evil; it does not follow that a thing + flies from itself, or that it is the same flight in both cases. +
[35360] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, cum sit alius timor quo timetur malum imminens, et +alius timor quo timetur ipse timor mali imminentis; non sequitur +quod idem fugiat seipsum, vel quod sit idem fuga sui ipsius.
+ Reply to Objection 3: On account of the various kinds of fear already alluded to (ad 2) a man's present fear may have a future fear for its object. +
[35361] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod propter diversitatem timorum iam dictam, timore +praesenti potest homo timere futurum timorem.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that unwonted and sudden things are not especially feared. Because, as hope is about good things, so fear is + about evil things. But experience conduces to the increase of hope in good things. Therefore it also adds to fear in evil + things. +
[35362] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod insolita et repentina non sint magis +terribilia. Sicut enim spes est de bono, ita timor est de malo. Sed +experientia facit ad augmentum spei in bonis. Ergo etiam facit ad +augmentum timoris in malis.
+ Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those are feared most, not who are quick-tempered, but who are gentle and + cunning." Now it is clear that those who are quick-tempered are more subject to sudden emotions. Therefore sudden things are + less to be feared. +
[35363] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod magis timentur non qui +acutae sunt irae, sed mites et astuti. Constat autem quod illi qui +acutae irae sunt, magis habent subitos motus. Ergo ea quae sunt +subita, sunt minus terribilia.
+ Objection 3: Further, we think less about things that happen suddenly. But the more we think about a thing, the more we fear it; hence + the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "some appear to be courageous through ignorance, but as soon as they discover that + the case is different from what they expected, they run away." Therefore sudden things are feared less. +
[35364] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +quae sunt subita, minus considerari possunt. Sed tanto aliqua magis +timentur, quanto magis considerantur, unde philosophus dicit, in +III Ethic., quod aliqui videntur fortes propter ignorantiam, +qui, si cognoverint quod aliud sit quam suspicantur, fugiunt. +Ergo repentina minus timentur.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6): "Fear is startled at things unwonted and sudden, which endanger things beloved, and takes + forethought for their safety." +
[35365] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in II Confess., timor insolita et +repentina exhorrescit, rebus quae amantur adversantia, dum +praecavet securitati.
+ I answer that, As stated about + (A[3]; Q[41], A[2]), the object of fear is an imminent evil, which can be repelled, but with difficulty. Now this is due to one + of two causes: to the greatness of the evil, or to the weakness of him that fears; while unwontedness and suddenness conduce + to both of these causes. First, it helps an imminent evil to seem greater. Because all material things, whether good or evil, + the more we consider them, the smaller + they seem. Consequently, just as sorrow for a present evil is mitigated in course of time, as Cicero states (De Quaest. Tusc. + iii, 30); so, too, fear of a future evil is diminished by thinking about it beforehand. Secondly, unwontedness and suddenness + increase the weakness of him that fears, in so far as they deprive him of the remedies with which he might otherwise provide + himself to forestall the coming evil, were it not for the evil taking him by surprise. +
[35366] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, obiectum timoris est malum +imminens quod non de facili repelli potest. Hoc autem ex duobus +contingit, scilicet ex magnitudine mali, et ex debilitate timentis. +Ad utrumque autem horum operatur quod aliquid sit insolitum et +repentinum. Primo quidem, facit ad hoc quod malum imminens maius +appareat. Omnia enim corporalia, et bona et mala, quanto magis +considerantur, minora apparent. Et ideo, sicut propter +diuturnitatem dolor praesentis mali mitigatur, ut patet per Tullium +in III de Tusculanis quaest.; ita etiam ex praemeditatione minuitur +timor futuri mali. Secundo, aliquid esse insolitum et repentinum +facit ad debilitatem timentis, inquantum subtrahit remedia quae +homo potest praeparare ad repellendum futurum malum, quae esse non +possunt quando ex improviso malum occurrit.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The object of hope is a good that is possible to obtain. Consequently whatever increases a man's power, is of a nature to + increase hope, and, for the same reason, to diminish fear, since fear is about an evil which cannot be easily repelled. Since, + therefore, experience increases a man's power of action, therefore, as it increases hope, so does it diminish fear. +
[35367] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod obiectum spei est bonum quod quis potest +adipisci. Et ideo ea quae augmentant potestatem hominis, nata sunt +augere spem, et eadem ratione, diminuere timorem, quia timor est de +malo cui non de facili potest resisti. Quia igitur experientia +facit hominem magis potentem ad operandum, ideo, sicut auget spem, +ita diminuit timorem.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Those who are quick-tempered do not hide their anger; wherefore the harm they do others is not so sudden, as not to be foreseen. + On the other hand, those who are gentle or cunning hide their anger; wherefore the harm which may be impending from them, + cannot be foreseen, but takes one by surprise. For this reason the Philosopher says that such men are feared more than others. +
[35368] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod illi qui habent iram acutam, non occultant eam, et +ideo nocumenta ab eis illata non ita sunt repentina, quin +praevideantur. Sed homines mites et astuti occultant iram, et ideo +nocumentum quod ab eis imminet, non potest praevideri, sed ex +improviso advenit. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit quod tales +magis timentur.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Bodily good or evil, considered in itself, seems greater at first. The reason for this is that a thing is more obvious when + seen in juxtaposition with its contrary. Hence, when a man passes unexpectedly from penury to wealth, he thinks more of his + wealth on account of his previous poverty: while, on the other hand, the rich man who suddenly becomes poor, finds poverty + all the more disagreeable. For this reason sudden evil is feared more, because it + seems more to be evil. However, it may happen through some accident that the greatness of some evil is hidden; for instance + if the foe hides himself in ambush: and then it is true that evil inspires greater fear through being much thought about. +
[35369] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, per se loquendo, bona vel mala corporalia in +principio maiora apparent. Cuius ratio est, quia unumquodque magis +apparet, contrario iuxta se posito. Unde cum aliquis statim a +paupertate ad divitias transit, propter paupertatem praeexistentem +divitias magis aestimat, et e contrario divites statim ad +paupertatem devenientes, eam magis horrent. Et propter hoc, malum +repentinum magis timetur, quia magis videtur esse malum. Sed potest +propter aliquod accidens contingere quod magnitudo alicuius mali +lateat, puta cum hostes se insidiose occultant. Et tunc verum est +quod malum ex diligenti consideratione fit terribilius.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that those things are not more to be feared, for which there is no remedy. Because it is a condition of fear, + that there be some hope of safety, as stated above + (A[2]). But an evil that cannot be remedied leaves no hope of escape. Therefore such things are not feared at all. +
[35370] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ea quae non habent remedium, non sint +magis timenda. Ad timorem enim requiritur quod remaneat aliqua spes +salutis, ut supra dictum est. Sed in malis quae non habent +remedium, nulla remanet spes salutis. Ergo talia mala nullo modo +timentur.
+ Objection 2: Further, there is no remedy for the evil of death: since, in the natural course of things, there is no return from death + to life. And yet death is not the most feared of all things, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore those things + are not feared most, for which there is no remedy. +
[35371] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, +malo mortis nullum remedium adhiberi potest, non enim, secundum +naturam, potest esse reditus a morte ad vitam. Non tamen mors +maxime timetur, ut dicit philosophus, in II Rhetoric. Non ergo ea +magis timentur quae remedium non habent.
+ Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 6) that "a thing which lasts long is no better than that which lasts but one day: + nor is that which lasts for ever any better than that which is not everlasting": and the same applies to evil. But things + that cannot be remedied seem to differ from other things, merely in the point of their lasting long or for ever. Consequently + they are not therefore any worse or more to be feared. +
[35372] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod non est magis bonum quod +est diuturnius, eo quod est unius diei, neque quod est perpetuum, +eo quod non est perpetuum. Ergo, eadem ratione, neque maius +malum. Sed ea quae non habent remedium, non videntur differre ab +aliis nisi propter diuturnitatem vel perpetuitatem. Ergo propter +hoc non sunt peiora, vel magis timenda.
+ On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those things are most to be feared which when done wrong cannot be put right . . + . or for which there is no help, or which are not easy." +
[35373] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod omnia timenda +sunt terribiliora quaecumque, si peccaverint, corrigi non +contingit; aut quorum auxilia non sunt; aut non facilia.
+ I answer that, The object of fear is evil: consequently whatever tends to increase evil, conduces to the increase of fear. Now evil is increased + not only in its species of evil, but also in respect of circumstances, as stated above ( + Q[18], A[3]). And of all the circumstances, longlastingness, or even everlastingness, seems to have the greatest bearing on the increase + of evil. Because things that exist in time are measured, in a way, according to + the duration of time: wherefore if it be an evil to suffer something for a certain length of time, we should reckon the evil + doubled, if it be suffered for twice that length of time. And accordingly, to suffer the same thing for an infinite length + of time, i.e. for ever, implies, so to speak, an infinite increase. Now those evils which, after they have come, cannot be + remedied at all, or at least not easily, are considered as lasting for ever or for a long time: for which reason they inspire + the greatest fear. +
[35374] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod obiectum timoris est malum, unde illud quod facit ad +augmentum mali, facit ad augmentum timoris. Malum autem augetur non +solum secundum speciem ipsius mali, sed etiam secundum +circumstantias, ut ex supra dictis apparet. Inter ceteras autem +circumstantias, diuturnitas, vel etiam perpetuitas, magis videtur +facere ad augmentum mali. Ea enim quae sunt in tempore, secundum +durationem temporis quodammodo mensurantur, unde si pati aliquid in +tanto tempore est malum, pati idem in duplo tempore apprehenditur +ut duplatum. Et secundum hanc rationem, pati idem in infinito +tempore, quod est perpetuo pati, habet quodammodo infinitum +augmentum. Mala autem quae, postquam advenerint, non possunt habere +remedium, vel non de facili, accipiuntur ut perpetua vel diuturna. +Et ideo maxime redduntur timenda.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Remedy for an evil is twofold. One, by which a future evil is warded off from coming. If such a remedy be removed, there + is an end to hope and consequently to fear; wherefore we do not speak now of remedies of that kind. The other remedy is one + by which an already present evil is removed: and of such a remedy we speak now. +
[35375] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod remedium mali est duplex. Unum, per quod +impeditur futurum malum, ne adveniat. Et tali remedio sublato, +aufertur spes, et per consequens timor. Unde de tali remedio nunc +non loquimur. Aliud remedium mali est, quo malum iam praesens +removetur. Et de tali remedio nunc loquimur.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Although death be an evil without remedy, yet, since it threatens not from near, it is not feared, as stated above + (A[2]). +
[35376] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, licet mors sit irremediabile malum, tamen, quia non +imminet de prope, non timetur, ut supra dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher is speaking there of things that are good in themselves, i.e. good specifically. And such like good is no + better for lasting long or for ever: its goodness depends on its very nature. +
[35377] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod philosophus ibi loquitur de per se bono, quod est +bonum secundum speciem suam. Sic autem non fit aliquid magis bonum +propter diuturnitatem vel perpetuitatem, sed propter naturam ipsius +boni.
We must now consider the cause of fear: under which head there are two points of inquiry:
+[35378] +Iª-IIae q. 43 pr. Deinde considerandum est de causa +timoris. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum causa timoris +sit amor. Secundo, utrum causa timoris sit defectus.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that love is not the cause of fear. For that which leads to a thing is its cause. But "fear leads to the love + of charity" as Augustine says on the canonical epistle of John (Tract. ix). Therefore fear is the cause of love, and not conversely. +
[35379] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non sit causa timoris. Illud enim +quod introducit aliquid, est causa eius. Sed timor introducit +amorem caritatis, ut Augustinus dicit, super canonicam Ioan. Ergo +timor est causa amoris, et non e converso.
+ Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those are feared most from whom we dread the advent of some evil." But + the dread of evil being caused by someone, makes us hate rather than love him. Therefore fear is caused by hate rather than + by love. +
[35380] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod illi maxime timentur, a +quibus expectamus imminere nobis aliqua mala. Sed per hoc quod +ab aliquo expectamus malum, magis provocamur ad odium eius quam ad +amorem. Ergo timor magis causatur ab odio quam ab amore.
+ Objection 3: Further, it has been stated above ( + Q[42], A[3]) that those things which occur by our own doing are not fearful. But that which we do from love, is done from our inmost + heart. Therefore fear is not caused by love. +
[35381] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +supra dictum est quod ea quae sunt a nobis ipsis, non habent +rationem terribilium. Sed ea quae sunt ex amore, maxime proveniunt +ex intimo cordis. Ergo timor ex amore non causatur.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33): "There can be no doubt that there is no cause for fear save the loss of what we love, when + we possess it, or the failure to obtain what we hope for." Therefore all fear is caused by our loving something: and consequently + love is the cause of fear. +
[35382] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., +nulli dubium est non aliam esse metuendi causam, nisi ne id quod +amamus, aut adeptum amittamus, aut non adipiscamur speratum. +Omnis ergo timor causatur ex hoc quod aliquid amamus. Amor igitur +est causa timoris.
+ I answer that, The objects of the soul's passions stand in relation thereto as the forms to things natural or artificial: because the passions + of the soul take their species from their objects, as the aforesaid things do from their forms. Therefore, just as whatever + is a cause of the form, is a cause of the thing constituted by that form, so whatever is a cause, in any way whatever, of + the object, is a cause of the passion. Now a thing may be a cause of the object, either + by way of efficient cause, or by way of material disposition. Thus the object of pleasure is good apprehended as suitable + and conjoined: and its efficient cause is that which causes the conjunction, or the suitableness, or goodness, or apprehension + of that good thing; while its cause by way of material disposition, is a habit or any sort of disposition by reason of which + this conjoined good becomes suitable or is apprehended as such. +
Accordingly, as to the matter in question, the object of fear is something reckoned as an evil to come, near at hand and + difficult to avoid. Therefore that which can inflict such an evil, is the efficient cause of the object of fear, and, consequently, + of fear itself. While that which renders a man so disposed that thing is such an evil to him, is a cause of fear and of its + object, by way of material disposition. And thus it is that love causes fear: since it is through his + loving a certain good, that whatever deprives a man of that good is an evil to him, and that consequently he fears it as an + evil. +
[35383] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod obiecta passionum animae se habent ad eas tanquam +formae ad res naturales vel artificiales, quia passiones animae +speciem recipiunt ab obiectis, sicut res praedictae a suis formis. +Sicut igitur quidquid est causa formae, est causa rei constitutae +per ipsam; ita etiam quidquid, et quocumque modo, est causa +obiecti, est causa passionis. Contingit autem aliquid esse causam +obiecti vel per modum causae efficientis, vel per modum +dispositionis materialis. Sicut obiectum delectationis est bonum +apparens conveniens coniunctum, cuius causa efficiens est illud +quod facit coniunctionem, vel quod facit convenientiam vel +bonitatem, vel apparentiam huiusmodi boni; causa autem per modum +dispositionis materialis, est habitus, vel quaecumque dispositio +secundum quam fit alicui conveniens aut apparens illud bonum quod +est ei coniunctum. Sic igitur, in proposito, obiectum timoris est +aestimatum malum futurum propinquum cui resisti de facili non +potest. Et ideo illud quod potest inferre tale malum, est causa +effectiva obiecti timoris, et per consequens ipsius timoris. Illud +autem per quod aliquis ita disponitur ut aliquid sit ei tale, est +causa timoris, et obiecti eius, per modum dispositionis materialis. +Et hoc modo amor est causa timoris, ex hoc enim quod aliquis amat +aliquod bonum, sequitur quod privativum talis boni sit ei malum, et +per consequens quod timeat ipsum tanquam malum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ( + Q[42], A[1]), fear, of itself and in the first place, regards the evil from which it recoils as being contrary to some loved good: and + thus fear, of itself, is born of love. But, in the second place, it regards the cause from which that evil ensues: so that + sometimes, accidentally, fear gives rise to love; in so far as, for instance, through fear of God's punishments, man keeps + His commandments, and thus + begins to hope, while hope leads to love, as stated above ( + Q[40] , A[7]). +
[35384] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, timor per se et primo +respicit ad malum, quod refugit, quod opponitur alicui bono amato. +Et sic per se timor nascitur ex amore. Secundario vero respicit ad +id per quod provenit tale malum. Et sic per accidens quandoque +timor inducit amorem, inquantum scilicet homo qui timet puniri a +Deo, servat mandata eius, et sic incipit sperare, et spes +introducit amorem, ut supra dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 2: He, from whom evil is expected, is indeed hated at first; but afterwards, when once we begin to hope for good from him, we + begin to love him. But the good, the contrary evil of which is feared, was loved from the beginning. +
[35385] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod ille a quo expectantur mala, primo quidem odio +habetur, sed postquam ab ipso iam incipiunt sperari bona, tunc +incipit amari. Bonum autem cui contrariatur malum quod timetur, a +principio amabatur.
+ Reply to Objection 3: This argument is true of that which is the efficient cause of the evil to be feared: whereas love causes fear by way of material + disposition, as stated above. +
[35386] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de eo quod est causa mali +terribilis per modum efficientis. Amor autem est causa eius per +modum materialis dispositionis, ut dictum est.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that defect is not a cause of fear. Because those who are in power are very much feared. But defect is contrary + to power. Therefore defect is not a cause of fear. +
[35387] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod defectus non sit causa timoris. Illi +enim qui potentiam habent, maxime timentur. Sed defectus +contrariatur potentiae. Ergo defectus non est causa timoris.
+ Objection 2: Further, the defect of those who are already being executed is extreme. But such like do not fear as stated in Rhet. ii, + 5. Therefore defect is not a cause of fear. +
[35388] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +illi qui iam decapitantur, maxime sunt in defectu. Sed tales non +timent. Ut dicitur in II Rhetoric. Ergo defectus non est causa +timoris.
+ Objection 3: Further, contests arise from strength not from defect. But "those who contend fear those who contend with them" (Rhet. ii, + 5). Therefore defect is not a cause of fear. +
[35389] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +decertare ex fortitudine provenit, non ex defectu. Sed +decertantes timent eos qui pro eisdem decertant, ut dicitur in +II Rhetoric. Ergo defectus non est causa timoris.
+ On the contrary, Contraries ensue from contrary causes. But "wealth, strength, a multitude of friends, and power drive fear away" (Rhet. ii, + 5). Therefore fear is caused by lack of these. +
[35390] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra, +contrariorum contrariae sunt causae. Sed divitiae, et robur, et +multitudo amicorum, et potestas, excludunt timorem, ut dicitur +in II Rhetoric. Ergo ex defectu horum timor causatur.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[1]), fear may be set down to a twofold cause: one is by way of a material disposition, on the part of him that fears; the other + is by way of efficient cause, on the part of the person feared. As to the first then, some defect is, of itself, the cause + of fear: for it is owing to some lack of power that one is unable easily to repulse a threatening evil. And yet, in order + to cause fear, this defect must be according + to a measure. For the defect which causes fear of a future evil, is less than the defect caused by evil present, which is + the object of sorrow. And still greater would be the defect, if perception of the evil, or love of the good whose contrary + is feared, were entirely absent. +
But as to the second, power and strength are, of themselves, the cause of fear: because it is owing to the fact that the + cause apprehended as harmful is powerful, that its effect cannot be repulsed. It may happen, however, in this respect, that + some defect causes fear accidentally, in so far as owing to some defect someone wishes to hurt another; for instance, by reason + of injustice, either because that other has already done him a harm, or because he fears to be harmed by + him. +
[35391] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, duplex causa timoris accipi +potest, una quidem per modum materialis dispositionis, ex parte +eius qui timet; alia per modum causae efficientis, ex parte eius +qui timetur. Quantum igitur ad primum, defectus, per se loquendo, +est causa timoris, ex aliquo enim defectu virtutis contingit quod +non possit aliquis de facili repellere imminens malum. Sed tamen ad +causandum timorem requiritur defectus cum aliqua mensura. Minor +enim est defectus qui causat timorem futuri mali, quam defectus +consequens malum praesens, de quo est tristitia. Et adhuc esset +maior defectus, si totaliter sensus mali auferretur, vel amor boni +cuius contrarium timetur. Quantum vero ad secundum, virtus et +robur, per se loquendo, est causa timoris, ex hoc enim quod aliquid +quod apprehenditur ut nocivum, est virtuosum, contingit quod eius +effectus repelli non potest. Contingit tamen per accidens quod +aliquis defectus ex ista parte causat timorem, inquantum ex aliquo +defectu contingit quod aliquis velit nocumentum inferre, puta +propter iniustitiam, vel quia ante laesus fuit, vel quia timet +laedi.
+ Reply to Objection 1: This argument is true of the cause of fear, on the part of the efficient cause. +
[35392] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de causa timoris ex parte +causae efficientis.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Those who are already being executed, are actually suffering from a present evil; wherefore their defect exceeds the measure + of fear. +
[35393] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod illi qui iam decapitantur, sunt in passione +praesentis mali. Et ideo iste defectus excedit mensuram +timoris.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Those who contend with one another are afraid, not on account of the power which enables them to contend: but on account + of the lack of power, owing to which they are not confident of victory. +
[35394] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod decertantes timent non propter potentiam, qua +decertare possunt, sed propter defectum potentiae, ex quo contingit +quod se superaturos non confidunt.
We must now consider the effects of fear: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fear causes contraction?
(2) Whether it makes men suitable for counsel?
+[35395] +Iª-IIae q. 44 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +effectibus timoris. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum +timor faciat contractionem. Secundo, utrum faciat consiliativos. +Tertio, utrum faciat tremorem. Quarto, utrum impediat +operationem.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that fear does not cause contraction. For when contraction takes place, the heat and vital spirits are withdrawn + inwardly. But accumulation of heat and vital spirits in the interior parts of the body, dilates the heart unto endeavors of + daring, as may be seen in those who are angered: while the contrary happens in those who are afraid. Therefore fear does not + cause contraction. +
[35396] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor non faciat contractionem. +Contractione enim facta, calor et spiritus ad interiora revocantur. +Sed ex multitudine caloris et spirituum in interioribus, +magnificatur cor ad audacter aliquid aggrediendum, ut patet in +iratis, cuius contrarium in timore accidit. Non ergo timor facit +contractionem.
+ Objection 2: Further, when, as a result of contraction, the vital spirits and heat are accumulated in the interior parts, man cries out, + as may be seen in those who are in pain. But those who fear utter nothing: on the contrary they lose their speech. Therefore + fear does not cause contraction. +
[35397] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +multiplicatis spiritibus et calore in interioribus per +contractionem, sequitur quod homo in vocem prorumpat, ut patet in +dolentibus. Sed timentes non emittunt vocem, sed magis redduntur +taciturni. Ergo timor non facit contractionem.
+ Objection 3: Further, shame is a kind of fear, as stated above ( + Q[41], A[4]). But "those who are ashamed blush," as Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8), and the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 9) observe. But + blushing is an indication, not of contraction, but of the reverse. Therefore contraction is not an effect of fear. +
[35398] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +verecundia est quaedam species timoris, ut supra dictum est. Sed +verecundati rubescunt, ut dicit Tullius, IV de Tusculanis quaest., +et philosophus in IV Ethic. Rubor autem faciei non attestatur +contractioni, sed contrario. Non ergo contractio est effectus +timoris.
+ On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 23) that "fear is a power according to {systole}," i.e. contraction. +
[35399] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, quod timor est virtus +secundum systolen, idest secundum contractionem.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + Q[28], A[5]), in the passions of the soul, the formal element is the movement of the appetitive power, while the bodily transmutation + is the material element. Both of these are mutually proportionate; and consequently the bodily transmutation assumes a resemblance + to and the very nature of the appetitive movement. Now, as to the appetitive movement of the soul, fear implies a certain + contraction: the reason of which + is that fear arises from the imagination of some threatening evil which is difficult to repel, as stated above ( + Q[41], A[2]). But that a thing be difficult to repel is due to lack of power, as stated above ( + Q[43], A[2]): and the weaker a power is, the fewer the things to which it extends. Wherefore from the very imagination that causes fear + there ensues a certain contraction in the appetite. Thus we observe in one who is dying that nature + withdraws inwardly, on account of the lack of power: and again we see the inhabitants of a city, when seized with fear, leave + the outskirts, and, as far as possible, make for the inner quarters. It is in resemblance to this contraction, which pertains + to the appetite of the soul, that in fear a similar contraction of heat and vital spirits towards the inner parts takes place + in regard to the body. +
[35400] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in passionibus animae est +sicut formale ipse motus appetitivae potentiae, sicut autem +materiale transmutatio corporalis, quorum unum alteri +proportionatur. Unde secundum similitudinem et rationem appetitivi +motus, sequitur corporalis transmutatio. Quantum autem ad animalem +motum appetitus, timor contractionem quandam importat. Cuius ratio +est, quia timor provenit ex phantasia alicuius mali imminentis quod +difficile repelli potest, ut supra dictum est. Quod autem aliquid +difficile possit repelli, provenit ex debilitate virtutis, ut supra +dictum est. Virtus autem, quanto est debilior, tanto ad pauciora se +potest extendere. Et ideo ex ipsa imaginatione quae causat timorem, +sequitur quaedam contractio in appetitu. Sicut etiam videmus in +morientibus quod natura retrahitur ad interiora, propter +debilitatem virtutis, et videmus etiam in civitatibus quod, quando +cives timent, retrahunt se ab exterioribus, et recurrunt, quantum +possunt, ad interiora. Et secundum similitudinem huius +contractionis, quae pertinet ad appetitum animalem, sequitur etiam +in timore ex parte corporis, contractio caloris et spirituum ad +interiora.
+ Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 3), although in those who fear, the vital spirits recede from outer to the inner + parts of the body, yet the movement of vital spirits is not the same in those who are angry and those who are afraid. For + in those who are angry, by reason of the heat and subtlety of the vital spirits, which result from the craving for vengeance, + the inward movement has an upward direction: wherefore the vital spirits and heat + concentrate around the heart: the result being that an angry man is quick and brave in attacking. But in those who are afraid, + on account of the condensation caused by cold, the vital spirits have a downward movement; the said cold being due to the + imagined lack of power. Consequently the heat and vital spirits abandon the heart instead of concentrating around it: the + result being that a man who is afraid is not quick to attack, but is more inclined to run away. +
[35401] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in libro de +problematibus, licet in timentibus retrahantur spiritus ab +exterioribus ad interiora, non tamen est idem motus spirituum in +iratis et timentibus. Nam in iratis, propter calorem et +subtilitatem spirituum, quae proveniunt ex appetitu vindictae, +interius fit spirituum motus ab inferioribus ad superiora, et ideo +congregantur spiritus et calor circa cor. Ex quo sequitur quod +irati redduntur prompti et audaces ad invadendum. Sed in +timentibus, propter frigiditatem ingrossantem, spiritus moventur a +superioribus ad inferiora, quae quidem frigiditas contingit ex +imaginatione defectus virtutis. Et ideo non multiplicantur calor et +spiritus circa cor, sed magis a corde refugiunt. Et propter hoc, +timentes non prompte invadunt, sed magis refugiunt.
+ Reply to Objection 2: To everyone that is in pain, whether man or animal, it is natural to use all possible means of repelling the harmful thing + that causes pain but its presence: thus we observe that animals, when in pain, attack with their jaws or with their horns. + Now the greatest help for all purposes, in animals, is heat and vital spirits: wherefore when they are in pain, their nature + stores up the heat and vital spirits within them, in order to make use thereof in + repelling the harmful object. Hence the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 9) when the vital spirits and heat are concentrated + together within, they require to find a vent in the voice: for which reason those who are in pain can scarcely refrain from + crying aloud. On the other hand, in those who are afraid, the internal heat and vital spirits move from the heart downwards, + as stated above (ad 1): wherefore fear hinders speech which ensues from the emission of the vital spirits in an upward + direction through the mouth: the result being that fear makes its subject speechless. For this reason, too, fear "makes its + subject tremble," as the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 1,6,7). +
[35402] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod naturale est cuilibet dolenti, sive homini sive +animali, quod utatur quocumque auxilio potest, ad repellendum +nocivum praesens quod infert dolorem, unde videmus quod animalia +dolentia percutiunt vel faucibus vel cornibus. Maximum autem +auxilium ad omnia in animalibus est calor et spiritus. Et ideo in +dolore natura conservat calorem et spiritum interius, ut hoc utatur +ad repellendum nocivum. Et ideo philosophus dicit, in libro de +problematibus, quod multiplicatis introrsum spiritibus et calore, +necesse est quod emittantur per vocem. Et propter hoc, dolentes vix +se possunt continere quin clament. Sed in timentibus fit motus +interioris caloris et spirituum a corde ad inferiora, ut dictum +est. Et ideo timor contrariatur formationi vocis, quae fit per +emissionem spirituum ad superiora per os. Et propter hoc, timor +tacentes facit. Et inde est etiam quod timor trementes facit, ut +dicit philosophus, in libro de problematibus.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Mortal perils are contrary not only to the appetite of the soul, but also to nature. Consequently in such like fear, there + is contraction not only in the appetite, but also in the corporeal nature: for when an animal is moved by the imagination + of death, it experiences a contraction of heat towards the inner parts of the body, as though it were threatened by a natural + death. Hence it is that "those who are in fear of death turn pale" (Ethic. iv, 9). + But the evil that shame fears, is contrary, not to nature, but only to the appetite of the soul. Consequently there results + a contraction in this appetite, but not in the corporeal nature; in fact, the soul, as though contracted in itself, is free + to set the vital spirits and heat in movement, so that they spread to the outward parts of the body: the result being that + those who are ashamed blush. +
[35403] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod pericula mortis non solum contrariantur appetitui +animali, sed etiam contrariantur naturae. Et propter hoc, in +huiusmodi timore non solum fit contractio ex parte appetitus, sed +etiam ex parte naturae corporalis, sic enim disponitur animal ex +imaginatione mortis contrahens calorem ad interiora, sicut quando +naturaliter mors imminet. Et inde est quod timentes mortem +pallescunt, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Sed malum quod timet +verecundia, non opponitur naturae, sed solum appetitui animali. Et +ideo fit quidem contractio secundum appetitum animalem, non autem +secundum naturam corporalem, sed magis anima, quasi in se +contracta, vacat ad motionem spirituum et caloris, unde fit eorum +diffusio ad exteriora. Et propter hoc, verecundati rubescunt.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that fear does not make one suitable for counsel. For the same thing cannot be conducive to counsel, and a + hindrance thereto. But fear hinders counsel: because every passion disturbs repose, which is requisite for the good use of + reason. Therefore fear does not make a man suitable for counsel. +
[35404] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor non faciat consiliativos. Non +enim est eiusdem consiliativos facere, et consilium impedire. Sed +timor consilium impedit, omnis enim passio perturbat quietem, quae +requiritur ad bonum usum rationis. Ergo timor non facit +consiliativos.
+ Objection 2: Further, counsel is an act of reason, in thinking and deliberating about the future. But a certain fear "drives away all + thought, and dislocates the mind," as Cicero observes (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8). Therefore fear does not conduce to counsel, + but hinders it. +
[35405] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +consilium est actus rationis de futuris cogitantis et deliberantis. +Sed aliquis timor est excutiens cogitata, et mentem a suo loco +removet, ut Tullius dicit, in IV de Tusculanis quaest. Ergo +timor non facit consiliativos, sed magis impedit consilium.
+ Objection 3: Further, just as we have recourse to counsel in order to avoid evil, so do we, in order to attain good things. But whereas + fear is of evil to be avoided, so is hope of good things to be obtained. Therefore fear is not more conducive to counsel, + than hope is. +
[35406] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sicut consilium adhibetur ad vitanda mala, ita etiam adhibetur ad +consequenda bona. Sed sicut timor est de malis vitandis, ita spes +est de bonis consequendis. Ergo timor non facit magis consiliativos +quam spes.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear makes men of counsel." +
[35407] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod timor +consiliativos facit.
+ I answer that, A man of counsel may be taken in two ways. First, from his being willing or anxious to take counsel. And thus fear makes + men of counsel. Because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3), "we take counsel on great matters, because therein we distrust + ourselves." Now things which make us afraid, are not simply evil, but have a certain magnitude, both because they seem difficult + to repel, and because they are apprehended as near to us, as stated above ( + Q[42], A[2]). Wherefore men seek for counsel especially when they are afraid. +
Secondly, a man of counsel means one who is apt for giving good counsel: and in this sense, neither fear nor any passion + makes men of counsel. Because when a man is affected by a passion, things seem to him greater or smaller than they really + are: thus to a lover, what he loves seems better; to him that fears, what he fears seems more dreadful. Consequently owing + to the want of right judgment, every passion, considered in itself, hinders the faculty of giving good counsel. +
[35408] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod aliquis potest dici consiliativus dupliciter. Uno +modo, a voluntate seu sollicitudine consiliandi. Et sic timor +consiliativos facit. Quia, ut philosophus in III Ethic. dicit, +consiliamur de magnis, in quibus quasi nobis ipsis +discredimus. Ea autem quae timorem incutiunt, non sunt +simpliciter mala, sed habent quandam magnitudinem, tum ex eo quod +apprehenduntur ut quae difficiliter repelli possunt; tum etiam quia +apprehenduntur ut de prope existentia, sicut iam dictum est. Unde +homines maxime in timoribus quaerunt consiliari. Alio modo dicitur +aliquis consiliativus, a facultate bene consiliandi. Et sic nec +timor, nec aliqua passio consiliativos facit. Quia homini affecto +secundum aliquam passionem, videtur aliquid vel maius vel minus +quam sit secundum rei veritatem, sicut amanti videntur ea quae +amat, meliora; et timenti, ea quae timet, terribiliora. Et sic ex +defectu rectitudinis iudicii, quaelibet passio, quantum est de se, +impedit facultatem bene consiliandi.
Reply to objections This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
[35409] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 ad 1 Et per hoc +patet responsio ad primum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The stronger a passion is, the greater the hindrance is it to the man who is swayed by it. Consequently, when fear is intense, + man does indeed wish to take counsel, but his thoughts are so disturbed, that he can find no counsel. If, however, the fear + be slight, so as to make a man wish to take counsel, without gravely disturbing the reason; it may even make it easier for + him to take good counsel, by reason of his ensuing carefulness. +
[35410] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod quanto aliqua passio est fortior, tanto magis homo +secundum ipsam affectus, impeditur. Et ideo quando timor fuerit +fortis, vult quidem homo consiliari, sed adeo perturbatur in suis +cogitationibus, quod consilium adinvenire non potest. Si autem sit +parvus timor, qui sollicitudinem consiliandi inducat, nec multum +rationem conturbet; potest etiam conferre ad facultatem bene +consiliandi, ratione sollicitudinis consequentis.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Hope also makes man a good counsellor: because, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "no man takes counsel in matters he + despairs of," nor about impossible things, as he says in Ethic. iii, 3. But fear incites to counsel more than hope does. Because + hope is of good things, as being possible of attainment; whereas fear is of evil things, as being difficult to repel, so that + fear regards the aspect of difficulty more than hope does. And it is in + matters of difficulty, especially when we distrust ourselves, that we take counsel, as stated above. +
[35411] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod etiam spes facit consiliativos, quia, ut in II +Rhetoric. philosophus dicit, nullus consiliatur de his de quibus +desperat; sicut nec de impossibilibus, ut dicitur in III Ethic. +Timor tamen facit magis consiliativos quam spes. Quia spes est de +bono, prout possumus ipsum consequi, timor autem de malo, prout vix +repelli potest, et ita magis respicit rationem difficilis timor +quam spes. In difficilibus autem, maxime in quibus nobis non +confidimus, consiliamur, sicut dictum est.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that trembling is not an effect of fear. Because trembling is occasioned by cold; thus we observe that a cold + person trembles. Now fear does not seem to make one cold, but rather to cause a parching heat: a sign whereof is that those + who fear are thirsty, especially if their fear be very great, as in the case of those who are being led to execution. Therefore + fear does not cause trembling. +
[35412] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod tremor non sit effectus timoris. +Tremor enim ex frigore accidit, videmus enim infrigidatos tremere. +Timor autem non videtur causare frigus, sed magis calorem +desiccantem, cuius signum est quod timentes sitiunt, et praecipue +in maximis timoribus, sicut patet in illis qui ad mortem ducuntur. +Ergo timor non causat tremorem.
+ Objection 2: Further, faecal evacuation is occasioned by heat; hence laxative medicines are generally warm. But these evacuations are + often caused by fear. Therefore fear apparently causes heat; and consequently does not cause trembling. +
[35413] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +emissio superfluitatum ex calore accidit, unde, ut plurimum, +medicinae laxativae sunt calidae. Sed huiusmodi emissiones +superfluitatum ex timore frequenter contingunt. Ergo timor videtur +causare calorem. Et sic non causat tremorem.
+ Objection 3: Further, in fear, the heat is withdrawn from the outer to the inner parts of the body. If, therefore, man trembles in his + outward parts, through the heat being withdrawn thus; it seems that fear should cause this trembling in all the external members. + But such is not the case. Therefore trembling of the body is not caused by fear. +
[35414] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +in timore calor ab exterioribus ad interiora revocatur. Si igitur +propter huiusmodi revocationem caloris, in exterioribus homo +tremit; videtur quod similiter in omnibus exterioribus membris +deberet causari tremor ex timore. Hoc autem non videtur. Non ergo +tremor corporis est effectus timoris.
+ On the contrary, Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8) that "fear is followed by trembling, pallor and chattering of the teeth." +
[35415] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Tullius dicit, in IV de Tusculanis quaest., quod +terrorem sequitur tremor, et pallor, et dentium +crepitus.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[1]), in fear there takes place a certain contraction from the outward to the inner parts of the body, the result being that the + outer parts become cold; and for this reason trembling is occasioned in these parts, being caused by a lack of power in controlling + the members: which lack of power is due to the want of heat, which is the instrument whereby the soul moves those members, + as stated in De Anima ii, 4. +
[35416] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in timore fit quaedam +contractio ab exterioribus ad interiora, et ideo exteriora frigida +remanent. Et propter hoc in eis accidit tremor, qui causatur ex +debilitate virtutis continentis membra, ad huiusmodi autem +debilitatem maxime facit defectus caloris, qui est instrumentum quo +anima movet, ut dicitur in II de anima.
+ Reply to Objection 1: When the heat withdraws from the outer to the inner parts, the inward heat increases, especially in the inferior or nutritive + parts. Consequently the humid element being spent, thirst ensues; sometimes indeed the result is a loosening of the bowels, + and urinary or even seminal evacuation. Or else such like evacuations are due to contraction of the abdomen and testicles, + as the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxii, 11). +
[35417] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, calore ab exterioribus ad interiora revocato, +multiplicatur calor interius, et maxime versus inferiora, idest +circa nutritivam. Et ideo, consumpto humido, consequitur sitis, et +etiam interdum solutio ventris, et urinae emissio, et quandoque +etiam seminis. Vel huiusmodi emissio superfluitatum accidit propter +contractionem ventris et testiculorum, ut philosophus dicit, in +libro de problematibus.
Reply to Objection 2: This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
[35418] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 ad 2 Unde patet +solutio ad secundum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: In fear, heat abandons the heart, with a downward movement: hence in those who are afraid the heart especially trembles, + as also those members which are connected with the breast where the heart resides. Hence those who fear tremble especially + in their speech, on account of the tracheal artery being near the heart. The lower lip, too, and the lower jaw tremble, through + their connection with the heart; which explains the chattering of the teeth. For + the same reason the arms and hands tremble. Or else because the aforesaid members are more mobile. For which reason the knees + tremble in those who are afraid, according to + Is. 35:3: "Strengthen ye the feeble hands, and confirm the trembling [Vulg.: 'weak'] knees." +
[35419] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, quia in timore calor deserit cor, a superioribus ad +inferiora tendens, ideo timentibus maxime tremit cor, et membra +quae habent aliquam connexionem ad pectus, ubi est cor. Unde +timentes maxime tremunt in voce, propter vicinitatem vocalis +arteriae ad cor. Tremit etiam labium inferius, et tota inferior +mandibula, propter continuationem ad cor, unde et crepitus dentium +sequitur. Et eadem ratione brachia et manus tremunt. Vel etiam quia +huiusmodi membra sunt magis mobilia. Propter quod et genua tremunt +timentibus; secundum illud Isaiae XXXV, confortate manus +dissolutas, et genua trementia roborate.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that fear hinders action. For action is hindered chiefly by a disturbance in the reason, which directs action. + But fear disturbs reason, as stated above + (A[2]). Therefore fear hinders action. +
[35420] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor impediat operationem. Operatio +enim maxime impeditur ex perturbatione rationis, quae dirigit in +opere. Sed timor perturbat rationem, ut dictum est. Ergo timor +impedit operationem.
+ Objection 2: Further, those who fear while doing anything, are more apt to fail: thus a man who walks on a plank placed aloft, easily + falls through fear; whereas, if he were to walk on the same plank down below, he would not fall, through not being afraid. + Therefore fear hinders action. +
[35421] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +illi qui faciunt aliquid cum timore, facilius in operando +deficiunt, sicut si aliquis incedat super trabem in alto positam, +propter timorem de facili cadit; non autem caderet, si incederet +super eandem trabem in imo positam, propter defectum timoris. Ergo +timor impedit operationem.
+ Objection 3: Further, laziness or sloth is a kind of fear. But laziness hinders action. Therefore fear does too. +
[35422] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +pigritia, sive segnities, est quaedam species timoris. Sed pigritia +impedit operationem. Ergo et timor.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle says ( + Phil. 2:12): "With fear and trembling work out your salvation": and he would not say this if fear were a hindrance to a good work. Therefore + fear does not hinder a good action. +
[35423] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Philipp. II, cum metu et tremore +vestram salutem operamini, quod non diceret, si timor bonam +operationem impediret. Timor ergo non impedit bonam +operationem.
+ I answer that, Man's exterior actions are caused by the soul as first mover, but by the bodily members as instruments. Now action may be + hindered both by defect of the instrument, and by defect of the principal mover. On the part of the bodily instruments, fear, + considered in itself, is always apt to hinder exterior action, on account of the outward members being deprived, through fear, + of their heat. But on the part of the soul, if the fear be moderate, without much + disturbance of the reason, it conduces to working well, in so far as it causes a certain solicitude, and makes a man take + counsel and work with greater attention. If, however, fear increases so much as to disturb the reason, it hinders action even + on the part of the soul. But of such a fear the Apostle does not speak. +
[35424] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod operatio hominis exterior causatur quidem ab anima +sicut a primo movente, sed a membris corporeis sicut ab +instrumentis. Contingit autem operationem impediri et propter +defectum instrumenti, et propter defectum principalis moventis. Ex +parte igitur instrumentorum corporalium, timor, quantum est de se, +semper natus est impedire exteriorem operationem, propter defectum +caloris qui ex timore accidit in exterioribus membris. Sed ex parte +animae, si sit timor moderatus, non multum rationem perturbans; +confert ad bene operandum, inquantum causat quandam sollicitudinem, +et facit hominem attentius consiliari et operari. Si vero timor +tantum increscat quod rationem perturbet, impedit operationem etiam +ex parte animae. Sed de tali timore apostolus non loquitur.
Reply to Objection 1: This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
[35425] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 ad 1 Et per haec +patet responsio ad primum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: He that falls from a plank placed aloft, suffers a disturbance of his imagination, through fear of the fall that is pictured + to his imagination. +
[35426] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod illi qui cadunt de trabe in alto posita, patiuntur +perturbationem imaginationis, propter timorem casus imaginati.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Everyone in fear shuns that which he fears: and therefore, since laziness is a fear of work itself as being toilsome, it + hinders work by withdrawing the will from it. But fear of other things conduces to action, in so far as it inclines the will + to do that whereby a man escapes from what he fears. +
[35427] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod omnis timens refugit id quod timet, et ideo, cum +pigritia sit timor de ipsa operatione, inquantum est laboriosa, +impedit operationem, quia retrahit voluntatem ab ipsa. Sed timor +qui est de aliis rebus, intantum adiuvat operationem, inquantum +inclinat voluntatem ad operandum ea per quae homo effugit id quod +timet.
We must now consider daring: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether daring is contrary to fear?
+[35428] +Iª-IIae q. 45 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +audacia. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum audacia sit +contraria timori. Secundo, quomodo audacia se habeat ad spem. +Tertio, de causa audaciae. Quarto, de effectus ipsius.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that daring is not contrary to fear. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 31) that "daring is a vice." Now vice + is contrary to virtue. Since, therefore, fear is not a virtue but a passion, it seems that daring is not contrary to fear. +
[35429] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod audacia non contrarietur timori. Dicit +enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod audacia +vitium est. Vitium autem virtuti contrariatur. Cum ergo timor non +sit virtus, sed passio, videtur quod timori non contrarietur +audacia.
+ Objection 2: Further, to one thing there is one contrary. But hope is contrary to fear. Therefore daring is not contrary to fear. +
[35430] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +uni unum est contrarium. Sed timori contrariatur spes. Non ergo +contrariatur ei audacia.
+ Objection 3: Further, every passion excludes its opposite. But fear excludes safety; for Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "fear takes + forethought for safety." Therefore safety is contrary to fear. Therefore daring is not contrary to fear. +
[35431] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +unaquaeque passio excludit passionem oppositam. Sed id quod +excluditur per timorem, est securitas, dicit enim Augustinus, II +Confess., quod timor securitati praecavet ergo securitas +contrariatur timori. Non ergo audacia.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "daring is contrary to fear." +
[35432] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod audacia est +timori contraria.
+ I answer that, It is of the essence of contraries to be "farthest removed from one another," as stated in Metaph. x, 4. Now that which is + farthest removed from fear, is daring: since fear turns away from the future hurt, on account of its victory over him that + fears it; whereas daring turns on threatened danger because of its own victory over that same danger. Consequently it is evident + that daring is contrary to fear. +
[35433] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod de ratione contrariorum est quod maxime a se distent, +ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Illud autem quod maxime distat a timore, +est audacia, timor enim refugit nocumentum futurum, propter eius +victoriam super ipsum timentem; sed audacia aggreditur periculum +imminens, propter victoriam sui supra ipsum periculum. Unde +manifeste timori contrariatur audacia.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Anger, daring and all the names of the passions can be taken in two ways. First, as denoting absolutely movements of the + sensitive appetite in respect of some object, good or bad: and thus they are names of passions. Secondly, as denoting besides + this movement, a straying from the order of reason: and thus they are names of vices. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks + of daring: but we are speaking of it in the first sense. +
[35434] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ira et audacia, et omnium passionum nomina, +dupliciter accipi possunt. Uno modo, secundum quod important +absolute motus appetitus sensitivi in aliquod obiectum bonum vel +malum, et sic sunt nomina passionum. Alio modo, secundum quod simul +cum huiusmodi motu important recessum ab ordine rationis, et sic +sunt nomina vitiorum. Et hoc modo loquitur Augustinus de audacia, +sed nos loquimur nunc de audacia secundum primum modum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: To one thing, in the same respect, there are not several contraries; but in different respects nothing prevents one thing + having several contraries. Accordingly it has been said above ( + Q[23], A[2]; + Q[40], A[4]) that the irascible passions admit of a twofold contrariety: one, according to the opposition of good and evil, and thus + fear is contrary to hope: the other, according to the opposition of + approach and withdrawal, and thus daring is contrary to fear, and despair contrary to hope. +
[35435] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod uni secundum idem, non sunt plura contraria, sed +secundum diversa, nihil prohibet uni plura contrariari. Et sic +dictum est supra quod passiones irascibilis habent duplicem +contrarietatem, unam secundum oppositionem boni et mali, et sic +timor contrariatur spei; aliam secundum oppositionem accessus et +recessus, et sic timori contrariatur audacia, spei vero +desperatio.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Safety does not denote something contrary to fear, but merely the exclusion of fear: for he is said to be safe, who fears + not. Wherefore safety is opposed to fear, as a privation: while daring is opposed thereto as a contrary. And as contrariety + implies privation, so daring implies safety. +
[35436] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod securitas non significat aliquid contrarium timori, +sed solam timoris exclusionem, ille enim dicitur esse securus, qui +non timet. Unde securitas opponitur timori sicut privatio, audacia +autem sicut contrarium. Et sicut contrarium includit in se +privationem, ita audacia securitatem.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that daring does not ensue from hope. Because daring regards evil and fearful things, as stated in Ethic. iii, + 7. But hope regards good things, as stated above ( + Q[40], A[1]). Therefore they have different objects and are not in the same order. Therefore daring does not ensue from hope. +
[35437] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod audacia non consequatur spem. Audacia +enim est respectu malorum et terribilium, ut dicitur in III Ethic. +Spes autem respicit bonum. Ut supra dictum est. Ergo habent diversa +obiecta, et non sunt unius ordinis. Non ergo audacia consequitur +spem.
+ Objection 2: Further, just as daring is contrary to fear, so is despair contrary to hope. But fear does not ensue from despair: in fact, + despair excludes fear, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore daring does not result from hope. +
[35438] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +sicut audacia contrariatur timori, ita desperatio spei. Sed timor +non sequitur desperationem, quinimmo desperatio excludit timorem. +Ut philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric. Ergo audacia non consequitur +spem.
+ Objection 3: Further, daring is intent on something good, viz. victory. But it belongs to hope to tend to that which is good and difficult. + Therefore daring is the same as hope; and consequently does not result from it. +
[35439] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +audacia intendit quoddam bonum, scilicet victoriam. Sed tendere in +bonum arduum pertinet ad spem. Ergo audacia est idem spei. Non ergo +consequitur ad spem.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "those are hopeful are full of daring." Therefore it seems that daring ensues from + hope. +
[35440] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod illi qui sunt +bonae spei, sunt audaces. Videtur ergo audacia consequi +spem.
+ I answer that, As we have often stated ( + Q[22], A[2]; + Q[35], A[1]; + Q[41], A[1]), all these passions belong to the appetitive power. Now every movement of the appetitive power is reducible to one either + of pursuit or of avoidance. Again, pursuit or avoidance is of something either by reason of itself or by reason of something + else. By reason of itself, good is the object of pursuit, and evil, the + object of avoidance: but by reason of something else, evil can be the object of pursuit, through some good attaching to it; + and good can be the object of avoidance, through some evil attaching to it. Now that which is by reason of something else, + follows that which is by reason of itself. Consequently pursuit of evil follows pursuit of good; and avoidance of good follows + avoidance of evil. Now these four things belong to four passions, since pursuit of good belongs to hope, avoidance of evil + to + fear, the pursuit of the fearful evil belongs to daring, and the avoidance of good to despair. It follows, therefore, that + daring results from hope; since it is in the hope of overcoming the threatening object of fear, that one attacks it boldly. + But despair results from fear: since the reason why a man despairs is because he fears the difficulty attaching to the good + he should hope for. +
[35441] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam pluries dictum est, omnes huiusmodi +passiones animae ad appetitivam potentiam pertinent. Omnis autem +motus appetitivae potentiae reducitur ad prosecutionem vel fugam. +Prosecutio autem vel fuga est alicuius et per se, et per accidens, +per se quidem est prosecutio boni, fuga vero mali; per accidens +autem potest prosecutio esse mali, propter aliquod bonum adiunctum, +et fuga boni, propter aliquod malum adiunctum. Quod autem est per +accidens, sequitur ad id quod est per se. Et ideo prosecutio mali, +sequitur prosecutionem boni, sicut et fuga boni sequitur fugam +mali. Haec autem quatuor pertinent ad quatuor passiones, nam +prosecutio boni pertinet ad spem, fuga mali ad timorem, insecutio +mali terribilis pertinet ad audaciam, fuga vero boni pertinet ad +desperationem. Unde sequitur quod audacia consequitur ad spem, ex +hoc enim quod aliquis sperat superare terribile imminens, ex hoc +audacter insequitur ipsum. Ad timorem vero sequitur desperatio, +ideo enim aliquis desperat, quia timet difficultatem quae est circa +bonum sperandum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: This argument would hold, if good and evil were not co-ordinate objects. But because evil has a certain relation to good, + since it comes after good, as privation comes after habit; consequently daring which pursues evil, comes after hope which + pursues good. +
[35442] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ratio sequeretur, si bonum et malum essent +obiecta non habentia ordinem ad invicem. Sed quia malum habet +aliquem ordinem ad bonum, est enim posterius bono, sicut privatio +habitu; ideo audacia, quae insequitur malum, est post spem, quae +insequitur bonum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Although good, absolutely speaking, is prior to evil, yet avoidance of evil precedes avoidance of good; just as the pursuit + of good precedes the pursuit of evil. Consequently just as hope precedes daring, so fear precedes despair. And just as fear + does not always lead to despair, but only when it is intense; so hope does not always lead to daring, save only when it is + strong. +
[35443] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, etsi bonum simpliciter sit prius quam malum, tamen +fuga per prius debetur malo quam bono, sicut insecutio per prius +debetur bono quam malo. Et ideo sicut spes est prior quam audacia, +ita timor est prior quam desperatio. Et sicut ex timore non semper +sequitur desperatio, sed quando fuerit intensus; ita ex spe non +semper sequitur audacia, sed quando fuerit vehemens.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Although the object of daring is an evil to which, in the estimation of the daring man, the good of victory is conjoined; + yet daring regards the evil, and hope regards the conjoined good. In like manner despair regards directly the good which it + turns away from, while fear regards the conjoined evil. Hence, properly speaking, daring is not a part of hope, but its effect: + just as despair is an effect, not a part, of fear. For this reason, too, daring + cannot be a principal passion. +
[35444] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod audacia, licet sit circa malum cui coniunctum est +bonum victoriae secundum aestimationem audacis, tamen respicit +malum, bonum vero adiunctum respicit spes. Et similiter desperatio +respicit bonum directe, quod refugit, malum vero adiunctum respicit +timor. Unde, proprie loquendo, audacia non est pars spei, sed eius +effectus, sicut nec desperatio est pars timoris, sed eius effectus. +Et propter hoc etiam audacia principalis passio esse non +potest.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that some defect is a cause of daring. For the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 4) that "lovers of wine + are strong and daring." But from wine ensues the effect of drunkenness. Therefore daring is caused by a defect. +
[35445] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod defectus aliquis sit causa audaciae. +Dicit enim philosophus, in libro de problematibus, quod amatores +vini sunt fortes et audaces. Sed ex vino sequitur defectus +ebrietatis. Ergo audacia causatur ex aliquo defectu.
+ Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those who have no experience of danger are bold." But want of experience + is a defect. Therefore daring is caused by a defect. +
[35446] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod inexperti periculorum +sunt audaces. Sed inexperientia defectus quidam est. Ergo +audacia ex defectu causatur.
+ Objection 3: Further, those who have suffered wrongs are wont to be daring; "like the beasts when beaten," as stated in Ethic. iii, 5. + But the suffering of wrongs pertains to defect. Therefore daring is caused by a defect. +
[35447] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +iniusta passi audaciores esse solent; sicut etiam bestiae cum +percutiuntur, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Sed iniustum pati ad +defectum pertinet. Ergo audacia ex aliquo defectu causatur.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that the cause of daring "is the presence in the imagination of the hope that the means + of safety are nigh, and that the things to be feared are either non-existent or far off." But anything pertaining to defect + implies either the removal of the means of safety, or the proximity of something to be feared. Therefore nothing pertaining + to defect is a cause of daring. +
[35448] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod causa audaciae +est, cum in phantasia spes fuerit salutarium ut prope +existentium, timendorum autem aut non entium, aut longe entium. +Sed id quod pertinet ad defectum, vel pertinet ad salutarium +remotionem, vel ad terribilium propinquitatem. Ergo nihil quod ad +defectum pertinet, est causa audaciae.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + AA[1],2) daring results from hope and is contrary to fear: wherefore whatever is naturally apt to cause hope or banish fear, is + a cause of daring. Since, however, fear and hope, and also daring, being passions, consist in a movement of the appetite, + and in a certain bodily transmutation; a thing may be considered as the cause of daring in two ways, whether by raising hope, + or by banishing fear; in one way, in the + part of the appetitive movement; in another way, on the part of the bodily transmutation. +
On the part of the appetitive movement which follows apprehension, hope that leads to daring is roused by those things that + make us reckon victory as possible. Such things regard either our own power, as bodily strength, experience of dangers, abundance + of wealth, and the like; or they regard the powers of others, such as having a great number of friends or any other means + of help, especially if a man trust in the Divine assistance: wherefore "those are more daring, with whom it + is well in regard to godlike things," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Fear is banished, in this way, by the removal + of threatening causes of fear; for instance, by the fact that a man has not enemies, through having harmed nobody, so that + he is not aware of any imminent danger; since those especially appear to be threatened by danger, who have harmed others. +
On the part of the bodily transmutation, daring is caused through the incitement of hope and the banishment of fear, by those + things which raise the temperature about the heart. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Part. Animal. iii, 4) that "those whose + heart is small in size, are more daring; while animals whose heart is large are timid; because the natural heat is unable + to give the same degree of temperature to a large as to a small heart; just as a fire does not heat a large + house as well as it does a small house." He says also (De Problem. xxvii, 4), that "those whose lungs contain much blood, + are more daring, through the heat in the heart that results therefrom." He says also in the same passage that "lovers of wine + are more daring, on account of the heat of the wine": hence it has been said above ( + Q[40], A[6]) that drunkenness conduces to hope, since the heat in the heart banishes fear and raises hope, by reason of the dilatation + and + enlargement of the heart. +
[35449] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, audacia consequitur spem, et +contrariatur timori, unde quaecumque nata sunt causare spem, vel +excludere timorem, sunt causa audaciae. Quia vero timor et spes, et +etiam audacia, cum sint passiones quaedam, consistunt in motu +appetitus et in quadam transmutatione corporali; dupliciter potest +accipi causa audaciae, sive quantum ad provocationem spei, sive +quantum ad exclusionem timoris, uno modo quidem, ex parte +appetitivi motus; alio vero modo, ex parte transmutationis +corporalis. Ex parte quidem appetitivi motus, qui sequitur +apprehensionem, provocatur spes causans audaciam, per ea quae +faciunt nos aestimare quod possibile sit adipisci victoriam; vel +secundum propriam potentiam, sicut fortitudo corporis, experientia +in periculis, multitudo pecuniarum, et alia huiusmodi; sive per +potentiam aliorum, sicut multitudo amicorum vel quorumcumque +auxiliantium, et praecipue si homo confidat de auxilio divino; +unde illi qui se bene habent ad divina, audaciores sunt, ut +etiam philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric. Timor autem excluditur, +secundum istum modum, per remotionem terribilium appropinquantium, +puta quia homo non habet inimicos, quia nulli nocuit, quia non +videt aliquod periculum imminere; illis enim videntur maxime +pericula imminere, qui aliis nocuerunt. Ex parte vero +transmutationis corporalis, causatur audacia per provocationem spei +et exclusionem timoris, ex his quae faciunt caliditatem circa cor. +Unde philosophus dicit, in libro de partibus animalium, quod +illi qui habent parvum cor secundum quantitatem, sunt magis +audaces; et animalia habentia magnum cor secundum quantitatem, sunt +timida, quia calor naturalis non tantum potest calefacere magnum +cor; sicut parvum, sicut ignis non tantum potest calefacere magnam +domum, sicut parvam. Et in libro de problematibus dicit quod +habentes pulmonem sanguineum, sunt audaciores, propter +caliditatem cordis exinde consequentem. Et ibidem dicit quod +vini amatores sunt magis audaces, propter caliditatem vini, +unde et supra dictum est quod ebrietas facit ad bonitatem spei, +caliditas enim cordis repellit timorem, et causat spem, propter +cordis extensionem et amplificationem.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Drunkenness causes daring, not through being a defect, but through dilating the heart: and again through making a man think + greatly of himself. +
[35450] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ebrietas causat audaciam, non inquantum est +defectus, sed inquantum facit cordis dilatationem, et inquantum +etiam facit aestimationem cuiusdam magnitudinis.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Those who have no experience of dangers are more daring, not on account of a defect, but accidentally, i.e. in so far as + through being inexperienced they do not know their own failings, nor the dangers that threaten. Hence it is that the removal + of the cause of fear gives rise to daring. +
[35451] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod illi qui sunt inexperti periculorum, sunt audaciores, +non propter defectum, sed per accidens, inquantum scilicet, propter +inexperientiam, neque debilitatem suam cognoscunt, neque +praesentiam periculorum. Et ita, per subtractionem causae timoris, +sequitur audacia.
+ Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) "those who have been wronged are courageous, because they think that God comes to the + assistance of those who suffer unjustly." +
Hence it is evident that no defect causes daring except accidentally, i.e. in so far as some excellence attaches thereto, + real or imaginary, either in oneself or in another. +
[35452] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in II Rhetoric., iniustum +passi redduntur audaciores, quia aestimant quod Deus iniustum +passis auxilium ferat. Et sic patet quod nullus defectus causat +audaciam nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet habet adiunctam +aliquam excellentiam, vel veram vel aestimatam, vel ex parte sui +vel ex parte alterius.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the daring are not more eager at first than in the midst of danger. Because trembling is caused by fear, + which is contrary to daring, as stated above + (A[1]; Q[44], A[3]). But the daring sometimes tremble at first, as the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 3). Therefore they are + not more eager at first than in the midst of danger. +
[35453] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod audaces non sint promptiores in +principio quam in ipsis periculis. Tremor enim ex timore causatur, +qui contrariatur audaciae, ut ex dictis patet. Sed audaces +quandoque in principio tremunt, ut philosophus dicit, in libro de +problematibus. Ergo non sunt promptiores in principio quam in ipsis +periculis existentes.
+ Objection 2: Further, passion is intensified by an increase in its object: thus since a good is lovable, what is better is yet more lovable. + But the object of daring is something difficult. Therefore the greater the difficulty, the greater the daring. But danger + is more arduous and difficult when present. It is then therefore that daring is greatest. +
[35454] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +per augmentum obiecti augetur passio, sicut si bonum est amabile, +et magis bonum est magis amabile. Sed arduum est obiectum audaciae. +Augmentato ergo arduo, augmentatur audacia. Sed magis fit arduum et +difficile periculum, quando est praesens. Ergo debet tunc magis +crescere audacia.
+ Objection 3: Further, anger is provoked by the infliction of wounds. But anger causes daring; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that + "anger makes man bold." Therefore when man is in the midst of danger and when he is being beaten, then is he most daring. +
[35455] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +ex vulneribus inflictis provocatur ira. Sed ira causat audaciam, +dicit enim philosophus, in II Rhetoric., quod ira est ausivum. Ergo +quando iam sunt in ipsis periculis, et percutiuntur, videtur quod +magis audaces reddantur.
+ On the contrary, It is said in Ethic. iii, 7 that "the daring are precipitate and full of eagerness before the danger, yet in the midst of + dangers they stand aloof." +
[35456] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur in III Ethic., quod audaces praevolantes sunt +et volentes ante pericula, in ipsis autem discedunt.
+ I answer that, Daring, being a movement of the sensitive appetite, follows an apprehension of the sensitive faculty. But the sensitive faculty + cannot make comparisons, nor can it inquire into circumstances; its judgment is instantaneous. Now it happens sometimes that + it is impossible for a man to take note in an instant of all the difficulties of a certain situation: hence there arises the + movement of daring to face the danger; so that when he comes to experience the + danger, he feels the difficulty to be greater than he expected, and so gives way. +
On the other hand, reason discusses all the difficulties of a situation. Consequently men of fortitude who face danger according + to the judgment of reason, at first seem slack, because they face the danger not from passion but with due deliberation. Yet + when they are in the midst of danger, they experience nothing unforeseen, but sometimes the difficulty turns out to be less + than they anticipated; wherefore they are more persevering. Moreover, it may be because they face the + danger on account of the good of virtue which is the abiding object of their will, however great the danger may prove: whereas + men of daring face the danger on account of a mere thought giving rise to hope and banishing fear, as stated above + (A[3]). +
[35457] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod audacia, cum sit quidam motus appetitus sensitivi, +sequitur apprehensionem sensitivae virtutis. Virtus autem sensitiva +non est collativa nec inquisitiva singulorum quae circumstant rem, +sed subitum habet iudicium. Contingit autem quandoque quod secundum +subitam apprehensionem non possunt cognosci omnia quae +difficultatem in aliquo negotio afferunt, unde surgit audaciae +motus ad aggrediendum periculum. Unde quando iam experiuntur ipsum +periculum, sentiunt maiorem difficultatem quam aestimaverunt. Et +ideo deficiunt. Sed ratio est discussiva omnium quae afferunt +difficultatem negotio. Et ideo fortes, qui ex iudicio rationis +aggrediuntur pericula, in principio videntur remissi, quia non +passi, sed cum deliberatione debita aggrediuntur. Quando autem sunt +in ipsis periculis, non experiuntur aliquid improvisum; sed +quandoque minora illis quae praecogitaverunt. Et ideo magis +persistunt. Vel etiam quia propter bonum virtutis pericula +aggrediuntur, cuius boni voluntas in eis perseverat, quantacumque +sint pericula. Audaces autem, propter solam aestimationem facientem +spem et excludentem timorem, sicut dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Trembling does occur in men of daring, on account of the heat being withdrawn from the outer to the inner parts of the body, + as occurs also in those who are afraid. But in men of daring the heat withdraws to the heart; whereas in those who are afraid, + it withdraws to the inferior parts. +
[35458] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod etiam in audacibus accidit tremor, propter +revocationem caloris ab exterioribus ad interiora, sicut etiam in +timentibus. Sed in audacibus revocatur calor ad cor, in timentibus +autem, ad inferiora.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The object of love is good simply, wherefore if it be increased, love is increased simply. But the object of daring is a + compound of good and evil; and the movement of daring towards evil presupposes the movement of hope towards good. If, therefore, + so much difficulty be added to the danger that it overcomes hope, the movement of daring does not ensue, but fails. But if + the movement of daring does ensue, the greater the danger, the greater is the + daring considered to be. +
[35459] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod obiectum amoris est simpliciter bonum, unde +augmentatum simpliciter augmentat amorem. Sed obiectum audaciae est +compositum ex bono et malo; et motus audaciae in malum, +praesupponit motum spei in bonum. Et ideo si tantum addatur de +arduitate ad periculum quod excedat spem, non sequetur motus +audaciae, sed diminuetur. Si tamen sit motus audaciae, quanto maius +est periculum, tanto maior audacia reputatur.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Hurt does not give rise to anger unless there be some kind of hope, as we shall see later on ( + Q[46], A[1]). Consequently if the danger be so great as to banish all hope of victory, anger does not ensue. It is true, however, that + if anger does ensue, there will be greater daring. +
[35460] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ex laesione non causatur ira, nisi supposita aliqua +spe, ut infra dicetur. Et ideo si fuerit tantum periculum quod +excedat spem victoriae, non sequetur ira. Sed verum est quod, si +ira sequatur, audacia augebitur.
We must now consider anger: and (1) anger in itself; (2) the cause of anger and its remedy; (3) the effect of anger.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether anger is a special passion?
(2) Whether the object of anger is good or evil?
(3) Whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty?
(4) Whether anger is accompanied by an act of reason?
(5) Whether anger is more natural than desire?
(6) Whether anger is more grievous than hatred?
(7) Whether anger is only towards those with whom we have a relation of justice?
+[35461] +Iª-IIae q. 46 pr. Deinde considerandum est de ira. +Et primo, de ira secundum se; secundo, de causa factiva irae, et +remedio eius; tertio, de effectu eius. Circa primum quaeruntur +octo. Primo, utrum ira sit passio specialis. Secundo, utrum +obiectum irae sit bonum, an malum. Tertio, utrum ira sit in +concupiscibili. Quarto, utrum ira sit cum ratione. Quinto, utrum +ira sit naturalior quam concupiscentia. Sexto, utrum ira sit +gravior quam odium. Septimo, utrum ira solum sit ad illos ad quos +est iustitia. Octavo, de speciebus irae.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not a special passion. For the irascible power takes its name from anger [ira]. But there are + several passions in this power, not only one. Therefore anger is not one special passion. +
[35462] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non sit passio specialis. Ab ira +enim denominatur potentia irascibilis. Sed huius potentiae non est +una tantum passio, sed multae. Ergo ira non est una passio +specialis.
+ Objection 2: Further, to every special passion there is a contrary passion; as is evident by going through them one by one. But no passion + is contrary to anger, as stated above ( + Q[23], A[3]). Therefore anger is not a special passion. +
[35463] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +cuilibet passioni speciali est aliquid contrarium; ut patet +inducenti per singula. Sed irae non est aliqua passio contraria, ut +supra dictum est. Ergo ira non est passio specialis.
+ Objection 3: Further, one special passion does not include another. But anger includes several passions: since it accompanies sorrow, + pleasure, and hope, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2). Therefore anger is not a special passion. +
[35464] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +una specialis passio non includit aliam. Sed ira includit multas +passiones, est enim cum tristitia, et cum delectatione, et cum spe, +ut patet per philosophum, in II Rhetoric. Ergo ira non est passio +specialis.
+ On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) calls anger a special passion: and so does Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 7). +
[35465] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Damascenus ponit iram specialem passionem. Et similiter +Tullius, IV de Tusculanis quaest.
+ I answer that, A thing is said to be general in two ways. First, by predication; thus "animal" is general in respect of all animals. Secondly, + by causality; thus the sun is the general cause of all things generated here below, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). + Because just as a genus contains potentially many differences, according to a likeness of matter; so an efficient cause contains + many effects according to its active power. Now it happens that an effect is + produced by the concurrence of various causes; and since every cause remains somewhat in its effect, we may say that, in yet + a third way, an effect which is due to the concurrence of several causes, has a certain generality, inasmuch as several causes + are, in a fashion, actually existing therein. +
Accordingly in the first way, anger is not a general passion but is condivided with the other passions, as stated above ( + Q[23], A[4]). In like manner, neither is it in the second way: since it is not a cause of the other passions. But in this way, love may + be called a general passion, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), because love is the primary root of all the other + passions, as stated above ( + Q[27], A[4] ). But, in a + third way, anger may be called a general passion, inasmuch as it is caused by a concurrence of several passions. Because the + movement of anger does not arise save on account of some pain inflicted, and unless there be desire and hope of revenge: for, + as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2), "the angry man hopes to punish; since he craves for revenge as being possible." Consequently + if the person, who inflicted the injury, excel very much, anger does not ensue, but only sorrow, as Avicenna states + (De Anima iv, 6). +
[35466] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod aliquid dicitur generale dupliciter. Uno modo, per +praedicationem, sicut animal est generale ad omnia animalia. Alio +modo, per causam, sicut sol est causa generalis omnium quae +generantur in his inferioribus, secundum Dionysium, in IV cap. de +Div. Nom. Sicut enim genus continet multas differentias potestate, +secundum similitudinem materiae; ita causa agens continet multos +effectus secundum virtutem activam. Contingit autem aliquem +effectum ex concursu diversarum causarum produci, et quia omnis +causa aliquo modo in effectu manet, potest etiam dici, tertio modo, +quod effectus ex congregatione multarum causarum productus, habet +quandam generalitatem, inquantum continet multas causas quodammodo +in actu. Primo ergo modo, ira non est passio generalis, sed +condivisa aliis passionibus, ut supra dictum est. Similiter autem +nec secundo modo. Non est enim causa aliarum passionum, sed per +hunc modum potest dici generalis passio amor, ut patet per +Augustinum, in XIV libro de Civ. Dei; amor enim est prima radix +omnium passionum, ut supra dictum est. Sed tertio modo potest ira +dici passio generalis, inquantum ex concursu multarum passionum +causatur. Non enim insurgit motus irae nisi propter aliquam +tristitiam illatam et nisi adsit desiderium et spes ulciscendi, +quia, ut philosophus dicit in II Rhetoric., iratus habet spem +puniendi; appetit enim vindictam ut sibi possibilem. Unde si +fuerit multum excellens persona quae nocumentum intulit, non +sequitur ira, sed solum tristitia, ut Avicenna dicit, in libro de +anima.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The irascible power takes its name from "ira" [anger], not because every movement of that power is one of anger; but because + all its movements terminate in anger; and because, of all these movements, anger is the most patent. +
[35467] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, vis irascibilis denominatur ab ira, non quia +omnis motus huius potentiae sit ira, sed quia ad iram terminantur +omnes motus huius potentiae; et inter alios eius motus, iste est +manifestior.
+ Reply to Objection 2: From the very fact that anger is caused by contrary passions, i.e. by hope, which is of good, and by sorrow, which is of + evil, it includes in itself contrariety: and consequently it has no contrary outside itself. Thus also in mixed colors there + is no contrariety, except that of the simple colors from which they are made. +
[35468] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod ex hoc ipso quod ira causatur ex contrariis +passionibus, scilicet a spe, quae est boni, et a tristitia, quae +est mali, includit in seipsa contrarietatem, et ideo non habet +contrarium extra se. Sicut etiam in mediis coloribus non invenitur +contrarietas, nisi quae est simplicium colorum, ex quibus +causantur.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Anger includes several passions, not indeed as a genus includes several species; but rather according to the inclusion of + cause and effect. +
[35469] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ira includit multas passiones, non quidem sicut genus +species, sed magis secundum continentiam causae et effectus.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the object of anger is evil. For Gregory of Nyssa says [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.] that anger is "the + sword-bearer of desire," inasmuch, to wit, as it assails whatever obstacle stands in the way of desire. But an obstacle has + the character of evil. Therefore anger regards evil as its object. +
[35470] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod obiectum irae sit malum. Dicit enim +Gregorius Nyssenus quod ira est quasi armigera concupiscentiae, +inquantum scilicet impugnat id quod concupiscentiam impedit. Sed +omne impedimentum habet rationem mali. Ergo ira respicit malum +tanquam obiectum.
+ Objection 2: Further, anger and hatred agree in their effect, since each seeks to inflict harm on another. But hatred regards evil as + its object, as stated above ( + Q[29], A[1]). Therefore anger does also. +
[35471] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +ira et odium conveniunt in effectu, utriusque enim est inferre +nocumentum alteri. Sed odium respicit malum tanquam obiectum, ut +supra dictum est. Ergo etiam et ira.
+ Objection 3: Further, anger arises from sorrow; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 6) that "anger acts with sorrow." But evil + is the object of sorrow. Therefore it is also the object of anger. +
[35472] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +ira causatur ex tristitia, unde philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., +quod ira operatur cum tristitia. Sed tristitiae obiectum est malum. +Ergo et irae.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "anger craves for revenge." But the desire for revenge is a desire for something good: + since revenge belongs to justice. Therefore the object of anger is good. +
Moreover, anger is always accompanied by hope, wherefore it causes pleasure, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2). But the + object of hope and of pleasure is good. Therefore good is also the object of anger. +
[35473] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 2 s. c. 1 Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in II Confess., quod ira appetit +vindictam. Sed appetitus vindictae est appetitus boni, cum vindicta +ad iustitiam pertineat. Ergo obiectum irae est bonum.
[35474] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 2 s. c. 2 Praeterea, +ira semper est cum spe, unde et delectationem causat, ut dicit +philosophus, in II Rhetoric. Sed spei et delectationis obiectum est +bonum. Ergo et irae.
+ I answer that, The movement of the appetitive power follows an act of the apprehensive power. Now the apprehensive power apprehends a thing + in two ways. First, by way of an incomplex object, as when we understand what a man is; secondly, by way of a complex object, + as when we understand that whiteness is in a man. Consequently in each of these ways the appetitive power can tend to both + good and evil: by way of a simple and incomplex object, when the appetite simply follows + and adheres to good, or recoils from evil: and such movements are desire, hope, pleasure, sorrow, and so forth: by way of + a complex object, as when the appetite is concerned with some good or evil being in, or being done to, another, either seeking + this or recoiling from it. This is evident in the case of love and hatred: for we love someone, in so far as we wish some + good to be in him; and we hate someone, in so far as we wish some evil to be in him. It is the same with anger; for when a + man + is angry, he wishes to be avenged on someone. Hence the movement of anger has a twofold tendency: viz. to vengeance itself, + which it desires and hopes for as being a good, wherefore it takes pleasure in it; and to the person on whom it seeks vengeance, + as to something contrary and hurtful, which bears the character of evil. +
We must, however, observe a twofold difference in this respect, between anger on the one side, and hatred and love on the + other. The first difference is that anger always regards two objects: whereas love and hatred sometimes regard but one object, + as when a man is said to love wine or something of the kind, or to hate it. The second difference is, that both the objects + of love are good: since the lover wishes good to someone, as to something agreeable to himself: while both the + objects of hatred bear the character of evil: for the man who hates, wishes evil to someone, as to something disagreeable + to him. Whereas anger regards one object under the aspect of evil, viz. the noxious person, on whom it seeks to be avenged. + Consequently it is a passion somewhat made up of contrary passions. +
[35475] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod motus appetitivae virtutis sequitur actum virtutis +apprehensivae. Vis autem apprehensiva dupliciter aliquid +apprehendit, uno modo, per modum incomplexi, sicut cum intelligimus +quid est homo; alio modo, per modum complexi, sicut cum +intelligimus album inesse homini. Unde utroque modo vis appetitiva +potest tendere in bonum et malum. Per modum quidem simplicis et +incomplexi, cum appetitus simpliciter sequitur vel inhaeret bono, +vel refugit malum. Et tales motus sunt desiderium et spes, +delectatio et tristitia, et alia huiusmodi. Per modum autem +complexi, sicut cum appetitus fertur in hoc quod aliquod bonum vel +malum insit vel fiat circa alterum, vel tendendo in hoc, vel +refugiendo ab hoc. Sicut manifeste apparet in amore et odio, amamus +enim aliquem, inquantum volumus ei inesse aliquod bonum; odimus +autem aliquem, inquantum volumus ei inesse aliquod malum. Et +similiter est in ira, quicumque enim irascitur, quaerit vindicari +de aliquo. Et sic motus irae tendit in duo, scilicet in ipsam +vindictam, quam appetit et sperat sicut quoddam bonum, unde et de +ipsa delectatur, tendit etiam in illum de quo quaerit vindictam, +sicut in contrarium et nocivum, quod pertinet ad rationem mali. Est +tamen duplex differentia attendenda circa hoc, irae ad odium et ad +amorem. Quarum prima est, quod ira semper respicit duo obiecta, +amor vero et odium quandoque respiciunt unum obiectum tantum, sicut +cum dicitur aliquis amare vinum vel aliquid huiusmodi, aut etiam +odire. Secunda est, quia utrumque obiectorum quod respicit amor, +est bonum, vult enim amans bonum alicui, tanquam sibi convenienti. +Utrumque vero eorum quae respicit odium, habet rationem mali, vult +enim odiens malum alicui, tamquam cuidam inconvenienti. Sed ira +respicit unum obiectum secundum rationem boni, scilicet vindictam, +quam appetit, et aliud secundum rationem mali, scilicet hominem +nocivum, de quo vult vindicari. Et ideo est passio quodammodo +composita ex contrariis passionibus.
Reply to objections: This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
[35476] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 2 ad arg. Et per hoc +patet responsio ad obiecta.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that anger is in the concupiscible faculty. For Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that anger is a kind of + "desire." But desire is in the concupiscible faculty. Therefore anger is too. +
[35477] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira sit in concupiscibili. Dicit enim +Tullius, in IV de Tusculanis quaest., quod ira est libido quaedam. +Sed libido est in concupiscibili. Ergo et ira.
+ Objection 2: Further, Augustine says in his Rule, that "anger grows into hatred": and Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that "hatred + is inveterate anger." But hatred, like love, is a concupiscible passion. Therefore anger is in the concupiscible faculty. +
[35478] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in regula, quod ira crescit in odium. Et Tullius +dicit, in eodem libro, quod odium est ira inveterata. Sed odium est +in concupiscibili, sicut amor. Ergo ira est in concupiscibili.
+ Objection 3: Further, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.] say that "anger is made up + of sorrow and desire." Both of these are in the concupiscible faculty. Therefore anger is a concupiscible passion. +
[35479] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +Damascenus et Gregorius Nyssenus dicunt quod ira componitur ex +tristitia et desiderio. Sed utrumque horum est in concupiscibili. +Ergo ira est in concupiscibili.
+ On the contrary, The concupiscible is distinct from the irascible faculty. If, therefore, anger were in the concupiscible power, the irascible + would not take its name from it. +
[35480] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra, +vis concupiscibilis est alia ab irascibili. Si igitur ira esset in +concupiscibili, non denominaretur ab ea vis irascibilis.
+ I answer that, As stated above (Q[23], A[1]), the passions of the irascible part differ from the passions of the concupiscible faculty, + in that the objects of the concupiscible passions are good and evil absolutely considered, whereas the objects of the irascible + passions are good and evil in a certain elevation or arduousness. Now it has been stated + (A[2]) that anger regards two objects: viz. the vengeance that it seeks; and the person on whom it + seeks vengeance; and in respect of both, anger requires a certain arduousness: for the movement of anger does not arise, unless + there be some magnitude about both these objects; since "we make no ado about things that are naught or very minute," as the + Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 2). It is therefore evident that anger is not in the concupiscible, but in the irascible faculty. +
[35481] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, passiones irascibilis in hoc +differunt a passionibus concupiscibilis, quod obiecta passionum +concupiscibilis sunt bonum et malum absolute; obiecta autem +passionum irascibilis sunt bonum et malum cum quadam elevatione vel +arduitate. Dictum est autem quod ira respicit duo obiecta, scilicet +vindictam, quam appetit; et eum de quo vindictam quaerit. Et circa +utrumque quandam arduitatem ira requirit, non enim insurgit motus +irae, nisi aliqua magnitudine circa utrumque existente; +quaecumque enim nihil sunt, aut modica valde nullo digna +aestimamus, ut dicit philosophus, in II Rhetoric. Unde +manifestum est quod ira non est in concupiscibili, sed in +irascibili.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Cicero gives the name of desire to any kind of craving for a future good, without discriminating between that which is arduous + and that which is not. Accordingly he reckons anger as a kind of desire, inasmuch as it is a desire of vengeance. In this + sense, however, desire is common to the irascible and concupiscible faculties. +
[35482] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Tullius libidinem nominat appetitum cuiuscumque +boni futuri non habita discretione ardui vel non ardui. Et secundum +hoc, ponit iram sub libidine, inquantum est appetitus vindictae. +Sic autem libido communis est ad irascibilem et +concupiscibilem.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Anger is said to grow into hatred, not as though the same passion which at first was anger, afterwards becomes hatred by + becoming inveterate; but by a process of causality. For anger when it lasts a long time engenders hatred. +
[35483] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod ira dicitur crescere in odium, non quod eadem numero +passio quae prius fuit ira, postmodum fiat odium per quandam +inveterationem, sed per quandam causalitatem. Ira enim, per +diuturnitatem, causat odium.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Anger is said to be composed of sorrow and desire, not as though they were its parts, but because they are its causes: and + it has been said above ( + Q[25], A[2]) that the concupiscible passions are the causes of the irascible passions. +
[35484] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ira dicitur componi ex tristitia et desiderio, non +sicut ex partibus, sed sicut ex causis. Dictum est autem supra quod +passiones concupiscibilis sunt causae passionum irascibilis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that anger does not require an act of reason. For, since anger is a passion, it is in the sensitive appetite. + But the sensitive appetite follows an apprehension, not of reason, but of the sensitive faculty. Therefore anger does not + require an act of reason. +
[35485] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non sit cum ratione. Ira enim, cum +sit passio quaedam, est in appetitu sensitivo. Sed appetitus +sensitivus non sequitur rationis apprehensionem, sed sensitivae +partis. Ergo ira non est cum ratione.
+ Objection 2: Further, dumb animals are devoid of reason: and yet they are seen to be angry. Therefore anger does not require an act of + reason. +
[35486] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +animalia bruta carent ratione. Et tamen in eis invenitur ira. Ergo +ira non est cum ratione.
+ Objection 3: Further, drunkenness fetters the reason; whereas it is conducive to anger. Therefore anger does not require an act of reason. +
[35487] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +ebrietas ligat rationem. Adiuvat autem ad iram. Ergo ira non est +cum ratione.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger listens to reason somewhat." +
[35488] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod ira consequitur +rationem aliqualiter.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[2]), anger is a desire for vengeance. Now vengeance implies a comparison between the punishment to be inflicted and the hurt + done; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger, as if it had drawn the inference that it ought to quarrel + with such a person, is therefore immediately exasperated." Now to compare and to draw an inference is an act of reason. Therefore + anger, in a fashion, requires an act of + reason. +
[35489] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ira est appetitus vindictae. +Haec autem collationem importat poenae infligendae ad nocumentum +sibi illatum, unde, in VII Ethic., dicit philosophus quod +syllogizans quoniam oportet talem oppugnare, irascitur +confestim. Conferre autem et syllogizare est rationis. Et ideo +ira est quodammodo cum ratione.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The movement of the appetitive power may follow an act of reason in two ways. In the first way, it follows the reason in + so far as the reason commands: and thus the will follows reason, wherefore it is called the rational appetite. In another + way, it follows reason in so far as the reason denounces, and thus anger follows reason. For the Philosopher says (De Problem. + xxviii, 3) that "anger follows reason, not in obedience to reason's command, but as a + result of reason's denouncing the injury." Because the sensitive appetite is subject to the reason, not immediately but through + the will. +
[35490] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod motus appetitivae virtutis potest esse cum +ratione dupliciter. Uno modo, cum ratione praecipiente, et sic +voluntas est cum ratione; unde et dicitur appetitus rationalis. +Alio modo, cum ratione denuntiante, et sic ira est cum ratione. +Dicit enim philosophus, in libro de Problemat., quod ira est cum +ratione, non sicut praecipiente ratione, sed ut manifestante +iniuriam. Appetitus enim sensitivus immediate rationi non +obedit, sed mediante voluntate.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Dumb animals have a natural instinct imparted to them by the Divine Reason, in virtue of which they are gifted with movements, + both internal and external, like unto rational movements, as stated above ( + Q[40], A[3]). +
[35491] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod bruta animalia habent instinctum naturalem ex divina +ratione eis inditum, per quem habent motus interiores et exteriores +similes motibus rationis, sicut supra dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: As stated in Ethic. vii, 6, "anger listens somewhat to reason" in so far as reason denounces the injury inflicted, "but listens + not perfectly," because it does not observe the rule of reason as to the measure of vengeance. Anger, therefore, requires + an act of reason; and yet proves a hindrance to reason. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Problem. iii, 2,27) that whose + who are very drunk, so as to be incapable of the use of reason, do not get angry: + but those who are slightly drunk, do get angry, through being still able, though hampered, to form a judgment of reason. +
[35492] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in VII Ethic., ira audit aliqualiter +rationem, sicut nuntiantem quod iniuriatum est ei, sed non perfecte +audit, quia non observat regulam rationis in rependendo vindictam. +Ad iram ergo requiritur aliquis actus rationis; et additur +impedimentum rationis. Unde philosophus dicit, in libro de +Problemat., quod illi qui sunt multum ebrii, tanquam nihil habentes +de iudicio rationis, non irascuntur, sed quando sunt parum ebrii, +irascuntur, tanquam habentes iudicium rationis, sed impeditum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not more natural than desire. Because it is proper to man to be by nature a gentle animal. But + "gentleness is contrary to anger," as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 3). Therefore anger is no more natural than desire, + in fact it seems to be altogether unnatural to man. +
[35493] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non sit naturalior quam +concupiscentia. Proprium enim hominis dicitur quod sit animal +mansuetum natura. Sed mansuetudo opponitur irae, ut dicit +philosophus, in II Rhetoric. Ergo ira non est naturalior quam +concupiscentia, sed omnino videtur esse contra hominis naturam.
+ Objection 2: Further, reason is contrasted with nature: since those things that act according to reason, are not said to act according + to nature. Now "anger requires an act of reason, but desire does not," as stated in Ethic. vii, 6. Therefore desire is more + natural than anger. +
[35494] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +ratio contra naturam dividitur, ea enim quae secundum rationem +agunt, non dicimus secundum naturam agere. Sed ira est cum ratione, +concupiscentia autem sine ratione, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Ergo +concupiscentia est naturalior quam ira.
+ Objection 3: Further, anger is a craving for vengeance: while desire is a craving for those things especially which are pleasant to the + touch, viz. for pleasures of the table and for sexual pleasures. But these things are more natural to man than vengeance. + Therefore desire is more natural than anger. +
[35495] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +ira est appetitus vindictae, concupiscentia autem maxime est +appetitus delectabilium secundum tactum, scilicet ciborum et +venereorum. Haec autem sunt magis naturalia homini quam vindicta. +Ergo concupiscentia est naturalior quam ira.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger is more natural than desire." +
[35496] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod ira est +naturalior quam concupiscentia.
+ I answer that, By "natural" we mean that which is caused by nature, as stated in Phys. ii, 1. Consequently the question as to whether a + particular passion is more or less natural cannot be decided without reference to the cause of that passion. Now the cause + of a passion, as stated above ( + Q[36], A[2]), may be considered in two ways: first, on the part of the object; secondly, on the part of the subject. If then we consider + the cause of anger and of + desire, on the part of the object, thus desire, especially of pleasures of the table, and of sexual pleasures, is more natural + than anger; in so far as these pleasures are more natural to man than vengeance. +
If, however, we consider the cause of anger on the part of the subject, thus anger, in a manner, is more natural; and, in + a manner, desire is more natural. Because the nature of an individual man may be considered either as to the generic, or as + to the specific nature, or again as to the particular temperament of the individual. If then we consider the generic nature, + i.e. the nature of this man considered as an animal; thus desire is more natural than anger; because it is from + this very generic nature that man is inclined to desire those things which tend to preserve in him the life both of the species + and of the individual. If, however, we consider the specific nature, i.e. the nature of this man as a rational being; then + anger is more natural to man than desire, in so far as anger follows reason more than desire does. Wherefore the Philosopher + says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "revenge" which pertains to anger "is more natural to man than meekness": for it is natural to + everything to rise up against things contrary and hurtful. And if we consider the nature of the individual, in respect of + his particular temperament, thus anger is more natural than desire; for the reason that anger is prone to ensue from the natural + tendency to anger, more than desire, or any other passion, is to ensue from a natural tendency to desire, which tendencies + result from a man's individual temperament. Because disposition to anger is due to a bilious temperament; and of all the + humors, the bile moves quickest; for it is like fire. Consequently he that is temperamentally disposed to anger is sooner + incensed with anger, than he that is temperamentally disposed to desire, is inflamed with desire: and for this reason the + Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that a disposition to anger is more liable to be transmitted from parent to child, than a + disposition to desire. +
[35497] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod naturale dicitur illud quod causatur a natura, ut +patet in II Physic. Unde utrum aliqua passio sit magis vel minus +naturalis, considerari non potest nisi ex causa sua. Causa autem +passionis, ut supra dictum est, dupliciter accipi potest, uno modo, +ex parte obiecti; alio modo, ex parte subiecti. Si ergo +consideretur causa irae et concupiscentiae ex parte obiecti, sic +concupiscentia, et maxime ciborum et venereorum, naturalior est +quam ira, inquantum ista sunt magis naturalia quam vindicta. Si +autem consideretur causa irae ex parte subiecti, sic quodammodo ira +est naturalior, et quodammodo concupiscentia. Potest enim natura +alicuius hominis considerari vel secundum naturam generis, vel +secundum naturam speciei, vel secundum complexionem propriam +individui. Si igitur consideretur natura generis, quae est natura +huius hominis inquantum est animal; sic naturalior est +concupiscentia quam ira, quia ex ipsa natura communi habet homo +quandam inclinationem ad appetendum ea quae sunt conservativa +vitae, vel secundum speciem vel secundum individuum. Si autem +consideremus naturam hominis ex parte speciei, scilicet inquantum +est rationalis; sic ira est magis naturalis homini quam +concupiscentia, inquantum ira est cum ratione magis quam +concupiscentia. Unde philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod humanius +est punire, quod pertinet ad iram, quam mansuetum esse, unumquodque +enim naturaliter insurgit contra contraria et nociva. Si vero +consideretur natura huius individui secundum propriam complexionem, +sic ira naturalior est quam concupiscentia, quia scilicet +habitudinem naturalem ad irascendum, quae est ex complexione, magis +de facili sequitur ira, quam concupiscentia vel aliqua alia passio. +Est enim homo dispositus ad irascendum, secundum quod habet +cholericam complexionem, cholera autem, inter alios humores, citius +movetur; assimilatur enim igni. Et ideo magis est in promptu ut +ille qui est dispositus secundum naturalem complexionem ad iram, +irascatur; quam de eo qui est dispositus ad concupiscendum, quod +concupiscat. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod +ira magis traducitur a parentibus in filios, quam +concupiscentia.
+ Reply to Objection 1: We may consider in man both the natural temperament on the part of the body, and the reason. On the part of the bodily temperament, + a man, considered specifically, does not naturally excel others either in anger or in any other passion, on account of the + moderation of his temperament. But other animals, for as much as their temperament recedes from this moderation and approaches + to an extreme disposition, are naturally disposed to some excess of + passion, such as the lion in daring, the hound in anger, the hare in fear, and so forth. On the part of reason, however, it + is natural to man, both to be angry and to be gentle: in so far as reason somewhat causes anger, by denouncing the injury + which causes anger; and somewhat appeases anger, in so far as the angry man "does not listen perfectly to the command of reason," + as stated above (A[4], ad 3). +
[35498] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod in homine considerari potest et naturalis +complexio ex parte corporis, quae est temperata; et ipsa ratio. Ex +parte igitur complexionis corporalis, naturaliter homo, secundum +suam speciem, est non habens superexcellentiam neque irae neque +alicuius alterius passionis, propter temperamentum suae +complexionis. Alia vero animalia, secundum quod recedunt ab hac +qualitate complexionis ad dispositionem alicuius complexionis +extremae, secundum hoc etiam naturaliter disponuntur ad excessum +alicuius passionis, ut leo ad audaciam, canis ad iram, lepus ad +timorem, et sic de aliis. Ex parte vero rationis, est naturale +homini et irasci et mansuetum esse, secundum quod ratio quodammodo +causat iram, inquantum nuntiat causam irae; et quodammodo sedat +iram, inquantum iratus non totaliter audit imperium rationis, ut +supra dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Reason itself belongs to the nature of man: wherefore from the very fact that anger requires an act of reason, it follows + that it is, in a manner, natural to man. +
[35499] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod ipsa ratio pertinet ad naturam hominis. Unde ex hoc +ipso quod ira est cum ratione, sequitur quod secundum aliquem modum +sit homini naturalis.
+ Reply to Objection 3: This argument regards anger and desire on the part of the object. +
[35500] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de ira et concupiscentia, ex +parte obiecti.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that anger is more grievous than hatred. For it is written ( + Prov. 27:4) that "anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth." But hatred sometimes has mercy. Therefore anger is more grievous + than hatred. +
[35501] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira sit gravior quam odium. Dicitur +enim Prov. XXVII, quod ira non habet misericordiam, nec erumpens +furor. Odium autem quandoque habet misericordiam. Ergo ira est +gravior quam odium.
+ Objection 2: Further, it is worse to suffer evil and to grieve for it, than merely to suffer it. But when a man hates, he is contented + if the object of his hatred suffer evil: whereas the angry man is not satisfied unless the object of his anger know it and + be aggrieved thereby, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4). Therefore, anger is more grievous than hatred. +
[35502] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, +maius est pati malum et de malo dolere, quam simpliciter pati. Sed +illi qui habet aliquem odio, sufficit quod ille quem odit, patiatur +malum, irato autem non sufficit, sed quaerit quod cognoscat illud +et de illo doleat, ut dicit philosophus, in II Rhetoric. Ergo ira +est gravior quam odium.
+ Objection 3: Further, a thing seems to be so much the more firm according as more things concur to set it up: thus a habit is all the + more settled through being caused by several acts. But anger is caused by the concurrence of several passions, as stated above + + (A[1]): whereas hatred is not. Therefore anger is more settled and more grievous than hatred. +
[35503] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, +quanto ad constitutionem alicuius plura concurrunt, tanto videtur +esse stabilius, sicut habitus permanentior est qui ex pluribus +actibus causatur. Sed ira causatur ex concursu plurium passionum, +ut supra dictum est, non autem odium. Ergo ira est stabilior et +gravior quam odium.
+ On the contrary, Augustine, in his Rule, compares hatred to "a beam," but anger to "a mote." +
[35504] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus, in regula, odium comparat trabi, iram vero +festucae.
+ I answer that, The species and nature of a passion are taken from its object. Now the object of anger is the same in substance as the object + of hatred; since, just as the hater wishes evil to him whom he hates, so does the angry man wish evil to him with whom he + is angry. But there is a difference of aspect: for the hater wishes evil to his enemy, as evil, whereas the angry man wishes + evil to him with whom he is angry, not as evil but in so far as it has an aspect of good, + that is, in so far as he reckons it as just, since it is a means of vengeance. Wherefore also it has been said above + (A[2]) that hatred implies application of evil to evil, whereas anger denotes application of good to evil. Now it is evident that + to seek evil under the aspect of justice, is a lesser evil, than simply to seek evil to someone. Because to wish evil to someone + under the aspect of justice, may be according to the virtue of justice, if it be in conformity + with the order of reason; and anger fails only in this, that it does not obey the precept of reason in taking vengeance. Consequently + it is evident that hatred is far worse and graver than anger. +
[35505] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 6 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod species passionis, et ratio ipsius, ex obiecto +pensatur. Est autem obiectum irae et odii idem subiecto, nam sicut +odiens appetit malum ei quem odit, ita iratus ei contra quem +irascitur. Sed non eadem ratione, sed odiens appetit malum inimici, +inquantum est malum; iratus autem appetit malum eius contra quem +irascitur, non inquantum est malum, sed inquantum habet quandam +rationem boni, scilicet prout aestimat illud esse iustum, inquantum +est vindicativum. Unde etiam supra dictum est quod odium est per +applicationem mali ad malum; ira autem per applicationem boni ad +malum. Manifestum est autem quod appetere malum sub ratione iusti, +minus habet de ratione mali quam velle malum alicuius simpliciter. +Velle enim malum alicuius sub ratione iusti, potest esse etiam +secundum virtutem iustitiae, si praecepto rationis obtemperetur, +sed ira in hoc solum deficit, quod non obedit rationis praecepto in +ulciscendo. Unde manifestum est quod odium est multo deterius et +gravius quam ira.
+ Reply to Objection 1: In anger and hatred two points may be considered: namely, the thing desired, and the intensity of the desire. As to the thing + desired, anger has more mercy than hatred has. For since hatred desires another's evil for evil's sake, it is satisfied with + no particular measure of evil: because those things that are desired for their own sake, are desired without measure, as the + Philosopher states (Polit. i, 3), instancing a miser with regard to riches. + Hence it is written ( + Ecclus. 12:16): "An enemy . . . if he find an opportunity, will not be satisfied with blood." Anger, on the other hand, seeks evil only + under the aspect of a just means of vengeance. Consequently when the evil inflicted goes beyond the measure of justice according + to the estimate of the angry man, then he has mercy. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "the angry man is appeased + if many evils befall, whereas the hater is never + appeased." +
As to the intensity of the desire, anger excludes mercy more than hatred does; because the movement of anger is more impetuous, + through the heating of the bile. Hence the passage quoted continues: "Who can bear the violence of one provoked?" +
[35506] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod in ira et odio duo possunt considerari, scilicet +ipsum quod desideratur, et intensio desiderii. Quantum igitur ad id +quod desideratur, ira habet magis misericordiam quam odium. Quia +enim odium appetit malum alterius secundum se, nulla mensura mali +satiatur, ea enim quae secundum se appetuntur, sine mensura +appetuntur, ut philosophus dicit I Politic., sicut avarus divitias. +Unde dicitur Eccli. XII, inimicus si invenerit tempus, non +satiabitur sanguine. Sed ira non appetit malum nisi sub ratione +iusti vindicativi. Unde quando malum illatum excedit mensuram +iustitiae, secundum aestimationem irascentis, tunc miseretur. Unde +philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod iratus, si fiant multa, +miserebitur, odiens autem pro nullo. Quantum vero ad +intensionem desiderii, ira magis excludit misericordiam quam odium, +quia motus irae est impetuosior, propter cholerae inflammationem. +Unde statim subditur, impetum concitati spiritus ferre quis +poterit?
+ Reply to Objection 2: As stated above, an angry man wishes evil to someone, in so far as this evil is a means of just vengeance. Now vengeance + is wrought by the infliction of a punishment: and the nature of punishment consists in being contrary to the will, painful, + and inflicted for some fault. Consequently an angry man desires this, that the person whom he is hurting, may feel it and + be in pain, and know that this has befallen him on account of the harm he has done the + other. The hater, on the other hand, cares not for all this, since he desires another's evil as such. It is not true, however, + that an evil is worse through giving pain: because "injustice and imprudence, although evil," yet, being voluntary, "do not + grieve those in whom they are," as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 4). +
[35507] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, iratus appetit malum alicuius, +inquantum habet rationem iusti vindicativi. Vindicta autem fit per +illationem poenae. Est autem de ratione poenae quod sit contraria +voluntati, et quod sit afflictiva, et quod pro aliqua culpa +inferatur. Et ideo iratus hoc appetit, ut ille cui nocumentum +infert, percipiat, et doleat, et quod cognoscat propter iniuriam +illatam sibi hoc provenire. Sed odiens de hoc nihil curat, quia +appetit malum alterius inquantum huiusmodi. Non est autem verum +quod id de quo quis tristatur, sit peius, iniustitia enim et +imprudentia, cum sint mala, quia tamen sunt voluntaria, non +contristant eos quibus insunt, ut dicit philosophus, in II +Rhetoric.
+ Reply to Objection 3: That which proceeds from several causes, is more settled when these causes are of one kind: but it may be that one cause + prevails over many others. Now hatred ensues from a more lasting cause than anger does. Because anger arises from an emotion + of the soul due to the wrong inflicted; whereas hatred ensues from a disposition in a man, by reason of which he considers + that which he hates to be contrary and hurtful to him. Consequently, as passion is + more transitory than disposition or habit, so anger is less lasting than hatred; although hatred itself is a passion ensuing + from this disposition. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "hatred is more incurable than anger." +
[35508] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod id quod ex pluribus causis causatur, tunc est +stabilius, quando causae accipiuntur unius rationis, sed una causa +potest praevalere multis aliis. Odium autem provenit ex +permanentiori causa quam ira. Nam ira provenit ex aliqua commotione +animi propter laesionem illatam, sed odium procedit ex aliqua +dispositione hominis, secundum quam reputat sibi contrarium et +nocivum id quod odit. Et ideo sicut passio citius transit quam +dispositio vel habitus, ita ira citius transit quam odium; quamvis +etiam odium sit passio ex tali dispositione proveniens. Et propter +hoc philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod odium est magis +insanabile quam ira.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not only towards those to whom one has an obligation of justice. For there is no justice between + man and irrational beings. And yet sometimes one is angry with irrational beings; thus, out of anger, a writer throws away + his pen, or a rider strikes his horse. Therefore anger is not only towards those to whom one has an obligation of justice. +
[35509] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non solum sit ad illos ad quos est +iustitia. Non enim est iustitia hominis ad res irrationales. Sed +tamen homo quandoque irascitur rebus irrationalibus, puta cum +scriptor ex ira proiicit pennam, vel eques percutit equum. Ergo ira +non solum est ad illos ad quos est iustitia.
+ Objection 2: Further, "there is no justice towards oneself . . . nor is there justice towards one's own" (Ethic. v, 6). But sometimes + a man is angry with himself; for instance, a penitent, on account of his sin; hence it is written ( + Ps. 4:5): "Be ye angry and sin not." Therefore anger is not only towards those with whom one has a relation of justice. +
[35510] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 7 arg. 2 +Praeterea, non est iustitia hominis ad seipsum, nec ad ea quae +sui ipsius sunt, ut dicitur in V Ethic. Sed homo quandoque sibi +ipsi irascitur, sicut poenitens propter peccatum, unde dicitur in +Psalmo IV, irascimini, et nolite peccare. Ergo ira non solum +est ad quos est iustitia.
+ Objection 3: Further, justice and injustice can be of one man towards an entire class, or a whole community: for instance, when the state + injures an individual. But anger is not towards a class but only towards an individual, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, + 4). Therefore properly speaking, anger is not towards those with whom one is in relation of justice or injustice. +
[35511] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, +iustitia et iniustitia potest esse alicuius ad totum aliquod genus, +vel ad totam aliquam communitatem, puta cum civitas aliquem laesit. +Sed ira non est ad aliquod genus, sed solum ad aliquod singularium, +ut dicit philosophus, in II Rhetoric. Ergo ira non proprie est ad +quos est iustitia et iniustitia.
The contrary, however, may be gathered from the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 2,3).
[35512] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 7 s. c. Sed +contrarium accipi potest a philosopho in II Rhetoric.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[6]), anger desires evil as being a means of just vengeance. Consequently, anger is towards those to whom we are just or unjust: + since vengeance is an act of justice, and wrong-doing is an act of injustice. Therefore both on the part of the cause, viz. + the harm done by another, and on the part of the vengeance sought by the angry man, it is evident that anger concerns those + to whom one is just or unjust. +
[35513] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 7 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ira appetit malum, inquantum +habet rationem iusti vindicativi. Et ideo ad eosdem est ira, ad +quos est iustitia et iniustitia. Nam inferre vindictam ad iustitiam +pertinet, laedere autem aliquem pertinet ad iniustitiam. Unde tam +ex parte causae, quae est laesio illata ab altero; quam etiam ex +parte vindictae, quam appetit iratus; manifestum est quod ad eosdem +pertinet ira, ad quos iustitia et iniustitia.
+ Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[4], ad 2), anger, though it follows an act of reason, can nevertheless be in dumb animals that are devoid + of reason, in so far as through their natural instinct they are moved by their imagination to something like rational action. + Since then in man there is both reason and imagination, the movement of anger can be aroused in man in two ways. First, when + only his imagination denounces the injury: and, in this way, man is aroused to + a movement of anger even against irrational and inanimate beings, which movement is like that which occurs in animals against + anything that injures them. Secondly, by the reason denouncing the injury: and thus, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, + 3), "it is impossible to be angry with insensible things, or with the dead": both because they feel no pain, which is, above + all, what the angry man seeks in those with whom he is angry: and because there is no question of vengeance on them, since + they can do us no harm. +
[35514] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ira, quamvis sit cum +ratione, potest tamen etiam esse in brutis animalibus, quae ratione +carent, inquantum naturali instinctu per imaginationem moventur ad +aliquid simile operibus rationis. Sic igitur, cum in homine sit et +ratio et imaginatio, dupliciter in homine potest motus irae +insurgere. Uno modo, ex sola imaginatione nuntiante laesionem. Et +sic insurgit aliquis motus irae etiam ad res irrationales et +inanimatas, secundum similitudinem illius motus qui est in +animalibus contra quodlibet nocivum. Alio modo, ex ratione +nuntiante laesionem. Et sic, ut philosophus dicit II Rhetoric., +nullo modo potest esse ira ad res insensibiles, neque ad +mortuos. Tum quia non dolent, quod maxime quaerunt irati in eis +quibus irascuntur. Tum etiam quia non est ad eos vindicta, cum +eorum non sit iniuriam facere.
+ Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 11), "metaphorically speaking there is a certain justice and injustice between a man and + himself," in so far as the reason rules the irascible and concupiscible parts of the soul. And in this sense a man is said + to be avenged on himself, and consequently, to be angry with himself. But properly, and in accordance with the nature of things, + a man is never angry with himself. +
[35515] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in V Ethic., quaedam +metaphorica iustitia et iniustitia est hominis ad seipsum, +inquantum scilicet ratio regit irascibilem et concupiscibilem. Et +secundum hoc etiam homo dicitur de seipso vindictam facere, et per +consequens sibi ipsi irasci. Proprie autem et per se, non contingit +aliquem sibi ipsi irasci.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 4) assigns as one difference between hatred and anger, that "hatred may be felt towards a class, + as we hate the entire class of thieves; whereas anger is directed only towards an individual." The reason is that hatred arises + from our considering a quality as disagreeing with our disposition; and this may refer to a thing in general or in particular. + Anger, on the other hand, ensues from someone having injured us by his + action. Now all actions are the deeds of individuals: and consequently anger is always pointed at an individual. When the + whole state hurts us, the whole state is reckoned as one individual [*Cf. + Q[29], A[6]]. +
[35516] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod philosophus, in II Rhetoric., assignat unam +differentiam inter odium et iram, quod odium potest esse ad +aliquod genus, sicut habemus odio omne latronum genus, sed ira non +est nisi ad aliquod singulare. Cuius ratio est, quia odium +causatur ex hoc quod qualitas alicuius rei apprehenditur ut +dissonans nostrae dispositioni, et hoc potest esse vel in +universali, vel in particulari. Sed ira causatur ex hoc quod +aliquis nos laesit per suum actum. Actus autem omnes sunt +singularium. Et ideo ira semper est circa aliquod singulare. Cum +autem tota civitas nos laeserit, tota civitas computatur sicut unum +singulare.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) unsuitably assigns three species of anger---"wrath," "ill-will" and "rancor." + For no genus derives its specific differences from accidents. But these three are diversified in respect of an accident: because + "the beginning of the movement of anger is called wrath {cholos}, if anger continue it is called ill-will {menis}; while rancor + {kotos} is anger waiting for an opportunity of vengeance." Therefore these + are not different species of anger. +
[35517] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod Damascenus inconvenienter assignet +tres species irae, scilicet fel, maniam et furorem. Nullius enim +generis species diversificantur secundum aliquod accidens. Sed ista +tria diversificantur secundum aliquod accidens, principium enim +motus irae fel vocatur; ira autem permanens dicitur mania; furor +autem est ira observans tempus in vindictam. Ergo non sunt +diversae species irae.
+ Objection 2: Further, Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that "excandescentia [irascibility] is what the Greeks call {thymosis}, and + is a kind of anger that arises and subsides intermittently"; while according to Damascene {thymosis}, is the same as the Greek + {kotos} [rancor]. Therefore {kotos} does not bide its time for taking vengeance, but in course of time spends itself. +
[35518] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Tullius, in IV de Tusculanis quaest., dicit quod excandescentia +Graece dicitur thymosis; et est ira modo nascens et modo +desistens. Thymosis autem secundum Damascenum, est idem quod +furor. Non ergo furor tempus quaerit ad vindictam, sed tempore +deficit.
+ Objection 3: Further, Gregory (Moral. xxi, 4) gives three degrees of anger, namely, "anger without utterance, anger with utterance, and + anger with perfection of speech," corresponding to the three degrees mentioned by Our Lord ( + Mat. 5:22): "Whosoever is angry with his brother" [thus implying "anger without utterance"], and then, "whosoever shall say to his + brother, 'Raca'" [implying "anger with utterance yet without full expression"], and lastly, + "whosoever shall say 'Thou fool'" [where we have "perfection of speech"]. Therefore Damascene's division is imperfect, since + it takes no account of utterance. +
[35519] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, +Gregorius, XXI Moral., ponit tres gradus irae, scilicet iram +sine voce, et iram cum voce, et iram cum verbo expresso, +secundum illa tria quae dominus ponit Matth. V, qui irascitur +fratri suo, ubi tangitur ira sine voce; et postea subdit, qui +dixerit fratri suo, raca, ubi tangitur ira cum voce, sed necdum +pleno verbo formata; et postea dicit, qui autem dixerit fratri suo, +fatue, ubi expletur vox perfectione sermonis. Ergo insufficienter +divisit Damascenus iram, nihil ponens ex parte vocis.
+ On the contrary, stands the authority of Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.]. +
[35520] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra +est auctoritas Damasceni et Gregorii Nysseni.
+ I answer that, The species of anger given by Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa are taken from those things which give increase to anger. This + happens in three ways. First from facility of the movement itself, and he calls this kind of anger {cholos} [bile] because + it quickly aroused. Secondly, on the part of the grief that causes anger, and which dwells some time in the memory; this belongs + to {menis} [ill-will] which is derived from {menein} [to dwell]. Thirdly, on the part + of that which the angry man seeks, viz. vengeance; and this pertains to {kotos} [rancor] which never rests until it is avenged + [* + Eph. 4:31: "Let all bitterness and anger and indignation . . . be put away from you."]. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) calls + some angry persons {akrocholoi} [choleric], because they are easily angered; some he calls {pikroi} [bitter], because they + retain their anger for a long time; and some he calls {chalepoi} [ill-tempered], because they + never rest until they have retaliated [*Cf. + SS, Q[158], A[5]]. +
[35521] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 8 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod tres species irae quas Damascenus ponit, et etiam +Gregorius Nyssenus, sumuntur secundum ea quae dant irae aliquod +augmentum. Quod quidem contingit tripliciter. Uno modo, ex +facilitate ipsius motus, et talem iram vocat fel, quia cito +accenditur. Alio modo, ex parte tristitiae causantis iram, quae diu +in memoria manet, et haec pertinet ad maniam, quae a manendo +dicitur. Tertio, ex parte eius quod iratus appetit, scilicet +vindictae, et haec pertinet ad furorem, qui nunquam quiescit donec +puniat. Unde philosophus, in IV Ethic., quosdam irascentium vocat +acutos, quia cito irascuntur; quosdam amaros, quia diu retinent +iram; quosdam difficiles, quia nunquam quiescunt nisi puniant.
+ Reply to Objection 1: All those things which give anger some kind of perfection are not altogether accidental to anger; and consequently nothing + prevents them from causing a certain specific difference thereof. +
[35522] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod omnia illa per quae ira recipit aliquam +perfectionem, non omnino per accidens se habent ad iram. Et ideo +nihil prohibet secundum ea species irae assignari.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Irascibility, which Cicero mentions, seems to pertain to the first species of anger, which consists in a certain quickness + of temper, rather than to rancor [furor]. And there is no reason why the Greek {thymosis}, which is denoted by the Latin "furor," + should not signify both quickness to anger, and firmness of purpose in being avenged. +
[35523] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod excandescentia, quam Tullius ponit, magis videtur +pertinere ad primam speciem irae, quae perficitur secundum +velocitatem irae, quam ad furorem. Nihil autem prohibet ut thymosis +Graece, quod Latine furor dicitur, utrumque importet, et +velocitatem ad irascendum et firmitatem propositi ad puniendum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: These degrees are distinguished according to various effects of anger; and not according to degrees of perfection in the + very movement of anger. +
[35524] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod gradus illi irae distinguuntur secundum effectum +irae, non autem secundum diversam perfectionem ipsius motus +irae.
We must now consider the cause that provokes anger, and its remedies. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the one who is angry?
(2) Whether slight or contempt is the sole motive of anger?
(3) Of the cause of anger on the part of the angry person;
(4) Of the cause of anger on the part of the person with whom one is angry.
+[35525] +Iª-IIae q. 47 pr. Deinde considerandum est de causa +effectiva irae, et de remediis eius. Et circa hoc quaeruntur +quatuor. Primo, utrum semper motivum irae sit aliquid factum contra +eum qui irascitur. Secundo, utrum sola parvipensio vel despectio +sit motivum irae. Tertio, de causa irae ex parte irascentis. +Quarto, de causa irae ex parte eius contra quem aliquis +irascitur.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the motive of anger is not always something done against the one who is angry. Because man, by sinning, + can do nothing against God; since it is written ( + Job 35:6): "If thy iniquities be multiplied, what shalt thou do against Him?" And yet God is spoken of as being angry with man on + account of sin, according to + Ps. 105:40: "The Lord was exceedingly angry with His people." Therefore it is not always on + account of something done against him, that a man is angry. +
[35526] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non semper aliquis irascatur propter +aliquid contra se factum. Homo enim, peccando, nihil contra Deum +facere potest, dicitur enim Iob XXXV, si multiplicatae fuerint +iniquitates tuae, quid facies contra illum? Dicitur tamen Deus +irasci contra homines propter peccata; secundum illud Psalmi CV, +iratus est furore dominus in populum suum. Ergo non semper +aliquis irascitur propter aliquid contra se factum.
+ Objection 2: Further, anger is a desire for vengeance. But one may desire vengeance for things done against others. Therefore we are not + always angry on account of something done against us. +
[35527] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +ira est appetitus vindictae. Sed aliquis appetit vindictam facere +etiam de his quae contra alios fiunt. Ergo non semper motivum irae +est aliquid contra nos factum.
+ Objection 3: Further, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) man is angry especially with those "who despise what he takes a great interest + in; thus men who study philosophy are angry with those who despise philosophy," and so forth. But contempt of philosophy does + not harm the philosopher. Therefore it is not always a harm done to us that makes us angry. +
[35528] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +sicut philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., homines irascuntur +praecipue contra eos qui despiciunt ea circa quae ipsi maxime +student, sicut qui student in philosophia, irascuntur contra eos +qui philosophiam despiciunt, et simile est in aliis. Sed +despicere philosophiam non est nocere ipsi studenti. Non ergo +semper irascimur propter id quod contra nos fit.
+ Objection 4: Further, he that holds his tongue when another insults him, provokes him to greater anger, as Chrysostom observes (Hom. xxii, + in Ep. ad Rom.). But by holding his tongue he does the other no harm. Therefore a man is not always provoked to anger by something + done against him. +
[35529] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, +ille qui tacet contra contumeliantem, magis ipsum ad iram provocat, +ut dicit Chrysostomus. Sed in hoc contra ipsum nihil agit, quod +tacet. Ergo non semper ira alicuius provocatur propter aliquid quod +contra ipsum fit.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is always due to something done to oneself: whereas hatred may arise without + anything being done to us, for we hate a man simply because we think him such." +
[35530] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod ira fit semper +ex his quae ad seipsum. Inimicitia autem et sine his quae ad ipsum, +si enim putemus talem esse odimus.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + Q[46], A[6]), anger is the desire to hurt another for the purpose of just vengeance. Now unless some injury has been done, there is no + question of vengeance: nor does any injury provoke one to vengeance, but only that which is done to the person who seeks vengeance: + for just as everything naturally seeks its own good, so does it naturally repel its own evil. But injury done by anyone does + not affect a man unless in + some way it be something done against him. Consequently the motive of a man's anger is always something done against him. +
[35531] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ira est appetitus nocendi +alteri sub ratione iusti vindicativi. Vindicta autem locum non +habet nisi ubi praecessit iniuria. Nec iniuria omnis ad vindictam +provocat, sed illa sola quae ad eum pertinet qui appetit vindictam, +sicut enim unumquodque naturaliter appetit proprium bonum, ita +etiam naturaliter repellit proprium malum. Iniuria autem ab aliquo +facta non pertinet ad aliquem, nisi aliquid fecerit quod aliquo +modo sit contra ipsum. Unde sequitur quod motivum irae alicuius +semper sit aliquid contra ipsum factum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: We speak of anger in God, not as of a passion of the soul but as of judgment of justice, inasmuch as He wills to take vengeance + on sin. Because the sinner, by sinning, cannot do God any actual harm: but so far as he himself is concerned, he acts against + God in two ways. First, in so far as he despises God in His commandments. Secondly, in so far as he harms himself or another; + which injury redounds to God, inasmuch as the person injured is an object + of God's providence and protection. +
[35532] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ira non dicitur in Deo secundum passionem animi, +sed secundum iudicium iustitiae, prout vult vindictam facere de +peccato. Peccator enim, peccando, Deo nihil nocere effective +potest, tamen ex parte sua dupliciter contra Deum agit. Primo +quidem, inquantum eum in suis mandatis contemnit. Secundo, +inquantum nocumentum aliquod infert alicui, vel sibi vel alteri, +quod ad Deum pertinet, prout ille cui nocumentum infertur, sub Dei +providentia et tutela continetur.
+ Reply to Objection 2: If we are angry with those who harm others, and seek to be avenged on them, it is because those who are injured belong in + some way to us: either by some kinship or friendship, or at least because of the nature we have in common. +
[35533] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod irascimur contra illos qui aliis nocent et vindictam +appetimus, inquantum illi quibus nocetur, aliquo modo ad nos +pertinent, vel per aliquam affinitatem, vel per amicitiam, vel +saltem per communionem naturae.
+ Reply to Objection 3: When we take a very great interest in a thing, we look upon it as our own good; so that if anyone despise it, it seems as + though we ourselves were despised and injured. +
[35534] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod id in quo maxime studemus, reputamus esse bonum +nostrum. Et ideo, cum illud despicitur, reputamus nos quoque +despici, et arbitramur nos laesos.
+ Reply to Objection 4: Silence provokes the insulter to anger when he thinks it is due to contempt, as though his anger were slighted: and a slight + is an action. +
[35535] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod tunc aliquis tacens ad iram provocat iniuriantem, +quando videtur ex contemptu tacere, quasi parvipendat alterius +iram. Ipsa autem parvipensio quidam actus est.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that slight or contempt is not the sole motive of anger. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that we + are angry "when we suffer, or think that we are suffering, an injury." But one may suffer an injury without being despised + or slighted. Therefore a slight is not the only motive of anger. +
[35536] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sola parvipensio vel despectio sit +motivum irae. Dicit enim Damascenus quod iniuriam passi, vel +aestimantes pati, irascimur. Sed homo potest iniuriam pati +etiam absque despectu vel parvipensione. Ergo non sola parvipensio +est irae motivum.
+ Objection 2: Further, desire for honor and grief for a slight belong to the same subject. But dumb animals do not desire honor. Therefore + they are not grieved by being slighted. And yet "they are roused to anger, when wounded," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. + iii, 8). Therefore a slight is not the sole motive of anger. +
[35537] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +eiusdem est appetere honorem, et contristari de parvipensione. Sed +bruta animalia non appetunt honorem. Ergo non contristantur de +parvipensione. Et tamen in eis provocatur ira propter hoc quod +vulnerantur, ut dicit philosophus, in III Ethic. Ergo non sola +parvipensio videtur esse motivum irae.
+ Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 2) gives many other causes of anger, for instance, "being forgotten by others; that others + should rejoice in our misfortunes; that they should make known our evils; being hindered from doing as we like." Therefore + being slighted is not the only motive for being angry. +
[35538] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +philosophus, in II Rhetoric., ponit multas alias causas irae, puta +oblivionem, et exultationem in infortuniis, denuntiationem +malorum, impedimentum consequendae propriae voluntatis. Non +ergo sola parvipensio est provocativum irae.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that anger is "a desire, with sorrow, for vengeance, on account of a seeming slight done + unbecomingly." +
[35539] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod ira est +appetitus cum tristitia punitionis, propter apparentem +parvipensionem non convenienter factam.
+ I answer that, All the causes of anger are reduced to slight. For slight is of three kinds, as stated in Rhet. ii, 2, viz. "contempt," "despiteful + treatment," i.e. hindering one from doing one's will, and "insolence": and all motives of anger are reduced to these three. + Two reasons may be assigned for this. First, because anger seeks another's hurt as being a means of just vengeance: wherefore + it seeks vengeance in so far as it seems just. Now just vengeance is taken only + for that which is done unjustly; hence that which provokes anger is always something considered in the light of an injustice. + Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "men are not angry---if they think they have wronged some one and are suffering + justly on that account; because there is no anger at what is just." Now injury is done to another in three ways: namely, through + ignorance, through passion, and through choice. Then, most of all, a man does an injustice, when he does an injury + from choice, on purpose, or from deliberate malice, as stated in Ethic. v, 8. Wherefore we are most of all angry with those + who, in our opinion, have hurt us on purpose. For if we think that some one has done us an injury through ignorance or through + passion, either we are not angry with them at all, or very much less: since to do anything through ignorance or through passion + takes away from the notion of injury, and to a certain extent calls for mercy and forgiveness. Those, on the other hand, + who do an injury on purpose, seem to sin from contempt; wherefore we are angry with them most of all. Hence the Philosopher + says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "we are either not angry at all, or not very angry with those who have acted through anger, because + they do not seem to have acted slightingly." +
The second reason is because a slight is opposed to a man's excellence: because "men think little of things that are not + worth much ado" (Rhet. ii, 2). Now we seek for some kind of excellence from all our goods. Consequently whatever injury is + inflicted on us, in so far as it is derogatory to our excellence, seems to savor of a slight. +
[35540] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod omnes causae irae reducuntur ad parvipensionem. Sunt +enim tres species parvipensionis, ut dicitur in II Rhetoric., +scilicet despectus, epereasmus, idest impedimentum voluntatis +implendae, et contumeliatio, et ad haec tria omnia motiva irae +reducuntur. Cuius ratio potest accipi duplex. Prima est, quia ira +appetit nocumentum alterius, inquantum habet rationem iusti +vindicativi, et ideo intantum quaerit vindictam, inquantum videtur +esse iusta. Iusta autem vindicta non fit nisi de eo quod est +iniuste factum, et ideo provocativum ad iram semper est aliquid sub +ratione iniusti. Unde dicit philosophus, in II Rhetoric., quod +si homines putaverint eos qui laeserunt, esse iuste passos, non +irascuntur, non enim fit ira ad iustum. Contingit autem +tripliciter nocumentum alicui inferri, scilicet ex ignorantia, ex +passione, et ex electione. Tunc autem aliquis maxime iniustum +facit, quando ex electione vel industria, vel ex certa malitia +nocumentum infert, ut dicitur in V Ethic. Et ideo maxime irascimur +contra illos quos putamus ex industria nobis nocuisse. Si enim +putemus aliquos vel per ignorantiam, vel ex passione nobis +intulisse iniuriam, vel non irascimur contra eos, vel multo minus, +agere enim aliquid ex ignorantia vel ex passione, diminuit rationem +iniuriae, et est quodammodo provocativum misericordiae et veniae. +Illi autem qui ex industria nocumentum inferunt, ex contemptu +peccare videntur, et ideo contra eos maxime irascimur. Unde +philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod his qui propter iram +aliquid fecerunt, aut non irascimur, aut minus irascimur, non enim +propter parvipensionem videntur egisse. Secunda ratio est, quia +parvipensio excellentiae hominis opponitur, quae enim homines +putant nullo digna esse, parvipendunt, ut dicitur in II Rhetoric. +Ex omnibus autem bonis nostris aliquam excellentiam quaerimus. Et +ideo quodcumque nocumentum nobis inferatur, inquantum excellentiae +derogat, videtur ad parvipensionem pertinere.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Any other cause, besides contempt, through which a man suffers an injury, takes away from the notion of injury: contempt + or slight alone adds to the motive of anger, and consequently is of itself the cause of anger. +
[35541] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ex quacumque alia causa aliquis iniuriam +patiatur quam ex contemptu, illa causa minuit rationem iniuriae. +Sed solus contemptus, vel parvipensio, rationem irae auget. Et ideo +est per se causa irascendi.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Although a dumb animal does not seek honor as such, yet it naturally seeks a certain superiority, and is angry with anything + derogatory thereto. +
[35542] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, licet animal brutum non appetat honorem sub ratione +honoris, appetit tamen naturaliter quandam excellentiam, et +irascitur contra ea quae illi excellentiae derogant.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Each of those causes amounts to some kind of slight. Thus forgetfulness is a clear sign of slight esteem, for the more we + think of a thing the more is it fixed in our memory. Again if a man does not hesitate by his remarks to give pain to another, + this seems to show that he thinks little of him: and those too who show signs of hilarity when another is in misfortune, seem + to care little about his good or evil. Again he that hinders another from + carrying out his will, without deriving thereby any profit to himself, seems not to care much for his friendship. Consequently + all those things, in so far as they are signs of contempt, provoke anger. +
[35543] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod omnes illae causae ad quandam parvipensionem +reducuntur. Oblivio enim parvipensionis est evidens signum, ea enim +quae magna aestimamus, magis memoriae infigimus. Similiter ex +quadam parvipensione est quod aliquis non vereatur contristare +aliquem, denuntiando sibi aliqua tristia. Qui etiam in infortuniis +alicuius hilaritatis signa ostendit, videtur parum curare de bono +vel malo eius. Similiter etiam qui impedit aliquem a sui propositi +assecutione, non propter aliquam utilitatem sibi inde provenientem, +non videtur multum curare de amicitia eius. Et ideo omnia talia, +inquantum sunt signa contemptus, sunt provocativa irae.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that a man's excellence is not the cause of his being more easily angry. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, + 2) that "some are angry especially when they are grieved, for instance, the sick, the poor, and those who are disappointed." + But these things seem to pertain to defect. Therefore defect rather than excellence makes one prone to anger. +
[35544] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod excellentia alicuius non sit causa +quod facilius irascatur. Dicit enim philosophus, in II Rhetoric., +quod maxime aliqui irascuntur cum tristantur, ut infirmi, et +egentes, et qui non habent id quod concupiscunt. Sed omnia ista +ad defectum pertinere videntur. Ergo magis facit pronum ad iram +defectus quam excellentia.
+ Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "some are very much inclined to be angry when they are despised for some + failing or weakness of the existence of which there are grounds for suspicion; but if they think they excel in those points, + they do not trouble." But a suspicion of this kind is due to some defect. Therefore defect rather than excellence is a cause + of a man being angry. +
[35545] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +philosophus dicit ibidem quod tunc aliqui maxime irascuntur, +quando in eis despicitur id de quo potest esse suspicio quod vel +non insit eis, vel quod insit eis debiliter, sed cum putant se +multum excellere in illis in quibus despiciuntur, non curant. +Sed praedicta suspicio ex defectu provenit. Ergo defectus est magis +causa quod aliquis irascatur, quam excellentia.
+ Objection 3: Further, whatever savors of excellence makes a man agreeable and hopeful. But the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "men + are not angry when they play, make jokes, or take part in a feast, nor when they are prosperous or successful, nor in moderate + pleasures and well-founded hope." Therefore excellence is not a cause of anger. +
[35546] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +ea quae ad excellentiam pertinent, maxime faciunt homines iucundos +et bonae spei esse. Sed philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod +in ludo, in risu, in festo, in prosperitate, in consummatione +operum, in delectatione non turpi, et in spe optima, homines non +irascuntur. Ergo excellentia non est causa irae.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9) that excellence makes men prone to anger. +
[35547] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus, in eodem libro, dicit quod homines propter +excellentiam indignantur.
+ I answer that, The cause of anger, in the man who is angry, may be taken in two ways. First in respect of the motive of anger: and thus + excellence is the cause of a man being easily angered. Because the motive of anger is an unjust slight, as stated above + (A[2]). Now it is evident that the more excellent a man is, the more unjust is a slight offered him in the matter in which he excels. + Consequently those who excel in any matter, are most of all + angry, if they be slighted in that matter; for instance, a wealthy man in his riches, or an orator in his eloquence, and so + forth. +
Secondly, the cause of anger, in the man who is angry, may be considered on the part of the disposition produced in him by + the motive aforesaid. Now it is evident that nothing moves a man to anger except a hurt that grieves him: while whatever savors + of defect is above all a cause of grief; since men who suffer from some defect are more easily hurt. And this is why men who + are weak, or subject to some other defect, are more easily angered, since they are more easily grieved. +
[35548] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod causa irae in eo qui irascitur, dupliciter accipi +potest. Uno modo, secundum habitudinem ad motivum irae. Et sic +excellentia est causa ut aliquis de facili irascatur. Est enim +motivum irae iniusta parvipensio, ut dictum est. Constat autem quod +quanto aliquis est excellentior, iniustius parvipenditur in hoc in +quo excellit. Et ideo illi qui sunt in aliqua excellentia, maxime +irascuntur, si parvipendantur, puta si dives parvipenditur in +pecunia, et rhetor in loquendo, et sic de aliis. Alio modo potest +considerari causa irae in eo qui irascitur, ex parte dispositionis +quae in eo relinquitur ex tali motivo. Manifestum est autem quod +nihil movet ad iram, nisi nocumentum quod contristat. Ea autem quae +ad defectum pertinent, maxime sunt contristantia, quia homines +defectibus subiacentes facilius laeduntur. Et ista est causa quare +homines qui sunt infirmi, vel in aliis defectibus, facilius +irascuntur, quia facilius contristantur.
Reply to Objection 1: This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
[35549] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 ad 1 Et per hoc +patet responsio ad primum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: If a man be despised in a matter in which he evidently excels greatly, he does not consider himself the loser thereby, and + therefore is not grieved: and in this respect he is less angered. But in another respect, in so far as he is more undeservedly + despised, he has more reason for being angry: unless perhaps he thinks that he is envied or insulted not through contempt + but through ignorance, or some other like cause. +
[35550] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod ille qui despicitur in eo in quo manifeste multum +excellit, non reputat se aliquam iacturam pati, et ideo non +contristatur, et ex hac parte minus irascitur. Sed ex alia parte, +inquantum indignius despicitur, habet maiorem rationem irascendi. +Nisi forte reputet se non invideri vel subsannari propter +despectum; sed propter ignorantiam, vel propter aliud +huiusmodi.
+ Reply to Objection 3: All these things hinder anger in so far as they hinder sorrow. But in another respect they are naturally apt to provoke anger, + because they make it more unseemly to insult anyone. +
[35551] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod omnia illa impediunt iram, inquantum impediunt +tristitiam. Sed ex alia parte, nata sunt provocare iram, secundum +quod faciunt hominem inconvenientius despici.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that a person's defect is not a reason for being more easily angry with him. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. + ii, 3) that "we are not angry with those who confess and repent and humble themselves; on the contrary, we are gentle with + them. Wherefore dogs bite not those who sit down." But these things savor of littleness and defect. Therefore littleness of + a person is a reason for being less angry with him. +
[35552] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod defectus alicuius non sit causa ut +contra ipsum facilius irascamur. Dicit enim philosophus, in II +Rhetoric., quod his qui confitentur et poenitent et humiliantur, +non irascimur, sed magis ad eos mitescimus. Unde et canes non +mordent eos qui resident. Sed haec pertinent ad parvitatem et +defectum. Ergo parvitas alicuius est causa ut ei minus +irascamur.
+ Objection 2: Further, there is no greater defect than death. But anger ceases at the sight of death. Therefore defect of a person does + not provoke anger against him. +
[35553] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +nullus est maior defectus quam mortis. Sed ad mortuos desinit ira. +Ergo defectus alicuius non est causa provocativa irae contra +ipsum.
+ Objection 3: Further, no one thinks little of a man through his being friendly towards him. But we are more angry with friends, if they + offend us or refuse to help us; hence it is written ( + Ps. 54:13): "If my enemy had reviled me I would verily have borne with it." Therefore a person's defect is not a reason for being more + easily angry with him. +
[35554] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +nullus aestimat aliquem parvum ex hoc quod est sibi amicus. Sed ad +amicos, si nos offenderint, vel si non iuverint, magis offendimur, +unde dicitur in Psalmo LIV, si inimicus meus maledixisset mihi, +sustinuissem utique. Ergo defectus alicuius non est causa ut +contra ipsum facilius irascamur.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "the rich man is angry with the poor man, if the latter despise him; and in like + manner the prince is angry with his subject." +
[35555] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod dives +irascitur contra pauperem, si eum despiciat; et principans contra +subiectum.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + AA[2],3) unmerited contempt more than anything else is a provocative of anger. Consequently deficiency or littleness in the person + with whom we are angry, tends to increase our anger, in so far as it adds to the unmeritedness of being despised. For just + as the higher a man's position is, the more undeservedly he is despised; so the lower it is, the less reason he has for despising. + Thus a nobleman is angry if he be + insulted by a peasant; a wise man, if by a fool; a master, if by a servant. +
If, however, the littleness or deficiency lessens the unmerited contempt, then it does not increase but lessens anger. In + this way those who repent of their ill-deeds, and confess that they have done wrong, who humble themselves and ask pardon, + mitigate anger, according to + Prov. 15:1: "A mild answer breaketh wrath": because, to wit, they seem not to despise, but rather to think much of those before whom + they humble themselves. +
[35556] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, indigna despectio est maxime +provocativa irae. Defectus igitur vel parvitas eius contra quem +irascimur, facit ad augmentum irae, inquantum auget indignam +despectionem. Sicut enim quanto aliquis est maior, tanto indignius +despicitur; ita quanto aliquis est minor, tanto indignius despicit. +Et ideo nobiles irascuntur si despiciantur a rusticis, vel +sapientes ab insipientibus, vel domini a servis. Si vero parvitas +vel defectus diminuat despectionem indignam, talis parvitas non +auget, sed diminuit iram. Et hoc modo illi qui poenitent de +iniuriis factis, et confitentur se male fecisse, et humiliantur et +veniam petunt, mitigant iram, secundum illud Prov. XV, responsio +mollis frangit iram, inquantum scilicet tales videntur non +despicere, sed magis magnipendere eos quibus se humiliant.
Reply to Objection 1: This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
[35557] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 ad 1 Et per hoc +patet responsio ad primum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: There are two reasons why anger ceases at the sight of death. One is because the dead are incapable of sorrow and sensation; + and this is chiefly what the angry seek in those with whom they are angered. Another reason is because the dead seem to have + attained to the limit of evils. Hence anger ceases in regard to all who are grievously hurt, in so far as this hurt surpasses + the measure of just retaliation. +
[35558] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod duplex est causa quare ad mortuos cessat ira. Una, +quia non possunt dolere et sentire, quod maxime quaerunt irati in +his quibus irascuntur. Alio modo, quia iam videntur ad ultimum +malorum pervenisse. Unde etiam ad quoscumque graviter laesos cessat +ira, inquantum eorum malum excedit mensuram iustae +retributionis.
+ Reply to Objection 3: To be despised by one's friends seems also a greater indignity. Consequently if they despise us by hurting or by failing + to help, we are angry with them for the same reason for which we are angry with those who are beneath us. +
[35559] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod etiam despectio quae est ab amicis, videtur esse +magis indigna. Et ideo ex simili causa magis irascimur contra eos, +si despiciant, vel nocendo vel non iuvando, sicut et contra +minores.
We must now consider the effects of anger: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether anger causes pleasure?
(2) Whether above all it causes heat in the heart?
+[35560] +Iª-IIae q. 48 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +effectibus irae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum ira +causet delectationem. Secundo, utrum maxime causet fervorem in +corde. Tertio, utrum maxime impediat rationis usum. Quarto, utrum +causet taciturnitatem.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that anger does not cause pleasure. Because sorrow excludes pleasure. But anger is never without sorrow, since, + as stated in Ethic. vii, 6, "everyone that acts from anger, acts with pain." Therefore anger does not cause pleasure. +
[35561] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non causet delectationem. +Tristitia enim delectationem excludit. Sed ira est semper cum +tristitia, quia, ut dicitur in VII Ethic., omnis qui facit +aliquid per iram, facit tristatus. Ergo ira non causat +delectationem.
+ Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "vengeance makes anger to cease, because it substitutes pleasure for pain": + whence we may gather that the angry man derives pleasure from vengeance, and that vengeance quells his anger. Therefore on + the advent of pleasure, anger departs: and consequently anger is not an effect united with pleasure. +
[35562] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod punitio quietat impetum +irae, delectationem pro tristitia faciens, ex quo potest accipi +quod delectatio irato provenit ex punitione, punitio autem excludit +iram. Ergo, adveniente delectatione, ira tollitur. Non est ergo +effectus delectationi coniunctus.
+ Objection 3: Further, no effect hinders its cause, since it is conformed to its cause. But pleasure hinders anger as stated in Rhet. ii, + 3. Therefore pleasure is not an effect of anger. +
[35563] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +nullus effectus impedit causam suam, cum sit suae causae conformis. +Sed delectationes impediunt iram, ut dicitur in II Rhetoric. Ergo +delectatio non est effectus irae.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) quotes the saying that anger is "Sweet to the soul as honey to the taste" (Iliad, xviii, 109 + [trl. Pope]). +
[35564] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus, in eodem libro, inducit proverbium, quod +ira multo dulcior melle distillante in pectoribus virorum +crescit.
+ I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14), pleasures, chiefly sensible and bodily pleasures, are remedies against sorrow: + and therefore the greater the sorrow or anxiety, the more sensible are we to the pleasure which heals it, as is evident in + the case of thirst which increases the pleasure of drink. Now it is clear from what has been said ( + Q[47], AA[1],3), that the movement of anger arises from a wrong done that causes sorrow, for + which sorrow vengeance is sought as a remedy. Consequently as soon as vengeance is present, pleasure ensues, and so much the + greater according as the sorrow was greater. Therefore if vengeance be really present, perfect pleasure ensues, entirely excluding + sorrow, so that the movement of anger ceases. But before vengeance is really present, it becomes present to the angry man + in two ways: in one way, by hope; because none is angry except he hopes for vengeance, as stated above ( + Q[46], A[1]); in another way, by thinking of it continually, for to everyone that desires a thing it is pleasant to dwell on the thought + of what he desires; wherefore the imaginings of dreams are pleasant. Accordingly an angry man takes pleasure in thinking much + about vengeance. This pleasure, however, is not perfect, so as to banish sorrow and consequently anger. +
[35565] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in VII Ethic., +delectationes, maxime sensibiles et corporales, sunt medicinae +quaedam contra tristitiam, et ideo quanto per delectationem contra +maiorem tristitiam vel anxietatem remedium praestatur, tanto +delectatio magis percipitur; sicut patet quod quando aliquis sitit, +delectabilior fit ei potus. Manifestum est autem ex praedictis quod +motus irae insurgit ex aliqua illata iniuria contristante; cui +quidem tristitiae remedium adhibetur per vindictam. Et ideo ad +praesentiam vindictae delectatio sequitur, et tanto maior, quanto +maior fuit tristitia. Si igitur vindicta fuerit praesens realiter, +fit perfecta delectatio, quae totaliter excludit tristitiam, et per +hoc quietat motum irae. Sed antequam vindicta sit praesens +realiter, fit irascenti praesens dupliciter. Uno modo, per spem, +quia nullus irascitur nisi sperans vindictam, ut supra dictum est. +Alio modo, secundum continuam cogitationem. Unicuique enim +concupiscenti est delectabile immorari in cogitatione eorum quae +concupiscit, propter quod etiam imaginationes somniorum sunt +delectabiles. Et ideo, cum iratus multum in animo suo cogitet de +vindicta, ex hoc delectatur. Tamen delectatio non est perfecta, +quae tollat tristitiam, et per consequens iram.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The angry man does not grieve and rejoice at the same thing; he grieves for the wrong done, while he takes pleasure in the + thought and hope of vengeance. Consequently sorrow is to anger as its beginning; while pleasure is the effect or terminus + of anger. +
[35566] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod non de eodem iratus tristatur et gaudet, sed +tristatur de illata iniuria, delectatur autem de vindicta cogitata +et sperata. Unde tristitia se habet ad iram sicut principium, sed +delectatio sicut effectus vel terminus.
+ Reply to Objection 2: This argument holds in regard to pleasure caused by the real presence of vengeance, which banishes anger altogether. +
[35567] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de delectatione quae causatur +ex reali praesentia vindictae, quae totaliter tollit iram.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Pleasure that precedes hinders sorrow from ensuing, and consequently is a hindrance to anger. But pleasure felt in taking + vengeance follows from anger. +
[35568] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod delectationes praecedentes impediunt ne sequatur +tristitia; et per consequens impediunt iram. Sed delectatio de +vindicta consequitur ipsam.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that heat is not above all the effect of anger. For fervor, as stated above ( + Q[28], A[5]; + Q[37], A[2]), belongs to love. But love, as above stated, is the beginning and cause of all the passions. Since then the cause is more + powerful than its effect, it seems that anger is not the chief cause of fervor. +
[35569] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod fervor non sit maxime effectus irae. +Fervor enim, sicut supra dictum est, pertinet ad amorem. Sed amor, +sicut supra dictum est, principium est et causa omnium passionum. +Cum ergo causa sit potior effectu, videtur quod ira non faciat +maxime fervorem.
+ Objection 2: Further, those things which, of themselves, arouse fervor, increase as time goes on; thus love grows stronger the longer + it lasts. But in course of time anger grows weaker; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "time puts an end to anger." + Therefore fervor is not the proper effect of anger. +
[35570] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +illa quae de se excitant fervorem, per temporis assiduitatem magis +augentur, sicut amor diuturnitate convalescit. Sed ira per tractum +temporis debilitatur, dicit enim philosophus, in II Rhetoric., quod +tempus quietat iram. Ergo ira non proprie causat fervorem.
+ Objection 3: Further, fervor added to fervor produces greater fervor. But "the addition of a greater anger banishes already existing anger," + as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3). Therefore anger does not cause fervor. +
[35571] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +fervor additus fervori, augmentat fervorem. Sed maior ira +superveniens facit iram mitescere, ut philosophus dicit, in II +Rhetoric. Ergo ira non causat fervorem.
+ On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that "anger is fervor of the blood around the heart, resulting from an exhalation of + the bile." +
[35572] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Damascenus dicit, quod ira est fervor eius qui circa +cor est sanguinis, ex evaporatione fellis fiens.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + Q[44], A[1]), the bodily transmutation that occurs in the passions of the soul is proportionate to the movement of the appetite. Now + it is evident that every appetite, even the natural appetite, tends with greater force to repel that which is contrary to + it, if it be present: hence we see that hot water freezes harder, as though the cold acted with greater force on the hot object. + Since then the appetitive movement + of anger is caused by some injury inflicted, as by a contrary that is present; it follows that the appetite tends with great + force to repel the injury by the desire of vengeance; and hence ensues great vehemence and impetuosity in the movement of + anger. And because the movement of anger is not one of recoil, which corresponds to the action of cold, but one of prosecution, + which corresponds to the action of heat, the result is that the movement of anger produces fervor of the blood and vital + spirits around the heart, which is the instrument of the soul's passions. And hence it is that, on account of the heart being + so disturbed by anger, those chiefly who are angry betray signs thereof in their outer members. For, as Gregory says (Moral. + v, 30) "the heart that is inflamed with the stings of its own anger beats quick, the body trembles, the tongue stammers, the + countenance takes fire, the eyes grow fierce, they that are well known are not recognized. With the mouth indeed he shapes + a sound, but the understanding knows not what it says." +
[35573] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, corporalis transmutatio quae est +in passionibus animae, proportionatur motui appetitus. Manifestum +est autem quod quilibet appetitus, etiam naturalis, fortius tendit +in id quod est sibi contrarium, si fuerit praesens, unde videmus +quod aqua calefacta magis congelatur, quasi frigido vehementius in +calidum agente. Motus autem appetitivus irae causatur ex aliqua +iniuria illata, sicut ex quodam contrario iniacente. Et ideo +appetitus potissime tendit ad repellendum iniuriam per appetitum +vindictae, et ex hoc sequitur magna vehementia et impetuositas in +motu irae. Et quia motus irae non est per modum retractionis, cui +proportionatur frigus; sed magis per modum insecutionis, cui +proportionatur calor; consequenter fit motus irae causativus +cuiusdam fervoris sanguinis et spirituum circa cor, quod est +instrumentum passionum animae. Et exinde est quod, propter magnam +perturbationem cordis quae est in ira, maxime apparent in iratis +indicia quaedam in exterioribus membris. Ut enim Gregorius dicit, +in V Moral., irae suae stimulis accensum cor palpitat, corpus +tremit, lingua se praepedit, facies ignescit, exasperantur oculi, +et nequaquam recognoscuntur noti, ore quidem clamorem format, sed +sensus quid loquatur, ignorat.
+ Reply to Objection 1: "Love itself is not felt so keenly as in the absence of the beloved," as Augustine observes (De Trin. x, 12). Consequently + when a man suffers from a hurt done to the excellence that he loves, he feels his love thereof the more: the result being + that his heart is moved with greater heat to remove the hindrance to the object of his love; so that anger increases the fervor + of love and makes it to be felt more. +
Nevertheless, the fervor arising from heat differs according as it is to be referred to love or to anger. Because the fervor + of love has a certain sweetness and gentleness; for it tends to the good that one loves: whence it is likened to the warmth + of the air and of the blood. For this reason sanguine temperaments are more inclined to love; and hence the saying that "love + springs from the liver," because of the blood being formed there. On the other hand, the fervor of anger has + a certain bitterness with a tendency to destroy, for it seeks to be avenged on the contrary evil: whence it is likened to + the heat of fire and of the bile, and for this reason Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that it "results from an exhalation + of the bile whence it takes its name {chole}." +
[35574] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod amor ipse non ita sentitur, nisi cum eum +prodit indigentia, ut Augustinus dicit, in X de Trin. Et ideo +quando homo patitur detrimentum amatae excellentiae propter +iniuriam illatam, magis sentitur amor; et ideo ferventius cor +mutatur ad removendum impedimentum rei amatae; ut sic fervor ipse +amoris per iram crescat, et magis sentiatur. Et tamen fervor qui +consequitur calorem, alia ratione pertinet ad amorem, et ad iram. +Nam fervor amoris est cum quadam dulcedine et lenitate, est enim in +bonum amatum. Et ideo assimilatur calori aeris et sanguinis, +propter quod, sanguinei sunt magis amativi; et dicitur quod cogit +amare iecur, in quo fit quaedam generatio sanguinis. Fervor autem +irae est cum amaritudine, ad consumendum, quia tendit ad punitionem +contrarii. Unde assimilatur calori ignis et cholerae, et propter +hoc Damascenus dicit quod procedit ex evaporatione fellis, et +fellea nominatur.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Time, of necessity, weakens all those things, the causes of which are impaired by time. Now it is evident that memory is + weakened by time; for things which happened long ago easily slip from our memory. But anger is caused by the memory of a wrong + done. Consequently the cause of anger is impaired little by little as time goes on, until at length it vanishes altogether. + Moreover a wrong seems greater when it is first felt; and our estimate thereof is + gradually lessened the further the sense of present wrong recedes into the past. The same applies to love, so long as the + cause of love is in the memory alone; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "if a friend's absence lasts long, + it seems to make men forget their friendship." But in the presence of a friend, the cause of friendship is continually being + multiplied by time: wherefore the friendship increases: and the same would apply to anger, were its cause continually + multiplied. +
Nevertheless the very fact that anger soon spends itself proves the strength of its fervor: for as a great fire is soon spent + having burnt up all the fuel; so too anger, by reason of its vehemence, soon dies away. +
[35575] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod omne illud cuius causa per tempus diminuitur, necesse +est quod tempore debilitetur. Manifestum est autem quod memoria +tempore diminuitur, quae enim antiqua sunt, a memoria de facili +excidunt. Ira autem causatur ex memoria iniuriae illatae. Et ideo +causa irae per tempus paulatim diminuitur, quousque totaliter +tollatur. Maior etiam videtur iniuria quando primo sentitur; et +paulatim diminuitur eius aestimatio, secundum quod magis receditur +a praesenti sensu iniuriae. Et similiter etiam est de amore, si +amoris causa remaneat in sola memoria, unde philosophus dicit, in +VIII Ethic., quod si diuturna fiat amici absentia, videtur +amicitiae oblivionem facere. Sed in praesentia amici, semper +per tempus multiplicatur causa amicitiae, et ideo amicitia crescit. +Et similiter esset de ira, si continue multiplicaretur causa +ipsius. Tamen hoc ipsum quod ira cito consumitur, attestatur +vehementi fervori ipsius. Sicut enim ignis magnus cito extinguitur, +consumpta materia; ita etiam ira, propter suam vehementiam, cito +deficit.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Every power that is divided in itself is weakened. Consequently if a man being already angry with one, becomes angry with + another, by this very fact his anger with the former is weakened. Especially is this so if his anger in the second case be + greater: because the wrong done which aroused his former anger, will, in comparison with the second wrong, which is reckoned + greater, seem to be of little or no account. +
[35576] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod omnis virtus divisa in plures partes, diminuitur. Et +ideo quando aliquis iratus alicui, irascitur postmodum alteri, ex +hoc ipso diminuitur ira ad primum. Et praecipue si ad secundum +fuerit maior ira, nam iniuria quae excitavit iram ad primum, +videbitur, comparatione secundae iniuriae, quae aestimatur maior, +esse parva vel nulla.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that anger does not hinder the use of reason. Because that which presupposes an act of reason, does not seem + to hinder the use of reason. But "anger listens to reason," as stated in Ethic. vii, 6. Therefore anger does not hinder reason. +
[35577] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non impediat rationem. Illud enim +quod est cum ratione, non videtur esse rationis impedimentum. Sed +ira est cum ratione, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Ergo ira non impedit +rationem.
+ Objection 2: Further, the more the reason is hindered, the less does a man show his thoughts. But the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) + that "an angry man is not cunning but is open." Therefore anger does not seem to hinder the use of reason, as desire does; + for desire is cunning, as he also states (Ethic. vii, 6.). +
[35578] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +quanto magis impeditur ratio, tanto diminuitur manifestatio. Sed +philosophus dicit in VII Ethic., quod iracundus non est +insidiator, sed manifestus. Ergo ira non videtur impedire usum +rationis, sicut concupiscentia; quae est insidiosa, ut ibidem +dicitur.
+ Objection 3: Further, the judgment of reason becomes more evident by juxtaposition of the contrary: because contraries stand out more + clearly when placed beside one another. But this also increases anger: for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "men are + more angry if they receive unwonted treatment; for instance, honorable men, if they be dishonored": and so forth. Therefore + the same cause increases anger, and facilitates the judgment of reason. Therefore anger does + not hinder the judgment of reason. +
[35579] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +iudicium rationis evidentius fit ex adiunctione contrarii, quia +contraria iuxta se posita magis elucescunt. Sed ex hoc etiam +crescit ira, dicit enim philosophus, in II Rhetoric., quod magis +homines irascuntur, si contraria praeexistunt, sicut honorati si +dehonorentur; et sic de aliis. Ergo ex eodem et ira crescit, et +iudicium rationis adiuvatur. Non ergo ira impedit iudicium +rationis.
+ On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) that anger "withdraws the light of understanding, while by agitating it troubles the mind." +
[35580] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Gregorius dicit, in V Moral., quod ira intelligentiae +lucem subtrahit, cum mentem permovendo confundit.
+ I answer that, Although the mind or reason makes no use of a bodily organ in its proper act, yet, since it needs certain sensitive powers + for the execution of its act, the acts of which powers are hindered when the body is disturbed, it follows of necessity that + any disturbance in the body hinders even the judgment of reason; as is clear in the case of drunkenness or sleep. Now it has + been stated + (A[2]) that anger, above all, causes a bodily + disturbance in the region of the heart, so much as to effect even the outward members. Consequently, of all the passions, + anger is the most manifest obstacle to the judgment of reason, according to + Ps. 30:10: "My eye is troubled with wrath." +
[35581] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod mens vel ratio quamvis non utatur organo corporali in +suo proprio actu; tamen, quia indiget ad sui actum quibusdam +viribus sensitivis, quorum actus impediuntur corpore perturbato; +necesse est quod perturbationes corporales etiam iudicium rationis +impediant, sicut patet in ebrietate et somno. Dictum est autem quod +ira maxime facit perturbationem corporalem circa cor, ita ut etiam +usque ad exteriora membra derivetur. Unde ira, inter ceteras +passiones, manifestius impedit iudicium rationis; secundum illud +Psalmi XXX, conturbatus est in ira oculus meus.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The beginning of anger is in the reason, as regards the appetitive movement, which is the formal element of anger. But the + passion of anger forestalls the perfect judgment of reason, as though it listened but imperfectly to reason, on account of + the commotion of the heat urging to instant action, which commotion is the material element of anger. In this respect it hinders + the judgment of reason. +
[35582] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod a ratione est principium irae, quantum ad motum +appetitivum, qui est formalis in ira. Sed perfectum iudicium +rationis passio irae praeoccupat quasi non perfecte rationem +audiens, propter commotionem caloris velociter impellentis, quae +est materialis in ira. Et quantum ad hoc, impedit iudicium +rationis.
+ Reply to Objection 2: An angry man is said to be open, not because it is clear to him what he ought to do, but because he acts openly, without + thought of hiding himself. This is due partly to the reason being hindered, so as not to discern what should be hidden and + what done openly, nor to devise the means of hiding; and partly to the dilatation of the heart which pertains to magnanimity + which is an effect of anger: wherefore the Philosopher says of the magnanimous man + (Ethic. iv, 3) that "he is open in his hatreds and his friendships . . . and speaks and acts openly." Desire, on the other + hand, is said to lie low and to be cunning, because, in many cases, the pleasurable things that are desired, savor of shame + and voluptuousness, wherein man wishes not to be seen. But in those things that savor of manliness and excellence, such as + matters of vengeance, man seeks to be in the open. +
[35583] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod iracundus dicitur esse manifestus, non quia +manifestum sit sibi quid facere debeat, sed quia manifeste +operatur, non quaerens aliquam occultationem. Quod partim contingit +propter impedimentum rationis, quae non potest discernere quid sit +occultandum et quid manifestandum, nec etiam excogitare occultandi +vias. Partim vero est ex ampliatione cordis, quae pertinet ad +magnanimitatem, quam facit ira, unde et de magnanimo philosophus +dicit, in IV Ethic., quod est manifestus oditor et amator et +manifeste dicit et operatur. Concupiscentia autem dicitur esse +latens et insidiosa, quia, ut plurimum, delectabilia quae +concupiscuntur, habent turpitudinem quandam et mollitiem, in quibus +homo vult latere. In his autem quae sunt virilitatis et +excellentiae, cuiusmodi sunt vindictae, quaerit homo manifestus +esse.
+ Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (ad 1), the movement of anger begins in the reason, wherefore the juxtaposition of one contrary with another + facilitates the judgment of reason, on the same grounds as it increases anger. For when a man who is possessed of honor or + wealth, suffers a loss therein, the loss seems all the greater, both on account of the contrast, and because it was unforeseen. + Consequently it causes greater grief: just as a great good, through being + received unexpectedly, causes greater delight. And in proportion to the increase of the grief that precedes, anger is increased + also. +
[35584] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, motus irae a ratione incipit, et +ideo secundum idem appositio contrarii ad contrarium adiuvat +iudicium rationis, et auget iram. Cum enim aliquis habet honorem +vel divitias, et postea incurrit alicuius detrimentum, illud +detrimentum apparet maius, tum propter vicinitatem contrarii; tum +quia erat inopinatum. Et ideo causat maiorem tristitiam, sicut +etiam magna bona ex inopinato venientia, causant maiorem +delectationem. Et secundum augmentum tristitiae praecedentis, +consequenter augetur et ira.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that anger does not cause taciturnity. Because taciturnity is opposed to speech. But increase in anger conduces + to speech; as is evident from the degrees of anger laid down by Our Lord ( + Mat. 5:22): where He says: "Whosoever is angry with his brother"; and " . . . whosoever shall say to his brother, 'Raca'"; and " . + . . whosoever shall say to his brother, 'Thou fool.'" Therefore anger does not cause taciturnity. +
[35585] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non causet taciturnitatem. +Taciturnitas enim locutioni opponitur. Sed per crementum irae usque +ad locutionem pervenitur, ut patet per gradus irae quos dominus +assignat, Matth. V, dicens, qui irascitur fratri suo; et, qui +dixerit fratri suo, raca; et, qui dixerit fratri suo, fatue. +Ergo ira non causat taciturnitatem.
+ Objection 2: Further, through failing to obey reason, man sometimes breaks out into unbecoming words: hence it is written ( + Prov. 25:28): "As a city that lieth open and is not compassed with walls, so is a man that cannot refrain his own spirit in speaking." + But anger, above all, hinders the judgment of reason, as stated above + (A[3]). Consequently above all it makes one break out into unbecoming words. Therefore it does not + cause taciturnity. +
[35586] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +ex hoc quod custodia rationis deficit, contingit quod homo +prorumpat ad verba inordinata, unde dicitur Prov. XXV, sicut +urbs patens et absque murorum ambitu, ita vir qui non potest +cohibere in loquendo spiritum suum. Sed ira maxime impedit +iudicium rationis, ut dictum est. Ergo facit maxime profluere in +verba inordinata. Non ergo causat taciturnitatem.
+ Objection 3: Further, it is written ( + Mat. 12:34): "Out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh." But anger, above all, causes a disturbance in the heart, as stated + above + (A[2]). Therefore above all it conduces to speech. Therefore it does not cause taciturnity. +
[35587] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +Matth. XII dicitur, ex abundantia cordis os loquitur. Sed per iram +cor maxime perturbatur, ut dictum est. Ergo maxime causat +locutionem. Non ergo causat taciturnitatem.
+ On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) that "when anger does not vent itself outwardly by the lips, inwardly it burns the more fiercely." +
[35588] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Gregorius dicit, in V Moral., quod ira per silentium +clausa, intra mentem vehementius aestuat.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[3]; Q[46], A[4]), anger both follows an act of reason, and hinders the reason: and in both respects it may cause taciturnity. + On the part of the reason, when the judgment of reason prevails so far, that although it does not curb the appetite in its + inordinate desire for vengeance, yet it curbs the tongue from unbridled speech. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v, 30): "Sometimes + when the mind is disturbed, anger, as + if in judgment, commands silence." On the part of the impediment to reason because, as stated above + (A[2]), the disturbance of anger reaches to the outward members, and chiefly to those members which reflect more distinctly the + emotions of the heart, such as the eyes, face and tongue; wherefore, as observed above + (A[2]), "the tongue stammers, the countenance takes fire, the eyes grow fierce." Consequently anger may cause such a disturbance, + that + the tongue is altogether deprived of speech; and taciturnity is the result. +
[35589] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod ira, sicut iam dictum est, et cum ratione est, et +impedit rationem. Et ex utraque parte, potest taciturnitatem +causare. Ex parte quidem rationis, quando iudicium rationis +intantum viget quod, etsi non cohibeat affectum ab inordinato +appetitu vindictae, cohibet tamen linguam ab inordinata locutione. +Unde Gregorius, in V Moral., dicit, aliquando ira perturbato +animo, quasi ex iudicio, silentium indicit. Ex parte vero +impedimenti rationis, quia, sicut dictum est, perturbatio irae +usque ad exteriora membra perducitur; et maxime ad illa membra in +quibus expressius relucet vestigium cordis, sicut in oculis et in +facie et in lingua; unde, sicut dictum est, lingua se praepedit, +facies ignescit, exasperantur oculi. Potest ergo esse tanta +perturbatio irae, quod omnino impediatur lingua ab usu loquendi. Et +tunc sequitur taciturnitas.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Anger sometimes goes so far as to hinder the reason from curbing the tongue: but sometimes it goes yet farther, so as to + paralyze the tongue and other outward members. +
[35590] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod augmentum irae quandoque est usque ad +impediendum rationem a cohibitione linguae. Quandoque autem ultra +procedit, usque ad impediendum motum linguae, et aliorum membrorum +exteriorum.
Reply to Objection 2: And this suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
[35591] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 4 ad 2 Et per hoc +etiam patet solutio ad secundum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The disturbance of the heart may sometimes superabound to the extend that the movements of the outward members are hindered + by the inordinate movement of the heart. Thence ensue taciturnity and immobility of the outward members; and sometimes even + death. If, however, the disturbance be not so great, then "out of the abundance of the heart" thus disturbed, the mouth proceeds + to speak. +
[35592] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod perturbatio cordis quandoque potest superabundare +usque ad hoc, quod per inordinatum motum cordis impediatur motus +exteriorum membrorum. Et tunc causatur taciturnitas, et immobilitas +exteriorum membrorum, et quandoque etiam mors. Si autem non fuerit +tanta perturbatio, tunc ex abundantia perturbationis cordis, +sequitur oris locutio.